Reconstruction of Ideology-related Norms in News Trans-editing

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The University of Edinburgh
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Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis is my own work and that recognition has been given to the references used. It has not been submitted for any degree or examination at any other university.

Ya-mei Chen

Edinburgh, 23 May 2006
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Abstract

Studies on news trans-editing, an activity combining both news translation and news editing, started to emerge in the 1980s. Their research emphases are always on only one of the following aspects: practical strategies, contextual factors, or the gate-keeping function, which could be said to be the control of information through channels of communication. Due to their own chosen focuses, all these existing studies have only partially explored news trans-editing, and no thorough account has yet been provided. To address such deficiency, this thesis, adopting Descriptive Translation Studies as a theoretical framework, brings together all the above research focuses and develops a method for reconstructing norms in news trans-editing, especially those which emerge due to the ideologies embedded in the target news organisation. The proposed reconstruction method is also intended to offer a useful analytical tool for translator trainers and researchers who are intent on investigating norms in news trans-editing as well as on applying the norms to translator training.

Chapter 1 discusses the notion of norms within DTS as well as the insights from existing research into news trans-editing. This discussion sheds light on two major components of the reconstruction of ideology-related norms in news trans-editing: the recurrent non-obligatory shifts occurring in ideologically significant linguistic and textual aspects at both the macro- and micro-levels, and the readily identifiable ideologies of the target and source news organisations as well as ideology-related contextual factors. Building upon these two major components, a reconstruction method is developed in Chapter 2 by adapting the methodology proposed by Toury (1995). The method thus developed consists of three stages: pre-comparison,
comparison, and reconstruction. The pre-comparison stage is further elaborated in the second part of Chapter 2 with the formulation of a translation-oriented news discourse model. This model assists with the identification of relevant ideology-related contextual factors, and linguistic and textual aspects. The source and target texts are to be compared against these identified factors and aspects during the comparison stage.

In order to verify the feasibility of the proposed method, Chapters 3 to 6 address the application of this method to two case studies, focusing on the reconstruction of ideology-related norms in English-Chinese news trans-editing. Chapter 3 introduces the data collected for the two case studies. The source texts are taken from the New York Times and the Washington Post, and the trans-edited texts from the China Times, the Commercial Times, and the Liberty Times in Taiwan. The main news events featured in the two case studies revolve around China-Taiwan political conflicts and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, respectively. The second part of Chapter 3 provides a comparison of relevant ideology-related contextual factors of the source and target texts, and a comparison of the readily identifiable ideologies held by the source and target newspapers. The source and target texts are then compared in terms of the ideologically significant linguistic and textual aspects at the micro-level (in Chapter 4) and the macro-level (in Chapter 5) to identify the recurrent non-obligatory shifts. Possible underlying ideological reasons behind the shifts are also explored. Based on those ideological reasons, a reconstruction of ideology-related norms is carried out in Chapter 6, including both process and product norms.

Chapter 7 evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of the method developed in Chapter 2. Four possible strengths of the method are identified: avoidance of the drawbacks of Critical Linguistics and Critical Discourse Analysis, the applicability to
different language-pairs, to different genres, and to visual images. The reconstruction method in question does, however, contain some weaknesses: (1) the applicability being limited to news trans-editing with traceable sources, (2) the impossibility of distinguishing the parties responsible for the shifts, (3) readily identifiable ideologies held by the news organisation as an indispensable prerequisite, and (4) the potential problem of the process being time-consuming. Possible practical applications of the reconstruction method are also proposed, including applying the reconstructed norms to translator training, and using the translation-oriented news discourse model to teach news translation or trans-editing.

This thesis can contribute to a more thorough understanding of media translation in general and news trans-editing in particular. Additionally, it provides translator trainers and researchers with a practical and flexible tool. They can systematically study ideology-related norms in news trans-editing with the method proposed here or adapt it for their own purposes.
Introduction

Background

What is News Trans-editing?

'Trans-editing', as defined by Karen Stetting (1989: 371), is a combination of translating and editing. In trans-editing, the processes of editing and translating are not only equally important but also closely intertwined. It follows that news trans-editing is a composite task of news translation and news editing. Both translating and editing activities exist simultaneously in any given news trans-editing task and cannot be easily distinguished from each other. Hence, translators doing news trans-editing are usually referred to as news trans-editors, and the strategies used are called trans-editing strategies, including deletion (selection), addition, substitution, combination, and re-organisation. The main purposes of news trans-editing are: (1) to meet the requirements of speed, brevity, and timeliness, and (2) to incorporate into the target news texts the receiving perspective and the target audience’s needs and interests to maximise communicative efficiency (Lee 2001:47-48).

The main focus of this thesis is news trans-editing in the press, including printed and on-line newspapers. Target texts in the press can be trans-edited from single or multiple source news texts. Generally speaking, three main types of news trans-editing exist, as illustrated below:
As for the first type, no references regarding the source texts are made in the target news texts. The only way the audience can know that they are reading a trans-edited text is through the by-line, which normally indicates that the news text at hand is trans-edited from several news items published by foreign news organisations, or from multiple items received from wire services. The target news texts in the second type are trans-edited from news items provided by foreign wire services. Such wire services as Reuters, AFP, UPI, or AP are indicated in by-lines. Concerning the third type, the source texts are on-line or printed news items published by foreign news organisations. The date of publication of the source texts and the names of the foreign news organisations are both specified clearly in the target texts.

Is News Trans-editing within the Scope of Translation Studies?

It may be argued that news trans-editing, which involves considerable changes as regards the form and content of the source texts, should not be regarded as a subject of translation studies. However, this thesis considers news trans-editing as a legitimate subject for the following reasons.

First, the activity of trans-editing “has always existed” (Stetting 1989: 371). For example, translators sometimes need to add explanations or notes to make some implicit meanings of the source texts more explicit. Otherwise, the target readers may feel confused or be left with an ambiguous text. Also, translators may delete some passages of the source texts which are deemed not relevant to the receiving audience. Such addition and deletion are, in effect, strategies within trans-editing (Stetting 1989: 371; Huang 2002: 13).

Second, trans-editing, as pointed out by Stetting, “is already practised in very many cases” (1989: 373). Some examples given by Stetting (1989: 373-374) are
introduced here. To begin with, audio-visual translators frequently need to shorten the source texts because of the space limitations. Moreover, professional translators from time to time would do some ‘cleaning up’ work to improve the readability of unclear or incoherent source texts. Furthermore, journalists or news translators usually have to use various trans-editing strategies to process quickly a large number of foreign news items and produce suitable target news for the receiving audience.

Third, if only ‘full’ or ‘pure’ translation can be regarded as a legitimate subject of translation studies, such a definition of translation may be “in danger of being applicable only to very few, well-selected cases, and of being unsuitable for a description of most actual facts” (Delabastita 1989: 214). In fact, trans-editing and full translation can be perceived as the two extremes of a spectrum, with most types of translating activities in-between (Stetting 1989: 379; Huang 2002: 22). Each type of translating activity can be viewed as a legitimate subject of translation research, since each of them has its own function.

Based on the above reasons, it is clear that news trans-editing is within the scope of translation studies. The activity of trans-editing exists in every type of translation, but it is, as indicated by Vuorinen (1997: 170), more prominent in news trans-editing due to the special characteristics of news items and the particular conditions of news production.

Research Objectives

By devising a systematic method for reconstructing norms in news trans-editing in the press, this thesis aims to achieve the following two objectives:
1. Contributing to a more thorough understanding of media translation in general and news trans-editing in particular

2. Providing an analytical tool, with which translator trainers and researchers can systematically investigate and theorise about underlying norms in news trans-editing, which in turn can be applied to translator training

**Contributing to a More Thorough Understanding**

Research on news trans-editing started to emerge in the 1980s. Relevant existing studies are illustrated in Table 1 below.¹

*Table 1 Existing studies of news trans-editing*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direction of News Trans-editing</th>
<th>Existing Studies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japanese → English</td>
<td>Fujii 1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English → Korean</td>
<td>Kirk 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese → English</td>
<td>Lee 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese ↔ English</td>
<td>Liu 2004: 138-175</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Three main research aspects can be identified for the above studies: practical strategies, the gate-keeping function, and contextual factors. All the studies related to the English-Chinese language pair place the emphasis on useful news trans-editing strategies, as they are chiefly concerned with principles and requirements, such as

¹ The term ‘news trans-editing’ is not used in all the studies listed in Table 1. Except for Hursti (2001), Lee (2001), Cheng (2002, 2004: 91-122), and Liu (2004: 136-175), the other studies opt for such terms as ‘news translation’ or ‘press translation’. Yet, the translated news texts examined in all these studies involve considerable editing work. For the sake of consistency, the term ‘news trans-editing’ is used in this thesis.
acceptability, accuracy, concision, and speed. Those studies pertinent to other language pairs are either interested in the gate-keeping function of news trans-editing (e.g. Fujii 1988; Vuorinen 1997; Hursti 2001) or in the impact of contextual factors, such as cultural-specificity and translators’ ideological stance on the resulting products of news trans-editing (e.g. Sidiropoulou 1998, 2004; Vuorinen 1999). Each of these existing studies, with its own chosen focus, only partially addresses news trans-editing, and fails to provide a comprehensive account.

Research into the reconstruction of norms in news trans-editing, which has not yet been explored, can offer a more systematic and thorough understanding of news trans-editing in particular and media translation in general, as it can bring together all the three major research aspects mentioned above. Here norms in news trans-editing refer to the normative expectations on what ‘correct’, ‘proper’, or ‘appropriate’ trans-edited news texts should be like in the target system (cf. Toury 1995). Their main function is to govern and guide the process of news trans-editing, in order to produce suitable trans-edited texts to meet the receiving audience’s needs and interests. An elaboration of norms will follow in Chapter 1.

How can the reconstruction of norms bring together all the previous research aspects? Norms in news trans-editing, in effect, arise due to various contextual factors surrounding news trans-editing. Contextual factors then exert their influences on the production of trans-edited news texts through norms. Thus, the reconstruction of norms in news trans-editing inevitably will include the investigation of corresponding contextual factors. Also, practical news trans-editing strategies (e.g. recurrent shifts) are adopted to meet underlying norms. Andrew Chesterman points out that “the motivation of a translator’s choice of strategy derives ultimately from the norms of translation” (1997: 113). It follows that the examination of trans-editing
strategies adopted in the target texts is significant for the reconstruction of the norms at issue, as it can shed light on the operation of the underlying norms and assist with their reconstruction. With the investigation of the adopted trans-editing strategies, how the source texts are adjusted to suit the new group of receivers in the target culture will be uncovered, which simultaneously will bring to light how the gate-keeping function is performed.

It is clear that although the issue of norms is not the research emphasis of the existing studies, these studies can, to some extent, contribute to the investigation of norms in news trans-editing. Chapter 1 will review some insights from these studies, especially those related to the development of a method for reconstructing the norms in question.

**Providing an Analytical Tool**

For translator trainers or translation researchers intent on studying norms in news trans-editing, a systematic analytical tool is indispensable, as news trans-editing is embedded in a very complex socio-cultural context. Vuorinen (1999: 68) indicates that:

> news translation is embedded at least in: (1) the culture of a specific news organization; (2) the journalistic culture prevailing in a given society; (3) the mass communication culture prevailing in a given society; and (4) the socio-cultural setting in general.

Various contextual factors from the four different cultures can influence the production of trans-edited news texts, including conventions of news production (such as the deadline, space limitations, and in-house news style), socio-political orientation of a given news organisation, and socio-cultural acceptability. More
significantly, each factor may interact with others in the same culture or across different cultures, which inevitably complicates the process for reconstructing the underlying norms which arise due to these factors. A systematic analytical tool can enable translator trainers and translation researchers to more comprehensively describe and theorise about underlying norms in an organised and methodical way. The underlying norms thus reconstructed can be applied to translator training, which will be detailed in Chapter 7.

Research Scope and Underlying Reasons

Scope

Every contextual factor surrounding news trans-editing has its own significance, so norms in news trans-editing arising out of any contextual factors are worth investigating and reconstructing. Nevertheless, the approaches used to examine norms emerging from different factors may be quite similar or rather diverse. It seems unworkable to reconstruct norms originating from various factors simply with one and the same method. Thus the reconstruction method to be developed in this thesis necessarily has its own emphasis.

The method will be particularly designed to reconstruct norms resulting from the ideologies embedded in the target news organisation, especially when these are considerably distinct from those inscribed in the source news texts, and when the target news organisation intends to convey its own ideological stance. The ideologies revealed in the source texts may sometimes be quite similar to those held by the target news organisation. Besides, even if most of the target ideologies are different from those in the source, it is still possible that the target news organisation wishes to bring in the source ideologies, in order to open up its own ideologies as
well as to challenge dominant target socio-cultural and socio-political values, attitudes, and beliefs. In either situation, there may not exist many problems concerning ideological conflicts, so the influences of ideological factors in the production process become much less significant, which in turn leads to far fewer frequent occurrences of ideology-related norms.

The definition of ideology which this thesis intends to pursue does not carry any negative undertones, such as false or distorted values and beliefs. Instead, the definition put forward by Teun A. van Dijk (1998: 48-49) is followed:

> an ideology is the set of factual and evaluative beliefs – that is the knowledge and the opinions – of a group [...] In other words, a bit like the axioms of a formal system, ideologies consist of those general and abstract social beliefs and opinions (attitudes) of a group.

In this thesis, the ideologies held by the news organisation are tripartite: (1) socio-cultural or socio-political ideologies towards the news event under consideration, (2) ideological assumptions about the audience’s needs, interests, and backgrounds, and (3) ideological presumptions regarding the acceptability of trans-edited news texts.

The reasons why the above-mentioned three types of ideologies are considered simultaneously are as follows. On one hand, the audience’s attention is, in effect, what a news organisation primarily endeavours to attract so as to maximise communication efficiency and make profits. It is essential for news organisations to produce suitable and acceptable news texts which meet the audience’s needs and interests. Although news organisations rarely have direct access to their audience’s actual needs and interests, they do work with an idea of the implied audience (Reah 2001: 35). That is, news organisations usually hold certain ideological assumptions
about their audience, which in turn may influence a news organisation’s presumptions as to what counts as a suitable and acceptable news text. In other words, the information concerning the audience’s background, interests, and needs can assist a news organisation in determining what types of news texts (including both the content and form) are acceptable, suitable, and desirable in the eye of the intended readers.

On the other hand, the ideological assumptions about the audience are mainly pre-determined by the socio-cultural or socio-political ideologies held by the news organisation towards the news event at issue. As Danuta Reah (2002: 35) points out, news organisations address their implied readers, and assume that their readers share the same opinions and attitudes as themselves. When a news item is being produced, the news organisation tends to infer the readers’ needs and interests according to its own socio-cultural or socio-political ideologies. After the news item is published and read, the news organisation may also expect the ideological ideas conveyed through the news item to be accepted by the readership, consciously or unconsciously.

The three types of ideologies are interrelated and need to be taken into account simultaneously, in order to have a thorough picture of the underlying ideology-related norms.

**Underlying Reasons**

The underlying reasons behind the scope of the research outlined in the last section are threefold. Firstly, news accounts are far from being ‘pure’ and ‘impartial’ reflections of ‘reality’ and ‘facts’. Since news organisations are socially, economically, and politically situated, news items are inevitably produced from certain perspectives, that is, from the news organisations’ own distinct ideologies, be they social, cultural, or political (Fowler 1991: 10). It stands to reason that the news organisation’s
ideologies play a rather significant role in the production of news items. Such significance has been acknowledged by scholars and practitioners of Critical Linguistics (CL) and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), who have proposed some approaches to the analysis of the relations between ideology and language in news, and have conducted some empirical studies to explain such relations, as will be discussed in Chapter 2. The data examined by them are mainly original news texts rather than translated or trans-edited news texts. As news trans-editing is embedded in the system of news production in general, it is worth investigating how ideologies govern and constrain the process of news trans-editing.

Secondly, the issue of ideologies continues to play a significant role in translation studies. As stated by Peter Fawcett, “through the centuries, individuals and institutions applied their particular beliefs to the production of certain effects in translation” (1998: 107). Likewise, Christina Schäffner (2003: 23) indicates that “any translation is ideological since the choice of a source text and the use to which the subsequent target text is put is determined by the interests, aims, and objectives of social agents”. The ideological effect is supposed to be more prominent in news trans-editing, as it involves more editing work.

Thirdly, ideologies of the target news organisation usually interrelate with other contextual factors. For example, the target news organisation’s ideologies are, to a considerable extent, influenced by values, beliefs, and attitudes prevailing in the wider socio-cultural or social-political context. They may also interact with the journalistic conventions, such as the space limitations. When there is limited space allocated to a given news text, ideologies may play a significant role in determining what is to be retained and what is to be omitted. As pointed out in the section on research objectives, the process of reconstructing norms in news trans-editing is
more complicated when there exist mutual relations between different contextual factors. Through the focus on ideology-related norms, this thesis hopes to assist translator trainers and researchers in having a better understanding about the process of reconstructing norms under such a complicated situation.

**Empirical Case Studies**

In this thesis, two empirical case studies will be carried out in Chapters 3 to 6 to explain how to apply the reconstruction method to be developed in Chapter 2, as well as to test the feasibility of the method.

**The Type of News Trans-Editing Investigated**

As discussed above, there are three major types of news trans-editing in the press. The one to be examined in the two case studies is the third type, that is, news trans-editing with identifiable source texts from foreign news organisations. This thesis limits itself to the third type of news trans-editing because of the increasing importance of this type and the ready availability of the source texts.

The third type of news trans-editing is increasingly gaining importance in the Taiwanese press, from where the target texts for the two case studies are taken. News items offered by wire services are usually short and continuously updated, which causes some trouble and inconvenience for carrying out news trans-editing tasks. In contrast, printed or on-line news items from foreign news organisations are reported with broad perspectives and in-depth contents. Most of the time, foreign news organisations even offer in-depth feature stories on particular news events. Also, news items from foreign news organisations are final products, which make
news-trans-editing tasks easier to carry out.²

Besides, the comparison of the source and target texts is a fundamental part of the reconstruction method, which will be elaborated upon in Chapter 2. Since no source is given in the first type of news trans-editing, it cannot be examined. For the second type, the source material from wire services is frequently not available to researchers, or because of updating by the services, it is impossible to know which version was used for the trans-edited piece. Hence, it will not be investigated, either. In the third type, the published dates of the source texts and the news organisations’ names are both specified clearly in the target texts. It is easy to collect both the source and target texts and compare them.

Case Study Data

The source texts are taken from the New York Times and the Washington Post, and the trans-edited texts are from two newspapers under the China Times Group (i.e. the China Times and the Commercial Times) and the Liberty Times in Taiwan. The reasons behind this newspaper selection are as follows. For one thing, news items published by the New York Times and the Washington Post are most frequently trans-edited into Chinese by the Taiwanese press, as they are regarded as the most prestigious and influential newspapers in the U.S. For another, the two target news organisations are selected because they produce two of the three largest-circulation newspapers in Taiwan. Also, their political ideologies are distinct, especially those towards Taiwan’s independence or its reunification with China, which will be elaborated on in Chapter 3.

² The information provided here was obtained through the author’s personal correspondence with Guo Chonglun, the deputy editor-in-chief at the China Times, on 23 October 2004.
Except for the target texts from the *Liberty Times*, all the other texts are collected from the on-line archives, which makes the data collection easier. The on-line version of the *Liberty Times* does not contain an archive, so the target texts from this newspaper are taken from its printed version.

**Brief Introduction to the Source and Target Newspapers**

The *New York Times* was founded in 1851 by George Jones and Henry Jarvis Raymond. Later in 1896, it was acquired by Adolph Ochs, who led the newspaper to a stature international in reputation, scope, and circulation (Lee 1998: 21-22). The newspaper is currently part of the New York Times Company. Today it is perhaps the most prominent U.S. daily newspaper. The newspaper’s editorial position is usually perceived as liberal in terms of its interpretation of social issues and events (Merrill 1976; Lin 2001: 55).

Launched in 1877 by Stilson Hutchins, the *Washington Post* in 1880 became the first newspaper in Washington, D.C. to be published daily. It is owned by the Washington Post Company. Like the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post* is generally viewed as being politically liberal, particularly on its opinion pages. The paper usually supports Democratic candidates when making political endorsements (Bray 1980; Lin 2001: 56-57).

The *China Times* is one of the three largest-circulation newspapers in Taiwan, and the other two with large circulation are the *Liberty Times* and *United Daily News*. It was founded in 1950 by Yu Jizhong, who died in 2002 and left the presidency to his second son, Yu Jianxin. The *China Times* is currently part of the China Times Group, which also includes the *Commercial Times* launched in 1978. Both the *China
Times and the Commercial Times take an editorial line with a Pan-China orientation, that is, pro-reunification with China (Wei 2000: 343; Huang 2003: 34).

The Liberty Times was launched in 1980 by Lin Rongsan, a Taiwanese businessman. It is owned by the Liberty Times Group, which also publishes the English newspaper the Taipei Times. In contrast to the China Times and the Commercial Times, the Liberty Times promotes an independent Taiwan and stresses the local values of Taiwan and advocates an independent Taiwan. Their editorial position leans towards pro-independence rather than pro-reunification with China (Wei 2000: 358; Huang 2003: 35).

**Thesis Organisation**

The thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 1 reviews the notion of norms within Descriptive Translation Studies as well as insights from existing research into news trans-editing. It also addresses implications from the literature review as regards the development of a method for reconstructing ideology-related norms in news trans-editing. Based on the implications discussed in Chapter 1, the first part of Chapter 2 develops a reconstruction method, which consists of three stages: pre-comparison, comparison, and reconstruction of norms. The second part of Chapter 2 formulates a translation-oriented news discourse model, which is an integral part of the pre-comparison stage. Chapters 3 to 6 address the application of the reconstruction method to two case studies focusing on the ideology-related norms in English-Chinese news trans-editing. Chapter 3 introduces the data collected for the two empirical case studies. Contextual factors of the collected data are also examined, including the readily identifiable ideologies held by the source and target newspapers and ideology-related contextual factors. Chapters 4 and 5 compare the source and
target texts for non-obligatory shifts in terms of the ideologically significant linguistic and textual aspects at the micro and macro-levels, respectively. Possible underlying ideological reasons behind the shifts are explored. Building upon these ideological reasons, Chapter 6 carries out a reconstruction of ideology-related norms for the two case studies. Chapter 7 evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of the reconstruction method, together with suggestions of possible practical applications of the method.
Chapter 1 – Literature Review

This chapter reviews the literature pertaining to the development of a method for the reconstruction of ideology-related norms in news trans-editing. Section 1.1. introduces the notion of norms within the framework of Descriptive Translation Studies (DTS), including the definition and functions of norms, relations between norms and systems, sources for the investigation of norms, and types of norms. Section 1.2. discusses insights taken from existing research into news trans-editing and elaborates on their implications for the reconstruction of ideology-related norms.

1.1. Norms within DTS

DTS, which began to emerge in the 1970s, places the main focus on describing translations as they actually occur in a given socio-cultural context. Within the framework of DTS, translation is viewed as a ‘communicative act’ taking place in a complex socio-cultural context. In such a socially relevant setting, the translator’s decision-making is, to a considerable extent, governed by a range of norms which arise due to various contextual factors, be they social, political, or cultural (Hermans 1996: 29, 1999: 80). The analysis and theorisation of norms thus become a significant aspect of DTS (Hermans 1996: 39).

As a means of communication, news trans-editing is undoubtedly an interlingual and intercultural communicative act, embedded in a complicated context, which may include news organisations themselves, other media institutions, and the wider society. DTS, with the emphasis on the social dimension, can serve well as a theoretical framework for the reconstruction of ideology-related norms in news
1.1.1. Definition and Functions of Norms

Based on the sociological view of norms, Gideon Toury (1995: 55) defines the notion of norms as follows:

the translation of general values or ideas shared by a community – as to what is right or wrong, adequate or inadequate – into performance instructions appropriate for and applicable to particular situations, specifying what is prescribed and forbidden as well as what is tolerated and permitted in a certain behavioural dimension.

Norms specify what a given community regards as ‘correct’, ‘acceptable’, or ‘appropriate’. They are mostly internalised, and they obtain “their legitimacy from shared knowledge, mutual expectation and acceptance” (Hermans 1999: 81). What is deemed ‘correct’ or ‘appropriate’ is determined socially, culturally, and ideologically (Hermans 1999: 84). In other words, norms result from a variety of factors governing a given community. Due to such socio-cultural and ideological specificities, norms are not static but changeable (Toury 1995: 62), especially when corresponding contextual factors undergo change.

Norms are situated between absolute rules and social conventions, and form a graded continuum, with some being stronger and more rule-like, and others weaker and more convention-like (Chesterman 1997: 55). Norms, unlike conventions, exert a directive force. They indicate not only how a given community expects its members to behave but also how they ought to behave. Breaking norms often provokes some sort of sanction from the community concerned, such as disapproval (Hermans 1996: 31; Schäffner 1998: 2).
Norms fulfil three main social functions. Firstly, like rules and conventions, they help to regulate the behaviour of individuals in a community, stabilise interpersonal relations, and maintain social order “by reducing contingency, unpredictability, and uncertainty” (Hermans 1996: 26). Secondly, norms can serve as standards for ‘correct’, ‘acceptable’, or ‘appropriate’ behaviour. They provide criteria against which the behaviour of individuals can be assessed (Toury 1995: 55; Schäffner 1998: 3). Thirdly, norms fulfil the dual functions of constraining and guiding. As pointed out by Theo Hermans (1996: 31):

Since norms imply a degree of social and psychological pressure, they act as practical constraints on the individual’s behaviour by foreclosing certain options and choices, which however always remain available in principle. At the same time, and more positively, they single out and suggest, or prescribe more or less emphatically, a particular selection from among the range of possible courses of action.

With such dual functions, norms can facilitate the process of decision-making in a given translation task.

Generally speaking, norms in news trans-editing can be assumed to be the normative assumptions and expectations generally shared by the members of the target community as regards ‘correct’, ‘proper’, or ‘acceptable’ trans-edited news texts. They originate from a range of contextual factors surrounding the activity of news trans-editing, be they social, cultural, political, economical, or ideological. They can direct the individual’s trans-editing behaviour, govern or speed the decision-making process of news trans-editing, and serve as a yardstick to evaluate the resultant trans-edited news texts. Breaking norms in news trans-editing usually leads to a turndown or disapproval of the trans-edited texts. For example, if
trans-editors violate norms in news trans-editing which prevail in their news organisations, their trans-edited news texts are normally returned by the editor-in-chief or other senior editors for substantial revisions.

1.1.2. Norms and Systems

From the review in Section 1.1.1., it is clear that various norms emerge due to a range of factors surrounding a given community, and then exert their binding force on the members within that community. One question may be raised here: how to define a given community in which the norms governing translation activities operate. The notion of systems discussed in this section can help answer this question.

1.1.2.1. Even-Zohar’s Polysystem

Itamar Even-Zohar was the first scholar to apply systems theory to translation studies, particularly to literary translation. A ‘system’ is defined by Even-Zohar as “the assumed set of observables supposed to be governed by a network of relations (i.e. for which systemic relations can be hypothesized)” (1990a: 27). Thus, systems are abstract in nature, and are not defined in physical terms. Translated literature is regarded by Even-Zohar as a system, because translated works are related to each other “(a) in the way their source texts are selected by the target literature [...] and (b) in the way they adopt specific norms, behaviors, and policies” (1990b: 46). The focus of Even-Zohar’s work is on the relations between the translated literary system and other literary systems, which are all subsumed under the literary polysystem. His interest is in whether the translated literature takes up a primary or a secondary
position with the polysystem.\textsuperscript{3}

The role played by the translated literature, according to Even-Zohar (1990 b: 50-51), conditions the norms prevailing in the system of translated literature. If it occupies the primary position in the literary polysystem, translators do not feel compelled to follow the established target literature modes. In this case, the target texts will be much close to the source texts, and the norms translators follow are more innovative and non-native (1990b: 50). However, if the translated literature is in the secondary position, translators will opt for the existing target models. The resulting translation will be ‘non-adequate’, and corresponding target norms will prevail to govern translators.

From Even-Zohar’s study, it can be concluded that a given translation system is where translation norms operate, and translators within the system are those governed by the translation norms. Analogously, norms in news trans-editing are supposed to function within the system of news trans-editing, constraining and guiding a given trans-editing team. The concept of the trans-editing team will be introduced in Section 1.2.3.1.

Another insight drawn from Even-Zohar’s work is that any given translation system does not exist on its own, but interacts with other systems, and the interactions will have a considerable impact on the occurrence of corresponding translation norms. For the system of news trans-editing, such inter-relatedness is more prominent due to its embedding in very complex socio-cultural and

\textsuperscript{3} According to Even-Zohar, a polysystem is "a multiple system, a system of various systems which intersect with each other and partly overlap, using concurrently different options, yet functioning as one structured whole, whose members are interdependent" (1990c: 11).
socio-political systems, as mentioned in the Introduction.

The next section introduces the literary system proposed by André Lefevere (1992), which provides a more concrete account of how other systems influence the translation system as well as their corresponding norms.

1.1.2.2. Lefevere’s Literary System

Lefevere (1992: 14) indicates that literature can be viewed as a social system, and that two control mechanisms exist in this literary system, where translation is embedded. One mechanism, which governs the literary system mostly from the outside, is called ‘patronage’; the other, which operates inside the literary system, is referred to as ‘poetics’.

Patronage refers to “the powers (persons, institutions) that can further or hinder the reading, writing, and rewriting of literature” (Lefevere 1992: 15). Those who can exert patronage include powerful individuals, groups, publishers, media, political parties, and institutions. What patronage is mostly concerned with is ideology. Patronage tries to control and manage the relations between the literary system and the other systems, and relies on professionals within the literary system to secure its own ideology (Lefevere 1992: 15-16).

Professionals within the literary system may include critics, reviewers, teachers, and translators. Apart from bringing the literary system in line with the ideology held by patronage, professionals also need to maintain the poetics of the literary system (Lefevere 1992: 14). Dominant poetics, according to Lefevere, consists of “two components: one is an inventory of literary devices, genres, motifs, prototypical characters and situations, and symbols; the other a concept of what the role of literature is, or should be, in the social system as a whole” (1992: 26). The second
concept is, to a considerable extent, influenced by the patron’s ideology.

Based on Lefevere’s literary system, two factors can be identified: outside ideological influences from patronage and inside influences of poetics. These two factors interact with each other and result in a series of norms.

The literary system proposed by Lefevere fits well for news trans-editing, as Lefevere regards translation as a form of rewriting, which means “any text produced on the basis of another with the intention of adapting the other text to a certain ideology [...] or to a certain poetics [...] and usually to both” (1984: 89). As will be discussed in Section 1.2.1.1., news trans-editing is adaptive in nature, which means it is also one form of rewriting. The application of Lefevere’s system to news trans-editing will be elaborated in Section 1.2.3.2.

1.1.3. Sources for Studying Norms

Norms themselves are not observable, but two major sources have been proposed for their investigation: textual and extra-textual (Toury 1995: 65-66; Nord 1991: 101-104; Hermans 1999: 85-86).4

Translated texts can be considered to be the external manifestation of underlying norms, as they are the results of norm-governed behaviour. Examining translations per se may “reflect conformity to or divergence from existing norms” (Nord 1991: 103). Analyses of different translated texts from the same source text may reveal significant differences, which it is worthwhile to investigate (Hermans 1999: 85). Translated texts can also be compared with their source texts for relevant changes, which may result from the operation of underlying norms (Toury 1995: 84).

4 Chesterman (1993: 16) particularly advocates the investigation of the work done by competent professional translators, which is regarded as embodying norms by definition.
Extra-textual sources include theoretical and prescriptive accounts, and critical statements or comments made by translators, editors, publishers, readers, or various translation associations (Toury 1995: 65; Nord 1991: 103-104). Hermans (1999: 85) points out other extra-textual sources, such as law suits, information about the distribution of translations, and translation prizes.

For news trans-editing, the most practical way to study norms is through the analysis of trans-edited news texts. Trans-edited news texts are used as daily news items, so there are no such things as critical comments or critical reviews going together with trans-edited news texts. Also, members of a trans-editing team may be able to tell what is right or wrong as regards a given trans-edited news text, but they may not be able to interpret underlying norms governing their decision-making, especially when those norms are taken for granted or are internalised unconsciously. Toury (1995: 65-66) also argues that:

Normative pronouncements, by contrast, are merely by-products of the existence and activity of norms. Like any attempt to formulate a norm, they are partial and biased, and should therefore be treated with every possible circumspection [...] There may therefore be gaps, even contradictions, between explicit arguments and demands, on the one hand, and actual behaviour and its results, on the other, due either to subjectivity or naiveté, or even lack of sufficient knowledge on the part of those who produced the formulations.

Therefore, the method this thesis intends to develop will be designed to reconstruct norms based on the analysis of trans-edited texts. But how can norms be reconstructed via the study of translated texts? Toury points out that norm-governed behaviour will “result in regularities of surface realisations” (1999: 16). Hence, regularities of translation behaviour can be assumed as external evidence of the operation of norms.
Regularities, however, are not sufficient to enable norms to be reconstructed, as they do not tell us the reasons behind their occurrence (Hermans 1996: 36). As claimed by Jeremy Munday, “the setting of the results [i.e. regularities] within the socio-cultural and political context of the texts” enables “some conclusions to be drawn as to the norms at work in the translation process” (2002: 91). Only when the information on corresponding contextual factors is also taken into consideration can the underlying reasons behind the regularities be derived. Based on the underlying reasons, unobservable norms can then be reconstructed.

1.1.4. Types of Norms

1.1.4.1. Toury’s Norms

Toury claims that norms can operate “at every stage in the translating event, and hence to be reflected on every level of its product” (1995: 58). Three kinds of process norms are identified by Toury (1995: 58-60): initial, preliminary, and operational norms.

Initial norms condition the translator’s decisions on the orientation of the target text: whether it will be ‘adequate’ and oriented towards the source text, or whether it will be ‘acceptable’ for the target culture. Hermans suggests: “replace the pair ‘acceptable’ versus ‘adequate’ with ‘target-oriented’ versus ‘source-oriented’, ‘prospective’ versus ‘retrospective’ or a similar set” (1999: 77). His main reason is that it is impossible to completely realise the source textual relationships in the target text, even word-by-word reproduction may not be able to assure complete adequacy (Hermans 1999: 76-77).

Preliminary norms are concerned with the choice of texts to be translated, and the decision to translate directly from the original language or from an existing translation
in another language.

Operational norms are those governing concrete decisions made during the actual act of translation. They are divided into two subcategories: matricial and text-linguistic norms. Matricial norms are related to the macrostructure of the target text, and govern decisions on translating all or part of the source text, and on distribution and segmentation of textual materials in the target text. Text-linguistic norms determine the micro-level linguistic realisations of the target text, such as lexical choices or stylistic features.

1.1.4.2. Chesterman’s Norms

Chesterman (1993, 1997: 64-70) proposes two types of norms: process and product. Chesterman’s process norms cover Toury’s initial and operational norms, but they are viewed from a different perspective. Toury’s norms mainly focus on those norms governing translators themselves as regards the methods and strategies employed to produce a given target text. Chesterman’s norms turn the attention to all parties involved in the process rather than to translators alone.

Chesterman perceives process norms as professional norms and distinguishes three types: accountability, communication, and relation norms. Accountability norms are ethical in nature, guiding translators to be responsible for their works and to the other parties concerned. Communication norms are social in nature, directing translators towards optimising communication between all parties concerned. Relation norms are linguistic, dealing with relations between the source and target texts. Appropriate relations are judged by translators “according to text-type, the wishes of the commissioner, the intentions of the original writer, and the assumed needs of the prospective readers” (1997: 69).
With regard to product norms, Chesterman conceives of them as expectancy norms, which “are established by the expectations of readers of a translation (of a given type) concerning what a translation (of this type) should be like” (1997: 64). According to Chesterman (1997: 64), factors giving rise to expectancy norms include the predominant translation tradition in the target system, the discourse conventions of similar genres in the target language, and economic and ideological considerations within and across cultures. If translators abide by expectancy norms, their products will be regarded as proper translations.

Section 1.1. has introduced basic concepts of norms within DTS, encompassing the definition, functions, relations between norms and systems, sources for studying norms, and types of norms. These basic ideas have also been applied to explain the notion of norms in news trans-editing. All the concepts and ideas introduced and discussed in this section concerning norms are intended to lay down the essential theoretical foundations for the further sections and chapters, which will focus on devising a method for reconstructing ideology-related norms in news trans-editing as well as on conducting two empirical studies to further explain the reconstruction process.

1.2. Existing Research on News Trans-editing

As mentioned in the Introduction, existing studies on news trans-editing do not directly address or deal with norms, let alone those particularly resulting from the ideologies embedded in the target news organisation. However, some insights from them provide significant implications for the development of a reconstruction method at issue. In what follows, these insights are addressed, and their implications are explored.
1.2.1. Nature of News Trans-editing

1.2.1.1. Main Concepts

Existing research highlights two notions concerning the nature of news trans-editing, which are like the two sides of a coin: news trans-editing as gate-keeping and news trans-editing as adaptation.

The notion of gate-keeping is used to describe the nature of the news trans-editing process. Vuorinen (1997: 161-162), among others, provides the definition of gate-keeping as follows:

Generally put, gate-keeping could be defined as the process of controlling the flow of information into and through communication channels. The controlling function is carried out by gatekeepers located at certain strategic areas, or gates, in the information channel. The gatekeepers decide what messages or pieces of information shall go through a particular gate and continue their journey in the channel and what not (“in” or “out” choices), and in what form and substance these messages are allowed to pass.

Members of a trans-editing team involved in a given news trans-editing task act as gatekeepers. They pass on to the target audience the information they deem relevant and newsworthy with such gate-keeping strategies as selecting, deleting, adding, combining, substituting, and restructuring (Fujii 1988; Vuorinen 1997; Hursti 2001). These trans-editing strategies are employed at both the macro- and micro-levels of trans-edited texts (Huang 2000: 66-79; Cheng 2004: 108-118).\(^5\)

The news trans-editing process, as indicated by Maria Cheng (2004: 103-108), can be further divided into three major stages, which I summarise diagrammatically

\(^{5}\) Gate-keeping strategies are referred to as trans-editing strategies by Huang (2000: 58-100) and Cheng (2004: 91-122).
as follows:

![Diagram of news trans-editing process]

**Figure 2 Three major stages of the news trans-editing process**

The first stage is to choose suitable source news texts for trans-editing. After the source texts are chosen, the reporting perspectives of the target texts will be reset in order to highlight what the target news organisation deems newsworthy (e.g., local perspectives) for the receiving audience. The source and target texts usually have different communicative purposes, so the target reporting perspectives need to be adjusted accordingly. At the final stage, the source news texts are trans-edited with the target perspectives as frameworks.

The resultant product of the above news trans-editing process is, in fact, an adaptation, which is meant to meet the target audience’s needs and interests (Lee 2001: 48-49; Cheng 2002: 113-114, 2004: 42-43). That is to say, what news trans-editing aims to achieve is not a faithful translation but an adaptive translation. Adaptation thus can be assumed as the expected product of a given news trans-editing task, which in turn guides the decision-making as to what gate-keeping strategies and methods to employ during the trans-editing process.

### 1.2.1.2. Implications

This brief look at the nature of news trans-editing as well as the major stages of its process offers one significant implication. As mentioned above, there exists a bidirectional cause-effect relationship between gate-keeping and expected adaptation,
that is, they shape and are shaped by each other. Norms governing the expected trans-edited product can provoke corresponding process norms that constrain the decision-making of the news trans-editing team. Process norms in turn reinforce and further legitimise related product norms. It stands to reason that both process and product norms need to be taken into account in order to gain a comprehensive picture of underlying ideology-related norms in news trans-editing.

With regard to product norms, Chesterman’s expectancy norms discussed in Section 1.1.4.2. should be further investigated. In the case of news trans-editing, expectancy norms may refer to those expectations of the target news organisation or its audience as to what ‘correct’, ‘appropriate’, or ‘acceptable’ trans-edited news texts should be like.

As for process norms, both Toury’s initial and operational norms as well as Chesterman’s communication norms should be examined. In fact, all three types of Toury’s norms operate in the news trans-editing process: preliminary norms at the stage of source selection, initial norms at the stage of perspective reset, and operational norms at the stage of actual trans-editing. However, preliminary norms will not be investigated in this thesis. It is beyond doubt that the selection stage is significant and worth examining, but the method this thesis intends to develop will be particularly designed to reconstruct norms which operate after the source texts are chosen. Also, the ways used to explore the norms before and after the selection of the source texts are, to some extent, different. Norms governing the selection of the source texts may be studied through a survey of other source news texts which were not selected as well as through interviews with the persons in charge of the selection, such as the deputy editor-in-chief, as will be illustrated in Figure 3 under Section 1.2.3.1. However, as discussed in Section 1.1.3., it is through the analysis of
trans-edited texts that this thesis will explore underlying ideology-related norms.

Chesterman’s communication norms are also of high relevance, as a given news trans-editing task involves not only trans-editors themselves but also editors and other senior staff. In order to produce ‘appropriate’ and ‘acceptable’ trans-edited texts to draw maximal attention from the target audience and enhance communicative efficiency, a high degree of consensus should exist within the trans-editing team, and efforts need to be made to achieve effective communication between the target news organisation and its prospective audience.

1.2.2. Inscription of Ideology

In Section 1.2.1.2., the types of ideology-related norms which need to be reconstructed have been identified. But where should we start to investigate them? Studies on inscription of ideology in news trans-editing done by Maria Sidiropoulou (2004: 21-56) and by Kuo Saihua and Mari Nakamura (2005) provide useful insights.

1.2.2.1. Main Concepts

By making several comparative studies of the source news items from the English press (Newsweek, Time, and the Economist) and their target versions in Greek newspapers, Sidiropoulou (2004: 21-56) points out that translation shifts in such linguistic aspects as adversatives, causal connectives, and temporal adverbials reflect the translators’ ideological assumptions about the social role played by the Greek audience.

The main shifts which Sidiropoulou identifies in her comparative studies are summarised in the following table:
Table 2 Main shifts identified in Sidiropoulou’s study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Linguistic Aspects</th>
<th>Main Shifts Identified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adversatives</td>
<td>• A great number of contrastive connectives (e.g. 'but') are added to the Greek target texts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casual Connectives</td>
<td>• Implicit causal relations of the source texts are made explicit in the Greek target texts by adding causal connectives to make clear the cause or the result.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Temporal Adverbials| • Certain time expressions become transparent in the Greek versions. (e.g. source text: Nov. 26, 1963 → target text: just Nov. 26, 1963)  
• Shorter time spans are employed. (e.g. source text: last week → target text: some days ago)  
• Some time adverbials are replaced by others of higher immediacy. (e.g. source text: quickly → target text: immediately) |

The shifts in adversatives, causal connectives, and temporal adverbials are said to result in a contrastive perspective of reality, clear reasoning, and higher evaluativeness, respectively. By referring to theories concerning assumptions about the readers of ancient Arabic rhetoric, Sidiropoulou (2004: 33) argues that these results reflect the translators’ ideological assumptions of the target readers as deniers or contradicters. With such social roles, the target readers “are assumed to be reluctant to accept the validity of arguments, at least at points of estimation or evaluation, and, thus, translators tend to make explicit the part of discourse that contributes to reasoning, in order to facilitate persuasion” (2004: 41).

Kuo and Nakamura (2005) adopt the CDA approach to analyse two trans-edited texts concerning the interview of Taiwan’s first lady Wu Shuchen with the Associated Press. The English source text appeared in the China Post, one of Taiwan’s three English newspapers. It was then trans-edited into Chinese by two ideologically opposed newspapers in Taiwan, namely the pro-reunification United Daily News and the pro-independence Liberty Times. Based on the macro-level analysis of headlines and editing operations (including deletion, addition, and combination) as well as on
the micro-level analysis of syntactic and lexical variations, the authors point out noticeable changes in the two trans-edited texts as compared to the source text, and significant differences between the two trans-edited texts themselves. They further contend that those changes and differences are not made at random, but are rather ideology-related. They reinforce and reproduce the underlying opposing ideologies of the *United Daily News* and the *Liberty Times*.

### 1.2.2.2. Implications

The two studies reviewed above shed light on two fundamental components of reconstructing ideology-related norms: the recurrent non-obligatory shifts in ideologically significant linguistic and textual aspects at both the macro- and micro-levels, and the relevant readily identifiable ideologies of the target news organisation as well as ideology-related contextual factors.

Regularities of translational behaviour, as reviewed in Section 1.1.3., are external evidence of the operation of norms, and play an important role in reconstructing underlying norms. However, not all recurrent shifts are relevant to the reconstruction of ideology-related norms. As illustrated by the above two studies, all the macro- and micro-level linguistic and textual aspects investigated do, in one way or another, carry ideological meanings, but it should also be noted that not all the shifts in ideologically significant linguistic and textual aspects are made to fulfil underlying ideology-related norms. Some of them may be obligatory due to cross-linguistic differences, and cannot be attributable to any ideology-related norms. That is, only recurrent non-obligatory shifts in ideologically significant linguistic and textual aspects can provide evidence of the operation of underlying ideology-related norms. However, it should be noted that it is not always possible to
make a clear distinction between obligatory and non-obligatory shifts, especially in some borderline cases, such as where the shifts relate to linguistic preferences.

Regularities themselves do not provide any hint of the underlying reasons, from which norms can be inferred and reconstructed. It is corresponding contextual factors that can assist in exploring the underlying reasons. From the studies done by Sidiropoulou (2004: 21-56) and Kuo and Nakamura (2005), it is found that both readily identifiable ideologies (e.g. the ideological stance of pro-independence) and ideology-related contextual factors (e.g. readership profiles) are essential for exploring ideological reasons.

As mentioned in the Introduction, the target news organisation’s ideologies in which this thesis is particularly interested are threefold. In order to explore more thoroughly ideological reasons behind the recurrent non-obligatory shifts, it would be best to specify clearly, right at the beginning, what those three kinds of ideologies are. However, like norms, ideologies are unobservable, so it is not always possible to identify them with accuracy. Social or political ideologies which the news organisation holds towards a given news event may be easy to identify if they have been explicitly conveyed again and again through numerous news items, but its ideological assumptions concerning the audience’s needs and the acceptability of trans-edited news texts are not always easy to decipher. One possible way to derive all three types of ideologies of a news organisation is through a data analysis of the source and target texts collected. Nevertheless, this may run the risk of circularity if later on these given ideologies are used to account for any shifts identified in the target texts.

Seeking to avoid the circularity of argument, this thesis will explore underlying ideological reasons behind shifts with the assistance of (1) the
readily identifiable ideologies of the target news organisation and (2) ideology-related contextual factors. As mentioned above, some ideological stances of the target news organisation may already be well-known or be readily available, so they can be of help in exploring underlying ideological reasons. It may be argued that with the readily identifiable ideologies available, researchers know exactly what ideological influences they are looking for from the outset. These identifiable ideologies, however, do not exhaust all the relevant ideologies held by the target news organisation, as most of the time they are mainly concerned with the target news organisation’s stances towards the news events themselves rather than with its stances towards the audience or the acceptability of the trans-edited texts. Instead of conducting a textual analysis and trying to uncover those unidentifiable ideologies, this thesis will use ideology-related contextual factors to help explore underlying reasons related to the unidentifiable ideologies. To put it differently, not all ideological stances of the target news organisation are fully known at the beginning, which makes it possible to avoid the circularity to a certain extent.

It should be noted that even if in some instances, the relevant readily identifiable ideologies seem to cover all the three types of ideologies the news organisation may hold as regards a given news text, ideology-related contextual factors still need to be taken into account in case there are any unnoticed hidden ideologies. The next section on contextual factors of news trans-editing will provide a glimpse into what ideology-related factors are.
1.2.3. Contextual Factors

1.2.3.1. Main Concepts

As put by Vuorinen, “translation which takes place in an institutional setting cannot be examined as isolated from the whole individual, institutional, social and cultural framework surrounding it” (1997: 169). Previous studies identify a range of contextual factors which constrain the decision-making process of news trans-editing. These contextual factors can be classified into three main types: actors, immediate contexts of the source and target texts, and socio-cultural or socio-political attitudes and values.

The first type of factor, i.e. actors, has much to do with ideology, so it is given slightly more space. Actors involved in a given news trans-editing task may include the target news organisation, a given trans-editing team (including editors, trans-editors, and senior staff), and the prospective audience (Vuorinen 1997: 67; Hursti 2001; Cheng 2004: 101), as illustrated by the following flowchart of English-Chinese news trans-editing at the *China Times* in Taiwan⁶:

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⁶ The information on the flowchart was obtained through the author’s personal correspondence with Guo Chonglun, the deputy editor-in-chief at the *China Times*, on 23 October 2004.
1. Preparing a list of possible news

The director of International News prepares the list in advance.

2. Pre-editing meeting

1. The director submits the list at the meeting.
2. The editor-in-chief and deputy editor-in-chief decide which news to report and if any news should be put on the front page.

3. Distributing source news texts

1. The director distributes the source news texts to trans-editors.
2. The director informs trans-editors of the space allocated and target reporting perspectives.

4. Trans-editing

Trans-editors carry out the trans-editing tasks.

5. Reviewing

1. The director reviews the trans-edited texts.
2. If only a small revision is required, the director will do it himself/herself. If the reporting perspectives of the trans-edited texts are not consistent with those decided beforehand, the trans-edited texts will be returned to trans-editors.

6. Checking

Senior staff carry out the checking work to examine if the Chinese translations of foreign names are consistent, to see if there are any errors, and to revise trans-edited texts and make them more reader friendly.

7. Creating headlines

The editor for the Section of International News creates headlines for the trans-edited texts.

8. Final reviewing

The deputy editor-in-chief reviews the headlines and chooses the corresponding photos.

Figure 3 Flowchart of English-Chinese news trans-editing at the China Times

The news trans-editing task takes place in a given news organisation, that is, the China Times. Stages 1 and 2, which are concerned with source selection, involve the director, editor-in-chief, and deputy editor-in-chief; stage 3 is where the target perspectives are reset, and the main parties involved are the director and trans-editors; at stages 4 to 8, the act of trans-editing is carried out, and the parties concerned are trans-editors, the editor-in-chief, senior staff, the editor of the Section of International News, and even the intended readers.

Concerning the target news organisation, its conventions of news production, news style, editorial policies, and socio-political ideologies can all constrain the decision-making process of news trans-editing. The members of the news trans-editing team also have individual interests, attitudes, or ideological stances, which could, in one way or another, influence how they trans-edit the source texts. As
for the prospective readers, their presumed expectations and needs are in fact an
overriding motivation behind a given news trans-editing task (Vuorinen 1999: 67; Ho

In terms of ideological influences, the target news organisation seems to be the
most dominant and powerful. The members of the news trans-editing team inevitably
have their own individual ideological stances, but normally they are expected and are
willing to follow the ideologies prevailing in the news organisation to produce
‘acceptable’ and ‘proper’ trans-edited news for the audience. Also, expectations and
needs of the target audience are usually pre-determined by the target news
organisation.

The second type of factor is concerned with the knowledge the news
trans-editing team has as regards the immediate contexts of the source and target texts,
which may include subject matters, intended readers, textual form and structure,
genre conventions, and the medium through which the target texts are to be relayed to
the target audience (Vuorinen 1999: 57).

The third type of factor is to do with socio-cultural or political attitudes and
values. As a news organisation is embedded in a wider socio-cultural system, social,
political, or cultural values and attitudes inevitably have an impact on the news
organisation, especially on its ideological stances. Moreover, news trans-editing is an
intercultural communicative act, so socio-cultural acceptability and specificity can
constrain the decision-making of the news trans-editing team (Hursti 2001; Cheng

1.2.3.2. Implications

As discussed above, news trans-editing is undertaken by a given news
trans-editing team within a specific news organisation, which in turn is embedded in a wider socio-cultural or socio-political system. Besides, the news organisation exerts its own ideological influences on the trans-editing team and expects the team to foster its ideologies.

Based on these characteristics, it stands to reason that Lefevere’s literary system can be applied to news trans-editing when ideology is viewed as a primary and fundamental binding force. The news organisation can be assumed to play the role of patron, imposing ideology-related norms from outside the system of news trans-editing and bringing it in line with prevailing values and attitudes of the wider socio-cultural or socio-political system. The trans-editing team represents the professionals within the system of news trans-editing. They assist in securing the ideologies of the news organisation by setting up the immediate contexts of the target texts which conform to the ideology-related norms, and by producing the target texts in accordance with these immediate contexts.

The application of Lefevere’s literary system casts light on one significant issue, that is, the existence of a two-way relationship between the ideologies of the news organisation and the other two ideology-related contextual factors of the target texts, as illustrated below:

![Diagram](values and attitudes in the wider socio-cultural or socio-political system) → (ideologies of the news organisation) → (immediate context) → (values and attitudes in the wider socio-cultural or socio-political system)

*Figure 4 Relationship between ideologies and the other two factors*

The two-way relationship illustrated above suggests that the other two contextual factors can, in one way or another, provide clues as to the ideologies of
the news organisation, and contribute to the exploration of the underlying ideological reasons behind the shifts.

### 1.3. Conclusion

The theoretical foundations underlying the development of a method for reconstructing ideology-related norms in news trans-editing have been laid down in Section 1.1. with the elaboration of the basic concepts of norms and systems within DTS and the application of these concepts to norms in news trans-editing. Following this, some insights from the existing research of news trans-editing have also been discussed, especially those directly related to the development of the reconstruction method at issue.

Based on these insights, two aspects significant to the development of the reconstruction method have been identified. First, there are two main components of the reconstruction of ideology-related norms. One is the following three types of contextual factors: (1) the relevant readily identifiable ideologies of the target news organisation, (2) the relevant values and attitudes of the target socio-cultural or socio-political system, and (3) the immediate contexts of the target texts. The other is the textual evidence, that is, the recurrent non-obligatory shifts in ideologically significant linguistic and textual aspects at both the macro- and micro-levels. Second, two types of ideology-related norms need to be reconstructed: process and product norms. The former include initial, operational, and communication norms, and the latter expectancy norms.

Building on these two essential aspects, a reconstruction method will be developed in Chapter 2.
Chapter 2 – A Method for Reconstructing
Ideology-related Norms in News Trans-editing

This chapter develops a reconstruction method for ideology-related norms by adapting the three-staged methodology proposed by Toury (1995). Section 2.1. sketches out the overall framework of the reconstruction method, which consists of three parts: pre-comparison, comparison, and reconstruction. The pre-comparison stage is further elaborated upon in Section 2.2. with the formulation of a translation-oriented news discourse model. This model assists with the identification of the relevant sub-factors under the immediate context and the relevant ideologically significant linguistic and textual aspects. Prior to the formulation of the model, four premises from which the model is developed are first addressed at the end of Section 2.1.

2.1. The Development of a Reconstruction Method

A systematic methodology for undertaking descriptive studies has been proposed by Toury (1995). In the following, Toury’s methodology is first briefly reviewed, and then a method for the reconstruction of ideology-related norms is developed in accordance with the rationale of Toury’s methodology.

2.1.1. Toury’s Methodology for Descriptive Studies

The methodology put forward by Toury (1995: 70-86) can be summarised as follows:
1. Examine the acceptability of the target text within the target system;
2. Compare the source text and the target text for regular shifts, and establish target-source relationships; and
3. Make generalisations about the underlying concept of translation.

In the first stage, the target text may be examined to see if it conforms to the principles embodied by ‘native’ texts or deviates systematically from them. Systematic differences between the target text and ‘native’ texts may be then attributable to formal relationships between the source and target texts (Toury 1995: 72-73). The target and source texts are compared at the second stage to identify recurrent shifts, which in turn assist in establishing the source-target relationships. On the basis of the established relationships, the last stage examines “the overall CONCEPT OF TRANSLATION [...] along with derived notions such as DECISION-MAKING and the factors [i.e. norms] which may have CONSTRAINED it” (Toury 1995: 86, capitals in the original).

The basic rationale of Toury’s methodology is to look at the target context first, go on to investigate regular shifts, and eventually explore norms, which govern the decision-making process, and even the underlying laws of translational behaviour.

2.1.2. A Method for Reconstructing Ideology-related Norms

As pointed out at the end of Chapter 1, there are two aspects essential to the development of a method for reconstructing ideology-related norms in news trans-editing. Building upon those two aspects, a reconstruction method is developed as follows by adapting the basic rationale of Toury’s methodology:
Table 3 A method for reconstructing ideology-related norms in news trans-editing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Compare the following three types of contextual factors:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. the relevant readily identifiable ideologies of the source and target news organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. the relevant values and attitudes of the source and target socio-cultural or socio-political systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. the immediate contexts of the source and target texts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 2. Compare the source and target news texts for recurrent non-obligatory shifts in terms of ideologically significant linguistic and textual aspects at both the macro- and micro-levels, and explore ideological reasons behind the shifts based on the comparison of the three types of contextual factors |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3. Reconstruct the following norms based on the reasons explored at stage 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. process norms: initial, operational, and communication norms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. product norms: expectancy norms</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first stage examines not only the target contextual factors but also those in the source. The reason why all the source contextual factors are also examined at the first stage is that they can help ensure whether or not the shifts identified are motivated by the target news organisation’s ideologies. Without relevant information on the source contextual factors, it is uncertain if the ideologies held by the source and target news organisations are similar or different. Accordingly, it is not possible to infer or explain whether or not non-obligatory shifts are caused by underlying norms which arise due to the dissimilar ideologies held by the target news organisation. The necessity for incorporating the information about the source context into the first stage is also pointed out by Munday (2002: 78):

the ST obviously also operates in its own sociocultural context, and that too will influence both whether it is selected for translation by the TT culture and also the way it is translated. It follows that consideration needs to be given to both ST and TT sociocultural contexts when studying a translation.

Before carrying out the comparative studies at the first and second stages, the following four issues must be addressed:
1. What are the relevant readily identifiable ideologies of the source and target news organisations towards a given news text?
2. What are the relevant values and attitudes of the source and target socio-cultural or socio-political systems to a given news text?
3. What sub-factors under the immediate context of news text are of relevance to providing clues on the news organisation's ideologies?
4. What linguistic and textual aspects at both the macro- and micro-levels of news texts are more likely to reflect the resultant effects of ideology-related norms?

Not all readily identifiable ideologies of the news organisation are relevant to a given news text, and neither are all socio-cultural and political values and attitudes. The solution to the first and second issues lies in the identification of the relevant sub-factors under the immediate context, which can provide a variety of information about a given news text. Thus, to address the above four issues properly, a pre-comparison stage needs to be incorporated into the reconstruction method, as illustrated below:

**Table 4 A method for reconstructing ideology-related norms in news trans-editing (revised)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Pre-comparison stage:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Identify the relevant sub-factors under the immediate context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Identify the relevant ideologically significant linguistic and textual aspects at the macro- and micro-levels</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2. Comparison stage:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Compare the following three types of contextual factors:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) the relevant readily identifiable ideologies of the source and target news organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) the relevant values and attitudes of the source and target socio-cultural or socio-political systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) the immediate contexts of the source and target texts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Compare the source and target news texts for recurrent non-obligatory shifts in terms of ideologically significant linguistic and textual aspects at both the macro- and micro-levels, and explore ideological reasons behind the shifts based on the comparison of the three types of contextual factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3. Reconstruct the following norms based on the reasons explored at stage 2:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. process norms: initial, operational, and communication norms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. product norms: expectancy norms</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As shown by the above method, the pre-comparison stage is of significance. Only after the relevant sub-factors under the immediate context and the relevant linguistic and textual aspects are identified can the comparison and reconstruction stages be conducted. In the next few sections, a translation-oriented news discourse model will be developed step by step to assist with the identification of the relevant sub-factors and linguistic and textual aspects. Prior to the development of the model, the four underlying premises on which the translation-oriented news discourse model is based are first addressed here.

First, relevant macro- and micro-level linguistic and textual aspects to be identified by the translation-oriented news discourse model should be ideologically significant, and should enable the operation of underlying ideology-related norms in news trans-editing to be revealed. Second, relevant sub-factors to be identified by the model should be, to some extent, related to the news organisation’s ideologies, as these sub-factors are to be used to help examine ideological reasons behind the identified shifts. Third, the model should account for the relations among all the three types of contextual factors, in order to illustrate the relations between the sub-factors and the news organisation’s ideologies, and to explain how to locate the relevant identifiable ideologies and socio-cultural or socio-political values and attitudes. Fourth, the model should account for the relations between all the three types of contextual factors and the identified linguistic and textual aspects. The function of all the contextual factors is to assist in exploring underlying ideological reasons behind the shifts occurring in ideologically significant linguistic and textual aspects. If the contextual factors are not related to the identified linguistic and textual aspects, they cannot fulfil the above function.

The model, referred to as a translation-oriented news discourse model, is mainly
based on the above four premises. The word ‘news discourse’ makes it clear that this model is designed for carrying out a discourse analysis of news items, that is, an analysis of the news text itself, its related context, and the relationships between the two. The word ‘translation-oriented’ does not carry any prescriptive meanings. It does not mean that this model will provide guidelines for translators to follow in order to produce ‘good’ translation. Instead, it is adopted to distinguish the model developed in this thesis from those proposed in CDA. As will be discussed in Section 2.2.2., both van Dijk (1988) and Norman Fairclough (1995) put forward their own models for analysing news discourse (media discourse in Fairclough’s terms). However, their models are particularly designed to examine original news texts rather than translated or trans-edited news texts, and translation phenomena are by no means their major concern. With the word ‘translation-oriented’, the model not only can distinguish itself from those put forward in CDA, but also can bring to the fore the primary focus on translational behaviour.

With these premises in mind, Section 2.2 starts with the development of the textual strata of the translation-oriented news discourse model to identify the relevant linguistic and textual aspects.

2.2. Development of the Textual Strata of the Model

According to the first premise, relevant linguistic and textual aspects to be compared should be able to reveal the ideological imprint. The relationship between ideology and language has been a main concern in the research on media discourse by linguists and practitioners of CL and CDA. The next section briefly reviews the main concepts of CL and CDA, and explores relevant linguistic and textual aspects to be included in the translation-oriented news discourse model.
2.2.1. CL and CDA Approaches

CL was developed by Roger Fowler and his associates in the 1970s (Fowler et al 1979; Kress and Hodge 1979; Fowler 1991). CDA results from the convergence of the development of CL with the approaches of the discourse analysts van Dijk and Fairclough. Whereas the text as the relevant linguistic unit is fundamental to both CL and CDA, CL largely deals with the linguistic analysis of the text, but CDA pays attention not only to the text but also to the social context (Wodak 1995: 89). A crucial concept of CL and CDA is that much language use is manipulative, so their primary goal “is to expose the ideological forces underlying communicative exchanges” (Calzada Pérez 2003: 2).

2.2.1.1. CL Approach

On the belief that underlying ideology can be conveyed through linguistic choices made in texts, CL proposes some linguistic aspects which are more likely to be ideologically significant, and examines how underlying ideologies are embedded.

The linguistic aspects CL proposes for the textual analysis are drawn from M.A.K. Halliday’s systemic functional grammar, which “is geared to the study of language as communication, seeing meaning in the writer’s linguistic choices and systematically relating these choices to a wider socio-cultural framework” (Munday 2001: 90). Fowler regards Halliday’s framework as the best model for examining the connections between linguistic structure, and social values and ideologies (Fowler 1991: 39-42). Following Halliday, he also views language as performing simultaneously three functions: ideational, interpersonal, and textual.

The ideational function refers to the speaker’s experience of the outer and inner worlds; the interpersonal function expresses the speaker’s subjective attitudes or the
speaker-hearer relations, and the textual function presents those two functions with cohesive and coherent structures (Fowler 1991: 69). According to Fowler, the ideational and interpersonal functions are of particular significance, as CL “is particularly concerned with the ordering of experience and with the mediation of social relationships and values” (1991: 70). Hence, major linguistic aspects suggested by CL are mainly under these two functions, as illustrated below:

Table 5 Analytical tools suggested by CL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideational</th>
<th>Interpersonal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. lexical structure</td>
<td>1. modality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. transitivity</td>
<td>2. naming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. transformations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(passivisation and nominalisation)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All the three linguistic aspects under the ideational function are pertinent to the representation or classification of ideas. Two components central to lexical structure are categorisation and over-lexicalisation (Fowler 1991: 80-85). Categorisation has to do with the labelling of groups and individuals, such as ‘freedom fighters’ versus ‘terrorists’. Through the choice of words used to name and describe groups, an ideological slant towards these groups may be constructed.

Overlexicalisation refers to the representation of one concept with an overabundance of quasi-synonyms (Fowler et al 1979: 211). For example, antagonists may be lexicalised in various ways within a single text, such as ‘dictators’, ‘criminals’, and ‘evil’. Overlexicalisation often has an effect of markedness, “as it signals a kind of deviation from social convention or expectation and reflects perceptions and judgments from the essentially biased standpoint of such cultural norms or social expectations” (Teo 2000: 21).
Transitivity refers to how speakers encode their physical and mental experience in the clause (Fowler 1991: 76). Transitivity can be expressed in terms of “who does what to whom” or “what happens” (Teo 2000: 25). It can be a useful tool to explore how agency, causality, or responsibility is highlighted or obfuscated. Here are two illustrating examples:

(1) John broke the window.
(2) The window broke.

What is conveyed in the first example is an action, and it is obvious that ‘John’ is the person doing the action of breaking. Agency and responsibility are made clear in this clause. In contrast, what is depicted in the second example is merely an event, so agency and responsibility become implicit and untraceable. As illustrated by these two examples, transitivity can offer alternative ways to analyse the same thing. Any choices made among the available options may be ideologically significant, as they seem to imply certain points of view.

As for syntactic transformations, passivisation and nominalisation are of particular importance. Passivisation may lead to thematisation and the deletion of participants (Fowler et al 1979: 208). Nominalisation, which refers to nominals derived from verbs or adjectives, can be adopted to weaken any feeling of activities, obfuscate agency, and create an impersonal style (Fowler et al 1979: 207-208). The following are two examples to explain these two transformations:

(3) The city was destroyed (by the enemy).
(4) The destruction of the city (by the enemy) was horrible.

The passivisation in example (3) allows the affected participant ‘the city’ to be
placed in the sentence-initial position and become the theme of the whole clause. Also, the agent ‘the enemy’ can be further deleted, obfuscating agency and responsibility. In example (4), the nominal ‘destruction’ is derived from the corresponding verb ‘destroy’. What is conveyed in example (4) becomes a static event, and the action expressed by ‘destroy’ in example (3) no longer exists. The agent ‘the enemy’ in example (4) can also be deleted, leaving agency and responsibility implicit.

Modality and naming are two major tools under the interpersonal function. As put by Fowler (1991: 85-87), modality pertains to obligation, permission, or possibility, expressed in ‘should’, ‘may’, and ‘possible’ etc. Addressers’ subjective attitudes towards themselves, towards the propositions expressed, and towards their addressees can be conveyed with modal expressions.

With regard to naming, Fowler et al. point out that people can be addressed or referred to in a range of ways, and “the different possibilities signify different assessments by the speaker/writer of his or her relationship with the person referred to or spoken to, and the formality or intimacy of the situation” (1979: 200). For example, an appropriate formality would be titles plus complete, unabbreviated names, such as ‘Foreign Minister Mohammed Ibrahim Kamel’; very-well known public figures tend to be called by titles plus last names, for instance, ‘Mrs. Thatcher’; and wives are referred to by only their first name, for example, ‘Sonia’.7

2.2.1.2. CDA Approaches

Both van Dijk (1988, 1991) and Fairclough (1989, 1992, 1995) have made an important transition from text analysis to discourse analysis. Van Dijk posits a

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7 All the examples of naming given here are taken from Fowler et al (1979: 201).
sociocognitive model for analysing news discourse, which consists of three parts: social functions, news production and comprehension, and textual analysis. Social functions (including ideology) can be related to textual expressions only through the cognition, that is, the mental models that journalists use to construct a given event in a news text and that readers adopt to comprehend the same news event.

The mental models are developed on the basis of similar events which happened previously. They are determined not only by personal beliefs and goals but also by socially shared opinions, attitudes, and ideologies. The mental models can be said to be subjective and ideological models which news workers adopt to organise and construct events depicted in news texts. Information on the mental models, therefore, can shed light on ideological influences from the wider society. Although the mental models are not observable, they inevitably leave traces in news texts. It follows that there should be some textual aspects which can embody these mental models, and thus can be the relevant textual aspects to be included in the model in this thesis. News frames proposed by scholars in journalism seem to constitute this kind of textual aspect, and will be elaborated in Section 2.2.2.3.

Van Dijk’s model also extends the range of CL from the micro-level text analysis, such as lexical structures and transitivity to the macro-level analysis. Van Dijk (1983, 1986, 1988: 30-58) indicates that the macro-level structures of news items consist of semantic macrostructures and news schemas. A semantic macrostructure is “a hierarchical structure of the topics of news discourse” (van Dijk 1988: 41). Its realisation is top-down, relevance-controlled, and cyclical. In other words, news topics are presented from general to particular and from the most important to those of less importance.

News schemas refer to the overall structural organisation of the contents signified
by semantic macrostructures, including such categories as summary (including both the headline and the lead), episode, consequences, verbal reactions, and comments. Like semantic macrostructures, news schemas are realised with top-down relevance, with the general information in the summary, followed by more details in the episode.

The ideological significance can be detected right from the headlines, as van Dijk (1991) points out that headlines summarise what news workers consider the most newsworthy aspects of news events, and necessarily convey certain opinions or specific views on the events.

Like van Dijk, Fairclough (1995) also develops an analytical model for media discourse, which integrates three-dimensional views of discourse analysis. A textual analysis is the first dimension. The second dimension is an examination of discursive practice, through which texts are produced and comprehended. It is an analysis of what transformations news texts go through during production and reception. The third dimension is an analysis of socio-cultural practice, which is particularly pertinent to the relations between discourse and power or ideology.

In Fairclough's model, ideology does not directly influence textual form. Instead, it is connected to the text through discursive practice. Transformations which texts are subjected to in production may have certain ideological implications, as the mechanism of selection and salience are involved. This sheds light on the ideological significance of various editing strategies which news texts go through. Section 2.2.2.2. will further address the issue of editing strategies.

2.2.1.3. Practical Applications of CL and CDA

The main concepts of CL and CDA have been applied to studies concerning the relationship between ideology and language in news texts, as well as to those
concerning ideological effects in translated texts (including translated or trans-edited news texts). As for the former, Kuo and Nakamura point out that two main research trends can be further identified. One focuses on “the subtle role of news discourse in the maintenance and legitimisation of injustice and inequality in society” (2005: 395), such as van Dijk (1991), Brookes (1995), Teo (2000), and Flowerdew et al. (2002); the other focuses on “the direct comparison of different media accounts of the same event” (2005: 396), and Lee and Craig (1992), Wang (1993), Weng (1998), Fang (2001) are some of the examples.

Regarding the studies on ideological influences in translated texts, they are either (1) concerned with different ideological stances exhibited in translated texts due to translators’ conscious or subconscious choices, such as Mason (1994), Hatim and Mason (1997: 143-163), Kelly (1998), Puurtinen (2000, 2003), and Calzada Pérez (2002), or (2) interested in the influences of the translator’s ideologies or the institution’s political ideologies on the text design of the target texts, for example, Schäffner (2003), Sidiropoulou (2004: 21-56), and Kuo and Nakamura (2005).

Apart from applying the analytical tools proposed by CL and CDA, the above-mentioned studies also highlight some other ideologically-relevant linguistic and textual aspects which are not fully explored by CL and CDA, especially those related to the textual function of language. These aspects include thematic structure, cohesion, and quotation.

Thematic structure examines the organisation of information within a clause. A theme is a kind of prominence that describes the starting point for the clause as a message, and can be indicative of the kind of foregrounding the writer or speaker intends to convey. As Peter Teo indicates, exploring the underlying reasons behind the motivation of placing a certain piece of information in the thematic position can
“provide a glimpse into the ideological meaning embedded within a text” (2000: 29).

Cohesion concerns the ways in which the words in a text are mutually connected. Lexical cohesion is one of the most important cohesive ties used in a text. Another significant cohesive device is conjunctions. The relevance of conjunctions in revealing ideological meanings has been mentioned in Section 1.2.2., where Sidiropoulou’s (2004: 21-56) study was reviewed.

Quotation patterns can also become a powerful ideological tool to manipulate readers’ perception and interpretation of people and events in news reports. Vuorinen, in his study on cross-cultural news transmission, points out that direct quotes of news texts have ideological potentials, as “they may be chosen and reproduced to suggest certain preferred interpretations or to lend support to certain viewpoints” (1999: 76).

2.2.2. Insights from Other Approaches

This section discusses four main insights from research done within journalism and translation studies.

2.2.2.1. Schematic Structure of Hard News

As discussed in Section 2.2.1.2., news schemas provide schematic structures for news items. With news schemas, semantic macrostructures of news items can be presented from most important (e.g. headlines and leads) to less important (e.g. backgrounds). However, such staged schematic structures cannot inform us how different components of a news item are related to each other. The orbital mode, which Peter White (2002: 200-206) puts forward, is able to explain the relations between different components, especially for hard news items, which refer to those
news items characterised by factual accounting, data, and information.

The orbital mode consists of a nucleus and a range of satellites. The opening nucleus is made up of a headline and lead, which encapsulate core information. In other words, the nucleus contains all new information essential for the text’s central message. Subsequent satellites act “not to introduce new meanings but to qualify, elaborate, explain, and appraise the meanings already presented in the opening nucleus” (White 2002: 401). They usually do not hold logical relations with one another, but they all refer back to the nucleus. Hence, hard news texts can be cut because of the textual predominance of the lead and the orbital relationship of the satellites. The removal of any satellite does not disrupt the orbital role of other satellites (Iedema, Feez and White 1994: 136-137).

The orbital mode will be more useful than the news schema when the news data to be examined for the reconstruction of norms include hard news items, as the orbital mode can enable us to capture the relations between the headline, lead, and other components of a given hard news item.

2.2.2.2. Editing Strategies

Allan Bell (1991: 33) emphasises that news texts are products of multiple parties, and editing is a fundamental stage of the news production process. Editing strategies may include information deletion, lexical replacements, and syntactic editing rules, which fulfil the following four functions: to cut, to clarify, to maximise news values, and to standardise language (Bell 1991: 70-83).

A similar situation also exists in the production of trans-edited news texts. As reviewed in Section 1.2.3.1., trans-edited news texts are produced not solely by trans-editors but by a trans-editing team. Editing strategies proposed by Bell are
normally referred to as trans-editing strategies in news trans-editing, as translating and
editing are intertwined closely and not always easily distinguished. Both micro- and
macro-level trans-editing strategies are identified by previous research on news
trans-editing (Fujii 1988; Vuorinen 1997; Hursti 2001; Lee 2001; Cheng 2002, 2004:
108-118). Micro-level strategies involve deletion (selection), addition, combination,
summarisation, substitution, and reorganization. Macro-level strategies consist of
trans-editing within a paragraph, across paragraphs, within a news item, and across
news items.

Apart from serving the four editing functions proposed by Bell, trans-editing
strategies fulfil another significant function, that is, the function of gate-keeping. They
are adopted to control what information from the source news texts should be passed
on to the target audience, and what should not. By using these trans-editing strategies,
the trans-editing team can adapt the source texts to the target audience’s needs. In this
respect, how various trans-editing strategies are applied to produce the target news
texts can be of ideological significance, as they can offer an insight into the target
news organisation’s ideologies and assumptions on its audience’s needs. Any given
news item contains a semantic macrostructure. When the source and target texts are
compared in terms of their semantic macrostructures, how various editing strategies
operate will be revealed.

2.2.2.3. News Frames

The concept of news frames has been adopted by some scholars of journalism in
order to examine news discourse (Entman 1993; Pan and Kosicki 1993; Zang 1999).
News frames are the central organising ideas of news texts. They can be regarded as
interpretative schemas that news media or news workers employ to encode, interpret,
and retrieve large amounts of information (Pan and Kosicki 1993: 56; Zang 1999: 109). For example, most of the U.S. media used to frame Saddam Hussein as a 'villain', and the UN coalition forces were framed as 'heroes', as they were fighting against a 'villain'.

Three levels of semantic structures for news frames are identified by Zang Guoren (1999). First, news frames contain macrostructures, that is, themes or topics. They are usually conveyed by headlines or leads, namely the nuclei. Second, the mid-level structures are concerned with main events, background information, history, consequences, attribution, and evaluation associated with news texts, that is, a range of satellites. Lastly, the micro-level structures are to do with syntactic and lexical structures as well as news style and rhetoric.

In order to effectively fulfil the function of framing, these semantic structures need to undergo such editing operations as selection and reconstruction. Selection, which entails exclusion, can achieve the effect of classification; reconstruction, which includes ordering and arrangement, may perform the function of emphasis (Zang 1999: 46-50). Specific ideologies may be formulated in the process of news framing, as various linguistic and textual aspects are selected and reconstructed to convey certain emphasis and saliency.

The notion of news frames adopted in journalism studies is quite similar to the concept of mental models suggested by van Dijk, but it is far more concrete and relevant to the analysis of news texts.

**2.2.2.4. Communicative Purposes**

Apart from DTS and discourse-based approaches to translation studies, which will be discussed in Section 2.3.1., functionalist approaches to translation studies also
regard translation as a communicative act. What functionalist approaches deem the most important issue for translation as communication is the *skopos* of a translation. In Hans J. Vermeer’s terms (2000: 221), the word *skopos* “is a technical term for the aim and purpose of a translation.” It is assumed to be the overriding factor in the translation process. The purpose of a translation is not necessarily the same as that conveyed in the source text. Vermeer (2000: 222-223) elaborates on this point as follows:

The target text [...] is oriented towards the target culture, and it is this which ultimately defines its adequacy. It therefore follows that source and target texts may diverge from each other quite considerably, not only in the formulation and distribution of the content but also as regards the goals which are set for each, and in terms of which the arrangement of the content is in fact determined.

The above concept fits in well with the activity of news trans-editing. The target communicative purposes are usually different from those of the source texts, as the source and target texts are located in different contexts, and trans-edited news texts need to meet the target audience’s needs. Accordingly, examination of the communicative purposes of news texts themselves may reveal the news organisation’s ideological assumptions about its readers’ interests and needs.

### 2.2.3. Textual Strata

Based on the discussion in Sections 2.2.1. and 2.2.2., the micro- and macro-level linguistic and textual aspects which are more likely to be of ideological significance can be summarised as follows:
The linguistic and textual aspects identified in Table 6 are, to some extent, interrelated with one another. Such interrelation occurs at both the micro- and macro-levels as well as across the two levels.

At the micro-level, all linguistic and textual aspects are related to one another. For example, transformations, especially passivisations, can lead to the change of thematic structure in a clause. Interdependence also exists between the three macro-level linguistic and textual aspects. Take as an example the aspect of communicative purposes. They mainly determine what news frames are to be adopted to describe a given news event, and what news structures are to be employed to convey those news frames.

As for the interaction across the macro- and micro-levels, each macro-level linguistic or textual aspect holds direct two-way relations with the micro-level aspects under the same function, and indirect two-way relations with those micro-level aspects under the other functions. Take news frames as an example. They influence the organisation of lexical structure, transitivity, and transformations at the micro-level. The realisation of these three micro-level aspects in turn reinforces and reproduces the news frames at issue. Apart from this direct influence, news frames can also partly influence the choice of different types of modality as well as the arrangement of thematic structure. Examples illustrating these relations will be given in Chapters 4 and 5, where the findings of two case studies are discussed.
The mutual relations between micro- and macro-level linguistic and textual aspects raise one significant issue: micro-level translation shifts may, to some extent, contribute to the investigation of macro-level translation shifts, especially those in news frames and communicative purposes. Hence, the second part of the comparison stage in the reconstruction method shown in Table 4 should be revised as follow:

B. Compare the source and target texts for recurrent non-obligatory shifts in terms of ideologically significant linguistic and textual aspects at the micro-level first and then at the macro-level, and explore ideological reasons behind the shifts based on the comparison of the three types of contextual factors.

To illustrate their interrelationships clearly, all the linguistic and textual aspects at the micro- and macro-levels are represented in a graph below, displaying the two textual strata of the translation-oriented news discourse model:

![Figure 5 Textual strata](image)

The concentric triangle format renders the interrelations at issue more transparent. Firstly, each set of micro-level linguistic and textual aspects under the corresponding function occupies one angle of the inner triangle, but there are no boundaries drawn
within the triangle. In this way, the fact that each set of linguistic and textual aspects interacts and overlaps with each other is made clear.

Secondly, the triangle format also works in the same way to demonstrate the interdependence of all the macro-level structures. In addition, it helps to explain the direct and indirect mutual relations between the macro-level linguistic and textual aspects and those at the micro-level. Each macro-level aspect has direct influence over the set of micro-level aspects which is located next to it. By drawing no boundaries within the outer triangle, the model demonstrates that the influence of each macro-level aspect reaches the other two sets of micro-level aspects, which are located on the other two angles of the inner triangle.

2.3. Development of the Contextual Strata of the Model

The textual strata of the translation-oriented news discourse model have been developed in Section 2.2. This section, based on the second and third premises mentioned at the end of Section 2.1., formulates the contextual strata to identify relevant sub-factors within the immediate context, and to address the relations among all the three types of contextual factors.

2.3.1. Relevant Sub-factors under the Immediate Context

Adopting the discourse-based approach, Basil Hatim and Ian Mason (1990: 48-51), Juliane House (1997: 108-110) and Anna Trosborg (2002: 10-13, 15-28) all draw on the notion of 'context of situation' from Halliday's systemic-functional grammar to emphasise the importance of the immediate context to translation as a
communicative act.

The context of situation consists of three variables, namely field, tenor, and mode. Field refers to "what is happening"; tenor has to do with who are taking part in the transaction as well as the "nature of the participants, their status and roles"; and mode concerns "what it is that the participants are expecting language to do for them in that situation" (Halliday and Hasan 1985: 12). These three variables serve to interpret the immediate context where meanings are being exchanged.

All of the three studies mentioned above specify what contextual aspects are relevant for translation activities under each variable. Their accounts are mainly based on insights from Crystal and Davy (1969), Gregory and Caroll (1978), Halliday (1978), Martin (1984), Halliday and Hasan (1985), and Eggins (1994). Their main ideas are summarised below:

Table 7 Contextual aspects under each variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Studies</th>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Tenor</th>
<th>Mode</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hatim and Mason (1990)</td>
<td>activity</td>
<td>addresser-addressee relationship</td>
<td>1. channel 2. text type</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House (1997)</td>
<td>activity or subject matter</td>
<td>1. social role relationship 2. nature of participants</td>
<td>1. channel 2. participation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trosborg (2002)</td>
<td>activity</td>
<td>addresser-addressee relationship</td>
<td>1. medium 2. text type 3. interpersonal and experiential distance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.3.1.1. Contextual Aspects under Field

All of the three studies are consistent in regarding activity as the major aspect subsumed under the variable of field. What is at stake here is whether the field of activity is specialised/technical or non-specialised/non-technical or somewhere in between (see Hatim and Mason 1990: 48; House 1997: 108; Trosborg 2002: 16).
In House’s definition, activity and subject matter seem to be identical. However, Hatim and Mason (1990: 48) indicate that:

field is not the same as subject matter [...] it is only when subject matter is highly predictable in a given situation (a physics lecture) or when it is constitutive of a given social activity (courtroom interaction) that we can legitimately recognise a close link between field and subject matter.

Activity is more general in nature, such as news reporting on China-Taiwan conflicts reported by the New York Times, whereas subject matter is more specific, for instance, the news event on the Taiwanese president’s independence remarks, which is a specific issue concerning China-Taiwan conflicts. Both activity and subject matter can offer clues on relevant socio-cultural and political attitudes and values as well as the news organisation’s ideologies towards the news event and towards the audience. Activity provides more general information, but subject matter more specific information. For example, the activity of ‘reporting China-Taiwan conflicts by the New York Times’ may indicate that the policies of the U.S. to China and Taiwan are of particular relevance; the subject matter of ‘independence remarks by Taiwanese presidents’ may point out the significance of specific political attitudes of the U.S. towards Taiwan’s independence. Subject matter can also throw light on the news organisation’s ideological stances towards the acceptability and newsworthiness of a given news text.

2.3.1.2. Contextual Aspects under Tenor

Concerning the variable of tenor, the first contextual aspect of each study is concerned with the degree of formality associated with the addresser-addressee relationship even though in different terms (i.e. ‘addresser-addressee relationship’ and
‘social role relationship’). Here, the main concern is distribution of power among the participants, that is, whether or not they are of equal power or status (Hatim and Mason 1990: 50; House 1997: 109; Trosborg 2002: 22).

The aspect of formality can shed light on the news organisation’s attitudes towards its relationship with the audience. Are they in a formal, casual, or intimate relationship? For instance, if a news text is written in an informal style with many colloquial usages as well as simple vocabulary and syntactic structures, it can be presumed that the news organisation assumes a close relationship with its audience. Therefore, it is beyond doubt that formality is a relevant sub-factor in the immediate context.

House (1997: 109) highlights another aspect which has not been considered by the other two studies, that is, the backgrounds of participants, which may include their temporal, geographical, and social provenance.

In the case of news texts, participants may consist of the audience and the whole team in the news organisation that is in charge of the news production (e.g. the news trans-editing team). Among these participants, the intended audience is much more relevant in revealing the news organisation’s ideologies.

As Bell (1991: 89) puts it, typical of news organisations is separation from the audience, but newsworkers do bear their audience in mind when producing news texts. They address stereotypes of audience members in their news texts. By locating the audience, the news organisation’s ideological assumptions on its audience, and on what news texts are acceptable to the audience may be revealed to some extent. Also, the audience may provide a glimpse into the news organisation’s ideologies towards the news event, for the audience is usually expected by the news organisation to hold similar socio-political ideologies. Moreover, different types of audience definitely
would highlight different socio-cultural or socio-political values and attitudes.

Bell (1991: 92) also emphasises that there are four types of audience: addressees (those who are directly addressed), auditors (those who are known but not targeted), overhearers (those who are known but not expected to be present), and eavesdroppers (those who are not even known). Different categories of text receivers may impinge on the language style of text producers to a varying degree. Among these four types, addressees and auditors are much more likely to provide clues as to the ideologies of a news organisation, as they are both assumed to be present.

**2.3.1.3. Contextual Aspects under Mode**

As for the relevant contextual aspects under the variable of mode, one thing that all studies have in common is the way in which communication is carried out, that is, channel or medium (Hatim and Mason 1990: 49-50; House 1997: 109; Trosborg 2002: 11-12). This aspect mainly covers spoken and written channels, “which can be ‘simple’, e.g., ‘written to be read’ or ‘complex’, e.g., ‘written to be spoken as if not written’” (House 1997: 109).

In terms of news texts, channel can also refer to the section where a news text is displayed. The section where a news text is displayed may pinpoint what ideologies the news organisation may hold as regards the news event conveyed by the news text. Take the *China Times* and the *Liberty Times* in Taiwan as an example. For the *China Times*, news texts concerning China and China-Taiwan relations are normally allocated to the ‘Section on the Two Sides (of the Taiwan Strait)’. In contrast, there is no similar section in the *Liberty Times*, so news texts on China are usually displayed in the ‘Section on News Focus” or in the ‘Section on Political News’. The different channels used by these two newspapers may be related to their different ideologies.
Although House (1997) differs, both the other two studies regard text type as an important aspect under the variable of mode. Text type is referred to as “a conceptual framework which enables us to classify texts in terms of communicative intentions serving an overall rhetorical purpose” (Hatim and Mason 1990: 140). A text is usually hybridised with respect to text types, but only one text type focus can exist “at one time in a given text” (Hatim and Mason 1990: 146). An example of news reporting provided by Hatim and Mason (1990: 146) explains such multifunctionality:

within news reporting, the dominant focus will always be on the sequence of events being related. Nevertheless, an evaluative strand will necessarily be present to a greater or lesser extent. The latter element is bound to remain subsidiary if the narration is not to drift into argumentation.

Trosborg (1997: 16-17) argues that “the text types employed in a particular text (or genre) need not agree with its text type focus”. It is in this case that the operation of underlying ideologies becomes even more telling. Hatim and Mason (1990: 164) indicates that:

In the expression of ideology, choice of which type to employ becomes a crucial issue [...] We normally expect contentious issues to be debated through argumentation. By the same token, we normally expect analytical exposition to relay the facts as they are. But expert arguers succeed in debating contentious issues through seemingly detached analysis. The deliberate ambivalence in this particular kind of hybridisation is clearly ideology.

In the case of news texts, text types may be able to provide relevant clues concerning the attitudes held by the news organisation and the wider socio-cultural or socio-political system as regards the acceptability of a given news text.
House (1997: 109) and Trosborg (2002: 12) propose another element, that is, participants’ physical participation, which means distance, either in terms of time or space, existing between the speaker/writer and the addressee/reader. At one pole of the continuum lie casual chats with friends, where immediate feedback can be had due to visual and aural contact. At the other pole of the continuum lies book writing, where the immediate feedback is not possible because no visual or aural contact is available between the writer and the reader (Trosborg 2002: 12). Again, the terms adopted by these two studies are different, including ‘participation’ and ‘interpersonal distance’.

Drawing on Martin’s analysis (1984), Trosborg (2002: 12) indicates another kind of distance, namely experiential distance between the text and social reality, which is also on a continuum. At one pole lies language as action, for which playing a game can be an example. The role which language plays in a game is to accompany the activity. At another pole lies language as reflection, for which writing a piece of fiction can be an example.

Both physical and experiential distance overlap with the addressee relationship discussed in Section 2.3.1.2. Physical distance may reveal the news organisation’s ideological assumptions about its relationships with the audience; experiential distance may unfold its assumptions about the audience’s needs and the relevance of the news text. For example, the physical and experiential distance are reduced in the news texts of the tabloids, as they tend to assume a more informal and intimate relationship with their audience, and usually adopt a more colloquial style. In contrast, higher degrees of physical and experiential distance are manifested in the news texts of the broadsheet, as they adopt a more formal style with lots of specialised terms and nominalisation.
2.3.1.4. Stratum of the Immediate Context

Based on the above discussion, all the contextual aspects under the three variables meet the requirement of the second premise mentioned at the end of Section 2.1., as they all, to some extent, are related to the news organisation's ideologies. It seems that all of them are relevant sub-factors in the immediate context. However, further scrutiny shows that the aspects of formality, distance (both physical and experiential), and text type are not as relevant as expected. All three aspects need the textual analysis of, say, lexical structure, naming, and schematic structure to a certain extent. As pointed out in Section 1.2.2.2., this may run the risk of circularity if the information on contextual factors obtained from the textual analysis is later on used to account for some phenomena revealed by the textual analysis.

As for all the other contextual aspects under field, tenor, and mode, they do not need detailed textual analysis. First, activity and subject matter can be derived by a cursory look at headlines and leads. Second, we can have general and common information about what the audience may be like even without a detailed analysis, which certainly can provide more specific ideas about the audience. Third, the information on channel can be obtained by examining where the news text is displayed in a given newspaper. Accordingly, the relevant sub-factors to be included in the immediate context can be assumed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Tenor</th>
<th>Mode</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>activity</td>
<td>audience</td>
<td>channel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>subject matter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Like the linguistic and textual aspects identified in Section 2.2, all the
sub-factors are interconnected. As put by Hatim and Mason, “a given level of formality (tenor) influences and is influenced by a particular level of technicality (field) in an appropriate channel of communication (mode)” (1990: 51). The graph below can help explain more clearly the relations among these sub-factors of the immediate context:

![Figure 6 Stratum of the Immediate Context](image)

No boundaries are demarcated between the two sub-factors of field. In this way, the connectedness of the two sub-factors is made clear. Likewise, no boundaries are drawn between field, tenor, and mode in order to demonstrate that the three variables are interdependent and overlap to a certain extent.

### 2.3.2. Contextual Strata

In Sections 2.3.1.1. to 2.3.1.3., the relations between the sub-factors and the news organisation’s ideologies as well as socio-cultural or socio-political values and attitudes have been pointed out. Those relations are summarised below for clarity:
All the sub-factors can, in one way or another, cast light on the news organisation’s ideologies, both identifiable and unidentifiable ideologies which are relevant to a given news text. Also, most of the sub-factors can provide clues on what values and attitudes in the wider socio-cultural or socio-political systems are relevant to a given news text. These relevant values and attitudes can in turn offer hints on the news organisation’s ideologies, both identifiable and unidentifiable. These relations further pinpoint the necessity to revise the first part of the comparison stage of the reconstruction method shown in Table 4. The revision should go like this:

A. Compare the three types of contextual factors in the following order:
   (1) the immediate contexts of the source and target texts
   (2) the relevant values and attitudes of the source and target socio-cultural or socio-political systems
   (3) the relevant readily identifiable ideologies of the source and target news organisations

As indicated in the third premise mentioned at the end of Section 2.1., the translation-oriented model should demonstrate the relations between the three types of contextual factors. Hence, the stratum of the news organisation and that of the socio-cultural or social-political system need to be incorporated into the translation-oriented news discourse model, as illustrated diagrammatically below:
Figure 7 makes clear the embedded relationships between the three types of contextual factors. All the sub-factors of the immediate context are encompassed by the news organisation, which in turn is embedded in a wider socio-cultural or socio-political system. The sub-factors of the immediate context are directly related to the news text, so they can provide information about what kinds of ideologies (identifiable and unidentifiable) as well as what sorts of values and attitudes may be in operation via-a-vis the news text. Once relevant socio-cultural or socio-political values and attitudes are determined, they can offer further clues as to the ideologies of the news organisation, which is under the influence of a wider socio-cultural or socio-political system.

2.4. A Translation-oriented News Discourse Model

The textual and contextual strata of the translation-oriented news discourse
model have now been developed separately. The last premise for the development of the model at issue is to establish the relationships between the contextual and textual strata. In fact, such relationships are already pointed out by Halliday (1978: 123):

field to the ideational component, representing the ‘content’ function of language, [...] tenor to the interpersonal component, representing the ‘participation’ function of language [...] mode to the textual component, representing the ‘relevance’ function of language, without which the other two do not become actualized.

It should also be noted that field, tenor, and mode overlap with each other, so apart from the direct relationships with the corresponding textual functions, each of them can hold indirect relationships with the other two textual functions. Take field as an instance. It is not only directly related to the ideational function, but also indirectly connected to the interpersonal and textual functions.

The contextual and textual strata can now be joined together in the translation-oriented news discourse model, as illustrated below:
With the format of concentric triangles, the relationships between the three contextual variables (field, tenor, and mode), and the linguistic and textual aspects can be illustrated more clearly. For example, with no rigid boundaries separating field, tenor, and mode, the model can explain that apart from the direct relationships with communicative purposes, modality, and naming, the coverage of tenor also reaches the linguistic and textual aspects under the other two functions. All these relationships, both direct and indirect, suggest that all the sub-factors can work together to account for the shifts occurring in the linguistic and textual aspects. The model demonstrated in Figure 8 also makes plain the fact that the production of the news text is under the influence of the news organisation’s ideologies as well as the wider socio-cultural or socio-political system.
During the development of the translation-oriented news discourse model, the importance of the comparison sequence was pointed out. Hence, the reconstruction method presented in Table 4 should be further revised as follows:

**Table 10 A method for reconstructing ideology-related norms in news trans-editing (final version)**

1. Pre-comparison stage (a translation-oriented news discourse model):
   A. Identify the relevant sub-factors under the immediate context
   B. Identify the relevant ideologically significant linguistic and textual aspects at the macro- and micro-levels

2. Comparison stage:
   A. Compare the three types of contextual factors in the following order:
      (1) the immediate contexts of the source and target texts
      (2) the relevant values and attitudes of the source and target socio-cultural or socio-political systems
      (3) the relevant readily identifiable ideologies of the source and target news organisations
   B. Compare the source and target texts for recurrent non-obligatory shifts in terms of ideologically significant linguistic and textual aspects at the micro-level first and then at the macro-level, and explore ideological reasons behind the shifts based on the comparison of the three types of contextual factors

3. Reconstruction stage:
   Reconstruct the following norms based on the underlying reasons explored at the comparison stage:
   A. process norms: initial, operational, and communication norms
   B. product norms: expectancy norms

**2.5. Conclusion**

In this chapter, a method has been developed for reconstructing ideology-related norms in news trans-editing based on Toury's methodology for descriptive studies. Three fundamental stages for the reconstruction method were clearly specified: pre-comparison, comparison, and reconstruction of norms. The function of the pre-comparison stage was defined to identify the relevant sub-factors of the immediate context, and relevant linguistic and textual aspects. Accordingly, it was assumed to be of vital significance for the proposed reconstruction method, as the comparison and reconstruction stages cannot be carried out without those aspects
being specified beforehand.

Given the integral role played by the pre-comparison stage, it was further elaborated on with the development of a complementary translations-oriented news discourse model, consisting of textual and contextual strata. The textual strata were designed to identify the relevant ideologically significant linguistic and textual aspects at both the macro- and micro-levels. Because of the multi-faceted nature of trans-edited texts, an eclectic approach was adopted to formulate the textual strata, with insights from research within CL, CDA, journalism, and translation studies. Three types of contextual factors were covered by the contextual strata, namely, the sub-factors of the immediate context, the news organisation’s ideologies, and socio-cultural or socio-political values and attitudes. The relevant sub-factors under the immediate context were identified with insights drawn from the discourse-based approaches to translation studies.

In Chapters 3 to 6, the reconstruction method developed in this chapter will be applied to two empirical case studies focusing on the underlying ideology-related norms in English-Chinese news trans-editing, in order to explain the method further and test its feasibility.
Chapter 3 – Case Studies: Data and Contextual Factors

This chapter first introduces the data collected for the two case studies which illustrate the reconstruction of ideology-related norms in English-Chinese news trans-editing. Background information on the news events featured in the data is also addressed. The second half explains the application of the reconstruction method developed in Chapter 2, with particular reference to the pre-comparison stage and the comparison of the three types of contextual factors.

The two case studies are dealt with together for the following reasons. First, the source and target newspapers for the two case studies are the same, as is the power relationship – the trilateral relationship between Taiwan, the U.S., and China – involved in the news events at issue. This means that the contextual factors for the source and target news texts in these two case studies are quite similar in a number of respects. Second, due to their similar contextual factors, the shifts emerging in the two case studies should overlap to some extent. If this is the case, it proves that the shifts are not arbitrary, and that they are caused by underlying norms. By discussing the two case studies together, it is easier to compare the shifts identified therein. The shifts identified in the two case studies will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, and the textual examples provided as regards the shifts are considered to be representative of the corpus as a whole.
3.1. Introduction of Case Study Data

This section introduces the source and target texts, together with the historical background of the news events featured in the data.

3.1.1. First Case Study

As mentioned in the Introduction, this research focuses on the New York Times and the Washington Post as the source newspapers, and the China Times and the Commercial Times under the China Times Group as well as the Liberty Times as the target newspapers.

3.1.1.1. Data

The time range for the data collected is from 1999 to 2003. Starting from 1999, statements regarding Taiwan’s independence began to emerge when President Lee Teng-hui announced the ‘two-state’ theory. Later in 2002, President Chen Shui-bian made another related declaration, that is, his ‘one country on each side’ statement.

The data collected can be divided into two types. In the first type of data, each given target text is trans-edited from only one source text, either from the Washington Post or from the New York Times, as illustrated in Table 11 below. The second type is trans-edited from more than one source, see Table 12.8

---

8 In Tables 11 to 14, ST refers to the source texts, TT the target texts, and the CCP the Chinese Communist Party. English translations of the Chinese headlines are provided in parentheses.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>ST</th>
<th>Data of the first case study: one ST to one or two TTs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TT1</td>
<td>(The <em>Washington Post</em> slams Clinton’s favouritism towards the CCP, <em>Commercial Times</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TT2</td>
<td>(The <em>Washington Post</em> attacks Clinton’s bias towards Beijing, <em>Liberty Times</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.2</td>
<td>ST</td>
<td>Taiwanese Leader Condemns Beijing’s ‘One China’ Policy, <em>Washington Post</em>, 07/10/03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TT</td>
<td>(President Chen: [We] will not bow to U.S. pressure regarding the referendum, <em>China Times</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.3</td>
<td>ST</td>
<td>Taiwan’s Top Agitator as Bold as Ever, <em>Washington Post</em>, 12/10/03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TT1</td>
<td>(Interviewed by the <em>Washington Post</em>, Lee Teng-hui: it is not possible that the CCP would attack Taiwan, <em>China Times</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TT2</td>
<td>(Lee Teng-hui pushes for the Republic of Taiwan; the more he fights, the bolder he gets, <em>Liberty Times</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.4</td>
<td>ST</td>
<td>The Volatile Issue of Taiwan, <em>New York Times</em>, Editorial, 15/07/99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TT1</td>
<td>(The <em>New York Times</em> asks President Lee to abandon the ‘two-state’ theory, <em>China Times</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TT2</td>
<td>(The <em>New York Times</em>: China must not threaten to use force again; Taiwan shouldn’t talk about two states, <em>Liberty Times</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.5</td>
<td>ST</td>
<td>Taiwan’s New Doctrine Unintelligible in Chinese, <em>New York Times</em>, 21/07/99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TT</td>
<td>(The <em>New York Times</em>: Taipei insufficiently prepared [for President’s announcement], <em>China Times</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.6</td>
<td>ST</td>
<td>A Tightrope Act Over Taiwan, <em>New York Times</em>, 05/08/99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TT1</td>
<td>(The <em>New York Times</em>: The U.S. fears the cross-strait situation will be out of control, <em>China Times</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The source texts of No. 1 to No. 3 are from the *Washington Post*, and those of No. 4 to No. 9 are from the *New York Times*. These source texts include both hard news and editorials. They are trans-edited into Chinese by the *Liberty Times* as well as by one or other of the China Times Group sister papers.

With regard to the second type of data, each given target text is trans-edited from two or three source texts: two texts from the *New York Times* with/without one text from the *Washington Post*, or one text from the *New York Times* and one text from the *Washington Post*, as demonstrated in Table 12:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. 10</th>
<th>ST1</th>
<th>Sparks Fly Across Taiwan Strait, <em>Washington Post</em>, 14/07/99</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ST2</td>
<td>U.S. Asking Taiwan to Explain Its Policy After Uproar,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>New York Times</em>, 14/07/99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>ST1</td>
<td>ST2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>China's Threats, Editorial, Washington Post, 23/02/00</td>
<td>New Tension Over Taiwan, Editorial, New York Times, 23/02/00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Beijing and Taipei Both Willing to Talk, but Only on Their Own Terms, New York Times, 21/03/00</td>
<td>A Vote in Taiwan, and A New Era, New York Times, 21/03/00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Envoy Reaches Out to Beijing For Taiwanese, Washington Post, 02/04/00</td>
<td>China Indicates Air of Restraint Toward Taiwan, New York Times, 02/04/00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Taiwan's Chen Backs Vote on Independence, Washington Post, 04/08/02</td>
<td>Defying China, Taiwan's Leader Backs a Vote on Sovereignty New York Times, 04/08/02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All the source texts are hard news texts, and none of them have their Chinese counterparts in the *Liberty Times*. The news events addressed in all the data shown in
Tables 11 and 12 revolve around China-Taiwan political conflicts. Specifically, the conflicts are concerned with the political status of Taiwan. Is Taiwan part of China according to China's 'one China' principle? Or is Taiwan a separate state in terms of President Lee Teng-hui's 'two-state' theory or President Chen Shui-bian's 'one country on each side' statement?

The reason behind the selection of these news events is that they involve the trilateral relationship between Taiwan, the U.S., and China. For Taiwan, China is undoubtedly the out-group; whereas the U.S. usually finds itself in the middle, and neither China nor Taiwan seems to be regarded by the U.S. as the definite out-group. Due to the different roles that Taiwan and the U.S. play in China-Taiwan conflicts, it is assumed that the ideologies held by the source and target newspapers are, to a considerable extent, different, especially their political ideologies towards the news events and ideological assumptions towards the audience. Hence, ideology-related norms are more likely to emerge and be more prominent.

To clarify the power relations between Taiwan, the U.S. and China, the next section will provide a brief historical account of China-Taiwan political conflicts and U.S. involvement.

3.1.1.2. Historical Background

After the end of World War II, Taiwan was handed over to China after 50 years of Japanese rule, and almost 200 years before that as a province or sub-province of China. China then was under the Nationalist government of President Chiang Kai-shek. While the war with Japan had come to an end, on mainland China the civil war between the Nationalist government and Mao Zedong's Communist forces continued more fiercely than ever. Eventually, the Communists gained control of
China in October 1949. President Chiang Kai-shek then withdrew his Nationalist army to Taiwan and vowed to reclaim China (Lu and Liu 1993: 219-220). The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 caused U.S. President Truman to order the 7th Fleet into the Taiwan Strait to prevent a possible Chinese attack on Taiwan. It was the first time that the U.S. had intervened in conflicts between China and Taiwan. Regarded as a buffer against communist expansion in Asia, Taiwan was provided with money and military supplies by the U.S. (Lin 2003: 56-57).

In the 1970s, the U.S. began improving relations with China as a way of preventing Soviet expansion. China and the U.S. issued their first joint communiqué – the Shanghai Communiqué – on 27 February 1972, agreeing to work together towards full normalisation of diplomatic relations. The U.S. committed itself to the 'one China' policy, which holds that there is only one China, and that Taiwan is part of China. Then on 16 December 1978, when Taiwan was under the rule of President Chiang Ching-kuo, son of President Chiang Kai-shek, China and the U.S. signed the Joint Communiqué on Establishment of Diplomatic Relations (Zhang 1998: 167). Full diplomatic relations began on 1 January 1979 after the U.S. switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. The U.S. Congress later in the same year passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) to maintain unofficial relations with Taiwan and to provide adequate defences to Taiwan (Brookes 2003).

On the death of President Chiang Ching-kuo in 1988, Vice President Lee Teng-hui became the first native Taiwanese president, and the National Assembly elected him to a full six-year term in 1990. President Lee Teng-hui tried to strengthen diplomatic relations with countries around the world, including the U.S. He travelled to the U.S. in 1995 and met with President Clinton. As the presidential election neared in 1996, tensions across the Taiwan Strait reached a new level, as China test-fired
missiles in March. President Clinton sent two aircraft carriers to the Taiwan Strait to patrol the area. Eventually, President Lee Teng-hui decisively won a second term (Lin 2001: 72).

On 9 July 1999, President Lee Teng-hui consented to be interviewed by a German radio station, and announced that Taiwan enjoyed a ‘special state-to-state relationship’ with China. This was later interpreted by most Taiwanese media as the ‘two-state’ theory. What President Lee Teng-hui’s statement meant was that the relationship across the Taiwan Strait could be regarded as a state-to-state relationship, or at least a relationship between two equal countries rather than between one central government and one local government (Zou 2001: 230). China regarded President Lee Teng-hui’s announcement as a theory that would split China, and considered it equal to insistence on Taiwan’s independence. Although Taiwan backed away from the position later, talks between the two sides were suspended. President Clinton reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the ‘one China’ policy, and promised that the U.S. position on Taiwan would not change (Yang 1999: 27-30; Huang 1999:3).

Taiwan also prepared for its next presidential election in 2000. This time, there were three candidates: Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party, independent James Soong Chu-yu, and Nationalist Vice President Lien Chan. China’s Premier Zhu Rongji threatened bloodshed if the Taiwanese voters acted on impulse. Although he did not state it explicitly, the voters to whom he referred were the supporters of Chen Shui-bian, whose party called for independence (Yoshiyuki 2001).

In February 2000, China’s Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council published a white paper entitled “The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue”, reiterating the ‘one China’ principle. One significant point made in this white paper is that if the Taiwan authorities indefinitely reject peaceful reunification through negotiation,
armed intervention would be required. This paper was interpreted as a warning to the
taiwanese electorate in the interest of influencing the presidential election (yoshiyuki
2001).

Despite the threat, chen shui-bian won the presidential election on 20 march
2000, defeating the nationalists for the first time in 50 years. This also further upset
the nationalists and communists seeking reunification. after the election, president
chen shui-bian said that he would not declare independence unless taiwan came
under military attack. china’s policy towards president chen shui-bian changed to
‘wait and see’ (lin 2003: 78).

At the 29th annual meeting of the world federation of taiwanese association
held in tokyo in August 2002, president chen shui-bian said that there was ‘one
country on each side’ of the taiwan strait, and contended that holding a referendum
on taiwan’s independence was a basic human right. His remarks elicited many
comments at home and abroad. china claimed that president chen shui-bian’s words
and deeds were a call for taiwan’s independence, and pointed out that this theory
would once again push cross-strait relations to the point of crisis and confrontation.
china then increased pressure on the u.s. to constrain president chen shui-bian’s
pro-independence tendency, and increased threats to use force against taiwan to
prevent further moves towards formal separation (lin 2003: 81).

In 2003, president chen shui-bian announced his plan for a referendum to be
held on 20 march 2004. It would call on china to remove hundreds of missiles
pointed at taiwan, and to renounce intentions to use force against taiwan. china
regarded the referendum as a further call for taiwan’s independence, and condemned
it as dangerously provocative. president bush also issued a sharp rebuke to taiwan,
urging it to maintain the status quo and abandon the referendum (dumbaugh 2005: 4).
President Chen Shui-bian stood firm and asserted that a referendum was a normal practice in democratic countries and the basic right of the people. He insisted that Taiwanese people should have the right to say loudly that they oppose missiles, and that they support democracy. On 20 March 2004, President Chen Shui-bian narrowly won the election over Lien Chan. The referendum was held on the same day as the presidential election, but it failed to pass because not enough voters cast ballots (Dumbaugh 2005: 5).

3.1.2. Second Case Study

This section introduces the data collected for the second case study, followed by the historical background of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.

3.1.2.1. Data

The time scales of the data collected are from February to April 2000 and from March to April 2001. The data from the first period concern arms sales during the Clinton administration, and those from the second period pertain to sales during the Bush administration. Presidents Clinton and Bush were expected to make the final decision on arms sales by late April, so news reporting concerning the sales started to emerge one or two months ahead of the final decision. The first set of data is illustrated in Table 13.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. 1</th>
<th>ST</th>
<th>Taiwan Seen Vulnerable to Attack, Washington Post, 31/03/00</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TT</td>
<td></td>
<td>美國官員：軍售台灣先進武器 非常急迫，工商時報，01/04/00 (U.S. officials: selling Taiwan advanced arms is urgent, Commercial Times)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 2</td>
<td>ST</td>
<td>Pentagon Won't Back Taiwan Deal, Radar Favored Over Sale of 4 Destroyers, <em>Washington Post</em>, 17/04/00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| TT 1 | 美國可能改售台灣長程雷達系統，工商時報，18/04/00  
(The U.S. may sell Taiwan Long-range Radar instead, *Commercial Times*) |
| TT 2 | 美將售我長程預警雷達 神盾艦暫緩，中國時報，18/04/00  
(The U.S. will sell us Long-rang Warning Radar, but defer the Aegis, *China Times*) |
| No.3 | ST | China Lobbies to Block An Arms Sale to Taiwan, *Washington Post*, 03/03/01 |
| TT | 阻美售台神盾艦 中共表樂觀，中國時報，04/03/01  
(The CCP expresses optimism about keeping the U.S. from selling Taiwan the Aegis, *China Times*) |
| No.4 | ST | China's Game Of Chicken, Editorial, *Washington Post*, 12/03/01 |
| TT 1 | 對台軍售 且看布希縱橫捭闔，工商時報，13/03/01  
(Arms sales to Taiwan depend on Bush's political tactics, *Commercial Times*) |
| TT 2 | 專家籲布希對台軍售勿因中共恫赫畏縮，自由時報，13/03/01  
(Experts ask Bush not to back off from arms sales to Taiwan due to the CCP's intimidation, *Liberty Times*) |
| No.5 | ST | The Taiwan Arms Decision, Editorial, *Washington Post*, 25/03/01 |
| TT 1 | 美是否售台神盾……美舆论籲明確表態支持台灣，  
中國時報，26/03/01  
(Whether the U.S. sells Taiwan the Aegis [...] U.S. public opinion calls for definite support for Taiwan, *China Times*) |
| TT 2 | 華盛頓郵報：美應表明助台對抗中共攻擊，自由時報，26/03/01  
(The Washington Post: the U.S. should clarify its assistance to Taiwan to resist a Chinese attack, *Liberty Times*) |
| No.6 | ST | Bush to Drop Annual Review Of Weapons Sales to Taiwan, *Washington Post*, 25/04/01 |
| TT | 軍售會議變革 冷卻競武，中國時報，26/04/01  
(The annual review of arms sales is dropped to cool the arms race, *China Times*) |
| No.7 | ST | Warning by China to Taiwan Poses Challenge to U.S., *New York Times*, 27/02/00 |
| TT | 紐約時報：美考慮售台四艘神盾艦，中國時報，28/02/00  
(The New York Times: the U.S. considers selling Taiwan four Aegis destroyers, *China Times*) |
| No.8 | ST | Taiwan Asks U.S. to Let It Obtain Top-Flight Arms, *New York Times*, 01/03/00 |
| TT 1 | 柯林頓可能同意台灣軍購案，工商時報，02/03/00  
(Clinton may approve Taiwan’s arms purchase, *Commercial Times*) |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>ST</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>ST</td>
<td>Military Rumblings Over Taiwan, Editorial, New York Times, 03/03/00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TT</td>
<td>(The New York Times editorial: the CCP's threat is disadvantageous to U.S.-China relations, and [the editorial] calls for Taiwan's abandonment of the 'Aegis card', China Times)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>ST</td>
<td>China Comes Calling, Editorial, New York Times, 21/03/01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TT</td>
<td>(The New York Times: it is not proper for the U.S. to sell Taiwan the Aegis, Commercial Times)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>ST</td>
<td>Secret U.S. Study Concludes Taiwan Needs New Arms, New York Times, 01/04/01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TT 1</td>
<td>美國海軍機密報告：台灣需在2010年前取得神盾，工商時報，02/04/01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TT 2</td>
<td>(The New York Times reports that the U.S. Pacific Fleet's on-site investigation indicates that Taiwan needs the Aegis, China Times)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TT 3</td>
<td>紐約時報報導 美太平洋司令部實地調查 台灣需要神盾，自由時報，02/04/01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TT 4</td>
<td>(The New York Times reports that the U.S. Navy claims to sell Taiwan the Aegis, Liberty Times)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>ST</td>
<td>U.S. May Withhold Main Radar Item on Taiwan's List, New York Times, 18/04/01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TT 1</td>
<td>布希國安幕僚力阻售台神盾艦，工商時報，19/04/01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TT 2</td>
<td>(Bush's national security aides strongly oppose the sales of the Aegis to Taiwan, Commercial Times)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>ST</td>
<td>Weapons for Taiwan, Editorial, New York Times, 19/04/01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TT</td>
<td>(The New York Times suggests selling the Kidd to Taiwan instead of the Aegis, Commercial Times)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The source texts of No. 1 to No. 6 are from the Washington Post, and those of No. 7 to No. 13 are from the New York Times.
7 to No. 13 are from the *New York Times*. These source texts also include both hard news and editorials. Also, the source texts of No. 2, 8, 11, and 12 have two target texts from the two newspapers under the China Times Group, that is, one from the *China Times* and one from the *Commercial Times*; out of the thirteen source texts, only three are also trans-edited by the *Liberty Times*, that is, TT2 of No. 4 and No. 5, and TT3 of No. 11.

In the second type of data, each given target text is trans-edited from two source texts: one from the *New York Times* and one from the *Washington Post*, as illustrated below:

*Table 14 Data of the second case study: two STs to one or more than one TT*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. 14</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ST 1</td>
<td>Dispute May Take Toll on Relations, Taiwan Arms Sales May Receive Boost, <em>Washington Post</em>, 12/04/01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TT</td>
<td>美主要媒體反對售台神盾，中國時報，13/04/01  (Major U.S. media opposes the sale of the Aegis to Taiwan, <em>China Times</em>)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 15</td>
<td>ST 1</td>
<td>Dispute May Take Toll on Relations, <em>Washington Post</em>, 12/04/01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ST 2</td>
<td>Taiwan Arms Sales and China's WTO Application Will Test a Relationship <em>New York Times</em>, 12/04/01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TT</td>
<td>對台軍售案 因「禍」得福？ 中國時報，13/04/01  (Arms sales to Taiwan; from 'ruin' to good luck? <em>China Times</em>)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ST 2</td>
<td>Bush Is Offering the Taiwanese Some Arms, but Not the Best <em>New York Times</em>, 24/04/01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TT 1</td>
<td>美對台軍售清單總額高達 40 億美元，工商時報，25/04/01  (U.S. arms sales to Taiwan amount to more than $4 billion, <em>Commercial Times</em>)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TT 2</td>
<td>美多位國會領袖對軍售清單強烈質疑，工商時報， 25/04/01  (Several U.S. Congress leaders strongly question the list of arms sales, <em>Commercial Times</em>)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The source texts of No. 15 and No. 16 are all hard news, while those of No. 14 consist of both a hard news item and an editorial. Moreover, the source texts of No. 16 have two trans-edited texts from the *Commercial Times*.

The news events of the data collected revolve around the U.S. arms sales to Taiwan in both the Clinton and Bush administrations, with particular reference to the sales of Aegis destroyers. The main reason behind the selection of these news events is to compare and contrast them with those in the first case study. The trilateral relationship embedded in the news events of the first case study also exists in the news events of the second case study. In other words, the U.S. was in the middle of China-Taiwan tensions. However, the U.S. assumed a more active role in the second case study, as it was the primary actor in the news events of arms sales. With such commonality and divergence, it is expected that the norms reconstructed in these two case studies will also reveal similarities and differences.

### 3.1.2.2. Historical Background

As introduced in Section 3.1.1.2., the U.S. changed its diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China on 1 January 1979, and formal relations between the U.S. and Taiwan were terminated. To ease this shock, the U.S. Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) to maintain unofficial relations with Taiwan.

TRA has governed arms sales since 1979, as it states that “the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability” (Kan 2001: 1). The U.S., therefore, committed itself to providing adequate defences to Taiwan, and started the annual debate over what types of U.S. weapons to sell Taiwan.

In the joint communiqué signed by the U.S. and China on 17 August 1982, the
U.S. agreed that it would sell Taiwan no more arms than in previous years, and would gradually over time reduce such sales. In the meantime, the U.S. also issued the Six Assurances, stating that it would not set a date for the termination of arms sales to Taiwan, and it would not alter the 1979 TRA (Hickey 1999: 8; Brookes 2003).

However, the first President Bush sold 150 F-16 fighters to Taiwan in 1992, violating the 1982 agreement. The Chinese government protested vehemently against the sale, but the proponents of the sale argued that the 1982 communiqué did not have the same legal force as the 1979 TRA (Nolt 2000).

After the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, where China launched missile tests, the Clinton administration started to pay attention to the transfer of software, as well as discussions over strategies, training, logistics, and plans in the event of an attack from China.

The Pentagon also carried out its own assessments on the defence needs of Taiwan. After the visit by a Pentagon team in September 1999 to assess Taiwan’s air defence capability, a classified assessment was completed in January 2000, pointing out many problems concerning Taiwan’s military ability to defend against ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and aircrafts. Later in September 2000, the Pentagon conducted another classified assessment in regard to Taiwan’s naval defence needs, and concluded that Taiwan needed the Aegis destroyers, Kidd-class destroyers, submarines, and anti-submarines (see Kan 2003: 2-3).

Since 2000, as China started to deploy more and more short-range ballistic missiles along its southeast coast, Taiwan has sought to purchase the destroyers with Aegis radar, which is the U.S. most advanced sea battle weapon. In order not to further provoke China, both the Clinton and Bush administrations deferred the decision on whether to sell the Aegis destroyers. China feared that the sale of the
Aegis system would not only undermine China's missile threat to Taiwan, but would also improve U.S.-Taiwan military cooperation (Gill 2001).

Although the purchase of the Aegis destroyers was rejected by Presidents Clinton and Bush, they approved the sale of other advanced weapons to Taiwan. The package approved by President Clinton in April 2000 included sophisticated air-to-air and anti-ship missiles, and a Pave Paws long-range radar system. On 1 April 2001, around three weeks before the final decision on arms sales to Taiwan was due to be made, a U.S. surveillance plane collided with a Chinese fighter jet, and its crew was detained by China. Eventually, the crew was released and returned safely to the U.S. Later, on 23 April, the White House authorised the largest arms sales to Taiwan since 1992, including four Kidd-class destroyers and eight diesel submarines (see Kan 2003: 6).

3.2. Application of the Reconstruction Method

This section starts to apply the reconstruction method developed in Chapter 2 to the two case studies. Section 3.2.1. is concerned with the pre-comparison stage, and Section 3.2.2 addresses the comparison stage, focusing on the comparison of the three types of contextual factors.

3.2.1. Pre-Comparison Stage

Based on the translation-oriented news discourse model developed in Chapter 2, the sub-factors of the immediate context, and the linguistic and textual aspects identified are as follows:
Table 15: Identified sub-factors and linguistic and textual aspects

| Sub-factors in the Immediate Context | 1. field: activity, subject matter  
2. tenor: audience  
3. mode: channel |
|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| Linguistic and Textual Aspects       | macro-level:  
1. ideational: news frames  
2. interpersonal: communicative purposes  
3. textual: news structures (schematic structure, semantic macrostructure, quotation) |
|                                      | micro-level:  
1. ideational: lexical structure, transitivity, transformations  
2. interpersonal: naming, modality  
3. textual: cohesion, thematic structure |

At the comparison stage, all the sub-factors of the source and target texts are to be compared in order to help identify possible ideological reasons behind the shifts occurring in the identified linguistic and textual aspects. In principle, all the linguistic and textual aspects, both at the macro- and micro-levels, need to be compared in order to reconstruct norms more thoroughly. However, the aspects of quotation and cohesion will not be compared in this thesis. There are still many sub-elements subsumed under these two aspects. Cohesion contains such cohesive devices as reference, substitution, ellipsis, conjunction, and lexical cohesion; the analysis of quotation may also need to take into account the verbs of saying, the persons quoted from, and direct as well as indirect quotations. To explore comprehensively these two aspects, all the sub-elements need to be considered, so they can be addressed by further research. In order to demonstrate with all possible clarity the use of the translation-oriented news discourse model to reconstruct norms, this thesis limits itself to those linguistic and textual aspects which do not contain too many sub-elements.

After identifying the sub-factors and the relevant linguistic and textual aspects, the next step is to make comparative analyses. This chapter focuses only on the
comparative studies of the three types of contextual factors, and those of the linguistic and textual aspects will be elaborated in Chapters 4 and 5. The next section starts the comparison of the sub-factors.

3.2.2. Comparison of the Sub-factors of the Immediate Context

The sub-factors of the immediate context for the source and target texts in the first case study are compared as follows:

Table 16 Comparison of the sub-factors in the first case study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Source Texts</th>
<th>Target Texts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Source Texts</td>
<td>New York Times</td>
<td>China Times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Post</td>
<td>Commercial Times</td>
<td>Liberty Times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Texts</td>
<td></td>
<td>hard news reports or editorials on China-Taiwan conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject Matter</td>
<td></td>
<td>hard news reports on China-Taiwan conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Texts</td>
<td>China Times</td>
<td>Commercial Times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberty Times</td>
<td></td>
<td>1. tensions over Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. China's reactions towards the independence-related statements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Taiwan's vote on Independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4. ambiguity of the 'two-state' theory or the 'one country on each side' statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1. the reactions of Taiwan's presidents towards the 'one China' principle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. China's threat of attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Taiwan's vote on independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audience</td>
<td>New York Times</td>
<td>China Times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Post</td>
<td>Commercial Times</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liberty Times</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. contribution of President Lee Teng-hui</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. auditor: the U.S. government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1. addresssee: Taiwanese readers who are reunification-oriented and have concerns over cross-strait relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. auditor: the Taiwanese government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1. addresssee: Taiwanese readers who are independence-oriented and have concerns over Taiwan's sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. auditor: the Taiwanese government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Channel</td>
<td>New York Times</td>
<td>China Times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Post</td>
<td>Commercial Times</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liberty Times</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The domain of activity is the same for both the source and target texts, that is,
China-Taiwan conflicts, whereas the type of activity is different. Where the source texts contain both hard news and editorials, the target texts are all hard news items. In other words, the editorials of the source texts are changed into hard news items in the target texts. The target texts of the source editorials are usually presented in the inverted-pyramid style, which is primarily used to construct hard news. Also, these target texts are displayed in the sections usually reserved exclusively for hard news, such as the Section on the Two Sides of the China Times and the Commercial Times. Furthermore, occasionally some source editorials and hard news items are trans-edited into one target text.

Concerning subject matters, most topics dealt with in the source texts reappear in the target texts. However, the ambiguity of independence-related statements is not one of the main topics in the target texts. The two newspapers under the China Times Group turn their attention to the negative impacts of these statements on Taiwan, and the Liberty Times to the contribution of President Lee Teng-hui.

The audiences for the source and target news texts can be further divided into two sub-groups: addressee and auditor. The source and target news texts are different in both sub-groups. The addressee and auditor for the source texts are elite U.S. readers and the U.S. government, respectively. However, the target texts have Taiwanese readers as their addressee and the Taiwanese government as their auditor. Also, the concerns of the U.S and Taiwanese readerships are far from the same. What concerns the source readers most is how to maintain the U.S.'s political and economic interests in the China-U.S.-Taiwan trilateral relationship, whereas the Taiwanese readers are assumed to pay more attention to the security and interests of Taiwan as well as to the threat from China. The focuses of the readers of the two newspapers under the China Times Group and those of the Liberty Times are slightly different. The readers of the
China Times and the Commercial Times tend to favour Taiwan’s reunification with China, so they are more concerned with the influence of the news events on China-Taiwan relations. The readers of the Liberty Times, in contrast, lean more towards Taiwan’s independence, so apart from concerns over China-Taiwan relations, they pay more attention to issues concerning Taiwan’s sovereignty.

Concerning the channel, the source texts are mainly positioned in the A section of both the New York Times and the Washington Post, where important international news items, either hard news items or editorials, are displayed. The target texts, nevertheless, are generally in the Section on the Two Sides of the China Times and the Commercial Times, and in the Section on Political News or News Focus of the Liberty Times.

In the second case study, the source and target texts are only compared in terms of activity and subject matter, because the sub-factors of audience and channel are the same as those in the first case study:

Table 17 Comparison of the sub-factors in the second case study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target Texts</td>
<td>China Times</td>
<td>hard news reports on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source Texts</td>
<td>Commercial Times</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liberty Times</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject Matter</th>
<th>Source Texts</th>
<th>New York Times</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target Texts</td>
<td>Washington Post</td>
<td>1. possible arms to sell to Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source Texts</td>
<td>Commercial Times</td>
<td>2. China’s opposition to arms sales to Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. comments on Taiwan arms sales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commercial Times</td>
<td>4. U.S.-China relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liberty Times</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As in the first case study, the domain of activity is the same for both the source and target texts, that is, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, but the type of activity is dissimilar.
All the subject matters covered by the source texts from the *Washington Post* are also encompassed by those from the *New York Times*, which contains one more subject matter, that is, ‘comments on Taiwan arms sales’. Except for the subject matter of possible arms to sell to Taiwan, the *China Times* and the *Commercial Times* shift their focus to the U.S.'s opinions and China's opposition, which are also the main subjects covered by the *Liberty Times*.

Since the source and target sub-factors have already been specified, the socio-cultural or socio-political values and attitudes relevant to the revelation of ideological information can be determined accordingly. From information about the activity domain in the first and second case studies, it is clear that a general historical background on the China-U.S.-Taiwan trilateral relationship as regards the China-Taiwan political conflicts and U.S. arms sales is essential information, which can provide insights into the ideologies held by the source and target newspapers. This historical background has been briefly introduced in Sections 3.1.1.2. and 3.1.2.2.

In terms of the contextual information about subject matter and audience, it follows that the U.S. seeks to maintain political and economic interests in both China and Taiwan, and tries to strike a balance between its relations with China and Taiwan. However, the main concerns of Taiwan seem to be Taiwan’s political relations with China, which have had grave impacts on the security of and democracy in Taiwan. Hence, the next section places emphasis on U.S. political policies towards Taiwan and China, and Taiwan’s political policies towards China.

### 3.2.3. Comparison of Political Policies

#### 3.2.3.1. Policies of the U.S. towards China and Taiwan

The time scales of the case study data run through the last two years of President
Clinton’s second term (1999-2000) and President Bush’s first term (2001-2004). These two presidents generally followed the policies towards China and Taiwan laid down by previous administrations, albeit with some slight differences. Their policies are summarised in Table 18 (Hickey 1999: 2-10; Brookes 2003: 1-4; Chen 2003: 1-3; Dumbaugh 2005: 1-3):

Table 18 Policies under the Clinton and Bush administrations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. ‘one China’ policy</td>
<td>1. ‘one China’ policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. engagement</td>
<td>A. strategic competitor (before 2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. strategic partner</td>
<td>B. constructive and cooperative relationship (after 2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. peaceful resolution and cross-strait dialogue</td>
<td>2. peaceful resolution and cross-strait dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. ‘strategic ambiguity’ towards Taiwan’s defence</td>
<td>3. ‘strategic clarity’ towards Taiwan’s defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. ‘strategic ambiguity’ towards arms sales to Taiwan</td>
<td>4. ‘strategic ambiguity’ towards arms sales to Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. ‘three nos’ policy</td>
<td>5. no unilateral change in the status quo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Clinton administration followed the long-standing ‘one China’ policy of the U.S. On account of its global strategy and national interests, the Clinton administration adopted the engagement policy to facilitate contact and dialogue with China. In addition, during Chinese President Jiang Zemin’s first visit to the U.S. in late 1997, President Jiang and President Clinton agreed to enhance cooperation towards a constructive strategic partnership in the 21st century (Chen 2003: 3).

The Bush administration still supported the ‘one China’ policy. President Bush initially adopted a more antagonistic approach to China, compared with that of President Clinton. China was regarded as a strategic competitor rather than a partner. Later, after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush administration modified its approach to China. The U.S. no longer viewed China as a strategic competitor. Instead, China was now a trading partner of the U.S., and both the U.S. and China were working towards a cooperative and constructive relationship.
With regard to the future of Taiwan, both the Clinton and Bush administrations, like previous administrations, did not take any definite position. They only insisted that the future of Taiwan should be settled peacefully by China and Taiwan themselves through cross-strait talks. The U.S., in principle, should not become a mediator in these talks (Hickey 1999: 14).

As for the security issue in the Taiwan Strait, the Clinton administration maintained the long-standing U.S. policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’. From the perspective of the U.S., its interests were best served if the status quo across the Taiwan Strait was not disturbed. The risk of a military confrontation with China was of no small concern to the U.S. Also, to abandon Taiwan for the interests in China would disturb U.S. economic interests in Taiwan as well as damage its international credibility. In order to find a point of balance between the two sides, the U.S. opted for a policy of ‘ambiguity’. Under this policy, the U.S. could remain unclear about how it would respond to a Chinese military attack on Taiwan. The hope was that the uncertainty of the U.S. position would defer both China and Taiwan from making a move that would upset the status quo (Brookes 2003).

Unlike the Clinton administration, the Bush administration moved from a policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’ to one of greater ‘strategic clarity’, by telling both China and Taiwan in no uncertain terms that the U.S. would like a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue, and would help Taiwan to defend itself (Brookes 2003).

Despite their differences over the security issue in the Taiwan Strait, both Presidents Clinton and Bush adopted a policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’ towards U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. They promised China a reduction in arms sales but still sold arms to Taiwan in accordance with TRA. Also, the defence articles and services they
would provide Taiwan were far from specific. Section 3 of the TRA merely states that the U.S. needs to provide “such defence articles and services [...] as may be necessary” (Dumbaugh 2005: 3).

Apart from following the policies set by previous administrations, both Presidents Clinton and Bush proposed their own views on Taiwan-China conflicts. In mid-1998, President Clinton visited China and publicly reiterated his ‘three nos’ policy: no U.S. support for Taiwanese independence, no support for two Chinas, and no support for Taiwan’s entry into the international organisations of sovereign states. President Bush declared that there should be no unilateral change in the status quo by China or Taiwan. In other words, “Taiwan should not declare independence; there should be no use of force by either side; and Taiwan’s future should be resolved in a manner mutually agreeable to the people on both sides of the Strait” (Brookes 2003: 3).

3.2.3.2. Taiwan’s Policies towards China

The time ranges of case study data presented in this thesis also run through two Taiwanese presidencies, that is, the last two years of President Lee Teng-hui’s second term (1999-2000) and President Chen Shui-bian’s first term (2000-2004). Unlike the U.S., Taiwan’s polices towards cross-strait relations varied with different presidents. To understand what changes were made by Presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian in relation to the policies to China, a general understanding of the cross-strait policies adopted before 1999 is also necessary. Hence, the policies of cross-strait relations under different periods are summarised as in Table 19 below:
Under the governance of Presidents Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo, the polices towards cross-strait relations were ‘one China’, opposition to communism, and recovery of mainland China. During this period, ‘one China’ referred to the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan. The ROC was the only legitimate government of all China, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in Beijing was not credible. To promote anti-communism, the ‘three-nos’ policy towards China was adopted, that is, no contact, no negotiation, and no compromise (Zheng 2003: 102-106; Dumbaugh 2005: 2).

The government under President Lee Teng-hui gave up its claim to the territory of the whole country of China, and abandoned its bitter contest with the PRC as the legitimate China. The policies were shifted to ‘one China’ and two equal political entities. Here ‘one China’ was not defined in political terms. It referred to China as a historical, geographical, cultural, and racial entity. Later, in 1999, one year before the end of President Lee Teng-hui’s second term, he proposed a ‘special state-to-state relationship’ between China and Taiwan (Zheng 2003: 106-116).

President Chen Shui-bian disputed the concept held by his predecessors, that is, there is ‘one China’, and Taiwan is a part of it. Instead, he emphasised a ‘new Taiwanese identity’ and said publicly that Taiwan already was an independent, sovereign country. President Chen Shui-bian further made his ‘one country on each
side’ statement in 2002, indicating a sovereign Taiwan on one side and a sovereign China on the other side of the Taiwan Strait (Dumbaugh 2005: 3-8).

3.2.4. Comparison of the Readily Identifiable Political Ideologies

With the comparisons made in Sections 3.2.2. and 3.2.3., the relevant political ideologies held by both the source and target newspapers are identified in Table 20, especially the political ideologies towards the news events at issue. These ideologies are selected from among the readily identifiable ideologies, which are either well-known in the source or target systems, or have been identified by previous studies or research.

Table 20 Comparison of the readily identifiable political ideologies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspapers</th>
<th>Readily Identifiable Political Ideologies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Source Newspapers</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York Times</td>
<td>1. 'one China' policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. ambiguous stance over the future status of Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. no current support for Taiwan’s independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. no support for the sales of advanced weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Post</td>
<td>1. 'one China' policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. less ambiguous stance over the future status of Taiwan and more support for Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. no current support for Taiwan’s independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. support for the sales of weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target Newspapers</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China Times</td>
<td>1. support for 'one China' (historical, geographic, and cultural)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Times</td>
<td>2. pro-reunification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. against Taiwan’s independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. against President Lee Teng-hui</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberty Times</td>
<td>1. against 'one China'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. pro-independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Taiwan as an independent sovereign country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. full support for President Lee Teng-hui</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2.4.1. Source Newspapers

Previous studies indicate a strong correlation between U.S. foreign policies and the coverage of international news by the U.S. press, which includes independent prestige newspapers, such as the New York Times, the Washington Post and the Los
Angeles Times (Becker 1977; Chang, Shoemaker and Brendlinger 1987; Chang 1988, 1989, 1993; Berry 1990; Lowry and Wang 2000). The political stances U.S. newspapers adopt to report foreign news usually conform to U.S. foreign policies. Among the above-mentioned studies, Chang (1988, 1989, 1993) and Lowry and Wang (2000) particularly pinpoint the close relationship between U.S-China policies and news coverage of China by prestige U.S. newspapers. As illustrated by Table 20, the political ideologies held by the New York Times and the Washington Post regarding China-Taiwan conflicts and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan also reconfirm the same tendency.

First, these two newspapers accept the ‘one China’ policy as the fundamental principle underlying China-Taiwan relations. Second, the two source newspapers are, to a varying degree, vague on their own stances as to whether Taiwan should be reunited with China, remain as a separate political identity, or become a sovereign country. The New York Times is quite conservative about Taiwan’s future status, without definite comments or opinions (Siegal and Connolly 1999: 323). Although the position of the Washington Post on Taiwan’s future status is also unclear, it holds a more positive attitude to Taiwan. Given Taiwan’s progress in free market democracy, it believes that Taiwan should have the right to decide on its own future (Lin 2001: 144).

Third, they both make it clear that they do not support Taiwan’s independence. Both of the source newspapers agree that Taiwan’s independence would inevitably do harm to the stability and security of the Asia-Pacific area, which in turn would pose a threat to U.S. diplomatic and economic interests there. They argue that if Taiwan were to declare independence unilaterally, the U.S. would not defend Taiwan against a Chinese attack (Lin 2001: 153).
Fourth, the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times* hold different attitudes towards U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Generally speaking, the *Washington Post* supports the sales of advanced weapons to Taiwan, whereas the *New York Times* takes the opposite stance (Tsang 2002: 45).

### 3.2.4.2. Target Newspapers

Taiwan’s policies towards cross-strait relations have been in constant change. In Taiwan, support for independence and for reunification with China exists as part of a political spectrum with most people in the middle. Traditionally, reunification has more support among ‘mainlanders’ (the descendants of those who fled the mainland China after the civil war), while support for independence is rooted in the ‘Taiwanese’ majority. Such political confrontation is illustrated not only by the combat of party politics but also by the political stances taken by the Taiwanese press. The proprietors of the China Times Group and the *Liberty Times* are respectively a mainlander and a native Taiwanese, which inevitably results in their different ideologies towards cross-strait relations (Wei 2000: 344; Huang 2003: 36).

The political ideologies of the target newspapers towards news events at issue differ greatly from those of the source newspapers. Also, the target newspapers are themselves at variance. The *China Times* and the *Commercial Times* recognise ‘one China’, defined in historical, geographical, and cultural terms. They support reunification and oppose Taiwan’s independence. Taiwan is deemed to be part of China, but the PRC is not the sole legitimate government of China, and reunification does not necessarily have to occur under the Communist regime. Moreover, they hold a negative attitude towards President Lee Teng-hui (Wei 2000: 343; Tian 2002: 81; Zhang 2002: 129-130; Lin 2004: 174). The *Liberty Times*, on the contrary, strongly
opposes the notion of 'one China', no matter how it is defined, whether politically, historically, or culturally. It argues that Taiwan is already an independent and sovereign country, so it expresses a positive attitude towards Taiwan's independence. Also, the Liberty Times totally identifies with President Lee Teng-hui's political thinking (Wei 2000: 344, 358; Tian 2002: 97; Chien 2003: 121-122, 126).

3.3. Conclusion

After introducing the case study data and historical backgrounds of the China-Taiwan conflicts and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, this chapter has embarked on the application of the reconstruction method to the two case studies, with emphasis being placed on the pre-comparison stage and the comparison of the three types of contextual factors. This chapter has also illustrated how the comparison of the sub-factors sheds light on the relevant political views and attitudes prevailing in the U.S. and Taiwan as well as on the relevant political ideologies held by the source and target newspapers.

The ideologies of the source and target newspapers identified in Section 3.2.4 are by no means exhaustive, as they are mainly the political ideologies towards the news events at issue. The ideological assumptions about the readers' needs and ideological presumptions on the acceptability of news texts have not yet been spelled out clearly. Also, there may still be some unnoticed political ideologies. As pointed out in Section 1.2.2.2., ideology-related contextual factors can provide a glimpse into those unidentified ideologies which are also relevant to a given news text. Accordingly, apart from the political ideologies, the sub-factors in immediate contexts and the political policies respectively discussed in Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3. also need to be taken into account, in order to explore more thoroughly underlying
ideological reasons behind the shifts.

Chapters 4 and 5 will carry out the second part of the comparison stage, that is, the comparison of the source and target texts vis-à-vis the ideologically significant linguistic and textual aspects at the micro- and macro-levels for recurrent non-obligatory shifts. The comparative studies of the three types of contextual factors made in Sections 3.2.2. to 3.2.4. will then be used to explore possible ideological reasons behind the recurrent shifts to be identified.
Chapter 4 – Micro-level Linguistic and Textual Aspects

This chapter continues the comparison stage. Here the source and target texts are compared for recurrent non-obligatory shifts in terms of the micro-level linguistic and textual aspects identified in Section 3.2.1. The underlying reasons behind the identified shifts are explored against the comparative studies of the three contextual factors introduced in Chapter 3.

As described in the reconstruction method outlined in Chapter 2, only non-obligatory shifts are relevant to the reconstruction of ideology-related norms. Accordingly, this chapter limits itself to the discussion of such shifts. In order to ensure that the shifts identified are not obligatorily caused by cross-linguistic differences, some background knowledge on the similarities and differences between English and Chinese is also given, especially knowledge pertaining to transitivity, modality, and thematic structure.

4.1. Lexical Structure

After comparing the lexical structure of the source and target texts in the two case studies, two types of recurrent shifts are identified: (1) the shifts in the lexical structure used to describe President Lee Teng-hui’s political thinking in the first case study, and (2) the shifts occurring in the lexical items referring to China as well as to people from China.
4.1.1. President Lee Teng-hui's Political Thinking

4.1.1.1. Recurrent Non-obligatory Shifts

In the first case study, the lexical items used to refer to the political thinking of President Lee Teng-hui in the source texts are quite diverse, while more unified terms are adopted in the target texts. Here are three illustrating examples from the *China Times*: ⁹

(1) No. 5

ST (lines 55-56): It may seem surprising that Lee's aides did not work out various explanations before he announced the change on July 9.

TT (lines 23-24): 李總統的幕僚竟然沒有事先構思完整的說法，以至於「國與國」論點拋出後，讓外界都嚇了一跳。

(President Lee’s advisers had actually not thought out a unified platform in advance, so that when the new ‘state-to-state’ theory was launched, outsiders were caught unaware.)

(2) No. 11

ST1 (lines 2-3): China is considering a new show of military force in reaction to Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui’s recent assertion that Taiwan and China should be treated as equals.

TT (line 8): 中共正在考慮做新的武力展示，以回應李登輝的「兩國論」。

(The CPP is considering a new show of military forces to react to Lee Teng-hui’s ‘two-state’ theory.)

⁹ For the whole texts of all the examples shown in Chapters 4 and 5, please refer to Appendices 1 and 2. All the numbers, such as No. 5 and No. 11 used in the examples here refer to the news items listed in Tables 11 to 14 on pages 77 to 79 and 84 to 87.
No. 11

ST2 (lines 23-25): the government in Beijing […] appeared to be divided on how to respond to the statement by Taiwan in the last month.

TT (line 38): 中共高層領導對如何處置「兩國論」有分歧。
(The CPP leaders are divided on how to deal with the ‘two-state’ theory.)

As illustrated by these examples, the source texts from the New York Times and the Washington Post use diverse ways to describe President Lee Teng-hui’s political thinking. Conversely, their trans-edited versions from the China Times adopt more concrete terms to describe President Lee Teng-hui’s political thinking, that is, 國與國 (‘state-to-state’) and 兩國論 (the ‘two-state’ theory), suggesting a correlation between President Lee Teng-hui’s political thinking and the promotion of Taiwan’s independence.

A similar shift is identified in the target texts from the Liberty Times, though the target term adopted is slightly different from those used by the China Times:

No. 4

ST (lines 25-26): Mr. Lee, for his part, should abandon talk of separate states.

TT1 (lines 1-2): 要求李登輝總統放棄「兩國論」的主張。
([The New York Times] called on President Lee Teng-hui to abandon the advocacy of the ‘two-state’ theory.)

TT2 (line 14): 李登輝總統則應該放棄兩岸是「特殊國與國關係」的言論。
(President Lee Teng-hui should abandon the statement that the two sides [of the Taiwan Strait] are in a ‘special state-to-state relationship’.)
No. 6

ST (lines 28-29): Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui announced he was abandoning the ‘one China’ policy.

TT1 (lines 10-11): 李登輝總統宣布「兩國論」……

(President Lee Teng-hui announced the ‘two-state’ theory [...])

TT2 (lines 12-13): 李登輝總統宣示兩岸是「特殊國與國關係」……

([...] President Lee Teng-hui declared that the two sides [of the Taiwan Strait] were in a ‘special state-to-state relationship’.)

In examples (4) and (5), the source texts from the *New York Times* still use different terms or clauses to make reference to President Lee Teng-hui’s political thinking. The same term 兩國論 (the ‘two-state’ theory) remains in use in the target texts from the *China Times*, that is, TT1 in examples (4) and (5), to express President Lee Teng-hui’s political thinking. The two texts from the *Liberty Times*, that is, TT2 in both examples, are also consistent in their reference to President Lee Teng-hui’s political notion, but the term adopted conveys a different meaning from that used by the *China Times*. They refer to President Lee Teng-hui’s thinking as 特殊國與國關係 (a ‘special state-to-state relationship’), suggesting that such a relationship is not similar to common relationships existing between independent states or countries.

4.1.1.2. Underlying Reasons

As illustrated by the above examples, diverse terms are used to describe President Lee Teng-hui’s political thinking in the source texts. This use of various quasi-synonyms is an example of overlexicalisation. Such a phenomenon may occur because constant repetition of the same lexical item is not very acceptable in English. Also, it may emerge due to the assumptions made by the two source newspapers about
their U.S. audience’s background knowledge. The news production teams of the two source newspapers may have supposed that if they were to adopt the technical political expressions used by the Taiwanese media, such as 两國論 (the ‘two-state’ theory), the U.S. readers would find the expression meaningless. Besides, the news production teams of the source newspapers may have believed that if they did not provide explanations somewhere in the source news texts, the U.S. readers would not have any idea about the content of President Lee Teng-hui’s political thinking.

Furthermore, the political ideologies of the two source newspapers can also play a role in the existence of overlexicalisation in the source texts. As can be seen from examples (3) and (5), the two source newspapers’ political ideologies seem to be inscribed in the lexical structure used to discuss President Lee Teng-hui’s political thinking. Example (3) reveals the Washington Post’s own interpretation of President Lee-Teng-hui’s thinking as the ‘assertion that Taiwan and China should be treated as equals’, suggesting President Lee Teng-hui’s promotion of two Chinas or Taiwan’s independence. Promoting independence is deemed incompatible with the Washington Post’s political ideologies, and therefore should be denigrated. Likewise, example (5) reflects the inference made by the New York Times as regards President Lee Teng-hui’s intention to abandon the ‘one China’ policy, the policy supported by the New York Times. Nevertheless, neither concept, neither that of equality nor that of abandonment, were clearly stated by President Lee Teng-hui when he put forward his political ideas.

Two possible reasons are identified concerning the use of more concrete terms to express President Lee Teng-hui’s political statement in the target texts. First of all, it may be due to the target newspapers’ assumptions about their Taiwanese readers’ background knowledge. The trans-editing teams in the target newspapers may have
supposed that their Taiwanese audience was already quite familiar with President Lee Teng-hui’s announcement and the technical expressions used to refer to it in Taiwan, since news concerning it had already been widely reported in the Taiwanese press. Thus, they opted for the existing technical expressions due to their simplicity.

Secondly, it is also plausible to account for the shift in terms of the political ideologies held by the target newspapers. The China Times advocates reunification and opposes Taiwan’s independence, whereas the Liberty Times regards Taiwan as a sovereign state and supports Taiwan’s independence. These two target newspapers are definitely clear on their own stances towards Taiwan’s future status. Guided by these political ideologies, consciously or subconsciously, the news trans-editing teams of these two target newspapers may have tended to compartmentalise ideas when producing the target texts.

No matter how diversely President Lee Teng-hui’s thinking was described by the source news production teams, the trans-editing teams of the China Times and the Liberty Times consistently opted for 大陸論 (the ‘two-state’ theory) and 特殊國與國關係 (a ‘special state-to-state relationship’), respectively. As a result, the Taiwanese readers were given no choice but to see things through the two target newspapers’ own perspectives without knowing what was actually reported in the source texts. The term 大陸論 (the ‘two-state’ theory) adopted by the China Times may imply President Lee Teng-hui’s advocacy of Taiwan’s independence, as ‘two-state’ suggests separation and confrontation. In this way, the trans-editing team of the China Times equated President Lee Teng-hui’s political stance to the promotion of Taiwan’s independence and justified their criticisms of it. The news trans-editing team of the Liberty Times, in contrast, retained the original term used by President Lee Teng-hui, that is, 特殊國與國關係 (a ‘special state-to-state
relationship'). The word 特殊 (special) suggests the recognition and reflection of complex historical facts and legal reality, as Taiwan and China have been separated from each other since 1949 and have distinct political and legal systems.

4.1.2. China and Chinese People

4.1.2.1. Recurrent Non-obligatory Shifts

In the source texts, when referring to China, the terms ‘Beijing’, ‘China’, and ‘the Chinese’ are used interchangeably. In the target texts, the Chinese equivalents of the above three English terms are seldom the chosen options. Instead, the term 中共 (the CCP) is widely adopted to translate the above three English terms, as illustrated by the following examples:

(6) No. 6 (the first case study)

ST (lines 35-37): Beijing has kept up the pressure with military maneuvers that appear to be a combination of muscle-flexing and psychological games. Last Saturday, the Chinese seized a Taiwan cargo ship off the Chinese coast.

TT (lines 14-15): 中共目前一面展現武力，另一面以心理戰威嚇台灣，如前不久中共扣押台灣一艘貨船（指新華輪）即為一例。

(The CCP is currently displaying military force and threatening Taiwan with a psychological war. For example, not too long ago, the CCP seized a Taiwanese cargo ship [i.e. the Shin Hua]).

(7) No. 5 (the second case study)

ST (lines 21-23): the United States should seek to cooperate where possible with China […] support for Taiwan does not mean enmity toward China.
TT1 (lines 20-21): 美國應該盡一切可能尋求與中共的合作。據指出，美國支持台灣並不等於與中共為敵。
(The U.S. should seek the cooperation where possible with the CCP. It is pointed out that U.S. support for Taiwan is not equivalent to enmity towards the CCP.)

TT2 (lines 18-19): 美國應盡可能尋求與中共的合作……美國支持台灣並不代表要和中共為敵。
(The U.S. should seek as much cooperation as possible with the CCP [...] U.S. support for Taiwan does not represent enmity towards the CCP.)

In example (6), the source text from the New York Times uses both ‘Beijing’ and ‘the Chinese’ to refer to China, while the target rendering from the China Times is shifted to 中共 (the CCP). Likewise, the word ‘China’ used by the Washington Post in example (7) is replaced by 中共 (the CCP) in both target texts from the China Times (TT1) and the Liberty Times (TT2).

A similar shift also occurs in lexical items related to people from China, as the following three examples demonstrate:

(8) No. 11 (the first case study)
ST (lines 1-2): Chinese Embassy officials and visiting army officers and scholars have told U.S. analysts and experts in Washington that […]

TT (lines 7-8): 中共駐華府大使館和中共訪美的軍官及學者們，告訴美方的專家與分析家……
(The CCP Embassy in Washington and CCP visiting army officers and scholars told the U.S. expert and analysts [...] )

(9) No. 3 (the second case study)
ST (lines 66-67): Chinese analysts and diplomats expressed optimism that the diplomatic offensive against the Aegis was paying off.
TT (lines 22-23) 中共外交界對於阻止美國出售神盾艦系統給台灣，表示樂觀。

(CCp diplomats expressed optimism about keeping the U.S. from selling the Aegis to Taiwan.)

(10) No. 4 (the second case study)
ST (lines 29-30): Other Chinese officials have warned that the sale could [...]  
TT2 (line 14): 中共官員說這些軍售……  
(CCp officials say that the sales [...] )

The pre-modifier 'Chinese' in the three source texts is consistently translated as 中共 (the CCP) in the target texts from the China Times (examples 1 and 2) and the Liberty Times (example 3).

However, this shift occurs less in the target texts dated after 2002. In other words, the term 中國 (China) is increasingly used in the target renderings, as illustrated by the following two examples from the first case study:

(11) No. 2
ST (lines 87-88): Chen said the SARS experience “really made Taiwan's people realize that China is full of hostile intent. You can't rely on China to ensure the health and welfare of Taiwan [...]”.

TT (lines 36-37): 陳水扁說，SARS 經驗「確實使台灣人民體認到中國（對台灣）充滿敵意，我們不能依賴中國來確保台灣人的健康和福祉……」
(Chen Shui-bian said the SARS experience “really made the Taiwanese people realise that China is full of hostile intent [towards Taiwan]. We cannot rely on China to ensure the health and welfare of the Taiwanese people [...]”.)
(12) No. 3

ST (lines 13-14): He also suggested that China would be constrained by the fact that it is scheduled to host the Summer Olympics in 2008.

TT1 (lines 8-9): 他並指出中國大陸二〇〇八年要辦奧運，不會在這段期間內輕舉妄動。

(He also pointed out that **mainland China** is to host the Olympics in 2008, so will not act rashly and blindly in the meantime.)

TT2 (lines 12-13): 他說……中國自己將在二〇〇八年舉辦奧運，不至於輕舉妄動。

(He said [...] China itself will host the Olympics in 2008, so cannot go so far as to act rashly and blindly.)

The three target texts (TT and TT1 from the China Times and TT2 from the Liberty Times) were all published in 2003. The target rendering for the term ‘China’ used by the Washington Post is either **中國** (China) or **中國大陸** (mainland China), rather than **中共** (the CCP).

4.1.2.2. Underlying Reasons

One possible reason why the term ‘the CCP’ is not used in the source texts to refer to China is that it is a convention in the U.S. newspapers to refer to foreign countries by the name of the country or the name of the state, or sometimes with words for its government or capital city. It may be a breach of etiquette to refer to foreign governments by the name of the ruling party. It is pointed out in the New York Times Manual of Style and Usage that “the name of the country is simply CHINA. **Communist China** is acceptable to make a special point – a contrast, for example – or in a quotation” (Siegal and Coonolly 1999: 77, emphasis in the original).

However, another reason motivated by the newspapers’ political ideologies is
also possible. The two source newspapers may hope to appear objective and to avoid being provocative. According to Chang (1989), U.S. news coverage of China seems to reflect shifts in China-U.S. relations. The terms used to refer to China in U.S. newspapers changed after the establishment of formal U.S.-China diplomatic relations in 1979, from ideological expressions, such as ‘Red China’ and ‘Communist China’ to neutral labels, such as ‘China’ and the ‘PRC’.

With regard to the target newspapers, the shift identified may be caused by the long-standing conflict which existed between the Nationalist Party in Taiwan and the Communist Party in China. Even though China was no longer regarded as a communist rebel by the Taiwanese government after President Lee Teng-hui took office, the main aim of Taiwan’s cross-strait policies before 2000 was still to reunite with the Mainland, and the government remained under the control of the Nationalist Party. The nationalist/communist confrontation may be too deeply rooted to eradicate.

The term 中共 (the CPP) used by the China Times and the Commercial Times may be to highlight the contrast between the ROC in Taiwan and the PRC in Beijing. The ROC exists under a democratic system, which these two target newspapers believe to be superior to the communist system on which the PRC is based. The same term 中共 (the CPP) used by the Liberty Times may be to emphasise that the PRC and Taiwan are completely different states with distinct life styles and political systems.

Since President Chen Shui-bian took office in 2000, and the ruling party became the Democratic Progressive Party, reunification under ‘one China’ was no longer a goal pursued by the government. Instead, a ‘new Taiwanese identity’ has been advocated. The Nationalist/Communist division is, therefore, gradually blurred.
Furthermore, the contact between Taiwanese people and Chinese people has become increasingly frequent due to Taiwan’s business investments in China as well as tourism. China is also increasingly opening up to the outside world, so the term ‘the CCP’ seems to be less compatible with the international outlook of China. It may be because of these reasons that the term 中国 (the CCP) is less used to refer to China in the target texts produced after 2002. It should be noted that there is another possible reason for the increased use of 中国 (China) in the target texts from the Liberty Times produced after 2002. That is to say, the term 中国 (China) is used to emphasise a contrast, as in ‘here is Taiwan, but there is China’, or ‘we are Taiwanese, but they are Chinese’.

4.2. Transitivity

This section first introduces the cross-linguistic commonalities and divergences between English and Chinese as regards transitivity patterns. Following this, systematic shifts in transitivity in both case studies are discussed, along with possible reasons behind them.

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10 The similarities and differences between English and Chinese in relation to transitivity, modality, and thematic structure are elaborated in this chapter for the following two reasons. First, the similarities enable the readers to know what shifts are non-obligatory, and the differences let the readers understand what shifts are obligatory. Second, these detailed analyses can help the translation trainers and researchers understand how to analyse the source and target texts in terms of transitivity, modality, and thematic structure. Then, they may know how to conduct similar analyses as regards these aspects when examining news trans-editing in other language pairs. The application of the reconstruction method to other language pairs will be discussed in Chapter 7.
4.2.1. Cross-linguistic Commonalities and Divergences

As mentioned in Section 2.2.1.1., transitivity refers to a semantic perspective on the transmission and representation of ideas in the clause. It illustrates how speakers use language to communicate their mental pictures of reality, and how they address their experiences of the outside world around them. The way through which transitivity carries out the ideational function is by expressing processes. A process consists potentially of three components: the process itself, participants in the process, and circumstances associated with the process. Both English and Chinese share five main types of processes: material, mental, verbal, relational, and existential. The comparative studies concerning these five types of processes are explained in Sections 4.2.1.1. to 4.2.1.5.\textsuperscript{11}

4.2.1.1. Material Process

Material processes are concerned with doing and happening. The participant roles related to material processes are actor and goal. Material processes can be divided into two subtypes: action and event processes. The former is performed by an animate actor, whereas the latter is performed by an inanimate actor, as illustrated by the following two examples:

(13) a. action process: intransitive

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>The tiger</td>
<td>sprang.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>老虎</td>
<td>跳起来。</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. action process: transitive

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Goal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>The tiger</td>
<td>bit</td>
<td>a tourist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>老虎</td>
<td>咬傷</td>
<td>遊客。</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(14) event process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>The crisis</td>
<td>arose.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>危機</td>
<td>浮現。</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The differences between Chinese and English lie in the passive form of a clause and the addition of circumstances to a given clause. The following is an example of the passive form:

(15)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Actor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>A tourist</td>
<td>was bitten</td>
<td>by the tiger.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>遊客</td>
<td>被老虎</td>
<td>咬傷。</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Three differences are noted. First, the actor in the English example is moved to the post-process position, while that in the Chinese example precedes the process. Second, the form of the verb in Chinese does not change at all, but in English ‘was’ is added, and the past participle form of the verb is used. Third, an additional passive marker, such as 被, is normally needed in Chinese (Halliday and McDonald 2004: 373).

Another difference is to do with the position of the circumstance in a given
(16) a. English:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Circumstance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unmarked:</td>
<td>The tiger</td>
<td>bit</td>
<td>a tourist this morning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marked:</td>
<td>This morning</td>
<td>the tiger</td>
<td>bit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Chinese

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Circumstance</th>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Goal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unmarked:</td>
<td>虎</td>
<td>今天早上</td>
<td>咬</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>老虎</td>
<td>this morning</td>
<td>bit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marked:</td>
<td>今天早上</td>
<td>老虎</td>
<td>咬</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>This morning</td>
<td>tiger</td>
<td>bit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The circumstance ‘this morning’ in the two English clauses can be placed either at the clause-final or clause-initial position. The former is an unmarked position (i.e. a default and neutral position), while the latter is a marked form. In contrast, the default position of the Chinese circumstance 今天早上 (this morning) is the one immediately before the process, although the marked position remains the same as that in English (McDonald 1992: 443; Fang, McDonald and Cheng 1995: 254). The default position of the circumstance in Chinese is applicable to all types of processes.

4.2.1.2. Mental Process

Mental processes are concerned with states of mind or psychological events. The participant roles related to mental processes are sensor and phenomenon. The latter is not necessarily present, and it may take the form of a projected clause. Four sub-types can be identified: cognitive, emotive, desiderative, and perceptive (see Halliday 2004: 208-210; Halliday and McDonald 2004: 369-371). Here are some examples:
(17) cognitive process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sensor</th>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Phenomenon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>She</td>
<td>remembered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>她</td>
<td>記得</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(18) emotive process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sensor</th>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Phenomenon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>like</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>我</td>
<td>喜歡</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(19) desiderative process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sensor</th>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Phenomenon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>He</td>
<td>wants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>他</td>
<td>要</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(20) perceptive process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sensor</th>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Phenomenon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>see</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>我</td>
<td>看見</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to Halliday (2004: 210), all the verbs used in the above examples belong to the ‘like’ type, which has the sensor at the clause-initial position as the subject. When the phenomenon is moved to the clause-initial position, the verb presenting the process will be replaced by its counterpart from the ‘please’ type verbs. For example, the verb ‘like’ in example (18) will be replaced by ‘please’ if the phenomenon ‘the present’ is moved to the clause-initial position:

(21)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>'like' type</th>
<th>Sensor</th>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Phenomenon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'please' type</td>
<td>Phenomenon</td>
<td>Process</td>
<td>Sensor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The gift pleases me.

All the four subtypes of mental processes in English contain both the ‘like’ and the ‘please’ types of verbs, although except for the emotive sub-type, the use of the
‘please’ verbs is very restricted (Halliday 2004: 210).

Conversely, only the emotive sub-type in Chinese contains some of the ‘please’ type of verbs, such as 赖 (frighten) exemplified in the following example:

(22)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>'please' type</th>
<th>Phenomenon</th>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Sensor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>You</td>
<td>frightened</td>
<td>me</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Normally, an analogous pattern, which exhibits a semantic feature of causative (i.e. to cause or to make), is constructed in Chinese to convey the ‘please’ type of meaning, as illustrated below:

(23)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>'like' type</th>
<th>Phenomenon</th>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Sensor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>like</td>
<td>him</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>'please' type</th>
<th>Phenomenon</th>
<th>Causative</th>
<th>Sensor</th>
<th>Process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>He</td>
<td>makes</td>
<td>me</td>
<td>pleased</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.2.1.3. Verbal Process

Verbal processes, which pertain to processes of saying, are intermediate between mental and material processes. A verbal process typically contains three participants: sayer, receiver, and verbiage. The receiver is an optional participant, and the verbiage can be a quoted or reported speech. Here is an example:

(24) a.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sayer</th>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Verbiage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>He</td>
<td>said.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>他</td>
<td>「他們會付你錢。」</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As shown in examples (24)a and (24)b, the verbiage can occur at the clause-initial and clause-final positions. The main difference between English and Chinese is that the sayer in English can also be placed at the clause-final position, while that does not occur in Chinese, as illustrated in example (24)c.

### 4.2.1.4. Relational Process

Relational processes refer to processes of being and having. They signify that a relationship is set up between two things, that is, an object and a quality. Attributive and identifying processes are two modes covered by relational processes. In the former, an attribute is assigned to an entity, and the associated participant roles are carrier and attribute; in the latter, one entity is used to identify another, and the associated participant roles are identified and identifier:

(25) attributive (taken from Halliday and Matthiessen 1999: 304):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Carrier</th>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Attributive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>am busy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>我</td>
<td>忙.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As illustrated in examples (25) and (26), the carrier and attribute cannot be switched around, while the identified and identifier can.

English and Chinese also exhibit one difference with regard to the attributive type. As Halliday and Matthiessen (1999: 304) point out:

Qualities in Chinese include within themselves the ‘be’ (the relation of ascription); hence ascriptive figures (e.g. ‘I am busy’) are constructed as two elements (‘I + be busy’ 我忙 wǒ máng). Syntactically therefore they belong to the class of verbal elements rather than the class of nominal elements — i.e. in Chinese “adjectives” are verbs, whereas in English they are a kind of noun.

4.2.1.5. Existential Process

Existential processes express the existence of an entity. They have one participant, that is, the existent:

As shown in example (27), the common existential process in English is the ‘be’ verb, but that process in Chinese is 有 (have). Also, the word ‘there’ is used in English, but it is “neither a participant nor a circumstance – it has no representational function in the transitivity structure of the clause; but it serves to indicate the feature
of existence” (Halliday 2004: 257). However, no equivalents exist in Chinese, that is, the Chinese clause starts right from the process 有 (have).

As discussed above, some structural differences exist between English and Chinese transitivity systems, and this inevitably results in certain obligatory changes when the English source news texts are trans-edited into Chinese. In the next section only non-obligatory shifts are discussed.

4.2.2. Recurrent Non-obligatory Shifts

Three types of regular shifts occurring in processes and participants are identified, as shown in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shifts</th>
<th>First Case Study</th>
<th>Second Case Study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Added Processes</td>
<td>China Times</td>
<td>Liberty Times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commercial Times</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Event to Action Processes</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Generalisation of participants</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All three types of shifts are found in the target texts from the China Times and the Commercial Times in both the first and second case studies, whereas only the first two types of shifts occur in the target texts from the Liberty Times.

First, more processes, especially material and mental processes, are added to the target texts in the two case studies. Three illustrating examples are presented here:

(28) No. 1 (the first case study)

ST (line 21): That's why Mr. Clinton accepts China's fiction that Taiwan is not a separate state.
TT1 (lines 18-19): 這就是為什麼柯林頓寧願接受中共的「虛構故事」，認為台灣不是「另一國」。
(This is why Clinton prefers to accept the CCP’s ‘fiction’ and believes that Taiwan is not a ‘separate state’.)

TT2 (lines 19-20): 這就是為什麼柯林頓接受中共的「虛構故事」，認為台灣不是「另一國」。
(This is why Clinton accepts the CCP’s ‘fiction’, and believes that Taiwan is not a ‘separate state’.)

(29) No. 11 (the second case study)

ST (line 97): The Kidd destroyer could be the basis of a compromise [...] ...

TT3 (lines 28-29): 可以出售紀德艦作為折衷方案。
(Selling the Kidd destroyer could be a compromise.)

(30) No. 12 (the second case study)

ST (lines 82-83): the submarine option seems to be gaining ground.

TT1 (lines 23-24): 出售柴油潜艇給台灣的方案可能性似乎大增。
(The possibility of selling Taiwan the diesel submarine seems to increase greatly.)

The mental process 認為 (believe), which does not occur in the source texts, is added to the two target texts (TT1 from the China Times and TT2 from the Liberty Times). Similarly, the material process 出售 (sell) is added to the two target texts in examples (29) and (30). These added processes seem to make the target texts more dynamic and active than the source texts.

Second, event processes with inanimate actors in the source texts are usually changed to action processes with animate actors, as exemplified below:

(31) No.6 (the first case study)

ST (lines 28-29): The crisis arose when the Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui announced he was abandoning the ‘one China’ policy.
(32) No. 5 (the second case study)

ST (lines 2-4): China's Communist government has been pressing hard: A decision to sell some of the more advanced items could lead to all kinds of trouble.

TT1 (lines 8-9): 中共已經提出警告，如果美國對台出售高性能武器，尤其是神盾艦，將引發各種各樣的問題。

(The CCP has issued a warning. If the U.S. sells Taiwan high-tech weapons, especially the Aegis destroyer, it will provoke all kinds of problems.)

In example (31), the inanimate participant ‘the crisis’ is used as the actor of the material process ‘arose’ in the source text from the New York Times, implying that the crisis event comes into being by itself, and no one is explicitly responsible for cause of the crisis; whereas in the two target texts (TT1 from the China Times and TT2 from the Liberty Times), the inanimate actor is shifted to 李登輝總統 (President Lee Then-hui), and the process ‘arose’ is changed to the transitive material process 引發 (provoke). These changes result in the prominence of President Lee Teng-hui’s responsibility for his action in causing the crisis. Likewise, the inanimate actor ‘a decision to sell some of the more advanced items’ in example (32) is shifted to the animate actor 美國 (the U.S.), and the process ‘lead’ is also changed to the transitive material process 引發 (provoke). In this way, an event process is turned into an action
process, highlighting the agency of the U.S. and causality of events.

Third, individual participants in the source texts tend to be generalised in the target texts from the *China Times* and the *Commercial Times*:

(33) No. 9 (the first case study)

ST (line 22): goading China into punitive action could be economically, if not politically, suicidal for Mr. Chen.

TT (line 3): 這一談話對台灣「即便不是政治自殺，也是經濟自殺」。
(This talk is economically, if not politically, suicidal for Taiwan.)

(34) No. 2 (the second case study)

ST (lines 30-31): China has deployed 200 missiles in Fujian and is adding about 50 a year, according to Adm. Dennis Blair, commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Command.

TT2 (lines 26-27): 太平洋海軍司令部最近提出報告，指中共在台灣對岸部署兩百枚飛彈，而且每年增加五十枚。
(The U.S. Pacific Command made a report recently, indicating that the CCP has deployed 200 missiles across the Taiwan Strait and is adding 50 a year.)

The individual participants in the two source texts become collective in the target texts. ‘Mr Chen’ is rendered as 台灣 (Taiwan); and ‘Adm. Dennis Blair’ is shifted to 太平洋海軍司令部 (the U.S. Pacific Command)

4.2.3. Underlying Reasons

The first type of shift, more processes added to the target texts, is primarily due to linguistic preferences in Chinese. Compared with English, which is characterised as relatively noun- and preposition-prominent, Chinese is described as a relatively verb-prominent language (Chen 1997: 9-10). More processes are added to the target texts in the interest of conforming to the linguistic conventions in Chinese. The added
processes do have ideological effects on the target texts, as the target texts become more dynamic and active than the source texts. However, given the strong tendency of linguistic preference behind the shift, the possibility that the shift is motivated by ideologies seems to be quite low. Accordingly, the first type of shift will not be taken into account when underlying ideology-related norms are reconstructed, as it cannot provide strong evidence for the operation of underlying ideologies.

Two possible reasons can be used to account for the event processes used in the source texts. One is that they may be adopted to serve the function of journalistic objectivity, as comments on agency and responsibility can be avoided. The other reason is ideological in nature. The two source newspapers both agree with the U.S.'s 'one China' policy, but at the same time they prefer to be vague on the future status of Taiwan. With these ideologies in mind, the news production teams of these two source newspapers, consciously or subconsciously, adopted inanimate participants to avoid clarifying agency, and constructed an image of 'objective outsider' for the U.S. In this way, the statements they made in the source texts appeared less provocative to both China and Taiwan.

The shifts from event to action processes in the target texts are much more likely to be related to their ideologies rather than to journalistic objectivity. The target newspapers do not agree with the U.S.'s 'one China' policy, and they have their own distinct stances on the issue of reunification/independence. Thus, the news trans-editing teams, when producing the target texts, may have wished to make plain the responsible parties involved in China-Taiwan conflicts, so as to defend the political stances of their own newspapers. Also, Taiwan itself is one of the main participants in China-Taiwan conflicts, so Taiwanese readers may be assumed to prefer to have a plain picture of the agency and responsibility involved in
China-Taiwan conflicts. Furthermore, animate participants can add the colour of action and energy to reduce the experiential distance, which in turn can maximise communicative efficiency.

Where the third type of shift from individuals to collectives is concerned, the trans-editing team may have wished to highlight the negative aspects of the ‘independence-like’ statements or to meet the reader’s needs. The trans-editing team rendered the term ‘Mr. Chen’ as 台灣 (Taiwan) in the target text, stressing the potentially ‘devastating impact’ on Taiwan’s economy of President Chen Shui-bian’s ‘one country on each side’ statement. Secondly, the name ‘Adm. Dennis Blair’ was deleted by the trans-editing team, in order to make the information clearer or more straightforward to the Taiwanese readers, as they may not be familiar with ‘Adm. Dennis Blair’ or care who he is.

4.3. Transformations

4.3.1. Recurrent Non-obligatory Shifts

This section addresses the shifts occurring in nominalisations and passivisations in the two case studies. The nominalised participants of the source texts are frequently changed to corresponding processes in both the target texts from the two newspapers under the China Times Group and those from the Liberty Times, as exemplified by the following examples:

(35) No. 1 (the first case study)

ST (lines 9-11): In part, this may reflect the administration’s dismay that Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui reformulated his country’s policy toward China without winning Washington’s advance approval.
TT1 (lines 10-11): 可能緣於台灣在未獲華府了解前計劃改變現行的對大陸政策，促使華府感到震驚。
(It may be because Taiwan changed its current mainland policy before winning Washington’s understanding, and [this] shocked Washington.)

TT2 (lines 10-11): 部分原因是李登輝總統在未獲華府首肯的情況下改變對大陸政策，令華府感到震驚。
(It is partly because President Lee Teng-hui changed his current mainland policy without winning Washington’s approval, and [this] shocked Washington.)

(36) No. 3 (the second case study)

ST (lines 42-43): Beijing’s response to an Aegis sale would be an immediate increase in the number of missiles deployed in southern China.

TT (lines 4-5): 如果美國出售神盾級軍艦給台灣，中共將立即增加部署在華南的導彈數量。
(If the U.S. sells the Aegis destroyers to Taiwan, the CCP will increase immediately the number of missiles deployed in southern China.)

(37) No. 4 (the second case study)

ST (lines 27-29): Foreign Minister […] recently to warn that sale of the Aegis or PAC-3 would “endanger China-U.S. relations”.

TT 2 (line 13): 中共外長上週警告美國如果出售神盾或愛國者三型系統，將「破壞中美關係」。
(The Foreign Minister of the CCP warned last week that if the U.S. sells the Aegis or PAC-3, it will “endanger China-U.S. relations”.)

In example (35), the nominal phrase ‘dismay’ is rendered as the mental process 震驚 (shock) in both the target text from the China Times (TT1) and that from the Liberty Times (TT2), strengthening the feeling of activity. Also, the emotion conveyed by ‘shock’ is far stronger than that by ‘dismay’. By the same token, the
material process 出售 (sell) is adopted to take the place of the English nominal ‘sale’ in the two target texts of examples (36) and (37), and a corresponding actor 美國 (the U.S.) is added to the two target texts. In this way, not only does the sense of activity increase but also the agency of the U.S. is highlighted in the target texts.

As for the passives in the source texts, most of them are replaced by actives in the target texts. Here are three illustrating examples:

(38) No. 1 (the first case study)

ST (lines 27-28): The people of Hong Kong were given no say.

TT1 (line 21): 她的人民無權置喙。

(Her people did not have the right to voice.)

(39) No. 7 (the first case study)

ST (line 17): That sensible arrangement was deliberately challenged last month by President Lee […]

TT (line 11): 台灣李登輝總統上月的言論卻等於公然挑戰這樣的立場。

(The statement made by Taiwan’s President Lee Teng-hui last month, however, openly challenged this position.)

(40) No. 11 (the second case study)

ST (lines 73-75): the type of Aegis being considered for sale to Taiwan would not be equipped with an interceptor able to counter the Chinese ballistic missiles directed at Taiwan.

TT3 (lines 19-20): 考慮出售給台灣的神盾雷達系統將不會具備攔截中共瞄準台灣的導彈飛彈的功能。

(The type of Aegis being considered to sell to Taiwan would not possess the function to counter the Chinese ballistic missiles directed at Taiwan.)

All the source texts in examples (38) to (40) adopt the passive structure, and their subjects are not actors but goals upon which the processes are acted. The passive structure is not kept in the three target texts. In examples (38) and (40), ‘the
people of Hong Kong’ and ‘the types of Aegis being considered for sale to Taiwan’ assume the role of actor in the target texts, performing the processes of ‘having’ and ‘possessing’. As for example (39), the active structure is also adopted by shifting the actor from ‘that sensible arrangement’ to 台湾李登輝总统上月的言论 (the statement made by Taiwan’s President Lee Teng-hui last month).

4.3.2. Underlying Reasons

The frequent use of nominal phrases in the source texts is probably because the source newspapers attempt to appear neutral, impartial, and formal as nominal phrases are more abstract and can also obscure the associated agency. Concerning the common use of passive structures in the source texts, several possible reasons are identified: to make necessary connections between sentences, to thematise the goal which a given process is acted upon, or to avoid mentioning the actor and obscure the corresponding agency and responsibility in order not to appear provocative.

The shifts occurring in nominal phrases and passive structures in the target texts seem not to be intended to change the impartiality or to highlight agency. Instead, the trans-editing teams made these shifts to conform to linguistic preferences in Chinese. The change of nominal phrases can be accounted for by the characteristic of the Chinese language as being verb-prominent, as discussed in Section 4.2.3. The use of the passive in Chinese is much less frequent compared to that in English (Chen 1997: 164; Liu 2004: 71). The use of passives in Chinese usually requires the existence of an actor. Otherwise, the active structure is preferred (Chen 1997: 164).12

12 It has been noted that Chinese passives usually contain unfavourable meanings (Chao 1968: 703) besides passive meanings. However, Chinese passives have been influenced by Western languages. They are no longer restricted to verbs with negative meanings, especially in the written language.
The shifts from nominal phrases to corresponding verbal phrases or clauses and those from passives to actives do produce ideological effects on the target texts, by strengthening the feeling of activity or by highlighting the actor, together with the corresponding agency. However, similar to the addition of more processes in the target texts, the linguistic preference in Chinese underlies these shifts, and this considerably decreases the possibility that the shifts are made due to underlying ideologies. Given that these shifts cannot provide strong evidence of the underlying ideology-related norms, they will not be considered when the reconstruction is carried out.

4.4. Naming

Regular shifts occurring in the names used to refer to participants in the news events are found in the first case study, especially those names referring to Presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian.

As illustrated by the following example, when the term ‘President Lee Teng-hui’ is used in the source text, its Chinese equivalent 李登輝總統 (President Lee Teng-hui) is used in the target texts from the China Times (TT1) and the Liberty Times (TT2):

(41) No. 6

ST (lines 28-29): [...]when the Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui announced he was abandoning the ‘one China’ policy.

TT1 (lines 10-11): 當李登輝總統宣布「兩國論」……
(When President Lee Teng-hui announced the ‘two-state’ theory [...] )
(Since President Lee Teng-hui declared that the two sides [of the Taiwan Strait] were in a 'special state-to-state relationship' [...] )

However, when the term ‘Mr. Lee’ is opted for in the source text, shifts are identified in the target texts:

(42) No. 4
ST (lines 29-30): In particular, Washington should make sure Mr. Lee clearly understands [...] 
TT1 (lines 11-12): 华盛頓也應該讓李登輝清楚的了解……
(Washington should also make Lee Teng-hui understand [...] )
TT2 (lines 16-17): 特別是華府應該確定李登輝總統清楚了解……
(Particularly, Washington should make sure President Lee Teng-hui clearly understands [...] )

The term 李登輝 (Lee Teng-hui) is used to replace ‘Mr Lee’ in the target text from the China Times, but the rendering in the target text from the Liberty Times is 李登輝總統 (President Lee Teng-hui).

For the news texts produced before late 2002, the English term ‘Mr. Chen’ is consistently replaced by 陳水扁 (Chen Shui-bian) in the target texts from the two newspapers belonging to the China Times Group, as illustrated below:

(43) No. 9
ST (lines 9-10): Mr. Chen said on Saturday [...] there was “one country on each side” of the Taiwan Strait.
TT (line 1): 陳水扁發表「兩岸一國」……
(Chen Shui-bian announced the ‘one country on each side’ statement [...] )
No. 13

ST1 (lines 39-40): Chinese leaders have little incentive to cooperate and make Mr. Chen look good.

TT (lines 10-11): 中國也沒有動機與陳水扁合作來幫助他。
(China also does not have incentives to cooperate with Chen Shui-bian to help him.)

However, for the news texts produced after late 2002, the term 陳水扁總統 (President Chen Shui-bian) and 陳總統 (President Chen) tend to be used more frequently in the target texts from the China Times Group:

(45) No. 2

ST (line 7): Chen said he would not bow to U.S. pressure to modify recent moves.

TT (lines 1-2): 陳水扁總統說……不會屈服於美國壓力而修正他最近推動的措施。
(President Chen Shui-bian said […] will not bow to U.S. pressure to modify his recent moves.)

(46) No. 15

ST1 (lines 3-4): Chen also issued the clearest definition to date of his views of Taiwan’s relations with China […]

TT (lines 4-5): 這是陳總統對界定台灣與中國關係迄今最清楚的說明……
(This is the clearest explanation to date of President Chen’s view of Taiwan’s relations with China […] )

As shown by examples (41) and (42), it is obvious that the target texts from the Liberty Times pay more respect to President Lee Teng-hui, for titles plus complete and unabbreviated names exhibit extreme formality, as discussed in Section 2.2.1.1. Such extra respect from the Liberty Times can be attributed to its support for President Lee Teng-hui. Concerning the additional respect accorded to President Chen Shui-bian as observed in examples (45) and (46), this can be accounted for by the
slight change occurring in the political ideologies held by the China Times Group after its founder, Yu Jizhong, died in 2002. That is, the China Times Group has become less adamant in its support for Taiwan’s reunification with China. It is gradually leaning towards the maintenance of Taiwan’s status quo, and its opposition against President Chen Shui-bian’s government is also reduced.

4.5. Modality

This section first introduces basic concepts of modality, followed by Chinese and English cross-linguistic commonalities and divergences in relation to the use of the modalities of possibility and obligation. Then, the non-obligatory shifts occurring in modality in both case studies are elaborated, together with possible underlying reasons behind the shifts.

4.5.1. Basic Concepts of Modality

As Halliday (2004: 146-147) points out, between the absolute ‘yes’ and ‘no’, there exist various intermediate degrees, which are known collectively as modality. Four main types of modality are identified as below (Halliday 2004: 147-150):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exchange</th>
<th>Modality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>probability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>usuality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>goods and services</td>
<td>obligation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>inclination</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When what is conveyed is information, the meanings for the positive and negative poles are respectively affirming and denying. Between these poles, there are
two intermediate systems: probability and usuality. The former is concerned with the speaker’s “judgments as to the likelihood or probability of something happening or being”; the latter is pertinent to the speaker’s “judgments as to the frequency with which something happens or is” (Eggins 1994: 179).

When goods and services are exchanged through commands and offers, the meanings for the positive and negative poles are prescribing and inhibiting, respectively. There are also two kinds of intermediate systems. In a command, the intermediate system is concerned with “the degree of obligation on the other person to carry out the command”; in an offer, it is related to “the degree of willingness or inclination of the speaker to fulfill the offer” (Thompson 1996: 57, emphasis in the original).

Within each type of modality, three values of modal judgment can be identified: high, median, and low. The high and low values are also referred to as outer values by Halliday (2004: 620), in order to highlight their differences with the median value in relation to polarity. As Halliday (2004: 620) indicates:

The median value is clearly set apart from the two ‘outer’ values by the system of polarity: the median is that in which the negative is freely transferable between the proposition and the modality […] With the outer values, on the other hand, if the negative is transferred the value switches (either from high to low, or from low to high).

With probability, for example, whereas ‘probably not’ is the same as ‘not probably’, ‘certainly not’ is equivalent to ‘not possibly’ and vice versa:
It should be noted that the absence of modal verbs in a given clause does not convey neutral meanings. It expresses the highest degree of possibility or obligation (Badran 2001: 50).

This thesis only focuses on the modalities of probability and obligation, since they are much more relevant to uncovering underlying ideologies, as compared to the other two types. The modalities of probability and obligation are more speaker-oriented, that is, the attitudes or opinions conveyed by them mostly originate from the speaker. In contrast, usuality and intentionality are more subject-oriented, that is, the attitudes expressed by them are more likely from the subject.

4.5.2. Cross-linguistic Commonalities and Divergences

After introducing the basic concepts of modality, the next step is to compare and contrast probability and obligation systems in English and Chinese. The following is the comparison of the probability system:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Direct Negative (Negation on the Proposition)</th>
<th>Transferred Negative (Negation on the Modality)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>That is probably not true.</td>
<td>That is not probably true.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>That is certainly not true.</td>
<td>That is not possibly true.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>That is possibly not true.</td>
<td>That is not certainly true.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Both modal adverbs and modal verbs can be used to express three different degrees of probability in English and Chinese. However, those used in Chinese are not as comprehensive as those in English. For example, there is not a positive high-valued modal verb in Chinese. Also, the transferred negative forms of modal adverbs and those of modal verbs in Chinese are in complementary distribution.

Moreover, some English modal verbs have two different forms, such as will/would, can/could, and may/might, but for each pair there is only one Chinese counterpart. The distinction between the two different forms in English is one between ‘neutral’ and ‘oblique’ (Halliday 1976: 210). The latter can be further divided into two types: undertone and overtone. According to Halliday, “If ‘toned down’, it has the sense of tentative, or else presumed by deduction. If ‘toned up’, it takes the form of an emphatic assertion, or an assertion contrasting with some kind of reservation” (1976: 196-197).

Similar comparison is made with regard to the obligation systems in English and Chinese. Obligation in English can be expressed by both the passive forms of verbs and modal verbs, while in Chinese it can only be expressed by modal verbs, as
illustrated below:

Table 24 Obligation systems in English and Chinese

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 24 Obligation systems in English and Chinese</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Passive Verbs</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Positive</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Also, the modal verbs used to convey low-valued obligation have both ‘neutral’ and ‘oblique’ forms in English. The latter, as indicated by Halliday, is “used in environments demanding sequences of tenses: past reported, tentative and hypothetical” (1976: 203). Conversely, modal verbs in Chinese only have one form, which can convey both the ‘neutral’ and ‘oblique’ meanings depending on the context where the modal verbs are used. Another difference is that modal verbs in English cannot occur in succession, such as ‘should can’, whereas those in Chinese can.

4.5.3. Recurrent Non-obligatory Shifts

The instances where the recurrent shifts occur in the first and second case studies are quite different, so the two case studies are discussed separately.

4.5.3.1. First Case Study

The recurrent shifts are found to occur in three different instances. First, the
degree of either possibility or obligation is usually changed in the target texts when the clauses containing modality are pertinent to China-Taiwan relations, as demonstrated by the following two examples:

(48) No. 1

ST (lines 27-28): Such an outcome would be acceptable for Taiwan [...]  
TT1 (lines 5-6): 這樣的模式⋯⋯可能被接受。  
(Such a model [...] may be accepted.)  
TT2 (lines 5-6): 這樣的模式⋯⋯才可能被接受。  
(Such a model [...] may then be accepted.)

(49) No. 7

ST (lines 1-3): [...] both sides need to step back and consider the risks they are courting – Taipei by its reckless declarations and Beijing by its unacceptable military threats.  
TT (lines 1-2): 兩岸均應自制，並慎思各自所冒的風險。台北不應繼續魯莽的發言，北京也不該一再威脅動武。  
(Both sides should step back and consider the risks they are courting. Taipei shouldn’t continue to make reckless declarations, and Beijing shouldn’t repeatedly threaten to use force.)

In example (48), the modal verb ‘would’ used by the Washington Post is not rendered into its Chinese equivalent 會 (would). Instead, it is replaced by the low-valued modal verb 可能 (may) in both the target text from the China Times (TT1) and that from the Liberty Times (TT2). The degree of certainty is decreased with regard to the belief that the ‘one country, two systems’ proposed by China is to be accepted by Taiwanese people.

In example (49), the modal verb ‘need’ is used in the first part of the source text, suggesting it is necessary for China and Taiwan to withdraw, or there will be some consequences. No other modal verbs appear in the second part of the source text after
the dash. The target text from the *China Times* uses three modal verbs, that is, 應 (should), 不應該 (shouldn’t), and 不該 (shouldn’t), indicating that it is expectation rather than necessity for China and Taiwan to act.

Second, the degree of possibility is shifted in the target texts when the clauses where modality appears are concerned with the political statements put forward by Presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, as shown in the following two examples.

(50) No. 4

ST (lines 25-26): Mr. Lee, for his part, **should** abandon talk of separate states [...]  
TT1 (line 1): 要求李登輝總統放棄「兩國論」的主張。  
([The *New York Times*] called on President Lee Teng-hui to abandon his claim of ‘two-state’ theory.)

(51) No. 9

ST (lines 47-50): Mr. Chen **may** be taking advantage of China’s distraction ahead of the Communist Party’s coming congress [...] to put the language back on the table, pleasing pro-independence forces in Taiwan and putting some pressure on Beijing.  
TT (lines 16-17): 陳水扁是趁中共忙於十六大準備無暇他顧之際，再度祭出自決言辭，既可取悅島內獨派，也可對北京施壓。  
(Chen Shui-bian is taking advantage of the CCP’s distraction ahead of the 16th Party Congress to put forward the notion of self-determination again both to please pro-independence forces in the island and to put pressure on Beijing.)

As can be seen in example (50), the source text of the *New York Times* uses the modal verb ‘should’ to convey its opinion on President Lee Teng-hui’s obligation to abandon the ‘two-state’ theory. The target text from the *China Times* (TT1) does not
keep this source modal verb, expressing a complete confidence that the *New York Times* requires President Lee Teng-hui to give up his remark.

Likewise, the source text from the *New York Times* in example (51) adopts the low-valued modal verb ‘may’ to explain the possible motivations behind President Chen Shui-bian’s statement of ‘one country on each side’. This modal verb is not kept in the target text from the *Commercial Times*. No modal verbs are used in the target text, which in turn expresses the highest certainty of the motivations behind President Chen Shui-bian’s statement.

However, the target texts from the *Liberty Times* exhibit different shift patterns as regards the issues related to President Lee Teng-hui’s political thinking. The following are two relevant examples:

(52) No. 4

ST (lines 25-26): Mr. Lee, for his part, *should* abandon talk of separate States [...]  

TT1 (line 1): 要求李登輝總統放棄「兩國論」的主張。  

([The *New York Times* called on President Lee Teng-hui to abandon his claim of ‘two-state’ theory.)

TT2 (line 14): 李登輝總統則應該放棄兩岸是「特殊國與國關係」的言論……  

(President Lee Teng-hui *should* abandon the statement that the two sides [of the Taiwan Strait] are in a ‘special state-to-state relationship’[...])

---

14 As all the target texts from the *Liberty Times* in the first case study are concerned with President Lee Teng-hui’s political thinking, it is not possible to compare the *Liberty Times* and the two newspapers of the China Times Group in relation to the issues pertinent to President Chen Shui-bian.
(53) No. 6:

ST (lines 27-29): Perhaps more ominously, another official expressed doubts about the effectiveness of Washington’s diplomacy since the crisis arose when Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui announced he was abandoning the ‘one China’ policy.

TT1 (lines 10-11): 也許更糟的是，當李登輝總統宣布「兩國論」而引發危機時，美國外交斡旋的效果卻令人質疑。

(Perhaps more ominously, the effectiveness of the U.S.’s diplomatic mediation was questionable when President Lee Teng-hui announced the ‘two-state’ theory and evoked the crisis.)

TT2 (lines 12-13): 更令人難以樂觀的一個情況是，另一位官員陸士達認為自李登輝總統宣布兩岸是「特殊國與國關係」，引發台海新一波危機以來，華府的外交斡旋效果有限。

(A more pessimistic situation was that another official, Stanley Roth, believed that the effectiveness of Washington’s diplomatic mediation had been quite limited since President Lee Teng-hui announced that the two sides [of the Taiwan Strait] were in a ‘special state-to-state relationship’ and evoked a new crisis.)

In example (52), the source text of the New York Times adopts the median-valued modal verb ‘should’ to express its view on President Lee Teng-hui’s obligation to abandon the ‘two-state’ theory. The target text from the China Times (TT1), as has already been discussed in example (50), deletes ‘should’ and conveys a full certainty that the New York Times requires President Lee Teng-hui to give up his remark. The target text from the Liberty Times (TT2) retains the modal verb ‘should’ and renders it as 應該 (should).

When talking about the effectiveness of U.S. reactions to the crisis caused by President Lee Teng-hui’s statement, the source text from the New York Times uses...
the modal adverb ‘perhaps’ to reduce its certainty over this issue, as shown by example (53). The target text from the China Times keeps the same degree of certainty by adopting the modal adverb 或許 (perhaps). The target text from the Liberty Times (TT2), in contrast, does not use any modal adverbs or verbs, conveying Roth’s complete certainty over the ineffectiveness of the U.S. diplomatic efforts.

Third, when the clauses with modal verbs are to do with negative aspects of U.S.-China relations, the values of modal verbs conveying possibility and obligation increase in the target texts. This shift only occurs systematically in the target texts from the newspapers under the China Times Group. The two following examples are concerned with the shifts in modal verbs of possibility:

(54) No. 1

ST (lines 32-33): This murkiness is designed to discourage Taiwan from recklessly declaring independence. The danger, though, is that China, rather than Taiwan, will misjudge U.S. steadfastness.

TT1 (lines 25-26): 這個模糊立場是為了阻止台灣貿然宣布獨立，危險在於對美國立場的堅定程度產生誤判的不是台灣，而是中共。
(The murky position is designed to discourage Taiwan from recklessly declaring independence. The danger is that it is not Taiwan but the CCP who misjudges US steadfastness.)

(55) No. 7

ST (lines 27-28): In the event of Chinese military action against Taiwan, President Clinton would have little choice but to chill relations with Beijing.
TT (lines 19-20): 如果中共真的侵犯台灣，柯林頓總統其實別無選擇，
只有凍結和北京的關係。
(If the CCP does invade Taiwan, President Clinton has
no choice but to chill relations with Beijing.)

The source text in example (54) does not express complete certainty over
China’s misjudgment, by adopting the modal verb ‘will’. The target text, in contrast,
does not show any uncertainty over China’s misjudgment. In example (55), the source
text states that it is very likely that President Clinton has little choice but to chill
relations with China if China does attack Taiwan; however, no modal verbs are used in
the target text. The target text, therefore, means that no choices are left for President
Clinton.

Similar shifts are also found in the modality of obligation, as exemplified in the
following two examples:

(56) No. 4
ST (line 24): Beijing should not make the same mistake of resorting to
military threats.
TT1 (lines 9-10): 北京不可再犯諸武力威脅的錯誤。
(Beijing cannot make the mistake of resorting to military
threats again.)

(57) No. 7
ST (lines 25-26): Beijing should not risk reversing that progress with a
new episode of aggression.
TT (lines 17-18): 呼籲北京不要冒進，避免歷史重演。
([The U.S.] calls on Beijing not to act blindly to repeat
history.)

In the two source texts, the U.S. expects China not to resort to military force by
using the median-valued modal verb ‘should’ in its negative form. However, in the
two target texts, the Chinese counterpart 應該 (should) in its negative form is not chosen as the equivalent rendition. The Chinese texts either opt for the high-valued modal verb 不可 (cannot), as in example (56), or remove the modal verb at issue, as in example (57). Hence, the U.S.’s expectations of China in the two source texts are changed to strong requirements. This in turn increases the degree of the U.S.’s unhappiness with China in the target texts.

4.5.3.2. Underlying Reasons

The shifts in modality identified in the three instances outlined above appear to be related to the target political culture and the political ideologies held by the target newspapers.

Both the China Times and the Liberty Times show the same shift pattern when the statements made are about Taiwan-China relations. The degree of certainty and obligation is decreased. The possible reason behind this shift is the sensitivity of the future development of Taiwan-China relations. Therefore, when producing the target texts, the trans-editing teams of the two target newspapers may have believed that it was better not to provide the Taiwanese readers with opinions which were too dogmatic and assertive. Also, the trans-editing teams may have been aware of the Taiwanese government being the auditor of their trans-edited texts during the production process. They made the shift to distance their newspapers from such a sensitive issue and avoid unnecessary criticism, in case that the political stances conveyed in their trans-edited texts were incongruent with the then government’s policies towards China.

As for the shifts under the second instance, there are sharp contrasts between the China Times Group and the Liberty Times. When it comes to negative aspects related
to the political notions proposed by President Lee Teng-hui, the target texts from the
two newspapers of the China Times Group tend to increase the degree of certainty.
This may result from its disapproval of Taiwan’s independence. From the perspective
of the China Times Group, both the ‘two-state’ theory and the ‘one country on each
side’ statement are synonyms of Taiwan’s independence. Guided by this, the
trans-editing teams of the China Times Group increased the degree of certainty over
the negative aspects of these two notions in the target texts to reinforce their
unacceptability and inappropriateness. On the other hand, due to the support of the
Liberty Times for independence and for President Lee Teng-hui, its trans-editing team
decreased in the target texts any negativity towards President Lee Teng-hui.

With regard to the shift occurring under the third instance, it can be accounted
for by the phenomenon that in the eyes of the China Times Group, China is conceived
of as a political rival. The trans-editing teams supposed that their Taiwanese readers
would welcome any negative information regarding China’s relations with the U.S. in
the target texts, as any worsening relations between the U.S. and China can imply that
the U.S. may lean more towards Taiwan, and give more support to Taiwan.

4.5.3.3. Second Case Study

Regular translation shifts are found to occur in two instances. On each occasion,
the target texts from both the China Times Group and the Liberty Times display the
same shift patterns.

First of all, when clauses containing modality are concerned with the benefits of
arms sales to Taiwan, the degree of certainty tends to increase, as shown in examples
(58) and (59) below:

148
(58) No. 4

ST (lines 22-23): Both would help Taiwan meet the threat of China's short-range missile arsenal deployed across the Taiwan Strait.

TT (line 10): 兩項目有助於台灣對抗中國部署於對岸的飛彈威脅。
(Both items help Taiwan protect itself from the missiles deployed by China across the Strait.)

(59) No. 11

ST (lines 80-81): Some liberal critics have complained that the Aegis would have an offensive capability because it would be armed with Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles.

TT1 (line 29): 部分自由派批評，神盾艦配有戰斧巡弋飛彈，具有攻擊能力。
(Some liberals have commented that the Aegis is armed with Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles and has offensive capability.)

TT2 (lines 20-21): 一些自由派的批評者認為，神盾艦配有戰斧巡弋飛彈，因此它有強大攻擊能力。
(Several liberal critics have held that as the Aegis is armed with Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles, it has a massive offensive capability.)

TT3 (line 21): 部份自由派人士批評，神盾艦配有戰斧巡弋導彈，具有攻擊能力。
(Some liberals have commented that the Aegis is armed with Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles and has an offensive capability.)

In example (58), the benefits which the Aegis and the PAC-3 anti-missile system would bring to Taiwan are mentioned in the source text, but with the use of 'would' no 100% certainty is granted. Nevertheless, the modal verb is not kept in the target text. No doubt is cast over the advantage of arms sales in the target version.

Example (59) is concerned with the attacking capability of the Aegis destroyer. In the source text from the New York Times, the modal verb 'would' is used twice to
add a certain ambiguity to the function of the Aegis destroyers. None of the three target texts (TT1 from the Commercial Times, TT2 from the China Times, and TT3 from the Liberty Times) keeps those modal verbs, and they all eliminate the ambiguity.

Second, when clauses containing the modal verbs are related to negative China-U.S. relations, the degree of certainty usually increases:

(60) No. 4:

ST (lines 32-34): Still other senior Chinese officials have hinted that American businesses in China could be punished if Bush approves the sale of any advanced weaponry to Taiwan.

TT2 (lines 15-16): 中共……官員更警告說，如果布希同意上述軍售，在中國大陸的美商將受到懲罰。
(The CCP […] officials have even warned that if Bush approves the above arms sales, American businesses in China will be punished.)

(61) No. 7:

ST (lines 75-76): Beijing has warned Washington that providing the destroyers could be “the straw that breaks the camel's back”.

TT (lines 4-5): 中共曾警告華府，如果美國出售台灣神盾級驅逐艦，將是「壓斷駝駒背的最後一根草」。
(The CCP has warned that if the U.S. sells the Aegis destroyers to Taiwan, it will be “the straw that breaks the camel's back”.)

In both examples (60) and (61), the source texts from the New York Times express only a low degree of certainty over China’s possible negative reactions towards U.S. arms sales to Taiwan with the modal verb ‘could’. However, the target texts, either from the China Times (TT) or from the Liberty Times (TT2), increase
the likelihood of China’s hostile responses by shifting ‘could’ to 將 (will). It should be noted that there may be two different interpretations for 將 (will). One is that it is used as a median-valued modal verb, and the other is that it is used to represent the future tense. If 將 (will) represents the future tense, that means the modal verb ‘could’ in the source texts is deleted in the target texts. In this way, complete certainty over China’s hostility is conveyed by the target texts.

4.5.3.4. Underlying Reasons

One likely reason for modal verbs being adopted in the source texts under the first instance is that the source newspapers follow the U.S. government’s policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’. Hence, their news production teams did not convey in the source texts total assurance over the advantages of arms sales to Taiwan and over the attacking ability of the Aegis. The target newspapers, nevertheless, do not share such ‘strategic ambiguity’. They may assume that from the perspective of a buyer, the Taiwanese readers wish to obtain a definite answer on the benefits of arms sales to Taiwan. The news trans-editing teams, guided by this assumption, deleted the modal verbs or adverbs used in the source texts and conveyed clarity.

The shift in modality under the second instance can also be accounted for in ideological terms. In examples (60) and (61), the use of the modal verb ‘could’ in the source texts may be to avoid being provocative, as the U.S. maintains diplomatic relationships with China. Therefore, the news production team reduced in the source texts the certainty over China’s hostile actions towards the U.S. For the target newspapers, China has been an obstacle to Taiwan’s purchase of arms from the U.S. The trans-editing teams highlighted China’s pressures on the U.S. in the target texts to help legitimate the U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.
4.6. Thematic Structure

In this section, the cross-linguistic commonalities and divergences between English and Chinese in relation to thematic patterns are first introduced. Following this, recurrent non-obligatory shifts in thematic structure in both case studies are discussed, along with possible reasons behind the shifts.

4.6.1. Cross-linguistic Commonalities and Divergences

4.6.1.1. Commonalities

Theme, as put by Halliday, “is the starting-point for the message; it is what the clause is going to be about” (2004: 58). There are basically three types of themes: simple, multiple, and clause themes (see Eggins 1994: 274-284; Halliday 2004: 79-86).

To begin with, a simple theme consists of just one element and cannot be further divided. The simple theme can be one nominal group, adverbial group, or prepositional phrase, which usually represents the ideational elements of transitivity, that is, participants or circumstances, as shown below:

(62) Actor as Theme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Rheme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>have to go to the library tomorrow.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>我</td>
<td>明天去圖書館。</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(63) Circumstance as Theme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Rheme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>Tomorrow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>have to go to the library.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>明天</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>我得去圖書館。</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Second, in a multiple theme an ideational element, which is also referred to as a topical theme, is obligatory. There may be textual and/or interpersonal elements as well. The textual element within a theme may have any combination of the following: continuative (e.g. yes, no, well, oh, now), structural (e.g. and, yet, so, even, however), and conjunctive themes (e.g. therefore, in other words, so far). Within the interpersonal element, there may be a modal theme (e.g. certainly, personally, seriously) and/or a vocative element (e.g. John, Mr. Smith, boys and girls). Here are two examples:

(64) Textual + Topical

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Rheme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Textual</td>
<td>Topical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>But I have to go to the library tomorrow.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>可是我明天得去圖書館。</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(65) Interpersonal + Topical

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Rheme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal</td>
<td>Topical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>Perhaps will have to go to the library tomorrow.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>也許 我明天得去圖書館。</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Third, themes can also be realised by a clause in clause complexes. If the dominant clause comes first, the thematic structure is analysed as:

(66)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Rheme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>We will go shopping if I am not busy tomorrow.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>我們去逛街，如果明天我不忙的話。</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
However, if the dependent clause comes first, there may be two ways to analyse the thematic structure, as shown below:

\[(67)\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme 1</th>
<th>Rheme 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Theme 2</td>
<td>Rheme 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>If I am not busy tomorrow,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>如果我明天不忙的話，</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

English and Chinese are similar in all the three types of themes discussed above. In the next section, their differences are analysed.

### 4.6.1.2. Divergences

Four main differences exist in relation to the thematic structures. First, theme in Chinese, as Halliday and McDonald indicate, “may be marked off from the rhyme by a pause (commonly represented in writing by a comma) and /or by a modal particle 啊, 呢, 吧 or 嗎” (2004: 321).

Second, as for the hypotactic-clause complexes, the usual order in English is that the dependent clause follows the dominant clause, such as the one shown in example (66); the common order in Chinese, however, is the opposite, such as the one demonstrated in example (67).

Third, the dummy subject ‘it’ and the empty item ‘there’ in existential clauses in English do not have Chinese counterparts, which in turn results in obligatory shifts in thematic structure in Chinese, as illustrated below:

\[(68)\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Rheme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>It is quite nice that you can join us.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>你能加入我們</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(69)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Rheme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>There</td>
<td>is some coffee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>有一些咖啡。</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen from example (68), the theme in the English clause is the dummy subject ‘it’; whereas the theme in the Chinese clause is shifted to a clausal theme, that is, 你能加入我們 (you can join us). The theme ‘there’ in example (69) is changed to an empty theme in Chinese.

Fourth, the thematic structure in English has a direct link with the mood structure. On the contrary, such a link does not exist in Chinese, as its expression of “different mood structures do not involve changes in the word order of the clause” (Halliday and McDonald 2004: 322). Such a difference gives rise to some obligatory shifts in the thematic structure when yes-no questions, wh-questions, and exclamatory clauses in English are translated into Chinese:

(70)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Rheme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>Is that young lady</td>
<td>her teacher?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>那個年輕的小姐</td>
<td>是她的老師嗎？</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(71)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Rheme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>Who</td>
<td>is that young lady?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>那個年輕的小姐</td>
<td>是誰？</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(72)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Rheme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>How fast</td>
<td>he runs!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>他</td>
<td>跑得多快啊！</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In example (70), the theme in the English clause includes both the finite verb ‘is’ and the subject ‘that young lady’, while the Chinese theme only contains the subject
那個年輕的小姐 (that young lady). While yes-no questions in Chinese normally contain a question particle, such as 嗎, it is placed at the clause-final position and does not influence the thematic structure.

The wh-element ‘who’ occupies the thematic position in the English clause of example (71), but in the Chinese clause, the theme is still the subject 那個年輕的小姐 (that young lady). Although the Chinese equivalent of ‘who’ (i.e. 誰) appears in the Chinese clause, it does not usually occur at the clause-initial position.

Concerning the exclamatory clause shown in example (72), the English theme is realised by ‘how fast’, but in Chinese, the theme is still conflated with the subject 他 (he). The interjection 啊 used to express exclamation in Chinese appears in the clause-final position rather than in the clause-initial position.

4.6.2. Recurrent Non-obligatory Shifts

Two significant shift patterns are identified in both case studies and in the target texts from the two newspapers under the China Times Group and from the Liberty Times. First of all, themes referring to sources are usually added to the target texts:

(73) No. 2 (the first case study)

ST (line 14): Chen's comments were unusual […]
TT (line 7): 華郵指出，陳水扁這番話頗不尋常……
(The Washington Post indicates that Chen’s comments were unusual […]

(74) No. 8 (the first case study)

ST (line 1): Chinese leaders have told the United States […]
TT (lines 1-2): 該報導指出……中共已透過管道向美國傳達……
(The report indicates that […] the CCP has conveyed the message to the U.S. […]

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As demonstrated in the above three examples, the terms referring to the source newspapers (i.e. 華郵 [the Washington Post] and 紐約時報 [the New York Times]) or the source texts themselves (e.g. 該報導 [the report]) are added to the target texts as additional themes.

When the source texts are editorials, the added themes in the target texts would make it clear that the sources are editorial in nature:

(76) No. 5 (the second case study)

ST (line 1): An ambitious annual weapons shopping list from Taiwan [...]  
TT1 (line 7): 社論指出，台灣的年度軍購清單⋯⋯  
(The editorial indicates that Taiwan’s annual weapons shopping list [...] )
TT2 (line 6): 郵報的社論指出⋯⋯台美年度軍售會議⋯⋯  
(The editorial from the Washington Post indicates that [...] the annual meeting of U.S.-Taiwan arms sales [...] )

The additional themes in the two target texts are 社論 (the editorial) and 華郵的社論 (the editorial from the Washington Post), which remind the target audience that what they are reading was initially published as an opinion article in the Washington Post.

Second, some inanimate themes are replaced by personal or institutional themes.
This shift is concomitant with the shift identified in transitivity, that is, the shift from event to action processes. The following are two relevant examples from the first case study:

(77) No. 3

ST (lines 37-38): Lee’s fearless view of China and reliance on the United States are common among Taiwan’s independence activists.

TT2 (line 20): 台灣很多台獨活躍份子都跟李登輝一樣，不怕中國，信任美國。

(Many of Taiwan’s independence activists hold the same view as Lee Teng-hui. They do not fear China and rely on the U.S.)

(78) No. 14

ST1 (lines 54-57): That principle holds there is only one China [...] “We are painting ourselves into a corner,” said one official in Beijing with links to China’s security services.

TT (lines 16-17): 報導並引述中共官員的話說，中共堅持「一個中國」，是把自己逼到牆角。

(The report also quoted one CCP official as saying that the CCP paints itself into a corner by insisting on ‘one China’.)

In example (77), the inanimate theme ‘Lee’s fearless view of China and reliance on the United States’ in the source text from the Washington Post is replaced by an animate theme 台灣許多台獨份子 (many of Taiwan’s independence activists) in the target text from the Liberty Times. Similarly, in example (78), the inanimate theme ‘that principle’ in the source text does not keep its position as theme in the target text from the China Times. Instead, 中共 (the CCP) becomes the theme, foregrounding China’s responsibility for its own dilemma.

The same shift also occurs in the second case study, as illustrated by the
following two examples:

(79) No. 7

ST (line 72): The destroyers were "under consideration."

TT (lines 1-2): 美國正考慮賣給台灣四艘配神盾防空雷達系統的柏克級驅逐艦。

(The U.S. is considering selling Taiwan four Arleigh Burke class destroyers equipped with the Aegis Combat System.)

(80) No. 11

ST (lines 120-121): While the Kidd might do for now, it is no substitute for the Aegis.

TT3 (lines 43-44): 目前美國可能出售台灣紀德艦，但它不能取代神盾艦。

(Currently the U.S. may sell Taiwan the Kidd, but it cannot replace the Aegis.)

The inanimate themes ‘the destroyers’ and ‘the Kidd’ in the two source texts from the New York Times are both replaced by the animate theme 美國 (the U.S.) in both the text from the China Times (TT) and that from the Liberty Times (TT3), bringing to the fore the decisive role of the U.S. as the Taiwan’s provider of advanced weapons.

4.6.3. Underlying Reasons

There are four possible reasons behind the addition of source-specifying themes to the target texts. First of all, the source specification is one of the generic conventions of news trans-editing in Taiwan. To be regarded as a trans-edited news text, acknowledging the sources is an important feature (Liu 2004: 177).

Secondly, the trans-editing teams may have added to the target texts the source-specifying themes in order to increase newsworthiness. The U.S. has been
playing a significant role in China-Taiwan conflicts, so it is likely that the target newspapers assume that the Taiwanese readers are quite interested in U.S. opinions. Guided by this assumption, the news trans-editing teams may have supposed that the target texts with the prominent reference to the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* could grasp the Taiwanese readers’ attention. These source newspapers are two of the most influential newspapers in the U.S., and are generally regarded as representative of U.S. public opinions.

Thirdly, the trans-editing team may have wished to help distance their newspapers from provocative opinions or comments made in the target texts, as they were aware that the then Taiwanese government was the auditor of their target texts.

Lastly, by describing those reported in the target texts as the points of view of the source newspapers, the target newspaper’s ideologies can be implicitly transmitted to the target readers.

The reasons behind the shift from inanimate to animate themes in the target texts are the same as those for the shift from event to action processes, which have been discussed in Section 4.2.3. This shift helps to highlight participants involved in China-Taiwan conflicts and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, as they are placed in a salient position. In this way, the narration of the news events in question can be more vivid, and the experiential distance can be reduced to some extent. The shifts in themes and transitivity work together to bring ostensibly remote events reported in the source texts closer to the target readers.

4.7. Conclusion

In this chapter, the source and target texts in the two case studies have been compared with each other in relation to lexical structure, transitivity, transformations,
naming, modality, and thematic structure. For each linguistic aspect, some significant and recurrent non-obligatory shifts were identified. Most of these shifts were found to have underlying ideological reasons behind them, either related to the target newspapers’ political ideologies, or to the assumptions about the Taiwanese readers’ needs and interests, as well as to the presumptions on the acceptability of the trans-edited news texts. The ideological reasons explored in this chapter will be used to reconstruct norms in Chapter 7.

The following three types of shift were found to be mainly caused by linguistic preferences in Chinese: the addition of extra processes, the change from nominalised participants to corresponding processes, and the change from passives to actives in the target texts. Given the strong tendency of the linguistic preference behind these shifts, they could not be regarded as evidence of the operation of underlying ideology-related norms, and will not be taken into account when the reconstruction of the norms at issue is conducted in Chapter 7.

Also, this chapter has identified some sharp contrasts between the target texts from the two newspapers under the China Times Group and those from the Liberty Times with regards to the recurrent non-obligatory shifts. These differences suggest that the shifts made in the target texts from the China Times Group and from the Liberty Times are not simply random or preferential choices, but are related to their distinct ideologies.

In Chapter 5, the source and target texts of the two case studies will be compared in terms of the ideologically significant linguistic and textual aspects at the macro-level. The micro-level shifts identified in this chapter will, to some extent, contribute to the identification of the macro-level shifts, especially those occurring in news frames and communicative purposes.
This chapter continues the comparison of the linguistic and textual aspects identified by the translation-oriented news discourse model, with emphasis on the macro-level aspects of news structures, news frames, and communicative purposes. For each aspect, systematic shifts are identified, together with the possible underlying reasons.

The shifts occurring in news structures are discussed first, as these shifts, to a certain extent, contribute to the identification of shifts in news frames and communicative purposes. As introduced in Section 3.1.1.1. and 3.1.2.1., the source texts in the two case studies contain both hard news and editorials. Different shift patterns are found between these two sub-types of source texts regarding news structures. In both case studies, the shifts occurring in the trans-editing of source hard news and editorials are discussed separately.

5.1. Shifts in News Structures in the First Case Study

5.1.1. Hard News

When the source hard news texts are trans-edited into Chinese, both the source and the target texts employ as their schematic structures the orbital mode introduced in Section 2.2.2.1. Both source and trans-edited hard news texts are presented in the format of a nucleus (including a headline and a lead) and a range of subsequent satellites, which recycle the information presented in the nucleus by means of elaboration, explanation, appraisal, or justification.
However, given the space limitations imposed by the target newspapers, the semantic macrostructures of the trans-edited versions are inevitably different from those of the source texts. The target texts are much shorter than the source texts. A target text trans-edited from a single source text is usually just one third of the total length of its source text; when a target text is trans-edited from more than one source text, a larger portion of the source texts needs to be cut off. In the following, the shifts in semantic macrostructure identified in the first case study are further elaborated on.

Section 5.1.1.1. discusses the shifts occurring in semantic macrostructures of the target texts from the two newspapers belonging to the China Times Group. Section 5.1.1.2. presents a contrast between the semantic shifts made by the China Times and those made by the Liberty Times as regards news items No.3 and No.6. An illustrative example of the shifts occurring in news structures is provided in Section 5.1.1.3, followed by an examination of the underlying ideological reasons behind the shifts in Section 5.1.1.4.

**5.1.1.1. China Times Group**

The semantic macrostructures of the target texts from the two newspapers under the China Times Group are different from those of the source texts in three aspects: (1) the source specification, (2) the semantic contents of nuclei, and (3) the composition of satellites.

Clear indication of the source newspapers or source texts is found throughout the semantic macrostructures of the target texts, that is, the source newspapers or source texts are recurrently specified in both the nucleus and its subsequent satellites. Here
are some examples taken from the headlines of the target texts in the first case study.\textsuperscript{16}

(1) No. 5
ST: Taiwan's New Doctrine Unintelligible in Chinese
TT: 紐約時報：台北事前籌畫不足
\textit{(The New York Times): Taipei’s advance planning is deficient)}

(2) No. 8
ST: A Distracted China Issues Censure of Taiwan Chief's Remarks
TT: 一邊一國論／紐約時報觀察 不是政治自殺 也是經濟自殺
\textquote{‘One country on each side’ statement/ the New York Times indicates that it is economically, if not politically, suicidal)

(3) No. 11
ST1: China Mulls Use of Force Off Taiwan, Experts Say Warnings Perceived As Effort to Gauge Likely U.S. Reaction
ST2: China and U.S. Are Reported to Trade Threats on Taiwan
TT: 紐約時報 華盛頓郵報：中共可能武力回應兩國論
\textit{(The New York Times and the Washington Post): the CCP may use force to respond to the ‘two-state’ theory)}

As can be seen from the above three examples, the source newspapers, such as 紐約時報 (the New York Times) and 華盛頓郵報 (the Washington Post) are clearly indicated in the target headlines. Here a two-way relationship between the macro-level semantic macrostructure and the micro-level thematic structure under the textual function becomes clear. The characteristic of source specification in the semantic macrostructure also impinges on the micro-level thematic structure of the target texts. As discussed in Section 4.6.2., additional themes indicating the source newspapers or source texts are added to the target texts. The source specification made at the micro-level thematic structure in turn reproduces and reinforces that at the

\textsuperscript{16} No. 5, No. 8, and No.11 here refer to those news items listed in Tables 11 and 12 on pages 77 to 79.
semantic macrostructure.

The semantic shifts in nuclei are illustrated in Table 25, where both the source and target nuclei are classified into three sub-types in terms of their similarity in news events:

*Table 25 Semantic shifts in nuclei in the first case study*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source Texts</th>
<th>Target Texts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. China's restrained attitude towards President Chen Shui-bian</td>
<td>1. China's restrained attitude towards President Chen Shui-bian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. China's negative reactions towards the 'two-state' theory or the 'one country on each side' statement</td>
<td>2. negative consequences of the 'two-state' theory or the 'one country on each side' statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. unintelligibility of the 'two-state' theory</td>
<td>3. strained relations across the Taiwan Strait</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only the first sub-type of source nuclei is retained in the target texts. The other two sub-types are not kept. The target nuclei turn the attention to Taiwan itself, emphasising the problems it faced when Presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian put forward their respective 'independence-like' political initiatives.

The semantic shifts in the target nuclei unavoidably lead to shifts in the semantic contents of the target satellites, as subsequent satellites are adopted to provide more detailed information about the opening nucleus of a given news text. It follows that different nuclei would result in different compositions of supplementary satellites. The main satellites selected and deleted in the target texts from the two newspapers under the China Times Group are listed below:
Table 26 Selected and deleted satellites in the first case study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected Satellites</th>
<th>Deleted Satellites</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. China's 'wait and see' attitudes towards President Chen Shui-bian and its attempt to reach an accommodation with President Chen Shui-bian's government</td>
<td>1. historical events between China and Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. China's deployment of ballistic missiles and warning of military attacks if necessary</td>
<td>2. information solely on the U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. negative impacts of the 'two-state' theory or the 'one country on each side' statement on Taiwan in terms of economy and security</td>
<td>3. information solely on China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. U.S. negative comments, opinions, or reactions to the 'two-state' theory and the 'one country on each side' statement</td>
<td>4. historical or current events between the U.S. and China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. negative aspects of President Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. increasing tension and war of words across the Taiwan Strait</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first selected satellite is related to the first target nucleus listed in Table 25; the second, third, fourth, and fifth selected satellites are, in one way or another, pertinent to the negative consequences of the 'two-state' theory or the 'one country on each side' statement; and the last satellite chosen expands the meaning presented in the last target nucleus, that is, 'strained relations across the Taiwan Strait'.

As for all the deleted satellites, they are irrelevant to the nuclei highlighted in the target texts, as they represent either information which is already shared by the Taiwanese readers or information exclusively pertinent to the U.S. and China.

5.1.1.2. Contrast with the Liberty Times

The source hard news texts of No. 3 and No.6 have two target texts, one from the China Times and the other from the Liberty Times. These two target newspapers are similar in the phenomenon of source specification, but differ in the shifts occurring in the semantic contents of nuclei and in the satellite composition. Accordingly, this section focuses on their differences.

The comparison of the semantic shifts in nuclei made by the China Times and the Liberty Times is illustrated in Table 27:
Table 27 Semantic shifts in nuclei by the China Times and the Liberty Times in the first case study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspapers</th>
<th>Nuclei</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. 3 Washington Post</td>
<td>former President Lee Teng-hui being the most influential political figure in Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China Times</td>
<td>former President Lee Teng-hui's thinking of Taiwan's independence and comments on China's use of force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberty Times</td>
<td>former President Lee Teng-hui being courageous enough to push for the Republic of Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 6 New York Times</td>
<td>the U.S. repeatedly finding itself caught between China and Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China Times</td>
<td>U.S.'s warning to Taiwan and China to reduce tension across the Strait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberty Times</td>
<td>China and Taiwan pouring verbal scorn on each other and the U.S. seeking to strike balance between China and Taiwan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Neither the China Times nor the Liberty Times keeps the source nuclei. Also, differences exist between these two target newspapers. In No. 3, the China Times highlights President Lee Teng-hui’s thinking of independence, whereas the Liberty Times puts a focus on the positive properties of President Lee Teng-hui. In No. 6, the two target nuclei are similar, emphasising the tension between Taiwan and China as well as the U.S.’s efforts to maintain the stability across the Taiwan Strait.

The differences between the two target newspapers concerning the nuclei also result in their different makeup of satellites, as shown in Table 28.
Table 28 Semantic shifts in satellites by the China Times and the Liberty Times in the first case study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspapers</th>
<th>Selected Satellites</th>
<th>Deleted Satellites</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China Times</td>
<td>1. U.S. responses to China-Taiwan conflicts</td>
<td>1. information solely on the U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. President Lee Teng-hui’s comments on China’s use of force</td>
<td>2. presidential campaign in Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. China’s threat to Taiwan due to the ‘two-state’ theory</td>
<td>3. historical background of President Lee Teng-hui’s troubled relations with China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. negative aspects of President Lee Teng-hui</td>
<td>4. historical events between China and Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. President Lee Teng-hui’s future plan of being a missionary for the Republic of Taiwan</td>
<td>5. China’s threat to Taiwan due to the ‘two-state’ theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. positive aspects of independence activists</td>
<td>6. negative aspects of President Lee Teng-hui</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberty Times</td>
<td>1. U.S. responses to China-Taiwan conflicts</td>
<td>1. information solely on the U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. President Lee Teng-hui’s comments on China’s use of force</td>
<td>2. presidential campaign in Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. President Lee Teng-hui’s future plan of being a missionary for the Republic of Taiwan</td>
<td>3. historical background of President Lee Teng-hui’s troubled relations with China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. positive aspects of independence activists</td>
<td>4. historical events between China and Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5. China’s threat to Taiwan due to the ‘two-state’ theory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The main differences between the China Times and the Liberty Times lie in their last two selected and deleted satellites. The satellites of ‘China’s threat’ and ‘negative aspects of President Lee Teng-hui’ chosen by the China Times are deleted by the Liberty Times. Likewise, the satellites of ‘President Lee Teng-hui’s future plan of being a missionary for the Republic of Taiwan’ and ‘positive aspects of independence activists’ are not selected by the China Times.

5.1.1.3. Example

To illustrate the shifts in semantic macrostructures in the first case study, the source hard news text of No. 6 and its target version are taken as an example. The semantic shifts in terms of the first three paragraphs of the target text from the China Times are illustrated as follows:
A Tightrope Act Over Taiwan

<1> As is often the case in disputes between China and Taiwan, the United States finds itself in the middle.

<2> This time -- unlike during the last crisis in 1996 [...] the United States finds itself in the middle.

<3> But as Chinese and Taiwan fighter jets fly perilously close to each other over the narrow waters of the Taiwan Strait, the administration is fearful that the volatile situation could get out of hand.

<4> The risk of a military clash comes as the administration's policy of engagement with China is under pressure and as the White House grows increasingly fretful that its China policy may blow up just at the start of the presidential campaign.

<5> And in Congress, Taiwan's stalwarts are proposing more military assistance, a move that the administration believes would further inflame the situation.

<11> Among other things, Washington has sent at least six urgent messages in the last three days to Beijing and Taipei demanding they reduce their provocative air sorties, said the official, Stanley Roth, the assistant secretary of state for Asia.

The source and target nuclei are not exactly the same. First, the source newspaper is indicated in the target headline as 紐約時報 (the New York Times). Second, the source headline only indicates the tension across the Taiwan Strait, but the target headline also highlights the U.S.'s concerns over the situation between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. Third, the source lead is kept in the target text, but it is only used as one part of the target lead. The 11th paragraph of the source text is adopted as the other part of the target lead to bring to the fore the actions the U.S. took because of its concerns for the increasing tension. The source newspaper, 紐約時報 (the New York Times), is also specified in the target lead.

After the target nucleus is set, relevant satellites from the source text are
selected. As can be seen from the above example, the 2nd to 5th paragraphs are all pertinent to the tense situation across the Taiwan Strait and the U.S.'s concerns, so they are chosen and used as the first satellite of the target text. The 3rd paragraph of the target text is a repeat of the second part of the target lead, and so it is also selected as part of the second satellite to highlight the increasing tension.

5.1.1.4. Underlying Reasons

The reasons behind the source specification manifested in the target semantic macrostructure are similar to those for the source specification revealed in the thematic structure as discussed in Section 4.6.3., so they are not discussed again here.

Concerning the semantic shifts in nuclei and satellites, they can be accounted for by two possible reasons: to increase the level of newsworthiness in the interest of maximising communicative efficiency and to highlight ideological stances. These two reasons are, in fact, interrelated. How a newspaper decides whether or not certain information is newsworthy is based on a range of factors, such as economic constraints, routines of newsgathering and news production, and the newspaper’s socio-political ideologies (van Dijk 1988: 119-121). The ideological underpinnings of newsworthiness are what need to be explored here, as they shed light on the operation of underlying ideology-related norms. When a newspaper decides newsworthiness in ideological terms, there usually exists a concomitant purpose, that is, to highlight effectively the information conforming to the newspaper’s ideological stances, or to effectively reduce the information incompatible with its ideologies.

The source newspapers do not support Taiwan’s independence, and assume that their U.S. readers agree with their view. Guided by this, consciously or subconsciously, the news production teams of the source newspapers may have
regarded the nucleus of ‘unintelligibility of the two-state theory’ as appropriate to attract their U.S. readers’ attention when producing the source texts. They may have believed that such a nucleus embodied the news value of consonance, because they supposed that this nucleus reconfirmed their assumed readers’ view of President Lee Teng-hui’s political initiative as unacceptable and problematic.

Moreover, the two source newspapers may assume that their audience, like themselves, identify with the U.S. government’s aim to seek a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue in order to balance its interests across the Taiwan Strait. Thus, it is possible that the news production team supposed that such nuclei as ‘China’s negative reactions towards Taiwan’s independence-like remarks’ and ‘the dilemma the U.S. faced when caught in the middle’ were newsworthy to the then U.S. readers, as these two nuclei could reflect the news values of conflict and dramatisation.

When the information contained in the above-mentioned nuclei is conveyed to the U.S readers, the negative aspects of the ‘independence-like’ statements are also brought to the fore.

The China Times Group holds negative attitudes towards President Lee Teng-hui and Taiwan’s independence. Accordingly, the trans-editing team, during the production process, may have assumed that the Taiwanese readers were interested in the nucleus which emphasised the negative consequences of the ‘independence-like’ statements put forward by President Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian. In other words, the team may have believed that this nucleus contained the news value of consonance, as they thought it was congruent with the Taiwanese readers’ view of ‘independent-like’ statements as harmful to Taiwan. The news value of consonance

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may also account for the deletion of the satellites concerning President Lee Teng-hui's plan for the establishment of the Republic of Taiwan as well as the positive aspects of Taiwan's independence activists. The *Liberty Times*, in contrast, supports President Lee Teng-hui and Taiwan's independent sovereignty, and assumes that its intended readers hold the same attitude. Therefore, its trans-editing team may have supposed that the readers' attention would be drawn if aspects favourable to President Lee Teng-hui were accentuated in the nucleus, and the satellites providing unfavourable information about him and his political thinking were deleted, due to the news value of consonance.

Moreover, the information related to the tension across the Taiwan Strait is the other nucleus appearing in the target texts from both the China Times Group and the *Liberty Times*. This may be because they assume that the Taiwanese readers are quite concerned about Taiwan's security. When producing the trans-edited texts, their trans-editing team may have supposed that such a nucleus could draw the target readers' attention due to its embodiment of the news value of conflict.

Furthermore, historical backgrounds, information solely on the U.S and China, and events happening between them were usually deleted in the target texts by the trans-editing teams. This may be mainly because they have assumed that the former information was commonly shared by the then Taiwanese audience, and the latter was not relevant or proximate for the target readers. Due to space limitations, these two types of information may be the best candidates for deletion, as they do not fulfil the news value of relevance.

When the level of newsworthiness is raised through the semantic shifts in nuclei and satellites, some information is also highlighted in the target texts. For example, aspects favourable to President Lee Teng-hui are emphasised in the target texts from
the *Liberty Times*.

5.1.2. Editorials

When the source editorials are trans-edited into Chinese, shifts are found to occur in both schematic structures and semantic macrostructures.

5.1.2.1. Shifts in Schematic Structures

The schematic structure of the source editorials is different from the orbital mode of the source hard news mentioned in Section 5.1.1. What is employed as the schematic structure of the source editorials is the argumentative mode, which is similar to the ‘thorough argumentation’ discussed by Hatim and Mason (1990: 184). It usually consists of a thesis as tone setter, a range of subsequent arguments, and a conclusion. Unlike the orbital mode, arguments do not recycle what has already been mentioned in the thesis. Instead, meaning is accumulated with each argument. Arguments are interlinked with one another in terms of logical relations. Hence, their positions cannot be changed as satellites of hard news items, which usually do not relate logically with one another. Also, the argumentative mode usually reaches a conclusion, which is not the case with the orbital mode (Iedema, Feez and White 1994: 160-161).

The target versions from the two newspapers under the China Times Group and from the *Liberty Times*, as pointed out in Section 3.2.2., are presented as hard news texts which employ a hybrid mode as the schematic structure. That is, the orbital and argumentative modes are mixed together in the target texts. In general, the headlines and opening paragraphs of the target texts usually summarise the main ideas or conclusions of the source editorials. They act like a nucleus encapsulating the main
contents of the news event at issue rather than as a thesis, which plays the role of a tone setter.

The subsequent paragraphs in the target texts act both like arguments and satellites. On the one hand, major arguments of the source editorials are mostly retained in the target texts. These arguments are often logically connected with one another, so their original order in the source texts is still maintained in the target texts. On the other hand, the subsequent paragraphs usually refer back to what has already been mentioned in the lead-like opening paragraph, especially when this opening paragraph is a summary of the main ideas of a given source editorial.

Another evidence of converting the source editorials into hard news is the close relationship of the headline to the opening paragraph in the target texts because the target texts are presented as hard news rather than as editorials. According to Iedema, Feez and White (1994: 110), this close relationship between the headline and the lead is characteristic of hard news texts, but seldom appears in other types of news items, such as editorials. Here are two illustrating examples:18

(4) No. 4

ST: The Volatile Issue of Taiwan

By most measures of civic development, Taiwan has evolved in recent years into a far more appealing model than mainland China. Taiwan's politics is now fully democratic, its economy market-based and thriving and its press free and spirited [...]
TT1: The New York Times calls on President Lee Teng-hui to abandon the ‘two-state’ theory

(The New York Times, a very influential newspaper in the U.S., publishes an editorial today calling on President Lee Teng-hui to abandon his claim of a ‘two-state’ theory [...])

TT2: The New York Times: China must not threaten to attack again; Taiwan shouldn’t talk about two states.

(The New York Times: China must not threaten to attack again; Taiwan shouldn’t talk about two states.)

(The New York Times publishes an editorial today criticising President Lee Teng-hui for abruptly announcing a policy which states the two sides [of the Taiwan Strait] are in a ‘special state-to-state relationship’ [...])

The lines in bold represent the headlines in the source and target texts, and the sentences following them are the first part of the leads. The source headline indicates the topic of the source editorial, that is, ‘the volatility of the Taiwan issue’, whereas the beginning of the opening paragraph is concerned with recent civil developments in Taiwan. The opening paragraph is not directly related to the headline, but rather provides an orientation, attempting to lead the audience into the upcoming thesis. Conversely, the lead-like opening paragraph of the target text of the China Times (TT1) restates what is presented in the headline, that is, the requirement of President Lee Teng-hui to give up his initiative of the ‘two-state’ theory. Similarly, the lead-like paragraph of the target text from the Liberty Times (TT2) further details the headline by pointing out the comment of the New York Times on President Lee Teng-hui’s ‘two-state’ theory.
5.1.2.2. Shifts in Semantic Macrostructures

As discussed above, the source editorials and their target versions usually do not employ the same schematic structure. This necessarily leads to the shifts in semantic macrostructures. The source and target semantic macrostructures are dissimilar in three respects: (1) the source specification, (2) the semantic contents of opening paragraphs, and (3) the deletion of certain information.

In the source editorials, all arguments are the author's own opinions and comments, and no outside sources are quoted. However, in the target texts, all the opinions expressed are quoted from the source editorials. Such terms as 華盛頓郵報社論 (the editorial of the Washington Post), 紐約時報社論 (the editorial of the New York Times), and 社論 (the editorial) recurrently appear in the target texts to specify that these are the outside sources.

The semantic shifts in the opening paragraphs of the target texts from the two newspapers under the China Times Group and from the Liberty Times are as follows. Only the source thesis of No. 7 is completely kept in the target texts. All the other source theses either do not occupy the opening position in the target texts or are only partially similar to the target opening paragraphs.
The source editorials of No. 1 and No.4 have two target texts: one from the China Times Group and the other from the Liberty Times. None of the source theses are retained in those target texts. In No. 1, the opening paragraphs of the target texts from the two target newspapers are the same. They both highlight President Clinton’s allegedly unbalanced policy towards Taiwan and China, as well as the required support for Taiwan from the U.S. In No. 4, the two target texts are slightly different in their opening paragraphs. The target text from the China Times focuses more on the tension evoked by President Lee Teng-hui’s ‘two-state’ theory, whereas that from the Liberty Times avoids bringing this negative point to the fore. Concerning No. 12, there are two source editorials, one from the Washington Post and the other from the New York Times. The target opening paragraph is concerned with the intimidation of China’s White Paper. It is clear that the source thesis from the Washington Post is
The lead-like paragraphs in the target texts of No. 1, No.4, and No. 12 all pertain to the major arguments put forward in the source editorials, and are more directly relevant and newsworthy to the Taiwanese audience than the corresponding source theses.

Unlike the source hard news articles, most of the contents of the source editorials are retained in the target texts. This is partly because these editorials are usually not very long, and partly because editorials normally have a beginning (thesis), a middle (arguments), and an ending (conclusion), and the deletion of too much may lead to a sense of incompleteness. Thus, what is deleted becomes even more significant from an ideological perspective. The following table illustrates the information deleted by the China Times Group and the Liberty Times:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspapers</th>
<th>Deleted Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China Times</td>
<td>1. details on U.S. policies towards Taiwan, such as the policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’ and Taiwan Security Enhancement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. historical events of China-Taiwan conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. historical events between U.S. and China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. the opinions of the U.S. or China on Taiwan’s reunification with China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Times</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberty Times</td>
<td>1. details on the policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. negative aspects of Taiwan’s independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. negative aspects of President Lee Teng-hui</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first three messages deleted by the China Times Group are more like supplementary information, which provides only background information to the main arguments put forward in the source texts. The last message omitted is argumentative in nature, but it conveys only China’s or the U.S.’s own assumptions about how
reunification should be achieved.

The first satellite deleted by the *Liberty Times* is also something supplementary, whereas the last two items deleted are arguments pertinent to unfavorable aspects of the advocacy of Taiwan's independence and President Lee Teng-hui's behaviour.

5.1.2.3. Example

Here the source editorial of No. 4 and its trans-edited version as hard news from the *China Times* are used as an example to explain the shifts made in the schematic and semantic macrostructure. The discussion is limited to the shifts occurring in the first three paragraphs of the target text:

![Figure 10 Source and target texts of No. 4 in the first case study](image-url)
The differences between the source and target texts with regard to the relationship between the headline and opening paragraph, as well as to the source specification are already explained above when example (4) was introduced. Here, attention is placed on the semantic shifts in the opening paragraph and subsequent arguments.

The source thesis is not retained in the target version. The second part of the 5th paragraph of the source editorial is used as a lead-like opening paragraph. What is presented in the 5th paragraph is one of the main conclusions made in the source editorial, and the second part of it is directly related to the suggestion made by the New York Times as regards President Lee Teng-hui’s ‘two-state’ theory. This opening paragraph and the target headline together act like a nucleus, conveying the central message of the source editorial to Taiwanese readers.

The 1st and 2nd paragraphs of the source text are selected to act as the 2nd paragraph of the target text to elaborate more on President Lee Teng-hui’s ‘two-state’ theory mentioned in the opening paragraph. The 3rd paragraph of the target text, trans-edited from the 4th and 5th paragraphs of the source text, expounds on the volatility of the Taiwan issue.

On the one hand, the 2nd and 3rd paragraphs of the target text act like satellites, as they recycle the information presented in the target nucleus. On the other hand, these two paragraphs are also argumentative in nature. The logical order initially arranged for the 2nd, 4th, and 5th paragraphs in the source text is retained in the 2nd and 3rd paragraphs in the target text.

5.1.2.4. Underlying Reasons

As discussed above, the target texts trans-edited from the source editorials
adopt a hybrid structure of orbital and argumentative modes. This may be simply because the target newspapers wish to inform Taiwanese readers of the main arguments from the source editorials right at the beginning, and the opening nuclei can fulfil such a function.

The shifts in schematic structures can also be accounted for in ideological terms. First of all, the shift may be related to the target newspapers’ assumptions about the acceptable and suitable generic structure in Taiwan for target hard news texts trans-edited from source editorials. From my survey of the on-line archives of the China Times Group as well as the United Daily News Group in Taiwan, it is found that source editorials are habitually trans-edited as hard news in Taiwan.

Other ideological reasons pertaining to the target newspapers’ political ideologies are also possible. The two newspapers under the China Times Group and the Liberty Times may tend to blur the boundary between subjective opinions and impersonal facts in the trans-edited texts, in order to transmit their political ideological stances in an implicit and seemingly objective way. Governed by this, the trans-editing teams created lead-like opening paragraphs in the target texts, and reinforced the significance of the information presented in the opening paragraphs with subsequent semi-satellites, in the interest of encouraging the intended readers to believe the intrinsic importance of the information presented in the lead-like paragraphs.

As in the trans-editing of the source hard news discussed in Section 5.1.1., the reasons behind the source specification occurring in the target semantic macrostructure are similar to those behind the source specification in the micro-level thematic structure, so they are not re-elaborated here.

Concerning the shifts in the opening paragraphs, the main reason is also to raise
the level of newsworthiness, as well as to effectively emphasise the information consistent with the ideologies held by the target newspapers, or to effectively reduce the information incongruent with those ideologies. Most of the thesis-like paragraphs in the source editorials act as tone-setters, presenting the author’s position or opinion. The opening paragraphs in the target texts, however, play the role of lead, where the target newspapers can put forward what they regard as the most newsworthy information.

Even though these target newspapers are not congruent with each other as regards independence and reunification issues, they both do not view China as a friend to Taiwan but more or less as a rival, and believe that their audiences hold the same idea or agree. Thus, when producing the target texts, the trans-editing teams of the target newspapers may have supposed that their Taiwanese readers welcomed any information related to negative aspects of U.S.-China relations, as such news would imply corresponding positive relations between the U.S. and Taiwan, and embodied the news value of consonance. As a result, the trans-editing teams created lead-like opening paragraphs in the target texts to convey information regarding negative aspects of China-U.S. relations, due to the supposed news value of consonance.

The trans-editing team of the China Times Group also highlighted in the lead-like paragraph increasing tension across the Taiwan Strait caused by President Lee Teng-hui’s ‘two-state’ theory, whereas the team of the Liberty Times not only did not give salience to aspects unfavourable to President Lee Teng-hui but even deleted them. Such a difference may also be attributable to the news value of consonance, as discussed in Section 5.1.1.4.

With regard to the information deleted by the both the China Times Group and the Liberty Times, it is related either to historical background or to U.S policies. The
main reason behind this deletion is that those backgrounds and policies do not fulfil the news value of relevance, that is, they are irrelevant to the target readers.

5.2. Shifts in News Structures in the Second Case Study

5.2.1. Hard News

As in the first case study, the source and target hard news texts in the second case study also adopt the orbital mode as their schematic structure. However, due to space constraints imposed by the target newspapers, shifts do occur in the semantic macrostructure of the target texts. Section 5.1.1.1. identified three differences in semantic macrostructures between the source and target hard news texts. All those differences exist in the second case study as well, but source specification will not be discussed again. Section 5.2.1.1. focuses on the source hard news texts and their target versions from the newspapers of the China Times Group, and explains the semantic shifts in nuclei and satellites. Section 5.2.1.2. presents a comparison of the shifts made by the China Times Group and the Liberty Times. An illustrative example is offered in Section 5.2.1.3. Following this, underlying reasons behind the shifts made by the target newspapers are investigated in Section 5.2.1.4.

5.2.1.1. China Times Group

As in the first case study, the semantic contents of the target nuclei in the second case study are quite dissimilar to those of the source nuclei as a result of restructuring. The shifts are specified in Table 31, where both the source and target nuclei are classified into three sub-types:
**Table 31 Semantic shifts in nuclei in the second case study**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source Texts</th>
<th>Target Texts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. the recommendation or decision on what weapons to sell</td>
<td>1. the same but with information on specific weapons as well as opinions from the U.S. or China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. the pressure from China</td>
<td>2. China's negative reactions towards arms sales to Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. the pressure from Taiwan</td>
<td>3. what weapons Taiwan is about to obtain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only the first source nucleus is retained in the target texts, but it forms part of the first target nucleus. Apart from ‘the decision on arms sales’, the two source newspapers are much more concerned about keeping the balance between China and Taiwan, whereas the target texts put more emphasis on specific weapons Taiwan can obtain and on China’s hostility, which may have decisive influences on the U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.

Based on the semantic shifts made in nuclei, the main satellites chosen and deleted in the target texts are listed below:

**Table 32 Selected and deleted satellites in the second case study**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected Satellites</th>
<th>Deleted Satellites</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. the specific weapons which the U.S. is going to sell</td>
<td>1. historical or current events happening between the U.S. and China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. people supporting arms sales and their related opinions</td>
<td>2. the dilemma the U.S. is facing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. the benefits of arms sales to Taiwan</td>
<td>3. historical backgrounds on arms sales (such as the Taiwan Relations Act and Taiwan’s reasons for purchasing advanced weapons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. China’s warning to the U.S. as regards arms sales</td>
<td>4. delicate information on the attacking potential of the weapons at issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. China’s military threat to Taiwan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. China’s objection on potential sales of certain weapons and its reasons behind the objection</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. the weapons which Taiwan is going to obtain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. the reasons why the Aegis destroyers cannot be sold to Taiwan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All selected satellites are, to some extent, relevant to the three major types of target nuclei specified in Table 31. The first three satellites selected hold relations to the first target nucleus; the fourth to sixth satellites selected are used to elaborate on
the second target nucleus, and the last two satellites chosen are used to recycle and extend what is already presented in the last target nucleus.

The first two satellites deleted are much more relevant to the source nuclei. Although the third satellite deleted is also concerned with arms sales, it merely offers the background contexts of the sales. Compared to other selected satellites, it is not very newsworthy for the Taiwanese readers. Also, most of the background information is related to Taiwan, such as the Taiwan Relations Act or Taiwan’s underlying reasons behind arms purchases, so it is assumed to be commonly shared by the Taiwanese audience. The last satellite deleted contains information that is either too detailed or too trivial to be included. Given the space limitations of trans-edited texts, background or subtle information is most likely to be omitted.

5.2.1.2. Contrast with the Liberty Times

The source text of news item No. 11 in the second case study has three target texts, two from the China Times Group and one from the Liberty Times. This section discusses the differences between the target newspapers with regard to their respective shifts in nuclei and subsequent satellites.

The comparison of the semantic shifts in nuclei made by the China Times Group and the Liberty Times is illustrated in Table 33 below. The source text gives prominence to the sale of advanced weapons as well as to China’s opposition to it. In the two target texts from the China Times Group, attention is shifted to a breakdown of all possible weapons which Taiwan needs to obtain. The target text from the Liberty Times places an additional focus on the defensive function which the Aegis is expected to fulfil.
Table 33 Semantic shifts in nuclei by the China Times Group and the Liberty Times in the second case study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspapers</th>
<th>Nuclei</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New York Times</td>
<td>the suggestion by a confidential review that Taiwan needs advanced new weapons, including the Aegis, which China particularly does not want Taiwan to have</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Times</td>
<td>specific weapons which a confidential review has concluded that Taiwan needs to obtain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China Times</td>
<td>specific weapons which a confidential review has concluded that Taiwan needs to obtain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberty Times</td>
<td>the suggestion made by a confidential review that the U.S. should sell Taiwan such advanced weapons as the Aegis to defend Taiwan against China's increasing military power</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The satellites selected and deleted by the China Times Group and the Liberty Times are quite similar, as illustrated in Table 34.

Table 34 Semantic shifts in satellites by the China Times Group and the Liberty Times in the second case study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspapers</th>
<th>Selected Satellites</th>
<th>Deleted Satellites</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China Times</td>
<td>1. the weapons that Taiwan needs, including Aegis and Kidd-class destroyers 2. China's opposition to the potential sales of the Aegis, PAC-3, and submarines 3. debates over the sales of Aegis by the U.S. politicians</td>
<td>1. U.S.-China relations 2. background on arms sales 3. possible consequences of the sales of the Aegis 4. comments on arms sales from Taiwanese officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Times</td>
<td>1. the weapons that Taiwan needs, including Aegis and Kidd-class destroyers 2. China's opposition to the potential sales of the Aegis, PAC-3 and submarines 3. debates over the sales of Aegis by the U.S. politicians</td>
<td>1. U.S.-China relations 2. background on arms sales 3. possible consequences of the sales of the Aegis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberty Times</td>
<td>1. the weapons that Taiwan needs, including Aegis and Kidd-class destroyers 2. China's opposition to the potential sales of the Aegis, PAC-3 and submarines 3. debates over the sales of Aegis by the U.S. politicians 4. comments on arms sales from Taiwanese officials</td>
<td>1. U.S.-China relations 2. background on arms sales 3. possible consequences of the sales of the Aegis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The only notable difference is the last satellite selected by the Liberty Times, which is exactly the one deleted by the China Times Group. The comments conveyed in the last satellite are mainly concerned with Taiwan’s priority to acquire the Aegis and willingness to defer the purchase of the Aegis if it could restrain China’s
military buildup.

5.2.1.3. Example

To illustrate the shifts in news structures in the second case study, this section takes as an instance the source hard news text of No. 7 and its trans-edited version in the China Times. The shifts occurring in the first two paragraphs of the target text are discussed below:

The source and target nuclei are totally different. For one thing, the source
newspaper is indicated as 紐約時報 (the New York Times) in both the target headline and lead. For another, the source nucleus is concerned with Chinese pressure on the U.S. regarding arms sales to Taiwan. The target text does not keep this source nucleus. Instead, the 21st paragraph of the source text is selected to act as the target lead, which together with the target headline conveys the information about U.S.’s consideration of selling Taiwan four Aegis destroyers.

After the target nucleus is set, the 22nd and 23rd paragraphs of the source text, which describe China’s negative reactions towards the sale of the Aegis destroyers, are chosen to act as the first satellite, providing more information pertaining to the sale of the Aegis destroyers. The three paragraphs from the source text are not deemed to be the most newsworthy or significant in the source text, as they appear quite late in the text. However, they become the most salient paragraphs due to their roles as the lead and the first satellite in the target text.

5.2.1.4. Underlying Reasons

As in the first case study, the shifts in semantic macrostructures in the second case study may be motivated by a wish to increase newsworthiness and to highlight or reduce certain information.

The two source newspapers seem to identify with the U.S. government’s policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’, and assume that their audience also does the same. Their news production teams thus used such general terms as ‘advanced weapons’ or ‘new weapons’ in the source nuclei, and postponed corresponding details to subsequent satellites to create ambiguity, which was supposed to be in harmony with the then U.S. readers’ political stances.

Moreover, by focusing on the pressures from both China and Taiwan in the
source nuclei, the news production team brought to the fore the dilemma the U.S. encountered when trying to keep the balance between China and Taiwan. These nuclei may have been regarded by the production team as most relevant to the U.S. audience, due to their implications for U.S. interests.

The target newspapers do not share the ambiguity principle, and they presume that Taiwanese readers, as buyers, want to know up front what weapons Taiwan could obtain. Accordingly, the news value of unambiguity may have been viewed by the trans-editing teams as significant in attracting the Taiwanese readers' attention during the production process. Also, the trans-editing teams shifted the nucleus to 'China's hostile responses to arms sales', which they believed to be the main concern of the Taiwanese readers, embodying the news values of consonance and conflict.

In the target texts, the information about China-U.S. relations, the background on arm sales, and the possible consequences of the sale of Aegis destroyers were frequently deleted by the trans-editing teams of the target newspapers. This is possibly because the trans-editing teams assumed that such information was not relevant to the target readers, based on the target newspapers' assumptions about their readers' needs and interests. Given space limitations, the information could be deleted without influencing the news values.

Taiwanese officials' comments on arms sales were retained in the target text by the trans-editing team of the Liberty Times, but were deleted by the team of the China Times Group. One likely reason behind this difference is that those comments were regarded by the trans-editing team as consonant with the 'Taiwan-first' perspective held by the Liberty Times and its Taiwanese readers.
5.2.2. Editorials

5.2.2.1. Shifts in News Structures

In the second case study, the shift in schematic structures is the same as that discussed in Section 5.1.2. This section only focuses on the shifts in semantic macrostructures, together with possible underlying reasons.

As in the first case study, the source and target semantic macrostructures are different from each other in three aspects: the source specification, the contents of opening paragraphs, and the deletion of certain information. The first difference is to be discussed when an illustrative example is introduced in Section 5.2.2.3. The semantic shifts in the opening paragraphs of the target texts from the China Times Group and from the Liberty Times are as follows:

Table 35 Semantic shifts in the opening paragraphs in the second case study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspapers</th>
<th>Opening Paragraphs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>No. 4</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Post</td>
<td>the Kennedy Administration being challenged by Nikita Khrushchev in 1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Times</td>
<td>the Kennedy Administration being challenged by Nikita Khrushchev in 1961 as well as China's pressure on the U.S. regarding arms sales to Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberty Times</td>
<td>the Kennedy Administration being challenged by Nikita Khrushchev in 1961 as well as China's pressure on the U.S. regarding arms sales to Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No. 5</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York Times</td>
<td>the pressure the U.S. faces from China and Taiwan as regards arms sales to Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China Times</td>
<td>three principles of arms sales to Taiwan which the U.S. should adhere to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberty Times</td>
<td>three principles of arms sales to Taiwan which the U.S. should adhere to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No. 9</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York Times</td>
<td>continuous crises occurring in the triangular relationship between China, the U.S. and Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Times</td>
<td>Taiwan being unable to resist long a Chinese attack and an escalation of Chinese threats making the triangular relationship more explosive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No. 10</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York Times</td>
<td>The visit of Chinese Vice Premier Qian Qichen's offering President Bush an opportunity to set a constructive course with Beijing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Times</td>
<td>the deferral of the Aegis sale to avoid provocation as well as the establishment of stable U.S.-China relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No. 13</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York Times</td>
<td>a sensible decision on arms sales to Taiwan which the Bush administration seems to head towards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Times</td>
<td>the replacement of the Aegis with Kidd-class destroyers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Only the source thesis of No. 4 is completely kept in the target text as the opening paragraph. Most of the source theses are to do with U.S.-China relations or the China-U.S.-Taiwan triangular relationship. The target texts, in contrast, highlight in the opening paragraphs the issues more directly relevant to Taiwan, such as the opinions of the U.S., China's threat towards arms sales to Taiwan, and possible weapons to be obtained. The source editorials of No.4 and No.5 have their target texts from both the China Times Group and the Liberty Times, but this time the two target newspapers have similar semantic shifts concerning the information contained in the opening paragraphs.

The source editorials in the second case study, as in the first case study, are usually not very long, and the arguments of these editorials are logically connected. For these reasons, the target texts usually retain most of the contents of the source editorials, and only a few messages are deleted. The following table illustrates those deleted by the China Times Group and the Liberty Times:

*Table 36 Information deleted by the China Times Group and the Liberty Times in the second case study*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspapers</th>
<th>Deleted Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China Times</td>
<td>1. historical events between China and the U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. details on the Aegis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Times</td>
<td>3. historical background on the purchase of the Aegis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. information on Beijing's 'one China' principle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. information on U.S. support for Taiwan's self-determination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberty Times</td>
<td>1. historical events between China and the U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. details on the weapons to be sold</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Both the newspapers under the China Times Group and the Liberty Times delete historical backgrounds and detailed information on some specific weapons, which are not major arguments in the source editorials. The last message deleted by the China
Times Group is an argument related to Taiwan’s self-determination as regards its future political status, which, in contrast, is retained by the Liberty Times.

5.2.2.2. Example

The following is an example regarding the shifts occurring in news structures when the source editorial of No. 5 is trans-edited into Chinese as hard news by the China Times:

Figure 12 Source and target texts of No. 5 in the second case study

The headline of the source editorial indicates the topic to be discussed in the source editorial, and the thesis first explains the pressure the U.S. faces as regards
arms sales to Taiwan, and then puts forward the main contention that the decision on arms sales should follow some principles. The headline does not point out what is argued in the opening thesis. Moreover, the subsequent paragraphs introduce the principles, which have not yet been specified in the opening thesis.

In the target text, the source thesis is not retained in the opening position. Instead, a lead-like paragraph is created, which, together with the headline, summarises the three principles introduced in the 2nd to 4th paragraphs of the source editorial. The target headline and lead are closely related to each other, as they are both concerned with the necessity of U.S. defence assistance to Taiwan.

The 1st to 4th paragraphs of the source text are then trans-edited into Chinese in their initial order to either provide the background information on the three principles addressed in the target lead or elaborate on each principle.

Throughout the target text, the news source is clearly specified as 社論 (the editorial), indicating the editorial from the New York Times is the main source for this target hard news item.

5.2.2.3. Underlying Reasons

The thesis-like paragraphs in the source editorials play the role of tone-setting, emphasising the authors' positions or attitudes, whereas the opening paragraphs in the target texts act like leads and convey the most newsworthy information. The reasons behind the shifts in semantic macrostructures identified in Section 5.2.2.1. are quite similar to those explored in Section 5.2.1.4., so they are not repeated here.

5.3. Shifts in News Frames

As reviewed in Section 2.2.2.2., news frames contain three levels of semantic
structures, that is, the macro-level nuclei, macro-level satellites, and the micro-level linguistic realisations. It follows that two sub-types of news frames can be identified: major and minor news frames. The former influences both the macro- and micro-level structures, whereas the latter merely governs the micro-level structures. The shifts in major news frames can be derived from the semantic shifts in nuclei and satellites as well as from those in the micro-level aspects; the shifts in minor news frames can be inferred from the changes in the micro-level aspects only.

Section 5.3.1. discusses the shifts identified in the target texts from the China Times Group in both the first and second case studies. Following this, the differences in news frames between the China Times Group and the Liberty Times are addressed in Section 5.3.2.

5.3.1. China Times Group

5.3.1.1. Shifts in Major News Frames

The comparison of the major news frames in the source texts and target texts from the China Times Group is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspapers</th>
<th>Source Newspapers</th>
<th>Target Newspapers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For Both Case Studies</td>
<td>seeking the balance of the triangular relationship</td>
<td>China's hostility to Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only for the First Case Study</td>
<td>1. China and Taiwan as two oppositional forces, recurrently provoking each other 2. the political statements made by Presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian as unintelligible and as moving towards independence 3. President Lee Teng-hui as bold and influential</td>
<td>1. China-U.S. relations on the rocks 2. the political statements made by Presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian causing negative influences 3. President Lee Teng-hui as a trouble maker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only for the Second Case Study</td>
<td>ambiguity over the issues revolving around arms sales to Taiwan</td>
<td>buyer's expectations towards arms sales to Taiwan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In both the first and second case studies, the source texts share one major news frame, that is, the U.S.’s efforts to strike and keep the balance between its interests in China and in Taiwan. In the target texts, the news frame concerning the U.S.’s interests is not taken to construct the news events at issue. China’s hostile reactions towards Taiwan, which have been of great concern to Taiwanese people, become one of the controlling ideas in the target texts.

The source texts in the first case study also construct news stories in terms of the general opinions of the U.S. government about the war of words between China and Taiwan, the ‘independence-like’ statements made by Taiwanese presidents, and President Lee Teng-hui’s behaviour. The target texts, in contrast, centre more on tensions and conflicts. They give particular prominence to troubled relations between China and the U.S., which may be beneficial to Taiwan. Also, when describing the political statements made by Presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian or issues pertaining to President Lee Teng-hui, the target texts bestow more attention to the unfavorable aspects.

In the second case study, another way which the source news texts use to frame the news events in question is to describe issues related to arms sales in an indefinite way, that is, to avoid making absolute statements. The target texts construct the same news events in a different way so as to state those events with as much clarity as possible.

5.3.1.2. Shifts in Minor News Frames

Three minor news frames are found to be at work at the micro-level in both case studies, as shown in Table 38 below:
The source texts do not attempt to highlight explicitly the distinction between democracy and communism, whereas the target texts do so by recurrently using the term ‘the CCP’ to refer to China. Also, as discussed in Sections 4.2.2. and 4.6.2., the source news texts tend to contain more event processes and place inanimate participants in the thematic position, which results in more unengaged and impersonal accounts. By adopting more action processes and replacing the inanimate participants with animate ones, the target texts opt for more vivid and lifelike descriptions, which reinforce involved accounts. Furthermore, the source texts exhibit the lack of clarity over the following three aspects: the lexical items used to refer to President Lee Teng-hui’s political thinking, the agency as well as responsibility involved in China-Taiwan conflicts, and modal verbs or adverbs appearing in the clauses related to arms sales to Taiwan. Conversely, the target texts take away the lack of clarity over these aspects.

5.3.2. Contrast with the Liberty Times

The major and minor news frames which the target texts from the Liberty Times employ to structure the news events at issue in the target texts are mostly similar to those favoured by the target texts from the China Times Group, as shown in Table 39, except for two major news frames pertinent to President Lee Teng-hui:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source Newspapers</th>
<th>Target Newspapers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. no explicit democracy/communism distinction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. detached description</td>
<td>1. explicit democracy/communism distinction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. lack of clarity</td>
<td>2. involved description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. clearness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 39 Differences in news frames between the China Times Group and the Liberty Times

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>China Times and Commercial Times</th>
<th>Liberty Times</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. the political statements made by President Lee Teng-hui causing negative influences</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. President Lee Teng-hui as a trouble maker</td>
<td>1. the political statements made by President Lee Teng-hui reflecting the reality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. President Lee Teng-hui as courageous and influential</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The target texts from the *Liberty Times* do not accentuate the negative impacts caused by President Lee Teng-hui’s political statements. Instead, the method used in the target texts from the *Liberty Times* to construct the account on President Lee Teng-hui’s thinking more or less implies that it simply reflects the current reality of Taiwan’s sovereignty. Also, President Lee Teng-hui himself is depicted as a hero, abounding in courage and undaunted by repeated setbacks.

5.3.3. Underlying Reasons

As the shifts in news frames are derived from the shifts in the micro-level aspects and in semantic macrostructures, their underlying reasons are inevitably quite similar. These similar underlying reasons are not discussed individually in this section, but possible reasons behind each news frame employed in the target texts are briefly summarised below:
### Table 40 News frames and the underlying reasons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspapers</th>
<th>News Frames</th>
<th>Underlying Reasons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China Times</td>
<td>1. China's hostility to Taiwan</td>
<td>1. news values of consonance and conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Times</td>
<td>2. China-U.S. relations on the rocks</td>
<td>2. news value of consonance; highlighting the unfavourable aspects of China-U.S. relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberty Times</td>
<td>3. buyer's expectations towards arms sales to Taiwan</td>
<td>3. news value of unambiguity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. explicit democracy/communism distinction</td>
<td>1. democracy/communism contrast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. involved description</td>
<td>2. closeness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. clearness</td>
<td>3. simplicity; plainness; clarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China Times</td>
<td>1. the political statements made by Presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian causing negative influences</td>
<td>1. news value of consonance; highlighting the unfavourable aspects of the 'independence-like' statements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Times</td>
<td>2. President Lee Teng-hui as trouble maker</td>
<td>2. news value of consonance; highlighting the unfavourable aspects of President Lee Teng-hui</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberty Times</td>
<td>1. the political statements made by President Lee Teng-hui reflecting the reality</td>
<td>1. news value of consonance; highlighting the favourable aspects of President Lee Teng-hui's political thinking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. President Lee Teng-hui as courageous and influential</td>
<td>2. news value of consonance; highlighting the favourable aspects of President Lee Teng-hui</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 5.4. Shifts in Communicative Purposes and the Underlying Reasons

In this section, the shifts in communicative purposes are examined from three aspects: addressees, communicative functions, and semantic propositions to be communicated.

The sub-factor of addressee helps identify with whom the source and target newspapers intend to communicate. As discussed in Section 3.2.2., the addressees for the source and target texts are U.S. elite readers and Taiwanese readers, respectively. The sub-factor of activity and the shifts in schematic macrostructures assist in identifying different communicative functions conveyed by the source and target texts. The source texts contain both hard news and editorials. The primary function of the source hard news, which is presented in an orbital mode, is to inform, while that of the source editorials, which are presented in an argumentative mode, is to
argue as well as to convince the U.S. readers. With further scrutiny, it is found that the source hard news texts have a secondary function worth mentioning, that is, to argue. The source hard news texts belong to what White terms as ‘issue reports’ (2002: 391). According to White, hard news reports should be divided into two subtypes. One is ‘event story’ describing “what happened in the event of some misadventure, act of political violence, crime, economic setback and so on”. The other is ‘issue report’ which describes “the criticisms, accusations, demands, warnings, discoveries or announcements of some authorized sources” (2002: 391).

The target texts are all hard news texts. For those trans-edited from the source hard news texts, the communicative functions are the same as their source texts, namely to inform as well as to argue for or against; for those trans-edited from the source editorials, one more function, to convince, is found in the target texts, as they employ the hybrid structure of orbital and argumentative modes. Hence, three communicative functions are identified: to inform, to argue, and to convince the Taiwanese readers.

With regard to different semantic propositions communicated by the source and target texts, they can be identified by drawing on the shifts occurring in news frames and in semantic macrostructures. Since the shifts in major news frames are derived from the shifts in semantic macrostructures, only the shifts in minor news frames are taken into account when identifying the shifts in communicative purposes.

Based on the above discussions, the shifts in communicative purposes in both case studies are illustrated diagrammatically as follows:
Table 4.1 Shifts in communicative purposes in the two case studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shifts in Communicative Purposes</th>
<th>Trans-editing of the Source Hard News Items</th>
<th>Trans-editing of the Source Editorials</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ST</td>
<td>to inform the U.S. elite readers of the propositions expressed by the semantic macrostructures of the source hard news items as well as to argue for or against those propositions</td>
<td>to argue for or against the arguments put forward in the source editorials and convince the U.S. elite readers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TT</td>
<td>to inform the Taiwanese readers in a more vivid way of the propositions expressed by the semantic macrostructures of the target hard news as well as to argue for or against those propositions by means of the perspectives of the source newspapers</td>
<td>to inform the Taiwanese readers in a more vivid way of what the two source newspapers argue for or against in terms of the arguments presented in the target texts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The shifts in communicative purposes can be attributed to three possible ideological reasons. First, it is likely that the trans-editing teams, during the production process, wished to reduce the experiential distance between the Taiwanese readers and the events narrated in the target texts with a more vivid description, in the interest of maximising communicative efficiency, which in turn could contribute to the communication of the target newspaper’s political ideologies.

Second, the two target newspapers may tend to distance themselves from any provocative opinions and comments reported in the trans-edited texts in order to avoid being too provocative. Hence, the trans-editing teams reiterated in the target texts that those opinions reported in the target texts were based on the source newspapers’ perspectives.

Third, the target newspapers may attempt to implicitly convey their own political ideologies by communicating their ideological views through the voices of the source newspapers. Under the disguise of the source newspaper’s perspectives, the trans-editing teams created different semantic macrostructures in the target texts so as to implicitly convey opinions or information congruent with the target newspaper’s
political ideologies. In this way, their own ideologies may be presented as just opinions made or information provided by the two source newspapers.

5.5. Conclusion

In this chapter, the shifts in news structures, news frames, and communicative purposes in the two case studies have been identified, together with possible underlying ideological reasons behind them. Unlike the micro-level linguistic and textual aspects discussed in Chapter 4, no underlying reasons were found to be related to linguistic preference in Chinese. All the shifts identified here can provide evidence of the operation of underlying ideology-related norms in news trans-editing.

This chapter has also revealed the interrelations between the micro- and macro-level aspects as well as those among the macro-level aspects. For example, as discussed in Section 5.1.1.1., the source specification reflected in the macro-level semantic macrostructures of the target texts was found to shape and be shaped by that reflected in the micro-level thematic structures. In addition, the shifts in macro-level news frames and news structures contributed to the identification of the shifts in communicative purposes.

As in Chapter 4, the target texts from the two newspapers under the China Times Group and those from the Liberty Times displayed certain differences via-a-vis their shift patterns in the macro-level linguistic and textual aspects. This further justifies that the shifts identified are not simply random changes, but are connected to the target newspaper’s underlying ideologies.

Up to this point, the shifts at the micro- and macro-levels have been examined, and their underlying ideological reasons have also been explored. Based on these
ideological reasons, Chapter 6 will carry out a reconstruction of the ideology-related norms operating in the two case studies.
Chapter 6 – Reconstruction of the Ideology-related Norms in News Trans-editing

Section 6.1. summarises the underlying ideological reasons explored in Chapters 4 and 5. General tendencies revealed in these ideological reasons are also explained in detail. Section 6.2., building upon the general tendencies, reconstructs the ideology-related norms for the two case studies, including both the process and product norms.

6.1. Underlying Ideological Reasons

The shifts occurring in both the micro- and macro-level linguistic and textual aspects of the target texts from the China Times Group and from the Liberty Times were investigated in Chapters 4 and 5. Possible underlying ideological reasons, on which the reconstruction will be based, were also explored. Prior to the reconstruction of the norms at issue, those ideological reasons are first summarised in this section for clarity.

6.1.1. China Times Group

6.1.1.1. Micro-level Linguistic and Textual Aspects

Table 42 below summarises the non-obligatory shifts recurring in the micro-level linguistic and textual aspects, along with their underlying ideological reasons:
### Table 42 Shifts in the micro-level linguistic and textual aspects as well as the underlying ideological reasons (China Times Group)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Shifts</th>
<th>Underlying Reasons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Lexical Structure   | 1. shifts in the lexical items referring to President Lee Teng-hui's political thinking  
2. shifts in the lexical items referring to China and its people | 1. simplicity; highlighting the unfavourable aspects of President Lee Teng-hui's thinking  
2. democracy/communism contrast |
| Transitivity        | 1. shifts from event to action processes  
2. shifts from individuals to collectives | 1. plainness; closeness  
2. highlighting the unfavourable aspects of the 'independence-like' statements; clearness |
| Naming              | shifts in the lexical items used to address President Chen Shui-bian | respect to President Chen Shui-bian                                                |
| Modality (the First Case Study) | 1. shifts in the modalities of possibility and obligation appearing in the clauses pertinent to China-Taiwan relations  
2. shifts in the modality of possibility appearing in clauses concerning the 'independence-like' statements  
3. shifts in the modalities of possibility and obligation appearing in the clauses related to the unfavourable aspects of China-U.S. relations | 1. keeping distance from the sensitive Taiwan-China issue and from unnecessary criticism  
2. highlighting the unfavourable aspects of Presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian  
3. highlighting the unfavourable aspects of China-U.S. relations |
| Modality (the Second Case Study) | 1. shifts in the modality of possibility appearing in the clauses concerning the benefits of arms sales to Taiwan  
2. shifts in the modality of possibility appearing in the clauses related to the unfavourable aspects of China-U.S. relations | 1. clarity  
2. highlighting the unfavourable aspects of China-U.S. relations |
| Thematic Structure  | 1. the source specification  
2. shifts from inanimate to animate themes | 1. acknowledging the sources; news value of reference to elite groups; keeping distance from provocative opinions and comments; implicitly conveying political ideologies  
2. closeness |

Four tendencies can be identified from the underlying reasons listed above: polarisation, clearness, closeness, and keeping distance. First, most of the shifts in lexical structure, transitivity, and modality are made to highlight what van Dijk (1998) calls ‘ingroup/outgroup polarisation’, that is, ‘positive self-presentation’ and ‘negative other-presentation’. Here the in-group (us) refers to the China Times Group and its Taiwanese readers, and the outgroup (them) refers to Presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian as well as China, all of whom are believed to hold opposing political ideologies compared to the China Times Group and its assumed readers. The strategy of polarisation has the following abstract evaluative structures (quoted from van Dijk 1998: 33):
1. Emphasize our good properties/actions
2. Emphasize their bad properties/actions
3. Mitigate our bad properties/actions
4. Mitigate their good properties/actions.

It is the second evaluative structure that prevails in the micro-level shifts made to highlight the ingroup/outgroup polarisation. Concerning Presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, shifts are made in lexical structure, transitivity, and modality to accentuate the negative aspects of the actions undertaken by them and their political initiatives. Changes are also made in lexical items related to China and its people to highlight the control of communism over them, which implies a lack of freedom and democracy in the eye of the China Times Group. Besides, aspects unfavourable to China-U.S. relations are emphasised with changes made in modality.

The second tendency is concerned with clearness, which is reflected in the reasons behind the following shifts: (1) the shifts in the lexical item referring to President Lee Teng-hui’s political thinking, (2) the shifts from event to action processes, and (3) the shifts in the modality of possibility appearing in the clauses concerning arms sales to Taiwan. The shifts from event to action processes also shed light on the trend towards closeness, together with the shifts from inanimate to animate themes. The tendency towards keeping distance is manifested in the source specification and the shifts in the modalities of possibility and obligation appearing in the clauses concerning sensitive China-Taiwan relations.

Some underlying reasons illustrated in Table 42 seem not to reflect any general tendencies, including the reason of ‘more respect for President Chen Shui-bian’ and most of the reasons behind the source specification occurring in thematic structure, which include ‘acknowledging the sources’, ‘the news value of reference to elite
groups’, and ‘implicitly conveying political ideologies’. The phenomenon of paying more respect to President Chen Shui-bian only accounts for the shift occurring in lexical items used to address President Chen Shui-bian in some target texts dated after 2002. No shifts in other micro- or macro-level aspects are made for similar reasons. As for the reasons behind the source specification, they do reflect some tendencies when they are examined together with the macro-level ideological reasons, which will be discussed in the next section.

6.1.1.2. Macro-level Linguistic and Textual Aspects

The non-obligatory shifts recurring in the macro-level linguistic and textual aspects as well as their underlying reasons are reproduced in Table 43. The four main trends reflected in the micro-level reasons are also revealed in the macro-level reasons.

To begin with, the tendency towards polarisation is observed in the underlying reasons behind the shifts in news frames and in semantic macrostructures. In addition to intensifying the negative aspects of the actions or political thinking of the out-group, aspects favourable to President Lee Teng-hui and independence activists are attenuated with the deletion of the information related to their good properties. The tendency of clearness is reinforced by the reasons behind the news frame of clearness, and that of closeness is reconfirmed by the news frame of involved description and the shifts in communicative purposes. Where the tendency of keeping distance is concerned, it is manifested again in the reasons underlying the shifts in communicative purposes as well as in the source specification.
Table 43 Shifts in the macro-level linguistic and textual aspects as well as the underlying reasons (China Times Group)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shifts</th>
<th>Underlying Reasons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. shifts in schematic structures</td>
<td>1. converting the source editorials into hard news; implicitly conveying political ideologies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. shifts in semantic macro-structures</td>
<td>2. (A) acknowledging the sources; news value of reference to elite groups; keeping distance from provocative opinions and comments; implicitly conveying political ideologies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(A) the source specification</td>
<td>(B) news values of consonance, conflict, and relevance; highlighting the unfavourable aspects of the 'independence-like' statements and those of China-U.S. relations; mitigating the favourable aspects of President Lee Teng-hui and independence activists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B) the first case study:</td>
<td>(C) news values of unambiguity; consonance; conflict and relevance; highlighting China's hostility towards arms sales to Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) the semantic shifts in nuclei and satellites</td>
<td>(D) democracy/communism distinction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) the semantic shifts in opening paragraphs and the deletion of certain information</td>
<td>(C) invaded description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C) the second case study:</td>
<td>(D) explicit democracy/communism distinction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) the semantic shifts in nuclei and satellites</td>
<td>(D) simplicity; plainness; clarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) the semantic shifts in opening paragraphs and the deletion of certain information</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Three more tendencies are revealed when examining the micro- and macro-level ideological reasons together: (1) implicitly conveying political ideologies, (2) acknowledging the sources, and (3) newsworthiness. The first tendency is reflected in the underlying reasons behind the shifts in news schematic structures, the shifts in communicative purposes, and the source specification in both semantic macrostructures and thematic structures. The second type is manifested in the reasons behind the source specification at both the micro- and macro-levels.
The last type is revealed in the reasons behind the shifts in news frames and in semantic macrostructure, as these shifts are partially accounted for by the reason of fulfilling some news values, including reference to elite groups (i.e. the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*), consonance, unambiguity, conflict, and relevance. The source specification in thematic structures partially intensifies the tendency towards newsworthiness, as one of its underlying reasons is to fulfil the news value of reference to elite groups.

There remains one macro-level underlying reason which seems to stand on its own and does not reflect any tendencies, that is, 'converting the source editorials into hard news'. However, it will be clear in Section 6.1.2.2. that this reason does reflect one tendency.

6.1.2. *Liberty Times*

6.1.2.1. Micro-level Linguistic and Textual Aspects

Table 44 below summarises the recurrent non-obligatory shifts at the micro-level which occur in the target texts from the *Liberty Times*, together with their underlying ideological reasons. The four micro-level tendencies addressed in Section 6.1.1.1. are also manifested here.
Table 44: Shifts in the micro-level linguistic and textual aspects as well as the underlying ideological reasons (Liberty Times)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shifts</th>
<th>Underlying Reasons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lexical Structure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. shifts in the lexical items referring to President Lee Teng-hui's political thinking</td>
<td>1. simplicity; highlighting the favourable aspects of President Lee Teng-hui's thinking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. shifts in the lexical items referring to China and its people</td>
<td>2. democracy communism contrast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transitivity</td>
<td>plausibility; closeness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naming</td>
<td>respect to President Lee Teng-hui</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naming (the First Case Study)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. shifts in the modalities of possibility and obligation appearing in the clauses pertinent to China-Taiwan relations</td>
<td>1. keeping distance from the sensitive Taiwan-China issue and from unnecessary criticism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. shifts in the modality of possibility appearing in clauses concerning 'independence-like' statements</td>
<td>2. highlighting the favourable aspects of President Lee Teng-hui</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modality (the Second Case Study)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. shifts in the modality of possibility appearing in the clauses concerning the benefits of arms sales to Taiwan</td>
<td>1. clarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. shifts in modality of the possibility appearing in the clauses related to the unfavourable aspects of China-U.S. relations</td>
<td>2. highlighting the unfavourable aspects of China-U.S. relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thematic Structure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. the source specification</td>
<td>1. acknowledging the sources; news value of reference to elite groups; keeping distance from provocative opinions and comments; implicitly conveying political ideologies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. shifts from inanimate to animate themes</td>
<td>2. closeness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To begin with, most of the abstract evaluative structures of polarisation mentioned in Section 6.1.1.1. are reflected in the underlying reasons behind the shifts in lexical structure, naming, and modality. Here the in-group (us) refers to the Liberty Times, its Taiwanese readers, and President Lee Teng-hui, and the outgroup (them) refers to China as well as the opponents of President Lee Teng-hui and of independence.

The shifts made in lexical structure and naming are used to enhance President Lee Teng-hui’s good properties, while those made in modality minimise the negative properties of his political thinking. Concerning China, its negative properties are enhanced by adopting the term 中共 (the CCP) in the target texts, and by foregrounding aspects unfavourable to China-U.S. relations with the changes in modality.

The ways in which the underlying reasons summarised in Table 44 reflect the
tendencies towards clearness, closeness, and keeping distance are the same as those discussed in Section 6.1.1.1., so they are not repeated here.

6.1.2.2. Macro-level Linguistic and Textual Aspects

The following table briefly summarises the recurring non-obligatory shifts in the macro-level as well as possible ideological reasons behind them:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 45 Shifts in the macro-level linguistic and textual aspects as well as the underlying reasons (Liberty Times)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shifts</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>News Structures</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. shifts in schematic structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. shifts in semantic macrostructures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(A) the source specification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B) the first case study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) the semantic shifts in nuclei and satellites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) the semantic shifts in opening paragraphs and the deletion of certain information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C) the second case study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) the semantic shifts in nuclei and satellites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) the semantic shifts in opening paragraphs and the deletion of certain information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>News Frames</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. for both case studies:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(A) China's hostility to Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B) explicit democracy/communism distinction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C) involved description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(D) clearness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. for the 1st case study only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(A) China-U.S. relations on the rocks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B) the political statements made by Presidents Lee Teng-hui reflecting the reality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C) President Lee Teng-hui as courageous and influential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. for the 2nd case study only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>buyer's expectations toward arms sales</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The four micro-level tendencies discussed in Section 6.1.2.1. are also identified
here. Except for the tendency of polarisation, the ways through which the macro-level reasons reflect the tendencies of clearness, closeness, and keeping distances are quite similar to those discussed in Section 6.1.1.2, so they are not elaborated here. The tendency towards polarisation is manifested in the underlying reasons behind the shifts in news frames and in semantic macrostructures. Apart from minimising the negative aspects of President Lee Teng-hui and independence activists, the following aspects are emphasised: positive properties of President Lee Teng-hui and the 'independence-like' statements as well as the negative aspects of China-U.S. relations.

As pointed out in Section 6.1.1.2., three more tendencies can be revealed when micro- and macro-level ideological reasons are examined more closely. All these three tendencies are manifested when the micro- and macro-level reasons illustrated in Tables 44 and 45 are investigated together. The ways in which the three tendencies are reflected are the same as those mentioned in Section 6.1.1.2., and hence this section does not re-discuss them.

One more tendency, that is, the tendency of converting the source editorials into hard news, is identified when examining together the underlying reasons behind the shifts in schematic structures of both the target texts from the China Times Group and those from the *Liberty Times*.

### 6.2. Reconstruction of the Underlying Ideology-related Norms

Section 6.1. summarised the ideological reasons explored in Chapters 4 and 5, and examined the overall tendencies reflected by them. In fact, those tendencies, which are usually more general and abstract than individual reasons, are the underlying norms which this thesis attempts to reconstruct. Section 6.2.1, building
upon those tendencies, reconstructs the underlying ideology-related norms for the two case studies. Following that, the classification of the reconstructed norms is conducted in Section 6.2.2.

6.2.1. Underlying Ideology-related Norms

Based on all the tendencies discussed in Section 6.1., the underlying ideology-related norms in news trans-editing for the two case studies are reconstructed together as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 46 Underlying ideology-related norms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Micro-level</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. polarisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. clearness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. closeness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. keeping distance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. acknowledging the sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. implicitly conveying political ideologies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. newsworthiness: reference to elite groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Macro-level</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. polarisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. clearness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. closeness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. keeping distance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. acknowledging the sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. implicitly conveying political ideologies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. newsworthiness: reference to elite groups, consonance, relevance, conflict, and unambiguity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. converting the source editorials into hard news</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Except for one sub-category under the newsworthiness norm, that is, the norm of unambiguity, all the other norms illustrated in Table 46 apply to both case studies and to both the target texts from the China Times Group and those from the Liberty Times. This strengthens the reliability of the reconstructed norms. Firstly, the target texts in both case studies are located in a similar socio-political context, and the news events described in the two case studies also engage with the same triangular relationship between China, the U.S. and Taiwan. Accordingly, the ideologies the
target newspapers hold in the first case study are quite similar to those in the second case study. This means that if there are some ideology-related norms operating in both the first and second case studies, they should be quite similar.

Secondly, the ideology-related norms operating in both the China Times Group and the *Liberty Times* are also supposed to be similar to some extent due to the similar socio-political context in which they are embedded. One question may be raised here: why do the pro-reunification China Times Group and the pro-independence *Liberty Times* impose almost similar norms on their trans-editing teams? There is, in effect, no inconsistency here. Even if norms operating in different social communities are almost the same, the actual performances carried out to conform to these norms may, to some extent, differ. Take the norm of polarisation as an example. The trans-editing teams in the China Times Group and the *Liberty Times* are both governed or guided by this norm, but the strategies adopted to conform to the norm of polarisation are quite dissimilar. As discussed in Section 6.1., the target texts from the China Times Group usually emphasise negative aspects of President Lee Teng-hui and his political thinking, and mitigate the favourable aspects of him. The target texts from the *Liberty Times*, in contrast, highlight good characteristics of President Lee Teng-hui and his political initiative, but attenuate his negative characteristics or actions.

The norm of unambiguity is applicable to both the China Times Group and the *Liberty Times*, but only in the second case study. This is mainly because the U.S.’s policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’ plays a significant role in the news events featured in the source texts in the second case study but not in the first case study.

6.2.2. Classification of the Underlying Ideology-related Norms

According to the reconstruction method developed in Chapter 2, two types of
norms, that is, process and product norms, should be reconstructed in order to have a more thorough picture of underlying ideology-related norms. The norms reconstructed in Table 46 do cover both process and product norms.

Except for the norms of acknowledging the sources and converting the source editorials into hard news items, all the other micro- and macro-level norms are process norms. These process norms can be further divided into two sub-types: operational and communication norms.

Operational norms, as reviewed in Section 1.1.4.1., subsume two sub-categories, that is, matricial and text-linguistic norms. Matricial norms are primarily concerned with the macrostructure of the target texts, so the reconstructed norms in Table 46 which belong to this sub-category include the macro-level norms of polarisation, clearness, and newsworthiness. Text-linguistic norms primarily determine the micro-level linguistic realisations of the target texts, and hence the reconstructed norms which can be classified under this sub-category are the micro-level norms of polarisation, clearness, and newsworthiness (i.e. reference to elite groups). Based on all these operational norms, the initial norm of acceptability can be inferred, as all of them are used to govern and guide the trans-editing team to produce the target texts from the receiving perspective.

Communication norms are supposed to guide the trans-editing team to produce trans-edited texts which can maximise communication between the target newspapers and their assumed readers. Thus, they cover the norms of polarisation, clearness, closeness, keeping distance, implicitly conveying political ideologies, and newsworthiness. The norm of polarisation guides the news trans-editing team to invoke feelings of identification from the intended readers. The clearness norm leads the team to clear out vague and ambiguous meanings. The norm of closeness directs
the trans-editing team to produce the target texts in a more concrete and vivid way to reduce the experiential distance between the text and the reality it describes, which in turn raises the readers' interests. Concerning the norms of keeping distance and implicitly conveying political ideologies, the trans-editing team is guided by these norms to convey the target newspaper's political ideologies in an implicit and natural way. The newsworthiness norm steers the trans-editing team to create target texts which contain attention-raising news values to attract the target readers.

It can be found that some process norms fulfill dual functions, that is, they act as both operational and communication norms. This is mainly because most of the times the norms governing the design of the news text *per se* are meant to increase the efficiency of communication.

The whole picture of the ideology-related process norms can now be reconstructed as follows:

![Diagram of ideology-related process norms]

*Figure 13 Underlying Ideology-related process norms*
As mentioned above, the norms of acknowledging the sources and converting the source editorials into hard news are not process norms. Since they govern the resultant structures of trans-edited texts, they are product norms or what Chesterman (1993) refers to as expectancy norms. The product (i.e. adaptation) and process (i.e. gate-keeping) of news trans-editing, as reviewed in Section 1.2.1.1., are like the two sides of a coin. Any gate-keeping strategies or methods the news trans-editing team adopts during the news trans-editing process are primarily meant to produce the expected adaptive target texts. In this respect, the initial and operational norms reconstructed in Figure 13 can also be perceived as product norms, because they mainly govern the decision-making as to how to produce the adaptive target texts, which can appear ‘suitable’ and ‘acceptable’ to the target audience. Accordingly, the underlying ideology-related product norms for the two case studies are reconstructed below:

Figure 14 Underlying Ideology-related product norms

With both the process and product norms being reconstructed, the whole picture
of the underlying ideology-related norms for both case studies can be shown diagrammatically as below:

![Diagram of ideology-related norms](image)

*Figure 15 Underlying Ideology-related norms in U.S.-Taiwan news trans-editing*

All the sub-types of norms regarded as necessary to be reconstructed in the method developed in Chapter 2 have been reconstructed. These sub-types of norms include the initial, operational, and communication norms under the process norms as well as the expectancy norms.

Moreover, there exist mutual interactions among the norms reconstructed in Figure 15. Most of the reconstructed norms do not exert their binding or guiding
force alone, but work together with other norms. For example, the communication norm of keeping distance is related to the product norm of acknowledging the source, as the latter partially contributes to the fulfilment of the former.

It should be noted that these reconstructed norms, which are supposed to prevail in the target newspapers, can be violated. Any member of the trans-editing team or even the team as a whole may, for one reason or another, decide to challenge these norms, although the degree of influence they may have can vary. The result of such violation usually leads to a turndown or disapproval of the trans-edited news texts, but it is still possible that revolutionary ways may be introduced. When it is the target news organisation as a whole that wishes to open up and initiate new modes of news trans-editing, innovative norms usually will be introduced, which in turn may result in the invalidity of some existing norms.

6.3. Conclusion

This chapter has reconstructed the underlying ideology-related norms in news trans-editing for the two case studies conducted in Chapters 3 to 5. The underlying ideological reasons examined in Chapters 4 and 5 were briefly summarised first, and the general tendencies reflected in these reasons were also detailed. Following this, the initial, operational, communication, and expectancy norms were reconstructed based on the overall tendencies.

After the reconstruction, the reliability of the reconstructed norms was demonstrated with the fact that most of them were applicable to both case studies and to both the China Times Group and the Liberty Times on account of their similar socio-political contexts.

This chapter has also indicated that the same norms could lead to different
performances within different news organisations. The example given was that the trans-editing teams of the China Times Group and the *Liberty Times* adopted different methods to meet the norm of polarisation. Also, the reconstructed norms were found to interact and influence each other, rather than to work alone to govern and constrain the decision-making process of news trans-editing.

The reconstruction method developed in Chapter 2 was applied to two case studies through Chapter 3 to Chapter 6. In Chapter 7, the strengths and weaknesses of the reconstruction method will be evaluated.
Chapter 7 – Evaluation of the Reconstruction Method

This chapter carries out an evaluation of the reconstruction method developed in Chapter 2 based on the two case studies carried out in Chapters 3 to 6. Sections 7.1. and 7.2. address respectively the possible strengths and drawbacks of the proposed reconstruction method. Following this, the application of the method to translator training is discussed in Section 7.3.

7.1. Strengths

Four main strengths of the reconstruction method are identified, namely the avoidance of drawbacks of CL and CDA, the applicability to news trans-editing in different language-pairs, to translated texts in different genres, and to visual images.

7.1.1. Avoidance of the Major Drawbacks of CL and CDA

The reconstruction method developed in Chapter 2, especially the translation-oriented news discourse model, draws heavily from CL and CDA, which have been criticised for their textual analyses and ideological interpretations. After the application of the reconstruction method to the two case studies, it seems that the method can effectively avoid the major drawbacks of CL and CDA which have been pointed out by some scholars (Sharrock and Anderson 1981; Fish 1989; Stubbs 1994, 2002). In what follows, each major drawback is first addressed, and then followed by the ways through which the reconstruction method can avoid these drawbacks.

First of all, CL and CDA are criticised for tending to analyse only a few linguistic features, and sometimes even just a single lexical item. Assumptions of underlying
ideological motivations behind a given text cannot be convincing if just a few
linguistic features are examined (Stubbs 1994: 202, 2002: 206). Hatim and Mason
(1997: 147) and Puurtinen (2000: 148) also point out that the assumption of
underlying ideological motivations needs to be based on a discernible tendency that is
reflected by various linguistic features in a given text rather than just the recurrent
patterns of one linguistic device. The reconstruction method developed in Chapter 2
can avoid the drawback of an incomplete analysis. This method contains a
translation-oriented news discourse model at the pre-comparison stage, which assists
in identifying a range of interconnected linguistic and textual aspects, at both the
micro- and macro-levels. Based on these linguistic and textual aspects, the textual
analyses of the source and target texts are carried out. The analysis of the identified
linguistic and textual aspects covers all three functions of language (i.e. ideational,
interpersonal, and textual).

Second, Stubbs draws attention to the circularity of argument inherent in many
CL and CDA studies. He argues that “a basic aim of critical linguistics is to determine
what is revealed or concealed in a text, but that much of the work is circular,
because analysts ‘know perfectly well at the outset’ just what political position
they are going to find” (2002: 208). As mentioned in Section 1.2.2.2., this thesis
seeks to avoid this circularity as much as possible, by examining ideological reasons
with the help of ideology-related contextual factors as well as with the readily
identifiable ideologies of the news organisation. In this way, researchers are not
completely aware of all ideologies relevant to a given news text before analysing
textual data, and the problem of circularity can be partially avoided. From the two
case studies conducted in this thesis, it is obvious that even if some ideologies are
not known at the beginning, it is still possible to reconstruct norms resulting
from them using the information derived from ideology-related contextual factors.

Third, scholars of CL and CDA are also criticised for positing determinism between ideology and actual linguistic expressions, and making ideological assumptions which appear too powerful (Stubbs 2002: 205-206; Sharrock and Anderson 1981: 289). Scholars of CL and CDA indicate that there exist textual traces of underlying ideologies, and propose a range of ideologically significant linguistic and textual aspects where those traces can be found. Simultaneously, they also argue that "ideology cannot be read off texts in a mechanical way, since there is no one-to-one correspondence between forms and functions" (Stubbs 2002: 205). However, once they locate some textual traces, they tend to interpret those traces only in ideological terms at the expense of other possible interpretations. As indicated by Simpson (1993: 115) and Hatim (2001: 125), the use of certain linguistic devices may yield several interpretations, and ideological motivations may be one of them but not a full interpretation.

The reconstruction method is able to avoid the pitfall of determinism, because it does take into account non-ideological reasons behind the identified shifts. Although the contextual factors covered by the method are all related to the news organisation’s ideologies, it does not mean that all the underlying reasons to be explored are entirely ideological in nature. Take as an example the shifts in passivisation and nominalisation discussed in Section 4.3. Although it is possible to account for those shifts in ideological terms, the non-ideological reason of linguistic preference certainly appears to override any ideological reasons. Hence, ideological reasons are not considered, as their reliability cannot be assured.

It is clear that the reconstruction method rectifies some of the major drawbacks of CL and CDA in respect of inadequate textual analyses, circularity, and the pitfall of
determinism. Aside from the avoidance of these drawbacks, the reconstruction method is also quite flexible and can be adjusted to other needs, as will be discussed in Sections 7.1.2. to 7.1.4. below.

7.1.2. Applicability to Different Language Pairs

The reconstruction method does not limit itself to the English-Chinese language pair. It can also be applied to the reconstruction of ideology-related norms in news trans-editing in different language pairs. None of the linguistic and textual aspects identified with the translation-oriented news discourse model are specific to English and Chinese only, as shown in Table 47 below:

| Table 47 Macro- and micro-level linguistic and textual aspects |
|----------------------------------|------------------|---------------------|
|                                  | Ideational       | Interpersonal       | Textual                                      |
| Macro-level                      | news frames      | communicative       | news structures                              |
|                                  |                  | purposes            | (schematic structure, semantic macrostructure, and quotation) |
| Micro-level                      | lexical structure| transitivity        | cohesion                                      |
|                                  | naming           | transformations      | thematic structure                            |
|                                  | modality         |                     |                                              |

The three language functions are the overarching semantic functions which many languages are assumed to have, so they are applicable to news texts in other languages. All the linguistic and textual aspects at both the micro- and macro-levels which are used to realise the three semantic functions also exist in other languages. Some of the linguistic and textual aspects involve obligatory cross-linguistic differences, whereas the others do not. The macro-level aspects of news frames and communicative purposes are semantic and pragmatic in nature, respectively. They are more abstract, compared to the other aspects, and they do not involve direct surface
linguistic realisations. Thus, there are no obligatorily cross-linguistic differences existing in relation to news frames and communicative purposes. All the other linguistic and textual aspects, especially transitivity, transformations, modality, and thematic structure, are much more likely to exhibit obligatory cross-linguistic differences, since they do involve surface linguistic realisations.

Whatever languages are involved in news trans-editing, it is necessary to identify obligatory linguistic differences when ideology-related norms are to be reconstructed. As discussed in Section 1.2.2.2., the shifts which occur obligatorily due to cross-linguistic differences cannot be perceived as evidence of the operation of underlying ideology-related norms. Identifying cross-linguistic differences in relation to the micro-level linguistic and textual aspects is not too difficult. Apart from English and Chinese, the systemic-functional approach has been adopted to analyse the grammars of several languages, including French, German, Pitjantjatjara, Tagalog, Telugu, Vietnamese, and Japanese (see Caffarel, Martin and Matthiessen 2004). Also, some research has been done on comparisons of English source texts and their targets texts in such languages as Spanish, German, French, and Swedish with regard to transitivity and thematic structure (see Munday 2000, 2002; Teich 2001; Matthiessen 2001).

7.1.3. Applicability to Translated Texts in Other Genres

It is also feasible to apply the reconstruction method to translated texts in different genres, as the three semantic functions encompassed by the translation-oriented news discourse model are simply ‘umbrella’ labels, and each of them can subsume a range of linguistic and textual aspects. The linguistic and textual aspects listed in Table 47 do not exhaust all options. They are chosen as the
relevant linguistic and textual aspects for comparison in this research on account of their relevance to the illumination of the operation of ideology-related norms in news trans-editing, especially of hard news articles and editorials. That is to say, the translation-oriented news discourse model can also help to identify ideologically significant linguistic and textual aspects for texts in other genres. Here news features and political discourse are taken as examples to elaborate the applicability to translated texts in other genres.

In addition to hard news items and editorials, news features also play a vital role in newspapers. As indicated by Iedema, Feez and White (1994: 166), news features offer in-depth analyses, background information, and detailed explanations of what happened in a given situation. Compared to the bare facts of hard news, news features allow journalists to do research on an issue, elaborate on it, and to fill in the details, so that readers can have a greater understanding. News features do contain elements of news, but their main purposes are more to educate, to humanise, and to entertain (see Itule and Anderson 2000). Hence, news features tend to use many evaluative adverbs and adjectives, and are fraught with subjective opinions and comments (Iedema, Feez and White 1994: 171-174). Based on these characteristics of news features, it is obvious that the reconstruction method can also be applied to them, because news features not only contain the main elements of news items but also involve more ideologically significant expressions.

Political discourse is another possible genre to which the reconstruction method can be applied. Political discourse, according to van Dijk, is a class of genres including “government deliberation, parliamentary debates, party programs and speeches by politicians” (2002: 19). It is eminently ideological, due to the encounter
of powers, interests, and struggles from distinct and opposed groups of people (van Dijk 2004).

To more thoroughly reconstruct ideology-related norms in the translations of news features or political discourses, one more micro-level linguistic aspect may need to be incorporated into the translation-oriented news discourse model. This is the appraisal system under the interpersonal function. Martin (2000: 145) defines this system as linguistic resources adopted to convey and negotiate emotions, judgments, and evaluations. More succinctly, appraisal is the indication of whether the speaker thinks that something is 'good' or 'bad'. The appraisal system can be further divided into three sub-systems: attitudes, graduation, and engagement (Lipson 2004: 86). Attitudes refer to the assessment, either positive or negative, which speakers make as regards things, people, or places. Graduation is a range of resources for intensifying or lessening feelings and attitudes, and engagement is concerned with the speaker's involvement in their utterances. The appraisal system is developed within the framework of systemic-functional linguistics, so it can fit in with the translation-oriented news discourse model.

7.1.4. Applicability to Visual Images

Iedema, Feez and White (1994: 262) maintain that visual images, such as photos, graphics, maps, and layouts work closely with news texts not only to illustrate but also to amplify, to extend, or to change the meanings expressed in the associated news texts. Visuals are not as neutral as one usually assumes. Therefore, meanings conveyed by a given news item cannot be fully and comprehensively accounted for

without taking visual images (if used) into consideration.

Although the reconstruction method only focuses on the investigation of norms for trans-edited texts without touching upon visual images, it does not exclude its applicability to the examination of visual norms. The semiotic codes of images also realise Halliday’s three functions but in different ways from the language system (Iedema, Feez and White 1994: 258-261; Kress and van Leeuwen 1996: 40-41). By incorporating into the translation-oriented news discourse model the visual aspects illustrated in Table 48 below, the reconstruction method can not only reconstruct ideology-related norms pertaining to the trans-edited texts per se but also ideology-related visual norms:20

\[\text{Table 48 Visual aspects under the three functions}\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideational</th>
<th>Interpersonal</th>
<th>Textual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>portraits, snapshots</td>
<td>mood, angles, shot types, visual modality</td>
<td>information value, salience, framing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ideational function is concerned with the contents of images, and it can be realised by portraits or snapshots. Portraits convey a static view of people or the world around us, whereas snapshots present a dynamic view of reality. Actions in snapshots are mainly represented by the vectors or axes, which are created, for example, by someone’s glances or by the shapes of some objects (Iedema, Feez and White 1994: 260). Like transitivity, these two types of images also reflect objectivity (portraits) or involvement (snapshots).

The interpersonal function for images refers to the relationship between the

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20 For elaboration on the ways in which visual images realise the three functions, please refer to Kress and van Leeuwen (1996, 1998), and Iedema, Feez and White (1994: 257-279).
viewers and the participants involved in a given visual image. Four visual aspects are important in realising this relationship: mood, angles, shot types, and modality (see Iedema, Feez and White 1994: 258).

Mood deals with the eye-contact of the participants in a visual image with the viewers. With eye-contact, a visual image is intended to be interpreted as a demand, and viewers' involvement is invited. Without eye-contact, an image is supposed to act as an offer, and the viewers simply observe the participants impersonally.

A visual image can be filmed from diverse angles, such as from below or from above, and from the front or the back. Different angles result in different perspectives. For example, a frontal shot creates maximum involvement, and a high shot taken from above suggests the superiority of the viewers.

Various photography shot types also imply differing degrees of involvement. The close-up shot signifies a higher degree of involvement, because an individual's personality can be seen more clearly by the viewers. In contrast, when the participants in visuals are far away, their individuality gets blurred, and in turn they become simply strangers to the viewers.

The truth value of images is determined by the modality reflected in visuals. Images can appear more or less real or more or less reliable through various compositions of elements such as colour, focus, and speed.

The textual function of visuals refers to the way through which the visual elements under the ideational and interpersonal functions are made to connect to each other (Kress and van Leeuwen 1996: 181). Fundamental aspects here are informational value, salience, and framing.

The information value of the elements covered in a visual image depends on their relative position to each other, namely right/left, top/bottom, and centre/margin
areas of an image. Given and new information in English, for example, progress structurally from left to right. The horizontal arrangement in an image also reveals the same information value, with left embodying given and right new (Iedema, Feez and White 1994: 260; Kress and van Leeuwen 1998: 189-200).

Salience is related to the degree to which participants featured in an image draw the attention from the viewers. It can be realised through various ways, including colour, relative size, foregrounding, and focus (Kress and van Leeuwen 1998: 200-202).

Where the framing of an image is concerned, different elements of an image can be connected or disconnected by means of frame-lines or white space to convey interconnectedness or separatedness (see Kress and van Leeuwen 1998: 203).

The three semantic functions realised by the language system are also performed by the visual system, albeit in a different way. This means that all the visual aspects illustrated in Table 48 fit in well with the translation-oriented news discourse model.

7.2. Weaknesses

The reconstruction method in question does, however, contain some weaknesses. First, it can only be applied to investigate norms of news trans-editing with identifiable source news texts. As mentioned in the Introduction, three main types of news trans-editing in the press can be identified. For one type, no information is given in the target texts as to which news organisations or wire services the source texts are taken from. In this case, it is impossible to locate the source news texts. Without the source texts being available, the comparison tasks cannot be undertaken, and the shifts made in the target texts are unidentifiable.

Second, the reconstruction method cannot distinguish who is responsible for the
shifts: the trans-editors, editors, or senior staff. As mentioned in Section 1.2.3.1., news trans-editing tasks are not carried out by news trans-editors alone; other editors or senior staff also get involved in the tasks but at different stages. Accordingly, during the process of news trans-editing, shifts may be made by trans-editors when trans-editing the source texts, by editors when revising the trans-edited texts, or by senior staff when doing the final checking and proofreading. The reconstruction method is designed to make a detailed analysis of final trans-edited products rather than of drafts produced at different stages of the trans-editing process. The shifts identified with the reconstruction method can be made by any party involved in the trans-editing task, but it is impossible to tell who made which shifts. Therefore, norms reconstructed in terms of the underlying reasons behind the identified shifts are those governing the trans-editing team as a whole, rather than governing trans-editors alone.

If the comparison of drafts made at different stages of the news trans-editing process is incorporated into the reconstruction method, it may be possible to distinguish who is responsible for the shifts. In this way, process norms operating during the trans-editing process can be reconstructed more accurately and reliably. However, getting access to drafts produced during the trans-editing process can be difficult, since obviously only the finished trans-edited products are published. Even for trans-editors themselves, it may not be easy to get hold of all the drafts produced.

Third, if none of the ideologies held by the target news organisation are known prior to the comparison of the linguistic and textual aspects, problems may be encountered in the reconstruction of ideology-related norms. The ideologies held by the target news organisation are assumed to give rise to underlying norms, which in turn cause shifts at both the micro- and macro-levels of the target texts. After the relevant ideologies of the target news organisation are specified, the source and target
texts are compared against each other to decipher significant shifts. With both the ideologies and the shifts known, possible ideological reasons behind the shifts can be identified. Then based on those ideological reasons, underlying ideology-related norms are reconstructed. Accordingly, if none of the ideologies held by the target news organisation are available, it is not easy to explore underlying ideological reasons behind the shifts.

As discussed in Section 1.2.3.2., the immediate context as well as socio-cultural or socio-political attitudes and values can assist in investigating ideological reasons. However, their main functions are to help identify what readily identifiable ideologies of the target news organisation are relevant to a given news text, and to complement those relevant ideologies in exploring ideological reasons in case there are any unnoticed, hidden ideologies. It follows that readily identifiable ideologies of the target news organisation are the most significant in the examination of underlying ideological reasons.

Fourth, the comparison stage of the reconstruction method may prove quite time-consuming, especially the comparison of the source and target texts for recurrent non-obligatory shifts. As can be seen from the two case studies discussed in Chapters 3 to 6, the comparisons of the source and target texts are done manually. If the amount of data to be compared is very large, carrying out comparisons manually is inevitably time-consuming, particularly when the source and target texts are to be compared and contrasted in terms of all linguistic and textual aspects identified with the translation-oriented news discourse model. One possible solution to this time-consuming problem is to use tools from corpus linguistics to aid the comparison
of micro-level linguistic and textual aspects to identify the shifts.\textsuperscript{21} As pointed out by Munday (2002: 80):

The tools provide two very important advantages: they can reveal phenomena which, because they may be spread over a lengthy text, might escape the attention of a researcher conducting manual analysis; and the analytical process is speeded up and far more reliable.

The micro-level shifts identified with the aid of computerised corpus studies may contain both obligatory and non-obligatory shifts, and need to be examined again to filter out obligatory shifts. Concerning the comparison of the macro-level linguistic and textual aspects, it still needs to be done manually, as corpus studies are yet unable to tackle macro-level semantic and pragmatic analyses.

7.3. Practical Applications

Given a different emphasis, the reconstruction method can be applied to translator training. Section 7.3.1. discusses how to apply the reconstructed norms to translator training. Section 7.3.2. details the use of the translation-oriented news discourse model as a training model for news translation or trans-editing.

7.3.1. Practical Applications of the Reconstructed Norms

After having reconstructed ideology-related norms with the method proposed in this thesis, translator trainers can apply the norms to translator training as regards news trans-editing. They can familiarise trainee translators with relevant underlying norms at work within a given target news organisation in relation to certain news

\textsuperscript{21} For the application of corpus linguistics to the study of shifts occurring in the micro-level linguistic aspects under the three language functions, see Munday (2002).
Explicit norms do more than informing trainees of constraints under which they may be required to work. They can be seen as a help. Translator trainees, by bearing relevant norms in mind, can know better what strategies to adopt when trans-editing news texts with similar events. They do not need to go over every possible strategy before making the final decision, which in turn can facilitate the decision-making process and meet the requirement of speed and timeliness in news production.

As put by Toury, “the findings of a descriptive study can be put to deliberate use. One objective of using such findings may well be to model one’s future strategies on actual translation behaviour” (1995: 102). Besides making explicit underlying norms, translator trainers can go further to suggest appropriate strategies to assist trainees in meeting similar norms in subsequent trans-editing tasks. Translator trainers can also design exercises on the conscious use of appropriate strategies to enable trainees to gradually resort to those strategies at will.

Translator trainers may need to make trainees aware that norms are not unbreakable. There are some instances when translators may need to make judgments concerning adhering to norms or deviating from them. For example, when norms become a hindrance, it may be better for translators to ignore them so as not to complicate the trans-editing tasks.

7.3.2. A Training Model for News Translation or Trans-editing

The translation-oriented news discourse model in particular may carry a practical value, being used as a training model for news translation or trans-editing in the press. Translator trainers can first employ this model as a bottom-up approach to teach translator trainees how to gain a better understanding of the ideological stances
imprinted in the source texts as well as the relationship between the ideologies and
the text design, and then use the model again as a top-down approach to teach them
how to produce suitable and acceptable target news texts. This two-way approach is
illustrated diagrammatically in Figure 16:

Before this two-way approach can be applied to the teaching of news
trans-editing, trainees will be required to have a basic understanding of the
systemic-functional approach to text analysis, especially such concepts as the
immediate context (i.e. context of situation), the three language functions, and the
linguistic realisations of these three functions, including transitivity, mood, modality,
and thematic structure.

When trainees have acquired the basic ideas of systemic functional linguistics,
trainers will then use the two-way approach to teach news trans-editing or news
translation. First, trainee translators will be taught to locate the source text in its
immediate context in terms of field, tenor, and mode as well as to identify
socio-cultural or socio-political values and attitudes relevant to the immediate context.
With the help of this contextual information, relevant ideologies held by the source
news organisation under the immediate context will be identified.

At the next stage, trainee translators will be instructed to adopt a bottom-up approach to analyse how the source news organisation’s ideologies shape the text design of the source text at the micro- and macro-levels. The micro-level linguistic aspects will be analysed first to examine how the ideologies influence surface linguistic realisations, followed by the analysis of macro-level linguistic aspects. The reason why the micro-level analysis is conducted first is that the micro-level analysis, to some extent, contributes to the macro-level analysis. With this bottom-up approach, trainees will not only better understand how the ideologies shape and influence the text design of the source text, but also will have a clearer picture of the ideologies themselves.

After analysing the relations between ideologies and the text structure of the source text, trainees will be trained to employ the top-down approach to produce the target text. They will learn two different ways to produce the target text: source-oriented or target-oriented. The target news text is more source-oriented when the following two instances occur: (1) the target and source news organisations hold similar ideologies, or (2) the target and source news organisation have different ideologies, but the target news organisation hopes to open up its ideologies, as well as to challenge the prevailing target socio-cultural values and beliefs. The resultant news text tends to be target-oriented when the ideologies held by the target and source news organisations are distinct from each other, and the target news organisation intends to convey its own ideologies.

In either situation, trainees will be instructed how to appropriately set up the immediate context of the target text according to the ideological stance which the target news organisation wishes to inscribe in the target news text. Following this,
they will be informed how to design the macro-level and then the micro-level of the
target text on the basis of the immediate context, in order to produce suitable and
acceptable target texts.

7.4. Conclusion

In this chapter, possible strengths of the proposed reconstruction method have
been addressed. Apart from avoidance of the major pitfalls of CL and CDA, the
reconstruction method was proven to be replicable and flexible. It could be used to
explore norms in news trans-editing in diverse language pairs and in different genres,
and it could even encompass the investigation of visual norms.

The method was also found to contain some weaknesses: (1) the applicability
being limited to news trans-editing with traceable sources, (2) the impossibility of
making sure of the responsible parties for the shifts, (3) readily identifiable
ideologies of the news organisation as a necessary prerequisite, and (4) the potential
problem of the process being time-consuming.

Possible practical applications of the reconstruction method to translator
training have also been pinpointed. Some suggestions were made as to how to make
conscious use of the reconstructed norms in teaching news trans-editing. The
translation-oriented news discourse model in particular was found to have a practical
value, offering a systemic method for translator trainees to better comprehend the
source news text and then produce the suitable target text.

Given its strong points and possible practical applications, the reconstruction
method developed in this thesis is indeed flexible, useful, and practical.
Conclusions

Summary

In this thesis, a method has been developed for the reconstruction of ideology-related norms in news trans-editing with DTS as the fundamental theoretical framework. The ideologies of the news organisations explored in this thesis included (1) socio-cultural or socio-political ideologies towards the news event in question, (2) ideological assumptions about the audience's needs, interests, and backgrounds, and (3) ideological presumptions regarding the acceptability of trans-edited news texts.

Literature pertaining to the method's development was reviewed in Chapter 1, which included relevant concepts of norms and relations between norms and systems within DTS, as well as insights from existing research into news trans-editing in the disciplines of translation studies and journalism. The literature review shed light on two major components of the reconstruction of ideology-related norms in news trans-editing: the recurrent non-obligatory shifts occurring in ideologically significant linguistic and textual aspects at both the micro- and macro-levels, and readily identifiable ideologies of the target and source news organisations as well as ideology-related contextual factors.

Building upon these two components, Chapter 2 developed a reconstruction method by adapting the methodology proposed by Toury (1995). Three stages were established for the reconstruction method: pre-comparison, comparison, and reconstruction of norms. A translation-oriented news discourse model was also formulated as a complement to the pre-comparison stage, with a view to assisting with the identification of relevant ideology-related sub-factors under the immediate
context, and ideologically significant linguistic and textual aspects at both the micro- and macro-levels. An eclectic approach was adopted to construct the translation-oriented news discourse model, with insights drawn from research within translation studies, CL and CDA, and journalism.

The feasibility of the proposed reconstruction method was tested by applying it to two empirical case studies, focusing on investigating ideology-related norms in English-Chinese news trans-editing.

The first part of Chapter 3 introduced the news data collected, together with the historical backgrounds of China-Taiwan conflicts and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. The second half applied the proposed reconstruction method to the two case studies, with emphasis on (1) the identification of relevant sub-factors of the immediate context, and ideologically significant linguistic and textual aspects, and (2) the comparative studies of the three types of contextual factors, that is, the comparison of the sub-factors under the immediate context, that of U.S. and Taiwan policies, and that of the relevant identifiable political ideologies held by the source and target newspapers.

After specifying the source and target contextual factors, the source and target texts were compared in Chapters 4 and 5 in terms of the ideologically significant linguistic and textual aspects at the micro- and macro-levels, respectively. Significant non-obligatory shifts were identified for each aspect. The non-random nature of the identified shifts was verified by the following two phenomena: first, most of the identified shifts occurred in both the first and second case studies, as the two case studies had much in common as regards their contextual factors; second, the target texts from the two newspapers under the China Times Group and those from the Liberty Times revealed both similarities and differences. Although they were located
in the same target socio-political context, they were under different ideological influences. The underlying ideological reasons behind the identified shifts were explored with the assistance of the comparative studies of contextual factors made in Chapter 3.

Based on the ideological reasons explored in Chapters 4 and 5, a reconstruction of ideology-related norms was carried out in Chapter 6. The underlying ideological reasons were first summarised, together with the discussion of the overall tendencies reflected by them. Following this, the initial, operational, communication, and expectancy norms were reconstructed.

Chapter 7 evaluated strengths and weaknesses of the proposed reconstructed method. Four strengths of the method were identified: avoidance of the drawbacks of CL and CDA, the applicability to different language-pairs, to translated texts in different genres, and to visual images. The reconstruction method in question was also found to contain some drawbacks: the applicability to news trans-editing was only valid where there existed identifiable source news texts; it was impossible to distinguish responsible parties for the shifts; readily identifiable ideologies held by the news organisation formed a necessary prerequisite; and finally, there was the potential problem of reconstruction being time-consuming. Possible practical applications of the reconstruction method to translator training were also proposed.

Findings

Three significant findings emerge from the development of the reconstruction method and its application to two empirical studies. Firstly, the study of news trans-editing does fit well into the scope of translation studies. The literature review in Chapter 1 indicated that DTS, with its emphasis on examining the socio-cultural
phenomenon of translation activities, could provide a suitable theoretical framework for investigating the activity of news trans-editing, which is indeed a social practice taking place in a complicated socio-cultural context. Additionally, the basic concepts of norms within DTS were found to be viable to account for the notion of norms in news trans-editing. Moreover, in Chapter 2, where the development of the reconstruction method was conducted, Toury's methodology for descriptive translation studies provided a solid basis for the stages of the reconstruction method. Discourse-based as well as functionalist approaches to translation studies also offered useful and significant insights for the formulation of the translation-oriented news discourse model in particular. To put it in another way, studies of news trans-editing can be carried out effectively by adopting some approaches within translation studies.

Secondly, the significant role played by the target news organisation's ideologies in the production process is revealed by the ideology-related norms reconstructed in Chapter 6. It is obvious that the ideological effects are quite extensive, as the influences of the target newspaper's ideologies can prevail in both the process and product of news trans-editing, and at both the micro- and macro-levels. Besides, during the process of reconstructing the norms at issue, this thesis also uncovered the interrelations between the target newspapers' ideologies and other contextual factors, such as the government's foreign policies, the journalistic conventions of space limitations and newsworthiness, and the immediate context of the target texts.

Thirdly, the objectives of this thesis as set out in the Introduction, have been achieved. The proposed reconstruction method definitely offers translator trainers and researchers a useful and flexible tool to study norms in news trans-editing, especially ideology-related norms. As discussed in Chapter 7, the method was
proven to be applicable to diverse language pairs, to different news genres, and to visual norms. How to apply the reconstructed norms to translator training was also introduced. Apart from applying the reconstruction method developed in this thesis, trainers and researchers themselves can extend the method to encompass other contextual factors. The section on further issues below will dwell on the expansion of the current reconstruction method.

In addition, the research focusing on ideology-related norms in news trans-editing does offer a more thorough understanding of news trans-editing. For one thing, the development of the reconstruction method has made clear the multi-faceted aspect of news trans-editing, because the method was built up with an eclectic approach, drawing insights from research done within translation studies, studies on news trans-editing, the approaches of CL and CDA to news discourse, and studies on news from the perspective of journalism.

For another, the reconstruction of the ideology-related norms in news trans-editing has illuminated the interconnectedness between the aspects of contextual factors, trans-editing strategies, and the gate-keeping function, which has not been clearly addressed in previous studies. The interconnectedness reflected in this thesis is as follow. The target news organisation’s ideologies give rise to a range of ideology-related norms, which in turn can constrain and guide the trans-editing team to select appropriate trans-editing strategies. With the chosen strategies, the news trans-editing team performs the gate-keeping function to filter out the information incompatible with the ideologies embedded in the target news organisation, and produce ‘proper’ and ‘acceptable’ trans-edited news texts to meet the target readers’ needs.
Further Issues

Two types of further issues can be proposed: those related to the reconstruction method per se and those pertaining to the two case studies.

Where the further issues pertinent to the reconstruction method are concerned, three trends of future research can be suggested. First of all, more case studies, both in different language pairs and in different news genres can be conducted either to reconfirm the feasibility of the proposed reconstruction method, or to come up with some suggestions for its refinement.

Moreover, the reconstruction method can be applied to investigate visual norms, so the expansion of the method to incorporate the reconstruction of visual norms can be made. The decision on selecting news photos to go with a given trans-edited text is an integral part of the news trans-editing process, which can be seen from the flowchart of news trans-editing illustrated in Figure 3. Such an expansion of the method will be able to explain how ideology-related norms in news trans-editing in the press can be examined more comprehensively by taking into account both textual and visual norms.

Furthermore, the reconstruction method is particularly designed for investigating ideology-related norms. However, as discussed in the Introduction, there is a range of contextual factors constraining and governing the decision-making of the trans-editing team, and the news organisation’s ideologies represent only one. The proposed reconstruction method thus can be used as a starting point to develop a large-scale method by taking into account such contextual factors as the news organisation’s economic considerations, conventions of news production, and socio-cultural specificity. Such a large-scale reconstruction, which may consist of several sub-methods, not only can investigate ideology-related norms but also can
examine norms arising due to non-ideological contextual factors. In this way, norms in news trans-editing can be more comprehensively reconstructed.

Concerning the two case studies, more research can be carried out in terms of the following aspects: (1) the comparison of the source and target texts in terms of cohesion and quotation, (2) the examination of visual norms, (3) the investigation of norms governing source selection, and (4) diachronic changes of norms.

The comparative studies of the source and target texts in relation to cohesion and quotation were not carried out in this thesis, so further research focusing on these two linguistic and textual aspects can be pursued. It is expected that the validity of the ideology-related norms reconstructed here will be re-confirmed by the shifts made in these two aspects. Also, the shifts occurring in these two aspects may shed light on some norms which have not been uncovered.

Second, the printed versions of the source and target texts of the two case studies can be collected to investigate norms governing the use of corresponding news photos. The examination of the visual norms may be able to further justify the reliability of the norms reconstructed in this thesis.

Third, as mentioned in Section 1.2.1.2., the selection of source news texts to trans-edit is a significant stage of the news trans-editing process. It follows that norms governing this selection stage would be worth investigating. Since the proposed reconstruction method is particularly suited to the reconstruction of norms operating after the source texts are chosen, norms governing the selection have not been investigated. Further studies can be undertaken concerning this aspect through a survey of other source news texts which were not selected by the target newspapers as well as through interviews with the persons in charge of the selection in the target newspapers. A clearer picture of the ideology-related norms operating in the news
trans-editing process as a whole can be illuminated with the combination of the selection norms and those norms reconstructed in this thesis.

Fourth, more recent data concerning the news events of the China-Taiwan conflict and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan can be analysed in order to examine possible changes in norms. In Chapter 4, two clues on possible changes of norms were revealed. The term 中共 (the CCP), which was frequently found to appear in the target texts dated before 2002 to replace such English terms as ‘China’, ‘Beijing’, and ‘the Chinese’ became less frequent in the target texts produced after 2002. Besides, the English term ‘Mr. Chen’ was found to be consistently replaced by 陳水扁 (Chen Shui-bian) in the target texts dated before late 2002, but by 陳水扁總統 (President Chen Shui-bian) or 陳總統 (President Chen) in those produced after late 2002. These two phenomena shed light on the possibility of changes in some of the ideology-related norms reconstructed in this thesis. More recent data would have to be analysed in order to adequately justify the changes in norms.
Appendix 1

Full Texts for the First Case Study

No. 1

1. Source Text:
Taiwan Tensions
Washington Post, Editorial, 04/08/99

In just the past few days, China has illegally seized a Taiwanese ship, sent jet fighters provocatively across the Taiwan Strait, repeatedly hurled threats at Taiwan and its elected president and test-fired a new ballistic missile built in part with stolen U.S. technology. It also has cracked down on a peaceful spiritual sect, rounding up hundreds of members for some old-fashioned Communist "re-education," and has (just on Monday) sentenced two pro-democracy activists to terms of eight and nine years in prison on charges of "subverting state power."

The Clinton administration response to all this has been, for the most part, to chide Taiwan and make soothing noises toward China. In part, this may reflect the administration's dismay that Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui reformulated his country's policy toward China without winning Washington's advance approval. The administration's unhappiness is understandable -- but so, unfortunately, is Mr. Lee's behavior. It was President Clinton, after all, who chose China as the venue for endorsing a new and, from Taiwan's perspective, disadvantageous U.S. policy toward Taiwan. That, along with Mr. Clinton's Beijing-centered policy overall, hasn't fostered trusting relations between the United States and Taiwan.

But the administration isn't just responding out of pique; it believes an accommodating attitude toward Beijing is the best way to maintain peace in a dangerous part of the world. Mr. Clinton wants to develop a "strategic constructive partnership" with China's regime, and to do so he treats friendly democracies in the region -- Taiwan, South Korea, even Japan -- as if they were of secondary importance.

That's why Mr. Clinton accepts China's fiction that Taiwan is not a separate state. That's why he accepts as legitimate China's parallel views of Taiwan and Hong Kong, even though Hong Kong -- now incorporated into China -- was a colony and never a free entity.

The Chinese "have made clear a sensitivity to the different system that exists on Taiwan, and a willingness to find ways to accommodate it, as they did in working with Hong Kong, and perhaps, even going beyond that," Mr. Clinton said recently. But the people of Hong Kong were
given no say before being turned over by Britain to the mercies of China's dictators. Such an outcome would be acceptable for Taiwan only with the explicit consent of the Taiwanese people -- and Mr. Clinton should say so.

Instead, the United States maintains a policy of "strategic ambiguity," warning China against the use of force without explicitly promising to defend Taiwan against Chinese attack. This murkiness is designed to discourage Taiwan from recklessly declaring independence. The danger, though, is that China, rather than Taiwan, will misjudge U.S. steadfastness. In the long run, there will be more chance of deterring war, securing peace and even fostering good relations with China if the United States opts for clarity, not ambiguity, in showing support for its true friends in the region.
2. Target Text 1:
華盛頓郵報批柯林頓偏袒中共
工商時報，05/08/99

華盛頓郵報今天發表社論抨擊柯林頓政府的中國政策「偏向北京」。社論警告說，柯
林頓的「一個中國」政策可能促使中共誤解；而要防止戰爭，確保和平，美國應摒棄
「戰略模糊」政策，明確支持友邦台灣。

此外，社論也批評柯林頓最近在記者會上暗示台灣可考慮香港「一國兩制」模式
的談話。柯林頓在記者會上應當強調說，這樣的模式應獲得台灣人民的點頭才可能被
接受。

華盛頓郵報社論指出，中共近日扣押一艘台灣船隻，並出動戰機在台海上空挑釁，
一再恫嚇台灣和台灣的民選總統，並測試一枚可能來自美國核武科技的彈道飛彈，此
外，又在本土鎮壓法輪功，將兩名「中國民主黨」領導成員判刑。

柯林頓政府對近期台海舉動的反應，大體是責備台灣及安撫中共，其中可能緣於
台灣在未獲華府了解前計劃改變現行的對大陸政策，促使華府感到震驚。

社論說，柯林頓政府的不悅是可理解，「但不幸的是，李（登輝）先生的行為也
一樣可以理解」，畢竟，柯林頓選在中國大陸為「三不」政策背書，這一點加上柯林
頓以北京為中心的政策，使美國和台灣之間也未培養出互信。

但社論指出，柯林頓政府的反應不全是出自氣憤，因為他們認為，要在這個危
險的地區保持和平，包容北京是最好的辦法。柯林頓希望與中共發展「建設性戰略伙
伴關係」，為了做到這點，華府把東亞的民主友邦台灣、南韓、甚至日本放在第二位。

社論說，這就是為什麼柯林頓寧願接受中共的「虛構故事」，認為台灣不是「另一
國」（a separate state），也因此，儘管香港過去是殖民地而從未不是個自由的政治
實體，但柯林頓卻接受中共立場，認為台灣和香港的地位也一樣。

不過，郵報指出，香港在被英國交給中共獨裁者處置之前，她的人民無權置喙。
這樣的結果除非獲得台灣人民明確的認可，否則不能被台灣接受，而柯林頓應該表明
這一點。

相反，美國保持「戰略模糊」的政策，警告中共不要使用武力，但不明確保證將
保衛台灣不受中共攻擊。社論說，這個模糊立場是為了阻止台灣正式宣布獨立，但危
險在於對美國立場的堅定程度產生誤判的不是台灣，而是中共。

社論最後說，長期而言，美國在展現對東亞真正友邦的支撐時，若能放棄模糊，
選擇清晰，就較能夠防止戰爭，確保和平，甚至增進與中國的關係。
3. Target Text 2:
華盛頓郵報抨擊柯林頓偏向北京
自由時報，05/08/99

華盛頓郵報今天以社論批評柯林頓政府的中國政策偏向北京，社論警告說，這可能導致中共的誤解，而要防範戰爭、確保和平，應該摒棄「戰略模糊」，明確展示對台灣、南韓和日本等東亞友邦的堅定支持。

這篇社論也批評柯林頓最近在記者會上暗示台灣可以考慮香港「一國兩制」模式的談話，社論說，柯林頓在記者會上應該同時指出，這樣的模式必須台灣人民點頭才能被接受。

華盛頓郵報的社論說，中共近日扣押一艘台灣船隻，出動戰機在台海上空挑釁，一再恫嚇台灣和台灣的民選總統，並試圖一枝花枝自美國科技的彈道飛彈；此外，北京大舉鎮壓法輪功，並將兩名民運人士判刑。

社論說，柯林頓政府對這些舉動的反應大體上是責備台灣和安撫中共，部分原因是李登輝總統在未獲華府同意的情況下改變對大陸政策，令華府感到震驚。

社論說，柯林頓政府的消極是可以理解的，「但不幸的是，李先生的行為也一樣可以理解」，畢竟是柯林頓選在中國大陸為美國一項對台灣的新政策（「三不」聲明）背書，這點加上柯林頓以北京為中心的政策，「並未培育出美國與台灣的互信關係」。

但社論也指出，柯林頓政府的反應不全是出自氣憤，因為他們認為，要在這個危險的地區保持和平，包容北京是最好的作法。柯林頓希望與中共發展出「建設性戰略夥伴關係」，而為了做到這點，華府把東亞的民主友邦台灣、南韓、甚至日本放在第二位。

社論說，這就是為什麼柯林頓對中共的虛構故事，認為台灣不是「另一國」（a separate state），也因為如此，儘管香港過去是個殖民地而從來不是個自由的個體，柯林頓卻接受中共立場，認為台灣和香港的地位是一樣的。

柯林頓最近在記者會上說，中共表明他們體認到台灣制度的不同，也表明願意仿照香港模式，為台灣研究出一套甚至勝過香港模式的辦法。

但郵報的社論指出，香港在被英國交給中共的獨裁者處置之前，她的人民無權置喙。這樣的結果除非獲得台灣人民明確的認可，否則不能被台灣接受，而柯林頓應該表明這一點。
President Chen Shui-bian issued one of his strongest condemnations of China on Monday and ruled out any talks as long as China imposes conditions on Taiwan.

In an interview in the presidential palace in central Taipei, the 52-year-old lawyer, who in March 2000 became the first opposition candidate to be elected president, accused China of "hostile intent" toward Taiwan. Chen, who faces a tight race next year, declared that Taiwan would "walk our own road, our own Taiwan road."

Chen said he would not bow to U.S. pressure to modify recent moves -- including holding a referendum on rewriting the constitution and adding the name Taiwan to its official Republic of China passports -- which Bush administration officials worry could heighten tensions with Beijing.

"Taiwan is not a province of one country nor it is a state of another," the Taiwanese president said, referring to China and the United States. "Any kind of democratic reform is our own internal affair. I don't think any democratic country can oppose our democratic ideals."

Chen's comments were unusual because Taiwanese leaders are rarely so dismissive of U.S. concerns. Absent from his message were any olive branches or pronouncements of possible cooperation with China that he used in the past.

China has said that it will negotiate a series of outstanding issues with Taiwan, such as the possibility of direct flights between the two places, only if Taiwan accepts the "one China" principle, which means that Taiwan is part of China. In the past, Chen had held out hope that he would one day accept it. At one point last year, he even mentioned the possibility of "future political integration" between China and Taiwan.

On Monday, however, Chen called the "one China" principle "abnormal thinking that should not exist, it should be corrected." He also ruled out accepting a compromise deal reached in 1992 under which China and Taiwan had agreed to disagree about the issue.

"The so-called 1992 consensus is still a 'one China' principle," he said. "It's a way to make Taiwan a region. It belittles Taiwan, it marginalizes Taiwan."

"The people of Taiwan firmly believe that there is one country on each side of the straits," he said. "One China and one Taiwan."

Dressed in a dark blue suit and surrounded by aides, Chen appeared blunt and confident, referring to himself as a "responsible, accountable leader who has a sense of mission and a great vision for his country." Increasingly, analysts and government officials say that mission involves
establishing Taiwan as an independent country and ruling out the possibility of uniting with China.

After his election, Chen issued a statement pledging that Taiwan would not declare independence, change its name or conduct a referendum on the question of independence. The referendums he is pushing now would be on rewriting the 1947 constitution, written for a mainland Chinese government and revised over the years, and on other issues such as nuclear power.

The Bush administration has watched with some alarm as the president has launched initiatives that many fear are designed to prompt a sharp reaction from Beijing, which has threatened to attack Taiwan if it declares independence. In the past weeks, Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher and the U.S. envoy to Taiwan, Douglas Paal, have all publicly cautioned Chen. The Taiwanese president will transit through the United States later this month on his way to Panama.

U.S. officials have expressed concern that Chen would use the constitutional reform package as a way, among other things, to change the official name of the country from Republic of China to Taiwan, a move that would enrage Beijing. There is also worry that Chen's plan to push the use of referendums would prepare the way for an island-wide vote on Taiwan's relations with China, something Beijing also opposes. Chen said in the interview that he would do neither.

Chen has suffered a series of snubs at the hands of Beijing, including its successful effort to keep Taiwan out of the World Health Organization following the outbreak in Asia of SARS, or severe acute respiratory syndrome, which many people here blame on Beijing. Chen cited the comment in May by China's U.N. representative in Geneva, Sha Zukang, after after Taiwan's bid was turned down again.

"The bid is rejected," Sha told reporters. "Who cares about your Taiwan?"

China's leaders "have never accepted me as the leader of Taiwan," Chen said. "In 2000 they didn't think I could be elected and they again misjudged the situation a year later during the election for our congress. The result was I became the president of Taiwan and the DPP [Democratic Progressive Party] became the biggest party in our congress. ... that China is wrong. China's leaders are wrong."

Weakened by a sluggish economy and record unemployment, Chen currently lags about 10 percentage points behind his challengers for the presidential election set for March 20. His calculation is that a strong reaction by Beijing would help his chances for reelection, according to a broad variety of Taiwanese analysts and senior government officials.

"The only way he can win is if he stimulates China to react," said Tim Ting, a leading pollster in Taiwan. "There will be a line somewhere and Chen will cross it." Ting and others say that China's threats -- including then-Premier Zhu Rongji's nationally televised finger-wagging,
seen as a warning to Taiwanese not to vote -- on the eve of the last presidential election helped
Chen win.

Heightened tensions in the Taiwan Strait would add significantly to international crises
facing the Bush administration. Already, the administration has been cast in the role of unwilling
mediator between China and Taiwan, a role it has rejected in the past.

"We have a bunch of political campaigners charting the course for Taiwan," said a senior
Taiwanese government official who spoke on condition of anonymity, saying he was alarmed at
Chen's shift. "The only way they think Chen will be reelected is if they succeed in polarizing
Taiwan."

But Chen's opponent in the race, Lien Chan, and Lien's running mate, James Soong, who
both ran in the last election, have so far failed to articulate a different vision for Taiwan.

Chen's Democratic Progressive Party "is increasingly being viewed as a bunch of amateurs
set on destroying U.S.-China relations," said the senior government official who travels
regularly to Washington. "But neither Lien Chan nor James Soong has convinced anyone that
they will be any better."

Less than six months away from the vote, Lien has yet to come up with a platform or
slogans for his campaign.

"We've never been good at dealing with the DPP," said John Chang, a senior official in
Lien's Nationalist Party. "We lack PR. We are always behind them."

Chen said the SARS experience "really made Taiwan's people realize that China is full of
hostile intent. You can't rely on China to ensure the health and welfare of Taiwan. We need to
walk our own road."
2. Target Text

陳水扁總統：公投不屈服美壓力
中國時報，08/10/03

陳水扁總統說，他不會更改國號，也不會推動統獨公投；但他也不會屈服於美國壓力而修正他最近推動的措施，包括舉辦公投、重修憲法以及在中華民國護照上加註台灣等等。

美國華盛頓郵報北京分社主任潘文六日在總統府專訪陳總統，華郵今天刊出專訪全文。陳總統說，「台灣不是哪個國家的一省，也不是另一個國家的一州」，言下之意指中華民國和美國。他強調，「任何民主改革都是我們的內部事務，我不認為有民主國家可以反對我們的民主理想。」華郵指出，陳水扁這番話頗不尋常，因為台灣領導人過去鮮少對美國的關切置之不理。

針對陳總統接受華郵專訪的內容，美國國務院已經在草擬一項聲明，最快將在今

天稍後做出回應。

陳總統在專訪中對中國表達強烈譴責，並稱只要中國對台灣強加條件，台灣就不可能與中國談判。五十二歲的陳總統指控中國對台灣充滿敵意，並聲稱台灣要「走我們自己的路，我們自己的台灣路」。

中國說過，將與台灣談判一系列尚待解決的議題，例如兩岸直航等，但前提是台

灣接受「一中」原則。中國過去還指望陳水扁有一天會接受「一中」，而陳水扁去年也一度提到中國與台灣「未來政治統合」的可能。

不過陳水扁六日卻宣稱，「一中」原則是不應該存在的「不正常想法，應該加以

糾正」；同時他也排除接受所謂的「九二共識」。陳水扁說：「所謂的九二共識還是

「一中」原則，這是要把台灣變成一個地區，它很低台灣，使台灣邊緣化。」

陳水扁說，「台灣人民堅決相信台海兩岸是一邊一國，一個是中國，一個是台灣。」

在談到他自己時，陳水扁以坦率自信的語氣表示，他是一個「負責盡職的領袖，

對國家有使命感和遠大的眼光」。越來越多分析家指出，陳水扁的使命感包括建立台

灣為獨立國家以及排除與中國統一的可能性。

許多人認為，陳水扁的一連串措施，旨在刺激北京當局。布希政府對此頗為擔心，

過去幾周來，美國副國務卿阿米塔吉、國務院發言人包潤石和美國在台協會台北辦事
處處長包道格都公開提醒陳水扁。

美國官員擔心的是，陳水扁可能利用修憲作為手段。把台灣的國號從中華民國更

為台灣共和國。此舉勢必激怒北京當局。他們也擔心，陳水扁推動的公投，可能演

變為針對台灣與中國關係的全島公投。這也是中國反對的。陳水扁在訪談中表示，這

兩件事他都不會做。

台灣在今年SARS流行期間申請加入世界衛生組織，結果被中國掐下來。當時

中國駐聯合國代表沙祖康告訴台灣記者說：「入會申請已經被拒，誰管你們台灣？」

陳水扁引述沙祖康的談話指出，中國領導人「始終不曾接受我是台灣的領袖，在 2000
年時，他們不認為我會當選，一年後他們在台灣改選國會時又誤判情勢，結果是我當
任台灣主席，民主黨選為國會第一大黨……中國錯了，中國領導人錯了。」

陳水扁說，SARS經驗「確實使台灣人民體認到中國（對台灣）充滿敵意，我
們不能依賴中國來確保台灣人的健康和福祉，我們必須走自己的路。」

受累於經濟不振及失業率創新高，陳水扁爭取連任的民調支持率目前落后對手十
多位台灣分析家認為，陳水扁目前的盤算，是要靠刺激中共來提高他的當選機會。

台灣知名民調專家丁庭宇說：「陳水扁唯一取勝的方法就是刺激中共。兩岸之間有條
敏感線，陳水扁將會跨過去。」丁庭宇和其他分析家說，陳水扁當初能當選，部份得
力於中國的威脅，包括當時的中國總理朱鎔基在電視上警告台灣人民，要對自己的選
舉結果負責。

台海兩岸的緊張情勢升高，將使布希政府面對的國際危機更為複雜。美國過去一
向拒絕在兩岸之間直接介入，如今布希政府卻心不甘情不願的成為中國和台灣的調人。
一位不願具名的台灣政府高層官員說，陳水扁的轉向令他訝異。他說，「我們有
一票政治選舉專家在設定台灣的走向。他們認為，只有在台灣成功的製造兩極對立才
能讓陳水扁當選。」

不過陳的對手連戰和宋楚瑜至今也未能清楚提出對台灣的另一套願景。上述高層
官員說，陳水扁的民進黨被看成一票外行人，一心只想摧毀美國和中國的關係；不過
連戰和宋楚瑜也尚未說服任何人，他們會比陳水扁做得更好。
No. 3
1. Source Text:
Taiwan's Top Agitator as Bold as Ever
Washington Post, 12/10/03

He's 80. He's got eight stents in his heart. China tries to prevent him from traveling abroad. He left office more than three years ago. And yet Lee Teng-hui, Taiwan's former president, is perhaps the most influential political figure in Taiwan today.

While still in office, Lee told reporters he planned to retire to become a missionary. He didn't clarify. Little did they know he would become a missionary for a new country: the Republic of Taiwan.

"I probably have 10 years left to carry out my work," Lee said, patting his heart, during a recent interview. "By that time, Taiwan should be a normal and complete country."

Lee's mission -- to create a country, independent of China, with a new name, a new constitution and a new national anthem -- is fraught with risk. China has vowed to attack Taiwan if it declares independence, but Lee dismissed the threats, arguing that it would not dare to take such action. He said he placed his trust in the United States, which is vaguely committed to Taiwan's defense by the Taiwan Relations Act. He also suggested that China would be constrained by the fact that it is scheduled to host the Summer Olympics in 2008.

"We really need to see whether the Beijing government has the power to launch this kind of attack," Lee said. "It seems to me that China is not in the position to act. It is afraid of the United States. The Beijing government does not dare to challenge U.S. military strength. Now is the time."

The administration of President Chen Shui-bian has been forced to respond to Lee's goals. It recently proposed revising the constitution, although not as radically as Lee would like. It has embraced the use of referendums, another Lee plan. And earlier this year it added the word "Taiwan" to the official Republic of China passport, an important first step, Lee said, in changing Taiwan's name to the Republic of Taiwan.

Lee is one of the fathers of democracy in Taiwan. He became president in 1988, when Chiang Ching-kuo, the son of Taiwan's longtime dictator, Chiang Kai-shek, died in office. He rammed through a series of democratic reforms. In an effort to scare voters away from Lee in 1996, China conducted missile tests near Taiwan, prompting the United States to dispatch two aircraft carriers to the region. Lee won by a landslide, becoming Taiwan's first directly elected president.

In 2000, Lee, then the chairman of the ruling Nationalist Party, helped foment a rift within his party that saw both his vice president, Lien Chan, and James Soong, another Nationalist stalwart, run for president. The split ticket allowed Chen to win with less than 40 percent of the
popular vote, becoming the first opposition political leader in Taiwan's history to win a presidential race.

"I look at him like a son," Lee said of 52-year-old Chen. "He's too young but he's studying."

Lee's fearless view of China and reliance on the United States are common among Taiwan's independence activists. Many of them, such as Vice President Annette Lu, spent years in prison. Others had family members killed or injured by Nationalist goon squads; Chen's wife, for example, was crippled in a suspicious car accident. The activists say they defeated the Nationalist Party and will do the same with the Communists in Beijing.

Lee and his allies have so succeeded in polarizing Taiwan that even calling Taiwan a Chinese democracy is considered too pro-Beijing. Lee still draws a crowd; 150,000 of his followers flooded the streets of the capital on Sept. 6 to call for the country's name to be changed.

Lee's vision is all the more influential in Taiwan because, analysts say, none of his detractors is either capable or courageous enough to come up with an alternative.

On the other side of the political spectrum, Lien Chan, Chen's challenger in the presidential voting on March 20, is running as if his party has already won, providing no new proposals, analysts said.

"To be honest, we don't know how to create even a slogan for the campaign," acknowledged John H. Chang, a senior official in Lien's Nationalist Party. In an interview, Lien spoke of maintaining the status quo between China and Taiwan.

"There's no counter-vision being provided by Lien or scholars or whomever," said Tim Ting, a leading pollster and political analyst. "They believe that if they wait until March 20, they will win by one vote. But they have no new blood, they have no new policies, they have no agenda. They talk about the status quo with China, but that status quo is changing too fast. Lien and [his running mate] James Soong are just trying to avoid controversy. Lee Teng-hui, however, provides a vision."

Lee became China's Enemy No. 1 when in 1999 he announced that Taiwan and China should establish what he called special state-to-state relations. The formula was confusing to many foreigners, but what it implied to China was that Taiwan had taken the first step toward independence. Whenever Lee tries to travel now, China's Foreign Affairs Ministry expends untold political capital pressuring countries not to issue him a visa.

The gambit that led to a split in the party turned him into the most controversial and most powerful politician in Taiwan -- a kingmaker extraordinaire. Some hated him. Unsubstantiated rumors circulated that he wasn't really Chinese, that his father was actually a Japanese police officer, that he had stolen millions from the Nationalist Party's coffers during his time in power.
After leaving office in 2000, Lee formed the Taiwan Solidarity Union, which became a force in Taiwanese politics. Most recently, Lee's party helped vote down legislation designed to improve Taiwan's ties with the mainland. Lee said he had spent the last year working to revise the history textbooks used in Taiwan's schools. He wants students to study Taiwanese history first, and he believes that Chinese history should be studied only as part of world history. Lee's views on education are influential. Vice President Lu recently called for rooting out Chinese influence from Taiwanese society, especially in education.

Lee's troubled relationship with Chinese culture is reflected in his upbringing. When he was growing up, Taiwan was a Japanese colony, and one of Lee's first languages was Japanese. He studied agricultural economics in Kyoto and was preparing to go off to work as a bureaucrat for the Japanese empire in China when World War II ended.

In the interview, held mostly in Chinese, he lambasted Chinese culture. "Chinese have a strange sense of history, with their obsession with 5,000 years of their culture," he said. "When you meet an Italian, you don't see him dreaming about the greatness of Rome, do you? How can modern people have such ideas? They think that everything belongs to them, even Japan, not to mention Taiwan."

"Don't just look at the Taiwanese face and think it looks like a mainland face," he said at another point, contending that Taiwan's culture is really a unique mix of Dutch, Polynesian, Japanese and Chinese strains.

He said his vision is to create a new Taiwanese, someone with a new identity with little relation to China.

"I recently read 'Roots,' " he said, referring to Alex Haley's best-selling novel. "I cried."
2. Target Text 1:

接受華郵專訪 李登輝：中共不可能攻台
中國時報，13/10/03

前總統李登輝最近接受美國《華盛頓郵報》記者的專訪（十二日刊出），暢談他對台灣獨立建國的擘畫，對中國大陸武力犯台威脅的評估，以及對中國歷史文化的觀感。

李登輝雖然卸任總統已三年多，但至今仍是台灣政壇最具影響力的人物之一。他在接受訪問時輕描嶽曾經動過多次手術的心在說：「我大概還有十年時間可以完成工作，到那時候，台灣應該已經是個正常而完整的國家。」

許多人擔心台灣獨立會引爆中共武力犯台，但李登輝不以為然，他說：「我們應該要好好審視北京當局有沒有能力發動攻擊。我認為中國不可能採取行動，他們害怕美國，北京當局不敢挑戰美國的軍事力量，我們的時刻已經到了。」他並指出中國大陸二○○八年要舉辦奧運，不會在這段期間內輕舉妄動。談到接替他的陳水扁總統，李登輝說：「我把他當成兒子來看待，他雖然年輕，但是一直在學習。」陳水扁政府近來許多政策如護照加印「台灣」字樣、催生新憲法、修改高中歷史科課程綱要等等，都與李登輝的主張遙相呼應。

就在陳總統與誰搭檔參選連任呼之欲出之際，前總統李登輝昨天則說，他接任中華民國總統，純屬偶然，故總統將經國挑選他當副手，並不是要讓他當接班人，蔣原本以為可以做到底，但沒想到會那麼早過世。

李登輝昨天在李登輝學校領袖學院「國策研究班」第一期第一次研習營，以校長的身分講授「台灣二十一世紀國家總目標」時說，歷史是必然和偶然的交叉結合，李登輝做中華民國總統，不是必然，很偶然。
3. Target Text 2:

李登輝催生台灣國 越戰越勇
自由時報, 13/10/03

美國華盛頓郵報今天報導，八十高齡的前總統李登輝，心臟裝有八根支架，三年前離開總統府，中國還在想盡辦法阻止他到國外旅行，不過他越戰越勇，可能已成為台灣當前最有政治影響力的人物。

這篇由日前專訪陳水扁總統的華盛頓郵報記者潘文執筆的專題報導說，李登輝在位時曾告訴記者，他退休後將去當傳教士。當時他沒有說清楚，原來他是要當一個新國家－－台灣共和國的傳道者。

報導引述李登輝日前在接受記者訪問時的談話說，「我也許還可以活十年，那時候台灣應該已是一個正常而完整的國家」。

報導說，李登輝賦予自己一個使命，就是建立一個獨立於中國之外的國家，用新的國名，新的憲法，新的國歌。不過這項使命充滿風險。中國一再威脅，如果台灣宣布獨立，將以武力攻台。李登輝對中國的威脅一點也不在乎，他強調中國只是在裝腔作勢。他說，美國根據台灣關係法，一定會保護台灣，何況中國自己將在二00八年舉辦奧運，不至於輕舉妄動。

報導引述李登輝的話說，「我倒要看看北京敢不敢打台灣。我看它是不敢亂來，它怕美國，它根本就不敢挑戰美國的軍事力量。今天台灣要獨立。現在正是時候」。

李登輝說，陳水扁總統將中華民國護照上加註台灣，就是將國名改為台灣共和國的第一步。

「我把他看成我的兒子一樣」，報導引述李登輝對陳水扁的看法，「他太年輕，但他一直在學習」。

報導說，台灣很多台獨活躍份子都跟李登輝一樣，不怕中國，信任美國，他們有些坐過牢，有些家屬遭受國民黨迫害，現任副總統呂秀蓮就是其中之一，陳水扁總統夫人吳淑珍也遭遇可疑的車禍受傷癱瘓。這些台獨活躍份子說，他們能夠打敗國民黨，也能夠打敗共產黨。

報導說，李登輝和他的邁隨者的反中立場，已經到了「台灣的民主與中國無關」的地步。報導並說，陳水扁的挑戰者連戰有如已經贏得勝利一般，迄今並未提出選戰主軸。報導引述單德堅的話說，「說實在話，我們連要怎麼做選舉標語都不知道」。連戰本人則在最近的一次專訪中說，他的兩岸政策是維持現狀。
Case Study 1: No.4

No. 4

1. Source Text:
The Volatile Issue of Taiwan
*New York Times*, Editorial, 15/07/99

By most measures of civic development, Taiwan has evolved in recent years into a far more appealing model than mainland China. Taiwan's politics is now fully democratic, its economy market-based and thriving and its press free and spirited. But relations between Taiwan and the mainland remain as tense and explosive as ever, and each side takes every opportunity to provoke the other. The latest dispute was set off when Taiwan's President, Lee Teng-hui, abruptly announced a new definition of Taiwan's status, needlessly angering Beijing and complicating relations between the United States and China.

In a radio interview last weekend, Mr. Lee asserted that Taiwan and China were, at least for now, two separate states. That cast aside the traditional and usefully ambiguous formula of "one China." That doctrine, adopted by Washington and Beijing when they began serious diplomatic courtship in 1972, affirms that "there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China." In practical terms, it means that Washington has committed itself not to recognize Taiwan as an independent state.

The merit of this formula is that it allows Taiwan and the mainland to coexist as separate political entities so long as both acknowledge a commitment to eventual reunification. Mr. Lee has not only challenged that status quo, but has virtually asserted Taiwan's independence. As he surely knew it would, his statement struck a nationalist nerve among mainland Chinese, stirring sentiments that the Communist leadership there has always been quick to exploit.

The combustibility of this issue should not be underestimated. Four years ago tensions increased after Mr. Lee exploited a private visa to attend a Cornell reunion to promote his vision of a more assertive Taiwan. Beijing, accusing Washington of going back on its earlier commitments, chilled relations with the United States. Several months later Beijing conducted missile tests and war games near Taiwan during the island's 1996 presidential election campaign.

Beijing should not make the same mistake of resorting to military threats. That bullying turned Taiwanese opinion sharply against the mainland and reunification. Mr. Lee, for his part, should abandon talk of separate states and instead reaffirm Taiwan's desire for eventual peaceful reunification on terms consistent with its current freedoms.

The United States, meanwhile, should try to stay out of the public crossfire while counseling restraint to both sides. In particular, Washington should make sure Mr. Lee clearly understands that while Americans support Taiwan's democracy, the United States believes the island's future is ill served by needless confrontations with Beijing.
2. Target Text 1:

紐約時報要求李登輝放棄兩國論
中國時報，16/07/99

在美國極具影響力的紐約時報，今天發表社論要求李登輝放棄「兩國論」的主張，
重新台灣與大陸和平統一的願望，以緩和目前兩岸爆炸易燃的局面。

紐約時報在一篇「急遽多變的台灣問題」的社論中，讚揚了台灣近年致力公民社
會建設的成就，其吸引力遠超過中國大陸。台灣不但政治完全民主，蓬勃的經濟以市
場為基礎，而且新聞自由、活潑有生氣。但李登輝總統上週接受「德國之聲」的訪問，
「突然宣佈了對台灣地位的新定義，不必要的激怒北京，使美中關係平添複雜因素，
這是由於李登輝拋棄了傳統曖昧但有用的一個中國模式」。

時報警告，台灣問題的「爆炸可燃性，不可低估，這次消除了四年前李登輝訪問
康乃爾大學所引發的一場台海危機即可了然」，但時報告訴北京不可再犯訴諸武力威
脅的錯誤。因為中共的「武嚇只是更加深台灣民意對大陸和統一的反感」。

至於美國的立場，社論主張美國不要捲入他們公開的「言論相互指責」，華盛頓
也應讓李登輝清楚的了解，「美國支持台灣的民主，但美國也相信與北京不必要的對
抗，對台灣的未來有害無益」。
3. Target Text 2:

紐約時報呼籲 中國勿再武嚇 台灣別談兩國
自由時報，16/07/99

紐約時報今天發表社論，批評李登輝總統最近貿然發表兩岸為「特殊的國與國關係」的政策，使得兩岸關係高度緊張，充滿爆炸性，不必要地惹怒北京，同時讓美國和大陸的雙邊關係更為複雜化。呼籲李總統立即停止特殊兩國論的談話，並重申台灣渴望追求兩岸和平統一的立場。

社論指出，一九七二年以來被華府與北京採行的「一個中國」政策，確定「世界上只有一個中國，台灣是中國的一部分」，換言之，華府不承認台灣是一個獨立國家。 「一個中國」政策的好處是，它允許台灣和大陸多年來以政治實體的方式共存，雙方都承認兩岸終將統一的承諾。

現在李登輝總統將將兩岸關係定位為特殊的國與國關係，這不僅對此現況提出挑戰，更幾乎等於是宣布台灣獨立。李登輝總統必然了解這項宣示會觸動北京當局的神經，擾亂大陸領導人的情緒。

紐約時報認為，面對台灣在兩岸關係定位改變的情勢，北京不應再重蹈訴諸武力威脅的覆轍，武力威脅將使得台灣反對大陸及反對兩岸統一的民意更為高張。

至於李登輝總統則應該放棄兩岸是特殊的國與國關係的言論，相反的，應重申在不犧牲自由民主的前提下，台灣渴望追求兩岸和平統一的主張。

在此同時，美國在呼籲兩岸自製時，應對兩岸的公開衝突置身事外，特別是華府應該確定李登輝總統清楚了解，雖然美國支持台灣的民主政治，但如果與北京發生無謂的衝突，對台灣的未來是不利的。
Case Study 1: No.5

1. Source Text:
Taiwan's New Doctrine Unintelligible in Chinese

*New York Times*, 21/07/99

Even with all the justifications, interpretations and clarifications that Taiwan's leaders have offered in recent days to try to explain their new relationship to the Chinese mainland, one thing stands out: They can't say it in Chinese.

Baffling as that may sound, the formula that Taiwan invented earlier this month to redefine itself as a separate state but not an independent country from China is so hard to articulate that officials here routinely resort to English.

"We believe there is one nation and two countries," said Chen Chien-jen, Taiwan's chief spokesman, speaking in English in an interview Tuesday. Invited to say the same thing in Chinese, Chen paused and then replied, again in English: "We are still looking for the right words."

It is a perplexing problem. In Chinese, "nation" and "country" and even "state" are the same word: "guojia" (pronounced gwo-jah).

Yet Taiwan officials like the slightly different gradings that those words each carry in English, conveniently allowing them to argue simultaneously that Taiwan is no longer part of China while not declaring independence, a step that Beijing has vowed to use force to prevent.

So they use the English words, even though Taiwan is a Chinese-speaking country, or state, or nation -- or whatever.

Beijing, for the record, calls Taiwan a province, one that has served as the base for the nationalists since their defeat in the civil war in 1949. And one that Beijing wants returned to the motherland.

Many Taiwan officials, when discussing the issue in Chinese, simply say "state" or "nation" in English.

It has been 11 days since President Lee Teng-hui created a diplomatic crisis by calling Taiwan a separate country, yet he and other Taiwan leaders are still struggling to find a way to express what they want: more distance from China, without getting crushed by an irate Beijing.

Lee emerged in public on Tuesday for the first time since July 9 to reiterate his stance, and to try to rebut criticism of his decision to drop the "one China" formula that Taiwan and China and the United States have all followed for decades as a way of averting a potentially violent argument about whose China that is.

On Tuesday, Lee fine-tuned his message. But for the ordinary listener that did not help much.
"Only after a democratic reunification can there be a possibility of one China," Lee said, in Chinese for once. "One China is not now."

Got that?

Here's a rough translation: If we insist on conditions like the arrival of democracy in China, we can say we still have the goal of reunifying, even though it's so far in the future that we can stop saying Taiwan and China are part of the same country. In a word, no more "one China."

The essence of Taiwan's quandary is that it and the Chinese mainland have effectively been separate and independent since the civil war, but have been unwilling to say so for political and historical reasons.

For decades both the nationalists on Taiwan and the communists on the mainland maintained rival claims to be the legitimate government of all China. Taiwan has since dropped its ambitions to rule the mainland, but Beijing insists that it will attack if Taiwan moves to thwart reunification by actually declaring independence.

"We are not seeking independence," said Lee on Tuesday, in case there were any lingering question. "We will foster dialogue and negotiations with the Chinese communists on an equal footing."

In Lee's words, as far as can be discerned, the key issue is whether Taiwan and China talk to each other as separate "states." Until now, Taiwan and China had agreed to talk to each other as "separate political entities," but as part of the same "country."

That may not sound very different to the untrained ear, but in the framework of a debate where a disputed notion of sovereignty could spark war, it is everything. As might be expected, six years of talks between Taiwan and China have so far yielded little beyond an endless back-and-forth about terminology.

It may seem surprising that Lee's aides did not work out various explanations before he announced the change on July 9. Several aides to Lee have apparently admitted that his remarks, in Chinese during a German radio interview, came as a total surprise.

The Mainland Affairs Council, Taiwan's chief decision-making body on the Taiwan-China issue, met for hours on July 10 and again on July 11, to try to work out the implications of what Lee said. Apparently it was not easy.

Su Chi, chairman of the council, told reporters on July 10 that there was "no big change," and that the Nationalist Party was keeping to its reunification platform.

The very next day, Su emerged from several more hours of talks to say that actually Taiwan was dropping its long-held "one China" stance, and that it was abandoning the guidelines for reunification that had steered policy since 1991. Those words landed like a bomb.

Ever since, government officials have offered various interpretations, many of them peppered with the English words "nation" and "state."
On Tuesday, Chen, Taiwan's word-parsing spokesman, conceded that describing Taiwan and China as part of the same country does not always accurately reflect the situation.

"Words cannot fully betray the significance," Chen said. "A policy has to not only be legitimate, but also realistic."
Case Study 1: No.5

2. Target Text:

紐約時報：台北事前籌畫不足
中國時報，22/07/99

「紐約時報」發自台北的報導說，李登輝總統的「兩國論」引來諸多風波，台灣官員這些天都忙著為其善後。但由於李的微言大義並不容易讓外界明瞭，為使國際澄清和宣傳，又不墜入中共「一個中國」的陷阱，台北官方這些天都不得不以英文說明。

台灣的政府發言人程建人周二在接受訪問時，就特別以英文表示，「我們認為是一個民族，兩國家」。但當記者要求他以中文解釋時，程建人先是停了一會兒，接著卻再度以英文說，「我們正在找尋適當的詞彙。」

報導指出，所以如此，是因為用中文解釋的確有點為難。因為，nation、country，甚至state在中文的意思都是「國家」。台灣官方喜歡用英文，是因為這些字在英文意思裡有些差異，而這便於說明台灣的立場。這是為何即使並非英語系國家，許多官員還是直接用英文夾雜的方式發言。

報導說，儘管李登輝總統發表所謂「兩岸為特殊的國與等關係」談話已有一段時間，但包括他本人和其他官員仍忙著找出一個能更確切表達其意念的說法，以便既能遠離和中國的關係，又不致被激怒的北京當局所打壓。

報導認為，雖然李總統在周二再度闡釋了他所謂的「特殊的國與等關係」，但聽在一般人耳裡，似乎沒什麼差別。儘管他在談話中具體否認為搞台獨，但「一個中國不是現在」的說法還是讓人有些聽不懂。

但報導指出，至少外界開始明白，李總統「兩國論」所在意的是，台灣和中共的對話得以「國與等」的平等地位進行，而非過去在「一個中國」下，「兩個政治實體」的對話。

報導說，雖然乍聽之下可能沒甚差異，但台灣和中共六年來的會談之所以成就不大，就是為了用辭在拉鋸，所以「國與等」的新說法可是非同小可，因為這涉及主權爭論，可能引發兩岸戰事。

報導認為，像這樣的大事，令人有些意外，李總統的幕僚竟然沒在事前構思完整的說法，以致「國與等」論點拋出後，讓外界都嚇了一跳。

報導就舉陸委會主委蘇起為例，說明這種事前籌畫不足的情形。因為蘇先是宣稱台灣的大陸政策沒有變化，民國黨仍將推動統一，卻在一天後宣布台灣放棄長久以來的「一個中國」原則，也不再堅持「國統領領」，結果引發外界更大疑慮，才迫得台北官方在避免損失枝節的考慮下，開始用英文解釋「國與等」。
A Tightrope Act Over Taiwan

New York Times, 05/08/99

As is often the case in disputes between China and Taiwan, the United States finds itself in the middle.

As the two sides pour verbal scorn on each other and as military tensions remain high, the Clinton administration is trying to steer a delicate course, signaling to Beijing its commitment to the "one China" policy that Taiwan is rejecting while reassuring Taiwan that arms sales will continue.

This time — unlike during the last crisis, in 1996, which brought China and the United States closer to confrontation than at any time since the Eisenhower era — the Chinese have not fired ballistic missiles towards Taiwan and Washington has not dispatched aircraft carriers to the region.

But as Chinese and Taiwan fighter jets fly perilously close to each other over the narrow waters of the Taiwan Strait, the administration is fearful that the volatile situation could get out of hand.

The risk of a military clash comes as the administration's policy of engagement with China is under pressure and as the White House grows increasingly fretful that its China policy may blow up just at the start of the presidential campaign.

And in Congress, Taiwan's stalwarts are proposing more military assistance, a move that the administration believes would further inflame the situation.

With all these competing forces, the administration is finding it difficult to soothe feelings between two stubborn sides.

"This is a very delicate time, even a potentially dangerous time," said Deputy Assistant Defense Secretary Kurt Campbell on Wednesday. "It behooves us to move very carefully."

He made his comments to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as it discussed legislation proposed by Sens. Jesse Helms, R-N.C., and Robert Torricelli, D-N.J., that would expand the military provisions of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act. This law is the basis of Washington's mandate to provide for the defense of Taiwan without entering a formal alliance.

Perhaps more ominously, another official expressed doubts about the effectiveness of Washington's diplomacy since the crisis arose when the Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui announced he was abandoning the "one China" policy.

Among other things, Washington has sent at least six urgent messages in the last three days to Beijing and Taipei demanding they reduce their provocative air sorties, said the official, Stanley Roth, the assistant secretary of state for Asia.
But he told the Senate panel: "We do not know if our warnings not to engage in military activity will work. The risk of escalation remains."

Beijing has kept up the pressure with military maneuvers that appear to be a combination of muscle-flexing and psychological games. Last Saturday, the Chinese seized a Taiwan cargo ship off the Chinese coast and followed up with the test launching, albeit expected, of a new long-range rocket.

Last Friday the administration notified Congress that it would go ahead with a planned sale to Taiwan of early-warning radar aircraft and spare parts for F-16 fighter jets. The notification was obligatory under the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act. But the Chinese made sure that Washington knew the announcement did not go unnoticed: the Foreign Ministry in Beijing called in a senior U.S. diplomat to protest.

From the administration's point of view, the current crisis, unlike one in 1995, came out of the blue. And this time, the White House has appeared more ambivalent in its support of Lee.

Four years ago, the administration was aware of the risk it was taking in antagonizing China when President Clinton reversed previous policy and issued a visa to allow Lee to visit his alma mater, Cornell University.

This time, the White House was apparently caught unawares when Lee, eager to bolster the flagging electoral fortunes of his possible successor, told a German reporter that his government would henceforth deal with China only on a "state to state" basis.

To Beijing, which considers Taiwan a renegade province, this statement came dangerously close to a declaration of independence. A fundamental axiom of China's policy is that it would use force if Taiwan declared independence.

In the United States, as the 2000 presidential campaign gets under way, China could easily become a hot issue, something that Vice President Al Gore could do without but which foreign policy experts advising Texas Gov. George W. Bush are debating.

Gore, the frontrunner for the Democratic nomination, supports the Clinton administration's policy of a "strategic partnership" with China. But Bush, the frontrunner for the Republican nomination, considers China a "strategic competitor," not a partner.

But foreign policy experts in both parties have not forgotten that in 1992, Bush's father, President George Bush, went ahead with the sale of F-16s to Taiwan. Since the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, the Clinton administration has acknowledged that it has broadened its military ties with Taiwan and is considering including Taiwan in a regional missile-defense system.

Against this backdrop it may not be easy, administration officials admit, to calm the eruptions in the Beijing-Washington-Taipei axis.
2. Target Text 1:

紐約時報：美擔心兩岸情勢失控

中國時報，06/08/99

紐約時報周四在一篇新聞分析中指出，兩岸關係的緊張情勢，使得美國陷入兩難。美國亞太助卿陸士達在參院外交關係委員會上說，過去三天美國至少六次向北京和台北發出警訊，要求雙方克制避免開打，但他懷疑「美國的警告能否持續奏效」，而兩岸危機升高仍然存在。

文章指出，這次兩岸衝突不同於一九九六年的一次台海危機，兩岸戰機在海峽如此接近，美國政府擔心有失控之虞。柯林頓政府對中共的「交往政策」，因而備受壓力，白宮擔心它的中國政策，可能在美國總統大選初期變成對手攻擊的目標。在國會方面，因主張擴大軍援台灣，有可能進一步激化兩岸的緊張情勢。

美國國防部副助理部長坎培爾，日前在參院外交關係委員會上指出，現在正處於「敏感時刻，甚至潛伏著危險」，「我們必須小心因應」。也許更糟的是，當李登輝總統宣布「兩國論」而引發危機時，美國外交乾部的效果卻讓人質疑。陸士達在參院坦承，過去三天來，美國至少有六次對兩岸發出警訊，要求雙方克制，但陸士達說，他「不知道美方的警訊未來能否奏效」，而危機升高依然存在。

文章指出，中共目前一面展現武力，另一面以心理戰威嚇台灣，如前不久中共扣押台灣一艘貨船（指新華輪）即為一例，日後中共還將試射新型洲際彈道飛彈作為威嚇之用。

文章還說，四年前，柯林頓政府簽發李登輝赴美護照，讓李訪問母校康乃爾大學。面對目前的緊張情勢，柯林頓政府開始猶豫這次要不要支持李登輝。

面對二千年的美國總統大選，中國政策勢將成為熱門話題。文章說，副總統高爾支持柯林頓的「交往政策」，並視中共為「戰略夥伴關係」，而最有可能代表共和黨角逐大選的小布希，則將中共為「戰略競爭者」，而非夥伴。而小布希的父親是前總統喬治布希，他曾於一九九二年下令把F－16戰機售予台灣。
3. Target Text 2:

六度要求兩岸自制 警告能否奏效美國沒有把握
自由時報，06/08/99

紐約時報近日針對兩岸關係發表分析指出，隨著台灣與大陸言詞交鋒激烈，軍事對峙
情勢轉趨緊張，柯林頓政府再次身陷兩難局面，並十分慎重處理與兩岸的平衡關係，
一方面向北京重申「一個中國」政策，同時繼續對台灣的軍售。

與一九九六年台海危機不同的是，這次中共未對台灣發射任何一枚導彈，而華府
也未派遣航空母艦到台海巡弋，但是隨著台灣與大陸的戰機頻頻在台海中線對峙，柯
林頓政府擔心，兩岸一觸即發的情勢可能變得難以控制。

台海緊張遞逢柯林頓政府主張與中國的「交往」政策受到壓力，同時白宮愈來愈
擔心，中國政策可能在總統選舉中成為對手攻擊的目標。

美國國防部副助理部長坎貝爾，在參加參議院外交關係委員會舉行的「台灣安全增
強法案」聽證會時指出：「現在是非常敏感的時刻，甚至是危機重重的時刻，我們必須
非常審慎的因應。」

更令人難以樂觀的一個情況是，另一位官員陸士達認為自李登輝總統宣示「兩岸
是特殊國與國關係」，引發台海新一波危機以來，華府的外交斡旋效果有限。

因務院主管亚太事務助理國務卿陸士達說，過去三天華府至少向北京和台灣傳達
六次緊急訊息，要求雙方減少空中攻擊挑釁行為，但他也說，「我們不知道是否這個警
告能夠奏效，兩岸危機升高的可能性仍然存在」。
With tensions mounting dangerously across the Taiwan Strait, both sides need to step back and consider the risks they are courting -- Taipei by its reckless declarations and Beijing by its unacceptable military threats.

Taiwan and the mainland have escalated the crisis by repeatedly flying warplanes in the direction of each other's territory. Chinese publications now regularly report on Beijing's preparedness to assault Taiwanese-held territory, and Taiwan's President, Lee Teng-hui, holds to his provocative demand that China deal with his island as a separate sovereign state.

Any military clash between China and Taiwan would imperil Taiwan's prosperity and democracy, threaten China's economic development and gravely damage relations between Washington and Beijing.

The United States, like most countries, recognizes Beijing's as the only lawful government of China. Washington considers Taiwan geographically part of China, but not currently subject to mainland political rule. That widely accepted formula leaves the question of China's eventual reunification to be resolved peacefully, at a later date, by people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Meanwhile, America is committed to providing Taiwan with adequate means to defend itself against attack.

That sensible arrangement was deliberately challenged last month by President Lee with his new formula of two separate sovereign states. Beijing predictably and unjustifiably responded with threats of military force.

Concern has centered on the possible blockade, shelling or occupation of several small islands controlled by Taiwan just off the Chinese mainland.

Four decades ago, Chinese shelling of the two offshore islands Quemoy (now called Kinmen) and Matsu brought American warships to the Taiwan Strait and Washington and Beijing close to military confrontation. Relations between the United States and China have come a long way since that unhappy era. Beijing should not risk reversing that progress with a new episode of aggression.

In the event of Chinese military action against Taiwan, President Clinton would have little choice but to chill relations with Beijing, freeze economic talks and consider whether American military intervention was warranted. The Administration must be sure that Beijing understands these likely consequences before China resorts to force.
2. Target Text:

紐約時報：兩岸均應自制
中國時報，08/15/99

「紐約時報」周三發表社論說，台海緊張局勢日益升高，兩岸均應自我克制，並慎思各自所冒的風險。台北不應繼續魯莽的發言，北京也不應一再威脅動武。

社論指出，在兩岸戰機頻頻出動，中共傳媒又一再報導北京已準備好攻擊台灣領土，台灣李登輝總統也不放棄「特殊的國與國關係」言論後，台海危機已日趨嚴重。

但社論警告說，台灣爆發任何的軍事衝突都將危及台灣的繁榮和民主，威脅中共的經濟成長，並嚴重損害華府和北京的關係。

社論並重申美國的「一個中國」政策，強調美國固然承認北京是代表中國的唯一合法政府，但只是認知台灣在地理上屬於中國的一部分，現階段並不受中共統治。此一立場預示的是，中國最終的統一必須是台海兩岸人民以和平方式達成，在此之前，美國將提供台灣足夠的武器自衛。

然而，台灣李登輝總統上月的言論卻等於公然挑戰這樣的立場，可想而知，北京可能以動武做為回應。

社論指出，目前外界都把焦點鎖向中共可能採取的行動，包括封鎖、炮轟和佔領台灣在中國大陸沿海所控制的外島，一旦北京真的這麼做，極可能把美國捲入戰爭之中。

社論並舉當年「八二三炮戰」，中共炮轟金、馬，迫使第七艦隊不得不開進台灣海峽協防，差點讓華府和北京直接衝突的歷史為例，呼籲北京不要盲動，讓此一歷史重演。

社論最後指出，如果中共真的侵犯台灣，柯林頓總統其實別無選擇，只有凍結和北京的關係，停止雙邊的經濟交流，並思考是否該出兵干預。美國政府應在中共決定動武前，讓北京當局充分了解這點。
No. 8
1. Source Text

China Indicates Air of Restraint Toward Taiwan

*New York Times*, 02/04/00

Chinese leaders have told the United States that they plan to stick with a "wait and see" attitude toward Taiwan's new president and that they are open to resuming a dialogue with the estranged island, a senior administration official said today.

The Chinese assurances, if borne out, come at a crucial time for the administration, which is scrambling to put relations with China on an even keel and to persuade Congress to upgrade economic relations with it before President Clinton leaves office.

This week, President Jiang Zemin and other top Chinese leaders indicated to the national security adviser, Samuel R. Berger, that China's initial, restrained reaction to the election of Chen Shui-bian as Taiwan's president last month was part of a "considered policy," in the words of the American official.

President-elect Chen's party had previously called for independence from China, something Beijing has sworn it will wage war to prevent, and he only recently muted that stance.

The Chinese have decided, at least for the time being, to try to reach an accommodation with his new government, which is expected to be formed in May, the official said.

"They don't quite know what to make of the situation," he said, describing Mr. Berger's two-day talks with the Chinese.

"But they are not inclined to act in a precipitous way and they want to find a way to reach an accommodation consistent with their principles."

Mr. Berger traveled to China, in part, because the administration is simultaneously seeking to smooth relations between mainland China and Taiwan even as it tries to assemble a Republican-dominated coalition of lawmakers willing to grant China permanent trading rights in the American market.

Congressional leaders said any flare-up in tension between China and Taiwan would almost certainly derail the administration's hopes of winning passage of the trade measure anytime soon. The administration, in turn, has warned that failure to pass the measure could seriously set back relations with China and diminish American influence there.

"There is an important national security argument for going forward with permanent normal trade relations which is if anything intensified by developments related to Taiwan," said the senior administration official. "It not only creates a degree of interdependence between China and the world community but also to the economic integration of China and Taiwan."

During the election in Taiwan four years ago, the Chinese lobbed missiles around the island in an attempt to intimidate voters.
Chinese leaders also gave bellicose warnings to Taiwan shortly before the latest elections, apparently to persuade voters to back candidates considered more favorable to reunification than Mr. Chen.

Despite its earlier statements, and perhaps relieved by Mr. Chen's conciliatory comments after his election, China now seems inclined to remain open to dialogue, the administration official said. Though any resumption of talks would most likely take many months to get under way, the mere prospect may reduce the risk that rising tensions will block passage of normal trade relations, which President Clinton has called his top remaining foreign policy priority. A Congressional vote on the matter is expected in May, the same time Taiwan's new government takes power.

The administration has asked Congress to give up its annual review of China's trade status, granting it same trading rights -- called permanent normal trade relations -- that most other countries have. The step is required if United States companies are to benefit fully from a market-opening agreement the administration negotiated as part of China's continuing effort to join the World Trade Organization. Talks between China and the European Union over China's entry into the trade group broke down on Friday.

Supporters argue that the economic rationale for giving up the annual review is overwhelming. The agreement requires China to open its markets and overhaul its regulatory regime, making way for foreign competitors in every area from agriculture to the Internet. But, as President Clinton has noted, "it's a one-way deal" that does not require reciprocal trading concessions by the United States.

Mr. Clinton has argued that granting permanent normal trading relations is essential for national security. He said the step would support reformers, lock China's bureaucracy into a rules-based international trading regime and contribute to stability in Asia.

The vote, however, has become freighted both with ideological concerns about China's Communist government and domestic political worries in an election year. While America's business community has begun a national lobbying campaign on behalf of the measure, labor unions have mounted a vigorous opposition intended to culminate in what unions are promising will be a huge mobilization of supporters in Washington and around the nation on April 12. Union leaders say that the use of child labor by China and its hostility to free labor unions allow it to compete unfairly with American workers and have worsened the loss of American industrial jobs.

Senate passage is considered likely. But if the measure slips through the House, President Clinton will have the Republicans to thank; early vote counts show that that two-thirds of his own party's members in the House will vote against permanent normal trade relations.

The administration and the Republican leadership in the House have begun to work to build a coalition across party lines in support of the measure. Dennis Hastert, the House majority
leader, has acceded to administration pleas and agreed to set a date for the vote in late May, aides said, even though Republican leaders acknowledge that Mr. Clinton has not met what they had insisted was a prior condition: proof that he can produce enough Democrats to ensure passage.

Getting 218 votes may prove difficult. Although business pressure on Republicans has been intense, some members of the party argue that the administration should work actively for the overthrow of the Chinese government instead of extending it upgraded trading rights.

Republican aides say the party will struggle to produce 150 votes in favor of permanent normal trade relations, the number that supported annual renewal of China's trading rights last year.

That means supporters will need about 70 Democrats to vote in favor. Democratic lawmakers who favor the measure say that is still possible, but acknowledge that most of their potential supporters are currently uncommitted.

President Clinton has started a major campaign aimed primarily at securing support from wavering Democrats. Mr. Clinton, aides said, is spending more time on China trade than any other single item on his agenda. He will make his sixth major address on the subject on Monday in California and has scheduled numerous evening talks with lawmakers in the White House residence this month.

The president has also assigned five cabinet secretaries to make China their top priority.

"This is an intensive, all-out effort, member by member, district by district, explaining what this agreement is really about and what's at stake in terms of relations with China," said Charlene Barshefsky, the United States trade representative. Ms. Barshefsky negotiated the sweeping trade agreement with China and is spending most of her time these days lobbying for it. "What we're saying is that this decision is about the best way to influence China, not just on economics but all the surrounding issues as well," she said.

Some people in Congress have said that their vote will be influenced by how Beijing handles Taiwan's transition now that Mr. Chen, of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party, has won election, ending the Nationalist Party's half-century dominance of the island's politics. Administration officials acknowledged that their lobbying to promote trade ties would be for naught if hostilities break out.

China analysts say that Beijing has not clearly signaled its intentions on Taiwan. Some argue that the mainland government has stuck to a relatively hard line on relations despite Taiwan's efforts since the election to expand trade and get a dialogue started. Beijing, for example, insists that Mr. Chen must first accept the so-called One China principle before any discussions can begin. Mr. Chen rejects that formula, preferring to think of any dialogue as state to state.
During what were described as "informal" discussions with Mr. Berger about the prospect for resuming talks, the Chinese indicated willingness to consider a possible compromise. Talks would take place under the "one China" umbrella, but each side would define "China" in its own way, a senior administration official said. Such subtle wordplay had allowed the two sides to talk in the past.
2. Target Text:

紐約時報 中共釋出對台和緩信號
工商時報，03/04/00

紐約時報二日再度以顯著篇幅報導兩岸關係，該報導指出，中共已透過管道向美國傳
達將節制對台行動的訊息，並對台灣的領導人繼續採取「聽其言，觀其行」的態度，
並強調可在「一個中國，各自表述」的原則下，與台灣恢復對話。

該報導引述一位美國官員的說法指出，上星期中共國家主席江澤民及其他高層領
導人告訴到訪的美國國家安全顧問柏格，中共對陳水扁當選台灣總統的最初反應，是
出自深思熟慮後的政策。而中共當局也已決定，至少目前盡量去適應陳水扁的新政府。

這名官員形容中共領導人與柏格舉行兩天的會談所表現的，完全不知道如何處理
目前的新情勢，但並不傾向貿然採取行動，而是希望找出一條符合他們所堅持原則的
方法，而在討論有關是否恢復台海兩岸對話時，中共方面表示願意考慮一項可能的妥
協方案，即在「一個中國，各自表述」條件下會談。

報導指出，柏格訪問北京的部分原因在於美國政府想要緩和台海兩岸的關係，同
時爭取共和黨主導的國會議員跨黨聯盟同意，以給予中共永久正常貿易關係（P N T R）
的待遇。美國國會領袖們同意，任何突發的台海緊張情勢幾乎可以確定將使P N T R難獲國會通過，但行政部門則回應，P N T R法案如遭否決，將使華府與北京的
關係倒退，並削弱美國在中國大陸的影響力。

美國政府官員說，也許是陳水扁當選總統之後的和解性談話產生了紓解作用，中
共現在似乎傾向於保持兩岸對話之門敞開。儘管台海兩岸要恢復對話可能還要再等數
個月的時間，但僅如此的訊息，就足以降低P N T R遭國會否決的風險。
No. 9

1. Source Text:
A Distracted China Issues Censure of Taiwan Chief's Remarks

*New York Times, 06/08/02*

Distracted by back-room maneuvering over leadership changes here, China has offered little more than a boilerplate response to aggressive statements on relations with Taiwan by its president, Chen Shui-bian, and has suggested that his own constituents may provide the strongest censure of his remarks.

Li Wei-yi, a spokesman for the Taiwan Affairs Office of China's State Council, issued a statement denouncing Mr. Chen's comments. Mr. Li said that the comments would have ramifications for Taiwan's economy and that they would probably have ramifications for the personal interests of Taiwan residents as well.

Mr. Chen said on Saturday that holding a referendum on Taiwan's independence was a "basic human right" and that, in reality, there was "one country on each side" of the Taiwan Strait. China has long threatened to use force against Taiwan if it declares outright independence or refuses to agree eventually to reunify with the mainland.

China may yet take some symbolic action to express its displeasure over Mr. Chen's remarks; war games are already planned on the coast opposite Taiwan in the weeks ahead.

But China's condemnation of Taiwan's president centered on an increasingly unavoidable reality in the decades-old standoff between the governments in Beijing and Taipei—that Taiwan's economy is fast becoming dependent on the mainland.

Already, one quarter of Taiwan's exports go to China, the biggest and fastest-growing market for the island's goods, and nearly all of Taiwan's major businesses now have investments on the mainland, totaling more than $50 billion.

With the island's economy at low ebb and the economies of its other markets slowing, goading China into punitive action could be economically, if not politically, suicidal for Mr. Chen.

Rebukes were swift. Taiwan's biggest opposition party, the Nationalist Party, which ran Taiwan until 2000, was harshly critical of him, saying he was turning the pro-independence policies of his Democratic Progressive Party into government policy despite having promised to pursue a centrist course in office.

"In this context, it is very risky," said Steven S. F. Chen, Taiwan's top diplomat in the United States until 2000 and now a national security expert at the National Policy Foundation, the Nationalist Party's research center.

Members of President Chen's administration, meanwhile, scrambled to discount the significance of his remarks.
"Do not overinterpret" Mr. Chen's comments, Tsai Ing-wen, chairwoman of Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council, said before leaving on a hastily scheduled trip to the United States to reassure American officials that the island is not pursuing a major shift in strategy. "Taiwan's China policy has not changed."

The United States has long counseled Taiwan against declaring independence, though China renewed its accusation today that Washington has emboldened Taipei with diplomatic support and continued weapons sales.

President Bush said last year that he would do "whatever it takes" to help Taiwan defend itself against the mainland.

In fact, Mr. Chen's comments, while the strongest since he took office two years ago, did not go beyond the language of a 1999 resolution on Taiwan's future adopted by his Democratic Progressive Party.

Mr. Chen had not repeated that language since he took office, when he promised not to declare statehood or to push for an independence referendum if China would abandon its threat to use force against the island.

But Beijing has not renounced that threat, and some experts believe that Mr. Chen may be taking advantage of China's distraction ahead of the Communist Party's coming congress, at which crucial leadership changes will be decided, to put the language back on the table, pleasing pro-independence forces in Taiwan and putting some pressure on Beijing.

Andrew Yang, the secretary general of the Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies, a research center in Taipei, said Mr. Chen appeared to be calculating that China would pay attention to Taiwan only if he speaks strongly.
2. **Target Text:**

一連一國論／紐約時報觀察 不是政治自殺 也是經濟自殺
工商時報，07/08/02

陳水扁發表「兩岸一國論」談話繼續在西方媒體發酵。「紐約時報」昨天指出，台
灣經濟正處低潮，中國是台灣的最大市場，陳水扁刺激中國的言論可能促使中國採取
懲罰措施，這一談話對台灣「即便不是政治自殺，也是經濟自殺」；不過在台美商樂
觀地認為，和九六年台海危機及九九年「兩國論」相較，這次「口舌之爭」不會更嚴
重，他們一點都不緊張，生意仍然照做。

上週六陳水扁發表「兩岸一國論」講話後，激起連漪至今餘波盪漾。「紐約時
報」昨發表文章說，陳水扁的言論可能刺激中國採取懲罰性措施，但也只會是一個象徵性
的行動。

報導指出，在陳水扁發表該講話後，正忙於黨大會準備工作的中共領導層只能色
厲內荏地批判一番，措辭則強調兩岸目前一個越來越難以避免的事實－－即台灣經濟對
中國日益依賴。目前，中國佔台灣出口市場的四分之一強，中國是台灣出口產品最大
也是成長最快的市場，台灣主要廠商幾乎都已跨足大陸，投資總額早已超過五百億美
元。

時報說，陳水扁的講話雖是就任總統兩年以來最強的一次，但其內容並未超越民
進黨一九九九年提出的「台灣決議文」內容。問題是北京至今並未宣佈放棄對台動武，
時報說，因此有些專家相信，陳水扁是趁中共黨內忙於十六大準備無暇它顧之際，再
度祭出自決言辭，既可取悅島內獨派，也可對北京施壓。
China assailed Taiwan's President, Lee Teng-hui, again today, saying his retraction of the island's long-standing "one China" policy constituted a move toward independence that could bring "monumental disaster" to Taiwan. The criticism, carried in a New China News Agency commentary that ran on the front pages of newspapers here, did not spell out what steps China might take. But the Foreign Ministry repeated China's long-standing threat to use force if Taiwan formally declares independence.

In a bid to reduce tension, a senior official at Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council urged China to move ahead with talks scheduled for the fall. But Taiwanese officials stuck to their new policy, saying they hope to convince Beijing that their actions are meant to put relations across the Taiwan Strait on a sounder foundation by describing Taiwan in more accurate terms. On Monday, China hinted that the talks might not happen.

Several factors appear to have contributed to the decision by Lee to reverse a policy that has been the basis for Taiwan's relationship with China since 1991. Just nine months before Taiwan's voters elect a new leader, Lee is seeking to seal his legacy as Taiwan's first democratically elected president by appearing to stand up for the island's 21 million people and set Taiwan's foreign policy on a tougher course, according to political analysts in Taiwan.

"Before he steps down, he wants to make sure that we go this way, that Taiwan and China are two different states," said Antonio Chiang, publisher of the Taipei Times. "He wants to use his charisma to cover his successors, so nobody can turn back the clock or change the track."

Despite government denials, political analysts say Lee is also trying to shake up his domestic opponents. Lee wants to put pressure on James Soong, a former ally in Lee's ruling Nationalist Party, who may challenge Lee's chosen successor, Vice President Lien Chan, in the presidential campaign.

In a recent interview, Soong advocated a significant improvement in ties with Beijing. He said he would allow direct air and sea links, and would consider changing some of Lee's most provocative policies, such as Taiwan's effort to gain a seat in the United Nations.

The timing of Lee's comments was intended to force Soong to take sides on the "mainland issue," analysts said. So far, Lien has expressed support for Lee's rejection of the "one China" policy. Soong has withheld comment on the decision, saying only that procedures used to make the policy shift were haphazard.

Lee hopes to co-opt some support from the opposition Democratic Progressive Party,
which has advocated outright independence from Beijing, analysts said.

Lee said on Saturday that ties with China should be considered "state-to-state relations," a direct challenge to Beijing's view that Taiwan is a province of China. Su Chi, Taiwan's top official on mainland affairs, amplified those comments Monday when he officially rejected the "one China" policy.

In 1991, Taiwan acknowledged that China's Communist government had jurisdiction over the mainland but said that the Republic of China, as Taiwan is known, had jurisdiction over Taiwan. It held that both were "political entities" that were part of "one China" that may eventually unite.

Taiwan's policy shift took many people by surprise, but analysts pointed out that Taiwanese officials have been saying for months, if not years, that they effectively have a "two China" policy. In meetings last year before high-level talks in Beijing, officials decided to insist that Taiwan be treated as an equal in any negotiations on reunification. Thus, Lee's statements are an attempt to formalize this equal status.

While Lee's moves have angered Beijing, many in Taiwan approve, saying the president is simply stating what they already know—that capitalist Taiwan has ruled itself for decades beyond the control of China's Communist leadership.

"Everybody knows, of course, Taiwan is a country. It's like the emperor's clothes. Now, they said the emperor has no clothes," said Chiang, the newspaper publisher. "It's kind of silly to continue to say Taiwan is a 'political entity.' What does that mean? It's very confusing. Even people in Taiwan don't understand what that means."

Ever since he became president, Lee has had a rough relationship with Beijing, which has singled him out as the source of the two sides' problems. China lobbed missiles over Taiwan to scare voters into opposing Lee in the island's first democratic presidential elections in 1996. That gambit did not work, and Lee won in a landslide.

One unanswered question is how the Taiwanese government's new stance will affect U.S. relations with Taiwan and China. When he was in China last year, President Clinton announced publicly that the U.S. had a "one China" policy. The Clinton administration repeated that policy Monday and today called for dialogue and restraint by Beijing and Taipei to resolve their differences.
Startled by the sudden declaration by Taiwan that it no longer stood by the "one China" policy that has been the pillar of stability between China and Taiwan, the Clinton Administration said today that it was urgently seeking an explanation from the Taiwan leadership.

The senior American official in Taiwan, Darryl Johnson, is scheduled to meet on Wednesday with President Lee Teng-hui, who outlined the switch in policy over the weekend.

A State Department official said that Mr. Johnson planned to stress in the meeting that the United States considered Mr. Lee's move away from the one-China policy "unhelpful" and that he would ask for specific clarifications.

Lee stopped short of making a declaration of independence for Taiwan, but said from now on Taiwan would treat contacts with China as "state-to-state" relations.

"Under such special nation-to-nation relations," he said, "there is no longer any need to declare Taiwanese independence."

Lee's statement could be interpreted in one of two ways, the State Department official said. Either Mr. Lee, the first Taiwan-born President of Taiwan, was stating a "new reality" or he was repeating a version of what he had said before.

At the very least, the State Department believed that Mr. Lee still favored the eventual reunification of Taiwan and the mainland, but that Taiwan also wanted to be treated as a "sovereign state," and not a renegade province as it approached the reunification problem, the official said.

Although the terms used in describing the "one-China" policy often seem a matter of semantics to outsiders, the words mean everything in China and Taiwan and for United States policymakers.

The policy has been at the heart of the United States posture toward mainland China since 1972. Taiwan's shift from that long-held position occurs at a low point in Washington-Beijing relations and threatens to sour the atmosphere further.

Washington is at odds with Beijing on a number of issues, including negotiations over China's desire to join the World Trade Organization, a subject that remains at an impasse, and the NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in the Kosovo conflict.

American officials noted today that both issues touched the question of sovereignty, which is at the center of the differences between Taiwan and Beijing.

Thus, a major dispute over the sovereignty of Taiwan was bound to irritate further Beijing's attitude to the stalled talks over its admission to the trade organization, which regulates global commerce.
The setback for Beijing in April after President Clinton had decided to reject their proposals had the effect of making the entry of Taiwan into the group a possibility before Beijing.

"This is going to increase the pressure on the United States to try and smooth the way to get China into the trade group," said Robert Suettinger, a China specialist who was on the National Security Council under Mr. Clinton and is a senior analyst at the Brookings Institution.

The NATO intervention in Kosovo, which the Chinese regard as a province of Serbia, was bitterly opposed by the Beijing Government on the grounds that it represented interference in a sovereign country. The accidental embassy bombing served only to worsen Beijing's feelings.

With the Administration's relations with Beijing at a near nadir, the statement by Mr. Lee was highly likely to encourage Taiwan's allies in Congress to push legislation to authorize the sale of more sophisticated weapons to Taiwan.

Hearings on the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, sponsored by Senators Jesse Helms, Republican of North Carolina, and Robert Toricelli, Democrat of New Jersey, are scheduled for early next month, and the legislation may well be pushed along if relations with Beijing continue to plummet, officials said.

In 1979, Washington dropped its diplomatic recognition of Taiwan and opened an embassy in Beijing. The "one-China" policy, supported by the United States and reiterated by Mr. Clinton on his trip to mainland China last summer, allows Washington to support Taiwan but recognize Beijing as the capital of China.

In reiterating the policy, Mr. Clinton said it was up to the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait to resolve the relationship between China and Taiwan.

The Administration has encouraged talks between Beijing and Taipei. But officials said Taiwan's new pronouncements might dash hopes for talks that had appeared likely toward the end of the year.

For its part, the Communist Government of mainland China regards Taiwan as a renegade province that broke away when the Chinese National Party and its supporters fled to the island after their defeat by the Communists 50 years ago.

What makes the mainland China-Taiwan friction so volatile is the refusal by Beijing to rule out the use of force if Taiwan insists on independence. The last time that Mr. Lee used new definitions with China, in 1996, Beijing showed its anger by testing missiles and holding war games in the Taiwan Strait.
It's a question that puzzled countless government officials, scholars and common people in China and Taiwan on Tuesday, many of them surprised by the news that the president, Lee Teng-hui, had suddenly changed the island's official stance toward China by dropping his Nationalist government's long-standing premise that Taiwan and the mainland are parts of the same country.

Danger was the first word in many minds, because tampering with Taiwan's political status is akin to tweaking a hornet's nest, easily provoking military action from Beijing, where eventual reunification with Taiwan is considered a patriotic imperative.

Taiwan and China have acted independently of each other for the 50 years since Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist forces retreated to the island, defeated by the Communists in a civil war.

But any hint that Taiwan is moving toward a formal declaration of independence rings loud alarm bells in Beijing. Lee's shift inevitably complicates relations between Beijing and Washington, which itself continues to abide by the one-China formula, and local politics in Taiwan, where a presidential campaign is getting under way.

Yet Lee seems to be looking farther afield. Expected to step down next spring after 12 years in office, a time of remarkable transition in Taiwan from an authoritarian state to an economically lively democracy, Lee appears to want to cement his legacy as the father of a modern Taiwan separate from mainland China.

Politicians and scholars who have followed the career of Lee, Taiwan's first native-born president, say he is driven by a overwhelming sense of mission.

"Lee Teng-hui in his heart is a romantic," said Fung Hu-hsiang, a Taiwan legislator who opposes Lee's moves away from China. "In his later years, his sense of mission is pushing him to clarify Taiwan's role with the mainland."

Yet Fung, a political opponent of Lee's who believes the policy shift is potentially disastrous, cited another possibility echoed by several political analysts: Lee may want to create a crisis to justify a postponement of next year's election so that he can remain in office.

In March 1996, China launched several missiles into the ocean near Taiwan in what was officially described as a military exercise but was clearly intended to intimidate voters who were about to cast votes in Taiwan's first free presidential election.

But instead of being intimidated, anxious voters rallied around Lee, giving him an overwhelming victory. It was a risky strategy, but Lee apparently reasoned that the chances of a military invasion by China were slight, and he was proved right.
"If it's like 1996 again, and missiles are raining down, he could try to justify staying on," said Chang Ling-chen, a political science professor at National Taiwan University. "If China is smart, they won't respond so strongly this time."

Lee's new move came on Saturday when he said in a German radio interview that China and Taiwan should deal with each other on a "state to state" basis, implying that they are two separate countries. On Monday, a government spokesman, clarifying Lee's remarks, went a step further and dropped the "one China" idea that has guided China-Taiwan ties, effectively giving up the notion of eventual reunification.

It all complicates Taiwan presidential politics, perhaps most notably for James Soong, the popular former official from Lee’s Nationalist Party, who is expected to run as an independent. Soong's position on relations with Beijing is less than clear, and a new focus on the issue could damage him.

But of paramount concern to outsiders is the reaction from Beijing, whose long-held official position is that reunification of the motherland is a historical necessity and that it will use military force to achieve it if negotiations fail. Short of military action, China could apply economic pressure on Taiwan.

China’s state-run media Tuesday issued some of the vitriol that has come to be expected on this issue from the Communist authorities, who called Lee's move "a monumental disaster."

Yet Beijing's public response was not as harsh as could have been. Zhang Qiyue, a Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, sidestepped several questions about Taiwan, suggesting that China’s leadership is mulling a course of action, which could take some time.

"They're probably trying to figure out what Lee is doing, and why he is doing it now," said an international relations scholar in Beijing, who felt the topic too sensitive to be quoted by name. "They may think the U.S. is behind him, telling him what to do."

In fact, U.S. diplomats here seemed as surprised as anyone by Lee's move, which counters Washington's efforts to push Taiwan and China into meaningful discussions.

A critical meeting is scheduled for October in Taiwan with China's top Taiwan negotiator, Wang Daohan, who would be the most senior official from Beijing to visit since the civil war ended in 1949. Whether that meeting will be held is now in doubt.
4. Target Text:

週兩岸論兩國美媒體紛揣測李宣示動機
中國時報，15/07/99

美國兩岸主流媒體今天繼續報導李登輝總統「兩國關係論」所引發的風暴，以及此一情勢對美、中、台三邊關係的影響。

紐約時報在重要的A版第三頁刊出一篇報導和一篇分析，幾乎佔了整頁。報導說美國離任的駐台代表張戴要台灣解釋其政策。白宮國家安全會議前中國事務專家蘇海立說「這會增加美國推動中共加入世貿組織的壓力」。

由於李登輝提出「兩國論」論時，正值美中關係陷於低潮，紐約時報說，李的聲明極可能會鼓動台灣在國會山莊的盟友們乘勢強行通過「加強台灣安全法案」。國會將於下月對這一由赫姆斯（外委會主席）及陶瑞奇等參議員領銜提出的法案召開聽證會。

新聞分析在找出李登輝此時此際推出「兩國論」的用意。紐約時報引述反李立委馮添祥的說法，「李登輝可能要蓄意製造危機，好利用危機延後明年的台灣總統選舉，他自己繼續執政」。台大教授張麟徵也持此看法。

李的兩岸關係也可迫使角逐總統的前台灣省長宋楚瑜作出大陸政策的選擇。宋現在的兩岸政策並不很明確，在這個政策上露出焦距只會傷害宋楚瑜。

紐約時報說，李的「兩國關係論」不僅令人困惑，也很危險。因為改變台灣的政治地位好比插黃蜂窩一樣，很容易激發北京的事事行動。

華盛頓郵報在 A-17 版刊出台北總統府院頂飄揚的青天白日旗的巨照，文字的標題是「台灣海峽兩岸火花紛飛」。郵報發自北京的報導說，台灣的政治分析家們相信李此舉在為他卸任前的政策留下「遺產」（Legacy），約束他的繼承人不可改弦更張，另一方面則逼宋楚瑜在大陸政策上攤牌。

郵報說，儘管李的聲明使中共暴跳如雷，台灣卻有許多人支持李。英文台北時報發行人江春男和民主黨立委張旭成等都認為李的說法與事實並無不符，因為大家都知道「台灣就是一個國家」。
1. Source Text 1:
China Mulls Use of Force Off Taiwan, Experts Say Warnings Perceived As Effort to Gauge Likely U.S. Reaction
Washington Post, 13/08/99

Chinese Embassy officials and visiting army officers and scholars have told U.S. analysts and experts in Washington that China is considering a new show of military force in reaction to Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui's recent assertion that Taiwan and China should be treated as equals.

Although the warnings could be psychological warfare designed in part to scare Taipei and Washington, U.S. analysts and Clinton administration officials expressed belief that China is genuinely weighing military options. They said these could include an amphibious assault on one of the tiny, sparsely populated islands Taiwan controls near the Chinese coast.

In a recent series of meetings with prominent, nongovernmental U.S. experts on China policy, the Chinese emissaries appeared to have been trying to measure the likely response by the United States to some limited military action, according to the analysts and officials.

"They walk in with the same message: 'We're going to do something. We can't tell you what, but we're going to do something,' " said James Mulvenon, a Chinese army expert at Rand Corp., a research organization specializing in military affairs. "The goal for China would be to cause maximum impact in Taiwan, without bringing the U.S. in."

Security experts said possible military steps include a blockade of some of the small Taiwan-controlled islands, a seizure of Taiwanese supply ships, a limited air clash or an incursion by Chinese fishing boats, submarines or naval vessels into Taiwanese waters.

Clinton administration officials and China experts believe it is unlikely that Beijing would launch military action before October because such a move would spoil a scheduled mid-September meeting between President Clinton and Chinese President Jiang Zemin in New Zealand, a conference in Shanghai next month featuring 300 senior executives from Western multinational companies and the Oct. 1 celebration marking the 50th anniversary of the Communist takeover in China.

"I don't think they'll do it soon, but I can't say they won't do it at all," a senior administration official said. "We have some time to play with, but we're not out of the woods."

U.S. policy experts have warned China that military action would provoke an outpouring of support for Taiwan in Congress, damaging trade ties and guaranteeing new pledges of U.S. military aid for the self-governing island.

Many analysts have warned that the United States would probably respond militarily as well. Although the United States endorses Beijing's view that there is only one China, under the
Taiwan Relations Act it has committed itself to protecting the island against unprovoked attack from the mainland.

Some analysts in Hong Kong, Taipei and Washington cautioned that the warnings could be ploys designed to frighten and pressure Taipei and Washington, underlining the issue's importance to China and causing jitters in the Taiwan stock market. Simply by raising the specter of an assault, they said, Beijing is stepping up pressure on Taiwan to retreat from Lee's position and on the United States to lean more heavily on Taipei.

"It's a psychological war right now," said a Hong Kong-based military analyst. "I don't think Beijing wants necessarily to use military force."

China's state-run media have been full of menacing rhetoric since Lee redefined ties between the two sides as "special state-to-state" relations last month. The move enraged Chinese leaders, who saw it as a renunciation of the "one China" principle, and Beijing repeated its long-standing warning that it will invade Taiwan if it formally declares independence.

"Military conflict between the two sides could erupt at any moment," the Global Times, a Beijing-based tabloid run by the official People's Daily, said yesterday.

Pro-Beijing newspapers in Hong Kong have said recently that Beijing has put submarines in "attack positions" in the 100-mile-wide Taiwan Strait, has mobilized reserves and moved military units to coastal areas in preparation for action against Taiwan.

But Andrew Yang, a senior military analyst at the Taipei-based Council of Advanced Policy Studies, said he has detected no signs of preparations for any large maneuver in the Taiwan Strait. He said such signs were apparent months before China conducted serious military exercises near Taiwan in 1996.

"There's a lot of noise in the air, which gets the hairs on my neck raised," Mulvenon said.

"The real trick is sifting the bluster from the reality."

Most analysts see more than bluster. They believe Chinese leaders debated the merits of military action during their summer retreat, and some China watchers say Jiang has come under pressure from hard-line army officers.

"The People's Liberation Army definitely wants to play a stronger role in the decision-making process on Taiwan issues," said Wang Chi, a Washington-based scholar who maintains close contacts with Chinese officials. "The [army] feels strongly that it has to be more than a military exercise."

Douglas Paal, president of the Asia Pacific Policy Center, quoted Chinese officials who met with him as saying that Lee's abandonment of the "one China" principle was taken more seriously than his 1995 visit to Cornell University. After that visit, which China said violated U.S. pledges to have only unofficial relations with Taiwan, Beijing launched large-scale military exercises in the Taiwan Strait and fired missiles near Taiwan.
Beijing has followed through on actions foretold by Chinese intermediaries on earlier occasions. In 1996, Mulvenon said, Chinese who claimed connections to the army visited the Pentagon and warned that China was planning to fire a missile an hour for six days near Taiwan. Missiles were fired soon afterward, although not nearly as many as threatened. Chinese scholars visiting Rand before Premier Zhu Rongji came to Washington in April accurately forecast that Zhu would offer deep reductions in China's trade barriers in a bid to gain China's entry into the World Trade Organization, Mulvenon said.

Conflict over the Taiwan-controlled islands near the Chinese coast would echo battles fought over the islands in the 1950s, when the defense of Quemoy and Matsu were rallying cries among Americans eager to oppose communism. Because of that history, most analysts believe China would target smaller, nearby islands.

Laris reported from Beijing.
Chinese government officials have warned the Clinton administration that Beijing may be compelled to take military action against Taiwan to "punish" Taiwan for what Beijing sees as moves toward independence, administration officials and China experts said Thursday.

In reply, Washington has warned the Beijing officials that action by the Chinese against Taiwan would bring retaliation by the United States, officials said. In the last week, the administration has also publicly and privately urged the two sides to resolve the situation between themselves. The message from the Chinese has not come from the very top of the government but from Chinese officials in meetings with administration officials. It was not clear, administration officials said, whether a firm decision had been made by Beijing what precise action would be taken.

If military action was taken it could range, they said, from striking at Taiwan to seizing an unpopulated island belonging to Taiwan. Military action against Taiwan itself appeared to be the most unlikely course for Beijing, several administration officials said.

But an administration official said the military situation in the Taiwan Strait was "dangerous" and "very delicate." For more than a week military aircraft from China and Taiwan have been flying close to each other over the 100-mile-wide waterway, he said.

"The chances are very real for inadvertent things or something more ominous," the official said. The United States was preparing for "contingencies" in the Taiwan Strait, another official said. But he declined to elaborate what those preparations were.

In 1996, the United States came to the closest to a military confrontation with China since the Eisenhower era after the Chinese fired a ballistic missile toward Taiwan and the Clinton administration moved two aircraft carriers into the area of the Taiwan Strait.

This time, the government in Beijing, whose top officials have just returned from an annual conference, appeared to be divided on how to respond to the statements by Taiwan in the last month. "The hardliners want to be tough, others are saying let's wait," an administration official said. He added that overall, China appeared to be "waiting to see if Taiwan could be put back into the box."

The charge d'affair at the Chinese Embassy in Washington, Liu Xiao-Min, was summoned to the office of assistant secretary of state for East Asia, Stanley Roth, last week.

In testimony the following day before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Roth said that the Chinese and the Taiwanese had been given six demarches by the United States urging them to restrain their military activities in the Taiwan Strait.
The Chinese government may also be sending their warnings about taking military action to test the United States, several China experts said. The government has used the South China Morning Post, a Hong Kong newspaper, to float stories about pending action. Thursday's edition of the paper said that 500,000 troops of the People's Liberation Army were being mobilized in a southern province.

But Pentagon officials have said in the last several days that they have seen no sign of such massive mobilization. An effort to take a smaller island belonging to Taiwan would not need such a large mobilization, however.
3. Target Text:

紐約時報 華盛頓郵報：中共可能武力回應兩國論
中國時報，14/08/99

華盛頓郵報和紐約時報今天都在頭版報導，中共可能對台採取軍事行動，以懲罰李登輝總統的「兩國論」，中共官員目前正多方試探美國的反應，華府則警告中共不可妄動，否則將會對美國報復的危險。

全美兩家最具影響力的大報，同時刊出中共可能對台動武的報導，而且消息來源是美政府官員及政府內的中國專家們，顯示這是美政府故意洩漏這一極為敏感的新聞，測試美國國內、共和黨國際間的反應。

華盛頓郵報說，中共駐華府大使館官員和中共訪美的軍官及學者們，告訴美方的專家及分析家們，中共正在考慮做新的武力展示，以回應李登輝的「兩國論」。

中共中央在對台灣進行心理戰，增加對台壓力，但柯林頓政府官員及美方的分析家相信，中共這次真正是權衡一些軍事的選擇方案，如像對台灣控制的外島，特別是人煙稀少或無人住的小島發動兩棲攻勢並佔領之。

蘭德公司的軍事專家穆文昂透露，中共的使者們跑進來說：「我們會做些事，至於什麼，不能告訴你們。」

安全專家們認為中共可能採取的行動包括：封鎖台灣控制的小島，攔截台灣的運補船，有限度的空中衝突，漁船、軍艦和潛艇入侵台灣水域。

中共對台可能採取軍事行動，不會是九月柯林頓與江澤民在紐西蘭舉行高峰會前或是十月一日中共建國五十週年慶典之前，以免破壞這兩件大事。

報紙引述美國一位高級官員的話說：「我不認為他們很快就要做，但我不能說他們完全不會做。我們還有些時間，但並未脫離險境。」

美國政策專家們警告中共，軍事行動會引爆美國國會對台灣的支持，包括承諾提供更多的軍援給台灣在內。

儘管中共武逆可能只是心戰，但蘭德公司的穆文昂指出，一九九六年台海危機發生前，自稱與中共軍方有關係的人士訪問五角大廈時，即表示中共要對台灣發射六天的飛彈，每小時一顆，後來果然兌現，雖說打了折扣，所以對中共這次揚言要動武懲罰李登輝的「兩國論」，是不能掉以輕心的。

紐約時報今天報導，針對中共要對台灣動武的威脅，美國官員的回應是：「任何對台灣的軍事行動，都將招致美國的報復」。

美官員分析中共動武的警告，有爭取美國對台施壓使台灣放棄「兩國論」的企圖，另一作用在測試美國對共用武的反應。

傳遞中共有意對台動武訊息的中方人士屬於較低層的官員，並非高層的領導。好幾位美政府官員認為北京對台動武的可能性極低，但一位官員稱：「台海的軍事情勢危險，非常微妙。」
這位官員指出，一個多星期來，兩岸的軍機在台海上空擦肩飛過的情形已有一百多架次，發生意外的機會或更險惡的事是非常真實的。

時報說，另外一位美國官員透露，「美國正在海峽準備應變措施」，至於是什麼措施，這位官員婉拒說明。

美方分析，中共高層領導對如何處置「兩國論」有分歧，強硬派主張斷然行動，另有人則說，「等等看」，看看能不能把台灣擺回籠子裡去。前國務院中國通、曾任駐北京美國代辦的傅立民告訴時報，中共這次要懲罰台灣的意向是「嚴重的」，只是不清楚以什麼方式懲罰而已。

時報報導，上星期二（三日）亞太事務助卿陸士達曾召見中共駐美大使館代辦劉曉明（李肇星大使現在大陸度假並出席內部會議），表示美國對台海緊張局勢的高度關切。陸士達第二天在參院作證時說，美國在四十八小時內，曾六次向北京和台北交涉抗議。
No. 12
1. Source Text 1:
China's Threats
*Washington Post*, 23/02/00

On the issue of China's claim to Taiwan, the Clinton administration, like its predecessors, has pursued a policy of "strategic ambiguity." The United States will provide the increasingly democratic island just enough political and military support to deter China from taking the island by force; but it will not provide so much that Taiwan's leaders feel emboldened to declare independence, which could provoke China to start a war that would almost certainly involve American forces.

This policy grows less tenable as Taiwan gets more and more democratic and China remains a dictatorship. Most Taiwanese understandably don't want to be swallowed by a repressive state, and unlike in the past--when Taiwan was governed by dictators of its own--their views on independence shape national policy. Now China has further weakened the rationale for the U.S. policy of ambiguity. Until now, the United States could fairly argue that Taiwan wasn't suffering much from Chinese threats--and that as long as it refrained from declaring independence, it knew it would be safe. But China has just issued a "white paper" threatening to attack Taiwan not only if it declares independence but also if, in China's judgment, the island's leaders drag their feet in reunification negotiations; and China alone reserves the right to decide how long is too long. This new Chinese rhetoric is preferable to its 1996 firing of nuclear-capable missiles into the sea near Taiwan, prompting the defensive dispatch of two U.S. aircraft carriers. But that's the best you can say for it.

China's new threat, like its 1996 military "exercise," was intended partly to influence a Taiwanese presidential election. It also may have been meant to shore up President Jiang Zemin's flagging status among hard-liners and to underscore China's opposition to the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, a proposal to increase U.S.-Taiwan military cooperation that has passed the U.S. House.

But the Chinese declaration also provides a window on that country's priorities. It was issued only hours after a high-level U.S. delegation in Beijing finished pleading for restraint on the subject of Taiwan. It could complicate administration efforts to win congressional support for China's entry into the World Trade Organization, as its bullying posture calls into doubt its willingness to live by international rules. None of this deters the regime from making threats.

The administration has in the past bent pretty far to China's wishes. The House was prompted to write the Taiwan bill in part because of President Clinton's public accession, in China, to Beijing's three key demands regarding Taiwan's status. The U.S. response to China's latest challenge should be shaped, at a minimum, by the need not to say or do anything that
China could present to the next administration as U.S. acquiescence in its new policy. Strategic ambiguity does, at times, have its uses; this is a moment for strategic clarity.
Dangerous pattern is emerging in the troubled relations across the Taiwan Strait. During Taiwan's last presidential campaign, in 1996, China test-fired missiles over waters close to the island's major cities to protest what it saw as a drift toward independence. Now, with a new campaign under way, Beijing is again trying to intimidate Taiwanese voters and push the island's next leaders into early reunification talks on the mainland's terms.

China was wrong this week to threaten to use force against Taiwan if the island's leaders take too long to agree to reunite with the mainland. By coupling that threat with an attempt to deflect the blame to Washington for increasing military tensions over Taiwan, Beijing may have damaged its chances of winning Congressional backing for China's entry into the World Trade Organization.

Unlike some of the past crises stirred up by the provocative actions of Taiwan's departing president, Lee Teng-hui, the blame for this flare-up lies squarely with Beijing. Taiwan's three leading presidential candidates have tried to mute the independence issue, and all three favor early talks with the mainland. Most of the world, and most Taiwanese, acknowledge the principle that Taiwan and the mainland are part of a single China that should ultimately be reunited.

But there are vital differences on how and when reunification should take place. The United States, which recognizes the Communist government in Beijing as the sole government of China, rightly insists that reunification be achieved by peaceful means. Beijing, however, has consistently asserted its right to settle the question by force. When China underscored that threat with missile tests in 1996, it created an anti-mainland backlash among Taiwanese voters and damaged Beijing's relations with the United States. The mainland could again hurt its own interests if it fails to show greater restraint.

Taiwan's presidential race is a tight three-way affair between the candidate of the ruling Nationalist Party, Lien Chan; a dissident nationalist, James Soong; and the candidate of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party, Chen Shui-bian. Although Mr. Chen's party has traditionally called for an independent Taiwan, he has deliberately stepped back from that position, promising that if elected, he would not seek formal independence. This caution reflects the general sense on Taiwan that President Lee needlessly provoked the mainland with his politicized 1995 visit to the United States and his 1999 declaration that Taiwan would henceforth negotiate with China only if Beijing acknowledged it as an equal state.

Over five decades, a relatively stable arrangement has evolved that allows Taiwan and the mainland to maintain separate political and economic systems as part of a larger, single China.
That understanding has served both sides well and preserved peace. This is no time for Beijing to threaten to overturn it.
3. Target Text:
美與論譴責中共白皮書
中國時報，24/02/00

美國兩大報「紐約時報」、「華盛頓郵報」今天都發表評論，譴責中共發表白皮書，
意圖以言辭恐嚇和武力威脅影響台灣的總統大選，並逼迫台灣的新領導人儘快與北京
談判。時報認為，中共揚言若台灣長期拒絕統一談判就將動武的新表述，等於推翻過
去五十年讓台海維持和平的默契，既錯誤，也沒必要；郵報則說，白皮書的要旨其實
和四年前的演習一樣，已經加劇了台灣兩岸的緊張。柯林頓政府過去對中共過分屈從，
現在應該是把所謂的「戰略模糊」政策調整為「戰略明確」的時候了。

「紐約時報」在題為「台灣的新緊張局勢」的社論中說，中共這次的錯誤舉動可能
危及它原本成為世貿組織成員的希望。因它增列對台動武的條件只會讓一向對北京
反感的美國國會更難給予它永久性正常貿易關係。

郵報則在「中國的威脅」的評論文章中說，在台灣愈來愈民主化，而中共還是維
持獨裁體制的情況下，美國在台灣問題上一貫奉行的「戰略性模糊」政策已愈來愈難
繼續下去。不幸的是，北京日前發表白皮書，揚言台灣若長久拒和，將不惜動武的說
法讓這項政策變得更沒有說服力。文章說，過去美國總是說，中共並未對台灣造成太
多威脅，只要台灣不獨立，就不會有事。如今，中共卻增列了動武的條件，而且對何
謂「長久拒和」還能片面、主觀的認定，不增加台海爆發軍事衝突的可能。

文章認為，除了試圖影響台灣的選結果，中共發表對台白皮書應該還有對內和
對外的雙重考量。前者，可能是要樹立江澤民對強硬派的領導地位，後者則是要凸顯
中共對台灣安全加強法的堅決反對立場。

文章最後說，柯林頓政府過去對北京顯然太過屈從，是何以美國國會主張立法，
加劇保障台灣安全的原因。在明知動武有損美國堅持的一貫立場，甚至可能危及本身
世貿入會的機會，北京仍執意這麼做，相反之下，現在該是華府對台政策調整為「戰
略明確」的時候了。
No. 13

1. Source Text 1:
Beijing and Taipei Both Willing to Talk, but Only on Their Own Terms

*New York Times*, 21/03/00

With a few tantalizingly parallel sentences today, the president-elect of Taiwan and the president of China captured the exasperating and probably intractable differences in their views of Taiwan.

"We can talk about 'one China' as long as it is not a principle," the victorious candidate, Chen Shui-bian, said to Taiwan reporters today. "As long as we are treated as equals, there is nothing we cannot discuss." His advisers regard the statement as a creative concession that may entice Beijing into talks.

In Beijing, President Jiang Zemin repeated the formula that his government sees as generous: "The one-China principle must first be recognized. Under this precondition, anything can be discussed."

On such wordplay are matters of war and peace decided across the Taiwan Strait -- or, more prosaically, the matter of whether the two sides can even sit together, as they have not done for years, to negotiate whether packages can be sent across without detouring through Hong Kong.

Around the world and among a decent share of Taiwan's people, there is fear that the election of Mr. Chen, who long advocated a declaration of independence from China but recently backed away on the ground that a formal declaration was not needed, could lead to a military attack by China.

Given all the concern, Mr. Chen and his advisers are surprisingly upbeat. They say he will not only avoid provoking a Chinese attack, but may also be able to coax China into a friendly dialogue as well as new agreements to deepen economic ties and perhaps even a peace treaty.

"I'm optimistic," Chiou I-jen, a top adviser to Mr. Chen who ran his presidential campaign and is the Democratic Progressive Party's representative to Washington, said in an interview. "If both sides can maintain a certain vagueness, then negotiations could carry on."

Mr. Chiou is going next week to Washington, where he will discuss Mr. Chen's strategy with American officials who are worried about possible tensions across the strait but who publicly hailed Mr. Chen's democratic election and the chance for, in President Clinton's words, a "fresh start."

Some experts question the assumption that China will want to seek any common ground with the chief of an independence-minded party.

"I think the optimism from the Chen people and the American government, this idea that they have a new beginning, is extremely dangerous," said Andrew Nathan, an expert on East
Asian politics at Columbia University, who observed the election here. "The Chinese simply don't trust Chen Shui-bian. They think his ultimate goal is to cheat China."

Beijing knows that Mr. Chen is in a weak position at home, having won with 39 percent of the vote in a three-way race. He will also be overseeing a divided government, with the legislature still under the control of the Nationalist Party. And Mr. Chen's advisers and a leading opposition expert on cross-strait relations both said Mr. Chen could not even begin to pursue talks with China until he forged a broad consensus domestically, which at best will take many months.

In addition, Chinese leaders have little incentive to cooperate and make Mr. Chen look good, said Mr. Nathan, who predicts four years of serious cross-strait tensions after Mr. Chen becomes president on May 20.

Countering such pessimism, Mr. Chen is fond of evoking the opening to China by the arch-anti-Communist Richard Nixon, saying that perhaps he, too, could make a breakthrough where his predecessors could not.

Mr. Chen and his staff have been buoyed by the initial signs since his election on Saturday.

Mr. Chen has avoided provocative statements, deliberately not uttering, for example, the phrase state-to-state relations, which the outgoing president, Lee Teng-hui, used last summer to the outrage of Beijing.

He has offered to exchange visits with Chinese leaders and discuss removing Taiwan's restrictions on economic ties, a longtime mainland goal. He said he was resigning from the Democratic Progressive Party's executive committee -- a way, perhaps, to dissociate himself from contentious statements in the party platform and from the party's hard-liners.

Though the leaders in Beijing had to be dismayed by Mr. Chen's victory, they halted their pointed vitriol of the week before, so far saying only, "We will listen to your words and watch your actions."

In interviews and speeches in the last two days, Mr. Chen and key advisers have described a strategy that they think may be more attractive to Beijing than what Mr. Lee had to offer.

Essentially, it involves being willing, as Mr. Lee never was, to take up China's offer to discuss Taiwan's status under the principle of "one China."

Mr. Lee accepted in theory that Taiwan and China might loosely unite in the distant future -- after the mainland became a democracy. But he said discussion of such fundamental issues was premature and must be kept aside while practical matters like trade and fishing rights were discussed. For the last several years this impasse prevented any formal negotiations.

The problem is that Mr. Chen does not even pay lip service to a future political link, although he says he will discuss anything including reunification.

That general willingness, from someone who has zero interest in reunifying, is made possible by Mr. Chen's final condition -- the trump card that enables him to agree to almost any
dialogue. Any important change in Taiwan's status that is proposed, he insists, must be decided by the democratic will of Taiwan's people.

"We insist on parity and that any ultimate resolution must have the consent of the people," said Mr. Chiou, the adviser to Mr. Chen.

Beijing has already rejected that condition. In February it issued a policy statement deriding the notion that one group -- like the residents of Taiwan -- should vote on a sovereignty issue concerning "all the Chinese people including Taiwan compatriots."

Still, Mr. Chen's advisers say that when Beijing is ready to talk and nurture better ties -- as it was for a time in the early 1990's, even though the meaning of "one China" was not quite agreed on -- the different assumptions can be played down.
The reverberations from the opposition leader Chen Shui-bian's victory in the presidential election on Saturday continued to spread across Taiwan today. The stock market tumbled, protesters clashed with the police and President Lee Teng-hui faced mounting pressure to resign as leader of the vanquished Nationalist Party.

The tension ebbed a bit from Sunday, when more than 2,000 protesters besieged the Nationalist Party's headquarters to demand Mr. Lee's ouster.

But a crowd of several hundred massed in front of the building again today, sounding air horns, waving flags and deriding Mr. Lee in fiery speeches as the man who had brought humiliating defeat to Taiwan's once-invincible Nationalists.

At darkness fell, protesters fought with a growing number of troops in riot gear who used water cannons in the grand square facing the building. At least eight people were injured.

Safely away from the mayhem, Mr. Lee held a marathon meeting in suburban Taipei with about 100 Nationalist Party legislators, 22 of whom were preparing to file a petition urging him to heed the demands for his resignation.

Mr. Lee did not respond to those calls, party officials said. They added that he had accepted responsibility for the poor finish of the Nationalist candidate, Lien Chan, who came in third.

After the meeting, a legislator loyal to Mr. Lee, who is 79, said he would not be forced out.

"The majority of the K.M.T. legislators hope the chairman can hang on for a while," said the lawmaker, Hung Yu-chin, using the initials for the party's Chinese name, Kuomintang.

Mr. Lee has already agreed to step down in September, a year earlier than he planned, but a growing number of party officials say that is not enough. Today the legislators discussed a wide range of reforms of the party.

"If the party doesn't reform, it will definitely fall apart," said Chu Li-lun, one of the legislators.

But by all accounts the Nationalist Party is already in tatters, the victim of feuds like the one between President Lee and James Soong, a former party stalwart who broke away to mount a nearly successful insurgent bid for the presidency, finishing ahead of Mr. Lien and just behind Mr. Chen.

The sudden eruption of violence on the streets, rare on this island since democracy replaced one-party rule in the 1980's, worried investors. Taipei's stock market fell 2.6 percent and would have fallen much further if the government had not set a limit of 3.5 percent on single-day price declines.
"This is because of the instability in our society," said Hsiao Jiun, 58, a retired businessman, as he stared moodily at a bank of television screens recording the market rout. "Even the Chinese government hasn't been hostile to Chen Shui-bian yet. They prefer to wait and see."

Stocks of companies with ties to the governing party fared particularly badly. Some investors said they worried that the Nationalist Party might liquidate parts of its vast portfolio before Mr. Chen, of the Democratic Progressive Party, takes power on May 20, causing further losses in the market.

"The K.M.T. has collapsed and is becoming a weak opposition party," said Liu Yi-ding, 56, a day trader. He had little to do today, since most shares quickly fell to the preset limit and virtually ceased trading.

Mr. Liu and other investors girded themselves for losses since the election of Mr. Chen, who has drawn fire from the Chinese government for his past advocacy of independence for Taiwan. But China's subdued response to Mr. Chen's victory -- combined with the president-elect's own soothing remarks about relations across the Taiwan Strait -- calmed some of those jitters.

Aides to Mr. Chen acknowledged that the turmoil had complicated an already fragile transition. The president-elect has been concentrating on domestic political issues since his victory, they said, even though the prospect of rising tensions with Beijing were expected to consume this period.

For now, the president-elect has a simple goal: steer clear of the mess in his rival's camp.

Mr. Chen's campaign manager, Chiou I-jen, said his boss had no immediate plans to order an investigation of the Nationalist Party's businesses, as some of the party's critics would like. He also said Mr. Chen saw no need to become involved in the internal dispute of another party.

"We still have confidence in President Lee's government, and we fully trust President Lee's ability to handle the situation," Mr. Chiou said.

That a spokesman for Chen Shui-bian, an opposition leader who was once jailed by the government, would feel obliged to express confidence in the party that ruled Taiwan with an iron grip for more than 50 years shows how much the political landscape here has changed in the last 48 hours.
3. Target Text:

紐約時報評析 台灣問題已至難以駕馭的歧異
中國時報，22/03/00

在頭版針對台灣大選後的兩岸局勢作大幅的分析報導。報導中特別指出，台灣新選出的總統陳水扁與中共國家主席江澤民這兩天所作的「吊人胃口」的談話，已使台灣問題惡化並產生難以駕馭的歧異。

報導指出，陳水扁的顧問們認為陳於二十日所提出，只要「一個中國不是原則」則什麼都可以談，應可誘使北京回到談判桌。然而北京方面，江澤民則立刻回應表示，必須先承認「一個中國原則」，在這個前提下，則什麼都可以討論。報導說，這類文字遊戲正主宰著台海的和與戰。

前來台灣觀察選舉的美國哥倫比亞大學東亞所教授黎安友認為，陳水扁陣營以及美國政府如果樂觀地認為兩岸將有新的開始，這將是一件非常危險的事。他表示，中國的確不信任陳水扁，他們認為陳的最終目的就是要欺騙中國。此外，中國也沒有動機與陳水扁合作來幫助他。黎安友預測，陳水扁五月二十日就職後，兩岸將面臨嚴重的四年緊張氣氛。

在對中共談判方面，陳水扁和他的幕僚亦提供較李登輝更具吸引力的策略。報導說，陳水扁願意就中國提出的「一個中國」與北京當局討論台灣的地位。而李登輝則主張在中國民主化之前，僅能與北京進行諸如經貿及漁業等事務性質的談判。

該報導悲觀地認為，儘管陳水扁願意與中共就包含統一在內的任何事進行談判，但是陳水扁手中的王牌則是設定了前提，亦即任何有關台灣地位的重大改變都必須經由台灣人民以民主方式決定。陳水扁的顧問之一邱義仁對此解釋說，「我們堅持對等原則以及任何最終解決方式都必須得到台灣人民的同意。」他表示，僅管雙方對一個中國的意義不盡一致，但是北京已經有對談的準備，並正建立比九〇年代初期更好的對台關係。

此外，紐約時報亦針對國家黨選後的內部動盪進行評析認為，二十日公眾在國民黨中央黨部的群眾以鳴喇叭、揮舞國旗及演說辱罵李登輝等方式，正一步步地擊敗在台灣堪稱無敵的國民黨。

報導說，陳水扁應有一個簡單的目標，也就是協助清理雜亂的對手陣營。但當訪問邱義仁時，邱表示，陳水扁目前並沒有要立即調查國民黨黨務的計劃，他不覺得有介入另一政黨黨內事務的必要。邱義仁說，「我們對李總統的政府有信心，也完全信任他有能力處理黨內的狀況。」
An American scientist who helped negotiate arms control treaties with the Soviet Union came to China tonight on a sensitive and unannounced trip to talk to Chinese leaders about Taiwan. His arrival coincided with reports that the Beijing leadership is embroiled in a debate about how best to reach its overriding goal of absorbing the island.

Jeremy J. Stone, president of the Federation of American Scientists, came to China from Taiwan, where he had met with President-elect Chen Shui-bian and Lee Yuan-tzu, the Nobel laureate who has become one of Chen's closest advisers on an evolving policy toward Beijing.

Noting this, a Chinese source called Stone an "unofficial representative" of the Taiwanese government-in-waiting. But Bi-khim Hsiao, chief of the international department of Chen's Democratic Progressive Party, said Stone is representing only himself, adding: "It's not like we've asked him to carry a message for us. . . . What we're trying to do is to find ways to communicate."

Whatever his status, Stone's trip to China was seen as another indication of the careful approach Chen has taken toward China since he was elected on March 18, unseating the Nationalists 51 years after they fled a Communist revolution in China and set up their own government on the island. Chen has invited China's senior leaders to his inauguration on May 20, for instance, and he has vowed that he will not declare Taiwanese independence despite a long history of favoring it.

By encouraging Stone's participation in the contacts, Chen decided to work with a man who is familiar with sensitive negotiations because of his arms control work with the Soviets. Sources in Beijing said that Stone and Lee, who won the Nobel Prize for chemistry in 1986, have been close friends for years, and that Lee played a role in encouraging Stone to take this trip.

Over the next four days here, Stone is scheduled to meet with Deputy Prime Minister Qian Qichen, the chief architect of China's Taiwan policy; Gen. Xiong Guangkai, a top policymaker with the People's Liberation Army; and officials at the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, China's cabinet, sources said.

Contacted in a small Beijing hotel, Stone declined comment other than to say he wants to avoid attention. "Please allow me to fade back into the woodwork," he said.

In the run-up to Taiwan's vote, China launched a series of diplomatic salvos, indirectly threatening war if Chen was elected because of his long-standing pro-independence views. Just days before the election, China's premier, Zhu Rongji, threatened to spill "Chinese blood" if
Taiwan indefinitely refuses to unite with China. Since the vote, that tone has been replaced by silence.

But U.S. national security adviser Samuel R. "Sandy" Berger had a difficult two days of talks regarding Taiwan in China earlier this week, Chinese sources said. A senior American official said the talks were productive; other sources said that they were tense and that Berger's Chinese interlocutors appeared concerned about any U.S. support of Chen and the possibility of more U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.

Because of his stand on independence, Chen, a 50-year-old former maritime lawyer, has a bad reputation in this capital. His victory caught China's leadership off-guard. Two Communist Party sources said the failure of China's top Taiwan watchers to predict the election results has sparked confusion in the foreign policy establishment here.

While a senior U.S. official on Thursday characterized China's response to Chen's victory so far as "prudent," two Chinese officials familiar with policy debates about the Taiwan issue said "chaotic" was a better word. Party officials place the confusion in the context of a leadership that is unsure of itself and lacks direction.

President Jiang Zemin appears to be buffeted by different party and military factions urging him to get tough or lower the pressure on Taiwan. Mindful of his legacy and concerned that a mistake on the Taiwan issue could cost him his job in the 2002 Communist Party conference, Jiang is described by sources as paralyzed by the new developments.

One major problem is that, in a controversial decision by senior party officials, China has set a precondition for reunification talks — that Chen must accept the "one China" principle before dialogue resumes. That principle holds there is only one China and that Taiwan is part of it, sharply different from Taiwan's insistence that it be treated like a separate state.

"We are painting ourselves into a corner," said one official in Beijing with links to China's security services. "We are being tough when we should be soft and passive when we should be taking the initiative."

Another official said it appears that Wang Daohan, China's long-time top Taiwan negotiator, might be sidelined. He returned to Shanghai late last week after a meeting on Taiwan in Beijing, "unhappy about the government's direction," the official said.

Wang has pushed a softer line on Taiwan for years, according to Lin Chong-bin, an expert on China at Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council, arguing that more trade and contacts, and fewer military threats, are the keys to improved relations and ultimate reunification. Wang could not be reached for comment.

Sources said Stone would not be meeting Wang, although he apparently tried.

Chinese party sources expressed worry that China might be on the verge of losing an opportunity to improve ties with Taiwan because the leadership is concerned about the appearance of weakness. One source in particular said the leadership seems stuck on the words
of China's late leader, Deng Xiaoping, who came up with the concept of "one country, two systems"--the formula used to manage the return of Hong Kong and Macao to Chinese rule.

China says it wants to apply that formula to Taiwan, but almost no one in Taiwan supports "one country, two systems," the source noted.

"If Deng were alive he would throw this out and create another formula," the official said.

"But now these men argue that they have principles and we must stick to our principles. Deng didn't have any principles. But he understood power and knew how to get things done. I have argued that Deng was one of us. If he can be great, so can we."
Chinese leaders have told the United States that they plan to stick with a "wait and see" attitude toward Taiwan's new president and that they are open to resuming a dialogue with the estranged island, a senior administration official said today.

The Chinese assurances, if borne out, come at a crucial time for the administration, which is scrambling to put relations with China on an even keel and to persuade Congress to upgrade economic relations with it before President Clinton leaves office.

This week, President Jiang Zemin and other top Chinese leaders indicated to the national security adviser, Samuel R. Berger, that China's initial, restrained reaction to the election of Chen Shui-bian as Taiwan's president last month was part of a "considered policy," in the words of the American official.

President-elect Chen's party had previously called for independence from China, something Beijing has sworn it will wage war to prevent, and he only recently muted that stance.

The Chinese have decided, at least for the time being, to try to reach an accommodation with his new government, which is expected to be formed in May, the official said.

"They don't quite know what to make of the situation," he said, describing Mr. Berger's two-day talks with the Chinese.

"But they are not inclined to act in a precipitous way and they want to find a way to reach an accommodation consistent with their principles."

Mr. Berger traveled to China, in part, because the administration is simultaneously seeking to smooth relations between mainland China and Taiwan even as it tries to assemble a Republican-dominated coalition of lawmakers willing to grant China permanent trading rights in the American market.

Congressional leaders said any flare-up in tension between China and Taiwan would almost certainly derail the administration's hopes of winning passage of the trade measure anytime soon. The administration, in turn, has warned that failure to pass the measure could seriously set back relations with China and diminish American influence there.

"There is an important national security argument for going forward with permanent normal trade relations which is if anything intensified by developments related to Taiwan," said the senior administration official. "It not only creates a degree of interdependence between China and the world community but also to the economic integration of China and Taiwan."

During the election in Taiwan four years ago, the Chinese lobbed missiles around the island in an attempt to intimidate voters.
Chinese leaders also gave bellicose warnings to Taiwan shortly before the latest elections, apparently to persuade voters to back candidates considered more favorable to reunification than Mr. Chen.

Despite its earlier statements, and perhaps relieved by Mr. Chen’s conciliatory comments after his election, China now seems inclined to remain open to dialogue, the administration official said. Though any resumption of talks would most likely take many months to get under way, the mere prospect may reduce the risk that rising tensions will block passage of normal trade relations, which President Clinton has called his top remaining foreign policy priority. A Congressional vote on the matter is expected in May, the same time Taiwan’s new government takes power.

The administration has asked Congress to give up its annual review of China’s trade status, granting it same trading rights -- called permanent normal trade relations -- that most other countries have. The step is required if United States companies are to benefit fully from a market-opening agreement the administration negotiated as part of China’s continuing effort to join the World Trade Organization. Talks between China and the European Union over China’s entry into the trade group broke down on Friday.

Supporters argue that the economic rationale for giving up the annual review is overwhelming. The agreement requires China to open its markets and overhaul its regulatory regime, making way for foreign competitors in every area from agriculture to the Internet. But, as President Clinton has noted, “it’s a one-way deal” that does not require reciprocal trading concessions by the United States.

Mr. Clinton has argued that granting permanent normal trading relations is essential for national security. He said the step would support reformers, lock China's bureaucracy into a rules-based international trading regime and contribute to stability in Asia.

The vote, however, has become freighted both with ideological concerns about China’s Communist government and domestic political worries in an election year. While America’s business community has begun a national lobbying campaign on behalf of the measure, labor unions have mounted a vigorous opposition intended to culminate in what unions are promising will be a huge mobilization of supporters in Washington and around the nation on April 12. Union leaders say that the use of child labor by China and its hostility to free labor unions allow it to compete unfairly with American workers and have worsened the loss of American industrial jobs.

Senate passage is considered likely. But if the measure slips through the House, President Clinton will have the Republicans to thank; early vote counts show that that two-thirds of his own party’s members in the House will vote against permanent normal trade relations.

The administration and the Republican leadership in the House have begun to work to build a coalition across party lines in support of the measure. Dennis Hastert, the House majority
leader, has acceded to administration pleas and agreed to set a date for the vote in late May, aides said, even though Republican leaders acknowledge that Mr. Clinton has not met what they had insisted was a prior condition: proof that he can produce enough Democrats to ensure passage.

Getting 218 votes may prove difficult. Although business pressure on Republicans has been intense, some members of the party argue that the administration should work actively for the overthrow of the Chinese government instead of extending it upgraded trading rights.

Republican aides say the party will struggle to produce 150 votes in favor of permanent normal trade relations, the number that supported annual renewal of China's trading rights last year.

That means supporters will need about 70 Democrats to vote in favor. Democratic lawmakers who favor the measure say that is still possible, but acknowledge that most of their potential supporters are currently uncommitted.

President Clinton has started a major campaign aimed primarily at securing support from wavering Democrats. Mr. Clinton, aides said, is spending more time on China trade than any other single item on his agenda. He will make his sixth major address on the subject on Monday in California and has scheduled numerous evening talks with lawmakers in the White House residence this month.

The president has also assigned five cabinet secretaries to make China their top priority.

"This is an intensive, all-out effort, member by member, district by district, explaining what this agreement is really about and what's at stake in terms of relations with China," said Charlene Barshefsky, the United States trade representative. Ms. Barshefsky negotiated the sweeping trade agreement with China and is spending most of her time these days lobbying for it. "What we're saying is that this decision is about the best way to influence China, not just on economics but all the surrounding issues as well," she said.

Some people in Congress have said that their vote will be influenced by how Beijing handles Taiwan's transition now that Mr. Chen, of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party, has won election, ending the Nationalist Party's half-century dominance of the island's politics. Administration officials acknowledged that their lobbying to promote trade ties would be for naught if hostilities break out.

China analysts say that Beijing has not clearly signaled its intentions on Taiwan. Some argue that the mainland government has stuck to a relatively hard line on relations despite Taiwan's efforts since the election to expand trade and get a dialogue started. Beijing, for example, insists that Mr. Chen must first accept the so-called One China principle before any discussions can begin. Mr. Chen rejects that formula, preferring to think of any dialogue as state to state.
During what were described as "informal" discussions with Mr. Berger about the prospect for resuming talks, the Chinese indicated willingness to consider a possible compromise. Talks would take place under the "one China" umbrella, but each side would define "China" in its own way, a senior administration official said. Such subtle wordplay had allowed the two sides to talk in the past.
3. Target Text:
纽约时报：北京试图与台湾新政府和解
中国时报 03/04/00

美国官员表示，台湾大选后的两岸关系，中共已确定「听其言，观其行」（wait and see）
的态度，有意在「一个中国，各自表述」下，重開兩岸對話。

纽约时报今天在頭版引述美方官员的话報導说，中共领导人告诉到访的白宫國家
安全顧問柏格，中共自我克制是「深思熟慮過的政策」，北京決定—至少目前如此—
試圖與陳水扁的新政府和解。美方認為，情勢到底如何，中共當局並沒有把握，但是
中共顯然不願走險棋，而有意採取行一貫的政策。

報導指出，美國的中國事務專家則認為，中共究竟如何打算，中共內部仍未定論。
有些專家表示，即使陳水扁當選後表達善意，但是中共卻展現更強硬的立場，例證之
一是中共堅持要陳水扁接受「一個中國原則」。陳水扁目前的主張是「一個中國可以
是議題，不是原則」。

不過報導引述美方官員的話說，在與柏格會談中，中共領導人表示「可能與台灣
達成妥協」。報導說，兩岸對話可望在「一個中國，各自表述」下重新展開，因為藉
著這種巧妙的文字運用，過去兩岸成功的開啟了對話之門。

昨天華盛頓郵報曾報導，陳水扁的勝選，令中共智庫和官員有些意外，中共國家
主席江澤民受到各種不同壓力，因此北京決策層一時之間拿不定主意，所以才顯得
十分「審慎」。報導並引述中共官員的話說，中共堅持「一個中國」，是把自己逼到
死角。

去年中共駐南斯拉夫大使館被炸後，柏格是迄今訪問中共的美國最高層官員。儘
管雙方表示這是例行對話，甚至以「非正式會談」形容，但是因為台灣政局出現重大
轉變，美國國會又即將審議給予中共永久正常貿易關係（PNIR）案，因此柏格此行頗
受矚目。稍早紐約時報發自北京的消息說，柏格與江澤民等人會談時，彼此花費時間
最多的的就是台海問題，柏格向中共重申美國的「一個中國」政策，但也同時強調，北
京和台北間「必須和平對話」。有關軍售問題，中共反覆警告，如果美國同意台灣要
求，出售先進防禦武器給台灣，將嚴重破壞「中」美關係。不過柏格也回應得十分清
楚，中共對台灣的威脅，只會產生反效果，美國是否出售台灣所要求的軍備，端視台
海情勢而定。
Taiwan's president, Chen Shui-bian, said today that he supported legislation for a referendum on whether the island should declare independence from China.

Chen also issued the clearest definition to date of his views of Taiwan's relations with China, fundamentally rejecting China's position that Taiwan and China belong to the same country. "Taiwan, China, on each side [of the Taiwan Strait] are different countries," Chen said.

The comments constituted the strongest anti-China statements made by Chen since he took office in May 2000 as the first member of Taiwan's opposition to become president of the island of 22 million people. In his inauguration speech, Chen pledged that he would not support a popular referendum on Taiwan's international status -- a position he overturned today.

China has vowed to attack Taiwan if the island declares independence. While China's threats toward Taiwan have fluctuated, Beijing said in late 1999 that it could also justify an attack if Taiwan went forward with a referendum on independence.

Chen's remarks, given at a gathering in Tokyo of independence supporters via video linkup, marked the third time in two weeks that Chen has made a statement designed to appeal to independence activists and irritate China, which had no immediate response. Analysts and Taiwanese politicians say the remarks underscore a rapid shift on Chen's part away from accommodation with China and toward confrontation.

The analysts also said Chen's new position would probably end recent speculation that China and Taiwan were on the verge of a breakthrough over negotiations aimed at opening direct shipping, air and communications links.

The catalyst for this shift is believed to have been a diplomatic victory by China that it announced on July 21, the same day Chen was named the chairman of the Democratic Progressive Party. China said it was establishing relations with Nauru, a Pacific island nation of 12,000 people known as the world's smallest republic, which dropped Taiwan in favor of Beijing.

Nauru, like all countries that recognized Taiwan, had been courted fervently by China. China now has diplomatic ties with 165 countries, while Taiwan has ties with only 27, mostly poor countries in Africa and Latin America. The United States cut official ties with Taiwan in 1979 and recognized China.

Two other factors may be playing a role in Chen's thinking. Chen may be seeking to capitalize on reports of a leadership struggle in Beijing to gain some advantage in the run-up to China's 16th Party Congress this fall. And Chen also appears anxious to establish strong ties...
with the right wing of the United States' Republican Party, which generally supports the idea of an independent Taiwan.

35 In a speech last Monday, Chen told businessmen that Taiwan "should not harbor any illusions" about improving ties with China.

"Taiwan needs survival and development, but they just don't allow us to take a breath. Precisely speaking, they want to eliminate us and swallow us. Then we must think seriously if we have to go down our own road, our own Taiwan road, toward Taiwan's future," Chen said.

Beijing reacted bitterly to Chen's expression "Taiwan road," because it implied an independent Taiwan.

Speaking in native Taiwanese today, Chen told independence activists that holding a "referendum is a basic human right that cannot be deprived or restricted."

"I want to sincerely urge and encourage everybody to seriously consider the importance and urgency of passing legislation on a referendum," Chen said, a direct contradiction with his inauguration pledge.

Taiwanese analysts noted, however, that there is little chance that Chen's wishes on the referendum law will become reality. His party does not have a majority in Taiwan's legislature, and there is opposition to such an inflammatory move even among his party faithful.

Chen's statement on Taiwan's status echoed the position of his predecessor, President Lee Teng-hui, who in late 1999 announced that China and Taiwan should establish "special state-to-state" relations -- a position that enraged Beijing.

China responded by buzzing the Taiwan Strait with warplanes and canceling negotiations with Taiwan that have not resumed.

Chen's comments provoked criticism from opposition politicians in Taiwan.

Nationalist Party Chairman Lien Chan, who came in third in the 2000 presidential election, accused Chen of leaning toward independence and warned that this would bring only "disaster and threats."

James Soong, head of the People First Party, who came in second in the 2000 race, warned Chen that he had spoken irresponsibly.

"When you were a lawmaker, you could say whatever you wanted and shift your position whenever you pleased, but as a president you can't be so reckless," Soong said.

Chen has been squeezed by his party's left wing, which fears that he will abandon the principles of the Democratic Progressive Party, whose party platform calls for the creation of an independent Taiwan.

But he is also under considerable pressure from business leaders to improve ties with China. Since 1987, when Taiwan relaxed an investment ban, Taiwanese companies have poured more than $70 billion into China.
In recent weeks, Taiwan has further relaxed rules restricting investment in the high-tech sector in China, and on Friday it eased restrictions on Taiwanese banks, allowing them to conduct direct remittances with Chinese banks.

These moves, along with some moderate statements from Chinese officials in Beijing, sparked speculation that talks were being readied on the "three links" -- direct flights, shipping and communication between the island and China, which are just 100 miles apart. Businessmen traveling between the two countries must now go through Hong Kong, Macao or Japan.

However, senior Chinese and Taiwanese officials have played down the speculation, saying that enormous problems remain between the two sides. A senior Chinese official said his government believes that Chen will not move on the three links until late 2003, when he will use the issue to boost his reelection campaign in 2004.
President Chen Shui-bian of Taiwan said today that separate countries now exist on either side of the Taiwan Strait and voiced support for legislation authorizing a referendum to declare Taiwan independent of China, positions that are certain to anger Beijing.

Speaking of the Taiwan Strait, less than 100 miles of ocean that separates Taiwan from eastern China, President Chen declared, "Simply put, with Taiwan and China on each side of the strait, each side is a country - this needs to be clear."

He made the comment from his office in Taipei, the capital, in a video teleconference with pro-independence Taiwanese in Tokyo.

President Chen also lent his support to pro-independence forces in his Democratic Progressive Party who want the national Legislature to approve a law making a plebiscite on independence possible.

"I want to sincerely urge and encourage everybody to seriously consider the importance and urgency of passing legislation on a referendum," he said.

President Chen's statements are the closest he has come to endorsing independence since taking office two years ago. He did not actually say when or even whether a referendum should be held, but stuck to endorsing legislation to make such a referendum possible.

The holding of referendums, he said, "is a basic human right that cannot be withheld or restricted."

An official in the Taiwan Affairs Office of the Chinese government in Beijing said this afternoon that the speech had been noticed. "At present it's the weekend, normal staff aren't on duty, so we haven't an official response yet to President Chen Shui-bian's speech, but the Chinese government won't be deviating from the One China principle," said the official, who declined to be named.

Ever since Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist Party supporters retreated to Taiwan after losing China's civil war in 1949, Beijing has maintained that Taiwan is a renegade province, and has consistently refused to renounce the use of force to reunite Taiwan with the mainland.

Cross-strait relations are so sensitive that Beijing seldom issues official statements without approval at the highest levels, which often can take several days. Predicting the level of anger from Beijing is especially difficult now because the party's leadership is at its annual retreat, preparing for this autumn's Communist Party congress, which is held every five years.

There have been signs that the party is embroiled in a struggle over how much power should be relinquished by Jiang Zemin, China's 76-year-old president and Communist Party chief, who is expected to give up at least one of his posts. Many important decisions, on
everything from economic policy to relations with the United States, have apparently been deferred until after the party congress, for which no date has been publicly set yet. So it is possible that Chinese leaders will be leery of confronting Taiwan while preoccupied with their own maneuvering.

But when Mr. Chen's predecessor, Lee Teng-hui, said in July 1999 that Taiwan and China had a "special state-to-state" relationship, Beijing responded furiously to the intimation that Taiwan was an independent country. Chinese fighters flew sorties near Taiwanese aircraft over the Taiwan Strait. Alarmed by rising tensions, Washington canceled a visit to Taiwan by American military aides but also warned Beijing that the United States would retaliate if China resorted to military force.

The comments today mark the second time in two weeks that Mr. Chen has made statements certain to draw Beijing's ire. He said on July 21 that his people should "walk down our own Taiwanese road to find Taiwan's future." Mr. Chen made those comments a few hours after the Pacific island of Nauru recognized Beijing and broke diplomatic relations with Taipei.
3. Target Text:

美媒體: 扁支持獨立公投
中國時報，05/08/02

陳水扁總統三日對世界台灣同鄉會發表的談話在國際間引發關切，紐約時報及華盛頓郵報等重要媒體均有專文報導，華盛頓郵報說，陳總統的談話推翻他先前宣示不推動公投的立場，紐約時報則，這是陳總統自任以來最接近支持台灣獨立的一次談話。

華盛頓郵報的報導發自北京，以「台灣陳總統支持獨立公投」為題，指出這是陳總統對界定台灣與中國關係迄今最清楚的說明，並稱其「兩岸一統一國」的說法，基本上拒斥了中國對台灣與中國屬於一個國家的立場。

紐約時報的報導發自香港，標題為「挑戰中國，台灣領導人支持主權公投」，報導中指陳總統雖未明言何時舉行公投或是否舉行公投，但強調公投是基本人權，不應受到壓制。

華郵說，這是陳總統兩週內第三次發表旨在迎合台獨人士並刺激中國的談話；而分析家則認為，陳的談話顯示他的立場從疏散中國迅速轉變為與中國對立。

中共對陳的談話尚未發表正式聲明。紐約時報說，這是因為台海兩岸的關係太過敏感，因此在最高層點頭之前，北京當局不會輕易表達看法，而此時要預測中共對陳水扁談話會憤怒到何種地步也很難，因為中共領導階層目前都在北京開會。

華郵說，之前媒體據多揣測，以為兩岸三通談判即將出現突破，如今陳總統態度驟變，其導火線可能係陳總統在七月廿一日就任民主進步黨主席的當天，中共宣布與諾魯建交。

華郵說，陳總統可能考量另外兩個因素，一是他想利用外傳中共領導班子間的鬥爭，奪在今秋中共十六次黨代表大會之前佔些優勢，二是他似乎亟於和支持獨立台灣的美國共和黨右翼建立密切關係。

華郵引述台灣分析家的分析指出，陳希望推動公投立法的希望很難實現，因為民進黨在立法院未佔多數，而且即使在民進黨內部，也有人反對陳總統的煽動性談話。
Appendix 2

Full Texts for the Second Case Study

No. 1

1. Source Text:
Taiwan Seen Vulnerable to Attack
Washington Post, 31/03/00

Taiwan is far more vulnerable to attack from China than is generally recognized because its isolated military has fallen behind technologically, according to a new and highly classified Pentagon report.

The 40-page report points out "a host of problems" with the Taiwanese military's ability to defend against airplanes, ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, said a Clinton administration official familiar with it. It concludes that Taiwan's military capability has been weakened by the island's diplomatic isolation, and faults the military for allowing poor security at its bases, for tolerating bitter interservice rivalries, and for failing to develop a professional corps of senior enlisted troops to operate its weapons systems.

"There is no other military in the world that experiences the kind of isolation Taiwan's does," the administration official said in summarizing the report. "They don't train or have contacts with anyone. And as warfare has become more complex, it has become more difficult for them to handle all these new technologies."

The Pentagon report comes after a spell of unusually bellicose Chinese rhetoric over the presidential election in Taiwan, which concluded with the victory earlier this month of a pro-independence candidate opposed by Beijing. By validating reports of Taiwan's military inadequacy, the Pentagon view could sway a decision by the Clinton administration, which is wrestling with the nettlesome question of whether to sell four sophisticated Aegis destroyers and other advanced military gear to Taiwan, including long-range radar that could look thousands of miles into the Chinese mainland.

The administration is expected to make a decision on the sale by the end of April, when a Taiwanese delegation is scheduled to arrive here to discuss the requested arms. A senior Chinese official warned earlier this month that a U.S. transfer of high-tech military equipment to Taiwan would be considered a hostile act and would be "the last straw" in U.S.-China relations.

"I can't begin to tell you how tense and sensitive this is," the administration official said in requesting anonymity.
"The drafting of this was an extraordinarily difficult process, because it is such an extremely sensitive issue," echoed a Pentagon official involved in producing the study.

The report was produced by officers on the staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by officials in the policy formulation office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Overall, it outlines "not a very pleasant picture" of Taiwan's defenses, the Clinton administration official said. He added: "These guys don't know how to do a lot of this stuff."

Taiwan's armed forces essentially have sat out the information revolution, the report argues, and so have failed to assimilate several generations of advances in information processing.

While such advances have attracted public notice in the military arena for leading to precision-guided munitions, they also have led to less flashy but equally significant increases in the ability of modern militaries to first detect fast-moving and hidden targets, then transfer that information to weapons systems and finally guide the fired weapon to its target.

A defense official at the Taiwan government office here declined to comment on the report.

The Taiwan government is believed to be aware of the report's existence but is not thought to have seen it yet. Senior Taiwanese officers have said in recent interviews that they understand they have severe weaknesses, and say that is why they want Aegis ships, which feature a high-powered phased-array radar able to simultaneously track and target hundreds of incoming missiles and aircraft. "Antimissile defense and air defense is our highest priority," Adm. Lee Jye said last month.

But some U.S. defense experts argue that the Aegis ships would be too sophisticated for the Taiwanese military to use properly and also would, at about $1 billion apiece, soak up funds better spent on other gear. "The Aegis could help with sea-based defense, but it doesn't speak to their core military problem of island-wide air defense," said Michael Swaine, a specialist in the Chinese military at Rand Corp. "What their situation demands is a lot of software integration, especially linkages between their army, navy and air force."

The report is the first in a series of studies of the military balance between Taiwan and China ordered by the Pentagon's policy office. Generally, that office, which is dominated by civilians, is seen as taking a harder line in favor of Taiwan than does the uniformed U.S. military.

The policy officials argue that for the Clinton administration's policy of engagement with China to succeed, it is necessary to maintain the cross-strait military balance, ensuring that neither is able to impose its will on the other. The new report implicitly argues that that balance now may be tilting too much in favor of Beijing.

Richard Fisher and William Triplett, two China specialists associated with conservative congressional Republicans, said they believe the Pentagon is deliberately suppressing the report. "This report is extremely significant," said Fisher.

The Pentagon report was completed in January, but since then has been labeled a "draft." Some congressional aides suspect it has been kept in that form because it makes it easier for the
Pentagon to refuse to show it to them. The report has been widely discussed in foreign policy circles, but very few people actually have been permitted to read it.

Pentagon spokesman Kenneth Bacon responded that the report isn't being suppressed. In addition, he said, a planned briefing to Taiwanese officials was postponed simply for logistical reasons. "We always planned to brief the Taiwanese on the contents of the assessment before releasing it to the appropriate people in Congress," he said. He declined to discuss the contents of the report, citing its classified nature.
2. Target Text:

美國官員：軍售台灣先進武器 非常急迫
工商時報，01/04/00

根據美國華盛頓郵報報導，美國國防部最近的機密報告指出，台灣的軍隊由於技術和設備老舊，再加上在國際上被孤立多年，缺乏訓練，可能無法抵抗中共攻打台灣。而華盛頓時報也同時刊載，報告中評估台灣的空防力量，結論認為台灣「無法應付來自空中的威脅」。報導中並提到，這份報告已成為美國政府與國會對台軍售的爭議焦點。

這篇四十頁的報告提到，台灣在遭受飛機或長程飛彈攻擊時，將面臨「許多問題」。報告中並指出，台灣國防力量的減弱，是由於近年來在國際上被孤立，無法和國外進行武器設備和訓練的交流。

報告中也認為，台灣軍隊的基礎並不好，也無法培訓出熟悉新型武器的資深專業人員。

這份報告是美國國防部在五月，委託國防專家及軍方所做的研究結果，報告原本是公開性質的，但美國政府部門拒絕提供給國會，將其列為「機密」文件，使其無法取得。報導認為，親中共的一些政府官員，曲解報告的結論，以支持其凍結對台軍售的立場。

柯林頓政府一名官員說：「沒有其他國家的軍隊會像台灣那樣被孤立。他們沒有和其他軍隊訓練或接觸，當戰爭的形式變得更加複雜時，他們並不會應用新技術來作戰。」美國國防部的官員指出，這份報告顯示，對台出售更先進的武器設備和防禦訓練是急迫且必須的。

美國政府正在考慮是否要出售四艘神盾級軍艦和其他先進的軍事設備給台灣，其中包括可以偵測到大陸內地的長程雷達。這份重要的報告將影響美國對台軍售，並將成為美國會與政府之間辯論的焦點，柯林頓政府很可能在四月底就會做出這項軍售案的決定。

一名中共資深官員說，中共強烈反對這項軍售案，若美出售高科技武器給台灣，就會被視為是具敵意的行為，並將會嚴重影響「中」美關係。
The Pentagon will recommend against the diplomatically explosive sale of four Aegis destroyers to Taiwan, but is in favor of selling the island a long-range radar that can peer deep into China to detect missile launches, Pentagon sources close to the deliberations said yesterday.

Taiwan's desire to buy the ships—at a cost of about $1 billion each—has posed an excruciating dilemma for the Clinton administration, which will infuriate mainland China if it approves the sale and antagonize key Republicans in Congress if it does not.

The Pentagon has decided to recommend that the United States put off Taiwan's request to buy several major new weapons. These include submarines and P-3 Orion anti-submarine aircraft, as well as the four Arleigh Burke-class destroyers equipped with the Aegis battle management system, an array of radars and computers capable of simultaneously tracking more than 100 targets on land, in the air and at sea.

Instead, the Pentagon will recommend a comprehensive study of Taiwan's naval defense needs, which could lead to future sales of some or all of these weapons, according to an official involved in the discussions.

Both the National Security Council and the State Department are believed to favor the sale of a small package of arms to Taiwan in order to avoid angering Beijing or encouraging Taiwan's independence movement. But finding a compromise that will satisfy everyone—Taiwan, Beijing and Congress—appears all but impossible.

If adopted at a White House meeting today, the Pentagon recommendations could anger both the Communist government in Beijing, which regards Taiwan as rightfully part of China, and Congress, whose members support Taiwan's blossoming democratic system and are seeking to keep U.S. shipyards busy.

Under the Pentagon's recommendation, the long-range radar, known as PAVE PAWS, would be sold only after Taiwan shows how it would be integrated into its air defense system. Then the United States would deliver it within one to two years, an administration official said. The system is designed to detect and monitor ballistic missiles and can be linked to missile defense systems.

Taiwan is concerned about its ability to defend against Chinese missiles based in Fujian province, just across the 100-mile strait that separates mainland China from the self-governing island. China has deployed 200 missiles in Fujian and is adding about 50 a year, according to Adm. Dennis Blair, commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Command.
The Chinese government, which strongly opposes the U.S. deployment of a national missile defense system or theater missile defenses for Taiwan, might be upset by the sale of the radar. But an administration official involved in the discussions said, "That's what you get when you aim a bunch of missiles at somebody."

The Pentagon has also decided to back the sale of advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles (AMRAAM) to Taiwan, on the condition that they be stored in the United States. While this would be the first sale of such weapons to any Asian country, storing them on U.S. soil would help to avoid an arms race in Asia, a Pentagon official said.

Taiwanese forces would be trained in the United States on how to use the missiles. A Pentagon official said the missiles would be moved to Taiwan if China acquired a similar, Russian-made missile called the AAX-12.

In addition, the Pentagon wants to sell Taiwan an upgraded version of the Maverick air-to-ground missile. Because of the Maverick's offensive potential, a Pentagon official said this proposal was highly controversial within the administration. Taiwan now has an older version that requires a fighter pilot to guide the missile to its target using a video camera. In the new version, an infrared sensor would enable a pilot to "fire and forget" the missile.

Under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, passed when Washington reestablished diplomatic relations with Beijing and downgraded them with Taipei, the United States committed itself to providing Taiwan with enough weapons to enable Taiwan to defend itself. While successive American presidents have supported Beijing's stance that there is only "one China," they have warned the mainland that they expect reunification to come about peacefully. China, however, has refused to renounce the possibility of using force.

Taiwan's annual request to buy arms from the United States has taken on added significance this year. With U.S.-Chinese relations poisoned by the accidental American bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade during the Kosovo war, China is looking with even greater than normal suspicion at U.S. support for Taiwan. Some experts also suggest that China wants to make Taiwan feel some insecurity so that Taiwan will enter talks on reunification with the mainland.

For Taiwan, the arms package is also an important test of U.S. intentions. The island just held its second democratic presidential election, and the victory of a longtime opposition candidate, Chen Shui-bian, means the island will undergo its first democratic transfer of power with his May 20 inauguration. Chen has long been an advocate of Taiwanese independence, although he recently modified his public stance, saying he would not pursue a formal declaration of independence and would be willing to talk with Beijing.

Aides to Chen and leading Republicans in Congress say it is a crucial time for the United States to support Taiwanese democracy. Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.), in whose home state the Aegis destroyers are built, has told President Clinton that he expects a "robust
package" of arms sales to Taiwan and has warned that failure to provide one could endanger passage of a trade bill granting China permanent normal trading relations. The administration is pushing for the bill as part of a deal to admit China to the World Trade Organization.

But Beijing remains extremely anxious about Chen's election and wants him to endorse the principle that there is only "one China." In meetings with Clinton's national security adviser, Samuel R. "Sandy" Berger, two weeks ago and with Commerce Secretary William Daley a week ago, top Chinese leaders bluntly warned the United States of grave consequences if Taiwan continues its drift toward independence. A meeting in Beijing between Daley, the administration's point man in pushing for congressional approval of the China trade bill, and Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji was dominated by discussion of Taiwan, an administration official said.

Berger is expected to play a key role in making the final decision on the arms sale this week, administration officials said. If, out of concern for Taiwan's security or reactions in Congress, the administration adds to the Pentagon's list, the most likely additional weapons to be sold would probably be the P-3 anti-submarine planes, which Defense Department officials say are relatively easy to integrate into Taiwan's forces.
2. Target Text 1:

美國可能改售台灣長程雷達系統
工商時報，18/04/00

華美年度軍售會議於十七日正式召開，據「華盛頓郵報」報導，美國國防部建議延遲
出售台灣四艘神盾級驅逐艦，而改售可偵測到中國內陸發射彈道飛彈情形，並可連結
至戰區飛彈防衛系統（TMD）的長程雷達系統；國防部並建議對台灣海軍軍備進行
全面檢討。儘管如此，報導說，國防部的建議仍可能激怒中共。

報導指出，這項每艘戰艦價值十億美元的對台售案，已使柯林頓政府陷於兩
難：通過軍售案將激怒中共；而不通過又將得罪國會的共和黨關鍵人士。目前美國國
安會及國務院，均傾向出售該軍售案中的其他零星項目以避免激怒中共。

除了四艘神盾級驅逐艦採購建議延緩外，國防部同時也建議台灣欲採購的一些新
項目一併展延再議，包括柴油級潛艇及P-3反潛機。國防部開出的條件是，針對台
灣海軍防衛需要再做一全面檢討，以做為未來出售該些項目之評估參考。然而郵報指
出，白宮若接受國防部的這建議，中方及國會兩方都不討好。

在國防部的這份建議中，售與台灣俗稱「魔爪」（PAVE PAWS）的長程
雷達系統，需有附加條件，就是台灣必須在整合海空軍防禦能力後才出售。白宮行政
官員表示，台灣若達此要求，美方可在一至二年內交貨。

此外，國防部也支持出售台灣改良型中程空對空飛彈（AMRAAM），同時台
灣軍方也可赴美接受訓練，但是飛彈必須貯存在美國本土，以避免引起亞洲軍備競賽。
這也是美國首次同意將該款飛彈售予外國。一位國防部官員表示，一旦中共獲得類似
該款飛彈的俄製AAX-12時，AMRAAM飛彈將可實際運交台灣。美國國防部
也希望售台改良型的小牛空對地飛彈，但因該款飛彈具有攻擊特性，因此這項提案仍
在爭議中。

美國國會對這兩軍售會議賦予高度重視，共和黨國會領袖們認為此時是美國支
持台灣民主的關鍵時刻。多位多數黨領袖羅特已於日前警告柯林頓，他希望這次軍售
會議能通過觀測項目，否則將危及對中國永久性正常貿易關係（PNTR）法案的通
過。

華府亞太政策中心主任包道格則表示，他希望柯林頓政府出售阿雷柏克級驅逐艦
給台灣，但不包括神盾雷達系統。包道格認為如此，將提供台灣改進防禦及飛彈的
能力，而不是針對中共部署在沿海的彈道飛彈。至於其他武器項目，包道格則相信柯
林頓政府將會同意出售長程雷達，但是反輻射飛彈及AMRAAM空對空飛彈通過的
機會較為渺茫。

美國太平洋海軍司令布萊爾則對台灣持同情的看法，他認為台灣確實面對中共飛
彈的嚴重威脅。他日前曾表示中共目前已部署兩百枚飛彈對準台灣，而且以每年五十
枚的速度增加中。但是布萊爾並沒有公開表明是否支持出售神盾級駕逐艦給台灣。
3. Target Text 2:
美將售我長程預警雷達 神盾艦暫緩
中國時報，18/04/00

今起舉行兩天的華美軍售會議，幾已確定美國暫不出售神盾級驅逐艦給台灣，但可望
出售長程預警雷達，使台灣及早得知中共發射飛彈，同時可望出售「先進中程空對空
飛彈」以及「改良型小牛空對地飛彈」。此外，P－3 獵戶星座反潛飛機仍有一線生
機。

華盛頓郵報今天在頭版引述美國國防部人士的話說，台灣所提採購清單，五角大
廈對其中數項主張「暫緩出售」，除了四艘共計美金四十四億元的神盾艦外，尚有潛
艇及 P－3 獵戶星座反潛飛機。其中高度敏感的神盾艦，在白宮國家安全會議及國務
院一直有很多爭議，國防部原本較為支持，如今國防部都主張暫緩，今年不賣大約已
成定局。

相對的，五角大廈贊成出售長程預警雷達，並主張針對台灣海防所需，進行全面
研究評估，以決定未來台灣需要的軍備。此一長程預警雷達，即 PAVE PAWS，中共
飛彈即使從內陸發射，此一系統亦可立即偵知，並可與台灣的反飛彈系統連線。唯台
灣須先證明有能力將此一系統與台灣的防空系統相整合，然後美國在一至二年內交貨。

美國國防部同時贊成出售先進中程空對空飛彈（AMRAAM）給台灣，這是美國
第一次出售這種 AIM-120 飛彈給亞洲國家。條件是需儲存在美國領土上，「以免避免亞
洲地區出現軍備競賽」。但是如果中共從俄羅斯獲得功能近似的 AAX-12 飛彈，美國
可望把 AMRAAM 交給台灣儲存。

國防部也贊同出售「改良型小牛空對地飛彈」。台灣擁有的舊式小牛飛彈，無自
動導引裝置，故駕駛員按鈕發射後，需藉助攝影機引導攻擊目標。改良型（AGM-65G）
則安裝了紅外線感應器，駕駛員可以「射後不理」。這種改良型飛彈具有攻擊潛力，
因此美國行政當局在內部討論時，爭議很多。

華盛頓郵報報，美國國防部這幾項建議，如果得到白宮採納，恐怕北京和國會都
會惱火。因北京一向反對美對台軍售，而國會方面，不但支持民主的台灣，也要為美
國的造船廠找生意。暫緩出售神盾艦，意味造船廠暫時接不到訂單，偏偏有一家造船
廠就位在參院多數黨領袖羅特的選區密西西比州內。

太平洋美軍總司令部最近提出報告，指中共在台灣對岸部署了兩百枚飛彈，而且
每年增加五十枚，目前準頭欠佳，只具恐嚇性質，但是「數量日增，準確度日高，終
將對台灣構成威脅」，因此台灣反飛彈能力備受關切。但是中共強烈反對美在台部署
「戰區飛彈防禦系統」（TMD），因此如果美出售長程預警雷達給台灣，必招致中
共不滿。不過一位參與軍售事務的美官員說，「你（中共）自找的，誰教你把大量飛
彈瞄準人家！」

據報導軍售案最後一關操於拍格之手，如能再增加一項對台軍售，最可能的是 P
－3 獵戶星座反潛飛機。這型飛機是洛克西德公司在一九六一年開始生產，冷戰期間
曾大量產製，具有四具渦輪引擎，時速七百六十公里，航程可達三千八百餘公里，可
因裝備不同而發揮不同功能，諸如電子戰、反潛、偵察、巡邏、氣象等。
China has launched a diplomatic offensive to head off the sale of a high-tech weapons system to Taiwan, dispatching two diplomatic delegations to Washington and preparing to send a third just six weeks after the Bush administration took office.

The Beijing government is trying to prevent Taiwan from acquiring the advanced Aegis air defense and battle management system, part of a large arms package the Bush administration is considering selling the island. A decision on the sale is scheduled to be made in April. Despite what appears to be a lukewarm response to the diplomacy in Washington -- after calling the heads of more than 20 countries, President Bush has yet to call President Jiang Zemin -- some Chinese analysts think Beijing is succeeding.

The diplomatic offensive reflects China's concern about the Bush administration's position on the Aegis, and more broadly about how it will pursue its relationship with China and Taiwan. During his campaign, Bush referred to China as a "strategic competitor," which raised concerns in Beijing. Some members of Bush's administration have called for a more aggressive China policy and more substantial arms sales to Taiwan.

The contacts underway represent a more carefully calibrated diplomacy from Beijing, which has blustered for years about U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Instead of blasting all U.S. attempts to sell weapons to the island of 23 million people, Chinese diplomats are now lobbying against specific systems, such as the Aegis and submarines, and are keeping relatively quiet about others, such as a proposed $600 million deal for four former U.S. Navy Kidd-class guided missile destroyers.

In Beijing, the Bush administration's decision on the Aegis has been imbued with extraordinary consequence as a verdict on the general course of U.S.-China relations. If the sale goes through, officials will see it as a signal that the United States is prepared to insert itself into any conflict between Taiwan and China. And an Aegis sale would be seen here as a sign the United States is willing to sacrifice the progress it has made in slowing China's proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

"The political significance is very, very rich," said Yan Xuetong, executive director of the Institute of International Studies at Beijing's Qinghua University. "A sale would show us the Bush administration does not care about a strategic relationship between China and the United States."

The Aegis system is mounted aboard Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. Taiwan wants to buy four of them at almost $800 million each. The system's radar allows ships, planes and missiles to be coordinated over a wide area and could help defend Taiwan against a Chinese missile attack. The Aegis thus would mark an important step in countering China's trump card with Taiwan.
short- and medium-range missiles. There are hundreds deployed in southern China, just across the 100-mile wide Taiwan Strait.

The Chinese fear the sale would also send a signal to Taiwan that the United States is moving closer to the idea of including Taiwan in a missile defense network that it hopes to design for Asia. That raises concerns in Beijing of the de facto resuscitation of a military alliance between Washington and Taipei.

As things stand now, the United States is committed to helping Taiwan maintain its defenses, but without a specific pledge of intervening if China should attack. Beijing, which considers the island part of China, has warned it could attack if Taiwan formally declares independence.

Beijing's response to an Aegis sale would be an immediate increase in the number of missiles deployed in southern China, predicted Chu Shulong of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, who is close to the military.

"It's easy and it can be done within the current military budget," he said. "We could increase it by hundreds within a year."

In addition, he predicted the People's Liberation Army would plan major military exercises in the spring or early summer, raising the specter of missile tests such as those in 1996 that prompted the Clinton administration to dispatch two aircraft carrier battle groups to the region.

Finally, he said, China would not cooperate with the United States on nonproliferation, including in Iraq and Iran.

The first Chinese delegation, three former ambassadors to the United States and Canada, went to Washington in mid-February. The second, led by Zhou Mingwei, deputy director of the Taiwan Affairs Office of China's State Council, was in Washington this week. Vice Premier Qian Qichen, the dean of China's foreign policy establishment, will cap the offensive with a trip to Washington late this month.

Zhou said in a meeting with Washington Post editors and reporters that an Aegis sale "would show [that] the U.S. government is supporting this particular [Taiwanese] government, which is independence-oriented. It would send the wrong signal."

U.S. officials said all three delegations in effect invited themselves, something one Western diplomat said was "unusual and very welcome from the Chinese."

Chu and other analysts and diplomats said China's tag-team delegations represented a significant change in the country's diplomatic behavior. "In the past China would always wait for something, for a U.S. official to come to China," Chu said. "In the past China used to be quite passive. Now they are worrying so they are sending people to America."

In recent interviews, Chinese analysts and diplomats expressed optimism that the diplomatic offensive against the Aegis was paying off, despite the absence of any clear indication from Washington about it. One possible reason for the confidence involves Chinese beliefs about using the old boy network of former U.S. officials who remain close to Bush's father, who was U.S.
envoy to China in the mid-1970s. The three ambassadors' first stop was Houston for a visit with the elder Bush.

Liu Huaqiu, a high-ranking Communist Party official involved in foreign affairs, during a meeting in January with senior American security experts, named former secretary of state Henry A. Kissinger and former national security adviser Brent Scowcroft as people China could count on to keep the new president from harming U.S.-China ties. He said he has received personal assurances that American "friends of China" that surrounded President Bush's father would step in to "teach Bush" if relations hit a crisis.

But China's diplomats so far have not exactly been warmly received. The first group of ambassadors was met by a mid-level State Department official.
2. Target Text:
阻美售台神盾艦 中共表樂觀
中國時報，04/03/01

假如四月台美軍售會議決定出口神盾級軍艦給台灣，中共專家預期，中共的因應之道，除了立即增加對台導彈數量外，還會在今年春天或夏初舉行大規模軍事演習，包括類似九六年九對台的導彈試射。

「中國現代國際關係研究所」研究員楚樹龍向「華盛頓郵報」表示，如果美國出售神盾級軍艦給台灣，中共將立即增加部署在華南的導彈數量，按照目前的軍事預算，這將是一件很容易的事，「我們可以在一年內增加數百枚（導彈）」。此外，楚樹龍預期，共軍將立即舉行大規模軍演，進行類似九六年九的導彈試射。

對北京來說，假如布希政府決定出售神盾級軍艦給台灣，反映美國已準備介入台灣與大陸之間的衝突，也反映美國將犧牲在勸阻中共出售大規模殺傷武器上取得的進展。中共也擔心這項軍售給台灣一個訊息，那就是美國逐漸把台灣納入它的亞洲飛彈防禦網，而且，實際上恢復了台美軍事同盟。

訪美的國台辦副主任周明偉表示，出售神盾級军舰顯示美国政府支持有獨立傾向的台灣政府，這將對台灣政府錯誤的訊息。北京「清華大學國際關係研究所副所長」閻學通也認為，出售神盾級軍艦給台灣的政治訊息非常重大，顯示布希政府不重視中美間的戰略關係。

據報導，從布希就職後的數週內，中共已先後派出兩個代表團訪美，而副總理錢其琛也曾於三月底訪美，外交動作之積極前所未見。就像楚樹龍說的：「在過去，中國總是眼見別人，等美國官員訪問中國；但現在，他們開始送人到美國去了。」

值得注意的是，中共近來的外交聲浪並未企圖全面阻止美國對台軍售，而是集中力量阻止美國出售某些特殊武器，如神盾艦及潛艇，對於總價六億美金的四艘神盾級驅逐艦租售協議，中共則保持沉默。

經過這一連串與美方的互動，中共外交界對於阻止美國出售神盾級系統給台灣，表示樂觀，因為中國相信，透過對老布希的遊說，特別是先前有三位中共駐美使節拜訪了老布希，可以達成遊說的目的。

一月份，中共國務院外事辦公室主任劉華與美國國務卿穆辛吉、前國家安全顧問史考克羅會晤時曾表示，假如中美關係真的發生危機，老布希周圍的「中國之友」保證會介入，會「救老布希」怎麼做。
When John Kennedy entered the White House in 1961, Nikita Khrushchev wanted to find out right away what the young, inexperienced American president was made of. So at a summit in Vienna that year, the Soviet leader hectored and bullied Kennedy on the question of Berlin and other contentious issues. Kennedy flunked the test. As George Ball later recalled, Khrushchev left the meeting convinced the American was "young and weak," a perception that probably emboldened him to deploy missiles in Cuba a year later. Khrushchev, we now know, miscalculated Kennedy's resolve. But JFK's early display of weakness helped bring on the harrowing crisis of 1962.

Today another young and inexperienced U.S. president is being put to the test. During the past two weeks, Chinese leaders suddenly have adopted a bullying stance in their dealings with President Bush. Last month, for instance, Bush diplomatically asked the Chinese to "investigate" the matter of Chinese military assistance to Iraq, saying he wanted to begin his relationship with Beijing "with trust." This was pretty gracious, considering that American officials have known for months that Chinese firms were helping Iraq improve its ability to shoot down U.S. planes. Privately, Chinese officials have admitted it. But publicly the Chinese foreign minister last week told Bush, undiplomatically, to stuff it. He denied any Chinese involvement in Iraq and all but accused Bush of fabricating the story.

This was nothing compared with Chinese hardball on the issue of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, which the Bush administration must decide on next month. Taipei for years has sought approval for the Aegis air-defense and battle-management system, and the PAC-3 anti-missile system, which is a more advanced version of the Patriot system used during the Gulf War. Both would help Taiwan meet the threat of China's short-range missile arsenal deployed across the Taiwan Strait, now numbering in the hundreds and growing at a rate of 50 missiles per year. And both systems could serve as the basis for a theater missile defense capability in the future. China, of course, has always opposed such sales of advanced weaponry to Taiwan. For Beijing, a good Taiwan is a vulnerable Taiwan.

But this year Beijing has turned up the heat. Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan held a press conference recently to warn that sale of the Aegis or PAC-3 would "endanger China-U.S. relations," aggravate tensions in the region and increase the chances of war. Other Chinese officials have warned that the sale could provoke China into carrying out another military exercise, complete with ballistic missile tests, of the kind that led to the dispatch of U.S. aircraft carriers in 1996. Still other senior Chinese officials have hinted that...
American businesses in China could be punished if Bush approves the sale of any advanced weaponry to Taiwan.

Meanwhile, amid these threats, Chinese officials announced an unprecedented 18 percent increase in defense spending aimed at meeting "drastic changes" in the international security environment, an allusion to America's military and political "hegemony."

Administration officials have only begun thinking about what weapons to approve for Taiwan, and the president probably hasn't given it much thought yet. But Beijing knows the Bush team comes to office with a much friendlier view of Taiwan than the last administration had. The new administration includes a troika of powerful policy-makers whose pro-Taiwan attitudes are a matter of record. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of State-designate Richard Armitage and I. Lewis Libby, Dick Cheney's chief of staff, sent a critical letter to President Clinton two years ago calling for a "clear statement of America's commitment to Taiwan" and insisting that the time for "strategic and moral ambiguity with regard to Taiwan has passed."

The Chinese have seen tough talk like this before, of course. Clinton came in breathing fire in 1993 and reversed himself after a year of Chinese pressure. But Beijing is not waiting a whole year this time. To counter the influence of the pro-Taiwan heavyweights on the Bush team, Beijing is trying to scare the president by creating an atmosphere of impending crisis. Chinese officials hope that if they sound the alarm loudly enough their "old friends" in the American foreign policy establishment will weigh in with the president and circumvent the hawks. As The Post's John Pomfret reported in a March 3 news story, top Chinese officials are looking to Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft for help and have gotten "personal assurances" that such "friends of China" will step in to "teach Bush" if he starts heading in the wrong direction.

A lot is riding on how Bush responds. Bush is now in the position Kennedy was in 40 years ago. Chinese leaders already may have interpreted his gentle response to their aid to Iraq as timidity. And after watching him back down from bellicose campaign promises to toughen U.S. policy toward Saddam Hussein, they may even suspect Bush is a paper tiger. If Bush now listens to his father's old advisers and decides to avoid a confrontation with Beijing over Taiwan arms sales this year, Chinese leaders could conclude that he won't stand up to them when a real crisis comes.

In the coming weeks, an army of China experts is going to tell us that selling advanced arms to Taiwan is too risky. If history is any guide, however, it will be even riskier if Beijing thinks it is dealing with another "young and weak" American president.
2. Target Text 1:
對台軍售 且看布希縱橫捭闔
工商時報，13/03/01

一九六一年約翰甘迺迪入主白宮後，外交政策遭到蘇共總書記赫魯雪夫的嚴厲考驗，
並醜成古巴飛彈危機。「華盛頓郵報」昨刊出專文指出，美國新任總統布希也正面臨
四十年前赫魯雪夫恫赫甘迺迪的同樣情況，中國將在對台軍售上向美施壓，看看這位
美國甫上台的年輕、卻缺乏經驗的總統將如何因應。

任職「卡內基國際和平基金會」的資深研究員卡根指出，由於甘迺迪當年缺乏治
國經驗，赫魯雪夫認為這個美國新總統「年輕而軟弱」，也導致一年後蘇聯在美國後
院的古巴部署飛彈的危機。

在「中國的弱雞遊戲」（China's Game of Chicken）文章中，卡根說，過去兩週
來，中國領導人也採行了恫赫政策來對付布希。像出賣光線給伊拉克的前後矛盾言論
以及對台軍售。文章指出，台北多年來尋求出售神盾艦及愛國者三型反飛彈系統，
兩項目都有助於台灣對抗中國部署於對岸的飛彈威脅，也可作為未來升級為戰區飛彈
防禦系統的基礎。

中共外長上週警告美國如果出售神盾或愛國者三型系統，將「破壞中美關係」；
中曾官員也再次在九六年在台海進行大規模軍演來威脅；國台辦副主任周明偉訪問幕
府時，更拿赴大陸投資的美商利益做威脅；而幾近八成的軍事預算，似更針對美國
而來。

卡根說，布希政府可能才剛開始思考究竟要賣什麼武器給臺灣，布希或許至今尚
未仔細考慮，但北京了解布希政府官員對台灣的態度較前政府友善；副國防部長伍佛
維茲、副國務卿阿米塔吉，甚至副總統鮑尼的幕僚長利比等政府也曾聯名致函柯林頓
政府，主張美國對台「戰略暨道德模糊的時代已經過去」。

卡根說，中國為了對抗布希政府內親台重量級官員的勢力，經由製造台海危機的
緊張氣氛，來恫赫布希政府。中國希望他們如果能大聲傳達警訊，就足以使他們在美
國外交政策的「老友們」發揮影響力，像季辛吉及史考克羅等人，並阻止布希政府
內跟派勢力。

卡根說，布希總統現在面臨的就像四十年前甘迺迪的情況一樣。中國在伊拉克問
題上已感覺到布希不如他競選時強硬，它們甚至可能懷疑布希是紙老虎，如果布希現
在聽從李季辛吉、史考克羅之流，避免在對台軍售上和中國起衝突，中國將斷定當真
有危機發生時，布希無法立足來對抗中國。

卡根最後說，未來幾周內，一班中國專家將會說，出售先進武器給台灣實在太危
險。但如果歷史可做為殷鑑，「讓北京認定她面對的是一個『年輕而軟弱』的美國總
統，才是更危險的事。」
3. Target Text 2:
專家籲布希對台軍售勿因中共恫嚇畏縮
自由時報，13/03/01
華盛頓郵報今天刊出國際問題評論家凱根的專文說，布希總統正面臨四十年前蘇聯恫
嚇前總統甘迺迪的同一情況，中共將在對台軍售問題上施壓，看看美軍備忘錄上的這位
年輕而缺乏經驗的總統如何因應。
卡內基國際和平基金會資深研究員凱根在文中說，甘迺迪一九年七月上任時，蘇
聯的赫魯雪夫立即想瞭解這位美國年輕總統的斤兩，兩人在維也納的首次高峰會上，
赫魯雪夫考問並恫嚇甘迺迪有關柏林及其他爭議性問題。
結果甘迺迪未能通過考驗，赫魯雪夫離開會議時心中篤定，美國新總統是一個「年
輕而軟弱」的總統，這個印象可能導致蘇聯一年後大膽在美國南邊的古巴部署飛彈，
雖然歷史演變證明赫魯雪夫低估了甘迺迪的決心，但甘迺迪上任之初的軟弱，是招致
一九六二年古巴危機的原因之一。
凱根說，如今美國又有一位年輕而缺乏經驗的總統將接受考驗。過去兩週來，中
共領導人突然採取恫嚇政策來對付布希。
中共外長上週警告美國如果出售神盾或愛國者三型系統，將「破壞中美關係」，製
造區域緊張，增加戰爭機會；還有中共官員說這些軍售將促使中共執行另一次類似一
九年六月台海危機的大規模軍事演習，中共國台辦副主任周明偉等官員更警告說，如
果布希同意上述軍售，在中國大陸的美商將受到懲罰。
在此同時，中共財政部長項懷誠昨宣布，中共新年度國防預算將大幅增加近百分
之十八，似乎是針對美國政治和軍事「霸權」而來。
凱根在文中說，布希政府可能才剛開始思考究竟要賣什麼武器給台灣，布希總統
或許至今尚未仔細去想這些問題，但北京瞭解布希政府官員對台灣的態度較前政府友
善，副國防部長沃佛維茲、獲提名副國務卿的阿米塔吉、副總統錢尼的幕僚長利比兩
年前都曾聯名致函柯林頓政府，主強新國對台「戰略暨道德模糊的時代已經過去」。
凱根說，中共為了對抗布希政府內親台重量級官員的勢力，經由製造台海危機即
將發生的氣氛，來恫嚇布希政府，中共希望他們如果能大聲傳達警訊，就足以使他們
在美國外交政策界的「老朋友」，發揮影響力並遏制布希政府內鷹派勢力，如同郵報三
月三日的報導，中共已由「老朋友」，像是李季吉及史考克羅等人得到個人保證，如果
布希政府的中國政策偏離方向，他們將出來「教」布希。
凱根說，布希總統現在面臨的就像四十年前甘迺迪的情況一樣。中共在伊拉克問
題上已感覺到布希不如他競爭時強硬，他們甚至可能懷疑布希是紙老虎，如果布希現
在聽從季辛吉、史考克羅之流，避免在對台軍售上和中共衝突，中共將斷定當真有
危機發生時，布希無法立足來對抗中共。
該文最後指出，未來幾週內，一堆中國專家將會說，賣給台灣先進武器實在太危
險，但是如果歷史可為殷鑑，讓北京認定他正面對另一個「年輕而軟弱」的美國總統，
才是更危險的事。
An ambitious annual weapons shopping list from Taiwan is forcing the Bush administration to define its China policy before, perhaps, the new team is entirely ready. China's Communist government has been pressing hard: A decision to sell some of the more advanced items could lead to all kinds of trouble, it says, while restraining Taiwan could open the door to cooperation between Beijing and the new administration. Chinese officials are particularly upset at the idea of America selling Taiwan a warship with a sophisticated radar system known as Aegis. It seems to us, though, that the important question is not whether to sell the Aegis. What matters, first, is to get the principles right.

And the first principle must be that Taiwan has a right to defend itself. No one can seriously believe that Taiwan (population 22 million) would contemplate attacking mainland China (population 1.27 billion), so China's claims of vulnerability are preposterous. China objects to the weapon sales because it wants Taiwan to remain vulnerable to bullying and, if it comes to that, attack. This is not an ambition the United States has any reason to indulge.

By the same token, the United States should make clear that it will assist Taiwan in resisting Chinese aggression. The point is not to be inflammatory; a public declaration may not be the best way to make the point. The Bush administration should make clear to Taiwan, as have past administrations, that it will not support a declaration of independence or other provocative actions. But there should be no ambiguity about the potential U.S. response to an attack from the mainland. The best way to deter a conflict, which certainly the United States does not want, is to be clear in advance about the consequences.

A third principle is that the United States should seek to cooperate where possible with China. It should make clear, as President Bush said last week, that it wishes China no harm, and that support for Taiwan does not mean enmity toward China. A growing Chinese economy, gradually opening to the world, which Chinese leaders proclaim as their goal, is likewise in the U.S. interest.

The administration should decide which weapons to sell according to military, not political, criteria. Some analysts argue that Taiwan needs Arleigh Burke class destroyers equipped with the Aegis radar systems to defend against China's gradually growing navy and, eventually, as part of a defense against the ballistic missiles China has deployed in growing numbers along the strait facing Taiwan. Others say Taiwan could better use its limited defense dollars on cheaper systems that can be delivered more quickly. One military fact is indisputable: Even if the administration were to agree to the sale of Aegis-equipped
destroyers, Taiwan would not receive them for six to eight years, which would do little to help with the current missile threat. As a practical matter, the United States might help Taiwan more by increasing its training and cooperation with Taipei's relatively isolated military. Though the United States should not withhold weapons systems simply because China objects, it should not sell them simply to show that it is willing to stand up to the Chinese.

The United States has never supported independence for Taiwan, and the Bush administration is not proposing to do so now. But it also cannot support China's claims that, because it views Taiwan as a renegade province, it is entitled to occupy it by force if it chooses. Taiwan has evolved into a prosperous democracy. If it is to join with China someday, it must be by the will of its people, not under duress. Such a voluntary marriage seems feasible only if China someday follows Taiwan's path toward democracy. The U.S. goal in the meantime must be a supple but strong diplomacy that leaves no doubt about its support for Taiwanese self-determination.
2. Target Text 1:

美是否售台神盾…… 美擔心舊明確表態支持台灣
中國時報，26/03/01

美國「華盛頓郵報」週日發表社論呼籲說，關於美國對台軍售 問題，重要的不是要不要出售神盾級飛彈防禦系統給台灣的問題，而是原則導正的問題。社論呼籲，美國應該堅持台灣有自衛權利、明確表態支持台灣抵禦中共的攻擊，及美國應儘可能尋求與中共的合作等三項原則。

華盛頓郵報」上週六才刊出對中共國家主席江澤民的專訪，江澤民在受訪時明確表示反對美國出售神盾艦等先進武器系統給台灣的立場。

社論指出，台灣的年度軍購清單，正促使布希政府在內閣團隊尚未定型前，就要釐清自己的中國政策。在此之前，中共已經提出警告，如果美國對台出售高性能武器，尤其是神盾艦，將引發各種各樣的問題。社論說，如今真正重要的不是要不要賣給台灣神盾艦的問題，而是幾項原則問題。

據指出，美國應該堅持的第一個原則，是台灣擁有自衛的權利。據指出，僅有二千三百萬人口的台灣，沒有人相信它會考慮對擁有十二億七千萬人口的中國大陸發動攻擊，所以中共自稱受到威脅，是非常荒謬的。中共之所以反對美國對台軍售，事實上是要保持自己對台灣進行威嚇甚至攻擊的能力。社論說，這種情況讓美國毫無理由退讓。

其次，社論認為，美國應該明確表態支持台灣抵禦中共的攻擊。社論說，布希政府應該如同過去歷屆美國政府一般，一方面明確對台灣表示美國不支持台灣宣布獨立或其他挑釁行動，另一方面也清晰地表明，如果中共對台灣發動攻擊，美國可能的反應。

社論還認為，美國應該盡一切可能尋求與中共的合作。據指出，美國支持台灣並不等於與中共為敵，一個經濟逐漸繁榮、逐漸對外開放的中國大陸，不但是中共領導人追求的目標，也符合美國的利益。
3. Target Text 2:
華盛頓郵報：美應表明助台對抗中共攻擊
自由時報，26/03/01

華盛頓郵報今天針對美國政府對台軍售的決定，發表社論提出三大原則：台灣有權自衛、美國將助台抵抗軍事攻擊但不支持台獨，以及尋求儘可能和中共合作，郵報呼籲布希政府勿讓政治利益決制定台軍售。

這是继紐約時報上週的社論之後，美東另一最具影響力的報紙就對台軍售決定發表社論，華盛頓郵報的立場與紐約時報不盡相同。

郵報的社論指出，布希政府新團隊還未完全就緒之際，台美年度軍售會議就要迫使布希政府界定其中國政策，中共在這方面大力施壓，他們特別反對美國出售神盾雷達系統給台灣。

社論中說：「我們認為真正重要的問題不在賣不賣神盾，而是首先要把原則搞對」。

郵報提出三大原則：

第一、台灣有權自衛自己：沒有人會認真地以為台灣會考慮攻打中共，中共並不接受威脅，它反對任何對台軍售是為了使台灣易於受到威脅、甚至攻擊，這是美國沒有理由容忍的野心。

第二、美國應表明將協助台灣對抗中共攻擊，但不支持台獨：美國刺激性公開宣言不是最好方式，但布希政府應像美國歷任政府一樣，向台灣表明，美國不會支持台獨宣示或其他挑釁行動，另一方面美國對於台灣遭到大陸攻擊時是否協助台灣的問題，也不應有任何含糊。避開衝突的最佳方式就是美國是先讓雙方了解後果。

第三、美國應儘可能尋求和中共合作：正如布希總統上週向中共副總理錢其琛說的，美國所做的一切都不在威脅中共，美國支持台灣不代表要和中共為敵，中國大陸經濟繁榮，逐漸對外開放是符合美國利益的。

社論中說，對台軍售決定應基於軍事標準，而非政治理由。有些分析家認為台灣需要美國配備神盾雷達系統的驅逐艦，以抵抗中共日益增強的海軍及導向飛彈，也有些分析家主張台灣的國防採購經費有限，花在購買較便宜的武器項目較實際。

從軍事角度，有一點是無可反駁的：縱使布希政府批准售台神盾，台灣至少還要六年到八年才能接收到，這對中共目前的飛彈威脅幫助不大。較務實的做法，美國還不如加強和台灣的軍事訓練與合作，但同時美國不能純粹因中共反對就不賣武器給台灣，也不能為了展現她決心抗拒中共壓力就賣給台灣。

郵報社論說：「美國從未支持台獨」，布希政府也不打算這麼做。美國同樣不能支持中共對台灣為分離勢力，就有權以武力來佔領台灣。台灣已經發展為繁榮民主政治，如有一天和中國統一，它必須是出自人民的意願，而非強迫，美國的角色是提供堅定外交，毫不保留支持台灣自決的權利。
President Bush said yesterday that he will scrap the annual review of arms sales to Taiwan, ending a policy used by the United States since 1982 to provide the island with weapons to defend itself against China.

The president, in an interview with The Washington Post, described his decision this week to offer Taiwan the largest arms package in nearly a decade as the "right package for the moment." But Bush also indicated that his administration would try to avoid the contentious, once-a-year showdown over arms sales to Taiwan.

Although the United States would "reserve the right" to arm Taiwan, Bush said, "We have made it clear to the Taiwanese that we will not have this so-called annual review -- that we will meet on an as-needed basis." Experts say the decision could cool the arms race in the Taiwan Strait and can be seen as a conciliatory gesture toward China.

The president, in his first Oval Office interview, spoke on a variety of subjects that have been on the agenda during the first 100 days of his administration:

He put to rest any doubts that he backs legislation for energy drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, a policy from which some of his advisers had appeared to backtrack. But he emphasized natural gas drilling in the region over oil, and insisted it would not harm the environment. "We're talking a footprint amongst 19 million acres," Bush said.

He offered a spirited defense of his decision to forgo the Kyoto accord on global warming and spoke of placating foreign leaders angered by the decision. He said he had told a number of those leaders that the United States will work to reduce greenhouse gases and added, "We do take the issue seriously."

He said he wants Congress to debate his Social Security overhaul "next winter," a sign that he is not backing down from the partial privatization proposal even though it has lost support during the stock market slump.

He said he opposed voting representation for the District of Columbia in Congress.

The president, seated in a red, yellow and green striped chair with a bust of Benjamin Franklin and a painting of a Rio Grande scene over his shoulder, spoke of being active in all aspects of his administration -- a sensitive subject because some have questioned his low-key management.

"If part of your life is to keep your dance card full, my dance card's full," said Bush, in a crisp blue suit and black loafers on a warm spring afternoon. "And it's really a decision-making job, much more so than people really realize. I make decisions every day --
large decisions, small decisions, which is a test of my management skills and a test of how firm the foundation on which I walk."

35 Moments later, he defended his administration's role in the Middle East, which has been criticized by some Israelis and Palestinians for being less active than the Clinton administration's. "Let me put it this way: We're involved on a daily basis -- at least it feels that way," he said. "Either me or the secretary of state are involved with dealing with leaders, listening to concerns and trying to reduce, break the cycle of violence."

40 At the same time, Bush said his presidency may be less visible than predecessors', typified by his decisions not to speak out on race riots in Cincinnati. Administration officials have said Bush hopes to improve relations with African Americans, 90 percent of whom voted for Al Gore in November, but the president said he saw no need to intervene publicly to help calm tempers during the Cincinnati disturbances. "It looked to me like the mayor was getting on top of the situation," he said.

45 The president linked his decision not to involve himself in Cincinnati with his decision not to participate in the homecoming of the air crew that had been held by the Chinese. "I believe in sharing credit and I do not believe in stepping on somebody else's story," he said. "I believe if somebody is in charge of the situation and is doing a fine job, that person ought to deserve the credit." Bush said he would get involved when "it's appropriate. And I may think it's less appropriate than other presidents, frankly."

The president seemed relaxed and at times lighthearted on the eve of his return to his Texas ranch. After a lengthy statement to open the half-hour interview, he and aides joked that there would be no time for questions. "I thought you'd want to see the new Oval," he said. Discussing meetings of Cabinet officials about global warming, Bush said: "You probably know more about the meetings than I do."

Bush said some nations had expressed appreciation for his candor about the Kyoto global warming accord. But he added: "I don't want to get their respective leaders in trouble by saying they endorsed George Bush's plan, which may be the kiss of death for some political leaders."

Historians contend that an administration's first 100 days have typically shed little light on a president's ultimate record, but Bush acknowledged the benchmark, which arrives Sunday, and will celebrate by having all 535 members of Congress over for lunch Monday in what aides called an effort to "share the credit."

65 The fate of Bush's opening agenda will not be known until Congress recesses in August. But Bush said he is pleased that Congress has made "significant progress" on passing a budget that is close to his framework, that he has made "good progress" on working out an education package with the Senate and that his plan to help faith-based organizations land social service contracts "is picking up momentum and steam."
"So I can say with certainty to the American people: Progress is being made," Bush said.

In his personal report card, the president spoke most expansively about his tax cut, which probably will wind up somewhere between the $1.6 trillion, 10-year package he proposed and the House endorsed, and the $1.2 trillion version the Senate has approved. Bush said that although he thinks it is too early to know the exact size of the final cut, he said the votes ensure that he "will be signing a significant tax relief package."

Bush said he believes that his "stated mission of changing the tone of Washington is beginning to pay off."

"I think people are debating in more respectful terms. There's going to be disagreements," he said. "But I hope people have noticed I'm not participating in the name-calling or the finger-pointing and the tone appears to be better. And I don't think that's wishful thinking."

On the subject of drilling in the Arctic refuge, Bush showed no sign that he was deterred by such strong opposition on Capitol Hill that even some of his Cabinet members have sent mixed signals about whether he is committed to it. "It's necessary," Bush said. "We're running out of energy, and a good place to look is where energy is."

Federal wildlife officials contend that the coastal strip in question is the biological heart of the refuge, home to caribou, polar bears and snow geese. But Bush, whose remarks seemed to emphasize natural gas exploration over oil drilling, said his plans would not hurt the wildlife. "We're talking about a 2,000-acre area that will be accessible by ice roads, and actually which won't exist, obviously, when the ice melts," he said. "All that will be there is a platform from which the exploration is taking place."

Bush said many world leaders have asked him about the U.S. commitment to reducing greenhouse gases after his renunciation of the Kyoto global warming treaty. "I assured them that we're making progress at home -- they've got to understand that the environment is of concern to this administration," he said. Bush added that the position about Kyoto he has expressed to them is that "the spirit is fine, but the details aren't going to work, and let's work together to come up with a better protocol, a better way, and we will."

On local matters, Bush was asked about full voting representation in Congress for residents of the District of Columbia, which has only a non-voting delegate. "I'm against the senators," he said. Asked about a full vote in the House, Bush said, "I guess it's logical if I'm against U.S. senators, I'm against the full voting rights."

The president said this week's offer of weapons to Taiwan was unrelated to the surveillance plane standoff with China. Bush said he wasn't concerned that the offer would worsen relations with Beijing, and he still expects to take a state visit to China in the fall.
"There's going to be some areas where we disagree and one area where we disagree...is whether or not the United States ought to provide defensive arms for Taiwan, which I have done."

Bush said he was "distressed" to learn that China had detained the archbishop of an underground Catholic church in China. "That's not a good sign, at all," he said. "And they will hear that from our administration."

But the president also offered conciliatory remarks toward China, saying he didn't view that country as an "enemy" and said competition between the two nations "does not necessarily mean distrust, anger, you know, furor." Bush noted "the fact that this nation is making progress toward more freedom, albeit not at the pace we'd like to see in America."

The decision not to have an annual review for arms sales to Taiwan is likely to benefit China, which considers Taiwan a breakaway province, because Taiwan will no longer automatically be on the agenda each year. As a result, U.S. administrations will never have to declare that they have rejected an arms request from Taiwan, thereby enabling them to sidestep criticism from U.S. supporters of Taiwan.

In reality, the United States was always free to sell weapons to Taiwan "as needed," and in fact has done so outside the annual review process, such as when former president George H.W. Bush unveiled the sale of 150 F-16s to Taiwan during the 1992 presidential campaign. The April deadline had been established to give Taiwan the budget information it needed for its fiscal year. But Taiwan recently switched from a fiscal to a calendar year.
2. Target Text:
軍售會商變革 冷卻競武
中國時報，26/04/01

華盛頓郵報今天報導，布希總統準備從根本上改變現行的對台軍售作法，不再採行每年一次整批討論的方式，而是視台灣實際需要隨時會商。一般認為，這有助於冷卻台海的軍備競賽，也是布希政府對中共展現善意。

從一九八二年以來，美國和台灣的軍方代表團每年集會一次，討論台灣所需的軍備，至今近廿年。今年的軍售會議，廿四日在華府的美國國防大學舉行一天，就在同一天，傳出布希有意徹底改變現行作法。

每年的軍售會議之前數月，我國提出有意採購的清單，由美國國防部、國務院、國家安全會議等部門討論，最後由美國總統定奪，美方在軍售會議上正式告知我國。由於每次是一整年的項目，所以內容多樣，金額龐大，似乎顯得聲勢浩大，同時也導致中共抗議。

布希接受華盛頓郵報專訪時表示，他在廿三日同意出售十分豐富的軍備給台灣，是近九年來最具規模的一次，也是「現階段十分正確」的作法。但是布希同時指出，他的政府也要努力避免這種「每年換牌一次」的爭議性作法。他表示，依照他未來的作法，美國繼續有權對台軍售，但是同時明告台灣，不再有這種所謂「年度檢討諮商」，而是依照實際需要而會商。

據報導指出，專家認為，布希這個作法可以冷卻台海的軍備競賽，也是向中共展現善意。

報導並說，沿用了近廿年的年度會商，還有一個壞處，就是如果美國否決台灣有意購買的某些項目，那些支持台灣的人士可能因此而批評行政當局，形成困擾。

事實上，美國對台軍售隨時可以「視需要決定」，不必受到年度會議限制。最明顯的例證是一九九二年九月，當年的軍售會議早已結束，下年度的還沒開始，可是老布希總統宣布出售一百五十架 F-16 戰機給台灣。
China's abrupt shift to a more aggressive stance on Taiwan left the Clinton administration scrambling this week for a response and struggling to temper increased pressure for new sales of sophisticated arms to Taiwan, Congressional and administration officials say.

Administration officials say they were given no hint of the shift by the Chinese, who made their announcement just days after one of the highest ranking American delegations ever to visit China spent two days in Beijing in talks that focused on urging restraint over Taiwan.

The administration had hoped that relations with China were on the road to improvement, but they now appear to be entering an extraordinarily delicate phase, and a series of approaching events, including elections in Taiwan, threatens to make things dramatically worse.

The new Chinese policy, announced suddenly in an 11,000-word paper that had apparently been in preparation for many months, said in essence that China would not wait indefinitely for Taiwan, which Beijing considers a renegade province, to reunite with the mainland and would consider a military attack if negotiations dragged on.

In immediate response, the under secretary of defense for policy, Walter B. Slocombe, made the firmest of warnings to Beijing, saying midweek that China would face "incalculable consequences" if it followed through on its stiffer policy.

But the document set off intense debate within the administration over a further reply throughout the week. On Friday, a senior Pentagon official said the Chinese statement was "unfortunate and very, very unhelpful," particularly from the "point of view of arms sales" to Taiwan.

There is now "incalculable pressure to sell more, do more," for Taiwan, another administration official said.

Besides bolstering support for legislation in the Senate that seeks to expand military ties between Washington and Taiwan, the new Chinese stance threatens to help unravel the administration's effort in Congress to usher China into the World Trade Organization.

The legislation in the Senate, known as the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, is strongly opposed by the White House. But the administration remains divided over the long-term effects of China's policy statement, known as a white paper, a senior administration official said. Some believed that it would significantly heighten the potential
for the use of force in the Taiwan Strait. Others thought it would end up being a "blip" on the screen.

"This is as delicate a moment in U.S.-China relations as ever before and never have so many factors been involved," said Chris Williams, the senior foreign policy adviser to the Senate majority leader, Trent Lott of Mississippi, who is a strong supporter of Taiwan. "The potential for a significant crisis in the Taiwan Strait is very high."

Officials said the very way the policy shift was announced by China was taken as a slap by the administration, which has been working toward what it calls "constructive strategic partnership" with China.

The administration had sent a deliberately high-powered delegation to Beijing on Feb. 17 and 18, intended to impress upon the Chinese the importance of a range of topics, but specifically restraint on Taiwan.

The delegation consisted of Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott; the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Joseph W. Ralston; Mr. Slocombe; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Kurt M. Campbell; and the deputy national security adviser, James Steinberg.

The group suffered its first setback when the Chinese did not include a military official of equivalent rank to General Ralston in the talks, but sent a more junior officer.

The two-day meeting included "lectures" on Taiwan from Chinese officials, administration officials recounted, although the tone was not significantly different from past discussions of the subject, which Beijing considers as its most vital.

Administration officials said the delegation did not receive any hint that a major policy change affecting the relationship between China and the United States was about to be unveiled.

Instead, they said, members of the American delegation first learned of the change of policy through the news media. "There was no 'by the way,' " said an official familiar with the Beijing meetings.

Another administration official said that the record of the talks had been scoured this week to see if the Chinese had tried to foreshadow the policy paper in such an oblique way that the delegation had missed the signal. There was no such signal, administration officials concluded this week.

The shift came at a particularly fragile moment. Taiwan holds presidential elections next month, and the warning by Beijing that it would not wait indefinitely for the island to reunite with the mainland was clearly intended to warn candidates off further steps toward independence.

In addition, the administration is well into its annual review of arms sales requests from Taiwan and is contemplating a much more robust sale of weapons than in past years.
Among the weapons the Pentagon is considering selling to Taiwan are four Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyers equipped with Aegis air defense radars that would help Taiwan toward creating a missile defense system.

A senior Pentagon official said Friday that the destroyers were "under consideration." Two would be built in Mississipi, the home state of Mr. Lott, and two in Maine, the home state of Defense Secretary William S. Cohen.

Beijing has warned Washington that providing the destroyers could be "the straw that breaks the camel's back," said Rear Adm. Eric McVadon, retired, who was the United States defense and naval attache in China from 1990 to 1992.

"They have said they will react harshly if we do it," he said. "They have said they will not allow Taiwan to have them, and the concern is they will destroy it before it became operational. That then starts a conflict that could bring in the United States."

Also complicating the atmosphere was the release on Friday of a human rights report by the State Department that was highly critical of China, and the intention of the administration to gather European support to censure Beijing for its human rights record at the annual meeting of the United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva in April.

A Pentagon official said the administration had to consider two factors when deciding what to sell Taiwan.

The first, he said, are the "objective" conditions, called for under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, of Taiwan's ability to defend itself. Second is the "broader, overall" context, meaning the state of relations among China, Taiwan and the United States and the internal political situations in the three countries.

By issuing its policy statement a month before the Taiwanese election on March 18 and in the midst of a presidential primary campaign in the United States, Beijing is playing with American domestic politics in a way that will backfire on China, the official suggested.

At the Chinese Embassy in Washington, Yu Shuning, the counselor, said that the policy statement was intended to "let the international community, including the United States government, know China's principled issue on Taiwan."

He said that the policy remained "peaceful unification with one country, two systems." He added, "This paper will make the United States government better understand the settlement of the issue."

In Congress, both Democrats and Republicans said the document had heightened broad dissatisfaction with the administration's China policy.

By the end of the week, support of the administration's legislation to grant China permanent normal trade relations had waned significantly, Senate aides said.
Geared to China's entry to the World Trade Organization, the measure had already been complicated by Vice President Al Gore's apparent coolness and by the opposition of the labor unions.

But China's policy paper adds another strong obstacle, making it possible that the measure will fail, even in the face of a concerted lobbying campaign by the White House, an aide to a Democratic senator said.

On the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, an aide to a Republican senator said there was growing enthusiasm among Republicans to bring the legislation to the Senate floor for debate. Such a debate would encompass the broad range of United States-China policy and could take place as early as next week, the aide said.

"There is a lot of pent-up frustration about the administration's policy approach to China," the aide said. "Either that gets vented in terms of the World Trade Organization and permanent normal trade relations or on the Security Enhancement Act."
2. Target Text:

紐約時報：美考慮售台四艘神盾艦
中國時報，28/02/00

據「紐約時報」透露，一位美國防部的高級官員上週五表示，美國正考慮賣給台灣四艘配有神盾防空雷達系統的柏克級驅逐艦。一旦成交，兩艘將在羅特參議員的家鄉密西西比州建造，另兩艘將在國防部長柯恩的家鄉新澤西州建造。

但曾任美國駐北京大使館武官、現已退休的海軍少將麥克登則透露，中共曾警告華府，如果美國出售台灣神盾級驅逐艦，將是「壓斷駱駝背部的最後一根草」（超過最後忍耐限度），他們絕對會強烈反應，他們絕不允許台灣擁有這些艦隻。麥克登認為，中共的意願似乎是他們將在這些艦隻正式啟用前就摧毀它。而這樣的衝突，極可能將美國也捲進來。

不過，立國大廈官員說，柯林頓政府仍將依據兩項考量來決定對台出售何種武器。第一是台灣自衛能力的「客觀條件」；其次是範圍更廣泛的美中台關係和國際局勢。

「紐約時報」報導說，華府方面認為，中共的對台白皮書顯然已準備了許久。雖然美國防部一開始就嚴詞警告北京，如果貿然犯台將有「不可估量的後果」，但之後柯林頓政府內部顯然對該如何回應有一番辯論，以致後來立國大廈又以較緩和語氣說，白皮書的發表是件很不幸的事，而且對軍售台灣的問題「一點也沒幫助」，反而讓壓力愈來愈多，也愈強。

另一個副作用是刺激參院支持台灣安全法，並抵銷先前柯林頓政府為了讓國會通過中共永久性正常貿易關係所做的努力。

參院多數黨領袖羅特的外交事務智囊克里斯威廉就認為，台海爆發危機的潛在可能性非常高，而美中關係也從未像現在這麼敏感。「有這麼多的複雜因素」。

事實上，連柯林頓政府的官員都承認，白皮書等於打了美國一巴掌，以塔波特、史坦柏格為首，屆滿國務院、國安會、參謀首長聯席會議和立國大廈的高階代表團的北京行顯然沒有發揮什麼作用。

一名官員透露，兩天的會談中，中共沒有任何暗示，只是高姿態的給美方代表「上課」，甚至未派出相對階級的軍方將領與會，以致後來他們還是透過媒體才知道白皮書這回事。

目前適逢美國對台灣軍售的年度檢討時刻，華府今年也承受更多壓力，要出售更多武器。

據美國參院的議員助理透露，截至上週底，因爲白皮書的關係，國會支持柯林頓政府給予中共正常貿易關係的聲勢已大減。同時，有愈來愈多的共和黨籍參議員傾向讓參院討論台灣安全強化法，甚至最快下周即開始辯論。一旦如此，恐怕只會給柯林頓的中國政策帶來更多的麻煩。
At a time of high tension among China, Taiwan and the United States, Taiwan's government is pressing Washington to sell it some of the most advanced defensive weapons as part of an ambitious new plan to counter China's growing military power.

The request for weapons, including four warships equipped with sophisticated radar and antimissile systems costing more than $1.5 billion each, has already provoked severe warnings from Beijing and has put the Clinton administration in a serious political bind.

Chinese diplomats have privately said that the warship sales in particular would be regarded as a serious violation of China's national sovereignty and would create dangerous new tensions with the United States as well as across the Taiwan Strait.

But Taiwan is determined to create a new shield against China's expanding forces of ballistic and cruise missiles, officials in Taipei said in interviews last week. An American refusal to sell Taiwan the weapons would cause enormous bitterness on the island, the officials said.

The Clinton administration is divided over the sales, which are supported by some American military officers and Pentagon officials as justified for Taiwan's defense but opposed by some officials in the State Department and the National Security Council as an unnecessary and risky provocation of China. Beijing regards Taiwan as Chinese territory, separated by civil war.

President Clinton seeks better relations with China. But refusing Taiwan's request would anger Taiwan's most ardent supporters in Washington, who want closer military ties with Taiwan as a price for one of Mr. Clinton's major goals, China's admission to the World Trade Organization. In recent years, Republicans in Congress have accused the administration of ignoring Taiwan's needs, an argument supported by lobbyists for military contractors.

While Taiwan officials were reluctant to comment directly on the arms request, they did not mask their fervent desire for the weapons.

"We are not so confident that if we are attacked, the United States will be there," said Maj. Gen. Tyson G. Fu, director of strategic studies at the Armed Forces University in Taiwan. "So we have adopted a stand-alone strategy."

As part of a larger weapons request, Taiwan has asked the United States to sell it four guided-missile destroyers equipped with Aegis radar, tracking and battle management
systems -- one of the American military's most advanced warships and one never before sold abroad completely equipped.

A decision is expected by April, when the United States and Taiwan hold annual talks on arms sales. The consideration of Taiwan's request, submitted to Washington last fall, comes as American relations with China are further strained by China's warning last week that it may use force if Taiwan delays negotiations on reunification indefinitely.

China's warning prompted new criticism in Washington and appeared to bolster Congressional support for the proposed Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, which would deepen American military contacts with Taiwan and is opposed by Mr. Clinton. The House passed the legislation earlier this month, and the Senate is now considering it.

The administration's debate over the arms sales, carried out in private over issues that are as much political as military, crystallizes all the contradictions in American policy toward Taiwan, which the United States wants to protect from attack even as it officially recognizes Beijing as the sole government of "one China."

"I don't think I've seen so much anxiety over a decision," a senior administration official said.

The commander of American forces in the Pacific, Adm. Dennis C. Blair, who is now visiting China for discussions on Taiwan and other issues, has supported the sale of destroyers, but not necessarily with the elaborate Aegis system, officials in Washington said. He has not yet made a formal recommendation.

In addition to the Aegis-equipped warships, Taiwan has also asked to buy batteries of the latest Patriot missiles, which are ground-based interceptors, as well as advanced long-range radar.

Taiwan officials see the three purchases together as the core of a new defensive shield, General Fu said, and the Aegis system is considered essential "because it's mobile and more survivable than the Patriot."

Taiwan has also requested diesel submarines, P-3 surveillance aircraft and a variety of American missiles. But the request for submarines is a perennial one and is certain to be denied.

While China opposes any significant weapon sales to Taiwan, the Aegis-equipped warship is the most controversial, because it would involve a leap in Taiwan's technological level and because it could also, experts say, someday be adapted for use in the kind of upper-atmospheric missile defense that China has most vehemently condemned.

In private warnings to American scholars and diplomats, the Chinese have vehemently warned against the sale of Aegis warships, calling such a sale a violation of China's sovereignty and of previous agreements.
Under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, the United States is to provide Taiwan only with defensive weapons "in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability."

In a 1982 agreement with China, President Reagan also pledged not to increase the quantity or quality of arms sold to Taiwan and said the United States would gradually reduce arms sales if the mainland and Taiwan pursued a peaceful solution to their conflict, a condition that some say Beijing has violated with its threats.

Officials at the State Department and White House have argued that neither the Aegis system nor other ultra-sophisticated weapons can buy Taiwan real security, which they say depends on negotiations and, ultimately, American support.

Supporters of the sale, including senior military officers, counter that Taiwan has a good case. "We are required to give capabilities that help Taiwan defend itself," said one senior administration official who favors the sale.

Ultimately, administration and Pentagon officials said, President Clinton may approve only part of Taiwan's request, rejecting the Aegis destroyers but offering enough other weapons to avoid criticism that the administration is not supporting Taiwan enough.

In Taipei, officials said they saw a vital need for advanced defenses, including the Aegis system on Arleigh Burke missile destroyers, despite the enormous costs. The four ships that Taiwan has requested would cost $6.5 billion to build and equip, officials in Washington say.

Taiwan must act now, its officials say, to counter China's buildup of ballistic missiles on its coast near Taiwan, its crash program to develop long-range cruise missiles and its recent purchase of Russian destroyers.

Taiwan's special interest in the Aegis system is not hard to understand. American military experts said the system had originally been designed to counter waves of cruise missiles, including the Sunburn guided missiles carried on the four Russian destroyers China ordered.

With computers able to track many threats at once and coordinate responses, the Aegis system also can combat jet fighters and warships.

American experts say China is right in contending that the Aegis system could be adapted for use in a future, "upper-tier" defense that could spot incoming missiles early in their trajectory and target them high in the atmosphere or even above it -- the so-called theater missile defense that the United States and Japan are working to develop and that China strongly opposes.

"That's true," agreed General Fu in Taipei, of the potentially expanded use. "But any excuse will serve a tyrant. The Chinese even say the Patriots have offensive uses." The Patriot antimissile system is a less advanced weapon.
Taiwan officials insist that their proposals are based on military need, but such requests inevitably take on a heavy symbolic burden.

"If the United States turns us down, Taiwan's elite groups will feel a very emotional bitterness," said a senior Taiwan national security official, who spoke on condition that his name not be used. "We have the money, and we think this is important to our survival."

Michael D. Swaine, a military expert at the Rand Corporation in California, said, "There are those in Taiwan who see the Aegis sale as a strong symbol of the United States commitment to defending Taiwan."

If the Aegis destroyer sales are approved, the first delivery will not be for perhaps five years, followed by more years of training and technical cooperation between the American and Taiwan militaries so that the systems can be used effectively.

Learning to use the highly sophisticated Aegis "is a tall order for the Taiwanese from an operational point of view," Mr. Swaine said, but without such instruction, the warships "will just become big magnets for Chinese missiles or torpedoes."

Such enhanced cooperation between the two militaries is, in itself, a political goal of Taiwan and is strongly objectionable to China.

China's intense concern about the Aegis system arises in part from the potential link to the broader antimissile network that the United States and Japan are pursuing. China fears that if Taiwan is included, not only will Beijing's best weapons be blunted, but Taiwan's military will also become closely integrated with American forces in an effective alliance.

Taiwan's defense minister, Tang Fei, has publicly joked that T.M.D. stands for "Taiwan missile defense." But he and other officials say for the record that they have decided only to develop a "lower-tier" defense with the Patriot and Aegis systems, withholding judgment on any future defensive network.

"If the United States and Japan do develop an upper-tier defense, then, from the bottom of our hearts, of course we'll want to join," General Fu said.

Causing new worries in Washington and Beijing, Taiwan's leaders have recently spoken of developing a new, more aggressive deterrent strategy, with a goal of fielding offensive weapons including long-range missiles.

In a Dec. 8 speech on national security, Vice President Lien Chan, who is the Nationalist Party candidate for president in the election on March 18, said, "Our country must establish effective deterrent forces so that Communist China won't dare take on Taiwan," including "the attacking potential of long-distance surface-to-surface missiles."

The statement angered American officials who are hoping to cool tensions in the Taiwan Strait.
In Taiwan there seems to be a near-consensus on military issues among the three major contenders for president. If anything, the opposition Democratic Progressive Party, which has a history of advocating Taiwan's formal independence, might be more hawkish.

"We all agree that the best defense is a good offense," Parris Chang, a legislator from that party and one if its defense experts, said in an interview. "Taiwan needs cruise missiles able to reach Shanghai as a deterrent."
2. Target Text 1:
柯林頓可能同意台灣軍購案
工商時報，02/03/00

台美年度軍事採購會議將於四月召開，據「紐約時報」報導，台灣最近趁美中台三方關係呈現緊張之際，已再度向美方就去年八月所提出高達美金六十五億元神盾級軍艦採購案展開行動，惟迫於外界壓力，柯林頓可能僅做部份軍售給台灣，但不包括台灣最希望獲得的驅逐艦。

這項武器的需求，包括每艘售價超過十五億美元、配備精密雷達及反飛彈系統的戰艦四艘，這項軍購提案已引起中共的強烈警告，並使柯林頓政府面臨左右為難之窘境。

據台北一位官員上週私下透露，針對中國的擴充彈道及巡弋飛彈武器，迫使台灣下決心創造出新的防衛能力。紐約時報引述該官員的談話指出，一旦美方拒絕售予台灣這些武器，將使這個島嶼蒙上更大的痛苦。

然而台灣的官員並不願直接對武器需求作評論。三軍大學戰略研究所主任許台興少將表示，在龐大的武器需求中，台灣目標美國售予四艘配有神盾級雷達的導向飛彈驅逐艦，這是美國軍方最先進且從未以全配備售予外國的戰艦。這項軍售案由台灣於去年八月提交華盛頓，預計將在今年四月的美台年度軍售會議中會做出決定。

除了神盾級軍艦，台灣同時要求購買最新式愛國者飛彈炮組及先進的長程雷達。台灣官員希望藉由這三款武器的採購來作為新防禦網的核心。

台灣也要求購買柴油潛艇、P-3 傅察機及多種美式飛彈，但對採購潛艇的要求卻年年遭到拒絕。在所有對台軍售項目中，中共反對最厲害的莫過於神盾級戰艦，因為這項軍售一旦成功，台灣的軍事科技將躍進一層，而且該項武器也會被運用到最受中共譴責的戰區飛彈防塞計劃中。
3. Target Text 2:
美擬售台其他武器 取代神盾艦
中國時報，02/03/00

柯林頓政府內部對出售台灣神盾系統軍艦等高性能武器仍意見紛歧，繼續辯論中，但下月台北軍方與美國在華府舉行一年一度的華美軍售會議時，美總統必須有所決定，目前的態勢是柯林頓可能不批准售予台灣神盾艦，而售予其他武器系統強化台灣的防禦能力。

紐約時報今天在頭版刊出一篇自北京發出的關於對台軍售的分析報導，說是中共強烈反對美國出售配有神盾系統的驅逐艦給台灣，北京已私下警告華府，如美國供應神盾艦給台灣，將「嚴重損害中國的主權」，並製造中美之間和台海「危險的新緊張情勢」。到底批不批准台灣去年十一月在台美軍售預備會議上提出的神盾艦申請案，已成了柯林頓總統面臨的政治難題。

紐約時報的分析報導稱，柯林頓政府內部在神盾軍售案上，分成兩派，有些軍方及五角大廈的官員們主張售予神盾是台灣防務的正當需求，而國務院和白宮國家安全會議的官員們則認為沒必要，若出售將冒激怒中共之險。

美國軍方支持出售神盾給台灣的以現在大陸訪問的太平洋美軍總司令布萊爾為代表。華府的官員們說，布萊爾贊成售神盾艦給台灣，但不見得是配有神盾系統的艦隻，到現在布萊爾並未有正式的建議。

台灣已提出購買四艘阿利柏克級裝有精密神盾雷達系統的驅逐艦，目前一艘造價約十五億美元，若加上其他配備，四艘的總價將高達65億美金。此外，台灣也提出購買P-3反潛飛機、PAC-3愛國者反飛彈、柴油引擎的潛艇等，P-3和PAC-3均有可能獲准，但潛艦一如往年，將遭拒絕（編按：美現已不製造柴油引擎動力的潛艇）。

時報稱，白宮和國務院的官員辯稱，神盾艦和其他極端精密的武器，並不能「買給台灣真正的安全」，他們聲稱，台灣的安全「最終靠談判和美國的支持」。

可是贊成神盾採購案的美國軍方高級官員則說，台灣有理由提出這樣的軍售要求。一位行政部門的高級官員說：「依規定我們得幫助台灣獲得防衛的本事」。

整個政府內部的辯論最後將由柯林頓總統裁決，小柯一方面要維持與中共的關係，另一方面不得不考慮國會對於台灣強有力的支持，特別是「強化台灣安全法案」，自中共發表白皮書後，在臺院的支持上漲，紐約時報說，最終柯林頓可能只批准台灣所提軍購的一部分，而拒售神盾艦，但會提供足夠的其他武器，以避免他的政府對台灣支持不足的批評。

即使美方批准出售神盾，第一艘交貨將需時五年，若加上訓練及必要的美台軍事合作與協調，則需要更長的時間。中共反對神盾主要是恐懼此一系統將來可提升為高空飛彈防禦系統，屆時台灣勢將納入美日軍事同盟的體系之中。
The triangular relationship between China, Taiwan and the United States seems to veer from one crisis to the next. The latest one was provoked last week by Beijing's threat to take over Taiwan by force if island leaders do not soon agree to reunification on the mainland's terms. Now Taiwan and its supporters in the Pentagon and Congress want Washington to provide the island government with four American destroyers equipped with sophisticated Aegis radar and antimissile technology. There must be a more constructive way to manage the sensitive issue of Taiwan's future status.

A showdown over Taiwan is in no one's interest. Any Chinese effort to take control of Taiwan by force would risk an armed confrontation with the United States. Taiwan on its own could not long resist a Chinese attack, even with advanced American weapons. An escalation of Chinese threats and American arms sales to Taiwan can only make the equation more explosive. Yet Washington will have little choice but to accept that escalation if China persists in trying to intimidate Taiwan. Fortunately, there is time to pursue other options.

China, which set off this crisis, needs to modify its course. Beijing's pressured approach to reunification is not productive. Someday it may be possible to work out a political arrangement that both mainlanders and Taiwanese find acceptable. But that is not feasible today. China should back off from its threats before they do lasting damage to its important relationship with the United States.

Taiwan has recently shown greater sensitivity in its own approach to the reunification issue. It has stepped away from provocative suggestions that its leaders were preparing for independence. But at this point it should not be clamoring for the Aegis destroyers, one of America's most technologically advanced weapons systems and one that has never been sold abroad completely equipped. Even with these destroyers, which would probably not be delivered for five years and not become operational for several more, Taiwan would not, on its own, be able to withstand a full-fledged Chinese attack.

Washington, for its part, should urge moderation on both sides, while not stepping back from its promise to treat any forcible attempt to reunite Taiwan with the mainland as a matter of grave concern to the United States.

It would be beneficial to America, China and Taiwan to see Beijing admitted to the World Trade Organization under the reasonable terms negotiated last year. But China is now pressing its luck in Washington. Its bullying attitude toward Taiwan will increase...
Congressional opposition to W.T.O. membership. The longer-term risk is that continued Chinese threats could lead to dangerous military tensions in the Taiwan Strait. That would be the least promising way to deal with Taiwan's future.
2. Target Text:

紐約時報社論：中共威脅不利美中關係 同時呼籲台灣不要打「神盾牌」
中國時報，04/03/00

紐約時報社論報導柯林頓政府對台軍售政策已引起內部爭辯後，今天發表社論說，即使
美國提供先進的武器，台灣也無法持久的抵抗中共的攻擊。中共的威脅和美國的軍售
升高，只會使華府、北京、台北的三角關係更具爆炸性。

社論說，在台灣問題上攤牌，對任何人都沒有好處，而中共想以武力控制台灣，
將冒和美國武裝衝突之險。

社論敦勸製造這場新危機的中共緩和其舉動，停止其威脅，以免對重要的
美中關係，造成長期的損害。

社論認為台灣最近對統一的問題表現得較為敏感，台灣的領袖們不再談挑釁性的
獨立話題。這篇社論也勸台灣不要叫囂著要向美國購買神盾軍艦，因為即使美國批准
賣，也得五年後才能交艦，還得加上好幾年的訓練時間。可是有了神盾艦，並不表示
台灣可以單獨抵抗中共全面的攻擊。

社論指出，中共的威脅只會增加美國國會對其加入WTO的阻力，製造台海充滿
危險的緊張情勢，這是對台灣前途最不利的。
Tomorrow's White House visit by China's top-ranking diplomat, Qian Qichen, offers President Bush an opportunity to set a constructive course with Beijing. Few international relationships are as important, and as complex, as that between the United States and China. Vital issues of economics, trade and security are intertwined, along with compelling human rights concerns. As the 21st century unfolds, Beijing's advance to the front ranks of global power assures that all of these issues will take on ever greater significance.

Productive relations with China do not require playing down China's faults or setting aside American interests. In the three decades since Richard Nixon began to normalize ties, no American administration has come up with a completely satisfactory China policy. But Mr. Bush's predecessors have left him much to build on, including the Clinton administration's success in preparing the way for Beijing's accession to the World Trade Organization.

As Chinese power grows, America has an interest in seeing Beijing increasingly integrated into the world economy and global institutions. The United States should also encourage China to act as a stabilizing political and military force in Asia and to abide by universal human rights standards. The two nations are unlikely to form the partnership that Bill Clinton prematurely envisioned, but they need not be antagonists.

Perhaps the most volatile issue in America's relationship with China is Taiwan, yet that is the first subject that Mr. Bush faces. If he yields to conservative pressure and authorizes the sale of four destroyers equipped with America's most advanced naval radar system to Taiwan, Mr. Bush is likely to condemn his China policy to a sustained period of discord with Beijing. The Aegis is the Navy's most powerful battle-management radar, and could be adapted to provide Taiwan with a limited shield against Chinese missile attack.

There is much about Taiwan that deserves American admiration, including its maturing democracy and vital market economy. China must recognize that the United States has a strong interest in seeing Taiwan develop its democratic institutions. But Washington, for its part, must understand that China's determination not to let Taiwan become an independent nation is deeply rooted. The best course for the United States, China and Taiwan is to maintain Taiwan's current status as an autonomous, but not independent, entity until such time as Beijing and Taipei peaceably agree on a mutually acceptable formula for their relations.

American military assistance to Taiwan is a critical factor in this equation. Some American aid is warranted to help Taiwan defend itself against China's longstanding threat to
use force if necessary to reunite Taiwan with the mainland. But the sale of the Aegis radar system is not justified at this point and would be needlessly provocative.

Some conservative Republicans argue that selling the Aegis and other advanced weapons systems would give Taiwan confidence to negotiate a peaceful resolution of its differences with Beijing. They also say such sales would send a useful message of military toughness to China. They overlook significant changes in Beijing's diplomatic approach to the Taiwan issue. After years of arguing that its "one China" formula meant Taiwan had to subordinate itself to the Communist mainland government, Beijing now speaks of "one China" as a kind of larger confederation, of which capitalist Taiwan and the Communist mainland could both be parts. Beijing also implies its willingness to maintain the political and military status quo so long as Taiwan does not declare independence.

Selling the Aegis would diminish, not increase, security across the Taiwan Strait. No Aegis-equipped ship could be delivered to Taiwan for eight years. But announcing a sale could cut off the promising diplomatic explorations now going on. If the military threat from China increases, it may become appropriate to revisit the sale proposal at a later date. But for now diplomacy offers the best hope for stable relations between Taiwan and the mainland and between China and the United States.
Case Study 2: No.10

2. Target Text:

纽约时报：美国不宜出售神盾战舰给台湾
工商时报，22/03/01

美国舆论界领袖纽约时报发表社论，主张美国不要出售神盾舰给台湾，以免造成‘不必要的挑衅’；并认为，美国应把握经济到访所提供的外交机会，创造稳定的两岸关系与美中关系。

社论指出，台湾的民主政治与市场经济发展值得美国赞赏，北京必须认清台湾发展自己的民主机制是美国的重大利益；同时，华盛顿也必须了解，台湾绝不容许台湾独立。

社论表示，对美、中、台来说，维持台海现状是最好的办法，但不是让台湾走向独立。社论说，美国军事援助台湾是维护两岸关系平衡的重要因素，但目前看来，美国没有理由出售神盾舰给台湾，引发不必要的挑衅。

社论说，部分保守派共和党议员主张出售神盾舰及其它先进武器，给予台湾和北京谈判寻求和平解决分歧时的信心，也给有关强硬派传达一个有效的讯息。但他们忽略了解决台湾问题，已经改採外交手段的途径。

社论指出，一旦美国出售神盾舰给台湾，不但不会增强，反而会削弱台海安全。神盾舰必须花上八年的时關才能运送到台湾，但是一旦宣布出售的决定，中国试图以外交方式缓颊的途径将中断。

社论说，如果台湾的军事花费增加，美国政府可以再重新讨论台湾提出的武器采购清单，这一做法较恰当。以目前中国提出外交斡旋的努力，是稳定两岸关系的希望。
Case Study 2: No.11

No. 11
1. Source Text:
Secret U.S. Study Concludes Taiwan Needs New Arms
New York Times, 01/04/01

A confidential review by United States naval officers has concluded that Taiwan needs a significant infusion of new weapons, including a sophisticated ship-borne radar system that China has put at the top of the list of arms it does not want Taiwan to have.

The assessment was carried out by officers from the United States Pacific Fleet, who visited Taiwan to assess its naval requirements in light of China's military buildup. While military factors are not the only consideration, the still secret review is an important element of the deliberations about whether to sell Taiwan the radar system, known as Aegis, and other naval weapons.

The decision on whether to sell naval, air force and army weapons, which President Bush is expected to make in the next few weeks, is one of the first major foreign policy tests for his administration and could set the tone of United States-Chinese relations for years to come.

China has bitterly opposed the sale of sophisticated weapons, which it fears will lead to a new degree of cooperation between Taiwan and the United States and buttress pro-independence sentiment on the island.

Beijing has singled out as particularly objectionable potential sales of three types of weapons: the Navy's Aegis, which China fears may provide the basis for an eventual antimissile defense and blunt China's missile threat to the island; the Army's advanced Patriot antimissile system known as PAC-3; and submarines, which China maintains are offensive weapons and which the United States has never before sold to Taiwan. Taiwan has sought to buy submarines as well as the Aegis and has also been in discussions about the new Patriot system.

In addition to citing a need for the Aegis system by 2010, the American naval officers who conducted the review concluded that Taiwan also needed the Kidd-class destroyer as a stopgap. And they cited the need for new submarines as well as an underwater sonar array to detect Chinese subs. Besides the naval review, similar studies have been carried out concerning other parts of Taiwan's military.

The pending decision on arms sales has split American China hands, including those in the Republican Party, putting pressure on Mr. Bush from both sides.

On one side are policy experts who say it would be foolish to pick a diplomatic fight with Beijing before the Bush administration has a chance to begin a dialogue with the leadership there. Washington's long-term interests, those experts say, are best served by

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finding a way to engage China, a nation of 1.3 billion people and a nuclear power with a growing economy.

On the other side are pro-Taiwan conservatives who insist that the United States has a moral obligation to safeguard Taiwan, a democratic nation of 22 million, from threats from the Communist government in Beijing. The conservatives also say that Washington should contain China's growing military power in Asia.

While there has been much discussion about China's growing force of short-range ballistic missiles, Beijing has also deployed new warplanes, destroyers, submarines, anti-ship missiles and surface-to-air missiles, many of which it bought from Russia. That has created a growing threat to Taiwan's aging fleet, whose role is to protect the island from attack and prevent a Chinese blockade.

The review of Taiwan's naval needs was begun during the Clinton administration. After Taiwan sought to buy four Arleigh Burke-class destroyers equipped with the Aegis system, the Clinton administration deferred a decision and asked for a Pentagon assessment.

A team of officers from the United States' Pacific Fleet inspected Taiwan's navy. Their conclusions have circulated among officials in Washington and Taiwan and have served as the basis for a Pentagon report on "Taiwan naval modernization."

Experts familiar with the officers' review say it concludes that by 2010 Taiwan will need vessels equipped with long-range surface-to-air missiles, a sophisticated battle management system and a phased-array radar, which is the hallmark of the Aegis system.

The year 2010 is significant since it may take eight years or more to agree on a configuration of the Aegis system for Taiwan's navy, build the ship and integrate it into Taiwan's fleet, according to American military specialists.

As an interim step, the review suggests that Taiwan buy four Kidd-class destroyers, which had most elements of the top advanced air defense systems before the Aegis was developed. The United States developed the destroyers for the shah of Iran, but the sale was thwarted after the shah fell from power. The ships were later used by the United States Navy and were nicknamed "Ayatollah-class" destroyers, but they have since been retired.

In a recommendation that is certain to prove contentious, the United States officers concluded that Taiwan needed new submarines. Currently, Taiwan has only four, including two Guppies of World War II vintage which it uses for training and which cannot descend more than 150 feet.

The review found that Taiwan needed an underwater sonar array to alert it to the presence of Chinese submarines near its ports and coasts. It also describes a need for a new maritime aircraft to hunt for enemy submarines and conduct patrols, alluding to the American P-3, which Taiwan also wants to buy.
The Aegis has been the center of much of the public debate, which has not always been well informed. Unlike a rotating radar antenna, the Aegis's four stationary arrays search the sky electronically. The Aegis is designed to track more than 200 targets, including sea-skimming missiles, and to direct ship-fired missiles at them.

While much of the discussion concerns the Aegis's potential as an antimissile platform, the United States Navy has yet to develop a sea-based theater antimissile system. And even if it does develop such a missile defense, the type of Aegis being considered for sale to Taiwan would not be equipped with an interceptor able to counter the Chinese ballistic missiles directed at Taiwan.

The primary reason to sell the Aegis is to protect Taiwan's fleet, and upgrading the Aegis to serve as a theater missile defense would require a future decision in Washington.

"There is a fantastic mythology about the Aegis," said Kurt Campbell, who led the Pentagon effort to improve Taiwan's defense ability during the Clinton administration.

Some liberal critics have complained that the Aegis would have an offensive capability because it would be armed with Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles. But the variant that the Pentagon is considering selling to Taiwan would not be equipped with those weapons.

There is something of a precedent for an Aegis sale. In an little known episode, the United States offered to sell a scaled-back version of the Aegis radar and command and control system in 1992 and install it on Taiwan's Perry-class frigates. Taiwan decided not to buy the system. That was before China continued its buildup in the Taiwan Strait and sought to pressure Taiwan by test-firing its ballistic missiles close to the island in 1995 and 1996.

This is not to say that there is unanimous agreement among military experts, including those in Taiwan, about the Aegis. Advocates of the system say it would provide Taiwan's fleet with the best possible protection against Chinese antiship missiles as well as a top-notch battle-management system. They say it could even serve as a backup command post in the event that Taiwan's land-based command posts were destroyed in missile strikes from China.

Critics cite its cost, $1 billion a ship, and the almost decade-long delivery time. And they question whether the Taiwanese Navy would be able to operate and maintain such a sophisticated weapons platform.

As the political debate over the Aegis has heated up, some analysts have speculated that the Kidd destroyers could be the basis of a compromise that would enable the White House to appear resolute while avoiding a rupture with Beijing.

By selling the destroyers, the Bush administration could argue that it was acting quickly to improve Taiwan's ability to defend its fleet. The administration could then put Beijing on notice that Washington would go ahead with the Aegis sale next year unless China curtailed its military buildup near Taiwan.
Trumpeting the value of the Kidds, Adm. Dennis Blair, the head of the U.S. Pacific Command, told Congress this week that the Kidd had an effective air defense ability and could be delivered in only two years, a time frame some experts say is somewhat optimistic. He also noted that the Kidds and the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers have the same propulsion system, suggesting that it could provide Taiwan's navy with some useful training should it eventually acquire the Aegis-equipped Arleigh Burke.

Wu Shi-wen, Taiwan's defense minister, indicated that Taiwan's priority was still to acquire the Aegis because it had the potential to serve as a sea-based antimissile defense. In an interview, he declined to say if Taiwan would buy the Kidds, saying the matter required further study.

But other Taiwanese officials suggested that Taiwan would be willing to defer the Aegis purchase for a year if it was linked to a demand that China restrain its military buildup.

"We are still hopeful that our request for the Aegis will be granted this year," Dr. Tien Hung-mao, Taiwan's foreign minister, said in an interview. "But I think this is something we are willing to give the U.S. administration room to think about. In the end, if the Chinese fail to cooperate, the U.S. will be in a more justifiable position to say, hey, we gave you 12 months. You cannot just make unilateral demands without making any concessions."

Some experts say, however, that while the Kidd might do for now, it is no substitute for the Aegis, especially if the Chinese continue to increase their air, missile and naval forces nears Taiwan throughout the decade.

They say the Aegis's phased-array radar and combat system is capable of tracking and attacking a greater number of targets than Kidd's system, which uses an older, rotating radar.

The Arleigh Burke-class destroyers on which the Aegis is installed also carries more surface-to-air missiles than the Kidd and can fire more quickly. And if the United States succeeds in developing a theater sea-based antimissile defense and decides to provide it to Taiwan, it would use the Aegis-equipped Arleigh Burke, not the Kidd, as a platform.

"The Kidds can handle the current Chinese antiship missile threat," said Norman Polmar, a naval analyst. "But the Chinese future missile capability will require a much more sophisticated defense like the Aegis."
2. Target Text 1:
美國海軍機密報告：台灣需在2010年前取得神盾
工商時報，02/04/01

就在美台軍事會議即將於本月舉行之際，美國紐約時報昨日引述美國海軍一份機密報告指出，台灣需要在二〇一〇年前取得「神盾」雷達系統。在取得神盾艦前的緩衝期，美國海軍則建議台灣應採購四艘紀德級驅逐艦。不過，美國考慮出售給台灣的神盾雷達系統將不會具備攔截中共瞄準台灣的導彈飛彈的功能。

這篇刊登在頭版的報導說，在這份由美國太平洋艦隊美國海軍官員所撰寫，並仍列為機密的報告，將是布希政論評估是否出售神盾雷達系統及其它海軍武器給台灣的重要參考。報導表示，布希預定在未來幾個月就出售台灣的內容作最後決定，這是美國新政府上台後的第一項重要的外交政策考驗，並將為未來四年的美中關係定調。

北京指明反對美國出售給台灣的武器有三項：第一個是海軍的神盾艦，大陸擔心這將提供反飛彈的基礎；第二是陸軍先進的愛國者反飛彈系統PAC-3；第三項是潛水艇。台灣不僅提出希望購買潛水艇和神盾艦，並與美方討論採購新愛國者系統飛彈。這份報告說，台灣需要新型的海軍飛機，偵測敵人的潛水艇並負起巡邏任務，故台灣提出的反潛直升機P-3要求美國應予同意。

在神盾級雷達的相關問題上，該報告指出，台灣除了需要在公元二〇一〇年前取得神盾雷達系統，並需要紀德級驅逐艦作為替代品；台灣同時需要新型的潛水艇及海底聲納系統以偵測大陸潛水艇位置，除了海軍防禦，這份報告並分析了台灣陸軍與空軍所需的防禦武器。熟悉這份報告的專家說，美國海軍在調查報告下結論認為，在二〇一〇年以前，台灣需要配有長程對空飛彈的艦艇，先進的戰鬥管理系統，及相關雷達系統，其中品質最佳的就是神盾系統。

美國軍事專家進一步指出，二〇一〇年之所以重要，是因為台灣海軍至少需要八年時間配置神盾雷達系統，建造艦隊並結合到台灣的艦隊。在取得神盾艦前的緩衝期，美國海軍建議台灣應採購四艘紀德級驅逐艦，因為它有最先進的空防系統配備。

報導還說，「神盾雖然引起廣大的公開爭辯，但卻沒有獲得正確的認知」。由於美國目前沒有海基型的導彈防衛系統，許多人認為神盾級驅逐艦有作為反導彈平台的潛力，不過，即使未來這個系統建構完成，考慮出售給台灣的神盾雷達系統將不會具備攔截中共瞄準台灣的導彈飛彈的功能。

報導指出，美國海軍主張出售神盾雷達系統給台灣的主要原因是為了保護台灣的艦隊。但提昇神盾雷達系統作為戰區飛彈防禦系統，需要華盛頓未來進一步的決定。部分自由派批評，神盾艦配備戰斧巡弋飛彈，具有攻擊能力，但美國國防部考慮出售給台灣的是不具備這些攻擊性武器的艦艇。美國前國防部助理部長坎貝爾就說：「對於神盾艦存在著太多的迷思。」
3. Target Text 2:
紐約時報報導 美太平洋司令部實地調查 台灣需要神盾艦
中國時報，02/04/01

美國太平洋司令部經實地調查後，在一項祕密評估報告中指出，台灣在二〇一〇年需具備「神盾」系統戰力，另外台灣目前也需要「紀德」級艦作為樞密之計。該份報告甚至認為，台灣還需要新型潛艇和水下聲納基陣才能偵測中共潛艇。

「紐約時報」昨（一）日指出，美國太平洋司令部官員曾赴台灣調查，對台灣海軍進行一次總評估，並做出一份機密評估報告，內容建議台灣海軍需要「神盾」多功能相控陣雷達系統，以及一些重要的新式武器。

報導說，美國是否對台出售海、空、陸軍等武器裝備，布希總統預計在未來數週就要決定，這將考驗「中」美關係未來數年的發展。中共對此已做出多次表態，堅決反對美國向台出售先進武器，以防止台灣走向台獨。

報導指出，北京在反對聲浪中尤其點名三項武器為中共所不能忍受。一是「神盾」級艦，中共擔心該艦裝備的反導彈系統能摧傷北京導彈對台的威脅。二是陸軍使用的「愛國者」三型導彈。三是潛艇。在中共眼中，這些都是攻擊性武器，也是美國從未對台出售的武器項目。

美國對台軍售引發的爭議問題開始在美國政壇發酵，代表政策系統的一派認為，和北京為敵非常不智，從長遠看華府的最佳策略是和一個擁有十三億人口並有導彈實力的北京政府交往，而且對台出售的「神盾」版本也不會裝配載導彈導彈。美方認為，對台出售「神盾」系統的主要目的是保護台灣艦隊，如果該系統升級成為戰區導彈防禦系統（TMD）的海軍作戰平台，就需要華府從長計議了。前美國國防部副助理部長坎貝爾說，有關「神盾」的說法有時太過神話。

一些自由派的批評者認為，「神盾」艦因配有戰斧巡航導彈，因此它具有強大攻擊能力。但持不同意見的人認為，五角大廈售予台灣的「神盾」艦當然不會裝配上述攻擊武器。

報導同時指出，美國曾於一九九二年表示願對台提供「神盾」雷達和作戰指控系統，裝配在台灣自製的「派里」級巡防艦上，但台灣沒有決定買。這在一九九五年和一九九六年台海危機早幾年的事。

反對把「神盾」級艦賣給台灣的人稱，該艦單價十億美元，且整套技術轉移給台灣需耗時十年，美方擔心台灣海軍如何操作和消化此先進武器裝備。一些分析家認為，售台「紀德」級艦從政治上說可取得妥協，不致把美國和中共的關係弄僵。
4. Target Text 3:

纽约时报报导 美海军主张售台神盾舰
自由时报，02/04/01

广受瞩目的台美军事会议本月即将举行，纽约时报一日引述美国太平洋海军舰队官员撰写的一份机密评估报告指出，美国应出售包括神盾雷达系统等先进武器给台湾，以因应中共不断增强的武力。

报告引述这份报告的专家说，美国海军在报告的结论中表示，在二0一0年以前，台湾需要具有长程对空飞弹的舰船，先进的战斗管理系统，及相控阵系统雷达，其中品质最佳的就是神盾系统。

美国军事专家进一步指出，二0一0年之所以重要，是因为台湾海军需要在十八年的期间配置神盾雷达系统，建造舰船并将之整合到台湾的舰队。

在取得神盾舰前的缓衝期，美国海军建议台湾应采购四艘纪德级驱逐舰，因为它有最先进的防空系统配备。

这份报告将引起辩论的报告并指出，台湾需要新的潜舰，目前台湾只有四艘潜舰，其中两艘是二次大战时代老式供训练用的潜舰，无法潜至一百五十呎以下的深海。

美国海军并认为，台湾应取得海底侦察能系统，一旦大陆潜舰接近台湾的港口或船隻，可以立即侦测得知。台湾同时需要新型的海面航机，侦测敌人的潜舰并负责巡逻任务，台湾提出的反潜直昇机P-3要求美国应予同意。

这次美国军售台湾的军品项目最受瞩目的，就是神盾雷达系统，它可以同时追踪两千个目标，不论海面飞弹或自船舰发射的飞弹。

中共担心神盾雷达系统可能成为未来反飞弹系统的平台，但美国海军必须发展一套以海面为主的防空系统，而且即使这个系统建立完成，考虑出售给台湾的神盾雷达系统将不会具备摧毁中共瞄准台湾的导弹飞弹的功能。

部分自由派人士批评，神盾舰配备有战舰巡弋飞弹，具有攻撃能力，但美国国防部考虑出售给台湾的是不具备这些攻击性武器的船舰。

这篇报导的专家说，一九九五和一九九六年，中共在台湾沿海部署的飞弹数量增加，并进行飞弹射击恫吓台湾，但这并不表示，所有的军事专家都认为美国应该出售神盾舰给台湾。支持者认为，这项系统可以提供台湾海军对抗中共飞弹及尖端战争管理系统的最佳保护，但反对者质疑台湾海軍操作及维修这种先进武器的能力。

目前华盛顿对于美国是否出售神盾舰给台湾的政治辩论日益白热化，部分政治分析家揣测，白宫是为避免与北京正面衝突，但又要表现保持台湾的坚定立场，可以出售纪德舰作为折衷方案。

藉出售纪德舰给台湾，布希政府可以展现“为加强台湾军舰的防禦能力，华盛顿採取了明快的动作”；另一方面也可以提醒北京，除非其减少在台海沿岸的军力部署，否则将出售神盾舰给台湾。

美国太平洋军区司令布莱尔上週在国会作证时已表示，纪德舰具备有效的防空能
力，而且兩年就可以交艦，且推進能力與神盾艦相同。

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中華民國國防部長伍世文說，由於神盾艦具有作為海面反飛彈系統的潛力，被列
為優先採購的武器，但他在紐約時報的專訪中，不願表示台灣是否會採購紀德艦，僅
表示這件事需要再進一步研究。

不過其他台灣政府官員表示，如果為了要求中共限制軍力擴張，台灣願意延後一
年採購神盾艦。中華民國外交部長田弘茂說，希望美國能同意出售神盾艦給台灣，「但
是我想我們願意給予美國政府一些考慮的空間，如果到最後中共仍不願意合作，美國
大可以說，嘿，我們已經給你十二個月的時間，你不能只是片面要求但不作任何的讓
步」。

不過部份專家說，無論如何，目前美國可能出售台灣紀德艦，但它不能取代神
盾艦，特別是未來十年如果中共繼續增加在台灣沿海的海、空軍力及飛彈數量，因為神
盾的相陣系統比紀德的旋轉系統能追蹤並攻擊數量更多的目標，神盾艦也能攜帶更多的
地對空飛彈。

海軍專家波瑪說，紀德艦足以對付中共目前的反軍艦飛彈系統，但是未來中共的
飛彈能力需要類似神盾艦等更先進的武器對付。

報導說，武力並不是唯一考量的因素，這份由美國海軍官員實地走訪台灣撰寫的
『機密報告』，是布希政府評估是否出售神盾雷達系統及其他海軍武器給台灣的重要參考。
1. Source Text:
U.S. May Withhold Main Radar Item on Taiwan's List

New York Times, 18/04/01

President Bush's senior national security aides have recommended that he defer the sale to Taiwan of advanced destroyers equipped with a highly sophisticated ship-borne radar system but have advised him to provide a range of less advanced weapons to counter China's growing arsenal.

The recommendation, by a team of senior deputies in the State and Defense Departments and the White House, was discussed this afternoon at a meeting of the National Security Council.

Officials declined to discuss that session, other than to say that Mr. Bush is expected to make a final decision next week. He and his senior advisers ?Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and the national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice ?could choose a different path, officials warn.

What Mr. Bush sells to Taiwan, and how he words his decision about whether Taiwan may ultimately obtain the advanced radar system, known as Aegis, or equipment that could perform a similar function, could set the tone of his dealings with China for the next several years.

For Mr. Bush the decision is particularly delicate because pro-Taiwan conservatives in his own party have urged that he agree to Taiwan's entire shopping list, especially after the 11-day detention of the crew of the American spy plane that collided with a Chinese fighter jet on April 1.

But much can be done to strengthen Taiwan's defenses without selling the high-profile Aegis, and many of Taiwan's deficiencies cannot be resolved through the sale of weapons alone.

Administration officials insist that the standoff with China over the April 1 collision will have no influence on their final decision on what to sell Taiwan. But taken together, the collision and the arms sales are likely to define Mr. Bush's relations with Chinese leaders, and it is far from clear how China will view his decision.

Beijing has said that any sale of advanced weapons to Taiwan would severely damage relations with the United States, though Washington has made such sales in the past.

According to officials familiar with the report, Mr. Bush's top aides concluded that Taiwan did not yet have the technical skill to handle the Aegis system, which could protect Taiwan against a missile attack.
Instead, they recommended selling less sophisticated Kidd-class destroyers. Nor would they sell Taiwan the Army's advanced antimissile system, known as PAC-3, because it has yet to be deployed by American troops. There is continuing debate over whether to sell Taiwan diesel-powered submarines armed with conventional torpedoes.

Top United States Navy officials urged in March that Taiwan should get more sophisticated weapons.

But today, "there was no big fight over any of this," one senior Administration official said. "The issue now is how we present it." The official noted that China's reaction may depend more on the signals Mr. Bush sends about future sales.

If he decides to defer the decision on the Aegis, as now seems highly likely, Mr. Bush would be able to hold open the possibility of selling the system to Taiwan later if China continues to improve its ability to threaten the island, which it regards as a renegade province.

The United States has no diplomatic relations with Taiwan and has always left ambiguous the extent to which it would aid Taiwan if it were attacked by China. The United States promised in 1982 that it would not increase the quality and quantity of arms sold to Taiwan, but that has always been interpreted by Washington to mean it could help the island maintain a defensive posture proportional to the perceived threat.

Deferring the decision on the sales also gives Mr. Bush some leverage over Taiwan's leaders. He wants to keep them from provoking Beijing, while encouraging them to invest in what one senior official called "the business of a modern defense."

"There would be some conditionality on the sale of Aegis," said another senior official involved in the decision. "Before you buy your Ferrari, you better build the garage first."

During the presidential campaign last year, Mr. Bush talked occasionally about taking the ambiguity out of American military commitments to Taiwan, to support its democratic practices and send a message to Beijing. Speaking of the Clinton administration during a campaign stop at a Boeing plant last May, Mr. Bush said, "They have been inconsistent on Taiwan. I will be clear."

But as president he has discovered that clarity has its limits.

Mr. Bush is facing the tug of conflicting priorities: He wants to show his support for Taiwan, without undercutting a relationship with China that seems to be off to a rocky start.

Mr. Bush appears to be weaving toward a middle ground—a sale he can defend to his own party without risking a new rupture with China.

Taiwan has long sought the Aegis system because it would give it a clear advantage in the South China Sea. Mounted aboard an advanced destroyer, the Aegis is designed to track more than 200 targets, including sea-skimming missiles, and aerial attacks. Because China
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does not have the ability to mount an invasion, suppressing its considerable missile threat is vital.

But Bush administration officials, like their predecessors, fear that before the system is up and running, which could take eight years and more, China would have time to counter it with new weapons.

Mr. Bush's decision is bound to be examined closely in Congress, where several conservatives called recently for more arms sales to Taiwan.

Senator Craig Thomas, the Wyoming Republican who heads the Foreign Relations subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific affairs, said today that he supported deferring any immediate sale of the Aegis system to Taiwan, because it would be unnecessarily provocative. "We're committed to helping Taiwan if they are attacked," he said, "but we don't need to be waving red flags in people's faces."

That is why the White House is leaning toward less sophisticated destroyers and diesel submarines to add to Taiwan's tiny fleet.

"Like a horse with legs at the end of the race, the submarine option seems to be gaining ground," said Bates Gill, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and an expert on the Chinese military. But it is unclear who would build the submarines; American shipyards have moved on to more sophisticated gear, Mr. Gill noted. "There's even talk that the Germans might do the building, but assemble it here in the United States," he said.
3. Target Text 1:
布希國安幕僚力阻售台神盾艦
工商時報，19/04/01

在中美軍事事件進行談判之際，美國新政府數位資深的國家安全幕僚已經就廿三日即將舉行的台美軍售會議向布希提出建議，希望布希政府暫緩出售配備神盾雷達的驅逐艦和愛國者三型防彈飛彈給台灣，而改售足以抗衡中共軍事部署，但較不具爭議性及觸發性之驅逐艦。

紐約時報透露，十七日下午由數位來自國務院、國防部和白宮的次長級國家安全官員所進行的內部會議中，認為即使目前不出售神盾艦，仍有許多強化台灣防衛能力的方法；況且台灣問題也不能單以出售武器的方式來解決，與會官員同時評估，台灣目前仍有足夠能力和技術來操作神盾系統，因此建議出售較不複雜的紀德級驅逐艦。

至於愛國者三型飛彈，與會官員認為，基於美軍本身也尚未部署該型飛彈，因此目前不宜出售給台灣，而另另一項台灣極有興趣的柴油動力魚雷潛艇，會議中則因爭議頗大而沒有獲得一致的結論。不過與會官員提醒，縱使幕僚已提出了這些建議，但布希、鮑威爾、國防部長倫斯斐、以及國安顧問萊斯等四位關鍵決策者，下週仍可能做出不同的決定。

紐約時報指出，這次軍售案布希若決定不出售神盾艦給台灣，也可為台灣領導者提供「標竿作用」，一方面使台灣不激怒中共，同時也鼓勵台灣進行現代國防工業的投資。一位參與決策的官員便不諱言，出售神盾艦需有一些必需條件，他說，「要買法拉利跑車之前，你最好先蓋個車庫。」

此外，布希做這項決定也將測試他與國會未來的互動，日前有數位保守派議員曾強烈要求行政當局出售更多的武器給台灣，不過參議院「亞太事務委員會」主席湯馬斯昨日則表示，為了避免不必要的挑釁，他支持暫緩出售神盾艦給台灣，他說，「台灣一旦遭到攻擊，我們承諾將會伸出援手，但無須在中共面前張牙舞爪，加以刺激。」

華府智庫「布魯金斯研究所」中共軍事專家季北慈指出，出售柴油潛艇給台灣的方案可能性似乎大增，但由於目前美國造艦廠均已升級到更為先進的級別，因此可能的方式是在德國建造，然後在美國組裝。

著名美中問題專家包道格則認為，多數華府人士寧可將這項軍售問題視為中美兩國對兩方關係意向的測試，而不願當成克服雙方文化誤解的一項課題。他說，美國高層的態度在這個議題趨向強硬，而美國對中國政策的政治氣氛也顯著感覺出來正往右傾。

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4. Target Text 2:
布希兩難 傾向走中間路線
中時報，19/04/01

對台軍售問題目前正困擾美國總統布希。他的安全幕僚建議推遲對台出售「神盾」系統，但可向台提供次一級的「紀德」艦。據稱，布希傾向走中間路線，確保在不與中共交惡的前提下繼續向台提供必要防衛武器。

這些幕僚主張推遲對台出售「神盾」系統，理由是，台灣目前尚不具備操控「神盾」系統的技術和能力；其次是「神盾」系統送交台灣直到部署就緒尚需八年時間，美方擔心中共在這段期間已研製更新的反制武器。

另外，美國高層安全幕僚建議布希總統，可向台灣出售「紀德」級艦，但陸軍使用的「愛國者」三型導彈（PAC-3）則不列入出售清單，因為PAC-3至今並未正式部署在美國陸軍。至於台灣要求購買裝配傳統魚雷的柴動力潛艇，是否能在此次採購中如願，目前美方仍在爭辯當中未有定論。不過，美國海軍高層將筆曾在上個月表態，認為台灣應該獲得更先進武器。

從外交的角度看，「中」美軍機撞機事件和對台軍售議題同時間交錯，使得美國對華政策發生微妙變化。美國安全幕僚認為，中共目前是伺機而動，視美方軍售清單出爐後再做反應，因此美國也不需要急著出招，推遲對台出售「神盾」系統以保持彈性；如果中共繼續在沿海威懾台灣，美國屆時再出手也不遲。

除此，美國安全幕僚還認為，推遲出售「神盾」系統能對台灣領導人起到「懲戒」作用。報導指出，美國對台政策一方面是我鼓勵台灣軍事現代化，另一方面則是防止台灣擁有太過先進武器而挑釁中共。

美國參議員湯瑪士稍早也表態，支持延緩對台出售「神盾」系統的建議。他說美國已經承諾台灣一旦受到中共攻擊，美方將會協助台灣，因此現在沒有必要出售「神盾」系統去挑釁中共。

「紐約時報」指出，布希總統在競選期間曾嚴厲批評對手的對台政策前後不一，他並承諾一旦當選總統將使政策「非常清楚」。但事實的發展顯示，布希的對台政策也不明朗。報導說，布希目前處於兩難當中，他是希望支持台灣，另一方面卻又不願與中共交惡。因此布希很可能走中間路線，在不破壞「中」美關係的前提下，亦能兼顧共和黨支持台灣的一貫路線。

報導說，北京並不反對美國向台出售P-3反潛機和「紀德」級艦，但堅決反對台灣取得「神盾」系統和潛艇，這是北京的底線。在中共眼中，「神盾」系統可成為地區導彈防禦的作戰平台，PAC-3則具有攔截導彈性能。

「紐約時報」指出，台灣軍方曾表明需要八至十艘常規動力潛艇，增強其反潛戰力，以防遭到中共潛艇對台實施封鎖，而且台灣需要的不是老舊型的「食蚊魚」潛艇。但中共對此強烈反對，認為潛艇是攻擊性武器，アメリカ也因此多次拒絕台灣的要求。
不過，曾在太平洋部隊服役的美國退役海軍上將參道維認為，潛艇對台灣而言是一非常好的戰略性武器，只要將它部署在台灣兩個主要港口外緣，即可有效阻止中共潛艇在台灣重要港口邊佈雷。但他同時認為，台灣購買潛艇的最大問題是後勤，因為美國目前已不生產柴動力潛艇，也許美國能當中間人到歐洲找德國和荷蘭幫忙。

據了解，布希總統將於下週對軍售問題做出最後決定。
The Bush administration seems headed toward a sensible decision on arms sales to Taiwan. The package proposed by senior deputies from the White House, State Department and Pentagon would help the island upgrade its naval forces to meet new threats from Beijing, while avoiding advanced weapons systems that would upset the military equilibrium in the Taiwan Strait. President Bush should be guided by these recommendations when he makes his final decision, probably next week.

When Taiwan submitted its annual weapons request earlier this year, no one anticipated that China would down an American spy plane and detain its crew for 11 days. Talks with Beijing about avoiding future incidents got off to a difficult start yesterday. The White House has wisely said it will not let the episode influence what it sells to Taiwan. Congressional conservatives should also avoid venting anger over Beijing's behavior by pushing for the sale of more advanced weapons to Taiwan.

America is committed to selling Taiwan defensive arms to keep it secure, but choosing the most appropriate weapons is always a sensitive diplomatic decision. At this time there is no good case for selling destroyers equipped with Aegis battle management radar, the Army's PAC-3 missile defense system or diesel-powered submarines.

Ever since China tried to intimidate Taiwan with missile tests off the island’s coasts in the mid-1990's, Taiwan's leaders have sought to acquire advanced missile defense systems. The Aegis radars and the PAC-3 represent the latest American technology in this area. But selling Taiwan four Aegis-equipped destroyers now would raise tensions with Beijing and possibly escalate an arms buildup without providing any immediate benefit to Taiwan's security. The ships are not yet built and none could be delivered for at least eight years. Taiwan's armed forces would need substantial retraining before they could use the Aegis radars effectively. Once operational, the powerful Aegis system would upset the military balance in the Taiwan Strait and might tempt a future Taiwanese government to declare independence.

Instead of Aegis-equipped ships, Mr. Bush's senior aides recommended selling less sophisticated Kidd-class destroyers. These are already built and could be delivered quickly. They are also faster, better armed and better protected than the ships Taiwan now has. The aides also rightly counseled against selling the PAC-3 missile defense system. It is not yet operational, and Taiwan already has an earlier version of the system, known as PAC-2.
No recommendation has yet been made on whether Taiwan should get the 8 to 10 diesel-powered submarines it seeks. Taiwan has requested these for many years and has always been rightly refused. There are other ways to counter submarine threats from the mainland, including submarine-hunting planes and surface ships. By selling the Kidd-class destroyers, and holding back on the Aegis, PAC-3’s and submarines, the administration can strengthen Taiwan without triggering an unnecessary crisis between Taipei and Beijing.
2. Target Text:

紐約時報建議 對台軍售 紀德取代神盾
工商時報，20/04/01

繼傳出美國總統布希的國家安全小組成員建議以紀德級驅逐艦取代神盾級驅逐艦售台後，紐約時報於昨日發表社論表示，美國政府如果不出售神盾級艦，愛國者三型反飛彈系統及柴油潛艇給台灣，而代之以低一級的紀德級驅逐艦，既可加強台灣戰備又不致在台海兩岸挑起無謂的衝突危機。不過，白宮昨日指出，布希目前尚未接獲幕僚人員任何的有關建議。

名為「對台軍售」的這篇社論指出，紀德艦是現成的武器，可立即交貨，不像神盾級驅逐艦需八年的時間。同時，紀德艦在巡航速度、武器配備等方面，都比台灣目前擁有的艦艦要好。社論說，選擇售台的合適武器是一項敏感的外交決定。「出售台灣神盾級雷達配備的驅逐艦、愛國者三型反飛彈系統及柴油動力潛艇，眼下看來並不是好主意」。

時報的提議顯然與白宮國家安全小組成員的提議相呼應。有消息指出，包括美國國務卿鮑爾、國防部長倫斯斐、白宮國家安全顧問萊斯、參謀首長聯席會議主席薛爾頓及在內的美國四位總負國家安全的首長準備建議布希，暫不出售神盾級軍艦給台灣，但台灣要求的其他軍備，包括P-3反潛飛機、柴油潛艦、以及紀德級驅逐艦等，都可望在建議清單上。至於愛國者三型飛彈台灣並未要求。
1. Source Text 1:
Dispute May Take Toll on Relations, Taiwan Arms Sales May Receive Boost
Washington Post, 12/04/01

The detention of 24 U.S. military personnel appears to have hardened attitudes toward Beijing in Congress and the Bush administration, increasing the chances that the United States will agree later this month to sell a major package of arms to Taiwan, including submarines, anti-submarine weaponry and the precursors of an Aegis missile defense system.

Soon afterward, the administration may decide to ignore Beijing's protests and grant a transit visa to Taiwan's president, Chen Shui-bian. A month later, Congress will have an opportunity to attach conditions to the renewal of China's normal trade relations status. And the month after that, the International Olympic Committee will decide whether to let Beijing host the 2008 Games.

"I think there's going to be a significant price," said one administration official, betraying frustration that lies just below the restrained posture President Bush and other senior administration officials have maintained during the 12-day standoff over the aircrew. "There's a strong sense within the U.S. government that there needs to be a price."

The mood on Capitol Hill is also restive. House International Relations Committee Chairman Henry J. Hyde (R-Ill.) said he expects a reaction against China when Congress goes back into session the week of April 23.

"I expect a less-than-amorous embrace of China on whatever issues present themselves, whether it's WTO [the World Trade Organization] or arms sales to Taiwan," Hyde said. "I think a difficult relationship will become more difficult, but whether there will be a long-term estrangement, I don't know."

Many policy experts assert that a more tempered approach -- bolstered by the business stakes in the $115 billion annual bilateral trade -- will prevail and restrain the United States from retaliating for the detention of 24 crew members of a Navy surveillance plane that made an emergency landing on China's Hainan Island after a midair collision with a Chinese fighter jet April 1.

"We stopped this process that was unfolding before it became more serious," Secretary of State Colin L. Powell replied yesterday to a question about the damage to U.S.-Chinese relations. "I don't see anything that is unrecoverable."

Others say the political dynamics in Washington have been altered by the confrontation.
"It weakens the supporters of China and very much emboldens those with suspicions that China's up to no good in the world," said Kenneth L. Adelman, a Reagan administration official, co-host of a defense information Web site, and friend of Vice President Cheney.

"Politics is about intensity, and you really zap the intensity out of the pro-China folks."

One administration official said that members of Bush's foreign policy team have drawn up lists of upcoming events and U.S. actions that could be taken in the near- to medium-term in light of the standoff, though he said no talks had taken place while the freedom of the U.S. crew was at stake.

"There's no question in my mind that people feel they've been rubbed the wrong way by the Chinese at senior levels of the administration," said an outside policy expert close to the Bush team.

At the Pentagon, the main mood yesterday was relief. Military officials expressed understanding of the diplomatic need for the United States to say it was "very sorry" about the death of the Chinese pilot and the emergency landing on Chinese soil. But there was annoyance with Beijing as well.

"One-foot difference and there could have been 24 dead Americans," said a senior defense official, referring to the midair collision. "I think they owe us an apology."

"My sense is that many in the U.S. military already had a vague sense of China as a possible military problem," said retired Rear Adm. Michael A. McDevitt, a former top planner for the U.S. Pacific Command. "For these people, this is suspicion confirmed."

The Taiwan arms sale, due to be decided by April 25, will provide the first major signal of where the Bush administration stands. The shopping list submitted by Taiwan is its largest, and the administration is likely to approve a surprising amount of it, a senior U.S. defense official indicated yesterday. The package is expected to include submarines, anti-submarine patrol aircraft and Kidd-class destroyers that would enable the Taiwanese navy to begin to prepare to operate Aegis anti-missile systems.

The administration, alarmed by a buildup of missiles in southeastern China, already was moving toward approval of a substantial sale. Anger at China may be the clincher, although U.S. officials say the main purpose is to preserve the military balance between China and Taiwan, not to retaliate for the Hainan incident.

Other decisions may also be seen, rightly or wrongly, in light of the standoff and be interpreted as indications of either weakness or retaliation by the Bush administration.

The administration could also find itself in the middle of a GOP feud, pitting Republicans who see China as a major strategic threat against Republicans who favor a healthy business climate and believe trade will bring political change to China.

The incident "should show both sides the dangers of accidents and the importance of attempting to prevent them. It ought to create the basis of longer-term stability in the
Case Study 2: No.14

relationship," said former secretary of state Henry A. Kissinger, whose approach to China has been criticized by many members of the new administration. "China is a billion and a half people. . . . We have to accord China the importance it warrants."

Despite threats by many leading lawmakers to review their trade stance, Kenneth Lieberthal, who was director of Asia policy on the Clinton administration's National Security Council staff, predicted that "at the end of the day, the votes will be there for annual renewal. This is a free-trade administration, and that will be a significant priority of the administration."

"I think there will be some China bashing, but there always is," said Senate Democratic Whip Harry Reid (Nev.). But, he added, "Whether people like it or not, we have a huge amount of trade with China and it's going to get larger." Reid, who was in Reno and interviewed by phone, noted that yesterday's Reno Gazette-Journal ran a big headline and article about a local company signing a deal to sell high-tech equipment in China.

Sen. Bob Graham (D-Fla.) told CNN, "I doubt that this will have any long-term scars on U.S.-Chinese relations."

Some conservatives outside the administration were worried yesterday that the State Department might have made some undisclosed, private assurances to China to obtain the crew's release.

"What most worries me is what is unspoken," said Robert Kagan, a conservative columnist. "What worries me is that we may have struck some sotto voce agreement not to do anything on all the broader issues of the relationship which will make the Chinese unhappy."

Senior administration officials vigorously denied that was the case. Indeed, shortly before China released the American aircrew, the United States introduced a resolution at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights criticizing Beijing for political and religious persecution and urging the release of political prisoners.

"Under no circumstances were broader issues placed on the table or somehow bartered away with the Chinese," national security adviser Condoleezza Rice said last night on ABC's "Nightline." "They were not even at issue with the Chinese."
Ending the Spy Plane Deadlock

New York Times, Editorial, 12/04/01

With some accommodation by both sides, the spy plane stalemate between Washington and Beijing has been resolved and the 24 detained Americans are on their way home. That is a great relief to their families and the entire country. Beijing's approach was needlessly confrontational at times. But in the end, both governments acted sensibly to conclude the affair before it seriously damaged their overall relationship.

To its credit, the Bush administration achieved a diplomatic solution without yielding to Beijing's unreasonable insistence that it accept blame for the American plane's collision with a Chinese jet fighter. It also refused to promise an end to American reconnaissance flights over international waters near China. Facing its first major foreign policy challenge, the administration performed well. It managed the episode in a restrained and measured way, keeping its own rhetoric muted and urging Congressional Republicans to do the same, even when Chinese military leaders used harsh and belligerent language.

Secretary of State Colin Powell and the American ambassador in Beijing, Adm. Joseph Prueher, played an especially constructive role in composing the American response. Mr. Bush's own public statements, though he seemed a bit ill at ease delivering them, made clear his resolve to see the Americans returned while also properly expressing compassion for the loss of the Chinese pilot.

This balanced approach culminated late Tuesday in a carefully worded letter from Ambassador Prueher to China's foreign minister. The letter, which broke the impasse, reiterated Washington's regrets about the pilot. Significantly, it added that the United States was "very sorry" that the crippled American plane had entered Chinese airspace for an emergency landing without verbal clearance from Chinese authorities.

The American pilots realistically had no time to request clearance as they struggled to land a badly damaged aircraft, and they did issue a "Mayday" distress call as they descended toward Chinese territory. But the use of conciliatory language on this point does no harm to American interests. The Bush administration rightly resisted Chinese demands for concessions on more central issues. These included Beijing's untenable condition that Washington apologize and accept responsibility for an accident whose circumstances have yet to be fully investigated, and that Mr. Bush agree to ban future reconnaissance flights.

As part of the diplomatic agreement, American and Chinese officials will meet next week to discuss the precise causes of the collision, precautions for avoiding future incidents and arrangements for the return of the American plane. While those difficult discussions are going on, the United States should refrain from conducting reconnaissance flights near
China. Although Washington has every right to conduct such flights in international airspace and a legitimate need to monitor Chinese military movements in the area, resuming operations while the two sides are trying to agree on relevant ground rules would be provocative.

China's confrontational rhetoric and delay in returning the crew members did not win Beijing any friends in Washington as the White House and Congress were preparing to consider several important issues, including arms sales to Taiwan and extending China's trade privileges as it negotiates entry into the World Trade Organization. But the events of the past two weeks should not push Washington into selling Taiwan the advanced Aegis radar system, which would upset the current political and military equilibrium across the Taiwan Strait. The same mix of steadiness and restraint that brought the spy plane affair to a reasonable conclusion will be needed on other issues facing Washington and Beijing in the months ahead.
3. **Target Text:**
美主要媒體反對售台神盾
中國時報，13/04/01

中美撞機事件落幕後，美國主要媒體皆讚揚布希政府處置得宜，但對於即將而來的對台軍售問題，美國媒體均反對出售神盾系統給台灣。紐約時報說：「面對首格重大外交挑戰，(布希)政府的表現可圈可點」，華爾街日報也說「雙方都可宣布雙贏」。

但對台軍售方面，「華盛頓郵報」表示，若白宮和國會因此事出售台灣神盾系統，只會助長雙方鷹派勢力，破壞彼此關係。紐約時報也再次發表社論指出，美國不能因此出售台灣先進的神盾艦，否則將影響台海目前的軍事平衡。

「華盛頓郵報」說，一旦美國機組人員平安返國，美國國內對中共要求採取強硬政策的聲浪無疑會升高，包括削減中共在對美貿易上的優惠與特權，以及出售台灣神盾系統等，但如果非理性的採取這種政策，只會增加雙方的對峙情緒。

因為從中美撞機事件可以看出，中美關係雖然複雜，但合作與交往仍是主軸，因為中美雙方都不願彼此的戰略和經濟利益受損，因此而言，江澤民接受布希的讓步，是解決此事件的最好方式。

不過此事件也突顯中共在軍事上對美國的挑戰與侵略性與日俱增，所以美國在亞洲發展長期防禦策略時，有必要考慮此點，並且必須改善台灣的國防安全。

「紐約時報」則批評，中共的反美言論，及拖延釋放美機組人員，不能為北京贏得華盛頓的友好，特別是在白宮與國會正準備在若干重要議題，包括出售武器給台灣、延長對大陸的正式貿易關係等進行考慮。

但華盛頓不能因此而決定對台出售神盾系統，這將引發台海不安，未來華盛頓與北京面臨其他重要議題時，必須有雙方在解決撞機事件時的穩定與自制。
No. 15

1. Source Text 1:
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Washington Post, 12/04/01

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One administration official said that members of Bush's foreign policy team have drawn up lists of upcoming events and U.S. actions that could be taken in the near- to medium-term in light of the standoff, though he said no talks had taken place while the freedom of the U.S. crew was at stake.

"There's no question in my mind that people feel they've been rubbed the wrong way by the Chinese at senior levels of the administration," said an outside policy expert close to the Bush team.

At the Pentagon, the main mood yesterday was relief. Military officials expressed understanding of the diplomatic need for the United States to say it was "very sorry" about the death of the Chinese pilot and the emergency landing on Chinese soil. But there was annoyance with Beijing as well.

"One-foot difference and there could have been 24 dead Americans," said a senior defense official, referring to the midair collision. "I think they owe us an apology."

"My sense is that many in the U.S. military already had a vague sense of China as a possible military problem," said retired Rear Adm. Michael A. McDevitt, a former top planner for the U.S. Pacific Command. "For these people, this is suspicion confirmed."

The Taiwan arms sale, due to be decided by April 25, will provide the first major signal of where the Bush administration stands. The shopping list submitted by Taiwan is its largest, and the administration is likely to approve a surprising amount of it, a senior U.S. defense official indicated yesterday. The package is expected to include submarines, anti-submarine patrol aircraft and Kidd-class destroyers that would enable the Taiwanese navy to begin to prepare to operate Aegis anti-missile systems.

The administration, alarmed by a buildup of missiles in southeastern China, already was moving toward approval of a substantial sale. Anger at China may be the clincher, although U.S. officials say the main purpose is to preserve the military balance between China and Taiwan, not to retaliate for the Hainan incident.

Other decisions may also be seen, rightly or wrongly, in light of the standoff and be interpreted as indications of either weakness or retaliation by the Bush administration.

The administration could also find itself in the middle of a GOP feud, pitting Republicans who see China as a major strategic threat against Republicans who favor a healthy business climate and believe trade will bring political change to China.

The incident "should show both sides the dangers of accidents and the importance of attempting to prevent them. It ought to create the basis of longer-term stability in the
relationship," said former secretary of state Henry A. Kissinger, whose approach to China has been criticized by many members of the new administration. "China is a billion and a half people. . . . We have to accord China the importance it warrants."

Despite threats by many leading lawmakers to review their trade stance, Kenneth Lieberthal, who was director of Asia policy on the Clinton administration's National Security Council staff, predicted that "at the end of the day, the votes will be there for annual renewal. This is a free-trade administration, and that will be a significant priority of the administration."

"I think there will be some China bashing, but there always is," said Senate Democratic Whip Harry Reid (Nev.). But, he added, "Whether people like it or not, we have a huge amount of trade with China and it's going to get larger." Reid, who was in Reno and interviewed by phone, noted that yesterday's Reno Gazette-Journal ran a big headline and article about a local company signing a deal to sell high-tech equipment in China.

Sen. Bob Graham (D-Fla.) told CNN, "I doubt that this will have any long-term scars on U.S.-Chinese relations."

Some conservatives outside the administration were worried yesterday that the State Department might have made some undisclosed, private assurances to China to obtain the crew's release.

"What most worries me is what is unspoken," said Robert Kagan, a conservative columnist. "What worries me is that we may have struck some sotto voce agreement not to do anything on all the broader issues of the relationship which will make the Chinese unhappy."

Senior administration officials vigorously denied that was the case. Indeed, shortly before China released the American aircrew, the United States introduced a resolution at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights criticizing Beijing for political and religious persecution and urging the release of political prisoners.

"Under no circumstances were broader issues placed on the table or somehow bartered away with the Chinese," national security adviser Condoleezza Rice said last night on ABC's "Nightline." "They were not even at issue with the Chinese."
2. Source Text 2:
Taiwan Arms Sales and China's W.T.O. Application Will Test a Relationship

*New York Times*, 12/04/01

Now that the Bush administration has resolved its first diplomatic test with China, an important question remains about what the episode says about the administration's still-evolving China policy and the relationship between the countries.

Within the next few weeks, the relationship faces two tests as the Bush administration must decide which weapons systems to sell to Taiwan and how to reignite China's stalled drive to join the World Trade Organization.

The release of the spy plane's crew almost certainly means that the incident will not create a permanent rift in Sino-American relations, and might even serve a positive end by reminding both sides that they stand to lose a great deal unless they begin a major push to find common ground, several American diplomats and China experts said today.

"There is no way to get away from this without some residue, mainly the public attitudes toward us in China and our public's attitude toward China," said Samuel R. Berger, who served as national security adviser under President Clinton. "But the people who believe in relations between these two countries prevailed over those who see it only in nationalistic terms, and I think that's a positive sign."

James R. Lilley, a former United States ambassador to China, said that every recent American president, whether by accident or miscalculation, "gets himself in a terrible mess with China to start things off."

The silver lining, he said, is that a sharp slide in relations usually prompts a frantic scramble to consult each other more, to open lines of communications and to consider each other's strategic interests. President Reagan, President Bush and President Clinton each began terms with a China crisis, and each left saying he had built a much closer relationship than the one he had at the start of their terms.

"I think you're going to see this administration reaching out to China on North Korea, on the W.T.O., and on a range of strategic and economic issues," Mr. Lilley said. "China badly needs to be included in these efforts, and we badly need to have a strategic dialogue with China."

The broader question for Sino-American relations is whether incidents like the spy plane episode and the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, as well as disagreements over Taiwan and human rights, are manageable rifts that distract from an otherwise solid relationship. If not, the almost seemingly endless succession of crises is likely to have a cumulative impact, like a roller coaster on which the uphill climb keeps getting longer and the downhill plunge steeper.
"I think we should view this mainly as a diplomatic management problem," said Stapleton Roy, a longtime State Department Asia expert and former China ambassador. It is a "period in which all kinds of episodes need to be handled, and the question is whether they will be handled skillfully."

Other experts said the latest episode is unlikely to be forgotten quickly. The involvement of American military personnel brings the strains in relations home to average American more vividly than any crisis since Tiananmen Square, which received weeks of saturation coverage by network television and made China's political instability a household concern. The tone of the relationship, at least for a time, should reflect American concerns about China's direction, these people said.

"I think our response going forward has to be quite cool," said Winston Lord, a former China ambassador and State Department official who oversaw East Asia policy during the earlier Clinton administration. "We need to make it clear to the Chinese that there's a residue of annoyance over their performance."

Mr. Lord said the two sides should try to restore a full dialogue on international strategic issues, including nuclear issues in South Asia and stability in the Persian Gulf, but that the Bush team should not give China the impression that the two sides are back to business as usual.

In some ways, President Bush had already put China on notice that it could not expect the same sort of attentive diplomacy it received at the end of Mr. Clinton's term. Mr. Bush came to office saying he had abandoned the Clinton administration's aspiration to make China a "strategic partner." Instead, he called the nation a "strategic competitor," a term that translates harshly in Chinese.

The change in tone was similar to vows by President Reagan and President Clinton to change the terms of the relationship with China. Mr. Reagan told the Chinese that he intended to stand firmly behind America's old friends in Taiwan, China's rival, which prompted diplomatic warring that ended only after Mr. Reagan signed the Shanghai Communique in 1982, a document in which the United States promised to phase out arms sales to the island.

Mr. Clinton came to office promising to challenge China on human rights and to link China's treatment of its own people to the extension of its trading privileges. That approach quickly backfired when the Chinese jailed several dissidents and effectively challenged the United States to withdraw its trading rights. Mr. Clinton ended up abandoning the link.

Wordplay did not cause the accident over the South China Sea. But some experts said it showed how even subtle changes in approach could strain ties.

Jiang Zemin, the Chinese president, had to corral growing anti-American sentiment in his own leadership ranks, a task made harder by the perception that the United States had
downgraded China ties and taken a tougher line on a range of diplomatic issues. "The Bush administration in its early comments may have been talking to the American right, but that hardened some positions in China," Mr. Berger said.

Many other experts gave high marks to Mr. Bush and his top aides for their handling of the incident. "Judicious, careful, firm," was Mr. Lilley's review. Mr. Roy said he thought Mr. Bush managed this episode better than Mr. Clinton handled the Belgrade embassy bombing.

But the next few weeks will bring fresh tests. The most sensitive is how to handle Taiwan's annual request to buy arms. Taiwan has long hoped to purchase the Aegis missile defense system, while China has said it will consider that sale an egregious affront to its sovereignty. A decision is expected later this month.

Most China watchers had been expecting Mr. Bush to sell Taiwan several items on its weapons wish list, but not the Aegis. But one former Clinton administration official who has studied the question said the administration may now decide to sell the Aegis system as a way of demonstrating that there was no quid pro quo for the release of the American military personnel.

"I think this incident could and perhaps should up the ante on Taiwan," the official said.

Mr. Lilley said that the arms sales question threatened to send the two nations into a fresh round of crisis management. But he said the Bush administration should find a way to delay the decision until tempers cool and the new administration has a chance to study options in depth.

The Bush team had been working to restore momentum in another area of common interest: China's bid to join the World Trade Organization. Negotiations in Geneva stalled over a variety of issues, including agricultural subsidies, and some experts feel China has delayed its final accession to the trade group because it is not ready to carry out the concessions it has made to gain entry.
3. Target Text:
對台軍售案 因「禍」得福？
中國時報，13/04/00

美國與中共軍機互撞事件雖因美國偵察機機員獲釋而暫時告一段落，但此一事件似乎已經導致聯邦國會及布希政府對北京的態度趨於強硬，增加了美國在本月稍後同意對台軍售案的可能。此外，美國政府未來還可能會決定不理會北京的抗議，同意給予台灣陳水扁總統過境美國的簽證，美國聯邦國會對延長對中共正常貿易關係的決議，可能會增加附帶條件，而國際奧委會對是否由中共主辦二００八年奧運的決定也可能受到影響。

布希政府一名官員透露，在對美國 EP-3 傳偵機廿四名機組人員遺留置十二日的僵局中，布希及其他官員的自制態度中，其實包含相當的挫折感。他說：「美國聯邦政府當局強烈地認為，中方必須要為此事付出相當的代價。」

根據華盛頓郵報指出，美國即將於廿五日決定對台軍售項目，其結果被視為共和黨籍總統布希政府在美中（共）撞機爭議事件後，如何處理未來對中共關係的第一個重要指標。台灣方面提出了歷來最大規模的軍購清單，據美國國防部高層官員透露，美國當局可能令各界意外地批准可觀的項目，其中料將包括數艘潛艦、反潛巡邏機，以及「紀德」級驅逐艦。

多數觀察家認為，美方將不會同意將「神盾」艦售予台灣，然而，美國前政府一名官員表示，布希當局現在可能會同意售予台灣神盾艦，以顯示釋放美國機員並無暗盤交易。前美國駐中共大使李潔明則認為，對台軍售問題極可能導致美中（共）面臨新的危機，而布希政府應尋求推遲相關決定的時程，爭取更多的決策時間以深入研議妥當的可行方案，待當前的爭端淡化之後再作最終的決議。

基於中共在東南沿海地區部署了大批飛彈，美國政府原已傾向同意台灣有意採購的主要軍品項目，雖然美國官員表示，當局如果核准售予台灣所需的武器，主要目的在維繫中共與台灣之間軍事力量的平衡均勢，並非為了報復南海島事件，但撞機事件恐仍為影響美國對台軍售決策的重要因素。

但據紐約時報報導，部份美國外交界人士及中共事務專家也有另外一個方向的考量，從中共方面釋放美國 EP-3 傳偵機廿四名機組人員看來，兩國關係確定已不致因撞機事件而陷入長期對峙的局面。雙方也可能因此次爭端而警覺到，若無法致力尋求兩邊互動的共同基礎，雙邊均有可能蒙受極大程度的損失。因此，這起事件亦有可能成為雙方未來的關係發展形成正面的效應。分析家說，畢竟過去雙邊關係歷來多逢大變局時，兩國當局均會因應情勢的需求，以更謹慎的態度尋求進一步的溝通協調，並相互考量彼此的戰略利益。

這起撞機事件引發的美中（共）外交爭議，也在聯邦國會方面掀起了波濤。眾議院國際關係委員會主席海德（共和黨籍，伊利諾州選出）預料，眾議院在廿三日的院會中對於中方近日來處理爭端的方式將會有所回應。
海德表示：「不論是關於中國加盟世界貿易組織的入會問題，或是美國對台灣的軍售案，聯邦國會料將不會對任何與中國有關的議題採取友善的應對態度。」海德並指出，中共與美國原已橫亙許多艱難險阻的關係發展恐將益形窒礙難行，不過，海德無意斷言雙方邦交將會陷入長期疏離的困窘境地。

而多數政策專家也確認，美中（共）雙邊關係發展的走勢將會採行溫和的取向，畢竟兩國均需考量當前雙邊貿易額已高達每年一千一百五十億美元，基於此項顧忌，美國當局就雙方軍事對峙的爭議事件向中共採取相應的報復措施將會審慎為之，適可而止。

然而，部分人士指出，撞機事件已牽動華府政局。現任副總統錢尼的友人、經營國防資訊網站的艾德曼表示，歷經此一爭端後，華府當局支持與反對中共雙方的勢力呈現此消彼長的趨勢。艾德曼認為，親中共的一方，立足之基礎顯著地遭此事端衝擊而致弱化。

美國政府一名官員表示，布希總統的外交政策團隊已將美國即將面臨的必須因應的事件，以及近期和中期可能就美中（共）雙方外交僵局採取的行動，詳列清單。
President Bush has approved the largest package of arms sales to Taiwan in nearly a decade, including Kidd-class destroyers, submarines and sub-hunting planes, but steered clear of the weapons system China had objected to most vociferously, a senior White House official said last night.

Although Bush has decided against selling Taiwan destroyers equipped with the sophisticated Aegis radar and battle management system, the United States will sell the island four less-advanced Kidd-class destroyers, a dozen anti-submarine planes and as many as eight diesel-powered submarines to help Taiwan defend itself against possible attack or blockade by mainland China, the senior White House official said.

The decision to put together a robust package for Taiwan reveals the strength of hard-liners in an administration that is also tugged by moderates and business-minded interests concerned that a large arms sale could worsen relations between Beijing and Washington.

If Taiwan accepts the package, the cost -- though not calculated by the administration -- could amount to more than $4 billion, the biggest since Bush's father sold Taiwan 150 F-16 fighter jets in 1992. It is almost certain to anger Beijing, which regards Taiwan as part of China and which says that U.S. sales of sophisticated weapons to Taiwan violate a 1982 U.S. agreement to gradually reduce the quality and quantity of arms sold to the island.

"China-U.S. relations are at a crossroads," China's Ambassador Yang Jiechi warned in a luncheon speech yesterday, before the final package was disclosed. "Continued U.S. sales of advanced weapons to Taiwan threatens China's national security, violates its sovereignty, and emboldens the separatist forces on that Chinese island."

The White House official last night stressed that the weapons approved were defensive and a reaction to China's own military buildup in the past five years -- not a response to the recent 11-day standoff over the detained crew of a Navy surveillance plane that had collided with a Chinese fighter jet.

The official called it "a balanced package but a substantial package." The administration anticipates Chinese objections, the official said, but "our message is this is driven by them. If they will reduce the threat to Taiwan and make clear that they will not use force against Taiwan to resolve cross-straits issues, that would certainly have an impact on what we would do in the future."
The White House said that one of those future steps could still include the sale of Aegis-equipped destroyers, and the senior White House official said the administration would take steps to ensure that the earliest delivery date for the Aegis destroyers, now estimated to be 2010, would not recede further because of the deferred decision.

While saying the Aegis "decision is for another day," the White House official said, "we're going to look whether there is a way to make sure that the availability date doesn't slip." The Aegis destroyer, armed with anti-missile and anti-aircraft weapons, is capable of tracking and responding to more than 100 planes and missiles at a time.

Meanwhile, Pentagon officials said that the Kidd-class destroyers would help train Taiwanese armed forces to handle more sophisticated weapons. They added that Taiwan's military would not be able to use Aegis-equipped destroyers effectively now even if they had them.

Bush, who is to announce the package today, also approved technical briefings for Taiwan on the newest version of Patriot anti-missile missiles, the PAC-3s, which are still in development and will not be available even for American armed forces until 2005 or 2006.

The administration also approved the sale of several other items -- such as mine-sweeping helicopters, torpedoes and amphibious assault vehicles -- while deferring decisions on Taiwan's requests for Apache helicopters, HARM missiles and battle tanks.

The sale of the submarines, if it goes through, could prove almost as irritating as an Aegis sale, according to a Beijing-based Western military official. China, he noted, retaliated against the Netherlands by downgrading diplomatic relations for three years after it sold the island a pair of conventionally powered Zwaardis-class subs in 1981. The submarine and anti-submarine warfare package would go a long way in thwarting the major tactical advantage that China has over Taiwan. Beijing possesses between 30 and 40 operational submarines, including four Russian-built Kilo-class vessels.

Indeed, the official said, submarines are one of three systems -- including the Aegis and the Pac-3 system, that China specifically mentioned in meetings with U.S. and Western officials.

"Anybody who thinks that China is going to be happy with this package is fooling themselves," he said. "If the submarines go through, and that's a big if, it will cause a lot of problems between Washington and Beijing."

The overall package appears likely to disappoint some American conservatives and other China critics, who had argued that even the Aegis system wouldn't be enough to protect Taiwan from a Chinese buildup in short-range missiles positioned within striking distance of Taiwan. China is increasing the number of those missiles, now estimated at 300, at a rate of about 50 a year.
"With the sizable buildup of military forces on the mainland side of the Taiwan Strait, I have serious questions regarding the Bush administration's decision not to provide destroyers equipped with advanced command and control systems to Taiwan," said House Minority Leader Richard A. Gephardt (D-Mo.).

Gary Schmitt, who heads the conservative Project for the New American Century, said that by delaying a sale of Aegis destroyers to Taiwan, "you open the window of vulnerability" through which China can gain superiority over Taiwan.

GOP leaders in Congress, however, supported the administration. "With this action, the administration has made it crystal clear the United States will not allow communist China to dictate our foreign policy and we are committed to our democratic allies in Taiwan," said House Majority Whip Tom DeLay (R-Tex.).

Sen. Craig Thomas (R-Wyo.), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee that oversees Asian affairs, said Congress would respond favorably. "On balance, most people don't want to be unnecessarily provocative," he said. "If our goal is to promote peace until there is a generational change in leadership [in China], this is the right thing to do."

U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have been a sticking point with Beijing since the United States and China normalized relations in 1979. China believes that the U.S. sales make Taiwan less likely to enter talks on reunification.

But the White House said that by making the Taiwanese feel more secure, the arms sales could "actually enhance their ability to enter into a constructive dialogue with the mainland." He also cited the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which said that the United States should provide military systems and services required for the defense of Taiwan.

The White House official yesterday said China's threat had been enhanced by its missile buildup, its purchase of four Kilo diesel-powered submarines from Russia to augment a fleet expected to reach 60 by 2005, and its acquisition of a Russian-made Sovremenny destroyers equipped with Sunburn anti-ship missiles.

Those developments contributed to the decision to provide the submarines, which were previously regarded as offensive weapons. The White House said the subs will be equipped with defensive weapons. The subs would most likely be built in the shipyard in Pascagoula, Miss., home state of Senate Republican leader Trent Lott, whose father worked in the shipyard.

The sub sale is complicated by the need for the United States to get designs from the Netherlands or Germany. The United States no longer builds diesel-powered submarines. The White House official said that the administration had not held talks with either country, and the submarines take three to five years to build from existing designs, eight to 10 years if done from scratch. The Kidd destroyers will be available in 2003. The United States, which built them originally for the Shah of Iran, has extras.
2. Source Text 2:
Bush Is Offering the Taiwanese Some Arms, but Not the Best
New York Times, 24/04/01

President Bush has decided to offer Taiwan a range of advanced weapons, including eight
diesel submarines and four guided-missile destroyers that China has long sought to block,
but he has declined, at least for now, to sell the Taiwanese a far more sophisticated class of
ships whose advanced radar systems could counter China's growing military power.

Mr. Bush's decision, described tonight by senior White House officials, takes the
diplomatically cautious path advocated by advisers inside and outside the administration
who have warned the president about the dangers of a further escalation of tensions with
Beijing. But the list of older yet sophisticated arms that Mr. Bush will tell Taiwan it is free
to purchase includes aircraft, helicopters, torpedos and anti-ship missiles that could vastly
improve Taiwan's navy.

"The only consideration here was the threat that Taiwan faces," a senior administration
official said tonight, as White House aides began informing members of Congress about the
decision, which will be officially conveyed to Taiwanese officials in a meeting with
Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld on Tuesday.

"There was no link to the EP-3E incident," a senior administration official said, referring to the 11-day detention of the crew of an American spy plane. China is still
holding the plane on Hainan island, where it made an emergency landing on April 1, leading
to Mr. Bush's first confrontation with the Chinese leadership.

That confrontation has intensified the scrutiny of Mr. Bush's first decision on what
to sell the new, democratically elected government on Taiwan. But in the end, Mr. Bush chose to send a mixed signal to Beijing. Though the sale of some weapons will
undoubtedly irritate China, Mr. Bush's decision to defer the sale of destroyers that use the
advanced Aegis radar defense system appears to be part of an effort to prevent the outbreak of an arms race between China and the island that it regards as a renegade province.

China on Tuesday denounced U.S. plans to sell weapons to Taiwan, warning the
decision could exacerbate already strained ties with the United States, the Associated Press reported. "Washington must exercise prudence on the question of arms sales to Taiwan so
as not to create new harm for relations," Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue said
at a news conference.

Taiwan may end up buying less than it is offered, and must now begin the process of
deciding how much of the American package it can afford.

Mr. Bush's decision conforms almost exactly to the recommendation made to him last
week by a team of senior deputies in the Defense and State Departments. Mr. Rumsfeld and
Secretary of State Colin L. Powell agreed with their conclusions, the senior official said, adding that "the only real debate was how to word the deferral" of the sale of the Aegis system.

Taiwanese officials will be told on Tuesday that they may be permitted to purchase the system in the future, if China continues building up its ability to threaten Taiwan with air and submarine forces. A study conducted by the administration in preparation for the decision concluded that by 2005, China could have more than 60 submarines, including four quiet-running diesel submarines with advanced weapons it recently purchased from Russia.

"We are going to leave open all possibilities in case there is an assessment in the future that the threat has worsened," the official said.

In Taiwan, news of the administration's decision came early Tuesday morning on the state-run Central News Agency. There was no immediate response from Taiwan's government, as President Chen Shui-bian had ordered his officials to keep silent after the foreign minister was quoted in a recent interview as saying Taiwan could live without the Aegis technology.

Past American presidents have declined to sell diesel submarines to Taiwan for fear they would be considered offensive weapons by China, violating the spirit, if not the letter, of Washington's understandings with Beijing. But after extensive discussion with his aides on Friday, and in continuing talks during his trip to Quebec over the weekend, Mr. Bush was convinced that Taiwan needed a more up-to-date submarine capability to defend against China's expanding sea power. Left unchecked, his advisers say, China's growing naval and air power eventually could empower it to threaten Taiwan with an economic blockade.

Still, Mr. Bush's decision is bound to anger many conservatives in his party, who had hoped that his election would result in far more aggressive support for Taiwan, and a far tougher stance against China's rapid military expansion. But ever since word of the deputies' recommendation leaked out last week, the White House and leading Republicans have been trying to tamp down any internal dissent.

In their briefings on Capitol Hill today, for example, administration officials pointed out that the sale of eight submarines — which will have to be produced by German or Dutch manufacturers because the United States no longer makes diesel-powered subs — were part of a broader new defense strategy for Taiwan.

The submarine sale is conditioned on Taiwan's agreement to buy P-3C submarine-hunting aircraft as part of what a senior official called a "layered, integrated approach to antisubmarine warfare." The four Kidd-class destroyers technology use technology that is two decades old. But the ships Taiwan will receive are mothballed models that the Navy is no longer using, meaning they can be up and running in just two years.
"It seemed to us," one of Mr. Bush's advisers said tonight, "that getting them a good system fast was more important than getting them the best system very slowly."

Nonetheless, some conservative Republicans expressed disappointment tonight at the administration's decision.

"George W. has shown a lot more moxie than Clinton, but he hasn't gone as far as some us would have liked," Representative Dana Rohrabacher, a California Republican on the House International Relations Committee, said in a telephone interview.

But several influential Senate Republicans praised the administration's decision as striking the right balance between fulfilling American obligations to provide for Taiwan's defense and not inflaming tensions with China.

Senator Jesse Helms, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and one of China's harshest critics, issued a statement tonight praising Mr. Bush for "taking the critical matter of Taiwan's defense seriously." But he added that he was "unalterably persuaded that the sale of Aegis destroyers is also justified in light of the outrageous actions of the leaders in Beijing."

Senator John W. Warner, a Virginia Republican who heads the Armed Services Committee, said, for instance, that the Kidd-class destroyers represented "a significant incremental enhancement of Taiwan's navy; it allows them to learn to train with a larger ship."

Mr. Warner said he had recommended deferring for a year any decision on selling Taiwan the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, which are equipped with the Aegis radar system.

Last month, before the collision over the South China Sea, administration officials hinted to a few members of Congress that Taiwan was unlikely to get the Aegis system, but would be offered a long shopping list of other arms. Like past presidents, Mr. Bush will cast these arms as defensive in nature, though many could also be used for offensive purposes.

By all accounts, Mr. Bush and his aides did not revisit that decision after the collision and the standoff over the fate of the spy plane's 24 crew members. But the incident certainly affected the environment in which he had to make his final decision. One wing of his party — the "engagement" wing that urges closer business ties with China to moderate its behavior — urged Mr. Bush to use the sale to send a conciliatory message to Beijing. Conservatives urged just the opposite.

"It makes no sense to let one incident like that determine your China policy," one administration aide deeply involved in the decision said last week. "That would be crazy." But he added that "we've gotten a lot of free advice," he said, mostly from conservative Republicans, "to do exactly that."
Administration officials offered several reasons for deferring the Aegis sale. The first was the most practical: The system cannot be delivered and fielded by Taiwan until 2010, meaning that China would have plenty of time to build up its air and missile ability to overwhelm it.

There was also concern that Taiwan's military was not yet skilled enough to make use of the system. Moreover, aides concluded that much could be done to strengthen Taiwan's defenses without selling the high-profile Aegis.
3. Target Text 1:

美国白宫高官周一表示，布希总统已批准对台军售项目，包括四艘纪德级驱逐舰、八艘传统柴油动力潜艇、十二架 P-3 反潜侦察机 、MH-53E 旋翼直升机、Paladin 自走炮系统、潜艇发射鱼叉飞弹、潜艇与水面发射鱼雷、MK48 鱼雷及 AAV7A1 两栖攻击车，将让台分享最新型 PAC-3 爱国者飞弹技术。白宫已向国会领袖提出简报，并将在周二的华美军售会议中正式转知台湾代表圈。布希总统则可能于周二接见外宾时亲自就此发表谈话。

华盛顿邮报周二报道指出，前白宫高官官员表示，配属神盾系统的驱逐舰虽不在此次核售清单之内，但只是「仅备后议」。该官员强调，布希政府将采取步骤，确保神盾级舰的快交期（目前估计为二○一〇年），不致因这次决定推迟出售而延后。

该官员指出，在周二举行的华美军售会议中，美方将告知台湾代表，若中共继续扩展其空中与潜艇武力，提高对台湾的威胁，则未来可能会出售神盾系统给台湾。

除了神盾外，台湾提出要求但美国并未同意的项目尚有：M1-A1 戰車、JDAM 攻击火炮与长程导引炸弹、AH-64 阿帕契直昇机及 HARM 反雷达飞弹。

白宫官员强调，布希总统批准的军售项目，与近期发生在南海上空的美国与中共军机擦撞事件无关。

美国国防部官员指出，纪德级驱逐舰将有助於台湾军舰学习操控较複杂的武器系统。因为即使现在就拥有神盾系统，台湾的军舰可能也无法运用自如。

白宫官员透露，美国原本为伊朗建造的纪德级驱逐舰尚有余舰，因此可在二〇〇三年交货。

该官员认为，这次核准的军售项目都属防禦性，而且係为反应中共过去五年来的建军规模，称得上是「均衡但实质性的军售方案」，不过，想必一定會激怒中共。

华邮在报道中估计，若台湾照单全收，则此次美国对台军售的总金额将超过四〇亿美元，创布希之父老布希一九九二年批准出售一五〇架 F-16 武机以来新高。

白宫高官官员表示，藉由提高台湾的安全感，此次军售可「实际上增进（台湾）与中国大陆展开建设性对话的能力」。该官员并援引一九七八年台湾关系法指出，美国应该提供台湾自我防禦所需的军事系统与服务。

白宫官员指出，上述发展促使美国出售过去被視為攻击武器的潜艇给台湾。这些潜艇将配属防禦型武器。华邮报道说，这些潜艇将最有可能由在参议院共和党领袖洛特（Trent Lott）选区密西西比州的帕斯卡古拉（Pascagoula）造船厂建造。美国现已不建造柴油潜艇，需向荷兰或德国取得相关设计。依现有设计建造需时三到五年，重新设计则需八到十年。
紐約時報週二報導指出，布希總統批准的軍售清單，幾乎與國防部及國務院大長級官員組成的小組在上週提出的建議完全雷同。不過，台灣可能不會照單全收。
4. Target Text 2:
美多位國會領袖：對軍售清單強烈質疑
工商時報，25/04/01

美國總統布希批准對台軍售項目，並由白宮官員告知國會領袖。華盛頓郵報與紐約時報週二報導指出，美國國會領袖對軍售內容普遍表示支持與推崇，部分領袖更認為神盾級驅逐艦未列其中是美中不足。

根據華盛頓郵報的報導，美國眾議院少數黨領袖蓋哈特（Richard A. Gephart）在得知清單內容後說：「以台灣海峽對岸中國大陸那麼浩大的軍事規模而言，我對布希政府決定不出售配備先進指揮與控制系統的驅逐艦給台灣，存著強烈的懷疑。」

華郵的報導指出，軍售內容受到共和黨國會領袖的強烈反對。一向對中共不假辭色的參議院外交關係委員會主席赫姆斯（Jesse Helms）發表聲明推崇布希「認真地處理台灣國防中的關鍵事務」，不過赫姆斯強調自己「毫不動搖地相信，鑑於中共領導人的粗暴行動，出售神盾給台灣也未必有失。」

眾院多數黨黨鞭狄雷（Tom DeLay）說：「透過此行動，布希政府已明白宣示，美國絕不會讓共產主義中國主導我們的外交政策，而我們也將信守對我們盟邦台灣的承諾。」

共和黨籍的參院外交關係委員會亞太小組主席湯瑪士（Craig Thomas）指出，參院的反應是肯定的。他說：「整體而言，大多數的人都不希望看見不必要的挑釁，如果我們的目標是促進和平，直到（中國）領導權出現世代交替為止，那麼什麼做是對的。」

約時報在報導中引述眾院國際關係委員會共和黨籍委員羅巴拉克（Dana Rohrabacher）的反應說：「布希展現出比柯林頓更大的魄力，但仍與我們的期待有落差。」

共和黨籍的參議院軍事委員會主席華納（John W. Warner）則表示，出售紀德級驅逐艦代表「台灣海軍軍力显著提升，可從中學會用較大軍艦進行訓練。華納指出，他曾建議延後一年再決定是否出售神盾系統給台灣。
References


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