Musis on "Nature and Spirit; the problem of their relation in experience."

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The relation of Nature and Spirit is the central problem of Philosophy—regarded as an interpretation of experience.

The problem of each concrete science is to determine 'what' certain things are. It is an analysis of a particular set of facts from a particular point of view. Each such science assumes the existence of its object, and asks what it is, i.e., what its nature is, what its relations are, what its existence is.

The problem of philosophy, on the other hand, is not the 'nature' but the 'meaning' of concrete things. It must not be supposed that this question is absolutely distinct from that of science. The meaning of things cannot of course be akin to their nature, if it is to be regarded as objective things, and not just a play of human intelligence or emotion on the transcendental surface of a being which is meaningless. It must, however, be assumed, that any attempt at philosophy that its object is real. Just as science assumes that things are and asks what they are, so philosophy must inevitably assume that things mean something, in order to ask what they mean; it must
assume that the meaning of things is objective, so that they may be interpreted true or false.

The nature of things cannot be conceived apart from the conception of their meaning.

In order that the meaning of things may be objective, it must be essentially related to their nature. Just in the same way, the very nature of things cannot be conceived apart from their meaning; a complete statement of what a thing is would be at the same time a statement of its meaning. [For in

really, the meaning of things is their relation to the system to which they belong. Philosophy is thus an investigation of systems. But relation to system really belongs to the nature of things as we know them. For this nature consists in their relations to one another. These are what we know in knowing things. But these relations themselves imply relation to systems; for they are objective; things are related to one another according to principles; but, in being so related, they form elements of a system.

Science, which is the analytic statement of experience, is thus the preliminary stage of philosophy, which is the interpretative of science.
element of science. This essential underlying unit of the meaning and relations of things must not lead us to ignore the essential distinction between the points of view implied. It must not be regarded as sufficient ground for absolute identifying nature and spirit.

Of course there is a sense of the word 'nature', in which it includes every possible objective real or existence and condition; and if we use the word in this sense, it is perfectly absurd to speak of anything that is not nature. But if 'nature' is 'everything', so that all knowledge is knowledge of nature, then it would be misleading to recognize some distinction within nature, corresponding to that which we now make between nature and spirit; and it seems best to stick to that sense of 'nature' which is generally accepted, and which is the ground of the distinction in question - the sense in which it is taken to be the totality of related phenomena that form the object of the ordinary experience of life and the related developed experience of science. In this view, the interpretation of experience of nature would be its synthesis from the point of view of spirit.

The foregoing may be a problem, which indicates th
direction of the present thesis, contain many statements that must later be verified or explained.

Meantime, however, it seems advisable to introduce what has to be said and discuss the problem of two important points in the history of the subject.

In Greek philosophy, the elements or aspects of reality were not conceived as we conceive them now. But the antithesis of physics and metaphysics is as old as philosophy. The distinction of metaphysical and common knowledge and of their respective objects, constituted the problem of Greek philosophy, in its chief developments.

There were two main conceptions of the relation of the elements of reality in Greece.

On the one hand, we have the monistic conception which originated with Heraclitus, and which formed the basis of the Stoic philosophy. This is the simplest philosophical theory of development. The world is regarded as a single, simple process of ordered change. It is essentially a unity. The nature of things is movement, progression, change. Such a system of developmental monism might seem to bound to ignore the difference of elements, but this is so that we need hardly look in it for a theory of their relation. In Stoicism, however, the variety
of aspects is no means neglected. On the one hand, the system is materialist; it is a construction of all reality from the point of view of a correlation applicable only to physical phenomena. Its metaphysics consists in the application of the idea of change, becoming, or process. It naturally follows that spirit is regarded as matter. God and the human soul are materialistically conceived. Spirit is nothing but the finest form of matter—fire which is the change of material elements. And this conception of spirit was not only inevitable for a theory which regarded all reality as essentially change.

On the other hand, a rationalistic Pantheism was no less essentially bound up with this conception. Stoicism was the theistic expression of the typically Greek idea of necessity which had been dramatized in the tragedies as the rock on which human passion hurled itself in vain. The inner process of Stoicism is orderly and rational. Its inner life is reason; its course is divine. God is thus the soul or law or reason of things. The true reality is reason. Not only is the process divine ordered; it is the divine life or reason itself.

Stoic monism is thus a singular combination of materialism and Pantheism—a combination that carries itself in ethics as at the same...
time a system of absolute rationalism and the very crudest naturalism. The singularity of Stoicism is not its rationalism, nor its naturalism, but the combination of these. It is a naturalism which assumes a wholly negative attitude towards desires and actual relations, because it is bound up with an identification of nature and reason. This is a conception of nature not as the actual facts, but as a developing system. It is this view of it that makes it to be made a source of ethical prescriptions—a standard of what should be—within the limits of a theory which at the same time makes reason the standard of the moral life. Stoicism therefore does not ignore the distinction of elements in reality; but it makes that distinction regarding reality as a process which is at once natural or material, and absolutely reasonable—the absolute rationality to which all elements must conform. We see this in the Stoic idea of freedom as harmony with the rational system of nature, in contrast with the bondage of irrationality and disharmony with the system.

In sharp contrast with this is the dualism of which characterizes the most important development of Greek philosophy in Plato. The problem of duality had been raised in an acute form by the Epistemic school...
in the absolute distinction between reality and appearance. This result is arrived at by carrying the process of abstraction to the furthest possible extent in the attempt to discover a ground of existence. Such a ground is maintained to be simply being. There is no reality except in the mere abstraction of existence. This of course implies the absolute unrealitv of all change. Change is simply illusion and unrealitv. There is an irreducible antagonism between seeming and being. For the phenomenal world is mutually changing. Change is its nature. But reality is unchanging. Difference is unrealitv. Unity is the sole existence. This of course is a dissolution of knowledge. It raises the problem of the possibility of a relation between the elements of reality. This was Plato's problem - to conceive a relation between being and seeming - to explain how the elements of reality can be conceived so as to admit of a relation between them.

Plato inherited the elements of a solution of this problem. Here was the suggestion of Anaxagoros - a world-ordering nous - a Reason being realized in things. This suggests a solution of the difficult of simile on the analogy of the actual work of human intelligence. It is satisfactory, as it were, to the Platonic employment of the Socratic doctrine
of notions, as the basis of a metaphysical construction of the relation of reality and phenomena.

Plato's theory is based on a theory of knowledge—the theory that true knowledge is knowledge of notions. The explanation of Plato's transition from this logical or epistemological point of view to a metaphysical construction is his Greek realism. He believed in the reality of the objects of knowledge. And since true knowledge is of notions or conceptions and of things, conceptions, it follows that conceptions have a real or objective existence. From the point of view of their real existence, i.e., metaphysically, notions are ideas. Such ideas are of course far removed from the simple "Being" of Parmenides; indeed, the very start from the point of view of knowledge places Plato at the opposite pole from the Eleatics. It finally excludes the absolutes of abstraction and denial of the possibility of concrete reality. Relation to concrete particulars is essential to the Ideas themselves; this was what constituted the problem of Platonic idealism. However, it might distinguish ideas and sensible particulars, it was compelled to recognize a relation between them. For ideas were notions regarded as objective, and their reality, as such, was their relation to particulars. In these demanding for their own reality,
they own nature, a relation to particulars, the ideas are akin to the modern idea of Spirit. Further, the idea of good is the object of the clearest knowledge. Of notions and ideas, can be known; and among ideas, the idea of good is that which is most clearly known. Thus, the idea of good can be said absolutely and thoroughly to exist. These in this way, as being, intelligibility, and perfection, are always proportionate to each other.

Particulars are unintelligible, unreal, and evil; ideas are intelligible, real, and good. And, between the chances of thought and the confusion of ignorance, lies 'theion', whose object is phenomenal: being 'so constituted as at the same time to be and not to be'. Thus, for Plato, things are my real & good & their relation to the intelligent world is ideas or universals. This principle, if fully carried out, might mean that the real world is a world where whole resistance is formed & conditioned by good; that the inner lasting nature of things is good; that evil is unreal and transitory; also, that good is an intelligent, spiritual reality. But the dark shadow of pessimism - the presence of the things of sense - lay in Plato's philosophy. Whatever may be the intention of a possible later development, in the Philostrates and Philostratus, and then seems to be ground for believing in such a development. There can yet be no doubt that the issue of Plato's accepted theory is profound, pessimistic.
istic dualism. Despite the manner of relation to particular ideas for ideas themselves, he asserts in its full manner the absolute distinction between appearance and reality. The sensible world—nature—is negative, non-existent, the source of evil and confusion. The particular is evil and unreal. The soul's true life is a continual death. Plato's principle might have been construed otherwise; it might seem to lead to the belief that things exist in relation to other things; that this relation to other things and to the world is their true reality; that therefore their nature is the fulfillment of their function, the working out in detail of the function of the whole. But this ethical idealism—which it is an undeniable element in Plato's thought—and furnishes his dominating ethical conceptions—is not worked out as a system. It forms, indeed, the only suggestion of a synthesis for the profoundly felt differences; but the abstractions are mere空洞, and Plato's attitude towards actual particular resistance remains negative. There is an unexplained persistence of evil, irrationality, and materiality. The actual is a mere copy of the intelligible. Nature in part remains set over against the now developing idea of spirit—unrepression to ideal ends—inorganic to the universal life, a body of death.
Both the points of view that have been indicated are reflected in Aristotle's metaphysical theory.

The four-fold classification of causes may resolve itself into an analysis of concrete reality (οὐσίας) or means into two elements - matter, and form or end.

These elements are not real apart from one another, but are wholly relative to one another. They exist as elements in the movement (κίνησις) or development of reality. They are not to be confused. The process is a real development. Aristotle regards the world as becoming something which it is not yet. But in any real development there are two essential elements. For all development is from something to something, therefore the two elements are distinct. But they are not separate. They exist in relation to each other. The idea of potentiality is the key to Aristotle's position. The development consists in the formation of matter or the realisation of the end of the means, and the elements or moments of this process of finality and impeccability. The lowest term is ousia, its highest is diaphora; each intermediate term is both of these, according as it is regarded from the point of view of the stage below or of that above it. Thus, while the elements are distinct, they are so only within the limits of their relation...
in the process, Aristotle thus makes the Platonic dualism of making form and matter, rational and irreal, essentially correlational elements of reality, and every stage of the movement, without exception, the correlatable potentiality of a higher reality. He thus regards reality as essentially one. At the same time he recognizes a duality of elements. He does not equate, as Stoicism had done, the distinction of actual and ideal elements. His recognition of this distinction forms the basis of his ethical system. The end of the human conduct is the realization of a rational τύπος as life-principle; it is the realization of that τύπος according to its own distinctive character as rational; but, since the human τύπος is not merely σιωπή but also ἔκφρασις, reason (λόγος) must be realized in each of these spheres; it has thus, in relation to the end in question, a two-fold function, to apprehend being as being, and to constitute morality; it is the source both of intellectual and practical virtue. This of course illustrates in ethics the metaphysical division from a system of monism, such as led in Stoicism to a purely negative attitude towards desire, while a similar principle with an atomistic psychology and an empirical attitude towards metaphysics issued, as with the Epicureans, in the idea of desire as absolute standard.
In the later stages of pre-Christian thought, Greek philosophy was being profoundly modified. On the one hand, the feeling of unity which had characterized it was giving way. The Greek feeling towards nature had been that typified in the meekness of Greek art and the naive anthropo-

morphism of Greek religion; and part of this feeling towards nature had been the identification of the individual with his city or nation. But now this was at an end. A new view of the world was forced on the reluctant Greeks; the old geography was no longer credible. Man no longer felt himself whole at home in the world—a part of the system of things. This new view of the world, as of the position of Greece—combined with other elements to destroy the old national and civic feeling. Questions were raised about the state and its position. Such questions could have one consequence for the traditions and sentiments to which they were aimed. Then there was the actual fact of the destruction of Greek power. It was for a republic and not a conquered state that the Greeks had felt reverence. So the individual no longer felt himself at one with the state; and the feeling of independence and isolation was reflected in the consciousness of nature. This feeling of isolation, with respect
both to nature and society, is universally characteristic of late Greek and Roman thought. The whole Latin philosophy—while apart from profound and systematic asceticism is profoundly sceptical—concerns of distinctions. Its logic is nomination; it disparates knowledge. Its questions are practical and personal—concerning the attainment of individual good. This Scepticism is at the root of the atomistic historicism of the Ciceronians for the intensified consciousness of moral issues which we find in the revival of Epicureanism within Roman Stoicism; while it is no less present in the Neo-Platonic attempt to transcend a knowledge regarded as essentially inadequate. In their manifestations of the sense of alienation from nature and society, we also find a distressing consciousness of the individual. This indeed is the most important consequence of the dread and abandonment of Greek philosophy. With the distressing consciousness of self, added came with the loss of the simple feeling of unity with nature, there came the elements of a corruption of Spirit. Aching as it did from the feeling of alienation and dissatisfaction with the actual, this corruption naturally took the form of an ideal or subjective demand. It was an ideal the means for whom realisation was not present—a demand which nothing actual
could only satisfy. The way to it had been prepared by the attempt to conceive man as positive rationalist, as the antitype of conscious life; and it was in Mr. Platonism, which was a real consequence of the ideal theory, that the attempt to reach a synthesis, caught rather than that of nature, had been made with the greatest intensity.

Such a demand at all events prepared the way for, if it did not already create, the idea of spirit. This expresses the content and point of view of Christianity, which is essentially the religion of spirit. The generic idea of the idea does not concern us. Whether the Christian idea be Jewish or Greek, or, as some would like, partly Jewish and partly Greek is a question which we must omit to consider here. It is at all events certain that, from whatever source it came, the idea of spirit in Christianity received a new development in Christianity. And it is no less certain that spirit, as the Christian idea, was the almost exclusive topic of speculation during the early centuries, at all events, of the Christian period.

The substitution of "life in the Spirit" for "life according to nature" as its ideal, marks a real step in the development of the active life. Indeed it is in a new view of the active life and its
universal relations that the idea of spirit manifests itself. The place of the new idea is practical not speculative. What is found is not a due to speculative pre-mundane; but a fuller satisfaction of desire and of the moral and religious consciousnes. The explanation of this is spirit. Besides this new interest, all other things seem for the time unimportant. The negative attitude towards the actual world is continued and even accentuated by Christian thought. In this connection, it is spirit only that is thought of as a positive existence, and a proper object for speculation. Nature falls out of account and is even discredited. The true world is spirit; that is the world is transitory; nature is at the best only a partial manifestation of spirit—a mere incident—in no sense independent, but as it were subservient to spirit itself, and an inconsequential part of the working of spirit. Nature, indeed, had given way. Nationalism, yet with nationalism in religion? in morals, had shown itself weak before an advancing world, going to nature is neglected and forgotten, and speculation is absorbed in the task of conceiving spirit. Such speculation is the theology of the Fathers and their antagonists in history—the enthroned spirit.
This speculation may be regarded legitimately enough as a new development. Yet it is no deeper escape from the influence of Greek thought. The very idea of defining and theorizing religious conceptions came to the fathers of theology from Greek sources. And the two main tendencies of Greek thought, which we have noticed, are directly present in the theology of the early church. On the one hand we see the Stoic monism in that way of thinking which regards God as immanent in the world - as the eternal universal reason of actual things. On the other hand we have the element of dualism which is expressed in the idea of opposition between the world itself, in asceticism, and aversion to external interests.

Both these tendencies were strong in early Christian thought. It is to be noted that both of them in this phase of their development are the basis in theories of Spirit - theories which recognize nature as an expression of Spirit and apart from this expression or as an unaccountable devil root of opposition to the positive and eternal goodness of Spirit.

Both these apparently opposed tendencies exist...
and have a real plan in the theological theory in which the development of the red Church culminates. Augustine is so deeply influenced by both, that he has been placed some among dualists while others regard his system as all but Pantheistic. Such ambiguity belongs to his attempt to mediate, on the one hand, the naturization of the cosmic - on the other, the dualism of Manichæans. The questions here are as to the source of evil and the possibility of deliverance from it. Augustine neither admits the Pelagian theory - that man can, by his own effort escape from evil - nor his own as of the real nature of things, as the Manichæans did. He affirms the necessity of redemption, and denies the possibility of self-deliverance, the sinned and corrupted will of man. On the other hand, he makes God - the eternal spirit - to be the sole source of good and truth. Knowledge and true virtue originate in the insight or faith that unites us to God. The work of deliverance is characteristic of man as he is. He is alienated from God. Augustine is so truly conscious of the distinction of God and the world (Spirit and Nature) that he even denies the title "nature" (since it equals "geniture") to the created world.

On the other hand, while the world does not mean
at from God, but is created in him "out of nothing" it remains the result of the "Will" of God. It is wholly dependent on God for its existence & continuance.

Subject to the limitations of the created—which in him is self-subjection—is the state of natural (actual) man. It is this self-subjection that is evil, so not matter but man, man, & he cannot realize the idea of truth & goodness. This freedom—rationality—belongs to God, and is his gift of grace to man. Augustine thus supplements his idea of the sovereignty of God and created beings, & the idea of a redemptive & revelational sacrifice wherein God relates the created beings to himself. The failure of the world-power of the eternal city which was the hope of nature & natural human life—is to be atoned for by the City of God—the kingdom of spirit, which is the new creation of the grace of God, and membership in which is relation to God—the true King good.

Augustine's principle of interpretation is thus theological. The relation of nature & spirit consists in the universal relation of the practical consciousness. The true ends of that consciousness are attained, not by nature independently of spirit, but only spiritually. So nature depends on spirit for its value no less than for its existence.

This is Augustine's interpretation of Paul. It forms the determining principle of Christian theology of the theory which has proved itself in the religious consciousness of Christianity.
But this apparent reconciliation did not settle the speculative problem as to the relation of Nature and Spirit. The position of Augustine indeed has been found satisfactory as an expression of the religious consciousness of Christendom; it is so because it recognizes a real relation of nature to spirit—and of the actual individual to God—and at the same time a real distinction—religious, expressed as the transcendence of God, and the total dependence of Nature and of man as natural.

But the historical result—now assured—had to be mediated to human reason. And philosophy as 'scholastic' was devoted to this task.

The presupposition of scholasticism was that the Church doctrine can be rationalized, and on the basis of this presupposition it proceeded to rationalize it. The mode of this rationalizing was typical of the life of the period. System, subordination, classification, were the ruling intellectual ideas. The feeling of a new and world-wide spiritual unity was predominant—a unity dependent on one God and given effect to in coordinate spheres of Pope and Church, of Emperors, of Church-State. It was the period of types. The idea of Spirit as
an idea to be lived in was not within its reach. Thought was not appreciated in symbolic representations. And this condition transferred itself to ideas themselves. The idea of explanation was reduced to that of a systematic arrangement of clauses regarded as real existence. And so the system of logical realism took its rise.

This system is half a theory of the relation of nature and spirit. Designed to rationalise not only the abstract life of the ecclesiastical community, but also the dogmas of the Church, and especially the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity—its primary application was limited within the Church; the theological purpose it was meant to serve, and康德系统, indicated the limit which the theological recognition of difference set to the realistic tendency. But, beyond the pale of Church authority, and stirred to new greater zeal for its principle and reactionary dualistic nomination, Realism went the logical length of its presupposition and became an absolute Pantheism—an identification of Nature and Spirit.

Such identification, and even the orthodox tendency to it, was by no means unchallenged. The criticism, whether it appeared as nominalist assertion of individual things or as an affirmation of will as the chief thought
as the basis of reality, has one meaning. It is a denial of the realistic unification of things in spirit, a negation of objective reality, a consciousness of the inadequacy of the unity that rested on the logic of single identity. Issuing in a contradiction of dogma and reflection it resulted the problem for modern philosophy, the abandonment of the scholastic attempts and the renewed antithesis of authority and opinion, universal and particulars, spirit and nature.

The rediscovery of nature and the individual forms the true starting-point of modern philosophy. Stimulated by the events of learning this two-fold discovery assumed profound importance in the Protestant Reformation, and the growth of Natural Science in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

The Reformation was more than a purely negative reaction of the individual. Each act in the political upheavals which accompanied the new religious movement. But that movement itself was dominated by the consciousness not simply of man's isolation as an individual, but also of man as spiritual and in direct self-determining relation to Spirit. The defined consciousness of self that produced and was intensified by revolt against an authority now felt as external and irrational, was at the
same time a consciousness of duty and with spiritual relations. It was a consciousness of God - of universal relations of thought and action. Such relations were no longer recognized as adequately estimated in the actual institutions of Church and State. But man's nature and the principles of his thought and life were placed in relation to the very innermost life of the Universe. And it was this consciousness of a universal relation to which no symbol was adequate that turned men's attention upon man on the problem of personal life - its infinite issues and its vast capacities and needs.

So with the new development of science. It was not simply a sceptical dissatisfaction with the logic of the schools, or an antagonism to traditional and authoritative beliefs. This negative attitude towards received opinion was of course an element in its growth. But it might even be said to be its primary element. Its mood was a hesitant tentative and irresolute adherence to tradition and prejudice. But there was a real and not merely negative reason for this mood. There was the consciousness of nature - the new and startling recognition of
a world of actualities, rich, complex, and yet various, seeming to be not the mere dependent
product of a life that was not its own, but itself
independent with life, and in all its complex intelle-
gittal. It was this consciousness of actuality, even
of an apparent independence of nature, that
made the formulation of scholastic logic contum-
ble and vain, and called for a direct sub-
mission endeavor to know the object that
now seemed to be seen "with openness".

So in the consciousness of spirit and nature,
and with belief in the accessibility of both, the
modern problem of the natural and spiritual
and man's relation to them, began to be seen to
intelligible and to claim solution.

In Descartes and Bacon a systematic attempt is
made to return develop the dual problem of
spirit and nature. What is chiefly to be noticed
in Bacon is his simple and direct interest in
nature and actuality. His philosophy is nothing
but a careful and partial systematic analysis
of facts of experience. His ideal is the extension
in a developed experience of knowledge of con-
crete actual reality. Such an ideal, resembling
the mood of his nation and period, is also full of
meaning for subsequent English philosophy. Howev-
its subject-matter, its intensity, its mood, might alter. English philosophy was destined to remain at the direct Bayesian point of view, in respect of its method and its ideal.

A totally different ideal is that of Descartes. His self-knowledge is deeper than that of Bacon. His problem is larger. He aims not simply at an extension of knowledge and a reorganisation and development of its method, but that at a restatement of its principles and an examination of its ground. The motive of his enquiry is not perhaps obvious. Certainly he does not take his subjectivism very seriously. Its main effect in his theory is to give bareness and vigour to the certainty which he develops. The true significance of Descartes in the development of the theory of natural spirit is more obvious.

It consists in his abstract separation and disassociation of the two elements. He finds consciousness to be the one certain undeniable reality. The existence of self as a conscious being is what no one can think away. Thus states of consciousness are primary and self-evidently real. And we are certain of them and of ourselves as subject to them apart from all relation to anything else. Thus for Descartes the relation of thought to anything else does not really belong to it. He does
not, in affirming the existence of self as a thinking substance, use thought as an interpretation of existence; he rather focuses on abstract conceptions of existence on the thought which he affirms. In regarding thought as substance, and so as independent and complete in itself, he ignores the very relation which is essential to the meaning of thought or of the self. With an idea of thought thus abstract and substantiated no real relation or normal relation can be found between thought and things. Establishing a “tour de force” the reality of extended substance, Descartes is wholly at a loss to relate it to thought as previously conceived. In point of fact, he was not entitled on his own grounds to the idea of an extended substance. Such substance does not follow from, or belong to any real necessity to, thought conceived as he had conceived it. The idea of thought as a substance, or of ideas as unperceived Self-dependent, is fatal to any attempt at a subsequent establishment of relations to thought. If thought is seen conceived as independent of such relations they cannot afterwards be shown to belong to its real nature. Descartes attempts to establish the relations in question, and the reality of the extended world, a return to the question
on the rationality of things, of body is inadequate, because it is purely mechanical and only brings out clearly the impossibility of finding objective relations between substances real independently of them. So in the very beginning of modern philosophy its problem is defined. If there are two substances, how can they interact? If spirit and matter are real independently of any arbitrary relation between them, how do they come to be related to one another at all? How is knowledge possible?

The unsatisfactoryness of Descartes' antagonism and of the mechanical attempts to reconcilation, and spirit above all, of occasionalist transcendentalism and matter to Epicurus' denial of the dualism of substance.

In Epicurus we have the same combination with which we have already noticed in Stoicism, of a rationalistic materialism and determinism with a nominalistic logic apparently at war with the pantheism of the system. But Epicurus' whole point of view is that of the modern world. Even his universalism does not make him remote from the subjective standpoint. If the distinction of Epicuresian from Stoic thus seems clear, to mark the difference between ancient and modern conceptions of
the elements of existence. The Stoic logos is thought; the flux of things is extension. The idea of an individual or personal life as disappearing and belonging to the central unit of things is thus present even in the modern system to which such an idea is no more completely foreign.

Epinomis's theory is absolute monism. There can be but one substance. From the very meaning of substance, its duality is impossible. Epinomis's principle, or point of view, is thus, however crude its working out may be, of the highest importance. It is the idea of a single and unchangeable necessity of a unit, in relation to which alone things have reality, and apart from which nothing can be said to exist; and this idea issuing as it does from antagonism to the Cartesian dualism is a variation of the principle of philosophy which is an investigation of system and cannot be in some sense monistic just as it is always idealism. As against the abstract gunnance and substantiation, then, of nature and spirit, Epinomy affirms their indivisibility unit. They cannot intercede with each other; the modification of each is independent of the other; but they modify concomitantly because
both are but attributes or aspects of one eternal
necessary substance. What has to be observed how- 
now is that despite the thoroughness of the unity of
substance, there is no real relation between
its attributes nature and spirit. They are only
related to one another in virtue of their
common dependence on substance. There
is nothing in either of them that implies
the other. And this failure of the theory to
give effect to the very which it was
designed to maintain is due to the abstract
character of the unity which it ascribes to
substance. Nature and spirit are not really related
but are superadded, as attributes or qualifications,
to substance. They are really only generalizations
of the elements of human experience regarded
in that absolute separateness from one
another in which Descartes had placed them.
And the idea of substance is not a real
unification of related elements — a unity to
be intuited in the light of its manifesta-
tions — but a mere substantiated unity, which,
instead of being both nature and spirit, is neither,
and can therefore not explain the relation
which they bear to one another. It is
an affirmation of identity; and this is its truth; but
the identity that it affirms cannot even itself remain

The idea of system is further developed by Leibniz. He also makes the idea of substance the basis of his theory; but his conclusion of it is that it is not single but essentially a multilateral. Individuality is the principle of existence and this implicis plurality. Existence is a plurality of monads. In the idea of such monads, however, the duration which had been around five centuries and had come to Spinoza, is denied. The individualistic conception of things, as real apart from one another, is transmuted in the idea of monads whose very being is a reflection of the universal life. The unity of things consists, for Leibniz, in the interrelation of all particular things. This is the meaning of an established harmony. Spirit is simply consciousness of reflection on this universality of relation. Not grounded in

of this idea of nature. But Leibniz's whole view of reality is spiritual. He sees concrete individuals, not just as negative, and real only in relation to that which is not themselves, but as real in relation to one another and existing only in their mutual relations. Thomas, on his view of it, is wholly spiritual. The universal life constitutes each particular element. And
that life, in its clear and full reality, is spirit. The formal development of this idea of system, which is an ontological idealism on the basis of the principles of continuity, contradiction, and sufficient reason, constitutes the system of Wolff.

But the direct influence of Descartes' individualism has been of greater historical importance than its influence within the systems which arose in antagonism to, yet profoundly influenced, his dualism. This was his influence on the development of English philosophy—an influence rather of his method and his presuppositions than of his positive results.

The elements of his theory which are historically most important are the epistemological and psychological turn which he gave to philosophy, and the individualistic assumption as to the nature of thought which dominated his whole theory.

To trace the consequences of this in detail, and to follow the development of English philosophy as influenced by Descartes would be beside our present purpose. We must content ourselves with a general consideration of the significance of that development, from the point of view of the theory of the relations of nature and spirit. The general development of philosophy during this stage at all events, took
the form of an attempt to evade the consequences, without denying the presupposition, of Cartesian duration. Such an attempt to explain the relation of thought to things without giving up the idea of nature & spirit as mutually exclusive, had, in the main, two directions. We have already seen it in the form of an attempt to conceive nature as spirit. In English philosophy it takes the form of a construction natural construction put upon spirit. Such an attempt was congenial with the genius of English thought and was rendered still more natural by the Baconian empiricism and inductive interpretation of reality.

Assuming the independent reality, if of a thinking substance in the Cartesian sense, and of ideas as states of consciousness unforced to reality, and so unmediated, English philosophy endeavoured to explain the synthesis of such units of feeling in knowledge. Berkeley's criticism of the mere assumption of the idea of 'extended' or 'material' substance & the limitation of knowledge to unperceived subjective states seems at first sight to lead to a spiritual conclusion of reality. To Berkeley himself it essentially was an expression of nature in terms of spirit; and it led at all
wants to the suggestion of an idealism which regarded all reality as spiritual and all knowledge as interpretation of the Eternal, the Finite, and the Spirit. But the historical consequence of this criticism was quite different. The transcendental ideas expressed a perception of reality other than themselves, and not merely significant of spiritual any more than of material reality. The suggestion of Spirit had no real relation to unformed ideas. Instead, the notion of Spirit, Spirit disappears more than matter-thinking no less than material substance—in the flux of unrelated sensations. The idea of Spirit as a substance, and of ideas as isolated and unformed phenomena, is in fact fatal to the possibility of the relation which is essential to Spirit. Indeed, our sensationalist criticism had already virtually reduced substance to series of ideas. His idea for spiritual substance could not be effective against his own criticisms. Spirit was practically identified, and explicitly there, reduced to ideas, in their different kinds. Spirit was thus simple phenomenon—the mere aggregate of series of conscious states. In being thus regarded as phenomenal, spirit was naturalized. The pre-supposition which ignored its distinctive character and regarded it as
an ecstatic substance and needed the thorough-going application of the subjective criticism which it neces-
sarily demanded, in order to yield the idea of a concurrence of spirit as simply phenomenal in nature. Thus the
spiritual condition of nature which had issued in Wolff's
deductive formalism was met by a reduction of every-
thing to nature, a reduction of man merely, a knowledge
of phenomena of consciousness.
A similar process is represented in English ethical theory.
By Hobbes and his successors critics, the moral life is
looked at as a simple phenomenon of physical and mental
life. Feeling and desire form only the basis of the
inherent sensations held in the English theory of knowledge.
This is most clearly of notice in the 'Moral Science'
writers who attempted to restore the moral synthesis
which remained still intact in the philosophy of Hobbes.
Now attacked the ethical or selfish view of life on mental
psychological grounds—not a true idea of spirit, but
a question of fact, as to the actual nature of human
feelings. This argument against ethical egoism was simply
an assertion of the existence of disinterested passions as
an element in human nature, and of such an moral
feeling as a fact. Even in Burke the authoritarianism
of conscience is nothing more than its relation
to the feelings of the individual, and the individualistic
point of view is never really transcended. Even such
whence as we find in Burke and Paley, to the relation of Conscience. Obligation, to God as supreme Spirit, do not what the moral life to Spirit, otherwise than for arbitrary or external means. Just as this theology is subjective, and never amounts to the assertion of reason in things, so their ethical point of view is never more than a study of futures as they belong to the particular constitution of human nature. Such then is the origin of naturalism in modern philosophy. It is to be observed that, to this development of philosophy in England, we owe the idea and point of view of psychology. The idea of observing and clarifying mental phenomena is Locke's achievement. And in the course of the development, which we have indicated, of the theory of knowledge and morality, the point of view and subject matter of a science of consciousness had became fixed. Mental phenomena are henceforth conceived as objects not simply of direct consciousness but also of a systematic and ordered knowledge. They are thus regarded as natural, in that wide sense of the word, in which it indicates the kind of knowledge generally.

The success of this reduction of spirit to nature, as a general philosophy, was of course widely different. The effect of its promulgation as an adequate interpretation of
knowledge and morality of man's relation experience act
in cognition - was indeed questionable. But it was
chiefly effective as a proof of the impossibility of ex-
plaining either nature or spirit from the point of
view of pure naturalism. Satisfactory as a point
of view for the study of mental phenomena, the
psychological standpoint could not be regarded as
adequate metaphysically - as an interpretation of the
relations of nature and spirit. No sooner did
it receive its logical development in this use,
than the inadequacy of its interpretation of ex-
prience called attention to the essentially abstract
character of its conceptions. The relations of nature
and spirit were not explained - naturalism any
more than - dogmatic spiritualism. Phenomenalism
was seen to be a real dissolution of knowledge - a
departure from the objective point of view. Reid &
Kant raised the problem anew; and it was un-
veiled by Kant in the form in which it has been
discussed by subsequent thinkers. The idea of criticism
of an interpretation of experience carries us beyond
the point of view of abstract individualism - and
also beyond the one-sided resolutions of Cartesian dualism
which we have described. It is at this point therefore,
and in the light of the critical idea, that we begin
the substantive discussion of the subject.
The problem which we intend is to explain experience - to account for knowledge and conduct as they exist in human life. Men are regarded, on the one hand, as purely and simply natural - as the result or part of the result of the natural process, which men have come to be what he is. And this is held to be an adequate explanation. On the other hand we have the view which regards knowledge, experience as essentially significant, and so not self-explained, a statement of the process in which it has come to be.

The question now at issue is as to the nature of explanation - whether what is generally called natural explanation is really explanation at all, i.e. whether or revere of facts as in its most developed form is in any degree calculated to explain the existence and relations of facts which constitutes nature. We have to determine what is the laws of nature really are - whether they an explanatory or descriptive.

Now, as has been indicated, a real distinction between these two modes of knowing - describing and explaining. A description is a statement of what things are. It is a statement of their nature and their relations to other things. But when we know this, so far as it can be known from this point of view, it remains to ask further what they mean. And the preliminary question at issue is whether
on knowledge of what things are enables us to say what they mean, or in other words, whether the meaning of things is limited to their actual present nature.

The preliminary discussion of the actual support of the laws of nature is of more than secondary importance. If they are not explanations but mere descriptions of a process—then they cannot contradict any explanation of the facts. Of course our knowledge of the facts is what enables us to test the adequacy of any explanation suggested. But no description can ever be explanatory of what it describes.

Take as an example such a generalisation as Darwin's great contribution to the theory of reproduction—the Law of Multiplication. He generalises, from facts which need not be detailed, that "the multiplication of any organism is at a rate in inverse to the degree of its individuation." This is a clear instance of a special natural law or generalisation: it is to be observed that it is a proposed or a statement of a uniformity among phenomena—an inverse ratio obtaining between rate of multiplication and degree of differentiation. It is further shown that this relation depends on the facts generalised in the laws of nutrition and growth, according to which the greater extent of surface relating to bulk, in the more highly differentiated organism, speeds the process of metabolism.
to go on longer without a rest; that in their nature
which is independent of the metabolic change, which conditions
life is shown to depend on the conservation of energy;
and this is the last word of physical science in this
connection; the statement of actual relations, that is
to say, ends with an enunciation of the simplest
and most general facts to which the original
phenomenon could be reduced. Now all this is
not explanation; it is a statement of certain
processes, and a reduction of a relation of them
to certain other processes. But the general process is
not explained; it is not stated and simplified.
This generalisation speaks of causes & effects; but
not of cause & effect; it tells us what certain
things are, but not how they operate or what they
mean. In fact experience (and science is just
experience) tells us what process are going on, but not
what they mean; it is thus only answering what
is an answer to the question to be an answer to
a quite distinct question that we come to think
of a plurality of antagonistic explanations. This
mistake has not always been on one side. Man has
often tried to answer the 'what' of science and experi-
ence & the 'how' of philosophy; and the mistake is
a very serious one: it is one, however, which is bound
to find correction soon; it cannot long be lived up
to, without collision with some underlying fact. The
other mistake is more common, and prima facie less
obvious. It is what we call Materialism. This
is of course a loose way of using this word; some
people are accustomed to call all the results of
physical science ‘materialistic’; in point of fact
none of them are; they are taken to be so chiefly
people who are not interested in the meaning of
things and who take every statement to be an
assertion about that. But it is not ‘materialism’
to say that men are descended from cetan-
rhine apes; it is a statement (true or false) of
facts and events; it is not an explanation; if one
should say it was an explanation this would
be materialistic. Materialism is only what some
of its supporters call it—‘the explanation of the
more developed by the less developed’. But this is a wholly illegiti-
mate procedure. A description of a natural pro-
cess in which development is going on is of course
intelligible and legitimate. But it may well be what things are.
The more developed cannot be explained by the less developed.
We may assent to the statement that ‘matter is the
potency of all terrestrial life’; but we cannot
understand, from experience of matter, how this comes
to be so. And, if we can be sure that matter
is such a potency, this is not because when we say
matter, we mean "the nature of all terrestrial life". So far as this is an explanation, of a relative kind, it is an explanation not of life but of matter.

What is really meant by this view of interpretation, which regards it as combative and analysis of conditions, is just that experience can tell us nothing more than what things are and in what order they have come to be; and this is what we have insisted on.

But this may mean either that the meaning of things is limited to their actual present content, or that they must be regarded from some point of view other than that of the experience which tells us only what they are. It is this last construction that must be adopted. How the problem of explanation arises for and within experience itself will be exhibited in greater detail later on. Meanwhile it is only to be observed that any statement of what things are raises inevitably the question how they are.

And this is the problem of metaphysics. Metaphysics is the science of the previous question. It is criticism of experience and of the conclusions that determine it—ing the implications of experience knowledge and action. The meaning of such criticism is evident. Experience cannot solve its own contradictions or vindicate its own points of view.

We find in experience mutually exclusive de-
declarations arrived at, and a contradiction arises which is insoluble & experience. The only possibility of its solution consists in relating determining principles to one another and limiting them from another - i.e. systematizing them.

Every science has its own category, and is a development of experience from a certain point of view. And just because each science - each development of experience - is the application of a category, so it cannot determine the rhythm of its category’s application. Criticism of experience is determination of the rhythm to which categories apply. It is a criticism of principles of experience, and so interpretation of experience itself.

Of course, each science culminates in an attempt to answer questions as to its category - to interpret - to become metaphysical. In the idea of evolution, for example, the category of cause & effect, or sum of metaphysics, is transformed. Causality, in its restricted modern sense, tells us of results and not of ends; while the idea of evolution involves the relation of end & means. The notion of “rhythm,” which is implied in evolution, is akin to the idea of causation. But, in this and many other cases, scientific sciences tend to go beyond & limit their own categories, and to determine the rhythm of the application of principles. Such a procedure is no means free from objection. The point of view of
development of science

a special meaning is always apt to be attached when it is
not relevant. An instance of this is the common
error of regarding spiritual mental life from points
of view rising applicable to external nature.
Such a mistake is partly induced by the metaphorical
use of physical expressions inevitable in this
connection. For example, it is perhaps necessary to
think of things as external to the mind that
knows them; and there can be no objection
to such a method of expression if we
recognise its metaphorical character; but
we must not become victims to such
figures of speech, and apply categories of
mechanical relation to material to which
they are wholly inadequate. The laws of things
being 'external to consciousness', as if consciou-
ness was in space and could be external
to things & thy to it, as they are to one another.
Such language, when used rigorously, ignores
the distinctive character of thought, and
makes it a thing among other things, so
that it soon becomes anomalous and fin-
ally incoherent, instead of being the
source and possibility of explanation.

Confusions of this kind are not accidental; they are
imperative from metaphysical unphilosophical from the
attempt to determine empirically the application of a principle of experience. Experience is wholly inadequate to such a task. Just because it is always the application of categories, it cannot be the system of that application. It is not self-intuiting; we need a science of principles—whose point of view must be the category of categories. Again, experience cannot determine the logical order of categories. It cannot relate them to one another. Their relation can only be made out from the point of view of this science and of the rationality that they require.

The attempt which experience makes to explain and organize itself shows the need of explanation; the failure of that attempt shows the need of a principle of explanation, and of a method whose province it is to explain the possibility of phenomenal existence and to show the meaning and necessity of its concatenation. This is the oldest idea of metaphysics, as well as the newest. Aristotle's 'causes' are principles of explanation; they are determinations of knowable reality. And for us, as for him, philosophy is the science of such determinations or principles, conceiving them as necessary.
Metaphysics has for its object the real. It does not take to do with the thinkable, but with the actual; not with those relations and events that can be conceived, but with those that exist and can be known. It has to explain phenomenal reality: it thus arises from, and is concerned with, the fact of change; for it is this fact that dominates phenomenal reality. Change is the object of study of simple and of specialized experience of nature: and it is the motion of metaphysics, which is simply the doctrine of the explanation of change, arising, as we saw, from the conflict of experiences of change.

According the idea of metaphysics is not just unity, but the universe as a system, a rationally determined whole. One can not explicitly point out what we have all along taken to be the nature of the unity with which Metaphysics deals. It is a unity of things: it is not a unity of which we make for things that exist apart from it. It is in the last degree objective: and it is as objective that we take to do with it. It must not be supposed that we first have things and then mentally contribute to them the means that make them
causes and effects. That is simply Hume's assertion, with an unexplained 'reason', substituted for an unexplained 'custom'. We know things as causes and effects; we know them in this relation; it belongs to their objectivity. We make them objects just as much as we make them causes and effects. Relations are the work of reason; it is reason that constructs experience. And, just on this account, the relations are in things as experienced. Things are in relation; their being is related being; if it were not it never could become so. A 'thing', which existed apart from all relation could never enter a system of relations; for it could only do so in virtue of some element of unit - some potentiality of relation - a relation to some principle of system-synthesis. If things existed apart from all relations - apart from the system of names - the attempt to relate them would be futile and inconceivable. It is because their unit - their individual existence consists in their relations, that they are knowable.

The applicability of categories is due to the fact that nature - the system of experience - is changed.
with reason, and has a life, an order, a rationality of its own, which we can know and realize. In fact there is no known or known-unknown that is without form. The indeterminate is the unknowable; it is also the unreal.

Of course the real is not and cannot be known to us except in relations; and so far it must be admitted that knowledge is relative. But, if this be supposed to discredit human knowledge, to make it illusory, we must ask what knowledge can be real. If water choke us, what shall we drink? If to know is to relate, and to relate is to falsify, the case of knowledge is evidently bad. But in such a case what does ‘false’ or ‘illusory’ mean? The distinction between ‘knowledge’ and ‘opinion’, between truth and falsehood, real and unreal, is a distinction within knowledge, and not between knowledge and something else. Seeing and being cannot be compared (and so what seems cannot be said not to be) unless attention and reality are abstrusely within a relating consciousness. Truth and falsehood belong to judgments, and judgments are of relations. When we say that anything has turned out not really to be what it seemed, we mean that we have discovered that it is not related as we previously supposed. The di
tinction is not between knowledge and that which is not knowledge, but between a judgment which is consistent with certain relations regarded as known and one which is not. The unification of such a distinction is that reality is ultimately rational; it assumes that the relations which constitute the real world form a system, so that, of two contradictory judgments restricting reality, one must be false. Relation is the form of all knowledge; its objectivity means that reality is a system.

It follows, then, from the view taken of the nature of relation, that the questions as to what things are and what they mean cannot be absolutely settled. The nature of things is relation. But relation implies system. The relations of things, as objects of knowledge, constitute a system. It is as belonging to such a system that they have meaning. The meaning of things is thus their nature—themselves regarded as recurring—looked at from the point of view of the system. If we can know the objective principle—the principle of the system—we shall be able in the light of it to interpret—all the meaning of our experience and its objects. Except in so far as we are able to do this, we do not really know even the nature of these objects. That nature, as relation, depends on the system; and the know-
way of it cannot be regarded as complete unless it is known in the system which it engages and which gives it its meaning. How far this is possible is a question that must meantime be postponed. It has now to be shown how the mass of intuibilization is involved in semi-cum itself, and at the same time how the meaning of things the principle of their intuibilization belongs to their own nature, and is not an addition to it at once.

The distinction between the problems in question has already been emphasized. But, from the real relation between them, that distinction is no means far from difficulties peculiar to itself.

Such difficulties culminate and come to an acute crisis in determining the relations of psychology and metaphysics, as there are exemplified in the disciplines e.g. of ethics and logic.

It is of course quite plain that psychology is a science - in respect of its method and legitimate point of view it is a natural science. It is the science of the individual consciousness. It regards this
consciousness as an object, a phenomenon, or a series of phenomena. It observes it, examines with it, infers about it, studies its connection with other series of facts related to it. Such a science might seem not to be much more metaphysical than biology is. It is descriptive and not explanatory. Phenomena of consciousness can no more explain one another than phenomena of organisms can. 'Mental' phenomena are as far from explaining anything as 'material' phenomena are.

But there is a special relation between psychology and metaphysics, in their commonness of subject-matter. The subject-matter of both is res verum. Psychology is a science of res verum in a double sense. It is an expository science just as biology is. But it is also an the science of res verum just in the same way as biology is the science of life. Not only its data but its investigations also are of res verum. It not only starts from res verum, as every science must do, but it also returns to res verum with this. Psychology is thus the descriptive science of res verum.

Metaphysics, on the other hand, is the explan...
ation of experience. And as much it is clearly related to psychology. The essence of the relation consists in this - that the relating principles of all human experience form ultimately the subject-matter of psychology, while the interpretation of this experience, and so the objective synthesis or concretization of its principles is the problem of metaphysics.

It is thus apparent, in criticism of human experience that the relations of nature and the spirit must be investigated. It is a fact to which all particular experiences or facts are related. In interpreting it, we interpret them. Our view of the relation of nature and spirit, of the meaning of things, will depend on our view of experience itself.

Now in the main, two ways in which experience is explained. It is regarded, on the one hand as a simple aggregate or result of unrelated units of feeling - units which simply come to relate themselves to one another. On the other hand, we have the view which regards intelligence as active, in knowledge, and explains experience as the result or embodiment of a synthesis.

The significance for our present purpose of
the question which of these as ways of explaining experience we are to adopt, is, that it is on this question that the correct theory of the relation of spirit to nature really turns.

If many is independent of intelligence and experience can be explained as the product of sensations, then no relation of spirit to nature can be made out. Many must, in such a case, be regarded as essentially void of meaning; to understand it would be hopeless, whatever construction we might put upon it would be of your subjective import - nothing more, in any case, than the effect of one element in consciousness on another. If the objectivity of the world be regarded as independent of a synthetic principle such as intelligence, its meaning dissolves; its relation to spirit is denied, and there is no longer any place for the idea of it as belonging to a system.

But the real intrinsic difficulties of such a sensationalist theory of knowledge can best be explained, I criticise of such an assertion of it as we have, e.g. in Schleiermacher.

Schleiermacher says that the universal forms of relations, which become universal forms of our consciousness, are of two orders - relations...
of sequence and relations of coexistence, of which the one is original, and the other derivative. Sequence is given in every change of consciousness, coexistence, not originally given in a consciousness whose static are serial, is distinguished when certain relations of sequence are found to have their times presented in consciousness in either order with equal facility; while the others are presented only in one order. Here are sequences known; the others are coexistences. Coexistent consciousness distinguish those, and generate an abstract conception of each. Time and Space are consciousness are generated as other abstractions are generated from other conceptions. Time and Space are not original conditions of consciousness. Space is generated out of experiences of individual positions—involving resistance and tension. Thus are experiences of form. And so with time.

It would of course seem no purpose to dispute the statement that "the experiences out of which, during the evolution of intelligence, this abstract of all coexistences (Space) has been developed—generated, an experiences of individual positions as assimilated to touch." Experience is admitted of
the concrete, and the question at issue is not primarily as to the origin of abstract conceptions, but as to the origin of concrete experiences. This concrete experiences is what Ebenezer assumes; and it is his view of its explanation that is in question. The question is how it comes to pass that resistance and muscular tension give experiences of position, what the character of that consciousness must be, which translates 'resistance' and 'muscular tension' and 'change', into 'position', and 'order' (resistance and 'muscular tension', abstractly regarded, are not 'position', and feelings of change are not irreversible order). Postponing the discussion of how they are taken to be so, we must ask how it happens that, in experience, what would otherwise in mere feelings yield a consciousness of objective position and order. The fact is that, in our experience, such feelings (from sensations) cannot properly be said to exist. Everything that exists it does so spatially and temporally conditioned. Now unrelated sensations are not an element in our experience at all. We always say 'here' and 'now', and it is my because we do so that our experience is of positions and orders. Between unrelated sensations viewed as unrelated (i.e. for a mere feeling consciousness) there could
plains not in relations of sequence. We do not know time apart from sequences; neither do we know them apart from time; for time (their relation to one another) is what makes them sequences. If time were not involved in sequence, the consideration of it could never be abstracted from sequences. If positions did not involve space (were not relations in space), no sequence of them could generate the abstract conception of space. In fact, you cannot take out of sequence what it does not contain; it is because space contains is a process of determination that it is possible to abstract from it. Relations yield 'sequences of position' and order becomes the sequence determines them throughout of temporal and spatial conditions.

In his account of knowledge, Schiller takes advantage throughout of the fact that we have present to our minds the idea of a real world independent of our feelings. It is always my concern in his assertion of the 'independent reality' of the world, and indignant at the attempt made in the premises of idealism to deny it. And his assertion, that the real world is independent of the principles of intuition, gives plausibility to his explanation of our knowledge of it. In his conclusion to his own assertions, he makes relations
of sequence and coexistence realities independent, not simply of individual perceptions, but of all intelligence, and, with this assumption, finds it easy to construct a universe out of feelings, because it no longer remains to indicate the process in which consciousness receives the feelings produced by things; and the process is tacitly identified with the sequence of a consciousness not merely limited but objective. Accordingly, conscious feelings are identically identified with relations of sequence, which are primary; and from them an abstract system of coexistence, which is secondary, becomes not originally given in consciousness when states an idea. Relations of sequence are distinguished from being presented as primary in order; this, of course, involves a world of necessitated causation. We know such a world, and human action is our knowledge of it. But such a world is not independent of all intelligence. It is rational—a world of relations formed and instituted thought—a world whose explanation is reason—and the simplest knowledge of which is of reason and of reason. This is the world which common sense think of, when they speak of a real world. The appeal to common sense may
sometimes visit a different way. If you press him, still more readily if you torture him. The witness may be got to say that the world which he thinks of as real is independent of intelligence. He says this because he identifies intelligence with his individual consciousness, and he knows that the reality of things does not depend on that. But, when the matter is explained to him, he does not say it: he denies with emphasis that the real world is irrational; and we can explain why he does so. The experience which we come to know rests on the assumption of universal inner connection of all matters except this. This cannot be derived from experience; for it is contained in the possibility of sensuous knowledge. No increase in the number of instances of any given sense will warrant us in predicting its recurrence, apart from this assumed rational connection. Of course repeated instances increase our expectation of a recurrence; but this is so simply because we assume, throughout, the existence of a rational connection, and because no doubt is due, not to any uncertainty as to the universal interconnectedness, which has been removed by the constant frequency of the
numenner, but to the constancy of things which
underlies its uncertain. Whether the sequence really
was as we supposed, and which is no longer an
obstacle when the frequency and variety of our
experience has become cognizant with it.
The certainty of mathematical truth is due to its
abstract nature: it is due to the fact that we
have ideally isolated a particular set of condi-
tions (mathematical conditions) so that we can be
sure that our observation is unaffected by any
circumstances which we do not take into ac-
count, and are as safe, unerring, in referring
from one instance as we could be in referring
from an infinite number. All inference rests on
the assumption of rational connection,
inference from one present fact to another, inference
from present fact to past and future; there are
all possible, actual, and valid. They are so be-
cause the universe is rational and corresponds
to rational expectation. Similarly, the search
for explanations is conditioned by the belief in a
single system of relations existing, not in thought
mind, but in reality. For explanation consists in
pointing out relations of dependence, and derives
its meaning and value from the conviction
that such relations belong to a rational
connected universe. The real world of relation and meaning has nothing to do either with the vague and general ideas of a merely feeling consciousness, or the reality (if such there be) that is not dependent on intelligence; and its place as the object of rational experience cannot be filled by the world of unconnected unity which appears put in its place.

The criticism of the sensational or atomistic theory of knowledge must not be carried further here. It was necessary to introduce some indication of it, because that theory would preclude the real relation of spirit to nature. It would reduce experience to a large series of phenomena or conscious states replicable as effects of nature, and not the involving the necessity of spirit - not demanding any true explanation.

From the point of view already indicated, the derivation of time, space, matter, emotion, sensation from experiences of force, must be regarded as essentially misleading. It is possible, only confusing feelings with facts, and making the element, which is further from our experiences, their base or object - on the strength of its being actual, though not conscious, involved in them. The fact is that force apart from intelligence is a mere negation - the negation of the known attributes of the phenomenal. Force, as related to
intelligible is quite different. But this brings us back to a rational world.

The point of what has been said is, that an attempt has been made to regard knowledge as due to the influx of impressions on a passive consciousness, such impressions being referred (not in any totoo to a 'nativist' which is not now unknown to us, but in its own nature unintelligible — 'beyond consciousness', in the sense of being finally incapable of being rationalised. And what has to be said against such an attempt is that it does not explain knowledge as the consciousness of objects; and that the idea of a natural order is wholly alien to it. Such a view of knowledge, fatal to the idea of spirit as interpretation of nature, is no less so to the idea of nature itself. On the other hand, such a view of knowledge as we have indicated in criticism before opens the possibility which it asserts the necessity of explaining experience, affirming the essential dependance of experience on conditions which are real as such and which demand investigation. As near and principle of these conditions, the examination of knowledge shows reference to a self to be essentially involved — such a self being not a 'mest of inert states' but a subject determined, not S being known.
paints or vivifies, but as the form of all cognition, as the principle of principles of experience. Knowledge involves cojunction, and such conjunction is essentially an application of modes as principles of synthesis. This application is in the last resort defined and determined by the synthesis of apperception, the reference to self, which may act of knowledge involves, and which gives the objective reference in knowledge. It is by such reference to the form of apperception self-consciousness that we acquire the single system of relations involved in all knowledge. We are not to think of matter coming to this form, and being thereby altered or distorted; we cannot make the self a subjective element in knowledge and distinguish its contribution from that of the objective element which is given. On the contrary, it is the condition as principle of objectivity. All knowledge refers to it and achieves it; it belongs to reality as known. Objects are given in and not to experience; they are not first, but last; their determination is the work of knowledge, and due to the application of the self, as form of reenforcement. Further than this the explanation of knowledge cannot be carried. An attempt to analyze or give a genetic account of the self is one which ignores the point of view of all explanation.
In being so accounted for, the self is regarded as an object or entity of phenomena. As so regarded it is the very object of psychology, and belongs to nature; it is not from this point of view that it is the source of explanation. The self so regarded is indeed the last stage in the natural system which is the object of experience. It is the medium through which the objectifying form is applied to nature. It is the spirit of the limited synthesis of human knowledge. But it does not explain that synthesis; rather it demands interpretation as the element in nature most fully organic to the explaining principle. But experience is in no sense self-explanatory. And consciousness as the most direct object of experience is in no better position than other objects. What does explain, relatively, at all events, is the point of view of experience, which experience has been shown to imply and which is the source of these principles which make experience a system. To attempt to explain this would be futile; for it is on any term of explanation, and it could not be referred back to itself. This, then, is the limit of the explanation of knowledge.

But human experience is not simply cognitive; it is also active. It might even be maintained with considerable ground that activity is the primary element in consciousness, so at all events is in con-
mine life as now existing the essential and invari-
able element. Even in the most simple and obvi-
ously passing cognitive processes, there is an active
element represented by the relation of abstractive
reflection of consciousness to its objects or in the
course of its own processes. Our conscious-
ness of ourselves is due to our activity. We become
conscious of ourselves in our action upon the
world; our knowledge is not what constitutes our
consciousness that result from and involve a greater
or lesser degree of activity. From the point of view
of a development theory we can in the same
fact. Thus could be no advantage to individual
or species, and no no help to survival, from the de-
velopment of an increased sensitivity or readiness
of sensations for us. It is because such an in-
crease of sensitivity issues in a more definite and
more precise reaction, that it is an activa-
tions and tends to be preserved. It is in virtue
of its relation to action that cognition is relevant,
just as in the singular type, and as a function of
organism, sensitivity is my important from its
relation to response to stimuli. Sensitivity is thus
a synthesis of activities. It is chiefly the mode
of running from a simpler to a more complex
form of conduct. Activity is, in fact essential to re-

Consciousness is active; and reason cannot be sustained apart from its active aspect.

In practical reasoning is volition just as an active reason is knowledge. And the same self-reflection which constitutes knowledge belongs also to volition. Just as we have seen that knowledge cannot be sustained as a result of an aggregate of unconnected sensations or the physical impressions that condition them, so neither can volition be regarded as just the effect of desire or the organic wants which they normally represent. Volition is essentially a chain of ends. Voluntary action belongs to what (in a strong continuation) is called the ideomotor type. Psychologically regarded, it is action which is preceded in consciousness by an idea of the end to be attained; it, to be capable of being determined, the consciousness of ends is thus to be a voluntary agent. This consciousness of ends is the distinctive element in human conduct. It is this that makes human conduct a product not of mere instinct, but as the consciousness of an objective system of relations is involved in the possibility of truth and falsehood. If conduct could be explained from a purely natural point of view, as the effect of causes not being natural and internal to the nature of the agent, then the moral category would
be inapplicable to it. The point is that conduct cannot be so explained. All that belongs to conduct does so if its relation to the self-references which characterize its existence. As a fact, human character is a system, and is not moved by extra-rel relations, but relates relations systematically to itself. It is subjective. No relations can affect it except in so far as they are related to its own nature. This is true of character as consciousness in its practical just as in its cognitive aspect. Character is thus organic to the reconditioning self-reference.

It is this self-reference (here as in knowledge an objective principle) that constitutes the applicability of the moral category. The applicability of that category in the moral judgment is just as means without reference to the nature of the subject of the judgment. The moral judgment requires reference to conduct as related to character — as requiring the intention of an agent who is the pure source of his own acts and who is in no respect so should be able to recognize the meaning and validity of the standard which moral judgment attributes to his conduct. But self-reference is not hirself essential to the meaning and explanation of the moral category or standard. Apart from it there would be no idea; and this means that there would be no morality. Man
would only be determination of desires, or of itself through desires, of a nature for which there would not be any other good and evil than satisfaction of each desire. Even in satisfaction of each desire as it presented itself would there be the only possibility; it would at the same time be the only possible realization of an ideal relation, if such a view might be supposed to have room for any such relation. And this is actually the view of mechanism which ignores self-reference and spiritual relation, and treats the manifestation of spirit as simply natural.

But the meaning of self-reference is that desires must constitute a system. What has to be realized is a system of satisfaction. Desires cannot be regarded as individually absolute. They contradict one another. In doing so they do indeed contradict themselves. No ideal system is not induced on them from without, but belongs to desires themselves. The satisfaction of each has a real relation to that of others. Even on its own account then, desire cannot be made absolute. While the end of active life must be satisfaction, it must be satisfaction in relation to the system. This means that rational satisfaction, satisfaction of a moral agent, is not independent of law. And the system of desires — their law — the principle of their relation —
is self-consciousness. In what respect, then, is the
nature of practice different from the nature of know-
ledge? The self that constitutes the and relating
explains, knowledge & practice alike, is one. The world
of its relations is also one. But there is a distinction
beyond doubt in the theoretical and practical relation.
We express this, saying that knowledge is ideali-
sation of the real, and conduct is realisation of
an ideal. The distinction lies in the view of the world
that belongs to each of these experiences. For knowledge
the world is cause and effects; for practice it is
means to an end. Thus we find fresh implications,
and a new conception of the world, involved in practical experience. Whereas for
knowledge it must be conceived as a system of non-
interwoven and coordinatated relations, so as to give
the possibility of truth, morality implies that the
real is capable of further interpretation as means
to an end - the realisation or store of functions.
It must not be supposed that such a view of it,
more than that implied in knowledge, can be
used to state the forces of things. This would
be to 'run quickly in the quivering of Dally' and to
establish invisible antimony between the
theoretical and practical consciousness. Nor means
its aim and may always be viewed as cause or nearly
cause of an effect. The idea of individual existence as systematic - as capable of being interpreted in their parts or states in the light of the whole or conditioned product - is one which is found in use in the conception of organism nature. The parts of an organic whole have a meaning relative to the whole to which they belong. They are determined, made what they essentially are, by their relation to it; it explains them. Apart from the whole to which they belong, they are not what they are in relation to it.

And similarly, the less developed stages of an organic life receive a relative explanation which they really need when they are looked at in relation to the more advanced and complete development which is reached through them. And we only understand the true nature of such parts or stages, when we regard them in the light of this explanatory whole or conception. The unity of an organism exists not by subjecting for the outward observer, or even from the point of view of the whole. The meaning of the parts is their own nature. It belongs to them objects. Their relation to the whole makes them what they are, and relates them to one another. Subjecting, anything can be considered a unity; a brick may be regarded as a unity and combined into further instinctive and artificial units. The parts of such a unity are not explained by it. Their relation to the whole does not really belong to them.
Conscious life is not simply a system of units in this subjective sense. It is objects of systematic. This whole mental life (all the phenomena of the consciousness) of an intelligent individual is what it is in virtue of the whole to which it belongs. Each distinct element in such a life derives its true nature from that which gives it its meaning—its relation to the character in which it is combined and synthesized with other elements. But there is a further sense in which the elements of such a life as described belong to an objective system. The actual character, in which remains are synthesized, and which is a system capable of adapting means to ends just as truly as any lower or more strictly organic type of life, is itself characterized by being criticized. How to be criticized is to be placed in relation to a system. In criticizing an actual and beliefs we subordinate them to the system or principle of happiness or consistency. But for this also we contain a criterion; this also we relate to a further and complete ideal system. Even if we identify the system of our own beliefs or desires with the true or the good, we are required that in doing so we regard it otherwise than if we simply called it a part. The consciousness of ideal or absolute ends provides our and is even required
in order to explain or justify our consciousness of ourselves as relating needs or systems.

Apart from such capacity of ideal determination, character could not be understood, and would not be what it is. In being organic to man as self-consciousness, character is distinctive from the ideal point of view. Just as our cognitive experience involves objective truth, so does our active experience involve objective good. And in neither can the implication be regarded as a real fact in experience. For each experience, its implication is a regulative ideal.

The meaning and plan of self-reference as a principle of explanation must, however, be discussed in greater detail than has yet been done. This is the point about which definiteness is most important, and it is unfortunately just here that antiquity limits the theories which make most, and in some respects least, use of the idea.

The idea of self, in that sense in which we make it the principle of explanation, we take to be a purely logical determination. We take it to be the category of categories of experience. Whether this is its intended meaning, in such theories e.g. as that of Kierkegaard, is a question which it is meaningless to discuss here. We may however
say that in the theory cited the function and meaning of the principle arbitrary to be genuine, apart from certain ambiguities, the logical or metaphysical. As a result a distinction becomes more definite; we may say that what is really established in that theory is that reference to a 'self' or subject is the inevitable point of view or logical form of all experience, whether theoretical or practical. Even when we elucidate the idea that the 'self' is a thing or fact among others. This is the meaning of the distinction already drawn between the subject and the object—between the logical or the epistemological and a psychological point of view. It seems hard to consent with the emphasis on this distinction to speak, as Argyropoulos characterizes, as the mode in which the self reacts circumstance. 'Reaction' is a function of particular classes of objects. But the self, as implied in experience, and asMotion of的手, is not an object as thing. To say that 'self-consciousness' or 'the self' acts (and so produces character) is to abandon the metaphysical point of view and such of the 'naturalized self' of consciousness or its physical correlate— which is the object of psychology. Such departure plunges ethical theory in the antinomies of determinism. The idea of the real agent in Kantian or human conduct as being
in any more abstruse from the character of the individual trait is an inevitable source of such antinomies. The agent so conceived must as Mr. H. W. B. Robinson points out (Mind Ed. 104) be regarded as purely active or purely passive. And neither view will meet the facts of experience. The idea of character as the real agent, and no less as the real known, is essential to the possibility of a psychological theory. Such a notion does not admit of the possibility of any other objective self. Thus the 'self' or 'self-consciousness', in the sense in which it is the explanation of experience, is a very logical principle, and indeed no other than a logical or formal determination could serve the function of explanation.

Having in mind this essential character of our explanatory self-reference, we find the limits of this use. We have seen that it is essential alike to our cognitive and practical experiences; and that reference to it is the ultimate limit of the explanation of knowledge and conduct. From the point of view of our experience of it, nature admits of no more causa sui mysterious than that which is afforded by self-consciousness. We have also seen that the implication of the self renders our cognitive and practical experiences, with the character which
synthesis into themselves systematic, but also makes actual character an element in a further objective through ideal system. Our knowledge and conduct, as developing the subject to criteria, must be regarded as belonging to a system of reality. The idea of reality as a system is thus inevitable. Further, we must regard the principle of that system as an end or aim. It may in general be said that the relation of end and means is what essentially characterizes a system. The principle of a system is not the cause but the end of the elements which it relates. All explanation is thus teleological. A teleological interpretation of nature is what is required in order to make out a real relation of nature and spirit; and the completion of such an interpretation would be a full statement of the relation in question, as well as a complete account of spirit in so far as it is related to nature or determines nature.

The apparent duality of nature consists in the relative distinctness of the two kinds of cause. The relation of means and end does not seem to be identical with that of cause and effect. Neither can it be allowed to suppose that relation; for it would then become mechanical and cease to be a true principle of explanation.
It remains, therefore, to discern how far nature as the object of experience can be interpreted; how the relations of means and end, cause and effect, can be described as regards us as consistent aspects of nature.

In a priori denial that this is possible can be simply met by pointing to man as an instance of the fact. Here is a life that is as truly natural as any process can be, and obvious a mix of physical causes and effects, and which is seen the less at the same time the realization of means and the development of a system.

Again, we have seen that it is impossible to explain the nature of intelligence, either as active or as cognitive, by deriving it from things. Reason does not explain freedom; nature cannot be the ground of spirit. It remains to be seen how nature, as the object of our experience, is grounded in and sustained in its relation to spirit, and how its very reality as cause and effect belongs to its determination as means to an end. The simple cause and effect relation does not explain our rationality itself. It is men who make of experience. A perfunctory reason would be blind and incomprehensible; the rationality which is its
ground is what may give physical causation the means of which we present ourselves to it. Each rationality is only the relation of nature to an end; it is the presence of an end in nature.

Nature is found in experience to be determined as means to an end which is not itself merely a part of product of nature.

In human conduct, nature is not just the cause of efforts; it is also the means to an end. Further, this is not merely a subjective end; it is not simply the reaction of man as natural, on nature; it is not added to or imposed on nature by man out of his own subjectivity. This is implied in the moral experience. It is essentially to the objective nature of the moral end as a criterion that it should be realizable; and this means that it bears a real relation to actual things — that it is of the nature of things. If the process of nature were in itself wholly unrelated to any end determined i.e., any physically and not morally — then it never could constitute a means to the realization of an end, any more than matter existing quite independently of human intelligence could, if any conscious manipulation, be made an object of knowledge. But the idea of nature as means to an end not means ut subjective but objective mind
and so capable of furnishing a basis for objective moral judgments, is essential to morality. It is essential to morality that the world be regarded not simply as something to be accomplished for its own sake or for something capable of realizing any subjective or relative ends - but also as the scheme for realizing an end objecting good. Faith in the possibility of the absolute good is essential to morality. And this means that the end of moral life - the criterion of conduct - belongs true to the nature of things, and is realized in the morality of nature. It appears that the mechanism of nature is throughout teleologically determined, and that it is charged with purposes which are in some degree revealed and realized in the moral life of man.

How much this may mean for metaphysics, regarded as a constructive ontology, would not be easy to say. The aim of the identity of the self or principle in finite and infinite spirit would not of course mean that these are numerically identical. For the idea of numerical identity does not apply to logical determinations, and such an aim would no mean that the form of the knowledge and duration of an infinite spirit consists in a self-reflection similar to that which constitutes the function, or mode of relating, characteristic of finite spirits; or to put it otherwise that knowledge
and surface analogous in form to our own belong to the infinite spirit. Towards such high conclusions we can at the best only grope. In affirming that our experience is objective, we make the principle that explains it a principle of nature. In so far as spirit is related to the nature that we know as a system of objective relations, we cannot conceive it as other than self-conscious. That such a category substantiates the reality of spirit would be to us un

To say, at all events, while spirit the explanation which self-consciousness yields, even of nature as we know it, is so relative and incomplete as it is. What we can say is that no purpose can be served by replacing self-consciousness by any of those categories which it determines and explains and systematizes, and that no conceivable advance of knowledge can ever give us a better principle for

renewing the character of spirit than self-consciousness. Self-consciousness, at any rate, is our only clue to the explanation of nature as we know it. So, the examination of experience shows that nature (the world of related objects) is essentially a system implying in its purest objectifying the logical form of self-reflection, which we discover in the consciousness of persons, who, in virtue of their giving effect to this form, are regarded as rational. We also
find that this system of nature is the means to an end, which is not simply subordinating materially related to it, but which belongs to the reality of things. This end, however, it may be summed, is the category of moral repression, and the rational of active repression and of all subjective ends.

On the other hand, since nature is in this sense spiritual, repression of nature does yield us a certain knowledge of spirit. Of course spirit is not an object or thing. But we know spirit as manifested in things, since it is their meaning and they are intelligible. Since repression is rational and moral, we do learn it in some measure what things mean; we know them in relation to their explanation; and we know it in them. But this is to know spirit. We know repression of the said that to know what things we do not tell us what they mean. But repression is also significant; it is of things as significant; we do not simply know things as "there" or "as simply existent"; we know them also as related in and to a system. Of course we do not know spirit apart from nature. It is not in abstraction that we know God; it is not in abstraction that we know ourselves and the world. But such realities are not wholly unrelated to our
another; they do not so exist. This is as may be more in infinite Spirit than we can know in its relations to the world of Nature. But its nature is essentially related to nature; and our knowledge of it in nature (i.e., of the meaning of resurrection) is a true knowledge of spirit. And thus all that spirit is must be related to the real meaning of resurrection. There is revealed in resurrection (in knowledge and morality) a kingdom of spirit to which, amid all our finiteness, we are very kin, and which is intelligible to us; the spiritual is the natural rightly understood; it is the meaning of the natural. We need not repress our ultimate faiths and convictions of our recognition of all that we really know, or suppose that, because God is not an object in a fact, among others and limited, that the knowledge of Him is thus for us impossible. God is known to us just as we are known to ourselves. And as in the consciousness of ourselves we have the key to our own consciousness, so in the idea of God we have the key synthesis that can be regarded as ultimate. Each synthesis must be held to embody and not deny the relative synthesis of human self-consciousness & personal life.
The highest term of our experience, and especially its essential character of individuality, cannot be passed over by any explanation that is to be adequate. The explanation of experience must explain and reveal personality; and so it cannot be anything less than personal.

But the chief character of personality as we know it is its limitation and the essential idiosyncrasy of its experiences. It belongs to a 'world unrealized' to a nature of relations other than that of nature and the phenomenal world. Ideals of truth, beauty and goodness determine all our experiences and limit while they affirm the worth of our personal life. So all our reminiscence of spirit as the meaning of things is at the same time a consciousness of limitation, even of remembrance from the ultimate and infinite spirit.

The ground of nature, as we know it, is its value; and its value, in relation to our personal life, is not a complete unity, even of our reminiscence. But while the relation of nature and spirit remains a problem, it is a problem which, so far as we have access to it in experience, is not irrational.