Organising Against a Violent Society:
Women’s Anti-violence Organisations in Sweden and the UK

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Declaration

The research for this thesis was conducted at the Department of Sociology in the School of Social and Political Studies at the University of Edinburgh.

The thesis has been composed by the candidate and is the independent work of the author. No part of the thesis has been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification.

(Lesley Elizabeth Jack McMillan)
Abstract

This thesis investigates the experience of the women's anti-violence movement in Sweden and the UK and its attempts to organise against a violent society. The women's movement redefined male violence against women from a feminist political perspective and from the outset was critical of the state for failing to address male violence against women and the re-victimisation of women inherent in the conduct of state agencies. As a result, feminism and the anti-violence movement had to engage with the power it sought to change – the state. From the outset the movement was reluctant to engage with the state in a formalised manner, however the advent of state funding for alternative welfare provision in the form of refuges and crisis centres meant the movement had to reassess its stance. Engaging with the state comes with both costs and benefits for the anti-violence movement. State funding of service provision provides stability for organisations, and engagement with the state can result in significant policy gains. However, there is the inherent risk that formalised relationships, restrictions imposed through state funding, and the individualised therapeutic approach preferred by the state, can have a contradictory effect on the movement by emphasising the social service role, thus lessening rather than expanding efforts for wider social and political change.

This research is a new comparative case study examining the trajectory of the women's anti-violence movements in Sweden and the UK. A central theme of the research is the dual role of feminist anti-violence organisations as part service provider and part agent for political change and how this subsequently impacts upon their relationship with the state, and the strategies adopted in order to achieve their goals. It examines the emergence and development of the movement in each country and the extent to which anti-violence organisations have engaged with the state and the strategies they have adopted.

The research is informed by a feminist theoretical perspective in terms of design, analysis and practice. It uses methodological triangulation – the use of both quantitative and qualitative research techniques – more specifically, a questionnaire
based survey and semi-structured interviews with women working in anti-violence organisations in the UK and Sweden.

The anti-violence movement in Sweden and the UK has adopted both the mainstreaming and the disengagement strategy in relation to the state. The research concludes that the process of institutionalisation, detailed in literature, that has characterised the US anti-violence movement, has not occurred in Sweden or the UK. Engagement with the state in terms of funding for service provision does impact upon the movement because it siphons energy away from campaigning for political change and into service provision. However, in Sweden and the UK this has not had the effect of transforming refuges and crisis centres from social movement organisations to ameliorative social service organisations. It also concludes that the relationship between organisational form and feminist ideology is not empirically evident and women’s anti-violence organisations range along a continuum with organisational structure and ideology not necessarily being consistent. In both countries the anti-violence movement has engaged with the state but at the same time resisted cooption into mainstream social services and has retained a feminist political analysis of violence and anti-violence work.
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Introduction

Violence against women is a salient concern for the women’s movement and the aim of a violence-free society is still to be realised. This research investigates the experience of the women’s movement in Sweden and the UK in its attempts to organise against a violent society, the responses they have given and the approaches taken in addressing the issue of violence against women. A central theme of the research is the dual roles of feminist anti-violence organisations such as women’s refuges and crisis centres – that is, the provision of alternative welfare services and campaigning for social, political and policy change – and how these dual roles impact upon their relationship and engagement with the state and its agencies.

The state is a central focus for the women’s movement. Second wave feminism has been critical of the state for failing to address male violence against women and has made demands on the state because it has the capacity to provide policy change and funding for welfare services. However, engaging with the state offers both costs and benefits. State funding can provide stability for refuge and crisis organisations, but with it comes the risk that close relationships with the state will result in the institutionalisation and cooption of organisations into state social services, thus diminishing the political aspect of refuge and crisis work. The extent to which organisations can engage with the state but at the same time avoid institutionalisation is a central question of this research.

This thesis investigates the complex relationship that women’s anti-violence organisations have with the state, and the strategies and tactics the movements in Sweden and the UK have adopted. It considers the successes the movements have had in terms of service provision and policy change, as well as the compromises they have had to make, and costs they have suffered. Organisations have a different relationship with the state when they are emphasising their role as service providers compared to when they are emphasising their role as agents for social change; each of these roles requires an appropriate strategy. Organisations are faced with the dilemma of working within or against the state to achieve their goals.
Chapter 1 provides an introduction to second wave feminism and violence against women. It discusses the importance of violence to the women's and feminist movements, detailing how the movement redefined male violence as a political issue, indicative of the subordinate position of women in society, rather than the problem of individual men. After a discussion of the feminist response to the problem of male violence, it moves on to indicate the prevalence of violence against women in society today, illustrating why this is still a key issue for the women's movement. Thereafter, the history and development of women's refuges and crisis centres is discussed, detailing the changes the movement has experienced since its inception in the 1970s. The importance of organisations' dual roles is covered, before moving on to provide a consideration of the limitations of social movement theory for understanding the relationship between the women's movement and the state. The chapter concludes with a discussion of what social movement theory can offer us in trying to understand this complex relationship.

Chapter 2 discusses the structural elements that can impact upon the women's movement, and how these affect its ability to influence policy and achieve wider social change. The chapter begins by reiterating the importance of the state to feminism and the women's anti-violence movement as well as why the movement has historically been reluctant to engage with it. The demands the movement has placed on the state and the resultant conflict are central to the stories of refuges and crisis centres. The chapter includes coverage of the complexities involved in talking about 'the state', the differing feminist approaches to the state, and how feminists have attempted to theorise about it. It moves on to consider how different 'types' of state produce different forms of social movements, and how differing feminist theoretical understandings of the state impact upon the development of the movement and the subsequent impact the movement is able to have on the state. This is exemplified in a discussion of the development of the movement in Sweden and the UK. It concludes by considering how the paths taken by the women's movement in particular countries reflect historical differences in the struggle for gender equality and the social condition of women in the country concerned.
In contrast to the structural elements that can impact upon the women's movement's ability to influence policy and achieve wider social change, Chapter 3 considers the role of agency. It details how feminists have chosen to intervene in the state both by working within existing state structures, and by maintaining a critical distance from them and challenging the state from the outside. This chapter discusses the political opportunities and constraints faced by the women's movement, the strategies that are open to them, and how this complex relationship might be negotiated. Concentrating on autonomous organisations of the women's anti-violence movement it examines the ways in which they have sought to influence the state, and in turn, the ways in which the state has impacted upon the movement. It covers the role of political opportunity structure and political opportunity, the extent to which organisations have 'insider', 'outsider' or 'thresholder' status in terms of policy access, influence and acceptability, and the extent to which organisations may adopt 'insider' and 'outsider' strategies to achieve their goals. It utilises literature concerning the US movement to consider the impact that engaging with the state might have on the anti-violence movement, particularly through the provision of state funding, in terms of the transformation of the US movement from a network of 'pure' or 'ideal type' refuges and crisis centres, to an institutionalised movement with a social service orientation. It concludes by posing the question – central to this research – about the extent to which the anti-violence movement can adopt a pragmatic approach and engage with the state in order to achieve its goals, but at the same time avoid becoming absorbed into state structures and bureaucracies.

A summary of the research questions identified from the literature discussed in Chapters 1 to 3 is provided before moving on to Chapter 4, which provides an overview of the methodological approach to the research and the particular methods used. It discusses the comparative element of the research and the feminist methodology that informed the research process. It then moves on to consider the merits of survey research and semi-structured interviewing for addressing the specific research questions. It describes the sampling procedures used and the approach taken in the analysis and reporting of material. Practical difficulties
encountered whilst conducting the research are detailed as well as my own experience of conducting research on gendered and sexual violence.

A short descriptive overview of the four national networks of organisations involved in the research is provided in Chapter 5 in order that the research findings can be placed in context. The findings of the research are presented in Chapters 6 and 7. Chapter 6 begins with the response rates and a brief ‘map’ of the organisations in Sweden and the UK that took part in the research. The research findings are organised thematically. Chapter 6 addresses the following areas: funding of anti-violence organisations; organisational structure; and the perceived function of anti-violence organisations. Thereafter, Chapter 7 addresses the motivations of women to become involved in refuge and crisis work, workers’ perceptions of, and attitudes towards, the state, and the strategies adopted by the movement to achieve their goals. Similarities and distinctions both between and within Sweden and the UK are drawn out. The thesis concludes by returning to the questions central to the research about how the movement has engaged with the state and considers what the future for the women’s movement is in terms of attempting to organise against a violent society.
Chapter 1 - Feminism, Violence and the Anti-violence Movement

Introduction

This chapter discusses the feminist redefinition of violence and the responses the movement produced, with particular reference to the UK and Sweden. It moves on to discuss largely US based literature concerned with the history and development of the movement detailing the supposed transition from a social movement stance to a service delivery orientation and the reasons why this occurred. Lastly, consideration is given to social movement scholarship discussing the usefulness and limitations of this for studying the women’s and anti-violence movements.

The Feminist Redefinition of Violence

Violence against women is a salient concern for the women’s movement and feminism. Although it is often seen as a relatively recent issue, first wave feminists campaigning in the nineteenth century were aware of its existence and significance, and more recent research has documented violence in women’s lives over the past centuries, indicating that it is not a new issue. Pleck (1987) has charted violence against women over the last 300 years in America, with Clark (1988) describing a similar situation in England in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Victorian feminists campaigned for a woman’s right to divorce or legal separation from her husband on the grounds of his violence, with their efforts culminating in the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1878 (Walby, 1990). A similar pattern can be noted between the analysis of violence by first wave feminists at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century, and that of second wave feminists in the 1960s. First wave feminists argued that incest and wife beating were part of a generalised pattern of male violence that could also be seen in acts of rape (Hooper, 1987). However, at the turn of the century first wave feminists turned their attention to the issue of suffrage and concentrated largely on political and property rights, and as a result violence was to remain relatively hidden until the emergence of second wave feminism in the 1960s and ‘70s (Maynard, 1993).
The feminist movement of the 1960s and ‘70s made the claim that ‘the personal is political’ and demanded a re-examination of women’s daily lives. The movement in the UK had seven main demands. These were: women’s equal right to education and employment opportunities; equal pay; free nurseries; free abortion and contraception on demand; women’s right to define their own sexuality and an end to discrimination against lesbians; women’s right to economic and legal independence from men; and an end to male dominance and violence against women, and a change to the laws and assumptions that support male dominance and aggression. The movement’s demands were focussed on the state, the reason for which is two-fold. Firstly, on the level of practical politics, second wave feminists engaged with the state and demanded a response from it in terms of policy change, and secondly, at a more theoretical level, the movement considered the state as upholding oppressive gender relations (Charles, 2000) and therefore it had to be challenged if gender inequality was to be addressed.

More specifically where violence was concerned, the movement demanded that domestic violence no longer be considered something that women were responsible for, and that rape and sexual assault no longer be viewed as a sex crime with women partly to blame (Amir, 1971). Rather, the women’s movement asserted that power was a central issue in violence against women and that sexual and domestic violence both reflect and determine gendered social structures. The distinction between the public and the private was challenged as well as the conduct of agencies in relation to sexual assault survivors and the reluctance of state agencies to intervene in ‘domestic’ situations. The movement aimed to have the under-reporting and high prevalence of male violence against women recognised, along with the acknowledgement that it can affect women at any stage of their lives and take many forms including: physical; psychological; economic; and/or sexual abuse. Overall, the aim was to have violence redefined as an issue of power that is both caused by and perpetuates gender inequality, recognising its systemic nature and pervasiveness and working to achieve an end to this violence.
The Feminist Response to Violence Against Women

The feminist response took two forms: political campaigns on issues of violence; and alternative welfare provision in the form of refuges and crisis centres aimed at empowering women and challenging male domination (Charles, 2000; Lovenduski & Randall, 1993). The battered women’s movement and the rape crisis movement were radical feminist branches of the women’s movement that emerged as part of this response (Collins et al, 1989; Black, 1994; Matthews, 1994; Reinelt, 1994). It was feminist because it was begun by women for women, and radical because it aimed to dismantle the existing social order.

Despite their general ambivalence about the nature of the state – the movement recognised the state’s ability to improve women’s rights through policy change, and also its ability to pursue policies that restrict women’s rights and concentrate power in the hands of men – the movement mounted campaigns on issues of violence against women. Women organised ‘Reclaim the Night’ marches in cities throughout the UK (Coote & Campbell, 1987) as well as campaigns around specific issues such as the treatment of sexual assault survivors by the criminal justice system and the courts. Their efforts bore fruit in parliament as throughout the 1970s a significant amount of legislation was passed that increased the rights of women experiencing domestic violence, rape and sexual assault (Charles, 2000; Dobash & Dobash, 1992). The Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act (1976) allowed women to apply for an exclusion order from their abusive partners and the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act (1977) defined women made homeless as a result of domestic violence as having the right to be permanently re-housed by the local authority (Charles, 2000). The Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act (1976) prohibited the use of women’s sexual history as evidence in rape and sexual assault trials unless the judge ruled it relevant and therefore permissible (Coote & Campbell, 1987). Although not all legislation was particularly effective, it represented a shift in official thinking and a change in consciousness. As Charles states:

Legal reforms and rights have to be translated into reality and it is here that the feminist politics of refuge and anti-rape groups is so important. (Charles, 2000: 141)
There has been significant legislative change relating to violence against women in the decades since, and the women’s and anti-violence movements continue to seek change in relevant areas. In the UK, legislation relating to violence against women was antiquated and some had not been updated for centuries. The presumed ‘right of access’ of men to their wives meant marital rape was not added to the statute books until 1991 (Lees, 1997). Other significant changes include the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (1994) that widened the definition of rape to include anal rape. The Protection from Harassment Act (1997), or so-called ‘stalking act’, introduced new criminal offences related to stalking and inducing the fear of violence.

The first refuge for battered women opened in London in 1972 (Coote & Campbell, 1987; Kelly, 1988) and the first rape crisis centre, also in London, in 1976 (Rape Crisis Federation, 2001). The National Women’s Aid Federation was formed in 1975 (Charles, 2000), by which time there were 28 groups in existence with a further 83 in

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1 Lees (1997) states that rape in marriage was criminalized in Britain in 1991. This is true for England, Wales and Northern Ireland, but not for Scotland where there is a distinct legal system. In Scotland, rape in marriage was criminalized in 1989 following the case of Stallard v HMA in Stirling High Court. There are other distinct pieces of legislation that apply to Scotland. The Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act (1985) introduced what was known as ‘shield’ legislation that prevented the use of sexual history and character evidence of the complainant. This was set out in terms of a general prohibition on such evidence, but with three rather loose exception clauses, so the defense had to make an application to introduce evidence under one or the other of them. In practice judges allowed this evidence to be admitted in the majority of cases, making the ‘shield’ legislation largely ineffective (Brown, Burman & Jamieson, 1993). The Sexual Offences (Procedure and Evidence) (Scotland) Act (2002) supersedes this older legislation. It prevents the accused from conducting his own defence in rape and sexual assault trials, and introduces stricter guidelines on the admissibility of sexual history and character evidence of the complainant; the defence are now asked to tie this more closely to relevance. Furthermore, the act also states that if a complainant’s sexual history is to be used in evidence then the previous convictions and charges of the accused must be admitted. The Protection from Abuse (Scotland) Act (2001) allows for powers of arrest to be granted with matrimonial interdicts; that is, an abusive partner who has violated an interdict, even if he has not committed a criminal offence, can be arrested and removed from the scene.
the process of being established (Coote & Campbell, 1987). Women’s Aid had a non-hierarchical structure and explicitly feminist objectives. It insisted that all groups remain autonomous and maintain an ‘open-door’ policy. The number of rape crisis centres in the UK also continued to grow and by 1985 a total of 45 centres were in existence throughout the UK (Coote & Campbell, 1987). Today there are 55 rape crisis centres affiliated to the Rape Crisis Network (Rape Crisis Federation, 2001), and in excess of 330 Women’s Aid groups (Women’s Aid Federation of England, 2001; Scottish Women’s Aid, 2001; Welsh Women’s Aid, 2001; Northern Ireland Women’s Aid Federation, 2001).

In Sweden, women had initially been mobilised around labour issues and came to the issue of violence slightly later than the UK. In 1977 Gothenburg was the first municipality to grant space for a women’s centre (Corrin, 1999), and the first centres for battered women and survivors of rape were opened in 1978 in both Stockholm and Gothenburg (Eduards, 1992). The number of centres for battered women increased throughout the 1980s and by 1992 there were 123 across Sweden. The increasing need for organisation became apparent and the national organisation of women’s shelters, Riksorganisationen för Kvinnojoureri Sverige (ROKS), was established in 1984. Today there are approximately 150 centres for battered women and survivors of rape across Sweden (ROKS, 2001; SKR, 2000).

In 1976 the Swedish government sex crime commission’s report (SOU, 1976) proposed that ‘rape’ be eliminated from the statute books and replaced with the lesser crime of ‘sexual assault’. This proposal was withdrawn after a successful challenge from women’s organisations to both the committee’s conclusions and its composition, as only one woman was on the committee (Corrin, 1999). In 1982 campaigns to the newly appointed sex crime commission were also successful when the committee’s report (SOU, 1982) recommended that assault and battery against women, even if committed on private premises (that is to say violence at home in particular), would be subject to public prosecution and no longer be only a civil matter (Eduards, 1992; Gillberg, 1999). The same legislation also allowed for the provision of public funds for women’s organisations. In 1998 a new law, Kvinnofrid
(Women’s Right to Integrity and Individual Space), was passed in parliament, which includes, among other things, the widening of the definition of rape, the criminalisation of the sex buyer and increased financial provision for women’s shelters. The legislation was proposed by women’s organisations and is unique in that it has an ideology based on the conception of a male power order and recognises that violence emanates from gender inequality.

**Prevalence of Violence Against Women**

Women face a disproportionately high risk of domestic and sexual violence compared to men. Kessler et al (1995) found that lifetime prevalence rates of rape for women were 9.2%, and rates of molestation were 12.3%. In comparison, the corresponding rates for men were 0.7% and 2.8% respectively. Male violence against women has become more apparent in most countries in the world during the 1980s and ‘90s (Corrin, 1999). However, the extent of male violence against women is notoriously difficult to measure. It is widely accepted that official statistics massively underestimate the amount of violence that occurs. Women do not often report assaults to the police, especially if their abuser is known to them, which is most often the case (Koss & Heslet 1992; Koss, 1993), because they fear they will not be taken seriously or believed, and because they fear further violence from their abuser. The secondary victimisation experienced by women in the criminal justice system also serves to deter women from reporting sexual and domestic violence (Byrne & Kilpatrick, 1999; Chesney-Lind, 1999; Hudson, 1998). Furthermore, the reluctance of the police to intervene in what are regarded as ‘domestics’ is also a contributing factor in the ‘hidden’ nature of violence against women (Dobash & Dobash, 1980; Hanmer & Saunders, 1984; Hanmer, Radford & Stanko eds., 1989).

Research studies that have tried to estimate the prevalence of domestic violence have varied widely in their estimates from under 1% of the female population (British Crime Survey, 2000) to approximately 1 in 10 of the adult female population (Stanko et al, 1998). These variations can be explained by the differing methodologies and definitions of domestic violence. Lifetime prevalence rates for women experiencing domestic violence tend to cluster closer together, suggesting that 1 in 4 adult women
will experience domestic violence by a partner or ex-partner at some point in their lives (Dominy & Radford, 1996; Henderson, 1997; McGibbon et al, 1989). The ‘Day to Count’ research (Stanko, 2000) estimates that a domestic violence incident occurs in the UK every 6 to 20 seconds.

The available data on prevalence rates for rape and sexual assault is also limited. Russell’s (1982; 1984) research with a random sample of women in the US found that 44% of women had been subjected to rape or attempted rape during their lifetime. The Progress of Nations (UNICEF, 1997) states that between 1 in 5 and 1 in 7 women will experience rape in their lifetime, and the UN Population Fund (1997) estimates that one woman in the US is raped every 6 minutes. In the UK between 1977 and 1997 the number of women reporting rape increased by over 500%, but the conviction rate fell from 33% in 1977 to 7.5% in 1999 (Home Office, 1999). As The Progress of Nations report states:

Violence against women and girls ... is so deeply embedded in cultures around the world that it is almost invisible. Yet this brutality is not inevitable. Once recognised for what it is — a construct of power and a means of maintaining the status quo — it can be dismantled. (UNICEF, 1997: 41)

Refuges, Crisis Centres and the Anti-violence Movement

The majority of literature available on the women’s movement and its related organisations concerns the US, and few studies compare women’s movements in more than one country (see Threlfall, 1997). For this reason comparisons with the US are difficult to avoid. Most anti-violence organisations in the US, both rape-specific and domestic violence-specific, began as free-standing organisations in the 1970s (Gornick et al, 1985), although many centres became affiliated to other institutions in the 1980s (Byington et al, 1991). As the number of centres steadily increased, strategies were communicated through the wider women’s liberation movement. As a result, centres embodied assumptions about ideology and goals and were therefore relatively uniform in character (Gornick, 1985). As Reinelt indicates:
Those who speak of a battered women’s movement generally share a feminist analysis of why this violence occurs and a commitment to organising for social and political change. (Reinelt, 1994:165)

Given that the majority of centres received little or no government support, they were free to explore for themselves new ways of communicating that challenged, at least internally, the bureaucratic values and structures of power that dominate in our society (Reinelt, 1994). The majority of centres chose collective forms of organisation in order to challenge the social paradigm of traditionally organised hierarchies where equity is not a concern (Matthews, 1994). Centres that developed in the 1970s were generally small, unaffiliated groups, offering services to adult female survivors of violence. Centres usually undertook community education for lay audiences and aimed to change procedures in, and monitor, professional agencies dealing with survivors of violence.

Services that were provided were usually non-medical, low cost, short term, and delivered by trained volunteer women who were not social service professionals, and who were often survivors of violence themselves. This has parallels with other branches of the women’s movement that emerged at the same time, for example health care for women, particularly surrounding birth control and abortion. The community education aspect of anti-violence organisations’ work was structured to adhere to the overall goals and principles of the women’s movement and the feminist analysis of the roots and repercussions of violence (Gornick et al, 1985). Many centres were started by women already involved in consciousness-raising groups; therefore empowerment was a key strategy. As Reinelt states, it was important that:

“...those who have been oppressed learn to know their strength and recognise themselves as experts about their own lives.” (Reinelt, 1994:688)

It is these features that are thought of as typifying the ‘original model’ of a refuge or crisis centre (Matthews, 1994; Gornick et al, 1985; Fried, 1994; Reinelt, 1994).
Changes in the Anti-violence Movement

Despite three decades of grassroots involvement, both scholars and activists disagree about the nature of refuges and crisis centres and their capacity to influence entrenched gender practices and structures (Fried, 1994). US literature suggests that growth in the number of centres also generated a radical change from a small homogeneous core to a large and diverse group of programmes that resembled the original ones less and less (Gornick et al, 1985; Matthews, 1994; Reinelt, 1994). Gornick et al (1985) claim that by 1985 in the US the ‘original model’ of a crisis centre was virtually extinct. This change is attributed to several events and developments since the 1970s, including: an increase in public awareness of the issue of violence; the influx of state monies for violence-related services; and an increasingly therapeutic society.

The demand for specific protocols for dealing with survivors of violence came from diverse sources, taking the pressure off refuges and crisis centres as sole agitators. With the influx of state monies, many centres were forced to comply with certain conditions in order to gain funding, for example the election of a board of directors or the institution of a bureaucratic structure. As Eliasson & Lundy (1999) explain:

State-sponsored forums and consultations draw women away from grassroots organising and mobilisation into a bureaucratic direction that can have a deradicalising and demobilising effect. The state sets the agenda, with funding for activities that tend to contain and undercut the potential for more radical and independent action on the part of women. (Eliasson & Lundy, 1999: 85)

The mental health profession’s awakening to the notion of rape and battering as clinical issues has also contributed to changes in the nature and role of refuges and crisis centres. The last two decades have seen a vast increase in the number of publications concerning the mental health impact of sexual and domestic violence. McCahill et al (1979) claimed to document “facts never before collected on what happens to mind and body” (p.xvii) post-rape. The legitimisation of rape trauma syndrome and battered women’s syndrome in explaining the aftermath of violence for women can also be noted during this time (Burgess & Holmstrom, 1974; Dobash & Dobash, 1992). With a few notable exceptions, for example Judith Lewis

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Herman’s *Trauma and Recovery* (1992), the majority have not been written from a feminist perspective, nor included a feminist analysis of why this violence occurs; rather, they have a more psychological or therapeutic slant and focus on the problem in terms of the individual victim and the individual violent man.

Literature also indicates that centres had to emphasise co-operation rather than conflict with community agencies (Black et al., 1994; Collins et al., 1989; Matthews, 1994; Reinelt, 1994). The relationship with the community changed and many centres altered services and formalised divisions of labour between newly recruited paid staff and volunteers. The staff of centres changed to include mainstream feminists and apolitical women, who would previously have been neither welcome nor interested in the more radical feminist centres. The changes that centres have undergone have led to questions being raised as to whether comprehensive services for survivors of violence have been accompanied by the abandonment of social change goals and the original aim of a violence-free society.

**Dual-roles of Anti-violence Organisations**

Anti-violence organisations have a dual function – part service provision and part political change. In order to provide services for women, funding must be sought. This, in the most part, comes from the state. In order to address the issue of violence against women the movement must engage with the state and campaign for change. The extent to which organisations can adopt a pragmatic approach and engage with the state, whilst at the same time remaining autonomous in order to avoid institutionalisation, is now a key area of debate (Cuthbert & Irving, 2001; Stedward, 1987). Indeed, recent literature is turning to the dual-roles of anti-violence organisations, and how both of these might be incorporated. Charles (2000) provides support for the argument that feminist welfare provision works; that organisations can in effect operate as part of the welfare state, but at the same time retain autonomy. Women’s Aid in the UK is an example of this; it has engaged with the state in order to improve the material position of women, but resisted co-optation, institutionalisation and diminishment of a feminist political analysis of violence that has been witnessed in the US (Charles, 2000; Stedward, 1987). Similarly, the
women's refuge and crisis movement in Sweden facilitated the passing of legislation in 1998 that provides for state funding for all anti-violence organisations offering services to survivors of violence, and despite their close relationship with the state and the existence of consensus politics in Sweden, the movement has retained its autonomy. The incorporation of the movement that has been witnessed in the US has not occurred in the UK and Sweden to the same extent. The circumstances and strategies which must be adopted for this approach to be successful, and for institutionalised movements to further resist this trend, are key areas of consideration.

**Social Movement Scholarship**

When considering the changes and developments the women's and anti-violence movements have undergone since the 1970s, and in trying to develop a deeper understanding of these, it is necessary to consider what scholarship on social movements can offer us in this respect. It is important to note that this thesis is not concerned specifically with social movement theory. It is concerned with the experience of the feminist social movement, exemplified in the form of the anti-violence movement, in terms of its history and trajectory, its relationship with the state, and the strategies and tactics it has employed in pursuing its goals and interacting with the state. Therefore, rather than analysing this large body of theory here, I will indicate the usefulness and limitations of such theories for understanding the experiences of the women’s movement. Charles’ (2000) analysis of social movement theory in relation to the feminist social movement informs this section.

Historically, the study of social movements has been divided into two distinguishable clusters or traditions. The first is known as 'new social movement' theory (NSMT)

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and has European origins, and the other is referred to as the ‘political process’ approach or resource mobilization theory, which has US origins (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). Both of these approaches have limitations when studying the women’s and feminist movement.

NSMT has limited applications for studying the women’s and feminist movement. Charles (2000) points out that many critics have claimed that new social movements are not actually ‘new’. There is both theoretical and empirical evidence for this assertion, in that new social movements do not necessarily resemble each other on many levels, often have considerable continuity with movements of the past, and are claimed to be ‘new’ as a result of structural transformations in society. However, these transformations are seen as occurring in capitalism, modernity or industrialism. They neglect to consider any changes in gender relations, and so have little application when attempting to explain feminist social movements (Roseneil, 1995 cited in Charles, 2000).

Charles (2000) also indicates that new social movement theory has been criticised for being ethnocentric, and has focussed almost exclusively – although she notes the exception of Castells – on movements in the first, or industrial world, with the claim that new social movements are based on post-material values. She also states that the supposed decline in the importance of material production, which it is claimed has been replaced by the production of signs, has resulted from a process of theoretical abstraction that is itself gendered, and has in fact little in common with the material realities of women’s lives, and those of many men. She argues that women are heavily involved in the production of both bodies and things, and that the labour of women and the working classes is necessary if material needs are to be met, an issue even more relevant to third world societies where material scarcity is more evident. Therefore, the claim that new social movements are unconcerned with issues of distribution of wealth and resources is unrealistic when they are in fact key features of many social movements, including the women’s movement.
Touraine (1992), conforming to the ‘action-identity’ paradigm, makes the distinction between social and political movements. Charles (2000) says this obviously creates a difficulty for him when considering the women’s movement, leading him to claim that it is not strictly a social movement in that it is concerned with both social and cultural change, as well as political change. She also discusses Melucci’s (1985) difficulties in theorising about the women’s movement within the framework of new social movement theory. In order to resolve these difficulties Melucci separates the women’s movement from feminism. He claims that feminism concerns women who were involved in the emergence of second wave feminism who affected social policy and succeeded in getting institutions to adopt feminist practices: essentially an equal rights feminism or referring possibly to the women working within institutions now referred to as ‘femocrats’. On the other hand, Melucci claims the women’s movement is characterised by its concentration on cultural dimensions rather than any direct confrontation with political institutions: a more ‘submerged’ phenomenon. Charles says his claim is that visible public mobilisations no longer exist, with the exception of occasional single-issue campaigns, and that the women’s movement is mainly symbolic in nature existing in submerged networks. By doing so, she claims, he manages to fit the women’s movement into his theory of new social movements, thus conceptualising it as cultural and symbolic rather than political. It is clear however, that to do so neglects to address the political aspects of the women’s movement, as Charles (2000) criticises most new social movement theory for doing, and does not incorporate the element of the women’s movement that directs its activity towards the state, which has always taken equal importance with the desire for cultural change within the movement. Melucci (1989) criticises the US-dominated resource mobilisation perspective, which I discuss further below, for failing to realise that “contemporary social movements, more than in the past, have shifted towards a non-political terrain: the need for self-realisation in everyday life.” (Melucci, 1989:23). However, Charles (2000) argues that there is no convincing evidence that what are considered ‘old’ social movements, in that they are not part of new social movement theory, were any less concerned with cultural change than they were with political change.
New social movement theory focuses predominately on issues of class, despite the claim that new social movements are not class based. Charles (2000) points out that scholars have considered the high numbers of the middle class in new social movements, but has neglected to consider the gender dimension and the high numbers of women involved. If new social movements are not class-based, but those arising from industrialisation were, then I would argue that from the NSMT perspective the women’s movement is a new social movement in that it is concerned with issues of gender inequality while at the same time is interested in class-based inequalities. Charles indicates that women’s involvement in new social movements has often been attributed to their marginal position in relation to the labour market, but that this does not wholly address the involvement of professional women, younger women and students. Furthermore, what is also ignored is the issue of collective identity and structural inequalities, not only in relation to gender but to ‘race’ and class as well. In fact, gender differences of participants in social movements seem infrequently tackled. McAdam (1992) studied male and female participants in the Mississippi Freedom Summer Project (promoting the civil rights campaign and votes for blacks), and was concerned with the extent of heterogeneity among participants, and the minority of women. He concluded that gender is the most important mediator of the activist experience, which is evidence to suggest that to neglect the gender dimension of social movement participation and the role of collective identity is a fundamental flaw. This seems especially pressing when the movement under scrutiny involves only one gender.

Further evidence of the importance of the political dimension in social movement participation is provided by Black et al (1994), who studied a sample of movement participants in rape crisis centres and battered women’s shelters in Texas. They hypothesised that the greater the influence of political motivations for social movement involvement, the greater the perceived acceptance of participants would be – in other words, the greater would be their sense of collective identity. The study found that psychic (for example, feeling good about oneself as a consequence of helping others) and altruistic (wanting to help others for its own sake) motivations were the strongest, but that political motivations such as ‘helping to stop the problem
of rape and battering’ were also significant. The findings of the study suggest that the movement participants studied have altruistic or psychic motivations for becoming involved but that feminist political biases compel them to do so in women’s movement organisations such as rape crisis centres and refuges for battered women. Blanton (1981) also indicates the importance of collective identity for movement participants, indicating that for women “the level of commitment to an FMO (Feminist Movement Organisation) can be quite deep, since members may be seeking not only a work setting or vehicle for social change, but also an experience of ‘sisterhood’ and personal acceptance.” (Blanton 1981 cited in Riger, 1984:104).

From a resource mobilisation perspective a social movement is a “set of opinions or beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society” and a social movement organisation is “a complex, or formal, organisation which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or a countermovement, and attempts to implement these goals” (McCarthy & Zald, 1977: 1218). Resource mobilisation theory, then, emphasises structure over ideology and, when used to analyse the women’s movement, produces what are known as ‘collectivist’ or ‘bureaucratic’ strands, and suggests that only the latter can facilitate policy change. A large number of women’s movement organisations that organise collectively or democratically have been instrumental in achieving policy change along feminist lines (Charles, 2000), but by virtue of its concentration on bureaucratic forms of organisation, resource mobilisation theory neglects to encompass these organisations. The US dominated approach of resource mobilisation theory (RMT) is also problematic when used to analyse the women’s movement, and as Charles (2000) indicates, this is largely to do with its focus on rational choice theory and organisation. She cites Ferree (1992), who argues that the centrality of rational choice theory to the RMT perspective creates a fundamental gender bias. This is because from an RMT perspective participants in social movements are seen as being devoid of social characteristics and therefore seen as rational actors encompassing ‘universal attributes of human nature’ (Ferree, 1992:41 cited in Charles, 2000:49). As Charles points out, feminists
have long argued that these apparently ‘universal attributes of human nature’ are in fact attributes of white western middle class males.

The centrality of rational choice theory to the RMT perspective is also problematic because it assumes the only motivation for those involved in a movement is self-interest. Not only is this problematic in that people may be motivated by a variety of things other than and including self-interest, as Charles (2000) notes as one of Ferree’s (1992) main criticisms, but she also notes that many movements have developed a critique of instrumental rationality. The majority of resource mobilisation theorists have failed to incorporate this and have thus asserted a particular point of view as objective and universal, thereby neglecting to acknowledge that people’s motivation for action is likely to be broader than self interest.

For example, literature indicates that there are likely to be a number of motivations for people’s involvement in a movement (Black et al, 1994; Cnaan & Goldberg-Glen, 1991; Gluck, 1979; Rubin & Thorelli, 1984; Smith, 1982; Wiche & Isenhour, 1977). Indeed, social exchange theory has frequently been used to address this question. This refers to the actions of an individual being motivated by the returns those actions are expected to bring, although these may not be tangible or stipulated in advance (Blau, 1964). Altruism, the direct opposite of self-interest, is also often cited as a motivating factor, with Sills (1957) making the distinction between ‘altruism’ (other-oriented), and ‘egoism’ (self-oriented) motives. Kidd (1977) has also distinguished between ‘intrinsic’ motives and ‘extrinsic’ motives. Some scholars, for example Pittman et al (1984), feel social exchange theory is particularly well equipped for the study of women who participate in the women-specific organisations of the women’s movement, stating that “attracting and retaining workers, paid or volunteer, revolves around the worker’s estimation of the intrinsic and extrinsic benefits of the job” (Pittman et al, 1984: 33). Obershall (1973) also used social exchange theory by developing a risk/reward ratio for estimating the likelihood of joining a social movement.
It should be noted that existing research fails to distinguish between the motivations of social movement participants to join a social movement, and their motivations for continued involvement – the motivations behind both of these may be quite separate (Gidron, 1984). This is partly due to the fact that when researching social movement participants, the population by its very nature are those who have continued their involvement, and those who have ceased their involvement are often not accessible.

Melucci (1989) is critical of social exchange theory and claims it is inadequate for studying volunteers participating in social movements because it fails to encompass the complexities, given that volunteering in a social movement involves multiple processes. McAdam (1992) also states that social movement participants, particularly in the women’s movement, are a diverse rather than a homogeneous group, and that social movements are characterised by unstable memberships. In addition, it is probable that the reliance of women’s movement organisations on volunteers in order to provide alternative welfare provision in the form of refuges and crisis centres – and few human service agencies rely on volunteers as much as those known as ‘female enclaves’ (Black et al, 1994) – means that conventional approaches to social movement participation fail to address the complexities of being involved in a movement that is both a campaigner for social change and a provider of welfare services. The motivations for volunteering in a social movement and being a member of a particular social movement organisation that delivers services may be distinct. The women involved may not necessarily see it as a social service or social movement, or both (Pahl, 1979). Either way, it would appear that neither rational choice theory nor social exchange theory adequately address the complexities and multiple motives of women involved in the women’s and anti-violence movements. There is a lack of fit between the theory and what happens on the ground in anti-violence organisations. The nature of ‘doing’ is not addressed.

Charles (2000) also indicates that the resource mobilisation perspective is problematic for studying the women’s movement because of the concept of organisation that is used. By emphasising the organisational nature of social movements, RMT fails to encompass those movements that lack the resources to
form organisations. Not only is this perspective class biased since it only includes movements with enough material resources to form organisations, as Charles (2000) indicates, but it also fails to include the women’s movement that has eschewed bureaucratic and formal organisation, opting for forms of organisation more in line with feminist politics. Refuges for battered women and rape crisis centres often organise collectively (although it should be noted that an organisation does not have to be collective to be feminist (Martin, 1990)), use non-hierarchical forms of organisation, and make decisions based on consensus and democracy. Such organisational forms were not stumbled upon accidentally, but were chosen to adhere to feminist politics (Matthews, 1994) where no one individual or group has power over another. This form of organisation is not exclusive to the women’s movement and is also found amongst other social movements.

Literature also indicates that those women’s movement organisations that are characterised by bureaucratic forms of organisation, and therefore combine qualities of a social movement organisation as defined by McCarthy & Zald (1977), are often criticised for becoming co-opted (Martin, 1990). In actuality, few feminist organisations reflect a ‘pure’ or ‘ideal’ type and “feminist organisations range along a continuum, with actual structure and ideology not necessarily being consistent” (Matthews, 1994:3). Martin (1990) believes scholars should exercise caution before labelling mixed types co-opted, institutionalised, or no longer part of the women’s movement. The assumption is made that for a group to be truly feminist it must be a ‘pure’ or ‘ideal’ type, and as such must have a collectivist internal structure, though Martin (1990) argues that few do so. In Chapter 3 I discuss in detail the body of literature that argues that the move away from collective organisation of rape crisis centres and refuges represents a process of institutionalisation and bureaucratisation, and with it an abandonment of social movement status (Collins et al, 1989; Byington et al, 1991; Gornick et al, 1985; Matthews, 1994; Black et al, 1994; Scott, 1993). I also argue in Chapter 3 that distinctions and dichotomies such as ‘collectivist’ and ‘bureaucratic’ have not proven empirically evident. As a result, the centrality of organisational form to the resource mobilisation perspective renders it inadequate for studying the women’s movement.
A further criticism that Charles (2000) notes of the RMT perspective is the concentration on strategy and the underlying assumption that all social movements develop some form of strategic action based upon the availability of resources and political opportunities, and ultimately that their success or failure can be measured in terms of their strategic effectiveness. Although some movements do develop strategies, or rather they may fall into a pattern of action that may subsequently be seen as a strategy, others in fact, and Charles (2000) cites Roseneil’s (1995) discussion of the Greenham women’s peace camp as an example, have no identifiable strategy and action may be based on ‘affective and emotional impulses’. Strategies that groups employ are also diverse and differ over time and between issues. The case of the anti-violence movement is particularly interesting in this respect, as strategies that are adopted or the pattern that develops is likely to differ when those groups are emphasising their role as service provider compared to when they are emphasising their role as campaigners for political change (Stedward, 1987).

Furthermore, as I will argue later in the thesis is the case with Rape Crisis in the UK, the movement itself may not necessarily choose the strategy, but rather other key players such as the state may take actions that force a movement to adopt or pursue a particular strategy, or indeed may prevent them from pursuing certain ones. It is also the case, as is discussed in detail in Chapter 3, that movements may adopt different strategies at different times and achieve different outcomes. Charles (2000) goes on to say that it is also not straightforward that a movement’s success or failure can be measured, and this is particularly pertinent when cultural change is considered. She cites Scott (1990) saying that a movement’s decline or disappearance is not necessarily indicative of that movement’s failure, but rather that the issue may have been successfully incorporated into policy and its goals achieved. Social movement goals are related to the ideology of the particular movement. For many involved in the women’s movement, policy reform and adequate service provision are important, but the wider societal and structural change remains their main aim. As Stedward (1987) notes, it is not possible to easily fit the demands of the women’s movement into specific policy reforms in specific areas. It requires wider change and a reappraisal or working practices, policies and society.
Criticisms of the RMT perspective come not only from its concentration on issues of organisation, but also for its neglect of ideology and grievances, as it gives no attention to meaning, identity, solidarity, culture and the emotional basis of action (Charles, 2000). She cites Buechler’s (1993) research on the US women’s movement which suggests that grievances were equally important as resources in mobilising women in second wave feminism, and indeed feminist ideology and collective identity was developed through the process of politicising women’s grievances. The consciousness raising groups of the 1960s and ‘70s that aimed to make ‘the personal the political’ are a prime example of this. Grievances often provide opportunities for the rise of a social movement as a focus for collective action.

It should also be noted that there are problems in relation to the presumed structure of women’s organisations from the new social movement perspective as well. From this perspective, the ‘original model’, or the ‘pure’ or ‘ideal’ type of feminist organisation is seen as typifying new social movements. That is: recruitment to a feminist group based on politics not skill; collective organisation and eschewing hierarchy; explicitly feminist ideology; decision making by consensus; and the use of volunteer or unpaid staff – also referred to as counter or neo-bureaucracies (Charles, 2000). New social movement theory has limitations for studying the women’s movement because it conforms to the notion that feminist organisations fit the ‘original model’ and that this is somehow “quintessentially feminist” (Charles, 2000:149). In reality, not all organisations conformed to this model at their inception (National Organisation of Women, for example), and even fewer do now. To accept this argument would be to accept the notion mentioned briefly above, and discussed in more detail below, that any other form of women’s organisation is a deviation and no longer part of the women’s movement (Martin, 1990; Reinelt, 1994).

**Summary**

It is clear from Charles’ (2000) discussion of social movement theory that neither new social movement theory nor resource mobilisation theory are sufficient for examining the women’s movement. As she summarises:
...feminist social movements can neither be defined unequivocally as new social movements nor do their forms of organisation and action correspond to those identified within RMT a characterising social movement organisations. (Charles, 2000:52)

I would argue that the variety of approaches to the explanation of the phenomenon of social movements suggests that no one of them is able to explain everything. The different approaches may be applicable and correct in their local sphere, but stressing either specific types of social movements and then considering them to be universal, or putting all the attention on a single aspect of the phenomenon of social movements and ignoring others means no one approach adequately addresses this complex issue. Despite their inadequacy for analysing the women's movement as stand alone theories because they are compromised by their reliance on concepts which are gender-blind, there are some useful aspects of each that can be helpful when studying the women's and feminist movement in relation to the state and policy change.

NSMT is useful, Charles (2000) notes, because movements are seen as being located in civil society as opposed to the economy, and those involved are not directly related to capitalist production and involve wider groups rather than just the industrial working class in a process of social reproduction rather than production. The emergence of movements is also seen as a consequence of state activity, for example the expansion of state control, and as a response to state policy. Furthermore, she notes that they challenge hidden power relations by naming them and, because they are primarily cultural in orientation, they challenge the inappropriate use of state power. Through the formation of collective identities, new ways of being within the world arise and challenge the values on which capitalist society is based.

The usefulness of the RMT approach, Charles (2000) argues, is that the construction of collective identities is part of the formation of social movements and that this is linked to structural inequalities. The RMT perspective focuses its attention on the social environments in which social movements operate, in particular the
organisations that make collective action possible and the political opportunity structures that impact upon the emergence and form of social movements.

We have seen that social movement theory fails to acknowledge the dual roles of the anti-violence movement in terms of alternative service provision and campaigning for political change. When considering the history and development of the movement and the factors that have influenced this, it is necessary to pay attention to both these roles. Failing to do so means social movement theory is inadequate for analysing movement participants’ motivations for becoming involved, and by measuring movement outcomes in terms of policy reform it neglects to encompass much of the work of the anti-violence movement in the form of service provision and their aim of wider societal change. This dual role means those involved, the strategies adopted, the organisation of the movement and its relationship with social and political structures such as the state is distinct.

It is to the issue of the role of the state that I now turn: its importance for the anti-violence movement; the effect it has on the emergence and development of a movement (in particular the feminist movement in Sweden and the UK) and in what way it may facilitate or repress a movement’s activities; and how the nature of the state in which a movement develops and operates may affect the impact it is able to have on policy.
Chapter 2 - Feminist Theories of the State

Introduction

The dual roles of anti-violence organisations mean it is necessary to consider the role of the state not only in its capacity as abuser of rights and its potential to alleviate women’s oppression, but also in its capacity as the main funding body for the organisations set up by the women’s movement as alternative forms of welfare provision for women suffering male violence.

Movements often make demands on the state and its agencies to change policies, and it is the resultant conflict that is central to their stories and the trajectories they have taken. The women’s movement and second wave feminism have been instrumental in achieving profound changes in society and in social policies that support women’s rights, as well as campaigning to protect women’s existing rights, much of which has been achieved through demands for policy change. Given the changes that have taken place, and the fact that the movement recognised the state’s power to grant women’s rights, it is necessary to examine both how these changes have come about, and to develop a theoretical understanding of how states and social movements relate to, and interact with, one another. This is especially important when the state’s social control functions intertwine with its social welfare functions (Gordon, 1988). Not only is the state shaped by social movements, it also provides the political framework from which social movements emerge (Charles, 2000; Gelb, 1989; Kaplan, 1992; Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996). Therefore, the state is a central consideration of this research because,

...the most salient differences ... in addressing male violence can be found in the location of the struggle; the role of the women’s movement; and the centrality of feminism in relation to the state. (Eliasson & Lundy, 1999:89)

This chapter outlines the importance of the state to feminism and to this research, and the reasons why the movement has historically been reluctant to engage with it. It considers different feminist approaches to the state and how the nature or ‘type’ of state may affect both the emergence of the women’s movement and the form that it
takes, and subsequently how it develops. Lastly, the impact the movement is able to have on policy depending on the nature of the state in which it operates, as well as the nature of the movement itself, is discussed.

**Importance of the State to Feminism and the Anti-violence Movement**

The state is a key focus of demands by the women’s and anti-violence movements. On a practical level, it has the ability to promote women’s rights and to improve the quality of women’s lives through policy and legal change, as well as the ability to take steps to alter the actions and conduct of its bodies charged with ensuring women’s protection from male violence. The state is one of the main organisers of the power relations of gender through legislation and policy and through the way it is implicated in the construction of the public and the private (Connell, 1990).

On a more theoretical level, the state is also identified by the women’s and anti-violence movements as one of the main oppressors of women’s rights and as the institution that defines what is legitimate or illegitimate in terms of violence against the person, and in what circumstances such violence can be used. As Cohen (2001) and other scholars have documented, the state is one of the main abusers of women’s rights, particularly in times of war when rape has been used as a form of attack. The alleged rapes of thousands of Bosnian women by Serbian forces are an example of this. Although the figures are still disputed, there is evidence to suggest that the rape of Bosnian women was a deliberate policy of Serbian forces during the war (Cohen, 2001: 254). It is the state’s ability to define what is legitimate and illegitimate, and its monopoly on the control of force, that ensures feminism must engage with it in relation to sexual violence (Franzway et al, 1989).

At the same time, the state is also the main sponsor of organisations that are part of the women’s movement, such as refuges and rape crisis centres. The movement relies on the state to fund alternative welfare provision so that vital services for women can survive. Thus, like the anti-violence movement, the state also has dual roles.
The Dilemma for Feminism and the Anti-violence Movement

The dual roles of the anti-violence movement as well as the state mean the politics of women’s involvement with the state is complex. It is a site of both threats and opportunities for feminists (Franzway et al., 1989; Connell, 1990; Eisenstein, 1991). Historically, the women’s movement has been reluctant to engage with the state. This has been to a greater or lesser degree depending on the women’s movement and the state involved. This will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter.

With the advent of state funding for feminist organisations, the movement was forced to confront the potential costs and benefits of engaging with it. State funding is cited in US literature (Gornick et al., 1985; Matthews, 1994; Reinelt, 1994) as a significant factor in the shift of refuges and crisis centres as a network of radical organisations mobilising for social change to a network of organisations with a social service orientation. In relying on the state for funding, the anti-violence movement is seeking funding from a body whose policies it wishes to change. As a result, there is an inherent risk of compromising the opportunities or scope for that change. As Tilly (1978) notes, if the state is the focus of demands by a movement it becomes a significant player when it has the ability to facilitate or repress movements by making collective action more or less costly. As a result, feminists remain ambivalent and wary of the state, and activists have had to face the compromises and dilemmas imposed by accepting government funding so that services vital to women can survive (Watson, 1990). Indeed, feminist commentators have remarked upon the ironies of “appealing to a masculinist state for protection against the violence of individual men” (Pettman, 1996:10).

There is a concern that when the anti-violence movement engages with the state the feminist political understanding of the causes, impact and potential alleviation of male violence against women is marginalized. Even if social problems that have traditionally been seen as private are successfully redefined as public issues, there is still the risk that these may be reframed in a way a movement does not intend (Matthews, 1994). There is a tendency for the state to dilute issues when it adopts them and, as a result, feminism loses control of definitions (Mackay, 1996). The state
encourages a more individual model of violence against women, making it an ameliorative concern rather than seeing violence as symptomatic of male domination (Matthews, 1994). Funding has been a particular concern because the state’s ideological preference can be instituted by imposing conditions on funding that impact on organisations’ structure, working practices, and by encouraging a service orientation to their work.

Olsen (1981) notes that one of the major potential costs of participation is the loss of freedom, control and the pure ideological position organisations are based on. Benefits of engaging with the state for organisations can include legitimacy, status and the ability to influence policy, and for anti-violence organisations the ability to ensure basic service provision is met. The costs of the loss of ideological identity can be particularly high for some sections of the women’s movement that are deeply suspicious of male dominated society and refuse to play by the rules of the game (Stedward, 1987). Other sections of the women’s movement have been more willing to engage with the state and see potential benefits as outweighing potential costs.

This complex relationship with the state means interactions with it must be negotiated carefully, given that the state is,

\[\text{simultaneously target, sponsor, and antagonist for social movements as well as the organiser of the political system and the arbiter of victory. (Jenkins, 1995:3)}\]

This research is concerned with how the feminist and anti-violence movements have impacted on the state and the extent to which they have been successful in achieving their goals of policy change, changes in gender relations and the provision of alternative welfare services. It is also concerned with how the feminist and anti-violence movements have been impacted on by the state and how the negotiation of this complex relationship affects the strategies adopted. This is discussed in detail in Chapter 3. This problematic relationship between the feminist movement and the state requires us to look at both structure and agency (Waylen, 1998). This chapter largely considers the former, and the latter is addressed in Chapter 3.
Different Feminist Approaches to the State

Feminists have theorised about the state in a number of ways (Watson, 1990), and different feminists conceive of the state, and women’s actual and potential relations with it, differently. These distinct approaches offer more or fewer possibilities, as well as limitations, for feminist engagement with the state. Despite these differences, what these approaches all share is the commitment to including gender as a category of analysis when developing theories of the state, one that has been more or less excluded in traditional state theory emerging from liberalism and Marxism (Waylen, 1998). Indeed, in McLennan et al (1984) The Idea of the Modern State, the index contains no references to ‘gender’, ‘feminism’, or ‘sex’, and there are only five pages listed in reference to ‘women’. Feminists have sought to remedy the gender-blind nature of state theory.

Liberal or equality feminists seek an end to state-sanctioned discrimination against women and urge state action for women’s equal rights. Although the state is male-dominated, liberal feminists believe increasing women’s access and power can alleviate gender inequalities. From this perspective the state is seen as a neutral arbiter between groups, but as Waylen (1998) points out, it cannot provide a sophisticated understanding of why the state has not always fulfilled this role for women. Nonetheless, liberal feminists are willing to interact with the state to achieve policy change that is positive for women and essentially see the state as ‘good’ and open to change. This approach is characteristic of the one adopted in Scandinavia, where there is a history of social democracy and consensus politics. As a result, some Scandinavian feminists argue that they are seeking a women-friendly state and that they are state-friendly feminists (Hernes, 1987). Liberal feminists see state structures as having possibilities for agency.

In contrast to the liberal approach, there are a number of feminist positions that are more wary of the state, and less optimistic about its potential for working in the interests of women. Socialist feminists see the state as propagating dominant class as well as gender interests and so are more ambivalent towards using the state for feminist goals. This approach has been criticised for adding women’s inequality into
a framework that was developed to analyse class inequality, therefore women’s oppression is seen as functional for capitalism (Waylen, 1998). Despite seeking a transformation of the state, many socialist feminists also recognise the need to engage with the state in order to defend women’s practical interests now (Molyneux, 1989).

Radical feminists, like socialist feminists, are also wary of the state and sceptical about its potential for benefiting the position of women. For radical feminists, women’s oppression is a priority and the male state is part of that oppression. The state is seen as patriarchal and as reflecting the male dominated nature of society in that it upholds the rights of men at the expense of the rights of women (Waylen, 1998). As a result, they are hostile towards further intrusion by the state in women’s lives, but at the same time many urge state action in defence of women’s rights.

There have been attempts to generate typologies of the state based on gender as well as class (Charles, 2000; Sainsbury, 1994), and a body of literature has attempted to redress the balance by incorporating the masculinist and patriarchal nature of the state into analyses (Walby, 1986; Gordon, 1988; Pateman, 1988; Mackinnon, 1989). Some feminists have attempted to develop dual system theories that combine both capitalism and patriarchy and see the state as mediating between these two systems and acting in the interests of both. I believe that one main problem with these attempts is their failure to provide a detailed explanation of the nature of the relationship between the two systems, or to address potential conflicts between the two systems. For example, it is likely that capitalism and patriarchy may compete for women’s labour, and dual system theories currently offer no explanation of how this conflict may be resolved, or in whose favour.

The three approaches of socialist feminists, radical feminists and dual system theorists, although differing in their analysis of the causes and potential alleviations of women’s oppression, share a strategic view that, on the whole, interaction with the state should be avoided. All three approaches see the “power of structures as overwhelming, leaving little room for agency.” (Waylen, 1998:5).
In response to these categorisations of the state, some feminists criticised their functionalist analysis for viewing the state as acting in the interests of different groups in a relatively unproblematic way (Franzway et al, 1989). Pringle & Watson (1992) argue that interests that are articulated around the state, as well as feminist political strategies, need to be reconsidered from the perspective of post-structuralist theory (cited in Waylen, 1998:6). This approach emphasises practice, discourse and process; rather than seeing the state as an arena where interests are given, it is seen as an arena where they are actively constructed, and where as a result the state is a by-product of political struggles. Therefore, post-structuralist feminists emphasise the internal workings and discourses of the state, which they see as a series of arenas constituted through discourses. From this perspective a number of possibilities for change exist, but outcomes are largely unpredictable (Pettman, 1996). Waylen (1998) points out that this approach offers one way of transcending the dichotomy between structure and agency.

**Problems and Complexities in Talking About 'The State'**

Talking about the state is typically problematic. Some feminists, who do not conform directly to the post-structuralist approach, have taken issue with the idea that both the state and women’s interests are unitary (Waylen, 1998). Charles (2000) explains that, because the state is defined and experienced as both a set of institutions standing over us as well as something that permeates our daily lives and in which we participate - be this unwillingly or willingly, this has led to questions concerning both the existence of the state and its usefulness for feminist practice (Abrams, 1988 & Allen, 1990 in Charles, 2000). Judith Allen (1990) indicates that, because so many feminist objectives appear to hinge on policy or legal reform, for example rape and domestic violence, for many feminists this has warranted a focus on the state. However, she goes on to argue that ‘the state’ has not been an indigenous category of feminist theory, but rather it is an import with parameters and definitions designed for political positions other than feminism. Despite this uneasy use of the concept of ‘the state’, it must be grappled with if a deeper understanding of the feminist movement’s impact on policy is to be further understood and analysed, simply
because the movement identified it as a central focus of demands. Waylen’s (1998) response to Allen’s (1990) position is that:

The conclusion that the analysis of the state up until now has been too aggregative does not necessarily imply that trying to theorise the state is a worthless enterprise, but can imply instead that more sophisticated analyses are necessary. (Waylen, 1998:4).

Previously, feminists who have attempted to theorise about the state have treated it as a coherent institution and have taken one aspect to count for the whole, for example Mackinnon’s (1989) analysis of the law. However, ‘the state’ is an abstraction that refers to a set of relations, practices, and institutions, ranging in Western states from warfare and policing to the provision of funding for community organisations (Pettman, 1996). Feminists also take up different positions in relation to the state at different times, indicating both the complexity of the state and women’s relations with it. Therefore it is not possible to see the state as a homogeneous category or a monolith, since it involves various levels, including the local and the national, and multiple arenas.

If we view the state as being heterogeneous and made up of a set of institutions and contested power relations, as not lying outwith society, and as a site of struggle, then it is possible to see the state as an institution that reflects gender relations and inequality as well as creates them. For example, Charles (2000) argues that the state plays a part in constituting social divisions and categories through forms of representation and intervention, and through the way it operates its legal and social policy. She cites Esping-Anderson in illustration of this point:

The welfare state is not just a mechanism that intervenes in, and possibly corrects, the structure of inequality; it is, in its own right, a system of

Charles (2000) argues that social movements mediate this dialectical process between society and state. She argues that feminist social movements engage with the state in two ways: by confronting it and by working within it. The state both constrains and enables the movement and is both oppressive and responsive to demands for change. Therefore, when feminists engage with the state they take the risk that their interests will be incorporated and redefined in ways not concordant with a feminist political analysis, but at the same time there is the possibility that political demands will be met and feminist interests will be represented. She states that:

This means that the state has to be engaged with both internally and externally in order to change its policies and to challenge the gender order. (Charles, 2002:28).

As a result, if the nature of the state or the relationship between the state and gender relations is not fixed, then it is possible that battles can be fought in the arenas of the state (Waylen, 1998). This perspective offers the possibility of investigating a situation where institutions defined as patriarchal are apparently pursuing feminist objectives (Savage & Witz, 1992), because if the state were simply a single entity that supports the dominance of men and the oppression of women, how would we explain state policies that apparently pursue feminist objectives?

3 It is important to note that despite Esping-Anderson’s (1990) insights, and although he recognises the role of the family as well as that of the economy, he maintains the split between family and economy and links gender interests to the family and class interests to the economy, therefore perpetuating the public/private divide intrinsic to state theory. Charles (2000) notes this shortcoming in Esping-Anderson’s approach, and Lewis (1992) provides detailed criticism of the neglect of gender in the analysis of welfare regimes.
‘Types’ of State & the Emergence of Second Wave Feminism

Different types of feminism and the state both result in different approaches from feminist groups and movements. The approach followed emanates from their theoretical understanding of the state, and different types of state generate different types of collective action (Birnbaum, 1988).

The political terrain at the time of the emergence of second wave feminism was very different in the UK and Sweden. As a result, the women’s movement took distinct forms in the two countries and has followed different trajectories since. As Margolis says, although the women’s movement is global, “within each country the movement follows a distinctive course, developing structures and agendas in response to local circumstances” (Margolis, 1993:379/380). Bouchier (1984) indicates that the women’s movement may be more successful in countries with strong constitutional guarantees of gender equality, going on to argue that right wing governments threaten repression but offer clear opposition, whereas left wing governments offer relatively safe environments for change but threaten debilitation through a lack of clear opposition. If rights are denied, or existing rights threatened, then social movements are likely to emerge (Kaplan, 1992), whereas if desired change is already institutionalised or being developed, then collective action is probably less likely (Gelb, 1989; Kaplan, 1992).

Most analyses of the women’s movement focus on the experience of the US (Charles, 2000), and the vast majority of the literature documenting the anti-violence movement is US-dominated. Although this research focuses on Sweden and the UK, given that comparisons with the US about the trajectories, strategies, growth, and decay, of the anti-violence movement and its organisations are difficult to avoid, it is necessary to look in more detail at the political circumstances in which the US movement emerged.

Gelb (1989) provides a useful analysis of the emergence of second wave feminism in relation to the type of state, comparing the United States, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Gelb claims that the US is a society where strong pluralism prevails,
whereas Sweden and the UK are both corporatist and centralist states, and that this in turn explains the different forms of second wave feminism that emerged.

The US is characterised as a weak state that is relatively open to, and can be easily influenced by, interest groups. As a result the women’s movement had been encouraged to establish professional organisations that focus both on the provision of services to women, and also campaign and lobby on issues of importance to women with the aim of achieving policy change. Because political parties are weak, organisations can then influence government directly. Equal rights and liberal feminism has dominated in the US and so movement action has mobilised primarily around policy change, state legislation and legal reforms. Ferree (1987) argues that equal rights and liberal feminism has dominated in the US because of a lack of a strong socialist tradition, as well as the movement’s roots in the civil rights movement. Given its liberal stance, the US movement has been prepared to engage with state bureaucracies, leading to the claim that the movement has become institutionalised and co-opted, thus diminishing its efforts for social change (Gelb, 1989).

Second Wave Feminism in Sweden

In Sweden in the 1970s, the state had made a commitment to gender equity, which included the right of women to be free from violence (Eliasson & Lundy, 1999). The idea that both women and men should have equal rights and responsibilities in society had been institutionalised and women’s traditional economic dependency upon men had to a large degree been transferred to the state (Hernes, 1987). Therefore, within the Swedish welfare state, an individual model of social policy had developed (Kaplan, 1992; Sainsbury, 1994), and significant legislation and policy changes took place despite the absence of a widespread feminist movement (Kaplan, 1992). In fact, the advanced nature of Swedish reform is cited as an explanation for the lack of a mass feminist movement in Sweden (Gelb, 1989; Kaplan, 1992). In Sweden,
as a general rule women’s organisations do not stand in a particularly strong position in relation to public authorities and in the main have no great influence on public policies. …women’s organisations occupy a marginal position in relation to the established corporate system, although this varies greatly according to the organisation. (Dahlerup & Gulli, 1985:34-35)

Gelb (1989) explains this in terms of the corporatist nature of the Swedish state, where politics are based on consensus. As a result there is a tendency to incorporate political interests into the dominant social democratic party and trade union organisations. Given that gender equity is a commitment and has been incorporated into policy, the state pre-empted many feminist demands, making the need for collective action less pressing. Therefore, the Swedish women’s movement did not emerge or develop to the same extent as the movements in the US and other parts of Western Europe. Eliasson and Lundy (1999) claim:

It is ironic that the centrality of gender equity as a philosophy also contributes to the denial of gender differences and conflict in that country and thereby masks the need for separate organising by women. (Eliasson & Lundy, 1999:87)

This gender equity commitment resulted in existing women’s organisations being co-opted and transformed into interest groups similar to those found in the US (Kaplan, 1992). The need for special organising by women was not seen as urgent, and it was perceived that change would be more readily achieved through existing political channels rather than working from outside the system. As a result, most of the shelters for survivors of violence in Sweden conformed to the ‘philanthropy model’, with the emphasis mostly on helping without any conscious feminist emphasis (Dobash & Dobash, 1991). It also explains why, until more recently, most women’s organisations have chosen the ‘mainstreaming’ strategy, as opposed the ‘disengagement’ strategy (Briskin, 1991). The extent of the action that was set in motion by the government in Sweden in the 1960s and 1970s (for example marital rape was criminalized as early as 1962), may partly explain why the women’s liberation movement lost the initiative and became absorbed into the party system.

The active public policy of equality between men and women in Sweden presumably meant that women concentrated on the traditional political
Furthermore, feminism has been resisted in Sweden because it would polarise women and men (Eliasson & Lundy, 1999), so women were neither encouraged to nor comfortable with identifying as openly feminist. It has been more difficult to address specific feminist issues in Sweden because there is an assumption that equality has already been achieved to a large extent. Gustafsson says:

...virtually all men tend to interpret women’s rights (such as having the right to vote, get elected, speak freely, and other formal rights) as significant indication of gender neutral citizenship. (Gustafsson, 1998:48)

This has made it more difficult to address other specific feminist issues, like violence against women. Recent research suggests that this ‘backlash’ has resulted in an increasingly activist feminist outlook for Swedish women, with Eliasson’s (1994) recent survey of women’s shelters indicating that most have taken on a more consciously feminist-activist orientation.

Second Wave Feminism in the United Kingdom

The situation in the UK was rather different. Social and welfare policy has historically been based upon the presumed economic dependence of women on their husbands (Charles, 2000), and at the same time the British state has been reluctant to intervene in the family (Lewis, 1992). However, like Sweden, the second wave feminist movement also emerged after significant legislation legalising abortion, and Gelb (1989) argues that the movement had little impact on equal opportunity legislation that was passed at that time. The 1960s was a time of reform and liberalisation in the UK, and it could be argued, as Melucci (1993) states, that the feminist movement emerged at a time of policy change that provided feminists with motivations as well as institutional resources.

Gelb (1989) argues that the UK state is not very open to interest groups because the party system remains strong with politics still framed in relation to class issues.
Therefore, the women’s movement focussed on autonomous organising rather than setting about influencing a state closed to external pressures. Kaplan (1992) also argues that because the UK women’s movement was linked closely to the labour movement and trade unions, it always remained of secondary importance to class analysis. However, Berry (1984) claims that in the UK interest groups are very important as they can often influence or determine policy, although this relationship is rarely acknowledged. Berry (1984) does note that some groups tend to be more influential than others, for example labour unions are more influential than peace groups. Stedward (1987) notes, “Clearly, not all groups can gain access. Equally, not all groups wish access, if they feel so alienated from the political system or believe that the costs of participation are too high.” (Stedward, 1987:211). Nonetheless, the government in the UK is less susceptible to pressure groups than other countries such as the US.

Charles (2000) is critical of Gelb’s (1989) typology because it fails to include the way in which feminists have worked, both collectively and individually, to put issues onto the policy agenda and the subsequent gains this has produced. It also fails to acknowledge the work done by feminists both within and outwith the state at the local level – an arena that has been particularly useful for UK feminists. Nonetheless, there is evidence to suggest that as a result of the nature of the state in the United Kingdom and the radical and socialist feminist approach that characterises the UK women’s movement, the anti-violence branch of the women’s movement concentrated on autonomous organising, forming groups such as Women’s Aid and Rape Crisis which operated in the most part outwith the state.

**Summary**

It is clear that the distinct paths taken by the women’s movement in the three countries, and with it their work to stop violence against women, largely reflect historical differences in the struggle for gender equality and the social condition of women in each country (Eliasson & Lundy, 1999). It is also clear that states affect social movements, the form that they take and the strategies they employ to facilitate change. These strategies will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter.
In Sweden, literature analysing the state and the development of social movements (Gelb, 1989; Kaplan, 1992) suggests no large scale women’s movement developed because the state had incorporated equality politics at an early stage, therefore masking the need for autonomous organising outwith the state. As a result, networks of women’s organisations have had a relatively close and institutionalised relationship with the state. The history of social democracy and consensus politics has meant the women’s movement has adopted what appears to be a liberal feminist approach and sought change and reform within and from existing state structures.

In the UK, literature suggests that the closed nature of the political system and the marginal position of interest groups in terms of access to policy makers and influence over policy, has meant the women’s movement has focussed on autonomous organising outwith the state, and has considered the costs of institutionalised state engagement as too high in terms of the potential loss of control and ideological stance. The dual roles of anti-violence organisations in both countries means a certain element of engagement with the state is necessary if service provision is to be funded, and if policy reform is to be sought. How organisations manage this complex relationship with the state is a central question of this research.

There are a number of questions this research seeks to address. Given the nature of the state in which these movements operate, what strategies are open to them for engaging with it? What differences are there in the way the Swedish anti-violence movement and the UK anti-violence movement have operated, and what opportunities have been open to them? In turn, has the Swedish women’s movement’s close relationship with the state compromised feminist goals, as well as their autonomous organisational base, resulting in an institutionalised approach where women’s movement goals are also compromised? And, for the UK, has the reluctance of the movement to engage with the state meant limited impact on policy and the exclusion from decision-making processes?

Stetson & Mazur (1995) offer a typology of the state that refers to the institutionalisation of feminist interests through the establishment of agencies such as
ministries for women and equal opportunities commissions, with the aim of
achieving ‘feminism from above’ through policy implementation that is positive for
women. The typology is based upon equal employment policy (EEP). Stetson &
Mazur (1995) identify four different types of state based upon policy influence – that
is, the participation of women’s policy offices in the formation of feminist policies
that promote the status of women, and policy access – the degree to which women’s
policy machineries develop opportunities for feminist and women’s advocacy
organisations to exert influence on feminist policies.

Within this typology both Sweden and the UK are characterised as having high
levels of policy authority, but low levels of access for women’s organisations or
feminist groups. However, the reasons for their categorisations are different.
Lovenduski (1995) indicates that in the UK the Equal Opportunities Commission
(EOC) harnessed the power given to it but has been reluctant to engage with
women’s and feminist organisations. This in turn has discouraged equal
opportunities-oriented women’s groups from pursuing close collaboration with the
commission. Elman (1995) indicates that in Sweden, JÄMO, the Equality
Ombudsmen, was charged with identifying problem areas for women, taking cases to
the labour courts and tackling sexual harassment. However, JÄMO failed to bring in
feminists on its staff, or to empower feminist activists. When it has worked with
political activists it has been those in political parties or trade unions who tend to
focus on gender-neutral notions of equality – the approach that has characterised
women’s issues in Sweden.

The preceding discussion about the emergence and impact of social movements
would not suggest Sweden and the UK would be likely to be found in the same
category when considering movement organisations’ access and influence over
policy. It can be argued that Stetson & Mazur’s (1995) typology is too simplistic.
The criteria for categorisation within this typology – policy influence and policy
access – are likely to be both complex and fluid, and a total of four final categories
may be too few to categorise states effectively. Furthermore, this typology also
concentrates on national policy machinery, and indeed machinery that deals with
only one policy area (EEP), and as a result it excludes the main locus of state feminism in the United Kingdom: local government – a key arena for autonomous women’s organisations as well as women’s committees. In the United Kingdom local government is an important area of resistance (Watson, 1990) and is often the main provider of funds for women’s organisations. Similarly, in Sweden regional government and the municipalities and Kommunen (local government or councils) are key areas for women’s organisations in that they provide funding and are often the target of lobbying and campaigning (Dahlerup & Gulli, 1985).

This typology is of limited use for understanding the women’s and anti-violence movements because Stetson & Mazur (1995) concentrate on state structures and their ability, or inability, to provide organisations with access and influence, and fail to pay much attention to the strategies and agency of these organisations and in what ways their actions determine policy access and influence. Analysing the problematic nature of states’ and social movement organisations’ relationships requires a consideration of both structure and agency. Their typology is also inadequate for addressing the dual roles of anti-violence organisations who may have a very different relationship with state structures and agencies in their role as service providers than in their role as campaigners for social change.

Another question raised by engaging with these debates is whether the experience of different branches of the anti-violence movement within each country is the same. Existing typologies suggest that experiences of groups within a country are likely to be similar. Therefore, from Stetson & Mazur’s (1995) typology we would expect the experience of Rape Crisis and Women’s Aid in the UK to be similar. If the nature of the women’s movement from which the anti-violence movement developed, and the nature of the state in which it operates, determines the relationship between movement organisations and the state, then we would expect the opportunities and constraints faced by the branches of the movement within each country to be the same. However, it is not only the nature of the state and the history and development of the women’s movement that determines this relationship. The agency of particular organisational groups, the subsequent strategy adopted, and the extent to which they
are able to capitalise on opportunities are also significant. These issues are addressed in the following chapter, as is the potential impact on organisations of engagement with the state – given the two-way nature of interaction – in terms of loss of control and feminist ideology, as well as potential benefits in terms of policy access and funding.
Chapter 3 - Women's Anti-violence Organisations and the State

Introduction

The previous chapters have outlined the importance of engaging with the state for the anti-violence movement in terms of accessing funding for alternative welfare provision and seeking policy reform. There are a number of factors that can facilitate or limit this interaction, and the basis on which it occurs. Feminists have chosen to intervene in the state and in turn to influence policy by working both within state structures and outwith them. The nature of the state, feminist political persuasion, and the nature of the women’s movement have impacted on the strategies adopted.

This chapter discusses the strategies open to the feminist movement, the constraints and opportunities that it faces, and how this complex relationship with the state can be negotiated. It is concentrated largely on women’s organising outwith the state, in the form of the autonomous organisations of the women’s anti-violence movement, and how they have sought to influence the state and, in turn, how the state has influenced the anti-violence movement. Women’s movement organisations seek to influence the state,

The difficult task then, is to turn political structures toward feminist goals without being absorbed in to the structure. (Margolis, 1993:391)

Political Opportunity Structures

The preceding chapters have provided an overview of some of the literature that details the importance of the political context in shaping the emergence, development and subsequent impact of social movements. More recently, literature has included the concept of ‘political opportunity structures’ when considering the development and impact of social protest movements (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996).

The concept of political opportunity structures (POS) can be helpful when examining the strategies adopted by a movement (Kitschelt, 1986; Kriesi, 1995; Tarrow, 1994).
Some studies of political opportunity structures have viewed them as stable, referring to stable aspects of government structures. On the other hand, a number of studies have used a more dynamic approach and examined both the likely outcomes and costs of pursuing collective action. Some aspects of political opportunity are stable, for example traditions and institutions, whereas others are unstable such as public policy, political openness and elite alignment (Gamson & Meyer, 1996 cited in Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996).

It is necessary to consider POS as dynamic, because movements can affect political opportunity structure in a number of ways, for example by influencing policy, altering political alignments, and raising public awareness of an issue (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996). Social movements also alter the structure of political opportunity for subsequent challengers, including themselves. As McAdam (1982) discusses,

...any event or broad social process that serves to undermine the calculations on which the political establishment is structured occasions a shift in political opportunities. (McAdam, 1982:41).

POS can take the form of an opportunity that arises from openness, but can also arise from a threat. As Meyer & Straggenborg (1996) indicate,

For some challengers, increased political openness enhances the prospects for mobilisation, while other movements seem to respond more to threat than opportunity. (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996:1634)

For example, women’s organisations in Sweden have capitalised on the institutionalisation of equal opportunity politics and have functioned as specialists on public bodies concerning children, women and the family, and they have had considerable influence on the formulation of public policies in these fields (Dahlerup & Gulli, 1985). On the other hand, the women’s movement in Sweden had to respond to the threat of the removal of rape from the statute books following the Swedish government sex crimes commission report in 1976 (SOU, 1976); on this
occasion they adopted a strategy that criticised the workings of the state, the findings and the composition of the committee.

As a result, movements adopt different strategies and tactics in response to changing opportunity structures, and given the dynamic nature of POS, this in turn changes the political opportunities available. Activists can frame issues in ways that are less confrontational and therefore can choose assimilation rather than a more militant strategy, depending on the nature of the opportunity.

One criticism of POS is that many theories include features as structural, which are in fact contingent (Rootes, 1997). For example, a political system may be structurally open or closed and at the same time there can be greater or lesser receptivity of political elites to collective action. Rather than considering political opportunity structures, it is more appropriate to consider political opportunity. Therefore, political opportunity has to be viewed in terms of openness – the extent to which groups can access the administration – as well as in terms of political receptivity to the claims being made. Access is typically necessary for success, but alone it is not enough to determine success: political elites and decision makers must be receptive to the claims being made. Additionally, political elites must also be receptive to those making the claims. For example, the anti-bureaucratic stance of the women’s movement and its preference for alternative forms of organising can mean decision makers are not receptive to them as a group (Stedward, 1987).

Thus, the structure and nature of the social movement organisation making the claim also impacts on political opportunity. When movement organisations respond to the political opportunities available, they adopt structures that help them operate in those particular venues. For example, movements using direct action may adopt flexible structures, whereas those groups which prioritise challenges through the courts, for example, may adopt a specialised and professionalised stance and structure necessary for litigation (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996). Therefore, political opportunity is not simply the openness, or not, of the political system, the receptiveness, or not, of elites, and the acceptability, or not, of particular groups. It is also determined by the
movement organisations involved – the extent to which they themselves are able to be dynamic and adapt structure, public image and strategy according to circumstance.

Activists select tactics from a limited repertoire in response to both organisational needs and the larger political context (Tilly, 1978). These may be institutionally oriented, or extra-institutionally oriented. Direct action is more likely when the political system appears closed (Oberschall, 1973), or when progress is lacking through institutional means. When adopting strategies, groups take into account the ideologies of their constituents, such as preference for direct action and not engaging with state bureaucracies, as well as learn to conform to the norms and practices associated with the venue in which they are operating.

Therefore, no one aspect of political opportunity is deterministic. Rather, the process of social protest is a dynamic one. It is true, as the preceding chapters have discussed, that the nature of the state in terms of openness to challenge, its stance on particular issues (for example the sanctions it can employ through fines and limiting protest opportunities, and as will be discussed in relation to anti-violence movement organisations, restrictions imposed through funding), are critical in influencing a movement’s strategy and tactics. At the same time the nature of the movement affects the tactics and subsequent influence it is able to have, in that structurally it may be antithetical to the workings of state bureaucracies; some within a movement may make it more difficult for the movement to frame issues in ways that appeal to public opinion; and in some cases, once in place, structures can constrain the development of tactical repertoires (Freeman, 1975).

Failure to innovate makes mobilisation more difficult and is a pre-cursor to movement decline. (McAdam, 1982)

There are of course other factors that influence policy and political change. I am not suggesting that political opportunity is the only feature that impacts on the possibility of policy change; other factors such as wider political, cultural and socio-economic
change are also likely to influence changes in state policy (Charles, 2000). For example, developments in equal opportunities and equal pay legislation are associated with the service sector expansion in industrialised economies after the Second World War and the accompanying labour shortage (Norris, 1987).

Political opportunity is useful for understanding the relationship between women’s anti-violence organisations and the state because it allows for an understanding of this relationship as dynamic, and therefore incorporates the impact the movement can have on states, how this might be achieved and what may prevent it, as well as the impact the state may have on the movement. Political opportunity also incorporates the notion that states are not monolithic but are a site of struggle and conflict, at the same time incorporating the notion that organisations are also dynamic and may adapt in response to different circumstances. In turn, their ability and willingness to adapt contributes to their effectiveness in seeking change from the state. The following section considers the features that may contribute to movement organisations being insiders or outsiders in terms of their relationship with the state, and the strategies they may adopt as a result, as well as the potential costs and benefits of doing so.

**Feminist Intervention in the State**

Feminists have sought to influence policy in a number of ways. Some feminists have chosen to work within state structures and bureaucracies, and new structures have been created, such as ministries for women, with the aim of benefiting women. Some states, for example Australia and Canada, have incorporated feminist inputs into policy-making and have created ‘femocrats’, professional feminists working within state bureaucracies at local and national level (Watson, 1990; Eisenstein, 1995). Elsewhere, feminists who have been appointed to policy machinery charged with ensuring gender equity may have few relationships with feminists or feminist organisations (Pettman, 1996). Many states, including Sweden and the UK, have developed women’s sections and policy machinery for putting women’s rights on the agenda. However, issues are often translated into welfare issues and often deal with women as a category rather than analysing the gendered impact of state policies. This
is a risk that is common to all feminist intervention in the state, be it from within or outwith the state.

The state has a tendency to transform or dilute political issues when it adopts them. The *Zero Tolerance* Campaign, initially developed by Edinburgh District Council Women’s Committee and taken up by other authorities and countries (the recent *Kvinnofrid* campaign in Sweden is a development of this) does not follow this pattern. This radical campaign, which used empowering images of women, and not victim imagery, received widespread support. Mackay (1996) attributes this in part to the increased visibility of women in popular politics and the local state, as well as the social, political, and personal salience of the issue of violence. All of these features contributed to the political opportunity for a successful campaign. It is clear that strategies of feminist women working within the state can be successful for feminist goals. However, the Scottish Office later adopted the *Zero Tolerance* Campaign for a series of television campaigns that were widely criticised by feminist groups for their use of victim imagery, indicating the state’s ability to redefine feminist issues as apolitical, individual issues, and the need for feminists not to be complacent and to remain watchful for this. A success for feminism may become a risk when the arena in which the issue is located changes.

Eduards’ (1997) research also indicates the importance of the increasing visibility of women in popular politics in terms of achieving feminist goals. Municipalities with low levels of female representation had no shelters for battered women, and there was a positive correlation between female representation and shelter provision. Scandinavian feminists insist on the possibility of a woman-friendly state, and some dismiss the idea that it is patriarchal given that it has increased women’s empowerment and emancipation. All Nordic parliaments have a critical mass of women members, and this may contribute to their optimistic view of the role of the state. As Arnlaug (1993) suggests, “The increasing representation of women in elite politics suggests a power base to build a women-friendly state or, more precisely, a base from which to advocate women’s interests” (Arnlaug, 1993:49). However, caution should always be exercised, as Eduards (1997) also notes the ability of the
state and its agencies to rename political demands concerning violence against women, thus effectively eradicating the political aspect.

One of the risks of engaging with the state for the anti-violence movement is that states prefer the individualised treatment model of addressing male violence, rather than the more political analyses (Eduards, 1997; Matthews, 1994). Dobash & Dobash (1992) also emphasise the government’s tendency to adopt the ‘individual pathology angle’ when addressing violence against women, and therefore to be willing only to recognise anti-violence organisations for their practical and material solutions. The state redefines demands to quell protest and maintain legitimacy. Evidence suggests that the increased visibility of women in the political arena may go some way to preventing this, or at least providing the opportunity to challenge it. Dahlerup & Gulli (1985) argue that what is required is institutionalised attempts (women in politics, women’s organisations and pressure groups), as well as a separate women’s movement, to make radical claims and not play by the rules of the game. Therefore, autonomous women’s groups organising outwith the existing political system which are willing to both interact with the state as well as challenge it can mount a significant campaign to improve the unequal position of women in society. Which political environment and strategy must be adopted to make that possible whilst at the same time avoiding cooption and institutionalisation is a main question of this research.

**Insiders, Outsiders and Thresholders**

It is likely, as with the emergence of distinct forms of second wave feminism in different states, that different types of feminism produce different approaches to the state, based both on their theoretical understanding of the state and the specifics of the country in which the movement develops. As discussed in the preceding chapter, liberal feminists, in the US and Australia for example, where there are more ‘femocrats’, see the state as gender-neutral and therefore open to influence. Conversely, radical and socialist feminists, which characterises UK feminism more, see the state as embodying repressive class and gender relations and are therefore more likely to maintain a critical distance from it.
However, the reality of feminist engagement with the state is not that simple. Both socialist and radical feminists have engaged with the state. Socialist feminists have done so in the arena of local government, engaging with it on its own terrain, whereas radical feminists have done so through the formation of refuges for women engaging with the state from an autonomous organisational base (Charles, 2000).

In considering the position accorded to groups in terms of policy access and the extent to which implementation of that policy is possible, exemplified through an analysis of Women’s Aid in Scotland, Stedward (1997) uses Grant’s (1977)\(^4\) distinction between ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ groups, which recognises that some groups have difficulty gaining access to policy makers. Groups can be classified in terms of access and acceptability, which relates back to the distinction drawn between political opportunity structures, and political opportunity. Grant’s (1977) approach is useful because it incorporates both the perceptions of decision makers as to which groups are acceptable, and therefore legitimate, as well as the strategies adopted by the groups themselves as a determinant of access (Stedward, 1987).

Insider groups are those which are recognised as legitimate and are part of the regular consultative framework. Such groups deliberately pursue strategies that are more likely to gain insider status and develop a perception of the ‘rules of the game’ (Stedward, 1987; Eduards, 1992). Those groups considered outsiders are not usually involved in consultation processes and, though outsider status does not necessarily mean they will have no influence, groups with this status appear to have little influence in practice. Stedward (1987) argues that this is because it is likely they have not \textit{chosen} their status as outsiders. The extent to which the adoption of a particular position as outsider or insider is a \textit{choice} is discussed in more detail below.

Stedward (1987) goes on to suggest that the incorporation of May & Nugent’s (1982) categorisation of some groups as ‘thresholders’ is a useful extension of Grant’s (1977) dichotomous model. Thresholder groups are those that adopt a variety of strategies and achieve a status in the policy process that places them on the threshold of insider status. Such groups exhibit strategic ambiguity and oscillate between insider and outsider strategies, on some occasions seeking close relationships with the state and on others adopting a more hostile and distant strategy. This typology is useful because it recognises that some groups may be excluded, some included, and others may have an ambiguous position depending on the role of the organisation and the issue they are pursuing. As a result, it is particularly useful for considering the anti-violence movement, which has two distinct roles and may adopt different positions at different times.

On the whole, it is a reasonable presumption that most groups would prefer insider status, given that “The advantage of being on the inside track of social policy seems overwhelming.” (Stedward, 1987:213). However, not all types of participation are to the advantage of a group, and the particular form of participation can be crucial in determining whether a group’s interests will be best served by maintaining a critical distance from state structures, or by engaging in enthusiastic participation. There are obviously costs and benefits of formalised participation (debates about these in relation to literature on the US women’s movement are discussed below). Benefits can come in the form of policy influence, cartelisation, efficiency, legitimacy, and funding; costs can come in the form of the loss of freedom, control, purity and ideological positions (Olsen, 1981). As a result,

Benefits and costs are neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive, but they characterise the differences among forms of coordination. These effects pose

This is the dilemma for feminism. In particular, the risk of cooption and institutionalisation can be very high for the women’s movement because of their feminist ideological stance and the likelihood that state involvement in an issue will result in its redefinition, diminishing its political analysis.

Anti-violence organisations identified their dual roles as service providers and as agents campaigning for political change from the outset of the movement. Stedward (1987) indicates that in the case of Women’s Aid, some demands are quite radical, but the service delivery element of their work has opened up the prospect of a close relationship with government in the implementation of public policies. Consequently, Women’s Aid are a thresholder group because when emphasising their service delivery role they are able to employ insider strategies, and when challenging the fundamental nature of male dominated society, they inevitably have to adopt an outsider strategy.

For anti-violence organisations to successfully negotiate this complex relationship and to adopt strategies appropriate to the claims they are making, and the arena in which they are making them, a pragmatic approach must be adopted in relation to the state. The ability to adopt a pragmatic approach, and for it to be successful, relies firstly on being accepted by the state as an insider by virtue of service provision status, as well as a willingness on the part of the organisation to adapt strategy. Organisations are required to weigh up the relative costs and benefits of adopting a pragmatic approach, and with it sacrificing elements of ideological purity.

The dilemma for organisations in adopting a pragmatic approach and therefore risking ideological purity has become a salient one as organisations have adapted to the changing political climate in which they operate (Cuthbert & Irving, 2001). As a result of these dilemmas, despite more than three decades of grassroots involvement, scholars disagree about the nature of rape crisis centres and refuges and their ability
to influence entrenched gendered practices and social structures. For some organisations, the adoption of a pragmatic approach has allowed them to influence the state and in turn facilitate policy reform. This has inevitably required the modification of a purist ideological stance.

For example, adopting a pragmatic approach requires groups to establish themselves as having appropriate expertise, thus encouraging groups to adopt a professional stance, something which they have long resisted. Furthermore, as Stedward (1987) notes, using the example of Women’s Aid, if groups are to be included and to be involved in the policy process and receive funding as insiders, then they inevitably have to entertain the idea of compromise.

Women’s Aid is faced with one overwhelming problem: to be in on the act one has to be invited, and to be invited one may have to compromise. (Stedward, 1987:230).

Additionally, state welfare provision is based upon the client/service provider model, a dichotomy that is far from the ‘women helping women’ philosophy that the anti-violence movement adopts. Conversely, collective working and the involvement of battered women in service provision are antithetical to the state’s view of welfare provision. In order to adopt a pragmatic approach, women’s organisations must be willing to adapt, or appear to adapt, some of their positions in relation to these issues. They must also be willing to fiercely defend those positions they are not willing to compromise on.

The changes that centres have made when adopting the pragmatic approach (and some organisations have changed more than others, as will be discussed in the following chapters) have contributed to the debate as to whether such organisations can be viewed as social movement organisations or social service organisations, a debate that also stems from their dual roles as campaigners for change and providers of alternative welfare provision. This argument has arisen because, in pursuing the objective of service provision and in seeking funding to do so, organisations have
had to adopt insider strategies and engage with the state, which, in turn, has impacted upon their ability to campaign for wider social change and to adopt outsider strategies.

Accepting the women’s movement’s analysis of violence requires far-reaching welfare and policy reform, and these are changes the state is reluctant to make. The women’s movement is then faced with the choice of engaging to seek policy reform to benefit the immediate and material position of women, or maintaining a critical distance. It is possible to gain further understanding about the tendency to view women’s movement organisations as either social service organisations or social movement organisations if we make the distinction between reform and reformism (Bunch, 1981). Organisations accused of abandoning social movement status may have adopted the ideological position of reformism. That is, the belief that women’s liberation is achieved by a process of institutional changes that will ultimately bring women equality within the existing social, economic, and political order. This ideological stance may also be called a liberal feminist stance. This is distinct from reform, which refers to a change or strategy that can be employed for either radical or reformist ends. However, some organisations accused of abandoning social movement status may not be reformist, but may be seeking reform. Such groups recognise that freedom for the oppressed comes not through reformism leading to equality, but only through a radical restructuring of the ideology and institutions of society. Reform strategies may be useful in that struggle (Collins et al, 1989), a position the social movement/social service dichotomy does not recognise.

Distinguishing between anti-violence organisations in terms of social services or social movement organisations is not empirically evident, as I discuss below, as crisis centres and refuges take multiple forms and pursue multiple goals, developing appropriate strategies in response to local circumstances. The argument about the nature of rape crisis centres and refuges has stemmed from the realisation that refuges and crisis centres no longer resemble the form they took at the time of their emergence in the 1970s, a form which is regarded as some as a ‘pure’ or ‘ideal’ type. This change is seen as indicative of a move away from radicalism and the
diminishment of social change goals in favour of service provision for survivors, and attributed in the most part to the advent of state funding for violence related services.

**The ‘Original Model’ and an ‘Ideal’ or ‘Pure’ Type**

The structural or organisational form of women’s movement organisations is a key area of scholarship, and collective forms of organisation are often regarded as the ‘ideal’ or ‘pure’ type of feminist organisation. A dichotomy is created between conventionally structured organisations, such as the National Organisation for Women (NOW) in the United States, and the collective groups that operated through networks of activists. From an RMT perspective it is upon this basis that the distinction between ‘collectivist’ and ‘bureaucratic’ types is drawn (Ferree & Hess, 1985). The difference between the two types is summarised thus:

> ...bureaucratic organisation ... is characterised by a formal division of labour, written rules, universal standards of performance, hierarchical offices, impersonal relationships, technical expertise, and individualistic achievement norms. In contrast, the ideal type of collectivist organisation is a community of like-minded persons, with minimal division of labour, rules, or differential rewards. Interaction among staff is holistic, personalised, informal, and designed to achieve consensus. (Ferree & Hess, 1985:49).

Adopting an RMT perspective that emphasises structure over ideology, Freeman (1975) claims that a group’s structure is key to its survival. She claims that bureaucratic groups are more likely to be able to mobilise resources and therefore survive, whereas collective groups are more innovative but have a tendency to be short-lived and ineffective. She also claims that the bureaucratic groups implemented the collective groups’ innovations, while the collective groups adapted to their environments and transformed their goals from radical social change to ameliorative social service projects that were ‘politically innocuous’ (Freeman, 1975:145).

However, Matthews’ (1994) research on the rape crisis movement in the US led her to claim the opposite. She found that feminists with a bureaucratic orientation were most likely to conform to the ameliorative approach and concentrate on service provision, whereas the collective groups created a new form of action in the form of activist service provision, which they implemented themselves rather than relying on
the bureaucratic organisations to do it for them. Matthews (1994) claims that in the US it was institutions and groups outside the movement that depoliticised crisis work and conformed to the social service approach. I will argue in the following chapters that dynamic and adaptable ‘hybrid’ groups, which adapt their structure and approach according to opportunity and circumstance, are more likely to survive and fulfil movement goals than either bureaucratised groups, which run a high risk of co-option, or ‘purist’ groups, which run the risk of being excluded and therefore short lived or unable to facilitate change.

US literature suggests the majority of rape crisis centres and refuges for battered women that emerged during the 1970s were grassroots, non-hierarchical, collectivist centres run by volunteers. The majority of centres were freestanding and not affiliated to other agencies or bodies (Gornick et al, 1985; Byington et al, 1991). US literature suggests that few centres fit this model, and they are often criticised for abandoning social change goals and conforming to a social service approach (Matthews, 1994; Reinelt, 1995). The centres that emerged at this time were generally, small, unaffiliated groups offering services to adult female survivors of violence. Centres generally undertook education to lay audiences and aimed to change procedures in, and monitor, agencies dealing with survivors of violence. Services that were provided were generally low-cost, non-medical, short term and delivered by trained volunteer women who were not, and did not regard themselves as, social service professionals, and who were often survivors of violence themselves. This has parallels with other branches of the women’s movement that emerged at the same time, such as health care for women, particularly surrounding birth control and abortion. The community education aspect of anti-violence organisations’ work was structured to adhere to the overall goals of the women’s movement and the feminist analysis of the roots and repercussions of violence (Gornick et al, 1985). Many centres were started by women already involved in consciousness raising groups; therefore, empowerment was a key strategy.

As noted above, those with an RMT perspective emphasise an organisation’s structure over its ideology. However, this poses a problem when analysing the
women's movement. Feminists did not stumble upon collective organisation by accident, but rather it was chosen as a radical critique of existing social organisation and was part of a larger cycle of protest that challenged existing paradigms (Kriesi, 1989). For feminists involved in collective organisations, not only the goals were important – the means by which they achieved them were of equal importance (Matthews, 1994). The RMT approach suggests only bureaucratic organisations can facilitate policy change. This is clearly not the case with Women's Aid, where a collectivist organisation has achieved significant policy change (Charles, 2000; Stedward, 1987).

Collective organisation was not without its problems, though. Women with more charismatic personalities were able to impose ideas on other women, particularly if they had the support of wider friendship networks (Charles, 2000). Therefore, the organisational structure that was designed to eliminate the concentration of power in the hands of the few often did not work in practice. Practically, too, collective organisation in its purist sense, which involves decision making by consensus, was often time consuming and impractical in the day to day running of an organisation. Freeman (1975) also argues that collective organisational structures were often unwelcoming and exclusive and resulted in a 'tyranny of structurelessness' that was not more or less anti-democratic than a traditional hierarchy. It is also argued that the original collective model of crisis centres failed to incorporate difference between women, and in fact caused differences to be suppressed. Although collectivist groups were regarded as being good at innovation, more formally organised groups are more stable and able to put innovation into practice (Staggenborg, 1995). Literature is too inclined to view organisational structure as being polarised and an either/or situation. To do so fails to incorporate the multiple forms and strategies a movement may adopt. Freeman (1975) argued for an organisational structure that combined the positive elements of each form, essentially a 'hybrid' form of organisation that is part hierarchy and part collective. This organisational structure would mean that groups would be more formalised and centralised but without necessarily being hierarchical.
The Move Away From Radicalism and the 'Pure' or 'Ideal' Type

US literature suggests that, as the number of centres grew in the 1970s and ‘80s, there was also radical change from a small homogeneous core to a large and diverse group of programmes which resembled the ‘original model’ less and less (Gornick et al, 1985; Matthews, 1994; Reinelt, 1994). These changes are attributed to several events since the 1970s. As discussed in the opening chapter, the increased public awareness of violence as an issue took the pressure off crisis centres and refuges as sole agitators. Furthermore, the mental health profession’s awakening to the issue of violence and its clinical implications widened the scope of discussion away from feminist politics and towards the experience of violence for the individual. Many US organisations hired clinical psychologists and social workers as counsellors, and this move was accompanied by a notable rise in the number of publications concerning rape trauma syndrome and battered women’s syndrome, something that Matthews (1994) believes is a manifestation of an increasingly therapeutic society, and an increasingly therapeutic state (Polsky, 1991). Not all organisations incorporated professionals, but many took on a professional air and began screening potential staff and volunteers as well as formalising recruitment procedures. States certainly prefer the individualised therapeutic model of welfare work, and state provision is based upon a service provider/client model that views the providers as experts and professionals, therefore best placed to serve the needs of the individual. This approach is antithetical to the approach and goals of the women’s movement who prioritise how the service is delivered, as much as the service itself.

One of the most significant changes is thought to be the influx of state monies for rape and domestic violence related services. This allowed for the hiring of professional staff, contributing in turn to the professionalisation of the movement (Matthews, 1994). Many centres had to comply with certain regulations in order to gain funding, such as the election of a board of directors or management committee. Funding requirements meant that centres had to make themselves more attractive to legislators, thus encouraging an emphasis on service provision rather than social change and radicalism. Centres also had to emphasise cooperation with community agencies rather than conflict. The staff of many centres changed to include
mainstream feminists and apolitical women who would have been neither welcomed nor interested in the more radical feminist centres. These changes that centres have gone through have also led to questions being raised as to whether they have resulted in comprehensive services for survivors of violence but the abandonment of social change goals and the original aim of a violence-free society (Collins et al, 1985; Matthews, 1994; Reinelt, 1994). I will argue in the chapters that follow, in the case of the UK and Sweden, changes are indicative of dynamic organisational approaches and strategies, with organisations seeking to project a particular image and to exploit material resources, whilst at the same time retaining movement goals.

It is also argued that state funding encourages professionalisation through centres identifying as ‘experts’ on rape and battering in order to achieve legitimacy (Staggenborg, 1995). As a result, many organisations came to believe themselves better equipped to provide services to women survivors than mainstream social services. There is a concern that such therapeutic frameworks often disguise social ills as personal trauma (Polsky, 1991). As a result of funding requirements, many centres adopted hierarchical structures and instituted routine bureaucratic practices, and in the US some organisations expanded into crime centres, therefore neglecting the gender-specific approach to their work. The influx of ‘new victims’ into these centres meant a feminist political analysis seemed less pertinent, which has also led to claims in the US that many rape crisis centres and refuges for battered women were no longer agitators for social change but had been transformed into social service organisations.

**Dichotomies and Distinctions**

It is certainly true that rape crisis centres and refuges for battered women do not fit the ‘original model’ of the 1970s, and that the second wave feminist movement does not now exist in the form it did at its outset (Charles, 2000), but there is little evidence to suggest that the dichotomies and distinctions drawn between different ‘types’ of feminist organisation are particularly powerful, nor even observable in reality. Furthermore, given the, at best, thresholder status, at worst outsider status anti-violence organisations may inhabit, and the necessity for those engaging with
the state to adapt to political opportunity and the dynamic nature of the relationship, it is unrealistic to expect organisations to retain the form they supposedly did at the outset. Given the literature on political opportunity, social movement organisations and the state, to do so would be likely to preclude successful policy change.

We must be careful not to view the relationship between the state and social movement organisations as deterministic or to see organisations as being ‘done to’ by the state, and therefore passive actors. To adopt such a position would allow no room for agency on the part of organisations, and would fail to see the relationship as dynamic. Not all change is necessarily bad, and to assume it is relies on dichotomies that are not empirically evident, and assumes there is an ‘ideal form’ of organisation and those that do not conform to this model are somehow not feminist and not pursuing feminist goals. Although the state can exert control over organisations to an extent, by encouraging them to work in a particular way, movement organisations can also manage their interaction with the state and, as a result, decide what level of compromise is acceptable or unacceptable.

Although feminism became associated with collective organisation which was largely critical of existing masculine power structures, not all feminist organisations fit easily into this model (Matthews, 1994), neither in the 1970s nor now. For many feminists in the US, organisational structure was not of great importance, and adopting a conventional organisational structure was a matter of convenience. Empirical observations, Matthews (1994) argues, indicate that any rigid differentiation between collectivist and bureaucratic strands is unrealistic.

Ferree & Hess (1985) argue that in the US, as the number of centres grew, the distinction between collectivist forms and bureaucratic forms rapidly diminished and US feminism came to embrace a spectrum of forms, although it should be noted that the critique inherent in collectivist organisation remained. It is misleading, Matthews (1994) argues, to think that collective groups simply became more bureaucratic, because in actual fact the collectivist critique still influenced groups that adopted more hierarchical approaches and they still retained non-bureaucratic practices.
despite becoming more formalised and professionalised. Charles (1995) also indicates that Welsh Women’s Aid adopted an organisational form that allowed for the specialisation of tasks but that did not involve power differentials. Therefore, adaptations to collective working do not necessarily equate to the adoption of a bureaucratic structure, although for some organisations, in the US in particular, they do. Stedward (1987) also indicates that Scottish Women’s Aid were encouraged to establish a national coordinating body by the Scottish Office because “…when an umbrella organisation does not exist government goes out and assists its emergence, suggesting that governments need these coordinating bodies with whom they can negotiate and consult” (Stedward, 1987:219). At the same time, they have retained their collectivist structure and not become institutionalised in the way literature suggests is the case in the US. She also argues that,

> From the policy-makers’ perspective, it is much more difficult to consult, let alone negotiate with, a group whose leaders cannot act as authoritative spokespersons and who cannot make agreements stick. (Stedward, 1987:222).

Bureaucratisation is not an inevitable consequence of engagement with the state, and it does not necessarily compromise the aims of an organisation (Staggenborg, 1995).

Fried (1994) also indicates that the controversy over the character of anti-violence organisations has not proven theoretically powerful. Martin (1990) argues that the dichotomising of groups as feminist or non-feminist on account of structure relies on an organisational paradigm that may not actually exist, and in any case fails to acknowledge that the relationship between organisations and social structures is both complex and conditional. There is no consensus about what the essential qualities of a feminist organisation are, and this is problematic given the differences amongst feminists themselves. Liberal feminists may not see hierarchy and bureaucracy as anti-feminist, but radical and socialist feminist often do. Martin (1990) opts for a definition of a feminist organisation as being,

> …any relatively enduring (exists for more than a few sessions or meetings) group of people that is structured to pursue goals that are collectively identified. (Martin, 1990:185).
It must also have feminist ideology, feminist guiding values, feminist goals, produce feminist outcomes or be founded during the women’s movement as part of the women’s movement. Apart from this, Martin (1990) claims that groups are otherwise diverse and can be for-profit or non-profit, collectivist or hierarchical, national or local, and legal or illegal. An understanding of feminist groups along these lines allows for the spectrum of organisations to be considered, rather than creating a hierarchy of more or less feminist groups.

Martin (1990) argues that a more intricate analysis is needed, one that encompasses the many ways that feminist organisations vary, and how social movement organisations express ideologies, goals and outcomes that are positive for women. The assumption is often made that feminist organisations can be equated with collective organisation. However, although collective organisation is often chosen because it is compatible with feminist politics, it is not necessarily a condition of being a feminist organisation, and although scholars would rarely argue that an organisation has to be collective to be feminist, many activists often make that claim (Martin, 1990). I believe that literature has concentrated too much on what differs between feminist organisations rather than what they have in common, and that is, for most, a desire to improve the position of women in society. The ways in which that can be achieved and the strategies adopted can take different forms.

Any attempt to divide organisations into bureaucratic or collectivist strands is unrealistic and succeeds in producing organisations that exist at two levels, both of which are ideal types and to which few organisations will ever conform (Rothschild-Whitt, 1979). Matthews (1994) indicates that the collectivist form of organisation became an ideal and a standard that many groups tried to embody, and it is from this that the passionate criticisms of supposedly ‘failed’ collectives stem. This also raises questions about how we define social movement success or failure. For some, whose commitment to a radical or socialist feminist perspective is strong, failure to retain a collective structure and loss of that ideological stance is a cost too high. For others, who see policy reform as important and as a measure of success, those costs are justifiable if sufficient reform is achieved. Accepting the dual roles of anti-violence
organisations means accepting that gains and outcomes can take a number of forms, all of which may contribute to the feminist struggle.

Arguments over the nature of refuges and crisis centres often occur within the movement itself as a result of ideological divisions rather than amongst social movement scholars. For example, in Sweden the two national networks conform to a different feminist political understanding. The ROKS network regards the SKR network as too liberal, and SKR regard ROKS as too radical. Matthews (1994) indicates, and this thesis intends to address in part, that the questions of most importance are not the extent to which organisations are 'pure' types, but to what extent do organisations adopt features associated with collectivist and bureaucratic types? Do organisations become more bureaucratic gradually or inevitably, or is it a combination of external pressures as well as internal political processes? What forms do organisations that comprise the women’s movement today actually take, and how do they self-identify? The position of organisations as thresholders with dual roles is significant in addressing these questions because engagement with the state, particularly in terms of funding for services, has necessitated internal change, in terms of organisational activity and structure.

**State Funding, Institutionalisation and Co-optation**

State funding is often cited as one of the main reasons for the transformation of crisis centres and refuges from the 'original model' – despite the fact that it is unlikely that it ever existed in this 'pure' form – to a more diverse network of social service agencies. Certainly, in the US, as Matthews (1994) indicates, the rape crisis movement has been influenced by a more conservative social service approach that has threatened to submerge the radical political analysis that inspired the movement. Indeed, in the US movement the distinction is drawn between ‘feminist’ groups and ‘social service’ groups (Dobash & Dobash, 1992; Matthews, 1994). However, this has not been the case in the UK (as this thesis will argue). Engaging with the state has costs, but these are not always as extreme as those experienced in the US, where some groups have adopted reformist strategies, and will depend upon the strategy
adopted by a movement and how fiercely they are willing, and able, to defend certain positions.

The initial lack of outside funding for the anti-violence organisations meant that groups were free to explore new organisational forms that challenged bureaucratic structures of power, and, because of the women’s movement’s ambivalence towards the state, they scrutinised possible funding sources. The influx of state monies for these services had an effect on organisational practice given that funding was contingent upon certain restrictions, bureaucratic practices, and the provision of particular kinds of services. In the US, this often involved electing a board of directors, formalising divisions of labour and adopting a client-counsellor approach rather than minimising the difference between helper and helped.

Matthews (1994) indicates the irony of state funding for anti-violence organisations, claiming that in the US,

> The movement aspect of anti-rape work is now less apparent than its character as a network of social service agencies, which are often integrated into the very institutions the early movement opposed. (Matthews, 1994: xi)

The movement against violence was in part a critique of the state not addressing male violence, and the same movement now relies on it for funding, and therefore survival. She claims that,

> …over time, increased reliance on state funding has a contradictory effect on the movement, both effectively promoting the movement’s survival and contributing to its transformation from grassroots activism to professionalised social service provision. (Matthews, 1994: xii)

Support for this argument is offered by Reinelt (1994). She discusses the battered women’s movement in the US, and states that:

> …state funding has provided resources for movement work and stabilised the funding of many local shelter programmes. On the other hand it has threatened movement solidarity by expanding the organisational field based on the
availability of resources not shared philosophical connection. (Reinelt, 1994:692)

Matthews (1994) and Reinelt (1994), among others, draw attention to the state’s ability to co-opt social movements because of their reliance on the state financially and the restrictions inherent in competing in the state’s grant economy. Despite state pressure for conformity though, many US organisations choose not to view themselves as representatives of the state agencies that fund them, and therefore push the state towards new interpretations of their work. Simon (1982) claims that government funding provides stability for organisations but does not necessarily undermine feminist goals. The loss of a feminist stance is not inevitable.

The experience of the Swedish women’s movement also offers support for this argument. The women’s movement in Sweden has always had a close relationship with state structures, and anti-violence organisations have succeeded in achieving core funding for all organisations, but at the same time the movement has succeeded in achieving significant policy reform in line with radical feminist claims. For example, in 1998 the Swedish women’s movement successfully campaigned for, and indeed helped devise, legislative change that guaranteed core state funding for organisations, and also included clauses that criminalized the sex buyer, thus significantly altering the state’s political stance on prostitution. Gould (2001) states that,

Sweden’s popular form of radical feminism has shown itself to be highly effective in mobilising support and creating consensus on an issue which can be very divisive. (Gould, 2001:437).

Such legislative change can certainly be viewed as a movement success, however I would disagree with Gould that it is “radical feminism [that] has shown itself to be highly effective” (Gould, 2001:437). I would argue that the claim was a radical feminist one, but that it was achieved through more liberal channels in line with the strategy the Swedish women’s movement has adopted from the outset, and has proven successful because it was achieved through consultation with the state in a formalised manner where women’s organisations used their insider status to achieve
change. ROKS has attained a position of influence as a result of its work during more than a decade of lobbying political women and government agencies on issues bearing on domestic violence, rape and violence against women in general.

This said, the concern remains that professionalism and institutionalisation of the anti-rape and battered women’s movements lessens rather than expands efforts for social change, a process that has been considerably more marked in the US, but is a concern for all women’s movements because engaging with the state comes with the inherent risk of capture. As Scott (1993) claims,

...the formal organisation of social movements inevitably produces oligarchy and conservatism leading to the decline of militant tactics and ultimately to the demise of social protest. (Scott, 1993:344).

In Sweden, there is evidence to suggest that the movement is adopting an increasingly radical stance and choosing increasingly not to play by ‘the rules of the game’ (Eliasson & Lundy, 1999; Eduards, 1997). The movement has historically chosen the mainstreaming instead of the disengagement strategy (Briskin, 1991). However, the history of equality politics has made issues specific to women more difficult to pursue. As a result, a recent survey of shelters suggests that, over time, many have taken on a more consciously feminist activist orientation (Eliasson, 1994) and have diverged from the traditionally philanthropic model that has characterised the movement in Sweden (Dobash & Dobash, 1992). Therefore, close engagement with the state has resulted in a different situation in Sweden than it has in the US, effectively increasing the social movement orientation of shelter work. Women have recognised that gains have been achieved through formalised participation and are now adapting to the possibility that further change might have to be sought using outsider strategies. In Sweden, “Many shelters have made a point of resisting professionalisation of shelter work and allow only limited appointments of paid workers” (Eliasson & Lundy, 1999). It can be argued that the movement is reacting to a political threat, because despite their insider status and the openness of the state, their reliance on it for core funding and the strength of equality politics may compromise campaigns for change that challenge the gender order. In turn, this
offers further support for the understanding of relationships with the state as dynamic and fluid, and requiring different strategies at different times.

'Managing Violence' and Redefining Violence as an Individual Issue

Matthews (1994) claims this process of co-optation of the anti-violence movement is a deliberate attempt on the part of the state to centralise control of programmes by instituting routine bureaucratic practices. She indicates that, “as the state became involved in the anti-rape movement it recast the feminist definition of rape as a political issue into a problem of the individual victim” (Matthews, 1994:8). She calls this process ‘managing rape’. The state has the ability to make collective action more or less costly and therefore repress or facilitate movements. This is especially the case where the state is the focus of demands by a movement. When the state became involved in the issue of violence it redefined it as a problem of the individual victim, again consolidating the concentration on service provision and funding aimed at maintaining that approach. Effectively this takes the issue of violence out of the political arena.

Matthews (1994) argues that, “State funding for social movement organisations is inherently problematic if part of the movement’s agenda is to change social and political relations” (Matthews, 1994:105). This is especially evident if the state has the ability to withdraw resources if recipients are not compliant. Reinelt (1994) offers support, suggesting that:

...movement activists also recognise the potential political and financial benefits of engaging with the state. This strategy is full of contradictions in that it has the potential to threaten movement solidarity and autonomy, even while it gives movement activists greater access to local shelter organisations and to the structures of state power. (Reinelt, 1994:701).

By focussing on ‘managing’ victims of violence it suggests that, “the state is enmeshed in gender relations not outside them, and incorporates feminist goals only in a limited way” (Matthews, 1994:149).
Charles (2000) argues that this is not the case in the UK, where the majority of organisations are affiliated to national networks of crisis centres or refuges, and are therefore relatively homogeneous. Further, autonomy from the state has been carefully guarded and organisations in the UK have not been co-opted in the way those in the US have. Nonetheless, the nature of state funding still impacts on the activities of anti-violence organisations. Stedward (1987) notes,

Women’s Aid finds itself in a position where it can barely keep refuges and administration running. This has meant the concomitant neglect of broader campaigning. Government funding of the ‘service’ function has siphoned off much of Women’s Aid’s energy into less controversial and less confrontational pursuits. (Stedward, 1987:224).

The main distinction between this and Matthews’ (1994) position is that Stedward (1987) does not include the element of design that Matthews implies on the part of the state. It is seen as happening as a consequence of state funding, rather than by design.

Similarly, anti-violence organisations in Sweden have also remained autonomous despite a close relationship with the state in terms of service provision. In addition, the voluntary status of movement organisations and the fact that they engage most often with the local rather than the national state has meant that autonomy has been easier to preserve in the United Kingdom, where state control is loose and organisations are free to develop women-centred approaches. The downside is that organisations are poorly funded, but, in contrast to the US, organisations can set the terms of how they work.

Nonetheless, the tendency to ‘manage violence’ can also be noted in the UK. Labour’s election pledge in 1995, for the 1997 election, was to give financial support to rape crisis centres. However, this provision was directed to Victim Support instead, which effectively tightened state control and succeeded in focussing the issue on the individual pathology angle therefore marginalizing other provision. Selective funding such as this means the social service approach is institutionalised and a feminist political outlook marginalized (Charles, 2000; Matthews, 1994).
focussing on individual solutions to crime – the Victim Support approach – the state focuses on control or management of the situation rather than elimination of the problem of male violence against women, thus having the effect of ‘managing violence’ rather than ‘challenging violence’.

**Strategy and Tactics – The Dilemma for Feminist Organisations**

It is clear that the way in which feminist organisations choose to engage with the state is of key importance given that they risk sacrificing their autonomy and feminist political principles, but have the opportunity to influence policy and to secure material resources for women. Without state financial provision the movement would struggle for survival, but with it comes the risk of co-optation and institutionalisation. The trajectory of the women’s anti-violence movements in the US, Sweden and the UK have been different because, as we saw in Chapter 2, they started from different positions and have had to react to different political opportunity and circumstances. At the same time, differences between the movements in terms of internal organisation and feminist ideological stance have also meant the trajectories have been different. The current situation of each movement and strand of the movement within each country is a result of a complex process of negotiation of dual roles and subsequent thresholder status.

Debates about the women’s and anti-violence movements tend to focus on what has changed, and why those changes are potentially undesirable. Focussing on the resultant differences between groups characterises them as either ‘better’ or ‘worse’ than one another. It is important to consider what is common to the women’s movement in all three countries, which is that many organisations choose to resist this trend towards co-option and exploit state resources in whatever ways they can while maintaining a feminist perspective and approach to their work. How organisations might achieve this and resist co-option is a more appropriate area of focus. For example, Charles (1995) argues that this is the case with Welsh Women’s Aid, and Stedward (1987) with Scottish Women’s Aid. Eliasson and Lundy (1999) argue that the Swedish women’s movement has resisted professionalisation (although they note that ROKS are ambivalent about this given they describe themselves as
having ‘expertise in the field’). Not all organisations manage to negotiate this relationship with the state as successfully, as I will argue is the case with Rape Crisis in the UK, who have not been successful in achieving insider status in terms of service provision, and therefore are more outsiders than thresholders. These successes and failures raise the question: what features allow this autonomy to be retained whilst allowing organisations access to the state? To what extent are these strategies actively chosen or defined by other environmental and political features?

Summary

Matthews (1994) and other commentators have noted that, in the US, engaging with the state has meant that refuge and crisis work has been influenced by an increasingly social service-oriented approach, threatening to submerge the radical political analysis that inspired the movement at the outset. Not all changes are indicative of co-option though, and it should be noted that many centres have also maintained their feminist political goals even after they have structurally adapted for survival (Matthews, 1994; Collins et al, 1989; Byington et al, 1991; Fried, 1994). Cocks (1984) indicates that the ideology of feminism encourages individuals with different feminist perspectives to enter organisations, which may result in different strategies being adopted. Collins et al (1989) also say that as staff turned over and got younger during the development of anti-violence organisations, their commitment to feminism and the original goals of the anti-violence movement diminished. However, I will argue that this is a commitment to one type of feminism, whereas in reality feminist political persuasion ranges along a continuum. I will go on to argue that it is not the case that feminist goals are any less pertinent, but that the strategies adopted to pursue these goals have altered.

For example, Katzenstein (1990) indicates that US feminism of the 1990s involved unobtrusive mobilisation within institutions, and that this has superseded political activism. I will argue that this is not the case in the UK where most organisations have adopted a more pragmatic strategy but have retained their feminist political goals and have not become incorporated into institutions. Nor is it true for Sweden, where there is evidence to suggest the movement is becoming increasingly radical.
and recognising the need for activism (Eliasson, 1994). Katzenstein (1987) also argues that one of the women’s movements greatest strengths is the emergence of local and therefore less visible feminist organisations. Martin (1990) also believes “that even the most institutionalised feminist organisation helps to perpetuate the women’s movement through, at the very least, exploiting the institutional environment of scarce resources” (Martin, 1990:183). I will argue in the following chapters that political goals remain a commitment of the women’s movement and feminism, and the provision of comprehensive services to survivors of violence should not be seen as antithetical to this. Empowerment of women through this provision is a key aim for the women’s movement, and successful gains in this area are especially important when state provision and responsibility for survivors remains inadequate and re-victimisation is inherent in its processes.

Although Katzenstein’s (1990) claim that unobtrusive mobilisation has superseded political activism is not true for the UK and Sweden, it is true that less obtrusive approaches have been employed. Swedish movement organisations have always adopted insider and mainstream strategies, and in the UK some organisations have included these approaches in their strategic repertoire over the last two decades. Therefore, there are some parallels for Sweden and the UK with Katzenstein’s (1990) argument about unobtrusive mobilisation within institutions in the US. But I believe it is more appropriate to describe this as with institutions rather than within institutions, and to see it as a ‘pragmatic’ approach as defined by Cuthbert & Irving (2001), since although the approach is less openly radical, there is no evidence to suggest that the approach is unobtrusive as such, nor is it institutionalised. An easier way to view this distinction is that US organisations have tended towards a more reformist stance and become incorporated into state structures, whereas those in the UK and Sweden have adopted a strategy of reform choosing to work with state structures. Also, in Sweden, the ‘pragmatic’ approach has continued rather than been adopted since it has characterised the movement from the outset, and in fact there is evidence to suggest the movement is becoming increasingly more radical than it has been in the past. In both countries, movement organisations have retained their
autonomous position and feminist analysis of violence and have not become co-opted like many of the organisations in the US.

Rape crisis centres and battered women’s shelters have succeeded in producing extensive services for survivors of sexual assault and domestic violence.

The feminist component of the service institutions will continue to push the boundaries of what is possible when working in concert with the state, but the extent to which they are able to articulate opposition and resist co-optations depends upon the existence of a broader feminist movement. Only in that context will new activists continue to emerge who have a feminist vision of rape crisis work as a broader project than just managing victims of violence. (Matthews, 1994:166).

The same applies to those working in the battered women’s movement, as Reinelt (1994) indicates,

The affects of state funding are mitigated when the movement leadership has a feminist vision and engages in feminist practices that challenge the bureaucratic and hierarchical practices of the state’s decision making structures by empowering movement participants to work together collectively towards common goals. (Reinelt, 1994:685)

Variations in ideology and politics of groups are often translated into the organisational structures of refuges and crisis centres in the US, whereas in the UK most organisations are affiliated to national networks that retain autonomy and also provide solidarity, and therefore a certain amount of homogeneity in ideology and practice (Charles, 2000). Differing feminist ideologies result in differing organisational structures, just as different states produce different forms of social movements that in turn adopt a variety of strategies. However, just as organisations do not have to be collective to be feminist, they also don’t have to be bureaucratic, as resource mobilisation theory asserts, to influence policy. Indeed, few organisations fit into such rigid categories. I will argue, though, that anti-violence organisations that are dynamic can successfully manage their dual roles as service provider and campaigner for social change, and engage with the state to facilitate change, whilst at the same time retaining their autonomy and feminist political analysis of violence.
Summary of Research Questions

Introduction

The central aim of the research is to examine how feminists have responded to a violent society in Sweden and the UK and how they have sought to organise this response. This section outlines the main research questions identified from the literature discussed in chapters 1 to 3. As we have seen in Chapter 1, the feminist response to male violence against women took two forms - alternative welfare provision and political campaigning (Charles, 2000; Lovenduski & Randall, 1993). It was feminist because it was run by women for women, and radical because it aimed to dismantle the existing social order (Black et al, 1994; Collins et al, 1989; Matthews, 1994; Reinelt, 1994). The movement had to engage with the state to facilitate their dual roles. Engaging with the state as a service provider and as a campaigner for political and social change results in a complex and ambiguous relationship between organisations and the state.

Despite three decades of grassroots involvement scholars and activists disagree about the nature of rape crisis centres and refuges in the US and their capacity to influence entrenched gender practices and structures (Fried, 1994). This raises the question of whether pursuing one role might compromise the chance of fulfilling the other, or alternatively, if it is possible to adopt a strategy where pursuing one role might facilitate the other. In US literature it is argued that the service provision role has compromised the campaigning role since the advent of state funding and closer relationships with the state has had the effect of coopting the movement, thus depoliticising it. This research aims to consider the experience of the movement in Sweden and the UK, and the extent to which it has been able to engage with the state but resist cooption.

Comparative Research

A comparative study is necessary because as Elisson and Lundy (1999) note,
the most salient differences ....in addressing male violence can be found in the location of the struggle; the role of the women’s movement; and the centrality of feminism in relation to the state. (Eliasson & Lundy, 1999:89)

Different types of state and different types of feminism result in different approaches from anti-violence organisations, an approach that also develops from their different theoretical understanding of the state. Therefore different types of state generate different types of collective action (Birnbaum, 1988). This raises several questions. What forms of mobilisation and collective action have the movements used in each country? How successful have the responses of the movement been in Sweden and the UK? What is their response now? How have women’s organisations chosen to engage with the state? How successful have they been at achieving service provision, policy change and wider political change?

Sweden has a history of gender equity and equality politics (Eliasson & Lundy, 1999), and significant legislation and policy change took place despite the absence of a widespread feminist movement (Kaplan, 1992). This high level of policy reform is cited as reason for the lack of a mass feminist movement (Gelb, 1989; Kaplan, 1992). Furthermore, there is also a history of social democracy and consensus politics (Gelb, 1989) therefore a tendency to incorporate interests into the existing political structure. As a result the state pre-empted demands and made the need collective action less pressing. Therefore feminists chose the mainstreaming rather than the disengagement strategy (Dahlerup & Gulli, 1985). As a result, autonomous organising did not develop on any widespread scale and shelters for battered women conformed more to the philanthropy model (Dobash & Dobash, 1992). In Sweden feminism has been resisted because it has been seen as potentially polarising men and women (Eliasson & Lundy, 1999), thus a liberal feminist approach has dominated. Literature now suggests that equality politics has made it harder to raise some issues specific to women - such as violence – this backlash has meant some feminists and shelter organisations are taking on an explicitly radical feminist outlook (Eliasson, 1994). In light of this there are a number of research questions this research aims to address. Is there an increasingly activist outlook or is there still a mainstreaming approach? Do refuges and crisis centres have a philanthropic
approach? Do women working in organisations in Sweden openly identify as feminist, and do they describe the organisations as feminist? How has this history shaped the movement’s relationship with the state now?

Conversely, in the UK social and welfare policy has historically been based upon the presumed dependence of women on men and the state has been reluctant to intervene in the family (Charles, 2000; Lewis, 1992). UK state is not open to interest groups and party system remains closed (Gelb, 1989) therefore the women’s movement chose autonomous organising outwith the state, an approach that was also influenced by the radical and socialist feminism that has dominated in the UK. Historically, the movement has considered the potential costs of engagement as too high and has therefore been reluctant to engage with the state. Existing approaches neglect the arena of the local state (Gelb, 1989; Stetson & Mazur, 1995), an arena that is particularly important for UK feminism (Charles, 2000; Mackay, 1996). Literature suggests that for some organisations, a closer relationship with the state in terms of service provision has been adopted, and some organisations have made significant policy gains (Charles, 2000; Stedward, 1987; Cuthbert & Irving, 2001). Is the movement still adopting the disengagement strategy or have they become more involved with the state? Does the movement continue to have heavier involvement with the local state than the national state? Is the radical and socialist feminist outlook that has dominated in UK refuges and crisis centres still evident? How has this history shaped the outlook of the movement and their relationship with the state now?

Another question that is raised is whether we would expect the experience of different networks within the same country to be similar. The analysis of literature in chapter 2 detailing the emergence and impact of feminist movements suggests this would be the case. However, this considers the role of structure and largely neglects the role of opportunity and agency. Therefore, what is different between networks in each country if anything? If there is a difference, what has contributed to it? Do organisations in a particular state have the same political opportunity? Do they enjoy the same access and acceptability? Do they have the same levels of organisation and
willingness to engage with the state? In addition, this raises the question of the extent to which organisations can choose their strategy? Can they choose to engage with the state or not?

**What is the Role of Feminist Theoretical Perspective?**

Feminist theoretical perspective is thought to influence a movement’s willingness to engage with the state (Margolis, 1993; Thelfall, 1997). We have seen above, that the liberal feminist approach dominant in Sweden and the radical and socialist feminist approach dominant in the UK are thought to have influenced the likelihood of movements choosing autonomous organising outwith the state or the mainstreaming approach within the state (Gelb, 1989; Kaplan, 1992). It is likely that feminist perspectives influence strategy adoption but the reality of feminist engagement with the state is not that simple (Charles, 2000). Is it also likely that movements are subsequently labelled a particular way because of their engagement with the state? How do the movements see themselves? Do movements consider themselves to be adopting a purist or pragmatic approach in their engagement with the state? Might it be more complex that the liberal/radical dichotomy suggests? Might organisations choose a different ideological stance on different issues?

**What are the Costs and Benefits of Engaging with the State?**

US literature (Matthews, 1994; Reinelt, 1994) has detailed the potential costs and benefits of engaging with the state. There is the possibility of organisational security and the widespread provision of services for survivors of violence. At the same time there is the potential cost of cooption and institutionalisation of the movement.

Literature specific to the UK and Sweden indicates that feminist welfare provision works (Charles, 2000; Eduards, 1997; Eliasson & Lundy, 1999) and that the movement can engage with the state in particular ways and still retain its autonomy from the state and feminist analysis of violence. This raises the question: What have been the costs and benefits for the anti-violence movement in each country? What have they been willing to sacrifice and what have they fiercely defended? For both the state and the movement, was this design or consequence? To what extent has the
movement in Sweden and the UK shaped the state, and to what extent has the state shaped the movement? This culminates in a broader question: to what extent have they managed to turn state structures towards feminist goals and to what extent have they remained autonomous or been absorbed into the state structure?

**Funding**

When discussing the costs and benefits of engagement with the state a significant amount of literature outlines the impact state funding has had on US organisations (Collins et al, 1989; Gornick et al, 1985; Matthews, 1994; Reinelt, 1994). It is suggested that in the US state funding has been significant in the transformation of the refuge and crisis movement from a radical social movement to a mainstream social service provider. Stedward (1987), talking about Scotland, notes the ability of state funding in the form of service agreements to direct energy towards service provision and siphon off energy from campaigning, but at the same time the movement has retained autonomy. Charles (1995& 2000) also indicates that the Women’s Aid movement in Wales has retained autonomy despite accepting state funding. What impact has service agreements with local authorities had on the UK movement? Given the core state funding provided in Sweden, what impact does this have on the movement’s wider goals? What level of state funding is available to refuges and crisis centres in Sweden and the UK? What restrictions do funding bodies place upon organisations? To what extent do movements view state funding as problematic?

If the situation detailed in US literature were to be the case in Sweden and the UK, we would expect to find a high number of bureaucratic centres, with a social service orientation rather than a social movement outlook. We would also expect to find the threat of removal of funding for failure to comply with funding restrictions. In addition, we would expect to find poor funding security for refuges and crisis centres in order to ensure they remain compliant. The research aims to see if this is the case in the case study countries.
What Organisational Structure Do Refuges and Crisis Centres Have?

We have seen in Chapter 1 that the RMT perspective is problematic because of the concept of organisation that is used (Charles, 2000). It fails to include women’s movement organisations that have chosen to eschew hierarchy and adopt collective organisation instead (Byington et al, 1991; Charles, 2000; Collins et al, 1989; Martin, 1990; Matthews, 1994; Reinelt, 1994; Stedward, 1987). This perspective tries to separate structure and ideology. In addition, refuges and crisis centres with bureaucratic structures are criticised for becoming coopted (Martin, 1990). This raises the question of what is the ‘pure’ or ideal type and did it ever exist?

Martin (1990) says there is no ideal type and that organisations range along a continuum with structure and ideology not necessarily being consistent. The research aims to address not whether there is a ‘pure’ or ‘ideal type’ in Sweden and the UK, but to what extent do organisations adopt features associated with pure or ideal types? Do they become more bureaucratic gradually or inevitably or is it a combination of external pressures as well as internal processes? In terms of structure and ideology, what forms do anti-violence in Sweden and the UK take? Is there a link between structure and ideology? Do we find dichotomies between collectivist and hierarchical organisations in Sweden and the UK? Furthermore, given the impact of funding, has this had an effect on the structure of organisations in Sweden and the UK? Have organisations altered their structure as a result of internal or external pressures?

What Motivates Women to Become Involved in Refuge or Crisis Work?

The posing of this question stems from the analysis of social movement scholarship in Chapter 1 in terms of its usefulness and limitations for helping us understand the development of the women’s movement. Charles (2000) criticises NSMT for failing to acknowledge that the women’s movement directs its activities towards the state, and as such is a political movement as well as cultural and social one. NSMT and RMT fail to recognise the dual roles of anti-violence organisations, in that they are a social movement but also provide services to survivors, and how that might define
and impact upon the motivations of those involved. The role of feminist politics as a strong motivating factor for volunteers becoming involved in refuge or crisis work is also noted by Black et al (1994). Psychic and altruistic motivations are also cited, as well as the importance of collective identity (Blanton, 1981). Rational choice theory suggests self-interest motivates social movement participants (Charles, 2000), and social exchange theory (Blau, 1964) suggests altruism and egoism are significant factors. The variety of perspectives and explanation suggests there are likely to be multiple motivations.

Therefore, what are the motivations of women in Sweden and the UK for becoming involved in refuge and crisis work? Might the motivations for joining a social movement be distinct from joining a social movement organisation that fulfils dual roles? Are the motivations of women in Sweden distinct from those in the UK given the more philanthropic base of the Swedish refuge and crisis movement? Are the motivations of workers related to the perceived function of the organisation as either service provider or social movement?

**What is the Perceived and Actual Role of Organisations?**

We have seen from literature that measuring social movement success is problematic (Charles, 2000; Scott, 1990; Stedward, 1997). If we concentrate on policy outcomes as social movement theory tends to do, then much of the work of the women’s anti-violence movement is ignored. If we concentrate on service provision, then there is a tendency to ignore campaigns for wider social change. What are the goals of the movements in Sweden and the UK? Is service provision seen as being more important than political activism or vice versa?

This area raises questions about service provision and campaigning. What level of service provision is there in Sweden and the UK? What campaigning work do organisations engage in? What facilitates or inhibits both of these roles? Given the possibility that the structure of an organisation may be linked to ideology, could it also be that the functions of the organisation are also linked to feminist ideology? Do
organisations identify as a service provider or as a social movement organisation, neither, or both?

**Redefinition of the Issue of Violence/ 'Managing Violence'**

Literature has indicated that when the state becomes involved in violence against women there is a risk they will redefine the issue from a more individual, psychological and apolitical perspective (Mackay, 1996; Matthews, 1994). Matthews (1994) argues this is a deliberate attempt on the part of the state to depoliticise the movement, and that state funding for example, is used to push organisations towards an ameliorative social service approach. Is this the case in Sweden and the UK? Do the anti-violence movements in Sweden and the UK think this happens? In what ways can and does the state dilute issues?

**Professionalism and Expertise**

An extension of this is organisations are encouraged to see themselves as experts and, also through the mechanism of funding, are encouraged to adopt a professional or expert approach linked to the service giver/client model (Staggeborg, 1995; Stedward, 1987; Reinelt, 1994). Has this phenomenon been witnessed in the UK and Sweden? If so, as literature suggests is the case in the US, has anything inside the movement, for example internal change, the influx of apolitical women or social service professionals contributed to this?

**Strategy Adoption - Can Organisations 'Manage the State'?**

RMT suggests that organisations develop a particular strategy, but Charles (2000) cites literature that indicates some movements may consciously develop one, others may fall into a pattern of actions, and some may have no discernible strategy at all. Furthermore, the dynamic nature of state/social movement interaction, political opportunity structures and political opportunity, suggests a movement may not always be able to choose a strategy, and one that is adopted may have to be quickly changed to a different arena or approach. Other factors may influence the strategy adopted as other key players may take actions to force a movement to develop a
particular strategy, or to prevent it from pursuing one. Does an organisation or movement choose a strategy? And finally, to borrow Matthews’ (1994) concept of ‘managing violence’, and to extend it, is it possible for movements to engage and at the same time ‘manage the state’?
Chapter 4 - The Research Process

Introduction

The research design, practice and analysis draw upon a feminist theoretical perspective in considering the nature of the relationship between women’s anti-violence organisations and the state, and the development and practices of such organisations. Given this stance, the research does not begin with particular hypotheses to be ‘tested’ through the analysis, but with a number of research questions. It utilises a variety of qualitative and quantitative methods to provide an understanding of the experiences of women’s anti-violence organisations in relation to the state.

This chapter outlines the practicalities and mechanics of the research process, the methods chosen, how the research was approached, the research strategy employed and the progression of the research. I include a review of the theory of social research, in particular feminist research, in order to justify the approach taken. A detailed discussion of the research design and strategy is provided, its strengths and weaknesses, and barriers and opportunities encountered in pursuing it. Then, following a discussion of the approach taken to data analysis, both qualitative and quantitative, I move on to discuss my experience of conducting this research and reflect upon my own involvement in it.

Methodological Issues

This research was conducted from a feminist theoretical perspective in terms of design, analysis and practice. Methodological triangulation, the use of both quantitative and qualitative data collection techniques, was used in order to obtain appropriate data to address the specific research questions. This section provides an explanation and justification of the approach adopted.
Feminist Research

Since the emergence of second wave feminism in the 1960s, feminism has had a considerable impact on sociology and its practice. Feminists criticised ‘gender-blind’ sociology and sociological theory and began to carry out their own empirical research and to create their own feminist theory. It was not enough simply to document women’s lives, but also necessary to understand the structure and organisation of a society that keeps women disadvantaged, subordinate, dominated and oppressed. An integral part of this critique was challenging the way ‘traditional’ social science was conducted, in terms of method, methodology and epistemology.

It should be noted though that there are many different feminist orientations, for example radical, liberal, socialist, black, lesbian, Marxist, and although they may all see the causes and alleviations of women’s oppression slightly differently, what they share is the desire to understand, document and to place in a structure women’s oppression. What then does ‘feminist research’ mean in terms of practice? This section aims to make explicit what ‘feminist research’ means in terms of this research and how it informed the way in which it was conducted.

When using the term ‘feminist research’, what I am referring to is feminist methodology, which, rather than the methods used, refers to the principles underpinning the research, the position for asking feminist questions and the framework in which these are located and the ways in which they are deployed. Again, this may largely depend upon the concept of feminism used; whether it is emphasising women’s lives and experiences, emphasising gender divisions, or emphasising patriarchy, power over women, oppression and control. Feminist researchers may not fit neatly into one of these categories: what is important is the framework in which feminist research takes place and the principles that underpin it. From a feminist perspective, the key issues are challenging objectivity and hierarchy and the central role of experience in feminist research. Therefore, although there is
not a distinctive ‘feminist method’, there is a distinctive ‘feminist methodology’. These principles have informed my own approach to this research.

Feminist research aims to be non-hierarchical and attempts to avoid objectifying respondents. Consideration has been given to the inadequacies of ‘traditional’ research (i.e. objectivity, ‘science’, detachment) and that research should be viewed as a more broadly based social relationship. Many feminists believe objectivity is a sexist notion that feminists should leave behind because it is based on a ‘male’ world-view and relies on a hierarchical research process, something that is distinctly anti-feminist (Stanley & Wise, 1983). May (1995) also says that

... the idea of objectivity as detachment was criticised ... as being based upon a limited view of science through its separation of reason and emotion. (May, 1995:39).

In approaching this research I did not consider myself an objective inquirer, nor do I strive to be so. Embarking on this research in the first place required an interest on my part and a desire to document the experiences of women working in anti-violence organisations, as well as to evaluate the position of such organisations in relation to the state. My interest in the topic stems from both my personal experience as a woman and my feminist politics. The notion of the researcher as objective is naive, as the decision to become an inquirer about a particular area or topic is a subjective one, and individuals come with their own history and experience. This can be summarised thus:

... it is inevitable that the researcher’s own experiences and consciousness will be involved in the research process as much as they are in life... (Stanley & Wise, 1983:48)

The kind of person we are and how we experience the research, all have a crucial impact on what we see, what we do, and how we interpret and construct what is going on. (Stanley & Wise, 1983:50)

This said, acknowledging one’s lack of objectivity is not an excuse for poor research design and practice.
Although ‘feminist research’ does not refer to the particular methods used, in the 1960s and ’70s early feminists advocated a qualitative approach to research, whereas sociology to a great extent had been concerned with quantitative methods. At the same time, qualitative methods were being turned to more frequently, in order to produce richer and more detailed description rather than just ticking boxes on questionnaires, and many feminists were influenced by this move, but many feminists also thought quantitative methods were inappropriate for studying women’s lives. For example, Hilary Graham (1983) claimed that her answers don’t fit his questions, claiming that the survey technique adhered to a masculine paradigm and male world-view. She also argued that the survey method does not allow for the realisation of one of the aims of the women’s movement – allowing women to speak and shattering the silence that surrounds women’s lives and experience.

The survey method has also been criticised for being hierarchical and based upon power and control, and therefore incompatible with feminist research that aims to challenge relationships based upon this (Kelly, 1988). Kelly argues that the survey method does not allow for the respondent to have any control over the situation, that there is no room for individual agency. Jayaratne (1983), however, offers support for quantitative methods in feminist research, although she acknowledges that in the form traditionally used in social science they are incompatible with many feminist principles. She argues that to reject them outright is not the answer, but to use them in tandem with other more qualitative methods and adapt them, as Oakley (1981b) does, with the interview method, to be more compatible with feminist principles and aims.

When using survey methods in this research these concerns were central to the design. Although the risk of objectifying respondents is a central concern when using quantitative methods, steps can be taken to ensure this is avoided or minimised as much as possible. Quantitative methods are particularly useful for studies of prevalence, or for ‘mapping’ phenomenon, experiences, or groups that have previously been ignored. This is the case in this research given that one of the central aims is to ‘map’ the women’s movement and anti-violence organisations in Sweden.
and the UK, a topic on which there is scant literature currently available. For this research, a far greater number of women and organisations were allowed a voice by the use of survey methods than would have had the study been based solely on qualitative methods, in this case interviewing.

Using survey methods allowed for the experiences and opinions of over 500 women in Sweden and the UK to be documented. In order to ensure the research process and specific data collection techniques were compatible with feminist principles, certain steps were taken to modify the approach conventionally used in social science research. A great deal of information about the research and about myself was provided for both the organisations and the individuals participating which included my own motivations for conducting the research, my own history and background as a social scientist and the potential outcomes of the research. Research participation is often heavily weighted towards giving on the part of the respondent with little return other than a ‘thank you’. Therefore I made a commitment to the organisations and individuals that took part in the research to disseminate my findings widely, to give feedback, and to make a summary of the research available to them. There was a high level of interest in, and commitment to, the research and I felt strongly that I had a responsibility to keep respondents informed of its progress and outcomes. Furthermore, organisations and individuals often made requests for specific information that I might have access to. A common request was to be put in touch with networks of organisations in the other country. Where I had access to the information requested, or was able to provide it, I did so with the consent of relevant parties. It was important to me to not always be doing the taking, but to respond willingly as those involved in the research had done with my requests.

The questionnaire was designed to include a mixture of both closed response questions and open response questions, the latter allowing more individual agency when responding. Respondents were also given several opportunities to include information that may not have been specifically asked about, or to elaborate on anything they felt they wanted to. These opportunities were taken by many women and included: requests for further information on specific things; the contact
information for other networks; often to express their support for the research and the need for it; requests for copies of the results of the research after its completion; and in some cases women took the opportunity to tell their own personal histories of violence and their journey towards anti-violence work. Therefore, although the questionnaire produced vast amounts of robust and reliable data for statistical analysis, it also produced varied and rich data through structuring it to allow for a certain amount of agency in its completion.

The need for richer and more descriptive data that elaborates the findings of a questionnaire-based study and that can address the ‘whys’ as well as the ‘whats’ meant qualitative data collection techniques were combined with quantitative techniques. These qualitative techniques are a likely choice for feminists because they involve non-hierarchical, or less hierarchical relationships than quantitative methods do. Having said this, qualitative data collection techniques are not compatible with feminist principals per se. Just as quantitative techniques require modification in their practice to make them less hierarchical and more compatible with the aims of feminist research, qualitative techniques also require modification. Indeed, feminist commentators have criticised conventional research techniques in terms of how they are practised and have documented the ways in which they have found them incompatible with feminist research. In approaching the interview-based part of this research, these debates and subsequent suggestions for modification have informed my own practice.

The protocol of conventional research techniques is that interviewers should remain objective and should facilitate rapport with their research subjects only in order to solicit information from them. According to conventional techniques, for an interview “to be successful, it must have all the warmth and personality exchange of a conversation with the clarity and guidelines of scientific searching.” (Goode & Hatt, 1952:191). This requires the researcher to be friendly but not too friendly and to walk a tightrope somewhere between detachment and rapport. The idea is to be friendly enough to solicit information but not to become emotionally involved. Oakley (1981a) also indicates that this requires respondents to be socialised in a
certain way so as not to ask questions back. “Both interviewer and interviewee are thus depersonalised in the interview process.” (Oakley, 1981a:37). Interviewers are encouraged to avoid questions that are asked of them and to discourage such activity either with a shrug that says ‘I don’t really know’, or ‘I haven’t really thought about it’, or to dismiss them with a statement that says, ‘I’m not here to give opinions, I’m here to get them’. Oakley therefore argues that,

...the entire paradigmatic representation of ‘proper’ interviews in the methodology text books, owe a great deal more to a masculine social and sociological vantage point than to a feminine one. (Oakley, 1981a:38)

‘Proper’ interviewing requires objectivity and detachment whereas ‘improper’ interviewing comprises subjectivity and involvement. This polarity is a classic representation of gender stereotyping where men are characterised as rational, scientific and objective, and women sensitive, intuitive, emotional and the ‘abused’ that are incapable of exploiting others. This may be an issue not of the capability to exploit, but the desire to do so, even if justified in the name of ‘science’. Oakley (1981b) found whilst doing her own research on the transition to motherhood that the protocol of ‘proper’ research was inappropriate. When a feminist is interviewing women the use of text book practice, she argues, is indefensible: the contradictions of the paradigm are exposed, and if a non-hierarchical approach is taken then much richer personal data is acquired. She found that the two main obstacles to adhering to ‘proper’ research practice were respondents asking questions of her, and that relationships developed between her and the women she interviewed. Interviewing relies “…very much on the formulation of a relationship between the interviewer and interviewee as an important element in achieving the quality of the information … required.” (Rappaport & Rappaport, 1976:31), and, as Oakley (1981a) argues, “…finding out about other peoples lives is much more readily done on a basis of
friendship than in a formal interview.” (Oakley, 1981a:52). It is this approach to interviewing that has informed my own practice.

When conducting interviews for this research I did not adhere to conventional research practice in a number of ways. Semi-structured interviews were used in order to allow women more individual agency in directing the interview and in discussing topics relevant to them. Many questions were asked of me in terms of the research, my personal life, and how I had come to be researching anti-violence organisations, as well as questions about violence against women in each of the countries I was researching. I always answered these questions to the best of my ability and did not try to hide myself from the research participants. I also developed relationships and friendships with the women involved in the research based upon shared feminist politics and beliefs and a mutual interest in each other’s work.

I was always welcomed into the organisations that I visited and was offered hospitality, invited out for meals, and offered accommodation when I had travelled some distance. Some of these offers I accepted and some I did not, but the decision was based upon practical and time constraints rather than any desire to adhere to ‘conventional research protocol’ of remaining detached. During interviews about anti-violence work many women divulge their own experiences of violence and this makes the interview a very personal and intimate experience. I discuss my experience of conducting the research in more detail below, but had the exchange not been so open then the sharing of such personal experiences would not have occurred very often, allowing me less insight into women’s experiences and involvement in
anti-violence work. My own social position and experience as a woman means I have an understanding of such experiences and am affected by their telling.

The issue and role of experience in the research process is a key feature of feminist research. Related to the feminist claim that ‘the personal is the political’, the aim is consciousness raising, using the researcher’s experience as a starting point from which to build, and seeing the researcher as a person who is part of the research process rather than removed from it. Oakley (1981b) found that, when interviewing women about their transition to motherhood, her shared experience, as she was also a mother, and the level of friendship that developed, facilitated her research. Similarly, Finch (1984) found that, when she divulged to clergymen’s wives that she too was married to a clergyman, the women would talk freely to someone they regarded as an equal and not merely a data gatherer. It is important to note that both women researched white, middle class women, which they both were themselves. As a result, they also shared an experience of class and ‘race’ as well as gender and the occupation of their husbands.

In conducting this research I also shared a gender with those I researched, and in the majority of cases interviewed women who were white and middle class, which I am myself. The key issue in this research is gender, though. “Feminists doing research both draw on, and are constantly reminded of the concrete practical and everyday experience of being, and being treated as a ‘woman’.” (McRobbie, 1982:8). My experience as a woman and as a feminist researcher means I am starkly aware of the fear of violence in women’s lives and the way in which women are encouraged to curtail their activities or behaviour in order to avoid it, with the implication that those who do not manage to avoid it have somehow ‘failed’ to curtail their behaviour appropriately. I share the anger of those who work in refuges and crisis centres at the extent of violence against women, the impact it has on women’s lives, and the ways in which women are encouraged to somehow assume responsibility for male violence. I also share the strength of their desire to do something about it.
Kelly (1988) argues that in contemporary feminist research the aim of consciousness raising – personal problems being seen as having a political and social basis – has been forgotten and now women talking is seen as a good thing simply in itself. In response to Kelly’s (1988) concern about the forgotten role of consciousness-raising, experience cannot be seen as an end in itself, but it must be viewed in a wider context and be critically reflected upon. This has parallels with critical theory and the development of a sociological imagination. As C. Wright Mills (1959) argues, one woman in a marriage has her own personal trouble, but to locate this within a wider social structure makes it a public issue. This essentially is the aim of feminism - making ‘the personal the political’. Sharing a gender and feminist political beliefs with those I researched facilitated the research in that it allowed a certain connection and understanding to develop, and a greater insight into the experiences of those working in refuges and crisis centres.

Despite whichever position is taken with regard to the place of experience within research, ‘proper’ practice requires it to be ignored entirely. Certain aspects of social science are viewed as ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ with regard to inclusion in a research report. What is regarded as ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ differs between feminist research and conventional research. Feminism criticises ‘hygienic’ research, arguing that the problems, doubts, feelings and experiences of the researcher should also be included (Kelly, 1988).

I have chosen to include my own experience of conducting the research below, as although I do not try to conform to ‘objective’ research, to accept or ignore feelings and the experience of research never results in objectivity anyway since a value judgement is still being made as to their importance and place in research. “... [A] feminist sociologist doing research on women actually shares the powerless position of those she researches...” (Finch, 1984). Therefore, these experiences must be included in research reports as the only other way to exclude self from research is simply not to do it (Stanley & Wise, 1983).
The terms and positions of individuals involved in research can only be the starting point of inquiry into social life, as Dorothy Smith (1987) argues, we “…must be able to disclose for women how our own situations are organised and determined by social processes that extend outside the scope of the everyday world and are not discoverable within it.” (Smith, 1987:152). This requires critical reflection on our own experiences and those of our respondents; social relations, structures and political and social processes must be critically assessed in order to achieve a fuller understanding.

**Research Design**

This section details the research design in terms of methods chosen and how they were deployed to achieve the research objectives detailed in the previous chapter and adhere to a feminist approach. A justification of the comparative design of the research is provided, followed by a discussion of the design of the data gathering instruments.

**Comparative Research Design**

The research necessitated a comparative design, given that the main focus of the project was to look at the relationship between the state and the feminist movement. Existing studies tend to have a one-country focus (Margolis, 1993; Threlfall, 1997), so there is a gap in existing research for comparative work. The Summary of Research Questions discusses the justification for the comparative design in more detail, and from a more theoretical perspective. This section offers a brief summary, as well as a discussion of why Sweden and the UK were selected from a practical perspective.

Sweden and the UK were chosen as case study countries for the research because existing literature (discussed in the earlier chapters) indicates that there are marked differences between the two in terms of: social and political history, both from a feminist and mainstream perspective; the development and trajectory of the feminist movement; the paths taken by anti-violence organisations; and the strategies the
women’s movement has adopted over time. Despite these differences, in both countries the women’s movement has made considerable policy gains on issues of violence that are positive for women. Therefore, comparative research involving these two countries offers the potential for deeper understanding of the complex phenomenon of states’ and social movements’ relationships, and how these gains have been achieved.

Furthermore, literature on the topic of states and feminist social movements is heavily US dominated, so comparisons with it are difficult to avoid, and often North American social scientists assume that movements follow an evolutionary path, thus leading to a movement similar to the one that developed in the US (Margolis, 1993). Women’s movements share a common concern with improving the position of women in society (Ferree, 1987), but this does not diminish the importance of economic, political, social and cultural differences. A comparison between Sweden and the UK allows us to investigate the importance of these differences in each country and the strategies the movement has adopted as a result.

From a practical perspective, Sweden and the UK offer a useful comparison because there are identifiable anti-violence movements in each country. Both have networks of refuges and crisis centres that developed from the women’s movement and second wave feminism, and both countries have seen considerable policy change in the area of violence against women. The movements have followed different paths but are still in existence, offering the possibility of comparative empirical work.

**Questionnaire Design**

The questionnaire was designed in a self-administered postal format to be distributed to women working in refuges and crisis centres in Sweden and the UK (see Appendix 1). It addressed a number of areas that were central to the research as a whole. Clear written instructions detailing how it should be completed were provided on the first page, with a brief description of the research and contact details should respondents have any questions. In order to make the questionnaire as user-friendly
as possible it had clearly defined sections with a title indicating the topic area; for example a sections entitled ‘About you…’ and ‘About the Organisation…’.

Due to the limited amount of literature available on the women’s movement and its organisations in Sweden and the UK, one of the main aims of the study was to ‘map’ the organisations and networks in each country. In order to achieve this aim the questionnaire was designed to gather a substantial amount of demographic data about the organisations and workers. The questionnaire was specifically designed to address all the main research themes, so included sections on a variety of areas including: funding; organisational structure and working practices; motivations and experience of work; service provision and campaigning; and workers’ attitudes towards the state’s treatment of violence against women.

The questionnaire included a mixture of open and closed response questions as well a number of opportunities to write freely on a particular topic, or to add information respondents felt was relevant. Full instructions were provided for the completion of the questionnaire and the response format of specific questions. The questionnaire also included the opportunity to respond with visual representations, for example drawing organisational structures, rather than solely written responses. This was in the context of gaining further insight into the organisational structure of refuges and crisis centres.

Language is an obvious area of concern when conducting comparative research where participants may not speak English as a first language. Following discussions with native Swedish speakers, the questionnaire was translated from English to Swedish for distribution to those participating in Sweden (see Appendix 2). These discussions indicated that it is often more difficult to understand the written form of a second language than it is the spoken form. Furthermore, they indicated that it would be easier to write responses for open questions in one’s native language given the difficulty experienced with this form of communication in a second language. Although the standard of English competence in Sweden is very high, I could not be sure that this would be universal amongst those participating in the research and did
not want to systematically exclude respondents based on their competence in the English language. Furthermore, from an ethical point of view I was not comfortable with expecting respondents to respond to a questionnaire in a language that was not their own because my second language skills were limited. In requesting that they devote some of their time to participating in the research, it did not seem appropriate to make this task potentially more difficult or time consuming.

I translated the majority of the questionnaire myself with some help from a native Swedish speaker. In order to check that the meaning or context had not been altered, and that questions were still understandable, the questionnaire was checked on two further occasions; once by a bilingual native Swedish speaker and then by a US born naturalised Swede. This led to minor alterations to some questions and some debate as to the direct translation of certain words or phrases. In many languages there are no direct translations of particular words that do not alter the meaning to a greater or lesser degree, and this was the case with the translation of words or phrases from English to Swedish. Any ambiguities were discussed in detail with a number of colleagues at the University of Lund and although a perfect translation could sometimes not be found, in each case the decision made was based upon ensuring the meaning of the question was maintained even if the structure and format differed considerably.

All organisations and individual respondents were assured of their anonymity and the confidentiality of their responses. Respondents were requested not to put their personal name or the name of their organisation on the questionnaire.

Interview Design

A semi-structured interview approach was used for the collection of qualitative data. An interview schedule was used which included both specific questions about the individual and the organisation in which they worked (see Appendix 3), as well as more general topic areas for inclusion in the discussion. One advantage of the qualitative interview is its openness and flexibility (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995). The interviewee’s experiences and opinions can be expressed through the discussion
of certain topics. The goal was that those interviewed would feel free to take up what they considered relevant to the topic and not be constrained to a set of pre-formed questions. This was particularly important since the survey aspect of the research, by its very nature and despite modifications to the traditional format used, is more restrictive for the individual in terms of variety of response and topics addressed. Therefore, although a schedule was used, it was predominantly a guide for myself to ensure key areas were addressed where possible.

The interview design was based upon interviews being conducted face-to-face in the refuge or crisis centre in which the women worked. This happened in the majority of cases and interviews were tape-recorded. However, during fieldwork it became clear that constraints in terms of the accessibility of organisations and limited resources for travel meant in geographically distant organisations this would not be possible. In order not to exclude more distant organisations, the decision was taken to use a system of email interviews for those not easily accessible. Coomber (1997) discusses the benefits of conducting internet-based survey research, but the benefits are also applicable to email-based interview research. He notes that, “A potentially vast population of all kinds of individuals and groups may be more easily reached than ever before, across geographical borders....” (Coomber, 1997:1). Although I was not present with the individual, email provides a useful tool in that data is automatically recorded when an individual responds. It is also possible to do follow up emails to clarify points or to request a point is developed further. One main advantage is the possibility of being able to include the respondents’ initial responses, making it easier for them to clarify or further develop.

To conduct these interviews solely via email did not feel appropriate and seemed to depersonalise the qualitative aspect of the research process somewhat. Therefore, follow-up telephone interviews were conducted with respondents that allowed for a more personal interaction and the complexities of their experience as anti-violence workers to be explored. Telephone follow-up was done with reference to the interview topic guide and individuals’ previous responses. There is no literature that discusses email-based interviews specifically, although a body of literature exists on
the use of computer assisted personal interviewing (CAPI) (Baker, 1992; Canoune & Leyhe, 1985; Couper & Burt, 1994), an interactive process in real time. Research has found that respondents using CAPI were more positive about data-privacy, and judged answering sensitive questions as less unpleasant than those using a face-to-face technique (Beckenbach, 1995). As yet there is no research that addresses the potential benefits or losses in terms of data quality.

When conducting both styles of interview there were no systematic differences in the nature of the topics covered, nor in the openness and willingness to answer that respondents exhibited. The ability to follow-up responses was invaluable as it meant clarification could be sought on particular topics, or investigated further, as I would have done had the interview been face to face. Telephone contact was also essential for clarification and for developing more of a relationship with the respondent. The majority of those I interviewed using email and telephone have continued to keep in contact via email.

During the face-to-face interviews areas were not covered in any particular order, and though the questions on the schedule were all asked, those interviewed were informed that they could discuss what they felt was relevant and important and any other issues that were not necessarily asked about directly. As a result the interviews were rich and varied but at the same time provided data that was comparable between organisations and countries. Although the email based interviews were more rigidly structured since the topics and question areas had to be written down, respondents were also informed that the topics and questions covered areas the research was interested in, but that the research was interested in their views and opinions of working in a refuge or crisis centre so they should feel free to discuss any topic they felt relevant, and develop the interview in whatever direction they saw fit.

It was particularly important to me that I used the semi-structured approach and allowed respondents more individual agency in the interview process. There has been a great deal of debate about the interviewer's role in the interview situation and the relationship between researcher and researched, particularly in feminist research (see
Oakley 1981a; Finch in Hammersley, 1993). Qualitative interviews can be both interactive and reflexive. The interview is a collaboration between interviewee and interviewer. “All interviews, like any other kind of social interaction, are structured by both researcher and informant …” (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995:151-2). As discussed in more detail above, as interviewer I cannot set aside my background and experience and be an objective collector of information, nor would I choose to if it were possible.

Although the interview is an exchange and shaped by both participants, the situation does not invite an equal relationship. Therefore it was important to me that interviewees were given the opportunity to have more control over the direction of the interview. Ultimately the qualitative interview, as with all research techniques, is not equal, but it need not resemble the hierarchical relationship with which it is traditionally associated.

Again, language was a concern and this is discussed in more detail below in terms of the impact this had on the sampling procedures used for the selection of interviewees. Interviews were conducted in English. My Swedish is not of a sufficient level to conduct an adequate interview. Had I conducted interviews in Swedish it would have resulted in very stilted and disjointed dialogue and valuable data would have been lost. I considered having a native speaker conduct the interviews for me and then translate them, however I decided that it would be more appropriate to the research to conduct them myself so that areas could be further investigated and to avoid it being merely a question and answer session rather than an interactive dialogue. Furthermore, I felt that to use an interviewer would allow me less connection with the data and the respondents and this detached approach was not compatible with my feminist approach to the research. The standard of English is very high in Sweden, so the interview process was rarely problematic. This said, it is impossible to quantify what effect conducting interviews in English has on the data collected. There were occasional bilingual exchanges when words, phrases or meanings needed to be clarified, or where respondents were unsure how to express themselves in English. As a result the interviews were all very warm exchanges and
great effort was made on both the part of respondents and myself to ensure understanding. I made it clear to all respondents that I was very grateful for both their ability and their willingness to communicate in English. Furthermore respondents were often keen to demonstrate their skills in English that were infinitely better than my Swedish, and displayed some pride in their competence.

**Sampling**

**Questionnaires**

In choosing a sampling method for the quantitative survey part of the research, care was taken to ensure the approach used would produce as representative a sample as possible. This would not only allow for the realisation of one of the main research aims, the ‘mapping’ of women’s anti-violence organisations in Sweden and the UK, but would also produce robust data for statistical analysis and generalisable results. The sampling procedure adopted to select organisations for the distribution of questionnaires was a stratified and systematic random sample. This involved the selection of every $nth$ organisation from a sampling frame made up of contact lists provided by each national network in which the method of ordering was alphabetical. It is crucial that any sampling frame used for systematic sampling is exhaustive (de Vaus, 1996:64), therefore it was ensured that the lists included all organisations registered with the national networks in each country.

One main disadvantage of this sampling procedure is periodicity in the sampling frame (de Vaus, 1996:64), which may lead to the selection of certain ‘types’ of respondent. In order to address this concern a stratified approach was combined with the systematic approach. This involved creating separate sampling frames, collated with a particular variable in mind, within the overall frame and subjecting them to
the same procedures. Adopting this approach ensures that no particular group is systematically excluded. The variables that stratified the sample were the country of location within the United Kingdom, and for both Sweden and the UK whether organisations had an urban conurbation or city location, or a small town or rural location.

Using this sampling procedure, a total of 40 organisations were selected in Sweden and a further 50 organisations in the UK. Contact was made with all 90 organisations by telephone initially to explain the nature and purpose of the research, the implications for involvement and to establish consent for participation. All of the organisations contacted agreed to participate in the research and so no further sampling procedures were required.

Rather than adopting a particular sampling procedure to identify individuals within the organisations to complete the questionnaires, a ‘blanket’ approach was taken and all women working in the organisation, no matter what the terms of their work, were asked to complete it. It was not possible to obtain exhaustive lists of women working within the organisations, nor on what basis they worked, which was the main obstacle to achieving a representative sample of workers as had been achieved for organisations. The inclusive ‘blanket’ approach was chosen because it would ensure that no particular ‘type’ of worker was systematically excluded.

A total of 675 questionnaires to be completed by staff working in women’s crisis centres and refuges were distributed. 300 were administered in Sweden and 375 in the UK. The number of workers in each organisation was established at initial
telephone contact, following which a letter (see Appendix 4) and an appropriate number distributed to each organisation. All respondents were provided with an overview of the research, contact details should they require further information, a questionnaire with instructions for its completion and a reply-paid envelope to return their questionnaire. Care was taken to assure respondents of the confidentiality and anonymity of responses.

**Interviews**

When sampling organisations in which to do interviews, care was taken to ensure a spread of respondents across the different national networks in each country. Again, sampling was done from each of the countries within the UK and the procedure was designed to obtain a geographical spread within Sweden. At the same time there were constraints in terms of the accessibility of organisations and limited resources for travel, which made organisations in the far north of Sweden and Scotland more problematic.

Organisations where face-to-face interviews took place were sampled from a clustered sub-sample that had been identified as geographically accessible. The sample derived from this clustered sub-sample was designed where possible to ensure a mix of rural and urban locations and a geographical spread throughout each country. Given that the initial sub-sample criterion was geographical accessibility, organisations in urban locations outnumbered those in rural locations or smaller towns. Those organisations sampled from the list that were not easily geographically accessible were selected for email and telephone interviews. In contrast to the face-to-face sample, organisations with rural locations outnumbered those in urban or city locations.

The sample produced a total of 28 organisations selected for interview. The selection of an individual to be interviewed from within the organisation posed another sampling challenge. The success of any research project relies on the goodwill of its
participants in giving up their time to contribute to the research. Given the nature of crisis and refuge work, that many women work on an unpaid or voluntary basis, and that organisations are very busy since services are often oversubscribed, it was difficult to place too many constraints on the organisations participating in terms of who should be interviewed. As a result, the individuals interviewed were, for the most part, self-selecting.

This self-selection was based partly upon the willingness to be interviewed, and partly on their ability to make themselves available. Therefore, it was often suggested I interview someone who worked at one of the centre’s quieter times, or someone who was not, for example, involved in the operating of the crisis line that day. Another reason organisations cited for the selection of a particular worker was the amount of time they had been involved in the centre. It was clear that organisations thought it would be helpful to interview someone who had been working there for some time and would know about the history and development of the organisation. Conversely some organisations did not select such an individual since there were many demands on their time because of their experience and expertise.

The selection criteria used within each organisation itself will of course impact upon the nature of the sample achieved. However, the criteria applied in organisations were not universal and depended upon the circumstances of the specific organisation. I am therefore confident that there was no systematic bias in the sample and preferred to have willing participants rather than jeopardise an organisation’s participation by insisting respondents met specific criteria and by placing more constraints on already very busy staff. The collection of basic demographic data from each individual indicated that both full-time and part-time workers, paid and unpaid workers, and those with longer or shorter lengths of service were represented.

These selection criteria applied to both the UK and Sweden, but another consideration was specific to the interviews conducted in Swedish organisations. As discussed above, the level of my competence in Swedish was not sufficient to
conduct successful or fruitful interviews in the respondents’ first language. Therefore Swedish organisations not only selected an individual who met the specific criteria relevant to them at the time, but also one able to be interviewed in English. This undoubtedly had an impact on the ‘type’ of workers that were selected. The most competent and confident English speakers tended not to be the older women, therefore all the interviews carried out were with those 50 years and younger.

Furthermore, spending time in the organisations involved revealed that those interviewed were the most confident English speakers but not necessarily the most competent. Respondents’ spoken English was always adequate for interview purposes, and occasionally there would be communication in both languages to clarify a point or explain the meaning of the word, but this distinction between confidence and competence is noted as there is the possibility that interviews were conducted with the more charismatic and self-confident members of the organisations. Nonetheless, I am confident that this does not impact negatively on the data’s validity, as those interviewed represented a spread of ages and different terms of work. Any potential costs of adopting the approach of interviewing in respondents’ second language would be far less than the potential costs to the data’s quality and reliability had I interviewed in Swedish – my second language and one which I speak only conversationally. Respondents’ ability to communicate orally in English far outweighs my ability to communicate orally in Swedish.

Not all the organisations sampled were able or willing to participate in the interview-based part of the research. Of the 28 that were sampled, I conducted interviews with individuals working in 25 organisations. Fifteen interviews were conducted face to face and a further 10 interviews were conducted initially by email and then followed up by telephone. The three organisations that did not participate cited different reasons for their inability or unwillingness to participate. Sadly, one organisation had been forced to cease operating due to lack of funds in the time period between completing the quantitative aspect of the research and beginning the qualitative aspect. Another organisation apologised explaining that at the time of the research they were very busy and due to a staff shortage their current level of staffing was not
meeting demand. Lastly, the remaining organisation was experiencing similar difficulties and, although still willing to participate, it proved impossible to arrange a mutually convenient time to carry out the interview in the fieldwork period.

**Progression of the Research**

Fieldwork was carried out in both Sweden and the UK between 2000 and 2001. After appropriate consideration of literature and the clarifying of research questions, methods and the design of suitable data collection tools, fieldwork began in the spring of 2000. The survey aspect of the research was conducted first, as the analysis of the resulting data would inform the interview based aspect of the research. Questionnaires were distributed initially in Sweden and then the UK. I spent a period of 6 months resident in Sweden based in the Department of Sociology at the University of Lund, Scåne. Interviews were carried out across Sweden in 2000, with some email and telephone follow up at the beginning of 2001. The qualitative aspect of the fieldwork was carried out in the UK in 2001 and involved travel to different parts of the country to conduct interviews. After completion of data collection and the fieldwork period, thorough data analysis was carried out prior to the write up of the research findings and conclusions.

**Analysis and Reporting**

**Quantitative Data Analysis**

The questionnaire was designed for statistical analysis with a computer-based data analysis package. Once returned, each questionnaire was assigned a study number and each question’s responses were coded appropriately by hand. Thereafter the responses were input into an SPSS database. The majority of questions were of a closed-response format, so coding for statistical purposes followed a clear structure. Open-response questions were recorded in full and where appropriate coded for statistical purposes once collated. Once all responses were entered onto the database, one in every ten questionnaires was checked for the accuracy of data input.
The questionnaire was designed to produce data suitable for reliable statistical analysis. The nature of the topic research area, and therefore specific questions, meant the majority of the data had a nominal or ordinal level of measurement. Initially descriptive analysis was carried out through analysis of frequencies of response and distribution and the cross-tabulation of variables. The data was subjected to further cross-tabulations and tested for significance and reliability using a chi-square ($X^2$) statistical test.

Missing values were always recorded and taken into account when conducting the analysis and variables were recoded or computed where appropriate to enable more detailed analysis and more significant and reliable results.

**Qualitative Data Analysis**

All interviews were tape-recorded and were on average 2 hours in length. The interviews were listened to several times, taking down notes and impressions and then transcribed. The interviews were edited to provide clarity, order and flow. Any unnecessary words or obvious repetition was cut out and then the interviews were reworked as a narrative or monologue. Presenting them in this way provided clarity and allowed for the depth and complexity of the interviewee to come through (Davies & Esseveld, 1989:56).

In order to maintain the integrity of the interviewees, I offered to send the reworked version to each respondent, explaining what I had done and why, and asking whether they accepted this as representative of the interview and as a reflection of their views. Only 5 interviewees took this offer up, and although I was willing to make adjustments if necessary, the response was uniformly positive.

After the editing process was complete I reviewed the material and compared responses thematically in line with the research questions and themes. The interview data was collated with these themes in mind and organised into the following topics: issues of organisations' funding and resources; organisations' structure and working
practices; the perceived functions of the organisations; workers' motivations for doing anti-violence work and their experience of work; workers' perceptions and attitudes towards the state and its treatment of violence against women; and the strategies and tactics organisations adopt in addressing the issue of violence against women.

**Ethical Considerations**

There were a number of ethical considerations that informed both the design and practice of the research. When conducting any research, one has to give careful consideration to the ethical implications of a particular project and the way in which it is conducted. This is particularly the case in human sciences, and especially in empirical research, given that the research participants are invariably human beings, and that in human and social sciences we are documenting the social world; a world that necessarily involves people. Therefore, ethics cannot be overlooked and must be given conscious consideration when conducting research since “Ethics is a matter of principled sensitivity to the rights of others.” (Bulmer, 2001:45).

> Researchers have always to take account of the effects of their actions upon those subjects and act in such a way as to preserve their rights and integrity as human beings. (Bulmer, 2001:46)

The ethical issues that were particularly relevant to this research were: ensuring informed consent; respect for privacy, confidentiality and anonymity; safeguarding data; adhering to a feminist methodology in order not to objectify respondents; causing the minimum disruption to women’s working lives; and the dissemination of the research findings to those who participated.

**Informed Consent**

Ensuring informed consent from those who participated in the research was particularly important. Defining ‘informed consent’ can be problematic in that the amount of information one person needs to consider themselves to be ‘informed’ may differ from another. This is also dependent upon the extent of prior knowledge
about a topic and about the research process in general. In order to maximise the possibility of informed consent, research participants were provided with the maximum amount of information possible about the nature of the research, why the research was being conducted, the outcomes of the research and use of data, and contact details should they wish further information. Those asked to participate in the research were always free to withhold their consent, or to withdraw their consent at any time.

Confidentiality and Anonymity

The privacy of the organisations and the individuals working in them was respected throughout the research project. An integral part of this was ensuring that data was anonymous and confidential. Respondents were not asked to provide their name, personal contact details or the name of their organisation. A coding system was used for the quantitative aspect of the research to ensure organisations and individuals remained anonymous. A coding system and pseudonyms were used for interview tapes and transcripts to ensure anonymity. Confidentiality was maintained by guaranteeing research participants that their responses would only be viewed by myself or other individuals closely related to the research. Swedish respondents were informed that their responses might also be viewed by a translator but otherwise would be confidential. The privacy of individuals was also maintained by allowing them to refuse to answer particular questions. In practice this rarely occurred, but individuals were able to exercise their right to refuse should they wish to do so. In writing up the research, any information that would identify a respondent or organisation was censored. This is represented in the research findings as ‘****’ to replace the censored word or phrase.

Data Storage

A key part of ensuring the privacy, confidentiality and anonymity of research participants is how research data is stored. At all times the contact details for organisations and the coding system identifiers were stored separately from the data to ensure anonymity and confidentiality could not be compromised accidentally. The
importance of safeguarding quantitative data has been documented (Lee, 1993), and this was ensured by using password protected data files and by storing hardcopy questionnaires securely. The storage of qualitative data was done in the same way.

A Feminist Approach

My commitment to feminist politics made it important to ensure the research was conducted from a feminist perspective and was compatible with a feminist political perspective. Conducting the research in this way was also an ethical issue. The particularities of feminist research and its application for this project are detailed above, but the key issues from an ethical standpoint were allowing participants an element of individual agency in the research, and to avoid objectifying respondents. Conforming to the traditional approach to social research, which involves the researcher remaining detached and personally uninvolved, would not be ethically defensible in this research. As a woman and a feminist researching other mainly feminist women working in organisations with the goal of challenging violence against women it was neither possible nor desirable for me to remain uninvolved. To do so would be conforming to the traditional notions of hierarchies of power from which violence stems. For the same reason I made a commitment to provide feedback and disseminate the research findings to those involved. Women working in refuges and crisis centres had given of their time freely to support the research, and it was important not to devalue this contribution by not informing them of the outcome.

The Fieldwork Experience

I have found the process of conducting fieldwork for this research both difficult and rewarding at different stages. The overwhelmingly positive response to the research from the organisations and individuals that took part made it a particularly rewarding experience. The high level of interest and the importance respondents attached to the research increased my commitment and enthusiasm for addressing the research questions and provided a constant reminder as to the importance of the research. Interacting with such committed and enthusiastic women working in refuges and
crisis centres, the friendships that developed, and the support they provided for me to conduct the research made the fieldwork experience very positive. A number of aspects of the research proved to be more difficult than I had expected, and some difficulties I had not foreseen. Conducting research in another country and culture with an additional language barrier created practical problems and constraints, many of which I had not anticipated. This meant the fieldwork process was often tiring and sometime frustrating, but the majority of these barriers were negotiated and the insights I gained will certainly inform my research practice in the future. Additionally, although I had foreseen the possibility that women would divulge personal experiences of violence, or talk in detail about the experiences of women who use the refuge or crisis centre in which they work, I had not anticipated how often this would occur or what my own emotional response might be, or that it would have such an impact on me.

Response to the Research

Conducting the research was an extremely rewarding experience due to the enthusiastic response from all the national networks of organisations, the refuges and crisis centres themselves, and the individual women working in them. The response to the quantitative aspect of the study was overwhelming, with a return rate in excess of 80%, a particularly high return rate for a postal questionnaire, and the interview response rate was also high at 89% (response rates are discussed in detail in chapter 'x'). When contacting organisations by telephone at the outset of the study there was a very positive response to the proposed research and women expressed their willingness to take part. They also articulated how important the research was and were grateful that I was pursuing it.

Conducting successful social research requires the willingness of respondents to participate. In the process of fieldwork it became clear from women’s comments that refuges and crisis centres are often over-researched, and that they rarely see the outcome of the research. Given this, I was extremely grateful for women’s willingness to participate, and the ease with which organisations and individuals could be recruited made the fieldwork process extremely satisfying. This intensified
my commitment to disseminate the research findings widely and provide appropriate feedback to those involved. The following comments were provided by women on questionnaires, and indicate the positive response the research received.

I fill in many questionnaires but never see the end result of the research. Would be interested – so if you would email me at ****@*****.co.uk I would appreciate it. Also if you have any further questions then feel free to e-mail me.

I would be very interested to read your results/analysis of the questionnaire and wish you great success with your work. Please continue to bash away at those with authority with the facts and figures about violence against women. Hopefully one day the powers that be will listen and provide core funding (without all the bureaucratic stuff) so we can provide support and help to all the women that need it.

When conducting research there are inevitably times that are tiring and frustrating. Comments such as these, and women's responses in interviews, and via email and telephone, about the value they placed on the research, were very effective at combating the tiring and frustrating times. Being reminded of the importance of the research and the potential impact for those participating, and for all women, is a very rewarding experience during the research process and helps provide renewed energy for its completion.

The research was also very rewarding in terms of the friendships I developed with the women involved in refuge and crisis work. I have maintained contact with some of these women since meeting them in the course of fieldwork. Our communication then and now is both social and work-related. Women will share relevant developments in their organisations or in violence policy, and on occasion contact me seeking particular information or resources. I am always happy to provide whatever help I can. I was offered hospitality at every refuge and crisis centre I visited during the course of fieldwork that extended from coffee to offers of accommodation and being taken out for meals. Organisations and individuals were incredibly friendly and welcoming and many women embraced me on my arrival and departure. It was an incredibly positive experience as a researcher and a person to be accepted so warmly.
During the fieldwork element of the research I met a great many women who inspired me in terms of their commitment to the work they do, their feminist politics and their desire for social and political change. Many women with personal experience of violence who now consider themselves survivors, and who have worked very hard to get to that point, shared their personal stories with me. These were often hard to listen to, as I discuss below in more detail, but invariably I was in awe at these women’s capacity not only to survive, but in to continue to fight. It is incredibly humbling to meet so many women who give their time for no financial reward with the aim of improving the lives of individual women, and in turn all women.

Practical Difficulties

The comparative and empirical nature of the research meant fieldwork in both Sweden and the UK was required. Conducting fieldwork in a country and culture where one is not ordinarily resident, and where the language spoken is not one’s first language, involves practical considerations other than those encountered when conducting research in one’s home country.

The setting up of fieldwork visits within Sweden was more problematic than I had anticipated. The geographical size and landscape of Sweden makes empirical research with respondents in various geographical locations more difficult. These problems contributed to the decision to conduct some email interviews, but those organisations where face-to-face interviews were conducted often involved long and tiring journeys. I also experienced particular problems when my planned research timetable corresponded with a month with frequent national holidays, a problem I had not foreseen. This led to unavoidable delays in the fieldwork timetable but did not create problems that prohibited fieldwork.

Although I speak conversational Swedish I do not speak Swedish at a standard that would mean I am not easily identifiable as a non-Swede. The standard of English amongst the Swedish population is particularly high, and I did not encounter problems that could not be resolved, but interacting in a second language for both
myself on occasion, and those gatekeepers and respondents involved in the research, was tiring and difficult. There are inevitable delays when conducting social research, but the additional language barrier meant these were occurred more frequently in Sweden as compared to the UK.

A particular practical problem that occurred during fieldwork, which I had not foreseen prior to commencing it, was the effect the secret nature of refuge and crisis centre locations would have on my ability to organise travel and accommodation and to seek resources whilst conducting fieldwork. The nature of refuges and crisis centres means in the most part they do not have a public address but correspond using a post office box address. This is essential to ensure the anonymity of women using the service and to protect them from the possibility of further violence. When travelling to refuges or crisis centres to conduct interviews I usually arranged to meet someone at a mainline train or central bus station, but rarely knew where I was being taken. Although I did not feel at risk or uncomfortable on any occasion, I did contemplate the irony of conducting research about violence against women and getting into cars with strangers to be driven to a location I did not know, nor could inform anyone else of. I fully appreciate the necessity of keeping the location of centres secret, nor do I expect those rules to be waived for researchers, but on occasion elaborate travel arrangements were made that often involved me making extra journeys on various forms of transport. The various practical problems I experienced whilst conducting the research did not prove prohibitive and are among the spectrum of barriers researchers come across in the process of most research projects. Many of these will inform my research practice in the future though and the problems I may foresee are likely to be more numerous as a result.

Personal Stories

Another issue that I had predicted would be potentially difficult when conducting interviews was being told about women’s personal experience of violence. Although I had anticipated that this would potentially be a topic of conversation during interviews, I was not sure how frequently this was likely to happen. The questionnaires addressed this question specifically but I did not ask women whether
or not they had experienced sexual or gendered violence in the interviews. Nonetheless, women described their own experiences of male violence in 16 of the 25 interviews I conducted. In the remaining 9 interviews, and additionally in some of the other 16, women described either a close friend or relative's experience, or gave anonymous examples of the experiences of women they had encountered during their work. More often than not these stories were offered when responding to questions about their motivations to get involved in refuge or crisis work and the reasons they remain involved. This is discussed in more detail in the following chapters.

Given the statistics on the incidence of sexual and physical violence against women outlined in Chapter 1, and if we consider sexual violence as a continuum ranging from inappropriate language and flashing to rape and sexual murder (Kelly, 1988) it is maybe surprising that I had not anticipated the incidence of personal story telling to be so high. Having reflected upon this during the fieldwork and since, I realised there were two issues here; whether I had expected the incidence of violence to be so high among the women I interviewed and their close friends or relatives (I had fully expected them to be knowledgeable about the experiences of women encountered during their work) and secondly, whether I had expected them to divulge those experiences. Initially whilst conducting fieldwork and before coming to realise that these two things may be distinct (nor at this stage had I reflected on my own response in any way), I was always unprepared for the divulging of experiences and telling of stories. Even after several incidences of this I was still surprised to a certain degree.

During the first interviews I conducted I found it particularly hard when women divulged their personal experiences of violence. I experienced a variety of emotional responses during the interviews that ranged from disbelief and embarrassment to anger and fear. In one I conducted mid-way through the fieldwork process, I cried during the interview in response to the story my respondent was telling about her experience. Although I had anticipated that personal experience might be a topic of conversation and that respondents were likely to recount stories of their own or of others, I had not devoted any time to considering how I might respond in these
situations. As a result my responses were often overwhelming and on many occasions took me by surprise.

A body of literature (for example Lewis Herman, 1992; Stanko, 1997; Coffey, 1998) details the emotional responses individuals may experience when hearing trauma stories. It is common on hearing trauma stories to create an emotional distance for oneself and to allow oneself not to really listen or engage (Herman, 1992; Coffey, 1997). When listening to a trauma story the teller asks the listener to share the burden of pain. The interactive process involved therefore requires the listener to accept that they are also vulnerable. As Coffey summarises:

If, for one person, foolishness does not account for helplessness, for ourselves, no amount of precaution can absolutely preclude it. .... The struggle to understand trauma is the struggle to hear in trauma stories the truths that they hold about vulnerability and helplessness. This is a struggle for us all. (Coffey, 1998:22)

Having reflected upon my own response to women’s personal stories of sexual violence I am aware that the emotional process I experienced followed this pattern. Trauma stories are inherently unbelievable and unspeakable (Lewis Herman, 1992); we do not want to believe we are vulnerable, so we do not want others to speak it because we do not want to be reminded when we listen. Both this process and society’s assumptions about gender stereotypes and norms of femininity and masculinity contribute to the silence that surrounds gendered and sexual violence.

The ordinary response to atrocities is to banish them from consciousness. Certain violations of the social compact are too terrible to utter aloud: this is the meaning of the word unspeakable. (Lewis Herman, 1992:1)

As a result, “... silence is the typical response of those who are sexually assaulted.” (Stanko, 1997:76). Lewis Herman (1992) argues the silence that surrounds gendered and sexual violence verges on cultural psychosis. The culture of silence and the hidden nature of violence means we are often ill-prepared for listening to personal stories.
At the beginning of the fieldwork process I was ill-prepared for listening to women’s personal stories. My initial response was shock and panic and I did not know how to respond, nor did I know if or how I was expected to respond. I am now aware that I created an emotional distance between those being interviewed and myself. In doing so I attempted to create a protective barrier between the information being shared and my own sensitivities. As a result, when women divulged their personal experiences I was not always *really* listening. I would hear the information being shared but was often unable to connect it with the individual sitting in front of me; I was unwilling to hear it as another human being’s experience. I am also now aware that my response was based upon my inability and unwillingness to face the overwhelming feelings of fear, sorrow, and despair that hearing such stories creates. Truly listening would also remind me of my own experience as a woman living in a society where fear of violence dominates the lives of all women.

Rebecca Coffey’s description of her own emotional response when conducting research on the personal trauma of rape, sexual assault and atrocities committed in times of conflict, documented in her book *Unspeakable Truths and Happy Endings* (1998), has helped me understand my own response. She describes listening to one of her respondents, Madeleine, telling her story of the experience of gang rape. Coffey notes that although she was attending a meeting with Madeleine and her therapist with the purpose of hearing her trauma story, meaning there was no element of surprise at it being told, when Madeleine then began to tell her story she felt overwhelmed. Feeling out of her depth with Madeleine only at the prelude, she was unable to leave or to stop her as Madeleine was sharing her story and going through the pain as an act of faith, and thus trusted Coffey to be able to hear her. In order to cope with this experience Coffey created an emotional distance between herself and Madeleine by engaging a coping mechanism that involved Coffey pretending she was watching a particularly good soliloquy of a playwright or actress. Later when Coffey was calmer she was able to reengage her appreciation of the reality of Madeleine’s situation.
My own response was more disorganised in that I did not pretend to be listening to an act of fiction or theatre, but the overwhelming panic about how I should respond was all consuming to the extent I was distracted from truly listening. It is only possible to ignore one’s emotional response for so long, and to eventually experience these emotions was unavoidable. This was also necessary if I was to truly engage with the women I interviewed. Women detailed their own experiences of rape, sexual assault and domestic violence, and the stories of women who had used the refuge or crisis centre in which they worked. The impact of violence on their lives in terms of flashbacks, nightmares, depression, suicide attempts, self-harm and fractured relationships were also discussed. Many of these stories were incredibly painful to listen to and when the overwhelming panic I experienced during the first interviews subsided I began to experience feelings of sorrow and despair, anger, and increased levels of fear about my own personal safety. Kelly (1998) documents similar emotional responses and Stanko (1997) says, “Emotion and pain are never far from teaching and research on sexual violence” (1997:75).

This was certainly the case in my experience but, in order to gain a deeper understanding of the impact of violence and the fear of violence in women’s lives, it is necessary to engage with these emotional responses and critically reflect upon them. In doing so I became aware that the shock I experienced when women told their personal stories of violence was not shock at the number of women who had been subjected to rape, sexual assault or domestic violence; it was shock at the number of women I interviewed who were willing to share their experience, who were no longer conforming to the culture of silence.

My response to hearing stories of violence made me realise that many of us, including myself, contribute to the culture of silence. I do not think violence against women should be considered unspeakable, and I think the culture of silence must be challenged, but I was forced to confront the fact that I was not prepared, nor particularly willing, to be a listener. Nor did I know how to cope with the feelings listening created. Having reflected on the experience of bearing witness to women’s stories of violence I have gained a deeper insight into the importance of a service that
allows women to speak about their experience to willing and sympathetic ears. It also reminds me of the importance of research that documents the experience of refuges and crisis centres that aim to provide that service and to campaign to challenge that silence and the hidden nature of violence. For me it has reinforced the importance of the fact that “…shattering the silence of women remains a major commitment of the women’s and feminist movement both within and beyond the academic world.” (Graham, 1983:135).

It has also reminded me about my own experiences as a woman living in a violent society and the fact that every woman lives with the fear of rape and “A few of us – more than a few, really – live with our own histories.” (Estrich, 1987:2). To encourage silence by failing to listen does not prevent either assault, or the fear of assault. The culture of silence that surrounds violence against women remains a strong force. My reflection on the research process reiterated the importance of including in my research the voices of those involved and of detailing my own emotional response. The aim of feminist research is to make the private, public; by including the stories of women’s experience of violence in the research it challenges the silence that surrounds sexual violence and brings some women’s experience into the public domain1. As a consequence,

...doing work on sexual violence – for some of us – involves an account of sexual violence that includes placing into the foreground the still hidden, devastating toll it has for so many. (Stanko, 1997:75)

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1 Interviewees who described their personal experience of violence were all consulted prior to the inclusion of their stories in the research. All the women whose experiences are documented in the following chapters gave consent for their inclusion. For many women it was particularly important that their experience be documented, and when asked if they would prefer it not to be included in the research, were adamant that it should be because in telling their story they were choosing not to remain silent.
Chapter 5 - Refuges and Crisis Centres in the UK and Sweden

Introduction

This brief chapter provides a descriptive overview of the networks of refuges and crisis centres operating in the UK and Sweden involved in the research. There are two main networks in each country: Women’s Aid and Rape Crisis in the United Kingdom; and Riksorganisationen för Kvinnojourer i Sverige (ROKS) and Sveriges Kvinnjourernas Riksförbund (SKR) in Sweden. All four networks developed out of the wider women’s liberation and feminist movements and continue to provide alternative welfare provision for survivors of violence, and campaign and lobby on issues surrounding violence against women. The organisations differ within, and between, the two countries, as well as within each organisation itself, in terms of their status as ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ in relation to the state. A brief history and overview of the current position of the organisations is discussed below.

United Kingdom

There are two main networks of anti-violence organisations offering alternative welfare provision in the UK. Women’s Aid is a network of refuges for women and children suffering domestic violence, who organise nationally in England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. Rape Crisis is a network of crisis centres offering services to women and girls, who have been raped, sexually assaulted or abused. There are Rape Crisis centres throughout England, Wales and Scotland, and one in Northern Ireland.

Both organisations are run by women and offer services for women, and identify with a feminist political outlook. The women’s movement in the UK, because of its association with radical and socialist feminism, and because of the ‘closed’ nature of the political system, organised autonomously at the outset and had little formalised contact with state structures. The local state has been one of the main political arenas that anti-violence organisations have interacted with, a strategy that has proved particularly successful for Women’s Aid in particular.
Women's Aid

The network of organisations now known collectively as Women's Aid grew from the women's liberation movement of the 1960s and '70s. Male violence against women was the subject of much activity for feminists and the first refuge for battered women was opened in 1972 in London (Coote & Campbell, 1987; Kelly, 1988). Erin Pizzey, the founder of the first refuge, was a skilled publicist and succeeded in attracting considerable media attention for an issue that was almost entirely hidden in society. Pizzey eventually separated from the rest of the Women's Aid movement, after disagreements about the need to set up a national coordinating body. Pizzey continues to be viewed as a leading authority on domestic violence but her views diverge sharply from other Women's Aid groups. Pizzey sees male violence as a psychological problem and claims some women are 'violence prone' and invite assault (Coote & Campbell, 1987). This is antithetical to a feminist analysis of violence.

The National Women's Aid Federation (NWAF) was formed in 1975 (Charles, 2000) by which time there were 28 groups in existence with a further 83 in the process of being established (Coote & Campbell, 1987). The thirty-five founding groups of NWAF saw the need for a national body that could campaign on issues of violence against women and could coordinate the work of the ever-growing number of shelters across the country. Women's Aid had a non-hierarchical structure and explicitly feminist objectives. It insisted that all groups remain autonomous and maintain an 'open-door' policy. NWAF identified five aims:

1. To provide temporary refuge for women and children suffering physical or mental harassment

2. To encourage women to determine their own future, and to help them achieve it, whether that involves returning home or beginning a new life elsewhere

3. To recognise and care for the educational and emotional needs of the children involved
4. To offer advice and support to any woman who asks for it, whether she is resident in the refuge or not, and to offer aftercare and support for those who have left the refuge.

5. To educate and inform the public, the police, the courts, the social services, the media and other authorities on the issue of the battering of women, emphasising that this is a result of the general position of women in society (Schechter, 1982:155).

It is clear from these five aims that the Women’s Aid movement identified its dual role as both service providers and campaigners for political change from the outset (Stedward, 1987). At the beginning, NWAF organised refuges in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, but by 1980 each country had its own national organising body (Schechter, 1982). Across the United Kingdom there are now in excess of 330 Women’s Aid groups (Women’s Aid Federation of England, 2001; Scottish Women’s Aid, 2001; Welsh Women’s Aid, 2001; Northern Ireland Women’s Aid Federation, 2001).

Women’s Aid has an explicitly feminist ethos in terms of how they organise their work and in their analysis of the roots and repercussions of violence, in that Women’s Aid recognises:

- domestic violence is a violation of women and children’s human rights, that it is the result of an abuse of power and control, and that it is rooted in the historical status of women in the family and in society

- women and children have a right to live their lives free from all forms of violence and abuse, and that society has a duty to recognise and defend this right

(‘About Women’s Aid’, Women’s Aid Federation of England, Homepage, 2002)

The national organising bodies of Women’s Aid refuges in the four countries of the United Kingdom assume the majority of responsibility for the organisation of campaigning efforts, providing consultation with national government, and coordinating the work of the individual refuge organisations. The refuges assume the
majority of responsibility for service provision as well as engaging in local campaigning. The national organisations and individual refuges take part in consultation exercises, multi-agency working, community education and training for various bodies. Funding is applied for and administered on a local level and refuges assume responsibility for securing funding. The vast majority of Women’s Aid refuges now have service agreements with local authorities to provide housing provision for those leaving violent relationships. The movement identifies its agenda on domestic violence as having three strands:

- working at a strategic level to promote the protection of women and children by representing their needs to policy and decision makers
- working towards the long-term prevention of domestic violence through public awareness and campaigning
- working to provide services that meet the needs of all abused women and children

(‘About Women’s Aid’, Women's Aid Federation of England, Homepage, 2002)

Women’s Aid has changed somewhat since its outset in the 1970s and has sought to have its professional status recognised, as well as the comprehensive services they now provide for survivors of violence. Despite these changes, Women’s Aid continues to aim to organise collectively and to adhere to a feminist ethos. It continues to emphasise the self-help element of refuge work and eschews the service provider/client dichotomy that characterises statutory welfare provision, and continues to seek both political reform and wider societal change on the issue of violence against women. As will be discussed in the following chapters, Women’s Aid’s service delivery element has allowed the opportunity for a close relationship with government despite having a feminist outlook and understanding of violence and relatively radical demands in terms of wider social change. This relationship necessarily comes with costs and benefits.
In the following chapters, it will be argued that Women’s Aid has succeeded in establishing itself as a legitimate organisation in the eyes of state institutions in its role as service provider, and has succeeded in putting the issue of domestic violence onto the political agenda. At the same time Women’s Aid has retained its autonomy from the state and a feminist political analysis of violence.

Rape Crisis

The network of Rape Crisis centres that now exists in the United Kingdom, like Women’s Aid, also grew out of the women’s liberation movement and second wave feminism. Women recognised a need for support services for women who had experienced rape and sexual assault, as well as the need for campaigning on issues of sexual violence, in particular surrounding the criminal justice system and its treatment of women complainants (Coote & Campbell, 1987). The first Rape Crisis centre opened in London in 1976, and by 1985 a total of 45 centres were in existence throughout the UK (Coote & Campbell, 1987).

Like Women’s Aid, the movement’s efforts were not geared simply at gaining legal reform from the state; it also had the chief aim of providing a woman-centred framework for support. Women aimed to help each other and their efforts were based upon the notion that the cause and problem of rape was deeply embedded in the social fabric, and needed wider change than piecemeal reform (Coote & Campbell, 1987). As with the majority of anti-violence organisations, the Rape Crisis movement had dual roles; service provision for survivors and campaigning for political change. The Rape Crisis movement had the wider aim of achieving a rape-free society (Gornick et al, 1989). The movement’s campaigns included slogans such as:

We are walking for all women – all women should be free to walk down any street, night or day, without fear. (Spare Rib, 1978)

Rape Crisis also organised collectively and provided services in a way that adhered to feminist politics. The difference between helper and helped was intentionally
minimised. Crisis centres provided counselling and a sympathetic environment to help women cope with the experience of rape (Coote & Campbell, 1987). The understanding that women were re-victimised by the state institutions that were supposed to protect them meant Rape Crisis demanded reform, however those that advocated a feminist revolution understood that profound social struggle that attacked the sexism, racism and class domination in society would be needed to end rape. As a result, although Rape Crisis recognised that institutions needed to be changed, much of it also felt the need to take an oppositional stance to these institutions (Schechter, 1982). There was a strong commitment to the transformational and radical goals of the movement as well as the provision of services.

Today there are 55 rape crisis centres affiliated to the Rape Crisis Network in the UK (Rape Crisis Federation, 2001). Rape Crisis was slower to organise nationally than Women’s Aid and only formed the national network in 1996. There are not the national coordinating bodies in each country of the UK that Women’s Aid has, and the Rape Crisis Federation operates as a networking body in England and Wales and a smaller more loosely organised network links the nine Rape Crisis centres in Scotland who are currently trying to establish funds and resources to form a national coordinating network. The level of national and regional organisation characteristic of Women’s Aid is not found in Rape Crisis. The national bodies that exist take part in consultation exercises, multi-agency working, community education and training where resources allow.

Rape Crisis continues to identify with the aims of the anti-rape movement as it did at the outset, with the national network in England and Wales stating its aims as:

- To raise the profile of the Rape Crisis Movement
- To act as a national voice for female survivors of sexual violence and abuse
- To represent the interests of Rape Crisis and Sexual Abuse services.
It remains a key aim of Rape Crisis to have sexual violence and rape to be seen as crimes of violence and not as acts of sex, and seek to challenge rape myths such as ‘women ask for it’, and say ‘no’ when they mean ‘yes’. Furthermore, they seek to continue to provide services for survivors of rape, and to document the impact rape has on women’s lives.

Rape Crisis centres are responsible for securing funding for services, but lack the service agreements that Women’s Aid have established with local authorities. It will be argued that because Rape Crisis do not provide statutory welfare services in the way Women’s Aid do, therefore the ‘off-loading’ of welfare provision by local authorities does not happen to the same extent (Stedward, 1987), as a result Rape Crisis are far less well funded. Recent press coverage has documented this:

Half of Britain's remaining rape crisis groups exist on less than £20,000 a year, raised entirely from donations, and operate without any paid workers at all, while one in five continues to function with less than £5,000. (Hill, 2002)

The lack of a service element that local authorities and state institutions recognise as legitimate, and therefore necessary to fund, has contributed to Rape Crisis’ poorer funding situation and thus made it less necessary for the movement to organise nationally to the extent Women’s Aid has in order to coordinate and negotiate that relationship. Rape Crisis has not engaged with the state in the same way that Women’s Aid has. Whether this is strategy on the part of Rape Crisis, and therefore a ‘choice’, or a consequence of the environment in which they operate, will be addressed in the following chapters.

**Sweden**

There are two national networks of refuges and crisis centres in Sweden offering alternative welfare provision for survivors of violence. Both the national organisations in Sweden, ROKS and SKR, developed from the wider women’s
liberation movement of the 1960s and '70s. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the Swedish women's movement was initially mobilised around issues of labour and came to the issue of violence comparatively late in relation to other Western European states. The women’s movement in Sweden followed a distinct pattern from the movement in the UK, and women’s organisations have had relatively close involvement with state structures and agencies. The movement followed this pattern because it developed from a political background of more liberal feminism, where feminist groups were more optimistic about the state's ability to provide change and reform, and where a history of social democracy and consensus politics characterises the Swedish state therefore there is a tendency to incorporate political interests.

The women’s movement in Sweden has historically geared more of its efforts towards the provision of services for survivors of violence, with some scholars claiming the movement is more philanthropic than those found in other Western states (Dobash & Dobash, 1992). In many ways this was because the women’s movement had less work to do in Sweden since significant legislation had been passed prior to the emergence of second wave feminism. For example, abortion was legalised in Sweden in 1937 (Charles, 2000) and marital rape was criminalized in 1962 (Dahelrup & Gulli, 1985). State funding was initially granted to women’s organisations following legislation in the early 1980s, and more recently Kvinnofrid (1998) legislation included the provision of state funding for all anti-violence organisations and refuges. Both the national organisations in Sweden were developed from a concern about domestic and family violence. One of the main distinctions between Sweden and the UK, and indeed other Western states, is Sweden’s lack of a rape-specific movement. In fact, only one particular movement developed at the outset, and that was the network of refuges that is known as ROKS. SKR began in 1996 following an ideological split between those feminists within the movement who endorsed a more ‘radical’ stance on issue of violence, and those who endorsed a more ‘liberal’ view. The understanding of the causes and repercussions of violence also differs between these two organisations, as I discuss below, and it will be argued, in turn, has implications for strategy and practice.
It is arguable that the differences between the two ‘strands’ of the movement are less apparent today, as I discuss in more detail in the following chapters, and to some extent the women’s movement in Sweden is adopting a more ‘radical’ outlook in response to the institutionalisation of equality making claims about the situation of women more difficult. The debate about the aims of the movement between the two strands, in terms of whether organisations should seek to provide for the needs of the individual woman, or seek a transformation of gender relations in society, are still evident.

Riksorganisationen för Kvinnojourer i Sverige (ROKS)

In Sweden, the first refuges for battered women and crisis lines for survivors of sexual violence opened in both Gothenburg and Stockholm in 1977 (Bolin, 1984; Eduards, 1992). These centres were established and run by feminist women who had previously been involved in consciousness raising groups and had engaged with the personal salience of violence as well as its political salience. Those involved had the aim of providing services for survivors of violence in order to address those needs. Similar to events in the UK, the number of shelters steadily increased throughout the 1970s and early 1980s and women began to see the need for a national body to coordinate the work of the shelters. Following a number of national meetings, where in 1981 the claim was made for state support for all women’s organisations (a claim that was successful with legislation in 1982), ROKS was established in 1984 with that aim of coordinating the work and strategy of the shelters (Eduards, 1997).

It became clear that there were ideological divisions within the movement early on in the work of the organisation. Two ‘strands’ of the movement developed, one of which regarded the other as being too charity-oriented and not adhering to a perspective and of being too willing to work in concert with politicians. This group, in turn, regarded the other ‘strand’ as having too radical a feminist approach and considered their politics and actions too ‘extreme’ (Eduards, 1997).

It is the more ‘radical strand’ that today make up ROKS. The national network organisation coordinate the campaigning work of the refuges as well as negotiating
issues of funding and resources with the state on behalf of the refuges. ROKS have an explicitly feminist outlook stating that they work:

... in the spirit of feminism like the kvinnojourer (women’s organisations) work against violence against women, and work against male dominance and superiority. (My translation) (ROKS, Home Page, 2002)

The national organisation and refuges organise in ways that are compatible with feminist principles, although they do not explicitly state that this form of organisation is, or has to be, collective. The principle that underpins it, however, is equality and empowerment. The difference between helper and helped is also intentionally minimised in ROKS’ work. ROKS now have a total of 125 refuges across Sweden and 26 ‘Tjejjourer’ - centres for young women. The establishment of Tjejjourer has been relatively recent in Sweden and these are distinct from similar efforts in other countries in that they do not specifically relate to violence or physical violation. These centres are aimed at all young women who may require support and not only those who have been violated in some way.

‘Knowledge’ and ‘Support’ are the guiding principles of ROKS and women are provided with expertise and resources but are urged to take their own decisions. A key element of ROKS’ work is the empowerment of women. ROKS aim to create debate on the issue of violence against women and have it remain an issue of public importance. They produce and disseminate documentation and research, undertake community education and campaigning, and advise public and state bodies on violence against women. It will be argued in the following chapters that ROKS have had a relatively close relationship with the state and its agencies and in many ways have enjoyed ‘insider’ status not only in their role as service providers, but because the movement has had a close relationship, and indeed influence on, the state since the outset. The securing of public funds for refuges and crisis centres is indicative of this.
Sveriges Kvinnojourernas Riksförbund (SKR)

The more 'liberal' strand of the women's refuge movement in Sweden, SKR, established itself as a national network in 1996. After a number of organisations involved in the movement split from ROKS in the late 1980s and early 1990s they eventually organised their own coordinating body in the form of SKR. SKR is now made up of a national coordinating body with 32 refuges and 3 Tjejjourer. The national network is less well organised and far smaller than that of ROKS and does not undertake the campaigning and consultation activity that ROKS does. This is in part a result of more limited resources, both financially and in terms of personnel, but also a result of their differing analysis of the roots and repercussions of violence.

The following extracts indicate how SKR describe themselves:

'non-profit, religious, political, autonomous' organisation of local women's shelters and other organisations concerned with the issues of male violence against women.

A feminist organisation working for a democratic and equal society that is free from violence. (My translation) (SKR, Home Page, 2002)

SKR's approach to anti-violence work is characterised and underpinned by a more philanthropic understanding than the work of ROKS. Refuges affiliated to SKR stress the individual woman and her specific experiences and criticise ROKS concentration on structural issues for being too 'feminist', claiming they are too concerned with the questions of women to the neglect of the problems of children.

4 The use of the term 'liberal' here is not intended to necessarily imply a close relationship with the state, and a desire to seek reform via the state. Although SKR are open to engagement with the state, in that it does not go against their feminist outlook, they engage with the state far less that ROKS. The use of the term 'liberal' in this context refers to the more philanthropic and charitable elements of this part of the movement. 'Liberal' is the term Swedish women working in refuges and crisis centres use in this context.
SKR conform to Hyden’s (1995) understanding that the problem of violence cannot be understood simply by looking at the structural patterns of society. An adequate understanding from Hyden’s point of view, requires a combined consideration of the gendered power perspective, as well as individual psychological explanations. Hyden (1995) claims a woman is not a victim but a person with great capacity and agency, and that to concentrate on structural explanations only removes the responsibility from the individual man and passes ‘blame’ to the patriarchal structure of society.\(^5\)

The provision of services to survivors of violence is a key feature of the work of SKR. Children and teenage girls are priority groups for SKR organisations as well as women with psychological or substance misuse problems. On the whole, SKR adopt a more welfare-oriented approach to their work as a network of organisations. SKR do not have a close relationship with state agencies, other than in terms of education and training despite their psychological approach being particularly compatible with the service provider/client model that characterises state welfare provision. I will argue that their lack of a close relationship is because of their smaller organisational network and limited resources rather than an incompatibility or unwillingness to engage with the state. SKR campaign on issues of violence against women and these follow the liberal feminist approach of seeking reform through existing state structures, and tend to concentrate on issues such as physical and mental health and welfare resources for women rather than wider political issues, a process the organisational network does not view as problematic.

**Conclusion**

Having provided an overview of the national networks involved in the research in terms of a brief history, how they officially describe themselves, and the work that

\(^5\) The difference between ROKS’ and SKR’s understanding of male violence are similar to the differences that split the Women’s Aid movement from Erin Pizzey, the founder of the first Women’s Aid refuge.
the organisations do, the following chapters address the questions specific to this research in relation to the two countries and four networks.
Chapter 6 – Findings I

Introduction

This section of the thesis details the results of the empirical research conducted in Sweden and the UK, moving on to conclude on what insights these offer us in relation to the main research questions and themes. The content of the following two chapters are organised thematically. The themes identified from literature, that subsequently informed the design of the data gathering tools, are dealt with in turn. This chapter begins with a discussion of response rates and provides a ‘map’ of refuges and crisis centres in Sweden and the UK in order that the research findings that follow can be placed in context. Thereafter, this chapter discusses: the funding of refuges and crisis centres and the impact this has on their activities and working practices; the organisational structure of refuges and crisis centres and the extent to which this has been changed or altered in relation to funding, as well as the extent to which an organisation’s structure reflects an organisation’s ideology; finally moving on to discuss how the organisations involved define the function of refuges and crisis centres in terms of service provision and campaigning for social change.

Chapter 7 discusses the remaining three research themes. Firstly, it considers the motivations of women engaging in refuge and crisis work relating this back to the perceived functions of the organisation, as well as discussing their experience of anti-violence work. Secondly, it considers the relationships these organisations have with state structures and agencies and workers’ perceptions of, and attitudes towards, the state in terms of its response to violence against women. Finally, the strategies and tactics that anti-violence organisations in Sweden and the UK adopt in relation to the state, and the factors that have influenced strategy adoption, will be discussed. Thereafter, the concluding chapter to the thesis relates the findings back to the overall research aims and questions.

Response Rates

The response rates for the research, in both Sweden and the UK, and in all four organisational networks involved, were universally high. The postal survey method
often achieves poor response rates (de Vaus, 1996), however this was not the case for this research. Of the total sample of 90 organisations that agreed to participate in the research, a total of 74 returned questionnaires, which represents a response rate of 82%. Of the 40 organisations in Sweden, 34 (85%) responded, and of the 50 organisations in the UK, a total of 40 (80%) responded. The response rates are shown in detail in Table 1, below.

Table 1 – Organisational and Individual Response Rates for Postal Questionnaire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th># Contacted</th>
<th># Responded</th>
<th>% Response Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sweden</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKR organisations</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKR individual</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>individual</td>
<td>organisation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROKS organisations</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROKS individual</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>individual</td>
<td>questionnaire</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total organisations</strong></td>
<td>40</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total individual questionnaires</strong></td>
<td>300</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UK</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's Aid</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organisations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's Aid</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>individual</td>
<td>questionnaire</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rape Crisis</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organisations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rape Crisis</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>individual</td>
<td>questionnaire</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total organisations</strong></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total individual questionnaires</strong></td>
<td>375</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>80.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organisations</strong></td>
<td>90</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual questionnaires</strong></td>
<td>675</td>
<td>549</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The response rates for individuals within those organisations were similar to the overall organisational response rate. Of the 675 questionnaires distributed, a total of 549 were returned completed, which represents a response rate of 81%. There were no significant differences between response rates in Sweden and the UK, with rates of 82% (247) and 80.5% (302) achieved respectively. Furthermore, as can be seen in Table 1, the response rates from each of the four national networks were similar therefore the data collected could be used for comparative analysis with confidence.

The decision to contact organisations to establish consent for participation prior to posting questionnaires was a significant factor in ensuring such a high response rate. This approach was used for previous research on refuges and crisis centres in Sweden and Scotland and achieved a high return on that occasion also. This approach was used because it had proved successful in the past and, often, those postal surveys that achieve a poor return have been posted unsolicited and therefore individuals are less likely to complete them (May, 1995).

The high response rate is also a reflection of the importance of the research to those who participated. This has been discussed in Chapter 4 where comments from those involved show the high level of support the research received. The high response rate means the data is both robust and comprehensive and allows for confident statistical analysis to be conducted. This, combined with the stratified and systematic sampling method used, means projections to the population of anti-violence organisations in Sweden and the UK as a whole can also be made, because we can be confident the sample is representative.

In Chapter 4 the sampling procedure for selecting organisations and individuals for interview was described. A total of 28 organisations were selected for interview, of

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which 25 ultimately took part. The following table (Table 2) details the break down of interview by country, organisation and by interview method.

**Table 2 – Interview Method and Location Breakdown**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Face-to-Face</th>
<th>Email/Telephone</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sweden</strong></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKR</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROKS</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>United Kingdom</strong></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Aid</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rape Crisis</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

‘Map’ of Anti-violence Organisations in the UK and Sweden

This section provides a brief ‘map’ of refuges and crisis centres in Sweden and the UK. There is a dearth of literature on women’s movement organisations as a whole, and a lack of any large-scale surveys of existing organisations today. Therefore, the inclusion of this data offers us a more detailed understanding of the refuges and crisis centres currently operating in Sweden and the UK.

Lifetime of Organisations

The organisations involved in the research ranged in age from less than one year old to 26 years old. In Sweden, the range was from less than one year old, to 22 years old, and in the UK from 2 years old to 26 years old. The fact some organisations exist that are so young tells us that the issue of violence against women for the feminist movement is a current one, and the need to provide services for survivors of violence and to campaign on these issues has not been forgotten. Furthermore, the
shorter lifetime of Swedish organisations reflects the fact the Swedish women’s movement turned to the issue of violence slightly later than the women’s movement in the UK and other parts of Western Europe, having previously concentrated on labour issues (Corrin, 1999).

In Sweden there was a ‘boom’ in the establishment of centres between the early to mid 1980s with 56% of the centres opening during these years. The SKR organisations were, in the most part, younger than ROKS organisations, and accounted for 90% of those organisations less than 15 years of age. Subsequently ROKS organisations outnumbered SKR in the older age ranges and accounted for 62.5% of those aged between 16 and 26 years. These findings are statistically significant at a 95% level of confidence ($X^2=7.809$, d.f=1, $p=.005$ – Output Table 1).

These findings are, in part, explained by the ideological split the movement experienced in the late 1980s. The SKR network was established as a more liberal alternative to the more radical ROKS network, and those that split from ROKS at that time existed independently until 1996 when they established the SKR network. The age difference is a result of the ROKS network retaining the majority of the existing organisations in their network. However, the findings indicated that SKR has been more proactive in establishing new centres than ROKS, which in turn suggests those organisations formed after the initial ‘boom’ of second wave feminism in the 1970s and early 1980s are likely to conform to a more liberal feminist ideology since they have chosen to affiliate with SKR.

In the UK, both Women’s Aid and Rape Crisis established a core group of centres in the 1970s. Rape Crisis continued to expand the number of centres into the 1980s, whereas Women’s Aid expanded more slowly at this time. However, the 1990s have seen a considerable rise in the number of Women’s Aid Refuges, and they have established twice as many new centres as Rape Crisis during this time. This is indicative of the better funding situation of Women’s Aid, the establishment of service contracts with local authorities (Stedward, 1987), as well as the increasing
public awareness of domestic violence compared to rape and sexual assault. All of these issues are discussed in further detail below.

**Domestic Violence & Sexual Assault Service Provision**

The description of the national networks in Sweden and the UK provided in Chapter 5 indicated that there is no rape-specific movement in Sweden. The reason why a rape-specific movement failed to develop in Sweden is unclear. Consequently, 100% of the Swedish sample indicated that they provided services for survivors of domestic violence. Those organisations that form ROKS and SKR also provide services for survivors of rape and sexual assault and 85% of centres indicated that they offered these services. However, as will be discussed below in more detail, this accounts for a much smaller part of their work and the main locus of their effort is domestic violence service provision. For example, interviewees indicated that no statistics were collated for the number of women using their services who had been subjected to rape or sexual assault outwith a cohabiting relationship.

In the UK there are two distinct networks providing services for survivors of domestic violence and survivors of rape and sexual assault. Therefore, when considering the total UK sample, 67.5% of centres reported that they had service provision for domestic violence survivors, and a total of 72.5% of centres dealt with rape and sexual assault. If we consider the networks in isolation then Women’s Aid indicated that 100% of their organisations provided services for domestic violence, of which 54% provided services for survivors of rape or sexual assault. All Rape Crisis centres indicated that they provided services for rape and sexual assault survivors, of which 19% provided services for domestic violence survivors. Unsurprisingly, the findings for domestic violence service provision are statistically significant at a 99% level of confidence ($X^2=28.889$, d.f=1, $p=.000$ – Output Table 2), and the findings for rape and sexual assault service provision are statistically significant at a 95% level of confidence ($X^2=10.115$, d.f=1, $p=.001$ – Output Table 3).
Organisations were also asked whether they provided services for survivors of child abuse. In Sweden ROKS were slightly more likely (75%) than SKR (50%) to provide such services. Differences in the UK were more marked where Rape Crisis were more likely to offer these service than Women’s Aid. 81% of Rape Crisis centres provided services for survivors of child abuse, compared to only 50% of Women’s Aid organisations. These findings are statistically significant at a 95% level of confidence ($X^2=4.000$, d.f=1, $p=.046$ – Output Table 4). It is not clear whether organisations in both countries, and in all four networks, provide services for adult survivors of child abuse, or children currently experiencing abuse, or both. The findings are potentially an artefact of the phrasing of the questionnaire in that it did not distinguish between the two. However, on face value the findings indicated that Rape Crisis centres are more likely than Women’s Aid to provide these services.
Section 1 - Funding & Resources

Introduction

The issue of access to funding and resources has been a salient one for women’s refuges and crisis centres. Organisations began in the 1970s with little or no state funding and were therefore free to explore new ways of working that were not curtailed by the restrictions and influence of other agencies. The advent of state funding for refuges and crisis centres offered the possibility of financial security but the risk of impacting upon organisations’ way of working and activities. The research has found that funding continues to be a key area for organisations in both Sweden and the UK. Debates about whether to accept state funding still occur within the movement and there have been notable changes over time in the methods used by organisations to secure resources. In addition, the results have shown that the level of funding provision is still highly variable and insecurity of funding is a major area of concern for organisations, even those with core state funding. For organisations in the UK and Sweden, applying for and accepting state funding restricts organisations’ activities but at the same time can provide stability for organisations on a longer-term basis and allow the provision of services to women. The research has also found that changes to activities and services come from pressures both within and outwith the organisations. This is discussed further in the themes that follow.

State Funding Provision

Given the impact that state funding can have on anti-violence organisations, detailed in US literature (Collins et al, 1989; Gornick et al, 1985; Matthews, 1994; Reinelt, 1994), in terms of the state’s ability to suppress political aspects of a movement by imposing restrictions on funding, this area was of considerable importance to the research. Investigation of state funding provision in Sweden and the UK also sheds light on the movements’ relationship with the state and the extent to which it has engaged with it.
State Funding in Sweden

All Swedish organisations receive funding from the state. As of 1998 the principle of the provision of state monies for women’s organisations and groups was included in the Kvinnofrid (‘Women’s Peace’: Women’s Right to Bodily Integrity and Individual Space) legislation meaning all are entitled to funding if certain criteria are met.

Women’s organisations themselves were heavily involved in defining this legislation and viewed the successful passing of the act as a victory, in terms of securing their own financial provision as well as the changes that were made to laws on violence against women, prostitution and trafficking. As ‘Ingrid’, a worker in a ROKS refuge said when asked about this state funding:

Having money from them is important for us. Of course we need the money to work, but having that money a guarantee is very important to us. When they give us money and guarantee us money it makes us valid and seen as important. They can give it to you once, twice, for some years maybe, and then ‘slut’! (finish). Now they must pay for our services – they cannot say ‘no money left’ – they must find it now. (‘Ingrid’, ROKS refuge worker).

Guaranteed state funding provided a certain level of stability for organisations and enabled them to provide more comprehensive and regular services for women.

We use it for a lot of things. The best thing for us was that it meant we could employ a cleaner and a caretaker to keep our safe house clean and good. We women would spend a lot of our time cleaning and fixing and problem sorting and not doing what we have been trained for. We want to help the women here - of course they need a safe and clean house for them and their children but now we can pay others for that and we have more time for counselling and working to help the women change their lives and to help the children to live with what they have witnessed so young. (‘Mia’, SKR refuge worker.)

Oh yes, it is very useful. We have a child psychologist that comes to see the children here, we moved to bigger offices and can do more counselling because we have many more rooms here, oh there is many a thing ... for me the biggest is spending more time with the women because I don’t spend so much time trying to find a way to pay the electric or the telephone or looking at the bank accounts. (‘Jessica’, ROKS refuge worker.)

Interviewees felt positively about core state funding on the whole indicating that they regarded it as a ‘right’ rather than a ‘gift’. The women said they felt it was the
responsibility of the state to provide the financial support for women’s refuges and services for survivors of violence. It is likely that Sweden’s social democratic history is significant here in that the women see the state as having responsibility for its citizens and their welfare (Dahlerup & Gulli, 1985).

...and it is their responsibility to protect women from violence so of course they should give us the funds. Women need to have a safe place to go for help and that is what we give them. If the state money was not there we wouldn’t be able to help all the women that we do. It is not so bad for us because we are in the city but other smaller refuges in the north for example would not be there at all without the money, and communities there are so small it is difficult for women to leave. Women have the right to leave and the state should provide ways for them to do this. (‘Jessica’, ROKS worker.)

They should give us more money for what we have here. But I think they should also have help for women themselves. They are better with the children because they have more rights than the women and they are taken out of the home to somewhere safe but the women can be left there if no refuge in the town or no space in it. (‘Mia’, SKR worker.)

We in Sweden take pride in our welfare services but beaten women fall through the... how do you say it ...fall through the net? We women provide it for them because it is their right and they should have the choices. It’s our right to have the money to do this and it is the government who should pay. (‘Katja’, SKR worker.)

However, it was also evident that workers in the organisations were aware of the potential problems and drawbacks of accepting state funding. Several interviewees indicated that although they felt positively about it on the whole, they were aware of the potential impact accepting state funding has on the approach to their work and they way that the organisation operates. Autonomy emerged as a key issue here. Although organisations in Sweden have the guarantee of state funding they are not, as a result, affiliated or incorporated into any state agency. The funding they receive is not contingent upon them becoming incorporated into state welfare services in a formalised way, as has often been the case in the US (Collins et al, 1989; Gornick et al, 1985; Matthews, 1994; Reinelt, 1994). Those interviewed for the research discussed the importance of this to the organisations and that it had been a key aim to secure state funding but not to sacrifice autonomy.
We were aware of the risk we were taking and we had to make sure we knew what we would and wouldn’t accept. The problem was that not all the women could agree about what we would accept. Some thought it was OK for the reports and accounts and some were happy to agree to training – they thought that if we were doing the training of police then it would be done in the right way and we could change their minds on violence to women – yes, ok, but not to have to do this for the money, for me it was important to get the money for the services to women, the training is ok, but separate, we are not working for the police but for the women, you see? For me these had to be not together. (‘Gun’, ROKS Worker, Sweden.)

Keeping autonomy is very important and no amount of money could buy that. I think the government is trying better with violence over women – it has the new research centre on violence now and the laws are better. But we’re outside of that, we want them to incorporate our ideas and to fund the safe houses, but not own us. (‘Jessica’, ROKS Worker, Sweden.)

They can have too much control over us. We have always to be careful I think. We are stronger because we are together in our network and we can pressure them together, by ourselves we don’t make so much noise so they can ignore what we are saying. (‘Mia’, SKR Worker, Sweden).

Currently within the ROKS network of refuges there is an ongoing debate as to whether organisations should continue to push for funding from the lower municipalities (Kommunen), and debates about the trade off between the potential gains and losses of state funding are evident here. Respondents indicated that their main concern was that current state funding comes from a national source, though it is distributed locally, and therefore the networks deal with one agency in relation to this funding. As a result they can negotiate as a network of organisations and not as individual groups, with the National Organisations taking the majority of responsibility for this. Funding from the lower municipalities would mean individual organisations or smaller local networks would each negotiate with their own Kommunen. Many of the women indicated they had concerns in three areas: firstly the possibility of being dragged into time consuming negotiations; secondly that differential outcomes for organisations could mean some were better resourced than others and this would risk creating ‘magnet’ organisations to the detriment of smaller ones; and thirdly that the lower municipalities would expect them to work or provide services in a particular way.
‘Åsa’, a ROKS worker in a refuge in the north of Sweden said:

I’m worried that we will spend a lot of our time on this for nothing at the end. The Kommunen here does not have much money for community things and they are old-fashioned. They give the money to ‘nicer’ things than refuges … things like music groups and handicapped children’s groups. (‘Åsa’, ROKS worker.)

If we get the money I can see them demanding on us, making us do things the way they want and not how we want. The money is not given to us to spend our way but they say this amount of kroner is for this thing, and you can’t spend the money on this and that thing. But I know we need it so I can see the other groups’ reasons for thinking we should try for it. It’s different for us in a small community where we have to do it all by ourselves. (‘Åsa’, ROKS worker.)

Organisations in larger towns and cities also had concerns about applying for funding from the Kommunen. They were concerned that the lower municipalities would grant funding to some organisations and not to others creating competition between groups. A similar situation occurred in the United Kingdom after local government reorganisation when more than one Women’s Aid refuge group or Rape Crisis centre was seeking funding from the same local authority. This had the effect of creating competition not only between the network and other applicants for funding, but between the network organisations. Competition for resources was increased in some authority areas whereas others had no refuges or crisis centres within their boundaries to seek funding from them.

We ended up in the same local authority as another refuge and we knew they weren’t going to pay for two – even if they had the money. It was a difficult time and we argued a lot with the other group about what we should do. We eventually merged the groups so we could split the money at least but we couldn’t keep all the stuff running. Now women in ***** don’t have a refuge to go to so they come here – we can’t turn them away although the authority funds us only for local women. (‘Mary’, Women’s Aid, England.)

The Swedish respondents indicated very similar concerns, but were also concerned that the lower municipalities would target specific organisations to the detriment of others.
I am never sure about these matters, ... many reasons to ask for the money but I always see the bad angle of things too. Will they fund the refuges for immigrants or just for the Swedes? ('Ingrid', ROKS worker.)

My worry is if we dispute with them or they don’t like what we do over some issue – they could use the money to punish us or make us do things their way. It’s different from the money we all get because we all have to fight our battle in different Kommunen. ('Jessica', ROKS worker.)

It is clear from these responses that women working in refuges in Sweden are concerned about how the state may act in ways that support one ‘type’ of organisation, to the detriment of another. It indicates that those involved in the movement are aware that one group’s political opportunity may directly impact upon that of another. Furthermore, it also indicates that women do not see the state as monolithic but have an understanding that battles can be fought in different arenas, with distinct outcomes, costs and benefits, and the particular strategies appropriate to that arena and the claims being made must be considered and then used appropriately.

**State Funding in the UK**

There is no guaranteed core funding for refuges and crisis centres in the UK. One of the major findings of the research is that all Women’s Aid organisations in the UK received some form of state funding whereas only half of Rape Crisis Centres do. One of the key differences here is in the nature of the services each organisation provides. Women’s Aid organisations received core funding administered at local authority level, often in the form of agreed service contracts. Women’s Aid offer refuge services for women leaving violent relationships, and as a result they provide key welfare services that otherwise would be the responsibility of the state. Local authorities are responsible for housing individuals, and in the most part have recognised the important role provided by Women’s Aid in this capacity.

We’ve got a service agreement with them to provide safe accommodation for women in this area. We’ve agreed to house women who come to us if we can find them a space and in return we get money from the council. ('Mary', Women’s Aid, England.)
Organisations were also asked about other funding provision, and Women’s Aid organisations cited housing benefit as their second largest income. This is important because housing benefit can be regarded as effectively a form of state funding in that the money comes from state institutions and the organisations provide a service on the state’s behalf. Therefore, Women’s Aid organisations were receiving two forms of state funding, whereas only half of Rape Crisis centres were receiving core state funding, and by the nature of the service provided by Rape Crisis centres, they are not eligible for funding via housing benefit payments.

We get some money from the council for our hotline but it’s not much. They don’t have service agreements with us because they don’t see us as a service. They have to house people but they don’t have to counsel them so we’re not a service to them. (‘Elaine’, Rape Crisis Worker, England.)

Rape Crisis workers indicated their resentment and anger at their funding situation. Several reasons were given for why they thought they were not well funded. These fell into three main themes: society’s attitude towards rape compared to domestic violence; a narrow and naïve view of the work Rape Crisis do; and their women-only approach.

During the interviews with Rape Crisis workers they frequently talked about society’s negative view of rape and of those who experience it, citing this as a reason why the state, local and national, were reluctant to fund rape-related services. Several respondents indicated that they felt public awareness of domestic violence had increased greatly over the past years, but that attitudes towards rape remained stereotypical and that myths about rape persisted. This suggests that Rape Crisis do not have favourable political opportunity in terms of the receptiveness of political elites and decisions makers, as well as society as a whole.

People are more sympathetic about domestic violence than they used to be and realise now that it happens, but that’s not happened so much with rape. It’s still seen as something that only happens to women who ‘ask for it’, and these are not the kind of women they want to give money for. (‘Margo’, Rape Crisis Worker, England.)
...domestic violence happens in the home and there’s now less tendency to blame the woman for it. It’s accepted that we should do something about it and help women to leave. Rape isn’t quite the same for folk because it’s still thought to be strangers in dark alleys attacking women who’re out on the streets. (‘Sarah’, Rape Crisis Worker, Scotland.)

Rape Crisis workers also stated that limited knowledge of the impact of rape, and therefore the importance of their service to women, and a naïve view of the work that they do also contributed to their poor funding.

The impact rape has on women is quite astounding and it’s not recognised for what it is so our service isn’t recognised for what it is. (‘Cara’, Rape Crisis Worker, Scotland)

It’s about understanding the need – and it’s not understood. They think we’re just women sitting around chatting to each other about our lives, because we’re not viewed as a specialised service we’re not funded as one. (‘Nessa’, Rape Crisis Worker, Northern Ireland.)

The women-only and feminist approach of Rape Crisis was also cited as a factor in relation to its level of funding. Respondents stated that the nature of the service Rape Crisis provides does not appeal to funding bodies, in particular the state, because they do not share their analysis of violence and why it occurs. However, Women’s Aid also have a feminist understanding of violence therefore we would expect their experience to be similar, and this is not the case. The research findings indicated that the political opportunity structures open to Women’s Aid are not open to Rape Crisis.

The fact local authorities now organise human service and care work through ‘service level agreements’ provides a political opportunity structure for Women’s Aid in that they can provide statutory welfare services. Rape Crisis do not have this opportunity since states do not have a responsibility to provide rape counselling, but they do have a responsibility under legislation to provide housing for those suffering domestic abuse. It is also clear from the research that Rape Crisis does not enjoy the same political opportunity as Women’s Aid. So, not only do they not have access in the same way as Women’s Aid, the issue of rape and their organisation are also not...
as acceptable to political elites and decision makers. Indeed, the current Labour government’s election pledge of 1997 to grant £1 million of funding for rape counselling services was granted to Victim Support rather than allocating this funding to Rape Crisis.

Because we’re women-only and feminist they think we’re anti-men and sexual assault isn’t thought of as something that’s a women’s issue and usually committed by men. Child abuse gets put together with sexual assault and rape and there’s still the idea that it’s only ‘bad’ women who’re raped and that people who really deserve help can get it at Victim Support or from a normal counsellor. (‘Sarah’, Rape Crisis Worker, Scotland.)

We’re here to help women who have been raped but we want rape to be seen for what it is. What we do isn’t just about fixing the individual – anyway you can’t – but about trying to help women by challenging the ideas about them and about rape ... helping them take control back, not seeing their reaction to it as their problem and that they need fixed. (‘Cara’, Rape Crisis Worker, Scotland.)

It is also likely that Rape Crisis’ success at receiving funding is different from Women’s Aid, not only because the former provides statutory welfare services and because rape and its impact is misunderstood, but also because of the level of organisation and co-ordination of the two networks. Women’s Aid organisations in the UK are affiliated under the banner of ‘Women’s Aid’, and organise nationally in Scotland, Northern Ireland, England and Wales. However, Rape Crisis has not developed into a network of organisations with a national body in the same way. Women’s Aid began national network organisations in the 1970s shortly after the first refuges opened, when the need for co-ordination and the sharing of resources became evident. Steward (1987) has noted the role of the Scottish Office in establishing the national network of Scottish Women’s Aid, hypothesising that when these organisations do not exist, state agencies facilitate their inception. She indicates that state agencies prefer to have a ‘body’ they can interact with directly rather than a group of organisations whose structure appears, to them, to be disorganised and antithetical to efficient interaction. Rape Crisis has only more recently pursued the idea of national networks, with Rape Crisis centres in England setting up a national organisation recently and Rape Crisis centres in Scotland currently organising to do
so. One respondent noted that Rape Crisis does not have the same national recognition as Women’s Aid does, but that they perceive this as a pressing need.

We don’t have the same level of organisation as Women’s Aid and that doesn’t help us pitch for funding I don’t think. We’re setting up a network just now because we only have a very loose one at present. We want to try and pool our resources and our ideas because we’re all fighting by ourselves just now and we should be sharing what has and hasn’t worked with each other. (‘Sarah’, Rape Crisis Worker, Scotland.)

Rape Crisis remains a far more disparate group of organisations both on a national scale and in terms of their position when applying for, and being granted, local authority funding. As a result of the lack of state funding Rape Crisis centres relied far more heavily on other forms of funding that in most cases took the form of charitable donations and organisations’ own fundraising activities.

We apply to the local council for money every year but we never know if we’ll get it or not. Last year they cut our grant in half with no explanation for why. We’re not high on their priority list. …… The local Women’s Aid group get a lot more than us but they’ve got a service agreement with them - the council don’t think they should have to deal with rape victims - but every woman that’s in the refuge is one less on their housing list. (‘Cara’, Rape Crisis worker, Scotland)

They (Women’s Aid) get the housing money too, housing benefit or whatever it’s called, but we don’t house folk so we don’t get it. We don’t get any money to help women in domestic abuse but we help them anyway, … they’ve often been raped for a start and when they come to us for advice or call us we don’t turn them away, but because we’re seen as only doing rape we don’t get any of the cash that’s there for domestic abuse, you see? (‘Elaine’, RCC worker, England.)

We have seen that Women’s Aid has been far more successful in applying for and being granted state funding. However, this process has not been unproblematic for organisations and has caused debates within the organisations and the network as to the appropriate path to take. Similarly to refuges in Sweden, the funding issue is a salient concern and debates about the potential benefits and risks of engaging with the state on this level continue to occupy the movement. Centres were initially wary
of accepting state funding, despite the acknowledged need, because doing so would challenge feminist politics because the state is implicated in gendered violence.

It was a difficult decision in many ways, though it seems a long time now since we made it – but I remember us arguing about it at the time. There wasn’t much money available then because there weren’t any service agreements in those days but there were civic funds we could apply for. It caused a split in the group politically – we all knew the reasons not to take the money but no one was suggesting many alternatives. (‘Anne’, Women’s Aid Worker, England.)

There were two women involved then who felt very strongly about it – they were both Catholic so it offended their Nationalist principles as well as their feminist ones. The idea of taking money from the people who condone violence against women and those who they see as a protestant occupying power was out of the question. They never voiced as much of course because we had a collective agreement that religious politics had no place in our refuge – we were a refuge for all women and religion didn’t matter, but although they would have objected I don’t think they would have objected as strongly to asking Dublin for money. (‘Roisin’, Women’s Aid Worker, Northern Ireland)

A clear theme in the interviews was that Women’s Aid refuges have come to acknowledge the need for regular funding, although this is rarely secure as will be discussed below, and have taken the decision to pursue state funding for their organisations despite their objections and concerns. A ‘pragmatic’ approach was adopted by many organisations that chose to seek funding from their local authority in order to provide services, and respondents acknowledged that the ‘grassroots’ tactics they had initially pursued had to be reassessed in the longer-term. It was the acknowledged need for services that was the most compelling feature for them.

In the end there seemed little choice but to accept the funds. The refuge was full to capacity and we were turning women away because we had no room for them and that was devastating for many of us. Most of us have been there and know what it’s like to have nowhere to turn. When we started a big part of it was that we were doing this ourselves - that it was our idea and our vision and we were going to do it, and we were going to do it our way. ... the collective discussed it for a long time and it caused many divisions before we got the money. (‘Helen’, Women’s Aid Worker, England.)

We were squatting in our refuge and we couldn’t go on that way – it takes too long for squatters’ rights! Doing that was part of our statement – we would fight to provide a refuge. But we couldn’t be sure we would always have a
space so we needed to find something more permanent and that needed money. We didn’t put our politics to the side but when women are experiencing violence they need to know they have somewhere to go and we needed to be sure we could give them that. (‘Susan’, Women’s Aid Worker, Northern Ireland.)

As discussed above, it is also the state’s acknowledgement of Women’s Aid’s ability to provide these services that has contributed to its success at gaining state funding. In the UK the state has become more involved and funds more highly those organisations that provide statutory welfare functions at a low cost. The acknowledgement of this on both the part of Women’s Aid, and on the part of the state, has impacted upon the approach Women’s Aid has adopted. It has chosen to accept state funding in order to pursue the goal of providing refuge for women experiencing violence, however it has remained vigilant in terms of the potential costs of doing so.

Level of Funding Provision

When assessing the state’s involvement with anti-violence organisations it is necessary not only to look at whether state funding is available, and on what terms, but the level at which funding is provided. Especially when, as literature suggests (Matthews, 1994), low levels of funding provision, and high levels of insecurity result in the quelling of protest as states then have the ability to make collective action more or less costly (Tilly, 1978). Organisations were asked to provide detailed information about the amounts and sources of funding, however very few responded to these questions. The majority of respondents indicated that they were unaware of the exact amounts they received from various bodies. As a result, it was therefore necessary to establish another measure of organisations’ income and resources. The number of paid workers was used as a measure for this given that an organisation’s ability to use paid labour is likely to be indicative of its relative wealth. Furthermore, it also provides an insight into whether organisations still rely as heavily on unpaid and voluntary labour as they did at the outset.

United Kingdom organisations were more likely to have paid workers than Swedish organisations. For example, 94% of the Swedish organisations had between 0 and 3
paid workers compared to only 27.5% (11) of the UK organisations having this many, with the remainder being spread between 4 paid workers up to as much as 26. These findings are statistically significant at a 99% level of confidence (X²=21.656, d.f=3, p=.001 – Output Table 5). In Sweden the majority of paid workers provided their labour on a part-time basis whereas the UK had a far higher level of full-time paid staff. Half of all the Swedish organisations had zero full time workers, and of the remaining 50%, the majority (38%/13) had only 1. The maximum amount of paid full-time workers reported in Sweden was 3. In contrast, only 17.5% of UK organisations reported zero paid full-time workers, and the remainder were relatively evenly spread between 1 full-time worker and 8 full-time workers. The one notable exception in the UK was the organisation that reported 25 paid full-time workers, meaning it fits the description of a ‘medium sized firm’ in terms of labour-power.

Indeed the pattern of paid work in each of the countries’ organisations is very distinct. The graph below (Figure 1) clearly illustrates the considerable differences in the number of paid workers employed in Swedish and UK organisations. It is evident that there is a greater likelihood of having between 1 and 8 paid workers in the UK than there is in Sweden.

Figure 1 - Number of Paid Workers by Country

![Graph showing the distribution of paid workers by country.](image)
Given Swedish organisations have core state funding, and therefore a relatively secure funding base, the fact that UK organisations have more paid workers is counter-intuitive. Therefore, the findings suggest that either core funding in Sweden is provided at a low level, therefore preventing the employment of many paid workers, or alternatively it may offer support for Elisson & Lundy’s (1999) claim that the Swedish women’s movement has been actively resisting the moves towards professionalisation and the employment of paid workers that has been witnessed in the US. There is also the possibility that the lower level of paid staff is indicative of a lower level of need in Sweden. State provision of welfare services is far higher in Sweden than other Western European states and as a result voluntary bodies are not used for ‘off loading’ (Stedward, 1987) to the same extent (Eduards, 1997).

If the lower level of paid workers found in Swedish organisations were indicative of resistance of professionalisation and organisations having a more radical feminist ideology, then it suggests that using numbers of paid staff as an indicator of access to wealth and resources for an organisation is flawed, since it relies on not only the ability to purchase labour, but the willingness to do so. However, using this measure produced interesting findings in the UK.

Further analysis of the between country data on the number of paid workers, indicates that the difference between Sweden and the UK is explained by the high numbers of paid staff employed by Women’s Aid in the UK. In fact, Rape Crisis centres follow a very similar pattern in terms of the employment of paid staff to the two Swedish networks. The graph below (Figure 2) illustrates this point clearly. These findings are statistically significant at a 99% level of confidence ($X^2=34.322$, d.f=6, p=.000 – Output Table 6). For Rape Crisis, ROKS and SKR, as the numbers of paid staff per organisation increases, the number of organisations reporting this level of staffing decreases. The opposite is the case for Women’s Aid organisations. As a result, this raises the possibility that core state funding provision in Sweden is
actually provided at a low level, therefore preventing the employment of larger numbers of staff. It is possible that this is the case because we know the funding situation of Rape Crisis in the UK is poor. Furthermore, the ideological split between ROKS and SKR would lead us to hypothesise that SKR would be less likely to eschew the possibility of employing staff on a paid basis, given their more liberal feminist ideology. By extension, we might expect ROKS to resist employing paid staff more strongly, but the two organisations do not differ considerably on these measures.

The differences between Women’s Aid and Rape Crisis are more easily understood and are indicative of the different funding situations of the organisations. The greater provision of core funding for Women’s Aid has resulted in their ability to employ a greater number of paid workers. Figure 3 illustrates the difference between Women’s Aid and Rape Crisis in terms of paid workers. These findings are statistically significant at a 95% level of confidence ($X^2=14.385$, d.f.$=2$, $p=.001$ – Output Table 7).
Figure 2 - Number of Paid Workers by Organisational Network

Figure 3 - Number of Paid Workers by UK National Organisation
From the graph (Figure 3) we can clearly see that Rape Crisis, represented in red, is far less likely to have paid workers than Women’s Aid, represented in green. Rape Crisis organisations are concentrated at the lower end of the graph and follow the opposite pattern in terms of number of organisations with high numbers of paid workers than Women’s Aid. All of Women’s Aid organisations that participated had at least one paid worker, whereas this was not the case for Rape Crisis centres as some reported no paid workers at all. In addition, for Women’s Aid organisations the numbers of paid workers extended up to 26, compared to Rape Crisis organisations who had no more than 8 paid workers. Essentially then, the data indicates that if paid workers are used as a measure of an organisation’s wealth, then Women’s Aid are far better off than Rape Crisis and the two Swedish networks, ROKS and SKR.

Again, in the absence of specific data on levels of funding, a further indication of an organisation’s income and resources can also be taken from their reliance on unpaid and voluntary labour. This measure again has the problem of not being able to account for agency of organisations, in that they may prefer not to employ paid workers, but is a useful measure nonetheless, and also gives us an insight about the extent to which organisations conform to their historically volunteer base. Just as the employment of paid staff is potentially problematic for feminist ideology, so is the use of volunteer labour. Volunteering has been a controversial issue in feminist organisations because of feminist politics (Riger, 1984). Using the unpaid labour of women is seen as perpetuating the reliance society has on the unpaid labour of women for doing care work. However, as Riger (1984) notes, the exception was made for women volunteering to help other women.

The number of unpaid workers in the organisations in both countries was spread between 1 and 40, with no concentrations at any particular point. Unpaid staff working on a part-time basis accounted for the majority of staff in women-oriented crisis centres and refuges, and the number of unpaid staff also provides a valid indicator of organisational size. It is clear from the data that women-oriented anti-violence organisations in both countries still rely heavily on the labour of unpaid workers indicating that in this respect they do adhere to one of the features of the
original model’, and it is also indicative of their relative lack of funds. There were, however, considerable differences between the countries and organisations.

In Sweden the number of unpaid workers ranged from 1 to 40, with all organisations reporting at least 1 unpaid worker. There were no significant differences between ROKS’ and SKR’s reliance on unpaid staff.

In the UK the number of unpaid workers ranged from 0 to 40. The majority of (92.5%/37) organisations reported having at least 1 unpaid worker. Again, most labour was provided on a part-time basis with the majority of organisations reporting zero full-time unpaid staff. The most significant difference between the national organisations were that Women’s Aid accounted for all the organisations reporting that they had no unpaid staff at all (3), as well as all those reporting numbers of unpaid staff of 3 or less. Therefore 29%(7) of Women’s Aid organisations have 3 or less unpaid members of staff, compared to no Rape Crisis centres reporting this. Furthermore, only 1 Women’s Aid organisation reported having between 20 and 40 unpaid members of staff, whereas 69% (11) of Rape Crisis centres reported they had this many. It is clear that Rape Crisis in the UK rely far more heavily on the labour of unpaid staff than do Women’s Aid, again something that is indicative of the poorer funding situation of Rape Crisis. This is illustrated more clearly in the graph below (see Figure 4).

Rape Crisis, represented in red, are clustered at the high end of the graph with a higher number of their organisations reporting a higher number of unpaid staff than Women’s Aid, represented in green. Although it is important to note that Women’s Aid also continue to rely on a considerable amount of unpaid labour, it is not to the same extent as Rape Crisis. These findings are statistically significant at a 99% level of confidence (X²=26.516, d.f=2, p=.000 – Output Table 8).
We can be confident that differences in the reliance on unpaid labour are indicative of distinct funding levels from the analysis of qualitative data. Interviewees from Rape Crisis Centres indicated the lack of funding and resources meant many of their services had either been terminated or were at risk. Levels of service provision will be discussed in more detail below but the following comments from Rape Crisis workers illustrate their lack of resources.

We can only afford to open our crisis line for 2 hours a week now ... we just can afford to open it for longer. We offer women long-term counselling in principle, but we’ve had to put it on hold. (‘Elaine’, Rape Crisis worker, England)

We’ve currently a rape survivors’ group and we were planning to start one for child abuse survivors, but we just don’t have the money for it. We’re barely scraping by as it is. (‘Sarah’, Rape Crisis worker, Scotland)

Therefore, the research findings clearly show that there are considerable differences between the two countries in terms of reliance on unpaid labour and their ability to employ paid workers. The political opportunity structure of service level agreements open to Women’s Aid means they can exploit the state’s funding provision. Rape Crisis cannot access this political opportunity structure because they do not have the
access needed to do so, nor do they have the acceptability and political opportunity in terms of the receptiveness of decision makers and wider public opinion on the issue of rape and sexual assault. This indicates that the experience of organisations within the same state, and therefore macro political framework, is not comparable and that other factors impact upon their ability to access resources.

**Changes in Funding Provision**

The anti-violence movement’s historical reluctance to engage with the state has meant significant changes have taken place in terms of funding since the advent of state provision and the willingness of organisations to exploit this. During the interviews women frequently talked about the changes they have witnessed over the years of working in their particular centre in terms of how funding and resources are sought. There has been a move away from what many women called ‘grassroots’ techniques for obtaining resources to more conventional approaches.

During the 1970s and early 1980s when women were setting up refuges and crisis centres they relied heavily on their own fundraising activities and charitable donations. The need for refuges and crisis centres had not been widely recognised and access to funding and resource opportunities were limited. Also, because the movement was a political movement and stemmed from left wing politics it was as much a statement against established ways of working as much as a statement against violence against women. The women interviewed, in the UK in particular, indicated that they felt this aspect of the anti-violence movement was now less apparent and that the movement in general was now more conventional in its approach.

Respondents described the techniques their organisations used during the 1970s and how these differ from the approach taken now. For example, ‘Susan’, a Women’s Aid Worker in Northern Ireland described how their refuge group had squatted in a house in order to use it as a refuge.
We didn’t have a refuge so we moved into an empty house and basically squatted in it. It’s unbelievable to think about it now – I’m not sure we’d be brave enough these days! It was different then, we really had a battle to fight to get space and there weren’t the funding opportunities there are now. In many ways we were much more radical in those days – we still have the same political beliefs but we act upon them differently now. It was part of the whole culture then, everyone was pushing the boundaries and so were we. (‘Susan’, Women’s Aid Worker, Northern Ireland)

She went on to discuss the techniques the refuge used to gain funding and resources now and the extent to which procedures have changed. The refuge in which she works applied for state funding in the 1980s and has been successful every year since in applying for it, to greater or lesser degrees. The refuge also received a grant from the National Lottery Charities Board (NLCB) in 2001 to start a young women’s project and also receives funding from a number of civic and charitable grant awarding bodies.

It’s so different now – it feels like a different era for the refuge. We get money from the authority for the refuge as part of our service agreement with them and we get funded from the voluntary organisation fund. This year we got a lottery grant to start a young women’s project, with money for the salary of our outreach worker for the project. We get other bits of money here and there too – we apply for everything going because it all adds up – it’s really so different from how we started out. (‘Susan’, Women’s Aid Worker, Northern Ireland)

‘Susan’s’ comments echo those made by other respondents who had been involved with their organisation since the 1970s. In the case of Women’s Aid, squatting in houses in order to have accommodation for a refuge was not uncommon. This was also cited by a Rape Crisis worker as a technique used to gain space for counselling sessions. Respondents in the UK indicated that their ‘grassroots’ approach stemmed from their roots in left wing politics, feminism and the women’s movement.

It was about solidarity and sisterhood. We were all doing it together and in the political climate it didn’t feel so radical – to do that now would I think. (‘Mary’, Women’s Aid Worker, England.)

I worried that I’d get caught and my Dad would find out, I was shitting myself a lot of the time. I couldn’t tell the other women because I didn’t think it was very feminist to be caring what my Dad thought about what I was doing, but I was secretly shitting myself! I knew he wouldn’t approve because he didn’t
approve of my left wing politics and feminism wasn’t a word he liked to hear under his roof. He thought I was doing charity work and that was fine for him, if he’d known I was squatting in a refuge when I was at work he’d have flipped! (‘Susan’, Women’s Aid Worker, Northern Ireland.)

Respondents indicated that they had mixed feelings about the changes the organisations had gone through in this respect. It was clear that the security provided by regular funding and the increased service provision as a result of it was viewed as an improvement, but respondents also indicated that they also missed the solidarity and ‘sisterhood’ of the early activities.

It was so much fun a lot of the time, and you need that when you’re doing this kind of work. Some of the things we did, and the marches we went on – it was such a great feeling of solidarity, togetherness. We still have that but it’s different now. We don’t have so much to fight against, or we have different battles to fight now, and in different ways. There isn’t the same binding between us I don’t think. (‘Anne’, Women’s Aid Worker, England)

It’s great that we have money for a refuge like this. When I think of the one we had back then I wince, it really was very basic. Now we can give women and their kids a nice place to stay and a choice of somewhere to go to when they need it. ....it’s a lot more conventional now though – it feels more professional I suppose – we’ve been accepted a lot more and that’s changed what we do, well it’s changed how we do it more I think. (‘Caroline’, Women’s Aid Worker, Scotland)

It was also clear that respondents thought the changes in funding and the success they now achieved when applying for state funding and to more ‘conventional’ sources of funds was as a result of the increased acceptance of domestic violence and of their organisations. At the outset domestic violence was largely hidden and the domestic sphere was very much seen as a male domain where a man should head his household. Interviewees reported that although they felt there was still some way to go in terms of challenging the silence around violence, and making domestic abuse less hidden, it was the gains already achieved in this respect that contributed to the wider availability of resources.

It’s seen differently now from how it was, not so much something we deny anymore. It’s been recognised as something we should do something about now. I’m not sure it’s seen exactly how we see it, you know about it being
about male dominance in society, but it’s seen. It’s now recognised that we should help these women. (‘Alison’, Women’s Aid Worker, England)

Therefore, this is evidence to suggest that the state is more amenable to the claims of anti-violence organisations in relation to domestic violence. Again, it offers support for the idea of political opportunity, in that the increased public awareness and acknowledgement of domestic violence prevalence and impact, means the state is more open and responsive to the claims being made. This also supports the argument that organisations in the UK are not coopted like their US counterparts, but that the state’s openness has provided the possibility of adopting a more pragmatic approach but at the same time retaining organisational autonomy and a feminist definition of violence.

UK respondents frequently talked about the changes they had experienced since the 1970s in terms of funding and the actions taken to gain resources. Responses such as these were less frequent from the Swedish respondents. It was clear from the interviews that the Swedish organisations had not adopted such ‘radical’ or ‘grassroots’ techniques at the outset, but had always pursued more conventional approaches to accessing funding and resources. This is partly because the Swedish women’s movement came to the issue of violence later than the US and other Western European countries because they had initially been concerned largely with issues of labour. It is also a result of the fact the Swedish women’s movement was far more incorporated into existing political parties because of this association with labour concerns. Swedish respondents indicated that their initial funding often came from these political groups and other more ‘mainstream’ women’s organisations as Dahlerup & Gulli (1985) suggest is the case.

When we started we got money from the Women’s Political Union and the rest we raised ourselves and we got some from the Municipality too. There wasn’t much money of course but it was enough for us to start with a small refuge. (‘Cristina’, ROKS Worker, Sweden.)

In response to the approaches adopted by many UK organisations, such as squatting in houses for refuge space, ‘Ingrid’, a ROKS worker, said:
We didn’t do that sort of thing because that wasn’t how we went about it. It was about helping the women I think maybe more than politics. That was important but a lot of the women involved were not particularly radical, we used the paths that already existed for us. A lot of women involved in the refuge I worked at then were older, their children had left home and they didn’t work. It was charity work for them not political work. They wanted to help the women because they knew what it was like to be a woman in a man’s world but violence was not their particular concern, …how can I say? It was about the woman they were helping not about all women. (‘Ingrid’, ROKS Worker, Sweden.)

‘Birgit’, an SKR worker, also indicated that the approach of the initial refuges in Sweden had not followed the pattern of those in the UK. The organisation she was involved in did not view itself as particularly ‘radical’, although they were aware they were providing a needed and currently unavailable service for women. She also indicated that the political climate in Sweden did not encourage ‘radical’ approaches but that they were prepared to work within the existing system.

It was doing something different and needed. Not the way of other countries though … Sweden has always been more open to equality and to gender issues and we tried to work in that system, not against it. I think we work against it now more than we did then, … (‘Birgit’, SKR Worker, Sweden.)

As a result respondents talked less often of the changes in funding and resources in terms of a move from ‘grassroots’ or ‘radical’ approaches, but more in terms of unstable state funding provision towards a guaranteed or regular funding provision. Swedish respondents also attributed this in part to the increased public awareness and acceptance of the issue of violence against women. They also viewed the increase in public awareness and the acceptance of their organisations as a measure of their success.

Violence is not so secret anymore and people must accept that it happens. We are not thought of in the same way now, it is somewhere where we have succeeded. Now we have money regularly and it has been agreed that it is important. (‘Kerstin’, SKR Worker, Sweden.)

Therefore, political opportunity in the form of increased public awareness and receptiveness of decision makers worked in the favour of Swedish organisations as
well as the UK. The difference though, is that this was not in terms of gaining access to funding, so not in terms of creating political opportunity structure as such, but in terms of increasing the receptiveness of elites in existing structures that already allowed for access, to the claims of the anti-violence movement seeking to improve their funding position. Indeed, the women’s movement has made significant gains in terms of the guarantee of funding being enshrined in legislation.

**Security of Funding**

It is clear the Swedish refuges view their regular and guaranteed funding from the state as a success. The security of organisations’ funding has always been a concern for the anti-violence movement. The dual roles of these organisations, as part service providers and part campaigning organisations, places them in a distinct position when compared to other social movement organisations. The security of funding is crucial to the continuation of services and the level of funding also determines the level of services that can be provided. Funding is sought not only to support an organisation that campaigns for political or social change, as do all social movement organisations, but also to provide welfare services for women experiencing violence that are delivered with these political and social goals in mind. Although the Swedish movement is considered in literature (Dobash & Dobash, 1992; Eduards, 1997; Eliasson & Lundy, 1999) to be more philanthropic and to have a more liberal base, it still engages in lobbying and campaigning, therefore still fulfils a dual function.

As a result, in most countries, the threat of the removal of funding is a constant concern for refuges and crisis centres. In both Sweden and the UK there is no equivalent service to refuges and crisis centres in state provision, nor is the existing counselling provision able to meet demand (although it should be noted that Swedish statutory welfare provision is more advanced that the UK). Without the services provided by the anti-violence organisations of the women’s movement many women would not be able to seek the help they need, and there is a need to extend the provision that is currently available. Therefore, security of funding for organisations in both Sweden and the UK is a key issue.
Issues of funding security were addressed in both the questionnaires and the interviews. Respondents were asked to indicate how long their centre had secure funding for. The longest time an organisation had secure funding for was 3 years. The length of time organisations had secure funding for in Sweden ranged from 6 months to 2 years and in the UK from 6 months to 3 years. Those reporting secure funding for 2 or 3 years were very much in the minority, and the majority of organisations (91%/67) reported they had secure funding for 12 months or less. In the most part organisations were required to re-apply on an annual basis to their funding body.

In Sweden, despite the guarantee of state funding for women’s refuges, organisations were still required to submit annual applications stating the work they do, the numbers of women they see, and the services they provide. This was also the case in the UK, where there is no guarantee of state funding, where Women’s Aid refuges and Rape Crisis centres have to apply annually for funds. Refuges and crisis centres in the UK compete with other voluntary, charitable and community organisations for limited funding resources and there is no guarantee that another year’s funding will be granted. Respondents indicated that this caused them deep concern and that it curtailed the organisation’s activities.

It’s difficult to plan for things because we don’t know if we’ll get funded again, or how much we’ll get. It’s horrible to feel so insecure. It effects what we do because we never know if the money will come in. Do you start a service, or extend a service, then to find out you can’t run it anymore? We’re reluctant and wary a lot of the time because we have no security. (‘Bronwyn’, Rape Crisis Worker, Wales.)

The climate of concern created by insecure funding is cited in literature as a way in which the state is able to exert control over organisations (Collins et al, 1989; Matthews, 1994; Stedward, 1987). If funding is not secure and must be re-applied for on an annual basis, organisations will be forced to comply with any funding regulations, which will be discussed in more detail below, but also with what they think is expected of them. The issue was raised frequently in interviews with respondents in both countries, and those reporting the highest levels of concern about
future funding security also reported the greatest impact on their activities. It is clear
from the research findings that organisations attempt to promote an acceptable public
image and are starkly aware of the risk of appearing too ‘radical’ in terms of its
activities. Women working in Rape Crisis centres most often expressed these
sentiments, which highlights the lack of access and acceptability Rape Crisis
experiences.

We’re aware that we can’t piss them off or we’re not going to be high up their
priority list. (‘Cara’, Rape Crisis Worker, Scotland.)

Oh yes, we’re careful. We can’t always afford to be as forthright as we might
want to be because they hold the key to funding. We need to behave in a way
that makes us acceptable to them and that means not being too radical.
(‘Elaine’, Rape Crisis Worker, England.)

In some ways this is counter to what US literature suggests about state involvement
and cooption and in some ways it supports it. Rape Crisis does not enjoy ‘insider’
status by virtue of their role as service providers, whereas Women’s Aid can be
considered ‘insiders’ in this respect (Stedward, 1987). Therefore, Rape Crisis’ lack
of access heightens their insecurity that what little provision is granted to them will
cease should they behave in a way counter to what is considered acceptable. As a
result they are acutely aware of the risks. In contrast, although Women’s Aid also has
an insecure funding base, their insider status as a provider of statutory welfare
services, allows them more freedom because the state relies on them to provide a
service on its behalf. Therefore, rather than organisations with a close involvement
with the state curtailing their activities in order to protect their funding as US
literature suggests, in the UK those organisations with outsiders status seeking
funding from the state are more aware of the need to behave in a particular way and
to project a particular image. It should be noted that I am not suggesting that
Women’s Aid are free to behave in any way they choose without risking their
funding and potentially closing off their routes of access, this is not the case, what I
am arguing is that by virtue of their insider status and the state’s reliance upon them,
they enjoy more freedom than Rape Crisis.
It was clear from respondents in both countries that the issue of funding was an area of dispute and concern within organisations. Several respondents indicated that they resented the amount of time it took up both for them personally, and as an organisation. A significant amount of worker’s time was devoted to either fundraising or worrying about the organisation’s lack of funds and resources.

I’ve run out of ideas for getting money. I’ve exhausted all my ideas and we’re always asking the same people for money. I feel like I’m constantly selling raffle tickets, baking for fetes and pester my family and neighbours to come along to things. I’m sure they hide when they see me coming you know! When I’m not doing all that stuff I’m wondering when someone’s going to turn round and say we’re bankrupt. (‘Elaine’, Rape Crisis worker, England)

We undertake vital, much needed work. Much of our effort is expended upon fundraising – often with little success because charitable organisations are already overstretched. A great deal of government funding goes into the penal system (justified perhaps) but the victims of sexual offences receive no government money – this must change! (Questionnaire comments from a Rape Crisis worker, England)

The agency has a refuge and aftercare centre and outreach projects – it also has training days and education stuff – we appear well funded and secure but we are not at all and would like to get on with bigger tasks of offering services to women and children and developing good practice however we are very distracted and constantly nervous of not being able to because of lack of core funding and the arbitrary nature of government interventions! (Questionnaire comments from a Women’s Aid worker, England.)

Respondents indicated that a considerable amount of time in meetings and working time was taken up with the issue of funding and resources and in developing plans for the organisation’s survival. The time consuming nature of these discussions was often attributed to the creativity required for funding applications and the more diverse places they were applying to.

We take a lot of our time to make letters and forms for things. I had to fill in a very long form once to tell the local hypermarket that we could use free underwear, clothes for the women and children’s clothes. They have a ‘community wing’ part of their business and say they will give things to the communities where they have stores. It felt quite silly to spend so long on a form for knickers! (‘Maria’, SKR worker)
We argue a lot about whether it is worth applying to certain places for money or not. I think we 'clutch at straws' too much of the time, and those forms take so long it is devastating when they turn you down. If I've spent hours trying to convince someone we'll start a service for, oh I don't know, ... black women aged from 14 to 17 who've been in care and have a dog called Spot say! - well, you know what I mean - you try to fit into their rules but you know you've not a chance in hell. I've been surprised too though so we can't afford not to try.

Last year we had to pretend to sell half our office equipment to ourselves so we could get cash out a grant to spend on other things. We'd gotten money for the stuff in a grant to target young women who'd been raped, not much money either, but we had all the stuff already so pretended to buy it and used the money for other things. ('Cara', Rape Crisis worker, Scotland)

The future of refuge and crisis centres' finances was an area of considerable concern for the women working in them. Almost 60% (329) of the 549 who responded to questionnaires indicated that they were either concerned or very concerned about the financial situation of the centre in which they worked. A further 13% (72) indicated that they were slightly concerned. The remainder either did not know or were not concerned. Women working in Swedish organisations reported lower levels of concern than did women working in UK organisations. Of those who were concerned or very concerned, more than two thirds (68% / 224) were from UK organisations, this represents 74% of all the UK workers that responded. This difference can be attributed to the guarantee of state funding provision in Sweden where organisations are ensured core funding provided they submit annual reports and accounts, therefore its potential withdrawal is not the source of concern that it is to UK organisations.

The level of concern reported in the two countries is shown in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Concerned/Very Concerned</td>
<td>42% (105)</td>
<td>74% (224)</td>
<td>60% (329)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slightly Concerned</td>
<td>18% (44)</td>
<td>9% (28)</td>
<td>13% (72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Concerned/Don’t know</td>
<td>40% (98)</td>
<td>17% (50)</td>
<td>27% (148)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The difference in the level of concern between the two countries is even clearer when those reporting concern at any level are grouped and compared to those reporting no
concern, or that they did not know. The following charts illustrate the higher level of concern experienced by women working in organisations in the UK compared to those in Sweden. These findings are significant at a 99% level of confidence ($X^2=36.884$, d.f=1, p=.000 – Output Table 9).

**Figure 5 – Concern About Funding in Sweden**

![Pie chart showing concern about funding in Sweden]

**Figure 6 – Concern About Funding in the UK**

![Pie chart showing concern about funding in the UK]

Although women working in refuges and crisis centres in Sweden reported less concern than women in the UK, a sizeable proportion of the women working in Swedish organisations still reported concern about the future of their centre’s
finances. The research found that funding remains a key area of concern despite the guarantee of state funding. 42% (105) of workers reported they were concerned or very concerned, and a further 18% (44) were slightly concerned. The current level of funding provision from the state is not enough for organisations to survive on alone, furthermore state funding encourages the provision of particular services over others and funding still has to be sought to continue providing other services for women.

I worry about our money a little. We have the core funding now but it isn’t enough for us to do everything, we still have to make sure we earn enough other ways to keep going. We would need a lot more core funding for us to stop raising money other ways and the money we raise ourselves we can spend however we want. That way we can try and give the women quality of life rather than just a chance to stay alive. (‘Katja’, SKR worker)

Having the money does not mean we do not worry. I worry that they won’t accept our accounts or our review of our work and decide we don’t fulfil the criteria. I have worked in women’s organisations long enough to know that you can never relax about these. We may have it now but it can easily be taken away with a change in the (government) bill. I never trust where money is involved. (‘Ingrid’, ROKS worker.)

In Sweden there was no significant difference between the two networks, ROKS and SKR, in the level of concern reported. However, in the UK there were significant differences between the level of concern experienced by Rape Crisis workers and Women’s Aid workers. Women working in Rape Crisis centres were more likely (96%) to report concern than those working in Women’s Aid refuges (75%). These findings are significant at a 99% level of confidence ($X^2=24.339$, d.f=1, $p=.001$ – Output Table 10).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Women’s Aid</th>
<th>Rape Crisis</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Concerned</td>
<td>75% (132)</td>
<td>96% (120)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Concerned/Don’t Know</td>
<td>25% (45)</td>
<td>4% (5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These findings are not surprising when considered in relation to the different funding situations of Rape Crisis and Women’s Aid discussed above. Rape Crisis’ lack of service agreements with local authorities and the fact they do not provide statutory welfare functions means chances of longer-term funding are more precarious. Interviewees indicated the difficult situation Rape Crisis centres face in the UK when applying for funding and the depth of concern it causes for those involved.

Funding causes me deep worry. It’s frustrating too because we want to help women but we’re fighting all the time for money. The local authority cut our funding in half this year and it’s been really hard to keep going. I try to get on with the work I’m really here to do but, yes, it does prey on my mind. ('Margo', Rape Crisis Worker, England.)

I get angry, depressed, upset and quite stressed out about it. I work here the most hours of everyone so spend a lot of time with the accounts and looking at what we can and can’t afford to do. I can honestly say that from year to year I never know if we’ll still be here … it’s something I dread – I feel sick if I think on it too long – and angry. They (local authorities) fund lots of other things that don’t seem important to me, or not as important as what we do. ('Bronwyn', Rape Crisis Worker, Wales)

The women working in the organisations were asked what they liked most and least about working in their refuge or crisis centre. A prevailing theme in response to the latter was the issue of funding and resources. Two thirds (369) of the 549 who returned questionnaires cited anxiety over funding, lack of resources, or the constant cycle of funding applications as what they liked least about their work. The following comments are indicative of the responses as a whole.

Very stressful at times. Need more staff. (Women’s Aid worker, Scotland)

Lack of money for further training, employment, which enables us to run workshops, education etc. etc. etc. (Women’s Aid worker, Wales)

Having to constantly think of ways to fundraise and apply for grants. (Rape Crisis worker, Northern Ireland)

Not having the resources to see it reach its full potential. (ROKS worker, Sweden)
Funding is also an important area with regard to the recruitment and retention of staff. As noted above, problems and the concern over the security of funds, were often cited as what women liked least about working in their particular organisation. Fundraising activities were described as being time consuming, frustrating and stressful for workers. The impact of this on workers is significant in that it affects the retention of staff. Several interviewees said that their organisation had lost valuable members of staff because of the frustration and stress they experienced in the constant worry about funding. It was a significant factor in ‘burn out’.

We lose a lot of people because they burn out. The work is hard going and I don’t blame them for leaving because I know what it’s like, I worry myself sick sometimes. I have sleepless nights over it (funding), and we’ve had women working here who just couldn’t stand the stress anymore. (‘Bronwyn, Rape Crisis Worker, Wales.)

A lot of volunteers give up eventually because they’re not doing what they expected to be doing. They wanted to help people and they’re spending their time trying to get money or trying to make do with what little we have. (‘Anne’, Women’s Aid Worker, England.)

No money to reach its full potential. I feel like giving up a lot of the time because I don’t have energy for it. (ROKS Worker, Sweden.)

Such an environment of insecure funding and a significant level of 73% (401) of all workers that responded reporting feeling at least some concern about the financial situation and future of the centre in which they work indicates that funding remains a key area for women’s organisations. Given that the state is the main source of funds for organisations it is clear that it has, through its control of these resources, a significant impact on the day-to-day workings of organisations and can influence their activities considerably. The research finding support the point made by Stedward (1987) that chronic underfunding has the effect of siphoning off energy away from campaigning work and into service provision.

**Funding Restrictions**

The state’s influence over anti-violence organisations is most apparent in the restrictions placed upon organisations through funding procedures and regulations.
All of the organisations contacted had restrictions placed upon them by the state bodies that fund them. These ranged from the submission of annual reports and accounts to the requirement to appoint a board of directors or management committee and the level of restrictions were dependent upon the state body that funded the organisation. In all cases in both countries those organisations in receipt of state funding were required to submit annual reports and accounts to the funding provider. Less frequently occurring responses included: statistical information on users; having to work from specific locations; having to deliver services to a particular population; or having to provide a particular kind of service, or provide it in a particular way.

Interestingly, when responding to items in the questionnaire asking about funding restrictions, the Swedish organisations rarely reported that they had restrictions placed upon them. Only 24% (7) organisations indicated that this was the case when asked directly. However, further analysis of data indicated that when asked more specific questions about requirement set by funding bodies a total of all but 2 (97%) of the organisations in both countries combined had restrictions placed upon them by the state body that funded them. It is possible that the Swedish respondents did not regard these measures, which in most cases was the submission of annual reports and accounts and statistical data on the centres’ users, as being restrictions as such. Swedish refuges have a longer history of engagement with the state than those in the UK, and operate in a society with a well-developed welfare state that does not necessarily see state involvement as restrictive or oppressive. These requirements of state funding bodies may not be regarded as restrictive in that they are not seen as oppressive or an attempt by the state to exert control. There was further evidence for this in interviews with women working in Swedish refuges.

I think it’s right that we have to do it. They should check that it is being spent how we say it will be. (‘Jessica’, ROKS Worker, Sweden.)

It was clear that workers in Sweden did not regard these measures as ‘restrictions’ and recognise that organisations in receipt of public funds should have to be accountable.
In the UK, respondents did not view restrictions as favourably, and they also did see them as restrictive rather than simply requirements. Nonetheless, UK respondents viewed them as a necessary evil in terms of the need to be accountable, and were therefore willing to comply to ensure funding.

If they’re giving away public money they want to know someone is ultimately responsible. (‘Rhona’, Women’s Aid Worker, Scotland)

It takes up a fair bit of time but we have to do it. We used to do it anyway but not quite so rigorously! We get fined if they’re late though (the accounts) and that annoys me because most of us are working here for nothing and we’ve not the time for everything. If a woman phones or comes in who’s been raped, I can’t say ‘sorry, I have the annual accounts to do, could you come back later?’ (‘Margo’, Rape Crisis Worker, England.)

The impact state funding has on organisations extends beyond official restrictions and requirements. Participating in the state’s grant economy encourages organisations to behave in a particular way and to project a particular image. Refuges and crisis centres are in a unique position compared to other social movement organisations in that they perform the dual roles of both campaigning for social or political change and providing alternative welfare services for women who have experienced violence. Both of these are key aims of the organisation. However, when receiving state funding refuges and crisis centres do so in their capacity as service providers not as campaigners for social and political change. The state is not interested in funding social movements, whereas it does have a responsibility to provide welfare services for its citizens. These dual roles make engaging with the state problematic in all areas, and especially with regard to funding.

The state has the ability to contribute to the success or failure of refuges and crisis centres through the provision of funds. As a result organisations have to make themselves attractive to funding bodies, whereby they must concentrate on their role as service providers. This has a considerable impact on the activities of organisations, and relates back to the concern experienced by Rape Crisis about their funding security discussed earlier. These dilemmas have been less marked in Sweden where involvement with the state has always been viewed as less problematic than it
has in the UK, however engaging with the state has also affected organisations in Sweden.

An issue that emerged in interviews with women in relation to this was ‘formalisation’. By this I mean the extent to which those within the organisations had instituted their own formal working practices. Women indicated that since the advent of state funding for their organisations they felt their activities and services had become more formalised, both as a result of external pressures as well as internal change. An example provided by one interviewee in Sweden was that they now kept certain amounts of ‘data’ about the women using their services, and although information had always been kept, she indicated that the procedures for doing so were now more formal.

When I see a woman I fill out a paper that tells us certain things about her and her children. We used to keep information but now we have forms for it and each woman has a file ... it’s so we can report back about who we see, what is the kind of woman who is being beaten. We always kept this for ourselves, but we keep it differently now someone else wants it too. (‘Lotta’, ROKS Worker, Sweden)

This change was a result of external and internal factors. ROKS organisations agreed to provide the government with data on violence against women derived from data gathered about women seeking help at their shelters. This was already done in the majority of shelters as part of monitoring their own work and services, and although the Swedish government set no rules as to how the data should be kept and collated, ROKS instituted their own formalised procedures for doing so. Data is submitted by each of the centres to the national network organisation via computer up-load where it is then collated for the government. Therefore a relatively informal procedure done in-house was formalised and structured when the state became involved.

Women’s Aid indicated they self-monitored and placed restrictions on their activities as a result of funding. These were similar to the modifications of activities detailed in relation to Rape Crisis in response to a lack of funding and trying to gain access. Organisations emphasised their role as provider of welfare services rather than the
political aspects of their work, reiterating the point made earlier about capitalising on ‘insider status’. So, although Women’s Aid enjoy an insider status, and the state has a reliance upon them, this does not equate to complete freedom and security. Women’s Aid has capitalised on their insider status by emphasising their service provision role. Refuge space, counselling services, advice services and services provided specifically for children were emphasised and further developed. Funding was also specifically sought by many organisations in order to further develop these.

We pushed what we could provide for them. We’re the best people to provide these services for women because we have the experience and the knowledge. This is what we emphasised. We’re also the best people to provide it because of how we provide it, with our feminist politics as a backbone, but that’s not what we push to them, we push that we’re experts and professional and well equipped, … and well, cheaper too. (‘Helen’, Women’s Aid Worker, England.)

It’s about weighing up the benefits of what you’re doing. It’s not selling out I don’t think, but we always have to be careful that we don’t … We can play their game but we have to make sure we don’t get played and sacrifice too much in the process. (‘Helen’, Women’s Aid Worker, England.)

This is indicative of the pragmatic approach adopted by Women’s Aid to its engagement with the state. The organisation attempts to ‘manage’ its interaction with the state and takes a strategic approach by emphasising the features of their work that appeal to the state. The potential benefits of engaging with the state in terms of financial security and service provision have been strived for, but organisations have sought to retain control over their work and services and to retain their autonomy. Women’s Aid organisations remain affiliated only to their own national networks and continue to define themselves as feminist organisations. They provide services on behalf of the state but are not affiliated or incorporated into any state bodies, therefore manage to remain autonomous with a feminist political approach to their work. Women’s Aid organisations in the UK have adapted from their 1970s form and approach in order to gain an element of stability and have made themselves more acceptable to funding bodies by emphasising their role as service provider, but in doing so have not sacrificed either their autonomy of allowed their analysis of violence against women, and why it occurs, to be altered or diluted.
Section Conclusion

Rape Crisis in the UK has not had the same success when engaging with the state if we view ‘success’ in terms of gaining state funding for their services. However, there are inherent problems in measuring social movement success (Staggenborg, 1995) because this depends on the theoretical base from which goals are defined at the outset. Therefore, for more liberal feminists funding for service provision is a key goal, and for more radical feminists wider social change may be the only measure of ‘true success’. In terms of policy reform, as the opening chapter to the thesis detailed, both Rape Crisis and Women’s Aid have made significant gains in the UK. Again, policy reform can be seen as a liberal feminist goal if feminist positions are adhered to strictly, but Molyneux (1989) notes, both radical and socialist feminists have recognised the importance of seeking policy reform to defend women’s practical interests now, and as such have made considerable gains.

In Sweden there is no distinct anti-rape movement or network of rape crisis centres. Both ROKS and SKR primarily deal with family or domestic violence, of which rape may be a part, but they do not have any rape-specific centres or organisations. Furthermore, all centres in Sweden are eligible for core state funding therefore distinct experiences are less likely. However, ROKS and SKR are considered to differ in terms of their feminist theoretical perspective with the former being more ‘radical’ in outlook and the latter more ‘liberal’. Nonetheless, both organisations are in receipt of state funding because it is guaranteed in legislation, and the movement as a whole has made considerable policy gains, not least their success in gaining core funding as a guarantee. Therefore, the differential experience of Rape Crisis and Women’s Aid in the UK, given their concentration on different aspects of violence against women means they are more susceptible to the costs and benefits inherent in engaging with the state as neither legislation, nor the ‘type’ of gendered violence they deal with, ensures equitable treatment.

On this note Rape Crisis have been less willing, or possibly able, to adapt their image and to emphasise their role as service providers than Women’s Aid has. This is partly a result of the fact they do not provide statutory welfare services at a low cost and
also lack the same network organisation that characterises Women’s Aid. In addition, the increased public awareness and acceptance of domestic violence as a legitimate issue compared to rape and sexual assault has also contributed to their distinct experiences. The findings of the research show that the strategy adopted by a particular movement, and their ability to pursue a pragmatic approach is not simply about choice, other structural and contingent features impact upon their ability to do so.
Section 2 - Organisational Structure

Introduction

Feminist organisations are often associated with collective organisation. Historically this has been the case, largely to do with feminist politics and finding alternative ways of working that challenge existing and accepted bureaucratic values. However, this research has found, as literature suggests, that feminism is not necessarily synonymous with collective working and that women’s refuges and crisis centres take a variety of organisational forms. Although the majority of centres in Sweden and the UK did continue to organise collectively, and stated that this was in line with their feminist politics, a significant minority also organised hierarchically or traditionally, and a smaller number indicated alternative forms of organisation such as democratic or cooperative.

The research found that a number of organisations in both countries had changed their organisational structure as a result of funding regulations, and had subsequently adopted a more traditional or ‘hierarchical’ form. Another key finding of the research is that the terms ‘collective’ and ‘hierarchical’ are ambiguous and cannot be used to imply that organisations clustered under the same heading will have the same working practices and procedures. Although there were considerable similarities in the working practices of those calling themselves ‘collective’ or ‘hierarchical’ there were also considerable variations within the groups, as well as between. The nature of these variations and reasons for them are discussed below, as well as women’s experiences of working within particular structural forms.

Current Organisational Structure

Centres were asked to indicate what form of organisation they used. The majority of the centres that responded (62%/46) indicated that they used a form of collective organisation. A further 24 (32%) organisations indicated that they used a form of hierarchical organisation and the remaining centres described the system of organisation as being either ‘democratic’ or ‘co-operative’. The findings for the sample as a whole are illustrated in the following chart (see Figure 7).
In Sweden the majority (68%/23) of centres indicated that they organised collectively, and a further 29% (10) indicated that they used a hierarchical form of organisation. The remaining centre described their organisational structure as ‘democratic’. ROKS organisations were far more likely to organise hierarchically with 50% (8) of their organisations indicating that they did so, compared to only 11% (2) of SKR organisations indicating that they used this form. The findings are illustrated in Figures 8 & 9.

This is a surprising finding given the ROKS network are considered the more ‘radical’ network and SKR the more ‘liberal’ network. We would have expected the opposite to have been a more likely scenario given that collective organisation is traditionally associated with more radical forms of feminism. These findings can be understood in two ways. They can be viewed as offering support for the argument that the relationship between structure and ideology is not empirically evident. In addition, it could also be viewed as offering support for the argument that networks of women’s organisations have become ‘institutionalised’, or more ‘mainstream’, as a result of their increasing involvement with the state and its agencies. If the latter
were the case, then how would we explain the differences between the two networks? Why had the movement's historical engagement with the state and both organisations' receipt of state funding not had a similar impact on both organisations?

**Figure 8 – Organisational Structure (ROKS)**

![Organisational Structure (ROKS) Pie Chart]

**Figure 9 – Organisational Structure (SKR)**

![Organisational Structure (SKR) Pie Chart]

Firstly, SKR operate as smaller, more loosely organised network of organisations. As a result, they have less formalised engagement with the state in terms of the network as a whole. ROKS as a national network has close connections with the central
Swedish state and its agencies, and operate in a consultative capacity on policy forum and issues surrounding violence against women. This may, then, account for the increased likelihood that they will have become institutionalised and therefore adopted more bureaucratic structures. Although funding does not impose particular organisational structures upon refuges and crisis centres in Sweden, we saw in the discussion of funding, that organisations noted the internal moves towards more formalised working practices. The sentiments expressed by women were not necessarily indicative of the adoption of bureaucratic structures though, rather they showed more similarity to the changes Welsh Women’s Aid have adopted in terms of the specialisation of tasks but without the power differentials (Charles, 1995). Furthermore, SKR have a greater number of younger organisations than ROKS do, and it would seem likely that organisations developing some time after the initial second wave feminist movement would potentially have less of a commitment to collective organisational structures, particularly if as US literature suggests is the case for refuges and crisis centres, the ‘ideal’ type of collective organisation rarely existed, and in reality organisations were often mixed types (Martin, 1990), with those that did conform to the collectivist model altering their structures during the 1980s (Byington et al, 1991). Again though, Eduards’ (1997) and Eliasson & Lundy’s (1999) claims that Swedish refuge organisations are resisting professionalisation and ‘mainstreaming’, and adopting a more ‘radical’ outlook may explain the network of younger organisations increased likelihood of having a collectivist structure. Clearly, there are a number of explanations for the differences between ROKS’ and SKR’s organisational structure. However, as I will argue below, further analysis of the research findings suggests that the distinction between bureaucratic and collectivist organisational types is not empirically evident (Martin, 1990), and the question that requires to be addressed is the extent to which organisations incorporate features associated with these types. Rather than seeking to answer this problem here, I return to it below and attempt to shed light on this issue in the context of a discussion of the merits of the collectivist/bureaucratic distinction.

In the UK, 59% (23) of organisations indicated that they organised collectively, and a further 35% (14) organised hierarchically or traditionally. The two remaining
organisations described their organisational structure as co-operative. (There was one non-response.) Rape Crisis Centres were only slightly more likely at 62.5% (10) to organise collectively than Women’s Aid organisations were at 56.5% (13). However, Women’s Aid organisations were more likely (43.5%/10) to organise hierarchically than Rape Crisis Centres were (25%/4). Indeed, if we view the data at face value, and given that both organisations describing themselves as ‘co-operatives’ were Rape Crisis centres, then the Rape Crisis network appears to have a wider spectrum of organisational forms than Women’s Aid Refuges. These findings are illustrated in Figures 10 & 11 below. Again, it is likely that the distinction between bureaucratic and collectivist types is not a powerful one, as further data analysis indicates below.

**Figure 10 – Organisational Structure (Women’s Aid)**
Changes & Adaptations to Organisational Structure

A change in organisational structure is often cited as an indicator of ‘institutionalisation’ or ‘co-optation’ of an organisation, particularly if this change can be linked to the advent of state funding for that organisation (Collins et al, 1989; Byington et al, 1991; Gornick et al, 1985; Martin, 1990; Matthews, 1994; Reinelt, 1994). Therefore respondents were also asked whether their organisation had always had this structure. In Sweden there were considerable differences between the two networks with all the SKR organisations indicating that this was the case whereas only 50% (8) of the ROKS organisations had changed from their original structure, which had previously been collective organisation. In the UK the difference between the networks was not so marked with 29% (7) of Women’s Aid organisations indicating they had changed structure and 19% (3) of the Rape Crisis Centres. In all cases, in both countries the change was from collective organisation to a more hierarchical or traditional form of organisation. These findings are illustrated in the table below.
As literature suggests, it is possible that change in organisational structure is a result of complying with state-funding practices. However as I discussed above, in Sweden there were no restrictions or stipulations reported with regard to organisational structure of the centres, nor the requirement for a board of directors or other ‘overseeing’ body. In any case, under the 1998 Kvinnofrid legislation, all women’s organisations dealing with violence are granted state monies. Therefore any ‘requirement’ to organise in a particular way would be universal and we would expect all centres to resemble each other quite closely in terms of organisational structure, which as illustrated above, is not the case.

However, specific requirements in terms of organisational structure imposed as a condition of funding, particularly in terms of electing a board of directors, was the case in the UK. Particularly with Women’s Aid organisations, a requirement of receiving funding was to appoint a board of directors from the local community and to adopt some sort of management structure. An explanation for this was offered by a Women’s Aid worker:

They make you do it so they know the buck stops somewhere. I suppose it’s all to do with accountability and all that. If they’re giving away public money they want to know someone is ultimately responsible. Basically so if something goes wrong they can say ‘it wasn’t us!’ (‘Rhona’, Women’s Aid Worker, Scotland.)

They do restrict what we do – mainly through the constant form-filling and boring management committee meetings. I feel like I could have eradicated
violence single-handed for all the time I've been sat in there! ('Mary', Women's Aid Worker, England.)

The requirement to have some sort of 'conventional' management structure was less likely in the case of Rape Crisis Centres, although it did occur in some cases. This difference can, in part, be attributed to the different funding situations of the two networks. Nonetheless, for those who did not have to make a structural change it is clear that increasingly bureaucratic working practices are encouraged when working with the state, particularly when participating in its grant economy.

The requirement to organise 'traditionally', or to institute more 'traditional' management practices, is cited by Matthews (1994) as a deliberate attempt by the state to exert control over women's organisations, and in turn to diminish the political aspect of their work – a process she calls 'managing rape', or 'managing violence'. When questioned about this, the majority of respondents did not believe this to be the case. For example:

I really don't think they're clever enough to do that, are they? (Women's Aid Worker, Scotland)

I don't think it's intentional but it probably happens. It's more about them having to justify what they do with money I think. As I said before, it's all about accountability.' ('Mary', Women's Aid Worker, England.)

You have to play by their rules. I'm not sure they know why they have the rules though. ('Rhona', Women's Aid Worker, Scotland)

The research findings show that women working in refuges and crisis centres do not see the state as a rational actor. Although respondents did not believe that it was the intention of funding bodies to attempt to exert control over the organisations that they fund, and in turn to diminish the political aspect of their work, they believed that this happened nonetheless. One Women's Aid worker stated:

They have us over a barrel because we need the money and the only way to get it is to comply. We either shut our refuge or have a management committee – it's as simple as that. We spend a lot of time jumping through hoops. In the end
you just have to do what they want if you need the money. (‘Caroline’, Women’s Aid Worker, Scotland)

It was clear from workers’ responses that having a management committee or a board of directors was rarely seen as a good thing in itself. In some cases, like the example above, they were accepted as a ‘necessary evil’, and this was more likely to be the case in Women’s Aid organisations. This is similar to the discussion of funding restrictions above, and the acceptance on workers’ part that they are required to be accountable. However, managing to be accountable without it becoming burdensome is more difficult. In other organisations there was a significant amount of resentment directed towards them, and this was more likely in the case of Rape Crisis Centres. In the majority of cases where resentment was evident, it was often related to the perceived inexperience and a lack of a feminist political analysis on the issue of violence against women, of those making up the management committee. Workers’ indicated that decisions were often made, or actions taken, that were not in the best interests of the organisation, or not in line with its feminist guiding values. The following comment written in response to what workers liked least about working in their particular organisation clearly illustrates this point.

Lack of support/awareness from Manager and Management Committee. Interference with counselling work – management committee have no counselling background and like to make changes that effect cases and clients’ well-being. Management Committee – all social work background. Making decisions that are working against the values of the centre. Management Committee – unavailable, do not meet deadlines for doing a job, funding applications, or funders’ requests – but still make decisions that are unrealistic about what we can do for clients, rather than looking at clients’ needs. (Rape Crisis Worker, England)

This point is further illustrated by the following comment written by a Rape Crisis worker at the end of the questionnaire.

I work for an all-women organisation – our management committee and manager in theory seem to think that they are working towards empowering women (core values of the organisation) but it’s quite disempowering – your views and opinions are not heard – as a counsellor I am very much aware of power and control in a relationship and also where rape and sexual assault is concerned – sadly; same type of pattern occurs with the decision making
behaviours of the committee – in the end it’s the clients who suffer – e.g. decisions made by management to stop therapy group, some counselling sessions due to budget cuts – but end of financial year we had more than enough money left which had to go back to the funders. (Rape Crisis Worker, England)

Another Rape Crisis Centre indicated that they had been prohibited from joining a national network of organisations because their management committee insisted on having male committee members. Despite stressing the importance of a women-only working environment, and the place of feminist politics within the organisation, the committee insisted on retaining the male members. During an interview a worker in this organisation commented:

They don’t listen to us. They’re not feminists – some of them aren’t even women for god’s sake! We tried to explain to them that we can’t have men walking all over the place because we want women to feel safe and comfortable coming here. These women have no reason to trust anyone - least of all men. We’re exempt from sex discrimination law for a reason. If they could convince me that they were necessary, had some skill or other? ...but they’re not. There’s nothing that they do that a woman couldn’t. These people think this is about wiping tears and saying ‘there, there’ - it’s about feminism – it’s about being women and helping women who suffer at the hands of men.” (Rape Crisis Worker, Northern Ireland)

This also offers support for the argument that I introduced above, that the link between structure and ideology is not empirically evident and the decision to organise in a particular was may not be at the sole discretion of the organisation itself.

Respondents offered alternative explanations for state funding bodies’ requirements to organise in a particular way, and to establish boards of directors or management committees. Several respondents indicated that they believed it to be a lack of understanding of why feminist and women’s organisations had chosen to organise collectively. Furthermore, respondents also indicated that they believed those not involved in collective working themselves tended to consider it an ineffective form of organisation, and somehow not ‘organised’ at all. This is in line with Steward’s (1987) position, when she asserts that state bureaucracies find it difficult to interact
with an organisation when those they engage with are unable to make decisions on the organisations behalf, or able to make them stick. For example:

> They just don’t get it. I mean, ...well..., they think we’re just playing at it. Most people never question what goes on in their day-to-day lives really. They don’t understand that it’s a choice to do this. I think they think we aren’t organised at all - all over the place or something – they don’t understand that it’s about our feminism. (‘Helen’, Women’s Aid Worker, England.)

> We scare them I think. They’ve no idea what we’re about and don’t understand why someone’s not in charge. I’ve told people before that we’re a collective and they still ask me for the Director’s name! (‘Alison’, Women’s Aid Worker, England.)

> Funders think it means that it’s a free for all and that we’re a liability. It’s quite funny really ... the forms for example – always have a space for ‘Director’, ‘Manager’, or some such thing. Here, I’ll show you – see! They don’t know what to do when you write ‘not applicable’ in there. (‘Elaine’, Rape Crisis Worker, England)

It was also evident that not all changes in organisational structure were externally motivated. This was particularly true of the Swedish organisations where there was no requirement to adopt particular management structures, but also occurred in some UK organisations. Respondents indicated that the decision to alter their existing form of organisation and decision-making had often been made on the grounds of practicality. Although collective working adhered to the individual women’s and organisations’ feminist principles and guiding values, it was not effective on a day-to-day basis for many of the organisations. This is in line with the discussion Cuthbert & Irving (2001) offer when considering the adoption of a more pragmatic approach by Scottish Women’s Aid.

Several issues were raised in relation to collective working, one of which was its time consuming nature. Not all organisations with a collective form used the same decision making procedures, some organisations could only reach a decision based on consensus whereas others had procedures in place that allowed for a majority vote to agree on an issue if a consensus could not be reached. It was organisations that
adhered to the former way of decision-making that found collective working the most problematic.

We all have to agree and on a lot of things we do, but there's a lot of issues that we clash on and it can take ages, I mean weeks sometimes, to finally decide either way on something. It's not an efficient way of working when we don't agree, when we do it's fine. ('Rhona', Women's Aid Worker, Scotland)

Getting everyone there at one time is difficult and when you decide by consensus it makes it difficult to decide on anything. That's not practical when you've got a job to do. ('Margo', Rape Crisis Worker, England)

Respondents also indicated that personality clashes were also problematic, or where more charismatic women in the group were able to dominate and have their ideas dominate in discussions. The interpersonal relationships between the women were a key issue with regard to the success of collective working. Power was also a frequently occurring theme when discussing decision-making procedures in relation to collective working.

Some respondents indicated that they felt some members of their collective would pursue an issue just to be 'difficult', or because the person putting the case for the alternative or opposite, was someone with whom they had a difficult relationship. This is illustrated by the following comment made during an interview.

There's two women in our group who don't get on but pretend to on the surface. But it's very clear in meetings that they won't agree, we know that before we start and everyone else sighs when they start on each other. One will put a case for something and you're just waiting for the other one to jump in and say the opposite - even if we all know she doesn't really believe it. It makes me really angry but I've tried to intervene and paid the price for it. We let them fight it out now but it takes up all our time. ('Helen', Women's Aid Worker, England)

Some women in the collective groups were more charismatic than others and tended to dominate the collective meetings. This was discussed during interviews with women in several of the organisations and I also witnessed it while attending a meeting of a Rape Crisis organisation. The issue being discussed was the
reorganisation of counselling sessions. Three members of the collective were making the case for providing longer counselling sessions for women, extending each session from the current one-hour duration to two hours duration. Their argument centred on making the women feel at ease and they believed the conventional ‘therapy-hour’ approach they currently used was too ‘clinical’. In their experience of conducting counselling sessions in this format they found that women only began to discuss their experience in the last ten minutes of the session, and prior to this they either steered the conversation away from the topic, changed the subject onto something they felt more comfortable with, and used a variety of avoidance techniques. The women making the case for changing to two-hour sessions hoped the longer sessions would give women more time to ‘open up’ therefore allowing more time to discuss their experiences when they felt comfortable doing so.

Of the other five group members, three women did not agree that this would be a useful or practical change, the fourth took the middle ground, agreeing with the reasons for the change but disagreeing that it would be workable on a practical level due to time and resource constraints, and the fifth was undecided. This group made decisions based on consensus initially, which should be strived for if possible, but if this was not achieved a majority vote decided an issue. The group discussed the issue for over an hour. The three women who did not want to change the counselling format made up the more charismatic members of the group and dominated the debate. In contrast the women who did want to alter the counselling format were far quieter and demanded, and also got, less time to speak than the others. Part of the exchange in the meeting is detailed below. The initials ‘M’ and ‘F’ represent two of the women that were against the change, and the initial ‘K’ represents one of the women making the case for the change.

M: But why change something that works fine the way it is?

K: We’ve told you we don’t think it does work.

M: It does work, you just have to get the women to talk about what they’re here to talk about.
F: I see what you’re saying but I don’t agree. We can’t give everyone two hours because there’s not time and some of the women would get distressed if they talked for two hours.

K: But some of them aren’t getting round to talking about it ‘til they’re going out the door.

M: If we see them for two hours then we’ll not be able to see as many women.

K: But....

M: We can barely see those who contact us just now we don’t have time to double the sessions.

K: But it’s....

M: Anyway, we’re not all here today so we can’t decide just now anyway so we can leave it ‘til the next meeting.

K: You’re not listening to me!

M: I am, I just don’t agree.

The issue was tabled on the agenda for the next collective meeting and no decision was taken. The more dominant women in the group were able to change the subject onto something else and avoid talking about the issue they did not want to discuss any longer. In many ways what happened in the meeting was reminiscent of what the three women who wanted to change the counselling procedures had described happening in counselling sessions, though the way of bypassing the issue was different.

Women indicated in interviews that this was a common problem in collective decision-making. In order for it to work effectively everyone must have the opportunity to be heard and to feel as though they are being heard. This was often not the case. Sometimes this was because more charismatic and confident women dominated in discussions and meetings and other times it was because some
members of the group did not have the confidence to speak out or to pursue an issue. Collective working and decision making is compatible with feminist politics because it allows women to be heard and to express an opinion. However, it relies on those involved feeling able to do so. Women in society are not encouraged to behave in this way and respondents indicated that many members find it difficult to do so, particularly those who have not been involved with the collective for a long time.

It’s hard to speak out at first. You’re not used to being listened to and then suddenly people want your opinion and you’re not even sure you’re that confident of what it is. (‘Elaine’, Rape Crisis Worker, Scotland)

Collective working only works if people contribute and not all the women can do that. What they would say would be valid but often the quieter women don’t get heard. (‘Katja’, SKR Worker)

The arrival of paid staff in organisations has also made collective working less practical for many organisations. A large number of Women’s Aid refuges in the UK in particular employ paid staff that work longer hours and are more regularly involved in the organisation. This has meant that in many organisations those who are more heavily involved in terms of time and are employed to do a job are often assigned responsibility on a day-to-day basis for making decisions in relation to a particular area. This has not necessarily meant the abandonment of collective working, though it has in some cases where paid staff and management committees dominate, but in others it has caused adaptations to the original procedures of collective working that were used.

Because they’re there more often than us it makes sense for them to be able to make more decisions. It’s not really a hierarchy but sometimes they can’t wait for us all to be around and they often know what’s going on more than we do. They do tell us or discuss it with us when they can, they don’t ignore us or do things they know we’ll not agree with but we have to let them take a certain amount of control or their job would be very hard. (‘Alison’, Women’s Aid Worker, England.)

It is clear from the research findings that many organisations in Sweden and the UK have experienced changes in organisational structure. The research has shown that in some cases change has been motivated by external pressures, and on others internal
pressures have precipitated the change. Therefore, the research findings show that despite feminist principles and the critique of bureaucratic organisation inherent in collectivist organisation, refuges and crisis centres have adapted organisation and working practices according to the particular pressures they are under. Thus, this indicates that connections between structure and ideology are not particularly strong or observable in reality.

**Problems of Meaning & Organisational ‘Realities’ and ‘Rhetoric’**

Further evidence of the lack of a strong theoretical or practical basis to the collectivist/bureaucratic distinction can be derived from the research findings. Given the problems with categorising organisations as particular ‘types’ (Martin, 1990), as well as being asked whether organisations identified as having a collective or hierarchical organisational structure (or others as appropriate), respondents were also asked about decision making, both on a daily basis and for making big decisions. The majority of answers from those in collective organisations for daily decision-making were:

‘Whoever is available at the time.’

‘Individuals.’

For big decisions responses tended to cluster around the following:

‘The collective.’

‘All of us at meetings’.

However, a significant number of the responses were not as expected. In responding to the question of who makes daily decisions, responses from those in collective organisations included:

‘Team leader.’
'Project manager.'

'The full-time staff.'

'The paid-staff.'

'The Outreach Worker.'

Similarly, there were several occasions where workers had responded to the question of who makes big decisions with seemingly contradictory answers. For example, responses given included:

'The management committee.'

'The board of directors.'

'Usually the full-timers decide and then tell us what's happening.'

In the same way as responses to questions about collective organisations' actual decision making procedures, those from workers in hierarchical organisations were not as expected. On several occasions respondents indicated that individuals made their own decisions about daily issues, or one or two workers would decide together. However, when it came to making big decisions the same number of respondents gave responses such as

'We all vote on it.'

'We all get to give an opinion and then we try to find the best thing we can agree on but it takes a lot of time up sometimes.'

These are contradictory to the idea of hierarchical organisation, as the ones above are to collective organisation, which may suggest that the definition of these terms are ambiguous when applied to working practices and individual experience.
Section Conclusion

Further to the discussion above about the organisational structure of ROKS and SKR, I will now return to the possible explanations for these apparent contradictions. It is probable that there are no pure organisational forms. That it is not possible to identify any solely hierarchical or solely collective organisations, and in fact women's organisations are located along a spectrum of organisational forms (Katzenstien, 1990). It also raises questions concerning the links between structure and ideology and whether it is a useful distinction, which I would argue given the complexities witnessed in Swedish and UK organisations, it is not. It also challenges the notion of an 'ideal type' of feminist organisation, and possibly too whether this 'pure' form ever existed.

An alternative explanation is what organisations espouse is not what they practice; that there may be a difference between 'organisational rhetoric' and 'organisational reality'. In turn, there are a variety of explanations as to why this is the case. There is the possibility that women's organisations adapted both for survival, and in order to project a more 'acceptable' image to those they interact with. Having seen the problems organisations like Rape Crisis face in terms of lack of political opportunity, access and acceptability, the adoption of an alternative structure, or the projection of that image, can be seen as an inherently pragmatic morphing of the positive features of both forms of organisation, thus creating a variety of hybrid-types (Freeman, 1975). Though the research findings show that this has been more successful for Women's Aid, thus supporting both Charles' (1995) and Stedward's (1987) position.

It is pragmatic for organisations to project a particular image to other bodies with which the organisation interacts, as Stedward (1987) notes the workings of refuge and crisis centres are often antithetical to the workings of the state. Therefore, rather than being indicative of cooption as US literature suggests, changes in structure and working practices reflect an attempt to appear more 'acceptable' and to emphasise co-operation rather than conflict, but in fact the everyday working reality is very different. Lastly, it is also a result of incompatibility between the micro and macro level. For example, an organisation may identify with a particular structure and have appropriate mechanisms and structures in place. However, individuals or groups
working within an organisation may not adopt the same procedures. The successful operation of any imposed organisational structure requires the cooperation of those individuals involved to facilitate the everyday practical procedures it relies upon.

Therefore, the research findings support the argument that equating feminism with collectivist organisation is unrealistic, and that the distinction between ‘collectivist’ and ‘hierarchical’ or ‘bureaucratic’ strands is unrealistic. The data from women’s organisations in Sweden and the UK suggests that this is not a realistic dichotomy, nor do organisations have to be collective to be feminist.
Section 3 – Perceived and Actual Functions of Organisations

Introduction

The advent of state funding for women’s anti-violence organisations is often cited in US literature as a significant factor in the change from what was previously viewed as a network of social movement organisations to what are now considered by some commentators as a network of social service organisations. They argue that as the state became more heavily involved with refuges and crisis centres and through participating in the state’s grant economy, the political aspect of anti-violence work diminished and made way for a concentration on service provision. The research findings show that this has not been the case to the same extent in the UK and Sweden. Firstly, organisations have retained their autonomy in both countries and have not become affiliated to state bodies as those in the US have. Secondly, organisations consider their function as being both service provider and political campaigning organisation and do not see these two aspects of their work as mutually exclusive.

Although organisations and staff indicated that in times of scarce resources their priority would be service provision, in that they have a responsibility to meet the needs of women who require access to their services, they attach considerable importance to the social change goals of the anti-violence movement. A feminist political outlook informs the work of organisations and the majority of women identify as feminists although in the UK feminist political principles were more explicitly stated and in Sweden they were more implicit. Furthermore, as Dobash & Dobash (1992) suggest, a philanthropic approach to refuge and crisis work can be noted in Sweden far more than in the United Kingdom, but this is not as marked as literature has suggested. Furthermore, in the case of Sweden, the distinction between ROKS and SKR is not as marked as the history of the two organisations would suggest.
Type of Gendered Violence

The initial introduction to this chapter detailed the types of gendered violence that organisations in Sweden and the UK provide services for. To recap, there is no rape-specific movement in Sweden as is found in the UK and US, and both networks, although willing to provide services to survivors of rape and sexual assault, concentrate on domestic and family violence in the main.

One of the issues raised earlier in the chapter was the service provision organisations provide for survivors of child abuse. It was noted that in the UK Rape Crisis centres are more likely to offer services relating to child abuse (62.5%) compared to Women’s Aid (50%). There was some initial ambiguity over the nature of provision in the UK, and whether organisations offered services to adult survivors of childhood abuse, or children themselves. Further data analysis comparing these findings with the numbers of women and children using Women’s Aid and Rape Crisis respectively, suggests that Women’s Aid are more likely to provide for children or young adults who may be suffering abuse in conjunction with their mothers, whereas Rape Crisis are more likely to provide services for adult women survivors of childhood abuse, or teenage or young women currently experiencing abuse.

Rape Crisis’ provision of services for adult female survivors of child abuse is also likely to contribute to its poorer funding situation and conversely the provision Women’s Aid have for children is likely to contribute to their better funding situation. In terms of the importance attached to care work and support services, the state assumes more responsibility for the safety and well-being of children than it does for adults in that children’s legal status as minors and as dependent upon adults or the state for care, ensures that the provision of services cannot be so easily ignored when crisis intervention may be required and abuse may be ongoing. Conversely, the provision of counselling services for adult survivors of child abuse or neglect, who are not currently experiencing abuse (although crisis intervention may indeed be required) does not carry the same responsibility on the part of the state to provide such services. Furthermore, services that are aimed at individuals with a therapeutic approach, and that are not organised from a feminist perspective, are currently
provided by the state and other charitable organisations. This provision is not adequate for demand, and Rape Crisis would argue is not wholly sensitive to the needs of adult women who have experienced sexual violence in the past or recently, but the key difference is that the state assumes more responsibility for the welfare of children experiencing violence than adults who experienced violence as a child. As a result Women's Aid is likely to receive higher and more consistent levels of funding since they provide statutory welfare provision in the form of refuge for children currently experiencing abuse or violence. This can be summarised in the following comments from interviewees that support this conclusion.

Children are a key topic for applying for money. It’s partly because the government doesn’t want to be accused of neglecting the needs of children because it gets such public attention if they’re ever accused of that, but also because it tugs on their heart strings more too. Sympathy levels for children are a lot higher than they are for adults. Of course it shouldn’t be like that, it should be about needs and about rights, but it doesn’t work that way. (‘Anne’, Women’s Aid Worker, England)

Rape, sexual violence – they don’t get the same status as domestic violence. It’s not connected to families the same way in people’s heads and I think it’s seen as being ‘just’ about the woman herself and we don’t jump to protect her the way that we do with a wife or a mother. ... And the child abuse complicates it too because there’s been such a furore about ‘false memory syndrome’ and for a while the papers were full of revelations about supposedly false accusations – do you remember? ... and lots of people questioning whether abuse can be forgotten like that or whether therapists were ‘planting’ memories and so on? There’s still a tendency to think women are making it up. I’ve counselled women myself who have only recently recalled abuse that happened decades ago ... their memories are sometimes confused and they resist it themselves sometimes – they don’t want to believe it’s true. I’ve never thought women were making it up – there’s so much raw emotion comes with the memories that I can’t see why anyone’d put themselves through it, and lets face it it’s not like people get that much sympathy about it. ... we encourage women to keep silent about abuse, rape, violence, to forget about it ... and the mind’s an amazing thing, it won’t remember what’s too hard to know, but then when they do forget and keep silent and then remember we tell them it’s all false and they’re making it up. Sorry, the point I started off trying to make was it’s not a sexy funding issue – no one wants to appear to give money to encourage false memory accusations. (‘Elaine’, Rape Crisis Worker, England)
The findings of the research in terms of service provision for survivors of child abuse contribute to our understanding of the limited political opportunity and low levels of access and acceptability Rape Crisis experience. There has been considerable controversy surrounding adult survivors of child abuse and with it a significant amount of scepticism on the part of mental health professionals and the general public as to the 'believability' of survivors' accounts (Coffey, 1998; Herman Lewis, 1992), with false memory syndrome and vindictiveness cited as explanations for survivors' accounts. As a result, providing services for adult survivors does not increase the likelihood of funding.

Conversely, Women's Aid's service provision for children of women suffering domestic violence, who may also be suffering abuse in conjunction with their mother, is a funding priority. It is of course a statutory responsibility to protect children and Rape Crisis workers see this as contributing to Women's Aid's funding success. Many Women's Aid refuges involved in the interview aspect of the research indicated they had paid children's workers, nursery and care assistants and that they often received funding solely for work with children.

Not only is ongoing or current abuse of children a statutory responsibility in terms of appropriate intervention to ensure a child's well-being, but recent high profile media cases of violence against children have ensured that it is prominent in terms of public awareness, therefore the safety of children, who are considered to need protection by virtue of their status as minors, is an issue that is likely to receive attention from the public, policy makers and funding bodies. In line with the public fear that surrounds violent threats to women and children, these high profile cases have in the most part involved violence from a male unknown to the individual (Lewis Herman, 1992), raising public awareness of the stereotypical view of sexual violence. Given this, we might expect that services offered by agencies such as Rape Crisis might be seen as legitimate organisations to fund, but the fact Rape Crisis counsel individuals who are predominately adults and not young children deemed in need of protection, such services are not high priority.
Service Provision Population(s)

Historically the women-only nature of refuge and crisis work has stemmed from its origins in the women’s movement and the gendered understanding of violence. The majority (81%/60) of centres in both countries provided services for women and children only, with all Women’s Aid organisations offering this. An additional 10 (13.5%) offered services to women only, in the most part these were the rape-specific centres. Similarly to the vast majority of women-oriented crisis centres in other countries, the majority of organisations do not provide services for men. Of the 74 organisations that responded there were 4 exceptions; 2 Swedish and 1 UK organisation provided services for ‘all’, and the remaining organisation operated specifically for young people and, although affiliated with Rape Crisis, did not provide a gender-specific service and therefore dealt with young men. The 3 organisations providing services for ‘all’ reported that they did not provide counselling, refuge or support services for individual male survivors of violence. The main aspect of provision in this respect was to provide information and advice relating to male violence against women, sources of support and advice, and how to support a female relative or friend. The involvement of men in organisations that began as part of a women-oriented, self-help feminist movement remains a problematic issue. Organisations indicated that the role of men both as the providers of a service and members of the organisation, and as users of the organisations’ services was still debated. This issue was more contentious in some organisations than others, and Swedish organisations were more likely than UK organisations to be open to the idea of their involvement.

It was clear from the 3 organisations that did involve men in their work, though only in relation to information provision for the support of a partner, relative or friend, they felt it was important to provide this service because we live in a predominately heterosexual world, and that in their experience of dealing with women who have experienced gendered violence relationships and interactions with men often proved problematic and difficult. As ‘Cristina’, a ROKS worker explained:
It’s not for their (men) benefit exactly – but for the woman and the man. I think it’s good if he wants to understand more and to help her, but I think we should do it with the woman’s needs in mind, not to somehow make him feel better. I know we can’t separate them all the time, and having him feel better might help her, but if I have to tell them to stop behaving in a particular way or that they’re not supporting her by being concerned about themselves then I will. For me it’s about helping the woman, not licking men’s wounds. (‘Cristina’, ROKS Worker, Sweden)

The lack of understanding women often experienced in the men close to them, and subsequently the impact that had on women was a significant reason for providing information services for men. Although addressing the needs of women primarily, it was also clear that in providing information for men under these circumstances it was hoped that it might also help to promote men’s greater understanding of the impact of gendered violence in general.

It raises awareness too, and that’s important. I would never agree to us counselling men because they can provide that service for themselves, we’re here for women … but if we can do something that changes men’s attitudes and helps them see it from a women’s point of view then that’s a good thing. (‘Maria’, SKR Worker, Sweden)

**Service Provision**

The provision of services to survivors of violence is a major part of the work refuges and crisis centres do. There is a lack of state provision for survivors of violence and without the services of women’s organisations many women would not be able to seek help. The provision of services ranged depending on the size and resources available to an organisation. The following table summarises the number of organisations providing particular services in each country.

The data illustrates that ‘frontline’/primary care services are the most prevalent, for example initial crisis counselling and the provision of refuges and safe houses for women escaping violence. This provides evidence that the priorities of these organisations are concentrated on the well-being and safety needs of women who have experienced domestic violence, rape, sexual assault or child abuse. This may indicate that there is a move towards a service-provision orientation to crisis work as
literature suggests is the case in the US, however organisations are not absorbed into social service structures in the same way, and the lack of basic core services elsewhere may be equally likely to produce this outcome.

Table 6 – Service Provision - % (n) of Organisations Providing Service

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Percentage (n) of Organisations</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>UK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Initial Crisis Counselling</td>
<td>94% (32)</td>
<td>95% (38)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refuge/Safe-house</td>
<td>91% (31)</td>
<td>57.5% (23)*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-term Counselling</td>
<td>79% (27)</td>
<td>60% (24)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accompanying to Police/Court</td>
<td>50% (17)</td>
<td>90% (36)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare/Benefits Advice</td>
<td>47% (16)</td>
<td>60% (24)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Groups</td>
<td>44% (15)</td>
<td>60% (24)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing Advice</td>
<td>38% (13)</td>
<td>65% (26)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Advice/Care</td>
<td>35% (12)</td>
<td>57.5% (23)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Advice</td>
<td>32% (11)</td>
<td>77.5% (31)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This Figure represents all UK organisations, both Women’s Aid and Rape Crisis Centres. Given the dichotomy of service provision for domestic violence and rape/sexual assault the inclusion of Rape Crisis responses misrepresents the situation somewhat. If Women’s Aid responses are considered independently of Rape Crisis then the figure for the level of organisations providing a refuge or safe-house is 96% (33).

The research findings also indicate that women’s anti-violence organisations in the UK are more likely to provide a wider range of services than those in Sweden. This is counter-intuitive given the secure funding base Swedish organisations have. There are a number of possible explanations for this. Firstly, the level of need may be lower in Sweden given that statutory welfare services are more comprehensive. However, women’s responses during interviews about the importance they place on services for survivors do not suggest this is the case. An alternative explanation for this is that the history of struggle that has characterised the UK movement’s involvement with the state has produced a greater range of services. Interview data does not shed any more light on this issue as women in both countries consistently indicate that they want to provide more services for more people, and that funding is the main barrier
to them doing so. Furthermore, as we have seen from the research findings on funding, both movements rely heavily on voluntary labour.

During interviews the topic of service provision and the level of importance attached to it was talked about at length. It was also a significant element in the questionnaire aspect of the study. Women were asked to rank the different functions of the organisations in which they worked, both from the organisation’s priorities and which they thought personally should be priorities. In the vast majority (97%) of cases respondents in the total sample indicated that their organisation’s first priority was service provision.

The research findings in relation to the importance of service provision to organisations and the women working in them, of whom 92% indicated the provision of services would be their own personal priority, are indicative of the lack of services elsewhere that women can access in relation to both domestic violence and sexual assault. This is discussed in more detail in the section on motivations for work, which discusses the importance of the awareness of need for those women with personal experience of violence. Interview responses also indicate the priority that is placed on service provision by the networks in both countries. Respondents reiterated the roles of the national network organisations in assuming the main responsibility for campaigning work, indicating that the majority of their focus was on the provision of services.

I hope it never comes down to a choice. Our national organisation does most of our lobbying and campaigning but we do it locally if there’s relevant issues and we do community education. The roles are related for me but if I had to choose one it would have to be services. (‘Roisin’, Women’s Aid Worker, Northern Ireland).

We do a lot of advising to government departments about violence to women and policy but we don’t really do that so much as the main ROKS. Our day to day is providing services and it’s not that the rest isn’t important, but we have to be there in case someone turns up. So it’s important that we keep it going. Abused women can’t wait until the next day or the next day, but if we have to then lobbying and campaigning can wait. (‘Cristina’, ROKS Worker, Sweden).
It is likely then, that the lack of a significant national network organisation for Rape Crisis means that individual centres assume responsibility for campaigning as well as service provision. Respondents indicated that this was the case, and that their poor funding level meant they devoted their time, in the most part, to service provision.

The following comments were provided by Rape Crisis Workers on questionnaires in relation to the campaigning work organisations are involved in.

If I ever had time to think about what we might do then I’d tell you.

We get involved in national events like the Violence Against Women Day but we don’t organise much ourselves unless something awful happens and we have to make response.

These findings show, not only the poor resources of Rape Crisis, but also the extent to which all energies are ploughed into service provision. Furthermore, it is likely that the lack of a national organisation contributes to Rape Crisis’ status as an outsider group in relation to the state since it relies on access being achieved by individual organisations rather than having a coordinating network working on its behalf (Stedward, 1987).

What is interesting about the second comment above, and other similar responses from interviews (detailed below) is that the anti-violence movement, in times of scarce resources, will respond to political threat even it us unable to find, or respond to, political opportunity (Staggenborg, 1995). Therefore, even those organisations with the poorest resources, would respond in defence of women’s rights if required to do so. In addition to questionnaire comments, the following interview comment illustrates this.

It’s like a red-rag to a bull for us. We don’t have time or money to have any long term coordinated campaigning though we’ll do training and things if we’ve got the people available, which is usually the problem. No, but we’ll respond to things if we have to and it’s difficult because there’s things it’s important for us to stand up about and we have to try somehow. We don’t have a network as such but we’ll get together in a more disorganised fashion if
we need to. Last time ... last time it was that rape case in Aberdeen and we went and lobbied the Scottish Office to try and get them to change the consent law and before that we helped others when all that ‘hoo ha’ was happening about the Human Rights Legislation about not being able to question the victim. But the problem is if we go and do those things then we can’t be here at the same time. (‘Sarah’, Rape Crisis Worker, Scotland)

Organisations also indicated they provide community education and training for a variety of bodies. A number of these agencies were state agencies, for example the police, social workers and health care professionals, and these are detailed in the section about organisations’ relationship with the state in the following chapter.

**Section Conclusion**

The findings of the research indicate that women perceive the function of the organisations as being part service provider and part agent for political change, but that the service provision element takes precedence. Overwhelmingly, anti-violence organisations continue to provide services run by women for women, indicating the link to feminist analysis the movement has. As a result, the findings do not offer support for the possibility that the UK and Swedish movements may experience change similar to that in the US, in that there is no evidence to suggest that there has been an influx of ‘new’ victims that has subsequently made a feminist analysis less pertinent. Service provision in both the UK and Sweden is comprehensive despite being poorly resourced and represents a considerable achievement on the part of the movement. The findings show that frontline or primary care services are most prevalent, which is most likely a result of poor funding, since longer-term services cannot be guaranteed. This is also supported by the data on funding that describes the difficulties organisations face in both countries in their attempts to provide adequate services.

It is clear that those organisations that have national network organisations can offer a more coordinated response to campaigning and can also take on issues specific to the organisations, like funding provision. As a result, this places Rape Crisis in a poor position in terms of its ability to achieve insider status. The lack of a national organisation means individual organisations are sole agitators and this adds to the
burden already placed upon scare resources, and is likely to further diminish the extent to which the organisation can raise public awareness. The findings show that movement organisations such as Rape Crisis, when there is a dearth of resources, will respond to political threat, as Staggenborg (1995) indicates is the case for some parts of the movement, and act in defence of women’s rights.
Chapter 7 – Research Findings II

Introduction

This chapter discusses the research findings in relation to the remaining theme identified from analysis of literature in the opening chapters. Section 4 discusses the research findings about the motivations of women to engage in refuge and crisis work relating these back to literature on social movement organisations and the motivations it suggests are significant for social movement participants.
Section 4 - Motivations & the Experience of Work

Introduction

In line with what literature on working and volunteering in anti-violence organisations suggests (Black et al, 1994; Gidron, 1984), altruistic reasons, that is the desire to help others, and psychic benefits, that is feeling good about oneself as a result of helping others, were strong motivations for the women working in refuges and crisis centres in Sweden and the UK. Furthermore, and again consistent with literature, political motivations were also strong amongst the women and frequently cited not simply as a motivating factor to do human service, care or voluntary work, but as significant in determining the type of that work and the location in which they did it. The research found that women’s motivations in terms of altruistic, psychic and political motivations were not mutually exclusive categories; for example psychic benefits were not forthcoming simply as a result of helping other women, but that these benefits were related to how that help was provided, that is from a feminist political perspective. Similarly, women’s altruism was strongly related to their feminist politics in that they felt the need to help others because those others were women and experiencing something that was gender-specific, and desired to not only help the individual woman but in doing so to help all women.

The research found differences in the motivations of those working in refuges and crisis centres in Sweden compared to the UK. The motivations of workers were, in part, related to the feminist theoretical perspective that has characterised the movement in each country respectively, with women in UK organisations citing more explicitly feminist motivations than those in Swedish organisations. As a result, workers in Sweden were more likely to cite philanthropic motivations and place more weight on the helping aspect of their work, which they regarded, in the main, as service provision. ‘Helping’ had a broader definition for those in the UK where women regarded service provision and campaigning on political issues as ‘helping’. Differences were evident in the number of women who worked in refuges and crisis centres that were also employed elsewhere as social service, care or therapeutic professionals. This was more often the case in Sweden, which offers some support
for literature that suggests the movement in Sweden has a more philanthropic base. Personal experience of violence was also cited as a strong motivating factor for many women in both Sweden and the UK. Again this was also related to altruistic motivations, psychic benefits and political motivations.

**Altruistic Motivations & Psychic Benefits**

Consistent with the literature on working and volunteering in women’s anti-violence organisations, (Black et al, 1994) women indicated that altruistic motivations and psychic benefits were significant in their decision to do refuge or crisis work. Altruistic motivations, for example the desire to help other people, were often cited by respondents in both the questionnaire based and interview based elements of the research. A total of 78% (428) of respondents cited altruistic motivations as significant in their decision to pursue refuge or crisis work. The following questionnaire responses are representative of this.

Desire to make a difference – albeit small!

To help others.

To make a difference and help people.

For many women these altruistic motivations were also underpinned by the psychic benefits of pursing anti-violence work. The majority (90%/385) of those who cited altruistic motivations indicated that the psychic and emotional benefits that were forthcoming as a result, also motivated them to do refuge and crisis work. On the whole women indicated that their work, and in particular helping other women and children, gave them a tremendous sense of satisfaction. The following comments from respondents’ questionnaires illustrate this.

Satisfaction in helping others – seeing women and children move on from violence to living a safe life.
Satisfaction in knowing you have helped a family to regain their self-esteem and start life again knowing they are a valued member of society.

When I see women change their lives around completely I just grin with pride – pride in myself and pride in them.

Women’s responses in interviews also offer further evidence for their altruistic motivations and the psychic benefits that come from fulfilling those desires. The following story provided by ‘Sarah’, a Rape Crisis Worker, about her experience of helping a young woman who had been raped, illustrates the important role this plays in keeping her motivated to do crisis work.

It’s hard sometimes not to get despondent and well, just really angry. I can keep going because I know the feeling I get from helping someone can lift me so much. I remember having that feeling for the first time when I’d only been working here about 3 or 4 months. This young woman phoned, well I discovered that after a while because she didn’t say anything for what felt like ages, probably 10 minutes of silence – trust me, that’s a long time on the phone when they’re not saying anything. I talked though – couldn’t stand the silence because I was nervous too. I tried to make it ok for her to speak and eventually she did. I talked to her for such a long time. She’d been raped a month before and felt so awful she wanted to kill herself – she’d already tried but it hadn’t worked. She said she couldn’t go on living with what had happened and couldn’t see that it would ever get better. I got her to talk about how she felt and I listened to her. She sounded distraught and I was scared she would kill herself. She felt worthless and dirty and couldn’t see that there was a point in her living anymore. She agreed to come in and talk to me the next day – I wasn’t really supposed to be working on the Wednesday, I still remember the day and everything!, but I came in to see her. I counselled her for months and watched her transform from someone who felt destroyed to someone who wanted to live and learned to live with what had happened to her. The feeling of that was so amazing I can hardly explain it. To know that I had helped her just from talking to her – I didn’t ‘do’ anything I just let her talk. It makes me smile still (‘Sarah’ is smiling as she tells me this part of the story) and that’s why I do it, it makes me feel good about myself and the world. (‘Sarah’, Rape Crisis Worker, Scotland).

Altruistic motivations for refuge and crisis work were particularly strong for those Swedish workers interviewed. It was evident that there was a charitable element to their work and their motivations to begin and continue refuge and crisis work had stemmed in part from a desire to do philanthropic work. This is not to suggest that a feminist approach was lacking, the research findings have already illustrated the extent to which feminism continues to firmly underpin refuge and crisis work (and is
discussed further below), but women often expressed a desire to help people who, as a result of no fault of their own, found themselves in difficult positions and vulnerable. As I outlined in Chapter 5, the ideological base of the two Swedish networks are considered to be distinct. SKR is supposed to have a more ‘liberal’ approach and ROKS a more ‘radical’ approach. Therefore, given that SKR are considered to conform to a more individual and psychological understanding of the causes and repercussions of violence than ROKS, who take a more structural view, we would expect SKR workers to express sentiments that corresponded with a philanthropic approach to a greater extent than ROKS workers. This was not the case and there were no marked differences between those working in SKR refuges and those working in ROKS refuges. Again, in line with other findings from the research, this indicates that distinctions between groups as more or less feminist are not empirically or theoretically sound. The following comments indicate the similarities between workers in the two networks, and are indicative of responses as a whole.

I wanted to do something to help other people because I feel strongly that we should help one another if we can. There is that saying, ‘there for the grace of god...’ and that’s important to me because if we can’t help each other then why do we live together at all. (‘Kerstin’, SKR Worker, Sweden)

I think we should all give something back to society if we can and I do that by working here. I’m lucky because I’ve never had anything very bad happen in my life but others are not so lucky. (‘Jessica’, ROKS Worker, Sweden)

**Political Motivations**

Literature on social movements from the NSMT perspective fails to acknowledge that the women’s movement directs action towards the state and as such is a political movement as well as a social and cultural one (Charles, 2000). Social movement theory from the NSMT and RMT perspectives has limitations for understanding the women’s and feminist movements because when considering the motivations of social movement participants, they do not have the scope to incorporate the dual role of anti-violence organisations and how this may impact upon an individual’s motivation to volunteer, or become involved. Thus, neither rational choice theory nor social exchange theory can adequately address the nature of ‘doing’. As a result of
the limitations in existing theory, and literature about empirical work on motivations for volunteering in social movements (with the exception of Black, 1994), this was an area the research addressed. Women very often cited strong political motivations for engaging in refuge and crisis work, but problems with regard to meaning, similar to those that arose in relation to the collectivist/bureaucratic distinction discussed in the previous chapter, were also evident with the terms ‘feminism’ and ‘feminist’.

The majority (97%/532) of women identified as feminists and as having a feminist political outlook in general, and in relation to their work with survivors of violence. What was surprising was that a smaller proportion (89%/488), although representing only a 9% reduction, described the organisation in which they worked as a feminist organisation. Of the 74 organisations that took part in the research, workers in 8 (11%) of them would not describe the organisation as feminist. This is surprising in the most part because the networks to which these organisations are affiliated have explicitly feminist objectives.

Furthermore, contradictions were evident because the same 8 organisations deliver services in a way that is compatible with feminist politics, with feminist goals in mind, and their descriptions of the organisations’ stance on violence against women was in line with a feminist political perspective. These organisations were more prevalent in Sweden (6) where naming oneself or the organisation in which one works as ‘feminist’ can have derogatory associations (Dahlerup & Gulli, 1985; Eliasson & Lundy, 1999; Gillberg, 1999). One Swedish respondent offered the following explanation for these apparent contradictions.

These women and these organisations are feminist in terms of what you and I would call ‘feminist’. There’s a fear of naming yourself a feminist here because it can be seen as promoting women not promoting equality. Does it matter what we call ourselves? ... actually I think it does, but what you call something is less important that what you do, and if they better women’s lives then that’s a good thing. Some of the organisations see themselves as ‘helpers’, not as ‘feminist helpers’! (‘Ingrid’, ROKS Worker, Sweden)
The concentration on equality politics in Sweden has meant that emphasising difference is often seen as a ‘bad thing’; this ‘backlash’ is cited as a significant feature in the increasingly ‘radical’ outlook of the Swedish refuge movement (Eduards, 1992 & 1997). Feminist political motivations were evident in the response women provided about their motives for doing refuge and crisis work. This was also particularly noticeable in responses to what women liked most about working in their particular organisation. In more than 90% of questionnaire responses women cited feminist politics as a motivating factor. Examples of responses to specific questions about motivations are provided below.

To support women and children fleeing domestic violence in all its forms.

To be able to work with women and children and use mine and their skills and experience to enable survivors to continue surviving. It’s about being a feminist.

Working on a topic that I’m passionate about. I’m standing up for what I believe in and trying to make a difference to women’s lives. Not just some women but all women.

It was clear from questionnaire and interview responses that women derived a lot of satisfaction from engaging in work that was related to their feminist politics and beliefs. Often women cited this as what they liked most about their work. The following comments are taken from questionnaire responses about what women liked most.

Women helping women helping women.

It’s women-only, it’s political, it’s caring and honourable.

Knowing I’m doing something to change women’s lives, to empower them and allow them to make their own destiny. We work together and together we’re stronger.

During interviews women were asked whether they saw their refuge or crisis work as directly related to their feminism. The response from all 25 women interviewed was
that it was undoubtedly related. Engaging in anti-violence work, often on an unpaid basis, was done not simply for helping in itself, but because it was specifically helping women. The following interview comments indicate the importance of helping women specifically, and helping them with something that is in the most part perpetrated by men.

I do this because I want to help women – I want to change their lives and see them move onto a life that doesn’t involve getting beaten by men on a regular basis. It’s very much related to my feminism and I can’t understand why all women aren’t feminists. How can you not be? (’Bronwyn’, Rape Crisis Worker, Wales)

I’m here because I want to see a world where rape and beating doesn’t happen. A world where power isn’t exerted over women in that way, where men can’t use it to stay in control and keep women scared. (’Rhona’, Women’s Aid Worker, Scotland)

The strength of political motivations indicate that there is little support for the argument that refuge and crisis work has been influenced, and is now done by, apolitical women. Although women expressed their feminism to a greater or lesser degree it was clearly a significant motivating factor. When I say women expressed their feminism to a greater or lesser degree, this was in terms of how often they would actually use the term ‘feminist’ and how outspoken they would be about it. Feminist values and politics clearly informed the work of all 25 women, some of whom stated this explicitly, some of whom made statements with more implicit feminist content.

Different feminist theoretical perspective obviously exist, and as we have seen from the literature in Chapter 2, these can be significant in determining the strategies adopted by a movement organisation. Respondents rarely identified with a particular branch of feminism when asked what ‘type’ of feminist they regarded themselves as. In order to gain further insight into what feminism meant to the women working in these organisations I asked in interviews what being a feminist meant in terms of their own life and work. The response to this question indicated that feminism has no one distinct meaning for women working in refuges and crisis centres. There was one
feature that connected all responses was the desire to change women’s lives, what differed was the ways in which this could be achieved. For example, ‘Birgit’ an SKR Worker in Sweden responded:

For me feminism means being committed to helping women and helping them through a difficult time. It’s about making a difference and encouraging women to turn their back on violence. (‘Birgit’, SKR Worker, Sweden)

In contrast, ‘Ingrid’s’ and ‘Margo’s’ responses indicate a more explicitly stated feminist perspective.

It’s about having a feminist(ic) understanding and knowing that we all experience the same things and that it’s because we share the world with men! (‘Ingrid’, ROKS Worker, Sweden)

What does being a feminist mean to me? .... I think being a feminist isn’t just about ‘pie in the sky’ kind of politics, it’s about practical politics, actually being a feminist in how I live everyday. ... Well, that means working here for a start, and it means challenging things I see that contribute to the oppression of women – the small things that no one notices are almost the worst ones, I mean, ... right violence is in your face, isn’t it?, and I know there’s all the rape myths and all, and horribly people believe them, but most people when it’s out in public would find it hard to make a decent case for violence against women wouldn’t they? It’s the wee things that are important on a day-to-day basis, like the ways women are made to feel bad about their bodies, made to feel they’re ‘sexual’ only when a man says it’s OK to be, told they have to be thinner, prettier etc. etc. etc. I think it’s also about being part of something bigger ‘cause you have to do it on different levels because it’s ingrained ... about being part of a collective who’ll stand together and say we won’t take it anymore. It’s the way we do it, and the support and the fact I, well all of us, won’t just take it, you know? (‘Margo’, Rape Crisis Worker, Scotland)

The research found one difference between respondents in Sweden and the UK in this respect. Those working in organisations in the UK were more likely to express the sentiment that it was not only the service provided and helping women in itself that was important, but the way in which the service was provided. ‘Mary’, a Women’s Aid Worker in England, explained that helping women was important but it was equally important that she felt empowered and able to help herself.
Helping isn’t enough. It’s not just about helping a woman, it’s about helping her to help herself. The police could help a woman by taking her husband away, neighbours could help a woman by phoning the police when they hear him hitting her... it’s not just about that – she’s had someone making decisions for her, making her live in fear – it’s more important that she’s allowed to decide what happens to her. Living with violence like that destroys your sense of self, you can’t see how to make decisions anymore because your life isn’t yours. To really help women you have to help them take their lives back. (‘Mary’, Women’s Aid Worker, England)

Similar sentiments were expressed by Rape Crisis workers:

Rape has such a devastating impact on a woman and as a society we don’t see that because we don’t want to. All the time women are made to think it’s their fault, the old ‘she asked for it’ thing. Counselling doesn’t stop that, I’ve seen women here who’ve had counselling from Victim Support, from doctors and private therapists and they make it about the woman, about what she did or didn’t do and they try to make her feel better. So many decisions are taken out of women’s hands by these people and it’s like being raped all over again. We’re different because it’s not just about stopping them suffering it’s about seeing that it’s not about them, it’s about power and control and that’s what they’ve lost more than anything ... that’s what we have to help women find again, to see that it’s not about them. (‘Nessa’, Rape Crisis Worker, Northern Ireland)

We’re good at what we do because we do it our way. We don’t tell women to report it to the police if they don’t want to, we don’t make them see doctors, we don’t force them to talk about it if they don’t want to, we work very hard not to reinforce the idea that she’s responsible and bad. Just because she’s been raped doesn’t mean she’s impotent for the rest of her life, men want women to be impotent. We encourage women to take responsibility for their health and happiness but not for the violence. We support women to make their own decisions about their lives. (‘Cara’, Rape Crisis Worker, Scotland)

Therefore, women involved in the UK anti-violence movement are more likely to express sentiments about their work that are in line with a radical feminist theoretical perspective, in that the nature of the process, in that they aim to empower women, is as important as the outcome. This is indicative of the radical and socialist feminist outlook that has characterised the women’s movement in the UK. It became clear when analysing the interview data that the definition of ‘helping’ was wider for women working in UK organisations than it was for those in Sweden. ‘Helping’ for women in the UK not only included the provision of services for survivors of violence, and providing them in a way compatible with feminist politics, but
‘helping’ also included campaigning for political change, challenging existing ideas and raising awareness of violence against women. As ‘Alison’ explains:

People working in the centre at first feel they aren’t doing anything unless they’re counselling women or running some sort of group therapy session. Everything that gets done here is important though – if the refuge isn’t clean and safe then the women living in it don’t have such a good quality of life. But people often think this is only about the service, it’s not – we do community education, training for police, social workers, doctors – and we stand up for things we believe in and we try to get changes. All the work we do is important and we need all of us to do it. No one is more important than anyone else. (‘Alison’, Women’s Aid Worker, England)

Although for the majority of organisations service provision is often prioritised due to a lack of core services elsewhere, women did not regard the service provision aspect of their work as being more important in terms of individual contributions. Those women actively engaged in the political work of the organisations, for example one woman who had responsibility for collating information about women’s experience of the police in order to lobby their local force for change, indicated that their work was equally about ‘helping’ women with the difference being they may not meet the women they help.

When women come in they often tell us about the police and the way they’ve treated them. It was so common it disturbed me. We want rape to stop but until that happens we want raped women treated better. I decided to use the information women were giving us to challenge their behaviour. We don’t use women’s details of course, and I tell the women what I’m doing and ask if I can use their experience as evidence. I’m very careful to take out the main problems and not tell them anything that would identify her. When I meet with the community policeman I say things like ‘some women have told us …’ then list the particular difficulties. There’s a long way to go but they’ve changed some things since I’ve been going to them and pushing for change. They now let women take a shower after their physical exam and they didn’t before I told them it was difficult for women to feel dirty and contaminated and that she has the right to a clean body. It’s change on a minor scale I know, but it’s change – and it helps the next woman who has to go in there and that makes it worth it for me. (‘Elaine’, Rape Crisis Worker, England)
Social Service Professionals

Literature from the US that discusses the transformation of refuge and crisis organisations from grassroots social movements to institutionalised social service provision cites the influx of social service professionals as significant in this process (Matthews, 1994; Reinelt, 1994). The research addressed the extent to which organisations in the UK and Sweden have seen the increased involvement of social service professionals. Questionnaire responses indicated that a significant number of women working in refuges and crisis centres were often employed as social service professionals. Of the 549 women that responded approximately one quarter (134) did paid work in a caring, therapeutic or human service occupation. It should be noted that women are often over-represented in care and social service work since their participation in the public sphere mirrors their role in the private sphere where they assume most responsibility for domestic labour and the care of dependants. However, interview respondents indicated that there had been a greater influx of women into refuges and crisis centres who were working in such professional careers over the last decade.

We’re far more likely to get social workers, psychologists, professional counsellors and so on wanting to join us than we are lawyers and accountants, though we get some of them too! I think they’re tuned into the helping idea and see themselves as having a professional expertise to offer. (‘Roisin’, Women’s Aid Worker, Northern Ireland)

Those questionnaire respondents who were social service professionals indicated that their motivation to work in the organisation came in part from their desire to use their training and skills. It was evident that refuge and crisis work is seen by some women as requiring a greater level of professionalism and expertise than it was considered to need at the beginning of the anti-violence movement in the 1970s. Questionnaire respondents indicated that they felt they had a particular expertise by virtue of their professional occupation, and although no respondent suggested they were in any way better qualified than women who did not work in that field, they also suggested that their professional training provided them with particular expertise, not simply their position as a woman helping other women. For example:
I have all this training and I want to use it help people. I volunteer with professional counselling and psychotherapy training and it means I can offer those skills to women. That makes my role here very important to me because I can use the skills I’ve learnt to help other women. (‘Gun’, ROKS Worker, Sweden)

You see the effect it has on a woman and especially the children. I know I can help them by working through the trauma with them, by helping her build coping strategies, helping her release the pain of that. When I work here I can use that to change their lives. (‘Katja’. SKR Worker, Sweden)

Respondents had mixed feelings about the influx of social service professionals as volunteers.

It’s good in that we always need more volunteers and they do have particular skills to offer which is good. They do have a tendency to deal with the individual though and see it more as being about therapy than some of us do. It’s a difficult one, because some women really need that psychological care, but I do worry that it becomes about fixing the particular woman and not about helping all women. (‘Roisin’, Women’s Aid Worker, Northern Ireland)

I’m not sure to be honest. Yes I suppose it’s good because they can offer help and knowledge that’s good for the women but they also think they know what women need more than the women themselves and that’s not good. That individual-psychological-therapeutic model is not what Women’s Aid is about. (‘Mary’, Women’s Aid Worker, England)

Funders like those sort of women and we do play up to it when we’re applying for money. We need to list our expertise and having those kind of skills on the list is a money winner. We don’t place the same importance on it within the organisation because every woman has a distinct set of skills to share. Those sort of skills are welcomed but all skills are and they’re all important. (‘Caroline’, Women’s Aid Worker, Scotland)

The response from Swedish respondents was overwhelmingly positive, which offers further evidence that a charitable approach has historically influenced the movement. There were a greater number of women working in Swedish organisations that were also employed as social service professionals, compared to the UK. Of the 134 women working in those fields and volunteering in refuges and crisis centre, approximately two thirds were in Swedish organisations. The therapeutic aspect of refuge and crisis work in terms of the benefit for the individual woman is valued very
highly and increasing an organisation’s expertise on that front was desired by many of the organisations.

It means we can offer them more help and counselling. We used to send women out to a psychologist in the town if they needed it but we now have one who volunteers and that’s much better. She’s also helping the others do counselling courses and monitoring them which means the help we can offer a woman is much more. (‘Birgit’, SKR Worker, Sweden)

It’s not enough to only be here. We need to have the skill to help them and a lot of them need the psychological treatment. We need more of those women here. (‘Ingrid’, ROKS Worker, Sweden)

It was clear from responses in both questionnaires and interviews that the ‘helping model’ in Sweden was a far more individual and therapeutic model than the one adopted in the UK. Concentration was placed upon ensuring the well being of the individual woman rather than women as a collective group. This is not to imply that Swedish organisations were unconcerned with women’s situation as a collective group, political motivations were present, nor that UK organisations were unconcerned with the well being of individual women, but rather that the weight of motivations and their own view of their work was weighted more towards the individual in Sweden with feminist politics being more explicitly stated in the UK.

Although there was increased involvement of social service professionals in refuge and crisis work, this has not occurred in the UK to the extent it has in the US. This is a likely result of the lack of cooption in the UK movement and the fact it retains an autonomous organisational base despite pragmatic engagement with the state. It is also likely that increasing levels of funding might exacerbate this trend in that regular funding, and the employment of paid staff, necessitates that workers gain qualifications in order to justify the funding and to fulfil the expectations of those to which they are held accountable (Cuthbert & Irving, 2001).
**Personal Experience of Violence**

Women often indicated that their own personal experience of violence had motivated them to become involved in anti-violence work. Often this was direct personal experience, and for some women it was the experience of a close relative or friend. The significance of this personal experience fell into four categories: the desire to ‘give back’ after receiving help themselves; an awareness of the impact of violence on women’s lives and knowing how vital services are; a commitment to campaigning for change in procedures of the police, courts and other professionals dealing with survivors of violence; and exorcising the anger and sharing the pain they felt about their own experience of violence.

Of those that responded to the questionnaire, 45% (248) of women had personal experience of either rape, sexual assault or domestic violence. There were no significant differences between women in the two countries with 43% (106) respondents in Sweden reporting rape, sexual assault or domestic violence and 47% (142) in the UK. The questionnaire did not address the continuum of violence against women (Kelly, 1988) but asked only about rape, sexual assault and domestic violence specifically. Personal experience of violence was explored in greater depth in interviews. On all occasions women’s experiences were shared voluntarily and not asked about directly. Most often experiences were disclosed in response to questions about motivations for working in a refuge or crisis centre. Many women also expressed that they felt it was important to tell their stories and to challenge the silence and ignorance that surrounds violence against women. In order to facilitate this aim and to report the experiences for why they were shared, longer interview extracts that include personal stories are included here.

Of those women interviewed 16 had personal experience of either rape, sexual assault, domestic violence or child abuse. If violence is viewed as a continuum as Kelly (1988) suggests, therefore including acts such as coercion, flashing, inappropriate comments and emotional abuse, then all 25 women interviewed had personal experience of sexual violence. All 25 women knew someone, not in connection with their work, who had experienced rape, sexual assault, domestic
violence or child abuse. These included: mothers; daughters; sisters; nieces; friends; neighbours; and colleagues.

Of those interviewed with personal experience of rape, sexual assault, domestic violence or child abuse, 10 were in the UK and 6 in Sweden. Seven respondents had experienced domestic violence (which often included rape and sexual assault but occurring specifically within a domestic relationship), 6 women had been raped, and another 2 women had experienced childhood physical and sexual abuse that had also been accompanied by the domestic abuse of their mothers.

Those women with personal experience of violence indicated that their motivation to engage in refuge or crisis work had stemmed from the desire to ‘give back’ after receiving help themselves. ‘Margo’s’ experience illustrates this.

It’s such a devastating experience – you always think it won’t happen to you, but it happens to someone … and it’s hard to believe it’s happened to you. I felt like a dead person for weeks afterwards – I wouldn’t admit to anyone I wasn’t coping. I didn’t get help until 5 months afterwards. I called the ***** Rape Crisis Centre … I felt such relief just to talk to someone who understood. I didn’t think anyone could understand how I felt, I thought I was alone. I know the difference that made to me and I remember how hard it was to call. Working here feels like saying ‘thanks’ in some way – if she hadn’t been on the end of the line when I called then who would have been there for me. I feel like I should pay back that by being there for someone else.

(‘Margo’, Rape Crisis Worker, Scotland)

‘Lotta’ and ‘Bronwyn’ also expressed the importance they placed on ‘giving back’ and on offering support to women in similar circumstances.

I don’t think his family believed me – I know they didn’t believe me. They had never liked me very much and thought I wasn’t good enough for him. I’m from the country and he was from the city and well educated. So when I left him they blamed me and said I was probably making it up. They said ***** was never violent – his mother even said I must be losing my mind and it was probably post-natal depression. I took the girls with me of course and this made them (his family) very angry … – what was I supposed to do, leave them with him? I asked them for help and they turned their backs on me, they refused to believe what was happening. I had nowhere to go when they rejected me … miles from my family and my home, I didn’t know anyone in the city apart from his family and friends and they wouldn’t help me, they
didn’t believe me. I went to the shelter with my girls and it’s the bravest thing I’ve ever done, and probably ever will. I was so frightened that they would say I was mad and take the children from me. I must have been holding it all inside myself because when I got there and began to feel safe the feelings all came out. I didn’t understand there was so much pain inside me. The support I got at the shelter changed my life completely. The fact that it was there at all changed my life because I had nowhere to go, but the help I got meant I could move on. I know what it’s like to have nowhere to go and I want to make sure some women have somewhere to go because, that I can repay and help some women be safe. (‘Helen’, Women’s Aid Worker, Sweden)

I was raped when I was 21, when I was at university. I was at a party at my flatmate’s boyfriend’s house. I’d had too much to drink so decided to walk home because I thought I was going to throw up. He must have followed me … I knew he was a friend of my flatmate’s boyfriend … he pulled me onto the football pitch, pushed me face down on the grass and raped me … I just froze. I did what many of us do and told no one at first. Eventually I told my flatmate because she knew something was very wrong with me, and I was bleeding still but I was too scared to leave the flat by myself to get help. She came with me and I went to the University health service and saw the nurse. I wouldn’t tell her what had happened to me – she knew though. She asked me if I’d been raped but I couldn’t even answer her … to be honest I’m not sure I’d called it rape in my head at that point. When I was leaving she handed me a card for rape crisis. I didn’t phone for a while, I still had to call it rape I think. It was the best thing I ever did. Sorry, you maybe didn’t want to hear all that – but that’s why I work here, I want to be here when someone else does the best thing they ever did. (‘Bronwyn’, Rape Crisis Worker, Wales)

Those women with personal experience of violence also indicated that a motivating factor was their awareness of the need for services and the impact violence has on the lives of women. Furthermore, their own experience had drawn attention to the poor provision of services for survivors as well as the silence that surrounds violence against women. Women indicated that seeking help after their own experience was problematic because of a lack of availability of support services as well as society’s tendency to encourage women to ‘forget’ about their experience making it more difficult to demand support. ‘Helen’s’ experience illustrates this.

I didn’t know who could help me and I hadn’t actually heard of Women’s Aid. I was very young though and there was even more silence about domestic violence then. I think I’d heard of a refuge but for some reason couldn’t imagine it was for people like me. A friend eventually said to me I should go there to get away from him, and eventually I did. Before that I thought I was trapped there forever. (‘Helen’, Women’s Aid Worker, England)
Questionnaire responses documented similar experiences for the women involved in refuges and crisis centres.

There’s nothing else for women in *****. We are unique. It took me too long to find them.

If we don’t provide these services then no one else will do it – I know what it’s like to be raped and have nowhere to turn. I came here for help when it happened to me, and want to make sure that the services stay to help other people in the same situation as me. I am sure I would have killed myself if I hadn’t had the support I got from here, I could see no way to deal with the awful feelings myself – I didn’t think I could even begin to, my life was over until I came here. I looked for help before finding here, but there wasn’t anything. No one to listen to me.

Women indicated they felt strong motivations to continue to provide the service that had helped them, and their memories of the difficulty of accessing services encouraged them to fulfil this. This also indicates that statutory provision for survivors of violence has changed very little over the last decades and it is still the case that refuges and crisis centres provide a unique service for survivors of violence. The service is of course unique in that it is organised and delivered from a feminist perspective, but it is also unique in that it is the only service available to many women given the dearth of statutory provision.

When discussing women’s personal experience of violence during interviews and why this had influenced their decision to do refuge and crisis work, it was not only the service provision element that was important to them but also the political element and the desire for wider political and social change in the area of violence against women. This was related to their feelings of anger and frustration about what had happened to them personally and what continues to happen to women, and the further victimisation they can experience at the hands of statutory agencies. For many women ‘doing something’ was important, and by working in a refuge or crisis centre they were not accepting the current position of women but attempting to change it.
I was so angry about it and kept thinking how dare he!, but not just that, how dare they! I needed to do something, needed somewhere to channel my anger or it would eat me up. (‘Margo’, Rape Crisis Worker, Scotland)

I called the police lots of times and they never really did anything. He never hit me where people would see and they didn’t think he was the ‘type’ to hit his wife. He wasn’t an immigrant, wasn’t poor, wasn’t a drunk. I wouldn’t have called them if it wasn’t true but they didn’t really do anything, they talked and joked with him. When I left I went to the police and reported the abuse, I wanted him punished. They told me it would be hard now I had left to do anything about it and they would just say I had post-natal depression if it went to court. Now that makes me very angry but then I just accepted it as what my life was. It’s not acceptable. (‘Lotta’, ROKS Worker, Sweden)

I’ve never felt so humiliated. I went to them for help, for them to do something. They tell you to forget about it, they really do, so you get no redress. I had to do something to change that if I could. (‘Nessa’, Rape Crisis Worker, Northern Ireland)

Women also indicated that working in an anti-violence organisation allowed them a channel for the pain they felt about their own experience of violence and helped them transform that experience into something positive. Working with like-minded women helped some individuals come to terms with their own experience of violence and allowed for a more open exchange about their feelings. This is discussed more detail below.

It is clear that personal experience of violence and the impact that has on women was significant in their decision to engage in refuge or crisis work, and in continuing to do so. The research does not offer support for Eliasson’s (1994) claim that those working in the Swedish movement are unlikely to have experienced violence themselves. The statistics and projections about the actual level of violence against women would suggest this would be unlikely anyway given the endemic nature of such violence, although the research findings do offer support for Eliasson’s (1994) and Dobash & Dobash’s (1992) claims that the anti-violence movement in Sweden is more philanthropically motivated than other anti-violence movements.
**Motivations as Complex and Interconnected**

In analysing the interview material it became clear that women’s motivations for engaging in refuge and crisis work were not mutually exclusive, and they were influenced by the dual roles and functions of the organisation. Therefore, just as anti-violence organisations have more than one function, women working in the organisations have several motivating factors for their engagement. It was not necessarily possible to separate altruistic motivations from political ones, nor psychic benefits from feminist political beliefs. For example, feeling good about oneself as a result of helping others was often related to helping other women in a particular way; a way that was compatible with feminist politics. For example,

I’m standing up for what I believe in and trying to make a difference to women’s lives. Not just some women but all women.

Furthermore, not only did the desire to help others often stem from feminist politics, women also indicated they felt good about themselves for pursuing and standing up for their political beliefs. For example, ‘Mia’s’ comments show that in pursuing her political beliefs and acting upon her political motivations, in turn she felt good about herself.

It’s satisfying to do something that I believe in and to know I’m not just accepting the way things are. I’m challenging something and it feels good to know I am. (‘Mia’, SKR Worker, Sweden)

**Women’s Experience of Work**

Literature about women’s involvement in refuge and crisis work suggests that women may become involved because they are seeking an experience of collective identity (Blanton, 1981). As such, the nature of women’s interpersonal relationships with those involved are likely to be significant factors in the recruitment and retention of workers (Black et al, 1994).
Interpersonal Relationships

For those women involved in the research, relationships with their colleagues in refuges and crisis centres were deeply important to them. Not only is the quality of these relationships important in retaining workers, both volunteer and paid, the perceived benefits of working with like-minded and supportive women were significant motivating factors in the decision to become involved.

In response to what women liked most about working in their particular organisation, women often cited the satisfaction they gained from working with colleagues who shared their political and social beliefs. It was clear that women were seeking not just a work setting but also an experience of ‘sisterhood’; the desire for connection with other women who were fulfilling the same political goals. The following responses to what women liked most about their work given in questionnaires illustrate this.

Working with fantastic like-minded women.

Working with women in an environment of equality.

Working with women, collective working – feeling that we are (in some small way) really making a difference.

These motivations were explored in more detail during interviews and it was clear that feeling accepted by colleagues was very important in terms of work satisfaction. Furthermore, women felt they were more committed to their work as a result of having positive interpersonal relationships with their co-workers and the feeling of pursuing collectively defined goals also increased their work satisfaction.

I work with women who understand where I come from and that’s amazing. I don’t get that at my paid job because people aren’t particularly committed to the company or what it stands for, at the end of the day I can still sleep at night if the company hasn’t made as much money as it wanted. Here it’s different though; I’m here for a reason and I do it for no money – if things are hard then they’re hard for all of us and we all pull together to make it better. It’s not about individuals here, it’s about all of us together. We have the same goals and we work for them, all of us are committed to that and I feel I belong. (‘Bronwyn’, Rape Crisis Worker, Wales)
I'm paid to work here but I don't do it for the money. Of course I have bills to pay but I could always get another job and pay them. I volunteered here first and then took a paid job when we got money for it. In some ways it doesn't feel like 'work' to me ... I mean it's hard, it's not that it's easy, a lot harder than other jobs – but it's because I work with such great women who believe in what I do and want the same things for all women, we share that in common so we're similar kinds of people. I learn something from them everyday and know their support is invaluable for keeping me going sometimes. ('Anne', Women's Aid Worker, England)

Furthermore, in relation to personal experience of violence, women indicated the support they felt from colleagues simply because they shared the same experience, and regardless if experiences were openly discussed on a regular basis. Women’s comments about the importance of their own experience of violence in contributing to their decision to volunteer, and to continue to volunteer, in refuge or crisis work, in terms of the connection they felt to the other members of the group, offers support for Judith Lewis Herman’s (1992) claim that ‘commonality’ is a vital part of the longer term process of coming to terms with traumatic events involving human cruelty. Her book *Trauma and Recovery* is one of the few texts on the impact of trauma to be written from a feminist perspective and to make the link between sexual violence and abuse and political power. She states that:

> Traumatic events destroy the sustaining bonds between individual and community. Those who have survived learn that their sense of self, of worth, of humanity, depends upon a feeling of connection to others. The solidarity of a group provides the strongest protection against terror and despair, and the strongest antidote to traumatic experience. Trauma isolates; the groups re-creates a sense of belonging. Trauma shames and stigmatises; the group bears witness and affirms. Trauma degrades the victim; the group exalts her. Trauma dehumanises the victim; the group restores her sense of humanity. (Lewis Herman, 1992:214)
Emotional Pain & Coping Mechanisms

It was clear from the research that women relied heavily upon their fellow colleagues for emotional support. Frequently during interviews, women indicated that they did not regard their workplace as a ‘normal’ or ‘conventional’ workplace in this respect. The central coping mechanism women used in dealing with the emotional pain and difficulties of refuge and crisis work was to talk to colleagues and to rely on their support. Furthermore, they indicated that without such support they did not think they would have continued to work in the organisation. Women also saw this reliance on colleagues as related to notions of ‘sisterhood’ and feminism and saw their organisations as being based on the ethos of mutual support.

We’re always there for each other and that’s very important. We always make sure there’s time for us to ‘debrief’. It can be very hard listening to this kind of thing all the time, at the end of the day violence is dead depressing. I find it hard when women go back time and time again and get beaten every time. It’s really hard for me to remember all the time that it has to be the right time for them to leave completely. Talking it over helps because I can express my anger and frustration that way and stop myself from expressing it to the women themselves. I’ve tried talking to my partner about it but it’s not the same, he doesn’t really understand that I just need him to listen, he wants to solve it for me. (‘Caroline’, Women’s Aid Worker, Scotland)

I thought about giving up 3 years ago because I was so stressed up. It took me a while to talk it through with the women here but it was good when I did. They made time to talk my day through with me when I was in, and reminded me I was never on my own. (‘Mia’, SKR Worker, Sweden)

Women also indicated that this support was invaluable when their work caused them to re-experience pain and emotions they felt about their own experience of violence. The very nature of anti-violence work means there are constant reminders for women with personal experience of such events and coping with these reactions was facilitated by supportive colleagues and an ‘open’ approach to the sharing of feelings and emotions. Some interview respondents also indicated that they felt this was not only due to the nature of anti-violence work and its connection to feminism, but also a result of the women-only working environment.
Sometimes it reminds me – especially if there are similarities. That’s not so much of a problem though. I mean I’ve come to terms with it. I think it would be hard anyway – you know, maybe harder even because it would seem so alien, so overwhelming, the feelings are so intense … it’s just very hard sometimes, probably for everyone … but seeing the change in women just from listening to that pain – sharing it with them helps them start to heal. I talk it through with my supervisor – we all have someone who supervises our work, the supervisors get supervised too. We share our feelings more generally too, the fact we’re all women helps that because women are more open with emotion I think. (‘Mary’, Women’s Aid Worker, England)

It’s easy to share it with the other women even if hard to feel. Sometimes you can literally see their pain and it’s hard to listen to. There’s much emotion in the room and it took me practice to be able to stay with it. I think my emotion was still too near the surface and it hurt it to hear it. Other women understand that so I could talk with them on it. (‘Ingrid’, ROKS Worker, Sweden)

The research findings indicate that the secondary trauma experienced by workers in anti-violence organisations can also be helped by ‘commonality’ of the group. Women relied heavily on mutual support that indicates that commonality may not just be supportive in the case of individual experience of trauma, but is also related to an experience of ‘sisterhood’ and a shared understanding of the subordinate position of women, and as such offers commonality in addressing the oppression, violation, and loss of power that women may experience in the course of their ‘everyday’ lives.

Section Conclusion

The research findings have shown that there is no one motivating factor for women working in refuges and crisis centres. Consistent with Black’s et al (1994) findings, altruistic and psychic benefits were significant in women’s decision to engage in crisis work, but political motivations and their feminist understanding of women’s oppression and gendered violence, were significant in their decision to work in a refuge or crisis centre in particular. It suggests that new social movement theory’s failure to acknowledge the political element of the women’s movement, as Charles (2000) suggests, means it fails to engage with the specifics of involvement in the movement, and the RMT perspective’s concentration on rational choice, seeing movement participation as motivated only by self-interest, means it does not capture
the complexities of social movement participation when the movement has more than one function, and therefore a helping aspect and a wider social and political aspect.

Women’s personal experiences of violence were significant motivating factors for their involvement in anti-violence work. This was, in part, related to the desire to ‘give back’, partly a response to their awareness of the dearth of services and therefore the need for alternative feminist welfare provision, and for some the desire to work with likeminded women with similar experiences and therefore and understanding of violence.

The research also found that women’s interpersonal relationships with their colleagues were viewed as positive aspects of their work and that women involved were often seeking a sense of ‘sisterhood’ or commonality and found the women-only working environment rewarding, suggesting again, the importance of feminist politics in their work. Interpersonal relationships were also significant in helping women deal with the emotional pain that inevitably comes with anti-violence work.
Conclusion

Introduction

Violence against women is a key concern for the women’s movement and feminism. My central aim was to examine how feminists have responded to a violent society in Sweden and the UK and how they have sought to organise this response.

Women’s anti violence movements in various countries have pursued two forms of action: political campaigns on issues of violence; and alternative welfare provision in the form of refuges and crisis centres aimed at empowering women and challenging male violence and domination. Feminist activists in different countries have varied in their analysis of the nature of the state however, despite differing degrees of ambivalence, the anti-violence movement has recognised the need to engage with the state to improve women’s rights through policy change.

Until now, the US experience has dominated the literature. The key themes of which have been that, although increased engagement with the state through state funding has brought benefits in terms of expansion of welfare services for women, it brought costs in terms of increased bureaucratization, the dilution of the original feminist aims, and the abandonment of non-hierarchical organisational forms. Scholars and activists disagree about the nature of rape crisis centres and refuges in the US and their capacity to influence entrenched gender practices and structures. It is argued that the service provision role has compromised the campaigning role following the advent of state funding and closer relationships with the state has had the effect of coopting the movement, thus depoliticising it. As noted in Chapter 1, US writers suggest such a trajectory is inevitable when organisations engage with the state.

This study has compared the experiences and organisational developments of women’s anti-violence organisations in Sweden and the UK. In both countries there are well-established and extensive networks of anti-violence organisations. Whilst the movements in Sweden and the UK have also chosen to engage with the state,
there is more variation in process and outcomes than the US experience suggests. Engaging with the state in different ways and by adopting different strategies, both movements to some degree have succeeded in turning state structures towards feminist goals, whilst retaining a significant degree of autonomy from the state, and a feminist political understanding of the causes and repercussions of violence. This suggests that the outcomes of engagement with the state are contingent upon multiple factors and are far from certain.

**Engaging with the state**

In examining the trajectory and the subsequent impact of the movement in each country, I have distinguished between political opportunity structure, by which I mean system level factors such as formalised consultative procedures or service-level agreements; and political opportunities, by which I mean contingent features such as the receptivity of political elites and other state actors, the impact of changing public opinion and so on. Turning to internal factors, I have identified as important variables, feminist ideological perspective and the willingness and capacity of organisations to be dynamic and responsive. These factors explain the degree to which different organisations can - or will - exploit the political opportunity structure and the political opportunities they encounter by, for example, adapting their organisational structures, arena and tactics accordingly.

Anti-violence organisations in Sweden have adopted a mainstreaming strategy and have sought change from within existing structures. The close relationship the movement has had with the state from the outset, the history of consensus politics, social democracy and the institutionalisation of equality politics have provided favourable political opportunity for the anti-violence movement to gain access to policy makers. Furthermore, the liberal approach the movement has adopted means it is seen as acceptable in the most part by political elites and therefore enjoys favourable political opportunity as well. In short, the movement in Sweden has acceptability, access and receptiveness.
However there are costs: the institutionalisation of equality politics has compromised some of the movement’s claims because the rhetoric of equality makes it difficult to raise women-specific issues. So organisations operate in a generally favourable political climate that allows claims to be heard but the movement must remain watchful because favourable political opportunities are not guaranteed.

Nonetheless, the willingness of the movement to adapt in the event of less favourable political opportunity can be noted in the increasingly radical feminist outlook that is beginning to characterise the movement. The success of the movement is well illustrated in the Kvinnofrid legislation of 1998, where organisations operated in a consultative capacity on this policy change. The legislation not only allowed for the core funding of anti-violence organisations, but also widened the definition of rape and criminalized the sex buyer, thus, the movement achieved radical feminist gains in terms of reform. This demonstrates the radical potential in terms of campaigning and social change goals using a still-largely liberal feminist approach.

The movement in the UK has historically been reluctant to engage with the state and has challenged the state from its autonomous organisational base. This approach developed as a result of the closed nature of the political system and the marginal position of interest groups in relation to the state. In short there was an unfavourable political opportunity structure. Furthermore, the radical and socialist feminist perspective that has informed the UK movement has meant organisations were previously ambivalent in their engagement with the state and less willing to enter formalised relations. The strategy the movement has adopted has altered in light of changing political opportunity afforded by increased public awareness of the issue and the state’s growing responsiveness to demands, especially at local level.

We might expect the political opportunity structure with regard to the anti-violence movement within a particular state to have a similar effect on its different branches. However, the research has documented that in the UK this has not been the case. Women’s Aid and Rape Crisis have experienced the state in different ways and have adopted different strategic responses.
So, on the one hand, Women’s Aid have adopted a pragmatic approach when engaging with the state and have succeeded in being accepted as insiders by virtue of their role as service providers. However, when they emphasise their role as agents for political change they occupy outsider status, and therefore overall, occupy thresholder status. It is Women’s Aid’s ability to provide statutory welfare services that has opened up a favourable political opportunity structure in the form of service level agreements with local authorities, as the distinct funding position detailed in the research indicates. Furthermore, those political elites involved have been receptive to the network’s ability to provide welfare services at a low cost, and so have welcomed the movement in their capacity as service providers. In addition, the increasing public awareness and acceptance of domestic violence as an issue has contributed to the claims being heard. Organisations may have access to a structure, but it requires the claims to be heard for them to be successful. Thus, favourable political opportunity meant a favourable political opportunity structure could be exploited. Furthermore, willingness on the part of Women’s Aid to adapt structure and strategy is also significant. Those organisations that maintain a ‘purist’ stance are unlikely to be able to exploit opportunities because they will not be able to gain access. Women’s Aid has managed to adopt a pragmatic approach to engagement with the state and as a result has avoided institutionalisation and the dilution of feminist political aims.

The strategy that Women’s Aid have adopted to achieve this has involved the creation of a national co-ordinating network that facilitates the individual refuges and provides consistency in terms of ideology and strong base from which to resist institutionalisation, as well as a national body with which the state can interact. Secondly, the organisation has adopted internal structure and working practices to make them more compatible with more formalised engagement with state structures. This has not, for the most part, involved the abandonment of feminist principles of democracy and eschewing hierarchy, but rather the adoption of more efficient structures.
On the other hand, the experience of Rape Crisis has not been so favourable. Rape Crisis has failed to get the same degree of access to the state, something that is evident in its poor funding situation. Rape Crisis centres do not provide statutory welfare functions so cannot achieve insider status by emphasising this function in the way Women's Aid can. Furthermore, Rape Crisis have not organised on a national level to the extent that Women's Aid have, and as a result appear less organised to state agencies, and also work in a way that is antithetical to the working of state bureaucracies.

Rape Crisis has retained its autonomous organisational base and feminist analysis of violence like Women's Aid has, but occupies a marginal position in relation to policy making and access to service provision. Having said this, the Rape Crisis movement has achieved significant policy gains in the area of violence against women, particularly in relation to the workings of the criminal justice system.

**Ideology and organisational forms**

One of the major themes of the US research has been the relationship between the changing organisational form of women's anti-violence organisations and the dilution of the movement's radical aims. In general centres have moved from an 'ideal form' terms of collective, non-hierarchical working to more formalised client-professional relationships and hierarchical structures. The changes that US centres have undergone have led to questions being raised as to whether comprehensive services for survivors of violence have been accompanied by the abandonment of social change goals and the original aim of a violence-free society. In this respect, the survival or modification of the 'original form' of organisation is seen to be a crucial indicator of the degree to which the movement has retained its radical ideology.

If the situation detailed in US literature were to be the case in Sweden and the UK, we would expect to find a high number of bureaucratic centres, with a social service orientation rather than a social movement outlook. We would also expect to find the
threat of removal of funding for failure to comply with funding restrictions. In addition, we would expect to find poor funding security for refuges and crisis centres in order to ensure they remain compliant.

However the dissertation argues that whilst levels of funding are still perceived as inadequate and insecure, the incorporation and deradicalisation of the movement that has been witnessed in the US has not occurred in the UK and Sweden to the same extent.

The research demonstrates that in the UK there is no strong link between organisational structure and ideology. Organisations no longer conform to ‘the original model’ as discussed earlier. However there is not necessarily a clear relationship between structure and the ideological perspective of a particular organisation. Nor is there necessarily a strong contrast between bureaucratic and collective organisations and their respective service provision, ethos and goals. Furthermore, how individuals and groups within organisations experience structure suggests adaptation rather than transformation. That which is espoused is not always practised. Although in some cases, organisations have had to adapt as a condition of state funding in practice most retain strong elements of collective working and ethos.

In the case of Sweden, the responses of workers in the ROKS and SKR networks indicated there was little discernible relationship between organisational structures and espoused feminist perspective. So, for example, the more radical ROKs organisations were as likely to have bureaucratic forms as they were to have collectivist structures, whilst the more conventionally liberal feminist SKR groups were more likely to be collectively organised. As in the UK espoused structures did not necessarily ‘hold’ in terms of how workers described their day to day practises.

The RMT approach to social movements emphasises structure over ideology and asserts that only bureaucratised movements can achieve significant policy gains. This approach largely neglects the role of political opportunity and agency for feminist engagement with the state. The research has shown that there is not an inevitable
movement trajectory, given that the movement in both Sweden and the UK have retained autonomy from the state and continue to use alternative forms of organisation, although these may not conform to a purist form of collective working. It is also the case that formal structure may not equate well with formal practices and organisational ethos.

**Women's Motivations & Experience of Anti-violence Work**

This research has concluded that there is no one single motivating factor for women doing either paid or unpaid work in refuges and crisis centres. Consistent with existing literature on motivations for anti-violence work and volunteering, I have identified as important altruistic and psychic benefits in women’s decision to undertake care or human service work. In addition, a key finding is that women’s political motivations as feminists motivate them considerably, and these political motivations play a central role in their decision to volunteer in a refuge or rape crisis centre in particular. The research also found that women’s multiple motives for volunteering are also related to the dual functions of the organisation – part social service and part agent for social change – and as such, their motivations for involvement in both these aspects are significant.

Concluding further from these findings, the research has found that neither the NSMT approach, nor the RMT approach to social movement participation adequately explain women’s involvement in the anti-violence movement and its organisations. The former fails to acknowledge the political element of the women’s movement and as such neglects the importance of politics as a motivating factor for women. The RMT perspective concentrates on rational choice and sees movement participation as motivated only by self interest. As a result, this perspective fails to capture the complexities of social movement participation, especially when the movement has more than one function; a helping aspect and a wider social and political aspect.
Another key finding of the research is that women have significant personal motivations for becoming involved in anti-violence work. I have identified the key role that women’s personal experience of violence plays in their decision to work in refuges and rape crisis centres. This can be their own individual experience, or the experience of a close friend or relative. This motivation is related to their own experience of help and support post-assault. For those who received help and support there is a desire ‘give back’, and for those who received inadequate help and support there is a keen awareness of the dearth of services available to women, and therefore the need for alternative feminist welfare provision.

For those women with personal experience of violence the research has also identified as important the desire to engage with women with similar experiences and understandings of violence. Traumatic experiences isolate people from those around them, and the silence that surrounds sexual and gendered violence compounds this. Women working in refuges and crisis centres were motivated in part by their desire to seek commonality and understanding as a protection from terror and despair. This sense of belonging was particularly important for those with personal experience of violence, but was also important for workers as a whole. The research found that women engage in anti-violence movement work because they are seeking an experience of ‘sisterhood’ and an all-women working environment. This restates the importance of feminist politics in women’s decision to become involved. The research demonstrates that women’s positive experience of work is related to both a positive working environment and strong interpersonal relationships. Interpersonal relationships with colleagues and a mutually supportive working environment were significant factors in helping women deal with the emotional pain that is an inevitable part of anti-violence work and listening to trauma stories. The research found that the retention of workers is most likely when this is the case.

**Theoretical Implications**

The research has demonstrated that traditional theoretical perspectives on the state and social movements have largely neglected the experience of the women’s
movement. The research has found that existing theory that attempts to explain the relationship of feminism and the feminist movement to the state fails to adequately address this complex relationship. Further, the social movement theory discussed in this thesis also fails to address the experiences and complexities of the women’s movement in terms of how movements put political issues on the agenda, and in terms of the motivations for individuals to become involved in social movement participation. Similarly, existing theories of motivations for volunteering fail to encompass the multiple motives identified as important to women working in anti-violence organisations. The most significant omission here is the political and feminist element.

As a result the research concludes that further development of these theoretical perspectives is required. Feminists have attempted to develop typologies of the state and state/social movement interaction. Despite some feminists’ ambivalence towards the state and the problems inherent in talking about ‘the state’, it is necessary for feminism and feminists to continue to engage with these debates in order for us to further develop our theoretical understandings of these complex relationships.

In conclusion, this study of the women’s anti-violence movement in the UK and Sweden has provided a new comparative case study of refuges and crisis centres and offers a major challenge to the existing US literature about the women’s anti-violence movement and its relationship with the state. It has demonstrated that a complex and ambiguous relationship exists between such organisations and the state, involving costs and benefits. Outcomes cannot easily be read from organisational forms and political opportunity structures. Far more contingent factors are at play.

And finally, to borrow Matthews’ (1994) concept of ‘managing violence’, and to extend it, I argue that whilst the state does shape and constrain women’s anti-violence movements, it possible for movements to engage and at the same time ‘manage’ the state.
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Appendix 1

Questionnaire for UK Organisations
About the Organisation ....

1. How long has the refuge or crisis centre in which you work been in existence? Please give your answer in years to the nearest year.

□ □ years

2. How many paid workers are there in your refuge or crisis centre? Please indicate how many paid workers do so on a full time and a part time basis.

□ □ full time paid workers
□ □ part time paid workers

3. How many unpaid or voluntary workers are there in your refuge or crisis centre? Please indicate how many unpaid or voluntary workers do so on a full time and a part time basis.

□ □ full time unpaid workers
□ □ part time unpaid workers

4. Please indicate the type(s) of violence your refuge or crisis centre deals with. Please tick all that apply.

□ domestic violence
□ rape and sexual assault
□ child abuse
□ Other
Please Specify _______________

5. Please indicate who of the following you provide services for. Please tick all that apply.

□ women
□ children
□ men
6. Please indicate which of the following services your refuge or crisis centre provides. Please tick all that apply. (This refers to your particular centre and not others in the same network.)

- ☐ refuge/safe house
- ☐ initial crisis counselling
- ☐ long-term counselling
- ☐ survivors’ support group
- ☐ legal advice
- ☐ housing advice
- ☐ health care/advice
- ☐ benefits/social welfare advice
- ☐ accompanying survivors to police or courts
- ☐ Other
- Please Specify ________________

7. How many people does your refuge or crisis centre see, on average, each week? Please write in the number for each category.

- ☐ ☐ women
- ☐ ☐ men
- ☐ ☐ children

I am interested to know how your centre organises....

8. What form of organisation does your centre currently use? Please tick.

- ☐ hierarchical/traditional
- ☐ collective
- ☐ Other
- Please Specify ________________
9. Has the refuge or crisis centre in which you work always used this form of organisation?

☐ yes
☐ no

If no, please give details of previous forms of organisation.


10. If you feel able, could you draw a diagram to represent your refuge or crisis centre’s structure?


11. Who takes responsibility in your refuge or crisis centre for making everyday decisions?


12. Could you give an example of an everyday decision, who made it and what was?


13. Who takes responsibility in your refuge or crisis centre for making big decisions?

__________________________________________________________

14. What was the last big decision that was made in your refuge or crisis centre, what was it and who made it or how was it decided?

__________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________

15. Is the refuge or crisis centre in which you work affiliated with a network of women’s organisations?

If yes, which one? ________________________________

What are the reasons for being or not being a member?

__________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________

About the Organisation’s Activities....

16. Does your organisation participate in any form of community education?

☐ yes

☐ no

If yes, please give details.

__________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________
17. Does your organisation provide or run training days, courses or workshops for other agencies or groups?

☐ yes
☐ no

If yes, please give details.


18. Does your organisation participate in any form of activism or campaigning?

☐ yes
☐ no

If yes, please give details.


19. Please rank the following from 1 to 3 in order of priority for your refuge or crisis centre.

☐ service provision to survivors of violence

☐ community education on issues of violence

☐ campaigning on issues of violence

☐ or all of equal priority (tick if appropriate)
20. Please rank the following from 1 to 3 in order of priority for you.

□ service provision to survivors of violence
□ community education on issues of violence
□ campaigning on issues of violence

□ or all of equal priority (tick if appropriate)

21. Would you describe the centre as a feminist organisation (please tick)?

□ yes
□ no
□ don’t know

22. Is your centre a charity, and is it registered as such?

□ yes
□ no
□ don’t know

23. Do you have a registered charity number? (It is not necessary to provide it).

□ yes
□ no
□ don’t know
About the funding for the organisation...

24. Where did the funding come from to start the centre? Please provide details of the grant awarding body or how the funding was raised if it was not a grant.

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

25. How much funding was there to start the centre (in £ or SEK)?

□□□□□□□□

26. Where does the funding for the refuge or crisis centre come from now? Please give details of source and amount.

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<th>Source</th>
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27. For how long do you have secure funding?

□□ years  □□ months
28. Are there any restrictions placed upon your organisation, or requirements that you must meet, in order to ensure initial or continued funding from the providers? (For example: producing annual reports; having a Board of Directors, using it for specific services; providing services for particular people.)

□ yes  □ no  □ don’t know

If yes, please give details.

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

29. Would you welcome state or government funding for all women’s organisations concerned with the issues of violence (please tick)?

□ yes  □ no  □ don’t know

30. How concerned are you about the future of the centre’s finances (please tick)?

□ very concerned  □ concerned  □ not concerned  □ not at all concerned  □ don’t know
31. If due to lack of finances you were forced to prioritise one area of work, which would it be (please tick)?

- service provision to survivors of violence
- community education on issues of violence
- campaigning on issues of violence

**Relationships with other organisations....**

32. Which of the following state or government agencies do you have dealings with (please tick)?

- police
- social work/welfare
- housing departments
- health care
- education departments
- legal system (not police)
- Other

  Please Specify ____________________________

33. Please give a brief description of the type of contact you have with these agencies or departments, however brief it may be. Particularly who you deal with (persons role not name), whether they contact you or vice versa, the capacity in which you deal with each other (i.e. education or training, campaigning or lobbying, on behalf of individual users of the centre etc.) and whether it is a local office/agency, a regional or municipal office/agency or a national office/agency).
34. What other non-state, non-government agencies do you deal with or have contact with? (Please provide similar details to the previous question.)

__________________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________

35. If you are lobbying or campaigning, which organisations, agencies or groups is this directed at? Please give details, and please state whether these are local, regional, municipal or national agencies/groups), and what form the campaigning or lobbying takes.

__________________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________

36. If your organisation provides training days, courses or workshops, which organisations, agencies or groups is this provided for? Please give details, and please state whether these are local, regional, municipal or national agencies/groups), and what form the training takes and what the specific training issues are.)

__________________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________
37. Is your refuge or crisis centre involved in any multi-agency working, or involved in any working groups about violence against women or related issues?

☐ yes
☐ no
☐ don’t know

If yes, please give details.

38. On a scale of 1 to 5, how sympathetic and/or responsive do you think the state and government at its various levels are to the issue of violence against women? (1 = not at all responsive/sympathetic, 5 = very responsive/sympathetic).

☐ the local state/government
☐ the regional or municipal government
☐ the national or central government

About you....

39. What is your age in years?

☐☐

40. Are you female or male? (please tick)

☐ female
☐ male
41. How long have you worked in the refuge or crisis centre?
   □□ years  □□ months

42. Do you work full time or part time? (please tick)
   □ full time
   □ part time

43. Do you work at the refuge or crisis centre on a paid or unpaid/voluntary basis?
   □ paid
   □ unpaid

44. Have you ever worked as an unpaid worker?
   □ Yes, at this refuge or crisis centre
   □ Yes, at another refuge or crisis centre
   □ Yes, at another organisation, not a refuge or crisis centre
   □ No, I have never been an unpaid worker

45. In an average week, how many hours do you work at the refuge or crisis centre?
   □□□ hours

46. Do you consider yourself a feminist?
   □ yes
   □ no
   □ don’t know
47. Have you personally experienced domestic violence, rape or sexual assault?

- [ ] yes
- [ ] no

48. What are your main motivating factors for working in a refuge or crisis centre?

- [ ]

49. What do you like most about working in your refuge or crisis centre?

- [ ]

50. What do you like least about working in your refuge or crisis centre?

- [ ]

51. How satisfied are you with your work in your refuge or crisis centre?

- [ ] very satisfied
- [ ] satisfied
- [ ] unsatisfied
- [ ] very unsatisfied
- [ ] don’t know
52. How effective do you find the system of organisation in your refuge or crisis centre?

☐ very effective
☐ effective
☐ ineffective
☐ very ineffective
☐ don’t know

53. What motivates you to continue to work at your refuge or crisis centre?

____________________________________________________

____________________________________________________

54. Do you have occasions when you find your work painful because of the issues and experiences that you have to deal with?

☐ yes, often
☐ yes, sometimes
☐ no, never

55. Please feel free to add any further comment about anything covered in the questionnaire, or other issues you feel are relevant.

____________________________________________________

____________________________________________________

____________________________________________________

____________________________________________________

☐ 105

Thank you very much for your help!
Appendix 2

Questionnaire for Swedish Organisations
### Om organisationen ...

1. Hur många år har organisationen i vilken du arbetar funnits?
   - [ ] [ ] år

2. Hur många som arbetar där är löneanställda?
   - [ ] heltid arbetar
   - [ ] deltid arbetar

3. Hur många arbetar där utan betalning/ideellt?
   - [ ] heltid arbetar
   - [ ] deltid arbetar

4. Ange åt den typ, eller de typer, av våld som din organisation kommer i kontakt med (kryssa för)?
   - [ ] våld i hemmet
   - [ ] våldtäkt/sexuella övergrepp
   - [ ] barnmisshandel
   - [ ] annat
     - ange närmare

5. Ange åt vilka av följande grupper ni erbjuder hjälp (kryssa för):
   - [ ] kvinnor
   - [ ] barn
   - [ ] män
6. Ange vilka av följande tjänster din organisation tillhandahåller (kryssa för) Det här hänvisas till ditt center/organisation och inte till andra i samma nätverk.

- kvinnohus
- första/inledande krisrådgivning
- långvarig rådgivning
- stödgrupper åt misshandlade kvinnor
- juridisk rådgivning
- bostadshjälp
- sjukvårds' hjälp
- sociala myndigheter
- stöd åt utsatta hos polisen/domstolen
- annat
  ange närmare _____________

7. Hur många personer träffar eller talar man med i genomsnitt per vecka i ditt center (Var vänlig och skriv antalet för varje kategori)?

- kvinnor
- män
- barn

Jag är intresserad av hur organisationen ser ut på ditt center...

8. Vilken organisationsform använder ditt center?

- hierarkisk/traditionell
- kollektiv
- annat
  ange närmare _____________
9. Har det alltid varit så (kryssa för)?

☐ ja
☐ nej

Om inte, ange närmare detaljer om tidigare organisationsformer.

10. Om det är möjligt, kan du rita upp ett diagram över organisationens struktur?

11. Vem är ansvarig för dagliga beslut?

12. Kan du ge ett exempel på ett dagligt beslut, vad det var och vem som tog det?
13. Vem är ansvarig för stora beslut?

______________________________________________________________________

14. Vad var det senaste stora beslut som ditt center tog, vad gällde det, vem beslutade och hur fattades det?
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________

15. Är ditt center anslutet till, eller medlem av ett nätverk av kvinnoorganisationer (kryssa för)?

Om ja, vilken/vilka?
______________________________________________________________________

Vad finns det för anledningar till att vara eller inte vara medlem?
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________

Om organisationen Activitet....

16. Deltar din organisation i någon form av kommunal utbildning (kryssa för)?

□ ja
□ nej

Var vänlig att ange närmare detaljer.
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________

□ 32
□ 33
□ 34
□ 35
□ 36
□ 37
17. Erbjuder eller bedriver din organisation studiedagar, kurser eller workshops för andra organisationer eller grupper?

□ ja
□ nej

Var vänlig att ange närmare detaljer

□ ja
□ nej

Var vänlig att ange närmare detaljer

18. Deltar din organisation i någon form av aktivism eller kampanjARBete?

□ ja
□ nej

Var vänlig att ange närmare detaljer

19. Rangordna följande från 1 till 3 efter din organisations prioriteteringar.

□ hjälp åt misshandlande kvinnor/som har blivit utsatta för våld
□ allmän utbildning om våld
□ kampanjer i våldsfrågor
□ eller allt har samma prioritering
20. Rangordna följande från 1 till 3 efter dina prioriteringar.

- □ hjälpåtgärder åt de som har blivit utsatta för våld
- □ allmän utbildning om frågor kring våld
- □ kampanjer i våldsfrågor
- □ eller allt har samma prioritet

21. Skulle du beskriva centret som en feministisk organisation (kryssa för)?

- □ ja
- □ nej
- □ vet ej

22. Är ditt center en ideell förening, och är den registrerad som sådan?

- □ ja
- □ nej
- □ vet ej

23. Har du ett registrerat organisationsnummer? (Det är inte nödvändigt att ange det)

- □ ja
- □ nej
- □ vet ej
Om finansiering ...

24. Varifrån kom pengarna för att starta centret?

__________________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________


25. Hur mycket pengar fanns det för att starta centret? (i £ eller i SEK)?

□□□□□□□□


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Finansiär</th>
<th>Summa</th>
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</table>

27. Hur länge är era anslag säkrade?

□ □ år □ □ månader
28. Är din organisation underkastad några restriktioner eller krav som ni måste uppfylla för att försäkra er om kontinuerlig finansiering från finansiärerna? (Till exempel: skriva årsredovisningar, ha en styrelse, använda anslag för särskilda tjänster, tillhandahålla tjänster för särskilda personer.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>☐ ja</th>
<th>☐ nej</th>
<th>☐ vet ej</th>
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</table>

Om ja, ange närmare detaljer.

<p>| |</p>
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</table>

29. Skulle du välkomna statlig finansiering av alla kvinnoorganisationer som arbetar med våldsfrågor?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>☐ ja</th>
<th>☐ nej</th>
<th>☐ vet ej</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

30. Hur oroad är du över centrets framtida finansiering (kryssa för)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>☐ mycket oroad</th>
<th>☐ oroad</th>
<th>☐ inte oroad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>☐ inte alls oroad</td>
<td>☐ vet ej</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For Office Use Only

| 68 |
| 69 |
| 70 |
| 71 |
31. Om du pga. brist på anslag skulle tvingas prioritera ett arbetsfält, vilket skulle det bli (kryssa för)?

☐ hjälp åt de som har blivit utsatta för våld

☐ samhällsinformation kring våldsfrågor

☐ kampanjarbete i våldsfrågor

Relationer till andra organisationer ...

32. Vilka av följande kommunala eller statliga organ kommer ni i kontakt i med?

☐ polis

☐ socialtjänst

☐ bostadförmedling

☐ sjukvård

☐ utbildningsorgan

☐ rättsvåsendet

☐ annat

ange nämnare ________________

33. Ge en kort beskrivning av den typ av kontakt som du har med dessa organ, hur flyktig den än må ha varit. Särskilt med vem som du kommer i kontakt med (personers roll, inte namn). Om de kontaktar dig eller tvärtom, i vilken egenskap som du kommer i kontakt med var och en (dvs. utbildning, kampanjarbete eller lobbyverksamhet, för individer eller centrets räkning etc. och om det är ett kommunalt kontor, ett länsskontor eller ett statligt/nationellt kontor.)

____________________
____________________
____________________
____________________

□ 72

□ 73

□ 74

□ 75

□ 76

□ 77

□ 78

□ 79

□ 80
34. Vilka andra icke-statliga organ kommer du i kontakt med? (Ange liknande detaljer som till föregående fråga)

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________


________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

36. Om din organisation tillhandahåller studiedagar, kurser eller workshops, åt vilka organisationer eller grupper erbjuder ni detta? Ange närmare detaljer och om de är lokala, regionala/läns eller kommunala/nationella organ, vilken form utbildningen har och vilka specifika frågor utbildningen tar upp.

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

□81

□82

□83
37. Är din organisation inblandad i något mångsidigt nätverk, eller i arbetsgrupper om kvinnovåld eller liknande frågor?

☐ ja
☐ nej
☐ vet ej

Om ja, ange närmare detaljer.

38. På en skala mellan 1 och 5, hur förstående och tillmötesgående anser Du att staten och myndigheterna på dess olika nivåer är inför kvinnovåldsfrågor? (1 = inte alls tillmötesgående/förstående, 5 mycket förstående/tillmötesgående).

☐ de lokala myndigheterna
☐ de regionala myndigheterna
☐ de rikstäckande myndigheterna

Om dig...

39. Hur gammal är du?

☐☐

40. Är du man eller kvinna (var vänlig och kryssa)?

☐ kvinna
☐ man
41. Hur länge har du jobbat på centret?

☐☐ år  ☐☐ månader

42. Arbetar du heltid eller deltid?

☐ heltid
☐ deltid

43. Är du löneanställd eller arbetar du utan betalning?

☐ löneanställd
☐ oavlönad

44. Har du vid något tillfälle arbetat utan betalning?

☐ på centret
☐ på ett annat center eller organisation
☐ på ett annat center eller organisation, inte kvinnojour
☐ nej

45. Hur många timmar arbetar du på centret i genomsnitt per vecka?

☐☐☐ timme

46. Anser du dig själv vara feminist?

☐ ja
☐ nej
☐ vet ej
47. Har du personligen blivit utsatt för våld eller sexuella övergrepp?
   □ ja
   □ nej

48. Vilka var de främsta anledningarna till att du började arbeta centret?

49. Vad tycker du är det bästa med att arbeta på centret?

50. Vad tycker du är det sämsta med att arbeta på centret?

51. Hur tillfredsställd är du med ditt arbete här (kryssa för)?
   □ mycket tillfredsställd
   □ tillfredsställd
   □ otillfredsställd
   □ mycket otillfredsställd
   □ vet ej
52. Hur effektiv anser du att organisationssystemet är (kryssa för)?

- mycket effektiv
- effektiv
- ej effektiv
- inte alls effektiv
- vet ej

53. Vad motiverar dig till att fortsätta arbeta på centret?

________________________________________

________________________________________

54. Har du stunder när du tycker att ditt arbete är jobbigt på grund av problem och upplevelser som du har att göra med?

- ja, ofta
- ja, ibland
- nej, aldrig

55. Här kan du skriva om du har fler kommentarer eller tankar som berör frågeformuläret eller andra frågor som du känner är relevanta.

________________________________________

________________________________________

________________________________________

________________________________________

Tack för din hjälp!
Appendix 3

Interview Schedule & Topic Guide
**Topics/Questions**

**Organisations' History/Development**

When was the organisation set up?

Can you tell me about how the organisation came into being? Who was involved in setting it up?

Numbers/Relationships. When? Where? etc.

Was there any funding to start the centre? Where did it come from? How much was there? [Was it difficult to get?]

How has the way the centre works/operates changed?

What do you see as positive changes?

What do you see as negative changes?

**Funding**

How is the organisation funded now?

Do you get state funding?

What funding do you get from the local/regional/national state?

For how long have you had state funding?

Is it easy to get state funding? [re:specific level of administration]

What procedures do you have to go through to get state funding?

Do you have to reapply for funding annually?

Is funding for organisations like this competitive?

How easy/hard is the application process? Is it time consuming? Who takes responsibility for this?

How secure is the funding?

Does this cause anxiety? [individually & as an organisation]

Does the insecurity/security of funding impact on what the organisation does? [activities engaged in/services provided etc.]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topics/Questions</th>
<th>Comments/Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Would you like to see a situation where there was guaranteed state funding for organisations like this?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are the positive aspects of state funding? [for your centre specifically/for the movement as a whole]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are there negative aspects of state funding? [for your centre specifically/for the movement as a whole]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How do you feel about the state funding violence services for women?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Do you think there are things that make it more or less easy for organisations to get funded by the state? [re: specific level of administration]</td>
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<tr>
<td>How does the organisation as a whole view state funding? Is it something that is discussed a lot?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Has the organisation’s strategy/attitude to state funding changed over time?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Are members of the group in agreement about these sort of issues?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Was applying for state funding the first time discussed in the group? [or something that just ‘happened’ over time]</td>
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<tr>
<td>[If discussed] Did members of the group agree on what to do?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Were these hard decisions to make?</td>
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<tr>
<td>What concerns did people have (if any)?</td>
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<tr>
<td>What benefits did people foresee (if any)?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Did it bring what you expected? [both negative and positive aspects]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Are you required to do anything in order to get state funding/or once you have got funding, are there requirements to be met?</td>
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<tr>
<td>[If yes] How do you feel about that? Do you think it is justified/fair?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Topics/Questions</td>
<td>Comments/Notes</td>
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<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are there what you would regard as restrictions placed on the organisation in</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>order to receive funding? How do you feel about this?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Have you had to alter any services as a result? [withdraw/modify/introduce]</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Have you had to change your organisational structure or any working practices</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>as a result of funding restrictions?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Are you monitored in specific ways?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Are you given funding that is earmarked for a specific thing? [staff/service-specific etc.]</td>
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<tr>
<td>What sources of funding, other than the state, do you have?</td>
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<tr>
<td>How much do you rely on these types of funding?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Has this changed over time? Do you rely more or less now than you did? What was</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>it like in the past?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Do you get funded by charitable organisations/bodies?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Do you get funded by any commercial bodies?</td>
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<tr>
<td>What sort of community support do you get?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Do you get material resources that are not in the form of money/cash?</td>
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<tr>
<td>What do you think about the changes in how the organisation is funded? What are</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>the positive and negative aspects?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is funding something that is a big issue for the organisation?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Do you spend a lot of time discussing it?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Do you spend a lot of time worrying about it?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Would you say the organisation had a particular strategy in relation to funding?</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
**Topics/Questions**

Do you think the state is more open to claims for financial support for these sort of services than it has been in the past? [re:specific level of administration]

How confident are you that the organisation will get funded next year?

### Organisational Structure & Working Practices

What is the current internal structure of the organisation? [collective/hierarchical]

What does collective/hierarchical/other mean in terms of how the organisation operates on a day to day basis?

Can you describe what might happen in an average day?

What sort of decision making procedures do you use?

How are big decisions made?

How are day to day decisions made?

How do you feel about the way the centre works? Do you find it effective? Are there things you would change?

What are the positive aspects of working this way?

What are the negative aspects of working this way?

Does everyone have a chance to have a say/get their opinion heard?

Are people given responsibility for certain tasks/issues?

How do you organise the provision of services on a day to day basis?

For other activities [ie campaigning/lobbying etc] are people assigned particular tasks or responsibility for an issue, or are these things shared (more or less) equally?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topics/Questions</th>
<th>Comments/Notes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Have you always worked this way, or has the structure of the organisation changed in any way?</td>
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<tr>
<td>[If yes], in what way have you changed, and why did you change?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Was this because of outside pressure, i.e. funding requirements?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Was this an internally motivated change?</td>
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<tr>
<td>[If it hasn’t changed ‘officially’], have working practices changed? Do you work in the same way as you always have?</td>
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<tr>
<td>How do you feel about these changes (if any)?</td>
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<tr>
<td>[If management committee or equivalent], how do you feel about having a management committee in place?</td>
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<tr>
<td>What role do they play?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Who makes up the committee?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Are they useful?</td>
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<tr>
<td>How do you feel about the decisions that they make?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Are you able to have your views heard on the management committee?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>To what extent do they impact on the way you work?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>[If required or encouraged to change for funding], do you think that placing these requirements and restrictions on organisations is a way of them controlling what you do? [explain, re: Matthews’ argument about ‘managing rape’].</td>
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<tr>
<td>Is the organisation part of a national network?</td>
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<tr>
<td>What role does the national network play? What do they do?</td>
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<tr>
<td>How important do you think being a member of a national network is?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Topics/Questions</td>
<td>Comments/Notes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Do you have any other connections of links with organisations like this?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Functions &amp; Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>Can you tell me about what services you provide for women?</td>
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<tr>
<td>How many women (&amp; children) do you see? [either weekly, annually] – Are these figures constant, or rising falling etc.?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Do you also provide services for children (&amp; men)?</td>
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<tr>
<td>How have services changed over time? Do you provide more now than you did at the outset/ten years ago, for example?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Which do you see as the most important aspect of your services?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Will you see women suffering any type of gendered violence or do you only provide services for specific types?</td>
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<tr>
<td>What services would you like to be able to provide (if any)?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Have you plans to introduce any new services?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What other activities do you do?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are you involved in lobbying / campaigning of any sort? Has this changed in any way over time/since the outset?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is campaigning as important for the anti-violence movement as it was in the 1970s?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Do you do any community education? What does it involve?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>What groups do you work with on this level?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are you involved in multi-agency working of any sort? What sort of opportunities/constraints does this bring?</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### Topics/Questions

- What do you see as the core role of the organisation?
- If you had to prioritise one sort of activity, which would it be? Are there some you see as more important, or more immediately pressing than others?
- There is an argument made, that refuges and rape crisis centres are more like social service organisations rather than social movement organisations, or part of a social movement. What do you think about this? How would you describe this organisation?
- Do you see the centre as part of the women’s movement?
- Do you see yourself as part of the women’s movement?
- Do you see the work of the organisation as political?
- Would you describe this as a feminist organisation?
- What makes it (or not) a feminist organisation to you?

### Motivations & Involvement

- How long have you been doing this sort of work? & how long at this particular centre?
- Why did you decide to get involved? [re:motivations]
- When you became involved, did you get from it what you expected?
- Why do you continue to be involved?
- What do you get from working here? [Is it satisfying/rewarding etc., why & how?]
- What do you like most about working here?
- What do you like least about working here?
- Why do you think people get involved in this type of work?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Topics/Questions</strong></th>
<th><strong>Comments/Notes</strong></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do you think people do it for different reasons than they did at the outset of these organisations/1970s?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does working here make you feel good about yourself?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you see your involvement here as political?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would you describe yourself as a feminist?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What does feminism and being a feminist mean to you?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does your work ever frustrate you or get you down?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did you have any personal reasons for becoming involved with the organisation?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How do the members of the group get on with one another?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you find your colleagues supportive?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In what ways is your work satisfying?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In what ways is your work difficult?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If you could change one aspect of your work here, what would you change?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Agencies/Bodies &amp; Role</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Multi-agency working above, but] do you have connections of any sort with other groups or bodies?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you work with state agencies? [police/social work/health etc.] If yes, in what capacity?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How do you feel about these groups in terms of how they deal with survivors of violence?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you think there have been changes? Are further changes needed?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you think state bodies are sensitive enough to issues of gendered violence? How has this changed?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In terms of the national state, do you think they are sensitive enough to issues of gendered violence?

Do you think you have managed to alter any of these agencies in terms of how they work/view violence? [as an organisation & as a movement]

To what extent do you think you have access as an organisation [and as a movement] to decision makers? [by level of administration]

To what extent do you think you can influence decision makers? [organisation and as a movement – by level of administration]

How much do you think the state and its agencies listens to your perspective on violence?

What do you think their priority areas should be?

What are the main changes you would like to see happen?

What about society and public opinion? Has this changed? Changed enough?

Do you think rape and domestic violence are more accepted now as happening and needing to be dealt with?

Do you think the same silence surrounds issues of violence as has done in the past?

**Demography**

Age

Paid/Unpaid

Length of Service

Marital Status

Occupation (if paid)
Appendix 4

Cover Letters Accompanying Questionnaires
Dear xxxx,

Further to our telephone conversation of (date) I have enclosed the questionnaires for the research I am conducting about women’s anti-violence organisations in Sweden and the UK. I would like to reiterate how grateful I am that you are willing to participate. I have provided an overview of the research below in case anything was unclear from our phone conversation, as well as details of how I can be contacted.

I am interested in finding out what organisations like yours are like, for example areas such as who works there, what services you provide, who funds you, how hard it is to get funding and how many unpaid workers you have – these are a few of them. I am also particularly interested in comparing how the government or state respond to organisations like yours and to the issue of violence against women, again comparing Sweden with the U.K. This is of interest to me to see if the state supports organisations like yours, or makes your work more difficult.

I would very much like to hear about your organisation and your experiences of working with the issue of violence. I have enclosed some questionnaires that I would hope the workers in your centre would be willing to complete. I have also enclosed an envelope with stamps already on it so they can be returned to me without any cost to your organisation. Please give a questionnaire to everyone that works at your centre, regardless of how many hours they work. I have enclosed ‘x’ questionnaires, should you require more then please contact me by mail, telephone or e-mail. Please return all of the questionnaires in the envelope even if they are not all used.

I appreciate that you will be very busy people providing vital services for those affected by violence, but hope that you feel able to take the short time to complete the questionnaire. As a feminist this research is something I feel strongly about because the lives and experiences of women and women’s organisations are not documented often enough. Also, I think it is important to publicise the vital work that organisations such as yours do, and to assess the extent to which the state supports it.
I can assure you that the questionnaires are totally anonymous and confidential. I will be the only person that reads them and no names are on the questionnaires, either for individuals or organisations. Envelopes have been provided so that each person can seal their own before putting it in the main stamped envelope. Some information about the research and instructions on how to complete the questionnaire are on the front page of each one so individuals can complete it in private if they wish. When it is completed I am committed to providing a report on the findings of the research to all of the organisations that take part in order to provide feedback. I also intend to publish the findings of the research in both Sweden and the U.K.

Should you want any more information about the research or have any particular questions I would be more than happy to respond, therefore please do not hesitate to contact me by mail, telephone or e-mail (details above). My Swedish address is valid until the end of September 2000, thereafter I will be at my Scottish address, my e-mail is always valid. I also hope to visit some centres to see the facilities you provide and to interview some workers about their experience of anti-violence work. This will be the sole decision of the individual organisations concerned.

I commend you on the work that you do and wish you energy and enthusiasm to continue with it. If possible, please return the questionnaires by (date), thank you very much.

Yours sincerely,

(Lesley McMillan)
Bästa xxxx,

Jag är en forskarstuderande vid universitetet i Edinburgh, Skottland och för närvarande är jag verksam vid Lunds universitet. Jag forskar om kvinnoorganisationer, vilka liksom Er, arbetar med frågor som rör kvinnovåld och ska jämföra situationen i Sverige med den i Storbritannien.

Jag är intresserad av att få reda på hur organisationer, som Er ser ut, till exempel vem som arbetar där, vilken hjälp Ni erbjuder, vem som finansierar Er verksamhet, hur svårt det är att få finansiering och hur många som arbetar oavlönat hos Er – detta är några exempel på frågeformulärets innehåll. Speciellt intresserad är jag också av att jämföra myndigheternas respons till organisationer som Er till kvinnovåldsfrågan och återigen ge en jämförelse mellan Sverige och Storbritannien. Det är viktigt för mig för att se om staten stödjer organisationer som Er, eller försvårar arbetet.

Jag skulle väldigt gärna höra om Er organisation och om Era erfarenheter av att arbeta med våldsproblem. Jag har bifogat några frågeformulär som jag hoppas att de som arbetar i din organisation är villiga att svara på. Till dessa medföljer även ett frankevänt kuvert så att de kan sändas tillbaka utan några kostnader för Er organisation. Var vänlig att ge ett frågeformulär till alla som är verksamma på Er organisation, oavsett hur många timmar de arbetar. Om Ni skulle behöva fler var snäll att kontakta mig per brev, telefon eller e-mail. Jag ber Er återsända samtliga frågeformulär i kuvertet även om dem inte har använts.

Jag förstår att Ni kommer att vara väldigt upptagna med att bistå med livsviktig hjälp för de som blir drabbade av våld, men hoppas att Ni kan avsätta den korta tid som det tar att fylla i frågeformuläret. Som feminist känner jag väldigt starkt för denna forskning för kvinnors liv och kvinnoorganisationer har inte blivit tillräckligt dokumenterat. Dessutom anser jag att det är viktigt att föra ut det livsviktiga arbete som organisationer som Er utför, och huruvida staten stödjer detta.
Jag kan försäkra Er att frågeformulären är fullständigt konfidentiella och anonyma. Den enda person som kommer att läsa dem är jag och inga namn finns på formulären, varken på personer eller på organisationer. Kuvert har bifogats så att varje person kan förseglas sitt eget innan det stoppas in i det frankerade huvudkuvertet. Information om forskningen och instruktioner om hur formuläret skall fyllas in finns på framsidan på varje formulär, så att de som vill kan fylla i det i enskilt.

När det är färdigt lovar jag att skicka en rapport om forskningsresultaten till alla organisationer som deltar för att ge feedback och för att visa hur situationen ser ut i Sverige jämfört med den i Storbritannien. Min avsikt är också att publicera forskningsresultaten både i Sverige och i Storbritannien.

Om Ni skulle vilja ha mer information om forskningen eller har några speciella frågor så besvarar jag de mycket gärna, tveka därför inte att kontakta mig per brev, telefon eller e-mail (upplysningar ovan). Min svenska adress är giltig fram till slutet av September 2000, därefter kommer jag att befinner mig på min adress i Skottland, min e-mail är alltid giltig. Jag hoppas också på att besöka två eller tre organisationer här i Sverige för att se det hjälper Ni kan erbjuda och förhoppningsvis intervjua några personer om deras erfarenheter av att arbeta i en sådan organisation. Detta är något som kommer att beslutats av varje enskild organisation.

Jag vill uttala min beundran för det arbete Ni utför och hoppas att Ni har ork och entusiasm till att fortsätta med det. Om det är möjligt, var vänlig och skicka tillbaka frågeformulären innan den (datum). Tack på förhand.

Med vänliga hälsningar,

(Lesley McMillan)
Appendix 5

Quantitative Data Output
Table 1 – Organisational Lifetime of Swedish Organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisational Lifetime</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>National Organisation Affiliated to</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-15 years</td>
<td></td>
<td>ROKS</td>
<td>KR</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Organisational Lifetime</td>
<td></td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>90.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within National Organisation Affiliated to</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>29.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
<td>29.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-26 years</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Organisational Lifetime</td>
<td></td>
<td>62.5%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within National Organisation Affiliated to</td>
<td></td>
<td>93.8%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>70.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>44.1%</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
<td>70.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Organisational Lifetime</td>
<td></td>
<td>47.1%</td>
<td>52.9%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within National Organisation Affiliated to</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>47.1%</td>
<td>52.9%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-Square Tests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)</th>
<th>Exact Sig. (2-sided)</th>
<th>Exact Sig. (1-sided)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Chi-Square</td>
<td>7.809</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuity Correction</td>
<td>5.844</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.016</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio</td>
<td>8.760</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisher's Exact Test</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linear-by-Linear Association</td>
<td>7.580</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of Valid Cases</td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Computed only for a 2x2 table

b. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.71.
Table 2 – Domestic Violence Service Provision in the UK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Violence type</th>
<th>National Organisation Affiliated to</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>% within Violent type - domestic</th>
<th>% within National Organisation Affiliated to</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>yes - domestic</td>
<td>Rape Crisis</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women's Aid</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>88.9%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>67.5%</td>
<td>67.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>Rape Crisis</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>81.3%</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women's Aid</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-Square Tests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)</th>
<th>Exact Sig. (2-sided)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Chi-Square</td>
<td>28.889</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuity Correction</td>
<td>25.304</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio</td>
<td>35.004</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisher's Exact Test</td>
<td>28.167</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Computed only for a 2x2 table
b. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.20.
### Table 3 – Rape & Sexual Assault Service Provision in the UK

#### Violence type - rape * National Organisation Affiliated to Crosstabulation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Violence type</th>
<th>yes</th>
<th>% within Violence type - rape</th>
<th>% within National Organisation Affiliated to % of Total</th>
<th>no</th>
<th>% within Violence type - rape</th>
<th>% within National Organisation Affiliated to % of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Affiliated to</td>
<td>Rape Crisis</td>
<td>Women's Aid</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Rape Crisis</td>
<td>Women's Aid</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>55.2%</td>
<td>44.8%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Violence type - rape</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>54.2%</td>
<td>72.5%</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
<td>72.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within National Organisation Affiliated to % of Total</td>
<td>45.8%</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>44.8%</td>
<td>55.2%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Violence type - rape</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>45.8%</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>44.8%</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>45.8%</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within National Organisation Affiliated to % of Total</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Violence type - rape</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within National Organisation Affiliated to % of Total</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Chi-Square Tests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)</th>
<th>Exact Sig. (2-sided)</th>
<th>Exact Sig. (1-sided)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Chi-Square</td>
<td>10.115</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuity Correction</td>
<td>7.947</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio</td>
<td>13.949</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisher's Exact Test</td>
<td>9.862</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Computed only for a 2x2 table

b. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.40.
Table 4 – Child Abuse Service Provision in the UK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Violence type - child abuse * National Organisation Affiliated to</th>
<th>National Organisation Affiliated to</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>Rape Crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes - child abuse</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Violence type - child abuse</td>
<td>52.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within National Organisation Affiliated to</td>
<td>81.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no - child abuse</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Violence type - child abuse</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within National Organisation Affiliated to</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Violence type - child abuse</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within National Organisation Affiliated to</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-Square Tests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)</th>
<th>Exact Sig. (2-sided)</th>
<th>Exact Sig. (1-sided)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Chi-Square</td>
<td>4.000b</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.046</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuity Correction</td>
<td>2.778</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.096</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio</td>
<td>4.212</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.040</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisher's Exact Test</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.056</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linear-by-Linear Association</td>
<td>3.900</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.048</td>
<td>.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of Valid Cases</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Computed only for a 2x2 table
b. 0 cells (0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.00.
Table 5 – Number of Paid Workers By Country

Number of Paid Workers * Country of Respondent Crosstabulation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Paid Workers</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 - 1</td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Number of Paid Workers</td>
<td>72.0%</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Country of Respondent</td>
<td>52.9%</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
<td>33.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>33.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - 3</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Number of Paid Workers</td>
<td>56.0%</td>
<td>44.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Country of Respondent</td>
<td>41.2%</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
<td>33.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>33.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 - 8</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Number of Paid Workers</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>90.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Country of Respondent</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>45.0%</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 - 26</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Number of Paid Workers</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Country of Respondent</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>34</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Number of Paid Workers</td>
<td>45.9%</td>
<td>54.1%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Country of Respondent</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>45.9%</td>
<td>54.1%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-Square Tests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Chi-Square</td>
<td>21.656a</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio</td>
<td>25.151</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linear-by-Linear Association</td>
<td>19.705</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of Valid Cases</td>
<td></td>
<td>74</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. 2 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.84.
Table 6 – Number of Paid Workers by Organisational Network

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Organisation Affiliated to</th>
<th>Number of Paid Workers</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>2-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National ROKS</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within National Organisation</td>
<td>43.8%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affiliated to</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Number of Paid Workers</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
<td>32.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KR</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within National Organisation</td>
<td>61.1%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affiliated to</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Number of Paid Workers</td>
<td>44.0%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rape Crisis</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within National Organisation</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affiliated to</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Number of Paid Workers</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's Aid</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within National Organisation</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affiliated to</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Number of Paid Workers</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within National Organisation</td>
<td>33.8%</td>
<td>33.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affiliated to</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Number of Paid Workers</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>33.8%</td>
<td>33.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-Square Tests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Chi-Square</td>
<td>34.322</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio</td>
<td>37.531</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linear-by-Linear</td>
<td>22.980</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of Valid Cases</td>
<td>74</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.19.
Table 7 – Number of Paid Workers by UK National Organisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Paid Workers - Fulltime</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>% within Number of Paid Workers - Fulltime</th>
<th>% within National Organisation Affiliated to</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>National Organisation Affiliated to</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rape Crisis</td>
<td>Women's Aid</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 - 1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>73.3%</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>68.8%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>27.5%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - 3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>35.7%</td>
<td>64.3%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>31.3%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 - 25</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>45.8%</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>27.5%</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-Square Tests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Chi-Square</td>
<td>14.385^a</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio</td>
<td>18.194</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linear-by-Linear</td>
<td>14.022</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of Valid Cases</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.40.
Table 8 – Number of Unpaid Workers by UK National Organisation

Number of Unpaid Workers Part-time * National Organisation Affiliated to Crosstabulation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Unpaid Workers Part-time</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>National Organisation Affiliated to</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rape Crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 - 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Number of Unpaid Workers Part-time</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>54.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within National Organisation Affiliated to</td>
<td>54.2%</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 - 12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Number of Unpaid Workers Part-time</td>
<td>76.9%</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within National Organisation Affiliated to</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 - 39</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Number of Unpaid Workers Part-time</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>92.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within National Organisation Affiliated to</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>81.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Number of Unpaid Workers Part-time</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within National Organisation Affiliated to</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-Square Tests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Chi-Square</td>
<td>26.516a</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio</td>
<td>32.591</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linear-by-Linear Association</td>
<td>23.910</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of Valid Cases</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.20.
Table 9 – Level of Reported Concern By Country of Respondent

**Country of Respondent * Level of Concern Crosstabulation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Respondent</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Level of Concern</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>concerned</td>
<td>not concerned/ don't know</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sweden</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>149</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>247</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Country of Respondent</td>
<td>60.3%</td>
<td>39.7%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Level of Concern</td>
<td>37.2%</td>
<td>66.2%</td>
<td>45.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
<td>45.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UK</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>252</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>302</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Country of Respondent</td>
<td>83.4%</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Level of Concern</td>
<td>62.8%</td>
<td>33.8%</td>
<td>55.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>45.9%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>55.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>401</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>549</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Country of Respondent</td>
<td>73.0%</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Level of Concern</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>73.0%</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Chi-Square Tests**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)</th>
<th>Exact Sig. (2-sided)</th>
<th>Exact Sig. (1-sided)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Chi-Square</td>
<td>36.884b</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuity Correction</td>
<td>35.719</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio</td>
<td>37.089</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisher’s Exact Test</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linear-by-Linear Association</td>
<td>36.817</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of Valid Cases</td>
<td>549</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Computed only for a 2x2 table
b. 0 cells (0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 66.59.
Table 10 – Level of Reported Concern by UK National Organisation

**National Organisation Affiliated to * Level of Concern Crosstabulation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Organisation Affiliated to</th>
<th>Level of Concern</th>
<th>not concerned/ don't know</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>concerned</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Organisation Affiliated to</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within National Organisation Affiliated to</td>
<td>96.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Level of Concern</td>
<td>47.6%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>41.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>39.7%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>41.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's Aid</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>132 45 177</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within National Organisation Affiliated to</td>
<td>74.6%</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Level of Concern</td>
<td>52.4%</td>
<td>90.0%</td>
<td>58.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>43.7%</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>58.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>252 50 302</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within National Organisation Affiliated to</td>
<td>83.4%</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Level of Concern</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>83.4%</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Chi-Square Tests**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)</th>
<th>Exact Sig. (2-sided)</th>
<th>Exact Sig. (1-sided)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Chi-Square</td>
<td>24.339</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuity Correction³</td>
<td>22.813</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio</td>
<td>28.380</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisher's Exact Test</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linear-by-Linear Association</td>
<td>24.259</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of Valid Cases</td>
<td>302</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Computed only for a 2x2 table
b. 0 cells (0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 20.70.
Appendix 6

Published Material

Kön och våld i Norden
Rapport från en konferens i Køge, Danmark, 23-24 november 2001

Gender and violence in the Nordic countries
Report from a conference in Køge, Danmark, 23-24 november 2001

Maria Eriksson, Aili Nenola och Marika Muhonen Nilsen (red.)
Koen och vald i Norden
Rapport fra en konferens i Køge, Danmark, 23-24 november 2001

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Nordisk Råd
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Women’s anti-violence organisations in Sweden and the UK

Lesley McMillan*

This research investigates the development and experiences of women’s anti-violence organisations in Sweden and the UK, the particular focus being the dual roles of these organisations: that is, part service provision and part political change. In addition, how these different capacities influence their relationship with ‘the state’ and its agencies. It investigates women’s organisations concerned with gendered violence including: Women’s Aid and Rape Crisis in the UK; and Sveriges Kvinnojourers Riksforbund (SKR) and Riksorganisationen för Kvinnojour och Tjejjourer i Sverige (ROKS) in Sweden, at local and national level, in order to identify changes, similarities and differences, and in what context these arise. This paper concentrates specifically on the findings from the quantitative analysis of self-complete questionnaires administered to women working in these organisations.

Although not dealt with in this paper, the theoretical framework of state feminism (Stetson and Mazur 1995) is also a central concern of the research as a whole. ‘State feminism’ refers to the institutionalisation of feminist interests through the establishment of agencies such as ministries for women and equal opportunities commissions, with the aim of achieving ‘feminism from above’ through policy implementation that is positive for women. This typology is based on employment and labour policy issues and organisations. In this respect, the United Kingdom and Sweden are both classified as type 2 in the typology of state feminism - offices have high levels of policy authority but low access for feminist groups. Therefore one of the main aims of the study is to assess its relevance to policy issues and organisations concerned with gendered violence and to assess the level of access of women’s anti-violence organisations to policy making bodies.

Therefore, the three main considerations of the research as a whole are:

- The history of the women’s movement and its related organisations.
- The state’s relationship with, and attitude towards, women’s organisations.
- The conceptual framework of state feminism when applied to gendered violence.

The women’s movement, violence and the state

Both the issues of ‘the state’ and violence are very important issues to feminism and the women’s movement. The state’s monopoly on the control of force ensures that feminism must deal with the state in relation to sexual violence (Franzway 1989). The state is also one of the main organisers of power relations of gender through legislation and policy and the way it is implicated in the construction of the public and the private
(Connell 1990 in Pettman 1996). The politics of women’s involvement with the state is very complex, the state is both a site of threats and opportunities for feminists. It is the site of demands, as workers, mothers and citizens but at the same time many feminists are suspicious of the state and its implication in the reproduction of unequal gender relations.

Far less literature exists on the women’s movement and its related organisations in any other country than the US, and few studies compare women’s movements in more than one country (see Threlfall 1997). For this reason comparisons with the US are difficult to avoid. However, although the women’s movement is global, “within each country the movement follows a distinctive course, developing structures and agendas in response to local circumstances” (Margolis 1993, 379-380). Bouchier (1984 in Margolis 1993, 387) indicates that the women’s movement may be more successful in states that already have strong egalitarian and liberal commitments. However, Margolis (1993, 388) also indicates that activists face some of their most difficult challenges in countries with strong constitutional guarantees of gender equality going on to argue that right wing governments threaten repression but offer clear opposition, whereas left wing governments offer relatively safe environments for change but threaten debilitation through lack of clear opposition.

Violence against women is a salient concern for the women’s movement and feminism. The UN Progress of Nations Report of 1997 states that, “Violence against women and girls [...] is so deeply embedded in cultures around the world that it is almost invisible. Yet this brutality is not inevitable. Once recognised for what it is - a construct of power and a means of maintaining the status quo - it can be dismantled.” (p 41, in Corrin 1999, 189-190). Gustafsson (1998, 46) provides evidence for the salience of violence as an issue, she found that on questioning women involved in the women’s movement in Sweden one of the more negative aspects of living as a woman in Sweden that they stressed was the issue of violence.

Therefore, one of the main aims of the women’s movement and feminism has been to put the issue of gendered violence onto the political agenda and no longer have it be considered a ‘private’ issue, or the problem of individual men.

Women’s anti-violence organisations

The battered women’s movement and rape crisis movement is a feminist branch of the women’s movement that began in the 1970s. The anti-violence movement was founded on two notions: the radical political insight that violence against women is a fundamental component of the social control of women; and that women should try to do something to turn victims into survivors. The establishment of refuges and centres was part of this movement. These were autonomous, grassroots, non-hierarchical, collectivist centres run by women volunteers and usually maintained an open-door policy. Services provided were usually non-medical, low cost, short term and delivered by trained volunteer women who were not social service professionals, and who were often survivors of violence themselves, to adult female survivors of violence. Centres generally undertook community education to lay audiences and aimed to change procedures in, and monitor, professional agencies dealing with survivors of violence.
The feminist movement of the 1960s and 70s made 'the claim that the personal is political' and demanded a re-examination of women's daily lives. It demanded that domestic violence no longer be considered something that women could be held responsible for, and that rape and sexual assault should no longer be viewed as a sex crime with women partly to blame (Amir 1971) but that power was a central issue and that sexual and domestic violence both reflect and determine gendered social structures.

The first rape crisis centre in the UK was opened in London in 1976 and by 1985 45 centres were established throughout the UK. The first shelter for battered women was established in 1972 by Erin Pizzey in Chiswick, West London. By 1975, 28 groups were in existence with 83 more in the process of being established. The campaign around domestic violence was successful in parliament in 1976 when the Domestic Violence Act was passed, although not particularly effective it represented a shift in official thinking. At the same time there was also a campaign to change the law and legal procedures of rape cases. This resulted in the Sexual Offences Amendment Act of the same year that prevented the use of women's sexual history as evidence unless the judge ruled it relevant and therefore permissible (Coote and Campbell 1987, 42).

In Sweden women had initially been mobilised around labour issues and came to the issue of violence slightly later than the US and UK. In 1977 Gothenburg was the first municipality to grant space for a women’s centre and the first centres for battered women and survivors of rape were opened in 1978 in both Gothenburg and Stockholm. There was a strong movement for political change and the wider women’s movement as well as those involved in these organisations, campaigned for political change in the area of violence against women. In 1982 campaigns in Sweden were successful when legislative changes meant that all assault and battery against women, even if committed on private property, would be subject to public prosecution and no longer only a civil matter. The same legislation also allowed for the provision of public funds to women’s organisations.

As in the US, strategies were communicated through the wider women’s liberation movement and centres embodied assumptions about ideology and goals and therefore were relatively uniform in character (Gornick et al. 1985). “Those who speak of a battered women’s movement generally share a feminist analysis of why this violence occurs and a commitment to organising for social and political change.” (Reinelt 1994, 685). Given that the majority of centres received little or no government support they were free to explore for themselves new ways of communicating and interacting that challenged, at least internally, bureaucratic values and structures of power that dominate in our society. One of the main distinctions between Sweden and the US or UK is that no rape-specific organisations (such as Rape Crisis) developed in Sweden. Issues of gendered violence were considered as a whole, and although the developing organisations offered services to survivors of rape, violence within family and intimate relationships was their main area of concern.

US literature suggests that today few centres fit this model and are often criticised for becoming service givers and abandoning social change goals (Matthews 1994; Reinelt 1994). An increase in public awareness of the issue of violence meant that pressure for change came from diverse sources taking the pressure off these centres as sole agitators. There was an influx of state monies for violence-related services and with it came the conflict inherent in being funded by those whose policies you seek to change. As
centres became linked with state funding there appears to have been a convergence towards a similar form and many women’s centres became part of social service provision. Many centres, in order to gain funding, were forced to comply with certain regulations and bureaucratic procedures. It is also indicated that centres had to emphasise co-operation rather than conflict with community agencies. The relationship of centres with the community changed and many altered services and formalised divisions of labour between newly recruited paid staff and volunteers. The staff profile of centres changed to include mainstream feminists and apolitical women who would previously been neither welcomed nor interested in the more radical feminist centres.

These changes that centres have undergone have led to questions being raised as to whether they have resulted in comprehensive services for survivors but the abandonment of social change goals, and their original aim of a violence free society (Collins et al. 1989; Matthews 1994; Reinelt 1994). Matthews (1994) argues that the state deliberately co-opts organisations in order to diminish the political analysis of violence and to encourage them to concentrate on service provision rather than campaigning. She argues that state funding is the main way in which this happens and calls this practice ‘managing rape’. She argues that it allows the state to individualise issues of violence against women as the problems of individual men and to deal with the consequences as the problems of individual women. As a result women’s organisations concerned with violence begin to resemble a network of social service organisations rather than a social movement.

This paper aims to address these issues with reference to Sweden and the UK in order to establish whether women-oriented anti-violence organisations have followed a similar path to those in the US.

Methodology

For the overall study data was gathered using self-complete questionnaires for quantitative analysis and semi-structured interviews with women working in anti-violence organisations in both Sweden and the UK. This paper concentrates on the preliminary findings from the self-complete questionnaires and specifically on the differences and similarities within and between the two countries.

A stratified and systematic random sample was obtained from exhaustive lists of the organisations registered with each network. The sampling frame was designed to provide a mixture of organisations by size and rural or urban location. In Sweden a total of 40 organisations were selected and initially contacted by telephone to establish consent for participation, and a further 50 organisations were contacted using the same method in the UK. All 90 organisations contacted agreed to participate. A total of 675 questionnaires to be completed by staff working in women’s crisis centres were distributed. 300 were administered in Sweden and 375 in the UK. The questionnaires distributed in Sweden were translated into Swedish. Questionnaires were administered by post with reply paid envelopes for their return. The data was input into SPSS for quantitative analysis, both descriptive and inferential, using frequency counts and chi-square analysis of expected and observed counts.
Main findings and results

Of the 90 organisations that agreed to participate 74 responded which represents an overall organisational response rate of 82%. Of the 40 organisations in Sweden, 34 (85%) responded and of the 50 organisations in the UK, 40 (80%) responded.

Of the 675 questionnaires distributed to staff a total of 549 were returned which represents an overall response rate of 81%. The response rate in Sweden was 82% (247) and in the UK 80.5% (302).

The response rates noted above are very high for a self-administered postal questionnaire. It is likely that the decision to contact organisations prior to posting questionnaires was significant in ensuring such a high return. Furthermore, it is also likely that the high response rate is a reflection of how important the issues covered in the questionnaire are to organisations and individual staff.

‘Map’ and overview of organisations

In Sweden the organisations ranged in age from 2 to 26 years old. The SKR organisations were, in the most part, younger than the ROKS organisations and account for all those established since 1990, and all but one of those 15 years or younger. A total of 50% of the SKR organisations are under 15 years old. ROKS organisations outnumbered SKR ones in the older age ranges accounting for the majority of organisations within the range of 16 – 22 years old. These findings are statistically significant at a 95% level of confidence (Pearson $=8.311$, d.f=3, Sig. (p) = .040). This difference in age can, to a great extent, be attributed to the fact that SKR is a much younger network, established in 1996. Similarly to other countries, the Swedish women’s movement experienced an ‘ideological split’ in the 1990s, where arguments concerning feminist ideology caused the movement to split into two distinctive strands. One regarded as more ‘radical’, and one more ‘liberal’. SKR was established sometime after this ideological split and retained less of the existing organisations than ROKS.

Similarly in the UK, both Women’s Aid and Rape Crisis established a ‘core’ group of centres in the 1970s. Rape Crisis continued to expand the number of centres in the 1980s, whereas Women’s Aid expanded far slower at this time. However, the 1990s have seen a considerable rise in the number of Women’s Aid Refuges, and they have established twice as many new centres as Rape Crisis. These findings are statistically significant at a 95% level of confidence (Pearson $=19.045$, d.f = 4, Sig (p) = .001).

The UK also has more of the younger (10 years or less) organisations than Sweden where the ‘boom’ in the establishment of organisations appears to have been between 1980 and 1985. This is a similar pattern to that of Rape Crisis, so the distinct position of Women’s Aid in this respect is responsible for the difference between the countries, rather than organisations as a whole.

Type of gendered violence

Organisations were asked to specify the areas of gendered violence that they dealt with. All the Swedish organisations (100%/34) that responded reported that they provided services for survivors of domestic violence, compared to 67.5% (27) in the UK. However, if Women’s Aid is considered in isolation of rape crisis, then figure for the
UK is also 100%. In addition, 85% (29) of Swedish organisations reported that they also provided services for survivors of rape and sexual assault, with 72.5% of organisations in the UK also providing services for survivors of sexual assault or rape. Additionally, 62% (21) of Swedish organisations reported that they provided services for survivors of child abuse or neglect, and similarly 62.5% (21) of UK organisations also reported this. Crisis centres in Sweden do not follow the pattern of those in the UK and US where there are rape-specific and domestic violence-specific organisations. Sweden lacks any solely rape-specific centres, such as the UK Rape Crisis equivalent, that exist as part of a national network. Both ROKS and SKR centres in the main provide services for those suffering domestic violence (of which rape may be a part) with those women suffering rape out-with a cohabiting relationship accounting for a far smaller part of their work. The data on current service provision suggests that SKR organisations are more likely than ROKS to have maintained the aim of offering services to adult women who have experienced violence as an adult, be it domestic/family violence or rape and sexual assault, and are less likely to offer services to survivors of child abuse to the same extent. However, ROKS organisations appear to have continued to concentrate on family violence and as a result deal mainly with survivors of domestic violence and their children, and have recently extended their provision to include services for survivors of child abuse. However, in both organisations, the provision of services for those affected by rape are less well developed and account for far less of their work in total, nor are statistics collected on the number of rape survivors accessing their services, whereas those for domestic violence and child abuse are. There is a possibility that ROKS’ increased involvement with state agencies has encouraged this trend given that the Swedish state accords a high status to the institution of the family and women’s position as mothers as well as workers.

In the UK Rape Crisis centres are more likely to offer services relating to child abuse (63% of organisations) compared to Women’s Aid (50%). There was some initial ambiguity over the nature of provision in the UK, and whether organisations offered services to adult survivors of childhood abuse, or children themselves. Further data analysis comparing these findings with the numbers of women and children using Women’s Aid and Rape Crisis respectively, suggests that Women’s Aid are more likely to provide for children or young adults who may be suffering abuse in conjunction with their mothers, whereas Rape Crisis are more likely to provide services for adult women survivors of childhood abuse.

Service provision population(s)

The majority (81%/60) of centres in both countries provided services for women and children only, with all Women’s Aid organisations offering this. An additional 10 (13.5%) offered services to women only.

Similarly to the vast majority of women-oriented crisis centres in other countries, the majority of organisations do not provide services for men. Of the 74 organisations that responded there were 4 exceptions; 2 Swedish and 1 UK organisation provided services for ‘all’, and the remaining organisation operated specifically for young people and, although affiliated with Rape Crisis, did not provide a gender-specific service and therefore dealt with young men. The 3 organisations providing services for ‘all’ reported that they did not provide counselling, refuge or support services for individual
male survivors of violence. The main aspect of provision in this respect was to provide information and advice relating to male violence against women, sources of support and advice, and how to support a female relative or friend. The involvement of men in organisations that began as part of a women-oriented, self-help, feminist movement, remains a problematic issue.

Service provision and organisational activities
Organisations were asked to indicate which services they provided. The results are illustrated in the following table.

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Percentage (n) of Organisations</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden</td>
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<tr>
<td>Initial Crisis Counselling</td>
<td>94% (32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refuge/Safe-house</td>
<td>91% (31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-term Counselling</td>
<td>79% (27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accompanying to Police/Court</td>
<td>50% (17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare/Benefits Advice</td>
<td>47% (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Groups</td>
<td>44% (15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing Advice</td>
<td>38% (13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Advice/Care</td>
<td>35% (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Advice</td>
<td>32% (11)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This figure represents all UK organisations, both Women’s Aid and Rape Crisis Centres. Given the dichotomy of service provision for domestic violence and rape/sexual assault the inclusion of Rape Crisis responses misrepresents the situation somewhat. If Women’s Aid responses are considered independently of Rape Crisis then the figure for the level of organisations providing a refuge or safehouse is 96% (33).

The data illustrates that ‘frontline’/primary care services are the most prevalent, for example initial crisis counselling and the provision of refuges and safe-houses for women escaping violence. This provides evidence that the priorities of these organisations are concentrated on the well-being and safety needs of women who have experienced domestic violence, rape, sexual assault or child abuse. This may indicate that there is a move towards a service-provision orientation to crisis work as literature suggests is the case in the US, however organisations are not absorbed into social service structures in the same way, and the lack of basic core services elsewhere may be equally likely to produce this outcome.
The organisations that responded did not appear to have considerable contact with state agencies that was not connected to individual advocacy. However, they did indicate that time and resource constraints were an issue in this respect. Comments included ‘we just don’t have time or money to do anything with or for them’, ‘we do what they want and need if we can, but a lot of the time it’s not possible, they forget we don’t have much money for things here’.

It was clear from responses that the organisations welcome a certain level of contact. For example ‘we try to do training or what they want, posters and so on, people might see them there, and there’s always a chance we might change what they do!’ (said in relation to police force). Also, ‘training days for nurses/doctors/students etc. we do them because mostly they’re responsive and listen to us, if they change what they do, we only have hope there’.

Responses offer little evidence that organisations operate as part of a social service system but there is evidence to suggest that they operate as a form of social service provision out-with state agencies. In terms of promoting the provision of services and challenging gendered violence, lobbying and campaigning is undertaken by the national organisations who co-ordinate campaigns.

**Workers**

United Kingdom organisations are more likely to have paid workers than Swedish organisations, and are also more likely to have full-time paid workers. For example 94% of the Swedish organisations had between 0 and 3 paid workers compared to only 27.5% (11) of the UK organisations having this many, with the remainder being spread out from 4 paid workers up to as many as 26. These findings are statistically significant at a 95% level of confidence (Pearson = 30.514, d.f = 2, Sig (p) = .001).

In addition, in Sweden the majority of paid workers provided their labour on a part-time basis and the UK organisations had a far higher level of full-time paid staff than the Swedish organisations. Half of all the Swedish organisations had zero full-time paid workers, and of the remaining 50%, the majority (38%/13) had only 1. The maximum amount of paid full-time workers reported was 3. Only 17.5% of UK organisations reported zero full-time workers, and the remainder were relatively evenly spread between 1 full-time worker and 8 full-time workers. The one notable exception is the organisation that reported 25 full-time paid staff, meaning it fits the description of a ‘medium sized firm’ in terms of manpower. These findings are statistically significant at a 95% level of confidence (Pearson = 14.385, d.f = 2, Sig (p) = .002).

Indeed, the pattern of paid work in each of the countries’ organisations is very distinct. The graph below clearly illustrates the considerable differences in the numbers of paid workers employed by Swedish and UK organisations. It is clear that there is a greater likelihood of having between 1 and 8 paid members of paid staff in the UK, than there is in Sweden.
However, further analysis of the data indicates that the difference is explained by the high numbers of paid staff employed by Women’s Aid. In fact, Rape Crisis centres follow a very similar pattern in terms of the employment of paid staff, to the two Swedish networks. The graph below, illustrates this point clearly. For Rape Crisis, ROKS, and SKR, as the numbers of paid staff per organisations increases, the number of organisations reporting this level of staffing decreases. The opposite is the case for Women’s Aid organisations.
The number of part-time unpaid workers reported by organisations is spread relatively evenly across the range from 1 to 40 with no concentrations at any particular level. Unpaid staff that work on a part-time basis account for the vast majority of staff in women-oriented crisis centres and provide a valid indicator of organisational size. Therefore, the data indicates that the breadth of organisational size is represented. It is clear from the data that women-oriented crisis centres in both countries still rely heavily on the labour of unpaid workers, but that nonetheless both countries have some very large and successful organisations.

In Sweden SKR organisations were less likely to have paid members of staff, and in the UK the same was the case for Rape Crisis. This is evidence that these organisations are generally less well funded and operate as a more loosely organised network of organisations.

Staff in the centres were exclusively female. A high percentage of women working in these organisations had personally experienced violence themselves. A total of 248 women indicated that they had been subjected to violence, this represents 45% of the total respondents. There was no significant difference between the two countries with 43% (106) respondents in Sweden and 47% (142) in the UK. The only significant difference between the organisations was that workers in Rape Crisis in the UK were more likely to have experienced violence than the other three refuge-based organisations.

Funding

Organisations' funding sources were varied. All of the Swedish organisations that responded received funding from the state that was administered at local level. As of 1998 the principle of the provision of state monies for women's organisations and groups was included in the Kvinnofrid (Women's Peace) legislation so all are entitled to at least basic funding if criteria are met.

In the UK all Women's Aid Refuges had some form of government funding. This was administered at local level by councils and/or authorities but no precedent has been set, nor is there any guarantee of funding. Rape Crisis were less likely to have local authority or local council funding although approximately 50% did. Other sources of funding for Rape Crisis that were most often cited were: The National Lottery Charities Board; Department of Health funded posts; banks and private corporations or charitable foundations; donations; and fundraising. For Women's Aid the most common funding sources were: housing benefit; The National Lottery Charities Board; Department of Health, or Social Work funded posts, for example outreach workers; charitable foundations and private companies; donations; and fundraising.

In Sweden other sources of funding that were indicated included the centres' own fundraising activities, money from corporations and local businesses and grants from regional government. The latter requires organisations in a particular region to apply for funding jointly as a network or organisations. This was far more likely to have been done by ROKS organisations than SKR ones. Centres also indicated that they received things of monetary value but were not given it as a grant as such. For example, some
local governments provided accommodation with a rent-waiver, and some local supermarkets provided food and clothing.

The longest time an organisation had secure funding for was 3 years. The range in Sweden was 6 months to 2 years, and in the UK 6 months to 3 years. The majority (67/91%) had secure funding for 12 months or less for which they were required to re-apply on an annual basis.

All but 2 centres, 97%, indicated that they had restrictions placed upon them as a result of the funding they received. In all of the cases this included the production of an annual report and accounts to be submitted to the provider. Less frequently occurring responses were: statistical information on users; having to work from specific locations; having to deliver services to a particular population; or having to provide a specific kind of service, or provide it in a particular way.

In Sweden there were no restrictions or stipulations reported with regard to organisational structure of the centres, nor the requirement for a board of directors or other ‘overseeing’ body however this was the case in the UK. Particularly with Women’s Aid, a requirement of receiving funding was to appoint a board of directors from the local community and to adopt some sort of management structure. Nonetheless, for those who did not have to make a structural change it is clear that increasingly bureaucratic working practices are encouraged when working with the state, particularly when participating in its grant economy.

Almost 60% (329) of the 549 workers who responded indicated that they were either concerned or very concerned about the future of the centres finances, and a further 13% indicated that they were slightly concerned. The remainder either did not know or were not concerned. Workers in Swedish organisations reported less concern than those in the UK. Rape Crisis reported the greatest concern of all the networks of organisations with 87% (109) of it’s staff reporting that they were either concerned or very concerned about their future funding and survival.

Such an environment of insecure funding and a significant level of 73% (401) of all workers feeling at least some concern could indicate a that the balance of power is weighted towards the state in this respect, which in turn may impact on the activities of organisations in not wanting to jeopardise their future. It also potentially offers support for the argument that the provision of state funding and participation in the state’s grant economy enables the state to control organisations to some degree in that it has the ability to influence their future survival or demise.

Organisational structure

The majority of the centres that responded (62%/46) indicated that they used a form of collective organisation. A further 24 (32%) organisations indicated that they used a form of hierarchical organisation and the remaining centres described the system of organisation as being either ‘democratic’ or ‘co-operative’.

In Sweden ROKS organisations indicated that 50% (8) of their organisations used a hierarchical form compared to only 2 SKR organisations. This may offer support for the argument that women’s organisations are becoming more institutionalised, more bureaucratic and less political that they previously were. These findings are statistically significant at a 95% level of confidence (Pearson = 8.032, d.f = 2, Sig (p)= .018).
Respondents were also asked whether they had always had this organisational structure. All the SKR organisations indicated that this was the case whereas 50% (8) of the ROKS organisations had changed from their original structural, which had been collective organisation. 29% (7) of Women’s Aid organisations had changed structure and 19% (3) of the Rape Crisis Centres that responded. As literature suggests, it is possible that this is a result of complying with state-funding practices. However, all organisations are granted state monies in Sweden therefore any ‘requirement’ to organise in a particular way would be universal and we would expect all centres to be hierarchical. Again, this may provide support for the argument that equating feminism with collective organisation is unrealistic, and the distinction between ‘collectivist’ and ‘bureaucratic’ types may be unrealistic.

Respondents were also asked about decision making, both on a daily basis and for making big decisions. The majority of answers from those in collective organisations for daily decision-making were ‘whenever is available at the time’, or ‘individuals’, and for big decisions it was invariably ‘the collective’ or ‘all of us at meetings’. However, a significant minority of the responses were not as expected. In responding to the question of who makes daily decisions, responses from those in collective organisations included: ‘team leader’; ‘project manager’; ‘the full-time staff’; ‘the paid-staff’; and ‘the outreach worker’. Similarly, there were several occasions where workers had responded to the question of who makes big decisions with seemingly contradictory answers. For example, responses given included: ‘the management committee’; ‘the board of directors’; ‘usually the full-timers decide and then tell us what’s happening’.

In the same way some of the responses from those in hierarchical organisations were not as expected. On at least 4 occasions respondents indicated that individuals made their own decisions about daily issues, or one or two workers would decide together. However, when it came to making big decisions the same number of respondents gave responses such as ‘we all vote on it’, or ‘we all get to give an opinion and then we try to find the best thing we can agree on but it takes a lot of time up sometimes’. These are contradictory to the idea of hierarchical organisation, as the ones above are to collective organisation, which may suggest that the definition of these terms are ambiguous when applied to working practices and individual experience.

Furthermore, these apparent contradictions raise several issues; for example it may provide support for the argument that women’s organisations adapted for survival and in order to project a more ‘acceptable’ image to those they interact with. It also raises questions concerning the links between structure and ideology and whether it is a theoretically powerful distinction. It also challenges the notion of an ‘ideal type’ of feminist organisation, and possibly too whether this ‘pure’ form ever existed.

Within the organisations a strong commitment to feminist politics, aims and objectives, in relation to violence, is clear. Although the majority (89%66) of organisations described themselves as ‘feminist organisations’ a significant minority (11%8) said that they would not describe the organisation in which they worked as being ‘feminist’. This was a surprising finding given the explicit feminist perspectives of the networks of organisations of which they are part. This was more likely in Sweden with 6 organisations compared to 2 in the UK.

However, contradictions were also evident here. The same 8 organisations stated explicitly feminist aims and objectives as responses to other questions, provided a range
of services that were delivered in a way that would be compatible with feminist politics, and described their views on violence against women that concurred with a feminist perspective. Is the term ‘feminism’ somehow become an undesirable term? Also, given that this was more likely to occur in Swedish organisations, it raises the question whether the term ‘feminism’ has a distinct meaning in Sweden from that in the UK?, or whether this is another sign of organisations’ trying to project a more ‘acceptable’ image in order to be included and accepted more.

It is especially interesting given that 97% (532) of the respondents described themselves as feminists and having a feminist political outlook in general, and in relation to their work with survivors of violence. Workers in these organisations are also often survivors of violence themselves which can be a motivating factor for having a feminist understanding, however this is not a requirement for having a feminist political understanding of violence. Those who did not (17) were equally split between the two countries and spread between organisations. This also challenges the idea that anti-violence and crisis work now involves a different ‘type’ of women as workers who are apolitical.

Caution should therefore be exercised when dividing organisations into collectivist and bureaucratic strands, or labelling organisations ‘not feminist’.

Questions, queries and conclusions

Do they fit the ‘original model’?

The findings suggest that there are several features of anti-violence organisations and crisis centres that resemble the ‘original model’ and ‘type’ described in US literature. For example: there continues to be a reliance on unpaid and part time labour; organisations consist of solely women staff members of whom a large proportion have experienced violence themselves; in the most part centres provide services for women and children only offering generally non-medical, low cost support in the form of initial crisis counselling and refuge. Their interaction with state agencies remains, in the most part, at the level of advocacy, community education and training rather than being affiliated to state-run social service agencies. A feminist analysis to their work is also evident in most cases, with the majority of individuals identifying as feminist.

However, the findings indicate that there is a concentration by organisations on service provision over any other area of activity. It is not possible at this stage to argue that social change goals have been abandoned. The national organisations take most responsibility for this area of activity, but individual organisations still identify a political aspect to their work, as well as the importance of supporting individual women. The concentration on service provision can also be explained as a consequence of the lack of state related provision for survivors of violence. It is true that many activists and workers in these organisations are less radical than they were, and employ less radical strategies than the 1970s, but it could be argued that there has been a shift in approach to more unobtrusive mobilisation around issues of gendered violence in response to a increasingly apolitical society as well as a concentration on the provision of services to survivors of violence.
There is evidence to suggest that the networks of organisations operate as a far more institutionalised and organised body of centres than they did in the 1970s. Many have altered their organisational structure and concentrate mainly on service provision to survivors of violence, which they explicitly state as being their first organisational priority.

**Problems of meaning**

The link between ideology and structure is often stressed in discussions about feminist organisations, and particularly their association with collective forms of organisation. Any possible links between organisational structure and ideology needs further investigation, particularly in relation to definitions and meanings attached to terms such as ‘collective’, ‘hierarchical’, ‘bureaucratic’ and ‘feminist’, and in turn, how these correspond with individual workers’, and organisations’, lived experience. The findings suggest that these terms are ambiguous when applied to organisations’ working reality. At this stage I would suggest that dichotomies such as ‘hierarchical’/‘collective’ and ‘feminist’/‘non-feminist’ will not prove to be theoretically powerful, and indeed may be more appropriately conceptualised as a continuum, given that issues such as political beliefs, ideology and organisational structure are likely to be complex and fluid. Therefore, caution should be exercised when considering labelling organisations ‘feminist’ or ‘not feminist’ and no longer part of the women’s movement. The existence of an ‘ideal type’ of crisis organisation at any point in the development of the movement and its organisations remains questionable, and it appears that a variety of organisational forms may have been embraced. The reason for this needs further investigation.

**Is that which is espoused, practiced?**

A further explanation for this ambiguity and apparent contradiction between stated identity or structure and actual organisational practice, is that the movement has had to structurally adapt for survival and in order to participate in the state’s grant economy. In short, the movement and its organisations may be attempting to project a more ‘acceptable’ public image that may bear little resemblance to organisations’ everyday working reality.

‘Purity versus pragmatism’ and co-optation

It appears that a lot of these questions surround issues of ‘purity’ versus ‘pragmatism’. That is, to what extent organisations should adhere to the ‘original’ approach adopted by the movement at the outset, or adapt for survival. It appears that the national networks of organisations in Sweden and the UK have both adapted for survival, particularly structurally, with there no longer being the level of commitment to collective working that there once was. This does not mean that a feminist political outlook, or social change goals, has been abandoned. Rather, it is an indication of the women’s movement and its related organisations adopting a different approach; choosing to engage and co-operate with the ‘powers that be’. It strongly suggests that a more pragmatic approach has been adopted in order to continue providing comprehensive services for women-survivors of violence and to facilitate change ‘from within’ existing structures as ‘insiders’, by virtue of their status as comprehensive
service providers, rather than being 'outsiders' (Stedward in Richardson and Jordan 1987) in terms of political campaigning – or at the very least occupying an ambiguous position as a result of these dual roles as part service-provider and part agent for political change. There is perhaps an argument for a network of organisations providing services for survivors that are delivered from a feminist perspective, that co-operates with state agencies and can afford to risk a certain amount of co-optation into state structures, being accompanied by a ‘sister-movement’ of organisations that can be free to adopt a more radical approach and not play by the ‘rules of the game’ (Eduards 1992).

Notes

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