VOLUME I.

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For the Degree of PH. D.
THE RELATION OF REPRESSSION TO CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT.

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Introduction.
The title of this thesis is "The Relation of Repression to Cultural Development." During his period of special study, the writer has followed various lines of thought derived from a large number of sources, and now that the time has come to embody his findings in thesis form, he discovers that it is quite impossible to treat in full the subsections of the territory which he has attempted to explore. Before him are notes taken from the works of perhaps a hundred and fifty authors, dealing with subjects which, though relevant to the task undertaken, could not be incorporated into thesis form without extending the work to an inordinate length.

Notwithstanding, the writer has felt it necessary, in large part, to follow the draft submitted at the beginning of the period of study. The subject of repression is a vast one, covering, if psychoanalysts are right, almost the whole field of human activities. "Repression is civilisation", according to Freud, and in addition the claim has been put forward that the life of the primitive is also largely determined by repression. Every aspect of contemporary life has been brought within the orbit of Freudian theorising, and the student who sought to discuss in detail every view put forward by psychoanalysts would require to follow them into the domain of all the mental sciences which they claim to have re-written.

Yet/

Yet the writer does not feel justified in leaving out of account the main trends of current thought which are relevant to the subject under discussion. Any true perspective of the part played by repression in cultural development can only be attained by seeing the phenomena of unconscious process in their historical and sociological setting.

Since, however, the present thesis must be subject to the limitations imposed upon the writer by considerations of space and time, it will be necessary to summarise in large part the lines of thought which have been pursued. Rigid selection must also be made of the viewpoints of the numerous authors who have contributed to the subject under discussion.
II.  

The Problem Outlined.
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The Problem Outlined.

What is the relation of repression to cultural development? Freudians are quick to supply the answer: repression is the supreme cause, the sine qua non, of cultural development: no repression, no civilisation. Repression is a function of all cultural process; abrogate it, and the whole social fabric will come tumbling down about our ears. The questioner is overwhelmed by a vast body of facts which purport to prove indisputably that repression is civilisation and all that it stands for.

Others again, including, indeed, Freudians themselves in different mood, insist that repression is an evil of the first magnitude, the enemy of rational thought, true morality, and satisfying aesthetic experience. But challenge these detractors of the institution of repression, and they will reveal every sign of radical dissociation. Implicitly or explicitly, they are harbouring divergent and irreconcilable views. The Freudian evades the issue by advocating "neither too much nor too little repression", and the champion of non-repressionist views will probably declare that what he really means is that, in an ideally constituted society, repression would not be necessary.

But the problem of the relation of repression to cultural development calls for a solution. The question has more than a theoretical interest. Repressions to-day are being undermined on a vast scale. Religion is declining, societal changes occur with alarming rapidity, the moorings of old ways of life are loosened/
loosened. We are faced with dangers without parallel in the history of our race.

Repressions are being undermined, indeed, partly on account of the dissemination of psychoanalytical teaching. If, as Freudsians claim, the conservation and increase of cultural values is dependent on repression, it would seem that the human mind will soon lose all its higher syntheses of the instinctual tendencies. The social implications are clear. Civilisation would almost inevitably collapse if its individual members were no longer subject to ethical and other controls.

If the Freudsians are right, we are confronted by a very grave crisis. In accordance with their theory, culture and civilisation can only be saved by finding means of re-introducing those sanctions which in the past led to the formation of repressed sentiments. Even if they are wrong, the present situation can in no way be regarded with equanimity. Unwin has given his considered view as to the effect of releasing the forces of repression. McDougall has stated his opinion that the continuance of communal life has at all times depended on the existence of taboos; whenever taboos have been withdrawn, social decline has followed. If these writers are accurate in their statements, the undermining of our system of repressions, unless something is put in their place, must inevitably lead to the destruction of our civilisation. We consider it our task to make a contribution, however slight, to the elucidation of the issues bound up with the question of/
of repression in relation to the life of contemporary society.

As a result of his line of study, the writer has become increasingly aware that it is the duty of psychologists to prepare a definite plan of action, by following which society may stave off the disasters which appear to lie in its path, and, by the careful application of a considered policy, place the social organism on secure foundations.

Freud has at least convinced us of the significance of the first years of life. If society is to save itself, it will be necessary to apply science to the education of the pre-school child. The present writer has had before him the works of a large number of authors who offer guidance to parents in their task of educating young children. We have been forced to the opinion that the guidance offered, especially by Freudian writers, must inevitably have a deleterious influence on the children themselves, and later on the society of which they are to form a part. The Freudian advice to parents runs as follows: "Be careful not to cause too much repression, but remember that it is equally dangerous to cause too little." Other writers suggest that parents should not adopt a repressive attitude towards their children, but, though they are right, they supply little but negative guidance. Education can never be a matter of leaving children alone; it must be an active process, and the successful educator must have a very clear conception both of the nature of the child and the ends to be realised, and of the means to realise these ends. The alternative to repression is not "non-repression". The task/
task of educating the young child is both a science and an art. A mere catalogue of "don'ts" is, in the main, what is supplied for the guidance of parents by those writers who consider that repression is an evil.

The position taken up in regard to child education by almost all writers both of the Freudian and other schools, appears unsatisfactory to a degree. We consider that the confusion is partly due to inadequate conceptions of the nature of repression, and partly to the fact that the problems in connection with repression are not sufficiently envisaged in their wider setting.

We construe our present task as an attempt to bring into perspective the issues bound up with the subject of repression. Our plan is as follows: we shall first review the opinions of a number of writers on the subject of the repressed unconscious. This will take the form of a series of short articles dealing with each writer in turn. In this section we shall adopt the policy of criticising the views discussed as we proceed. We realise that this method is unusual. The reason for following it is that, in the present stage of the development of the psychology of the unconscious, it would appear impossible effectively to co-ordinate the views of writers in this field. We have felt it desirable to set down the principal trends of thought in connection with the psychology of repression and sublimation. We have gathered together representative views on these subjects, and in developing our thesis in the sequel, we have/
have kept before us as far as possible the findings of the writers whose works we have studied. But it seemed impossible to attempt the synthesisisation of the many disparate views presented. As we hope to show, few of the authors to whose works we refer show any degree of consistency within their writings. The disadvantage of following out this plan has been that we have been involved in a certain amount of repetition.

Our main critique of the Freudian writers we later base on a study of Franz Alexander's "Psychoanalysis of the Total Personality." In the case of writers who hold that repression is undesirable, we have been content to confine our remarks within the body of the articles in which their views are treated, in some cases pointing out where they should be supplemented, and in others suggesting that implicitly they are themselves in part accepting the Freudian position that repression is a determinant of cultural process.

We shall then concentrate on repression in its historical aspect, particularly seeking to answer the Freudian contention that repression has been the principal determinant of cultural development. We shall refer to works both on anthropology and the history of civilisation. We shall endeavour to demonstrate that the evidence is in the main against the Freudian view of repression as having played a large part in cultural development. We shall then proceed to examine closely the claim of the Freudians as to the value of the superego as a determinant of cultural process, using as a basis for discussion, as we have already stated, Franz Alexander's "Psychoanalysis of the Total Personality". At/
At this stage we hope to have shown that, from the standpoint of culture, repression should be regarded as a dysfunction rather than a function of higher forms of mental process. We shall then seek to outline the conditions under which repressions may be safely dispensed with in the education of young children. Our position will be that the alternative to repression is control of impulse after conscious deliberation. In this section, having in mind the viewpoints of the writers discussed at an earlier stage, we shall give our views as to how repressions are built up in the human mind.

It is perhaps desirable to state here, very briefly, the position which we have been constrained to take up as a result of our study. It is this. The phenomena of repression may be roughly classified into two types, primary repression, being the removal from consciousness of sentiments of a highly painful order, and what may be described as secondary repression, leading to the construction of what Freudians call the superego. It has appeared to us that this type of repression is more accurately described as dissociation. It seems doubtful if the first type of repression ever leads to sublimation. The second type, on the surface at least, would seem to give rise to sublimations, but a closer study of the facts suggests that the sublimation in question would be better described in terms of sentiment formation.
III.

A Discussion of the Views of Representative Writers as far as relevant to the present Thesis..
Earlier Writers, and Principal Representatives of Schools.

Pierre Janet.
Discussion of position that repression is due to failure of the method of applying rational thought. No theory of sublimation. Comparison with Freud.

Morton Prince.
Discussion of dissociated personalities, with reference to the superego doctrine.

W. H. R. Rivers.
Discussion of theories that repression is biologically determined, with the object of clarifying the issues in respect of Freudian contention that repression, and therefore sublimation, has root in biological process. Reference to absence of claim by Rivers that repression leads to sublimation.

W. Trotter.
Place of the "Herd Instinct" in repression. How the superego system is responsible for individuals continuing to be suggestible. Discussion of possibility that repressed complexes took the place of custom thought in controlling the individual in society. Trotter's statement as to the conventionality of the Freudian viewpoint. His criticism of the statistically normal.

C. J. Jung.
Writer's views given on the Jungian contribution to the discussion of sublimation. Reference to symbolism. The pragmatic viewpoint criticised.

Alfred Adler.
Adlerians claim that they are in a position so to modify the human mind that cultural development may be facilitated. Views of Adler compared with those of Freudians.

Sigmund Freud.
A discussion of the views of Professor Freud in relation to our subject. In course of the article, the writer's own position as to the nature of repression is enunciated. Attempt to show that our discussion, from the genetical standpoint, resolves itself into an examination of the superego system.
The writings of Janet are of more than historical interest. He represents the starting point of Freudian teaching, but during several decades, in the course of which Freudians have elaborated the basic theories put forward by him towards the end of last century, Janet has consistently refused to follow the psychoanalytical movement in its later developments.

His main position may be summarised as follows: Mental behaviour can be divided into two types. First, we have psychic processes determined by the ordinary ends of conscious personality. In this case, we use intelligence, careful observation of our environment, and we respond rationally to objective situations as they come before us. Secondly, there are the phenomena which may be summed up as "neurotic". Behaviour of this kind is irrational, automatic, and ill adapted. But the latter type of behaviour is not limited to those suffering from nervous disorders, for it also appears when the organism is under the influence of fatigue or in emotional states.

Where Janet diverges from Freudian writers, or rather where they diverge from him, is in regard to the relative influence on conscious life of the two sets of phenomena. Whereas the Freudians have practically eliminated rational process as a determinant of behaviour, Janet insists that normality is ideally and in actuality to be described in terms of purposiveness, the organism striving to realise objectives which are accepted on account of intrinsic worth. His "unconscious" includes relatively unorganised/
unorganised psychic systems which are nearer to the basic drives of human nature than the sentiments and ideals formed at the conceptual level. His views can therefore be correlated with the position taken up by Shand, McDougall, and others, while he seeks to explain in terms of repression those irrational trends which break through into normal consciousness in the form of morbid process.

In his "Principles of Psychotherapy", Janet emphasises the place of the fixed idea as the determinant of abnormal psychic reactions. Referring to the development of his views, he states: "A fixed idea seemed dangerous because it was apart from the personality, because it belonged to a group of phenomena over which the conscious will of the subject had no longer any control." In this simple statement we have, as it were, the first and the last word as to the place of repressed sentiments in the human organism.

The aim of Janet's treatment was to bring about what he describes as "a moral fumigation" by raising the fixed idea to the conscious plane. "But Freud," he says, "transformed a clinical observation and a therapeutic treatment with a definite and limited field of use, into an enormous system of medical philosophy."

He says, pertinently, "...this sexual interpretation of nervous disorders is becoming the foundation of all pathology... This conception is soon inordinately extended: all the facts of normal/
normal psychology must be explained in the same way because all psychology rests on an aggrandised notion of the sexual instinct. This same interpretation must be applied to legal diagnosis, to the psychology of religion, to literature, to pedagogy, to aesthetics, and so on." He compares psychoanalysis with "French Animal Magnetism" stating that it has "the same characteristics, the vaulting ambition, the contagious fascination, the struggle against orthodox science," but he allows that it may "have given a useful impulse to the study of psychology."

Janet accounts for repression, or dissociation as he would say, as due to "the depression of nervous force" this depression being fostered by every unhappiness, by every form of inaction. "How many people," he asks, "are ill because their lives are vulgar, dismal and monotonous, because they have no hope, no ambition, no aim in life, because no one is interested in them, because they can see no way ever to become interesting to anyone." One feels that Janet has indeed given an adequate explanation of most cases of nervous disorder. Contemporary man seems to suffer far more from disorganised sentiments than from unorganised complexes.

Janet finds that, in general, his patients "have very feeble powers of reflection", their reflection being "always slow, difficult, and brief". Janet explains this fact as due to fatigue, and though it is doubtful if his description is altogether accurate/

accurate, we note his suggestion that "repression" is characterised by an absence of the capacity to apply rational thought to the psychological difficulties which have arisen.

From whence is derived the energy which gives the fixed idea its power of producing symptoms? Janet's answer is that "every tendency, even the slowest and the smallest, possesses a certain charge without which it would be impossible to understand either the suggestions that cause it to function or the excitement caused by the arrest of this tendency." He does not doubt the possibility that a charged idea may have derived its energy from more original tendencies, "but the new tendency once established, this charge remains attached to it in a permanent way." Thus the human mind has within it impulsive ideas, and there are various ways of inhibiting any particular impulse. The one which is specifically human is the result of what Janet describes as "reflective deliberation". But should an impulse act out with the control of higher tendencies, it becomes automatic, the energy expressing itself independently of the accepted ends which are the goals of the conscious self. The suggestion, indeed, leads to the arousal of energised ideas which are not subject to the control of the organised personality. To Janet it is obvious that acts based upon psychic automata "have real faults; not having been reflected upon, they are less assimilated to the personality, they leave few memories, and do not serve to build up/"
Janet is here referring especially to the use of suggestion as a therapeutic measure. This may be said to be his only mention, in "The Principles of Psychotherapy", of anything which might be regarded as "sublimation". But he clearly considers that even in this case a diseased formation is being utilised in order to mitigate the evils brought about by the disease's existence. Where suggestion has been used to good effect, he says, "suggestion has not accomplished any marvels, and has done nothing which outstrips the normal human activity. But it has made it possible to bring about acts which the patient's dis-integrating will could no longer perform and thanks to these methods, it has prepared the way for the restoration of the whole mind."

Indeed, his ideas on the formation of "sublimations" seem to be in line with the doctrine of ordinary sentiment formation. Sublimation would seem to be due, in certain cases, to excessive energy which is aroused in connection with some ordinary activity. He says: "In a normal activity, the energy mobilised for activating the tendency is sufficient, and even over-abundant. After the consummation of the action, the unused forces drain into other tendencies, and play an important role in gaiety, the joy that crowns the act."

For our present purpose, interest is chiefly centred around Janet's discussion of possible methods in dealing with an impulse which meets with opposition in some particular setting. The personality/

personality is faced with a defeat, and according to Janet there are three possible ways of dealing with the situation. One is to make a further attempt to realise the end bound up with the thwarted impulse. The second is to modify the impulse; and the third is to give up making any attempt to realise the projected end. "This last resolution," he says, "is extremely important. It is resignation, accompanied with a feeling of necessity or impossibility." This is in many cases the best way of dealing with a tendency the continued operation of which involves conflict. It requires, however, a high level of psychic activity, and "when an individual is somewhat weak constitutionally, or when he is somewhat depressed by previous exhaustion, he becomes incapable of this difficult act."

One of the principal characteristics of the neurotic state is that the individual is unable to appreciate the impossible, and lacks the ability to be resigned. Individuals who, for any reason, are unable to deal rationally with an impulse involving conflict, are "disposed to repeat endlessly the same insufficient and incomplete act, and one may say that many of them spend their lives in indefinitely pushing against a wall." But this is not all. The energy used up in fruitless effort leads to exhaustion which makes even less possible controlling activity at the "conceptual level". The activity becomes more and more degraded, and "takes on a lower form in the hierarchy of acts. It loses the characteristics/"
characteristics that belong to the level of reflective activity. It is no longer co-ordinated with other acts; it no longer has a part in that story of our life that we are constantly formulating in our memory; it is no longer correctly assimilated to our personality. In short, it gradually takes the strange aspect of an automatic act inspired by some occult power, of an unreal act performed in a dream, or of a subconscious act. One observes all the intermediary stages between the simply excited act that is consciously repeated, in 'getting stuck', and the really subconscious act that continues indefinitely, unknown to consciousness and memory."

To Janet, then, "repression" has as its immediate cause the non-application of rational methods in dealing with an impulse, the expression of which involves conflict. The individual does not, as it were, accept "No" for an answer, and despite a full assurance of the impossibility of securing a particular gratification, still persists in an attempt to realise the forbidden impulse in action. At first the individual is quite conscious of the stupidity of his attempt, but gradually the irrational striving becomes more and more automatic. The energised idea still continues to operate, but now, despite the utmost effort of will, the energy charge cannot be withdrawn. It is very probable that Janet's description is capable of explaining most of the facts of repression, and we shall see later that his principal conceptions have been revived by Campbell Garnett/"Op.cit., p.192.
Garnett in his "Instinct and Personality." What we do not discover in Janet is the theory of how impulses rendered automatic as a result of the non-application of reason in dealing with emotional conflict, give rise to a variety of phenomena which are to be equated with all that is of value in human life, civilisation, and all forms of cultural response. If Janet had formulated such a theory, it would have been necessary for him to see in the "stupidity" referred to a function of cultural process.

It will be worth while, during our subsequent discussion, to keep in mind the position taken up by Janet regarding the nature of repression. What would appear to be the simple facts of repression easily become obscured when we are seeking to follow the highly elaborated system of the Freudians. Students who studied the subject of repression at the end of last century would never for one moment have thought it likely that repression lay at the base of all that we are accustomed to regard as higher human values. Repression meant a diseased condition, and it would have appeared clear that any society which was daily faced with the necessity of wresting its living under natural conditions from an unsympathetic environment, could not have afforded the luxury of neurosis. At best, repression seemed to be a subtraction of the vital energies from life; at worst, a process which had a disturbing influence on reactions at the conscious level/

'Cf. "Instinct and Personality", p.183. Reference is here made to the primitive who, according to Freudians, is largely controlled by the unconscious.
level. And moreover, just because of the sapping of energy resulting from repression, the mind was necessarily deprived of the force requisite for conceptual activities.

We realise, of course, that all conflict is not necessarily at the conceptual level. Theoretically, repressions may be set up before the mind has attained to that stage of development; but it is safe to say that the majority of impulses are repressed during the period when the child has attained a sufficiently high level of development for dealing rationally with opposed tendencies. There is one notable exception - that bound up with the "normal" modes of cleanliness training. But in the main, it is held that Janet's description of the conditions lying behind the repression of impulses adequately accounts for the facts.

Further, it may be rightly argued that later Freudian elaboration of the views held by psychologists in 1900 cannot be dismissed as irrelevant when seeking an explanation of such phenomena as class consciousness, refinement, and even the motives which lead students into the philosophic field. Nevertheless, the present writer would still insist that the utmost significance must be placed on the viewpoints of the earlier students of unconscious process, viz., that repression is due to irrational modes of dealing with primitive impulses; and therefore, if Freud is right in his assertions as to the part played by repression in cultural development, existence must be regarded as even queerer than is ordinarily supposed.

Freud re-writes the Book of Genesis in this vein: In the beginning/
beginning, God created man with a set of instinctual impulses, but he also endowed him with the capacity for rational self-control. Man was destined for a high degree of cultural development, religious, artistic, intellectual, and moral. But as a means of changing natural man into a being a little lower than the angels, the Creator hit on this rather surprising expedient. He ordained that progress should occur as a result of man's losing self-control. Various instincts should be turned into compulsive mechanisms, i.e., into unconscious processes, and thereupon there should blossom forth in man's nature an interest in religion, art, and philosophy.

It is suggested that when the Freudian view is stated in the above terms, we cannot escape the impression that it has within it an element of improbability. Janet tells us that repression is a very unsatisfactory way of dealing with our instinctual impulses: the Freudians appear to regard repression as an ingenious means by which the soil of man's nature has been prepared for the growth of "higher" impulses. Who is right, Janet or the Freudians? It is the purpose of this thesis to supply the answer by showing (a) that culture arose before repressions as we know them were set up in the human mind, and (b) that much of what Freudians consider is due to unconscious processes is capable of explanation along the lines of ordinary sentiment formation.
Morton Prince.

For our present purpose, a brief reference need only be made to the contribution made by Dr. Prince to our understanding of the nature of repression. It is felt that, while the student of the unconscious must bear in mind the almost bizarre facts revealed in Prince's famous case history of the Beauchamp family; there seems little prospect, meantime, of relating the phenomena to which he drew our attention to the present-day theory of repression with its essential emphasis on the superego system.

The possibility of the existence of co-conscious personalities, even in the normal mind, should not be left out of account. It is indeed possible that the phenomena of the latency period may be in part due to a break in the development of the personality owing to the essentially new conditions which arise during the early years of school life. The earlier, purely play responses, are no longer evoked to anything like the same extent, especially when the child's time is occupied even during the evenings by "home work". At the stage referred to, the child's orientation is chiefly in relation to teachers and companions outwith the home. Does the child's earlier personality tend to live on, revealing itself in unconscious phantasy and in the dream life? Hadfield refers to discarded personalities.

And again, if superego ideals do not fuse together into a single system, it is quite possible that different personalities may be formed in the same individual. This might result from incompatibility/

'Morton Prince, "The Dissociation of a Personality".
'S. Freud, "The Ego and the Id" p.39.
incompatibility between the viewpoints of parents, or in cases where a child, during its early formative period, is placed for a time under the care of other guardians.

As a definition of subconscious personality, Dr. Prince gives the following: It is a condition where "complexes or subconscious processes are constellated into a personal system manifesting a secondary system of self-consciousness endowed with volition and intelligence."

In the opinion of the present writer, the Freudian superego would appear to have the characteristics of a subconscious personality. According to Freud the superego is highly organised, and is certainly endowed with volition and at least a kind of intelligence. Freud never commits himself to this view, but Alexander, as we shall see, draws what appears to be the only logical conclusion in this matter. It would appear desirable that the superego should be recognised in the light of a subconscious personality. If the normal person is at all times under the influence of a secondary personality, it is just as well that he should know this, in order that he may become aware that part of his personality is pathological.

Dr. Prince holds the view that connation expresses itself in three ways: in overt conduct and thoughts, in internal visceral discharges, and in the inhibition of other impulses. It is this last activity of connation which leads to repression, and in this way there is set up the repressed unconscious. Prince's description appears to fit in with the facts of dissociation rather than those of repression proper. We note that Campbell Garnett takes up a similar/

'See section on Alexander, p. 398.
similar view. Prince's finding is doubtless based on a careful study of the facts. It is our view that the phenomena of the Freudian superego system are in the normal person to be explained far more in terms of dissociation than in terms of repression.

Prince's theory, however, does not appear to account for complexes of the type described by Rivers, nor in our view does it account for Freud's primary repressions. It appears that when a certain intensity of psychic pain is experienced by a human being, the cause of the disturbance is withdrawn from consciousness. There seems reason to believe, however, that most of what Freud describes as repression is not brought about by the mechanism to which we have referred. To a large extent the individual can still be said to have as his motive the avoidance of psychic pain, but his response is by no means an "unconscious process". Difficulties are overcome by the use of dissociation rather than repression. It would indeed appear that in many cases the kind of repression brought about by the superego averts the necessity for repression proper.

"A.C. Campbell Garnett, "Instinct and Personality" p.157 et seq."
Dr. Rivers, like Janet, may be regarded as a classical writer on the subject of the unconscious mind. For our present purpose, however, reference to his work may be brief. We shall pass over his biological theories of the origin of repression. As far as can be seen, the position taken up by him that repression has as its determinant the substitution of epicritic for protopathic sensibility is unsubstantiated. The caterpillar-butterfly analogy also does not appear to have any relevance to the facts.

Rivers, in any case, builds no theory of sublimation on the basis of his biological theories.

Also, we are not satisfied with his regarding repression as biologically determined in that it is a means of removing unbearable thoughts from the mind. No animal, as far as is known, resorts to mechanism of this kind in repressing disagreeable experiences. Biologically, the possession of such a mechanism would be fatal.

Rivers, however, has a theory of sublimation. Conflict, he thinks, draws energy from the physical on to the psychic plane. Even if this be the case, most conflicts are conscious, and if they are responsible for increasing the energy available for psychic uses, it may still be held that this energy is expended in the formation of ordinary sentiments. Again, if a conflict is/

"Instinct and the Unconscious" p.5.
semi-conscious or subconscious, it is in no way necessary to use the word "sublimation" to describe the method by which additional energy is released for the construction of psychic formations. We suggest that the energy may still be regarded as leading to the formation of ordinary sentiments. In general, Rivers' "sublimation", according to our own theory, corresponds to what appears to be superego determined redirection of energy. We shall elaborate this conception in the sequel.

But Rivers never appears to consider that repression by the drastic method described by him leads to sublimation. As he says in connection with his famous case of claustrophobia: "Nature took no account of the effects of the suppression which were to torment the child and man for thirty years... Suppression is a process of reaction to the pleasures and pains which are immediately present, and takes no account of the more extended experience with which it is the function of intelligence to deal."

His viewpoint here is similar to that of Janet. It would appear to have been obvious to Rivers that repression of this type did not lead to socially valuable redirection of instinctual energy.

Rivers believes that repression of the drastic type is due to the activities of the instinct of self-preservation. In our view, he is probably right, if we re-interpret the self-preservation concept in terms of the flight instinct, in its immobilisation aspect. If such reinterpretation be permissible, it appears/

"Instinct and the Unconscious" p.21.
appears even more unlikely that sublimation is a consequence of drastic repression.

Rivers' theory at this point appears to be in accordance with the facts. We should, however, like to suggest an amendment. Rivers, in enunciating the theory, is chiefly thinking of painful situations objectively conditioned. In our view, there are many highly painful experiences in children which are intrapsychically conditioned (Freud's "secondary anxiety"). We refer chiefly to the "night terror". An experience of this kind is far more "horrible" than anything experienced by day. It is probable that Rivers' "repressed unconscious" is largely a reservoir for experiences of this type.

To Rivers, then, repression is not a function of cultural process, but he certainly suggests that it may be a decided dysfunction of such process. His claustrophobic patient could hardly be described as being capable of entering fully into his cultural heritage.

If, then, we would evaluate repression in relation to cultural development, we would be led to the conclusion that the conditions which give rise to repression of the type under discussion are a dysfunction of cultural process. It would then be relevant to enquire into the nature of these conditions, in order to see if they are subject to control.

We would only here point out that Rivers' "repression" is usually/
usually the result, direct or indirect, of fear of someone or something in the environment. Such fear, in our view, is peculiar to civilisation, being the result of the means used for enforcing discipline when civilisation as we know it was set up in Dynastic Egypt.

Finally, the fear may also be determined in the developing mind of a civilised individual by unpleasantly toned nocturnal experiences. Into these there would appear to enter painful feeling tone largely derived from "inferiority feelings". It is probable that in Dynastic Egypt, painful negative self-feeling was soon developed as a concomitant of the fear of the rulers.

But first and foremost, Rivers tells us, we must look to the instinct of self-preservation if we would understand repression. Supplemented by the conceptions of Trotter and Janet, the theory under discussion probably supplies all that is required to explain the phenomena of repression.

Repression is a process subject to control. If it is considered desirable to dispense with repression, all we need to do is to prevent the child feeling that his environment is dangerous, avoid stimulating powerful negative self feeling, and allow the child to solve his problems by the rational method.

We have made no reference to the doctrines of the child analysts. It is our view that, in an atmosphere of emotional calm, any phylogenetically determined conflict will, in course of/

"See section on Egypt, p. 390 et seq."
of time, be resolved without the individual resorting to repression. If the child is not subject to painful conflicts, he will have no urge to take refuge in phantasy through the construction of a superego.
Dr. Trotter wrote his book on "The Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War" shortly after the Great War. The theories he enunciated have been criticised from various angles. It may well be that he is not sufficiently analytical in his method, but in spite of any criticism to which he may be subjected, the work stands out as a forceful statement of the relation in which the individual finds himself in respect of public opinion.

It is not at all unlikely that Trotter is dealing with secondary phenomena, and that human nature is not necessarily in the grip of the "herd" to the extent he suggests. Be this as it may, the student of repression must take into consideration the power of society over its individual members. It may be said that Trotter's statements are to-day even truer than at the time when they were written. Life is becoming more and more regimented. Departures from the norm are met with powerful sanctions. It would almost appear that our mass attempt to throw off the yoke of inner compulsion has merely had the effect of increasing our sensitivity to the opinions of others. The student of biological process might even seek to establish a relation between the two sets of phenomena. The alternative to "superego conditioned" individuality might well seem to be a re-establishment of the old-time control of custom thought; in dispensing with inner controls, we find ourselves being drawn within/

"Cf. J. Drever, "The Psychology of Education" p.113."
within that vortex which must inevitably lead to a reversion to the ways of the custom-haunted savage.

Referring to the savage, Trotter tells us that "his whole life, to its minutest detail, is ordained for him by the voice of the herd, and he must not, under the most dreadful sanctions, step outside its elaborate order. It does not matter to him that an infringement of the code under his very eyes is not followed by judgment, for with tribal suggestion so compactly organised, such cases are in fact no difficulty, and do not trouble his belief, just as in more civilised countries apparent instances of malignity in the reigning deity are not found to be inconsistent with his benevolence....Such must everywhere have been primitive human conditions, and upon them reason intrudes as an alien and hostile power, disturbing the perfection of life, and causing an unending series of conflicts."

The view above elaborated may not be without value when we attempt to trace the development of human beings from the food-gathering stage to that of civilisation. Whatever be the disadvantages of the primitive type of mentality, it is at least stable. There is no need for repression; no one persists in the attempt to realise "private" impulses. Janet's ideal method of dealing with conflict seems invariably realised. The individual gives up desires which are not in accordance with the mores of his tribe, as a matter of course. The renunciation is final/

"Cf. C.E.M. Joad, "The Future of Morals" Chapter V. 
"The Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War" pp.34-35.
final. It could be suggested that the savage is scarcely using a high level of mentation in making such renunciations, but this is doubtful. The primitive shows great intelligence in the practical tasks of his life. It is not at all unlikely that he clearly realises the folly of "kicking against the pricks" when individual impulse comes into conflict with established order. But should the primitive accept the doctrine of the "rights of man" and seek to work out a societal system whereby each individual may follow out his own inclinations, he is embarking on a task the realisation of which strikes contemporary individuals as a Utopian dream.

Nevertheless, a study of the early days of Egyptian and Minoan civilisation arouses in the mind a suspicion at once staggering and fantastic. Could it indeed have been that these early folk succeeded, as they emerged from the pure food-gathering stage and its accompanying mentality, in developing a social order, a working arrangement by which the powers of the mind were released, which was consistent with individuals living together in primitive harmony? If such be the case, we must stand in awe before an outburst of racial genius beside which the attainments of the later Greeks must be regarded as the work of mere amateurs in societal organisation.

Trotter appears to look forward to a time when the herd instinct might be used as a sanction for rational thought. "If rationality"/

\[^1\text{See section on Egypt and Crete, thesis page 367 et seq.}\]
rationality", he says, "were once to become really respectable, if we feared the entertaining of an unverifiable opinion with the warmth with which we fear using the wrong implement at the dinner table, if the thought of holding a prejudice disgusted us as does a foul disease, then the dangers of man's suggestibility would be turned into advantages." But he also says: "Again, scepticism may detect the nature of the herd suggestion and deprive it of its compelling force." It is suggested that as soon as "rationality" got under way, it would not be long before the guns of herd suggestion were effectively spiked, and there is a possibility that the newly discovered "individuality" would hold dangers as great, or greater than, those bound up with the acceptance of herd opinion.

Yet Trotter is right in detecting a high degree of insecurity in our present mental organisation. Our confidence in mere mechanism, whether it be the product of repression or of excessive suggestibility, causes the individual to be prone to the acceptance of illusion which may well bring our civilisation to irretrievable disaster. If Stanley Casson be right, in his "Progress and Catastrophe", intelligent Romans who lived during the last stages of the decline of the Roman Empire, were completely unconscious of the doom which was fast overtaking their civilisation/

3 Note: Nevertheless, the writer is confident that rational thought may be trusted if the application is sufficiently thorough.
4 Stanley Casson, "Progress and Catastrophe" Chapter 13.
There is a possibility that contemporary man is equally blind to the dangers which await him.

Referring to the work of Freud, Trotter made an observation which in recent decades has gained increasing significance. "To those who approach Freud's work solely by the path of medicine, the idea that it can give anyone the feeling of a certain conventionality of standard and outlook, and of a certain overestimation of the objectivity of man's moral values, will seem perhaps mainly absurd. That this is an impression which I have not been able altogether to escape, I record with a good deal of hesitation and diffidence, and without any wish to lay stress upon it."

Those who have read Professor Freud's idyllic reference to the virtues of the superego as set down in "The Ego and the Id", can have little doubt that Trotter was essentially right in the suspicion which he held.

We also discover in Trotter a critic of the Freudian conception of the "normal" to which the patient is to be restored. He says bluntly: "The statistically normal mind can be regarded only as a mind which has responded in the usual way to the moulding and deforming influence of its environment - that is, to human standards of discipline, taste, and morality." And, he might have added, a proneness to suggestibility which appears to be inherent in the normal mind. To Trotter, normality is a resultant of processes which at once mould and deform the psychic apparatus/

apparatus of the young child. He is deeply conscious that there is no safety in the acceptance of mere normality as our guide. Somehow, we must find a method of adopting a thoroughgoing critical attitude to the psychological bases of our present-day mentalities. Otherwise, we shall not be in a position to rise to that "conscious direction of man's destiny" which "is plainly indicated by nature as the only mechanism by which the social life of so complex an animal can be guaranteed against disaster and brought to yield its full possibilities."

Speaking of Freudian resistances, Trotter makes the following superlatively valuable statement: "It is interesting to notice that in discussing the mechanism of psychoanalysis in liberating the abnormal patient from his symptoms, Freud repeatedly lays stress on the fact that the efficient factor in the process is not the actual introduction of the suppressed experience into the conscious field, but the overcoming of the resistance to such an endeavour. I have attempted to show that these resistances or counter impulses are of environmental origin, and owe their strength to the specific sensitiveness of the gregarious mind."

We may speculate with a fair degree of certainty on what would have been Trotter's views on sublimation had he discussed the subject. We should have had from him no complacent utterances on the secondary advantages of disease. To him, suggestibility/

suggestibility, and whatever forces were proved to lie at its root, would have been an evil which was in no way mitigated by claims for recognition as being indirectly responsible for the "highest" in human life. Any such claimant for respectability would have been viewed by him as a wolf in sheep's clothing, to be at once disrobed of its pretensions and recognised for what it was, an enemy within the gate of the City of Mansoul.

Trotter, we believe, has indicated for us the prime cause of those conflicts which lead to repression. The parent has to hand a potent weapon which, if not applied with the greatest discrimination and in the light of a full objective knowledge of the personality of the child, will inevitably involve the minds of the young in painful conflicts this leading to (a) primary repressions, (b) to that extraordinarily elaborate and fantastic psychic superstructure which Freud describes as the superego.

On the other hand, if the parent does not apply the weapon of prestige suggestion to the child, he will not resort to repression and phantasy weaving, and the "parent" will not be set up within the child. The child will retain his critical faculties, and as an adult, will be only slightly amenable to public opinion, his propensities for scepticism leading him to detect the irrational nature of morality, national ideals, and ill-based ideologies of all kinds.

Even intelligently directed public opinion might prove ineffective in controlling him. What is for the good of the community, or of posterity, is not necessarily in line with the private/
private interests of the individual. The task of the educator who departs from traditional methods is anything but simple, and also the path of a society which trains up its children intelligently will be strewn with difficulties. Repression is an evil, but lack of repression may well be a greater evil unless humanity realises the full implications of departures from the ways of the past.
We shall now turn to a consideration of the views of Dr. C. J. Jung, in relation to the subject of repression and sublimation. The sub-title of his "Psychology of the Unconscious" is, "A Study of the Transformations and Symbolisms of the Libido." We may take it, then, that Dr. Jung's special concern is the theory of sublimation. We do not, however, propose here to follow in detail the various standpoints which he puts forward. The impression given is that Jungian psychology is "in the air". Freud accuses him of being in full flight from the basic findings of psychoanalysis. There may be more or less truth in Freud's charge, and of course there is always a possibility that Freudian psychology is indeed inadequate for the task of interpreting the facts revealed through psychoanalysis. Most writers at least admit that Jung has done a considerable service in stressing certain aspects of Freudian theory, and here and there providing a corrective, especially in respect of what they regard as the Freudian preoccupation with sex.

In the view of the present writer, Jung has thrown out many valuable suggestions which may form a basis for further research. Nevertheless, one feels that the Freudian interpretation of the repressed unconscious is in essentials accurate. Our principal disagreement with the Freudian position is that it seems to over-emphasise the part played by the facts which it has discovered, in relation to the activities of the entire psyche as we find it at/

'S. Freud, "An Autobiographical Study" p. 96.
at work in contemporary individuals, and as far as can be
gathered from a study of peoples living in other ages, the
Freudian unconscious never has played the part which is claimed
for it.

Jung does, indeed, provide us with a valuable contribution
in tracing out the place of symbolism in the process of "sublima-
tion", although it would probably be better to state that the
value of his work chiefly lies in demonstrating how symbolisation
provides a link between the instinctual tendencies and the types
of interests which mankind follows. What he has really emphasised
is the part played by symbolism in sentiment-formation. His con-
ception of the libido as a kind of *élan vital* has enabled him to
form a more or less systematic theory of the development of senti-
ments, and possibly on account of the very lack of differentiation
in the conception of the libido, he has rendered more easy the path
of those who would relate ultimate values to the instinctual basis
of human life.

Nevertheless, it appears to the writer that he has merely
thrown a veil over the biological tendencies clearly indicated to
exist in man by McDougall, Drever, and others, and that therefore
his system suffers from a lack of definiteness. There is even
reason to suppose that the Jungian psychology is little more than
a "polite" version of Freudianism, suffering from most of its
defects and having few virtues to compensate for its departure
from psychoanalysis proper.

Speaking/

' We shall again refer to this point in our section on Otto
Rank's "Trauma of Birth" p. 339 et seq.
Speaking of sublimation, Jung tells us that if instinctual energy is diverted from "the sexual territory into associated functions...without injury to the adaptation of the individual" we have sublimation. But he gives little attention to what constitutes "injury to the adaptation of the individual". Here, indeed, lies the entire crux of the problems raised by recent study of the unconscious. Jung inveighs against repression as harmful. He is apparently quite unconscious that as far as his own system goes, the factors leading to repression have not been submitted to that keen scrutiny without which they will continue to exert their baneful influence. When the facts are rightly envisaged, it is our contention that repression, and therefore sublimation, is at all times harmful from the standpoint of the development of the total personality.

Like the Freudians, Jung sees in repression a distinct function in relation to cultural development. He says, for instance; "The resistance against sexuality aims, therefore, at preventing the sexual act; it also seeks to crowd the libido away from the sexual function." He does not, indeed, consider that the young child has a specifically incestuous attachment to the parents. Such an attachment, however, takes place later, and when the attachment is forbidden, the energy is diverted along the lines of pregenital interests, which are themselves largely directed/

directed towards the parents. It is, of course, very doubtful if the distinction is worth making. Jung would appear to wish to minimise the part played in early life by the Oedipus complex. The young child is not faced with the bitter problems bound up with an incestuous attachment. But if the Jungian theory teaches the non-sexuality of the child in its earlier stages, the phenomena which it describes as emanating from the unconscious as a result of incest prohibition are essentially the same as those which enter into the Freudian system.

At the end of Jung's "Psychology and Religion" the following statement occurs: "The thing that cures a neurosis must be as convincing as the neurosis; and since the latter is only too real, the helpful experience must be of equal reality. It must be a very real illusion, if you want to put it pessimistically." Since to Jung the sole foundation of truth is pragmatic, being that which "helps you to live", one feels that he might have difficulty in convincing his patients as to the difference between "mere" illusion and "real" illusion. Jung appears never to have discovered that the only cure for a neurosis is truth of a very obvious order, the truth that has finality. At the present day, Freudians have become entangled within their superego system. They are at any rate struggling with something which is very real. Jung has not followed the Freudian logic into its present Slough of Despond. He would seem to prefer the pleasures/

pleasures of the imagination to engaging in the arduous task of discovering a way to the Celestial City. The present writer believes that the truth is to be found somewhere within the slough to which we have referred.

We also find Jung saying: "If the repressed tendencies, the shadow as I call them, were decidedly evil, there would be no problem whatever." If this were the case, repression, according to Jung, would be wholly desirable. "There would be no problem whatever." Jung would appear to be completely oblivious to the fact that if the repressed tendencies were "decidedly evil" there would be all the more reason why they should be controlled by conscious purpose rather than by an act of repression. Experience shows that a repressed impulse tends to do far more harm than it would do if subject to conscious control, and moreover Jung appears to have no realisation that repression is something which occurs in the sensitive mind of a young child. It is senseless and unethical to speak of a child as having evil tendencies, and it is equally wrong and psychologically futile to adopt an attitude of blame towards a child for being the possessor of a tendency. It would seem useless, therefore, to expect from Jung any enlightenment on the problem which we have before us.

The task of a psychologist is not to distinguish between the relative significance of sets of illusions. What are the facts in regard to the process of repression? Jung appears to be almost/

1. "Psychology and Religion" p.94.
2. Cf. Wm. Blake's poem on "Christian Forbearance".
almost unaware that repression exists. There may be
differences of opinion as to the universality of repression and
also regarding the adequacy of the Freudian description of the
repressed unconscious. But repression is a very real process,
occurring in the human mind at definite times and under definite
conditions. We feel that any real development in the psychol-
ogical field will come as a result of a determined effort to
study, not the symbol, but that which is symbolised.
The late Professor Adler had the distinction of developing a system of psychology without reference to the concept of repression, or to the idea of sublimation. We cannot, however, merely dismiss his work as irrelevant in the elucidation of the problems which have occupied the attention of the writer. Adler, in the main, is dealing with facts which he himself observed when forming contacts with individuals who represent the viewpoint of our Western civilisation. The fact that societies have everywhere sprung up with the aim of practising "Individual Psychology" sufficiently demonstrates that what he describes is true to the experience of a vast number of people.

It is often complained that Adler is superficial, and that his followers betray an essentially uncritical attitude to the psychological system which they have embraced. In our view, this criticism is just. The mind does not reveal its secrets save as the result of prolonged and scientific introspection. The average Adlerian, we suggest, has no more claim to be regarded as scientific than those naive members of the public who imagine that they are qualified to undertake what they describe as spiritualistic "research".

It would, indeed, appear that Adler himself was in the grip of his own mechanisms, rather than being guided by intelligence, in developing his psychological scheme; how else could he allow Phillipe Mairet, in his introduction to "The Science of Living", to make the following statement: "If the occidental world is not/
not too far gone to make use of his (Adler's) service, he may well come to be known as the Confucius of the West."

In the same introduction, we read: "What Adler proposes is not the universal study of psychopathology but the practical reform of society and culture in accordance with the positive and scientific psychology to which he has contributed the first principles... A positive psychology", Mairet continues, "useful for human life, cannot be derived from psychic phenomena alone, still less from pathological manifestations. It requires also a regulative principle, and Adler has not shrunken from this necessity by recognising, as if it were of absolute metaphysical validity, the logic of our communal life in the world... The ideal, or rather normal, attitude to society, is an unstrained and unconsidered assumption of human equality, unchanged by any inequalities of position."

The Adlerians, therefore, claim that they have to hand a psychology which adequately explains the workings of the human mind, and that by its application they are in a position to institute those reforms in our psychical make-up which are essential if we would attain to rationality of thought and outlook. Although, indeed, the followers of this school make slight use of the conception of repression, it is obvious that they claim to have discovered a panacea which will release mankind from the evils arising through the distorting influence of complexes on the conscious life. Moreover, the Adlerian system/

system has also implicitly a doctrine of sublimation. The tendency towards superiority brought into activity by what we might describe as the negative irritant of inferiority feelings the source of which is no longer conscious in adult life, provides the energy for cultural development in its narrower and wider senses.

The Adlerian system which, in our view, has an essential similarity to Freudian psychoanalysis, despite the fact that both parties would emphatically disclaim relationship, has within it many incompatible viewpoints. Like the Freudians, the Adlerians attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable, being unaware of the real premises on which they base their conclusions. We thus find them stressing the necessity for the development of "communal feeling". It is in this respect that man tends to be deficient. We even find them insisting on the essential "goodness" of human nature. "We ought not to regard," says Mairet, "the communal feeling as something to be created with difficulty. It is as natural and inherent as egoism itself, and indeed as a principle of life it has priority. We have not to create, but only to liberate it where it is repressed. It is the saving principle of life as we experience it."

We find ourselves on even more Utopian heights when we discover that in Viennese education where, according to Mairet, the Adlerian doctrine of salvation is being applied, "abolition of competition and the cultivation of encouragement has been found/"
found to liberate the energy of both pupils and teachers."
And also, we read: "Our conception of normal behaviour should be
to allow the world or society or the person with whom we are con¬
fronted, to be somehow in the right equally with ourselves. We
should not depreciate either ourselves or our environment, but
assuming that each is one half in the right, affirm the reality
of ourselves and others equally." We are almost conscious of
the brush of Paracletan wings when we discover that the "practice
of Individual Psychology demands that its students should submit
themselves to mutual scrutiny, each one to be estimated by the
other as a whole personality."

By the magic of Adlerian psychology-cum-philosophy,
repressions are to be swept from the face of the earth. "All
feelings of innate suspicion, of hostility, of an undefined
cautions, and desire for some concealment, when such feelings
affect the individual in social relations generally, evince the
same tendency to withdraw from reality which inhibits self¬
affirmation."

The followers of the Adlerian school, by a proper use of
psychological method, are enabled to submit their whole natures
to the scrutiny of an enlightened public opinion. But when we
read on, in the passage above quoted, our suspicions as to the
efficacy of the system are aroused. "The ideal," we read, "or
rather/

rather normal, attitude to society is an unstrained and unconsidered assumption of human equality, unchanged by any inequalities of position." We can only remark, from what we know of human nature, that, although individuals belonging to the favoured classes may imagine that their attitude towards those in the lower strata of society is objective, it is certain that the lower classes could never be described as having "an unstrained and unconsidered assumption of human equality, unchanged by any inequalities of position." Mairet's "normal" is impossible in society as at present constituted.

Adler's psychological system is, in fact, just as much a psychology of the unconscious as Freudian doctrine. It is indeed the psychology of a "complex" and, stripped of its trappings, it reveals a single principle. At times, Adler speaks of his "complex" as a disease formation. But in his role of doctor, he at best provides a palliative, a means of alleviating to some extent the evils which spring from the disease, both in the individual and in society. Like the Freudians, he justifies the existence of his complex on biological grounds, while at the same time giving full recognition to any advantages which might accrue from the irrationally determined strivings of the impulse towards what is sometimes described as "ego-maximation". He is indeed committed to the Freudian "not too much and not too little repression" formula/

formula, and in the last resort he is unable to envisage a psychological organisation in which there is an absence of repressed inferiority feelings, with the resultant irrational striving towards self-affirmation as a means of balancing the "negative irritant".

Man, as Adler sees him, is mechanism, and all that is left for consciousness to do is so to manipulate things that the mechanism functions in a way consistent with the smooth workings of the social organisation. As in the case of Freudianism, the underlying philosophy is that of the individualists of last century, who believed that the maximum social good would accrue from allowing each individual scope to pursue his own private ends. The popularity of the system can easily be understood.

Adler's viewpoint is essentially static and conservative, but he claims that it is dynamic and progressive. It is mechanistic, but he insists that it is hormic, that it incorporates within itself the principle of biological purposiveness.

In his "Education of Children" he states: "The fundamental fact in human development is the dynamic and purposive striving of the psyche. The child, from its earliest infancy, is engaged in a constant struggle to develop, and this struggle is in accordance with an unconsciously formed but ever-present goal - a vision of greatness, perfection, and superiority. This struggle, this goal-forming activity, reflects, of course, the peculiarly human/
human faculty of thinking and of imagining, and it dominates all our specific acts throughout life. It dominates even our thoughts, for we do not think objectively but in accordance with the goal and style of life we have formed....In considering the construction of a personality, the chief defect to be noted is that its unity, its particular style and goal, is not built upon objective reality, but upon the subjective view the individual takes of the facts of life. A conception, a view of a fact, is never the fact itself, and it is for this reason that human beings, all of whom live in the same world of facts, mould themselves differently. Each one organises himself according to his own personal view of things, and some views are more sound and some views are less sound. We must always reckon with these individual mistakes and failures in the development of a human being. Especially must we reckon with the misinterpretations made in early childhood, for these dominate the subsequent course of our existence."

And we read in "The Science of Living": "When the prototype - that early personality which embodies the goal - is formed, the line of direction is established and the individual becomes definitely oriented. It is this fact which enables us to predict what will happen later in life. The individual's apperceptions are from then on bound to fall into a groove established by the line of direction. The child will not perceive given situations as they actually exist, but according to a personal scheme of apperception/

"The Education of Children" p.6.
apperception - that is to say, he will perceive situations under the prejudice of his own interests."

Adler has here given us a picture of human personality as he sees it. His views correlate with the Freudians who find that the principal motives which determine our life ends are unconscious. He tells us that we are essentially unobjective; we do not deal with facts as they are, but live in our own little individual world. Offset our main system of motivation by the development of a little social feeling, and we still are and must remain individualistic to the core. We form our life plan, as we build up the superego, in the years of early infancy, at a time presumably, when we are no more competent to form an adequate conception of what life should be than we are to draw up the plans of our future residence.

Even the young child to whom we refer is hardly rational in the formation of his immediate goals. He is obsessed not with the idea of positive achievement, but with the desire to assuage a feeling of inferiority. "We can imagine," says Adler, "how the process takes place. A child, being weak, feels inferior and finds itself in a situation which it cannot bear. Hence it strives to develop along a line of direction fixed by the goal which it chooses for itself."

And, moreover, it is uncertain, according to Adler's presuppositions, how far even the young child can be regarded as using conscious judgment in elaborating his goal. "In medicine," he/

he says, "we see all organs striving to develop towards definite
goals. They have definite forms which they achieve upon
maturity. Moreover, in cases where there are organic defects,
we always find nature making special efforts to overcome the
deficiency, or else to compensate for it by developing another
organ to take over the function of the defective one... Now the
movement of the psyche is analogous to the movement of organic
life."

We may take it, then, that the child, in developing his
compensating goal, is under the influence of motives similar
to those by which nature makes blind attempts to compensate for
organ inferiority. There is a suggestion that even at the stage
when the life goals are formed, the child is essentially an
automaton in the grip of circumstances over which he has no
control. If we are to consider that the Adlerian striving for
superiority, as incorporated in what he asserts is the normal
personality, is a desirable institution in psychic life, we are
forced to the conclusion that the biological striving, as
revealed in the infant, is equipped with remarkable insight and
prevision, both as to the type of society and the kind of
individual which is to result from the life-goals formed under
its domination.

We have already quoted Adler as saying: "This struggle,
this goal-forming activity, reflects of course the peculiarly
human faculty of thinking and of imagining," We suggest that
the/

"The Science of Living" p. 33.
the child's construction of a goal in infancy, under the stress of a mere biological urge, and subject to the essential limitations of its restricted viewpoint, is far removed from anything we should regard as "peculiarly human". Whatever the child does construct will be merely infantile, supplying immediate antidotes for irrationally conditioned inferiority feelings. Why, may we ask, does not Adler see the entire influence of the hidden goals which he claims to have discovered in human beings, as a purely morbid phenomenon? Moreover, why does he fail to realise that there must be factors which prevent the mature individual from revising the aims incorporated in his life system?

Instead of stating the obvious, that his "inferiority" mechanism is irrational to the core, he calmly accepts the complex which he has discovered as a part of "normal" human nature, only dilating on the evils of its excessive development, and seeking by therapeutic means to modify the infantile goals when these happen to be non-adaptive. Lest he should lead his followers to perceive the obvious, he side-tracks the issue by taking refuge in principles of biological necessity. His solution for man's ills is to develop social feeling alongside of the necessary and inevitable superiority striving, being seemingly oblivious to the fact that, according to his premises, he is encouraging the development of dissociation phenomena, an activity scarcely creditable in a psychopathologist who has assumed the role of the Western Confucius.
In our view, however, the Adlerian unconscious goal, though probably existent to some extent in all, does not in the normal have the degree of influence which he suggests. To use a popular phrase, our "ego-maximation" tendencies are usually "taken with a pinch of salt", and alongside of our irrational superiority strivings, we build up sentiments which are truly adaptive. Our main life purposes are formed at the conceptual level, chiefly during adolescence, and although it is true that the superiority tendency which Adler describes influences us to a greater or less extent in formulating our life goal, we are usually conscious that it represents an interference factor, to be partially accepted maybe, but at all times limited in its influence on the formulation of our life plan.

Adler tells us that the striving for superiority has a biological root. Indeed, "human nature is tied up with the development of the striving for superiority." Moreover, he says, "there are certain functional abilities which can be developed further, and it is in this possibility of further development that we see the biological root of the striving for superiority, and the whole source of the psychological unfolding. And, as far as we can see, this dynamic urge to assert oneself under all circumstances is common both to children and adults. There is no way of exterminating it. Human nature does not tolerate permanent submission. Humanity has even overthrown its gods. The feeling of degradation and depreciation, the mood of uncertainty and of inferiority/ 

1."The Education of Children" p.36.
inferiority, always gives rise to a desire for reaching a higher level in order to obtain compensation and completeness." We take this quotation from a chapter headed, "The Striving for Superiority and its Educational Significance."

We would pass two remarks. First, throughout man's long period of development prior to civilisation, we have little evidence that the striving for superiority played a considerable part in primitive life. For milleniums, we are told, our ancestors would continue the even tenor of their way without making even the slightest improvement in their implements; the present-day Australian aborigine does not fit in with Adler's description. Whenever his complexes show signs of disturbing the surface layers of his mind, he quickly performs the necessary rites for restoring internal equilibrium.

Secondly, according to Adler it would be, we imagine, a mistake of the first magnitude to remove from the child's life the causes of inferiority feeling, since by so doing we should destroy that with which is tied up the development of the human being. In the main, however, this contingency is improbable, since nature sees to it that children are given a reasonable dose of negative self-feeling, for, as Adler says, "all children have an inherent feeling of inferiority which stimulates the imagination and incites attempts to dissipate the psychological sense of inferiority/"

"The Education of Children" p.37.

inferiority by bettering the situation."

It is the duty of educators not to exaggerate the sense of inferiority. The child must not be rendered super-sensitive, otherwise he will become nervous or eccentric, and may become irresponsible and criminal. Nevertheless, the dutiful educator, if he accepts Adler's teaching, will be ready to assist nature by deepening the sense of inferiority in the child if, perchance, "our mete nurse" has neglected, for any reason, to equip the child with the average amount of inferiority feeling.

We stated above that there is an essential similarity between the Adlerian and the Freudian viewpoints. When we come to discuss Freudian teaching in our criticism of the views of Franz Alexander, in "The Psychoanalysis of the Total Personality", we shall discover an almost tiresome repetition of Adlerian psychologising. We shall find that Alexander, as a typical Freudian, brings us to the point of seeing that the superego "complex" is irrational. Its virtues, however, will be duly stressed; it will be accounted the mainspring of all cultural development, and when we are about to enquire as to the ethical significance of what, to an unbiassed mind, is a product of crazydom, when we are on the point of bringing ourselves to face the essential fact which has been revealed, viz., that our present methods of child training are directly or indirectly responsible for the conditions which cause the young child to construct an irrational/

"The Education of Children" p.10.
irrational psychic formation the effects of which will be felt throughout the whole course of subsequent life, then we are informed that the course of development is "biologically determined". Nature is responsible, and our duty as educators is to stand by watching the beneficent unfolding of biological purpose, taking steps only to prevent "excessive repression".

As we shall suggest later in our discussion, such an attitude is entirely mischievous. Whatever is responsible for either superego formation or for its correlate, the Adlerian "superiority striving" - we suggest that they are identical - must be eliminated. The conditions which lead to the superiority striving are, of course, far more complex than Adlerians suppose, but nevertheless, if educators made it their constant task to prevent the formation of inferiority feelings in children, or if they happen to come into existence on account of circumstances outwith the control of the educators, to take immediate steps to neutralise these inferiority feelings, it is certain that the developed human being would cease to be troubled with superiority striving or the machinations of the superego.

What is to become of culture, it may be asked, by those who accept the teaching of Adler, if it is cut off at the roots - that is, if children are no longer made to feel inferior and therefore no longer make the attempt to compensate themselves by/
by developing their personalities? At the risk of oversimplification, we would state that most of the things worth while, including Adler’s community feeling and Freudian reality or objectivity, are in no way dependent on "complexes".

Finally, Adler tells us that parents and teachers "should learn to interpret personality on the basis of objective facts, seen as the expression of the purposive but more or less unconscious strivings of the individual." That is, the educator should discover the hidden goal of the child personality and build his educational system around it. As we suggest in our discussion of Wilfrid Lay’s contribution to the psychology of education, this attitude is also mischievous in the extreme. Our business, particularly as teachers, is not to draw out the motives which are bound up with the superego or ego-maximation; on the contrary, we shall best subserve the interests both of the child and of society if we are able to ignore the irrational in the child. Despite the imposing Freudian theory of the latency period, a teacher suitably equipped may tap the original power sources of human nature. The grand educational appeal must be at all times to fundamental disinterestedness, and not to aim-inhibited impulses, or, for that matter, to irrationally determined superiority strivings. A thoroughgoing application of Adlerian and Freudian theory in our schools would lead to an enormous increase in the present-day trend towards the production of neurotic and psychotic phenomena/

"The Education of Children" p.16.
phenomena. Education must not be adapted to "civilisation"; education must reform civilisation.

Individual Psychology, we suggest, has to date shown little appreciation of the nature of the individual in his early stages. Without the understanding of the child that resides in the breast of the adult, it is impossible to treat adequately the various psychological ills from which he may suffer. And also, without an accurate understanding of the nature of children during the formative period, little can be done to assist them to overcome the inner difficulties with which they are faced.

We must reject the claim made for Adler as being the "Confucius of the West".
Sigmund Freud.

We shall now attempt to give an account of the views of Professor Freud on repression and sublimation.

Freud's psychological writings extend over a period of forty years, and during this time his views have developed. He has, indeed, seen little reason to change his original position, and it may be said that his later statements merely systematise his earlier findings. It has been held that Freudianism stands or falls according to the truth of the doctrine of the Oedipus complex. This statement we feel is not necessarily true. Freud himself does not rule out the possibility that our bi-sexuality may be the principal determinant of unconscious process. It would be far truer to state that psychoanalysis stands or falls on the proof or disproof of the doctrine of the superego. It cannot indeed be justly asserted that Freud is dogmatic in respect of the factors which lead to the formation of the superego. He admits that the process of identification is little understood. What Freud does assert, however, is that there is within the normal human mind an irrational factor which has a direct influence on conscious process, and which, in addition, accounts for repression, symptom, and sublimation.

If we were to enquire of Freud as to the relation of repression/

'Ernest Jones, "Psychoanalysis" (Benn's Series) p.31.
"The Ego and the Id" p.43. 1Op.cit., p.36.
repression to cultural development, his reply would resolve itself into a discussion of the superego as the determinant of cultural process. His position is, in general, that the superego mechanism has been responsible for the development of civilisation, and has largely determined the structure of society, the more or less willing acceptance of the privations inherent in that structure, and in the case of a minority of individuals it has supplied the energy for higher forms of development.

In his "Future of an Illusion", Freud argues that there is at least a possibility that humanity could develop without repression. But so consistent has Freud been in most of his writings in maintaining that all higher development is repression-determined, that Roheim has cause to say: "In spite of occasional remarks by Professor Freud and others to the contrary, I cannot easily understand how a sublimation, that is, an impulse-deviation, can occur without repression. First, there must be anxiety, then repression, and lastly the break through and motor discharge of the repressed in a form acceptable to the superego. Thus impulse energies are not damped down but canalized. In order that this can happen, some power other than the id must have been operative."

As we shall see in our discussion of other Freudian writers, it is generally accepted as being the teaching of the"

"G. Roheim, "The Riddle of the Sphinx" p.245."
the founder of psychoanalysis that repression is a necessary and inevitable process. This would indeed appear to be the usual viewpoint of Freud himself, and moreover, when considering his later writings, we can only conclude that he regards the superego also as necessary and inevitable. There is at present a tendency among orthodox Freudian writers to discover the superego in process of formation at the age of six months. According to Melanie Klein, "early analysis shows that the Oedipus complex sets in as early as the second half of the first year of life, and that at the same time the child begins to modify it and to build up its superego." And since Freud himself accounts for so much on the lines of phylogenetic inheritance, it is probably true that he accepts the findings of those of his followers who have made a special study of the formative period of child development. As we shall see later, Alexander, who is considered to follow closely the teachings of Professor Freud, bases his whole discussion of the "Total Personality" on the concept of the superego.

Freud admirably summarises his later position in his introduction to Theodor Reik's "Ritual: Psychoanalytical Studies". This was published in 1931. His "New Introductory Lectures", delivered in the following year, are mainly an expansion of the views summarised in the article to which we refer. Speaking in historical vein, Freud tells us that in the earlier days of his work there seemed no likelihood of being able to place the new findings in respect of neurotic and psychotic individuals in relation/

'Melanie Klein, "The Psychoanalysis of Children" p.28.'
relation to normal persons. Psychoanalysis was to all intents and purposes a branch of medicine. Later, however, he says, the study of the dream convinced psychoanalysts that there is an essential similarity between the mentation of the normal and the abnormal. "And in solving the enigma of dreams, it found in unconscious mentality the common ground in which the highest as well as the lowest mental impulses are rooted, and from which arise the most normal mental activities as well as the strange products of a diseased mind. The picture of the mental mechanisms of the individual now became clearer and more complete: it was seen that obscure impulses arising in his organic life were striving to fulfil their own aims, and that controlling them there was a series of more highly organised mental formations acquired and handed on by man under the pressure of his cultural development which had taken possession of parts of these impulses, developed them, or employed them in the service of higher aims - had bound them fast, at all events, and utilised their energy for its own purposes. This higher organisation which we know as the ego, had rejected another portion of the same elementary impulses as useless, because these impulses could not accommodate themselves to the organic unity of the individual, or because they conflicted with its cultural aims."

Freud thus gives us a picture of what he considers to be the normal mind. Arising from the purely organic plane, the mind has two/

'S. Freud in "Ritual: Psychoanalytical Studies", by Theodor Reik, p.5-6.
two impulses, the life instinct and the death instinct. At the human level, these impulses are worked up into a complex organisation through the medium of cultural tradition. The task of taming and utilising raw natural impulse in the interests of cultural purposes is by no means simple. Man has been faced with the stark necessity of securing a firm grip of his basic impulses, these representing purely and simply his animal inheritance. He has succeeded, however, in taking possession of parts of the impulses lodged in his primitive psychic organisation. But Freud seems to consider that "taken possession of" does not quite describe the process by which man has secured control of his primitive impulses, and adds: "had bound them fast at all events, and utilised their energy for its own purposes."

Behind Freud's statement there lies his whole doctrinal system of the superego, to which we more specifically refer at a later stage. The whole process of instinct control, according to Freud, is complicated and, indeed, ingenious. Under the stress of vital necessity, the individual rejects a portion of his elementary impulses partly because certain impulses are mutually incompatible, and partly because they are in conflict with cultural aims. In the last resort, Freud's viewpoint is strictly biological, and he believes that most of our psychic organisation at the adult level is constructed under the direction of that stern taskmaster, Necessity. The question, for Freud, is not the place of repression in the development of higher forms of cultural process: repression/}

¹"Beyond the Pleasure Principle" p.47-8.
²"Introductory Lectures" p.298.
repression, to him, is a _sine qua non_ of any development whatsoever at the human level. Take away repression, if this were indeed possible, and man at once sinks to a purely animal level, but with this disadvantage, that his instincts are no longer sufficiently specific for effective orientation in any imaginable environment. Freud does not present us with the alternatives of repression or a lower form of cultural development: to him, the alternative to repression is extinction.

Perhaps Freud is wrong; at least one hopes that he may be proved to be wrong. But however this may be, one cannot but admire the courage which has enabled him to face a Nature at once grim and terrifying. His logic may conceivably have led him to a position which is illusory, but lesser mortals would have hesitated to follow reason to its ultimate conclusions.

But we would suggest that Freud has here made an implicit confession. He has not completed his course of self-analysis, for if he had, his instinctual forces would no longer be "bound"; that is, according to his teaching, he would be insane. This is a point to be remembered. The Freudian position ultimately rests not on knowledge but on hypothesis, hypothesis which is incapable of proof. That is, analysis brings the individual to a point at which there is a sign: "Thus far shalt thou go, and no farther." Rank would also seem to have come upon the same sign, though his picture of the Never-Never-Land is essentially different from/

'Otto Rank, "The Trauma of Birth".
from Freud's, and consequently his explanation of the raison d'être for the warning sign is not the same.

We are reminded of Blake whose spiritual wanderings brought him to the lowest known stratum of the psychological world. He was impelled to go farther, but discovered that this could not be done unless he broke his way through a layer of extremely disgusting materials. Disturbing these, he found that tree roots were embedded within them, whose lower portions stretched out into the awful void beneath. Still pursuing his purpose, he lowered himself through the aperture which he had made, and found himself suspended over an abyss, his hands holding desperately to the projecting roots. In his vision, Blake released his grip and allowed himself to fall into the depths, only to discover that he was in a beautiful garden, a Paradise wherein the Golden Age found living embodiment.

It is indeed pertinent to ask whether Blake's dream was a mere expression of insane imagining. Was he the subject of illusions? Who is right, Freud or Blake? Would we become insane if we took the further step of analysing out all repressions, or is this step required before we can become truly sane?

The present writer does not pretend that he has solved this problem, but precisely because the problem is not solved he is compelled to admit that any conclusions to which this thesis may bring us are, in the last resort, contingent. No Roheim has, to date, solved the Riddle of the Sphinx. We await a greater than Freud to unlock the secret places of the unconscious mind.

To/

See Note in Appendix. p. 495.

To return to our immediate theme. In the article to which we have made reference, Freud continues: "The ego was not powerful enough to exterminate those forces it could not control. Instead, it turned away from them leaving them on the most primitive psychological level, and protected itself against their demands by means of energetic defensive or reactive mechanisms, or sought to compromise with them by means of substitute gratifications. Unsubdued and indestructible, yet inhibited in every direction, these repressed impulses together with their primitive mental content, form the underworld, the kernel of the true unconscious, ever on the alert to urge their claims and to find any means for gratification. Hence the insecurity of our proud psychical superstructure, the nightly emergence of proscribed and repressed things in dreams, and our proneness to fall ill with neuroses and psychoses as soon as the distribution of power between the ego and the repressed is altered to the disadvantage of the former.

"It requires but little consideration to realise that such a view of the life of the human mind cannot possibly be limited to the sphere of dreams and nervous diseases. If it be a justifiable view, it must apply also to normal mental phenomena and even the highest achievements of the human mind must have some relation to the factors recognised in pathology - to repression, to the strivings for mastery of the unconscious, and to the possibilities of gratification which are open to the primitive impulses."

We have here a simple and concise statement of the Freudian position as relevant to our discussion. Repression is normal, inevitable/"Ritual" p.5-6.
inevitable, and moreover the principal determinant of cultural process. Freud goes on to say that it is "a scientific duty to extend the psychoanalytical methods of investigation from their original field to more distant and diverse spheres of mental interest." He says it is evident that in neurosis there are expressions which correspond "with the most highly valued products of our civilisation". The hysterical is a poet, the obsessional patient, through ceremonials and prohibitions, creates a religion, albeit a private one, and the paranoiacs "show an unwelcome external similarity and inner relationship to the systems of our philosophers." Freud draws the conclusion that the only difference between poetry, religion, and philosophy, as ordinarily understood, and the expressions of the afflicted individuals to whom he has referred, lies in the fact that in the so-called normal, their higher activities happen to be "acceptable to a large number of persons." Both are making an attempt, unconsciously and fortuitously, to solve their conflicts and to appease their urgent desires.

Here we find all that is essential in the Freudian theory of sublimation. Cultural interests are not the result of an attempt by the individual consciously to orient himself to a world of values; they are determined by inner drives over which the individual has no direct control. To use a geological metaphor, we/

we have the picture of vast subterranean lava streams which are at all times attempting to force their way through the crust of the earth. The how and why of their breaking through is apparently adventitious. At once place there is a quiet outflow of molten rock which is harmless; at another place, the internal stresses, the ultimate cause of the lava flow, reveal themselves in hot springs, geysers, etc., whose heated waters may be used for a variety of purposes by the natives; the geyser phenomena may be aesthetically pleasing, and the minerals contained in the evaporating water may lead to beautiful encrustations of surrounding rocks. At another place, springs may occur of medicinal value. On the other hand, the inner forces might lead to destructive explosions, devastating earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions which spread ruin over the surrounding area.

Modern science can with a fair degree of accuracy predict when and where the more disruptive forces will break out, but it is powerless to control these forces. To all intents and purposes, this situation also applies to the human mind in Freud's view. It is true that by means of psychoanalysis a few individuals may have their psychological processes modified in some degree, but in the main the unconscious is almost entirely outwith human control, both for good and for ill. There is a prima facie case for those who see in the unconscious according to Freud's description an evolutionary mechanism of the highest significance. Man at the present stage at least has virtually no/
no control over his destiny. Under compulsions, he propagates his kind; he strives for the maintenance of his social organisation, and as a sort of bi-product of evolutionary process, he produces works of art, intellectual systems, and interesting though apparently illusory rules for the guidance of his ethical life.

Freud seemingly agrees with Reik in his finding that the subject matter of literature in general, and particularly in dramatic poetry, is almost entirely limited to working out in artistic form a solution for the Oedipus complex. "Through the elaboration of this complex into the most manifold variants, distortions and disguises, the poet seeks to elucidate his most personal attitude to this affective theme."

Freud then gives a brief outline of his theory of the formation of the Oedipus complex. "It owes its significance," he says, "not to any unintelligible concatenation of events. The importance of the parental relationship springs naturally from the biological fact of the long helplessness and slow maturing of the young human being, and the complicated development of his capacity for love; and furthermore guarantees that the lines on which the Oedipus complex is overcome shall run parallel with those on which the archaic and animal inheritance of mankind is most-successfully brought under subjection."

We would specially note that the solution of the Oedipus complex, according to Freud, is by means of "binding" the original instinctual/

instinctual impulses. McDougall would have us believe that Freud considers that in normal individuals the Oedipus complex disappears. We do not think that this is a true rendering of Freud's position. While Freud does not hold that in normal persons the Oedipus complex sets up stresses which affect conscious life, it is his view that the complex in question only ceases to be an interference factor in conscious life in so far as the operation of the impulses contained within it is effectively side-tracked into the domain of the superego. The impulses must be "bound" in order that the solution of the Oedipus complex should run parallel with the method by which the "archaic and animal inheritance of mankind is most successfully brought under subjection." We are not quite clear, however, that Freud succeeds in differentiating between the two types of process, that which is biologically determined and that which is dependent on cultural tradition. But from the above quotation, it seems certain that Freud views the construction of the superego as part of the process of growth in normal human beings.

The Oedipus complex is not dissolved in any real sense, but transformed, and if it be true, as Freudians often tell us, that any normal individual may, under certain circumstances, be involved in neurosis, it follows that the Oedipus complex is capable of being revived in the normal individual.

We/

We therefore repeat our assertion that to the Freudians repression, sublimation and symptom are all superego determined, and therefore a discussion of the relation of repression to cultural development on Freudian premises resolves itself into an examination of the superego and its dependent systems in relation to cultural development. It will be on these lines that we shall later attempt to deal with the main Freudian attitude to the subject of sublimation.

We would here briefly refer to the question as to whether repression is necessary as a means to sublimation. Here and there Freudians tell us that sublimation is the alternative to repression, but usually we find that writers who make this statement later qualify their position by informing us that sublimation is only hindered by too much repression. If a child analyst should indeed demonstrate that a redirection of instinctual energy occurred without repression, our reply would be that the new interests were formed along the lines of ordinary sentiment formation. It is to be noted that these analysts treat of a period in the life of the child prior to the setting up of the superego. But according to Freud, the repressions of later life are part and parcel of the superego system and therefore, as we have seen, the impulses contained within them can no longer be subject to direct control. They are already repressed, and must remain so, and any overt expression will be by way of circuitous modes of superego functioning.

Of course it might be argued that in the pre-superego stage the/
the alternative to repression might have been sublimation. In this case, however, it would appear obvious that the re-directed energy from the very start found expression through ordinary sentiments and was therefore under direct conscious control. We think that a great deal of energy, especially in the normal person, is in no way subject to the control of the repressed unconscious, but there seems to be no justification for using the term "sublimation" for this type of expression of instinctual energy. According to the main Freudian pre-suppositions, most if not all of our energy is caught up within the system of the repressed unconscious, and in adult life only expresses itself in so far as the censor or superego allows it to do so, the invariable condition being that expression should be disguised.

We are of opinion, then, that there can be no basis for the view that the alternative to repression is sublimation. Sublimation is dependent on repression, as Roheim insists.

The alternative to repression is not sublimation, but non-repression, in which case, hypothetically at least, instinctual energies would be utilised in ordinary sentiment formations. It was the writer's original intention to discuss in detail the Freudian theory of sublimation in respect of various forms of cultural process, but as we followed up our line of study it became increasingly clear that such a treatment would be irrelevant to our main purpose. As we stated in the introduction to this essay, the purpose in developing our theme is practical. The question at issue/
issue is, how should we regard repression in relation to cultural process in contemporary life? Almost every Freudian makes out a case to show that repression lies behind a variety of forms of higher development. We consider that our present task is to demonstrate that any advantages from repression are merely incidental. There may be a grain or two of wheat in the bushel of superego-determined chaff, but the question which occupies our attention is why the human mind, in so far as it is superego determined, should produce such a disproportionate amount of useless material, if we are to accept the Freudian finding that occasional "sublimations" do occur.

We suggest that the answer to our query is only discoverable by a close study of the conditions under which the superego is formed. It is our view, from the standpoint of human values, that the existence of the superego in the human mind is intolerable. Our judgment of Charles I. as a bad king is in no way affected by the dilations of his apologists as to his family virtues. A clergyman's rhetorical abilities do not influence us in our view as to his unfitness for the office which he holds if his moral life has shown flagrant defects. The fine-spun arguments of the Schoolmen do not impress us when we realise that their intellectual life took no cognisance of really significant facts.

And so with the superego. If it is morally and intellectually disreputable, we need not concern ourselves with incidental advantages which accrue from its operation. Our question is, can we/
we regard repression as a function of cultural process? If by function we mean an indispensable factor, an essential determinant, we must form the conclusion - that is, if our position can be substantiated - that repression is not a function of cultural process, and we must maintain in the face of the defenders of the sublimation theory of human development that repression is indeed a dysfunction of cultural process, a harmful intrusion in the minds of human beings, which vitiates many lines of intellectual thinking and prevents adequate ethical response.

From the aesthetic standpoint, we hope to show that any individual in whom a superego exists is essentially limited in his powers both of the creation and the appreciation of beautiful objects.

We shall now seek by means of a quick review of Freud's works to bring into our intellectual purview statements which appear significant from the standpoint of our present undertaking. Let us first turn to Professor Freud's "Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis", using the reprinted edition of 1923. Freud, throughout his entire works, strives to relate his theories to the evolutionary viewpoint. In his introduction to the work under consideration, he states that the opposition to his theories is due to intellectual, moral, and aesthetic prejudices. These, he says, "are powerful things, residues of valuable, even necessary, stages in human evolution."

Presumably these prejudices are connected with the forces which maintain repressions; but it seems that these very higher cultural attitudes/

"Introductory Lectures" p.16.
attitudes are themselves determined by repression. "Nay, more," he says, "...these sexual impulses have contributed invaluably to the highest cultural, artistic, and social achievements of the human mind." Then follows a peculiar statement: Why, he asks, does psychoanalysis evoke such a storm of resistance from the ordinary members of civilised communities? It would seem that he has already supplied the answer. It so happens that we are prejudiced against certain types of knowledge; but Freud does not give this expected reply. He tells us that we, as ordinary members of a civilised community, know quite well that the enlightenment which the Freudian offers is dangerous to our community life. In our heart of hearts we are already aware of all that he has to tell us, but we prefer not to raise our implicit knowledge to the conscious level.

The point we wish to emphasise is that the charge directed against us by Freud is not that we repress but that we dissociate a large number of facts. The ordinary individual knows precisely what he is doing in suppressing certain types of knowledge. And moreover, he insists on doing it. Freud provides an excellent reason, of which it would again seem that the individual has been implicitly aware throughout. We quote from the relevant passage: "We believe that civilisation has been built up under the pressure of the struggle for existence by sacrifices in gratification of the primitive impulses, and that it is to a great extent for/

for ever being recreated as each individual successively joining the community repeats the sacrifice of his instinctive pleasures for the common good. The sexual are among the most important of the instinctive forces thus utilised: they are in this way sublimated, that is to say, their energy is turned aside from its sexual goal and diverted towards other ends no longer sexual, and socially more valuable. But the structure thus built up is insecure, for the sexual impulses are with difficulty controlled; in each individual who takes up his part in the work of civilisation, there is a danger that a rebellion of the sexual impulses may occur, against this diversion of their energy. Society can conceive of no more powerful menace to its culture than would arise from the liberation of the sexual impulses, and the return of them to their original goal. Therefore society dislikes this sensitive place in its development being touched upon; that the power of the sexual instincts should be recognised and the significance of the individual's sexual life revealed is far from its interests; with a view to discipline, it has rather taken the course of diverting attention away from this whole field. For this reason, the revelations of psychoanalysis are not tolerated by it, and it would prefer to brand them as aesthetically offensive, morally reprehensible, or dangerous."

Crichton Miller tells a story, in "The New Psychology and the Preacher", of a lady who heard for the first time of the Darwinian theory/

theory of evolution. "Descended from monkeys!" she exclaimed. "My dear, I trust that is not true; but if it is, let us pray it may not become widely known." The plain man, according to Freud, differs from the lady referred to in that he has an implicit knowledge of the main tenets of psychoanalysis before psychoanalysis seeks to enlighten him. The plain man, however, resembles the lady in not wishing the facts revealed by psychoanalysis to become extensively known, not only in society at large, but within the precincts of his own personality.

We cannot allow that the attitude of the plain man may rightly be regarded humorously. On Freud's own showing, he is fundamentally right in insisting that dissociations should be maintained both in himself and others. Freud appears to blame society for resorting to rationalisation in warding off his psychoanalytical rapier. It appears to us that the plain man is justified in using any weapon which lies to hand. He cannot return the attack by means of genuine intellectual weapons, for should he do so it will be at the expense of a complete surrender of his entire position before the battle begins. As we have stated, the plain man prefers not to know the facts of psychoanalysis, and for excellent reasons, if Freud's diagnosis is true. Freud tells us that he himself has yielded to "no tendency in propounding this objectionable theory. Our intention has been solely to give recognition to the facts as we found them in the course of painstaking researches, and we now claim the right to reject unconditionally any such introduction of practical/
practical considerations into the field of scientific investigation..."

It is one of the positions which we wish to establish in this thesis that any considerable increase in the influence of the superego or the repressed unconscious is at the cost of blunting the ethical sense. Even at the risk of being considered hyper-critical, we cannot withhold this remark. For a quarter of a century before the publication of the "Introductory Lectures", Freud had been immersed in the study of the superego determined unconscious. If our theory is right, "libido" had been drawn into this system from normally developed sentiments, ethical, intellectual, and aesthetic. The vision of life as a whole was accordingly distorted. As the foregoing statement made by Freud stands, we are obliged to take up the viewpoint that it expresses an attitude at once unreasonable and ethically reprehensible.

There are many medical matters which are not discussed in public, and rightly so, and perhaps Freud would have been justified in disseminating the knowledge of psychoanalysis among his medical confreres under the conditions of professional secrecy. Supposing it were found that death could be brought about by the application of some common household substance to a part of the body; or, should it be discovered that the application of slight pressure to a blood vessel would have fatal effects without any suspicion falling on the individual who happened to have homicidal tendencies; would the medical profession be justified in spreading far/

far and wide such discoveries? The reply is obvious. If Freud, believing that the system of knowledge which he has propounded is dangerous to society, insisted on broadcasting his results, it is difficult to exonerate him from the charge of ethical irresponsibility. Psychoanalysts have, indeed, vied with each other in publishing popular accounts of their theories, and the exponents of the "new freedom" base their activities on psychoanalytical theory.

What is the relation of repression to cultural development? Freud supplied the answer, and then took the best possible means of destroying both culture and civilisation. But fortunately, we suggest, there are more things in heaven and earth than are included in Professor Freud's philosophy, and we should perhaps give him the benefit of the doubt in attributing to him an implicit knowledge as to what normal human nature really is like, when not drawn within the vortex of superego mechanisms. Perhaps after all he did not feel that his revelations were quite as dangerous to humanity as his logic led him to conclude. It is our belief that ordinary individuals succeed passably well in evading their superegos in so far as these are constructed within their personalities, and proceed in the building of their characters to all intents and purposes as though the superego were non-existent. Of course, we cannot at once rule out the possibility that superego morality, even if implicit, has some restraining power over conduct, but anyone who looks dispassionately at the facts/
facts gains the impression that superego morality is chiefly honoured in its neglect.

Aldous Huxley has a volume of essays entitled "Do What You Will." It would appear that the average individual acts on the principle here implied, and that the superego is utilised in order to make possible "free living". As Trotter has pointed out, we are so constituted that we are very much under the control of public opinion. We cannot bear to feel ourselves ostracised by those who are in a position to exert prestige suggestion upon us. If, however, we look to "conscience" as our supreme authority, we are then able to escape from the control of parental and similar influences. We have indeed a suspicion that the young child who takes to that phantasy weaving which is the precursor of the superego system has a shrewd idea as to the essential utilitarian value of internalised authority from the standpoint of securing freedom to "do what he wills".

Alexander makes much of the self-punishing mechanism in the neurotic personality. It is probably true that young children make considerable use of their imaginations in discovering means for evading parental control. The child who has been "naughty" may allay the anxiety which will rise in his mind when he realises the inevitable attitude of the elders to his misdemeanour, by imagining that he is the grown-up. All he then needs to do is to play at punishing himself, perhaps by causing a slight "accident", and all is well.

When/
When the child grows up normally, the impression is given that the adult individual treats his superego formations very much as he did when he was a child. It is probably true that civilised human beings do not wish their superego formations to be disturbed, as Freud suggests, but the reasons would appear to be quite different from those supplied by Freud. The person who possesses a superego is probably far more concerned for his psychological comfort than for civilisation, when he informs the psychoanalyst that he prefers darkness to light. On the whole, we are still inclined to be sympathetic to those who request the Freudians not to disturb their psychic peace. It is perhaps not very creditable in the adult to use childish tricks to escape the forces of public opinion, but as society is at present organised, it would not be easy to seek out those who are in a position to give reliable and salutary guidance on problems of behaviour. As Margaret Mead points out, there are so many contending authorities. The person without an inner authority would find himself involved in constant conflict, and particularly in adolescence it is vitally necessary that the young person should break free from the sense of being under the control of his parents or guardians. Whatever be the truth of Freud's theory of infantile sexuality, it would appear to be a matter of common observation that incestuous tendencies develop in the later home environment if the adolescent has been unable to find the necessary courage to seek out new attachments outside the home. In our opinion, Freud is essentially conservative in his/

*Margaret Mead,*"Coming of Age in Samoa" p.199-200.
his attitude; he at least is more moral than he appears. Is it not a little ironical that young people nowadays are inclined to regard him as the high priest of the new order of freedom, thus having additional confidence in making even fuller use of their superegos to evade parental control?

Like Janet, Freud states that repression does not take place if an impulse suffers rejection as the result of deliberation. Where this occurs, the repudiated impulse becomes powerless. But unlike Janet, as we have seen, he considers that in the formative years, repression is inevitable, in part because of biologically determined forces, and partly on account of the necessity for the child's adapting itself to a civilised environment.

We have seen that Freud holds that civilisation is dependent for its existence on the continuation of the system of repressions being built up in the human mind, or at least he states that the civilised individual believes that interference with repression would be fatal to society's continuing in its present form. In a later chapter, Freud definitely tells us that he is in agreement with those members of society who consider his process of enlightenment dangerous. He says: "For it is indeed one of the most important social tasks of education to restrain, confine, and subject to an individual control (itself identical with the demands of society) the sexual instinct when it breaks forth in the form of the reproductive function. In its own interests, accordingly,"

"Introductory Lectures" p. 245.
accordingly, society would postpone the child's full development until it has attained a certain stage of intellectual maturity, since educability practically ceases with the full onset of the sexual instinct. Without this, the instinct would break all bounds and the laboriously erected structure of civilisation would be swept away.

Freud then gives his opinion as to society's motives for repression. He does not tell us to which society he refers, nor does he inform us how the individuals who make up a society discover what are the views of the "group mind", since as far as we are aware there never has been a literature which has deliberately instructed parents to crush out the sexuality within their children. Presumably he makes special reference to contemporary society, but if we were to enquire of any individual parent as to his motives for suppressing sexuality, he would certainly not give as a reason that provided by Professor Freud. The parent in question would frankly inform the questioner that no ulterior motive was involved: it was a clear matter of right and wrong. The question as to who or what it is that has a motive for inducing repression in children is still unanswered. If pressed, it would seem that the Freudian would have to fall back on a "biological principle"; this at least is his usual method when faced with similar situations.

Freud tells us: "At bottom, society's motive is economic; since it has not means enough to support life for its members without work/"

"Introductory Lectures,"p.262.
work on their part, it must see to it that the number of these members is restricted and their energies directed away from sexual activity on to their work - the eternal primordial struggle for existence therefore persisting to the present day."

But Freud does not appear to be aware that there is every reason to suppose that, during the far greater part of human history, society did not concern itself about infantile sexuality. Although no certain conclusions can be reached, the probability is that civilisation existed through several millennia without sex prejudices being engrained into the minds of children. Early Egyptian moral codes know nothing of "sin" and seem to take it for granted that sex expression is natural and normal, and quite compatible with societal organisation. The pharaohs were notoriously immoral, and the gods, it would seem, provided abundant amorous opportunities for those who were admitted into the realms of the blessed. We draw attention to these facts, as Freudians would have us accept a theory of civilisation as based on sexual repression. Here Freud speaks of society's motive as being economic, and it is as well to realise that statements of this kind are essentially without meaning. The implication of the Freudian doctrinal system is that society will collapse if complexes are not set up in the minds of our children. Since psychoanalysis aims at destroying complexes, the Freudian is the self-confessed enemy of society. As we shall see in our discussion of:

of Roheim, Freudians take comfort in the thought that their activities will be ineffectual. Humanity loves its bonds too dearly for there to be any likelihood that the Freudian programme of emancipation will be successful. But however satisfied Freudians themselves may be with their peculiar logic, or lack of logic, the practical educator in the form of the modern parent discovers himself in an equivocal position, and that indirectly due to Freudian teaching. On the one hand, psychoanalytical writers lecture parents on account of being responsible for the formation of complexes in the child; on the other, they calmly inform them that civilisation is endangered, and what is more, that the individual child will probably "go wrong", if complexes are not formed.

Speaking of prophylaxis, Freud says: "It may accomplish too much; in that it favours an exaggerated degree of sexual repression which is harmful in its effects (that is, if the parent seeks to prevent the child having sexual experiences) and it sends the child into life without the power to resist the urgent demands of his sexuality that must be expected at puberty." The second danger is due to strict supervision in the sense of taking precautions against the child becoming involved in situations which lead to conflict and ultimately to repression. Freud then continues: "It therefore remains most doubtful how far prophylaxis in childhood can go with advantage, (that is, parents are to do nothing in the matter) and whether a changed attitude/

"Introductory Lectures" p.305-6.
attitude to actuality would not constitute a better point of departure for attempts to forestall the neurosis."

What Freud means by "a changed attitude to actuality" it is difficult to understand. We must ask again, who is to change? The answer would be, "society". But according to Freudian findings society cannot change its attitude unless it modifies its method of child education, and Freud forbids us to do this. As far as we can see, the circle is completed. Society and parents are equally helpless. For good or ill, we can do nothing to control our evolutionary development. Freud is not the apostle of a new order, he is a reactionary, an ultra-conservative. In making the above statements he is apparently blind to the ethical situation which he himself has partly created. The parent has had his eyes opened to the irrationality of creating conditions in the nursery which lead to conflict; not only the irrationality, indeed, but the stark injustice of blaming the child for possessing impulses for which he is in no way responsible.

Despite Freud's advice, parents who are influenced by his teaching are altering their policy, in that they are afraid to adopt any consistent policy at all, and the child suffers. Children cannot be safely left to grow up by themselves; even the most primitive society has its definite traditions incorporating consistent methods of child rearing. "Custom thought" brings many evils in its train, but society continues to exist, and the individuals/

individuals who compose it find a reasonable amount of happiness and satisfaction as members of the social group. Never before has humanity been led to adopt the policy towards its children of mere drift. Contemporary man must discover a new policy in regard to methods of child rearing, deliberate and purposive, if there is to be any security in the future, both for the individual and for the race. It may be fairly asserted that psychoanalysis to date has done nothing to assist in the propounding of such a policy.

In Freud's reference to prophylaxis above quoted, we have implicitly the doctrine that what is required is "not too much and not too little" repression. If too much, we have neurosis, if too little the individual will be incapable of self-control as he progresses towards later stages of development. We have no hesitation in stating that the Freudian "training formula" is mischievous to a degree. The alternative to traditional modes of child rearing is not merely modification in the direction of a lessening of severity, or a reduction of the forces of moral suasion, but the careful application of methods which will ensure that from the very beginning the child is able to bring his impulses under control by rational means. The Freudian method prevents the child having built up within himself those effective controls based on powerful repressions; nor can he view his problems sufficiently unemotionally to be in a position to subjugate his a-social impulses by rational means. We shall go more fully into these points in the sequel.

Freud/
Freud views the early form of infantile sexuality as being composed of a number of what he calls "component tendencies". These tendencies later come together to form sexuality as we know it in adult life. These component tendencies he regards as the growing points of cultural life. They are ultimately destined to repression. When repressed, the theory would seem to be that they act as psychic dynamos, producing energy which the individual may use for cultural purposes.

In his "Introduction to Psychoanalysis", Flügel gives a list of the cultural derivatives of anal-eroticism, this being one of the Freudian component tendencies. In this list are to be found almost all the instincts upon which society depends for the maintenance of its communal life. Repressed anal eroticism may lead to concentration, generosity, interest in children, writing, painting, and chemistry. It may also lead to tidiness, clear thinking, punctuality, purity, and strong will, and, rather surprisingly, to a "sense of reality".

The question arises as to what will happen to our communal life if the component tendencies have not been subject to repression. The lay reader becoming acquainted with the statements of such writers as Flügel, can only gain the impression that the hidden sources of power resulting from the repression of the component tendencies have an indispensable part to play in producing the energy necessary for socially useful pursuits, and the question will arise in his mind as to whether it is desirable to/
to interfere with traditional methods of child rearing. If the child were not equipped with the psychic dynamos to which we have referred, would he not be unfitted to play his part in the life of the community?

Freudians have also developed the theory that among the reaction formations arising from repressed anal-eroticism, is a tendency to displace sex interest from below upwards. Once again, the impression left on the mind of the lay reader is that the state of affairs would be indeed deplorable if the human being should no longer have a tendency to displace his interest from objects which have no intrinsic worth to higher things. We are led to understand that the inmates of insane asylums often revert to disgusting interests, and teachers are well aware of the underlying anal-erotic trends in the characters of their pupils.

Two problems arise. Is it desirable to subject to psychoanalysis the mind of the developed human being? Is it not likely that, if such analysis were thoroughgoing, the individual would become unashamed of his infantile liking for disgusting things? Surely the human being would then become a mere animal. Also, is it safe to refrain from disgust conditioning and the application of the sanctions of shame and fear in training young children? Would not the child remain uncivilised? It might be held that, if the anal-erotic and other component tendencies were subjected to rational control, they would still supply their quota of psychic energy for the construction of socially directed/
directed interests. This is, however, improbable. First, the reaction formations would not be brought into existence under these conditions. Secondly, the component tendencies, with the exception of the sadistic tendency, are relatively weak if the interests to which they lead have not been opposed by the child's environment. Parents who are acquainted with Freudian literature will inevitably draw the deduction that wisdom lies in continuing to use traditional methods in educating their young children.

The question therefore arises as to whether cultural process is dependent for its supply of energy on the repression of the component tendencies. The Freudian thesis that human beings are supplied with a great deal of energy as a result of the repression of component tendencies seems to be well substantiated, although the present writer is of opinion that the component tendencies are as a general rule dissociated rather than repressed, or, more accurately, they operate subconsciously rather than unconsciously. Be this as it may, the component tendencies of an individual who has been subjected to traditional methods of child rearing appear to act in accordance with the statements made by the Freudians.

To put the matter simply, in the case of the anal-erotic impulse, is the alternative to repression the acceptance of dirt as an object of supreme and absorbing value? Our reply is that children brought up without what is known as "cleanliness training" appear to have little interest in what are considered to be disgusting/
disgusting objects. Furthermore, a child so brought up develops all the necessary energy for cultural pursuits; that is, the component tendencies would not seem to act by any means exclusively as the growing points of cultural interests, as Freudians claim. Each and every instinctual tendency as described by Shand, McDougall, Drever, and others, would seem to supply its quota of energy as the child proceeds in his task of constructing sentiments which will be of value when he takes his place as a member of the adult community.

We have noted how Freud has led us to believe that repression has a vital part to play in the maintenance of the conditions of civilised life. We are therefore surprised to discover, towards the end of the "Introductory Lectures", this statement: "We can demonstrate with ease that what the world calls its code of morals demands more sacrifices than it is worth, and that its behaviour is neither dictated by honesty nor instituted with wisdom."

Since repression is largely the result of the moral demands made by educators upon children, we would seem to be supplied with a carte blanche to do away with repressions. Freud has told us the likely effect on the individual of applying rational methods in child rearing, and he has stated in no uncertain terms the probable effect on society of the abrogation of the repressed unconscious. And now we discover that he is giving society a sound rating on account of its hypocrisy and moral worthlessness. Since, according to his own showing, society cannot help itself without courting/

courtling utter extinction, it would appear that Professor Freud's attitude is a little unfair.

In "The Ego and the Id" Freud develops his theory of the superego. We shall treat of this subject later when we undertake our main critique of the Freudian system. Freud has demonstrated that the human personality may be divided into three parts: the ego, the superego, and the id. He has discovered that part of the ego itself is unconscious, and this he calls the superego. It is, however, essentially a piece of mere mechanism, whose activities the conscious personality can in no way control. It is a complex among complexes, repressed for reasons which, according to Freud's description, are far from obvious. The impartial reader has formed the conclusion that the pathological may even invade parts of the personality in ways previously unsuspected. One is greatly surprised, therefore, to read the following: "But now that we have embarked upon the analysis of the ego, we can give an answer to all those whose moral sense has been shocked and who have complained that there must surely be a higher nature in man: 'Very true', we can say, 'and here we have that higher nature, in this ego-ideal, or superego, the representative of our relations to our parents. When we were little children we knew these higher natures, we admired them and feared them; and later we took them into ourselves.'" And later he says: "It is easy to show that the ego-ideal/" "The Ego and the Id" p. 47.
ego-ideal answers in every way to what is expected of the higher nature of man. In so far as it is a substitute for the longing of a father, it contains the germ from which all religions have evolved. The self-judgment which declares that the ego falls short of its ideal produces the sense of worthlessness with which the religious believer attests his longing. As a child grows up, the office of father is carried on by masters and by others in authority; the power of their injunctions and prohibitions remains vested in the ego-ideal and continues, in the form of conscience, to exercise the censorship of morals. The tension between the demands of conscience and the actual attainments of the ego is experienced as a sense of guilt. Social feeling rests on the foundation of identification with others, on the basis of an ego-ideal in common with them."

In the same strain, we read in the "New Introductory Lectures": "It is probable that the so-called materialistic conceptions of history err in that they underestimate this factor. They brush it aside with the remark that the 'ideologies' of mankind are nothing more than resultants of their economic situation at any given moment, or superstructure built upon it. That is the truth, but very probably it is not the whole truth. Mankind never lives completely in the present; the ideologies of the superego perpetuate the past, the traditions of the race and the people, which yields but slowly/

slowly to the influence of the present and to new developments, and, so long as it works through the superego, plays an important part in man's life, quite independently of economic conditions."

We shall here make no further comment, except to state that according to Freud, the superego is the heir to the Oedipus complex, is the end result of a long series of acts of repression, and is responsible for the continued existence of repression in the adult human mind. It is a result of all the insincerities and hypocrisies of that social morality which Freud, as we have seen, bitterly condemns. The heir would seem to have developed many fine mental qualities despite the degrading conditions from which he has sprung. The Freudian doctrine of absolute determinism appears to have one exception.

We would now make brief reference to the Freudian doctrine of repression, quoting from "Sigmund Freud: Psychoanalytical Epitomes, No. 1", edited by John Rickman. Here, we read: "The ego hates, abhors, and pursues with intent to destroy, all objects which are for it a source of painful feeling, without taking into account whether they mean to it frustration of sexual satisfaction or of gratification of the needs of self-preservation." In other words, the human personality responds blindly to situations involving psychic pain, seeking at any cost to rid itself of that which causes the irritation. This fact/

"New Introductory Lectures" p.91.
2"Psychoanalytical Epitomes" p.96.
fact probably accounts for the final stages of any repressive process. It is probable that repression proper never occurs without consciousness having been faced with a situation of extreme pain.

We read later: "We see then that it is a condition of repression that the element of avoiding pain shall have acquired more strength than the pleasure of gratification." Once again, Freud is stating that the motive for repression is the avoidance of pain.

Freud has a theory that there are two types of repression, one primary and the other secondary. We shall quote the relevant passage, but we would first draw attention to what would appear to be a decided omission from Freud's theory. In our view, the end result of normal disgust conditioning is the basic complex of the human mind. We shall return to this point later.

We find Freud saying: "Now we have reason for assuming a primal repression which consists in the denial of entry into consciousness to the mental (ideational) presentation of the instinct....The second phase of repression, repression proper, concerns mental derivatives of the repressed instinct presentation, or such trains of thought as, originating elsewhere, have come into associative connection with it." And on the following page: "Probably the tendency to repression would fail of its purpose/"

"Psychoanalytical Epitomes" p.100.

purpose if these forces did not co-operate, if there were not something previously repressed, ready to assimilate that which is rejected from consciousness."

But we now face a difficulty. Freud uses the conception of another type of repression, that under the domination of the superego. Presumably, we are committed to thinking of a tertiary type of repression. Indeed, the entire later trend of Freud's thinking would lead us to believe that in the adult at least the effective repressing agent is the superego. In the "New Lectures" he says: "Now that we have posited a special function within the ego to represent the demand for restriction and rejection, that is, the superego, we can say that repression is the work of the superego - either that it does its work on its own account, or else that the ego does it in obedience to its orders."  

He also says: "The superego has the ego at its mercy, and applies the most severe moral standards to it; indeed, it represents the whole demands of morality, and we see all at once that our moral sense of guilt is the expression of the tension between the ego and the superego."

Implicitly, we suggest, this would appear to be the position: The superego represents our "morality", that which is responsible for our having prejudiced feelings in relation to the/

1."Psychoanalytical Epitomes" p.102.
2."New Lectures" p.93.  
3."New Lectures" p.83.
the id. The id is essentially a part of our make-up on account of which we experience acute feelings of inferiority. As adults, we automatically deny that it is part of ourselves, this through the mechanism of the superego. Though many complexes would appear to have been set up before the superego came into existence, (primary repressions), these, once the superego is formed, appear in a matrix which is itself repressed. The superego therefore does not directly render inaccessible the primal complexes. When it was set up, the personality no longer knew of their existence. But so long as the superego continues to function, the whole matrix in which the primal complexes are embedded remains in a state of repression.

For our present purposes, we shall dispense with the Freudian conception of that secondary repression which is conditioned by primary repression, and shall use "secondary repression" to denote the repressive activities of the superego. In elucidating our subject as to the relation of repression to cultural development, the question arises whether primary repression is a determinant of cultural process. That is, we would enquire whether a single complex set up in early life has or has not a function.

It is of significance to note in this connection that neither Janet nor Rivers, whose attention was primarily fixed on what we might describe as the simple complex, suggests that complexes have a function. Purely and simply, they represent a pathological condition. We would also bear in mind that, in/
in our view, the constant primal repression among civilised people brought up under traditional methods of child rearing is due to disgust conditioning. The question arises: Is there any likelihood that a simple complex would act as a determinant of cultural process? Our reply is, on the whole, in the negative. For this reason: most people who are subject to the influence of repressed complexes consider the underlying mechanism as an intolerable nuisance. We feel that they are abnormal, and have a restricting influence from the standpoint of effective adaptation. We feel almost a passion to be free from the entanglements due to our having forgotten incidents or phases of our past life. It is suggested that, if complexes could be simply resolved, few individuals would spare themselves the necessary effort to bring into consciousness their relapsed memories. The organism in its entirety has, it would seem, a distinct tendency towards abreaction. A little concentration, and the submitting of oneself to a certain amount of psychic pain, would enable us to resolve the greater number of our complexes, if the situation were not complicated by factors bound up with the superego. It seems likely, therefore, that simple complexes would have little relation to cultural development, since they would be speedily resolved as the individual passed into years of maturity.

One possible exception is that of the disgust complex, but even here the writer can recall that as a child he realised the artificiality of disgust attachments and it appears even likely that/
that if the issues remained simple, the developing individual would find means of freeing himself from an essentially irrational attitude of mind.

But, as we suggest, we are not here concerned with the simple complex. According to Freudian theory, both repression and sublimation are controlled in the adult by the superego, and if this last named psychic institution were abrogated, both repression and sublimation would cease to exist. Our contention is that the superego exercises a harmful influence on cultural development, and it is the main purpose of this essay to show that repression, as determined by the superego, is essentially a dysfunction of cultural process. Far from representing the things which we most value, it is, when rightly regarded, the enemy of man's cultural life. Repression is dependent for its continuance on the superego: and the superego cannot possibly be allowed to remain as part of the mind if the individual is to attain to his full stature as a human being. It represents a dwarfing influence, and when considerably developed, shuts out the possibility of worthy behaviour, satisfying aesthetic experience, and most of all bars the way to intellectual advance. The superego tends to bring about the atrophy of all higher cultural processes, not their facilitation.

If the human being were without repressions, would he adapt himself to his cultural environment? Although at times Freud would/
would seem to think that the impulse towards science is not determined by complexes, his general theory would seem to be that repression is the sole explanation of cultural development. We find him saying; in "Beyond the Pleasure Principle": "The development of man up to now does not seem to need any explanation differing from that of animal development, and the restless striving towards further perfection which may be observed in a minority of human beings is easily explicable as a result of that repression of instinct upon which what is most valuable in human culture is built." Such is Freud's estimate of human nature.

Even the capacity for tenderness is not innate in human nature: we are dependent for this quality on the repression of the sex instinct. The child has first an attachment to his parent which he renounces under cultural pressure. Freud says: "The repression which then sets in compels him to renounce the greater number of these infantile sexual aims, and leaves behind a profound modification in his relation to his parents, but by instincts which must be described as being inhibited in their aim, the emotions which he feels henceforward towards these objects of his love are characterised as tender."

Nevertheless, Freud seems to teach at other times that repression is not necessary as a means to sublimation. In fact, repression and sublimation are alternatives. As an instance/

instance of this, we find him saying: "The components of the sexual instinct are especially distinguished by such a capacity for the sublimation and exchange of their sexual goal for one more remote and socially valuable. We probably owe the highest achievements of our culture to energy which has been liberated in this way. A repression taking place at an early period precludes the sublimation of the repressed impulse; after the removal of the repression the way to sublimation is again free."

The situation is a little baffling. As far as we know, Freud has not made an attempt to reconcile these opposed views. What seems to lie behind his statements is this: If during the pre-superego stage of development, an impulse is subjected to what he seems to describe as primary repression, the energy of that impulse may no longer be used by the personality. Later repressions under the dominance of the superego appear to be of a rather different nature. As we have pointed out, they are massive. On the other hand, the repression is not necessarily severe. Indeed, the impression is given that we are not justified in using the term repression at all. Repression, as Rivers pointed out, is unwitting. A sentiment in the mind conditions a highly painful affect when it is aroused. After a while, the sentiment apparently loses the power of conditioning experience directly; it becomes repressed. How this happens would appear to be still a complete mystery. There is reason to suspect that it is due to the immobilisation reaction of the fear/

"Psychoanalytical Epitomes" p.42.
fear instinct. Fear at least would always seem to be an accompaniment of an impulse about to undergo repression, and when a complex is about to emerge from the unconscious the subject is apt to experience fear paralysis during the condition of sleep. It would seem according to Freud that repression of this type does not lead to sublimation; in fact, sublimation only occurs when the repression is raised. Precisely what, then, does Freud mean by his constant reiteration that repression is a means to sublimation, indeed an indispensable means? The only explanation is that Freud is speaking of two different things. We suggest that "dissociation," not "repression," should be used for all the phenomena of instinct control bound up with the workings of the superego. Sublimation is probably at all times a redirecting of an instinctual energy to be described in accordance with the theory of sentiment formation. The superego, unless it attains pathological proportions, lays a relatively light hand on the impulses which it is supposed to repress. The normal individual is more or less implicitly conscious of his superego phantasy system. It is a part of himself which is reasonably under control. Provided the instinctual tendencies have not been tied up in early childhood as a result of a trauma or series of traumas, the individual has available for the purposes of life practically all the energy provided by these tendencies. Freud seems to consider/
consider that every child experiences a certain amount of primary repression, but the point arises as to whether the superego would be formed at all if there were no complexes formed in the pre-superego period.

It is our belief that the superego is a more or less consciously elaborated escape mechanism, which the child constructs in order to assuage a sense of inadequacy of which he is fully conscious. This feeling is by no means sufficient, under normal circumstances, to occasion repression proper - if it were, no further problems would be experienced, and the superego would not be formed. But it is sufficient to cause the child to discover means of making his mind "comfortable" and it seems to be quite in accordance with what we know of the mentality of young children, and indeed of adults, that refuge will be taken in phantasy weaving. The child "pretends" that he is his father or mother, the doctor, an older brother, etc. He is not a naughty boy, but a good person; he is not weak, but strong. The child resorts to taking psychic drugs, and if inferiority feelings are continually evoked by his environment, the practice becomes habitual.

But it is not to be supposed that the individual is without a reasonably shrewd idea both as to the worth of his pretensions to being a superior being, and of his moral poses. He knows, however implicitly, that he is only play-acting. The "censor" allows the utilisation of his energies through "sublimation" because/
because the censor is the conscious personality. That is, there occurs sentiment formation, not sublimation in the strict sense of that term. The redirecting of energy towards a desirable end is subconscious, not unconscious.

What harm, then, is there in the superego? Probably not as much as would at first sight appear. But we do suggest that it rather detracts from human dignity if the adult personality must carry around at all times a set of childish fictions. As Freud rightly points out, the superego leads to illusions, and although these may have little influence on practical life, they would seem capable of doing considerable harm when the possessor of such illusions turns his attention to those sciences which are based on a knowledge of human personality. We shall later go more carefully into this last mentioned point.

We shall conclude this section with a brief reference to one of Freud's later works, "The Future of an Illusion". In this book, Freud turns his attention to the future prospects of society, basing his discussion on the facts brought to light by the psychoanalytical school. He says that he disdains "to separate culture and civilisation", and whatever may be the precise significance of this statement, Freud continues throughout his work to regard culture and civilisation as more or less synonymous.

He repeats his doctrine that civilisation has been built up/

\[\text{See Appendix. 500.}\]
\[\text{2."The Future of an Illusion" p.8-9.}\]
up as a result of sacrifices made by the individual. On account of these sacrifices, "every individual is virtually an enemy of culture....Thus culture must be defended against the individual, and its organisation, its institutions, and its laws are all directed to this end; they aim not only at establishing a certain distribution of property, but also at maintaining it; in fact, they must protect against the hostile impulses of mankind everything that contributes to the conquest of nature and the production of wealth."

Why is not the average individual satisfied with culture, Freud enquires. Why does not he consider that the cultural life which he has created is well worth the sacrifice of lower forms of pleasure? Freud states his reply as follows: "So one gets the impression that culture is something which was imposed on a resisting majority by a minority that understood how to possess itself of the means of power and coercion."

But if society in the past has rested on a foundation unacceptable to the majority of its members, why should not contemporary humanity proceed to invent societal forms which will please everyone? "That would be," says Freud, "the Golden Age, but it is questionable if such a state of affairs will ever be realised. It seems more probable that every culture must be built up on coercion and instinctual renunciation; it does not even appear certain that without coercion the majority of human individuals/"

individuals would be ready to submit to the labour necessary for acquiring new means of supporting life." That is, the average human being would sink to the level of the primitive, if left to himself.

As we have previously observed, Freud has a low opinion of human nature. Here we find him saying: "One has, I think, to reckon with the fact that there are present in all men destructive, and therefore anti-social and anti-cultural tendencies, and that with a great number of people these are strong enough to determine their behaviour in human society," Mankind would still seem to need the slave-driver's whip if it is to submit to those conditions which are necessary for life in a civilised community. For, as Freud says, "the masses are lazy and unintelligent, they have no love for instinctual renunciation, they are not to be convinced of its inevitability by argument, and the individuals support each other in giving full play to their unruliness....Men are not naturally fond of work, and arguments are of no avail against their passions."

Freud foresees the obvious objection to his description of human nature, that man's undesirable qualities are "only the result of defective cultural organisation, through which men have become embittered, revengeful, and unapproachable. New generations brought up kindly and taught to have a respect for reason...will have a different attitude towards it; they will feel it to be their/

their very own possession, and they will be ready on its account to make the sacrifice in labour and in instinctual renunciation that is necessary for its preservation."

Freud does not rule out this possibility, but he considers it irrelevant. His estimate of human nature holds, since there is no possibility that new methods of child rearing will be tried out. If the superegos of the educators are not modified, children will be submitted to the traditional methods of child rearing, and since the superego can only be extensively modified by altering these methods, the social system as we know it is ordained to continue.

But Freud is by no means hopeful that, even if means could be devised for changing our present methods of educating young children, society could dispense with coercion. Man is limited, he feels, in his capacity for education. The trouble is that each new-born child, almost independently of education, must submit to the control of processes which are phylogenically determined. Frustration thus occurs quite independently of cultural training, and the child must inevitably develop a hostility to culture. Freud is referring to his theory of the development of mankind as elaborated in "Totem and Taboo". We there read: "One day the expelled brothers (of the primal horde) joined forces, slew and ate the father, and thus put an end to the father horde. Together they dared and accomplished what would/

would have remained impossible for them singly....The violent primal father had surely been the envied and feared model for each of the brothers. Now they accomplished their identification with him by devouring him, and each acquired a part of his strength." This deed being committed, suppressed tender impulses asserted themselves, and the brothers felt intense emotions of remorse and guilt. These led them to invent two taboos, one against incest and the other against parricide.

The child of to-day retrospectively lives through the primal scene, and at the point in the drama where the emotions of remorse and guilt assert themselves, he imposes upon himself the ancient taboos of the primeval band of brothers. But the taboos are only accepted by the personality under the stress of strong emotion, and the older antagonisms still remain active. Since Freud is committed to this rather extraordinary view of human nature, it is only logical for him to suppose that the child is not completely amenable to educational influences. However, on the basis of his theory, it must be considered a merciful dispensation of Providence that the terrible instinctual impulses, as revealed in the incestuous, parricidal, cannibalistic, children of the primal horde, should be brought under control by any method.

Freud would appear to accept gratefully as de facto this phylogenically determined method of bringing the instincts under control/

control. His wonder appears to be aroused at nature's ingenuity in "binding" the primary instincts. He even considers his newly discovered superego as a lineal descendant of nature's earlier invention for the control of the instincts. "It is in accordance with the course of our development", he says, "that external compulsion is gradually internalised in that a special mental function, man's superego, takes it under its jurisdiction. Every child presents to us the model of this transformation; it is only by that means that it becomes a moral and social being. This strengthening of the superego is a highly valuable psychological possession for culture. Those people in whom it has taken place, from being the foes of culture, become its supporters. The greater their number in a cultural community, the more secure it is, and the more easily can it dispense with external coercion."

It would appear, however, that in the suppressed classes we do not find any considerable internalisation of cultural prohibitions. Is, then, the superego, according to Freud, the exclusive possession of the members of the higher classes? This, incidentally, is not the opinion of the present writer.

Freud then goes on to discuss the value of ideals in holding together the social group. He considers that the satisfaction which an ideal gives is of a narcissistic nature. If this be the case, they would appear to be determined by the superego mechanism. The ideal, Freud says, "can be shared not only/"
only by the favoured classes which enjoy the benefits of this culture, but also by the suppressed, since the right to despise those that are outside it compensates them for wrongs they suffer in their own group." But in addition, the lower classes, by identifying themselves with the higher classes, are led to imagine that they themselves possess the superior qualities if not the privileges of those who are more favoured. "In spite of their animosity, they can find their ideals in their masters. Unless such relations, fundamentally of a satisfying kind, were in existence, it would be impossible to understand how so many cultures have contrived to exist for so long in spite of the justified hostility of great masses of men."

The most useful ideal, however, in our racial development, according to Freud, has been the religious one. He frankly states his belief that religion is illusory. But he considers that it has had a contingent value in reconciling humanity to life in society. He believes, however, that in the near future mankind will have to develop rational sanctions for behaviour if social life is to continue. Science has undermined the foundations of religion, and we must look elsewhere for norms by which to guide our conduct. Rather strangely, Freud does not here connect up his doctrine of the superego with the factors which are responsible for religious faith. We have previously noted that Freud considers the superego to be the source of religion.

Dr. Ernest Jones, in his "Essays in Applied Psychoanalysis", also gives the viewpoint of the psychoanalytical school in regard to the relation of the repressed unconscious to the development of religious ideas, when he says: "By a divine Father or Mother, i.e., god or goddess, we mean, from a purely psychological point of view, an infantile conception of a Father or Mother, a figure invested with all the attributes of power and perfection, and regarded with respect or awe." Since the child identifies with the parents to form the superego, religion must therefore be a derivation of the superego.

We have noted that Freud has stated the view that social advance must be on the lines of the further development of the superego. It would seem quite clear that nothing would be more destructive of the superego formation than the breaking down of religious beliefs. According to Freud, the "authorities" within the superego are imagos of our parents. Throughout life those in whom the superego is well developed act precisely as though the parents had a continued right to control their conduct. But there is reason to believe that all such individuals have identified their parents with the divine figures of whom they heard in childhood when under religious instruction. It is safe to say that the superego of these people would become dissolved, or would at least assume more normal proportions, if religious faith were lost. And again, if children are no longer given conceptions of divine figures who have essentially the qualities and/

and characteristics of their parents, any superego formation which may be developed will have much less influence. Fewer prohibitions will be internalised.

Freud, in the volume under consideration, is adding his weight to those who, on scientific grounds, teach that religion is illusory. He is therefore assisting indirectly in the demolition of superego formations in his contemporaries, and thus, according to his own arguments he is rendering impossible any further cultural advance; indeed it would seem clear that on Freudian presuppositions, cultural retrogression will inevitably follow the weakening of religious belief.

Freud informs us that religion, far from being indispensable in cultural development - which, as we have seen, to him means the extension of superego control - is to be regarded as the universal obsessional neurosis, and adds: "One might prophesy that the abandoning of religion must take place with the fateful inexorability of a process of growth, and that we are just now in the middle of this phase of development." He does not appear to realise that his analogy is extremely inapt. Anyone who has followed his previous discussion must have arrived at the conclusion that, according to Freudian teaching, the fateful inexorability is not one of growth but of moving in a closed circle.

In developing the analogy, Freud says: "We know that the human child cannot well complete its development towards culture without/

without passing through a more or less distinct phase of neurosis. This is because the child is unable to suppress by rational mental effort so many of those instinctual impulsions which cannot later be turned to account, but has had to check them by acts of repression, behind which there stands, as a rule, an anxiety motive. Most of these child neuroses are overcome spontaneously as one grows up, and especially is this the fate of the obsessional neuroses of childhood."

But is it not the case that, according to the whole tenets of Freudian theory, unwanted character trends are overcome by the process of internalisation? They are "bound" within the superego formation, and in the case of successful development their energies are transformed by the method of sublimation.

In Freudianism, all psychic roads lead to the superego. Without the inhibition of natural instinctual outlets, no energy would be available for cultural process. And Freud adds: "The remainder (of the childhood neuroses) can be cleared up still later by psychoanalytical treatment."

But Freud has asked, "where the throng of superior, dependable, and disinterested leaders who are to act as educators of the future generations are to come from?" Nature does not seem to have as part of her plan the provision of ready-made psychoanalysts. She apparently knows nothing of the Freudian analogy. It would almost seem that "the fateful inexorability of a process of growth" will only take place if nature has the good sense to imitate/

imitate the psychoanalytical method as developed by Professor Freud. We can only state that as far as we are aware, there is no evidence "that we are just now in the middle of this phase of development". Nature so far has not responded to Freudian sympathetic magic.

We are reminded of the story of the Frenchman who was being attacked by a farm dog. The farmer, from a distance, called out: "You have nothing to fear. Barking dogs don't bite." The gesticulating Frenchman replied: "I know ze proverb. You know ze proverb. But does ze dog know ze proverb?" We also have a suspicion that Nature is ignorant of the said fateful inexorability.

In the final chapters of "The Future of an Illusion", Freud appears to have been subjected to a widespread amnesia. He seems to have forgotten all about psychoanalysis, the superego, biological principles, and the primal horde-father. We suggest that the changed attitude is not to be deplored. The reader is almost filled with amazement as he peruses the following lines: "Certainly men are like this (his imaginary opponent has suggested that human beings are not amenable to reason). But have you asked yourself whether they need be so, whether their inner nature necessitates it?"

He then likens our present methods of child rearing to deforming children's heads by bandaging them, and therefore the psychological anthropologist has no means of discovering their cranial/

'Op.cit., p.81.'
cranial indices. He contrasts the "radiant intelligence of a healthy child and the feeble mentality of the average adult." He tells us that he does not believe that children would naturally trouble themselves about religion. (We presume that the hordefather is a little more pushing than the Almighty). Our minds are enfeebled because we "accept without criticism all the absurdities that religious doctrines repeat." Our only means of controlling the instincts is by intelligence, but the inhibition of sexual interests prevents the development of intelligence, especially in women, and he concludes his paragraph by saying: "So long as a man's early years are influenced by the religious thought inhibition, and by the loyal one derived from it, as well as by the sexual one, we cannot really say what he is actually like."

Freud admits the possibility that he, too, is "chasing after an illusion", and says: "Perhaps it will turn out that human nature remains the same even if education is not abused by being subjected to religion."

Freud thinks, then, that it is worth while to experiment with non-religious education, and if this should prove unsatisfactory he is ready to give up the attempt to reform human nature, and to return to his previous description of man as being "a creature of weak intelligence who is governed by his instinctual wishes." We can only remark that on Freudian presuppositions, society will be no/

no longer in existence if the said experiment should have proved unsuccessful.

Freud commits himself to the view that mankind should no longer seek consolation in religious illusion. He foresees that if this happens, man will be in a difficult situation. "He will have to confess his utter helplessness and his insignificant part in the working of the universe; he will have to confess that he is no longer the centre of creation - no longer the object of the tender care of a benevolent Providence.... Man cannot remain a child for ever; he must venture at last into the hostile world. This may be called his 'education to reality'". And then he adds: "Need I tell you that it is the sole aim of my book to draw attention to the necessity for this advance?"

And later: "Thus, by withdrawing his expectations from the other world, and concentrating all his liberated energies on this earthly life, he will probably attain to a state of things in which life will be tolerable for all, and no one will be oppressed by culture any more." This view is hardly consonant with the psychoanalytical doctrine of human development having proceeded on the lines of retardation.

We shall now refer to what we believe to be the most extraordinary statement in the whole of Freudian literature. "We may insist as much as we like," Freud says, "that the human intellect is weak in comparison with human instincts, and be right/

right in doing so. But nevertheless, there is something peculiar about this weakness. The voice of the intellect is a soft one, but it does not rest until it has gained a hearing. Ultimately, after endlessly repeated rebuffs, it succeeds. This is one of the few points on which one may be optimistic about the future of mankind, but in itself it signifies not a little." And Freud goes on to state his belief that ultimately the rational part of man's soul will strive for "the brotherhood of man and the reduction of suffering."

Freud appears to us in the role of the man of faith, believing where he cannot prove. More than that: he is a sublime example of one who, in spite of all the evidence, as he sees it, being diametrically opposed to a certain belief, holds it to his bosom as containing within it the quintessence of saving knowledge.

Freud gives every indication that he is suffering from dissociation. And, we may say, in this lies his sanity. As we are constituted, or rather, in so far as the superego holds sway over our minds, reason is powerless in providing a basis for a significant life philosophy. In large part we must trust to intuition. It would appear certain, on the evidence of the above quotations, that despite appearances, Professor Freud has never taken quite seriously the doctrines which he has elaborated.

The superego has had limited sway in determining his fundamental beliefs and attitudes. But if Freud has for a moment allowed his essential humanity to express itself, he quickly resumes the role of the dispassionate investigator. We are led to understand that he bases his optimism on science which "has shown us by numerous and significant successes that it is no illusion." And in concluding his work, he reiterates: "No, science is no illusion. But it would be an illusion to suppose that we could get anywhere else what it cannot give us."

According to Freud, then, what is the relation of repression to cultural development? The whole body of doctrine which he has developed leads but to one conclusion: that repression is a necessary and inevitable process which first and foremost prevents man reverting to the level of the animal, a condition which would involve racial extinction. The instincts must be bound, otherwise the devil, whose name is legion, will work destruction on the face of the earth. But Nature is not unkind. She has provided her consolations and compensations. Man has his ideals, his art, his intellectual activities, these coming into existence as a by-product of the process of instinctual repression. Indeed, if repressions were abrogated, mankind would be left with no urge towards higher syntheses. He would become as the natural man of Hobbes' definition, "poor, nasty, brutish". But Freud cannot quite accept the position as stated. The scientific spirit at least cannot be the mere product of blind, irrational, inconsequential strivings. It at least must have its basis in man's original/"Op.cit., p.95. "Op.cit., p.98."
original nature, otherwise psychoanalysis itself would have to
be regarded as just another delusion of man's over-heated
imagination. We discover that reason and crude instinctual
impulses lie at the basis of human nature. We must surmise
that reason soon realises that it is no match for its formidable
companions in a straight fight. If it is to prevail, it must do
so by guile, and even cunning. Fortunately, it would seem, the
other basic impulses become engaged in internecine strife, and
when the contending forces are nicely balanced, reason steps in
and secures victory for one side or the other despite its puny
strength. Or, to use Freud's metaphor, the instinctual impulses
become "bound". Then, and only then, has reason a chance.

In "The Future of an Illusion" Freud suggests that we
should put our faith in reason, and points out means whereby he
thinks the whole mind might be brought under the control of the
rational faculty. He suspects that the motive for the internecine
strife is somehow bound up with religion, and suggests that the
instinctual forces should, as it were, call a truce in order that
they may come to realise that that for which they are fighting is
a mere illusion. The despised and largely ignored little brother,
reason, is to have the task of providing his confreres with the
necessary information, whereupon the contending parties will
become members of a democratic community, with reason enthroned.

We can only state our opinion that, in accordance with
Freudian presuppositions, the outcome of the little drama we
have/
have attempted to depict would be quite different. And yet we believe wholeheartedly that Freud is right, and also we venture to suggest, Freud the man, rather than the scientific worker, knows that he is right; for human nature is not a mere bundle of biologically determined instinctual impulses plus a little reason. Given a fair chance, the soul of the primitive, the soul of the child within, may yet arise in its simplicity and lovableness. Whether the pure in heart will see God we do not profess to know, but we are at least confident that the single-minded will inherit the earth. Whatever be the explanation, the soul of man thirsts after righteousness, hungers after truth, and is unhappy unless he is able to find expression for his yearning for those things which are beautiful. It at times we are drawn within the influence of that realm of crazydom the superego, we are at least conscious of our departure from "normality". Surely that is a proof of our essential sanity.
Academic Psychologists.

William McDougall.

The purpose of the article is to establish the part played by taboos in repression. Consideration of McDougall's warning in respect of raising taboos. Suggestion that implicitly McDougall accepts the superego mechanism as desirable. Doctrines of self-sentiment and sentiment of self-regard compared.

Francis Aveling.

Aveling quoted as illustration of a psychologist who finds little evidence for the factual existence of Freudian phenomena in normal people. Suggestion that repression cannot have the place claimed for it as a determinant of ordinary everyday activities.
Professor McDougall expresses his views on matters relevant to our subject in an article in "Sex in Civilisation", entitled "Should All Taboos be Abolished?" McDougall appears to think that repression is the indirect result of the application of what he describes as "taboos". His arguments are principally based on observations of individuals who are already developed, and there is just the possibility that he is dealing with secondary phenomena in much of what he says. But McDougall also did anthropological field work in the Torres Straits and Borneo, and had at that time the opportunity of studying human behaviour which is relatively free from the influence of repressions. We can also take it for granted that he has profited by the observation of the growth and development of his own children. He has himself done work in psychopathology, especially during the war, and therefore, in spite of the fact that he is regarded by the psychoanalysts as an "academic" psychologist, we have every reason to treat with respect the statements which he makes.

The trouble is, however, that the psychoanalysts have obtained a hearing from the lay public, and it is greatly to be regretted that parents especially are given a version of psychology uncorrected by those psychologists whose vision does not limit them within the narrow confines of superego determined doctrine/
doctrine. Thus, when we state that McDougall appears to regard repression as the result of taboos, there is good reason to believe that his opinions are the result of a careful study of all the relevant facts. And moreover, when he warns us of the dangers of attempting to abolish taboos, we may take it for granted that his admonitions are based upon a careful consideration of the relevant data.

McDougall sees as the principal determinant of conduct, the fear of breaking taboos. In a sense he states the obvious, but it is a matter for wonder that those immersed in the study of the unconscious mind experience difficulty in realising the part played by the fear of breaking taboos, both in childhood and adult life. A resistance seems to be set up in our minds against accepting what should be so obvious. The present writer remembers definitely attempting to dissociate his conviction of the power of the "herd instinct" in human life. It would even appear that in so far as we have within us neurotic trends, it is not sex from which we are running away, but the disapproval of someone in our present or past environment. The main purpose of repression would appear to be the freeing of oneself from the obligation of facing squarely the critical eyes of one's contemporaries.

The neurotic is a Jonah attempting to escape from the necessity of recognising the force of public opinion. Rank sees in the Medusa head a symbol of the dangerous mother. He is in part right, but the mother was dangerous just because she exerted/
exerted over us the force of prestige suggestion. The question before the child is not mainly how to free himself of his prohibited impulses. The child, on the whole, retains a kindly feeling towards the poor relations of his psychological family. What tortures his soul is the awful sense of being subjected to an attitude of disapproval. He wants to kill the mother or the father, not because of the sadistic element in his make-up, not because of his Oedipus complex - both of which may be regarded more or less playfully by the child: not so much because they have the power of inflicting punishment - as Freud points out, the masochistic trend may do much to mitigate the severity of the infliction of physical pain, erotogenous zones usually being involved - but because the parent has the power of arousing in the child intense negative self-feeling, a sense of worthlessness, of being an outcast, a pariah. Often the child wishes to run away from home, but he soon realises that this way out of his difficulty is impracticable. He may seek another "authority" to offset the parental one, among other adults, but he discovers that grown-up society in general thinks in very much the same terms as his parents.

It would indeed appear that there is only one possible way of escape from the influence of the frowning eyes of the parent, and that is among the child's contemporaries. If he can but feel that he belongs to a "society" of individuals who have different ideas from his parents, who indeed agree with him that their/
their aesthetic conceptions have no foundation in reality - we refer to the parental negative evaluation of the coprophillic - if he may be assured that others also regard the adults as betraying an incapacity to differentiate between truth and error - then the individual may succeed in assuaging the intense negative feelings aroused by the parental "May".

And if we would seek for a true explanation of the formation of the superego, it is not in Freudian mechanics, in an interplay between aggressive feelings bound up with the Oedipus situation, the striving of the Eros principle towards expansion, and the clash of all positive impulses with the death instinct. Not in these mechanisms is to be found the vera causa of that flight into unreality which comes under the descriptive term of "superego formation". The sole efficient cause lies in the child's dire need to escape from the disapproving parent.

As we have watched the growth of our little boy, we have noted at times his eyes turned towards his parents in almost pathetic expectancy that there will be directed upon him those looks of disapproval which he would appear instinctively to feel are the force which he has most reason to fear. On one occasion, when Philip had created a disturbance during the night, his cot was removed by his father to an adjoining room. The boy only remained two minutes in isolation, but the sight which met his father's eyes when he returned to the room will never be forgotten. The child's face revealed the epitome of sheer despondency. He would give in. He would not again disturb his parents. He wanted to be wheeled back/
back into his room and have his mother "tuck him in". The strained and anguished look on the child's tear-stained face, the entire suggestion that he had recognised an overpowering force, something which had the power to break him, to crush the spirit, to demand implicit obedience to the word of the parental law-giver, brought home to the writer a realisation of the sheer quality of the irresistible which is bound up with the taboo, the "Thou shalt not", as emanating from the adults who belong to a child's environment.

As we have said, it is strange how those engaged in self-analysis fight shy of the most obvious fact that the meaning of repression is only to be found in the recognition of the part played by "the herd instinct" in human life, its all-compelling power, its finality, its inescapability. In an earlier section of this thesis we described the views expressed in Trotter's "Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War", and we remarked that however open to criticism his theoretical conceptions may be, he was describing the most significant facts in relation to the/

'Note: Suttie would account for the phenomena as an exemplification of the effects of separation anxiety. In our view, such anxiety plays an essentially secondary part in creating highly painful situations of the type we have described. Philip is quite willing that his parents should go out and leave him at home, provided a present is to be brought back. He even urges us to go out as a means of securing an additional toy. (See Ian Suttie, "The Origins of Love and Hate".)
the subject of repression.

We are willing to dabble in sexuality, we are ready to take trips down the corridors of time in the company of Freud, of Rank, or of Roheim. We cheerfully accept our sadism, once we have overcome the initial shock. Even our aggressiveness is, after all, a part of the self whose existence we had already suspected. But what we will not accept is the truth about ourselves, in that we are principally motivated in the setting up and retention of repressed complexes by the simple desire to adjust ourselves to those who have the power to evoke negative self feeling, as McDougall has insisted for several decades.

The repressed unconscious, according to McDougall, can only be explained as an indirect expression of taboo activity. Change the nature of the taboos, and something will happen both in respect of the unconscious of the contemporary individual - the psychoanalytical curative process in reality rests on methods which secure this end - and of society at large. For good or ill, taboos represent the supreme controlling power of our societal life. Take away that control, and the powers of darkness may be unloosed, or conversely, maybe the powers of light.

*Note: Historically considered, it is probable that the fear sanction had priority as a determinant of repression. The early Egyptians seemed to be largely free from the influence of taboos. In the case of contemporary individuals, it is also likely that repression is founded on fear of the punishing parent in the first place. Once "inferiority feelings" have been aroused, however, an abnormal sensitivity to public opinion is developed within us. Henceforth those painful feelings which are the precursors of repression seem to be largely determined by the arousal of the self instinct in its negative aspect.*
We would now consider more expressly the views of Professor McDougall as revealed in the article to which we have made reference. Here we find the following: "The simple secret of the power of taboo is that man is by nature incurably social. He cannot bear to be alone, and worse, far worse than physical isolation, is moral isolation. We are so constituted that we desire not only to be with our fellows, but also to be at one with them, and each of us knows that, if he should break a taboo, they will look askance at him, regard him as an outsider. And we cannot bear to be so regarded. It is only the social outcast, the man that is already a hopeless outsider, who is unaffected by taboo. For him, the worst has happened; he has nothing to fear." And, we may add, it is almost certain that the person seemingly unaffected by taboos has formed within himself the conception that he is the object of some special approval, possibly of a divine figure.

McDougall continues: "In spite of the assurance of secrecy, of exemption from all ostracism, we shrink from the tabooed action. The action is not forbidden by law; it carries no penalty, as far as we can see; it will harm no one. And yet we shrink from it, it is repugnant to us. How explain the fact? For fact it is. There are some tabooed actions, the mere imagination of which we shrink from in horror, even though they may fascinate us."

McDougall's explanation is on the whole similar to Freud's in that he states that our respect for taboos which are not connected/

connected with our immediate environment is due to the influence of early training, being "formed under the influence of... our social circle, and more especially the circle of our childhood."

We are here tempted to state a belief which may be regarded as unorthodox. In our view, there is an extraordinary similarity between many of the conceptions of Freud and McDougall. It is true that McDougall explains psychological phenomena in terms of the sentiments, while Freud's views are anchored to the notion of repressed complexes working more or less autonomously. But when McDougall describes the higher sentiments, especially the moral ones and those of self-regard, he appears implicitly to accept most of the findings of Freud in respect of the part played in life by the superego.

Briefly, our position may be stated thus: McDougall, in his conception of the normal, has a place for an intrusive element of an irrational nature. He regards human nature, however, as it were from the outside. He notes the workings of instinctual tendencies in ordinary conscious life, and has formed a theory which in the main appears to be true to the facts. When discussing the abnormal aspects of human character, McDougall tends to explain the abnormal in terms of the normal. In certain cases, his explanation of the "unconscious" does not appear altogether satisfactory. We suggest the reason. McDougall is right in thinking that the forces seen at work at the conscious level/ "Op.cit., p.85."
level also account for phenomena resulting from repression, but it is doubtful if he is fully cognisant of the degree of elaboration which typifies unconsciously determined mental expressions, and also he would not appear to be fully aware of the universality of the "repressed unconscious".

Freud, on the other hand, attempts to explain the normal in terms of the abnormal. He is superego obsessed, and his psychological conceptions are almost entirely based on the admittedly strange workings of unconscious repression determined process. His exclusive dealing with the phenomena of the unconscious leads to two opposite results. He insists that conscious life is not what it seems to be. The instinctual tendencies described by McDougall are mere figments of the imagination; and when in his explorations of the unconscious, he comes across the very peak formation of human inanity, he proudly describes it as the determinant of all the best in human life, that which represents the summit of human achievement, the ego-ideal, incorporated in the superego.

By a strange irony of fate, this Sinaic eminence is the meeting ground of the two most outstanding figures in the psychological world, whose views would appear to be diametrically opposed, whose methods of psychological approach are as disparate as could possibly be imagined. Freud, however, wrapped in his aura of superego-determined emanations, fails to note the presence of the other, while McDougall, much to his chagrin, discovers that, in spite of all his efforts to attract the attention of his distinguished/
distinguished contemporary, his presence is ignored.

We read in McDougall's "Psychoanalysis and Social Psychology" in reference to the fourth level of human development: "The topmost level...is achieved by the formation of the moral sentiments and an ideal of self shaped by the moral tradition. Freud's "ego" is, in short, what in my 'Social Psychology' is called character; while his superego (with its ego-ideal contained within it) corresponds to what in my book is called 'moral character'."

McDougall then quotes from Freud's "New Lectures": "The superego of the child is not really built on the parents' superego; it takes over the same content, it becomes the vehicle of tradition and of all the age-long values which have been handed down in this way from generation to generation....The ideologies of the superego perpetuate the past, the traditions of the race and the people."

McDougall makes the following comment: "These and a few other passages from the "New Lectures" show clearly that Freud is here, tardily and scantily, recognising that highest level of functioning and the development of it under the influence of parents and other elders who embody the moral tradition. There is here no substantial difference between us; except that Freud merely points to the essential facts, while I have tried to supply in some detail, by aid of my theory of the sentiments, an account of the development, constitution and working of this highest stratum of the personality."

There/

There is, we suggest, reason to suspect that McDougall does not recognise an irrational factor underlying his sentiment of self-regard, of which he says in his "Character and the Conduct of Life": "This alone can perfectly fill the role of master-sentiment; it alone can supply a determining motive for right conduct in all conceivable circumstances; and it alone makes always for strength of character, efficient volition, and enduring happiness."

We would note that McDougall speaks of "self-regard" not "self-respect". It is perfectly understandable that in the hierarchy of sentiments the self-sentiment should have the pre-dominant role. Under civilised conditions at least, and probably in the case of all contemporary human beings, the strongest instinctive tendency is that which causes us to pay attention to the thoughts entertained of us by others, and so long as a person is objectively minded, there is constantly at work within him an interest in his standing within that circle whose views he considers worthy of respect. We have suggested that "abnormality" is mainly the result of the individual's attempting to hide himself away from the critical gaze of those who form part of his significant environment. Normally, the self-instinct is at work throughout our lives, and it would seem to supply our dominant motive. The doctrine of the "self-sentiment" as playing the principal/

\[\text{Cf. J.C.Flügel, "A Hundred Years of Psychology", page 288, where he says:"The second factor (introjection of narcissistic libido into the superego, this leading to the setting up of ideals) has obviously much in common with the self-regarding sentiment of McDougall.}\]
principal role in human life appears to be well established. But when we read the above quotation, we are unable to equate the prosaic though all-embracing self-sentiment as discoverable - ideally at least - in normal individuals, with that sentiment of self-regard which "alone can supply a determining motive for right conduct in all conceivable circumstances"; and which "alone makes for strength of character, efficient volition, and enduring happiness."

We cannot here pursue the point further. In the last resort, in these matters, we can only fall back on a statement that the writer personally, as a result of "empathy", thinks a certain conclusion is justifiable. The most we can say is that in our view the self-sentiment, as a rational component of the human psyche, cannot be appropriately the object of idyllic reference. The superego, with its counterpart of the sentiment of self-regard, on the contrary, would appear to stand in need of a good deal of eulogising if it is to be regarded as an intellectually respectable part of the human mind.

To return to the main line of our discussion. Speaking of taboo, in the article to which we first referred, McDougall says that "through emotional contagion we share the emotional attitudes of our circle to the tabooed actions, and the attitudes become habitual/"

Note: It is interesting to compare Professor Drever's treatment of the self-sentiment with that of Professor McDougall. (See "The Psychology of Education" p.70, and pp.80-112).

"Sex in Civilisation" p.86.
habitual; in short, we acquire moral sentiments of repugnance or aversion." This in point of fact is how our characters are built up, whatever part we think repression plays in human life. We would suggest here that if the Freudian superego has a biological function, it must lie in its capacity for maintaining the influence derived from early prestige suggestion throughout the whole life of the individual. It is perhaps necessary, if the race is to continue, that our more biologically significant impulses should be outwith the power of direct conscious control. Later, we find McDougall saying: "And our sex taboos are concerned with just this troublesome business of getting men born. There is not the least reason to suppose that reason alone would perpetuate the race. The begetting and the rearing of children is a most unreasonable business. Can we reasonably hope to commit it without serious results, to the care of reason?" Those who would abrogate repression would do well to consider carefully McDougall's statement.

He goes further: "Let us note," he says. "that no people known to us, however advanced or however primitive, has continued to exist without sex taboos." And later he refers to "The Clash of Culture and the Contact of Races" by Pitt-Rivers, in bearing out his assertion that "perhaps natural selection rapidly and surely eliminates societies without sex taboos or those in which sex taboos become few or feeble."

He also makes the following apparently incontrovertible statement: "And in view of the fact that the conduct of most of us/

us has hitherto owed so little to reason and so much to taboo, the burden of proof must be with the exponents of the policy of reason. For though our conduct may not on the average be very lofty or admirable, nevertheless we are here, society has at least survived, and even our much decried civilisation has shown itself to be compatible heretofore with the multiplication of the species."

It is argued in Benjamin Kidd's "Social Evolution" (1896), that during the whole course of human history, religion has had the function of looking after the interests of posterity. On page 64 he has the title heading: "There is no rational sanction for progress". He sums up his position in the following words: "A religion is a form of belief providing an ultra-rational sanction for that large class of conduct in the individual where his interests and the interests of the social organism are antagonistic, and by which the former are rendered subordinate to the latter in the general interests of the evolution which the race is undergoing. Like Pitt-Rivers, Kidd discusses the harmful effects of the "clash of cultures" on primitive peoples in that taboo sanctions are weakened. If we agree with Freud in considering that religion has been the traditional guardian of the taboo system, we may regard the convincing arguments put forward in the work to which we have just referred as substantiating McDougall's suggestion that taboos have had a great deal to do with the continued propagation of the race; and also, in point of fact, with the preservation/

2Benjamin Kidd, "Social Evolution" (1896) p.112. 3Ibid., p.51.
preservation of tribal solidarity, without which a culture quickly disappears.

McDougall pertinently says: "Take any one of the forms of behaviour in our list of sex taboos, and in calm detachment from all taboo influences and emotional repugnances, ask yourself the question, why not?... In each case a compelling answer requires a wide range of knowledge and a wise judgment, and presupposes a very strong interest in or desire for the continued flourishing of the social group in the distant future. We may hopefully estimate that one young person in a hundred might find an answer such as would prompt an effort of self-restraint." As a result of studying the behaviour of young people in his immediate area, where taboos are to all intents and purposes a thing of the past, the present writer must regretfully confirm what McDougall thinks will be the result of society's being freed from the influence of taboos.

What is the place of repression in cultural development? McDougall would have us believe that, if taboos disappear without something taking their place, the very existence of the race itself is endangered, and with it that superstructure which we call culture.

McDougall, both in the article at present under consideration and in the other two works to which we have here made reference, discusses at considerable length the doctrine of sublimation. Theoretically/

"Sex in Civilisation" p.93.
Theoretically, he does not consider that repression is a constant in the contemporary mind, and therefore in general he considers that sublimation, "the raising of the plane upon which the energy of any instinct operates", proceeds as a part of the normal development of sentiments. But he is definitely of opinion that in the sex sphere sublimation does not occur unless there is restraint. "Without sex restraint, no sublimation, and without sublimation, no culture, but rather the pleasant, lazy life of Trobriand, of Tahiti, of Hawaii. We may say also more confidently: no restraint, then no love, but only lust."

One is not altogether satisfied with McDougall's last statement. There is the suspicion that if the sex impulse were not waylaid in the superego system it would of itself become attached to an object which would provide its own restraints. Havelock Ellis, in his introduction to "Sex in Civilisation", tells us that "the cultivation of sex, being primordial, can reach a high degree outside what we usually call civilisation. We discover that in this field, as we have long known to happen in other fields, the uncivilised man can be an artist." And of the Trobriand Islanders; "Their art of love is in the best sense more civilised than ours usually is...They are considerate of the feelings of the woman, and they recognise that in the art of love each sex has its part to play."

McDougall/

McDougall, however, would appear to recognise this, for he makes the interesting statement: "The beauty of woman's form, although it greatly adds to its power to excite the sex impulse in man, yet in some obscure way evokes a restraining influence. It evokes another and opposed dynamic tendency of our nature; and this, holding the sex impulse in restraint, secures that balanced satisfaction of opposed tendencies which is of the essence of aesthetic contemplation." But later he adds: "If then we were all as sensitive to beauty and ugliness as Shelley and Byron and Dante, and if all women were as beautiful as Beatrice, we should need no sex taboos. But unfortunately the majority of us fall far short."

It is, however, a moot point whether our falling short is not the effect of unnatural conditions resulting from civilisation's present method of repressing the sex impulse.

McDougall, however, would seem to be right in insisting that if, under conditions as we know them, the energy of the sex impulse "be freely expended in the most direct and natural fashion, it will not seek and find...alternative and higher expression."

But McDougall's most significant statement from our present standpoint is made in a connection which has no direct relation to the questions of repression and sublimation. In his "Character and the Conduct of Life", we find the following: "The mysterious though/

though very real process of self-control, the practice of recognising and nipping in the bud inappropriate stirrings of our tendencies, is here of the first importance. The power of exerting such control may be developed in children, by wise guidance." He refers to the modifications of our original disposition. He then speaks of "the discouragement of over-strong tendencies. Its essence," he says, "is development of the power to inhibit, to cut short, an impulse at the earliest possible moment when we become aware that it is stirring within us. Mysterious as it may seem, this power may be acquired in very high degree, and is of the first importance."

We have discovered that when our child has, in moments of calm deliberation, decided that he would not repeat certain peccadilloes which appeared to have become habitual, he was able to carry out his intention to reform. On one or two occasions, under these circumstances, he has apparently forgotten his good resolutions, but being reminded of the modification of his conduct which he had decided to effect, he has checked the impulses which were beginning to find expression. This only occurred when the emotional outburst was at its inception. We have discovered that it is quite useless to attempt to reason with the child when he is in a state of developed emotion. One of the questions which we are here attempting to decide is whether repression is inevitable, and our answer must largely depend on the/

the question of the child's power of self-control as a result of rational process. McDougall supports the view that such control is possible.

We would conclude by referring to another conception found in the work last quoted. "Though direct inhibition is possible and useful, and should be practised, he who sets out on the road of self-discipline does well to recognise that inhibition may generally be achieved more easily and effectively by energetically turning towards and striving for some other goal, whether as a momentary action or as a sustained policy." Applying this conception in the educational field, our policy will be to build up in the child sentiments which will increasingly draw him away from forms of unadapted behaviour, and provide him with the necessary conditions for McDougall's more effective means of self-control.

McDougall's position in regard to repression as a determinant of cultural process would, then, appear to be that society depends for its very existence on taboos (the chief predeterminants of repression), and therefore, indirectly, repression is a condition of cultural process. We note the similarity to the views of Professor Freud. To him, suppression of sex at least is an essential condition of cultural development.

But we have suggested that McDougall implicitly at least accepts/

3See section of Freud, thesis page 61-2, and 103-4.
accepts repressions, as described by Freudsians, as necessary and highly desirable. In the main, we hold he is right in treating of repression in terms derived from a study of normal conscious process, but we have attempted to show that he accepts uncritically certain psychic formations which, in our view, have their root in the Freudian superego.

We note that McDougall stresses the possibility of self-control as the result of rational process applied at moments when a tendency is, as it were, just beginning to bestir itself. And also we would bear in mind McDougall's doctrine of the place of sentiment formation in stabilising the human personality. By combining the two methods of instinctual control, we have to hand the means of effective prophylaxis in respect of the development of repressed complexes. Provided the application of the methods of prophylaxis is thorough, it is our belief that fears for the future of society are groundless.
Francis Aveling.

Aveling envisages normality without repressed impulses, and "sublimation" as controllable. He opposes the idea that a complex should be regarded as a hypostasised entity, but describes it as a "personal tendency radically connected with a thwarted instinct." "The censor," he states, "is the character, as far as this is integrated apart from the complex in question." There is probably a good deal of truth in the suggestion that a complex is part of an entire mental organisation, and is subject to a greater or less degree of control by the integrated character.

"All abnormalities", he says, "...are in reality no more than morbid exaggerations of quite normal mental processes. All of us experience inner conflicts of one kind or another, whether fully or only partially conscious. If we do not all suffer from complexes, all of us have sentiments or emotionally charged memories which, if they are unpleasant, most of us do not wish to recall - even if we are able to do so. All of us have censors, in the shape of accepted traditions, social, moral, or religious, which have been forced upon us, as a rule in very early childhood, by the sheer pressure of our environment. Even such morbid mechanisms as the Oedipus or Electra complex have their normal counterparts in the ordinary attitudes which a child spontaneously adopts towards his father and mother."

"In/

Francis Aveling, "Directing Mental Energy" p.228.

"In normal people," he says, "we need not look for deeply repressed complexes of this kind, which require a course of analysis, extending perhaps over months and even years, for discovery. The sentiments and old emotional experiences and desires running counter to their accepted traditions, even if forgotten, lie near the surface, and can more easily be recalled. Indeed, many of them come quite clearly to awareness when what is called an examination of conscience is made. In such an examination one is really making a confession to oneself."

"Sublimation, on the other hand, is a process in which excess of energy properly belonging to an instinctive disposition is drained away from its connate, and in the circumstances undesirable, outlet, to some other socially more beneficial one, either within the scope of the instinct or outside it. Thus, for example, the urge to anger with those who oppose his will of the man of irascible temperament may be diverted to the conquest of difficulties in the arduous pursuit of some goal that will be of service to his fellows. Thus the drive of sex may be - and, in circumstances in which it cannot find its connate sexual outlet, generally is - employed in other directions. Social conditions are not always such that this instinct can have free release in its normal channels. The disharmonies between the time of its arousal and the possibility of its satisfaction are notorious."

The/

The knowledge that such a transformation is possible in the case of instinctive activity enables the "normal" individual to set about the management of his impulses and desires with a strong and justifiable hope of success in resolving his disturbances. Not only can he pass these in review before his mind as in catharsis; he can divert his energy and set about the creation of sentiments also in which it is capable of being fully employed to advantage.

Aveling, then, sees repression in the light of subconscious process, and uses sublimation as a synonym for sentiment formation. In the main, his position seems well substantiated. He makes no mention of repression brought about as a result of intense psychic pain. He presumably regards such repressions as abnormal.

If Aveling is right, repressions as described by Freudians hardly exist, and sublimation is not an unconscious process. Though the present writer cannot wholly accept these opinions, he realises that Aveling, as a trained psychologist, is speaking of the facts as he sees them. One thing is at least certain: the normal people with whom Aveling has made contact cannot have been greatly influenced in their daily lives by Freudian mechanisms. It is also obvious that these individuals believed that they had control of their mental energy.

Our view would be that the "unconscious" of normal persons is better described as a "subconsciousness" and that most if not all/

all sublimations are subconsciously elaborated. Aveling sees complexes in the light of sentiments which have been forced upon us by our environment. He admits that they may be a troublesome feature in our mental life. But why, we may ask, does not the normal person seek to break up sentiments which are no longer adaptive? Why continue to be influenced by our early environment? The answer is that we cannot break up these sentiments. If one has developed a dislike for an individual in adult life, and subsequent relations prove that one's original feelings were based on a false judgment, the underlying sentiment is modified accordingly. How is it, then, that, despite all conscious effort, despite all the new evidence we have before us, our childhood prejudices remain? Our view is that the explanation lies somewhere along the lines of Freud's superego or Hadfield's self-phantasy.

Nevertheless, we consider Aveling's account of repression and sublimation as nearer to the truth than that of the Freudians. The average individual is very nearly "normal", but always would seem to be subject to a modicum of irrational impulses.
The Philosophical Aspect.

William Brown.

The purpose of this section is to treat of the doctrine that human nature is equipped to respond to values. In the course of discussion it is suggested that Brown implicitly accepts the superego mechanism as normal. Discussion of the psychological basis of religious experience, so far as relevant to our subject.

A. Campbell Garnett.

Further treatment of the position that values must be taken into consideration in discussing human nature. Garnett's views on sublimation.

C. P. Blacker.

The main object of this article is to demonstrate that the Freudian doctrine has no adequate philosophical basis. Deduction drawn as to the effects of becoming engrossed in the phenomena of the repressed unconscious on capacity for adopting a rational attitude to wider issues. Suggestion made that Blacker is under the influence of dissociation.
Dr. Brown's viewpoint on psychology is almost identical with that of the writer. He regards repression as pathological, but not dissociation, which he considers normal. The subject of sublimation he leaves almost untouched. Values he considers independent of the self. He regards repressed complexes as preventing an objective attitude. Religion he considers is purified by analysis, but religion is to be defined mainly in terms of the values of truth, beauty, and goodness, although he does not consider these values as identical with religion. As he states in "Mind and Personality": "The value experiences of the good, the beautiful and the true, are not identical with religious experience although they are related to it. Religious experience is not exactly on all fours with it; it is not on the same level, but on a higher level still....Personality is within these values which we have been describing, and passes through them to enrich the higher of the more profound religious attitude. It takes one beyond the time and the limits of the individual, and that is what is meant by saying that the personality is in the end transcended in the Absolute or God, and that there is only one complete personality."

The present writer, however, does not profess to having the religious insight of Dr. Brown.

'We/

'William Brown, "Mind and Personality", p.303.'
We would now very briefly summarise the salient features of "Science and Personality". In an early chapter, we find Brown saying: "Health is a simple thing; it is disease that is complex. Truth is simple; error is complex; There is one way of hitting the mark, but innumerable ways of missing it."

The neurotic personality is complex. Its phenomena, almost baffling description in their infinite permutations and combinations, are indeed formidable. But beneath this complex mass, we may look for the point where the organism departed from health. In our view, the significant facts from the standpoint of etiology are very simple, but they cannot be understood unless a clear conception is formed of the psycho-neurotic disposition as being, in however modified a degree, a condition of disease.

Dissociation, to Brown, is normal and necessary, but he makes it clear that "normal dissociation is of the nature of rational rejection or renunciation." But "in repression, the individual runs away from the experience, and does not adequately face it; he pushes it aside, and yet a part of his mind continues to cling to it. The mind is divided against itself."

We would point out the essential similarity between the views of Professor Janet and those of Dr. Brown.

Dr. Brown is a realist, and we find him saying: "No mind is completely normal, since no mind completely solves its problems from day to day, and it is the failure to solve mental problems/

problems which is one of the general causes of the symptoms of psycho-neurosis and mental disease." And again: "In the most normal mind there is a falling away from complete unity. There is in the activity of this unitary mind, not only a normal process of disjunction or dissociation, but also a certain degree of abnormal dissociation."

Although Dr. Brown does not explicitly say so, we may take it that room is left in his system for the activities of the Freudian superego. But it is quite clear that he does not consider that the task of the psychotherapist lies wholly within the realm of the repressed unconscious and its eruptions in consciousness. Unharmonious sentiments also require attention. He says: "In addition to abreaction, I advocate the thorough thinking out of the whole psychological situation by the patient, so that he may be brought eventually to understand himself adequately."

One statement made by Brown the present writer considers of considerable significance. Brown tells us: "But there is an instinctive cognitive activity, fundamental, present at birth, undergoing its own course of development in relation to the other instinctive activities. This is the activity, the instinctive urge, which has been entirely neglected by Freud (except in the form of sexual curiosity), and by most of the modern writers on instinct psychology."

It/

It may well be that the tendency to which Brown refers has a basis in the instinct of curiosity as defined by McDougall and Drever, but it is certain that the tendency quickly shows itself as a rational interest in persons and things which surround the child. The impression is given that the child has as part of his biological equipment a definite tendency peculiarly adapted for the acquirement of his cultural tradition and a scientific understanding of the world in which he is destined to play a part. We stress the point, in view of the necessity of having a clear conception within our mind as to the nature of the young child at the time when he becomes involved in the conflicts which, if Freud is right, lead to the extraordinary system of projections, introjections, identifications, further projections and re-identifications, which are the preliminaries to the child attaining to that "hall-mark" of human personality, the Freudian superego.

Dr. Brown apparently accepts the sentiment theory of Shand and McDougall, but as may be expected, he considers that the master-sentiment should ideally be one related "to the universe as a perfected system, as the full realisation of the good, the beautiful, and the true." But after all, the business of the psychologist is to describe human nature as he finds it in normal individuals, and Professor Drever's self-sentiment would seem most adequately to sum up the facts as discoverable in the normal/

'Op. cit., p. 79.'
normal individual. But it appears that Dr. Brown is fully justified in defining a more ideal principle of synthesis. He states in psychological terms the ideal objective of human existence, and his position can only be criticised in so far as it may be proved that human nature is incapable of realising this ideal.

Nevertheless, Dr. Brown sees the necessity of defining normality from a less ideal standpoint. He says: "The normal person is a person who is free from complexes, fixations, and projections, and who has a clear and direct view of events outside, sees them as they are, sees other people as they are, and also sees himself as he is."

Abnormality and introversion he regards as synonymous, and he describes the abnormal or the introvert as "a person who is morbid through shocks, unsolved mental complexes, fixations, disturbances of mental development, disharmony which attracts his attention to himself. His mind is held and is unable to give him a clear picture of himself." Then Brown expresses himself in the following clarifying statement: "The interests of some people are more definitely called out by external events, events of the outer world. Others have interest in what goes on inside them, but that distinction is simply a distinction like any other. One person is specially interested in physics, another in psychology, but/

but both are extroverted. It is a matter of classifying interests into subjective interests and objective interests - a distinction that is not a fundamental one. On the other hand, the distinction of the normal and the pathological is fundamental."

He then goes on to say: "Like the physical sciences, psychology is a form of revelation. Something may stand in the way. The individual may stand in his own light..." Psychotherapy aims at freeing the patient from introversion and subjectivity.

Referring to conscience, Dr. Brown insists on distinguishing between true conscience and "the mere feeling that certain things should be done without giving any justification for it." It is a pity that Freudian psychologists are unable to make this distinction. If they could, that psychoneurosis which we call psychoanalysis would be quickly healed.

Speaking on the same subject, Brown says: "One realises that conscience is a good thing. It is one of the fundamental values of human life. Like truth, it is not to be questioned in so far as it is real conscience, but the fact that we may have a false conscience needs explanation." It is surely not the business of a psychopathologist to make idyllic references to that false conscience which is bound up with the superego system.

Brown makes the point that Freudians must at least accept one value as non-illusory, that is, truth, psychoanalysis itself being "qua theory... an intellectual construction." Brown then adds:  

"Op.cit., p.84. 
"Op.cit., p.84. 
adds: "In the same way there should be a criterion of beauty. Some Freudians undertake to explain aesthetic processes as 'reaction formations' to sex activities from moral sources, but they have no criterion of aesthetics, nor has Freud himself any criterion of morals. Finally, he has no criterion of religious experience. All through he is explaining things away, instead of explaining them, and he is producing a theory which is impressive because it is so all embracing."

Speaking more specifically of repression as a dysfunction in cultural life, though referring in particular to religious experience, Brown tells us that objective experience may be obscured in several ways, one of which is self-centredness, self-love, which "is the enemy of every kind of love. It is the vampire which seeks to draw everything into itself. It is the thing from which we must obtain deliverance. It is the dragon which must be slain." We may infer that Dr. Brown refers to secondary narcissism as incorporated within the superego system. In our view, there is no primary narcissism. The young child is objectively oriented.

We have only one criticism to make of what we regard as a most satisfactory statement of the facts relating to the phenomena of the repressed unconscious. Dr. Brown's work requires to be supplemented by the application of the principles which/

which he describes to the training of young children. There is just the suspicion that he has not yet attained perspective in respect of the concrete situation as it exists in the nursery. We find him saying: "The young child has an idea of his father as perfect, omnipotent, omniscient, etc. Later on, he becomes disillusioned and finds that his father is not so powerful or magnificent." The present writer is of the opinion that the young child would never develop ideas so nonsensical unless he were already seeking a compensatory ideal for inferiority feelings which have been thrust upon him. Freudians constantly tell us that the young child is in a state of primary narcissism. If it were so, it is hardly likely that he would gratuitously hand over the palms of honour and glory to his male parent. The Freudian answer would probably be that the child does not clearly distinguish between his father and himself. According to our experience, nothing is farther from the truth. The child has very definite attitudes towards "a present for father" and a present for himself. As soon as he realises that he is not to be the recipient of the present, the child's interest vanishes.

We are thus left with the problem as to why the young narcissist should attribute to his father "the power and the glory". If it be proved that an individual did fall into this very specific error of over-evaluation, we must look for other causes. If the child is not narcissistic, which is our contention, he will throughout view/

view his parents with impartial objectivity, noting their faults as well as their virtues, unless some distorting influence is at work. This distorting influence, we suggest, is usually due to inferiority feelings having been evoked, and in general the setting up of those conflicts which we hold lead the child to being drawn within that fatal web of his own weaving, the superego system.

Dr. Brown continues: "And yet there remains this ideal of omniscience and omnipotence which is then projected away from the individual, as the conception of a God all-powerful and all-loving." We would, with all deference, express the opinion that Dr. Brown does not appear to be altogether aware of the complexity of those conditions which bring into being the repressed unconscious, nor is he able to see the relation of those norms which he so ably defends to the concrete situation in which both parents and children are involved.

Meantime, at least, we must reserve judgment as to whether or not the religious philosophy which Dr. Brown is able to accept has its basis in a "sublimation" - that is, whether it is complex determined. If this prove to be the case, according to the main position taken up by Dr. Brown, the religious experience to which he refers must be regarded as suspect. It is the result of an artificially developed need which would have little more ultimate significance than an appetite for alcohol, tobacco, or sensual excitement.

A. Campbell Garnett.

The purpose of this section is to give an account of repression as viewed by a psychologist who is also a recognised student of philosophy.

In general, Garnett considers that ultimate values are in no way contingent upon the process of repression. Virtually, he does not recognise the existence of sublimation as such. He stresses the existence of a capacity in man for acting in accordance with ethical and other norms. We shall follow his discussion as found in his book "Instinct and Personality", and by so doing attempt to find a basis for conceptions which we shall use at a later stage. We shall also compare Garnett's description of human personality with that of orthodox Freudians.

Dr. Garnett's explanation of the unconscious is of interest because it is on the lines followed by Janet. He is emphatic that the mind normally acts as a whole. This is our belief in respect of normal individuals in whom is incorporated a superego. It appears to us that Garnett's conception of the personality as not ordinarily losing hold of the threads which go to make up our psychic life is of considerable value.

We now turn to Garnett's reference to the ethical aspect of experience. When the writer was recently attending a course of lectures given under the auspices of the Workers' Educational Association, a member of the class requested the lecturer to give his views on the concepts of "right" and "wrong". The reply/
reply was that "right" is that which is socially approved, and "wrong" that which is socially disapproved. Several members of the class were obviously dissatisfied with these definitions. It is, of course, probably true that psychology as a science, in the present state of its development, is justified in more or less ignoring the plain man's conviction that the idea of social approval or disapproval does not explain the moral sense. We know that the psychoanalyst rushes into the breach with what he believes to be an illuminating supplement to the view of the "academic" psychologist. The ideas of right and wrong are essentially bound up with the superego formation, but when pressed for further information on the matter, the psychoanalyst admits that the ideas of right and wrong are mediately derivative from public opinion. In conscience, it is our parents who are speaking, or rather a reflection of their own superegos which is indirectly derived from notions built upon what our ancestors happened to regard as worthy or unworthy of social approval. Catechising the psychoanalyst a little further, we have the uneasy suspicion that the superego "right" is often wrong, and its "wrong" often right. We are no longer impressed with the psychoanalyst's claim that he has esoteric knowledge as to the distinction under discussion. The plain man is thus left with his question unanswered.

It is indeed very important for practical conduct that the ordinary/
ordinary individual should feel a conviction that right and wrong are terms of more than contingent significance. This is especially true when we enter the nursery and seek to guide the child during the period of his early development.

We think, therefore, that Dr. Garnett's discussion of this problem must be regarded as a real contribution to the science of education. He says: "In almost every language there is a word corresponding to our word 'right'. There is no tribe of humans, be they ever so low, and whatever the shortcomings of their language, to whom Christian missionaries have been unable to convey the notion of right and wrong, finding sometimes that the idea is not unknown even though there is no special word to express it."

And later he says: "Unless custom had been judged at the bar of this higher concept, there could have been no advance to a higher plane, only a loosening of the group of customs and a descent into anarchy, or else the mere exchange of one custom for another."

We also attribute considerable significance to Dr. Garnett's discussion on the ideals. "The altruistic motive," he says, "satisfies something in our nature which the instinctive impulses cannot account for, some urge which is above them or more fundamental than they. This evaluation of altruism is but a particular instance of the general trend of the human mind - the tendency to place a higher value on the goods of the spirit. The good, the beautiful/

"A.Campbell Garnett, "Instinct and Personality" p.102-3.
beautiful, the true, possess a magnetism for mankind which cannot be explained by any alchemy of instincts."

He further says: "The patient, earnest, eager seeking of the finest minds for a philosophy that shall glimpse a little deeper into the meaning of life, a little farther into the whence and whither of the universe, is moved by something deeper than the instinct which subserves the animal needs. A readily aroused and persistent curiosity is not commonly accompanied by a compelling love of truth." On the next page we read as follows: "The urge of the ideals is something essentially different from that of the instincts. The instinctive end is never ultimate, but always a means unto a further end. The end in the service of which all the instincts exist is the preservation of the individual and the species."

He says that to pursue an instinctive activity beyond the point of satiety is to "excite pain and cause injury, but the urge of the ideals - the desires of the spirit as they have been called - is different. For them there is no point of satiety, and they can only be pursued well if pursued for their own sakes." Garnett then refers to Arthur Clutton Brock's "Ultimate Belief".

For the human being, beauty, truth, and goodness mean life. "The triple ideal is but an analysis of the spirit's one desire; and that desire is the response of the life within to that which has come to mean for it fuller and more abundant life - that which/

which means Life in the highest sense, a sense in which life transcends the little being that conceives it."

Whoever has read the above must feel a distinct disinclination to enter again the noisome chamber of the Freudian superego, where all is pretence, self-deception, and where the highest values are merely the resultant of aim-inhibited impulses. Mankind is a prey to a grand delusional system; he only imagines that he wants beauty, goodness, and truth, while all the time his Caliban-like nature is feeling out for grosser sensual pleasures. From a cosmic standpoint, according to the Freudian doctrine, the maintenance of the delusion has a function in that it has brought into existence civilisation and all cultural values. But, strangely enough, the delusional system is only maintained by that psychotically determined individual whom we call the normal man, because he believes in the continued existence of the horde-father who, ever and anon, threatens him with the big stick, or, to speak more precisely, with an instrument by means of which he will perform an indelicate operation if the individual dares to depart from his system of internalised morality. Rather incongruously, the female is threatened by the horde-father with a loss of love, but let that pass. We can only breathe a deep sigh of gratitude that academic psychologists have not so far been driven out of the psychological field by the Freudian vampire.

What is the relation between repression and cultural development? We suggest that it is rather unsafe to accept doctrines emanating from the superego-obsessed. It is a sad reflection/

reflection that the people who are in responsible positions, especially among the clergy, are found expressing their "utmost gratitude" for the Freudian illumination.

We shall now turn to the point where we may correlate the views of Janet with those of Dr. Garnett. Garnett's theory is that when an instinct is in operation - and under the term "instinct" for the present purpose, we may include the more specifically human tendencies which he has outlined - the instinctive presentation has within it the quality of expectant attention. Should an idea, representing of course the instinct presentation, or more accurately speaking synonymous with it, pass out of consciousness without being negativd, the expectant attention remains. To Garnett, it is expectant attention which initiates a process and when repression occurs, the "process does not necessarily cease." "The phenomena of neurosis are neither more nor less than effective suggestions which have become dissociated from consciousness instead of being negativd. Every neurotic symptom originates in some experience and persists as a neurotic symptom because that experience is dissociated."

Dr. Garnett does not consider that the hypothesis of an unconscious mind is necessary. He would rather speak of "degrees of clearness of consciousness." While we agree that behind all phenomena of the unconscious are "ideas" which have still the quality of expectant attention, we cannot explain the ultimate effects/

'Cf. F. R. Barry, "Christianity and Psychology" p. 79.
effects of those ideas without postulating something in the nature of an unconscious which is outwith the direct control of the experient. Garnett tells us that the phenomena of the unconscious "are products of suggestion, and therefore of consciousness." Our reply is that neither suggestion nor consciousness can account for the elaboration of the content of repressed ideas.

In spite of the foregoing, however, we suggest that in the main Garnett is right. The normal person has far more inkling as to what is going on within his mind than psychoanalysts are inclined to believe. Garnett says: "The object to which it (the mind) attends is the complex one of the conflicting desires. The activity of its thought is initiated and guided by its attention to that complex object. The mind is still a unit with one activity, and one experience, however complex that activity and that experience may be." There is far more truth in this conception than in that of the Freudians who, to use Garnett's words, consider the unconscious as a "blind aggregate of forces loosely bound together and tumbling drunkenly around, now accidentally pulling together, and now accidentally pulling against each other."

Dr. Garnett's theory of dissociation, in the main follows the lines of that of Professor McDougall. We refer to this view, not in order to become involved in a highly controversial subject, but because we believe that Dr. Garnett is expressing in psychological/

psychological terms the results of his observation of ordinary individuals going about their daily concerns. He considers that dissociation is explained by the fact "that the dominant interest of the moment tends to absorb attention; not merely in that other things are excluded for lack of room, but also in that things contrary to that interest are specially guarded against. It is not true of consciousness as a whole that it possesses a censor which shuts out from it everything painful to it, but it is true of every particular interest which for the time may dominate consciousness that it works in a manner somewhat analogous to Freud's censor. It tends to direct attention away from everything that is contrary to it. Things forgotten in this way are of course painful, but it is not merely because they are painful that they are forgotten. They are forgotten because the dominant interest of the moment directs the mind solely to things in harmony with it."

The psychoanalytical method consists in the individual's relaxation of his normal interests, and then ordinarily submerged ideas may appear in consciousness. But he does not leave out of account the possibility of repression of the Freudian type. "Whatever the cause of the struggle," he says, "if it be too long continued, or too severe, then at last the overburdened mind loses its grip upon all the conflicting threads of its problem. The dominant interests of the personality simply shut the contrary elements/"

elements out of consciousness."

What we would here stress is the conception that, under normal conditions, in accordance with Garnett's observations, the mind does not lose "its grip upon all the conflicting threads of its problem." If it be true that the superego exists in the normal mind, and the present writer is forced to that conclusion, it would appear, in accordance with Garnett's conception, that the individual is still conscious, however faintly, of the conflicting threads of which it is composed.

We would conclude by reminding ourselves of Garnett's observation that the mind, under normal circumstances, acts as a whole. It is "still a unit, with one activity and one experience, however complex that activity and that experience may be."

Dr. Garnett insists throughout his work that psychological phenomena are explicable in terms of the psychology of conscious process. He is not disposed to leave room in his system for sublimation as such. He acts on the supposition that the repressed unconscious can be explained in terms of conscious process, the unknown in terms of the known. It would seem that Garnett does not take sufficient account of the complexity of the facts bound up with the workings of the repressed unconscious, a complexity which has led the Freudians to invent several impossible hypotheses as a means of reducing to some sort of order the phenomena which they study. Behind the "unconscious" they postulate further degrees of unconsciousness, deep seated biological/

biological principles, and dim ancestral memories. Garnett would appear to hold to a faith that ultimately such hypotheses will be unnecessary. Once the tangled skein of the unconscious is unravelled, it will be discovered that the threads of which it was composed were simply part of the warp and woof of the loom of conscious life. And, may we add, the task of disentanglement may not be as difficult as would at present appear. A microscopic amount of foreign matter may disarrange the functions of the eye; how much more so an intrusion of irrationality into that infinitely more delicate mechanism, the mind of man.

Repressions, we maintain, are a dysfunction of cultural process; humanity should not suffer from delusions, however mild they may be. We read Freudian literature, and we are asked to believe that our delusions are, in the last resort, biologically determined. Garnett insists that delusions are due to conscious process gone wrong. Freudians would consider that he had no right to an opinion. The present writer has no option but to range himself on the side of the "academic" psychologist. The probabilities, in his view, lie all on the side of Garnett's hypothesis, viz., that the unknown will ultimately show itself capable of explanation in terms of the known.
Psychoanalysts in general consider that the process of psychoanalysis must lead to a new synthesis, a reorientation of the instinctual impulses released during analysis. The usual practice is for the psychoanalyst to take little direct part in the constructive process. The theory seems to be that as the libido is released, new interests will be found. A little encouragement may be given to the patient in developing along the lines of an embryonic sublimation system, but on the whole the psychoanalyst does not consider it necessary to supply a "philosophy" to which the patient is advised to attach himself. Janet is, indeed, quite outspoken as to what he considers the folly of providing ready-made metaphysical systems for the use of the patient. (Criticism of Dubois).

There are, of course, an indefinite number of peculiar brands of psychotherapy which seek to convert the patient to the views of the analyst, but it is safe to say that the Freudians themselves are averse to influencing their patients in this way. It is indeed quite understandable that, in the concrete situations in which the analyst finds himself, he must regard it as his task to assist the patient to adapt himself to his immediate environment. The patient has some symptom which interferes with his work or enjoyments, and he comes to the analyst with a quite definite purpose in view. However much the psychoanalyst may wish to bring in a new heaven and a new earth, as/

as a result of his activities, the simple fact is that he accepts payment for carrying through a very clearly defined task.

On the surface of it, therefore, the work of Blacker on human values in psychological medicine would appear superfluous. The main purpose of the book seems to be the justification of a pragmatic attitude in relation to the process of psychoanalysis, an apologia for the doctrine of being all things to all men. One can imagine, however, that the individual analyst who heretofore was troubled with rather definite philosophical beliefs might, as a result of studying the book in question, be enabled to adopt a more convenient pragmatism.

Our concern here, however, is not with psychoanalysis in its professional aspects, but with psychoanalysis as a science. Implicitly, psychoanalysis has a philosophic basis, and Blacker's work on human values has a significance in enabling us to understand the philosophical presuppositions of psychoanalysis.

In attempting to estimate the relation of repression to cultural development, it is part of our task to discover what are the views of psychoanalysts on this problem. Every writer on psychoanalysis gives incidental expression to his views as to the part played by repression in producing culturally valued phenomena, but we hope, by following Blacker's argument, to make explicit the theory underlying the doctrine of sublimation.

This is not all. It is our contention here that the whole psychological system which goes under the name of psychoanalysis is falsified and distorted on account of an incorrect attitude towards human/
human nature. It is, in our view, useless to discuss the manifold errors and self-contradictions of psychoanalytical doctrine. We make bold to say that psychoanalysis is nothing but a reflection of a psycho-neurosis, a somewhat pathetically conscientious attempt to describe in psychological terms a disease formation, which disease formation, if "adaptive", is regarded as normal. Psychoanalysts are totally unaware that, by accepting the system as normal, they are committed to a set of philosophical presuppositions which, in our view, are entirely erroneous.

We submit that the facts which form the basis of a doctrine of ultimate values are discoverable by the ordinary process of introspection and the observation of the conduct of others. We do not suggest that the student of the human mind should necessarily be involved in metaphysical subtlety. Everything that is essential to our doctrine of values can be understood by a little child, and, in fact, is understood by a human being at this stage. We would, indeed, reduce our philosophic conception of values within the compass of a single proposition, viz., that there is an ultimate distinction between truth and error. The child knows perfectly well when it is speaking and acting in accordance with the truth. It does not for one moment confuse the realm of imagination with the realm of fact. The world is divided between "pretend" things and "real" things. Every psycho-neurosis would immediately collapse if its possessor again became truthful, and with/

Also section on Campbell Garnett, p.153-156.
with it the necessity for the highly elaborated doctrine of psychoanalysis.

Both biological and historical arguments for repression as having function are entirely irrelevant. The psychoanalyst himself who has not attained this insight is necessarily involved in a tissue of false value judgments, and his attempts at philosophising constitute a mere process of rationalising. He is, indeed, as much in the grip of compulsions as the patient whom he seeks to cure. For the practical purposes of the analytical process, this perhaps does not matter, but it does matter when we attempt to evaluate psychoanalysis as a body of scientific opinion.

Now, the extraordinary thing about "Human Values in Psychological Medicine" is that the critical student may find within the ideas elaborated, statements which may be used in attacking the views which are more specifically bound up with the doctrine of psychoanalysis. Other striking instances of this kind of thing are to be found in Roheim's "Riddle of the Sphinx" and Alexander's "Psychoanalysis of the Total Personality". We are driven to the conclusion that we are in the presence of dissociation phenomena.

Blacker gives us an excellent account of the nature of the aesthetic. We read the following: "But though aesthetic emotions would, from the genetic standpoint, appear to have arisen in connection with the evolution of secondary sexual characters/
characters, and though they are still to a large extent related to sexual functions, they have subsequently, by various processes of biologically neutral variation, moved in certain directions a long way away from purely sexual functions. This is especially clear of music. Pleasure in hearing most music has no relation to sexuality in the ordinary sense of the word. Here there would appear to have taken place a differentiation along biologically neutral lines of an emotion which originally was biologically useful. Many beautiful objects, many aesthetic stimuli, have a value per se. So far as can be observed, this value has no relation whatsoever to the stimulus of sex in the usual limited sense of the word."

And later we read: "Originally this function may have been nothing more than an accessory to the sexual instinct. But whatever its origin, it has undergone differentiation, and now has a value that is largely, though not wholly, independent of sex. It has acquired a qualitatively distinct value of its own. A person may be moved more deeply, and more memorably, by aesthetic emotion that has no ulterior biological aim, than by experience of direct sexual gratification. Most people probably go through their lives without ever having their affective aesthetic capacities evoked to their fullest. The completely adequate stimulus does not often occur."

And he further states: "The conception here suggested of a fontal source of beauty within the mind, a source from which beauty can/

can overflow and permeate the manifold experiences of life, has been given eloquent expression by Mr. Aldous Huxley."

We also find this striking statement: "Consciousness of guilt" (an invariable ingredient of the superego system) "seems to close the mind to aesthetic experience. Melancholiacs frequently complain of a total paralysis of the aesthetic sense."

We have here an account of aesthetic development which, it would seem, proceeds independently of repression and sublimation. We have implicitly, also, a doctrine of some cosmic force working for ends which have a value other than the purely biological.

In passing, we would point out that if the aesthetic sense developed along biologically neutral lines, and was thereafter transmitted from generation to generation, we are led to suppose that our primitive ancestors had a keen appreciation of the beautiful. If such were the case, there is additional reason to suppose that repression had no function in the creation of a love of the beautiful. According to Roheim and other anthropologists, primitive man as we know him to-day is relatively free from repressions.

But Blacker tells us that the aesthetic sense is in large measure inoperative in the ordinary man and woman. "In the lives of the majority of my working-class patients," he says, "aesthetic values play a small part. I have found it very difficult to devise a suitable series of questions to ask with a/

a view to throwing light on this matter."

Then follows this delightful passage: "When I began enquiring into this subject, I asked a series of about twenty patients whether they were at all sensitive to beauty in nature, or in music or literature, particularly poetry. Most of the patients were embarrassed by the question. Two, however, answered volubly in the affirmative. The first, a girl of eighteen, replied (irrelevantly to my question) that she loved beautiful fireworks, especially catherine wheels that threw coloured sparks about. Another said that she loved beautiful "pictures" (i.e., the cinema) when the orchestra played languorous music ('lovely music that makes you go all dreamy like'). Another liked beautiful colours such as you see at dances when people put on paper hats and the balloons come down. One young man of twenty said that he liked to sit in churches at evensong. He and the young lady with whom he was walking out used to spend two evenings a week in this way. Three of the women said that they loved beautiful flowers. One woman could not remember ever having seen a sunset in the country. One man, after looking at me uncomprehendingly, said that the most beautiful thing he knew was a pint of beer in a mug, with a head on it, when you were holding the mug in your right hand. I eventually gave up asking these questions, as they seemed to be a waste of time. By the majority of London working-class patients, aesthetic values are probably not often recognised as such. My impression is that consciously/
consciously, at any rate, they play a very small part in their lives. In a few instances, however, aesthetic values play a very notable part in shaping the ideals and the aspirations of working-class people.

But Blacker fails to draw the obvious conclusion. In accordance with his theory, aesthetic sensibility was developed through long eras of a classless society. If the effects of the mutations which he presupposes were to be cumulative, we are led to the conclusion that the possession of the aesthetic sense must have become a constant in the vast majority of our ancestors. Though it is probably true that the progenitors of the individuals with whom Blacker has come into contact had belonged to a slave class for several centuries, it is unlikely that so short a period would in any way modify inherited characteristics. In that case, a capacity for the love of the beautiful should be present in the ordinary populace of contemporary Britain. If Blacker discovers that the powers of aesthetic appreciation are wanting, the conclusion surely is that some interference factor is at work which prevents the aesthetic sense from becoming attached to its rightful objects.

Blacker himself has indicated the negative relation of repression to aesthetic experience. The logical conclusion would seem to be that, if we could clear the mind of repressions, the "fental source of beauty" would again "overflow and permeate the/

permeate the manifold experiences of life," and would become attached to beautiful objects which "have a value per se."

But unhappily, we soon discover that we are once again being drawn within the vortex of psychoanalytical fatalism and materialistic gloom. We have just breathed a sigh of relief, thankful to find that the aesthetic sense is after all not bound up with the workings of endopsychic censors and superego formations. In the not long distant past, mankind had a relatively clean slate and his vision was not obfuscated by vapours arising from the unconscious.

But Blacker proceeds to nail the censor, or superego, on to biological process. He perceives a new function in the endopsychic censor, or as he himself states, "in a later terminology, the superego." He says: "If dreams are the disguised fulfilments of repressed wishes, we should be enabled by a successful psychoanalysis in which the repressions are removed and the disguises are made superfluous, to dream the undisguised fulfilment of wishes that are no longer repressed. We should be able to gratify all our unrealisable sexual aspirations in glorious and all-satisfying dreams. But this does not apparently happen, however thorough the analysis. Psychoanalytical theory has never afforded a satisfactory answer as to why not."

In parenthesis, the present writer would suggest that the reason why "this does not apparently happen" is precisely because psychoanalysis never is "successful" in any ultimate sense. The removal/

The removal of repressions is relative, a mere superficial modification of the superego system. We shall further elaborate this view in our main critique of Freudian psychoanalysis, in our discussion of Alexander's "Psychoanalysis of the Total Personality"

Blacker continues: "We are the surviving products of countless generations of ancestors who, through inability to derive sexual satisfaction from phantasies, were driven to find it in exogenic reality... In the highest degree, therefore, survival value attaches to the capacity to be influenced by exogenic rather than by psychogenic reality in the satisfaction of sexual needs."

The superego was then the "biological trustee of our racial future", and Blacker further hypostasises the superego by stating that "he will not allow us frivolously to squander our capital in phantasies. By him we are mercilessly forced towards effective action in the external world." And we also discover that the praiseworthy biological mechanism is the determinant of salutory philosophical views in modern man. "Despite the unescapable logic of the solipsist and the idealist, this racial censor may help to keep the average man firmly grounded in a robust phenomenal realism." The neurosis is enlarging its sphere of influence.

Now we proceed to an ultra-Freudian description of values. Values, we are told, are "as various and as multitudinous, as ephemeral and as permanent, as conscious and unconscious, as are psychic needs." We are then given a list of a variety of things which/

which are valued, - food, money, a national flag, titles, privileges, legal rights; aptitudes and accomplishments which are socially prized, these including "intellectual, artistic, athletic, and other endowments, knowledge, general and special, and skills of all kinds." Persons and relationships with persons may be valued, and also imaginary relationships, such as when a psychotic woman thinks that someone is in love with her. And, to sum up, "the universe is the universe, its goodness or badness depends on the colour of our vision."

We would suggest that the racial censor must have been off duty when the above passage was written. Surely we have here an extreme instance of solipsism. We repeat our view, that values are essentially objective, and in all significant conduct and experience they have a compelling power, being "firmly grounded in a robust phenomenal realism." The major problem of psychoanalysis is to explain how and why human conduct is no longer in accordance with objective norms. It is true that the neurotic disposition plays fast and loose with objectivity, substituting illusion and delusion for sound sense and rational orientation. The psychoanalysts claim that the normal person has incorporated within his psyche a greater or less amount of the constitution revealed in an extreme form in neurotic or psychotic patients. The most significant fact about the neurotic constitution is that value judgments have gone awry.

Psychoanalysts/

Psychoanalysts, however, make a cult of regarding such judgments as "normal", accepting in justification of their irrational attitude a specious doctrine of philosophic pragmatism. As far as psychology goes, one belief is as good as another. For certain purposes, psychology has a right to its abstractions, but the individual psychologist is wrong if he builds a philosophical system on the basis of such abstractions. Virtually, the psychoanalysts are saying that as far as they can see, people's beliefs and value judgments make neither rhyme nor reason, which may be more or less true, but when on the basis of this finding they draw the conclusion that beliefs and value judgments as found in the "normal" are the reality, they have, we suggest, quite outstepped their sphere.

Having disposed of values as adventitious, Blacker is free to approach the problem which has been before him in discussing human values in psychological medicine, in a thoroughgoing pragmatic spirit. He thus states baldly: "There are two possible approaches to the problem of values. Which is the most convenient for the psychiatrist?" One possible line of approach is through what Blacker describes as "the transmissive view", this equipping the psychiatrist "with a philosophic optimism, and a force from which his patients may benefit. The belief that the essential order of things is good, and that failure to perceive its goodness is due to certain remediable imperfections in ourselves, is encouraging and morally stimulating. The relation between/

between the patient and the physician is such that the physician's point of view is readily assimilated by the patient. In the disorientation of a neurosis, a robust optimism on the part of the physician can come near to a pivotal value for his patients."

The second line of approach is what he describes as "the reactive view", according to which the world is "axiologically neutral", and values are purely a matter of personal idiosyncrasy. Blacker inclines to think that the second viewpoint has certain advantages; the psychiatrist being "detached and free from moral preconceptions, his outlook is not determined by any particular ethical system. It will therefore be impartial, and 'objective'." Blacker considers that a reconciliation of the two points of view "is more or less possible".

With almost melodramatic swiftness, we discover that Blacker has alligned himself with the ultra-mystics, although of course, we are warned that the reconciliation of the two points of view is only "more or less possible". The psychoanalyst qua philosopher, Blacker tells us, may accept the following theory without doing violence to his scientific conscience, and without in any way incapacitating himself in his task of adapting his patients to the civilisation in which they live. A reconciliation may be effected "if we regard man's affective life as capable in various degrees of being 'inspired'. Both the transmissive and reactive hypotheses are compatible with a philosophy of 'instrumentalism'. We can think of the individual being utilised, as/

as might an instrument, by forces operating through the fountains of his affective life, forces like the _élan vital_, or the _Phusis_ of the Stoics; or, in more familiar language, like the Holy Ghost or the Spirit of Christ."

We can understand certain uncritical religionists being enamoured by the psychoanalyst's "confession of faith". The plain man, however, would, we fear, be somewhat forcible in expressing his opinion of a psychoanalyst who accepted a "faith" on such purely utilitarian grounds. He would probably use an epithet directed towards certain scribes and Pharisees, by one whose name Blacker has not hesitated to use in the "confession of faith" above referred to.

In our view, Blacker completes his in many ways valuable work, by lapsing into an attitude at once naive and ingenuous. We ask why? Here is our explanation: We take the liberty of using one of Blacker's many valuable conceptions. "Personal idiosyncrasy", he tells us, "resides in peculiarities of the transmissive apparatus of the psychological prism." We suggest that Blacker, as psychoanalytical theorist, identified himself with the viewpoint revealed through the "peculiarities of the transmissive apparatus". Prisms, psychological or otherwise, are a poor medium for those who wish to become apprised of the essential facts of the objective world. Notwithstanding, the psychoanalyst as such must view his patients through the queer lenses of his own superego system, otherwise understanding would be impossible. During the period when/

when the analyst is in search of troublesome complexes, he must stimulate into activity that part of his mind which is least rational. He is obliged to form a body of systematised conceptions to assist him in his work - he is fully justified in doing this - but these conceptions refer only to the elaborations of an unhealthy imagination. The psychoanalyst's "reality", when in the consulting room, is a land of make-believe. He is in constant contact with a dream world whose images have little significance in so far as they happen to have attained causal efficacy in interfering with the ordinary life of the patient.

There is a strong tendency for the analyst to become superego obsessed, and in his theorising he is more than usually under the influence of that regrettable institution which, in the writer's view, has found its way into the normal mind of the contemporary individual. Amongst its many imperfections, the superego is the embodiment _par excellence_ of the principal of hypocrisy. We suggest that Blacker, in enunciating his "confession of faith", is essentially "under the influence" of a psychic institution which will one day become the object of the strongest prohibitions of those to whom love, beauty, and truth, provide the key for the understanding of what in man is most specifically human, and that by which he is qualified to attain the status of the divine.

It is not by the study of needs springing up from the repressed unconscious that we shall discover a clue to the nature of objective reality. The repressed unconscious is no fountain from which flows the _élan vital_, the _Phusis_, or the Holy Ghost. That/
That it acts as the wellspring of many of our actions the writer would not care to deny, but he would state bluntly what he regards as simple truth, that the wellspring is poisoned, not by "all uncleanness" but, what is infinitely more reprehensible, by a mass of lies, of half-truths, of hypocrisies, the very negation of all those values by which man lives, in so far as he has a life independent of the super-ego system, and by which he must live if he is ever to outgrow the dwarfish stature, the evidences of which are writ large across the page of history.

Some anthropologists hold that a Golden Age existed in the past before men became civilised. If it were so, we must take it that the values to which we have referred were in great part realised in the lives of our primitive ancestors. However that may be, there can be no Golden Age in the future unless the entire superego system is abrogated.

Blacker’s philosophy will not assist us in the task which confronts our race, if we are to put away childish things. To him, repression is inevitable and therefore its necessary concomitants. He says: "In this process of inter-adjustment (he refers to the process of social adaptation) some impulses, particularly those of violent and undifferentiated character which express themselves at an early age, will undergo repression." This we emphatically deny. There is nothing in human nature which/

which cannot be controlled by reason if the necessary conditions are provided in the psychological environment of the young child. Once again we are puzzled as to why Blacker should betray such seeming callousness in committing human nature to the dogs of unreason. There is only one reply. The psychoanalysts are less conscious of the unconscious than is the intelligent layman. Their very preoccupation with the unconscious has, by a process which we shall later attempt to describe, blinded them to what should appear obvious. The repressed unconscious, and its presiding daemon the superego, is not the determinant of human values. It has no function in producing phenomena of vital worth. It is indeed the very acme of dysfunction in relation to cultural process, and if we may be pardoned the use of somewhat strong language, the terrestrial residence of the Father of Lies.

It is well, however, that Blacker enables us to track down the philosophical implications of psychoanalytical theory. It is a philosophy engendered within the superego system. It is based on compulsive thoughts, and it is precisely what Freud claims as the essence of all cultural process, an illusion. If our cultural values are indeed superego determined, we may as well accept it as probable that cultural values are illusions. We are like the denizens of the cave of Plato's famous allegory, witnessing the movements of mere shadows. And if repressions are inevitable, the black cap of the cosmic judge has already indicated that our doom/
doom is sealed: we were already condemned when the superego was nailed to biological process. Freud's still small voice of reason has but one function, and indeed a diabolical one; it can only increasingly make us aware of the horror which awaits us, of our impending doom.

It is a cheerless prospect. As Schopenhauer long ago pointed out, our only morality is in the nature of a little sympathy for those who are placed in a like desperate plight with ourselves. What love can we feel for each other when our souls, stripped of the glamour of illusions, are revealed as "poor, nasty, brutish" things, which answer in every respect to the haunting description given us by John Buchan in his novel, "The Watcher on the Threshold." Buchan's picture is in no way overdrawn, it is as real as the phantasmagoria of the Freudian unconscious. It is indeed an expression of that unconscious. The psychoanalytical theorist would commit us to the conception of an unspeakably evil deity, and as a consequence to a fatalistic and hopeless philosophy.

The wellsprings of the repressed unconscious are indeed poisoned, and in neurotic mood we are inclined to subscribe to the tenets of the Freudian faith in a _diabolus ex machina_ - or should it be _in machina_? But we are reminded of Harvey's poem, "Ducks", in which the author elaborates the thesis that, when God had been engaged on the more serious tasks of creation, He decided that it would be appropriate to introduce the element of the comic/
comic. He therefore created ducks, lest man should

".........so forgetful of his Maker be,
As take even himself quite seriously."

We venture to suggest that there is just a possibility that the
Freudian will find his soul's salvation when he has the good
fortune to unearth the repressed complex of the humorous.

We shall not pursue the topic further here. It is even
believed that the psychoanalyst has within himself the antidote
to his solipsist philosophy. This is not the racial censor
of Blacker, but the ordinary good sense which the psychoanalyst
reveals when his mind is not befogged by the emanations of the
psychoanalytical den. Will it always be necessary to conduct
analyses in a "dim religious light"?
The Ethical Aspect.

J. A. Hadfield.

The main purpose of the article is to show that a rational discussion of ethical problems is rendered difficult by the presence in the mind of superego-determined distorting influences. Suggestion that psychoanalysts have only begun to analyse. Criticism of theory of sublimation.

Edwin Holt.

In this article we describe an attempt to correlate psychoanalysis with the science of ethics. Holt's main position is that present methods of child rearing lead to the parent figure coming between the individual and that part of experience which requires to be organised in accordance with ethical norms. We develop Holt's viewpoint in the light of Freudian teaching, seeking to demonstrate that Holt's position should be interpreted in terms of conceptions used to describe the repressed unconscious.
Hadfield, in his "Psychology and Morals", and in his introduction to "Psychology and Modern Problems", views repression as having the purpose of relieving psychological pain. He does not discuss the historical origin of repression, or the more remote societal forces which bring it into existence. He believes that repression can be given up through the introspective process under psychoanalysis. But there is reason to be suspicious of his claim that this is possible. He instances the bringing to the surface of repressed impulses which continue to operate with their former strength; or conversely, he says, if an impulse has been under-developed in childhood on account of repression, it will still be weak when the repressive psychic influences are removed, and will be capable of adding but a small quota to the total psychic organisation.

"If" he says, "as a result of childhood experiences our observationism was developed, we should follow our bent and become scientists; if our exhibitionism, then we should become actors, lecturers, or artists, recognising the while the instinct to which we are giving expression."

"A woman with a maternal instinct completely repressed in childhood.....would make a poor mother, even when this is liberated in later life by analysis."

It would seem more probable that, if the repressed impulses referred to were really brought into the full light of consciousness/

consciousness, they would at once attain normal proportions, despite any adventitious over- or under-development in childhood.

What seems to lie behind sublimation is a compulsive element which complete analysis could theoretically remove. If the impulse continues after analysis, in its original strength, the presumption is that the compulsive mechanism continues to operate. There appears to be a difference between the recognition and acceptance of a compulsion, and that insight into the formerly hidden structure beneath the compulsion, an insight which would, to all intents and purposes, destroy the concealed tendency. A public speaker who is fully conscious of the origin of his self-display impulse, would not continue to any extent in the use of this psychic component. The associations with the original situation would be embarrassing. The psychotherapist's reassurance that "instincts are not low" would help him but little. He would be aware that his audience held very different views as to exhibitionism, and it is difficult to imagine anyone, under the circumstances, who would not lose self-confidence, and thereby unfit himself for his task. If he were to continue as a public speaker, he would cease to be an exhibitionist.

If a clergyman was in a real sense aware of the part played by "self-importance" in his calling, he would realise the folly and injustice of imposing himself upon others. The "superiority" will/

will inevitably react upon others, either in producing negative self-feeling, or contempt. It a slum worker discovers "a social snobbishness which urges him to seek the society of people amongst whom he will be 'somebody'"; we suggest that he will be completely irrational if he continues in his activities. Instincts in this case are not "ennobled in their uses". A person going in among the submerged section of our community with an attitude of snobbishness will only further embitter those who have been broken on the wheel of our social system. The end motive does not justify the gratification of an urge to social snobbishness. It is, indeed, only too obvious that a person who is fully aware of a member of a lower class as a personality to be respected and loved could not go into his presence with an attitude of social snobbishness. The saint with his "self-righteousness", we suggest, is hardly a saint, and if analysis has not convinced him of this, we can only suggest that the analysis is far from complete.

Hadfield regards irrational intrusions into the psychic system as normal. "We find, in fact," he says, "that these healthy people (he refers to individuals undertaking training analyses) have complexes, repressions, and abnormalities of character differing very little from those of patients; and, indeed, one soon forgets that they are not patients."

Repression, then, according to his findings, is universal.
The most significant fact revealed by psychoanalysis, Hadfield considers to be the part played by the self-phantasy throughout life. The picture a child has of himself at three "is destined to remain throughout life and determine the character of the individual." The conception thus formed, however, tends to be of an extravagant nature and "is therefore repressed." "Phantasies of moral perfection are extremely common and are least suspected by those who have them."

He distinguishes between the ideal as "part of a consciously accepted sentiment" and the phantasy which "is the result of a morbid repressed complex." It is the phantasy of the self which represses. Repression is therefore an unconscious activity, "the abnormal elements in us" being far more due to a morbid self-phantasy than to other repressed emotional complexes. He regards complex-formations as incompatible with self-realisation, "the complete and full expression of all the instincts" and impulses within us. "In a fully realised self, there will be no conflict of purpose, no complexes, no repression, but the harmonious expression of all the vital forces towards a common purpose and end."

He finds within human beings a "craving for completeness and self-realisation" which "compels us to moral endeavour and the development of character.....The craving for fulfilment...is the most potent force which drives us to live and strive with persistent/"
persistent energy till the ultimate goal of self-realisation is reached." The true ideal should involve the expression of all the instincts. But we must discover ways of so expressing our instincts that we seek after ideals of objective worth, such as "beauty, art, virtue, and religion."

In morality, the objective ideal is supplied in a rough way by racial experience, giving rise "to what we call the moral code", this being "embodied in such conceptions as honour, justice, altruism, generosity, and liberty." He appears to adopt the utilitarian doctrine of right being that which produces the greatest happiness, but suggests that, to date, an ultimate ideal has "not yet been determined or generally agreed upon by all men." That there is such an ideal, he considers "scientifically probable."

Hadfield envisages the possibility that, during the process of analysis, "we may be reduced to the level of the savage, but there is one thing to be said for the savage - it is that he rarely, if ever, suffers from nervous breakdown, for his instincts are rarely repressed." But he foresees that the cure of a patient's nervous ills will be "at the expense of destroying his morals."

Moral laws are, however, "the enunciation of the higher laws of biology." And because of this we must hesitate in throwing/
throwing the individual back on his mere instincts, because civilised man has developed a need for the organisation of the instincts under the moral self. He cannot, therefore, find happiness by a return to "the chaotic condition of soul typical of the savage."

One cannot help having the suspicion that Hadfield's brief for morality and civilisation is the result of a very normal superego morality system. There appears to be no truth in the notion that civilisation evolved in the ordinary sense, and racial experience extending over a period of a mere six thousand years is not likely to develop within us new fundamental needs. It is also untrue that the soul of primitive man is in a "chaotic condition." There is far more reason to suppose that he has attained to a very satisfactory synthesis of his impulses.

It is indeed strange that Hadfield, who maintains the thesis that repression can be and should be dispensed with, sees anything but his beau ideal in the savage whose instincts are rarely repressed and who does not suffer from nervous breakdown.

From what, we may ask, does he derive his notion of the sanctity of "morals"? They are, we presume, necessary to maintain civilisation which, he says, has been the "purpose of man's evolution". The present writer's sympathy rests rather with Freud, who asks, "Is it worth it?" And he must also insist that a rational treatise on morals to-day could hardly accept uncritically/

"G. Elliot Smith, "Human History", p.199."
uncritically what passes as the ethics of civilisation.

Hadfield appears to pass over the very artificial nature of morality, this being somewhat surprising in a psychologist who has specially interested himself in studying the ethical aspect of human life. It is said of George Stephenson that he replied to his critics who pointed out the danger to cattle of his new invention, that "it would be a bad job for the coo." It would appear that it would be only logical if Hadfield expressed himself in a similar manner when considering the effects of the abrogation of repression on morality. Morality, as we know it, is surely an artificial product. If a thorough-going analysis did bring us to what Hadfield describes as the level of the savage, we should no longer desire morality, and the individual analysed would not consider that anything of value had been destroyed. It is our opinion that Hadfield is by no means sufficiently analysed for his superego system to be abrogated, otherwise his critical faculties, obviously of a high order, would not allow him to adopt the illogical attitudes to which we have drawn attention.

Hadfield tells us that "the will has no direct control over any impulses of the mind except those which are constituted as part of the self....Self control is the conscious and voluntary direction of the instinctive emotions to the will and service of man....In self-control, we not only recognise and accept our impulses/
impulses, and give them expression in conduct by re-directing them to higher ends...." "It is only in so far as we admit our instincts that we can control them and sublimate them." We can only suggest that Hadfield is but giving us counsels of perfection. According to his own showing, everyone has complexes, and presumably a mischievous self-phantasy, unless of course the individual has had the privilege of a thoroughgoing psychoanalysis, which the present writer believes has never yet been carried out. He would, indeed, suggest that wisdom lies far more in the acceptance of our irrationality than in attempting to modify it. It is also by no means certain that the conscious will is without direct control of the repressed unconscious. Even if the word "direct" is too strong, it is probable that the normal person has a very effective control of his irrational impulses for all practical purposes. Matters are not improved by turning the attention on to the self, by becoming introspective.

Hadfield deals with the subject of sublimation. He accounts for the surplus energy which we have at our disposal for sublimation as due to the fact that the instincts are not required at their full strength for their original purposes. Surplus energy "gives rise to all those activities of culture, of art, and of learning, which adorn civilised life." It is doubtful, however, if, as Hadfield declares, we have "an enormous surplus capacity for fear."

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He treats sublimation and sentiment formation as identical. "Sublimation" he says, "is a natural process to be observed not only in the play of the young, but also in the natural development of music and the arts which we find even in lower phases of evolution, for example, amongst birds and savages." "Any kind of activity may serve as a sublimation." We have referred to his views as to how sublimation is not affected by psychoanalysis.

In discussing altruistic conduct, he states that "altruism means that we find our joy in doing things for others...So long as the pleasurable impulse (relating to some private concern of our own) is directed towards the service of others, it is altruistic; as soon as the gratification of the instinct becomes itself the end motive as well as the motive force, it becomes selfish." Our only remark is that, in the case of the higher sentiments at least, a disinterestedness must be attained with which the existence of any considerable degree of what Hadfield describes as "motive force" is incompatible. The impression is, as we have suggested, that Hadfield is to all intents and purposes accepting repression and its resulting compulsive behaviour as normal, and that his self-realisation ideal implies the acceptance of what Freudians describe as superego motivation.

The urge to self-realisation may be present in Hadfield as a motive force of considerable power, but we suggest that the ideal of self-realisation does not provide a motive for self-synthesis which can be regarded as having any deep ethical significance.

True/

True ethical behaviour is not concerned with self-realisation, but with the welfare of others or the appreciation of others based on an attitude which is entirely objective. The artist who is realising himself would, we feel, have little sensitivity to beauty. In those moods when we attain to new truths, our minds are not concerned with ideals of self-realisation. If they were, we should arrive at few significant conclusions.

Hadfield concludes by suggesting that we should "abolish our phantasies of ourselves" and realise that we are "for the most part extraordinarily ordinary." "One of the greatest acts of daring a man can perform is to be himself: it is humbling, but ennobling, whereas pretence is humiliating and degrading." Our opinion is that the most effective way to attain the desirable states which he appraises is not through reductive analysis. Such analysis is far more likely to inflate phantasy than to lessen it.

In the main, however, we are in agreement with the position laid down by Hadfield. But "Psychology and Morals" was published in 1923, before the year of Freud's epoch-making work, "The Ego and the Id", and therefore Hadfield was relatively uninfluenced, at the time of writing, by the later trends of psychoanalytic teaching. In our opinion, his work is all the more interesting, in that he gives us a doctrine of the self-phantasy as the key to the understanding of the unconscious.

We are by no means certain that advance in our understanding of repression/

repression will not be on the lines of developing Hadfield's conceptions rather than Freud's.

"Psychology and Morals", in our view, omits the most fundamental facts of modern psychology in its bearing on morals. This was, of course, inevitable at the time of its publication. We refer to the essentially immoral nature of the superego or self-phantasy, as Hadfield calls it. In our view, a meaningful moral philosophy is impossible until such time as the civilised human mind is freed from the influence of the repressed unconscious.

What, then, to Hadfield, is the relation of repression to cultural development? He would, in general, seem to think that repression should be abolished, but when "moral issues" are raised, we discover that he virtually accepts repression as desirable, and implicitly the whole doctrine of the superego as being the prime determinant of our ethical life.

We also suggest that Hadfield's attempt to develop a significant theory of ethics fails completely in its intention. This is not due to any lack of capacity on his own part, but, as we suggest in our appendix, the civilised human mind is meantime precluded from developing such a theory, this being due to the presence of the superego formation.

'See Appendix, section on the detrimental effects of repression on cultural development, p. 504.
In his book, "The Freudian Wish", Holt considers the bearing of what he describes as "wish psychology" on ethics, a matter on which, he says, Freud has said little, but which Holt believes leads to "very interesting and practically useful conclusions." He states that since the wish is the unit of conduct, ethics ought to regard the wish "as its fundamental unit of discourse, whatever its further argument is to be as to the nature of the good or the source of moral sanctions."

He sets out to enquire "whether conduct which is compounded of such purposes has ethical significance." In the discussion that follows, he adopts the behaviouristic viewpoint. He gives an illustration of a child stretching out its hand towards a flame. He suggests that, provided the child is allowed to receive a burn, or at least discomfort, as the result of his action, he will be conditioned so that in the future he will avoid the now dangerous object, because he has discovered that the objective situation justifies caution. If, however, the mother interposes herself as a forbidding agent between the child and the flame, the situation will assume a triangular relationship, and the child's attention will be divided between the actual dangerous object, and the forbidding mother. In the first case, "the child's conduct towards fire becomes integrated/

integrated, and is solely a function of the actual properties of fire." In the second case,"the child is frustrated, but not instructed," and the mother has actually engrained "the very tendency which she wishes to curb." What is objectively dangerous to the child is "an intrinsic property of mother and not of fire....When mother and flame are together, it perceives the situation where flame cannot be touched." The mother has "left unexercised the conservative tendency to withdraw from heat....and has prematurely got the child to respond to herself as an object of the environment, with qualities of her own, and needing suitably to be studied and dealt with." And during the plastic period of childhood, the child will continually tend to pursue his original interest and "no amount of actual burns will ever correct it." This, says Holt, is a paradigm of Freudian morals.

".....The child's withdrawal "has become"a withdrawal from the mother's hand, and not, as it ought to be, a response to (or function of) the flame itself." Here, says Holt, we have dissociation. Whereas the "precautionary response" should be associated with fire, it becomes transferred to something else, being dissociated from that part of the situation to which it really should belong, namely, the fire. If the mother is withdrawn from the entire situation, should it again arise, the child will have no caution with regard to fire, and will indeed be more liable to approach the dangerous object than he was on the first/

first occasion when fire attracted him.

Holt suggests that two complexes have been formed which, though related to each other, have "more internal cohesiveness" than they have cohesion with each other. "Between the two there is relative dissociation." The mother has committed two errors. First, the right and wrong category was not applicable in the situation which arose, and second, she has transferred "the role of truth to her own person." The burning qualities of fire should be part of the child's own objective experience. Those qualities do not depend on the mother's opinion; authoritativeness is out of place. The mother has become "an obstacle between it and fire," and as far as the child's experience goes, the "fire is not hot". She has "put herself in the position of an alien force frustrating the child." "And moreover," adds Holt, "non-frustration is the condition for sympathy; frustration obviously for antipathy."

Thus a barrier has been set up between the child and reality. That barrier is apparently an unreasonable parent, and the child therefore develops hatred for the parent, and the tendency will be for the child to pursue the forbidden line of action whenever the parental sanction be removed. Here we feel that Holt has laid his finger on the root cause of that irrationality in humanity which leads both to inappropriate responses in many so-called "normal" relations, and also may cause the individual to become entrammelled in neurotic and possibly psychotic/

psychotic conditions. The predominating part of a child's reality has become an authority which he more or less rightly regards as irrational. That authority looms large in his early years, and his principal habit-responses, at least when at home, are directed towards the alien guardian, not towards the material environment which surrounds him; and moreover, not towards any personalities which happen to be in the environment who behave in a more rational manner than those in whose care he finds himself.

According to Janet, the whole of neurosis springs from the individual's continued attempt to pursue ends which were originally impracticable owing to their being forbidden, this attempt ultimately becoming automatic.

A child conditioned on the lines suggested by Holt's illustration will tend to adopt the same attitude towards each "moral" situation as it subsequently arises. As he gets older, he may in many instances be able to evade the parental taboo, and in this way he would have the opportunity of learning the actual properties of objects; but in so doing, he will have present in his mind two factors which will relatively unfit him for dealing wisely with the objective situation. First, he will have a sense of guilt, in that he is disobeying authority, a state of mind which is apt to vitiate judgment; and secondly, he will tend to pursue the forbidden activity, not on account of its intrinsic/

intrinsic interest, but as a means of "getting even" with the unreasonable adults. But, as Holt points out, this is not the worst feature. During later life, many situations will arise where it is necessary, in the child's own interests, that he should accept the findings of authority. For instance, if he should wish to experiment with tobacco. At such a juncture, it is pre-eminently desirable that he should accept the parental admonition; in this case, should he attempt experimentation with tobacco, it is very probable that he will not discover the injuriousness inherent in tobacco until it is too late. The child who has developed an antipathy towards authority will often refuse to accept the injunction of the parent.

The situations as described do not, however, seem to involve repression as it is ordinarily understood. The positions could be described in terms of "conditioning", and the point could be raised as to why the child of ordinary intelligence does not revise his irrational attitudes, why he should not himself reduce the triangular relationship to a directly lineal one. Is it not to be expected that reflective self-consciousness will be capable of correcting the errors of previous training? Holt's answer to-day would probably be that, by the time the child is five, the harmful responses have been incorporated into the superego system, and that the original situations are no longer subject to rational thought, being overlaid by the infantile amnesia.

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The present writer, however, would suggest that later additions to Freudian psychology in no way detract from the de facto position as described by Holt. What Adlerians would describe as "the training formulae" continue to act throughout life. As we suggest later in this thesis, Holt does not describe the whole story. Provided the child has contemporaries who form an implicit alliance against the "stupid" adults, he may have, and usually does have, sufficient moral strength to ignore parental influence in most of his objective relations.

Holt rightly suggests that behind neurotic manifestations there is an ethical problem. But we cannot follow him in his attitude of criticism of the adult personality. It seems irrational to adopt an attitude of blame to adults on account of "the hidden lie" within the soul. Moreover, with our minds as they are, ethical conduct consists in a wise adaptation to our irrational psychic intrusions. To attach blame to ourselves as the possessors of imperfect personalities only leads to an attitude of morbid introspection. The most satisfactory individuals, from an ethical standpoint, are those who are free from self-consciousness.

There is probably a good deal of truth in Holt's idea as to the harm which results from a morality "from above", when "the moral sanction is somehow super-mundane." "These egregious ethics of the air", he says, "have produced other tangible and all-pervading consequences." Our remark in passing is that the "ethics/

"ethics of the air" happen to be very completely incorporated in our psychic make-up, and wisdom, as we have said, lies in adapting ourselves to them. They are as old as civilisation, and though not the cause of civilisation, have certainly been concomitant with it.

To continue. "Since ethics is such a floating vapour, many sober-minded persons conclude, and not illogically, that it is quite apart from the practical conduct of life." (This is true, as far as theories of ethics go, but in practice they are taken into consideration in the conduct of life.) "And," continues Holt, "they lead their lives accordingly. Thus the Teutonic races, in their vigorous fashion, have codified this conclusion. Ethics, they explicitly say, have no part to play in politics and statecraft."

We agree that ethical science cannot, as we are at present constituted, deal with realities. But we are not sure that Holt is differentiating sufficiently clearly between the implicitly accepted ethic of the ordinary man and the attempts to codify these ethical beliefs. In the first sense, the "ethics of the air" are not effete.

Holt's position would seem to be similar to that of Janet. Repression is the result of our not dealing with our psychic conflicts in a rational manner. Like Janet, he has no doctrine of repression proper which seems to be preceded by intense psychic pain, usually, though not always, due to unresolved psychic conflict.

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\(^3\) See Appendix, Note on the detrimental effects of repression, p. 504.
What Janet considers unusual, Holt thinks is normal. All civilised human beings have failed in the task of solving their problems rationally, the reason being that no child brought up under traditional methods can succeed in reacting rationally to the psychic situations which are thereby created. His problems are all emotionally envisaged. He does not recognise the justice of parental injunctions, and strives against them. His opinion is that the parent is in the wrong. Why, then, should he exert control over his impulses? Nevertheless, he is in the grip of his own desire to stand well in the sight of his educator. A rational solution of his problems is therefore impossible. The child is committed to continual dissociation. He is two persons—one striving to please his parents, and the other seeking out his personal ends.

If the facts are as stated by Holt, the child in his opposition to his parents is in part acting in accordance with ethical norms. He opposes them because he considers them unjust. If finally he has to resort to embodying the parents within himself in order to secure mental peace, accepting as his ideal the image of the parent, the obvious implication is that he is led to accept as an ideal a person whose conduct he regards as unethical. If, in his superego, he enacts the part of the parent, it is patent that he is behaving in a way which his ethical sense condemns as morally wrong.

To/
To Holt, then, repression leads to unfortunate results from the ethical standpoint. It is not, therefore, a function of cultural process from the ethical aspect. Irrational responses towards the environment become incorporated in the child's personality, these later leading to social maladjustment.

Finally, Holt is unsparing in his condemnation of the "ethics from above" - ethics, incidentally, which proceed from the superego.
The Aesthetic Aspect.

S. Herbert.

Herbert gives a simple statement of the Freudian doctrine of the part played by repression in determining cultural process. Our discussion especially deals with the Freudian claim as to the part played by the unconscious in art.
S. Herbert.

In his book entitled "The Unconscious in Life and Art", Herbert treats of repression and sublimation from the Freudian standpoint. In his opinion, man started with a crude animal mind. The original instincts were repressed at the time of the formation of the Band of Brothers. In the individual to-day, the original instincts are present, but repressed, and do not appear in consciousness, there being an intermediate region between conscious life and the primal instincts which "remains entirely unexplored."

The instinct school of psychologists are in error in thinking that instinctive impulses find "direct expression in behaviour". There is, he says, "but a thin veneer superimposed upon the fundamental features of our animal nature." He asserts that "the whole process of social culture is based upon the successful repression of the unconscious complexes." He states plainly that the purpose of the repression is that "we may become social."

The method by which man develops his "thin veneer" of sociality, is through "sublimation and reaction formation." "The crude sensual feelings...disguise themselves, as it were, under a cloak of respectability, and thus gain entrance into our conscious by what is called sublimation. In this way they can attain satisfaction in some manner, yet without entirely giving/

giving up their original purpose.

Among sublimations formed in this way he mentions religion, which "derives its driving force from unconscious complexes."

"Our spiritual life is the outcome of our deepest complexes, forming the core of our very being." In our enjoyment of art, our "tastes and preferences are influenced by subtle unconscious complexes that colour our feelings and beliefs at their very roots, long before they reach the sphere of conscious thought." In this connection he also refers to politics and religion. "We make believe," he says, "that we have rational reasons for expressing this or that judgment, but in reality we are swayed by deep-rooted prepossessions - and we do not even know that we are thus suborned beforehand."

Intellectually, the main activity of reason is rationalisation. He rightly asks the question: "If the unconscious has such a preponderant share in the make-up of the mind, what function is left to rationality in man?" He admits that "the artistically minded person will no doubt look first of all for artistic qualities in a work of art, and enjoy it because it gives him this aesthetic satisfaction." "Reason," he says, "may act as a check on precipitate action," but immediately takes back what he has said by stating that "the inner forces of the ego repress, side-track and transform the unconscious impulses into actions which are in conformity with conscious reason", but, "as the conscious self is unaware/
unaware of the changes that take place within the mind, it is unable to assess the actual conditions." The inference is that the "ego" is also acting unconsciously, in accordance with the method described in accounts of the workings of the superego found in the later teaching of Freudians.

There is obviously little left for consciousness to do. The human mind can be explained in terms of crude repressed instincts, and their unconscious elaboration. The thin veneer of our moral and rational self is to be accounted for as the product of processes with which consciousness has little or no connection. The unconscious is the determinant of both life and art.

"The real forces which supply us with our energy are deeply embedded in our organic nature." But nature appears to have been reasonably successful in producing the varied phenomena of civilised existence by elaborating these basic instinctual impulses, without the co-operation of conscious personalities. The obvious inference is that we should leave well alone. Nature has never, to date, invited our co-operation in the development of personality, and a wise policy would be to accept gratefully what nature does for us; we should not presume to interfere with her benign activities. In any case, what cause have we to think that the untried faculty of reason has the necessary knowledge and experience to improve on nature?

But/

'Op. cit., p.34.  

But we are startled by Herbert's statement that "it would bring us a good step nearer to true social feelings if we learnt to understand our unconscious motives. We would then be able to recognise how much they mar and distort our outlook, leading us to wrong judgments about ourselves and our neighbours. Increased insight into the working of our unconscious mind and a proper knowledge of psychoanalysis will do a good deal in future to resolve the many misunderstandings between human beings that are now a constant source of disagreements and quarrels."

It is also asserted that "the unconscious which in health is repressed and kept in bounds by the counterpoise of reason, is let loose" when the mind is in disease. But, as we have seen, it is the repressed ego, the superego, that controls the instinctual impulses. Herbert is thus illogical in suggesting that it is reason which controls the unconscious; the unconscious controls itself. It follows that, if our mind is free from disease, it would be extremely unwise to understand more fully our unconscious motives. According to Herbert's finding, it is not reason that keeps us sane, and if, by introspection, we modify the superego which, according to his teaching, is the real determinant of sanity, there seems a greater likelihood that self-knowledge will bring on insanity rather than avert it.

We have thus in Herbert a clear expression of the Freudian position/

position. Repression, we are told, has been and is responsible for cultural development. And yet in the same breath we are informed that repression should be dispensed with as a means of psychic control. We shall later see the manifold absurdities to which the psychoanalysts are led by their extraordinary capacity for dissociation. In recent works by such writers as Roheim, Rank, and Nicole, we have a further elaboration of the views implicit in the teaching of Herbert, an elaboration which, to the critical reader, amounts to a reductio ad absurdum of the belief that repression is a function of cultural process.

To Herbert, art and other cultural activities are determined by unconscious process. Thus, in his view, complexes supply at once the motive and the energy for humanity's search after the good, the beautiful, and the true.

A complex, we have suggested, could be defined as conscious process gone wrong. The probabilities would appear to be against the acceptance of Herbert's theory as revealed in "The Unconscious in Life and Art".
The Educational Aspect.

Pedagogy.

Wilfrid Lay.

Lay is an example of a Freudian who develops an educational theory on the basis of the Freudian doctrine of repression and sublimation. The inadequacy of the position demonstrated.

Child Education.

Fritz Wittels.

At some length we attempt a criticism of the attitude of Freudsians to the problem of child rearing.
Wilfrid Lay.

In his book, "The Child's Unconscious Mind", Lay contends that the aim of psychoanalysis is "to unite the individual with his kind." He considers that the task of the teacher should be to bring the child into a better relationship with society as a result of the educator's insight, developed in the study of psychoanalysis. The new type of training for the teacher which he envisages will be "to make the work of the teacher more efficient, his relations with parents and children more profitable, and his position in the present social organism more valued than it is."

He presents as the basis of a newer science of education "the hypothesis that the unconscious portion of our human mind, child or adult, is an activity which plays an extremely important, if not an exclusively controlling, role in the life of every individual." His emphasis is thus on the unconscious as being the pre-determinant in the production of the phenomena of consciousness, and the efficient educator "must adopt this new point of view."

He suggests that, in the past, the educator has guessed at the facts of the activity of the unconscious in his pupils, and "human conduct has always been modified by the unconscious desires; but no conscious cognizance has been taken of it except in a very indefinite/
indefinite and unproductive way."

He would ask the teacher to view the unconscious mind as composed of mental states which are not inert, but "are activities, energies, or groups of forces which are operating by mechanisms of which only the special student knows anything definite at all."

There are, however, in daily life, "frequent examples of the conscious results produced by those elaborate and complicated mechanisms." The teacher should therefore concentrate his attention on the hidden reaches of the child's mind. Only by an understanding of the inner mechanisms can he adequately perform his task in imparting knowledge and developing character.

The unconscious mind is universal, being "an element in the constitution of every normal human being." He states that the nature of this unconscious factor may be "described in one word: desire. It constantly desires my superiority to my fellowmen in all the relations of life." It has been compared to a current of power which is forever flowing and ready to be applied to any purpose for which the human body is a suitable machine. But it loves "gratification which comes from the worsting of any contestant, and in a certain sense everything with which and everyone with whom I come in contact is taken by it as a possible or actual rival. It feeds on a feeling of power which it gets by making me overcome or outwit my adversaries. If I do not think of this or that man as an opponent/
opponent, my unconscious factor does and makes me unconscious for a brief moment."

Lay here stresses what is probably the most outstanding component of what Freud later described as the superego. His description would almost equally apply to the Adlerian tendency to ego-maximation, and also we may detect the kind of phenomena described by Stekel in "The Beloved Ego". We may take it, then, that the teacher should realise that this desire for superiority is hidden within the mind of every child, and should adapt his methods of teaching to this inward force. The moral would seem to be that the teacher should work out a system whereby the child's emulative impulses should provide the drive for the attainment of knowledge and the acquisition of moral sentiments.

Even the things we most desire are not those we consciously seek after. "The greater number of our desires are absolutely unknown to us." The things we most desire, however, are those things sexual which "have been tabooed in many civilisations". These desires can never enter into consciousness except in a disguised form. "All the unconscious wishes are forms of the creative wish for reproduction" but on account of the barrier created by society, these desires express themselves in a groping manner "like a blind animal, or like a blade of grass ..... stretching forth... under a board towards the light."

Lay would seem to accept uncritically the forces which have led towards the changing of sometime desires into a form where they must grope "like a blind animal". He, indeed, justifies repression of the sex instinct as a very proper way of dealing with a dangerous situation. We have the idea, he suggests, that having to do with sex is like "playing with fire" with the implication that all those who play with such fire are likely to be burnt. Furthermore, that it is a bad thing in every way to be burnt. A state of society is conceivable in which such a fear of being burnt did not exist, and in which therefore there would be plenty of people in evidence who had been burnt and been disfigured by their burns.

Now the fact is that, in avoiding the one kind of burns, we are suffering another kind. What we are really doing is exchanging a physical for a mental burn. This, it would seem, is all to the good. But the matter does not rest here. "There is an absolute law of the conservation of energy in the mental as well as in the physical world. What we gain in the way of physical advantage by our constant curbing of the natural instincts" should be turned to "mental advantage". In many cases, this does not happen. This is doubly a mistake, first because our conscious desires "are the fewest in number and the weakest in dynamics" and secondly because "the unconscious wishes...are the ones which most exactly represent what we really are."

The/
The result is that we are only partially energised and we have "failed of the spiritual union within (ourselves) which is so rare a thing."

Lay would seem to suggest that it is the task of the teacher to provide an ideal of personality which will enable the child to express his unconscious wishes. How this can be done without raising the taboos to which the child has been subjected, it is difficult to see. It would rather seem to be the task of the teacher to prevent the child becoming conscious of such an ideal. His business would be to hoodwink the child into imagining that he no longer desires the forbidden lines of activity.

Lay considers that one of the fundamental purposes of education is to "enable each individual to take at will into consciousness as many and as diverse thoughts as possible, which the uneducated person is unable to face." The educator should aim at enabling the individual to face as much reality as possible. Reality, he appears to think, is to be found in the unconscious, and under ideal conditions of early education, the unconscious impulses would find their various concrete ends. In this case the individual would have developed "naturally without help from the outside." There is, he says, in human beings, an innate tendency from the earliest days of infancy...to repress reality, to forget it voluntarily, to drive it from consciousness and keep it out of/

of consciousness. Because reality is largely, and more in nervous persons than in others, a source of pain and distress .... And so we go on from year to year accumulating in the unconscious all the painful and distressing experiences.'"

Lay may be in part describing what exists under present conditions of early child education, but surely the emphasis in a book on education, directed partly to parents, should be on those conditions which cause reality to have the quality of being painful. He envisages natural development "without help from the outside", but offset against the desirability or possibility of such development, we have his reference to the dangerous quality of the sex impulse which, as far as we can see from Lay's viewpoint, fully justifies the substitution of an unconscious burn for a physical one. There his only plea is that we should sublimate the energy bound up in the repressed instinct.

Conscience in children Lay describes as being due to "the voice of their fathers and mothers heard in reality in earlier days, but now heard in imagination." He is thus committed to an intuitive view of the moral life. While he is in part correct, it would seem that conscience in children is far more than this. This point we discuss more fully in our critique of Freudian psychology based on Alexander's "Psychoanalysis of the Total Personality."

Referring/

Referring to sublimation, Lay states that "the aim of education is the sublimation or adaptive transformation of physical into psychic energy." What differentiates a sublimation from other displacements arising out of repressed sexuality, is this, that "sublimation of a trend of the psyche is nothing more or less than the selection by society of that particular trend for its own use or amusement."

We suggest that Lay's definition of the aim of education would be sound were the word "sublimation" omitted. Why, may we ask, should the "adaptive transformation" be beneath the threshold of consciousness? That is, why should the emphasis be on complexes rather than on normally developed sentiments? And, moreover, the suggestion that the adaptive transformation is merely in relation to that which society selects "for its own use or amusement" would seem to cut the ground from beneath the educator to whom the vital ends of education are in relation to things which have intrinsic value quite independently of utility or entertainment value.

We consider it a mistake to suggest to the teacher that the educative process should be related to the unconscious, which, according to Lay, contains all the energies which consciously or unconsciously are used by the teacher during the child's period of school training. Surely all our energies are not locked up within what Freud later described as the superego system. And, in/  

in any case, sublimation, according to Freudian authorities, is an unconscious process and is beyond the control of either the child or the teacher. Wisdom would seem to lie in placing before the child ideals which he may consciously assimilate, and as far as the unconscious is concerned, patiently awaiting the harnessing of any forces which happen to be locked up therein.

Lay seems to be completely unaware that, if the facts are as stated by him, the child does not really desire to realise the ends which are bound up in the educational process. He is, indeed, an unconscious dupe in so far as the educator succeeds in "sublimating". It is probably true that any educator who really believes that his job is to manipulate the inner psychic mechanisms of his pupils, will cease to have the ability to inspire in the children a desire for the conscious pursuit of ideals of vital significance. A thoroughgoing belief in mechanisms leads to materialism and obscuration of ethical values, and a conscious acceptance of insincerity and chicanery.

It is, of course, not true that the educator who accepts the theory of Freudian psychoanalysis really acts on the philosophic assumptions which lie at the base of Freudian psychology. Happily, he is the subject of dissociation, and his practical viewpoint is only in part determined by his theoretical presuppositions.
Towards the end of his book, Lay engages in a talk on hypocritical education in respect of sexuality. He says that it "is very rarely considered until it is too late...how a boy or a girl should feel...about the things concerning which the deepest and most pervasive feelings are right and proper...and the sexual feelings, which should be kept for sexual things, have gotten detached from those primal experiences and transferred to incidents which never in the world should have had attached to them feelings of sexual intensity.....In a sense, then, our civilisation is based and the vast fabric of it is erected on a sense of shame, for repressed sexuality works itself out in excesses of every sort, in enormousness of cities, and commerce, and all the great things which so astound the individual when he looks at them in large. It may thus be that our shame-civilisation has resulted from a shunting off of power from reproduction of species to production of externals of life and that, had we had our sexuality less repressed, we should have been a simple people like the Chinese."

Once again we have the doctrine of repression being harmful if in excess, and desirable if only existing in a modified degree. The general reader must indeed be baffled by a perusal of a book of the type of "The Child's Unconscious Mind". At one time the implication is that repression is a necessary, and perhaps an inevitable, process. And within the same work, repression is attacked/

attacked as being at the root of many of the world's major evils. The only effect on those who seek guidance in their dealings with children is to develop within them a vacillating and inconsistent policy. And moreover, there is a tendency to accept the implied materialism of the Freudian position which sees in the young child a mere animal, something to be "conditioned" with a corresponding lack of any appreciation of the child as having ethical and aesthetic sensitivity, and also a desire to bring his experience into rational relationship.

What is the relation between repression and cultural development? Lay's whole position would lead us to the conclusion that, in all essential activities, we are complex driven. Hence his educational corollary that the teacher should provide for the child opportunities of sublimation. Our position is, on the contrary, that the child should be encouraged to develop sentiments by placing before him ends which have an intrinsic appeal. Education must be an active process in which the child consciously accepts ends which to him are of felt value, and thereupon seeks out and adapts means by which these ends may be realised. Only when the character has attained stability as a result of this process is it profitable for the educator to concern himself with the repressed unconscious, but not with the intention of effecting sublimations. Rather must the end be to eliminate the repressed unconscious by bringing its energies under the direct control of conscious process.
Fritz Wittels.

Fritz Wittels might be described as a Freudian with a mission. We have before us his book entitled "Set the Children Free", an article on "Narcissism" in "Sex in Civilisation", and one on "Sadistic Tendencies in Parents" in "The New Generation". He is out to inform the lay public that it is high time they modified their methods of child rearing. No one can doubt Wittels' sincerity; but the reader gains the impression that he is still anchored in the dismal philosophy of the Freudians, implicit in whose teaching is the belief that if child rearing methods were altered the race would quickly be destroyed. "Repression is civilisation". Moreover, all cultural process is dependent on impulses which are aim-inhibited as a result of repression.

In our opinion, Wittels, on account of his Freudian presuppositions, does not fully grasp the problem which he wishes to resolve, because of false beliefs as to the nature of the young child. The essential prerequisite of dealing more intelligently with children is to have a clear understanding of their nature.

Wittels, like many other writers whose views we have discussed, subscribes to the belief that there is a stage in the child's development when something catastrophic occurs, but he does not give a very adequate description of how and why this happens. It is probably the main distinction between thinkers like/
like McDougall and Watson, and those whose interest is mainly centred in the unconscious, that whereas the former regard development as proceeding gradually by sentiment formation or the conditioning of primary impulses, the latter have formed the belief that at some point in the child's development there is a sudden rift, and what takes place at this time is the principal determinant of subsequent character formation.

Wittels makes many illuminating statements, and since he represents the "reforming" spirit as found in many Freudian writers, we shall follow fairly closely the viewpoint illustrated in the writings at present before us.

Writing on narcissism, in "Sex in Civilisation", Wittels tells us: "The primary narcissism forms a normal part of sound development" but "secondary narcissism is a dangerous thing, and in its higher degrees may even become a disease." Secondary narcissism is the result of identifications bound up with the catastrophic event in the child's development, the factual existence of which is, we believe, implicit throughout Wittels' writings. But, as we have stated in other connections, there is grave reason for doubting if the condition of primary narcissism ever is present in young children. Young children are not in love with themselves. Our three-and-a-half year old child does not appear to have noticed himself as a person. There is every reason to suppose that his interests are objective, even in so far as/

"Sex in Civilisation" p.441.
as he reflects on his own psychological processes. His "libido" is certainly not on himself. It is attached to the objects, animals, and persons in whom he is interested.
There is, of course, the personal point of reference, but merely in so far as Professor Drever's "general appetitive tendency" is at work, in that he seeks pleasure and avoids unpleasure.

There appears to be no factual basis for the Freudian belief in primary narcissism, and the impression we gain is that Wittels, on account of his Freudian viewpoint, throws a cloak over the true nature of the young child. Wittels' child would seem to be a projection of his own unconscious processes. We have an extreme instance of this kind of thing in McCurdy's description of the infantile nature. It is becoming more and more evident to the writer that the Freudian as such is badly equipped for the task of instituting reforms in traditional methods of bringing up children.

When Wittels describes secondary narcissism, we feel that he is on surer ground. We find him saying: "He (the narcissist) feels more respect and more love for himself, tiny as he is, than for the great universe by which he is surrounded. Here we perceive the egocentric standpoint which leads, on the one hand, to defeat by insanity, and on the other to the hero who has succeeded repeatedly in changing the world, especially in the spiritual/

spiritual realm. We are reminded of Küntel's viewpoint, as exemplified in the symbol which we shall describe when referring to this author. But Küntel has no mention of the hero as conditioned by a narrowing of objectivity, and an abnormally large degree of egocentricity.

Wittels goes on to say: "So we see narcissism triumphant, the solitary man victorious over the outside world, and we would like to draw a sharp line between such summits of achievement and the errors of the human mind. But it is not possible to make a sharp distinction."

It is our contention in this thesis that, on the findings of students of the unconscious, it is possible to make a sharp distinction between the errors of the human mind and the conditions on which cultural process depends. This can only be brought about if we study the total personality of the young child and perceive the ethical significance of the process of repression. A solution can be found only when we apply to the problem the touchstone of the apparently old-fashioned concepts of right and wrong, the true and the untrue, and distinctions based upon the aesthetic sense.

In his article on "Sadistic Tendencies in Parents", Wittels makes several interesting observations to which we shall briefly refer. Like Bertrand Russell, he regards the "fall of man" as taking/}

' See section on Fritz Küntel, thesis p. 300.
' Bertrand Russell, "Marriage and Morals" p.136 et seq.
taking place when the institution of property was brought into existence. In Arcadian days, the child had "run beside its mother like a young colt", but under civilised conditions he became "the property of his parents" and was "treated as such". Besides having economic functions, the child was regarded as being destined to acquire the property of his father, and must receive appropriate training. But as time went on, a class grew up which had no property, and by the rules of right reasoning the proletarian child should have regained that ancient inheritance which he ceased to receive as soon as he became the heir to property. But Wittels points out that things did not work out this way. He says: "Proletarian children are not heirs, they are nothing more or less than property, the only property the proletarian owns. The right to box his children's ears, because they are his children, has remained a proletarian right, and no one has a right to object. He does not wish to be considered lacking as compared to the father of the wealthy, so he 'brings up' his child. He vents his own ill-humour on his children, and the property owning classes have no interest in disturbing him in this possession by enlightening him.'"

Wittels goes on to say: "The children must accustom themselves in good season to having their ears boxed, so that they will not be surprised when life, later on, turns out to be an affair of cracks and cuffs. Then, in their turn, they will regard/

regard children as defenceless property, when they have become fathers."

Wittels here has become a realist.

In the article previously discussed, Wittels tells us that fear in childhood is due to phylogenic factors. We suggest that, above, Wittels gives us a far more adequate account of the factors which lead to repression than when he seeks for efficient causes of childhood's fears by peering into those dim corridors which represent our racial past.

On the following page, Wittels again is almost unpleasantly realistic when tracing the factors which give rise to repression. Perhaps the writer will be forgiven if he indulges in a little anecdote which was recently related of a tradesman in a small town, who, like most other persons in the community, had suffered at the hands of the local gossips. In his braid Scots, he said: "Ye ken, they tell an awfu' lot o' lees aboot me, but I never heed them. But if they started to tell the truth aboot me, I wad hae to tak' notice!" We suggest that if psychoanalysts told us the truth instead of indulging in mythology, their influence might be commensurate with the significance of the facts which they have brought to light.

We find Wittels saying: Yet where is there a power that is not liable to be misused, should it give us pleasure to misuse it?" If we would account for repression, we need not look much farther than into the minds of ordinary human beings when/

1 "The New Generation" p.42. 2 "Sex in Civilisation" p.455.
3 "The New Generation" p.43.
when no longer under the eye of public opinion. Wittels also speaks of "the degrading of the child to the level of a mere chattel" and moreover says: "Slavery and serfdom have been abolished, but children are slaves." And he proceeds to tell us: "Our education will always train slaves - human beings inwardly and externally not free - so long as the sadistic element is present in that education."

Wittels refers to masochism as "an enthusiastic subjection, a spirit of servitude...inbred in the nursery," And yet, in the eyes of most Freudians, masochism is an essentially respectable part of the superego, an institution which they regard with the pride of the archaeologist who has unearthed the foundations of some ancient temple the existence of which had heretofore been unsuspected.

Later, Wittels tells us: "Drilled children are a sin against the Holy Ghost. An eight-year-old boy, the son of an officer of high rank, said to his father at the table: 'The beating you gave me has already worked, hasn't it father? I'm sitting a good deal straighter!". On the next page, Wittels says: "Not only inhuman parents, but nearly all parents take a sadistic attitude with regard to their children: they derive pleasure from torturing their children." Once again, Wittels is realistic. Sadism, whatever be the explanation, is part of our original equipment; this fact is forced on every unbiassed witness of the behaviour of children. Most parents take steps to instil into the child a belief/

belief that cruelty is "wicked"; henceforth, the tendency is viewed within an emotional setting, and therefore is no longer subject to rational control. It has become a complex, strangely enough a respectable one, and in adult life it finds "legitimate" expression in correcting young children, not only in respect of their "cruelty", but also in connection with any impulse whatsoever which is traditionally regarded as "wrong".

The present writer makes this statement as a result of observing the conditions in numerous homes, chiefly of the working class. Elsewhere in this paper, he ventures the opinion that disgust conditioning has far more to do with repression in our own society than Freudians appear to realise: he would here emphasise his belief that sadism is a powerful determinant in the development of the preconditions of neurosis, and of normality in so far as normality has an admixture of the irrational. Malinowski considers that in primitive society we need not look into the past for an explanation of the mores of that society. The existing organisation may be explained in terms of present utility.

Although it would probably be vain to seek for a "biological" explanation of contemporary family organisation, we might do well to apply Malinowski's conception in the sense of looking for the causative factor of repression in the concrete conditions of present-day families. Those who are obsessed with the super-ego system seem almost incapable of realising the relatively simple/

'Bronislaw Malinowski in "The New Generation" p.143.'
simple and easily observable factors which are responsible for repression. Most Freudian explanations, we suggest, are irrelevant. It is refreshing to find Wittels drawing our attention to real ontogenetic factors, rather than to imaginary phylogenetic ones.

Also in another instance, Wittels deals realistically with a prime causative factor in inculcating irrationality into our children. We read: "We cripple the intelligence and courage of our children by tales among which the cruelties of the Old and New Testaments occupy the place of honour. The crucifixion of Christ, the slaughter of the Innocents of Bethlehem, the Flood, the Egyptian plagues, and much else, are presented to the child hall-marked with the deepest reverence and the utmost solemnity. We demand of the child that it accept these religious cruelties as true, actual happenings, either because we ourselves believe them, or, in any event, act as though we believed them. In fairytales one should at least leave open the loop-hole that it is all poetry and play of the imagination." In point of fact, most children, if not all, reach a stage when fairytales etc. cease to have an influence over their characters. But the type of story from Holy Writ to which Wittels refers, remains in the minds of a great number of adults as being fundamentally true.

We then find Wittels saying: "The love which the child requires must be as well regulated as a luke-warm bath whose invariable temperature is always maintained." McDougall tells us/

us of the effect on parents of this kind of advice. They become afraid to show any affection to their children, lest their love passes the "temperate" point of the Freudian thermometer. We are inclined to agree with McDougall in this matter. Wittels appears to be influenced by seeing in the child a tendency towards sensuality in his attachments to his parents. From what we have ourselves observed, the young child is simply not interested in sentimental affection, any more than the boy of ten, and quickly rebuffs tendencies towards sentimentality in his parents.

When sexuality is repressed, or at least when something is repressed, attachments to parents previously almost unemotional take on, within the super-heated chamber of the repressed unconscious, a strength which did not exist when the attachment was directed towards the real parent. It probably matters very little, if a child's impulses are to be repressed, whether the attachments to the actual parents were greater or less. There can be no question, however, that the child loses his sense of security if he is not continually reminded that his parents bear an affectionate attitude towards him.

Wittels' book "Set the Children Free" runs into almost two hundred pages, and although much of what he says is relevant to our present discussion, it will be impossible here to do more than make brief reference to a few of the salient points.

Wittels/

Wittels repeats his belief that we "come into the world loving ourselves". Only gradually does the child's interest stray into the outer world, or rather, the world to the child is himself, and its external happenings mere dreams. But in process of reducing his seemingly psychological world to order, he becomes aware of others as having egos, and from that point he has a dim conception of himself as an ego, but it "is a fragile asset... The recognition of the personal ego constitutes a turning point in life. Up to that moment, the child was a creature which had not felt any difference between itself and the outer world."

Speaking of identification, Wittels states that it "is as simple as can be. A boy is interested in a locomotive; he is himself the locomotive." Our comment is that, from a very early age, the child knows quite well the difference between himself and the things with which he becomes identified. He is "only pretending". We are told that the feeling of inferiority "can never be looked upon as a primordial feeling among mankind. How could a being which feels itself to be unique, which feels that it, indeed, constitutes a world in itself, how could such a being ever come to look upon itself as inferior?" The child is born with "a cuirass of self-satisfaction to protect it against the mortifications from which its sensitive little mind would otherwise suffer."

We reiterate that the child has no such extraordinary belief in its own uniqueness, and cannot in any sense whatever be regarded as loving itself. Against this view, we would point out that a child of a month old is able to respond to emotional expressions in others. Philip smiled at his attendant when only twenty-eight days old. It is a well-known fact that children are influenced by the emotional expressions of others from a very early age. How the child is able to interpret facial expressions, in view of the fact that he has, as a general rule, never seen a reflection of his own face when emotionally roused, is a complete mystery, but the fact is there, and since the capacity is so obviously innate we have every reason to think that the child quickly gains a notion, however hazy, of the existence of other personalities.

Philip, at the time of writing, heard his mother sigh. He had previously heard it said that she was worried on account of her sister who had just returned from abroad in a state of ill health. Interpreting the sigh, Philip enquired: "Are you worried about Auntie Nancy?"

The child is surely equipped for objectivity, and the whole conception of his being shut up for a considerable time in a narcissistic dream, and protected by a feeling of self-satisfaction from the attacks of an alien world, is a theory which is in/
in the highest degree improbable. Yet this is the basis of
the psychology of the author of "Set the Children Free". If
parents accept his doctrine, they are, in our view, accepting
an illusory system of beliefs, a projection of so-called secondary
narcissism into the life of the young child.

Parents have, indeed, a fair intuitive knowledge of the
workings of the minds of their young charges. It is to be
feared that false theoretical conceptions such as those enunciated
by Wittels will make parents far less effective in the treatment
of their children than they would be if simply left to the guidance
of their intuition.

According to Wittels, the child is surrounded by what he
describes as the "Tu". At one time in our life, we represented
God. We were the whole of existence. We read the following:
"Maybe we premise here that the consciousness of the Ego comes
to us from without, and that the great Tu from which this self-
consciousness arises requires that the Ego shall be reabsorbed in
itself. We are then 'gathered to our fathers' or our mothers;
we rest in God.'" We would ask here, what has all this got to
do with human development? The child presumably does come
to have an idea of himself, which idea we may call the ego. But
should not our attention be fixed on the self as an organic
unity? Is there not a basic ego, and is it not probable that
the child has within him at an early stage that totally
mysterious power, the capacity for introspection? That is, he
knows/

knows what is going on in himself just as much as he knows of the events taking place in the outer world through his senses. Once again, is not Wittels' ego a projection on to the child of a conception merely found within the highly elaborated consciousness or unconsciousness of the adult? After all, is not the superego a mere complex, essentially a part of that self which is an organic whole, even though it does contain within itself a false idea of the self which causes a break in what Künkel calls its organic continuity?

To Wittels, the child and the adult at all times retain a hankering after the pristine belief in self-perfection, this being the original idea of the self in early childhood. But surely if we wish to get back to our first idea of ourselves, we should find this idea bound up with our introspective knowledge, a knowledge however implicit, of the self as experienced during the early years of childhood.

According to Wittels, the child does a number of extraordinary things in order to get back his feelings of self-importance and self-satisfaction. When he comes to realise that his ego has weaknesses and limitations, he compares himself adversely with that grand and glorious being which he previously imagined himself to be, and thereupon sets up within himself "an ideal ego set apart from our everyday ego, and retaining in the fictional world of the ideal/"

'Cf. J. Varendonck, "Evolution of the Conscious Faculties", Chapter on "Reduplicative Memory".
ideal its divine and omnipotent qualities. Everything a man feels to be good and right he brings into the mansion where dwells his ideal ego. The ideal ego is also in control of our conscience, and upon the decisions of this higher tribunal depend both our happiness and our unhappiness throughout life."

We can only confess to feelings of astonishment. The child tells to itself a deliberate lie, and can plead in extenuation of the fault only that the lie is comforting. On the basis of this lie, on his creation of a picture of a fictitious self, there is constructed that which controls our conscience, our higher tribunal, and the determinant of our sorrows and joys. And Wittels follows this up by stating that "good breeding, behaviour, and gentlemanliness, depend to a large extent upon this ego ideal - or superego as Freud calls it." We are sufficiently proletarian to believe that "gentlemanliness" has some such basis, but we totally demur when Wittels calmly informs us that all worthy conceptions spring not merely from human error but from sheer baseness and total disregard for truth.

Speaking of the child as he emerges from this state of Arcadian bliss, Wittels says: "But however beautiful-and paradisial this stage of development may be, it is bound to come to an end sooner or later. The child of a civilised community strives to circumscribe its ego in order to become unique. Again, it encounters so many annoyances in the course of/

of its upbringing, annoyances coming pre-eminently from the beloved Tu (chiefly the parents), that doubt begins to germinate in its mind, with the result that the first conflicts are implanted.

Thus to Wittels the child of two or three is already a prey to illusions. Surely the truth is that a child of this age has no tendency to over-estimate his own importance in the scheme of things. Wittels then goes on to discuss the conceptions of the pleasure principle and the reality principle. The pleasure principle he identifies with the child's gratification of his belief that he is all-important and all-powerful, and reality is that which convinces him that his pleasurable idea of himself cannot be maintained. His state of bliss is disturbed by the Tu's insistence that he is less important than he previously imagined. The child has taken comfort in the thought that the Tu has accepted him at his own evaluation, but when he discovers that his environment adopts a critical attitude towards him, he looks round for a substitute for the rather disappointing Tu institution. The community obligingly supplies the child with a series of religious conceptions, and thus "the father's place is taken by God the Father; the mother's place (at least in Catholic lands) is taken by the Virgin Mary; the inefficient ego which has to undergo so long a passion is replaced by Jesus Christ, the Son of God." We accept religion in order to bolster up a false conception of our own importance.

This/

This tendency to take refuge in authorities has, it would seem, a distinct function in leading the child to accept societal organisation. "All forms of authority have arisen out of this kind of childish substitution - teacher, mayor, king, etc. Hence also arise other concepts, such as the sense of belonging to a certain nation, country, town, or class. Such substitutes likewise, if they early take root in the child's mind, are not amenable to extirpation by the rational faculty." It would seem that our eternal preoccupation is to defend our pristine ego conception.

According to Wittels, there is good reason, for if "doubt ....invades the sanctuary of the ego", ego-consciousness becomes completely extinct, and "we have to do with veritable insanity. So far as normal beings are concerned, doubt cannot penetrate into the core of the ego, but merely gnaws at the outside rind. Even so, however, there arise feelings of inferiority from which hardly any child is wholly free."

Our opinion is that the above statement is merely an implicit confession that psychoanalysts have not, to date, succeeded in effecting any vital analysis of the psychic structure. We shall not discuss Wittels' reference to the condition of the insane, but according to his statement, no individual who has been under the analytical process has ever brought reason to bear on that illusory system of ideas represented by what Wittels describes as the/

the ego. It seems absurd to imagine that if an individual lost his illusions he would become insane. Rather would he be left with the young child's ordinary psychological equipment, which includes the power of introspection and the formation of a true idea of the self on the basis of that introspection.

Wittels then proceeds to explain everything in terms of the child's attempting to defend his primary narcissism, just as Rank founds his psychological edifice on the theory of the "birth trauma". Wittels' ostensible purpose is to "set the children free", but like almost all other Freudian writers, he gives us the impression that the person to be emancipated is caught in the toils of a fate from which it is well-nigh impossible for him to extricate himself.

Rank has his "birth trauma", Melanie Klein and Susan Isaacs an all-significant superego which develops inexorably whatever educational methods may be employed; Suttie sees in weaning the decisive factor - one also relatively uncontrollable; McCurdy has his "tendency" to form an Oedipus complex, and here we have in Wittels' "Set the Children Free", perhaps the most stultifying conception of all. "We are born blind, and at the same time we come into the world loving ourselves." Illusion is natural to us, and complete disillusion spells insanity.

We have seen that the child fits himself in to the social order on account of his "need" for substitutes, these being accepted in order to bolster up his irrational over-estimation of/
of his own personality. As a means of defending himself against doubt - for which, of course, there is every reason - mankind rather paradoxically seeks knowledge, and thus science comes into being. "But when a child feels that its title to ownership is being threatened, then do we witness the first hint of scepticism; thereafter, becoming alarmed, it starts passionately on the road of enquiry. The wiseacre's saw, "Knowledge is power", finds no more enthusiastic believer than a child. Nevertheless, it only wants to obtain knowledge in the realm where the love of those who rub shoulders with it in daily life does not suffice to satisfy its craving for pleasure."

Wittels is soon involved in the usual type of absurdity which springs from adopting false premises based on Freudian misconceptions. We read: "Doubt is born from an insufficiency of love, and bitter experience is the driving force which puts the child's enquiring mind into action." The obvious corollary is that we must see to it that the child has "an insufficiency of love" - this presumably being the luke-warm variety referred to earlier in our discussion. Otherwise, human beings will no longer have interest in scientific pursuits. Any unbiased observer of children is fully convinced that the child's desire for knowledge is one of his fundamental attributes, and that it has no ulterior motives.

If what Wittels says of the young child is true, he might evoke/

"See section on Wm. Brown, p.145; also section on Campbell Garnett, thesis p.155.
evoke our pity, but scarcely our love. The child is a congenital egoist, committed to a career of untruthfulness and deceit; his ostensible motives have always an ulterior motive behind them, and his sole concern in life is to maintain an inward condition of self-love. His religion consists of self-worship, but his breviary translates the words of a traditional prayer into more appropriate form; not "Thine is the Kingdom", but "Mine is the Kingdom, the Power and the Glory." Wittels does not give us a picture of a child but of an infantile monstrosity, another creature of the superego system turned loose into spheres where no objective counterpart can be found.

We shall now very quickly summarise the remainder of the views found in "Set the Children Free", in so far as they are relevant to our present purpose.

We have suggested that we cannot accept the theoretical basis of Wittels' teaching. But in much of what follows, it would appear that his powers of observation have not been obscured on account of subjective factors. We find him saying that parents often force their children "into an unequal combat whence the youngsters emerge with a sense of guilt" - and, we may add, with a "training formula" to the effect that it is hopeless to resist authority, and often, also, that it is hopeless to attempt the achievement of any ends whatsoever. Wittels tells us that punishment/

punishment is irrational, and that the child never accepts the justice of punishment until his personality has been crushed. "The right to punish rests entirely upon the right of the stronger.'"

We find Wittels saying that "during its early years, the child cannot see that there is any difference between God and his own father and mother. . . . Grown-ups are never naughty, they are unfailingly good." From experience, we suggest that the young child can be very critical of the behaviour of his parents. Adults do not do wrong, we are told, because "there is no one in authority to forbid the doing of this, that, or the other." We would express the view that the child has a very keen sense of justice and injustice, and that adults, in his estimation, certainly do wrong when they act unjustly.

Wittels argues that on account of the child's ideal of the parent as perfect, he has, when that ideal is incorporated into his own psychological system, saddled himself with a striving for the unattainable. He has "a primary and unattainable ideal in the underground regions of the mind." It would appear that Wittels is here referring to phenomena which require another interpretation. If the child considers his parents in the light suggested by Wittels, it must be presupposed that his judgment has been influenced by emotional factors.

Towards the end of Wittels' book, we come across a curious statement/

He says: "Agreed that culture and civilisation are impossible without the renunciation of many freedoms, all the same, the inner freedom must remain inviolate." No objection can, of course, be taken to this statement, but we are a little baffled when we read on: "Internal freedom is a splendid feeling, being equivalent to a sense of omnipotence produced by the conviction that one has entered into alliance with the divine power."

We have no hesitation in suggesting that if anyone experiences the inner freedom described by Wittels, he has the characteristics of a person in the positive phase of circular insanity. Wittels is describing a state of mania, not normality as found in either the adult or the child.

Yet Wittels does not hesitate to apply his findings as to the psychological conditions which should exist if a person is to have "internal freedom". "See to it, parents," he says, "that you, regarded by your child as its divine Tu, do not poison for it this most important of cognitions which is the first, the most primitive element, of a child's philosophy. No doubt the child will ere long recognise your inadequacy, and thus become aware of its own. But first of all let it absorb your sufficiency, this meaning your love. 'Honour thy father and thy mother' - but then, as Anzengruber justly remarks, the parents must be worthy of honour."

Comment would almost seem to be unnecessary on such perverse/
perverse teaching. The first thing a parent must do if he would give justice to his child is to come off that absurd pedestal, to the elevation of which he has heretofore considered himself entitled, and admit to himself, and if necessary to the child, that he is in every vital essential the equal, if indeed not the inferior of those who have been accidentally committed to his care. Thus do we find false Freudian theory causing those whose ostensible purpose it is to "set the children free" to bolster up the traditional system which, unless modified, threatens to engulf our civilisation in possibly irremediable ruin.

Wittels has also views on the function and nature of religion, but we do not think that the clergy will in this case be specially inclined to accept his contribution to a better understanding of the psychological bases of theological belief. "The religious sentiment," says Wittels, "is a regurgitation of the swallowed and ruminated divinity of the primal authority, the primal perfection, which is now extrojected into the skies. The religious phase of development is a necessary one, and the child will spontaneously bring it to a close by adopting a peculiar, quasi-humorous attitude towards its own piety." Thus do we attain normality!

In conclusion, we would remark that the impression we gather from reading Wittels' "Set the Children Free" is that, from first to last, the author is dealing with phantasies. The child/
child is crazy, the adult is crazy, but the latter, by accident, happens to be called normal. If, as a result of analysis both of himself and his patients, Wittels has formed the conclusion that civilised humanity is characterised by the manic-depressive state, even if in a somewhat mild form, we are willing to allow that he is entitled to his opinion. But we would be emphatic that only harm can come when conceptions derived from the study of the abnormal in human development are projected into the lives of our children. Up to the present time at any rate, it is not regarded as an essential part of the training of a teacher that he should make a special study of the aberrations of the insane, supplemented by periodic visits to a mental hospital, as a preparation for the correct envisagement of the nature of his future charges, though at times the practical educationalist may gain the impression that such training might not altogether have been inappropriate. But we would at least be emphatic that only harm can come when those in charge of young children are taught to see in their natures, psychic structures which are only to be found in the minds of the insane or partly insane. By implication, Wittels would seem to consider the normal as among the last named class.

We shall not attempt specifically to relate the position taken up by Wittels to our subject. Our main purpose has been to show the inadequacy of the Freudian whose attention is turned to the problems of child rearing. Repression, we hold, is a dysfunction/
dysfunction of cultural process. The Freudian reformer, on account of his theoretical presuppositions has not, in our opinion, the necessary clarity of vision to inaugurate an efficient campaign towards the highly desirable and vitally necessary end of "setting the children free".
The Sociological Aspect.

General.

Aurel Kolnai.

Kolnai deals with the relation between psychoanalysis and sociology. He wrote in 1921. He takes the line that the aim of psychoanalysis should be to reform society by persuading it to give such insight into its impulses that rational control may be set up instead of control by the repressed unconscious. We suggest that contemporary psychoanalysis has succeeded in so obscuring the issues that a consistent policy may no longer be envisaged.

Marxist.

Francis H. Bartlett.

The purpose of this article is to show the relation between Freudian psychology and Marxist philosophy. Like the Adlerians, the Marxists claim that they are in a position to free the mind from the harmful effects of the repressed unconscious. We seek to show that their policy cannot alone effect the desired results.

Samuel Schmalhausen.

In the course of this article the Marxist position is again examined from another angle.
Aurel Kolnai.

In 1921, Kolnai attempted to inter-relate psychoanalysis and sociology. His work is interesting in that it gives us a straightforward attitude to repression, as the opposite of self-critical judgment. "Repression," he says, "...is far from being a final settlement of anti-social wishes. It merely carries them forward to account without destroying them..."

He rightly discovers "that purely individual psychological categories are solely explicable through their relationships to the environing community." Psychoanalysis has been led "to recognise the existence of an intimate mutual determinism between individual and society;"

Kolnai makes an interesting point. Under conditions of repression, a private wish may still be retained without interfering to any extent with social relationships. "We know, indeed," he says, "that persons can collaborate even when they have sharp differences upon matters of feeling, and upon matters of opinion." In a primitive community, "solidarity cannot tolerate any hostile acts (thoughts) that stand so close to realisation." The expression of anti-social wishes would imply anarchy and atomisation; the social organisation is inelastic; solidarity, therefore, represses any such expression. But a social organisation on the primitive type of solidarity holds the community in the grip of what Briffault calls "custom-thought" and/

'Aurel Kolnai, "Psychoanalysis and Sociology" p.59.
'Robert Briffault, "The Making of Humanity" Chapter V.
and progress is resulting slow. New ideas are an extreme rarity.

Although Kolnai does not specifically draw the deduction, there would appear reason to think that there would be a distinct advantage from the standpoint of evolutionary process if anti-social wishes were internally controlled. This would make possible a relaxation of control by public opinion, and the individual would therefore be freed to think independently of the rest of the community, and the prime condition of social progress could then be fulfilled, viz., the application of rational thought to the environment - this, of course, at the expense of the looking up of certain trends of thinking, and rendering inaccessible large tracts of the psychic organisation.

Kolnai then proceeds to make a further interesting statement. The problem of the primitive community was to prevent the appearance of anti-social trends in overt behaviour. They had to discover means of maintaining extensive dissociations in the individual mind. The group hit on a very simple method of effecting its purpose. It was forbidden that any mention of the anti-social wishes should be made: dissociation was effected by dint of seeing that no associations were formed between the disturbing tendencies and ideas which were acceptable to the life of the social group. Provided there was no public discussion of a subject, the mind of the individual would be uncultivated in respect of that subject. They adopted the policy/
policy of leaving the inhibited wishes "wholly undiscussed", and therefore undisturbed. The anti-social wishes could not even be formulated. The primitive wishes would form a kind of "Sally" personality without her "eyes open", with this difference, that whereas "Sally" was fairly well organised on a primitive level, the forbidden wishes of the primitive would never have had the opportunity for organisation. It is interesting to note that in our present-day sex education, we adopt precisely this policy of preventing the formation of associations with the impulses which we wish to eliminate.

According to Kolnai, then, modern society repeats the method of the primitive in dealing with socially unacceptable tendencies. But he does not consider that this is desirable, stating that "sexual evolution lags behind the general progress of civilisation". He considers that the function of psychoanalysis is to lead to the sex instinct being placed under "self-critical judgment". Psychoanalysis he describes as a "powerful international spiritual movement."

This was written in 1921. Psychoanalysts to-day would not seem to be quite as certain that psychoanalysis may be regarded as having a social programme. Explicitly or implicitly, they appear to be of the opinion that the attempt to resolve the repressed unconscious by raising the conflicts to the conscious level would destroy civilisation, this despite a certain amount of/

1 Morton Prince, "The Dissociation of a Personality" Chapter VI. 
of half-hearted propaganda in the direction of modifying the methods used in the nursery.

To Kolnai, then, repression is of environmental origin, and he considers that instinctual control by this method is a relic of the state of savagery. Instead of facing our desires, we leave them "wholly undiscussed." He sees a contingent use in repression since it internalises instinctual control, and therefore society can afford to tolerate a certain amount of private opinion. The suggestion is plausible, but history would not appear to bear out the theory. Culture, including a high degree of social organisation, was first attained without repression.

We might enquire if the theory holds in respect of civilised societies. Our answer is in the negative. Repression did not make rational thought possible, rather did it act in such a way as to delimit its application. The most we can say is that rational thought was not entirely incompatible with the existence of the repressed unconscious.

But Kolnai is right in suggesting that society cannot afford the continuance of control of an impulse by leaving it wholly undiscussed, even though the mind is rendered proof against its deeper layers being disturbed by the existence of no less august a body than the Freudian Superego.

The superego, to Kolnai, by implication, represents a force/

1 See section on Pre-Dynastic Egypt, thesis p. 357.
force which maintains our race in a state of savagery, psychic control being effected by leaving certain impulses wholly undiscussed. He rightly inveighs against the status quo of the civilised mind. Rational thought is the only method of individual control which is compatible with our attaining our full stature as members of a race which has taken upon itself the title of homo sapiens.
In 1938, Francis H. Bartlett published a book entitled "Sigmund Freud: a Marxist Essay". Writing from the viewpoint of a Marxist, like Schmalhausen he sees in repression the effect of a social disease. Concepts such as the bourgeoisie and the proletariat are found throughout his work. He does not go into detail in showing how capitalist society produces neurosis and other harmful phenomena in the human mind. His main position seems to be that Freudianism is irrelevant in the understanding of human life in its entirety. He does not deny the facts to which Freud would draw our attention, but considers that the theories based on these facts are imaginative creations, the result of an inadequate philosophy of human life.

Bartlett gives us an excellent and comprehensive statement of Freudian psychology, and appears to have a full knowledge of Freudian literature. He contends, however, that Freud is in the fangs of the "melancholy mechanism of the nineteenth century bourgeoisie". "Bourgeois" he says, "is the correct term by which to designate a thinker whose point of view is essentially the same as that of an active practising capitalist."

The psychologist under the dominance of bourgeois thinking sees human nature from the same myopic and limited standpoint. He looks for mechanisms by which to explain an individual's reactions/
reactions to the existing system. That system is the psychologist's reality, and to him the problem is to discover why the neurotic or other ill-adapted individual is prevented from taking his place as an effective member of a capitalist community. His presuppositions will lead him to seek for the explanation of ill-adapted conduct in some hidden departure from the norm. Beneath the surface phenomena are the potentialities of normality. He will adopt as a working theory that behind experience is a natural man, with certain definite trends and impulses. There will be an "ineradicable animal nature" which, however, is capable of being readjusted to outer reality. Thus, says Bartlett, "the essential development is determined not in a social milieu, but almost exclusively from within... The natural man is always with us, whatever the social influences." "Freud's affinity to Hobbes is astonishingly close."

In his chapter on the animal nature of man, Bartlett states that when Freud cannot account for the child's development in mere terms of the unfolding of an ineradicable original nature, he has to fill in "the gaps in individual truth with prehistoric truth", this the result of his having no adequate conception of the societal forces on which the child's development or maldevelopment depends.

To Freud, "the id can produce varying social expressions without itself changing.... The mental representatives of the id, both/

both in the conscious and the unconscious, may vary, but that
which they represent, the id itself, is in the fullest sense of
the word immutable'....The bourgeois point of view leads inevit-
ably to a separation within the person between the biological
and the social, the hereditary and the environmental. In
Freud, it has led to the separation between the instincts and
their mental representatives, between the 'sexual function' and the
'social training'. "The ego is a surface modification of the
id, which does not transform the rest of the id.'"

Bartlett then goes on to suggest how, in a capitalist
society, the child is thrust into a system of inherent contra-
dictions, economic, social, intellectual, and emotional. "The
child is as incapable of dealing with them as the bourgeoisie is
of dealing with economic crisis." The difficulties spring from
an antagonism which grows up between husband and wife in a
patriarchal society. The wife has an inferior status, but
according to the patriarchal norm, she should love her husband
"romantically". "The bourgeois family is...a focal point for
the contradictions of capitalism." The family also "in some
ways...contradicts the system of which it is a part." Bartlett
goes into no detail in order to substantiate his position as to
the influence of the capitalist system upon the mind of the child.

Bartlett then considers class society in relation to the
superego. He refers to Freud's "exasperated determination to
get/

get society in somehow." The superego, according to Freud, contains traditional and age-long values, but since, as Bartlett points out, the superego is formed before the age of five, it is difficult to understand how traditional values are transmitted. "Freud," he says, "simply asserts that the father is the embodiment of social tradition." Bartlett follows the descriptions of Freudians of the superego in the young child, and in its later developments, and states that he is forced to the conclusion that "the superego is a hypocritical moral standard enforced by irrational authority. We may well ask," he goes on to say, "if such a region of the personality is a permanent feature in human beings." He sees in the superego a "function" of capitalist society. The ability of the fictions bound up with the superego to "maintain the established social relations intact... is the ultimate criterion of their truth" to the psychologist who is steeped in the bourgeoisie ideology. "The whole organisation of an exploiting society, the very conditions of existence, the contradictions and confusions, all make for the development and acceptance of false conceptions of reality." And to-day, he thinks, there is even a greater need from the standpoint of the possessors to "redouble" their "efforts to confuse the issues, since intellectual clarity is one condition of successful proletarian revolution."
Bartlett next enquires as to what becomes of the repressed impulse of hostility which is the concomitant of the child's forced acceptance of the parental authority. According to Freud, he says, it is turned upon the self, as the punitive component of the superego, causing an irrational sense of guilt, with a resulting "unconscious need for punishment" tormenting the ego on account of "mere evil intentions", and in many cases driving the individual to the committing of immoral or criminal actions. But, adds Bartlett, "the hypocritical morality and the undisposed of hostility, are bound up inextricably with the patriarchal authority of the father, interwoven with the savage categorical imperative of Puritanism, and altogether set in a matrix of exploiting class relations."

He states that in the Soviet Union, the family situation which in our society gives rise to the superego system, is fast disappearing. There, "the moral code is not an irrational, impossible, categorical imperative. It is a guide to human relations. Its function is to reveal and make conscious, not to conceal, the real relationships. Under such circumstances, sex does not have to be repressed in favour of a fictitious purity. Hostility does not have to masquerade in saintly garb. Aggressive impulses which may be produced coincide with reason. Hate is directed towards those things which are hateful. No subterranean hostile urges need be turned against the individual himself. Aggressive impulses are directed from persons to things. No irrational/"

irrational sense of guilt, no hyper-moral hypocritical substitute for social conscience, need arise."

Bartlett does indeed give us a picture of an ideal society. How far this is realised, even in part, in Soviet Russia, is another matter. He bases his statements on a book entitled, "Russia, Youth, and the Present-day World", by Dr. Frankwood Williams, who, however, according to Bartlett, "was never able completely to rid himself of the conception that the complexes of infancy are invariable traits belonging to the nature of man."

We suggest that there is a reason why Dr. Williams still found evidence for the belief as to undesirable factors in the child mind, even in Soviet Russia. Of course, it can be claimed that there has been no time for any fundamental re-organisation of the mentality of Russian people, in a period covering less than two decades. Unwin is probably right in his claim that it takes a hundred years to make any profound modification in the human psyche. But we suggest that there are other reasons for suspecting that the Soviet Union has not ushered in a new regime of perfected methods in dealing with young children. The whole system would seem to be infected with the disease which Tawney describes in his "Acquisitive Society". The emphasis is still placed on productiveness, and the individual is regarded as a means for bringing into existence/

* Op. cit., p.120.
existence a "wealthy" society, even though that wealth is to be shared by all.

Throughout Bartlett's whole work, there is no reference to the sensitive child nature against which the "crimes" of the bourgeoisie are directed. There must the emphasis be placed; in the soul of the child, the alive educator will see the end to which all activities are subservient. Equally with Freud, Bartlett's attention is rivetted on non-essentials. Like Freud, he is under the dominance of materialistic preconceptions of existence bred within that society which we call civilised. Dispose of the evils arising from the asceticism brought into existence within our modern society by the Puritan; destroy the last vestige of that capitalist system which has spread itself over the face of the world as a consequence of the industrial revolution: the human mind will still contain within itself the virus introduced when civilisation assumed the proportions of a vast societal organisation. The essential tragedy of the last six millenniums is that the emphasis has been placed on things rather than on human values. The human soul has been measured by what it possesses rather than by what it is. The Soviet system would still seem to place the emphasis on possessions, even though these are to be owned communally. Russia appears to be largely actuated by the closed system of the superego. If society is to be changed, our attention must be fixed on human nature for its own sake.

Bartlett/
Bartlett insists, and on the whole rightly, that much which passes for human nature is a malformation, a psychic artifact, brought into existence by conditions which may be subjected to fundamental modification. But he is wrong in drawing the conclusion that the "natural man" is a figment of the imagination. To him, human nature is entirely dependent on cultural tradition. Such tradition he regards as the cause of the forms which human nature takes in this, or any other, type of community. But if we are to attain to a correct perspective when considering the problem of re-creating human nature, we must realise that cultural tradition should not be regarded as the cause of human development, but merely as the occasion. We must, in short, form a conception of "homo" as having intrinsic qualities which are peculiarly his own.

Bartlett has shown that the natural man of Freud is unnatural, but all unwittingly he has substituted a conception of human nature which is equally unnatural. The task still remains to discover the nature, qualities, and potentialities of man as he is.

Repression, says Bartlett, is evil: it is not a function of cultural process. Indeed, repression leads to the formation of the superego, an institution which is a decided dysfunction of cultural process.

So far, Bartlett is right, but when we enquire what are his suggestions for effecting changes in civilised mentality, we discover/

'Cf. E.J.D. Radclyffe, "Magic and Mind" p. 83.'
discover that he is to all intents and purposes superego-
determined in his viewpoint. The individual would still seem
to exist for the State, not the State for the individual.
Samuel D. Schmalhausen.

Schmalhausen, in "The New Road to Progress", seeks to place the phenomena of repression in their wider societal setting. As in "The New Generation", he pleads his cause with great eloquence, and the impression is left that we are in the presence of a partisan. We have the suspicion, however, that Schmalhausen neither takes himself nor his subject altogether seriously.

In his introduction, he sets forth his position. "Communism" he says, "is the one adequate psychotherapy, social sanity being a prerequisite of individual sanity. We should aim at a "mens sana in societates sana".

He speaks of "the major neurosis called competitive acquisitive capitalism" and states that Freudianism will itself be cured by Marxism. Facism, he asserts, represents cultural regression. He states that, in accordance with the Freudian view, "man's instincts are bad, sadistic, destructive.....There is no help for it," and the "patently reactionary and regressive character of this thinking is richly in evidence in the bourgeois human nature sciences." The human mind bred under our present system has paranoid mechanisms. He speaks of our "inferiority haunted state of mind" and a "compulsion to seek some object on which to pin one's indignation."

"Rivalrous hate," he tells us, is the "unsolved misery of personal frustration." He speaks of our "psychopathic ceremonials of/

'S.D. Schmalhausen, "The New Road to Progress" p.16.  
Op.cit., p.16.'
of joy, symbolising the triumph of the ego bathed in delusions of grandeur: the flooding back of ego elation and the sense of importance, the hated rival reduced to submission and ignominy, vanquished, destroyed."

"By means as foul as the occasion requires, the paranoid mechanism of the balked mind strikes at the enemy (within the brain) by a technique of vengeance as vicious as it is compulsive, over-compensating for a gnawing sense of inadequacy that threatens to destroy the brain's equilibrium, since self-regard has been so wounded and rebuffed as to endanger the social integration of the mind, its consolatory vanity, and self-approval." Italy and Germany, he states, are illustrations of this.

The new psychology, he informs us, can only trace back our neurotic tendencies to the home, where "parents have the divine right to mutilate" our "personality on behalf of their own semi-demented taboos and values. The largest social unit that modern psychology and psychiatry studies for therapeutic purposes, is the family."

But, he says, "beyond the family, around and beneath it, are forces, relations, determinants, that must themselves be studied first before the unit called the family which surely lives with a hot and urgent context of historic and cultural reality, not merely as a static specimen in a psychoanalyst's glass jar, can be/

be understood adequately."

It is, he says, the "economic and social pathology of our age that draws in its train of disintegration the little band of victims called the family.... Social revolution, therapeutically envisaged, is the most intelligent method available for lifting the repressed and ego-dwarfed masses from their inferior and servile status."

He is not afraid of the inevitable logic of the doctrine of non-repression which must lead to the acceptance of incest as no more blameworthy than other means of sexual gratification. "Incest," he says, "is natural innocence viewed by strange compulsive logic as most unnatural guilt."

Schmalhausen is not impressed with the pessimism of the Freudians. He believes that human nature is capable of illimitable modification "under new incentives and appropriate social conditions." Freud and McDougall, he asserts, regard human nature as inherently pre-determined, and goes on to state that the former "dodges sex and the latter outlaws it." He, Schmalhausen, is willing to carry Freudian doctrine to its logical conclusions, even to the point of accepting incest as normal, but he believes that the abolition of the deleterious effects of sex repression on human life can only be brought about by modifying the entire social milieu in which the family is placed. Through the institution of a thoroughgoing communism, and by that means only, can mankind be again set on the road to progress.

Schmalhausen/


Schmalhausen does not regard repression as being a determinant of cultural process, rather does he view it as a disease of civilisation. Change the social organism, he says, and the human mind will rediscover normality.

The present writer is by no means satisfied with Schmalhausen's panacea for human psychic ills. Rather would we assert that the human mind is sick because it has, to a greater or lesser extent, failed to use reason as the supreme arbiter when psychic difficulties have arisen. Nay, more: it has been definitely conditioned not to use reason in adapting itself to the more significant parts of its environment. Social revolution or no social revolution, the forces of psychic inertia will cause the mind to remain in its comatose condition unless the educator adequately diagnoses the malady, and thereupon takes the necessary steps for effecting a cure.

There is one solution, we suggest, and only one, the deliberate arousal of conceptual process in relation to the prejudices and preconceptions of which we have the misfortune to be the possessors. Civilisation's disease is the partial paralysis of rational thought: the cure, the application of a thoroughgoing rationalism to all aspects of our experience. The task which lies to hand need not be postponed till after the social revolution.
Freudians with Special Viewpoints.

J. T. McCurdy.

In this article we follow a Freudian statement on repression and sublimation. Especially do we attempt to show the sheer inadequacy of the Freudian when approaching problems of child education.

H. Banister.

This article deals with the views of a non-medical psychologist, who holds the Freudian viewpoint. It is suggested that implicitly he accepts the superego mechanism as normal and desirable. Reference is made to his views on the high intelligence of the young child.

R. Money-Kyrle.

The purpose of this article is to study a Freudian attempt to propound a policy by which the evil effects of repression may be lessened without sacrificing those cultural advantages which, according to Freudian theory, accrue from repression. The difficulties of the Freudian reformer are demonstrated.
John T. McCurdy.

McCurdy is a psychopathologist who departs but little from the orthodox Freudian position. Instead of a real Oedipus complex, based on actual conflict within the home, he substitutes what he describes as "an imago", an "idealised imagined parent rather than the real one!" We mention this as evidence that Freudians themselves are by no means convinced that at all times they are dealing with realities.

McCurdy tones down the notion of infantile sexuality, considering that because the child has no physiological capacity for sexual relations, the "genital stage cannot be reached at this period." One has the suspicion that McCurdy is taking considerable liberties with the foundation stones of the Freudian edifice.

From our personal observation of young children during early school days, we are by no means convinced that McCurdy's amendment of Freudian psychology is sound. Children do appear to attain the genital level during the pre-school period. However, according to McCurdy, "the Oedipus complex is not an unconscious memory but an unconscious fabrication." But he considers that the individual has "a tendency" to form the concept, at least this is a useful hypothesis; and he adds: "A materialistic minded reader may be shocked by the suggestion that anything can he held to exist which is recognised simply as an hypothesis to explain certain phenomena." McCurdy, suggesting that an analogy may/ 

may make his point clearer, then says: "I venture to state that the evidence for the Oedipus complex as a tendency is more easily demonstrable than that for the existence of the gill tendency in the human body." We cannot see how the "materialistic minded reader" is in any enlightened by the analogy. The gill theory can at least summon in its favour a long chain of facts gathered by those who propounded the theory of evolution. At what point in our racial past the Oedipus tendency came into use, and for what purpose, and for what reason the fully developed Oedipus complex shrunk into a mere tendency, it is impossible to imagine.

From what we know of contemporary primitives, there seems no evidence that they have a special hate of the father and an incestuous fixation on the mother. Malinowski's Trobriand Islanders laughed at the notion that anyone could entertain erotic feelings for his mother. Primitive man appears to have been peaceful and had not, it seems, a great font of repressed father hate which required to be displaced on to surrogates.

We do not dispute the right of a psychiatrist to adopt any hypothesis, as a means of systematising the phenomena towards which his attention is directed, but it is absurd to imagine that the hypothesis of the Oedipus-complex-forming tendency can be rationally applied in other fields of study. According to McCurdy/ 'Op. cit., p.95. 'Bronislaw Malinowski, "Sex and Repression in Savage Society" p.95.
McCurdy himself, the most significant concept of psychoanalysis is an unconscious fabrication, and it would seem that the whole psychic superstructure built on this fabrication is likely to be equally foolish and removed from the world of reality.

McCurdy refers to the suckling as a pure egoist, "a kind of parasite who depends for his maintenance on the maternal host or nurse." Roheim discovers in flea-catching one of the primary sources of culture. McCurdy goes one better in describing the child as of the same nature as the creature to whom, indirectly, according to Roheim, we owe a great deal of those things which we value most. We can only remark how far the psychotherapist who is immersed in Freudianism is removed from a sane, rational and humane attitude to young children.

On the same page, we are met with another statement which is somewhat surprising. McCurdy says that "we are....still learning to distinguish between thoughts and things, between thoughts that are pure imaginations and thoughts that duplicate actual or potential experience. The child or savage has progressed but a little way on this latter road, hence the behaviour of either towards a pure imagination may be identical with his behaviour towards the material environment." As far as we know, no responsible present-day anthropologist would bear out this statement in respect of the savage - any savage who did not distinguish between his imaginings and the material environment would be quickly eliminated. The savage's imaginings are supplementary/

'Geza Roheim, "The Riddle of the Sphinx" p.204.
supplementary to his practical life, and when it comes to serious business, he is far more efficient than the majority of civilised individuals.

As for the child, McCurdy's statement is in no way borne out by facts. We have quoted Banister's opinion of the intelligence of the child on another page of this thesis, and on the basis of knowledge derived from the study of our own child, we are quite definite in asserting that Philip, at the age of three-and-a-half, has a very clear conception as to the difference between "real" things and "pretend" things. His mother recently enquired of him if his "teddy" were real. The reply was an emphatic "No." But when asked the same question in respect of Sheila, the dog, the child answered in the affirmative. The writer enquired of the child whether, when he grew up, he was going to have a school like Daddy. He replied that he had one already, but added that it was "only a pretend one." Instances of this kind could be multiplied indefinitely.

McCurdy then states the theory that, "if the health of an organism be in any way affected, the first functions to be altered will be those of most recent acquisition," and that the alteration will be in the direction of reinstatement of more primitive functions. In neurology, McCurdy tells us, this tendency is called "devolution", but in psychoanalytical theory it is described as "regression", and he adds that "whenever imaginations are not utilised in planning, but become an end in themselves/

themselves, regression has taken place." The sane adult has relapsed to the level of the child or the savage. And later, we read: "Sanity and insanity are, roughly speaking, states where progressive or regressive thinking rule. The essence of a functional psychosis is a flight from reality to a retreat of easeful unreality."

Speaking of infantile sexuality, McCurdy tells us: "There is no lawful, direct sex outlet in childhood, so such tendencies must be repressed to the unconscious where the instinct continues to grow until it can gain outlet in adult life." We have no fault to find with McCurdy's statement as to fact, but why the "must"? Psychoanalysis is surely without function, at least in its scientific aspect, unless it enables us to obtain a clearer and more humane view of the young child struggling to bring into order his impulses. May we be pardoned the use of rather forcible language when we say that McCurdy tends to see in the child a miniature lunatic, not a perfectly sane human being with easily injured feelings, with the beginnings of an ethical sense, with nascent aesthetic appreciations, and most of all with a longing for truth. The statement that impulses "must" be repressed, when applied to the young child as a member of a household where the parents are acutely aware of the nature of the sensitive little being who, for a time, is committed to their care, appears harsh, and, we may say, almost blasphemous.

Referring in a later chapter to regression, McCurdy says that/

that in certain psychoses, the patient falls back into free associational thinking, that is, in accordance with McCurdy's earlier statements, the child is characterised by this form of thinking. Nothing is further from the truth. The child, from a very early age, is concerned with adapting means to realise ends of felt value. His thinking is purposive. Moreover, his desire for knowledge is essentially logical. In our view, if the insane had regressed to the child's way of thinking, they would make an immediate and complete recovery. But according to McCurdy, the child is already complex-ridden. He has within him tendencies to murder and incest. These must be repressed. The child, however, is not called upon to deal consciously with these impulses, the crimes to which they would lead being "unbiological", and kindly Nature, mindful of her own, performs the psychic operation of repression without either the intervention of the parents or of the child himself. Parents, knowing this, have good reason for supposing that there is a possibility that Nature may, on occasion, be a little forgetful, and the child may at any moment be transformed into a criminal lunatic. What a dreadful inheritance we carry with us! The old-time doctrine of original sin was mild compared with the phantasmagoria emanating from the minds of contemporary psychiatrists.

We conclude this section by a brief reference to McCurdy's views on sublimation. The child, on the eve of his passing through/ 

through the humanising process of sublimation, has already developed attachments to his parents, but presumably, as these affectionate relations become strengthened, the child finds himself involved in a process which, if continued, would lead to incest. According to what McCurdy has already said, a biological mechanism is brought into effect, and the incestuous attachment is drawn into the unconscious. The repressed then "tends to come into consciousness in a distorted form, the sublimation." It seems that the incestuous tendency was "sexual and selfish", but it gains "a substitutive outlet". He gives as an instance of this the woman who devotes her life to nursing. What she really wants is physical contact with father or brother, but without herself knowing the reason why, she accepts a substitute activity. "At the same time," continues McCurdy, "and this is the important point - the objective interest primarily directed within the family is turned to strangers, or towards society as a whole." This, leading to the process of sublimation, must include a "union of selfish and social tendencies in some activity which is a substitute for more primitive and selfish ones." As far as we can see, in the case of the socialisation process described above, the interest in strangers and society as a whole is just as sexual and selfish as when the same impulses were directed towards individuals within the family.

McCurdy then proceeds to apply his conception of sublimation to/
to "the sublimation of war, where originally repressed cruelty is allowed outlet to the soldier, and applauded by society, because it now serves a social end." We have questioned soldiers who took part in the Great War. From a description of their mental attitude when engaged in killing others, we fail to see that the ordinarily repressed impulses had attained an admixture of sociality despite the applause of society.

McCurdy would appear to think that the sublimation processes as described by Rank and Jung are of an inferior order to his own, for, "the symbol stands for something physical, or at most a circumscribed concept, something which is purely selfish; the sublimation on the other hand is a substitution of a higher, more social activity, for one which originally had in it merely the elements of potential altruism." We again contemplate his illustration of the "sublimation of war".

We now go a stage further. "If we look on sublimations as socialised childish objectivation", he says, "we can see how adult sex interests, culminating in marriage, are really to be grouped with them....Psychological analysis demonstrates these adult objects to be surrogates for the earlier recipients of the affection." And to complete the proof, he adds that psychotic patients declare that those whom they thought they had loved were really substitutes for their parents, or other members of the family.

We suggest that if what McCurdy has stated is true, the psychotics/
psychotics alone are sane. They at least know with whom they are in love.

We submit that here we find the reductio ad absurdum of the whole Freudian doctrine of sublimation. McCurdy, despite his belief that he is dealing with factors bearing on the lives of children and normal adults, is but moving within the closed system of the psychotic disposition. We have shown the inadequacy of his views as to the facts of child nature. We have perceived the crassness of his theory of the development of higher interests. And we ended by noting the extraordinary absurdity of the view that married relationships have, as their essential basis, attachments to persons with whom the partners do not happen to be married. We are reminded of the music-hall situation in which the person of feeble mentality denies relationship with his partner on the grounds that she is "only his wife."
H. Banister.

The writings of Dr. Banister are chiefly of interest to us in that they represent the views of a non-medical psychologist. In the main, he seems to accept the tenets of the orthodox Freudian, but in the course of his discussion he raises several interesting points.

Early in his work on "Psychology and Health", we discover the following: "It is not generally realised how intelligent the normally endowed child is. I believe he is often, in fact, more intelligent at the age of five or six than he will be ten years later when his intellectual growth may have been cramped by incorrect methods of teaching." And he adds: "Within his limitations, he is frequently the most intelligent member of his household, and has usually considerable logical ability."

The present writer can bear this out by a reference to a recent incident in connection with his three-and-a-half year old boy. A motorist had run out of petrol, and he called to enquire if he could borrow a sufficient quantity to see him on to the next petrol pump. There being no free petrol on the premises, petrol was drawn off from the autovac of our own car. Philip was an interested spectator of this operation. Before allowing the motorist to take away the petrol, the car engine was started on the drop of petrol which was still in the carbur-ettor, in order to make certain that sufficient petrol was drawn up/

"H. Banister, "Psychology and Health" p.33."
up into the autovac for immediate purposes when the car was
next required for use. The petrol drawn for the passing
motorist was still available if the carburettor required to be
refilled before the autovac was sufficiently replenished.

Several hours later, Philip surprised his parents by the
following enquiry: "Daddy, were you trying to see if the car
would start without petrol?" Philip had observed that the
autovac had been emptied, and not knowing the principle of this
piece of mechanism, he put forward a perfectly intelligent
hypothesis. That he was not entirely satisfied with his
hypothesis was proved by his later referring the matter to his
father. Six hours had elapsed since the incident, during which
time his scientific curiosity had remained active. Given a
fair chance, it is suggested that the young child will be able
to solve his emotional problems without resorting to the
intellectual legerdemain which, if Freud is to be believed, goes
into the formation of the superego.

Dr. Banister draws the correct conclusion as to the
immediate effects of irrational treatment as applied to the
child. When frustrated, the child will expect a logical explana-
tion, and if this is not given, resentment will be felt. "This
is one step towards the formation of a sentiment of hatred in
however mild a form.... In consequence, he will become, with
frequent repetitions of the frustrations, morose and non-
co-operative, and when opportunity offers he will manifest more
active/
active forms of non-co-operation.' And, we may add, if the child has adopted this attitude, there is little chance of his again being in the position to resolve his emotional difficulties. We suggest that repressions will be a thing of the past just as soon as we are able and willing to treat the child as a rational being.

Dr. Banister gives practical advice in respect of early education. He states that "the child must be helped through his various stages, not delayed in any, or frightened out of them." And he adds that, "his questions as to the origin of babies are but one more example of his curiosity, and should be answered frankly......Any thwarting of natural curiosity is almost bound to defeat its object."

Banister thus assumes the role of reformer, giving guidance on problems of child rearing. He thinks it desirable that a definite course of prophylaxis should be undertaken. In "Psychology and Health" he is not only demonstrating how faulty psychological attitudes lead to psychic ill health, but he is assuming the role of educator enunciating principles which, if put into practice, will ensure that the future individual will be free from psychological disturbances. He would initiate a campaign aiming at building up in our midst a new generation free from limitations such as he describes when he refers to the neurotic, the over religious, and the statistically normal.

It follows from this that the ultimate aim of all educators is to bring up children who are free from such limitations. This can be achieved by understanding the child's mind, by providing appropriate opportunities for learning, and by creating an environment that fosters growth and development. It requires patience, insight, and a genuine interest in the growth of the individual.

It is a psychological truism that no end will be energetically sought unless those who are seeking it have confidence that what they wish to realise is possible, that by adopting certain means there is a high degree of certainty that the desired results will be forthcoming. But Banister holds out but a faint hope of our ever re-creating human nature in accordance with the ideal which he implicitly outlines, for he says: "There is, and must probably always be, a large amount of repression just as the psychoanalysts maintain, since all conflicts are not capable of solution; and these repressed sentiments, or complexes, will have their own expression, and will affect the character and behaviour." Not only so, but the campaigner who enlists under his banner will be influenced by a gnawing sense of doubt. Banister accepts the Freudian doctrine, stating that "many...think that all that is best and highest culturally and morally in human life is the outcome of repression". And later he states: "If the energy (derived from a repressed complex) is led away through useful channels, we get 'sublimation', all that is best and highest in life." Then, specifically stating his own opinion, he says: "A very large number of symptoms and sublimations arise in this way (through endopsychic conflict) and in the realm, perhaps more especially, of creative art and social reform, the drive behind many of the most forceful individuals does originate from repressed urges."

He/

He further adds: "In fact, it is almost axiomatic that all new discoveries are the outcome of conflict, and in the sciences particularly, of conscious conflict."

The corollary is evident. Take away those conditions on which repressions depend, and the individual may be deprived of urges towards creative art, social reform, and also those qualities which go towards ensuring success in contemporary society - we refer to qualities of forcefulness; and also the implication is that the urge to scientific discovery will be diminished if repressions are abrogated.

We suggest that the position of our campaigner is equivocal, or, to use the psychological term, ambivalent. There is little likelihood that he will be effective in the task of reforming society.

Banister even discovers a new use for the inferiority complex, a psychic component which is generally deprecated both from the standpoint of individual happiness and that of effective social relations. The possessor of such a complex is usually regarded as being inclined to moroseness, "superego-ridden" and in general requiring the attention of the psychological specialist. But Banister is not afraid of being unconventional. "Whatever the cause," he says, "most individuals have a more or less strongly developed 'inferiority complex'. The individual who had none would be a most objectionable person socially, though he might go far in his business or professional career."

Once/

Once again we suggest a corollary. The parent must see to it that the child has a due proportion of "inferiority complex" instilled into his psychic organism. Our campaigner, we would imagine, would be subject to feelings of discouragement when he realised that his non-repressionist policy should not be too thoroughgoing, otherwise the child may become "a most objectionable person socially."

Banister is thus an example of a writer who inveighs against repression and yet, on account of Freudian presuppositions, leaves those to whom he addresses himself in a position of doubt. Repression is to be understood as an evil, but it also leads to the highest things in human life. The person without an inferiority complex will be an objectionable person, and therefore it may be inferred that a person without repressions will be objectionable.
Money-Kyrle is a writer of the Freudian school, but he is distinguished in attempting to find a practical solution for the quandary in which, according to psychoanalysis, man finds himself. On the whole, he is cautious in suggesting remedies, and has before his mind the full significance of the repressive systems as understood by Freudians. He does not actually envisage a state of things in which no superego exists, but like the practising psychoanalyst in his relations to his patients, he thinks it might be possible to modify the superego in all individuals by control exercised at the time of its formation.

Flügel writes an introduction in which he states that the morality of the superego is archaic. It has included in it a strong element of cruelty, which is "the most unsocial and devastating of our pleasures - whether it is directed against ourselves or against our fellow-men."

Money-Kyrle would seek to control, from a quantitative standpoint, the aggressiveness which finds its way into the superego. Though sublimation of aggressiveness is satisfactory, it is not practicable unless present methods of education are changed sufficiently to re-direct the aggressive tendency into social channels. Something must be done to lessen the amount, or part of the aggressiveness will act in a harmful manner by being/

being incorporated within the superego. He sees the root cause of aggressiveness in frustration, of which it is "a natural and inevitable reaction." His problem, then, is, how may we set about reducing the amount of frustration in the life of the young child? Frustration, he suggests, is today chiefly in connection with the imposition of taboos connected with sex, these leading to "some of the fiercest aggression... breeding resentment."

He reminds himself, however, that in accordance with the Freudian doctrine to which he himself subscribes, there is a strong probability that all culture is due to the repression of the sex impulse, but adds that repression has certain disadvantages, as our capacity for sublimation is limited, and as a result repression is responsible for neuroses and "corresponding diseases of the body politic."

His problem would therefore seem to be, how to retain culture and yet prevent the harmful effects of repression, both desirable and undesirable features of human life springing from the same source, ultimately from the frustration of the child's desires. He then makes an extremely pertinent criticism of psychoanalysts, saying that they have "taken little trouble to discuss the ethical implications of their own discoveries in recent years" and "they have been looked upon as unprogressive by the more advanced reformers." And he goes on to say that, "since/

"since human destiny is determined by innumerable factors, some vital influence may well have been neglected."

"Psychoanalysis", he tells us, "has shown that depression and discontent are derivatives of hate. Therefore, a Utopia in which happiness and contentment predominate must be a society based on universal love. This is a familiar description of the Golden Age of the past or future." He proceeds to trace back aggressiveness to a hypothetical stage in man's development, when he was a member of a primal horde. The largest ape-man forbade sex-expression in the weaker members, thereby giving rise to aggressiveness. He suggests, however, that in those days, the situation was mitigated by the acceptance by the weaker males of the pleasures of passive homo-sexuality. This led to stability in the group.

Aggressiveness was thus first prohibited by an outside authority. In the days of primitive man, the prohibition was largely external, and even in the mediaeval age, the internalised factor was less at work than in contemporary man. He states that now "a precipitate of this authority" is set up within in the form of "a conscience or superego, and when aggressiveness is inhibited and unconscious, it is liable to be inverted against the self. In extreme cases, the resulting depression leads to suicide, that is, the murder of the self. But more often the inverted aggressiveness fuses with an inverted sexuality to form some neurotic/

neurotic symptom or masochistic perversion. Sometimes the masochism may be projected and enjoyed by proxy. In this way, the refined sadist whose sadism is not merely the expression of hate but of a pleasure in the vicarious enjoyment of pain, is developed. "Only extreme cases of these perversions are apparent to the ordinary observer, but the psychoanalyst has no difficulty in detecting them in a disguised form, in all the habits and institutions of mankind."

Thus, then, internalised aggressiveness pursues its destructive path in our midst. The pure Freudian, as Money-Kyrle reminds us, can envisage no solution for the impasse in which we discover ourselves. He tells us that Freud speaks of the "law of the indestructibility of hate", and is resultingly pessimistic. There is apparently, according to Freudian findings, "a certain fixed amount of aggression which can never be diminished."

Money-Kyrle at this point ventures to disagree with Professor Freud, stating that he thinks "that aggressiveness is the servant of other instincts," and thus has "no fixed amount." Phylogenetically, aggressiveness has a capacity for being transferred from one activity to another. At one time, it entered into the sex instinct proper, at other times it was used in overcoming the female and the driving off of rivals, and during the periods interspersing the rutting seasons, in the search after game.

Aggressiveness/

Aggressiveness, he contends, may be lessened by reducing frustration, frustration being, we may presume, merely another of the types of stimuli which may evoke the aggressive instinct. If this can be done, the psychoanalyst is "not confined to the recommendation of sublimations which he has no power of inducing anyone to adopt."

By reducing frustration, he may hope to "reduce the total aggressiveness of mankind." Society to-day is based on a repetition of the history of the primeval family. To-day, as of yore, we have the jealous old man who interdicts the sexuality of the sons. Frustration leads to hatred in the sons, which is partially diminished by their adopting an attitude of passive homosexuality to the father. There is a recurrence of their hate, and its transference to other groups, or its inversion towards themselves. The inverted hate once more breaks out in the form of sadism, which attaches itself undiscriminatingly to any external object. "These," says Money-Kyrle, "are the old themes which recur throughout our culture."

He now proceeds to discuss means of lessening frustration. During the oral phase, he thinks that perhaps thumb-sucking "can be gently discouraged without harm." In the case of cleanliness training, he considers that by showing more tolerance, we may leave the child to outgrow impulses which are considered undesirable. Onanistic activities may be similarly dealt/

dealt with. Thus will resentment be lessened.

As things are at present, "the various frustrations to which infants are subjected for their supposed good, by their mothers and nurses, have two far-reaching effects, namely, pre-genital fixations and ambivalence towards subsequent love-objects." He suggests that when we arrive at the stages of object-choice, we should remember that "the early loves of children are even more selfish and intense than those of their elders, and they are treated with less consideration."

We should not snub or punish children for exhibiting jealousy, otherwise the child will carry into later life a repressed hatred of parent figures. Sexual curiosity should also be treated tactfully. In regard to sexual play among young children, he points out what he regards as the evil results of the suppression of "naughty" activities, leaving behind "the dissociated and unfinished impulses of the infant and the child. His disappointments of later life are apt to reactivate those forgotten yearnings which, in so far as they are satisfied, give rise to neurotic symptoms or perversions, and in so far as they are frustrated to depression and discontent." In a footnote, he states that "sublimations also occur, but we are here concerned with the less desirable effects of repression."

He further criticises the undesirable effects of repression, stating that "moral intolerance is directly proportional to the normality of the impulse which it condemns."

"Morality/
"Morality", he tells us, "as usual, regards its own offspring with disgust and endeavours to repress that which it has itself produced."

We quote Money-Kyrle as a Freudian who has made some attempt to free himself from the fatalistic attitude of orthodox psychoanalysis. He at least asserts that there is not a fixed amount of aggressiveness to be expended in attacking the self or others. And what aggressiveness we have, being in part dependent on environmental conditions, is to some extent curable. But our racial prospect is still dreary. The horde father still dogs our steps and we shall have to be satisfied if future reports on the progress of humanity merely state that it is "as well as can be expected".

The educator, reading Money-Kyrle's book, would, we fear, receive little inspiration. Indeed, his contact with this slightly more optimistic member of the psychoanalytical group would, we feel, merely stir up morbid trends in his mind.

Money-Kyrle is right in insisting that psychoanalysis has social implications, and his methods of reform are soundly based. What he is unable to supply is the necessary confidence for the carrying out of his reforms - repression has also its desirable aspect, he says - and moreover his picture of the child is in accordance with Freudian preconceptions. What is vitally necessary is not so much that the parent should strive to act "ethically"/
"ethically" towards the child, but that the parent should see the child as itself ethically endowed. Otherwise, no reforms can be effective. If the child is so envisaged, the educator's morals may be left to take care of themselves. No one who understands a child will offend, but with the best intentions in the world, the educator will commit blunders unless he is able to love the simple humanity, the sensitivity of spirit, of those little ones who have within them all the potentialities of man as he may some day become. The child must be set in the midst.
Other Special Viewpoints.

J. D. Unwin.

To Unwin, implicitly at least, repression is the condition of cultural development. His position examined in light of our thesis that repression is not a determinant of cultural process.

Charles W. Hayward.

Hayward is a writer who emphasises that the situation in the home which gives rise to repression is intolerable from the standpoint of the norms of justice and truth. We accept his position, but suggest that the problem needs to be envisaged in a wider setting. The view is expressed that an attitude of ascribing blame to parents is harmful.

Fritz Künkel.

This article deals with a theory of repression to which we attach great value. In our view, Künkel's description of the effects of repression on cultural development is the best propounded to date. His position is that objectivity is in direct proportion to the degree of repression set up in the mind. We apply Künkel's findings to our theory of the ontogenesis of the superego.

Trigant Burrow.

In this article we see that Burrow considers that the repressed unconscious is due to the application in child education of irrational norms. On the basis of his findings, we describe how the superego is instituted in the mind of the child.
Dr. Unwin, throughout his volume on "Sex and Culture", maintains the thesis that the development of culture is dependent on the amount of continence which is imposed on sex expression outwith marital relations. He speaks only of compulsory continence, and at all times regards the individual as a unit in a social group whose behaviour is determined by the sanctions at work in that group. One of his most interesting statements is that it takes a hundred years before the full effect is felt of a change in the group attitude towards sexual expression. It is here that Unwin's theory may be linked up with the doctrine of repression. As far as we can see, he does not himself attempt to show how societal sanctions become so engrained in the minds of the individuals of a society that even after the sanctions are withdrawn, their effects continue for three generations. Unwin states that this is the case, and in support of his viewpoint he takes eighty separate peoples and seeks to demonstrate that in every case their degree of culture has a direct relation to the amount of continence insisted upon by the society.

It may be said in general that Unwin's method is descriptive rather than analytic, and when we come to the end of his work, we feel that we are in no better a position than when we started in respect of the understanding of the vital causative factors underlying cultural process. In a sense, on the basis of his findings, we/
we might feel that we are justified in predicting that the present undermining of taboos and the increase of prenuptial intercourse will lead to social decline, and yet it may well be that such expectations will not be fulfilled. Unwin has provided little more than a demonstration that in the past the increase or decrease of taboos has been followed by changes in the cultural life of a people. But so long as we are ignorant of the psychological laws which have given rise to variations in cultural attainment, we cannot be sure that the taboo was the really efficient cause of the resulting phenomena.

Dr. Unwin says: "I submit, therefore, that the limitation of the sexual opportunity must be regarded as the cause of the cultural advance." But is it not more likely that the real cause of cultural advance lies in those rational activities which are seemingly at work in most young children before they are influenced by the taboo system? If, as Freud says, much of the child's mind by the age of five is reduced to mechanism, and if on the workings of this mechanism depend those social phenomena which go under the name of sublimation, it is conceivable, indeed even probable, that the less opportunity the individual is given for overt sexual activity, the greater amount of energy will pass over into the repressed unconscious, and, in this way, find expression in cultural process. But it is by no means certain that the human intellect, if allowed to develop without having to encounter the wall of traditional negatives, would not find means of making direct/

direct use of sex energy through the ordinary process of sentiment formation.

It may be that Unwin would not rule out this possibility, but his reply would be that the "rational" method has not been tried. In this he is at one with the majority of Freudians. Our suggestion is that much of human development has, through all ages, proceeded on the lines of sentiment formation. At first sight, it might be thought that Unwin's theory would still hold even if this were the case. Minimise the amount of sexual energy expended in direct biological activity, and the more energy will be left over for other pursuits. But it must be remembered that Unwin's theory is implicitly bound up with the doctrine of repression. It is only after three generations, during which time repression has been internalised, that the human mind breaks forth in higher forms of social activity. Thus, according to Unwin, it may be concluded that the increased energy available for cultural process is due to an increase in the extent of the repressed unconscious, with an inevitable decrease in the amount of energy available for sentiment formation. It may thus be fairly said that Unwin's outbursts of energy are due to the process of sublimation. They are not the result of restraint at the conscious level, this, of course, involving conflict.

We would suggest that there are certain cases of extraordinary cultural advance for which Unwin's theory does not account/
account. As we shall point out later, there appears to have been an almost entire absence of sexual repression when the foundations of civilisation were laid both in Egypt and Crete. It is inconceivable that the emergent savages of these early days should have adopted attitudes totally dissimilar to the vast majority of food-gathering peoples. In each case the peoples were, it would seem, at the matriarchal stage of development; therefore, the husband's authority would be at a minimum. Though it is true that neither the Egyptians nor the Cretans ever spent time and energy on the building of temples, it is evident that in solid human progress their respective eras outstripped all others.

We have suggested that Unwin's theory is inadequate, because he does not show precisely how the limitation of sexual opportunity creates repression. His only complaint against those conditions which, according to his statements, have produced the highest types of development, is that they have been dependent on the virtual enslavement of women and children. This he considers intolerable, but he is quite willing to envisage a new type of society in which we shall reduce sexual opportunity to the minimum, and by this means the world may witness outbursts of cultural energy which will transform and revolutionise every aspect of human life. Implicitly, he wishes to extend the repressed unconscious until almost all our energy drives are mechanistically determined, little energy being/

being left for direct sentiment formation.

If Unwin had sought to remedy the striking omission in his doctrinal system to which we have drawn attention, he might have discovered that the objection to the reduction of overtly expressed sexuality through the construction of a "repressed unconscious" is bound up with norms of justice and truth as applied to young children at the time when they are chiefly under the influence of the mother. We suggest that it is totally impracticable to institute Unwin's condition of compulsory continence without arousing in the young child bitter resentments as a result of over-riding the ethical sense with which the child is endowed, and also without undermining the child's desire for clear understanding of facts both in relation to the physical world and to psychological processes in himself and others.

Whatever else is doubtful in modern theories of the unconscious, this at least would seem to be proved, that there is no repression without intense psychic pain, and in general, no psychic pain without conflict. If Unwin's system is to work, conflict must be created within the child's mind. In the past, such conflict was the result of blind impulses on the part of parents. There may have been purposiveness, but it was without foresight. If Unwin is to have "compulsory continence" engrained in the psychic organism, then he is definitely committed to a policy of the artificial creation of complexes in/

in the child's mind. Such a line of action would necessarily be incredibly inhuman, and the child, realising the deliberate-ness of the process, would harbour intense resentment towards his society, and his ethical susceptibilities and truth-loving impulses would be completely destroyed. We should quickly produce a race of criminals.

It is interesting to note in this connection that a Russian psychologist, Luria, has experimented with methods for inducing artificial complexes. His activities appear to be both harmless and instructive. Notwithstanding, the average person would be inclined to feel shocked at the notion of the deliberate inculcation into a girl medical student of the belief that she had performed an illegal operation, under conditions of deep emotional stress caused by it have been "suggested" to her that the "wrong act" was justified by humane considerations of a peculiarly poignant order; moreover, leaving the impression in her mind that the operation had been unsuccessful, having led to a haemorrhage. We suggest that the cold-blooded creation of conflict in the young child's mind is far more "unthinkable" than Luria's psychic operation, especially when we remember that the Russian scientist finally dissolves the complex during subsequent hypnosis.

We are by no means certain that Unwin's conclusions are helpful/

'See Francis Bartlett, "Sigmund Freud", p.22 et seq."
helpful as a contribution to present-day discussions on the subject of repression. His work appears convincing, and seems to call for the practical application of his theory in child education. He is probably right in suggesting that repression in the past few millennia has had a great deal to do with certain forms of cultural development, but in our view his findings have little relation to the practical problems with which we are faced. All that we are justified in taking from his work is that once civilisation had set up in the human mind specific types of repression, certain types of cultural advance depended on the extension of the repressed unconscious.

At the end of his book, Unwin states that no one has proved that increased energy is beneficial. This statement, however, is beside the point. The objection to the extension of the repressed unconscious is that it involves increasing malformation of the human psyche, and a further encroachment on the amount of energy available for sentiment formation under the control of normally conditioned conceptual process.

Dr. Unwin sums up his conclusions in the following words: "If a vigorous society wishes to display its productive energy for a long time, and even for ever, it must re-create itself, I think, first by altering the economic and social organisation in such a way as to render it both possible and tolerable for sexual opportunity to remain at the minimum for an extended period/"

"Sex and Culture" p.431.
period, and even for ever. In such a case the face of the society should be set in the direction of cultural process; its inherited tradition would be continually enriched; it would achieve a higher culture than has yet been attained; by the action of entropy, its traditions would be augmented and refined in a manner which surpasses our present understanding."

We venture to suggest that Unwin's Utopian dream will never be realised as a result of applying methods by which compulsory continence will be tolerable; because, according to his own showing, cultural energy of the type required for the realisation of his dream will not be developed unless repressions are set up within the individual during the process of child rearing. In the last resort, conflict, the pre-determinant of repression, is, to put the matter simply, set up in the child as a result of irritable parents. From what we know of human nature, neither the institution of legal equality nor between the sexes, nor economic security, nor opportunities for "sublimation", will allay human irritability if the sex impulse cannot find reasonable expression.

Unwin pictures a highly "moral" society; such a society would inevitably develop even more highly "moral" parents, and the child would be treated with an ever increasing lack of sympathy and understanding. The final outcome of the application of Unwin's method for the recreation of society is not difficult to foresee.

Charles W. Hayward.

In his book entitled "Recreating Human Nature", Hayward adopts the attitude that repression is due to irrational methods of training children, and he emphasises that the root cause of repression lies in a departure on the part of educators from the norms of truth and justice. He says: "I maintain that every individual psychology is formed solely by the environment with which we, as adults surround our newly born infants and children." "If either ignorance, selfishness, or immorality is permitted to obstruct or violate them, then the psychology of humanity will become progressively more and more diseased, and no matter what cleverness of invention or knowledge may be attained, untruth, crime, immorality, and hatred, will make these ornaments look like diamonds upon a dunghill."

He accepts the doctrine of an unconscious self independent of the repressed unconscious which "controls all the vital processes of his (man’s) own body: the nourishment, growth, and right working of every cell, muscle, gland, organ, and function in his physical structure. The force and health of his nervous system, circulation, digestion, and other functions, are under the sway of his unconscious self."

Hayward's suggestion is that the repressed unconscious may interfere with the normal unconscious self, and prevent its fulfilling its function in relation to the efficient working of the physical system. He recognises the place of reason in the/

Charles W. Hayward, "Recreating Human Nature" p.21.
the life of man, but states that he is "the only animal who has had the power of aborting reason, so as to turn it into a product more degrading than the animal instincts from which it was derived." In passing, we would draw attention to the conception of animal instincts as "degrading". Does it not appear that Hayward is implicitly accepting the doctrine of human nature as, in part, evil?

He goes on to state that "entire blame must be cleared off the innocent child victim itself" - with this we agree - "and placed upon its environment, and those responsible for it." To the writer it appears that blame is equally misapplied both to the environment and the educators. Hayward would seem to be working partly under the influence of unconscious prejudice emanating from the superego. "Occupation and amusement do not imply flurry and excitement," he says, "but the majority of those who bring up children have not sufficient brains to recognise this." After all, we suggest, it is hardly fair to abuse parents for lack of brains. For this, at least, they are not responsible.

Hayward continues: "For the sake of posterity, I shall not mince matters, but repeat that every nervous, fidgety child, is the embodiment of the faults of those who are responsible for its treatment previously."

Hayward is probably right in his main contention. He goes on to say, however: "There is no blame whatever to the infant, but all/

all the true blame is on the parents and guardians!" Hayward has the ardour of the reformer, but does not appear to see that the inculcation into society of additional doses of irrational feelings of moral culpability is hardly calculated to effect those ends which he rightly considers desirable.

The evil results of repression he considers as permanent. "Something," he says, "may be done to improve the conditions afterwards (referring to the period of wrong training) but the psychology picture will never have that definiteness and clearness of outline which is essential to real beauty: the psychological record will always display a harshness and inequality of tone which will detract from the harmony, the distinctness, of the song." The first task of the educator is to "visualise the perfect psychology, and try to copy its beauty and grandeur in each one we are modelling." He claims that the norms which should guide the educator are "absolute truth, fair play and honesty, which is absolute truth in action" and "good humour."

"The most minute bending of our standard of measurement," he says, "falsifies every single calculation, and even the most conscientious of these friends (referring to inefficient parents) can never produce a straight psychology with a flexible standard."

"With absolute truth and honesty," he contends, there would be no crime and no injustice, and there would be the perfection/
perfection of which, under our present debased standards, even the contemplation seems ridiculous and the realisation impossible."

"The various hysterias of immorality, alcoholism, drugging and doping, are the inevitable consequences of these nursery and school outrages upon the developing nervous system."

"To renounce our sins," however, "will need a revolution of thought and ideals. The animal passions and lusts will not relax their degrading forces until we use the elevating forces of reason, and use them with honesty and determination to follow them until they drag us up above our present level of only super-animal, and elevate us towards the true destiny of the super-man."

Hayward also protests against "silly - but insistent - adulation of show and prettiness" stating that it "does as much harm to a child's psychology as would equally silly and insistent condemnation and fault-finding."

Hayward's attitude towards repression is that it is evil and due to preventable causes. He does not envisage the possibility that repression may have had and may still have a function to carry out in human life. He apparently takes no account of the imposing body of "facts" brought forward by psychoanalysts, and anthropologists who are influenced by psychoanalysis/

psychoanalysis, to prove that repression is a phenomenon which has at least been the concomitant of racial development. His position is that of common sense when the reflective faculties have been awakened as to the ethical implications of ordinary methods of child treatment. It is not unlikely that, in its very simplicity, his fundamental position is sounder than that of the psychoanalyst.
Fritz Künkels.

Fritz Künkels wrote a book in 1929, under the intriguing title, "Let's Be Normal: The Psychologist Comes to His Senses", and another volume from his hand was published in 1936, "What It Means to Grow Up."

Both books are written from an Adlerian standpoint. Because of this, no references are made to the unconscious as such, or to the subject of sublimation. The present writer, however, is convinced that Künkels raises a few points which are by no means irrelevant for the present study.

Throughout his earlier book there runs the concept of "clarification". Clarification could almost be described as a type of conversion. Künkels claims, to use Freudian terms, that it is possible to break up the superego. Since he does not specifically recognise the existence of a repressed unconscious, and therefore is unable to analyse out the manifold impulses of what, to Freud, is an extraordinarily complex and elaborate system - we refer to the superego - Künkels curative process must either enable the patient, who, incidentally, is the normal man, to undermine the superego structure by removing the fundamental cause, or afford a means of removing the keystone of the superego edifice.

According to Künkels's theory, in practice these two operations occur simultaneously.

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In many ways his view is similar to that of Stekel, as described in "The Beloved Ego". His theory can also be correlated with that of Trigant Burrow. Our interest here lies in the light shed by Künkel on the formation of what Freudians describe as the superego, and his views have a certain bearing on the theory of sublimation. He does, indeed, demonstrate with a high degree of clarity that any considerable amount of repression is incompatible with that objectivity which is a prerequisite of cultural process, whether the instinctual energy is directly applied or passes indirectly through the superego system, that is, by way of sublimation. Künkel believes that behind all psychic disorder is the inferiority feeling. Unlike some other Adlerians, he does not consider that the inferiority feeling is inevitable, given for the child ideal surroundings.

As in the case of Burrow, Künkel's terminology is sometimes a little difficult to follow. He has, indeed, a metaphysical background, and he thinks that if we were really normal the science of psychology would be without content. He uses the term "subject" in the sense of an ego which is a mere experient. What psychology deals with is the self as object, a something which comes between the pure ego and reality. Ideally, the ends of this metaphysical self are "infinal". The young child is in this happy situation, but his ends in the course of time become "refinalised": they have "finality". What/

See section on Trigant Burrow, thesis p.311 et seq.
What he describes as "nonic science" is a description of that which blocks the way of the ego in its search for the infinal. A synonym for "nonic science" appears to be "characterology" which is "the study of the deviations of the subject, of the difficulties which arise as soon as the human being no longer behaves like a subject." "Clarification" is a process which dissipates the self as an object, and the ego is again face to face with reality. We are afraid that the average reader, by the time he reaches the end of the introduction, will be inclined to reverse Künkel's subtitle, "The Psychologist Comes to his Senses".

Speaking of clarification, Künkel says: "Clarification itself, the new shining of the subject, the new appearance of the infinal, are all beyond all scientific perception. So far as characterology tries to delineate the process of clarification, it is from the standpoint of science indemonstrable poetry: and from the standpoint of life, an attempt to speak the truth."

The present writer persisted in his reading of the book, his interest meantime being diverted from "Let's Be Normal", to Künkel. He has indeed to confess that in his explorations of psychoanalytical literature he has often maintained his flagging interest by attempting to psychoanalyse the psychoanalyst. But further perusal of the book convinced him that Künkel/

Künkel has a very real contribution to make to the elucidation of our present problem. He considers that at the base of our abnormality is a feeling of inferiority, that automatically compensates itself by a claim of superiority. The greater the feeling of inferiority, the greater the claim for superiority. Here is the basic distorting mechanism of human life. To interpret his viewpoint in Freudian terms, a feeling of inadequacy has its automatic compensation in a strongly developed superego. The more intense the repression, the stronger the repressing force.

Künkel then provides us with a symbol of great value. He says: "We illustrate the behaviour of the egocentric by a vertical line, the middle point of which is zero. Every point above zero is in relation to the equidistant point below zero. That is, the deeper a human being's feeling of inferiority, the greater his desire to amount to something, or to be recognised; and vice versa. The whole line represents the self-evaluation of an individual. He is not consciously aware of the amount of tension between this need of recognition and his feeling of inferiority, i.e., the distance between the point above and the point below.... Most people are occasionally conscious of only one of these two points. We feel ourselves superior and secure, or inferior and insecure.... A closer examination shows, without exception, that both points have been continually effective."

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'Op.cit., p.34.'
He develops his symbolical representation as follows: "Let us illustrate the objective attitude by concentric circles which are at right angles to zero in the vertical line. We place the subject in the centre of the circles, which is also the zero point in the vertical line. The objective connections are the radii which link him to the periphery. The size of the circles symbolises the degree of objectivity. We call this tie between a human being and the world his aliveness or delicacy of perception, or objective sensitiveness...."

Künkel's point appears to be that the greater claims we make for superiority, this based on a correspondingly intense inferiority feeling, the less we are capable of an objective attitude. As a corollary, we may state that as a general rule the greater the development of the superego, the less sublimation of the instinctual impulses will occur in the sense of building up effective contacts with external reality.

Has repression a relation to cultural development? If Künkel is right, repression is essentially a dysfunction of cultural process, if such process is directed to the world of real things. From the standpoint of ethics, Künkel insists that the greater the distance between the inferiority feeling and the claim for superiority, the more irritable will the person be, and also the less capable of developing affectionate relationships with others.

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In respect of rational thought, the greater the distance above and below zero of the superiority and inferiority feelings, the less effective contact the individual has with the objectively real. Aesthetically, also, the superego-obsessed hardly sees the beauty in external reality. From the standpoint of the community, the individual who has what Freudsians describe as excessive repressions, will tend to be useless in so far as his job requires of him any degree of adaptivity, this being based on a knowledge of facts. That is, the greater the degree of repression, the less contact with the objective world, the final stage being insanity, where the patient has ceased to be conscious of reality as such.

Kūnkel gives as a basic idea of his system that sensitivity is in inverse ratio to irritability. He tells us that the situation as symbolised by him is not present in the young child, and he devotes a long section to describing how the disease formation creeps into the mind. It is not necessary here to go into detail. According to his findings, what is responsible for human nature losing what he describes as its "subjectivity" is the undiscriminating use of praise and blame. His views here are very similar to those of Trigant Burrow. The child feels it increasingly necessary to attend to the expression of others in respect of their suggestions that he is inferior or superior, and his interest is thus divided. "The refinalisation lies in the fact that a life process is detached from its/

See also section on Edwin Holt, thesis p. 192 et seq.
its original purposive connection and is made to serve a special individual purpose." In the end, according to Künkels the inferiority feelings become so intense that the child feels that his friendly relations with his mother are endangered. He will, we take it, come to hate her, and thereby lose the sense that he is loved by her and therefore under safe protection. Then the child enters into the catastrophic period of his development. There is at first an "occasional egocentricity" but later the child commits himself to the constant employment of the inferiority balancing mechanism.

Künkels, indeed, is not too clear as to precisely what happens at this period, but he is convinced that something does happen of a catastrophic nature. The Freudians tell us that the superego is a result of a more or less violent reaction formation. Künkels appears to be speaking of the same phenomenon in other terms. He uses, however, a conception which we think is of considerable value. He tells us that the child's inferiority feelings find expression in what he describes as "training formulas". The content of a child's consciousness after a "negative experience" has within it such phrases as, "I am no good at doing that." "Grown-ups can do things, but children are useless." "There is something bad about me." "I am not quite sane." "I am a dirty person." "I hate my mother (or father) and that is bad." "I can't do such-and-such a/

a thing", and so on. In other words, what the child receives as a result of his "negative experiences" is a system of beliefs. And we may take it that beneath the superego system is a very definite set of negative self-evaluations in respect of specific activities and "moral" qualities. The person saddled with a superego is implicitly committed to a definite philosophy, and throughout life he is acting under the domination of beliefs gained at a time when his critical faculties were relatively undeveloped, and moreover when those which he possessed were incapable of operating on account of his being involved in emotional situations. "Training formulas", to use Künkel's expression, lie beneath the superego.

Künkel insists that at the time of the catastrophe, an ego-ideal was formed as a means of combating the child's feelings of painful inferiority, and sense of isolation. This ego-ideal holds, as it were, the training formulas in position, and thus in later life the application of the "training formula is not dependent upon concrete advantage or disadvantage accruing to an individual." In speaking of the "repression" as a whole, he says: "It is not a living development, but an inflexible and unhealthy condition which changes the living subject into a dead object." In our view, Künkel here expresses the essential truth. It is true that the superego as part of the entire reactive organism cannot rightly be regarded as being "dead", and what is more the possessor/

possessor of the superego, under normal circumstances, has a fair knowledge both of its existence and of what steps may be taken to keep the superego within bounds, and moreover, how to make use of it in pursuing his life purposes. But notwithstanding, we believe that Künkel puts the emphasis in the right place when he says that the superego leads to "an unflexible and unhealthy condition which changes the living subject into a dead object."

In "What It Means to Grow Up", Künkel applies the principles described in his earlier work to the education of young children. We shall here only refer to a single conception which we find in this work. He says: "Repression will be the result if the young person's courage is insufficient for him to meet in actual life the experiences that really do seem to him the most important in the world." We ask ourselves here what is the difference between normality and abnormality as ordinarily understood. According to our belief, normal and abnormal alike have within their psychic constitutions a superego formation. We believe that Künkel supplies the clue. If, during the stormy period of the formation of the superego, the child is not, to use a popular phrase, completely "downed", he has a good chance both of adapting himself to life and of keeping within bounds the influence of his relatively autonomous superego system. If courage is completely or almost completely lost, a pathological outcome is not improbable.

Künkel/

Künkel leaves out of consideration the Freudian Oedipus complex. As far as we remember, he makes no mention of what Freud considers to be the foundation of the repressed unconscious. In our opinion, Künkel lays the emphasis in the right place. The child is driven to form a superego under the stress of inferiority feelings which are environmental in their origin. He has, in short, learnt to distrust his environment. It had inflicted hurts, not on an innate narcissism as Wittels would have us suppose, but upon the child's legitimate sense of self-esteem. The child has become "depressed" and takes refuge in "elation". Human psychological ills are of environmental origin.

We would like to believe that this is the whole story, but before us we have the writings of Melanie Klein, Susan Isaacs, and other psychoanalysts who have observed the lives of young children. Reluctantly, perhaps, we find ourselves in the position of being unable altogether to dismiss as fictitious the findings of these psychologists. Melanie Klein tells us that the superego is set up after six months of age. She also informs us that every sublimation is the indirect expression of the masturbatory activity. She declares that a young child has desires to devour his mother's body; and considers that sexual theories in children are a phylogenetic heritage. The child has phantasies in which the parents/

1Melanie Klein, "Psychoanalysis of Children" p.28.
parents destroy each other, and she says that night terrors are due to the Oedipus complex.

Susan Isaacs has rather dark theories of urine being an instrument of aggression, although at other times it is a good gift towards the mother, and she sums up her viewpoint by stating that whatever is the training "there will always be some intense emotions and inarticulate imaginings behind difficulties." And again, "most of these difficulties are to a greater of less extent inherent in the human situation; they cannot be altogether avoided no matter what we do."

While not attempting to express a detailed opinion on the views of the child analysts, there seems to us reason to believe that a good deal of conflict is subjectively determined. The question arises as to whether we can safely ignore the purely psychological factor when planning for stability. Whatever we do by way of modifying the environment, is there not a likelihood that the child will still become involved in painful psychological situations which he must resolve by a process of repression?

The present writer is not a child analyst, nor has he a particular predilection for the theories of the psychoanalysts. But, as a result of observing the behaviour of his own child, and by studying the child's dreams, he has been led to the conclusion that a great deal of conflict is subjectively determined. In our home, every effort has been made to avoid emotional situations/

situations with the child and to prevent conflicts being set up within his mind. On occasions when it seemed necessary to prevent him indulging in some inconvenient activity, we have endeavoured to do so by diverting his attention, rather than by directly frustrating his original desire. Disciplinary measures have been confined to placing the child in his cot upstairs for five minutes or so, on a few occasions.

We would simply here recount two dreams recently given us by the child, who is now three-and-a-half years of age.

Philip woke up crying, and told his mother the following dream: "I was in a garage, and there was a lorry made of rubber. It was coming out of the garage, and the man shouted to me to keep back, and I couldn't keep back because I was in bed."

A few minutes later he was the subject of a day-dream which was also of a painful nature. "Mummy, I was dreaming again." (He had not actually been asleep, however). "There was a balloon in my bed, and it got wee and then big again, and there were prickles in it; and I was trying to keep Teddy off the prickles because they would burst him."

We shall not here attempt any theoretical explanation of the symbolism. We would simply point out that there was every indication that the child's mind was involved in painful conflict.

Two days later, the child came into his father's study for "a story", but was easily persuaded to recount his dreams, and then/
then quite spontaneously he added a story about "Johnny's Daddy and Mummy, Mr. and Mrs. Johnny" who both had their heads cut off and "went all funny; and Johnny went away with his Violet." (Violet is our maid). Speaking about his dreams, the child's father asked why he did not want the "prickly balloon" in his bed. Philip replied: "I wanted to get out of my bed so that, when I'm grown up, I can sleep with Mummy and you will have gone away."

Asked about the car situation, he stated that he was in danger of having his leg cut off. On the basis of Freud's theory of wish fulfilment, it was decided that it was improbable that the child contemplated self-injury. He held to it, however, that in the dream he was Philip and not the driver of the lorry; but immediately told his father that he was going to cut his (Daddy's) feet off, and moreover suggested that he should get his pedal car and play at knocking his father down and running over his legs. Partly for experimental purposes, and partly as a prophylactic measure, this activity was allowed in a modified form. The child was asked whether he thought Daddy would hurt a little boy even though Philip did want to send him away. Philip replied: "No, and I won't hurt a little Daddy."

We are thus forced to the conclusion that the Oedipus situation is a reality, and it must be decided that Kürbel is in part mistaken in his description of the origin of psychological/
psychological disorders. Yet there seems little reason for despair. Contrary to the assertion of the Freudians, the child's conflicts would appear to be anything but unconscious. We do not say that he necessarily reflects on his psychological processes, but we may presuppose that an introspective recording of such processes is not altogether absent. With a little trouble, there would appear to be no difficulty in causing the child to become fully conscious of the implications of the trends bound up within the Oedipus situation, and if he is neither afraid nor ashamed of his impulses, and if he is assured that his possession of them will not lead to the loss of love, there seems every reason to suppose that the child's keen intellect will resolve the conflict without resort to the drastic method of repression.

Behind the whole theory of a catastrophic event leading to the formation of the superego as taking place in the child, there is the belief that the acute tension which ultimately necessitates repression is essentially composite, and below it lie a great number of contending sentiments whose juxtaposition involves painful affects. If each conflict can be dealt with separately, and the issues involved within it subjected to conscious control, there appears no reason to believe that anything of a catastrophic nature would occur. Even if a few conflicts remained unresolved, the child would not thereby be driven into strong identifications, reaction formations, etc., in order to avoid painful feelings bound up with these conflicts/
conflicts. A more or less intelligent use of the principle of dissociation would be sufficient, and as the child grew older he would retrospectively deal with the "left overs".

To Künkel, then, repression is a dysfunction of cultural process, in that it narrows down our capacity for objectivity. He makes suggestions as to how repression may be prevented, and if these are followed out, there seems reason to believe that repression will prove to be a preventible evil, provided due recognition is given to the existence of types of conflict whose determinants are only in part of environmental origin. These need not present insuperable difficulties in the educator's task of bringing all impulses under the control of the conscious personality.

Note: At the time of re-reading this essay, preparatory to submitting it for examination, it was pointed out by the child's mother that he had not been troubled by painful dreams since the occasion when prophylactic measures took place.
Dr. Burrow's work entitled "The Social Basis of Consciousness" is interesting in that he has largely broken away from the traditional psychoanalytical school. He came to the conclusion that Freud's psychology was inadequate to make fully conscious the disorders of the personality which it sought to cure. He even goes so far as to suggest that psychoanalysis is "just another application of the method of suggestion." He regards analysts themselves as "unconscious dupes of the suggestive process."

Throughout his work he uses the term "organismic", which he defines as "the feelings and reactions common to the social body regarded as a coherent integral organism." He tells us that "organismic" is "identical with the term 'organic' in its individual application." We at once ask ourselves what precisely is the significance of Burrow's basing his theory on a term which is suggestive of the group mind. It would appear to be this: Burrow has formed the conclusion that human nature in contemporary society has gone wrong because the child has been obliged to develop with the feeling that a large part of his nature is disapproved of by the society which surrounds him. He has therefore repressed a great deal of his human nature, forming an "unconscious".

We/

1 Trigant Burrow, "The Social Basis of Consciousness" p.3.
We would here seem to have an application of the conceptions developed by Trotter in his "Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War". Throughout his work, Burrow has in mind the essentially human setting of the child who is passing through the process of education, this in striking contrast to what we so often find when reading the works of other psychoanalysts. He says that he has arrived at his views by eliminating the personal equation, by which he means the "unconscious and arbitrary tendency within us all to adopt a personally systematised mental attitude toward life in substitution for the physiological reality of life itself."

He states, then, that he has succeeded in viewing things impersonally, and he considers that previously he was influenced by the "unconscious projection" of his own ego.

As complementary to the term "organismic", Burrow repeatedly uses the term "organic unity of personality." This, he says, rises "naturally from the harmony of function that pertains biologically to the primary infant psyche." He envisages normal development as a gradual growth of the child personality, and has no place for the conception that normality may only be obtained after the infant psyche has effected within itself those changes which bring into existence the superego. Normal growth should be spontaneous, unhindered, and should be a gradual development in which the original unity is preserved. And then he says: ".....sexuality, as it has come to exist socially to-day, is identical/ 

identical with the unconscious, while the unification of personality is alone to be found through eliminating the resources of substitution and sexuality and thus reuniting the elements of the conscious and organic modes now kept asunder through the interposition of the unconscious. "Sexuality," he goes on to say, "as it now exists, is not only utterly unrelated to sex, but it is intrinsically exclusive of sex. Sex is life. It is life in its deepest significance. Sex is the spontaneous expression of a natural hunger. In the instinct of sex, there is felt a yearning from the depths of man's organism for mating and reproduction, while sexuality is the personal coveting of momentary satisfaction in mere superficial sensation!" He defines sexuality as "the restless, obsessive, over-stimulated quest for temporary self-gratification that everywhere masquerades as sex, and is everywhere substituted for the strong, simple, quiet flow of feeling that unites the organic and the conscious life in a single stream, and is the expression of personality in its native inherency."

Speaking of normality, he says: "The organic denial and the restless compensations and substitutions comprising the unconscious are, in essence, the psychology of the mental reaction average known as normality. The popular analytic view places a premium upon this manifestation of the collective unconscious, and assigns/"
assigns the criterion of normality as the desired goal of adaptation for the neurotically repressed personality.'

Leaving out of account the possibility of an overstatement, we feel that we are on far surer ground in accepting Burrow's views than when we are under the influence of psychoanalytical doctrine. It is a peculiarity of psychoanalytical doctrine that when the mind enters into the labyrinth of the Freudian unconscious, one tends to become more and more blinded to the existence of a psychological world outside that labyrinth. On a closer inspection, the creatures that inhabit the repressed unconscious, beings, on the whole, very tame and manageable, take on the form of monsters, and they attain to a significance out of all proportion to the influence which they normally exert on conscious life.

McCurdy definitely asserts that, alongside of our ordinary consciousness, is a pathological co-conscious, and if the separating barriers are broken down, the individual becomes insane. Our theory is that although it may well be that the repressed unconscious acts as a secondary personality, it cannot, in the normal mind, be regarded strictly speaking as pathological. It is not that in insanity the barriers between the foreconscious and the co-conscious are broken down. Rather, the reverse is the case. The normal personality has a considerable control over and implicit knowledge of the workings of

\[\text{\textsuperscript{1}}\text{Op. cit., p.11.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{2}}\text{J. T. McCurdy, "The Psychology of Emotion" p.470.}\]
the superego system. The pathological situation only follows when there is a complete rift between the foreconscious and the co-conscious, the latter having become autonomous. Such a theory, we suggest, best covers the facts. Human beings in civilised communities are made that way, and despite inevitable limitations, we are able to get along reasonably well, and succeed in maintaining a large number of direct contacts with outer reality.

But the peculiarity of the repressed unconscious is that it only behaves normally when no attempt is made to bring its components into the clear light of consciousness. When this attempt is made, to use a homely analogy, we stir up a hornet's nest, and it is understandable that we should, for the time being, consider that hornets and their nests are the most significant part of reality. As a result of sympathetic process, the constant observers of those whose minds are preoccupied with their unconscious manifestations, cannot easily escape the tendency to over-estimate the part played by the unconscious in people who are able to adopt an attitude of healthy neglect towards it.

It is easily possible to level criticism against normality as we know it - the psychological situation is far from ideal - but in so doing, we must not forget that our very criticism is based upon values which have become manifest to us during the ordinary/
ordinary functioning of our minds under present conditions. Dr. Burrow, after emerging from the Freudian labyrinth, is, we feel, inclined to think that he has discovered ideals which have been hidden from the beginning of the world. We consider it very probable, however, that the normal person reading Dr. Burrow's views will discover, on a little reflection, that the high-sounding and impressive phraseology of the writer on "The Social Basis of Consciousness" can easily be interpreted in terms of a very workaday prose which the plain man has been using all the time; and that the ideas wrapped up in Burrow's rather involved diction are already present, implicitly at least, in the thought systems which we apply in our ordinary everyday activities.

Dr. Burrow gives his opinion of normality in no uncertain terms. To Burrow, normality, like the law in the opinion of certain individuals, is asinine; his suggestion is probably accurate, but our defence is that, in our best moments, none of us are quite normal. We apply the gentle art of dissociation, and if not more moral than we know, we are at least far more kindly, human, and rational.

But keeping in mind what we have said above, we feel that Burrow's description of the psychic organism is worthy of our close attention. If what he says is true, then we have in our hands a method which, if applied, may considerably alter human nature/
nature as we know it. Repressions will be swept away, and, given certain safeguards which Burrow does not himself discuss, humanity might be set on a new path of progress and be released from those psychological limitations which many think are responsible for wars and the numerous social maladjustments by which we are all too patently surrounded.

We find Burrow saying: "In truth, normality, in evading the issues of the unconscious, envisages less the processes of growth and a larger consciousness than the neurotic type of reaction which, however blind its motivation, at least comes to grips with the actualities of the unconscious......It is the hall-mark of normality that, suspecting nothing, it takes itself completely for granted. In the spirit of true conformity, it accepts its expressions of the vicarious at their face value, and assumes the burden of its self-inflicted compensations with entire complacency. The neurotic, on the other hand, at least senses the inherent discrepancy in his life. He at least demurs in so far as to withhold assent from the mass compromise embodied in the substitutions and connivances of the social unconscious. In a word, it is the distinction of the neurotic personality that he is at least consciously and confessedly 'nervous'."

Burrow is probably right, but our reply is that almost everyone is a little "nervous", in the sense in which he uses the/

the term. We are rather afraid of taking seriously many of the promptings of conscience; mercy often seasons justice. It is only the ultra-religious and those in the grip of high moral ideals who, as individuals, act in accordance with Burrow's view of the normal. It may be, however, that the group mind has within it tendencies far harsher and more inhuman than those found in the ordinary individual. Our capitalist system may, for instance, have qualities of callousness and cruelty, but we are wrong if we read these feelings into the individuals who form part of the system, whether they belong to the higher or the lower classes.

Still referring to normality, Burrow says that much of our adult behaviour is "an expression of the distorted and symbolic. This distortion is to be seen upon every hand, in the restless greed, the obsessive self-seeking, that underlie the national, industrial, political, social, and religious possessivism and competition which are the typical psychology of the normal mind notwithstanding its plausible exterior of human progress and universal goodwill." But "normality possesses the warrant of the institutionalised and current, it enjoys the protection of the concensus." It is the complaint of the present writer that Freudians have not realised the implications of their theories. Burrow, looking at things from a slightly different angle, expresses the same view. "But if we will look beyond the narrow/

narrow confines of the clinic, and face squarely the logical issue of Freud's thesis, we cannot avoid the conclusion that it is an indictment of man's consciousness in its entirety."

There is an Adlerian flavour in the following: "In analysing the unconscious of the neurotic personality, it has become gradually clearer to me that the factor underlying and actuating the conflict Freud describes as repressed sexuality, is nothing else than the personal desire of ascendency or the lust of acquisition concomitant with the organism's unconscious reversion upon its own image." That is, the secret of the neurosis is not to be found by a study of the workings of the sex instinct. To Burrow, the consciousness of the normal individual is as much determined by irrational mechanism as Freud claims. He says, for instance: "It is well nigh impossible to study the virgin soil of consciousness from our present adaptive premise without vitiating our conclusions with the bias of our own adaptations." It will be impossible to have a science of psychology unless we are able to attain to an "envisagement of consciousness in its ultimate pre-adaptive composition."

The seat of all psychological disorder, in the normal as well as the abnormal, to Burrow, lies in children being taught that certain things are "right" and certain things "wrong". It is probably unfortunate that Burrow uses these terms, though on occasion he qualifies "right" by the word "arbitrary". To the present/}

present writer, it would be necessary to secure a much more complete "envisagement of consciousness in its ultimate pre-adaptive composition" before we could come to an adequate decision as to the significance of the concepts to which we have referred. What Burrow really means is that by applying the sanctions of social approval and disapproval, we create artificial categories of the praiseworthy and the disgraceful. With the disgraceful is often associated the fear of punishment, and with the praiseworthy the expectation of reward. Certain parents also suggest to their children that a divine being or beings share their views as to the ultimateness of the categories referred to.

Burrow considers that it is through the adoption of what might be described as a moral attitude towards young children that the child is led to construct out of his native impulses the unconscious, as understood by the Freudians. He thinks that parents adopt a "moralising" attitude merely for their own convenience. If certain modes of behaviour are labelled as "bad" and others "good" the child may be controlled in such a way that the adults suffer the minimum of disturbance.

Dr. Burrow makes considerable use of the conception of an "artificial image of life." He seems to suggest that if our image of life were to correspond with reality, it would require a third dimension, and this should be supplied by what he describes as "the inclusive societal factor." What he appears to/
to suggest is this: Under present methods of child rearing, the individual constructs a picture of himself the purpose of which is to offset the conception he has gained of himself from his educators as something low and disgraceful. Under the stress of circumstances, the child takes refuge in this consoling picture. He is not the inferior child, but a superior being. Those impulses which he has learnt are intrinsically evil are not himself. To use the words of an old nursery song, he denies the existence of those qualities which are likened to "snaps and snails and puppy dogs' tails". He is a "nice" child, with pleasing qualities of the nature, according to his childish eyes, of "sugar and spice". Probably there enters into the child's fictitious belief system an identification with older individuals of his family circle, and later if the negative self-feeling which is responsible for the consoling idea is intensified, belief that his nature is divine: he is God. He is no longer able to see himself as others see him. The image he has formed, according to Burrow, is bi-dimensional. The tri-dimensional factor, which could be more simply described as the truth, is absent.

There is formed, to quote Dr. Burrow, "a fictitious brain state which has become entirely withdrawn from continuity with his (the child's) organic life, so that, from the point of view of consciousness, in the sense of an integral mental life -
the especial mark whereby we claim prerogative over all other species - man is, by this very token, the least integrant of them all." Referring to the same subject, he continues: "Unlike the adult, the spontaneous joy of children is their wholehearted participation in the free impersonal radiation of life. Unlike ourselves, their personal importance has not yet defeated their impersonal significance. As yet they do not live under the curse of a dogma of conduct. Theirs is no creed of behaviour that is of one cloth with an enforced pretence of 'goodness'. Their lives are not a daily concession to fanciful needs of self-protection against an arbitrarily predicated world of 'evil'. Adult vigilance, however, early inculcates its delusion of separateness - of a self to be defended against other selves - and its dissociative influence is slowly imparted to the confiding mind of childhood. In a world of dissociation this universal suggestion acts with powerful effectiveness, and the child of yesterday, having once been inducted into the general guild of secret mistrust and compensatory behaviourism, and grown to parenthood, may be safely trusted to pass on without question the secret code of differentiation, self-distinction and disharmony to the offspring by which he is in turn succeeded."

We have described the viewpoint of Burrow, because we believe his description of the repressed unconscious is largely true/

true. If we accept his position, the conclusion must be
drawn that repression is a dysfunction of cultural process.
Not only does it cut off the individual from society, but also
it changes the creative urge of sex into what Burrow describes
as "sexuality".

Speaking on a similar subject, Waldo Frank says: "But the
most pernicious aspect of these dangers comes from the denial
... of the communal principle of sex: from the assumption that
sex is or can healthily be a private matter. The immature
person is an insulated ego; he is autoerotic, he is a wilful,
absolutistic atom. In this stage his sexuality is private.
To confine his sexuality to this stage is to bar the dynamic
energy of man from growth; it is to fixate the individual in
immaturity. It is to make maturity almost impossible. Sex
censorship in a people stratifies and perpetuates infantility;
it is the profoundest imaginable check on the emotional growth
which must precede the growth of intelligence and of the spirit."
And also, on another page: "Here, then, is our condition: we
are a people of private persons: collectively the mass;
individually alone. And in consequence of our solitude we are
emotionally under-nourished, spiritually insecure."

Repression of the sex instinct is, according to these
writers, incompatible with any considerable development of
cultural/

Waldo Frank, in "Sex in Civilisation", p.178.
cultural interests in those whose minds contain repressed complexes.

If we would seek a final answer to our question: Is repression a determinant of cultural development, it is, in our opinion, to writers like Burrow, Frank, and Künkel, that we should turn. These, one feels, come very near to the truth in their respective viewpoints. Repression is an evil because it creates artificiality, and therefore, in varying degrees, shuts off the conscious mind from the wellsprings of its cultural life.