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The Uses of Ceremony:
Performing Power in the First Civil War

Victoria Anker
Abstract

Within the body of scholarly interpretation of the British Civil Wars (1642-1651), there is an absence of research into the politicisation of rituals of power and the struggle between monarchy, parliament, and the army to command these symbolic forms of authority. My thesis examines the performances of rituals as the methodical enforcement of political authority during the First Civil War (1642-1646). In synthesising notions of court culture and performances of political discourse, it traces the constriction of royal ritual, parliamentary subversion of monarchical rituals, and the rise of politico-military ritual, culminating with Charles I’s surrender on 5 May 1646.

Situated within existing interdisciplinary research that explores the communication and image of power, this thesis examines (1) the battle to control symbols of political power, (2) polemical interpretations of the conflicting use and ownership of these performatives, (3) the efficacy of these performative acts among a divided public. It highlights the ways in which such performances limited the public to the role of audience, despite the apparent inclusiveness of many ritualised events. This enables a close reading of ritual performances and the subsequent literature produced around the events. It also calls upon the close reading of literary and non-literary texts that can be described as ‘virtual performances’ of ritual, most notably Charles’ royal entry into London (1641), and the funeral of the third Earl of Essex (1646).
Ritual and ceremony in their due times kept the world under the sky and the stars in their courses. It was astonishing what ritual and ceremony could do.

Terry Pratchett, *Pyramids*
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I could not have completed this without the wonderful support of three fantastic women, and their insightful and constructive comments: Alison Garden, Muireann Crowley, and Dorothy Butchard. A special thanks to Jessica Legacy for generously lending her time and company while finishing this thesis.

Finally, this is for Iain, who always had my back – even when I didn’t realise.
Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................... vii

Abbreviations ................................................................................................................... xi

1. The (ab)uses of ceremony: a theoretical overview ...................................................... 1
   1.1 Minidramas and metaphors .................................................................................... 2
   1.2 Early modern scholarship .................................................................................... 6
   1.3 Ceremonial and political experience ................................................................... 9
   1.4 Ritual and ceremony .......................................................................................... 14
   1.5 Thesis outline .................................................................................................... 19
   1.6 A note on terminology ....................................................................................... 23

2. Parliament, speech acts and self-knowing performance ............................................. 25
   2.1 The Covenanting example .................................................................................. 27
   2.2 Speech acts: genre and medium ......................................................................... 38
   2.3 Book burning and reactive censorship ................................................................ 58
   2.4 Co-opting religion: preaching and fasting ......................................................... 68
   2.5 Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 82

3. Performing kingship: Charles I and royal entertainment ........................................... 87
   3.1 London, 1640 ...................................................................................................... 90
   3.2 Edinburgh, summer 1641 .................................................................................. 101
   3.3 London, November 1641 ................................................................................... 111
   3.4 London, winter 1641-42 ................................................................................... 122
   3.5 On the road to Nottingham ............................................................................... 128
   3.6 Nottingham, August 1642 ................................................................................ 139
   3.7 On the road to war ............................................................................................ 142
   3.8 A refashioned court at Oxford .......................................................................... 147
3.9 Conclusion................................................................................................................. 154

4. Robert Devereux: the Protestant Prince and military ritual .......................... 157

4.1 The rebellious earls of Essex ................................................................................. 160
4.2 Triumphant and glorious, 1642-43 ........................................................................ 164
4.3 The language of politico-military authority............................................................... 176
4.4 Primus inter pares? Essex’s downfall, 1644-45 .................................................... 183
4.5 A noble death, autumn 1646 .................................................................................. 192
4.6 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 209

5. Mutual courtship: parliament, Fairfax and civic ceremony ....................... 213

5.1 The city’s protection of parliament, 1642 ............................................................... 224
5.2 Communal ceremonial, 1642-45 ............................................................................. 215
5.3 A new Lord General, 1645 .................................................................................... 227
5.4 The Naseby parade, 1645 ....................................................................................... 230
5.5 A civic welcome, 1646 .......................................................................................... 235
5.6 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 239

6. An immutable code? ............................................................................................... 241

Bibliography ............................................................................................................... 251
### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CJ</td>
<td><em>Journals of the House of Commons</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>CSPD</td>
<td><em>Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the Reign of Charles I</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>CSPVen</td>
<td><em>Calendar of State Papers, Venetian</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LJ</td>
<td><em>Journals of the House of Lords</em></td>
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<td>LMA</td>
<td>London Metropolitan Archives</td>
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1. The (ab)uses of ceremony: a theoretical overview

And what have kings that privates have not too,  
Save ceremony, save general ceremony?  
And what art thou, thou idol ceremony?  
What kind of god art thou, that suffer’st more  
Of mortal griefs than do thy worshippers?  
What are thy rents? What are thy comings in?  
O ceremony, show me but thy worth!  
What is thy soul of adoration?  
Art thou aught else but place, degree, and form,  
Creating awe and fear in other men,  
Wherein thou art less happy, being feared,  
Than they in fearing? (Henry V, IV.i.235-46)¹

In this celebrated moment from Shakespeare’s Henry V, we see the apparently candid king reflecting on the difference that kingship makes. Or, rather, we see him reflecting on the difference that makes kingship – it is, he says, the work of ceremony itself. In this ‘extended consideration of ceremonial authority’, Henry sees ceremony as Janus-faced.² On the one hand, the dismissive way in which he speaks of it subjects it to sceptical diminution: ceremony is an ‘idol’, an illusion, ‘dream’ or hollowness that amounts to nothing substantial – its ‘worth’ is fundamentally in doubt. But at the same time, ceremony is crucial: it establishes kings as kings, seeming to bestow as much as to confirm their duties and burdens. It creates ‘awe and fear in other men’; ‘general ceremony’ is that which instantiates not just ‘place, degree, and form’ but also the very public nature of kingly life – it is a tool that through its performance separates king from subjects.

This is not the only occasion on which Shakespeare reflects critically, but inconclusively, on the bi-fold nature of public or kingly ceremony.³ In Richard II, for instance, we find a lengthy dramatic meditation on the intertwining of two different views of the extent to which ‘ceremony’ makes a king. What Shakespeare registers here is an equivocation, as much modern as early modern, about the place that

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² M.J. Smith, ‘The Experience of Ceremony’, Studies in English Literature 1500-1900, 54:02 (Spring, 2014), 403.
‘ceremony’ – or, speaking more broadly, rituals, speech acts, and other performatives – have in the operation of political power. Are these no more than shadows, representations, reflections or images of a power that really exists otherwise? Or do they have a role to play in creating power, as Henry acknowledges? And such a debate gives rise to other questions: if there is a sense in which ‘ceremony’ or its family of near analogues does make a difference, does actually matter to the effective operation of political power, then what about those moments of political contest, transformation or revolution, which – in Marvell’s words, ‘cast the kingdom old / Into another mould’ – remade the forms as well as the substance of political authority?

1.1 Minidramas and metaphors

As Shakespeare’s words reveal, ceremonial and performatives were seen as political tools by which social cohesion – at a courtly, government or civic level – could be maintained, although Wilentz’s suggestion that we interpret these rituals ‘as minidramas or as metaphors, upon which are inscribed the tacit assumptions that either legitimize a political order or hasten its disintegration’ also hints at our inability to definitively comment upon the efficacy of these acts.4 However, these ceremonial norms were disrupted in the 1640s by the outbreak of the British Civil Wars (1642-51). My thesis examines the uses of performative ceremony – ritual and ceremonial entries, forms of commemoration and memorialisation, sermons, feasts, and civic speeches – by king and parliament as the methodical enactment of conflicting political authorities during the First Civil War (1642-46). Situated within existing interdisciplinary research that explores the communication and image of power, this thesis examines (1) the battle to control and refashion enactments of political power, (2) polemical interpretations of the conflicting use and ownership of these performatives, (3) the socio-political efficacy of these performative acts within a divided polity. In doing so, it argues for the rise of parliament as a collective agency that sought to redirect public deference for increasingly revolutionary ends, including

(but not solely) promoting itself as a body capable of enacting executive power without royal consent. In synthesising notions of court culture and the performance of political discourse, this thesis traces the constriction of royal ritual, parliamentary subversion of monarchical rituals, and the rise of politico-military ritual, culminating with Charles’s surrender on 5 May 1646.

Within the body of scholarly interpretation of the British Civil Wars, there is a lack of extensive research into the use of ceremonies of state, and into the struggle between Charles I and the Long Parliament to command these symbolic and rhetorical performances of authority, although Sharpe – most notably in his Image Wars – began to breach this gap as part of a broader analysis of image, representation, and monarchy. Cressy argued in England on Edge that it was religious and political instabilities of the early 1640s that set the rhetorical tone for debate during the revolution and enabled the ‘deconsecration of majesty and demystification of power’. More recently, in Charles I and the People of England, Cressy reaffirmed his argument that, during the period of Personal Rule and into the 1640s, Charles’s subjects were increasingly ‘not over-awed by obligations of duty and deference, showed minimal respect for arcana imperii, and judged Charles unfit to govern’. However, even as he acknowledges the role Charles and his advisors played in this decline of respect, Cressy does not examine the question of where the deference previously shown to the monarchy was redirected.

In Image Wars, the second volume in his trilogy on the image and representation of the Tudor and Stuart monarchies, Sharpe situated the fight for representation during the Civil War within his broader assessment of the centrality of language and forms in representing authority (be it monarchical or protectoral) in the first half of the seventeenth century. Specifically, Sharpe systematically set out how between 1642-1649, king and parliament fought to project images of authority through words, pictures, and performances arguing that, ‘[t]he image of authority was central to the exercise of authority’, especially after January 1642 when Charles fled London,

5 K. Sharpe, Image Wars (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010).
abandoning many of the tools of state.\textsuperscript{8} This built on his earlier thesis, as defined in the first volume, that ‘politics and power have never been a matter simply of institutions but are part of a complex culture formed through representations and negotiations’.\textsuperscript{9} In discussing the Tudor monarchy, Sharpe emphasised how rituals can be used to ‘neuter’ oppositional politics, such as Anne Bolyen’s coronation (which silenced opposition to Henry VIII’s divorce), but simultaneously demand the active participation of the public in the ritual.\textsuperscript{10} This dual necessity is, this thesis argues, evident in how these rituals are reported as both newsbooks and pamphlets idealise the behaviour of citizens within the ritual framework, presenting them not only as orderly and loyal, but also — through their presence — complicit in the ritual’s assertion of authority over competing claims. In Rebranding Rule, the final volume in the trilogy, Sharpe demonstrated how the legacy of the war — on the field and by the pen — affected and influenced critical responses to monarchy after 1660. During the Exclusion Crisis and Popish Plot, he demonstrates how the opposition ‘inherited discourse and divisions of civil war but [also] a familiarity with and acceptance of sharp public criticism of the crown’.\textsuperscript{11} This took the shape not just of interventions in royal ceremonies and entertainments (such as was the case with London’s entertainment of Charles II and Prince James in 1678) but in the form of ‘counter-representation’ (as evidenced by the duke of Monmouth’s public progress around western England and touching for the king’s evil in the early 1680s).\textsuperscript{12}

Moving on from Sharpe’s ‘image’ or ‘representative’ model, this thesis innovatively offers a new ‘performatice’ model that draws upon anthropological, sociological, and linguistic theories to interpret speech acts and ritual as performances of the competition for power, rather than a representation of uncontested power itself. Literary and cultural critics have already demonstrated that ‘speaking, writing, [and] discursive performances… not only reflect social arrangements and structures of

\textsuperscript{8} Sharpe, \textit{Image Wars}, 283.
\textsuperscript{10} Ibid., 168.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., 167-8, 217
authority; they are themselves acts of authority’. Both building upon and extending the above interpretation, this thesis considers what happens when these forms are challenged by an alternative political body. In doing so, it treats ceremony, ritual, speech acts, and other performatives as codified acting – or, to use Schechner’s term, ‘a semiotic system of references’. Schechner argues that to understand the performance, ‘the actor / viewer has to know the specific vocabulary and grammar’ of the semiotic system; that there exists a shared linguistic or performative culture even as the semantics of that culture are fought over and contested. This thesis examines the efficacy of these performances when the grammar or genre of their expression was appropriated to advance or defend conflicting politico-religious ideologies. It is investigating the ‘highly formalised performances of government’ not just as images or representations but also as competing enactments of power during a period of radical social and political upheaval.

As Cannadine notes, ‘the danger of using words like ‘power’ and ‘ceremonial’, unavoidable though they may be, is that it implies that they are constant and unchanging notions’. This thesis recognises, however, that power during the First Civil War did not remain static. If anything, the ceremonies under discussion here reveal power was not absolute. It could be, and was, contested. The ceremonies performed by the different actors considered in this thesis were attempts to claim and enact control over both the government and religion. That these ceremonies were not always efficacious further demonstrates that power could be performed badly and that the performer’s intent was not always realised. In using the words ritual and ceremony interchangeably, this thesis challenges the assumed sense of efficacy embodied within ritual and the sense that ceremony is merely reflective, ephemeral, or hollow. Common to both is the concept of the performative, that these are ‘performances enacting known patterns of behaviour and text’. While a ceremonial act might not necessarily change

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15 Ibid., 186.
17 Schechner, Performance Studies, 50.
the status of the performer – as is the case of a ritual (if we understand it in its strictest sense) – ceremony still exhibits efficacious elements: it is not merely a show of power but a site in which the claim to power is enacted. This thesis then is not blurring the distinction between ceremony and ritual but highlighting the impediment of such a distinction. In clarifying terminology and word relationships, the use of the word power also needs to be refined. In earlier works, Sharpe argued that power was the ‘effective means’ of government – the ‘instruments of force and punishments’ – and authority the ‘cultural construction’ – ‘codes and norms’, however, in Selling the Monarchy, he refined this view to acknowledge that power and authority are sinuous terms that defy simple construction. 18 Although a seemingly clear-cut distinction between power and authority could be applied – power, for instance, could be seen as the army, and authority as the forms that raised it (the Commission of Array or the Militia Ordinance) – this thesis does not presume a sharp distinction between these terms.

This thesis emphasises the competing power relations between king and parliament as enacted through cultural forms, and how these performative acts did not successfully establish incontestable power but instead emphasised the conflict within the Caroline government. As Sharpe notes, since power is situated within social frameworks, it is relational not absolute, thus these performatives demonstrate the fragility of power and can, as such, be seen as tactical moves by which competing authoritative bodies or individuals laid bare their claim. 19 These events are thus seen as moments where the contest for authority is brought to light; they are the cultural processes of a contest that was also played out on the battlefield and in political negotiations.

1.2 Early modern scholarship

As de Groot highlights, the European court in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was ‘the most politically powerful and culturally significant institution in the

18 Sharpe, Selling the Monarchy, 8-9.
19 Sharpe, Selling the Monarchy, 57.
country’. To date, however, there are few thorough accounts of ceremonial usage in the Stuart courts, although the recent performative turn has led scholars to revisit the rituals of kingship and princely ceremony in renaissance Europe. Focusing on the Scottish monarchy, Thomas’s chapter in Goodare and MacDonald’s edited collection argued for the refashioning of royal regalia and coronation ritual of James V of Scotland whilst Lynch’s chapter in his and Goodare’s collection demonstrated the splendour of court ceremony and ritual in the subsequent reign of James VI. Woodward’s monograph on royal funerals, meanwhile, offered a comparative study of relationship between power and royal funeral ceremony in the English and Scottish renaissance courts whilst demonstrating the influence of medieval French funerary forms on her northern counterparts. Historians of the English court are indebted to the work of Anglo, in bringing to light the use of spectacle and theatrical display as expressions of Tudor policy. Hunt’s monograph demonstrated the symbolic complexity and drama of Tudor coronation ceremonies whilst Kisby’s article considered the royal use of religious ceremonies and the ritual calendar in early Tudor courts. Loach and Cole have both offered detailed readings of individual monarchs’ uses of ceremony: the former on the function of ceremonial in the context of religious reform in Henry VIII’s reign and the latter on Elizabeth I’s progresses and the conflation of politics and ceremony. In discussing the republic and protectorate, Sharpe argued that these governments failed because their leaders did not know how to use forms that were not monarchical – that they continued to use representations of

25 A. Hunt, The Drama of Coronation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); F. Kisby, “When the King Goeth a Procession”: chapel ceremonies, and services, the ritual year and religious reforms at the early Tudor court, 1485-1547’, Journal of British Studies, 40:01 (January, 2001).
monarchy during the Commonwealth because other forms of authority lacked tradition and conviction.\textsuperscript{27} In his preoccupation with figureheads however, Sharpe overly focuses on Cromwell’s image and the similarities to Elizabeth, concluding that not only did Cromwell use Elizabeth’s memory to promote ‘an aggressive foreign policy’, but that ‘Cromwell’s intense personalizing of authority made it difficult for any to succeed him’.\textsuperscript{28} Acknowledging Sharpe’s work on representing the republic post-1649 and the constructing of a Cromwellian image, Kelsey and, in particular Knoppers, have attempted to move away from the ‘tendency to assimilate him [Cromwell] to monarchy’ to interpret the courtly and ceremonial forms of the Protectorate as reinventing royal rites as ‘civil ceremony’.\textsuperscript{29} More recently, Little has explored the semantic struggles that parliament faced in framing Cromwell’s reign as evident in the contrasting versions (monarchical and protectoral) of the Humble Petition and Advice (1657).\textsuperscript{30} These are just a few works that are beginning to address the lack of research on the protectoral court that de Groot and Sillitoe identified in 2007.\textsuperscript{31}

Contributors to Starkey’s edited collection and Adamson’s chapter in \textit{Princely Courts} demonstrated the changes to ceremonial usage in a chronological survey from the Wars of the Roses to the eighteenth-century that enabled the analysis of court etiquette and ritual within the framework of court culture.\textsuperscript{32} This is by no means an exhaustive account of recent works but it reveals that, while there is a growing corpus of scholarly research on the use of ceremony in Tudor courts – in particular the courts of Henry VIII and Elizabeth – and the role of ceremony within the broader historiography of renaissance court culture, the place of ceremony within Stuart courts remains understudied. Bucholz, in researching the court of Anne (and again, building on Sharpe’s work on the tension between court and parliament during Anne’s reign),

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{27} Sharpe, \textit{Image Wars}, part IV & part V focus particularly on representing, writing and staging the republic and the protectorate.
\textsuperscript{28} Sharpe, \textit{Selling the Monarchy}, 470; \textit{Image Wars}, 541.
\textsuperscript{30} P. Little, ‘Monarchy to protectorate: re-drafting the Humble Petition and Advice, March-June 1657’, \textit{Historical Research}, 70:203 (February, 2006).
\textsuperscript{31} de Groot and Sillitoe, ‘Court Culture’, 2.
\end{flushleft}
acknowledges the general decline of court culture whilst carefully emphasising the political significance of Anne’s use of ceremony. However, the fullest account of any one early modern court remains Keay’s analysis of rituals of royalty used by Charles II. Similarly, apart from Dean’s work on the role of ritual in the Tudor parliaments and Peacey’s recent and thorough analysis of the theatrical openings of Stuart and Protectoral parliaments, there is an absence of accounts of ceremony within the walls of Westminster. This is not to suggest that the significance of ceremony within the Stuart courts is unrecognised by historians, but rather that these ceremonial practices are often seen as representations of politico-religious authority as opposed to enactments of this authority. It is in this context that Loomie’s introduction to Finet’s Note Books as Master of Ceremonies sits, as Loomie contextualises diplomatic ceremonies within Stuart court culture alongside domestic and foreign political developments. This has enabled scholars such as Butler to read early Stuart court masques and literature as sites of political negotiation – as more than mere reflection or representation, but rather a working out of numerous political possibilities and conflicting aspirations.

In a similar vein, where Butler uses the concept of negotiation to re-evaluate court masques, this thesis considers how ceremonial acts can likewise be interpreted as sites of political negotiation that sought to reform and change the structure and operation of the Caroline government.

1.3 Ceremonial and political experience

The dramas of political expression that form the basis of this thesis require the establishment of a broader definition of ‘ceremony’ that extends beyond the

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institutional or procedural boundaries of a constituted court, parliament, and church to locate it as a social force. In *Negara*, Geertz famously interpreted rituals as ‘artifices, more or less cunning, more or less illusional, designed to facilitate the prosier aims of power’. 38 Geertz argued that ceremony was an ends to, not a means of, political power – that to perform ceremony was an enactment, not just a representation, of power. In a similar vein, Cannadine has warned against ‘making any easy generalisations about power and pomp’ as ritual forms can encourage ‘new ways’ of consolidating power ‘but in essentially traditional terms’. 39 Although their modes of power stood in conflict to each other, the use of ceremony by both Charles and parliament was designed to highlight their centrality within the state through either the stability of the monarchy or the legitimacy of parliament as conciliar body. Thus even when authorities were clearly under pressure, the use of ceremony – as with the opening of the Long Parliament – bolstered the presence of power. Sharpe argues that scholars should ‘think of MPs conscious of themselves as performing, and, like the actors and stage managers, performing a service for court and audience’; the same can be said – for example – of the actions of both Charles and Robert Devereux, the third earl of Essex and parliament’s Lord General from 1642-45. 40 From the choice of performers – and their place within the ceremony – to what they wore, the ceremonial route through the city or town to the choice of venue (sacred or secular), the organisers carefully constructed and staged the performance to enact specific types of authority.

The social nature of the ceremonial forms is thus an important consideration as performers consciously engaged with the public (in particular London’s citizens) by encouraging crowd participation. Performers and spectators were complicit in this: on the one hand, parliamentarian preachers aligned their sermons to political reform to legitimate the Long Parliament’s actions, on the other, the civic speeches Charles received reinforced the king as a divinely empowered monarch above such partisan factionalism. The invasion of the civic space, meanwhile, demonstrates the importance

of the city itself as a ‘spatially performed entity’. In these rituals, the city is held up as a model of society: civic spaces are appropriated by the monarch’s presence and reconfigured as royal spaces, reinforced by the mayor’s ritual surrender of the sword or mace of office to Charles – in these performances, Charles literally holds the (symbolic) power of the city or town in his hands. As Sharpe argued, such transparent symbolism was a necessity when interacting with a populace whose levels of literacy varied. Precise literacy figures remain elusive, not least because of disagreement among historians as to what signified an ability to read – a signature or a mark (‘X’), both of which suggest an ability to write but not necessarily to read – and a recognition of type hierarchies – black letter being the most common form of print type. It is generally accepted that literacy levels were higher in the capital; men were more literate than women were; and the more literate social classes included clergy, gentry, guildsmen, and merchants.

However, being able to interpret the symbolism – being ceremonially conscious – did not equate simply to a passive reading of those symbols. As is evidenced through private reports or observations of ceremonies or speeches, observers were aware of the way in which these performatives were manipulated to enact a particular kind of authority and of when these performances failed. This ambiguity is also evidenced in the conflicting reports of these acts, which circulated as newsbooks, eye-witness accounts, and pamphlets. Sharpe has argued that Russell, in his thorough and detailed Fall of the British Monarchies, overlooks the broader ‘community of news... that formed political opinion and shaped political behaviour’. He further criticises revisionist historians for oversimplifying their reading of ballads, news, and pamphlets. In Print and Public Politics, Peacey went some way to address this criticism in demonstrating how printed material enabled the daily, and informed,

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42 Sharpe, Image Wars, 283.


44 Sharpe, Reading Revolutions, 5.
participation in political life, both in making parliament’s actions ‘accessible and transparent’ and in enabling the public to engage in politics, ‘as writers, petitioners, lobbyists or protesters, and as constituents and interested citizens’. By prioritising print – newsbooks and pamphlets in particular – this thesis also seeks to redress this revisionist oversight by examining the way these texts report on and represent performative acts of authority. Some texts are biased in that they gloss over political tension whilst also providing a reasonably accurate account of the ceremonial details – who stood where, the route they took. Martin Parker’s description of the opening of the Short Parliament (April 1640) or Charles’s entry into London (November 1641) are representative of this type, as too is William Marshall’s account of Essex’s funeral (October 1646), as both authors focus on presenting an image of national (Parker) or parliamentary (Marshall) harmony. Other texts more willingly acknowledge political tension and violence but are framed within traditional or legitimate forms of address, for instance the Covenanters’ (and later Westminster’s) protestations and remonstrances in the late 1630s. Anonymous accounts purporting to be eye-witness testimonies are among the more openly polemical. These accounts might for instance, exaggerate or underestimate the numbers present at an event, or, loudly assert the king’s pleasure when another will hotly claim the opposite; this is most evident in the competing descriptions of the king’s martial journeys to English towns in 1642. The fourth type of text spares very little print space to the performative act, for instance, Fairfax’s arrival in London to accept the role of Lord General (February 1645). More often than not, these types of text are newsbooks and the report is part of a broader body of news. To complicate this emerging picture of the different types of texts and their interpretations of performative acts, newsbooks can also prove to be the most detailed and exhaustive account of an event, providing extensive commentary as well as printing copies of the formal orders and arrangements for the occasion, such as the Naseby Parade (June 1645).

As Raymond points out, ‘newsbooks made the history of the civil war, influenced society, and shaped the course of events’, thus their presentation and interpretation of the conflicting acts of authority should not be overlooked.\footnote{Raymond, \textit{Invention of the Newspaper}, 312.} If the competing performances of authority by parliament and Charles generated controversy and conflict, the factionalism evident in newsbooks added to this confusion; as Peacey notes, contemporaries could not ‘agree on whether such material was welcome’ but they were concerned about its impact on ‘political life and popular participation’.\footnote{Peacey, \textit{Print and Public Politics}, 6.} Although newsbooks strove to retain what Raymond calls ‘pretensions to the language of objectivity’, especially prior to the emergence of \textit{Mercurius Aulicus}, it is evident in the way newsbooks describe certain ceremonies and rituals that factual (or seemingly factual) details such as the ceremonial route or the names of those present could still be politicised to support different factions.\footnote{Raymond, \textit{Invention of the Newspaper}, 25.} Raymond also notes that contemporaries viewed and used newsbooks in different ways: Robert Baillie complained on more than one occasions that newsbooks encouraged anti-Scottish sentiment and attacked Presbyterianism – thus recognising the polemical intent – while Rushworth directly transcribed newsbooks as historical fact.\footnote{Ibid., 260-61, 309-10.} Whilst Raymond acknowledges the difficulty for historians seeking to understand how newsbooks were read – that reading patterns remain ‘an enigma’ – Peacey has more recently attempted to discern readers and reader reception of such printed material as well as those genres that Russell has been accused of overlooking.\footnote{Ibid., 258; Peacey, \textit{Print and Public Politics}, 13, see in particular chapt.3, in which Peacey considers readers’ perceptions of a text’s authority, and how readers approached concepts of true and false.} In particular, Peacey has demonstrated that news became integral to everyday lives because of its usefulness and democratising effect, rather than its credibility or authority. It is in this sense that the conflicting claims evident in news reports of acts claiming authority are revelatory in themselves because they reinforce and extend Sharpe’s earlier assessment about the complexity of reading – that to read is more ‘than a simple acceptance or rejection of a unified meaning’.\footnote{Sharpe, \textit{Reading Revolutions}, 36.}
engaging with texts (post-publication and post-event), this thesis takes a step back to consider the performative act itself and the varying interpretations of these acts evident in the reports. The process of reading was complex but so too was the process of performing and reporting.

1.4 Ritual and ceremony

An act hath three branches – it is to do, to act, to perform. *(Hamlet, V.i.11)*

In one line, the Gravedigger in *Hamlet* recognises the multiplicity of the term ‘act’— as the name for a family of related terms and concepts which manage to accommodate both the idea of a deed done in the world and the on-stage imitation of such a deed. That such an anatomy should be offered from the stage, in a play much concerned with ‘seeming’, only heightens its pertinence. As discussed above, this thesis uses terms including ‘ritual’, ‘ceremony’ and ‘performative’ in a similarly overlapping way, both to speak of the formalised procedures of particular institutions and the more general social and cultural practices from which they arise, what Sharpe terms ‘cultural forms’. It draws here on both specific theories of ritual and ceremony, such as those pioneered by performance theorists including Schechner, and the broader theories of social and linguistic action derived from the work of Austin. There are strong continuities between these bodies of thought, though there are of course differences too. For Austin, rituals of all kinds are fundamentally continuous with the broader social practices that make our utterances much more than descriptive or reflective of the world, whereas for some theorists of ritual it is the discontinuity with ordinary life that is stressed. For Austin, all utterance, whether or not explicitly ceremonial, has this performative dimension – it constitutes a deed. For Schechner, however, ritual is differentiated ‘by its function, the circumstance of the event within society, the venue,

and the behaviour expected of those taking part’. Likewise, McGrath identified four key factors that define the ritual – as opposed to the purely theatrical – arena:

1. Ritual artefacts (i.e. costumes, food, decorations)
2. Ritual script (i.e. written texts or oral script)
3. Ritual norm (i.e. a model that serves as an example)
4. Ritual meaning (i.e. the reason or importance of the ritual)

These four factors, if performed correctly, enable an efficacious performance (that is, the establishment or confirmation of status) through the invocation of ‘the presence and action of powers which, without the ritual, would not be present or active at that time and place, or would be so in a different way’. The implication in this statement is that an incorrect performance renders the ritual invalid. However, as Schechner has argued, ‘rituals tend to have the greatest number of functions, but rarely does a performance accomplish all the functions’. For Austin and his followers, too, the efficacy or ‘felicity’ of a performative depended on its conformity to certain fundamental conditions, including a conventional procedure. Any performative that failed to meet these conditions was to be described as ‘infelicitous’, as failing to accomplish its purposes and create the required change in the social world. These observations have direct implications for the interpretation of rituals of power during the First Civil War. In visiting English towns in the spring and autumn of 1642, Charles sought to enact his kingship above parliament whilst simultaneously rendering himself partisan by the implicit request for financial and military support. The fact that the success of these performances depended on the civic authorities’ acceptance of Charles’s authority as preferable to, and superior to, that of parliament in maintaining a stable state, highlights Charles’s vulnerable position in performing an authority that lacked financial or military support. Whilst these ceremonies ostensibly demonstrated

58 Schechner, Performance Studies, 38.
Charles’s power over his citizens – he was granted entry into the towns, even if his reception was lukewarm – the welcomes were hollow in that the king’s demands, made within the framework of the act, were infrequently met. This was a far cry from the royal entry into London of 1641, in which Charles’s enactment of royal power succeeded – albeit temporarily – in binding London’s citizens to the crown through a heavily formalised process of civic engagement. The success of this performance of power is evident in the speed with which the House of Commons set about wooing the city’s authorities in winter 1641, trying to regain the apparent solidarity that had united the city (in particular the common council) and parliament during the king’s absence. The difference in ritual meaning of these performances also illuminates Schechner’s understanding of rituals as impermanent:

Rituals can be invented, both by official culture and by individuals. It is the job of official culture to make new rituals and the traditions they embody appear old and stable – this helps support a sense of social stability. 59

The impermanence of ritual was a crucial challenge that parliament faced as it sought to legitimise its politico-religious reforms. Proponents of Cromwell would also struggle in locating Cromwellian ceremony in historical precedent whilst alternatively manipulating or rejecting monarchical forms. Parliament could imitate the performative elements of objects and form, but it could not easily or readily enforce ritual efficacy without the right actors. The desire to locate parliamentary reform and parliamentary procedure in historical precedents – such as the Petition of the Twelve Peers or the (failed) attempt to install a custos regni in Charles’s absence – was a strategic move by which parliament could legitimate their actions through the revival of traditional or archaic procedural forms or conventions. Similar intent is also evident in the ritual construction of Essex as England’s Protestant Prince, the inheritor of Sir Philip Sidney’s and Prince Henry’s legacies. Goody has argued, however, that ritual is ‘the action as distinct from the beliefs’ and it is certainly the case that many members

59 Ibid., 73.
of parliament did not believe in Essex as a heroic figure.\textsuperscript{60} The performance of this military power – which used royal and princely modes – enabled politicians to present Essex as a ritual figurehead to rival Charles but the rituals failed to produce a sense of \textit{communitas} within parliament.

This possibility of performative failure – which is evident too in Charles’s lukewarm welcomes into regional towns – aligns with Myerhoff’s argument that ‘ritual is a collusive drama, and all present must be in on it… [because] if a lapse occurs, self-consciousness may enter, and the mood may be lost’.\textsuperscript{61} This thesis, however, argues for the self-consciousness of the performers, of an awareness in constructing and performing ceremony that their actions were innovative, manipulative, and often issued a challenge to the social order. The collusion between parliament and London’s civic authorities in thanksgiving sermons and other performatives generated a symbolic model of social order in which parliament, not the king, sat at the centre of the social hierarchy by virtue of their obedience of God’s will. However, if, as Cannadine argues, the need for ceremony and order increased dramatically ‘as the stability of the state became more uncertain’, the competition to control what rituals were performed (and by whom) also intensified as ideological differences hardened.\textsuperscript{62} It is for this reason that in legitimising politically questionable behaviour (to paraphrase Skinner), we can see parliament as ‘innovating ideologists’ who manipulated speech acts to enable reform.\textsuperscript{63}

The question then arises of whether a ritual’s purpose and effect have to be understood by the whole community (as Myerhoff suggests) in order to operate effectively. The responses to Charles I’s entry into London in 1641 reveal divisions among spectators and government officials, despite the homogenising effects of the entry’s celebratory texts. Whilst the entry as a rhetorical enactment of kingship was not questioned, its success remained open to debate. Conversely, Essex’s entries into

\textsuperscript{60} J. Goody, ‘Religion and Ritual: The Definitional Problem’, \textit{The British Journal of Sociology}, 12:02 (June, 1961), 147.
\textsuperscript{62} Cannadine, ‘Divine rites of kings’, 8.
London in 1642 and 1643 could be seen as too effective in enacting not just military authority but political power too – to paraphrase Skinner’s appropriation of Austin’s terms, the illocutionary act generated, without Essex intending it to, a wider illocutionary force.\(^\text{64}\) What happens when a new ritual replaces an old ritual but the new forms are misunderstood? The monthly Fast days initiated by parliament were not completely innovative but in co-opting the rite, parliament instilled a new meaning that demonstrated the division between parliament and king, whilst casting parliament as the defenders of Protestant England. Similarly, the contest between the Commission of Array (an archaic speech act that Charles revived) and the Militia Ordinance (an innovative speech act used by parliament) evidences the competition for, and conflict over, forms that enacted the power to raise military force. Both these forms struggled to engender a vigorous response, which leads to the question of what happens when people resent the method of ritual performance? The Scottish Parliament’s refusal to allow Charles to use the sceptre to ratify its legislation in 1640 reveals an awareness – at the very least at a governmental level – of the symbolism embodied within these rites. This raises a secondary question over the validity of the performance when a part of the rite is omitted. The Scottish Parliament believed the legislation to be official and legal without the ritual of the sceptre and Charles – although unhappy with their refusal to allow this enactment of royal authority – was forced to accept these ceremonial alterations. Similarly, the speeches presented to Charles by civic authorities in the ritual welcome to English towns reveal the localities’ unease over the presumption that participation in the ritual equated to demonstrations of military and political support. Wilentz has argued that ‘when harmony dissolves… the common rhetoric can serve as the ideological rallying points for opposing causes’.\(^\text{65}\) However, what happens when the rhetoric is used for these different ideological ends? Gunpowder Treason Day is perhaps the clearest example of a ritual whose purpose and meaning was highly contested. Although the form of the thanksgiving remained static, the context in which the performers placed it differed greatly – parliament adopted the ritual as an

\(^{64}\) Ibid., 109.

enactment of parliamentary salvation whilst for others it symbolised the salvation of monarchy and – by extension – the divine authority invested in the king.

1.5 Thesis outline

Geertz argued that ‘pomp was not in the service of power, but power was in the service of pomp’. This thesis sets out to ask how ceremonial practices (from speech acts to religious rites and other performatives) were used as enactments or appropriations of authority (be it political, military, or civic). If it is ‘by uttering the same cry, pronouncing the same word, or performing the same gesture in regard to some object that they become and feel themselves to be in unison’, to what extent did these forms succeeded in convincing the performers and spectators alike of the authority embedded therein.

‘Parliament, speech acts, and self-knowing performance’ focuses on rebellion as a form of drama, ‘drawing on traditional forms of action not only in order to legitimate but also to coordinate improvised collective action’. It examines how parliament enacted its role as a conciliar institution through speech acts, political rituals of state, and religious ceremony in order to stand up to and challenge royal prerogatives in church and state. In doing so, this chapter finds that parliament was able to call on linguistic, rhetorical, and performative models established by the Covenanters in late 1630s to early 1640s as they too sought to resist royal interference in the Kirk (and subsequently the Scottish government). From Covenanting tracts to discarded rituals, this chapter demonstrates how the Westminster Parliament watched the Covenanters tactics keenly, although the forms were not adopted without subtle changes. It argues that parliament developed its own set of performatives in response to Charles’s authority but that its own actions threatened the stability of state necessitating the continuing use of ceremony as a tool to manipulate the situation to their favour. In this assessment, the chapter aligns and extends Sharpe’s assessment

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that ‘both sides had to claim the validating languages and symbols of kingship… to argue that they were the true supports of majesty’. 69 This chapter concludes that this collective self-fashioning enabled parliament to present itself as defender of ‘the safety of the King’s person’ and preserver of ‘the true religion, the laws, liberty, and peace of the kingdom’. Building upon existing scholarship on popular politics and print, notably that of Peacey and Raymond on early modern readership, the chapter demonstrates how, in utilising ceremonial modes, parliament altered the socio-political landscape by changing the way in which the public talked about and witnessed power and sovereignty. 70

‘Performing kingship: Charles I and royal entertainment’ focuses on Charles’s use of royal ceremony and the written word to express royal authority over the English and Scottish Parliaments, and the ultimate failure of these forms in preventing instability. It demonstrates how ceremony became an arena in which to negotiate the king’s relationship with parliament (in Edinburgh) and city (in London) and civic authorities (towns), and how the performative space became a site of conflict between these multiple authorities. In particular, this chapter challenges Adamson’s interpretation of the royal entry into London as a site of mediation between king and parliament, to argue that the entry instead highlighted the polarisation between the king and parliament. 71 Cressy recently noted that due to the king’s framing ‘every initiative as a test of authority, or every objection as refractoriness or malignancy’, it is easy to conclude that Charles could only blame himself for the events leading up to the outbreak of war. 72 In this Cressy contradicts Sharpe’s (perhaps overgenerous) assessment of Charles. 73 While Charles cannot hold sole responsibility for the war, this chapter highlights how the closed nature of royal progresses earlier in his reign generated difficulties for the king as he struggled to frame his need for support within the framework of civic welcomes and entertainments. In particular, while this chapter acknowledges the raising of the standard as the reinvigoration of old medieval and

69 Sharpe, Rebranding Rule, 2.
70 Peacey, Print and Public Politics, chapt.3; Raymond, Invention of the Newspaper, chapt.5.
71 Adamson, Noble Revolt, 438-446.
72 Cressy, People of England, 312.
73 Sharpe, Image Wars, part 2.
Tudor rites of kingship, as other scholars have noted, the extensive analysis of this performance demonstrates the king’s failure to project old forms into a new political context. This chapter concludes that the centrality of ceremony to Charles’s enactment of kingship is best demonstrated by the refashioning of a royal court at Oxford, which conversely emphasised Charles’s displacement from the centre of the political and social order, and the contraction of royal authority ‘into a merely partisan and partial phenomenon’. 74

‘Robert Devereux: the Protestant Prince and military ritual’ focuses on Essex as an iconic figure who dominated London’s performative landscape in order to argue for the self-consciousness of these actors in manipulating ceremonial forms. It considers ‘the problem of ceremonial legitimation’ and the development of a political charisma around Essex as an unintentional consequence of military power. 75 In doing so it challenges Adamson’s interpretation that Essex used military rituals to fashion himself as a political leader. 76 This chapter argues that the construction of ceremony around Essex as parliament’s military figurehead – which parliament eagerly supported in the early years of war – proved too effective as an ideological weapon as it led parliamentarians and royalists alike to interpret him as the embodiment of parliament’s political authority. This projection of power onto Essex foreshadowed the authority invested in Cromwell as Lord Protector, and it is notably that the classical language that surrounded Cromwell is evident from 1642 in the language parliament used to describe Essex. However, this chapter argues that ‘the deployment of pomp only created illusions that could not be sustained’ against the realities of Essex’s mediocre career on the battlefield and the vociferous anti-Essex faction within the House of Lords. 77 Finally, this chapter revisits Essex’s funeral to refine historical interpretation of the ceremony as comparable with that of Prince Henry. While accepting the clear influence of Prince Henry’s funeral on that of Essex, in particular

77 Ibid., 6; unlike Essex, Cromwell’s claims were not founded on heredity precedent or divine right, see: Knoppers, *Constructing Cromwell*, 3.
the hearse, this chapter refines this appraisal by highlighting the range of state and civic funerals performed within the city of London during the early 1640s, which also influenced the funerary forms.

‘Mutual courtship: parliament, Fairfax and civic ceremony’ turns the focus onto the collective agency of parliament (rather than individual members) acting in collusion with London’s civic authorities in order to dominate religious and civic space. It argues that parliament and the civic authorities used ‘rituals [to] provide a sense of control over an uncertain existence’. Sharpe has already referenced the role of the city in publically validating parliament’s cause in 1642; however, this thesis develops Sharpe’s assessment by demonstrating how the use of civic entertainments continued throughout the war and how the city authorities used these feasts to negotiate their position with parliament as war progressed. It finds that the celebratory thanksgiving sermons allowed parliament to utilise a Protestant religious framework to justify themselves as enacting God’s work, which was a direct challenge to Charles’s use of prayer to frame parliament as rebels against God for attempting to attack their divinely appointed king. In enacting these rituals together, the performers generated a sense of communitas. However, this chapter finds that this communitas was explicitly Anglo-centric and emphasised the relationship of parliament and city at the expense of the Scots. Where previously, scholars have focused on the role of individuals such as Essex (or, later, Cromwell), this chapter emphasises the collective agency of the institutions over the individual as actors in these performances. Nowhere is this more evident than in the reduction of military ritual around Fairfax in order to emphasise his subservience to parliament.

This thesis argues that far from disappearing during the First Civil War, ceremony and performatives remained central to the enactment of political power by Charles and parliament. Sharpe argues in *Image Wars* that rival rituals were central to parliament’s construction of authority; however, in juxtaposing the state rituals of parliament (notably trials and executions) and Charles, his assessment occasionally

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overlooks the multiplicity of performers during the Civil War. This thesis extends Sharpe’s assessment to incorporate players such as the city, the Scots, and the New Model Army in order to demonstrate how new forms were invented, archaic forms reintroduced, and current forms appropriated. As the shifting – though always, and necessarily, repetitive – use of ceremony shows, these forms were not static but changed according to the performer’s intent and purpose. The projection of new words and acts into new contexts – to use Cavell’s terms – and the manipulation of existing forms opened the floodgates for rival partisan attempts to co-opt these rituals for alternative ends.80 It was out of this performative mire that Cromwell emerged to dominate ceremony as Lord Protector.81

1.6 A note on terminology
For the sake of clarity, this thesis uses the term ‘royalist’ to denote supporters of the king, whilst acknowledging both the unsuitability of this term prior to the outbreak of war and the continuing scholarly debate over its usage.82 Likewise, attempting to define the different political factions within the Long Parliament is a fraught process as alliances shifted on religious and political grounds throughout the 1640s. Although Adamson argues for the primacy of the House of Lords during the First Civil War, this thesis locates the active zeal and drive for politico-religious reform primarily in the House of Commons.83

80 S. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say? 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 52.
81 For the performance of republican theory and the construction of Cromwell’s image during the Commonwealth, see: Kelsey, Inventing a Republic; Knoppers, Constructing Cromwell; P. Little (ed.), The Cromwellian Protectorate (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2007), in particular P. Gaunt’s chapter on the early protectoral ordinances of 1653-54 and P. Hunneyball’s chapter on protectoral art and architecture.
82 For shifting allegiances and manifestations of royalism, see: J. McElligott and D.L. Smith (eds.), Royalists and Royalism during the English Civil Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
2. Parliament, speech acts and self-knowing performance

This chapter focuses on the use of ceremony and speech acts and the performance of politico-religious rituals by parliament in order to demonstrate how parliament developed from a legislative body to a legislative and executive body in the early 1640s, a complex issue still unresolved on Charles’s death. Focusing on the actions of the Long Parliament from its opening in November 1640 to the passing of the Militia Ordinance in March 1642, this chapter will explore how parliament asserted, created, and declared itself through words and actions as a powerful institution, and a body capable of standing up to and challenging the prerogative powers and absolutism of the king. That Charles decided to arrest the Five Members in January 1642 rather than continue to negotiate with parliament demonstrates how successful parliament’s actions proved to be in reducing the spectre of royal authority.

In seeking to protect the Church of England from idolatry whilst ‘broadening the base of government’, the reforming faction within the English Parliament could look north of the border to the Covenanters, whose actions throughout the late 1630s and early 1640s provided clear precedents in ways – performative or otherwise – to protect the Scottish church and government from Charles’s authority. ¹ The Covenanters, in resisting what they saw as royal interference in the Kirk developed a range of performative tactics through which to gain religious concessions from the king, whilst simultaneously limiting the royal prerogative in Scotland. The obstruction and manipulation of ritual forms, the language of defiance, and the recourse to public appeals utilised by the Glasgow Assembly (21 November – 20 December 1638) and the Scottish Parliament (31 August – 14 November 1639) were closely observed by reformers at Westminster and were crucial events in shaping the Long Parliament’s position against the king.

The reforming faction in the Long Parliament (especially within the Commons) were determined to push forward the grievances that had prompted Charles to dissolve the Short Parliament. In doing so, the reformers self-consciously adopted the role of

¹ Russell, *FBM*, 238.
defender of religion, liberties, and freedom even as they challenged, appropriated and limited the royal prerogative. In the ensuing debate over the religion and government of England, parliament manipulated speech acts that were formerly the privilege of the crown and attempted to co-opt public processes such as petitions, although Peacey has highlighted how petitioners also had their own aims in submitting a petition that could involve criticism of parliamentary processes and systems. 2 Parliament’s actions however altered the socio-political landscape by changing the way in which the public talked about and witnessed power and sovereignty, which would in turn affect the acceptance of ceremonial forms utilised by royalists and parliamentarians during the First Civil War. It is therefore apt that Sharpe interprets the Commons’ actions during the 1640s as a form of theatre and encourages scholars to ‘think of MPs conscious of themselves as performing, and, like the actors and stage managers, performing a service for court and audience’. 3 As Sharpe later notes of the king’s trial itself, the proceedings were deliberately made public, ‘to demonstrate the legitimacy of their [parliament’s] claims and to represent themselves as the champions of justice and of the people’. Kelsey has also convincingly argued for the theatrical self-consciousness of those who managed the king’s trial – from the choice of venue to the erection of the Lord President’s stage and extra public viewing galleries – as the trial was ‘integral to the struggle to control and define a constitutional revolution’. 4 Playing into this consciousness, Kelsey further argues, were the deliberate ‘ambiguities’ of language. 5 In 1649, ‘man of blood’ could, with difficulty, equate to regicide. Similarly, in the early 1640s, the language of resistance was instead framed as deference and respect.

To reinforce its powers as a conciliary institution, parliament utilised the printed word, creating a linguistic framework that reinforced the legitimacy of its reforms. Adopting the language and terminology of the monarchy in order to weaken the royal prerogative, politicians attempted to establish themselves as central players in England’s government. This chapter will closely analyse the writings of the Long

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2 Peacey, Print and Public Politics, 269-271.
4 Sharpe, Image Wars, 381.
Parliament and the different genres it utilised in order to justify reform. It will also consider parliament’s ability to own or control political developments by printing partisan or polemical versions of parliamentary proceedings before the king could print a royal official account. It will also consider attempts to control and censor the press in order to discuss the limitations of parliament’s authority despite efforts to reinforce such censorship through the manipulation of book burning rituals as a codified visual punishment. If the ritual of book burning symbolised royal authority over the written word, the pulpit demonstrated royal authority in alignment with that of God; thus finally, this chapter will analyse parliament’s manipulation of key religious ceremonies in order to locate their cause within a historical narrative of English Protestantism.

In utilising these forms, the reformers (predominantly but not solely located in the Commons) achieved four goals: to locate the need for reform within their role as representatives of the people (in reality, the land-owning gentry who composed the electorate); to challenge Charles by altering public awareness of government tensions; to co-opt and manipulate public demonstrative acts (largely within London) as proof of popular support for the reforms; and to cloak its own subsequently arbitrary actions (such as the attainder of Strafford) under the guise of protecting the king. Although parliament did not initially desire to become an executive body, its actions were ultimately successful in enabling it to strengthen its powers as a conciliar institution; to remove key advisors whom members and the public identified as wicked and tyrannous; to move the Church of England away from Laudianism; and to strip Charles of many of the royal prerogatives that he believed to be inalienable from the crown.

2.1 The Covenanting example
There were clear precedents for the Long Parliament’s manipulation of speech acts and ritualised forms in the actions of the Covenanters in the late 1630s. Following the signing of the Scottish National Covenant (28 February 1638), the Covenanters, in resisting what they saw as royal interference in the Kirk, developed a range of performative tactics through which to gain religious concessions from the king, whilst simultaneously limiting the royal prerogative in Scotland. These actions culminated in
the Treaty of London (10 August 1641). Although the Treaty failed to ensure a ‘lasting reconciliation’ between the Covenanters and Charles I, the former’s use of resistance and force, advancement of factional agendas, recourse to public appeals, and language of defiance provided models of opposition which the Long Parliament could mimic and learn from.

The clearest model of Covenanter resistance to the king was the General Assembly at Glasgow’s defiance of Commissioner Hamilton’s order to dissolve (on 28 November 1638). As a stage for rebellion, the Covenanter-dominated Assembly that convened at the cathedral had been rowdy and disorderly since its opening on 21 November. Huge crowds outside the cathedral hindered the formal procession of the Assembly’s members and swarmed inside to witness the proceedings, prompting complaints about the unseemly ‘dinn and clamour in the house of the true God’. Like the riot in St Giles’ Cathedral over the Book of Common Prayer (July 1637), the Covenanters utilised this disruption in order to justify their concerns over Charles’s religious policies – mob action was here interpreted as proof of popular support. Throughout proceedings, this public voice closely echoed the exasperations of the Covenanters. The first disputes arose over the order of events when Hamilton attempted to read a letter from the absent bishops before the appointment of a moderator (22 November). The dismay of the Covenanters is mirrored in the cries from the ‘huge numbers of people, ladies, and some gentle-women’ – self-appointed defenders of the Assembly’s conventions. Similar disputes arose over the appointment of a clerk (23 November); with Hamilton arguing that the previous clerk had not been formally dismissed. In each instance, the Covenanters succeeded in appointing one of their own (Alexander Henderson and Archibald Johnston). Unhappy with proceedings, Hamilton dissolved the Assembly and left, although his

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7 Russell, FBM, 203.
8 Laing, LJB, i.123.
9 Ibid., i.124.
10 Both men worded the final draft of the Scottish National Covenant and were involved in negotiating the Treaty of Berwick (June 1639).
exit was hampered by ‘the fact that the cathedral door had been locked and the key concealed so that it had to be broken open’. This deliberate attempt to stop Hamilton leaving signalled the Covenanters’ awareness of the necessity of Hamilton’s presence in validating the Assembly’s proceedings – without him, the Assembly’s legitimacy and decisions were vulnerable to attack. That the door had to be broken down also symbolised the extent to which Hamilton had lost control over the Assembly.

The Assembly continued to sit in the cathedral until 20 December; the presence of the earl of Argyll (a temporal not spiritual office-holder) signalling the powerful support upon which the Covenanters could draw from within the Scottish nobility. With Hamilton gone, proceedings flowed quickly and the General Assembly at Edinburgh (12-30 August 1639) ratified all the decisions made the previous year. The most important of these decisions, for the growing puritan faction in Westminster, was the deposition and excommunication of Scottish bishops, and the abolition of Scottish episcopacy. The wording of the sentences of deposition and excommunication emphasised the righteousness of the Covenanters’ cause: the bishops (and their dioceses) were ‘pretended’, their power ‘usurped’ from the Kirk, and their actions disrupted the ‘order and government of this Kirk’. Not only had the bishops wrongfully appropriated powers that were not theirs, but their own power came from a false premise. In framing the sentences as a godly routing of evil, the Covenanters represented the Kirk as a victim of ungodly machinations: the abolition of episcopacy therefore became a necessary act that purified the Kirk and rid it of ‘all the ambitious titles invented in the kingdome of the Antichrist’. This foreshadowed the English puritans’ denunciation of Archbishop of Canterbury, William Laud as the Antichrist in December 1641.

If the General Assembly offered the Long Parliament a model of resistance on religious grounds by seizing the king’s ability to control the Kirk, the Scottish Parliament offered political justifications for resistance. When the Three Estates met

11 Stevenson, Scottish Revolution, 123.
12 Church of Scotland General Assembly, The principall acts of the solemne Generall Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland (Edinburgh, 1639), 14-27.
13 Ibid., 14, 26.
in Edinburgh (on 31 August 1639), the Scottish bishops were conspicuous by their absence. Two months later, contrary to the earl of Traquair’s desires, the Lords of the Articles voted (on 5 October) that constitutional proposals could be debated and decided internally by the Scottish Parliament regardless of the king’s approval, effectively claiming royal prerogative power to ‘give laws to all his subjects… without consent of any other greater, equall, or lesser than himselfe’. The parliament proceeded to declare Traquair’s prorogation (on 14 November) illegal and it reconvened (2-11 June 1640) despite Charles’s attempt to delay it. The Covenanters justified this action by claiming that Traquair’s actions were ‘not onely contrary to the Articles of pacification, but also the prejudice of the Liberties of the Parliament’. The Treaty of Berwick (signed 19 June 1639) had granted the Scots the power to settle ‘matters Civill by the Parliament’ and guaranteed a parliament in Scotland (the first since 1633): in attempting to prorogue parliament, Traquair directly contravened this term of the settlement. In framing Traquair’s actions as an attack on parliament’s liberties, the Covenanters emphasised ‘the constitution and practices of all preceding Parliaments’ to sit, once called, until matters were concluded. Whilst Charles accused the Covenanters of ‘the trampling of Our Crown and Royal Authoritie’, they presented parliament as merely asserting its historic right to sit and make good Charles’s promise at Berwick, mirroring contemporary attempts of the Short Parliament to seek redress of grievances (as was its constitutional purpose) before voting on issues of supply. The Scottish Parliament’s resistance to the king’s demand to prorogue offered a valuable model for the Long Parliament as it sought to push through the Triennial Act in winter 1640-41.

The legislation introduced by the Scottish Parliament was a blatant attempt to constitutionally limit Charles’s royal prerogatives and Laudian worship. One of its first legislative changes was to bar bishops and clergy from parliamentary membership (which now comprised ‘the Nobilitie, Barons, and Burgesses’), constitutionally

16 F. Windebank, His Majesties declaration, concerning his proceedings with his subjects of Scotland (London, 1640), 7, 33, 61.
endorsing the Glasgow Assembly’s abolition of the episcopacy. The acts of the Edinburgh Assembly were also ratified and confirmed, and the parliament subsequently passed acts against papists, Sunday activities and other popish behaviour. The Triennial Act (perhaps the most important secular act) bound parliament to sit every three years, limiting arbitrary royal rule.\(^\text{17}\) During his visit to Edinburgh in August-November 1641, Charles ratified these acts (on 28 August) and was also pushed to relinquish another royal prerogative, that of ‘instituting and removing the highest officers’. On the Covenants’ insistence that it was Scots ‘law and old custome, to have all these elected by the advyce of Parliament’, henceforth Charles required parliament’s consent before making executive (Officers of State) or judicial (Lords of the Session) appointments.\(^\text{18}\) The significance of parliament’s actions was not lost on contemporaries, as James Balfour remarked:

> the reall grattest change at ane blow that euer hapned to this churche and staite thesse 600 years baypast; for in effeecte it ouerturned not onlie the ancient state gouernment, bot fettered monarchie with chynes and sett new limitts and marekes to the same, beyond wich it was not legally to proceed.\(^\text{19}\)

The acts were novel in their political implications (the reduction of royal prerogative in Scotland), but the language used by the Covenants framed them as fulfilments of the king’s desire for ‘a perfect and solide peace’ enacted within ‘the fundamental laws and customes of the… Kingdome’ in order to preserve Scotland’s ‘Religion, Lawes, and liberties’.\(^\text{20}\) By this logic, the Covenants had not disobeyed Charles; rather they were obeying his royal will – and Charles wished for an end to the rebellion. Although somewhat circular, the argument for acting in the best interests of king and country (even if these actions appeared contrary and confrontational) would be used by the

\(^\text{17}\) The acts made in the session of the second Parliament of our most high and dread sovereign Charles (Edinburgh, 1641), 2, 5, 22-26, 28.
\(^\text{18}\) Bodin, Six books of a commonweale, 159; Laing, LJB, i.389.
\(^\text{20}\) Dissolution of Parliament in Scotland, 4-5.
Long Parliament to justify its defiance of royal will: ‘the true Religion, the Laws and Liberties of this Kingdom’, ‘peace and safety’, ‘privileges of Parliament’ were oft-invoked phrases. The Covenanter’s manipulation of words offered the Long Parliament a model in how to utilise the ritualised language of government to respectfully address the king, even as the words themselves signalled rebellion against royal policy.

As well as providing Westminster’s puritan faction an example of how to linguistically justify rebellious activities, the Covenanter also provided a lesson in promoting factional agendas through the use of petitions, a written format the Long Parliament would actively encourage English subjects to utilise in pressing forward reform. By the early seventeenth century, petitions were a constitutionally accepted way of presenting, within a framework of deference to the social hierarchy, grievances before the government: a way to refer ‘local grievances to central authority’ through what Cressy terms ‘the rhetoric of humility in supplication’. Individual or collective petitions were submitted to the Commons (in England) or the Estates (in Scotland) who referred the grievances to a higher authority. Petitions thus worked ‘in a hierarchical fashion’ and petitions that failed to acknowledge due deference to social superiors could be justly ignored. This changed dramatically in England during the First Civil War, but examples of the politicisation of petitions are evident in Scotland as early as 1637, in the reactions against the Book of Common Prayer. The supplications presented to the duke of Lennox and the Privy Council (on 20 September 1637) obeyed the social framework of petitioning – nobility, lairds, parish commissioners and ministers patiently ranked ‘themselves over against the entrie to the Tolbooth’ to submit their petitions. The ritual, however, was heavily politicised by the content of the petitions. It suggested a growing ness and interest in the working of government that Charles was both wary of and frustrated by: despite his recognition

23 J. Leslie, A relation of proceedings concerning the affairs of the Kirk, ed. D. Laing (Edinburgh: Bannatyne Club, 1830), 9.
of petitions as a subject’s privilege and a royal duty, Charles ignored the petitions and ordered the Privy Council to reject any further advances.\textsuperscript{24} Despite the supplicants’ failure to see their grievances acknowledged, their determination to make clear their interest in religious policy signalled an ‘impressive demonstration of strength’.\textsuperscript{25} Unlike the riot in St Giles’ Cathedral two months earlier and unlike the mob demonstrations that would later be seen outside Westminster, these petitioners had been orderly, respectful, and united, although small riots broke out prior to the next meeting of the Privy Council (17 October 1637).

The appearance of unity was important in building solidarity amongst the Covenanters, especially in the face of subsequent internal divisions in the late 1630s as the petitioners’ attack broadened to encompass Canon Law and bishops, as well as the Book of Common Prayer. Such solidarity did not require performers to share the same beliefs but rather to act together.\textsuperscript{26} Following the signing of the National Covenant (28 February 1638), the Mercat Cross on Edinburgh’s Royal Mile (a symbol of civic not royal government) became a specific focal point for demonstrating religious solidarity. The protestations of June and September 1638, and December 1639 were all proclaimed at this spot, whilst the Protestation of November 1638 against Hamilton’s dissolution of the Glasgow Assembly was made at Glasgow’s Mercat Cross.\textsuperscript{27} As speech acts, these protestations acted as formal (public) declarations of dissent from the Book of Common Prayer and rebuttals of the king’s accusations of religious rebellion.\textsuperscript{28} The title-pages of all four petitions obeyed a similar formula: the titles list those who are protesting in descending hierarchical order (the General Assembly, nobility, barons, gentlemen, burghs, ministers and commons);

\textsuperscript{24} For the numerous petitions – both successful and ‘importunate’ – Charles received prior to the outbreak of war, see: Cressy, People of England, chapt.6.  
\textsuperscript{25} Stevenson, Scottish Revolution, 69.  
\textsuperscript{26} Kertzer, Rituals, Politics, and Power, 76.  
\textsuperscript{27} A. Henderson and A. Johnston, The protestation..., dated 28. June 1638 (Edinburgh, 1638); A. Henderson and A. Johnston, The protestation..., dated September 9. 1638 (Edinburgh, 1638); Church of Scotland General Assembly, The protestation of the Generall Assembly... 18. of Decemb 1638 (Edinburgh, 1639); Church of Scotland General Assembly, The protestation of the Generall Assembly... 28, and 29. of November 1638 (Glasgow, 1638).  
\textsuperscript{28} Protestation: A formal, solemn, or emphatic affirmation of a fact, opinion, or resolution; a (public) declaration, typically made in response to an explicit accusation or an implied doubt. “protestation, n.1”. OED Online. June 2015. Oxford University Press.
the sub-titles state that all the aforementioned are subscribers to the Covenant (and in June and September 1638, to the Confession of Faith); and the texts reference the physical location at which the protestation was made (the Mercat Cross of Glasgow or Edinburgh). The Mercat Cross was an important site of civic authority in the cityscapes, an open public area in which pronouncements were made and punishments meted out. This location reference on the title-pages of these texts, emphasises the fact that the protestations were not private or elite documents of resistance; the act of reading out the protestation at a symbolic site in the city centre potentially enabled the illiterate to partake in the resistance. Houston has suggested that 28% of Scottish men were illiterate and 80% of Scottish women. As with the English capital, literacy rates in Edinburgh and Glasgow were significantly higher than other more rural areas in Scotland and the ability to read (or again, sign ones’ name) correlates closely with occupation and social hierarchy (lairds, professionals, and tradesmen being more literate than agricultural workers and servants).

The protestations themselves also followed a similar formula: the phrase ‘true and loyall Subjects’ is oft repeated as an assertion of fidelity to Charles (as Scottish king); blame is laid firmly on ‘His M'aiesties absence from this His native Kingdome’ and the actions of his commissioners (in particular Hamilton); emphasis is placed on the Covenanters’ ‘legall’ and ‘lawfull’ action (including the petitions); and finally, a list of reasons is given justifying the Covenanters’ actions and refuting accusations of illegality (with reference to biblical and legal precedent). Crucially, the protesters were aware that their protestations were declared not just between subscribers (an act of solidarity) but before subscribers and ‘in the presence of the ever living God’ and ‘before all men’ – a sacred and civic audience.

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31 Ibid.; in discussing speech acts in the Scottish National Covenant, Gunn argues that ‘[t]he Covenanters do not contract with God’ despite the authors’ claims to the contrary since the Covenanters’ could not presume God’s presence despite invoking his name, see: R. Gunn, ‘Speech Acts in the Scottish National Covenant of 1638’, New Waverley papers politics series (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, Department of Politics, 2000), 1.
The protestations thus served a twofold purpose: as speech acts performed before witnesses, they bound the performers (the protesters) together; and in printing the protestations, the Covenanters could defend and justify their resistance to royal religious policies and dismantling of royal prerogatives before their detractors. Baillie certainly believed print a necessity by which ‘to clear ourselves of all slander, especially of that vile calumny of our intention to invade England, or to cast off our dutiful obedience to our prince’. 32 Unlike her southern counterpart, Scotland did not have a centralised printing hub, but the Covenanters quickly made use of certain printers; notably George Anderson (who printed the National Covenant) who moved his press from Edinburgh to Glasgow for the Glasgow Assembly to enable a quick turnaround of Covenanting tracts. 33 Covenanting tracts were produced in both Scotland and England: their production in London facilitated the dramatic growth of printing in the capital during the early 1640s, by which time the English Parliament had also realised the benefits of accessing a popular audience and quickly developed what Peacey terms, a ‘network of reliable printers and publishers. In doing so, they clearly learned from their Scottish friends’. 34 This model of rhetoric and performance – and in particular the realisation of the centrality of print in disseminating and promoting a cause – would prove invaluable for Westminster in framing their resistance in the early 1640s without recourse to open rebellion.

In self-consciously appealing to specific sections of the Scottish and English public, the Covenanters’ actions demonstrate an acute awareness of both their audience and the potentially transformative power of the printed word. Covenanter tracts, especially those printed during the Bishops’ Wars (1639-40), are notable for appealing directly to an English audience as much (if not more) than a Scottish readership in justifying their military invasion. This is evident in the titles that specifically address themselves to ‘the kingdom of England’, ‘their brethren in England’, to ‘all the true

32 Laing, LJB, i.188.
34 J. Peacey, Politicians and pamphleteers (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 44.
English’. This has been an issue of some debate among historians: Stevenson states that despite the efforts of non-Covenanting writers, the Covenanters were successful in persuading English readers of the legality and necessity of their actions, generating heightened awareness of the king’s failures to redress English grievances as much as Scottish ones. Baillie also thought ‘our innocencie was so well remonstrat in print… that we, over all England, began to be much more pitied then before’. Conversely, Waurechen proposes that the Covenanters failed to captivate an English audience because they misunderstood their English readers and failed to inspire integrated action by Scots and English alike – the sympathy that Baillie witnessed did not necessarily develop into action. However, the response of the king to Covenant tracts suggests Charles at least believed in the threat of a combined Anglo-Scottish uprising.

Charles was frustrated by his Scottish subjects’ resistance to the Book of Common Prayer and their actions against the bishops, both of which he believed were part of the royal prerogative since the monarch was head of the (English) Church. Although angered by the Covenant tracts, Charles failed to effectively utilise print (a monarchical monopoly) in response. Walter Balcanquhall produced a brief history from the royal perspective of events from 1638 to spring 1639, which Francis Windebank subsequently continued from the Pacification of Berwick to spring 1640. Both were issued as royal declarations – assertions that stated facts for, but did not interact with, the public. Charles also issued at least four proclamations aimed at English subjects warning them of Covenant libel: again, these were formal orders issuing instructions for the public, who were expected to obey such orders on the basis

35 For example: Church of Scotland General Assembly, An information to all good Christians (Edinburgh, 1639); A. Henderson, The intentions of the armie of the kingdome of Scotland (Amsterdam, 1640); Parliament of Scotland, Information from the estaits of the kingdome of Scotland (Edinburgh, 1640); Parliament of Scotland, Information from the Scottish nation (Edinburgh, 1640).

36 Laing, LJB, i.188; Stevenson, ‘Revolutionary Regime’; Waurechen, ‘Covenanter Propaganda’.

37 The Act of Supremacy (1534) consolidated the monarch position as head of the Church of England. The Scottish crown did not hold a comparable role in the Kirk, although the controversial Concordat of Leith (1572) confirmed the monarch’s power to appoint bishops.

38 Balcanquhall, A large declaration concerning the late tumults in Scotland (London, 1639); Windebank, His Majesties declaration.
of their monarchical authority. Whilst the proclamation as a form of communication might not be as unique as de Groot implies, it is true that Charles’s proclamations, deployed ‘the rhetoric of polemic propaganda disguised as authoritative instruction and monarchical truth’. In issuing proclamations and declarations, Charles did not engage with the content of the Covenanter tracts, instead he was issuing a command (not a plea, or a promise) against the authors that he expected his subjects to obey. As Sharpe notes, Charles believed in, ‘the intrinsic loyalty of [his] subjects’ and, as such, these statements were designed to reinforce royal power (through the expectation of obedience) rather than contribute to the increasingly public debate about the nature of the Caroline government. The situation would be very different in spring 1642, when – following his attempts to arrest the Five Members – Charles was forced publically to engage with and respond to the grievances of the Grand Remonstrance.

Despite royal fears, the Covenanters’ attempts to persuade Englishmen to support their actions were not entirely successful, not least because they could not predict the public audience in England (or their reactions) and because the factions within both the Commons and Lords had their own political agenda. The Scottish plight might have inspired sympathy in those south of the border but such understanding did not translate into political or military action. The Covenanters’ recourse to public appeal was just one of a range of performative tactics that the English Parliament mimicked and learned from. In turning to print, the Covenanters demonstrated how powerful (and perilous) an appeal to the public could be. Moreover, in promoting the factional belief that the Covenant with God bound king and people together, and that the king and people had a duty both to maintain the Covenant and to

39 By the King, A Proclamation and Declaration to inform Our loving Subjects of Our Kingdom of England of the seditious practices of some in Scotland, seeking to overthrow Our Regall power under false pretences of Religion (London, February 1638[1639]); By the King, A Proclamation publishing an Act of State, and His Majesties command concerning a scandalous Paper lately dispersed amongst many of His Subjects (London, August 1639); By the King, A Proclamation against libellous and seditious Pamphlets, and Discourses sent from Scotland (London, March 1640); By the King, A Proclamation declaring those of Scotland, who have entred, or shall enter this Kingdom in a Warlike manner, and their Adherents, to be Rebels and Traitours to His Majestie (London, August 1640).
41 Sharpe, Image Wars, 281; Sharpe also notes that others were using print in order to appeal to the king including, The Life and Death of Queen Elizabeth (1639), which urged Charles to follow Elizabeth’s example, see: Sharpe, Selling the Monarchy, 469.
account for any violation of it, the Covenanters developed ‘an essentially religious justification for rebellion’, variations of which would emerge in the language of the Commons’ justification of war.\textsuperscript{42} This language of justification and necessity masked the defiance behind their actions, enabling the Covenanters – and later the Long Parliament – to employ resistance and force in driving through religious and political reform.

In introducing the Book of Common Prayer into Scotland in 1637, Charles did not expect to meet with such open resistance, in part because he thought he understood his Scottish subjects and in part because the advice he received from ‘anglicized Scots’ such as Hamilton and Lennox glossed over the growing resistance from within the Kirk.\textsuperscript{43} This approach foreshadowed his intentions in opening the Short Parliament – Charles expected to be obeyed not challenged, as well he might when, as Cressy argues, ‘grumbling cooperation was more common than stubborn objection’.\textsuperscript{44} The Covenanters’ resistance towards Charles’s religious policies quickly expanded into an attack on royal authority in Scotland and following the Bishops’ Wars, Charles was forced to ratify these limitations as part of the constitution. The Covenanters’ obstruction and manipulation of ritual forms in the General Assemblies and Scottish Parliaments; the language of defiance couched within the linguistic framework of subservience and obedience; the written justification for encroaching on the royal prerogative; and the manipulation of public processes such as petitions were all observed with interest south of the border. In pushing forward religious and political reform, the Long Parliament would draw upon and refashion these Covenanter examples to create a linguistic and performative framework that validated and legitimised its reforms.

\textbf{2.2 Speech acts: genre and medium}

In discussing the centrality and function of language and literature during the Civil War, Smith argues that:

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  \item \textsuperscript{42} E. Vallance, \textit{Revolutionary England and the National Covenant} (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2002), 401.
  \item \textsuperscript{43} C. Carlton, \textit{Charles I: the personal monarch}, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 1995), 15.
  \item \textsuperscript{44} Cressy, \textit{People of England}, 107.
\end{itemize}
A genre is nothing more nor less than a ‘bag’ or ‘sack’ of words (however large or small), the totalised identity of all the linguistic, rhetorical, and narrative elements by which we recognise a particular speech act or text. It ‘performs’ when it is uttered or published and this itself is of course related to the assumptions which underlie its composition.45

In pushing forward religious and political reform, the Long Parliament called upon a series of written and performative modes that legitimised their actions. Issuing speech acts across a range of genres allowed parliament to both perform and justify their gradual encroachment on and appropriate of royal authority. Challenging the assumed dominance of the monarchy over printed forms, these speech acts appealed to fellow members within parliament as well as to the broader public, declared parliament’s position in opposition to the king, and proposed solutions to what parliament saw as the problems with, and abuses of, the Caroline government. The importance of these genres should not be underestimated. Sharpe has argued that the public were very aware of different genres and what those genres signified; they understood the difference between a petition and a protestation – or to use Sharpe’s examples, ‘the state trail, the scaffold speech, or the addresses to the Assize judges’.46 Not only were they aware of these different genres, they also – as Peacey has demonstrated – used different forms in responding to parliament and expressing their own frustration, desires, or needs (both personal and political).47 In performing their authority, members of parliament were forced to use forms of address that the public would recognise as authoritative: a petition to the king merely emphasised Charles’s centrality within the government – a parliament declaration on the other hand marginalised royal dominance.

These speech acts were designed to represent the collective actions and beliefs of both the Lords and the Commons. As Raymond argues for the newsbook as ‘a bitter

46 Sharpe, Reading Revolutions, 57.
47 Peacey gives the example of petitions, which presented grievances before parliament within the framework of a humble supplication, and pamphlets that accompanied or followed on the back of these petitions and enabled a more assertive case to be made before a broader public audience, see: Peacey, Print and Public Politics, 229-235.
and aggressive instrument of literary and political faction’, so too can parliament’s use of authoritative genres be seen as a tool for generating opposition against royal policy. However, when the Long Parliament convened (3 November 1640), it was far from a unanimous body. The Covenanters were initially united by the primary desire to stop Charles’s Anglicisation of the Kirk. The drive for political reform was in part a consequence of this desire as it enabled the Covenanters to constitutionally protect the Kirk. From the outset of the Long Parliament, members were divided – in particular in the Commons – over issues that encompassed religion, supply, Scotland, and Ireland (or more pointedly, Strafford). In the lower house, some issues proved less contentious than others: within a week, the Commons impeached Strafford, arresting Laud a month later; and by the following February, parliament had declared itself irremovable with the passing of the Triennial Act. These actions however were largely justified as preventative measures necessary to protect the rights and privileges of parliament. On other issues, however, the reformers met with resistance. It was not a simple matter of pushing an agenda that already enjoyed majority support but of justifying radical actions (not only within Westminster but also before the public) that clearly went further than mere defence. News of the Commons’ attempt to act against bishops prompted several petitions of protest warning ‘that they will not suffer this hierarchy to be taken away from the Church of England’. The petitions served to remind the Commons that, whilst they could use the threat of ‘public’ action (violent or otherwise) to manipulate Charles, the public were not a homogenous body and would not be easily co-opted into supporting drastic reform. It also served as a reminder that the public were not only aware of parliamentary proceedings but were willing to contradict and criticise its actions. Although the workings of parliament were supposed to be secret, manuscript accounts of various parliaments had been in circulation since Elizabeth I’s reign (and earlier): ‘speakers themselves often disseminated accounts of speeches, and members informed their constituents and

50 The Commons impeached Strafford on 11 Nov 1640, Laud on 18 Dec 1640 and passed the Triennial Act on 15 Feb 1641: *CJ*, ii.20, 26, 54, 86; *LJ*, iv.82, 88-90, 112, 162.
others of their doings’. This suggests not only that there was an audience for these accounts (and one, as Lake and Pincus show, that was able to judge and act on what they read or heard) but that the author (or faction, or house) was alert to the ways in which the text could be interpreted.

This raises the question of the extent to which the texts produced by parliament in the early 1640s were successful in convincing the public of the necessity, righteousness, and validity of its actions? What (if any) actions did parliament expect the public to take, and how did this audience know the expected response? On the eve of war, the Venetian ambassador remarked that the parliamentary tracts ‘sound very plausible in the ears of the people here, and they do not fail to arouse feelings prejudicial to the interests of His Majesty’, concluding that the public were increasingly convinced of parliament’s legitimacy. However, what of the medium and language of the texts themselves: how did parliament shape this written performance of its authority? In November 1640, parliament could not have succeeded in passing the Militia Ordinance because it had no authority as a legislative body to raise an army or pass bills without the king’s consent. However, the issuing of other forms of speech acts (declarations, propositions, protestations, remonstrances, and resolutions) allowed parliament to both perform and justify its gradual appropriation of royal authority.

As has been noted, and as many scholars have emphasised, neither parliament as a whole nor the individual houses were united in the desire for reform. The publication of protestations and resolutions, along with speeches of individual members served therefore to emphasise factions within and between the houses. Indeed, Peacey highlights that ‘as factional divisions hardened, the press became a weapon not just for expounding a particular message, but to criticise rivals’. When Oliver St John complained in the Commons about the unauthorised publication of one of his speeches, nothing resulted from the committee’s investigations. Rather than complain again about this lack of action, St John utilised print to present his own

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52 P. Lake and S. Pincus, ‘Rethinking the Public Sphere in Early Modern England’, The Journal of British Studies, 45:02 (April, 2006), 276.
53 Ibid., 277.
54 CSPVen 1642-43, 72.
55 Peacey, Politicians and pamphleteers, 308.
‘authorised’ edition of his speech.⁵⁶ Whilst some members of parliament advised against the printing of any account of parliament’s business, authorisation for the printing of parliamentary speeches did occur. Edward Dering entered his speeches for licensing to the printing committee (which, coincidentally, he chaired) and other members of the Commons followed leading Lambert to conclude that there was ‘semi-official recognition of the practice of printing speeches if not proceedings of the House’.⁵⁷ If this reveals anything, it is that parliament was not only divided in its aims but also disagreed on the necessity of co-opting the public to bear witness to the changes being made.

As parliament quickly learned, the lack of licensing made it difficult for contemporaries (and subsequently early modern scholars) to know which works were ‘official’ or were ‘encouraged’ by members of parliament and which works were the result of opportunistic printers or simply polemical supporters of the Commons. The declarations of parliament were, for the most part, written by a small group of members (in the Commons: John Glynne and John Pym; in the Lords: Lord Saye) and then amended by the house before receiving final approval from the whole of parliament.⁵⁸ When analysing the attributed names of the primary authors, what is remarkable here is the stability of these actors: the houses used similar groups of men to write these declarations, creating a consistency in their ‘message’. These declarations enabled parliament collectively to announce its position – they did not have the force of law (unlike an act, or later an ordinance). Despite this lack of legislative force, writers of the declarations still drew upon legal or constitutional terms to affirm a certain religious or political position, as was the case with the Commons’ declaration regarding religious innovations (September 1641). This declaration was the result of a Commons committee’s investigation into religious services, which found many popish practices in place including the use of altar-rails and east-end placement of the altar. The declaration demanded that these practices stop immediately, but as the order did

⁵⁶ CI, ii.80.
⁵⁸ Peacey, Politicians and pamphleteers, 51.
not have the force of law, the Commons presented this demand as being in keeping with existing laws on worship. The innovations were ‘without warrant of Law’, thus the declaration – whilst demanding a change in behaviour – did so by casting the order as being in accordance with laws previously passed by parliament (and authorised by the king). The declaration expected obedience to the commands contained within, but the additional requirement to submit ‘certificates of the performance of these Orders’ suggested the Commons’ anticipated resistance.59

This framework (and the perceived ability to punish non-compliers) was important considering the Commons were acting without the Lords’ support: in a bicameral conference on 9 September, the Lords referred the Commons back to their order of the previous year (16 January 1640) which had targeted sectarians (‘such as shall disturb that wholesome Order’) as much as ceremonialists.60 The Commons argued that as the order passed the house with such a small majority (11 votes to 9) and such little discussion with the Commons, they could not agree to it. In publishing the declaration, the Commons snubbed the Lords, implicitly suggesting that the Lords’ attempts to reform religion were misguided (possibly because of the presence of the bishops in the house). This is explicitly demonstrated through the final sentence of the declaration: ‘it may well be hoped when both Houses shall meet again, that the good Propositions and Preparations in the House of Commons… may be brought to Perfection’. With these words, the Commons claimed the act of reforming religion as theirs, not the Lords, although the peers published their own order in contradiction to the Commons.61

Parliamentary declarations were polemical in their nature: their power resided not in their legal authority but in their challenge to royal authority. Declarations were public statements – written embodiments of parliament’s position.62 They were

59 A declaration of the Commons in Parliament made September the 9th 1641 (London, 1641), 2, 3.
61 A declaration… September the 9th, 5; Die Sabbathi 16. Januarii. 1640. It is this day ordered by the Lords spirituall and temporall (London, 1641); for the king’s response see: By the King: A proclamation for obedience to the laws ordained for establishing of true religion (London, 1641).
62 Declaration: A proclamation or public statement as embodied in a document, instrument, or public act.
"declaration, n.6". OED Online.
emphatically not supplications presented before the monarch (like a petition) and on
several occasions certain factions within parliament tried to turn a declaration into law.
The declarations did not have the king’s consent, but this was not new: the Petition of
Twelve Peers for the summoning of a New Parliament circulated without authorisation
of the king (August 1640); the Scots quickly published the Treaty of London (August
1641) without royal consent; and the Grand Remonstrance was printed despite the
Lords’ disapproval and without Charles’s knowledge (December 1641). The royal
proclamation, as a ritual of monarchical power, was a tool by which the king addressed
his people, clarifying (and occasionally justifying) government action. Sharpe has
emphasised how important traditional forms were in lending legitimacy and authority
to parliament’s claims, and how parliament were ‘compelled to appropriate and ape
these [royal] forms of representation in order to secure some legitimacy’. 63 In
mimicking the royal address – in seeking to address and converse with the public –
parliamentary declarations can thus be seen as an attempt to ritualise parliamentary
authority, to embed it within the existing framework of performative text. Slowly but
increasingly after January 1642, these speech acts were met by a royal counter-
statement, presented as a proclamation or a royal answer. Responding to parliament’s
Declaration or Remonstrance (19 May 1642), Charles ‘wished an answer should be
prepared as soon as possible it might be’ so ‘the poison thereof might not work too
long upon the minds of the people’. 64 The problem in producing royal answers was
two-fold: firstly, in having to respond to partisan texts already in circulation, Charles
did not have control of the political message – he was disadvantaged by the existence
of alternative arguments. Secondly, printing a royal response exposed to the public the
extent to which relations between king and parliament had broken down, and signalled
the king’s increasing involvement in, rather than position above, such partisan politics.

Parliamentary declarations allowed the Commons to challenge or criticise the
current system of government without directly offending the king. In this, the
declarations were similar to vindications or resolutions, which also sought to justify or

63 Sharpe, Image Wars, 281.
response was published on 1 July 1642.
confirm an action already taken (or to shortly be taken). The word ‘vindication’ most frequently appears in the title along with the word ‘remonstrance’ or ‘declaration’: to vindicate is to defend, but the Long Parliament was on the attack. To write solely in defence of its actions would be to appear in the wrong, thus the term ‘vindication’ should be seen as a synonym with ‘proof’ to reinforce another speech act, as in, *A Declaration of the House of Commons, touching a late breach of their priviledges*. The focus of this text was the assault on members’ privileges caused by the king’s attempts to search the rooms of and arrest the Five Members, firstly via his Sergeant at Arms (3 January 1642), and secondly in person with an armed guard (4 January). The breach of not only the ‘rights and priviledges of parliament’ but ‘the Fundamentall Liberties of the Subject’ led the Commons to declare anyone who attempted to arrest any member of parliament a ‘publike enemy of the Common-wealth’. Intriguingly, this declaration was not one to which the Commons felt themselves personally beholden: having already executed Strafford and imprisoned Laud, the declaration reaffirmed their factionalism as much as it threatened outsiders. The promise made in the declaration to duly investigate the Five Members according to ‘the Lawes of the Kingdome’, was another empty assurance, which remained unacted. Finally, the declaration created a hypothetical scenario by which Charles could redeem himself. They stated that the ‘priviledges of Parliament, and the liberties of the Subject’ could not ‘be fully and sufficiently vindicated’ until they knew who had advised Charles in this incident. Thus, the Commons offered Charles the chance to blame his advisors and, by allowing the Commons to investigate and punish these advisors, demonstrate his desire to protect the liberties, and freedoms of his subjects.

That the decision to arrest the Five Members was Charles’s chosen course of action emphasises the extent to which he had lost control over parliament (and, so he thought, the city) by January 1642. The route from Whitehall to Westminster was down King Street, which, although narrow, was the main thoroughfare between court

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65 For instance: *Resolutions of the House of Commons on Ecclesiastical Innovations* (London, 1641); *CJ*, ii.279.
66 *Vindication*: The action of vindicating or defending against censure, calumny, etc.; justification by proof or explanation. OED Online.
67 *A Declaration of the House of Commons, touching a late breach of their priviledges; and for the vindication thereof* (London, 1642).
and government. Proceeding down King Street, attended by the Elector Palatine and
the earl of Roxburgh as well as the armed guard, was a highly visible act. Such a public
procession, at a time of intense political pressure, was never going to go unnoticed.
This open aggression demonstrated Charles’s failure to achieve a satisfactory
resolution with parliament. As Spalding commented, ‘thus, is this good king
compelled to yield unto such ordinances as his royall predecessors never did grant’. 68
In the space of twelve months (January – December 1641), Charles had reluctantly
given his signature to acts that severely limited or removed his royal prerogatives. The
Act for the Attainder of Strafford (May 1641) and the Act for the Abolition of the
Court of Star Chamber (July 1641) challenged his prerogative to institute and remove
the highest officers as well as to grant pardons and dispensations. The destruction of
the Star Chamber and High Commission also jeopardised the royal prerogative to hear
appeals, which were referred to the Lords (who in turn were criticised for corrupting
their judicial powers as the cases became increasingly political). 69 The Tonnage and
Poundage Act (June 1641) weakened the royal prerogative to impose taxes on subjects
as it forced the crown to seek parliament’s authority to levy the duty (which was
granted for only two months). The act declaring the illegality of ship-money (August
1641) similarly restricted the crown’s revenue. The royal prerogative to ‘give laws to
all his subjects… without consent of any other greater, equall, or lesser than himselfe’
was destroyed by the Triennial Act (February 1641) and the Dissolution Act (May
1641), legally enabling the continuation of the Long Parliament. 70

Of Bodin’s marks of sovereignty, Charles retained, after consenting to these
acts, the ability to determine the name, value and measure of coinage, and the right to
require subjects to swear their loyalty to their sovereign prince. He also remained head
of the Church of England, a uniquely English monarchical prerogative (until the
Commons succeeded in passing the Clerical Disabilities Act (February 1642), barring
bishops from temporal office). Coates suggests that whilst these governmental reforms

68 J. Spalding, The history of the troubles and memorable transactions in Scotland and England: from 1624 to
70 Bodin, Six books of a commonweale, 159.
were in process, ‘[the] extension of parliamentary power was not perceived as dangerous to the balance of the constitution’.\textsuperscript{71} The Commons, however, found the pace of reform frustratingly slow and so passed and printed the Grand Remonstrance in winter 1641.

The Grand Remonstrance (December 1641) listed the grievances of the Commons against the king’s government (held under tyranny by popish and evil counsellors). The notions of parliamentary sovereignty regarding the king’s ministers and the call for church reform were not in themselves new ideas, but the document had scant support in the Lords, who had already forced Pym to drop the clause demanding Charles ‘take into his Councell, for managing of the great affairs of the Kingdome, such Officers and Counsellors, as his people and Parliament may have just cause to confide in’.\textsuperscript{72} As Coates notes, ‘the printing of the Grand Remonstrance without the concurrence of the Lords or the king implied that a new theory was evolving in regard to the relationship of parliament to the people’.\textsuperscript{73} The Grand Remonstrance was unusual because as a form of petitioning it broke the conventions of the petition system by pleading down the social hierarchy to the people not upwards to the king.\textsuperscript{74} In printing the Grand Remonstrance without the Lords’ permission, the Commons were disrupting the ritualised format of petition; they were supplicating before the people by printing it for a public audience and asking this public to acknowledge not only their grievances but also the reasons behind them. In doing so, the Commons simultaneously questioned the traditional superiority of the Lords whilst opening parliament up to the possibility that its proceedings needed validation from and the support of the people. The concept of a public appeal was in itself unconventional (despite the publication of the Protestation); the heated debate in parliament (which


\textsuperscript{72} This is the wording of the clause as it appeared in Ten Propositions (see: Rushworth, \textit{Historical collections}, iv.298); Charles also rejected this request (see: LJ, iv.310) although Coates suggests ‘he had more than once flirted with the idea of acting on the proposal... But to the King a concession to parliament of control over the appointment of ministers could be no more than a temporary expedient’, see: Coates ‘Some Observations’, 10.

\textsuperscript{73} Coates, ‘Some Observations’, 2; for discussion of parliamentary petitions in the early Stuart period, see: E.R. Foster, ‘Petitions and the Petition of Right’, \textit{Journal of British Studies}, 14:01 (November, 1974).

\textsuperscript{74} Petition: In earlier use: a formal document in which the British Houses of Parliament (originally the House of Commons) presented a measure for the sovereign’s granting. ‘petition, n.2a’. OED Online.
led to frayed tempers and drawn swords) emphasised the zeal and vigour of those who wished to curtail the king’s power.\textsuperscript{75}

The printing of the Grand Remonstrance also offended the king through its implicit attack on monarchical dominance of printing and licensing: ‘the said declaration is already abroad in print, by directions from your House as appears by the printed copy, we must let you know that we be very sensible of the disrespect’.\textsuperscript{76} Charles had received remonstrances before: the General Assembly and Scottish Parliament had both printed one in the past two years, and in 1626 Charles had himself issued a proclamation prohibiting the circulation of the remonstrance written by members of the then recently dissolved parliament.\textsuperscript{77} In the 1626 proclamation, Charles used the term ‘remonstrance’ and ‘declaration’ interchangeably, and again in 1642 he termed the remonstrance a ‘declaration’ and ‘petition’.\textsuperscript{78} The Grand Remonstrance was in fact a combination of these three speech acts. Through its title, the text distinguished itself as a remonstrance: this was arguably how the Commons perceived it, as a formal statement of grievances being presented (as a physical document) to the king. It was a declaration in that the Commons asserted what actions they wanted to be taken in order to solve the grievances; and it was a petition in the traditional sense that the Commons expected action to be taken upon the grievances being heard.

The Grand Remonstrance was presented to Charles on 1 December 1641 at Hampton Court and licensed for publication three weeks later (23 December). Clarendon was of the opinion that the text ‘poisoned the hearts of the people’ and did ‘much harm, and would do much more if it were not answered’.\textsuperscript{79} Alongside the Grand Remonstrance, Englishmen were being encouraged to sign the Protestation Oath, as a demonstration of loyalty to parliament’s religious (and by association it’s political)

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{75} CJ, ii:344; CSPD 1641-43, 179-182.
\bibitem{76} His Maiesties answer to the petition which accompanied the declaration of the House of Commons (London, 1641), 2.
\bibitem{77} Church of Scotland, General Assembly. The remonstrance of the nobility, barrones, burgesses, ministers and commons within the kingdome of Scotland (Edinburgh, 1639); Convention of Estates, A remonstrance concerning the present troubles (Edinburgh, 1640); By the King: A Proclamation prohibiting the publishing, dispersing and reading of a Declaration or Remonstrance (London, 1626).
\bibitem{78} His Maiesties answer to the petition, 1.
\bibitem{79} Clarendon, Life, i.98.
\end{thebibliography}
reforms. The Protestation promised to ‘maintaine and defend… the true Reformed Protestant religion, expressed in the Doctrine of the Church of England against all Popery, and Popish Innovations’. The Commons signed it on 3 May 1641, in the midst of growing revelations over the Army Plot – a failed attempt by Charles’s supporters (with his knowledge) to seize the Tower of London and rescue Strafford by military force. The Lords signed on 4 May and the Commons ordered it to print the next day. The Protestation was primarily a religious promise (unlike the protestations of 1622 and 1629) but it also contained a promise to protect the ‘Royal Person, Honour and Estate, as also the power, and privileges of the Parliament, the lawfull Rights, and Liberties of the Subject’. Although respectful, the wording carried a veiled threat of rebellion against the king, especially in light of botched plans to rescue Strafford and rumours of Strafford’s Irish army, and caused some tension between the houses. However, both houses acknowledged that the signing of the Protestation effectively bound them together, ‘to joyne our selves in a Declaration of our united affections, and Resolutions’.

Until spring 1642, signing of the Protestation by English citizens remained optional, although it was actively encouraged, ‘as they justify the Taking of it in themselves, so they cannot but approve it in them that shall likewise take it’.

Published amidst rumours of military threats, Russell interprets the Protestation as ‘a declaration of readiness to resist a royal coup d’état’, although the Preamble carefully uses the term ‘popish’. Whilst the Preamble is openly critical of those seeking ‘the Ruine of the true Reformed Religion, in his Majesties Dominions’, the vague wording of the Protestation ‘served both to sharpen and to complicate’ public discourse, and ‘revealed divisions in allegiance and opinion’. The indistinct language caused

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80 The protestation made by the Parliament (London, 1641), 3; CJ, ii. 132.
82 A preamble with the protestation made by the whole House of Commons ([London], 1641); CJ, ii.132.
83 The House of Commons protestation declaring their right to free speech on 18 December 1621 led James to dismiss parliament (6 Jan., 1622); the Commons’ Three Resolutions (2 March 1629) led Charles to dissolve parliament eight days later.
84 CJ, ii.135.
85 Russell, FBM, 300.
86 D. Cressy, ‘The Protestation Protested’, The Historical Journal, 45:02 (June, 2002), 251; see, Lambert, ‘Beginning of Printing’ for printing difficulties surrounding Protestation and issues with the religious clause.
confusion among the public, among pamphleteers, and among politicians, leading to the publication of *Queries to be decided by a Committee of the House of Commons*, a list of seventeen pertinent questions that attacked the Protestation (as well as other topical issues such as the intended use of the Scots army). Parliament was subsequently forced to identify ‘The true Reformed Protestation Religion’ as ‘onely the publike Doctrine professed in the said Church’, and emphatically not ‘any Rites or Ceremonies’ or other ‘Popish Innovations’.

In issuing the Protestation for public signatures, parliament had hoped to create a sense of solidarity and reaffirm its lawful position as defender of the true Church of England, stripped of the Laudian ceremonies that dominated the late 1630s. Instead, its circulation sparked a public conversation about the theological arguments it contained. Pamphlets such as John Ley’s *A Comparison of the parliamentary Protestation with the canonical oath* (1641) and the publication of Denzil Holles’ *Speech at the delivery of the Lords* (1641) – both printed without parliamentary license – staunchly defended the Protestation through reference to precedent and reason. Henry Burton’s *Protestation protested* (1641) was somewhat more contentious: Cressy describes the text as ‘a landmark in the radicalisation of the religious revolution’.

Phrases such as ‘if any humane laws be found to be contrary to Gods word, they are invalid and void’ and ‘the Protestation hath an edge to cut them [the branches of Popery] off all at one stroke’ were interpreted by many as an open call to destroy the Church of England. Certainly, this aligns with Clarendon’s interpretation, ‘that all men were obliged by their late Protestation, by what means soever, to remove both bishops and the common prayer book out of the Church of England as impious and papistical’. Despite Clarendon’s wariness, there were factions within the Commons who shared Burton’s zeal and wanted the Protestation to bind God, king, and subjects together with the same force as the Scottish National Covenant. The Five Members incident enabled this faction to enforce signing of the Protestation. Speaker

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87 CSPD 1641-43, 113.
88 The protestation made by Parliament, 5.
91 Clarendon, History, i.449.
Lenthall instructed sheriffs to oversee signing in their counties in a letter dated 18 January 1642, and all Englishmen were required to sign between February and March. Those who refused to sign the Protestation were blocked from office (both spiritual and temporal).

The combination of speech acts in circulation in winter 1641-42 prepared the political ground both within Westminster and among the public for parliament to push for legislative control of the militia. While this could be seen as a premeditated plan, there was, what Russell terms, ‘a lack of political sure-footedness’ that suggests a spontaneous or reactionary impulse. Cumulatively, the speech acts dramatically altered public awareness of the politico-religious tensions within government – although the speech acts did not always guarantee public support for reforms – cloaking parliament’s own arbitrary actions (such as the attainder of Strafford) under the guise of protecting the subject’s liberty and religion. The Grand Remonstrance highlighted very publically the range and number of grievances of parliament, and Charles’s answer, although conciliatory, offered little reassurance in the face of increasing riots around Westminster and the city. The Protestation theoretically united parliament and subjects in protecting the true Protestant religion and English civic liberties. Moreover, the Irish Rebellion generated fears that Charles might raise an Irish army against parliament, as he had done previously in the Bishops’ War. Sir Arthur Hesilrige first introduced the militia bill (drafted by St John) on 7 December 1641, proposing parliament undertake complete control of appointing commanders to lead England’s armed forces. It passed the same day by a margin of 33 (158 to 125), a relatively slim margin that indicates politicians’ awareness of the revolutionary impact of the bill. Throughout February, a seemingly united parliament urged the king to accept the bill: Charles rejected it. It is possible he recognised the bill as more than an attack on another royal prerogative, as an attempt to revitalise ‘the whole question of where power in the state ultimately lay’. Although war could still be avoided, Charles’s flight from London the previous month and the very public scuffles for

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control of county arsenals such as Hull (yet another disaster for Charles) suggested parliament had achieved a new level of authority. The reforming faction were, however, very alert to the audaciousness of their claim over the militia and it is no coincidence that Parker’s *A Question Answered* went into circulation the same day the Militia Bill entered its third hearing. Finally, parliament declared that ‘in this time of Imminent Danger’, it had the ability to act independently of royal approval – and passed the bill as an ordinance (5 March 1642).

The Militia Ordinance signalled a victory for parliament’s executive authority: it now claimed to hold the royal prerogative to make war. Although the country remained divided and/or reluctant to go to war, the Militia Ordinance was parliament’s most important act in marginalising Charles’s authority. This genre of speech act, however, was not in itself new – this was not the first time the Long Parliament had issued a decree without the king’s ratification. During Charles’s visit to Scotland in summer 1641, the Long Parliament passed five ordinances beginning with the ordinance on 20 August ‘concerning Agents and Committees to be sent to attend the King in Scotland’. These commissioners were to press the king for executive powers the Commons believed necessary to continue daily government business in his absence. Foster suggests that the command was more an order to the commissioners than an ordinance however, Mendle has argued that the use of the term ‘ordinance’ was an attempt ‘to acclimate the house to this sort of [authoritative] activity’. This ordinance – along with those subsequently issued – mimicked royal proclamations in their form but their existence ‘provoked little outcry’ even as they demonstrated parliament’s push towards ‘the new and unfamiliar terrain of conciliar governance’.

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94 Peacey argues ‘that Parker’s work was designed as a substitute for a declaration is evident from its resemblance to official statements of this period. Indeed, this resemblance was sufficiently strong for Parker’s work to be treated as official by contemporaries, including Edward Husband, who included it in his collection of official statements [An Exact Collection of All Remonstrances (London, 1643)]’, see: Peacey, *Politicians and pamphleteers*, 58.

95 An Ordinance of the Lords and Commons in Parliament, for the safety and defence of the kingdom of England and dominion of Wales (London, 1641[1642]).

96 CJ, ii.265; LJ, iv.372.


of the Militia Ordinance was thus not innovative, but its consequence – the removal of power over the militia from the king’s authority – was profound. As increasingly dire news of the Irish Rebellion filtered into London and the country, parliament continued to issue ordinances for the raising of soldiers to send to Ireland (May 1642). The news – usually in pamphlet form – greatly aided parliament’s assumption of military control; titles such as *Bloody newes from Ireland* (1641) and *Worse and worse newes from Ireland* (1641) played on popular fears of popery, describing the rebels as inhumane, barbaric, and merciless. The Venetian ambassador reported that the Irish Rebellion ‘aroused strong feeling everywhere... among the members of parliament in particular, because of the harmful consequences which this example may entail’. 99 Parliament quickly capitalised on and exploited these scare-mongering reports: and whilst the politicians did not pen these pamphlets, the fear the tracts generated certainly did not damage their cause. Clarendon clearly believed that royal mismanagement of the Irish Rebellion contributed to the First Civil War, ‘How one, which should have prevented, did contribute to the other, must be too often remembered’ and commented that the alarmist ‘reports’ of atrocities ‘made a wonderful impression upon the minds of men’. 100

Describing the reaction of the Commons, Peacey uses the term ‘news management’, and arguably the tactics of the Commons were co-ordinated and in tune with public feeling. 101 Similarly, Clarendon remarked that they ‘could not but make great impression on the people’. 102 As tracts continued to feed terrible news of Irish atrocities to the English public, petitions began to pour into parliament. 103 Parliament not only heard these petitions but also actively encouraged their publication; parliamentary speeches as well as “leaked” information were printed: the public were saturated by information of varying degrees of reliability informing them of an imminent invasion, calling for the removal of Catholics and bishops from parliament,

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99 CSPVen 1640–42, 240.
100 Clarendon, *History*, i.412, 397.
102 Clarendon, *History*, i.480.
103 Peacey notes that the printer of many of these pamphlets was the puritan John Thomas, popular amongst the more zealous politicians, see: Peacey, *Politicians and pamphleteers*, 241. Peacey has since refined public responses to, and engagement with, political news, see: Peacey, *Print and Public Politics*, part 2.
and even implying that the king had had a hand in the rebellion.\textsuperscript{104} In particular, the muddying of the king’s name proved very effective despite the attempts of some writers to expose the scare-mongering tactics.\textsuperscript{105} The Venetian ambassador reported that such an accusation, ‘served to stop the spread of a sentiment in favour of his majesty, which many had recently expressed’, whilst Charles himself was aware that it ‘made more impression upon the minds of sober and moderate men (and who till then had much more disliked the passionate proceedings of the parliament) than could be then imagined’.\textsuperscript{106} Unfortunately for the king, the presences of Catholic and Irish peers at York did little to bolster his image.

It is likely that Charles was aware of parliament’s tactics. He openly criticised Pym’s apparent claim that ‘many of the chief commanders, now in the head of the rebels, have been suffered to passe by his majestie’s immediate warrant’.\textsuperscript{107} The implication – that he had ordered and even encouraged the Irish rebels – led Charles to question ‘by what means, and by whose fault, his authoritie hath been highly abused, as to be made to conduce to the assistance of that Rebellion which he so much detests and abhors’.\textsuperscript{108} Rather than apologise for implicating the king, the Commons instead advised Charles to ‘take such course, that not onely your honour may bee vindicated for the time past, but your kingdome may be secured from the like mischeife for the time to come’, appearing to urge the king to apologise for an uprising he had not supported.\textsuperscript{109} Disappointingly for the Commons, Charles (wisely) refused to take the bait, instead scolding parliament for neglecting the art of defe rence: ‘I rather expected a vindication for the imputation laid on me... than that any more generall rumours and discourses should get credit with you’.\textsuperscript{110} Charles did not receive a vindication. Instead parliament presented him with the Nineteen Propositions (1 June 1642), a list of issues

\textsuperscript{104} See: Lindley, ‘The Impact of the 1641 Rebellion’ for a full discussion of the print frenzy during the Rebellion.
\textsuperscript{105} For example: No pamphlet, but a detestation against all such pamphlets (London, 1642): the title continues, ‘plainely demonstrating the falsehood of them [pamphlets]’.
\textsuperscript{106} CSPVen 1642-43, 46; Clarendon, History, i.399-400.
\textsuperscript{107} His Majesties Message to the House of Commons, February 7. 1641 (London, 1641[1642]).
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{109} The Humble Answer of the Honourable House of Commons to the Kings Majesties Last Message, 7th of Feb. 1641 (London, 1642); Cf., ii.399.
\textsuperscript{110} His Majesties Speech to the Committee, the 9th of March, 1641 (London, 1642).
from which to negotiate settlement.\footnote{LJ, v.97.} An extension of Pym’s Ten Propositions (24 June 1641), the Nineteen Propositions essentially called for a constitutional monarchy in which parliament would be consulted and approve all state affairs including foreign and religious policies, as well as finances and tax. Parliament would approve all royal ministers, control royal children’s education and marriages, be able to complete reform of the Church of England (including the enforcement of a new law against Catholics), and control the army. Charles rejected the Nineteen Propositions; issuing an Answer (18 June) in which he recognised the validity and authority of a mixed constitution, and conceded that the monarchy (along with the Commons and Lords) was one of three estates.\footnote{His Majesties answer to the nineteen propositions of both Houses of Parliament (Cambridge, 1642); royal acknowledgement of the three estates is removed in both the 1643 editions.}

The Propositions, like the petitions (to and by the Commons), were a form of negotiation, a communicative act that required the recipient to firstly acknowledge the plea contained within the speech act and secondly, to react positively to the plea – to accept the offered solution or attempt to find an alternative. If Charles was under pressure from parliament’s Propositions and the Commons’ Grand Remonstrance, then so too was parliament under pressure from the public’s increasing use of petitioning. The petitions produced in the early 1640s are one of the clearest examples of a speech act (excluding the ordinances) that required or expected an action from the receiver and Peacey has highlighted the development of the petition from a discreet appeal to parliament to petitions designed to generate a public response.\footnote{Peacey, Print and Public Politics, chapt.8, in particular sections ii and iii.} Petitions were also one of the few forms that parliament both received (for instance, The Root and Branch Petition of December 1640) and wrote (for instance, the Petition of Twelve Peers for the summoning of a new parliament in August 1640). Thus, parliament was both the ‘higher’ authority before whom citizens supplicated and the group pleading up the hierarchy to the king. When petitions sought constitutional redress for acceptable (non-political) grievances (in line with the reformers’ goals), they were welcomed, but petitions that overstepped the boundaries of parliamentary privilege
and sought to instruct the Commons on how to act, were loudly condemned as subverting the law. Holles spoke in the Commons criticising the petition of the twelve bishops (30 December 1641), which he condemned as treasonous against both king and parliament. Digby also criticised the Londoner’s petition against the bishops (in February 1641), arguing firstly that episcopacy should be reformed not abolished and secondly that the petition was ‘presumptuous’, frivolous, and incorrectly presented before the house.

The pressure of petitions was closely tied to the more direct and immediate threat of rioting and violence, which in turn emphasised the divisions within and between both houses of parliament as well as the unrest in the city of London. The trial, attainder, and execution of Strafford offer a clear example when parliament was under pressure from below as well as from within. Lambeth and Southwark were shaken by riots in May 1640 in reaction to Strafford’s trial: by the time the Commons passed Strafford’s attainder, they had received ‘an estimated 10,000 petitioning citizens’ demanding his execution. The same month, the Lords were forced to ride to Westminster in coaches in order to protect themselves from the thousands of demonstrators gathered to protest their delay in passing the attainder. Although the Commons also protested against these rioters, their presence was useful in forcing the Lords to agree to the attainder. Since the Bishops’ Wars, the Commons’ threat of impeachment had carried more force than those of Charles. Lords Brooke and Saye, when confined by Charles at York (in April 1639), were quickly released, and returned the following year to the Short Parliament. In contrast, Secretary of State Windebank and Lord Keeper Finch fled from London after their impeachment; Charles responded with fury to the Commons’ attempt to impeach Henrietta Maria; while the executions of Strafford (1641) and later Laud (1645) proved the Commons were unafraid to carry the act of impeachment through to its ultimate judicial conclusion.

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115 G. Digby, *The Third speech of the Lord George Digby to the House of Commons* ([London], 1641).
Parliament’s impeachment and trial of Strafford was an attack on the king: a plan to remove a worrisome and overbearing advisor who many felt encouraged Charles’s more absolutist policies. Hast terms the impeachment ‘pre-revolutionary’ – as occurring before the growth of revolutionary politics because the king gave his consent to the trial (unlike that of Laud). The trial was justified on the basis that Strafford had tried to usurp royal prerogative and subvert English law through cumulative treason – the collective impact of a series of individual actions. The charge of cumulative treason in Strafford’s capacity as Lord Deputy of Ireland was, as Hast notes, perfectly acceptable within the 1352 Treason Act, but the Commons’ recourse to this charge was unusual. The attainder of Strafford was an attack on both the king (and his prerogative to appoint advisors), and an attack on the judicial powers of the Lords. To some extent, this is unsurprising: both the charges against Strafford and the prosecution speeches had been printed on order of the Commons without the Lords approval. It was the Commons who pressed the Lords to agree to the attainder, and the Commons who benefited most from the proliferation of pamphlets and petitions calling for Strafford’s execution – in passing the attainder, the Commons actively redressed the grievances of the petitioners, even as the house condemned the petitioners for overstepping political and hierarchical boundaries.

From the opening of the Long Parliament in November 1640 to the passing of the Militia Ordinance in March 1642, parliament utilised a broad range of speech acts in order to justify and legitimise religious and political reform. Some genres – such as petitions – were already a common constitutional way of presenting grievances before the government. Others – such as ordinances – were revivals of archaic forms of royal address rather than historical precedents of parliament. These forms enabled parliament to expand its role as a conciliar body to appropriate royal prerogatives and assume an executive place in government. Cumulatively, these speech acts and Charles’s ratification of legislative acts limited the royal prerogative to make and

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119 Peacey, Politicians and pamphleteers, 261; CJ, ii.142; LJ, iv.232-33.
120 Foster, ‘The House of Lords and Ordinances’, 158.
repeal laws; to declare war; to hear legal appeals; to appoint officers; to impose taxes; to grant pardons; and the power over life and death. The publication of these speech acts also served to increase public awareness of these reforms, although public reaction was not always positive. While it is important to acknowledge, as Peacey recently has, that petitions were frequently intended for circulation within parliament rather than general publication, the rising use of petitions beyond personal issues demonstrates the increasing political engagement of England’s citizens, which the Commons attempted (not always successfully) to manipulate to their advantage.\textsuperscript{121} Parliament struggled, however, to control the written word and could not stop the publication of texts that were critical of its actions. In seeking to censor these texts, parliament appropriated a visual royal ritual: book burning, an extension of the royal monopoly over print that, as Clegg argues, ‘established censorship as a performative act that registered in the public imagination’.\textsuperscript{122}

\subsection*{2.3 Book burning and reactive censorship}

Few scholars would deny the central role of the written word in shaping faction and forming opinion in the Civil War. As Smith argues:

\begin{quote}
Never before in English history had written and printed literature played such a predominant role in public affairs, and never before had it been felt by contemporaries to be of such importance. There had never been anything before to compare with this war of words. It was an information revolution.\textsuperscript{123}
\end{quote}

This revolution was due, in part, to the Commons’ attack on the royal monopoly over print and parliament’s subsequent inability to enforce licensing. Clegg has traced the royal use of book burning to a Henrician statutory law; appropriating this ritual thus

\textsuperscript{121} Peacey, \textit{Print and Public Politics}, 269.

\textsuperscript{122} C. S. Clegg, \textit{Press Censorship in Jacobean England} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 69; in her subsequent analysis, Clegg downplays the royal ‘privilege’ over print, proposing instead – through an extensive analysis of print practices and institutions that interacted with print and censorship – that monarchical attempts to regulate printing were due to the fact that ‘trade regulation generally came within the monarch’s prerogative’, see: C. S. Clegg, \textit{Press Censorship in Caroline England} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 11.

\textsuperscript{123} Smith, \textit{Literature and Revolution}, 1.
enabled parliament to symbolically enforce censorship and repression, whilst simultaneously performing its increasing executive authority.\textsuperscript{124}

The Star Chamber and High Commission were abolished on 5 July 1641, although Hill argues that ‘censorship collapsed’ in November 1640 and the abolition merely formalised the breakdown of the Stationers’ Company’s monopoly.\textsuperscript{125} With the fall of the Star Chamber, print – however divisive – offered a cheap and effective form of communication with a public whose interest in censorship, as Clegg notes, had already been stimulated by the Arminian-Calvinist divide that dominated the 1620s.\textsuperscript{126}

Thanks to McElligott, Raymond, Peacey and others, the expansion of the print trade during the First Civil War is a well-known subject.\textsuperscript{127} Although texts still technically required a license (and some politicians insisted on licensing their tracts), the numbers soared – Thomason collected 700 texts printed in 1642, although only 76 were officially licensed. Hill notes there were just four newsbooks in 1641, growing to 167 in 1642 and a staggering 722 in 1645 whilst Raymond has counted over 2,000 titles produced in 1641 and roughly 4,000 the following year (a dramatic increase on the 400-700 titles produced in the first three decades of the seventeenth century).\textsuperscript{128} Contemporaries were equally aware of the speed and consequences of this change: Burton observed that the abolition of the High Commission had ‘opened many mouths’.\textsuperscript{129} However, as attempts to restrict and re-install licensing in 1643 reveal, parliament did not want a free press. Parliament were not attacking the system of licensing but rather the abuse of the licensing system by royal monopolists. The continuing publication of royalist texts – McElligott estimates ‘a dozen titles in production in the capital’ and Oxford by 1644 – and the exponential growth in the

\textsuperscript{124} Clegg identifies the statute passed under Henry VIII as extending the ‘prescribed mode of execution for the confirmed heretic’, that is to say, burning, to that of the heretical book: Clegg, Jacobean England, 75-76.
\textsuperscript{126} Clegg, Caroline England, chapt.2.
\textsuperscript{128} Hill, ‘Censorship and Literature’, 39; Raymond, Pamphlets and pamphleteering, 193.
\textsuperscript{129} H. Burton, Englands Bondage and Hope of Deliverance (London, 1641), 14.
number of printed texts suggest that the licensing system parliament tried to re-establish was both inefficient and unwieldy.\textsuperscript{130}

The lack of licensing regulations meant that as the printing of parliamentary speech acts increased so too did criticism: and the public had access to both. The first parliamentary printing order was recorded in the Commons journal in May 1641 but at least two orders (one concerning monopolists, the other concerning the clergy) were printed before this date and Speaker Lenthall’s speech at the opening of the Long Parliament was also in print by the end of the year.\textsuperscript{131} In June 1643, parliament issued an order ‘for the regulating of printing’ so as to suppress the ‘many false, scandalous, seditious, libellous, and unlicensed pamphlets, to the great defamation of the religion and government’. The order had previously appeared three months earlier (in March) appended to an ordinance concerning weekly assessments, which was itself a reiteration of an order appended to a declaration issued the previous year (August 1642) regarding soldiers’ behaviour.\textsuperscript{132} As Raymond argues ‘propaganda could be effective, not because it made readers the pawns of centrally administered publicity, but because it made them active participants in a public sphere of political debate’.\textsuperscript{133} As the citizens of London responded with increasing violence to what they read or heard in print, parliament needed a strategy by which to ensure the texts coming off the press favoured it not the king, in order to mould public reactions in its favour.

One of the ways parliament achieved this was by publishing a list of licensors appointed by the Commons (June 1643). In theory, these men controlled ‘pre-publication censorship’ and had the ability to stop potentially subversive tracts reaching print.\textsuperscript{134} While such licenses failed to stop publications critical of parliament,

\begin{enumerate}
\item McElligott, Royalism, Print and Censorship, 1.
\item C.J, ii.135-36; Lambert, ‘Beginning of Printing’, 45-46; Lenthall, W. Mr Speaker his speech to His Maiestie (London, 1640).
\item An order of the Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament: For the regulating of printing (London, June 1643); An ordinance of the Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament: for the relieving of all persons over rated by the ordinance for weekly assessments (London, March 1642[1643]); A declaration of the Lords and Commons assembled in parliament: that whatsoever soildier or soildiers... (London, August 1642); the House of Lords held a meeting with the Stationers’ Company in March 1641 which led to the reading of a printing bill in July 1641 see: Lambert, ‘Beginning of Printing’, 44; M. Mendle, ‘De Facto Freedom, De Facto Authority: Press and Parliament, 1640-1643’, The Historical Journal, 38:02 (June, 1995), 314-5.
\item Peacey, Politicians and pamphleteers, 133, 144-45.
\end{enumerate}
the existence of a licensing list reflected the desire of the Committee on Printing to engage ‘directly in supervision and licensing’.\textsuperscript{135} Detractors of parliament complained at length about the success of parliament in managing and using print to frame its public image, criticism that Raymond has argued still influences critics’ tendency to associate newsbooks’ ‘propaganda function… with lying and deception’.\textsuperscript{136} Three months after the raising of the royal standard at Nottingham, one royalist remarked, ‘Parliament is far too nimble for the King in printing... the common people believe them’.\textsuperscript{137} The Commons’ self-representation of its centrality to the raging politico-religious debates (at the expense of the royal prerogative) led Dering to remark, ‘I did not dream that we should remonstrate downward, tell stories to the people, and talk of the king as of a third person’.\textsuperscript{138} Another commentator on the escalating crisis wrote that:

The liberty of the press, the liberty of factious preaching of ill-afflicted ministers to the present Government of the Church and State, and the liberty that tumultuous persons have taken to themselves by their unlawful meetings in the City, has poisoned the obedience of too many of his Majesty’s subjects.\textsuperscript{139}

But poisoning the king’s subjects against Charles’s words did not necessarily make those subjects place faith in the words of parliament; and the king, prompted by Clarendon, had begun to challenge parliament in print. In his response to the Grand Remonstrance, Charles criticised the ‘very unusuall nature’ of the tract as well as its publication, ‘We are very sensible of the disrespect’, whilst refusing to acknowledge the grounds on which the petition stood.\textsuperscript{140} In doing so, he highlighted not only parliament’s attack on royal prerogative but also the inappropriate nature of the

\textsuperscript{135} Mendle, ‘Press and Parliament’, 314.
\textsuperscript{137} Qtd in A. Hopper, \textit{‘Black Tom’ Sir Thomas Fairfax and the English revolution} (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), 139.
\textsuperscript{138} Qtd in Peacey, \textit{Politicians and pamphleteers}, 37.
\textsuperscript{139} CSPD 1641-43, 255.
\textsuperscript{140} His Majesties answer to the petition which accompanied the declaration of the House of Commons (London, 1641), 1, 2.
medium in which its grievances had been presented. Although Charles, after his flight from London (January 1642), could no longer rely solely on the royal presses in the city, the king could utilise several other printers, including Leonard Lichfield (the University of Oxford), Roger Daniel (the University of Cambridge), and Robert Barker (whose travelling press operated at Newcastle-upon-Tyne in 1639-42, York in 1642 and Shrewsbury in 1642-43). Parliament could not prevent these presses operating, although it challenged their success with the creation of a committee to oversee the circulation of parliamentary-endorsed tracts and strove to ensure parliamentary speeches and parliamentary-endorsed sermons were licensed.

In striving to legitimise its control over print and seeking to censor writers whose opinions clashed with its own, parliament appropriated the ritual of book burning, formerly a symbol of royal control over the press. The last heretic was burnt under James VI/I (11 April 1612) but James had amplified the ceremonial aspects of the book burning ritual, in a move ‘designed to call public attention to the book’s status as officially censured – as condemned by King James’. However, as Clegg notes, public condemnation did not necessarily lead to further punitive action or attempts to prevent circulation of the book. Indeed, both James and Charles both condemned fewer books than their Tudor predecessors: instead, the royal focus on ‘participation, spectacle, and dialogue’ turned the ritual into ‘part of the communications repertoire of the early modern state’. Traditionally the ritual took place in large public spaces such as Cheapside Cross or the Palace Yard at Westminster (and outside of the capital in university college greens or town marketplaces); the most memorable and recent instance of the heavy hand of royal authority crushing libellous books had been the burning of William Prynne’s Histrio-Mastix (1633) in 1634. The ceremonial aspect

141 Peacey, *Politicians and pamphleteers*, 43.
142 Lambert, ‘Beginning of Printing’, 58; the politicisation of religious rituals is discussed in greater detail below.
was, on this occasion, enhanced by royal employment of the hangman to execute the burning (a practice already in place in other European countries), a new symbolic element of ritual that reinforced the metaphorical death of the author and carried strong allusions to the fate awaiting those authors who continued to write inflammatory texts. The hangman’s presence could also be interpreted as instilling a sense of fear into the watching crowds, enhancing the theatricality of the display. Prynne also suffered bodily mutilation as his ears were cropped at both the locations in London where his book was burnt (Westminster and Cheapside). In 1637, Prynne suffered again alongside Burton and John Bastwick, but this time, there being little ear left to crop, his cheeks were also branded ‘S.L.’ (seditious libeller).

Whilst parliament refrained from mutilating writers, in three years (1640-42) it ordered the burning of more books than Charles had in his entire reign. The Canons of 1640 were condemned in December of that year; in 1641, 4 books were banned; and in 1642, 13 books were ordered to be burnt. Early in 1641, parishioners from Yeldon, Bedfordshire bought a petition against John Pocklington, a Church of England ceremonialist who had accompanied Charles to York (in 1639). The angry petitioners accused Pocklington of turning Yeldon’s communion table altarwise, frequently bowing towards it, using an altar-cloth and sacring bell, and generally displaying ‘more outward reverence to the Altar, then to the name of God’. His two books, *Sunday No Sabbath* (1636) and *Altare Christianum, or, The Dead Vicars Plea* (1637) drew criticism for supporting the ceremonial practices of the church, as outlined in the *Book of Sports*. Such popish attributions led the petitioners to denounce Pocklington as ‘a chiefe Author and Ring-leader in all those Innovations which have of late flowed into the Church of England’. The Lords agreed: on 12 February 1641, they stripped him of his benefices, banned him from court, barred him from the church, and ordered the books to ‘be publiquely burnt in the City of London, and the two Vniversities’, by the

148 Ibid., 5.
The issuing of a second order the following month demanding that ‘the Sheriffs of the City of London, and the Vice-chancellors of both the Universities, do forthwith take care and see that the order of this House be put in Execution accordingly’ suggests enforcing the order proved more difficult than its passing.\footnote{149}

Five months later (on 13 July), the Commons ordered the public burning of Digby’s speech against the attainder of Strafford.\footnote{150} The speech appeared in print (on 1 June) ten days after Digby had roundly condemned the bill during the third reading of the attainder in the Commons (21 April).\footnote{151} With much haste, the Commons established a committee (chaired by John Evelyn) to investigate the publication, as Digby’s speech gravely endangered the prosecution’s case against Strafford. Already in its second edition by the beginning of July, the speech had the potential to turn opinion in the Lords and damage the apparent legitimacy with which the Commons were acting. The Commons chose not to respond with an official reply, realising that to do so would suggest some truth in Digby’s words. However, it is no coincidence that multiple un-official texts, defending the actions of the Commons, appeared as ‘a damage limitation exercise’.\footnote{152} Reporting the committee’s decision, Evelyn concluded that Digby’s speech ‘containeth in it matters untrue, and scandalous’ whilst its publication was ‘scandalous to the proceeding of the House, and a Crime’.\footnote{153} Unlike Pocklington’s books, Digby’s speech met its fiery demise at Cheapside, Smithfield, and Westminster just two days after the Commons’ order passed.

Digby survived the incident relatively unscathed, largely due to Charles’s elevation of him to the Lords as baron. Rather than retire (as Pocklington had done), Digby responded to the Commons’ actions by printing an \textit{Apologie} (January 1642).\footnote{154}

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{The petition and articles, or severall charge exhibited in Parliament against John pocklington} (London, 1641), 26–27; \textit{LJ}, iv. 160–61; the titlepage of this petition presents a satirical woodcut of Pocklington’s crimes.

\item \textit{LJ}, iv. 180.


\item G. Digby, \textit{The Lord Digbies speech in the House of Commons to the bill of attainder, of the Earle of Strafford} (London, 1641); also printed as: \textit{The Lord Digby his last speech against the Earle of Strafford} (London, 1641); until this date Digby had been a support of parliament’s actions, including the initial impeachment of Strafford.


\item Evelyn, \textit{His report}, 3.

\item G. Digby, \textit{The Lord George Digbies Apologue for Himself} (Oxford, 1642).
\end{itemize}
This quickly developed into a war of words between Digby, who protested his innocence, and parliamentary polemists who emphasised the legality and justice of the Commons’ actions. In challenging the Commons authority, Digby became a target for more puritan writers and reports of treasonous plots and copies of private letters circulated throughout 1642-43. Some letters had a basis in truth, others were clearly forged; but many were printed with the words ‘by order of Parliament’ lending an air of authority to their content (although as Peacey has shown, the imprimatur could and was frequently forged).

Whilst Digby’s speech had signalled his dramatic abandoning of the reformers in the Commons, other former allies, such as Dering, changed allegiance more slowly. Originally a supporter of religious reform and chair of the parliamentary committee for printing and licensing, after the summer recess in 1641, Dering increasingly criticised the Commons’ attempts to interfere in religious matters and condemned their decision to address the Grand Remonstrance (essentially a petition) to the public not the king (to whom, according to the hierarchical nature of petitioning, it should have been addressed). In his Collection of Speeches (January 1642) Dering presented himself as a moderate in comparison to the more extreme factions emerging in the Commons. A month later (3 February) the Commons decreed that the speeches were ‘against the Honour and Privilege of his House, and scandalous to the House; and shall be burned, by the Hands of the Common Hangman, in Westminster, Cheapside, and Smythfield’. The Commons expelled Dering from the house and dispatched him to the Tower. Although Dering was not the first politician to change allegiance nor the first to fall foul of the censors, the publication – which contained speeches from as

156 An answer to a pamphlet intituled the Lord George Digby his apologie for himself (London, 1643); An answer to the Lord Digby his apology for himself (London, 1642).
157 Three letters of dangerous consequences (London, 1642), A briefe relation abstracted out of severall letters (London, 1642); Horrible newes from Hull ([London], July 1642); G. Digby, Two letters, the one from the Lord Digby (London, 1642).
158 Peacey, Politicians and pamphleteers, 157.
161 CSPD 1641-43, 275, 278-9; Dering remained in the Tower for just 9 days before his release on 11 February.
early as 1640 when he did have the support of the Commons – threatened the house because ‘it undercut their effort for religious reform’.162

Following the burning of Dering’s speeches, parliament increased its efforts to censor texts post-publication. Petitions from citizens of London and Kent were condemned as ‘scandalous, dangerous, and tending to sedition’, with the Commons’ order stating a very precise time of between 10.00am and noon for the burning. The Lords subsequently imprisoned the earl of Bristol (coincidentally, Digby’s father) in the Tower for covertly receiving a copy of the Kent petition.163 The anonymous *A Speedy Post from Heaven to the King of England*, which identified a number of peers and commoners (including Essex, Warwick and Pym) as the ‘wicked counsel of all *Achitophels*’, also met a fiery end along with an order to uncover the identity of the author and printer.164 Notably, it was not until 13 November 1642 that the Commons ordered the burning of the Book of Sports and it was a further six months before the Lords acquiesced (4 May 1643).165

In comparing these condemned texts, Pocklington’s case emerges as one of the few instances where the Lords actively took a lead in issuing the judgement. The cases of both Digby and Dering were predominantly (if not solely) managed by the Commons, and the Lords’ delay in passing sentence on the Book of Sports also reveals the Commons’ dominance in this case. The reasons for the Lords’ dominance in the Pocklington judgement are not entirely clear since his works offended the puritan factions in both houses. It is, perhaps, easier to see why the Commons so actively pursued Digby: the arguments contained within his text threatened the legality of and judicial premises on which the prosecution of Strafford rested, and the Lords were neither as unanimous nor as vitriolic in their attack. However, the continued existence of condemned texts after their public burning suggests that ultimately the attempts of parliament to eliminate such works were unsuccessful. Book burning was ‘part of the public performance of power as well as a means of policing discourse and destroyed

words on paper’ and parliament’s actions represent an attempt to publically and theatrically assert its authority as much as the act of censoring effectively.\textsuperscript{166} Still, parliament could not always agree on which books to condemn; Lords Brooke and Pembroke disagreed on whether a pamphlet of ‘their letters’ (forged by Clarendon) should be burnt.\textsuperscript{167}

Book burning was a symbolic form of censorship and repression, and simultaneously a performance of parliament’s increasing executive authority. Was it effective? In short, no. It did not stop the production of royalist or anti-puritan texts and not all the condemned texts were turned in as requested (as evidenced by their continued circulation and readership after the ceremonial burning). Far from suppressing texts critical of parliament, the order to burn a book served to draw attention to these texts’ existence. Nonetheless, as a ritualised display of power, book burning reinforced parliament’s (tenuous) grasp on printing (and therefore political power). It was a symbol of authority over a previously royal prerogative, even as parliament lacked legitimacy to thoroughly execute its actions. That the orders were enacted also reveals the growing acknowledgment among London’s civic authorities of parliament’s power. More literally, the flames of burning books were a visual reminder of the punishments meted out to heretics under the Tudor regime, a tangible warning of the fate (death) that might await those critical of parliament’s remodelling of the government.

Since re-establishing an effective censorship programme – as had existed under the Star Chamber – proved unmanageable, book burning was a practical measure that physically destroyed the texts, theoretically removing the temptation to read them (although the fact that these texts became harder to source conversely made them more desirable to those determined to read the condemned works). The problem with the ritual was not so much its performance but its reception: parliament could not be sure that the crowds that watched the burning (and therefore physically participated in the ritual) believed the Commons’ insistence that the content of the books was seditious.

\textsuperscript{166} Cressy, ‘Book Burning’, 361.
\textsuperscript{167} CJ, ii.925.
Whilst burning the text might symbolically represent the death of the author, many authors continued to write, including Digby’s *An Apologie for himself* (1642) in which he sought to justify and vindicate his initial publication. Digby and Dering were not mutilated – unlike Prynne – but the Commons’ ordered Dering’s printer to stand in the pillory as punishment, whilst Pocklington’s licenser (William Bray) was made to preach a recantation sermon by way of apology, which parliament subsequently ordered into print.

The early Stuart kings utilised the ritual of book burning less frequently than previous monarchs but they amplified the drama and theatricality of the ritual. Parliament appropriated this propagandistic and symbolic spectacle in order to demonstrate its authority over the written word at a time when press censorship was in disarray. This post-publication repression of seditious texts was dramatic and signalled parliament’s (tenuous) grasp on the written word, in particular literature that commented on the role of parliament within the English government. However, its public impact was limited by the specific spatial location in which the ritual occurred. Most of the burnings ordered by parliament took place within London or the two major universities; what parliament needed was a universally ritualised form that could be manipulated in order to reach the broader English public.

### 2.4 Co-opting religion: preaching and fasting

In seeking to locate the need for reform within their role as defenders of ‘the true Reformed Protestant religion’, the church pulpit was an obvious place from which parliament could manipulate religious rituals for political ends.\(^{168}\) Davies has argued that the pulpit was one of ‘the most influential of all the organs of public opinion’ and represented ‘a formidable platform for disseminating the royal line’.\(^{169}\) If the ritual of book burning symbolised royal authority over the written word, the pulpit demonstrated royal authority in alignment with that of God. The drive in parliament

for reform of the Church of England was an ideological battle as much as a constitutional battle and the Commons’ co-opting of church pronouncements, sermons, and fasts allowed it to communicate to a large audience of church-goers in a familiar ritualised form. Through appropriating royal forms of communication and redirecting these forms to legitimise reform, the Commons constructed alternative messages and interpretations, even though the structure of the ritual remained unchanged.

What is notable in the period 1640-42 is the printing of parliamentary sermons not just to challenge royal assertions or rites of authority but to coincide with days of popular celebration, in particular Gunpowder Treason Day (5 November) and Elizabeth’s Accession Day (17 November). The use of Gunpowder Treason Day as a vehicle by which to criticise Caroline policy had precedents during the period of Personal Rule. Sharpe argues that this criticism was closely linked to the latent fear of Catholicism as a consequence of Charles’s vacillating foreign relations with the Habsburgs and Bourbons.170 In 1636, Burton gave two sermons, printed together as For God and the King.171 Whilst the title framed the sermons as a defence of Charles and ostensibly encouraged civic obedience to the crown, it was in fact a carefully worded attack on royal interference in religious policy. The sermons expanded on Proverbs 24.21-22 ‘My son, fear thou the Lord and the king: and meddle not with them that are given to change: For their calamity shall rise suddenly; and who knoweth the ruin of them both’. As Reese notes, ‘Burton does not, however, interpret the command “meddle not” to mean that the people should give the king their blind obedience’.172 Instead, Burton encouraged readers to resist those who were interfering in the church, namely religious innovators such as Laud (with whom Burton was already out of favour), even as he protested the king’s innocence in the face of such wicked counsel. In choosing this verse, Davies suggests that ‘Burton anticipated the Long Parliament in attributing the misgovernment of the King to evil ministers’.173 That the sermons were printed in Amsterdam not London indicates Burton’s awareness of their

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170 Sharpe, Personal Rule, 842-43.
171 H. Burton, For God and For King ([Amsterdam], 1636).
inflammatory content and he would later suffer under the heavy hand of the Star Chamber.  

As the Commons appropriated Gunpowder Treason Day to justify their own religious reforms, Charles’s defenders similarly attempted to use the ritual in order to preserve a national unity centred on the monarch as head of the Church of England. Recalling the original plot as an action against the king, parliament’s critics encouraged the celebration of Gunpowder Treason Day as an act of dynastic – not parliamentary – salvation. Such voices suggested that God, in ordaining James’s salvation, had confirmed the king’s right to rule; to rebel against the king’s rule was thus to rebel against God. For the king’s supporters, the Gunpowder Plot was a ‘treason unheard of’ and unequalled in recent times until the contemporary attack on the church by the puritans. This enabled clergymen such as William Sclater in his sermon *Papisto-Mastix* (1642) to directly link puritans and papists to suggest that the puritan sects were actually a covering for Catholics. Taking Judges 5.31, ‘So let all thine enemies perish, O Lord: but let them that love him be as the sun when he goeth forth in his might’, Sclater warned of the ‘crooked and perverse generation’ in which his congregation now lived and prayed for a return to the ‘Resolution and Sanctity’ of the Elizabethan church. The subtitle of the sermon, ‘Deborah’s prayer’, obliquely referenced Elizabeth (who utilised the image of and was frequently portrayed as Deborah), challenging parliament’s self-fashioning as the true heirs of Elizabethan Protestantism.

Gunpowder Treason Day was then a malleable symbol of a divided society, a fact that did not go unnoticed by contemporaries: ‘Interpreters contend and sweat about the special occasion of this Gratulatory Song’, noted Cornelius Burges. As Sclater used his sermon to criticise puritan reformers, so puritan preachers manipulated the ritual to attack Laudianism and popery. One such writer was John Vicars, whose

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174 Burton was one of the three puritan “martyrs” along with Prynne and Bastwick whose ears were cropped in 1637.

175 W. Sclater, *Papist-Mastix, or, Deborah’s prayer against God’s enemies* (London, 1642); see also, *The fifth of November, or, The papish and schismaticall rebells* (Oxford, 1644).

176 Ibid., 13.

rhyming translation of Francis Herring’s *Pietas Pontificia* (1605) was re-printed as *The Quintessence of Cruelty* to mark the 1641 anniversary of the Gunpowder Plot.\(^{178}\) Like many puritans, Vicars explicitly sought to link the Pope with the Antichrist, criticising popish ‘traditions’ and laws for encouraging wrongdoing and blasphemy.\(^ {179}\) Vicars outlined the history of papist threats to the monarchy, from the Armada (1588) to poor harvest (1628), in an attempt to open people’s eyes to the constant threat of popery:

> Be not more blind than *Earth-devouring Moles,*
> Who love to grovel *under-ground* in holes:
> Or so unthankfull as the sottish *Swine,*
> Who eat up *Acorns,* but ne’re cast their ey’ne,
> Up to the *Oake* from whence they to him fell.\(^ {180}\)

Whilst Vicars’ sermon aligned with parliament’s reforms in its promotion of puritan ideals and censure of royal advisors, the Commons did not order Vicars to print – it was published without warrant with a commendatory verse by Prynne. Nevertheless, by the mid-1640s, Vicars had become one of parliament’s most vocal polemicists.\(^ {181}\)

> However, the Commons did order the publication of Burges’ Gunpowder Treason Day sermon preached in 1642.\(^ {182}\) For Burges, as for many within the Commons, papists were easily equated to traitors because they sought to tyrannise the church ‘under a false guise of Christian Liberty’.\(^ {183}\) His sermon, delivered as news of the Irish Rebellion broke in England, can easily be interpreted as a rousing attempt to drum up support and zeal for parliament’s drive to reform the church and state. Burges figured parliament as ‘imployed by God and the King in the great service of the Kingdome’, whose ‘protection and preservation for ever’ was assured by ‘this very

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\(^{178}\) Vicars’ translation first appeared as *Mischeefe’s Mysterie* in 1617.

\(^{179}\) Vicars, *Quintessence of Cruelty* (London, 1641), 86.

\(^{180}\) Ibid., 91-92.

\(^{181}\) Vicars’ subsequent tracts included two satires on the Catholic Church, *Babylons beautie, or The Romish-Catholicks sweet-heart* (London, 1644) and *Behold Romes monster on his monstrous beast!* (London, 1643); an attack on royalist dissembling, *The danger of treaties with papish-spirits* (London, 1645); and a preface to the *Solemn League and Covenant, A caveat for covenant-contemners and covenant-breakers* (London, 1647).

\(^{182}\) Burges, *Another sermon preached... November the fifth, 1641* (London, 1642).

\(^{183}\) Ibid., A2v.
Deliverance given to your Predecessours’.¹⁸⁴ By walking with God and so guaranteeing God’s protection, parliament becomes a ‘terror’ to those that would terrify it, whom Burges explicitly identifies as the Irish and the papists – those ‘Limbs of Antichrist’.¹⁸⁵ Whilst continuing to blame wicked counsellors for abusing ‘Royall Clemencie and Goodnesse’ and bringing about this unrest, Burges is clear that it is parliament (in particular the Commons) who must guide England through these troubles.¹⁸⁶

For the Gunpowder Treason Day sermon in 1642, Matthew Newcomen delivered *The Craft and Cruelty of the Church Adversaries*. Based on Nehemiah 4.11, ‘And our adversaries said, They shall not know, neither see, till we come in the midst among them, and slay them, and cause the work to cease’, the sermon played upon the threat of hidden enemies. Tracing a link between the popish enemies of Elizabeth and James to the rise of the Laudianism in the 1630s, Newcomen urged the Commons to beware popish trickery: ‘First, bring in the Arminian doctrines, then the popish will easily follow’. The sermon appealed to the Commons, who noted ‘his great Pains taken in the Sermon’: the order to print and the demand that Newcomen ‘may have the usual Privilege’ indicates the close working relationship that existed between preachers and politicians.¹⁸⁷

In 1644, in the midst of war, the *Parliament Scout* took time to commend the celebration of Gunpowder Treason Day:

Tuesday the 5 of November. Was a day of thanksgiving... for our deliverance from the Powder Plot, and it was kept very solemnly; many guns went off, and many fine popish gods were burnt, which to do so in the reign of Canterbury was a mark of a Puritan.¹⁸⁸

In contrast to the sermons preached in previous years, which had offered religious justification for parliament’s actions, the sermons preached in 1644 before the

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¹⁸⁴ Ibid., 56, 57.
¹⁸⁵ Ibid., 59, 60.
¹⁸⁶ Ibid., 24.
¹⁸⁷ CJ, ii.835.
¹⁸⁸ J. Dillingham (ed.), *The Parliament scout*, no. 72 (31 October-7 November 1644), 579.
Commons (by Charles Herle and Anthony Burgess) sought to chastise the house. Although the Battle of Marston Moor (2 July) had effectively wiped out the royalist army in northern England, Essex’s embarrassing defeat at Lostwithiel (2 September) and the inconclusive Second Battle of Newbury (27 October) was a reminder that victory was not assured. Herle cautioned the Commons against forgetting their original salvation and reminded them to give thanks, as ‘you must expect still to stand in need of more deliverances’ from ‘the same brood of enemies’. Similarly, Burgess urged the Commons to work together towards accommodation and toleration in the face of further attacks: ‘In wounds it is better to close and heale, rather then widen, especially when there is a common enemy to destroy both’. These warnings were also timely reminders of the need to address the continuing divisions within parliament and the army – in particular the bickering between the army’s commanders (Essex, Manchester, and William Waller) which threatened to tear military command apart – as well as the need to reach an agreement with the Scots over the form of religious settlement.

The theatrical celebration of Gunpowder Treason Day in 1647 glossed over internal tensions in order to present an image of a government in harmony. The Commons watched an elaborate show at Lincoln’s Inn Fields with ‘Fire-Bals burning in the water, and rising out of the water burning, shewing the Papists conjunction and consultation with infernall Spirits’, which the royalist Mercurius Elencticus mocked as ‘some spuirting and squibbing fooleries’. With Charles in captivity at Hampton Court, the event was perfectly timed to celebrate ‘England’s willingness to cherish the light of the glorious gospel’. The celebrations, however, masked the continuing failure to reach a settlement with the king and the radical politicisation of the New Model Army, and the not-so-secret negotiations between the Scots and Charles. The distribution of small boxes of fireworks among spectators with a caution to ‘take heed for the future that they cherish none that are enemies to England’s king and parliament’,

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190 Modell of the Fire-Workes to be presented in Lincolnes Inn Fields on the 5th of Novem. 1647 (London, 1647); Mercurius Elencticus 5-12 Nov 1647.
can be seen as an implicit warning to those parliament saw as sectarians and political radicals.

With Gunpowder Treason Day, parliament inverted the meaning of the ritual but conformed to the format – the bonfires, the church bells, the sermons. Whilst conspicuously ignoring the Accession Day commemoration of Charles (25 March), parliament self-consciously manipulated the commemorations of Elizabeth’s accession (17 November).191 The Accession Day sermons, preached before parliament and printed for public consumption, sought to link parliament (in particular the Commons) to Elizabeth, to see itself as her true heirs. The Act of Supremacy (1558) and Act of Uniformity (1558) established a Protestant form of worship throughout England. Stephen Marshall’s Accession Day sermon of 1640 eagerly promoted this inheritance. Marshall explicitly referenced the year 1558, ‘make this another blessed seventeenth of November’; praised Elizabeth for the success of Protestantism during her reign; and mourned the faith’s unfortunate lack of progress since her death: ‘the Lord set up the Gospel among us and took us to be a nation in Covenant with him. Oh, the progress that some nations would have made!’ Marshall based his sermon on 2 Chronicles 15.2: ‘The Lord is with you, while ye be with him; and if ye seek him, he will be found of you; but if ye forsake him, he will forsake you’. In expounding on this theme, Marshall drew the Commons’ attention to their need to commune with God at this time. The meaning was clear: those seeking reform had God’s support because they sought to do his word. The sermon supported those in the Commons who thought that the law of church and state had been disregarded, that the current state of England was God’s punishment (his forsaking) for allowing it to happen, and that England had turned away from its Elizabethan inheritance, ‘that the glorious light of the Gospel in eighty two years should not take away this filme from the eyes of men’.192

Marshall would prove to be one of the most frequently invited preachers before the Commons. He benefitted from the patronage of the earl of Warwick, whom Sharpe

191 Hutton has shown that several London parishes celebrated Elizabeth’s Accession Day in 1626 in protest against Charles’s marriage to Henrietta Maria but few churches outside the capital bothered to ring bells for either monarch, see: R. Hutton, The Rise and Fall of Merry England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 186-87.
describes as one of the ‘most famous puritan magnates of the Caroline era’ – the other being Warwick’s brother, Holland. 193 Trevor-Roper argues that Marshall also benefitted from a close political and spiritual alliance with Pym, and certainly, Thomas Fuller believed he was indispensable to parliament: in ‘sickness he was their confessor; in their assembly their counsellor; in their treaties their chaplain; in their disputations their champion’. 194 In 1641, Marshall was joined by Burges, who drew upon Jeremiah 50.5: ‘They shall ask the way to Zion with their faces thitherward, saying, Come, and let us join ourselves to the Lord in a perpetual covenant that shall not be forgotten’.

Again, Burges’ sermon supported the puritan faction of the Commons, urging – as it did – the creation of a binding covenant between god, king, and people; the only hope of salvation whilst ‘so many thousands... are still suffered to sit in such darknesse and in the shadow of death’. He also pointedly referenced the Scottish Covenant, its impact on the Kirk (principally the removal of bishops), and the piety and nobility of James in sending ‘some Preachers at his owne charge’ to correct ‘the ignorance of multitudes in the North’. Of the influence of both preachers, Clarendon commented, ‘the archbishop of Canterbury had never so great an influence upon the counsels at court as Dr Burges and Mr Marshall had then upon the Houses’. 195 On their own, the sermons provide fascinating insights into the minds of the reformers, but Marshall and Burges also had their own reasons for encouraging change. Printed on the order of the Commons (both sermons went through numerous editions in 1641, printed both together and separately), the sermons were prefaced with an epistle, which ‘contained a specific suggestion as to the task of parliament’. 196 As Marshall and Burges saw it, parliament’s task lay ‘in the perfecting of the Reformation’, again recalling the advance of Protestantism under Elizabeth; of ensuring every parish had ‘an able, godly, faithful, zealous, profitable, Preaching Ministry’, thus creating a ‘purer’ church; and in ‘setting up a Faithful, Judicious, and Zealous Magistracy’. Thus, through

193 Sharpe, Personal Rule, 741.
195 Clarendon, History, i.401.
referencing ‘our late royal Deborah’ and the Scottish example (the necessity of ‘joining
themselves to God by covenant’), Marshall and Burges ‘laid down the political
conditions of parliamentary survival’. 197

There existed, then, a symbiotic relationship between the preachers and
politicians: reform of church and state were two sides of the same coin, and the puritan
zeal of the Gunpowder Treason Day and Accession Day preachers inspired their
political counterparts. The publication of sermons enabled the promotion of this
reforming drive among the public; preachers in local parishes were encouraged to read
these sermons to their congregations. The belief in a united national congregation was
actively encouraged through these sermons, mirroring the 1641 Protestation and
efforts within parliament to push through a National Covenant. Both the Gunpowder
Treason Day and Accession Day sermons capitalised on existing rituals of
commemoration, enabling parliament’s self-identification with and public promotion
of its members as the heirs of Elizabethan Protestantism and government. Intimately
related to this was parliament’s use of fasting and fast-day sermons, a ritual that had a
difficult relationship with successive monarchs since the Reformation because of its
association with puritans and radicals in England. Elizabeth rejected the parliamentary
request for a fast in 1580, although she understood the solidarity that fasting generated
and authorised a fast in 1588 during the threat of the Armada. 198 James authorised fasts
in 1603 in response to the plague, as did Charles in 1625 and 1640. Like Elizabeth,
Charles resented his parliament’s requests for fasts, recognising that regular fasting
could create division within the church. When Charles allowed a general fast to mark
the suffering of continental Protestant churches, he specifically stated that he hoped it
was not the first of many. 199

Utilising the ritual of fasting as a response to political, spiritual, or national
crises, the Commons were able to sidestep Laudian attempts to formally integrate fast
days into the ecclesiastical calendar (for instance, fasting during Lent). By claiming

198 J. Wilson, Pulpit in Parliament: Puritanism during the English civil wars, 1640-1648 (Princeton, NJ:
199 Trevor-Roper, Religion, the Reformation, 295.
the ritual as their own, they were also able to control the private use of fasts, which was growing out of control. As Baillie remarked in 1641, in London, puritans met ‘oft in private houses, for in public they dare not, fasts and prays, and hear sermons, for whole days, sundry times in the week’.\footnote{Laing, \textit{LJB}, i.291.} However holy the intent, fasting as a private performative act was difficult for parliament to manage as the comments of one London citizen reveal: ‘On Whitsun Tuesday, being the 14 of May, I heard of four or five great meetings of God’s people in humiliation, and fasting, and prayer’ whilst ‘many youths and apprentices did meet at Dyers’ Hall in fasting and prayer’.\footnote{N. Wallington, \textit{Historical Notices of Events Occurring Chiefly in the Reign of Charles I.} ed. R. Webb, 2 vols. (London: R. Bentley, 1869) i.138-9.} Fasts – although popular amongst puritan communities – needed to be controlled, and in claiming authority for this ritual parliament found a way in which to create a semblance of unity embedded in the conviction that parliament was the defender of the English Protestant faith and of English subjects’ freedoms and liberties. As such, the parliamentary fast sermons of the early 1640s should be seen as innovative in content, meaning, and format.

At the simplest level, the fast day was a basic inversion of the Anglican feast days enshrined in the Stuart customary calendar. However, this was more than an anti-ritual or an attempt to establish a rival puritan calendar. With its emphasis on communal prayer and singing, preaching, and (once the fast broke) communal eating, the fast day promoted order and obedience – to God but also to parliament as the earthly embodiment of God’s laws. Fasts were also social. Fasting within the family group or community enabled the mutual recognition of the godly, a congregational performance that united the performers whilst singling out the absent as ungodly (by virtue of their absence from the ritual). By encouraging public participation in this ritual through the printing of proclamations and sermons, parliament claimed authority over fast days as it did likewise with Gunpowder Treason Day and Accession Day. As Trevor-Roper argues, parliament’s leaders ‘used the pulpit for strategic and for tactical
purposes: both to declare long-term aims and to inaugurate temporary shifts of policy.\textsuperscript{202}

The first fast of the Long Parliament was on 17 November 1640 (Accession Day), in celebration of the opening of parliament. This was not, in itself, radical: Charles had authorised general public fasts at the beginning of each of his previous parliaments.\textsuperscript{203} Whilst this fast and the process by which it was organised could almost be seen as standard Caroline procedure, the content of Marshall’s and Burges’ sermons as discussed above were full of invective against the tyrannies and abuses to the Church of England in the 1630s. So too were the sermons of John Gauden and George Morley on 29 November 1640, when the Commons gathered to take the sacrament. In contrast to the political and religious changes preached by Marshall and Burges, Trevor-Roper describes their sermons as revealing ‘something of the social programme envisaged’ by reformers.\textsuperscript{204} The title of Gauden’s sermon, \textit{The love of truth and peace} hinted as much and his epistolary dedication is notably less aggressive than Marshall and Burges’. Gauden praised the Commons as a ‘Learned, Pious and Judicious Assembly’ that would preserve the ‘publique good’ and peaceably achieve reform.\textsuperscript{205} The Commons invited Gauden and Morley to print their sermons but Morley was not asked to preach before them again.\textsuperscript{206}

The ceremonial fast complete, parliament returned to business but as its business became increasingly contentious, the need to continue fasts – both within parliament and throughout the nation – became more pressing. Having failed to secure royal permission for a fast in April 1641, the next general fast fell on 7 November 1641, by which date the Treaty of London had been ratified (in August) and the Scottish army disbanded. The observance of the fast – from sermons to bells – was pointedly parliamentary, the king being absent in Scotland. Marshall preached once more, \textit{A Peace Offering to God}, taking Psalm 124.6-7 as his text: ‘Blessed be the Lord, who hath not given us \textit{as} a prey to their teeth. Our soul is escaped as a bird out of the

\textsuperscript{202} Trevor-Roper, \textit{Religion, the Reformation}, 294.
\textsuperscript{203} \textit{CJ}, i.671, 715, 869, 873-4, 922-6.
\textsuperscript{204} Trevor-Roper, \textit{Religion, the Reformation}, 299.
\textsuperscript{205} J. Gauden, \textit{The love of truth and peace} (London, 1640), Av, A2.
\textsuperscript{206} \textit{CJ}, ii.40.
snare of the fowlers: the snare is broken, and we are escaped’. Marshall was very aware that he was interpreting God’s word for parliament, ‘I remember I speak to a great assembly... but I speak in the name of a great God’, but he also reaffirmed parliament’s belief that it was acting according to God’s desire: ‘the planting of a new heaven and a new earth’, ‘bring heaven down to earth’. Marshall was joined by Jeremiah Burroughs, who used Isaiah 66.10: ‘Rejoice ye with Jerusalem, and be glad with her, all ye that love her: rejoice for joy with her, all ye that mourn for her’. Together they praised 1641 as ‘annus mirabilis’, the Protestation rivalling the Acts of Uniformity and Supremacy and other Protestant achievements of Elizabeth’s reign, whilst signalling ‘a very jubilee and resurrection of Church and State’. The king’s royal entry into London two weeks after the fast on 7 November threatened parliament’s religious reforms. With the added threat of the Irish Rebellion, parliament had a serious case of the jitters, leading to another general fast. On 22 December 1641, parliament and the city of London celebrated the fast, with the rest of the country holding the fast one month later (20 January 1642). Once again, Marshall preached, this time alongside Edmund Calamy. Reading these sermons, it is clear that the Commons thought carefully about the choice of speakers: the pair made a good double act. In Reformation and Desolation Marshall encouraged the Commons to seek and wipe out sinners whilst in Looking Glass, Calamy warned of the suffering God would inflict on those hindered the reformation.

On 24 December 1641, in the face of the Irish Rebellion, the Commons asked the Lords to present a joint request to Charles calling for a regular monthly fast. Trevor-Roper argues that this was, once again a carefully selected issue, although in focusing on the centrality of Pym in tuning the pulpit ‘both for strategic and for tactical purposes’, he perhaps overlooks the role of other politicians pushing for reform in both the Commons and Lords. However, the Irish Rebellion was a unifying concern; the Lords were equally fearful of events in Ireland and the English public were also highly

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207 S. Marshall, A Peace Offering to God (London, 1641), 37, 40, 44.
208 J. Burroughs, Sion’s Joy (London, 1641); Marshall, A Peace Offering, 46.
210 Trevor-Roper, Religion, the Reformation, 294.
informed due to the rapid circulation of hysterical reports. Charles therefore agreed to parliament’s request and a royal proclamation was issued designating the last Wednesday of every month as a day of public fasting and humiliation. The appointed date for such a fast coincided with the country’s observation of the general fast ordered by parliament on 17 December. Thus, the first regular monthly fast held by parliament and the country took place on 23 February 1642. The Commons’ preachers, once again, were Marshall and Calamy and again they performed a double act: Calamy in God’s Free Mercy to England looked to historical precedent, describing the ‘peaceful’ reformations of England’s past whilst Marshall, in Meroz Cursed, looked forward, calling for war.  

Marshall based his sermon on Judges 5.23: ‘Curse ye Meroz, said the angel of the Lord, curse ye bitterly the inhabitants thereof; because they came not to the help of the Lord, to the help of the Lord against the mighty’. He willed the Commons to take up arms against their enemies: ‘who stand as neuters, who stand aloof off, showing themselves neither open enemies nor true friends’. He especially singled out the indecisive and hesitant as a threat to reformation: ‘The lord acknowledges no neuters’. Such rousing language would eventually become commonplace in the sermons of parliament and the army: men were either fighting to defend the Protestant church and complete the Elizabethan reformation, or they were fighting to destroy it. Tempering such stirring language, Calamy took inspiration from Ezekiel 36.32: ‘Not for your sakes do I this, saith the Lord GOD, be it known unto you: be ashamed and confounded for your own ways, O house of Israel’. Spalding suggests Calamy’s sermon offers a good example of how preachers used the history of Israel to draw parallels with the current experience of England whilst also emphasising England was not unique. ‘Let us not... think ourselves more righteous than other nations nor presume upon God’s mercies’: as events such as the Irish Rebellion had proved, God was unhappy with England’s reformation and served her no favours.

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212 Marshall, Meroz Cursed, 10-12.
213 For a list of such sermons, see: Trevor-Roper, Religion, the Reformation, 308.
These fast day sermons had varying degrees of popularity, both within parliament and amongst the public. William Sedgewick’s fast day sermon on 29 June 1642 just two months before the raising of the royal standard was blatantly polemical.\(^{215}\) Sedgewick based his sermon on Isaiah 62.6-7: ‘I have set watchmen upon thy walls, O Jerusalem, which shall never hold their peace day nor night: ye that make mention of the Lord, keep not silence, And give him no rest, till he establish, and till he make Jerusalem a praise in the earth’. It incentivised parliament, validating its reformation to date, and encouraged the continuation of such reform until England emerged as a New Jerusalem. However, such openly war-mongering and polemical sermons were not so well received in the country, and even politicians used evasive tactics to escape the sermons. That members of the Commons tried to avoid the ritual of fast-day sermons, suggests that the ritual had been easily integrated and normalised into parliament’s proceedings to the point where it could be just as easily ignored. Spalding also notes that Charles permitted the Oxford Parliament to observe the monthly fast, which – as well as demonstrating the continued necessity of royal authorisation for these rituals – would indicate that as a religious ritual, the content of the fast day sermon could be easily manipulated to support king or parliament.\(^{216}\)

In manipulating English pulpits, parliament drew upon universally ritualised forms that could be broadcast to and understood by all of England’s citizens. Parliament appropriated Gunpowder Treason Day and through employing puritan preachers such as Marshall, reinforced the celebration as a day of parliament’s delivery. Of all the thanksgiving ceremonies, Gunpowder Treason Day was the most malleable as royalists continued to celebrate the occasion as a day of royal deliverance. Whilst consciously ignoring Charles’s Accession Day, Parliament revived the celebration of Elizabeth’s Accession Day in order to present itself as the heir to Elizabethan Protestantism – as completing the reforms begun by the Acts of Uniformity and Supremacy. In establishing a monthly day of fasting, parliament took control of a form that successive monarchs had viewed with suspicion. Attempting to strip the ritual of


its more radical associations, parliament utilised the fast day sermon to collectively celebrate the godliness of its reforms and bind its members together through the identification of a common enemy. Whilst the structure of these rituals remained unchanged, parliament – by manipulating the content of these religious ceremonies – demonstrated the righteousness of their reforms as ordained by God.

2.5 Conclusion

When the Long Parliament opened in November 1640, it immediately set out to reform the Caroline government and rid the Church of England of the trappings of Laudianism and popery. Although far from united, parliament’s actions were ruthlessly effective in achieving these aims: by March 1642, when the Militia Ordinance passed, the only marks of sovereignty (as identified by Bodin) that Charles’s retained were the ability to determine the name, value and measure of coinage and the ability to require subjects to swear their loyalty to their sovereign prince. Given the war-like footing that England appeared to be on, this last mark was now also in doubt. To achieve these reforms, parliament called upon ceremonial forms and speech acts that it manipulated in order to promote this factional agenda.

There were clear precedents for parliament’s utilisation of these forms in the actions of the Covenanters in the late 1630s. The Covenanters, in resisting what they saw as royal interference in the Kirk developed a range of performative tactics through which to gain religious concessions from the king, whilst simultaneously limiting the royal prerogative in Scotland. The obstruction and manipulation of ritual forms, the language of defiance, and recourse to public appeals were observed with interest south of the border and were imitated by the reforming faction in the Long Parliament. The Covenanters’ denunciation (and subsequent abolition) of the Scottish bishops as usurpers and pretenders foreshadowed the Commons’ denunciation of Laud as the Antichrist. The Scottish Parliament’s refusal to prorogue and the passing of the Triennial Act were valuable models for the English Parliament as it pushed through its own Triennial Act. The Covenanter’s manipulation of words offered the Long Parliament a model of how to utilise the ritualised language of government to respectfully address the king, even as the words themselves signalled rebellion against
royal policy. Beyond the walls of government, the Covenanters’ politicisation of the act of petitioning provided the Commons with a lesson in promoting factional agendas, whilst also signalling the growing public awareness of, and interest in, the workings of government.

This public attention was, in many ways, a consequence of the Covenanters’ and the Commons’ increasing use of print, and both the Scottish and English parliaments attempted to co-opt citizen action as proof of popular support. Engaging the public was, however, a dangerous game. The Covenanters failed to inspire military support from England despite the self-consciousness with which they appealed to a specifically English audience in their tracts. The Commons found the violence and riots in London to be a useful scare tactic in putting pressure on Charles or the Lords, but the storm of criticism parliament faced following the collapse of royal censorship served to remind the Commons that the public were not a homogenous body and not all citizens were willing to support drastic reform.

In pushing forward religious and political reform, the Long Parliament called upon a series of written and performative modes that legitimised their actions. Issuing speech acts across a range of genres allowed parliament to create a linguistic framework that reinforced the legitimacy of its reforms, not only to the public but also to hesitant members within both houses. Through declarations, parliament publically stated their criticisms of the Caroline government. As Sharpe argues, society was ‘sensitive to the genre, form, and materiality of their texts’. Like the ordinances, declarations mimicked the form of a royal proclamation and even utilised the royal printer. The gothic typography that visually identified texts as the royal word was retained by parliament so their declarations and ordinances stylistically resembled the king’s word and the king, at this point, remained reluctant to use print in order to present his views. When the royal proclamations were issued, parliament continued to benefit from the open criticism directed towards the royal word and the fact that, despite the regal form, Charles was forced to address the charges levelled at him.

\[217\] Sharpe, Reading Revolutions, 26.

\[218\] Sharpe similarly argues that Charles thought the form was powerful enough on its own to be respected, ‘to establish the true status of royal utterances’, see: Sharpe, Image Wars, 291.
Sharpe argues that the use of gothic typography would continue as ‘a medium of direction and control’ until after the Restoration, suggesting that both the republic and protectorate failed to find an alternative genre that would convincingly convey their authority.\(^{219}\)

The Militia Ordinance signalled a victory for parliament’s executive authority while its form and genre demonstrated the ease with which the royal style could be appropriated to authorise oppositional goals. It now held the royal prerogative to make war but such an aggressive action would not have been possible without the use of other speech acts that presented parliament as protectors of England’s liberty and religion. The declarations and ordinances demonstrate that parliament was not averse to manipulating ritual forms to present itself collectively as one harmonious body. Conversely, the Grand Remonstrance – printed without the Lords’ consent – revealed parliament to be far from unanimous. The discord concerning the attainder of Strafford further indicates the lack of unity between the houses. The Commons’ decision to ignore the Lords and print the charges against Strafford (and later the Grand Remonstrance) are early signs of a desire to limit the judicial and conciliar powers of the Lords, which would find greater expression (and support) in the midst of war.

Parliament also altered the socio-political landscape and the way in which the public talked about and witnessed power and sovereignty through the use of ceremony. The utilisation of book burnings and religious rituals demonstrates the self-awareness of these politicians, ‘conscious of themselves as performing, and, like the actors and stage managers, performing a service for court and audience’.\(^{220}\) James and Charles had both amplified the drama and theatricality of the book burning ceremony and parliament did not hesitate to co-opt this symbolic form of censorship and repression for its own polemical ends. Book burning was yet another symbol of parliament’s authority over a previously royal prerogative but the impact of the spectacle is difficult to measure. The impact of parliament’s manipulation of religious rituals is also difficult to affirm. The appropriation of Gunpowder Treason Day, revival of

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\(^{219}\) Sharpe, *Reading Revolutions*, 51.

\(^{220}\) Sharpe, ‘Representations and Negotiations’, 861.
Elizabeth’s Accession Day, and control over fast days demonstrate parliament’s awareness of the pulpit’s importance within English society. By aligning their reforms to the word of God, parliament once again challenged royal authority over both church and state.

In centralising the role of ceremonial forms in its reinvention from legislative to legislative and executive body, parliament openly appealed to the public and in doing so altered public awareness of politico-religious tensions within the Caroline government. This collective self-fashioning enabled parliament to present itself as defender of ‘the safety of the King’s person’ and preserver of ‘the true religion, the laws, liberty, and peace of the kingdom’. Whilst such stylisation enabled parliament to gain political and religious concessions from the king and control of London at the outbreak of war, its manipulation of ceremony opened the floodgates for rival partisan attempts to co-opt these rituals for alternative ends.
3. Performing kingship: Charles I and royal entertainment

The previous chapter sought to demonstrate how parliament developed from a legislative to a legislative and executive body through the use of speech acts and codified performatives including fast sermons and book burning. Building upon existing scholarship on popular politics and print, the chapter demonstrated how, in utilising ceremonial modes, parliament altered the socio-political landscape by changing the way in which the public talked about and witnessed power and sovereignty. It is within this context that this chapter considers Charles’s attempts to utilise ceremonial in order to express royal authority over the English and Scottish Parliaments – as being above political factionalism by virtue of his kingship – in the first quarter of the 1640s. Beginning with Charles’s ceremonial entrance into Westminster to open the Short Parliament (13 April 1640), this chapter traces an intricate pattern of decline in royal sovereignty centred on the performative failures of the king’s authority. The ceremonial performance, intended to reassert royal executive authority over a parliament Charles was reluctant to call, ultimately failed as it was dissolved three weeks later (5 May 1640). Countering parliament’s disruptive voice, Charles sought to appear above the divisions, and, as such, the only body capable of solving the country’s problems. Charles’s desire was mirrored in the verses produced to mark the occasion, in particular Martin Parker’s ballad, which deliberately overlooked the tension of the entry, in order to style the ceremony as a symbol of political harmony.

The political failure of the Short Parliament would be repeated a year later when Charles visited Edinburgh and ceremonially entered the Scottish Parliament at Parliament House (17 August 1641). The parliament had already opened in July but Charles hoped that his physical presence in Scotland would help heal the body politic and mend the breach between the king and his Scottish subjects. The texts written to welcome Charles to Scotland implicitly criticised Charles’s protracted absence from Scotland through their evident hope that his physical presence would enable a successful politico-religious settlement. Although willing to accept Presbyterian forms of worship, the parliament and Charles clashed on political issues that would erode the
royal prerogative. His failure to reconcile his subjects, especially after the infamous attempt to arrest the leading Covenanters (11 October 1641) was later made explicit in the Scottish Parliament’s refusal to help quell the Irish Rebellion without first obtaining the consent of the English Parliament (28 October 1641). This refusal mirrored the actions of the Scottish Commissioners who, the previous year, had refused to negotiate the Treaty of London with their English counterparts whilst Charles was in attendance.

This chapter emphasises how the royal entry into London upon Charles’s return from Scotland (25 November 1641) revealed his willingness to appeal directly to the city’s citizens and civic authorities, in an attempt to both celebrate (and thus endorse) the monarchy and reaffirm the crown’s relationship with the capital. The entry (the first and last of Charles’s reign) emphasised the fact that the king could no longer expect or prevail upon the city’s loyalty even as it demonstrated the city’s willingness to be courted by Charles in an effort to heal the political breach. Where Adamson sees the entry as a site of mediation between king and parliament, this chapter argues that the entry instead highlighted the polarisation between the king and parliament, and that subsequent petitions presented to Charles by London’s civic authorities reveal their willingness to assist him against parliament. Charles’s inability to respond appropriately to these petitions, combined with the Commons’ publication of the Grand Remonstrance, led him to make a decisive move against it in his attempt to arrest the Five Members. The resulting uproar in the city prompted him to leave London (10 January 1642).

Whilst war was not inevitable in January 1642, Charles’s subsequent actions can be read as a process of reinvention as he sought to curry support in English localities. Although Charles performed progresses throughout his reign, these were smaller in scope than those of his predecessors, this chapter argues that they had limited impact on his subjects by virtue of the closed and formal nature of this journeys and the tendency to stay in royal palaces rather than more civic enviorns. This performative failure of kingship enables this chapter to read the civic visits and hospitality offered to Charles at towns such as York, Lincoln, and Shrewsbury in 1642 as revelatory in exposing the complexity of the negotiations between Charles and the
civic authorities. These authorities were unwilling to disrupt the relative socio-economic stability of the town but were equally unwilling to declare themselves enemies of the king. The resulting fragmentation of Charles’s authority is best illustrated in the raising of the Royal Standard at Nottingham (22 August 1642). This chapter highlights how the event marked the culmination of the king’s attempt to reinvent himself as a warrior king, as other historians have also argued, but also demonstrated the difficulty in calling upon archaic ceremonial forms with the expectation that the symbolism therein would be easily understood and accepted. As with the Commission of Array, the effectiveness of these antiquated forms was limited because of the fear that acceptance of and participation in these rituals signalled willingness to engage in war.

The raising of the Standard was a pivotal moment in Charles’s performance of kingship even if the ritual failed as a performative act. It mimicked in style and language the royal entries into London whilst simultaneously emphasising the geographical displacement of the king out of the heart of his body politic. This disparity is also found in the written accounts of Charles’s visits to towns across England as he sought to build an army, as well as the royal speeches given before gentry and ‘gentlefolk’ on occasions such as Heworth Moor (3 June 1642). Whilst the visits support Sharpe’s and, more recently, Peacey’s assessment that Charles was ‘conflicted’ between ceremony as an ‘opportunity to project majesty’ and fear of his subjects’ disorderly and boisterous behaviour, the tendency to change these forms at the last minute and the evident hostility of some citizens reduced the efficacy of these acts.1 More pertinently, these occasions of royal performance led to fragmentation as the king became partisan; by placing himself in opposition to parliament, Charles’s authority was questioned – he was no longer the Godly-ordained authority above government dispute but a part of it. Nowhere was this more evident than in Oxford, where the king was forced to set up his court, after his failure to take London. Deprived of the visibility Whitehall offered and the tools of state situated in the capital,

1 Sharpe notes that ‘throughout the war, a central plank of Royalist propaganda was the association of the monarch with all national rituals, and especially with popular ceremonies and festivities’, see: Sharpe, Image Wars, 373; Peacey, ‘Street Theatre of State’, 164.
ceremony and court etiquette became vital tools for Charles in maintaining and reasserting his kingship. That Charles refashioned a court at Oxford emphasises the centrality of these rituals, even as the very displacement of these forms represented the decline of monarchical authority embodied in the king’s person.

3.1 London, 1640
In 1640, Charles opened two parliaments. The ceremonial opening of the first, the Short Parliament, was designed to emphasise Charles’s superiority over parliament by self-consciously calling upon traditional forms: a theatrical spectacle that drew crowds in their hundreds. In utilising these ceremonial modes, Charles wanted to demonstrate that nothing had changed despite the eleven year Personal Rule – that this was business as normal – a high-handed, if not somewhat naïve, action. When Charles agreed in December 1639 to summon a parliament the following spring, his intention had been to press for a vote on supply that would enable him to finance a second campaign against the Scots. As Russell emphasises, ‘the King was not consulting his Parliament: he did not even intend to offer them the option of refusing’. As the Venetian ambassador wrote two years previously, ‘the long rusted gates of parliament cannot be opened without difficulty’. The calling of parliament would, however, lend an air of legitimacy to the planned campaign, as the royal message to the Privy Council (who had themselves encouraged the move) made clear:

But because this is a public business and of great weight, and not to be undertaken upon the public charge, we have made known... our own desire to meet our people, and to demand their assistance in the ancient and ordinary way of a Parliament.

Accepting the necessity of a parliament, Charles ordered preparations to proceed: writs were issued, peers summoned, and the arrangements made for the royal ceremonial entrance into Westminster. This included refurbishing the state barge, to the tune of

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4 CSPD 1639-40, 149.
£620; a considerable sum when his Majesty’s Wardrobe still owed over £4,300 for robes made in 1637.5 Peacey notes that Westminster Hall was also refitted ‘with degrees and seats against the lords and commons sitting there’.6 The news generated both excitement and disbelief: Secretary of State, Henry Vane the elder, wrote that ‘there is great hope that by his wisdom all [difficulties] shall be overcome’ whilst the people of Devonshire thought the news a lie.7 Northumberland offered a more astute observation that ‘If in this Parliament the people acquit themselves as becomes dutiful and loyal subjects, all may do well; but if otherwise, the events are likely to prove unhappy.8

On 13 April, the king undertook the brief journey from Whitehall, riding down King Street to Westminster Abbey, where he entered at the west door. The formal procession followed a familiar pattern: two messengers and two trumpeters rode at the front of the procession, following which those in the cavalcade rode according to their precedence and degree. Pairs of heralds were interspersed along the procession demarcating the different groups including the judges (in ermine-lined scarlet fur gowns), bishops (in scarlet gowns and hoods), the barons (in parliament robes), the viscounts, the earls, and officers of state (although the two printed accounts of the procession present the groups in different orders).9 The Bishop of London, William Juxon, rode with the officers of state (including the Lord Privy Seal, the Archbishops of York and Canterbury, and the Lord Keeper of the Great Seal) in his role as Lord Treasurer. The marquess of Winchester, John Paulet, rode alone – either after the earls (and before the officers of state) or amidst the officers of state. The reason for this appears to be based on precedent: the title ‘marquess of Winchester’ did not have a higher title (that of duke), so whilst Winchester ranked higher than the earls, he could not ride with the duke of Buckingham. At the pinnacle of this procession rode the king wearing a purple velvet and ermine robe and his crown, surrounded by the royal

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5 Ibid., 487, 501-2.
6 TNA, AO1/2429/71, qtd in Peachey, ‘Street Theatre of State’, 161.
7 CSPD 1639-46, 495, 420.
8 Ibid., 526.
insignia: the royal sceptre, the cap of estate and the sword of state. On either side of
the king walked his Gentlemen Pensioners bearing gilt poleaxes, whilst three unnamed
noblemen’s sons carried his train. Behind the king, drawing the procession to a close
rode the Master of the Horse, leading the horse of honour, followed by the Captain of
the Pensions and the Captain of the Guard (riding together) and four guards (walking
two by two). The visual and orderly display of stately robes and military arms in this
ritualised procession presented to the participants and to the spectators an exemplary
model of society: a demonstration of royal superiority over his orderly subjects. The
ceremonial procession enabled Charles to take ‘the theatre of regality on to the streets,
both to display his authority and to ‘have the more due valuation from the people’
which was vital to maintaining it’. 10

The procession generated intense excitement among spectators, from foreign
ambassadors to the nobility, gentlemen travelling from outside the city to London’s
lowly citizens. As Master of Ceremonies, Finet recorded how the Spanish, Venetian
and United Provinces ambassadors jostled to rent the best rooms in houses on King
Street, from which to watch the procession. The Spanish ambassador privately rented
from the duchess of Chevreuse (at an unknown cost), the Venetian ambassador paid
£10 for a chamber and half of a pergola (implying the other half had been rented to
someone else), and the United Provinces ambassador paid £5 for a chamber in another
house (the lower cost suggesting the room was either smaller or had a poorer view). 11
Evelyn travelled up from Surrey to watch the procession, which he found to be ‘a very
glorious and magnificent sight, the King circled with his royal diadem and the
affections of his people’. 12 Preparations had also been made for spectators on the street
in the form of railings ‘on both sides from Whitehall gates to the west end of the
Abbey’. 13 As Peacey notes, the prospect of a large crowd is evident in the
communication of the nobility, with John Castle predicting ‘the streets will be full
before 5 o’clock, and the space within the rails quickly after, choaked up with the press

10 Sharpe, Image Wars, 237.
11 Loomie, Ceremonies of Charles I, 279.
12 J. Evelyn, Diary and correspondence of John Evelyn, ed. W. Bray (London: Henry Colburn, 1850-52), i.11-12.
of the multitude’. The railing also served to check the spectators and keep them at a respectful distance from the king. As Smuts and more recently Peacey have argued, Charles favoured order and decorum, not disorder and chaos. Whilst the unruly behaviour of an antimasque was constrained by theatrical boundaries and ultimately rehabilitated in the main action of the masque itself, outside the court on the streets, crowd behaviour was a worrying unknown, irrespective of rails.

The crowd presented in Martin Parker’s contemporary print account of the ceremony, however, display none of these characteristics. In this 12-stanza ballad, Charles’s ‘true subjects’ are full of hope and joy; ‘the people’s hearts were set on fire’ at the sight of the richly appareled figures making their way to parliament. Parker praises Charles:

The next and last in honours seat
Was he who made the show compleat,
Our gracious King, our Charles the Great
   Our ioyes sweet complement,

The words ‘made the show compleat’ emphasise the importance of Charles’s place within not just the procession but the structure of government at large, whilst complimenting the king with allusions to Charlemagne, ‘Charles the Great’. Yet Parker also express hope for what parliament might achieve:

This happy April will, I trust,
Give all true subjects reason just
Of joy to feel a pleasant gust,
    To yield them hearts content:
For we may be assur’d of this,
If any thing hath been amiss,
Our King and State will all redress
    In this good Parliament.

14 Correspondence between John Castle and the earl of Bridgewater, qtd in Peacey, ‘Street Theatre of State’, 161.
The redress that ‘true subjects’ can expect was not what Charles had in mind, but the inclusion of the king – ‘Our King and State will all redress’ – bound Charles to the Lords and Commons, implying that it is through the cooperation of all three estates that national harmony is restored. As Sharpe argues, in this ballad, ‘royal ritual is presented as symbolizing the unity of the commonweal and the ceremony is represented in order to gain popular support for Charles’; this was made all the more easier by the use of a popular and common tune, Triumph and Joy.\textsuperscript{16}

Parker’s record of the procession was in itself a symbolic activity, allowing those who read or heard the ballad to recreate the procession in private. Parker openly declares that this is his intent:

\begin{verbatim}
The order how they rode that day
To you I will in briefe display,
In the best manner that I may,
    For now my minde is bent
To publish what myselfe did see,
That thine (Loyall) hearts may be
Participants as well as wee
Ith’ joy oth’ Parliament.
\end{verbatim}

Whilst verses on the Short Parliament circulated in manuscript form, ‘An Exact Description’ was the most popular and widely circulated account in print and as such, Parker’s ballad had a monopoly over how the ceremonial procession was represented and remembered.\textsuperscript{17} He proclaims himself to be an eye-witness, thus lending validity to his description, whilst the phrase ‘thine (Loyall) hearts) links together writer and reader as the latter participates as a loyal subject in reading the ballad.

The subsequent twelve stanzas detail ‘The order how they rode that day’ and it is notable that Parker continually emphasises concepts of duty and place. The trumpeters ride at the front ‘as their places fall’ while the heralds ‘proper office was to guide; / And range the show on every side’. The refrain in stanza four, ‘Thus every

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\textsuperscript{16} Sharpe, \textit{Image Wars}, 238.
\textsuperscript{17} See: A. Marotti, \textit{Manuscript, Print and English Renaissance Lyric} (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), chapt.2.
man in his degree / Rode to the Parliament’ is echoed in that of stanza six, ‘Thus every one in order right / Rode to the Parliament’. All the performers have a role to play within the procession, which reflects their role within the government and nation at large. Parker expresses hope that as they have correctly performed their role within the procession, so too will parliamentary proceedings run smoothly. On entering Westminster Abbey, the procession exited the public gaze and the remainder of the procession was conducted within the more private precinct of Westminster. It is here that Parker’s ballad ends with a confident assertion that ‘The King of Kings did’s Angels send / T’ assist our Parliament’.

At the entrance to the church, Charles was presented with the sceptre; he then sat underneath the canopy (held by the prebends) to hear the sermon. Following the sermon, Charles delivered the sceptre back to the church and walked on foot underneath the canopy (now held by Gentlemen of the Privy Chamber) to Parliament House. Here the formal proceedings were opened with a speech by Lord Keeper Finch, urging members to forget ‘the memory of all former discouragements in preceding assemblies’ and ‘lay aside all other debates’ to focus on the pressing issue of supply.\textsuperscript{18} Finch also posited the notion that the members were ‘made happy in your beholding of his most excellent and sacred person’ and should be ‘pleased to lay by the shining beams of Majesty’. The figuring of Charles as the sun would become a familiar motif in subsequent royal entries and visits in the years following.\textsuperscript{19} The emphasis on royal supremacy served as a reminder of Charles’s high-handed intent, which was at odds with the Common’s desire to discuss the grievances that had developed under Charles’s Personal Rule. As has been well documented, the parliament was not a success: less than two weeks into its sitting, Northumberland was already predicting its demise:\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 115.
\textsuperscript{20} Adamson, \textit{Noble Revolt}, 1-20; Cope, ‘Compromise in Early Stuart Parliaments’, \textit{Albion}, 09:02 (Summer, 1977); Russell, \textit{FBM}, chapt.2.
we are all breaking to pieces here in our Parliament, and know not how we shall be able to pay the army for one month, the Lower House resolve not to supply the King’s presence occasions until they have first presented their grievances, this proceeding of theirs will I fear soon put an end to our meeting in Parliament.21

The Venetian ambassador was equally sceptical, observing, ‘no one believes that parliament is disposed to give satisfaction before receiving it’. His speculation that ‘it will not be easy for his Majesty to rid himself of this assembly without making important concessions’ was proved wrong when Charles – with varying levels of support from his Privy Council – decided to end the session without gaining supply.22 The dissolution of the Short Parliament saw none of the ceremony of its opening: on 5 May, Charles took the state barge from Whitehall (via the Privy Stairs) to Westminster (landing at Westminster Stairs) where he accused a ‘few seditiously affected men’ of sabotaging the parliament through ‘malicious cunning’.23 Following this speech, ‘he bade my Lord keeper speak which was no more than this. This Parliament is dissolved’.24 The lack of ceremony is indicative of Charles’s displeasure with the session and within a month, Charles issued a royal declaration, in which he set out his reasons for his actions.25 As Cope notes, this was not an unfamiliar form of royal speech, being in use by sixteenth-century rulers in both England and Europe; moreover, Charles had authorised declarations following the dissolutions of the 1626 and 1629 parliaments. The declaration allowed citizens to imagine Charles’s plight, to share his frustration with a bickering parliament whilst presenting ‘messages from the crown as the principal events of the parliament’.26 Intended to justify the dissolution to the broader public and generate support for the crown’s actions, it failed in both respects. Since parliament was also issuing (or turning a blind eye to) reports that supported and promoted the opposing point of view, the declaration – with its vastly

21 CSPD 1640-41, 71.
22 CSPVen 1640-42, 38.
23 His Majesties Declaration to all his Loving Subjects (London, 1640), 51-2.
25 His Majesties Declaration to all his Loving Subjects; Rushworth, Historical collections, iii.1165-67.
different interpretation of events – merely exposed the extent to which relations had broken down.

Relations had not improved by autumn 1640 in part because Charles pressed forward with the campaign against the Scots, leading to a humiliating defeat at the Battle of Newburn (28 August). A few days later, the king was presented with the Petition of the Twelve Peers. Unlike contemporary petitions, the peers’ petition was not a simple request up the social hierarchy for an action to solve an existing grievance. As Adamson states, it was ‘a petition of right (a formal declaration of pre-existing entitlements, albeit couched in the outwardly deferential form of a petition)’. 27 Drawing on the precedent of the 1258 Oxford Parliament, the twelve peers offered Charles one of two choices: either he summoned parliament, or they would. 28 Charles, however, was equally prepared to utilise archaic forms and summoned the Great Council of Peers (which convened on 24 September). As Clarendon later wrote, ‘this council was so old that it had not been practised in some hundreds of years’, but Charles’s intention was (to Clarendon, at least) clear. In calling the council, Charles placed ‘the honour of the King and kingdom… so visibly upon the stage’ that the peers – once reminded of the ties of honour and hierarchy between the monarch and nobility – would agree to subsidise the king. 29

The Great Council of Peers, however, refused to do anything that would exacerbate tension between the Lords and Commons. Outmanoeuvred, Charles summoned a parliament to meet in six weeks’ time. Once more, ceremonial preparations began, with, as Peacey emphasises, orders to rail off King Street all the way to Westminster Abbey and warnings to keep the route free from obstruction, again emphasising Charles’s fear of disorder and disruption from the crowd. 30 Charles returned to Whitehall on 30 October, and although there was no formal entry or welcome from the city, Evelyn records that he saw the king ‘ride in pomp and kind of ovation, with all the marks of a happy peace, restored to the affections of his people,

27 Adamson, Noble Revolt, 47-8.
28 Ibid., 55-9, the 1258 parliament had given twelve barons the power to summon a parliament should the king refuse.
29 Clarendon, History, ii.95.
being conducted through London with a most splendid cavalcade’.\textsuperscript{31} Evelyn perhaps misunderstood the reasons behind the street theatre: since spring, riots and tumults had disturbed the city, and with the Scots in Newcastle, Whitehall had been heavily fortified in anticipation of further unrest. Within Whitehall, however, there were those eager to greet Charles; Finet notes that the day after his return (1 November), the Spanish, Venetian and States ambassadors each had an audience with the king.\textsuperscript{32}

Despite the ceremonial preparations, Charles made the decision not to conduct a full ceremony for the opening of this parliament. Given England’s embarrassing military defeat at Newburn, the manipulation of the Twelve Peers in forcing Charles’s hand, and Charles’s usual concerns with decorum and order – no doubt heightened by the riots in London – this decision is perhaps unsurprising. However, the cancellation also indicates Charles’s awareness of the power of royal spectacle. To perform the full ceremony would be to symbolically endorse the session and give parliament his royal approval. To not perform the ceremony demonstrated the opposite – that Charles had deep misgivings about calling this parliament, that he did not approve of its necessity, and that he resented the pressure from the peers.\textsuperscript{33} Charles was being forced to take a political action he was unhappy about and his manipulation of ceremonial forms enabled him to express his displeasure in public. In cancelling the horseback procession down King Street, the public were denied the spectacle, which fed into the increasing awareness within the city of the breach between king and parliament.

Instead, Charles left Whitehall, descended Whitehall Stairs, and took the state barge to Parliament Stairs (at the south of Westminster Palace). The whole ceremony was therefore performed in the relative privacy of Westminster’s precinct. From Parliament Stairs, the procession proceeded on foot through the Old Palace Yard (east of Westminster Abbey) and along the northern wall to enter the Abbey at the west end. As well as shortening the ceremony, Charles also made changes to the personnel. The Cap of Estate, one of the chief symbols of monarchy, was usually carried by a peer

\textsuperscript{31} Bray, \textit{Diary of Evelyn}, i.12-13, this is misdated as 30 December 1640. 
\textsuperscript{32} Loomie, \textit{Ceremonies of Charles I}, 292. 
\textsuperscript{33} Sharpe notes that Charles had not called a parliament in 1637 when signing the French alliance and in the early parliaments of Charles’s reign were ‘of only limited help in fighting the wars’, see: Sharpe, \textit{Personal Rule}, 87.
much in royal favour: in April, Strafford had performed this task. In November, Charles gave this role to Essex. Recognising Essex’s popularity among the public and in the Lords, Windebank had been encouraging Charles to show favour to Essex, who found little of it during Charles or his father’s reign.\(^{34}\) Essex had served as Lieutenant-General during the First Bishop’s War (losing out to the earl of Holland in the competition for second in command), but found himself denied this role in the Second.\(^{35}\) He was a vocal critic of bishops in the Short Parliament and signed the Petition of the Twelve Peers.\(^{36}\) The choice of Essex was thus a token of favour.

The lack of ceremony around the opening of the Long Parliament, from the cancelled cavalcade to the private procession by barge and through Westminster, was interpreted in several ways. Clarendon recalled that it ‘had a sad and a melancholic aspect’ and that the king ‘went privately in his barge to the Parliament-stairs, and so to the church, as if it had been to a return of a prorogued or adjourned Parliament’.\(^{37}\) The absence of ceremony signified Charles’s distaste for the session, which he been reluctant to call. The Venetian ambassador wrote of the decision to open parliament quietly: ‘The wisest do not approve of this decision, for it shows more clearly than ever to his people that he consented to the summons merely from compulsion by the enemy, and not of his own free will, to please the people’.\(^{38}\) His words are revealing in that the ambassador – perhaps mimicking those closer to the king – already presents parliament as ‘the enemy’, suggesting a divide between executive and legislative authority. The use of the word ‘enemy’ also implies the position of the ambassador in this struggle, behind the king, even as he criticised the king’s decision. Despite, or perhaps because of, Charles’s aversion to the parliament, his opening speech was one of defiance, in which he reminded parliament of its duty, ‘that support I might justly expect from you’, recalling its role in assisting the king in ‘the securing and good of this Kingdom’. Whilst Charles spoke of his confidence in parliament’s ‘love to me’,

\(^{34}\) CSPD 1639-40, 94-5.  
\(^{35}\) Like Essex, Holland experienced a lack of royal favour in the earlier years of Charles’s reign. Sharpe argues that it was not until the rise of Henrietta Maria’s influence in the late 1630s that Holland’s star also rose, only to fall from favour in 1640, see: Sharpe, Personal Rule, 165, 744.  
\(^{36}\) Fissel, The Bishops’ Wars, 84-86; Russell, FBM, 104.  
\(^{37}\) Clarendon, History, i.220.  
\(^{38}\) CSPVen 1640-42,, 92-3.
there was also an unspoken implication that those who did not support him (in reaching settlement with the Scots, in voting on supply, on disarming the army) were no better than the rebels he sought to defeat.  

The contrast between the opening processions of the Short and Long Parliaments could not have been starker. In April 1640, the processional had been witnessed by spectators low and high, on the streets and in private houses. Despite Charles’s reluctance to engage with the disorderly, potentially troublesome crowds, the cavalcade offered up a harmonious representation of the social order, in which every man had his place. Although London’s cityscape was not devoid of civic ceremony, this was a theatrical spectacle that the public were eager to observe because it made Charles visible, even if the ceremony’s message of political harmony was met with suspicion by some. In contrast, the closed, private ceremony in November 1640 was a performance of exclusion: the public was deliberately denied the opportunity to witness (and thus participate in their witnessing) the ritual opening of parliamentary business. By refusing to perform the full ceremony, Charles manipulated royal forms to express his displeasure over the necessity of calling parliament whilst simultaneously exposing the breach to the broader public; he was, as Peacey observes, aware that a cancelled or reconfigured ceremony ‘sent just as powerful a message as any display of grandeur and pomp’. Charles’s insistence on ceremonial forms within Westminster – from the stairs to the Abbey to the Hall – was a royal exercise in saving face, in which he tried to bestow favour on previously ostracised peers such as Essex. The truncated ceremony failed to convince its performers: ‘instead of conciliating their [parliament’s] good will… he [Charles] alienates them over a matter of outward show which is of no real importance’.

Although the Long Parliament was by no means a unanimous body, by the end of the year it had impeached and imprisoned Strafford and Laud, forced Windebank

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40 Lord Mayors' Shows were performed until 1640 and Withington notes elements of 'splendour' but no pageants upon the mayoral appointment of 1643, see: Withington, *English Pageantry: An Historical Outline*, 2 vols. (New York: B. Blom, 1920) ii.43.
41 Peacey, ‘Street Theatre of State’, 165.
42 *CSPVen 1640-42*, 92-3.
and Finch to flee, and ordered the release of Prynne and John Lilburne both of whom were popular (and vocal) critics of Charles. In London, public awareness of the king’s troubles were exacerbated by pamphlets and ballads such as *The Kings Favovr* and *Good Nevves for all true hearted Subjects*, which declared Charles incapable of solving England’s problems. The reduced circumstances of the marriage between Mary, Princess Royal to William, Prince of Orange (May 1641), further highlighted the difficulties Charles faced in maintaining ceremony within Whitehall.

### 3.2 Edinburgh, summer 1641

It is in this context of political tension and financial limitations that Charles visited Scotland in summer 1641, intending to oversee the implementation of the acts ratified by the Treaty of London. With financial troubles and political tensions brewing in England, there was a great deal riding on Charles’s reception by and discussions with the Scottish Parliament for both kingdoms. He travelled with a small train of nobility: Lennox, Hamilton, Lord Willoughby of Parham and the Elector Palatine, a last minute addition whom the Venetian ambassador hinted was invited out of fear. Of these four, Willoughby had been reluctant to support the king during the First Bishop’s War and voted against the king on the issue of supply during the Short Parliament. As Russell has revealed, the arrangements for Charles’s visit were not without their difficulties. The earl of Winton refused to house the king at Winton House (conveniently located between Berwick and Edinburgh), Argyll complained about the cost of repairing Holyrood Palace and the earl of Lanerick asked that (due to limited funds) Charles’s party bring ‘plate, linen, and £6,000 with him from England’.

In contrast, and with clear propagandistic intent, contemporary reports suggested the king’s arrival was met enthusiastically both in Edinburgh and at Newcastle (13 August), where the king received a ‘gallant entertainment’ from General Leslie and reviewed the Scottish troops who presented themselves to him ‘in a posture full of obedience and zeal to his person’. Arriving at Newcastle, Charles

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43 Ibid., 228; Spalding also includes the earl of Morton in this list, see: Spalding, *Scottish Troubles*, i.335.
45 *CSPD 1641-43*, 105, 101.
was greeted by a military display of troops, arranged by divisions that ‘rendered them the more conspicuous and with the braver aspect to the beholders’. This display of loyalty to the king, however, also doubled as a reminder of the superior force of the Scottish army, now rendered docile and submissive in the king’s presence. At the end of the line sat Leslie, on horseback. As Charles reached him, Leslie dismounted and ‘prostrated himselfe and service before the King upon his knees’, lowering himself in submission to the king in a gesture that recognised sovereign authority over the army. Rising and remounting, Leslie subsequently conducted Charles on an inspection of the troops, ‘as if it were his own rather than one of occupation’. Rather than dine with the mayor, as previously arranged, Charles chose to dine with Leslie; whilst this decision confirmed the cordiality between king and general, it can also be seen as an unwitting snub towards the city who had borne the costs of the military occupation.

On 14 August, Charles arrived at Holyrood House, entering into the burgh of Canongate via the Watergate to be met by Scottish nobility, and the provost and bailies of Edinburgh. The citizens greeted the king and his train with ‘great acclamations of joy’, although his arrival was not a state entry through the city and lacked the processional formality and triumphal arches of the 1633 celebrations. Charles was welcomed with a speech by ‘the Speaker for Scotland’. This speaker has been tentatively identified as Robert Balfour, appointed president of the Scottish Parliament on 11 June 1640 and who continued in this role into the parliament of summer 1641. The use of the word ‘speaker’, when the Scottish Parliament did not have such a clearly defined role, suggests the writer of the pamphlet was English (albeit a supporter of the Covenanters), confirmed by the frequent use of the word ‘these’ when referencing the Scots. The speaker likens Charles’s return to the sun warming ‘the frozen earth’, a familiar image that praised Charles’s physical presence whilst implicitly criticising his protracted absence from Scotland since 1633. The same motif greeted Charles on his return to London three months later, and images of

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46 His Maiesties Passing Throvgh the Scots Armie (Edinburgh, 1641); Carlton, Personal Monarch, 225.
47 Spalding, Scottish Troubles, 1.335.
‘cheering rayes’ inspiring ‘not onely motion, but life’ appear in the civic pageantry created for Charles’s entry into Edinburgh of 1633. As Sillitoe notes, the power of a monarch’s ‘healing rays’ was also a dominant theme in early Stuart masques performed before both Charles and his father. Most notable of these was Jonson’s The Masque of Darkness, ‘in which the rays given from James prompt a transformation of the appearance of the female masquers’. The transformative power of Charles’s presence is evident too in the phrase, ‘If you had denyed your presence among us at this time, we had wandred in darkenesse, like those people which are forsaken by the Sun’. These words demonstrate an awareness that Charles did not have to visit Scotland, whilst hinting at further difficulties that might have arisen had he not: ‘if you had denyed’.

In his response, Charles also utilised the sun image: ‘me thinks I see already how the Sun of our happinesse begins to shew his face, through the thicke clouds of distraction’. Where the speaker envisages Scottish subjects basking in the sun because the king has returned to Scotland, the king’s response reveals an awareness of the politico-religious issues waiting to be resolved. Again, Sillitoe suggests that this bears witness to the changed nature of royal movement around the kingdoms as, unlike his predecessors, Charles ‘could now only travel in order to diffuse or tackle complex political discourses away from his court’. Cressy conversely, suggests Charles had a greater aptitude for travelling around England than has previously been acknowledged but the threat of plague limited royal travel plans in 1637 and monarchical indecision stalled plans to journey north in 1638. Scotland, however, had not witnessed a royal visit since 1633 and Charles, in his response to the speaker, figured his visit as a

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49 W. Drummond, Entertainment of the High and Mighty Monarch Charles (Edinburgh, 1633), 3; W. Forbes, Panegyric to the High and Mighty Monarch Charles by the grace of God (Edinburgh, 1633); W. Lithgow, Scotslands Welcome to her native sonne and soveraigne Lord (Edinburgh, 1633).
50 Sillitoe, ‘Rediscovering the Progresses of Charles I’, Yearbook of English Studies, 44 (2014), 95; McElligott has demonstrated how this language developed in the later 1640s when royalists described Charles in relation to Old Testament heroes, in particular those who faced rebellion (David) and suffering (Job), see: McElligott, Royalism, Print and Censorship, 55.
51 The Kings Entertainment into Scotland, 1641, 5.
52 Ibid., 6.
54 Cressy, People of England, 171.
pilgrimage. As such, Charles’s description of the journey (for him a necessity enabling him to calm affairs in England) aligned with the speaker’s emphasis on Scotland as ‘his owne Countrey’, emphasising the kingdom as being ‘true’ and ‘loyal’ to him in a way that England could not. Consequently, when the speaker remarked that ‘to salute your Highnesse onely with a welcome, is nothing’, he recognised that this formal, ceremonial display was empty, and that it was the ‘thronging together’ of ‘obedient subjects’ that validated the speech.

The subjects of the pamphlet are exclusively the body politic as the emphasis is placed on ‘the vulgar’, ‘the citizens’, ‘the Commons in Scotland’. Whilst homogenising the citizens as one body, the writer also highlights their presence through their actions. Caps are thrown into the air in response to the speaker’s speech, their noisy cheers hinder the performance of the speech – on several occasions, the speaker pauses until the noise dies down. In contrast to the reports of Baillie, Sidney Bere and Secretary Vane, the crowd’s actions appear somewhat choreographed, but given the bias of the writer, the descriptions of the crowd’s joyous behaviour complements and corresponds with the speaker’s figuring of the Scots as dutiful and loving subjects. According to ceremonial custom, ‘the keyes of the town [were] rendered’ to Charles and duly returned. Charles and his train then continued into Holyrood House to rest.

These celebrations, staged or otherwise, masked the political undertones and tensions generated by the king’s visit. Before leaving for Scotland, the Scottish commissioners in London had intimated that once Charles met with the Scottish Parliament, their differences would cease to exist and the Scots would assist Charles in restoring the full powers of the monarchy in England. Meanwhile, the English Parliament had been reluctant to see Charles travel north, fearful that an alliance

55 Pilgrimage: In extended use: a journey undertaken to a place of particular significance or interest, esp. as an act of homage, respect, etc. "pilgrimage, n.1b". OED Online.
56 The Kings Entertainment into Scotland, 1641, 3, 6.
57 Ibid., 3; the obedience of Charles’s Scottish citizens is perhaps overemphasised in order to contrast the apparent disorderly behaviour and lack of obedience of Charles’s English citizens.
58 Spalding, Scottish Troubles, i.335.
between the king and Scotland would negate its reforms. The Venetian ambassador reports in great detail the various excuses parliament presented to Charles in an effort to detain him in London, from packing Westminster with 400 citizens petitioning him to stay, to asking him to appoint commissioners to pass all acts in his absence. These efforts reveal parliament’s lack of faith in Charles’s promises but also its fear that Charles would use the Scots to re-establish his royal authority and shake off the constitutional limits parliament had recently imposed. Conversely, others were hopeful that ‘if the King shall settle and establish a perfect quietness with the Scots there it will open a way for a happy and good conclusion of all differences here [in England]’. In order to achieve such quietness, Charles willingly attended Presbyterian services at St Giles and in Holyrood. Having been reprimanded by Alexander Henderson for failing to attend the afternoon sermon on Sunday, Charles diligently obliged the Scots by attending without complaint ‘for want of a Liturgie, or any Ceremonies’. This ‘show of cordiality’ on the king’s behalf, ‘demonstrated Charles’s willingness to restrain his conscience when there was an important objective in sight’. For Charles, this objective was to politically alienate the Covenanters from the reforming faction in the Commons through the destruction of Argyll’s dominance, but Argyll and others in Scotland interpreted this willingness as his symbolic ‘acceptance of the renegotiated ‘Union’ with England’ in which monarchical power was diminished’.

The warm reception of the king by his Scottish subjects could be seen as reflecting this desire for reconciliation, although the celebrations could equally reflect the embracement by Edinburgh’s citizens of spectacle itself (Adamson notes that the Elector Palatine received as much applause as the king). When Charles went to the newly constructed Parliament House on 17 August, ‘the multitude came in throngs’ lining the route up Canongate, through Netherbow Port, up the High Street, to Parliament House on the south of St Giles. In anticipation of the crowd, one organiser

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60 CSPVen 1640-42, 200-03.
61 CSPD 1641-43, 34.
62 Laing, LJR, i.385-86.
63 Carlton, Personal Monarch, 226; Cust, A Political Life, 303.
64 Adamson, Noble Revolt, 348.
65 Ibid.
(whether a member of the royal train or of the Scottish Parliament) saw fit to appoint
someone ‘to go before him [Charles] to make room’.\textsuperscript{66} Baillie writes that the king
travelled by coach, although other reports are less clear on the mode of transport,
instead emphasising the processional order of king (flanked by Argyll on his left and
the third earl of Home on his right), Scottish nobility, barons, burgesses ‘according to
their Degrees’. Emphasis is also placed on the crowd cheering the king ‘in their owne
language’, which again suggests these reports were authored by Englishmen.\textsuperscript{67} Having
received a Latin oration outside Parliament House, the procession continued inside.
Once settled, Charles delivered a ‘pleasant pithie speech’ that carefully sought not to
lay blame on any one faction. Instead, the recent events were styled as ‘unlucky
differences’ and ‘unhappy mistakings’, words that sought to diminish the friction and
imply an easy solution. He also issued a reminder of parliament’s promise to maintain
royal power, to which members were bound by national oath; reaffirming a structural
relationship between parliament and crown rather than a personal relationship with the
monarch: ‘for the maintenance of that royall power… to which your owne nationall
oath doth oblige you’.\textsuperscript{68} The procession from Holyrood to Parliament House was not
a state entry – nor was Charles’s arrival into Canongate three days previously.
However, as with the opening of the Short Parliament, Charles utilised the formal
elements of these ceremonies as an enactment of royal authority over the Scots –
despite the demonstration of superior military force evident at his welcome by Leslie’s
army. That Charles actually gave many political and religious concessions to the Scots
yet still performed these ceremonies, suggests these acts reveal the awareness of both
Charles and the Scots of the necessity of theatrical display as a tool by which to
publically reaffirm the latter’s loyalty to the crown.

Whilst the entertainment the king received at Edinburgh from both nobles and
civic authorities left Charles ‘neither wanting in pains nor affection’, the hospitality
could not disguise the differences that continued to divide him and the Covenanter-

\textsuperscript{66} A. Campbell, \textit{A Post from Scotland} (Edinburgh, 1641), 1.
\textsuperscript{67} Laing, \textit{LJB}, i.386; \textit{A Post from Scotland}, 1.
\textsuperscript{68} Spalding, \textit{Scottish Troubles}, i.336; \textit{The Kings Majesties speech, in the Parliament at Edinburgh} (Edinburgh,
1641).
dominated parliament.\textsuperscript{69} These differences were made explicit in the sidestepping around the use of the sceptre to authorise the 39 Acts of Parliament (the legislative result of the Treaty of London). Monarchical ratification of parliamentary acts was traditionally symbolised by the touching of the royal sceptre to the named acts, either by the king in person or his Scottish representative (the Lord High Commissioner). Acts that were not touched by the sceptre lacked royal permission, invalidating the legislation. According to precedent, Charles offered to perform the customary ritual but was prevented from doing so:

\begin{quote}
He was intreated, according to the order of the House, to suspend till the morrow: at which tyme he pressed againe that he might ratifie the Acts. He was intreated to delay till the returne of the Commissioners who were present at the Treatie: at last he was intreated so to doe.\textsuperscript{70}
\end{quote}

Rather than outright refuse the king’s request, parliament sought to delay the act by arguing for the necessary presence of the Scottish Commissioners, currently en route to Edinburgh. The implication was that since it was they who had confirmed the terms of the treaty (the king being notably absent during discussions with their English counterparts), they should be present to bear witness to the ratification. That Charles pressed twice to perform the rite, suggests he did not share this opinion. On their return, the Commissioners were refused entrance to Parliament House until they swore to the Scottish National Covenant and the matter of the sceptre appears to have been quietly dropped. This tussle over the use of the sceptre reveals a deep awareness of the political significance of this ostensibly formulaic act. Charles expected to perform the rite according to traditional custom, but it can also be seen as an attempt to symbolically assert his authority over legislation, and in doing so signify that acts passed without the touching of the sceptre (past or future) were void. Furthermore, the legislation severely restrained royal power over the Scottish Parliament; the use of the sceptre would have enabled Charles to symbolically claim ownership and authorship over the acts, and in doing so appear as the gracious monarch gifting these powers to parliament

\textsuperscript{69} CSPD 1641-43, 97, 102.
\textsuperscript{70} Laing, \textit{LJB}, i.386.
as his ‘representatives’ in Scotland. The Scottish Parliament were equally aware not only of the potential claim of ownership of the act but also the fact that in performing the ‘unreasonable and undesired’ rite, any legislation passed without it would lack validity and could be subsequently challenged by the king.\(^{71}\)

Once again, the Scottish Parliament set precedents the English Parliament would follow: the terms forced Charles to give substantial concessions to the Covenanters, confirming the Scottish Triennial Act (1640) and limiting the royal prerogative to raise a Scottish army. The remaining issues included another of the royal prerogatives: the appointment of officers, which Charles eventually and reluctantly gave up (16 September). Despite these political victories for the Covenanters, this working (or perhaps haranguing) relationship with Charles quickly deteriorated after a failed coup – known as the Incident – organised by Will Murray (Groom of the Bedchamber) to imprison, or worse, murder Argyll and Hamilton (who had deserted Charles for the Covenanters). Again, there is some debate as to whether or not Charles knew of this plan but Russell argues that the secrecy surrounding it suggests ‘it was meant not to terrify but to succeed’.\(^{72}\) The fact the plans were kept secret – that they were not deliberately leaked or spread as rumours – distinguishes the Incident from other plots in which Charles had a hand. This wheeling and dealing would become much more explicit in the later 1640s as Charles’s secret and not-so-secret negotiations pitted the Covenanters against royalist Scots, the Scots against Westminster, Westminster against the New Model Army, and so on. This vacillating approach had also dominated Caroline foreign policy in the early years of his Personal Rule. The need to ‘preserve English security and to expand trade’ (which Sharpe argues he achieved), meant that Charles was alternatively reluctant to join an anti-Habsburg league or, in turn, negotiating with the Spanish Antichrists.\(^{73}\) During the Bishops’ Wars and Civil War, Charles sought to protect not trade and security but religion, yet his modus operandi – consistently playing one opponent against the other – was remarkably similar.

\(^{71}\) Laing, *LJB*, i.389.


\(^{73}\) Sharpe, *Personal Rule*, 96.
Had the Incident succeeded, Charles’s chief antagonists in the Scottish Parliament would have been removed, achieving by force what Charles had set out to achieve by words three months earlier. The plot (planned for 11 October) failed: having been forewarned by Leslie the night before, Argyll and Hamilton fled with Lanark (Hamilton’s brother) to Kinneil House. This in turn led to the suspension of parliament, giving affront to the king, who demanded their return so parliament could continue. The lords’ return (2 November) enabled a hasty conclusion to outstanding issues: after a formal procession to Parliament House – in which two of three bearers of royal insignia were leading Covenanters – and a banquet at Holyrood House (17 November), Charles took his leave (18 November).74

The Incident scuppered any remaining hopes of conciliation between Charles and parliament but it also emphasised how quickly public reaction could turn hostile. On the night the lords fled, Edinburgh’s citizens, ‘understanding of their flight’ posted watch guards in the streets, and several noblemen placed watchmen around their townhouses. When the king arrived at Parliament House with an armed guard of roughly 400 men (on 11 October), both citizens and Parliament responded in alarm, leading to a commission for Leslie to raise city bands to guard Parliament.75 The reaction was met by a royal proclamation addressing ‘the unnecessary confluence of’ Scottish subjects in an attempt to maintain ‘peaceable and regular’ proceedings.76 Charles personally claimed ignorance of the plot but the defensive and hostile reactions of both parliament and the citizens ominously foreshadowed later events in London. Despite the celebratory welcome, the cheers, and the throngs of crowds, Charles failed to convince his Scottish subjects of his good intentions whilst the continued use of ceremony (which Charles intended to reinforce his power) failed to mask the radical dismantling of royal authority in Scotland. For three months, Charles gave many political and religious concessions to the Covenanters, whilst the failure of the Incident ultimately strengthened their position within his three kingdoms. When Charles

74 Argyll carried the crown, the earl of Sutherland carried the sceptre and the earl of Mar carried the sword, see: Spalding, Scottish Troubles, i.355-356.
75 Laing, LJB, i.392; Spalding, Scottish Troubles, i.346.
76 The Kings Most Excellent Majesties Proclamation and the Estates of Parliament in Scotland (London, 1641), titlepage, 1.
informed the Scottish Parliament of the Irish Rebellion (28 October), he had no
 guarantee that the Scots would send an army to fight the rebels.

On his arrival in Edinburgh, Charles had been ‘as welcome to his native Scots,
as ever was the Sun to the frozen earth’. 77 His protracted absence from Scotland was
implicitly criticised even as his physical presence gave hope to those seeking
resolution. Two months later, Lennox, speaking to the Scottish Parliament, remarked
that the king ‘hath beene present here so long, that others beomane… his absence’. 78
Lennox acknowledged that although Scotland was Charles’s native land, London – not
Edinburgh – was the centre of Charles’s power: ‘for a body without a head, what is it
but dead’. In urging the Scottish Parliament to detain the king no longer, Lennox –
although loyal to Charles – implied the king’s presence was no longer necessary in
Scotland now that personal monarchy had been dismantled: ‘the Land receives the
more courage while their King is present, concerning State affayires, then is to be
conceived then can, he being absent’. Having largely wrestled control of state affairs
out of Charles’s hands, Scotland no longer needed Charles’s presence. The king
needed to return to London in order to stop the ‘distractions… in England and Ireland…
which is both wicked & pernicious to the Common wealth’ (including Scotland). 79
Closing his speech, Lennox expressed hope ‘that Caesar may have his due’,
anticipating the motto on the royal banner. 80 Despite evidence of the desire for
reconciliation on both sides in summer 1641 and despite the use of ceremonial forms
to enforce the traditional relationship between king and parliament, political tension
continued to dominate proceedings. The forms themselves also became a site of
tension as the Scots were highly aware of royal symbolism and sought to prevent
Charles performing certain rites. Their refusal to allow Charles to use the royal sceptre
exposed the distance between Charles’s assumption that these monarchical forms were
unquestionable and the Scots’ willingness to challenge and prevent such performances.
Whilst the public were not deprived of spectacle – as had been the case with the

77 A Relation of the Kings Entertainment into Scotland, 3.
79 Ibid., A2v.
80 Ibid., A4.
opening of the Long Parliament – the readiness with which Edinburgh’s citizens stood to defend the city (and the nobles accused of treason) as well as the pointed comments about ‘needless protractions’ suggests the line between street theatre and efficacious political statement remained blurred.\textsuperscript{81}

### 3.3 London, November 1641

As Charles left Edinburgh, preparations in London were already underway for a royal entry. Having been absent from his capital for three months, this entry was Charles’s opportunity to demonstrate to London’s citizens that he was still very much the royal author – in command over parliament and aligned with the city. Whereas the openings of the 1640s parliaments can be read as political negotiations, the royal entry can be read as a process of civic engagement that enabled the city to invest in Charles as king.

The journey from London to Edinburgh in August 1641 had taken exactly two weeks, a sign of Charles’s eagerness to leave behind a parliament intent on pushing him to the ‘periphery of political life’.\textsuperscript{82} This journey paled in comparison to the speed with which Charles returned south: just seven days. Worsening reports of the Irish Rebellion no doubt contributed to his haste, along with Nicholas’s (inaccurate) reports of the slow preparations in parliament.\textsuperscript{83} Nicholas – and so presumably Charles, since they were in regular communication – was also aware of rumblings of discontent amongst the city towards parliament, whilst unease over parliamentary reforms (particularly in religion) was also brewing in the country.\textsuperscript{84} As is evident in Nicholas’s letters, the impetus for a civic welcome came from the city itself. As early as 6 November, Nicholas advised the king ‘to give leave to my Lord Mayor and ye Cittizens here to wayte on you into this town… for ye best of ye Cittizens expresse a great desire to shew their affection therein to your Majestie’. Charles delegated responsibility for the royal preparations to Henrietta Maria, who in turn largely

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\textsuperscript{81} Laing, \textit{LJB}, i.396.

\textsuperscript{82} Adamson, \textit{Noble Revolt}, 439, for a full political reading of the entry see pp.438-446.

\textsuperscript{83} Bray, \textit{Diary of Evelyn}, iv.113; parliament learnt of the rebellion on 1 November and the Commons immediately called for the creation of a Joint Select Committee to investigate whilst ordering £50,000 to be sent to Ireland: \textit{CJ}, ii.300.

\textsuperscript{84} \textit{CSPD 1641-43}, 97: ‘The City is not satisfied with the Parliament about their protecting of their debtors… Like to be here a disturbance about the choice of sherrifs’; Russell, \textit{FBM}, 402-04.
delegated these to Nicholas. As Adamson notes, that Charles chose not to order Essex (as Lord Chamberlain) to oversee these preparations suggests the king still had not forgiven him for his part in sending Strafford to the scaffold or pushing reforms through the Lords.\textsuperscript{85} By 20 November, city preparations were well under way with the Lord Mayor issuing an order to the livery companies to be prepared ‘on horseback, in such array, and such furniture, for the better reception of his Majestie.’\textsuperscript{86}

Charles spent the night before the entry (24 November) at Theobalds, where he was reunited with Henrietta Maria (who journeyed from Oatlands, where she had resided during the king’s absence) and his children (Charles, James, and Mary) as well as the Prince Elector and the duchess of Richmond. Just before 8.00am the following morning, the Lord Mayor (Richard Gurney) dressed in a crimson velvet gown left his house in Old Jewry with the City Recorder (Sir Thomas Gardiner), the aldermen (all wearing their finest scarlet gowns) and the common council. Travelling up Coleman Street and exiting the city at Moorgate they stopped at Moorfields just after 8.00am. Already gathered at Moorfields were forty liverymen from the twelve main companies on horseback dressed in plush, satin, and velvet, wearing a chain of gold and swords. Each liveryman had two attendants on foot dressed in livery coats carrying gilded truncheons (for the first half of procession from Moorfields to Guildhall) and torches (for the evening procession from Guildhall to Whitehall). They also wore the ribbons of the company colours. In further attendance for each company, was another horseman, who rode at the head of the company, bearing the pendant with the company coat of arms. This same man would carry the lead torch for his company in the evening procession. The order in which the companies would progress through the city was based on the order of precedence established by London’s aldermen in 1515. In descending order, the main twelve companies were: the Mercers, the Grocers, the Drapers, the Fishmongers, the Goldsmiths, the Skinners, the Merchant Taylors, the Haberdashers, the Salters, the Ironmongers, the Vinters, and finally the Clothworkers. The civic authorities and liverymen were joined at Moorfields by the noblemen not

\textsuperscript{85} Bray, \textit{Diary of Evelyn}, iv.113; Adamson, \textit{Noble Revolt}, 436-37.
\textsuperscript{86} J.H. \textit{King Charles his entertainment and London’s loyaltie} (London, 1641), A3.
already attending the king. From Moorfields, this procession continued to Hoxton to welcome Charles – originally they were to meet at Shoreditch Church, but such was the state of the roads that an alternative, makeshift route was provided using temporary bridges and planks from Hoxton to Moorfields.

Charles arrived at Baumes House on the northern fringes of Hoxton in the royal coach with his family, the Prince Elector and the duchess of Richmond. There he was greeted by these civic representatives. The Lord Mayor had ordered a tent to be pitched with the intention that Charles would alight from the coach and enter the tent, to hear the recorder’s speech. Whether this part of the ceremony was performed is unclear: one account suggests it does, whilst another suggests Charles heard the recorder’s speech, delivered one of his own, knighted Gurney and Gardiner using the city sword and then alighted with Prince Charles. Since both Charles and his son rode into the city on horseback, it may be that the king did leave the coach prior to the speeches but the prince did not until after the dispensing of knighthoods. Although seemingly trivial, the act of physically stepping down from the coach and placing himself on an equal level with the civic representatives (as opposed to looking down on them from the coach), demonstrated Charles’s eagerness to consolidate the crown’s relationship with the city. Adamson interprets Charles’s speech to the civic representatives as ‘both a highly revisionist account of the various crises past and a summary of his intentions for the immediate future’ in which the meaner sort of people were blamed for the city’s recent troubles. Given the context of the Incident with Argyll and Hamilton, as well as broader fears over the Irish Rebellion, this emphasis on dissent – a move that allowed Charles to praise the Lord Mayor whilst also condemning radicals within the city – enabled the king, once again, to place himself above such factionalism. Following the speeches and the knighthoods, Charles and Prince Charles (if they had not already) then mounted their horses and the procession fell in line to begin the formal entry.

87 J. Taylor, Englands Comfort and Londons Ioy (London, 1641), 4, ‘there was a Tent erected, in which the King lighted and refreshed himselfe and [heard] a learned Speech’; Ovatio Carolina (London, 1641), 13, ‘His Majesty having ended this gracious Speech, was pleased to confer the honour of Knighthood… After these things done, his Majesty and Prince alighted from the Coach, and tooke their horses’.
88 Adamson, Noble Revolt, 441.
As with the opening of the Long Parliament, the nobility were carefully placed within the procession. The livery companies, the sheriff’s men, and other civic delegates formed the majority of the procession, with members of the Lords in between the civic representatives and the king’s immediate retinue. Adamson writes that ‘Charles assigned some of the most prominent places to a series of grandees, all associated (with varying degrees of enthusiasm) with the reformist cause: among them, Lord Littleton (Lord Keeper), and the earls of Holland, Manchester, Salisbury, and Arundel’. The disposition, Adamson concludes, ‘clearly reflects the king’s success in surrounding himself with the known advocates of moderate reform’. However, this assessment overstates the role of the nobility within both the structure of the entry and broader political manoeuvrings. The peers Charles included in his inner cohort were not really in a position to object: to refuse to participate would have meant showing their hand in open opposition to the king. Moreover, the placing of these men according to their position within Charles’s government is not dissimilar to the processional order for either of parliament’s openings in 1640. Lord Keeper Littleton and the Lord Privy Seal (Manchester) rode in tandem at the front of this central column. Whilst Manchester’s son, Lord Mandeville, was one of the Twelve Peers who signed the petition in August 1640, Manchester (who died in November 1642) had helped raise funds for both of Charles’s Scottish wars (in 1639 and 1640). Littleton was a recent appointment (January 1641) and his loyalty would be subsequently questioned but illness had prevented him taking part in Strafford’s trial: which seems, in Charles’s eyes, to have been the benchmark of loyalty. After these two nobles, the Prince of Wales rode on horseback, surrounded by sergeants at arms. Following Prince Charles, was the Lord Mayor, bearing the city’s sword, flanked by the Garter King-at-Arms and a gentleman usher. This arrangement was not unusual: in April and November 1640, those bearing the insignia of state had been well protected. The positioning of the herald and usher around the Lord Mayor was thus a nod to the importance placed on the city’s symbols of government. Behind the city’s sword, rode the marquess of Hertford, flanked by the Lord Great Chamberlain (the earl of Lindsey) and Earl

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89 Ibid., 442.
Marshall Arundel. Arundel presided over Strafford’s trial but voted against the attainder, whilst Lindsey was a moderate, but uncontroversial, reformer. Hertford bore the sword of state, which as Adamson notes was unexpected, since Lennox was the more senior peer. 90 Hertford was also one of the Twelve Peers, and his position directly in front of the king mirrors that of Essex’s position in the opening of the Long Parliament. It is perhaps, in this context that the positioning should be read: as an attempt to offer the same token of favour (in a highly ritualised format) as was offered to Essex without any promise of political advancement.

After the king and the royal coach (containing the royal family), rode the Master of the Horse. Hamilton had held this post since 1628 and had been instrumental in pushing Charles’s religious policy in Scotland prior to 1640. Despite the Incident, he had returned immediately to the king’s side, unlike Argyll, and had ridden in the same position in the opening of the Short Parliament. The Captain of the Gentlemen Pensioners (the earl of Salisbury) followed Hamilton, again occupying the same position within the king’s immediate retinue in the opening of the Short and Long Parliament. Behind Salisbury and the Gentlemen Petitioners, rode Holland, Captain General Beyond (north of) the Trent. Charles gave Holland this position in April 1641: Holland was one of the peers who did not vote on the attainder of Strafford (although he was a witness for the prosecution). As Groom of the Stool, his appearance in the procession was to be expected, although his position here emphasised the martial and protective nature of his duties as Lord General. Holland had been closely associated with the puritan faction in the Lords since spring 1640. 91 His position here was also a reflection on his role in the Second Bishops’ War: Holland was immediately followed by Viscount Grandison and the principal commanders of the 1640 campaign. Of all eight peers at the heart of the procession, only one (Hertford) signed the Petition of the Twelve Peers. The one exception, in which a royal insult is evident, is Essex. As Lord Chamberlain of the Household, Essex’s presence in the ceremony was unquestionable:

90 Ibid.
91 CSPD 1639–40, 278: Viscount Conway remarked of Warwick and Holland, ‘the one is their visible and the other their invisible head, not because he means to do either good or hurt, but because he thinks it is a gallantry to be the principal pillar on which a whole cabal must rely’.
it was a duty of his office. However, he did not ride with other officers of state or household: instead he was relegated to the ranks of nobility without office. In this, it would appear Charles was indeed employing non-verbal partisanship, but it raises the question of whether Charles or Essex were aware of the political implication: Strafford appeared in the apex of the procession for the Short Parliament, but not that of the Long Parliament. Four months later, he was dead. Essex appeared in the apex of the procession for the Long Parliament, but not that of the royal entry. Was he now politically spent? Beyond the insult to Essex, the peers who most desired reform simply did not attend. Whether they intended to snub the king through their absence, or thought it best to avoid a very public situation (in which their loyalty could be questioned), the emphasis on the entry was on the king and the citizens of London, who made up the body of the procession, contributed the funds, and lined the streets to witness him. This was not the ‘language of faction’ between king and parliament, but the language of harmony between king and city.92

As such, when the procession returned through Moorfields to Moorgate, they were greeted by a band of seven trumpeters, waiting to welcome the king on the boundaries of the city. The procession then turned left, eastwards along London Wall to Bishopsgate, before turning right and south along Cornhill past the conduit flowing with wine. Passing the Exchange, a band of seven trumpeters issued a second welcome to the king, before the procession continued westwards, approximately two-thirds of the way along Cheapside, passed the Greater Conduit (also flowing with wine), until the right-hand turn leading up St Lawrence Lane. Along the left-hand side of the route from Bishopsgate to St Lawrence Lane stood members from nine of the twelve main companies, ranked according to precedence. The Mercer’s company stood closest to St Lawrence Lane, with the other eight (from the Grocers to the Salters) arranged in descending order of importance back towards Bishopsgate. The road between Moorgate and Bishopsgate was similarly lined with members from inferior companies. Each company had a wooden stand, the rails of which were covered with blue cloth, decorated with their flags, banners, pendants, and escutcheons. The right-hand side of

92 Adamson, *Noble Revolt*, 444; the Commons did not attend the entry in any formal capacity.
the route was also railed off, roughly four or five feet in front of the houses that lined the streets. These rails were less about demarcating the livery companies’ stands and more an act of dividing the procession from the spectators who gathered to watch the entry. At a distance of five feet, liverymen sat mounted on horseback, ensuring order and enabling the procession to proceed without incident. The presence of the liverymen contributed to the visual splendour of the procession but also acted as a guard should the behaviour of the spectators turn sour. The repeated use of guards and rails, in 1640 and 1641, reveals, as Smuts and Peacey have noted, the concern for decorum and the desire to stage-manage crowd behaviour.93 St Lawrence Lane being too narrow to construct rails or mount a guard of horse or foot, the liverymen on horseback and their attendants rested in St Paul’s churchyard, whilst the Lord Mayor and civic authorities conducted the king to Guildhall. Arriving around 1:30pm to the sound of music, the king and his royal party were conducted to council chambers to rest before dinner.

At 2.00pm dinner was served in the Hall. The king and his royal retinue sat at the east end, a raised area known as Hustings Court. The king sat with Henrietta Maria to his left, both under the cloth of state, and Prince Charles to his right. Next to Prince Charles sat the Prince Elector, whilst on the left of the queen sat Princess Mary and then Prince James. At the north-end of the table (to Charles’s right) sat the musicians, who entertained the court throughout the dinner. Running lengthways down the hall (from east to west) were two parallel tables, raised a couple of feet off the ground, at which the lords and ladies ate. Although no names are given, these were members of the nobility: the peers, officers of state, officers of the royal household, and their wives. At the west end, a table was set for the King’s Pensioners. ‘The others’, the civic representatives, dined in other rooms. Although they could witness the dinner from the west door, they did not feast with the king. The royal banquet thus resembled something of a tableau: a vision of courtly harmony in which the king presided over the banquet, his nobility in attendance. In doing so the civic representatives also created a ‘home from home’ – in which spectators could go to Whitehall to watch the

93 Smuts, ‘Public ceremony’, 74-5; Peacey, ‘Street Theatre’, 163.
king dine – implying the king was as welcome (and should be as comfortable) in
Guildhall as in his own palace. In total around 150 people were entertained and fed at
Guildhall with approximately 170 dishes for the royal table in the Hustings and some
500 dishes for lords and ladies, and pensioners’ tables in the hall. After dinner, the
Lord Mayor, on behalf of the city, presented Charles with £30,000 and Charles
knighted John Pettus (the Lord Mayor’s son-in-law). Once more, it is unclear whether
the gift-giving proceeded the knighthood or vice versa. However, it seems sensible
(albeit a little cynical) that Charles would seek to honour the city and express his thanks
for the gift – which clearly had been collected in advance of the entry – and the
impromptu knighthood demonstrated the high regard in which the king now held the
city.

The king, the royal family, the nobility, and the civic authorities left Guildhall
around 4.00pm. The 500 liverymen had already returned to their positions along
Cheapside ready to continue the second half of the procession. Going west, the
procession passed the Little Conduit (again flowing with wine), turning south to pass
by St Paul’s. The livery companies which had not had stands along the morning’s route,
now stood along the route to Temple Bar, beginning with the Ironmongers, Vinters,
and Clothworkers (the last of the Great Twelve). Torches replaced the truncheons of
the liverymen’s attendants and the horseman at the front of each company also bore a
torch. Turning at the northeast of St Paul’s, the procession wound its way along the
eastern wall to the south door of the cathedral. Here, the king was greeted by the choir
singing an Anthem of praise to God, accompanied by sackbuts and cornetts. The
procession must then have passed through Ludgate in order to continue onto Fleet
Street, passed the Fleet Street Conduit (unsurprisingly, also flowing with wine) to
reach Temple Bar. Here at Temple Bar, occurred one of the few unscripted incidents
that made it into printed accounts of the entry. Subjects Happiness describes how:

having marched as farre as Temple Barre, the Martiall Society of
Westminster in no lesse state, and ambitious desire of service, entertaine
his Majesty, The City duty, and power are here both limited, the traine
Bands returne, but the Lord Mayor and his Brethren with the rest who were on horseback prosecute their service to White-hall.\textsuperscript{94}

Westminster’s trained bands had not participated in the ceremonial entry, since Westminster precinct was outside London’s city walls. Thus, when the procession reached Temple Bar, the Westminster men were eager to lead the remainder of the journey, as a demonstration of their loyalty to Charles. In this, they were overridden and the procession continued (with or without the additional support of Westminster’s trained bands) to Whitehall. It is perhaps for this reason that other accounts of the entry did not refer to this incident: since the procession continued as planned, they saw no need to include it. On reaching Whitehall, the king gave his thanks and retired. The 500 liverymen and footmen then escorted the Lord Mayor back to his house in Old Jewry, a sign perhaps of the high esteem in which Gurney was now held.

It would therefore appear that Adamson’s assessment of the entry as ‘the language of faction’ overstates the role of parliament within the ceremony and overlooks the importance of this event for the city itself. Regardless of the presence or absence of the peers (who in absenting themselves due to political dissent pre-figured the later actions of parliamentarian supporters in the towns Charles would later visit), the entry emphasised the unique bond between court and city. Admittedly, said bond had been stretched in recent years, but it was one that the Lord Mayor and aldermen hoped would now be strengthened, despite resistance from the common council. This hope is borne out in the praises, poems, and other printed texts contemporaries produced, which drew upon a range of motifs already alluded to in Charles’s entry to Edinburgh and the openings of the 1640 parliaments. The most familiar of these was the mourning motif: Charles’s ‘absence had caused a generall mourning Vesture to be worn throughout the whole Realme’ but now the city of London:

\begin{quote}
 having now put off[f] at the sight of his beame, all their mourning habiliments, with which since his departure they have bin dead, appears now as illustrious in their habits, as joyfull in their hearts, and by their
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{94} \textit{The sviects happinesse, and the citizens joy} (London, 1641), A4.
externall Ceremonies acquaint the desirous Subject, with their internall and most ample conceived happinesse.\textsuperscript{95}

The reference to external ceremonies is particularly worthy of note given the Venetian ambassador’s criticism of the half-hearted ceremonies surrounding the Long Parliament. It suggests that the ceremonies – by virtue of being publicly performed – had a truer intent than those performed behind closed doors. Such ceremony did not come cheap: the performers in the procession are ‘so illustriously bedect, that you would imagine they had ransackt the Treasurie of all the City to present it to their Soveraign’. Meanwhile the feast was such a sumptuous Banquet, that by report, ‘the oldest man now living never knew the like’.\textsuperscript{96} The cost to the city was astronomical: £30,000 as a gift for the king, around £10,000 for the ceremonial elements, and Gurney contributed £4,000 from his personal funds. The shouts and cheers from the spectators suggest it was money well spent: ‘the Lord preserve our dread Soveraigne King Charles’ and ‘God blesse and long live King Charles and Queen Mary’ were met by their Majesties reciprocally, and heartily, blessing and thanking the people, with as great expressions of joy’.\textsuperscript{97} The vocal acclamations were complemented – but not superseded – by the ringing of bells and the music that greeted Charles along the procession: ‘the Bells Ring forth their melodies the Silver Trumpet sounded forth piercing Ecchoes, the Bon-fires blazing on high, but yet the voyce of the Kings loyall Subjects farre exceeded all the rest of the musick’ wrote one author, confirmed by another’s account of ‘14 Trumpets with Banners in Scarlet Cloaks, Sac-Buts, Cornets and all instruments of musick usuall with bells ringing at 121 parish Churches’.\textsuperscript{98} In both these accounts, the sound of bells is specific to the second half of the procession after the Guildhall entertainment. Whilst it is tempting to presume the bells were rung throughout the day, the sound of church bells in the late afternoon, combined with the lit torches and bonfires would have had a powerful effect on those witnessing or

\textsuperscript{95} Great Britaines time of triumph (London, 1641), A2; The svbiects happinesse, A3.
\textsuperscript{96} Great Britaines time, A3; The svbiects happinesse, A3.
\textsuperscript{97} Great Britaines time, A3; Ovatio Carolina, 17.
\textsuperscript{98} Great Britaines time, A3v; Englands Comfort, Londons Joy, 5.
performing in the procession. The torch light and noise also tied into the martial motif that dominates descriptions of the liverymen:

prepared themselves in all their warlik abiliments, as if Mars himselfe the God of Battel had been their conducter: whereby what with the sounding of Trumpets, bouncing of Muskets, and Ratling of Drums, the very aire azure seemed to rejoynce, adding Ecchoes to their felicity.  

The audio-visual effect of this display reflected the city’s loyalty to Charles but also contributed to the concept of the city as performer. Whilst the liverymen were dressed in martial finery, the city too decked itself in adornments. These adornments were primarily material: ‘The outside of the houses, all the way their Majesties passed, being beautified with rich Tapestry’, ‘the glory and riches of Cheapeside, and Lumbard-street, were not only in their shops, but worn on mens shoulders, their gownes all of one colour expresse the vnitie and integrity of their minds’. Such description homogenised London’s citizens until there was no room for dissent, until the citizens were literally sewn into the landscape: ‘The bankes hedges, high-ways, streets, stalls, and windowes were all embroydered with millions of people, of all sorts and fashions’. Such imagery also, as Cressy notes, renders Charles almost invisible in the account as the descriptions of London’s citizens and guilds give prominence to the city.

The royal entry into London, in contrast to Charles’s arrival in Edinburgh, encapsulated what Shaw terms ‘knowingly maintained propaganda’. The visit to Edinburgh drew crowds of citizens to witness the king’s arrival, it was a ‘spontaneous subjection’ on the part of the subjects towards their king as little beyond a formal address from Balfour and the civic ritual of exchanging keys was prepared. In contrast, the royal entry into London was a staged event whose preparation involved both civic officials (the Lord Mayor, aldermen, and livery companies) and members of the court

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99 Great Britaines time, A2v.
100 Ovatio Carolina, 16. The subjects happinesse, A3.
(Henrietta Maria, Nicholas, and heralds). It was a propaganda event, designed to capture the minds of those who acted in and watched the procession, restoring faith in the king whilst alienating the reforming faction in parliament. However, the distinction is not as clear-cut as Shaw implies. Participants in the triumphal entry – largely Londoners, who were, ‘uniquely among the monarchs’ lowlier subjects’ incorporated into the body politic by virtue of their geographical and economic proximity to court – engaged with the ritual at an individual level through the very act of participation.104

As spectators’ comments reveal, the ritual was not absolutely pervasive; signs of dissent and distrust remained. In Edinburgh, the crowds lining Charles’s route to Parliament House were spontaneous, but the presence of a gentleman to walk before the king in order to create a path through the throngs, suggests a level of propagandistic awareness within the royal circle and an improvised attempted to enforce the desired image of kingly propriety. Like Edinburgh’s citizens, it is possible that the crowds lining London’s streets turned out, regardless of their private opinion of the king, to watch the spectacle (the first royal entry of Charles’s reign), not to absorb the political message. Whilst a multitude of pamphlets celebrated the entry as a triumphal affirmation of the city’s loyalty to Charles, private worries and concerns suggest the entry – although successful as a theatrical event – remained unconvincing as a demonstration of royal authority.

3.4 London, winter 1641-42

Whilst Charles’s royal entry was a grand theatrical affair and the presence of such large crowds could be read as an ‘abundance of popular loyalty which the king could yet draw upon’, for many within the circle of government, it was an unconvincing display.105 The entry encouraged expectations that Charles and parliament could still reach an agreement that would protect the Church of England from idolatry whilst ‘broadening the base of government’.106 Charles’s subsequent actions in response to

105 Sharpe, Image Wars, 238.
106 Russell, FBM, 238.
the city’s petitions and in regard to the reforming faction in parliament certainly indicate his belief that this would be the case. For the reformers, the royal entry only served to heighten their zeal. On the eve of the entry, anxious members of parliament feared that the people, ‘grown tired of so much violence [in London]’ would welcome the king, ‘contemplating a return to their old loyalty and devotion to his Majesty’. Alarmed by the reception of the king, these men, ‘fearful that the support of the people may fail them’, drew up a paper ‘with all the disorders which have taken place in the government’. The Grand Remonstrance was carried through the Commons by 158 to 149 votes three days before the royal entry, signalling an important win for those who no longer believed the rhetoric of Charles’s ceremonial performance. Whilst Charles reviewed this paper, others were also unhappy; a week after the triumph, one courtier wrote ‘since the King’s coming all things have not happened so much to his contentment as by his magnificent entertainment was expected. The day after his coming, he was expected at parliament, but left for Hampton Court’. And whilst the Venetian ambassador reported that ‘the pomp and circumstance’ of the entry ‘give rise to hopes that the aspect of affairs here may yet change’, two weeks later he reported on the city’s fear that Charles’s retirement to Hampton Court for Christmas was a sign he was abandoning it to the machinations of parliament. This ambivalent attitude towards the king was mirrored by the civic authorities, who, remembering the cancelled entries of 1626 and 1633, staged neither dramatic presentations nor civic pageants, although the entertainment at Guildhall alone cost £1,786. In 1633 in particular, London’s citizens hoped that because Charles performed a public entry into Edinburgh, he would perform a similar entry on his return to London:

His Majesty’s entry into this city will be delayed for some months still. An idea is current that as the crowned king of Scotland, he will have to make a public state entry here also, to be celebrated by arrangements and functions which the people are here devising.

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107 CSPVen 1640-42, 251.
108 Ibid., 254; the timing seems unlikely to have been coincidental see: Russell, FBM, 428-29; CJ, ii.322.
109 CSPD 1641-43, 188; LJ, iv.452 Charles told the House of Lords he had a cold.
111 LMA, COL/CC/01/01/041 f. 9.
112 CSPVen 1632-36, 132.
Sharpe notes that given the time of year, Charles would have been eager to retire from the city for the summer, and that the lack of formal ceremony did not prevent London’s citizens from ‘greeting him at the waterside’. However, the cancellation of these entries revealed ‘an unthinking sovereign’ who cared little for the money already spent and the inconvenience caused; it led to judgement being passed on the king, that he was ‘unresponsive to the people and to tradition’. In 1641, this undertone of pessimism existed partly because of fear the entry would be cancelled and partly because of the evident discord between king and parliament, a discord in which the city was being pulled and pushed as the Lord Mayor and aldermen inclined towards the king whilst the common council leant towards the Commons. The excitement and anticipation of the entry had also been tempered because the entry was, in many respects, an oddity for the city. Charles’s coronation ceremony had been postponed in 1625 (James died on 27 March at Theobalds, Hertfordshire) due to plague and was not held until 2 February the following year. Although Cressy notes the importance of the ritual in confirming Charles’s monarchy, the sense that ‘kingship was incomplete’ without the ritual, the coronation ceremony was not as grand as those of his father or Elizabeth. The court cancelled the official ceremonial entry into the city of London and Charles did not travel to Westminster Abbey in his carriage along the Strand but rather travelled in the royal barge down the Thames. Richards is highly critical of this decision and suggests many felt ‘surprise, disappointment… disapproval’ at this ‘private’ display. Less critical of Charles, Sharpe calls this decision a ‘miscalculation’, while Cressy suggests it was fear of plague, rather than Charles’s aloofness, that led to this decision. Disease – or rather fear of it – certainly seems to have influenced royal movements throughout Charles’s reign, however, the decision not to allow members of the public into Westminster Abbey can certainly be

113 Sharpe, Image Wars, 235; Sharpe, Personal Rule, 782.
115 Cressy, People of England, 66.
117 Sharpe, Personal Rule, 105; Cressy, People of England, 66.
criticised. By refusing to allow the public the chance to view the coronation ritual itself, Charles was (inadvertently or otherwise) already distancing himself from his subjects.

Following the coronation ritual, there were other opportunities to witness royal ceremonial in the city. As Sharpe has argued, in 1637, Charles staged a reception for the Moroccan ambassador that included the unveiling of his new British flagship, *The Sovereign of the Seas*. Likewise, in 1638, when Marie de Medici sailed to Dover, Charles met her at Colchester and accompanied her on the journey through London to St James’s Palace. However, whilst it is true that these events, as Sharpe interprets them, are proof that ‘the later 1630s… were not years devoid of public spectacle’, there is an importance distinction between these ceremonies and the royal entry into London. In both the Moroccan ambassador’s reception and Marie de Medici’s welcome, emphasis was placed not on the relation between Charles and his English subjects, but on the king as part of a broader European monarchical culture.

The celebrations on each occasion were designed to impress the foreign visitor – they were entertainments that demonstrated England’s wealth and power rather than celebrations of Charles as king. Sharpe’s discussion of Charles’s enrichment of the ceremonies around the Order of the Garter and the enhancement of the public aspects of this ceremony – for instance, dining in St George’s Hall at Windsor – should also be seen in this light. Even though the Garter rituals were performed on a public stage, Charles used these performances to reaffirm the social bond with his aristocracy not to consolidate his bond as king with his subjects.

This is further supported by the changing nature of the royal progress under Charles. Cressy has recently demonstrated that Charles regularly travelled away from Whitehall with his court, and that occasions when these progresses were changed or

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118 Cressy notes that in the twice-yearly ceremony of touching for the king’s evil, Charles did not personally touch his subjects and tokens were issued to scrofula applicants waiting to be touched in an attempt to impose order on, and control, the crowd, see: Cressy, *People of England*, 157-8.


cancelled were the result of unforeseen events such as plague (in 1625 and 1637) or pregnancy (in 1638). However, a closer analysis of these journeys reveals that Charles favoured royal palaces and the two universities (Oxford and Cambridge) over private houses or towns outside the Thames Valley – although he visited the Isle of Wight twice in the late 1620s – and that these progresses were highly formalised and scripted events that did little to enhance the king’s visibility or accessibility among his subjects. Compared to Elizabeth, whom Sharpe notes ‘spent 1,200 days in progress, or nearly a tenth of her time on the throne’, Charles’s progresses again appear to emphasise the celebration of monarchy within an elite setting rather than incorporating and engaging with English citizens. Smuts argued that as celebrations of monarchy increasingly turned inwards towards the court, the increase of spectacle and ceremony of Lord Mayor Pageants during this period enabled ‘the traditions of the royal entry [into London] to survive even in the monarch’s absence’. Nonetheless, the lack of civic engagement and spectacle by the king with the citizens of London, and his more far-flung subjects, damaged the culture of monarchical celebration that endorsed the relationship between king and subjects.

Despite this ambivalence, the entry and Charles’s warm words to the Lord Mayor and civic authorities placed him in a powerful position against parliament, who could no longer rely upon the city to protect its members against the king. Charles’s subsequent meetings with representatives of the common council also appeared to signal an improvement in his relationship with the city. Following his return to Whitehall, Charles had retired to Hampton Court, but the court was back at Whitehall by 11 December. In returning to the city, Charles fulfilled a promise made the previous week to a committee of citizens, who petitioned Charles to return to Whitehall for the festive season, as ‘Their Residence there, would give a good quickning, to the retayling Trade; and by consequence to the Merchant’. The petitioners also expressed

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123 Sharpe, Selling the Monarchy, 430; these progresses could still be expensive for the host town or city as Charles often travelled with a large retinue including his court jester. For costs incurred by the mayors of Plymouth and Totnes during his visit in autumn 1625, see: J. Wasson (ed.), Devon. Records of Early English Drama (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 1986), 269-71, 282.
124 Smuts, ‘Public ceremony’, 84.
125 CSPD 1641-43, 194.
fear over the recent unrest, taking care to emphasise that the ‘most considerable part of the Citizens of London, had not any hand, in the disorders’ and suggesting that Charles’s presence at Whitehall might help to end the unrest. In presenting these petitions, the petitioners signalled a desire to maintain a working relationship with the king, and their faith in his ability to restore order to the city. Charles spontaneously embraced the opportunity to tie the city and crown together, calling London, ‘the chief limb of his crown, and that upon which his greatness rested’ and knighting seven of the aldermen as a show of his appreciation. This simple act, performed on a whim, galvanised London in support of the king, leading Thomas Wiseman to criticise the ‘sedition of the Sectaries and others ill affected’ who thought they spoke on the city’s behalf.

The collective feeling of devotion did not last, as the king’s attempt to arrest the Five Members (5 January 1642) shattered the illusion of harmony between crown and city, increasing fears of an ‘insurrection’. The attempted arrest also alienated peers in the Lords who had previously tempered the reforming zeal. The Lords agreed with the Commons that the king, by entering Westminster not only uninvited but with an armed guard, had destroyed the institution’s sanctity and threatened the members’ privileges. It was into this politically tense atmosphere that Elizabeth’s Golden Speech to her 1601 parliament was republished, in an attempt to avert conflict. It did not prevent parliament from adjourning and ordering committees to meet in the city until parliament reconvened (on 11 January), while the Commons openly defied the king’s orders by reopening the sealed studies of the accused members and arresting ‘those that sealed them’. Charles, having failed to convince the common council that his actions were justified by the presence of ‘traitors’ within parliament (whose advice he would otherwise accept), left Whitehall for the safety of Hampton Court (10 January). Charles’s departure suggested he did not believe his relationship with the city could

126 Ovatio Carolina, 25-7.
127 Ibid., 27-8; the eighth alderman was already a knight: CSPVen 1640–42, 261.
128 CSPD 1641–43, 192.
129 Ibid., 241-44.
130 Sharpe, Selling the Monarchy, 469.
131 CSPD 1641–43, 239.
be salvaged since the authorities not only failed to prevent the tumults and protests on the streets against his actions but also provided an armed guard the next day (11 January) to escort the Five Members back to parliament. Only a handful of lords and courtiers went with him. The city at this point was still divided in its loyalty, although both Pearl and Russell have argued that parliament’s supporters were much better organised and proactive in demonstrating their support. The arming of citizens to protect parliament and Charles’s flight from London signalled not only Charles’s inability to command the city but also his misunderstanding of what the city (divided as it was) expected from him. As with the Scots, Charles misjudged London’s civic authorities and citizens in presuming that his use of monarchical forms of authority (both spoken addresses and ceremonial rites) would be loyally accepted and obeyed. The irregularity of the use of ceremonial forms in both London and Edinburgh in these years enabled performers in and spectators of these rites to question them – even within the framework of the ritual.

3.5 On the road to Nottingham

For the next seven months the king, deprived of his court at Whitehall – and the public visibility that London had offered him – was on the road, the grand visual demonstrations of monarchical splendour increasingly replaced by the written and spoken word. In appealing to towns and counties across England, Charles also called upon ritual forms that the country had not witnessed in centuries, namely the Commission of Array. The efficacy of both this Commission and the raising of the standard as royal forms of authority were severely limited by the tension many local authorities felt in accepting the symbolism of these forms without committing the town to the king’s military cause. The delayed utilisation of written forms further indicates Charles’s reliance on performatives as proof of his kingship and suggests royal expectations of these forms were too high, as loyalty to the crown was no longer a

132 The King Majesty’s Demand to the House of Commons together with the Speech to the Court of Aldermen and Common Council (London, 1641); CSPD 1641–43, 246–47, 252.
133 V. Pearl, London and the Outbreak of the Puritan Revolution (London: Oxford University Press, 1961); Russell, FBM, chapt.11.
given. The road to war was by no means linear and even after the standard was raised, Charles lacked ‘the military might to demand obedience’. Moreover, deprived of London’s ‘reservoir of talent and manpower’, canvassing towns and currying favour among the civic officials became a crucial stratagem for Charles. Yet, contrary to royal expectations, not all civic authorities were willing to offer money, men, or munitions to the king’s cause. Even York, the town to which the king fled, was reluctant to become the king’s military and administrative base. The journey from Hampton Court to York took over two months, indicative perhaps of Charles’s hope for ‘some sort of concession’. Prior to his arrival at York, Charles saw Henrietta Maria and his daughter, Princess Mary, on board ship at Dover and wrested Prince Charles from the protection of Hertford (and in doing so, freed his son from parliamentary control). On their way to York in early March, Charles and the Prince of Wales were entertained at St John’s College, Cambridge and Cowley’s _The Guardian_ was performed before Prince Charles at Trinity College.

The establishment of the court at York was a strategic move even though initial attendance of courtiers was low and funds were low as the Tonnage and Poundage Act was due to expire in March. The Council of the North had been based there until its abolition in 1641; a royal mint was still in operation (a remnant from the Bishops’ Wars); Charles had been warmly received in 1639; and control of the city was key in gaining control of his northern lands.

On 19 March 1642, Charles and his retinue were met approximately one mile beyond the walls of York by the mayor, aldermen, recorder, and several prominent gentlemen. According to customary ritual, the recorder spoke on behalf of the citizens and welcomed the king to the town, before conducting him through the gate. The two

135 Carlton, _Personal Monarch_, 234.
136 Russell, _FBM_, 486.
137 Communications suggest plans to send Princess Mary to join her husband were already underway in winter 1641-42 see, _CSPD_ 1641-43, 250.
138 A. Nelson (ed.), _Cambridge. Records of Early English Drama_ (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 1989), i.699-701; Cowley’s play remained unpublished until 1650 and later appeared revised as _The Cutter of Coleman Street_ in 1661, for the political significance of Cowley’s revisions, see: T. Kaouk, ‘“Perjur’d Rebel”: Equivocal Allegiance and Abraham Cowley’s “Cutter of Coleman Street”’, _Restoration: Studies in English Literary Culture_, 1660-1700. 33:02 (Fall, 2009).
139 Rushworth, _Historical collections_, iv.559.
accounts of Charles’s arrival at York are both royalist and are problematic in that the writers, like those reporting on the entries to Edinburgh and London, homogenise York’s citizens: they are presented as a joyful multitude ‘embroidering’ the streets, sending up congratulatory cheers at Charles’s arrival. The recorder’s speech, however, reveals more division, vacillating between joy at the king’s presence and sadness for the reasons that caused it. Drawing upon the familiar sun motif, with echoes of Balfour’s ‘frozen earth’, the recorder praises the timing of Charles’s arrival ‘with the approach of the Sunne, made a double Spring in Yorke: As the Sunne in Plants, So His Majestie in the hearts of all his loyall Subjects’. In contrast to the previous year, when the citizens were ‘joyful for your presence’, now they ‘are traduced with passion for your absence’. Reminiscent of Lennox’s description of London as a body without a head, the recorder also figures London as the centre of Charles’s government; ‘your Palace at Westminster wants in expectation of your presence’. This led John Strickland to remark that the king showed ‘no pleasing Countenance at those words, nor gave no answer at all’. Having entered the city gates, the procession conducted the king through the streets towards King’s Manor, pausing ‘in the midst of the City’ to present Charles with gifts. Performing on behalf of York’s citizens, and in a markedly civic space, the civic authorities gifted Charles two Golden Flaggons and two golden cups. Although expensive, these gifts in no way demonstrated the town or county’s open commitment to support a war. As would later be made more explicit, York’s response to Charles’s presence and request for financial and political assistance was as much about protecting its own as it was a demonstration of loyalty to the king. In fact, so increasingly obvious was York’s reluctance to become the king’s power base that when Charles eventually left for Nottingham, he declared, ‘no provocation shall provoke me to make this place to be the seat of the war’.

With no musicians and reduced attendance of his courtiers, Charles’s court in York was thus a ghostly version of the court at Whitehall, reinforcing the appearance

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141 Strickland, *The Kings entertainment*.
of a king in exile. Despite the gradual arrival of loyal peers and commoners, including Clarendon, Saville, Littleton, and Paget, Charles’s absence from London and estrangement from parliament was increasingly interpreted as a fatal blow to the body politic. Essex and Holland, who had refused to attend the king at Hampton Court, once more refused Charles’s summons to attend him in York and resigned their posts (as Lord Chamberlain and Groom of the Stool respectively). Although Charles ordered the transferral of some instruments of power (including the Law Courts and the Great Seal) suggesting that theoretically the king could rule from anywhere, he could only do so if his subjects understood the validity of his geographically-displaced authority and acknowledged parliament as rebels. For them to do that, he needed to raise support, especially after the incident at Hull (23 April 1642) revealed the extent to which his power over the militia had diminished and that of parliament’s grown.

In advance of his visit to Hull, during which Charles intended to seize control of the town’s arsenal (the largest outside London), the king sent the duke of York and the Elector Palatine to meet the town’s governor, Sir John Hotham (22 April). Hotham and the mayor officially entertained their royal guests, who subsequently stayed the night. Wary of Charles’s intentions as he approached the following day, Hotham – with the support of the town’s MP, Peregrine Pelham, but not the mayor – closed the gates to the king, refusing to allow him and his 300-strong retinue to enter the town. After asking for and being refused entry a second time, Charles was forced to retreat without the arsenal: the whole event was, as Cust accurately describes, ‘elaborately theatrical’ but ultimately futile. The incident revealed the strength of obedience parliament could command in the localities despite such obedience placing men such as Hotham (former MP for Scarborough) in direct opposition to the king. However, it also revealed the factionalism among the local authorities who were divided in their support for king or parliament. The tension at Hull between governor and mayor typified civic reactions to Charles’s request for financial and military support in spring

143 Lord Saville and the earl of Sainsbury also refused the summons although Saville did eventually join the king in May, see: Russell, FBM, 502-3, 511-12.
144 For details of political and military manoeuvrings see: LJ, v.28-9.
145 Cust, A Political Life, 340.
and summer 1642 as he sought to build an army. Charles immediately charged Hotham with treason, which parliament countered with a declaration that vindicated Hotham’s actions. Instead, parliament argued that the king, in attempting to use military force to enter the town, and in charging a member of parliament with treason, was guilty of ‘A great Infringment of the Liberty of the Subject, and the Law of the Land’ and ‘a high breach of the priviledge of Parliament’.  

Charles’s public denunciation of Hotham was one of a series of royal texts issued between January and August 1642. Although the king was initially slower than parliament to grasp the importance of print, these months witnessed a rapid increase in production of royalist propaganda, largely orchestrated by Clarendon. These texts would form part of a broader corpus of royalist writing during the Civil War that was incredibly varied in style, genre, and language, although as Sharpe notes, following the publication of Charles’s speech at Marston Moor (July 1644) Charles did not authorise the publication of subsequent speeches until 1648. De Groot has argued that royalist texts encouraged ‘passivity or submissive subjectivity’ in their readers, that they were ‘expression[s] of officially sanctioned Royalism... predicated upon hierarchical structures of identity and loyalty’. However, this assessment is perhaps too simplistic and de Groot’s suggestion that royalists were implicitly conservative overlooks the range of counsel (from absolutist to conservative) Charles received from the Council of War and the variant settlements the Oxford Parliament proposed between 1644-45. His suggestion that royalists were scared of print because it enabled public debates and generated popular responses that challenged the hierarchy is also slightly restrictive as it implies all royalists were elite. Beyond the texts authorised for publication by the king, royalist literary output was hugely varied, from high poetry (John Denham’s *Coopers Hill*) to low (Brome’s bawdy poems that delighted in intoxication); from broadsheets and street ballads (notably those penned by Martin Parker, whom McElligott deems ‘the most famous composer of street ballads of his

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146 *The declaration and votes of both Houses of Parliament, concerning the magazine at Hull, and Sir Iohn Hotham governour thereof* (London: Robert Barker, 1642), 6; *LJ*, v.16-17.
147 Sharpe, *Image Wars*, 289; Sharpe argues that this was a deliberate strategy designed to position Charles above ongoing discussions for a settlement and reinforce his centrality through his silence.
day’) to royalist newsbooks (such as *Mercurius Aulicus*) that celebrated courage for the king irrespective of class.¹⁴⁹

Many of the texts Clarendon scripted were designed for national circulation and styled as ‘Answers’ or ‘Replies’ to texts issued by parliament or petitions presented by various counties.¹⁵⁰ In responding to country petitions, Charles sought to charm the petitioners by aligning their concerns to his. Responding to the petition from Lancaster, Charles graciously thanked them for ‘your desire of a good Understanding between his Majestie and his two houses of Parliament’, which was no more than his ‘Just and Necessary Desire’ whilst urging them to direct ‘your Zeal and Knowledge’ as ‘loyall and true affected Subjects’ to assist him in protecting ‘the true Protestant Profession’.¹⁵¹ Charles’s response to a petition from Cumberland and Westmoreland utilised similar language, praising the petitioners’ ‘Duty and Affection’, emphasising his magnanimity in assenting ‘to many good Bils’ and encouraging them to ‘embrace all good means that might tend to a happy union’.¹⁵² In both these petitions and others, Charles was presented as a reasonable and thoughtful king, willing to reconcile with parliament and desirous of calming his subjects’ fears. Aligning the royal cause to the principles parliament claimed as theirs – most notably freedom and justice – the king’s responses to these petitions identified parliament as rude and disobliging: ‘His Majestie hath often intimated and of late seriously recommended to both Houses, but not onely without Successe, but without Answer’.¹⁵³ Whereas the petitioners used the lawful and constitutional form of petition to express their grievances, parliament’s lack of cooperation and abuse of authoritative commands such as the ordinance, rendered them unruly (and thus unlawful) citizens.


¹⁵⁰ For instance: *His Majesties answer to the declaration and votes of both Houses of Parliament concerning Hull* (London, 1642); *The humble gratulation and petition... of Lancaster with His Majesties answer thereunto* (York, 1642); *His Majesties answer to the declaration of both houses of Parliament, concerning the Commission of Array* (York, 1642).

¹⁵¹ The petition of Lancaster, 7-8.

¹⁵² *The humble petition and representation of the gentry, ministers, and others of the counties of Cumberland and Westmerland* (London, 1642), 4.

¹⁵³ Ibid., 4-5.
These county petitions expressed a desire for peace and reconciliation, but they were not expressions of support even if those from the West Country inclined towards an episcopal government (one of Charles’s central beliefs). In an attempt to quantify and generate military support, parliament passed the Militia Ordinance (5 March 1642) without royal assent. Since parliament would not consent to Charles raising an opposing force, Charles turned to the Commission of Array to raise a militia without parliamentary approval. The Commission of Array has been condemned by historians as a medieval instrument of sovereignty, last used in 1557. The fact that it was written in Latin enabled parliament – as Clarendon feared – to easily discredit it ‘by glosses and suggestions’ translating ‘it into what English they pleased’. However, as Hutton argues, ‘given the bizarre nature of the whole situation… it seems unlikely that any device would have fared better’. Although outdated, the Commission of Array in side-stepping parliament was legally no different from the Militia Ordinance – which side-stepped the king. This similarity did not stop parliament condemning it as illegal, prompting Charles to defend his actions in a lengthy answer that accused ‘both Our Houses as being beyond all just exception in the point of Legality’. The Commission of Array was issued county by county, often with an accompanying letter in English authorising those named to muster the county’s trained bands, ‘carefully seeing that they be supplied with able and sufficient Persons, and completely arm’d’ – largely out of their own pockets. The direct and personal appeal of Charles via the Commission of Array, forced private allegiances into the open. In Leicester, this led to a standoff between Henry Hastings (Commissioner of Array) and the earl of Stamford (Lord-Lieutenant) when the latter attempted to sabotage the former’s summons to arms, resulting in Hastings fleeing the town whilst his men’s arms were seized (22 June).


His Majesties answer... concerning the Commission of Array, 2.


Ibid., iv.669-80.
Amidst this confusion, Charles continued to personally rally support through meetings with county gentlemen and freeholders, visiting towns, and summoning trained bands for inspection. His success on these occasions was variable: at Beverley in late July, one observer noted that ‘the King beat up his Drums but none cometh in here, he beats his Drums, but not a man [responded]’.\textsuperscript{160} In contrast at the meeting with Yorkshire gentry and freeholders at Heworth Moor (3 June), estimates of attendance ranged from 40,000 to 70,000.\textsuperscript{161} At the appropriate hour, Charles arrived with his two sons, the peers now in York, a regiment of horse and an armed guard of 800 foot soldiers – which can be read both as protection against potentially unruly citizens and as a demonstration of his increasing military presence in the country. Unlike many accounts that emerged during the king’s residence in York, which reveal their bias through their sophisticated praise or criticism, one reporter recognised both the effectiveness of the king’s summons but also the continued reluctance of the local citizens to align themselves with the king’s cause.\textsuperscript{162} Charles was greeted with ‘a very loude shout’ and spoke of his desire to protect ‘the Protestant Religion’ – although the attendance was so large that the speech (already printed) was distributed around the field.\textsuperscript{163} Following the speech, Charles rode around the moor, followed by some 65,000 men (according to the anonymous report) all of whom praised him crying, ‘God blesse the King’.\textsuperscript{164} An alternative account adds that others could be heard shouting ‘God unite the King and Parliament, God turn the King’s heart’, leading Malcolm to conclude that confusion and chaos dominated the affair.\textsuperscript{165} The remaining 5,000 did not follow the king back toward the town, but attempted to present a petition calling for his reconciliation with parliament. Despite Lord Saville’s attempt to prevent the petition circulating around the field, the petitioners appointed Thomas Fairfax to present it to the king. That such a large number sought to petition the king indicates

\textsuperscript{160} Some speciall passages from Hull, Alanby, and Yorke: truly informed Munday the first of August, ([London], 1642), 5.
\textsuperscript{161} For Lord Howard’s report, see: LJ, v.107; A true and perfect relation of the particular passages at York, on Friday the third of Iune, 1642 (London, 1642).
\textsuperscript{162} Particular passages at York, 1.
\textsuperscript{163} A Letter sent by a Yorkshire Gentleman to a friend in London (S.L., 1642), 2.
\textsuperscript{164} Particular passages at York, 1.
\textsuperscript{165} A Letter sent by a Yorkshire Gentleman, 2.
that traditional military forms of monarchical authority were no longer blindly accepted by the people but increasingly utilised as an arena for political debate. The ritual summoning of men to arms, usually the domain of the king, began to fail as ‘a symbolic model of social order’ as hierarchical principles of society, which saw subjects swear loyalty to their monarch, were increasingly broken down.166

The meeting at Heworth Moor was just one of many attempts by Charles to woo the county. Those who responded were largely outnumbered by those who preferred neutrality or supported parliament. The petitions for peace and reconciliation also continued, but so too did the gradual arrival of men, money, and munitions; by early August, one observer found that the king ‘wants no money, and... I never here the Souldiers complaine’.167 Although the court remained based in York, Charles actively maintained his visibility by visiting surrounding towns. Given the geographical dislocation from the capital, this issue of visibility was of central importance. As Loxley argues, the joyous celebrations at Charles’s entry into London the previous year had resulted in the image of ‘a King with a spatially specific and therefore limited authority, identified increasingly with the whereabouts of his person’.168 On the road, this issue of power located within a person in a geographical location became problematic; the king had to actively maintain his visibility in order to validate his political authority whilst appealing to his subjects for military assistance. In contrast, parliament, by remaining in London – and refusing to convene its sessions elsewhere – was immediately more visible, and there was a sense of permanency in its refusal to leave Westminster. It was not until July, by which point ‘both sides [had] passed beyond the stage where they were still trying to give the appearance of seeking accommodation’, that Charles’s ‘search for men for his marching army’ began in earnest, prompting visits to Newark, Lincoln, Doncaster, Nottingham and Leicester.169

These visits should not be seen in the same light as Charles’s entry into London; as

167 H.M. A true relation of the proceedings from York and Beverley (London, 1642), A3v.
168 Loxley, Royalism and Poetry, 69-70.
will be illustrated, they were military recces to determine political (and thus military) allegiances, not triumphal celebrations of monarchy. In this they were more akin to Charles’s journey north in 1639, which Cressy describes as ‘a military monarch [travelling] to campaign against the rebellious Scots’. As the visit to Lincoln demonstrates, the entertainment and speeches Charles received can be seen as part of a broader negotiation between civic and royal authority, in which the former sought to protect their country from any external threat (parliamentary or royalist) whilst the latter promised protection in return for financial and military support.

The gentry of Lincolnshire were summoned to attend Charles in Lincoln on 15 July. As Malcolm details, the county was beset by economic problems (as a result of the fen drainage schemes Charles imposed) and the town’s sympathies divided; as a result, Charles could not be sure of the welcome he would receive. For four miles along the road, ‘a throng’ of people gathered to watch Charles’s arrival and at the city’s parameters stood the gentry, swords drawn in salute. Again, royalist accounts emphasise the citizens’ joy and shouts of ‘A King, A King’, explicitly rendering the spectators as ‘one Body... one soule’. In contrast, a parliamentarian reporter ‘noted wryly that not one in twenty of those present had brought even a sword with him and concluded, ‘you may perceive by that they came not to fight’. Royalist accounts excused the slim attendance on the speedy and sudden issuing of the summons; but it is also possible that Lincolnshire’s citizens turned out (irrespective of loyalty) to see the king and watch the ensuing drama – not to show their willingness to arm themselves in support, thus challenging Sharpe’s assessment of the welcome as displaying ‘the popularity of the monarch’. On entering the city, the recorder gave a speech to which Charles, unlike at York, responded. The speech did not appear in print, but royalists believed it sufficiently rousing to describe the occasion as witnessing ‘the Funerall of the New [parliamentarian] Militia’.

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172 A true relation of His Majesties reception and royall entertainment at Lincoln (York, 1642).
175 His Majesties reception at Lincoln, A3v.
citizens petitioned the king, but unlike Heworth Moor, the petition was presented within the structure of the ritual. For this, they were rewarded with a gracious answer, which – whilst acknowledging their fears – reinforced the illegitimate claims of parliament on the king’s authority and the unavoidability of war in order to protect the ‘Religion, Lawes, Interests, and just Rights of Parliament’. Unlike the cautious Yorkshire royalists, whom increasingly provoked Clarendon’s ire, the Lincolnshire royalists greatly pleased him in their demonstrations of support with 75 gentlemen subscribing to the king’s cause. Despite the familiar motif of the king’s physical presence lessening the fears of the subjects, the reception Charles received and the promises made could not secure the town’s loyalty. When parliamentarians took control of the county arsenal, the town justified the action as a defensive move intended to protect the city from any external threat, royalist or parliamentarian.

The king fled London in January 1642, and spent the following months engaging with the gentry across his English kingdom (whilst negotiating with both his Scottish and English Parliaments). The Welsh were more willing to actively support their king with men, money and munitions, but while royalists dominated the Home Counties, the north in particular proved resistant. What the receptions at York and Lincoln reveal is that royal power within these civic spaces came second to civic authority. Smuts (referring to royal entries into London) observes that the presence of the monarch was an ‘interruption’ as the king was not a part of the urban community even though he embodied the authority that endorsed the community and its privileges through his very position as king. The civic authorities welcomed Charles into their towns and performed the due ceremony but their actions did not translate into a willingness to support a royal war. Most ‘wanted their militia to remain at home [in order to protect local interests], and few men... were ready to volunteer to follow their king’ outside the county. As Thomas Povey observed, ‘scarce any city or corporation is so unanimous, but they have division enough to undo themselves’. Furthermore,

176 Ibid., A3v.
177 Clarendon, History, ii.284-85, 228-29.
178 For the differing counsel he received in how to do this see: Cust, A Political Life, 327-30.
180 T. Povey, The moderator expecting sudden peace, or certaine ruine (London, 1642[1643]), 11.
the homogeneity evident in royalist reports was lacking in reality; in summer 1642, counties and towns dominated by parliamentarian supporters (including Derbyshire, Leicestershire, and even Nottinghamshire – the county in which the king raised his standard) saw themselves stripped of arms for refusing to turn out for the king.\footnote{181}

There was also a fear that in supporting the royalist cause and allowing royalists to be stationed in their towns, civic authority would be undermined. This was the case with the mayoral elections in York in 1643 and 1644, which the royalist earl of Newcastle forbade ‘in order to keep on the reliable Sir Edmund Cowper’.\footnote{182}

If the incident at Hull evidenced the extent to which these ritual forms failed to convince citizens of Charles’s peaceful intent and his willingness to settle with parliament, the intervention at York highlighted the tension between civic and royal authority and the difficulties civic authorities faced in providing civic hospitality and accepting Charles’s physical presence whilst refusing to be bound to his cause. Some civic authorities outright refused Charles’s request for entry: at Coventry, en route to Nottingham, Charles’s retinue was shot at by armed citizens.\footnote{183} This further highlights the difficulties Charles faced in using ceremony as a form of authority: as isolated instances of royal engagement with civic authorities (in person as opposed to through text), the ceremonies failed to achieve what was intended – namely financial and military assistance.

\subsection*{3.6 Nottingham, August 1642}

The raising of the standard should have been the peak of these months of negotiation, in which Charles appeared reinvented as a warrior king. It was intended to be a continuation and culmination of the traditional modes by which Charles had tried to bind the localities to him. Whereas parliament and Essex appropriated and usurped royal forms and speech acts, Charles – in raising the standard – reinvigorated old

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{183} Malcolm, ‘A King in Search of Soldiers’, 264; Ingram notes that from the mid-1630s, the city had moved into an increasingly military state, despite the absence of a garrison, see: R.W. Ingram (ed). \textit{Coventry. Records of Early English Drama}. (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 1981), xxiv.
\end{thebibliography}
medieval and Tudor rites of kingship. Having issued a proclamation (12 August) to all loyal subjects to attend him at Nottingham ten days hence, Charles left York (19 August). Although his finances were improving, the numbers of troops he had so far raised fell woefully short of expectations; the lords in attendance at York had promised Charles 1,375 horse but he left with ‘about 800 horse and only 200 or 300 foot’.\footnote{Malcolm, ‘A King in Search of Soldiers’, 263.}

Arriving on the eve of the ceremony with far fewer followers than expected, Charles found Nottingham ‘much emptier than he thought the fame of his standard would have suffered it to be’. Worse still, ‘it had been so long since a King of England had ceremonially proscribed his subjects in rebellion that the heralds were not quite sure of the proper form’.\footnote{Clarendon, History, ii.292-93; Carlton, Personal Monarch, 240.}

The raising of the standard had become ‘something of a damp squib’.\footnote{Cust, A Political Life, 352.} The procession began in the pouring rain in the castle-yard around 6.00pm. The king with a small train, consisting of his two sons Charles and James, the Princes Robert and Maurice, the duke of Richmond and ‘divers other Courtiers and Cavaliers’ rode outside the castle walls to the highest hill point of the city.\footnote{There is some debate as to whether this was Eastcroft Common or Derry Mount – it has also been suggested that Derry Mount was a man-made hill created during the war (thus after the raising of the standard) on which the ordnance was placed in order to defend the town.}

Sir Edmund Verney, the Knight Marshall, carried the standard, assisted by 20 supporters including Sirs Thomas Brooks, Arthur Hopton, Francis Wortley, and Robert Dadington.\footnote{A true and exact Relation of the manner of his Majesties setting up his Standard (London, 1642), A3v.} Observers described the standard as ‘much of the fashion of the City streamers used at the Lord Mayor’s show’ (a pendants or escutcheon) with ‘a long pole like a May-pole, dyed red, on the upper end whereof hands a large silke flag’.\footnote{Ibid.; Remarkable Passages from Nottingham, Lichfield, Leicester and Cambridge (London, 1642), 1.}

The flag did not depict the Union Flag (the crosses of St George and St Andrew) authorised by James in 1606: without a guarantee of Scottish support, such explicit symbolism could hardly have been appropriate. Instead the flag displayed St. George’s Cross (next to the pole), next to which were ‘the Kings Armes quartered’ – in recognition of the union of the three kingdoms (and Charles’s desire to maintain it) – ‘with a hand pointing to the Crowne… with this Motto: Give Caesar his due’.\footnote{His Majesties setting up his Standard, A3v.} The little procession made its way to the hill,
accompanied by three troops of horse and around 600 foot. The herald then read the royal proclamation, in itself an improvised affair, as Charles’s last-minute corrections (made whilst standing on the hill) were difficult to read in the rain. After the proclamation, those present through their hats in the air shouting ‘God Save King Charles and hang up the Round-heads’.191

While these two accounts express a sense of glee among the royalists – even though the necessity of war and the royalist’s later actions are subsequently criticised – apparently not all members of the king’s retinue were so joyful. Clarendon remarked that the whole affair was performed ‘with little other ceremony than the sound of drums and trumpets’ leading to a sense of ‘melancholy’ among the king’s supporters.192 There also appears to be some confusion amongst those present as to the fate of the standard after it was erected. One contemporary thought that ‘it being towards Night, the Standard was taken down, and again carried in to the Castle, with the like State as it was brought into the Field’, whilst Clarendon later recalled that the ‘standard itself was blown down the same night it had been set up, by a very strong and unruly wind’.193 Which account is correct is difficult to assess, but both may contain elements of truth given that Charles could not afford to mount a continuous guard on the hill. The standard was carried back to the castle in great state and the procession was repeated over the following two days – albeit with decreasing ceremony. The sense of shock at the low turnout – the sheriff of Nottingham mustered just 30 men (whom Charles ungraciously rejected) – is highlighted by Clarendon: ‘There appeared no conflux of men in obedience to the proclamation; the arms and ammunition were not yet come from York, and a general sadness covered the whole town’.194 While Sharpe interprets the events as proof that ‘the ritual and symbolic force of majesty proved more enduring than the military’, the raising of the Standard was a pivotal moment in Charles’s performance of kingship precisely because it failed as a performative act.195 The low response to the royal summons emphasised the failure of

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191 Passages from Nottingham, Lichfield, Leicester and Cambridge, 1.
192 Clarendon, History, 290-91.
193 His Majesties setting up his Standard, A4; Clarendon, History, ii.291.
194 Clarendon, History, ii.291.
195 Sharpe, Image Wars, 373.
Charles to bind the localities to his cause through such rituals whilst the planned
grandeur of the occasion was marred by poor weather and the necessity (and inability)
to mount a continuous guard around the standard. The historic irregularity of public
performances of royal ceremonial outside London limited the effectiveness of the
raising of the standard, a symbolic foreboding for the continuation and success of
Charles’s recruitment campaign.

3.7 On the road to war
The recruitment campaign continued in full force after the raising of the standard, but
once again, Charles faced difficulties in persuading performers of the civic receptions
to turn these performative acts into real demonstrations of support because the civic
authorities and citizens remained divided in their political allegiance. Unlike the road
to Nottingham, war was now a clear outcome of his and parliament’s actions, and
despite continued pleas for peace, towns did begin to contribute men, money, and
munitions to his cause. In the following weeks, drums beat for volunteers but
attendance at Nottingham was slim and uninspiring; as late as September one reporter
remarked ‘there is [still] no considerable party at Nottingham to doe any thing’.196
Nottinghamshire’s trained bands refused ‘to go out of their County’, and the town
refused ‘to let part of their Magazine’ go beyond the town walls.197 In part this was
because of the continued reluctance to take a clear stand for or against the king and a
desire to maintain civil order regardless (or because of) disruptive national politics.
Russell has also concluded that the delayed call to arms – and gradual response – was
a measure ‘of how extraordinarily demilitarized a country England had become’.198
Whilst London witnessed a speedy arming of men and gathering of a military force
around parliament, the rest of England was slow to raise troops, due in part to the
problematic fact that no indisputable legal call to arms existed. It was also a
consequence of Charles’s reluctance to fight despite the counsel of those closest to him,
including Henrietta Maria’s infamous advice that ‘to settle affairs it was necessary to

196 Remarkable Passages from Nottingham, Lichfield, Leicester and Cambridge, 1.
197 Speciall passages from divers parts of this kingdome, no.2 (16-23 August 1642), 13.
198 Russell, FBM, 455.
unsettle them first’. By engaging in war, Charles reduced the spectre of royal authority, as Argyll commented, ‘the power of princes is best maintained when most feared bot least used’; in taking a side, in making ‘himself head of ane pairtie’, there emerged a possibility that the power and the institution of monarchy was flawed. Royal authority was already much depleted in Scotland and the Irish Rebellion raised questions over the crown’s security there. The losing side of the English struggle would see their power superseded by the victors; little wonder then that Charles delayed raising his standard when so much lay at stake.

The king continued to rally his subjects to his cause; to side with him – as partisan leader – against the rebellious parliament. ‘To show that he enjoyed widespread support throughout the land, Charles printed loyal addresses from Yorkshire, Hereford, Cornwall, Cumberland, Westmoreland, Kent, Flint, Lincoln, Newark and Lancaster’. In response, parliamentary ‘letters’ and ‘accounts’ also appeared, emphasising civic splits that royalist reports of Charles’s visits gloss over. These royalist reports of his visits and entertainments as the king made his way south were crucial, in offering the opportunity to those not present to learn of the king’s actions and participate – through reading the texts – in rallying around the king. Reporting and printing these accounts became – like the issuing of royal or parliamentary declarations – a race; being the first to produce a written account of a royal visit made the author (and therefore the cause the author supported) appear more authoritative; they had first claim to a ‘true and perfect relation’ of events.

A month before Charles’s arrival at Shrewsbury, a parliamentarian report had already noted that whilst the town mayor and sheriff were for the king, many of the citizens were for parliament. Clarendon also noted that the ‘parliament party had been very active’. When Charles resolved to visit the town (20 September), the mayor encouraged four royalist aldermen to largely cover the expense, but a contemporary report noted that ‘divers hundreds are resolved not to appeare’ in

200 Qtd by Russell, FBM, 453.
201 Carlton, Personal Monarch, 240.
202 Speciall passages and certain informations from severall places, no.3 (23-30 August 1642), 23.
203 Clarendon, History, ii.310.
response to the king’s summons. As at other towns and as occurred in Chester three days later, ‘those who had been most notably instrumental to the Parliament withdrew themselves’.

Through their absence, they silently (almost peacefully) demonstrated their political allegiance, but at the same time, their absence highlighted to the king the range of subjects, from nobility to labourers, he had yet to win. Their absence, however, did occasionally enable Charles to manipulate civic appointments: during his visit to Leicester, which coincided with the general assizes, Hastings was appointed High Sheriff. Clarendon remarked that the appointment was a ‘purposeful’ design to replace the parliamentarian Archdale Palmer (although parliament responded by ordering the appointment of another parliamentarian).

At Chester three days later, Charles was again greeted with a warm welcome, despite the tenuous loyalty of the country. The king and his retinue (which both royalist and parliamentarian reports describe as rather small) were greeted outside the town by forty gentlemen (including former office holders), who led him into the city. The mayor and aldermen, dressed in scarlet, waited to receive the king on a scaffold, specially erected in Eastgate Street. This is an interesting architectural detail that accounts of other visits omit, either because similar stages were not built or because the reporters, in seeking to emphasise the performance of kingship and homogeneity of the apparently joyous crowds, overlooked such details. Clopper notes that Chester was known as a town with ceremonial traditions that blurred religion, drama, and ritual and the use of a scaffold suggests the civic authorities were indeed conscious of their role as performers within the civic welcome. Similar scaffolds were erected for the town’s reception of Duchess Tremoyle (18 September 1630) and of Strafford (15 July 1633) and on both occasions the civic guilds had lined the street with their company banners. The addition of the scaffold visually placed the civic authorities not only above the crowd but also on a par with the king, and indicates an attempt to

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204 *Speciell passages and certain informations from severall places*, no.6 (13-20 September), 48; *Speciell passages and certain informations from severall places*, no.7 (20-27 September 1642), 55.
206 In terms of military retinue: two lords, a knight and three troops of horse.
207 L. Clopper (ed.), *Chester. Records of Early English Drama* (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 1979), lx.
208 Ibid., 398, 413.
ceremonially incorporate Charles’s welcome into the town’s existing civic rituals. This symbolic levelling of civic authority as equal to royal authority was broken when the mayor and aldermen knelt to welcome Charles, visually (and physically) lowering themselves in submission to a superior power. The inflection of the printed reports is that the king remained seated on horseback throughout this reception, as it would appear he also did on other town visits. As before, the recorder gave a speech, after which the mayor ‘gave the King the Sword, the Mace, and the Staff’ – symbols of civic authority – which the king duly gave back to the mayor, conferring the transferral of power upon this civic figure.209 The mayor then mounted his horse, and, holding the civic sword, rode before Charles towards Bishop’s Palace. In its ritual forms, this event was correctly performed. As with York, the content of the recorder’s speech found little favour with the king: one report commented that the recorder was ‘so full of malice and pride, and but an ignorant man’ that the speech did little for his credit. Another report tries to minimise the importance of the speech within the framework of the event by simply suggesting Charles could not even hear it, because ‘there was such shouting of joy’ from the crowds.210 Having formally declared war a month earlier, Charles needed real acts of loyalty more than warm words – most notably, he needed money. He was thus disappointed that despite all the celebrations, Chester could only afford to present him with 200 pounds; and his son, a mere 100. In total, 300 pounds was a hefty sum. However, in the context of war, it paled in comparison to his needs. Prince Rupert for instance demanded two thousand pounds from Leicester (he received 500) and during the year-long occupation of Newcastle by the Scots (following the end of the Second Bishops’ War), the English government had been paying out 850 pounds per day.211 Charles stayed at Chester for several days: on leaving the city to head towards Wrexham, the civic authorities rode before him through the streets (with the mayor carrying the city sword) to the boundary of the city at Bromfield Lane where they dismounted and kissed his hand.212

209 Citizen of Note, A true and exact relation of the King’s Entertainment in The City of Chester (London, 1642).
211 PRO SP 16/470/1 qtd in Russell, FBM, 163.
212 Clopper, Chester. REED, 466-7
As Malcolm suggests, ‘county gentlemen gave support but in quite limited amounts, for a limited time, and confined to precincts of their own county’. The incident with Lincoln’s arsenal and later the mayoral elections at York demonstrate civic resentment towards royal interference in local politico-military matters. 213 Whilst Hutton has demonstrated that this attitude did not prevail in most of Wales and the Marches (post-August 1642), it certainly typifies the reactions of many in the counties through which Charles passed prior to the mass gathering of royalist troops at Wellington (19 September). Despite the cheers, drums, and trumpets that greeted Charles on his visits, there was an underlying scepticism as to whether he could actually protect the liberties and religion of the people with such a small (and, to some, unruly) army. This scepticism was only heightened by Charles’s willingness to fill the army’s ranks with Catholics and Irish – a move that parliament was quick to expose and turn against him. 214 The visits to towns and accompanying ceremonial (paid for by the town) often came at the expense of true commitment from the citizens; increasingly ‘the defence of the [civic] community and its faith no longer appeared to entail devotion to the king’. 215 Even Hereford, where royalism appears to have existed from the outset, warned Charles of the ‘dire effects of Warre, when flourishing Cittes shall be turned to dust, nay this yet flourishing Kingdom shall become its owne destroyer’. 216 Whilst his presence in Hereford (on 1 October) was as welcome as the sun ‘to the half starved traveller’, the recorder urged Charles to shine his ‘splendant favour… one splendant beame’ on parliament’s endeavours to ‘raise their drooping hopes’ and enable peace (the flower) to flourish. Charles’s reaction to this speech is not reported, but the recorder’s awareness that ‘I have displeased (if not your Majestie, yet some of your retinue)’ suggests this last minute plea for peace missed its mark. 217

213 Malcolm, Caesar’s Due, 38.
214 Fletcher, Outbreak of the Civil War, 327-9; for an example of parliamentary speech acts announcing the king had granted commission to many ‘profest papists’, see: A declaration and protestation of the Lords and Commons in Parliament, to this kingdome, and to the whole world (London, 1642).
216 Hutton, Royalist War Effort, 4, 13-14; A Covenant for Religion… whereunto is annexed, His Ma’s entertainment at Hereford (London, 1642), A4.
217 Entertainment at Hereford, A4-A4v.
The use of ceremony in English towns from January 1642 onwards, enabled Charles to continue the performance of kingship even as the reception of these forms emphasised both the tension between royal and civic authority, and the internal divisions within these towns. The hospitality and civic receptions Charles received did not always guarantee him real support and the performers were not afraid to criticise the king’s inability to settle with parliament within the framework of these rites.

3.8 A refashioned court at Oxford

Despite these limitations, by late-September Charles had gathered a force that – in cavalry numbers and officer experience – rivalled parliament’s army. Although the first major battle at Edgehill (23 October) proved inconclusive, by evening the following day, Essex’s army had withdrawn, providing the king with a clear road to London. On 29 October, Charles visited Oxford, on what many – including the king – believed to be a layover on his return to London. The city was, like others, divided in its allegiances, and the traditional manner in which Charles was received belied this politico-religious tension. In July 1642, Charles received a donation of money and plate from several of the university’s colleges; a month later, 300 students raised arms in the king’s name. In August, the mayor printed the royal declaration for raising the standard. On 28 August, Sir John Byron took Oxford as a royalist stronghold, although not all citizens supported him and the council refused to help fortify the city. Byron received a splendid welcome from the University Chancellor whilst the mayor of Oxford provided the victuals, giving ‘Sir John and his companie wine drinke and free welcome’, but his command at Oxford was short: he fled as the parliamentarian commander Saye and his troops approached. However, when Charles and his army approached the city after Edgehill, the city offered no resistance.

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218 Wanklyn and Young, ‘A king in search of soldiers – a rejoinder’, 147, 150-51.
219 23 October 1642: the royalists and parliamentarians both claimed it a victory. Charles gained the road to London but was repulsed by the Essex’s troops at Turnham Green on 13 November 1642.
220 W. Emberton, The English Civil War Day by Day (Rochester: Grange Books, 1997), 35, 46: war exacerbated town and gown rivalry: the city’s Trained Bands prevented royalist students destroying Osney Bridge (1 September 1642) but were subsequently forced to work on the city’s (royalist) fortification.
Arriving outside the town, Charles ‘was welcomed in the traditional manner at Penniless Bench’ by Richard Gardiner, the University Vice-Chancellor and deputy orator and presented with a gift of 200 pounds. One reporter was quick to emphasise the traditional ‘town versus gown rivalry’ noting that the troops ‘were ushered into the Towne by such applause by our S[c]hollers, as made the streets ring. But the Townesmen… lay stil in their beds’. Four days later (on 2 November), the king thanked both the university and the city for their support but proceeded to disarm Oxford’s citizens and arrest the city’s MP for advocating rebellion. As in other towns, the heavy hand of royal authority interfered in civic appointments – a new governor and a new colonel of the trained bands were imposed on the city despite protests from the mayor. With London in sight, these interferences were a necessary measure by which to ensure Oxford’s continued loyalty.

As Charles and his army prepared to continue south, pamphlets urged London’s citizens to prepare to entertain him with hearty affections’ as ‘provision is made for his comming unto White Hall’. Recalling the king’s welcome to London the previous year, pamphlets reinforced contemporary opinion that peace and good rule demanded the king’s re-installation in Whitehall: ‘that once Sun of Majesty may appeare in this Spheare from whence his beames darted comfortable influence on all his Subjects’. The importance of Whitehall as the central physical residence of monarchy was emphasised through its figuring as a mourner: ‘Thus you see poore White-Hall is miserably deserted of all its darlings’. Deprived of the king, the palace was a mere shell, ‘A Court without a Court’, and cannot become ‘againe a Court’ until Charles resided there once more. Despite such joyful proclamations and indeed despite Charles’s own belief that he would return to London, after three weeks on campaign, he was forced back to Oxford after losing a skirmish at Turnham Green (13 November 1642). De Goot details how the frustrated king ‘settled his garrison, court and executive in Oxford, and the city became a symbolic locus for the Royalist

221 Vniversity nevves, or, The unfortunate proceedings of the cavaliers in Oxford. (London, 1642), A2v.
223 Ibid.
224 A deep sigh breath’d through the lodgings at White-hall (London, 1642), A4v.
225 Ibid., A2; Alsted, Happy news, A2v.
Symbols of royal authority were transferred (the Great Seal), established (the Oxford mint) or re-fashioned (the Privy Council and Council of War) as a challenge to the financial, legislative and judicial powers of parliament.  

The geographical dislocation of the king and his court sat ill with Charles, for whom monarchy and London were inextricably linked. As early as December 1642 he told the duke of Hamilton, ‘I will either be a glorious King or a patient martyr’ – Charles would either triumph victoriously over parliament’s army (thus ensuring his heroic return to Whitehall) or die trying.  

A speech made by the king before members of his court and university in the New Year, however, suggests a more positive approach to the situation, placing a special emphasis on Oxford – more specifically, the university – acknowledging its significance as a new residence for the court:

yet there was no place in Our whole Dominions, since We abandoned for urgent causes Our royall City of London, that We accounted more faithful to Us, that his Our City of Oxford, and so esteemed none apter to be made by Us the residence of Our Person: and here, if Our more weightie occasions call Us not hence, We intend to abide.  

Even in this speech, Charles did not give up his dream of returning to London, ‘the Jerusalem of Our Nation’. Such a dream could not become reality without more money, which led the Vice-Chancellor to present Charles with a gift from the university on New Year’s Day 1643 during the royal entertainment at Christ Church. In a stunning display of what de Groot terms ‘ritualized abasement’, the Vice-Chancellor handed Charles a beautiful gilt cup filled with 200 pounds.  

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229 A speech delivered by the Kings most excellent Maiestie, in the Convocation House at Oxford (Oxford, 1643), A3v.

230 Ibid.


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need for money but it also constituted an astute move on the university’s part: the Vice-Chancellor presented the gift as all ‘our Universities decay’d debilitie hath to tender as an offering’, forestalling future gifts (for the time being) with the wish ‘it were an unexhaustible Indies’. The speech, like that of the University Orator William Strode a few months previously, was a carefully constructed panegyric, designed to praise the king whilst subtly emphasising both the university’s academic accomplishments and the limitations of its financial offering. Whilst Strode’s speech envisaged Charles as the water of life, refreshing and watering ‘our thirsty Gardens’, the Vice-Chancellor feared for the continued ‘afflications of our Country and its inhabitants, who groane as the Israelites did under the Egyptians’. He hoped war would end soon, so that time may be ‘spent in inbalming and curing the many wounds of our English Israel’, reaffirming the university’s moral and intellectual support for the king’s cause even as he denied further financial assistance. As at York and Chester the previous year, the ritual of gift-giving evidenced an adherence to formal ceremony even as the Vice-Chancellor’s words precluded a repeat performance.

After Charles’s failure to reach London, court life at Oxford continued in a reduced fashion. Whilst the university continued to style London as the centre of royal power and encouraged Charles to return, the colleges were co-opted as Charles self-consciously fashioned an alternative court. Christ Church became the centre of the king’s power, a place in which to receive ambassadors and conduct government business. The dean’s lodgings in the main quadrangle were transformed into a royal palace, with Presence and Privy Chambers as at Whitehall, to which access was strictly limited. When at Oxford, the queen resided at Merton College, with Corpus Christi becoming a ceremonial walkway connecting the royal lodgings, a route that ensured privacy from the public whilst retaining an element of procession. As early as spring 1643, the Law Courts were in operation, working out of the University Schools while

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234 Ibid., 7; Mr. Vice-Chancellors speech, A3.

235 Mr. Vice-Chancellors speech, A4.
the exchequer found a new home at All Souls. The Oxford Parliament of 1644-45 occupied the Convocation House (for the Lords) and the Divinity School (for the Commons). Magdalen was re-appropriated for the arsenal and the munitions were stored in New College. Several other colleges found a new purpose as lodgings for courtiers and their attendants. The court and the king’s army took over not only the university but the city too, overcrowding the city where a single lodging was shared by two or three men.236

Charles issued several proclamations aimed at his courtiers that strove to maintain formality and decorum while ridding the city of excess in attitude, costume, and people.237 In one such proclamation, the king prohibited the wearing of ‘Lace-Embroidery, Fring, Riband, Buttons, Claspes, or Buttons and Loops of Gold or Silver, or any Embroidery or Lace… [or] Silk’ not just on his courtiers but ‘upon any Saddle, or Furniture of Horse’.238 It seemed that, given the strained circumstances, Charles was willing to trim the excess of ritual and protocol, but not the rites themselves: rather a diminished court complete with ceremony than a large but un-ceremonial one. This desire to shape and control the court at Oxford appears to have roots in contemporary understanding that the court was supposed to be a micro-model of society, ‘an example of virtue for the realm’.239 The increased formality of the Caroline court, and the enhanced role of ritual and ceremony within it, is well known. Sharpe, citing James Wadsworth’s *The Present Estate of Spain* (1630) proposed that the ceremonies and rituals of the Spanish court and church that Charles observed whilst in Madrid influenced the changes the king implemented.240 That Charles sought to continue this formality and decorum in Oxford reveals both his attachment to these forms and his awareness of their importance – in providing continuity and structure for his courtiers

237 To some extent, these proclamations built on orders made by the Vice-Chancellors of both Oxford and Cambridge in the early seventeenth-century when preparing to receive a royal visit. Notable in these university orders are the instructions to scholars and students not to smoke tobacco in the king’s presence, restrictions on physical access to the king, limiting access to the college accommodating the king and more general guidelines against visiting taverns and inns within the city. See for example: Nelson, *Cambridge. REED*, i.597-8, 636-7 for orders issued by Cambridge’s Vice-Chancellor in 1624 and 1632.
238 *By the King, a proclamation against wast and excesse in apparel* (Oxford, 1643).
240 Ibid., 217.
and in promoting the image of monarchical magnificence to both a national and international audience. As de Groot and Sillitoe note, the continued significance of the court, and its corresponding signification of the continuation of royal authority, is highlighted by the need of parliamentarian polemists to attack it.  

Despite these accusations of hedonism and popery, the Oxford court was smaller and more restrained than the earlier Caroline court. Money played a huge part in this as the royal coffers were rapidly drained in financing the war. However, while the slim number of extant inventories – such as that of Henrietta Maria’s lodgings at Merton, which de Groot and Sillitoe transcribe in their 2007 article – detail these reduced circumstance, they also reveal the continuation of leisurely pursuits such as hunting and tennis, often at the expense of courtiers’ salaries. Similar contradictions are evident elsewhere. Royal proclamations dismissed the ‘many Women and Children as well as Men, who have no necessary employment’ at court but many of Charles’s household members continued to lodge in Oxford, including Apothecaries, Vintners and Officers of the Wardrobe. De Groot suggests that the appearance of musicians and wardrobe grooms in financial accounts indicates the continuation of some form of entertainment at Oxford, a view supported by Wainwright’s discovery of a ‘royalist [musical] repertoire’ in the city. This merriment was in part a remnant of court practices at Whitehall and in part an attempt to (possibly) forget the effects of war. However, it again reveals Charles’s awareness of the importance of appearance and his need to project an image of a strong monarch before his European counterparts. At a conference concerning accommodation with parliament in early 1643, Charles issued a reminder of the:

sad and lamentable vicissitude of fortune (indeed heavens punishment for the Lands offences) that We who were but yesterday the pride and envie of all Our neighbours, beloved and dreaded both abroad and at home, should, as it were in an instant, become but at best their pity.  

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241 de Groot and Sillitoe, ‘Court Culture’, 2, 10.
242 Ibid., 9.
243 By the King, a proclamation for the ease of the City of Oxford (Oxford, 1643).
245 Two Speeches delivered by The Kings most Excellent Maiestie at Oxford (London: John Turner, 1642), 7.
The continuation of the court’s attitudes, habits, and protocol was one way to avoid such pity, yet the daily forms observed at Oxford appear less dictatorial than those obeyed in London. Limitations were imposed on excess, but there are no extant records prescribing behaviour for the courtiers. Whilst the colleges offered an approximate imitation of Whitehall, the physically distorted nature of the court led to inescapable differences in its structural make-up: as the king’s route through Corpus Christi College to Merton suggests, improvisation became a necessary element in continuing royal ritual. This was not just a geographical displacement: the court’s residence in Oxford also presented what de Groot terms a ‘conceptual challenge’ for royalists as they adapted to reduced circumstances. Courtiers might have been unsettled by the change, but they were not the only ones; so was the city but (perhaps more importantly) so too were Charles’s English citizens at large. Charles had always maintained a visual presence in London, but hidden away in an Oxford college, he appeared inaccessible and thus unable to fulfil his monarchical role. When a courtier (generally agreed to be Sir Edward Walker) recorded the spatial order of the court, the royalist newsbook, *Mercurius Aulicus*, ran a print copy that same week, suggesting that the ritualisation of daily space as a symbol of monarchical authority was powerful enough to warrant publication for all to read. Following the Restoration in 1660, an account titled, *Iter Carolinum*, also attributed to Walker, appeared in print. This account related the marches and journeys Charles undertook between leaving London in January 1642 and his return there seven years later. *Iter Carolinum* is highly performative: in detailing the length these journeys took, where Charles stayed and (occasionally) the entertainment he received in these places, the account enables the reader to re-imagine the movements of the king. Although the manuscript source for this is unknown, the writer is again demonstrating an intense concern with documenting the activities and movements of the king for posterity. That Charles refashioned a court at Oxford

247 Ibid., 1218: de Groot states that it is Walker’s hand in the manuscript account.
emphasises the centrality of ritual forms in asserting his kingship, even as the very displacement of these forms represented the decline of royal authority.

3.9 Conclusion
In the early years of the 1640s, there were multiple socio-political and religious tensions at play as parliament utilised speech acts and other performatives to erode the royal prerogative and push through government reforms. Despite personal reluctance over engaging with a potential disruptive public, Charles was forced to reassert his kingship through the performance of public ceremonial and a series of royal publications in order to demonstrate the monarch’s superior position above his parliaments and political factionalism. Charles used ceremony in the expectation that the royal symbolism contained therein would be willingly accepted by the spectators (and readers of subsequent literature) as proof of an incontrovertible monarchy. Where Sharpe sees Charles as continuing to perform his kingship before the public, this chapter has demonstrated that whilst introspective ceremony and court etiquette had flourished during Charles’s Personal Rule, Charles had sorely neglected public rituals that engaged with and incorporated his citizens. The irregularity of ceremonial usage highlighted the political ends to which it was being manipulated and enabled performers in and spectators of these rites to question them – even within the framework of the ritual.

In London, parliament’s reforms and Charles’s recalcitrance generated tension between maintaining social order and suppressing subversive crowd reactions against the need to perform kingship outside the walls of Whitehall in order to reinforce royal authority. The ceremonial opening of the Short Parliament was designed to emphasise this authority by self-consciously calling upon traditional forms of government. In utilising these ceremonial modes, Charles wanted to demonstrate that nothing had changed despite the eleven year Personal Rule. In contrast, the decision not to conduct a full ceremonial opening of the Long Parliament indicated Charles’s awareness of the power of such forms even as the manipulation of the rite evidenced the extent of the breach between king and parliament. Once again, London’s citizens were denied the opportunity to witness and participate in the performance of royal authority.
Whilst ostensibly Charles visited Edinburgh in summer 1641 in order to confirm the Treaty of London, he also hoped to gain promises of Scottish support against his English Parliament. Although texts warmly welcomed Charles back to his native country, there existed in Edinburgh a tension between Charles’s manipulation of royal and civic performatives and the radical dismantling of royal authority in Scotland. The warm civic welcome Charles received at Canongate masked the political undertones of his visit and could be seen as reflecting the desire for reconciliation evident in the texts and speeches. It could also, however, reflect the embrace of Edinburgh’s citizens of the spectacle itself – of seeing their king after his eight year absence. Although this entry was not a state entry, it and the subsequent procession to Parliament House were ‘presented as symbolizing the unity of the commonweal’. These rituals also revealed the awareness of both Charles and the Scots of the necessity of theatrical display as a tool by which to publically reaffirm the latter’s loyalty to the crown, but this awareness also led to disagreements over the use of ritual forms as the Scots denied Charles the chance to symbolically claim ownership and authorship over the legislation being passed.

If ceremony in Edinburgh had been utilised to reinforce and negotiate the relationship between Charles and the Scottish Parliament, the royal entry into London was designed to reaffirm the crown’s relationship with the city, not, as has been previously suggested, the relationship with parliament. The ritual emphasised the fact that Charles could no longer expect or prevail upon the city’s loyalty even as it demonstrated the city’s willingness to be courted by Charles in an effort to heal the political breach. Whilst pamphlets styled the spectators and performers as willing participants in the entry, homogenising the citizens as one joyful body, privately there were concerns over the ritual’s efficacy. The performance was sufficiently convincing to push the reformers into passing and publishing the Grand Remonstrance but subsequent actions by Charles suggest he did not trust the city to support him. In the months after Charles left London, a new tension emerged between attempts in localities to maintain peace and a reluctance to take a political stand against the

crown’s need to establish loyalty through ritual demonstrations and provision of men and arms. Throughout these performances of kingship there existed a contradiction between the centrality of ceremony on the one hand and its impotency as a performative on the other that emphasised Charles’s fall from royal author to royal actor. No longer above the political fray, the king, in Oxford, was faced with the struggle to maintain a public visibility when the instruments of power and the easy access to public display available in London (even if infrequently used) were no longer accessible. While Charles struggled to impose court etiquette on an unfamiliar cityscape, another iconic figure began to dominate London’s performative landscape.
4. Robert Devereux: the Protestant Prince and military ritual

As the construction of royal ceremony outside London has demonstrated, there were multiple performative tensions at play in the early 1640s. Having left London in January 1642, Charles struggled to maintain a visible platform from which to generate political and military support in preparing for war against parliament. While military historians have debated and contested Charles’s capabilities as a military leader, the previous chapter demonstrated how the performances of royal military authority often fell wide of the mark and failed to engender the expected support. Whilst Charles strove to map rituals of state on to Oxford’s cityscape, the absence of a royal ceremonial figurehead in London created a performative void that coincided with the extraordinary and rapid changes to England’s political landscape. Whereas the previous chapter sought to emphasise the failure of Charles’s performances of kingship – in Edinburgh, London, and the English localities – this chapter examines the position of Robert Devereux, third earl of Essex and parliament’s Lord General, as a transitional figure in the performance of authority during the First Civil War. As Lord General, Essex became a rival figurehead, self-consciously manipulating ceremonial forms in a manner that foreshadowed the coercion of monarchical rites during the Cromwellian Protectorate.

This chapter seeks to explain both how Essex became this figure, and the extent to which this performance of authority succeeded, while consciously challenging scholarly claims that Essex used military rituals to fashion himself as a political leader. In contrast to the king’s non-entries of 1626 and 1633, Essex’s entries into London in 1642 and 1643 were reassuring and emotive events. As Lord General, Essex entered London on 7 November 1642 to a hero’s welcome following the battle of Edgehill on 23 October (for which both sides claimed victory). The following year, on 25 September having successfully broken the royalist siege of Gloucester (8 September), Essex again entered London ahead of the main army to receive a warm welcome by parliament and the city’s citizens. These two events encouraged the popular perception of Essex in pamphlets and verses as a ‘Protestant Prince’; a god-fearing Englishman who could temper Charles’s popish and Francophile tendencies. This chapter argues
that, as much as Essex self-consciously furthered this image, it was one that parliament also eagerly supported in the early years of war.

This princely image was both a construct of the war and the result of Charles’s tendency in the spring and summer of 1642 to isolate Essex in print as the lead rebel in the war against the crown.¹ It was also a consequence of his father’s heroic legacy, which public memory still valorised, and which has been overlooked in recent accounts of Essex’s popularity in favour of comparisons between Essex and Prince Henry. Essex found little favour at court from Charles or his father. Royal disfavour, combined with the military experience Essex gained on the continent in the 1620s and 1630s, enabled parliament to present Essex as the figurehead for its cause. In 1641-42, Charles courted Essex intensely in an effort to secure his support – Essex held the role of Lord Chamberlain from July 1641-April 1642 and was Captain General South of the Trent during the king’s visit to Scotland (August-November 1641). These positions, however, were little more than tokens of favour and Essex refused to join the king at Hampton Court or York after Charles fled London in January 1642. This final break from the king led to Essex’s appointment as Lord General (12 July 1642) and this chapter argues that parliament did little in the opening years of war to prevent Essex dominating ceremonial forms of military power, despite the growing tension between Essex’s self-conscious performing of military power and the tendency to interpret these rites as aspirations to political leadership. Despite attempts to limit his military role in the early months of 1643, parliament refused to accept his resignation in July 1643, suggesting that despite increasing signs of his unwillingness to inflict a clear defeat on the king and the increasing subservience of parliament in military ritual, Essex was still a necessity as a parliamentary figurehead.

Essex was forced to resign from his military position with the passing of the Self-Denying Ordinance, together with the earls of Manchester and Denbigh (3 April 1645). Historians have largely interpreted this ordinance as an attempt to constitutionally oust Essex from command, weaken the peace faction in both the Lords

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¹ Charles issued at least two proclamations in 1642 attacking Essex’s ‘pretended authority’, see: By the King, a proclamation for the suppressing of the present rebellion, under the command of Robert Earle of Essex (York, 1642); By the King, His Majesties offer of pardon to the rebells now in arms against him (Oxford, 1642).
and Commons, and centralise command. Undoubtedly Essex’s independence and tendency to ignore parliamentary directives irked the war faction (such as his refusal to obey the Committee for Both Kingdoms’ orders to attack Oxford on 6 April and 12 June 1644), but as Graham and Davies have argued, military issues (pay, desertion, training) also influenced Essex’s actions. More pertinently, the end to Essex’s military command also signalled a corresponding decline in ritualised performances that focused on any one figure, despite Northumberland’s rise within parliament as he took custodianship of the royal children. The review of London’s trained bands in 1646 was conducted by parliament en masse, revealing a desire to dominate military ceremonial forms. As this thesis highlights, even prior to Essex’s resignation, London’s civic authorities had taken care to wine and dine parliament and offered hospitality to the Prince Elector (an alternative figure of authority whom parliament eagerly courted in the early years of war), suggesting the ceremonial performance of Essex’s Lord General-ship did not go unquestioned.

Paradoxically, the biggest demonstration (both financially and logistically) of Essex as England’s Protestant Prince was the one ceremony beyond his control: his funeral (22 October 1646). This was an ostentatious and elaborate affair, the fullest expression of military leadership that Essex had been unable to perform as Lord General. Ostensibly the funeral reinforced the concept that one powerful – but non-monarchical – figure could guide parliament toward victory. The Commons contributed £5,000 towards the funeral costs, despite the fact that Essex’s political star within parliament had been eclipsed, revealing parliament’s willingness to manipulate Essex’s public image and utilise ceremonial forms in order to reinforce its political authority. The state funeral of Pym (15 December 1643) in Westminster Abbey and the public procession for the funeral of Francis Popham (15 August 1644) provided parliament with contemporary models for Essex’s funeral; although contemporaries

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also drew comparisons with the funerals of Prince Henry (1613) and James I (1625), an appraisal historians have overly emphasised.  

In style, the funeral drew upon chivalric and medieval modes, but the spectacle itself was an important political gesture. The lengthy period of mourning (Essex died on 14 September and lay in state for six weeks), the effigy in military dress with parliament robes, and the 3,000 performers involved in the funeral procession ensured the public eye remained on Essex. With Charles now in captivity (he surrendered to the Scots on 5 May 1646) and fighting theoretically at an end, Essex’s funeral drew the attention of the spectators (and those who read the subsequent funerary literature) away from the problematic and protracted negotiations for peace, the factions developing between the English and Scottish armies and parliaments, and the (not-so) secret negotiations of Charles with the Scots. Essex had ceased to be the golden boy long before his death, but it suited parliament to allow its supporters to mourn him through rose-tinted glasses, if only to stop the escalating tumults and riots in London’s streets.

4.1 The rebellious earls of Essex

In analysing the position of Essex as a transitional figure in the struggle for performative forms of power, it is first necessary to understand the developments that led to his appointment as Lord General in 1642. Essex’s family history and personal background help to explain his later insistence on acting independently of parliament as well as the ease with which he was accepted as the rebel figurehead (by royalists and parliamentarians alike). Although by spring 1642, it was clear that Essex would be given command – the Commons had been pushing for Essex to lead a Westminster guard since Christmas 1641 – there were other peers who were equally eager, if not more so, to see reform.  

Among these was Northumberland, whose title gave him precedence over Essex and whose family were equally notorious for rebelling against

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5 The Commons settled with a watch organised by Westminster’s JPs, see: Russell, FBM, 441-43; R. Cust, Charles and the aristocracy, 1625-1642 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 263.
the monarchy: the last three title holders had ‘either been imprisoned or beheaded for treason’. A member of the Order of the Garter and Captain General in the 1640 royal campaign against the Scots, Northumberland’s alliance in the early 1640s with parliament was something of a coup, bringing ‘the antiquity and splendour of his family, his great fortune and estate, and the general reputation he had amongst the greatest men’. Another prime candidate was Saye, whom Clarendon described as, ‘in truth the pilot that steered all those vessels which were freighted with sedition to destroy the government’. Historians have also credited Saye with a prominent role in many of parliament’s actions (political, military, and religious) during this period.

Whilst Northumberland found himself restored to royal favour in the 1630s, neither Saye nor Essex were so fortunate. Whereas Saye’s interest turned to colonisation, Essex’s turned to the military and he spent five summers fighting in the Rhineland (1619-24). This gave him military experience that few of his fellow peers could match. Fifteen years later, the queen’s intercession meant Essex was denied the role of second-in-command to the Lord General Arundel in the First Bishop’s War, which served to reopen old resentments. Despite this snub, Clarendon described him in these years as ‘a punctual man in point of honour’ who forwarded letters from the Scottish commissioners direct to ‘the King without… performing the least ceremony with or towards the messengers’. As has already been noted, Charles – eventually realising the usefulness of Essex as a military leader and a public figure – attempted to win Essex’s favour through his ceremonial position in the opening of the Long

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6 Adamson, Noble Revolt, 2.
7 Clarendon, History, ii.537.
8 Clarendon, History, ii.548.
11 Fissel, The Bishops’ Wars, 84-86.
12 Clarendon, History, i.158.
Parliament (3 November 1640) and appointment as Lord Chamberlain (July 1641). Conversely, the king countered these tokens by refusing to put Essex in charge of Yorkshire’s trained bands following the Army Plot (spring 1641), relegating him in the royal entry into London (25 November 1641), and blocking his appointment to the Lord’s committee appointed to investigate charges against the Five Members (January 1642). The estrangement between king and earl is made explicit in Henrietta Maria’s comments to Edward Nicholas regarding the king’s arrival at Theobalds (24 November 1641): ‘the King commanded me to tell this [the date] to my lord of Essex but you may doe it, for there Lords ships are to great prinses now to receaued anye direction from mee’.

Whilst such an argument offers a partial account of his political manoeuvring within Westminster and distancing from Whitehall, it is too simplistic an explanation of Essex’s rise to dominate ceremonial (and public) forms of authority. As important to the development of Essex as the poster boy for parliament’s cause was his family legacy, a fact often overlooked by the historical emphasis on similarities to Prince Henry. Beheaded by Elizabeth on charges of treason, the second earl of Essex (also called Robert) had been something of a protestant champion and patron of the godly. Essex’s mother, Frances Walsingham, had previously been married to Sir Philip Sidney, held in popular memory as the ‘saviour of Protestant England’. Indeed, Hammer has argued that in marrying Sidney’s widow, the second earl issued ‘a statement that he regarded himself as the new Sidney’. Through ties of blood or marriage, Essex was thus linked to two popular Elizabethan military figures, enabling parliament to cast him as heir to the Protestant Elizabethan tradition to which it sought a return.

However, the importance of the second earl was more than just his popular legacy. The second earl ‘was fond of issuing public explanations’ for his actions, in an early attempt to manage his public image outside the government. In the 1590s, this

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attempt to seek ‘public endorsement’ and ‘deliberately populist appeal’ drew criticism from his enemies. In 1642, parliamentary texts (official and polemical) praised Essex’s piety in seeking to defend and protect the country, whilst parliament’s members and soldiers swore to an oath of loyalty to Essex’s person (27 August 1642). As the second earl encouraged dedications by puritan dissidents that advanced his ‘image as a Protestant crusader’ so parliamentary texts spoke of Essex as saving England’s Protestant faith, whilst woodcuts showed him adopting the pose of military commander, armed and mounted. Just one month after the raising of the royal standard, Lord Robarte asserted that the Commons were united in crying ‘Vives le Roy et Essex, God save the King and Essex’ whilst Parker suggested Essex ‘serve as a temporary Dictator’, empowering him to protect England from harm. This treasonous statement evidences the dramatic development of political language since Elizabeth. In courting public support, the second earl challenged ‘the monopoly which a sovereign supposedly enjoyed over their subjects’ ‘love’. The pursuit of ‘popularity’ was therefore an offence of lèse-majesté. By the time Charles raised his standard at Nottingham, his royal prerogatives were already severely restricted and the battle for ‘love’ (in the form of military and financial support) was well underway.

Early signs that Essex took this role more seriously than some peers might have preferred, is evident as early as summer 1641. As Charles prepared to travel north to Scotland in August, the Commons – fearful of what agreements the king might make with his northern subjects – debated the necessity of appointing a Custos Regni to rule as regent in Charles’s absence. This proposal ultimately failed to find majority support in the Lords; it resulted instead in the king’s appointment of a commission of

17 LJ, v.326-7, 328; CJ, ii.740; Adamson interprets this as a baronial or feudal contract, Adamson, ‘Baronial Context of War’, whilst Vallance sees this as a feeding into the puritan demand for an English Covenant, Revolutionary England, 53-4.
18 Hammer, ‘Smiling Crocodile’ 102; For examples of Essex as godly prince, see: R. Devereux, Most Hapy and Wellcome Newes From His Excellencie the Earle of Essex (London, 1642); J. Ricraft, A Perfect List of the Many Victories Obtained (through the Blessing of God) by the Parlaments Forces Under the Command of His Excellency, Robert Earl of Essex (London, 1645).
20 Cust, Charles and the aristocracy, 243-45; Russell, FBM, 365-7.
peers – with Essex holding military power as Captain General South of the Trent. Since Essex was forced to enquire of the Lords ‘how the said Commission may take Effect’, from levying men to raising money, this was in effect another token of royal favour; but the willingness of both houses to accept Essex’s appointment suggests a confidence in his military capabilities and a confidence (at this stage) in his political allegiance.\(^{21}\) This willingness was stretched when parliament reassembled on 20 October 1641 and the Lords found Westminster’s trained bands posted around the palace. Essex explained he, as Captain General, had ordered the guard as a result of the Commons’ fears of ‘Insolencies and Affronts’ following news of the ‘Incident’ in Edinburgh (the attempt to arrest Argyll and Hamilton).\(^{22}\) The Lords agreed to keep the guard, which Essex discontinued upon Charles’s return, but this affair demonstrates the eagerness with which Essex put his military command into action without seeking approval from his peers. That the Lords were also aware of this is evident in their refusal (on 30 December 1641) to join with the Commons in petitioning the king for a guard around Westminster led by Essex.\(^{23}\) The refusal was a result of both a reluctance to overrides the king’s authority and an unwillingness to name a military commander, actions that reeked of rebellion. Essex’s actions reveal early signs of his willingness to act independently of parliament in military affairs, self-consciously establishing himself as a military leader. Even though war could not be predicted in 1641, the ostracisation Essex faced in both the Jacobean and Caroline courts combined with his military experience on the continent, set him apart from the peers, including the more preeminent Northumberland. That his father was still valorised in public memory and that Essex had links to Sidney were important factors in the public construction of Essex as the Protestant Prince, continuing the legacy of his Elizabethan forefathers.

### 4.2 Triumphant and glorious, 1642-43

\(^{21}\) *LI*, iv.367; for changing allegiances within the peerage in 1641-42, see: Cust, *Charles and the aristocracy*, appendix 2.

\(^{22}\) *LI*, iv.396.

\(^{23}\) *LI*, iv.494-6; *CJ*, ii.363-4.
Despite the Lords’ reluctance in winter 1641-42, Essex was appointed Lord General of parliament’s army on 12 July 1642. The military ceremonies that Essex utilised were initially accepted by parliament as these performances enabled Essex to self-consciously reinforce his military authority, providing a figurehead for parliament’s war against Charles. As Sharpe astutely observes, parliament ‘knew that the power of ritual and ceremony could not be surrendered to the royalists without yielding to them authority itself’.24 Thus, despite initial reservations, performative demonstrations of his newly invested authority were already in full swing by Essex’s departure from London (9 September). His own actions also demonstrate his self-awareness of his new role. On this day, Essex gave a brief speech in the Painted Chamber to a committee of both houses, then ‘with great solemnity’ took his leave of parliament ‘with much appreciation of happinesse’.25 Pym, who attended with William Strode on behalf of the Commons, reported back to the house:

That the Earl of Essex, my Lord General, only spake at the Conference, to this Effect:
That, as he had undertaken this Service upon the Commands of both Houses, so he was… ever would be, ready, from time to time, to obey such Orders and Directions as he should receive from both Houses.26

The words ‘from time to time’ do not appear to have inspired any debate, although Essex – true to his word – would frequently ignore or override parliament’s directives. Members of the Commons not present at the meeting were given leave along with Speaker Lenthall ‘to take leave of the Lord General at Essex House’. This permission is at odds with the written accounts of Essex’s departure: one newsbook states that Essex left Westminster before the Commons took their leave, but Pym’s report of his speech back to the house contradicts this claim.27 Another account implies that Essex was ‘gloriously attended to his house’ on the Strand (formerly known as Leicester House) by members of parliament; this also suggests they went on foot down King

24 Sharpe, Image Wars, 376.
26 CJ, ii.760.
27 Remarkable Passages, no.1 (5-12 September 1642), A3v.
Street and past Charing Cross and along the Strand. Essex House is a significant feature in all three accounts, a structural embodiment of one person’s power, in contrast to the conciliary authority of parliament. After receiving the Commons members, Essex walked to Temple Bar (directly up from his house) and there took horse for the procession proper through the city itself for which he was ‘honorably attended by many Lords, Captaines and Gentlemen’, most of whom would serve under him on campaign. An attendant walked in front of Essex, possibly for practical purposes (to clear a path, since the streets had not been railed off) but also to signal Essex’s lofty position as Lord General. Behind him came the city’s trained bands as a guard.28 That those in the procession are not personally named (by title or office), unlike Charles’s royal entry the previous year, emphasises the fact that this was foremost a military procession, in which Essex was the central figure. From Temple Bar, Essex traced in reverse the route Charles had taken in November 1641: entering the city at Ludgate, through St Paul’s churchyard to Cheapside, turning westwards to the Royal Exchange. From here, the directions are unclear: the more detailed of the two printed accounts describes the procession going ‘along to the Royal Exchange, turning down from thence to Moore-gate’.29 If the procession continued to mimic that of Charles, it would have continued along Cornhill, bearing right up Bishopsgate Street to Bishopsgate and left along the inner city wall. In doing so, Essex would have followed the traditional route ‘prescribed for royal entries since Tudor times’, ceremonially reinforcing Lord Robarte’s tribute.30 Exiting the city, Essex ‘accompanied with many followers [went] unto the new Artillery yard’. Having performed his military duties and inspected the yard (in Finsbury Fields, where it had moved from Bishopsgate in May 1641), Essex continued to Highgate en route for St Albans ‘from thence to Northampton where his forces met him’.31

The accounts written following Essex’s departure were eager to emphasis the multitude of followers – citizens, members of the Commons, lords, and soldiers, who

28 Ibid., A4.
29 Ibid., A4.
30 Adamson, Noble Revolt, 443.
accompanied Essex on his route through the city. As with the accounts describing Charles’s visits to English towns, the citizens are homogenised, accompanying him ‘with much expression of love… whose hearts looking through their eyes imprecated Heaven for the happinesse and prosperity of his Honours Resolution’. Essex’s task is seen as God given, ‘imprecate’ here meaning to pray for rather than to curse. The prayers are not only that Essex receive ‘favour in the eyes of our Gracious Sovereaigne’ – thus lending much needed spiritual legitimacy to parliament’s cause – but for a peace achieved ‘without the effusion of the blood of Innocents’. This is what all ‘true-hearted Christians and loyall Subjects’ desire; neatly defining those who do not support parliament’s aims as unfaithful (and therefore treasonous) and papist (‘true-hearted’ being a pseudonym for the Church of England). To support this claim, both accounts append to the description of Essex’s departure, events that warn their readers of the punishment awaiting unfaithful subjects. In both instances, men reported as having spoken against or plotted to kill Essex were sentenced to the pillory and a whipping through the city. Neither event is corroborated in the parliamentary journals – where the sentence was supposedly made – but the mocking inversion of the processional form (in which the accused was tied behind a cart) was a pointedly political display. The inclusion of these two men in the accounts was also a reminder that the city was not a homogenous body, despite appearances to the contrary in the written accounts. The threat of shaming through public spectacle can be read as an attempt to impose order on a city whose citizens and authorities were far from unified behind parliament.

Essex’s procession out of London was in essence a military parade that utilised civic space – and appropriated the royal ceremonial route – in order to negotiate his superior military position in his relationship with parliament. The city did not financially contribute towards the procession, although it contributed towards the broader war effort in lives and money. There were no entertainments, no stands, no

32 The Resolution of the Right Honourable Earl of Essex.
33 Imprecate: To pray (a deity), invoke, supplicate. “imprecate, v.2”. OED Online.
34 Remarkable Passage, no.1, A4.
civic speeches, or addresses. It is possible that the lack of investment in the performative event partially explains the lack of verses or poems in Essex’s honour. Similarly, whilst the two accounts quoted above are full of rhetoric, they do not dwell on Essex’s departure. The newsbook – covering a week’s worth of news – devotes little more than a page, whilst in the second account, Essex’s procession is used as a preface that enables the author to reprint Lord Robarte’s speech, in which he eloquently (if somewhat extensively) praises parliament’s cause and Essex’s military leadership. Whilst Codrington maps the parade onto the royal procession route and also recalls the language of the 1641 celebrations – ‘the people on each hand having al the way made a hedge with their own Bodies, and with loud acclamations all crying out, God blesse my Lord Generall, God preserve my Lord Generall’ strongly echoes ‘The bankes, hedges… were all embroydered with millions of people, of all sorts and fashions’ crying ‘the Lord preserve our dread Soveraine King Charles’ – his is a commemorative account published after Essex’s death in 1646.\textsuperscript{36}

This contradiction – between glorifying Essex as Lord General and devoting little print space to the performance of this role – is overlooked by Sharpe, who argued that the argued \textit{The Resolution of the Right Honourable Earl of Essex} is proof of ‘the ritualistic as well as discursive endorsement of Essex’. While the frontispiece depicts Essex on horseback and the subtitle offers a brief description of his exit (which continues onto the reverse page), the major part of the pamphlet is given over to Robartes’ propagandistic speech. This inconsistency would occur again two months later, when Essex returned to London.\textsuperscript{37} This entry (7 November) followed the Battle of Edgehill (23 October), in which both sides had claimed victory. Again, there is an evident tension between the performative mode of the military entry and its written reception. The reports of his return comment on the number of troops of horse and footmen returning with Essex, despite the recent fight, and describe his going into and

\textsuperscript{36} R. Codrington, \textit{Mournefull cloud, over vaylinge the face of England} (London, 1646), 14; \textit{Englands Comfort, Londons Ioy}, A2; \textit{Great Britaines time}, A3.

\textsuperscript{37} Sharpe, \textit{Image Wars}, 376.
through the city on his way to parliament.\textsuperscript{38} The likelihood is that this parade also followed the traditional processional route, deviating from the royal route to end at Westminster not Whitehall. On entering parliament, Essex was received by the Lords and presented with £5,000 by the Commons ‘for the great and faithfull service done to the Kingdome, and for his undaunted courage, and unheard of valour’. Notably, the Lords were not involved in this gift-giving rite.\textsuperscript{39} In the afternoon, Essex went with Warwick to the artillery yard to view the additional forces Warwick had raised in early November.\textsuperscript{40} Whilst the procession to parliament and subsequent military inspection reveal Essex actively maintaining a visible presence within the city, the newsbook reporting is minimal; some do not mention Essex’s return at all.

Although Essex went straight to Westminster on his arrival to London, it was not until four days later that the houses passed an order to deliver and print a formal thanks (11 November). It promptly appeared in print the next day.\textsuperscript{41} The declaration praised the ‘Wisedome, Courage, and Fidelity of Robert Earle of Essex… for the defence of the true Protestant Religion, the King, Parliament, and Kingdome’.\textsuperscript{42} It is noteworthy for several reasons. Firstly, it reiterates the fact that Essex’s position was due to the ‘Authority of Parliament’: the words ‘Service’ and ‘Employment’ appear frequently in the text. Secondly, the thanks glosses over the indecisiveness with which the campaign of autumn 1642 had ended, instead emphasising the ‘bloody Battle’ and ‘extremest Hazard’ that Essex encountered.\textsuperscript{43} Adamson suggests that the thanks also calls upon the traditional interpretation of war as a noble, aristocratic act: the thanks is given for Essex’s ‘Wisdom, Courage and Fidelity’, and his ‘Care, Valour, and Dexterity’.\textsuperscript{44} It is given to preserve his ‘lasting Honour’ and as ‘a Mark of Honour to his Person, Name and Family’. Such language – printed and disseminated for the

\textsuperscript{38} Continuation of certain remarkable passages, no.3 (4-11 November 1642), 4; Special Passages and Certain Informations from several places, no.13 (1-8 November 1642), 112; England’s Memorable Accidents (7-14 November 1642), 74; LJ, v.436; CJ, ii.838.
\textsuperscript{39} Special Passages and Certain Informations from severall places, no.13, 112.
\textsuperscript{40} For Warwick’s activities, see: LJ, v.426.
\textsuperscript{41} CJ, ii.842; LJ, v.441; for discussions on 7 Nov, see: LJ, v.436; CJ, ii.838; A Declaration of the Lords and Commons… Concerning the late Valorous and Acceptable Service of his Excellency (London, 1642).
\textsuperscript{42} A Declaration… of his Excellency, A2.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., A2v.
\textsuperscript{44} Adamson, ‘Baronial Context of War’, 106-08.
literate public – legitimised Essex’s self-fashioning as triumphant military leader even as it reminded readers that his appointment came from parliament’s authority. A congratulatory verse, printed on the same day, can also be seen to reflect the peers’ worries of Essex’s pre-eminence as it is carefully addressed to both Essex and Warwick. Together Essex and Warwick are presented as ‘the health, / the very life and soule o’th’ Common-wealth’, recognising the important political role played by both earls in the build up to war as well as their military positions – Essex as Lord General and Warwick as Lord High Admiral. The verse likens Essex to Mars and Warwick to Neptune, but crucially makes explicit the link between Essex and his father:

Illustrious Essex, who’s so truly good,
His virtue dignifies his name and stood: …
To whom by right inheritance did arive
The stile of Earle of Essex, and of Eve [Ewe]
Whose father, that same darling and delight
Of manhood vanquish’d in victorious fight.

Essex’s military leadership and the battle against ‘the malignants’ renders him worthy of his title because he is following in the footsteps of his father, ‘that same darling’ who also fought (in this interpretation) to protect his country’s safety. The second earl’s ignoble execution is here transformed into a glorious death, and Essex similarly is portrayed as willing to fight till death ‘to serve the King and Parliament’. As the verse progresses, the duties of Essex and Warwick are increasingly tied together; ‘these brave Earls, by their industrious course’ will vanquish the enemy. The verse is full of martial imagery, ‘groves of Pikes’, ‘honour in the tombed field’, ‘waving ensigns gloriously displaid’ but the writer is more concerned in repeating and justifying the reasons for war. They fight to protect:

that great Chartre which was made
Unto our Ancestors, by whom was lai’d

45 London’s joyfull gratulation, and thankfull remembrance for their safeties (London: John Johnson, 1642).
46 Ibid., 3; Both Essex and Warwick signed the Petition of the Twelve Peers, and Warwick was instrumental in moving Hull’s arsenal to London in May 1642.
The Basis of our Liberties.

This reference to the Magna Carta was typical of parliamentary propaganda. The charter protected not only the kingdom but also the king, thus the fight was presented as not against Charles but for him, in order to protect his royal person as well as the king-in-parliament. Essex and Warwick were the ‘heroes’ who will lead the country to peace. Through the military parade, Essex attempted to set himself apart from parliament, as well as other parliamentarian lords who were actively engaged in the military: he was (consciously or unconsciously) manipulating their treatment of him. Clarendon remarked that the peers were acutely aware of this; they ‘thought themselves as much overshadowed by the greatness of the earl of Essex and the chief officers of the army as they could be by the glory of any favourite or power of any counsellors’. Parliament’s declaration and the congratulatory verses served to counterbalance, through print, this performance of aristocratic military leadership.

In winter 1642-43, parliament – thanks to the dominance of the peace-faction – had ‘resolved to merit as much as they could of the King by advancing an honourable peace’. The sooner a peace settlement was reached, the sooner the army (which was already causing unrest in the capital) could be disbanded and Essex’s power reduced. However, peace proposals at Oxford floundered in spring 1643 and by August, parliament was negotiating a political agreement with the Scots that guaranteed Scottish military support in return for English acceptance of the Solemn League and Covenant. Throughout summer, Essex’s leadership had come under sharp criticism from radical elements within London and parliament, prompting Essex to threaten his resignation. Parliament refused – possibly because the war faction were already working on ways by which to limit his powers – but in late July it resolved to raise more men and find funds to pay the arrears. In the city, radical calls (led by the Lord
Mayor, Isaac Penington) for a separate force under a new command resulted in the appointment of Waller with power ‘over all forces to be raised within the City of London, and all other forces… under the command of the militia of London’.\textsuperscript{54} Essex interpreted this, quite rightly, as an offence to his honour and authority, and the Commons later agreed that Waller would be subordinated to Essex (8 October). Essex was further angered by the appointment of Manchester as Commander of a newly formed Eastern Association Army, which was also independent of Essex. These slights on Essex’s military authority by the very institution who had appointed him were compounded by the rumours and slander circulating the streets of London; the royalist newspaper, \textit{Mercurius Aulicus} reported that Essex was ‘abused in pictures, censured in pulpits, dishonoured in the table talk of the common people’.\textsuperscript{55}

His success following the relief of Gloucester (8 September), where he was ‘received with all possible demonstrations of honour’, went some way to restoring his position of popularity as did the parliamentary victory at Newbury (20 September).\textsuperscript{56} After evacuating Reading, Essex and his chief commanders returned to London ahead of the main body of his army (25 September), creating a physical and geographical distance between himself as Lord General and the common soldier. His return, however, was interpreted by many newsbooks as part of his plan to press parliament for men, money, munitions, and other supplies.\textsuperscript{57} As with his return in 1642, his arrival failed to generate much press attention. Of greater interest to the newsbooks were the actions that followed the next day. On 26 September, the two houses of parliament adjourned in the morning in order to go to Essex House. Here, delegates from the Lords, the entire Commons and Speaker Lenthall congratulated Essex, thanking him for his ‘unexpressible Courage and Valour… and to let him know how far the Parliament and whole Kingdom are indebted to him (under God) for their safety and protection’.\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{54} \textit{CJ}, iii.281-2; Pearl, \textit{Puritan Revolution}, 269-72.
\textsuperscript{55} For instance: \textit{Parliament Scout}, no.3 (6-13 July 1643); \textit{Mercurius Aulicus}, no.32 (6-13 August 1643).
\textsuperscript{56} Clarendon, \textit{History}, iii.171; Newbury ended when the king withdrew - hardly a resounding victory for parliament.
\textsuperscript{57} \textit{A perfect diurnall}, no.11 (25 September-2 October 1643), 82; Essex’s intent is also the subject of speculation in \textit{Mercurius Civicus}, no.18 (21-28 September 1643), 137-8.
This was a significant change to the traditional route. By stopping at Essex House, the performance was truncated, forcing parliament to respond to this deviation by sending a delegation from Westminster along the Strand to give thanks and pay attendance. By paying homage to Essex, in Essex House, parliament was figured as his inferior: as Adamson notes, the only other occasion the houses gave attendance outside of parliament was for royalty.\(^59\) It also reinforced the subversive potential of Essex, as it was from this house in 1601 that his father had organised and led the rebellion against Elizabeth. After the humiliations of the spring and summer, it would be easy to interpret this action as a warning to parliament; whilst Essex owed his military position to parliament, he could easily use such a position against it. As Kenyon notes, Essex’s actions ‘suggest a cult of personality which the King himself encouraged by making the earl the principal target of his propaganda’.\(^60\)

This triumphal performative coup was again ceremonially reinforced in the afternoon. Around 5.00pm, Essex and the two houses rode to Finsbury Fields to review the trained bands that had remained to defend the city during the recent campaign. After resting in a tent, specially erected for the occasion, the Lord Mayor, aldermen and sheriffs ‘in their Scarlet Gownes, and stately attendance, came into the Fields to his Excellency, and also expressed their great joy and thankfulnesse at his safe return’.

This is the first reference of the three military rituals in which the colour of the gowns is noted. It may be that the gowns were also worn on the previous occasions (in September and November 1642), but since scarlet gowns were usually worn to greet royalty – as with Charles in 1641 – such apparel could be expected to draw attention and commentary. Why the civic authorities wore scarlet gowns in September 1643 and not the previous year can only be speculated, but it is likely the result of factional division with the city (which had generated such vocal criticism in the summer), and a subsequent need to reassure Essex of the city’s allegiance and loyalty to Essex as Lord General. The symbolism therefore doubled as an apology and a sign of their high regard, without civic figures such as Penington needing to apologise with words. After


receiving the city delegation in the tent, the party rode on horseback around the artillery yard, reviewing the troops. Several newsbooks commented on how the crowds ‘by their loud acclamations, testified their great affection to his Excellencie; and each Regiment… gave him a Volley of Shot, with Colours displayed, in a very exact manner’. Clarendon would later recall how Essex was received:

> with all imaginable demonstrations of affection and reverence; public and solemn thanksgiving was appointed for his victory, for such they made no scruple to declare it. Without doubt, the action was performed by him with incomparable conduct and courage, in every part whereof very much was to be imputed to his own personal virtue, and it may be well reckoned amongst the most soldierly actions of this unhappy war.

Two days later Essex presented the royalist colours captured at Gloucester and Newbury to the Lords, ending the military celebrations of the Lord General. The city had cause to celebrate again when the London trained bands sent out to fight with Essex at Gloucester arrived home (28 September). The soldiers were greeted at Temple Bar by the Lord Mayor, aldermen, sheriff, and common council along with ‘divers other able and worthy Citizens… testifying their great affection unto them, for their great courage and valour in the cause of God and his people’. This formal welcome would no doubt have been visible from Essex House, adjacent to Middle Temple. Neither Essex nor the senior commanders are recorded at this welcome – nor were parliament – this was a civic affair, a welcoming of citizens back to their environs. Martial motifs were, however, prominent in the files in which they marched through the streets, the colours and ensigns, and more significantly, the wearing of green boughs in their hats ‘(imitating the ancient Romans)… in signall of victory’.

Codrington in his commemorative account recalls that they ‘declared their cherefull Resolution, that when soever his Excellence (their Heroick Generall) should command their service they would most readily advance with him and esteem it their greatest

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61 A perfect diurnall, no.11, 83; Mercurius Civicus, no.18, 141.
63 LJ, vi.233; CJ, iii.257.
64 The True Informer, no.2 (30 September 1643), 10-11.
65 Ibid.
happinesse to pertake with him in the honour of his dangers’. Although, considering Codrington’s intentions, the extent to which this is true is open to question, that contemporary newsbooks also comment upon the cheerful atmosphere suggests Essex had succeeded in rehabilitating himself in the minds of London’s soldiers, if not the civic authorities.

The victories at Gloucester and Newbury offered Essex affirmation that his cautious, slow approach to defeating Charles was the correct course; that – as Lord General – he could use the threat of military force to encourage an English Presbyterian settlement. It was, in Adamson’s words, when ‘his political stock was at its highest’. The military rituals of autumn 1642 and especially that of September 1643, with the truncated route, suggest Essex treated such ceremonial performances as part of his Lord Generalship. The rituals emphasised Essex’s pre-eminent position above his peers in the Lords, enabling him to gloss over internal insecurities through authoritative display. These events, in which parliament paid homage at Essex House and civic authorities donned apparel suitable to greet kings, were designed as spectacle, alternatively associating Essex with Charles – in his power to bring peace – or his father – in his defence of subjects’ liberties. If the ceremony and splendour captured the imagination of London’s citizens, it did not mask political tensions within and between the city and parliament, which is in turn reflected in the limited contemporary textual material of the acts.

In discussing the ceremonial and procedure around Essex in the early years of his Lord Generalship, it is all too easy to follow Adamson’s interpretation of a man who laid claim to ‘protectoral, vice-regal authority’. Whilst Essex encouraged and undoubtedly manipulated these performative forms of military authority, it does not follow that he was trying to claim a quasi-regal political position. The entries and exits into London in 1642 and 1643 were enactments of Essex’s belief that he could and should act independently of parliament as Lord General – that parliament could recommend but not dictate military strategy. The ceremonies thus utilised the civic

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68 Ibid., 108.
space and appropriated the royal ceremonial route in order to demonstrate the authoritative distance between Essex and parliament. That parliament did not prevent these performances despite unease amongst the Lords regarding Essex’s political aspirations indicates a collective awareness of the necessity of a figurehead to lead the cause. By examining the language of military authority that Essex adopted upon his appointment, it becomes evident that he was very aware of the powerful role he had to play in propagating parliament’s cause.

4.3 The language of politico-military authority

As Lord General, Essex had a highly visible platform from which to generate financial, political, and military support for the war against Charles through his embodiment of the politico-religious English values parliament were trying to protect. Whilst Essex’s use of ceremony demonstrates his awareness of this role, printed texts also emphasised Essex’s military leadership even as the input of royalist writers complicated the issue of political authority. Much of what was officially printed in Essex’s name was actually ordered by parliament, and parliament frequently printed orders to the soldiers and instructions to Essex. The orders to soldiers within the capital to leave and return to camp and the orders for regulating those soldiers were issued on parliament’s authority.\(^{69}\) However, Essex astutely authorised the printing of several letters written by his officers, describing military victories over the royalists.\(^{70}\) These letters present parliamentary troops as outnumbered by the royalists, against whom they demonstrate great courage in the face of uncertain victory. The military engagements are described in great detail, with the parliamentarians consistently figured as the underdogs, escaping one trap only to find another. Ultimately, the parliamentarians triumph, rarely losing many men – often in contrast to the numbers believed dead on the royalist side.

\(^{69}\) A Declaration of the Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament; Orders of the Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament for the regulating of those soldiers (London, August 1642); however Essex also issued proclamations: Two Proclamations by his Excellency Robert Earl of Essex (London, March 1642[1643]); A Proclamation by his Excellency Robert Earle of Essex (London, February 1643[1644]);

\(^{70}\) At least three such letters were authorised for publication: E. Harvey, A letter from Colonell Harvie, to His Excellency the Earle of Essex (London, 1643[1644]); R. Norton, Good newes from Portsmouth (London, 1643[1644]); R. Browne, A letter sent from Major-generall Brown, to His Excellency the Earle of Essex (London, 1644[1645]).
These letters sought to boost morale among their faction, to enforce the righteousness of their cause, and to dishearten the enemy. Essex also authorised a military guide for his soldiers in 1642, which was re-published twice the following year, and again in 1645 following the creation of the New Model Army. Similar texts appeared during the Bishops’ Wars in the names of Arundel (1639) and Northumberland (1640) and Charles also issued military orders in summer 1642. There were, however, a few differences that testify to the changing politico-religious landscape: the earlier references to sacred vessels and utensils were removed, as was the warning against using traitorous words towards the king. Also missing in the 1642 guide was the soldiers’ oath to serve Charles. The absence of an alternative oath to Essex may indicate early concerns about his growing authority but this is countered by the fact that parliament were willing to swear a covenant to Essex (27 August 1642) which was subsequently distributed to localities in the expectation that they too would promise obedience.

In response to Charles’s denunciation of Essex and parliament’s army as traitors, Essex also authorised the publication of a declaration in defence of his character. Declaring he ‘hath as upright a heart as any subject in England’, Essex reiterated parliament’s humble desire that Charles return to Westminster – with the caveat that the king ‘put all Delinquents and evil Counsellours out of his protection, and leave them to the justice of the Law’. Since said justice had led to Strafford’s death, this caveat made it impossible for Charles to agree. Essex also repeated parliament’s justification of war, but in contrast to parliament’s pledge to fight ‘in the Defence of the true Protestant Religion, the King’s person, the laws of the Land, the Liberties and Properties of the Subject’, the order of the first two items is here reversed: Essex’s declaration places the protection of the king above maintaining religion, laws

71 Laws and ordinances of warre, established for the better conduct of the army (London, September 1642).
72 Lawes and ordinances of vvarre, for the better government of His Maiesties Army Royall (Newcastle, 1639); A. Percy, Lawes and ordinances of warre established for the better conduct of the service in the northern parts (London, 1640); Military orders and articles established by His Majestie, for the better ordering and government of His Maiesties army (York, 1642).
73 By 1644, St Paul’s and Westminster had been stripped of utensils, images, and organs, see: Laing, LJB, ii.130, ‘My Lord Manchester made two fair bonfyres of such trinkets at Cambridge’.
74 The Earl of Essex his declaration concerning the Kings Most Excellent Majesty (London, October 1642).
75 Ibid., 2-3.
and liberties.\textsuperscript{76} Perhaps wary of Essex’s inclinations towards peace, parliament did not order the printing of any of his speeches given at Westminster during his command; where his speeches do appear in official texts, they are summarised or paraphrased within a broader narrative of the day’s or week’s events.\textsuperscript{77}

Essex’s position therefore, was perhaps more complex than has been previously recognised. Whereas, as Smuts has argued, Charles ‘ruled as a remote source of authority’, the military parades in 1642 and 1643 enabled the construction of Essex as ‘a visible symbol of the religious and patriotic values uniting England’.\textsuperscript{78} Whilst parliament tried to reduce this spectre in print, royalists accepted Essex as the embodiment (or representative) of parliament’s authority. Yet when, by virtue of Essex’s military position, royalists or ambassadors approached him directly to negotiate peace, he refused to accept this responsibility, deferring instead to parliament. Conversely, Charles refused to receive petitions from Essex (presented on behalf of parliament) because of his elevated status. Thus, when the Oxford Parliament sent a formal address to Essex (27 January 1644), it was without royal authorisation; although both the princes signed it.\textsuperscript{79} A ‘large parchment’, Baillie wrote it was ‘directed onlie to The Earles of Essex’, its arrival – not at Westminster but at Essex House – heralded by a trumpet.\textsuperscript{80} As Adamson notes, ‘the only precedents for such formal, engrossed addresses from the two Houses of a Parliament were submission to a Protector or to a reigning king’.\textsuperscript{81} Although primarily designed to praise the honour and virtue of Charles, the letter was significant in its direct appeal to Essex for assistance in peace negotiations, as ‘a person likely to be sensibly touched with these considerations’. It appealed to Essex’s unease over Scottish involvement ‘the outward more menacing destruction by a forraigne Nation, upon the very poynt of invading’ and figured him as a mediator ‘faithfully and industriously pro-moving with those by

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\item \textsuperscript{76} CJ, ii.715.
\item \textsuperscript{77} For instance: The Kings proclamation and determination concerning the Earle of Essex, and all who go under his command. With the resolution of both Houses of Parliament concerning the said Earle of Essex, and the same proclamation. (London, August 1642).
\item \textsuperscript{78} Smuts, ‘Public ceremony’, 91.
\item \textsuperscript{79} A copy of a letter from the members of both houses assembled at Oxford, to the Earle of Essex (Oxford, January 1643[1644]).
\item \textsuperscript{80} Laing, LJB, ii.138; Clarendon, History, iii.297.
\item \textsuperscript{81} Adamson, ‘Baronial Context of War’, 109.
\end{itemize}
whom you are trusted’. Essex refused to open it and duly presented the letter to the Lords three days later, upon which a joint committee of both houses was appointed to open it. Somewhat stubbornly, parliament refused to answer the letter, because it had not been addressed to it. The Venetian ambassador reported, ‘Parliament is offended because the letter was directed to the general as they know quite well that this was done in order not to recognise the assembly as a parliament’. In addressing the letter to Essex and by styling itself as a parliament, the Oxford Parliament threatened the legitimacy and validity of that at Westminster, but the letter and its contents also reinforced the fact that royalists saw Essex as a powerful man who could influence parliament. In his response (which parliament ordered to be printed along with the declaration of both kingdoms), Essex recognised his duty – as Lord General – to work towards peace, but emphasised that he could not take political action independently of parliament, ‘whensoever I shall receive any directions to those who have entrusted me, I shall use my best endeavours… to further any way that may produce that happiness that all honest men pray for’.

Regardless of Essex’s protests of political subservience, royalists saw him as legitimising parliament’s cause, his ‘repute in the world had cast some credit on these [parliaments’] mens designes’. Some royalist writers even sought to defend Essex whilst criticising parliament’s treatment of him:

For though in the beginning they smooth’d and courted him to undertake the Cause… they heaved Him up to such a value among the people… yet now is he sunke to so low a rate in their affections, that He is fain to complain… he hath ventured his life and fortune in their service, and yet hath arrived at no greater estimate in their eyes.

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82 A copy of a letter…, 2-3.
83 CJ, iii.382-3; LJ, vi.399-40; Devereux, Lives and letters, ii.389-90.
84 CSPVen 1643-47, 71.
85 A letter from the Earle of Forth, to His Excellency Robert Earle of Essex, Lord Generall (London, 1643[1644]), 2; see also, The copy of his excellency the Earle of Forth’s letter to the Earle of Essex (Oxford, 1643[1644]).
86 The Earle of Essex his letter to Master Speaker… with some breve animadversions on the said letter (Oxford, 1643), 5.
87 Ibid., 5-6, 9.
Here Essex is held up as honourable and simultaneously to be pitied because parliament ignore him. Why would a royalist text seek to place Essex on such a pinnacle when to do so implicitly drew comparisons with Charles’s and James’s earlier ostracisation? In part because it set up parliament as mean-spirited and reticent in contrast to Essex’s honour and virtue – and in doing so it built on and exacerbated divisions among parliamentarians (those that approved of Essex’s military tactics and those who did not). The royalist text also exposed dissent regarding military command in its recognition of Waller’s rising popularity; ‘Ladie Waller, who expects every hour (by participation with her Husband) to be Ladie Generall’. The writer encouraged sympathy for Essex – beholden to an ungrateful parliament – but also reduced the military threat he posed by exposing his lack of men, money and munitions, as well as parliament’s reluctance to supply him with these things.

This royalist text appeared in summer 1643, when rumours and slander about Essex’s inept leadership were at their highest in London. In response to these slights, a Remonstrance appeared, vindicating Essex’s actions ‘from false Aspersions’ (Thomason’s copy is marked October 16). The Remonstrance offered a prose narrative of Essex’s character and military career, from his ‘former free services’ on the continent through to his actions against the Scots (in which the writer criticises Charles’s decision not to place him in command), ‘though he commanded not in chiefe, and little was done; what was best done, was done by him’, through to the current war. The Remonstrance recalls Parker’s Contra-Replicant, in arguing for Essex as a temporary ‘Dictator’. Like the Roman Senate, parliament have put ‘the sole and independent command of the Souldiery upon one man’, if only for a limited time. The author criticises parliament’s attempts to limit Essex’s military power, arguing that ‘too strait a limitation of Generals in their power has been destructive to their best desgines’, as ‘the old petty States of Greece’ and ‘great Carthage’ discovered to their dismay. Crucially, Essex is here figured as a military hero, there is no attempt to link his military leadership to an equivalent role in parliament. It is parliament’s

88 Ibid., 9.
89 A remonstrance to vindicate His Excellence Robert Earle of Essex from some false aspersions cast upon his proceedings (S.L., 1643).
interference – in seeking to weaken Essex’s leadership – that has led to its army’s misfortunes. The city was also criticised for having the ear of parliament; the city’s ability to withhold money and men pushed Essex to move towards Oxford (in winter 1642) ‘much against judgement’. The main source of the military’s misfortunes, however, was the result of Waller’s actions in disobeying military orders and it is in exposing these actions that the Remonstrance is most concerned. Although Waller succeeded in capturing Gloucester for parliament (24 March 1643) and made inroads into the royalist-dominated Midlands and Wales, he suffered a heavy defeat at Roundway Down (13 July 1643). Dubbed ‘William the Conqueror’, his popularity within London sat ill with Essex, who felt that Waller’s appointment came at the expense of his own force. The Remonstrance is thus highly critical of Waller, presenting him as a disruptive and inconsistent officer, concluding that ‘a judicious Reader will by the language easily perceive’ Essex’s innocence.

A year later, a second defence of Essex appeared, An Apologie and vindication, detailing military successes from August 1643 (where the Remonstrance ended) to May 1644 (Thomason’s copy is marked August 8). These months had seen both military victories and heavy defeats – which are blamed on the royalists’ ‘cruell commander[s]’ and the ‘barbarous, butcherly’ soldiers. The narrative of battles is interspersed with letters from or about Essex that demonstrate ‘his Noblenesse’. As with the Remonstrance – which defends Essex against Waller – An Apologie also defends Essex against accusations of indecision and irresolution by emphasising his duty to spare innocent blood. Unlike the Remonstrance, An Apologie claims Essex has achieved honour through the actions of Waller, because Waller – as his inferior officer – is commander on his behalf; he bears Essex’s name in absentia. This cleverly allowed the writer to overlook the failures of the campaigns that Essex personally led (the delay outside Reading, the failure to attack Oxford, the decision to head west) whilst also glossing over the tension between Essex (who had been reluctant to issue Waller’s

90 Ibid., 2-3, 6, 7.
91 Ibid., 9-14.
92 Ibid., 13-14.
93 An Apologie and vindication (from all false and malignant aspersions) for his excellencie (London, 1644).
94 Ibid., 12-13, 17.
command) and his officer (whose success at the Battle of Cheriton (29 March 1644) was one of parliament’s first clear victories).

Neither of these texts bears Essex’s name: both are printed ‘by authority’ but the authority is not specified, although in summer 1643 (shortly before the Remonstrance appeared), parliament had acknowledged the need to issue a vindication of Essex’s character. Usually texts authorised by Essex proclaimed this sanction on the title-page, although it is possible he did not want to openly acknowledge a hand in these texts. Peacey has recently demonstrated that Essex briefly (in 1644-45) held the license for Mercurius Britannicus to ensure positive coverage of his actions, strengthening the argument that Essex understood the importance of (and willingly manipulated) public perception. It would also appear that Essex acknowledged a small collection of prose and verse called, The true character of a noble gennerall (1644). True Character is dedicated to Essex and the author states that Essex had ‘seen and allowed’ the text prior to publication. If this is true, it would suggest Essex was aware of and attempting to manage his written image as his father had done 40 years earlier. True Character is no less partisan than the written defences of Essex’s character, but it does not directly attack parliament, the city, or officers under Essex’s command. Once again, the emphasis is squarely on Essex’s exalted position as a military – not political – leader:

There needs no more addition then thy Name
To get our loves, yet thou hast gotton fame,
With it a Title of High Excellence,
Which doth so well become thee in my sense,
That it is farre more honour’d in thy wearing,
Then is thy goodnesse by the Titles bearing:

The writer emphasises the importance of Essex’s name: he is loved because he bears the name of Essex not because he holds the position of Lord General. Again, the writer refers to the legacy of his father and Essex’s fulfilment of it through his actions: ‘The

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97 Ibid., A3, l.19-24.
Name thy Father had survives in thee, / His Love, His Vertue is thy Legacie’. In defending Essex’s leadership in these terms of legacy and dictatorship, these writers continued to develop the cult of personality that Charles had initiated by singling Essex out as the chief rebel and which Essex, through performances of military authority, helped to perpetuate. The tendency of royalists as well as parliamentarians to isolate Essex as parliament’s figurehead exacerbated tensions between parliament and Essex. The written vindications of Essex indicated parliament’s lack of trust in Essex, which was in turn a source of concern for the newsbooks. As a collective institution, parliament was internally divided over war strategy and the question of settlement and whilst Essex was clearly frustrated by the former, he was equally as clearly willing to defer to parliament on the latter. Little surprise then that the vindications shy away from defending Essex’s potential claim to political leadership and focus instead on defending his military leadership – whether through his own actions or those of his inferiors. The possibility that Essex could use his military authority to legitimise claims to political leadership was a latent threat to parliament’s authority and as early as spring 1644, the war faction were introducing legislation designed to limit Essex’s power.

4.4 Primus inter pares? Essex’s downfall, 1644-45

The pomp and circumstance around Essex and the parliamentarian declarations issued in his name masked the increasing tension within parliament over the course of the war. Essex was in many ways, a double-edged sword. With his family legacy and military experience, he acted as a poster boy for Protestant England; numerous pamphlets depict him in equestrian pose, emphasising the righteousness of his cause and the military strength of his army. However, the pronoun ‘his’ caused problems through the implication that Essex held superior status above other military leaders and parliament itself. This implication was strengthened through the visual appearance of the parliamentarian army, whose colours – an orangey-yellow – were those of Essex. Such was the importance of this visual display that parliamentary troops who wore

98 Ibid., A3, 1.52-3.
alternative colours were, as Malcolm notes, condemned as malignants. That parliamentarian’s placed Essex on a pedestal is understandable. The more worrying issue was that the royalists also recognised Essex as parliament’s leader. As Adamson astutely summarises, ‘acknowledgement of Essex’s protectoral status by loyal parliamentarians was one thing; acknowledgement by a royalist Parliament at Oxford quite another’. This placed Essex in a position the war faction in Westminster found untenable, since their aims clashed with Essex’s desire for a moderate Presbyterian settlement.

The winter of 1643-44 saw a series of political manœuvrings as the death of Pym created a leadership void in the Commons. The emergence of St John as leader of the middle group in the Commons led to a new alliance with Saye in the Lords, whilst Essex’s reluctance to ally with the Scots led him to an alliance with Holles in the Commons. The winter also saw the creation of a Committee of Both Kingdoms (7 February 1644), invested with the power to ‘advise, consult, order and direct, concerning the carrying on and managing of the war’. Ostensibly, the Committee of Both Kingdoms was created to acknowledge the assistance of the Scots, but it also enabled those wary of Essex to limit his military position. In doing so it mirrored the Committee of Safety (established 5 July 1642), designed to offer advice to and report on the Lord General’s activities, but with greater power to check Essex. Mulligan argues that it was intended ‘to be the vehicle of those men who wanted to pursue the war vigorously and defeat the king decisively’ but it was also seen by contemporaries as a way to reduce the voice of the peace faction by taking the lead role in discussing terms for peace (which was not initially part of its remit). By and large, Essex chose to ignore the Committee of Both Kingdoms: aware of – and

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101 Pearl offers the clearest analysis of these constantly shifting political alliances, see: Pearl, ‘Oliver St. John and the ‘Middle Group’ in the Long Parliament’, *English Historical Review*, 81 (July, 1966); W. Notestein, ‘The Establishment of the Committee of Both Kingdoms’, *The American Historical Review*, 17 (January, 1911)
102 *CJ*, iii.392; Laing, *LJB*, ii.141.
103 L. Mulligan, ‘Peace Negotiations, Politics and the Committee of Both Kingdoms, 1644-1646’, *The Historical Journal*, 12-01 (January, 1969), 4; Glow argues that the early Committee was largely under the direction of the peace faction, see: L. Glow, ‘The Committee of Safety’, *The English Historical Review*, 80 (1965); Laing, *LJB*, ii.144-45.
unhappy with – Northumberland’s and Saye’s private conspiring of his downfall, Essex continued his military campaign contrary to Westminster’s wishes. His obstinacy led to parliament’s humiliating defeat at Losthwithiel (2 September 1644), justifying the Committee’s argument for military reform. Essex’s action were not the only factor of this reforming zeal – the fallout between Manchester and Cromwell following their decisive victory at Marston Moor (2 July), the inconclusive Second Battle of Newbury (27 October), and the need for a new method of financing the army were all influential. Crucially, the embarrassment at Losthwithiel finally offered the war faction the opportunity to bring Essex to heal.

Having saved his own skin in Cornwall (which saw him abandon his 6,000-strong army to the royalists whilst he escaped by fishing boat), Essex finally fell out of favour with parliament. Many in both houses viewed his attempts to defeat the king as half-hearted, whilst Essex failed to find a suitable scapegoat for the Cornish debacle, despite pointing the finger at Waller. Essex wisely chose not to stage a military entry into London that autumn, although the citizens were not completely deprived of the ceremony. On 27 September 1644, the two London regiments that had fought with Essex in Cornwall returned to the capital, where ‘they were met by the Sheriffs and divers others of the chiefe citizens of London’. Essex was conspicuous by his absence; the Venetian ambassador reported that following Losthwithiel, ‘the general did not dare to come here [London] and wished to go by sea to Portsmouth, but was driven back by the wind. He is doing his utmost to assemble troops’. In this recruitment drive Essex was hindered not only by lack of funds and dejection among the soldiers, but also by the constant bickering and disagreements among the commanders; Manchester in particular did not want to join forces with Essex because he did not want to serve ‘under the general’. Manchester’s reluctance was symptomatic of a general concern within the Lords: collectively the peers did not want to be ruled by Essex, whilst individually they aspired to assume his role.

104 The True Informer, no.47 (21-28 September 1644), 352.
105 CSPVen 1643-47, 138, 140.
For many within both houses, Essex’s inability or reluctance to inflict a total military defeat on Charles also hindered their ability to complete their Protestant reformation. Essex was failing to ‘Expell Romes Idolls, bring home Haltian dayes’. Increasingly, as Bennett has demonstrated, ‘regional commanders resented Essex’s imperious summonses and... tended to find reasons to circumvent the commander’s orders’ whilst in January 1644, the Eastern Association ‘was granted new powers freeing it’ from Essex’s control. Whilst Adamson argues that the peers were able to control the Committee of Both Kingdoms through their clients in the Commons and by manipulating appointments to the Committee, the Lords – as a collective body – was in a dangerous position. Their opinion was increasingly viewed by the Commons as irrelevant since their claim to power was based in the same political and social structure as the monarch’s; a structure that was being violently dismantled. During the Short Parliament, the Lords asserted their authority as the upper chamber and, aligning with the king, insisted that the issue of supply preceded discussion of grievances. At the Great Council of Peers in York (September 1640), the peers had once more used their conciliar strength (as well as medieval baronial rights) and utilised the king’s weakness to press for another parliament. However, the bill of attainder against Strafford and the Grand Remonstrance had highlighted tensions between the two houses, emphasising the Commons’ willingness to push the Lords as they sought to attack the king’s prerogatives. During discussion of the Triennial Bill (winter 1640-41), peers displayed wariness of extensive reform because of the potential threat to their hereditary power:

[the] upper chamber has not seemed entirely favourable, fearing lest such an alleviation of the royal authority and the frequency of parliaments might not augment licence among the people, with manifest danger that after shaking off the yoke of the monarchy they might afterwards apply themselves to abase the nobility also and reduce the government of this realm to a complete democracy.

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106 Cooke, True Character, A3, 126.
107 M. Bennett, Oliver Cromwell (London: Routledge, 2006), 70.
108 See: C.H. Firth, House of Lords during the Civil War (London: Longmans, 1910).
109 CSPVen 1640-42, 111; bill presented in Lords, 20 Jan 1644, see: LJ, iv.136.
On 29 June 1644, parliament passed an ordinance excluding those (peers and commoners) who had abandoned parliament for the king from returning to their seats; a direct attempt to prevent the six peers who had fled to Oxford the previous summer from re-admission.\footnote{CJ, iii.546-47; An ordinance of the Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament: for excluding such members of either House of Parliament, as have deserted the Parliament, and adhered to those that leave war against the Parliament (London, 1644); the six peers were Bedford, Clare, Conway, Holland (who was sitting & voting again in the House of Lords by January 1644), Lovelace, and Portland.} It is in this light that Cromwell’s attack on Manchester following the Second Battle of Newbury should be seen. On 25 November 1644, Cromwell, before the Commons, accused Manchester of:

some principal unwillingness... to have this war prosecuted to a full victory, and a design or desire to have it ended by accommodation (and that) on some terms to which it might be disadvantageous to bring the king so low.\footnote{CSPD 1644-45, 159.}

Manchester had previously spoken of his fear that ‘if we fight [the king] 100 times and beat him 99 he will be king still, but if he beat us but once, or the last time, we shall be hanged, we shall lose our estates, and our posterities be undone’.\footnote{CSPD 1644-45, 159; Bennett, Oliver Cromwell, chapt.5; Whitelocke, Memorials, i.343-347, offers an insightful account of his meeting at Essex House, in which Essex branded Cromwell as an ‘incendiary’.} Now he vigorously defended himself before the Lords (28 November) and a verbal spat quickly developed between Manchester and Cromwell, in which the latter was accused of attempting ‘to abolish the nobilitie of England’.\footnote{Bennett, Oliver Cromwell, 92; CJ, iii.704; LJ, vii.73, 76.} Cromwell’s attack, as Bennett has shown, went far beyond mere criticism of Manchester himself. It was an attack on Manchester as a commander (and thus other aristocrats in military roles including Essex), as an aristocrat (and thus that section of society), and as a peer (and thus the Lords as a political body). The ensuing debate over the separation of political and military office contributed to the creation of the Self-Denying Ordinance and the New Model Army. Historians have fiercely debated the origins of this move (Kishlansky locating the origins in the Commons whereas Adamson locates them in the Lords), and whilst it seems slightly short-sighted that the Lords would collectively seek to put
themselves out of military power just to limit that of Essex, it certainly appears – based on calls to exempt Essex from taking the Self-Denying Ordinance – that this was a primary motivation. Such interpretation is strengthened by Whitelocke’s observation that the removal of Essex was Cromwell’s goal; Cromwell ‘seemed (but cautiously enough) to lay more blame on the officers of the lord-general’s army than upon any other’. The Venetian ambassador meanwhile suggests that Essex took advantage of the inquiry to oppose Manchester and seek further advancement for himself.114

In the midst of this heated political debate, Thomason records a doggerel written by ‘some Independent’ that he found scattered about the street in early December.115 ‘Alas pore Parliament’ writes of parliament’s betrayal as a consequence of Essex’s and Manchester’s actions, who masquerade as parliament’s commanders but are really fighting for the king; ‘when they should doe, they undoe, and indeed to undoe is all the marke they aime at’. The verse is highly critical of their presumption to command by virtue of their nobility, ‘Honour without honesty stinkes: away with’t’, ultimately calling for an end to the peerage, ‘no more Lords and yee love me, they smell o’ the Court’. Concurrent to this debate on the future of the army, the Lords were also under intense pressure from both the Commons and the city of London to pass the bill of attainder against Laud. The Venetian ambassador wrote that the Lords were finally alert to the danger of giving into such pressure, realising that to do so would be ‘to deliver them from the yoke of the king’ but subject them ‘to that of the common people’.116

The Commons meanwhile continued with plans to reform the army. On 17 December, the Commons defeated the motion to exclude Essex from the Self-Denying Ordinance by 100-93 and it passed two days later (19 December).117 In demanding the resignation of all peers and commoners from military positions, the ordinance ended the chance for any one peer to gain the popularity and power that Essex had held. More importantly, as both Kishlansky and Manning have noted, it stripped the nobility of

114 Whitelocke, Memorials, i.343; CSPVen 1643-47, 159.
115 Alas pore Parliament, how art thou betrai’d (S.L., 1644).
116 CSPVen 1643-47, 162.
117 CJ, iii.726, 728.
their ancient rights as an elite order, ‘denying them their ancient military rights and implicitly censuring the conduct of the aristocratic generals’.\textsuperscript{118} This in turn increased tension between the Commons and the Lords for Cromwell would maintain both his political and military role. Despite the Lords rejection of the Self-Denying Ordinance by just four dissenting votes (13 January 1645), the Commons refused to amend the ordinance and continued their scheme to vote Fairfax as commander of the New Model before the Lords’ resolve collapsed (the bill eventually passed on 3 April 1645). Thus despite the strength of peers such as Northumberland and Saye in the most important parliamentary committees, the house as a whole had seen its authority overridden, ignored, and reduced. The passing of the bill also confirmed Essex’s military eclipse with the emergence of new military leaders, Fairfax and Cromwell. Whilst the makeup of the New Model did not substantially differ from the army under Essex, its creation heralded a new style of waging war, as chivalric traditions and aristocratic honour were displaced by a hard-line desire to win the war. In his speech to the Lords on the offering up of his commission, Essex acknowledged ‘it is the desire of the House of Commons, that my Commission may be vacated’.\textsuperscript{119} Given the criticism he had faced throughout his command, Essex also felt the need to remind the Lords that he had offered to resign in 1643 but parliament had refused to accept. In ‘wishing it [his Commission] may prove as good an expedient to the present distempers as some will have it believed’, Essex also expressed a sense of war-weariness amid the realisation that continued bloodshed was not the route to peace.\textsuperscript{120}

As Lord General of parliament’s army, Essex had been the ceremonial centre of military ritual. On resigning his command, this public visibility declined, although he remained active in the Lords, attempting to reconcile with the Scots and urging a Presbyterian settlement that would enable the continuation of monarchy.\textsuperscript{121} No longer

\textsuperscript{119} \textit{A Paper delivered into the Lords House by the Earl of Essex Lord Generall, At the offering up of his Commission} (London: printed for Thomas Hewer, 1645), 2.
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., 3.
Lord General, Essex was no longer the pre-eminent peer within the Lords, and this enabled others to fill the performative void and utilise ceremonial forms in order to enhance their own political position. Most notable of these was Northumberland, one of the four peers who voted for the Self-Denying Ordinance. On 18 March 1645, Northumberland was appointed guardian of the two younger royal children. With this appointment came the ability to relocate to St. James’s Palace, a practical move that served to reinforce his superiority over other peers through claiming ownership of a royal residence. As Adamson has noted, Northumberland’s self-fashioning continued through the refashioning of a royal court at St. James’s, revival of royal offices (including Clerk of the Robes and Wardrobe to the king and the Board of Green Cloth), and an architectural remodelling of Northumberland House on the Strand. Where Essex had called upon the image of the Protestant Prince in his military campaigns, Northumberland styled himself as ‘Lord Protector in all but name’.\(^{122}\)

Through these actions, Northumberland replaced Essex as the most prominent peer in the Lords, as befitting his hierarchical superiority in terms of family lineage and precedence. Despite the visual signs and symbols, this did not result in the isolating of political power in the hands of one man, just as the military ceremonies failed to consolidate military power for Essex. Moreover, with the peers now stripped of military command and the subsequent victories of the New Model, it became easier for the more radical elements in society to begin criticising the peerage as a whole. By 1645, newsbooks were already debating the extent to which the nobility were responsible for the war. In discussing the royalist and Catholic earl of Worcester, and proposed sale of his lands in June of that year, the Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer concluded it was, ‘A good course to subdue the Enemy, thus by clipping the wings of their chief Abettors: Better pull down a few Families, than to suffer the ruine of a whole Kingdome by an unsafe lenity towards them’.\(^{123}\) Buchanan offered similar sentiments; ‘To tell me of sparing noble blood is but a toy; all blood is alike if it be not


\(^{123}\) Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer, no.106 (24 June-1 July 1645), 844.
corrupt with evil humours’. Although written with distinctly Scottish interests, Buchanan makes it clear that he feels the (English) nobility should be held accountable, especially those who ‘have betray’d the Cause of God and his people’. Whereas the newsbook got away with its accusations – as it was aimed squarely at the Catholic nobility – Buchanan was not so lucky; parliament condemned the text and ordered it to be burnt by the hangman. A year later, Overton (languishing in Newgate) published a rousing condemnation of the Lords, which Thomason dates to 10 October – between Essex’s death and funeral. Describing himself as the ‘Prerogative Archer to the Arbitrary House of Lords’, Overton accused the Lords of usurping ‘the Commons liberties, and freedomes’ and blamed them for illegally sanctioning ‘the cruel, villainous, barbarous, Martyrdomes, murthers and butcherys of Gods People’. Whilst these texts are clearly partisan and playing to a specific audience, private diarists also attacked the position of the Lords. Juxon remarked, ‘tis plain they intend so to drain the Commons and the City that they shall be never able to nourish rebellion or faction’, going on to accuse the Lords of obstructing the army in the knowledge that ‘the war will neither be carried on to their, nor the king’s, interests by this’.

If Essex as Lord General had proved a double-edged sword for parliament, the Self-Denying Ordinance prevented any one peer in the Lords from repeating this performance. The ordinance was introduced for several reasons – not just to limit Essex – but this limitation was an important factor: by stripping Essex of his military power, he became less visible in the public eye and thus the image of him as a potential political leader also became less viable. The ordinance also served to increase the power of the Committee of Both Kingdoms at the expense of both houses, which corresponded with the limited success of Northumberland’s grandiose stylisation and the Commons’ increasing tendency to dispense with etiquette and protocol within the

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124 D. Buchanan, *Truth its Manifest, or A short and true relation of divers main passages of things* (London, 1645), 120.
125 Buchanan, *Truth its Manifest*, 17.
126 T. Overton, *An arrow against all tyrants and tyranny, shot from the prison of New-gate into the prerogative bowels of the arbitrary House of Lords, and all other usurpers and tyrants whatsoever.* ([London], 1646).
127 Ibid., t.p., 6, 13.
walls of Westminster. Whilst peers such as Northumberland attempted to style themselves as politically superior, these rituals increasingly clashed with radical voices that were critical of the Lords. When Essex died (14 September 1646), the elaborately stage-managed funeral procession (22 October) enabled the peers to challenge their detractors by once more utilising the image of a Protestant Prince to praise the central role this nobleman (and by extension the nobility at large) had played in the war.

4.5 A noble death, autumn 1646

Essex’s funeral was an elaborately staged event, largely paid for by parliament, that ostensibly reinforced the image of Essex as the Protestant Prince of England. This was spectacle at its finest, embedded with political and military symbolism and the emphasis once more returned to Essex as a transitional figure and the now lost possibility that he could have been a great leader akin to Sidney or Prince Henry. Whereas Essex’s entries and exits into and out of London demonstrated his self-awareness of the uses of ceremony, the funeral arrangements reveal parliament's awareness and willingness to co-opt these forms of display. By recalling the flamboyant forms of aristocratic Tudor funerals and imitating the cortège of Prince Henry (who died in 1613), the funeral created the impression of a united and victorious parliament: the Prince of Wales had fled to the Scilly Isles (March 1646) and thence to France (June); Charles had surrendered to the Scots at Newark (6 May); Oxford – the bastion of royalism for four years – had surrendered to Fairfax (24 June) and Prince James was taken prisoner of parliament. In reality, Essex’s death had been a severe blow for the Scots, with whom he had allied. Baillie remarks that he was ‘the head of our partic here, keeped all together, who now are like by that alone to fall in pieces’. Since Charles’s surrender, Essex had also begun a campaign to reclaim military power through the position of Lord High Constable, which (along with Lord Steward) had not been included in the Uxbridge Proposals (1644-45). This was not as far-fetched as it might appear: the Lords had considered reviving the role for Essex in 1642 and in

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129 For a detailed comparison of Prince Henry’s and Essex’s cortège see, Adamson, ‘Chivalry and Political Culture’, 191-93.
130 Laing, LJB, ii.401.
summer 1645, Lord Savill had written, ‘iff yow can but beatt or disgrace Fairfaxe his Independent armie, Essex and the Scots will be greater than ever’.\textsuperscript{131} Clarendon later acknowledged that Essex died ‘in a time when he might have been able to have undone much of the mischieve he had formerly wrought’. To the political and religious Independents, Essex had been ‘the only person whose credit and interest they feared, without any esteem of his person’.\textsuperscript{132} His death enabled them to push more vigorously for a restricted settlement with the king and temporarily stalled the rise of the Presbyterians.

At his funeral, Essex was accorded a ceremony worthy of a king: from the formation of the cortège to the decorations in Essex House and Westminster Abbey, the funeral followed the example of royal and noble funerals past, a deliberate attempt on the part of the heralds (acting on parliament’s order) to manipulate the trappings of royalty in support of the earl. ‘Pomp’, ‘splendour’, ‘ceremonial’ are words that frequently occurred in contemporary accounts and the staging and elaborate display of nobility at Essex’s funeral far exceeded the established ritual of death and mourning adhered to by other members of the nobility. The event (and accompanying texts) intended to reassert Essex’s authority to a public (from the spectators to the texts’ readers) distanced from their king and sceptical of the war’s outcome now Charles had been decisively defeated. The actions and words performed during the protracted mourning process (from his death to the dismantling of his hearse at the end of November) were thus crucial in the presentation of Essex as England’s Protestant Prince. Such stylisation encouraged citizens to mourn Essex as a brave hero, fighting a godly campaign against the Antichrist. For one last time, Essex proved a useful figurehead for parliament, enabling its members to ‘locate their cause in a romanticised vision of Elizabeth’s reign’ in what Adamson describes as ‘a calculated exercise in anachronism’.\textsuperscript{133} That men such as Parker and the author of the 1643 Resolution had presented Essex as a temporary dictator enabled the funeral to draw upon an

\textsuperscript{131} Laing, \textit{LJR}, ii.491; D. Scott, \textit{Politics and War in the Three Stuart Kingdoms} (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) offers a comprehensive and clear account of the political factions and groupings.
\textsuperscript{132} Clarendon, \textit{History}, iv.219.
\textsuperscript{133} Adamson, ‘Chivalry and Political Culture’, 191.
established linguistic framework that overlooked the reality of Essex’s poor military record.

For the city of London, Essex’s funeral was the largest pageant since the procession of royalist prisoners through the city following the Battle of Naseby. However, the funeral was not the only state funeral that London’s citizens witnessed during the war. Pym and Strode were both accorded state funerals by the Commons and buried in Westminster Abbey. The countess of Dorset, Mary Curzon, former governess of the royal children (until Northumberland assumed responsibility) was also buried in Westminster Abbey after the Commons sequestered £600 from the earl of Dorset’s estate to pay for it. London’s citizens were not immune from conflict and buried many of their own during the war, including Francis Popham, MP and parliamentarian colonel, whose funeral the Commons also attended. Pym’s death (8 December 1643) greatly disturbed the balance of power between the war and peace factions in the Commons. He died, as Gentles has argued, at a time when a royalist victory looked highly viable and he was denounced by the royalists as ‘the promoter of the present rebellion and director of the whole machine’. On 11 December, the Commons ordered his body to be interred in Westminster Abbey ‘and that the Speaker, and the whole House, do accompany his Body to the Interment’. Baillie wrote that on the day of the funeral (13 December 1643):

Mr. Pym was carried from his house to Westminster, on the shoulders, as the fashion is, of the chieffe men in the Lower House, all the House going in procession before him, and before them the Assemblie of Divines. Marshall had a most eloquent and pertinent funerall sermon; which we would not hear; for funerall sermons we must have away, with the rest. The Parliament hes ordered to pay his debt, and to build him, in the Chappeell of Henry the VII a stateliie monument.

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134 The Battle of Naseby (14 June 1645) was a pivotal victory for the New Model, the procession of around 4,000 royalist prisoners took place a week later (21 June).

135 CJ, iv.211, 227.


137 CJ, iii.336.

138 Laing, LJB, ii.118.
Of the ten members from the Commons who carried the coffin, Holles, Hesilrige and Strode had also been impeached by Charles (January 1642), whilst Vane the younger had helped prepare the Solemn League and Covenant (signed by the English Parliament in September 1643). St John, who took over leadership of the middle group, also bore the coffin. The pallbearers symbolised division over the army and the growing factionalism in parliament. As Hexter notes, Holles and John Clotworthy were ‘forced out of the House [of Commons] in 1647’ by the army, whilst St John, Vane the younger, and Hesilrige ‘signed an engagement to live and die’ with it. A Perfect Diurnall described Pym as ‘that truly zealous and religious patriot, of whose indefatigable labours, and integrity in this publique cause, time will undoubtedly tell his story to after ages’. This assessment was mirrored in Marshall’s sermon in the Abbey:

Woe is me, for I am as when they have gathered the summer fruits, as the Grape gleanings of the vintage. There is no cluster to eat: my soul desired the first ripe fruit. The good man is perished out of the Earth.

Basing the sermon on Micah 7.1-2, Marshall developed ‘a favourite puritan theme: the idea of the faithful remnant, the beleaguered godly minority’. As with many of Marshall’s sermons, the Commons immediately ordered it to be printed. When Strode died (9 September 1645), the Commons again ordered a state funeral in Westminster Abbey instructing that he be buried ‘near the Place where Mr Pym was buried, and in such a Manner as may be fitting for a Person of his Quality and Desert’. All members of the Commons were ordered to attend. The Mercurius Civicus reported that on 22 September 1645, ‘divers worthy Members of the honourable house of Commons being present at his Funerall, and Mr, Gasper Hicks preached before

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140 A perfect diurnall, no.21 (11-18 December 1643), 165.  
142 CJ, iii.341.  
143 CJ, iv.268.
them’. Even the countess of Dorset was given a funeral ‘in great state’ in Westminster Abbey (September 1645), despite her husband’s royalism.

As well as these funerals, organised and orchestrated by parliament (with the exception of the countess of Dorset’s funeral), the city had also witnessed the funeral of Francis Popham in 1644. An MP for Minehead in the Long Parliament, Popham had taken ‘an active part in the military organisation of parliament’s army in Wiltshire and Somerset’. His sons, Alexander and Edward, were also active parliamentarians – Edward would also receive a state funeral (24 September 1651). Popham died on 28 July 1644 and was buried in Stoke Newington parish church two weeks later (15 August 1644). This was a civic not a state funeral but members from both the Lords and Commons were present in the funeral procession from his house to the church, walking behind the chief mourners (Alexander Popham ‘assisted by four gentlemen’ including his brother and Lord Conway). Also in the procession were Colonels Pyne and Roger, and Captain Smith. John Pyne was a close ally of the Pophams in Somerset, whilst Roger was probably Hugh Rogers, a cousin to the Pophams, who led the Somerset foot. Smith possibly served in Lord Brooke’s Midland Association alongside Captain Thomas Egerton who was later captain to Alexander Popham. Egerton, however, is not named in the funeral procession. This funeral was the first in the heralds’ orders to include a large number of military officers; a reminder of the fractured state of the country. No poor men are noted in the account for Popham’s funeral procession, but there were 220 poor men at Alderman James Cambell’s funeral (1642) and 110 at Alderman Richard Fenne’s funeral (1639), which suggests the custom was still in practice. Thus, whilst Adamson is correct in arguing that Essex’s funeral was undoubtedly the most elaborately staged in these years, it is important to emphasise the fact that this ceremony did not occur in isolation; it drew on Tudor

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144 Mercurius Civicus, no.121, (11-18 September 1645), 1067.
145 Whitelocke, Memorials, 1.509.
147 The funeral procession is detailed in full in BL Add MS 71131, file R.
148 I find it unlikely that this would be Viscount Edward Conway, who was sequestered for delinquency in 1644.
149 BL Add MS 71131, files P and Q.
funerary forms but also on more immediate parliamentarian and civic precedents, which Adamson and Gentles overlook.

Due to the ostentatious arrangements for Essex’s funeral (which took five weeks to complete), embalming the corpse was imperative to preserve the body whilst resting at Essex House. The corpse was enclosed in a lead coffin engraved with Essex’s coats of arms and inscribed with his title, a reminder to mourners of his noble prestige. An effigy lay atop the coffin, dressed in a buff coat, scarlet breeches, white boots, and parliament robes. Both the buff coat and Parliament robes acted as important reminders of Essex’s career; Essex had worn the coat at the ‘victorious’ Battle at Edgehill, whilst the robes recalled his active presence in the Lords. Access to a representative image of Essex constituted an important part of the mourning ritual by enabling a visual memory of the deceased; the earl’s coronet, the Commander’s staff, and his sword (used in many battles) thus completed the effigy’s military and chivalrous appearance. As a temporary resting place, the bed-chamber also served as a reminder of Essex’s temporal power and bearings; black broadcloth hung from the walls, adorned with escutcheons, with the earl’s arms, colours, and banners also on display.

Having laid in state for five weeks, on 22 October the hearse was taken from Essex House and slowly proceeded to Westminster Abbey in a cortège involving 3,000 performers, a scale unseen in England since the outpouring of grief at Prince Henry Frederick’s funeral 33 years earlier. Whitelocke wrote that:

> the funeral of the earl of Essex was solemnized with great state. All the members of both houses, sir Thomas Fairfax, the civil and military officers then in town, and the forces of the city, a very great number of coaches, and multitudes of people present at it.\(^{150}\)

It should not be forgotten, however, that military processions of prisoners through the city occurred throughout 1642-46; over 4,000 royalists prisoners trooped through the city in 1645 following the defeat at Naseby. The Commons had explicitly banned Hertford (Essex’s brother-in-law) ‘or any other Person that hath been in Arms against

\(^{150}\) Whitelocke, *Memorials*, ii.79.
the Parliament’ attending the funeral; the number of mourners for Essex was a demonstration of parliamentary support as much as a display of grief.\textsuperscript{151} The days leading up to Essex’s funeral had been disruptive: on 17 October, Hertford’s wife had seized £3,700 ready money from Essex House as well as a stack of papers – the panic within the Commons suggests they were concerned with the contents of the papers as much as the missing money. Meanwhile, having ordered the Committee of Sequestration to remove Officers of Arms loyal to the king from the College of Arms (on 20 October), the names of their replacements were only passed in the Commons the day before the funeral.\textsuperscript{152}

The performance of Essex’s funeral in contrast was precise and orderly, with great care given to the details; parliament, in a self-conscious act of vanity, ordered the stewards and constables of Westminster to clean the streets of the passage from Essex House, along the Strand and down King Street to Westminster Abbey, so the Lords would not be forced to walk through the dirt. At a time when the country, specifically the nobility, had lost its figurehead (embodied in the monarch), the splendour of Essex’s funeral represents an attempt to appropriate the trappings of nobility that were being abused and destroyed by the king. Around 2.00pm, the procession began its march from Essex House down streets lined by five trained bands, stationed since 1.00pm. Officially, the presence of the trained bands was ceremonial, the colours of their uniform (red, green, yellow, white, and blue) contrasting the black gowns of mourners and guiding the cortège towards the Abbey. Unofficially, they offered the houses protection from the spectators. A regiment of the horse led the cortège, sounding cornets and trumpets to both clear the passage and draw the crowds. The city marshal followed the regiment on horseback, leading twenty men wielding swords and truncheons to ensure a walkway, which suggests the trained bands struggled to maintain their position against the crowd. Following them, walked sixty-eight poor men two-by-two, led by two conductors holding black staves.

\textsuperscript{151} CJ, iv.697.
\textsuperscript{152} CJ, iv.696-7, 701, Edward Bysshe was appointed Garter King of Arms; for an account of the sequestration see, Wagner, \textit{Heralds of England} (London: H.M.S.O., 1967).
After the poor men, two more conductors led the servants of gentlemen, esquires, knights, and baronets, who in turn were followed by four of London’s trained bands, each soldier trailing their pikes, the drums covered with black cloth and adorned with escutcheons. Of these four bands – the Trained Band of Westminster, the Trained Band of London, the Blue Regiment of City, the Red Regiment of City – two had marched to Turnham Green with Essex (November 1642) and subsequently fought with Essex at Newbury (September 1643). Following the bands was Colonel Richard Fortescue, an officer in the New Model who had been instrumental in summoning the surrender of Pendennis Castle, the last royalist stronghold in the west (August 1646). Fortescue led approximately 800 commanders and captains, walking four abreast, each trailing their arms or pike, with Waller bringing up the rear. Whilst Fortescue was an appropriate choice, no love was lost between Waller and Essex: Essex was blamed for Waller’s defeat at Roundway Down (July 1643), whilst Essex blamed Waller for the shameful defeat at Lostwithiel (September 1644). Like Essex, Waller had been forced to resign his commission with the passing of the Self-Denying Ordinance, thus his place in the procession was one of military recognition, a token of thanks from parliament. Next in the procession walked a series of musicians and heraldic flag holders wearing hooded gowns that partially covered their faces, interspersed with Essex’s more personal mourners. These included Colonel Flloyd, bearing the Devereux standard; Colonel Francis Thompson, carrying the Devereux guidon; and Samuel Luke, holding the Lovaine banner. Luke had been Essex’s scout-master, although like the earl and Waller, he too had been forced to resign in 1645. Auxiliary commanders followed and then, behind another set of musicians walked Colonel Harvey bearing the Bourchier banner. Harvey, notably, had refused to join Essex’s army in 1644, ignoring parliament’s command until he and his troops received their arrears owed. Over fifty colonels and field officers who served in Essex’s immediate command followed Harvey, before yet another set of musicians. Behind the musicians walked Colonel Dalbier carrying the Ferrers of Chartley banner. Essex thought extremely highly of Dalbier, securing his release from prison for debt in 1642 and assigning him the post of quartermaster-general until 1645. The New Model Army
overlooked Dalbier for promotion and his presence in the procession emphasises the predominantly Presbyterian beliefs of the cortège.

With the exception of Fortescue, the procession thus far resembled a roll-call of former members of Essex’s army, from Waller – with whom there was no love lost – to Dalbier and Luke. As Gentles notes, the officers also included ‘many who would publicly identify themselves with the Presbyterian cause by dint of supporting parliament against the New Model Army in the crisis of 1647’. Yet the banners that they held also emphasised Essex’s noble pedigree, symbolism that was reinforced by the presence of six trumpeters who declared the final heraldic banner in the procession, the great banner of Essex’s quartered coats, borne by Sir Henry Cholmley. That Cholmley was chosen as the final bearer of the heraldic flags is fitting as by 1646, his political positions included Commissioner for Abuses in Heraldry. This long, pompous display of chivalry emphasised Essex’s nobility and family pedigree; the titles ‘Baron Ferrers of Charley’ and ‘Baron Bourchier’ both pre-dated the founding of the Order of the Garter (1299 and 1342 respectively).

The centre of the procession was signalled by the preacher Richard Vines, an old friend of Essex. Vines’s place in the cortège – after the display of military mourners and marks of nobility – serves to remind the crowds (and readers of the printed description) of Essex’s Presbyterian beliefs and more importantly, of his soul, so easily forgotten amidst the representations of his temporal achievements. Behind Vines walked the newly appointed Officers of Arms, bearing the emblems of military chivalry (the helmet, crest, spurs, gauntlets, sword, target, and coat of arms). At the centre of the cortège, the earl’s effigy ‘was drawne in an open Chariot of blacke velvet’ with six horses ‘garnished with Plums, Shafferons, Escocheons, and Compartements of his Lordships Armes’. Close mourners stood at his feet (Master Tubb, Essex’s page) and head (Master Pudsey, Gentleman of the Chamber). Six sons of nobility surrounded the hearse: Henry Howard, Holles, George Montague on the right, and Charles Rich, Colonel Sidney, and Thomas Sheffield on the left. Heraldic tradition

dictated the right side in chivalry was the side of greater honour, a rule mirrored in the positioning of these six men. Howard fought for the king during the First Bishop’s War; Holles, was de facto leader of the peace party; and Montague, whose family was divided in religion and politics, represent the embodiment of nobility as a structure or idea above religious faction or political division. Rich, whose grandmother was Essex’s aunt; Sidney, who formed a tumultuous alliance with Essex; and Sheffield, whose father, the earl of Mulgrave, entrusted his proxy vote to Essex, represented nobility in practice: family connections and alliances. Surrounding the hearse and these six men walked commanders and noblemen bearing the earl’s armour and bannerolls; eight footmen walked on the outer edges of the chariot protecting the group from the crowds. According to William Marshall, the order and structure at the centre of the funerary procession were, ‘by reason of the multitude of people, and fowlenesse of the streets, all the armour-beares, and bearers of the Bannerolls were enforced to proceed before the Chariot out of their proper places’. Marshall’s is the only account to record this disruption, but he states from the outset his aim is to ensure, ‘the Representation before expressed is here more plainely demonstrated, and set forth for better satisfaction’.

Behind the chariot walked Edward Bysshe, Garter King of Arms, followed by the Viscount Hereford (Walter Devereux) the chief mourner and main representative of Essex’s family. Eight noblemen, closely followed the Viscount Hereford: the earls of Northumberland, Pembroke, Suffolk, Warwick, Holland, Lord Lisle, Sir Robert Sherley and St John. If the earlier figures in the procession had been a roll-call of military Presbyterianism, this was a roll-call of some of the highest peerages in England. Gentles suggests that the presence of Northumberland and St John – two active members of the war party – was due to their role as executors of Essex’s will. This is doubtlessly true, but their position was also necessary in order to create a convincing impression of the unity of parliament; their absence would have been more noticed than their presence, implying the divisions in parliament were unsurmountable.

155 Ibid., 17.
156 Ibid., 18.
Likewise, the presence of Suffolk (who had largely withdrawn from parliament) and Shirley (Essex’s nephew and supporter of monarchy) suggests parliament’s willingness to style Essex as a Protestant Prince around whom all nobility were gathered. Essex’s hearse as depicted in several texts, including *Mournefull cloud, over vaylinge the face of England*, is similar in style to Prince Henry’s hearse in George Chapman’s *Epicide*, notably the use of coronets, banners, escutcheons, and the figure of the effigy itself. One spectator grew so frustrated with the ostentatious and overly extravagant nature of Essex’s funeral he wrote a short poem, *Rithmes made in a Belcony by one who Impatiently Expected the shews att the E[arl] of E[ssex] his funerall*. The title is revealing in that the location – a balcony – implies that houses or rooms were rented in order to watch the funeral, as had been the case when Charles opened the Short Parliament. The word ‘shews’ is also reveal as it indicates the author’s awareness of the funeral procession as a form of display; there is a sense that he expects to be entertained. The poem in full is transcribed here:

How long shall we waite this horrible Funerall?
To veiwe the State in Black for their funerall?
had this man sate still, not a Gunn had been stirring
But see here he comes as dead as a Herring
When first he left London and went towards Edge-hill
that very day he began to fall very ill
But on Holyrood day, when Bucks goe out
Death turn’d his face as white as a Clout.
The world hath abas’d him now all men may see’t
for his Hearse is noe Broader att head than att fee’t
He went hence in hast, or Els’ he’s belide
First slandres himselfe then’s Lady, then dyde

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158 See also, J. Wild, *An Elegie upon the Earle of Essex’s Funerall* (London, 1646); Daniel Evance, *Justa Honoraria: or Funeral Rites in honour to the Great Memorial* (London, 1646).

159 Bodleian MS. Douce 37 f. 12v.

160 Holy Cross Day (one of the Anglican feasts of the cross) was celebrated on 14 September – the same day Essex died.
first Lost him Commission, e then Lost his Life,
he Lou’d not his King, nor himselfe, nor his wife.

Poorly constructed though the poem may be, the author hints at delays to the procession, already indicated by the presence of a guard to clear the ceremonial path. When Essex’s effigy does appear, ‘see here he comes’, the author continues to bemoan Essex rather than grieve. It is heavily implied that, if not for Essex, there would be no war, ‘had this man state still, not a Gunn had been stirring’, indicating contemporaries still viewed Essex as the chief rebel against the king (although the fact he ‘Lost’ his commission as Lord General also implies incompetence). The author’s royalism is emphasised through referencing the Anglican feast day, ‘Holyrood day’, and through the implicit connection between the young bucks and the stag in Denham’s *Coopers Hill*, identified as Strafford. Despite the abasement Essex received, the author does not pity him because Essex’s inability to love his king or his wife (this could allude to either Frances Howard, who divorced Essex in 1613 or Elizabeth Paulet, who separated from him in 1631) renders him transgressive. That the writer could pen this poem while also participating in the funeral as a spectator once again underscores the notion that the enactment of a political authority was not always welcomed or accepted by those who observed it.

There is in this poem a clear sense of the funeral as belonging to the state - it is ‘their funerall’. Considering the city did not contribute to Essex’s funeral, it could be argued that the spectators were somehow less invested in the ceremony, and more aware of the ritual as a stage-managed spectacle. Alternatively, *A Perfect Relation* thought it necessary to explain in detail, ‘divers things… which were not understood by many of the Spectators’ because of the uniqueness of the funeral.¹⁶¹ Although unauthorised by parliament (in contrast to Marshall’s account), the writer constantly returns to the idea of ‘great state’ and ‘perfect’ commemoration of Essex.

After the chief mourner and the peers, the Black Rod with the Speaker of the Lords (Manchester) followed the Horse of Honour, leading the Lords. Following the

Lords, the Commons walked three abreast, led by Speaker Lenthall with his mace-bearer. Finally, the city’s aldermen, the Committee of the Militia of London, and the Westminster divines (led by the Prolocutor) followed behind the members of parliament. A party of fifty horses completed the procession, preventing the crowds from following the procession too closely as it slowly walked towards the Abbey. At the Abbey, secular decorations transformed the building from a place of sacred worship to a stage of aristocratic grief. As with Essex House, black cloth hung throughout the Abbey, covered in escutcheons, as though for a royal funeral, and the pews and pavement were likewise draped in black. At the heart of the Abbey – where the communion table stood – a twelve-foot high hearse was erected, hung with velvet and gilt edging. Escutcheons, banners, mottoes, and other heraldic signs covered the velvet, whilst atop the hearse sat a ducal coronet with four smaller coronets at each corner. Due to limited space, ‘women of any quality’ and the lower ‘multitudes’ were not allowed in the Abbey; the Lords ordered Captain Falconbridge and Laurence Sweetenham (Justices of Peace) to keep them away, a service they performed ‘with great care and discretion’.162

The sermon Vines delivered lasted three hours; the mourners did not leave the Abbey until after 7.00pm. Vines chose for his funeral oration 2 Samuel 3.38, ‘And the king said unto his servants, Know ye not that there is a prince and a great man fallen this day in Israel?’ This prince and great man was Abner, commander-in-chief of Saul’s army, who rescued the people of Israel from Saul’s tyranny and led them to unity under David’s rule. Throughout the sermon, Vines drew comparisons between Abner, whose project ‘took rife in him, from an ill or suspicious ground’, and Essex, whose ‘fall is cleere of the disaster of Abners story’. Vines (who objected to the notion of government without a king) strived to portray Essex in a favourable light, whilst using the example of Abner to warn the warring factions of parliament.163 After Vines’s sermon, the three officers of Essex’s household broke their white staves and the Abbey officials performed the final sacred (as opposed to secular) ceremonies,

including his burial in the Chapel of St. John the Baptist, where several abbots and kings lay interred. Alongside accounts such as Marshall’s, which described the funeral ritual, Vines’s printed sermon assisted parliament in consolidating Essex’s memory as a Protestant Prince; an aural rejoinder to the ideas of a military and chivalric nobility visually evident in the banners, escutcheons, chariot attendees, and hearse. In the opening two pages, Vines compared Essex to Jonathan, son of Saul, appropriating the custom of using biblical allusions to describe monarchs; both James and Charles were frequently likened to Solomon. In doing so, Vines confirmed Essex’s position as a princely figure, descended from an ‘honourable Family’ and honoured in his death by ‘so great a confluence of names and titles of honour’ as would likewise mourn a king.164

As a final, ostentatious act, the trumpets within the cortège sounded their signal, giving the order to ring the great bell at St Margaret’s Church thrice. The knolling of this bell was the signal to Mr Ward (the parliamentarian officer and poet), positioned in the highest tower of Westminster. On hearing the signal, he revealed a great globe-lantern, the signal to all the forts within the Lines of Communication to fire a volley of cannon in a final military salute. The trained bands, who still lined the streets from Essex House to the Abbey, answered the cannon volley with a cascade of pistol shots. This ceremonial volley was repeated twice more; an audible ritual for those who had not seen the procession or witnessed the sermon.

Through the use of visual symbols, elaborate rituals and dramatic words, the portrayal of Essex as the princely saviour of the Protestant, English nation, was confirmed. After the funeral, the hearse and Essex’s effigy lay in the Abbey for mourners to behold; the intention was that the effigy would lie on display for five weeks after the funeral, mirroring the five weeks between Essex’s death and burial, during which time his effigy lay on display at Essex House. On the night of 26 November, three days before the effigy was due to be dismantled, vandals broke into

164 Ibid., 2.
the Abbey and demolished Essex’s effigy. An anonymous pamphlet detailed the eight acts of vandalism:

1. The head was pulled off, and broken to peeces.
2. His Buffe Coate was slit upon the breast, from one end to the other.
3. The Scarlet Breeches were also cut and split.
4. His Bootes were slit, and cut along the legs of them.
5. His band was thrown downe upon the ground, but not cut nor torne.
6. His Sword was broken in 3 peeces, which was the same Sword that he wore in the field.
7. His Parliament Robes, were thrown down, but not cut nor torne.
8. All his Finges was defaced and thrown down, but nothing thereof (at all) missing, done (as is supposed) with Swords,

The act of vandalism was undoubtedly an attempt to diminish or destroy the power vested in the effigy, but exactly what element of power – be it personal, noble, military, or political – the vandals wanted to destroy remains in doubt. The author quickly laid the blame on the ‘Jesuited Cavaliers’, but it was the marks of nobility (the coat, the breeches, the sword) that the vandals destroyed, not the marks of parliamentary loyalty (his parliament robes and his band). Was the demolition therefore an act of aggression against parliament’s aims (as exemplified in Essex’s military career), the nobility (as embodied by Essex and his lineage), or the person of the earl (his achievements and memory) himself? No perpetrators were caught or accused although the pamphlet offered several possibilities before concluding, ‘most probably (it is conceived) that they were Jesuited Cavaliers, that did it out of inveterate malice against the Parliament, and the Cause of the people of God’. This opinion further aligned Essex not just to parliament’s cause but also to the cause of Protestantism in a similar manner to which the elegies and ritual descriptions painted him as a Protestant hero. The pamphlet described the attack as a ‘strange accident’ and keenly protected the Protestant church, emphasising the innocence of the Bell-ringer who left ‘all things safe, and (as he thought secure)’. Quickly, a ‘happy’ conclusion to the event is revealed; the hearse was taken down and repaired, the perpetrators reprimanded (with threats of ‘most

165 The whole proceedings of the barbarous and inhumane demolishing of the Earle of Essex Tombe (London, 1646).
exemplary punishment’) and the author ends with ‘A briefe and compendious Narrative’ of Essex, designed to reaffirm his memory and banish the thought of his disfiguration. There is a discrepancy, however, between the vandalism itself and those who were blamed. The author concluded that the perpetrators were violent, ungodly, and barbarous cavaliers, but the damage done was to the trappings of nobility rather than that of religion or parliament. This does not accord with the author’s sense of the significance of the act – that it was a royalist attack on parliament, as embodied in the earl. Instead, it appears as though the author was determined to rationalise the attack by explaining it as an instance of good versus bad regardless of the evidence suggesting the vandals were more loyal to the Independent faction in parliament than to the king.

Apart from Essex’s tomb, the only other act of vandalism occurred on ‘the good ould Chambdens [Camden] monment’, where the nose, some fingers, the ruff, and the ‘Britania’ were cut or hacked off. William Camden, an antiquarian and historian, produced the first chronological account of the history of Great Britain (Britannia, first published in Latin, in 1586). Camden also acted as Clarenceux King of Arms and it is possible that the attack on his monument was not a random assault but represented an attack on history, chivalry, and the nobility, which he embodied in his profession. Since the heralds were traditionally masters of ceremony, from coronations to funerals, the attack on Camden was thus simultaneously an attack on ceremony and ritual too. This reinforces the innocence of the ‘Jesuited Cavaliers’ and suggests responsibility for the attack should instead be placed at the feet of supporters of the Independents, who wielded considerable influence in parliament and advocated the separation of religion and state. That the vandalism occurred just three days before the hearse was due to be dismantled, also suggests an element of premeditation; the timing was important because it disrupted the ability of the funeral performers to complete the ritual of mourning in the appropriate time-frame. However, if the disruption aimed to destroy the power embodied in the effigy, the act failed. On the appointed day, five weeks after the funeral ceremony, Essex’s hearse was duly taken down (in order to complete the ritual) and the effigy taken to be repaired before being placed – as intended – in the press. The disruption startled both parliament and the public, but the memory of the earl was – if anything – strengthened, as the attack led
to the printing of pamphlets that further glorified Essex and the Protestant cause. Unfortunately for Camden, money or memory (or both) diminished after the attack and it was not until the late eighteenth century that his monument was restored by the University of Oxford.

The proliferation of texts describing and explaining the funeral ritual reveals the unusual nature of Essex’s funeral; Marshall was particularly concerned with detailing who was in the cortège, what the heraldic banners looked like, and how the ceremony proceeded. The funeral encouraged the interpretation of Essex as a Protestant Prince whilst willing overlooking his military failures and political failures. In Rowland’s ‘An Epitaph’, Essex was styled as England’s ‘noble Champion’, ‘That Fame hath his victorious browes / Oft duly crown’d with Lawrell boughs’.\(^{166}\) Rowland also recalled the sermon for Pym’s funeral, suggesting that God has taken Essex from England because of England’s sins:

\begin{quote}
But is there not more in good ESSEX’S death
Then yet I’ve said? let's feare he’s gone from th’earth
As one we were unworthy of: because
Our sinnes against Gods sin-forbidding Lawes
Have th’Almighty inces’d and made him frown\(^{167}\)
\end{quote}

Essex’s death is here figured as a punishment on the English nation – and it is particularly the English that are held in reproach in these elegies. Wild’s elegy in particular pours scorn on the funeral rites; ‘some men, some walls, some horses put in black / With the throng scrambling for sweet-meats and sack’. For Wild, this gaudy and expensive display was hollow, and he condemns England as a ‘Niggardly Nation’ who should be ashamed of these commemorations because the performance was not befitting of Essex’s status. If Essex had died in Rome, he argues (recalling earlier texts that styled him as a Roman General), ‘He must have had an Altar, not a Tombe, / And there instead of youthfull Elegies, / Grave Senators had offer’d sacrifice’\(^{168}\). As a state

\(^{166}\) W. Rowland, *An Elegie upon the death of the right Honourable & most renowned* (London, 1646), l.17-18.
\(^{167}\) Ibid., l.41-45.
funeral, it far exceeded that of Pym or Strode; the grandeur and pomp openly referenced the great age of Elizabethan Protestantism to emphasise Essex’s godliness and in doing so, the ritual also memorialised his father (to whom Essex was frequently compared as Lord General), by recollecting his godly role during that great age. This connection is again made explicit in several elegies, most notably that of Twiss:

When England lost its darling in the fate
Of his lov’d Father (though unfortunate
In their desires) their hopes did still survive
Whil’st he had left so brave a Son alive.169

For Twiss, Essex – through his actions – had added further honour to his father’s name. Twiss glosses over Essex’s own lack of children, Essex’s legacy is to ‘those men / Are yet unborne, and they the same agen’.170 Rowland, however, acknowledged this problem: ‘And that no more of that same Blood / Is left, to do England more good’, suggesting England was now leaderless and laid open to the sectaries whom Essex’s moderation had held in check.171 Unlike the texts that appeared during Essex’s period as Lord General – which sought to defend his military (but not political) leadership – the funeral elegies and verses see the two types of power as analogous. Since Essex’s death precluded such a possibility, parliament were able to utilise the funeral as a grand demonstration of its political authority and military success. The elaborate spectacle was a fitting commemoration of Essex as Lord General but it also served as a highly visible and stylised public reminder of what the war was being fought for. With Charles in captivity but yet still no peace settlement, Essex’s funeral was a dramatic opportunity for parliament to show they were in control.

4.6 Conclusion
The early years of the First Civil War wrought extraordinary changes on the English political landscape. In failing to re-take London in autumn 1642, Charles left a

169 T. Twiss, An Elegie vpon the unhappy losse of the Noble Earle of Essex (London, 1646), 4, l.29-32.
170 Ibid., 5, l.63-64.
171 Rowland, An Elegie, l.21-22.
performative void that Essex, as contemporaries and historians both noted, swiftly filled. The positioning of Essex as a transitional figure was crucial in enabling parliament to convince a worried and reluctant public of the need for such dramatic change, not least the citizens of London from whom parliament demanded men, money, and munitions. This chapter has highlighted how Essex’s use of ceremony in his role as Lord General demonstrates the self-consciousness of performers in constructing a public image. His adaptation of military ceremonial and utilisation of royal ceremonial routes gave the city a visible figure on whom to focus. That Essex came from a family renowned for rebellion against the monarchy and that his father remained in public memory as a tragic hero enabled him to assume this public position with relative ease. Through ties of blood or marriage, Essex was linked to two popular Elizabethan military figures (the second earl of Essex and Sidney), enabling parliament to cast him as heir to the Protestant Elizabethan tradition to which it sought a return. Parliament needed a figurehead around whom to construct this narrative to counter Charles’s self-reinvention as a warrior lord.

What many within parliament perhaps failed to appreciate was Essex’s own belief that he could and should act independently of parliament as Lord General – signs of which were already evident in Essex’s willingness to enforce military orders without the Lords’ consent during his tenure as Captain General South of the Trent (August-November 1641). This chapter has redressed this oversight, which is also shared by scholarly interpretation of Essex as seeking a key political role. The rituals Essex utilised provided him with a tool by which to manage his public image as parliament’s military leader and to distinguish himself from his fellow peers and military commanders such as Manchester and Warwick. The entries and exits of 1642 and 1643 were rituals that enabled Essex to negotiate his relationship with parliament and to reinforce his dominance in military affairs. Parliament did not prevent these entries but it was aware of the power imbalance represented therein. In particular, by truncating the entry of 1643 into London, Essex rendered parliament subservient to his authority whilst playing up to the image of a Protestant Prince and the memory of his father.
The reluctance of those in parliament to allow Essex to dominate these ceremonial forms increased in response to the royalist tendency to view Essex as parliament’s figurehead. Charles identified Essex as his main enemy, as leader of the present rebellion, and – much to the Commons’ anger – the Oxford Parliament sent several personal addresses to Essex asking him to intercede on its behalf. This tension between military and political authority was also recognised in several newsbooks and there is evidence that Essex manipulated print in order to challenge parliament’s suspicions. However, this thesis challenges those who see Essex as seeking political power and suggests instead that whilst Essex freely utilised military display, he was less inclined to appropriate forms of political power. In political matters such as peace negotiations and petitions, Essex referred to parliament and did not hesitate to remind the royalists that he owed his position of authority to Westminster. What Essex resented was the military restrictions placed on him by parliament, whether those restrictions were purposeful (as with the creation of the Committee of Both Kingdoms) or otherwise.

Growing distrust of Essex’s war aims as well as suspicion of his apparent popularity (not least among the royalists) led the war faction to limit and curtail Essex’s military power. It is in this light that Essex can be seen as a proto-Cromwellian figure, a complex character whose visual, literary, and vocal representations enabled the possibility of assuming political leadership. The removal of Essex in 1645 destroyed such notions whilst the Self-Denying Ordinance also enabled the Commons to check the power of the Lords (both collectively and individually). The tension between military and political authority eased following Essex’s resignation but evidence suggests that by summer 1646, many were ready to support Essex in returning him to military leadership. His death in September 1646 put an end to such rumours but his funeral reveals parliament’s own sense of theatre in its co-option of elaborate forms of display – civic as well as princely – to reinforce its authority in government.
5. Mutual courtship: parliament, Fairfax and civic ceremony

As Lord General, Essex had a highly visible platform from which to generate political and military support, at a national level, for parliament’s war against Charles. Essex’s self-conscious use of military ceremony was, however, problematic as it rendered parliament subservient in military affairs, implicitly threatening its political authority. However, where previously scholars have interpreted these performatives as an attempt by Essex to usurp political authority, this thesis counters this interpretation and instead argues that these acts were demonstrations of Essex’s pre-eminence as a military – not political – leader. As has already been demonstrated in earlier chapters, parliament was not averse to manipulating ritual forms or of acting collectively as one body in order to promote a factional agenda. Accordingly, where the previous chapter sought to emphasise the prominence of Essex in the ritual performance of military power, this chapter considers the collusion of parliament with London’s civic authorities in dominating religious and civic spaces. Sharpe argues that the city played a vital role in validating ‘civic entertainment as a public manifestation of the legitimacy of the parliamentary cause’. However, whilst he references one occasion in 1642, Sharpe does not consider how the use of civic entertainments continued throughout the war and how the city authorities used these feasts to negotiate their position with parliament as war progressed. This thesis further develops Sharpe’s assessment: as will be demonstrated, between 1642 and 1646, parliament and the civic authorities engaged in a mutual courtship through the use of ceremony, which justified the political and religious reforms of the Long Parliament – and later the war itself.

The civic entertainments of parliament in January and May 1642 suggest the continuation of a performative relationship between parliament and city that has previously been overlooked although Smuts has argued that the increase of spectacle and ceremony of Lord Mayor Pageants prior to 1640 (when the shows ended) enabled ‘the traditions of the royal entry [into London] to survive even in the monarch’s

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1 Sharpe, *Image Wars*, 375.
absence'. As this chapter demonstrates, Essex – although Lord General – was not the only peer the city entertained. The civic entertainments in January 1644 (with the Scottish Commissioners) and June 1645 (following the Battle of Naseby) also suggest the city, despite its own internal divisions, was a willing participant in figuring parliament as the chief authority in the war. Following Essex’s resignation, parliament moved to control military rituals within the city, in particular through reviews of the trained bands. Parliament’s collective appropriation of these rituals was designed to reassert its authority over the city’s militia, and, by extension over the New Model Army. In doing so, parliament also limited Fairfax’s ability as Lord General to imitate the performative forms that Essex had utilised. Where previously scholarship has focused on Fairfax’s military role, this chapter highlights the methods by which parliament carefully styled Fairfax as a figure whose performances within the city of London emphasised his subservience to it; he held military authority over the New Model Army and drew respect from parliament, even as he performed political homage to it.

While these performances arguably placed parliament at the centre of the ritual, implying an extension or evidence of its control over the army, parliament did not dominate the civic space. The sheer vastness and scale of the Naseby parade (June 1645) emphasises the importance of spectacle and theatre as a continuing form of civic entertainment throughout the Civil War. Likewise, the collusion between civic authorities and citizens in welcoming Fairfax into London (November 1646) demonstrates the continuation of performances independent of parliament. In particular, the handover of Naseby prisoners at the city boundaries emphasises the city’s awareness of itself as a performer and of ownership over the civic space. This treatment of Fairfax by the city stands in contrast to parliament’s attempts to limit the construction of military ritual around Fairfax. Fairfax’s reaction to the display suggests a self-conscious desire to avoid such ceremonial and his subsequent interactions with

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2 Smuts, ‘Public ceremony’, 84.
parliament reaffirm his subservience to it, although as Hopper notes, Fairfax was not without political ambition or connections.³

The surrender of Charles to the Scottish army at Newark (5 May 1646) and the surrender of Oxford to Fairfax (24 June 1646) ostensibly signalled the end of the First Civil War. The New Model Army rapidly mopped up remaining areas of resistance in the west country and Wales including the surrender of Worcester (22 July), Pendennis Castle (17 August), Raglan Castle (19 August), Flint Castle (24 August) and Denbigh Castle (26 October). Parliament’s attention turned to the question of settlement, issuing the Newcastle Propositions in mid-July, although its vote to maintain the New Model Army for a further six months (7 October) is indicative of continued civil unrest.⁴ To this end, in December 1646, parliament declared its right to control the king’s person, for his ‘safety and preservation’ and ‘in preservation and defence of the true religion’.⁵ In proclaiming such ownership, parliament placed itself at the centre of any political settlement, mirroring its dominance over performative acts both within the city and by the army.

5.2 Communal ceremonial, 1642-45

The entertainment at Grocers’ Hall in January 1642 was one of many events in which parliament and the civic authorities attempted to court each other. As Lindley notes, ‘the city was far from being a natural supporter of parliament prior to 1642’ and ritual entertainments served to collectively unite parliament and the civic authorities through the identification of a shared or common enemy.⁶ Despite Essex’s self-fashioning as the chief military leader and interaction with the civic authorities in his entries of 1642 and 1643, he was not the only member of the Lords capable of utilising the city’s ceremonial space. On 27 October 1642, Northumberland and Holland – whose continued presence at Westminster offered more regular access to the city – paid court to the Lord Mayor at Guildhall:

³ Hopper, Black Tom, 56-7.
⁴ CJ, iv.687; LJ, viii.514.
⁵ Whitelocke, Memorials, ii.97; CJ, v.31-2; LJ, viii.635.
the Lord Mayor of London having convoked a Common Hall of all the Free Citizens into the Guild Hall, there came a Committee of Lords and Commons unto them, where the Earles of Northumberland and Holland, made two pithie and patheticall Speeches unto them, therein expressing to the life, the common miseries and dangers, which this distracted Kingdome now groaneth under, these being finished, Mr Pym did second them with the like.7

The visit was heavily motivated by rumours of Charles’s advance towards London, which had generated a wave of parliamentary orders instructing the city to prepare for an attack.8 The orders included the temporary closure of shops and suspension of trade – a huge disruption for merchants – as well as the appropriation of stables and horses, tightening security around the Tower, and reading the city’s trained bands. The visit enabled parliament’s delegates to both sooth and stoke fear. As the only representative of parliament’s army, Lord Wharton’s eye-witness account of the battle at Edgehill (23 October) offered reassurance of its strength and capabilities. Conversely, the very necessity of the visit (at Essex’s behest) was a reminder of the continued threat to the city, enabling the committee to reinforce orders and ensure their execution. That Northumberland – the most preeminent peer – made a speech shows how valuable the city’s cooperation was whilst Pym’s accompanying speech gave the appearance of accord between the two houses.9

The mobilisation into a posture of defence proved to be unnecessary after the royalist army withdrew from Turnham Green (13 November 1642). However, the civic authorities and parliament continued to court each other through rituals that ostensibly focused on military force. Early in 1642, the civic authorities provided hospitality and entertainment ‘in the fields’ and at Guildhall following Essex’s review of the trained bands (10 May). The total cost – including trophies for exemplary military demonstrations – was over £1,830.10 On 19 May 1646, the trained bands mustered

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8 3 orders on 23 October, 2 on 24 October, and orders continued throughout October, see: CJ, ii.820-21.
9 The Lords were pushing to reopen peace negotiations, which the Commons resisted until early November, see: LJ, v.424; CJ, ii.832.
10 LMA COL/CHD/CM/06/002, items 1-2.
again for review at Clarendon Park. On this occasion, they were reviewed not by the Lord General but by parliament. Fairfax was at Oxford, contemplating a siege of the town. Tents were erected, ‘like a town or Camp’, and in these both houses of parliament, along with the Lord Mayor and aldermen gathered to watch the display.\textsuperscript{11} Following the review, the civic authorities entertained parliament at Grocers’ Hall, expending £583 on the festivities.\textsuperscript{12} The reports of the general muster gloss over the presence of the city’s militia; rather the emphasis is on the presence of parliament. The \textit{Moderate Intelligencer} notes that the majority of parliament turned out to watch the muster, with such a congregation of nobles and gentry ‘as the oldest man in London hath hardly seen together’.\textsuperscript{13} The emphasis on the presence of parliament, as much as on the troops themselves, suggests that the review – despite its military environs – was a site for negotiating the relationship between the city and parliament. Parliament – as an institutional body – replaced the figure of Lord General to whom the militia owed obedience and loyalty, indicating its centrality to this military display. Observers of the muster were nonetheless divided on its significance. Whilst one, surveying the orderly lines and well-apparelled turnout concluded that ‘England is now in a hundred times better warlike posture then when the war began’, another described it as ‘a gallant shew’ and prayed that it would never be called upon to be anything more.\textsuperscript{14} The day of the muster also coincided with the passing of a resolution in the Commons that parliament had ‘no further use’ for the Scottish army: the display can thus be seen as a demonstration of an exclusively English Protestant force.\textsuperscript{15}

Whilst the need to review the trained bands offered a ready-made setting for parliament and the city to negotiate their alliance, the military were often marginalised in these performances, especially prior to the creation of the New Model Army. On 13 January 1644, the sheriffs of London along with several aldermen and members of the common council appeared in person before the two houses and issued an invitation for dinner. The invitation – on behalf of the civic authorities and citizens – was a chance

\textsuperscript{11} The Scottish Dove, no.134 (13-20 May 1646), 664.
\textsuperscript{12} LMA COL/CHD/CM/06/003.
\textsuperscript{13} Moderate Intelligencer, no.63 (14-21 May 1646), 453; Mercurius Civicus, no.155 (14-21 May 1646), 2249.
\textsuperscript{14} Moderate Intelligencer, no.63, 453; The Scottish Dove, no.134, 664.
\textsuperscript{15} C/4, iv.551.
for the city to give parliament ‘great Thanks for their Pains and Care in the Preservation of the Kingdom and City’ and – noted Alderman Fowke – a chance to stop royalist attempts to ‘divide the Parliament from Them, and Them from the Parliament’. The invitation came just seven days after the surrender of Arundel Castle to Waller (who led a number of London’s trained bands) and less than two months after the Scottish alliance with parliament was finalised (on 28 November 1643), both occasions worthy of celebration. However, the return of Holland from Oxford (following his brief defection in autumn 1643) had resulted in divisions within parliament; so too had the introduction of a parliamentary Great Seal. If the Royal Seal represented the symbolic authorisation of the royal word, parliament’s version physically and symbolically challenged that authority. Pym’s death (8 December 1643) had also disrupted the balance in the Commons. The Westminster Assembly (whose Scottish and English members were included in the invitation) had also suffered its biggest fallout to date on 17 January 1644 over the power and ceremony of ordination. Thus, although parliament ordered a day of public thanks and asked Marshall to preach at Christ Church on the morning of the dinner, Whitelocke was aware that the event was ‘rather contrived’ and the Venetian ambassador observed that ‘others recognise it as the result of fear, which will be used, however, to extract considerable help in money’.

The hospitalities began at Christ Church (18 January 1644) where Marshall preached on the importance of harmony and union, taking 1 Chronicles 12.38-40 as his text:

38 All these… came with a perfect heart to Hebron, to make David king over all Israel: and all the rest also of Israel were of one heart to make David king. 39 And there they were with David three days, eating and drinking: for their brethren had prepared for them. 40 Moreover they that were nigh them, even unto Issachar and Zebulun and Naphtali, brought bread on asses, and on camels, and on mules, and on oxen, and meat, meal, cakes of figs, and

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16 CJ, iii.365; LJ, vi.378.
18 Whitelocke, Memorials, i.234; CSPVen 1643-47, 67.
19 S. Marshall, A Sacred Panegyrick (London: printed for Stephen Bowtell, 1644); for the order to print the sermon, see: CJ, iii.370; as discussed earlier, Marshall had strong support from within the Commons – despite Pym’s death in 1643 – and among the Lord, due to his position as Warwick’s client., see fn. 241.
bunches of raisins, and wine, and oil, and oxen, and sheep abundantly: for there was joy in Israel.

Despite Marshall’s protests over the difficulty of finding a suitable text for such a broad audience, the chosen passage was rife with parallels. Most obviously, the Lords, the Commons, the civic authorities, the army’s commanders, the Westminster divines, and the Scottish commissioners were – quite literally – mirroring the Israelites through ‘rejoicing abundantly… [and] in feasting, eating, and drinking’. The gathering together of this diverse congregation was not, Marshall argued, dissimilar to the multitude of tribes gathering around David. More pertinently, they were gathered for similar reasons, ‘because their hearts were united in one, and that in the way to obtaine a blessed peace’. In this reading, David is not analogous with Charles (whose inability to ‘concurre’ is still blamed on the ‘wicked’) but rather with Christ. God had ‘not yet made us so blessed’ with a temporal David, but Marshall reminds his congregation that it is – ultimately – Christ whom they are trying to re-establish as ‘Lord and King’.

Although Marshall frequently references the collaboration between England and Scotland, *A Sacred Panegyrick* was an English-centric sermon in which hopes that England would become a New Jerusalem, relegated Scotland to the role ‘of the Lambs wife, that England may be in love with it’. The Scottish commissioners demonstrated their unease over this role by withdrawing from the ceremonial procession from Christ Church to Merchant Taylors’ Hall, in favour of their private coach.

Following Marshall’s sermon, the congregation progressed eastwards along Cheapside to Merchant Taylors’ Hall situated halfway along Cornhill. Several newsbooks and diarists recorded the processional order: the common council in their gowns walked first; the Lord Mayor and aldermen in ‘their scarlet gowns on horseback thereafter’; Lord General Essex, Lord Admiral Warwick, Manchester (as Commander of the Eastern Association), and the members of the Lords attended by 20 Marshall, *A Sacred Panegyrick*, 4.
21 Ibid., 5-6.
22 Ibid., 22.
23 The Scottish commissioners were eventually forced onto foot, as the dense crowds observing the procession prevented the coaches travelling, see: Laing, *LJB*, ii.134.
army officers on foot; then ‘the House of Commons with their Speaker, and his mace before him’; and finally the Westminster divines. The Scottish commissioners were supposed to walk between the Commons and divines but elected to take their coach. Baillie later wrote of the Scots’ wish that ‘the union in realitie had been as great as it was in shew’, revealing an awareness of the extent to which the sermon and entertainment had been constructed to enforced a sense of harmony and the failure of these acts to achieve this end.24 Whilst the procession emphasised the unity of those in it, the London militia were also present in a protective capacity, lining the streets on either side to cordon off the spectators. The procession also offered an element of theatricality reminiscent of Lord Mayors’ Shows and royal parades that reinforced civic authority over the trained bands and the crowds. When city and parliament celebrated Hopton’s defeat in spring 1646, Juxon commented that ‘Cheapside [was] th’wackt with people as at a Lord Mayor’s day’.25 The civic space itself also performed an important role. Although Cheapside Cross was dismantled on 2 May 1643 (itself a carefully orchestrated spectacle), the site retained its significance in civic rituals.26 Upon a stage, specially erected for the occasion, rosemary beads, crucifixes, pictures, and other superstitious relics were ceremonially burnt before the procession and crowd. Whilst unity in the minds of the city and parliament remained elusive, this ritual served to unify their actions in continuing the war. The feast itself was lavish – although Baillie complained there was no dessert and found the drums and trumpets unsatisfactory as a musical backdrop. Toasts were made by the Lords (as peers and as military leaders), Speaker Lenthall (on behalf of the Commons), and the Lord Mayor

24 Certaine informations from severall parts of the kingdome, no.53 (15-22 January 1644), 416; Laing, LJB, ii.134-35; Whitelocke includes the Scottish commissioners in the procession, see: Whitelocke, Memorials, ii.234-35.
(on behalf of the city), a ceremony that offered ‘a fair demonstration of the great unanimity of all these’.

This event enabled parliament and the city to mutually congratulate each other on their close relationship, but in doing so it risked alienating the Scottish commissioners. Marshall’s sermon reminded the congregation of the importance of unanimity, confirmed by the ceremonial bonfire of popish and superstitious relics. Yet the Scots were absent from the procession and did not raise a toast at the feast; one newsbook failed to even mention their presence at the entertainment, describing it as a day ‘wherein the Union of the Parliament and City of London was solemnized’.

Disagreements within parliament continued – over Holland’s return, the Oxford Parliament’s letters to Essex, the impeachment of Laud – and the Scottish commissioners contested the make-up of the Committee of Both Kingdoms, but parliament’s (or at least the Commons’) relations with the city appear to have improved. That the army was absent from this ritual is perhaps unsurprising, given the duality of military and political authority invested in peers such as Essex, Manchester and Warwick. By June 1645, when the civic authorities and parliament celebrated the victory at Naseby (14 June 1645) the lack of figures from the New Model Army strikes a note of discord. Having received news of the victory, parliament requested the presence of the Lord Mayor, aldermen and the common council at Christ Church for a thanksgiving service preached by Marshall and Vines (held on 19 June).

The city’s sheriffs, on behalf of the civic authorities, subsequently invited both houses to dine with them at Grocers’ Hall following the service, spending £405 on the feast.

Marshall chose a suitably celebratory verse on which to base his sermon, Psalm 102.18: ‘This shall be written for the generation to come: and the people which shall be created shall praise the Lord’. Vines took 2 Chronicles 22-26 as his verses. Less celebratory but still fitting for these troubled times, the verses warned of wicked rulers

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27 Laing, LJB, ii.134-35.
28 Certaine informations from severall parts of the kindome, no.53, 416.
29 Whitelocke notes that the city’s petition to the Commons concerning recruitment of their trained bands promoted ‘a stroke of jealousy and discontent to Essex and his friends… because the house [Commons] so well entertained it’: Whitelocke, Memorials, ii.236.
30 CJ, iv.175; LJ, vii.432.
31 CJ, iv.176; LJ, vii.437; LMA COL/CHD/CM/06/002, item 2.
from Ahaziah (who heeded wicked counsel and worshipped idols) to Athaliah (who tyrannised her people) and Amaziah (whose pious reign was corrupted by his prosperity). The Commons duly ordered thanks be sent to them, requesting – as usual – that the sermons be printed. Interestingly, only Marshall’s sermon appeared in print, an oddity that Thomason thought worth noting on his copy. *Mercurius verdicus* reported that ‘Both Sermons were ended by one of the clock, after which the members of both Houses were royally entertained by the City at Grocers’ Hall’ and sung Psalm 46, ‘God is our refuge’. The newsbooks do not mention a procession, although the journey would have followed a similar route along Cheapside as the previous year, but the sumptuousness of the feast was deemed worthy of extended detail:

It will not be offensive I conceive to write a word or two in the dayes passages of the gallant entertainment the City gave the Parliament at Grocers Hall, according to the former Invitation not to mention the several Messes and Dishes which in great plenty was provided every wayes answerable to so honourable an Assembly, the manner of the solemnity was thus:

The newsbook proceeds to detail the seating plan, suggesting the writer had either been present at the festivities or had access to this information via an eye-witness or a plan circulated in advance of the feast. This detail is also enlightening as it suggests the writer sought to control how the readers reconstructed the feast in their imagination. If, as Sharpe suggests in his analysis of Sir William Drake’s commonplace books and Drake’s own curation of, and engagement with, the texts, ‘many feared that ‘every fantasy’ was occupied with matters of government and politics’, the precise (although, as it happens, incorrect) description of the seating plan could be seen as an attempt by the writer to control the reader’s interpretation. By limiting the unknown elements,
the writer simultaneously limited and shaped the reading of the feast. Thus, the newsbook reports that in the main hall the Lords and Commons sat at three tables, with the Lord Mayor joining the more preeminent peers. The Westminster divines sat in the parlour, and in the upper room over the parlour sat the city’s representatives (the recorder, aldermen, and common council). Notably absent from the entertainment were the Scots. *A perfect diurnall* mistakenly identifies Lord Saye and Sele as a ‘Scottish Lord’ and only two Scottish commissioners are listed in the seating plan. Also absent were representatives of the New Model Army – the Self-Denying Ordinance having removed dual authority from the members of parliament. There are three possible explanations for this. The first reason, and perhaps the weakest, concerns logistics: Fairfax had pressed on after the battle – news of which had been sent via messengers. Consequently none of a suitable social standing were present in the city who could represent the army at this entertainment. A second, more nuanced, reason is the fact that these rituals of entertainment – of sermons and feasting – were, as has been demonstrated, a long-standing method by which parliament and the city publicly reinforced their relationship. Whilst the army had been represented in previous years through figures such as Essex, its presence was not necessary to validate the event. The same argument can be applied to the presence or absence of the Scottish commissioners; they bore witness to the ritual but were not necessary to its performance. The final reason – equally nuanced if not more manipulative – concerns parliament’s intent. As evidenced in the military reviews of the city’s trained bands, parliament (after Essex’s ousting) were determined to maintain dominance over military ceremonial forms – to place itself, not a military commander, at the centre of these performances. Parliament’s centralisation of the symbols of victory could arguably be seen as part of a broader attempt to assert its power over the New Model Army, the city of London and her trained bands. The reviews of London’s militia and the New Model Army’s victories offered up opportunities for parliament and the civic authorities to celebrate with each other and thus reaffirm their relationship. The sermons and feasts were, in particular, highly staged events, from the choice of preacher to the processional order of the parade and the seating plans. The city was consistently figured in these rituals as inferior in its relationship with parliament;
parliament ordered the civic authorities to attend the sermons, and parliament fed and
dined at the city’s expense. The public nature of these interactions did, however, enable
the civic authorities to demonstrate its control over the citizens by co-opting the
spectators as witnesses to this mutual courtship whilst reinforcing the politico-
religious aims of the war through the ceremonial bonfires and other performatives.

5.1 The city’s protection of parliament, 1642
Since reconvening in November 1640, parliament had sought to utilise civic space to
perform and reinforce political authority. From book burnings to Strafford’s execution
(May 1641) these actions were an attempt to legitimise and justify first resistance and,
then, rebellion against the king. To do this, parliament needed the co-operation of the
civic authorities – in lighting the bonfires, in rounding up banned books, and in staging
Strafford’s death. Following Charles’s attempt to arrest the Five Members (4 January
1642), the civic authorities willingly colluded in ceremonies and entertainments that
emphasised not only their apparent unity with parliament but also the central role of
parliament (with the city behind it) in bringing about a resolution with the king.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the procession of the Five Members (and Lord
Mandeville) from Guildhall back to Westminster (11 January 1642), a symbolic tour
de force of resistance against the king.

In organising the return of the Five Members, public sympathy would prove
invaluable. Parliament itself had adjourned on Wednesday (5), appointing committees
to meet in the city until Tuesday (11) when it would reconvene at Westminster. On
Saturday (8) the Commons’ committee discussed how to bring the Five Members back
to parliament: they, along with Lord Mandeville were escorted to Grocers’ Hall by two
trained bands, surrounded by armed citizens.38 The Commons sent out a declaration
calling for public support in defending the parliament, asking nearby counties to
provide trained bands for their protection; the Venetian ambassador reported that a

38 CSPVen 1640-42, 280; Diurnall occurrences, or, The heads of severall proceedings in both houses of
Parliament (3-10 January 1641(1642)), un-pg; in contrast, D’Ewes’ infers the Five Members joined the
committee on Monday 10, see: S. D’Ewes, The journal of Simonds D’Ewes, ed. W.H. Coates (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 1942), 396-99.
body of almost 20,000 citizens responded to this call. D’Ewes, in his diary, briefly summarised the declaration, noting command of this body under Captain Skippon (Captain-General of the Artillery Garden), henceforth to ‘be Serjeant Maior Generall of the cittie forces till the cittie order it otherwise’. To ensure the faithfulness of these protectors, the Commons ordered that they all swore the Protestation – binding them to parliament’s cause. The Venetian ambassador identified this as one of many ‘intrigues against the king’s service’, which also included the circulation of false reports designed to prompt fear and agitation against the king.

At 2.00pm on Tuesday (the day after Charles – alarmed by city’s evident sympathy for parliament – fled to Hampton Court), the Five Members – guarded by Skippon, the city sheriffs and all the trained bands – began the procession to Westminster. The route was lined with visual and physical threats to any who might seek to disrupt the procession: ‘the streets were barred with great chains’, the trained bands carried eight pieces of ordnance, whilst sailors and mariners ‘with musket and other ammunition in severall vessels’ were stationed along the Thames from London Bridge to Westminster Stairs. The militia and apprentices (present despite instructions ‘to keepe at home’) carried the Protestation stuck into their hats and on ‘banners, pikes, and sticks’. Although undoubtedly orchestrated, it was a symbolic gesture of solidarity with parliament. Clarendon commented on the huge noise and clamour that followed their return, estimating that they were attended ‘by a conflux of many thousands of people’ who had gathered to watch the procession. Although this was a carefully planned procession, designed to justify parliament’s actions toward the king, it was the crowd-led actions that fully demonstrated the extent to which the king had lost control of the city. Clarendon reported shouts from the crowd condemning ‘bishops and popish lords’ whilst on passing by Whitehall some shouted ‘with much

40 Coates, Simonds D’Ewes, 400.
41 CSPVen 1640-42, 280.
42 Ibid., 281; Coates, Simonds D’Ewes, 398; one newsbook suggests the Five Members came by barge from Three Cranes Wharf to Westminster Stairs, see: Diurnall occurrences, or, The heads of several proceedings in both houses of Parliament (10-17 January 1641[1642]), un-pg.
43 Clarendon, History, i.508; Coates, Simonds D’Ewes, 400; CSPVen 1640-42, 281.
44 Clarendon, History, i.508.
contempt, ‘what was become of the King and his cavaliers? and whither he was gone?’.

On reaching Westminster, the crowd refused to disperse until the afternoon’s business had been concluded, ensuring that parliament remained protected whilst its members finalised and passed their resolution.  

Despite the spectacle surrounding the procession, some committees continued to meet outside Westminster, which Clarendon criticised as a propaganda exercise designed to ‘keep up the apprehension of danger and the estimation of their darling the city’. The bicameral Committee for Irish Affairs was still conducting meetings at the Grocers’ Hall a week later, when both houses were entertained there by ‘divers Citizens of good quality’. Initial hesitancy over the invitation by the Commons ‘not knowing what occasions might happen’ hints at continuing tensions between parliament and the city, but these ‘Citizens’ – mostly members of the common council – were also radicals, whose civic authority the Commons had recently enlarged.  

The purpose of this entertainment was to reassure the houses of the city’s great love for parliament, at a time when relations between the Lord Mayor and aldermen (on the one hand) and the common council (on the other) appeared to be ‘dissolving’. Following dinner, the civic representatives declared themselves ready to ‘defend his Majesties Royall persons and theirs [parliaments], and the Priviledges of Parliament’, foreshadowing the opening lines of the Militia Ordinance. It seems the memory of Charles’s reception ‘in state [at Guildhall] by the magistrates in the presence of a great crowd of people’ just two weeks earlier, had already been forgotten. Whilst it would be naïve to ignore the frictions within the civic authorities and between the city and parliament, the entertainment at Guildhall can be read as an act of consolidation. The civic authorities were evidently protecting the city’s own interests, which, in January 1642, were not about choosing to stand with parliament solely for ideological reasons  

45 For details of the resolution, see: CJ, ii.369-70; whilst neither Clarendon nor the Venetian ambassador were neutral observers, their observations are similar – and more detailed – to those of D’Ewes and Whitelocke.  
46 Clarendon, History, i.521.  
47 LJ, iv.525; Londons Love, or The Entertainment of Parliament (London, 1641[42])  
48 See: Pearl, Puritan Revolution, chapt.4.  
49 Pearl, Puritan Revolution, 131.  
50 Londons Love, unpag.  
51 CSPVen 1640-1642, 277; CSPD 1641-43, 241.
but aligning itself with parliament in order to enable a return to social order within the civic space. Whilst their cooperation ostensibly demonstrated the city’s support for parliament’s actions, it more accurately demonstrated the feelings of resentment held by many of the more vocal and radicalised citizens towards Charles.

5.3 A new Lord General, 1645

The collusion of parliament and civic authorities in dominating the civic space via politico-religious and military performances increasingly resulted in the army’s exclusion from these rites, especially following the Self-Denying Ordinance and creation of the New Model Army. Whilst Essex took centre stage in military ceremonial, Fairfax did not follow in his footsteps. Despite the performative potential, Fairfax shunned demonstrations of his military status, which in turn aligned with parliament’s desire to limit such performances. It could also indicate Fairfax’s awareness that he could not control these events as Essex had a subsequent willingness to be passively constructed within these ceremonies. Wary of the ease with which military ceremonial could be redirected (intentionally or otherwise) towards political goals, parliament attempted to limit the centring of Fairfax within these rituals; in particular those that emphasised a relationship between city and army to the exclusion of parliament.\(^{52}\) The only ritual that parliament partook in was the brief ceremony surrounding Fairfax’s appointment as Lord General.

On 18 February 1645, Fairfax arrived in London to accept parliament’s commission to lead the New Model Army. Fairfax entered the Lines of Communication through Fort Royal, near Islington, where ‘three of the great Ordnance were discharged by way of salutation’.\(^{53}\) This greeting would appear to be the extent of Fairfax’s welcome; or at least all that observers saw fit to record. It was a strictly military salute and neither Fairfax nor parliament took the opportunity to organise a more ostentatious display through the city of London. The lack of ceremonial surrounding Fairfax’s arrival is mirrored in the lack of detail in many of the newsbooks:

\(^{52}\) It is surely no coincidence that the election in which Fairfax stood for MP (at Cirencester in January 1647) was declared void, see: Hopper, *Black Tom*, 75.

\(^{53}\) *Mercurius Civicus*, no.91 (13-20 February 1645), 827.
‘Sir Thomas Fairfax here to receive the Commands of the Houses’⁵⁴ says one, another, ‘This night or tomorrow Sir Thomas Fairfax is expected here’,⁵⁵ whilst a third retrospectively remarks, ‘Sir Thomas Fairfax is come up and hath received the commands of the Houses’.⁵⁶ A perfect diurnall thought Fairfax’s mode of arrival worthy of comment, ‘[he] came this day to Towne in a private manner, desiring to avoid all ostentation’,⁵⁷ – a pointed contrast to the elaborate forms preferred by Essex. His behaviour in parliament the following day offers further confirmation of Fairfax’s apparently retiring nature. ‘Such was the respect given him… [that] as a further addition of honour’, the Commons offered him a seat, which ‘modestly [Fairfax] refused’.⁵⁸

This inconspicuous event was not devoid of political undertones. As Hopper has emphasised, Fairfax’s appointment was not apolitical, despite the claims in Anglia Rediviva that it was ‘without any premeditation or designe’.⁵⁹ He had been accompanied to London by Colonels John Alured, Sir William Constable (his uncle), Alexander Rigby,⁶⁰ and Sandys along with a small party of officers.⁶¹ Hopper succinctly describes Alured and Constable as ‘two notorious sectarian’ whilst Alexander Rigby was also a parliamentarian radical.⁶² The Commons had voted 101 to 69 votes to appoint Fairfax, despite the preventative attempts of Holles and Sir Philip Stapleton (moderates aligned to Essex).⁶³ His appointment was passed by the Commons before the Lords passed the Self-Denying Ordinance, and unlike Essex’s commission, the clause to protect the king’s person was notably absent. Despite this, Fairfax was not without friends in the Lords: whilst Northumberland’s involvement in the remodelling of the army continued to be debated, the earl was acquainted with the Fairfax family due to his lands in the north, and Fairfax’s cousin, Mulgrave, also sat

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⁵⁴ Mercurius Britanicus, no.71 (17-24 February 1645), 574.
⁵⁵ Weekly Account, no.7 (13-19 February 1645), un-pg.
⁵⁷ A perfect diurnall, no.82 (17-24 February 1645), 649.
⁵⁸ Ibid.; CJ, iv.54.
⁵⁹ Hopper, Black Tom, 56-7; Sprigg, Anglia Rediviva (London, 1647), 7.
⁶⁰ The same Rigby of Master Rigby’s Speech in Answer to the Lord Finch (S.L., June 1641).
⁶¹ For descriptions of these men, see: Mercurius Civicus, no.91, 827; A perfect diurnall, no.82, 649; Perfect passages of each dayes proceedings in Parliament, no.17 (12-19 February 1645), 126.
⁶² Hopper, Black Tom, 62.
in the Lords. For those in parliament inclined towards a moderate settlement and Presbyterianism, Fairfax’s appointment was thus ‘as little pleasing… as to them at Oxford’. Sharpe has argued that there are two basic premises to the success of an image:

It requires a language or symbolism that may be understood through reason or grasped by faith: an image of authority needs to be communicated if it is to influence, and communication requires some common language. Secondly, the political success of representations of authority depended upon the projection of images of power which carried conviction with both common subjects and the gentry who ruled the localities.

Essex had self-consciously manipulated his public image to present himself as a military figure invested with authority: he was a Protestant Prince, empowered to protect England from a wayward king and popish threat. This image – played out in ceremonial rituals, the written word, and visual images – was successful even as those within parliament sought to disrupt it, because of the unspoken threat to its political authority. Fairfax was an ‘ordinary’ gentleman soldier, promoted to head of the army as a consequence of his military skill and religious right-doing. However, he did not replace Essex as the ceremonial centre. Fairfax inherited Essex’s honorific title ‘his Excellency’ and became commander-in-chief of the New Model Army, but his office lacked the trappings and glory that surrounded Essex. He was given authority to command all England’s ‘garrisons, forts, castles and towns’ but he did not (initially) have the power to appoint his own officers without parliament’s approval. Moreover, unlike Essex, no fealty was sworn to Fairfax as Lord General; soldiers swore allegiance to parliament (although it should be noted that during the siege of Bristol, the Somersetshire Clubmen ‘all promised to live and die with the Generall Sir Tho. Fairfax’).

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64 R. Bell (ed.), Memorials of the Civil War: comprising the correspondence of the Fairfax family (London: R. Bentley, 1849), 1.162.
67 Mercurius Civicus, no.120 (4-11 September 1645), 1058.
The promotion of Fairfax to the position of Lord General was inherently contradictory in terms of military and political performative rituals. As leader of the New Model Army, he was an authoritative figure, yet devoid of the ceremonial trappings of that role. In appearances, he was both more modest and more humble than Essex, with less investment in politics; a submissive figure who would answer to parliament and act on their behalf. The lack of politically-endorsed rituals indicates a deliberate attempt by members of parliament to limit Fairfax’s public persona to prevent possible misinterpretation of military ritual as confirming political precedent on him. It is therefore unsurprising that, following the victory at Naseby, the subsequent parade of royalist prisoners through the city of London was notable for its lack of a military figurehead. This was an explicitly civic ceremony: whilst none of London’s trained bands fought outside London after the creation of the New Model Army, it would be they who led and co-ordinated the parade.

5.4 The Naseby parade, 1645
Following the success of a battle, captured royalist colours were routinely taken back to parliament, as a sign of victory. The visual impact had obviously propagandistic messages: the enemy had been defeated and disgraced; God was on the side of the righteous. After the First Battle of Newbury (20 September 1643) Essex returned to London to be received by parliament, who offered its humble thanks. On the 26 September, he reviewed the trained bands that had remained in London to protect the city at Finsbury Fields, before the return of the remaining London regiments two days later (28 September). On the same day, Essex presented the colours captured at Newbury to parliament, receiving further congratulations. 68 This simple ritual emphasised Essex as Protestant Prince, whilst the display of colours in Westminster Hall simultaneously reinforced parliament’s position of political authority. The aftermath of Naseby followed a different formula. 69 Following the battle, parliament

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68 *A perfect diurnall*, no.11 (25 September-2 October 1643), 85.
69 For details of the letters sent from Fairfax and Cromwell relating the battle and a list of prisoners of war, see: *LJ*, vii.432-36; There does not seem to be a similar event following the royalist defeat at Marston Moor (2 July 1644), possibly because parliament’s army immediately resumed the siege of York: parliament’s generals dispatched a Captain William Stewart to Westminster with several captured letters and commissions, coronets,
proclaimed the following Thursday a day of thanksgiving ‘within the Cities of London and Westminster, and Lines of Communication’, which was duly observed, with a second public day of thanksgiving to be observed in all counties under parliamentary control.\(^70\) On 18 June, the Commons sat to debate the disposing of prisoners (numbered around 4,500), referring the matter to the Committee for Prisoners, which resolved to hold the prisoners in the ‘Military Yard behind the Mewse’ (on 20 June).\(^71\) The 50 colours bought up to Westminster (on 19 June), including six royal colours and four of the queen’s colours, were taken to Highgate in preparation for the parade.\(^72\)

As part of these preparations, a tract appeared detailing the manner in which the royalist prisoners would march through the city. This tract had to be in circulation before 21 June as several newsbooks quote from it or reference points where the proscribed form was not observed.\(^73\) Meanwhile, the royalist prisoners (excluding the more senior commanders) slowly progressed with a convoy headed by Colonel John Fiennes and his horse, the Suffolk regiment of horse, and the Hertfordshire trained bands – a guard of around 1,200 men.\(^74\) On the night after the battle ended, Fairfax moved his headquarters to Market Harborough in order to relieve Leicester; the majority of prisoners were sent to Northampton. The following day (15 June) Fairfax ordered Colonel Fiennes onwards to London: the prisoners marched from Northampton to Newport Pagnel and hence Luton, onwards to St Albans and thus to Barnet, in advance of the parade through London.\(^75\) On Saturday (21 June), London’s Yellow Regiment (under Colonel Ralph Harrison) and Green Regiment (under a Colonel Roe, most likely the regicide Owen Rowe) rendezvoused at Aldersgate Street (by Longlane End) and Redcrosse Steet (just south of Barbican), outside the city colours, and ensigns, although the fate of the prisoners remains unclear. See: W. Stewart, *A full relation of the late victory* (London, 1644), 12-13; A. Leven, *A letter to the committee of both kingdoms* (London, 1644), 14-16.

\(^70\) *Ci*, iv.175; *LJ*, vii.432; *Mercurius Civicus*, no.108 (12-18 June 1645), 957.

\(^71\) *Ci*, iv.177, 181; *The True Informer*, no.9 (21 June 1645), 60; *A perfect diurnall*, no.99, 786; *Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer*, no.104 (10-17 June 1645), 839; *The Manner of how the Prisoners are to be brought into the City of London* (London, 1645), 1.

\(^72\) *Mercurius Britannicus*, no.87, 791; *The True Informer*, no.9, 62; *Mercurius Veridicus*, no.10, 77.

\(^73\) *Mercurius Britannicus*, no.105 (17-24 June 1645) most closely references the tract.

\(^74\) *The Manner of how the Prisoners*, 1; *Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer*, no.105, 840; *Mercurius Veridicus*, no.10, 77.

\(^75\) *Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer*, no.105, 839-40.
walls. From there, the regiments’ instructions were to march to the ‘further end of Islington’ to meet Fiennes and the prisoners, most likely at Fort Royal, one of the largest forts north of the Thames, situated just outside the Lines of Communication. However, one newsbook disapprovingly remarks that by the time the city regiments arrived, the prisoners were already within the Lines of Communication.

The New Model Army’s custody of the prisoners ended here – at a city fort, built by order of parliament, outside the city walls and beyond the gaze of most of London’s citizens. Fiennes and his troops would still participate in the ritual parade, but their role was now marginalised and subsumed under the direction of Harrison and Rowe. The transfer of responsibility reveals a clear demarcation of the army’s responsibility – on the battlefield – and the London regiments’ responsibility to protect the city and parliament within the Lines of Communication. To this end, Fiennes and his troops marched in several divisions – as indeed they had on the journey to London – to prevent unruliness and disorder among the prisoners. Once the prisoners were handed over, they were arranged in descending order of rank. The field officers headed the parade, followed by the inferior officers: of these, the chief officers were permitted to ride on horseback. The common soldiers marched behind their seniors. The standards and colours (bought up the previous day) were carried at the forefront of the procession. The prominent display of these colours was a crucial visual element of the parade. As Gentles notes, colours were ‘public artefacts… high prized as trophies of war’ – a visual representation of the officer and his troops. The large number of colours – 55 – on show in the Naseby parade added another layer of symbolism to the propagandistic message of parliament’s success against the king, even if the crowds could not interpret the mottos (which were often in Latin). Newsbooks further derided the royalist colours, mocking the quality of fabric (‘damaske’, ‘very much torne’); evidence of popery (‘supposed to be brought from Ireland’); lack of mottos and figures;

76 The Manner of how the Prisoners, 2.
78 Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer, no.105, 840.
79 The Manner of how the Prisoners, 1-2.
and absurd pictures (‘The picture of a Souldier in Armour cap-a-pee reversed, his head downwards’).

In this fashion, the parade began the march through London. Beginning at Mount Mill at the north end of Aldersgate Street (Goswell Road), the parade marched toward the city walls, entering the city proper at Moorgate. Once within the city, the parade continued along the wall to Bishopsgate, turning south into the city down Bishopsgate Street. From there it continued to Cornhill turning west along Cheapside and down the Strand until the parade eventually reached St Martin’s Lane, at Charing Cross. Neither ‘The Manner’ nor the newsbooks detail the route between Cheapside and the western city walls. However, the importance of the route from Cheapside around St Paul’s in both royal entries and mayoral processions suggests the Naseby parade likely followed this processional path since this was a ritual of victory and triumph (for parliament). At St Martin’s Lane, the officers and common soldiers were separated. The latter were enclosed within ‘the Military yard behind the Mewse’ at Charing Cross; and, lest any be tempted to ‘breed disturbances and cause uproares’, gibbets were erected as a warning. The following day the Commons requested the Sub Committee of the Militia to view several other locations including Tothill Fields and ‘the Military Yard in St. Martin’s Fields’ with the notion of re-locating some of the prisoners. This order helps explain the contradictory locations described in various newsbooks as to where the common prisoners were held. The officers were then taken by the most direct route to Peterhouse. Peterhouse – formerly Lord Peters’ house on Aldersgate Street – had been turned into a prison by order of parliament (2 January 1643), after the prison at Lambeth was deemed inadequate for entertaining prisoners of the commanding ranks following the influx of royalist officers after their surrender.

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81 The Manner of how the Prisoners, 3-5; this account is condensed in Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer, no.105, 840-1; for a detailed analysis of royalist and parliamentarian colours see; Gentles, ‘The iconography of revolution’.

82 Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer, no.105, 840; The Manner of how the Prisoners, 6.

83 CJ, iv.181; The Manner of how the Prisoners, 6.

84 CJ, iv.182; The Manner of how the Prisoners and The True Informer, no.9 states the royal mews, Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer, no.105 states Tothill Fields, A Perfect Duturnall, no.99 states ‘the military ground on the backe side of the Muse’ [i.e. St Martin’s Fields] and Tothill Fields, and Mercurius Britanicus no.87 obliquely states ‘several prisons’.
Taking the officers to Peterhouse involved retracing their steps back along the Strand. Logistically, it would have been quicker and easier to separate the officers from the common soldiers on the first section of the march from Islington to the city walls, or divert the officers at the Little Conduit on the western juncture of Cheapside. That the officers were forced to march all the way to Charing Cross before returning to Aldersgate Street highlights the importance of the parade as a ritual of humiliation. Through appropriating the royal ceremonial route, parliament demonstrated the extent to which Charles – and the royalists – had lost control not only over the city but also over the country. At the same time, the lack of a clear, military figure leading the parade, combined with the politically neutral termination point, as well as the apparent absence of representatives from the Commons or Lords rendered the parade a strangely civic affair despite the overtly militaristic overtones.

This juxtaposition is evident yet again in the arrival in London of senior royalist commanders the following Wednesday (25 June). These prisoners arrived in wagons, literally hidden from public view, and were taken direct to Peterhouse without any ceremonial parade. Unlike the previous week’s parade, which occasioned much reporting, the newsbooks barely touched upon the arrival of these senior prisoners and those that did used similar terms, indicating the existence of a shared ritualised vocabulary used to describe prisoners of war. Furthermore, whilst these prisoners were valuable as a form of exchange – enabling parliament to secure the release of senior commanders taken prisoner by the royalists – the lack of ritual surrounding their arrival emphasises the Naseby parade as a form of spectacle: a mass procession that demonstrated the renewed vigour of the New Model Army – an army that parliament had created. This also explains the absence of a senior military commander (such as Fairfax), whose presence would have diluted this message of parliament’s centrality by locating the glory of the success in one person.

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85 CJ, ii.910.
86 Mercurius Civicus, no 109 (18-25 June 1645), 973; The True Informer, no.10 (28 June 1645), 78; A perfect diurnall, no.100 (23-30 June 1645), 795.
87 Fairfax received letters of thanks and parliament ordered ‘500l to be bestowed upon a jewel’ as a token of their appreciation, see: Whitelocke, Memorials, i.450.
5.5 A civic welcome, 1646

The Naseby parade aimed to unite London’s citizens by literally presenting them with the defeated enemy. As with the return of the Five Members to Westminster in 1642, this was about communal identification of a common enemy against whom the city could react. The parade also highlighted the continued importance of ceremony within the city as entertainment and it is in this light that the welcome of Fairfax into London in winter 1646 should be read.

The victories of the New Model Army over the royalists had culminated in the surrender of Oxford on 24 June 1646, marking the seemingly decisive defeat of the royalist army and bringing an end to the First Civil War. Fairfax had not returned to London directly after Oxford’s surrender, instead continuing to dismantle the few remaining royalist strongholds. Parliament subsequently granted him temporary leave over the summer and he went to Bath to recuperate. The recuperation also gave him an excuse to avoid Essex’s funeral (22 October); his presence as Lord General would have complicated the image of Essex as England’s Protestant Prince, especially given the success of his leadership on the battlefield in comparison to the earl’s.

His return to London on 12 November was not therefore a triumphal entry and lacked the self-awareness that surrounded Essex’s entries into the city (1642, 1643). Despite the absence of members of parliament, Fairfax received a warm welcome from the citizens and authorities of London.\(^{88}\) Fairfax approached London from the west and was met just outside the Lines of Communication in Clarendon Park by the London’s Militia Committee and a multitude of citizens.\(^{89}\) There, Fairfax received speeches delivered by aldermen Fowke and Gibbs.\(^{90}\) Both aldermen leaned towards what would later be termed the political ‘Independent’ faction and both would be critical figures in maintaining calm within the city during the crisis of summer 1647 (much to Holles’s disgust). The Venetian ambassador described the reception as one

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\(^{88}\) The Commons journal for the 12 does not allude to Fairfax’s arrival but their decision on the 13 to visit him indicates they were aware of his arrival, see: *CJ*, iv.720; *Mercurius Candidus* no.1 (11-20 November 1646), 6.

\(^{89}\) *Weekly Account*, no.48 (11-18 November 1646), un-pg; *The Scottish Dove*, no.160 (11-18 November 1646), 110.

\(^{90}\) *Weekly Account*, no.48, un-pg.
of ‘triumph and with pomp’. From Clarendon Park, Fairfax entered the Lines of Communication (presumably at Clarendon Park Fort) and progressed through the city (past Charing Cross and along the Strand, turning at Temple Bar) to his house in Queen Street, Lincoln’s Inn, accompanied by those who had first greeted him. His progress was celebrated with the ringing of bells and cheers of citizens, and ‘with honour and joy, according to his merit’. The preparation of speeches and the coordination of bell ringing – in advance of Fairfax’s arrival – aligned with more spontaneous reaction of the crowds to produce a welcome that was all the more genuine through the lack of conscious display.

That evening, Fairfax visited Manchester, the Lords’ Speaker, in what appears as a private act of homage. Manchester reported to the Lords the following day (13 November) that during his visit, Fairfax had ‘expressed his Readiness to serve this House, in any Thing as lies in his Power, with all Readiness and Respects’. It is noteworthy that Fairfax visited Manchester in private, rather than paying homage in a more public fashion (such as visiting the houses at Westminster). It is noteworthy, too, that Fairfax does not appear to have conducted a similar visit to the Commons’ Speaker, perhaps implying that Fairfax still considered the Lords the more eminent house. Fairfax’s private visit to Manchester emphasises once again his awareness and rejection of attempts to ceremonially style him as a great victor. Both houses, however, recognised the need to acknowledge Fairfax’s return, resolving to send a delegation of their Speakers and a committee of their members to his house.

On Saturday 14 November, the delegations both duly went to greet Fairfax. Whitelocke records that, ‘first, the house of lords and their speaker complimented him, and then the house of commons; and to both he made a short and modest answer’, suggesting the houses visited one after the other rather than simultaneously.

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91 CSPVen 1643–47, 292.
93 For the vocabulary of celebratory modes see, D. Cressy, Bonfires and Bells. National Memory and the Protestant Calendar in Elizabethan and Stuart England (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1989).
94 LJ, viii.563.
95 CJ, iv.720; LJ, viii.563.
96 Whitelocke, Memorials, ii.85.
modesty of Fairfax’s reply is difficult to assess, suggesting perhaps a modesty in personality or a political imposition designed to limit Fairfax’s ability to answer at more length. The delegations thanked Fairfax on behalf of their respective houses, praised his faithful service to parliament, his ‘wise Conduct, and great Valour’ in the war, and commended him for ‘reducing the distract Affairs of this Kingdom to this happy Condition and Issue’. Unlike the delegations sent to Essex House in 1643, this was not an act of political homage; although Hopper describes parliament’s thanks as ‘a hero’s welcome’. The houses did not visit Fairfax until two days after his arrival, nor is there mention of special forms of dress being worn. Fairfax’s absence from Essex’s funeral provides another motive to parliament’s actions – the delegations’ presence was a symbol of parliament’s faith in Fairfax’s military ability to lead the army, despite (or perhaps because of) rumours over the summer that Essex would be returned to the position of General in order to force the Commons to reach a settlement with the king.

The warm welcome that greeted Fairfax’s return thus united the citizens of London with parliament, despite the more private nature of parliament’s welcome. As Lindley notes, ‘war deprived masters of the services of their apprentices, hit trade and closed shops, [and] brought unprecedented fiscal demands and administrative burdens’. The civic welcome was as much a celebration of Fairfax as it was a sign of hope that social order and economic prosperity would be revived. The jubilation at his military success was mirrored in reports of his arrival. Words (and derivations thereof) such as ‘congratulations’, ‘faithful’, ‘grateful’, ‘peace’, and ‘thankfulness’ appear frequently; and there is an emphasis not just on the salvation of the kingdom but specifically of the city of London. Naturally, Fairfax’s victories were believed to be a consequence of God’s blessing, but Fairfax is also praised as a man of ‘great

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97 CJ, iv.720; LJ, viii.563.
98 Hopper, Black Tom, 75.
99 Thomas Juxon remarked on 22 October 1646, ‘Had he lived but a week longer, the Lords had voted him generalissimo and Sir Thomas laid aside for his good service’, see: Journal of Thomas Juxon, 138; Clarendon noted ‘that Cromwell and his party… were wonderfully exalted with his death’, see: Clarendon, History, iv.219.
101 Mercurius Civicus, no.182 (12-19 November 1646), 2455-2456; Weekly Account, no.48, un-pg; Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer, no.174 (10-17 November 1646), 303; Mercurius Candidus, no.1, 6-7.
gallantry, Heroycke valour, and advantagious desert’. Speaker Lenthall remarked, ‘Hereafter... as the successors of Julius Caesar took the name of Caesar, all famous and victorious succeeding generals in this kingdom will desire the addition of the name of Fairfax’. John Harris, editor of the *Mercurius candidus*, seemed particularly in awe of Fairfax’s valour, offering a lengthy vindication of his character that concluded in an appraisal of the army:

Unity of power in an Army is mother of success, and confusion daughter of dissention. Two equall Generals would more hardly have obtain’d one Victory, then one Generall has many. It is the safest way, in a Martiall expedition, to commit the maine charge to the hands of one: Companions in Command begets confusion in the Camp. When two able Commanders are joyn’d in equall Commission, each is apt to think his own way best, and by mutuall thwarting each other, both give opportunity to the Enemy, and make distraction in the Army.

Harris’s assessment may possibly have been a comment on the disturbing attempts of officers under Fairfax’s command who sought more power (both within parliament and the army) for themselves; Holles was already complaining that Fairfax ‘was the shadow’ of Cromwell whilst Clarendon observed that Cromwell ‘was now the declared head of the army, though Fayrefax continued general in name’. It could equally be a criticism of the royalist army: the hostility between Prince Rupert and royal advisors such as Lord Digby was no secret, and the confusion amongst generals of the royalist army in the west had contributed in part to its defeat earlier that year. Harris’s assessment also proves that the comparison with the ‘old’ parliamentarian army (which witnessed a struggle for prominence between Essex, Manchester, and Waller) was very much alive and that parliament’s fears of another valorised Lord General were being realised in print if not in ceremony.

102 *Mercurius Candidus*, no.1, 6.
104 *Mercurius Candidus*, no.1, 7.
5.6 Conclusion
This chapter has highlighted how, between 1642 and 1646, parliament and the civic authorities colluded in dominating the civic space through the use of ceremony. This interplay demonstrates the collective agency of the institutions over the individual as actors in these performances, where previously scholars have focused on the role of individuals such as Essex (or, later, Cromwell). It has demonstrated how these performances placed parliament at the centre of the ritual, which served as an extension or evidence of its control over the army and the drive for reform and settlement. Parliament utilised the civic space to reinforce its political authority and the co-option of the civic authorities in reviews of the trained bands and the celebrations of military victories ostensibly demonstrated the city’s support for parliament. More accurately, it demonstrates the feelings of resentment aimed at Charles. Whilst war was not inevitable in January 1642, the willingness of London’s citizens and trained bands to protect the Five Members and guard parliament suggests the king would not have been welcomed back. While political settlements sought to appease the Scots and revealed Presbyterian concerns about the radicalisation of the New Model Army, this chapter has emphasised how the self-conscious staging of these Anglo-centric rituals marginalised the army and the Scottish commissioners, enabling parliament and the city to mutually court each other. Although the city is consistently figured within the context of these ceremonies as inferior to parliament, the civic authorities used these events to demonstrate their control over the city through theatrical display, as evidenced by the handover of Naseby prisoners at the city’s boundaries. The ceremonial bonfires reinforced the politico-religious aims of the war and offered a continuation of street spectacle in the city’s ceremonially spaces such as Cheapside Cross, even as these locations were stripped of popish and superstitious symbolism.

This use of ceremony by parliament stood in conflict with the self-conscious performances of Essex as Lord General, whose military performances implied potential political superiority over parliament, although this thesis argues that, counter to these implications, Essex was not vying for political command. The passing of the Self-Denying Ordinance, however, removed the duality of authority situated in figures such as Essex, Manchester, and Warwick, who held both political power by virtue of
their peerage and military power by virtue of parliamentary ordinance. Fairfax’s military prestige brought him to the fore of the army but despite the performative potential, Fairfax shunned demonstrations of this status. His reception in London on his appointment as Lord General (February 1645) was a distinctly military affair; the lack of reporting in the newsbooks suggests there was little civic celebration over Fairfax’s arrival in the city. Fairfax’s welcome by the city in November 1646, following the surrender of Charles and the Oxford garrison, highlighted the desire of the city (both citizens and authorities) to stage and partake in civic spectacle but can also be read as a celebration of the apparent end to war. These actions reinforce the argument that Fairfax was not another self-aggrandising lord – his was strictly a military appointment.

Sharpe has previously argued for the importance of rival rituals but focused his discussion on dramatic state trials, organised and performed by parliament. This thesis extends Sharpe’s argument to demonstrate how military rituals, such as the review of trained bands – which previously placed the Lord General at the heart of the ritual – came to focus on parliament, situating it as the central politico-military authority to the exclusion of the new Lord General. However, whilst the scale and frequency of military rituals decreased, the performance of civic entertainments continued to offer London’s citizens an element of theatricality and display. Designed to strengthen relations between the city and parliament, the entertainments (usually occasioned by military victories) offered an idealised version of civic and political harmony centred on feasting the soul and body. The detailed (and occasionally contradictory) reports in newsbooks counter claims that London witnessed a decline in spectacle during the First Civil War, whilst demonstrating an increased awareness of the partisan ideology behind such performances. This is epitomised in the Naseby parade, a theatrical expression of parliament’s victory that appropriated the royal ceremonial route through the city to publicly proclaim its political superiority.

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106 Sharpe, Image Wars, 379-84.
6. An immutable code?

In early August 1647, fifteen months after Charles surrendered to the Scots, London and parliament found themselves under threat of invasion by the New Model Army. Amid frantic political and civic negotiations, the subsequent processions of the New Model through the city (on 6 and 7 August) emblematised the centrality of ceremony as an instrument of power during the First Civil War. The use of ceremonial and performatives were, historically, political tools by which social cohesion – at a courtly, governmental, or civic level – was maintained.¹ The First Civil War resulted in the disruption of ceremonial norms but the forms continued to be utilised and manipulated: as Keay argues, ‘[c]eremonial was not an immutable code’.² Where Sharpe focuses on the rival rituals between Charles and parliament, this thesis has extended Sharpe’s assessment to consider the rival performances of other key players such as the city, the Scots, and the New Model Army. In doing so, it has demonstrated how new forms were invented, archaic forms reintroduced, and existing forms appropriated. As the shifting – perhaps even repetitive – use of ceremony shows, these forms were not static but changed according to the performer’s intent and purpose. Nor were the performers themselves consistent. With the exception of Charles, the dominant voices within parliament shifted throughout these years, Scotland’s role in enabling a victory against Charles and in drawing up a settlement rose and fall, those holding authoritative positions within London’s civic government changed, and so too did parliament’s Lord General. The central players at the outbreak of war had, by 1647, been replaced.

On 6 August, Fairfax and four regiments escorted nine peers and over 50 members of the Commons – whose Independent stance had led them to flee Westminster – from Holland House in Kensington to Westminster. After a congratulatory welcome at Clarendon House from the Lord Mayor and aldermen, the company progressed to Charing Cross (where the common council, wearing formal

¹ For a brief historiography of ceremony and court history see chapter one of this thesis, ‘The (ab)uses of ceremony: a theoretical overview’.
² Keay, The Magnificent Monarch, 208.
gowns, received and welcomed them). From Charing Cross to Westminster, the procession continued down King Street, passing the now empty Whitehall. In doing so the procession deliberately mimicked the formal ceremony for the opening of the Short Parliament that citizens (high and low) had observed in April 1640. The peers, led by Northumberland, dominated the procession, reinforcing the Lords’ superiority over the Commons. Their position also emphasised the continuing importance of precedence – a concept that had been increasingly undermined by those seeking to blame the nobility for the war. In the context of ‘the short-lived Presbyterian putsch’ (a plan to take control of the city) in the preceding weeks, the procession symbolised the victory of the New Model Army and the Independent faction not only over parliament but also over the city. This victory was further highlighted by the wearing of bay and laurel, classical symbols of victory. The flight of the Independents mirrored in many ways both the flight of the Five Members from Westminster and Charles’s subsequent flight from London. As the Five Members had accused Charles of breaching parliamentary privilege, so the Lords criticised the violation of parliament’s privileges by ‘discontented Persons’ in the city. The Independents left London in a state of riot, engineered – or so they, like Charles, believed – by the civic authorities. Mob violence proved to be a dangerous, albeit effective, tool as it demonstrated the lack of control parliament had over popular action despite efforts to co-opt it. Evidence of crowd control along the street indicates continuing fears about disorder – the positioning of Cromwell and others ‘who made a Lane to the very doores’ of Whitehall

4 Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer, no.221 (3-10 August 1647), 626-7; Moderate Intelligencer, no.125 (5-11 August 1647), 1202.
5 For example, one newbook concluded it was ‘Better [to] pull down a few Families, than to suffer the ruine of a whole Kingdome by an unsafe lenity towards them’, see: Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer, no.106, 844; Juxon also criticised the Lords’ attempts to hinder Fairfax and the New Model Army, see: Journal of Thomas Juxon, 74.
7 LJ, ix.356; Fairfax likewise condemned the city telling them, ‘I cannot but look on your selves (who are in authority) as accountable to the Kingdome, for your present interruptions of that hopefull way of peace and settlement’, see: A Declaration of the Engagements, Remonstrances, Representations, Proposals, Desires and Resolutions from His Excellency Sir Tho: Fairfax, and the generall councel of the Army (London, 1647), 106.
physically echoed the railings that separated the spectators from performers in April 1640.  

However, if the procession on 6 August was designed as a warning, the following day’s parade was a calculated ‘show of strength’. Like the parade of Naseby prisoners in June 1645, this was a mass display of the sheer might and strength of the New Model Army. Early in the morning of 7 August, over 18,000 troops gathered at Clarendon Park and ‘with Drums and Trumpets, and Colours flying’ proceeded to march from there to Cheapside, utilising the familiar ceremonial route from Charing Cross along the Strand, ‘before fanning out to walk through every street’. In diverting from the traditional ceremonial route that would have taken the parade along the northern city walls, the New Model Army literally took over the city, with some troops exiting at Aldgate for Whitechapel and others crossing London Bridge headed for Southwark. The behaviour of the troops also evidences the self-consciousness of the organisers and awareness of the New Model Army’s image. Juxon observed that the army marched, ‘in so great order and civility that ‘twas not heard of so much as an apple took by any of them’. Newsbooks noted that the soldiers ‘behaved themselves with admirable civility’, which was ‘to the great joy of their friends and the perpetuall infamy of their enemies’; ‘a welcome contrast to the excesses committed by the reformadoes in July’. This appearance of civility was further enhanced by the lack of arms worn by the soldiers, which Gentles proposes was a deliberate attempt to appear less aggressive. It also downplayed the fact that this was essentially a military coup and in the following days the city’s Presbyterian leaders either fled or faced arrest on charges of treason, whilst key military and political positions were reassigned to the New Model Army’s Independent allies. Once again, the city was coerced into cooperation with the dominant political force.

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11. Moderate Intelligencer, no.125, 1202.
13. Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer, no.221, 627; A perfect diurnall, no.210 (2-9 August 1647), 1692; Gentles, New Model Army, 282.
14. Gentles, New Model Army, 495.
The New Model Army’s adoption of ceremonial forms in August 1647 and its concurrent politicisation in spring and summer of that year shocked and surprised contemporaries but its actions are exemplary in demonstrating the adoption of ceremonial forms for polemical ends, the subject of this thesis. There were, moreover, clear precedents for the New Model Army’s behaviour in the actions of the Covenanters in the late 1630s and the English Parliament in the early 1640s, a pattern that has been relatively underexplored. The Covenanters, in resisting what they saw as royal interference in the Kirk developed a range of performative tactics through which to gain religious concessions from the king, whilst simultaneously limiting the royal prerogative in Scotland. The obstruction and manipulation of ritual forms, the language of defiance, and recourse to public appeals were observed with interest south of the border and were remodelled by the reforming faction in the Long Parliament to attack the deficiencies and deviancies of the Caroline government. Sharpe argues for the self-awareness of these MPs, ‘conscious of themselves as performing, and, like the actors and stage managers, performing a service for court and audience’.\(^{15}\) In seeking to limit royal prerogatives from November 1640 onwards, parliament created a linguistic framework that reinforced the legitimacy of its reforms. As Sharpe argues, society was ‘sensitive to the genre, form, and materiality of their texts’; this thesis has demonstrated how parliament, by reframing royal forms as declarations, remonstrances, and ordinances, used traditional forms of authority to legitimise their oppositional goals.\(^{16}\) In centralising the role of ceremonial forms in its reinvention from legislative to legislative and executive body, parliament openly appealed to the public and in doing so altered public awareness of politico-religious tensions within the Caroline government – although they could not control public responses to, and engagement with, their actions. This collective self-fashioning enabled parliament to present itself as defender of ‘the safety of the King’s person’ and preserver of ‘the true religion, the laws, liberty, and peace of the kingdom’, which this thesis argues was as much an attempt to gloss over internal division as it was an attempt to raise public

\(^{15}\) Sharpe, ‘Representations and Negotiations’, 861.

\(^{16}\) Sharpe, Reading Revolutions, 26.
support. Whilst such stylisation enabled parliament to gain political and religious concessions from the king and control of London at the outbreak of war, its manipulation of ceremony opened the floodgates for rival partisan attempts to co-opt these rituals for alternative ends. That the Independents fled parliament in 1647 and that the New Model Army took it upon itself to return them indicates that, despite performances to the contrary, the authority parliament claimed to have was – five years after war began – still very much open to attack.

There existed, then, a contradiction between the centrality and impotency of ceremony that was also evident in Charles’s attempts to assert royal authority through these forms. As Sharpe and Peacey have argued, Charles – despite personal reluctance – was not averse to using public ceremonial – but the tendency to employ or change these forms at the last minute reduced their efficacy. This thesis has demonstrated that there is an important distinction between court ceremony and etiquette on the one hand, and propagandistic public events on the other; and between ceremonies in which Charles engaged with his nobility and continental counterparts as a European monarch, and ceremonies in which Charles engaged directly with his subjects as their king. Introspective ceremony remained central to Charles’s performance of monarchy within the Caroline court and even flourished as Charles tightened rules on decorum and protocol. The royal reception for the Moroccan ambassador (1637) and Marie de Medici’s arrival in London (1638) utilised civic space and citizens bore witness to the more elaborate elements of the ritual (such as fireworks) but they were not included in the political message contained therein. In contrast, the royal entry into London (1641) was designed to be inclusive, to incorporate the city – both its civic space and its citizens – into the performance. This thesis has demonstrated that the inclusivity was specifically about civic and royal relations, not, as Adamson has argued, a site of mediation between king and parliament.\(^\text{17}\) Charles expected his use of ceremony to be accepted because these rituals were a performance of what he believed to be an incontrovertible monarchy. The irregularity of ceremonial usage, however, enabled both performers in and spectators of these rites to question them – even within the

\(^{17}\) Adamson, *Noble Revolt*, 438-446.
framework of the ritual. Despite royal progresses (which this thesis has revealed to be closed and inward-looking) in the late 1620s and 1630s, this thesis has argued that the civic welcomes Charles received (in 1642) also failed, both because the political stakes were too high and because the royal invasion of civic space often highlighted existing tension between civic and royal authority. The forms Charles used were also somewhat antiquated, and this thesis has departed from previous interpretations of the raising of the royal standard as proof of Charles’s successful projection of himself as warrior king to demonstrate the king’s failure to project old forms into a new political context. While this thesis has not vastly expanded upon existing research on the royal court at Oxford, it has highlighted how the very refashioning of a court emphasises the centrality of ritual forms in asserting his kingship, even as the very displacement of these forms represented the decline of royal authority.

If Charles struggled to convince parliament or civic authorities because of his misuse of ceremony, one of the claims of this thesis, then Essex faced the opposite challenge: he was too successful as an iconic and emblematic figure. Essex’s use of ceremony in his role as Lord General demonstrates the self-consciousness of performers in constructing a public image. As Lord General, Essex had a highly visible platform from which to generate political and military support for the war against Charles. The rituals constructed around Essex set him apart from the nobility as well as other military commanders such as Manchester and Warwick. In truncating the entry of 1643 into London, parliament became subservient to his military authority. This subservience resulted in tension between Essex’s intent (to enforce his dominance as Lord General) and parliament’s interpretation of these actions as signs of political aspiration. Nor was parliament alone in this reading; the royalists and the Oxford Parliament, in addressing Essex, clearly believed he had the ability to shape parliamentary discourse. There is a subsequent tendency by historians, Adamson in particular, to interpret Essex as a figure vying for vice-regal powers when in fact his political position was more deferential than has previously been recognised. This thesis has challenged such interpretations to argue that Essex resented the military restrictions placed on him by parliament since the Lord General theoretically held supreme command over the army. In seeking to demonstrate his independence through
these rituals, Essex unwittingly reinforced parliament’s determination to limit him. The tension between military and political authority eased following Essex’s resignation but evidence suggests that by summer 1646, many were ready to support Essex in returning him to military leadership. His death precluded such a possibility whilst enabling parliament to utilise the funeral as a grand demonstration of its political authority and military success. The elaborate spectacle was a fitting commemoration of Essex as England’s Protestant Prince but it was also a useful (albeit expensive) distraction from the growing factionalism within parliament and the failure to reach a settlement with Charles. While accepting the clear influence of Prince Henry’s funeral on that of Essex, which both Adamson and Gentles have identified, this thesis has refined this appraisal by highlighting the range of state and civic funerals performed within the city of London during the early 1640s, which also influenced the funerary forms.18

Essex’s funeral also symbolised parliament’s dominance in performances within London. These rituals differed in style and in content, and parliament did not have complete control over the civic space even as it attempted to position itself at the centre of these performances. However, this thesis has demonstrated how the ceremonies that parliament and the civic authorities enacted were important in binding together the performers, in enabling a mutual courtship through celebrating shared actions despite the diversity of private intent. These ceremonies have been greatly overlooked as performative acts by historians, and this thesis fills an important gap by bringing to light the complex negotiations of deference and support within these events. Whilst others witnessed or performed in these rituals – such as the Scottish Commissioners – they were peculiarly Anglo-centric, highlighting the central role of the English Parliament and the city of London in bringing about an English peace. The reviews of trained bands – which previously placed the Lord General at the heart of the ritual – now focused on parliament, situating it as the central politico-military authority in the war. The city-led welcome of Fairfax in 1646 meanwhile, demonstrated the important place of ceremony within civic life, although the line

between the efficacy of these events as mere street theatre or as a political statement remained blurred. This welcome also demonstrates city and parliamentary concepts of ceremony did not always align as parliament attempted to limit the ritualisation of Fairfax as Lord General in order to emphasis his subservience to parliament. A year later, the march of the New Model Army through London was viewed without apparent hostility despite the fact that just days before the citizens had armed themselves against the army. This raises the question of efficacy – of whether the rituals performed in the First Civil War were effective in convincing or winning the citizens’ support and demonstrates once again the tension between theatricality and intent. The evident continuation of ceremonial practices by individuals (Charles and Essex) and institutions (parliament, the civic authorities, the New Model Army) enables this thesis to challenge studies that see a sharp division in political practices prior to and during the First Civil War. Although these performances were more overtly polemical than (for example) the Lord Mayors’ Shows, it proves the multiplicity of ceremonial usage during the First Civil War, beyond the obvious dichotomy of royalist and parliamentarian acts.

This is by no means an exhaustive account of the uses of speech acts and ceremony during the First Civil War and it brings to light areas that would benefit from further research. Whilst the Long Parliament’s debt to the Covenanters has been noted, it would be interesting to see a more sustained comparative analysis that draws out the similarities of these rebel tactics in the late 1630s – early 1640s. The royal court at Oxford is another area deserving of further study. Whilst royalist culture and identity has experienced something of a renaissance, the structure of the court between 1642-46 remains underexplored as does the economic and social impact of the court on the city of Oxford. New biographies of Charles, Cromwell and Fairfax continue to appear in print, but the most up-to-date biography of Essex is nearly 50 years old. A more modern appraisal is long over-due and would contribute to a more nuanced understanding of Essex as Lord General. Finally, an in-depth study of the role played by foreign ambassadors who negotiated between Charles and parliament would help

19 V. Snow, Essex the Rebel (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1970).
challenge the traditionally Anglo-centric approach to the First Civil War, by placing events in England within a broader European context. By examining the First Civil War within the context of ceremony and ritual, it extends research on Caroline court culture, and complements the work of Kelsey and Knoppers on the performance of republican theory and the construction of Cromwell’s image during the Commonwealth.20

20 Kelsey, Inventing a Republic; Knoppers, Constructing Cromwell.
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