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“Is Open-mindedness Necessary for Intellectual Well-being in Education? 
Bringing together Virtue, Knowledge and Well-being 
in Initial Teacher Education”

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ABSTRACT

Is open-mindedness necessary for intellectual well-being in education? To answer this question this thesis draws on Aristotle’s virtue ethics and virtue epistemology. It is argued that in order to understand eudaimonia (well-being) it is necessary to understand phronesis. In this regard, it is implied that in order to understand well-being, it is necessary to understand virtue, thus, well-being needs virtue(s). Just as Aristotelian virtue ethics defends the necessity of virtue(s) for well-being, virtue epistemology defends the priority of intellectual virtues for intellectual well-being. Unlike epistemology, virtue epistemology focuses on how an individual can be a good informant through the cultivation of intellectual virtues. To this end, this thesis proposes an alternative regulative educative virtue epistemology for intellectual well-being in education. In this context, open-mindedness is examined as an intellectual virtue that secures and facilitates other virtues both for individual and collective well-being in education. Bringing together White’s and Nussbaum’s seemingly opposed approaches to well-being, this thesis argues that a better theory of well-being in education must be one that equally combines a collective subjective major-informed desire theory with an individual objective list account of well-being. This account of well-being implies a certain understanding of intellectual open-mindedness. Drawing on Wolff’s and De-Shalit’s novel ideas of ‘secure’ and ‘fertile functioning’ as well as on Roberts’ and Wood’s ‘intellectual functionings’, this thesis proposes a genuine intellectual open-mindedness that is both well-informed, reasonable, and necessary to ‘secure’ and ‘fertile’ ‘intellectual functionings’ for intellectual well-being in education. Throughout the discussion, the thesis asserts that particular attention needs to be paid to the well-being of student teachers. Although it is widely accepted that pupils’ well-being is important, less attention has been given to teachers’ well-being. This thesis argues that teachers’ and pupils’ well-being is inextricably connected and initial teacher education should focus on student teachers’ intellectual well-being as they constitute the future teaching workforce. The implications of how this account of well-being might inform Scottish initial teacher education programmes is addressed.
LAY SUMMARY

This thesis attempts to explore the significance of intellectual well-being in education with a particular focus on the intellectual virtue of open-mindedness. It begins from the general position that well-being needs virtue(s) and then focuses on the concept of intellectual well-being that gives intellectual virtues a primary role as presented in recent epistemological discussions. In this context, it argues that open-mindedness can play a crucial role, because it is a virtue that secures and facilitates all other virtues and thus leads to well-being. Moreover, this thesis examines the concept of well-being in education and mainly focuses on the best known distinction of well-being in education as subjective or objective. It argues that a better theory of well-being in education equally values the subjective and the objective factor. It also argues that well-being in education is significant both from an individual point of view, and a collective point of view, since education is social by definition and thus, an individual approach would be insufficient. In this regard, the thesis specifically addresses a gap in Scottish initial teacher education programmes as it explicitly focuses on student teachers’ well-being, an under addressed area of the research on well-being. In addition to this, the thesis argues for extending Scottish initial teacher education’s focus on student teachers as (future) professionals. It is argued that in teaching, unlike other professions, it is not possible to separate the professional from the personal that is from what kind of person one is. Therefore, here, it is suggested that a specific focus of initial teacher education on student teachers as individuals that are intellectually flourishing and particularly open-minded is necessary both for themselves and for others. The thesis concludes with a brief discussion on how this account of student teachers’ intellectual well-being with a particular focus on the intellectual virtue of open-mindedness might inform Scottish initial teacher education programmes.
DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis has been entirely my own work, any sources of information have been properly cited and it has not been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification.

Christina Mavropoulou
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NOMENCLATURE

AREVEP - Alternative Regulative Educative Virtue Epistemology
BERA - British Education Research Association
CA - Capabilities Approach
CfE - Curriculum for Excellence
CM - Closed-mindedness
GTCS - General Teaching Council Scotland
ITE - Initial Teacher Education
NE - Nicomachean Ethics
NICE - National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence
OECD - Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OM - Open-mindedness
SACR - Scottish Alliance for Children’s Rights
VE - Virtue Ethics
VEP - Virtue Epistemology
WB - Well-being
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I dedicate this thesis

to my beloved husband Dimitrios and our son Ioannis,

to my parents Panagiota and Vasileios and

to my sister Kyriaki.
CHAPTER I

Introduction

I owe to my parents to zein (life) and to my teacher to eu zein (well-being).

(Alexander the Great, in Diogenes Laertius, 1925)

1.1 Background

This phrase, that Alexander the Great was quoted as saying, epitomizes the role of teachers and education in helping pupils live a life worth living. However, what does well-being (thereafter WB) consist in? Is it, for example, wealth, pleasure, fame, among the most popular, that make a life worthwhile when one’s basic needs, such as food and shelter, are met? In this thesis, my understanding of WB is different and it is based upon an understanding of virtue(s). Although my teachers were not as famous as Aristotle, they gave me a good life, because their virtuous life cultivated the ground and broadened my horizons so that I could aim at a life worth living, a virtuous life, and, in this sense, every day is a work in progress, and being a parent and a teacher myself, I want to help both children and teachers to live a good life. Nowadays, at a time of urgent human problems and unjustifiable growing human inequalities all over the world, there is an increasing interest in the concept of WB, particularly as an educational and social ideal (White, 2011) (Nussbaum, 2011). However, I argue that most of the problems are related to a misleading or insufficient understanding of WB both individually and collectively.

Here, I specifically focus on teachers and teaching, because I show that teachers’ and pupils’ WB are inextricably connected, therefore, an equal emphasis should be placed on both. However, I argue that there is a gap in teacher education, because it over-emphasizes pupils’ WB and overlooks the significance of teachers’ WB, both for teachers’ own and then for pupils’ WB. Additionally, I show that teacher education shows a one-sided interest in teachers as professional agents only.
However, I argue that in teaching, unlike other professions, it is not possible to separate the personal from the professional and both aspects are equally important for teachers’ overall WB, which is inseparably connected to pupils’ WB.

To this end, I focus here on an account of WB that relies on a particular account of virtue(s), and then I argue that it is really one virtue that everyone has to have, that is, open-mindedness (thereafter OM). In particular, I draw a parallel to say that OM is a virtue that facilitates other virtues and, therefore it facilitates the acquisition of a person’s “secure” and “fertile functionings” for WB. In this sense, this thesis brings the concept of OM into the concept of WB and contributes both to what we mean by WB and to what we mean by OM.

In this context, I look at an account of WB that relies on an account of virtue(s) and argue that OM is a necessary concept if we want to know about what WB means. To this end, I draw on Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*, because that connection itself is related to Aristotle as he connects the concepts of WB and virtue. In addition, I look at contemporary virtue epistemology which focuses more on intellectual WB and connects that to epistemic virtue(s). In this way, I bring Aristotle and virtue epistemology together as a background to what I believe an account of WB that requires an account of virtue(s) means. I then focus on WB discourse in education. In particular, I examine White’s subjective-collective account of WB and Nussbaum’s objective-individual account of WB. Additionally, I explore Wolff’s and De-Shalit’s concept of WB, which, although it is widely considered to be a development of the CA, there are differences that are relevant here. Last but not least, I hone in on the intellectual virtue of OM, which becomes the link between all those different discourses examined so far that use different terminology. Specifically, I argue that the concept of genuine intellectual OM that is both “reasonable” and “well-informed” is necessary for teachers’ “secure” and “fertile” “intellectual functionings”, i.e. epistemic WB, both for themselves and for pupils’ WB. Hence, before breaking down the argument of the thesis, let me explain, in the following sections, the issues that underlie it.
1.2 Why Teachers’ Well-being Matters

The demand for education quality and particularly teacher quality is almost a platitude. In this regard, there is much discussion about teacher quality, but less discussion, if any at all, about teacher quality in terms of teachers’ WB. This is rather paradoxical and I now attempt to explain why. First, very briefly, I look at the idea of quality and quality in education. Then, I focus on the demand for teacher quality and the fact that high-quality teachers are greatly and positively associated with pupils’ WB. In this context, I argue that in order to have high-quality teachers we have to aim at teachers’ WB and particularly at an account of WB that requires an account of virtue(s).

Nowadays, as Day and Gu (2010) notice, there is growing and continuing concern on the part of governments worldwide about teachers and teacher education quality, raising standards and pupils’ WB. However, although this goal is always stressed in educational institutions at every level, what exactly it means is far from clear. Quality is a multidimensional and slippery concept both theoretically and practically, and thus it is very difficult to define (Garvin, 1998). Aristotle, in his *Categories*, where he classifies basic types of entity, uses the term/category of quality to show what is distinctive of a thing (Studtmann, 2013). According to Peters (1977), a more general use is developed nowadays, with which we are more familiar. Specifically, quality in a normative sense is related to superiority in elements that are regarded as distinctive about the thing in question. For instance, “quality in a knife usually relates to its capacity for cutting” (Peters, 1977, p. 24). However, when we talk about quality in education generally and teacher education in particular, multiple criteria are necessarily involved.

In Scotland, for example, Donaldson (2011), in the major five ideas which underpin his recommendations about teacher education, suggests that “firstly, the quality of teaching and secondly, the quality of leadership are the two most important ways in which school education can realize the high aspirations Scotland has for its young people” (ibid, 2011, p. 2). Although from a different point of view, the English Department for Education (2014) also emphasizes the need to raise the quality of teacher training, teaching and school leadership, and the European
Commission (2007) states that teacher training programmes “must be capable of providing high quality teaching in order to enable European citizens to acquire the knowledge and skills which they will need in their personal and professional lives.”

It is a widely-held view that the basic criterion that determines teacher education quality is its contribution to pupils’ achievement and overall WB. “Research shows that a great difference can be made to children and young people’s accomplishment by high-quality teachers in comparison to those who are not” (Day and Gu, 2010, p. 5). To give an example, high-quality teachers are usually considered to be those who, among other things, are distinguished for resilience, lifelong learning, subject knowledge skills etc. The European Commission (2007) and OECD (2005) additionally note that, according to research reports, teacher quality is crucial for pupils’ learning and is essentially and positively associated with pupils’ achievements. Likewise, Donaldson highlights that “high quality people achieve high quality outcomes for children” (2011, p. 2). Moreover, the McKinsey report (cited by Malm, 2009, p. 78) underlines the fact that “the basic driver of the variation in pupils’ learning in school is teachers and that even in good school systems students do not progress… because they are not exposed to teachers of sufficient quality.” Therefore, it is implied that the basic goal of teacher education is the formation of high-quality teachers and the main criterion for high-quality teachers is their contribution to pupils’ WB. In this sense, teaching can be considered as a helping profession.

However, the above criterion seems paradoxical and incomplete, because “if teaching is considered as a helping profession”, since it aims at helping children, and, “if helping means merely help others and not oneself”, as it seems to be in the case of teaching, “then teaching is not a helping profession” (Higgins, 2011, p. 3). In other words, if teaching is a helping profession, then it also has to help teachers to express their deepest motivations and personal ambitions.

Particularly in teaching, unlike other helping professions, e.g. surgeons, it is impossible to separate teachers’ self-fulfillment from their professional commitments, because teachers are to a large extent professionally concerned with the transformation of persons (pupils) and the transmission of a life worth living,
therefore it is a normal expectation that this is exhibited by those who hold it (Carr, 1993) (Higgins, 2011). Similarly, Day and Gu (2010) emphasize that “who teachers are as persons cannot and should not be separated from who they are and what they do as professionals” (ibid, 2010, p. 5). Malm (2009) also says that it is unnatural and meaningless to separate teachers’ professional and personal lives. In addition, Griffiths and Tann (1992) argue that teachers’ personal theories, that is who they are, should be valued and encouraged to be revealed so that they can be challenged by public theories, then confirmed or rebuilt into practice and thus, “increase the effectiveness of their own professional thinking” (ibid, 1992, p. 82). The educational life as it really is involves

“actions and efforts of thousands of people, all of whom are devoting a considerable part of their lives to it... they find that their own lives are changed by the efforts they are making and each of their individual selves change and are changed by both small and large scale educational developments” (Griffiths, 1993, p. 151)

Besides, Baehr (2013) argues that many teachers follow the profession because they consider teaching to be purposeful work that can give important meaning to their personal and professional lives and that “a worthy educational aim should make sense of the putative purpose and meaning of teaching and learning” (ibid, 2013, p. 253). In this regard, setting teachers’ WB as a goal of teacher education programmes contributes to a better understanding of the purpose and meaning of teaching and learning themselves. Along the same lines, Hansen (2007) suggests that teacher education should operate between two boundaries, that is, “a professional, evidence-based track of what does work and an existential-normative track of how teachers understand themselves in what they are saying and doing” (ibid, 2007, p. 3).

Donaldson (2011, p. 2) also recognizes that “teaching should be seen as both complex and challenging”. And Day and Gu (2014) observe that teaching is a multi-layered relational context both of teachers’ work and of their life and when it is perceived as such, it can produce collective intellectual and emotional excellence for job fulfilment. Additionally, Hamilton (2014) argues that being a teacher is “a

1 It is teachers’ professional duty to contribute to children’s achievement and WB among other things.
complex and multi-faceted role” (ibid, 2014, p. 1) that involves both their personal and professional life and that subject knowledge is a vital characteristic in successful teaching, but it is not sufficient for teaching education needs which also involve knowledge and understanding about “what it is to be an educator” and a “teacher training that is sustained throughout teachers’ working lives” (ibid, 2014, p. 4). In BERA (2014) the idea that being a teacher combines many practical, theoretical, technical skills etc. and that any narrow or simplified view should be avoided is emphasized, as well as the need for a systematic and coherent approach in teacher education (ibid, 2014, p. 8).

Also, teacher education should not only be about how to teach, but about learning how to learn through teaching and about developing practical wisdom (Higgins, 2011). Hence, as Higgins (2011) suggests for education in general, I argue that teacher education should be something “educative that facilitates teachers' flourishing” (ibid, 2011, p. 256). In this sense, I argue that teacher education programmes overlook a crucial factor in terms of quality achievement, which is teachers’ WB. In other words, if we want high-quality teachers who make a difference to pupils’ WB, it is necessary to value both the personal and the professional life of teachers, their WB overall, because pupils’ and teachers’ WB are inextricably connected.

In this context, I argue for an account of teachers’ WB that relies upon an account of virtue(s), and particularly on OM. In specific, I try to define the concept of WB and in order to define WB, I look at the concept of virtue(s) and at what OM means in particular, because I argue that WB and OM are connected. In particular, I argue that OM is a concept and a way of being that is necessary, in terms of conceptual clarification, if we want to know what WB is. I draw a parallel to say that OM is a virtue that facilitates other virtues, and therefore it facilitates the acquisition of teachers’ “secure” and “fertile” “intellectual functionings”, that is, OM facilitates both teachers’ and their pupils’ epistemic WB. Finally, I argue that a way to achieve teachers’ WB is by focusing on their WB early, before they become teachers, particularly in initial teacher education programmes, which is the early foundation for high-quality teachers.
Although we might agree in theory that teachers’ WB matters, in the next section I argue that there are at least two factors, i.e. wealth and power, that have significant negative impact on teachers’ WB in practice and in turn on pupils’ WB. In fact, it is almost a truism that teachers work in difficult and/or bad conditions and many people agree that this is negative and that much more attention and help should be given to them. However, what may not be so obvious is that profit-seeking (wealth) and political power are two factors that can involve the notion of corruption, which entails impairment of virtue(s), therefore, wealth and power become part of a “corrosive disadvantage” to teachers that over time increasingly hinder teachers’ ability to be good teachers because they negatively affect their WB and then, unavoidably, hinder pupils’ WB, since they are inseparably connected as I argued earlier.

1.3 Threats to Teachers’ Well-being: Profit-seeking and Political Power

To be more specific, it is necessary to clarify what profit-seeking and political power stand for in this chapter. The former relates to economic benefits as an essential aim, whilst the latter concerns governmental interventions and political expediencies, which are totally different from Aristotle’s perception of politics as the development of virtue(s). Generally, if wealth and power by definition encompass the dynamic of corruption, as Girling (1997) argues, and if by corruption we basically and generally mean the impairment of virtue in terms of changing from good to bad and doing wrong (Merriam-Webster dictionary, 2014), unrighteousness and wrongdoing (Oxford Dictionary, 2016), or bad as opposed to good (Cambridge Dictionary, 2014), then profit-seeking and political power constitute two dynamic factors that entail corruption and thus destroy virtue(s). In this sense, they unavoidably also destroy WB since the account of WB that this thesis argues for is based on an account of virtues. In particular, Girling (1997) observes that

“Corruption is the illegitimate reminder of the values of the market place that everything can be bought and sold, which in the age of capitalism increasingly, even legitimately, permeate political and social spheres... Corruption is the symptom, not...”

2 I use also the terms wealth and power interchangeably with profit-seeking and political power respectively.
the disease. The disease is the predicament of our time: the frustrated popular yearning for the good society” (Girling, 1997, p. ix).

We can see ways of how profit-seeking and political power are involved with one another and with formal education and how these relationships negatively affect teachers’ WB that is based on virtue(s). Peters (1977) argues that politicians and economists may tend to look on educational institutions and programmes in an instrumental way, because they are particularly interested in achieving the right amount of effectively trained workforce. From this point of view, quality in education differs greatly from quality in the context of WB and virtues as examined by this thesis that equally values individual and collective WB, because it is only related to its instrumental value, i.e. the ability to provide training relative to the places to be occupied and the ability to select the right workforce for these places (Peters, 1977). In this sense, the merely instrumental view of education, and accordingly of teacher education as a vital part of education in general, that politicians and economists tend to adopt, results in a mere concern about posts to be filled to which the workforce must be adjusted.

Similarly, Macfarlane (2012) observes that “in this brave new world values are threatened, students have become customers and lecturers are treated as service providers and knowledge entrepreneurs” (ibid, 2012, p. 578). Therefore, there is a need for direct influence on the part of philosophers of education through “participation in policy and parliamentary committees, in think-tanks and lobbying groups” as well as partnerships across all sectors of educational research (Macfarlane, 2012, p. 578). What is worrying, according to Biesta (2012), is not so much the idea of teachers’ professional development per se, but the fact that it is viewed unilaterally in terms of technical skills and scientific knowledge, which in turn monopolize the theory and practice of teaching and teacher education. To give an example, in the communication of the European Commission Improving the Quality of Teacher Education (2007), as well as in the OECD report Teachers Matter: Attracting, Developing and Retaining Effective Teachers (2005), we find an exclusive focus on teachers’ development concerning subject-knowledge and skills in order to be competitive in labour markets. No other alternatives, visions or suggestions are implied or proposed at all.
In this sense, these reports appear to articulate and promote one dominant way of thinking and doing in teaching and teacher education, i.e. to achieve high scores in international league tables and measurements, which appears to be interconnected with profit-seeking and political power. In particular, Papastephanou and Roth (2012) note that “the idea seems to be that standardization and testing… to underpin competition… will improve the quality of education” including teacher education (ibid, 2012, p. 188). However, “the suggested connection between competition and improved quality of education is not necessarily true or correct… it is likely a political vision that highlights the need and value of making the relationship between education and the job market stronger” (Papastephanou and Roth, 2012, p. 188). Any other alternative ways and/or views run the risk either of “being left behind” or of “ending up at the bottom end of the league table” (Biesta, 2012 p. 9). However, the concept of change, which is a *sine qua non* in education, by definition encompasses, among other things, the element of the unexplored, and thus it entails risk(s). As Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) argue, however, not all risks are bad.

As I elaborate in Chapter 5, there are particular kinds of “risk(s)” that are embedded in the concept of “disadvantage” which works against WB. In this context, I argue that profit-seeking and political power form a part of such “corrosive disadvantage” to the particular account of teachers’ WB that is based on virtue(s) and then to pupils’ WB. Also, the notion of standardized-mindedness that I introduce in Chapter 6, unlike OM, is related to people who uncritically align themselves with such dominant yet “corrosive” standards in teaching and education in general. From another point of view, BERA (2014) stresses the significance of dialogue and of taking reciprocal risks in terms of giving teachers the opportunity to learn and explore why things work or do not work in several contexts. In this regard, I argue that the virtue of OM can play a crucial role, as it by definition entails, among other things, a serious engagement in dialogue, and helps one to be resilient and adaptable (Hare, 2006).

Furthermore, Griffiths (personal communication, April 2014) emphasizes that national policies are significantly influenced and constrained by global trends, especially globalization and neo-liberalism, which seem to be the whole or part of the ‘disease’ because of their explicit connections to profit-seeking and political
power, and teacher education does not constitute an exemption. Oancea and Orchard (2012) also note that typically philosophical concerns such as “what knowledge, values, dispositions and skills do teachers need to educate others well? Do teachers need to be good people, and if so, in what sense? How can teacher education and policy help foster and develop these abilities and the conditions in which they can be exercised?” remain rather unexplored in policy debates about teacher education (ibid, 2012, p. 580). Likewise, Biesta (2012) argues that the key question in teacher education should be “how to become educationally wise”, not how to become scientifically competent and skilled at the top of worldwide league tables through testing and measurements (ibid, 2012, p. 8). He also notes that governments should not “turn their attention to teacher education in order to establish total control over the educational system”, but they should specifically focus on the formation of the entire individual towards educational wisdom (Biesta, 2012, p. 8).

For example, in Scotland, as well as in most parts of Europe nowadays, unlike England and the USA, the provision of teacher education is mainly and increasingly undertaken by the university sector3 (Menter, 2011) (Hulme and Menter, 2011) (O’Brien, 2012) (Menter, Brisard and Smith, 2006) (BERA, 2014). Specifically, Donaldson (2011) stresses the significance of research-oriented professional skills and knowledge in teaching. He also argues that “the school experience should be designed along with the university experience to allow reflection on practice and its interpretation in ways which bring theoretical and research perspectives to bear in relation to actual experience” (Donaldson, 2011, p. 7). Moreover, Oancea and Orchard (2012) highlight the need for teacher education

3 Unlike others who are strongly dissatisfied with the university-based component of teacher training (e.g. Woodhead cited in Oancea, 2014) or situations where the “value of research in teacher education has diminished over years” (BERA, 2014, p. 6), I am in favour of the taking up of teacher education by universities, because higher institutions (should) provide overall higher quality. Besides, there is much debate relating to research v. practice, practical knowledge v. academic knowledge etc. (Oancea, 2014). In my view, all kinds of teachers, i.e. teachers, student teachers and teacher educators, should share most of the characteristics of their training. However, due to the particular nature of their working environments, teacher educators should be more research-oriented and less school-practising, whilst teachers should perhaps be more school-practising and less research-oriented (Edmond and Hayler, 2013) and student teachers should be somewhere in the middle as they are neither qualified teachers (yet) - though learning to be them - nor teacher educators. However, I believe that anyone should be in a position to experience and have an understanding of the different working environments and particular elements, so as to be realistic and adaptable to change, as change is intertwined with education environments (Kosnik, Cleovoulou, Fletcher, Harris, MacGlynn-Stewart and Beck, 2011).
partnership models. Similarly, Donaldson (2011) talks about “joint appointments between schools and universities… i.e. hub school partnerships… that should be pursued with research as an integral part… rather than as something which sits apart” (ibid, 2011, p. 8). The idea of partnerships is quite significant in social terms, because, although it maintains a distance from a mere individualistic perspective, it values, as this thesis does, the importance of collective factor(s) for WB in education, without in any way overlooking individuals. However, the “universitisation of teacher education” (Menter et al., 2006, p. 78) and its practical turn through the focus on research development and the establishment of standards (Furlong and Lawn, 2010) may have led to Scottish teacher education “struggling to survive within the competitive environment of the modern university” (Menter, 2011, p. 297) (Christie, 2008).

In particular, Pring (1998 cited by Oancea, 2014) implies that universities seem to be under attack from government(s) which aim(s) at taking over control of teacher education. Likewise, Humes (2011) notes that “teacher education institutions in Scotland… when told to jump by government, they simply ask, how high?” (ibid, 2011, p. 9). In contrast to this, Oancea (2014) suggests that all teachers should be “powerful participants in constructing the publicly visible accounts of their professional knowledge, its nature and significance and the best ways to cultivate it” (ibid, 2014, p. 7). From my perspective, neither the focus on research excellence nor the introduction of standards in teacher education is reprehensible. Perhaps they are symptoms of “either increased managerialism in higher education across the UK... and an effort to raise institutions’ positions in international league tables or both research excellence and standards aim at the flourishing of teaching profession and of its leadership... in an increasingly fast-changing, complex and challenging national and global environment” (Menter, 2011, p. 295) (Donaldson, 2011, p. 82)

Also, indicative of the current status of financial-oriented education is PISA’s Results on Students and Money Report (2012), in which pupils’ performance in financial literacy and their access to money are examined as well as their experience with financial issues. In this regard, the former tends to prevail over the latter and
this is unsurprising, if “competitiveness” and “managerialism”, among other market environment terms at whose heart lie profit-seeking and political power, are used to describe the aims and objectives of educational institutions and teacher education in particular.

Additionally, according to the Universities Scotland report (2014), 51% of the income of Scottish higher education institutions in 2006 came from core public funding, i.e. the Scottish Government was the majority shareholder of university funding, which unavoidably involves political interests and motives. Particularly, Sinclair Goodlad (cited by Macfarlane, 2012) identified sponsorism as one of the heresies of academic life. Likewise, Grant and Zeichner (1984) argue that “there is not such a thing as a neutral educational activity” as it is necessarily linked to the external economic, political and social order (ibid, 1984, p. 112). In the 1970s funding for universities was 80% public and only 20% came from other sources. Nowadays, almost half of institutions funding comes from tuition fees, research contracts and consultancy. (Universities Scotland Report, 2014). However, as O’Brien (2012) stresses “at a time of recession, finance may prove the ultimate stumbling block to the implementation of any proposed reform in education” (ibid, 2012, p. 46). Similarly, I argue that profit and political power are not only “stumbling blocks” but part of a “corrosive disadvantage” which increasingly hinder teachers’ ability to be good teachers because it has “corrosive” negative effects on their WB and then on pupils’ WB.

Although, as I argue, profit-seeking and political power appear to be part of a “corrosive disadvantage” to teachers’ WB, suggesting a prohibition of their involvement in teacher education and in education generally would, I think, be unrealistic. Hence, if markets and state represent profit-seeking and political power, we can say that the more they are involved in teacher education, the more they hinder teachers’ WB that is based on an account of virtue(s). Having said that, I do not suggest that the market and the state should not be involved in teacher education at all, because from another point of view, state funding is necessary for sustaining and developing teacher education programmes and political involvement is inevitable if a goal of education is the formation of good citizens. However, I think it is necessary
and realistic that their involvement be subject to conditions and control, so that they do not impede teachers’ and then pupils’ WB.

From another point of view, teachers’ WB is not only highly and positively associated with pupils’ WB, but it can also contribute to the economy and prosperity of a nation generally (Griffiths, personal communication, April 2014). Similarly, Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) imply that the more one gets from one’s education the more one gives and takes “advantage of a growing economy” (ibid, 2007, p. 144). In this regard, the more teachers get from teacher education programmes, the more they can contribute to the economy and national prosperity, and thus everyone, individually and collectively, can flourish. Especially nowadays, the economy and politics are equally accountable for the determination and achievement of educational goals, because they either facilitate the ground towards WB or, by being part of a “corrosive disadvantage” in the case of profit-seeking and political power, as argued above, they hinder teachers’ WB both individually and socially. Hence, nowadays, when voices such as those who proclaim that “the persistence and expectation of peace is responsible for slow-growth… and a focus on war improves a nation’s longer-run prospects” (Leonhardt, 2014) become increasingly popular, the significance of an account of WB that is based on an account of virtue(s) and equally values both individual and collective WB, as I argue in this thesis, seems timely and urgent.

1.4 Chapter Aims

So far, on the one hand, I have argued that teachers’ WB matters because it is inseparably intertwined with pupils’ WB and also, it necessarily consists in both their personal and their professional life. On the other hand, I have argued that profit-seeking and political power are part of a “corrosive disadvantage”, since over time they are two factors that increasingly hinder teachers’ ability to be good teachers because they negatively affect their WB and in turn pupils’ WB. In this section, I will show how the argument unfolds within each chapter. As I previously said, my understanding of WB relies on a particular understanding of virtue(s). In order to make the connection between WB and virtue(s), first, I draw upon Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*. Second, I rely on virtue epistemology (thereafter VEP) because
VEP specifically focuses on intellectual WB and connects that to intellectual virtue(s). In this regard, I am bringing the ancient Aristotelian virtue ethics and the contemporary VEP together as a background to what I think of as an account of WB that requires a particular account of virtue(s). In the VEP context, I imply that OM, in particular, is an intellectual virtue necessary, in terms of conceptual clarification, for intellectual WB, because it facilitates all other virtues, therefore, it facilitates “secure” and “fertile” “intellectual functionings” that is epistemic WB. This, however, becomes obvious when I put it in the context of WB discourse in education, and then OM becomes the link between these different discourses which use different terminology. Thus, let me explain how the argument unfolds in the chapters of the thesis.

In Chapter 2, in order to make the connection between WB and virtue(s), I look at the *Nicomachean Ethics*, since this connection in itself is related to Aristotle. Aristotle’s aim is the determination of *arete* (virtue) and *agathon* (good) as the means to accomplish the highest of all goods achievable by action, i.e. *eudaimonia* (WB) (Kraut, 2014). In this regard, he proceeds by considering what is ultimately essential to humans, i.e. WB, and explores ways that the answers can be found, specifically through the examination of the concept of virtue.

According to Aristotle, *eudaimonia* (WB) consists in the activity of the rational part of human beings’ *psyche* (soul) in accordance with *arete* (virtue). As Aristotle claims, the most characteristic good of human beings is their capacity to use reason and to use reason well, i.e. in accordance with virtue, in a lifetime; this is what WB consists in. Virtue is necessary in order to do anything well and it means human goodness and excellence of any kind (Liddell and Scott, 2011) and is what makes a human being good (Barnes, 2000). However, Aristotle does not exactly identify WB with virtue; he argues that “to virtue belongs virtuous activity” (Aristotle, NE 1098b31). If WB means to live well during one’s entire life, this in turn means not just being in a certain state, but also acting in a certain way. Therefore, WB appears to be a virtuous activity in a lifetime and virtuous activities appear as the realization of the virtues that belong to the rational 4 part of human

4 The part of the soul where the ability to reason belongs.
beings’ soul. Aristotle maintains that engagement in virtue(s) entails participation in WB and vice versa.

Aristotle claims that most people cannot be entirely mistaken, therefore he starts his investigation by looking at endoxa, i.e. any received opinions which are held by everyone or at least by most people, as well as those held by the wise, and then he critically assesses these views. Aristotle recognizes three kinds of human activity, namely (i) theoria, i.e. contemplative activity (Aristotle, NE 1177a17), (ii) praxis, i.e. activity related to matters of human conduct such as ethics and politics (Aristotle, NE 1178a10) and (iii) poiesis, i.e. productive activity and argues that praxis is the best human activity, a kind of WB that, unlike poiesis and theoria, is both virtuous and feasible.

In particular, praxis is human activity in the realm of the contingent, which we seek to affect by our actions (Knight, 2007), and it focuses on virtuous action that contributes directly to one’s own WB rather than serving ends determined by others. It is “a life of informed, virtuous activity that encompasses specific criteria such as both the individual’s and others’ WB” (Siegler, 1967, p. 31). Additionally, according to Aristotle, praxis is the “life in accordance with the other kind of virtue” (Aristotle, NE 1178a9-10). Particularly, according to a widely-held view, this virtue is phronesis, i.e. practical wisdom, which is the highest virtue of the mind when one deals with practical issues (Hughes, 2001). Therefore, in order to understand eudaimonia (WB) it is necessary to understand phronesis (virtue). Also, Aristotle argues that virtue reveals itself in action, however, virtue is not found in the action itself, but in the agent, thus, an action is not virtuous in its own right but due to the agent who performs it.

Moreover, Aristotle describes arete (virtue) as hexis, i.e. as a state of character which involves one’s dispositions in relation to what one feels, how one thinks and reacts, what choices one makes and what actions one performs and all these in different situations (Aristotle, NE 1105b19) (Aristotle, NE 1106a12) (Lacewing, 2016). Similarly, the virtue of OM here is mainly considered to be a character trait of this kind. However, Aristotle says that it is also necessary to clarify
what sort of state of character virtue is (Aristotle, NE 1106a14-15). To this end, he looks into the concept of *meson*, i.e. the doctrine of the mean.

Aristotle argues that “virtue is a kind of *mesotes*, since virtue aims at what *meson* is” (Aristotle, NE 1106b29) and elsewhere that “*meson* preserves the goodness” (Aristotle, NE 1106b12). Specifically, *meson* is “to feel at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way, what is both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of virtue” (Aristotle, NE 1106b20). This implies that the concept of *meson* is inextricably connected with the concept of virtue. Open-mindedness, as I argue in this thesis, is a virtue, therefore, OM, among others, is related to the concept *meson*. Specifically, if OM consists in the “willingness and within limits ability to transcend a default cognitive standpoint in order to take up or take seriously the merits of a distinct cognitive standpoint and… when it is necessary to adjust one’s beliefs or confidence levels according to the outcome of their rational assessment” (Baehr, 2011, p. 154), then it could be argued that OM aims at *meson*. It can also be maintained that OM is preserved by *meson*, so that one’s “brains neither fall out” nor does one “take one’s own ideas to be obvious, universal and thus, unquestionable” (Riggs, 2010, pp. 178, 184).

Also, Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of *mesa* and he particularly talks about the *meson* that is relative to the person and the *meson* that is relative to the object. The *meson* that is relative to us is “to feel at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way, what is both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of virtue” (Aristotle, NE 1106b20). Therefore, OM appears to share an additional characteristic with the concept of *meson*, i.e. they are both agent-oriented and relative to the individual. According to Aristotle *meson* is determined by reason (Aristotle, NE 1138b20), thus, it involves rational thinking and is intellectually significant. The main difference between the two kinds of *meson* is that the *meson* relative to us varies and depends on persons, activities and aims, and involves the idea of *prohairesis* (choice). Along the same lines, I argue that the account of WB that this thesis defends involves the characteristics of one’s desire and choice, which “is deliberate desire of things in our power…” (Aristotle, NE 1113a10).
However, are there any experts able to determine *meson*? Aristotle argues that the *phronimos* man, who is distinguished for their “*phronesis*, the reasoned and true state of capacity to act with regard to virtue” (Aristotle, NE 1140b20), is able to determine *meson* in any case (Bostock, 2000). If WB is a virtuous activity in a lifetime and virtuous activities are the realization of virtues that belong to the rational \(^5\) part of human beings’ soul, then *phronesis* is necessary for being virtuous. Thus, according to a certain understanding, being *phronimos* and virtuous is exactly the same, since a *phronimos* man has the same knowledge and desires as a virtuous man and in *phronesis* reason and desire are united (Moss, 2011) (Rorty, 1980). Hence, it is obvious that in Aristotelian ethics the concepts of WB and virtue are strongly connected with one another and also with the concept of *meson* which appears to be a criterion for both.

In Chapter 3, I again look at the connection between WB and virtues, but this time from the perspective of VEP, which particularly focuses on the concept of intellectual WB and intellectual virtue(s). Virtue epistemology is a collection of contemporary approaches to epistemology, i.e. the theory of knowledge, which gives intellectual or epistemic virtues a primary and essential role for WB (Baehr, 2004) (Baehr, 2011). Virtue epistemologists argue that one’s true belief should be obtained by virtue of one’s epistemic activity, therefore, instead of focusing on what the agent knows, VEP turns its focus on the agent per se. In this regard, the central question that VEP raises, and its roots go back to Aristotle, is what it is to be a good knower rather than what knowledge is (Kotzee, 2013). Virtue epistemology places the individual in the centre and investigates how one can form beliefs in order to achieve credit for them and how an individual’s characteristics can support justification for their beliefs. In this respect, VEP becomes an essential tool, because it focuses on the individual’s traits per se as well as how one can be a good knower through the cultivation of one’s intellectual virtues for WB.

As in Aristotelian ethics, a virtue considered to be an excellence, in VEP an intellectual or epistemic virtue, is an intellectual excellence that aims at intellectual WB. Epistemic virtues in VEP have a general two-tier structure. Specifically, at a

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\(^5\) The part where the ability of reason belongs.
primary motivational level, all epistemic virtues involve a kind of love for epistemic goods. An intellectually excellent (or intellectually virtuous) person is someone who desires and pursues epistemic goods such as knowledge and understanding. In this regard, the explicit orientation of VEP towards epistemic goods distinguishes the virtues examined in this field from moral virtues, which are explored in other areas such as in virtue ethics (Blackburn, 2001) (Baehr, 2013). Additionally, although epistemic virtues share a common motivational basis, i.e. the love of epistemic goods, each virtue alone seems to present its own distinctive activity or psychology which is grounded on that love of epistemic goods. For example, an open-minded person is willing to examine alternative views, because he/she recognizes that in doing so it is easier to accurately understand those views and approach the matter under investigation pluralistically (Baehr, 2013).

Beyond this common ground that virtue epistemologists share, there is a dispute in relation to the relationship between intellectual and moral virtues. In this chapter, I clarify that I particularly focus on intellectual virtues as excellences and human characteristics which explicitly aim at epistemic goods such as knowledge and understanding. In addition, virtue epistemologists disagree about the nature of intellectual virtues. Here, I emphasize that disagreements over the nature of intellectual virtues may be pointless and harmful, because, as Battaly (2008) argues, a perfect account of VEP should include both virtues as faculties and virtues as character traits, e.g. a good knower in order to reach an epistemic good, let us say understanding, obviously needs both a good memory and persistence (Baehr, 2006). In other words, a person’s persistence in achieving understanding seems pointless without their good memory, and vice versa.

However, in this chapter, I mainly argue for a character-based, moderate-autonomous, high-grade account of VEP, which is mainly responsibilist, but is also reliabilist in the sense that a perfect account of VEP obviously involves to some degree an understanding of virtues as reliable faculties such as sense, perception, induction, deduction and memory, as Battaly (2008) highlights. In this context, I argue for a VEP account that expands outside the area of traditional epistemology and its debates, does not aim at giving robust definitions of knowledge or
justification and also, does not deal with standard epistemological concerns as Kvanvig (2010) and Roberts and Wood (2007) suggest. To this end, I introduce the concept of an alternative regulative educative virtue epistemology (thereafter AREVEP).

The account of VEP that I propose is “alternative”, because it perceives virtues primarily as character traits, but also necessarily as faculties in the sense that for instance, a good informant obviously needs both their good memory and persistence in order to reach an epistemic good (Baehr, 2006). In this regard, it is alternative because it does not explicitly follow either of the two basic approaches, i.e. virtue-responsibilism and virtue-reliabilism. Second, it is “regulative”, because it aims at providing guidance for epistemic practice, that is, how to conduct understanding and what to do when forming beliefs. Additionally, a regulative VEP is strongly practical and social and it is divided into two kinds: a rule-oriented and a habit-oriented, as Kvanvig (2010) and Roberts and Wood (2007) argue.

In this sense, I look at a “habit-oriented regulative” VEP because it attempts to provide training that helps teachers towards what it considers to be right intellectual dispositions (Roberts and Wood, 2007). This conflicts with analytic epistemology, which mainly targets the production of theories of knowledge and explores definitions of the terms under investigation (Wolterstorff cited by Roberts and Wood, 2007, p. 20). Also, it is “educative”, because in this thesis I talk about teachers’ intellectual virtues and WB and a teacher education that aims at it. In this regard, as Higgins (2011) suggests for education in general, the account of VEP I argue for aspires to connect teaching and intellectual virtues and WB, therefore it should be something “educative” that facilitates teachers’ intellectual WB (Higgins, 2011, p. 256). In this context, AREVEP should be used as a tool towards epistemic goods for teachers’ intellectual WB.

My aim in exploring these connections in a VEP context is to contribute to the concept of intellectual virtue and the concept of intellectual WB and particularly, as far as teachers are concerned, to make them excellent intellectual agents, so as to help children be the same. Being a teacher is a complex and multi-faceted role (Hamilton, 2014, p. 1) and as Roberts and Wood (2007) argue, in teaching the
“question is not only technical, e.g. a training in specialized skills, but is also a formation in human excellence and the characteristic products of such a teaching for life are called virtues” (ibid, 2007, p. 64).

In Chapter 4, I look at something different. My aim here is to investigate WB discourse in education. I am doing this because I am specifically interested in teaching and teachers’ WB, which, as I argue in this chapter, is inextricably connected to pupils’ WB. I look at the best-known distinction in WB theories, between “subjective” and “objective” ones, with a particular focus on the “subjective major-informed desire” and “objective list” theories, where the issue at stake is whether something is good for us because we want it or we want something because it is good for us. In this chapter I argue for a combined theory of WB which is objective and also subjective enough to cope with any imbalances. However, this thesis also argues that a similar concern both for the individual and for collective WB in education is vital. That is, both self-interest and concern for others in the educational context should be viewed equally, because education is social by definition and this concept includes not only individual students and groups of children, but also individual teachers and groups of teachers etc. who all interact with one another.

To these ends, first, I explore White’s (2011) account of WB which consists in “successful and whole-hearted engagement in worthwhile activities and relationships” (ibid, 2011, p. 109). According to White (2011), “success” is getting what one wants. However, success in a WB context is related to “desires that are both personally important and well-informed” and to be well-informed means, among other things, to know one’s various options for WB, that is, to be autonomous (White, 2011, p. 50) (White, 1991). In this regard, White (2011) points at a kind of education that does not merely map out possible lives ahead, but also gives children lots of experience of what WB means, now and into the future, by inducting them into WB pursuits themselves (White, 2011). Similarly, from the point of view of this thesis, I argue that there is a whole open space for teachers to explore what intellectual WB means, if teacher education programmes help teachers to be open-minded in order to accomplish epistemic goods such as knowledge, acquaintance and understanding, and in this way to induct them into WB pursuits themselves.
Moreover, WB pursuits should be “whole-hearted”, pursuits that children enjoy, and education should help them to experience WB now, while they are children, not in the future or just in their life as adults (White, 2009). However, it is not realistic to experience all kinds of worthwhile pursuits and, to this end, imagination can play a vital role. White (2011) argues that through literature and the arts children may experience all sorts of activities and relationships which it is not possible to experience directly, providing them not just with the relevant knowledge but with feeling(s) as well. In relation to teachers, however, unlike White, I argue that philosophy may be more appropriate in the context of an account of WB that requires an account of virtues.

Additionally, in order to exclude meaningless activities, which may be what one wants and gets, but do not contribute to one’s WB, White (2011) argues that the criterion of “worthwhileness is necessary to WB” (ibid, 2011, p. 58). In this way, White (2011) adds the parameter of objectivity in WB through the element of “worthwhileness”. However, he claims that WB depends on a desire satisfaction condition that is worthwhile for a loose group of people. Specifically, White (2007) argues that human nature alone is not in a position to provide reasons for worthwhile activities and relationships. Although there are not authorities to impose their views, an individual’s WB pursuit has to be compatible with respect for others’ worthwhile pursuits and autonomy. This implies that self-interest and concern for others should be inter-connected and treated with respect for one another, as I argue in this thesis.

In this sense, “worthwhile activities and relationships are not relative to individual preferences”, which means that they are objectively determined (White, 2011, pp. 59, 86) by experts on WB in the same way that art critics are called experts in their fields. Thus, the more “authoritative voices” on what WB consists in are those with an “experience of all kinds of goods” who do not constitute a group of experts, but a loose body of people with “accumulated wisdom” (White, 2002, p. 454). From this point of view, according to White (2011), almost all voices across the population in different contexts and in different degrees can and should participate in the discussion regarding the components of human WB, and the more expert one is the more “authoritative” one’s voice is.
In this context, White (2011) argues that education can play a vital role in distinguishing who exactly can participate in that loose body of people and to what extent. If one of the aims of education is WB, as White suggests, then, because of education, individuals become better-informed in discerning what WB consists in. Similarly, in this thesis, I argue that the virtue of OM is necessary, in terms of conceptual clarification, to any discussions regarding WB, especially in the educational environment, because one of the characteristics of this account of OM, among other things, is its serious engagement in dialogue and its ability to keep dialogue alive and fertile towards WB (Hare, 2006).

In Chapter 5, I still look at WB discourse in education. However, I argue that White’s account of WB is insufficient for the aims of this thesis, because he places too much emphasis on the subjective and collective factors of WB rather than on the objective and individual ones, which in this thesis are considered equally important for WB. For this reason, here, I also examine Nussbaum’s (2011) objective-individual account of WB, which is more objective and individual-oriented than White’s account, but it is subjective and collective enough to confront criticism.

However, it is stressed that there are implications with Nussbaum’s account that are not addressed satisfactorily, which makes her concept of WB rather problematic in relation to the aims of this thesis. Therefore, I argue that it is necessary in terms of conceptual clarification to go beyond Nussbaum’s CA and expand her ideas, especially those related to the concepts of “capabilities” and “functionings” for WB. The best way to do this is through Wolff’s and De-Shalit’s (2007) concepts, which are a development of the CA. I particularly focus on Wolff’s and De-Shalit’s (2007) novel ideas that WB consists in “genuine opportunities for secure functionings”, in promoting “fertile functionings” and in diminishing “corrosive disadvantages”. In this context, I draw a parallel, which I elaborate in the following chapter, and say that OM is an intellectual virtue that facilitates other virtues, therefore it facilitates the acquisition of a person’s “secure” and “fertile” “intellectual functionings” for epistemic WB.

In particular, Nussbaum (2011) develops a theory of WB which consists in ten central capabilities/objective goods that articulate different priorities at both the
personal and the social levels. The concept of capabilities is central to Nussbaum’s account and it is the answer to the basic question of the CA, i.e. what a person is able to do and to be. Specifically, she argues that “capabilities are a set of interrelated opportunities or freedoms created by a combination of a person’s abilities, political, social and economic environment”, which are valuable in themselves, because they entail the notions of “freedom and choice” (Nussbaum, 2011, pp. 20, 25). She talks about three kinds of capabilities and emphasizes that it is among the duties of society to contribute to the development of people’s “capabilities” for their WB, especially through education. In the light of Nussbaum’s (2011) ideas, it could be argued that if teachers’ WB is crucial, as stressed in Chapter 1, then a special emphasis should be given to the development of teachers’ “combined” and “internal capabilities” in order to promote their WB and then pupils’ WB. In other words, teacher education programmes should give teachers the opportunities or freedom, as Nussbaum (2011) suggests, or teach them to be open-minded as I argue in this thesis, to function according to their “internal capabilities” and in this way to help them also to develop their “combined capabilities”.

On the opposite side to “capabilities”, according to Nussbaum (2011), there are “functionings, which are the realization of capabilities” (ibid, 2011, p. 24). However, Nussbaum (2011) argues that in promoting capabilities one is promoting freedom and choice and this is not the same as promoting someone to function, and in this sense, policy should promote “capabilities”, not “functionings”. In particular, she argues that “WB demands a minimum threshold of ten central capabilities which should be protected and promoted by governments so that all people are able to have a dignified and minimally fulfilling life” (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 32).

However, I argue that it is necessary in terms of conceptual clarification to expand Nussbaum’s CA and look at Wolff’s and De-Shalit’s ideas in relation to WB. Like this thesis, Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) mainly focus on “functionings” rather than on “capabilities”. They argue that “the concept of capabilities is too abstract and thus, it should be replaced with the concept of genuine opportunities to secure functionings” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, pp. 37, 74). In this regard, they suggest that a “genuine opportunity” is an opportunity that does not involve undue costs and risk to other functionings (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 80). It is also an opportunity
to do something only if this is reasonable, that is, any costs of doing so are reasonable, depending on the context. Thus, being disadvantaged consists in “lack of genuine opportunities for secure functionings” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 4). In this context, it is crucial that policymakers consider how to provide and secure people’s functionings and not just their capabilities. In Chapter 6 I draw a parallel to say that as in the case of policy and people generally, teacher education should focus on facilitating teachers’ “intellectual functionings” for epistemic WB by teaching teachers to be open-minded.

Moreover, Wolff and De-Shalit (2007), unlike the CA, emphasize how crucial it is for WB not only to achieve a functioning but also to “secure” that “functioning” over time. From this point of view, they argue that it is necessary to look at the concept of “risk” and underline the fact that the “lack of genuine opportunities for secure functionings” usually involves risk to other functionings and therefore to WB (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, pp. 65, 84). Along the same lines, Chapter 6 includes discussion of two cases of anti-OM that entail the idea of risk in some respects, namely standardized-mindedness and closed-mindedness.

However, as Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) note, we need more than to understand the concepts of “risk” and “secure functionings” alone. In addition, it is necessary to look at the phenomenon of “clustering” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 120). Specifically, they observe that functionings “cluster together”, and in this sense, either they produce “corrosive disadvantages” or “fertile functionings”. Whereas the former “affects other functionings in a negative way”, the latter “spreads its good effects over several categories, either directly or by reducing risk to the other functionings” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, pp. 121-122). Regarding “corrosive disadvantages”, Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) notice that there is a significant degree of difficulty in identifying cause(s) behind them, because “causation is not straightforwardly observable” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 136). Also, as far as “fertile functionings” are concerned, they say that it is “difficult to verify beyond doubt fertile functionings, because very little is known” about this concept (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 154).
However, in relation to these difficulties, among other things, and from the perspective of this thesis, I argue that the virtue of OM can play an important role. Specifically, I argue that if in teaching we aim at pupils’ WB and help them be mutatis mutandis as advantaged as possible, then, on the one hand, we should focus on teachers’ “genuine opportunities for secure functionings” that constitute advantages for their WB and facilitate teachers’ “secure” and “fertile functionings”. In parallel, on the other hand, we should try to limit and/or diminish teachers’ exposure to “risks” that constitute “disadvantages” for their WB, such as profit-seeking and political power, as I argue in Chapter 1, and then for pupils’ WB. To this end, in the following chapters, I argue that a way to facilitate teachers’ “secure” and “fertile functionings” is by teaching teachers to be open-minded, whilst standardized-mindedness and closed-mindedness are discussed as two anti-OM cases that hinder teachers’ acquisition of “secure” and “fertile functionings” and therefore hinder teachers’ WB as well as pupils’ WB.

In Chapter 6, I hone in on the intellectual virtue of OM, which becomes the link between those different discourses that use different terminology as examined in the previous chapters. Specifically, I argue that as a virtue that facilitates other virtues, OM facilitates the acquisition of a person’s “secure” and “fertile” “intellectual functionings” for epistemic WB, both one’s own and that of others’. In particular, building upon what we established in Chapter 3 and VEP, I focus on two accounts of OM that appear to be “the most developed in character-based VEP”, that is, Baehr’s (2011) and Riggs’ (2010) accounts of OM (Kwong, 2015, p. 3), which I further enrich by looking at the relationship(s) of OM with strongly-held beliefs and dialogue in the educational context (Adler, 2004) (Hare, 2006).

According to Baehr (2011), OM is a willingness and within limits ability to transcend a default cognitive standpoint in order to take up (seriously) the merits of a distinct cognitive standpoint… and when OM involves rational assessment, it also necessarily involves adjusting one’s beliefs according to the outcome (Baehr, 2011, p. 154). Equally importantly, Baehr (2011) argues that “OM is largely or often a facilitating virtue”, that is, OM is an intellectual virtue that creates the space for other virtues and faculties to achieve their functions, especially by “helping one’s mind to
detach or stay detached from a specific position” (ibid, 2011, p. 157). According to Riggs (2010), OM as an intellectual virtue is descriptive and normative, detailed and applicable to the real world, a personal quality necessary for epistemic WB. In relation to the latter, Riggs (2010) notes, as I argue in Chapter 3, that although virtue-reliabilism and its idea about virtues as faculties seems necessary for an excellent informant, virtue-responsibilism and its agent-oriented concept of virtues as character traits appears more relevant and satisfactory in terms of providing an account of OM.

Moreover, it is common practice among virtue epistemologists to present lists of intellectual virtues and OM is often at the top of these lists (Riggs, 2010). Generally, it appears as a top-of-the list virtue because, although OM has strong ethical aspects, it does not introduce itself as a moral virtue, therefore it seems less controversial. In this thesis, however, OM is significant neither as the most important virtue for intellectual WB, since I do not attempt to rank virtues here, nor as less disputed, because I do not look at the controversial relationship between intellectual and moral virtues. In this chapter I imply that a special characteristic of this account of OM is that all other virtues that aim at intellectual goods and epistemic WB necessarily involve some kind of OM. On the other hand, I argue that “closed-mindedness” (Riggs, 2010) and standardized-mindedness are two anti-OM examples that hinder the way towards epistemic goods and intellectual WB. In this context, I introduce the concept of genuine intellectual OM that is both reasonable and well-informed, and becomes the link between those different discourses discussed in the previous chapters. In this regard, I argue that as OM facilitates other virtues (Baehr, 2011), it also facilitates teachers’ “secure” and “fertile” “intellectual functionings” for both their own and pupils’ epistemic WB (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007) (Roberts and Wood, 2007).

Finally, in Chapter 7, I conclude with some ideas about how the concepts of this thesis can be applied in a real context in Scotland. In particular, since I am talking about teaching, WB and OM, the natural conclusion should be how we are going to get there, therefore, I look at Scottish initial teacher education programmes and briefly discuss directions towards future improvement.
CHAPTER II

Aristotelian Virtue Ethics: Virtues for Well-being

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter from an Aristotelian perspective, I look at an account of WB that requires an account of virtue(s). Although there are various approaches to the concepts of WB and virtue(s), Aristotle’s approach as presented in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (thereafter NE) seems to be one of the best sources of examination of how best to live human life. The Aristotelian concept of *eudaimonia* (WB) is inextricably connected to the concept of *arete* (virtue). In this regard, Aristotle implies that engagement in *arete* (virtue) entails participation in *eudaimonia* (WB) and vice versa. In Aristotelian ethics WB involves a lifetime, the concepts of success and achievement beyond mere contentment and satisfaction as well as external goods to some extent. Aristotle’s account of WB is also intertwined with a person’s choices and it requires rational thinking. Thus, he argues that WB consists in the activity of reason in accordance with virtue. Specifically, according to Aristotle, *eudaimonia* (WB) is a virtuous activity in lifetime and virtuous activities are the realization of the virtues that belong to the rational part of human beings’ psyche (soul).

In this context, Aristotle argues that *praxis* is the best human activity, a kind of *eudaimonia* (WB) that, unlike *poiesis* and *theoria*, is both virtuous and feasible. *Praxis* appears to be a life of informed, virtuous activity concerned both with one’s own *eudaimonia* (WB) and with others’ WB. In *praxis*, *phronesis* is the key intellectual virtue and the practical approach to knowledge, therefore, in order to understand *eudaimonia* it is necessary to understand *phronesis*. In other words, as this thesis argues, in order to understand WB it is necessary to understand virtue, and in this sense, the concept of virtue(s) is necessary to the concept of WB. Additionally, in a *phronimos* person, that is, a person who acquires *phronesis*, reason and desire are united, and although there are not experts in WB, a *phronimos* person can operate as a guide towards WB and virtues.
Moreover, one of the key concepts of *phronesis*, according to Aristotle, is *meson* which appears to provide the criterion for being *phronimos* and thus virtuous and *eudaimon*. *Meson*, according to Aristotle, is to feel at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way, which is the best and is characteristic of virtue. The concept of *meson* is inextricably connected with the concepts of *arete* (virtue) and *eudaimonia* (WB). It involves a person’s *prohairesis* (choice) and rational thinking and it is also agent-oriented and intellectually significant.

In this thesis I also argue that teacher education should focus on teachers’ WB and particularly on an account of WB that is based on an account of virtue(s). In this regard, the concepts of intellectual WB and intellectual virtues are specifically explored in the next chapter from a virtue epistemological perspective. In this context, it is argued in Chapter 6 that teacher education programmes should particularly focus on the intellectual virtue of OM, both for teachers’ intellectual WB and then for pupils’ WB as I argue in the previous chapter.

2.2 The Significance of Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* for the Concepts of Well-being and Virtue(s)

To begin, Aristotle should be read carefully and thoughtfully, with an understanding of the historical, social and political context not as an ally in a modern debate, nonetheless, as one of the best sources of examination of the human ethical condition (Pakaluk, 2005). Almost all of his topics in the NE are central to modern moral philosophy, however, one should read this as a record of work in progress, as lectures to be delivered instead of a finished philosophical work (Hughes, 2001). In this context, the significance of Aristotle’s work seems to be beyond question for two main reasons. On the one hand, his innovative investigation regarding how best to live one’s life concerns any society with rational reflection on human aims over time and, on the other hand, his answers to this investigation about the right and wrong ways to act and feel, as well as the conception of the human good partly based on an understanding of the human nature, are always an inexhaustible source of insight and inspiration (Kraut, 2014) (Crisp, 2000). In addition, as Papastephanou (2010) notes,
“it is possible… to defend the relevance of Aristotle to present-day educational concerns… in fresh and fertile ways” (ibid, 2010, p. 589).

Nevertheless, there are some difficulties regarding Aristotle’s specific background and work that should be taken into consideration when one examines his work. First, it is essential to remember the context in which Aristotle composed the NE. He was writing two and a half millennia ago and was himself a nobleman writing for noblemen in a city-state, with a world view quite different from that of any modern writer (Hughes, 2001). Many of Aristotle’s audience were aiming at making careers in law and politics, and for them it was essential to comprehend what was to be rewarded and punished. Second, Aristotle, like many people of his time, regarded slaves, women and manual workers as inferior and incomplete beings only capable of “listening to the reasoning and acting on the instructions of their male superiors” (Knight, 2007, p. 35).

The NE is a seminal work for the concepts of WB and virtue (Saylor Foundation, 2013). Specifically, the main issue in the NE is the determination of arête (virtue, excellence) and agathon (good) as the means to accomplish the highest of all goods achievable by action, i.e. eudaimonia (well-being, flourishing, happiness, fulfilment) (Kraut, 2014). Aristotle addresses this issue almost in all his works but mostly in his ethical works, Nicomachean Ethics, Eudemian Ethics and Magna Moralia. The first has been recognized according to During (1991) as the most mature of Aristotle’s ethical treatises due to its critical clarity, insightful argument, exquisite mental structure and perhaps some kind of literary style. However, Hughes (2001) argues that the NE may also strike the modern reader as, if not exactly chaotic, rather loosely written. Similarly, Bartlett (2008) implies that Aristotle’s writing is uncommonly complicated and indirect, characterized by oddities such as unnecessary repetitions, long parentheses and self-contradiction.

In any case, the NE is important for the concepts of WB and virtue(s) both from an individual and from a collective point of view, and this interests us here. In

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6 There is much discussion concerning their differences and similarities in organization, content and writing time (Hughes, 2001), even issues of originality (Knight, 2007), which does not concern us here.
particular, it addresses important issues related to the *eudaimon* life and makes brief points about the kind of the community in which people leading such a life hope to function best, i.e. the *polis*. In other words, Aristotle’s aim in the NE is to provide an account of how a good person should live and how society should be structured in order to make such lives possible (Hughes, 2001). It is also a work of practical philosophy in the sense that the purpose of the philosophy is not merely to purvey truth but also to affect action, both personal and social, and in particular, as applied in this thesis, to affect teacher’s WB, and then pupils’ WB, as I argue in Chapter 1, and a teacher education that would be oriented to teachers’ WB (Barnes, 1995). Specifically, Aristotle notes that

“The present inquiry does not aim at theoretical knowledge like the others (for we are inquiring not in order to know what virtue is, but in order to become good, since otherwise our inquiry would have been of no use), we must examine the nature of actions, namely how we ought to do them; for these determine also the nature of the states of character that are produced” (Aristotle, NE 1103b26-31)

In addition, the NE attempts to reply to questions about what an individual should do. In this regard, it proceeds by considering what it is that is ultimately essential to humans, i.e. *eudaimonia* (WB), and explores ways that the answers can be found, e.g. through the examination of *arete* (virtue). However, as Aristotle clarifies, “our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the subject-matter admits of, for precision is not to be sought for alike in all discussions” (Aristotle, NE 1094b13-15).

### 2.2.1 Other Approaches to Well-being and Virtue(s): Plato, consequentialism, Deontology and Various Strands of Virtue Ethics

The Aristotelian account of WB requires an account of virtue(s), however, this is neither the only approach to WB nor a perfect one. Aristotle’s contemporary and teacher, Plato, also maintains a virtue-based account of WB, that is, that *eudaimonia* (WB) is the highest human goal of moral thought and conduct and *arete* (virtues) are the necessary skills and dispositions to accomplish it (Frede, 2013). Nonetheless, as Frede (2013) notices, Plato’s concept of WB is an ideal state

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7 Aristotle elaborates on this in *Politics*, which is considered to be the follow-on work to the NE.
grounded on metaphysical assumptions alienated from ordinary everyday life and bodily pleasures, whilst Plato thinks that virtue is both a necessary and a sufficient element for WB regardless of any external factors. Aristotle, on the other hand, regards WB as something truly realistic. For Aristotle, according to my understanding, theory without practice is not possible for humans to achieve and practice without theory is not WB. Thus, Aristotle aims at an account of human WB that entails both theory and practice, i.e. an account of WB that entails *phronesis*. From one point of view, Aristotle seems to regard virtue as an element that is only necessary to and not sufficient for WB, as he stresses the significance of external conditions for one’s WB. From another point of view, though, Aristotle implies that the virtue of *phronesis*, in particular, is an element both necessary and sufficient for eudaimonia (Moss, 2011). In this chapter, I argue that virtue/*phronesis* is necessary for WB and I leave the problem of sufficiency for future investigation.

Additionally, according to Crisp (2000), virtue ethics are usually challenged by two other major theories, namely consequentialism and deontology. In deontology, as the word itself reveals coming from the Greek *deon* + *logy/logos*, i.e. necessary and science (Oxford Dictionary, 2016), the ultimate aim is what one ought to do instead of what kind of person one is or should be, as in virtue ethics. For example, according to Kant, human beings must act out of duty, and what makes an action right or wrong is the motive of the agent who performs that action (Alexander, 2012). On the other hand, Alexander (2012) observes that consequentialism holds that an action is assessed as wrong or right by the consequences it brings about for many.

Also, both consequentialism and deontology might converge in some practical conclusions with virtue ethics, e.g. one should be just, but the reasons behind their conclusions differ. For instance, Crisp (2000, p. xvii) notices that whereas consequentialism argues that what makes actions just is their producing the largest amount of the overall WB and deontology maintains that what makes actions just is their being in accordance with the law of reason, Aristotelian virtue ethics argue that what makes actions just is their being virtuous. There is also a third combining view. Specifically, Nussbaum (1999) points out that it is confusing to categorize virtue ethics as a third major theory of ethics next to consequentialism and
deontology. In particular, she says that “both Utilitarianism and Kantianism contain treatments of virtue, so virtue ethics cannot be a separate approach in contrast to them” (ibid, 1999, p. 164).

Apart from theories outside virtue ethics, there are also different strands of virtue ethics. In particular, when Anscombe published her seminal work *Modern Moral Philosophy* (1958) as an objection to the central place that modern moral philosophy was giving to the notions of obligation and duty and as a call to return to Aristotle and ancient ethics, back to the notions of virtue, character and WB, many theories and concepts resulted; these were widely known as virtue ethics and all were influenced by Aristotle (Garver, 2006). However, different scholars developed different theories of virtue. For example, Garver (2006) notes, the ethics of care, mainly developed by feminists such as Noddings and Gilligan, is a theory influenced by Aristotle’s virtue ethics, but different from Slote’s agent-based account of virtue ethics, which in turn differs from the eudaimonist account maintained by Hursthouse and the pluralist one developed by Swanton with reference to Nietzsche etc.

In this context, as Athanassoulis (2016) points out, many scholars who whole-heartedly embrace a return to the concept of virtue undertake the task of defining virtue ethics with regard to what it may not be, i.e. how it differs from other normative theories, and avoiding their faults. Among them is Bernard Williams (1985) who makes a significant distinction between the concepts of morality and ethics. He proposes abandoning the idea of morality altogether as too narrow, too limited and over-focused on the notions of obligation and duty. Williams (1985) prefers the terms “ethics instead of morality as a wider concept which encompasses elements that may be rejected as irrelevant by morality such as things that are out of an individual’s control but important for one’s WB whatsoever” (ibid, 1985, p. 6).

Clearly, these topics are huge and worth further investigation within the context of WB and virtue(s), however, the limitations and the particular focus of the present work do not allow further elaboration. In the following sections, I attempt to approach conceptually some key Aristotelian terms and then provide various views on their use and content, because a proper understanding of these is fundamental in

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8 I do not look at the differences between various theories of virtue ethics in this thesis.
the investigation of Aristotle’s argument, and also the argument of this thesis, that an understanding of human WB requires an understanding of virtue(s).

2.3 Eudaimonia (Well-being): the Aristotelian Account of Well-being

According to Aristotle eudaimonia is the highest of all goods achievable by action and identifies living well and doing well with being eudaimon (Aristotle, NE 1095a16-19) (Aristotle, NE 1098b21-22). The word “ethics” comes from the Greek word ethos, i.e. moral\(^9\), and ethika\(^10\) means a treatise on morals (Liddell and Scott, 2016). Barnes (2000) also notes that ethika are issues to do with character. Eudaimonia consists of two words, that is, eu (– good, well) and daimon (– spirit, divinity) but Aristotle does not take this etymology into account; he seems to regard eudaimonia as a substitute for eu zein, i.e. to live well (Kraut, 2014), and eu prattein, i.e. to do well (Knight, 2007). Aristotle defines eudaimonia as (i) the chief final good without qualification that is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else (Aristotle, NE 1097b28-37) (Aristotle, NE1097b1-7), (ii) the final good which is thought to be self-sufficient and all other goods are desirable for the sake of it (Aristotle, NE 1097b18-14), i.e. when isolated it makes life desirable and lacking in nothing (Aristotle, NE 1097b15-17) and (iii) the ultimate good which is obviously the end of action (Aristotle, NE 1097b21).

The traditional subjectivist translation of the word adopted by Ross and Irwin (cited by Knight, 2007) is “happiness”, but, as Bostock (2000) argues, this cannot be right because eudaimonia is essentially long-term\(^11\), it connotes success and achievement and requires more than mere contentment and satisfaction; one is eudaimon or not and this is absolute. Different scholars adopt different views, however. The most well-known dispute about the meaning of eudaimonia is that between an inclusive-comprehensive and an exclusive-intellectual view of the concept (Knight, 2007). For instance, Hardie (1968) and Nagel (1972) are in favour of a supreme dominant end of contemplation, whilst Ackrill (1973) and Kraut (1989), who have an inclusive understanding, argue that eudaimonia is constituted by

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\(^9\) As opposed to dianoetikos, i.e. intellectual (Aristotle, NE 1103a5).

\(^10\) In Greek: Ethika Nikomachea (i.e. Nicomachean Ethics).

\(^11\) “... In a complete life… for a short time does not make a man blessed and happy” (Aristotle, NE 1098a19-21).
many different desirable and tuned-up ends. This thesis takes a position between the inclusive - exclusive view in the sense that there is both an ultimate end and various sub-ends towards that supreme end. However, as Nyabul and Situma (2014) note, Aristotle himself\textsuperscript{12} seems to be responsible for this misunderstanding(s) because sometimes he implies that \textit{eudaimonia} is a single end and at other times he suggests that \textit{eudaimonia} is made up of multiple ends. From my perspective, Aristotle understands \textit{eudaimonia} both as a single end and as something made up of many ends.

Additionally, others use a range of words for \textit{eudaimonia} depending on the context, such as “fulfilment”, “welfare”, “flourishing\textsuperscript{13}” and “well-being\textsuperscript{14}” (Hughes, 2001). As Robinson (1989, p. 90) points out, \textit{eudaimonia} is the “human flourishing” in a life that is given over to what is most honourable and enduring. Ackrill (1980) also argues that the word \textit{eudaimonia} has a force not at all like happiness, comfort or pleasure, but more like the best possible life where the “best” does not have a narrowly moral sense. Last but not least, Knight (2007) observes that an increasingly prevailing translation of the term is “success”. According to Aristotle, \textit{eudaimonia} is not an external good, nor a good of the body, but a good of the human \textit{psyche} (soul), which is the highest kind of good. Simultaneously, some external goods\textsuperscript{15} such as wealth and power as well as some bodily goods such as health and good looks (NE 1098b13) are necessary conditions for \textit{eudaimonia}, as one cannot be \textit{eudaimon} without some kind of wealth, beauty, good birth, friends, political influence and good children (Aristotle, NE 1099a31) (Aristotle, NE 1099b1-5).

Although an \textit{eudaimon} person does require some good fortune, it is, however, more important that one cultivates the appropriate state of \textit{psyche}\textsuperscript{16} (Bostock, 2000). According to Ackrill (1980), as in this thesis, \textit{eudaimonia} is neither the outcome of a lifetime’s effort nor is it something to look forward to, such as a contented retirement. \textit{Eudaimonia} is a life that is enjoyable and worthwhile all the way through

\textsuperscript{12} Aristotle is indeed sometimes unclear himself and different translations may create and exaggerate confusion.

\textsuperscript{13} A translation that perhaps relates more to Aristotle’s biology and metaphysics (Knight, 2007).

\textsuperscript{14} The same as above.

\textsuperscript{15} Aristotle seems to categorize goods into external (wealth, power etc.), bodily goods (health, good looks, life etc.) and goods of the \textit{psyche} (virtues, knowledge, friendship etc.).

\textsuperscript{16} “…we call those that relate to soul most properly and truly goods” (NE 1098b13).
and not the reward for a life. It is *eupraxia*, i.e. doing well, and not the result of doing well, which is unavoidably intertwined with one’s choices, since in choice the desirable (good or bad) comes after what the judgement states is doing well (Anscombe, 1967). Garver (2006, p. 328) also notes that “*eudaimonia* is an *energeia*”, i.e. an actuality, made up of *energeiai*’ (actualities) and in this sense the good person has to make their life one *energeia* out of many (Aristotle, NE 11177a12).

Clearly, there is plenty of disagreement as to what *eudaimonia* consists in, but no disagreement whatsoever that *eudaimonia* is what we all want. Particularly in this thesis, as I elaborate further in the following chapter, I argue for a cognitive account of WB that partly consists in intellectual virtue(s) and obviously one that goes beyond the basics in life such as food, shelter etc. To this end, Aristotle’s unique - in the sense that no one before had presented this particular account of what it is to live well (Kraut, 2014) - concept of *eudaimonia* seems the most appropriate source to look at. It is also appropriate in terms of understanding because *eudaimonia* has multiple definitions both as a single end and as something made up of multiple ends towards an ultimate single end. Alternatively, the term I use throughout the thesis is “well-being” (WB).

### 2.3.1 The Function Argument and *Arete* (Virtue)

As Kraut (2014) observes, it would be rather useless to acknowledge that *eudaimonia* is the highest of all goods, if we did not determine what good(s) *eudaimonia* consists in. In order to deal with this, Aristotle looks at *ergon*, i.e. what is the characteristic function of human beings, and argues that *eudaimonia* (WB) consists in the activity of the rational part of human beings’ *psyche* (soul) in accordance with *arete* (virtue). As Aristotle claims, the most characteristic good of human beings is their capacity to use reason. Additionally, a human being who uses reason well in a lifetime is *eudaimon* and this is what *eudaimonia* consists in. Virtue or excellence is necessary in order to do anything well. Human *arete* means virtue,

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17 Actuality (*energeia*) and potentiality (*dynamis*) is another Aristotelian key distinction in *Metaphysics Z* (Cohen, 2012).
human goodness and excellence of any kind (Liddell and Scott, 2011). *Arete* is what makes a human being good (Barnes, 2000). Specifically, Aristotle notes that

“To say that eudaimonia is the chief good seems a platitude and a clearer account of what it is that is still desired. This might perhaps be given if we could first ascertain the function of a man (Aristotle, NE 1097b22-24)... Now if the function of man is an activity of psyche which follows or implies reason (Aristotle, NE 1098a7-8)... human good turns out to be activity of psyche exhibiting virtue and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most complete... in a complete life.” (Aristotle, NE 1098a16-19)

So, does Aristotle identify *eudaimonia* with *arete*? Not exactly. He argues that “to virtue belongs virtuous activity” (Aristotle, NE 1098b31). If *eudaimonia* means living well for one’s entire life, this in turn means not just being in a certain state, but also acting in a certain way. Therefore, *eudaimonia* appears to be a virtuous activity in a lifetime and virtuous activities appear as the realization of the virtues that belong to the rational\(^\text{18}\) part of human beings’ psyche (soul).

### 2.3.2 *Endoxa*: Aristotle’s Starting Point of Investigation of Various Kinds of Life and Well-being

Hence, Aristotle maintains that engagement in virtue(s) entails participation in *eudaimonia* and vice versa. However, what is the starting point of his investigation about the good life and the concept of virtue and why is this relevant here? Aristotle used to begin his examination with *endoxa*, i.e. any received opinions which were held by everyone or at least by most people as well as those held by the wise, and then he used to subject these views to critical assessment. Looking at Aristotle’s ways of finding answers to his problems is significant, especially from a practical point of view. In this case, for example, *endoxa* could be what policy, institutions, government, anyone involved in education thinks about the concepts of WB and virtue(s), and then teacher education could use this ‘data’ as a starting point for further investigation concerning teachers’ WB. However, Aristotle also seems sympathetic to the view that most people cannot be entirely mistaken, i.e. it is often the case that what the majority of people thinks is indeed right. In particular, he says

\(^{18}\) The part of the soul where the ability of reason belongs.
“Some of these views have been held by men and men of old, others by oligous and endoxous, i.e. a few eminent people, and it is not probable that either of these should be entirely mistaken, but rather that they should be right in at least some one respect or even in most respects (Aristotle, NE 1098b26-29)... Those things are endoxa which seem so to everyone, or to the majority, or to the wise and either to all of them, or to the majority, or to the most endoxois (notable) among them” (Aristotle, Topics 100b21-23)

As Klein (1992) notes, Aristotle relies heavily on this method and his argument about eudaimonia uses two kinds of endoxa, i.e. the substantive and the regulative. The former provides plausible alternatives for the determination of eudaimonia and the latter specifies the evaluative criteria. For instance, in Book X of the NE, Aristotle claims that basically four kinds of life seem to be chosen by men. Most men aim at hedone (pleasure), which is an aim for slaves or beasts. Other men aim at political arete (honour), which is the object of the political life. But honour depends more on the one who gives rather than on the receiver, whereas the end of life must be something that assures one of their own virtue, and virtue seems the end of political life. Some men also pursue wealth, but this is a means rather than an end. Finally, Aristotle says that the life of contemplation is the highest end and this way proceeds to an inclusive outlook on human life. He also classifies these kinds of life according to hedone (pleasure), political arete (excellence) and phronesis (practical wisdom), while he considers the third type superior on the grounds that it can provide the ultimate end, that is, eudaimonia.

Put differently, ways of life based on external goods, bodily goods and honour seem to be eliminated by the criteria of regulative endoxa such as the criterion of ultimate end, self-sufficiency, uniqueness to human beings, endurance, internality etc., leaving moral virtues and contemplative activities as the alternatives that fit with all the regulative endoxa. Thus, it may be the case that since only these two kinds of virtuous activities survived the examination, they alone constitute eudaimonia. Then Aristotle argues that contemplation is eudaimonia in a higher sense than morally virtuous activity is, because it fits more rigorously with the regulative endoxa (Klein, 1992). However, Klein (1992) also stresses that Aristotle’s method might be superior if any “plausible opinions were examined in a cooperative
or shared discourse which would proceed systematically so as to overcome objections to preceding opinions” (ibid, 1992, p. 153). In the same line of thought, Hughes (2001) points out the possibility that Aristotle’s method only amounts to repeating the prejudices and unexamined assumptions of his own culture.

Although Klein (1992) and Hughes (2001) indicate two important problems in relation to Aristotle’s method, their comments in my view make sense only up to a point. Specifically, on the one hand, Klein (1992) seems to look at Aristotle’s method in the light of modern research methods and emphasizes ways of improvement. In this sense, an “improved” Aristotelian method might be “superior” as Klein (1992, p. 153) suggests, but it would no longer be Aristotle’s. Besides, since one is interested in original Aristotelian ideas, I think one should look at them exactly the way they are, i.e. as a work in progress and as lectures to be delivered, not like a modern work, since it was written two and a half millennia ago, nevertheless, it remains central to modern philosophy as an inexhaustible source of insight and inspiration (Hughes, 2001) (Kraut, 2014) (Crisp, 2000).

On the other hand, it may be the case, as Hughes (2001) observes, that Aristotle repeats prejudices and assumptions from his culture as he was himself a nobleman in a city state where women, slaves and workers were regarded as inferior and incomplete beings and had a world view quite different from ours today (Knight, 2007). But still, I think that, all things being equal, Aristotle’s work is of great significance, because it is innovative, timeless and unique in terms of coping with how and why questions concerning human WB in everyday life and in practical reasoning about a good to be brought (Kraut, 2014) (Crisp, 2000) (Pakaluk, 2005). Next, let us look at Aristotle’s investigation into human activity and how he relates it to eudaimonia.

2.4 Understanding Well-being as a Human Activity

According to Aristotle, eudaimonia (WB) consists in the activity of reason in accordance with virtue. Thus, it is implied that WB is a virtuous activity during a lifetime whilst virtuous activities appear as the realization of the virtues that belong to the rational part of human beings’ soul. In addition, Aristotle recognizes three kinds of human activity, namely (i) theoria, i.e. contemplative activity (Aristotle, NE
1177a17), (ii) *praxis*, i.e. activity related to matters of human conduct such as ethics and politics (Aristotle, NE 1178a10) and (iii) *poiesis*, i.e. productive activity. In this context, Aristotle seems to argue that *praxis* is the best human activity, a kind of WB that, unlike *poiesis* and *theoria*, is both virtuous and possible to achieve.

2.4.1 *Praxis*: the Best Human Activity and an Account of Well-being both Virtuous and Feasible

While honing in on the concept of *praxis* it is necessary at the same time to look at *theoria* and *poiesis* in terms of a deeper understanding of the concept of *praxis*. To begin, according to Aristotle *theoria*, i.e. the activity of reason, consists in dealing with the best, eternal and unchangeable matters and exercising philosophical thinking is a human being’s noblest end (Aristotle, NE 1177a11-13) (Aristotle, NE 1177a19-24) (Aristotle, NE 1177b35). The purpose of *theoria* is the pursuit of truth through the contemplative life and its telos (end) is the achievement of knowledge for its own sake (Carr and Kemmis, 1986). Some scholars argue that *theoria* constitutes a perfect and superior kind of *eudaimonia*. Notwithstanding, Ackrill (1980) notes that what is the best life a man should lead remains rather vague. Aristotle is, however, quite clear in his opinion that a life of *theoria* is superior to any other life and such indeed is the life of divinity, of God. Nonetheless, he admits that *theoria* by itself does not constitute a possible life for human beings (Aristotle, NE 1177b27-30). A man is a sort of syntheton (compound) within space and time, who is, however, able to engage in an activity that may escape time and touch the eternal.

Most importantly, Aristotle tries to prove that his concepts are not just theories. Although he believes that a life dedicated to the activity of reason is the noblest one, he acknowledges that such a life is superhuman, because on the one hand, man by nature is an incomplete and finite being and on the other hand, it is impossible to fulfil every external condition that *theoria* demands in advance (Aristotle, NE 1179a19-23). So, if this is the case, why bother looking at *theoria* anyway? If both *theoria* and virtuous action are valuable forms of activity, perhaps they could be combined for the accomplishment of the best possible human life (Ackrill, 1973). And the result of such a combination is *praxis*. 
Hughes (2001) highlights that the best needs the rest and Aristotle seems to exaggerate the concept of *theoria* in order to stress the importance of practical activity. Similarly, Knight (2007) notes that Aristotle “refers to theoretical activity in order to provide practical activity its further final end” (ibid, 2007, p. 36). He points out that unlike *theoria*, which produces nothing beyond itself and deals with the universal, unchangeable truths, *praxis* is human activity in the realm of the contingent, which we seek to affect by our actions (Knight, 2007). Thus, Aristotle in the concept of *praxis* appears to suggest a secondary\(^\text{19}\) kind of *eudaimonia* (Aristotle, NE 1178a9) which is more realistic and approachable to all human beings. A *practical activity* is concerned with political and ethical life and its end is practical wisdom and knowledge (Carr and Kemmis, 1986). *Praxis* also focuses on virtuous action that contributes directly to one’s own *eudaimonia* rather than serving ends determined by others. It is “a life of informed, virtuous activity that encompasses specific criteria such as both the individual’s and others’ *eudaimonia*” (Siegler, 1967, p. 31).

Moreover, Nicholson (2016) notes that “*poiesis* is the productive activity that requires technical skills and it has an end goal” which is the end product (ibid, 2016, p. 52). The aim of *poiesis* is to create something and its *end* is the production of some artefact (Carr and Kemmis, 1986). Aristotle, distinguishes *poiesis* from both *theoria* and *praxis* as an activity that basically lacks virtue, on the grounds that the end and value of an artefact is in the product itself, whereas the value of a virtuous action depends on the individual who must be virtuous and know and choose the action for itself (Parry, 2014). For example, Aristotle says that “the end of medical art is health, that of shipbuilding a vessel, that of strategy victory, that of economics wealth” (Aristotle, NE 1094a9). In this sense, what might be the end of teacher education? A possible answer to this could be, as I argue in this thesis, teachers’ WB which requires an account of virtue(s). In this regard, *poiesis* cannot be the ultimate end of teacher education because it lacks virtue(s).

For example, teacher education programmes nowadays seem to aim at a kind of modern *poiesis*, if I may put it that way. In particular, it seems that they mainly

\(^{19}\) Or, in another aspect, a second way to achieve *eudaimonia* (Hughes, 2001).
focus on the development of teachers’ technical skills and knowledge in terms of competence and achievement through testing and measurements, so as to be, for instance, at the top of worldwide league tables (Biesta, 2012)\(^2\) (White, 2011). Hence, in this light, the end and value of a top-league-tables-focused teacher education seems to be in itself, whilst the end and value of a teacher education that aims at virtuous teachers’ and teachers’ WB is in teachers who aim at virtue(s) and know and choose any action for itself, and then for pupils’ WB, as I argue in Chapter 1. In this context, as Higgins (2011) suggests, teacher education programmes should not only aim at teaching teachers how to teach, but also teach teachers how to learn (be virtuous) through teaching. In other words, a teacher education for an account of teachers’ WB that requires an account of virtue(s) with a particular focus on the virtue of OM will, as I argue in Chapter 6, help teachers, among other things, to further develop their self-cultivation, both for the sake of their own WB and then for pupils’ WB.

Furthermore, there is much discussion in philosophy and education, concerning the relationship(s) between the theoretical, practical and productive human activity and on this, Aristotle, who, as Pakaluk (2005) observes, is unique in pursuing all three concepts can shed some light. However, on the one hand, Knight (2007) notices that Aristotle “is not consistent in his semantic distinction between *praxis* and *poiesis*, action and production” and threfore, difficulties arise (ibid, 2007, p. 19). For instance, it seems unreasonable for someone actually engaged in *theoria* to interrupt their contemplation so as to engage in *praxis* (Adkins, 1978). On the other hand, Ackrill (1978) says that Aristotle “fails to deal with obvious direct questions such as what is an action” and this alone can cause contradictions (ibid, 1978, p. 601).

Although Aristotle’s discussion is often not as clear as it should be, when he talks about *praxis*, the practical activity as the “life in accordance with the other kind of *arete*”, he attempts to engage in a more detailed way (Aristotle, NE 1178a9-10). Particularly, according to a widely – held view, this *arete* is *phronesi*, i.e. practical

\(^2\) Biesta is discussing education and schooling in general. Part of this same context, though, is teacher education, which particularly interests us here. In this sense, it seems reasonable to adjust his notion in the relevant context.
wisdom, which is the highest arete of the mind when one deals with practical issues (Hughes, 2001). Aristotle’s statement here is of great importance for the argument of the thesis, because he seems to consider arete (virtue) and particularly phronesis, a key intellectual virtue, which is necessary to praxis, that is, it is necessary to eudaimonia (WB). Therefore, in order to understand eudaimonia (WB) it is necessary to understand phronesis (virtue). To this end, next, I look at the concept of phronesis, i.e. the practical approach to knowledge and a key intellectual virtue, as well as at its relationship(s) with episteme and techne which constitute the theoretical and practical approaches to knowledge respectively. Besides, it is important to look at phronesis as the practical approach to knowledge, because knowledge and teacher education are unbreakably intertwined.

2.5 Understanding Well-being as an Approach to Knowledge

The most appropriate place in the NE to start an exploration of knowledge, and thus, an exploration of WB as an approach to knowledge, is Book VI, where Aristotle elaborates the concept of intellectual virtues. Let us recall that Aristotle maintains that the psyche (soul) is divided in two parts, i.e. the ellogon (rational) and the alogon (irrational) (Aristotle, NE 1102a29). The irrational part of the psyche (soul), from an Aristotelian point of view, is vegetative in nature and relates to nutrition and growth, therefore it does not relate to anything of interest to us here (Aristotle, NE 1102a35). In addition, Aristotle in Book VI (Aristotle, NE 1139a4-16) goes further and distinguishes in the rational part of the psyche between the logistikon, i.e. the calculative part, with which a human considers variable and changeable things (practical/productive thinking), and the epistemonikon, i.e. the scientific part, with which one considers invariable and unchangeable things (theoretical reasoning) (Kraut, 2014). As I said earlier, for the aims of this thesis, I focus on the logistikon and particularly on practical reasoning.

Then, Aristotle stresses the importance of looking at “the best state of each of these two parts for this is the virtue of each” (Aristotle, NE 1139a16), which is
determined by five chief intellectual virtues, namely, those concerning theoretical reasoning, i.e. nous (intuitive reason or intelligence), episteme (scientific knowledge), sophia (philosophical wisdom), phronesis (practical wisdom) regarding practical thinking, and techne (art or craft knowledge) in relation to productive thinking (Aristotle, NE 1139b14) (Aristotle, NE 1141b25). On the one hand, nous as the starting point for scientific knowledge cannot be the object of such knowledge, craft knowledge or practical wisdom. On the other hand, sophia is the highest and perfect kind of knowledge and combines both intelligence and scientific knowledge (Hoffmann, 2016). In this context, Aristotle examines three ways to knowledge, i.e. episteme, techne and phronesis, and how they relate to one another as well as which qualifies as the most appropriate in terms of being both virtuous and possible to achieve. In this project, I mainly focus on phronesis, however, in terms of a full understanding of phronesis as the practical approach to knowledge, I also have to look at the concepts of episteme and techne which are the theoretical and productive approach to knowledge respectively.

2.5.1 Episteme: the Theoretical Approach to Knowledge

According to Aristotle “the object of scientific knowledge is of necessity, therefore it is eternal, ungenerated and imperishable… it is a state of capacity to demonstrate” (Aristotle, NE 1139b23) (Aristotle, NE 1139b32). The most common interpretation of episteme is that of scientific knowledge or knowledge (as presented in the next chapter epistemology also comes from episteme), but as Kraut (2014) stresses, one should not confuse this with the modern understanding of science, which involves experimentation. Its translation as scientific knowledge rather aims at highlighting its concern with necessary, unchangeable truths and involves demonstration (Hoffmann, 2016). Apart from the interpretation of episteme as knowledge or scientific knowledge, it is worth noting that among scholars there is also wide acceptance of the concept as “understanding” which involves demonstration, i.e. the capacity to explain (Burnyeat, 2012) (Barnes, 1994) (Taylor, 1990) (Irwin, 1988) (Burnyeat, 2012).

21 He also regards deinotes (cleverness or readiness of mind), euboulia (excellence in deliberation), synesis (understanding) and gnome (good sense or judgement) as minor intellectual virtues (Aristotle NE 1142a32) (NE 1143b16).

22 I used the most common translation(s) for the terms.
2.5.2 Techne: the Productive Approach to Knowledge

Aristotle attempts to define techne mainly by contrasting it with phronesis. Specifically, he argues that “techne is concerned with coming into being, i.e. considering how something may come into being, and whose origin is in the maker and not in the thing made… Making and acting being different, techne must be a matter of making not of acting… and both are concerned with the variable” (Aristotle, NE 1140a37) (Aristotle, NE 1140a23). Techne like poiesis does not imply that a technites (craftsman) is making something in a virtuous way or that they are virtuous, which is in contrast with phronesis where one is virtuous and acts in a virtuous way. The only criterion here is that the object is good, e.g. a well-built table that does not fall apart (Hoffmann, 2016). The relationships between Aristotelian episteme, phronesis and techne lay the foundations for the modern concepts of pure theory, experienced-based practice and something that involves both. However, there is some uncertainty among researchers about how Aristotle uses the terms which may cause various problems in interpretation (Kraut, 2014).

2.5.3 Phronesis: the Practical Approach to Knowledge and a Key Virtue to Praxis

Furthermore, Aristotle describes phronesis as being “reasoned and capable of action with regard to human goods … to things that are good or bad for man… it cannot be episteme or techne; not episteme because that which can be done is capable of doing otherwise, not techne because action and making are different kinds of thing … phronesis is a virtue” (Aristotle, NE 1140b20) (Aristotle, NE 1140b37) (Aristotle, NE 1140b24). At this point, before elaborating on the concept of phronesis, that is, the practical approach to knowledge and a key intellectual virtue necessary for WB, it is important to look at the concept of arete (virtue) and how Aristotle defines phronesis in terms of arete (virtue).

2.5.3.1 Phronesis Is Arete (virtue): an Account of Virtue

The concept of arete (virtue) in Aristotelian ethics forms the basis for eudaimonia (WB) (Broadie, 1991). Earlier we saw that eudaimonia is the highest of all goods achievable by action and consists in the exercise of reason in accordance
with *arete* in a complete life. As Lacewing (2016) points out, Aristotle’s list of *aretes* (virtues) is not just a diverse collection, but is based on a broad, justified account of what *arete* is. Hence, after having distinguished human *psyche* (soul) into two parts, i.e. the *elogon* (rational) and the *alogen* (irrational) (Aristotle, NE 1102a29), Aristotle in a similar way argues that

“Arete (virtue) too is distinguished into kinds in accordance with this difference, for we say that some of the *aretai* (virtues) are dianoetikai (intellectual) and others ethikai (moral), sophia (philosophic wisdom) and synesis (understanding) and phronesis (practical wisdom) being dianoetikai (intellectual), eleutheriotes (liberality) and sophrosene (temperance) ethikai (moral)… Virtue then being two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual virtue(s) (virtues of mind or intellect) in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching (for this reason it requires experience and time), while moral virtue(s) (virtues of character) comes about as a result of ethos (habit)” (Aristotle, NE 1103a4) (Aristotle, NE 1103a14)

Additionally, Aristotelian *arete* is sometimes interpreted as a habit or disposition or fixed disposition and *eudaimonia* as a mindless routine, but this according to Sachs (2016) seems imprecise and rather passive, because Aristotle himself argues that “to virtue belongs virtuous activity” (Aristotle, NE 1098b31). Thus, virtue reveals itself in action. However, Aristotle argues that virtue is not found in the action itself, but in the agent. In other words an action is not virtuous in its own right but due to the agent who performs it. So, from an Aristotelian perspective, virtue reveals itself in the actions of a virtuous person.

Furthermore, Aristotle (Aristotle, NE 1105b19) (Aristotle, NE 1106a12) describes *arete* as *hexis*, i.e. as a state of character, which involves one’s dispositions in relation to what one feels, how one thinks and reacts, what choices one makes and what actions one performs and all these in different situations (Lacewing, 2016). For Aristotle *arete* is neither passions such as bodily appetites, emotions and feelings that go along with pleasure or pain nor faculties such as such hearing or the ability to feel angry, which are given by nature (Lacewing, 2016). Likewise, in Chapters 3 and 6, I argue that the virtue of OM mainly as such a character trait fits, among other things, the Aristotelian concept of virtue that is
required for a full account of WB. However, Aristotle suggests that “we must not only describe arete as a state of character but also say what sort of state it is” (Aristotle, NE 1106a14-15). To this end, Aristotle turns to the concept of meson, i.e. the doctrine of the mean, as a criterion of phronesis and of man who is phronimos.

**2.5.3.2 Meson, Eudaimonia (well-being) and Arete (virtue)**

Aristotle develops his doctrine of meson mainly in the context of the discussion about arete (virtue) and it appears to be a sine qua non of his ethical theory. First, he introduces the concept in terms of health, e.g. “drink or food which is above or below a certain amount destroys the health, while that which is proportionate both produces and increases and preserves health” (Aristotle, NE 1104a16). Perhaps he does this because he wants to establish a general principle that is widely acceptable. But how is this relevant to the concept of arete? Aristotle argues that “arete is a kind of mesotes, since arete aims at what meson is” (Aristotle, NE 1106b29) and elsewhere that “meson preserves the goodness” (Aristotle, NE 1106b12).

The idea of meson is also important for the overall argument of this thesis, i.e. if an account of WB requires an account of virtue(s) and if OM is a virtue, then OM is necessary for WB. Let me explain. According to Aristotle meson is “to feel at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way, is what is both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of virtue” (Aristotle, NE 1106b20). Therefore, the concept of meson is inextricably connected with the concept of virtue. Open-mindedness is a virtue, as I show in Chapter 6. Therefore, OM as a virtue is related to meson. Specifically, if OM consists in the “willingness and within limits ability to transcend a default cognitive standpoint in order to take up or take seriously the merits of a distinct cognitive standpoint and… when it is necessary to adjust one’s beliefs or confidence levels according to the outcome of their rational assessment” (Baehr, 2011, p. 154), then it could be argued that OM aims at meson. It can also be maintained that OM is preserved by meson, so that one’s “brains neither fall out” nor does one “take one’s own ideas to be obvious, universal and thus, unquestionable” (Riggs, 2010, pp. 178, 184).
However, in terms of understanding, let us approach the idea of *meson* conceptually. There are two main Greek words that Aristotle uses interchangeably in order to develop his concept and they have the same meaning, i.e. *mesotes* and *meson*\textsuperscript{23}, where the former seems more general and refers to a state of character as intermediate and the latter is more specific and relates to an action as intermediate (Pakaluk, 2011). Modern scholars talk about *meson* as intermediate (Ross, 1925), middle (Bostock, 2000), betweenness (Pakaluk, 2011), and most of them translate it as mean (Urmson, 1980) (Broadie, 1991). However, Chatzopoulos disagrees with the translation of *meson* as mean. To justify his disagreement he gives an example of the translated Aristotelian quote that courage is the mean between cowardice and recklessness and argues that this is wrong because the original word includes the concepts both of mean and of dispersity.

In addition, Chatzopoulos observes that in antiquity, Aristotle, like other people, did not have any statistical tools available. Therefore, people used the methods of example and analogy to form their explanations, e.g. the right quantity of food that a human should consume could be used as an example of what it means for a person to achieve a virtue. Nowadays, we use statistics and thus, we are able to quantify the amount of food that a man needs by means of a sample taken by a group of people and by calculating both the mean and the dispersity. However, when one translates *meson* as mean, Chatzopoulos argues, one seems to destroy *arete* (virtue) because one removes the degrees of freedom, the range that dispersity gives to *arete*, while Aristotle shows exactly the opposite. Therefore, *meson* should be translated as mid-space and not as mean (Chatzopoulos). In this chapter I maintain the original word of *meson* throughout.

Moreover, Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of *meson* and the virtue of OM is related in particular to the second kind of *meson* as explained next. First, he talks about a kind of quantitative *meson*, i.e. “the intermediate to the object” (Aristotle, NE 1106a29) and “the intermediate according to arithmetical proportion… which is equidistant from each of the extremes and it is one and the same for all” (Aristotle, NE 1106a34) (Aristotle, NE 1106a32). Second, he identifies a *meson* that is relative

\textsuperscript{23} Here, I use the term *meson*. 

to the person which differs from the meson that is relative to the object. The meson that is relative to us is “to feel at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way, is what is both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of virtue” (Aristotle, NE 1106b20). Therefore, OM shares an additional characteristic with the concept of meson, i.e. they are both agent-oriented and relative to the individual.

To illustrate his notion, Aristotle talks about Milo, an athlete, whose diet is regulated relative to the aim of the amount of food that promotes Milo’s good health; “if ten pounds is too much for someone to eat and two too little, it does not follow that the trainer will order six pounds… for this would be too little for Milo and too much for the beginner in athletic exercises” (Aristotle, NE 1106b36). The main difference between the two mesa is that the meson relative to us varies and depends on persons, activities and aims and involves the idea of prohairesis (choice). In a similar line of thought, I argue that the account of WB that this thesis defends involves the characteristics of a person’s desire and choice, which I further investigate in Chapters 4 and 5 in the context of the WB discourse in education. Also, the idea of prohairesis24 (choice) may enlighten how the concepts of meson and arete (virtue) are related to the intellect. According to Sorabji (1980) Aristotle expresses this aspect clearly in his statement that

“The agent (who acts in accordance with the virtues) must have knowledge and he must choose the acts… in order to be good (virtuous) when one does several acts, one must do them as a result of choice… and that… choice is deliberate25 desire of things in our power…” (Aristotle, NE 1105a32) (Aristotle, NE 1144a17) (Aristotle, NE 1113a10)

Likewise, Evrigenis (1999) talks about a strong connection between arete, phronesis and meson and between all these concepts and eudaimonia. Hence, eudaimonia consists in using reason in accordance with virtue, virtue is a kind of

24 I acknowledge that there is much discussion and disagreement concerning the meaning(s) and, for some, the inconsistent use of Aristotelian prohairesis in the NE, but it is not my aim here to elaborate on this.
25 I use deliberation as zetesis, i.e. involving search (NE 1112b20, 1142b15 etc.). As for prohairesis, deliberation and its association with it seems quite problematic to some scholars in terms of means, ends and types of reasoning. An examination of these debates however would be beyond the scope of this thesis.
*mesotes* and *meson* is a characteristic of virtue, therefore, *meson* is intellectually significant and involves rational thinking. This is particularly important from the point of view of this thesis, because I argue for a cognitive account of WB (which becomes more obvious in the next chapter) that requires an account of virtue(s) and in this regard, it requires OM. In this context, OM and *meson* are further connected because they are both intellectually important and involve rational thinking. However, this becomes more obvious in Chapter 6 where I elaborate on the concept of OM as an intellectual virtue that facilitates WB.

In addition, Aristotle’s concept of *meson*, as Pakaluk (2005) notes, is interesting and bold, but it is not true in an obvious way and certain issues in it need further clarification. He also highlights that in Aristotelian work the concepts of *eudaimonia* (WB) and *arete* (virtue) are essentially related, i.e. no one can be *eudaimon* unless they are virtuous, and he observes that *eudaimonia* and *arete* are the two key concepts upon which the idea of *meson* is based. According to Aristotelian theory, *eudaimonia* and *arete* consist in the equal mean between two extremes, i.e. an excess and a defect. Besides, the concept of *meson* constitutes a core theme in his ethical treatise in the sense that if somebody wants to accomplish *arete* and be *eudaimon*, they should avoid extreme choices (Pakaluk, 2005).

Furthermore, the key point for virtuous actions is *logos* (reason), that is, the capacity to think. Therefore, one is *eudaimon* when one acts according to *logos* as “life seems to be essentially the act of thinking” (Aristotle, NE 1170a19). Additionally, *logos* (reason) aims by definition at balance and symmetry, at something that is not extreme, neither an excess nor a defect, and therein lies *eudaimonia*. Specifically, “to be in a state of excess or deficiency in relation to a virtue is to have a vice; it is not to have too much or too little of a virtue” (Hardie, 1968, p 136). Also, Pakaluk (2005) says that success (as a sine qua non for *eudaimonia*) consists in the correct way, but the concept of way suggests degree, and degree in turn needs balance and correct adjustment of things. Having said that, though, it is not at all implied that *meson* is a kind of mediocrity.

On the other hand, Urmson (1980) interprets *meson* quantitatively in terms of too much or too little concerning *deon* (right) and as an intermediate between two
things. However, Hursthouse (1980) (2006) disagrees with this view and points out that it is not possible for almost anyone or anything to be simply measurable in a straightforward manner, and in relation to this, Aristotle himself gives the image of the centre of a circle “e.g. to find the middle of a circle is not for everyone but for him who knows” (Aristotle, NE 1109a25). Moreover, Williams (1985, p. 36) states that the doctrine of meson should be “better forgotten” as the least useful and depressing part of Aristotle’s theory. However, Williams (1985) recognizes that meson may have a point in the sense that “virtuous people are supposed to recognize others’ vices as such and those who have them or their actions as unpleasant or unhelpful” (ibid, 1985, p. 36). On the other hand, Losin (1987) argues that Williams (1985) is unfair to Aristotle’s insights in relation to meson. Like Pakaluk (2011), he thinks that the concept of meson is vital for the complete not partial interpretation of Aristotelian ethics and suggests an alternative interpretation in terms of hexis (habit) that is observable and public and not in terms of disposition or quality of psyche (soul). Here, as I noted above, the concept of meson is significant in relation to Aristotle’s key topics of eudaimonia (WB) and arete (virtue), and therefore it is particularly important for the argument of this thesis and the virtue of OM.

Hence, Aristotle describes arete (virtue) as hexis (a state of character) which is related to prohairesis (choice). The concept of prohairesis lies in the kind of meson that is relative to the person and it is determined by a rational principle which in turn is determined by the person. However, is there any expert(s) able to determine meson? Aristotle argues that the phronimos man, who is distinguished for his “phronesis, the reasoned and true state of capacity to act with regard to virtue” (Aristotle, NE 1140b20) is able to determine meson in any case (Bostock, 2000). In this regard, the concept of meson also becomes significant in practical terms, because it is implied that the phronimos man, that is, a person who has phronesis, can provide some kind of guidance towards meson and eudaimonia (WB). This in turn may have implications for teacher education, if teacher education programmes aim at teachers’ WB and if they particularly aim at an account of WB that requires an account of virtue such as OM, as I argue later in the thesis. In the following section, let us look at the idea of phronesis, that is, the practical approach to knowledge and a key intellectual virtue necessary for eudaimonia (WB).
2.5.3.3 Phronesis: a Key Intellectual Arete (virtue) Necessary for Eudaimonia (well-being)

Since arete (virtue) is the ground upon eudaimonia (WB) lies, a thorough examination of virtue(s) could help us know what eudaimonia is and how to achieve it (Broadie, 1991). In Book VI of the NE, Aristotle elaborates on the virtues of the intellect which specifically interest us here, because I look at an account of teachers’ WB as an approach to knowledge and a teacher education that supports this. Aristotle’s aim here is mainly to elucidate his previous statements “that meson is determined by reason, let us discuss this… it should also be determined what correct reason is and what is the standard that fixes it” (Aristotle, NE 1138b20) (Aristotle, NE 1138b35).

To this end, Aristotle turns to the examination of the virtues of the intellect which are concerned with truth and enable one to reason well under any circumstance. In other words, Aristotle seems to hold that logos (reason) makes someone able to arrange their activities in accordance with rational pursuits (Ackrill, 1973). As Kenny (1978) observes, the output of the intellectual virtues is truth either about how things are or about bringing them into existence. Specifically, Aristotle says that “we must learn what the best state of each of these two rational parts of the soul is for this is the virtue of each… that is truth26” (Aristotle, NE 1139a15-6) (Aristotle, NE 1139b13).

In 2.5 we saw that Aristotle distinguishes ellogon, i.e. the rational part of the psyche (soul), into two parts: first, the logistikon, i.e. the calculative part with which a human considers variable and changeable things and which is practical reasoning or productive thinking and second, the epistemonikon, i.e. the scientific part with which one considers invariable and unchangeable things and which is theoretical reasoning (Kraut, 2014). Then, he identifies five chief intellectual virtues. Specifically, Aristotle on the one hand talks about the key intellectual virtues of sophia, nous and episteme that belong to the epistemonikon, and on the other hand

26 An examination of how Aristotle approaches and defines the concept of truth is beyond our scope here.
about *phronesis* and *techne* that belong to the *logistikon* as I illustrate in the following diagram.

(Figure 1: Aristotle’s main intellectual virtues)

Let us focus on the key intellectual virtue of *phronesis*. It comes from the ancient Greek verb *phronein*, i.e. to think, to have understanding\(^{27}\) and the noun *phren*, i.e. mind, thought. As Noel (1999) notices, *phronesis* has various English translations and interpretations in order to cover the full meaning of the term. Usually it is translated as practical wisdom, practical reasoning, moral insight or prudence (Noel, 1999) (Liddell and Scott, 2011) (Oxford Dictionary, 2016). Different translations stress different aspects of the concept of *phronesis* and many disagreements arise among scholars concerning its nature, functions and relationship

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\(^{26a}\) The non-rational part of the soul is also divided into the *epithemetic* (epithetive) part that responds to reason and the *phytikon*, i.e. the vegetative part, that does not respond to reason. Moral virtues, i.e. the virtues of character, respond to the appetitive part. The second kind are the virtues of the intellect which respond to the rational part of the soul.

\(^{27}\) Not to be confused with the minor intellectual virtue of understanding which “only judges whilst *phronesis* issues commands” (Aristotle, NE 1143a8-10), i.e. understanding as a virtue of the intellect is not related to action.
with other concepts in Aristotle’s theory (Noel, 1999). Clearly, it is beyond our scope here to discuss them all. In this thesis I mainly use the original term of *phronesis* with a combination of interpretations\(^2^8\) and an emphasis on its inextricable connection with the concepts of *arete* (virtue) and *eudaimonia* (WB) as well as with a focus on who one is as a whole person.

Additionally, I do not look at the intellectual virtues of *nous*, *episteme* and *sophia* where the latter is a combination of the former two, because they are all concerned with unchangeable things. Specifically, Aristotle says that “*sophia* will contemplate none of the things that will make a man *eudaimon* but *phronesis* has this merit\(^2^9\)” (Aristotle, NE 1143b20). However, this does not necessarily mean that *phronesis* is the highest and best intellectual virtue to achieve *eudaimonia*. As Kenny (1978) argues despite the fact that *sophia* appears from time to time alongside *phronesis* as a quasi-synonym or to mark a contrast, Aristotle states that “*phronesis* is not supreme over *sophia* any more than the art of medicine is over health” (Aristotle, NE 1145a6).

Furthermore, Kraut (2014) and Hoffmann (2016) observe that Aristotle discusses *techne* (craft knowledge) only in order to offer a contrast with the other intellectual virtues; he does not suggest it as a necessary element towards *eudaimonia*, because *technites* (craftsmen) do not necessarily make something in a virtuous way, nor are they themselves virtuous, in contrast with *phronesis* and the *phronimos* man. Having said that, in the previous chapter, it was argued that “who teachers are as persons cannot and should not be separated from who they are and what they do as professionals” (Day and Gu, 2010, p. 5), because teachers are to a large extent professionally concerned with the transformation of persons and the transmission of a life worth living. Therefore it is a normal expectation that a life worth living is exhibited by those who hold it (Higgins, 2011) (Carr, 1993). In the light of this, as I argued in Chapter 1, teacher education should not be seen in an

\(^{2^8}\) Due to the fact that all kinds of interpretations seem to be intertwined in Aristotle’s ethics, it may not be possible to talk just from one point of view, e.g. the moral character interpretation, the basic interpretation, the rationality interpretation, the situational perception and insight interpretation etc. (Noel, 1999).

\(^{2^9}\) Nevertheless, a few paragraphs later Aristotle says the opposite, i.e. “so does *sophia* produce *eudaimonia*” (NE 1144a5).
instrumental way that aims at producing *technites*, but for the sake of pupils’ WB it should equally value teachers’ WB and aim at producing *phronimous*.

To be more specific, according to Biondi Khan (2005) there are at least three major views of *phronesis*. The first is about choosing the right end and the means to that end. This is not the same as choosing any end and then just accomplishing it, because there are both good and bad ends. It is choosing correctly, having *euvoula*, i.e. “excellence in deliberation” (Aristotle, NE 1142b6) regarding both ends and means to these ends. In that sense, *phronesis* differs from *deinotes*, i.e. cleverness, however, “*phronesis* does not exist without this faculty” (Aristotle, NE 1144a30).

From another point of view, Aristotle seems to define *phronesis* in terms of proper means to the right end. Specifically, he says that “virtue makes the goal right and practical wisdom makes what leads to it correct” (Aristotle, NE 1144a9). However, if *phronesis* is only about proper means, then it does not essentially differ from *deinotes* (cleverness) (Biondi Khan, 2005). Third, it may be the case that *phronesis* does not exist in its own right, but in relation to the *phronimos* man, i.e. a person who is both virtuous and clever.

Although Aristotle generally does not give clear-cut answers, he explores various ways that answers can be found. However, his “discussion is adequate if it has as much clearness as the subject--matter admits of, for precision is not to be sought for alike in all discussions” (Aristotle, NE 1094b13). For the aims of this thesis I adopt a position between the first and the third interpretation, but certainly not the second view as it distinguishes *phronesis* from virtue. Rorty (1980) notices that the problem whether *phronesis* relies on virtue to provide the ends or offers the ends itself is solved by acknowledging that the desires of the *phronimos* man are the requirements of virtue.

Moreover, Aristotle emphasizes that “*phronesis* must be a reasoned and true state capable of action with regard to human goods… *phronesis* is a virtue… and to virtue belongs virtuous activity” (Aristotle, NE 1140b20) (Aristotle, NE 1140b24) (Aristotle, NE 1098b31). In *phronesis* reason and desire are united. Earlier on we saw that the most characteristic good of a human being is one’s capacity to use reason. Subsequently, a human being who uses reason well in a lifetime is *eudaimon*.
and this is what *eudaimonia* consists in. However, in order to do anything well one requires *arete* (virtue). Similarly, “if the function of a man is an activity of *psychê* (soul) which follows or implies reason… human good turns out to be activity of *psychê* exhibiting *arete* (virtue) and if there are more than one *arete*, then in accordance with the best and most complete… in a complete life” (Aristotle, NE 1098a7) (Aristotle, NE 1098a16).

It seems that *eudaimonia* is virtuous activity in a lifetime and virtuous activities are actually the realization of the virtues that belong to the rational\(^{30}\) part of human beings’ *psychê* (soul). According to this understanding, *phronesis* is necessary\(^{31}\) for being virtuous. As Moss (2011) argues, being *phronimos* and virtuous or good is exactly the same. In other words, Aristotle says that “it is not possible to be good in the strict sense without *phronesis*” (Aristotle, NE 1144b30) and being virtuous, i.e. to act in accordance with virtue and not being in a passive state, is necessary (and perhaps sufficient\(^{32}\)) for being *eudaimon*. Therefore, it appears that being *phronimos* is necessary for being *eudaimon* and in this sense, virtue(s) is necessary for WB. Rorty (1980) also notes that the life of a *phronimos* man is *eudaimon*, however, not necessarily always.

Additionally, Aristotle says that “with the presence of *phronesis* will be given all the virtues” (Aristotle, NE 1145a2) and that “virtues do not exist in separation from one another” (Aristotle, NE 1144b34). In relation to this, Russell (2009) argues that *phronesis* is the key element that unites all virtues and rejects the view that virtues conflict. It is widely accepted that all virtues seem to involve *phronesis*, from which it can be implied that virtues form a kind of unity, even though it is rather unclear what kind of unity this is (Russell, 2009). Likewise, Rorty (1980) claims that the *phronimos* man has the same knowledge and desires as the virtuous man. Furthermore, “*phronesis* is what is fitting in relation to the agent and to the circumstances and the object” (Aristotle, NE 1122a25). How is it realized though? *Phronesis* is accomplished through the *phronimos* man. Aristotle argues that “a man has *phronesis* not by knowing only but by being able to act… and he acts voluntarily,

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\(^{30}\) The part where the ability of reason belongs.

\(^{31}\) And for some scholars *phronesis* is also sufficient for *eudaimonia* (Moss, 2011).

\(^{32}\) As I said earlier, I am not concerned here with the condition of sufficiency.
for he acts in a sense with knowledge both of what he does and of the end to which he does it, but is not wicked, since his choice is good” (Aristotle, NE 1152a13) (Aristotle, NE 1152a15).

However, various problems occur with the Aristotelian idea of *phronesis* and the *phronimos* man such the problem of circularity (Biondi Khan, 2005) which is also a general problem of the NE as discussed in the following sections. Specifically, Aristotle defines *phronesis* in terms of virtue and vice versa, e.g. “it is not possible to be virtuous without *phronesis* or have *phronesis* without virtue” (Aristotle, NE 1144b32). In this regard, one should be virtuous in order to acquire *phronesis* but simultaneously, one cannot be virtuous unless one is *phronimos*. A second problem is how to identify the *phronimos* man. As Biondi Khan (2005) observes, Aristotle does not offer any straightforward reply to this. On the one hand, there are those who are not *phronimoi*, perhaps the majority of people. However, since they do not have the excellent qualities of a *phronimos* man, how are they in a position to distinguish one who is *phronimos*? Maybe only a *phronimos* man, one or many, can recognize another *phronimos* person(s). But again, how can this be justified? To this end, Aristotle’s *endoxa*, as explained in the previous sections, may provide some sort of advice as Reeve (1999 cited by Biondi Khan, 2005, p. 50) suggests.

Next, I look at some\(^{33}\) well-known objections to Aristotelian virtue ethics that are also relevant to the topics that this thesis explores such as the problem of guidance in action, objections concerning circularity, a criticism about self-centredness and the problem of luck.

### 2.6 Some Objections to Aristotelian Virtue Ethics

After Anscombe’s (1958) paper *Modern Moral Philosophy* and the revival of virtue ethics, not surprisingly, various criticisms were raised among scholars concerning virtue ethics. However, as Athanassoulis (2016) observes, much of the work on virtue ethics so far constitutes responses to such criticisms. Obviously, it is not possible and is beyond our scope here to look at every objection in relation to

\(^{33}\) There are also the problems of teleology, conflict between virtues, utopianism etc.
Aristotle’s virtue ethics. Therefore, I particularly focus on four well-known problems as more relevant\textsuperscript{34} to the aims of this thesis.

\textbf{2.6.1 Guidance in Action}

A first problem according to Hursthouse (2012) is the application problem that is whether Aristotelian virtue ethics can provide guidance in action. For example, utilitarianism presents the principle of the greatest good for the greatest number and Kantianism provides the categorical imperative. Does the concept of meson in virtue ethics function in a similar way? We saw earlier on, for instance, that Williams (1985) discards meson as not useful at all and suggests that it is “better forgotten” (ibid, 1985, p. 35). Many scholars also notice that the criteria of “too much” and “too little” or “to feel at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive and in the right way” (Aristotle, NE 1106b20) are in practice complex, vague and difficult to understand (Lacewing, 2016). However, as Losin (1987) argues, meson is not intended to function as a guide in action, but is presented as a \textit{sine qua non} of Aristotle’s concept of arete and is also determined by the \textit{phronimos} man.

Could then a person with \textit{phronesis} (practical wisdom), who holds arete and acts in accordance with it, be such a rule or principle for guidance? Advocates of virtue ethics argue that the \textit{phronimos} man can operate as an exemplar in action which is much more flexible and context – sensitive in contrast with other theories which appear too rigid and fixed (Athanassoulis, 2016). Thus, \textit{phronesis} is necessary in order to apply any rule or principle correctly (Hursthouse, 2012). But what about those who do not exercise virtue and are not oriented towards \textit{phronesis} (practical wisdom)? Guidance from this point of view seems to be provided just to a few. On the other hand, Aristotle implies that only a few people are entirely corrupted, that is, have no sense of what is good or bad, which especially nowadays I find quite optimistic, and that most people have an understanding of the good and in order to deepen this understanding they just have to become more virtuous (Lacewing, 2016).

\textsuperscript{34} Their relevance is more clearly presented later on in the educational context where issues of implementation of this account of WB in the Scottish initial teacher education programmes are discussed.
From my perspective, this is one of many fascinating elements in Aristotle’s theory. Admittedly, human life is so complicated that simply applying a rule or a set of principles would not do. Aristotle avoids providing a fixed ‘recipe’ or ‘one size fits all’ solution and partly in this way, from the inside out, he may also avoid paternalism and oppression. In any case, just because Aristotle does not offer a straightforward set of rules, this does not mean that he does not give us any guidance in action at all. He does, but it is a different kind. Hence, Aristotle does not provide precise answers on what to do and he warns us in advance about this. Rather, he points out ways that answers can be found (Hughes, 2001) by considering “the highest of all goods achievable by action” (Aristotle, NE 1095a16) (Aristotle, NE 1098b21) both an individual point of view and a collective one.

Furthermore, Solomon (1988) argues that just because virtue ethics provide a different kind of guidance, this does not mean that no guidance in action is provided at all. The main focus of virtue ethics is on human character and since human character is a dynamic phenomenon, unavoidably the focus turns to a person’s whole life. To this end, Aristotelian virtue ethics do not use algorithms to cope with practical problems, which perhaps policy makers, governments etc. would love, but rather Aristotle seems to favour a kind of “fitness programme to get one prepared for a race” (Solomon, 1988, p. 437). Additionally, whereas both consequentialism and deontology provide principles and rules for guidance in action, there is always difficulty in applying them. Therefore, as Solomon (1988, p. 438) stresses, “easy cases are easy for everyone and hard cases are hard for all too”.

2.6.2 Circularity

Another objection raised against Aristotelian virtue ethics is that of circularity. According to Monan (1968) one finds plenty of explanatory circularities in the NE, that is, Aristotle seems to define concepts in terms of each other. This seems to belong to the wider problem of justification (Hursthouse, 2012). To mention briefly only two, there is the possibility of circularity in defining *eudaimonia* as virtuous activity and virtuous activity in terms of virtuous agent. For instance, Ackrill (1973) notes that, if *eudaimonia* partly consists in virtuous activity, one cannot explain at all why this certain activity is virtuous by arguing that it
promotes *eudaimonia*. However, Peterson (1992) says that this is not necessarily
circular and argues that “any notions which occur in Aristotelian entirely
unfolded practical advice can be arranged in an explanative sequence which has no apparent
circularity” (ibid, 1992, p. 105).

Moreover, Lacewing (2016) notices that a simple reading of Aristotle’s
sentences usually causes problems of circularity. For instance, in reading all together
that (a) an activity is virtuous if it is done by a virtuous agent in a certain situation
and (b) a virtuous agent is someone who is inclined to act in a virtuous way, the
difficulty is that we do not have a clear picture of what a virtuous activity or a
virtuous agent is and we finally get a definition in terms of each other. But the
problem may be solved by looking closer and in more detail at Aristotle’s statements.
Specifically, he notes that a virtuous activity is indeed what a virtuous agent does,
but they know exactly what they are doing and they chose the activity for its own
sake (Lacewing, 2016).

Likewise, Peterson (1992) argues that a virtuous agent is not just someone
who acts in a virtuous way, but one who acts virtuously “plus the full array of
qualifications… that is, a number of qualifying phrases such as what one ought,
when one ought, to whom one ought etc.” (ibid, 1992, p. 94). Last but not least,
Nussbaum (1980) notices that it still seems impossible to define the *phronimos*
man in a way that is separate from the changeable human way of thinking about practical
thought, but she also says that circularity issues should not discourage us as they are
usually found to some extent in any complex ethical theory (Nussbaum, 1986). She
concludes that

“In the end our feeling about the circle, as to whether it is small and pernicious or
large and interesting, will depend upon our sense of whether Aristotle has indeed
done well what his method dictates: to work through the complexities of our beliefs
concerning choice, correctly describing the conflicts and contradictions they present
and to produce the ordering that will save what we most deeply consider worth
saving” (Nussbaum, 1986, p. 312)
2.6.3 Self-centredness

Another problem with Aristotle’s virtue ethics is its primary concern with the individual’s own WB and the acquisition of virtues as part of one’s own WB and in this sense he seems to overlook others’ WB. Due to this, Aristotle’s theory is criticized as self-centred or egoistic (Athanassouli, 2016). In relation to that, Williams (1973) says that the “problem with an egoist is neither that one expresses desires nor that they are their desires, but that their desires are only for oneself” (ibid, 1973, p. 260). Similarly, Annas (1993) observes that “an ethics of virtue is at most formally self-centred or egoistic; nevertheless its content can be fully other-regarding” (ibid, 1993, p. 128). Hence, “is Aristotle a kind of egoist” or not? (Hughes, 2001, p. 172). Hughes (2001) argues that this is not true and only a narrow understanding of WB in the NE could result in such a conclusion.

As Solomon (1988) suggests, a quick reply to the egoism objection (Hursthouse, 2012) is that the objectors overlook two important elements of virtue ethics. First, they fail to see the significance of one’s own character in practical thinking and second, they overlook the virtues that one tries to integrate into one’s character. Whilst the former seems too self-centred, the latter, however, counteracts that risk. In other words, one may put one’s effort into the development of one’s character, but at the same time that effort can also make one fully concerned with others’ WB, e.g. trying to be just. Additionally, this criticism seems to be focused on a kind of imbalance between one’s concern about one’s own character and one’s concern about others’ character (Hursthouse, 2012). So one might ask, “should I have the same concern for other’s character as I have for my own?” (Solomon, 1988, p. 435).

This problem appears to be a part of the general problem of cultural relativity (Hursthouse, 2012) and it is as ineliminable in virtue ethics as it is in consequentialism and deontology (Solomon, 1988) (Hursthouse, 2012). For instance, Solomon (1988) argues, that in Kantianism the difference between duties to oneself and duties to others is found in that, whilst one can only aim at others’ WB, one must first aim at one’s own WB. Besides, in deontology one deals with one’s own actions in a different way to that in which one deals with others’ actions. The same difficulty
may be found in consequentialism. To give an example, in classical utilitarianism others’ WB is merely instrumental because any concern relating to others is essentially directed by the single criterion of maximizing human WB overall. In this sense, in both deontology and consequentialism individuals are required to deal with their own actions or motivations in a different way to that in which they deal with others’ actions (Solomon, 1988).

Finally, as Garver (2006) observes, Aristotle’s ethical virtues are in fact political virtues and as such they are necessarily others-regarding as well. Similarly, according to Eikeland (cited by Papastephanou, 2010, p. 591) “for Aristotle, even the wisest individual will be better able to think with the aid of others rather than alone.” Besides, it is not by chance that Aristotle elaborates on human relationships and virtues in relation to others, e.g. kindness, justice etc., throughout the NE. This is obvious when Aristotle states that

“Surely it is strange too to make supremely eudaimon man a solitary; for no one would choose the whole world on condition of being alone, since man is a political creature and one whose nature is to live with others. Therefore even the eudaimon man lives with others... the eudaimon man needs friends.” (Aristotle, NE 1169b17)

2.6.4 Luck

There are various responses and approaches in relation to the problem of luck in Aristotelian virtue ethics as there are with almost any objection (Nelkin, 2013). According to some “luck is the only decisive factor in having a good life, whilst in another view, a good life is totally invulnerable to luck” (Nussbaum, 1986, pp. 320, 322). Specifically, it is argued that virtue ethics leave too much space open in terms of luck, if by luck we mean good or bad things that occur in one’s life independently of one’s control and affect one’s WB (Statman, 1991). Let us recall what Aristotle says

“Eudaimonia, evidently, needs the external goods as well; for it is impossible, or not easy, to do noble acts without the proper equipment. In many actions we use friends and riches and political power as instruments; and there are some things the lack of

35 He especially devoted two whole books of the NE (viii and ix) to friendship.
which takes the lustre from eudaimonia - good birth, goodly children, beauty... for this reason some identify eudaimonia with good fortune though others identify it with virtue.” (Aristotle, NE 1099a30) (Aristotle, NE 1099b10)

According to particular understandings of virtue ethics, some accounts of virtue depend on external goods. Thus, it could be said that if an individual is subject to luck it may be unfair to praise or blame them for matters of luck that are in any case outside their control. However, how is it possible to accomplish WB if some aspects of it are beyond one’s control? Nelkin (2013) and Athanassoulis (2016) notice that some theories attempt to solve the problem of luck by setting it aside as irrelevant, e.g. deontology. On the other hand, virtue ethics embrace luck and recognize it as a widely accepted indispensable element of the human condition which in my view is both realistic and humane. Additionally, Nussbaum (1986) observes that “we can see that luck appears to have a significant ethical role, in making us able or not so able to act virtuously, and thus, to lead ethically complete lives” (ibid, 1986, p. xiv). She also recognizes the fragility of individual elements of the best human life and although Nussbaum (1986) thinks that eudaimonia is vulnerable to external factors, she also argues that “a life so vulnerable is, nevertheless, the best” (ibid, 1986, p. 10). In the next section, I briefly point out some educational implications in relation to the ideas examined so far, and I further discuss them in chapters 6 and 7.

2.7 Educational Implications

To sum up, in this chapter I argued for an account of WB that requires an account of virtue(s) from an Aristotelian perspective. Aristotle claims that WB consists in the activity of reason in accordance with virtue. In other words, WB is a virtuous activity during lifetime, whereas virtuous activities appear as the realization of the virtues that belong to the rational part of human beings’ soul. In this context, Aristotle argues that praxis is the best human activity, a kind of WB that is both virtuous and feasible. Additionally, in praxis, as Kenny (1992) observes, phronesis is a key virtue and also the practical approach to knowledge. Phronesis also appears to be unique in terms of coping with how and why questions concerning one’s WB in everyday life and is important in practical reasoning about a good to be brought
about in terms of what should be done. In this regard, Aristotle implies that in order to understand *eudaimonia* it is necessary to understand *phronesis*, therefore, in order to understand WB it is necessary to understand virtue, and thus, virtue(s) is necessary for WB.

From an educational perspective, if, for instance, “we should offer a teacher education that is not only about learning how to teach, but about learning how to learn through teaching, a teacher education for practical wisdom that helps teachers further their own self-cultivation” as Higgins (2011, p. 12) suggests, then, as this thesis argues, we should seek a concept of WB that requires virtue(s). In addition, Aristotle notes that “intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching for which reason it requires experience and time” (Aristotle, NE 1103a15). Likewise, this thesis argues for a teacher education that is not just or mainly instrumental in terms of merely learning how to teach. In Aristotelian terms, an instrumental teacher education might be a kind of *techne* (craft knowledge) that neither need necessarily be done in a virtuous way nor require that those who are learning how to teach, that is student teachers, be virtuous (Kraut, 2014) (Hoffmann, 2016). On the contrary, here it is argued that teacher education programmes should aim at cultivating teachers’ virtues which from an Aristotelian point of view means that teacher education should aim at producing *phronimous*.

In the light of this, if teachers have a main responsibility for pupils’ intellectual WB, since thinking-related virtues are basically acquired through instruction and learning, as Pakaluk (2005) notes, then teachers themselves should first acquire intellectual virtues and experience intellectual WB. As I argued in the previous chapter, who teachers are as persons and what they do as professionals should not be separated, because, basically, teachers are professionally concerned with the transformation of their pupils and the transmission of a life worth living; therefore it is a normal expectation that this life is exhibited by those who hold it (Higgins, 2011) (Carr, 1993) (Day and Gu, 2010). From this point of view, I argue that teacher education should primarily focus on teachers’ WB and help them cultivate their intellectual virtues with a particular focus on the virtue of OM, so that they also contribute to pupils’ WB. In this sense, would such an account of WB that is based on an account of virtue(s) be reasonable and possible to achieve in teacher
education programmes in contemporary times? This thesis is sympathetic to that view, however, certain conditions such as profit-seeking and political power as discussed in the previous chapter, should be taken into account in terms of achievement of this account of WB.

Next, I elaborate the argument of this thesis that an account of WB requires an account of virtue(s) and to this end, I particularly look at virtue epistemology which gives intellectual virtues a primary role for intellectual WB.
CHAPTER III

Virtue Epistemology: Intellectual Virtues for Intellectual Well-being

3.1 Introduction

This chapter, like the previous chapter, addresses the concepts of WB and virtue(s) that are connected and mutually defined from both an individual and a collective point of view. In the previous chapter I argued that according to a certain understanding of Aristotle’s ideas in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (NE), Aristotle implies that in order to understand *eudaimonia* (WB) it is necessary to understand *phronesis* (virtue), and therefore, an account of WB requires an account of virtue(s). From an Aristotelian point of view it was argued that *eudaimonia* (WB) is a virtuous activity in a person’s lifetime, and virtuous activities are the realization of the virtues of the rational part of human beings’ souls. In this context, *praxis* appears to be the best human activity and an account of WB that is both virtuous and feasible. Additionally, the key intellectual virtue of *praxis is phronesis*, that is, the practical approach to knowledge. In this regard, *eudaimonia* (WB) and *phronesis* (virtue) are connected and mutually defined. It was concluded that the concept of virtue(s) generally and that of *phronesis* in particular appear unique in terms of coping with how and why questions regarding WB in everyday life, and in practical reasoning about a good to be brought about, and this has implications for teachers and teacher education.

In this chapter, I particularly focus on teachers’ intellectual WB and intellectual virtues, and I therefore, look at the concept of virtue epistemology (thereafter VEP) because it gives intellectual virtues an essential and primary role in intellectual WB (Roberts and Wood, 2007). The basic claim of virtue epistemology is that individuals should form their beliefs in the right way, virtuously and not because of (good) luck or accidentally. In this regard, VEP focuses on how individuals form their beliefs in order to achieve credit for them and how individuals’ characteristics can support justification for their beliefs (Kawall, 2002). Moreover, VEP is explicitly oriented towards the accomplishment of epistemic goods such as
knowledge and understanding, and in this way it becomes an essential tool towards intellectual WB. It focuses on the individuals’ traits per se and how they can be good informants through the cultivation of their intellectual virtues. VEP focuses on the individual per se and what it is to be a good knower instead of what the individual knows and what knowledge is.

In this chapter, I argue for a particular kind of alternative regulative educative virtue epistemology (thereafter AREVEP). To this end, I draw mainly, among others, on Roberts’ and Wood’s work *Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology* (2007). This chapter argues for a character-based, moderate-autonomous, high-grade account of VEP that is both responsibilist and reliabilist. It is reliabilist in the sense that a perfect account of VEP should include both virtues as faculties and virtues as character traits as Battaly (2008) highlights. In this context, I argue for a VEP account that expands outside the area of traditional epistemology and its debates, does not aim at giving robust definitions of knowledge or justification and also, does not deal with standard epistemological concerns, as Kvanvig (2010) and Roberts and Wood (2007) suggest. I also draw on Kvanvig’s (2010) non-traditional epistemological ideas, especially those concerning any relationship(s) of VEP with education and other-regarding/social concerns. However, under this wide, non-traditional framework, I also attempt to bring in the ideas of other scholars, all of whom suggest that the study of knowledge and relative human goods should be expanded and connected with ethical issues as well as with the enterprise of education.

Moreover, particular emphasis is given to discussing the idea of AREVEP and its connections with the concepts of intellectual virtues and the epistemic goods, such as knowledge and understanding. In this context, intellectual virtues explicitly aim at epistemic goods and constitute the foundation of excellent epistemic activity such as reasoning and they also demonstrate strong social dimensions (Roberts and Wood, 2007). From this perspective, epistemic virtues are regarded as individual qualities that are mainly acquired through action and practice and they are “an acquired base of excellent intellectual functioning of some human activity” (Roberts and Wood, 2007, pp. 153, 215) (Baehr, 2011) (Riggs, 2010). In addition, it is argued
here that knowledge as intellectual good involves more than a narrow understanding of it as justified true belief. I also argue that epistemic goods such as knowledge, acquaintance and understanding are interconnected and therefore, should not be treated separately from one another but as a complex.

My aim in exploring all these connections is to contribute to the concept of intellectual virtue and the concept of intellectual WB and particularly as far as teachers are concerned, to make them excellent intellectual agents, so as to help children be the same. Being a teacher is a complex and multi-faceted role (Hamilton, 2014, p. 1), and as Roberts and Wood (2007) argue, in teaching the “question is not only technical, e.g. a training in specialized skills, but is also a formation in human excellence and the characteristic products of such a teaching for life are called virtues” (ibid, 2007, p. 64).

3.2 Epistemology: the Roots of Virtue Epistemology

To begin, epistemology is considered to be the theory of knowledge, that is, the systematic examination of knowledge, its nature, its origins and limitations as well as the study of truth and justification (Williams, 2001) (Blaauw and Pritchard, 2005) (Steup, 2005). The word derives from the Greek verb *epistamai*, i.e. to know, to know how to and *logos*, i.e. word (Liddell and Scott, 2016). Also, in Greek the noun *episteme* means “(scientific) knowledge, a system of understanding” and an *epistemon* is a person who acquires *episteme* (Oxford Dictionary, 2016). One of the most basic questions of epistemology is what the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge are (Craig, 1990).

In this sense, the main tasks of epistemology are (a) the constituent elements or the nature of knowledge, (b) the substantial states or sources of knowledge and (c) the limits or extents of knowledge (Blaauw and Pritchard, 2005) (Truncellito, 2007). These three areas of investigation cause debates over the analysis, sources and limits of knowledge and justification (Moser, 2002). As Steup (2005) observes, these are essential characteristics of the traditional epistemology which is belief-oriented and evidential. On the other hand, there is also the non-traditional kind of epistemology which is agent-oriented and based on one’s intellectual virtues or cognitive faculties.
(Steup, 2005). Virtue epistemology, which is particularly examined in this chapter, is considered a non-traditional epistemological theory.

Specifically, epistemology is the study of “propositional knowledge”, i.e. know-that-something-is-so knowledge, in contrast with other kinds of knowledge such as procedural knowledge, i.e. know-how-to-do knowledge, and knowledge by acquaintance or direct awareness i.e. know-someone/something knowledge (Moser, 2002) (Zagzebski, 2004) (Steup, 2005) (Truncellito, 2007) (Pritchard, 2010). According to Moser (2002), epistemologists have divided “propositional knowledge” into (a) empirical or a posteriori knowledge, i.e. knowledge that is grounded on perceptual or sensory content and uses reason (b) non-empirical or a priori knowledge, i.e. knowledge that uses reason and is independent of any experience, (c) collective knowledge, i.e. the ways that collective bodies acquire knowledge and (d) individual knowledge (Truncellito, 2007).

In a similar context, there is also discussion in relation to knowledge as having “intrinsic” and “extrinsic value” (Zimmerman, 2014). Various terms are used to refer to value as “intrinsic” such as “in itself”, “in its own right”, “for its own sake”. As Zimmerman (2014) observes, the intrinsic value of something is found in the value that this thing has for its own sake, whereas extrinsic value consists in not being intrinsic. From this point of view, what does it mean, for example, that knowledge is valuable for its own sake and, from the opposite viewpoint, that knowledge has value for the sake of something else to which it is related in some way? Perhaps Aristotle’s ideas could shed some light on this question. In Book 1 of the NE, Aristotle argues that

“If there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this) and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for at that rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our desire would be empty and vain), clearly this must be the good and the chief good.” (Aristotle, NE 1094a 19-23).

36 Social epistemology is a strand of epistemology that particularly addresses this kind of propositional knowledge.
37 VEP specifically explores this type of knowledge.
Therefore, it may be the case that what is intrinsically good is not derivatively good since it is good for its own sake and in contrast, what is not intrinsically but extrinsically good is derivatively good since it is good for the sake of something else that is good and to which it is related in some way (Zimmerman, 2014). In this chapter I am interested in a kind of knowledge and other epistemic goods that have both intrinsic and extrinsic value, that is, they are good both in themselves and for others. To this end, I look at VEP, which is a collection of contemporary approaches to epistemology that attributes a primary role to intellectual virtue(s) for epistemic WB.

Specifically, epistemology regarding the problem of what knowledge consists in replies that “knowledge is justified true belief” (JTB), and from this traditional point of view, “propositional knowledge” consists in these three individually necessary and jointly sufficient elements (Ichikawa and Steup, 2012) (Sosa, 1991). In relation to this, Moser (2002) observes that “in contemporary epistemology questions about the concepts of belief and justification attract much attention” whilst truth is less controversial (Moser, 2002, p. 4) (Ichikawa and Steup, 2012). However, this traditional definition of knowledge was challenged by Edmund Gettier (cited by Steup, 2005), who showed that JTB cannot fully elucidate knowledge and proved that JTB is incomplete (Steup, 2005). To this day, the debate on the Gettier problem remains extremely complicated and unresolved (Moser, 2002) (Shope, 2002) (Kvanvig, 2003) (Zagzebski, 2008), however, this debate was the triggering point for the birth of VEP, as is explained next.

3.2.1 Gettier’s Case: The Transition from Epistemology to Virtue Epistemology

When Gettier published his paper Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? (1963), he “challenged what was held to be the traditional analysis of knowledge so far, that is if one has a JTB that p then one knows p”, the origins of which are found in Plato and which is adopted by eminent philosophers of the 20th century (Shope, 2002, p. 29). Gettier showed that knowledge is not only JTB and that the three elements of justification, truth and belief are not sufficient for knowledge, because “some true

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38 Plato in his work Theaetetus, by the mouth of Socrates, is the first who says that “knowledge is true opinion accompanied by reason” (Plato, Theaetetus 202c).
beliefs may be supported merely by luck and therefore, they cannot be knowledge” (Gettier, 1963, p. 121).

Specifically, against the traditional definition of knowledge that Smith knows that \( p \) if and only if \( p \) is true and Smith believes that \( p \) is true and Smith is justified in believing that \( p \) is true, Gettier (1963) juxtaposed the following argument: Smith has a justified belief that Jones will get the job that they have both applied for, because the manager told him so. Smith also has a justified belief that Jones has ten coins in his pocket, because he saw them. Therefore, he infers that he who gets the job will have ten coins in his pocket. His belief is reasonable and well-justified, because it is based on a testimony and on his observation. Also, it comes out that Smith’s belief is indeed true, but not in the way that Smith believes, i.e. it is he himself who gets the job, not Jones, and it is also he himself who has ten coins in his pocket, and both these things were unknown to him. So, is his true belief that he who gets the job will have ten coins in his pocket, knowledge or not? Gettier (1963) argued that it is not, and changed epistemology discourse forever.

Pritchard (2010) also argues that the problem with the traditional definition of knowledge as JTB is that two of the three components, i.e. justification and belief, are related to the agent and only one, i.e. truth, is related to the world, and this is problematic. However, a response to the Gettier problem that knowledge is true belief that is achieved as a result of the operation of reliable (a) intellectual virtues and/or (b) cognitive faculties “clarifies knowledge in terms of the individual’s intellectual virtues and cognitive faculties and this is known as virtue epistemology” (Pritchard, 2010, p. 59).

From a VEP perspective, Smith, in order to know, would have to obtain his true belief by virtue of his reliable (a) epistemic activity and/or (b) cognitive faculties, and neither was the case. In addition, Roberts and Wood (2007) claim that the recent focus on virtues and the ways they relate to epistemic or intellectual goods puts epistemology in the right place, and that VEP in particular is a solution to Gettier’s problem concerning epistemic luck. Battaly (2008) also notes that epistemology so far was concerned with debates over rival analyses of knowledge, truth and justification, whereas DePaul and Zagzebski (2003) observe that when
Sosa’s work *The Raft and the Pyramid* (1980) (cited by Zagzebski, 2003) was published the concept of intellectual virtues appeared in a clear and distinct way and a distinctive kind of epistemology was raised with its own classification, that is, VEP (MacAllister, 2012).

Sosa (1980), in particular, tried to resolve the conflict about the problem of justification by introducing the notion of intellectual virtue. Since then, depending on “how philosophers conceive the concept of an intellectual virtue, different kinds of approaches in VEP have been developed”, as I show in the following sections (Sosa, 1980, p. 9). In this context, some virtue epistemologists argue that traditional subjects of epistemological investigation such as knowledge, rationality, truth and justification could be defined in terms of intellectual virtues, whilst others suggest that the traditional goals of epistemology could be replaced by an examination of virtues in the cognitive realm (DePaul and Zagzebski, 2003).

### 3.3 Virtue Epistemology

Virtue epistemology is a collection of contemporary approaches to epistemology that gives intellectual-virtue concepts an essential and primary role and much recent epistemological discussion concerns the concept of intellectual virtues (Baehr, 2004) (Baehr, 2011). In VEP individuals rather than beliefs are the primary objects of epistemic evaluation, and intellectual virtues and vices (evaluations of persons) constitute the basic concepts. Virtue epistemologists argue that one’s true belief should be obtained by virtue of one’s epistemic activity. In particular, VEP views intellectual virtues and vices, i.e. forms of agent-evaluation, as more important than justification, knowledge or any other kind of belief-evaluation. By contrast, belief-based epistemology argues for justification and knowledge that is kinds of belief-evaluation, instead of intellectual virtues and vices or any other forms of agent-evaluation (Battaly, 2008). In other words, instead of focusing on what the agent knows, VEP turns its focus on the agent per se. Roberts and Wood (2007) note that this is related to the way that VEP copes particularly with the problem of epistemic luck, as in Gettier’s case.
In addition, Hetherington (2014) notices that VEP is particularly related to two problems in Gettier cases, that is, luck and fallibility. On the one hand, there is significant luck in the way belief combines truth and justification, i.e. some unusual circumstance is present in the case that makes justified and true belief rather accidental. On the other hand, justification in these cases is fallible, i.e. it leaves open at least one possibility for a false belief. In order to deal with the problem of epistemic luck, VEP proposes turning the focus on the individual rather than on beliefs, especially by introducing the notion of credit on behalf of the individual (Roberts and Wood, 2007). In the case of Smith, for instance, Smith does not deserve credit for his true belief, because it was not obtained by his intellectual or epistemic activity, but rather by luck. All in all, the central question that VEP raises, and its roots go back to Aristotle, is what it is to be a good knower rather than what knowledge is (Kotzee, 2013). Virtue epistemology places the individual in the centre and investigates how one can form beliefs in order to achieve credit for them and how an individual’s characteristics can support justification for their beliefs. This is possible when individuals form their beliefs in the right way that is virtuously and not because of (good) luck or accidentally. In this way, VEP becomes an essential tool, because it focuses on the individual’s traits per se as well as how one can be a good knower through the cultivation of one’s intellectual virtues for WB.

Furthermore, VEP is criticized for over-emphasis on self-regarding virtues and over-looking other-regarding virtues which implies that it is more interested in the individual WB rather than in the collective one (Kawall, 2002). Such an individualistic kind of VEP would be problematic here, because this thesis argues for an equal concern both for individual and collective WB, in terms of teachers’ intellectual WB and then pupils’ WB. In this context it is argued later in the chapter that, although individualistic implications are found in VEP, these can be partly addressed by introducing the concept of social epistemology which focuses on social conditions for WB and on virtues in which individuals engage to share information with others (Schmitt, 1999) (Kotzee, 2013).

Also, I argue that through the particular focus on the intellectual virtue of OM, which I elaborate in Chapter 6, this thesis avoids the problem of over-emphasis
on the individual virtues and WB in VEP at the expense of collective virtues and WB, as this account of open-mindedness is related both and equally to the individual and to the collective factors. In addition, as Higgins (2011) suggests, in order to investigate how to reconcile self-interest and other-regard, I look at teaching and teachers. Based on Carr’s (1993) ideas, in Chapter 1 I argue that in teaching, unlike other helping professions such as medicine, it is impossible to separate teachers' self-fulfillment from their professional commitments. Therefore, an understanding of teachers’ intellectual WB from a VEP perspective as examined in this chapter consists in an understanding of the individual’s self-cultivation. Self-cultivation, in turn, is perceived as the cultivation of one’s intellectual virtues, and this has implications for teachers and teacher education, as I argue in Chapter 1 and further explore in the last chapter of the thesis. Just as in Aristotelian virtue ethics the concept of virtue is necessary for WB, in VEP discourse the concept of intellectual virtues is indispensable for intellectual WB. In this regard, we now need to clarify the central concept of virtues within VEP.

3.3.1 The Concept of Virtues in Virtue Epistemology

As I pointed out in Chapter 2, Aristotelian virtue ethics define virtue as a *meson* between two extremes. In this sense, virtue is an excellence and aims at *eudaimonia* or human WB. In addition, Aristotle was the first philosopher who identified a class of intellectual virtues separately from the class of moral virtues and gave them a primary role in human knowledge (Baehr, 2011) (Zagzebski, 1996). Analogously, in VEP, whose roots are found in Aristotle’s ethical theory, an intellectual virtue is regarded as an intellectual excellence and aims at intellectual WB.

Before exploring the differences between strands of VEP it is necessary to specify the common ground upon which they all build including this thesis’s AREVEP. As Hookway (2003) notes “all types of VEP share a common characteristic, that is they are approaches to basic problems of epistemology which give to intellectual or epistemic virtues a primary role” (ibid, 2003, p. 183). Baehr (2013) also emphasizes that there is a widely-held view among virtue epistemologists that intellectual virtues seem to have a general two-tier structure. Specifically, at a primary motivational level, all epistemic virtues involve a kind of love for epistemic goods. An
intellectually excellent (or intellectually virtuous) person is someone who desires and pursues epistemic goods such as knowledge and understanding. In this regard, the explicit orientation of VEP towards epistemic goods distinguishes the virtues examined in this field from moral virtues, which are explored in other areas such as in virtue ethics (Blackburn, 2001) (Baehr, 2013).

Additionally, as Baehr (2013) observes, although epistemic virtues share a common motivational basis, i.e. the love of epistemic goods, each virtue alone seems to present its own distinctive activity or psychology which is grounded on that love of epistemic goods. For example, a person who is curious is quick to wonder and ask why-questions out of a desire to comprehend the surrounding world. An open-minded person is willing to examine alternative views because he or she recognizes that in doing so it is easier to accurately understand those views and approach the matter under investigation pluralistically. Also, an intellectually courageous person tends to persist in beliefs that reasonably will lead one to the truth against all odds and despite the fact that this may cause them harm (Baehr, 2011). Next, I look at the various views and debates within VEP discourse because the kind of VEP that this thesis introduces, namely an alternative regulative educative VEP (AREVEP), combines characteristics from many different types.

3.3.2 Types of Virtue Epistemology

Beyond this shared ground, however, points of view differ. First, a significant point of dispute in VEP concerns the relationship(s) between intellectual and moral virtues. This conflict again goes back to Aristotle and the problem of the reciprocity of virtues (Bailey, 2010). In relation to the latter, Baehr (2011) identifies three strands:

“(a) the reductive thesis where no principled distinction can be drawn between intellectual and moral virtues; intellectual virtues just are or are reducible to moral virtues; while, in ordinary thought and language, we distinguish between intellectual virtues and moral virtues, this distinction is superficial and lacks any ultimate basis, (b) the subset thesis according to which intellectual virtues are a species or proper subset of moral virtues; whilst intellectual virtues are moral virtues, they are unified
in a way that sets them apart from other, more familiar moral virtues and (c) the independence thesis where intellectual virtues are not a proper subset of moral virtues; rather, they are fundamentally distinct from moral virtues” (Baehr, 2011, p. 207)

Baehr (2011) takes a position between the subset-independence thesis, whilst Zagzebski (1996), Roberts and Wood (2007) are in favour of the reductive thesis and argue that any attempt to draw a dividing line between intellectual and moral virtues is “artificial and unhelpful” (Roberts and Wood, 2007, p. 60). Others like Sosa (1991) and Greco (2002), seem to support the independence thesis. In this chapter, however, it is not my intention to draw a sharp distinction between intellectual and moral virtues and adapt a definite position. In this chapter, I only use the terms intellectual or epistemic virtues, which does not in any way exclude the moral element, and in this sense, I refer to virtues as intellectual or epistemic excellences, as explicit human characteristics, which in VEP explicitly aim at epistemic goods.

Second, depending on how virtue epistemologists define the concept of intellectual virtues, they usually support a different strand without being able to form a common and clear consensus. In particular, Greco and Turri (2011) say that although virtue epistemologists generally regard the epistemic virtues as more important than knowledge and justified true belief, they do that in two different ways. On the one hand, the theorists or conventional virtue epistemologists, such as Sosa (1991) and Zagzebski (1996), define or ground knowledge and justified true belief in terms of intellectual virtues and try to use virtue epistemological resources to approach standard problems in Western epistemology in standard ways (Battaly, 2008). On the other hand, the anti-theorists or alternative virtue epistemologists such as Roberts and Wood (2007), avoid stereotypes and standards concerning virtues and knowledge and argue that epistemic virtues are the primary and basic concepts in epistemology and can be explored in their own right drawing simultaneously on literature and history (Battaly, 2008). Likewise, from an educational point of view, Kvanvig (1992) argues that VEP should put aside standard questions of traditional epistemology regarding the nature and limits of knowledge and focus on the role that intellectual virtues can play in training and education.
Moreover, whilst virtue epistemologists agree that intellectual virtues are epistemic excellences, they disagree about what kind of epistemic excellences they are, i.e. they argue about the nature of intellectual virtues. In this context, there are two different groups (Axtell, 1997). First, there is the “virtue-reliabilist” group which argues that intellectual virtues should be understood as reliable faculties such as sense, perception, induction, deduction, and memory (Sosa, 1991) (Greco, 2002). In particular, they argue that virtue is the quality of something that enables it to perform well (Battaly, 2008) (Baehr, 2011) (Ortwein, 2012) (MacAllister, 2012). In this context, if one’s fundamental intellectual function is to reach an epistemic good, e.g. understanding, intellectual virtues are any faculties, either natural or acquired, that enable one to accomplish the target of attaining understanding (Greco and Turri, 2011) (Ortwein, 2012).

For instance, according to Sosa (1991), an intellectual virtue is “a quality that helps to maximize one’s amount of truth over error” (Sosa, 1991, p. 225). He also notes that “a person has an intellectual virtue or faculty relative to an environment E if and only if the person has an inner nature I in virtue of which one would mostly attain the truth and avoid error in a certain field of propositions F, when in certain conditions C” (ibid, 1991, p. 284). Likewise, Greco (2002) defines intellectual virtues as general cognitive abilities or powers which help one to reach the truth. Specifically, he says that intellectual virtues are “innate faculties or acquired habits that enable an individual to reach at truth and avoid error in some relevant field” (Greco, 2002, p. 287).

In contrast, the “virtue-responsibilist” group argue that epistemic virtues are traits of character, qualities of an individual that are closely identified with a person’s selfhood and not just as natural faculties which are the raw materials of the self (Code, 1987) (Montmarquet, 1993) (Zagzebski, 1996) (Hookway, 2003) (Battaly, 2008) (Baehr, 2011) (Ortwein, 2012) (MacAllister, 2012). Specifically, Code (1987) argues that intellectual virtues are “a matter of orientation toward the world, toward one’s knowledge-seeking self and toward other such selves as part of the world” (ibid, 1987, p. 20). Likewise, Montmarquet (1993) perceives intellectual virtues as qualities of an individual that desires truth. Zagzebski (1996) also states that an
intellectual virtue is “a person’s deep and enduring acquired excellence which entails the basic elements of motivation and success” (ibid, 1996, p. 137).

Also, Axtell (cited by Hookway, 2003, p. 188) contrasts two types of VEP. On the one hand, the reliabilist VEP appears to define justified belief in terms of virtuous character and explain virtuous character in terms of successful and stable dispositions to form true beliefs. On the other hand, the responsibilist VEP emphasizes the role of intellectual virtues in guiding individuals in accomplishing activities such as inquiries. Virtue-responsibilists explicitly reject virtue-reliabilists’ claim that reliable vision, memory and the like count as intellectual virtues. In this regard, virtue-responsibilists seem to construct their analyses of intellectual virtues on Aristotle’s analysis of moral virtues, i.e. they think of the intellectual virtues as acquired character traits for which the individual is to some extent responsible and their paradigms of intellectual virtue include OM, intellectual courage etc. (Hookway, 2003).

The division between virtue-reliabilism and virtue-responsibilism, however, has been criticized in a way that I also adapt in this chapter. In particular, Battaly (2008) emphasizes that disagreements about the nature of intellectual virtues are pointless and harmful, because on the one hand, there seem to be many ways towards intellectual WB and on the other, a perfect account of VEP should include both virtues as faculties and virtues as character traits, e.g. a good knower in order to reach an epistemic good let us say understanding, obviously needs both a good memory and persistence (Baehr, 2006). In other words, a person’s persistence to achieve understanding seems pointless without their good memory, and vice versa.

Another field of disagreement in VEP concerns what virtue epistemologists introduce into the notion of cognitive abilities (Pritchard, 2003). Specifically, Pritchard (2003) notices that internalist virtue epistemologists, like Zagzebski and other virtue-responsibilists, argue that a cognitive ability primarily involves some kind of appropriate reflection, e.g. whether the conditions and the environment are appropriate for the exercise of the relevant intellectual ability. In contrast, externalist virtue epistemologists, such as Greco and other virtue-reliabilists, think that intellectual abilities are often totally unreflective (Pritchard, 2003).
Particularly concerning the character-based virtue responsibilist kind of VEP which this thesis mainly draws on, Baehr (2011) (2008) observes that there are two general approaches namely the “conservative”, which addresses the notion of epistemic virtue as a way of approaching traditional epistemological problems and the “autonomous”, which focuses on epistemic virtues in ways that overlook traditional epistemological questions, but are still epistemological in nature (Baehr, 2011, p. 11). Both conservative and autonomous character-based VEP have sub-categories. On the one hand, there is the strong conservative, which gives the intellectual virtues a primary and central role in traditional Western epistemology, whilst the weak conservative gives intellectual virtues a secondary role. On the other hand, the strong or radical autonomous argues that an autonomous virtue-based approach should replace traditional approaches and that there is not an important role for intellectual virtue to play in traditional epistemology, whereas the weak or moderate autonomous do not aim at replacing traditional epistemology, but rather at enlightening issues that conventional epistemology seems to have overlooked (Baehr, 2011) (Baehr, 2008).

Last but not least, as Battaly (2008) notes, there are different voices regarding grades of knowledge. Specifically, low-grade knowledge, e.g. perceptual knowledge, is acquired passively. In contrast, high-grade knowledge is acquired rather actively than passively, as a result of intentional inquiry, i.e. it requires the individual to perform voluntary intellectual activity such reasoning, understanding etc. In this regard, virtue-reliabilism, despite the fact that it may offer a valuable yet arguable account of low-grade knowledge, seems to fail to explain high-grade knowledge. Likewise, virtue-responsibilism, although it may offer an informative yet contestable account of high-grade knowledge, seems to fail to explain low-grade knowledge (Battaly, 2008).

In this chapter, I mainly perceive intellectual virtues as character traits because, among other things, “thinking of intellectual virtues as traits of character encourages us to expand our conception of intellectual goods” (Roberts and Wood, 2007, p. 42). I also argue for a character-based, moderate-autonomous, high-grade account of VEP, which is mainly responsibilist, but it is also reliabilist in the sense
that a perfect account of VEP obviously involves to some degree an understanding of virtues as reliable faculties such as sense, perception, induction, deduction and memory, as Battaly (2008) highlights. In this context, I argue for a VEP account that expands outside the area of traditional epistemology and its debates, does not aim at giving robust definitions of knowledge or justification and also, does not deal with standard epistemological concerns as Kvanvig (2010) and Roberts and Wood (2007) suggest. To this end, I introduce the concept of an alternative regulative educative virtue epistemology (AREVEP), which I elaborate in the following sections.

3.3.3 Alternative Regulative Educative Virtue Epistemology

Let me clarify the concepts behind the terms as each of these captures something important. First, the account of VEP that I propose in this chapter is “alternative”, because it perceives virtues primarily as character traits, but also necessarily as faculties in the sense that for instance, a good informant obviously needs both their good memory and persistence in order to reach an epistemic good (Baehr, 2006). In this regard, it is alternative because it does not explicitly follow either of the two basic approaches, i.e. virtue-responsibilism and virtue-reliabilism.

Second, it is “regulative”, because it aims at providing guidance for epistemic practice that is how to conduct understanding and what to do when forming beliefs. Additionally, a regulative VEP is strongly practical and social and it is separated into two kinds: a rule-oriented and a habit-oriented, as Kvanvig (2010) and Roberts and Wood (2007) argue. In this sense, I am looking at a “habit-oriented regulative” VEP because it attempts to provide training that helps teachers towards what it considers to be right intellectual dispositions (Roberts and Wood, 2007). This conflicts with analytic epistemology, which mainly targets the production of theories of knowledge and explores definitions of the terms under investigation (Wolterstorff cited by Roberts and Wood, 2007, p. 20).

Also, it is “educative”, because in this thesis I am talking about teachers’ intellectual virtues and WB and a teacher education that aims at this. In this regard, as Higgins (2011) suggests for education in general, the account of VEP I argue for aspires to connect teaching and intellectual virtues and WB, therefore it should be
something “educative” that facilitates teachers’ intellectual WB (Higgins, 2011, p. 256). In this context, AREVEP should be used as a tool towards epistemic goods for teachers’ intellectual WB.

Next, the idea of AREVEP is further explored through the concepts of intellectual virtues and epistemic goods. My aim in exploring these connections is to contribute to the concept of intellectual virtue and the concept of intellectual WB and particularly as far as teachers are concerned to make them excellent intellectual agents, so as to help children be the same. Being a teacher is a complex and multifaceted role (Hamilton, 2014, p. 1) and as Roberts and Wood (2007) argue, in teaching the “question is not only technical, e.g. a training in specialized skills, but is also a formation in human excellence and the characteristic products of such a teaching for life are called virtues” (ibid, 2007, p. 64). In this context, I also argue in Chapter 7 for a teacher education that advocates these aim(s).

### 3.3.4 Alternative Regulative EducativE Virtue Epistemology and Intelligent Virtues

The concept of AREVEP gives intellectual virtues a primary role, mainly as character traits, because, among other things, to perceive intellectual virtues “as traits of character encourages us to expand our conception of intellectual goods” (Roberts and Wood, 2007, p. 42). In the context of AREVEP teaching, intellectual virtues, such as OM, and epistemic goods, such as knowledge, acquaintance and understanding, are interconnected constituent parts of teachers’ intellectual WB.

First, it is necessary to recall a significant difference between virtues in VEP and other areas such as virtue ethics. Intellectual virtues in VEP, as Roberts and Wood (2007) stress, explicitly aim at epistemic goods and are realized in the relevant epistemic context, whereas moral virtues in virtue ethics aim at moral good and are realized in the context of good-seeking. For example in this thesis, the intellectual virtue of OM aims, among other things, at knowledge and understanding and in this sense, it is realized in the context of knowledge/understanding-seeking. (Roberts and Wood, 2007). Intellectual or epistemic virtues also constitute the foundation of
excellent intellectual activity such as reasoning and they demonstrate “strong social dimensions” (Roberts and Wood, 2007, p. 113).

However, the way that intellectual virtues are examined here is not the only legitimate way. Earlier I mentioned, for example, virtue-reliabilism, which perceives intellectual virtues as reliable faculties or, elsewhere, virtues as skills and talents (Baehr, 2011). A crucial difference between intellectual virtues as understood here and other understandings of virtues is that epistemic virtues in AREVEP constitute individual qualities that are mainly acquired through action and practice and they are “an acquired base of excellent intellectual functioning of some human activity” (Roberts and Wood, 2007, pp. 153, 215) (Baehr, 2011) (Riggs, 2010). Additionally, a principal characteristic of a person with intellectual virtues is their desire to achieve intellectual goods, e.g. a virtuous intellectual person wants to know, to understand etc. (Baehr, 2011) (Roberts and Wood, 2007). In this context, as Robert and Wood (2007) argue, a person’s intellectual “virtues contribute to the acquisition and transmission of epistemic goods” (ibid, 2007, p. 35). Likewise, as I argue in Chapters 5 and 6, the epistemic virtue of OM facilitates a person’s acquisition of “secure” and “fertile” “intellectual functionings” for WB, both for themselves and for others. However, what epistemic or intellectual goods are related to epistemic virtues? Epistemic goods in VEP are conceived as the particular good ends/aims of epistemic activity which contribute to one’s intellectual WB, which in turn is part of an individual’s whole good life (Roberts and Wood, 2007).

3.3.5 Alternative Regulative Educative Virtue Epistemology and Intellectual Goods

According to Aristotle, the ultimate end of any good is “eudaimonia” (WB). Similarly, the ultimate end of any epistemic good is intellectual WB. In this section, I look at epistemic goods. Roberts and Wood (2007) identify three general categories of epistemic goods, namely “knowledge, acquaintance, understanding” (ibid, 2007, p. 34). They notice that what is usually called “knowledge” in the twentieth-century epistemology is perceived as a belief that is both true and justified. Nevertheless, as Roberts and Wood (2007) argue, this is a narrow view because the concept of knowledge as epistemic good involves more than justified true beliefs or
propositional knowledge. From this point of view, epistemic goods are usually interconnected; therefore, we should not look at them separately but rather as a complex. The concept of AREVEP here is sympathetic to that view.

Specifically, earlier we saw that propositional knowledge is know-that-something-is-so knowledge (Moser, 2002) (Zagzebski, 2004) (Steup, 2005) (Truncellito, 2007) (Pritchard, 2010). However, when propositional knowledge is treated as an isolated topic regardless of the knowledge that surrounds and sustains it, it becomes “artificial” (Roberts and Wood, 2007, p. 43). Unlike Zagzebski (2004) who identifies knowledge with propositional knowledge and attempts to distinguish knowledge from understanding as something non-propositional, just as traditional epistemology does, Roberts and Wood (2007) maintain that knowledge involves both propositional and non-propositional understanding. They argue that “understanding differs from propositional knowledge not in being necessarily non-propositional, but in not being necessarily propositional” (Roberts and Wood, 2007, p. 48). To give an example, in relation to non-propositional understanding, when we say that someone knows how to play chess very well, we do not mean that the same person knows some proposition about it, but that he/she understands how to play chess and he/she is acquainted with it.

In this regard, understanding appears as a deep and complex epistemic good that encompasses both propositional knowledge and acquaintance and may also appear as a condition of truth. In addition, understanding with all five senses seems to be the most essential epistemic good right after truth. In fact, Roberts and Wood (2007) observe that “something like truth is typically a condition of understanding… for example, if we think that a person’s understanding of a text is incorrect, we say that she does not understand it… Understanding in general is a rich and complicated epistemic achievement” (ibid, 2007, p. 44). They also argue that understanding is the ability to “fit things together or grasp connections” and it comes with degrees of depth (Roberts and Wood, 2007, p. 45).

39 For example, in linguistic situations someone may understand the words as sounds or syntax, but not their meaning, i.e. what do they imply or how do they fit with other sentences (Roberts and Wood, 2007)
Moreover, propositional knowledge is a fundamental epistemic good especially in education, but as Ortwein (2012) notes, to acquire as many as possible know-that-something-is-so facts may not be as significant as it is to perform an understanding concerning these facts. Besides, a thorny, and in my view paradoxical, issue in teaching and teacher education is, as I argued in Chapter 1, to give more value to the possession and transmission of propositional knowledge and skills (Higgins, 2011) rather than to the understanding of acquired knowledge and how anything one knows connects with another and the world. Especially in relation to this, the intellectual virtue of OM as illustrated in Chapter 6 can play a fundamental role, because, among other things, it helps people cultivate their critical qualities and become independent thinkers (Hare, 2006). In this sense, like Kvanvig (2003), I also stress the significance of a shift in focus from propositional knowledge to understanding in teacher education, which appears to have more long-term benefits and a lifelong value for both teachers and children.

Furthermore, Roberts and Wood (2007) liken the epistemic good of acquaintance to the condition of someone who has had “such contact and carries within him or her, via memory, aptitudes of recognition, belief formation, and understanding that are consequent on that earlier contact” (ibid, 2007, p. 51). This is the kind of cognitive advantage that we give to someone by saying, for example, that they have had a lot of experience hunting in the woods, or working in the financial markets. Like propositional knowledge, acquaintance is of great importance for teaching, but unlike propositional knowledge, it involves first-hand, personal experience.

For instance, in ancient Greek the verb “know” can be replaced either by the verb oida or gignosko (Liddell and Scott, 2016). Oida involves personal experience because it encompasses sensual experience, and it is used in cases of acquaintance, whilst gignosko is only perceptual and is associated with propositional knowledge. Thus, on the one hand, I gignosko that honey has a sweet taste, i.e. I know from what I have heard or read that honey is sweet, but I have never personally tasted it, and on the other hand, I oida that honey is sweet, i.e. I know from personal experience, because I have tasted it, at least once, that honey has a sweet taste (Sakkos, personal
communication, July, 2005). Generally, in order of strength, acquaintance is stronger than propositional knowledge, but weaker than understanding.

3.4 Limitations of Virtue Epistemology

Although the appeal to virtue epistemology appears to have advantages in relation to the concepts of intellectual virtues and teachers’ WB, it also has some limitations. In this context, it is suggested that attention should be given not only to VEP and to intellectual virtues that good informants – teachers should acquire, but also to other concepts. Particularly, if teacher education aims at helping teachers to become good informants, VEP is necessary, because it examines, among other things, what it is to be a good informant.

However, according to Siegel (2008), the role of VEP is not sufficient, and several issues should be taken into consideration, as education is a wider concept than the epistemic. Specifically, Siegel (2008) argues that education is a wider concept than the epistemic in the sense that education involves matters of “character, moral training, sociality and civic participation, and so on, all of which go beyond the epistemic” (ibid, 2008, p. 464), that is, matters that go beyond the desirable condition of being merely a good informant, which is what VEP aims at. I argue that the same applies to teacher education and teaching, which are the particular focus of this thesis, as a sine qua non of education.

Also, according to Kawall (2002), VEP appears to be too individualistic. Unlike virtue ethics, which recognize the difference between self-regarding (moral) virtues (e.g. courage) and other-regarding (moral) virtues (e.g. compassion) and appreciates both kinds equally, VEP seems to overlook the other-regarding epistemic virtues (e.g. integrity) which promote others’ intellectual WB along with individual WB, by over-focusing on the self-regarding epistemic virtues (e.g. courage) which mainly contribute to one’s own epistemic WB. However, this thesis is equally concerned with both individual and collective WB, therefore, any mere individualist approach to this appears problematic. In order to deal with these implications it is worth looking at social epistemology and virtues that share epistemic elements.
Specifically, an anti-classical kind of social epistemology (Goldman, 1999) can perhaps avoid individualistic implications found in VEP as it focuses on the social conditions in which individuals engage in order to share information with others (Schmitt, 1999) (Kotzee, 2013) which undoubtedly constitutes a crucial characteristic of education in general and teacher education in particular. However, there is disagreement about whether social epistemology actually is a kind of epistemology (Alston, 2005). In particular, Alston (2005) challenges the claim that social epistemology as presented in Goldman’s work *Knowledge in a Social World* (1999) is “real epistemology” (Alston, 2005, p. 5) and he argues that social epistemology has more in common with social sciences than with epistemology.

Although Goldman (2006) acknowledges that there is little consensus regarding the extent of the social as well as the objectives of social epistemology, he refutes Alston’s claim. Specifically, on the one hand, Goldman (2006) notes that some argue that social epistemology should have the same goals as traditional epistemology, as the latter seems to be too individualistic, and on the other hand, others more radically suggest that social epistemology should be orientated towards different traditionally epistemological areas and ultimately replace it.

Additionally, Goldman (2010) observes that the confusion about whether social epistemology is a legitimate strand of epistemology may be due to enquiries that investigate social contexts of belief and thought and generally aim at deconstructing traditional epistemic concepts rather than enlightening the nature and conditions of epistemic accomplishment or failure, and thus, are wrongly categorized under the heading of epistemology. Regarding the relationship of social epistemology with traditional epistemology, Goldman (2010) identifies three kinds, i.e. (a) revisionism, (b) preservationism and (c) expansionism.

In this context, he argues that “revisionism is not real epistemology”, and in this category he places “various social studies of science such as postmodernism, deconstructionism and social constructionism” (Goldman, 2010, p. 4). Nevertheless, both preservationism and expansionism deserve to be considered original strands of epistemology and what makes them different is that preservationism is close to traditional epistemology, whilst expansionism seeks to explore areas that are
unfamiliar to mainstream epistemology (Goldman, 2010). Kotzee (2013) also notes that over the last two decades traditional epistemology has been challenged by two different strands in the subject, i.e. virtue and social epistemology. In this regard, he also recognizes that social epistemology is a distinctive branch, yet true epistemology (Kotzee, 2013).

Also, Schmitt (1999) argues that social epistemology constitutes a distinct category of epistemology and differentiates, for example, from the sociology of knowledge or other social studies “in being conceptual and normative study, not primarily empirical, and in describing the necessary-sufficient social conditions, not just the possible social conditions of knowledge” (ibid, 2004, p. 354). In his discussion about “social conditions”, Schmitt (1999) seems to argue for a situation where there is more than one individual and, more interestingly, where two or more individuals are intentionally related (e.g. friendship) (ibid, 2004, p. 379). Besides, on the basis of the notion of social conditions, Schmitt (1999) divides social epistemology into three categories, i.e. “(a) the role of social conditions in individual knowledge, (b) the social organization of cognitive labor and (c) the nature of collective knowledge” (ibid, 2004, p. 354). Although all three attempt to explore different areas, they also try to answer whether the conditions of knowledge in various aspects are social or individualistic. In the following paragraphs, I point to some implications that the concepts examined so far may have for teachers and teacher education.

3.5 Educational Implications

Education consists in knowledge, thus, teaching and teacher education as parts of education are necessarily and strongly related to knowledge. Epistemology is also the theory of knowledge, therefore, teaching, teacher education and epistemology are necessarily connected. Additionally, Roberts and Wood (2007) argue that “the formation of excellent intellectual agents is clearly the business of schools and parents” (ibid, 2007, p. 23). Likewise, from the point of view of this thesis, the formation of excellent epistemic informants – teachers is as much a teacher’s personal endeavour as it is the business of teacher education. If teacher education programmes aim at teachers’ intellectual WB, then there is an obvious
reason to focus on teachers’ intellectual virtues so that teachers become good informants. In relation to this, Roberts and Wood (2007) highlight the importance of intellectual development through training and nurture. However, they also note that epistemology appears to be quite disappointing because

“Given the central place of knowledge and understanding in human life, one would expect that epistemology would be one of the most fascinating and enriching fields of philosophy and itself an essential part of an education for life. But the character and preoccupations of much of the epistemology of the twentieth century disappoint this expectation” (Roberts and Wood, 2007, p. 8)

Similarly, MacAllister (2012) and Siegel (2008) observe that epistemological concepts appear too abstract and vaguely focused, and for this reason they are not easily directly applicable to education and therefore, to teacher education. In this sense, I argue that VEP and particularly AREVEP can offer alternatives and new insights, and teacher education, among other things, could be an area where VEP extends the importance of epistemology as the theory of knowledge. Accordingly, a focus on teachers’ intellectual virtues, rather than on abstract definitions of knowledge, beliefs and justification, makes the concept of VEP clearly more relevant to teacher education than mere epistemological discussions, as well as an area of research that is potentially more responsive and welcoming to new concepts.

From a different perspective, Siegel (2008) notes that not only is education rich in epistemological content and relevance, but particular epistemological matters, e.g. epistemic goods and values, could well be developed in the context of education, so that thinking about education could bring significant advantages in the pursuit of epistemological concerns. Similarly, I argue that both teacher education and VEP are keen to comprehend epistemic goods and virtues and show a determination in fostering them, as formal education is, or at least should be, a social practice interested mainly in the development of intellectual goods (Siegel, 2008). Therefore, from this point of view, teacher education programmes, apart from a primary interest in VEP and AREVEP, should perhaps also show an interest in social epistemology as a more collective epistemological type (Siegel, 2008).
In this context, what epistemic goods should teachers try to achieve? The Standards for Registration (GTCS, 2012) state, among other things, that teachers should acquire knowledge and understanding which according to Roberts and Wood (2007) are two of the “three main intellectual goods, i.e. knowledge, acquaintance and understanding” (ibid, 2007, p. 34). Intellectual goods are conceived as good ends of intellectual activity which contribute to teachers’ intellectual WB, which is part of their whole good life and then pupils’ WB. In the light of this, as Hansen (2007) suggests, teacher education programmes should operate between two boundaries: “a professional, evidence-based track of what does work and an existential-normative track of how teachers understand themselves in what they are saying and doing” (ibid, 2007, p. 3). However, any epistemic goods that teachers should achieve, such as knowledge and understanding, as I argue in Chapter 1, should be acquired primarily for their own intellectual WB, and then pupils’ WB is inevitably also advantaged, because teachers’ and pupils’ WB are unbreakably intertwined. In this sense teachers’ epistemic WB is significant not only in its own right but also because it fosters pupils’ WB (Fallon, 2006) (Malm, 2009) (Gray, 2010).

However, as Resnick (2006) argues “it used to go without saying that education is toward some vision of the good life… and without a claim of the meaning of life, educational intervention is not well-justified” (ibid, 2006, p 329). From this point of view, I argue that a justification for teaching someone is needed and if that is toward a vision of the good life and WB, then teachers should be able to experience that (ibid, 2006, p. 329). Also, Goodlad (1992) notes that “the mission of teacher education is derived on the one hand, from the mission of schooling and on the other hand, from the role of teachers in advancing that mission” (Goodlad, 1992, p. 90). Accordingly, if the mission of schooling involves a vision of WB particularly for those directly involved in the educational process (Resnick, 2006), i.e. both teachers and pupils, then teacher education programmes should be concerned with teachers’ WB per se. This implies that in teacher education programmes that aim at teachers’ WB, teachers should “not only learn how to teach but also learn how to learn through teaching” (Higgins, 2011, p. 12). Particularly, from the perspective of this thesis, teacher education should aim at teachers’ epistemic WB - both for their own sake and for the pupils’ sake - and should help teachers cultivate their
intellectual virtues with a particular focus on the virtue of OM on which I will elaborate in Chapter 6.

Specifically, I focus on OM and particularly on two accounts that appear to be “the most developed in character-based VEP” (Kwong, 2015, p. 3). The first account is that of Baehr (2011), who argues that OM is a character trait that necessarily makes particular demands on the individual themselves. The second account is that of Riggs (2010), who argues that OM shows that the individual’s involvement is necessary for intellectual virtue. In addition, I specifically examine OM in relation to the individual’s strongly-held beliefs (Adler, 2004) and their “engagement in dialogue” and enquiry (Hare, 2006), which are in particular educationally significant. Additionally, I draw a parallel to say that OM is a virtue that facilitates all other virtues, and, therefore, it facilitates the acquisition of teachers’ “secure” and “fertile” “intellectual functionings” for intellectual WB (Baehr, 2011) (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007) (Roberts and Wood, 2007). In this regard, I introduce the concept of genuine intellectual OM which is both reasonable and well-informed, and becomes the link between those different discourses discussed in the thesis which use different terminology. This, however, should become clearer in Chapter 6, when I put it in the general context of WB discourse in education, and in the specific context of “subjective” and “objective” theories of WB, which is investigated in the following two chapters.
CHAPTER IV

Well-being and Education (Part One): White’s Subjective-Collective Account of
Well-being

4.1 Introduction

In the previous chapters I argued that an account of WB requires an account
of virtue(s). In order to make that connection between WB and virtue(s), I relied on
(i) Aristotle’s NE and (ii) virtue epistemology, which focuses more on intellectual
WB and connects that to intellectual virtue(s). In this context, I brought together the
old and timeless Aristotelian theory and contemporary virtue epistemology discourse
as a background to what I believe to be a full account of WB that relies on a
particular understanding of virtue. In this chapter I look at something different.

My aim in both Chapters 4 and 5 is to investigate WB discourse in education.
I am doing this because I am specifically interested in teaching and teachers’ WB,
because, as demonstrated in Chapter 1, teachers’ WB is inextricably connected to
pupils’ WB, and therefore, they are equally important. First, I approach the terms
conceptually and stress that various terms are used in the literature for the concept of
WB, the most dominant of them being “flourishing”, “happiness” and “well-being”.
In this chapter, and throughout the thesis, I consistently use the term “well-being”
because it is more general and expresses in a less problematic way the aims of this
project. Next, I look at the best-known distinction of WB theories, between
“subjective” and “objective” ones, with a particular focus on the “subjective major-
informed desire” and “objective list” theories, where the issue at stake is whether
something is good for us because we want it or we want something because it is good
for us.

In this chapter I argue that a full account of WB in education should be both
subjective and objective in equal measure. Additionally, as I argued in Chapter 1,
education is social by definition, in that there are not just individual students and
groups of children, but also individual teachers and groups of teachers among others,
who all interact with one another. Therefore, in this chapter I also argue for an equal concern for both individual and collective WB, i.e. both self-interest and concern for others should be equally important in the educational context. In order to further support these views, here, I look at White’s (2011) subjective-collective oriented account of WB and in the next chapter, I additionally examine Nussbaum’s objective-individual oriented account of WB, so that an equal balance in subjective-objective and collective-individual factors of WB is maintained in accordance with the aims of this thesis. In particular, White’s account of WB consists in three elements, namely “success”, “whole-heartedness” and “worthwhileness” which can be objectively determined. The best way to do this is by looking at the example of the arts and art critics, as “objectivity” is central to their work. It is also stressed that White’s subjective factor of WB is not the individual but a loose body of people where the most “authoritative voices” on what WB consists in are those of people who experience all kinds of goods. These people, however, are not experts in the same way that art critics are experts in their fields, but rather they are a loose body of people with “accumulated wisdom”. Education, as White (2011) emphasizes, plays a crucial role in this process, mainly because through education individuals become better – informed about WB pursuits and what WB consists in.

4.2 Well-being in Education: Terms and Concept(s)

Recently there has been an increasing interest in education for WB, and questions about WB in education in fact constitute some of the most important questions about the purpose of education itself (Suissa, 2008) (Coleman, 2009) (White, 2011) (Morris, 2013) (Thorburn, 2014). Before one starts to analyse the problem of defining WB, one faces a problem. As De Ruyter (2015) notes, not only are there different terms for and concepts of WB, but different terms may be used for the same concept. For instance, apart from the term “well-being”, two other words are dominant in the literature namely “flourishing” and “happiness” (White, 2011) (De Ruyter, 2015). Some scholars use the terms interchangeably, whilst others maintain that each of the three has a different meaning. Usually, however, “well-being” is considered a general term which covers various theories of happiness and
flourishing, and the use of one or another indicates which specific theory of WB one is defending (White, 2011) (De Ruyter, 2015).

Both “flourishing” and “happiness” go back to Aristotle and the debate about how eudaimonia is best translated. As De Ruyter (2015) notes, “flourishing” is related to objective theories of WB and “happiness” to subjective ones. However, it may also be the case that the more one thinks of subjective WB as something that could objectively be achieved, the less subjective one becomes, adopting a combined view of WB. Moreover, Brighouse (cited by White, 2006, p. 383) argues that “happiness” and “flourishing” do not have the same meaning and should not be used interchangeably because “flourishing is a richer property than happiness”. According to White (2006), however, Brighouse (cited by White, 2006) is not consistent in his view, because he sometimes brings the notions together, although he advocates avoiding that. For instance, he claims that “it is fair to assume that the evidence of what makes people happy in the real world is also evidence of what makes people flourish” (Brighouse cited by White 2006, p. 384). In this thesis, I use the term “well-being” instead of the terms “flourishing” or “happiness”, because it is more general and less problematic.

Coleman (2009) emphasizes that it is an exciting challenge to work out the different educational approaches to the notion of WB and he attempts to define it by looking at conflicting concepts of WB in the literature. Coleman (2009) observes that for some scholars “well-being” is not the same as “happiness” when “happiness” appears to be a measurable condition within positive psychology\(^{40}\). Additionally, he observes that “well-being” is not identical with emotional literacy\(^{41}\), if emotional literacy consists in “understanding and managing one’s own emotions as well as responding to the emotions of others” (Weare cited by Coleman, 2009, p. 284). Besides, Coleman (2009) argues that perhaps a line should be drawn between “mental health” and WB because mental health is mostly used by health professionals in a negative way rather than positively. Therefore, it would be better

\(^{40}\) For WB as an approximation for studying happiness see Layard, Seligman et al. (Coleman, 2009, p. 283-284).

\(^{41}\) For WB as an approximation for emotional literacy or emotional intelligence see Ecclestone and Hayes, Hall et al. (Coleman, 2009, p. 284).
to avoid using the term “mental health” in the educational context though this may be contestable (Coleman, 2009).

Furthermore, Coleman (2009) notes that WB is usually employed in discourses such as “resilience, freedom and choice, a meaningful life, high morale and job satisfaction, social and emotional aspects of learning, though from different standpoints” (ibid, 2009, p. 283). Similarly, Thorburn (2014) claims that recent educational theories on WB “focus on personal growth, relationships with others and engagement with activities of interest” (ibid, 2014, p. 206). On the other hand, Rice (2013) puts an emphasis on the individual arguing that “WB is about what is good for the individuals, what is in their self-interest and makes life go well for them” (ibid, 2013, p. 197).

Another aspect of how WB is comprehended in educational literature is reflected in a report conducted by the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE, 2008) on secondary education which shows that there are many ways to define WB. Specifically, the review was based on a definition of social and emotional WB which encompasses three aspects:

“(a) The emotional WB (including happiness and confidence, and the opposite of depression/anxiety), (2) the psychological WB (including resilience, mastery, confidence, autonomy, attentiveness/involvement, and the capacity to manage others and to problem solve) and (3) the social WB (good relationships with others, and the opposite of conduct disorder, delinquency, interpersonal violence and bullying)” (NICE, 2008, p. 6-7)

Particularly in Scotland, the new Curriculum for Excellence (Education Scotland, 2004) gives a leading role to the WB of children and of all those who belong to the educational community. “Health and Well-being” is determined as one of the core curricular areas where “learning in health and well-being ensures that children and young people develop the knowledge and understanding… they need for mental, emotional, social and physical well-being now and in the future” (Education Scotland, CfE, 2004, p. 8). Obviously, the ongoing educational reform in Scotland shows an increasing interest in educating for WB and this is welcome. However, as Thorburn (2014) suggests, “educational ambitions should be better
supported in terms of philosophical clarity, model-based explanations about how well-being may be planned and pedagogically enacted” (ibid, 2014, p. 220).

The account of WB that this thesis defends neither rejects any of these current approaches to WB nor explicitly supports them. It rather looks at the wider concept of WB in education discourse, under which various theories of “happiness” and “flourishing” reside. In this regard, the best – known theories subject to this distinction, as White (2011) and De Ruyter (2015) observe, are the subjective and objective theories of WB. The central conflict between these theories is whether some things in our life are good because we want them or whether we want them because they are good for us (Heathwood, 2014). In this chapter I argue that WB consists in both subjective and objective factors. To this end, in the following paragraphs, I begin by briefly examining the general context of these foundational concepts. Then, I particularly investigate White’s (2011) subjective-collective oriented account of WB. However, this thesis argues for a multi-faceted account of teachers’ WB that shows an equal concern for both subjective and objective factors of WB as well as for collective and individual ones. Therefore, in the next chapter, I also look at Nussbaum’s (2011) approach which is more objective-individual – oriented to compensate for the imbalance.

4.3 A Combined Theory of Well-being: Subjective-Major-Informed Desire and Objective List Theory

A central question in the study of human WB is whether it is objective or subjective, that is, whether the elements of an objective list are good merely by virtue of one’s positive attitude towards them or good independently of one’s attitude. In both Chapters 4 and 5 I argue that WB is neither merely objective in the sense that it is rooted in human nature per se nor is it merely subjective in the sense that it is entirely based on individualistic major-informed preferences (White, 2007). Therefore, a full account of WB in education should be one that combines a subjective- major-informed desire theory with an objective list theory of WB. In addition, I argue that both self-interest and concern for others in the educational context are equally important, because in education not only individual pupils and groups of pupils are involved, but also individual teachers and groups of teachers etc.
who all depend on and interact with one another. Therefore, a full account of WB in education should also place an equal emphasis both on the individual and on collective factors of WB.

To this end, first in this chapter, I examine White’s subjective (major-informed desire)-collective account of WB. However, I argue that White’s account is insufficient for the aims of this thesis, because he gives too much emphasis to the subjective rather than the objective factor, and to the collective rather than the individual. Therefore, in the next chapter, I also explore Martha Nussbaum’s objective-individual account of WB, which emphasizes the objective and individual aspect of WB. Let me now elaborate the concepts.

### 4.3.1 Subjective Major-Informed Desire Theory of Well-being

To begin with, a challenge to the objective view of WB is the belief that it is necessary for individuals to have a positive attitude towards something, i.e. to want, like, desire, care about something in order for it to be beneficial for them or for something itself already to involve their positive attitude towards it (Heathwood, 2014). As Heathwood (2014) notices, according to one aspect of “desire theory” or preference satisfaction theory, WB consists in satisfying one’s desires. This view is popular among economists, obviously because this way WB is more easily measured through people’s choices in the markets.

However, sometimes we want things that are not or turn out not to be good for us. In other words, how does satisfying these false or “ill-informed” desires contributes to one’s WB? Subjectivists maintain that personal WB can be achieved through the satisfaction of one’s major informed desires (White, 2002). On the one hand, White (2002) observes that desires are described as “major” because an individual’s desires are usually hierarchically structured. For instance, a person’s desire to abuse others or take drugs because this makes them happy and gives them satisfaction is obviously a false or “ill-informed” desire. To give another example, someone’s desire to eat sugar does not have the same significance as the same person’s desire to be healthy and fit. In this sense, one’s desires should be hierarchically structured and the “major” ones, e.g. staying healthy and fit instead of consuming sugar, should prevail. On the other hand, there are many kinds of desires,
such as desires about oneself (“self-regarding), desires about one’s entire life (“global”) and desires about one’s desires (“second-order”) (Heathwood, 2014). Thus, people can accomplish WB, if they pursue what they primarily desire, i.e. WB consists partly in pursuing one’s “major” desires. Additionally, desires should also be “informed” because it is possible that major desires are based on misleading or insufficient understanding, so, one should take into account every effect in satisfying one’s desires (White, 2002).

Some problems that arise in desire theory relate to its scope and to desires which may change over time. Regarding the former, one could argue that desire theory should be limited just to one’s own life and not apply to others’ lives. It should also exclude desires the fulfillment of which one is unaware. In relation to the problem of changing over time, desire theory should look only at what happens at the time of desire and not at events before or after that (Heathwood, 2014), which I think is meaningful from an individual point of view, but perhaps not from a collective one, where many individuals are involved and can be affected by others’ desires during, before and/or after, as happens in education. The next part briefly discusses two other approaches to subjective WB, i.e. pleasure and positive emotions, are shortly discussed as well as how they might be related to the major-informed desire theory that particularly interests us here.

4.3.1.1 Subjective Major-Informed Desires, Pleasure and Positive Emotions

First, it is necessary to say a few things about the nature of pleasure. As Heathwood (2014) summarizes, according to the “felt-quality or emotional theory”, pleasure is just a feeling among others which one may or may not want and, if pleasure is good, then it is an objective good and hedonism turns out to be an objective theory of WB. In the “attitudinal theory”, pleasure is or involves an attitude, and if the pleasure is good then it is a subjective good and hedonism is a subjective theory of WB. Second, another dominant approach to subjective WB is that of “positive emotions”. Positive psychology in particular explores this concept and psychologists begin with “measuring, e.g. through individuals’ self-reports, what is best referred to as subjective WB” (Van Hoorn, 2007, p. 2). Specifically, Diener, Oishi and Lucas (2009) state that
“Researchers who study subjective WB assume that a fundamental element of the good life is that individuals like their life. Subjective WB here is particularly defined as individuals’ cognitive and affective WB, i.e. the presence of positive and the absence of negative effects and evaluations of their life. In this sense, subjective WB is a wide concept that involves experiencing pleasant emotions, low levels of negative ones and high life satisfaction. The positive experiences of subjective WB are a central topic of positive psychology because they make life rewarding.” (Diener et al., 2009, p. 63)

Moreover, recent research shows that there has been huge progress in psychologists’ understanding of the factors that influence individuals’ subjective WB (Van Hoorn, 2007) (Easterlin, 2003). Besides, as Easterlin (2003) notes, using methods that give the concept of subjective WB an empirical and measurable content improved by progress in information and communication technology, subjective WB research has attracted increasing attention from markets, economists, politicians and policy-makers. In attempts to define human WB there is almost no agreement among scholars over a single definition of human emotion and pleasure (Van Hoorn, 2007). Taking into account the descriptions given above, it seems that desire, pleasure and emotion are closely related and perhaps in some instances overlap. However, the subjective factor of desires as understood in the WB account of this thesis differs from mere desires, informed desires, major desires, mere pleasure and emotions in that they are both major and informed.

Furthermore, it is a widely-held view that emotions and pleasure can be found and observed outside human beings, e.g. dogs seem to enjoy cuddles and treats and they also seem to feel guilty when they are scolded for misbehaviour, whereas they are not widely believed to possess the ability to reason at least as far as we know and in the particular way that human beings demonstrate reason. In this connection, following Aristotle’s ideas as discussed in Chapter 2, it is also widely accepted that perhaps the most characteristic good of human beings is their capacity to reason and if they reason well they are able to form informed and reasonable desires, i.e. to know what they want, why they want something and how this can contribute to their WB. Hence, if an individual’s desires are hierarchically structured, I argue that an account of WB should be related to one’s major desires, which are also informed and
reasonable in order to avoid misleading or insufficient understanding, and this in turn relates to one’s ability to reason well.

In this regard, in Chapter 5 I argue that the virtue of OM can play a crucial role both in informing major desires and in reasoning well, because they share some common characteristics. For example, OM involves “rational assessment and evaluation and also involves adjusting one’s beliefs or confidence levels according to the outcome of this assessment” (Baehr, 2011, p. 154). Additionally, OM is descriptive in that it provides information about how things are and it is normative because it informs us about how things ought to be; it is also detailed and able to give answers to what, why and how questions, such as why an excellent informant should be open-minded anyway (Riggs, 2010). Also, OM is central to enquiry and seriously engaged in dialogue, as well as being closely related to self-knowledge and self-monitoring (Hare, 2006). Being “informed”, or “well-informed” as White (2011) emphasizes later on, and reasoning well are closely related to all these elements, among others. Next, let us look at the other side of the spectrum, which is objective theories of WB.

4.3.2 Objective List Theory of Well-being

It is believed that education should aspire and help anyone being educated to lead a personally fulfilling life (White, 2002) (White, 2007). However, what is meant by that is contested. Is it possible to compose an objective list of elements for individual WB which applies to all individuals being educated, regardless of how desirable or pleasant these elements are? Or is WB a subjective issue that merely consists in the satisfaction of an individual’s desires and pleasures? Different answers to these questions have significant implications for education. This thesis argues that a better theory of WB in education is a combined one that consists in both subjective-major-informed desire theory and objective list theory. According to the objective view of WB certain things are good for individuals independently of their particular interests, likes and cares (Bradley, 2014) (Heathwood, 2014). Objective list theories are usually understood as theories of WB that list elements which consist neither in mere pleasurable experience nor in desire-satisfaction. In other words,
objective list theories claim that “all instances of a plurality of basic objective goods directly (or non-instrumentally) benefit people” (Rice, 2013, p.197).

But what should go on the list? For instance, objective lists of educational WB usually contain among other things knowledge, autonomy, enjoyment, being respected, achieving one’s goals etc. (White, 2002) (Heathwood, 2014). A first objection when creating such lists is why certain things rather than others are included on the list. Crisp (2013) argues that this is not a problem for an objective list theory on the grounds that it can be seen as “enumerative and not an explanatory” theory, i.e. it simply gives a listing of all objects that belong to the concept of WB and it does not have to explain why certain objects are on the list and others are not. Similarly, White (2002) notes that it is one thing to compose objective lists of individual goods and another to demonstrate their objectivity. Therefore, according to Crisp (2013) what makes a particular element on the list good, e.g. knowledge, is that “it is good in itself and explanation should stop there”. In my view, Crisp’s response to this problem is unsatisfying and weak. In particular, following the question of what should go on a list (say x), the question of why x should go on the list inevitably arises. The view that x “is good in itself” carries its own problems, but let us suppose we agree on that. Unless it is clarified what exactly its specific good is in relation to a specific aim, x appears either weak or pointless.

To give an example, let us say that OM is good in itself and as such it should be included in an objective list of WB. To stop investigation there, as Crisp (2013) suggests, is problematic. First, we should look at why such a list is conducted, that is, what are its particular targets, e.g. its goal may be an account of WB that shows an equal concern for the individual and the collective. Second, it is necessary to agree on a definition of OM so that we all have a common understanding of what OM consists in. In this context, it is important that a definition of x encompasses similar elements to the aim(s) of the list, obviously beyond being “good in itself”. Third, it should be clarified how, if so, OM is related to the specific aim(s) of the list. If it is not related, then, I believe it should not be included, whether “it is good in itself” or not.
Hence, it is one thing to say that an explanation of why something should be included on an objective list is a kind of work in progress and a completely different thing to say, as Crisp (2013) does, that there is no need to provide such an explanation. In this sense, if an objective list theory should be adapted in teaching, first the aim(s) of such a list should be clarified, let us say pupils’ WB. Second, there should be an agreement through dialogue especially between all those involved, e.g. teachers, students, teacher educators, policy-makers etc., regarding the elements of the list. In this regard, those who are involved should agree on a common understanding of the elements and then, arguments should be provided by all regarding why something should be included on the list or not and the best arguments should prevail. From this point of view, as shown in Chapter 5, OM appears as a facilitating virtue necessary for fertile dialogue.

A second objection against objective list theories of WB is how the elements in the list are rated. Why, for example, is component x more essential than component y? This is similar to the problem mentioned above. Bradley (2014) suggests that rather than just jumping into intuitive judgments about the significance of certain elements, it would be better to find a general principle for objective lists that can inform us what components should be included and why as well as how these can be evaluated once they are included on the list.

Moreover, I think that Aristotle’s function argument can shed some light on both the problems that objective list theories face. Specifically, if the main characteristic of human beings is the activity of reason and if human good is the ability to reason well namely in accordance with virtue, then it could be the case that any elements of an objective list theory of WB should be characterized by their potential and/or actual contribution to the activity of reason in accordance with virtue and their evaluation should be based on the extent to which each element contributes to the activity of reasoning well. In particular, we saw in Chapter 2 that in Aristotle’s view virtues are necessary to WB because WB is a virtuous activity and virtuous activity is the realization of virtues of the rational part of the human soul. Accordingly, we could say that an objective list for WB generally requires virtues as elements and an objective list for intellectual WB would require intellectual virtues in particular.
Hence, let us suppose there is a final convergence on what should be included on the list and in what order. Another problem arises, that is, who is the most appropriate to take such decisions and in what ways? According to White (2007) “there are not any experts or authorities in relation to what a flourishing life consists in”, if an expert is supposed to be one that knows everything about WB and if authority is someone who has the legitimate right to impose on others what he/she considers to be best for their WB. Again, Aristotle’s ideas can be enlightening that is some people are generally in a better position than others to comprehend WB goods because of their ability to reason well, their knowledge and their experience. For instance, doctors are usually in a better position to understand issues related to health than fishermen and in turn, cardiologists are usually in a better position to comprehend issues related to the heart than ophthalmologists, but all, to a greater or lesser degree, have some understanding of health. In a similar line of thought, White (2007) argues that since there are not WB experts per se, all individuals’ voices are or should be heard in the context of WB, however, to a varying extent. I elaborate White’s ideas later in the chapter. In the next section, two other approaches in objective WB, i.e. pleasure and perfectionism, are briefly discussed in relation to the objective list theory.

4.3.2.1 Objective List Theory, Pleasure and Perfectionism

An alternative to the objective list theory of WB is objective hedonism, according to which the only elements of WB are pleasure and pain, where pleasure is the positive element and pain the negative one (Bradley, 2014). Prima facie, hedonism seems to be a kind of objectivism as pleasures make one’s life better and pain makes it worse, regardless of one’s attitude towards pleasure or pain. In this sense, i.e. assuming that pleasure is a different kind of feeling not reducible to desire, hedonism is a version of objective WB.

Nevertheless, Bradley (2014) notes that, if we think about pleasure in a different way, then hedonism becomes a subjective kind of WB. That is whether a feeling is a pleasure and contributes to a person’s WB, depends on the attitude of the individual who has the feeling. Anti-hedonists, however, would argue that not every pleasure is good and there are things other than pleasures that are good. From my
perspective, objective hedonism may not be so different from objective list theories in the sense that they both have objective elements of WB. Specifically, the former recognizes two objective components for WB, namely pleasure and pain (Bradley, 2014), whilst in the latter more components are included and new ones can be added or taken out (Nussbaum, 2011) (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007).

Furthermore, perfectionism is considered to be another dominant objective theory of WB (Bradley, 2014). Specifically, according to perfectionism “what is good for us is determined by what kind of things we are; for example, in a society where people are treated as less than fully human, those people may fail to perfect their nature which is a tragedy for them” (Bradley, 2014, p. 8-9). However, I think that instead of being antagonistic to the other objective theories, perfectionism could be viewed as a way to provide solutions, to some extent, to the objections discussed above. To be more specific, like in the problems of what WB consists in or what the aims of education are, that constitute perpetual problems to which there is not a single answer, the definition of perfectionism in terms of human nature seems problematic because there is not a single view concerning what human nature is. Nevertheless, perfectionism could provide a criterion for objective list theories in terms of what should be included on the list, why and in what order, and in this way operate in a supplementary manner. For instance, a criterion might be what is good in order to perfect human nature and on this, again, Aristotle’s function argument and the activity of reason as discussed above and particularly in Chapter 2, can shed some light.

In relation to all three, i.e. perfectionism, human nature and education, it is worth quoting Democritus (1948) who said that nature and instruction, that is teaching, are similar as instruction transforms humans and in transforming them it creates humans’ nature. However, Kazepides (1979) notes that “a lot must be said about the nature of teaching which in turn would enable human nature to flourish” (ibid, 1979, p. 63). In a similar line of thought, in this thesis I argue that teachers, teaching and students cannot be seen separately from one another, because teaching requires somebody to ‘deliver’ it, i.e. teachers, and also someone to ‘receive’ it, i.e. students. Teaching also aims at students’ WB, but as argued in Chapter 1, teachers’
and students’ WB is inextricably connected, therefore, I argue that “a lot must be said” about teachers’ WB in education.

4.4 White’s Subjective-Collective Account of Well-being

It is a widely – held view that one of White’s most important contributions to educational theory and practice is his work on WB which over the years took an objective-subjective form that has both individual and collective at its core (De Ruyter, 2015) (Siegel, 2015). According to White (2011) WB is a “successful and whole-hearted engagement in worthwhile activities and relationships” (ibid, 2011, p. 109). As is shown next, White argues for a subjective-major-informed desire account of WB and objective goods. However, White’s (2011) idea of subjective does not focus on individuals’ major-informed desires, but on what a group of people desires. In this sense, De Ruyter (2015, p. 88) observes that his account of WB is “inter-subjective” rather than (individual-) subjective. Thereafter, in the chapter, I refer to White’s account of WB as subjective-collective. In the following section, some of White’s most significant ideas on WB are discussed, i.e. “success”, “worthwhileness”, “whole-heartedness”, “objective goods” among other things and “a wider transformation in the social, political and economic realm” which are elaborated in his work Exploring Well-being in Schools (2011) and which this chapter mainly draws from.

4.4.1 Well-being beyond the Basics

First, let me clarify that White (2011) uses the terms “well-being”, “flourishing” and “fulfillment” interchangeably. However, for the sake of clarity and consistency I only use the term “well-being”. Second, whereas White’s ideas mainly concern children and schools, my concepts relate to teachers and teaching. So, what does WB mean once a person’s basic needs such as food, housing, health, income, education and freedom are met, if anything? The answer to that is far from clear. According to White (2011) “we need to go beyond the basics, which may provide the necessary for WB, but what exactly is WB is still in question” (ibid, 2011, p. 28). It is apparent throughout White’s work that his purpose is beyond mere survival and to
this end, he begins with an examination of the most commonly held views of WB to conclude with the most promising ones, a method that reminds us of Aristotle.

As White (2011) observes, a popular modern view of WB is that it entails being famous in wider circles than close relationships. Only a few people, however, can be famous, so in this sense everyone else is excluded from WB. Being rich and able to buy whatever one desires is another popular view of WB. However, if education, health and income, for example, which are basic goods for all, can be bought, those who cannot afford them are excluded from WB. Apart from the problem that fame and positional goods do not have intrinsic value in themselves, they “may also be at the cost of others’ WB” in terms of accumulation and leaving less for the rest (White, 2011, p. 37). Besides, something must be wrong with an account of WB if, in order to promote it, things become worse for other people. In this regard, White (2011) stresses the need to protect children from the cultural tsunamis of fame and wealth so as to give them the opportunity to form a more balanced view of WB.

Moreover, another popular view of WB is based on “pleasure-seeking” (White, 2011, p. 42). Drawing on his experience in Britain, White (2011) notices that Bentham’s ideas about WB as pleasurable experiences and the moral duty to promote the greatest happiness have been revived in recent years through the work of the economist Richard Layard (cited by White, 2011) who grounded his happiness agenda into governmental policy in 2000. In relation to this, White (2011) argues that in many instances enjoyment may come without pleasurable feelings, and that WB is not necessarily tied up to happy feelings, which usually last for a short time. Although White is not against the idea of pleasure in general, he emphasizes “the difference between the sensation sense and the activity sense of pleasure” (White, 2011, p. 46) and encourages teachers to help their pupils to go beyond popular visions of WB in pleasurable exotic food, drink, sex etc. (White, 2007) (White, 2011). I would add that teachers themselves have to be beyond these popular views of WB in order through teaching to help children themselves go beyond them. Even more, I argue that teachers’ WB requires a particular understanding of virtue and then there is really one virtue that teachers have to have, as explored in Chapter 5, and that is OM because it facilitates their WB and, therefore, pupils’ WB too.
So, if fame, wealth and pleasure as some of the most popular views of WB nowadays do not meet the criteria for WB according to White (2011), what might WB consist of? White replies that WB is a “successful and whole-hearted engagement in worthwhile activities and relationships” (White, 2011, p. 109) (White, 2011b) (White, 2007) (White, 2002).

4.4.2 The Significance of Success for Well-being

Let us begin with White’s (2011) notion of “success”, that is, in getting what one wants. “Desire satisfaction” or “success” in one’s goals is undoubtedly related to human WB. However, sometimes, the satisfaction of one’s desires makes one’s life worse rather than better, or it may be the case that two or more desires contradict one another, although they contribute to one’s WB. “What happens in that case?” White asks (White, 2011, p. 49). Success is crucial for WB, but only conditionally. Specifically, White (2011) suggests that desires should be limited to those that have some significance to the individual’s life, namely to desires that they are not willing to give up easily. In this sense, if desires are hierarchically structured, then the most significant are the ones near the top, that is, major desires.

Additionally, something about knowledge should be added to the desire satisfaction account, in that desires should be “well-informed” in order to contribute to one’s WB. However, White (2011) also draws attention to issues of paternalism, a danger when one’s “desires are both personally important and well-informed” (ibid, 2011, p. 50). Put differently, paternalism can be avoided, if an individual’s desires are important for them personally and not because somebody else says so and if one’s desires are not the result of misleading or insufficient understanding. All this is summarized in one term, which is that desires for WB should be “well-informed”. I think that White adequately mitigates the dangers of paternalism and authoritarianism on children by suggesting they have as many as possible actual and imaginary experiences of what WB may consist in as well as by targeting the development of pupils’ critical understanding so as to be well-informed and autonomous agents (White, 2011).
Specifically, White (2011) maintains that a conflict between two goals of WB can be dealt with a pre-requisite of “autonomy” on the one hand and a kind of disposition formation on the other hand. Let us explain. Being autonomous is a part of human WB and it is related to an individual’s knowledge of their various options (White, 1991) and having knowledge of various options for WB has to do with induction into WB pursuits (White, 2006). All this implies that, if children have to be inducted into WB pursuits to become autonomous, this means that they are not fully there yet. In particular, all things being equal, the younger they are the less knowledge they have about their options. Thus, an induction, a kind of apprenticeship may give them the understanding and the experience required to make choices (White, 2011). In addition to this, White (2011) turns his attention to the problem of what sort of education would fit this kind of well-informed, autonomous individual who is the final authority on their own WB. He points at a kind of education that does not merely map out possible lives ahead, but also gives children lots of experience of what WB means, now and into the future, by inducting them into WB pursuits themselves (White, 2011).

White’s suggestions are also interesting in relation to teaching, teachers and teacher education, which is a particular focus of this thesis. Specifically, if teachers are trained to develop further, does that mean that they are not fully teachers yet? Does it mean that the options out there are numerous, so teachers should expand their knowledge and understanding required to make “well-informed” choices for their WB, and thus, for pupils’ WB? If this is the case, what sort of teacher education would teachers who are the final authority on their WB? This thesis argues that the answers to these questions can be found in an account of intellectual WB that relies on an account of intellectual virtue as discussed in Chapter 5. From this point of view, there is a whole open space for teachers to explore what intellectual WB means, if teacher education programmes help teachers be open-minded in order to accomplish epistemic goods such as knowledge, acquaintance and understanding, and in this way to induct them into WB pursuits themselves.

Additionally, in helping children into WB pursuits, White (2011) suggests that “the literary arts, including fiction, drama and film, are ideal media for introducing us to valuable relationships and activities of all sorts that we have not
experienced first-hand” (ibid, 2011, p. 65). However, in the case of teachers, I think that philosophy may be even more ideal. Specifically, since I am looking at an account of WB that relies on virtues through (i) an Aristotelian perspective which is necessarily related to the activity of reason and (ii) a virtue-epistemological background which aims at epistemic goods, philosophy, in my view, is more appropriate for teachers’ induction into such an account of intellectual WB pursuits, and an account of OM as genuine, reasonable and well-informed, as presented later on in the thesis, is an intellectual virtue that facilitates intellectual WB overall. The significance of philosophy in this context should be regarded as an idea that may be worth future investigation, it is not possible to elaborate here, since this aspect is beyond the scope of this thesis.

Furthermore, White’s justification of autonomy as an educational aim relies on its relationship with the concept of WB. He maintains that “being autonomous is an element of WB in a democratic society” (White, 1991, p. 24). However, both Siegel (2015) and Pring (2015) raise concerns from different viewpoints in relation to White’s idea of WB as an overarching educational goal and autonomy as a subsequent one. Siegel’s (2015) worry is that “taking the promotion of pupils’ WB as the overall aim of education may threaten pupils’ autonomy in terms of imposing a particular understanding of WB on them” (ibid, 2015, p. 121).

Also, he argues that, if White tries to give autonomy a general justification in its role as an educational aim, this would be problematic, because in non-democratic societies autonomy cannot be justified as such (Siegel, 2015). However, I think that White (1991) only states something obvious in saying that autonomy is a characteristic of WB in democratic societies, because in a non-democratic society, e.g. Saudi Arabia, the concept of WB itself, and therefore of any idea that relates to it, e.g. autonomy, does not exist at least in ways discussed in this thesis. Thus, Siegel (2015) suggests that White should be explicit in restricting his account of WB and autonomy in certain circumstances, which I think White does, but perhaps not in a bold way. In this sense, obviously, it is reasonable to clarify that the account of WB that requires virtues as argued in this thesis is also restricted to the educational environments of truly democratic societies where the individual and social WB are
highly and equally valued. Whether our Western societies nowadays are truly
democratic and equally value individual and collective WB or not is a contested
matter. In this project, clearly, I assume they are, at least up to some point, so that the
concept of WB can find fertile ground for further exploration and implementation.

Siegel (2015) nevertheless, insists that there should be a way of getting a kind of
universal justification of autonomy as an educational aim in any society, if
autonomy is separated from the notion of WB. From my point of view, Siegel’s (2015) observation would be more meaningful if he provided justification on the problem of what makes autonomy a distinctively human characteristic that deserves to be respected per se and not in relation to WB, which he does not. For instance, let us say, according to Siegel’s (2015) remarks, that if teachers deal with children as ends in themselves and respect them as individuals per se, they (should) cultivate their autonomy regardless if autonomy contributes to pupils’ WB. However, in non-democratic societies, this may entail grave dangers for pupils’ WB in various ways, whereas in a democratic society the opposite usually applies. Therefore, I think that a universal justification of autonomy as an educational aim per se regardless of WB may not be possible or meaningful at all.

From this perspective, it seems that White’s notion of autonomy is closely related to “success” the significance of which in WB is unquestionable. However, De Ruyter (2015) notes that White (2011) does not give a full description of success in his account of WB. Specifically, White seems to imply that something is successful only if it is accomplished in the way in which it is intended, which does not take into account various gradations of success in the same worthwhile activity (De Ruyter, 2015). Also, there seems to be a subjective part in White’s objective account of WB which complicates matters, which is that the individual should be able to confirm their WB and their feelings should be harmonized with the successful worthwhile activity or relationship. However, De Ruyter (2015) argues that different individuals usually value and rank an activity or relationship differently, so a successful worthwhile activity that is extremely important for one may be less important to another. Additionally, often in real life people may be successful in worthwhile activities and relationships, nonetheless, they may not be in a position to confirm
their WB and harmonize their feelings with these, due, for example, to periods of psychological distress.

Unsurprisingly in the context of WB, various problems must be addressed in relation to White’s (2011) ideas, where he maintains that a revised desire satisfaction account of WB is appropriate for our society. However, he argues that desire satisfaction is not enough, since WB apart from being “successful” and “well-informed”, equally importantly requires “worthwhileness” and “whole-heartedness” (White, 2011). Let us see what these mean and why they are necessary to White’s account of WB.

4.4.3 The Requirements of Worthwhileness and Whole-heartedness

First, White (2011) notes that pupils need from an early age to spend time in whole-hearted pursuits that they enjoy, and education should help them to experience WB now, while they are children, not in the future or just in their life as adults (White, 2009). Importantly, White (2011) (2009) points out that it is not realistic to experience all kinds of worthwhile pursuits and, to this end, imagination can play a vital role. Through literature and the arts pupils may experience all sorts of activities and relationships which it is not possible to experience directly, providing them not just with the relevant knowledge but with feeling(s) as well. In relation to teachers, however, I argued earlier that philosophy may be more appropriate in a context of an account of WB that requires an account of virtues.

Moreover, in order to exclude meaningless activities, which may be what one wants and gets, i.e. the desire satisfaction criterion is met, but do not contribute to their WB, White (2011) adds the criterion of “worthwhileness as necessary to WB” (ibid, 2011, p. 58). However, what makes an activity worthwhile? White (2011) claims that one must deal with this problem with genuine and practical, not philosophical, doubt, which is usually endless and therefore, unhelpful. Having said that, White (2011) does not imply that we must rule out philosophical enquiry completely. In other words, he maintains that it is not difficult to think of intrinsically worthwhile activities or relationships that contribute to human WB, not
just as a means to an end but also valuable and worthwhile in themselves and apparently, they should be successful (White, 2011).

White (2011) emphasizes that his account of WB owes a great deal to Joseph Raz (cited by White, 2011), who first talked about three additional elements to the concept of WB. A first element is “whole-heartedness”, i.e. to lose oneself in the relevant activity or relationship that contributes to one’s WB (White, 2011, p. 60). Second, education for WB should not be restricted to academic subjects but primarily “develop a range of personal qualities” which apart from “success” and “whole-heartedness” may include other elements such as determination\(^{42}\), courage\(^{43}\), persistence\(^{44}\), good judgement\(^{45}\), temperance\(^{46}\) and many others (White, 2011, p. 61).

Third, “good luck” seems to be an additional characteristic, necessary to WB and, in this sense, White (2011) argues for the need to make life opportunities more equal and accessible to all within society, so that WB becomes possible for many and not just for a few.

The second and third characteristic in particular are more relevant to and support other parts of this thesis’s argument. Briefly, in Chapter 1 and 2 I argued for teachers’ WB, a particular account of WB that relies on a particular understanding of virtues. In this sense, as in White’s (2011) claims above, it was argued in Chapter 3 that teachers’ intellectual WB “should not be confined to academic subjects” (ibid, 2011, p. 61) but primarily develop a range of intellectual virtues such as “intellectual courage”, “intellectual perseverance”, “intellectual honesty”, “intellectual integrity” etc. (Greco and Turri, 2011) (Baehr, 2011) and, in particular, should develop the intellectual virtue of OM. Unlike White (2011), however, who talks about “good luck”, drawing on Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) in Chapter 5, I argue that teacher education should provide “genuine opportunities” for WB to all teachers, both for themselves and for children, and that teaching teachers to be open-minded in particular, as presented in Chapter 5, is a way to facilitate teachers’ WB and then pupils’ WB.

\(^{42}\) i.e. decisiveness to bring to a completion what one wants
\(^{43}\) i.e. be strong enough to deal with physical and non-physical fears
\(^{44}\) i.e. continue against all odds
\(^{45}\) i.e. make proper decisions in any context
\(^{46}\) i.e. “the intelligent regulation of one’s bodily appetites” (White, 2011, p. 61)
White (2011) (2002), drawing on Raz, claims that WB depends on a desire satisfaction condition that is worthwhile for a loose group of people, which constitute a kind of culture or tradition within time and that the individual is not the final authority on their own WB. However, De Ruyter (2015) notes that, on the one hand, an individual’s WB presupposes that they are in a position to give meaningfulness to the good things that are important to all human beings and, on the other hand, a person’s WB also depends on their ability to take full advantage of their capabilities to have an optimal development. Both these two characteristics appear to be individual-dependent (De Ruyter, 2015). Besides, there is always the possibility of existing somewhere in the middle, i.e. “being agent-neutral” (De Ruyter, 2015, p. 92). All this suggests that there are kinds of goods that are good for all but not optimally developed yet, and individuals should move towards them (De Ruyter, 2015). If they do so, they can achieve WB as well as when they successfully do things that not only are valuable to them but are also “worthwhile” and contribute to their development.

Furthermore, White (2007) argues that human nature alone is not in a position to provide reasons for worthwhile activities and relationships. Although there are not authorities to impose their views, however, an individual’s WB pursuit has to be compatible with respect for others’ worthwhile pursuits and autonomy. This implies that self-interest and concern for others should be inter-connected and treated with respect for one another as I argue in this thesis. Pring (2015, p. 8) notices though that a deeper explanation and understanding of the historical philosophical tradition of this concept is necessary, since White’s notions seem to call upon Mill’s and Dewey’s similar concerns. Pring (2015) also underlines the significance of experience in justifying worthwhile activities and relationships, therefore, experience is another concept that deserves special investigation for its contribution to WB which White does not develop.

4.4.4 Worthwhileness, Objectivity and Well-being

All in all, can WB as “a successful and whole-hearted engagement in worthwhile activities and relationships” be objectively determined? (White, 2011, p. 109). According to White (2011) “worthwhile activities and relationships are not
relative to individual preferences” which means that they are objectively determined (ibid, 2011, pp. 59, 86). In order to investigate this, White (2007) (2011) first looks into human nature and then into culture. In relation to human nature, White (2011) claims that WB may partly depend on human nature, but this is not sufficient, because it is not possible to determine what WB is merely on the basis of facts about what kind of creature one is. Therefore, more sound argument(s) must be put forward beyond human nature in order to justify an activity or relationship as worthwhile.

To this end, White (2011) looks at the example of aesthetic values. “Aesthetic values involve qualities relevant to sounds and sights, balance, contrast and complexity as well as qualities that are more closely related to human concerns such as expressiveness, humour, depth of insight etc.” (White, 2011, p. 87). They can be discovered in both works of art and aesthetic objects and they exist independently of one’s specific inclinations and human nature, and no-one is able to perceive them unless they practice doing so. However, he notes that aesthetic values are also “extra-individual, i.e. they can be comprehended as the products of a culture historically located”, so in this sense they appear to be problematic (White, 2011, p. 87).

Having said that, White (2011) does not mean that aesthetic values are only relevant to particular cultural conditions and they cannot exist outside these. The same applies to life values, which are usually not relevant to the culture that produces them, e.g. the institution of marriage. So, “if individuals are not found on what a life of WB is for themselves, who could that be, if anyone?” (White, 2011, p. 89). To answer this, White (2011) turns his attention to cultures and philosophers. He notices that although cultures can produce “worthwhile activities”, they can also produce activities of little or no value or of disvalue, e.g. slavery, and subsequently, they can provide a misleading kind of WB. Concerning philosophers, White (2011) observes that although they can show various types of WB, they do not usually offer guidance towards the most worthwhile which again is problematic.

However, we saw in Chapter 2 that according to a certain understanding, Aristotle distinguishes praxis as the best account of human WB in terms of being both virtuous and feasible. In this context, a person with phronesis could be a guide in WB pursuits and through reasoning guidance could be found in relation to both the
individual and the social (Hughes, 2001). Let us recall that Aristotelian WB consists in human activity and human activity is the realization of the virtues of the rational part of the soul. Rationality means the ability to think and act in terms of universal principles in accordance with reason (Oxford Dictionary, 2016). In this regard, I think that Aristotelian reason is central to objectivity and vice versa. Therefore, objectivity is not, as White (2011) claims, central only or mainly to be critics’ work, but also to Aristotle’s work and perhaps to the work of philosophers’ generally. Besides, as White (2011) notes, art critics justify their judgements with arguments that are always open to revision by better ones. If, however, this is not an activity of reason, then what is it?

He concludes that the arts can shed some light on the problem of objectivity in WB, because despite any disagreement among art critics, objectivity is central to art critics’ work since they justify their judgments with arguments that are always open to revision by better ones (White, 2011). In making these judgments, some individuals are in a better place than others. For instance, someone who has studied Russian literature for years and has become an acknowledged authority in his field seems to be in a better place to judge Dostoevsky’s novels in comparison with somebody who has never read a Russian novel (White, 2011). From this point of view, this can provide a criterion for WB in terms of “an outsider, a more authoritative insider and an ordinary insider” (White, 2011, p. 90). In light of this, White (2011) attempts to apply the same pattern on judgments about objective components of WB.

To be more specific, whereas all kinds of gradations can be found between outsiders and insiders, the “authoritative insiders”, as White (2011) argues, cannot be characterized as experts on WB in the same way that art critics are called experts in their fields. Taking into consideration Mill’s notion (cited by White, 2011) about higher and lower pleasures, where those who experienced both prefer the former, White (2011) in a similar line of thought claims that the more “authoritative voices” on what WB consists in are those with an “experience of all kinds of goods” who, nonetheless, do not constitute a group of experts. Instead, they are a loose body of people with “accumulated wisdom” (White, 2002, p. 454). Another characteristic of
these people could be a specific interest in reflection on what human WB consists in (White, 2011). They also acquire some kind of knowledge about all these issues and they reflect with a “freedom of spirit” (White, 2011, p. 454). Besides, they may do that “collaboratively or solitarily, but like art critics, they always welcome critical discussion of their ideas” (White, 2011, p. 91).

According to White’s (2011) view, almost all voices across the population in different contexts and in different degrees can and should participate in the discussion regarding the components of human WB. He also stresses that the more expert one is the more of an insider one becomes, which is reasonable. However, it is important to note that White’s (2008) idea of WB is not subjective from an individual point of view. Specifically, he argues that WB should not be comprehended as an individual’s desire satisfaction, even if the desires in question are well-informed and major (White, 2008) (White, 2011). White’s subjective factor of WB is not the individual but a loose body of people where almost everyone is inside, whether or not they are experts. As De Ruyter (2015) observes, White’s account of WB is “inter-subjective” (ibid, 2015, p. 88) or, as I say here, it is a subjective-collective account of WB.

Additionally, White (2011) maintains that education can play a basic role in distinguishing who exactly can participate in that loose body of people and to what extent. If one of the aims of education is WB, as White suggests, then, because of education, individuals become better-informed in discerning what WB consists in. According to White (2011), pupils have to take the message that no one has the one only answer on what constitutes WB and that all are welcome to participate in the discussion of “the endlessly open matters that the notion of WB brings with it locally, nationally and globally” (White, 2011, p. 95). In a similar context in Chapter 5 I argue that the virtue of OM is necessary to any discussion concerning WB, especially in the educational environment, because one of the characteristics of this account of OM, among other things, is, for example, its serious engagement in dialogue and its ability to keep dialogue alive and fertile towards WB (Hare, 2006).

Pring (2015) applauds White’s call for an early and explicit consideration of the aims of education. However, he notices that there is a need for an explicit
connection between curriculum and knowledge of how to stay healthy and safe nowadays, which modern school reality seems to overlook, and perhaps much more could be said by White on this problematic area of basic WB (Pring, 2015). Furthermore, Bigger (2012) argues that White’s concept of WB, which sounds like an urgent call for radical educational transformation may lack degrees of criticality. In particular, in a digital age when information bombards individuals it is crucial for children to develop criticality as a necessary ability for WB both in the basic sense and for a deeper engagement in worthwhile activities and relationships (Bigger, 2012).

Unavoidably, however, various problems occur in relation to the concept of objective goods and in White’s ideas alike. An immediate example is how something objectively good for someone can motivate them to pursue it if they do not want to (Clayton, 1993). To this end, the role of education is crucial because it can (or should) cultivate within the individual the ability to discern what is good and the desire to desire it. However, in my view, it is not education in general that does that. This is vague and elusive. It is teaching, and teachers in particular, that can or should cultivate this ability in children in the educational context. This is a reason why there should be an explicit focus on teachers’ WB as I argued in Chapter 1.

Moreover, De Ruyter (2015) like White (2011), believes that objective goods are necessary elements for human WB. She thinks that these goods can be determined to be important for individuals independently of their disposition towards them. Drawing on Nussbaum’s idea of “central requirements of a life with dignity” (Nussbaum, 2006, p. 75 cited by De Ruyter, 2015, p. 93), where objective goods, among others, include health, food, shelter and safety, i.e. basic goods, De Ruyter (2015) talks about objective goods as “existential needs such as social relations, intellectual, creative, aesthetic and physical pursuits and autonomy” (ibid, 2015, p. 93). In this context, she says that objective goods can be given various meanings and contents which, I believe, can be a double-edged sword. Put differently, how can something be objectively good if multiple meanings and contents are given to it?

Specifically, in line with White (2011), she notices that these objective goods are individual-dependent and they are related to human nature. However, both De
Ruyter (2015) and White (2011) maintain that the way these objective goods are accomplished and how individuals develop them are not predetermined. Whereas White (2011) seems to focus on the way these objective goods are achieved by individuals, De Ruyter (2015) highlights the significance of the universality of these goods more than White does, on the grounds that human nature can be extremely diverse, but, at the same time, people all over the world share much in common.

Besides, De Ruyter (2015) like Nussbaum (cited by De Ruyter, 2015, p. 94), concludes that it is crucial to recognize that accomplishing these objective goods is vital to a “common humanity” which is independent of culture. However, this view seems vulnerable and perhaps unrealistic in cases where an individual or a group of people are strongly influenced by their culture, resulting perhaps in an override of sharing with others the same basic goods due to a “common humanity” idea. For example, if an individual's or a group of people’s culture legitimizes the abuse of children and women, and if these individuals or groups of people are strongly influenced by their culture, how is it possible to share with them any objective goods that have “human dignity” at their core? In this sense I think that more should be said about objective goods and culture on a basis of a “common humanity” criterion, otherwise I would probably need to be “so open-minded that my brains fall out” (Riggs, 2010, p. 178). On the other hand, would it be legitimate to absorb all cultures into one with common objective goods or would it be possible for all cultures to be united under “a common humanity” idea? I don’t think so either.

To summarize, a subjective-collective major-informed desire concept of WB advanced by John White was explored. Specifically, according to White WB is “successful and whole-hearted engagement in worthwhile activities and relationships” (White, 2011, p. 109) (White, 2011b) (White, 2007) (White, 2002). First, it has to be successful because continual failures in one’s projects alienate one from WB. However, in order to be successful, the individual’s desires have to be major and informed and part of being informed is to know the various options one has for WB, that is, to be autonomous (White, 1991). Second, it has to be whole-hearted because dragging oneself even to the most valuable pursuits in an unproductive way cannot contribute to WB. Third, it has to be worthwhile. This is
more complicated because the idea of worthwhileness seems to involve issues of human nature and cultural existence and also relates to the problem of objectivity.

Regarding the latter, White (2011) emphasizes that there are no authorities in relation to worthwhileness and therefore, to WB (White, 2011) (White, 2007). In particular, he argued that worthwhile activities and relationships are objectively determined because they are not relative to individual preferences. In order to justify this, White (2011) looks at the arts and art critics, and says that objectivity is central to art critics’ work who justify their judgments with arguments that are always open to revision by better ones. In making these judgments, some individuals are in a better place than others and this can provide a criterion in terms of outsiders, more authoritative insiders and ordinary insiders (White, 2011, p. 90). And likewise, White (2011) argues for a similar pattern on judgments about objective components of WB, where the more “authoritative voices” on what WB consists in are those with an “experience of all kinds of goods”, who, however, do not constitute a group of experts but a loose body of people with “accumulated wisdom” (White, 2002, p. 454).

However, White’s position is not sufficient for the aims of this thesis, because he gives too much emphasis to the subjective rather than the objective factors of WB. Specifically, White’s account of WB is not subjective from an individual point of view, but from a collective one. In this sense, he argues that WB should not be comprehended in terms of the individual’s desires satisfaction but in terms of what a loose body of people desire, even if the individual’s desires are well-informed and major (White, 2007b) (White, 2011). However, a stronger focus on the objective factors of WB as well as on the individual ones is necessary, because this thesis argues for a multi-faceted account of teachers’ WB that equally values the objective and subjective, the individual and collective factors of WB. In this sense, it is necessary to highlight the idea that there are basic objective goods that can be objectively determined and benefit people independently of their particular interests, likes and cares (Rice, 2013) (Bradley, 2014) (Heathwood, 2014). Thus, in order to stress the significance of objective and individual factors of WB, in the following
section I examine Nussbaum’s (2011) more objective-individual oriented theory of WB with a particular focus on education and teaching.
CHAPTER V

Well-being and Education (Part Two): Nussbaum’s Objective-Individual Account of Well-being and Wolff’s and De-Shalit’s Development of Nussbaum’s Objective-Individual Account of Well-being

5.1 Introduction

This chapter, like the previous chapter, explores WB discourse in education. In the previous chapter I first approached concepts and terms conceptually and stressed how they are used in the literature in relation to the concept of WB, the most dominant of these terms being “flourishing”, “happiness” and “well-being”. Next, White’s (2011) subjective-collective account of WB was examined. I argued that White’s account of WB was insufficient for the aims of this thesis, because he seemed to place too much emphasis on the subjective and collective factors of WB rather than on the objective and individual ones, which in this project are considered equally important for WB. For this reason, additionally, in this chapter I examine Nussbaum’s (2011) objective-individual oriented account of WB which is more objective and individual focused than White’s account, however, it is subjective and collective enough to confront criticism.

Specifically, I look at some fundamental concepts of Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach (thereafter CA), which are most relevant to the aims of this thesis. First, I clarify how some basic terms and concepts of the CA are used. Then, I look at the core ideas of “capabilities”, that is, what a person is able to do and be and “functionings”. Capabilities, according to Nussbaum (2011), are valuable per se because, unlike functionings, they entail “freedom and choice” (ibid, 2011, p. 25). She distinguishes between “combined”, “internal” and “basic” capabilities. Whereas combined and internal capabilities are interconnected and can be further developed and trained, basic capabilities are the foundation upon which later development and training is possible. On the opposite side to “capabilities” are “functionings”, which
are “the realization of capabilities” (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 25). Functionings are inferior to capabilities because they do not involve “freedom and choice” as capabilities do. Nussbaum (2011) also introduces into the concept of “capabilities” the criterion of “human dignity”, in order to promote the most important capabilities. In this sense, she argues that a “life worthy of human dignity” requires “a minimum threshold of ten central capabilities” (ibid, 2011, p. 32). However, it is stressed that there are implications with Nussbaum’s account that are not addressed satisfactorily, which makes her concept of WB rather problematic in relation to the aims of this thesis. Therefore, I argue that it is necessary in terms of conceptual clarification to go beyond Nussbaum’s CA and expand her ideas especially those related to the concepts of “capabilities” and “functionings” for WB.

The best way to do this is through Wolff’s and De-Shalit’s (2007) theory which is regarded as a development of the CA. In this context, I particularly focus on Wolff’s and De-Shalit’s (2007) novel ideas that WB consists in “genuine opportunities for secure functionings”, in promoting “fertile functionings” and in diminishing “corrosive disadvantages”. Wolff and De-Shalit (2007), unlike Nussbaum (2011), focus on “functionings”, and they argue that being “disadvantaged” is not being able to accomplish functionings. Thus, whereas WB is “genuine opportunities for secure functionings”, the lack of them constitutes disadvantage. According to their theory, it is not only the level of functionings that people enjoy at a given time that matters for WB, but it is also important to secure that level over time, that is, to have “secure functionings“. Moreover, they emphasize that, apart from “secure functionings” and the concept of “risk”, a significant role in WB is played by the fact that “disadvantages cluster together”. The phenomenon of “clustering” results on the one hand, in “corrosive disadvantages”, that is, in multipliers of disadvantage against WB, and on the other hand, in “fertile functionings”, that is, in multipliers of advantage for WB. Likewise, this thesis argues that since OM is a virtue that facilitates other virtues, it also facilitates teachers’ “secure” and “fertile functionings” for their own WB and then pupils’ WB. Last but not least, Wolff’s and De-Shalit’s (2007) method of “dynamic public reflective equilibrium” consists in engaging in dialogue with people to further analyse the concepts of functionings and capabilities in order to find effective ways
to cope with disadvantage and promote WB. In this regard, the potential use of their method in teacher education to further explore ways to improve teachers’ WB is stressed.

5.2 The Capabilities Approach as a Theory of Well-being

The CA is one of the most influential of the modern theories of WB, especially in relation to education (Unterhalter, 2007) (Unterhalter, 2013) (Deneulin, 2013) (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007). The CA begins with these simple yet complex questions: “what are people actually able to do and to be, what real opportunities are available to them?” (Nussbaum, 2011, p. x). Founded by economic theorist Amartya Sen and then notably developed by Martha Nussbaum, the CA appears as “a normative theory which claims that the freedom to accomplish WB is a result of what people are able to do and to be, i.e. a result of the reasoned choices that people are able to make” (Wood and Deprez, 2012, p. 473). The CA was initially developed by Sen as an alternative to the utility view and assessment of WB that had dominated in economics (Deneulin, 2013). Sen, according to Kleist (2016), argues that WB should be assessed not through utility criteria but through capabilities that is the freedom people have to do or to be what they have reasons to value. Although Nussbaum initially shared a common theoretical ground with Sen, she later differentiated from his concepts. It is her later ideas that this thesis particularly focuses on.

There are several reasons for such an explicit focus. First, this thesis argues for a multi-faceted account of WB that is not measurable mainly by one factor, as is usually the case in GDP and other theories of WB. The thesis’s multi-faceted view of WB necessarily leads to the CA as one of the most developed modern pluralist approaches to WB (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007). Second, this project argues for an equal concern for individual and collective WB. Although the CA gives emphasis to the individual, it also highlights community as vital to human WB (Wood and Deprez, 2012). This becomes apparent in Nussbaum’s (2011) statement that “capabilities belong first and foremost to individual persons and only derivatively to groups” (ibid, 2011, p. 35). Likewise, Deneulin (2013) observes that
“The subject of Nussbaum’s CA is not groups but individuals; each person has to be seen as an end in oneself. What matters is not what a structure or group is doing, but how each individual is doing and the impacts of these structures and groups on the lives of each individual.” (Deneulin, 2013, p. 626)

This quote, however, should not be read as if the CA overlooks the collective factor in WB, because the capabilities of “affiliation” and “practical reason” for example play an “architectonic role” as organizers of all other capabilities in the sense that they are woven into them, as is shown later (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 39).

Third, as Wood and Deprez (2012) note, Nussbaum considers education to be a sine qua non for other capabilities, because education expands possibilities and offers alternative ways of being and doing, and helps individuals to live lives that have reason to be valued. Unlike other theories of WB, Nussbaum’s work attracts (or should attract) more attention in the educational context, because of her explicit concern with the content and process of education, which characterizes her entire work both implicitly and explicitly (Unterhalter, 2007) (Unterhalter, 2013).

Fourth, Nussbaum’s (2011) theory explicitly provides a list of ten central capabilities for WB, which is of crucial importance in terms of objectivity and objective goods in the WB context. However, Nussbaum’s (2011b) list is “not offered as a dogma that must be swallowed as a whole… but only if it stands the test of argument should be adopted and put into practice” (ibid, 2011b, p. 24). In relation to this remark, however, Kleist (2016) notes that whereas earlier Nussbaum argues that the list is fixed, she later changes her position to an open-ended list, which obviously makes it less problematic. Next, Nussbaum’s theory of WB is explored in relation to other counter theories. To this end I mainly draw on Nussbaum’s work Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach (2011).

5.3 Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach: An Objective-Individual Account of Well-being

Education is the first theme that appears in Nussbaum’s (2011) work, in the form of the story of the life of Vasanti, an Indian woman who is unable to do and to be things she values, such as having bodily integrity, being educated, having a decent
and stable job (Unterhalter, 2013) (Deneulin, 2013). According to Deneulin (2013), Nussbaum (2011) attempts to present the extent of her approach in the life of Vasanti. Specifically, she attempts to shed some light on deprivations and sufferings that other theories such as the GDP approach, human capital, utilitarian and resource-based approaches simply “cannot read” (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 12) and to which they therefore, cannot offer solutions. Also, in this way Nussbaum (2011) tries to give people a theoretical framework in order to hold their governments responsible and accountable to protect and promote a set of foundational individual entitlements (Deneulin, 2013). In this regard, Nussbaum (2011) states that

“We need a counter-theory to challenge the entrenched but misguided theories if we want to move policy in the right direction. Such a counter-theory should articulate the world of development in new ways, showing us a different picture of what our priorities should be. The Capabilities Approach is the counter-theory we need in an era of urgent human problems and unjustifiable human inequalities.” (Nussbaum, 2011, pp. x-xii)

Nussbaum’s (2011) approach usually appears as the “Human Development Approach” or “Capability Approach” or “Capabilities Approach”. She rejects the first, because it is “historically related to the human development report office of the United Nations Development Programme and its annual human development reports” and because she is also interested in the capabilities of non-human animals (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 17). On the other hand, she favours the term “capabilities” over “capability” for describing her approach, because she wants to highlight the fact that the most significant components of people’s WB are plural and distinct and not reducible to a single measurement (Nussbaum, 2011), which as I clarified above fits the multi-faceted account of WB of this thesis. Next, I look at some of the CA’s core ideas, most relevant to the aims of this thesis, namely the idea of the ten central capabilities list and the concepts of capabilities and functioning(s).

5.3.1 Ten Central Capabilities as Objective Goods for Well-being

To begin, Nussbaum (2011) develops a minimal theory of justice and WB, which consists in ten central capabilities that articulate different priorities at both the personal and the social levels. These objective goods are the following: “life, bodily
health, bodily integrity, senses, imagination and thought, emotions, practical reason, affiliation, other species, play and control over one’s environment” (Nussbaum, 2000, pp. 77-78) (Nussbaum, 2011, pp. 33-34). My aim here is not to examine these objective goods per se, but rather to explore some aspects of Nussbaum’s rationale in relation to this objective goods list for WB. With this sense in mind, let us look at some of the most important characteristics of the list.

First, the list is “open-ended” in terms of local contexts and in that other capabilities can be added (Nussbaum, 2011, pp. 35-36) (Deneulin, 2013). Second, these ten central capabilities are related to individuals and only “derivatively” to groups (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 35). Third, “the heterogeneity of these capabilities is irreducible”, i.e. they are all distinctive and equally significant, therefore, for example, one cannot be regarded as more important than another (Nussbaum, 2011, pp. 35-36). Fourth, a life of “human dignity” demands that all individuals as citizens should be found “above a particular threshold of capability in all ten areas” (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 32). Fifth, in a case of “tragic choice”, that is when, for instance, two central capabilities collide, either alternative involves wrong-doing because of the impossibility of ranking among them (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 37). Therefore, in “tragic dilemmas”, one should choose the better between two evils. Sixth, “the central capabilities are intertwined in many ways, however, “affiliation” and “practical reason play an architectonic role in organizing and suffusing all others” (Nussbaum, 2011, pp. 37, 39). All these, as essential characteristics of Nussbaum’s objective goods list, are now further explored, together with the concepts of “capabilities”, “functionings” and the “human dignity” criterion for WB and how they relate to the aims of the thesis.

5.3.2 Capabilities

“Capabilities” are central to Nussbaum’s (2011) theory both as a term and as a concept. Standing opposite “capabilities” are “functionings, which are the realization of capabilities” (ibid, 2011, p. 25). From this point of view, capabilities seem useless without functionings which appear to give capabilities their purpose. However, this is not the case, because as Nussbaum (2011) argues, capabilities are valuable in themselves, in the sense that they entail the notions of “freedom and
choice” (ibid, 2011, p. 25). According to Nussbaum (2011) in promoting capabilities one is promoting freedom and choice, which is not the case in promoting functionings. Therefore, capabilities both as a term and as a concept come first in Nussbaum’s theory. However, the priority and significance that Nussbaum (2011) gives to “capabilities” over “functionings” for WB is seriously contested by Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) in several aspects, as I show later in the chapter.

Capabilities are the answer to the central question of the CA, i.e. what is a person able to do and to be. Specifically, “capabilities are a set of interrelated opportunities or freedoms created by a combination of a person’s abilities, political, social and economic environment” (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 20). In this regard, Nussbaum (2011) distinguishes three kinds of capabilities: (a) combined capabilities, (b) internal capabilities and (c) basic capabilities (Nussbaum, 2011, pp. 21-24). “Combined capabilities” are an individual’s whole set of opportunities for choice and action in their political, social and economic environment. “Internal capabilities” are a person’s intellectual and emotional capacities, personality traits, states of bodily fitness and health, internalized learning, skills of perception and movement, and they are highly relevant to the “combined capabilities as an integral part of them” (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 21). In particular, Nussbaum (2011) describes “internal capabilities” as one’s non-static and dynamic characteristics which represent one’s trained or developed features and abilities interacting within one’s particular environment.

In this context, Nussbaum (2011) emphasizes that it is among the duties of society to contribute to the development of people’s “internal capabilities”, especially through education. Nussbaum (2011) maintains that the distinction between “combined” and “internal capabilities” is extremely important, because a society can do well in supporting the production of people’s “internal capabilities”, but not give the opportunities or the freedom to people’s functionings according to their “internal capabilities”, therefore in this way society may treat people’s “combined capabilities” unfairly. Let me explain. For instance, a teacher on a teacher education programme has the “internal capability” to freely express him/herself. However, through repression of speech, as happens in some kinds of “political correctness”, in practice he/she is deprived of this “internal capability”. On the other
hand, a teacher can realize an “internal capability”, although he/she may lack the
developed ability. That is, the teacher is given the opportunity or freedom in the
educational context to criticize, but he or she lacks the ability to think in a critical
way. In this regard, as Nussbaum (2011) underlines, it is “not possible for society to
produce combined capabilities without producing internal capabilities since the
former actually constitute the latter in addition to the social, economic and political
context where functionings can be chosen” (ibid, 2011, p. 22).

Moreover, “internal capabilities” should not be confused with one’s innate
equipment, i.e. the powers that a human being brings into the world and that are then
either developed or not (Nussbaum, 2011). These innate powers are called “basic
capabilities” (Nussbaum, 2011). “Basic capabilities” are like raw material, the
foundation upon which later development and training is based. However, Nussbaum
(2011) highlights that one should be careful with the concept of “basic capabilities”
in terms of meritocracy, so that it is not assumed that the most innately gifted
individuals get privileged treatment, but quite the opposite, that is, people who are in
greater need get more help.

In the light of Nussbaum’s (2011) ideas, it could be argued that if teachers’
WB is crucial, as stressed in Chapter 1, then a special emphasis should be given to
the development of teachers’ “combined” and “internal capabilities” in order to
promote their WB and then pupils’ WB. In other words, teacher education
programmes should give teachers the opportunities or freedom, as Nussbaum (2011)
suggests, or teach them to be open-minded as I argue in this thesis, to function
according to their “internal capabilities” and this way help them also to develop their
“combined capabilities”. In this context, it could be argued that the virtue of OM, as
presented in the next chapter, facilitates the development of both internal and
combined capabilities, and therefore it facilitates WB, in the sense that it appears to
share some common characteristics with them. For example, OM, like “internal
capabilities”, is non-static, dynamic and context-dependent, as it can be adapted to a
complex and constantly changing educational environment (Hare, 2006). However,
there are significant implications in relation to Nussbaum’s “capabilities” that
discourage us from adapting her concept and prompt us to continue with the idea of
“functionings” for WB instead, through Wolff’s and De-Shalit’s (2007) perspective, which is more appropriate to the aims of this thesis as discussed later.

Williams (1985b) also expresses some similar reservations, prior to Wolff’s and De-Shalit’s (2007) current concerns in relation to “capabilities”, without, however, rejecting the capabilities approach overall. However, the fact that Williams’ (1985b) critique can be still found in Wolff’s and De-Shalit’s ideas (2007) implies that there are still unresolved and/or underdeveloped implications with Nussbaum’s CA even after two decades. In particular, he notes that the term capability is not clearly defined and asks what it means to have the capability to do anything (Williams, 1985b). Similarly, Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) currently notice that the term capabilities is too vague and not used consistently, in that in some cases it means freedoms for functionings, whilst in other cases it is used as a potential combination of functionings not yet accomplished. Also, Williams (1985b) looks at the relationship between the capability to do something and the ability to do something here and now, and argues that the two may not be identical. Quoting an example given by Sen (cited by Williams, 1985b), he says that if one has the capability to breathe unpolluted air, then one can do so, i.e. one has the ability to breathe clear air here and now. But this is not possible, for instance, if someone who lives in a polluted area does not have the financial means to move to another area to breathe unpolluted air. Additionally, Williams (1985b) points out the relationship between “capability” and “choice” and observes that the former can be transformed into mere possibility without the presence of the latter and therefore, the concept becomes problematic.

Furthermore, from an educational point of view, Walker and Vaughan (2012) notice that education is (or should be) vital for WB because it can influence the way people make good or better choices towards functionings. However, they also note that education should move towards developing people’s capabilities on the grounds that “research evidence so far shows that education is central to the expansion of capabilities as it provides individuals with skills and capacities” (Walker and Vaughan, 2012, p. 500). However, we should not expect that WB, even when it is

47 Although Williams (1985b) is talking about Sen’s ideas, his critique is also meaningful for Nussbaum’s approach on a shared basis.
explicitly set as an educational aim, will just occur in the educational process without showing an explicit concern for teachers’ education and training for WB as Morris (2013) observes and I argue in Chapter 1. Next, let us look at another foundational concept of Nussbaum’s CA, i.e. “functionings” and the criterion of “human dignity” for WB.

5.3.3 Functioning(s) and the Criterion of Human Dignity

On the opposite side to “capabilities”, Nussbaum (2011) argues that there are “functionings”, i.e. the “realization of capabilities” (ibid, 2011, p. 24). She notes that capabilities seem useless without functionings which give them their purpose, however, capabilities also have value in themselves because they encompass the notions of “freedom and choice” (Nussbaum, 2011). In this regard, Nussbaum (2011) maintains that in promoting capabilities one is promoting freedom and choice and this is not the same as promoting someone to function. She also notes that some deny this when they claim that the government should simply make people function in the right way, e.g. live a healthy life, which Nussbaum (2011) rejects, arguing that there is a moral difference between policies that support health and those that support health capabilities in terms of people’s right to exercise freedom and choice. Hence, governments should promote “capabilities”, not “functionings” (Nussbaum, 2011).

This is a basic point of disagreement between Nussbaum (2011) and Wolff and De-Shalit (2007), who argue that “functionings’ should be promoted instead, as explained later in the chapter. Additionally, “people should not be given the option to be treated with respect and non-humiliation… all people must be treated with respect and their governments should deny humiliating them” (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 26). However, in a particular understanding, Nussbaum’s latter statement is at odds with her former one, in the sense that if people should not be given the choice whether or not to “be treated with respect and non-humiliation” then implications for their “freedom and choice” seem to arise. Similar problems are identified by Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) in the following sections.

In this context, Nussbaum (2011) looks at the problem of which capabilities should be promoted as the most important. In order to give a systematic answer to this, Nussbaum (2011) reminds us that the CA is not a human nature theory that talks
about resources, possibilities and obstacles, but not about what to value, but the CA is a theory that is “evaluative and ethical from the very beginning” (ibid, 2011, p. 28). In this sense, Nussbaum (2011) examines on what basis a selection of capabilities is possible, and therefore, she introduces the criterion of “human dignity”. She argues that there are human living conditions “worthy of human dignity” and others that are not. Nussbaum (2011) also emphasizes the protection of particular areas of freedom that are vital for a life worthy of “human dignity”. In this way she transforms the problem of which capabilities should be promoted as the most important into “what a life worthy of human dignity requires” (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 32). The answer to this is that “human WB demands a minimum threshold of ten central capabilities which should be protected and promoted by governments so that all people are able to have a dignified and minimally fulfilling life” (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 32).

However, Claasen and Duwell (2013) observe that Nussbaum (2011) is not consistent in her use of the “human dignity” criterion, because in her earlier work she uses a different criterion: that of “a common humanity” (Nussbaum, 2000, p. 71 cited by Claasen and Duwell 2013, p. 495). In relation to this, they argue that Nussbaum neither offers satisfying reasons for choosing to abandon the criterion of “a common humanity” and continue with the criterion of “human dignity” instead, nor does she point out the implications that may result from introducing a new criterion into her theory (Claasen and Duwell, 2013). They also note that whilst Nussbaum changes her selection criterion, she does not make any changes to her central capabilities list. Moreover, they seem uncomfortable with the fact that in her later work the earlier notion of a common humanity still seems fully active (Claasen and Duwell, 2013).

From my perspective, however, Nussbaum (2011) does not aim to replace her earlier criterion of “a common humanity” with a later criterion of “human dignity” in the sense that she turns to a totally different concept. I think that Nussbaum (2011) moves forward in the same direction, i.e. the “human dignity” criterion can be seen as a more specific part of the more general “common humanity” criterion. This may bring its own implications as Claasen and Duwell (2013) notice, but unlike them, I think that Nussbaum’s new criterion of “human dignity” constitutes a progress rather than a step backwards. Although Nussbaum (2011) emphasizes that “dignity is an
intuitive notion that is by no means completely clear… it is a vague idea that needs to be given content by placing it in a context of related ideas” (ibid, 2011, p. 29-30), I agree with Claasen and Duwell (2013) that further elaboration and clarification are needed.

To summarize, Nussbaum’s objective-individual account of WB with a particular focus on education was explored as a necessary addition to White’s subjective-collective account of WB. The central questions of Nussbaum’s CA are what people are actually able to do and to be and what real opportunities are available to them so as to realize their capabilities and achieve WB. To this end, Nussbaum (2011) introduces an open-ended list of ten central capabilities or objective goods. A criterion for this objective goods list for WB is the idea of “human dignity”. According to this human WB demands a minimum threshold of these ten central capabilities, which should be protected and promoted by policy so that all people are able to have a dignified and minimally fulfilling life (Nussbaum, 2011). However, Nussbaum’s concepts appear problematic in various aspects. In relation to these unresolved and/or underdeveloped implications among other things, Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) “introduce some novel ideas that theoretically enrich the CA” (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 42). Wolff’s and De-Shalit’s (2007) modifications are of great importance for this thesis because on the one hand, they focus on “functionings” rather than on “capabilities” and on the other hand, they argue that, although it is important for WB to achieve a functioning, it is also crucial to “secure functioning” over time. It is also crucial to “de-cluster” “corrosive disadvantages” that hinder WB and promote “fertile functionings” that promote WB (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007). In the next part of the chapter, Wolff’s and De-Shalit’s (2007) ideas are investigated as an expansion and “a natural development of the CA” and the notions of “capabilities” and “functionings” are further analyzed and discussed in relation to the aims of this thesis with a focus on education and teaching.

5.4 Wolff’s and De-Shalit’s Concept of Well-being

In this part of the chapter I argue that it is necessary in terms of conceptual clarification to expand Nussbaum’s CA and look at Wolff’s and De-Shalit’s ideas in relation to WB. Unlike the CA, Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) mainly focus on
“functionings” rather than on “capabilities” and they emphasize how crucial it is for WB not only to achieve a functioning but also to secure that functioning over time. Overall, Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) argue that WB consists in “genuine opportunities for secure functionings” (ibid, 2007, p. 37), in promoting “fertile functionings” and in diminishing “corrosive disadvantages” (ibid, 2007, pp. 121-122). My ultimate aim here is to make three parallels and say that (i) OM is a virtue that facilitates all other virtues as was implied in Chapter 3, therefore, OM, as presented in Chapter 6, facilitates the acquisition of a person’s “secure” and “fertile functionings” for WB, (ii) a kind of “risk” is embedded in the anti-OM cases of standardized-mindedness and closed-mindedness discussed in the next chapter, therefore, anti-OM hinders the acquisition of an individual’s “secure” and “fertile functionings” for WB and (iii) as argued in Chapter 1, political power and profit can be two factors corrosive to virtue, therefore, they are part of what Wolff and De-Shalit call a “corrosive disadvantage” at the expense of teachers’ and then pupils’ WB. All three parallels are further investigated in Chapters 6 and 7. However, for a better understanding, we need first to look at Wolff’s and De-Shalit’s (2007) (2013) rationale behind Nussbaum’s (2011) CA extension and explain the terms they introduce.

5.4.1 Beyond Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach

Some of the basic similarities and differences between Nussbaum’s and Wolff’s and De-Shalit’s views of WB are adapted by and contribute to the account of WB and OM in this thesis. Let us look at them more closely. Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) draw heavily on Nussbaum’s CA and their theories have various characteristics in common (Gheaus, 2010). First, like the CA, Wolff’s and De-Shalit’s view is pluralist and rejects a monistic approach to WB, e.g. being disadvantaged in one aspect does not and should not compensate for being advantaged in another aspect (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, pp. 22-30) (Nussbaum, 2011, pp. 24, 36) (Gheaus, 2010). Second, both approaches aim at providing practical guidance to policy by constructing a theory that is possible to apply to real world conditions (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007) (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 97) (Grant, 2008). Third, Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) take Nussbaum’s (2000) ten central
capabilities list as a starting point “because it is meant to be part of a policy project and it is grounded in cross-cultural work aiming at a consensus of what functionings are included in the list regardless of people’s different views of WB” and they add to that list another four elements (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 38). They both stress that their objective-element lists are open and “context-dependent” in terms of “respecting people” while addressing WB issues, therefore, they are flexible as a work in progress (Nussbaum, 2011, pp. 40, 97, 32) (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 138, 144, 167).

Fourth, Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) consider six functionings in particular to be more “widespread” (although not more important) than the others and they argue that the least advantaged are the ones that are doing badly in these “six high-weight functionings” (ibid, 2007, p. 106) (Grant, 2008). Nussbaum (2011) does not make such a distinction in her central capabilities list, but in a similar manner she says that two capabilities in particular “appear to play a distinctive architectonic role” in terms of organizing and pervading the others (ibid, 2011, p. 39). Neither Wolff and De-Shalit nor Nussbaum rank the elements of their lists, but they argue that the more a person is doing badly in more than one of these functionings/capabilities, the more disadvantaged he/she is, and therefore, he/she does not experience WB (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, pp. 36-62). Similarly, the account of WB of this thesis is multifaceted, aims at improving and helping to implement educational policy and argues among other things for an objective list of WB characteristics that is open and context-dependent, an element of which is the virtue of OM. Additionally, in the next chapter it is argued that OM as presented in this thesis should not only be an element of such a list but is also necessary in the process of deciding what should go on or

48 (1) life, (2) bodily health, (3) bodily integrity, (4) senses, imagination and thought, (5) emotions, (6) practical reason, (7) affiliation, (8) other species, (9) play, (10) control over one’s environment (Nussbaum, 2000, pp. 77-78) (Nussbaum, 2011, pp. 33-34)
49 Namely “doing good to other people, not being forced to act contrary to the law, comprehending the law and being in a position to understand the local language” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, pp. 50-51).
50 Wolff’s and De-Shalit’s list of high-weight functionings includes life, bodily health, bodily integrity, affiliation (or belonging), control over one’s environment and sense, imagination, thought (ibid, 2007, p 106).
51 “These two are affiliation and practical reason which pervade the other capabilities in the sense that when the others are present in a form commensurate with human dignity, they are woven into them” (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 39)
taken out off that list. In this sense, OM does not appear more important than other virtues but rather as a virtue that “plays an architectonic role” in this account of WB and as a virtue that must be “widespread” in order to facilitate “intellectual functionings” for epistemic WB.

However, Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) do not adapt the CA as it is. First, they argue that Nussbaum’s account of WB “emphasizes the individual who cares more for herself rather than the active member of a community who cares both for herself and others” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 45). Earlier in this chapter it was argued that White’s account of WB placed too much emphasis on the subjective and collective factors of WB rather than on the objective and individual ones. As she herself notes “capabilities belong first and foremost to individuals and only derivatively to groups” (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 35). It was partly for this reason that I turned to Nussbaum’s more objective-individual oriented CA. Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) disagree, and they try to draw this out as an issue of special focus. As this thesis argues, they imply that there should be an equal concern for the individual and the collective WB.

Second, Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) focus on functionings rather than on capabilities and notice that the CA’s focus on capabilities rather on functionings is “less well motivated than often thought” (ibid, 2007, p. 65) (Gheaus, 2010). Whereas the CA focuses on what people can do and be, i.e. the ability to function and “the opportunity to select”, Wolff and De-Shalit concentrate on people’s functionings, i.e. the “realization of capabilities” and levels of advantage and disadvantage (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 25) (Olsaretti, 2008). Their target is “not just to create opportunities for the sake of creating opportunities, but create opportunities for the sake of a life worth living” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 37).

Let me explain. Wolff and De-Shalit raise three concerns in relation to the idea of capability (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2013). First, they argue that there is a gap between capabilities and functionings in the CA and they try to show this by examining when an individual has a capability. For instance, if someone has the opportunity to create social networks but does not take advantage of this because they choose to spend their time alone, do they have the capability for “affiliation” or
not? Wolff and Shalit (2013) observe that they do have it in the sense that they have the ability or the opportunity to accomplish the capability of “affiliation” if they decide to do so. In contrast, if someone lives in a village where there are not many opportunities to meet people and create relationships with others, do they still have the capability of “affiliation” or not? Wolff and De-Shalit (2013) argue that if having the capability of affiliation means that one has social networks, then any distinction between capability and functioning collapses. If this is not the case, then it is necessary to determine when an opportunity is too distant to be a capability. In the light of this, the more remote an opportunity is, the more the capability is unrealized, therefore, according to Wolff and De-Shalit (2013) the capability becomes useless and the less remote an opportunity the less obvious a distinction between capability and functioning, therefore, it makes more sense to focus on functionings instead of capabilities.

Next, they point out that when the two concepts are together, they tend to create misunderstandings, because it is not always apparent whether something is a capability or a functioning (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2013). In particular, some functionings are actually capabilities for other functionings, e.g. literacy is the capability and reading the functioning. However, as Wolff and De-Shalit (2013) note, reading is also a capability for other functionings such as driving, studying etc. Also, one can recognize a functioning, e.g. drawing, and sometimes there is a straightforward relation between certain capabilities and certain functionings, e.g. painting is the capability to draw. However, this is not always the case. For example:

“A capability set is a set of sets of alternative functionings one is able to accomplish which means that with the same capabilities one might be in a position to achieve different functionings... In this sense, an implication occurs that to accomplish one functioning he or she may have to sacrifice another functioning.” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 64)

A third reason for focusing on functionings rather than on capabilities is epistemological, i.e. “functionings unlike capabilities are more or less directly observable, possible to be illustrated, less vague... and therefore, they appear less complex in terms of policy” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, pp. 37, 63-64). They argue
that whereas it may be possible to illustrate a set of achieved functionings, a set of capabilities would perhaps need “an indefinite number of illustrations” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 65). In this regard, although both Nussbaum’s and Wolff’s and De-Shalit’s concepts aim at policy, I think the ideas of the latter appear more feasible in terms of implementing policy whereas the former may be problematically complex. Fourth, Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) find the CA distinction between being in a position to do or to be something, i.e. capability, and actually doing or being something, i.e. functioning, unconvincing. They argue that “the concept of capabilities is too abstract and not always used with consistency and thus, it should be replaced with the concept of genuine opportunities to secure functionings” (ibid, 2007, pp. 37, 74). In order to analyse their concept, Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) begin by assuming that normally most of the good things that a government can legitimately offer to its citizens are opportunities, since to guarantee any functionings of them would unavoidably involve some kind of coercion.

In this regard, they suggest that a “genuine opportunity” is an opportunity that does not involve undue costs and risk to other functionings (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 80). It is also an opportunity to do something only if this is reasonable, that is, any costs of doing so are reasonable, depending on the context. Besides, Wolff and De-Shalit (2013) disagree with CA’s idea of a state that offers and/or secures capabilities instead of securing functionings, because this way the main responsibility for one’s WB shifts to the individual. However, Wolff and De-Shalit (2013) argue that an emphasis on the least-advantaged individuals’ responsibility for their WB does not make sense, therefore it is crucial that the state considers how to secure the latter’s functionings and not just their capabilities. In Chapter 6 I draw a parallel to say that as in the case of a state and its citizens, teacher education should focus on facilitating teachers’ “intellectual functionings” for epistemic WB by teaching teachers to be open-minded. In the next section I explore Wolff’s and De-Shalit’s (2007) most remarkable ideas in terms of this thesis, mainly drawing on their work *Disadvantage.*
5.4.2 Disadvantage: the Lack of Genuine Opportunities for Well-being

To begin, Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) look at WB in terms of what it is to be (dis)advantaged and in the light of this, they try to explore how and why WB is absent or incomplete in a person’s life and then suggest ways for improvement. As Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) emphasize, in order to improve the WB of the disadvantaged, first of all one “must have a basic understanding of what it is to be disadvantaged… and being disadvantaged in a particular way is basically a matter of not being able to accomplish the particular functioning… it is a lack of genuine opportunities (for secure functionings)” (ibid, 2007, pp. 4, 38, 74, 84). In this regard, they argue that it is necessary to investigate the concept of functionings.

Particularly, their understanding of human WB is based on understanding people’s level of advantage or “functioning” and “its opposite, i.e. disadvantage” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 38). In this way, on the one hand, they try to produce a rich account of the nature of disadvantage theoretically (Shrader-Frechette, 2008). On the other hand they attempt to explore the nature of disadvantage in practice, as I elaborate later in this section, by engaging in the real world through their method, i.e. the “dynamic public reflective equilibrium” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, pp. 41-43) which consists in engaging in dialogue with people to further analyse the concepts of capabilities and functionings in order to provide policy effective ways to deal with disadvantage (Gheaus, 2010) (Grant, 2008) (Shrader-Frechette, 2008). Nevertheless, “achieved functionings do not count as the only measure for WB” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, pp. 65, 81). Other parameters, which the CA seems to overlook, should also be taken into account. An important parameter of this kind is the ability to provide “genuine opportunities for secure functionings” to all, as discussed earlier, and to sustain the functionings over time (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 37).

5.4.3 Secure Functionings Over Time

Hence, another significant concept here is the idea of “secure functionings” which Wolff and De-Shalit consider “a natural development of Nussbaum’s CA” (ibid, 2007, p. 37, 84). The general idea is that what matters for people is not just the level of functionings they enjoy at any specific time, but also their potential for sustaining that level, i.e. to secure functionings. Additionally, they emphasize that
the main problem with sustaining a level of functionings is when people are exposed to particular kinds of risk of losing the functionings. In this sense, they argue that the CA fails to look at an issue of vital importance for WB, i.e. “the freedom to sustain functionings” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 65), because of its persistent focus on “the freedom to achieve functionings” (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 18). But how do Wolff and De-Shalit justify the need for “secure functionings” for WB? They argue that in terms of WB and diminishing disadvantage, we should first, and in particular, cope with “the problem of risk” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 7).

5.4.4 The Idea of Risk

So, they begin by investigating the exposure to “risk” as a crucial factor of disadvantage (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 65). In other words, the “lack of (genuine) opportunities” usually involves risk to other functionings (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, pp. 38, 74). Having said that, Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) do not suggest that all risks are bad or possible to avoid. On the contrary, some risks may be considered good, or advantages and elements of a good life. However, their particular concept of risk is embedded in the concept of disadvantage which negatively influences WB and it has the following three characteristics. First, a risk to secure functionings and WB is not something good or possible to avoid, and in everyday life it is usually taken involuntarily and therefore becomes a disadvantage. Second, bigger risks are either those that cause more harm or those that potentially involve further risks. And third, there is the compulsion to take risks not in terms of physical violence, but in a situation where there are not better alternatives (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, pp. 63-69).

Let us look at a current example, i.e. Shia/Alawite Muslims and Christians of the Middle East\(^{52}\). In the areas which are currently occupied by extremist Sunni Muslims of ISIS, any Shiite, Alawite and Christian civilians usually face significant risks in relation to their WB. Roughly speaking, they are forced either to renounce their religious, cultural and political identity or to be beheaded or to abandon their homeland and become refugees. These people can be characterized as disadvantaged

\(^{52}\) These groups are merely a contemporary example. Many other groups exist and lots of other examples could also be used as illustrations.
and according to Wolff’s and De-Shalit’s definition of risk they fulfil all three criteria, i.e. they take these risks involuntarily, it is not possible to avoid them and they have to choose between death, potential death and loss of their identity whilst there are not better alternatives.

Specifically, Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) argue that people’s functionings can be at risk in three ways. First, there is the “risk to a particular functioning” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 70). One common example of this category in my view is employment risk. For instance, an employee on a non-permanent basis faces the risk of unemployment every day. Usually, he/she is not in a position to improve their condition, unlike policy which in terms of people’s WB could offer permanent jobs and alternatives in case of unemployment. Second, there is the “cross-category risk” (ibid, 2007, p. 70). For someone whose only means of subsistence is their income from employment, the risk of unemployment also puts at risk their life, bodily health, bodily integrity, affiliation and other elements that Nussbaum (2011) and Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) describe. Third, there is the “inverse cross-category risk” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 70). In order to secure one functioning, let us say food, some people put at risk their life and bodily health by scavenging from garbage. However, Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) note that, unlike cross-category risk, inverse cross-category risks are usually initiated by the person him/herself, whose actions put one category at risk in order to secure another. Chapter 6 includes discussion of two cases of anti-OM that entail the idea of risk in some respects, namely i.e. standardized-mindedness and closed-mindedness.

### 5.4.5 Corrosive Disadvantages: Multipliers of Disadvantage against Well-being

Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) underline that we need more than to understand the concepts of “risk” and “secure functionings” alone. In addition, it is necessary to look at the phenomenon of “clustering disadvantages” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 120) and particularly at the consequent idea of “corrosive disadvantage” (ibid, 2007, p. 121). In order to identify the least advantaged, Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) basically consider two issues, i.e. disadvantages in the “six high-weight functionings” and whether these “disadvantages cluster together” (ibid, 2007, p.
Looking at relevant existing literature and research that uses the language of functionings as well as using findings from their own empirical research, Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) show that there is “clustering” in these core functionings. Accordingly, people who experience “a clustering of disadvantages especially in the six high-weight functionings” seem to be the worst off (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 118). This idea, as Gheaus (2010) stresses, appears to be one of Wolff’s and De-Shalit’s “most significant contributions” (ibid, 2010, p. 149). The phenomenon of “clustering” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 120) is particularly important for this thesis because it entails the core ideas of “corrosive disadvantages” and “fertile functionings”. Also, it is significant in terms of indexing disadvantages and understanding the causal relations that produce “corrosive disadvantages”.

In particular, “corrosive is a kind of disadvantage that affects other functionings in a negative way” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 121). There are various difficulties in relation to the identification of cause(s) behind corrosive disadvantages that identify a corrosive disadvantage itself that needs to be confronted. One difficulty is that “causation is not straightforwardly observable” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 136). For instance, how do we know that x is such because of y or whether there is a deeper cause z for both? How do we know that someone became a drug user because he or she dropped out of school or whether they did both because they were a victim of bullying? It seems there is not a definite answer to this. In my view, however, the problem of this “not straightforwardly observable causation” behind corrosive disadvantages partly downgrades Wolff’s and De-Shalit’s claim of superiority of functionings over capabilities as “functionings are more observable” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, pp. 37, 136). Besides, if, as Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) argue “functionings are in a way the opposite of disadvantages” (ibid, 2007, p. 38) and “functionings are observable”, then it would be reasonable to expect that the same applies to non-functionings as well, i.e. disadvantages, but it does not.

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53 See details in Disadvantage (2007, pp. 122-127). Clearly, it is beyond the scope of this chapter to present in detail the works upon which this argument is based.
54 Wolff and De-Shalit also observe that clustering can be “dynamic” and “cross-generation dynamic”; the first takes place when “clustering of disadvantage may persist and accumulate over time” and the second when it is “reproduced over generations” (ibid, 2007, p. 120). It is not my intention to examine these notions here.
Additionally, is it sufficient to characterize a disadvantage based only on the fact that it leads to further disadvantages, unless one is also in a position to identify the causal relations behind it? Take for instance a person infected by an aggressive kind of cancer that causes further health problems. What is the point of identifying that cancer causes these further problems unless we know why? Usually it is not possible to cure or treat a health problem unless its causes are known. Likewise, I believe that the merits of “observable functionings” are less significant in terms of intervention, e.g. in teacher education policy, unless the cause(s) behind the functionings is/are also observable or possible to identify.

Another difficulty in identifying causes behind corrosive disadvantages, as Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) note, is that different background theoretical frameworks could influence what one identifies as cause(s). In this sense, there is a possibility that some causal relations are just artefacts of the theoretical framework within which the issue under investigation is examined, that is, there is a problem of bias. However, I think that this is not necessarily illegitimate or something that should be avoided at any cost, because obviously we use our past (knowledge, experience etc.) to move in the present and towards the future. Particularly, in the following chapter, concerning the problems both of identifying causal relations behind corrosive disadvantages and of bias, I argue that OM can offer help and be part of the solution due to its specific characteristics of being genuine, well-informed and reasonable. This in turn implies that OM facilitates “secure” and “fertile” “intellectual functionings” for epistemic WB.

5.4.6 Fertile Functionings: Multipliers of Advantage for Well-being

Apart from “corrosive disadvantages”, the phenomenon of “clustering” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 120) also entails the concept of “fertile functionings”. According to Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) a fertile functioning is “a functioning or the precondition for functioning that spreads its good effects over several categories, either directly or by reducing risk to the other functionings” and it appears as a way to “overcome corrosive disadvantages” (ibid, 2007, p. 122, 121). However, Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) note that it is generally “easier to establish which are the corrosive disadvantages than to verify beyond doubt fertile functionings” because
“currently very little is known about fertile functionings in contrast to a significant established amount about corrosive disadvantages, especially in the area of health” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 154, 147).

In order to understand this difficulty let us look at the following example. A widely – believed claim is that “being educated” means being able to address various kinds of disadvantage and as such being educated is a significant fertile functioning (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, 142). Specifically, Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) argue that being educated can be translated, among other things, into being able to make “good use of one’s sense, imagination and thought” which is a fertile functioning (ibid, 2007, 142). Nevertheless, Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) observe that although research into education such as that of Piaget (cited by Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 214) shows that education of two- to three-year-old children is extremely fertile, the general claim that being educated is a fertile functioning can be challenged in various respects.

First, findings of the European Social Survey (as cited by Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 142) demonstrate that “it is not the case that the more people are educated, the more satisfied they are with their lives.” However, they note that this can be challenged by the fact that educated people’s horizons and aspirations are wider, therefore they are more difficult to satisfy. Second, educated people are usually more critical of the world and themselves, therefore, it is less easy to be satisfied with their life overall. Although there is not a significant correlation between being educated and being satisfied with one’s life overall, Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) highlight that “the highest correlation lies between being educated and healthy” (ibid, 2007, p. 143). Apart from their own research, Wolff and De-Shalit

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55 Sense, imagination and thought is one of Nussbaum’s ten central capabilities (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 33) and one of Wolff’s and De-Shalit’s six high-weight functionings (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 106). Nussbaum’s definition of sense, imagination and thought, which Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) also adapt is “being able to use the senses, to imagine, think and reason and to do these things in a truly human way, a way informed and cultivated by an adequate education, including, but by no means limited to, literacy and basic mathematics and scientific training. Being able to use imagination and thought in connection with experiencing and producing works and events of one’s choice, religious, literary, musical and so forth. Being able to use one’s mind in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of expression with respect to both political and artistic speech and freedom of religious exercise. Being able to have pleasurable experiences and to avoid non beneficial pain” (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 33).
(2007) call upon several studies that also support this claim (ibid, 2007, pp. 122-125, 214).

In the same context, whereas “it is difficult to prove that being educated is necessarily a fertile functioning, there is strong evidence that not being educated is a corrosive disadvantage particularly in terms of (un)employment” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, pp. 143, 214). That is to say, whilst being educated does not guarantee employment, an uneducated individual is more likely to be unemployed, therefore, they are more likely to be exposed to risks concerning the functionings associated with employment, e.g. bodily health, affiliation, control of one’s environment, and their WB overall (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007). Similarly, they note that “although lacking education is always a corrosive disadvantage, its fertility appears to be much more context-dependent” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p 144).

From another point of view, Nussbaum (2011) observes that “fertile functionings” seem to be the “flipside of corrosive disadvantages” (ibid, 2011, p. 44). However, this is not always the case as “corrosive disadvantages and fertile functionings are not necessarily mirror images of each other” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 134). This distinction is particularly important in terms of policy intervention. To give an example, the absence of bodily integrity is corrosive, whilst its presence is not necessarily fertile. Conversely, the absence of humour is not corrosive, whereas its presence can be fertile (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 134). Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) emphasize that “causation in is not always similar to causation out”, that is, if somebody has been “run over by a car this person will not be cured by having that car reverse back over him” (ibid, 2007, p. 134). Additionally, inspired by Susan Mayer’s argument (1998 cited by Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, pp. 134-135), they argue that although research data clearly shows that a lower income is a corrosive disadvantage because it prevents one from having genuine opportunities to secure functionings, earning more, that is beyond a certain minimum to meet basic needs, is not necessarily a fertile functioning or a facilitating precondition for other functionings. In the next chapter I argue that since OM is a virtue that facilitates others virtues, it can also facilitate a person’s secure and fertile functionings for WB.
5.4.7 Dynamic Public Reflective Equilibrium: Dialogue about Functionings for Well-being

The last idea discussed in this section is Wolff’s and De-Shalit’s attempt to explore the nature of disadvantage practically by engaging in the real world through their method, i.e. a “dynamic public reflective equilibrium” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, pp. 41-43), which consists in engaging in dialogue with people to further analyse the concepts of functionings and capabilities in order to find policy effective ways to deal with disadvantage (Gheaus, 2010) (Grant, 2008) (Shrader-Frechette, 2008). Their method consists in dialogue between philosophers and the public about functionings for WB and how to provide policy effective ways to deal with disadvantage (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, pp. 41-43) (Gheaus, 2010) (Grant, 2008) (Shrader-Frechette, 2008). As Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) note, the roots of their method lie in John Rawls’ private reflective equilibrium and Michael Walzer’s contextual reflective equilibrium (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, pp. 12-13).

They clarify that their aim is to “provide and philosophically justify a method that is in position to identify the least advantaged in any society” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 120). To this end, they conducted a series of interviews with people they regarded as disadvantaged\(^\text{56}\) and professionals who take care of disadvantaged people in a variety of fields\(^\text{57}\). Interviews in the first phase were semi-structured, i.e. more like discussions rather than simple interviews in the sense that people had the opportunity to talk about the most important human functionings without a particular frame. In the second phase, whilst they moved on to an explicit discussion of Nussbaum’s (2011) ten central capabilities list as it appeared “intuitive, well-argued and comprehensive enough”, they suggested four additional categories due to their findings (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 189). Finally, they created a developed “basic list of functionings as part of the task of setting out a particular pluralist account of disadvantage” and advantage for WB (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 37). Although their method is only a work in progress and a research pilot programme, as Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) note, I think in future research it would be worth looking

\(^{56}\) Such as unemployed, patients, student on state stipends, refugees etc. (Wolff and De - Shalit, 2007, p. 187)

\(^{57}\) Such as social workers, doctors, teachers, asylum seeker workers etc. (Wolff and De - Shalit, 2007, p.187)
at its potential use in teacher education where for example open-minded philosophers of education, virtue epistemologists, educational researchers, teachers, student teachers, policy makers etc. jointly engage in dialogue in order to explore intellectual pursuits for epistemic WB both for themselves and for pupils’ WB.

5.4.8 Disagreements

Generally, Shrader-Frechette (2008) emphasizes that Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) have developed the concepts of advantage and disadvantage in significant ways. However, these do not constitute answers to problems (Shrader-Frechette, 2008). Gheaus (2010) also notices that, despite the fact that Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) make some original contributions, the most significant of which is “the use of the insight that in most societies disadvantages cluster”, their work involves various theoretical and practical problems which they do not examine properly by looking at the arguments in depth (Gheaus, 2010, p. 149). For example, she says that Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) may be unrealistically optimistic concerning the possibility of provision on behalf of a policy that provides “genuine opportunities to secure functionings” for all in accordance with the provided list of functionings (Gheaus, 2010). She also notes that their account of disadvantage is closer to an account of WB rather than an account of justice as it should be (Gheaus, 2010). Moreover, Grant (2008) observes that, even if Wolff’s and De-Shalit’s (2007) approach is the right one, they still have to answer the question of what people themselves should do so as to achieve a particular level of functioning. Instead of replying, they provide ruminations about the subject through discussions relating to disadvantage and responsibility in general (Grant, 2008).

In addition, although Arneson (2010) finds Wolff’s and De-Shalit’s work significant and full of insight, he thinks that they fail to provide guidance to policy for three reasons. First, he challenges their claim that there is “a consensual starting point” for different theories to adapt the same policy that “priority should be given to the worst off” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 3) as unjustified and rather arbitrary (Arneson, 2010). Second, he finds contradictions in Wolff’s and De-Shalit’s (2007) pluralistic view of disadvantage. For instance, on the one hand, Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) note that “pluralism is merely the doctrine that different disadvantages are
incommensurable” and on the other hand they say that “although we have accepted the incommensurability of functionings… alternative functioning sets are comparable” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 96-97) (Arneson, 2010). Third, their “six high-weight functionings” list appears to be directed by “hunches” instead of being anchored in solid theoretical and empirical ground (Arneson, 2010, p. 348).

Apart from these general concerns about Wolff’s and De-Shalit’s project, particular concerns are expressed in relation to their idea of shifting from capabilities to functionings. Arneson (2010) for instance thinks that Wolff’s and De-Shalit’s (2007) suggestion “not just to create opportunities for the sake of creating opportunities but create opportunities for the sake of a life worth living” is confusing, because if opportunities mean expanding one’s capabilities, then in one sentence it is implied both that capabilities are not worthwhile per se and that in order to live a good life one should value and enable one’s capabilities. So, “do capabilities matter per se or not?” he asks (Arneson, 2010, p. 346). Besides, he says that Wolff’s and De-Shalit’s (2007) strategy of “genuine opportunities to secure functionings” is, on the one hand, flawed due to the multidimensional nature of functionings and the difficulties in evaluating one’s opportunities to achieve certain functionings and, on the other hand, it is problematic in terms of commensurability, i.e. to tell who is the least advantaged (Arneson, 2010).

Also, various objections are expressed in relation to Wolff’s and De-Shalit’s (2007) concept of “secure functionings”. Specifically, Arneson (2010) argues that the idea of “risk” is incorrect because “the possibility of suffering a risk of harm is not the same as suffering a harm” (Arneson, 2010, p. 346). Unlike the latter, the former does not necessarily involve negative effects on WB. Therefore, he says that he cannot see the extra merit that the “secure functionings” idea gives to the CA. Gheaus (2010), although she recognizes that the integration of the factor of “risk” into the account of disadvantage is an innovative idea, she stresses the need for a deeper exploration due to the diversity of cases. From my perspective, Arneson’s objection is a reasonable one, but I would not go so far as to discard the whole concept as incorrect, because it is often the case that the balance between actually suffering the risk and the possibility of suffering a risk is so delicate that it affects
one’s functionings to a greater or a lesser degree in any case. Besides, it is generally accepted that prevention is better than treatment.

In contrast, Olsaretti (2008) observes that the “high-weight functionings” or heavy disadvantages for their opposites are actually evidenced by Wolff’s and De-Shalit’s (2007) empirical research, i.e. the “public dynamic reflective equilibrium”, which also shows that these functionings do cluster regarding the least advantaged. In addition, let us recall that the significance of these “high-weight functionings” is determined by relevant existing literature and research\(^{58}\) that already uses the language of functionings and their interviewees’ answers. Thus, it is not fair to maintain, as Arneson (2010) does, that their list is merely based on “hunches”. Besides, they emphasize that any findings are considered to be “suggestive rather than definite” and that their work should be seen as a pilot research programme where there is open space for further research and deeper analysis of existing research (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 127). Without overlooking these implications, which are not exclusive to Wolff’s and De-Shalit’s concepts, I think that OM, as presented in the next chapter, can offer significant help to their approach to WB by adding new and crucial perspectives to solve any problems that arise. In this sense, the virtue of genuine intellectual OM that is well-informed and reasonable facilitates secure and fertile functionings for WB both theoretically and in practice. However, critique of Wolff’s and De-Shalit’s ideas is not limited to the above. Of particular interest are Nussbaum’s critical views on their modifications and concepts.

First of all, Nussbaum (2011, p 42) welcomes Wolff’s and De-Shalit’s (2007) ideas as a fruitful contribution in the theoretical apparatus of the CA overall. In spite of the fact that Nussbaum (2011) seems to embrace the core of “secure functionings” which is the security perspective, she insists on the significance of “capabilities” both as a term and as a concept, and therefore, she re-names the term “secure functioning” as “capability security” (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 43). She also underlines that “an idea of security is already contained into the central capability of emotions” implicitly (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 33). However, she admits that Wolff’s and De-Shalit’s concept of “secure functionings” is related to both emotions and reasonable expectations. In

\(^{58}\) See Disadvantage (2007), pages 122-127.
this regard, reasonable expectations may suggest that the security factor looks at “if and how far a capability is secured by policy, the market or power politics” (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 43). Regarding Wolff’s and De-Shalit’s ideas of “fertile functionings” and “corrosive disadvantages” she recognizes that they both constitute two concepts of great significance, however, she raises particular concerns in relation to the former (Nussbaum, 2011). Specifically, she claims that Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) do not distinguish as clearly as they should between the concepts of “functionings” and “capabilities”, and alliteration makes their analysis confusing. Therefore, she suggests that the term “fertile capabilities” instead of “fertile functionings” is more appropriate in the context of WB (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 44).

Wolff and De-Shalit (2013) respond to Nussbaum’s observations by making a thought experiment. Through this, they try to show that Nussbaum’s (2011) suggestions are perplexing and lead to further philosophical implications. Particularly, Wolff and De-Shalit (2013) look at what it means to have a functioning as a “realized capability” (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 24). They set forth three options:

“(i) to accomplish the functioning, (ii) to have the choice whether or not to accomplish the functioning, i.e. to have the freedom whether or not to accomplish the functioning and (iii) to accomplish the functioning in one’s own way, i.e. to have the freedom how to accomplish the functioning” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2013, p. 163)

According to their thought experiment both choice (ii) and choice (iii) constitute kinds of freedom, and therefore, they could easily be confused. Additionally, if a person has a “realized capability” for bodily health, this means that (i) he/she is healthy and probably (iii) he/she is healthy in his/her own way. Moreover, Nussbaum (2011) argues for a “CA that is committed to respect people’s powers of self-definition” which can mean either (ii) or (iii) or both (Nussbaum, 2011 cited by Wolff and De-Shalit (2013, p. 163). In this sense, Wolff and De-Shalit (2013) doubt whether people’s choice/freedom whether or not to be healthy is actually respected. Elsewhere Nussbaum (2011) says that “the CA is focused on freedom or choice holding that a good society is one that promotes for its people a set of opportunities or freedoms that they choose whether or not to exercise, thus, it respects people’s powers of self-definition ibid, 2011, p.18). However, she also
argues that “there is one exception: people should not be given the choice or freedom to be treated with respect and nonhumiliation” (ibid, 2011, p. 26). In writing this, however, as I see it, Nussbaum (2011) contradicts and undermines her own argument.

In order to make their argument stronger, Wolff and De-Shalit refer to research conducted by Michael Marmot (2008 cited by Wolff and De-Shalit, 2013, p. 163). Specifically, they consider people who live in an area of Glasgow where men’s life expectancy is very low around fifty-four. Although these men have free access to the Scottish health system, their lifestyle choices, which include drinking and smoking, use of drugs, poor diet and violence, result in their low life expectancy. However, some men in the same area manage to live longer, which implies that all men in the area have the freedom to choose whether they achieve health or not.

According to Wolff and De-Shalit (2013), if we accept Nussbaum’s (2011) critique we should focus on health capability rather than health per se because it is the former that gives value to people’s lifestyle decisions. However, in this case, freedom of choice is no longer the focus and the stress is on concerns about the environment that leads them to particular lifestyle choices. From this point of view, Wolff and De-Shalit (2013) note that “freedom whether or not to accomplish bodily health does not seem valuable in itself” (ibid, 2013, p. 163). In this context they also recognize “the legitimacy of people’s choice to damage their health, but not so much as a freedom good in itself, but rather as a side effect of some other activity that they find valuable” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2013, p. 165).

In addition, Wolff and De-Shalit (2013) notice that Nussbaum (2011) seems to liken the two types of freedom, i.e. freedom to achieve health and freedom to fail to achieve health, to “different religious and secular views of life” (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 26). However, they argue that the capabilities usually come into the category of bodily health rather than the “religious and secular” categories, because there is great “value in the accomplishment of capabilities as well as in the capabilities being secured” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2013, p. 164). In this sense, they recognize how

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59 Wolff and De - Shalit at this point clarify that they are not looking at issues of responsibility, and neither do I in this thesis (ibid, 2013, p. 163).
essential it is that people accomplish capabilities in their own way, and so does Nussbaum’s (2011) CA. However, at the same time, Nussbaum (2011) seems to “over-emphasize the freedom not to accomplish some functionings” in one’s own way (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2013, p. 164).

Furthermore, Wolff and De-Shalit (2013) disagree with Nussbaum’s (2011) suggestion that “fertile functionings” be changed into “fertile capabilities”, because this would be problematic from the viewpoint of an “unrealized capability” and how possible it is for a capability to be fertile (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2013, p. 164). They argue that it is not possible for an “unrealized capability” to be “fertile”, unless it is instantly realized, “but then it is the functioning that does the work” and not the capability (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2013, p. 164). In this regard, Nussbaum’s proposal to modify the terms does not make sense. Having said that, Wolff and De-Shalit (2013) agree with Nussbaum (2011) that “the way a functioning is acquired can make the functioning more or less fertile”, however, “this does not apply to all cases” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2013, p. 164).

All in all, I think that Nussbaum’s and Wolff’s and De-Shalit’s ideas are to some extent are of mutual importance for WB rather than antagonistic. Specifically, on the one hand, I agree with Wolff and De-Shalit (2013) to a certain degree that emphasis should be given in a “context-dependent” or consequences-dependent value of freedom of choice, i.e. if one’s freedom to choose is for choosing good then freedom has high value, but if it is for choosing bad, then it is not highly valuable. On the other hand, however, I recognize along with Nussbaum (2011, p. 26) how crucial a person’s “freedom of choice” per se is, when I think of it in terms of its absence, and from this point of view a “context-dependent” discussion would make no sense (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 97). If “freedom of choice” means “the power or right to act, speak or think as one wants and the power to self-determination” (Oxford Dictionary, 2016), Nussbaum (2011) is right to stand for this above all. In this context, although need not be any discussion about whether we should be free to choose, I believe that discussion about the consequences of our choices for WB that are freely made is necessary beyond doubt. In relation to the latter, the virtue of OM is necessary in terms of conceptual clarification, because I argue that facilitates a
person’s acquisition of “secure” and “fertile functionings” for WB in his/her own way, since it is related to self-knowledge and self-monitoring, as argued in Chapter 6. In addition, it is a virtue with respect to others’ “freedom of choice” and WB because, among other things, it is seriously engaged in dialogue. Last but not least, this account of OM appears to be highly “context-sensitive” in terms of “a more refined and thoughtful… or a better and more appropriate” (Papastephanou and Angeli, 2007, p. 606) consideration of the context, because it is genuine, reasonable and well-informed.

To sum up, in Chapters 4 and 5 I looked at WB discourse in education and argued that a full account of WB in education should place an equal emphasis on the subjective and objective factors of WB. In particular, I argued that WB is not merely subjective in the sense that it is only based on individualistic major-informed preferences and it is not merely objective in the sense that it is rooted in human nature per se (White, 2007). Therefore, I argued for a combined account of WB which consists in both subjective-major-informed desires and objective list elements. In addition, I argued that education involves not only individual students and groups of children, but also individual teachers and groups of teachers etc. who all depend on and interact with one another. Therefore, I argued that an equal concern both for the individual and for collective WB is vital.

To this end, first, in Chapter 4, I examined White’s subjective-collective oriented account of WB. According to White (2011), WB consists in three elements, that is, “success”, “whole-heartedness” and “worthwhileness”, which can be objectively determined. The best way to do this is by looking at the example of the arts and art critics, as “objectivity” is central to art critics’ work. Also, the subjective factor of WB in White’s account is not the individual him/herself, but a loose body of people where the most “authoritative voices” on what WB consists in are those of people who experience all kinds of goods. These people, however, are not experts in the same way that art critics are experts in their fields, but rather they are a loose body of people with “accumulated wisdom”. And in this process, education, as White (2011) emphasizes, plays a crucial role, mainly because through education individuals become better—informed about WB pursuits and what WB consists in.
However, I argued that White’s account of WB is insufficient for the aims of this thesis, because he gives too much emphasis to the subjective rather than to the objective factor, and to the collective rather than the individual. Therefore, in this chapter, I also explored Nussbaum’s objective-individual account of WB, which emphasizes the objective and individual aspects of WB. According to Nussbaum (2011) a “life worthy of human dignity” requires at least ten objective elements, that is, “a minimum threshold of ten central capabilities” which belong “foremost to individual persons and only derivatively to groups” (ibid, 2011, pp. 32, 35). The core idea of Nussbaum’s theory of WB is “capabilities”, namely what a person is able to do and be. Capabilities are valuable per se because, unlike functionings, they entail “freedom and choice” (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 25). In this regard, education and policy in general should promote and cultivate people’s capabilities. On the opposite side to “capabilities” are “functionings”, which are “the realization of capabilities” and, as Nussbaum (2011) argues, functionings are inferior to capabilities because they do not involve “freedom and choice” as capabilities do (ibid, 2011, p. 25).

However, I argued that it was necessary in terms of conceptual clarification to go beyond Nussbaum’s CA and expand her ideas, especially those related to the concepts of “capabilities” and “functionings” for WB. To this end, I also investigated Wolff’s and De-Shalit’s (2007) account of WB which, although it is regarded as a “natural development of the CA”, is different because, among other things, it focuses on “functionings” instead of “capabilities” and emphasizes that apart from the level of functionings that people enjoy at a given time, it is also crucial to secure that level over time. In this chapter, I argued that if, as Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) maintain, WB consists in “genuine opportunities for secure functionings” (ibid, 2007, p. 37), in promoting “fertile functionings” and in diminishing “corrosive disadvantages” (ibid, 2007, pp. 121-122), and if in teaching we aim at pupils’ WB and help them be mutatis mutandis as advantaged as possible, then, on the one hand, we should focus on teachers’ “genuine opportunities for secure functionings” that constitute advantages for their WB and facilitate teachers’ “secure” and “fertile functionings”. In parallel, on the other hand, we should try to limit and/or diminish teachers’ exposure to “risks” that constitute “disadvantages” for their WB, such as profit-seeking and political power, as I argued in Chapter 1, and then for pupils’ WB. To
this end, in the following chapters, I argue that a way to facilitate teachers’ “secure” and “fertile functionings” is by teaching teachers to be open-minded, whilst standardized-mindedness and closed-mindedness are discussed as two anti–OM cases that hinder teachers’ acquisition of “secure” and “fertile functionings” and therefore hinder teachers’ WB as well as pupils’ WB.
CHAPTER VI

The Case for Open-mindedness: Open-mindedness as Necessary for Epistemic Well-being

6.1 Introduction

In this chapter I hone in on the intellectual virtue of OM. My aim here is, on the one hand, to show that OM is necessary in terms of conceptual clarification if we want to know what epistemic WB is and, on the other hand, to draw a parallel to say that OM is a virtue that facilitates other virtues, therefore, it facilitates the acquisition of a person’s “secure” and “fertile functionings”, both their own and others’. Building upon what we established in Chapter 3 and virtue epistemology (VEP), I focus on two accounts of OM that appear to be “the most developed in character-based VEP” (Kwong, 2015, p. 3). The first account is that of Baehr (2011) who argues that OM is a character trait that necessarily makes particular demands on the individual themselves. The second account is that of Riggs (2010) who argues that OM shows that the individual’s involvement is necessary for intellectual virtue. In addition, I specifically examine OM in relation to the individual’s strongly-held beliefs (Adler, 2004) and their “engagement in dialogue” and enquiry (Hare, 2006) which are, in particular, educationally significant. Then, I briefly discuss two anti-OM cases, that is, “closed-mindedness” (Riggs, 2010) and standardized-mindedness.

As I will show, OM is the link between those different discourses that use different terminology as examined in the previous chapters, that is, on the one hand, an account of WB that requires virtue(s) from Aristotle’s and VEP perspectives, and on the other hand, an account of WB in education that equally combines the subjective and objective, the collective and individual factors of WB from White’s, Nussbaum’s and Wolff’s and De-Shalit’s viewpoints. Particularly in this chapter, my aim is to extend the concept of intellectual WB and to this end, I bring together, among other things, Roberts’ and Wood’s (2007) idea that epistemic virtues are “an acquired base of excellent intellectual functionings of some human activity” (ibid,
2007, pp. 153, 215) discussed in Chapter 3, and Wolff’s and De-Shalit’s (2007) notion of “secure” and “fertile functionings”. In this context, I put forward the concept of genuine intellectual OM that is both reasonable and well-informed and argue that it facilitates “secure” and “fertile” “intellectual functionings”, namely epistemic WB, both individually and collectively. In this sense, I use the terms secure and fertile intellectual functionings and epistemic (or intellectual) WB interchangeably. Also, I briefly discuss the case of standardized-mindedness as something that hinders teachers’ secure and fertile” “intellectual functionings” for intellectual WB and then pupils’ WB since, as I argued in Chapter 1, teachers’ and pupils’ WB are inseparably intertwined.

6.2 What Is Open-mindedness?

To begin, Baehr (2011) talks about three accounts of OM. First, he presents the “conflict model”, according to which OM is “a willingness or ability to temporarily set aside one's doxastic commitments about a particular matter in order to give a fair and impartial hearing to an opposing belief, argument, or body of evidence” (ibid, 2011, p. 143). He argues that this model is insufficient, because OM does not always involve some kind of conflict or disagreement, and thus it cannot be adequate in contexts such as neutrality and indecisiveness about the matters under examination.

Second, Baehr (2011) illustrates a refined version of the conflict model, i.e. the adjudication model, which suggests that “OM is essentially a disposition to assess one or more sides of an intellectual dispute in a fair and impartial way” (ibid, 2011, p. 145). However, he notes that this model is not satisfactory either, because OM is not necessarily an issue of making a fair or impartial evaluation of the aspects of an intellectual disagreement. For example, OM may also concern neutral situations in which there are not any disagreements or conflict as well as activities that do not involve rational assessment. Therefore, Baehr (2011) proposes a third account of OM:

“An open‐minded person is characteristically (a) willing and within limits able (b) to transcend a default cognitive standpoint (c) in order to take up or take seriously the
merits of (d) a distinct cognitive standpoint... supplemented - only to a limited range of cases\textsuperscript{60} - by the proviso that where open-mindedness involves rational assessment or evaluation, it also necessarily involves adjusting one's beliefs or confidence levels according to the outcome of this assessment” (Baehr, 2011, p. 154)

Equally important, Baehr (2011) argues that “OM is largely or often a facilitating virtue”, namely OM is an intellectual virtue that creates the space for other virtues and faculties to achieve their functions, especially by “helping one’s mind to detach or stay detached from a specific position” (ibid, 2011, p. 157).

To continue, Riggs (2010) wants to provide a clear understanding of epistemic virtues in general and to this end, he starts with OM. His interest in epistemic virtues is related to their “particularity and distinctiveness”. In this regard, Riggs (2010) explores “an account of OM that is plausible and makes OM interesting in its own right... namely independently of whether it is possible to define evaluative concepts in terms of any virtue” (ibid, 2010, p. 175). In order to give an account of OM, Riggs (2010) examines three parameters.

The first parameter is that OM, like any particular virtue, should offer a clear picture of a person possessing that virtue, i.e. on the basis of a particular account of OM it will be easier to recognize an open-minded individual than to recognize a virtuous person on the basis of a general account of virtue. In this sense, an account of OM should be descriptive and normative\textsuperscript{61} as well as detailed and directly applicable in the real world where one lives (Riggs, 2010). Second, Riggs (2010) argues that intellectual virtues in general and OM in particular, like ethical virtues, should be treated as personal qualities. However, whether epistemic virtues should be viewed as “faculties” or as “personal qualities” can be contested as we have seen in Chapter 3, as it is a major point of conflict between “virtue-reliabilists” and “virtue-responsibilists” in virtue epistemological debates. In this context, although Riggs

\textsuperscript{60} Baehr (2011) notices, however, that “this does not constitute a general requirement or necessary condition for exercising open-mindedness, because in contexts where rational assessment is not involved, there is not any concern as to whether the person has exhibited an open-minded doxastic response to such assessment” (ibid, 2011, p. 155).

\textsuperscript{61} Descriptive: giving information about how things are; Normative: giving information about how things ought to be.
(2010) does not reject “virtue-reliabilism” on the grounds that its ideas may be necessary for an excellent informant, he argues, and I agree, that “virtue-responsibilism”, with its agent-oriented concept of virtue appears more relevant and satisfactory in terms of providing an account of OM. Third, Riggs (2010) notes that any account of OM should be able to provide satisfying answers to questions such as (a) why a person should want to be open-minded, (b) how it is possible to be open-minded, when, for instance, one holds at the same time a firm belief, (c) why someone virtuous should be open-minded. These questions are further explored in 6.2.1.

However, what makes OM so special a virtue for WB in comparison with other intellectual virtues? Generally speaking, it is common practice among virtue epistemologists to present lists of intellectual virtues, and OM is often at the top of these lists (Riggs, 2010). This could imply that the virtue of OM is the most important and/or the least controversial. Riggs (2010) though challenges the view of OM superiority in relation to other virtues and argues that its place near the top of a list of virtues may be due to the fact that although OM has strong ethical aspects, it does not introduce itself as a moral virtue, therefore, it is an easy choice. On the other hand, Riggs (2010) observes that it is difficult to make judgments about the controversiality or significance of an epistemic virtue, because in virtue epistemology, in comparison with moral virtues and virtue ethics, little progress has been done so far concerning a deep understanding of the concept of intellectual virtues.

From another perspective, Arpaly (2011) argues that OM can be regarded both as an intellectual and as a moral virtue, but as a moral virtue OM is a puzzle, because exercises of moral virtues in general appear as expressions of moral concern, whilst gaining, losing and/or reconsidering beliefs are not actions and therefore, cannot be actions derived from moral interest. In this regard, two virtues which are in essence different and operate in the areas of intellect and moral respectively, claim the same name, that is, OM. However, here I am not looking at and taking a position concerning tensions between intellectual and moral virtues. This thesis aims at teachers’ intellectual WB and then pupils’ WB which as I argued in Chapter 1, are
inseparable. Thus, I particularly focus on virtue epistemology and epistemic virtues, which, however, does not necessarily imply an exclusion of the moral factor, only that it is not examined here.

Moreover, it is not my aim in this chapter to defend OM as the most important virtue for intellectual WB. However, on the one hand, I imply that a special characteristic of this account of OM is that all other virtues that aim at intellectual goods and epistemic WB necessarily involve some kind of OM and on the other hand, I argue that as OM facilitates other virtues (Baehr, 2011), it also facilitates “secure” and “fertile functionings” for WB (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007). Let us look at some examples in relation to the former. According to Roberts and Wood (2007) “love of knowledge is an intellectual virtue that consists in excellent orientation of one’s will to knowledge… a virtue that provides the motivation needed for intellectual WB” (ibid, 2007, pp. 153, 213). “Generosity” is another intellectual virtue that consists in contributing to others for their own WB (Roberts and Wood, 2007, p. 286). Also, “intellectual courage is to be able to persist in a doxastic state, e.g. belief, or/and course of action, e.g. inquiry, towards intellectual goods despite the fact that doing so involves an obvious threat to one's WB” (Baehr, 2011, p. 164).

Given a definition of these virtues and a rich definition of OM as presented above by Baehr (2011) and Riggs (2010), we can see how particular characteristics of OM are entailed in other virtues, therefore, it is probably the case that all virtues entail some kind of OM. An examination of the relationship(s) between OM and other intellectual virtues is certainly worth its own research, however, this is beyond the scope of this thesis, which focuses on the concepts of OM and WB. Hence, let us further explore the intellectual virtue of OM through the ideas of strongly held beliefs (Adler, 2004) and “engagement in dialogue” and enquiry (Hare, 2006) that are in particular educationally significant for WB, both individually and collectively.

6.2.1 Open-mindedness and Strongly-Held Beliefs

Adler (2004) emphasizes the relationship between OM and strongly-held beliefs. He observes that, if one has a firm belief, then it is usually the case that one does not think that there is a serious possibility that one’s belief is false. However,
only beliefs that are held as all-or-nothing can represent how one actually holds strong opinions. According to Adler (2004) OM is a “meta-attitude” towards one’s belief as perceived and not merely towards the particular proposition in the same way that “fallibilism is a meta-doubt” about the excellence of one’s belief and not a doubt about the truth of any particular proposition (ibid, 2004, p. 130). He emphasizes that this tension becomes crucially central in the relationship between OM and education (Adler, 2004).

For instance, in the light of the aims of this thesis we should ask, if it is necessary in teaching teachers to be open-minded and how far this should be an obligation. If our aim is teachers’ WB and then pupils’ WB and if this account of WB requires a particular account of virtue(s), then OM is necessary to teachers. On the other hand, if OM is necessary to teachers who teach and if teaching and teachers are part of formal education where legal commitments apply, then being open-minded involves some kind of obligation. However, as I argued in Chapter 1 and further stress in the next chapter, both necessity and obligation issues here should be seen from both viewpoints, i.e. that of teachers and of teacher education programmes. In this regard, if teacher education aims at teachers’ WB and then pupils’ WB, then it is necessary and an obligation of teacher education programmes as part of formal education to teach teachers to be open-minded.

However, to what extent should teachers be open-minded? This question particularly relates to the problem of receptiveness of different views without decreasing one’s strength of commitment or strongly-held beliefs and it is also related to Riggs’s (2010) intertwined questions that were put forward in section 6.2, i.e. (a) why should a person want to be open-minded, (b) how is it possible to be open-minded, when, for instance, one holds at the same time a firm belief, (c) why should someone virtuous be open-minded. Let me explain. In relation to why a person should be open-minded anyway, Riggs (2010) notes that it is an absolute fact that all human beings are fallible. Therefore, to be open-minded, that is, to be open to alternative views, different from one’s own views, constitutes a good strategy to find and restrict one’s false beliefs that obviously hinder intellectual WB.

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62 In terms both of necessity and of obligation as discussed previously.
This gives rise to whether it is possible and/or legitimate to be open-minded and simultaneously hold a strong belief. Riggs (2010) points out that this is appropriate and “if one is not so open-minded that one’s brains fall out”, one must be capable of firm beliefs with regard to which the virtue of OM seems to be most essential (ibid, 2010, p. 178). To give an example, a person has a strong belief that dialogue, as “a discussion between two or more people or groups especially one directed towards exploration of a particular subject or resolution of a problem” (Oxford Dictionary, 2016), is a sine qua non for teachers’ and pupils’ WB in the educational context. This is a firm belief that not only does not undermine the virtue of OM, but, on the contrary, I believe, it seems impossible to hold such a strong belief unless one is open-minded.

Moreover, there is the problem of why someone virtuous or an excellent informant should be open-minded anyway, since an excellent informant is most likely to achieve intellectual goods, such as knowledge and understanding, and then achieve WB their own beliefs rather than any alternatives. In relation to this, Riggs (2010) argues that no matter how intellectually virtuous one is, there is always the possibility of holding a false belief even if the possibility of a false belief maintained by an excellent informant is smaller in comparison with less virtuous informants. Although to become an excellent informant is, among other things, what we should all strive for in education, to assume that we need not always be intellectually open to alternative views seems to undermine intellectual WB itself. Looking at ways always to be intellectually open leads us to examine issues regarding enquiry and dialogue.

6.2.2 Open-mindedness, Enquiry and Serious Engagement in Dialogue

Hare’s (2006) account of OM is educationally significant in particular, because among other things, he connects OM with education straightforwardly. He argues that OM plays a crucial role in education, because it helps one to be ready for change in an unsettled world and to be inventive in addressing emerging issues. According to Hare (2006), in societies and educational environments alike, to move towards and/or come into mutual agreements is crucial, because people usually hold different opinions and criteria, and therefore they come to differing conclusions
which can, if not properly treated, disrupt the good operation of both society and education.

In this context, on the one hand, enquiry and dialogue are significant for WB and on the other hand, OM appears to be a virtue central to enquiry and dialogue (Hare, 2006). As Hare (2006) implies, OM is particularly important in teaching, because if teachers are supposed to cultivate any critical qualities, become independent thinkers and in this way “work towards a closer approximation” to the epistemic goods of knowledge and understanding towards both their own and pupils’ WB, teachers should also pursue the ideals of original enquiry and open dialogue (Hare, 2006, p. 15).

In addition, although OM can be justified by one’s self-view as fallible, it does not necessarily result from one’s judging it worthwhile to engage in dialogue where one does not know or is not certain of one’s and/or others’ beliefs (Adler, 2004). In this regard, Riggs (2010) talks about a “serious engagement in dialogue” where one is receptive to others’ criticism and alternative views and engages in achieving, losing and revising beliefs in certain reasonable ways (Arpaly, 2011). From this point of view, OM maintains dialogue alive and fertile and holds out the possibility that thorny issues can be worked out effectively over time.

6.2.3 An Open-minded Individual and Open-minded about Something

Furthermore, it is important to stress the distinction between being an open-minded individual and being open-minded about something. Both Adler (2004) and Riggs (2010) note that it is possible for an open-minded person not to show OM in certain cases.

Being open-minded about a particular belief means that one takes challenges to this belief seriously. However, to take challenges seriously does not imply that a person should take all challenges seriously (Adler, 2004) (Riggs, 2010). In order to evaluate which challenges should be examined seriously in terms of devoting time and energy to this, and which ones should not, an epistemic agent should acquire and/or be in a process towards “epistemic self-knowledge” and “epistemic self-monitoring” (Riggs, 2010). As Riggs (2010) argues the former consists in one’s
knowledge about one’s own intellectual strengths and weaknesses and is something that can be cultivated and the latter ensures that one’s epistemic self-knowledge is always effective in practice and can be practiced. In addition, both “epistemic self-knowledge” and “epistemic self-monitoring” promote genuine OM and not the kind of “an open-minded person whose brains fall out” as explained earlier (Riggs, 2010). Next, I briefly discuss two cases of anti-OM, that is, “closed-mindedness” and a concept that I call standardized-mindedness. Although I only hint at these concepts here, they are both worth further examination in the future.

6.2.4 Closed-mindedness and Standardized-mindedness as Anti-Open-mindedness Examples

It is probably the case that we would not appreciate life if death did not exist. In a similar way, “closed-mindedness as the result of taking one’s own ideas to be obvious and universal, therefore, unquestionable” makes its opposite that is OM even more important for WB (Riggs, 2010, p. 184). However, it is fundamental not to confuse “closed-mindedness” with strongly-held beliefs. As Riggs (2010) implies above, a person’s strongly-held beliefs based on the criteria of epistemic goods such as knowledge and understanding can contribute positively to their WB. For instance, when Socrates states that he only knows that he knows nothing, he grounds his concept on this one and only strongly-held belief that he knows nothing.

Also, an anti-OM case may be what I call standardized-mindedness in teaching. To give an example, if, in accordance with political correctness we should “avoid forms of expression and/or actions that are perceived to exclude, marginalize and/or insult (individuals and/or) groups of people who are socially disadvantaged and/or discriminated against” (Oxford Dictionary, 2016) and if a kind of double-standard political correctness is one that, although it “avoids forms of expression and/or actions that are perceived to exclude, marginalize and/or insult (individuals and/or) groups of people who are socially disadvantaged and/or discriminated against”63, it does not “avoid forms of expression and/or actions that are perceived to

63 How are “socially disadvantaged or discriminated groups of people” and individuals determined? Who determines them as such? Aspects of these problems are partly discussed in Chapter 5 through Wolff’s and De - Shalit’s (2007) ideas. How legitimate is it to be politically correct in favour of one...
exclude, marginalize and/or insult (individuals and/or) groups of people who are” not perceived to be “socially disadvantaged” and therefore, it “discriminates against” them, then, in this context, if particular double-standard types of political correctness are regarded as prevailing standards in formal education and if one keeps up with these standards, one is standardized-minded. In this sense, standardized-mindedness may also be regarded as a kind of “closed-mindedness”. Hence, when teachers are not open-minded as shown earlier, towards negative prevailing norms such as a kind of double-standard political correctness, they hinder their way towards epistemic goods and WB and also towards pupils’ achievement of intellectual goods and WB.

Let us look at another example. If a prevailing norm orchestrated by the factors of profit-seeking and political power, as I argue in Chapter 1, is that teaching consists in the “transmission of detachable skills and discrete knowledge, all measured by standardized tests” (Higgins, 2011, p. 3), and if teachers merely keep up with this norm without being open-minded to alternative views, then teachers are standardized-minded. However, this should not be seen as a one-sided situation. We should also look at what kind of teacher education promotes or hinders anti-OM for or against teachers’ WB respectively and subsequently pupils’ WB, as I argue in Chapter 1. I discuss this further in the following sections and in Chapter 7, particularly in relation to student teachers and initial teacher education in Scotland.

(Figure 2 – Epistemic virtues through epistemic tools for epistemic goods for epistemic WB)

group or individuals, but at the same time discriminate against another? Many questions arise, but it is not possible to address them here.
To sum up, OM is perceived as “often and largely a facilitating” intellectual virtue significant both individually and collectively (Baehr, 2011, p. 157). However, as Riggs (2010) argues, it is difficult to make judgments about the controversiality or the importance of an epistemic virtue, because, unlike in the area of moral virtues and virtue ethics, in virtue epistemology little progress has been made so far concerning a deep understanding of the intellectual virtues. In addition, OM in relation to strongly-held beliefs, as Adler (2004) observes, is a “meta-attitude” towards an individual’s belief as perceived and not merely towards the particular proposition in the same way that fallibilism is a “meta-doubt” about the excellence of one’s believing and not a doubt about the truth of any particular proposition (ibid, 2004, p. 130). In this regard, it is suggested that dialogue can play a crucial role in the tension between being open-minded and holding a strongly-held belief. However, although OM could be justified by one’s self view as fallible, it does not result from one’s judging it worthwhile to engage in dialogue where one may not know or should not be certain of one’s belief, as the same also happens regarding others’ beliefs, according to Adler’s (2004) view.

In this regard, Riggs (2010) suggests the criterion of serious engagement in dialogue, i.e. devotion of time and effort, where alternative views can be discussed. It is argued that to be open-minded, namely to be open to alternative views other than one’s own, constitutes a good strategy to find and restrict one’s false beliefs. Besides, “if one is not so open-minded that one’s brains fall out”, one must be capable of firm beliefs with regard to which the virtue of OM seems to be essential as Riggs (2010, p. 178) argues. The virtue of OM is also important because, no matter how epistemically virtuous one is, there is always the possibility of holding a false belief, even if the possibility of a false belief maintained by a virtuous person is smaller in comparison with a less virtuous person.

Moreover, Hare (2006) observes that coming to mutual agreements is very important for the good functioning of education where, as in society, people usually hold different opinions and criteria, and therefore, they come to differing conclusions. From this perspective, the virtue of OM seems essential, particularly in initial teacher education, since it maintains dialogue alive and fertile and holds out
the possibility that thorny issues can be worked out effectively over time (Hare, 2006). Last but not least, it is suggested that to be open-minded about a particular belief means that one takes challenges to this belief seriously. Notwithstanding, Adler (2004) and Riggs (2010) argue that to take challenges seriously does not imply that one takes all challenges seriously. In this regard, in order to evaluate which challenge should be examined seriously and which one should not, an epistemic agent should strive for epistemic self-knowledge and maintain epistemic self-monitoring (Adler, 2004) (Riggs, 2010).

In the second part of this chapter, I introduce the concept of genuine intellectual OM that is both reasonable and well-informed and brings together all the different discourses discussed in the previous chapters that use different terminology. In this context, I argue that the virtue of genuine intellectual OM facilitates teachers’ acquisition of “secure” and “fertile functionings”, both for their own and then for pupils’ intellectual WB.

6.3 The Concept of Genuine Intellectual Open-mindedness: Reasonable and Well-informed

Just as OM creates the space for other virtues and faculties to achieve their functions for intellectual WB by helping one’s mind to detach or stay detached from a specific position, and therefore, OM is a facilitating virtue (Baehr, 2011), genuine intellectual OM is a virtue that facilitates the acquisition of a person’s “secure” and “fertile” intellectual functionings” or epistemic WB, both individually and collectively (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007) (Roberts and Wood, 2007). However, what particularly does the concept of genuine intellectual OM stand for in this thesis? In this section I break down the concept of genuine intellectual OM that is both reasonable and well-informed and explain how it becomes the link between the different discourses discussed in the previous chapters that use different terminology.

First, the term “genuine” adapts the characteristics that Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) attribute to “genuine opportunities” (for secure functionings) (ibid, 2007, pp. 37, 74) that is genuine OM does not involve undue costs and risk towards one’s WB. In this sense, for example, it facilitates the virtue of “intellectual courage which consists in being able to persist in a doxastic state despite the fact that doing so
involves an obvious threat to one's WB” (Baehr, 2011, p. 164). Second, genuine OM is “intellectual” because it involves “cognitive standpoint(s)... and rational assessment or evaluation” (Baehr, 2011, p. 154). It is also intellectual because it explicitly aims at intellectual goods such as knowledge and understanding towards intellectual WB. In this regard, genuine intellectual OM is based on virtue epistemology which gives intellectual virtues a primary role for epistemic goods and WB. Additionally, by being “intellectual”, genuine OM becomes in particular educationally significant because one the one hand, as Aristotle says, “intellectual (virtue) in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching for which reason it requires experience and time” (Aristotle, NE 1103a15) and on the other hand, everything in (teacher) education is thinking-related and usually delivered through instruction and learning (Pakaluk, 2005).

Moreover, genuine intellectual OM is both “reasonable” and “well-informed”. It is “reasonable” because it involves “within limits ability...” (Baehr, 2011, p. 154) that is any costs of being open-minded are reasonable to accept depending on the context. Thus, it is reasonable in terms of being “context-dependent”, as Nussbaum (2011, p. 97) notes, but not in terms of whether or not but to what extent to be genuinely open-minded. Moreover, genuine intellectual OM is reasonable because it is closely related to the Aristotelian concepts of the activity of reason and meson and practical reasoning about a good to be brought (Kraut, 2014) (Crisp, 2000). Let us remind ourselves that, according to Aristotle, WB consists in using reason, i.e. the rational part of the soul, in accordance with virtue and “meson is to feel at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way, and this is characteristic of virtue” (Aristotle, NE 1106b20). Also, “virtue aims at what meson is” (Aristotle, NE 1106b29) and “meson preserves virtue” (Aristotle, NE 1106b12). According to a certain understanding, being virtuous and being phronimos is exactly the same thing, and in intellectual virtue/phronesis, reason and choice are united. Besides, “an open-minded person is characteristically willing and within limits able...” (Baehr, 2011, p. 154).
Additionally, genuine intellectual OM is “well-informed” in order to confront the risk(s) of misleading or insufficient understanding that hinder one’s WB. Specifically, as White (2011) argues, desires for WB should be both major (personally important) and “well-informed” (ibid, 2011, p. 50). An individual with genuine intellectual OM that is “well-informed” is able to provide answers in relation to why and what they are open-minded about as well as how this can contribute to their epistemic WB; in this sense, one is able to give detailed information about how things are (descriptive) and how they ought to be (normative) (Riggs, 2010). Moreover, it is “well-informed” because it is promoted, as Hare (2006) notes, by self-knowledge and self-monitoring. From an Aristotelian perspective, genuine intellectual OM is well-informed because it belongs to “praxis which is a life of informed, virtuous activity…” (Siegler, 1967, p. 31), “a life in accordance with the other kind of virtue” (Aristotle, NE 1178a9-10) that is phronesis (Hughes, 2001), the practical approach to knowledge that copes with what, why and how questions concerning WB (Kraut, 2014) (Crisp, 2000) (Pakaluk 2005).

6.3.1 Genuine Intellectual Open-mindedness for Secure and Fertile Intellectual Functionings

Furthermore, Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) aim at “creating opportunities for the sake of a life worth living” through exploring the concepts of “secure” and “fertile functionings” (ibid, 2007, p. 37). And Baehr (2011) argues that OM, among other things, “creates the space for other virtues and faculties to achieve their functions” for intellectual WB (ibid, 2011, p. 157). Therefore, I argue that OM facilitates the creation of such opportunities for WB and, specifically, I argue that genuine intellectual OM that is both reasonable and well-informed facilitates the acquisition of a person’s “secure” and “fertile” “intellectual functionings” for intellectual WB (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007) (Roberts and Wood, 2007, pp. 153, 215).

According to Wolff and De-Shalit (2007), a focus on offering opportunities for functionings for WB seems less problematic in comparison to guaranteeing functionings for WB, because the latter may involve issues of paternalism or authoritarianism. Likewise, I argue that a teacher education that aims at teachers’
intellectual WB by helping them, among other things, to be open-minded, therefore facilitates the acquisition of teachers’ epistemic WB or “secure” and “fertile” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007) “intellectual functionings” (Roberts and Wood, 2007, pp. 153, 215) and also, shows respect to their “freedom and choice” (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 25) and their “major informed (intellectual) desires” (White, 2002), because by definition OM involves teachers'/individuals’ “willingness and within limits ability to adjust…” (Baehr, 2011, p. 154). Besides, as I argued previously from an Aristotelian perspective, genuine intellectual OM is connected to the concept of meson and particularly to that which is relative to the individual (Aristotle, NE 1106b20) which is intertwined with one’s choice, and “choice is deliberate desire of things in our power…” (Aristotle, NE 1113a10).

In addition, OM maintains dialogue fertile and alive (Hare, 2006) and in this way it offers “genuine opportunities” (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 74) for further exploration of particular subject(s) and/or resolution of thorny issues. Genuine intellectual OM that is reasonable and well-informed helps people “come into mutual agreement(s) through serious engagement in dialogue” (Hare, 2006) because in such dialogue self-interest and concern for others in terms of peoples’ different criteria and opinions are equally important and also this kind of dialogue involves the notion of “success” beyond individual desire satisfaction (White, 2011, p. 49) both for the individual’s and for others’ intellectual WB. On the other hand, a lack of OM as a facilitating virtue to the creation of such opportunities (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 84) hinders dialogue, therefore, there is a “lack of genuine opportunities” for “secure” and “fertile” “intellectual functionings” for WB both individually and collectively (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007, p. 74) (Roberts and Wood, 2007, pp. 153, 215).

Moreover, genuine intellectual OM is necessary for “secure functionings” both in terms of sustaining the level of functionings over time (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007) and concerning the freedom or choice to sustain functionings in respect of their powers of self-definition (Nussbaum, 2011) (Baehr, 2011). As Hare (2006)

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64 I use deliberation as zetesis, i.e. involving search (NE 1112b20, 1142b15 etc.). As for prohairesis, deliberation and its association with it seems quite problematic to some scholars in terms of means, ends and types of reasoning. An examination of these debates however would be beyond the scope of this thesis.
observes, OM is closely related to self-knowledge and self-monitoring, it cultivates one’s critical qualities and helps one be ready for change. Therefore, genuine intellectual OM helps individuals to distinguish when to do what in order to sustain “intellectual functionings” for WB as well as whether and/or how to achieve functionings over time, depending on the context. It is also helpful in relation to the problem of the multidimensional nature of functionings and thus of the difficulties in evaluating opportunities that Arneson (2010) points at, since genuine intellectual OM is central to inquiry and devotes time and effort to evaluating challenges (Hare, 2006).

Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) note that “generally, very little is known about fertile functionings and it is difficult to verify them beyond doubt” (ibid, 2007, pp. 147, 154). Accordingly, would it not be problematic to claim that genuine intellectual OM is necessary to fertile functionings as a facilitating virtue, since so little is known about fertile functionings themselves and on top of that, it is difficult to verify them beyond doubt? On the contrary, given the reasonable, well-informed and context-dependent account of genuine intellectual OM, I argue that its contribution is necessary if we want to further unpack the concept of teachers’ “fertile” “intellectual functionings” for intellectual WB in teacher education. Also, if genuine intellectual OM is considered a virtue that is closely related to meson as discussed above and meson is what “produces, increases and preserves health (or WB)” (Aristotle, NE 1104a16), then that which is intertwined with “what produces, increases and preserves” WB, i.e. OM, can be regarded as something that contributes to fertile and secure functionings for WB.

Last but not least, Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) argue that in terms of WB and “improving people’s lives… understanding fertile functionings is vital... and a fertile functioning is a golden lever for social policy”, so to discover more about it becomes a crucial task (ibid, 2007, pp. 122, 136). In terms of educational policy and implementing policy, I argue that genuine intellectual OM is crucial as something

65 That is “to feel at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive and in the right way” (Aristotle, NE 1106b20)
that contributes to the concept of teachers’ fertile intellectual functionings for their own WB and then pupils’ intellectual WB. In the following section, I look at the concept of standardized-mindedness, which entails risk and therefore, hinders intellectual WB. In this regard, it is on the opposite side to genuine intellectual OM.

6.3.2 The Case of Standardized-mindedness

Earlier in the chapter it was noted that closed-mindedness, i.e. “the result of taking one’s own ideas to be obvious and universal, therefore unquestionable” (Riggs, 2010, p. 184), appears to be the opposite of OM. In this context, it was also stressed how fundamental it is not to confuse firm beliefs with dogmatism (Adler, 2004) and in this regard, I argued that strongly-held beliefs based on the criteria of epistemic goods seeking both for individual and for collective intellectual WB constitute a good basis for intellectual achievement. Also, the notion of standardized-mindedness was discussed where one does not differentiate from negative prevailing norms in relation to epistemic goods-seeking for WB. In this sense, the concept of standardized-mindedness was briefly discussed in the context of particular kinds of political correctness in education as well as in dealing with a mainly subject-knowledge/skills oriented teacher education.

Thus, in this section, the concept of standardized-mindedness that is partially reasonable and partially informed is regarded as a kind of anti-genuine intellectual OM that hinders secure and fertile intellectual functionings for intellectual WB. For example, in this sense, one is partially reasonable when one does not think it reasonable to accept any costs for aiming at intellectual goods and WB regardless of the context. One is also partially informed when, for instance, is not able or willing to confront the risk(s) of misleading or insufficient understanding for intellectual WB, both one’s own and others’. In addition, a standardized-minded person may engage seriously in dialogue with others in terms of devoting time and effort (Hare, 2006), however, they do not show the “willingness and within limits ability to transcend a default cognitive view in order to take up or take seriously the merits of distinct alternative cognitive points” (Baehr, 2011).
Also, as we saw in the previous chapter, a corrosive disadvantage is a kind of disadvantage that affects other functionings in a negative way (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007). In this context, standardized-mindedness appears to be corrosive and involves risk(s) for intellectual functionings for WB. Thus, if genuine intellectual OM facilitates teachers’ secure and fertile intellectual functionings, then it may well be the case that the absence or insecure presence of genuine intellectual OM, as it occurs in standardized-mindedness, hinders teachers’ epistemic WB and then pupils’ WB. From this perspective, if teacher education should limit, minimize or diminish teachers’ exposure to risk(s) that constitutes disadvantages for accomplishing epistemic goods towards intellectual WB, then teacher education should maximize teachers’ opportunities to secure and fertile intellectual functionings that constitute advantages for intellectual WB by helping them be open-minded as I argue in this chapter.
CHAPTER VII

Conclusion and Directions for Future Research

7.1 Conclusion

In this thesis I argued that teachers’ WB is crucial, because it is inextricably connected with pupils’ WB. However, I stressed that there is a gap in teacher education concerning an explicit concern about teachers’ WB overall, because, on the one hand, it seems to overlook teachers’ WB, and on the other hand it shows a one-sided interest in teachers as professional agents only. I also looked at two factors that threaten teachers’ WB, namely, profit-seeking and political power, and argued that they constitute a part of a corrosive disadvantage to teachers’ and in turn on pupils’ WB, because over time they actually increasingly hinder teachers’ ability to be good teachers as they negatively affect their WB.

In this context, I looked at an account of WB that relies on an account of virtue(s) and argued that OM is a necessary concept if we want to know about what WB means. To this end, first, in Chapter 2, I drew on Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*, because that connection itself is related to Aristotle as he connects the concepts of WB and virtue. Second, in Chapter 3, I also looked at contemporary virtue epistemology which focuses more on intellectual WB and connects that to epistemic virtue(s). In this way, I brought Aristotle and virtue epistemology together as a background to what I believe an account of WB that requires an account of virtue(s) means.

In Chapters 4 and 5, I looked at something different, that is, WB discourse in education. To this end, first, I explored White’s subjective-collective account of WB, however, I argued that his account is insufficient, because White places too much emphasis on the subjective and collective factors of WB, whereas this thesis regards them equally important in the educational context. Therefore, I also examined Nussbaum’s objective-individual account of WB. However, I argued that we also
need to go beyond Nussbaum’s CA and look at Wolff’s and De-Shalit’s concept of WB, which, although it is considered to be a development of the CA, is different because it focuses on functionings rather than on capabilities and stresses the importance of securing the level of functionings that people enjoy over time. In this context, Wolff and De-Shalit argue that instead of capabilities we should focus on genuine opportunities for secure and fertile functionings for WB. In Chapter 6, I honed in on the intellectual virtue of OM, which becomes the link between those different discourses that use different terminology examined so far. In particular, I argued that the concept of genuine intellectual OM that is both reasonable and well-informed is necessary for teachers’ secure and fertile intellectual functionings or epistemic WB, both for themselves and for pupils’ intellectual WB.

All in all, WB is what we all want and as we move forward, policies at a national and a global level increasingly focus on WB. For example, the UK Government directly relates WB and health policy and has also launched the National Wellbeing Programme to “start measuring our progress as a country, not just by how our economy is growing, but by how our lives are improving; not just by our standard of living, but by our quality of life” (UK Government, 2010). Also, from a global perspective, in 2015 the United Nations66 (UN) agreed on an ambitious global agenda that outlines seventeen goals for sustainable development, and Goal 3 in particular talks about “well-being for all at every stage of life” by 2030. However, as Dag Hammarskjold (1964) once said, “In our era, the road to holiness necessarily passes through the world of action” (ibid, 1964, p. 240). In a similar way, I think that the road to teachers’ WB, which is inextricably connected to pupils’ WB, should necessarily pass through the world of teacher education policy. Thus, I look next at initial teacher education programmes in Scotland and discuss some ideas about how the concepts of this thesis can be applied in a real policy context.

66 The UN also “chose as Chair of the Human Rights Council Saudi Arabia, a country that has beheaded more people this year than ISIS… and in this sense, petro-dollars and politics trumped human rights” (Neuer, 2015). However, this is not the kind of policy that promotes WB, particularly the account of WB of this thesis.
7.2 Directions for Future Research

Since I am interested in teachers, teaching, WB and OM, the natural conclusion should be how we are going to get there, and one way is to teach teachers to be open-minded before they become teachers. Therefore, I look at Scottish initial teacher education programmes and briefly discuss ways towards future improvement. I particularly focus on initial teacher education (thereafter ITE) and student teachers, i.e. prospective teachers who are not yet qualified but are learning to be teachers, because as stated in the Guidelines for Initial Teacher Education (GTCS, 2013), it is the “first stage in the process of professional education and the foundation upon which all further professional development is built” (ibid, 2013, p. 2). Additionally, a large number of teachers come from ITE programmes where they shape their initial educational identity as future teachers. In this sense, “ITE provides the foundation for the quality of future teaching workforce and this should be a priority for all” (Donaldson, 2011, p. 46). Thus, I now turn to discuss some key topics of Scottish ITE and, although I do not go through each of the topics systematically, I look at how the main ideas and argument(s) of this thesis might inform it. To this end, I mainly draw on Donaldson’s report Teaching Scotland’s Future (2011), on the Standards for Registration (GTCS, 2012) and on the Guidelines for ITE Programmes in Scotland (GTCS, 2013).

7.2.1 Aim(s) of Scottish Initial Teacher Education Programmes

Let us begin with the overall aim of Scottish ITE as stated in the Guidelines for ITE Programmes (2013) and in Donaldson’s report Teaching Scotland’s Future (2011):

“The overall aim of programmes of ITE is to prepare student teachers to become competent, thoughtful, reflective and innovative practitioners, who are committed to providing high quality teaching and learning for all pupils...” (GTCS, 2013, p. 1) (Donaldson, 2011, p. 30)

Generally, an aim is a desired outcome (Oxford Dictionary, 2016) and a result that one’s plans or actions are intended to achieve (Cambridge Dictionary, 2014). Thus, an overall aim is the general and ultimate desired outcome and result of
the plans or actions that are intended to be accomplished. What is this ultimate aim? It is “high quality teaching and learning for pupils”. How is this overall aim achieved? It is accomplished by “preparing student teachers to become practitioners (competent, thoughtful etc.)”. In the light of the ideas of this thesis, I think there are several problems with this.

In Chapter 1 I argue that high – quality teaching is greatly and positively associated with pupils’ overall achievement and WB. However, it is also stressed that high – quality teaching does not consist only in teachers’ quality as professional agents, because teachers’ personal and professional life is equally important as far as high – quality teaching is concerned. In other words, who teachers are as persons cannot and should not be separated from who and what they do as professionals (Carr, 1993) (Higgins, 2011). The same applies to student teachers who constitute the future teaching workforce. In this regard, I argue that an explicit concern about student teachers as individuals and not just as future practitioners should be clearly stated and both their personal and their pre-professional WB should be regarded as of equal value, otherwise, from the point of view of this thesis, the overall aim will be insufficient and it will not be possible to accomplish the desired outcome fully or even partially.

Furthermore, although there is concern about the negative impacts that pupils’ social disadvantage has on their education for WB, as Donaldson (2014) observes, there is no similar concern about student teachers. For instance, Donaldson notes that “social disadvantage remains a very important factor in pupils’ educational failure” (2014, p. 188). For this reason, the Standard talks about “teachers’ responsibility to address pupils’ underachievement arising from social disadvantage” (Hulme and Menter, 2011, p. 87). However, if we care about teachers’ and student teachers’ WB, as this thesis argues, we should also look at teachers’ and student teachers’ “underachievement arising from social disadvantage”. In Chapter V, it was discussed how disadvantage is eliminated, that is, when there are genuine opportunities to secure functionings for all (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007).

Thus, a factor of successful reform in ITE, from the perspective of this thesis, would be the extent to which ITE provides such genuine opportunities and whether it
promotes student teachers’ secure and fertile intellectual functioning(s) for epistemic WB by teaching student teachers to be open-minded, as well as the extent to which it deals with risks and corrosive disadvantage(s) that hinder student teachers’ WB, such as profit-seeking and political power. Also, the method of dynamic public reflective equilibrium, where philosophers, non-academics, student teachers etc. engage in dialogue could be used as a way to work them out.

Moreover, in Chapter 3 it is underlined that teaching and learning in education are strongly and necessarily related to knowledge and understanding, which constitute epistemic goods. Epistemic goods are good ends of intellectual activity which contribute to student teachers’ intellectual WB, which in turn is part of their whole good life, both personally and professionally (Roberts and Wood, 2007). From this perspective, if student teachers’ intellectual WB is closely related to the achievement of particular epistemic goods/educational aims such as knowledge and understanding, and if intellectual virtues are the means to achieve epistemic goods, then ITE should focus in particular on the cultivation of student teachers’ intellectual virtues so as to become good informants. In this regard, ITE should also place an emphasis on virtue epistemology and particularly on an alternative regulative educative virtue epistemology, and thus go beyond abstract definitions of knowledge and subject-knowledge excellence.

7.2.2 Standards and Capabilities

Here, I do not suggest discarding the idea of standards in ITE overall, but rather enriching and expanding its perspective. In particular

“The Standard for Provisional Registration specifies what is expected of a student teacher who is seeking provisional registration with GTC Scotland. It must therefore constitute standards of capability in relation to teaching... The scope of this document is limited to defining the SPR and does not address in detail how judgements will or should be made. It is not intended to be used as a checklist. In broad terms, the person reviewing the work of the teacher needs to be reassured that the capabilities described by the professional standard are achieved...” (GTCS, 2012, p. 2)
The basic ideas that the above statement implies are close to some of the ideas of this thesis as presented in Chapters 4 and 5 in the context of WB discourse in education. First, it is clarified that particular “standards of capability” are expected from student teachers as future teachers which, obviously, are objective and constitute a minimum threshold\(^67\). Likewise, as explained in Chapter 5, according to Nussbaum (2011) human WB demands a minimum threshold of ten central capabilities which should be protected and promoted by policy so that everyone is able to have a dignified and minimally fulfilling life. In the light of this, more can be said about ITE’s obligation not only to protect and promote “standards of capability in relation to teaching”, but also to protect and promote student teachers’ “secure” and “fertile” “intellectual functionings” for epistemic WB (Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007) (Roberts and Wood, 2007) through teaching them to be open-minded. Second, it is specified that the standards of capability should not be used as a “checklist”, which means that the concept of the standards entails a kind of subjective factor. This thesis is sympathetic to that view, since it argues that objective and subjective factors of WB in the educational environment are equally important.

Moreover, “the person reviewing the work of the teacher” appears to be a kind of expert. Similarly, Donaldson (2011) also talks about “mentors that should be carefully selected and undertake training based on a recognition of the skills and capacities required for this role” (ibid, 2011, pp. 53, 94). However, this person/expert/mentor is called to assess student teachers “in broad terms” having as a guide the Standard for provisional registration which “does not address in detail how judgements will or should be made and it is not intended to be used as a checklist”. This sounds rather odd and the ideas discussed in the thesis can perhaps shed some light. Specifically, let us recall that from an Aristotelian viewpoint, an expert is a person with *phronesis*, which is a key intellectual virtue for WB and the practical approach to knowledge. In this regard, “the person reviewing the work of the teacher” should be *phronimos* and intellectually virtuous.

From another point of view, we saw that according to White (2011), an expert in WB, in terms of a more “authoritative insider”, belongs to a body of people with

\(^{67}\) Donaldson also refers to the idea of a “threshold for entry” (2011, p. 85)
accumulated wisdom and experience of all kinds of goods. In this sense, the person who reviews the work of teachers should be such “an authoritative insider”. This also implies that there should not be only “one person reviewing the work”, but a body of people with accumulated wisdom or a kind of *phronesis*, and from the viewpoint of this thesis, virtue epistemologists, educators, philosophers of education and others like them should participate.

However, as Donaldson (2011) observes, “teaching has never been a straightforward task… it is both complex and challenging” (2011, p. 84) and, along the same lines, Ortwein (2011) suggests that such teaching should take place in “an educational environment that takes a holistic view of the educated person” (2011, p. 147). Additionally, Donaldson (2011) notes that ITE cannot provide student teachers with the knowledge and skills necessary for a lifetime of teaching. In this sense, the education and professional development of every student teacher needs to be seen as a lifelong task. From this perspective, as Roberts and Wood (2007) emphasize, “the education in question is not only technical, i.e. a training in specialized skills, but is also a formation in human excellence and the characteristic products of such an education for life are called virtues” (ibid, 2007, p. 64). In such a context, this thesis argues that OM is a virtue necessary for WB because it facilitates student teachers’ secure and fertile intellectual functionings for epistemic WB.

### 7.3.3 Extended Professionals and Partnerships

Furthermore, Donaldson (2011) highlights and promotes the idea of the teacher as an extended professional, namely one who

“is highly proficient in the classroom and who is also reflective and enquiring not only about teaching and learning, but also about those wider issues which set the context for what should be taught and why… Extended professionals are agents of change, not passive or reluctant receivers of externally-imposed prescription” (Donaldson, 2011, pp. 15, 18).

This thesis is sympathetic to Donaldson’s (2011) view of a teacher as extended professional, and would argue that a necessary virtue that this kind of teacher or student teacher has to have is OM and in particular, genuine intellectual
OM that is both reasonable and well-informed, as described in Chapter 6. Also, the idea of “partnerships” in education in order to “promote learning and well-being”, is highly valued and pervasive in all ITE policy documents (GTCS, p. 15) (GTCS, 2013, p. 1) (Donaldson, 2011). Working in partnerships, or in other words working collaboratively, is another way of highlighting the importance of collective WB perspective in education. In the context of this thesis, which equally values the individual and collective WB, any model of partnership can be strengthened and further developed if the individuals, who work collaboratively towards “learning and well-being”, are persons who cultivate their intellectual virtues and in particular OM.
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