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IV.

A Criticism of the Freudian Position that Repression is a Function of Cultural Progress
Freudian Evolutionary Theories Outlined..
Otto Rank.

Otto Rank's theories of human development, as revealed in his book "The Trauma of Birth", are essentially based on the belief that repression is the supreme factor in man's life. Alexander tells us that Freud has shown a great deal of indulgence in respect of a follower who is regarded by some as unorthodox. Rank himself, however, appears to think that he is merely interpreting one aspect of the teaching of the master. He says: "But we wish to dwell for the moment on the equally indubitable analytical fact that just as the anxiety at birth forms the basis of every anxiety or fear" (and here, presumably, is his own special contribution) "so every pleasure has its final aim in the re-establishment of the intrauterine primal pleasure."

And in the quotation which follows, we have again exemplified Rank's belief that he is merely developing ideas which are already implicit in Freudian doctrine. "As, according to the Freudian concept, hysteria is closely related to artistic production, the obsessional neuroses to the formation of religion and philosophic speculation, so the psychoses are closely related to the mythological world view. When analytically adjusted psychiatrists have recognised that the content of the psychosis is 'cosmologic', we need not avoid the next step, that of analysis of cosmology itself, for then we shall find that it is/

'F. Alexander, "Psychoanalysis of the Total Personality" p.114.
'O. Rank, "The Trauma of Birth", p.17.
is nothing other than the infantile recollection of one's own birth, projected on to nature."

Rank propounds an evolutionary theory of development, and it will therefore be necessary to give an account, however brief, of his position. We may say also that Rank betrays even more than most Freudian writers, a spirit of fatalism. Just as Wittels regards the human mind as being engaged in the impossible task of defending its pristine narcissism, so Rank regards the human being as destined throughout life to make the impossible attempt to re-enter the womb and again enjoy that state of bliss which he imagines is the lot of the unborn infant.

Rank's psychological viewpoint is at least picturesque. Simply stated, it is this. The human being who has had the misfortune to be born, is devoured by a tremendous longing to return to the place from whence he came. Nature, however, will have none of this. It is indeed really her fault that the human being has within him this highly non-adaptive ambition, because she plunges him into the world long before he ought to be born, if sub-human precedent counts for anything. Unlike the lower animals, the human being is born in a very immature condition, and the child, seemingly realising this, has a "grouse" against Nature, and throughout life has a desire to get even with the mother of all by returning to the condition which preceded/

preceded birth.

As we have said, Nature emphatically said, "No", and hit on a somewhat peculiar method of securing her ends. This method is, indeed, symbolised in the story of the Angel with the double-edged sword, who stood outside Eden in order to prevent our progenitors from returning into the garden of bliss from which they had been rudely ejected. Or, to change the metaphor, just as a certain type of civilised parent gives a boy a sound thrashing to prevent him again approaching a tree of unripe apples, so Nature gives each babe, as it comes into the world, a highly painful experience, the memory of which is stamped indelibly on the brain of the infant. Let anyone so much as dream of putting into effect the deepest of all human desires, and the traumatic memory of birth will bestir itself, and the recalcitrant one will experience fear of a highly painful quality.

According to Wittels, society has created a series of substitutes through which the child may find consolation when his primary narcissism is threatened. In the same way, Rank suggests that Nature has presented to each one of us a set of symbols by means of which the libido is directed to that outer world towards which we must adapt ourselves if the race is to continue.

But/
But in reality, the symbols are but cheats. None of us care about the outer world; what we really want is intrauterine bliss. Nature, however, has succeeded in cajoling us, by leading us to imagine that we are taking steps to realise our basic wish when all the time we are dancing to her tune. It is interesting to speculate what would be the position of a child born as the result of a Caesarian operation. Such a child, one would imagine, being thrust into the world even earlier than Nature had intended, would be specially prone to feelings of spitefulness, and in accordance with Rank's arguments, since he had escaped the traumatic experience of natural birth, there would be no means of persuading him to develop in accordance with the traditions of the society into which he was born. Since, as far as we know, such children develop quite normally, it is to be supposed that the theory of the birth trauma will require a certain modification, this being doubtless on the lines that the child has phylogenically inherited the traumatic experience, or that he has a tendency towards experiencing a trauma, and if his expectations are not fulfilled, he will proceed to elaborate an imaginary one.

On the basis of his theory that man is at all times striving to realise his one fundamental desire to return to the womb, Rank proceeds to build up an elaborate theory of symbolism, according to which everything that man has ever sought after, everything/
everything that he has ever valued in the external world, every new proof of his invention and ingenuity, is but a symbol of this desire.

"The study and understanding of so-called dream symbolism", Rank says, "now enables us to trace back cultural creation to its origin in the depths of the unconscious. From the overwhelming and confusing mass of existing cultural material, which humanity, compelled by the same old primal yearning, still constantly produces, we shall mention here only one example.....It concerns the room, the space which, for the unconscious, regularly symbolises the female genitals. And indeed, ultimately it symbolises the womb as relating to the only female genital known to the unconscious, and the place in which, before the birth trauma, one was protected and warmed." And thus man interests himself in houses, temples, and so on. Since, however, according to the best authorities, man never bethought himself to build a house for almost a million years, it would appear that the symbol was long in coming into operation.

Clothing is also a symbol of the warming and protecting mother. And here applies the same counter argument; clothing is unknown among many primitives.

Rulers attain their status by becoming in part identified with/


"See Elliot Smith, "Human History" p.304."
with the mother. They are the objects of ambivalent feelings. "He (the ruler) is loved, protected, and spared, that is, taboo, in so far as he represents the mother." But he also represents the youngest brother who has had the temerity to take the place of the father, and as such he is "hated, tortured, or slain." But society at least allows him a limited authority, and this authority has had a function in producing a condition in which law and order may reign. The objection here is that, according to Roheim and other anthropologists, the kingship is a very recent invention. It is rather difficult to imagine that the compulsion bound up within the birth-trauma-cum-primal-scene situation should have lain dormant throughout the far greater part of the thousand millenniums during which mankind has inhabited the earth.

The overthrow of matriarchal conditions was also due to the birth trauma. "The development of the paternal domination into an increasingly powerful state system, administered by men, is thus a continuance of the primal repression, which has had as its purpose the ever wider exclusion of woman - just on account of the painful memory of the birth trauma - even at the cost of establishing the uncertain descent (semper incertus) from the father as the foundation for the entire law, (name, inheritance, etc.)"

Just as a symbol of the mother is used in order to bring into/

"Elliot Smith, "Human History" Ch,V., "The Kingship".
existence conditions which have the quality of protectiveness, so does the antagonism towards the mother express itself in discovering symbolic means for attacking her, these proving useful in extending man's power over his environment. Implements and weapons are a means of satisfying unconsciously "the perpetual insatiable tendency to force one's way completely into the mother."

The primeval hunter had an interest in slaying the objects of the chase because he would then be able to find a substitute for the mother's nourishment, especially in drinking the blood of the slain animals, this being "in direct continuance of the intrauterine nourishment, and the raw flesh was swallowed—lingering echoes of which still reach us in the myths of swallowing, where the hero in the interior of the animal eats of its soft parts." The warm hide of the animal provides a "protective covering against the cold" and "is thus the real counterpart to the mythical creeping into the animal's warm body."

Thus the hunter was not really interested in killing animals for food. His activities were all part of a dream, and at all times he was striving in a completely irrational manner at once to avenge himself on his mother and symbolically to regain his former state of intrauterine bliss. One is reminded of that famous scene in Pickwick Papers in which one of the Pickwickians implores Mr. Pickwick, when emerging from the hole in the ice, to/
to keep himself up for the said Pickwickian's sake. Dickens here suggests that, had Mr. Pickwick decided not to comply with the request as a means of obliging his follower, it might have struck him to "keep himself up" for entirely personal reasons. No sane person would doubt that Mr. Pickwick, in taking such steps as were necessary to safeguard his existence, was mainly actuated by motives bound up with his own private predilection for continued existence. It would appear certain that our primitive ancestor, in hunting animals, was principally dominated by motives entirely apart from any symbolic value the activities may have had, in relation to his repressed unconscious.

But Rank thinks otherwise, and we read: "We believe we have understood symbolism as the most important means for adjustment to reality in the sense that every 'comfort' that civilisation and technical knowledge continually strive to increase only tries to replace, by durable substitutes, the primal goal from which, in the meaning of so-called development, it becomes even further removed."

Rank brings his theory up to date by accounting for inventions in the scientific field. "In other cases of electrical inventions (apparatus through which run warm unseen currents) etc., a detailed study of the patient's delusions ought to show clearly their importance as a reaction to the birth trauma." We are told that most inventors have an admixture of madness in their make-up/

make-up, so we may take it that the proof is established.

Religion also is an expression of the tendency symbolically to find one's way back into the succouring and protecting mother. "This tendency is most consistently developed in the Christian mythology, summing up the entire view of the ancient world." The interest in the universe as the projected mother leads finally to astronomy.

Greek art was a product of a like process of symbolisation. "So the deep cultural and historical importance of the development of the Greek art lies in this, that it repeats the biological and prehistorical act of becoming human, the severance from the mother, and the standing upright from the earth, in the creation and perfection of its aesthetic ideal of the human body."

Pottery had its origin in the attempt to represent symbolically the "maternal" vessel. Plato's theory of pure ideas was, according to Rank, the result of his "extraordinary intuition in recognising in all things the yearning for the transcendental, the striving for perfection, the will to ascend to the primal image of the idea." Aristotle was a reactionary, but Schopenhauer, according to Rank, has revived the "Hindu primal wisdom and its philosophic expression in Plato."

We also learn that "the real unconscious proves to be the embryonal state existing unchanged in the adult ego. By this embryonal/
embryonal I mean that which psychoanalysis has recently described in a metapsychological term as the idea of the sexually neuter 'It'". And thus we have the conception of that psychic elaboration dependent on the tendency to symbol formation at work in present-day personalities being responsible for our varied interests in the civilised world.

We must now quickly pass to the denouement of Rank's drama. As we also discover when studying the writings of Wittels, Roheim, and other psychoanalytical thinkers, fate has the last word. Once more we confess to a tendency to attempt the psychoanalysis of the psychoanalyst. The suggestion is forced upon us that the mind of Rank qua psychoanalyst is moving within a closed circle. He has presented to us an almost fearful spectacle of the evolutionary process or whatever it is that controls our destiny, playing a strange and fantastic trick on human kind. Humanity has been condemned endlessly to work on Nature's treadmill, by the offer of a reward which can never be granted. At all times he is cajoled into pursuing ends which for him have no intrinsic value. He is, it would seem, the object of a mean and heartless trick. Mother Nature shows herself in her worst aspect.

In view of the foregoing, we shall not be surprised when we peruse the final pages of "The Trauma of Birth". Rank undertakes to forecast the future in the light of his reading of:

of the past. "When we bring to mind," he says, "the power of
the primal repression and the attempts to overcome it repeated
by man indefatigably and ever fruitlessly throughout thousands
of years, our first inclination might be to add to the pessi-
mistic consequences to which this concept seems everywhere to
lead, the thought of the hopelessness of all psychotherapy."
The reader finds comfort in the thought that the author's
second inclination might give us a little hope to lighten the
gloom which appears to envelop us. But our modern Jeremiah
proceeds as follows: "For what power on earth could prevail
upon the unconscious to renounce its inborn nature and to take
another direction? From what has been said, no other con-
clusion seems possible than that there can be no such power."

We now await the enunciation of the saving clause. Rank
proceeds: "On the other hand, analytic experience shows that
something must exist which makes it possible to an extensive
degree to free highly neurotic human beings from the excessive
dominance of their unconscious and put them in a position to
live as those who are not neurotic." Keeping us no longer in
suspense, he gives his verdict: "That, to be sure, is all that
can be done....Psychoanalysis has compelled us, step by step,
to lay aside our intellectual pride (!) and to learn to attach
less and less value to the power of our consciousness as against
the/

the biological and elementary force of the unconscious." Our doom is sealed.

Then follows one of the most extraordinary statements of psychoanalytical literature. "I believe we have to go further along the same way in the field of psychoanalytical therapy itself, for...even simple therapeutic action can be arrested by too much knowledge and too much insight."

Rank then, by way of contributing to our knowledge of child psychology, states: "According to our conception, the new-born individual would immediately fall back into the abandoned state, that is, practically expressed, would die, unless nature undertook the first 'therapeutic' intervention, and prevented the striving back by the anchoring of anxiety. From this moment, every further activity of the individual in life acquires a 'therapeutic' character, in that, in opposition to the backward striving tendencies, it preserves the 'abandoned' patients for a while longer in life, without, however, succeeding in this for ever." The patient, of course, is the normal individual.

"If in the end we have to turn to so weak a thing as consciousness for support, we may yet console ourselves with the following reflection. Though consciousness is but a feeble weapon, it is the only one accessible to us in the fight against neurosis." (We are relieved to find that consciousness, after all, has some slight use.) "The psychical anchoring in consciousness/

consciousness of the anxiety perception at parturition acts biologically as a therapeutic means against the backward striving tendency, and determines, as we have attempted to show, the actual process of becoming a human being. And consciousness is the human characteristic par excellence. Should not, then, the removal, by analysis, of the primal repression and its anchoring in consciousness be sufficient to make the neurotic grow up to the same limited degree as that reached by the ordinary civilised human being, who even to-day is only in the 'short clothes' stage?" 

Poets are agreed that "something happens" towards the close of the period of childhood. A dark intrusion, a substratum, is formed below the surface of the child's heretofore essentially free and joyous personality. Most psychoanalysts, indeed, confirm the belief in a catastrophic event occurring during the closing months of the period of infancy. What was previously intuition has now, in part, been raised to the plane of knowledge. But Rank, it seems, must go one better, and places the dire happening at the very beginning of life.

However Freud may regard the aberrations of the writer of "The Trauma of Birth", the lay reader can form only one conclusion, that the basic conceptions represent the fevered dream of a person in whom the superego or what not has become autonomous. How else could Rank calmly discuss, at the end of his work, the bearings of his theory on the psychoanalytical process, viewing as/ 

as of supreme significance the "light" which he is able to bring to bear on the method of helping a mere handful of individuals more effectively to adjust themselves to surrounding conditions. His attitude is only paralleled by those evangelical preachers of the last century who calmly condemned the ninety and nine which represents humanity in general to everlasting torment, and took upon themselves infinite credit for being able to save the hundredth from perdition.

Rank closes his work with the following sentence: "For the neurotic has only remained fixed in the birth trauma a little earlier than most people, and all we can ask of psychotherapy is that it should bring him up to the 'short clothes' stage at which the bulk of humanity has remained to this day." But, as we have seen, the condition of humanity, according to Rank, is hopeless, if we accept the belief that our future depends on the development of our intellectual powers. The further we advance along the lines of traumatically determined progress, the nearer we come to the point when we shall turn our sharpened intellectual weapons back upon ourselves, and realise that we are nature's dupe. "Too much knowledge and too much insight" will arrest the therapeutic action of the birth trauma, and we shall inevitably lose all further incentive not only to progress but to continue life.

If Rank is right, nature has already prepared schemes for a vast incendiarism which will ultimately destroy our race.

On the basis of his diagnosis, he has given his prognosis. He informs us that the situation is irremediable, and at the end of his work we find him making use of the art of dissociation on a vast scale. When he bids us adieu, we discover that his mind is preoccupied with the task of restoring neurotics to their rightful mind, bringing them up to the "short clothes stage", thus doctoring up the rearguard of humanity's army, the indirect result of which, according to his presuppositions, will be to facilitate that march of progress which leads on to inevitable doom. To use Roheim's phrase, the author of "The Trauma of Birth" is either "more, or less, than human."

Whatever we may think, however, of the underlying theory regarding the urge behind symbolic expression, Rank's discussion draws our attention to the possibility that symbolism has a great deal to do with the method by which instinctual energy is transferred from immediate biological ends to those activities which are characteristic of our life as human beings. To make Rank's theory work, we must postulate a pre-existent arrangement in accordance with which the symbolic emanations of the psyche correspond with the size, shape, and qualities of objects in outer reality. Berkeley developed such a theory in order to inter-relate subjectively determined experiences with the physical world. There is, of course, a possibility that/

that as man's development proceeded, schematic representations of the outer universe were introjected into the psyche. The belief that this could have occurred will depend on how far we consider the Lemanckian theory of the inheritance of acquired characteristics as being proved.

But fortunately, our present discussion need not become involved in these highly speculative matters. We would suggest that Rank's theoretical pre-suppositions are, to say the least of it, open to question. We feel justified, therefore, in attempting to simplify the problems bound up in the symbolisation process.

It is our opinion that "sublimation" by way of the symbol does actually occur. The writer has often found himself actuated by powerful drives which he has later discovered to have their source in repressed impulses. Professor Drever tells us that however far removed a particular activity may be from the underlying instinctive tendency, the general organic resonance connected with the instinct will probably remain present. In the case of three specific interests, apparently non-sexually determined, the writer has become aware of the emotion originally connected with a primitive impulse, and introspection also established a clear connection between the primitive impulse and its symbolic expression in consciousness.

It would seem, indeed, that desire fixated on the mother finds indirect expression in multitudinous activities at the conscious level; but it is obvious that the number of symbols for which a counterpart/

"J. Drever, The Psychology of Education" p. 66,
counterpart may be found in outer reality is legion, when we remember that the mother's body is itself a part of objective existence. We may regard it as established that the young child is emotionally attached in a variety of ways to his mother, and that these attachments, as time goes on, become increasingly inappropriate as a basis of behaviour: is it not therefore probable that sentiments directed towards the mother, which can no longer find expression, will tend to become attached to objects which, in various ways, "remind" the child of the mother? It is easy to see that the configuration of the earth's surfaces has a likeness to various parts of the human form. Running water, trees, and so on, may be, as Freud says, symbolic expressions of physical processes and anatomical structure. "The good brown earth" may well derive symbolic interest from a similar source. Implements of various kinds could represent the contractive components of the child's reactions towards his mother. In general, it appears not at all unlikely that Rank is accurate in suggesting that libido is conveyed by means of the symbol to an indefinite number of objects in man's environment.

Discounting the peculiarities of Rank's theory, the question arises as to whether the use of the symbol is dependent on the process of repression, or does it quite naturally proceed as a result of the child, in the course of development, having to relinquish attachments which are no longer appropriate? In our/
our view, it appears likely that the transference of energy by way of the symbol is not necessarily dependent on repression. We would suggest that there is reason to believe that everything that is essential in civilisation was brought into being before repression as we know it had come into existence.
In his book entitled "The Riddle of the Sphinx", Roheim gives us an account of the development of mankind from the psychoanalytical standpoint. On the whole, he agrees with Freud, differing only on minor points. Roheim is a psychoanalyst who spent a considerable amount of time in actual field work, living among the Australian aborigines. It is probable that his work is more valuable in providing evidence by which his position can be criticised, than in giving any convincing account of the workings of the Oedipus complex in racial development. He agrees almost entirely with those anthropologists who see in primitive peoples who have had little contact with civilisation, a simplicity of life which we might well emulate in many particulars. Much of his work could be transplanted into books by such writers as Massingham, Perry, and Elliot Smith, without giving any impression that the respective authors were influenced by disparate presuppositions.

In speaking of the Central Australians, Roheim tells us that the parents are "not severe educators. Only two things are forbidden; to see the parental coitus, and to take part in totemic rites." The parents, however, take no great precautions to prevent children witnessing the sexual act. When this happens, "the fear of the father represses this experience, together with the incestuous impulse associated with it; but the totem ritual offers a substitute and a sublimated form of/
of gratification. What was forbidden," he adds, "is now raised into the sphere of the superego, and thus becomes compulsory and socially valuable."

It is, indeed, difficult to see how, under the conditions described by Roheim, the child has sufficient motive for saddling himself with a superego. Roheim appears to think that the superego proper is only built up during the initiation rites. Up to that time, the phenomena to which he draws our attention would seem to be explicable merely in terms of an attempt to abreact a simple and unelaborated traumatic experience. The child fixes anxiety on animals, the connection arising from the fact that he has opportunity of witnessing their coitus. It is only at the initiation period that the anxiety is introjected, "this time in a sublimated, superego-syntonic form."

In his chapter on "The Ontogenetic Interpretation of Culture", Roheim introduces a further factor which he considers must affect cultural development among the Australians. It seems that the mothers of the community he describes "very often sleep on the top of their sons till they are eight or nine", thereby exciting "libidinal desires in the boys which they are not yet old enough to satisfy." He adds that, "the whole culture is built on the repression of the woman...." The child has been libidinally stimulated, we might say conditioned to a certain sexual object, and since any real expression/
expression of the child's desires towards his mother is forbidden by cultural tradition, the stimulated feelings must needs find expression through other channels.

Roheim deprecates the attempt to discover traumata in a people's early history. His theory is that traumata are not inherited in the ordinary sense, but are reproduced in each generation. In the case of the Australians, the mothers developed the habit of lying on their sons, and this is the vera causa of the continuance of the Australian specific culture through the generations.

"I believe," he says, "that every culture, or at least every primitive culture, can be reduced to a formula like a neurosis or a dream."

We suggest that, if this be the case, the "culture" referred to cannot greatly affect the individual's reactions when engaged in his ordinary pursuits. A people who were in any large measure absorbed in dream-like states would soon be eliminated under primeval conditions.

If a superego formation is set up, Roheim states that its activities will recreate in the children conditions which will require the construction of a defensive superego.

"There is thus a vicious circle from a typical trauma to a typical superego structure, and from this to a repetition of the same trauma." The Australian mother has received repressive/  


repressive treatment at the hands of her husband, and asserts herself by the symbolic castration of her sons. This in turn creates an aggressive reaction formation, a masculine over-determination, in the male children, who will likewise adopt a repressive attitude towards their own wives. "This periodicity between trauma and superego structure is the true cause of cultural stability."

Roheim then enunciates his main thesis, viz., that "the emergence of mankind was itself determined by traumata of ontogenesis," this being found in the "parent-child relation among the anthropoids or pre-human beings from whom we are descended." He says that, "analysis teaches us that superego and character, the moral attitudes that are independent of reality, of the current situation, result from infantile experience. The possession of these moral attitudes is specifically human; it separates man from his pre-human forebears."

At this point we would note the great significance which Roheim attaches to the superego in its moral aspect. It is that which pre-eminently differentiates man from the lower animals, and if we would enquire what brought man into existence, we must discover a point in evolutionary process where a moral superego becomes incorporated within the mind of subhuman creatures. Surely a study of Freudian psychology should/

should lead us to realise that the superego is not the type of mental institution of which we should be inordinately proud. Since Roheim has swallowed the Freudian superego camel, we need not be surprised if his treatment of anthropological data bears the mark of distortion and false emphasis.

In general, Roheim accepts the Freudian account of certain dire events within a horde of anthropoid apes, which led to the murder of the dominant male, thereby evoking within the sons feelings of repentance which expressed themselves in bringing into existence the first human community, complete with superego, which thereafter introduced into every subsequently born male a like superego formation, partly, we presume, through passive sympathy, and partly by the father dealing firmly with the type of impulse in the son which had originally led to the crime of parricide.

But Roheim here makes his specific contribution to what he describes as "the problem of human origins" (Chapter title, p. 201). "It appears to me, however," he says, "that the specifically human element must have begun to develop much earlier" (that is, than the Freudian primal horde event), "and that, in fact, the apes described by Zuckermann have already gone a long way upon the road." He then gives a description of Zuckermann's baboons, which "represent a relatively archaic period/"

period of human pre-history." If, then, we would gain a true idea of the factors which raised the animals into human beings, we must turn our attention to the study of a horde of baboons. We discover that though the bachelors do unite against the overlord, the results of the battle are not always fatal. Indeed, the former claimant of special privileges in relation to the females, is often driven away or even degraded to the position of a member of the horde, thus resuming his position as a bachelor. And also, the overlord is not quite as fierce and uncompromising as the "father" of Freudian legend. The bachelors are, in fact, allowed some gratification of their libidinal impulses. Otherwise, indeed, they would have no motive in remaining within the horde.

The younger and weaker males have the status of camp followers, who from time to time collect an occasional crumb of sexual gratification as it falls from the table of the primordial Dives. "Thus", says Roheim, "the first groups are based, like families, upon sexual impulses rather than on economic necessity." Now why, asks Roheim, do the older males tolerate the presence of juniors, who are at all times awaiting the opportunity of sharing what the older members regard as their prerogative? "The reason," says Roheim, "for such tolerance is not hard to guess. Homosexual relations occur/

occur fairly often between the overlords and bachelors, and in this partial turning of libido to a homosexual object, the first trace of aim-inhibited sexual impulse may be found."

Here we have the germ of sublimation: a step has been taken on the road towards cultural development. "Moreover", says Roheim, "the existence of play battles by the side of real ones points to a long period of mitigation." Presumably, the young males could work off in some measure their feelings of irritation against more favoured members of their community. Roheim continues in the same strain. "Another characteristic of these apes," he says, "which separates them from other animals and approximates them to mankind, is...sexual prostitution. Females, or weaker males, often present to stronger males, allowing themselves to be used sexually in order to avoid an attack, to get a portion of food, or to win an ally in battle, that is, to form the foundations of a friendship. By such employment of the sexual impulse for non-sexual aims, the ape is distinguished from lower mammals." Once again we have the germ of a sublimation: humanity is beginning to appear on the evolutionary stage.

Thus, says Roheim, "every member of the social group, whether old or young, is a sexual object to every other member."

One form of sex expression is found in the picking of the fur of/

of a younger member of the horde by an erotically inclined female. The sexual object gains by being able to eat its food undisturbed. "When we say," adds Roheim, "that this behaviour exhibits the beginning of the overflow of libido into the ego sphere, we are only translating Zuckermann's observations into psychoanalytical terms."

Roheim again repeats his ideas as to the specifically human. "A man," he says, "is a whimsical animal, a peculiar being who does certain things, and avoids others, not only from motives of pleasure, or self-preservation, but because they seem to him to be 'right' or 'wrong'. In short, a man is an ape with a character, or with a superego which amounts to much the same."

Roheim then proceeds to suggest how the superego was formed in the circumstances which he has just described. It would seem that the "children" of the primal horde were constantly being stimulated sexually by their association with their seniors. The pent-up feeling thereby aroused proceeds to erect a superego, presumably on account of the quality of the libido in changing itself into anxiety, a doctrine at one time held by Freud but repudiated in later works. "The superego", Roheim states, "is formed analogously: objects which give (pleasure) do not permit, and are therefore taken into/"
into the ego with this double quality."

It seems that among baboons which, according to Roheim, have the characteristics of our distant animal forebears, the conditions determining traumata are present in abundant measure. The young are in danger of being attacked by the overlord, and also there is a "risk of being smothered by the mother in her excitement". The grown-ups, it would seem, are "alternately fighting and copulating, indeed there is no shortage of libidinal dangers in the form of seductions and primal scenes." The older males have pseudo-relations with quite young females, and the mothers are prone to practise the arts of seduction upon their young sons. The sons display considerable anxiety when the mother is subject to the attentions of a male. "We may assume, therefore," says Roheim, "that at this stage of development the beginnings of repression are already present, and the phenomena described by Freud really took place among adult pre-men."

Roheim's contribution is in showing how the early processes of humanization were due to influences to which the child was unintentionally subjected. "The infantile period of these pre-men", says Roheim, "is characterised by marked libidinal stimulation from the older generation, combined with great danger to the ego. Hence arises anxiety, and with anxiety repression/

repression. Whatever is repressed is likely to return; and the repressed memory of the real battles witnessed in infancy reappears in the sham fights. When these sham fights have gradually taken the place of the real ones, when reality has become such a disillusion to the ape that he is satisfied with appearance, then the misfortune has already occurred; he has become a man. Humanity has emerged, as a human being emerges to-day, by the growth of defence mechanisms against the infantile situation, by the development of the unconscious.'"

We cannot help feeling that there is a certain element of non-sequitor in the position taken up by this representative of the neo-evolutionary school, but it is at least interesting to have an open statement of the absurdities which lie at the root of Freudian doctrine. As we have suggested in referring to the Australians, any species which accepted illusion for reality would not long continue to propagate its kind.

Roheim, however, continues: "Our solution is not yet free from all difficulties and contradictions", - and in this one feels that he by no means overstates the position. He foresees that even his modified account of the beginnings of humanity will meet with a certain opposition. But he forestalls criticism by putting it down to "senseless opposition" due, presumably, to resistances on the part of the psychoanalytically unenlightened.

Roheim/


Roheim proceeds to trace human development to those specific factors discoverable in Zuckermann's baboons. First, the activity of flea-catching provides a basis for societal organisation in general. There is in flea-catching an erotic element, the skin being an erotogenous zone; the stimulating of this zone, in lower animals merely leading to the sexual act, in the sub-human formed the basis of friendship, and thereby the libido became side-tracked, spreading over into social relations as these were developed. But as we have seen, our sub-human ancestors had suffered traumas, and their libido was partly bound up with memories which had been repressed on account of their extreme unpleasantness. This fact, however, ultimately proves to be of tremendous value, because the individual, by repeating the repressed memory in symbolic form, invents the drama and other forms of poetic expression. His interest "in the past", by the mechanism of substitution, leads him to value tradition: he is really obsessed by the scene or scenes which occurred in his infancy. He wants to get back to the original memory, but, acting blindly, he places value on memories of the past embedded in his social tradition. In addition, he has a tendency "to re-live the past in the persons of his children", so presumably he causes the original trauma to be repeated, this leading to similar fixations in the new generation.

Aim/

Aim-inhibition in general has the function of leading to the "capacity to retain affects at a constant tension", new possibilities being offered for the spreading over of the libidinous energy into associated territories. The new capacity for "friendship" was responsible for the development of the horde into the tribe, and the tribe into national and even international units.

Religion also results indirectly from the primal trauma. The aggressive impulses, it would seem, are deflected, these originally having been directed against the father, and now they appear in consciousness in the form of a "jealous god who sees to it that we are not happy." This intolerance towards the young has been responsible for the evolution of society in its higher forms. There has been an increasing degree of prohibition of sexual expression, cultural progress being accompanied by the substitution of fore-pleasure for end-pleasure as the object of parental censure. "The higher the society, the earlier the education; that is, the more serious the attitude of adults towards infantile sexuality, and the greater the tendency to repress it."

Roheim here tells us that the Australian aborigines allow almost complete freedom during the period of childhood and youth. Repressions are therefore relatively slight, and it is only when the stage of the puberty rites is reached that such taboos as govern/

govern adult life are made to appear "sacred". He goes on to say that the reason why primitive children are free is because the adults "are not 'nervous' and therefore undisturbed by noise."

Roheim then gives us a concise statement of his theory of social development once the superego is set up, as a result of the primal trauma. "Jealous adults and the superegos which are their shadows, first prohibit end-pleasure, and then the pre-genital forms of pleasure. When masturbation and excretory functions have become 'not nice' we have reached a high stage of culture. Such things are said to be incompatible with higher civilisation; but if we are right, we must reverse this formula, and say that culture has arisen from the substitutes resulting from the progressive repression, first of genital, then of pre-genital, impulses."

Repression following on prohibition, this due to the jealousy of the adults, has been a function of cultural process, and had it not been for repression, civilisation would not have come into existence. We have the implication that those cosmic forces responsible for evolution have made use of a human tendency which contemporary society does not regard as particularly creditable, in order that progress might be effected. There is a definite educational corollary. If we are to follow the tried ways of nature in bringing into existence a Utopian society/

society, which may now be the object of conscious desire, we must see to it that parental jealousy is not only kept at its present level, but steps must be taken to ensure that it is progressively increased. Doubtless this would be possible if our contemporary engines of propaganda were intelligently directed to forward the evolutionary purpose.

But Roheim does not hesitate to state that progress has been made by human morality becoming increasingly infantile. The primitive is far more adult than we are. The obvious solution would seem to be to discover a means whereby culture may be made compatible with full adult development. Roheim has frankly accused us of being infantile, and just when we are on the point of looking around to find a way of remedying our defect, Roheim, with that extraordinary perverseness which characterises almost all Freudians, proceeds to inform us that it is quite useless to attempt the modification of our psychological make-up. It turns out that, after all, parental jealousy had little to do with our becoming infantile. It has had the same part to play in human development or maldevelopment as consciousness had to epiphenomenalists. The significant factors are purely biological.

In substantiating his theory, Roheim quotes from "Das Problem der Menschwerdung" published by L. Bolk in 1926. The burden of Bolk's thesis appears to be that human development, physiologically/
physiologically considered, has proceeded on the principle of retardation. "Structural properties or relations that are only temporary in the foetus of other primates have become stabilised in the human species." Bolk tells us that the "human structure has been formed by two factors: functional adaptation of the consequential characters, and conservation of the primary characters. What was a passing stage in our ancestors has become an end in ourselves." He concludes that the cause must be physiological, and considers that retardation is due to additional secretions of the hormonal products of the endocrine system. Hairlessness and loss of pigment in human beings are due to retardation. But, "pithecoïd characters are latent in us, awaiting only the disappearance of the inhibiting force." Reduce the amount of hormonal inhibition, and the human being, man or child, will presumably be quickly covered with a thick fur. If this occurred, the human being would, we take it, at least have the opportunity of making a fresh start in his cultural development, in accordance with Roheim's theory as to the origin of society.

Bolk goes on to show how, in the physiological sphere, that which corresponds to the Freudian latency period is determined by a process of retardation dependent on endocrine secretions.

In/

'L. Bolk, "Das Problem der Menschwerdung" p.7. 'Ibid., p.8-9. 'Ibid., p.15.
In Chapter V. of "The Riddle of the Sphinx", Roheim applies this conception to psychological development. While he does not definitely equate the psychological with the physiological, he argues that those psychological conditions which lead to inhibition "must be conceived as differentiated forms of the retardation process." And later we read: "The conservative (regressive) or retarding process causes an ever increasing 'infantilisation' of man, an ever stronger accentuation of what is specifically human. This process continually reduces the possibility of autoplastic consequential adaptations, and thus makes it more difficult for the ever more helpless individual to adapt himself to his environment. Thus we have two movements, one regressive from the ontogenetic point of view; the other the consequential adaptation, an offshoot of the former, but progressive from the point of view of the surrounding world."

Perhaps we are not fully justified in suggesting that Roheim sees a complete correlation between physiological and psychological retardation, but this viewpoint would seem to be implicit. At the end of his book we find Roheim saying: "But when we regard the process of cultural development as a special case of the evolutionary principle of retardation, we cannot imagine that we can do anything to oppose it. Things are/

are as they are. The primacy of the intellect which has
developed in the course of a long deviation from the primacy
of the sexual impulse, has nothing left but to adopt a rather
more friendly attitude towards its original ancestor, and to
free the process of retardation as much as possible from
anxiety and deprivation." He concludes his paragraph with the
rather contradictory statement that "culture should be made for
man, not man for culture."

Thus Roheim solves the Riddle of the Sphinx. Humanity is
in the grip of a relentless fate from which it can never be
freed.

We would now briefly discuss Roheim's view of the relation
of psychoanalysis to cultural development. He has attempted
to prove that repression is the cause of human progress, and he
rightly foresees that he will be called upon to defend the
position of psychoanalysts who ostensibly seek to remove
repressions, thereby, according to Roheim's beliefs, endangering
both culture and civilisation. He says: "Another question to
be discussed concerns the relation between analysis and culture.
Our opponents are apt to complain that analysis is hostile to
culture. We should not, I believe, protest too violently
against this complaint.... But in general we have no cause to
deny the hostility of analysis to culture. Culture involves
neurosis/

neurosis, which we try to cure. Culture involves superego, which we seek to weaken. Culture involves the retention of the infantile situation, from which we endeavour to free our patients. Our point of view is pessimistic, our formula the reverse of M. Coue's. Every day we (humanity) are worse and worse. Culture does not involve happiness; people are happier in the Trobriand Islands or Central Australia than in the Middle Ages. Therefore psychoanalysis can cry its delenda est tua Carthago, against the excessive tension in civilisation. But we need have no fear. The pleasure in the discomfort of civilisation, and in the holding of fore-pleasure tension at a constant level, is so great that we can never win this battle. Hence our courage. For otherwise, we should be really more, or less, than human."

We believe that in the foregoing the psychoanalytical school have reached the high-water mark of their many absurdities. Roheim, it would seem, finds courage in applying his remedies to the ills of mankind because he is convinced that they will be ineffective. The psychoanalyst, in the above passage, is, in accordance with his own belief, delivering his oration to the inmates of a home for incurables. Why, then, upbraid the sufferer on account of his taking pleasure in his discomforts? Psychoanalysts in certain moods are of a truth less than human.

To/

To this impasse does the psychoanalytical position lead. We can only add that it is inconceivable that such statements as the above could be made if the brain of the expositor were not, metaphorically speaking, under the influence of some narcotic drug. Otherwise, the writer would look about in order to discover the point in the argument at which false premises had been adopted.

It only remains in this section to follow Roheim in his description of the Australians with whom he lived for some time. He states that the views expressed in his book are the result of this residence. We suggest that this statement cannot possibly be true. Roheim tells us that he found the primitive peoples with whom he dwelt lived much happier lives than ourselves, in spite of the unfavourable external circumstances. He states that the savage is much nearer to the ideal genital stage than the member of a civilised community, and is freer from disturbances of potency.

He says: "Among the savage and half-savage people whom I know, masculine psycho-sexual impotence does not occur, female frigidity and perversions are relatively rare, and pseudo-masochistic perversions (in which the superego plays the leading role) are unknown except for a few doubtful symptoms." He then makes the following striking statement: "No savage occupies himself as much with primitive religion as the anthropologist." He/

He denies the belief that savage tribes exterminate one another because of castration anxiety, and adds that they virtually live in a classless society; "everyone does what he wants to, the chief's position is mainly ceremonial; he has little dignity, and no power." He considers that "castration anxiety is common to all men", but the savage unburdens himself of this anxiety "by projecting his superego, which is markedly archaic, (sadistic and only slightly desexualised) but not deeply introjected."

Whatever neurosis there is among primitive peoples is simply dealt with by means of projecting the anxiety into "fictive surroundings, after undergoing a psychical elaboration." But these fictive surroundings are institutionalised and the individual never experiences the sense of separation on account of those psychological disturbances determined from within.

Savages are not intimidated. They have no theory of punishment as being for the child's own good. Roheim gives an instance of a missionary who was in danger of his life because he "once thrashed a boy who refused to go to school." Contrary to expectations, savages are not conservative, or at least, less so than ourselves. He tells us of an Australian native who asked for the loan of a pocket knife to perform the rite of circumcision. In Papua, stone tools have given place to iron axes, and Roheim states that the inhabitants of this last-mentioned country readily adopted the growing of potatoes, tobacco/

tobacco smoking spread rapidly, and, by way of anticlimax, "Christianity has no active opponents; it is accepted because it is the white man's religion."

Roheim says, however, that the savage is conservative in the sense that he "is contented with things as they are" and "does not always think of change." The true savage is not intolerant and does not mind what others believe. "If they don't believe in devils, it is their own fault if the devils catch them." He finds embodied in the natives of Australia and Papua the principles of the French Revolution: democracy is a realised achievement.

Turning to an earlier chapter, we discover what we believe to be the most significant statement made in "The Riddle of the Sphinx": "A state of equilibrium, and indeed a projected state of equilibrium, is the characteristic of Central Australian culture. So long as the tjurungas remain in their holes, so long as the father's penis remains in the mother, everything is in order, and the children of the desert can wander carefree among the beloved sand-dunes of their home." Occasionally, however, Roheim tells us, this state of equilibrium is disturbed, and the aborigine forthwith goes through certain rites which have the effect of bringing the mind back to normal. "The tjurungas can be put back in the holes."

Roheim has given us a delightful picture of primitive life, a/

a condition of things which, according to anthropologists, remained as the common lot of men until civilisation sprang up as it were overnight along the banks of the Nile. According to Roheim's showing, the primitive is almost free from repression. Those conditions which bring into being a relatively autonomous superego system do not exist. There is little fear of the father, no shame, apparently a complete absence of disgust, and no danger of loss of love on account of infantile "naughtiness". From everything Roheim tells us, the dread biological principle of psychological retardation has scarcely affected the aborigines; physiologically it would appear to be at work since, as far as we are told, Australian girls of five or six years of age do not become mothers.

If there were the slightest grounds for Roheim's fatalistic viewpoint that psychological development is anchored in biological process, we should surely have to postulate a period far greater than that which elapsed between the end of the food-gathering stage and the development of civilisation in order to account for the retardation principle being engrained in the contemporary mind of civilised communities. Is it not obvious also that the child of three or four has many of the desirable qualities of the Australians and Papuans? Who dare assert that it is necessary to subject his mental powers to that twisting and contorting process which is bound up with traditional methods of/
of child rearing in civilised communities? If the aborigine succeeds in developing normally with a very small amount of superego intrusion, is there not reason to think that our own children can be guided to an equally effective orientation towards their environment, especially when we remember that, according to Roheim, the methods of Australian mothers in respect of bringing up their boys are by no means above criticism.

Finally, if evolutionary process has a predilection for applying the principle of retardation in the psychological realm, in order to effect its ends, why did it withhold its hand for a million or more years? If anthropologists are right, mankind lived through at least a thousand millenniums without the repressive processes being brought into operation, during which period there are indisputable signs of progress in brain structure and objective achievement, this culminating, as we are told, in the amazing productions of the Upper Paleolithic era.

Is it reasonable to think that repression is other than a mere incidental accompaniment of the latest and indeed the shortest phase in our racial history? We suggest that the probabilities, regarding the matter anthropologically, are totally against the view that repression has had any considerable part to play in human development.

In/

'Cf. Frederick Tilney, "The Master of Destiny", (1930) Ch.XI. Also, Sir Arthur Keith, "The Antiquity of Man".
In our next section we shall attempt to show that the whole foundations of civilisation were brought into being without any considerable modification of that psychological equipment which Roheim tells us is characteristic of primitive man.
Development of the Position ..
that the Repressed Unconscious
had little influence prior to
the setting up of the Kingship.
In our previous section we treated of the views of Otto Rank, noting that he accounts for human evolution in terms of his "trauma of birth". During our discussion, we made incidental criticisms. We would only add here that, in our opinion, a statement of Rank's position is sufficient to convince the non-psychoanalytical reader that the entire conception of cultural process as determined by the birth trauma is in the highest degree improbable. His treatment of symbolism, however, is not without value, but as we sought to show, in discussing Rank's contribution, symbolism is not necessarily bound up with repression.

In our attempt to describe the views expressed in "The Riddle of the Sphinx", we followed a Freudian statement of the part played by repression in cultural development. To Roheim, culture and civilisation are the resultant of processes springing up from the repressed unconscious, and progress has been due to the taboos of society spreading in the sexual field from end activity to fore activity.

We noted that, according to Roheim's statements, primitive man is almost free from repressed complexes, and those he has have little influence over his conduct. We suggested that if repression had had a large part to play in human development, it was surprising that contemporary Australians were almost free from its influence. If it is true, as anthropologists assert, that/
that the entire human race was, some ten million years ago, at the stage of development exemplified by present-day Australians, Roheim's theory must be shown to be principally applicable to that period in which the foundations of civilisation were laid.

We shall now attempt to show that all that is essential in modern culture came into existence without the extension in the human mind of the repressed unconscious. Later, an effort will be made to demonstrate that repressions as we know them were first set up during the period of the earlier Egyptian Dynasties; but we shall seek to show that even after what Freudians describe as the "superego system" was developed in the mind of civilised man, much of his conduct can only be explained in terms of the "Id" coming into direct contact with the environment.

It had been our intention to describe culture as it arose some fifty thousand years ago; but on account of limitations of space, we must be content with making a very brief reference to this period of pre-history.

Two races of men roamed over Europe at this time, the Cromagnons, and the Solutreans. Of the Cromagnons, we read: "The impressive feature about Cromagnon art, especially in the Aurignacian period, is the absence of that period of infantilism and crudity almost always observed in the artistic development of primitive races. The Cromagnon first reveals his artistic effort/"

effort in a state of sturdy youth. His art passed directly into a relatively mature stage. Its treasures, preserved in the art galleries of the ancient caves, comprising remarkable drawings, sculptures, and paintings, fully warrant the title of 'Palaeolithic Greeks' conferred upon the Cromagnon. Indeed they resemble the Greek and Egyptian artists in many ways.'

And further we read: "Their remarkable artistic contributions denote far more than the executive mastery of art. They signalise that new spirit which had been breathed into mankind, that devotion to the beautiful in life which created an abiding enthusiasm in all of our race for its highest ideals and loftiest purposes." "It was, however, in the carving of animal forms that Cromagnon art attained its real heights. Many living and extinct species of birds, mammals, and fish, have thus been immortalised. Back of all this artistic creation, there must have been a social organisation of high order, for only rich human experience could provide the soil for such vivid and real beauty in art."

These people belonged to a hunting community. There appears no likelihood that their psychological organisation was different from that of other food-gatherers. Dobson considers that they would be similar to the present-day South African Bushmen, Australian aborigines, or the Esquimaux. If/

If this were the case, they would be essentially unrepressed.

What we have said above is of special interest in view of the fact that archaeologists are now of opinion that there is a close affinity between the artifacts of the early Egyptians and those of the Solutreans. It is indeed suggested that they came from the same stock. Sir Flinders Petrie, in his "Ancient East," supports this view.

We now turn to an account of the development of the early Egyptians. Professor Gordon Childe, in his book entitled "The Most Ancient East", provides evidence that a high cultural level had been attained before the "civilised mind" came into being. If he is right in his belief that the foundations of civilisation were already laid in the days of pre-Dynastic Egypt, we may infer that during the most vital period of human advance the mind was dominated by sentiments, not by repressed complexes.

Professor Childe points out that before 1924 little was known of the earlier stages of development in ancient Egypt. But he considers that we are now in a position to give an account of the lives of the earlier Egyptians. In general, he informs us, almost everything which is essential to civilisation was developed before the time of the pharaohs. In some ways, artistic skill never again reached the high level which is discoverable in the pottery of the Badarian period.

While it is probably true that the population of Egypt increased/

'Gordon Childe, "The Most Ancient East" p.13.'
increased tremendously when the vast irrigation works of the pharaohs were put into operation, Egypt appears to have supported a fairly dense population at an earlier stage. Professor Childe accepts the position of the Diffusionists that civilisation first arose on the banks of the Nile, owing to the peculiarly favourable natural conditions. It appears that the climatic conditions of the Nile area have altered considerably in recent millennia. The river was at one time surrounded by grass lands on which there roamed a small population of people at the food gathering stage. The Nile itself was bordered by marshes which were uninhabitable. Periods of drought followed, and the hunters began to come down the cliffs which fringed the Nile valley, and dwelt on the edge of the marshes.

These early settlers had considerable artistic ability, and engraved pictures of animals on the rocks. Amongst these settlers were the Badarians, who "were a short and extremely slender race with small narrow skulls. Thus they closely resemble the later Pre-Dynastic Egyptians...."

Professor Childe goes on to tell us that these Badarians "lived in regular villages, cultivating barley and emmer, and probably raised domestic animals, though of course they also hunted and fished." They made garments of linen, were expert at polishing hard stone, knew the art of weaving, and among other accomplishments were basket-makers, potters, and carvers of/
of wood, bone, and ivory. They made use of copper, and had discovered the process of glazing stone beads. They had developed trade relations with both the Red Sea and the Sinai Peninsula, from the former obtaining marine shells, and from the latter malachite for eye-paint. They had a belief in a future life, as shown in funerary ritual. Professor Childe tells us that "the pottery vessels, especially those designed for funerary use, illustrate a perfection of ceramic technique never excelled in the Nile valley." They had "ivory combs ornamented with carved birds...and pins of the same material, sometimes with grooved heads, and an eyelet in the neck perhaps fastened the clothing...Ostrich feathers were apparently used as fans." They made female figurines modelled of clay, these being placed in the graves presumably as substitutes for a man's wife. Such figurines were undraped, and do not suggest that these early peoples had any feelings about nudity.

Later there appears to have been an infiltration of other peoples, probably as a result of the increasing dryness of the surrounding country. Professor Childe describes the population resulting from this fusion of the early pre-Dynastic Egyptians. They lived, he suggests, in autonomous villages. "Of kingship or chieftainship there is no sign; in the early cemeteries no grave is sufficiently distinguished in richness from the rest/

rest to be assigned to any personage deserving such a title."

This people would appear to have had the democratic organisation found in primitive communities.

The Badarian culture persisted, and the trade routes extended as far as Syria, but there were additional developments, copper being used for tools, and gold imported from Nubia, and even coniferous woods from Syria. A very serviceable boat had also been developed. Professor Childe tells us that Petrie believes that the sail must also have been invented at this time.

Despite this high level of culture, the men went about naked save for the Libyan sheath, which we may take it was worn for purposes of protection from magic rather than from a sense of "decency". The women, it seems, wore linen aprons.

Professor Childe describes a second pre-Dynastic civilisation which, although it appears to have been considerably influenced by an infusion of warlike peoples, preserves in essentials the cultural level attained during earlier periods. Villages increased in size, and small towns began to come into existence. Trade further developed, and lead, silver, amethyst and turquoise, were imported. At this stage only does there begin to appear any acute differentiation between one person and another. This is shown by graves of a more elaborate order.

Enough/


'Note: Speaking of a grave belonging to the later period, Professor Childe says: "No private clansman rested in that sumptuous sepulchre; out of the equalitarian squalor, chieftainship had arisen, preparing the way for the/
Enough has been said to suggest that the human mind laid the basis of civilisation during the period in which tribal organisation was essentially primitive. People lived in small, autonomous, democratic communities. They lived at peace with surrounding tribes, and the Nile must have been as safe as the highways of Europe under the Pax Romana. There is abundant evidence that these people were matriarchal in their stage of social organisation, and we are probably safe in inferring that conditions of life were very similar to those of Malinowski's Trobriand Islanders.

We would now very briefly refer to the development of civilisation in Crete, following Stanley Casson's "Progress and Catastrophe". Although it is probably true that the Cretans owed their knowledge of agriculture to an infusion of a foreign element, it may be said that the culture which developed was in the main indigenous. The fusion appears to have been peaceful, there being no sharp break with the more primitive traditions. Changes took place gradually, but in a few centuries small townships developed. Some individuals amassed more wealth than others, but for long periods the communities were organised on democratic lines.

Casson says: "At Gournia, one of the best preserved of the Minoan/

the unification of the land under a king." (p.94). We do not know, however, why Professor Childe should consider that the early Egyptians lived in a state of "squalor". From his own account, these people seem to have done much in the way of perfecting the art of living in a community, and also they would seem to have attained a high capacity for aesthetic expression.
Minoan sites, the earliest phases of the town which could have held, perhaps, two thousand inhabitants, indicate that all alike lived in houses of the same type and size."

When, at a later stage in this town, a family seems to have attained greater wealth than its neighbours, a large and finely built house appears. But Casson suggests that there could have been no segregation, the family in question living in "the heart of the town, surrounded by the ordinary people."

Later, something in the nature of a kingship appears to have developed in Crete. "But the kingship never seems, as far as we can tell, to have acquired the wealth and predominance of the kingship in Sumer, nor yet the sanctity and rigid control belonging to the kingship in Egypt."

There were no temples, and "the few shrines there are are small, unostentatious, and designed clearly as buildings destined for ceremonies which had to do not so much with the people as a whole as with the activities of the king."

Though the kingship appeared to have a certain religious significance, the king was never inaccessible, his people having direct contact with him. The Cretans seem to have been little concerned with the after life, concentrating their attention on the simple business of living.

Speaking of their outlook as revealed in their art, Casson says/

'Stanley Casson, "Progress and Catastrophe" p.156.
says: "It is a most delicate and refined outlook, and the artists exercised their craft with restraint and discrimination. Minoan art is the first art to be free of any non-artistic control in the history of the world. The artist for the most part chose exactly what he wanted without regard to the orders and conventions of religion or the demands of a monarch."

We cannot here pursue the matter further. The point we wish to suggest is that from the evidence to which we have here made but a bare reference, it would appear certain that the minds of the Cretans were free from repression. Prior to the coming of the knowledge of agriculture, the Minoans must have lived the life of ordinary food-gatherers, and would seem to have been at the matriarchal stage of organisation. There would be no strong Oedipus complex, no sharp conflicts, in the minds of the children; the progress towards civilisation was gradual, not catastrophic; and at the time when the foundations of the new way of life were securely laid, the people were entirely democratic in their organisation. Their minds were relatively uninfluenced by religion. Many think that the civilisation of Crete reached a high-water mark in human development.

Note: The Cretans also developed many notable innovations of a practical nature. "The Cretans were the first people who had a complex system of roads for traffic...They laid a bottom of stones which was covered with concrete and earth. Bridges of stone were erected over small streams...The Minoans also introduced a wonderful drainage system, and they laid pipes to carry water supplies from a distance." Donald A. Mackenzie, "Footprints of Early Man" p.123.
What is the relation of repression to cultural development? Is repression indispensable as a means to such development? We suggest that our extended knowledge of the beginnings of civilisation supplies the final answer.
Enunciation of Theory of how Repression came into being in Dynastic Egypt
In our last section we sought to demonstrate that a high level of culture had been attained prior to the unification of Egypt under the pharaohs. We also made brief reference to the rise of civilisation in Crete. It was held that in neither case could repression have been the cause of cultural advance.

It now remains to demonstrate that the Freudian thesis that repression is the principal determinant of cultural advance is untenable even when we are dealing with the later stages of the development of civilisation.

How did repression as we know it in civilised societies come into existence?

The most striking fact revealed by a study of Dynastic Egypt is that, though the existence of repressions is clearly indicated, these repressions had little or nothing to do with the sex instinct. No indication can be found that the Egyptians throughout their long history, ever regarded sex as intrinsically evil. In his "Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt", J. H. Breasted says: "The requirements of the great judge in the hereafter were not incompatible with the grossest sensuality. Not only was sensual pleasure permitted in the hereafter, as depicted by the Pyramid Texts, but positive provision was made for supplying it. The king is assured of sensual gratification/
gratification in the grossest terms...."

An ascetic trend did, in fact, appear late in the history of Dynastic Egypt - some six centuries before the beginning of our era - but it seemed to have little influence on the vast majority of the people.

It would therefore seem impossible to hold that cultural development in Egypt had as its determinant repressed libido. Despite this fact, it seems evident that repression in a very real sense had come into existence in the minds of individuals belonging to those highly organised civilised communities which arose in Egypt, Sumer, Babylonia and Assyria, as the result of a form of societal organisation developed by the early pharaohs.

According to Elliot Smith, "civilisation was not simply a jumble of new arts and crafts. It was an amazingly complex organisation which gave man an entirely new outlook on the world and his activities in it....It was responsible for the origin of the kingship, and for conferring upon the king the reputation of being not merely the distributor of the waters of irrigation, but also the actual Giver of Life....He was regarded as the source/"

'J.H. Breasted, "The Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt" p.177.


Note: The theory of culture as being diffused from a common centre would appear to be well established. Cf. W.J. Perry, "The Growth of Civilisation, Chapter III. Elliot Smith, "Human History" Chapter VII. H.J. Massingham, "The Golden Age" Chapter VI.
source of the life of the whole population, and the creator of the state. In a much more absolute sense than was involved in the famous boast of the king of France, the earliest king in the history of the world was regarded as 'The State'.

Mankind became involved in an ideology. He developed a world view, and if we would understand repression as it arose in civilised communities, we must discover the relationship between a more or less consciously accepted philosophical conception and those psychic exclusions which are described as the "repressed unconscious". Albert Schweitzer, in his preface to "Civilisation and Ethics", speaks of the "strange and inexorable connections which exist between civilisation and our view of the world as a whole." The Egyptians, and resultingy all other civilised communities, we suggest, developed a world view, and it was this that reacted on the human mind in such a way as to set up the "repressed unconscious".

Repression was in the first place the result of the acceptance of an idea of existence which did not correspond with the objectively real. It would appear to be in no real sense biologically conditioned, being consequent on the development in man of higher conceptual process. We are in agreement with Bertrand Russell when he says: "I believe that all solid progress in the world consists of an increase in rationality, both practical and theoretical." But, we suggest, it was that very capacity for/

1 G. Elliot Smith, "Human History" p.267.
2 Albert Schweitzer, "Civilisation and Ethics" p.vi.
3 Bertrand Russell, "Sceptical Essays" p.53.
for conceptual process which led to the formation of the repressed unconscious. The early Egyptians of the Dynastic Era became entrammelled in a false logic, and that irrational intrusion into the human mind which we call the "repressed unconscious" was an indirect result.

Briffault describes in general terms the effects of the acceptance by the Egyptians of the doctrine that their welfare was bound up with that of the kingship. "But as soon as primitive equality is broken up," he says, "and differentiation of power takes place, there comes about a corresponding differentiation of interests. The interests of the power holders are no longer identical with those of the herd, and accordingly a corresponding divergence arises in the motivation, in the object and function of thought....Not to harmonise and correspond with facts as they are is now the object of thought, but to harmonise and correspond with the order of ideas on which power and authority rest. That fundamental order of ideas becomes the necessary postulate of all thought. Henceforth, the criterion of every mental process is not its intrinsic validity but its relation to that idea, to that situation of power and authority. That is the sole touchstone by which every judgment, every value, every thought is tested. All that tends to undermine it is false, bad; all that tends to consolidate and confirm it is true, good/
good. The motive, the criterion of thought is changed in its foundation, its function is diverted and transformed. Its aim and purpose is now not to fulfil its original cognitive function, but to frustrate it. Thought suffers from a functional disease. It is no longer rational thought, it is power-thought....That tragic infirmity is no congenital disease of the mind, no constitutional weakness; it is an artifact, a manufactured product of the human order, of human society, like its institutions, armies, thrones and temples. It is like those a product arising out of the crystallization of power and interest around dominant sections of the social organism."

Briffault's explanation as to how irrationality found its way into the civilised mind requires to be supplemented by the viewpoint enunciated by Elliot Smith to which we have made reference.

Let us briefly describe the process whereby, in our view, the repressed unconscious was formed.

We have shown in our previous section that the inhabitants of Egypt during pre-Dynastic times were essentially democratic in their organisation, and man had not learnt to regard others merely as a means to his own ends. When the great Dynasties were set up, a change came over the whole societal organisation, and gradually the civilised mind came into existence.

'It/

It would appear that one of the tribes of native Egyptians succeeded, under the leadership of their chief, in subjugating great tracts of territory along the banks of the Nile, by military force, and thereupon proceeded to carry out measures for improving the irrigation of the land. Great canals were constructed, and the various communities which now formed part of the united Egypt benefited considerably in that they had no longer to rely on the rising of the flood waters of the Nile. They thus had greater security and in addition the area utilised for food production could be enormously extended. They soon realised the advantages of forming a part of a larger community, and they were ready to pay tribute to the ruler in respect of benefits received.

The people came to feel their dependence on their royal house, the Children of the Sun, and they were not without anxiety lest the beneficent rule of the reigning house should cease, and the canals no longer convey the water on which now their very lives depended. The population had increased to the limits of subsistence. They felt towards their rulers a loyalty based on self-interest, but it is not to be supposed that these primitive folk were without a sense of gratitude, if we are to judge by the character of contemporary primitive peoples.

The king would rarely be seen by his subjects, the area of
his control, on account of geographical conditions, being spread over seven hundred and fifty miles along the banks of the Nile. To the children at least, the figure of the king would appear as more than human, an unseen benefactor towards whom sentiments of loyalty and gratitude were present in the minds of their elders. And thus if, owing to understandable motives, the king were inclined to regard himself as immortal, it would not be difficult to persuade the uprising generation that the royal claims had a factual basis, and that death, the inevitable fate of all other human beings, was not the lot of their benefactor. Indeed, there was a definite advantage if, after his passing, he could continue his influence from beyond. The belief in the immortality of their rulers would naturally develop along the ordinary lines of sentiment formation, and the idea of an ever present deity watching over the interests of his people would find root in the minds and hearts of the populace.

If things had remained at this stage, mankind would presumably have enjoyed the benefits of civilisation without its regrettable concomitants. To date, there was no repression. Alongside a belief in the advantages of the acceptance of the sovereignty of the pharaoh, there was a fanciful psychic construction which had no basis in fact. It is very doubtful if the individual of that time took very seriously the doctrine of the divinity of the kingship. What subsequently/
subsequently transpired was, we suggest, due to the evils arising from what Briffault describes as "power-thought".

Those who originated Egyptian civilisation were, we may take it, people with a keen sense of the realities. It is not unlikely that their successors fell under the influence of what is popularly known as "swelled head". It may be that the native intelligence of their progenitors was not in every case inherited, and a stupid king would give rise to a foolish tradition. His work of governing the country would be delegated to officials, he himself preferring the easier task of philosophising on the glories of his state. The people over whom he ruled were far removed, and none but a man of strong imagination and active intelligence could realise that they were individuals with rights of their own. The perfect administrator must never lose sight of the fact that his administrative functions are not an end in themselves, but are essentially a means aiming at the welfare of human beings.

It would have been surprising if all Egyptian rulers had been able to live up to this ideal, and as time went on a division of interests would arise between the rulers and the governed. The people, in the eyes of the kings, tended to become mere means to the realisation of their private ends. This state of things is well exemplified in the large scale absurdity of the construction of the pyramids and the national resources/
resources expended on the search after life-giving substances, which were to be used as a means to ensure the immortality of the kings.

The officials soon discovered that their main function was to extract wealth from the Egyptian populace, and as this inevitably affected the standard of living, resentment would be felt by the exploited classes. Irritability would be introduced into the social system; officials, under the influence of the higher powers, would be egged on to use any means to maintain or increase the income of the reigning house. The quality of ambivalence would be brought into existence; the people felt that they had an essential stake in the wellbeing of their kings; if they lost their authority, there was no guarantee that the water supply through the irrigation canals would continue. Feelings of reverence and gratitude towards their rulers were deeply engrained. But now there was reason to feel that injustice had crept into the system. However much the priests, the servants of the departed kings, might insist that it was necessary for the good of the State, that the means of ensuring immortality for the royal line should be forthcoming, it is almost certain that the common people had not lost the power of rational thought, but were fully capable of realising that/

'G. Elliot Smith, "Human History" Chapter IX.
that there was no justification for the expenditure of such gigantic sums on "religion"; feelings of hatred would develop towards their rulers, to the priestly class who supported their pretensions, and most of all to the officials to whom the collection of taxes was entrusted.

The dilemma was both real and serious. If the people were disloyal to their rulers, and the structure of the state undermined, nothing but calamity could ensue. But the callousness which had entered the system could not but stir up deep feelings of resentment. "The life of the peasant," says Shorter, "was a hard one, unless the officials placed over him had a developed sense of humanity towards their humble inferiors. This, however, was probably not very frequent, it being more likely that the last ounce of work was demanded from the labourers." Any individual who was driven to resist the oppressors, would be regarded by the officials as a criminal, and they would adopt such punitive measures as seemed necessary to maintain the integrity of the state. The individual who sustained the punishment would have near relatives, and in most cases children, who could not fail to be impressed with the dire results of disobedience. Mothers whose husbands had felt the heavy hand of the law would feel that it was necessary, in their children's own interests, to teach them to eschew evil. They would indeed come/

come to realise that the root cause of their husbands' downfall was impiety, the application of sceptical thought. Thinking, therefore, was evil, and submissiveness the only "safe" virtue.

It was a matter of vital policy to teach the young that complete acceptance of the will of the ruler, however unjust, was necessary, and indeed inevitable. The mother herself would, in the child's eyes, be endowed with the qualities of the stern merciless ruler, who was capable of callous cruelty towards his people, but at the same time must be loved and revered if life under existing conditions were to remain. Rebelliousness would be put down in the children with a stern hand, and this in their own interests. They must be conditioned to accept evil as good, and good as evil.

Referring to school life in ancient Egypt, Shorter says: "The discipline...must have been painfully strict, judging by the references made to it in the improving compositions which the schoolboys had to copy out. 'Write with thine hand, and read with thy mouth', says the master to his pupil. 'Be not slack, and spend not a day in idleness, or woe betide thy limbs!......Spend no day in idleness, or thou wilt be beaten. The ear of the boy is on his back, and he hearkeneth when he is beaten'........In another passage from the copybooks, the master describes to his pupils the grave things which happened to him when he was young, and apparently equally irresponsible. 'If thou/
thou lookest at me myself,' he says, 'when I was as young as thou, I passed my time with the handcuffs on me, and this it was that bound my limbs, when it stayed on me for three months and I was imprisoned in the temple, while my father and my mother were on the land and my brethren also.'

Thus was the paramount virtue of obedience diligently instilled into the youthful mind.

But unfortunately, the young child was himself a primitive, with the power of differentiating between justice and injustice, with an expectation of receiving kindness and love from his natural protectors. He had within him the capacity and urge for rational thought, yet in the interests of the child's subsequent happiness, his parents must treat him with a cruelty and brutality which would inevitably drive him into hatred of those who rightly felt that they were doing their best for him. He would realise his dependence on his parents, and the value of their continued goodwill. The lesson of the gibbet standing on the outskirts of the village could not but drive home to him the awfulness of rebellion. Shorter describes how the execution of condemned criminals was witnessed by their wives and children, 'who filled the air with piteous lamentations.'

A degree of mental conflict would develop in the mind of the child, which must be resolved if life were to be possible at all. Panic measures must be adopted. In any case, to his mind/

"Everyday Life in Ancient Egypt" p.88-89.

mind, neither sense nor reason entered into the system under which he was born, and an irrational solution of his difficulties would seem not only necessary but appropriate. Psychologically, he must enter the realm of crazydom; a wholesale acceptance of irrationality was the only sound adaptive premise. Repression was resorted to, and in our belief, by no means unwittingly.

The ruling house themselves would also require to "condition" their children to the acceptance of injustice as normal, and it would be necessary to crush out any inclination to tenderness towards the underlying masses.

Thus, we suggest, was repression set up in the civilised mind. First a philosophical belief in the divinity of the kingship was accepted. It was irrational, but it appeared harmless. As time went on, the rulers increasingly identified themselves with the absurd notion of their being more than human, and acting on this belief, they gradually set about to enslave the peoples whom they governed. It is probable that for a long time the inhabitants of Egypt were fully aware of the injustice which crept into their system of societal organisation as a result of their kings holding irrational conceptions, but as new generations grew up, what had previously been a pleasing and polite myth as to the superhuman qualities of the pharaohs was accepted as having a basis in reality.
The older generation were powerless to prevent the wholesale inculcation of irrationality into the minds of their children. It had now become evident that anyone who dared to dispute the claims of the kingship as being entitled to special privileges, was in danger of severe punishments.

It became, indeed, a duty to teach the children that it was "wrong" to disobey the behests of superiors. They must be trained to absolute obedience. It was dangerous to apply reason to the psychic conflicts which arose in the developing mind; the child must be taught to realise that death would be the inevitable result of disobedience to the commands of those placed above him. Terror became associated with any impulse which happened to be subject to the disapproval of those in command. As under similar circumstances to-day, the child would resort to the mechanism of identification by imagining that he was the law-giver. He would live, as it were, at all times in the presence of the one who held in his hands the power of life and death. What were regarded as non-social impulses would thus be effectively prevented from finding overt expression. What was adopted in childhood as a more or less temporary method of dealing with dangerous impulses, would prove to have a considerable value in adult life. The fiction would at least serve the purposes of the instinct of self-preservation. The person who had built up a "pharaoh-phantasy" would not be inclined to disobey/
disobey the orders of the authorities, and, indeed, his conduct would be considered praiseworthy by the officials who were placed over him.

If the foregoing description is in accordance with the facts, it would appear difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Egyptians as a people had become insane. The rulers were subject to delusions of grandeur, and the governed classes were controlled in their behaviour by a mere phantasy. The Freudians would probably be ready to accept the seemingly inevitable conclusion, but to make their theories work, they would require to which postulate quantities of unrelieved sex tension, as a result of the process of displacement, would give rise to sublimations. As far as we can see, however, the repressed psychic systems of the Egyptians contained no surplus libido. Sexuality was expressed openly.

But the Freudian would rightly argue that, in repression as we know it in contemporary society, sex is repressed and therefore the theory we have enunciated does not appear to hold in respect of the repressed unconscious of modern civilisation. The truth is, that once the repressing mechanisms are set up in the civilised mind, they may be used to render "unconscious" any impulse which the educators consider undesirable. The real source of sex repression in western civilisation is to be found in/
in the rise of Christianity, with its ascetic ideals. In the early centuries of the Christian era, these reached a height of fanaticism which, though never wholly accepted and certainly never practised by the general populace, nevertheless coloured the whole future trend of thought in regard to sex expression. Actual sex repression among the mass of the people is an essentially modern phenomenon, which appeared in the western world largely as a result of the Reformation, and the spread of Calvinistic teaching.

We stated above that our argument would seem to lead to the conclusion that early civilised people were virtually insane. But such a position cannot be accepted as in accordance with the evidence. The Egyptians were, from most standpoints, essentially rational in their outlook. Even their acceptance of a false world view was necessary, if civilisation was to continue. But what is more, they appear to have retained the capacity for happiness, reminding us in many ways of their primitive ancestors of pre-Dynastic days.

What, then, is the explanation? Our reply is that much of their natures had direct contact with the externally real. They were sane, largely because they accepted their sexuality, and in all classes life remained a fine art. They accepted joyously what/

what good things came to their hands, and were kindly and tolerant to others. Moreover, sexuality appeared to extend its influence in the creation of beautiful things. The Egyptians were free, not because they were free from repression but because sexuality was not included amongst those things which were repressed.

Are we, then, committed to a view that contemporary man is insane? In this we are definite: in so far as a present-day individual is entirely or almost entirely under the sway of a repressed unconscious which has placed a ban on sex, the condition of that individual is pathological, or bordering on the pathological. But the writer does not assert that the ordinary individual is to be considered as in any large degree under the sway of the superego system. The attempt to include sex among the banned impulses was fortunately coincident with a weakening of the theory of divine kingship, of the autocratic power of Church and State. There was no longer the necessity to teach children the "wickedness" of heretical thought. The Puritans fortunately discovered that intolerance was not a business proposition. It is safe to say that only in the homes of contemporary ultra-Puritans are conditions prevalent which lead to the development of a strong "superego". For the rest, neither children nor adults take quite seriously the internal gods/

'Note: Provided, of course, in the case of the rulers, their "rightful claims" remained unquestioned. Sedition and heresy would seem to have been punished with the utmost severity. Cf. V. F. Calverton in "Sex in Civilisation" p. 264.
gods which they created in response to repressive treatment. The superego has, as it were, a convenience value, and it is not allowed to interfere to any great extent with free self expression.

We shall not go into a detailed study of the Freudian claim that repression is a determinant of cultural process in modern society. We have shown that the foundations of civilisation were laid before the repressed unconscious, as we now know it, was set up. We have demonstrated that the Freudian thesis as to the part played by repressed sexuality in the further development of civilisation is untenable, as sexuality was precisely the part of the mind that was not repressed until recent days; and finally, we gave reasons for thinking that sex repression in contemporary society is only partial, owing to the weakening of the entire repressive mechanisms.

There would therefore seem to be no evidence for the Freudian claim that culture was constituted as an indirect result of sex repression.
Discussion to show that the Freudian Superego cannot be regarded as a function of cultural process... ...
In our section dealing with Professor Freud, we stated that we should base our main critique of the Freudian position on the work of Dr. Franz Alexander in his "Psychoanalysis of the Total Personality". The writer has before him an account of Alexander's views which would extend to over a hundred and fifty pages. It has been decided that the article cannot be presented in the form originally intended, and we shall therefore have to be content with giving a brief summary.

We noted that Professor Freud made eulogistic references to the superego. To him, it was the main agent of repression in the human mind. We learnt that, according to Freud, its formation was largely due to biologically determined factors, and that on Freudian premises it was inevitable that the superego should arise in the human mind. We pointed out that it was claimed that the superego was the pre-determinant of sublimation. We therefore decided that a critique of the Freudian theory must proceed on the lines of a discussion of the superego.

Alexander's entire work may be said to deal with the superego, and it appears to give an excellent description of the present-day Freudian viewpoint.

Alexander states that "a comprehensive psychoanalytical experience of many years has repeatedly confirmed the fact that....repression is employed, especially in connection with those instinctual stirrings which violate moral and aesthetic laws/" See section on Freud, thesis pp. 90-91.
laws." "Let us," he says, "designate that part of the internal inhibitory faculty which represents these laws within the psychic apparatus, the superego." (p.16). He thus states that there resides in the superego the moral and aesthetic sense. He then goes on to explain by what means these higher aspects of human nature become incorporated within the superego. Ultimately, they are derived from the prohibitions of parents or others who assume the role of educators during the early stages of life, and have associated with them the threat of punishment.

"Child rearing," he goes on to say, "imitates in this respect inanimate nature, which inhibits through the infliction of pain those of our instinctual stirrings which run counter to adaptation - a pain infliction for which punishment is the substitute in the process of child rearing. In the course of time, these prohibitions and commands of the educational process become transformed into internal laws, and this internalised morality, as conscience, becomes in large measure independent of the presence of the original prohibiting person. The objective fear of the punishing persons in the child's environment becomes internalised as conscience activity. If now an instinctual stirring condemned by conscience becomes conscious, there results conscience anxiety." (p.16).

Thus at the outset Alexander fails to note the ethical implications of his statements. He blandly declares that conscience has its basis in a child's fear of punishment, and he/
he would have us believe that the punishment of children is "natural".

To Alexander, the superego is a labour-saving device, in that it enables the individual to control his impulses automatically, and it also has a function as a means of avoiding anxiety. (p.21). There is a division of labour between the conscious and the unconscious mind. In discussing the superego from this aspect, he again reveals insensitivity as to the real significance of the building up of the superego, when the facts of ontogenesis are seen in relation to the personality of a young child. The superego would appear to him to be a very satisfactory institution, his only criticism being that it "entails a serious disadvantage from the standpoint of pathology." (p.21). He later adds that it is "only in the neuroses that it (the superego) is not adequate to its task, and it abuses its far-reaching independence of the conscious ego, and uses its autonomy in such a fashion that a condition arises which the patient regards as illness." (p.24).

We note from the above quotation that Alexander regards the superego as to all intents and purposes a co-consciousness or secondary personality. He considers that, in normal individuals, it acts autonomously, and his only complaint against this state of affairs is that in the neurotic, illness results in consequence of there being a part of the personality outwith the/

"See section on Morton Prince, thesis p.20."
the control of conscious will. Once again he appears to have no realisation of the implications of his statement. He calmly accepts a state of radical dissociation as normal, and as we have seen, considers that the ethical sense has its seat in an autonomous and dissociated personality. If the facts are as stated by him, the only rational conclusion is that the normal mind is in a chronically diseased condition, and what we value as conscience springs from a pathological system of delusions.

He then repeats his statement as to the existence in the normal human mind of a dissociated personality. He says: "The claims of the superego do not coincide with those of the conscious ego, in the neurotic under no circumstances, and in normal persons only to a certain extent; the borderline case of ideal health furnishes an exception to this rule. If the standpoints of the superego and of the ego always coincided, the results of repression and those of conscious judgment would be the same."

Once again Alexander totally fails to realise the implications of what he has said. Normal persons, he states, are ill adapted to the superego system, but he envisages exceptional cases of ideal health where superego and conscious ideals both work in the same direction. Now it is obvious that the superego is capable of little modification, and/
and therefore ideal health arises from successfully modifying the sentiment which lies behind the conscious ego ideal, so that it fits in with the implicit aims and purposes of the superego. Thus the superego must have the last say in determining the ideals to which human personality must conform.

We must remember that the superego is formed by an immature child, under the age of five, and it therefore follows that ideal normality consists in the adaptation of conscious life to the ideals of an infant. Alexander's state of ideal health can thus only be realised by an individual becoming infantile.

It is not surprising that Alexander considers that ill-adaptation is normal. But he believes that, through the medium of sublimation, the stresses resulting from the ill-adaptation between the ego and the superego may be resolved. Here again, from the wider standpoint of the functioning of the total personality, he appears unaware that if we are to rely on sublimation as a means of adaptation, the building up of satisfactory sentiments is left to chance, sublimation being an unconscious process. He has enunciated a doctrine of complete fatalism. The most vital issues affecting human personality are a matter of chance; society can do little or nothing to assist the individual in developing

developing his personality, and the individual himself is likewise unable in any way to control his destiny.

Alexander then proceeds to draw a distinction between the neurotic symptom and sublimation. He says that they have this in common, that they are both expressions of libido which "seeks new avenues of release which are capable of circumventing the censorship of the superego." (p.25). That is, the individual in the case both of symptom and sublimation, unwittingly accepts substitutes for ends which have intrinsic appeal for his native personality. "They are both", he states, "modified or at any rate disguised manifestations of repressed tendencies, that is, tendencies which have been condemned by the superego." No symptom or sublimation without superego condemnation. We are left with the impression that, if the superego control were abrogated, both symptom and sublimation would disappear, and in their place the individual would pursue directly the satisfaction of his basic instinctual needs.

The formation of both symptoms and sublimations, then, takes place "under the pressure of the demands of the superego". But Alexander would have us understand that the modification/

Note: We have followed out the implication of this viewpoint in our section on "May's "The Child's Unconscious Mind", p.206 et seq.
modification of the original tendency in sublimation is "much more fundamental than in the case of the neurotic symptom wherein the original ego-alien impulse" - should it not be "superego-alien" impulse? - "is not abandoned nor essentially modified, but merely disguised. The sublimated impulse becomes attached to other impulses which are acceptable to the ego, and in this good company gets by the censorship". (p.25). And he adds: "It acquires a distinctly social aspect."

"The moral claims of the superego become satisfied through this altruistic social note, thus rendering possible the return of the repressed in its altered form.... In the case of the neurotic symptom, the original activity alone is checked. The meaning of the substitute gratifications is very much akin to the original condemned instinctual urge. This original condemned tendency, therefore, does not become altered as in the case of the sublimation, but only disguised." (p.26). It is difficult to see what fundamental distinction there is between the two processes, that is, symptom formation and the formation of a sublimation. Both, at any rate, are purely mechanical, and the possessor of either type of libidinal expression must accept what happens to be pushed round the barrier set up by the superego control.

Cf. section on McCurdy, thesis p. 265 et seq.
In the last quotation we note that Alexander states that one of the differences between a symptom and a sublimation is that, in the case of a symptom, the original impulse is disguised, whereas in the case of a sublimation it is altered. As we have seen above, however, Alexander has already stated that symptoms and sublimations are "both...disguised manifestations of repressed tendencies." (p.25). It does not seem possible to find a reason for this change of viewpoint. We therefore accept the original statement as being in accordance with Alexander's fundamental position.

In the case of the symptom, it appears that the "superego of the neurotic is in conspiracy with the id" being "only concerned in giving the appearance of carrying out the letter of the law, yet" permitting "the cropping out of the a-social urges of the id." (p.25). Nevertheless, the superego insists on meting out condign punishment as a condition of the expression of the forbidden impulses. In the case of sublimation, there is libidinal expression without punishment. If the libido must be disguised in order that sublimation may be accomplished, it is difficult to see why the superego is able to discriminate between expressions with "a social aspect" and those which cannot claim this justification. The suspicion, indeed, arises that the development of so-called sublimations is outwith the superego system altogether. Any other conclusion/
conclusion does not seem to fit in with the Freudian description of the superego.

Is it not probable, regarding the matter genetically, that in normal people the superego, when formed by the child, is regarded as an inner encumbrance, not to be taken over seriously in its admonishments and suggested self-castigation, and that the main personality proceeds to develop with the superego system more or less consciously dissociated - and we may say, relatively inactive? We may take the following as an illustration of the type of thing which seems to take place: A girl of nine had been impressed by a religiously minded teacher with the omnipresence of God. Whatever you did, and wherever you were, the child informed the writer, God was watching. The writer enquired whether she was aware of the dogma in question when she was disobedient to her mother or when she was misbehaving in her relations to her brother. The child's reply was, "Perhaps it isn't true." It is certain that during most of the twenty-four hours of the day, the belief in divine omniscience was in abeyance. Prestige suggestion determined that she should accept her teacher's belief, but her developing interests proceeded as though the belief in question were not present. We suggest that the "internalised" morality is similarly regarded in the case of normal people.

Alexander then proceeds to make reference to the aspect of superego activity in which he is specially interested (p.26-7).
The punishments of the superego furnish carte-blanche to the sins" (that is, the forbidden impulses finding expression in neurotic symptoms), "inasmuch as through these punishments the ego is rid of its qualms of conscience and of its conscience anxiety." This self-punishment mechanism not only enters into the symptom, "but the mere fact of illness signifies punishment. ...The superego of the neurotic," he goes on to say, "does not punish because of the demands of justice, neither is the punishment intended to serve as a deterrent...but as a matter of form, in order to satisfy in a formal manner the code of conscience." It would seem, then, that the superego, at least in the neurotic, has no sense of justice, and that it is far more in league with the "evil" of human nature than with those manifestations of the "higher nature" which find expression in conscious ideals. Is it not significant that, in accordance with the theory described, there are drawn from that class who possess a "degenerate" superego, those who are universally acclaimed as the possessors of a high degree of sensitivity, aesthetic, intellectual, and ethical? Both Havelock Ellis in his "Study of British Genius", and Herzberg in "The Psychology of the Philosopher", are definite that the correlation between a neurotic disposition and the development of those susceptibilities which may be regarded as more specifically human is beyond question. It is safe to say that highly developed individuals, in their best moments, are little influenced by the superego system within them. Their work, in so far as it is/
is valuable, is in spite of, not because of, the superego and its system of repressions, and its alleged sublimations.

The superego system is, it seems, peculiarly invulnerable from the standpoint of the psychoanalyst, and presumably of the independently organised sentiments of the individual under analysis. Alexander states: "The exposé of this secret id-syntonic attitude of the superego (he refers to his view that the superego and the id are in secret alliance) constitutes the most difficult problem in the treatment of the neurosis." (p.29). If this id-syntonic attitude is relinquished, the individual will be faced with the necessity of seeking satisfaction in more socially acceptable forms; at least this is the argument of Alexander. We would rather suggest that the superego system remains intact, or relatively so, despite the onslaughts of the psychoanalyst, because it represents a solution, however unsatisfactory, for urgent problems which were thrust upon the child of three or four years of age. While it is true that in normal individuals the superego plays a relatively insignificant part in ordinary life, its components being satisfactorily dissociated, it does not follow that the superego can be lightly dispensed with by anyone who has sought refuge in the construction of the system in question. The Australian aborigines, according to Roheim, seem to spend most of their time in activities which cannot by any stretch of imagination be regarded as aim-inhibited, yet the continuance of these activities depends on the stability/

"G. Roheim, "The Riddle of the Sphinx".
stability of such superego organisation as they possess. Any disturbance of the superego, and they are subject to emotional strain which does not abate until certain ceremonial expressions permit the restoration of equilibrium within the superego. Both in the normal and in the neurotic, an attempt to dispense with the superego entails not only emotional pain in reviving the experiences which led to its formation, but its abrogation would enforce on the individual the necessity of a type of orientation towards the environment which, to date - at least as far as civilised man is concerned - has never been tried.

The abrogation of the superego, while ideally practicable and theoretically desirable, would leave the liberated individual with complete indifference to incest, except in so far as there are logical reasons for refraining from the type of activity in question; murder would provoke as little repugnance as the killing of a domestic fowl; things ordinarily regarded as disgusting would no longer appear as intrinsically "nasty"; cleanliness would be a mere convention, and cruelty in no way reprehensible, and the individual would be incapable of moral indignation, save such as arose from a nice calculation as to the relative amounts of pleasure or pain which would ensue from any given activity. He would be in the position of the sceptic quoted by Bertrand Russell, with this difference, that whereas we strongly suspect that the sceptic in question was/

"Bertrand Russell, "Sceptical Essays". 
was little but a poseur, whom everybody knew to have at bottom like prejudices with themselves, the really thorough-going sceptic would be abhorred by all "right thinking" persons. Could anyone, in view of man's peculiar susceptibility to "herd opinion" as described by Trotter, withstand the criticism of society, which would regard him as eccentric, and indeed inhuman?

Alexander traces the genesis of the punitive aspect of the superego. His account is probably accurate. He says: "The child soon notices that its forbidden deeds are wiped out by the punishment which follows, even in a moral sense. Thus it comes to take its punishment gladly, in order to be thereby absolved from the sins committed. It then sins with the thought in the back of its head, 'I will be punished for it anyway'.....In this way there arises the truly paradoxical relationship between the child and its elders, namely that it provokes punishment so that it may sin freely." (p.31). Even unjust punishment is accepted in order that the child may free himself from a sense of "moral unworthiness". "We know", he says, "the genesis of the superego in its relation to education." The superego carries on the "unpsychological and unsuccessful educational methods" of the parents.

We are glad to have this very clear statement of the origin of the punitive aspect of the superego. But we cannot/
cannot agree with Alexander's use of the phrase "moral sense" as expressed in the passage already quoted. "Forbidden deeds," he states, "are wiped out....even in a moral sense." This is certainly not true. "Moral", in its true connotation, means no more and no less to the child than it does to the adult. What is wiped out by the punishment is the sense of being disapproved of by the adults in the environment. There is a factual basis for the opinion formed by the child of the efficacy of punishment in restoring him to the good opinion of his educators; but the moral sense is something far different, and is fundamentally based on a sentiment of justice, however implicit it may be, in the young child. The feeling of ethical dissatisfaction remains after a wrong act has been performed, even though punishment has been accepted. The share-swindler, if even a remnant of his ethical sense is still at work, does not feel absolved of responsibility for the evil which he has done even after he has suffered a period of imprisonment.

The/

also section on Campbell Garnett, thesis p.152, et seq.
The child who has come to a point where he finds satisfaction in the acceptance of punishment is, according to our view, already morally corrupted. Praise and blame, reward and punishment, are sanctions which can have no bearing on ethical behaviour proper, which, whatever else it may be, has the quality of disinterestedness. We may take it that as soon as a child comes to accept the sanctions referred to as "just", his moral sense is blunted. Under certain circumstances, the child's ethical strivings might receive confirmation, as it were, by the mild expression of approval or possibly even of disapproval, of those around him. It is obvious, if the type of sanction referred to is to correspond with the child's ethical strivings, positive or negative, that the educator must have a keen understanding of the working of the child's mind, an acute power of discrimination when distinguishing between behaviour which is purely conditioned by instinct, and therefore a-moral, and that behaviour which proceeds from quiet deliberation at times when the child's mind is free from emotion. If there is a modicum of truth in Freudian teaching, the parent has little or no insight into the child's mentality, and moreover if the parental superego system is working at all, the child is being judged by preconceptions and prejudices which are inherent in that system. The norm of justice must surely forbid blame and punishment in cases where the child cannot be held responsible for his activities/

"See section on Fritz Wittels, p. 222, and p. 236."
activities. Given that attitude in the educator which inevitably leads the child to the formation of a superego, the child will form the conclusion that the adults are unjust and that seemingly injustice is the "correct thing". If the child comes to accept flagrant acts of injustice as having propriety, we may be certain that the voice of conscience proper is effectively stifled to a large extent. It will not be long before the child applies the norms which he has learnt from the established moral system to younger children; sadism, an instinctive urge which, in course of time, may be outgrown by the child, is practised on principle; when, through final identifications the "moralising" personages are incorporated into the superego system, the behaviour determined by this system will take on the colour of the qualities of character which were noted in the adults in the original environment.

We suggest then, that the superego is based on the acceptance by the child of immoral "training formulas". In neurotic and normal alike, the conditions of the formation of the superego are such that its very existence implies corruptibility of a definite order. The superego is in no sense part of our ethical nature; it is not an "unconscious conscience". The superego would never come into existence at all were it not for the child's denial of the ethical sense with which he is endowed/

1See section on Fritz Wittels, p. 223.
2See section on Fritz Künkél, p. 302.
endowed. The superego, then, is based on the acceptance by the child of unjust norms of behaviour. It is therefore the representative, not of morality but of immorality, and represents a stage in the child's life at which he became "corrupt", this in opposition to his ethical sense. Alexander has again revealed that he has little realisation of the nature of the Total Personality which he sets out to analyse. He passes over a vital, and what should be an obvious, distinction between the ethical and the unethical, and thereupon proceeds to elaborate a doctrine of the superego as incorporating man's ethical sense.

Briefly we would here mention another point which, in our opinion, effectively indicates the superego as what it is, namely, an irrationally conditioned intrusion into human mentality which, to use Alexander's term, has a definite dysfunction in the realisation of cultural values. It is this. Identification means precisely what one would infer from its derivation. One acts on the assumption that one is "the same". It is often argued that the child is incapable of distinguishing between similarity and identity, and that therefore his identifications are possibly the result of immaturity. Nothing however, appears to be farther from the truth.

When the child identifies, he commits himself to a view which he well knows is fundamentally untrue. The superego, therefore/

'See section on Wittels, thesis p. 226.'
therefore, hides within itself a fundamental lie, which in various degrees influences overt behaviour. The possessor of an active superego is committed to maintain a lifelong pretence; he is committed to act a lie. His superego is founded on untruth.

Alexander tells us that he has gained the impression that the superego, as observed by him, is in the nature of a secondary personality. He states: "I am in earnest about the division of the personality into part personalities which it is true are closely connected, merged into one another, and form a whole, but which still, especially in neurotics, maintain a much more independent existence than we have hitherto imagined.... With Freud's discovery that there were mental processes similar to conscious ones, of which the subject was not aware, the question of the possibility of an unconscious personality was, in principle, answered in the affirmative." (p.51).

"The description given by Freud of the ego-ideal as the precipitate of relinquished object-relationships and of freshly set up personalities within the psyche justifies our assumption that besides the conscious personality, there is at least one unconscious agency which, to a greater or less degree, represents a circumscribed personality, and which represents the demands of upbringing, having been formed with the parents as a model, by a process of identification." But, we read, "all these ego structures form a more or less coherent and integrated whole in which/
which they co-operate harmoniously." (p. 52). Freudians would now seem to be in agreement with Boris Sidis in regard to the acceptance of secondary personalities working alongside normal conscious states, but the situation is scarcely to be described as coherent and integrated, if it actually exists; nor can we exactly see how a mental formation based upon the acceptance of untruth as truth, injustice as justice, can co-operate harmoniously with a personality which regards the norms of truth and justice as ultimate, and seeks to guide its conduct at all times by these norms.

The superego, we learn, has the function of sifting the instincts from the standpoint of social demands, and the psychic tendencies do not reach consciousness before they have been subjected to an inspection by the superego. The superego "aims to bring them into more accurate adaptation with the actual and accidental conditions of reality." The impression we have here is that of a highly intelligent daemon, with a well developed sense of responsibility to society as a whole. Although working subconsciously or endopsychically, it has an accurate conception of the precise nature of "reality". It is surely analogous to Myers' "supernormal self".

We would again stress that the superego is the product of

an attempt by an immature being - the child of three or four-to cope with the strains and stresses within his disposition set up by "unpsychological" modes of treatment emanating from the adult environment. We would therefore suggest that it is in the highest degree unlikely that the superego has the function of sifting the instincts with a view to adequate adaptation in respect of the "actual and accidental conditions of reality".

We would now proceed to discuss Alexander's description of superego development from the standpoint of the Oedipus complex. First, he postulates his primary narcissism. At a point in development, the child makes his first object choice, the mother. All other individuals in the environment continue to be regarded sadistically. We may here remark that the child from an early date displays more of the submissive aspect of the parent-child instinct, and probably of the negative phase of self-instinct, than of aggressiveness towards his parents. Sadism and aggressiveness are occasional manifestations of the child's instincts, not the usual ones.

The first love choice has an immediate sequel, in that the father becomes the "central focus of the child's hostility. This is the instinct constellation of the Oedipus complex." (p.76). The child is then faced with the problem of overcoming his hate for his father. He adopts a rather peculiar method. He sublimates the "sensual erotic relation to the mother", and, now/

now having spare "eros" at his disposal, he attaches some to his father. He is now aggressive or sadistic in a loving way. "The formerly purely hostile attitude towards his father acquires an erotic component." (p. 76). There is, it seems, "an interim period of ambivalence" when the child both loves and hates his father, but soon the relation has a "positive colouring." (p. 76).

We now learn that the mother attachment referred to above is transformed into the simultaneous but sublimated love for both parents. "The transformation of sensual love into tenderness is the first form of sublimation." The positive attachment of the child, which is presumably at the genital level, is diluted, the libidinal relationship losing in intensity and gaining in expression "through its distribution over a number of objects". (p. 76).

The weakening of the eros attachment to the mother sets free the old "instinct to destroy", the "death instinct" which the child previously directed towards his mother. In passing, we can only point out that a child of three has a well organised sentiment directed towards his mother, and even if there is a "death instinct" it was already only a single component in a much wider sentiment at the time of the onset of the "catastrophic era" of the child's development.

However, according to Alexander, the hate of the mother breaks away from the mother sentiment and enters into the father sentiment, or rather one of the father sentiments, and sharpens
"the ambivalence conflict". Normal development, we are then told, consists in overcoming the conflict by displacing "the hostile tendencies from the father to alien objects" and through sublimating and eroticising the hostility. A normal solution would, we must infer, be contingent on there being, let us say, a convenient maternal uncle in the environment. The Trobriand Islanders in this respect would seem to be guided by sound psychological principles. A younger, or perhaps an older brother, would be a godsend, and even a dog might be valuable as the object of the child's paternally directed aggressiveness. We suggest that the sublimating solution is far too fortuitous to give the educator much help in dealing with the child at this juncture, and we can look for little help from the process of further eroticising, since in any case any further withdrawal of the "eros" from the mother would lead to another "crop" of aggressiveness to be again directed towards the father. The development of normality would seem to be precarious to a degree.

That many do not achieve this rather astonishing piece of psychic adjustment is to be expected. That the "perseverator" will not succeed is obvious, and also there appears to be a strong likelihood that children with a developed ethical sense may have difficulties. The process of discovering more convenient objects on which to attach hatred is hardly of a moral order, and further, children with a sense of objective reality will not easily turn hate/

'See. B. Malinowski, "Sex and Repression in Savage Society".'
hate directed to one person on to another, on the grounds of mere similarity or contiguity. It is not at all improbable, also, that the "maternal uncle" is rather liked in his own right, and a child will quickly discover that it is hardly fair to treat him as a substitute for a less conveniently hated person.

And, in parenthesis, we would reiterate that the sheer inadequacy of the Freudian position arises from the apparent inability of its followers to realise the simple ethical implications of its statements. If we were what Freudians paint us, we should have to admit complete ethical insensitivity, a high degree of intellectual stupidity, and a lack of susceptibility to aesthetic values.

Let us now follow the psychic fortunes of the abnormal, in this case the compulsion neurotic. In this connection, we would note that, according to Havelock Ellis, a large majority of men of exceptional ability have been subject to nervous disorders. The "fault" of the compulsion neurotic is that he clings tenaciously "to his erotic attachment to his mother" and "he has not enough libido left over to mitigate or neutralise the hostility to his father." (p.77). In addition, he is strongly narcissistic, and cannot draw on his self love "libido quota" in order to neutralise the outwardly directed aggression. This is somewhat strange, as this strong narcissist has already shown his capacity for love by a/

'Havelock Ellis, "A Study of British Genius" p.177.
a specially strong attachment to his mother.

The trouble, as we have seen, is chiefly the child's obtuseness in refusing to give up the erotic attachment to his mother. What he does now in order to lessen his hatred for his father (why he should insist on becoming involved in painful complexes by attempting to love and hate the same person we are not told), is to over-develop the Oedipus complex. He develops "an excessively strong masochistic attachment to the father, which arises from a deflection of the hostility originally directed against the father to the individual's own person." (p.78)

"Now," he says, "I am permitted to love mother provided I am sufficiently punished for it by father." One would imagine that if the mother noticed naughty interests in her body on the part of the child, and expressed her disapproval, the child would not improve matters very much by imagining that his father had punished him for his misdeeds and therefore he could continue to have naughty interests in his mother. The mother would quickly disillusion him as to the efficacy of his method of escaping a feeling of culpability. Since, according to Alexander, there is no real sense of guilt at this time, it is difficult to understand what precisely the child is trying to evade.

But now comes the climax in the process. Not content with imagining that he is the father and punishing his father in himself as a means of freeing himself from a non-existent sense of/
of guilt, and the retention of an attachment which he can retain not one whit more comfortably than heretofore, the child now eroticises his self-castigatory impulses by imagining that his father is beating his mother in himself. Now, of course, he loves himself \textit{qua} mother, and has lost the capacity for loving her at all, and has precisely succeeded in defeating his original purpose.

And now we have a fully fledged superego, called out of the void, as found in many highly cultured persons. The superego assumes "the role of the father who is hated and at the same time loved in a feminine masochistic manner", and a now interminable endopsychic conflict continues ad lib. The normal superego is, of course, constructed in a somewhat similar manner, and Freud always assumes the double Oedipus complex in all analysands, normal and abnormal.

In some measure he may be right, but the Freudian claim to find a clue to man's higher life in this product of crazydom, the superego, is surely fantastic.

Let us now examine more thoroughly Alexander's account of Conscience. It has been our complaint that the Freudian account of human nature is based on an insensitivity to ethical issues. Not only do they ignore the place in the total person- ality of ethical striving, but would lead us to believe that conscience, which is a product of the superego system, (a system/
system which, as we have shown, is the very antithesis of that which may be described as ethical) is the only moral sense which exists in human personality. At times, Alexander speaks of a "conscious conscience" but we can only infer that, according to his tenets, this conscious moral sense has its foundation in the superego. "We must not forget," he explicitly states, "that the claims of conscience are merely those claims, those demands of society, which the child has taken into himself through an identification with its parents, its first guides."

That is, conscience proceeds from the superego mechanism built up by the identification process, and thus the real motive of ethical conduct is a purely instinctive striving which blindly seeks its own selfish ends through an altruistic path. The individual is really being motivated by fear (of castration, we may presume), and the entirely egoistical desire to avoid the pain of conflict, but as a result of superego alchemy, the individual is no longer acting in typically "id" fashion, but in accordance with the highest norms conceivable for man.

The conscience, Alexander tells us, "behaves like a renegade who turns against his former companions" (children have a name for characters of this description) or "is not unlike the police force in a capitalised state, which is recruited from the proletariat against which its restrictive peace-preserving power is chiefly directed." (p.92). In parenthesis, it/
it may be stated that the said proletariat have also definite views as to the moral standing of the guardians of law and order, and there is a strong suspicion that, were it not for injustice on the part of the system, no police force would be necessary. The institution is absent among primitive peoples who are free from the class system.

Conscience is, then, to Alexander, a "secondary instinct derived from the original primordial instincts." (p.92). Alexander continues his thesis as to the nature of conscience by explicitly deriving it from (i) aggression turned upon the self, and (ii) primary masochism, that is, hating the self as a substitute for others in an effort to avoid the pain of conflict, and masochism which is used as a means towards the same end, the avoidance of conflict. Conscience, then, is purely hedonistic in its origin, and is a simple expression of the tendency to avoid pain.

We can only remark that if human beings have such a "conscience" it cannot be claimed that it has any ethical significance. It may be present in neurosis; we suggest that it is relatively absent in normal life, as an effective determinant of ethical behaviour. The fact that the "unconscious conscience" can be bribed is not a thing which should cause surprise: it is obvious that the entire superego system is egoistical to the core, not even a super-id, but far more appropriately a "sub-id", a disreputable renegade whom the right/
right minded individual will either keep strictly in his place as an uninfluential member of the psychic body politic, to be deprived as far as possible of the power of interference with the rest of the personality, or which he will seek to reform.

Conscience, then, is "merely introjected castration fear ....the concentrated expression of the fact that the internally socially aimed regulation of instinct arose through the introjection of the laws of society." (p.95), and Alexander finds the origin of the internal "justice system" in the "primitive punishment and sacrifice system of primitive society." (p.96). It is obvious, however, that primitive "justice" takes little or no account of whether the individual could really help the actions for which he is held responsible. It is essentially undiscriminating, its requirements being external, and would seem to proceed by neglecting the individual's sense of ethical responsibility. The primitive code of justice, in its application to children, is thus essentially unethical, and it would therefore seem to follow that the superego system, which internalises the external code, must suffer from the same defect.

Trends of character established during the oral and anal phase of human development, as the result of applying the primitive code of justice to which he has referred, are regarded by Alexander as the bases of all subsequent development, including/
including the construction of a superego. Indeed, we may infer that the child could not construct the superego had he not accepted as part of reality the intrinsic blameworthiness of certain impulses quite independent of the question as to his capacity for the ethical control of these impulses. Like the slum child who enters school, he has learnt to expect unjust punishment as in the natural order of things. He has acquired a vicious and immoral training formula. The young child, on the basis of experience of sheer injustice and lack of discrimination in the treatment meted out to him, takes it for granted when he develops those love relationships on which the Oedipus complex is based, that he will be blamed and punished for his "evil" desires. He faces the new problem in a state of emotional excitement, fearing, with good reason as it appears to him, those in his environment who have previously treated him irrationally and unjustly at the period when they sought to effect control of the impulses bound up in the oral and anal phases.

The new situation is therefore met in an attitude of mind which is inimical to any ethical solution of his problems. First, if the example of his educators means anything, established behaviour among adults is not in many instances conditioned by ethical norms. His belief in his power of reaching an ethical solution is therefore undermined. "That is not the way things are/"

'See section on Fritz Künkkel, thesis p.302.'
are done." And seemingly the situation is fraught with such a degree of danger, that panic measures are necessary. Whether or not the child is afraid of castration need not be discussed, but it is certain that if he has been punished, shamed, etc., at an earlier period, he will be terrified when faced with a new set of socially disapproved impulses.

Alexander, in the section of his work which we are discussing, leads us to the point of realising the very shaky foundations of the superego system, in that it is based on undiscriminating and unethically determined parental attitudes, and then side-tracks the issue by suggesting that man's punitive system is a continuance of nature's methods on the "inanimate" level. Despite the side-tracking, the reader might find himself on the point of realising the ethical - or rather the unethical - significance of the superego, but Alexander then proceeds virtually to withdraw all that he has implicitly conceded, allowing us to understand that the part played by society in the formation of the superego is relatively slight, and that it is on other grounds based in nature.

First, a main set of traumas which lie behind the creation of the unconscious are biologically conditioned. In the course of development, older stages of instinctual organisation must be renounced. At the time of renunciation, there arises instinct tension which is of a painful order. The first group of traumatic/
traumatic influences is, he says, the product of the necessary course of biological development and includes birth, weaning, learning to walk, etc. The second group he describes as physical traumata, whose source is in the "resistance of inanimate nature to the deeds of the individual" (p.102), (the postponement of satisfaction of needs because of conditions in time and space: stimulation due to changes in the condition of the physical environment). This group, owing to the absence of "means of satisfaction of a libido attachment" would again lead to instinct tension, which is in itself painful. The third group are due to "educational demands" for social behaviour, which are opposed to the original instinctual tendencies and which are enforced by means of threats of punishments and withdrawal of love (social traumata). (p.102).

In regard to the first two classes of traumata which form the basis of the unconscious, control would seem to be outwith the hands of the educator. But even in regard to the third group, we find that repression of the conflicting tendencies "has its prototype and preconditions in the primeval history of mankind." (p.103). Alexander refers to the racial memory theory adopted by Freudians from Jung. Freud, Roheim, and Reik, all take quite seriously the idea that at the back of our/

1 See section on Freud, thesis p. 105-6.
2 See section on Roheim, thesis p. 346 et seq.
3 T. Reik, "Ritual: Psychoanalytical Studies" p.298.
our minds we have guilt feelings in respect of the murderous activities of our distant forebears, the "band of brothers" who slew their father in order to gain possession of the women of the primal horde. "It is," continues Alexander, "nevertheless an open and experimentally untested question whether this inherited predisposition would suffice to overcome the incest fixation without any aid from the environment." (p.103). The educators can thus have little confidence, according to Alexander, in their attempt to prevent the development of irrational and uncontrollable intrusions of repressed complexes among the rationally and objectively conditioned sentiments of what Freud describes as the preconscious. Thus repression due to the third type of trauma is, by implication, in large measure beyond human control, and the resulting superego formation must be regarded as, in the main, phylogenically determined.

Alexander enunciates his fatalistic conclusions as to the inevitability of repression in the following statement: "The biological restrictions upon the instincts from birth through the period of the training in cleanliness must be borne by every human being. And the same is true for the later social restrictions on the instinctive urges." (p.112). Individuals differ only as to the "quantitative factor" in the various repressive forces. But, as we enquired when discussing McCurdy's contribution, why the "must"? Is there not adequate reason/
reason for believing that neither weaning nor cleanliness training, nor indeed any of the restrictions which Alexander cites, need result in traumatic effects? The Trobriand Islanders would seem to experience no trauma at the time of weaning, and with us children may be gradually introduced to other means of securing sustenance, without their experiencing any sharp break between the earlier and later methods of receiving nutriment. Cleanliness training may be effected without resort to any sanctions which lead to anxiety or a sense of guilt. There is, of course, the possibility of birth having a traumatic effect, and this at least "must be borne by every human being." There seems no reason to think that the child, after birth, is more conscious than when in the intrauterine state. Oxygen is supplied to the child's brain from the blood-stream of the mother, and therefore the absence of breathing in the unborn child will not prevent the brain conditioning psychological process. There may, therefore, be some truth in Rank's contention, but Alexander himself considers the theory "entirely improbable" as accounting for the phenomena which he has studied. (p.114).

Our point here is that the quantitative factor need not necessarily arise save in so far as there is reason to accept the theory of the trauma of birth as explaining subsequent psychological/

psychological phenomena. During the pre-Oedipus complex phase, the child need not have engrained into his being the "training formulas" - to use Küngel's phrase - which are, according to Alexander, the foundations of those later reactions which result in the development of the superego. In our view, it should be the business of psychoanalysis to stress the need for a complete reversal of normal modes of treating the young child, especially in respect of cleanliness training. However far precedent would lead us into antiquity - it is by no means certain that our present modes of cleanliness training have a history pre-dating the development of civilisation - a little reflection enables us to see that it is fundamentally unjust to adopt an attitude of blame towards the infant in respect of his natural processes. Moreover, if we believe that fear has little place in the life of ethically developed humanity, we cannot reasonably introduce this sanction in any phase of development. In any case, our implicit belief in inflicting punishment is that the individual can in some way "help" his conduct, and this presupposes that we consider that the individual can modify his behaviour by what is popularly regarded as an "act of will". But "will" cannot be said to exist in the young child, conceptual process being absent, or almost entirely so. The justification of punishment may, of course, be based upon the fact that the child is not yet "moral" in any true sense, and that therefore we may proceed to condition him by any/
any methods which may be regarded as expedient. The objection to this view is that the child inevitably antedates in their application any norms which he later accepts, and moreover, will be disposed to criticise the validity of norms later presented to him if they do not fit in with his early experience. It is not at all improbable that the Oedipus complex would never arise if a child were not subjected to unethical preconditioning.

The doctrine of "biological restrictions" which necessarily lead to traumatic influences, is therefore mischievous, and its enunciation betrays a fundamental insensitivity to the ethical issues involved. The inevitable impression also left upon the reader of Freudian literature is that, as the traumata resulting from cleanliness training are inevitable, there is little need to modify the seemingly biologically determined methods of present-day training; and if, indeed, repression in all its subsequent phases is in various degrees likewise inevitable, normality being dependent on the educator preventing "undue" or "over-severe" repression, then it is almost a duty to continue cleanliness training in its present form. And we would here stress a point which receives little attention from Freudian writers. The process of cleanliness training, in our view, leads to the formation of complexes which have a decisive effect on all subsequent developments of the unconscious mind. We refer to the inculcation of disgust/
disgust. If repression is a desirable process in the development of culture, we must therefore conclude that the disgust complex has a vital and predominating part to play in such development. Anyone closely observing normal methods of child upbringing in this country cannot fail to be impressed with the fact that, whatever variations we may find in parents in regard to their attitude towards childish "naughtiness", they are in agreement as to the category of the "dirty", and before a child is five he is in possession of the capacity to be thoroughly and painfully disgusted with certain objects. In so far as "morality" proceeds from the superego, the immoral and the disgusting are coincident. There is every indication that a disgust complex has its unhallowed shrine wherever the superego formation is constructed.

It is thought that the disgust mechanism was first used as an effective way of making children house-clean when man adopted life in settlements. However that may be, the spread-over of the influence of a disgust complex is a striking feature both in contemporary personalities and probably in those of all peoples who have been influenced by civilisation. It might be argued that the influence of disgust on conduct can be overcome, witness doctors, hospital nurses, policemen, and those whose occupations lead them to come into contact with the disgusting. From the writer's observations and enquiries/

"Cf. Ffloyd Dell, "Love in the Machine Age" p.86."
enquiries - unfortunately exact statistical methods have been impossible - it would appear that the individual's capacity for disgust remains despite apparent deconditioning experiences. It is suppressed rather than obliterated from the mental system. There is indeed a suspicion that the deconditioning required of the medical and nursing professions leads to a further spread-over of the unconscious disgust complex. The sanctum par excellence of the disgust complex is within or behind the social status sentiments, and it is perhaps no exaggeration to state that in the professions referred to the insistence on social status is manifested to a marked degree.

The writer has had contact with a great number of children, most of whom belonged to the working classes. From time to time he has conducted informal experiments where veiled references were made to the objects commonly regarded as intrinsically disgusting. There has been a strong positive reaction in almost all cases. The only instance he has observed where relatively little emotion was displayed, was in the case of a family well known for immoral proclivities. One member, a boy, when at school, (his age was thirteen) had gratified exhibitionist impulses before members of the opposite sex.

Among the ordinary population, the capacity for powerful disgust feelings would seem to be a "constant". The writer, during/

during the Great War, was brought into contact with a great number of individuals drawn from all classes. Despite the laxity in morals, the enjoyment of scatological and lascivious conversation, the categories of the intrinsically disgusting were well marked. One man, a regular soldier, whose moral inhibitions had long since ceased to influence conduct, related with expressions of considerable revulsion how natives of India expectorated in their porridge. Another showed strong disgust at the memory of soldiers who had shaved in tea, under circumstances, presumably, where water was difficult to secure. It was also observed that, however lightly words of sexual connotation might be used in general, there were circumstances under which they were used as epithets carrying with them feelings of considerable repugnance. There was no indication that the disgust complex normally inculcated in children had lost its influence, despite an apparent absence of taboos in conduct and speech.

Although it is difficult to obtain precise confirmation, there would seem to be few individuals who, under certain circumstances, are not liable to experience disgust to such a degree that retching ensues. This is the common experience of medical students who enter the dissecting room for the first time.

This discussion could be prolonged indefinitely, but sufficient/
sufficient has been said to indicate that a disgust complex is powerfully present in the minds of civilised people, at any rate in our own country. How is it, then, that this factor is so cursorily dealt with by writers of the Freudian school? It is obvious that, in any adequate discussion of the unconscious, the disgust complex should appear as the nucleus and probably the most unanalysable of the system of repressed sentiments. It is fairly safe to conjecture that if psychoanalysts really analysed, the patients would experience extreme nausea during the sittings, and vomiting would be an unavoidable concomitant of the curative process.

Here, in Alexander's discussion of cleanliness training, we have as was pointed out, a complete lack of realisation of the part played by disgust inculcated at this time into the human psyche. Is it not indeed possible that the explanation of the blindness of Freudian writers to the real significance of their findings lies in their developing more than the usual degree of myopia in regard to the phenomena of that period of life which precedes the Oedipus complex stage? It would almost seem that they have, to a far greater degree than others, suppressed their disgust feelings in the interests of scientific research, only to incapacitate themselves from being aware of the existence of the disgust complex still functioning in their own minds. The present writer can testify/
testify that deconditioning of disgust associations does not in any way affect the nuclear complex, but its manifestations reappear in more massive expressions. It would be interesting to know something of the inner workings of the mind of Dean Swift, who, presumably, in certain moods, had the feelings of his Gulliver after residence among the Houyhnhnms towards his own kind.

Our theory is that an attempted analysis of certain of our complexes leads only to the suppression of the manifestations of the complex, however unwitting. Strictly speaking, this would involve further repression. Should it be that the disgust complex of those attempting self-analysis is only further repressed, - any insight into the minds of others under analysis is, of course, inevitably conditioned by the degree to which one can at the same time gain insight into one's own processes - we have a key to the understanding of why in Freudian psychology reference to the disgust complex is conspicuous by its absence.

The present writer, as a result of several years of psychoanalytical study, feels that he has gained some first-hand information as to the nature and workings of repressed complexes. The Oedipus situation, and the identifications underlying it, have/

"Cf. Essay on Dean Swift by Aldous Huxley, in his volume entitled "Do What You Will".  
"And, we may add, the key to the Freudian blindness to the significance of most of the phenomena which they study."
have been brought sufficiently near to the margin of consciousness to appear as facts, subject to fairly minute observation. Nevertheless, when the mind has made any real attempt to realise fully the significance of the phenomena in question, one has been faced with an overwhelming barrier of disgust sensations. This has occurred on probably a dozen occasions. During sleep, after a period of prolonged effort to overcome the barriers separating the conscious and the unconscious, a dream situation developed in which the subject was lying in a cot in the home of his parents. The dream referred to a period before he was three years of age. The strength of disgust feeling developed in the mind during the dream process was highly painful and a challenge seemed to issue from the unconscious which might be interpreted in the following words: "If you want to know further of the unconscious, this barrier must be broken through."

There would probably be far more reason to suppose that the traumatic experiences connected with the complexes of which the disgust emotion is the principal component, account for most of the phenomena of repression, than to think that the principal condition lies either in the birth trauma or in the Oedipus complex. If we feel it is incumbent upon us as educators to release the mind from the influence of the unconscious, the main line of attack would inevitably lie in preventing/
preventing disgust conditioning. It is probably true that the superego holds together the repressed system of complexes, but it appears likely that its grip is itself due to the individual's flight into a safeguarding system against the return of the unconscious in the form of disgust feelings, with which, of course, is associated a large quantity of painful negative self-feeling and anxiety. Without the preconditioning of the early cleanliness training period, it is in our view very doubtful if any child would construct a self-limiting superego system.

Here also is a further position which requires careful scrutiny when we examine Alexander's claim to analyse the total personality. The disgust complex cannot, in a human being at the present stage of evolution, be regarded as having a justification on grounds of mere expediency. Homo sapiens finds it incumbent upon himself to act not only ethically, but also aesthetically, in accordance with norms which are independent of what might be described as his own personal idiosyncrasies. He is compelled, if he is true to himself, to evaluate, positively and negatively, the phenomena which arise before him, in respect of their aesthetic worth. Adequate aesthetic experience is not contingent upon accidental and irrational conditioning of childhood. A true and vital/

*Cf. Bertrand Russell, "Marriage and Morals" p.87.*
vital empathy must bring with it the whole personality in its affective aspect. Any individual in whom great tracts of feeling response are conditioned by a set of what might be regarded as early prejudices, has to that extent cut himself off, or perhaps has been cut off, from the aesthetic world. A disgust attachment, direct or indirect, implies a negative aesthetic evaluation which is without justification, or at least the experiences which led to these negative evaluations are no longer subject to conscious revision.

If we would seek for the supreme distorting factor in mental development, it will not be found in the immoderate use of otherwise salutary and beneficial sanctions which lead to repression, but in the falsification of aesthetic values which must inevitably follow the inculcation of negative aesthetic evaluations which are both irrationally based and are subsequently incapable of revision in the light of consciousness.

In passing, we might note another aspect of human personality which does not find a place in Alexander's analysis of the total personality. The young child is a humorist; quite spontaneously, we have noted, the child whom we have had most opportunity of studying has expressed his feelings in relation to his father in the words, "funny Daddy". When in good health/

health, his most characteristic feature is his appreciation of boisterous fun. Anything which is out of keeping with the order of things as he knows it, evokes amusement. The first time the child saw his father smoking a pipe, instead of the cigarettes to which he had become accustomed, he appeared to regard the matter as a huge joke.

Individuals who are under control, in a large part of their lives, of the superego system, are observed to lack a sense of humour. If, in any measure, they gratify the sense of humour of others, it is on account of what is described as "unconscious humour". It is a striking testimony to the fact of the ultra-seriousness of the superego system, that humour in sacred buildings is almost entirely taboo. Were it not that the child’s sense of humour is partially suppressed during his period of cleanliness training, his being conditioned to regard certain objects as sacre, although his common sense tells him that the objects referred to are of the same order as drinking water, chairs, tables, and other common objects, he would, we suggest, be quite incapable of erecting the absurdity of a superego system. Indeed, both older children and adults respond immediately to any overt expression of the delusions built into the superego by poking fun at the individual who has been sufficiently unfortunate as to betray to others his private/
private opinion of his own uniqueness and importance.

We would also suggest that the psychoanalyst's myopia when considering the phenomena of the unconscious is due to his inability to understand a section of his own personality in which the sense of humour is repressed. It would appear again that his attempt to force an acquaintance with his disgust complexes has resulted in abnormal repression of this part of the unconscious, and that, as a result, an unnatural seriousness prevents his realising the presence of a vital causative factor in the development of subsequent complexes. The expert would appear to have sacrificed "common sense" in his attempt to envisage more clearly the phenomena which he purports to study. Admittedly, he specialises in describing for us "unconscious" humour, but here at least we emphatically refuse to follow the psychoanalyst in his assertion that conscious and unconscious processes are identical, save that the latter happen to lack the quality of being conscious. Humour is something which appeals to "a sense of fun" leading to very definite types of visceral changes. It is not a question of behaving in an incongruous manner; it is based on a clear perception of the incongruous in self and others. There is, strictly speaking, no such thing as unwitting humour. The superego/

1 See section on Money-Kyrle, thesis p. 277.
superego specialist never does, in fact, regard his own absurd expressions as humorous; the appreciation of the ridiculous in the situation is in the minds of others.

We have already indicated that, in our view, sublimation, in the sense of the development of increasingly complex sentiments, proceeds in the normal, in the main independently of the superego illusory system. Psychic growth may be prevented in greater or less degree at certain points in the developing psychic organism, but that does not prevent the original nature (the Freudian id) from coming into appropriate and direct contact with external reality through the sentiments which condition behaviour.

It is now our purpose to substantiate our position by showing that there is grave reason to doubt if repression, as determined by the superego, ever leads to "sublimation" in the sense of the development of sentiments having as their object the highly complex environment by which we are surrounded. Alexander tells us that a "sublimation" is characterised by (i) "an aim lying outside the personality" and (ii) "a social quality". Moreover, in the case of a sublimation, "the contents of the strivings are most extensively changed....Normal restriction changes its content." (p.116), - that is, of the repressed impulse. In the case of the symptom, "the content of the instinctive urge....remains unaltered." (p.115).

Alexander/
Alexander explicitly states the main tenet of the Freudians in regard to sublimation, viz., that "our sublimations arise from the Oedipus complex" but he adds that "the repressing forces... are not to be deceived" on account of the origin of sublimation in that it arises from the id. "They recognise," he states, "the best disguised articles of contraband, and demand customs duty. How does it happen, then," he adds, "that the sublimations in the so-called normal activities excite no feelings of guilt, and that one need not pay for them with suffering?"

Alexander has certainly set himself a difficult problem, and our interest is aroused as to how he will proceed to solve it. According to his own account, and that of other Freudian writers, the superego is weak on the discriminative side, and specialises in "all or none" reactions. Its power of internal perceptivity is such that the banned impulses cannot make a move without the superego becoming aware of it. This system of the unconscious also has no natural distaste for the id, but makes a point, as it were on principle, that any expression of the id must be associated with an appropriate punishment. Its activities remind us of the little child playing at "schools" who welcomes misdemeanours in its pupils, as the opportunity is then provided of inflicting punishment. The superego, we are told, being part of the unconscious, has neither past nor future/
future, acting always in the present, its aim being a maximal libidinal satisfaction, or at least a freeing of tension. Its "ethical standard" is extremely low, and it is easily corrupted. "Provided I can play my little game of punishment," it would seem to say, "the id can also have its little satisfactions." In general, it lives in a play world, and cannot be influenced by the objectively real save through a prolonged and extensive course of psychoanalysis under an expert. Its knowledge is that of the stage reached by the child when it was constructed by him, and no one would assert that a child of three or four has a capacity for realising the meaning and value of the intricacies of the cultural milieu into which it is his destiny to grow. Aesthetically, the superego is insensitive, having been constructed at a time when the child was obsessed with scatological interests, these inevitably following his "cleanliness training". How, then, can this queer anachronistic automaton, the superego, have the capacity to differentiate between a sublimation and a symptom? Why should it withhold its infantile punitive hand from the first type of libidinal expression, and pursue the second with what it regards as retributive enthusiasm?

Alexander, however, to all intents and purposes, does not attempt to give a reply. What apologia he does offer for the doctrine of sublimation owing to the activities of the superego, supplies arguments which may, in our opinion,
be used to demolish the whole structure of the doctrine of
sublimation. His first assertion is that "it is obvious that
this question represents nothing other than the psychology of
morals." (p.125). In a sense he is right, but since the super-
ego, according to Freudians, is "conscience", Alexander's explana-
tion does not bring us one whit nearer the elucidation of the
difficulty which he is seeking to overcome. To the extent that
Alexander recognises a morality independent of the superego, he
must necessarily be forced to the conclusion that the superego
is by no means the kind of psychic institution which could be
trusted to differentiate between issues involving ethical
judgment. Any objective morality condemns untruth, and the
superego has its basis in false judgments as to facts.

He goes on to say: "The instinct modification which is
acceptable to the ego, so far as its content is concerned, is
dependent on the prejudices and convictions of society." (p.126).
This again is in part true, but it is obvious that these
prejudices and convictions are either in some way worked into
the inner structure of the superego, or they represent something
which is external to the individual personality. We have seen
that the child of three, from whom the superego derives the
"content" of its ideas, knows little or nothing of the prejudices
and convictions of society, save in so far as they relate to his
very narrow little world. The superego, then, could not possibly
per se, be in a position to decide which libidinal expressions
would/
would be in keeping with the manifold complexities of the social organism. In so far as Alexander would maintain that these prejudices and convictions are independent of the individual personality, we must conclude that their influence in determining the content of sublimations works on psychic structure which is independent of the superego, and which owns no fealty to the "legal system" which it, the superego, has incorporated.

Alexander appears to feel that, for his present explanatory purposes, it is safer to accept the attitude that the prejudices and convictions of society are outwith the individual, but he goes on to say that the questions involved are "not strictly speaking a psychological problem". We would suggest that they are the psychological problem. But he is still troubled as to how sublimation occurs in view of the obvious incapacity of the superego, as defined, to undertake the necessary re-distributions of energy which will enable the individual to interest himself in the manifold branches of the arts and sciences, to differentiate in matters of those fine distinctions which must inevitably arise when ethical questions are raised, and to enable the "total personality" to respond with the exact degree of emotion, quantitative and qualitative, towards reality in its aesthetic aspects.

He now proceeds to state that "for the unsublimated instinct, the answer is simple and known to us all. We see again that the attainment/
attainment of the genital level, the positive erotic relation to objects, brings with it a liberation from a sense of guilt, and the acquiescence of the deepest unconscious strata of the conscience." (p.126). He goes on to argue from this position, that it is "the going beyond the limits of one's own personality which relieves the sense of guilt. One is exerting a beneficial influence."

Let us, however, meantime examine Alexander's premise. "For the unsublimated instinct, the answer is simple and known to us all" he says. If there is a "positive erotic relation to objects, there is a liberation from a sense of guilt."

This claims to be a statement of fact, the implication being that the superego, as an institution, releases its control over the id whenever the id expresses itself in direct sexual relations. We must, however, raise the question as to why the superego should behave in this astounding manner. It was formed at a time when the supreme and unthinkable crime in the eyes of the child was to act sexually. As someone has said, the "morality" of the nursery has a sliding scale in the degrees of blameworthiness in relation to expressions of libido. The most heinous and most highly deplorable type of conduct is that which has for its object heterosexual relations. Homosexual activities have a rather lesser degree of objectionability, pre-genital expressions are not quite so culpable, whilst/
whilst the neurotic symptom, whether in the nature of manifestations of hysteria, phobias, and the like, is regarded as regrettable, but as otherwise outwith the category of the blameworthy. In view of this easily observed fact, why should the superego allow of expressions at the genital level? Any such attempt on the part of the id would surely provide the superego with the opportunity of a veritable orgy of punitive activity. Again, in the case of the neurotic over whom the superego holds most obvious sway, genital satisfactions are never in point of fact regarded as free from blame. In this respect we may recall the attitude of the early Christians, or at least of the Fathers, to sexual expression at the genital level. Freudians themselves are never tired of telling us how the whole significance of the superego in its relation to culture lies in its maintaining the expressions of the libido in childish forms.

No appeal to what is "known to us all" of the superego, will enable us to explain how genital satisfaction is, in normal people, untroubled by the machinations of the superego. The obvious explanation to which Alexander brings us, and which, as in other instances, he fails himself to see, is that normal genital relations are the expression of sentiments which are in no way connected with the Freudian unconscious. If there/

'See section on G. Roheim, thesis p. 356.
there is an apparent "acquiescence of the deepest unconscious strata of the conscience" (p.126), in activities at the genital level, it is not due to some miraculous conversion of a highly tight-laced and tradition-bound superego system, but because, meantime, on account of the opportunity for complete satisfaction, the superego system is temporarily de-energised.

We would again note Alexander's statement that "the attainment of the genital level brings with it a liberation from a sense of guilt." (p.126). It is here clearly implied that the superego "approves" of positive erotic relations to objects, and that it hurries to give its blessing to the id when it has advanced to the stage of acting "biologically". The true explanation is, we suggest, that the id attains to the genital level in spite of, and not because of, the superego. The individual ceases to have a sense of guilt because he has disowned the authority of the superego and is therefore no longer neurotic.

Finally, in this connection, we note that, according to Alexander, the unconscious, when the superego system is in control, has a distinct preference for exogamic objects. Here we have a reductio ad absurdum of the entire position which claims that the superego favours sexual activities at the genital level. As families are constituted, immorality among children is regarded as most horrible and unthinkable when/
when directed towards individuals in the outside world. A little homosexuality between brothers would conceivably be forgiven by parents after the price had been paid in suitable punishment; but such naughtiness in relation to boys outwith the family would bring "disgrace", a loss of caste, upon the parents. If a child embodies into his superego what he believes to be the scale of values subscribed to by his parents, exogamous relations would be regarded as far more taboo than naughtiness carried on within the home.

It could, of course, be argued that the idea of exogamous relations is more acceptable to the personality of the child than that of sexual play within the home, since, in the case of naughtiness carried out away from the possibilities of parental surveillance, there is less chance of being found out. But surely the child would not incorporate this way of looking at things into his ideal of the punishing parent; qua punishing parent, he will be even more zealous in bringing to book the id when undertaking sexual relations with individuals unconnected with the home. The fact that we appear to be exogamous gives strong support to the view that the individual, both in childhood and in later life, when normal, finds expression for his impulses independently, as far as possible, of both the parental home and its later representative in the superego formation.
If the foregoing is true, we have no reason to suppose that the superego will show any preference for instinctual expression which goes beyond the limit of one's own personality, and it will therefore have no inclination to condone either direct sex expression or expressions of libido by way of the "sublimation".

"In this social efficacy," says Alexander, "I see the derivative of genitality." (p.125). But, sensing one would imagine, the impossibility of the position adopted, he takes refuge in a piece of high mysticism, and ends his argument by recounting an anecdote to drive home the mystical viewpoint which he has adopted. In some way, he sees in the superego's otherwise quite unaccountable activity in allowing expression of impulses in sublimation without demanding the usual toll of punishment, "the erotic factor, in Freud's sense, the Eros principle, which binds individuals into larger units, into society." This principle stresses itself "as a social conscience" which has "the function of watching over social behaviour, over the sublimated impulses, approving the erotic relationships, and reacting against the destructive ones with a sense of guilt." Whatever truth there be in Alexander's assertion of the existence of a social conscience based upon "the Eros principle", it is quite obvious that it has no relation to the superego system. The most outstanding feature/
feature of the superego is its sheer delight in destructiveness. Any admixture of the Eros principle, as far as we can see, would simply lead to the superego deriving sadistic enjoyment in administering punishments.

Alexander tells us that "in the sense in which Abraham speaks of a 'genital' character, we may speak of a 'genital stage'". He makes mention, in support of the term which he has coined, of the case of artists who suffer from "inhibition of productivity" when they develop those neurotic manifestations associated with the word "temperamental". We are to draw the conclusion that sublimation and expression at the genital stage of behaviour go together. This is, of course, probably true, but Alexander would have us believe that the difference between productivity and unproductivity is due to varying states within the superego system. He does not see that the far more probable explanation is that when the individual is finding expression at the genital level, he is to that extent free from the interference of his "internalised morality", and that the real association is between sexual normality in this sense, and freedom of expression. He has not relapsed in his superego system, to pregenital levels, when he is subject to a phase of unproductiveness. The superego, by its very nature, can never allow of the development to this level within the mental system which it controls. On the contrary, in states of productivity/
productiveness, the artist has evaded his superego system. Unproductiveness merely means relapse into disease, which is incompatible alike with sublimation and free sexual expression.

"Newly created work," Alexander goes on to add, "no matter in what field, represents new life - the creation of Eros for which the original sin may be forgiven." (p.127). He relates an African story on the Tannhauser theme. A murderer had committed incest, but the judge offers to pardon the prisoner provided that a withered branch, with which he had committed the murder, should develop new shoots. "And in this judgment," says Alexander, "is contained the prime law of the human conscience: destroyed life may be expatiated (sic) only by new life. And in accordance with this law, the Eros instinct follows the destructive instinct which, according to Freud, is its path-finder, in order to mingle with it and make amends for its ravages." (p.128). Thus would idealism appear to be the obverse of materialism.

We must draw this discussion to a close. Alexander, in the second part of his work, supplements his description of the superego by the addition of the Freudian Life and Death instincts. We suggest that no useful purpose will be served by following him in his attempt to connect up additional "biological principles" with the superego system. We trust that/

'Cf. D. H. Lawrence, "Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious, 1923, p.32. "Thus we see how it is that, in the end, pure idealism is identified with pure materialism."
that enough has been said to demonstrate that repression, as envisaged by Freudians, is not to be regarded as a function of cultural process. Ethically, the superego can in no way be considered as a psychic institution that facilitates right conduct: the conditions of its origin preclude the possibility of its having any function to subserve in this sphere. It was formed by the child’s wholesale acceptance of the immoral "training formulas" of his educators.

The superego is also based on illogicality, its continued existence depending on the acceptance of untruth as truth. From the aesthetic standpoint, it commits its possessor to negative aesthetic evaluations which have no basis in objective reality. In general, the superego may be said to resemble American civilisation, as seen by C. E. M. Joad, - a civilisation which, he declares,"substitutes cleanliness for beauty, mechanism for men, and hypocrisy for morals".

The "conscience" incorporated within the superego is formalistic and undifferentiating, and in no way takes into consideration the good of others. Its viewpoint is purely individualistic: it pays no regard to the effects on society of the activities which it determines, and in extreme cases leads to crime.

The position that the superego has a function in determining cultural process by way of sublimation would appear untenable. No theory can explain how the superego differentiates between a symptom and a sublimation. The only conclusion which can be drawn/

"C.E.M.Joad, "The Future of Morals" p.32
drawn from the study of the facts is that sublimation is not an "unconscious process" determined by the superego. Rather must it be explained in terms of subconscious process.

We have attempted to show that the superego does not play a large part in the lives of normal people. We sought to account for the false emphasis which psychoanalytic writers place on the superego, and for their insensitivity to the ethical and other implications of their statements. A theory was enunciated as to the effects of an attempted psychoanalysis of the disgust complex. We suggested that such an attempt rendered more inaccessible the memories of early childhood.

Repression, then, as determined by the superego, cannot, we have argued, be considered as a function of cultural process. We cannot accept the psychoanalytical argument that the "unanalysed" are not in a position to pass an opinion; rather have we sought to show that the analyst is, on account of his preoccupation with the repressed unconscious, far more prone to suffer from incorrect envisagement of the facts he purports to study than the non-analytical psychologist, or for that matter the ordinary layman.
V.

Conclusion.
It is not our intention to summarise the views of those writers whose works we considered in the first part of this paper. From the great diversity of opinion, and the wide range of the views put forward as to the nature of repression and the process of sublimation, it seems evident that contemporary literature on the subject of the unconscious does not provide conceptions which may be subjected to a process of correlation.

In attempting to find a solution of the problem of the relation of repression to cultural development, we have endeavoured to show that little light is shed on our subject by a study of the process of sublimation. From the historical standpoint, it may be of interest to discover a relationship, if such exists, between repressions and various types of higher processes, intellectual, ethical, and aesthetic. But the problem as it presents itself to the student who is aware of the educational impasse in contemporary society must be to provide guidance for those engaged in the practical task of educating young children.

In a previous section we treated the subject of repression historically, and sought to show that primitive man had laid the foundations of civilisation long before repressions as we now know them had been engrained in the human mind. We touched on the subject of those factors which had led to the formation of complexes in the minds of civilised people. In general, it may/
may be stated that, in our view, repression is a result of the development of a class system.

We have now arrived at the point where it would appear desirable to envisage the process of repression in the concrete setting of the modern home. But such envisagement seems almost impossible at the present stage of the development of the science of psychology. The contemporary scene among psychologists who claim that their views have a bearing on the process of child rearing presents the spectacle of scores of writers with highly disparate views, each asserting that psychological truth is more or less exclusively in his possession. The bewildered lay reader must often be under the impression that the respective writers are referring to quite different things.

Freud, for instance, discovers that the most significant thing about a human being is that he is almost entirely under the control of the unconscious. Adler, on the other hand, leaves the unconscious almost completely out of account. Rank sees the ultimate explanation of everything in the birth trauma; Melanie Klein and Susan Isaacs, in an aspect of child nature which was of old regarded as the seat of original sin. Wittels considers that the basic explanation of human behaviour lies in that irrational self love which goes by the name of "primary narcissism". Roheim and Alexander, in the last resort, consider that human beings are in the grip of biological mechanisms. McCurdy discovers that the principal determinant of human conduct ultimately lies/
lies in the tendency to construct an Oedipus complex, quite irrespective of whether or not the environment provides the materials in the form of parents. Bartlett and Schmalhausen find that human nature has no original content whatsoever, and the form it later assumes is entirely the result of societal forces playing upon it. Unwin leaves us with the impression that human nature is something which must be sexually repressed, and when this process has been effected cultural interests will make their appearance. Money-Kyrle sees on our nature the dark shadow of aggressiveness which will ultimately destroy both the individual and the race unless means can be found of grappling with it. Trotter finds the ultimate explanation of human behaviour in man's peculiar sensitiveness to the whip of public opinion, whereas Kunkel sees as the prime determinant of human conduct the broken if not contrite heart of the child within us all.

The list could be extended indefinitely. On no point does there appear to be agreement. Human nature would seem to be for each writer a mere symbol around which he weaves a more or less consistent body of doctrine. Is it, then, that a significant child psychology is as yet beyond our grasp? The answer would appear obvious.

What can be the explanation of this astounding state of affairs? Unhappily, the answer to this question is also obvious. Psychoanalysis has only begun to psychoanalyse, the pathetic admission/
admission of which fact was revealed some time ago in a book entitled "The Origin of Love and Hate", by the late Dr. Suttie - a book which, we may say, is highly praised. We are told in this work that it is the "love" of the physician that cures.

The most surprising thing about the whole situation is the confidence with which each and every writer expresses his peculiar views. Small wonder Professor McDougall states, in his "Psychoanalysis and Social Psychology": "...the more fully acquainted I become with the history of psychology, the more I am inclined to this pessimistic conclusion, namely, the mental powers of our species are inadequate to the task of building up the science of human nature."

The present writer has the temerity to suggest that he knows where the solution of the difficulty lies, and thus aligns himself with the list of authors to whom he has made reference. He does not claim, however, to have made any new discovery, and would simply assert that the root of the difficulty is in our not being able to accept, in a psychological sense, the simple assertion of Professor McDougall that our mental aberrations are ultimately to be traced back to the workings of the system of taboo, thereby confirming the position taken up by Trotter.

That is, to speak psychologically, we suffer a derangement of the self tendencies, and until we find the means of curing our/

1. Ian D. Suttie, "The Origins of Love and Hate" p.75.
our psychological disorder, the real facts as to the nature of repression will remain unknown to us.

Künkel and Burrow appear to be working along these lines. The ultimate result of the new enlightenment will probably be a confirmation of the views of those psychologists who have been onlookers at the psychoanalytical game, which incidentally may be said to resemble that old-fashioned type of football which is said to have had its origin in certain impious activities of the early Egyptians when scrambling for the head of the mummy of the dead pharaoh. Here, at least, the onlooker would appear to have seen most of the game.

But it is suggested that the exigencies of the contemporary scene cannot allow of our waiting until rival schools of psychology have settled their differences, before a meaningful psychological system is supplied for the guidance of those whose task it is to educate the rising generation during the period of infancy and early childhood. An attempt must therefore be made to arrive at a significant conclusion in respect of the subject under discussion. Is repression good or bad?

The Freudian viewpoint would appear to be that it is a question of degree; too much and too little repression are equally harmful. The educator should so manipulate things that the child goes forward into life with a moderate amount of repression in his psychological make-up. McDougall, along with /

with others, points out that there are very real dangers in withdrawing those taboos which, when applied to the child, result in repressed complexes, although he himself considers the end result as more in the nature of a set of moral prejudices rather than the bringing into existence of a relatively autonomous unconscious system. Professor Drever deals with the matter by stating that repression should be at a minimum, the presumption being that a certain amount of conflict, leading to the type of repression described by Rivers, is inevitable. There is, indeed, a fair amount of evidence pointing in this direction. In our experience, conflicts develop in the mind of the young child in spite of the utmost efforts to control the environment, and systematic use of the methods of prophylaxis by way of providing opportunities for abreaction and for bringing the child's problems to the conscious level.

Writers such as Schmalhausen and Bartlett would have us believe that nothing can be done in the way of effecting modification of our methods of child rearing until our entire class system is swept away. The methods employed in the home in training the young are the reflection of a social organisation based upon the exploitation of the masses by a small minority. Our impression is that these reformers are content to allow the traditional methods of child rearing to continue to/

"James Drever, "The Psychology of Education" p. 72."
to operate as heretofore. Implicitly, in their view, the home is a psychological slum, and nothing can be done about it. Matters will only be righted when a thoroughgoing communism has been applied to our social organisation.

Be this as it may, thousands of contemporary parents are becoming increasingly aware of the vital necessity of applying science to the task of bringing up children. And moreover, it is simply not true to state that traditional methods of child rearing reflect the societal organisation as it exists to-day. While it is true that class distinctions were chiefly responsible for the development of repressions in the human mind, there is in contemporary life hardly a vestige of those dire sanctions which formerly had the power to evoke the immobilisation reaction of the flight instinct on which, ultimately, repression would appear to rest. And most of all, it must be remembered that the ancient gods who would appear to have had their archetype in the pharaohs of Dynastic Egypt, are increasingly losing their hold upon the imaginations of men and women.

We have before us a volume recently issued by the Thinkers' Library, entitled "Humanity's Gain from Unbelief", by Charles Bradlaugh. When this book was first published, towards the end of last century, it was regarded as blasphemous. To-day the arguments appear childish. What was previously considered shocking, appears to-day very largely as an expression of the obvious/
obvious and self-evident. Whether or not it be to our gain, unbelief to-day is almost the normal attitude of mind. Psychologically speaking, the communist revolution of which Schmalhausen and Bartlett dream is already attained. The average man is to-day only moderately afraid of his "boss"; even if thrown out of his job, he will at least not be faced with starvation. He is amused rather than impressed by the display of wealth. The contemporary aristocrat is, on the whole, a very humble person, a little apologetic, if anything, for being placed in a position of social superiority. No one imagines that the deity has a particular preference for the class system which arose in our midst a few millenniums ago. It may be said that already home conditions are reflecting the changing societal organisation. Something is happening within our homes, and we are safe to say that these modifications are totally without precedent. We are quickly becoming uncivilised in a psychological sense. The whole structure of our psychological make-up is being subjected to a process of dissolution.

The primitive was subject to control by taboos, but these represented a process of gradual development. They presented themselves to the individual, to use Trotter's words, with all the force of an "a priori synthesis". They formed part of what/
what might almost literally be described as a social organism. They were peculiarly adapted to the needs of a simple society which had little or no contact with similar societies.

Even though it be accepted that for a few millenniums preceding civilisation as we know it to-day, certain tribes appeared to shake themselves free from the influence of taboo without repression being substituted as a means of controlling the individual, it must be remembered that the process was a very gradual one, and societies were still numerically small and segregated from their neighbours. The Greeks appeared to pass through a similar process of development, in more recent times.

But the present situation is entirely dissimilar. The human mind is being faced with the necessity for massive readjustment as the former method of controlling the individual is being abrogated. Moreover, at the present time we are almost literally members of a society which is world-wide.

Our entire social structure is being undermined. Schmalhausen and Bartlett appear to be oblivious to this fact, or at least they attach to it little significance. Already, as we look around the contemporary scene, there appears to be every indication that the social machine is in part out of control. What is to happen when the civilised mind has attained a further stage of dissolution may be imagined.

We/

We suggest that the psychologist must step into the breach and discover methods by which new foundations for our societal structure may replace those which are being withdrawn. Mere changes in the organisation of the social system will not solve the problems which are being forced upon us. Freud would have us believe that, without repression, human life would cease to exist, and yet he clearly sees that repressions are being undermined with alarming rapidity. But, as we have seen, the whole Freudian position is obfuscated by a mass of fallacious reasoning which is probably unparalleled in the history of science. We are told with somewhat tiresome iteration that psychology is in its infancy and little can be expected from it. The sad truth appears rather to be that that section of psychology which deals with the repressed unconscious is infantile, being in large part a mere reflection of psychic processes which are pathological.

Freud appears to think that, in the distant future, reason might conceivably take the place of repression, but quite understandably, he is not very optimistic. The simple fact is that if we are to control our destiny - the alternative to such control is sufficiently evident - we must apply reason at once to the problems which cry for a solution. Freud has at least taught us this much: the child is almost a finished product at the age of five or six, and therefore the sole effective education is bound up with the formative influences applied/
applied to the child during pre-school years. As we have previously suggested, the alternative to repression as a means of controlling impulse is rejection following a process of deliberation. The half-and-half method is impracticable. The child throughout the early period of his life must retain complete self-confidence if each and every problem as it arises is to be dealt with rationally. Nothing undermines a child's self-confidence so much as the realisation that, after repression has been set up, he is in the grip of compulsions. He early realises that his psychic machine is out of control, and that he is virtually committed to a further, and now witting, series of psychic acts of an irrational order. The present writer clearly remembers the terrible feelings of fatalism which developed in his mind when he discovered that he was in the grip of compulsions.

Our position then is, that in the interests of a continuance of that social life on which all cultural process depends, repression must be pronounced as having a negative relation to cultural development. We suggest that it is the business of the psychologist who is not without a sense of responsibility to tell the truth about repression, describe its nature, and while granting that it may have had a contingent value, to proclaim in no uncertain voice that its continuance is in the highest degree dangerous, and that society must immediately organise itself/
itself in applying rational methods to the process of child
rearing. We suggest that it is mere folly to advise parents
to subscribe to the Freudian doctrine that we should strike a
nice balance between too much and too little repression.
There is no such nice balance; and the only result will be to
weaken indirect taboo control which, as McDougall points out,
has been at least consistent with the continued propagation of
the species, the individual with moderately developed repressions
discovering, as he goes forward into life, that reason is hope-
lessly ineffective in dealing with compulsions which arise from
the unconscious.

As Drever points out, a deeply repressed complex does not
necessarily lead to instability. The reverse is often the
case. Alexander is right when he suggests that repression may
have a function in withdrawing from consciousness a large
number of problems, consciousness then being relatively free to
orient itself in its environment, even though the individual
suffers from restrictions in his aims and purposes. The
universe has narrowed, but it is at least controllable. We
are not without experience in contemporary life of vacillating
unstable personalities who are only moderately repressed, and
would/

"The Psychology of Education" p.75. Professor Drever is
speaking of a complex at the perceptual level. Perhaps
we are accurate in suggesting that such a complex will be
"deeply" repressed when higher levels are attained.
would seem to find it impossible to apply reason to the problems of their lives. The awful example of the spoilt child held up as a warning to Victorian parents has, it would seem, a basis in fact. What in those days was the exception will, if Freudian principles are applied, quickly become the rule.

Professor Drever rightly says: "In our advocacy of freedom for the child we must not forget that the true freedom of the adult is inner freedom on the rational level, which may well be irretrievably lost and destroyed by well meant but ill directed attempts to give a freedom which, if education means anything at all, involves in the long run a negation of true human freedom." Such inner freedom cannot be realised if repressions, of however modified an order, are set up in the mind in accordance with the Freudian doctrine. We suggest that even from the standpoint of freedom on the rational level, there is far more likelihood that this will be attained, if only in part, if the mind has been subjected to a thoroughgoing process of repression. The writer remembers Professor Darroch in the class of Education at Edinburgh University, once stating that if a situation arose which unequivocally demanded the adoption of repressive measures, it was desirable that these should be thorough; both rational control and severe traumatic experiences/

"The Psychology of Education" p.64.
experiences may lead to stability, and even in the second case the individual may exert a considerable degree of rational control over activities which are unconnected with the repressed complex.

The writer, as a child, remembers almost consciously breathing a sigh of relief when a painful sentiment had finally succumbed to repression. One imagines that the position of the half repressed is unenviable. Quite recently a young man in a town near to the writer's home, committed an extraordinary crime, attempting to kill an aunt with whom he had been brought up, while taking a run in a hired car. The writer had a fair knowledge of the case. The young man in question had appeared surprisingly free from "complexes". He was intelligent and had read extensively along the lines of the modern psychology of sex. He knew his Havelock Ellis, and dabbled in Freudian literature. Sexually, his life seemed to be entirely free, and in other respects he appeared free from inhibition. At the time of committing the crime, though in financial difficulties, he was engaged to be married. He was a hairdresser, and although he had had to give up the business of which he had been proprietor, he was a capable worker and could doubtless have secured employment in the city. If one's experience counts for anything, the young man to whom we refer is only an extreme example of the type of irresponsibility which is being bred in the modern home.
The writer has made a careful study of the lives of several young children between the ages of five and fourteen. Sexually, they appear almost entirely free. They are capable of using language which is more usually associated with the barrack-square. When they leave school, they almost at once have a fully developed sex life, with the result that illegitimacy is the rule rather than the exception. On the surface, it would appear that these children belong to an emancipated generation. But this is not the case. The principal attribute of the young people in the district appears to be sheer stupidity. They become involved in endless trouble; one former evening class pupil, a young man of twenty-four, now supports three illegitimate children. A girl who had left school a few months previous to the writer's taking up duty in his present post, was known to attempt suicide at the age of sixteen, by manoeuvring what appeared to be a bicycle accident. The area is literally strewn with tragedies.

To return to the children of school age. The most amazing phenomenon to be observed in these children is the extent to which "conscience" is developed. In the presence of a representative of "authority" they appear completely inhibited. In their homes, they are "well brought up"; they are not allowed to swear, and so on, although in the end,
End exempla docet, both in this respect and in a loose standard of sexual morals. Notwithstanding, "conscience" is developed in the children, several of them having definite symptoms of tics, compulsions, and speech defects. When speaking to them, one is forced to conclude that they have set up within themselves an inner authority which uncompromisingly condemns their overt behaviour. Though they are fully aware that their interrogator views unemotionally and in a rational spirit their departures from good behaviour, there is set up a barrier of resistance which is apparently insurmountable. A boy of nine, brought up in unfortunate surroundings, who was an expert in the use of indecent language, and who at the age of eight had behaved improperly to members of the opposite sex, found it impossible in the presence of the teacher to utter a "bad" word which he had used, incidentally, of a lady member of the staff.

It can be safely said that the majority, if not all of the children, who have been under observation have shown every indication of having resorted to the process of repression. The end result seems to be that they are incapable of any degree of rational self-control. Their later behaviour is marked by irresponsibility, and at times an almost unbelievable callousness towards others. But in the long run their conduct is definitely harmful to their own interests. The question could/
could be raised as to whether their behaviour was the outcome of compulsive mechanisms. The writer would not care to commit himself on this matter, but the facts in the main would lead to the conclusion that overt behaviour is in a fair degree a direct expression of instinctual tendencies. What appears to be repressed is the capacity for rational control. Something within them condemns their recreational activities. Their interests have become "unthinkable". Any attempt to face up squarely to the issues as they present themselves would appear to lead to a highly emotional state of mind which renders calm deliberation, the essential prerequisite of all effective rational control, well-nigh impossible. Half-and-half repressive measures appear to have led to their complete enslavement to lower forms of activity. They live at the perceptual and ideational level; conceptual process would appear to be almost completely inhibited. We suggest that the Freudian panacea has already been tried, and there is every indication that it has dismally failed in bringing about any desirable reform in human nature.

Nothing is more certain than this: we cannot go back to the old methods of instinctual control. Nobody deliberately planned the enslavement of the human mind which took place some six thousand years ago. Repression was an accidental outcome of the development of the class system in Egypt. In the/
the truest sense of the word, it was unwitting. No one
decided to invent the religion of the deified pharaoh in order
to control men's minds by "spiritual" means. No one to-day,
save certain gentlemen of a contemporary European state, would
dream of attempting to reinstate the system of repression as
developed in ancient Egypt. The ultimate outcome of the
experiment referred to is not difficult to forecast. We
cannot go back, nor can we remain where we are. If civilisation
is to continue, we must take the further step of
effecting thoroughgoing reforms in our methods of child rearing.
A deliberate and determined effort must be made so to train our
children that their instinctual impulses can be controlled not
by repression, mild or otherwise, but by rational means, viz.,
calm deliberation followed by rejection. The question at once
arises, can human nature be trusted? We suggest that no one
is called upon to supply the answer. The simple fact is that
human nature must be trusted. If it is beyond the wit of man
to devise means whereby communal life may be rendered accept-
able to the individuals who compose the community, we might as
well face the fact that racially we are doomed.

If we are to prevent repression, it is necessary that we
should know in what it consists, and what are its determinants,
and by what means these may be controlled. We have attempted to
show that half measures are worse than useless. No one who
was fully conversant with the facts could suggest such a policy.
Bearing/
Bearing in mind the views of the authors whose works we have consulted, we shall proceed to give our own views on the subject of repression.

First, we shall consider as proved that most repressions are a result of conflict. In the case of primary repressions, the conflict would seem to lead to a highly painful affective situation. When the pain resulting from the conflict reaches a certain pitch, one of the contending sentiments is automatically withdrawn from consciousness, probably be means of the immobilisation reaction of the fear instinct; the sentiment being subject to repression may now be termed a complex. Among primary repressions, there would seem to be one complex which is formed by a method different from that we have described. We refer to the disgust complex. In this case, a highly painful affective situation may be developed by the disgust emotion being evoked through passive sympathy.

What instincts are involved in those conflicts leading to primary repression? We shall not here specifically concern ourselves with the instinctual tendencies which are ultimately repressed, but rather concentrate on the sentiments which remain acceptable to the conscious personality. Conflict may be occasioned as a result of physical punishment. If severe punishment has been administered, the recollection of the entire situation, which includes the sentiment representing the form of behaviour to which objection has been taken, may become/
become so painful that repression ensues. In this case, it is not quite clear in what way conflict may be considered to be the precursor of the active repression. In practical situations, the child subject to punishment usually feels a strong sense of being the object of disapproval on the part of those who administer the punishment. Conflict would, to that extent, add to the painfulness of the idea representing the situation as described. Among primary repressions, there are probably cases of complexes which are the result of accidents — scalds, burns, severe falls, etc., the highly painful memories left by these incidents resulting in repression without conflict being involved. With older children, however, the thought of the incident becomes shameful in that it contains an element of fear. The child has been trained to feel ashamed of being afraid, conflict thus adding to the painfulness of the sentiment formed in connection with the unpleasant incident.

We would state in passing that parents can easily refrain from disgust conditioning. The memory of painful incidents may be rendered less painful if the child is encouraged to describe them, and opportunities of abreaction can be provided. Painful memories due to corporal punishment need not be formed; the traumatic situation can be avoided if the child is wisely treated.

The prime source of conflict is due to the evoking of the self/
self tendency in its negative aspect; in other words, it is due to the imposition of taboos. The self tendency is capable of conflicting with any impulse which the educators consider undesirable. On account of his possession of the impulse which is subject to the disapproval of his environment, the child may come to experience intense negative self feeling. When the feeling of painfulness reaches a certain point, the sentiment representing the condemned impulse may be withdrawn into the unconscious.

Besides desiring the approval of its educators, the child would also seem to want their love, and this desire may intensify the type of conflict to which we have referred. But it would appear desirable to fix our attention on the self tendency as having a preponderating influence in producing those conflicts which lead to repression. We would ask here if it is necessary for educators to resort to the arousal of negative self feeling in controlling the conduct of their children; and also we would enquire to what extent corporal punishment is justifiable. As we stated when discussing the Freudian position, the child inevitably gains the impression that he is subjected to disapproval, or to physical chastisement, on account of his being blameworthy. In what sense, then/
then, and under what circumstances, can a young child be held responsible for his actions - that is, how far can a child be rightly blamed for his activities?

We must here step outwith the purely psychological field. The child believes that the parent thinks he "ought" to control or "ought not" to possess certain impulses. If the parent is to act in a rational manner towards the child, he must be convinced before "blaming" the child that an ethical situation is actually involved. This at least is clear. No human impulse may be permanently controlled unless the possessor of the impulse is able to adopt a calm and judicial attitude towards it. Once the parent has evoked a strongly emotional attitude in the child in respect of a line of conduct which is considered undesirable, the child is no longer in a position to subject his impulse to rational control. Also if, as a result of punishment, the child comes to view emotionally a line of conduct taught by his educators to be undesirable, rational control is no longer possible. The conclusion would seem to be that the sanctions to which we have referred may not be applied to the young child.

We appear to have withdrawn every weapon from the parental armoury. We suggest, however, that the parent cannot merely leave the child to grow up without providing effective means for controlling/

1. Cf. J. Drever, "The Psychology of Education" p.114: "The third main condition is that the emotional discharge should be at no time so violent as materially to impair through dissociation this normal control."
controlling the instinctual impulses. For one thing, opportunities must be provided for the child's developing social sentiments. The tender emotion, like other instinctual impulses, grows by exercise, and kindly feelings may possibly be inculcated by means of passive sympathy. But we suggest the vitally important thing is to give the child abundant opportunity for developing the processes of rational thought. He must be allowed to learn to reason accurately. Parents may assist by at all times treating the child as a rational being. But there is another aspect of the situation which should not be forgotten. It is not enough merely to decide that "moralising" attitudes towards the child are unjustifiable, and thereupon proceed to act as though the child, under no conceivable circumstances, can be held to be blameworthy in respect of his activities. Like the adult, the young child has an ethical sense, and this fact must be appreciated by the parent. Furthermore, the child has aesthetic preferences and the sense underlying these should be allowed to develop. Probably the best thing the parent can do is to provide tasteful surroundings, but this is not quite enough. If the child's powers of aesthetic expression are to develop to the full, it must feel that this aspect of its personality is appreciated.

So far, we have spoken of primary repression and the means whereby it can be prevented. We shall now turn our attention to/
to secondary repression, which, according to our view, involves what Freud describes as the superego. Here the situation is a little puzzling. The child analysts inform us that the superego is set up without parental intervention. McCurdy and others also accept this view. But if our criticism of the superego as developed in the adult has a basis in fact, the task of the educator would seem to be to prevent as far as possible the development of this psychic institution. The superego, with its dual imagos, should be viewed in the light of psychological tonsils. If they may not be removed by a psychic operation, they should at least be prevented from becoming diseased. There is just the possibility that the development of the superego is to some extent phylogenically determined. But if this be the case, there is all the more reason to discover means of limiting the influence of what should be regarded as merely vestigual. We suggest, however, that meantime no one is in a position to give an adequate account of the superego formation, especially in respect of its ultimate determinants.

What is the nature of secondary repression? And how far may the process be controlled? It is at least certain that the educator cannot accept the superego formation as we know it in the adult as an ultimate. In an earlier section we discussed the views of several writers on the nature and formation of that part of the mind to which Freud refers as the/
the superego. But there seemed little agreement in essentials among the various writers. We suggested that in our view, Künkel came nearest to the truth. We shall here, however, give our personal opinion as to the nature and formation of the superego.

Under traditional methods of early education, the child of three or four discovers that there are large tracts of his psychic nature of which his parents or guardians apparently disapprove. He soon realises that the stirrings of his many forbidden impulses lead to painful feelings of inadequacy and inferiority. In addition, they are accompanied by a feeling that he is "to blame" although he is more or less aware that his parents are unjust in attributing to him responsibility for the impulses with which he has been endowed. The only way to escape the painful feeling resulting from parental disapproval is to discover means of controlling his impulses. For two reasons the child is loath to do this. First, the forbidden impulses are in connection with objects and activities which he values, representing sources of considerable gratification. Secondly, he has an intuitive knowledge that all his impulses are part of himself, and that if he is to develop to completeness, the impulses must form the foundation of later psychic superstructures.

Gradually it is borne in upon the child that control, or rather/
rather suppression is necessary if he is to have the approval of his educators. But the greater the amount of negative self feeling which the child develops in connection with his impulses, the less chance there is that he will be able to suppress them by the rational method. There is a further complication. Many of the impulses to which the adults take exception are uncontrollable on account of their springing from primary repressions. They appear in consciousness with a compulsive force. These compulsive impulses often lead to conduct which the adults consider specially reprehensible. The child discovers himself totally incapable of behaviour which fits in with the pattern approved by his educators. Amongst the forbidden impulses, many of which are of a compulsive nature, are hate, various types of sexual naughtiness, sadism, and in the middle and higher classes a desire to form friendships with "common" children. If cleanliness training has followed the traditional methods, there may be strong coprophilic and urethral interests. The child is in an unenviable position, and especially if he is already in the grip of compulsive mechanisms, he acquires the conviction that he is not quite same. He is, in point of fact, accurate in his self-diagnosis. The whole unhappy situation may be intensified if the child is subjected to corporal punishment on account of one or more of his/

'Note: Sanity, we suggest, could be defined as a state in which the individual knows what he is doing and why he is doing it. Compulsive behaviour resulting from repression is, in our view, the result of partial insanity. We would even insist that/
his "naughty" tendencies.

Continuing our theory of the ontogenesis of the superego system, we suggest that the child at last develops intense feelings of inferiority, owing to the negative self tendency being constantly evoked. It is probable that dispositions left by unpleasant experiences become associated on account of their having a similar feeling tone. At a later stage in the child's development, we suggest that there is something in the nature of "polarisation", sentiments associated with negative and positive self-feeling forming themselves into opposed systems. The situation for the child is highly complicated. In his resistance against authority he has the feeling that he is essentially right; the adults are unjust, applying blame and punishment undiscriminatingly; they betray many signs of having prejudices which are irrational in their nature; their judgments as to fact are out of keeping with the objectively real. They have apparently little or no understanding of the problems with which the child is battling. They live in another world, and often seem to be guided by mere illusions. Such beliefs and thoughts the child harbours, and his sense of separation from those whom he is constrained to respect on account of his susceptibility to herd opinion is increased/

that repression as part of the behaviour of the entire organism should be regarded as an insane reaction, in so far as it is not the result of rational rejection.
increased.

Let it again be remembered that the child's resistance to the adults is not simply due to what is often described as self-will. It would rather seem that the child is in large part fighting for the integrity of what used to be described as his "soul". If he submits to authority, he must in varying degrees obfuscate his sense of values in respect of the distinction between truth and untruth, justice and injustice, and moreover between the aesthetic and the unaesthetic.

In connection with the question as to how far aesthetic issues are involved at the time of the formation of the super-ego, we have so far merely stressed that parental negative evaluation of the coprophilic is without rational justification. But it is our opinion that far more than this is involved. The child, we believe, senses the connection between the free expression of sexuality and his potentiality for aesthetic development. We are also by no means sure that the child is not fully conscious that any effective orientation in the ethical sense is only possible when the "love" impulse is free. We would also here repeat that the child well knows that illusion is dangerous, even though its utilisation is sponsored by the adults.

It is probable that throughout most of the period of human/

*Note: We sought to establish this position in our main critique of the Freudian doctrine. See especially thesis p. 410.*
human history to which the term "civilisation" is applied, the child's resistance was foredoomed to failure. In recent centuries, however, it would appear that children who are passing through this stage of development, have sought out companions among their contemporaries whose attitude towards adult authority is similar to their own. If such companions are found, the home situation is to some extent alleviated. Nevertheless, the child must inevitably be under the eyes of his parents or guardians for a considerable part of the day; also, as the child grows older, he finds himself increasingly urged towards the unification of his experience, and he is involved in further conflict.

It will be noted that we have made no mention of the Oedipus complex. The omission is intentional. As far as we can see, its significance is entirely secondary when one is dealing with the ontogenesis of the superego system. Once the superego system is set up, we would not care to deny that the influence of this complex may be very considerable.

The child is thus faced with an extremely difficult situation. Not only is he subject to painful conflicts during the day, but at night, when the rational faculties are relatively in abeyance, the feeling tone attached to his many unpleasant experiences seems to become displaced in accordance with the principle which leads to what Freudians describe as "over-determination". The night-terror then ensues. It is a/
a mistake, in considering this period of life, to under-estimate the significance of nocturnal fears. As adults, we have usually no longer any remembrance of the events of our childhood to which we have referred; but there is every indication that the night-terror is one of the major afflictions of the human mind. The feeling tone experienced by the child has a degree of intensity which the individual will probably never again be called upon to face. We have reason to suspect that the adult fear of death is little else but a somewhat mild repetition of the extreme horror to which the individual was subjected in childhood when in the grip of the night-terror.

One possible solution for the child's difficulties is on the lines of primary repression. It is not unlikely that the child senses that there is a possibility of this type of repression setting in if his painful conflicts continue. From previous experience, he probably knows that such repression, if resorted to on a large scale, would lead to his virtually losing control of large sections of his psychic organisation. An impulse subject to primary repression generally breaks out as a compulsion. At this juncture, we suggest, does the superego come into existence. We already referred to this stage in the child's development in our discussion of the views of Künkel and Garnett. We can, therefore, at this point, be brief. The child had, on occasion, discovered that he/
he could find temporary alleviation of his painful inferiority feelings by imagining that he was one of his educators. He had formed an idea of himself which in no way corresponded to the reality. He had imagined that he was the adult of whose essentially unethical, illogical, and unaesthetic propensities he had been fully cognisant. Just what happens at this stage is probably, at the present stage of our knowledge, unknown. Künkel speaks of the transition from "occasional to principled egocentricity," and also of "emergency laws" as being "those training formulas by which the refinalisation is made permanent." We have referred to Burrow's "fictitious brain state" and Hadfield's "self-phantasy". It would seem probable that the idea of being someone other than himself becomes permanently set up in the child's mind as a result of subconscious rather than conscious process.

However this may be, there is abundant evidence that the older child has incorporated within himself an idea of the self which acts as a palliative for most of the difficulties which he has experienced. In the child's imagination the parent is now always within, and resultingly, any stirrings of forbidden impulses/

1 See section on Trigant Burrow, thesis p.321.
impulses are immediately checked.

Provided, however, the child has made suitable contacts with his contemporaries, he is able more or less effectively to dissociate his self-phantasy system when engaged in pursuits which are not under the immediate surveillance of the adult environment.

We believe also that the normal individual has a fair intuitive knowledge of the method by which he controls his impulses, and, to use Garnett's conception, he has not lost hold of the threads which go into the making of his personality. Moreover, when giving up the forbidden impulses, he retained what he considered his "rights" of self-expression, to the extent of securing various "internalised" satisfactions. Alexander gives his opinion that the ego, in certain cases of neurosis, may be in league with the id. It is our belief, however, that the ego is always in league with the id. The conscious personality, when normal, makes use of most if not all of its psychological dispositions when orienting itself to the objective environment. The mind acts as a whole. Thus so-called sublimation has not as its main determinant the various automatic processes which are said to occur in the superego. Rather does the individual purposively, if subconsciously/

'Note: It is probable, however, that impulses which have been previously subjected to primal repression may still determine compulsive behaviour, and if the child is involved in further difficulties in respect of these compulsions, the impulse to inconvenient forms of behaviour is itself subjected to repression proper.
subconsciously, elaborate such sentiments as will enable him to make effective contact with his complex environment. As Burt points out, intelligence has been at work in the production of sublimation.

Notwithstanding, it is very probable, in our opinion, that the superego exists in normal contemporary individuals, though not as a determinant of cultural process. The best that can be said of it from this aspect is that it does not interfere much with cultural development, provided the individual does not become "self-conscious". If he does, the superego, normally composed of sentiments which are only slightly subject to dissociation, becomes increasingly inaccessible and therefore autonomous in its activities. The neurotic is, to use Burrow's expression, a person who is "nervous". He is aware of the superego trends, and he thereupon proceeds to further dissociate them. The "healthy" individual has implicit knowledge of his dissociated sentiments, but does not worry himself about the contradictions and pretences of his inner nature. The unconscious is something to be got on with as best one can, and the usual policy with this end in view is to allow one's knowledge of this part of oneself to remain implicit. But in practice, it is reckoned with when the individual is engaged in ordinary everyday activities, and he often displays an accurate, if instinctive, knowledge, both as to his own motives and those of others.

These/

These we consider to be the essential facts as to the nature of what we have described as secondary repression.

We do not contend that the situation as to character formation as discoverable in the normal is desirable. Reference has been made to Trotter's viewpoint in this connection. But we do hold that contemporary man is capable of far more objectivity than Freudians would seem to allow. It can therefore be stated that the abrogation of repressions would by no means demand a complete reconstruction of the psychological bases of our lives. We are largely "normal" already, that is, our ideals and purposes have as their objects our orientation to a real environment, and not an imaginary one: we are, in the main, guided not by illusions but by ideas which have their counterpart in the objectively real.

We have stated that our psychic organisation is not ideal. It is neither desirable nor possible in this paper to describe the manifold "evils" which arise from normal methods of child rearing.

We would, however, state here what has appeared to us obvious, as we have followed the views of the writers to whom reference has been made. With our present psychic organisation, a science of psychology is impossible. As soon as we try to envisage human nature from a scientific standpoint, the/
the most significant facts are at once subjected to a distorting influence, and what in all seriousness are regarded as being essential constituents of normal human nature, are nothing more than the results of unconscious elaborations which are analogous to, if not identical with, the thought processes of the insane.

It is claimed by the exponents of the unconscious that human nature is really like that, and that the ordinary unscientific observer is biased. Our view is that human nature changes when an attempt to get a "close-up" is made. The superego system becomes autonomous, a state of things which is anything but normal: a secondary personality or co-consciousness is developed.

And if a science of psychology is impossible, neither can we have an adequate basis for any of the social sciences, for ethics, or for education. In these spheres our attitude is pre-scientific: we are largely limited in our activities to the method of "rule of thumb".

Should the superego system in the mind be allowed to continue? Our reply is that, if only in the interests of clear thinking, this distorting factor should be removed from our psychic organisation. This, we suggest, can be done provided the child is no longer made to feel "inferior" on account of/

'Note: We have elaborated this point in the appendix, on the detrimental effects of repression.'
of his impulses, and is given full opportunity for rational control.

In conclusion, let us quickly review the salient points which we have had under discussion.

The purpose of our thesis, then, has been to make a contribution to those discussions which must be undertaken before the psychologist can be in a position to carry out the task of placing society on a secure foundation. Has repression a relation to cultural development? We have sought to demonstrate that repression is essentially a dysfunction of cultural process, and in accordance with our arguments, society has nothing to fear in freeing the mind from the influence of repressed complexes.

Also, we have attempted to show that the Freudian contention that repression is inevitable is without foundation. The educator may, then, have confidence in seeking to bring the mind under rational control.

On the other hand, we have sought to demonstrate that civilisation proper has had as its concomitant the development in each individual of a repressed unconscious, this resulting from the demands for obedience on the part of the holders of power. Hence, the abrogation of the system of repressions set up in the civilised human mind must entail massive readjustment. Therefore we have held that it is necessary that the full implications of effecting changes in the civilised human mind should be realised.
It has been emphasised that there is only one safe course to adopt, viz., so to train the young child that his impulses may be subjected to rational control. In this matter we are glad to find that we are in essential agreement with the viewpoint expressed in Professor Drever's "Psychology of Education".

We have felt it necessary to show in its true light the Freudian claim that they are in a position to offer safe guidance to parents in the education of young children - one fears at the expense of extending this thesis to unreasonable proportions. We have described the Freudian maxim of "not too much and not too little repression" as being mischievous to a degree. It has been shown that the Freudian panacea has been tried and has failed dismally.

Also, we have contested the Freudian assertion that man's nature cannot be trusted unless a system of control by repressed complexes is instituted as part of his psychological make-up. We have argued that man attained to a high level both of societal organisation and cultural activity, without repression. Moreover, we have referred to the claims of anthropologists that the unspoiled primitive has many qualities which we might well emulate.

In order to establish the position that it is not necessary to repress sexuality as a means of ensuring the conservation and increase of cultural values, we examined the assertions of/

See Appendix, p. 520.
of the Freuds as to the part played by repressed sexuality in giving rise to cultural process, attempting to show that repression could not have been the cause of cultural development, because:

(1) During the days of pre-history it was absent.

(2) During the historical period sex repression has been the exception.

(3) When the attempt to repress sex was made in recent centuries, the repressive forces were sufficiently weakened for the individual implicitly to ignore the prohibitions of the internalised moralising agent; cultural advance was therefore made not because of the superego but in spite of it.

We have drawn attention to the essentially unethical, unaesthetic, and illogical nature of the superego. Repression, we have argued, is a dysfunction of cultural process. The freeing of the mind from the influence of repressed complexes is entirely desirable, provided the implications of the changes in psychological organisation are understood by the leaders of society. Given intelligent direction of the present trend to dispose of the influence of repression, mankind may be set on a new road to progress.

As Briffault says: "The abolition of each obsolete survival means not only an obstacle removed, but the setting free of all the force which had been engaged in struggling against it. Huge sources of power await liberation, incalculable stores of energy lie as yet untapped."

And/

And again to quote Briffault: "Seldom indeed has such good fortune befallen man as to be permitted to wage that straightforward fight; whenever it has been granted him, he has acquitted himself with singular ease, and the issue has been for him a triumphant victory. Human evolution has indeed been a long and arduous battle, but against quite other forces. It is against obstacles which it has itself erected that the mind of man has been fated to war and struggle. Not the difficulties of the problems set before it, not the infirmities of reason have resisted and crippled its action, but man-made artificial obstacles, deformities forcibly, traumatically inflicted upon it in a constant and determined effort to paralyse it. In the conflict which constitutes the evolution of humanity, the antagonist of rational thought has been thought falsified by custom and by the interests of power. ....Human thought has shown itself competent enough to fulfil its function whenever it has been set free. Freedom is not, as it has become the fashion to consider, an empty shibboleth, but the condition of human development."

That freedom must again be established, and without reservation.

VI.

Appendices.
Appendix I.

"A Memorable Fancy"
The Poems of William Blake, published by
Macmillan & Co., 1931, p.169...

The passage referring to the above was written from
memory, and on tracing down the reference, it was discovered
that we had taken some liberties with the images described
by Blake. We have, however, left the text as it stands.
The general conception is the same.
Appendix II.

A working out of the detrimental effects of repression on cultural development .......

(a) On higher psychic powers.

(b) On intellectual development, particularly in respect of its influence on the leaders of society.

(c) On ethical development.

(d) On aesthetic development.

(e) On religions development.
Our position is that the repressed unconscious is not to be regarded with equanimity, but as a powerful dysfunction of all that should be rightly considered as cultural development. When this topic is being discussed, there is often a certain amount of confusion as to the various definitions of the unconscious. Freud seems to claim for his repressed psychic systems all the attributes of unconsciousness. But repression, it would appear, has no connection with what may be described, for want of a better name, as the higher psychic powers.

Telepathy, "second sight", etc., are faculties of whose modus operandi the subject has no consciousness, but there is no reason to think that they are manifestations of the repressed unconscious. The building up of a system of thought, the development of an artistic conception, proceed outwith direct conscious control; purposiveness is often without foresight. This is the way our mind works, and the proposition is far more tenable that the repressed unconscious interferes with higher mental powers, than that a repressed system conditions or facilitates the functioning of these powers. The coincidence of the neurotic disposition and genius does not prove that genius is a result of repression; rather would it suggest that the genius, in childhood, showed a sensitiveness which caused him to be specially susceptible to those mental hurts inherent/
inherent in our child-rearing system, called by psychologists "traumata". This would appear self-evident.

If the superego system is what we have suggested, it is not improbable that it represents an interference factor of the first magnitude in the process of self-realisation, the development of powers in our kind which are at present manifested in the exceptional, in genius, and in the psychologically unbalanced. It may well be, indeed, that the supreme dysfunction of repression lies in its interference with what Myers described as the "supernormal". The conscious mind can do much to withstand the bias, the distorting influences, of the repressed unconscious upon intellectual, ethical, aesthetic, and religious life, since these activities are dependent upon processes arising from sentiments whose nature we understand. It would be logical to presume that morbid unconscious processes would exert a more baneful influence on other processes whose delicate workings were also lodged in the unconscious regions of the mind.

It is not unlikely that the capacity for reviving percepts, images, and concepts at the right moment, underlies unconscious process no less than conscious, and it is a matter of common experience that repressed impulses interfere to a serious degree in the process of reinstatement. The neurotically/
neurotically inclined individual will at times discover that the simplest and apparently least significant matters, emotionally considered, are temporarily beyond recall: almost all association paths seem to be blocked. It is therefore probable that repressed complexes act similarly on the processes of the normal unconscious.
Let us now consider how repression affects the intellectual life. We have just mentioned how complexes interfere with the power of reinstatement. There can be no considerable intellectual advance without a good memory. We have referred to the supernormal powers of the unconscious, powers which are, as far as one can see, hardly the result of any prior intellectual process. The arithmetical genius would be a case in point. But what we commonly regard as the storehouses of memory are largely filled as a result of our capacity for apperception, the weaving of the new with the old; and if, owing to a failure of memory through interference factors set up by the repressed unconscious, some of the normally associated memories fail to appear, any complete mastery of facts as presented will be impossible. Aspects will be unrealised, and the mind will inevitably tend to proceed along biased lines.

But most of all, we have to face the fact that humanity has decided that introspection is morbid, and, we suggest, not without good reason. Introspection is instinctively associated, in popular thought, with introversion. It is taken for granted that an objective attitude to one's own mental processes does not, in fact, lead to self-knowledge, but to delusional thinking. Freed, in part, from the influence of custom thought and power thought, humanity is to-day able to adopt/
adopt a rational attitude to the objectively real and also to human conduct regarded externally. But it seems constitutionally incapable of delving into its own hidden motives without danger of losing objectivity, and without substituting illusion for fact.

A disinterested observer of scientific activity must be impressed by the impossibility of explaining, on rational principles, the urge to concentrate on some very limited aspect of experience, to the exclusion of all others. A good case can be made out that high specialisation is advantageous to society; human knowledge has gained such a degree of complexity that the mastery of the facts in even a sub-section of a branch of science is the task of a life-time. But there would appear to be no reason why, by a further process of subdivision of labour in the scientific field, the individual worker should not be freed from the necessity of excessive limitation of his interests to the detriment of his wider cultural development. To thinkers of the Greek age, our present-day scientists would be classed with the monomaniac and the fanatic. They would immediately sense the danger arising from these individuals gaining the power of prestige suggestion. What can be expected of the masses, if our intellectual leaders have so narrowed down their interests that they are incapable of bringing an adequate system of knowledge?

'Cf. Alex. Darroch, "Education and the New Utilitarianism" (1914) p.95.'
knowledge to bear on the wider problems which press for a solution?

There is in the human being a powerful drive towards consistency. It is seen in the child, who seeks to bring his acquirements in knowledge into mutual relationship. It is shown in the Freudian process of rationalisation, and perhaps most pathetically of all in the logic of the insane. The hunger for relatedness, wholeness, is no Freudian sublimation, a disguised manifestation of some other and more fundamental tendency. It is not a figment of the philosopher's imagination projected into the minds of his less sophisticated brethren. It is a simple fact, revealed by introspection, and by observation of the conduct of others in all classes and at all levels of the scale of intelligence.

McDougall has done us a service in showing how all our activities are related to the self, and Drever has demonstrated, in connection with the self-sentiment, how the idea of the self provides a unifying principle for human life in its entirety. At every point we ask ourselves, how is this or that fact related to me? The young child shows in undisguised form what we might call the principle of self reference. The savage also does not forget that his experiences are "owned" by himself.

We suggest that in the civilised adult, the ego sentiment has/

"L. Levy-Bruhl, "The Soul of the Primitive" (1928) p. 15."
has within it derivatives from a "self complex", which, for want of a better term, we might describe as the superego. Instead of the point of internal reference being to an adequately defined idea of the self, the civilised adult discovers that he must attempt to refer his experience to a blurred and internally chaotic superego self concept. The self sentiment would appear to be largely incapable of fulfilling its vitally important function of causing mental systems to be built up into a coherent whole. Thus even the thinking of the scientist is piecemeal, and he is constrained to make a virtue of his acceptance of the principle of thoroughgoing irrationality. "Know thyself" has been the parrot cry throughout the ages, but man has well known his apparent constitutional incapacity for self-knowledge. Before the self idea can again emerge in its unifying clarity, the superego system must be abrogated. Until such time as this can be effected, scientists must accept the charge that, in a greater degree than their lay brethren, they have chosen to be unscientific. The scientific spirit is the spirit of the whole, and the non-specialist is in an advantageous position in respect of making some progress in the unifying of his experience.
Ethical.

According to popular views, the moral philosopher deals with unreality. His ethical systems are intuitively felt to deal with irrelevancies. As Professor Seth points out, moral philosophy is an attempt to clarify an ethical sense already existent in the unreflective individual. But it would seem that the task of the philosopher is foredoomed to failure. Rational principles in relation to behaviour as found in a civilised age do not exist. Conduct is based on a compromise between principles arising from the repressed unconscious, and those relating values which are objectively conditioned. Common-sense morality does not attempt to systematise these two sources of ethical judgment, intuitively feeling that this is not possible. Logic simply does not apply if we are to get on with our business of living, and behave reasonably well towards our contemporaries. Any attempt to reflect on the logical bases of our moral conduct leads, not to greater clarification, but to the closing up of the wellsprings of the ethical life. Aboulia is a necessary consequence of applying "the pale cast of thought" to ethical judgment.

As from the intellectual viewpoint, the ordinary man generally succeeds in attaining some implicit inner unification. He has a moral philosophy no less than a philosophy of/

'James Seth, "Ethical Principles" (1908) p.8.
of life. Wisdom lies in refraining from the attempt to express either in terms of logically related concepts. Blake tells us the fate of "love outspoken"; a similar fate awaits our implicit philosophies if we are so rash as to turn the light of reason upon them.

The mind acts as a whole, even in its partial enslavement, and meanwhile it is felt to be the mark of the fool rather than the wise man to attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable, the implicit contradictions which lie at the root of our existence.

Moral philosophers, in the main, may be divided into two classes - those who accept conscience as being able to give guidance for behaviour without considering the consequences of our actions, and those who would seek the sanctions for our moral behaviour in societal life. We suggest that these views cannot be combined. The first is irrational, and the second is impracticable. The pure intuitionist accepts the findings of conscience as ultimate, irrespective of social consequences; he is provided with a set of a priori rules of conduct to which he conforms; he is responsible, not to man but to God: the rationalist, on the other hand, if logical, will at every moment enquire if the consequences of his actions, immediate and remote, are in accordance with ideals such as the greatest good of the greatest number, this including his own contemporaries/

"James Seth, "Ethical Principles" (1908) Chapter on "Moral Ideals."
contemporaries, and individuals in the future. The first will develop into a harsh dogmatist, and it is probable that moral pride will not be long in overtaking him. The second will become a sceptic. Rarely can we say whether the ultimate consequences of our actions will be good or evil.

Some ethical thinkers attempt to combine these views under a doctrine of self-realisation as the supreme end of man. Before them they have a conception based on what they consider to be the psychology of the instincts, coupled with the Aristotelian notion that an idea of perfection can be formed for every creature and thing. But, we suggest, the individual who could find inspiration in looking at an image of himself as a splendid synthesis of the instinctive tendencies, governed in accordance with the mean of temperance, and at the same time crushing down evil impulses in a manner indicated by divine revelation, is not far from being pathological. There is every reason to think that such a narcissistic conception of the way of life is nothing but an emanation of the Freudian superego, a product of illusion, a mirage which may, in part, contain something of worth.

But as we are to-day organised, it can only draw us to our doom. We shall leave behind us the wellsprings of our humanity: narcissism and vital ethical life are incompatible.

We/

'T Professor Seth uses some such conception, which he describes as "Eudaemonism". ("Ethical Principles" (1908) Chapter III.)
We cannot have a science of ethics. If we entrust ourselves to our deeper intuitions, living a life of inner compromise, accepting indeed, diametrically opposed principles, we may at least have a fair chance of remaining happy, and should thus confer on our fellows the greatest benefit which we can conceive under present conditions. On the whole, we should not act too badly towards others, and we should neither become persecutors on behalf of an ideal goodness, nor should we trouble the land by preaching wild schemes of social reform which, more likely than not, if carried out, would have little ultimate utility.

Let it not be thought that the writer views with favour, or indeed with equanimity, the morality of the "normal", who is precluded from any satisfying orientation towards others. In his relations with children he is inevitably unsympathetic; he is incapable of understanding the ideals and ways of life of individuals in lower or higher social strata; he is as a minute unicellular organism, carried hither and thither by the currents of social movements. If evolution is a gigantic force working ever beneficently towards some high goal, he is the ideal unit being without power to withstand the high policy of cosmic trend. But if, as would seem more likely, man must either control himself or go down into the dust, the individual is pathetically unfitted for the gigantic task of controlling the social/
social machine which has, as it would seem, been created as an emanation of his own irrational mentality. We would suggest that contemporary man has no ethical philosophy, and is meantime precluded from developing one. Thouless likens society to a car driving across an open space, the passengers in which do not exercise any control over the steering wheel.' The metaphor would seem to express the situation as it really exists.

On the basis of our study, it would appear that the inherency of the superego system is the stumbling block in ethical progress. It is the seat of illusions, is based on untruth, on an acceptance of evil as good and good as evil. Although the normal individual does not by any means wholly submit to its domination, he is bound to accept its existence as a simple fact, and any effective adaptation must take into consideration its influence, its factual existence, as part of the entire situation. The superego system must be resolved, be completely abrogated, if man is ever to rise to an intelligent control over his destiny, for such control is in the last resort dependent on the intelligent application of ethical norms in the organisation and development of our social life.

'R. Thouless, "Straight and Crooked Thinking" pp.242-44.
Aesthetic.

It is more than a truism to say that beauty is in the mind, in the eye of the beholder. The indispensable quality of the aesthetic is in the inter-relation of parts to the whole in accordance with a definite norm. We do not feel it necessary here to elaborate the point. If, as we have tried to show, the superego system is a pathological formation, repellant to the intellectual, ethical, and aesthetic sense, it would follow that the existence of a superego at all times detracts from vital aesthetic experience. It imposes a limitation upon our best efforts to reduce our experience into that order which our ideal of beauty demands.

Clutton Brock and others would suggest that mankind has a hunger for the beautiful, as strong as the hunger for truth, righteousness, or, indeed, the hunger for food. Matthew Arnold, William Morris, and, amongst contemporary writers, J. C. Powys and Professor Jacks, all dilate upon the evil effects of beauty starvation, the suppression of the aesthetic sense.

The superego, we suggest, has a dysfunction in its relation to aesthetic process, being a part of the mind whose ugliness enters into the process of empathy. Beauty can only/
only be realised in its completeness if the soul itself, the perceptive organism, is freed from the dross of ugliness.'

Freudians have insisted that there is a relation between repression and art. The facts to which they draw our attention are undeniable. Art, more often than not, is born out of conflict, conscious and unconscious, but we are by no means obliged to see in that relation the principle of causality. We would rather suggest that, when the artist feels the need of self-expression, he must inevitably relate such expression to the ideals of beauty to which his nature responds. Were he completely free from repression, he would likewise put into any work which he undertook the same conception of loveliness which enters into his work under contemporary conditions. The artist is born with extreme sensitivity, and the fact that repression and art as a rule exist side by side is to be explained on the basis that the artist's sensitive nature must inevitably, under our present system of child rearing, become entrammelled in the meshes of what Freudians call "excessive repression."

We suggest that the artist expresses himself through beautiful forms in spite of, not because of, his neurosis.

'Professor L. Jacks, speaking in this connection, says: "The beauty of the landscape will escape us unless we ourselves are 'beautiful people'". ("The Education of the Whole Man", p.57).
Religious.

If religion stands for truth, goodness, and beauty, then the superego and its associated system of repressed impulses must be regarded as the arch enemy of religious values. We have tried to show that religion cannot tolerate the conception that repression indirectly determines the strivings, the desires, which characterise the religious mind, nor can religion benefit by any projections thrown up by the repressed unconscious. We have often heard the assertion that the completed whole does not depend for its validity on the value of the parts which enter into that whole. Beneath the violet is an earthy mould, the beautiful greenhouse bloom depends for its perfection on the application to its roots of due proportions of manurial substance. Is it not possible, it is argued, that projections whose determinants are the base in human life may, in accordance with a divine scheme, correspond to objective realities? On account of its quality of containing within itself the germ of the whole, the Leibnitzian monad may be able to produce perceptions, images, and conceptions, which exactly correspond with the nature of that universe of which it is an integral part. Therefore, it may be argued, we should not be surprised if the human psyche should, even though by devious workings, produce ideas which correspond/
correspond with external reality.' Evolution proceeds from the simple to the complex, often by methods which appear bizarre and strange.

Is there not, then, a strong presumption that the superego is just another instance of nature's queer workings? This, we suggest, is implicitly the belief of many contemporary religious psychologists who accept the superego at what we may term its "face value". Given the acceptance of the doctrine of sublimation, a consistent philosophy of religion must also accept the view we have above delineated. But we hope we have shown in our discussion of the Freudian superego that the religious thinker should regard this emanation of the repressed unconscious as only to be explained when subsumed under the category of "the evil", an exemplification of the workings of the powers of darkness. Its deceitfulness, its sheer insensitivity to ultimate values, its role as poseur, its overweening childishness, qualify it for the fate of those who are thrust into outer darkness. It can be no helpmeet to any whose business it is to bring down on earth the things of the Kingdom; rather is it a deadly foe, whose insinuations may deceive even the elect, being at all times ready to take advantage of its "topographical" setting just/

just outwith the borders of that part of Mansoul which is the seat of the divine. For inspiration, religious and cultural, in the wider sense, may rightly claim to have its source in the unconscious.

If religion claims that it is more than an emanation of the unconscious clothed in specious rationalisation, if it is confident that the little child may become aware of the Father which is in Heaven, by a process other than the dark projections which result from complexes formed under conditions which cannot wittingly be reproduced by any parent to whom justice and truth appear as having ultimate significance - if such is the conviction of religion, then its attitude towards the superego in contemporary life must be precisely that of the simple and unsophisticated. It is something to be got on with as best we can, an inescapable limitation of our inner soul; something which may not be abrogated by psychological analysis, not because it is sacrosanct, not because self-knowledge is opposed to the divine will, but simply on account of the fact that introspection, as we are at present constituted, leads only to introversion; it does not free us from our inner irrationality, but, by charging the system referred to with a greater cathexes of libido, it draws us increasingly within its influence. The last stage is indeed worse than the first.

A/
A rational religion will be tolerant of human limitations when it realises their essential inevitability, but will not revive within the soul the dark image of the Egyptian priest or the Hebrew prophet. It will not emphasise the thunderings of Sinai, descanting on an intimidated people a set of categorical imperatives which could only further paralyse the intellects of the broken-spirited who cowered around that hill to approach which was death. Such, we would state, cannot be accepted as part of present-day religious teaching. Let religion preach the Fall, let it insist on sin, the worm in the heart, a devolution from Arcadian acceptance of the norms of human kindliness, truth, and love. Let it emphasise the beauty of holiness. Whatever else psychoanalysis teaches us, we are brought to greater realisation that we see as through a glass darkly. Revelation cannot be complete until truth, beauty, and goodness be restored as the corner-stones of our psychic structure. Repression is no precondition of a religion which has vital meaning.

The founder of the Christian religion must be regarded as having lived within the closed psychic system brought into existence when our ancestors departed from the principle of brotherhood, and came to regard men as mere means to their own ends. The Jewish nation, more than any other, bears the impress/
impress of the dead hand of Egyptian culture. The founder of Christianity was a Jew, living at a period in his nation's history which inevitably resuscitated the age-long endopsychic conflict. The oppressor was within their gates, beating into the structure of their minds new psychic malformations. In distant Rome was the king-priest, whose edicts were carried out with impersonal cruelty. A loyalty was demanded of them which revived in their souls that hatred first implanted in the land of Goshen, beneath a fierce Egyptian sun. More and more of their psychic energies were drawn into the superego system. The Roman governors found quite outwith their understanding the fierce fanaticism of a people who responded so differently to the mild rule which in other places ensured a fairly willing acceptance of the Pax Romana.

What were the problems, social and religious, of the Galilean teacher? How did he solve them? Under the conditions with which he was faced, how did he acquit himself? Did he act as a realist, accepting things as he found them, paying to Caesar his due, yet remaining detached, realising that he was fore-doomed to accept intuition rather than knowledge as his guide, with limited vision doing his utmost to provide a solution for the terrific conflict which was raging within his own mind, and the minds of his contemporaries? It is said that he knew what was in men. He could read their hearts. Was he, one/
one wonders, purely a "superegoist", or did he live largely outwith his superego system, interpreting the inner law, the inner prophets, in accordance with the norms which guide the lives of people who succeed in remaining largely normal, during most of their lives pursuing their interests, leaving the great world to go its way?

We do not attempt to answer these questions. We suggest that if Christian religion would give rational interpretation to its conception of the divinity of its founder, it must take into consideration the theory of repression which we have attempted to describe. We suggest that its apologetic must be on the lines of showing that Christ attained a contingent perfection in spite of, and not because of, the repressed unconscious: he was a hero who, under conditions the complexity of which we are only now beginning to realise, inaugurated a movement which he intuitively felt would restore wholeness to the human mind. His battle must inevitably have been - that is, if we are to regard him as our race's saviour - with that superego system which was a legacy from the time when the founders of civilisation took a wrong turn, the magnitude of whose evil consequences would justify its identification with the Fall of Man. In the days of early Egypt, man had perhaps not risen far, but he had reached a point where he was capable of/
of rising. He fell, not so much from an initial perfection as from a stage in evolutionary development which had within it the potentialities of that Utopian world of which we dream.

The facts of evolution demonstrate that whole species have taken a wrong turn, and have ultimately fallen upon extinction. Indeed, nature would appear to have had far more failures than successes. The evolutionary road is strewn with the remains of those who have proved unfit. Even human history is a record of races which blossomed forth, found a temporary niche in the scheme of nature, and disappeared for ever from the face of the earth, leaving behind them neither their culture nor their progeny as a contribution to ultimate racial progress! Indeed, we often forget that anthropologists, when considering the lives of the world's peoples in the period preceding the New Stone Age, at most twenty thousand years ago, speak only of races which are extinct. Of our own ancestors, they have nothing to tell us. They can produce no artifacts, no skeletal remains, not a direct clue, to guide us in our search after the endowments and mores of those who carried forward the torch of life into the modern world. Even of the Egyptians, the most that can be said is that they were derived from the original/

'Frederick Tilney, "The Master of Destiny" p.327.
original stock from which sprang the Solutreans.

If the Egyptians happened to take a wrong turn, we need feel no surprise. It is merely a habit of nature, shown in countless other settings. We would suggest that it is a mistake on the part of theological thinkers to attempt to account for contemporary history as a product of evolutionary process. Theologians of bygone ages had probably a clearer insight into things as they are, when they insisted on the doctrine of original sin which is born anew in each generation. The teaching of science to-day should not lead us to deny this doctrine, but should enable us to see when and where the fatal virus entered the human soul. Many religious thinkers to-day are enamoured with the doctrine of sublimation, little realising that sublimation is just as much a symptom of the disease of civilisation as the most repellant perversion. Religion must go to the roots, if it would justify its mission, should not politely acquiesce in the superego system as "good in parts", but should seek with all the forces at its command to eradicate the evil that is within men.

Notwithstanding, the keynote of its teaching must be first tolerance - what has been described as "psychiatric tolerance" - refraining alike from praise and blame. Its chief/

'S. D. Schmalhausen, "Sex in Civilisation" p.391.
chief attack, if such a word may be used, should be in the altering of those nursery conditions which inevitably bring the superego system into existence. The norms of truth, goodness, and beauty, must be applied with unswerving loyalty deviation from them being kept at a minimum. It must be accepted that no contemporary parent can be expected to behave "psychologically" on all occasions, yet the cumulative efforts of child educators through several generations must inevitably result in the weakening, if not the complete abrogation, of systems of repression as we know them.
Appendix III.


"The general principle is that the activity of a complex may be restrained and controlled without the repression of the complex - that is, Freudian "repression". The fact that the line of action prompted by a "wish" is not accepted, does not necessarily imply the creation of a repressed complex. The conditions requisite for the achieving of this result, that a complex may be controlled and restrained rather than repressed, are of some educational importance. The first main condition is that the self should be stably organised on a sufficiently broad basis. The second main condition is the recognition by this stably organised self of the existence of the complex in question and its relation to the self, which implies the entering of the complex into the organisation as a recognised part. The third main condition is that the emotional discharge should be at no time so violent as to materially impair through dissociation this normal control.

The above passage would seem to sum up Professor Drever's position as found throughout "The Psychology of Education".
VII.

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Addenda.
