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Reason-Giving as an Act of Recognition

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Presented for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
School of Law
The University of Edinburgh
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Abstract

This thesis defends the claim that reason-giving is a discrete type of speech act (of an expressive kind) that has a distinctive value. It further argues that this value is best understood in terms of recognition, rather than justification, and that it is *intrinsic* to reason-giving. Its main aim is to argue against the commonly-held view that the main, sometimes the only, value to reason-giving lies in its capacity to provide justification (and in the related claim that if reasons cannot justify, then reason-giving has no value). The argument presented is intended to support that recognition (of a certain type) is a value that reason-giving has independently from any other value that it might or might not have – including justification; and hence, that reason-giving has a certain distinctive value that is not predicated upon a capacity for actually achieving justification.

In particular, this thesis argues, based on speech act theory and on the concept of recognition, that this value is best understood as consisting in the expression of a particular type of recognition for the other. To establish this claim, in chapter one, it begins by setting out the standard view: that the value of reason-giving lies in its capacity to justify, and analyses some of the moves that have been made in the literature when the connection between reason-giving and justification breaks down. In chapters two to four, it uses speech act theory to analyse the acts of arguing and reason-giving, and to argue that reason-giving is a discrete speech act that has features in common with but is not reducible to
arguing. Finally, in chapter five, it defends the claim that reason-giving has an intrinsic value, and that this value is best understood as an expressive value: namely, the expression of recognition for the other as a rational being (which is a valuable feature of the other's humanity); and that it has this value regardless of whether the reasons in question are “good” from a justificatory standpoint.
Declaration

I declare that the contents of this thesis have been composed by me and that they have not been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification.

______________________________________________
Felipe Oliveira de Sousa
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Introduction

Reason-giving’s value is often underestimated. It is not uncommon to find authors holding that there is nothing valuable in reason-giving, that all there is to reason-giving is cynicism, hypocrisy, manipulation.\(^1\) Various as those claims might be, they often have a common source. Reason-giving's value is often predicated on its capacity for achieving justification, and as soon as there is doubt about whether reason-giving actually has that capacity, doubts about the very value of reason-giving are raised. Some authors think that reasons cannot actually justify anything, and some even think that reasons that do not justify are not really reasons.\(^2\) Indeed, the latter position is a quite standard position in mainstream literature.

This is a brief statement of the problem I will be dealing with in this thesis. I think that the argument stated above – that reason-giving does not have value because it cannot achieve justification – is misguided. It seriously

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\(^1\) Brandom R *Reason in Philosophy* (2013) p. 144, e.g. attributes the origins of this idea to Nietzsche, and holds that it was further developed in the twentieth-century by Foucault and Derrida: ‘It sees the practice of giving and asking for *reasons* as just the distinctively modern form of *power*: Instead of controlling people by threatening them with violence, one systematically manipulates the language they use...And the thought is that that is *all* reason is’, Kornblith H, Distrusting Reason (1999) XXIII Midwest Studies in Philosophy p. 181, says that ‘views of this sort have been articulated and defended by some feminists, Freudians, Marxists, and deconstructionists’.

\(^2\) See, e.g. Scanlon T M, *What We Owe to Each Other* (2000) p. 19, who says that saying ‘that something is or is not a reason [is the same as saying that]... it is [or not] a *good* reason – a consideration that really counts in favour of the thing in question’; Parfit, D, *On What Matters* (2011), vol. 1, p. 31 ff., says that reasons that ‘do not count in favour of [something]’ are only ‘*apparent* reason[s]’; Alvarez, M, *Kind of Reasons* (2013), p. 24, holds that reasons that do not justify are not ‘genuine reasons’ (on p. 140, to say that a reason is a ‘false reason is just a way of saying that it is not really a reason’).
mischaracterizes the value of reason-giving. My aim in this thesis is to offer an alternative way of thinking about reason-giving’s value, one that does not focus too much on justification. And my central contention is that reason-giving has a certain distinctive value that is not predicated upon a capacity for achieving justification. In a nutshell, I hold (a) that reason-giving is a discrete type of speech act; (b) that reason-giving’s value – its most important or primary value\(^3\) – is best grasped in terms of recognition, rather than justification; and (c) that recognition (of a certain type) is a value that is intrinsic to reason-giving, that reason-giving has simply in virtue of the type of act that it is and independently from any other value that it might or not have – including justification.

The argument I develop in this thesis is composed of several interconnected claims. They are organized as follows: In the first chapter, I explain in more detail how the focus on justification has led to a systematic underestimation of the value of reason-giving. I discuss the cases of Pyrrhonic scepticism and Nietzsche to illustrate that if one places too much focus on justification as a condition for reason-giving to have value (coupled with the belief that reason-giving cannot achieve justification), reason-giving becomes either pointless or cynical. I also argue, by referring to early emotivism, that even when the conclusion is not so extreme, there is sometimes a very impoverished sense in the literature of what value reason-giving has if it cannot justify. This chapter’s aim is to illustrate and analyse some of the moves authors have made when they rely too heavily on

\(^3\) Those notions will be explained in due course. For now, this is sufficient just to give a general picture of what my claim is.
justification as the source of value in reason-giving. This is mainly a preparatory chapter to set out the problem with which I will be dealing in the next chapters.

After grounding this initial claim, I take a step back and investigate the act of reason-giving. Before proceeding, in the second chapter, I build a framework of analysis by introducing the vocabulary of speech act theory, as developed mainly by J.L. Austin and John Searle.\(^4\) I explain the theory’s main notions, and then use them to deal with the specific object of my research in chapters three and four. I also make some small amendments to the theory itself (e.g. I introduce the notion of ‘primary value’), and clarify some concepts that are not very clear in the theory as traditionally presented (such as ‘uptake’). But my central aim in this chapter is to introduce the conceptual framework for the rest of the thesis, in order to enable an analysis of reason-giving as a speech act – in particular, to compare reason-giving with arguing, which is an act with which reason-giving is often identified. In this chapter, I build the analytical framework in a more general way, to then provide an analysis of both types of acts.\(^5\)

In the third chapter, I analyse arguing as an illocution-type. I use the vocabulary introduced in the second chapter to conduct the analysis. Some authors have


\[^5\] Some of the notions I mention only briefly in this chapter will be further developed in the next chapters – e.g. the notion of expressive primary point and expressive primary value –, but only to the point that this is necessary to articulate aspects of my claim.
analysed arguing in detail. Indeed, a vast body of literature has been produced on the subject in recent years. I engage with it here to flesh my own analysis out, and focus in particular on a recent analysis of arguing as a second-order speech act-complex – composed of an act of adducing reasons and of an act of concluding. I focus on this analysis because it is especially useful to establish the contrast with reason-giving. For that reason, I also give a special emphasis on the act of adducing reasons. I provide a definition of arguing as an illocution-type by identifying its definitional features, and also spell out a list of conditions that must be fulfilled for its fully ‘felicitous’ performance. I spell out the conditions that must be fulfilled for felicitous adducing separately, and explain how this account deals with non-standard cases of arguing.

In the fourth chapter, I defend one of my thesis’ central claims: that reason-giving is a discrete type of speech act. I argue that even though reason-giving has features in common with arguing, it is not reducible to arguing. I show that, from the point of view of speech act theory, some of the differences between reason-giving and arguing are fundamental. I identify them both by way of example and in terms of speech act theory, of how to best fit the intuitive data into the theory’s categories. In particular, I explain how reason-giving differs from the act of adducing reasons (which I analyse in chapter three). One core claim that I make in this chapter is that for a given act to count as felicitous reason-giving,

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7 For more detailed references, see chapter three.
the reasons given do not have to be strong justificatory reasons. Indeed, they might not have to in fact support the claim at all.⁹ My central claim is that different from arguing (which is an assertive speech act), reason-giving is best treated as an expressive speech act whose primary value is to express a certain attitude towards the hearer that is positively related to the hearer. I identify this attitude with one of recognition and explain why I think this is so.

Especially for those working in the field of speech act theory, my account of reason-giving as an expressive speech act will probably sound more controversial than the one of arguing (and, in particular, than the one of adducing reasons), which draws heavily on the existing literature. In that literature, reason-giving is not referred to as a discrete illocution-type or a speech act at all. But I believe that there are reasons for treating reason-giving as a discrete illocution-type, and I explain those reasons in this chapter. My hope is that what I say here will contribute to the debate within speech act theory; but its main role within the thesis is to offer a firm ground for defending my central claim about reason-giving’s value. The main reason for pursuing the analysis of chapters three and four is to prepare the way to understand the distinctive value in reason-giving (which, as I said, is a value that has not yet received sufficient attention and remained under-analysed in the literature, with its almost exclusive focus on justification).

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⁹ Various authors hold (rightly, in my view) that to count as felicitous adducing, one must provide reasons that actually support a given claim as correct. See, e.g. Bermejo-Luque L, Giving Reasons (2011) p. 67; Biro J and Siegel H, Argumentation, Arguing and Arguments, in Theoria, vol. 26, no. 3(72), 2011, p. 279, 283, who say that ‘what makes a set of propositions an argument for p is its suitability to be deployed...to justify someone in believing that p’.
In the fifth chapter, I flesh out in more detail what this value is. I defend a normative claim about reason-giving's value based on the value of recognition. This claim is grounded on my account of reason-giving as an illocution-type, developed in the fourth chapter. I provide further reasons for thinking that reason-giving has a distinctive value, and that this value is best grasped as a certain type of recognition for the other – more precisely, recognition for the other in a particular feature that the other has and that is valuable in him (his rationality). I argue that this value is intrinsic to reason-giving – a value that reason-giving has for its own sake, simply in virtue of the type of act that it is. In the course of the argument, I first discuss the concept of intrinsic value, and argue for the possibility of a value being at the same time intrinsic and relational. I then introduce a distinction between two ways of thinking about the value of an act of recognition (intrinsic and extrinsic), which in my view has not been sufficiently fleshed out in the literature and explain, both by means of the concept of recognition and of examples, how this distinction helps to support the claim that reason-giving has an intrinsic recognitive value of a distinctive kind.
Chapter 1: Reason-Giving between Pointlessness and Cynicism

1. Introduction

In the last few decades, a lot of attention has been devoted to the connection between the value of reason-giving and its capacity for achieving justification.\textsuperscript{10}

Influential discussions in different areas of philosophy (e.g. philosophy of language, epistemology and ethics) have focused on questions about the capacity of reasons to justify certain types of propositions or actions.\textsuperscript{11} The value of reason-giving is often predicated upon its capacity to provide justification, by which it is meant its capacity not merely to provide purported or apparent justification, but \textit{actual} justification. The value of reason-giving is often not only assessed in terms of its justificatory capacity, but is also predominantly explained and understood in terms of this justificatory capacity.

In one of the most influential books in argumentation theory, Toulmin suggests that it could be argued that justification ‘is in fact the primary function of

\textsuperscript{10} See, e.g. Raz J, \textit{From Normativity to Responsibility} (2013), p. 19, who argues that the ‘explanatory use of reasons is secondary, and depends on the fact that they favor [i.e. have ‘the potential to...justify’] what they favor’; Parfit, \textit{On What Matters} (2011), p. 31 ff.; Scanlon T, \textit{What We Owe to Each Other} (2000), p. 17: ‘[the problem of whether] something is or is not a reason...[is] whether it is a \textit{good} reason – a consideration that really counts in favor of the thing in question’; Forst R, \textit{The Right to Justification} (2014), p. 32; MacCormick N, \textit{Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory} (1994), p. 13-18: ‘the essential notion is that of giving...good justifying reasons...The process which is worth studying is the process of argumentation as a process of justification’; also Alexy R, \textit{A Theory of Legal Argumentation} (1989) p. 13, 33.

\textsuperscript{11} See, e.g. for ethical propositions, Stevenson C L, \textit{Ethics and Language} (1969); Ayer A J, \textit{Language, Truth and Logic} (2002); Toulmin S E, \textit{Reason in Ethics} (1960), p. 4. In the philosophy of language, it has also been noted that reasons have no capacity to justify propositions about the meaning of words. See, Kripke S, \textit{Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language} (1982).
reasons, and that the other uses, the other functions which reasons have for us, are in a sense secondary, and parasitic upon this primary justificatory use. In this passage, Toulmin suggests that justification is not merely one among the values that reason-giving might have, but rather that justification is reason-giving’s most important value (as Toulmin says, it is its ‘primary’ value). To be sure, this is an entirely unargued – perhaps even throwaway – comment, but Toulmin suggests that it is an appealing one. It offers a good starting point here, because it illustrates an author who explicitly suggests that justification is the main source of value in reason-giving.

When Toulmin suggests that every other value in reason-giving is not only secondary but also ‘parasitic’ upon justification, this might be taken to mean something quite strong. In a certain reading, ‘parasitic’ conveys the idea of a value whose presence entirely depends upon the presence of another value. Take this other value away – the value upon which the ‘parasitic’ value is parasitic –, and the object would not have this parasitic value either. If one reads ‘parasitic’ in this way, when Toulmin suggests that all the other values in reason-giving are ‘parasitic’ upon justification, it might be thought that he is suggesting something more than merely that all the other values in reason-giving are less important.

Achieving justification becomes a necessary condition for any other value to

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12 See, Toulmin S E, The Uses of Argument (2003), p. 12. Raz J, Practical Reason and Norms (1999), p. 16, also holds that even though ‘the concept of a reason is used for various other purposes as well’, the justificatory one is ‘primary’ and ‘the rest are derived from or dependent on them’.
13 Toulmin S E, The Uses of Argument (2003), p. 12 says that ‘it is not important for the [his] present investigation to justify this thesis: it is enough that [this] function...is a significant and interesting one’.
obtain. I do not think that Toulmin endorses this thesis.\textsuperscript{14} As I just explained, he merely suggests it and does not argue for it. But I think that something like this thesis is precisely what some authors have held to be the case (or so I argue in this chapter).

In this chapter, I argue that one specific way in which the relation between the value of reason-giving and its capacity for achieving justification has been conceived can be captured in terms of the following modus ponens: If reason-giving cannot achieve justification, then reason-giving has no value; reason-giving cannot achieve justification, therefore reason-giving does not have value.\textsuperscript{15} Radical as this argument might be, in this chapter I argue that different versions of it can be attributed to some authors. As I explain below, the authors I discuss do not explicitly offer such argument to reach a conclusion about the value of reason-giving, but they implicitly rely on it. To support this claim, I analyse the moves that these authors have made as soon as they think that the connection between reason-giving and justification breaks down. And I argue that the radical conclusions they arrive at about reason-giving’s value – that it lacks value – are based on the assumption that reason-giving is valuable only if it can actually achieve justification.

\textsuperscript{14} This is probably more a leap of attention, but it is a revealing one: it shows how central he thinks that justification is as a source of value in reason-giving.
\textsuperscript{15} Another way of putting that argument is this: reason-giving is valuable only if it can achieve justification; it cannot achieve justification; therefore, it is not valuable.
In the following sections, I first discuss two extreme cases to illustrate that if one places too much focus on actual justification as a condition for reason-giving to have value, for those for whom this condition cannot be met, reason-giving becomes either pointless or cynical; as exemplified by Pyrrhonic scepticism (2.1) and Nietzsche (2.2). Even though these cases are different in significant aspects, they have in common both the implicit claim that reason-giving cannot actually justify anything\textsuperscript{16} and the implicit conclusion that reason-giving as such has no value. The Pyrrhonic sceptic ultimately holds that reason-giving is a pointless thing to do, while Nietzsche holds that reason-giving is only a cynical act. I then discuss the case of early emotivism (2.3), in order to support the further claim that even when the conclusion is not so extreme, there is still sometimes a very impoverished sense of what value reason-giving can have if it cannot actually justify. This chapter is intended mainly as a preparatory chapter to set out the problem with which I will be dealing in the rest of this thesis.

\textit{2. Challenges to the value of reason-giving}

\textit{2.1 Pyrrhonic Sceptic: reason-giving and pointlessness}

I think that a qualified version of the modus ponens introduced above – namely, 'If reason-giving cannot actually justify, then reason-giving has no value; reason-giving cannot actually justify, therefore reason-giving has no value' – can be

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\textsuperscript{16} Both Nietzsche's and the Pyrrhonic sceptic's views on the value of reason-giving are not affected by difference of subject matter or variety of discipline. They are supposed to have general application.
attributed to the Pyrrhonic sceptic. The Pyrrhonic sceptic does not try to directly argue against reason-giving to then conclude that reason-giving has no value. In fact, how could he do that? How could he justify the claim that reason-giving cannot justify by giving reasons for it? Rather, he chooses a different strategy. He uses reason-giving against reason-giving, in the sense that – as I clarify below – by reason-giving, he tries to show that reason-giving is a pointless thing to do to actually justify anything. A brief survey of Pyrrhonic scepticism helps to explain why Pyrrhonists implicitly rely on the claim that reason-giving has no actual justificatory capacity. As Sextus defines it, the sceptic’s ability is

‘a capacity for bringing into opposition, in any way whatever, things that appear and things that are thought, so that, owing to the equal strength of the opposed items and rival claims, we come first to suspend judgment and after that to ataraxia [tranquillity of mind]’\(^{17}\)

This passage contains the main elements of the Pyrrhonist method. Some authors refer to it as a specific kind of ability in reason-giving, and explain that when one learns how to apply it, one is learning ‘a capability, a know-how’\(^{18}\). The sceptic tries to prove that every time one expresses concern for the truth of a proposition \(p\), equally good reasons can be produced both for \(p\) and against \(p\), and hence, that one is ‘unable to find any reason for preferring one to another \([p\) or not-\(p]\) and is therefore bound to treat all as of equal strength and equally


worthy (or unworthy) of acceptance'\textsuperscript{19}. He then tries to bring one into a position where one cannot actually state either $p$ or not-$p$. By doing this, his ultimate intention is to eliminate belief not merely in this or that proposition, but belief itself and the very need one might have for reasons. His reason-giving ability is supposed to grant that one will always produce evenly balanced reasons that will lead to equipollence and then to suspension of judgment.\textsuperscript{20}

Take an example to make this point more vivid. Imagine someone who suspects to have a fatal disease. Being unsure, this person is cognitively distressed and becomes depressed.\textsuperscript{21} In order to restore her peace of mind, she decides to investigate. What would a Pyrrhonist tell her? Probably something like this: ‘On the one hand, there are several clear signs that you are not ill at all; on the other hand, I can produce compelling reasons to show that you will die within a month’. He will then make an account – as vivid as he can – of the reasons for and against and, given his special ability in reason-giving, he will assure you that they are equally balanced, so as to lead you to suspend your judgment on the matter. Note that by doing this, his aim is to leave you neither supposing that you are ‘fatally infected nor cheerfully imagin[ing] that [you are] in perfect health’\textsuperscript{22}. Rather, as Nussbaum says, he takes reason-giving to be essentially ‘a way of

\textsuperscript{22} Id. Ibid.
telling [you] not to go on pressing that question, not to care about the answer’\textsuperscript{23}, not to ‘bother inquiring into truth or sorting things out’\textsuperscript{24}.

From this brief example, one can already see that reason-giving is the method chosen by the Pyrrhonic sceptic to ‘defend’ his scepticism. His first or immediate aim in reason-giving is to arrive at equipollence and hence, to lead one to suspend judgment over whether $p$ or not-$p$. Barnes, for instance, explains that in any matter that disturbs one’s peace of mind, a Pyrrhonist will assemble reasons ‘for and against; he will weigh them against each other; and – thanks to his sceptical ability – he will find that they are equipollent, and so suspend his judgment’\textsuperscript{25}. The conclusion he always tries to reach is that ‘there is much to be said in favour of it and much to be said against it’\textsuperscript{26} – exactly as much to be said for as against. And his special reason-giving ability will ensure that faced by any problem, he will ‘always produce evenly balanced reasons in favour of two or more incompatible solutions’\textsuperscript{27}, and hence lead you to suspend judgment. As I said, his ultimate aim in doing this is to help you achieve tranquillity or peace of mind.\textsuperscript{28}

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\item \textsuperscript{23} Nussbaum M C, \textit{The Therapy of Desire} (1996) p. 291.
\item \textsuperscript{24} Id.Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{26} Id.Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{27} Id.Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{28} Barnes J, Introduction, in: Annas J and Barnes J (eds.), \textit{Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Scepticism} (2000) p. xxx, summarizes the sceptic’s view: ‘We make inquiries, and, thanks to our sceptical abilities, we find ourselves in a state of suspended judgment. Why make inquiries in the first
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On the way Pyrrhonism conceives it, suspension of judgment is not just a stance one adopts out of rational caution, because none of the conflicting propositions seem to be sufficiently justified (so that one has reason to keep asking for reasons). Sextus defines it as a ‘standstill of the intellect, owing to which we neither reject nor posit anything’. He views suspension as a certain sort of experience that is forced upon one by reason-giving. The core idea is that by reason-giving, one can produce a state of detachment, that is, a state of experience in which one is rationally forced to suspend judgment. Sextus explains that tranquillity comes as if by chance, once one stops actively trying to get it, as the comparison he makes with the experience reported by the painter Apelles. Tranquillity, as it were, follows the suspension, and is something that simply happens when one experiences the method of opposing reasons.

The exact scope of Pyrrhonic scepticism is a matter of controversy, but there is agreement that it has wide application. Sextus says that the original cause of place? We inquire – according to Sextus – because we are ‘troubled by the anomaly of things’ (1.12); being troubled, we have no peace of mind; having no peace of mind we are not happy'.


30 Sextus says (see Annas J and Barnes J (eds.), Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Scepticism (2000) p. 10 (Book I para 28), that ‘he [Apelles] was painting a horse, and trying to represent the foam on its coat, he was so unsuccessful that he gave up and flung at the picture the sponge on which he had been wiping the paints off his brush. And the sponge made the effect of the horse’s foam’.

31 Burnyeat M, The Sceptic in His Place and Time, in: Burnyeat M and Frede M (eds.), The Original Sceptics (1998) p. 92-100, argues that the sceptic’s aim is the elimination of all belief, while authors like Frede hold that his aim is only to remove a certain class of beliefs restricted both by their content (belief about theoretical entities, and real nature of things) and by the way in which
Pyrrhonism is ‘the anomaly in things’ and the disquiet that such anomaly arouses.\textsuperscript{32} Further, Sextus seems to hold that evenly balanced reasons demand suspension in a psychological sense.\textsuperscript{33} If one is faced by equipollence, one will simply not find oneself holding a view one way or another. But, as Barnes points out\textsuperscript{34}, some of the assertions Sextus makes suggest that this suspension can also be construed conceptually – e.g. if you are faced by evenly balanced reasons, then you cannot, logically speaking, take a stance on the matter (for this would mean that the reasons are not evenly balanced); or as a demand of rationality – e.g. if you are faced by equally good reasons both for \textit{p} and against \textit{p}, rationality demands that you do not form any view on whether \textit{p} or not-\textit{p}.\textsuperscript{35}

However construed, it is clear that the Pyrrhonic sceptic sees a close connection between reason-giving and promoting suspension of belief. His main goal is to oppose reasons in such a way as to gradually weaken – and if possible, eliminate – the expectation one may have on the capacity of reasons to actually justify anything. He uses reason-giving only to promote a sense of its own pointlessness. Burnyeat, for instance, explains that the sceptic’s ultimate aim in reason-giving is

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  \item they are held (that is, dogmatically), see Frede M, The Sceptic’s Belief, in: Burnyeat M and Frede M (eds.), \textit{The Original Sceptics} (1998) p. 1-5.
  \item Id.Ibid.
\end{itemize}
to eliminate ‘any concern for whether [anything] is founded in truth or reasons’\textsuperscript{36} (to ‘unpersuade us of anything which persuades us that...represents truth and reality’\textsuperscript{37}), and that he uses reason-giving to ‘check all the sources of belief and destroy all trust in reason itself’\textsuperscript{38}. This is why I think it is plausible to claim that Pyrrhonic sceptics endorse a version of the modus ponens presented above. Though they do not explicitly claim that reason-giving is pointless, the very way in which they use reason-giving is evidence to believe they are committed to it.

A Pyrrhonist tacitly holds that reason-giving should be used only to show that by reason-giving, one cannot achieve actual justification. Some authors argue that he uses reason-giving only polemically, that is, never to actually justify anything, but only to oppose.\textsuperscript{39} Burnyeat says that ‘nothing he wants to say in his own person is such as to require a reasoned justification’\textsuperscript{40}, and that it would be inconsistent for him to seriously ‘advance any assertion or argument’\textsuperscript{41}. This has confirmation in Sextus, when he says that ‘in bringing these utterances forward [i.e. utterances that look like claims] she is [merely] telling what strikes her and reporting her experience without belief, not making any firm claim about


\textsuperscript{37} Burnyeat M, Can the Sceptic Live His Scepticism?, in: Burnyeat M and Frede M (eds), The Original Sceptics (1998) p. 34.

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid. p. 46; also p. 32.

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid. p. 41.

\textsuperscript{40} Id.Ibid. (Burnyeat says that the sceptic restricts himself to providing reports of how things appear to him, reports that ‘cannot be challenged and [for which] he cannot properly be required to give reason, evidence or proof’).

anything outside of this'\textsuperscript{42}. In various passages, Sextus explains why anything that appears to be an expression of belief from the part of a Pyrrhonist should not be taken to be so – it is just a report of the way he is affected, or an avowal, or a misuse of language, but never a claim about how things really are.\textsuperscript{43}

In the beginning of this section, I said that the attribution of the referred modus ponens to the Pyrrhonic sceptic had to be qualified. I said this mainly to avoid an obvious objection to my claim. One may object that though it might be true that Pyrrhonists think that reason-giving is pointless, it is not true that they endorse a version of the modus ponens I presented above (at least not without some qualification). It is not that because they believe that reason-giving cannot achieve actual justification (and use reason-giving only to prove that belief to be correct), they conclude that reason-giving has no value. Clearly, reason-giving has an important value for the Pyrrhonic sceptic. As I just explained, reason-giving is a constitutive part of the very method adopted for achieving tranquillity, which is seen as the ultimate and most important aim.\textsuperscript{44}

Though this objection is plausible, in Pyrrhonic scepticism, reason-giving has at best only a transitory value in the process of achieving tranquillity. It would not be exaggerated to say that reason-giving is thought to have here a purely

\textsuperscript{43} Id.Ibid. 
\textsuperscript{44} Sedley D, The Motivation of Greek Skepticism, in: Burnyeat M (ed.), \textit{The Skeptical Tradition} (1983) p. 10, argues that \textit{ataraxia} is ‘the ultimate focus of all his [the Sceptic’s] desires and intentions’.
instrumental value for the sake of achieving tranquillity.\textsuperscript{45} When one achieves it, reason-giving becomes a waste of time, because one knows by experience that one cannot actually justify anything by reason-giving. In fact, if one is sure that in answer to any question whatsoever, one must suspend judgment, why even bother asking for reasons for or against anything in the first place? Whether this state of total indifference towards reasons is really achievable is a different question. Some authors criticize Pyrrhonic scepticism in that regard. Striker questions whether that state ‘is psychologically possible or perhaps rather pathological’\textsuperscript{46}. Barnes says that different Pyrrhonists underwent different degrees of suspension and exercised their ability over different areas, and that it is hard to know whether anyone has actually achieved full tranquillity.\textsuperscript{47} But full tranquillity is what Pyrrhonists want to achieve.\textsuperscript{48} Nussbaum holds that, at the end of the process, the need for reasons is expected to be so low – ideally, non-existent – that ‘the bare posing of a question will already induce a shrug of indifference, and [reasons] will prove unnecessary’\textsuperscript{49}.

\textsuperscript{46} Striker G, Historical Reflections on Classical Pyrrhonism and Neo-Pyrrhonism, in: Sinnott-Armstrong W (ed.), \textit{Pyrrhonian Skepticism} (2004) p. 22 (on p. 18, the Pyrrhonist way ‘of following appearances…is entirely passive and unquestioning, not based on any reasons at all’).
\textsuperscript{48} Burnyeat M, The Sceptic in his Place and Time, in: Burnyeat M and Frede M (eds.), \textit{The Original Sceptics} (1998) p. 112, says that the great recommendation of Pyrrhonism is that suspension of judgment on all questions as to what is true and false, good and bad, results in tranquillity – the tranquillity of detachment from striving and ordinary human concerns, of a life lived on after surrendering the hope of finding answers to the questions on which happiness depends’.
From this, I conclude that what Pyrrhonists ultimately propose is an abandonment of reason-giving by reason-giving. And this is why I believe that it is still plausible to attribute to them the view that because reasons have no actual justificatory capacity, reason-giving is ultimately a pointless thing to do – and has value only up to the point at which one convinces one’s interlocutor of that. A Pyrrhonist, if he is really a Pyrrhonist, cannot overtly admit that, for that would be to express a belief. However, he cannot deny that his method is itself an attempt to give others a reason to believe that reason-giving is pointless, and hence, that it is designed to produce belief, if not in the propositions being opposed, the second-order belief that the reasons for and against them are equally balanced. So that, by accumulation of instances, one has also a reason to believe that in general, reason-giving is a pointless thing to do. If he is to remain faithful to his scepticism, he has to remain in silence here.

2.2 Nietzsche: reason-giving and cynicism

Similarly to the Pyrrhonic sceptic, Nietzsche thought that the value of reason-giving is entirely predicated upon its actual justificatory capacity. He also implicitly holds that reason-giving cannot actually justify anything and that in virtue of this, reason-giving has no value. While he never explicitly states this,

50 Burnyeat M, Can the Sceptic Live His Scepticism?, in: Burnyeat M and Frede M (eds.), The Original Sceptics (1998) p. 56: ‘both the causes (reasoned arguments) of the state…and its effects…are such as to justify us in calling it a state of belief’.

51 I agree with Burnyeat when he says (ibid. p. 54) that ‘in being shown, both on general grounds and by the accumulation of instances, that no claim...is to be preferred to its denial, he has…been given reason to believe that generalization true’.
there are reasons to believe that this is the view to which he is committed. My
claim that Nietzsche rejects the value of reason-giving is not based in any
passage in which he has clearly denied it. He does not defend this position in a
systematic way. In fact, also similarly to the Pyrrhonic sceptic, how could he do
that? At least, he could not do that with reasons. My claim is based on a rational
reconstruction of what he must be committed to if we are to make full sense of
his claims, had he made his intentions and presuppositions fully explicit.

Instead of stating his position and giving reasons for it, or of considering
counter-positions and objections, Nietzsche speaks in paradoxes, and defends
paradoxes. He uses this aphoristic method not to try to prove that philosophical
theses are wrong, but to mock and disqualify them. Macintyre, for instance,
argues that Nietzsche’s method does not resemble that of conventional academic
work, where theses are ‘tested dialectically and demonstratively’\textsuperscript{52},
replacing
this instead with ‘the shifting play of forces and use of metaphors’\textsuperscript{53}. Clark says
that he plays ‘joyfully with [the liberated intellect] itself, rather than [engaging]
in the...activity of offering arguments’\textsuperscript{54}. Nietzsche displays a different form of
attack on the value of reason-giving. He does not, as the Pyrrhonic sceptic does,
use reason-giving against reason-giving. Rather, he suggests in various passages

\textsuperscript{52} MacIntyre A C, \textit{Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry} (1990) p. 33, see also p. 48. See also
Horstmann R-P, Nietzsche: Beyond Good and Evil, in: Pippin R B [ed.], \textit{Introductions to Nietzsche}
(2012) p. 184, who holds that Nietzsche does not ‘present [his] views in compliance with this
idea [of having a ‘good argument’], see also p. 189 f.; Kaufmann W, \textit{Nietzsche} (2013) chap. 2; and
Clark M, \textit{Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy} (1990) p. 2 (‘Only the misguided...will even taken
Nietzsche to be offering arguments or theories’).


\textsuperscript{54} Clark M, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy (1990) p. 2.
– very often in a mocking and disqualifying tone – that all there is to reason-giving is manipulation, hypocrisy, cynicism.\textsuperscript{55}

Nietzsche’s rejection of the value of reason-giving is directly related to his perspectivist view about truth, the view that there is no such thing as truth as such, but only truth from one or another point of view.\textsuperscript{56} His view on truth has been the object of intense investigation in the literature.\textsuperscript{57} Whatever its details are, there is little doubt that any talk of achieving ‘the truth’ or ‘actual justification’ is for Nietzsche senseless. ‘Justification’, ‘truth’ and other related epistemic notions are all relative to perspective. Macintyre, for instance, holds that Nietzsche has surely committed himself ‘to the thesis that all claims to truth are and can only be made from the standpoint afforded by some particular perspective’\textsuperscript{58}. Similarly, Horstmann holds that Nietzsche insists over and over in

\textsuperscript{55} Brandom R, \textit{Reason in Philosophy} (2013) p. 144, attributes to Nietzsche the view that ‘giving...reasons [is] just the distinctively modern form of power. Instead of controlling people by threatening them with violence, one systematically manipulates the language they use to understand and interpret themselves and their world...the thought is that that is \textit{all reason is}’.

\textsuperscript{56} See, e.g. MacIntyre A C, \textit{Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry} (1990) p. 36; Clark M, \textit{Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy} (1990) p. 130, holds that ‘all justification is contextual, dependent on other beliefs held unchallengeable for the moment, but themselves capable of only a similarly contextual justification’.


\textsuperscript{58} MacIntyre A C, \textit{Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry} (1990) p. 36. Nehamas A, \textit{The Art of Living} (2000) p. 147, argues that though Nietzsche has no theory of truth, he repeatedly holds that ‘there is no point in trying to explain what truth is [or to try to reach it]’, for there is no such thing as truth-as-such. See also, Clark M, \textit{Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy} (1990) p. 1: ‘Nietzsche’s position on truth seems to amount to a denial that any human belief is, or could be, true’.
his writings ‘that what he has to tell us are above all his truths’\textsuperscript{59}, rather than the truth. Here are some of Nietzsche’s passages:

‘Judgments, value judgments on life, whether for or against, can ultimately never be true: they have value only as symptoms, they can be considered only as symptoms – in themselves such judgments are foolish’\textsuperscript{60}

‘facts are precisely what there is not, only interpretations’\textsuperscript{61}; ‘there is a multiplicity of perspectives and idioms, but no single world which they are of or about’\textsuperscript{62}

‘[truth] is a mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms [...] which [are] rhetorically and poetically intensified, ornamented and transformed, come to be thought of...as fixed, canonical and obligatory [...] truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions, worn-out metaphors now impotent to stir the senses’\textsuperscript{63}

A deeper analysis of Nietzsche’s view on truth would fall beyond the scope of my claim in this chapter, which is, as I said before, only an introductory one.

Nietzsche’s view on truth is only important here insofar as it leads him to a view on the value of reason-giving. Given the passages above, his view can only be that by reason-giving, one cannot achieve actual justification, because there is no actual justification that can be achieved on anything. But further, actual justification is also a value that Nietzsche assumes reason-giving ought to

\textsuperscript{60} Nietzsche F W, \textit{Twilight of the Idols} (2008) p. 11.  
\textsuperscript{61} Nietzsche F W, \textit{The Will to Power} (1968) p. 315.  
\textsuperscript{62} Id.Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{63} Nietzsche F W, \textit{Portable Nietzsche} (1994) p. 46 f.}
achieve to have value. I refer below to several passages in Nietzsche’s writings that, in my view, offer strong support for this latter claim.

Nietzsche’s typical move, given his belief that reasons cannot actually justify anything, is to speculate about the possible motives for why people give reasons. And he is normally very suspicious of them. The only question that seems relevant to him is: Why do people insist in giving reasons? It is precisely this shift of attention from the value of reason-giving towards motives that shows that Nietzsche rejects its value. In his writings, the investigation about reason-giving is entirely reduced to an investigation about motives.\textsuperscript{64} Surely, the belief that reasons can justify is a possible motive. It is indeed a common one. Some people genuinely think that they can actually justify what they think or do. But, for Nietzsche, this is just part of the problem, for this is a mistaken motive. One should then push the question further: Why do they have such a misguided belief? He then often points out that this belief hides deeper, not-fully-conscious motives that might better explain why people see value in reason-giving.\textsuperscript{65}

Take one example to elaborate the point. In a passage of \textit{The Gay Science}, Nietzsche openly criticizes the attitude some teachers hold towards reason-


\textsuperscript{65} See, e.g. Nietzsche F W, \textit{Daybreak} (2007), p. 129, where he says that ‘by far the greatest part of our spirit’s activity remains unconscious and unfelt’. Leiter B, \textit{Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Nietzsche on Morality} (2002) p. 95, argues that Nietzsche’s view on the motives of action ‘like Freud’s entails that the real causes of our actions may be opaque’; on p. 87, ‘our conscious life is essentially epiphenomenal...what rises to the level of consciousness is simply an effect of something unconscious’, see also p. 92, p. 104.
giving. He is highly critical of the fact that they attribute a high value to reason-giving, and that they teach others to do so. Nietzsche holds that those teachers not merely ‘shout’ things such as ‘life is worth living’ or ‘There is something behind life, beneath it; beware!’. Rather, he notes that they also offer reasons, saying things like ‘Life ought to be loved, because - ! Man ought to advance himself and his neighbor, because - !’.

Arguably, they are teachers only because they do so. Here, Nietzsche is making a point about justificatory reasons – that is, reasons that are supposedly linked to normative or ‘ought’ claims (and that are given in the attempt to justify these claims). In particular, he suggests that by fostering the idea that reason-giving is a valuable thing to do, those teachers have gradually transformed man into a ‘fantastic animal’, one that

‘must fulfill one condition of existence more than any other animal: man must from time to time believe that he knows why he exists; his race cannot thrive without a periodic trust in life – without faith in the reason in life!’

Nietzsche holds that by trying to make all events in the world (‘what happens necessarily and always...without any purpose’) appear purposeful, done for a reason, those teachers created in others a need for reasons that they otherwise would not have. He says that ‘human nature has...been changed by...these teachers’ and that it ‘has now one additional need – the need for the ever new appearance [...] of a “purpose”’. According to Nietzsche, that has produced in them – and in others – the false belief (or faith, as Nietzsche sometimes says)

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67 Id.Ibid.
68 Id.Ibid.
that there are or might be reasons (Nietzsche also thinks that this belief – and the need it generates – is a damaging one, one that distracts from the truth of existence). Nietzsche’s puzzle – the one for which he tries to find an explanation – then is: Why did these teachers promote the idea that reason-giving is a valuable thing to do to justify those judgments? For Nietzsche, as I said above, they ‘can ultimately never be true’⁶⁹ and one cannot actually justify them.

He then suggests that an answer to that question can only be found by investigating their motives. And in their case, the only plausible psychological explanation he can think of is an irrational drive they had for surrounding themselves with ‘reasons and [to try] with all its might to make [them] forget that fundamentally [life] is drive, instinct…lack of reasons’⁷⁰. In another text, he says that there must be ‘some pretence, some deception going on’⁷¹, one that prevented them from ‘perceiving’ that ‘they cannot gain possession of it [the reality of existence]’⁷²; and that ‘because they cannot gain possession of it they look for reasons as to why it is being withheld from them’⁷³. For Nietzsche, this is where the fundamental mistake lies, for he thinks that there is no point in looking for reasons where there are none. Often, he notes that a fear for the absence of reasons or a desire for certainty – for being under control – is a factor that usually explains the will to give reasons. He holds that

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⁷² Id.Ibid.
⁷³ Id.Ibid.
'[...] tracing something unknown back to something known gives relief, soothes, satisfies, and furthermore gives a feeling of power. The unknown brings with it danger, disquiet, worry – and one’s first instinct is to get rid of these awkward conditions'74

From these passages, it is clear that Nietzsche does not hold reason-giving in high regard and that for him, the only plausible explanation for why some people attribute a high value to reason-giving is a psychological one. I disagree with Clark and Dudrick, when they argue that even though Nietzsche’s purpose in the passage above seems to be ‘to debunk reason-giving’75, his attitude towards reason-giving is not ‘wholly negative’76. According to them, Nietzsche’s suggestion that irrational drives underlie reason-giving is to be read not as debunking the value of reason-giving as a whole, but only ‘the cognitivist understanding of [it] as expressing, first and foremost, beliefs and representations of the world’77 – in my terms, as denying that reason-giving can actually achieve justification. To support this claim, they refer to another passage, where Nietzsche supposedly sees some value in reason-giving. In that passage, Nietzsche criticizes the great majority of people for lacking an ‘intellectual conscience’, and affirms that

'[they do] not consider it contemptible to believe this or that and to live accordingly, without first having given themselves an account of the final and most certain reasons pro and con, and without even troubling

74 Ibid. p. 78 ('First principle: any explanation is better than none...').
77 Ibid. p. 209 ff.
themselves about such reasons: ‘the most gifted men and 
noblest women still belong to this “great majority”’\textsuperscript{78}

Clark and Dudrick claim that, from this passage, it is clear that Nietzsche’s ‘fullest 
respect goes only to those who live in accord with beliefs that have been formed 
[…] through an examination of the reasons for and against’\textsuperscript{79}. They also claim 
that it authorizes the claim that Nietzsche’s attitude toward reason-giving is not 
wholly negative. I do not think it does.

Nothing that Nietzsche says in that passage can be made to seem that he is 
attributing some positive value to reason-giving (at best, he is only attributing 
some positive value to the inner act of asking for reasons). He is just criticizing 
people who lack an intellectual conscience, because they do not find it 
contemptible to actually believe ‘this or that and live accordingly’ without 
questioning those beliefs. He thinks that the ‘great majority’ of people is not even 
a little aware that those beliefs cannot be actually justified, and do not even 
bother to investigate them. They simply take their ‘truth’ for granted. In the same 
passage, Nietzsche says that among some pious people he ‘found a hatred of 
reason and was well disposed to them for that’\textsuperscript{80}. I think that a more consistent 
interpretation of Nietzsche’s remarks here – it is also one that is more consistent 
with what he writes elsewhere (see below) – requires making explicit his

\textsuperscript{78} Nietzsche F W, \textit{The Gay Science} (1974) p. 76.
\textsuperscript{79} Clark M and Dudrick D, Nietzsche and Moral Objectivity: The Development of Nietzsche’s 
\textsuperscript{80} Nietzsche F W, \textit{The Gay Science} (1974) p. 76. It is worth noting that Clark and Dudrick entirely 
omit this passage from their discussion. This is reason for believing that that their discussion is 
selective and that they pick only those excerpts that favor the view they want to support.
implicit assumption: that if one bothered to seriously investigate those beliefs, one would realize that there are no reasons that could actually justify them.

This is a position that Nietzsche repeatedly expresses in his writings. The passage relied on by Clark and Dudrick in no way undermines the claim that Nietzsche generally holds reason-giving in low regard. Because he believes that reason-giving cannot actually justify, Nietzsche is normally very suspicious of what might lead people to think or foster the idea that reason-giving is a valuable thing to do. Often, he takes reason-giving to be the result of sheer hypocrisy or cynicism. In another passage of The Gay Science, for instance, he holds that often, when some people have their beliefs attacked, one can see ‘what is to be seen so often but what [they] hate to see’\(^81\): they deliberately lie and invent reasons ‘simply to avoid admitting that [they] had become used to [those beliefs] and no longer wanted [them] to be different’\(^82\). They pretend to have reasons they know they do not have. Or, as he puts it more polemically when he discusses prevalent morality and religion: ‘reasons...are always lies that are added only after some people begin to attack these habits and to ask for reasons’\(^83\).

Cynicism and hypocrisy are recurrent topics in Nietzsche's writings. Take, for instance, what he says about the impossibility of rationally justifying morality. He claims that anyone who thinks that morality can be rationally justified

\(^{81}\) Ibid. p. 102.
\(^{82}\) Ibid. p. 101.
\(^{83}\) Ibid. p. 102 ('At this point, the conservatives of all ages are thoroughly dishonest: they add lies').
Nietzsche’s view that reason-giving cannot actually justify, he concludes that reason-giving can only be a matter of power; in this case, of having power over others.

All this is evidence for believing that Nietzsche does not see value in reason-giving. From various passages (taken from a range of Nietzsche’s writings), it is possible to interpret him as implicitly holding that because reason-giving cannot actually justify, reason-giving is nothing more than an act of power or of lack of it. When one gives reasons, this is either only a subterfuge to have power over oneself or over others – e.g. to make oneself feel better or to control others in a more subtle way – or just a sign of weakness – e.g. that one is not strong enough. In general, it is possible to conclude that Nietzsche sees reason-giving

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86 Ibid.
88 Nietzsche’s attitude towards Socrates (Nietzsche F W, Twilight of Idols (2008) p. 13) offers further support to that claim. For Nietzsche, Socrates’ dialectical method – of assessing reasons, finding contradictions, asking his interlocutors for stating their reasons – is ultimately a senseless exercise, for he believes that one cannot achieve actual justification for one’s beliefs.
as a deeply rooted psychological drive whose ultimate source is the will to power. This conclusion is by no means surprising, given that – as some authors note – the will to power is posed by Nietzsche as the best possible psychological explanation for a wide variety of human behavior.\textsuperscript{89} From what I said above, I believe that Nietzsche also thinks that to be the case with reason-giving.

\textit{2.3 Early emotivism: impoverished sense of the value of reason-giving}

In the last two sections, I discussed views that implicitly assume that all the value of reason-giving is dependent upon its capacity to achieve actual justification. I argued that both the Pyrrhonic sceptic and Nietzsche believe that reason-giving cannot actually justify anything and that, from this, they implicitly conclude (in their own ways) that reason-giving has no value. Reason-giving is either pointless (the Pyrrhonic sceptic), or merely cynical (Nietzsche). In this section, I argue that even when other values in reason-giving that are different from justification are recognised, there can still be sometimes a very impoverished sense of reason-giving’s value when it is thought that reason-giving cannot through it. He then questions Socrates’ motives, and suggests that Socrates could only be motivated by some purely self-serving motive – such as a pleasure for fascinating others, or for proving them wrong.\textsuperscript{89} See Leiter B, \textit{Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Nietzsche on Morality} (2002) p. 142; Kaufmann W, \textit{Nietzsche} (2013) p. 185: ‘Nietzsche used the will to power as a principle to explain behavior – as a psychological hypothesis. More often than not, he used it to explain behavior he happened to dislike’, see also p. 183, 192.
actually justify. This is the case, for example, of early ethical emotivism, such as
defended by C.L. Stevenson and Ayer.\textsuperscript{90}

Early emotivist authors, different from Nietzsche and the Pyrrhonic sceptic,
defend a more modest claim, namely, that reason-giving cannot actually justify a
particular type of propositions only, namely, ethical propositions – such as ‘X is
right (or wrong)’, ‘Y is good’. They thus restrict their conclusion only to a
particular kind of reason-giving, namely, ethical reason-giving. Also, as I explain
in detail below, they do not conclude that because reason-giving cannot actually
justify, reason-giving does not have value. Rather, they only conclude that the
value of reason-giving can only be derived from some other source, and hence
that reason-giving can only be a matter of achieving something else – namely,
persuasion.

According to early emotivism, ethical judgments do not have truth-value. Ayer,
for instance, holds that ‘there is no criterion by which one can test [their]
validity’\textsuperscript{91}. When I say ‘You acted wrongly in stealing that money’, the only thing
that can be ‘tested’ is whether you did or did not steal it. The question on
whether or not stealing is wrong is not testable. Ayer says that ‘there is obviously
no sense in asking whether what [the judgment] says is true or false...[for it

do not refer to more recent versions of emotivism, like e.g. Blackburn S, Antirealist Expressivism

does] not come under the category of truth and falsehood. Indeed, in Ayer’s view (which is the same as Stevenson’s in that regard), ethical judgments lack truth-value for the same reason that a cry of pain or a command lack truth-value: as Ayer says, they ‘do not express genuine propositions’. For Ayer, when one utters an ethical judgment, even though that utterance might have the form of a statement, it is in reality not a statement at all, for it has ‘no objective validity whatsoever’.

This lack of truth-value leads early emotivist authors to hold that ethical judgments are nothing but expressions of feeling. They qualify this thesis by holding that ethical judgments are not merely uttered to express or vent one’s feelings, but are also calculated ‘to arouse feeling, and so to stimulate action’. In their view, this is the primary function of an ethical judgment. When one utters an ethical judgment, one expresses a feeling or attitude and tries to cause a certain effect in the hearer. Take Ayer’s own example. When I say ‘You ought to tell the truth’, I say it not merely to express a belief to you or to tell you how I feel about the value of truthfulness. I also say it to express approval for the value of

\[\text{\footnotesize \begin{align*}
92 \text{ Ibid. p. 109.} \\
93 \text{Id.Ibid.}
94 \text{Id.Ibid.}
95 \text{Ibid. p. 103: ‘whatever in them that is not scientific (that cannot be empirically verified), is not in the literal sense significant but are simply expressions of emotion which can be neither true nor false’. Macintyre A, \textit{After Virtue} (2007) p. 12, says that ‘emotivism is the doctrine that all evaluative judgments and more specifically all moral judgments are nothing but expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling’.
97 Ayer (id.Ibid.) rejects ‘the alternative subjectivist view that a man who asserts that a certain action is right, or that a certain thing is good, is saying that he himself approves of it [in the sense that he is describing an attitude he has, rather than expressing it’}. Macintyre A, \textit{After Virtue} (2007) p. 12, says that for early emotivists, ‘we use moral judgments not only to express our own feelings and attitudes, but also precisely to produce such effects in others’.
\end{align*}}\]

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truthfulness and to evince or provoke a similar feeling or attitude in you. I say 'You ought to tell the truth', and implicitly mean it as 'Tell the truth as well'. This is how early emotivist authors understand ethical judgments in general. They think that ethical judgments are similar to ordinary imperatives.

Stevenson explicitly holds that ethical judgments 'have a meaning that is approximately, and in part, imperative', and are primarily used 'for encouraging, altering, or redirecting people's aims and conduct'. In his analysis, he treats ethical judgments as equivalent in meaning to 'I approve/disapprove of this; do so as well'. He says that they have a descriptive part ('I approve') and a directive one ('do so as well'), which is addressed to changing or intensifying the attitudes of the hearer. This directive element may differ in strength - e.g. one may utter an ethical judgment more like a command or like a suggestion. But the core idea, according to him, is that an ethical judgment is never merely uttered to report one's own state of mind. Rather, it is always uttered in the attempt of exerting some influence on the hearer.

99 Ibid. p. 21.
100 Ayer A J, *Language, Truth and Logic* (2002) p. 108, also holds that ethical judgments can be differentiated 'in terms both of the different feelings they are ordinarily taken to express, and also the different responses which they are calculated to provoke'.
101 The imperative function can be conceived in different ways. Hare R M, *The Language of Morals* (1964) p. 14-15, was aware of that and made the point against early emotivist authors. More recent versions of emotivism are more careful. Blackburn argues that early emotivists have an over-simplistic notion of which attitude is primarily expressed, and that some latitude is needed in 'identifying what is expressed...our ethical reactions can be more or less emotional, more or less demanding, and more or less prescriptive'. See Blackburn S, Antirealist Expressivism and Quasi-Realism, in: Copp D (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory* (2006), p. 147-161.
The lack of connection with actual justification is easy to flesh out. As I mentioned above, early emotivist authors think that ethical judgments do not have any truth-value, for they are mere expressions of feelings (of approval and disapproval), and therefore that they cannot be actually justified, and that reasons have no actual justificatory capacity here. The very idea of justifying them comes always with scare quotes. Their main reason for thinking that is that, as Stevenson says, ethical proofs are ‘distressingly meager’, for they are not ‘exactly like scientific proofs’. Stevenson repeatedly holds that in the ethical case, reasons are neither ‘demonstratively nor inductively related to [the judgment]’, which is different in the scientific case; and that ‘the supporting reasons here...have no sort of logical compulsion’, for they lack the sort of finality to prove an ethical judgment as they do in the scientific case. He argues that, in virtue of this lack of finality (or, in my terms, of actual justificatory

102 Hudson W D, Modern Moral Philosophy (1983) p. 110, commenting on early emotivism, says that an ethical ‘judgment because it has no literal meaning can be neither true nor false, valid nor invalid. It cannot, therefore, be argued about’.
103 Ayer A J, Language, Truth and Logic (2002), p. 107, says that ‘another man may disagree with me about the wrongness of stealing, in the sense that he may not have the same feelings about stealing as I have...But he cannot, strictly speaking, contradict me’.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid. p. 27.
107 Ibid. p. 36: ‘the reasons which are given for an ethical judgment, although open to the ordinary tests so far as their own truth or falsity is concerned, may give support to the judgment in a way that neither inductive nor deductive logic can exhaustively characterize’.
109 Ibid. p. 135 (in the ethical case, ‘finality may be impossible’; on p. 277, he says that reasons do not ‘strictly imply the judgment in the way that axioms imply theorems; nor are they related to the judgment inductively, as statements describing observations are related to scientific laws’).
capacity), in the ethical case reasons can be called ‘valid’ or ‘invalid’ only in ‘a dangerously extended [or analogous] sense’\textsuperscript{110}.

From his writings, it is clear that Stevenson endorses the view that there are no methods of supporting ethical conclusions that we can sensibly be said to recognize as valid, and that he arrives at that thesis because he assumes (like Ayer in that regard\textsuperscript{111}) that logic and, more particularly science, provided the leading picture of rationality and justification in general. Cavell, for instance, affirms that Stevenson’s central thesis is precisely that ‘what characterizes ethical judgments, [i.e. what] distinguishes them from logical and scientific judgments, is this absence of validity in their methods of support [i.e. the fact that they cannot be actually justified]’\textsuperscript{112}. Likewise, Macintyre holds that what early emotivism asserts is in central part that

‘[...] there are and can be no valid rational justification for any [moral] claims...and hence that there are no such standards...emotivism holds that purported rational justifications there may be, but real rational justifications there cannot have been, for there are none’\textsuperscript{113}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{110} Ibid. p. 30; on p. 114, he says that the sentences ‘describing the “verification” of an ethical judgment are [often] identified (as perhaps they should not be) with the reasons that support it’.\textsuperscript{110}
\item \textsuperscript{111} Ayer A J, Language, Truth and Logic (2002), p. 107, also holds that in the ethical case, no criterion can be given ‘by which one may decide between conflicting intuitions [or of conflicting feelings]’, for ‘it is notorious that what seems intuitively certain [or good] to one person may seem doubtful, or even false, to another’; while in the empirical case, when differences of opinion arise, one may ‘attempt to resolve them by referring to, or actually carrying out, some relevant empirical test’.
\item \textsuperscript{112} Cavell S, The Claim of Reason (1979), p. 277.
\item \textsuperscript{113} Macintyre A, After Virtue (2007) p. 19; see also p. 24.
\end{itemize}
Though this is an important point, what is most relevant for my purposes here is the specific conclusion that both Stevenson and Ayer arrive at about the value of reason-giving because of their belief that reasons cannot actually justify an ethical judgment (in the sense of ‘justifying’ they assume to be the only relevant one, ‘actually justifying’). Both conclude, in virtue of this, that to ‘justify’ an ethical judgment must be a quite different procedure from offering valid reasons for it. In particular, they further conclude that in the ethical domain, reason-giving can be nothing more than an act of calling attention to various considerations which will cause the hearer to assent to the judgment. Stevenson, for instance, argues that, because they are neither demonstratively nor inductively related to an ethical judgment, ‘the reasons which support or attack an ethical judgment’ can only be related to it ‘psychologically’. They only ‘serve to intensify and render more permanent the influence upon the attitudes’ of the hearer.114 Hudson summarizes well the early emotivist view here:

‘if no question of validity arises concerning the connection between the attitudes recommended and the “reasons” given in their support, then it does seem to follow that the only test left...is whether or not [they] will be efficacious in producing the desired attitudes [in the hearer]’115

115 Hudson W D, Modern Moral Philosophy (1983) p. 148. See also, Macintyre A, After Virtue (2007) p. 12; Cavell S, The Claim of Reason (1979) p. 259, says that in Stevenson’s view, ‘there can strictly speaking be no question of proof...but there can be “reasons” offered pro and con, and these are related psychologically (not demonstratively and not inductively) to the judgment they support’. 
This reaches the core point of the early emotivist view on the value of reason-giving. Early emotivist authors hold that though reasons cannot actually justify an ethical judgment, reasons can still be offered to back the judgment up, “establish it” or “base it on concrete references to fact”\textsuperscript{116}, in the attempt to change the hearer’s beliefs and to try to exert some influence in the hearer’s attitude – i.e. to make the hearer’s attitude agree with my own attitude.

From this, it is already possible to see that for early emotivist authors – different from the authors discussed in the previous two sections –, it is not that because they believe that reason-giving cannot actually justify an ethical judgment, they conclude that reason-giving has no value. In fact, Stevenson explicitly holds that reason-giving is ‘particularly important in ethics’\textsuperscript{117}. Rather, the point here is more that from their belief that reasons have no actual justificatory capacity in the ethical domain, they conclude that reason-giving is valuable only because it might help changing the hearer’s attitude, and because other devices that one could use to change the hearer’s attitude – such as uttering a bare command (Do X!), unaccompanied by reasons – might be ‘really too blunt an instrument to perform [their] expected task [i.e. to change the hearer’s attitude]’\textsuperscript{118}. Stevenson, for instance, argues that in some cases, if ‘a person is explicitly commanded to

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{116} Id. Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{117} Ibid. p. 28.
  \item \textsuperscript{118} Ibid. p. 32.
\end{itemize}
have a certain attitude, he becomes so self-conscious that he cannot obey’\textsuperscript{119} and that

'Command a man's approval and you will elicit only superficial symptoms of it. But the judgment, "This is good" [or “This is good, because..."], has no trace of this stultifying effect’\textsuperscript{120}

'[through reason-giving, I can influence the other] not by an appeal to self-conscious efforts [as in blunt imperatives, or threats]...but by the more flexible mechanism of suggestion'\textsuperscript{121}

Here, I take Stevenson to be saying: if instead of saying to you 'Do it!', I say something less direct or less strong – e.g. 'I think you should do it, because' –, it might be more likely that you do it. He thinks that reason-giving is valuable only because it might help to make the influence I want to have over you less evident (as he says, reason-giving helps to give to that influence the appearance of a suggestion). If I am skilful in reason-giving, I can influence you without you even noticing it. As Stevenson says, I may lead you, rather than command you, to change your attitude.\textsuperscript{122} Indeed, his position here is that reasons matter only insofar as they help to cause the desired change in the hearer's attitude. In some

\textsuperscript{119} Id.Ibid.
\textsuperscript{120} Id.Ibid.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid. p. 33, p. 104.
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid. p. 33.
passages, he explicitly holds that reasons are just instruments to be used when
the hearer is not willing to agree.\footnote{Ibid. p. 130. On p. 112, Stevenson argues that in the ethical case, the hearer normally demands reasons, and that ’he is neither so docile nor so trusting as to set the speaker up as his ultimate authority’.}

Ultimately, Stevenson views reason-giving as a purely instrumental device to
effect persuasion, and takes reason-giving to be valuable merely because it might
be a more effective device for achieving that end than other devices. This
becomes very clear when he holds that ’\textit{any} statement about \textit{any} matter of fact
which \textit{any} speaker considers likely to alter [the hearer’s] attitude may be
adduced as a reason for or against an ethical judgment’\footnote{Ibid. p. 114.}. From this statement,
the criterion for whether a reason is good is not whether it supports the
judgment, but whether it is effective. In fact, Stevenson even equates both ideas –
of offering ’support’ and of being ’effective’ – when he holds that whether a
’reason will in fact support or oppose the judgment will depend on whether the
hearer believes it, and upon whether, if he does, it will actually make a difference
to his attitudes’\footnote{Ibid. p. 115.}. According to this criterion, if a reason does not help to change
the hearer’s attitude, one may still ’conveniently call it a reason (though not...a
”valid” one)’\footnote{Id.Ibid.}, but it would be a bad reason because not effective.
Some authors have criticized the early emotivist view here.\textsuperscript{127} To give one example, Cavell says that Stevenson’s concern ‘to maintain scrupulous neutrality and scientific detachment’\textsuperscript{128} has led him to make certain statements that, though they might be true, cannot be true of ethical reason-giving – or, more precisely, of reason-giving that deserves to be called ethical. Cavell argues that the statement made by Stevenson (the one I quoted above), even though it is a statement that strikes him ‘as paradoxical an assertion about morality as one is likely to hit upon with the unaided intellect’\textsuperscript{129}, is a statement which ‘Stevenson, and others, [do not] find…difficult to maintain belief in’\textsuperscript{130}. I agree with Cavell when he says that this statement cannot ‘be reconciled with any theory of sensibility recognizable as moral’\textsuperscript{131}, and that the fact that Stevenson has no problem in making that statement is rather surprising, taking into account that he claims to be offering a picture of ethical reason-giving.

In the early emotivist picture (the statement above is evidence of this), there is no presumption that when one confronts the hearer ethically, one must be ‘recognizing [him as someone] about whom he cares’, and one’s entire concern is to get the hearer to do what one wants him to do. If one follows Stevenson’s criterion, it does not matter which reasons I give to the hearer, provided that

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\textsuperscript{127} See, e.g. Cavell S, \textit{The Claim of Reason} (1979), chap. X; Macintyre A, \textit{After Virtue} (2007) chap. 2; Hudson W D, \textit{Modern Moral Philosophy} (1983), p. 120, says that Stevenson does not make any difference between providing the hearer ‘with reasons for adopting an attitude (or for anything else) and saying things which will cause him to do so’.
\textsuperscript{128} Cavell S, \textit{The Claim of Reason} (1979) p. 274.
\textsuperscript{129} Ibid. p. 274.
\textsuperscript{130} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{131} Ibid. p. 275.
they are effective. Presumably, it does not matter whether I believe them or whether they are my real reasons, or whether they ought to change the hearer’s attitude, as long as they do.\textsuperscript{132} Ultimately, it does not matter even whether I change the hearer’s attitude by reason-giving or by doing something else.\textsuperscript{133}

The criterion proposed by Stevenson implies that I need to take into ‘account the position of [the hearer] only to the extent necessary to manipulate [his] feelings and conduct’\textsuperscript{134} and I agree with Cavell in that reason-giving that is based solely on what is likely to be effective in altering the hearer’s attitudes is not ethical. In fact, how can I be said to be treating the hearer ethically and consider the hearer \textit{only} to the extent that this favors me or my own attitudes? Whatever else ethical reason-giving requires, it is the kind of action that must be ‘conceived in terms of what will...benefit the person the speaker adduces his reasons to’\textsuperscript{135}. It presupposes a hearer-directedness that is not fully captured in the picture here. In a way, the early emotivist view is similar to Nietzsche’s here, for reason-giving becomes a mere manipulative device.\textsuperscript{136} Different from Nietzsche, however, early emotivist authors are less willing to explicitly admit that.

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{132} Macintyre A, \textit{After Virtue} (2007) p. 24, argues that I need more ‘the generalizations of the sociology and psychology of persuasion’ rather than ‘the standards of a normative rationality’.
\item \textsuperscript{133} Stevenson C L, \textit{Ethics and Language} (1969) p. 140, thinks that irrational methods are sometimes more effective to achieve that end, and it is perfectly legitimate to use them.
\item \textsuperscript{134} Cavell S, \textit{The Claim of Reason} (1979) p. 287 (see also p. 283).
\item \textsuperscript{135} Ibid. p. 281. For a similar point, see Macintyre A, \textit{After Virtue} (2007) p. 23 ff.
\item \textsuperscript{136} Macintyre A, \textit{After Virtue} (2007) p. 23, argues that early emotivism ‘entails the obliteration of any genuine distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative social relations’.
\end{itemize}
\end{flushleft}
Stevenson often denies that his view implies such a radical conclusion. He affirms, for instance, that ‘when certain methods...are denied any connection with validity, one may feel that no ground for choice between them remains’ or that this choice ‘may seem to involve only a crude, forensic success’, so that as ‘long as one's opponent is impressed...one method is as good as another’ and that ‘the whole purport of ethics is to sway attitudes’. In reply to this objection (which is one that he himself anticipates), the only thing he says is that his view does not necessarily imply that, for there are ‘a number of grounds for choice between methods’, and that if in certain cases these do not depend upon validity, it does not directly follow that they depend merely on ‘crude, forensic success’ either. He lists a range of examples to defend that his view does not necessarily imply ‘disillusionment and chaos’.

However, it is telling that Stevenson also does not exclude that possibility. I also agree with Cavell in that this is an interesting feature of early emotivism, for – different from authors such as Nietzsche, who knew that they were attacking morality as a whole, and pointing to the various ways ‘in which private motive or personal ignorance can be wrapped in the rags of morality’ – early emotivist authors did not think that this is what they were in fact doing (as it can be concluded from the passages above, this is something that Stevenson sometimes explicitly denied to be doing). They present their claim itself as being ‘a neutral

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138 Though, it is worth noting, it is not an objection that he seriously felt.
139 Id. Ibid.
140 Id. Ibid.
one, taken in the service of the advanced ideas of logic and scientific method, the
dictates of reason". The specific form that this claim took in the case of early
emotivism was thus a peculiar one (Cavell qualifies the early emotivist view as a
highly ‘intellectualized picture of irrationality’).

A deeper analysis of the early emotivist view would go beyond the scope of this
chapter, however. I mention Cavell’s criticism here (which is also a criticism
made by other authors) just to make clear how impoverished is the sense that
early emotivist authors have of the value of reason-giving. For the reasons
explained above, I think that this impoverishment is directly related to their
claim that reason-giving cannot actually justify an ethical judgment. I return to
early emotivism in later chapters, when I defend my claim about reason-giving’s
value (indeed, I think that the early emotivist view is a particularly ironic view
on the value of reason-giving and, in the fifth chapter, I explain why). Within
this view, one does not need to take the hearer into account in any full-fledged
way, and reason-giving’s value is explained and assessed entirely in terms of its
capacity for achieving a certain effect in the hearer.

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142 Id. Ibid.
143 Ibid. p. 291.
144 See footnote n. 129.
145 See chapter 5, section 6.
3. Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I discussed some of the challenges that have been posed in philosophy to the value of reason-giving. My discussion was not meant to be exhaustive, but only illustrative of a range of views that rely too much on the capacity for achieving actual justification as a source of value in reason-giving. I argued that reason-giving’s value is predominantly thought in terms of justification, and also that one particular way in which this relation has been conceived could be grasped in terms of a modus ponens: If reason-giving cannot achieve justification, reason-giving has no value; reason-giving cannot achieve justification, reason-giving does not have value. I then examined the views that some authors have held and explained their reasons for holding them. In all the cases discussed, the authors misstep about the value of reason-giving, and for a similar reason: they rely too much on the capacity for achieving actual justification as a source of value.

In extreme cases, the value of reason-giving is thought to be entirely given by its actual justificatory power, in such a way that if reason-giving does not have such power, it is thought to have no value at all. In one extreme (Pyrrhonism), reason-giving is used only to show its pointlessness and to undermine its own value – to show that it cannot actually justify anything. In the other extreme (Nietzsche), reason-giving is viewed as merely cynical, as nothing more than an act of power or the lack of it. I also argued, with reference to early emotivism, that even when the conclusion is not so extreme, there can still be a very impoverished sense of
what value reason-giving can have if it cannot actually justify – reason-giving is here viewed as a mere tool for achieving a certain effect in the hearer.

All of these cases have in common the assumption that reason-giving cannot actually achieve justification (in certain domains at least), and also the implicit conclusion that, in virtue of this, reason-giving must only be a matter of achieving or of doing something else – e.g. persuasion, manipulation, or as in the case of Pyrrhonism, showing that reason-giving cannot achieve actual justification. In my view, this excessive focus on justification has led to a systematic underestimation of the value of reason-giving, and has distorted our way of thinking about the kind of value that reason-giving might have. In particular, as I hope to make clear in the discussion to follow, other values that reason-giving might have – and that might be equally or even more important than justification – have either been explicitly discounted or simply ignored.

The focus on actual justification has also hidden other possibilities of thinking of how reason-giving’s value can be said to be dependent upon the capacity to justify. Is it dependent upon the actual presence of this capacity, or only in some other, perhaps weaker, way – e.g. dependent upon not its actual presence, but only on the appearance of its presence in some degree (or on the general belief that reason-giving has such capacity)? There are, roughly, three ways (of varying strength) in which reason-giving’s value can be said to be dependent upon a capacity to justify: (1) no act of reason-giving could have value unless the reasons given actually justify the claim (strongest); (2) no act of reason-giving
could have value unless reason-giving in general actually has the capacity to justify; and (3) no act of reason-giving could have value unless reason-giving in general is generally believed to have the capacity to justify. All that the claim I will be defending in the next chapters needs to work is (3).

In what follows, I will defend the thesis that reason-giving’s most important value – even though in some sense dependent upon a relation to justification – is not justification. Rather, it is an expressive value, namely, recognition. If this is right, reason-giving does not have to have a capacity for achieving actual justification to have this value – and hence, to have value. As I will explain in the chapters that follow (especially in chapters four and five), this is a value that reason-giving has even if reason-giving were never capable of actually justifying anything. I develop this claim mainly to explain why I think that the radical conclusion about reason-giving’s value (that it has none) is misguided. In this chapter, I offered support for the claim that this cognitive value has not yet received sufficient attention and remained under-analysed in the literature, due to the almost exclusive focus on justification.

My argument proceeds as follows. I first take a step back and provide an analysis of reason-giving and arguing as types of speech acts. My strategy is to use speech act theory to defend the claim that there is a distinction between reason-giving and arguing. I use the theory’s main notions in order to develop this central claim. Those notions are especially useful here because, as I will explain in detail in the next chapters, they help to map the discussion of justification as a value of
reason-giving into speech-act theoretical terms.\textsuperscript{146} I argue that though reason-giving and arguing have some features in common, they are not identical speech acts. My claim is that the very fact that some authors see the lack of actual justificatory capacity as a sufficient reason for concluding that reason-giving has no value is a sign that they might be working with the unstated assumption that reason-giving and arguing are essentially the same act. In the next chapter, I introduce the conceptual framework for the analysis.

\textsuperscript{146} In the literature, justification is often taken to be the primary value of arguing, which is normally referred to as a speech act (see especially chapter 3).
Chapter 2: Speech Act Theory and Analytical Framework

1. Introduction

In this chapter, I present and set the analytical framework for the rest of the thesis. In the last chapter, I explained how common it is in philosophy to think that reason-giving's value – or its most important value – is justification. In particular, I argued that the connection between reason-giving and justification is sometimes thought to be so intimate that some authors think that because reason-giving cannot achieve justification, reason-giving has no value at all. In this thesis, my central aim is to argue that this assumption is mistaken – and hence, that one should not rely so much on justification as a source of value in reason-giving – or as a condition for reason-giving to have value.

To defend this claim, I first take a step back and provide an analysis of the act of reason-giving. Not much attention has been devoted to this in the literature. In particular, my aim is to investigate whether reason-giving is identical or not with arguing, which is often taken to be a discrete speech act (in the next chapter, I give special emphasis to the analysis of the act of ‘adducing reasons’, which was recently referred to as one of the two speech acts that make up the ‘speech act complex’ of arguing\textsuperscript{147}). I provide an analysis of both types of acts in the next two chapters. To pave the way for this analysis, I first introduce the vocabulary of

\textsuperscript{147}See in particular, Bermejo-Luque, \textit{Giving Reasons} (2011), chap. 3. In the next two chapters, I will compare and contrast my account of reason-giving with her analysis of adducing.
speech act theory and explain the theory's main notions, as developed by authors such as J.L. Austin and John Searle.148

In this chapter, I also make some amendments to the theory itself (e.g. on section 3.2, I introduce the notion of ‘primary value’), and clarify some concepts that are not very clear in the theory as traditionally presented (such as that of ‘uptake’, on section 3.4.3). But my central aim is to introduce the conceptual framework for the rest of the thesis, and I thus explain speech act theory first in a more general way. Speech act theory offers a good basis for pursuing the analysis of the next two chapters, because it provides a well-developed vocabulary to explain various types of speech acts by identifying their discrete features.149 This vocabulary is thus especially useful in the context of this thesis, because it enables a firm framework of analysis to deal with the specific object of my research in chapters three and four. In my view, arguing and reason-giving are two discrete speech acts, and I think that speech act theory helps to explain in a systematic way why this is so and to make the contrast between them clear.

2. Basic terms of speech act theory

In a typical speech situation involving a speaker S and a hearer H, there are many things S might be said to be doing when he says something to H. At the most basic level, he is moving his tongue and making some noises. But he might also be

149 See, e.g. Searle J R and Vanderveken D, Foundations of Illocutionary Logic (2009), especially chap. 1, where they identify a set of definitional features of a speech act.
trying to irritate or bore H. At another level, he might be trying to do so by making a statement, asking a question, greeting him. Speech act theory is mainly concerned with clarifying the last kind of acts, which are called illocutionary acts or, simply put, illocutions. Austin distinguishes three ‘senses’ of performing a speech act, namely, the act of saying something (of uttering words with a certain meaning), what one does in saying it (e.g. asking a question, stating, promising), and how one affects one’s hearer by saying it. He calls these, respectively, the ‘locutionary’, the ‘illocutionary’ and the ‘perlocutionary’ senses of performing a speech act.\textsuperscript{150} Searle makes a similar distinction.\textsuperscript{151}

Austin refers to them as three different kinds of acts – sometimes, he talks of ‘different senses or dimensions’\textsuperscript{152} of what one can do in and by speech – and holds that each of those acts is really only an abstraction from the total speech act, which it is his ultimate goal to clarify.\textsuperscript{153} The locutionary sense focuses on the content of the act, while the perlocutionary sense focuses on the effects that the act has or is intended to have on the hearer, and the illocutionary sense focuses on the act itself. In the context of this thesis, it is particularly important to keep a distinction between the illocutionary sense of performing a speech act and the perlocutionary sense of performing a speech act, even though often, even

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\textsuperscript{150} Austin J L, \textit{How to Do Things with Words} (1962) p. 91-93.  \\
\textsuperscript{152} Austin J L, \textit{How to Do Things with Words} (1962) p. 103; p. 109.  \\
\textsuperscript{153} Ibid. p. 52: ‘the total speech-act in the total speech-situation is the only actual phenomenon which, in the last resort, we are engaged in elucidating’; on p. 147: ‘in general the locutionary act as much as the illocutionary is an abstraction only: every genuine speech-act is both’. See also Hornsby J, Illocution and Its significance, in: Tsohatzidis S L, \textit{Foundations of Speech Act Theory} (1994), p. 187-188. 
\end{flushright}
normally, one intends both by performing the same act. Explaining Austin’s
distinction, Bach says that almost any speech act

‘is really the performance of several acts at once, which can be distinguished by different aspects of the speaker’s intention: there is the act of saying something, what one does in saying it, such as requesting or promising, and how one is trying to affect one’s audience’\(^{154}\)

No attempts have been made in the literature to provide a watertight definition of what an illocutionary act is. Normally, the illocutionary act is explained by means of a contrast with those two other kinds of acts. Generally speaking, a speech act is a piece of intentional behaviour, something that is produced with certain kinds of intentions.\(^{155}\) It is then said that a ‘perlocutionary act’ is a speech act viewed from the point of view of its consequences or effects in the hearer, such as persuading, convincing, scaring, enlightening, inspiring – which are all things one might try to do and succeed in doing by performing a speech act\(^{156}\); while an ‘illocutionary act’ is a speech act viewed from the point of view of the very type of act that it in itself is (e.g. promising, stating, thanking). Butler says that ‘the illocutionary speech act is itself the deed that it effects’\(^{157}\), while the


\(^{155}\) Searle J R, *Speech Acts* (1969) p. 17, says that performing a speech act is a ‘result of intentional behaviour’; Bach K, *Speech Acts*, p. 1, holds that ‘speech acts...fall under the broad category of intentional action, with which they share certain general features’.


perlocutionary has to do with the effects – intentional or not – that are achieved by the act, and ‘are not the same as the [illocutionary] speech act itself’\textsuperscript{158}.

As I said above, speech act theory focuses primarily on what the speaker does when he says (does) things in the illocutionary sense. Austin, for instance, says that his main interest is ‘essentially to fasten on…the illocutionary act and contrast it with the other two’\textsuperscript{159}. This is the primary object of analysis. For this reason, ‘illocution’ and ‘speech act’ are often used as synonymous expressions.

The theory isolates the illocutionary act for various reasons.\textsuperscript{160} One reason is that performing an illocutionary act constitutes the basic unit of linguistic communication, rather than performing a locutionary or a perlocutionary act.

One cannot be said to be trying to communicate something to a hearer linguistically without performing an illocutionary act of a certain kind – e.g. asking a question, making a statement, requesting something.\textsuperscript{161} But one might or might not perform an illocution with the intention of bringing some further, perlocutionary effect about in the hearer. Searle holds that

\begin{quote}
‘the unit of linguistic communication is not [...] the symbol, word or sentence [...] but rather the production or issuance of the symbol or word or sentence in the
\end{quote}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{158} Id.lbid.
\textsuperscript{159} Austin J L, \textit{How to Do Things with Words} (1962), p. 103, does so because ‘there is a constant tendency in philosophy to elide this in favour of one or other of the other two’ (on p. 100: ‘I call the act performed an ‘illocution’ and shall refer to the doctrine of the different types of function of language here in question as the doctrine of ‘illocutionary force’).
\textsuperscript{160} See, e.g. Cavell S, \textit{A Pitch of Philosophy} (1996) p. 77 ff.
\textsuperscript{161} Austin J L, \textit{How to Do Things with Words} (1962) p. 98, says that ‘to perform a locutionary act is in general...also and \textit{eo ipso} to perform an \textit{illocutionary act}, by which he means that one cannot perform a locutionary act without \textit{also} performing an illocutionary act (while one may perform an illocutionary act without also performing a ‘perlocutionary act’).
One of speech act theory’s main tasks is to classify and explain various types of speech acts (or illocutions) by identifying their discrete features – e.g. what kinds of conditions have to be in place, what kinds of intentions one typically has when performing them. For that, it elaborates a vocabulary that explains what it is to perform an illocutionary act of a certain kind. Searle and Vanderveken, for instance, hold that the most important question for speech act theory is this: ‘Given that a speaker in a certain context...performs [an] illocutionary act of a certain form, what...does the performance of that act commit him to?’ 163 In the next sections, I flesh out the notion of an illocution-type, for this is the central notion for my analysis in the chapters that follow. I give special emphasis to the account of Searle and Vanderveken, because it is the most detailed and systematic account that has been produced so far, and it is especially useful to analyse arguing and reason-giving as illocution-types.

Searle and Vanderveken claim that any illocution-type can be explained in terms of a set of definitional features. 164 They offer a list of seven features: (i) primary point; (ii) degree of strength of the primary point; (iii) mode of achievement; (iv) propositional content conditions; (v) preparatory conditions; (vi) sincerity conditions; (vii) the degree of strength of the sincerity conditions. For my

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163 Id. Ibid.
purposes, conditions (iv) to (vii), even though Searle and Vanderveken treat each of them as a separate feature, can be treated together as one comprehensive definitional feature under the heading ‘felicity conditions’ – the set of conditions that are necessary for a fully ‘felicitous’ performance of a given illocution-type. The same goes for condition (ii), which can be treated together with condition (i). I introduce another feature here: that of the primary value of an illocution-type. Though Searle and Vanderveken do not use this term, I think this notion fits well with the general framework they develop and I explain why.

In what follows, I explain primary point and primary value first, because – as I hope to make clear in the discussion to follow – they are the most fundamental features of an illocution-type (and also because, in the analysis I conduct in chapters three and four, these two features will play the most prominent role).

3. The notion of an illocution-type and its definitional features

3.1 The primary point of an illocution-type

Each illocution-type has a point or purpose that is internal to its being an act of its type.165 This is the point or purpose that is essential to the illocution in question, the point without which it could not be the type of illocution that it is. This is why this point is called primary point. Searle says that ‘each genuine

illocutionary act has an illocutionary point or purpose built into it in virtue of its being an act of that type’\textsuperscript{166}, and that the main idea is that a given illocution-type ‘could not be the type of [illocution] that it is, it could not be that very kind of [illocution] if it did not have that [point]’\textsuperscript{167}. Within speech act theory, the primary point is not the only feature of an illocution-type, but is the most important feature, because all the other features of an illocution-type are either further specifications and modifications, or they are consequences of its primary point (on section 3.2, I argue that the primary value together with its primary point are the two most fundamental features of an illocution-type).\textsuperscript{168}

Searle claims that there are five and only five primary illocutionary points.\textsuperscript{169} The basic idea is that any illocution-type has one or more of those five primary points, and hence, that the primary point of any illocution-type can be explained in terms of those five basic points alone (or, in some cases, in a combination of them). Those five primary points correspond to the five basic categories of illocution-types: assertive, directive, commissive, expressive and declarative.

Whenever a speaker $S$ says something to a hearer $H$ in the illocutionary sense, $S$


\textsuperscript{169}Searle J R, Expression and Meaning (1979) p. 29: ‘If we adopt illocutionary point as the basic notion on which to classify uses of language, then there are a rather limited number of basic things we do with language’. Searle J R and Vanderveken D, Foundations of Illocutionary Logic (2009), p. 51: ‘there is a finite number of illocutionary points’. On p. 52: ‘there are five and only give fundamental types and thus five and only five illocutionary ways of using language’. 
is either telling $H$ how things are in the world (assertives), or is trying to get $H$ to do things (directives), or is committing himself ($S$) to doing things (commissives), or is expressing feelings and attitudes to $H$ (expressives), or is making changes in the world (declaratives). Here are some examples of the five basic categories of illocution-types:

1. **Assertives**: illocutions whose primary point is to commit the speaker (in varying degrees) to something's being the case, e.g. stating, claiming, hypothesizing, guessing, informing, describing, predicting, insisting, or swearing that something is the case.

2. **Directives**: illocutions designed to get the hearer to do something, e.g. requesting, commanding, pleading, advising, asking, recommending, imploring.

3. **Commissives**: illocutions that commit the speaker to doing something, e.g. promising, threatening, vowing, offering.

4. **Expressives**: illocutions that express the speaker's attitude towards something – either towards the hearer or not –, e.g. congratulating, thanking, deploring, welcoming, greeting, praising.

5. **Declaratives**: illocutions that bring about the state of affairs they refer to, e.g. blessing, firing, baptizing, giving a verdict, declaring war.

Searle built this classification upon Austin's original scheme, which already included a rich variety of illocution-types. However, as Searle has argued,

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170 In chapter four, section 3.1, I elaborate more on expressive illocutions, in order to defend that reason-giving is best understood as an expressive illocution.

Austin’s classification was not based on any clear principles of distinction. As an alternative to Searle’s, other classifications have been offered. Some authors – e.g. Bach and Harnish, Alston – have done this because they think that Searle’s classification, even though better than Austin’s, is still not fully satisfactory. Among other reasons, they argue that Searle’s category of expressives – on the way Searle defines it – is over-inclusive, for in a basic sense, every speech act can be conceived as the expression of a certain attitude by the speaker. Bach and Harnish even define the notion of a speech act in terms of expressed attitude, and argue that types of illocutionary acts should be classified ‘in terms of types of expressed attitudes’ – e.g. a belief, an intention, a desire, a feeling.

Even if Searle’s classification is not fully satisfactory, it is worth noting that Bach and Harnish’s does not fundamentally change Searle’s proposal here and only adds more precision to it. Indeed, they acknowledge that their classification

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172 See Austin J L, How to Do Things with Words (1962), Lecture XII.
174 The most well-known is the one developed by Bach K and Harnish R M, Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts (1982) chap. 3 (also for other references).
175 Alston W P, Searle on Illocutionary Acts, in: LePore E and van Gulick R (eds.), John Searle and his critics (1991) p. 69, 73, argues that Searle’s sense of ‘express’ in the ‘expressives’ is ‘presumably…the same sense of “express” as that in which assertives, commissives, directives, and declarations express psychological states of various kinds’.
176 Bach K and Harnish R M, Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts (1982) p. 39. In the Introduction, they say that ‘an act of linguistic communication is an act of expressing an attitude by means of saying something’, and that ‘what type of attitude is expressed determines the kind of illocutionary act being performed’.
177 The same can be said of Alston. See Alston W P, Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning (1991) chap. 3.
based on the type of attitude being expressed – they divide speech acts into four basic categories, constatives, directives, commissives and acknowledgments – roughly corresponds to Austin’s original categories of expositives, exercitives, commissives and behabitives, as well as to Searle’s categories presented above.\(^{178}\) This is why I prefer to stick to Searle’s terminology here. In any case, I also think that which terminology is adopted does not make a significant difference to defend my central claim about reason-giving and arguing.

As I said above, Searle uses the notion of primary point mainly to map out similarities between different illocution-types and to identify the five basic categories illustrated above. But that notion is also helpful to draw differences. In the next chapters, I argue that one of the most important differences between arguing and reason-giving as illocution-types is precisely in their primary point.\(^{179}\) In Searle’s account, primary point is something that different illocution-types are supposed to have in common. Requesting and insisting (that \(H\) do something), for instance, have the same primary point – a directive one. They are both attempts to get the hearer to do something. But they are clearly not the same illocution-types. Indeed, this is why Searle argues that the primary point of an illocution-type – even though it is its most important feature – is not the same

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\(^{179}\) See chapter three, section 2.2; and chapter four, section 3.1.
as the illocution-type itself, and that in general, an illocution-type ‘is the resultant of several elements of which illocutionary point is only one’\textsuperscript{180}.

Searle introduces the notion of the degree of strength of the primary point, for instance, to explain some further differences between illocution-types belonging to the same category (as I argue in section 3.2, this is where the notion of primary value can be introduced). Take an example. As I said above, insisting and requesting have the same primary point. But the degree of strength of the point of insisting is stronger than that of requesting. Similarly, suggesting or conjecturing that $p$ is the case have the same primary point as swearing that $p$. They are all assertives. But the degree of strength of the point of suggesting or conjecturing that $p$ is weaker than that of swearing that $p$ (and the degree of strength of their point is both stronger than that of guessing – which comes close to zero). This distinction in degree of strength is quite pervasive, and the speaker may undertake varying degrees of strength or commitment when performing various illocution-types. This applies to other categories as well\textsuperscript{181}.

Most illocution-types have one and only one of the five primary points of Searle’s list. However, some illocution-types can be said to have a mixed primary point. Searle and Vanderveken do not mention the possibility of a mixed primary point (probably because they assume that each illocution-type only have one primary

\textsuperscript{180} Searle J R, \textit{Expression and Meaning} (1979) p. 3.

\textsuperscript{181} Expressing regret for having done something has a lesser degree of strength than humbly apologizing for having done it. Searle J R and Vanderveken D, \textit{Foundations of Illocutionary Logic} (2009) p. 15, argues that ‘there are different sources of different degrees of strength’.
point). However, I think that the primary point of some illocution-types can be best explained in those terms. When a speaker blames the hearer for having done something, he always asserts something (e.g. that $H$ has done something wrong), and expresses a certain attitude towards $H$ – disapproval. Similarly, when $S$ complains about $p$ to $H$, $S$ asserts that $p$ to $H$ while at the same time expressing dissatisfaction for $p$. When $S$ boasts about $p$ to $H$, $S$ asserts that $p$ to $H$ while expressing pride for $p$. A speaker cannot blame, boast or complain without both asserting something and expressing a feeling or attitude to $H$. Taken as illocution-types, they are both assertive and expressive.

Searle and Vanderveken classify them as illocution-types that have an assertive primary point with an added feature in their sincerity condition. In my view, however, they are actually cases of mixed primary point. It is an essential feature of these illocution-types that they are partly designed to represent something about the world as being the case and partly to express a certain attitude or feeling by the speaker in relation to it. What would be the point of complaining about something if not also to express dissatisfaction about it? I believe that treating their primary point as a mixed one offers a more intuitive explanation for those cases. Searle sometimes comes close to endorsing this possibility, but

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183 Ibid. p. 21: ‘the illocutionary force of complaining differs from assertion in that it has the additional sincerity condition that the speaker is dissatisfied with the state of affairs represented by the propositional content’ (see also p. 188-191). They are ambivalent here (on p. 213, they say that complaining can ‘be either an assertive or an expressive’, while I think it is both).
he is not clear as to whether he thinks that mixed primary points are possible.\textsuperscript{184} I stress this here, because this notion will be relevant to clarify the primary point of reason-giving as an illocution-type (in particular, to explain why I think that it should \textit{not} be construed as a mixed primary point).\textsuperscript{185}

The notion of primary point has raised some criticism in the literature.\textsuperscript{186} Alston suggests that it is better to understand primary point in terms of the illocution’s ‘standard point’, as the point with which particular tokens of a given illocution-type are ‘typically or standardly performed’\textsuperscript{187}, rather than as the point that is essentially built into that illocution-type as Searle claims. He says, first, that what Searle calls primary point might not be the point with which a speaker may perform that illocution-type in a particular situation.\textsuperscript{188} Second, a speaker often has more than one purpose when he performs an illocution-type. So, for instance, when I am making a promise to you, Alston says, I might be committing myself to doing something, but my actual point might be something entirely different from this – e.g. to make you believe that I am trustworthy. In a similar vein, Siebel

\textsuperscript{184} Searle J R, \textit{Expression and Meaning} (1979) p. 28, indicates that ‘some... verbs mark more than one illocutionary point’ – e.g. protesting involves both ‘an expression of disapproval and a petition for change’. But he does not treat protesting as having a mixed primary point (in this case an expressive and a directive one). More often, he says that ‘many verbs mark illocutionary point plus some other feature, e.g. “boast”, “lament”, “threaten”, “criticize”, “accuse”...’ (Id.Ibid.), are all cases that – in my view – are better described as a mixed primary point.

\textsuperscript{185} See chapter four, section 3.1.


\textsuperscript{187} Alston W P, Searle on Ilocutionary Acts, in: LePore E and van Gulick R (eds.), \textit{John Searle and his critics} (1991) p. 69, 70 (primary point ‘is ‘best thought of as attaching to the illocutionary act type standardly or typically, rather than being something that must be involved in a particular case if that case is to fall under that type’).

\textsuperscript{188} Ibid. p. 69.
argues that for Searle, ‘one of the conditions of an act type having [its] point is that...the utterer intends to bring about that point’\textsuperscript{189}, and that the primary point of an illocution-type is determined by the ‘actual intentions of the utterer’\textsuperscript{190}.

I do not think that this is Searle’s claim, and this is why I think that those objections are mistaken. Though some of the things Searle says might convey the impression that he thinks the primary point of an illocution-type to be essentially determined by the speaker’s intentions\textsuperscript{191}, his claim is not that the primary point is defined by the speaker’s actual intentions when performing a particular token of a given illocution-type. Rather, it is only that the primary point of an illocution-type is defined in terms of the type of intention that the speaker would have when he is performing that illocution-type in a fully serious way. The speaker’s actual intentions – e.g. whether he is sincere or not, or has a further intention to achieve a perlocution in \textit{H} – are irrelevant to determine the primary point of an illocution-type. In his work with Vanderveken, Searle says that

‘In real life a person may have all sorts of... aims... in making a promise, he may want to reassure his hearer, keep the conversation going, or try to appear clever, [but] none of these is part of the essence of promising. But when he makes a promise he necessarily commits himself


\textsuperscript{190} Id. Ibid.

\textsuperscript{191} See, e.g. Searle J R, Meaning, Communication, and Representation, in: Grandy R E and Warner R (eds.), \textit{Philosophical Grounds of Rationality} (1986) (in p. 220; in p. 209: ‘the concept of intention was the crucial element in the analysis of meaning. I still believe that to be the case; ‘the different [primary] illocutionary points are determined by the different intentions that speakers have regarding the ways that their utterances should represent reality’).
As I read it, Searle’s claim is only that every illocution-type has built into it a particular point that is basic to the type of illocution that it is – or, as he says, that is ‘internal to its being an act of that type’\textsuperscript{193}. In this sense, for instance, it is not necessary for \( S \) to be requesting \( H \) to do \( A \) that \( S \) actually has the intention to get \( H \) to do \( A \). What he says to \( H \) can be a request even if he does not have that intention, and quite apart from whether he actually has that intention. I can make you a request mainly to impress you as to how humble I am. However, I cannot make you a request, without that being an attempt to make you do something. And the reason is that, taken as an illocution-type, it is of the essence of a request to be an attempt to make \( H \) do something. The central idea, thus, is that the primary point of an illocution-type has explanatory priority in relation to other aims, for one cannot explain what a given illocution-type is – e.g. a request, a promise, a statement – without explaining what its primary point is.\textsuperscript{194} Because it is primary, it is a point that every instance of that type of illocution exhibits,

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{192} Searle J R and Vanderveken D, \textit{Foundations of Illocutionary Logic} (2009) p. 13 (‘other aims are up to him, none of them is internal to the fact that the [act] is a promise’).
\textsuperscript{194} Searle J R, What is language: some preliminary remarks, in: Tsohatzidis S L (ed.), \textit{John Searle’s Philosophy of Language} (2007) p. 39, says that one cannot explain what a statement or a promise is ‘without explaining that a statement commits the maker of the statement to its truth and the promise commits the maker of the promise to carrying it out’; Searle J R, Response: Meaning, Intentionality and Speech Acts, in: LePore E and van Gulick R (eds.), \textit{John Searle and his critics} (1991) p. 81: ‘Any given speech act may, of course, be performed for a number of purposes. A man might make a promise for all sorts of reasons. But if he makes a promise, then in virtue of its being a promise, it is the undertaking of an obligation to do something for the hearer’.
\end{footnotesize}
regardless of whether or not the speaker intends that point as his primary point or whether he intends to achieve that point at all.\textsuperscript{195}

3.1.1 Distinguishing the primary point from perlocutionary aims

The primary point of an illocution-type needs to be distinguished from all the further aims with which a given illocution-type might or might not also be performed. When a speaker promises a hearer to do something, he commits himself to doing what is promised (commissive primary point). But he may also want to reassure the hearer, to make the hearer believe he is trustworthy, to calm the hearer down. Those further aims – though they could be achieved by promising – are not essential for the speaker to be promising. They are often called perlocutionary aims or simply ‘perlocutions’.\textsuperscript{196} Convincing, impressing, outraging and humiliating the hearer are all cases of perlocutions. As I said before, different from illocutions, perlocutions refer mainly to the effects – intended or unintended – that the performance of a given illocution-type may have on the hearer. Austin affirms that

\begin{quote}
‘Saying something will often, or even normally, produce certain consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts,
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{195}In some cases, it is necessary that the speaker at least pretend to have the intention to achieve the primary point of the illocution he is performing. To be making an assertion, for instance, he must at least pretend ‘that he is saying what he does with the intention of saying something true’ (Dummett M, \textit{Frege} (1973) p. 299). If he makes quite evident that he does not intend to say something true, then he will not be taken to be making an assertion (at least not a serious one). Likewise, Bach K and Harnish R M, \textit{Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts} (1982) p. 80, argue that the speaker must not be obviously insincere.

\textsuperscript{196}Austin J L, \textit{How to Do Things with Words} (1962) chap. VIII and IX.
or actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or of other persons: and it may be done with the design, intention, or purpose of producing them’

He adds that the salient feature of perlocutions is that ‘they are not illocutionary’, and holds that to perform them is to perform an act ‘of another kind’. So, for instance, to say ‘I warn you’ – if certain conditions are fulfilled – is to warn you (illocution), but it may further (as a perlocution) ‘alarm you or exasperate you or intimidate you...[and also] convince you (that I am serious in my concern) and persuade you (to take action)’, all of which are not illocutions.

Most illocution-types are not essentially tied to the production of certain effects or responses from the hearer. But some illocution-types are. Making requests and giving orders – indeed, all directives – are essentially tied to the attempt to make the hearer do something. In other cases, the hearer must respond in a certain way for the illocution to be fully performed – e.g. in order to be a bet, he has to accept it first. In some cases, this is a matter of controversy. Some authors, for instance, hold that arguing is essentially connected to a perlocution (convincing), and some hold that it is not. In the next chapter, I argue that taken as an illocution-type, arguing is not essentially connected to the pursuit of any perlocution in the hearer – e.g. to convince or persuade the hearer of

198 Id. Ibid.
200 Searle J R, Expression and Meaning (1979) p. 3, says that ‘for many, perhaps most, of the most important illocutionary acts, there is no essential perlocutionary intent associated by definition with the corresponding [illocution]’.

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something.\textsuperscript{201} In chapter four, I also argue that reason-giving is not essentially connected to the pursuit of any perlocution in $H$.\textsuperscript{202}

Even if most illocution-types are not definable in perlocutionary terms, every illocution-type has characteristic perlocutions. This is, for instance, the case of warning (illocution) and alerting (characteristic perlocution), and of threatening (illocution) and intimidating (perlocution). A perlocution is characteristic of an illocution-type when performing that illocution-type is a typically good means for bringing that perlocution about. Making a threat is a typically good means to intimidate the hearer, as promising is a good means to reassure $H$ of something. But one can threaten a hearer without intimidating him, and intimidate him by means other than a threat. One can perform an illocution-type without achieving (or intending to achieve) any of its characteristic perlocutions. And one can also achieve all kinds of perlocutions, including non-characteristic ones. The relation between performing an illocution-type and achieving perlocutions – be they characteristic or non-characteristic – is non-essential.\textsuperscript{203}

This is the case even if it is in general true that when a given illocution-type is successfully performed, certain classes of perlocutionary effects become more likely to happen than others (e.g. when one warns a hearer, it is more likely that the hearer feel alerted than that he laughs). But these are still effects that may or

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\textsuperscript{201} See chapter three, section 2.1.
\textsuperscript{202} See chapter four, section 3.2.
\textsuperscript{203} See Cohen T, Illocutions and Perlocutions (1973) 9(4) Foundations of Language p. 492, 497: ‘An associated perlocution is one brought about by means of an illocution it ‘belongs with’.  


may not happen. It is precisely this lack of necessary connection that leaded Austin to affirm that ‘clearly any, or almost any, perlocutionary effect is liable to be brought off, in sufficiently special circumstances, by the issuing, with or without calculation, of any utterance whatsoever’\textsuperscript{204}, and to exclude perlocutions from his analysis. He had other reasons as well, such as his belief that there was a ‘constant tendency in philosophy to elide [the illocutionary] in favor of one or other of the other two [i.e. either only content or only effects, such as in early emotivism]’\textsuperscript{205}. It is worth noting that that exclusion in itself does no theoretical harm to Austin’s project, since Austin’s aim was to isolate and fasten understanding of the ‘illocutionary act’ and ‘contrast it with the other two’\textsuperscript{206}.

The distinction between illocutions and perlocutions is one of the most discussed issues in speech act theory.\textsuperscript{207} Austin himself argued that this is the distinction likeliest to give trouble.\textsuperscript{208} He originally based it on the fact that while illocutions are conventional, in the sense that ‘to say them [\textit{eo ipso}, he sometimes adds] is to do them’, perlocutions are not so. We can say ‘I promise that’ or ‘I warn you that’ (which are cases of illocutions), and – if certain conditions are fulfilled – to say those things is to do them: it is to warn you, to promise you something. However, though we can say ‘I convince you that’ or ‘I alarm you that’ (which are cases of

\textsuperscript{204} Austin J L, \textit{How to Do Things with Words} (1962) p. 172.
\textsuperscript{205} Ibid. p. 103.
\textsuperscript{206} Id\.ibid.
\textsuperscript{208} Austin J L, \textit{How to Do Things with Words} (1962) p. 110.
perlocutions), saying those things is not (at least not yet) to do them. Austin’s original contrast is that while illocutions are built into the verb that names them (and hence, can be fully performed by uttering that verb), perlocutions are not (and hence, cannot be fully performed by uttering the verb that names them).

The main criticism raised against Austin was that the criterion of conventionality is not an appropriate ground for making that distinction.\textsuperscript{209} Strawson, for instance, argued that various acts that Austin calls illocutionary acts can be performed without uttering the verbs that name them and that Austin himself sometimes acknowledges that fact. An act of warning, for instance, ‘can be brought off nonverbally, without the use of words’\textsuperscript{210} and yet be described as an act of warning. From this, Strawson concludes that the conventional nature of illocutionary acts does not hold generally, and that only in very special cases illocutionary acts are essentially conventional – e.g. marrying, pronouncing a sentence (which are acts that can only be performed by uttering a performative formula – e.g. by saying ‘Yes’ or ‘I hereby declare the defendant guilty’; these are the cases that most caught Austin’s attention). Strawson adds that in general, illocutionary acts could be said to be conventional only in the less interesting

\textsuperscript{210} Ibid. 443.
sense that the linguistic means that are typically used to perform them are conventional.\footnote{Id.Ibid.}

In brief terms, this is why Strawson thinks that the criterion of conventionality used by Austin is not a good criterion to distinguish illocutions from perlocutions. He argues – drawing on Grice’s idea of communicative intention\footnote{The original idea is in Grice P, \textit{Studies in the Way of Words} (1991) chap. 5.} – that a better criterion is the type of intention involved in each case. Many authors have followed Strawson here.\footnote{See, e.g. Habermas J, \textit{Theory of Communicative Action} (1984), vol. 1, p. 287 ff; Searle J R, \textit{Speech Acts} (1969) p. 42-49; Bach K and Harnish R M, \textit{Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts} (1982) chap. 1.} He argues that the main difference is that, while the illocutionary intention ‘is essentially something that is intended to be understood’, the perlocutionary intention is not.\footnote{Strawson P F, Intention and Convention in Speech Acts (1964) 73(4) \textit{The Philosophical Review} p. 439, 459.} While the former is essentially overt and hearer-directed, the latter is often intended to remain only implied. In particular, while illocutions can be and are often expressed openly\footnote{This is the case even if very often, we do not actually use the performative verb to express our illocutionary intention (e.g. more often than saying ‘I apologize’, we merely say ‘I’m sorry’).}, many perlocutions would often fail if they were openly admitted. Saying ‘I humble you’ or ‘I convince you’ – which are perlocutions – is not only not to humble or convince you (or not yet). Saying those things might even frustrate the very achievement of those perlocutions.

Strawson discusses the examples of ‘showing off’ and ‘insinuating’ to further support this claim. He argues that, for different reasons, both acts fail to be
illocutionary acts, and that a reflection on why they fail sheds light on the nature of the illocutionary intention itself.\textsuperscript{216} When one shows off, one tries to produce an effect on the hearer (to impress him).\textsuperscript{217} But Strawson argues that it is no part of the intention to secure that effect 'by means of the recognition of the intention to secure it.'\textsuperscript{218} Indeed, recognition of that intention might count against securing it and only contribute to the promotion of an opposite effect. Similarly, when one insinuates, one intends to make the hearer suspect, but no more than suspect, of one's intention (which is an effect on the hearer, and hence a perlocution). If one tries to make that intention fully public to the hearer by saying 'I am trying to insinuate', that might not only count against achieving that effect. It would not even count as an act of insinuating anymore.

In both cases, the speaker is primarily trying to achieve a perlocution in the hearer, and his intention is 'essentially non-avowable.'\textsuperscript{219} If he seriously intends to achieve that perlocution, it is better not to let his aims be known. Strawson's point is not that we cannot intend that our perlocutionary goals be recognised, only that this is not a feature that is essentially built into them. In many cases, 'the hearer is intended not to recognize them.'\textsuperscript{220} And this is why Strawson thinks that showing off and insinuating are not illocutions.\textsuperscript{221} In contrast, he argues that

\textsuperscript{217} Id.lbid.
\textsuperscript{218} Ibid. p. 452.
\textsuperscript{219} Id.lbid.
\textsuperscript{220} Id.lbid.
\textsuperscript{221} Rather than because of the fact that one cannot perform them by saying that one is performing them.
the illocutionary intention always involves an intention to make the hearer know exactly what one is trying to do. This hearer-directedness is essentially built into it. Strawson argues that the illocutionary intention can be broadly characterized as ‘an audience-directed intention’ that has a ‘wholly overt’\textsuperscript{222} nature and is essentially something ‘intended to be recognized’\textsuperscript{223}. I return to this point on section 3.4.3, when I discuss the concept of uptake.

### 3.2 Illocution-type and its primary value

Together with the primary point, the primary value is another fundamental feature of an illocution-type. As I said before, Searle and Vanderveken do not use the term ‘primary value’ in their list of definitional features. But, as I explain below, I think that introducing this notion here not only fits well their framework of analysis, but it can also bring some benefits in terms of analytical clarity and of making clear an important distinction that lies at the core of speech act theory.\textsuperscript{224}

Primary value, as I understand it here, can be defined as the value that is of the


\textsuperscript{223} Strasson P F, Intention and Convention in Speech Acts (1964) 73(4) The Philosophical Review p. 439, 459 (on p. 452, he says that this ‘kind of intention lies at the core of all illocutionary acts’; on p. 459, that it applies ‘in all cases’). Likewise, Habermas J, On the Pragmatics of Communication (1998) p. 2, argues that ‘anyone acting communicatively must...claim to be: a. Uttering something understandably; b. Giving [the hearer] something to understand; c. Making himself thereby understandable; and d. Coming to an understanding with another person’; Bach K and Harnish R M, Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts (1982) chap. 1, also argue that the illocutionary intention ‘is an intention that is intended to be recognized as intended to be recognized...[and] whose fulfillment consists in nothing more than [its] recognition’.

\textsuperscript{224} Primary value is also a particularly useful notion to map the discussion of the last chapter about justification as a value of reason-giving on to speech act theoretical terms (as the primary value of arguing as an illocution-type).
very nature of a given illocution-type to realise.\textsuperscript{225} In section 3.1, I explained that Searle and Vanderveken use the notion of ‘primary point’ mainly to distinguish between five basic categories of illocution-types, and take primary point to be something that a given illocution-type has in common with other illocution-types belonging to the same category. But, as they acknowledge, more is needed to distinguish between illocutions within those basic categories.

Primary value is closely related to what Searle calls the ‘essential condition’ of an illocution-type. Though he does not explain what he means by ‘essential condition’ in detail (probably because he thinks that it is an intuitive notion), he refers to it as the ‘essential feature’ of an illocution-type, the feature that ‘distinguishes [it] from other kinds of illocutionary acts’\textsuperscript{226}. Here are some examples: the essential condition of a request is that it is an attempt to get $H$ to do something; that of an assertion is that it is an undertaking to the effect that $p$ represents an actual state of affairs; that of a question is that it is an attempt to elicit information from $H$; that of advising is that it is an undertaking to the effect that what is advised is in $H$’s best interest; that of a warning is that it is an undertaking to the effect that a certain event $E$ is not in $H$’s best interest; that of a

\textsuperscript{225} With ‘primary value’, I refer here only to the primary illocutionary value. So, for instance, the primary value of a request, in the sense I am using the term, is not to make the hearer do something (which is a perlocution), but to make an attempt to make the hearer do it.

promise is that it is the undertaking of an obligation to perform a certain act; that of a greeting is that it is a courteous recognition of $H$ by $S$.\textsuperscript{227}

From this brief list, it is already possible to see (even if one disagrees with the formulation that Searle gives for some of them) that to identify the ‘essential condition’ is to identify the condition without whose fulfilment a particular performance of a given illocution-type could not count as a performance of that illocution-type. This is why Searle calls it ‘essential condition’. However, this condition also defines in more specific terms the particular illocutionary goal or value that that type of illocution is designed to achieve (and hence, it defines something slightly different – because more specific – from what Searle considers to be the primary point of that illocution-type). Searle sometimes oscillates, and talks as if the primary point of an illocution-type were the same notion as its essential condition.\textsuperscript{228} But I do not think that they are.

Thanking, for instance, has an expressive primary point as much as congratulating, praising, apologizing. But their primary value (the one defined in the essential condition) is clearly different. The primary value of thanking is to express gratitude for $H$, while that of congratulating is to express pleasure towards $H$, and of apologizing is to express regret or sorrow. It is clear that primary value is related to primary point. In the case of expressives, their

\textsuperscript{227} Id.Ibid. (I adapt them from Searle).
primary value can be obtained by specifying the type of attitude or feeling that the illocution-type is designed to express. In the case of assertives or directives, the degree of strength of their primary point is an important feature to determine their primary value. It helps, for instance, to explain the difference between making an assertion, a conjecture and a guess, and within directives, between requesting and ordering that $H$ do something.\(^{229}\) As I explain in the next section, the mode of achievement is another relevant feature here.

In general, the primary value of an illocution-type can be obtained by a further specification or modification of its primary point. A central benefit of introducing the notion of primary value is to distinguish more clearly something that is only cryptically conveyed with the notion of achieving the ‘primary point’. Searle and Vanderveken argue that when the performance of a given illocution-type achieves its primary point, this means that the essential condition is fulfilled, and that the act in question counts as a token of the relevant illocution-type (e.g. as a promise, an assertion, an apology). They say that ‘a successful performance of an act of that type necessarily achieves that purpose [the primary point]’\(^{230}\), and that ‘if the act is successful the [primary] point is achieved’\(^{231}\). However, as I explain more fully in section 3.4, to say that the act is ‘successful’ is different from

\(^{229}\) Requesting has a similar primary value as ordering, but is still different, because of the weaker degree of strength of its directive point. In other cases, the difference of just a genus-species one. Searle J R, \textit{Speech Acts} (1969) p. 69, for instance, argues that ‘asking questions is really a special case of requesting, viz., requesting information (real question) or requesting that the hearer display knowledge (exam question)’.


\(^{231}\) Id. Ibid.
saying that it is a good token of that illocution-type. Holdcroft uses the terms 'external' and 'internal' goals to make a similar distinction:

' [...] relative to its classification as an illocutionary act of a given type, any perlocutionary purposes one may have are external to it, and...the only goals that are not external to it [and hence, internal] are those that must be achieved for it to be an illocutionary act of that type'  

In my view, introducing the notion of 'primary value' helps to distinguish more clearly between what needs to be in place for a given act to count as 'an illocutionary act of that type' – in Searle and Vanderveken's terms, for the act to achieve its primary point – and what needs to be in place for that act to be a good act of its type. 'Value' suggests the idea of something to be achieved, of an ideal to be aimed at, rather than merely a condition to be fulfilled. I am not claiming that Searle and Vanderveken entirely missed this fundamental distinction. As I explain in section 3.4, the notion of felicity conditions – especially the distinction Searle makes between success and non-defectiveness conditions – can fulfil this role as well. However, I still think that using the notion of 'primary value' here helps to avoid confusion with achieving the primary point or fulfilling the essential condition (which, as I just explained, only refer to what must be minimally fulfilled for the act to count as an act of a certain type).

Let me stress this: it is a truism that performing an illocution-type – like performing other actions – can be good or bad for something. A certain

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232 Holdcroft, D, Conversation and Structure, in (On) Searle in Conversation, p. 69-70.
performance can be said to be good because of its elegance, style, or whatever else one may value in it. In the context of speech act theory, however, the relevant sense of being a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ performance is that of being good or bad as a performance of the relevant illocution-type. And to ask whether a token of an illocution-type is a good or bad token of its type is to ask about how well it realizes its primary value (which, as I explained above, is the value that is of the very nature of that illocution-type to realize). In general, the primary value is the only value that a particular performance of a given illocution-type has to realize to be a good performance of an illocution of that type.

Even though Searle and Vanderveken do not view the fulfilment of the essential condition as a matter of degree but only as an all-or-nothing matter, I think that allowing for degrees of fulfilment or of achieving the primary value offers a more intuitive way to assess particular performances of some illocution-types at least. As I explain in the following chapters, I think that this is the case of arguing and reason-giving. Particular performances of these illocution-types can achieve their respective primary value (which, as I argue, is different in each case), but be better or worse in achieving it. They can also achieve it in a higher or lesser degree in relation to a fully felicitous performance of an illocution of that type.

3.3 Mode of achievement of the illocution-type

233 In the case of arguing, in particular, authors are in general agreement on this point. See for references, chapter three, section 4.
The third definitional feature that is relevant to my analysis is the mode of achievement of a given illocution-type. Though this feature is less fundamental than the primary point and the primary value, it is also an important feature. Like most purposes of our actions, the primary value of an illocution-type can be achieved in various ways and by different means. The mode of achievement of an illocution-type refers broadly to the means that the speaker characteristically employs to achieve the primary value of that illocution-type. Vanderveken, for instance, argues that the mode of achievement ‘determines how its point is [characteristically] achieved’\(^{234}\) (instead of point, I prefer to talk about primary value, for as I explained above, the latter is a more specific notion). He compares the relation between the mode of achievement and the primary value of an illocution-type with the relation of a means towards an end.

Most illocution-types have a characteristic mode of achievement, even though their primary value can be achieved in other ways.\(^{235}\) But some illocution-types have a special mode of achievement, in the sense that their performance requires that the speaker adopt certain specific means to perform them.\(^{236}\) Vanderveken argues that the mode is special when it ‘properly restricts the conditions of


\(^{236}\) Searle and Vanderveken (*Ibid.* 15) hold that ‘some, but not all, illocutionary acts require a special way...of achieving their illocutionary point’. I think that this is the case of all expressive illocution-types, for they are all characteristically to be performed with an appropriate degree of ‘emotional warmth’. If S thanks H with an angry face, there will be doubts about whether he is really thanking H. When he thanks H, he implies that he feels grateful; when he apologizes, he implies that he feels regretful and so on.
achievement\textsuperscript{237} of the primary point. In order to command the hearer to do something, a speaker must be more peremptory than to request the hearer to do it. Similarly, begging has a special mode of achievement, for to beg is to make a humble or polite attempt to get the hearer to do something. Vanderveken defines begging as ‘a request made with the humble or polite mode of achievement’\textsuperscript{238}, and argues that as a result of this special mode, many ways of achieving the directive point ‘which are neither humble nor polite’\textsuperscript{239} are excluded.

Searle and Vanderveken use the notion of ‘mode of achievement’ only to illustrate a feature where illocution-types that have the same primary point may still differ. As I just said, they explain the difference between commanding and requesting in this way. This is also how they explain the difference between testifying and asserting. In this case, both illocution-types have an assertive primary point, but testifying differs from asserting because it has a special mode of achievement. To testify is to assert something in one’s capacity as a witness. Indeed, it is one’s status as a witness that turns an assertion one makes in a court trial into a testimony. It is also this special mode of achievement that explains why the point of testifying has a higher degree of strength than the point of other assertives (e.g. a conjecture). Searle and Vanderveken argue that, in the case of

\textsuperscript{237} Vanderveken D, Meaning and Speech Acts (1990) vol. 1 p. 110, says that when the mode is special, it ‘restricts the conditions of achievement of its point by requiring certain specific means or ways of achievement of that point’.

\textsuperscript{238} Id.Ibid.

\textsuperscript{239} Id.Ibid.
testifying, it is precisely its special mode of achievement that ‘requires the degree
of strength of [its] illocutionary point to be high’\textsuperscript{240}.

Even though Searle and Vanderveken do not elaborate this point, I think that the
mode of achievement is also useful to explain why some illocution-types look
similar when they are performed, even though they have a different primary
value or a different primary point. Promising, for instance, has a commissive
primary point, while threatening has a mixed primary point (commissive and
directive). Their primary value is also different: promising is the undertaking of
an obligation to do something for the hearer (that it is in the hearer’s interest),
while threatening is the undertaking of a commitment to do something to the
hearer (that is not in the hearer’s interest). Even though these illocution-types
have neither the same primary point nor the same primary value, they often look
similar when they are performed. Imagine a teacher who says to a lazy student,
‘If you do not hand in your paper on time I promise you I will fail you in the
course’. Is the teacher’s utterance a promise or not?

I agree with Searle when he argues that, even though he utters ‘I promise’, the
teacher’s act is more naturally described as a threat, rather than a promise. In
some cases, we use ‘I promise’ or ‘I hereby promise’, because these expressions
are among the strongest indicating devices for commitment in the English

achieves the assertive illocutionary point in his status as a witness speaking under oath commits
himself strongly to the truth of the propositional content’.
language. Searle says that these expressions are often used in the performance of illocutions that ‘are not strictly speaking promises, but in which we wish to emphasize the degree of our commitment’\(^\text{242}\). In the case above, the illocution performed is not strictly speaking a promise. It only has the surface structure of a promise (i.e. it only appears to be an act of promising), but has the deeper structure of a threat. Take another example. A speaker says ‘I promise you, I did not steal the money!’$. Similarly to the case above, the illocution performed also appears in its surface to be an act of promising, but what the speaker is actually making is an emphatic assertion (‘I swear that (it is true that) I did not steal it’).

I think that these cases can be explained as follows. Due to having a similar mode of achievement, a given performance may appear to be the performance of a certain illocution-type (e.g. a promise), while it is actually the performance of another illocution-type (e.g. a threat, an assertion).\(^\text{243}\) In the next chapters, I argue that the similarities between reason-giving and arguing as illocution-types can be explained in precisely these terms. I argue that though reason-giving and arguing have neither the same primary point nor the same primary value, they have a similar mode of achievement.

\(^{242}\) Id. Ibid.
\(^{243}\) I think that it is also possible to explain the similarities between arguing and other illocution-types –e.g. threatening – in these terms. Arguing shares neither the same primary point nor the same primary value with threatening. But, in some cases, making a threat might have the surface appearance of an act of arguing (‘If you do not do X, then Y will happen’; ‘Y is bad for you’; ‘Therefore, you ought, from your own self-interest, to do X’). Some authors have made exactly this claim, see Wreen M, May the Force be With you, Argumentation 2 (1988) p. 425-440. For authors who defend that arguing and threatening are different acts, see Bermejo-Luque, L. Giving Reasons (2011) p. 194-200; Levi, D S. The Fallacy of Treating the Ad Baculum As a Fallacy, Informal Logic, vol. 19 (1999) p. 145-159.
3.4 The felicity conditions of an illocution-type

To be felicitous, the performance of a given illocution-type must fulfil certain conditions deriving from the definitional features of the specific type of illocution that it is. A felicitous act of arguing, as I argue in the next chapter, succeeds in justifying a claim, but does not need to succeed in persuading or convincing the hearer of that. Likewise, a felicitous act of advising need not lead the hearer to do what is advised, and a request can be fully felicitous as a request even if fails to direct behaviour. To produce those effects in the hearer, these performances have to fulfil further conditions that are in general not relevant to determine whether they are felicitous as a performance of an illocution of their type. As I said in section 3.2, a fully felicitous performance of a certain illocution-type is a performance that is good as a performance of the type of illocution that it is, that achieves the primary value of that illocution-type, say, in a high degree.

Searle and Vanderveken, for instance, argue that ‘one way to understand the notion of an illocutionary act is in terms of the notion of the conditions for its successful and non-defective performance [or for its fully felicitous performance]’ and that as any adequate talk of propositions involves the pair of concepts truth and falsity, any adequate talk of illocutionary acts involves ‘the pair of concepts success and failure’. For all illocution-types, their performance can be felicitous only if certain conditions obtain. Felicity conditions

245 Id. Ibid.
define the various commitments a speaker has when performing an illocution of a particular type. They define what he must do (or is committed to do) in order to perform a fully felicitous instance of an illocution of that type, and hence, what must be in place for a particular performance of that illocution-type to be a good performance of that illocution-type.

The concepts of ‘felicity’ and ‘infelicity’ are the main organizing concepts in speech act theory.\textsuperscript{246} There are two different ways of articulating felicity conditions. Austin focuses on the concept of ‘infelicity’, and tries to map out the different ways in which the performance of an illocution-type can characteristically go wrong, or be infelicitous. He does so as a guide to understand what it takes for the performance to go right, or be felicitous. Searle focuses on the concept of ‘felicity’ instead, and makes explicit the necessary and sufficient conditions for a fully felicitous performance of a given illocution-type.\textsuperscript{247} Whether one chooses the first or the second method may be a matter of methodological strategy. Since both strategies will be relevant for the rest of this thesis, I will present both of them here.


3.4.1 Austin and ‘infelicity’: misfires and abuses

Austin distinguishes two main kinds of infelicities: misfires and abuses. Though he is not entirely clear, he uses misfires to refer both to cases where the illocution-type ‘is not successfully performed at all...is not achieved’\(^\text{248}\), and to cases where it is performed, but the performance is ‘vitiated by a flaw or hitch’\(^\text{249}\). When an illocution misfires, the illocution is either not performed, or is wrongly performed.\(^\text{250}\) A report, for instance, in virtue of its nature as an illocution-type, must be either about some event in the past or in the present. A report about an event in the future thus misfires as a report, because it cannot be a report. A false report also misfires, but for a different reason. This is the kind of distinction Austin is hinting at. He makes a distinction between cases where the performance counts as an attempt (a partially successful one at least) to perform a given illocution-type, and cases where there is doubt even on whether an attempt at performing that illocution-type has been made at all.

Take one of Austin’s own examples to clarify this distinction. A clergyman may baptize the wrong baby with the right name or the right baby with the wrong name, or baptize a baby with a number – e.g. ‘I baptize this infant 2704’.\(^\text{251}\) In all those cases, Austin holds that the illocution misfires albeit for different reasons.

\(^{248}\) Austin J L, How to Do Things with Words (1962) p. 16.
\(^{249}\) Id. Ibid.
\(^{250}\) Ibid. p. 39. Austin says that misfires cover cases where the illocution is not invoked at all, or is ‘...invoked in inappropriate circumstances; [or is] faultily executed or incompletely executed’.
\(^{251}\) Ibid. p. 35.
In the first two, he argues that an attempt at baptizing has been made (I think that even more than an attempt might have been made, that a baptizing might have been actually – successfully – made, even though infelicitous), while in the last case, one can plausibly question whether it can count as an attempt at baptizing at all. As Austin says, in all these cases, ‘there is something of the wrong kind or type included’\(^{252}\), but only in the last case one is tempted to say that the illocution simply does not ‘come off’ (while in the first two, the intuition is that it does come off, but incorrectly). As I explain in the next section, Searle also makes a similar contrast, but he uses different terms.

In some passages (especially where he defines what he means by misfires), Austin suggests that when an illocution misfires, the illocution is not actually performed, only an attempt (as in the difference between attempted murder and murder). He says, for instance, that misfires refer to those infelicities ‘which are such that the act…is not achieved…[or] is void or without effect’\(^{253}\), and that we speak of an act that misfires only ‘as a purported act, or perhaps an attempt’\(^{254}\). But, as I said, he is not entirely clear on this, and when he applies that notion to particular cases, he sometimes also refers as misfires to some cases in which the illocution is performed but incorrectly (as the above example illustrates).

\(^{252}\) Id. Ibid.
\(^{253}\) Ibid. p. 16.
\(^{254}\) Id. Ibid.
The category of abuses is introduced to cover cases in which the illocution does not misfire in any way, but is still infelicitous. Insincerity is the main case of abuse. The illocution might be successfully performed – and have the appearance of being fully felicitous –, but still be infelicitous if the speaker, say, is insincere. He may assert something true believing it to be false. Austin holds that any illocution can be successfully performed without the speaker being at all sincere. If certain conditions are fulfilled, when I say ‘I congratulate you’, I do congratulate you, even if I do not think you deserve it; or when I say to you ‘I promise’, I do promise, even if I do not have any intention to do what I promised. Austin says that the circumstances might be ‘in order and the act is performed [that is, is not void] but it is actually insincere’.

He stresses that those distinctions are not hard and fast, and that what is important is that one has a vocabulary that is sufficiently prepared for describing different types of infelicity. In some cases, the decision of how to classify a particular infelicity is an optional matter. Some infelicities are more naturally described as an abuse, even though no insincerity is involved, and some are more naturally described as a misfire. Austin also adds that his concept of infelicity – in particular, the two categories he identifies, misfires and abuses – is not supposed to cover all the cases of mistakes and infelicities in the performance of

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255 See Austin J L, How to Do Things with Words (1962) chaps. II, III, IV.
256 Ibid. p. 40.
257 Ibid. p. 16, ‘the ways of going wrong ’shade into one another’ and ‘overlap’, and the decision between them is ‘arbitrary’ in various ways’ (p. 23); see also p. 38.
258 Ibid. p. 24.
259 Austin associates ‘abuses’ also with ‘disrespects, dissimulations, disloyalties, infractions, indisciplines’ (Ibid. p. 18).
an illocution-type. He says that a performance that is ‘felicitous in all [the] ways [he discusses] does not exempt it from all criticism’\textsuperscript{260}, and that illocutions are ‘subject to certain...dimensions of unsatisfactoriness to which all actions are subject but which are distinct – or distinguishable – from what we have chosen to discuss as infelicities’\textsuperscript{261}. But his concept of infelicity is useful, because it illustrates – indeed, inaugurates – the kind of analysis that since Austin, speech act theorists have been developing.

\textit{3.4.2 Searle’s vocabulary of felicity conditions}

Different from Austin, Searle prefers to give an account of the conditions for a fully felicitous performance of a given illocution-type, or – in his terms – ‘of the conditions for its [fully] successful and non-defective performance’\textsuperscript{262}. Searle uses the terms ‘successful’ and ‘non-defective’ to make a similar contrast Austin makes with ‘misfires’ and ‘abuses’.\textsuperscript{263} Success conditions are conditions whose violation vitiates the performance ‘in its entirety’\textsuperscript{264}. Defectiveness conditions are conditions whose violation only makes the performance in some way

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{260} Ibid. p. 21.
\item \textsuperscript{261} Id. ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{263} Searle J R, \textit{Speech Acts} (1969) p. 54, says that his ‘notion of a defect in an illocutionary act is closely related to Austin’s notion of an “infelicity”’. See also, Searle J R and Vanderveken D, \textit{Foundations of Illocutionary Logic} (2009) p. 12 f., 17, 22 f. (on p. 13: ‘even when they succeed, [illocutions] are subject to various faults and defects’).
\end{itemize}
defective, but the illocution ‘will have been performed nonetheless’\textsuperscript{265}. Searle’s contrast is between conditions that must be in place for the illocution to have been performed – ‘successfully’ –, and conditions that must be in place for the illocution to be performed \textit{well} as the type of illocution that it is.\textsuperscript{266}

He prefers to use this terminology because he thinks Austin’s distinction between ‘misfires’ and ‘abuses’ fails to make this contrast sufficiently clear.

Clarity in this contrast will be important in the following chapters. To produce a list of felicity conditions for a given illocution-type, Searle argues that it is necessary to assume that the speaker is performing that illocution-type in a fully serious way, and in circumstances in which that type of illocution is normally performed. One must assume that the speaker is not joking, acting in a play, or speaking in soliloquy, and also that he is not being sarcastic, ironic or metaphorical.\textsuperscript{267} Those ‘non-serious’ or ‘not-fully-serious’ cases are excluded to fulfil a definite theoretical task: that of articulating the core set of conditions that must be fulfilled for a fully felicitous performance of a given illocution-type. The idea is first to analyse paradigm cases to develop a model that is sufficiently informative. Searle explains that this method

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{265} Id.Ibid. Searle J R and Vanderveken D, \textit{Foundations of Illocutionary Logic} (2009) p. 13, hold that one must distinguish between ‘those [illocutions] which are successful but defective and those which are not even successful’.

\textsuperscript{266} Bach K and Harnish R M, \textit{Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts} (1982) p. 55-56, also make a difference between ‘success conditions’ – ‘conditions necessary (and sufficient) for the successful performance of an act’ – and ‘felicity conditions’ – ‘conditions necessary (and sufficient) for a completely non-defective or felicitous performance of the act’.

\end{flushleft}
'is analogous to discovering the rules of chess by asking oneself what are the necessary and sufficient conditions under which one can be said to have correctly moved a knight [...] We are in the position of someone who has learned to play chess without ever having the rules formulated and who wants such a formulation’

To start with, some conditions apply to the performance of any illocution-type. No illocution-type can be felicitously performed, for instance, if the hearer does not speak the language in question, or where there is some physical impediment to communication, or if the speaker cannot speak. These are conditions for language use of a more general kind. Further, some conditions are shared by various illocution-types. All directives, for instance, have an ‘ought implies can’ condition: the speaker implies that the hearer is able to carry out what is being asked of him (or at least that he believes that). Illocution-types that are H-friendly all have a condition that they be performed for H’s own sake rather than for one’s own – e.g. advising, promising. Searle also holds that in general, performing the illocution has to make sense in the situation – that performing it must have a point. He calls this the ‘non-obviousness condition’ and argues that this is ‘a general condition on many different kinds of [illocutions].’

Apart from these conditions, there are conditions specific to the type of illocution being performed. Searle gives different names to designate these different

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268 Ibid. p. 55.
269 Searle (Ibid. p. 57) calls them normal input and output conditions, and says that they include both ‘conditions for intelligible speaking and...conditions of understanding’.
270 Searle (Ibid. p. 59) suggests that this condition ‘runs through so many kinds of [illocutions] that...it is not a matter of separate rules...but rather...a general condition on [illocutions].’ For instance, if it is completely obvious in the situation that S will do what he promises, there is no point in promising it. Or if S requests H to do something that is obvious that H is already doing or is about to do independently from the request, the request is pointless (and hence, defective).
conditions – propositional content conditions, preparatory conditions, sincerity conditions and essential conditions.\textsuperscript{271} Propositional content conditions refer to the conditions having to do with what can figure in the content of the act – e.g. if a speaker makes a prediction, the content of the prediction must be some event in the future. One cannot make a prediction about an event in the past. Similarly, if he makes a promise, its content must be that he will perform some future action, for one cannot promise to have done something in the past nor that someone else will do something (though one can promise to \textit{try to make sure} that someone else does it). For a similar reason, a speaker cannot successfully apologize for the law of \textit{modus ponens} or for the colour of his eyes.

Preparatory conditions are conditions that the speaker presupposes to be fulfilled whenever he performs a certain illocution-type.\textsuperscript{272} Whenever he apologizes to \textit{H}, he presupposes that the action he apologizes for is bad or reprehensible, and that he is responsible for it. Whenever he thanks \textit{H}, he presupposes that what he is thanking \textit{H} for benefited him in some way (or was at least intended to benefit him, and that \textit{H} was responsible for it). Whenever he promises something to \textit{H}, he presupposes that this is in \textit{H}'s interest and that he can do it; and so on. Searle and Vanderveken argue that when a speaker performs a given illocution-type, he presupposes that all the preparatory conditions related to that illocution-type are fulfilled. They view those conditions as ‘certain

\textsuperscript{272} Searle (Ibid. p. 65) says that preparatory conditions have to do with what the speaker \textit{implies} in the performance of the act.
sorts of states of affairs that have to obtain in order that the act be successful and non-defective\textsuperscript{273}, rather than psychological states of the speaker. The core idea is that the presupposition of these preparatory conditions is internal to the performance of the relevant illocution-type.\textsuperscript{274}

There are also conditions for the sincere performance of an illocution-type. Whenever a speaker performs a given illocution-type, he expresses a certain psychological state that belongs to the specific illocution-type he is performing – e.g. a belief, a desire, an intention, a feeling.\textsuperscript{275} Whenever one makes an assertion to \( H \), one expresses a belief. Whenever one makes an order or a request to \( H \), one expresses a desire to \( H \) (that \( H \) do something). Whenever a speaker promises \( H \) to do something, he expresses that he has the intention to do it.\textsuperscript{276} Whenever a speaker thanks \( H \), he expresses gratitude for \( H \). Clearly, it is always possible that the speaker express a psychological state he does not have, and that is how a distinction is made between a sincere and an insincere performance of an illocution-type. But in general, the speaker is committed to actually having the relevant psychological state of the illocution-type he is performing for the performance to be sincere.

\textsuperscript{274} That they are internal can be shown by the fact that it is paradoxical to perform the illocution-type and deny that one of the preparatory conditions is satisfied (e.g. 'the cat is on the mat, but I do not believe that he is there').
\textsuperscript{275} Searle J R, \textit{Speech Acts} (1969) p. 65: ‘wherever there is a psychological state specified in the sincerity condition, the performance of the act counts as an expression of that psychological state’.
\textsuperscript{276} He also presupposes having states that are entailed by that basic state – e.g. that he believes that he can do it and that this is something in the hearer’s interest.
Even though Searle and Vanderveken do not explicitly state this, I think that – in some cases at least – the fulfilment of some of these conditions can be a matter of degree, while the fulfilment of other conditions cannot.\textsuperscript{277} The essential condition is always a success condition, for if a given performance does not fulfil it, it does not count as a performance of that illocution-type at all. The sincerity condition is always a non-defectiveness condition. An insincere promise or an insincere assertion, if certain conditions are fulfilled, counts as a promise or as an assertion (albeit defective ones). Some preparatory conditions are success conditions, and some are non-defectiveness conditions.\textsuperscript{278} As I said, a speaker cannot successfully apologize for the law of \textit{modus ponens} or the colour of his eyes, but he can successfully promise \textit{H} to do something, even if that is not in \textit{H}'s interest. The latter would be a successful, but defective promise.

Taken together, those conditions articulate the commitments that the speaker has when performing a particular instance of a given illocution-type in a fully serious way, and in normal circumstances. They make explicit what the speaker must do to perform that illocution-type in a fully felicitous way to a hearer \textit{H} (or, in Searle’s terms, in a fully successful and non-defective way). Take an example to illustrate this further. The felicity conditions for making a statement – that is,

\textsuperscript{277} Searle J R and Vanderveken D, \textit{Foundations of Illocutionary Logic} (2009) p. 13, say that ‘a speech act may be unsuccessful, it may be successful but defective, and it may be successful and non-defective’.

\textsuperscript{278} Searle and Vanderveken (Ibid. p. 23) say that ‘some of the preparatory conditions might not obtain and yet the act might still be performed’, and that ‘this possibility holds only for some, but not all preparatory conditions’.
for a fully felicitous performance of the illocution-type 'making a statement' –

would include the following\(^\text{279}\):

(i) The speaker commits himself to the truth of the expressed proposition (essential condition)

(ii) The speaker must be in a position to provide evidence for the truth of the expressed proposition (preparatory condition)

(iii) The expressed proposition must not be obviously true to both the speaker and the hearer in the context of utterance (preparatory condition)

(iv) The speaker believes in the truth of the expressed proposition (sincerity condition)

A speaker \(S\) who makes a statement to a hearer \(H\) implies that all these conditions have been fulfilled, and is committed to fulfil them\(^\text{280}\). If one or more of these conditions have not been met, the performance of that illocution-type would be, in specific ways, infelicitious. It would follow, for instance, that \(S\) made a false or mistaken or wrong statement, or that he did not have sufficient evidence for making it, or that the statement was pointless because \(H\) already knew it, or that \(S\) was lying because he stated something without believing it. As I said, conditions (ii) and (iii) would be preparatory conditions, while condition (iv) is the sincerity condition for the illocution-type 'making a statement'. The essential condition (condition (i) above) is that a statement is an undertaking by \(S\) to actually represent a state of affairs in the world as being the case. I do not

\(^{279}\) I adapt this list from Searle J R, Expression and Meaning (1979) p. 62.

\(^{280}\) Searle says (1d.Ibid.) that the speaker 'is held responsible for complying with all these [conditions]', and that they 'establish the internal canons of criticism of the utterance'.

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claim that these conditions are uncontroversial. I list them here only to illustrate the type of analysis involved.

In the next chapters, I offer a set of conditions whose fulfilment is necessary for a fully felicitous (i.e. for a fully successful and non-defective) performance of arguing and reason-giving as illocution-types or, to follow Austin, ‘for the smooth or ‘happy’ functioning’ of those illocution-types. I argue that – though there are some similarities – these conditions do not coincide and hence, that a fully felicitous act of reason-giving has to fulfil different conditions than those that are necessary for a given act to count as a fully felicitous act of arguing (in particular, I argue that on occasion, a fully felicitous act of reason-giving does not have to be even a successful act of adducing, which is one of the two speech acts that compose the speech act complex of arguing). My aim is not to offer an exhaustive list of conditions for either illocution-type – a full set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a given performance of them to count as fully felicitous. I only elaborate a list that fits with our ordinary intuitions, and which is sufficiently informative in order to make the contrast between them clear.

281 Williams B, *Truth and Truthfulness* (2002) p. 71, for instance, argues that even though condition (iii) is a necessary condition for the felicitous performance of some assertives (e.g. informing H), it is not a necessary condition for felicitous statement-making.

One felicity condition that is especially important to my claim in the chapters to follow is the uptake condition. Uptake is a notion that is under-theorized in both Austin and Searle, and that has given rise to controversies in recent literature. Even though most illocution-types are not definable in perlocutionary terms, it is often argued that an illocution-type must produce a certain effect in the hearer to be successfully performed. Austin calls this effect 'basic illocutionary effect or uptake', and Searle 'understanding'. Both authors are careful to stress that this effect is not a perlocutionary effect and that in general, this is the only effect that has to occur in the hearer for an illocution-type to be successfully performed. Austin says that if this effect is not achieved, the illocution 'will not have been happily, successfully performed'. Searle and Vanderveken also hold that 'when an illocutionary act is successfully and non-defectively performed there will always be an effect produced in the hearer'. Searle says that

>'In the case of illocutionary acts we succeed in doing what we are trying to do by getting our audience to recognize what we are trying to do. But the ‘effect’ on the hearer is

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not a belief or a response, it consists simply in the hearer understanding the utterance of the speaker.\footnote{288}

Though it is a matter of controversy whether actual uptake is in general necessary for the successful performance of an illocution-type, this is the view that Austin and Searle seem to favour in their rather cryptic remarks on the topic. Strawson, for instance, has attributed this view to Austin, according to which (i) no illocution-type can be said to have been performed – ‘successfully’ – without the actual achievement of uptake (if no such ‘effect’ is achieved on the hearer, the act misfires, is not actually performed); (ii) actual uptake must always be on the ‘intended’ hearer; and (iii) all illocution-types depend on achieving that effect to be ‘successfully’ performed.\footnote{289} This is a very strong view, and I call it the standard view. It takes the occurrence of actual uptake to be a necessary condition for the successful performance of any illocution-type (and not merely, say, for its fully felicitous – non-defective – performance).

Despite of the fact that they explicitly acknowledge its importance, it is remarkable that Austin and Searle have given so little attention to the notion of uptake. Searle and Vanderveken, even though they claim that uptake is a

\footnote{288 Searle J R, \textit{Speech Acts} (1969) \textit{p.} 47. Similarly, Hornsby J and Langton R, \textit{Free Speech and Illocution} (1998) \textit{Legal Theory} \textit{p.} 21, 25, say that ‘uptake consists in the speaker being taken to be performing the very illocutionary act that, in being so taken, she (the speaker) is performing’. \footnote{289} See Strawson P F, \textit{Intention and Convention in Speech Acts} (1964) \textit{73(4) The Philosophical Review} \textit{p.} 439, 448 (he says that for Austin, securing uptake is an ‘essential element in bringing off the illocutionary act’). Sbisà M, \textit{Uptake and Conventionality in Illocution} (2009) \textit{5(1) Lodz Papers in Pragmatics} \textit{p.} 33, 34, also says that Austin endorsed the view that ‘the (successful) securing of uptake (and, with it, the actual occurrence of uptake) to be a necessary condition for the performance of an illocutionary act’ and that ‘in the few examples he makes, [he] shows an inclination towards considering actual uptake...as the standard requirement’.
‘prominent’\textsuperscript{290} condition for the felicitous performance of illocution-types in general, argue that securing uptake involves such diverse range of conditions such as that ‘the hearer must be awake, must share a common language with the speaker, must be paying attention etc.’\textsuperscript{291}, that uptake is of ‘little...interest in a theory of speech acts’\textsuperscript{292} and it should just be assumed to have been secured. Austin also refers to uptake as a ‘particular very important consideration’\textsuperscript{293}, but he does not explain why and, as some authors have noted\textsuperscript{294}, restricts himself to making a few very quick remarks and examples.

Austin discusses uptake very briefly in the context of a failure to secure it, as ‘a sort of ‘infelicity’...arising out of ‘misunderstanding’\textsuperscript{295}. He claims that ‘it is obviously necessary that to have promised I must normally (A) have been heard by someone, perhaps the promisee; (B) have been understood by him as promising’\textsuperscript{296}. The fact that terms such as ‘obviously necessary’ are directly followed by ‘normally’ and ‘perhaps’ is a sign that Austin is not very confident of his claim. Still, he holds that if one or another of these conditions is not satisfied, ‘doubts arise as to whether I have really promised, and it might be held that my

\textsuperscript{291} Id.Ibid.
\textsuperscript{292} Id.Ibid.
\textsuperscript{293} Austin J L, \textit{How to Do Things with Words} (1962) p. 22.
\textsuperscript{294} Sbisà M, Uptake and Conventionality in Illocution (2009) \textit{5(1) Lodz Papers in Pragmatics} p. 33, 44, argues that Austin’s characterization of uptake is rather cagey, ‘saying what it is not rather than what it is’; De Gaynesford M, \textit{Agents and their actions} (2011) p. 128, argues that often authors only ‘point to a tiny sample of cases’ and feel ‘no need to provide argument’, and accuses Austin for being the one who set that ‘pattern at the beginning of debate’.
\textsuperscript{295} Austin J L, \textit{How to Do Things with Words} (1962) p. 22.
\textsuperscript{296} Id.Ibid.
act was only attempted or was void’²⁹⁷ (thereby suggesting that he views uptake as a success condition). Later, he holds that ‘generally’, even though the illocutionary act is not identical to ‘the achieving of a certain effect’²⁹⁸, an effect ‘must be achieved on the audience if the illocutionary act is to be carried out’ and the ‘performance of an illocutionary act involves the securing of uptake’²⁹⁹.

Some authors argue that Austin’s claim here is itself infelicitous, because it is very unclear what it comes to.³⁰⁰ Is the failure of securing uptake a misfire or an abuse? Is it the case, for instance, that it is always one or the other? Austin says that if uptake is not achieved, the illocution will not have been ‘happily, successfully’ performed. But the two words suggest different things. If it is a misfire, the act is not actually performed (‘successfully’ suggests this). If it is an abuse, the act is performed, but still not fully ‘happily’. Also, in whom uptake must be secured, in the intended hearer (Austin says ‘perhaps’), or is it sufficient that it be secured in some hearer? Is the uptake condition the same for all illocution-types³⁰¹? What happens when actual uptake does not correspond to the speaker’s expectations? Also, when Austin says ‘generally’³⁰², does he mean that the performance of illocution-types only ‘generally’ depends on achieving an effect on the hearer, or that it is ‘generally’ the case that this effect must happen?

²⁹⁷ Id. Ibid.
²⁹⁸ Ibid. p. 116.
²⁹⁹ Id. Ibid.
³⁰¹ Presumably, this is not the case. To successfully warn you, it seems to Austin that you only need to understand me as warning. But to successfully bet with you, you must accept the bet.
³⁰² Austin J L, How to Do Things with Words (1962), p. 117, says that ‘generally the effect amounts to bringing about the understanding of the meaning and of the force of the locution’.
None of these questions have a clear and well-motivated answer from Austin. But, in his brief remarks, it is clear that he is inclined to think that actual uptake is in general necessary, and that the successful performance of all illocution-types depends on it. De Gaynesford, for instance, attributes Austin’s misgivings here to the fact that uptake turns out to be a notion that is ‘a good deal more complex than Austin himself seemed prepared to appreciate’ 303.

The sort of example Austin has in mind is this. An actor on stage intends to warn his audience of a real fire in the theatre, but they fail to understand that he means it and is not acting. Uptake is thus not secured and he fails to warn them. 304 Did he warn his audience? Or did he merely try to warn them? Austin thinks that it is more intuitive to say that the illocution misfires and is only an attempt at warning: ‘I cannot be said to have warned an audience unless it hears what I say and takes what I say in a certain sense’ 305. In this case, the hearer’s failure of uptake means that the speaker did not warn him. One could also imagine cases where the hearer simply refuses to hear the speaker – e.g. by refusing to take his earphones off – or where the speaker tries to warn the hearer in a language the hearer does not speak. In all these cases, it seems more plausible to say ‘He tried to warn him’ rather than ‘He warned him’.

304 I take this example from Davidson D, Communication and Convention, in Davidson D, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (1984) p. 269-70.
For Austin, these examples clearly show that to successfully warn a hearer requires at least that he understands that the speaker is warning. It does not require that the hearer becomes worried or that he runs away (which are perlocutions), but he has to understand it as a warning. But what does this sort of case – where failure of uptake implies lack of success – say about uptake in general? Very little I think. In particular, it does not even prove that uptake is in general necessary for the successful performance of a warning (which is a particular illocution-type); only that, in some cases, it might be.

Some authors argue that observing few particular cases of the performance of a particular illocution-type in no way authorizes the claim that Austin and Searle are inclined to make: that in general, uptake is necessary for the successful performance of an illocution-type. When a judge passes a verdict, for instance, his illocution may be successfully performed, whether or not the convicted prisoner realizes that this is what the judge is doing (nor does anyone has to realise that). This also applies to other cases, such as writing a will, praying. I agree with Bird that in these cases, the ‘conditions for successful illocution do not [at least not necessarily] include uptake. Strawson also argues that taken

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306 The previous cases differ from another set of cases. Imagine that a speaker did everything he could have done to warn the hearer of a danger – i.e. to make the hearer understand what he said as a warning – but, from no fault of his, this fails to register with the hearer – say, because the hearer does not take him seriously and refuses to take what he said into consideration. In this case, uptake is secured and a warning has been actually, successfully performed.

307 Bird, A Illocutionary Silencing (2002) 83 Pacific Philosophical Quarterly p 1, 8, argues that, in some cases, it is reasonable to say that the speaker has in fact, genuinely warned the hearer, even if the hearer fails to see that the warning was sincere.

308 Bird, A Illocutionary Silencing (2002) 83 Pacific Philosophical Quarterly p 1, 8. De Gaynesford M, Agents and their actions (2011) p. 133, gives a similar example: ‘As immigrants know to their cost, a suitably deputed official can successfully refuse them permission to enter the country by
at face value, the general claim is simply false, for a speaker may surely ‘actually have made such and such a bequest, or gift [which are illocution-types], even if no one ever reads his will or instrument of gift’\textsuperscript{309} – indeed, even if he had no expectations or intention of that fact ever being known by anyone.

It is in virtue of examples like these that some authors conclude – rightly, in my view – that actual uptake is not in general necessary for successful illocution.

Various illocution-types can be performed even if no one recognizes the speaker’s intention to perform them. They thus prefer to rely on an equally general, but more modest claim. Strawson holds that only the \textit{aim} of achieving uptake – not its actual achievement – is in general necessary (to be sure, he is even more careful and argues that, since that aim is sometimes not necessary, the only thing that can be in general affirmed is that that aim is ‘essentially a standard, \textit{if not an invariable}, element in the performance of the illocutionary act’\textsuperscript{310}). Cohen holds that in general, having the aim is not sufficient, and that the performance must be ‘of a kind that he could \textit{reasonably expect} to secure uptake’\textsuperscript{311}. Other authors (e.g. Alston) prefer to entirely reject the notion of uttering a formula to that effect, and this act is successfully performed even if the immigrant does not speak the official’s language and hence fails to understand what the formula means’.

\textsuperscript{310} Ibid. p. 449.
uptake, and hold that illocution-types never depend on ‘uptake’ for their successful performance.\(^\text{312}\)

One conclusion that can be drawn from these discussions is that, differently from what Austin and Searle seem to assume, the question of ‘uptake’ does not arise at the higher level of the genus ‘illocutionary act’, but only at the subsidiary level, concerning species of that genus. Clearly, some illocution-types require uptake to be successfully performed (e.g. betting), while other illocution-types do not (e.g. passing a verdict, praying). In other cases, this is debatable (e.g. warning). De Gaynesford, for instance, argues that the problem here is that ‘the issue [insofar as it is situated at the general level] is not set up in such a way as to allow for fruitful debate’\(^\text{313}\) and that in general, authors in that debate have tended to think that the claim ‘is either just obviously true for all illocutionary acts [Austin and Searle], or just obviously false of any of them [Alston]\(^\text{314}\), so that they feel no need to provide detailed argument and think that instead, it is sufficient ‘merely to point to particular cases of illocutionary acts’\(^\text{315}\).

To make progress here, he argues that one needs to do something that authors in that debate did not do: take a comprehensive list of illocution-types and identify which ones – if any – require uptake to be successfully performed (whose

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\(^{313}\) De Gaynesford M, *Agents and their actions* (2011) p. 132: ‘it makes no sense to ask of ‘the illocutionary act’ whether it [is uptake-dependent or uptake-free]’.

\(^{314}\) Id. Ibid.

\(^{315}\) Ibid. p. 128. He adds that they are often biased, and point only to a tiny sample of cases depending ‘on which side they support’.
performance is ‘vulnerable to [that] particular kind of failure’ and which ones do not. Since pursuing this task in detail falls outside the scope of this chapter, I will restrict myself here to making two considerations that are more directly relevant for the analysis I will be developing in the chapters to follow.

First, even though most authors treat uptake as a success condition, I think that – in the case of some illocution-types at least – securing uptake can be a matter of degree. In the next chapter, I argue that this is the case of arguing. This way of understanding uptake will strike some as unusual. In its traditional version, as I explained, uptake was meant to be quite strict, in the sense that a failure to secure it meant that the illocution has not been performed. But a more refined reading, for instance, allows that on occasion, some uptake might have been secured though not completely or still not the right one (e.g. you understood that I was warning you, but thought I was referring to something different from what I actually intended to), or that the right uptake is secured even though the speaker did not do everything he should have done to enable it in the hearer. In these cases, the speaker can still be blamed for not having done what he should have done and the performance would be defective.

I think that Austin would have committed himself to such a position had he devoted more attention to uptake. Though, as I said, he gives no systematic

316 Ibid. p. 130.
318 See chapter 3, section 3.
account of it and spends very little time explaining it, Austin does suggest that in some cases, the speaker might have left so unclear the illocution he is trying to perform that it can be ‘open to [the hearer] to take it as either one or the other’ (e.g. I say ‘There is a bull in the field’, but it is unclear whether I mean it as a warning or a description). Austin says that, in these cases, the hearer is ‘not anyway bound to take it as’ a warning, and that the point here ‘is not...just that the audience did not understand but that it did not have to understand, e.g. to take it as [a warning]’. And the reason is clear: in these cases, the speaker was not sufficiently clear or differentiated enough, and he did not make sufficiently explicit to the hearer which illocution-type he wished to carry out.

Among others, Petrus argues that it is a mistake, as Austin and Searle seem to do, to assign the primacy to actual uptake, for actual uptake might be wrong or arbitrary or simply not happen. He holds that ‘the performance [Vollzug] of an illocutionary act does not depend in any way on whether the hearer actually understands what the speaker is up to’, and that for such an act to be performed, it suffices that the speaker – from what he actually does – guarantee

\[319\] Austin J L, *How To Do Things with Words* (1962) p. 34.
\[320\] Id. Ibid.
\[321\] Petrus K, *Illokution und Konvention, oder auch: Was steckt nun wirklich hinter Austins “Securing of Uptake”?* (2005) 70 *Grazer Philosophische Studien* p. 101, p. 123, prefers to read ‘understanding’ (*Verstehen*) not as a factual verb, but as a normative one (*normatives Verstehen*), for otherwise one would have to maintain that the ‘sheer understanding (or misunderstanding) of the hearer can enable (or prevent) the performance of illocutionary acts’ (which he thinks is an untenable position). Jacobson D, *Freedom of Speech Acts? A Response to Langton* (1995) 24(1) *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, p 64, 77, also argues that this ‘would be to hold the performance of an illocutionary act hostage to the [idiosyncrasies] of one’s audience’.
the possibility of uptake in the hearer (rather than actual uptake).\textsuperscript{323} He argues that, despite his misgivings, Austin was hinting at such a position in the passages quoted above and that, contrary to the standard view, uptake is best understood as a normative notion setting the standard for what counts as ‘correct understanding’ (\textit{richtige Verständnis}). In general, the speaker must make ‘optimally (or sufficiently) explicit’ the illocution he is performing to the hearer.

Likewise, Kemmerling also argues that

\begin{quote}
‘whether an illocutionary act was performed does not depend on the factual understanding [\textit{faktische Verständnis}] of the hearer, but on whether the hearer should be expected (in a normative sense of ‘expect’) to understand the speaker’s performance as a performance of the given act’\textsuperscript{324}
\end{quote}

Other authors have also appealed to a similar strategy. Jacobson, for similar reasons, also argues that ‘our success in performing an illocutionary act’ does not depend ‘on our success in securing [actual] uptake’ and that to perform a given illocutionary act it is necessary only ‘that a \textit{competent} auditor [and not the actual one] – where this will require more than purely linguistic competence – would recognize [in the situation] the illocutionary act as such’\textsuperscript{325}. To this, he argues that it must be added that standardly at least, the speaker is aiming at securing

\textsuperscript{323} Likewise, Kemmerling, A, Der bedeutungstheoretisch springende Punkt, in \textit{Kommunikationsversuche} (1997) p. 60, 78, also argues that the brute understanding of the hearer is not sufficient, because the speaker must ‘(in the logical, not only in the mechanistic sense of ‘must’) succeed in performing it’. He claims that this is not special in the case of illocutionary acts, but that holds for the case of any action: to be possible that someone understands what I do as action X, I must succeed (intentionally or not) in doing X; otherwise, no one can understand’.


the hearer’s uptake, in order to circumvent cases where he secures uptake by
accident or mere luck (which is, of course, possible).\textsuperscript{326} Like the authors referred
above, Jacobson also holds that the condition just stated is the decisive criterion
for assessing the securing of uptake. It is whether the speaker did what he
should have done to enable uptake in the hearer (rather than whether uptake
has actually been secured).\textsuperscript{327}

In this reading, whenever the speaker performs a certain illocution-type in a way
that fails to live up to the ideal established by that condition, the performance
could be criticized as infelicitous. But this condition can be more or less fulfilled,
and is only fully fulfilled when the speaker ‘makes optimally explicit, that he
wants to $\Psi$’\textsuperscript{328}. In some cases, the failure can make the performance
unsuccessful, but in other cases, only more or less defective. If the speaker makes
sufficiently explicit the illocution he is performing, the hearer is justified in
taking what he does as a token of an illocution of that type; otherwise, he is not.
And this holds whether or not the hearer actually understands what the speaker
is up to. From this, it follows that if the speaker did everything that he could to
secure the hearer’s uptake, the uptake condition can be said to have been
fulfilled. Even though the possibility of infelicity still exists (e.g. that the hearer

\textsuperscript{326} Strawson P F, Intention and Convention in Speech Acts (1964) 73(4) The Philosophical Review
p. 439, 449, says that ‘an illocutionary act may be performed altogether unintentionally’.
\textsuperscript{327} Note that what, more specifically, the speaker has to do to enable the hearer’s uptake depends
on the particular illocution he is performing.
\textsuperscript{328} Petrus K, Illokution und Konvention, oder auch: Was steckt nun wirklich hinter Austins
does not actually understand it), the illocution will have been nonetheless – ‘successfully’ – performed.

I think that this more nuanced way of understanding the notion of uptake (as a normative notion, and allowing for fulfilment in degrees) captures better the insights that Austin and Searle had about uptake, and also about its importance within speech act theory. For the reasons already explained, my claim is not that uptake is necessary for the fully felicitous performance of every illocution-type. As I argued above, there are many illocution-types that can be successfully performed without securing uptake. But I think that every time a given illocution-type is performed to a hearer, such a condition applies – namely, that the speaker should perform the illocution in a charitable way in relation to the hearer, i.e. in a way that the hearer can understand.

This is the first consideration about uptake that should be retained for the discussion in the chapters to follow. The second consideration is that, within speech act theory, the notion of uptake is useful also to make an important distinction between illocution-types. In section 3.1.1, I explained that performing an illocution-type standardly involves adopting a hearer-directed intention. However, as some authors hold329, a distinction can be made between illocution-types that are essentially hearer-directed – i.e. illocution-types that, in virtue of their nature, must be directed at a specific hearer (e.g. cursing, blaming.

thanking, betting, informing, warning, just to mention a few examples) – and illocution-types that are not essentially hearer-directed – i.e. illocution-types that, in virtue of their nature, can but need not be directed at any hearer to be actually performed (e.g. I can describe, accept, predict and guess without there being any person ‘to whom, or with whom, I do these things’\textsuperscript{330}).

Searle and Vanderveken hold that this is ‘one of the most pervasive distinctions’ between illocution-types, and argue that illocutions such as stating, conjecturing, vowing and pledging, even though they often (even normally) are performed to someone, can ‘be addressed to anyone or no one’ and hence, can be actually performed even if there is no hearer around; while illocutions such as promising, warning, notifying, informing and ordering cannot.\textsuperscript{331} Similarly, De Gaynesford argues that a striking feature of the latter illocution-types – i.e. essentially hearer-directed ones – is that one cannot perform them ‘in a vacuum’, for – he gives betting, thanking, entreating and warning as examples – ‘there must be someone to whom...I make the bet, someone whom I entreat...some person or persons whom I thank [or curse or blame or warn]’\textsuperscript{332}. Indeed, this feature – i.e. their essential hearer-directedness – distinguishes them from illocution-types that lack the need for that sort of directedness.

\textsuperscript{330} De Gaynesford M, \textit{Agents and their actions} (2011) p. 131. Though often (even normally) one describes, curses or blames to someone, one needs no hearer to actually perform them. One can be alone in his room, and still be said to have performed them (praying is another example).
\textsuperscript{331} Searle J R and Vanderveken D, \textit{Foundations of Illocutionary Logic} (2009) p. 180. They say that ‘a promise is by definition always a promise to someone, even when the speaker makes a promise to himself’. On p. 211, they add that most of the expressive speech acts are also essentially hearer-directed.
\textsuperscript{332} Ibid. p. 134.
This distinction must be qualified. Cursing and blaming, like thanking, betting and warning, are all essentially hearer-directed in the sense defined. However, cursing and blaming share with illocution-types that are not essentially hearer-directed the feature that they do not have to be performed to the person to whom they are directed. I can blame or curse you to someone else or even to no person at all. Only some illocution-types that are essentially hearer-directed have to be performed to the person to whom they are directed. This is the case of thanking, betting, advising, warning, promising, informing. Illocution-types of this latter kind are hearer-directed in a special way. I call them strongly hearer-directed illocution-types. In virtue of their specific nature, they must be not only directed at a particular hearer, but must also be performed ‘to the [particular] person...to whom they are directed’\textsuperscript{333}. De Gaynesford argues that it is not sufficient for them to be ‘directed at a person’, such as in cursing or blaming, and that they ‘must be addressed (explicitly or implicitly) to the relevant person’\textsuperscript{334}.

In the following chapters, I argue that some of the differences between arguing and reason-giving can be explained in terms of the uptake condition and of the distinction between essentially hearer-directed and non-essentially hearer-directed illocution-types. In particular, I argue that there is a difference in what is required from the speaker to enable uptake in the hearer in arguing and in reason-giving, that a different set of abilities is required from the speaker in each case. I also argue that taken as an illocution-type, arguing is not essentially

\textsuperscript{333} Ibid. p. 135.
\textsuperscript{334} Id. Ibid.
hearer-directed, for though it is often (even normally) performed to a hearer, it does not require a hearer to be performed (arguing is like describing, conjecturing or lamenting in that regard), and this is different in reason-giving (which is strongly hearer-directed, and hence, must be directed and performed to a particular hearer in order to be actually performed). I think that reason-giving is like thanking, informing and promising in that regard.

4. Complex illocution-types

Speech act theory – especially in its traditional version as developed by Austin and Searle – has occupied itself exclusively with explaining illocution-types that are performed in single sentences.335 Nothing like a deeper analysis of illocution-types that are performed with multiple sentences was developed by them. In all the cases Austin and Searle discuss, for instance, there is a one-to-one relation between the utterance of a particular sentence and the performance of a given illocution-type. Some illocution-types, however, in virtue of their very nature, consist in the performance of more than one sentence.336

Pratt, for instance, argues that in many cases it is impractical and counterintuitive to view felicity conditions as applying only at the level of the

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sentence. She says that traditional speech act theory has been exclusively confined to single-sentence speech acts, but holds that there is no reason not to apply that sort of analysis also to acts such as explaining or testifying that might be performed ‘many sentences long’. Some acts, even though they are performed in many sentences, have a single point or purpose, and their analysis involves elaborating a list of felicity conditions that ‘by virtue of that overall purpose, apply across the entire [act]’.

A further point is that some illocution-types count as one illocution-type even if their performance necessarily consists in the performance of more than one elementary illocution-type, which at the sentence level has a one-to-one relation with a grammatical sentence. Those larger illocutionary units are often called compound or complex illocution-types. Taken as a whole, they constitute a single illocutionary unit, with a single primary point and a single primary value. Complex illocution-types have an overarching purpose that unifies the elementary illocutions performed into a single unit. This is one of their distinctive features. Searle suggests that some illocution-types can be explained

338 Id. Ibid. She also mentions thanking and story-telling as examples of this.
339 Id. Ibid.
342 Ibid. p. 5: ‘complex illocutionary acts relate to the uttering of sentences which together constitute a particular textual whole which can be allocated [an] illocutionary force [of its own]’ (on p. 6, they say that ‘at the textual level the uttering of a group of sentences is likewise the performance of one, and only one, illocutionary act complex’).
in this way. He argues that in some cases, one performs a series of illocutions each of which individually is an illocution of its own but that taken together, ‘add up to a larger [illocutionary] unit’.

What makes an illocution-type complex is not the number of sentences in which it is performed, but that it is composed of different illocution-types (in some cases, it is possible to perform them in one sentence). Different from testifying, which is an illocution-type that is normally performed with various sentences (though it can be performed with one sentence), other illocution-types have by necessity to consist in the performance of more than one illocution-type. In the next chapters, I hold that arguing and reason-giving are both complex illocution-types of this latter kind. Each constitutes a single illocutionary unit, with a single primary point and a distinctive primary value.

5. Second-order illocutions

Two further categories of illocutions will be useful for my analysis in the next chapters. Some authors make a distinction between ‘first-order’ and ‘second-
order’ illocutions.\textsuperscript{346} An illocution-type is second-order when, in virtue of its nature, it stands in a certain relation to another illocution-type. ‘Explaining \textit{p}, ‘replying that \textit{p}, ‘concluding that \textit{p}’ are examples. At the first-order level, they correspond to a certain illocution-type (e.g. an assertion), but at the second-order level, they become something more due to a relation they have to another illocution. A reply, for instance, is never merely a first-order assertion, but an assertion that is made in response to a question. In virtue of this relation to another illocution-type (a question), a reply is always ‘something more than [it] could have ever been without [that relation]’\textsuperscript{347}. When one performs a second-order illocution, one performs the first-order illocution that it also is and the further illocution that it is in virtue of its second-order nature.

Some authors explain this feature by holding that second-order illocutions have two illocutionary forces at the same time.\textsuperscript{348} This means that to be fully felicitous, their performance must fulfil both the conditions that are necessary for a felicitous performance of the specific first-order illocution-type that is performed and further conditions due to the relation that that first-order illocution-type has to a further illocution. So, a felicitous reply must fulfil both the conditions that are necessary for a felicitous performance of the first-order assertion that it is (e.g. it must be true, sincere, not pointless etc.), and other

\footnotesize
conditions stemming from its second-order nature. If, as a reply to a question, I assert something true but that has no relation to the question, that reply would be infelicitous as a reply, even if it were fully felicitous as a first-order assertion.

It is worth noting that second-order illocutions are not indirect illocutions. In indirect illocutions, by directly performing one illocution-type (e.g. a statement) one indirectly performs another one (e.g. a request), which is the primary in the situation. So, for instance, I say to you ‘You are standing on my foot’. Even though the illocution explicitly performed is a statement, within the context of utterance, I primarily mean it as a request (for you to move your foot) or even as an order. From this example, it is possible to see why indirect illocutions are not second-order illocutions: they are not linked in a specific manner with another illocution-type as second-order illocutions are.

Holdcroft argues that various illocution-types have a second-order nature, and that they can only be the illocution-types that they are because they stand ‘in a certain relation to some other utterance which is already part of the... context’. He mentions ‘deny’, ‘accept’, ‘add’, ‘illustrate’ as examples. What is special about

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349 Searle J R and Vanderveken D, *Foundations of Illocutionary Logic* (2009) p. 10, argue that in the case of indirect illocutions, ‘the explicitly performed act is used to convey another speech act’ and that ‘the speaker relies on background knowledge and mental capacities that he shares with the hearer in order to achieve understanding’. For a detailed analysis of indirect illocutions, see Searle J R, *Expression and Meaning* (1979) p. 30-57.

350 Bermejo-Luque, L, *Giving Reasons* (2011) p. 60, holds that one reason why a second-order illocution is not an indirect one is that one cannot perform a second-order illocution *without doing two things at the same time*, and that it by definition stands in a certain relationship with a further speech act that serves as its basis’ – e.g. an *explanandum*, a question.

them is that they specify 'types of functional role that an act otherwise
classifiable [only as a first-order illocution; e.g. an assertive, a declarative] can
have in discourse'\textsuperscript{352}. In some cases, their very point is to establish a certain
relation between two or more illocution-types. Searle also holds that some
illocution-types have the extra feature of marking 'certain relations [with] the
rest of discourse or the context of utterance'\textsuperscript{353}. He refers to concluding,
deducing and objecting as examples.\textsuperscript{354}

6. Speech act theory and non-standard cases

As I said in the section on felicity conditions, speech act theory’s method is to
consider first the most central cases of the performance of a given illocution-
type, in order to define the conditions that must be fulfilled for its fully felicitous
performance. The idea is first to describe the ideal situation where a given
illocution-type is performed in a fully serious way by a speaker $S$ to a hearer $H$,
and in normal circumstances. All the other cases are treated as derivative from or
parasitic upon those paradigmatic cases, and are to be explained in terms of how
they deviate from those more central cases. This does not mean that the theory
t entirely neglects those less central cases. An investigation about the ‘non-serious’
or ‘not-fully-serious’ cases is a further part of speech act theory. This point is

\textsuperscript{352} Id. ibid.
\textsuperscript{354} In chapter three, section 2.3, I argue that arguing is best conceived as a complex illocution-
type that is composed of two second-order illocutions: adducing (reasons) and concluding (from the reasons adduced). In chapter four, I argue that like arguing, reason-giving also has a second-
order structure, but it has a primary point and primary value that are different from arguing.
worth stressing especially after the charge made by some authors (e.g. Derrida),
according to which speech act theory’s exclusion of the non-serious was a serious

As I explained in section 3.4, the main reason why Austin and Searle did not focus
on non-serious cases was a methodological one. Standard cases have explanatory
priority, in the sense that if one wants to know what it is to perform a certain
illocution-type, such as a statement or a promise, one should not start the
investigation with instances of that illocution-type made by actors on stage or
writers of a fictional novel, or performed in a joking manner. Searle argues that
the very existence ‘of the pretended form of [an illocution-type] is logically
dependent on the possibility of the non-pretended [form] in the same way that
any pretended form of behaviour is dependent on non-pretended forms of
behaviour’\footnote{Searle J R, \textit{Reiterating the Differences: A Reply to Derrida} (1977) 1 \textit{Glyph} p. 198, 205.}. It is only in this sense that the non-standard cases are said to be
parasitical upon the standard ones. This does not imply anything about whether
the non-standard cases are less important.\footnote{I agree with Searle when he argues that when Austin uses the term ‘parasitic’ Austin is not
making ‘some kind of moral judgment [and is not] claiming that there is something bad or anomalous or not ‘ethical’ about such discourse’. See Searle J R, \textit{Reiterating the Differences: A Reply to Derrida} (1977) 1 \textit{Glyph} p. 198, 205.}
This is the way in which the theory traces the difference between a ‘(fully) serious’ performance of an illocution-type, and a ‘non-serious’ one. To be sure, this method involves a certain degree of idealization of the object of analysis (an illocution-type), for as Searle says, ‘without abstraction and idealization there is no systematization’. A certain degree of idealization is necessary to develop the analysis of an illocution-type. Counter-examples to the paradigmatic cases do not refute the analysis, but only require an explanation of why and how they depart from the paradigm cases. I note this here because it will be relevant to explain how my analysis of arguing as an illocution-type deals with non-standard cases of arguing – e.g. hypothetical arguing, and various cases of non-serious arguing. In the next chapter, I first describe what is the most standard and intuitive way of explaining arguing as an illocution-type, and then explain how this model copes with non-standard cases of arguing.

7. Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I introduced the conceptual framework for the rest of this thesis. My aim was only to explain the key notions developed in speech act theory – by Austin and Searle – to be in a position to develop an analysis of arguing and reason-giving as illocution-types (which is the main focus of my research). I

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358 ‘Non-serious’ performance includes also teaching a language – e.g. when the speaker is showing to the hearer what it is to perform a certain illocution-type –, reciting a poem, writing a novel, practicing pronunciation etc. and also insincere cases.


360 See chapter three, section 5.
made some amendments to the theory itself by introducing the notion of ‘primary value’ and a further elaboration on ‘uptake’. In particular, I explained the kind of method speech act theory adopts to develop an analysis of illocution-types in general. It is a method focused on the concepts of ‘felicitous’ and ‘infelicitous’ performance of an illocution-type. I also fleshed out the definitional features of an illocution-type – its primary point, its primary value, mode of achievement and felicity conditions. Some of the notions that were here only briefly mentioned will be further developed in the next chapters, but only to the point that this is necessary to articulate aspects of my argument.

The central idea to be retained for the chapters to follow is that whenever a speaker $S$ performs a certain illocution-type to a hearer $H$, $S$ (i) commits himself to the primary point of that illocution-type together with its mode of achievement; (ii) commits himself to realising the primary value of that illocution-type as well as he can; (iii) presupposes that all its felicity conditions have been fulfilled (and is committed to fulfil them, including the sincerity condition and the uptake condition). This is, in general, what the speaker must do to perform a given illocution-type in a fully felicitous way to a hearer $H$. What, more specifically, is required will depend on the particular illocution-type in question – that is, on its specific definitional features. I argued in this chapter that these features are mainly determined by its primary value and by its primary point (which are the most fundamental features of an illocution-type). In the next chapter, I use the notions explained in this chapter to provide an analysis of arguing as an illocution-type.
Chapter 3: Arguing as a Speech Act

1. Introduction

In this chapter, I analyse arguing as an illocution-type to then ask, in the next chapter, what is the difference between arguing and reason-giving as illocution-types. In English, the word ‘arguing’ is used in two distinguishable senses. One sense is that of the act of putting forward reasons for or against something. The other is that in which one says things such as ‘they are arguing with one another’ or ‘they had a bitter argument’. In this sense, ‘arguing’ has to do with fighting and hostility, and is not always accompanied by arguing in the first sense. Here, I am concerned with arguing mainly in the first sense, for this is the sense that matters for the contrast with reason-giving. In this sense, arguing could also be called ‘justifying’. In the literature, however, arguing is the term that is normally used to designate the illocution-type, so I will stick to that term.

Arguing appears in both Searle’s and Austin’s lists as an illocution-type. Some authors have analyzed it in detail. Others have rejected the very idea that

arguing is an illocution-type. Since this is a minority view, I will not take it into account here. I will use the vocabulary of speech act theory introduced in the last chapter to conduct the analysis. I first provide a definition of arguing as an illocution-type. I then spell out a list of conditions to be fulfilled for its fully felicitous performance, and show how to deal with non-standard cases. Those steps help to compare arguing and reason-giving as illocution-types and to make a contrast between them. My ultimate aim is to defend the thesis that reason-giving is a discrete type of illocution that, though it has features in common with arguing, is not reducible to it.

2. Arguing and its definitional features

2.1 Arguing and its primary value

Taken as an illocution-type, arguing can be defined as the illocution of trying to support a given claim by means of adducing reasons for it. Justifying a claim is its primary value as an illocution-type. Various authors have offered similar definitions. Hitchcock holds that arguing is ‘a type of discourse in which the

\[\text{\footnotesize\textsuperscript{365}}\] Hitchcock holds that arguing is ‘a type of discourse in which the

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\[\text{\footnotesize\textsuperscript{364}}\] Jacobs S, Speech acts and arguments (1989) 3(4) Argumentation p. 345, 350, 360, holds that arguing is not ‘an isolable and homogeneous speech act’, and that instead it covers ‘a family of act types that vary in function and pragmatic logic depending upon the context of their use and the form of their expression’. All the cases he considers to justify this claim can be treated (as he himself admits) as non-standard cases of arguing (see section 5). The best way to explain why he is wrong is thus by providing the sort of analysis based on speech act theory.

\[\text{\footnotesize\textsuperscript{365}}\] Copi associates arguing with ‘any group of propositions of which one is claimed to follow from the others, which are regarded as providing support or grounds for the truth of that one’, Copi I M, Introduction to Logic (2008) p. 7; Cederblom J B and Paulsen D W, Critical Reasoning (2007) p. 15: ‘When someone gives reasons to support a point of view, that person is usually offering an argument’; Bermejo-Luque L, Giving Reasons (2011) p. 124, defines it as the illocution of adducing ‘reasons...to show that a claim [is] correct’, of communicating ‘[one’s] credentials for
author expresses a point of view and offers one or more reasons in support of that point of view"\textsuperscript{366}. Govier defines arguing as ‘a reasoned attempt to justify a claim on the basis of other claims’\textsuperscript{367}. More recently, Bermejo-Luque holds that justifying is ‘just a synonym for ‘arguing well for [a claim]’ and that ‘arguing for a claim [is] nothing but trying to justify this claim’\textsuperscript{368}.

These are just a few examples to show how widespread this definition is. When one argues for or against a claim $C$, one is essentially trying to justify $C$ or not $C$ to a hearer $H$. To say that justification is the primary value of arguing as an illocution-type is, first, to say that justification is the value that distinguishes arguing from other illocution-types\textsuperscript{369}, and second, that justification is the only value one has to be pursuing to be arguing. Every other value is non-essential to arguing, for one can argue without aiming at them. Though one can achieve other aims by arguing, it is not necessarily the case that one can achieve them only by arguing. Convincing and persuading are examples. To refer to a case from Austin: ‘you may convince me...that she is an adulteress by asking her whether it was not

\textsuperscript{366} Hitchcock D, Informal Logic and the Concept of Argument, in: Dale J (ed), Philosophy of Logic (2007) p. 3.


\textsuperscript{368} Bermejo-Luque L, Giving Reasons (2011) p. 39, see also p. 17, 23, 36, 38, (‘arguing for $p$ is...‘trying to justify that $p$’ and...’justifying that $p$’ is...’arguing well for $p$’, p. 44).

\textsuperscript{369} This is what distinguishes arguing from explaining something to $H$, see Govier T, A Practical Study of Argument (2013) chap. 1.
her handkerchief which was in X’s bedroom, or by stating that it was hers\(^{370}\). But one cannot argue for a claim and not try to justify it, for ‘if it does not count as an attempt at justifying a claim...it is not [arguing]\(^{371}\).

To identify the primary value of arguing with justification is, however, controversial. Various authors define arguing in perlocutionary terms. As I mentioned in the last chapter\(^{372}\), in *Speech Acts* Searle suggests that arguing is partly definable in terms of intended perlocutionary effect. He holds that different from other illocution-types, arguing seems to be ‘essentially tied to attempting to convince [the hearer]’\(^{373}\). In his work with Vandeverken, however, this is qualified by saying that when one argues for \(p\), ‘one asserts that \(p\) and gives reasons which support the proposition that \(p\), normally with the perlocutionary intention of convincing the hearer that \(p\)’\(^{374}\). When they add ‘normally’, they imply that though there is often a connection between arguing and convincing, the connection is not essential (thereby suggesting, different from the former definition offered by Searle in *Speech Acts*, that convincing is only a characteristic perlocution of arguing).

\(^{371}\) Bermejo-Luque L, *Giving Reasons* (2011) p. 34; also p. 38, p. 37: ‘we cannot really say that we use argumentation for justifying, because there is no argumentation prior to deploying some communicative behavior in order to justify’.
\(^{372}\) See chapter 2, section 3.1.1.
\(^{373}\) Searle J R, *Speech Acts* (1969), p. 66, ‘I am simply stating that \(p\) and not attempting to convince you [that \(p\)] is acceptable, ‘I am arguing that \(p\) and not attempting to convince you’ is not.
They are not entirely clear about this, however. When they compare arguing with assuring (another illocution-type), they stress that arguing and assuring are similar because, in virtue of their very nature, both are attempts to achieve a perlocution in $H$, namely, ‘to make the hearer feel sure [of something]’\(^{375}\). In their definition, assuring is ‘to assert [a proposition] with the perlocutionary intention of convincing the hearer of the truth of the [proposition]’ (or at least to convince $H$ that $S$ believes that proposition to be true, ‘I assure you, I was at home yesterday!’). They hold that the only difference between arguing and assuring is that in arguing, the mode of achieving $H$'s assurance is by adducing reasons for $p$. This suggests that they still think that convincing is essential to arguing.

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst also define arguing as the illocution in which propositions are asserted as reasons in order to convince a hearer of the acceptability of an expressed opinion.\(^{376}\) Like Searle and Vanderveken, they are also not entirely clear here. Even though they hold that one should keep the illocution and the perlocution separate, they also hold that arguing is always linked with convincing. They suggest that, though the connection is essential, arguing and convincing should be viewed as 'two distinct acts (or aspects of the complete speech act), viz. an *illocution* (the communicative aspect) in the case of [arguing] and a *perlocution* [...] in the case of *convincing*'.\(^{377}\) Still, they define

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\(^{375}\) Id.Ibid.

\(^{376}\) Van Eemeren F H and Grootendorst R, *Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions* (1984) p. 49, also p. 18. On p. 7: arguing 'is a functional language usage entity which is primarily connected with bringing about a particular sort of effect on the listener'.

\(^{377}\) Ibid. p. 49 f.: 'convincing is always linked with [arguing] and [arguing can be defined] as an attempt to convince'. But they also say – rightly, in my view – that arguing and convincing have
arguing not merely as an attempt by $S$ to justify a claim $C$ to a hearer $H$, but to try
to do so to $H$'s satisfaction. As they put it:

‘Advancing the constellation of statements $S_1, S_2 (..., S_n)$
counts as an attempt by $S$ to justify $O$ to $L$'s satisfaction,
i.e. to convince $L$ of the acceptability [or non-acceptability]
of $O$\textsuperscript{378}

Definitions of arguing based on perlocutionary purposes are common. Johnson
and Blair also define arguing as an ‘attempt to persuade us of something by citing
reasons intended to support that claim’\textsuperscript{379}. More recently, Johnson defines
arguing as 'a type of discourse...in which the arguer seeks to persuade the Other
of the truth of a thesis by producing reasons that support it'\textsuperscript{380}.

Some authors are more careful. Pinto holds that to define arguing in terms of
convincing or persuading is too narrow.\textsuperscript{381} He holds that when one argues, one
can aim and often does aim at producing a variety of belief-like attitudes in $H$
that are not straightforward belief. In many cases, one tries not to convince $H$ of
$C$, but only to incline $H$ to believe $C$, or to make $H$ suspect that $C$, or to consider it
possible that $C$, or even to withhold judgment as to whether $C$ or not-$C$. One’s aim

different felicity conditions. Arguing is felicitous 'if the speaker has performed the illocution
correctly and achieved the effect that the listener understands that the speaker has advanced a
pro- or contra-argumentation.... Convincing is happy...if the speaker has achieved the effect that
the listener accepts the expressed opinion....or rejects it’. Here, they assume that convincing is not
essential to arguing, and that one can fully felicitously argue without convincing.

\textsuperscript{378} Ibid. p. 43.
p. 147, 149.
\textsuperscript{381} See, Pinto R C, Argument, Inference, and Dialectic (2001) p. 11 ff.
may also be to produce other attitudes in $H$ that have little or not directly to do with belief-like attitudes, such as an intention to undertake a certain course of action, or to approve or not of something, or to hope or fear something.\textsuperscript{382}

In virtue of this, Pinto concludes that the attempt to engender full belief in $H$ – convincing $H$ – is just ‘a special case of attempting to modify a person’s doxastic attitude toward a proposition through [arguing]’\textsuperscript{383}. It involves trying to achieve a very substantial change in $H$’s beliefs. He then suggests that a definition of arguing should also include attitudes that are belief-like but are not straightforward belief, and even other attitudes in $H$ that have only indirectly to do with belief itself. So, he suggests that arguing should be defined more broadly as ‘the attempt to modify conscious attitudes through rational means’\textsuperscript{384}. In his altered definition, even though he is more careful and offers a definition that is richer and compatible with a wide-range of different attitudes in $H$, Pinto still assumes that arguing is essentially (rather than only characteristically) connected to perlocutionary purposes.\textsuperscript{385}

My thesis is that taken as an illocution-type, arguing is not essentially connected to any perlocution. Only the idea of support is essential. Though this is not so often the case, one can be arguing with no intention or expectation of convincing

\textsuperscript{382} Pinto says that by arguing, one often ‘aims at the alteration of conscious attitudes toward non-propositional objects’; e.g. ‘the attempt to get us to perceive and imagine things in new and different lights’, ibid. p. 19.

\textsuperscript{383} Ibid. p. 14.

\textsuperscript{384} Pinto R C, \textit{Argument, Inference, and Dialectic} (2001) p. 39.

\textsuperscript{385} Pinto (Ibid. p. 32) defines arguing as ‘a set of statements or propositions that one person offers to another in the attempt to induce that other person to accept some conclusion’.
anyone of the claim being supported. One’s aim may be simply to make one’s reasons manifest, in a ‘take it or leave it’ spirit.\textsuperscript{386} Some scholars, when they make a case for an academic position, are often ‘more concerned to get on the record a solid justification of the position than to actually persuade any particular person...to accept it'\textsuperscript{387}. They may argue for it even if they know in advance that they would not convince anyone of it. Indeed, they can be said to be arguing for that position even if they are not addressing (or intending to address) any hearer at all. Would it be plausible to say that they did not actually argue for that position simply because no one knew of that? I think not.

The reason for this is that arguing, like describing, conjecturing or lamenting, is an illocution-type that is not essentially hearer-directed\textsuperscript{388}, for though it is often (even normally) performed to a hearer, it does not require a hearer to be actually, successfully performed. As I explained in the last chapter, illocution-types that are not essentially hearer-directed can be performed without there being any actual person to whom, or with whom, they are performed. S can argue for or against a claim without intending to convince or persuade H of it – indeed, without intending to achieve any perlocution in H (even without intending to address any H at all).

\textsuperscript{386} Strawson P F, Intention and Convention in Speech Acts (1964) 73(4) \textit{The Philosophical Review} p. 439, 460 holds that S’s ‘wholly overt intention may amount to no more than that of making available – in a “take it or leave it” spirit – to his audience the information...in question’.


\textsuperscript{388} See chapter two, section 3.4.3. This is a main difference with reason-giving, which is an essentially hearer-directed illocution-type (see chapter four).
In order to define arguing as an illocution-type, thus, it is better to leave undetermined all the further purposes for which \( S \) might argue, and focus only on its essential illocutionary value, which is justification or support – which I use here as synonymous.\(^{389}\) What I said above is one reason not to accept a definition of arguing in perlocutionary terms. There are also other reasons. It is important to make a clear distinction between what must be in place for a fully felicitous performance of arguing as an illocution-type, and for the production of a certain perlocution in \( H. \) \( H \) may not be convinced of the claim or of the reasons \( S \) adduces for it, but this is not necessarily a sign that the illocution was incorrectly performed. In some cases, \( S \) might perform the illocution very well, and still fail to convince or persuade \( H. \) The contrary may also be the case. \( S \) may adduce bad reasons for the claim, and still succeed in convincing \( H \) of it. Whether \( S \) has performed the illocution correctly as the type of illocution that it is has thus little to do with whether \( S \) has also succeeded in convincing \( H \) of that.\(^{390}\)

A definition of arguing that focuses exclusively on its illocutionary features – and hence, that leaves perlocutions out of the picture – also helps to preserve this intuitive distinction. \( H \) may realize perfectly well that \( S \) is trying to justify a claim \( C \) to him and what \( S \)'s reasons are, without being in any way convinced by it or inclined to believe it. I will return to this point in section 3, when I flesh out what

\(^{389}\) Bermejo-Luque L, *Giving Reasons* (2011) p. 70, holds that justification is arguing's 'constitutive value', for while it does not make sense to say that one 'aims at arguing', it does make sense to say that one aims ‘at justifying’. She holds that justifying is an illocutionary achievement [or goal] rather than an illocutionary act.

\(^{390}\) Bermejo-Luque (ibid. 21, 25) makes this point: ‘an argument can produce persuasion because it appears good, even though it is not’; also p. 122 f., 155 ff. (on p. 56, she says that ‘the persuasive force of particular acts of arguing need not be a consequence of their justificatory force’).
is required to secure uptake in arguing. For now, I only stress that there is no direct connection between the illocutionary qualities of a given performance of arguing and its actual perlocutionary effects.

Such a definition also helps to explain why arguing is typically a good means for bringing certain perlocutions about in $H$; e.g. to persuade $H$ to do something. The explanation has to do with the fact that when one tries to persuade $H$ by arguing, one tries to persuade $H$ in a particular way – namely, by adducing reasons that are supposed to show that that action or claim is correct. Bermejo-Luque, for instance, holds that arguing is a typically good means ‘for...various perlocutionary achievements, such as rationally persuading an addressee’\textsuperscript{391} precisely because arguing is an attempt at justifying, i.e. an attempt at showing by means of reasons that a given claim is correct (and not the other way around).\textsuperscript{392} She holds that this appeal to good reasons ‘explains not only [arguing’s] widespread use as a means to persuade...but also its legitimacy – because trying to persuade...by giving good reasons for it is trying to persuade in the name of what seems actually right to believe or do’\textsuperscript{393}.

I believe that this is a further reason for preferring a definition of arguing that focuses only on its illocutionary features. Its illocutionary nature has priority also to explain why arguing is a good means for pursuing certain perlocutions in

\textsuperscript{391} Ibid. p. 55.
\textsuperscript{392} Id. Ibid. (also p. 73).
\textsuperscript{393} Bermejo-Luque L, Giving Reasons Does Not Always Amount to Arguing (2015) \textit{Topoi} p. 1, 2.
It also helps to explain the differences between trying to persuade by arguing and by performing other illocution-types, for instance, by threatening

In any case, arguing can be performed to achieve a variety of perlocutions in H. Some of those perlocutions are characteristic, and some are non-characteristic of arguing. In later texts, Pinto seems to favour such a view. He holds that to be arguing, S does not need to have the intention to produce ‘any effect beyond that of making it manifest to H the type of illocution he is performing. He thereby implies, different from what he has defended before, that the pursuit of perlocutions is not essential to arguing.

From this, I conclude that, taken as an illocution-type, what is essential to arguing is the idea of support. Arguing is best understood as the illocution of trying to support a claim by means of putting forward reasons for it. Justifying the claim is its primary value as an illocution-type. This definition holds regardless of any perlocution S might or not be trying to bring about in relation

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394 As I explain in the following sections, it is possible to say that the better a given performance is in the illocutionary sense, the higher is its practical adequacy as a means to persuade or convince H (even if it does not actually persuade or convince H).
395 Bermejo-Luque L, Giving Reasons (2011), p. 122, holds that it is ‘precisely this appeal to reasons that confers on [arguing] a kind of legitimacy and force that makes it different from other persuasive devices – like suggestions, coercions and threats…seductions’. On p. 124, following Pinto, she holds that when one tries to persuade by arguing, this ‘takes the form of an invitation for [H] to infer, i.e. to reason by [himself], as opposed to merely making [him] “come to believe” [or do something]’ (such as in threatening or ordering).
396 On this distinction, see last chapter, section 3.1.1.
398 He holds (ibid. p. 237) that S does not need to have ‘the intention to persuade or convince [H]’.
399 Hitchcock D, Informal Logic and the Concept of Argument, in: Dale J (ed.), Philosophy of Logic (2007) p. 103, also holds that ‘what is crucial to an argument is the claim that the reasons collectively support the conclusion’. Johnson R H, Manifest Rationality (2000) p. 125, holds that ‘an argument is a collection of statements in which some (the premises) are put forth as support for the other (the conclusion). The key idea here is that of support’.
to $H$. Also, it does not contradict the claim that, typically, $S$ argues to bring certain perlocutions about in $H$—such as to convince or persuade $H$ to believe or to do something (or belief-like attitudes, such as inclining $H$ to believe).

Within speech act theory, as I argued in the last chapter\(^{400}\), to ask whether a token of an illocution-type is a good token of its type is to ask about how well it realizes the value that is of its very nature as an illocution-type to realize (its primary value), rather than to ask whether it achieves its primary point (which, as I also explained, only refer to what must be minimally fulfilled for the act to count as an act of that type). I also argued that particular tokens are good or bad tokens of that illocution-type depending on how good or bad they are in achieving that value. The main idea, thus, is that *qua* an illocution of that type, there is no other value that a token must realise to be a good token of its type. In the case of arguing, there is no value other than justification that tokens of arguing must realise to be good tokens of arguing. Good arguing is arguing that actually achieves justification, and bad arguing is arguing that does not. Justification is the value at the core of arguing.\(^{401}\)

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\(^{400}\) See chapter 2, section 3.2.

\(^{401}\) Bermejo-Luque L, *Giving Reasons* (2011) chap. 3, recently argued that arguing has the structure it has as an illocution-type because of the value it primarily serves, which is justification. For a similar claim (though using persuasion as arguing’s primary value), see Johnson R H, *Manifest Rationality* (2000) p. 148.
2.2 Primary point and mode of achievement

Taken as an illocution-type, arguing is best classified as an assertive illocution, because, in virtue of its very nature, it has an assertive primary point and an assertive mode of achievement. Its primary point is similar to illocutions such as stating, claiming, suggesting that something is or is not the case. Arguing is different from other assertives, because it is not simply the illocution of stating something to a hearer $H$, e.g. ‘Abortion is wrong’. It is the illocution of stating why, of providing reasons that count in favour of holding a certain claim as correct. When one tries to justify something to $H$ (e.g. a belief, a claim), one argues for or against that belief or claim. One does not merely try to communicate that belief or claim to $H$, but also tries to show why that belief or claim is correct.

2.3 Arguing as a complex illocution-type

Taken into account the notions introduced in the last chapter, arguing is best classified as a complex illocution-type composed of two second-order illocution-types, adducing and concluding. The order in which they are performed is not relevant. One can state the claim to be concluded first – ‘Abortion is wrong,


403 I introduced the notion of complex illocution-types and of second-order illocutions in the last chapter. See sections 4 and 5.
because...’ –, or only in the end – ‘Given those reasons, it follows that...’.

Hitchcock holds that arguing 'is a claim-reason complex consisting of an act of concluding...and one or more acts of premising (each of which is an assertive)'\(^{404}\). Similarly, Bermejo-Luque holds that arguing is a complex illocution composed ‘of a target-claim, the reason put forward [for the target-claim] and the implicit inference-claim that turns a mere claim into a reason for another’\(^{405}\). When S argues for or against a claim, S adduces reasons to support that claim as correct and holds that the claim is supported by those reasons.

Adducing and concluding are correlatives: concluding is concluding from the reasons adduced, and adducing is offering support to the conclusion. Each of them is a first-order illocution that takes on a second-order character in virtue of their relation to each other. By adducing, one turns a first-order illocution into a reason for another claim, and by concluding, one turns a first-order illocution into a supported claim or conclusion. What makes them relate in this way to each other is an often implicit inference-claim that ‘if R, then C’ (which can have varying degrees of strength). I call it the justificatory claim.\(^{406}\) In less technical terms, when one argues, one typically utters some sentences (which have the role of reasons) to support another sentence (which has the role of a conclusion or a supported claim). I agree with Van Eemeren and Grootendorst when they

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\(^{405}\) Bermejo-Luque L, *Giving Reasons* (2011) p. 57 (‘all of them with their corresponding...degree of pragmatic force as constatives, which can be made explicit by means of certain qualifiers’).

\(^{406}\) Bermejo-Luque (ibid. p. 60) says that arguing minimally consists of 'two speech-acts of claiming connected to each other by the corresponding inference-claim ['if R then C'] [on p. 62, she adds that this implicit inference-claim is 'constitutive of any act of arguing'].

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hold that a performance can only be regarded as a performance of arguing ‘if the sentences uttered [as reasons] stand in a particular relationship to another sentence’\(^{407}\); in no case can the former sentences function as a justification ‘in isolation from a sentence that has the function of [a supported claim]’\(^{408}\).

The claim being supported and the reasons adduced in its support constitute together a single illocutionary unit, with a single primary point – assertive – and a single primary value – justification. These are the most fundamental features of arguing as an illocution-type. To recognize what \(S\) does as an attempt at arguing, there must be a claim that is the object of support and the reason (or reasons) that is adduced to support that claim as correct. Typically, both the supported claim and the reasons adduced are first-order assertives. Most authors adopt this position.\(^{409}\) However, some authors have recently criticized it and argued that though in the most central cases, arguing consists in the performance of a series of assertives connected with each other in a specific way, this might not be

\(^{408}\) Id. Ibid.
\(^{409}\) Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (ibid. p. 98) view arguing as a sequence of assertives, and hold that when arguing consists ‘of illocutions of some other type’, this is so only ‘superficially’, and that they must first ‘be analyzed in such a way that it is clear exactly what assertives are involved’ (on p. 32: ‘one may use ‘an assertion, a statement of fact, a supposition or some other specific [illocution] from the category of assertives’, on p. 34: ‘this act complex is composed of elementary illocutions which belong to the category of assertives.’) See also Bermejo-Luque L, *Giving Reasons* (2011), chap. 3.
always the case. In particular, it has been argued that the supported claim or conclusion does not have to be a first-order assertive at all.

Hitchcock, for instance, argues that though adducing is always an assertive (or something reconstructible as an assertive), the conclusion – even if it is typically a first-order assertive – does not need to be a first-order assertive. He argues that one can adduce reasons for any illocution-type of the four other basic categories of Searle’s list and that in many cases, it is perfectly plausible to say that one is arguing for a directive (e.g. a request for an explanation), for a commissive (e.g. a promise), for a declarative (e.g. a judicial verdict) and even for an expressive (e.g. an exclamation of surprise). He argues that ‘one can find seriously meant pieces of discourse in which a constative [the reason adduced] is followed by the word ‘so’, followed by any of these four main types of non-constative speech acts, and that ‘on the face of it, such communicative acts should count as acts of arguing’. He then argues that if one applies what he calls the ‘so’ test, one can easily see why this claim is true.

Take the examples he uses to justify this claim: (a) ‘you were there, so what was it like?’; (b) ‘there is a forecast of thundershowers, so let’s cancel the picnic’ (or

412 Hitchcock D, Arguing as Trying to Show That a Target-claim is Correct (2011) 26(3) Theoria p. 301, 302.
413 Id.Ibid.
‘I’m feeling cold, so please close the door’; (c) ‘I know how difficult it will be for you to get the milk, so I promise you that I will pick it up’; (d) ‘my conduct was inexcusable, so I apologize most sincerely’; (e) ‘the evidence establishes beyond reasonable doubt that you committed the crime, so I hereby declare you guilty’. Hitchcock argues that in all these cases, the sentence following the term ‘so’ can be plausibly interpreted as a conclusion being argued for, even though it does not correspond to a first-order assertive. In cases (a) and (b), it corresponds to a first-order directive, in case (c) it corresponds to a first-order commissive, while in case (d) it corresponds to a first-order expressive and in case (e) it corresponds to a first-order declarative. He claims that in all these cases, it is possible to interpret the act performed as an act of arguing.

I think that he is mistaken. Some of these examples are not acts of arguing at all. ‘My conduct was inexcusable, so I apologize most sincerely’ is better described as an act of explaining the apology. Likewise, ‘you were there, so what is it like?’ resembles more an act of clarifying why that question is being asked to you, than of adducing a reason in its support. In the remaining cases, the act can be more plausibly taken as an act of arguing, and in all of them, the conclusion can be reconstructed as an assertive. In case (b), ‘so let’s cancel the picnic’ can be reconstructed as ‘the picnic should be cancelled’; in case (c), ‘so I promise you that I will pick it up’ can be reconstructed as ‘I should commit myself to pick it

415 Govier T, A Practical Study of Argument (2013) p. 13, argues that while in arguing ‘premises are put forward as grounds to justify a conclusion as true’, in explaining, ‘claims are put forward in an attempt to render a further claim understandable’.
up'; and in case (e), 'so I hereby declare you guilty' can be reconstructed as 'You are guilty'. In all these cases, what figures in the propositional content of the act of arguing is not the 'act' of advising, promising or declaring a verdict itself, but the implicit claim that these acts are reasonable or justified ones.

Bermejo-Luque discusses another example to defend a similar claim: 'I promise I will take care, so don't worry'. Here, a promise (a first-order commissive) is adduced as a reason for the claim 'don’t worry' (a first-order directive). She argues that it only makes sense to read that promise as an act of adducing if it corresponds at the second-order level to an assertive. I must be claiming that my promise is a reason for you not to worry (which is the supported claim). Likewise, it only makes sense to read 'don't worry' as an act of concluding if I am claiming that that advice follows from or is supported by the reason adduced. It is only when one attributes the justificatory claim – namely, 'because I commit myself to take care, you do not need to worry' or some such – that one can interpret what I say as an act of arguing. Only then is it possible to interpret me as adducing that promise as a reason in support of a conclusion. I agree with Bermejo-Luque when she holds that this justificatory claim is

‘precisely the reason why acts of adducing and acts of concluding have to be [second-order] constatives: the inference-claim establishes an inferential relationship

\[\text{\textsuperscript{416} Bermejo-Luque L, Giving Reasons (2011) p. 64 ff.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{417} Whether my promise is a good reason or not for the supported claim depends not merely in it being a felicitous promise. It also depends on whether it is a good reason for you not to worry. If you know that I am in the habit of breaking promises (even if in this case, I am serious in my promise, and intend to keep it), my promise may not be a good reason for you not to worry.}\]
between their contents by stating that if something is the case then something other is also the case.\textsuperscript{418}

In a different place, she argues (rightly, in my view) that two speech acts can only ‘become an act of adducing \( R \) (for \textit{reason}) and an act of concluding \( C \) (for target-claim) because of their relationship to an implicit inference-claim whose propositional content is ‘If \( R \), then \( C \).\textsuperscript{419} It is only when it is possible to attribute this justificatory claim to the speaker that it is possible to interpret what he does as an act of arguing.\textsuperscript{420} Indeed, as Bermejo-Luque holds, this justificatory claim is ‘constitutive of any act of arguing’.\textsuperscript{421} If no such claim is made, the act in question is not an act of arguing. This is also why I think, like her, that adducing and concluding are best characterized as second-order assertives (even when they do not correspond, in the first-order level, to assertives). It is still worth noting, however, that paradigmatically adducing and concluding correspond to first-order assertives (and that most authors agree on this).

Before concluding this section, let me add that the account offered by Bermejo-Luque of arguing as a complex illocution-type – in particular, her account of adducing reasons\textsuperscript{422} – is especially useful here, because it helps to make a clear contrast with reason-giving in the next chapter. In virtue of this, I elaborate further on the act of ‘adducing’. Similar to other authors (and rightly, in my

\textsuperscript{420} In section 5.2, I return to this point when I discuss non-standard cases of arguing. I defend that it is only possible to interpret non-verbal acts as acts of arguing if it is possible to reconstruct them as attempts at making a justificatory claim.
\textsuperscript{422} Bermejo-Luque L, \textit{Giving Reasons} (2011), chap. 3.
Bermejo-Luque holds that to adduce a reason is to perform a special sort of assertive.\textsuperscript{423} In that regard, she follows Van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s position in that only an assertive (or something reconstructible as an assertive) can count as adducing a reason in support of a claim.\textsuperscript{424}

She argues that adducing is only one part of the total speech act complex of arguing, ‘the other being that of concluding’\textsuperscript{425} (this is why, in her view, arguing is best understood as a complex illocution-type that is composed two second-order illocution-types). To that extent, she disagrees with the traditional account of arguing developed by Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, because they do not take the supported claim or conclusion as part of the act of arguing itself, but only as another act linked to the act of arguing in a specific way.\textsuperscript{426} In her view, when they do this, they mistakenly equate ‘arguing’ with ‘adducing’. She argues that if the claim in support of which one argues were not an integral part of the act of arguing, the felicity conditions for “it’s raining” would be the same.

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whether it is adduced as a reason for “streets will be wet” or for “we’d rather stay at home”\textsuperscript{427}. But they are clearly different in each case.

Though she does not explain in detail why there is a difference in their felicity conditions, in my view, the reason lies in the fact that adducing has a second-order nature. In each case, the reason adduced – ‘it’s raining’ – is adduced to support a different claim. In the last chapter, I explained that to be fully felicitous, the performance of a second-order illocution must fulfil both the conditions necessary for a felicitous performance of the first-order illocution that is performed and further conditions due to the relation that that first-order illocution has to a further illocution (which, in the case of adducing, is the supported claim).\textsuperscript{428} This is why the relation that the reason adduced has with the supported claim is essential for a given act to count as an act of adducing, and also why the felicity conditions for ‘adducing’ are different depending on the claim being supported (indeed, I think that in Bermejo-Luque’s example, a different act of adducing is performed in each case).

The core idea is that when one adduces a reason, one asserts that reason and claims – explicitly or not – that that reason provides good support for a further claim. Both claims are necessary for an act to be one of adducing. I must claim both that the reason adduced is itself correct or true, and that it supports a certain claim as correct (the specific degree of how good one thinks the reasons

\textsuperscript{427} Id., ibid.
\textsuperscript{428} See last chapter, section 5.
are can be qualified by using terms such as ‘possibly’, ‘necessarily’, ‘presumably’). It is the relation to this latter, supported claim that gives adducing its second-order nature, and that makes a first-order illocution into an adduced reason.\footnote{Bermejo-Luque (ibid. p. 60) argues that presenting a spoon in front of your mouth to show that the soup is good does not count as adducing, but it may be a means for bringing the adducing about. Adducing ‘consists of presenting evidence [for the claim] that the soup is nice’.} Bermejo-Luque holds that ‘a speech-act counts as an act of adducing if and only if it counts as an act of putting forward a claim as a reason for another claim’\footnote{Id. Ibid. She adds (p. 68) that it is sufficient for one to be adducing that one explicitly endorses a claim made either by someone else or by oneself on some other occasion: ‘in order to infer that the speaker is arguing, we have to attribute to her such adduction \(R\) or the endorsement of a claim that \(R\) as a reason. This is something that we can do either if the speaker herself puts forward \(R\) or if she just endorses the corresponding claim as a reason for her target-claim \(C\).'}\footnote{Bermejo-Luque L, Exchanging Reasons (2011), \textit{Theoria}, p. 329, 337.} This is how she explains the basic intuition that arguing is essentially an attempt at ‘making others see...that something [the target-claim] is correct’\footnote{Bermejo-Luque L, \textit{Giving Reasons} (2011), p. 53; also p. 67.} by means of adducing reasons for it.\footnote{To sum up, within speech act theory, arguing is best characterized as an assertive illocution-type – that is, an illocution-type that has an assertive primary point – with a complex illocutionary structure. Arguing is composed of two second-order illocution-types – adducing reasons and concluding something from the reasons adduced – each of which typically corresponds, in the first-order level, to assertives. In other words, arguing typically consists in the performance of a series of first-order assertives that acquire a second-order character within the whole illocutionary unit, and its primary value as an...}
illocution-type is to achieve justification: it is to offer support by means of reasons to the correctness of a certain claim.

This basic model covers the central cases of arguing, where \( S \) adduces one or more reasons in direct support of a claim. Later, I explain how it can be extended to less central cases – e.g. cases where neither the reasons adduced nor the supported claim are believed by \( S \), or are believed but only in some qualified way and so on.\(^{433}\) As I said, there are various terms \( S \) can use to specify how good he thinks the reasons adduced are for the supported claim \( C. S \) can qualify the supported claim by saying that it is ‘possibly’, ‘probably’, ‘presumably’ or ‘necessarily’ the case, and thereby express different degrees of confidence on it.\(^{434}\) \( S \) may also qualify his claim by saying that \( C \) is or is not the case from a certain point of view – e.g. morally, legally, economically, aesthetically.\(^{435}\) Also, \( S \) may adduce two or more reasons as jointly supporting the claim (in which case they count as a single reason for that claim), or he may adduce two or more

\(^{433}\) Pinto R C, *Argument, Inference, and Dialectic* (2001) p. 14, for instance, treats cases where ‘neither premises nor conclusion are believed by the one who makes the inference or draw the suppositional conclusion’, or cases where the ‘grounds on which a proposition is…put forward support it without entailing it [that is, defeasible grounds]’ as less central cases of arguing.

\(^{434}\) The modal qualifiers help to specify different degrees of the force with which the proposition is expressed. This is a complex topic, and more detail on this would fall beyond this scope of this chapter, which is just to present a general account of arguing as an illocution-type. Bermejo-Luque L, *Giving Reasons* (2011), p. 62, says that arguing is to ‘communicate [one’s] credentials for concluding, i.e. the type and degree of support that [the reasons adduced] are supposed to confer on the target-claim’, and that ‘just as the type and degree of force of adducing and concluding can vary, the type and degree of...force of the inference-claim may vary’.

reasons as separately supporting the claim – in which case S has offered more than one argument for the same claim.\textsuperscript{436}

In addition to this, it is worth noting that it is possible to perform an act of arguing even if some or even all the necessary elements – the reason adduced, the supported claim and the justificatory claim – remain implicit in the act as actually performed. As some authors acknowledge, in the vast majority of everyday arguments, some of these elements (especially the justificatory claim) are left unstated.\textsuperscript{437} But they are often marked linguistically. By using terms such as ‘since’ and ‘because’, S can indicate that the following illocution is adduced as a reason in support of another illocution. By using terms such as ‘therefore’ or ‘so’, he can indicate that the following illocution is the supported claim or conclusion. The use of those terms help to interpret what S says as an attempt at justifying a claim C to H. Paradigmatically, thus, it is possible to say that an act of arguing consists in a set of reasons followed by a conclusion (often introduced by terms such as ‘so’ or ‘therefore’), or in a conclusion followed by a set of reasons (often introduced by terms such as ‘because’ or ‘since’).

\textsuperscript{436} A claim adduced as a reason in support of a claim can also become a claim to be supported. \textsuperscript{437} We normally utter ‘it's raining, you should take your umbrella’ and not ‘If it rains, then you should take your umbrella; it is raining; therefore, you should take your umbrella’. Bermejo-Luque L, \textit{Giving Reasons} (2011), p. 19, argues that ‘most everyday arguments...lack certain premises that, if added, would make the original arguments deductively valid’; Quine W O, \textit{Methods of Logic} (1974), p. 169, defines an enthymeme as ‘a logical inference in which one or more premises have been omitted on the basis that its truth is common knowledge and it is not necessary to mention them’; Walton D, \textit{Informal Logic} (2008), p. 143, holds that ‘it may be a difficult job to fairly...judge whether such enthymematic premises were truly meant to be asserted by the arguer’, but that in many cases (e.g. ‘All men are mortal, therefore Socrates is mortal’), it is reasonable to presume that the missing premise (e.g. ‘Socrates is a man’) is assumed by S.
3. Arguing and its uptake

In the last chapter, I argued that in general, illocutions – in order to be felicitously performed – do not require the achievement of any perlocution in $H$. But they must have the capacity for producing a certain effect in $H$. This effect is called the hearer’s uptake (Austin) or minimal illocutionary effect (Searle). I argued that, differently from the way in which it is traditionally understood, uptake is best understood as a normative notion, and that having the aim to secure it is not enough. I also argued that, differently from Searle and Austin, one should not put too much emphasis on actual uptake. The basic idea is that the illocution must be performed in such a way that one could reasonably expect to secure $H$’s uptake. Uptake is a mutual notion, and there are conditions that both $S$ and $H$ must fulfil. $S$ must perform the illocution in a way that enables a competent $H$ to identify the type of illocution he is performing not merely in general, but also in its details. And $H$ must pay attention, be well disposed to follow what $S$ is doing etc., in order to understand it.

In this section, I take all this for granted and define what is required for uptake in arguing. To flesh this out is important to ground a distinction with uptake in reason-giving. As I argued in section 2.1, arguing is not an essentially hearer-directed illocution-type, but I think that, similar to other illocution-types that are not essentially hearer-directed, when $S$ argues in the presence of a hearer, $S$

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438 See chapter two, section 3.4.3.
439 See discussion in the last chapter, section 3.4.3.
must argue in a way that maximizes the chances of securing H’s uptake (otherwise, S’s act is infelicitous). Even though it is not necessary that the act produce any perlocution in H (such as convincing H of the supported claim), it must have the capacity for producing some beliefs in H about what S is trying to do. H does not have to believe that S’s act is a felicitous act of arguing; indeed, H may have doubts or even strongly disagree with the supported claim or with the reasons S adduces for it. But, from what S does, it must be possible for H to understand that he is adducing reasons to support a certain claim as correct.

To be more precise, it must be possible for a competent H to understand, from what S does, not only that S is trying to justify something to him (rather than, say, simply making a series of disconnected assertions), but also what S’s chain of reasons is (e.g. that he is trying to make a justificatory claim, and what specific type of claim this is). In a nutshell, it must be possible to understand (i) that the reasons S provides are being adduced by S, rather than simply mentioned; (ii) what those reasons are; (iii) that the reasons are adduced to support a claim C – and not some other claim; and (iv) what C is. These are the conditions that a given act of arguing must fulfil to fulfil its uptake condition. I agree with Pinto when he holds that S has ‘to make a reason for [the claim] manifest – in such a

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440 See, e.g. Pinto R C, Argument, Inference and Dialectic (2001) p. 36, who argues that S’s act to be able to effect an inference in the person to whom it is performed, from the reasons adduced to the supported claim.
way that it is apparent or manifest [to \( H \)] (a) what the reason is, (b) what the reason is a reason for and (c) that it is a reason’\(^{441}\).

As I said, for \( H \) to take \( S \) to be adducing a reason for a claim, \( H \) does not need to make any positive assessment of its value as a reason. \( H \) simply has to be able to recognise, from what \( S \) does, that it is being adduced as a reason. Bermejo-Luque, for instance, holds that this has to do with the production of a certain effect in \( H \), but also adds – rightly, in my view – that it does not need to ‘involve...[\( H \)] making [any] critical assessment of...the reasons adduced’\(^{442}\). The referred effect is thus a rather minimal one. She refers to this effect as a perlocutionary effect\(^{443}\), but I think that – if one follows speech act theory, as I do here – this effect is better classified as arguing’s uptake.

This effect is a pre-condition for \( H \) having any further attitude about \( S \)’s illocution. Even to doubt that the reasons adduced are good reasons for \( C \), or to be not inclined to believe them, \( H \) must first understand that \( S \) is trying to adduce those reasons in support of \( C \).\(^{444}\) Only then, other effects (such as being

\(^{442}\) Bermejo-Luque L, Giving Reasons (2011) p. 75; on p. 78, she says that ‘taking a claim...as justified involves... adopting a reflexive attitude, that of determining that the corresponding [reasons] and [inference-claims] are correct’, see also p. 80, 122 ff., 156 f.
\(^{443}\) Ibid. p. 54 (‘the capacity to invite inference...is...the paradigmatic perlocutionary effect of [arguing]’), p. 73, p. 79.
\(^{444}\) Walton D, Informal Logic (2008) p. 137, holds that ‘most often, before we can begin to properly evaluate the argument as good or bad, we have a formidable job of trying to determine just what the argument is’. He adds that in some cases, even though ‘an argument, as a whole, may be very confusing [e.g. ‘lengthy...incomplete [or] seems to be heading in a wandering and unclear direction’], it is still possible to identify it (and it might even be a good argument).
convinced or not by them) become possible.\textsuperscript{445} This is not a trivial requirement, especially in cases where \( S \) proposes a complex argument to \( H \) (here, \( S \)'s ability to present the argument charitably to \( H \) must be high). If \( S \) argues in a language \( H \) does not speak, or presents the reasons in a badly ordered or in a very unclear way, or speaks in a low tone of voice, \( S \) may prevent any uptake from being secured, and not as a result of any failing on \( H \)'s part.\textsuperscript{446} If this happens, the performance will be infelicitous. In some cases, one could even say that the performance would be unsuccessful – if judging from what \( S \) does, \( H \) is not even in the position to guess what \( S \) is trying to do.

In the last chapter, I already suggested that fulfilling the uptake condition in the case of arguing might be a matter of degree.\textsuperscript{447} The result of its non-fulfilment may vary from not being possible to understand anything of what \( S \) is doing (e.g. if \( S \) argues in an entirely unknown language, or in a very cryptic way) to just being hard to follow (thereby making uptake more difficult). In some cases, for instance, it may be possible to understand that \( S \) is trying to justify something, but still be unclear what the supported claim is. Some uptake may thus be produced, but not entirely. In other cases, uptake might still be produced, even if \( S \) did not do everything he should have done to enable it in \( H \). It might still be

\begin{itemize}
\item There are various possible further effects, such as doxastic attitudes varying from full belief that the claim is justified, to a series of belief-like attitudes such as presuming it to be justified, having some inclination to believe it, suspecting it to be justified or being agnostic about it. See Pinto R C, The Uses of Argument in Communicative Contexts (2010) 24(2) Argumentation p. 233.
\item Pinto (ibid. p. 237) holds that \( S \) would fail to achieve uptake 'if the words in which he attempts to present a reason (or reasons) are unclear, muddled, cryptic, insufficiently articulated, and so on', for the reasons would not be \textit{manifest} – i.e. “perceivable or inferable” by \( [H] \).
\item See chapter two, section 3.4.3.
\end{itemize}
possible to guess or anticipate, from what $S$ does, what $S$ wanted to say.\footnote{$H$ might be more competent than $S$ and understand better what $S$ tries to do than $S$ himself. This is, of course, very context-sensitive. Walton D, Informal Logic (2008) p. 143, for instance, argues that in some cases, 'it may be a difficult job to fairly and reasonably judge whether [certain] premises [that were left unstated, or were stated in an unclear way by the speaker] were truly meant to be asserted by [him]'. Likewise, Bermejo-Luque L, Giving Reasons (2011), p. 180, notes that in some cases, $H$ will have the problem 'of deciding between making the actual intentions of the speaker explicit or being charitable with respect to the potentialities of her argumentation' (even though he has not made things fully clear).} In these cases, it is possible to blame $S$ for not having done what he should have done, and his act would count as defective arguing. It would be defective not necessarily because it fails to achieve its primary value, but because $S$ fails to perform the act charitably in relation to $H$. Take some examples.

Imagine that $S$ adduces various reasons in support of $C$. Some of these reasons are otiose or unnecessary, others are in the wrong order and phrased in unclear language. However, there might still be a clear sense that one could infer $C$ from them. In such a case, it is intuitive to say that $S$'s act, even though it achieves justification, is still not a fully felicitous act. And its defect has to do with $S$'s inability to present the reasons adduced in a fully charitable way in relation to $H$. This is a failure in fulfilling the uptake condition. Likewise, a mathematician may give a paper that succeeds in justifying an outstanding claim. The justification he presents can be fully good as a justification, but his act of presenting it may still not be fully felicitous if, for instance, he did not make it fully clear to $H$. He might have argued in a language that is too technical or confusing. Indeed, the act can still be a very defective act in that regard. This defect also has to do with the
speaker’s inability to adjust his illocution to the addressed $H$, in performing it in a way that $H$ could follow and understand.$^{449}$

One may think that the question of how charitable $S$ is in relation to $H$ – i.e. how well or tidily he has presented the adduced reasons – is a secondary issue, for, in principle, this does not affect their justificatory quality, i.e. whether they are good reasons or not for the purpose of supporting $C$. One may thus think that the defect here – if it is a defect at all – is not really a serious one as long as the conclusion in the end is justified. But I think that if one understands arguing as an illocution-type, this is a necessary condition for its fully felicitous performance, even if it is not strictly speaking a necessary condition for achieving its primary value, which is the justification of a certain claim.$^{450}$ I think that this view is also more intuitive. As I argued in the last chapter on the section about the primary value of an illocution-type, a given performance of a certain illocution-type may achieve the primary value of that illocution-type, but be better or worse in achieving it (in comparison to a fully felicitous performance). This means that there are good and bad ways of achieving that value.$^{451}$

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$^{449}$ Bermejo-Luque L, *Giving Reasons* (2011) p. 186, holds that an act of arguing, to be fully felicitous, must not only ‘show’ a given claim to be correct, but also be a good ‘act of “showing”’ (see p. 189-192; on p. 161, she says that ‘conditions that determine how well [the act is] in making it salient to an addressee that a [conclusion] is correct establish that particular acts…will only [be fully felicitous]...if they are adequately informative quantitatively and qualitatively and clear enough to be understood’).

$^{450}$ Bermejo-Luque (ibid. p. 178) does not refer to these conditions as ‘uptake’ but says that they provide ‘a basis for talking about how well correctness has been “shown”’.

$^{451}$ See chapter two, section 3.2.
Because uptake is a mutual notion, in order to be actually secured, H must also not ignore the illocution and must pay some degree of attention to it and make some effort to understand it.452 Actual uptake is not achieved, for instance, if H does not pay attention to what S says – e.g. because H is too busy with other things –, or is not interested in what S says, or does not think that S is worth paying attention to. In these cases, S’s illocution might fail to achieve actual uptake, but not due to any fault on S’s part. S might have done everything he should have done to secure H’s uptake, and still fail to secure it (for some purely idiosyncratic reason). In my view, as I argued in some detail in the last chapter, in these cases one can still say that S’s illocution fulfils the uptake condition – for S has performed it in a way that was fully charitable in relation to H –, even if it fails to achieve actual uptake in H.453

In the next chapter, I argue that what is necessary for securing H’s uptake is significantly different in the case of reason-giving. In particular, I argue that the kind of skills or abilities S must display in relation to H in order to secure H’s uptake in reason-giving is different than in the case of arguing.454

452 Goodwin J, Designing Issues, in: van Eemeren F H and Houtlosser P (eds.), *Dialectic and Rhetoric* (2002) p. 85 f., 88, identifies various strategies that S can use to call and maintain H’s attention on what he is saying. She argues that silence or pauses can be used, and other techniques not to divert attention from the claim.

453 This is different in the case of warning, for example, where failure in securing actual uptake sometimes does lead to unsuccessful performance. This difference has to do with the fact that arguing is not essentially hearer-directed, while warning is. See last chapter, section 3.4.3.

454 See chapter four, section 4.
4. Arguing and its felicity conditions

In this section, I follow the method of analysis explained in the last chapter. I said that one way to explain an illocution-type is in terms of the conditions that must be fulfilled for its fully felicitous performance (in Searle’s terms, for its fully successful and non-defective performance).\textsuperscript{455} I will now set out the conditions that are necessary to be fulfilled for fully felicitous arguing. The starting point is a situation in which a speaker $S$ tries to justify a claim $C$ fully seriously to a hearer $H$. I take for granted a set of conditions that are necessary for any felicitous communication. I presuppose that $S$ is not joking or being ironic, that both $S$ and $H$ know how to speak the language, have no physical impediment to communication etc.\textsuperscript{456} I leave all these conditions unstated in my list below. My aim is to produce a list of conditions that are specifically necessary for felicitous arguing. Since arguing is a complex illocution, the felicity conditions for arguing are a conjunction of the felicity conditions for adducing and concluding. In what follows, thus, I offer a separate list of conditions for each of them:

Felicity conditions for adducing

(i) $R$ (the adduced reason) must be itself true or correct;
(ii) The justificatory claim $S$ makes must also be correct, the claim whose antecedent is ‘$R$ is correct’ and whose consequent is ‘$C$ is correct’;
(iii) $S$ presents the reason (or reasons) adduced in a charitable way to $H$;

\textsuperscript{455} See chapter two, section 3.4.
(iv) $S$ must believe that $R$ is itself correct and that $R$, being correct, is a good reason for holding that $C$ is correct;
(v) Adducing a claim $R$ as a reason is an attempt to show that $C$ is correct;

To these conditions, it must be added that $S$ is adducing reasons in a situation in which it is rational to do so, e.g. where the correctness of $C$ is or could be in question.\textsuperscript{457} This list of conditions will be especially important to make the contrast with the conditions for felicitous reason-giving in the next chapter. To use Searle’s terms, conditions (i) to (iii) listed above are preparatory conditions, while condition (iv) is the sincerity condition for felicitous adducing. Condition (v) is the essential condition, the condition whose violation makes a given performance not count as an act of adducing. As in the case of other illocution-types, the sincerity condition is always a non-defectiveness condition, while the essential condition is always a success condition. The other conditions may be either non-defectiveness or success conditions depending on how serious the failure is. I will make some comments about them below. The felicity conditions for concluding include the following:

Felicity conditions for concluding

(i) The correctness of $C$ is or could be in question in the situation
(ii) $H$ does not already entirely agree that $C$ is correct and with the reasons $S$ adduces for $C$
(iii) The reasons adduced for $C$ provide good support for $C$ (with the degree of strength that $S$ claims that they do)

\textsuperscript{457} This condition is related to a condition that Searle takes to be a general condition for the felicitous performance of illocution-types, to the effect that performing a given illocution-type must have a point in the situation. See last chapter, section 3.4.
(iv) $S$ believes that $C$ is correct (with the degree of strength he claims that the reasons adduced support $C$)

(v) $S$'s act counts as an attempt at showing, by means of a reason, that a claim $C$ is correct

Even if these conditions are not exhaustive, taken together, they are clearly conditions whose fulfilment is necessary for a given act to count as a fully felicitous act of arguing. As I said in the last chapter, I am committed only to the claim that this list is sufficiently informative, and that it fits our ordinary intuitions. For the reasons I explained before, I will give a special focus here on the conditions for fully felicitous adducing.

Authors who formulate these conditions often phrase them in a way that blurs the illocutionary-perlocutionary distinction. For the reasons I explained in section 2.1, this should be avoided. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst formulate all the preparatory conditions in terms of the beliefs $S$ must have about $H$ (e.g. that $H$ will accept the reasons as correct).\textsuperscript{458} Bermejo-Luque also offers similar formulations. She lists as a preparatory condition for felicitous adducing that ‘$S$ believes that a claim $R$, having such and such pragmatic force, may be taken to be correct by $L$’\textsuperscript{459}. I think that this condition is not even necessary for sincere adducing, because $S$ might adduce fully sincerely even if he knows in advance

\textsuperscript{458} Van Eemeren F H and Grootendorst R, \textit{Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions} (1984) p. 44: ‘1. $S$ believes that $L$ does not (in advance, completely, automatically) accept the expressed opinion $O$; 2. $S$ believes that $L$ will accept the propositions expressed in the statements $S1, S2 \ldots Sn$; 3. $S$ believes that $L$ will accept the constellation of statements $S1, S2 \ldots Sn$ as a justification of $O$.’

\textsuperscript{459} Bermejo-Luque L, \textit{Giving Reasons} (2011), p. 70. On p. 71, she formulates two of the three preparatory conditions for concluding as follows: ‘(i) $S$ takes the correctness of a claim $C$ to be question within the context of the speech act; (ii) $S$ takes a claim $R$ to be a means to show a target-claim $C$ to be correct’ (that $S$ ‘takes’ these things to be the case is less important than that they are the case).
that $H$ will not agree with him. A felicitous performance of the *illocution of adducing* depends only on the performance itself. It is only necessary that the reasons adduced by $S$ are themselves true, and that they offer good support for $C$ ($S$ must also believe that they do; no reference to $H$ is needed here). 460

Further, both Van Eemeren and Grootendorst and Bermejo-Luque are in agreement (rightly, in my view) that the fulfilment of some of these conditions may be a matter of degree. 461 This is the case, as I explained in the previous section, with the uptake condition (condition (iv) in the above list) and also with condition (ii) – e.g. the reasons adduced by $S$ may support the conclusion but not with the strength $S$ claims that they do ($S$ may claim that the conclusion is necessarily the case, but the reasons he adduces only support the claim that it is possibly the case). Van Eemeren and Grootendorst argue that a given performance of the illocution of arguing can be 'to a greater or lesser extent *defective* 462, and that the degree of deficiency may vary from a total failure in performing the illocution – in which case it would be unsuccessful – to partial failures in performing it, in ways that are not entirely or not fully felicitous (to follow Searle’s terms, more or less defective).

460 At most, $S$ must believe that $H$ will be able to understand that he is adducing these reasons in support of $C$ (uptake).

461 See, Van Eemeren F H and Grootendorst R, *Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions* (1984) chap. 3; Bermejo-Luque L, *Giving Reasons* (2011) p. 178-179, refers to ‘degrees of justification’: ‘a claim would be said to be highly justified if the reasons put forward for it are very good means for showing [that the claim is correct]’, and weakly justified if they are not.

If one or more of these conditions are not fulfilled, something has gone wrong and the performance will be an infelicitous act of adducing. Conditions (i) and (ii) have to do with the justificatory quality of the reasons adduced, i.e. with the value of the inferential relationship established between them and the supported claim and the value of the reasons themselves. If it violates condition (i), the reasons are false, and if it violates condition (ii), it follows that they are bad justificatory reasons for \( C \) (e.g. weak, irrelevant, the wrong kind of reasons).\(^{463}\) The performance would be infelicitous even if \( C \) were itself correct: for the reasons one adduces for \( C \) do not show \( C \) to be correct.\(^{464}\) If it violates condition (iii), the act is performed in a way that is not charitable in relation to \( H \). If it violates condition (iv), the performance is insincere. If it violates condition (v), it does not count as an act of adducing. As in the case of other illocution-types, a given performance may violate more than one condition at the same time, and each condition marks a different kind of infelicity that may happen.

I draw heavily on the formulations of these conditions offered by Bermejo-Luque. Even though, as I explained above, I disagree with the way she formulates some of them\(^ {465}\), I agree with Bermejo-Luque in that to be adducing, it has to ‘make sense to attribute to the speaker the corresponding inference-claim that is

\(^{463}\) A judge who argues for his decision by claiming that he does not like the defendant fails to fulfil condition (ii). Likewise, an attorney who prosecutes a defendant for murder may argue fully felicitously for the claim that murder is a horrible crime, but his act fails if the claim he is supposed to justify is that this particular defendant is guilty of murder. Hasty generalizations are also a case here (e.g. ‘I know two Arabs that are terrorists; therefore, all Arabs are terrorists’).

\(^{464}\) This is what Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (ibid. p. 33) have in mind when they say that ‘one may very well say…’I share your view but I think your argumentation [for it] is feeble’.

\(^{465}\) Especially the preparatory condition that ‘\( S \) believes that a claim \( R \)...may be taken to be correct by \( L \)’. See, Bermejo-Luque L, Giving Reasons (2011), p. 70.
meant to license the step from this claim to the claim for which it would be a reason. She is not clear, however, as to which conditions of the above list are success conditions and which are non-defectiveness conditions. However, given the way she formulates the essential condition (which is condition (v) above), she is committed to holding that if one adduces a reason that has no potential at all to support the relevant claim as correct, this act would be unsuccessful as an act of adducing, for the reason adduced would not be in any way a capable ‘means to show that a target-claim C is correct’.

Since this is going to be important in the next chapter, let me elaborate this point a bit further. Imagine that S says ‘It is raining, therefore you should take your umbrella’, in a situation where it is not raining. Now, imagine that S says to H ‘2+2 = 5, therefore the sun is shining today’. In the first case, the reason adduced (‘It is raining’) is false, and S’s act is a defective act of adducing. It violates condition (i) of my list. The second act is also infelicitous, but is it like the former act (a defective one) or an unsuccessful act? In the first case, the reason adduced, if it were true, would have at least the potential to justify the conclusion; but in the second case, the reason is obviously false (‘2+2 = 5’), and has no potential at all to justify the relevant claim (‘the sun is shining today’). It is not even the kind of consideration that, if it were true, would be capable of justifying it.

\[\text{\footnotesize 466\, Ibid. p. 71.}\]
\[\text{\footnotesize 467\, She formulates the essential condition for adducing as follows: ‘(vi) Adducing R with such and such pragmatic force is a means to show that a target-claim C is correct’ (Id.Ibid.).}\]
\[\text{\footnotesize 468\, Id.Ibid.}\]
\[\text{\footnotesize 469\, One can accept this regardless of whether one also agrees that that reason would be by itself a good reason for establishing the conclusion, if it were true.}\]
Different from the first case, in the second case one can plausibly wonder whether this act is successful adducing at all.

Generally, an unsound argument (i.e. an argument based on false premises) is defective, but is still an argument. In some cases, however, it is possible to doubt whether it is an argument at all. Bermejo-Luque suggests that ‘if there is no relationship [at all] between reason and target-claim’\(^{470}\) (or no sense in which the target-claim could ‘follow from’ the reason), it is a ‘bad act of arguing, [for] the reason is worthless as a means to show that the conclusion is true’\(^{471}\) (my further claim is that it is unsuccessful arguing). Walton also argues that in extreme cases, the reasons adduced ‘are so irrelevant that they do not even share any common subject matter with the [conclusion] to be established’\(^{472}\) (e.g. when the relation claimed to exist between them and the conclusion is an absurd one). In these cases, there is a sense in which the act has entirely missed its point. Even though these authors do not explicitly claim that, if one follows speech act theory, I think that these cases are best understood as unsuccessful adducing, for they fail to fulfil the essential condition.

A minimal condition for an act to be an act of adducing is that S offers something that can be a reason for C, where this means that the reason adduced has to have at least the potential to justify C if it were true. The reason does not have to be

\(^{471}\) Id. ibid.
true or to actually justify the claim, but needs to at least (i) be capable of being true (i.e. truth-apt) and (ii) be capable of standing in a justificatory relation with the supported claim.473

These two conditions rule out not only cases in which the reason adduced is obviously false or nonsensical but also some cases of circular arguing. Suppose that $S$ intends to argue for the conclusion ‘God is benevolent’ by adducing a single reason in its support that is equivalent to the conclusion – namely, ‘God is benevolent’. The argument that $S$ claims to be offering has thus the following form: ‘God is benevolent, therefore God is benevolent’ (‘God is benevolent, because God is benevolent’). $S$ may hide this by repeating the same claim in slightly different words, or by inserting some comments in between that may distract from the issue. Most authors agree that, in a straightforward sense, what $S$ says counts as an argument, at least if one relies on the traditional (and widely accepted) definition of an argument as an ordered set of propositions, among which some are premises and another is a conclusion.474 It is even a deductively valid argument, for if the premise were true – ‘God is benevolent’ –, the conclusion ‘God is benevolent’ would be true as well.

473 Toulmin S, The Uses of Argument (2003) p. 157, argues that some conditions have to be fulfilled for minimal ‘intelligibility and meaningfulness’, such as that the supported claim, the reason and the inference-claim be logically possible and are not incomprehensible.

474 See, e.g. Sinnott-Armstrong W, Begging the Question (1999) 77(2) Australasian Journal of Philosophy p. 171, 174, argues that ‘an argument consists of an ordered pair of a set of propositions (the premises) and a proposition (the conclusion)’.
But is it possible to characterize what S does here as an act of arguing? Has S adduced any reason in support of that conclusion at all? In this case, it is more intuitive to say that S has not adduced any reason, for he has merely re-asserted the conclusion in the premise word by word. He has merely held it to be the case twice. This case illustrates a violation of the essential condition (condition (v) of my list). I agree with Hoffman in that a minimal condition for an act to be an act of arguing is that one proposition is claimed to follow from another, which is regarded as providing evidence for the truth of that one. If, as in the example above, S claims to infer the truth of a certain proposition *not* from that of some other proposition, but from its own truth, posited as a premise, the same proposition is asserted twice, and therefore the minimal condition of there being at least two asserted propositions is not fulfilled. S might thus even have tried to argue for the conclusion, but he has not actually argued for it at all.

To put in my terms, this is not merely a defective act, but an unsuccessful act of adducing, because it is not strictly speaking an act of providing support for the conclusion by means of adducing a reason for it. Its problem, so to speak, is not merely that the reason adduced is a bad justificatory reason for the supported claim, but that, even it were true, it would not have any potential to justify the supported claim (since the reason adduced and the supported claim are in this

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476 Id. Ibid.
477 Hoffman (id. Ibid.) says that S commits 'the error of taking [himself] to be presenting an argument when [he] is merely asserting the truth of some proposition'. Walton D, Informal Logic (2008) p. 64, refers to it is as an 'inadequate or useless' attempt at arguing, for it 'stands no chance of fulfilling its proponent's obligation to [justify] his conclusion'; Bermejo-Luque L, Giving Reasons (2011), p. 190, says that S's act is 'a flawed attempt at [justifying] anything.
case identical). Even though some authors have argued that circular arguing can be sometimes useful for the purposes of justification\textsuperscript{478}, I think that in some cases at least (like the one described above), it cannot. Also, it is worth noting that in many cases, there might be a point in saying 'C therefore C'. If S has argued for C to H before, saying 'C therefore C' might be a good way of reminding H of that (e.g. to stress that C is not in question anymore), or if C is self-evident it might be a good way of trying to make H aware of the obviousness of C ('Don't you see? C is true!'). But these are not acts of adducing.\textsuperscript{479}

I stress this here because, in the next chapter, I argue that some acts that would count as unsuccessful adducing – i.e. that would not have any potential for achieving the justification of a certain claim (e.g. when S adduces an obviously false reason, or a reason that, even if it is not obviously false, has no relation at all with the supported claim) – can still be on occasion fully felicitous acts of reason-giving. More generally, I argue that none of the conditions listed above and that I claim to be necessary for felicitous adducing are necessary for felicitous reason-giving. In particular, I argue that normally, felicitous reason-giving has only to resemble some of them in some way and to some degree. In

\textsuperscript{478} See, e.g. Sinnott-Armstrong W, Begging the Question (1999) 77(2) Australasian Journal of Philosophy p. 171, 176; Sorensen R, 'P, therefore P' without Circularity (1991) 88(3) Journal of Philosophy p. 245-266, argues that 'a variety of arguments having the form 'P, therefore, P' do not beg the question', and discusses some interesting cases. See also Sanford, D H, Begging the Question (1972) 32(6) Analysis p 197–199.

\textsuperscript{479} Sinnott-Armstrong W, Begging the Question (1999) 77(2) Australasian Journal of Philosophy p. 171, 182, offers the example of 'a lawyer...whose closing argument is simply, 'My client is innocent, because she is'. If he were just repeating the conclusion for emphasis or suggesting that – given what he has argued before (e.g. the evidence presented) – it is clearly true, this would not be a problem, but he argues that if, by saying what he says, 'he is trying to justify the conclusion...[then] for that purpose' this act is a total failure, since 'the premise and the conclusion are identical'.

the next chapter, I explain both by way of example and in terms of speech act theory why this is the case. For now, I only flag these considerations, and return to them in more detail in the next chapter.

Before concluding this section, let me just make a few considerations about some of the other conditions listed above. Some authors will disagree that condition (iii) of my list (the uptake condition) is a necessary condition for felicitous arguing, or at least will object that it is a less important one. They view felicitous arguing as being primarily a matter of adducing good reasons for C.\textsuperscript{480} However, if one assumes, as I do here, that S argues for a claim $C$ to a hearer $H$, this condition applies. I discussed it in detail in the last section, but it is worth noting that S’s act may fulfil all the other conditions (and hence, achieve justification of a claim), and still be infelicitous if the reasons adduced are badly presented – e.g. badly ordered, or presented in unclear language. This condition has to do with performing the illocution ‘in a recognizable manner’\textsuperscript{481} to $H$. I agree with Van Eemeren and Grootendorst in that this condition ‘must be incorporated into the

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\textsuperscript{480} Biro J and Siegel H, Argumentation, Arguing, and Arguments: Comments on Giving Reasons (2011) 26(3) \textit{Theoria} p. 279, 281 f, argue that one should make a distinction between ‘talking about something concrete (the act) [where considerations of style do come in, e.g. how the arguments are organized, presented – apart from whether they are in themselves good]’ and ‘something abstract’. Ultimately, they argue that ‘an argument, considered as a set of propositions some of which purport to support, justify, provide warrant for, count in favor of, another, the conclusion’ is what matters for ‘argumentative goodness’.

[felicity] conditions, and that an act of arguing can be defective also for reasons having nothing to do with its intrinsic justificatory merit.

The sincerity condition for arguing, as in the case of other assertives, is that S has certain beliefs (conditions (iv) of my list). When S argues in support of a claim C, S expresses the belief that the reasons he adduces for C are true or correct, that they offer good support for C, and that C is itself correct. In some cases, however, instead of committing to a stronger claim (e.g. that C is necessarily the case), S may commit only to a weaker one. He might only presume that C is the case, or claim that C is possibly the case. In these cases, S needs to believe C and the reasons adduced only in a weaker degree. When he presumes that C, he implies that though the reasons adduced do not offer strong evidence for C, they offer at least some evidence in its favour. In general, as I argued, arguing consists in the performance of a series of assertives. Often, even normally, it will include the performance of full-fledged assertions, but that needs to be not always the case. It may also include suppositions, assumptions and presumptions. As a result of this, the sincerity condition must be adjusted accordingly.

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482 Ibid. p. 41. Bermejo-Luque L, Giving Reasons (2011), p. 186, also holds that an act of arguing, to be fully felicitous, must not only 'show' a given claim to be correct, but must also be a good 'act of "showing"' (see p. 189-192).
483 Walton D N, The speech act of presumption (1993) 1(1) Pragmatics & Cognition p. 125, 126, presuming is 'half way between assertion and (mere) supposition' and that while an assertion 'implies a substantive commitment to the proposition asserted', a presumption 'essentially means that the proponent...does not have a [strong] burden of proof', and that it offers 'some provisional basis for going ahead, even in the absence of firm premises known to be true'.

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In some cases, the degree of commitment expressed by \( S \) may even reach or be close to zero.\(^{484}\) This is the case, for instance, when \( S \) just supposes a claim \( C \) to be true ‘for the sake of argument’. This sort of case is a large topic in the literature, and it is not my aim here to elaborate it in detail.\(^{485}\) But let me mention it briefly. As I claimed before, the most standard way of arguing for or against a claim is by directly adducing reasons for or against it. But another relatively common way of arguing is by supposing a certain claim to be true with a view to drawing implications from it. This is traditionally called arguing \textit{ad absurdum} (e.g. ‘If \( C \) were the case, then \( X \) would also be the case; \( X \) is not the case; therefore, \( C \) is not the case’).\(^{486}\) When \( S \) supposes that a certain claim is true for the sake of argument, \( S \) is not asserting it, i.e. he is not putting it forward as true. He does that only to investigate what would follow if it were true. Indeed, by supposing it to be true, he might be (and very often is) actually trying to show that it is \textit{not} true, and hence trying to argue against it.

Fisher argues that in cases of suppositional arguing (that is, of arguing that is based on a supposed claim), \( S \) ‘is not asserting (telling us)’ that the supposed claim is true. Normally, he is only asking \( H \) to consider it in order ‘to draw out its implications, usually with a view to accepting or rejecting it after some

\(^{484}\) These cases count as standard cases of arguing, as fully serious arguing, and must be contrasted with the non-standard cases discussed in section 5.1 below.


\(^{486}\) Fisher A, Suppositions in argumentation (1989) 3(4) \textit{Argumentation}, p. 403, refers to ‘indirect or reductio \textit{ad absurdum} arguments’. Jacobs S, Speech acts and arguments (1989) 3(4) \textit{Argumentation} p. 345, 354, also talks about ‘indirect argumentation’.
argumentation'. When \(S\) says ‘Suppose that’, nothing that follows is really asserted by him, and everything he says must be understood within the scope of that supposition (words such as ‘therefore’ or ‘it would follow that’ lose their assertive force). But \(S\) is still committed to a statement – a conditional – with his supposition in its antecedent (‘If it is true that \(C\), then...’), and the sincerity condition of his act has to be adjusted accordingly. For the act to be sincerely performed, \(S\) must believe only the conditional, but not the supposition in its antecedent or what is in its consequent. One peculiar feature of suppositions is that \(S\) is not expected to actually believe them. \(^{488}\)

In the next chapter, I use the list of conditions articulated in this section (especially the conditions for felicitous adducing, and the distinction between defective and unsuccessful adducing) to make a distinction between arguing and reason-giving as illocution-types.

5. Dealing with non-standard cases

Non-standard cases of arguing are to be explained in terms of how they depart from the standard cases. In the last chapter, I explained that speech act theory’s strategy of producing a list of felicity conditions is primarily based on standard cases, and that it excludes the non-standard cases only for methodological

\(^{487}\) Fisher A, Suppositions in argumentation (1989) 3(4) Argumentation, p. 403. He says that this is similar in the case of arguing on the basis of a hypothesis: ‘He’s not initially asserting that this is the case, but he’s considering it’ (he may eventually be prepared ‘to assert (or to deny it)’.  

\(^{488}\) Id. Ibid. (‘One who supposes \(P\) need not believe \(P\) (and may even know it to be false’).
reasons. If one wants to know what it is to perform a certain illocution-type, it is better not to start with instances of that illocution-type that are non-standard.

In the last section, I identified what is standardly necessary for $S$ to felicitously perform the illocution of arguing to $H$. My list of conditions presupposes that $S$ is arguing in a fully serious way to $H$, and in normal circumstances. Various authors endorse that the standard cases are those in which $S$ directly adduces reasons for or against a certain claim. In the next two sections, I discuss some non-standard cases of arguing only to explain how the account of arguing introduced in the foregoing sections would deal with them.

5.1. Playing devil’s advocate and hypothetical arguing

Various cases of arguing depart from the more central cases. Botting, for instance, says that sometimes, $S$ might be said to be arguing ‘just in an exploratory fashion to critically test a certain view point’. He argues that in those cases, $S$ is not really arguing, but only doing something that looks like arguing, for among other reasons, $S$ ‘may not believe the conditional [If $R$, then $C$], and there is no commitment to the conditional implied by the speech-act as

489 See chapter two, section 6.
such’. Since it is not a felicity condition of S’s act that he believes the conditional, if S does not believe the conditional, this ‘does not demonstrate any infelicity in the speech-act’. Botting holds that instead of arguing, it is better to describe this act as one of ‘establishing a viewpoint’s rational credentials’ or of ‘presenting an argument without making any implicit claims as to whether it is good or bad’. S is not putting the reasons forward as true, and hence is not really adducing those reasons, but simply mentioning them or trying them out.

Similarly, Jacobs refers to the cases of devil’s advocacy and hypothetical arguing, and treats these cases as non-standard cases of arguing. He says that the standard sort of context in which one does such things ‘is less one of advocacy [i.e. of seriously arguing for or against a claim] than it is one of idea-testing’. Sometimes, one does it just for fun. The primary function of what one does is ‘to test [in a non-committed way] …the acceptability or unacceptability of [a claim]’. S is not seriously committed to any of the conditions to which he would normally be committed if he were seriously arguing against that claim to H. Indeed, part of the point of playing devil’s advocate or arguing hypothetically is precisely to avoid any full-fledged commitment. Often, one adds disclaimers like ‘I am only playing devil’s advocate here’ or ‘I am just trying this out’, in order

492 Id. Ibid.
493 Id. Ibid.
494 Id. Ibid.
496 Id. Ibid.
497 Id. Ibid.
to make it fully plain to the hearer that he does not have any intention to be seriously committed to what he is doing. Jacobs says that in these cases,

‘the speaker is not committed to believing that O is unacceptable. Nor is [he] committed to believing that S₁, S₂, ..., Sₙ are acceptable... nor... to believing that S₁, S₂... Sₙ refute O’.

This is why these cases are best treated as non-standard cases of arguing. These are cases in which the speaker argues in a non-serious or not-fully-serious way. When I claim that these are non-standard cases, I do not claim that they are less important and should be neglected from the analysis. They may have, for instance, a high pedagogical value in relation to H. If S is a professor trying to bring his students to consider alternative ways of thinking about a claim, S may elaborate the best possible reasons for and against that claim, without committing himself to any particular side of the issue. His aim might be to teach his students how to think critically. In this case, one may say that S is not seriously arguing for or against that claim, even that he is not actually arguing for or against that claim at all. He is only doing something that looks like arguing.

How one ultimately treats these cases is a matter of secondary importance, provided that one is prepared to distinguish them from the standard cases and to explain how the former deviate from the latter.

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500 These cases are different from the cases of suppositional arguing discussed in the last section, which are standard cases and count as fully serious arguing.
5.2 Non-verbal arguing

I agree with O'Keefe that in the paradigmatic cases, arguing 'involves the communication of both (1) a linguistically explicable claim and (2) one or more overtly expressed reasons which are linguistically explicit'\(^{501}\) – and that are adduced in support of that claim. But one can also adduce and conclude non-verbally.\(^{502}\) Various authors argue that drawings, paintings and bodily gestures may be used to try to justify a claim C to H, and hence may be on occasion interpreted as an attempt to perform an act of arguing.\(^{503}\) Gilbert offers various examples in which one can be said to be adducing reasons or concluding non-verbally.\(^{504}\) He argues that not all arguing is 'ultimately linguistic' and that some modes of arguing are non-verbal. A various range of physical gestures – 'from a touch to classical nonverbal communication [to] body language'\(^{505}\) – can be interpreted on occasion as an act of arguing and he holds that they are additional modes to the 'logical-critical mode', which is the paradigmatic one.

Among other cases, Gilbert refers to the case of Michael, who is preparing food for dinner and Deanne asks him if he thinks adding a bit of curry is a good idea.

\(^{502}\) The cases falling into this category are different from the cases I mentioned in the end of section 2.3 of enthymematic arguments, in which either the reason, the justificatory claim, or the conclusion is left unexpressed under the assumption that they are common knowledge and do not need to be explicitly stated (these are standard cases of arguing).
\(^{505}\) Ibid. p. 84.
Michael says no. Deanne, instead of arguing verbally by adducing reasons to justify why she thinks Michael is wrong (e.g. by adding that ‘the powder would in various specific ways enhance the dish, or even that she had a particular yearning for curry’), chooses to go to the kitchen cupboard and begins searching around. Gilbert holds that even though Deanne has not argued verbally, she has *showed* [through her actions] how important she thought the curry was. He argues that, in this case, ‘it was her physical actions that comprised the argument’ and that it is possible to linguistically describe the argument (her actions can be interpreted as a non-verbal act of adducing a reason in support of the claim ‘You [Michael] are wrong’; the reason adduced being ‘Curry is important for me’ or some such). For Gilbert, if this is so, ‘the nonverbal analogue should also be...categorized [as an act of arguing].’

Take another example to further illustrate this point. On some occasions, pointing to a set of fingerprints on the wall may count as an attempt at justifying to someone that a person X committed the crime (which is the supported claim). But like the former case, I think that it can only be grasped as such an attempt if it is possible to reconstruct the steps that remain implicit in that gesture: ‘these are X’s fingerprints, they must be those of the culprit because there was no one else here, therefore X did it’. Only seeing the fingerprints is not enough. One needs to reconstruct the steps that one would need to articulate if one were to

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506 Ibid. p. 85.
507 Id. Ibid.
508 Id. Ibid.
explicitly argue for the claim ‘X did it’ to H. This includes fleshing out the chain of reasons underlying the act of pointing. This is a necessary condition for that act to be understood as a non-verbal attempt at adducing a reason for the claim ‘X did it’, and hence as an act of making or asserting a justificatory claim.  

The same applies for cases of arguing by exemplification. Goddu discusses the following case. King George III believed there were no black swans, and John Latham’s rebuttal was to place a black swan in front of the King. Is this latter act an act of arguing? It is clear that Latham’s action was an attempt at refuting the King’s claim ‘There are no black swans’ on the basis of presenting a counterexample. Goddu says that the striking feature of this case is that ‘the rebuttal (or at least the premise of the rebuttal) appears to be an object – a particular black swan – or the action that is the placing of the black swan before the king’. But, like the former cases, in order to interpret that action as an act of arguing for the claim ‘there are black swans’, one must be able to reconstruct what is implicit in the act performed: ‘Here is a swan; this swan is black; 

509 Gilbert (ibid. p. 81) gives a similar example: ‘Harry held a finger over his lips to signal for silence. He pointed to the door with his revolver. “He’s in there”, he said to Jane’. It can be reconstructed: ‘Since the robber is in there [reason], you should stay in silence [conclusion]’.
510 See, e.g. Sorensen R, ‘P, therefore P’ without Circularity (1991) 88(3) Journal of Philosophy p. 245-266 (he says that one may back the claim ‘I speak French’ by uttering ‘Je parles français’).
512 Ibid. p. 239.
therefore, there are swans that are black (or there is at least one swan that is black); therefore, the claim that there are no black swans is false’.\footnote{513}

Goddu explains that Latham might not have made the essential elements of that argument linguistically explicit – the reason, the conclusion and the inference-claim – for reasons of argumentative efficiency: ‘the black swan Latham places in front of George forestalls having to defend, ‘Latham’s swan is black’, for the swan itself makes it manifest that the proposition is true’\footnote{514}. He argues (rightly, in my view) that it is possible to identify the corresponding argument, even though it is non-verbally presented. The conclusion is the existential claim (‘There are black swans’) and the premise is the reason adduced, namely the example provided (the black swan). Latham’s action of placing a black swan in front of the King can thus be interpreted as an act of arguing. Whether the reason adduced is good or not depends on whether it is itself true or correct (e.g. whether the swan placed in front of the King is really black, and not merely painted black), and whether it provides sufficient support for the conclusion.

What those cases have in common is that they are all interpretable as non-verbal attempts at supporting a certain claim by means of (non-verbally) adducing a reason for it. I agree with Bermejo-Luque and other authors when they suggest that in order to count as an act of arguing, what is ultimately necessary is that it

\footnote{513}{Goddu (ibid. 247) holds that it contains ‘a premise saying the proffered example has the relevant properties and a conclusion saying something has (or can have) the relevant properties’.}
\footnote{514}{Id. Ibid. Searle, \textit{Speech Acts} (1969) p. 60, argues that in general ‘there is operating in our language, as in most forms of human behavior, a principle of least effort’.}
is possible to recognize – from what the arguer does – that he is putting forward a certain content as holding ‘for which an adequate inference-claim can be attributed’\textsuperscript{515}. Though, as I explained in the previous sections, the most standard cases of doing this involve linguistically expressing both the reason and the claim for which it is adduced, there are other possibilities. A given bodily gesture or an image can count as an act of arguing ‘as far as it makes sense to attribute to the [agent or the painter, or drawer] the corresponding inference-claim, and it will count as a good [act of arguing] to the extent that [the adduced] reason and the corresponding inference-claim are correct’\textsuperscript{516}.

Groarke gives several examples of visual arguments, and holds that when it is possible to recognize ‘a concatenation of visual statements in [an] image’\textsuperscript{517} mutually supporting each other, this image counts as an act of arguing. He uses the example of a poster that advocates opportunities for women at the University of Amsterdam. The poster presents the university’s three chief administrators (all males) in front of its official entrance. Groarke holds that the

\textsuperscript{515} Bermejo-Luque L, Giving Reasons (2011) p. 163. Groarke L, Logic, Art and Argumentation (1996) 18(2) Informal Logic p. 105, 107, argues that ‘visual arguments can...contain a premise-conclusion structure’; and Blair, J A, The Possibility and the Actuality of Visual Arguments (1996) 33(1) Argumentation and Advocacy p. 23, 26, argues that for visual communication to count as arguing, ‘it would have to have...the salient properties of arguments’ (on p. 28, he argues that to reconstruct a painting – e.g. Picasso’s Guernica – ‘as an argument, it is necessary not only to give propositional expression to it...but also to identify and distinguish premises (reasons) from conclusions, whether asserted visually or unexpressed (and discoverable from the context)’.

\textsuperscript{516} Bermejo-Luque L, Giving Reasons (2011) p. 163. This excludes some non-verbal acts from counting as acts of arguing. She gives as an example Coca-Cola’s frosty bottle, whose image is intended to convey the belief ‘Coca-Cola is refreshing’. Though the image of the bottle aims at producing that belief, it does not aim at producing that belief by ‘[showing] that Coca-Cola is refreshing since this bottle has frost’. She says that such a claim is so implausible that there is no reason ‘to attribute it to the creators’, and concludes that this is not a case of non-verbal arguing.

image 'makes a stark impression, placing all this confident maleness in front of (visually blocking) the university's main entrance'\textsuperscript{518}, and that, according to the very committee that designed the poster, it was aimed at making the claim that 'we want more women at our university' and 'still have a long way to go in this regard'\textsuperscript{519}. Similarly to the cases above, this poster can be interpreted as an act of arguing, because all the necessary elements are visually present and clearly identifiable – the reason, the conclusion and the inference-claim.

6. Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I used the notions of speech act theory – which I introduced in the previous chapter – to provide an analysis of arguing as an illocution-type. Its primary value is justification. This is the value that is of the very nature of arguing to realise. I held that its primary point is an assertive one, explained its illocutionary structure, and fleshed out its felicity conditions. I followed Bermejo-Luque’s account of arguing as a complex illocution-type, composed of two second-order illocutions, adducing and concluding. Whenever $S$ argues for or against a claim $C$ to $H$, $S$ tries to justify $C$ (or not $C$) to $H$. $S$ is then committed to adducing reasons that support $C$, to $C$ being a kind of claim that can be supported by reasons, to the act not being pointless (either in itself or in relation to $H$), to believing that the reasons adduced are good reasons for $C$, and to it being

\textsuperscript{518} Ibid. p. 111.
\textsuperscript{519} Id. Ibid.
charitably performed in relation to $H$ – e.g. in a language that $H$ can understand, with well-organized and clearly articulated reasons adduced.

If one follows speech act theory, felicitous arguing is not only but mainly a matter of adducing good reasons for a given claim – more precisely, reasons that actually support that claim as true or correct. To preserve ordinary intuition, however, I also argued that even though arguing is not an essentially-hearer directed illocution-type (someone may be said to be arguing to no particular hearer, even to no hearer at all), when $S$ argues in the presence of a hearer, $S$ must have some hearer-regarding sensitivity and perform the illocution charitably in relation to $H$ (the uptake condition). The felicity of an act of arguing depends mainly but not only on the actual relationship of justification itself. It also depends on whether, for instance, $S$ was sufficiently clear or informative in relation to $H$. But the main idea is that whenever $S$ argues for a claim $C$ to $H$, $S$ primarily intends to communicate that the reasons he adduces for $C$ are good reasons for $C$. This is the essential feature of arguing as an illocution-type.

This feature will be especially useful to make the contrast with reason-giving as an illocution-type. In the first chapter, I argued that it is often assumed that justification is the primary value of reason-giving. Good reason-giving is reason-

\[ \text{footnote}
520 \text{ I favor this view both because it is more intuitive, and because it offers a harder target to make the contrast with reason-giving. In the next chapter, I argue that even if one allows for some hearer-directedness as a condition for felicitous arguing, arguing and reason-giving still do not coincide. In particular, I claim that whereas someone might argue fully felicitously even if there is no hearer, one cannot successfully perform an act of reason-giving to no hearer.} \]
giving that actually justifies, and bad reason-giving is reason-giving that does not. If my analysis is right, however, justification is the primary value of arguing. Thus, justification would be the primary value of reason-giving only if reason-giving and arguing were identical illocution-types (in particular, if reason-giving and adducing were the same illocution-types). In the next chapter, my claim is that, though they have some features in common, they do not coincide. Reason-giving is to be treated as a discrete illocution-type that has a distinctive primary point and a distinctive primary value (both of which are different from arguing). I will explain why this is the case, and flesh out the main differences between arguing and reason-giving as illocution-types.
Chapter 4: Reason-Giving as a Speech Act

1. Introduction

In the last chapter, I identified the definitional features of arguing as an illocution-type and spelled out the conditions for its fully felicitous performance. Arguing is a complex speech act that has an assertive primary point, and is composed of two second-order illocution-types, adducing and concluding. It is the act of providing support for the correctness of a claim by adducing reasons for it. To argue is essentially to commit oneself to the existence of a relation between the reasons adduced and the supported claim. A competent arguer is thus someone who knows how to articulate reasons in support of the supported claim, and who knows how to do so in a charitable way towards a hearer H. I claimed that this account identifies different kinds of infelicity that may happen when one argues, and also explained how it deals with non-standard cases of arguing such as hypothetical and non-verbal arguing. The core idea is that felicitous arguing is mainly a matter of adducing good reasons for C, and that its primary value as an illocution-type is to achieve justification.

In this chapter, my thesis is that there is a certain illocution-type that though has some features in common with arguing, is different from arguing. I call it reason-giving. As I said in the Introduction of this thesis, especially for those working in speech act theory, the claim that reason-giving is a discrete illocution-type will probably sound more controversial than the claim that arguing can be so
understood, as the latter is commonly accepted in the existing literature. In that literature, reason-giving is not referred to as a discrete illocution-type or a speech act at all, only arguing is. Reason-giving does not appear in any mainstream list of illocution-types, such as Searle’s, Austin’s and Bach and Harnish’s. In particular, it may be thought that reason-giving is equivalent to adducing reasons (which I analysed in detail in the last chapter), but I will show below that there are good reasons for treating reason-giving as a discrete illocution-type. My hope is that what I say here will contribute to the debate within speech act theory, but its main role within the thesis is to offer a firm ground for defending my central claim about the intrinsic value of reason-giving in the next chapter.

Searle and Vanderveken claim that two illocution-types are identical only ‘when they are the same with respect to [all their definitional] features’\textsuperscript{521}. If they do not share all those features, they are not identical and thus, are different in some respect.\textsuperscript{522} My claim, thus, is that taken as an illocution-type, reason-giving has certain features that differ from those that define arguing.

The task of this chapter is to continue the analytical work of the last two chapters. The questions to be addressed are: What type of illocution is reason-giving? Does reason-giving have a discrete illocutionary force? What are its primary point and its primary value? How do they differ from the primary point

\textsuperscript{522} See chapter two, section 3.
and the primary value of arguing? What are the conditions for its fully felicitous performance? How do they differ from the conditions for a fully felicitous performance of arguing (especially for a fully felicitous performance of adducing)? I elaborate first by way of an example. I refer to this example here because it is a good intuitive illustration of what felicitous reason-giving is and of why I think making a distinction between arguing and reason-giving is a reasonable thing to do. This example will also help to introduce the main elements that must figure in the analysis of reason-giving as a speech act and, thus, to identify the specific differences with arguing.

2. Working example: Socrates’ case in the Crito

A good example to give an intuitive flavour of my claim that there is a distinction between arguing (and more particularly, adducing) and reason-giving as illocution-types is Socrates’ case in the Crito.\footnote{I refer to the translation made by Grube G M A, Plato, The Trial and Death of Socrates (2000) 3rd ed.} I will use it here as my working example. Socrates was convicted in trial for having corrupted the youth of Athens with his mode of living devoted to philosophy. In the dialogue, Crito – who is a devoted friend – is in deep distress about Socrates’ imminent death, and tries to persuade Socrates to escape from prison by adducing various reasons for why escaping is the right thing to do. Allen describes Crito ‘as an advocate, pleading a cause to his friend in behalf of his friend, using, as a pleader will, such
terms as he must to persuade. Crito appeals to the loss of Socrates’ friendship, to the negative effect that Socrates’ death would have on his (Crito’s) reputation and in the education of Socrates’ children, to how easy it would be to arrange the escape. Various commentators claim that these reasons reflect considerations that are appealing to ‘the many’ and reveal an innocent kind of lawlessness.

From the dialogue, it is clear that Crito is strongly convinced that escaping is the right thing for Socrates to do. After Crito presents his reasons, Socrates takes over and as a first step, he does not try to refute Crito’s conclusion directly (i.e. that he, Socrates, ought to escape). Rather, he adopts the more indirect strategy of raising doubts about the reasons Crito has just adduced for it – that is, he tries to produce in Crito a sense that these reasons might not be as good as Crito seems to think that they are. Some authors argue that this serves to prepare Crito’s own frame of mind for what is to come, and also shows that Socrates was aware that to change Crito’s mind – if possible at all – would take time and patience. After he does so, Socrates does give some reasons to Crito that directly contradict the conclusion Crito was defending – namely, that escaping

526 Woozley A D, Law and Obedience (1979) p. 17, argues that what Socrates does is first to maintain that ‘whatever the status of Crito’s conclusion, [Crito’s] reasons for it...are not good reasons’.
was the right thing to do. This is my main focus here. Various authors have noted that Socrates’ behaviour is puzzling in a number of different respects.  

First, Socrates does not attribute those reasons to himself, but to the laws. And he does not present them *in propria persona* to Crito, that is, in his own voice. What he does is to invite Crito to engage in a thought experiment. He invites Crito to imagine what the laws would say – the reasons they would give – if they discovered that Socrates was planning to escape and to disobey them. Socrates says: ‘Look at it this way [Crito]. If, as we were planning to run away from here...the laws...came, confronted us and asked’. And, in the sequence, he says (playing the laws): ‘Tell me, Socrates, what are you intending to do? Do you not by this action are attempting to destroy us, the laws...?’ He then continues by saying that, among other things, the laws would reply that by escaping, he would be doing his best to destroy them in the face of his community and also to violate his own commitments to live in accordance with them.

Second, it is often argued that these reasons are not merely bad justificatory reasons for not escaping, but also that they are inconsistent with the very

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529 Yeats L B, *Thought Experimentation* (2004) p. 150, defines: ‘A thought experiment is a device with which one performs an intentional, structured process of intellectual deliberation in order to speculate, within a specifiable problem domain, about potential consequents (or antecedents) for a designated antecedent (or consequent)’.


531 Id. Ibid.

532 He adds (51b) that the laws would say that an unjust verdict is not a sufficient reason for disobeying it, for no one should treat the laws as their equal. They claim authority, in that one should obey them regardless of whether one agrees with them or not.
standards that Socrates explicitly endorses in the dialogue.\textsuperscript{533} Weinrib, for instance, argues that their inconsistency is so pervasive and systematic, that it is hard to believe that they could be convincing to Socrates.\textsuperscript{534} This is a fact that even authors who are not so critical of those reasons are ready to note.\textsuperscript{535} However, some of the things Socrates says do leave the impression that he believes these reasons to be good. He says that their echo resounded in him as ‘the Corybants seem to hear the music of their flutes’, and that they make it ‘impossible for [him] to hear anything else’\textsuperscript{536}. Because in the end he stays, the ultimate impression is that he did agree with them after all. But if they were bad reasons according to his own standards, how could they be so persuasive to him? And how could he present himself as being so persuaded by them? Some authors have even raised a charge of dishonesty against Socrates here.\textsuperscript{537}

Authors often think that these two features are puzzling and demand an explanation. Why did Socrates leave Crito with such bad reasons (as I said, they are not only inconsistent with Socrates’ own standards, but also do not justify

\textsuperscript{534}Weinrib E J, Obedience to the Law in Plato’s Crito (1982) 27(1) The American Journal of Jurisprudence p. 85, 103: The reasons of the laws remain ‘oddly detached from the principles on which [they are] supposedly grounded’, on p. 101: they ‘are not of the sort required to convince him’.
\textsuperscript{535}Farrell D M, Illegal Actions, Universal Maxims and the Duty to Obey the Law (1978) 6(2) Political Theory p. 173, argues that Socrates has not managed to prove that it would be wrong for him to try to escape, but he also holds that Socrates ‘comes much closer to [justifying his belief] than most commentators have been willing to concede’.
\textsuperscript{536}Plato, The Trial and Death of Socrates, Grube G.M.A (trans), 54d. Young G, Socrates and Obedience (1974) 19(1) Phronesis p. 1, 28, holds that the first impression of this passage is no doubt ‘that it expresses Socrates’ agreement with what…the laws say’.
\textsuperscript{537}See, e.g. Beversluis J, Cross-Examining Socrates (2004) p. 73.
the claim that escaping is wrong? And why did he not present them in his own voice? Vlastos refers to what Socrates does here as ‘a curious act of self-abnegation – an act without parallel in the Platonic corpus’\textsuperscript{538}, and Strauss notes that ‘what the Laws are made to tell him reduces him...to a quasi-somnolent state’\textsuperscript{539}. For some authors, that they are bad justificatory reasons from Socrates’ own standards is even more puzzling, because the very fact that Socrates gives those reasons to Crito is for them sufficient reason for assuming that he believes them to be good. Insofar as they support the conclusion that escaping is wrong, and that Socrates believed that conclusion, they also assume that these were his real reasons for not escaping\textsuperscript{540}, and therefore that they must be reasons ‘of grave philosophic significance’\textsuperscript{541}. Woozley, for instance, says that ‘the views as presented, and the reasons advanced from them, are what...matter’\textsuperscript{542} (he even writes a whole book to assess their justificatory quality).

In my view, the explanation for why this is seen as a puzzle lies in the assumption that what Socrates primarily intended to do was to argue in favour of his belief to Crito, and against the conclusion Crito was so strongly defending (that he ought to escape). It was to adduce reasons against that conclusion. If one assumes this (as is commonly done), what he does is indeed puzzling. Socrates’

\textsuperscript{539} Strauss L, Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy (1986) p. 54.
\textsuperscript{540} See, e.g. Woozley A D, Law and Obedience (1979), p. 29; Farrell D M, Illegal Actions, Universal Maxims and the Duty to Obey the Law (1978) 6(2) Political Theory p. 173, also claims that he meant them 'to be taken seriously and at face value', and that they were 'intended to provide at least a sketch of [his position]'.
\textsuperscript{542} Woozley A D, Law and Obedience (1979) p. 9.
act violates some of the conditions that are necessary for felicitous arguing. In particular, it violates the second condition of the list I presented for felicitous adducing\textsuperscript{543}, for even though they are true, the reasons adduced for not escaping (which is the supported claim) are bad reasons for it, and do not justify that claim. It also probably violates the sincerity condition, for though he seems to believe the supported claim, he does not seem to believe that the reasons he adduces for it are good reasons for it. If the focus is only on the conditions for felicitous arguing, it is impossible to assess what Socrates does as felicitous. Socrates’ act would fail as an act of arguing taken into account the model I presented in the last chapter.

Authors often focus on the content of Socrates’ act – i.e. on the reasons that he gives – and stress how low their justificatory value is. Their focus is primarily on whether Socrates’ act justifies what it (presumably) purports to justify, and thus, on whether the reasons he gives are good reasons for it. In my view, this focus on justification has led many authors to neglect a certain value that Socrates’ act has that is more important to note and to explain than is its low justificatory value. This is a value that his act has quite apart from whether the reasons he gives to Crito are bad justificatory reasons and are insincerely given (indeed, I think that, in this case, it is a value that his act has because they are bad justificatory reasons and insincere).\textsuperscript{544} Various authors share the intuition that, in despite of this,

\textsuperscript{543} See chapter three, section 4.  
\textsuperscript{544} Later on, I argue that they are not strictly speaking, insincerely given (he only does not believe them to be good in a justificatory sense).
Socrates’ act is still very felicitous. The problem, however, is that one cannot explain why if one assumes that what he does is primarily meant as an instance of arguing (i.e. of adducing reasons in support of a certain claim, an attempt at justifying it). Ultimately, I think that Socrates’ act cannot be fully explained in terms of intentions that one typically has when arguing.

In virtue of this, some authors argue that there is a better way of explaining what Socrates does here. They argue (in my view, rightly) that it is impossible to fully explain Socrates’ act in terms of a desire or intention to speak what he believes simpliciter (i.e. of adducing reasons that he believes to be good reasons for holding a certain claim as correct), without taking into account the particular hearer he is addressing in the situation – his friend Crito. The reference to Crito is essential to understand what he does. Congleton, for instance, argues that the puzzle about Socrates’ act – the puzzle about bad reasons – is only an apparent or a false puzzle, and that it can be easily dissolved if one attends ‘closely to the person with whom Socrates is speaking and to the circumstances [of his act].’

She suggests that the very fact that this is seen as a puzzle might be the result of a failure to pay due attention to this fact (in my view, it has also to do with the

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fact that commentators often attribute an excessive emphasis on justification as a source of value in Socrates’ act).

As I explained above, Crito was emotionally distressed for seeing Socrates in that situation. He was also so absorbed with his own reasons and committed to saving Socrates, that he was incapable of seeing anything else. This is why Socrates tries first to make Crito aware that there are at least some objections to the position Crito was so strongly and one-sidedly defending, and also why he presents the reasons of the laws to Crito not in an abstract way, but tries to give expression to them as vividly as he can. He imitates them even in their authoritative tone, for he was also trying to express to Crito the special kind of superiority that the laws claim to have over their subjects. Some authors suggest that Socrates presents these reasons in that way, because this would likely have a stronger impact on Crito himself, who is a member of ‘the many’. Socrates is still trying to persuade Crito that his view is correct, but he is doing so by adducing reasons he does not believe to be good. And he probably does that partly because Crito would be more disposed to hear them if they were put into
the mouth of the laws than if Socrates had presented them in his own voice.\textsuperscript{547}

But note that it is still Socrates who is giving those reasons and not the laws.\textsuperscript{548}

In this reading, Socrates does not attribute those reasons to himself both because they are inconsistent with what he himself believes (and he knows that)\textsuperscript{549}, and because they were more appropriate to Crito in the situation. Socrates was aware that there was a fundamental difference in the categories in terms of which he and Crito perceived the situation, and also knew that though he was a valued friend, Crito was not and would probably never be in a position to understand Socrates’ real reasons. The overriding value philosophy had for him, his own principles, these are all essential to understand Socrates’ resignation towards his own death. But Socrates knew that Crito was unable to understand them anyway\textsuperscript{550}, and thereby adjusted his reasons to Crito’s limited capacity for understanding.\textsuperscript{551} At the same time, though he was convinced that escaping was wrong, he was also aware that Crito was in deep distress with his imminent

\textsuperscript{547} Young G, Socrates and Obedience (1974) 19(1) \textit{Phronesis} p. 1, 12: ‘the laws...are presumably more awesome in Crito’s eyes, endowed with a more impersonal and a higher authority, than Socrates.’ Also Koritansky J, Strauss on the Apology and Crito, in: Burns T (ed.), \textit{Brill’s companion to Leo Strauss’ writings on classical political thought} (2015) p. 419: ‘the Laws have an easier time persuading Crito than they would otherwise insofar as they have been given soul and voice’, and he adds that Crito listens with a ‘reverential silence to what “the Laws”...says’.

\textsuperscript{548} Young G, Socrates and Obedience (1974) 19(1) \textit{Phronesis} p. 1, 12, holds that it is ‘Socrates, playing the laws, [who] questions Socrates, pretending he is about to [escape from] Athens’.

\textsuperscript{549} Weinrib holds that ‘the [reasons] are not enunciated directly by Socrates because they are not consistent with his philosophic position’, Weinrib E J, Obedience to the Law in Plato’s Crito (1982) 27(1) \textit{The American Journal of Jurisprudence} p. 85, 102.


death and was unwilling to accept that conclusion. And he wanted to do something to help Crito cope with it.

The best he could do, thus, was to offer Crito reasons he did not regard as decisive, but that would seem to support his own position to someone like Crito (who was a non-philosophical person). This was the way he found in the situation to preserve both his commitment to what he believed (he did not, at least not so clearly, lie to Crito, for he attributed the reasons to the laws), and to preserve his commitment to Crito as someone for whom he genuinely cared. The reasons he gives Crito do seem to count against Crito’s conclusion, and in favour of his decision to stay in prison and to die. But they do not accord with the way he himself sees the situation, only with the way Crito sees it. They are not his real reasons, for they resemble categories of popular morality that sound appealing to ‘the many’ and lack the degree of coherence that is to be expected from the reasons of someone like Socrates (a philosopher). In this reading, thus, Socrates tries to reject Crito’s conclusion, but in Crito’s own terms, that is, in terms that Crito could himself identify with.

Socrates’ act is important not for what it reveals about his own reasons, but for what it shows about his ‘concern for the person with whom he is speaking’. He considers ‘exactly who it is with whom he is speaking, what that person’s present

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frame of reference is...where that person is starting from"\textsuperscript{554}, and responds accordingly. The image some readers have of the Socrates of earlier dialogues as someone who was utterly insensitive to his interlocutors' needs is not true in the case of Crito.\textsuperscript{555} Socrates displays a high sensibility to understand what Crito needs, and does what he does because he cares about Crito and for Crito's own sake, rather than for his own.\textsuperscript{556}

On this reading (which I think is a plausible one), Socrates' act has a value that cannot be grasped if one takes what Socrates does merely as an instance of arguing, and thus, by asking whether the reasons he gives to Crito are good justificatory reasons, well organized, or whether he believes them to be good. Put otherwise: we cannot fully evaluate Socrates' act merely by asking whether it counts as a fully felicitous act of arguing – with its primary value being justification. To understand this value, one must pay closer attention to how he gives those reasons, for which purposes and to whom. Ultimately, my claim is that what Socrates does is not (and is not meant to be) an instance of arguing, and that to understand his speech act as felicitous (which, as I said, is an intuition shared by some authors, and one that I also find plausible), one must assume that he is doing something else. In what follows, my suggestion is that he is performing an act of reason-giving. Its most important value lies in something other than justification, and is a value that it has apart from its low justificatory

\textsuperscript{554} Id. ibid.

\textsuperscript{555} Nussbaum M C, The Therapy of Desire (1996) p. 36, holds that some of Socrates' readers have the impression that Socrates' behaviour exhibits 'aloofness...lack of affect, and his ironic distance from his [interlocutors]'.

value. In particular, I argue that this value is best understood as an expressive one, for it is a value that lies in the attitude Socrates expresses in relation to Crito.

Socrates’ act illustrates that there is a contrast to be made between arguing and reason-giving as illocution-types. I believe that it offers a good starting point here, because it offers a good intuitive illustration of a fully felicitous act of reason-giving and therefore, of the main features that reason-giving has as an illocution-type, that is, of the features that characterise it in terms of speech act theory. One possible way to assess his act is simply to say that it is infelicitous arguing, because it does not achieve justification. It is to say that the reasons he gives to Crito are bad reasons for the supported claim and insincerely adduced. But, in my view, this does not explain everything there is to be explained. Another way (which I find more convincing) is to say that there are indeed two distinct illocution-types that resemble each other but are not the same. In the next sections, I identify and explain these features to establish the claim that, even though reason-giving has some similarities with arguing, reason-giving is best treated as an illocution-type of its own.

3. Reason-giving and its definitional features

3.1. Primary point and mode of achievement
As I said before, if one looks at Austin’s and Searle’s lists of illocution-types, and other lists as well (e.g. Bach and Harnish’s), no reference at all is made to reason-giving as an illocution-type, only to arguing. The term ‘reason-giving’ is often used loosely to refer to a variety of acts.557 Directive illocutions (e.g. ordering or requesting $H$ to do something) are often described as acts of reason-giving – as attempts to give $H$ a particular kind of reason to do or not to do something.558 Other acts are not so clearly definable, but often operate in a similar way. I may promise something to you, partly as an attempt to give you a reason to believe that I will do what I promise.559 Some authors even offer a general account of illocution-types based on this idea. Bach and Harnish claim that illocution-types can all be conceived as attempts at giving $H$ a reason to believe that $S$ has a certain attitude (e.g. a belief, an intention, a feeling, a desire), and differentiate illocution-types by the type of attitude that is expressed.560 Here, I refer to reason-giving in a more specific sense, as a discrete illocution-type.

In the second chapter, I argued that the primary point and the primary value are the two most basic features of an illocution-type, and that all the other features (e.g. its felicity conditions and its mode of achievement) are either a result of or a

557 Bermejo-Luque L, Giving Reasons Does Not Always Amount to Arguing (2015) Topoi, p. 1, argues that ‘there is a harmful ambiguity in the expression ‘giving reasons’, and attributes this ambiguity partly to the lack of an adequate definition of ‘reasons’. In the same paper, she refers to arguing as only one type of reason-giving act.


559 When I promise, I also create a reason for myself to do the promised act.

560 Bach K and Harnish R M, Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts (1982) chap. 3: ‘to express an attitude in uttering something is...to intend that the hearer take one’s utterance as reason to believe one has the attitude’.
modification from its primary point and its primary value.\textsuperscript{561} Let me start with the primary point. This is the point that is essential to an illocution of its type, the point without which that illocution would not be the type of illocution that it is. In the last chapter, I claimed that arguing has an assertive primary point, similar to the primary point of stating, claiming or suggesting that something is or is not the case. At first sight, reason-giving also seems to be more readily associated to an assertive primary point. Authors who think of reason-giving as an act normally think of it as an act of arguing or explaining something, thus as having an assertive point.\textsuperscript{562} I think this is misleading, and that reason-giving’s primary point is best construed as an expressive one. As I explained in the second chapter, to follow Searle, when one performs a given illocution-type one is either

\begin{quote}
[\texttt{telling}] people how things are, \texttt{[or trying]} to get them to do things, \texttt{[committing oneself]} to doing things, \texttt{[or expressing]} feelings and attitudes \texttt{[or bringing]} about change in the world through our utterances
\end{quote}

Which of these things is one primarily doing in reason-giving? In which of these basic categories does my working example, Socrates’ act, best fit? One reason for thinking that reason-giving’s primary point is expressive is that it cannot be well explained in terms of any other primary point of Searle’s list.\textsuperscript{564} If one takes

\textsuperscript{561} See chapter two, sections 3.1 and 3.2.
\textsuperscript{562} The most prominent case is Brandom R, \textit{Articulating reasons} (2001) p. 193, who says that ‘giving reasons for a claim is producing other assertions that license or entitle one to it, that justify it’; Brandom R, \textit{Making it Explicit} (1998) p. 167: ‘The idea is that assertings \ldots are in the fundamental case\ldots what giving a reason always consists in’ (also p. 276).
\textsuperscript{564} I assume (and agree with Searle) that his list of five basic primary points is actually exhaustive, and when I refer to primary point here, I refer again to primary \textit{illocutionary} point,
Socrates’ act, his act clearly does not have a commissive primary point, because its primary point is not to commit Socrates to doing something. Its primary point is also not declarative nor directive, for it is neither to bring about a change in the world nor an attempt to get Crito to do or not do something. Its primary point is also not assertive. What Socrates primarily does is not to adduce reasons to support a certain claim as correct. Even though this might be at some level of description part of what he does, this is not the primary point of his act (I will come back to this shortly). Its primary point is neither to give Crito reasons that are true or correct nor reasons that offer good support for the claim. Rather, taking into account what I said in the last section, its primary point has more to do with giving reasons that are particularly suited to Crito. To put this in speech act theory’s terms, his primary intention is to give reasons that fit the way Crito himself sees the world, rather than reasons that fit how the world actually is.

This is why I think that the primary point of Socrates’ act is not assertive, i.e. it is not ‘to commit [him]...to something’s being the case [in the world]’ (in particular, that the reasons he gives to Crito are good reasons in support of the relevant claim). To follow Searle and Vanderveken, its primary point is not to say

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for Socrates might plausibly be thought to be also intending to achieve some perlocutions in Crito (such as calming Crito down, persuading him).

565 This is why I think that reason-giving’s primary point should also not be construed as a mixed one (see chapter two, section 3.1). In the second chapter, I argued that some illocutions do have a mixed primary point (e.g. complaining, lamenting). When S complains that it is raining, S commits both to it being true that it is raining, and to feeling dissatisfied. But I do not think that reason-giving has a mixed primary point.

that ‘the propositional content matches the world’\textsuperscript{567}. From this brief overview, one can already see that the only option left is then the expressive point. It is thus possible to argue that by exclusion, reason-giving’s primary point can only be understood as an expressive one.

This is not the only reason for thinking that reason-giving’s primary point is an expressive one, however. Another reason – indeed, a more important one – is that identifying reason-giving with an expressive primary point (i.e. with the expression of a certain attitude or feeling of Socrates to Crito) offers a more intuitive way of describing the primary point of Socrates’ act. I think that all its puzzling features can be well explained if its primary point is understood as expressive – e.g. the fact that he does not attribute the reasons to himself, that he does not believe them to be good, that he makes a representation of them as vivid as he can to Crito by playing the laws, and even the fact that they are bad justificatory reasons.\textsuperscript{568} In particular, it offers a plausible explanation for the leading intuition identified in the last section, namely, that Socrates’ act is still in some sense fully felicitous, for it realises a certain value (which I flesh out in detail in the next section), even though it fails to achieve (indeed, I think that it does not even aim at achieving, properly understood) justification.

\textsuperscript{567} Searle J R and Vanderveken D, \textit{Foundations of Illocutionary Logic} (2009) p. 54. As I explained in the last section, I think that its primary point is not even to give Crito a reason to believe that Socrates \textit{believes} that the propositional content he is asserting matches the world (even though, one may argue that Socrates intends to do that).

\textsuperscript{568} I provide a full explanation for why the expressive understanding I am defending here dissolves these puzzling features in the following sections.
To make this more informative, let me first draw some considerations about expressive illocutions in general. An illocution-type is expressive when its primary point is to express a certain feeling or attitude of $S$ to $H$—e.g. dissatisfaction, fear, gratitude, regret. Thanking, apologizing, praising, congratulating, greeting are examples of expressive illocutions. Various illocutions express an attitude of $S$ to $H$, but are not expressive in this sense because their primary point is not to express that attitude or feeling to $H$. This is the case of all directives. Whenever $S$ orders or requests $H$ to do something, $S$ may be said to express a desire that $H$ do it, but the primary point of $S$’s act is not to express that desire to $H$, but a directive one—namely, to try to give $H$ a reason to do it (or to get $H$ to do it). Expressive illocutions are also not assertive illocutions. When $S$ says ‘I am disgusted by John’s behaviour’, this is best construed as an assertive illocution, for its primary point is to report to $H$ the disgust he feels about John’s behaviour (rather than to express that disgust).

Searle and Vanderveken argue that ‘the verb “express” is ambiguous between the sense of “express” in which humans express propositions...and the sense of “express” in which they express their feelings and emotions’ to $H$, and that it is only this latter sense in which one may be said to ‘express’, ‘manifest’, or ‘give vent to’ one’s feelings to $H$ that is relevant to the explanation of expressive

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569 In the second chapter, I only explained expressive illocutions briefly (section 3.1).
570 See chapter two, section 3.1.
571 The primary point of $S$’s act here is to accurately represent or describe the emotional state of $S$ in relation to John’s behaviour (rather than to express that state). See, e.g. Alston W P, *Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning* (2000) p. 104.
Illocution-types. Similarly, Bach and Harnish also claim that the distinctive feature of some illocution-types – they call them 'acknowledgements' – is that they 'express feelings regarding the hearer'\(^{573}\), and Alston explains that performing an expressive illocution 'is a matter of linguistically making [a certain attitude] public, getting it out into the open'\(^{574}\). Other authors have also endorsed a similar view.\(^{575}\) Austin also suggests that some illocutions are essentially connected to the adoption of 'an attitude towards a person' (or to 'the taking up of an attitude'\(^{576}\)), and calls them 'behabitives'. Though he does not develop this in detail, he says that behabitives include

> '[...] expressions of attitudes to someone else [and though] there are obvious connexions [between performing a behabitive and] both stating or describing what our feelings are and expressing, in the sense of venting our feelings...behabitives are distinct from both of these'\(^{577}\)

Austin adds that in numerous cases, 'the adoption of an attitude is conventionally considered an appropriate or fitting response or reaction'\(^{578}\), and that the distinctive feature of behabitives is that, due to their nature, they are themselves 'designed to exhibit attitudes and feelings'\(^{579}\). He stresses that performing a

\(^{573}\) Bach K and Harnish R M, *Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts* (1982) p. 41. Austin J L, *How to Do Things with Words* (1962), p. 78, argues that sometimes 'for...perhaps less estimable reasons...it becomes de rigueur to 'express' these feelings [e.g. gratitude, sympathy]...when they are felt fitting, regardless of whether we really feel anything at all which we are reporting'.


\(^{575}\) Habermas J, *The Theory of Communicative Action* (1984) p. 308, says that when one performs an expressive speech act, one 'discloses, reveals, confesses, manifests something' of his subjective world to H. He also claims that they raise 'a special claim to truthfulness and sincerity'.


\(^{577}\) Ibid. p. 160.

\(^{578}\) Ibid. p. 78.

\(^{579}\) Ibid. p. 83.
behabitive is to express an attitude or feeling to H, rather than merely to describe it – e.g. ‘I feel grateful’ or ‘I feel regretful’ – or to inform H that one has it.\textsuperscript{580}

Searle explains expressive illocutions in a similar way. In his work with Vanderveken, he argues that in general, performing an expressive illocution involves the expression ‘of a belief, and [of] a desire [to express the attitude expressed]...but the point of the speech act is not to express that belief and desire but rather to express the state of sorrow, pleasure, gratitude etc.’\textsuperscript{581}. Take some examples. Whenever S apologizes to H, he presupposes not only that he has various beliefs (e.g. that he has done something, that it was bad to H), but also that he has a certain desire (to express regret, which is the attitude expressed). However, the point of apologizing is neither to express these beliefs nor that desire to H, but to express sorrow or regret to H.\textsuperscript{582} Likewise, whenever S thanks H, S also presupposes that he has various beliefs (e.g. that H has done something, that this was something good to have done, that benefited S in some way) and

\textsuperscript{580} He argues (ibid. p. 81) that a behabitive ‘is not merely a conventional expression of feeling or attitude’, and that there is a difference between ‘being sorry [and] apologizing, or in being grateful...[and] thanking’.

\textsuperscript{581} Searle J R and Vanderveken D, \textit{Foundations of Illocutionary Logic} (2009) p. 94 (‘which presupposes the truth of that belief and involves an expression of that desire’). They add that there are only few exceptions to this general principle, such as some expressive illocutions that are simply expressions of desire such as ‘If only John would come!’ cases where the attitude expressed refers itself to a desire.

\textsuperscript{582} S can actually perform the expressive speech act of apologising indirectly, merely by asserting the sincerity condition thereof (I am sorry) – indeed, that is the standard way of apologizing (rather than saying ‘I apologize’).
also that he has the desire to express gratitude to H. But its primary point is not
to express these beliefs or that desire, but to express gratitude for H.\textsuperscript{583}

Searle and Vanderveken clarify this central claim by holding that in general, the
primary point ‘of an expressive illocution is not to say that the propositional
content matches the world [as in assertives], nor to get the world to match the
propositional content [as in directives and commissives]’, but that it is ‘simply to
express the speaker’s attitude’\textsuperscript{584} in relation to the hearer, or to a certain state of
affairs in the world. Indeed, this is the main reason why they believe that it is
better to treat expressive illocutions as a separate basic category of illocution-
types. In various passages, they stress that in expressive illocutions ‘there is no
question of achieving success of fit between the propositional content and the
world’, and that when S performs them, S has no responsibility for fitting ‘the
propositional content of the illocution [to] an independently existing state of
affairs in the world’\textsuperscript{585}. As the authors above, Searle and Vanderveken also think
that the distinctive feature of expressive illocutions is that their primary point is
simply to express a certain attitude or feeling by S to H.

Within the category of expressive illocutions, it is possible to draw a distinction
between illocutions whose primary point is simply to express a feeling or

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{583} Likewise, whenever S condoes, S also presupposes that he has some beliefs (e.g. that
something bad happened with H) and a desire, but the point of condingoling is to express sympathy
for H, as the point of congratulating is to express pleasure for H having done something
noteworthy (rather than merely the belief that H has done it). For a comprehensive list, see
\item \textsuperscript{584} Ibid. p. 54.
\item \textsuperscript{585} Ibid. p. 53.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
attitude of $S$ to $H$ (e.g. complaining, boasting) and illocutions whose primary point is to express a feeling or attitude of $S$ to $H$ toward or in relation to $H$ (e.g. thanking, congratulating, praising, apologizing).\textsuperscript{586} Illocution-types belonging to that second group are essentially hearer-directed, while illocution-types belonging to the first group are not.\textsuperscript{587}

Complaining and boasting have both an expressive primary point, but the attitude they express is not essentially $H$-directed. $S$ may complain to $H$ about the weather, inflation, or the laws of logics. Of course, he can complain to $H$ about something $H$ has done, but this is not essential for $S$ to be complaining. Boasting is an even clearer case, for it is essentially not hearer-directed. To boast is to express pride for something related to oneself, either something one has done or that happened to one. This is different from thanking, congratulating, praising, apologizing. When $S$ performs them, $S$ expresses an attitude to $H$ that is essentially $H$-directed. When $S$ thanks $H$, he thanks $H$ for something $H$ has done. When $S$ congratulates or praises $H$, $S$ expresses pleasure or admiration for $H$ about something $H$ has done. When $S$ apologizes to $H$, $S$ expresses regret for having done something bad in relation to $H$. Different from complaining and boasting, it is an essential feature of these latter illocutions that the attitude they express is an attitude towards or in relation to $H$.

\textsuperscript{586} Searle J R and Vanderveken D, \textit{Foundations of Illocutionary Logic} (2009) p. 212, argue that ‘one apologizes to the hearer and one thanks the hearer in each case for something about him [the hearer]’.

\textsuperscript{587} See chapter two, section 3.4.3.
It is possible to make a further distinction within the class of expressive illocutions that are essentially \(H\)-directed. Within that class, there are illocutions which are essentially tied to the expression of an attitude by \(S\) to \(H\) in relation to \(H\) that is essentially \(H\)-friendly (such as thanking, congratulating, apologizing, complimenting, which respectively, express gratitude, pleasure, regret and approval to \(H\) in relation to \(H\))\(^{588}\), and illocutions that are essentially tied to the expression of an attitude to \(H\) in relation to \(H\) that is not \(H\)-friendly – e.g. despising, resenting, cursing \(H\), which respectively, express contempt, resentment or curse in relation to \(H\).\(^{589}\)

These considerations help to explain in more precise terms reason-giving’s primary point. Its primary point is similar to the primary point of expressive illocution-types that are essentially \(H\)-directed and essentially \(H\)-friendly. As I just explained, these are illocutions that are essentially tied to the expression of an attitude towards or in relation to \(H\) and that is \(H\)-friendly (such as thanking, congratulating, praising and apologizing). If one takes Socrates’ act again (which I take to be a good intuitive illustration of a fully felicitous act of reason-giving), it is possible to see why Socrates’ act is essentially Crito-directed and Crito-friendly. For the reasons already explained, it is likely that Socrates would not have given the same reasons and in the same way if he were addressing a different hearer, and the reference to Crito – the particular \(H\) he is addressing – is

\(^{588}\) There are other illocution-types that are \(H\)-friendly, such as advising, warning and promising (though they belong to different basic categories, directive and commissive).
\(^{589}\) Strawson P F, Freedom and Resentment and other essays (2008) p. 6, draws a distinction between ‘attitudes...of goodwill, affection, or esteem...[and] contempt, indifferece or malevolence on the other’.
essential to understand what Socrates does (and also to understand why
Socrates does what he does). Crito, though he was a decent and loyal friend, did
not have the same capacity for understanding that Socrates had. In the last
section, I suggested that it was precisely this fact that leads Socrates to adjust his
reasons to Crito (and to give Crito bad justificatory reasons).\textsuperscript{590}

This strong hearer-directedness marks a central difference between reason-
giving and arguing. In the last chapter, I argued that arguing is not essentially
hearer-directed, for though often (even normally) one argues in the presence of a
hearer, one can be said to be arguing even if there is no hearer.\textsuperscript{591} But this is not
the case with reason-giving.\textsuperscript{592} One way to see this difference is by imagining a
variation of Socrates’ case. Imagine that Socrates is entirely indifferent towards
Crito and that instead of giving reasons with which Crito could identify, he
chooses to give a more honest reply. He gives Crito his real reasons, that is,
reasons that he believes to be good and also actually justify the supported claim
– that he ought not escape (even though he knew Crito would be unable to
understand them).\textsuperscript{593} He might even give these reasons only in the attempt to
make Crito suffer even more. In this case, one could criticize Socrates for being

\textsuperscript{590}On section 4 (on felicity conditions), I argue that felicitous act of reason-giving has to fit its
propositional content to the particular $H$ (and the kind of relationship $S$ has with $H$).
\textsuperscript{591} See chapter three, section 2.1.
\textsuperscript{592} This does not undermine the claim that whenever one argues to a hearer $H$, one is always
expressing (in some degree) the attitude that one expresses to $H$ when reason-giving (but
expressing this attitude – which I identify in the next section with one of recognition – is neither
the primary point nor the primary value of an act of arguing). This is precisely why I think that it
is better to keep a distinction between the two illocution-types here.
\textsuperscript{593} As I mentioned last section, Socrates’ real reasons had to do with his devotion to philosophy,
his being disposed to be committed to it regardless of what it may happen to him (even if that
commitment would lead him to die).
insensitive, but taken as an act of arguing, he could still be arguing for his belief to Crito and doing so fully felicitously.

The reasons he adduces for the relevant claim can still be true or correct, offer good support for that claim, be charitably presented to Crito (i.e. be well-ordered, presented in a clear language), and be sincerely adduced (Socrates might believe that they are true or correct and that they offer good support for the relevant claim). Socrates’ act could still fulfil all the conditions that are necessary for it to count as a fully felicitous act of arguing. The mere fact that Socrates is indifferent towards Crito in no way turns his act into an infelicitous act of arguing. The explanation for this, in my view, lies in the fact that arguing is not essentially hearer-directed. In the following sections, I explain why this would turn his act into infelicitous reason-giving. For now, it is only important to stress that different from arguing, reason-giving is essentially hearer-directed. As I argued in the last section, the fact that Socrates gives Crito reasons that are not good reasons in a justificatory sense is secondary in relation to the attitude he expresses to his hearer in relation to his hearer while giving them.

From this, I conclude that reason-giving and arguing do not have the same primary point, for while arguing has an assertive primary point, reason-giving is best construed as having an expressive one. The similarities between reason-giving and arguing as illocution-types can be explained in terms of their mode of achievement. Both take the form of an argument, and in a certain level of description, can be described as acts of pointing out considerations that count in
favour of or against a certain claim. Indeed, reason-giving is usually (perhaps even paradigmatically) performed through an act of arguing. As I argue in the following sections, a fully felicitous act of reason-giving can also be a fully felicitous act of arguing (but, as Socrates’ act shows, this is not always the case). I think that their identical mode of achievement constitutes one reason for why the reason-giving illocution has been overlooked. For the reasons I explain below, I believe that the mode of achievement is the only feature that reason-giving shares with arguing as an illocution-type.

This difference in their primary point is already sufficient to establish my claim that reason-giving and arguing are not identical illocution-types. In the next section, I elaborate more about the attitude that is expressed in relation to $H$ by reason-giving. It is in the expression of this attitude that lie reason-giving’s primary value as an illocution-type, which is also different from the primary value of arguing (which is to achieve the justification of a claim).

3.2. Reason-giving and its primary value

My claim in this section can be best presented by analogy with other expressive illocution-types: as thanking is essentially connected to the expression of gratitude for $H$, congratulating to the expression of approval for $H$ and apologizing to the expression of regret to $H$, reason-giving is essentially

594 In section 4, I argue that even though every successful act of arguing is also a successful act of reason-giving (however defective), some acts can be fully felicitous acts of reason-giving even if they are not even successful arguing (in particular, unsuccessful adducing).
connected to the expression of a certain type of recognition for $H$. Expressing (a certain type of) recognition for $H$ is the value that is of the very nature of reason-giving as an illocution-type to realise. In the second chapter, I introduced the notion of primary value and argued that it plays a crucial role in speech act theory analysis. Particular tokens of a given illocution-type are said to be good or bad tokens of that illocution-type depending on how good or bad they are in achieving its primary value. I also argued that qua an illocution of its type, there is no other value that a particular token of that illocution-type must realize to be a good token of its type, and that this is the only value that a given token has to realize to be a fully felicitous token of an illocution of its type.

My claim, thus, is that particular tokens of reason-giving are good or bad tokens of reason-giving depending on how good or bad they are in expressing recognition for $H$. This claim is similar to the one I made in the last chapter about arguing, with its primary value being justification. Like arguing, reason-giving is also not essentially connected to the pursuit of any perlocution in $H$. A given act of reason-giving can be fully felicitous as an act of reason-giving (in the illocutionary sense), even if it fails to achieve any perlocution in $H$. Socrates’ act is also a good example of this, for it can be fully felicitous, whether or not it ultimately succeeds in achieving any of its intended perlocutions in Crito (e.g.

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595 In the second chapter (section 3.2), I argued that the primary value of expressive illocution-types can be determined by specifying the type of attitude or feeling that the relevant illocution-type is designed to express (and thus, by a specification of their primary point). The primary point of all expressives is to express some feeling or attitude of $S$ to $H$, and the primary value of particular expressives is to express a particular feeling or attitude.

596 See chapter two, section 3.2.

597 See chapter three, section 2.1.
release Crito’s distress, calm Crito down, persuade him, change his mind). Some authors take Crito’s silence in the end of the dialogue to be a strong sign that he was not even a little reconciled with Socrates’ death, and some even suggest that it is likely that Crito could only be fully reconciled if he could understand Socrates’ real reasons (which he could not).\textsuperscript{598} All this might be true, but it is irrelevant to assess the illocutionary felicity of Socrates’ act.

As in other illocution-types, what is relevant for assessing its felicity is not whether it succeeds in producing good effects in \( H \), but how well it achieves its primary illocutionary value (which, in this case, is to express recognition for \( H \)). Since identifying reason-giving’s primary value with recognition presupposes an understanding of what recognition is, I first set out the concept of recognition that informs my argument in this thesis, and then explain why reason-giving’s primary value is best identified with the expression of recognition for \( H \) (rather than to achieve justification).

3.2.1. The concept of an act of recognition: its philosophical roots

For my purposes, it is only important to explain the main features of an act of recognition in order to support my claim that reason-giving’s primary value is to

\textsuperscript{598} Some authors suggest that this corresponds to a tragic element in the dialogue, and that the best Socrates could do was to choose a second best option (for no reasons that he could have given to Crito would have been sufficient to make Crito understand). See, e.g. Beversluis J, Cross-Examining Socrates (2004) p. 72; Young G, Socrates and Obedience (1974) 19(1) Phronesis p. 1, 9, claims that ‘it is possible, indeed likely, that Crito could be fully reconciled to Socrates’ death only on Socratic principles’.
express recognition for H. The concept of recognition has been the object of sustained investigation in the past decades. Its origins lie in Hegel's concept of Anerkennung, which is my main focus here. Inwood identifies five meanings of the verb 'to recognize' in English, and claims that only some are close to the German verb 'anerkennen'. To recognize can refer to an act of intellectual identification of a thing or person as being of a certain type (e.g. a lion), or to an act of identifying an individual (as one says 'I recognized a friend in the street today'), or of realising something (e.g. that one made a mistake). These are all examples of 'erkennen', not of 'anerkennen'. Inwood notes that to recognize can also be 'to admit, concede, confess or 'acknowledge' a thing or person to be something' or 'to take notice of, acknowledge a thing or person [...] in a special way, to honour him'. These latter examples are close to 'anerkennen'.

Hegel uses the term 'recognition' to refer to a mutual process where by recognizing another, one also comes to recognize oneself – and the other, his own self. But, especially in recent literature, recognition is often referred as an

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600 See Hegel, G.F.W. Phenomenology of Spirit, part 1.
601 Inwood M, A Hegel Dictionary (1992), Recognition and Acknowledgment. See also Ricoeur, P, The Course of Recognition (2005) p. 6-22, who identifies 23 different meanings of 'to recognize'; Geuss R, Philosophical Anthropology and Social Criticism, in: Honneth A, Reification (2012) p. 125-126, mentions that in English, to 'recognize' can mean either 'to identify or in particular to re-identify [e.g. a place, a person, 'She is so changed after she lost her job that I could barely recognize her'], or to 'admit' or 'grant' (e.g. 'I recognize you as president').
602 Inwood M, A Hegel Dictionary (1992), Recognition and Acknowledgment. Likewise, Ricoeur P, The Course of Recognition (2005) p. 11, says that in French, recognition can also mean 'gratitude': to recognize is 'to have appreciation for, to bear witness to one's gratitude'.
603 See Hegel, G.F.W. Phenomenology of Spirit, part 1.
other-related attitude or an expressive act. Honneth explicitly uses the term ‘act of recognition’, and claims that recognition can also be characterized ‘as a specific kind of attitude or action’ (one that is other-directed and other-regarding). He stresses that recognition has a practical character and that it is a kind of ‘responsive attitude’, and claims that an act of recognition is not a mere ‘side-effect of an other-directed action but...the expression of a free-standing intention’. Likewise, Inwood also claims that recognition involves not only the intellectual identification of a person (though it presupposes such identification), but ‘the assignment to it of a positive value and the explicit expression of this assignment’. Inwood also stresses that ‘anerkennen’ suggests ‘overt, practical, rather than merely intellectual, recognition’.

The concept of an act of recognition is often explained by a distinction between cognition and recognition, between merely ‘cognizing’ something about the other (e.g. that he has certain traits, abilities or needs) and ‘recognizing’ the other as having them. Iser, for instance, argues that ‘if you recognize another person

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605 See Honneth A, Grounding Recognition 45(4) Inquiry (2002) p. 499, 503 (on p. 505, he stresses ‘recognition’s character as an action’ and says that ‘an act of recognition is never exhausted by mere words or symbolic expressions’, and that ‘it is only the corresponding behavior that establishes the credibility that matters...to the recognized subject’).
606 Ibid. p. 505.
608 Id. Ibid.
with regard to a certain feature that she has [e.g. her autonomy], you not only admit that she has this feature but embrace a positive attitude towards her for having this feature⁶¹⁰. Likewise, Brandom also argues that in Hegel’s vocabulary, recognizing essentially means ‘to take or treat [the other] in practice as [being an X or as having a certain feature F]’⁶¹¹, and that recognizing refers to ‘what I must do, the activity, whatever it is…in order thereby to be taking or treating something in practice as something’⁶¹² (like the authors above, Brandom also stresses its practical nature, and holds that recognizing involves ‘practically’ attributing this feature to the other, i.e. ‘practically’ treating the other as having that feature). Various authors have endorsed this view.⁶¹³

The core idea is that while one can ‘cognize’ that the other has a certain feature F without reacting in any way towards him, one cannot ‘recognize’ the other as having F without responding to the other in a certain way. Recognition is not only a matter of believing that the other has a certain valuable feature, that is, of acknowledging it, say, in one’s thoughts. Rather, it is essentially a matter of responding (more or less appropriately) to the other in virtue of this feature.

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⁶¹⁰ Iser M, Recognition, in: E N Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2013) p. 1 (he adds that ‘such recognition implies that you bear obligations to treat her in a certain way’ and that ‘recognition does not only matter normatively…[and] is also of psychological importance’).


⁶¹² Ibid. p. 139.

⁶¹³ Brudney D, Producing for others, in: Schmidt Am Busch H-C and Zurn C F (eds.), The Philosophy of Recognition (2010), p. 151, 162, holds that recognition is best understood as a ‘practical attitude’, rather than as a mere ‘feeling or emotion’, and Wildt, A, “Recognition” in Psychoanalysis, in: Schmidt Am Busch H-C and Zurn C F (eds.), The Philosophy of Recognition (2010), p. 189, 191, associates recognition to an attitude that is ‘intentionally, evaluatively, and in certain cases affectively related to the [other], and that it cannot be reduced to [sheer] propositionality’; ‘mere cognition [Erkennen] is not enough to arrive at recognition [Anerkennen] – also required are voluntative [voluntativ] approval or affirmation’. 

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Authors often explain that recognition manifests itself in the kind of considerations one takes to be relevant, in the kind of feelings one has, and in the kinds of dispositions to act and to refrain from acting in relation to the other.\textsuperscript{614} But recognition refers above all to an attitude that one \textit{expresses} towards the other in relation to the other – that is, an attitude that one makes public towards the other through one’s actions, whether through bodily gestures or by performing a speech act.\textsuperscript{615} The expressive character and the other-directedness of this attitude are both essential for qualifying it as one of recognition.

The concept of recognition developed in the Hegelian tradition is similar to what is called in analytical philosophy of ‘acknowledgment’. Cavell, for instance, argues that there is a distinction between knowing something about the other (e.g. that he is in pain) and acknowledging that to the other.\textsuperscript{616} While one can know that the other is in pain and remain unaffected or unresponsive to it, one cannot acknowledge that he is pain and remain unaffected or unresponsive to it. Different from knowing, acknowledging is a matter of realising practically a piece of knowledge and involves being \textit{responsive or affected} by what one knows. A crucial difference between recognition and acknowledgment is that recognition has a more definite normative core. Cavell claims that acknowledgment is not a normative notion. He says that it is not ‘a description of a given response’, nor a

\textsuperscript{614} See previous footnotes for references.
\textsuperscript{615} Brudney D, Producing for others, in: Schmidt Am Busch H-C and Zurn C F (eds.), \textit{The Philosophy of Recognition} (2010) p. 162, argues that recognition involves ‘a disposition to act in certain ways toward others (and to do so for their sake), to have beliefs (e.g. about the value of these others), and surely at times to have feelings with regard to others’, but adds that recognition is not reducible to any of these.
\textsuperscript{616} Cavell S, \textit{Must We Mean What We Say?} (2002), p. 255.
claim about how one should respond towards the other, but only a conceptual
category 'in terms of which a given response is evaluated'\(^{617}\) as good or bad,
appropriate or not in relation to the other.\(^{618}\)

In Cavell’s sense, for someone to be acknowledging that the other is in pain, it is
sufficient that one responds to the other in some way. There are many ways
(good and bad ones) of doing so. One may acknowledge the other’s pain without
feeling any sympathy in relation to the other, or in the case of feeling it, without
being disposed or prompted to do anything about it (e.g. to relieve the other
from that state). One may be a vindictive person and think that the other
deserves that suffering, or think that that suffering could be somehow good for
the other. But one can also acknowledge the other’s pain to the other by
responding to the other in a way that incorporates the other’s suffering in more
positive ways – e.g. by showing impatience, concern, or by actively trying to do
something to relieve the other from that state. As I said above, in Cavell’s
account, acknowledgment is not necessarily something good or valuable for the
other. Cavell views it as a neutral concept; as he explains, it is a concept that ‘is
evidenced equally by its failure as by its success’\(^{619}\).

But, like the authors working on the Hegelian tradition, Cavell also stresses that
acknowledging goes beyond knowing, for it involves expressing ‘the knowledge

\(^{617}\) Ibid. p. 264.
\(^{619}\) Cavell S, *Must We Mean What We Say?* (2002), p. 263.
at its core, to recognize what [one knows], to do something in the light of it'\textsuperscript{620}, and explains that acknowledgment ‘goes beyond not [...] in the order of knowledge, but in its requirement that I do something or reveal something on the basis of that knowledge'\textsuperscript{621}. He makes this point in the context of the problem of scepticism of other minds, and claims that what primarily matters in my relation to the other is not knowing something about him, or having full certainty about who the other is or of how he feels. Rather, it is what I do in the presence of the other, and how I respond in the light of what I do know about him. Acknowledgment is thus different from but not opposed to knowledge, for it involves acting on and responding to what one knows about the other. This interaction between knowing and acknowledging is exactly what authors have tried to capture under the concept of ‘recognition’, as being at once both a practical cognition or perception and an other-directed response.\textsuperscript{622}

But, as I mentioned above, the concept of recognition has a more definite normative core.\textsuperscript{623} Honneth, for instance, explains that recognition involves something ‘added to the mere perception of a person’ – namely, an ‘affirmation’\textsuperscript{624} –, and that it goes beyond ‘the concept of seeing, that is, of

\textsuperscript{621} Cavell S, Must We Mean What We Say? (2002), p. 257.
\textsuperscript{622} Markell P, Bound by Recognition (2003), p. 39, says that ‘recognition brings together cognition and evaluation: it is a matter both of seeing who someone is and of affirming…what we see, of letting that knowledge matter to our conduct in one way or another’.
\textsuperscript{623} I return to this in more detail in the next chapter. See especially section 2.1.
identifying and cognizing...someone. He adds that recognition also goes beyond merely expressing an awareness that the other is physically there, in front of me. In fact, to do this, it would be sufficient just to point a finger at him, or nod my head in his direction or just utter something like 'I know you are there'. But Honneth claims that nothing of this captures the significance that recognition has as the expression of an other-related attitude. He argues that, taken as an other-related attitude, recognition is distinctive precisely because it extends beyond the cognitive act of individual identification by giving public expression ('with the aid of suitable actions, gestures, or facial expressions') that the other is being perceived in a positive light. Honneth writes that

'while by cognizing [...] a person we mean an identification of him as an individual that can gradually be improved upon, by 'recognizing' [...] we refer to the expressive act through which this cognition is conferred with the positive meaning of an affirmation'.

He also argues that 'the expressive responses that accompany [recognition] symbolize the practical ways of reacting that are necessary in order to 'do justice' to the person recognized. From these passages, it is clear that recognition is a normative notion. In the Hegelian tradition, for reasons I will explain in the next chapter, recognition is thought to be essentially valuable for

\[\text{\footnotesize 625 Ibid. p. 113.} \]
\[\text{\footnotesize 626 Id. Ibid.} \]
\[\text{\footnotesize 627 Ibid. p. 111, 115, 124.} \]
\[\text{\footnotesize 628 Ibid. p. 118 (on p. 119, he writes that 'by replacing or enhancing speech acts, or independently of them, these expressive responses are supposed to make clear publicly to the person in question that she has been accorded social approval, or possesses social validity, in the role of a specific social type (friend, cleaning lady, fellow traveler)').} \]
the other\textsuperscript{629}, and recognizing is related to the expression of a practical attitude to the other that is essentially other-directed and other-friendly.\textsuperscript{630} To be sure, Honneth himself adds that when he claims that recognition involves adopting an ‘affirmative attitude’ towards the other, he is not claiming that recognition is always related to the expression of positive feelings or emotions towards the other. In principle, there are many ways of expressing recognition that do not involve expressing friendly feelings, e.g. being angry at the other, putting pressure on him or keeping one’s distance. These are all responses that, on occasion, may express a recognitive attitude towards the other.

But Honneth stresses that these responses express recognition only if they reflect an attitude that is overall ‘affirmative’ of the other (rather than one that denies the other or that expresses sheer indifference towards him). It is this basic idea that he tries to capture when he says that ‘the adjective “positive”’ should ‘not be understood as referring [only] to positive, friendly emotions’, but rather as designating ‘the existential fact...that we necessarily affirm the value of another person in the stance of recognition, even if we might curse or hate that person at a given moment’\textsuperscript{631}. At its roots, recognition refers to a mode of being or of existing to the other, of showing to the other that the other does matter to 

\textsuperscript{629} See chapter five, section 3.1.1.
\textsuperscript{631} Honneth A, Reification (2012) p. 51.
me, even if on occasion this is not connected to the expression of friendly feelings or emotions. However, Honneth still remarks that in cases where one recognizes the other in an emotionally negative way, there is ‘always a residual intuitive sense of not having done full justice’\textsuperscript{632} to his personality (thereby suggesting that, for him, recognition is mainly a positive, other-friendly attitude).

It is worth stressing that at its roots, recognition presupposes a capacity for being affected by the other that reaches the affective sphere, and that is not entirely explainable in cognitive terms. It involves a motivational readiness that directly orients one’s actions towards the other.\textsuperscript{633} Honneth explains that recognition involves a decentring of the self towards the other, and that an existential receptiveness or empathetic engagement with the other is often signalled directly (as when an adult reacts directly ‘to the perception of a small child with expressive responses in which a fundamentally affirmative attitude is expressed’\textsuperscript{634}). He sometimes uses terms such as ‘spontaneity’ and ‘involuntary openness’ to characterize this affective element, and to stress that it is not fully rational.\textsuperscript{635} He argues that this element constitutes a necessary pre-requisite for felicitous other-directed behaviour, for an affective involvement with the other is normally necessary for taking up the point of view of the other in an appropriate

\textsuperscript{632} Id.Ibid.
\textsuperscript{633} Honneth A, Invisibility: On the Epistemology of Recognition (2001) 75 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes p. 111, 121, says that ‘the suppression of egocentric inclinations in the subject takes place, as it were, necessarily’.
\textsuperscript{634} See Honneth A, Reification (2012), p. 151, also p. 45.
\textsuperscript{635} Ibid. p. 152 (‘this is not a rational act or one in which we become conscious of reasons. Rather, we precognitively take up a certain stance’).
Honneth believes that every adult who has been socialized successfully and in a normal way has this ability at least in some degree.

Even though this affective element is a typical feature in an act of recognition, it is neither sufficient nor must it be always present for a given act to express recognition for the other. Indeed, some acts might be said to express recognition simply because they represent an other-directed behaviour that is, as Honneth says, ‘affirmative’ of the other, even if no positive affection is actually involved. In a recent text, though he does not elaborate in detail, he suggests that ‘certain actions...have recognition built into their character as the subjects engaged in them...express a specific form of recognition’ for the other. For the reasons I am explaining (and will be explaining in the next sections, and especially in the next chapter), I believe that this is the case with reason-giving. One does not need to have any particular affection for the other to express recognition for the other when one gives the other reasons (on some occasions, this is necessary for the act to count as one of due recognition, but the act itself has a recognise value independently of that, or so I will argue).

I am introducing this normative reading of recognition here, because it will be useful to develop my claim about reason-giving’s value in the next chapter (that

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636 Ibid p. 152 (this affective element ‘represents [an] epistemic condition for our capacity to orient ourselves toward the other’s reasons’; e.g. for understanding them).
637 This ability can be improved and matured by experience and self-reflection.
639 In the next chapter, I argue that any act of reason-giving has a certain recognizable value independently of any affection the reason-giver may or may not have for the other. As I note below, the degree of affection depends on the relationship he has with the particular other.
is, the claim that reason-giving has an intrinsic recognise value), and also because it offers a firm ground, as I explain in more detail in the next chapter, to understand why recognition is in general valuable. For now, let me just add a few points. First, authors (Honneth is probably the main example) often refer to ‘recognition’ as ‘due recognition’ (as the ‘appropriate response’; e.g. he says that ‘in recognition we react correctly or appropriately to evaluative properties [of the other]’ and that ‘in our recognitional attitudes, we respond appropriately to evaluative qualities [of the other]’). In his account, an act counts as one of recognition only if it expresses due recognition for the other, and this is an all-or-nothing matter: a given act either expresses due recognition or it does not count as one of recognition. He precludes the possibility of an act of recognition being more or less good in expressing recognition for the other.

This does not make any theoretical harm to his project, because he is more concerned with defining what counts as ‘due’ recognition, and with developing a background for his own normative theory about recognition. But since this distinction is going to be important for my claim about reason-giving’s value, it is important to bear it in mind. In the next chapter, I make a distinction between expressing ‘bare’ and ‘due’ recognition to mark the idea that, in my view, a given act can express some recognition for the other (and hence, have some

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641 Ibid. p. 510.
recognitive value), even if it does not express due recognition. The idea is that a
given act can be more or less good in expressing recognition for the other.\textsuperscript{642}

Second, an act that expresses due recognition is typically performed out of
certain reasons; namely, \textit{for the other's sake}, rather than for one's own. Honneth
argues that, in the first instance, acts of recognition 'are determined by the value
or worth of other persons' and 'are oriented not towards one's own aims but [...]'
towards the evaluative qualities of others'\textsuperscript{643}. If I express admiration for the
other's intelligence just because I want him to do something for my own benefit,
this act might express some recognition for the other, but it would not express
due recognition, for my primary aim in doing that is something related to my
own self, rather than to the other's own.\textsuperscript{644} Though this act would have some
recognitive value, it would have less recognitive value than if it were performed
out of non-self-directed reasons. I think that this condition is necessary in order
to rule out cases in which one expresses a positive attitude towards the other
merely to satisfy some of his selfish desires, and also to mark that an act of
recognition is in the first instance other- rather than self-directed.

For similar reasons (this is my third point), expressing due recognition typically
presupposes the exercise of a set of other-regarding abilities, e.g. the ability for
understanding (not only cognitively, but also emotionally) how the other thinks

\textsuperscript{642} See chapter five, section 3.1.2.
\textsuperscript{643} Ibid. p. 513 (on p. 506, he claims a given act counts as one of recognition 'only if [its] primary
purpose is directed in some positive manner towards the existence of the [other] person').
\textsuperscript{644} In speech act theory's terms, it would be a successful but defective act of recognition.
and feels, and the ability for responding accordingly.\textsuperscript{645} Butler argues that one must learn to lose one’s egocentrism and that, even though one does not need to sympathize with the perspective of the other (she says that one does not need ‘to adopt the other’s point of view’ in the sense of ‘making the other’s point of view the same as my own’\textsuperscript{646}), one must be able ‘to distinguish the other’s perspective from [one’s] own, and...to undertake an understanding of that perspective as well as [one] can’\textsuperscript{647} \textit{in the other’s own terms}, rather than in one’s own. One must regard the other as a second person that is separate from one, and who has an independent perspective that must be dealt with in its own terms (and that might not be entirely convergent with one’s own).\textsuperscript{648}

Finally, let me add one last point. A leading criterion for whether a given act expresses due recognition for the other is whether or not it is an appropriate response to the other \textit{in light of the relationship one has with him}. Honneth, for instance, argues that expressing due recognition is not merely a matter of expressing an affirmative attitude towards the other. Rather, it is a matter of giving public expression ‘to the fact that the [other] is noticed affirmatively in the manner appropriate to the relationship in question’\textsuperscript{649}, i.e. it is to respond to the other in accordance with the character of the relationship they have with each

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{645} Honneth A, \textit{Disrespect} (2007) p. 111-113, argues that the process of role-taking requires ‘more than mere cognitive capabilities’, and also involves ‘empathy and intuitive understanding’.


\textsuperscript{647} Ibid. p. 112.

\textsuperscript{648} Darwall S, \textit{The Second-Person Standpoint} (2006) p. 45, also argues that it ‘requires empathy in the sense of simulation or imaginative projection into the other’s point of view (while... retaining a sense of one’s own independent perspective)’.

\end{footnotes}
other. In a recent text, he adds that due recognition implies ‘above all else, treating the other in the way that the relevant [relationship]...demands’\textsuperscript{650}. When one recognizes the other, one always recognizes the other as being in a certain relationship to one (Honneth says that one always recognizes the other ‘in the role of a specific social type (friend, cleaning lady, fellow traveler)’\textsuperscript{651}, and should respond in a way that accords with that relationship.

3.2.2. Why recognition is reason-giving’s primary value

In the last section, I set out the concept of an act of recognition in general terms and only to the extent necessary to explain why identifying reason-giving’s primary value with the expression of recognition for \textit{H} is not an arbitrary move. The attitude expressed in acts like Socrates’ fits well with what was outlined above. By choosing to give Crito only reasons that are appropriate to Crito’s way of thinking, Socrates shows that he is not only intellectually aware of Crito’s situation (e.g. his emotional distress, his limited capacity for understanding), but is also responsive to it. He is actively trying to help Crito release his distress and displays a high capacity for putting himself in the place of Crito, for understanding Crito’s situation in Crito’s terms and for reacting accordingly. And, as I explained, he does all that because he genuinely cares about Crito, and for Crito’s sake rather than for his own. His concern for Crito is so high that he

comes close to renouncing his commitment to the truth (which, for a philosopher like him, is a commitment that is especially difficult to renounce).

As I mentioned in the last section, whether or not a given act of recognition expresses due recognition for the other differs according to the relationship one has with the particular other. In the case of Socrates and Crito, the relationship they had with each other was one of close friendship. Within such a relationship, something quite robust is required from Socrates in order for his act to count as an act of *due* recognition for his friend Crito. From what I just said above, I believe that Socrates’ act is in the first instance Crito-directed (indeed, it is essentially Crito-directed), and when he performs it, he also displays a high degree of affection in relation to Crito, who as I just said (even though Crito was a non-philosophical person), was a close friend of his. For all this, I believe that Socrates’ act can be well qualified not only as an act of recognition for Crito, but also as a very good act of recognition, as an act that expresses *due* (rather than merely ‘some’ or ‘bare’) recognition for Crito.

In the next chapter, I elaborate more about this recognitive value and defend that it is intrinsic to reason-giving. I develop in more detail this distinction between expressing ‘bare’ and ‘due’ recognition for the other, in order to argue that every successful act of reason-giving (i.e. every act of reason-giving)

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652 In the next section, I argue that in general, one felicity condition for an act of reason-giving is that it accord with the relationship $S$ and $H$ have with each other (and that this is not a felicity condition for the case of adducing).
653 See chapter five, especially section 3.2.
achieves this recognitive value to some degree (and hence, that this value is intrinsic to reason-giving). For now, let me just clarify a possible ambiguity in my use of the term ‘value’. As I explained before, ‘primary value’ refers to the value that is of the very nature of an illocution-type to realize. The sense of ‘intrinsic value’ on which I will be relying in the next chapter is a different one. My claim is that recognition is intrinsic to reason-giving in a way that justification is not intrinsic to arguing, for even though every act of arguing has as its primary value justification, there can be (infelicitous) acts of arguing that do not achieve justification; while every act of reason-giving achieves recognition to some degree (however infelicitous it might be as an act of reason-giving).

My concern here is first to draw a clear distinction between reason-giving and arguing as illocution-types. What I said in this and in the last section is reason for thinking that reason-giving’s primary value is best understood as the expression of recognition for $H$, rather than to achieve justification. If this is right, it follows that reason-giving and arguing not only do not share the same primary point: they also do not share the same primary value either. This means that, from the point of view of speech act theory, their differences as illocution-types are fundamental. In the next sections, I argue that as it is to be expected, these differences in primary point and in primary value also generate differences in the felicity conditions for each illocution-type.

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654 See chapter two, section 3.2.
4. Reason-giving and its felicity conditions

In the second chapter, I argued that one way to explain an illocution-type is by identifying the conditions that must be fulfilled for its fully felicitous performance (to follow Searle’s terms, for its fully successful and non-defective performance as the type of illocution that it is).655 In the last chapter, I offered a list of conditions for fully felicitous arguing and gave special emphasis to the conditions for felicitous adducing, because – I then held – this would be especially useful to make the contrast with the conditions for fully felicitous reason-giving.656 In this section, I articulate the conditions for felicitous reason-giving by comparison only. Similarly to the last chapter, my central aim is not to provide an exhaustive list of conditions for felicitous reason-giving, but only a list that fits our ordinary intuitions and is sufficiently informative to make the contrast with adducing clear. As is to be expected, given the differences in primary point and primary value, though there are some resemblances, there is no perfect parallel in the felicity conditions for both illocution-types.

In the last chapter, I offered the following list of conditions for felicitous adducing and claimed that the fulfilment of all of them is necessary for an act to count as a fully felicitous act of adducing: (i) R (the adduced reason) must be itself true or correct; (ii) the justificatory claim S makes must also be correct, the claim whose antecedent is ‘R is correct’ and whose consequent is ‘C is correct’;

655 See chapter two, section 3.4.
656 See chapter three, section 4.
(iii) S must present the reason (or reasons) adduced in a charitable way in relation to H (uptake condition); (iv) S must believe that R is itself correct and that R, being correct, is a good reason for holding that C is correct (sincerity condition); and (v) Adducing a claim R as a reason is an attempt to show that a claim C is correct (essential condition). I also argued that, together with these conditions, it must be added that S is adducing reasons for a claim C in a situation in which it is rational to do so, e.g. where the correctness of C is taken to be or could be in question (which corresponds to Searle’s general condition that performing an illocution-type must have a point in the situation).657

If one takes this list into account, apart from condition (iii), none of the other conditions are necessary for a given act to be a fully felicitous act of reason-giving.658 Socrates’ act helps to explain why. Conditions (i) and (ii) of the above list are not necessary. Even though the reasons Socrates gives to Crito have a low, even very low justificatory value (they do not actually justify the supported claim), they are still good reasons to give Crito. Condition (iv) (the sincerity condition) is also not necessary. Socrates believes neither that the reasons given are correct, nor does he believe that they offer good support for the claim. As I said, he only believes that they are good reasons to give Crito in the situation. Condition (v) above (the essential condition) is also different due to the difference in primary value. Different from adducing (which is an attempt to

657 As I explained in the last chapter, I draw heavily on the list of conditions offered by Bermejo-Luque L, Giving Reasons (2011) chap. 3. 
658 That, of course, does not mean that on occasion a given act of reason-giving might fulfill them.
show that a given claim $C$ is correct, i.e. to justify that claim), reason-giving is an attempt to express an attitude by $S$ to $H$ in relation to $H$ that is positively related to $H$ (namely, as I argued before, to express recognition for $H$). 659

From this brief overview, it is already possible to see that most of the conditions that are necessary for fully felicitous adducing are not necessary for fully felicitous reason-giving, and thus that their felicity conditions do not coincide. In the last chapter, I mentioned that one useful way to see this difference is by thinking on acts of unsuccessful adducing, i.e. acts that would not have any potential for achieving the justification of a claim. 660 I argued, in addition to Bermejo-Luque's account, that a minimal condition for an act to count as an act of adducing (i.e. to be successful adducing) is that the reason adduced, though it does not have to be true or to actually justify the claim, must at least (i) be capable of being true and (ii) be capable of standing in a justificatory relation with the supported claim (otherwise, it does not count as an act of adducing). This means that if $S$ adduces an obviously false reason or a reason that, though true, has no relation at all to the claim being supported (that has no capacity to justify that claim), $S$'s act does not count as an act of adducing at all. 661

659 Searle J R, *Speech Acts* (1969) p. 67, argues that the essential condition of expressive illocutions can be defined by their sincerity condition, for they all count as an expression of the attitude defined in their sincerity condition – e.g. as an expression of gratitude, regret etc.

660 See last chapter, section 4.

661 In the last chapter, I argued that some cases of begging the question fall here.
In my view, these two conditions are not necessary for fully felicitous reason-giving. Imagine that $H$ is a young child who just lost her pet and is asking herself why. In reply, it might be better for $S$ to deliberately give her a false reason, even to invent one (e.g. ‘He did not die’), than to provide the actual reason for why her pet died. Though this might be an obviously false reason and would not fulfil its justificatory role to any sound adult (i.e. it is a very bad reason from a justificatory standpoint), it would probably be a more appropriate reason to give to that child, due to her not very developed experience. It may fit better what she needs in the situation, to her limited capacity for understanding. Giving a false reason (even an obviously false one) may be an appropriate response to what the particular hearer needs in the situation. In some cases, expressing a genuinely recognitive attitude to the particular $H$ might require giving her a false (even an obviously false) reason. This is so especially in cases where giving comfort is more important than telling $H$ the truth.

I bring this example here just to illustrate that such an act, even though it would count as unsuccessful adducing (for it does not have any potential for achieving the actual justification of the relevant claim), can still be on occasion a fully felicitous act of reason-giving. My claim is not that this is always felicitous, only that it might be; and that this is sufficient to demonstrate the difference between ‘adducing’ and ‘giving’ reasons.

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One key difference between adducing and reason-giving is that in adducing, the reasons are assessed primarily in terms of their justificatory value (i.e. in terms of whether they are true or correct, and offer good support for the relevant claim), while in reason-giving they are assessed primarily in terms of their recognizable value. This latter value is determined mainly by whether they are appropriate to the particular situation – e.g. to the type of relationship $S$ has with $H$ and other features such as who the particular $H$ is, what $H$’s needs are. In general, to be a fully felicitous act of reason-giving, $S$ must give reasons that match the relationship he has with the particular $H$, and must treat $H$ in accordance with the character of the relationship that holds between them.\textsuperscript{663} To assess this, one has to consider more closely the communicative expectations between $S$ and $H$, in virtue of the specific type of relationship they have to each other – either in general, or in special situations defined by their roles (e.g. whether it is an intimate or a more distanced one).\textsuperscript{664}

Honneth explains that when one recognizes the other, one always recognizes the other ‘in the role of a specific social type’ and that in general, in order to be felicitous, an act of recognition must give public expression ‘to the fact that the person is noticed affirmatively in the manner appropriate to the relationship in

\begin{table}
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\textbf{Reason} & \textbf{Effect} \\
\hline
A & B \\
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\textsuperscript{663} The kind of reasons $S$ must give, how much sensibility he must display in relation to $H$ etc., these are all factors that are relevant to assess the felicity of an act of reason-giving. And this assessment can only be done if one takes more closely into account the relationship holding between $S$ and $H$.

\textsuperscript{664} Enoch D, Giving Practical Reasons (2011) 11(4) Philosophers Imprint p. 1, 7, argues that one needs ‘a thicker description of the relationship between the persons involved’, for ‘the relevant persons are involved in a much more...personal way’.
question'. He also adds (in my view, rightly) that expressing due recognition requires 'above all else treating the other in the way that the relevant form of recognition...demands'. Tilly also claims that, from a relational perspective, the acceptability of the reasons given does not depend 'on their truth, much less on their explanatory value, but on their appropriateness to the social situation' and argues that this varies 'according to the relationship between giver and receiver' and primarily 'depends on their match with the social relations' between them. Tilly offers various examples to justify this claim (e.g. 'Gotta go' may be a perfectly good reason to give to a stranger asking for directions in the street, but it would not be a good reason if given to an old friend one has not seen for years).

In general, for a given act to be a felicitous act of reason-giving, it is only necessary that S preserve the appearance of some justificatory relation between the reasons given and the supported claim to the particular H. How much congruence has to be preserved cannot be determined in an abstract way. It is

665 Honneth A, Invisibility: On the Epistemology of Recognition (2001) 75 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes p. 111, 115. See also, Honneth A, The Pathologies of Individual Freedom (2010) p. 51, 'recognition means not only meeting [the] other in a certain affirmative attitude but implies, also and indeed above all else, treating the other in the way that the relevant form of recognition...demands'.
666 Honneth A, The Pathologies of Individual Freedom (2010) p. 51. For a similar claim, see Cavell S, The Claim of Reason (1979), p. 434, who illustrates the notion of acknowledgment with reference to relationally defined social roles (e.g. if one is to acknowledge another as one's neighbor, one must acknowledge oneself as his or her neighbor, and must treat the other in a way that accords with that relationship).
668 Id. Ibid.
669 Ibid. p. 26 (also p. 22, p. 41).
670 In general, Tilly (Id.Ibid.) claims that 'distant relationships [often] justify perfunctory reasons, and render elaborate reasons incomprehensible, intrusive, or embarrassing' while intimate relationships often require 'more detailed...reasons...and reasons consistent with their other interactions'.
important that $H$ does not have the impression that $S$ is not taking him seriously into account by giving him reasons that obviously do not support the claim (otherwise, he would probably feel misrecognized). But, as the child’s example discussed above illustrates, this is a highly context sensitive matter.

Some conditions for felicitous reason-giving are of an entirely different kind (compared to the conditions for felicitous adducing). This is the case of the sincerity condition, for instance.\textsuperscript{671} Take Socrates’ act again. Even though he gives Crito reasons he does not believe to be good in a justificatory sense, his act of giving them to Crito remains fully sincere if taken as an expression of recognition for Crito. As I argued, Socrates gives these reasons to Crito out of genuine concern for Crito, because he wanted to do something to help Crito cope with his distress. Sincere reason-giving involves something different than merely giving $H$ reasons $S$ believes to be true, or that $S$ believes to offer good support for the relevant claim (as in sincere adducing).\textsuperscript{672} The sincerity condition for reason-giving is similar to other expressive illocutions. In general, for their performance to be sincere, $S$ must actually have the attitude expressed (e.g. to be sincerely...

\textsuperscript{671} I also argued that, given the difference in primary value, the essential condition for reason-giving is also entirely different from the essential condition of adducing.

\textsuperscript{672} Likewise, insincere reason-giving involves something different than merely giving $H$ reasons $S$ does not believe to be true, or reasons that, though true, $S$ does not believe to offer good support for the relevant claim (as in insincere adducing).
thanking $H$, $S$ has to actually feel grateful). Likewise, to be sincere reason-giving, $S$ has to adopt a genuinely recognitive attitude in relation to $H$.$^{673}$

What this more specifically means, again, depends on the type of relationship in question, and cannot be described in an abstract way. But a necessary implication of this condition is that whenever $S$ performs an act of reason-giving, $S$ must perform it for $H$'s own sake rather than for his own.$^{674}$ This is also a necessary condition for the felicitous performance of other illocution-types that are essentially $H$-friendly (e.g. advising, promising, warning). Whenever $S$ advises $H$ to do something, $S$ presupposes, among other things, that what he advises $H$ to do is in $H$'s best interest. Likewise, whenever $S$ promises $H$ to do something, among other things, $S$ presupposes that the promised act is in $H$'s interest (as I argued before, when he promises, he promises to do something for $H$, rather than to $H$; a similar point applies to warning). A necessary condition for the felicitous performance of these illocution-types is that $S$ performs them for $H$'s sake, rather than for his own. For the reasons I explained before (especially in section 3.1), I believe that a similar condition also applies to reason-giving.$^{675}$

$^{673}$ $S$ also implies that he has some beliefs (e.g. that the reasons given are appropriate to give $H$, that they fit the kind of relationship he has with $H$, that $H$ is capable of dealing with them etc.) and also a certain desire (of expressing recognition for $H$).

$^{674}$ This condition rules out some cases where $S$ is extremely good at grasping $H$'s abilities and needs, and is remarkably attuned to them but ultimately use those skills only to use $H$ to satisfy some of his selfish desires (in this case, he would not be adopting a genuinely recognitive attitude in relation to $H$, because he would be acting for his own sake, rather than for $H$'s sake). See, e.g. Lear J, The Slippery Middle, in: Honneth A, Reification (2012) p. 135.

$^{675}$ This condition is not necessary for fully felicitous adducing.
Further, similarly to other illocution-types that are H-friendly, when S performs an act of reason-giving, S is also committed to acknowledge that H has an independent perspective that must be dealt with in its own terms. This is also similar in the case of advising. When S advises H to do something, he presupposes that H is free to follow that advice depending on whether he finds that advice good or not. He also presupposes that H is not only in general capable of following advices, but also that advice in particular:676 Likewise, in reason-giving, S also presupposes that H is free to deal with the reasons given, and also that H has not only the ability to respond to reasons in general, but also to the reasons that are given to him.677 Enoch is correct, in my view, when he claims that this condition is ‘one in the absence of which the reason-giving fails, or misfires [for there could be no uptake], or without the belief in which [the act] is insincere or some such’678. To conclude this section, let me just offer a schematic list of conditions for fully felicitous reason-giving:

(i) The reasons given by S match the relationship S has with H; (preparatory condition)
(ii) The reasons given preserve the appearance of a justificatory connection between them and the supported claim to the particular H; (preparatory condition)
(iii) S presents the reason (or reasons) in a charitable way in relation to H;

676 Darwall S, The Second-Person Standpoint (2006) p. 56, argues that ‘an advisor must generally assume...that her advisee is sufficiently capable of normative guidance to follow her advice [and also the particular advice that is given]...[even though] this doesn’t commit her to assuming that he can give advice himself or take part in a genuinely mutual conversation about what to do’.
677 This condition helps to explain one puzzling feature of Socrates’ act. Socrates gives Crito bad justificatory reasons, because these were the reasons that Crito was ready to hear.
678 Enoch D, Giving Practical Reasons (2011) 11(4) Philosopher’s Imprint p. 1, 7 (he adds that ‘the ability of the reason-receiver to respond to the given reason [is] assumed...by the very act of reason-giving’ and refers to it as a ‘normative felicity condition’). In the first case, the act would be unsuccessful as an act of reason-giving, while in the second it would be defective.
(iv) S actually has the recognitive attitude he expresses in relation to H; (sincerity condition)
(v) S’s act counts as an attempt to express a certain type of recognition for H; (essential condition)

I offer this list of conditions just to make the contrast with adducing clear (and also to facilitate the comparison). As I said in the beginning of this section, my claim is not that this is an exhaustive list, only that it reflects our ordinary intuitions of what felicitous reason-giving is (especially the intuition that reason-giving’s primary value is to express recognition for H). Even if this list is not exhaustive, I believe that the fulfilment of all these conditions is necessary for a given act to count as a fully felicitous act of reason-giving. Some of these conditions are non-defectiveness conditions, while others are success conditions. If S’s act fails to fulfil conditions (i) or (iv), it could still express some recognition for H, but it would be a defective act. If it fails to fulfil condition (i), it would fail to recognize H in the particular way that their relationship demands. If it fails to fulfil condition (iv), it would be insincere, for S would not actually have the recognitive attitude he expresses. In both cases, S’s act would still be an act of recognition, but it would not count as an act of due recognition for H.

Note that, apart from condition (iii), none of the other conditions is necessary to be fulfilled for a given act to count as a fully felicitous act of adducing.

As I claimed before, an act of reason-giving can achieve in a higher or in a lesser degree this recognitive value, and it counts as an act of due recognition only when it is fully felicitous in the sense defined. These distinctions will be especially important in the next chapter, when I discuss two cases of very defective but still successful acts of reason-giving to defend the claim that the expressive recognitive value I identify in this chapter is intrinsic to all acts of reason-giving. See chapter five, section 3.3.1.
5. Reason-giving and its uptake

In the last chapter, I fleshed out the uptake condition for arguing. I argued that even though arguing is not an essentially hearer-directed illocution-type, whenever $S$ argues in the presence of a hearer, $S$ must argue in a way that maximizes the chances of securing $H$'s uptake; otherwise, $S$'s act is infelicitous.\footnote{I also argued that fulfilling the uptake condition in the case of arguing might be a matter of degree (varying from the act being only more or less defective – hence, making uptake more difficult – to entirely unsuccessful).} I also claimed that though it is not necessary that the act produce any perlocution in $H$ (such as convincing $H$ of the supported claim), it must have the capacity for producing some beliefs in $H$ about what $S$ is trying to do.\footnote{See chapter three, section 3.} In general, for an act of arguing to secure its uptake, $S$ must only succeed in making $H$ realise that $S$ is adducing reasons to support a certain claim as correct. And to succeed in this, he must make it manifest to $H$ what these reasons are and what the supported claim is. I also claimed that this involves the exercise of a set of skills such as presenting the adduced reasons charitably in relation to $H$ (e.g. in a well-ordered way, in a language that $H$ understands and also in a way that increases the chances that $H$ will pay attention to them).

In the second chapter, I argued that, differently from the way in which the notion of uptake is traditionally understood (Austin and Searle view uptake as a success condition, and take for granted that the production of actual uptake in $H$ is a necessary condition for the successful performance of illocution-types in
general), uptake is best understood as a normative notion whose fulfilment may be a matter of degree. I also argued that securing actual uptake is not in general necessary for successful illocution\textsuperscript{683}, and further claimed that even though uptake is a mutual notion (there are conditions that both \textit{S} and \textit{H} must fulfil for uptake to be secured), the fulfilment of the uptake condition has to do more with \textit{S} does (and hence, with the illocutionary qualities of \textit{S}'s act, with how well \textit{S} succeeds in making it explicit to \textit{H} the illocution he is trying to perform). In the last chapter, I fleshed out the uptake condition for arguing and mentioned that this would be important, because there are some differences in what is necessary from \textit{S}'s part for securing \textit{H}'s uptake in reason-giving.

I do not deny that for an act to be a fully felicitous act of reason-giving, it must also fulfil all the conditions that are necessary for uptake in arguing. However, given the differences in primary point and primary value, to secure \textit{H}'s uptake in reason-giving, \textit{S} needs to do more than making manifest to \textit{H} what the reasons are and what the supported claim is (as in arguing). In general, as in other illocution-types, \textit{S} must perform the illocution in a way that enables \textit{H} to understand what \textit{S} is trying to do. The main difference is that in reason-giving, \textit{S} is primarily trying to recognize \textit{H} by giving \textit{H} reasons (while in arguing, \textit{S} is primarily trying to justify a claim). Taken into account what I said in the last section, fulfilling the uptake condition in the case of reason-giving involves \textit{S} making fully manifest to \textit{H} that he is trying to express a genuinely recognitive

\textsuperscript{683} See chapter two, section 3.4.3.
attitude in relation to $H$ in light of the relationship that holds between them. Like
in arguing, this does not require the production of any perlocution in $H$ (such as
that $H$ feels duly recognized or properly taken into account).\footnote{Kojève A, Tyranny and Wisdom, in: Gourevitch V and Roth M S (eds.), On Tyranny (2013) p. 143, compares the feeling of being recognized to a kind of "satisfaction" that comes from "recognition" and adds that this is not necessarily a feeling of love, affection or happiness. Likewise, the feeling of not being duly recognized usually corresponds to negative emotional reactions such as feeling insulted or not being properly taken into account. See Honneth A, The Struggle for Recognition (1995), chap. 6, for a similar claim.}

What this, more precisely, means is highly context-sensitive. How much
sensitivity $S$ must display in relation to $H$, what kinds of reasons he must give,
how he gives them etc., these are all factors that are relationship-dependent. In
some cases (e.g. when the relationship between $S$ and $H$ is a close one, such as an
intimate friendship), $S$ must have a capacity for displaying a high degree of
emotional engagement with $H$; while in other cases (e.g. in a more detached
relationship, when $S$ is a judge and $H$ is a litigant in court), it may require $S$ to
adopt a more distanced attitude towards $H$.\footnote{One reason why, in my view, Socrates’ act is a highly felicitous act of reason-giving is that it is an appropriate response to Crito in light of the relationship they had with each other.} What $H$ can reasonably expect
from $S$ also varies according to the kind of relationship he has with $S$. Macintyre,
for instance, refers to the virtues of conversational justice and acknowledged
dependence, that $S$ must display a certain degree of ‘attentive and affectionate
regard’ for the other\footnote{Macintyre A, Dependent Rational Animals (2009) p. 110-111, 122-124.}, and Laden argues that, in some cases, this includes the
exercise of an ability for transferring to \( H \) the sense that \( S \) is being affected by \( H \)'s stance, that he is truly vulnerable for being touched by \( H \).\footnote{Laden A S, *Reasoning* (2012) p. 13.}

My point is only that, in reason-giving, \( S \) must have a higher capacity for attuning to the particular \( H \) (e.g. to \( H \)'s needs, traits and abilities) than in arguing; and that, as a result of this, the uptake condition for reason-giving, even though it is similar to the uptake condition for arguing, is not identical to it. For \( H \) to understand that \( S \) is arguing, \( S \) does not need to display any heightened responsiveness to \( H \) in light of the relationship they have with each other. As I argued before, \( S \) needs to take \( H \) into account only to the extent as to make \( H \) understand that he is adducing reasons in support of a claim (i.e. as to make clear to \( H \) what the reasons adduced are and what the supported claim is). In reason-giving, however, \( S \) needs to take \( H \) into account to the extent necessary as to express the appropriate degree of recognition for \( H \) in light of their relationship. This difference holds even if one admits, as I did in the last chapter, some hearer-regarding sensitivity for uptake in arguing.\footnote{When \( S \) thanks \( H \) or apologizes to \( H \), \( S \) must do so in a way that conveys that he is really expressing gratitude or regret to \( H \). \( S \) presupposes that he has that attitude, and that he is being appropriately affected by it. If \( S \)'s act is not only to count conventionally as the expression of gratitude, regret etc. to \( H \), but to \textit{be} such an expression (and for \( H \) to understand it as a genuine expression of that attitude), \( S \) must exhibit an appropriate affection when he performs them to \( H \).}
6. Socrates’ case re-explained

I began this chapter discussing Socrates’ case, because – at the pre-theoretical level – it gave us an intuitive sense of what felicitous reason-giving is. With the help of speech act theory, I then gave to this intuition a theoretical articulation, by identifying the definitional features of reason-giving as an illocution-type. If one looks at Socrates’ act as an act of reason-giving (in the sense defined in the previous sections), all the features that are puzzling or that would make it infelicitous as an instance of arguing can be well explained.

Socrates gives Crito reasons that do seem to support – and that do support to a certain degree – the claim that escaping is the wrong thing to do. But he does not believe these reasons to be good (though he believes the supported claim to be true). They are inconsistent with his own standards, and are also bad reasons in a justificatory sense. He chooses and gives them in accordance with Crito’s specific rational abilities, as well as in virtue of Crito’s emotional distress in the situation (he was trying to do something to help Crito cope with his distress). Socrates tries to avoid giving reasons that were ‘more than one step beyond [Crito’s] level’⁶⁸⁹. He was neither morally obliged to give reasons to Crito for his decision to stay, nor to choose reasons that were especially charitable to Crito’s way of thinking. By choosing to do so, he responds appropriately to Crito, and thereby expresses a genuinely recognitive attitude to Crito in relation to Crito.

He treats Crito in accordance with the specific type of relationship they had with each other – one of close friendship.\textsuperscript{690}

Taken as an act of reason-giving, thus, Socrates’ act is a highly felicitous one. It matches very well the reasons given to the relationship he has with Crito, and is also fully sincere for, even though he gives Crito reasons he does not believe to be good from a justificatory standpoint, he gives those reasons out of genuine concern for Crito, because he knew that Crito was not ready for dealing with better reasons.\textsuperscript{691} In a nutshell, Socrates’ act realises well reason-giving’s primary value, which is to express recognition for Crito (who is the particular hearer to whom he gives the reasons), and hence, is a fully felicitous token of the speech act of reason-giving. It realises this recognitive value in a very high degree. As I argued in section 3.2, this is the only value that Socrates’ act has to realise to be a good token of reason-giving, and is also a value that his act realises apart from whether it realises any other value – e.g. apart from its low justificatory value, and from whether it actually succeeds in releasing Crito’s distress (which is its intended perlocutionary effect).\textsuperscript{692}

\textsuperscript{690} Weinrib E J, Obedience to the Law in Plato's Crito (1982) 27(1) The American Journal of Jurisprudence p. 85, 104, argues that 'the friendship of Socrates and Crito is the friendship of the philosopher and the non-philosopher', and that by giving the reasons he gives to Crito, Socrates reaffirms his friendship to Crito, despite their unbridgeable disagreement. Young G, Socrates and Obedience (1974) 19(1) Phronesis p. 1, 8, also says that 'Socrates and Crito are friends, perhaps as close as two people could be, given the huge gap between their opinions'.

\textsuperscript{691} My claim is not that this is in general felicitous, only that in some cases it might be (hence, that giving good justificatory reasons is not in general necessary for felicitous reason-giving).

\textsuperscript{692} The account I offered explains why although Socrates’ act is an infelicitous act of arguing, it remains a fully felicitous act of reason-giving.
7. Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I defended one of the main claims of this thesis: that reason-giving is a discrete illocution-type. I argued that though reason-giving and arguing have some features in common (in particular, their mode of achievement), there is no perfect parallel between them. I claimed that, from the perspective of speech act theory, the differences between them are fundamental and that they have neither the same primary point nor the same primary value. They belong to two completely different categories of speech acts. While arguing is essentially connected to an assertive primary point, reason-giving is essentially connected to an expressive one; and while arguing’s primary value is to achieve justification, reason-giving’s primary value is to express recognition for H. I also argued that these two differences are sufficient for treating reason-giving as a discrete illocution-type, and that all the other differences between arguing and reason-giving as illocution-types follow from and can be explained in terms of these two fundamental differences.

In virtue of these differences, I argued that most of the conditions that are necessary for fully felicitous adducing (which I elaborated in the last chapter) are not necessary for a given act to count as a fully felicitous act of reason-giving. They are conditions that normally, felicitous reason-giving only has to resemble in some way and in some degree. Some conditions (e.g. the uptake condition, the sincerity condition and the essential condition) are of an entirely different kind. This means that a given act can be a fully felicitous act of reason-giving even if it
violates some of the necessary conditions for it to count as a fully felicitous act of adducing (and vice-versa).\textsuperscript{693} Even though there are some qualities that the reasons given normally need to have, they do not have to be fully good reasons in a justificatory sense for the act of giving them to be felicitously performed. To stress this point, I argued that, on some occasions, an unsuccessful act of adducing (i.e. that would not have any potential to achieve the justification of a certain claim) could still be a fully felicitous act of reason-giving.

Another way to present the same point is this: the fact that a given act of reason-giving exhibits a low, or indeed no, justificatory value is not necessarily relevant for assessing its felicity as an act of reason-giving (as it is for assessing its felicity as an act of adducing). It might still realise in a high degree a recognitive value, which is its primary value as an illocution-type to realise.

The felicity of an act of reason-giving depends on how well it expresses recognition for \( H \). I argued that different from arguing, this is strongly determined in terms of the relationship \( S \) has with \( H \) and of the degree of responsiveness that \( S \) displays in relation to \( H \) in light of that relationship. I supported this claim by referring to Socrates’ act in the Crito, and by claiming that reason-giving is an essentially hearer-directed illocution-type (while arguing is not). Taken as an illocution-type, reason-giving is relational in a

\textsuperscript{693} A given act can fulfil all the conditions necessary for felicitous adducing – e.g. \( S \) can adduce excellent reasons for \( C \), present them in a charitable way to \( H \), believe them to be good –, and something might still be wrong and be infelicitous reason-giving.
further sense than arguing is, for reason-giving is essentially a result of relations between persons. When one performs it, one always performs it in the presence of an other to whom one is related in some way, and must respond appropriately. This other-directedness is an essential feature of reason-giving (but non-essential in arguing). In table 1, I summarize the basic differences between reason-giving and arguing as illocution-types.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Primary point</th>
<th>Primary value</th>
<th>Mode of achievement</th>
<th>Kind of attitude expressed</th>
<th>Hearer-directedness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arguing</td>
<td>Assertive</td>
<td>Justification</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>Belief</td>
<td>Not essentially hearer-directed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reason-giving</td>
<td>Expressive</td>
<td>Recognition</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>Recognition towards or in relation to ( H )</td>
<td>Essentially hearer-directed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As I already said in the Introduction of this thesis, my ultimate aim in defending that reason-giving is a discrete illocution-type is to understand the distinctive value in reason-giving. This chapter’s analysis already suggests that reason-giving has a certain distinctive value (an expressive one, namely, the expression of recognition for \( H \)) that is not predicated upon a capacity for actually achieving justification. As I argued before, this value remains under-analysed, due to the
almost exclusive focus on justification. In the next chapter, I build on the analysis conducted in this and in the previous chapters, and defend a normative claim about reason-giving’s value. I flesh out in more detail what this value is, and defend a stronger claim: that recognition (of a particular type) is a value that cannot be realised by doing anything else, only by reason-giving. I also argue that this value is intrinsic to reason-giving, that is, a value that reason-giving has apart from any other value that it might or not have – including justification; and that every instance of reason-giving has this value in some degree.

\footnote{694 See chapter one.}
Chapter 5: The Intrinsic Value of Reason-Giving

1. Introduction

My thesis is that reason-giving is a discrete type of speech act that has a distinctive value. In this chapter, I argue that this value is intrinsic to reason-giving, and that it is best understood as the expression of recognition for the other in a particular feature that the other has and that is valuable in him (namely, his rationality). Every instance of reason-giving realises this value in some degree. My claim is not that reason-giving is a means to or is conducive to or furthers a certain type of recognition for the other. Rather, it is that reason-giving expresses a certain type of recognition for the other, that reason-giving is a particular act of recognition.\textsuperscript{695} This is a task I pursued in the last chapter only to a limited extent, for I was primarily concerned with making a distinction between reason-giving and arguing as illocution-types.

As I explained before, the main reason for pursuing the analysis in the last two chapters was to prepare the way to understand the distinctive value in reason-giving.

\textsuperscript{695} This claim is similar to the one I made about arguing (see chapter three, section 2). I said that one cannot try to justify a claim without trying to argue for it. Similarly, my claim is that one cannot try to recognize the other \textit{in a certain way} without giving the other reasons. There are cases in which one gives the other reasons not as a way of recognizing the other, but in the attempt to let oneself be recognized by the other (as much as cases in which one asks the other for reasons – or allows the other the space to give his reasons). This sort of case, though related to recognition, is not my main focus here. Ricoeur P, \textit{The Course of Recognition} (2005) p. 72, refers to cases in which one ‘causes himself to be recognized by other partners’. See also Duff and others (ed.), \textit{The Trial on Trial – vol. 3} (2007), p. 99, 128, 135, who argue for the importance that the defendant have the chance to defend herself in a criminal trial. By allowing him the chance to explain himself, one is allowing him the chance of making himself recognized.
giving. In the first chapter, I argued that this value has not received sufficient attention, remaining under-analysed in the literature, due to its almost exclusive focus on justification. In the last chapter, I clarified what type of illocution reason-giving is, and identified in which features reason-giving is different from another illocution-type with which it is often identified, that of arguing (especially, adducing). Despite having some features in common, they are best treated as different illocution-types, because they belong to different basic categories of speech act. Different from arguing (which is essentially connected to an assertive point), reason-giving is best understood as an expressive illocution, because it is essentially connected to an expressive point.

One of the upshots of my analysis is that reason-giving’s primary value as an illocution-type (the value that reason-giving has built into it, that is of its own nature to realise), though in some sense dependent upon a relation to justification, is not reducible to justification. Rather, it is an expressive value – namely, to express recognition for $H$ in a certain valuable feature $F$ that $H$ has.

In this chapter, I flesh out in more detail what this value is. I offer a normative argument for the value of reason-giving. My aim is to provide a defence of reason-giving’s value based on the value of recognition. To do this, I first explain what intrinsic value is, and criticize the traditional notion that takes intrinsic value to be necessarily non-relational. I then distinguish in section 3.1.1 two

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696 See first chapter.
697 See last chapter, especially sections 3.1 and 3.2.
ways of thinking about the value of an act of recognition (intrinsic and extrinsic), and in section 3.1.2, I explain why recognition is valuable (for my argument about reason-giving’s value presupposes, and is mediated by, the value of recognition). I then present reasons, in section 3.2, why reason-giving has an intrinsic cognitive value. In section 4, I deal with a possible objection to my claim. And in section 5, I argue that claiming that reason-giving has an intrinsic cognitive value is compatible with claiming that reason-giving has also an extrinsic cognitive value, even of a distinctive kind.

2. The concept of intrinsic value

To understand why reason-giving has an intrinsic cognitive value and what type of value this is, I first explain the concept of intrinsic value. The value that something has is always based on one or more of its properties. These properties can be either relational or non-relational. Relational properties are properties that something has in virtue of its relation to other things. ‘Being a parent’, ‘being loved’ and ‘being useful to X’ are examples of relational properties. Conversely, non-relational properties are properties that do not depend on the relation that the object has to other objects. They are properties that the object can be said to
have in itself, that the object has purely in virtue of the way the object itself is.

‘Having a mass’ and ‘being rational’ are examples of non-relational properties.\textsuperscript{698}

Traditionally, intrinsic value is thought to be value that something has ‘in itself’, ‘for its own sake’, ‘as such’, ‘in its own right’, or ‘in virtue of its intrinsic properties’. This is a rough characterization, but it serves as a start. Extrinsic value is value that is not intrinsic, that is, value that something has for the sake of something else that is of value, and to which it is related in some way. The classical definition of intrinsic value comes from G.E. Moore:

\begin{quote}
‘to say that a kind of value is “intrinsic” means merely that the question whether a thing possesses it, and in what degree it possesses it, depends solely on the intrinsic nature of the thing in question’\textsuperscript{699}
\end{quote}

Though this is not explicit in the above definition, in his writings Moore directly opposes intrinsic value to instrumental value (the value that something has as a means to an end), and equates instrumental value with extrinsic value.\textsuperscript{700} In his view, every value that is not intrinsic – that is not value that the thing has ‘in itself’ – can only be instrumental, that is, value it has as a means or a tool for the production of a certain end – and hence, can only be value for the sake of something else. In particular, Moore thought that a value could only be intrinsic if it supervenes on non-relational properties of the thing that has it, and took

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnote{698}{Often, ‘relational properties’ are said to be ‘extrinsic’, while ‘non-relational properties’ are said to be ‘intrinsic’. This is not completely accurate, for there are also properties that can be characterized as intrinsic and relational. See, Weatherson B and Marshall D, Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Properties, in: E N Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.}

\footnote{699}{Moore G E, The Conception of Intrinsic Value (1922) Philosophical Studies p. 255, 260.}

\footnote{700}{See e.g. Moore G E, Principia Ethica (2004) chap 1, part D.}
\end{footnotesize}
intrinsic value to be non-relational value. Because he equates the extrinsic to the instrumental, if the value something has is value it has in virtue of a relational property, this value cannot be intrinsic to it, only instrumental.

Moore’s way of understanding intrinsic value has been criticized in the literature. First, as I just pointed out, Moore treats ‘instrumental value’ and ‘extrinsic value’ as if they were synonymous. Against this, it has been argued that there are other ways in which something might be said to be valued ‘for the sake of something else’, without that value being instrumental; that there are other sorts of contributions things can make to good ends rather than ‘being their causes or tools for their production’. It is sometimes said, for instance, that a part of an intrinsically valuable whole has ‘contributive value’, or that objects that may contribute to someone having an intrinsically good experience (even if no one knows of their existence) – e.g. a painting, a piece of music – have ‘inherent value’. Those values are like instrumental value in that they derive

701 Korsgaard C M, Creating the Kingdom of Ends (1996) p. 254 says that for Moore ‘the intrinsic nature of a thing seems to consist of its non-relational properties’; Beardsley, M C, Intrinsic Value (1965) Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, p. 1, 2, also says that for Moore, intrinsic value is ‘the value that depends upon a thing’s internal properties alone’; ‘the intrinsic value of a thing is independent of its relationship to anything else’.


704 See Lewis C I, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (1946) p. 391; Frankena W, Ethics (1973) p. 82 (inherent value = ‘things that are good because the experience of contemplating them is good or rewarding in itself’); Zimmerman M J, Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2015 Edition), p. 15 says that ‘the value attributed to the painting is one that it is said to have in virtue of its relation to something else that would supposedly be intrinsically good if it occurred, namely, the appreciation of its beauty’.

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from the contribution they make to the existence of a good end (they are all extrinsic), but are not values something has as a means to an end.

Second, it has been argued that Moore conflates two separate (yet related) distinctions with regard to value. Korsgaard argues that one is the distinction between value ‘for its own sake’ (which she calls ‘final value’) and value ‘for the sake of something else’ (which she refers to as ‘instrumental value’). Another is the distinction between value that something has ‘in itself’ (which in her view is ‘intrinsic value’) and value that derives from another source (‘extrinsic value’). She holds that those distinctions are not co-extensive, and that for them to be so considered, they must ‘be under the influence of a theory’ – like Moore’s – that holds, or assumes, that the two distinctions are the same. In the absence of a specific theory, she holds that it is more natural to contrast ‘instrumental value’ with ‘final value’, and ‘intrinsic value’ (the value something has in virtue of its intrinsic, non-relational properties) to ‘extrinsic value’ (the value something has in virtue of its extrinsic, relational properties).

Korsgaard keeps the intrinsic-extrinsic distinction to refer to a distinction on the source of the value. To say that a certain value is intrinsic is to say that its

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706 Ibid. p. 250 (‘one is the distinction between things valued for their own sakes and things valued for the sake of something else – between…final and instrumental [value]. The other is the distinction between things which have their value in themselves and things which derive their value from some other source: intrinsically good things versus extrinsically good things’).
707 Id. Ibid.
708 Id. Ibid.
709 Id. Ibid.
source lies in the object itself, that it is a value that the object has purely in virtue of the way the object itself is (and thus, a value that it has ‘in itself’). To say that a certain value is extrinsic is to say that its source is derived from some other source – e.g. from a relation that the object has to some other object. In her terminology, value that supervenes on relational properties is always extrinsic, while value that supervenes on non-relational properties is always intrinsic.

Further, she holds that the distinction between final and instrumental value is a distinction about the way things are valued. Things can be valued either ‘for their own sake’ – and hence, have ‘final’ value – or ‘for the sake of something else’ – and hence, have ‘non-final value’. The most typical way of being valued ‘for the sake of something else’ is being valued instrumentally.

Korsgaard holds that if one does not conflate the two distinctions, there is no reason to think that ‘final value’ cannot supervene on either kind of property (relational or non-relational). In particular, as she says, something can be said to be ‘extrinsically [i.e. relationally] good yet [have final value, or value for its own sake]’. Take an example to elaborate this point. A father may value his children ‘for their own sake’ simply because they are his children. It is perfectly natural, for instance, to attribute more value to one’s children simply because they are one’s children. They are not merely valued for the sake of something else, e.g. for the happiness they bring to one. The fact that they are his children is a relational

\[
\text{\textsuperscript{710}} \quad \text{Id. Ibid.}
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\text{\textsuperscript{711}} \quad \text{Ibid. p. 250 (it has to do not with ‘the location or source of the goodness [but with] the way we value the thing’).}
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\text{\textsuperscript{712}} \quad \text{Korsgaard C M, Creating the Kingdom of Ends (1996) p. 252.}
\]
property, but also a property they have in themselves (e.g. it is a property that no
other children in the world have). In Korsgaard’s terms, even though the
property upon which the value supervenes is relational, the value that
supervenes upon it is ‘final’ (or value ‘for its own sake’).

Korsgaard holds that if one does not conflate the two distinctions (final and
instrumental, intrinsic and extrinsic), it is possible that a value be final and
extrinsic (as the example above), final and intrinsic (e.g. the value of a human
being *qua* rational), instrumental and extrinsic (e.g. the value of a hammer for
pressing a nail in the wall). The only combination that seems to be analytically
impossible is instrumental and intrinsic. However, some authors have tentatively
endorsed even that possibility (Kagan, e.g. argues that the value of helping
another in need is a case of an ‘intrinsically valuable instrumental value’). 713

Korsgaard holds that Moore’s way of thinking about value – because of his direct
opposition of intrinsic to instrumental – is an impoverished one. In particular, it
does not allow the possibility of describing the value of certain things as being
both for its own sake and relational 714, that is, as being both ‘final’ and ‘extrinsic’
– in that it supervenes on a relational (extrinsic) property.715

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possibility of distinguishing ‘two kinds of instrumental value, one final and the other non-final’.
715 Ibid. p. 273, she distinguishes between ‘a thing that is intrinsically good and a thing that is
extrinsically good yet valuable [for its own sake]’. 
Korsgaard does not use the term ‘intrinsic value’ to refer to ‘final value’, which is a slightly idiosyncratic terminological choice.716 She does that probably because she wants to stress that this sort of value can be either relational or non-relational, and thinks that the term ‘intrinsic’ suggests – both in ordinary idiom and philosophical jargon – the idea of ‘non-relational value’ (which is Moore’s use). But some authors, even though they acknowledge the relevance of Korsgaard’s point, prefer to keep the term ‘intrinsic value’ to refer to ‘final value’.717 They hold that the distinction Korsgaard makes can also be made if one sticks to the more familiar terms ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’, and that the contrast she makes is not entirely clear, because she contrasts ‘final value’ to ‘instrumental value’ and also takes (rightly) instrumental value to be one type of ‘extrinsic value’ (value that something has not ‘for its own sake’, but ‘for the sake of something else’, to which it is related in some way).

In sum, they argue that the important distinction still is that between the value that something has for its own sake and the value that something has for the sake of something else. In my view, the terms used are not essential. One can as well keep the terms ‘intrinsic value’ and ‘extrinsic value’ to refer to this


717 Zimmerman M J, Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, p. 9, holds that there is no need to reserve the term ‘intrinsic value’ to refer to ‘the value that something has in virtue of its intrinsic [= non-relational] properties’. Kagan S, Rethinking Intrinsic Value (1998) 2(4) The Journal of Ethics p. 277, 280, 290, also refers to final value as intrinsic, and argues that ‘other possible names…are unsatisfactory and potentially misleading in their own ways’.
distinction, and add that intrinsic value can also supervene on relational properties. The central idea is that intrinsic value is value that something has in itself or for its own sake. This is equivalent to Korsgaard’s claim that final value can be either intrinsic (non-relational) or extrinsic (relational). I think that using the term ‘intrinsic value’ is further justified here because in the case of reason-giving, as I argue in the next sections, the recognizable value I identify is both final and extrinsic (relational), that is, it is a value that reason-giving has for its own sake, but that supervenes on a relational property. From now on, I use ‘intrinsic value’ to what Korsgaard calls ‘final value’ (value ‘for its own sake’), with the qualification that this value can be either relational or non-relational.

Various examples have been produced to sustain the idea that a value can be both intrinsic and relational. Kagan gives the example of the pen Lincoln used to sign the Emancipation Proclamation. He holds that Lincoln’s pen has an intrinsic value that supervenes on a relational property, namely, its having been used by Lincoln in an important historical moment. It is a value that no other pen in the world has, that this pen has for its own sake. But it is not a value that

\[718\] Zimmerman M J, Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, p. 9, says that it is justifiable, perhaps even advisable, to continue, despite Korsgaard’s misgivings, to use the terms “intrinsic value” and “extrinsic value” to refer to these two types of value.


\[722\] Ibid. p. 285.
this pen has non-relationally. There was nothing special about it before Lincoln used it to sign the Proclamation. Indeed, he could have used any other pen to sign it. If it was broken or without ink, it would not have the value it now has, since it could not have been effective to sign the Proclamation. But note that it is the relation this pen has to Lincoln (and its history) that is decisive for understanding why this pen has intrinsic value. This pen can have other values as well – e.g. it has a considerable instrumental value for it was ‘the actual means by which a great deal of intrinsic good was brought into the world’ and of reminding us of that. But this does not exhaust all the value that this pen has.

In the terminology I adopt here, Lincoln’s pen can also be said to have a value that is both intrinsic and relational, for it ‘is something we could reasonably value for its own sake’ but only in virtue of its relation to Lincoln. Similarly, Korsgaard claims that some objects have value for their own sake (or ‘final value’, in her terms) in virtue of the role they play in our lives (which is a relational property, e.g. luxurious instruments, mink coats) and Beardsley wonders whether a rare stamp has value for its own sake in virtue of its rarity. Other authors have offered similar examples. The common feature in all those cases is that the objects referred to have a certain value that can be said to be

\[\text{723 Kagan (ibid. p. 286) says that it is not ‘the mere capacity to have played this role’ but the fact that this very pen played a historically important causal role’ that matters here.}\]
\[\text{724 Id. ibid.}\]
\[\text{725 Id. ibid.}\]
\[\text{726 Korsgaard C M, Creating the Kingdom of Ends (1986) p. 264.}\]
\[\text{727 Beardsley, M C, Intrinsic Value (1965) Philosophy and Phenomenological Research p. 1, 3-4.}\]
\[\text{728 See, e.g. Rabinowicz W and Ronnow-Rasmussen W, A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and For Its own Sake, in Proceeding for Aristotelian Society, p. 33, 40.}\]
intrinsic, even though it supervenes on a relational property that the object has.

The core idea to be retained for the next sections is that a value might be thought to be ‘intrinsic’ in that it is not merely a value something has for its contribution to an end seen as the source of value (that is, it is not merely extrinsic value, value for the sake of something else) while also being relational.

I refer to those examples here because I think that reason-giving also has a certain value – indeed, a distinctive value – that can be characterized in this way. In the next section, I argue that, apart from any other value that reason-giving might also have, reason-giving has a value that is both intrinsic and relational (that is, an intrinsic value that supervenes on a relational property), and that this value is best grasped as a certain type of recognition for the other (‘recognizing the other’ is a relational property). In the next section, I provide reasons to support this claim, which is the central claim of this chapter.

3. Reason-giving and its intrinsic value

3.1 Recognition
3.1.1 Two ways of thinking about the value of an act of recognition

There are two ways of thinking about or analysing the value of an act of recognition. In the last chapter, I hinted at this point only briefly.\textsuperscript{729} The value of an act of recognition can be characterized in different ways, depending on the aspect upon which one focuses. To put it in the terms introduced in the last section, it can be characterized either in intrinsic or in extrinsic terms. In the first, intrinsic, way, its value lies in its character as a response to features that the other has and that are valuable in him. In the second extrinsic way, its value lies on what it brings about or can bring about in the other – e.g. good effects such as helping the other relate to those features in himself, making the other feel recognized, or satisfying needs in him. The value of an act of recognition is more often explained in extrinsic terms. Honneth, for instance, often explains it in terms of the contribution such act makes to the other’s well-being or the other’s positive self-relation, such as his self-esteem or self-confidence.\textsuperscript{730} But I think that it can be thought in both ways, and one way does not exclude the other.\textsuperscript{731}

\textsuperscript{729} See chapter four, section 3.2.
\textsuperscript{730} See, e.g. Honneth A, \textit{Disrespect} (2007) p. 137, where he claims that ultimately, recognition matters because it can lead ‘to a state that is considered desirable because it serves [the other’s] well-being’.
\textsuperscript{731} Even though he does not elaborate in detail, I think that Honneth endorses this view when he claims that acts of recognition represent ‘the...appropriate response to evaluative qualities [in the other]’, and lose their ‘purely instrumental meaning in coming to be also a matter of meeting a moral or ethical demand’, Honneth A, \textit{Disrespect} (2007) p. 137. Laitinen A, \textit{Interpersonal Recognition: A Response to Value of a Precondition of Personhood?} (2002) 45 (4) \textit{Inquiry} p. 475, defends a similar claim. See also, Markell P, \textit{Bound by Recognition} (2003) p. 40.
This distinction is crucial to establish my claim about the intrinsic value of reason-giving. The distinction between the intrinsic and the extrinsic recognitive value of an act of reason-giving – and how well a given act of reason-giving realizes each type of value – is equivalent to speech act theory’s distinction between the illocutionary and the perlocutionary felicity of an act of reason-giving.\textsuperscript{732} How well a given act of reason-giving realizes its intrinsic recognitive value is equivalent to how good that act is as an act of reason-giving (illocutionary felicity), while how well it realizes its extrinsic recognitive value is equivalent to how good that act is in achieving certain good effects in the other, such as the other feeling duly recognized (perlocutionary felicity).\textsuperscript{733} In the last chapter, I argued that the conditions for illocutionary felicity are the only conditions that must be fulfilled for a given act of reason-giving to be a fully felicitous act of reason-giving; while the conditions for perlocutionary felicity may or may not be fulfilled, that this is a contingent matter.\textsuperscript{734}

How much intrinsic recognitive value a given act of reason-giving has can be judged entirely in terms of how well it recognizes, or expresses recognition for, the relevant other in light of the relationship that holds between them (illocutionary felicity). When I say this, my point is not that the effects of an act of reason-giving are irrelevant, only that whether or not those effects actually happen is a contingent matter, and depend on further conditions being fulfilled.

\textsuperscript{732} See chapter four, section 3.2.
\textsuperscript{733} Effects related to recognition have to do, for instance, with making the other feel duly recognized, or satisfying some need in him.
\textsuperscript{734} See chapter four, section 3.2. They are all conditions whose fulfilment is relevant to assess how much extrinsic recognitive value a given act has.
apart from those that have to be fulfilled for its illocutionary felicity. In fact, as I argue in the next section, the possibility of good effects being produced in the other partly explains why recognition is valuable. In section 5, I argue that a fully felicitous act of reason-giving (in the illocutionary sense) has a greater chance of realizing a higher extrinsic recognitive value than an infelicitous (but still successful) one. Laitinen A, Interpersonal Recognition: A Response to Value of a Precondition of Personhood? (2002) 45 (4) Inquiry p. 469, argues that acts of recognition and misrecognition have 'their positive and negative effects partly because they are the right or the wrong thing to do', and their 'rightness must be able to [be defined] independently of the positive effects'. However, in my view, a given act of reason-giving may not realize any extrinsic recognitive value, and still have value – for it might still realize (even a high degree of) intrinsic recognitive value.

Some authors, when they explain what intrinsic value is, hold that intrinsic value is the value that would remain if all extrinsic value were subtracted. See, e.g. Beardsley, M C, Intrinsic Value (1965) Philosophy and Phenomenological Research p. 1; Baylis, C A, Grading, Values, and Choice (1958) Mind LXVII, p. 485, 494, also explains 'intrinsic value' as value that can exist 'entirely apart from any extrinsic value it may have'.

In the last chapter, I suggested that Socrates’ act in the Crito might be a good example here, for in my view, Socrates’ act counts as a fully felicitous act of reason-giving (i.e. as a fully felicitous expression of recognition for Crito, it counts as an act of due recognition for Crito), whether or not it ultimately succeeds in achieving any of its intended perlocutions in Crito (e.g. release Crito’s distress, console him, and persuade him). I noted that some authors take Crito’s silence in the end of the dialogue to
be a strong sign that he was not even a little reconciled with Socrates’ death\textsuperscript{737}, and that some even suggest that Crito could only be fully reconciled if he could understand Socrates’ real reasons (which he could not). But I claimed, following speech act theory, that even though all this might be true, it is irrelevant to assess the illocutionary felicity of Socrates’ act, and that Socrates’ act can be said to achieve a high degree of (intrinsic) recognitive value apart from that.

Just a brief caveat. My way of thinking about the value of an act of reason-giving is similar to Kant’s way of thinking about the moral value of an action. For Kant, the other’s humanity (or rational nature) directly generates reasons for responding to the other in certain ways.\textsuperscript{738} And these reasons do not derive from the fact that these responses would often – even normally – have good effects in the other, such as helping the other acknowledge his humanity, or put him in contact with the humanity he has in himself (though Kant would agree that these would be welcomed effects). As Hill puts it, Kant thinks that the value of ‘respecting’ the other in his humanity is ‘not derivative from the desirability of promoting other good consequences...[and] stands independently of this fact’.\textsuperscript{739}

Insofar as this is so, Kant also thinks of this value in intrinsic terms, i.e. as a value that belongs to the very act of ‘respecting’ the other in his humanity and to the

\textsuperscript{737} Beversluis J, \textit{Cross-Examining Socrates} (2004) p. 72, for instance, writes: ‘The end of the \textit{Crito} presents us with an interlocutor who has heard Socrates out and “assented to” each of the premises put to him but who continues to disagree with him and finally lapses into silence because he realizes that further protests would indeed be futile’.


\textsuperscript{739} Ibid. p. 45.
attitude it expresses towards the other, a value that that act has independently of the good consequences it might or not produce in the other.\footnote{Wood A W, *Kant's Ethical Thought* (1999) p. 141, has a similar point in mind when he claims that Kant’s view here is ‘expressive’ in character and that it differs both from consequentialist views (which conceive the value of an action in terms of ‘bringing about desirable states of affairs’) and from deontological ones (which ‘represent [actions] as obedience to an obligatory rule or commandment’. I think that Parfit D, *On What Matters*, vol. 1 (2011) p. 236, has something similar in mind when he says that some acts ‘are worth doing [e.g. respecting people, engaging in various worth while activities], not merely as a means to happiness or other good ends, but partly or wholly for their own sake’. He adds that these acts have value for their own sake ‘when they have intrinsic properties or features’ that make them so valuable. I think this is the case with reason-giving.}

3.1.2 Introducing the thin conception of recognition

Before continuing, let me just spell out more clearly the conception of recognition that underlies my argument. I rely on a thin conception of recognition, i.e. of what is minimally necessary for an act to count as an act of recognition. Not much attention has been given to clarify this in the literature. In the last chapter, I said that Honneth refers to recognition always as ‘due’ recognition, and in various passages he implies that a given act counts as one of recognition \emph{only if} it is due.\footnote{See chapter four, section 2.1. Honneth A, *Grounding Recognition: A Rejoinder to Critical Questions* (2002) 45(4) \textit{Inquiry} p. 499, 516 says that acts of recognition ‘represent the...appropriate response to...evaluative qualities [in the other]’.} I think that this is misleading. Other authors have endorsed a more nuanced view. Laitinen, who I think is in the right direction, claims that in general, recognition is best conceived ‘as a reason-governed response to evaluative features [in the other]’\footnote{Laitinen A, *Interpersonal Recognition: A Response to Value of a Precondition of Personhood*? (2002) 45 (4) \textit{Inquiry} p. 464.}, and that an act counts as an act of recognition whenever one ‘(more or less) adequately responds to [the other]...'}
in ways that are called for or required by [the other’s] normatively relevant features\textsuperscript{743}. This helps to articulate the ‘intrinsic’ part of my claim. To quote him, the core idea is that the other has certain valuable features and that

\begin{quote}
‘these features generate reasons to respond in certain ways – certain responses are called for or required by these features...[and] there is a plurality of kinds of responses that are normatively called for’\textsuperscript{744}
\end{quote}

Laitinen argues that a valuable feature is any feature in the other whose recognition (or misrecognition) might be relevant for the other’s positive self-relation. So, to use his example, if someone claims ‘rightly or wrongly, that the number of hairs on my head is 4732’, ‘it is hard to see what difference this would make’\textsuperscript{745} (positively or negatively) to my self-relation.\textsuperscript{746} Because, as I said in the last chapter, the notion of recognition is primarily a normative one, Laitinen (like other authors) argues that ‘any kinds of responses ...[that] may intelligibly enhance our positive self-relation when adequate, or may be experienced as misrecognition or inadequate recognition, when inadequate’\textsuperscript{747} are relevant

\textsuperscript{744} Ibid. p. 324.
\textsuperscript{746} Whether this would have the potential of affecting my self-confidence, or self-esteem, for instance.
\textsuperscript{747} Laitinen A, On The Scope of ”Recognition”: The Role of Adequate Regard and Mutuality, in: Schmidt Am Busch H-C and Zurn C F (eds.), The Philosophy of Recognition: Historical and contemporary perspectives (2010), p. 330 (on p. 338, he claims that what all responses that express (some) recognition have in common is that ‘they are responses...[to] normatively significant features [in the other], and that it is meaningful to expect such responses, and that lack of such responses [or of appropriate ones] may rightly be experienced as lack of recognition’.
here. Honneth also makes a similar claim when he notes that misrecognition (or inadequate recognition, in my terms) differs from bad things merely happening to the other (such as bad luck, or natural events).\textsuperscript{748} The crucial test is whether it makes sense for the other to feel misrecognized (whether or not he actually feels misrecognized), because he was not adequately taken into account.

However, in the thin conception, it is a sufficient condition for an act to count as an act of recognition that the act is a response to the other that is sensitive to some valuable feature $F$ that the other has. This is a sufficient condition for that response to express (some) recognition for the other in that feature (and therefore, for that response to have some cognitive value). This means that whenever one responds to the other in that way, one recognizes the other as having that feature (and therefore, it can be said that the other \textit{is being recognized} by him in that feature). I call this the ‘thin conception’, because nothing more is necessary for one’s act to count as an act of recognition for the other (e.g. the other does not have to be aware that he is being recognized, or to feel properly taken into account, indeed, that act does not even need to be a good act of recognition for it to count as an act of recognition for him). To use a term I introduced in the last chapter, it is sufficient for an act to be an act of recognition that it expresses ‘bare’ recognition for the other.

\textsuperscript{748} Even these can also (negatively) affect the other’s self-relation. See, e.g. Honneth A, \textit{Disrespect} (2007) p. 133-137.
This is, of course, not sufficient for that act to express *due* recognition for the other. Expressing due recognition, differently from bare recognition, is a matter of *adequately* responding to the other in virtue of a certain feature $F$ that the other has and that is valuable in him, while bare recognition is a matter of simply responding to the other in virtue of that feature.\cite{749} From this perspective, how good a given act is as an act of recognition – i.e. in recognizing – depends on how well it expresses recognition for the other in a feature $F$ that he has and that is valuable in him. (In the last chapter, I claimed that this requires that some conditions must be fulfilled, among which one must display a degree of responsiveness to the other that is appropriate to the kind of relationship that holds between them). In this sense, again, whether a given act is a good act or not can be determined apart from its effects in the other (i.e. from how much extrinsic recognitive value this act realises), and only in terms of the act itself and of what it expresses. This is why I argued that the conditions that have to be fulfilled here define how much *intrinsic* recognitive value a given act has.

In the following sections, I will be defending that all acts of reason-giving (insofar as they are acts of reason-giving – i.e. successful reason-giving – however defective they are as acts of reason-giving, i.e. whether or not they express ‘due’

\footnote{\cite{749} Brandom R, The Structure of Desire and Recognition: Self-consciousness and self-constitution (2007) 33(1) *Philosophy & Social Criticism* p. 127, 142, makes a distinction between ‘simply recognizing’ and ‘robustly recognizing’ the other. Laitinen A, On The Scope of “Recognition”: The Role of Adequate Regard and Mutuality, in: Schmidt Am Busch H-C and Zurn C F (eds.), *The Philosophy of Recognition: Historical and contemporary perspectives* (2010), p. 323, also says that ‘something is adequate regard towards a person if it is an appropriate response to the normatively or evaluatively significant features $F$ of the other’ (also p. 325). He also seems to favour this view when he says that recognizing is matter of ‘merely being responded to by $A$’, while due recognizing is a matter of ‘being responded to adequately’ (p. 326).}
recognition for the other) express 'bare' recognition for some (particular) valuable feature in the other being recognized. This means that the expression of 'bare' recognition for that feature in the other is a necessary condition for an attempt to perform an act of reason-giving to be successful, i.e. for a given act to count as an act of reason-giving. My claim is that insofar as a given act of reason-giving is successful, this act always expresses bare recognition for this (particular) valuable feature in the other, and therefore, that it has some intrinsic recognitive value in virtue of this fact (i.e. merely in virtue of being an act of reason-giving); therefore, all successful performances of the illocution-type 'reason-giving' have an intrinsic (recognitive) value.

In other words, the claim I will be defending is that recognition (of a certain type) is a value that reason-giving has just in virtue of the type of act that it is. Whether a given act of reason-giving expresses 'bare' or 'due' recognition depends on how felicitous that act is as an act of reason-giving. As I just explained, this is a matter of how much intrinsic recognitive value that particular act realizes. However, my claim is that whenever one gives the other reasons, one always responds to a particular valuable feature F in the other and thereby recognizes the other as having this feature, and I will argue below that reason-giving has a certain intrinsic value simply in virtue of this fact.
3.1.3 Remarks about the value of recognition

My argument about reason-giving’s value presupposes the value of recognition. Presenting a full-fledged account of recognition – of what it is, and of why it is valuable – would require a long diversion from my thesis’ central aim. But since my argument about reason-giving’s value presupposes the value of recognition (or is mediated by that presupposition), I will provide at least some reasons for why recognition is thought to be valuable. I believe that there are good reasons for making this assumption. They are based on the Hegelian understanding of recognition and the literature that is built on it. I present them here only to pave the way for defending my claim about reason-giving’s value.

Normally, authors do not argue for the value of recognition. Rather, they take it for granted, based on the role that recognition has to human experience. Taylor, for instance, has claimed that the importance of recognition is ‘now universally acknowledged in one form or another’, and that recognition is not just a mere courtesy we owe to others, but a ‘vital human need’. Honneth – who also favours such a view – takes for granted that humans need the experience of recognition ‘to relate [positively] to their capabilities and potentials’. In this view (which is the standard one), the value of recognition is rooted on a basic

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750 See chapter four, section 3.2, where I explained the concept of an act of recognition.
752 Honneth A, Grounding Recognition: A Rejoinder to Critical Questions (2002) 45(4) Inquiry p. 499, 515, though he points out that ‘its forms and contours can become differentiated in the course of historical transformations’. On p. 503 he says that ‘it is still particularly tempting to attribute to persons an unconscious will to distinguish themselves’.
anthropological premise – indeed, on a basic fact about human nature. The best proof that can be offered for it is not an argument, but experience. That recognition has value, it is argued, is best seen when it is missing, when the other suffers from a lack of it. Cases of explicit humiliation, oppression and racism illustrate that. Most theories of recognition assume that persons fundamentally depend on the positive feedback of other subjects to maintain a positive relationship with their own selves, and that the failure to experience due recognition may thereby hinder (in serious ways) that relationship.

In this view, the value of recognition (and also the motivation to investigate the concept of recognition itself) is mainly grounded in the positive and negative effects that recognition (and its lack) might have in the other. It is thus grounded in empirical terms. It is stressed that the lack of recognition (or misrecognition) often has a real core, and that the other actually feels not to be perceived or taken into account. Taylor, for instance, holds that misrecognition can imprison one ‘in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being’ and thus be a source of real harm. Likewise, Honneth also stresses that human experience provides a strong basis for thinking that recognition has

754 Just to give one example, Fanon F, Black Skin, White Marks (1952), for instance, has described how the victims of racism and colonialism have suffered severe psychological harm by being demeaned as inferior humans.
755 I am not saying that this is the only way of thinking about the value of recognition, only that this is sufficient to grant that recognition has value.
757 Taylor C, The Politics of Recognition, in Philosophical Arguments, p. 25 (he also says that one’s very identity as a person is ‘partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others’).
value. He argues, for instance, that if one reflects on experiences of misrecognition seriously enough, one would understand why recognition is valuable and its deeper moral meaning. Ultimately, it is only by having those experiences (which are primarily felt or lived, rather than rationally understood) that one could actually grasp the important value of being recognized by others, and why recognition matters.\footnote{Fraser, in: Fraser N and Honneth A, \textit{Redistribution or Recognition} (2004) p. 37-45, argues that one should not rely too much on actual experience here. She argues that the other might not be aware that he is being misrecognized (as when he has internalized a sense of being inferior), or may feel misrecognized just because he has an unreasonable expectation of how others should treat him. She mentions cases where misrecognition ‘conveys psychological benefits’ for the other, and argues (different from Honneth and Taylor) that they disconfirm the view that actual experience ‘can supply a justificatory standard for recognition’.


Underlying this idea is the Hegelian belief that recognition is not only an effective means for making the other feel recognized, but also a necessary condition for him to develop a positive relation to his own self, indeed to have a self at all. Honneth, for instance, who follows Hegel in that regard, argues that the only way in which individuals ‘are constituted as persons is by learning to refer to themselves, from the perspective of an approving or encouraging other, as beings with certain positive traits and abilities’\footnote{Honneth A, \textit{The Struggle for Recognition} (1995) p. 173}, and that the other can only maintain a positive self-relation (e.g. have self-confidence, self-esteem, self-respect) with the help of affirmative attitude from others. In the last chapter, I said that Hegel originally uses the term ‘recognition’ to refer to a fundamentally inter-subjective process, in which one’s attitude towards oneself emerges in – and is constituted by – one’s encounter with an other’s attitude toward oneself
(Honneth sometimes uses the term ‘encouraging other’ to refer to this idea). This point has also been well stressed by Kojève, who holds that

‘it is only by being “recognized” by another...that a human being is really human... And only in speaking of a “recognized” human reality can the term human be used to state a truth in the strict and full sense of the term...”

Even though the value of recognition is most often taken for granted, some authors are doubtful about the value of recognition and cast recognition in a far more negative light than do authors such as Honneth and Taylor. They argue that instead of an inherent human need, the need for recognition might be only an ideological construction or a product of social domination, something that was created and imposed by some hegemonic groups in society. Despite this resistance, however, it is worth noting that a wholesale rejection of the value of recognition is not common. Just to give an example, McNay, who is a prominent voice against recognition, is careful to note that she argues against recognition not in general, but only in the more specific sense that authors who stress its value often rely on ‘a reductive understanding of power’. She suggests that the need for recognition might not be as ‘spontaneous and innate’ as the standard

761 See, e.g. McNay L, Against Recognition (2008) p. 10; Duttmann, A G, Between Cultures (2000), p. 156, criticizes that recognition is often presented by positing an idealized norm that is not realistic; McBride C, Recognition (2013) p. 6 also alerts for the possibility that the ‘desire for recognition can itself be a product of social domination’ and that recognition should better not be thought of ‘in terms of a psychological need’.
762 Skeggs B, Class, Culture Self (2003) p. 1 ff., argues that this concern for recognition is essentially a middle-class phenomenon.
Hegelian view assumes it to be and that it might be more ‘the effect of a certain ideological manipulation of individuals’\textsuperscript{764}.

To my purposes, whether or not this claim is true is not relevant (even if it were true, it would still be true that this need exists, and that it is experienced as relevant). I do not want to dispute this claim, for that would require spelling out a more general account of recognition than the one I need to establish my claim about the value of reason-giving. I return to this point on section 4, when I provide a response to a possible objection against my claim about the value of reason-giving. But it is worth noting that even if McNay (and other authors) were right and the need for recognition were merely a result of ideological manipulation, as will become clear below, this would not undermine in any way the claim that an act of reason-giving can still have an intrinsic recognitive value on the lines I am defending. It would only have some consequence as to whether an act of reason-giving also has an important extrinsic recognitive value (e.g. in satisfying a valuable need in the other).

\textit{3.1.4 Interim conclusion}

If it is true that any act of recognition has (some) intrinsic recognitive value and reason-giving is a particular act of recognition, this already entails that reason-giving also has an intrinsic recognitive value. However, as I argue in the

\textsuperscript{764} Id. ibid.
following section, reason-giving is distinctive as an act of recognition, because it expresses recognition for the other in a particular feature that the other has and that is valuable in him.

3.2 Why recognizing the other by reason-giving has a distinctive intrinsic value: the value of recognizing rationality

3.2.1 Recognizing the other in his rationality

I claimed that the sense of ‘recognition’ that is most relevant here is that of recognition as a response to features that the other has and that are valuable in him (i.e. of ‘recognizing’); and that recognizing is a matter of responding (more or less appropriately) to the other in virtue of these features. Since the other can have a variety of valuable features, there are also a variety of responses that may be sensitive to them and that can express some type of recognition for the other. Honneth claims that there is a ‘multitude of gestures that can give expression to the act of recognition’ and that there are many ‘forms...of action as there are valuable features to be recognized’\(^ {765} \) in the other. Other authors endorse similar views.\(^ {766} \) Reason-giving expresses a distinctive type of recognition for the other, for it expresses recognition for a particular feature that the other has and that is valuable in him. Similarly to the claim I made about arguing (I held that one


cannot try to justify a claim without trying to argue for it\textsuperscript{67}, one cannot try to recognize the other \textit{in a certain way} without giving the other reasons.

Whenever one gives the other reasons, one recognizes the other as a rational being, as a being that can be motivated by and is sensitive to reasons. It is this rational capacity in the other that makes reason-giving a meaningful thing to do. In the last chapter, I identified a list of conditions for felicitous reason-giving and argued that whenever one performs an act of reason-giving, one must presuppose that the other has this capacity at least in some degree.\textsuperscript{68} If the other does not have this rational capacity at all (e.g. if he is entirely insensitive to reasons, or unmoved by reasons), reason-giving would be an entirely pointless thing to do. This is why, for instance, it does not make sense to give reasons to a rock or a plant, or to a parrot.\textsuperscript{69}

I rely here on a traditional notion of rationality, namely, that of a capacity for responding to reasons in a particular way – namely, a capacity for responding to reasons \textit{as such}.\textsuperscript{70} Brandom, for instance, associates rationality to ‘a practical grasp of reasons’\textsuperscript{71}, to a ‘sort of practical mastery, as a kind of know-how’\textsuperscript{72}.

\textsuperscript{67} See chapter three, section 2.
\textsuperscript{68} See chapter four, section 4.
\textsuperscript{69} Brandom R, \textit{Reason in Philosophy} (2013) p. 2, argues that before we can ask about whether the other ‘is better or worse, more or less reliable, in doing what rational beings do’, there is a constitutive issue that is more basic, namely, the issue of whether the other ‘is a rational creature at all (something that does not come in degrees)’.
\textsuperscript{70} See McDowell, J, \textit{Having the World in View} (2013) p. 129 ff. Scanlon T M, \textit{What We Owe to Each Other} (2000), p. 23, says that ‘a rational creature is, first of all, a reasoning creature – one that has the capacity to recognize, assess, and be moved by reasons’.
Animals have a capacity for responding to reasons. When a hungry animal identifies an item in the world as food, and moves directly to reach and eats it (or when it senses the possibility of danger and flees), there is a clear sense in which the animal can be said to be responding to a reason, or at least to what it takes or perceives to be a reason (its hunger). However, that animal is not capable of being aware of reasons or of dealing with reasons as such, in the way that human beings can do. Various authors have raised this point.\footnote{Ibid. p. 88. Brandom R, \textit{Reason in Philosophy} (2013), p. 169, holds that it involves ‘a practical ability, a kind of skill: sorting possible inferences into good ones and bad ones, endorsing or being disposed to make some of them, and rejecting or being disposed not to make some others’.
\footnote{McDowell J, \textit{Having the World in View} (2013) p. 128 (on p. 130, he argues that this capacity is present even when it is not explicitly exercised).}

Responding to reasons as such presupposes a capacity for seeing connections, drawing conclusions, imagining contrary reasons. It presupposes the ability to step back from one’s immediate desires and to \textit{reflect} upon reasons. McDowell argues that it is not sufficient for having the capacity of responding to reasons as such that one has the ability to discriminate between things and to react accordingly (like the animal in the above example). It requires the further ability of taking reasons into account as one does when reasoning, i.e. of thinking about them, of asking whether the reasons for doing or believing or feeling something outweigh the reasons against.\footnote{McDowell J, \textit{Having the World in View} (2013) p. 128 (on p. 130, he argues that this capacity is present even when it is not explicitly exercised).} As with any capacity, it may come in degrees. One may exercise it well or badly, or be better in certain areas and worse in
others. Some beings may have only the potential for having it (such as young children), and there might be cases in which even the potential for having it has been lost – e.g. severely mentally disabled people. But the point is that it is a capacity that humans normally have and that is distinctive in them.

The difference between those two ways of responding to reasons is often attributed to different sorts of awareness.\textsuperscript{775} Sentience or sensuous awareness is said to be the sort of awareness that an organism has solely in virtue of its sensory apparatus. It is the sort of awareness manifested when an organism feels pain, sees things and hears sounds. It is an exclusively biological phenomenon.\textsuperscript{776} Sapience, by contrast, involves more than this. Brandom, for instance, argues that sapience relies ‘on a kind of mindedness that is [also] tied to understanding rather than [mere] sensing’\textsuperscript{777}. Sapience is the sort of awareness manifested when one thinks or believes that things are thus-and-so (or desires or intends that things be thus-and-so, or when one asks oneself whether things are thus-and-so, or whether one could do anything to change them). Sapience, different from mere sentience, has to do with the exercise of intelligence and rationality. It presupposes a capacity for being aware of reasons in more than a merely sensuous way, and is what demarcates a being as rational.


I elaborate this here just to give a more informative account of what feature is being recognized in the other by reason-giving. When one gives the other reasons, one attributes ‘a kind of rational personhood’778 to him, and recognizes, or expresses recognition for, the other ‘not only as sentient (a factual matter of biology), but also as sapient779, that is, as someone who is capable of responding to reasons as such, rather than of merely responding to reasons in the more rudimentary manner outlined above.

3.2.2 Rationality as a valuable human feature

The next step to be added in the argument is that recognizing the other as having that capacity (i.e. as a rational being) is recognizing the other as having a capacity that is distinctively valuable in him (and that is essential to his humanity). I elaborate on this further claim by drawing on Kant’s insights about humanity (or rational nature, as he used the terms interchangeably) as an end in itself. Kant’s insights are particularly helpful to make this further step, because he explicitly grounds the value of humanity – either in oneself or in the other – in its rationality.

Kant stressed, more than any other modern philosopher, the value that humanity has in virtue of its rational nature, and that humanity has both an unconditional

778 Ibid. p. 3.
779 Id. Ibid.
and an objective value in virtue of this fact.\footnote{See Kant I, \textit{Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals} (1998) sec. 2.} In his texts, he initially associates humanity to a predisposition that is fundamentally different from animality (which is associated with the instinctual desires for self-preservation, and for the propagation of the species\footnote{Kant I, \textit{Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone} (1960) p. 26-27.}). Humanity is closely related to rationality: both to the ability to determine oneself through reason, rather than by mere instinct, and to the ability to be self-governing, i.e. the ability to freely act on the basis of one’s own thought.\footnote{Wood A W, \textit{Kant’s Ethical Thought} (1999) p. 119, says that humanity presupposes ‘a kind of freedom, namely the ability to resist the immediate coercion of desires and impulses’. Hill Jr. T E, \textit{Respect for Humanity}, p. 14, holds that humanity is grounded ‘in the distinctively human capacities for thoughtful evaluation’ (see also p. 18).} Later, Kant also associates humanity to what he calls ‘the disposition to personality’\footnote{See, e.g. Kant I, \textit{The Metaphysics of Morals} (2011) p. 159 (he refers to these feelings as ‘antecedent predispositions on the side of feeling’ and that ‘every human being has them’).}, which refers to the sensitive preconditions for acting morally, such as having (in some level) the capacity for moral feeling, conscience, love of humanity (to be affectively touched by the humanity of others, e.g. by their suffering), and self-respect.

On Kant’s view, rationality is what qualifies a being as human, for it is what distinguishes humans from inanimate things, plants and animals.\footnote{Kant I, \textit{The Metaphysics of Morals} (2011) p. 154 (6:392), says that ‘the capacity to set oneself an end – any end – whatsoever is what characterizes humanity (as distinguished from animality)’.} Even though humans share some capacities with animals (e.g. for feeling pain, seeing things), humans are marked out as having distinctive capacities for understanding, memory, foresight, use of language, rational reflection and awareness of...
others. Wood, for instance, argues that on Kant’s view, anything possessing those capacities ‘is an end in itself, however well or badly it may exercise those capacities’, and possesses humanity.

For Kant, rationality is not only a distinctively human capacity in the other, but also a distinctively valuable one. Indeed, rationality is what endows the other with a distinctive sort of value in himself. It is rationality, for instance, that explains and grounds the fact that the other has an intrinsic value or worth. In Kant’s thought, this stems from the mere fact of the other being human. It is precisely this capacity in the other that Kant’s Formula of Humanity commands not to never treat as a mere means, but always as an end in itself. This is why, for instance, the other’s humanity or rational nature directly generates reasons for responding to the other in certain ways, namely, in ways that take his rationality into account. Kant’s core normative idea is that whatever possesses humanity is an end in itself and, being an end in itself, should always be so

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787 Ibid. p. 121, Wood suggests that ‘perhaps the most fundamental proposition of Kant’s entire ethical theory is that rational nature is the supreme value’.
789 Wood A W, *Kant’s Ethical Thought* (1999), argues that Kant’s proposal is ‘to ground categorical imperatives on the worth of any being having humanity, that is, the capacity to set ends from reason, irrespective of whether its will is good or evil’.
treated: ‘So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or that of another, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means’.

Kant thinks that the other’s rationality has practical implications as to how the other should be treated. Hill argues that for Kant, humanity is directly a reason to allow the other the space and the opportunity to freely exercise his rationality and also to help him in that pursuit to some extent. It is also directly a reason not to simply “write [the other] off” as a creature who can only understand and respond to power, bribery, and manipulation. I am bringing Kant here just to explain why rationality is a valuable feature in the other. It is worth noting, however, that claiming that rationality is a valuable feature in the other is not the same as claiming that whenever one gives the other reasons, one is thereby treating the other as an end in himself (i.e. treating the other, to use Kant’s terms, with the respect that he deserves). My claim is only that whenever one gives the other reasons, one always expresses (some) recognition for the other in his humanity, and that insofar as the other’s humanity is an end in itself, this has some intrinsic value (a cognitive one) simply in virtue of this.

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793 Ibid. p. 27.
3.2.3 Second interim conclusion

Reason-giving does not have intrinsic value simply because it always expresses some kind of recognition for the other. Rather, reason-giving has a distinctive intrinsic value because the feature recognized in the other by reason-giving is a particularly valuable one. It is the other’s rationality, which is essential to his humanity.

3.3. Reason-giving and misrecognition: limiting cases

One way to see that reason-giving has an intrinsic recognitive value is by reflecting on cases of highly infelicitous (but still successful) reason-giving. If that recognitive value is intrinsic to reason-giving as an act-type, then all acts of reason-giving will have that value, that is, this value will recommend itself every time one is faced by a particular instance of reason-giving. Different from Socrates’ act in the Crito, to which I referred in the last chapter as an illustration of what fully felicitous reason-giving is, I now turn to two cases where the presence of this intrinsic recognitive value is low – even very low. As I argued in the former sections, in my view every successful act of reason-giving (i.e. every act of reason-giving) expresses some recognition for the other in his rationality (which is a particular valuable feature that the other has), and has some intrinsic recognitive value in virtue of this (whether or not it is an act of ‘duly recognizing’ or of ‘barely recognizing’ the other as a rational being).
A first illustration of this sort of case can be found in a scene of Jane Austen’s *Pride and Prejudice*, where an exchange between Mr Collins and Elizabeth Bennet occurs. In the scene, Mr Collins gives reasons to Elizabeth for why marrying her is a good thing for him to do. He first states reasons for why he generally thinks it is a good thing for him to marry, and then for why it is good for him to marry Elizabeth in particular. Among his general reasons for marrying, he mentions that a man in easy circumstances like him should set the example of matrimony, that it will contribute to his happiness, and the advice his patroness has given to him. As to why he wants to marry Elizabeth in particular, he stresses that if he marries her, he will inherit her father’s estate and increase his fortune. These are all reasons that seem to him good reasons (indeed, very good reasons) to marry not only in general, but also Elizabeth in particular.

If Mr Collins’ act is taken as an act of arguing, there is nothing obviously wrong with it. He identifies reasons that are true and that count in favour of the supported claims (i.e. that it is good for him to marry in general, and Elizabeth in particular), presents them in a charitable way to Elizabeth (i.e. in a way that she can follow), and they are also plainly sincere. He strongly believes them to be good reasons for marrying and manages to make this very clear to Elizabeth. Even if this is so, one may object that his act is not a fully felicitous act of arguing.

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795 Whether these reasons were good justificatory reasons or not is at least a disputable matter. Elizabeth’s mother, for instance, thought that given the society Elizabeth lived in, her place in it, Mr Collins’ reasons were not without appeal (see Austen J, *Pride and Prejudice* (2008) p. 96).
796 For a list of conditions for felicitous arguing, see chapter three, section 4.
He does not realise, for instance, that none of the claims he supports (that it is good for him to marry in general, and Elizabeth in particular) are contentious in the situation. From the way Austen describes the scene, it is plainly clear, both to him and to Elizabeth, why marrying Elizabeth would be a good thing for him to do. The truth of both of these claims, and of the reasons he gives, are obvious to him and to Elizabeth. During the exchange, Elizabeth even says that she understands why these reasons make it so appealing for him to marry her.797

His act, thus, can be said to be pointless, for it violates the non-obviousness condition that I claimed to be necessary for the fully felicitous performance of an act of arguing, and to that extent it can be said to be an infelicitous act of arguing.798 But this does not explain everything there is to be explained here. In particular, it does not explain what is really wrong with Mr Collins’ act. To start with, it is true that he gets his reasons wrong and that they are unhelpful for the purpose of justifying the only claim that was contentious in the situation. As Austen describes the scene, what was not clear was not whether he had good reasons to marry Elizabeth (this was clear from the very beginning of the scene), but whether Elizabeth had good reasons to marry him.

Indeed, from this perspective, Mr Collins’ act is entirely self-defeating. All the reasons he gives to Elizabeth are self-referring. They are all reasons that show why marrying her would benefit him. He never mentions, for instance,

797 Austen J, Pride and Prejudice (2008), vol. 1, XIX, p. 82.
798 See chapter three, section 4.
Elizabeth's happiness as one of his reasons. He is so convinced that he is going to achieve the end he desires – marrying her – that he is unable to imagine that Elizabeth might not think in the same way as he does, and that those reasons – though good reasons for him – might not be good reasons to give her. He does not even realise that they would only help to move her away from him (hence, to frustrate the achievement of his desired end). It is telling that, as Austen pictures the scene, Mr Collins is not trying to persuade her to marry him, nor to convince her that this would be a good thing for her to do. Rather, he is simply announcing his reasons to her, as if he had already made the decision to marry her apart from her stance on the matter. He declares, in a cold-hearted tone: ‘perhaps it will be advisable for me to state my reasons for marrying’.

It is this cold-hearted or indifferent attitude that Mr Collins expresses towards Elizabeth that makes Elizabeth feel misrecognized by him, not properly taken into account. She declares her discontentment with the way Mr Collins treats her in several moments during their exchange (usually after expressing her refusal to marry him): ‘[Mr Collins,] You must give me leave to judge for myself, and pay me the compliment of believing what I say’; ‘Do not consider me now as an elegant female intending to plague you, but as a rational creature speaking the truth from her heart’. From these passages, it is clear that her problem is not

\[800\] Ibid. p. 81. Just right after that, Mr Collins replies: ‘When I do myself the honour of speaking to you next on this subject I shall hope to receive a more favourable answer than you have now given me; though I am far from accusing you of cruelty at present, because I know it to be the established custom of your sex to reject a man on the first application’.
\[801\] Ibid. p. 82.
so much that the reasons he gives her are bad reasons (though they are), or that these reasons were already known and that there was no need to repeat them to her. Rather, her main problem is that when he gives those reasons to her, he does not seem to be addressing her at all, that he seems to be addressing her only insofar as she is an instance of a general type, that of the ‘elegant females’\textsuperscript{802}. That becomes clearer as the scene develops.

She refuses several times to marry him, but he does not pay attention to what she says. He remains unaffected by this, as if he were not listening to her at all or as if her stance on the matter was entirely irrelevant to him.\textsuperscript{803} In my view, Laden is correct when he claims that it is ‘not the considerations he brings forth or the facts that support them that is the problem, but his utter failure to be responsive to what she says in reply’.\textsuperscript{804} Even though Mr. Collins presents himself as making a marriage proposal to Elizabeth, he was in fact not making her a proposal at all. Rather, he was only imposing himself on her.\textsuperscript{805} To be a proposal, there must have been some space for her to refuse it. But Mr. Collins did not leave any such space to her. After Elizabeth realized that her refusal failed to register with him and complained that he was not treating her as a rational creature, Mr Collins

\textsuperscript{802} Id.\textit{ibid.}
\textsuperscript{803} He says in reply to Elizabeth’s refusal (\textit{ibid.} p. 83): ‘I am not now to learn...that it is usual with young ladies to reject the addresses of the man who they secretly mean to accept...and that sometimes the refusal is repeated a second or even a third time. I am therefore by no means discouraged by what you have just said, and shall hope to lead you to the altar ere long’.
\textsuperscript{804} Laden A S, \textit{Reasoning} (2012) p. 143 (on p. 13: ‘although the propositional content of what he says shows proper responsiveness to a set of relevant considerations...he does not show proper responsiveness to her [i.e. the particular other to whom he is giving his reasons]’).
\textsuperscript{805} In contemporary vocabulary, Mr. Collins’ act could be classified as an instance of ‘mansplanning’, for he presents his reasons ‘without [any] regard to the fact that [Elizabeth] knows more than [he assumes that she does]’ (this is normally done by a man in relation to a woman). See, e.g. Solnit R, \textit{Men Explain Things to Me} (2014).
replies, with his usual indifference, that she is ‘uniformly charming’ and claims that he is ‘persuaded that when sanctioned by the express authority of both [her] excellent parents, [his] proposals will not fail of being acceptable’\textsuperscript{806}.

Austen concludes the scene by saying that Mr. Collins persists in his ‘willful self-deception’\textsuperscript{807}, and begins the next chapter ironically, with Mr. Collins in ‘silent contemplation of his successful love’\textsuperscript{808}.

These later remarks capture better what is really wrong with Mr Collins’ act. Ultimately, in my view it is the attitude that Mr Collins expresses (or fails to express) towards Elizabeth while giving her those reasons that is the problem. The kind of reasons he chooses to give her is only a consequence of that. His act does not express an appropriate level of recognition for Elizabeth in her rationality (this is particularly evident if one takes into account the kind of relationship he wanted to have with her, a married relationship). His act would not have been as outrageous – as insulting – were he giving the same reasons to a different other (e.g. a friend in a party), that is, if he was not performing it to Elizabeth herself (the particular other to whom he gives the reasons). In my view, he strongly underestimates Elizabeth’s rational capacities, in particular, her capacity for having her own opinions and for thinking about the issue by

\textsuperscript{807}Id. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{808}Ibid. p. 84.
herself (and also her freedom for making the decision to marry him by her own). Whether he does that consciously or not is a different matter.

Mr Collins’ act violates some of the conditions that I claimed to be necessary for a given act to count as a fully felicitous act of reason-giving. In particular, it does not fulfil the first condition of my list, for it does not match well the reasons given to the relationship he wanted to have with Elizabeth (who is the particular other to whom he gives the reasons); and it also does not fulfil the sincerity condition, for he does not display a sufficiently recognize attitude in relation to her. Thus, in my view Mr Collins’ act counts as an infelicitous act of reason-giving (Indeed, I think that his act is more infelicitous as an act of reason-giving than it is as an act of arguing, for the degree in which Mr Collins’ act fails to express recognition for Elizabeth is higher than the degree in which his act fails to achieve the justification of the supported claims).

But, first, the problem with Mr Collins’ act is not that it does not recognize, or does not express recognition for, Elizabeth as a rational being at all. Rather, it is that Mr Collins remains unaffected by that perception in the appropriate way. The very fact that he cares to give her reasons shows that he is somehow responsive to her rationality, and hence, to the fact that she is a rational being –

809 See chapter four, section 4.
though, of course, he is not responsive and recognition enough. Second, Mr Collins’ act can be said to be infelicitous as an act of reason-giving entirely apart from the causal connection it has with producing bad effects in Elizabeth. Indeed, from what I just explained, it is precisely because his act is a highly infelicitous act of reason-giving in the sense defined in the last chapter (i.e. because it is an inadequate response to Elizabeth in her rationality – which is a valuable feature that Elizabeth has) that Elizabeth does not feel properly recognized or taken into account by him (and hence, why her need for being properly recognized remains unsatisfied in the situation).

In a nutshell, these are the reasons why I think, first, that Mr Collins’ act still exhibits some recognition value (even though in a low, even very low, degree) for Elizabeth as a rational being; and second, that the recognition value Mr Collins’ act exhibits (even though, as I said, it is low) is intrinsic to Mr Collins’ act. To put this point in the terms I introduced in section 3.1.1, his act still recognizes, or expresses some recognition for, Elizabeth as a rational being, even though for the reasons just presented, it expresses only ‘bare recognition’ for Elizabeth as a rational being rather than ‘due recognition’.

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810 Nozick R, *Philosophical Explanations* (1981) p. 23, argues that one can show (some) respect for the other’s ‘rationality (if not [the other’s] autonomy)...but [still not be] responsive and respectful enough’.
Take now a second case, the case Primo Levi describes in his book *If This is a Man*.\textsuperscript{811} This case illustrates an even more infelicitous act of reason-giving if compared to Mr. Collins’ act. Indeed, in my view it illustrates the limit case of a still successful but highly infelicitous act of reason-giving. As Levi describes the situation, a Nazi soldier, after seeing Levi trying to reach an icicle outside the window in order to satisfy his thirst, beats him; and when Levi asks him ‘Warum?’ (Why?), gives in reply: ‘Hier gibt es kein Warum’ (‘Here, there is no why’). Clearly, as Levi describes the scene, the soldier’s response is an expression of arbitrary power in relation to him, that he is willing to do anything he pleases with Levi, without giving any appropriate reasons for it.

Many authors have thought (indeed, this is a quite standard reading of this scene) that its horrific aspect lies precisely in the fact that the soldier has not given Levi any reason. Geuss, for instance, suggests that what gives the ‘potentially diabolical aspect’ of the scene is not that Levi was in ‘a place in which there was no “why” at all [for, he adds, there were reasons, and even if they were repugnant, they were publicly known]...but that those in control of Levi’s fate were in no way required or inclined to give him any reasons for anything that occurred’\textsuperscript{812}. According to my account, however, this is misleading. In my view, by saying what he says to Levi (‘Here, there is no why’), the soldier is in a sense

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{811} Levi P, *If This is a Man* (1991), p. 35.
\textsuperscript{812} Geuss R, *A World Without Why* (2014), p. 233. He describes Levi’s world as ‘a world in which reason was utterly inaccessible to the individual’ (‘The SS officers with whom he came into contact had a variety of reasons for what they did and what they allowed to happen. Some of these reasons, to be sure, were unreflective and conflicting, some perhaps fantastic and delusional, many were deeply malicious’).
\end{footnotes}
giving Levi a reason – a reason for not asking why. To be sure, the reason he gives can be taken as the biggest travesty of a reason imaginable, the closest thing to a non-reason that he could have given, but is still a reason. Levi himself says that 'the explanation [the soldier gives him] is repugnant but simple'\textsuperscript{813}, thereby implying that ‘Here, there are no reasons’ is itself a reason.

To be sure, the soldier’s act is an example of perhaps the worst possible case of reason-giving, for it expresses an extremely demeaning attitude towards Levi in his humanity. But however demeaning this attitude might be, it still expresses some recognition for Levi and his humanity. Indeed, it is this very fact – that his response was directed at a human rational being – that makes it so horrific.\textsuperscript{814} It is possible, indeed likely, that the soldier would not have replied in the same way to a rock or to a plant (he would have probably been surprised had a rock or a plant asked him ‘Warum?’), and that reply would certainly not have been as outrageous as it is when given to Levi. Still, there is a humanizing aspect in it. Instead of not giving any reply to Levi, the soldier still feels compelled to give Levi \textit{some} reason (even though, again, a terrible one), and by doing so, he responds to the general fact that Levi is a rational being. Contra Geuss, thus, I think that what lends the memorable ‘diabolical aspect’ to this scene is not that

\textsuperscript{813} Id.lbid.: ‘the explanation is repugnant but simple: in this place everything is forbidden, not for hidden reasons, but because the camp has been created for that purpose’.
\textsuperscript{814} Cavell S, \textit{The Claim of Reason} (1978) p. 375, talks of a ‘soul-blindness’, and says that what the slave owner ‘really believes is not that slaves are not human beings, but that some human beings are slaves’, that he ‘is missing something about himself, or rather something about his connection with [them]’. But he stresses that ‘everything in his relation to his slaves shows that he treats them as more or less human – his humiliations of them, his disappointments, his jealousies, his fears’. This point applies to the soldier’s case.
the soldier refuses to give Levi any reason, but precisely that he continues to recognize him, albeit barely, as a rational human being despite the more general context in which the exchange takes place.

Like Mr Collins’ act, the soldier’s act still has some cognitive value, though in a very low – perhaps in its lowest degree. In my view, the problem in those very infelicitous acts of reason-giving is not that they are without cognitive value, but that the cognitive value they exhibit is diminished in a significant degree if compared to cases of fully felicitous reason-giving – which are cases of duly recognizing (rather than of ‘barely recognizing’) the other as a rational being.

4. A response to a possible objection

Some may think that my claim that reason-giving has an intrinsic cognitive value is too optimistic. Allen, for instance, raises the concern that if one views reason-giving’s value mainly in positive terms, one may end up not paying sufficient attention to the ways in which reason-giving ‘can and often does serve not only to legitimate existing relations of domination but also to enact them’ Allen holds that to foster the idea that reason-giving has such a positive cognitive value might be only to foster a group-specific behaviour that

privileges certain people in society in relation to others. Reason-giving is one of the primary aptitudes only of some people in society, such as knowledge experts, consultants, lawyers, politicians and academics. They are specifically trained to be good at it.

Olson – more than Allen – suggests that in reality, reason-giving is often not a way of recognizing the other in his rational humanity, but of implicitly universalizing ‘a vision of humanity whose signature characteristics are most comfortably practiced by the members of elite groups’ and that reason-giving might have little to do with recognizing ‘an essential aspect of being human [in the other]’. He even suggests that reason-giving might not be ‘a privileged mode of human action’ at all, and that the idea of recognizing the other by reason-giving may not be as ‘naturally human’ as some may suppose. He argues, for instance, that ‘academics might see reason-giving as a fundamental aspect of being human’ but that reason-giving is actually just ‘a group-specific-behaviour that defines the borders and criteria of entry to certain privileged groups’. For Olson, reason-giving is, ultimately, often just an attempt at manipulating others in some way, to impose one’s views on others.

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818 Ibid. p. 97.
819 Ibid. On p. 88, he says that reason-giving may well be just ‘a class-specific...practice that favours elite groups over others’.
820 Ibid.
822 Ibid. p. 98.
The concern is that instead of avoiding or challenging relations of power, reason-giving risks only reproducing them. Both authors hold that, in virtue of this, one should favour a view of reason-giving that is more sensitive to its relation to power and domination. What may seem from their point of view a disadvantage is, from my point of view, an advantage of my claim. My account of reason-giving as an act of recognition is sensitive to the relation between reason-giving and power. Cases in which one uses reasons just to manipulate the other in some way – e.g. to one’s own benefit, rather than the other’s own – or to impose oneself on the other, are cases that my account treats as cases of infelicitous reason-giving, of reason-giving that is not sufficiently recognitive in relation to the other, and hence, cases in which the presence of the intrinsic recognitive value I claimed reason-giving always has is low (Mr Collins’ act, discussed in section 3.3.1, is an example of how my account deals with such cases).

It is true that people who are intelligent and articulate are, in virtue of this very fact, in a better position to use reason-giving in a coercive or oppressive manner. Some authors have (rightly, in my view) raised this claim. They are in a better position to explore reasons to trap the other in some way, or to impress the other ultimately just to realise some of their own selfish ends. It might even be true that, empirically speaking, it is more often the case that reason-giving is used merely as an instrument of power – that the powerful use just to rationalize

823 See chapter four, section 5.
824 See, e.g. Kornblith H, Distrusting Reason (1999) XXIII Midwest Studies in Philosophy p. 181, 184; Rorty R, Truth and Progress, vol. 3 (1998), p. 147, says that ‘the more gebildet you are, the more complex and interesting are the kinds of reasons you can ask for and give’.
their dominance over others, or to control them in a less explicit way. But that implies nothing against my claim that reason-giving has an intrinsic cognitive value. It only shows that people who are in a privileged position must have a higher responsibility to use their higher skills in reason-giving well (I think that Socrates’ case in the Crito is a good example of this).\textsuperscript{825} To acknowledge that they are in such a position is even more important in their case.\textsuperscript{826}

It is also worth noting that claiming that reason-giving has an intrinsic cognitive value does not commit me to the much stronger (and obviously wrong) claim that all acts of reason-giving are all-things-considered good. This is a point I already made in former sections. It only commits me to the more modest claim that all acts of reason-giving – insofar as they are successful tokens of that illocution-type – have a certain cognitive value simply in virtue of the type of acts that they are. This claim is both a conceptual one – based on an analysis of reason-giving in terms of speech act theory – and a normative one. I think that this way of thinking about reason-giving has the advantage of putting the relation with power more in evidence, for it invites a reflection about what is

\textsuperscript{825} See chapter four, section 2. It illustrates how a philosopher (like Socrates) relates to a non-philosophical other through reason-giving. Another point: When one gives the other reasons – even if one’s ultimate aim is to manipulate the other –, this still leaves the other free to consider those reasons, and to freely act according to his own thought. I think it is possible also to make a case for holding that it is less bad (morally speaking) to try to manipulate the other by giving him reasons than by appealing to force or some other device of non-rational manipulation. Foucault (who thought reason-giving is just a matter of power), by the end of his career has admitted that manipulation by reasons represents some improvement over just threatening to hurt or to kill people, Foucault M, \textit{Power} (2001) p. 328 ff.

\textsuperscript{826} Laden A S, \textit{Reasoning} (2012) p. 129, argues that if the relationship is distorted by some inequality in power, some virtues are even more required from the reason-giver – e.g. ‘certain skills of listening and heeding what others say’, displaying an effort to displace oneself from one’s own self-centred perspective.
missing when one fails to express due recognition in reason-giving (more than if
the focus were merely on justification). It also has the advantage of providing a
response to the suspicion often raised in the literature with which I began this
thesis – that reason-giving does not have value if it cannot justify.\footnote{27}

5. Reason-giving and its extrinsic recognitive value

In this chapter, I am mainly concerned with defending that reason-giving has an
intrinsic recognitive value. But it is worth pointing out that claiming that reason-
giving has an intrinsic recognitive value is entirely compatible with claiming that
reason-giving might also have other values. In particular, reason-giving might
also have an extrinsic recognitive value, some of which might even be of a
distinctive kind. In my view, as I explained before, those two kinds of value –
intrinsic and extrinsic – may or may not be related to each other, and the fact
that a given act does not realise a high degree of – or even any – extrinsic
recognitive value should not be taken as evidence for thinking that it does not
have intrinsic recognitive value – even in a high degree.\footnote{28} As I argued before, the
intrinsic recognitive value is the only value that is always present, while the
extrinsic value may or may not be present; and the intrinsic recognitive value is
the only value that has to be present in a high degree for reason-giving to be
felicitously performed as the type of act that it is.

\footnote{27} See first chapter.
\footnote{28} With achieving ‘extrinsic recognitive value’ I refer mainly to the good effects that an act of
reason-giving may or may not produce in the other (e.g. make the other feel duly recognized).
Even though this is the case, they are not entirely unrelated to each other. The higher the intrinsic cognitive value that a given act of reason-giving has, the higher are the chances that this act also realizes a high degree of extrinsic cognitive value – i.e. that good effects are produced in the other, such as that the other feels duly recognized, or has some need satisfied in him. But whether or not those good effects actually occur is still contingent.\textsuperscript{829} This is precisely the reason why I argued in section 3.1.1 that it is important to keep a distinction between the intrinsic and the extrinsic value of an act of recognition, that is, between the value that a given act has as a response to a valuable feature \(F\) in the other (the value of ‘recognizing’), and the value it has in virtue of its consequences or likely consequences in the other (the value of ‘being recognized’, extrinsic). Though the extrinsic value is not essential to my argument, it is an important point that reason-giving may also realize an extrinsic cognitive value of a distinctive kind. So, I elaborate some considerations about this here.

I think that this claim can also be well expressed with the help of Kant, for also in Kant the dichotomy between the intrinsic and the extrinsic value of an action is present. In the foregoing sections, I claimed that for Kant, the other’s humanity is

\footnote{\textsuperscript{829} In section 3.1.1, I noted that the value of an act of recognition is often thought in extrinsic terms, i.e. in terms of what it brings or can bring about in the other. Honneth’s theory (Honneth A, \textit{The Struggle for Recognition} (1995) chap. 5), e.g. is based on the assumption that the other has certain needs – for love, esteem and respect – that must be satisfied if he is to maintain a positive relation to his own self. And those needs – which he sees as different expressions of a single need for recognition – can only be satisfied by recognition. From this perspective, the value of an act of recognition is thought to lie in the contribution it makes for the satisfaction of needs in the other (see, e.g. Laitinen A, Recognition, Needs and Wrongness: Two Approaches (2009) 8(1) \textit{European Journal of Political Theory} p. 13, who argues that from this perspective, ‘the happy cases are naturally ones where adequate recognition helps to meet [the other’s] needs’.)}
directly a reason to respond to the other in certain ways, and that Kant sees humanity in the other mainly as a value to be respected (i.e. to be responded to appropriately). I did this because my primary concern in the former sections was to defend my claim that reason-giving has an intrinsic recognitive value.

However, on Kant’s view, the other’s humanity is also directly a reason to respond to the other in ways that help him foster, promote or acknowledge the humanity he has in himself, i.e. that help him realize his humanity in some way. In other words, the other’s humanity is not only a value to be respected, but also a value to be promoted in the other. This means that the other’s humanity is also directly a reason to cultivate humanity in the other and to encourage the other to cultivate humanity in himself.

The Kantian distinction is helpful, because it helps to spell out the reason why reason-giving might have also an extrinsic recognitive value of a distinctive kind. The core idea is that insofar as the other’s humanity is a value with which it is worth engaging for its own sake, by promoting the other’s active engagement with reasons, one is also promoting the other’s active engagement with something of intrinsic worth in him, something essential to his humanity (to put in Kantian terms, one is helping the other to acknowledge the humanity he has in himself). Indeed, I think that this is something that can only be done by reason-giving. Other acts of recognition – e.g. hugging the other, telling something nice to

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830 Kant, I. *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1998), p. 114 (4:431) says that the other’s humanity is also directly a reason to try, as far as one can ‘to further the ends of others’.

him, or expressing admiration for him – do not seem well suited to promoting this end.\textsuperscript{832}

Socrates’ act in the \textit{Crito} provides a good illustration of this point. I will take for granted what I said about Socrates’ act in previous sections and in the last chapter, for what interests me here is a new aspect. Socrates could have tried to console Crito – perhaps even more effectively – by doing various other things, such as hugging Crito or singing him a song, or even using a device of purely causal manipulation that had little connection with reasons, such as drugs. Some of those devices might have made Crito immediately release his distress. Moreover, as I explained before, it is possible, indeed likely, that no reasons that he could possibly have given to Crito could have helped to change that situation. Socrates was aware that there were things he knew – and that it would be good if Crito knew – but also that there was no fully satisfactory way for him to transmit them to Crito, in a way that Crito could actually understand. In the last chapter, I claimed that though a valued friend, Crito was not – and would probably never be – in a position to understand the reasons that really moved Socrates.\textsuperscript{833}

Despite all this, Socrates decides to give Crito reasons. As I said, those reasons are neither good justificatory reasons nor Socrates believed them to be good. But

\textsuperscript{832}Nussbaum M C, \textit{The Therapy of Desire} (1996) p. 321, e.g. argues that when one gives the other reasons, one gives the other the chance for thinking by ‘his own thoughts, thinking them actively, rather than being a passive vessel for the dogmas of another’, and that the other ‘is not [simply] ordered around…or manipulated by coercive tactics, but is intellectually active for herself’.\textsuperscript{833}For a more detailed account, see chapter four, section 2.
they are reasons. Socrates does not simply assert to Crito that he is not going to escape, nor does he ask Crito to simply acquiesce to it (‘Crito, I appreciate your concern, but I am convinced to stay’). Rather, he gives Crito reasons for his decision. Why does he do that? Why does he decide to give Crito reasons?

One plausible answer to that question (to why, despite all the circumstances, Socrates still gives Crito reasons, instead of doing something else) is that he attributed a very high importance to Crito’s own capacity for active thinking and for Crito’s participation in the exchange. He took this capacity to be essential to Crito’s humanity, and thought that promoting Crito’s active engagement with reasons was something worth pursuing for its own sake. It is likely that he also thought that promoting Crito’s active engagement with reasons could be an effective means to release Crito’s distress as much as possible (and thus, that reason-giving was instrumentally valuable in order to achieve that end). But Socrates’ act can realize the first value even if it does not realize the second, that is, it can succeed in making Crito actively engage with reasons (and hence, in helping Crito acknowledge the humanity he has in himself), even if it does not

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834 It is also possible that Socrates was also aware of the distinctive (intrinsic) value that reason-giving had as a response to Crito in his rational humanity, and that reason-giving was the only way of expressing a certain type recognition for Crito – namely, as a rational being (hence, that he could not recognize Crito in his rational humanity without giving Crito reasons).

835 Vlastos G, *Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher* (1991) p. 44, holds that Socrates had a deep commitment with his interlocutors’ own autonomy and rational capacities, and that though he cared about the truth and cared that they arrived at the truth, he cared more about them arriving at the truth by themselves (in the hard way, even if that meant that they would never arrive at the truth). Vlastos suggests that for Socrates, this was also the only way of promoting a real, long-term and stable effect in their self-understanding (p. 42).
ultimately succeed in releasing Crito’s distress or calming Crito down (which are Socrates’ ultimate perlocutionary ends).

These are two important values that Socrates’ act might also have, and are values that Socrates’ act might have in addition to the high intrinsic recognitive value it already has, as an act that expresses due recognition for Crito, i.e. that fulfills the conditions necessary for felicitous reason-giving. These values are both extrinsic, for, to the extent that his act of reason-giving realizes (or helps to realize) them, they are values that his act has for the sake of something else that is of value and that it helps to realize, and not values that his act has for its own sake. In both cases, the ‘something else’ refers to intrinsically valuable ends (releasing Crito’s distress, and helping Crito acknowledge the humanity he has in himself). Further, even though reason-giving may help to console Crito (and be instrumentally valuable to that end), there seems to be nothing distinctive to reason-giving in that regard (some other act could also have been an effective means for achieving the same end); whereas the achievement of the other value (helping Crito acknowledge the humanity he has in himself) seems to be something that cannot be achieved by doing anything else, only by reason-giving.

I use Socrates’ act here just to suggest that reason-giving may also realize an extrinsic recognitive value of a distinctive kind. From this, one can see that reason-giving can have both kinds of recognitive value – intrinsic and extrinsic –, and that both values can be said to be distinctive in their own ways.
Before concluding, let me just bring the argument into full circle. The main reason that led me to defend that reason-giving has an intrinsic recognitive value is that reason-giving's value is often thought to be entirely parasitic on its capacity for achieving justification (and hence, to be *extrinsic* to the act of reason-giving).\(^\text{836}\) In the first chapter, I argued that some authors even think that because reason-giving cannot achieve justification, reason-giving is not valuable in any respectable sense, or even that reason-giving has no value at all. I claimed that this is explicit in the case of Nietzsche (who views reason-giving just as a cynical act), but is also present – albeit in a less explicit form – in other cases. Early emotivist authors are an example. When they realize that reason-giving cannot achieve justification, they do not conclude that reason-giving has no value, but that reason-giving can only be an instrument for something else, namely, persuasion.\(^\text{837}\) In my view, what they do here is simply to replace one extrinsic value (justification) for another one (persuasion).

Their expressivism does not hinder them from thinking about the value of reason-giving in a by-and-large extrinsic way. Taken into account what I said in the previous sections, I think that their case is a particularly ironic one. As the foregoing discussion hopefully makes clear, despite their claim to be expressivists, they appear to have missed reason-giving’s most distinctive value; which in my view is neither justification nor persuasion, but an expressive one – namely, to express recognition for the other in his rational humanity. They do

\(^{836}\) See first chapter.

\(^{837}\) See first chapter, section 2.3.
not appear to have considered the possibility that reason-giving might have any distinctive expressive value of this sort (an intrinsic recognitive value).

6. Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I defended the central claim of this thesis: that reason-giving has an intrinsic recognitive value of a distinctive kind. This is a value that is always present, that every act of reason-giving has. I argued by way of examples that even instances of very infelicitous reason-giving realise this value in some degree, and that this is the only value that has to be present in a high degree for a given act to be a fully felicitous act of reason-giving. When one gives the other reasons, one always responds to the other’s rationality, which is a valuable feature of his humanity. With the help of Kant, I argued that because the other’s humanity is an end in itself (worth being responded to for its own sake), every act of reason-giving has a certain intrinsic value in virtue of this fact. It does not matter whether it succeeds in achieving any good effects in the other, or even whether it is a good act of reason-giving or not, for it to have this value. The degree in which a particular act has this value depends only on the act itself, on how well it expresses recognition for the other in his rational humanity.\textsuperscript{838}

\textsuperscript{838} I introduced a distinction between ‘due’ and ‘bare’ recognition to articulate this point. As I argued in the last chapter, a fully felicitous act of reason-giving has to fulfill some conditions, among which is that the reason-giver shows an appropriate degree of responsiveness to the other in light of the relationship that holds between them.
I defended the claim that this value is best understood as a value that is intrinsic to reason-giving (that reason-giving has for its own sake) even though it supervenes on a relational property – namely, that of recognizing the other in his rational humanity.\textsuperscript{839} I also argued that claiming that reason-giving has an intrinsic cognitive value that is distinctive is entirely compatible with claiming that reason-giving also has an extrinsic cognitive value, even of a distinctive kind. By reason-giving, for instance, one can promote the other’s active engagement with reasons and help him realize, or put him in contact with, the humanity he has in himself\textsuperscript{840}; and I suggested that this can only be done by reason-giving. Even though this is another distinctive value that reason-giving may realize, this value is extrinsic to the act of reason-giving. It is a value that reason-giving has for the sake of something else that is of value, and that it helps to realize (in this case, an intrinsically valuable end).

I drew a distinction between these two types of cognitive value – intrinsic and extrinsic – to stress that the former intrinsic cognitive value is always present, while the latter extrinsic cognitive value may or may not be present (this is the case even if it is true that the higher the degree of intrinsic cognitive value that a given act of reason-giving realizes, the higher might be the chances of that act realizing also a high degree of extrinsic cognitive value). In any case, noting

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{839} Korsgaard would describe this value as being both ‘final’ and ‘extrinsic’. For reasons I presented in section 2, I prefer to refer to this value as an intrinsic-relational value.
\item \textsuperscript{840} One can also help the other satisfying some distinctive needs – e.g. a need for being recognized in his rational humanity, and for understanding the reasons for something.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
that reason-giving may also realise an extrinsic cognitive value of a distinctive
kind helps to reinforce the connection that reason-giving has with recognition.

My main reason for defending the claim that reason-giving has an intrinsic
cognitive value – and for focusing more on the intrinsic rather than on the
extrinsic value – was to counter the suspicion about reason-giving’s value that is
sometimes raised in the literature and that I identified in the beginning of this
thesis, namely, that because reason-giving cannot achieve justification, reason-
giving has no value at all, that all there is to reason-giving is manipulation,
cynicism, hypocrisy. For the reasons I explained in this chapter, I believe that
this conclusion is misleading. Reason-giving has a certain value (an intrinsic
cognitive value) that is independent from whether it achieves any other value –
including justification. This is a value that reason-giving has simply in virtue of
what it is, and hence, a value that reason-giving has even if it were never capable
of actually justifying anything.

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841 See first chapter. Kornblith H, Distrusting Reason (1999) XXIII Midwest Studies in Philosophy p. 181, holds that a certain distrust on the value reason-giving is the result of ‘a certain climate of anti-intellectualism that is currently a potent force’.
Conclusion

The main claim I defended in this thesis was that reason-giving has a certain value that is distinctive and that even though is dependent upon a relation to justification, is not justification, but an expressive value – namely, to express recognition for the other in a particular feature that the other has and that is valuable in him (his rationality, which is an essential feature of his humanity). I argued that this value is intrinsic to reason-giving, that it is a value that reason-giving has simply in virtue of the type of act that it is and independently from any other value it might or might not have – including justification.

The main reason I presented for defending this claim was the suspicion that is commonly found in the literature, namely, that reason-giving has no value because it cannot achieve justification. In chapter one, I argued that some authors take the connection between the value of reason-giving and justification to be so intimate that they think that because reason-giving cannot achieve justification, reason-giving has no value. Some think (e.g. Nietzsche) that all there is to reason-giving is manipulation, hypocrisy, cynicism. Others think that reason-giving is a pointless thing to do, and that the only value reason-giving has is to show that it cannot actually justify anything (Pyrrhonic sceptic). I also argued that even when the conclusion is not so radical, there is still sometimes a

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Nietzsche thinks that reason-giving cannot actually justify anything, and that because reason-giving cannot actually justify, the only alternative is to explain reason-giving in a valueless world – as an act of power or lack of it.
very impoverished sense of what value reason-giving can have if it cannot actually justify (I noted that the early emotivist view about the value of reason-giving was a particularly ironic one in that regard). In the rest of the thesis, I explained why I think that this claim – that reason-giving has no value, because it cannot actually justify – is mistaken, and developed an alternative way of thinking about the value of reason-giving.

I argued, based on speech act theory and on the concept of recognition, that reason-giving is a discrete type of speech act (of an expressive kind), one that has some features in common with arguing, but is not reducible to arguing. In particular, I used speech act theory to show that a distinction can and should be made between both types of acts. One of the main results of my analysis is that, even though reason-giving and arguing have the same mode of achievement, they have neither the same primary point nor the same primary value, and that they belong to two entirely different categories of speech acts. While arguing is essentially connected to an assertive primary point, reason-giving is essentially connected to an expressive primary point; and while arguing’s primary value is justification, reason-giving’s primary value is best understood as an expressive value. In chapter four, with the help of the concept of recognition, I argued that this value is best understood as the expression of a certain type of recognition for the hearer (rather than to achieve justification).

As I argued in chapter two, in speech act theory, how good a particular performance of a given illocution-type is as a performance of that illocution-type
depends on how well it realises the primary value of that illocution-type. In chapter three, I argued that in the case of arguing, this depends on how well a given act achieves justification. And in chapter four, I argued that in the case of reason-giving, it depends on how well the act expresses recognition for the hearer. I fleshed out and compared the felicity conditions for arguing (with special focus on felicitous adducing) and for reason-giving, and concluded that, though there are some similarities, there is no perfect parallel between them. A fully felicitous act of adducing can still be an infelicitous act of reason-giving and vice-versa. Drawing on examples, I argued that, due to the difference in primary value, acts that would count as unsuccessful acts of adducing (i.e. that would not have any potential for achieving the justification of a certain claim) could still count as fully felicitous acts of reason-giving.

While felicitous arguing is mainly a matter of adducing good reasons in support of a certain claim (it also depends on whether the speaker was sufficiently clear or informative in relation to \( H \), and on whether he believes the reasons adduced to be good in a justificatory sense), felicitous reason-giving is strongly determined in terms of the degree of responsiveness that \( S \) displays in relation to \( H \) in light of the relationship that holds between them. One important conclusion arrived at was that in felicitous reason-giving, though there are some qualities that the reasons given need to have, they do not have to be fully good reasons in a justificatory sense for the act of giving them to be felicitously performed: even though a particular act of reason-giving can exhibit a high degree of justificatory value, this is not necessary. In some cases (Socrates’ act in the *Crito* is an
example), a particular act of reason-giving can exhibit a very high recognitive value, even though it has a very low justificatory value; and vice-versa.

The analysis conducted in chapter four of reason-giving as an illocution-type indicates that reason-giving has a certain distinctive value that, though related to justification, is not reducible to justification. My analysis indicates that the expression of recognition for the other’s rationality (which is a valuable feature in the other, and essential to the other’s humanity) is not merely one among the values that reason-giving may or may not have. Rather, it is the value that is at the core of reason-giving. In chapter five, I provided a normative argument for the value of reason-giving (mediated by the value of recognition), and defended the claim that this recognitive value is intrinsic to reason-giving, and that any successful act of reason-giving (i.e. any act of reason-giving; whether or not it is a good act of reason-giving) realises this recognitive value in some degree.\textsuperscript{843} I argued that this recognitive value is best understood as an intrinsic-relational value (that is, an intrinsic value that supervenes on a relational property – namely, that of recognizing the other in his rationality).

Also in chapter five, I argued that claiming that reason-giving has an intrinsic recognitive value is compatible with claiming that reason-giving has also an extrinsic recognitive value, even of a distinctive kind. By reason-giving, one may facilitate the other’s active engagement with reasons, and thus make the other be

\textsuperscript{843} This is true even of limiting cases, i.e. of highly infelicitous (but still successful) reason-giving.
in active contact with the humanity he has in himself (which is an intrinsically valuable end). I also suggested that this is something that cannot be done by doing anything else, only by reason-giving. But the intrinsic cognitive value is the only value that is always present in an act of reason-giving, and is also the only value that has to be present in a high degree for a given act of reason-giving to be a fully felicitous act of reason-giving. If one thinks of the value of reason-giving in the terms proposed in this thesis, it is possible to avoid the extreme conclusions presented in chapter one, and has also the advantage of explaining cases which seem puzzling for someone putting too much emphasis on justification – like Socrates’ act in the Crito – in a more intuitive way.


____. Arguing as Trying to Show That a Target-claim is Correct (2011) 26(3) *Theoria* p 301–309.


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