Title: Clarifying the utilitarian meaning in Alexander Bain's Association Psychology
Author: Charpentier, Claude
Qualification: PhD
Year: 2002

Thesis scanned from best copy available: may contain faint or blurred text, and/or cropped or missing pages.

Digitisation Notes:
- Page 262 is missing in original
CLARIFYING THE UTILITARIAN MEANING
IN ALEXANDER BAIN'S ASSOCIATION PSYCHOLOGY

by

Claude Charpentier

Doctor of Philosophy
The University of Edinburgh
2002
I declare that the thesis has been composed by myself, that the work is my own, and that it has not been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification.

Claude Charpentier

Candidate for the PhD in psychology
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Thanks must first be expressed to my mother whose support and trust over the years have never once faltered. I also owe a large debt to the teaching of Dr. Dale Stout, historian of psychology, whose relentless pursuit of the true and of the good has opened my mind to the importance of meditation on fundamental questions and on psychology's early responses to them.

As a recipient of a Commonwealth scholarship, I am grateful to the Commonwealth Scholarship Commission for its financial assistance. While making my three-year stay in Edinburgh pleasant, this help was instrumental in my getting at needful archival, primary and secondary materials, thereby facilitating my research into the present subject. I would like to extend a warm thank you to those individuals whose conversations and critical comments have had a stimulating effect on my work. And they are: Dr. Robert Morris, Dr. John Beloff, Dr. Martin Kush, Dr. Dale Stout, Dr. Steve Sturdy and Ms Kirsty Moore. I am also indebted to Dr. Peter Caryl who has offered prompt and valuable assistance with administrative matters.

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</th>
<th>iii</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PART I: BAIN'S ASSOCIATION PSYCHOLOGY</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 1: BAIN'S ASSOCIATION PSYCHOLOGY</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIND AS AN OBJECT OF NATURAL SCIENCE</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The movement of consciousness: subject and object worlds</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The body-and-mind model</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The end of explanation: order, causation, and law</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE PANORAMIC VIEW OF MIND</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The region of intellect</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The power of discrimination</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From discrimination to retention</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Righting the imbalance of detached units</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From contiguity to similarity</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The division of Feeling</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The department of Will</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PART II: FEATURES OF THOUGHT: INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2: FEATURES OF THOUGHT</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE TENDENCY TOWARD ABSTRACT THINKING</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preliminary remarks</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preoccupation with generalized knowledge: Mill</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ways and means of Science</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In defence of the positivist mode of thought in science</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In search of principles: fixing genera, classes and class-names</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The conceptualization of the human mind</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The isolate and partitioned Mind</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mind classified</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predilection for analytic dissection and the isolation of theoretical problems: Mill</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divide in order to conquer</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis: the method of detail</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE REFORM OF TYRANNICAL ABUSES: PLEADING THE INDIVIDUALISTIC CAUSE

Preliminary remarks
The justification of individualism
Individualizing tendencies in Bain's psychology
The vindication of intellectual individualism
The liberationist appeal of the scientific intellect
Constructive association: the institution of self-rule
The virtuous Will as the theoretical acknowledgement of self-command
Registering the desirability of self-government by physical conveyance
Psychology's call for self-directed, autonomous and well-disciplined individuals: the validation of the independent conscience

CHAPTER 6: ASSOCIATION PSYCHOLOGY'S SOCIO-POLITICAL AGENDA

THE REFORM OF TYRANNICAL ABUSES: PLEADING THE DEMOCRATIC CAUSE

The vindication of democracy
Altering the socio-political landscape
Representative government
The need of checks as securities for responsible government
Sounding for danger in democratic governments
The making of leaders: cultivating conscience and intellect
Recognizing the voice of authority in morals and politics
The lead of the speculative intellect
The primacy of Association Psychology
The institution of the democratic rule in Bain's psychology
The government of Mind
Psychological Superior and Inferior
The relation of rule and obedience in Mind
The taming of the Psychological Inferior
The making of the democratic Mind
The power of Feeling
The powers of Intellect and of Will
Checks and balances in Mind
The establishment of a government of the wisest

CONCLUSION

BIBLIOGRAPHY
ABSTRACT

CLARIFYING THE UTILITARIAN MEANING IN ALEXANDER BAIN'S ASSOCIATION PSYCHOLOGY

The present dissertation on the subject of Alexander Bain's mid-nineteenth century Association Psychology aims at providing an interpretive framework of importance to the clarification of the science's utilitarian meaning. Shared social attitudes and thought patterns associated with radical-utilitarians and fellow reformers John Stuart Mill and Alexander Bain serve as frames for defining the latter's position on psychological questions. Herein investigated are abstract, atomistic and mechanistic ways of thinking that joined Mill and Bain together in a community of intellect whose utilitarian perspective structured Bain's psychological ideas. Also explored are the ways in which these psychological ideas expressed the socio-political concerns shared by Mill and Bain alike, and were in fact worked into tools for fashioning social reality and bringing it into a desired form. Thus the object of the study is to determine how certain ways of thought as well as social attitudes common to Mill and Bain functioned as utilitarian influences in the latter's psychological texts. While serving as a case study for use in illuminating the subject of intellectual styles, the present research also draws interest by marking and spelling out psychology's past relevance to society.
INTRODUCTION

CLARIFYING THE UTILITARIAN MEANING
IN ALEXANDER BAIN'S ASSOCIATION PSYCHOLOGY

As given expression by J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, Philosophic Radicalism or Benthamism not only stood for the hope of a science of ethics, but for a program of juridical, economic, and political reform as well. The direction of reformist pursuits by its advocates must be referred to a strong interest in the prosperity of persons and communities alike. While seen as educational influences, their writings on ethical, political, economic, juridical, and psychological matters were thought to lend a hand to projects of improvement. Among the undertakings of radical-utilitarians were the elucidation and validation of utility or general welfare as the standard of morals and guide to right conduct. In settling the ethical end, the formulation of the greatest happiness principle was also believed to be an adequate representation of the political end pursued by the promoters of parliamentary reform. An existence rich in as many pleasures and exempt from as few pains as possible was the utilitarian ideal of a happy life. With happiness thus defined, a government was deemed good whose object aimed at promoting the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people.

The institution of both democratic rule and representative government was yet another utilitarian plea for the need of liberation from restrictions of personal freedom and action. Those who adhered to the Benthamite school of political thought countered the argument in support of things as they were with the demand for parliamentary reform and the redress of political abuses. They also called for a gradual extension of the suffrage in accordance with the spread of education. Both representative system and democratic suffrage were recommended as securities for a responsible government whose regard for the general interest would ultimately prove the intellectual and moral welfare of the people.

The radical-utilitarians coupled their demand for better government with their call for better legislation. Those determining the scope of law reform intended to change the common modes of reasoning in legislation while remedying its defects towards the end of good judicature. And of the Benthamites whose special study was political economy, the goal was to raise the working classes on Malthusian principles while promoting the free trade movement.
Last but not least was the utilitarian contribution to the advancement of a science of the human mind, on which rested the moral and political sciences. Pledged as these reformers were to the formation of morally and intellectually wise characters through the application of the principle of association, they trusted in education as a means of improving the human condition. Theirs was the belief that mental qualities conducive to happiness issued from the direction given to the mind's associations.

To be a utilitarian, then, as both Mill and Bain lived it out in the second and third quarters of the century, was to commit to this multi-faceted project and work out both the salvation and progress of the human mind by means of contributions in one's own field of endeavour. Never would they lower their sights nor lose sight of the ends which they sought to attain: a regenerate human nature and an improved social state. And it seems important that we take these ends along with their commitments into account as we read their works.

It is common practice among Mill and Bain scholars to associate John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) and Alexander Bain (1818-1903) with the nineteenth-century radical-utilitarian movement in England. It is also well known that while working jointly with others, Mill and Bain worked closely together in intellectual and practical endeavours directed at the establishment of the Association psychology and Experience philosophy. Bain's social outlook, moreover, had much in common with Mill's own. Though scholars and commentators have occasionally remarked on this connexion,¹ neither the recognition of a community of intellect between Mill and Bain nor the admission of an interpenetration of cognitive and social ideas have been the subject of past or recent discussion. As a searching analysis of Bain's psychology, my thesis attempts to close this gap by bringing a new interpretive perspective to some of his psychological ideas that draws on Mill and Bain's shared intellectual styles and social views.

Both associationist psychology and empiricist philosophy on which Bain and Mill expounded stood for the possibility of human improvement. As the mechanism for linking mental elements together and recovering ideas according to fixed laws, Association told of the malleability and orderliness of the human mind. The belief was that a re-formation of thought associations would follow from actual contact with a world reordered to meet liberal challenges.
Basic to the utilitarian argument for human management and progress was the presupposition that the mind's suggestions were liable to the correction of experience, while dependent for their formation on a supply of sense data possessed of associative and separative qualities. To gain wide experience of the world of human affairs was thus recommended for its stimulating influence on individual minds whose mental contents seemed just as shapeable as the environment was to utilitarian prescriptions.

As participants in the movement for representative and responsible government in nineteenth-century Britain, it was part of the utilitarians' vision to think of political enfranchisement and mental improvement in tandem. While participation in the political life of the nation was thought to reward individual mental improvement, this intellectual and moral development was itself unthinkable without the reality of free institutions. Intent on purging governmental institutions of members with sinister motives and class interests, James Mill had warned the people against aristocratic abuses of power.

Perusal of his personal notes antedating the 1832 Reform Act shows the concern of the time. He had written:

Collect evidence of the hostile mind of the aristocracy to the people: and remember Burke's declaration that the hostile mind of the rulers to the ruled is ample reason for a change of government. Ample reason then exists why the aristocracy of this country should have no share whatever in its government. What do I call the people? All but the aristocracy, & the clergy of the established church. I believe the hostile mind in them to be unambiguously declared & that the cause of it are sufficient to make it wholly incurable.  

All the while that he and Bentham were leading the Philosophic Radicals' campaign for democracy and personal freedom from social and political bondage, James Mill was arguing for the improvability of the human mind by education. As a contribution to the cause of mental improvement, his was the idea to "make the human mind as plain as the road from Charing Cross to St Pauls" by a revision and promotion of David Hartley's associationist theory of the mind. The liberation of the human mind had become the issue of the day by mid-century as J.S. Mill was writing out his thoughts on parliamentary reform.

Taking a wider view, John Stuart Mill saw reason to harmonize the voice of
democratic aspirations with that of an enlightened leadership. Added to the political text because deemed essential to the production of harmony were his notes on education. Educated intelligence and morality were required of Mill's massed individuals for securing their willingness to abide by the authority of the wisest in social and political affairs. Education was also thought to be a powerful ally of all persons lacking autonomous and self-reliant qualities whose externally imposed restrictions of liberty and action inspired the call to arms.

Those educational undertakings would bear on the mental regeneration of mankind that were grounded on scientific Psychology and partly developed from the subject of abstract and universal psychological functioning. To be seen as the requisite scientific basis of Morals, Politics and Education was not Psychology's only goal. For when applied to the training of human beings the mental science was expected to bear practical fruit, and so to further the cause of individual and social welfare. Joined as casters in shaping associationist psychology in the scientific mould of the day, Mill and Bain meant to break ground for a radical change in political and social affairs. The radical-utilitarian reformist movement was thus marked by a modification of psychological and social doctrines, and first called for a removal of abuses no less psychological than political.

The emancipation proclamation of mid-nineteenth century utilitarian-associationists stood for freedom from restrictive oligarchic rule and intuitionist belief alike. The a priori philosophy headed by Sir W. Hamilton was the then dominant school of thought, and because considered a stumbling block to human improvement, was the bête noire of its antagonist, the philosophy of Experience and Association. The difference between these two philosophical schools was construed in practical as well as in theoretical terms. Mill spelled out what the difference meant as regards the treatment of social questions.

The practical reformer has continually to demand that changes be made in things which are supported by powerful and widely-spread feelings, or to question the apparent necessity and indefeasibleness of established facts; and it is often an indispensable part of his argument to show, how those powerful feelings had their origin, and how those facts came to seem necessary and
indefeasible. There is therefore a natural hostility
between him and a philosophy which discourages the
explanation of feelings and moral facts by circumstances
and association, and prefers to treat them as ultimate
elements of human nature; a philosophy which is
addicted to holding up favourite doctrines as intuitive
truths, and deems intuition to be the voice of Nature and
of God, speaking with an authority higher than that of
our reason.5

As the mid-century's foremost utilitarian representatives of the a posteriori mode
of thought, J.S. Mill and A. Bain took a common stand in the debate. Bain had joined
up with Mill at an earlier date, and together they worked to define the contours of
individual and national character according to the utilitarian-associationist plan.
Propagation and institutionalization of the utilitarian creed, experience philosophy and
liberal orientation were part and parcel of the plan.

Begun in 1841, Mill and Bain's early correspondence set the tone for all
subsequent contacts by confirming them as adherents of a common philosophical creed.
Joined in condemnation of all lines of thought serving conservative interests, Mill and
Bain were lifelong collaborators in philosophical and psychological productions. They
kept track of, and relied on, each other's trail-blazing work, neither one dominated nor
eclipsed by the other's success. As Mill was wont to say, Bain was no disciple of his.
Note his words.

Coleridge reminded one of his critics, that there are such
things in the world as springs, and that the water a man
draws does not necessarily come from a hole made in
another man's cistern. Mr. Bain did not stand in need of
any predecessor except our common precursors, and
has taught much more to me, on these subjects [genesis
of psychological ideas], than there is any reasonable
probability that I can have taught to him.6

Epistolary exchanges used as a means by which to comment on each other's
works were the occasion of Mill and Bain's first acquaintance.7 A shared set of opinions
on matters philosophical and political as well as an eagerness to advance the cause of
reform while promoting each other's intellectual productions would further consolidate
a friendship that was to last a lifetime. From 1842 onwards, Bain the Scotsman made
several visits to London and had frequent conversations with Mill; both correspondence
and personal contacts were kept up until Mill's death in 1873. Bain outlived Mill by thirty years.

Bain lent a hand in the preparation of Mill's 1843 Logic as well as of later editions by applying his expertise in natural philosophy to the illustration of Mill's logical doctrines. He wrote a laudatory review of it for the Westminster Review when first published. Bain was himself assisted by Mill's comments in the writing and later revision of his psychological treatises. Mill and Bain also collaborated in the 1869 revision of James Mill's Analytic psychology by annotating the text with psychological notes while updating its doctrines with the latest scientific improvements. "Coincidence of view was the rule", as Bain puts it. Their showing a united front was imperative as they aimed at reinterpreting the philosophy of their time in non-intuitional terms. As propagandists of the Experience and Association philosophy, therefore, Mill and Bain worked tirelessly and diligently to make known each other's works on inductive logic and on the human mind.

Time and again would Mill lend his name to the promotion of Bain's psychological undertakings, reputation and career. He interceded with the publisher John William Parker for the publication of Bain's psychological treatises, offering guarantee against financial loss by the publication of the Emotions. Mill held Bain's work in high regard and made it better known by means of private communications and published reviews, while speaking to its merits in his own writings. He was wont to refer to Bain's work on the human mind as original and profound. He regarded it as the most important contribution to mental philosophy and "as incomparably the most complete analytical exposition of the mental phenomena, on the basis of a legitimate Induction, which has yet been produced."

From 1842 until Bain's obtention of the Chair of Logic at Aberdeen University in 1860, Mill frequently availed himself of his many connexions to secure teaching work for his friend. As such, he pleaded Bain's case with persons of rank and importance and wrote testimonials on his behalf. Mill's 1857 letter to Lord Overstone then a member of the Senate of the University of London is but one of several instances of the former's determination to get Bain an advantageous position from which to advance the cause of the Experience philosophy and Association psychology.
I have just heard from my friend Mr. Alexander Bain that he is a candidate for the Examinership in Logic and Mental Philosophy. I think him in all probability the fittest person for it in the three kingdoms, having on the whole a greater knowledge of the entire subject than any other person I could mention and having also been a very successful teacher of it for some years at an University (Marischall College Aberdeen). How much mental philosophy owes to him as an original, profound, and at the same time sober and judicious thinker, may be seen in his principal work "The senses and the Intellect", in my opinion the best book yet written on the Philosophy of Mind. I cannot imagine that any other person of this generation has made good equally strong claims to such a post as he applies for.15

Bain was in fact appointed Examiner in Logic and Mental philosophy for the University of London in 1857, and reappointed in 1864. He obtained the Chair of Logic at Aberdeen University in 1860 after several abortive attempts at other Chairs. The teaching appointment in Aberdeen was the occasion of getting his own psychological, and Mill's logical, works prescribed for study in psychology and logic courses. During his tenure of office as Examiner at London University Bain was also instrumental in prescribing subjects for the several degrees, pushing through Mill's Logic as well as his own Senses and Emotions as topics of study for the revised scheme of Logic and Moral philosophy in the B.A. degree.16 He writes:

My eleven years' tenure of this office had the effect of introducing widely into the colleges the volume on The Senses and the Intellect. At the same time, John Mill's Logic was extensively studied, with a view to the examinations, and was of very great service in retaining Logic and Mental Science in the University curriculum.17

Never so obvious as in Bain's attempts to influence academic appointments at London University, jockeying for position was a means of propagating liberal beliefs, associationist doctrines and philosophical views grounded on Experience.18 From its foundation in 1826, London University, afterwards called University College, was of particular interest to the philosophic radicals because it aimed at imparting a non-sectarian education. Mill and Bain were closely connected with this institution and with one of its founding members and influential administrators, George Grote, himself a
staunch supporter of the Experience and Association philosophy.

The lead taken by Grote in some of the most important decisions of the University while an active member of both Council and Senate, Vice-Chancellor, Treasurer and one-time President, would profit the radical-utilitarian cause. The 1866 decision to appoint George Croom Robertson, a former student and lifelong assistant of Bain, to the Chair of Mental Philosophy and Logic at University College spelled success for the a posteriori philosophy against apriorism. The outcome was as Mill had wished. Declining to write a testimony on behalf of James Martineau, chief rival and contender for the Chair, Mill explained to the clergyman that,

if I were to volunteer that testimony on the occasion of the vacancy in University College, & if when given it were of any value to you, it could only be so by being prejudicial to another candidate who...would certainly teach doctrines much nearer than yours to those which I myself hold on the great philosophical questions. Now...the opportunities are so few & unfrequent of obtaining for opinions similar to my own their fair share of influence in the public teaching of this country that if I myself had a vote in the disposal of the professorship, I shd think myself bound, in the general interest of philosophical thought no less than of my own form of it, to give the preference to a candidate who would teach my own opinions, in one of the very few chairs from which those opinions would not be a peremptory exclusion...19

Battle-ready allies as they doubtless were, Bain and Grote busied themselves with canvassing on behalf of Robertson and against Martineau. "That Martineau's teaching would be both in spirit and in the letter hostile to inductive philosophy is to me most certain", confesses Bain to Grote.20 The decision was long in the making but eventually favourable to the interests of the utilitarian-associationists. Commenting upon Robertson's appointment to the Chair, Bain remarked to Grote: "If R. had been elected in August, it would have been a success; now it is a triumph. The abuse we have been all subjected to -[?], Mill and I -for Sensationalism and Atheism, has missed the mark, and made our position so much the stronger."21 Grote had his own message to send to Robertson, and it was meant to be clear. He wrote:

You have a great advantage in the presence and
friendship of Mr. Bain for your preparation -& I doubt not that you will avail yourself of it. Succeeding as you do to a Chair which has for thirty years been a nullity in the hands of another, you have the most splendid opening before you for acquiring dignity & reputation as a Professor -& for furthering (what I value most of all) the scientific handling of Mental Philosophy, in the footsteps of Mill & Bain. This is the task for which you must gird yourself...22

Expressed through academic institutions, the Experience and Association philosophy was thought to wield greater power by the formalization and consolidation of its theoretical positions and methodological commitments. Reform-oriented, the a posteriori school of thought worked for freedom from psychological and political restraints by inviting a naturalistic interpretation of the world. Much as it had in previous times, the turn to the 'natural' would be taken by repulsion to the domination of mere authority and tradition.

The search for an understanding of the world on its own terms called for an identification and analytic expunction of all artificial interferences. Lockean sensations had been found to be real as they could be referred to objective events. And so would those Humean relations be held up as nature's work that were stripped of all fictitious qualities and determined simply by association. Shedding all but sequences of sensations and movements of atoms, mental and natural philosophy would in this way draw closer together, no longer seeming to be worlds apart. By Mill and Bain's time, subjective naturalism had found expression in an associationist psychology and sensationalistic epistemology.23

Punctuated with accounts of pleasure and pain as sovereign masters and of judgment and conscience as associative builds of atomistic sensory residua, the language of the 'natural' appealed to the Utilitarians. Its say was thought to militate against the reification of abstract entities and metaphysical concepts by shifting the centre of authoritative discussion from the supernatural to the phenomenal. An examination of beliefs and opinions by the light of experience was thought to be the only mode of correcting fallacies of thought, and as politicised by Mill, was seen as the one and only way to innovation and progress.

While himself an influential turn of the century promoter and interpreter of
theological utilitarianism, William Paley would yet never serve as Mill's type of a progressive utilitarian. For though he had censured authoritative maxims rooted in established opinions and habits and unamenable to correction and reform, his particular brand of Utility was to Mill's mind but a mere index to the will of God. In Mill's opinion, principles of divine legislation, transcendental mysteries, a priori reasonings, and the like all stood in the way of individual freedom and social improvement. His was the firm conviction that the sense-experience offensive was unsurpassable in its ability to beat off the intuitionist line, while addressing the intellectual and moral infirmities of human nature.

By utilitarian standards the language of 'the natural' had not only political implications, but social relevance as well. While naturalistic interpretations told of self-regulation in operations mental and physical, models of nature were seen as a means of inviting moderation in human conduct. Knowledge and acceptance of one's limitations as set by natural laws was thought to foster a climate of restraint conducive to happiness and orderly behaviour. Reinforced by naturalistic and physiological reflection, Bain's psychological innovations carried social resonance by working out the blueprint for the making of self-controlled individuals.

Inasmuch as they showed themselves to be efficient mechanisms worked without intervention, self-regulating systems provided a rationale for the separation of private and public domains. Mill and Bain would live and breathe the transition to a market economy, and work over the argument for self-reliant and independent individuals as the lifeblood of industrialized societies. Built on the classic narrative of Townsend's goats and dogs story, Malthus' earlier argument had represented social ills as "the necessary and inevitable results of the laws of nature". With vice and misery threatening the fabric of society, labour, virtue and happiness were said to be within reach of those whose conduct was self-regulated and whose survival was worked out in compliance with nature's dictates.

To suggest that balance and order could be maintained independently of authority and external control - and secured, therefore, by natural sanctions, diverted the attention from government-assisted to person-driven remedial action. It also aimed at encouraging industry, economy and subordination in the masses. As a good Malthusian,
Bain thought to incorporate these ideas in his psychology by expounding a theory of the mind whose mechanical operations while governed simply by associative laws were yet regulated without intervention by a self, subject or ego. Cast in naturalistic form, Mill and Bain's works clearly stood as a mid-century defence of autonomy and freedom from arbitrary interference.

The recognition of the significance of the ego in turn-of-the-century psychologies would damp the enthusiasm for subjective naturalism by discouraging reductionist explanations of human nature. Atomistic and individualistic renditions of mind and of society would give way to more organic conceptions of psychological and social workings.

Of interest to late-century thinkers was the idea that creative individuals endowed "with the 'main miracle' of will" would only trust in a world whose meaning they could understand. The special importance attached to ideas of history, value, progress, will and final purpose was read as a rejection of scientific naturalism and of its restrictive methodological practices. Writers of James Ward's stamp who rejuvenated psychical life by condemning the earlier abstract, atomistic and mechanistic thinking on psychological matters, looked on historic directive activity as evidence of purposiveness in the world. The language of 'willing' would be used as a dialectic weapon by those contending with a naturalistic opponent whom they deemed to be incapable of addressing human concerns.

Unwilling to compromise the richness of human nature by underrating the complexity of its motivational expression, Joseph Butler had prefigured the dualistic nature of practical reason whose regulative principles of self-love and conscience would find resonance in nineteenth-century intellectual circles. The recognition of virtue and interest as inner moral authorities would loosen the grip of Hobbesian man whose self-interested pursuit of the good-cum-pleasant had opened the way for a patchwork conception of morality. As represented by mid-nineteenth century utilitarian-associationists, conscience stood as a complex feeling made up of self-regarding and other elements sewn together with the thread of sympathy. While associationists had striven to fit individuals into the patchwork, James Ward would later condemn the practice for its dwarfish effects on our moral nature.
The century's last decades were marked by changes of scenery no less psychological than socio-political. Mill and Bain had worked Paley's idea of "liberty in security" in political and psychological treatises whose democratic appeals and pleas for self-control aimed at disseminating power while checking corrupt practices. Disputing the validity of both faculties and ego, Mill and Bain recognized Association as the one and only authority in the mental constitution and trusted to it as the great leveller of unearned psychological distinctions. With patronage and corruption on the decline, the rhetoric of control would change to one of consensus as late-century thinkers sought to express the interdependent nature of state, society and individual. In changing Bain's associationism for a science of immediate experience in which both subject and object are co-dependent factors, James Ward was thought to have traded up psychological thought.

Bain's psychology was framed with a view to advantaging and strengthening the utilitarian-associationist position. Faithful to the traditions of the a posteriori school, Bain made common cause with Mill in working out remediable policies promotive of individual and general welfare. As a work steeped in utilitarian concerns, his psychology carries social and political resonances while it bears out the mark of an author whose mode of thought is characteristic of the school. Both these ideas — namely, the existence of a distinctive manner of thinking as well as the social conditioning of psychological thought, are here explored in the effort to gain a broader perspective on Bain's psychological ideas. As an exercise in the history of nineteenth-century British psychology, the present work is novel in that an understanding of Bain's thought is sought in a context of collective experience showing the likeness in Mill and Bain's social attitudes and intellectual styles. The ways in which these common ideas function in his texts are here investigated.

An analysis of Bain's psychological thought having reference to the socio-historical context in which he participated and to the philosophical coterie with whom he associated, shows a community of discourse and of intellect between Bain and Mill. Getting into the Mannheim spirit, one might say that Bain thinks with Mill. That is to say that they speak the same language. Indisputable is the fact that both Bain and Mill
strove through their respective works to change society in accordance with the principles and beliefs of the radical-utilitarian creed.

The stand taken in this thesis is that the juxtaposition of Mill and Bain's ideas gives the latter's Association psychology greater definition by highlighting the utilitarian thread running throughout the work. As a standard-bearer in the cause of social reform, Mill would draw out and work the moral and political fibres of this utilitarian strand. To be conversant with the object of Mill's undertaking and ideas assists the reading of Bain's texts by recognizing in the details of the works a similar commitment to the moral regeneration of mankind and liberalization of society, as well as a community of intellect between them.

The present research is characterized by a history of ideas approach. With Bain set down as both a defender of the utilitarian-associationist cause and a leading agent in the development and dissemination of its psychological teachings, the object of the research is twofold. Attention is given to the ways in which Bain's psychological ideas express the socio-political issues of joint concern to himself and Mill, while his writings are read as confirmation of a way of thought associated with mid-nineteenth century radical-utilitarians. There is here no attempt to test the consistency of Bain's earlier with later ideas and to weigh the strengths and defects of his arguments, nor is the concern with reconstructing a sounder psychological theory.

The thesis divides into three parts. The idea is to begin with a brief but comprehensive account of Bain's psychology that stands as a near-description of the work's broad outlines. This first chapter starts from a discussion of Bain's phenomenal dualism, psychophysiologic interests and naturalistic beliefs, and moves on to the consideration of his definition of mind by subject-matter. As there is here no concerted effort to place Bain's psychological ideas in perspective, no mention is made of Mill as such. The chapter simply serves as an introduction to the subject of the human mind seen in the light of Bain's associationist commitments, and is basic to an understanding of a work whose doctrines are detailed in subsequent chapters of the thesis.

While absent in the first part of the thesis, the object of the two remaining parts is directed to viewing Bain's project in a larger framework by showing how certain utilitarian concerns and ways of thinking function in his texts. The second part consists
of three chapters and treats of features of thought that might be said to characterize Mill and Bain's intellectual style. Abstract, atomistic and mechanistic ways of thinking link Mill and Bain together in close union of thought on matters scientific, logical, psychological and sociological. As influences bearing on their scientific conceptions of mind and of society these features of thought are in turn the focus of attention, and together make up the second part of the thesis.

As there is nothing like contrast to sharpen the outline of things, attention is given to James Ward's criticism of mid-century associationist thought with a view to setting Mill and Bain's abstract, atomistic and mechanistic thinking in greater relief. Issues about which Ward disputed with Bain are occasionally given more than a summary account when deemed necessary to the representation of opposite intellectual styles and alternative ways of thinking in psychology. In saying that Mill and Bain's thought runs along these lines, I am not suggesting that all of their pronouncements on mind and society reflect such modes of thinking. There is no denying their commitment to a project of social reform whose underpinnings call for reciprocity as the basis of cooperative relations between individuals and society. And their occasional use of organic imagery for impressing this very idea attests the fact. But their discourse on the logic of the moral sciences betokens a faith in, and abidance by, certain scientific tenets the endorsement of which encourages an abstract, atomistic and mechanistic way of thinking in the psychological and social sciences. And that is the discourse which is the focus of attention in this thesis.

Composed of two chapters, the remaining part of the thesis sounds for social and political resonances in Bain's psychological writings. Preliminary explanatory remarks bearing on the socio-political issues of concern to Mill and Bain alike lead to, and confirm, the reading of the latter's psychological text as a representation of the need for greater freedom and power-sharing among enlightened individuals. Bain's speaking out in defence of individualism (chapter 5) and democracy (chapter 6) through his psychological works centres the discussion of this last section. While the broad outlines of Bain's psychology (chapter 1) are distinguishable from first to last, the hope is that superimposed layers of meaning formed out of the reading of subsequent chapters will put a different complexion on the main facts.
Endnotes


3. Francis Place papers, Manuscript Students Room, British Museum Library, London, England; letter of James Mill to Francis Place, 6 Dec. 1817. This passage refers to the psychological treatise Mill would publish in 1829, and known as the Analysis of the phenomena of the human mind. Mill intended to make Hartley's theory "perfectly
familiar to one's mind in every part of the field of thought". In his mind, Hartley's psychological associationism provided a true account of the world of ideas. As such, Mill believed that by expounding Hartley's ideas with greater clarity, "metaphysics thereafter would not be very mysterious". Letters of Mill to F. Place, 6 Sept. 1815, 8 Oct. 1816, 6 Dec. 1817.


Sidgwick's Ethics, p.177.


12. Bain's *The senses and the intellect* was first published in 1855, while *The emotions and the will* came out in 1859.


20. Letter of Bain to G. Grote 2 Aug. 1866, George Croom Robertson papers, Correspondence Bain-Robertson, Manuscripts and Rare Books Room, University College, London; see also Bain's letters to Grote, 26 July 1866, 1 Dec. 1866. See Johnson's thorough account of the circumstances under which Robertson was appointed to the Chair, in Johnson, D.F. (1986). The Utilitarian-Associationist tradition, vol.1, pp.143-148.


22. Letter of G. Grote to G.C. Robertson, 10 Dec. 1866, George Croom Robertson papers, Correspondence Bain-Robertson, Manuscripts and Rare Books Room, University College, London. See also Bain, A. (1871). Obituary notices, Proceedings of the Royal Society, No.130, iii-x.


Balance and order are seen as naturally and not artificially maintained among Townsend's goats and dogs who either suffer want or delight in abundance according as both food supplies and population size diminish or increase. The weakest of these pay the debt of nature, and equilibrium is restored between population size and availability of food supplies. Townsend wants to argue that it is the quantity of food which regulates the numbers of the human species. See McCulloch, J.R. (1859). A select collection of scarce and valuable economical tracts. London: Private distribution; J. Townsend's 1786 tract 'A dissertation on the Poor Laws', pp.416-419.


PART I

BAIN’S ASSOCIATION PSYCHOLOGY
CHAPTER 1

BAIN'S ASSOCIATION PSYCHOLOGY

MIND AS AN OBJECT OF NATURAL SCIENCE

THE MOVEMENT OF CONSCIOUSNESS: SUBJECT AND OBJECT WORLDS

"The mind of man", wrote Bain in 1849, "has in all times ranked among the most important subjects of human knowledge and inquiry. Besides being a wonderfully-framed and highly-complicated piece of work -infinite in faculty and noble in reason, the mirror of the vast universe without- it is the only seat of human feeling and conscious existence, the exclusive dwelling-place of joy or woe." Bain's tone is cheerful, his words, promising. He is confident that an exploration of the great avenues of psychological knowledge will reveal the character and mechanism of the human mind.

Mediated by Bain's eye, the representation of consciousness as a beacon guiding the exploration of the mind would seem to afford an expanded view of mental existence. Yet by delimiting the mental realm with the mark of the "unextended", Bain has so restricted its province as to cause schism in the mental world. For consciousness in its subjective expression is now set off in opposition to the realm of the objective. Decontextualized by a definitional process, conscious experience is thus torn asunder while made by Bain to exhibit the differences between two fundamentally antagonistic worlds, each following its own set of laws: mind and matter, subject and object.

Journeying through the mind's inner regions, though, does not confine us to the world of Feeling, Thought and Volition, as so many "moods" of our inward being. Wide as is the chasm between the two worlds of mind and matter, Bain is unworried about bridging the theoretical gap, trusting that we "flutter to and fro" between the objective and subjective spheres of conscious existence. On Bain's explanation, to adopt a cognizant attitude towards the extended universe at one moment is to leap over the fine boundary line of consciousness, shifting the mental scene to the object. The
material world is yet eclipsed at the next moment by a mere glimpse into the depths of
the mind's inner regions, where extension has no footing. As projected by Bain, the
same being, at one moment all sensation in the experience of the facts of the object
world, exists subjectively at the next, as the scene has shifted from the object to the
subject.

Conceived by Bain as the two extreme facts of human experience, the subject-
world and the object-world determine antagonistic attitudes of mind. The waking
consciousness at his hands is thus a schismatic world wherein "hostile" object and
subject states shift the scene of mental life. To thread the course of conscious life on
Bain's itinerary is to straddle both sides of the delicate dividing line, alternating between
object and subject states. Yet, amidst the conflict of stances, Bain detects a note of
harmony. For embedded within the antithetic 'Mind-External World' relation, he
recognizes a unique and intimate alliance of terms, that of mind and body.

THE BODY-AND-MIND MODEL

Though these two classes of properties are said to be joined in the unity of
mental being, Bain warns that the body is not to prefigure as the dwelling of the mind.
Talk of union in space is inadmissible from his viewpoint, for that which has no spatial
relations because unextended cannot be given local habitation. Physical and mental
facts may well be thought of as "undivided twins", but they are not to be treated as
identical for all that, says Bain. For they are distinct and irresolvable natures.

Labouring the difficulty of preserving the idea of close incorporation while
relinquishing that of local connexion, Bain turns the trick by fashioning a phraseology
conformable to his cast of mind. As he sees it, the mode of union admits of only one
interpretation. And it is that,

the same being is, by alternate fits, object and subject,
under extended and under unextended consciousness;
and that without the extended consciousness the
unextended would not arise. Without certain peculiar
modes of the extended -what we call a cerebral
organization, and so on- we could not have those times
of trance, our pleasures, our pains, and our ideas, which
at present we undergo fitfully and alternately with our extended consciousness. Talk of transitional states rather than changeable places finds favour with Bain as the most convincing rendition of this union of close succession in time. As foundational conceptions go, body-and-mind may well be argued to be the terra firma on which Bain's psychological science rests. For according to his dictates, we are not entitled to think of Mind apart from its material companion.

Touching at the edge of conscious experience, then, subjective and objective attitudes are the contrasting phenomenal expressions of a Janus-faced world. Though bound by the manifestations of its objective correlate, Bain yet looks on the human mind as "the greatest thing in the world". Framed by him on a naturalistic plan and contrived as a highly complex mechanism, the human mind is brought into conformity with nature's ways, and socially integrated, via the instrumentality of its material ally. As handled by Bain, physical processes subservient to mental operations and exercised towards bodily restoration, preservation, regulation, conservation and exertion, are seen to constitute the material breeding ground and forecast of individual and collective welfare. Knowledge-yielding and systematic interrogations of the mind whose success turns on their power of explaining mental phenomena by commanding principles, all combine to teach Bain what the human mind is: a sum-total of emotional, volitional and intellectual facts.

THE END OF EXPLANATION: ORDER, CAUSATION, AND LAW

Should all relevant data be known, the predictability of human actions would be a desirable and impressive outcome by Bain's standards, and possibly as accurate a forecast as that issued in predicting the course of nature. Bain is committed to the view that constancy of causation holds in both psychological and physical worlds. Gazing at the course of human life, he sees a remarkable likeness to the succession of other natural events in that all actions are subject to invariable laws. Irrespective of its mental or material determination, Bain has no doubt that the course of nature is an ordered succession. Uniformity of sequence, therefore, is its distinctive mark.
In treating the human mind as a portion of the living system, Bain affirms the scientific validity of his procedural ways by anatomizing psychological life in search of the manifest workings of reigning laws. Emulous of the physical sciences, Bain thinks it advisable to appropriate both their investigative methods and their intellectual habits so as to make the study of Mind scientific. Bear in mind that Bain looks on conscious states as analogous to physical forces.

Advanced as a fundamental branch of knowledge, Bain's psychological science aims at expressing the regular course of human nature's proceedings through the ascertainment of general laws. Bain is sure that as mental phenomena come under the sway of commanding principles through generalizing strides, clouds of mystery will dissipate. He construes the power of scientific explanation to be such as to render all intellectual soarings into the cloudland of speculation futile according as scattered and solitary particulars are resolved into "fraternity" by flashes of identity. In his view, thorough psychological understanding is gained when overcoming the isolation of a fact through causal assignment while establishing its reason as a higher generality into which it is resolved.

Bent on the eradication of the inexplicable, Bain has left no psychological region unexplored in his inductive treatment of the mind, holding that each and every psychical appearance is susceptible of scientific explanation. Occupied with rooting out all trace of "metaphysical dead-lock", "puzzle", "paradox", "inextricable knot", "factitious difficulties" and "transcendental mysteries" from the realm of mind, Bain clears the way and opens up a plain path. So-called fictitious and inscrutable entities, and, generally speaking, anything "having a lurking reference to some power behind the scenes", are clearly anathema to him.

Dismissing the possibility of anarchical risings in the physical and psychological worlds, Bain turns his attention to the flow of mental life, following its regular course with a selective eye. He is determined to uncover the actual "links of power" and "hinges of causation" which as directive forces regulate the course of nature's changes. In search of causes, Bain has little doubt that processes of observation, generalization, abstraction, induction and deduction are the ways of discovery. When all natural operations are assimilated and final terms of explanation reached, Bain figures that
"there is an end to explanation, and to the necessity for it; there is an end to what the mind can intelligently desire; perfect vision is consummated." On Bain's schedule, the work is done when laws are ascertained and consequences followed out to the outmost. All that is then left is "to rest and be thankful" as such.

Bain is unfaltering in his conviction that to seize the law-like realities of psychological nature through procedural methods modelled on those of the physical sciences is what constitutes finality in scientific questions. Truth, for Bain, is truth only when representing the world precisely as it is, and as scientifically pursued, is something to be believed and acted on. In light of this, we are entitled to question the extent to which Bain's depiction of the psychological landscape is a realistic and faithful portrayal of experienced psychical life, and the degree to which his explanatory survey renders us sharp-eyed. Presumably much depends on this 'goodness of fit', if Bain's projected Mind is to be a credible 'dwelling-place of joy or wo'. The stakes are indeed high. Whichever one of these two emotions prevails will undoubtedly depend on the strength of, and direction given to, associated trains of thought.

THE PANORAMIC VIEW OF MIND

Having discussed in general terms Bain's understanding of Mind's place in nature, we have to consider his analysis of Mind proper. Seen through Bain's eyes, feeling, intellect and will are the bare bones of the psychological matter. While acknowledging the co-essential implication of these three divisions, Bain yet submits his "trinity in unity" to a process of decomposition, giving separate attention to each of its powers in turn. That is because Bain looks on psychology as an analytic science whose specific task is to assign the constituents of complex wholes.

THE REGION OF INTELLECT

Abiding by the prescriptions of a scientific method that is said to require analytic treatment, Bain performs "dissociating surgery" upon the given concrete Mind. The end result is an abstracted intellect, distinguished as a real kind and given consideration
to the neglect of the other constituent mental powers. As is Bain's plan, a further separate exhibition of all fundamental properties of the intellect completes the analytic exploration of a region marked with the sign of primordial powers.

Bain points to the analytic separation of the intellectual properties (powers) of discrimination, retentiveness and agreement as the way to reach the highest generalities of thought expressed as the laws of relativity, contiguity and similarity. In order to attain such a feat, he warns that due logical process must take precedence throughout. That is to say that if rules of logical division are to apply, these abstractive intellectual properties must be mutually exclusive, "however much they are mingled, and inseparably mingled" in their actual workings. To that end, Bain argues that aggregates must be divided into elements according to the received rules, and boundaries drawn around component parts ideally opposed and isolated. Only then can the analysis be said to be ultimate. Having made good his promise to abide by the rules, Bain avows that discrimination, retentiveness and agreement are "the Intellect, the whole Intellect, and nothing but the Intellect." This is to speak of the intellect in the abstract, of course. For the powers do not actually work nor exist in separation.

In discriminating, retaining and comparing, then, we are said to be thinking. We here tread what Bain calls the "depths of intellect". And it is evident that the many lines marking his work on cognitive powers meet at the point of association: mental development through accretion, persistence and reproduction of mental units, relationships of cohesions and attractions all point to the work of associating processes on which hang the acquisitive and inventive powers of the mind. Supply and demand in the intellectual world completes Bain's methodized picture. It is understood that the fabric of associated elements (supply) must be reared before applying the outcome to various utilities and to all varieties of intellect (demand).

Bain accounts it a mistake to speak of the intellect as a bundle of faculties when all that is needed to understand intellectual operations is a thorough grounding in the subject of association. He is sure that as varieties of intellect go, memory, reason, judgment, imagination are but applications of associative laws expressive of the forces directing the currents of thought. Introspection is here seen as the methodological floodgate admitting the conscious stream so as to conceptualize both thought processes
and associative links.\textsuperscript{42} In the region of intellect as visited by Bain, principles of connexion regulate "aggregations and concatenations", while "resuscitation" of "extinct sensations and feeling of all kinds" follows an orderly course.\textsuperscript{43} Bain contends that if association be good for anything, it must point to companionship between the members of intellectual trains, while obliterating all trace of lawlessness and randomness in thought sequences. We are told accordingly that the succession of ideas takes place according to fixed laws, and that restoration is governed by specific and assignable principles of relationship between mental elements.\textsuperscript{44}

Law and order are thus the operative words in intellectual circles. At Bain's hands, associative principles act as governing agents regulating the stream of consciousness, while mental unity is justified in the idiom of "train", "series", "sequence", "transition", "chain" and "thread".\textsuperscript{45} Whatever be the mode of expressing coherence and unity in the intellectual region, it is clear that no word shall pass Bain's lips that suppresses the circumstance of plurality and independence among mental terms.\textsuperscript{46}

The power of discrimination

Notwithstanding the element of order in the realm of intellect, the mind has yet an erratic character. Bain thinks of the stream of consciousness as "a series of ebullitions rather than a calm or steady flow."\textsuperscript{47} Such a fitful display upon the stage of mental life is in fact part and parcel of the experience of mental transition or shock, and Bain deems it necessary to consciousness. As such, Mind starts with a feeling of difference.\textsuperscript{48} As the fundament of knowledge, this awareness of change is the very beginning of intellectual life. Bain speaks of it as the defining mark of intelligence.\textsuperscript{49}

From discrimination to retention

We are thus creatures gifted with powers of discrimination. Primary impressions, Bain explains, are as varied and numerous as the discriminative sense is
refined. As distinct states, they enrich the stock of stored-up recollections. As we set upon the track of bygone times in search of memory deposits kept in the "repositories of the mind", the resurrection of impressions is said to be within our power. Bain reasons that it is because we are possessed of associative and reproductive properties with which to construct "chains of ideas" and revisit old trains of thought.

If we are to build up trains of thought along Bain's lines, we need his "distinct and isolated" units. There is little doubt that these "detached" vehicles of the mind that enter into associating operations to form connected lines of thought conveyances are vitally important to him. Observe that in comprehending the meaning of associative suggestion, we must reckon with mental units designated by Bain the "impression, sensation, presentation, perception, idea, image, trace, residuum, representation, memory, recollection." With units thus discriminated, psychological order is then possible by means of the power of the associative intellect to make sequences from parts.

In thinking about the linking process as these units become associated together, we realize that there is dual fellowship in Bain's world of association. That is to say that "companionship" among associated terms is struck in one or other of two ways: either through proximity in place and time or through resemblance. In any event, individual impressions must first persist if they are to enter into permanent relationship with one another. Retentiveness is here of assistance, expressing the possibilities of growth and acquisition.

Should we travel a good ways down the road of retentiveness, we would find that the ground of acquisition is only as solid as the fixing and adhesive processes are adequate to the task of learning. Bain thinks, for instance, that the mental comprehension of a thing is but feeble, unless gained by "adding unit to unit" in such way as to secure a mature and firm association. As he sees it, this aggregate is what constitutes our idea or intellectual grasp of the thing. Inasmuch, therefore, as connexions are firmly engrained in the mind and solidified through repetition, to that extent they are growths contributing to mental advance.

Now acquisition, mental "alliance", "cemented" grouping, "fusion", "coalition" and "cohesion" are the very terms used by Bain in the description of the workings of the
plastic operation. Exercised towards efficacy, this plastic process fixes parts of complex impressions thereby made to endure, at the same time that it secures the adhesion of the contiguous elements that will later be reproducible under the form of ideas. Bain's individual terms, originally discrete and isolated, thus come to "flow together in company and order". In characteristic Bain idiom, the new alliance is described as an "embrace" of states.

Bain speaks of individuals as intelligent who absorb the world's picture in their minds and can live a life as rich in ideas as in actualities. This idea and ideal of intellectual persistence represents one of two aspects assumed by the retentive power, the other being reproduction. Bain's construal of the plastic mechanism is rather involved. Several operations take place that evince the workings of the retentive process.

Righting the imbalance of detached units

To illustrate the multi-faceted aspect of the plastic property, let us take a simple case of association between concurrent sensations such as forms a contiguous growth. As discriminated mental elements are recalled in the form of ideas, each sensation must acquire persistence in the form of a self-sustaining idea or mental deposit if it is to be later recovered upon presentation of the contiguous member. According to Bain, this leap from the reality to the idea is credible only to those who allow for the possibility of the identical physical embodiment of sensation and idea. Now, given the compound nature of sensations, Bain further contends that there must first be a fixing process applied to each sensation before it can persist in the absence of the original stimulation. That is to say that all parts of the sensation must be fused or compacted into a coherent whole. Apart from this fixing process going on with each individual sensation, Bain argues that there is also a "bond of attachment" in course of formation: an associating process (contiguity) joins into a contiguous growth or "agglutination" co-existing or consecutive sensations. So long as there is one obtainable handle, Bain figures that the most "vagabond" fact can be associated.

All told, in comprehending the workings of the retentive power, we must
envisage a fusion of parts to form multiplex impressions, a persistence of these impressions in the form of ideas, and an alliance of contiguous individuals as the means of restoration of one such member upon the presentation of the other. As Bain will have it, the very same power as that expressed by the law of contiguity is presupposed in the process of preserving the co-existence of parts and of converting the sensation into the idea.68

From contiguity to similarity

While Bain speaks in glowing terms of similarity generally,69 it is yet the detection of agreement in the midst of diversity by which the highest exertions of the mind are sustained that is of particular interest to him.70 For those are original and inventive by Bain's standards who, undeterred by the obstruction of differences, sound the depths of mental repositories in search of the common features of past and present images. Minds endowed with a great stretch of identifying power are said to represent the highest range and consummation of intellect. Bain explains that,

- contiguity leads to routine, and to the arranging of things as they happen to be in nature by mere juxtaposition;
- similarity breaks through juxtaposition, and brings together like objects from all quarters. It is by far the grandest manifestation of the human mind; it enables us to rise to the unity, simplicity, and comprehensiveness of plan that regulates the complicacy of the world's arrangements and movements, and lessens to an unlimited degree the toil attendant on man's situation in the universe.71

Bain is a practical man for all that. And he well knows that while geniuses do not walk the streets by the dozen, yet every individual properly educated into a sense of individual and collective responsibility can lead a life in accordance with the rules of conscience. In servicing this end contiguity commands respect, and Bain is sold on it as the indispensable device in human management and control. On a soberer note, he speaks of similarity as a useful tool in "patchwork" learning which makes use of old knowledge to piece the new.72 With seemingly no regard for abstractive intellectual bounds supposed to be mutually exclusive, the powers of agreement and retentiveness
are here seen to join forces in the concrete in an effort to "tack" together previous acquisitions in new groupings.\textsuperscript{73}

Bain depicts the world of "mental magnetism" as one in which companionship among associates does not precede, but follows upon, the reinstatement of old states.\textsuperscript{74} In contrast to contiguity, the past image that flashes into the mind because drawn to a present resemblant impression might have had no connexion to it in a former experience. Bain points out that the "rapprochement"\textsuperscript{75} between things from different times and circumstances comes only after the discovery of community between past and present states. And when this resemblance is perceived in the face of great distraction by discordant accompaniments, all the more credit to the individual whose discovery it is, thinks Bain. For this detection of agreement amidst partial difference while showing insightful capacity on an individual's part, also flashes the light of knowledge.\textsuperscript{76}

Though magnetized into companionship through the attraction of sameness, it is evident that the "fellows"\textsuperscript{77} of new coincidences have yet to be reconciled to their differences. Bain's rendition of the conflict is cast in the language of opposition and resistance. The attractive and repulsive forces of likeness and diversity are said to meet head-on, while their respective strength is seen as a measure of the power to overcome opposition.\textsuperscript{78} There is but one desirable outcome in Bain's view: "obstructives" must be defeated so as to clear the way for the reviving stroke of similarity.\textsuperscript{79}

Bain figures that as the identifying power is a prime requisite in reasoning, and reason that which affords comprehensive views of purposeful existence, then the force of similarity is most important to our mental range. He advocates widening the grasp of the intellect so as to devise noble schemes of life. To that end, all stumbling-blocks, hindrances and dead weights arresting the generalizing impetus must be conquered in order to secure the "triumph of identification" and make "like flow to like."\textsuperscript{80} Bain contends that it is only as the flow is unimpeded by the "discordant heap" and as magnetized particulars are gathered up into comprehensive generalities, that the human reason advances in its endeavours to comprehend the world and guide human life.\textsuperscript{81}
THE DIVISION OF FEELING

Reckoned great by the impressive range of its cognitive resources, the intellect must bring all manner of power to bear upon materials of yet a lower ranking. Bain would say that even though muscular feelings and sensations occupy the lower rungs in the psychological organization, their impress is no less remarkable for all that. And that is because their provenance is Experience in the cause of which Bain is unreservedly outspoken. Indeed, while the rival schools of Intuition and Experience debate the question of the origin of knowledge, he is sure to side with the "post-natal experience" contenders against the defenders of "ante-natal" knowledge.\(^{82}\)

Bain's motto is in keeping with the spirit of the school's main tenet which stipulates that "nothing is to be held innate that can be shown to arise from experience and education."\(^{83}\) Bain stands for the view that so-called innate knowledge must be subjected to a determinative test of truth. He himself abides by the authority of sensible experience and acquisition in accounting for knowledge. His claim is that all knowledge is derived from post-natal experience and thus from encounters with the world through the combination of movements and senses discriminated and retained.

Bain contends that knowledge gained through experiential elements (intellectually combined) is the rule without exception. As such, he thinks all "Innate ideas, Instinctive truths, notions and truths \(\text{a priori}\), First Principles, Common Sense, Primary Beliefs, Transcendental notions and truths, truths of the Reason" should be uprooted.\(^{84}\) And he figures that any discussion bearing on ideas of time, space and cause, axioms of mathematics, notions of right and wrong, and conceptions of God and immortality, needs to be recast in the language of experience.

If the intellect is to bear cognitive and practical yields, Bain must lay up the store of foundational sensibilities constituting the alphabet of the knowable. Accordingly, we are told that sights, sounds, smells, tastes, touches, muscular feelings, organic affections, emotions of love, anger and fear, are the A B C of our cognitive capabilities. It is clear that on Bain's terms, the possibilities of knowledge do not extend beyond the compass of these primary active and passive sensibilities, and of their various compounds.\(^{85}\) It is also evident that the work of refinement is the intellect's,
whose task is to transform these primitive constituents into the cultured pearls of the mind.

In leading the psychological search after fundaments, Bain's genetic inquiry, interpenetrated by analysis, focuses the attention on several of his interests. While giving special prominence to the intellect by implicating it in the work of cultivation, a natural history of the feelings logically systematized confers a scientific character to the subject of Mind.86

Bain partitions the human feelings into sensations and emotions.87 And whether engaged in describing muscular feelings, pangs of hunger or tender emotions, he never fails to appreciate the hedonistic worth of each and every feeling. For Bain considers that as operant motives to volitional exertion, pleasures and pains constitute the region of the great life issues.88 We are told that the greater part of feelings are pleasures and pains, while those few that are hedonistically neutral are yet a potential source of great mental excitement and thus a distinct spring of human action.89 Feelings, however, have not only an emotional aspect but an intellectual dimension as well. Bain writes:

If we examine the Sensations of Organic Life, Taste, and Smell, we shall find that as regards pleasure and pain, or in the point of view of Feeling, they are of great consequence, but that they contribute little of the permanent forms and imagery employed in our Intellectual processes. This last function is mainly served by Touch, Hearing, and Sight, which may therefore be called the Intellectual Senses by pre-eminence...90

Emotions, on their part, are more complex than sensations. Bain tells us that they are formed by intellectual intervention, the mode of composition being contiguous growth. There are also feelings that coalesce, and in this process of blending, are said to originate new emotions that acquire permanent forms. There is no question that as thus impearled into refinement by the intellect, emotions fit Bain's description of a higher order of Feeling.91 He points out that some emotions are of an ultimate character, and as elementary, are irresolvable into simpler sensory elements. Bain explains that love, anger and possibly fear are original fountains of sentiment and are not derived from sensation as such. It would seem, rather, that they are themselves sources, along with the senses, of secondary emotions. "Love and Anger", says Bain,
are the commanding and indispensable members of the emotional scheme. Withdraw these, and the whole fabric would collapse to something little beyond sensation aggregates. Although there are a few other distinct emotional roots, yet the growths from such would be utterly insignificant, but for the incorporation of these two mighty allies.92

Bain thinks that emotions such as pride, for instance, are derived from the simple and primary ones, while those of property, power and knowledge are uniquely compounded by associations with the pleasures and pains of the senses.

By Bain's psychology, we may indeed be natural seekers of pleasure and avoiders of pain. But though hedonists, we are not mere self-seekers. For sensory gratifications and selfish considerations do not cover the whole field of human impulsion, as expanded by Bain. His argument for the ultimate nature of the love emotion assures us of such. denied the character of a large aggregate of sense pleasures, it has not a selfish origin. Bain contends that,

the pleasures of love, affection, mutual regard, sympathy, or sociability is a wholly distinct fact from the prime supports of existence and from the pleasures of the five senses, and is not, in my opinion, resolvable into those, however deeply we may analyze it, or however far back we may trace the historical evolution of the mind.93

Drawn from the source of gregariousness as the great socializing agent of all times, the inborn powers of sympathy, love and disinterestedness are said to be "fountains of the unselfish, that relate us to our fellow-beings."94 Bain insists that conduct in pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain is a wholly distinct fact from disinterested conduct. He well knows that to defend this position raises a most formidable difficulty, namely, that the feeling-prompted action of the will does not always square with the attainment of happiness. Bain finds all attempts at reconciliation inadequate that feature the self as the primary source of social feeling, that is, of not-self. No theory of happiness can prove satisfactory on Bain's view unless both one's and others' pleasures are taken up into the count.95

Of course the count is just the problem; a "vast problem",96 as it were. And yet Bain figures that if Psychology is to be of service to mankind, it must apply itself to the quantitative analysis of emotional states.97 He recognizes that the means of
measurement are somewhat problematic, if not plain defective, in the very inexact science of Mind.\textsuperscript{98} Notwithstanding the near absence of numerical estimates in respect of mental qualities, Bain yet deems it necessary to assess degree in feelings. For to give up the effort would signal Psychology's failed attempt at dealing with questions of interest to mankind. Bain holds that,

the great life problems that engage the attention of mankind manifestly take the form of estimating differences of value, with a view to choice or preference. In Ethics, in Economics, in Rhetoric, we have to arbitrate between opposing considerations and motives, and, whether we will or not, must assume some measure of their respective amounts. To arbitrate between the Stoic and the Epicurean theories of life, we must decide questions of comparative worth; and progress in psychological knowledge should prove its genuineness by coming to our aid.\textsuperscript{99}

Should it be said that fluidized thought movement congeals into distinct crystallized ideas that allow of a precise count, this would give Bain's view on the subject of thought processes.\textsuperscript{100} This he maintains in the face of the criticism of associationist psychology as atomistic doctrine.\textsuperscript{101} Atomistic or no, Bain yet contends that degree of feeling must be adaptable to a quantitative computation. For as he sees it, rational conduct stands as the preference of greater to lesser pleasures and of lesser to greater pains.\textsuperscript{102} And this calls Bain to account for the computational potential of feeling.

Once again, mental analysis bears a hand in estimating feelings. Bain figures that when the ingredients of a complex feeling are known, the degree of any one is so far the degree of the whole. It is in some such way that the known degree of individual sympathies, being a component of the moral sentiment, tells on the degree of moral feeling. However, Bain realizes that no test of the sufficiency and thoroughness of an analysis is adequate that casts up sums in this way. For he fears that numerical estimates of feelings generally, and of emotions in particular, are never accurate. This is a circumstance unfavourable to their "exact or scientific" treatment.\textsuperscript{103}

Though they indeed concentrate attention on important problems, the qualitative and quantitative aspects of emotional states need not focalize all rays of hope, however.
For feelings also have volitional as well as intellectual marks, and as such, are appealing to Bain. In their volitional expression, they act as motives to human exertion, being either pleasures or pains.\textsuperscript{104} According to Bain, pleasures direct the will to their continuance while pains favour actions for their avoidance. And, as he reminds us, "every state denominated pain or pleasure, and tested by operating on the will, is either a muscular feeling, a sensation, or one of the special emotions; there being also modes of feeling of a neutral or inert character, as regards the will."\textsuperscript{105} No volitional spur is thus conveyed by neutral excitement.

It is only too clear to Bain that a feeling but dimly recollected is quite powerless to engage efforts of pursuit or avoidance, which is otherwise for the retained and recovered one. Though all feelings possess a certain degree of ideal persistence and recoverability, Bain legitimates the construction of a scale of sensibilities, bottomed by muscular feelings as the least revivable, rising to the higher senses, and ending with the most refined and revivable emotions at the top of the scale.\textsuperscript{106}

The discriminative, retentive and reproductive aspects of feelings are said to represent their intellectual properties. As Bain sees it, these properties have either intellectual or practical appeal. From an intellectual point of view, feelings susceptible of being discriminated, compared and remembered are important sources of perceptions and thus engage us in the comprehension of the world. When feelings are remembered in their qualitative character as pleasures and pains, they are said to have practical and social relevance. Bain looks on these ideal pleasures and pains as choice brooding considerations in the reckonings of forethought and prudence. While invested with actuating power, they bear significantly on the guidance of human life. The retentiveness for pains is of particular interest to Bain, being the intellectual foundation of both prudence and sympathy.\textsuperscript{107}

Bain reckons with the conflicting impulses of the human frame, telling of the hostile encounter between the allurement of pleasure and the virtuous motive. Speaking to the importance of practical wisdom and of a well-guarded happiness of life, he observes that "a very large intervention of the department of intelligence, and a considerable experience already had of good and evil, are necessary to foreshadow the future to the will with a fidelity that shall be justified when that future becomes
Bain would doubtless say that what is required is an education in the volitional memory of good and evil. Those schooled in Bain's associationist thought soon learn that it is only as the intellectual holding ground is good that the fluency of Feeling "gains consistence and permanence" and that pleasures and pains thus become indelible memories. Bain's claim is that "if the intellectual element is sound, all is sound."10

THE DEPARTMENT OF WILL

Were it not for a powerful centre of human activation bordering the region of Intellect, we might not be roused to activity by longsighted intellectual considerations. But as it is, Bain has carefully fashioned his theoretical Will out of the mold of "obedience". So that as it reaches the apex of general command on the back of instinct, experience and education, the Will is fit to carry out the tall orders of the intellect. That is to say that it is ready to put forth any mode of action aptly represented to the mind by the intellect. It is as a "well-disciplined" centre, therefore, that the Will gives force to broad and remote views, by following the lead of Intellect in the guidance of daily life, and by carrying its decisions into effect. It is thus obvious to Bain that the Will can bear no greater influence than that which is warranted by intellectual considerations.

On Bain's view, the Will operates strictly within the limits of self-conservation, obeying the mandate to work for pleasure and to remove pain. Bain explains that the whole superstructure of the mature Will is grounded in the conservation of the individual as the foundation stone of voluntary action. We are told that in the fullness of time, this functioning "indivisible" is kept in action by an elaborate machinery of associated detail. And as it is growing, the Will is said to be gradually formed by the union of compoundable ingredients into a bundle of acquisitions.

Bain sees in this "embrace of feelings and actions" the mechanism by which distinct and uniform mental sequences are forged and cemented. When the very need to appease these feelings prompts to specific muscular exertions, we are said to be working for ends. On Bain's view, purposeful actions that are mental in character
because emotionally induced, controlled and determined, are thereby called volitions.118

Before it can grow and develop into a full-blown and distinct centre of voluntary power, the Will must first be set in motion. In its primitive expression, Bain hypothesizes that the nascent Will involves an action that, once begun, and in so far as it gratifies or alleviates pain, is persisted in. In the infancy of the Will's being, then, Bain figures that feeling can thus induce action of some kind, but not necessarily of the right sort. It is only at a later period that the fully-formed Will executes directional movement towards the maintenance of pleasure and alleviation of pain.119 According to Bain, spontaneity supplies the first impulse, conservation, the crucial primary link, and self-preservation, the initial volitional cast. The rest is up to the intellect under the law of contiguity.

The thrust of Bain's argument is that without spontaneity and self-conservation, the growth of the Will is inexplicable and voluntary acquisition, impossible.120 It would seem that unless his exposition of the Will hits the mark, his theoretical superstructure will not rise,121 thereby undermining psychology's practical relevance to the cause of social and moral reform. For Bain is no doctrinaire. He looks on the Will as that activating force which binds human engagement with the world, and as thus supplied with proper motives and abetted by habits, sustains the work for moral ends. It is evident that the theoretical carving of the Will is of great interest to Bain.

Bain contends that voluntary movements must somehow jibe with the solicitations of motives. His idea of an "educated executive" is an activity confined to specific channels, prompted by great leading motives, and regulated by the intellect.122 Bain has it that a Will putting forth immediate action to fulfill pleasurable and painful promptings typifies the work of volition in that nothing bars the execution of movement under the motivational spur. What Bain means is that there is an absence alike of deliberation (suspended action), resolution (action adjourned), desire (ideal volition) and belief (preparedness to act), all of which are but various displays or complications, though not distinct centres, of voluntary power. Bain writes:

> The most general and essential attribute of the will, is to act at once on a motive. The typical will neither deliberates nor resolves, but passes, without interval, from a motive state to an action. The superior
intelligence of the higher beings induces upon this primitive link a series of artificial suspenses, not exceptions to the general law of the will, but complications of it... As Bain puts it, these volitional milestones are not essentials but so many developmental "accidents" of the Will.

Bain explains that as we advance through stages in volitional education and acquire control of the Will, motives, at bottom always some variety of pleasure or pain, yet appear in new guises, while their fundamental character is unaltered. As he points out, the pursuit of pleasurable, and the avoidance of painful, objects as present and actual is not the sole incitement to the accelerated growth of the Will. Actual or future, primary or derivative, intermediate or aggregated, all motives alike work as chisels in the transformation of the Will, prompting it to educe latent exertions.

Bain takes his stand on the view that without some hedonic antecedent, the Will is simply not stimulated. Suspension or transcendence of motive in the performance of voluntary acts is to his mind an unmeaning proposition. Bain speaks up for regularity and prediction in the volitional realm, by arguing that voluntary acts are always in the grip of motives. Uniformity of mental sequence is thus the rule of the road in the region of the Will. Bain reasons that, "...according as we reduce Will to law, we foster good habits; according as we withdraw it from regularity and prediction, we unsettle the pursuit of virtue." Bain seems to think that just as rules of the road are developed in the interest of safety, so is a rule-bound Will a theoretical structure raised for purposes of moral preservation.

A Will inspired to work for intellectual and moral ends is not the only source of active power, however. It is Bain's contention that central spontaneity (constitutional self-originating force), mental excitement (tendency to act out a fixed idea), habit (mechanical action), and disinterestedness also energize, though without any hedonic reference. Themselves powerful determining principles of human conduct, they are said to occasionally baffle and unnerve the Will by deflecting its natural course and opposing its self-regarding interests. Bain fears that the rational pursuit of ends is subject to many thwartings and perversions. But leave him to settle the matter and the outcome is predictable. We are told that prudential and disinterested volitions need
confirmation by the stamp of habit, and that, when action is most needed, the Will is the one and only reliable support of human existence.

.........

In working for the mental improvement of society's members, Bain has launched the search for the dispassionate Intellect, and for the "pure" and "healthy" Will. Engaged in social reform, John Stuart Mill is his travelling companion. Of like mind in deliberating practical questions of relevance to the welfare of persons and communities, Mill and Bain are also joined in close union of thought on matters scientific, logical, psychological and sociological. As powerful utilitarian influences bearing on their scientific conceptions of mind and of society, abstract, atomistic and mechanistic ways of thinking are in turn the focus of the next three chapters.
Endnotes


3. Although Bain has occasionally used the term consciousness to refer to the method of self-examination, the "general consciousness" of which he speaks in his 1849 article refers to mental existence proper. This is to be distinguished from self-consciousness. He likens the difference to that between 'seeing' and 'looking': 'seeing' or general consciousness offers "a general vision of a wide range of objects", while 'looking' or self-consciousness is "the special or concentrated observation of some single object". In this article, Bain uses the term consciousness to define or circumscribe the region of Mind. Bain, A. (1849). The human mind, *Chambers's Information for the People*. See also Bain, A. (1866). The intellect, viewed physiologically, *Fortnightly Review* 3, 735-748. Mill, J. (1869). *Analysis of the phenomena of the human mind*. Vol.1. London: Longmans, Green, Reader, & Dyer, pp.227-228.


5. In later writings, Bain uses the term consciousness to include both subject and object states. As such, he extends the word to include Mind proper. The unextended mental world (Mind) becomes the subject-consciousness or ego, and the extended


13.Ibid., p.130.

15. Bain's discussion of the conditions of physical and mental activity, the distribution of blood supply to the brain, the economy of nerve and mental forces, the consumption and production of vital energy, the circular course of mental and nervous conveyances, and the expenditure of surplus nervous power, will be related, along with their bearing on the subject of individual and collective welfare, in Chapter 5.


21. Bain, A. (1876). Mind and body, p.121. Bain, A. (1884). Practical essays, 'Errors of suppressed correlatives', p.64. According to Bain, mystery is solitariness or the isolation of a fact from all others, the resolution of which is found in generalization or identity.


23. Ibid., pp.491, 500.


29. According to Bain, science is the most perfect embodiment of truth and of the ways of getting at truth. As he sees it, the central fact of science is the generality or abstraction. As a firm adherent to the principle of the limitation of human nature, he thinks it inconceivable that anyone should have a strongly developed interest in both the concrete and the abstract points of view. On Bain's view, a person cannot both show a vivid interest in the concrete aspects of the world as well as commit to the scientific point of view which deals with nature by way of abstractions. Indeed, we are told that a marked interest in one generates a repulsion to the other. I will discuss these points further in chapter 5. Bain, A. (1868). *The senses and the intellect*, pp.358-359. Bain, A. (1898). *Education as a science*, pp.146-147, 161-162, 287.


41. Bain holds that reasoning, for instance, involves chiefly, though not only, similarity, while imagination is a product of all three fundamental powers. Bain, A.
42. In delimiting the respective spheres of introspection and psycho-physics, Bain claims that introspection is an adequate means by which to conceptualize the mental flow. It also constitutes the main approach to the threefold division of the mind and to the further analysis of the intellect into properties. In ascertaining the facts of association, Bain admits the relevance of psycho-physics. He holds, however, that introspection has the largest share in propounding the theory of intellect. According to Bain, "the minute linkings in our thought successions are open to introspection, and to that alone..." Bain, A. (1903). Dissertations. 'The respective spheres and mutual helps of introspection', pp.245-246, 248, 252, 254.


47. Bain, A. (1866). The feelings and the will, Fortnightly Review.

48. According to Bain, discrimination, or sense, feeling, or consciousness of difference between consecutive or co-existing impressions is a fundamental intellectual power. By the term 'fundamental', 'primary', 'primitive' or 'instinctive', Bain means that which is irreducible and unacquired. As such, we are born with our
powers of discrimination, retention, and comparison. On Bain's usage of terms, see The senses and the intellect, pp.iv, 8, 326. See also his chapter on 'Evolution, as applied to mind', in The emotions and the will, pp.47-68.

According to Bain, discrimination is also expressed as, or manifests itself in the form of, the law of relativity. Contrast is the reproductive phase of this first law of mind, though itself not an independent law of association. Claiming that it is a somewhat rare reproductive bond, Bain thinks it best to refer the process to the other associative laws of contiguity and similarity. Bain admits, however, that there is neither general agreement on the analysis of the intellectual fundamentals nor unanimity on the classification of the laws. Bain, A. (1866). The intellect, viewed physiologically, Fortnightly Review. Bain, A. (1884). Mental and moral science. Part first, p.83. Bain, A. (1903). Dissertations, 'Association controversies', p.32.

49. Bain holds that we only know things by their differences and agreements with other things. As for differences, we are struck by the characteristic features of any one thing with the help of discrimination. Bain has a computational understanding of knowledge: to know man is to sum up the contrasting points between a person and all other things, as well as the points of identity on comparing persons with one another. Bain, A. (1868). The senses and the intellect, pp.396, 457, 565. Bain, A. (1875). The emotions and the will, p.549.

50. According to Bain, we can no more retain that which we cannot discriminate in the first place: "the retentive power works up to the height of the discriminative power; it can do no more." We are thus said to be intellectually limited by our discriminative sense. Bain, A. (1898). Education as a science, pp.15-16.


Bain's statement of the 'retentiveness-law of contiguity' reads as follows: "Actions,
Sensations, and States of Feeling, occurring together or in close succession, tend to grow together, or cohere, in such a way that, when any one of them is afterwards presented to the mind, the others are apt to be brought up in idea." The senses and the intellect, p.327.


64.Concerned with the embodiment of persisting and renewed impressions, Bain hypothesizes that persisting and reinstated ideas borrow the same circles of nervous conveyance as the original feelings. According to him, the only difference between a sensation and its idea is that the latter is but a weaker copy. Rejecting the notion of a separate cerebral closet for storing ideas, Bain contends that in its self-sustaining condition, the idea does not change its seat nor pass into some new nervous circle. As he puts it, "the mode of existence of a sensation persisting after the fact is essentially the same as its mode of existence during the fact; the same organs are occupied, the same current action goes on." The same process is involved in reproduction: nervous currents, hardened in their own circle, return "exactly on their own tracks". Bain hypothesizes that, "the renewed feeling occupies the very same parts, and in the same manner, as the original feeling, and no other parts, nor in any other assignable manner." In Bain's book, the psychological theory of ideality is cast in physiological terms. See Bain, A. (1849). The human mind, Chambers's Information for the People. Bain, A. (1868). The senses and the intellect, pp.336-341. Bain, A. (1875). The emotions and the will, pp.564-565. Bain, A. (1884).

Compare Bain's discussion of the retentive power in its two aspects of persistence and reproduction and his rendition of retentiveness in his 1849 article on the human mind. Bain, A. (1849). The human mind, Chambers's Information for the People. In this article, the property of persistence is called the law of sensational growth, while the laws of intellect proper refer to contiguity and similarity.
69. The following is Bain's statement of the 'agreement-law of similarity': "Present Actions, Sensations, Thoughts, or Emotions tend to revive their LIKE among previous Impressions, or States." Bain, A. (1868). The senses and the intellect, p.457.
73. Bain, A. (1868). *The senses and the intellect*, p.360. Bain contends that the two modes of action do not exist separately, but in fact work together. Throughout his exposition of the law of contiguity, he tells us that similarity has simply been assumed. Repetition, for instance, is of no avail in forming a contiguous growth, unless the presented contiguous impressions recover the sum total of their past states, which process is aided by the operation of similarity. According to Bain, "we have everywhere taken for granted, that a present occurrence of any object to the view, recalls the total impression made by all the previous occurrences, and adds its own effect to that total." See pp.458-459. And Bain, A. (1903). *Dissertations*, 'Association controversies', p.35.


On the applicability of physical conceptions to the discussion of the human mind, see Bain, A. (1838). A comparison of the styles of the principal writers, unpublished manuscript, Aberdeen University Library, Scotland.


This completes the section on the intellect. Bain adds to it by tracing out the workings of compound and constructive association. No new power is here introduced. What the term 'compound association' suggests is that when associations are individually too weak for effective recovery, many bonds of connexion unite as a
means of facilitating recall. Bain's statement of the law is as follows: "Past actions, sensations, thoughts, or emotions, are recalled more easily, when associated either through contiguity or through similarity, with more than one present object or impression." Ibid., p.545.

In constructive association, Bain tells us that "by means of Association, the mind has the power to form new combinations, or aggregates, different from any that have been presented to it in the course of experience." Constructive association is the process involved in the operations of imagination and creation. Bain contends that the very same intellectual powers involved in simple association are operating in the formation of imaginative and creative constructions. Ibid., pp.570-571, 581.


84. Ibid., pp.181, 183-184.


Bain distinguishes between two leading aims of psychological study. The inquiry into the original foundations of our psychological being consists in tracing the
experience of the mature individual back to its early stages and manifestations. In broaching this subject (genesis), Bain contends that an initial determination of the simpler elements of any compound still introspectively distinguishable (analysis) can be of assistance. But though they interpenetrate, Bain warns that an analysis of psychological compounds is an altogether different aim from that of a genetic inquiry. In other words, the genesis (how does complexity come about) and the analysis (what is complexity made of) of complex psychological products focus on different questions. For instance, though sympathy as a primitive power is irresolvable into sense pleasures (an analytic contention), Bain considers it to be deeply rooted in the gregarious situation and thus a development by the cumulative experience of past generations (a genetic contention). As such, the endeavour to trace it to its foundations is deemed relevant. See Bain, A. (1903). Dissertations. 'The respective spheres and mutual helps of Introspection', pp.242-244. Also, Bain, A. (1875). The emotions and the will, pp.57-58, 121-122, 267.

While Bain made sympathy a purely intellectual growth in earlier writings, he later abandoned this position in reviewing the nature of sympathy. He writes: "The need of a further element of an emotional kind was strongly urged, and was supplied by the hypothesis of a gregarious origin in the past history of the races of animals and man. It was also necessary to vindicate, against various ethical authorities, the existence of purely disinterested motives, apart from all roundabout selfish considerations..." Bain, A. (1904). Autobiography, p.324.


For a different conception of the relation of analytic, genetic, and physiological psychology, see Ward, J. (1904). On the definition of psychology, British Journal of Psychology.

87. In the following discussion, I will use the term 'emotional' as Bain does, to refer to the most comprehensive designation of Feeling stated in adjective form. Emotional states, then, comprise not only emotions, but sensations as well. In their qualitative character as 'Feeling', Bain contends that emotional states are either pleasurable, painful, or indifferent. In their knowledge-giving capacity as discriminative and retainable states, feelings are said to have intellectual aspects. For a different conception of Feeling, see Ward, J. (1882). A general analysis of mind, Journal of Speculative Philosophy. Ward, J. (1883). Psychological principles. II, Mind. Ward, J. (1887). Psychological principles. III, Mind. Ward, J. (1933). Psychological principles, pp.44-45. See also Johnson, D.F. (1986). The Utilitarian-


100. Bain, A. (1875). The emotions and the will, p. 29.


104. According to Bain, the description of motives as pleasures or pains is simply a convenient way of summarizing all possible motives. He admits, however, that conduct is not only self-seeking, and, as such, recognizes the existence of purely disinterested impulses. He argues that in possessing motivational power, emotions such as sympathy influence conduct through the agency of the fixed idea, thereby thwarting the regular action of the will. This will be further discussed in the next sub-section. See Bain, A. (1875). The emotions and the will, pp.14, 498. Bain, A. (1884). Mental and moral science. Part first, p.279.


111. Bain uses this word to describe the relation of the will to the intellect. See Bain, A. (1849). The human mind, Chambers's Information for the People. See also Bain, A. (1868). The senses and the intellect, p.410.


116. While Bain recognizes that there are many modes of Feeling, he regards the Will as the collective muscular machinery of the system. Even though it takes on many aspects, the Will is said to be an indivisible centre of power. See Bain, A. (1861). On the study of character, p.46. Bain, A. (1870). Logic, Part second, p.278.


PART II
FEATURES OF THOUGHT
PART II

FEATURES OF THOUGHT

INTRODUCTION

The features of thought discussed in the following chapters are everywhere in evidence throughout Mill and Bain's writings, and they manifest themselves in distinctive ways when examined through the scope of these sources. As such, in exploring any one feature, I have focused on those aspects that serve to distinguish Mill and Bain's thinking on that one dimension of thought. I have thus specifically framed the particulars of these features of thought from the details of their primary writings. And upon consulting the secondary literature, I have drawn on such ideas as bear on the attempt to characterize these features of thought, and have referred to the secondary sources accordingly.

With regard to the dimensions of thought examined in this thesis, I readily admit that the treatment is neither comprehensive nor the selection exhaustive. I have neither pretense that all conceivable aspects of any one dimension have been realized, nor illusion that all possible features of thought common to Mill and Bain have been considered. The fact, however, that secondary sources occasionally refer to them has determined my selection of these particular ways of thought. And because commentators not infrequently make use of these ideas without defining their terms nor substantiating their claims by evidence, I think a fuller treatment of these issues is indicated.

In chapter 2, I explore Mill and Bain's tendency towards abstract thinking. Chapter 3 will focus on their propensity to think in atomistic ways, while the inclination to mechanistic thinking will be the subject of chapter 4. At the beginning of each chapter, I discuss the meaning given to each term, and within any one discussion, consult Mill and Bain's writings in search of the many ideas that evince the characteristic qualities of the feature.
CHAPTER 2

FEATURES OF THOUGHT

THE TENDENCY TOWARD ABSTRACT THINKING

PRELIMINARY REMARKS

Two facets of this mode of thought are here explored. The first draws attention to the emphasis on the universal or general as a distinctive feature of Mill and Bain's writings on logic and psychology. It maintains their focus on the common nature rather than on the specific determination of things, and shows their concern with the theoretical disentanglement of generic from divergent factors. Closely related to the first, the second facet shows their predilection for analytic dissection, seclusion of parts from wholes, and isolation of subject matter, when deliberating scientific and other questions.

PREOCCUPATION WITH GENERALIZED KNOWLEDGE: MILL

The ways and means of Science

Mill makes room for the pursuit of truth in the concrete as a collectible item in the armory of intellectual pursuits. He beseeches for the consideration of studies, like poetry and art in all its branches, that are concerned with the portrayal of objects in their full dress of individuality. Mill is remarkably accommodating, and for cause, as the search after truth in the concrete affords what he believes to be the only "corrective and antagonist principle" to the pursuit of truth in the abstract.1

Bain, for one, would dispute the idea that poetry serves the end of truth. No matter, for the point here is that, while one's choice may be to 'make room' by expansion in extent, Mill instead opts, in the face of so-called 'antagonist' viewpoints, to
accommodate differences by rearrangement of things. Something is taken for granted in the process. A few remarks will make my meaning clearer. As they pertain to Mill's endorsement of a particular philosophy of science, it is advisable to say something about his manner of employing the term philosophy or logic of science. I borrow his words.

The philosophy of a Science thus comes to mean the science itself, considered not as to its results, the truths which it ascertains, but as to the processes by which the mind attains them, the marks by which it recognizes them, and the co-ordinating and methodizing of them with a view to the greatest clearness of conception and the fullest and readiest availability for use: in one word, the logic of the science.²

As things stand in Mill's world of logical disquisition generally, and of induction in particular, the operations subsidiary to an inductive logic are its staple. As such, abstraction, classification, naming and definition constitute the scientific armature of investigative practices.³ Mill holds that any fundamental branch of inquiry, be it deductive or inductive, stands to gain in scientific credibility if it incorporates within its compass, and successfully carries out, these operations. He considers any study scientific whose investigator adopts habits of analysis and abstraction, and eschews all consideration of objects as individuals. Mill contends that,

[i]t is a primitive fallacy to imagine that assurance or truth can be had by looking at the subject-matter in the concrete, without that process of analysis which men term abstraction. But that is the wise, practical way; and, for want of disciplined minds, you cannot make people understand that no conclusion obtained in that way ever rises above a more or less strong presumption requiring to be philosophically verified -brought to the test of analytic investigation.⁴

As Mill sees it, the regard for individuality and concrete reality is a bar to the isolation of properties on account of which classes are formed and general names given. He thus recommends that objects of scientific inquiry be dealt with in the abstract.⁵ Such are the ways and means of Science, and such are Mill's terms.

Some deemed this philosophical reflection on science deficient in range and depth because unable to accommodate the resultant of important differences in standpoints between various sciences. Mill, we note, devises a logical plan for the
sciences that encompasses a number of aims and positions from which concrete reality is viewed and according to which objects of experience are analyzed. However, his philosophical take on scientific investigation undergoes no expansion of scope as might reconcile differences in scientific viewpoints. He is committed to a particular philosophy of science, the main tenets of which are of uniform application and hold good independently of any science. His is the view that, "however different these searches for truth may look, and however unlike they really are in their subject-matter, the methods of getting at truth, and the tests of truth, are in all cases much the same."6

Be the subject-matter physical or psychological, Mill takes for granted that the cultivator of abstract science in search of laws governing natural facts operates on concrete reality by way of analysis, abstraction and classification, and, as such, decontextualizes objects. He readily admits that the process "leaves our conceptions of them as individuals, lame and meagre".7 Yet he makes no allowance for the preservation of individuality nor does he welcome the attempt to render concrete experience into the conceptions of the sciences of human nature.

In defence of the positivist mode of thought in science

It is well to bear in mind that as a self-admitted positivist,8 Mill is particularly intent on ridding the moral sciences of a metaphysical way of thinking. His hope is to extinguish these "vicious tendencies of the human mind".9 I here quote Mill’s words at some length.

What is the whole doctrine of Intuitive Morality, which reigns supreme wherever the idolatry of Scripture texts has abated and the influence of Bentham’s philosophy has not reached, but the metaphysical state of ethical science? What else, indeed, is the whole a priori philosophy, in morals, jurisprudence, psychology, logic, even physical science, for it does not always keep its hands off that, the oldest domain of observation and experiment? It has the universal diagnostic of the metaphysical mode of thought, in the Comtean sense of the word; that of erecting a mere creation of the mind into a test or norma of external truth, and presenting the abstract expression of the beliefs already entertained, as the reason and evidence which justifies them.
...we must admit that the metaphysical mode of thought still rules the higher philosophy, even in the department of inorganic nature, and far more in all that relates to man as a moral, intellectual, and social being.\textsuperscript{10}

Mill discounts the metaphysical explanation of natural phenomena by way of realized abstractions. As such, he considers it a necessary part of the scientific process to abandon all reference to metaphysical conceptions in the form of "essences", "verbal abstractions", "fictitious entities", and "mysterious forces and principles".\textsuperscript{11} He stands by the view that the ascertainment of invariable laws governing elementary facts is part and parcel of the cultivation of the positive abstract sciences. Inasmuch as a branch of inquiry is positive, says Mill, to that extent it is scientific.\textsuperscript{12}

Yet Mill wants to be accommodating. He chooses to make room for the many intellectual pursuits and diversified viewpoints by way of a rearrangement of things through separation, order, and division. In some such way does he rework a classification of the sciences that neither disturbs the ground of his logical understanding of science nor shakes the basis of his philosophical commitments.

The conceptual separation of sciences into the abstract and the concrete meets with Mill's approval. He also fully endorses the Comtean view of a scale of subordination of the sciences, which follows the order of their logical dependence and the degree and order of complexity of their subject-matter.\textsuperscript{13} Mill marks off branches of theoretical inquiry from those of practical business in his own logic of the moral sciences. And in this treatise he contradistinguishes the poetical department from the scientific one.\textsuperscript{14}

In search of principles: fixing genera, classes and class-names

The how of scientific investigation thus features prominently in Mill's logic of discovery and proof.\textsuperscript{15} The search for the common element in things of a various nature is a prize occupation within the scientific enterprise, as Mill regards the comprehension of law as the "highest worth" and "the end and aim of all philosophy".\textsuperscript{16} To sort out genera and species, comprehend the meaning of classes, and correctly identify the individuals comprised in each, neither confusing them with the class as a whole nor
with the class name, are necessary steps towards the ascertainment of these laws.\textsuperscript{17}

Mill is himself a self-styled speculative thinker whose theoretical relish, forte and focus are, on his own admission, accurate classification, methodological analysis, and the comprehension and exposition of general principles.\textsuperscript{18} He is a theorist, and this word, for Mill, "expresses the highest and noblest effort of human intelligence".\textsuperscript{19} Bain says of Mill that "he had an intellect for the abstract and the logical, out of all proportion to his hold of the concrete, and the poetical."\textsuperscript{20} Mill's self-portrait is also revealing.

The only thing which I can usefully do at present, & which I am doing more & more every day, is to work out principles: which are of use for all times, though to be applied cautiously & circumspectly to any: principles of morals, government, law, education, above all self-education. I am here much more in my element: the only thing that I believe I am really fit for, is the investigation of abstract truth, & the more abstract the better.\textsuperscript{21}

Remarking that no scientific generalization or induction is possible without abstraction, conceptualization and naming, Mill specifically means to distinguish between "nonsensical abstractions" and "concrete perceptions and ideas".\textsuperscript{22} His is the view that though obtained by abstraction from individual things, general conceptions have no separate existence in the mind save as the class attributes constituent of each notion are represented as part of a larger agglomeration, as in some individual object. In denying reality to the abstract idea as an independent object of thought, Mill concludes:

General concepts, therefore, we have, properly speaking, none; we have only complex ideas of objects in the concrete: but we are able to attend exclusively to certain parts of the concrete idea: and by that exclusive attention, we enable those parts to determine exclusively the course of our thoughts as subsequently called up by association; and are in a condition to carry on a train of meditation or reasoning relating to those parts only, exactly as if we were able to conceive them separately from the rest.\textsuperscript{23}

Hence not only is the mental isolation of parts through attention feasible, but the abstractive effort warranted, by the philosophical legitimation of generalization.

Rather than talk of the concept of a class, Mill enjoins us to speak of the
signification or connotation of a class name. This he looks on as an indispensable safeguard against realist and conceptualist claims assertive of the reality of universals and abstract ideas. As names of objects, says Mill, class names are expressive of certain attributes whose sum constitutes the mental representation of each object. So though Mill tells us that he can only think a concept as individual, yet for the sake of scientific convenience he may choose to drop all attributes constitutive of the concrete idea save those that are the object of his study.

The conceptualization of the human mind

This Mill does when the subject discussed is that of the human mind. His somewhat exclusive regard for the common elements of things gives rise to a process of reasoning relating to those parts only. It is all very well on Mill's understanding of the concrete idea that we should conceive of the human mind as enfolded with the various attributes of an individual whole. Still, he maintains that as a concept, Mind has no other meaning than that of the sum of the feeling-thinking-willing attributes composing it. Mill thereby approaches the subject of Mind through the scope of abstraction, abandoning all attempt to render the nature of the human mind in its concrete unfolding, as manifested in prereflective individual experience. This, W.S. McKechnie would say, is just another instance of Mill's tendency to put abstractions in place of realities.

Doubtless is it Mill's ardent wish to see the subject of Mind brought up to the scientific level of his time, in fact, to see it put in its "true position as a part of Positive Philosophy". But then again, it bears remembering that Mill's work on Logic is meant to be the determinant of logical standing, as its author fully intends to help the "special sciences" onward by settling the logical terms of scientific know-how. Within this philosophical armamentarium of Mill's, there is no question that abstraction, classification, naming and definition are indispensable intellectual resources, albeit devices of Mill's particular design.

Let us consider Mill's terms. "To define", he writes, "is to select from among all the properties of a thing, those which shall be understood to be designated and declared
by its name". Now in the case of Mind, it is worth the effort to understand what this nameable thing is. Logically speaking, Mill contends that all existing things denoted by names can be subsumed under one of three classes: Feelings or States of Consciousness, Substances, and Attributes. Holding with the usual distinction of Substances as Bodies or Minds, Mill's definition of Mind is here important as helping to distinguish his philosophical approach to the subject. I quote at some length.

There is something I call Myself, or, by another form of expression, my mind, which I consider as distinct from these sensations, thoughts, &c.; a something which I conceive to be not the thoughts, but the being that has the thoughts, and which I can conceive as existing for ever in a state of quiescence, without any thoughts at all. But what this being is, though it is myself, I have no knowledge, other than the series of its states of consciousness. As bodies manifest themselves to me only through the sensations of which I regard them as the causes, so the thinking principle, or mind, in my own nature, makes itself known to me only by the feelings of which it is conscious. I know nothing about myself, save my capacities of feeling or being conscious (including, of course, thinking and willing): and were I to learn anything new concerning my own nature, I cannot with my present faculties conceive this new information to be anything else, than that I have some additional capacities, as yet unknown to me, of feeling, thinking, or willing.

Mill explains that from a logical point of view, we have a class of real things called Minds which experience feelings. The fact however that this "mysterious" something is inconceivable except as an "unknown recipient" of these feelings leads Mill to consider the first leading division of nameable things, that is, Feelings or States of Consciousness. After all it is Mill's contention that our only awareness is of a series of feelings, a thread of consciousness, as it were. Of a Self "as a primordial fact of our nature, it is impossible to have direct evidence". Erected by Mill into a "summum genus" called Feeling, then, this division separates into species, namely, Sensation, Emotion, and Thought. To these three Mill adds Volition as a fourth species.
The isolate and partitioned Mind

In light of these views, it seems reasonable to think that when Mill approaches the subject of the human mind, it is Mind as a class, nay, better, it is Feeling as a genus, that occupies his thoughts. His philosophical inquiry may best be seen as a query into the signification of the name Mind and its relation to the things signified by it. As Mill himself remarks, definitions are properly of names only, and not of things. Hence to be initiated into the subject of the human mind by way of a concretization of psychological experience is definitely not Mill's idea of scientific proceeding. What he actually puts before us is the connotation of the class name Mind, implying a union of attributes which is said to constitute its significance.

Mind, on first appearance, has already undergone transformation, then. Stripped by Mill of all individual peculiarities save those considered as the essentials, the isolate and partitioned Mind has obviously been submitted to analytic and abstractive treatment. And for cause, Mill would undoubtedly say, as these operations are the auxiliaries of philosophical classification, and classification is vital to the successful prosecution of inductive inquiries.

While the number and importance of attributes possessed by certain objects in common decide the scientific character of a classification, Mill holds that they also settle its importance in the ascertainment of laws. A 'something', therefore, whose inmost nature is said to be unknown and 'mysterious' and whose properties cannot be abstracted so as to fix its meaning, is not properly a matter of classification. It is perforce not material to Mill's purpose. Bear in mind that as manipulated by Mill, objects are resolved into mental representations by restricting rather than widening the scope of vision.

Mill's outlook would draw fire from those who argued that to so restrict Mind was to distort, by ignoring, important psychological facts, the most central of which was the Self. They believed in widening the scope of scientific vision by devising and fine-tuning a methodological instrument better adapted to meet the exigencies of the case. They held it of no account to point to the explanation of origin in association as sufficient warrant to supersede the objectionable conception of a Self or Subject. For
this was said to confuse "the stand-point from which the origin of the conception is expounded with the stand-point at which the conception is acquired." 

Their was the contention that no appeal to an infantile stage of knowledge need nor should obstruct the view of the psychologist whose proper standpoint and unique perspective brings to light the psychological fact of presentation to a subject. To confound the two viewpoints, as James Ward argued, and then abstract the object from its presentation to a subject while treating the latter as a point of minor importance, "entails a violation of scientific method." 

Mind classified

Mill and Ward obviously do not share an understanding of scientific method. According to Mill, Mind divested of its 'thinking principle' stands as a matter of classification, and leads the division of all nameable things under the summum genus 'States of Consciousness'. Seen through his eyes, the division meets the logical requisites of a natural classification, while it turns upon the most important and elementary features of the things classified. Mill looks on this classificatory scheme with favour as he deems it conducive to the ascertainment of laws.

The fact that Mill wishes to see psychology well ensconced in the shelter of positive philosophy bears remembering here. He seems to think that in order to secure its 'true position' as a positive science, psychology must respect the terms of engagement. Though not originally Comte's terms, they are yet expressed through him, and meet with Mill's approval. It is well that they should be recalled, then. Mill writes:

The fundamental doctrine of a true philosophy, according to M. Comte, and the character by which he defines Positive Philosophy, is the following: -We have no knowledge of anything but Phaenomena; and our knowledge of phaenomena is relative, not absolute. We know not the essence, nor the real mode of production, of any fact, but only its relations to other facts in the way of succession or of similitude. These relations are constant; that is, always the same in the same circumstances. The constant resemblances which link phaenomena together, and the constant sequences which unite them as antecedent and consequent, are termed
their laws. The laws of phaenomena are all we know respecting them. Their essential nature, and their ultimate causes, either efficient or final, are unknown and inscrutable to us.43

As already pointed out, Mill wants to be rid of 'nonsensical abstractions' by arguing for the reality of concrete ideas wrapped in a swathe of miscellaneous attributes. And yet it is the representation of Mind in its abstract aspects that holds his interest and is presented as a specimen of sound philosophical thinking. Mill hopes to be taken up on his offer. For he is concerned that "the loose mode of classing and denominated objects has rendered the vocabulary of mental and moral philosophy unfit for the purposes of accurate thinking".44

PREDILECTION FOR ANALYTIC DISSECTION AND THE ISOLATION OF THEORETICAL PROBLEMS: MILL

Divide in order to conquer

According to Mill, analytic skills and powers of abstraction are the alpha and omega of scientific procedure. While the demarcation of subject-matter is an important aspect of Science in his book, the question concerning philosophic methodology is no less important to him. Mill believes that the comprehension of the nature of investigative process proper to each science abets the search for truths.45 And on that score, he figures that no person seizes the truth of things generalized whose gaze is steadfastly directed towards Nature's concrete wear. So that the ascending slope to truth through generalization may rise above the concrete horizon, the world of facts in Mill's estimation must be stripped of its concrete attire save that which is indispensable in leading the fashion of Law.46

Mill thinks it quite appropriate as such to study mankind in the pursuit of wealth as sole propellant driving economic action;47 or yet again, to seek a firm grounding in the rudiments of character formation upon the basis of a partitioned Mind.48 He readily admits that all such considerations are but partial glimpses of the truth about human nature. Yet he is adamant that "this is the mode in which science must necessarily
As scientific explanations go, Mill's own conception is meant to be conclusive. It states that an explanation of natural events is only as good as the threads of causative forces productive of these events have been disentangled, correctly identified, and studied apart. We separate that we may scientifically approach Nature and eludicate its mysteries. Or so Mill seems to think. He writes:

When an effect depends upon a concurrence of causes, those causes must be studied one at a time, and their laws separately investigated if we wish, through the causes, to obtain the power of either predicting or controlling the effect... The same is the case with the conduct of man in society. In order to judge how he will act under the variety of desires and aversions which are concurrently operating upon him, we must know how he would act under the exclusive influence of each one in particular.\(^50\)

Hence both the approach of the political economist who treats of the economic motive apart from all other human impulses, and that of the psychologist who contemplates a fragmentary Mind detached from the substance of its concrete unfolding, are justified in Mill's eyes. He deems them necessary to the investigation of laws governing economic and psychological operations. We seem meant to understand that in consolidating the reign of law, an excision of thread-like parts from the fabric of human life is a necessary operation. On Mill's view, this extractive may be an abstract being single-mindedly concerned with economic gain. Or again it may be one that is summed up as the arithmetic product of its thoughts, feelings, and actions.

**Analysis: the method of detail**

In probing the finer workings of Mill's procedural ways, the password 'analysis' will gain us entrance to the stronghold of his methodological convictions. Standing at the gateway to the place, a picture of Mill's description lies before us:

The order of nature, as perceived at a first glance, presents at every instant a chaos followed by another chaos. We must learn to see in the chaotic antecedent a multitude of distinct antecedents, in the chaotic consequent a multitude of distinct consequents. This,
supposing it done, will not of itself tell us on which of the antecedents each consequent is invariably attendant. To determine that point, we must endeavour to effect a separation of the facts from one another, not in our minds only, but in nature. The mental analysis, however, must take place first. And every one knows that in the mode of performing it, one intellect differs immensely from another. It is the essence of the act of observing; for the observer is not he who merely sees the thing which is before his eyes, but he who sees what parts that thing is composed of. To do this well is a rare talent.51

And that rare talent, Bentham possessed. Mill looks to him for the philosophical underpinning of scientific methods. He is sold on this Benthamite "method of detail" as that which affords the only safe guarantee for accurate thinking.52 As Mill is himself disciplined in the ways of logic and analysis, this dissecting approach suits his taste. As such, it constitutes the methodological underlay in his treatment of scientific questions.53 It is clear that in the search for answers to scientific questions, Mill's inquirer must find footing upon the basis of an exploded surface. Mill teaches that sound thinking first comes to those who know to break into pieces and take apart. We are told that a complex whole is mentally ungraspable until its constituent parts have been surveyed and catalogued.54

As countenanced by Mill, these habits of analytic thought and modes of investigation are the lifeblood of a pulsant scientific enterprise, and the way of a disciplined mind. Mill in fact believes that this analytic resolution of complexity into simplicity - be it of laws or of phenomena, does much towards perfecting the structure of science itself. Its progress, he says, is the measure of advance in scientific knowledge.55 Witness Mill's words.

Bentham's method may be shortly described as the method of detail; of treating wholes by separating them into their parts, abstractions by resolving them into Things, -classes and generalities by distinguishing them into the individuals of which they are made up; and breaking every question into pieces before attempting to solve it. This method Bentham has finally installed in philosophy; has made it henceforth imperative on philosophers of all schools. This is nothing less than a revolution in philosophy.56
**Mind as a breakable**

Determined to revolutionize the mental and moral worlds, Mill figures that there is no better intellectual contrivance designed to effect the changeover than the theoretical construction of Mind on the data afforded by psychological analysis. Divide and conquer seems to be his motto. For note that psychology's success in grounding the truths of the ethological and social sciences rests on a scientific understanding of the mind as a breakable. Mill promises to pick up the pieces after the analytic shock.

"Pure mental philosophy, therefore, is an essential part, or preliminary, of political philosophy", concludes Mill. He is no less certain that the laws of the formation of character are to be deduced from the general laws of Mind. In light of these claims, there is obvious need of a full-blown science of the human mind. Its assignment as given Mill's sanction is impressive indeed. On the plausibility of its arguments and the certainty of its truths rests the possibility of both a regeneration of human nature and an improved social state.

**Marking the great divide between individual and society**

We are sure to find that whenever the question of individual well-being comes up, Mill is busy devising theoretical safeguards of some sort. Not that the signs of an intellectual rebellion nor those of a moral revolution would alarm Mill, were the events to signify the surrender of prejudicial and oppressive thought. As it were, Mill is driven to plan fortifications by the exertion of a moral pressure. This is the "necessity" as he sees it to surround "individual independence of thought, speech, and conduct, with the most powerful defences". Theoretical bulwarks are thus raised by him for the defense of individuality, all the while that he is warning against the dangers of individual and collective encroachment upon person, property and interest.

Whether Mill is marking the limits of governmental interference in the lives of individuals or contradicting the economic theory of dependence and protection for the benefits of the working classes, the fountains of his thought are yet always playing
recurrent ideas. Persistent indeed are the themes of needful self-government, independence, liberty, privacy and solitude in Mill's theoretical works. And no passage better renders his conception of a free agent than that which represents individuality as beyond encroachment.

Whatever theory we adopt respecting the foundation of the social union, and under whatever political institutions we live, there is a circle around every individual human being, which no government, be it that of one, of a few, or of the many, ought to be permitted to overstep: there is a part of the life of every person who has come to years of discretion, within which the individuality of that person ought to reign uncontrolled either by any other individual or by the public collectively. That there is, or ought to be, some space in human existence thus entrenched around, and sacred from authoritative intrusion, no one who professes the smallest regard to human freedom or dignity will call in question: the point to be determined is, where the limit should be placed; how large a province of human life this reserved territory should include. I apprehend that it ought to include all that part which concerns only the life, whether inward or outward, of the individual, and does not affect the interests of others, or affects them only through the moral influence of example.

In conducting his many pleadings in the courts of the 'political', 'economic', and 'social', Mill argues for the need to be "self-protecting" and "self-dependent", so as not to incur evil at the hands of others. His appeal on behalf of self-dependence is brought before the court of economics, for the cause Mill deems to be worthy. Claimed to be a highly prized virtue, self-dependence is said to be "one of the first conditions of excellence in the human character". In order to guarantee the safe expression of this virtue and avoid undue social influence, Mill sees fit to fence in individuality with the tool kit of theoretical distinctions. In assigning the legitimate spheres of individual control and social influence he reckons that "there is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual independence: and to find that limit, and maintain it against encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of human affairs, as protection against political despotism."

Upheld as maxims of prudence in the political realm, self-government and self-help are also thought to justify popular government. Mill's contention is that what
make good government is the fact that "each is the only safe guardian of his own rights and interests" and is "self-helping" in the struggles with nature. For he argues that when elicited in the exercise of political rights and functions, these virtues supply the motive power of the political machinery while allowing a variety of administrative efficiencies. And he adds that a government's promotion of such virtues in a people, if and when appropriate, is itself an important criterion of a good polity.

Whether of economic, social or political application, then, the defense of individuality is an argument upheld in Mill's many courts of appeal. The provision of theoretical fortifications are his way of shielding individuals from the dangers of overexposure. In that which affects no other's interests but concerns the individual only, independence of action, he claims, is absolute. For Mill is adamant that "[o]ver himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign".

So that no area within the realm of human nature be borderless, the region of Mind is also the target of Mill's bounding tendencies. He represents it as an extensive province all parts of which are under similar risk of potential encroachment, unless departments are circumvallated, and their respective spheres of action bounded. Note the following words by Mill.

Truth is the province of reason, and it is by the cultivation of the rational faculty that provision is made for its being known always, and thought of as often as is required by duty and the circumstances of human life. But when the reason is strongly cultivated, the imagination may safely follow its own end, and do its best to make life pleasant and lovely inside the castle, in reliance on the fortifications raised and maintained by Reason round the outward bounds.

So that human nature may ultimately bear no marks of violence, protective measures must be taken that will dispute the advance of encroachers. Mill conducts the case for individuality in the social realm by drawing the perimeter of theoretical ramparts. Within the domain of the psychological, that which calls forth a protective response is the truth-yielding Intellect.
PREOCCUPATION WITH GENERALIZED KNOWLEDGE: BAIN

Mind relativized, generalized and classified

No sooner have we entered the realm of the psychological than we are met with the idea of a 'mental shock' as necessary to conscious life. Bain relates the story of a shock-absorbing Mind by way of grounding his theory of the relativity of all feeling and thought. It is said, for instance, that we only know light by a transition from dark; a subject world by contrast to an object world; an explicit consciousness, by passing out of an implicit consciousness; all transitions being bidirectional. Bain contends that "shocks of discrimination" such as attest our psychological experiences of change also tell the two-sided nature of mental phenomena. "In order to make us feel", he writes, "there must be a change of impression; whence all feeling is two-sided. This is the law of Discrimination or Relativity." Bain instantiates the claim by arguing that "[w]e can neither feel nor know heat except in the transition from cold."

Mental experience at Bain's hands is not only cast in relative but in abstract terms. We are told that any one member of a "relative couple" may be singled out by way of attention and considered in its individual manifestation, as the explicit property constitutive of a state of consciousness. This mental concentration upon one property is a way of thinking an abstraction. And those are found in profusion within the covers of Bain's psychological treatises. For he begins and ends his disquisitions by fixing at all times upon the most salient features of things psychological, singling out and focusing on the agreeing properties as part and parcel of his running commentary on mental life. As Bain sees it, "there seems to be no possibility of conceiving individuals without classifying and generalizing at the same time".

With definition said to be a process of generalization, Bain's concept of Mind is formed by an identification of concurring generalities. "[E]very act of classifying or generalizing necessarily tends to abstractive separation", says Bain. Accordingly, his analysis of the human mind proceeds as Mill's has, by way of a definition that translates into a division of the summum genus Mind into its species Feeling, Intellect, and Will. Not that Bain would ever think the points of community conceivable by themselves, nor
admit of their reality apart from actual beings exerting mental functions. For he rejects all such conceptualist and realist claims, holding that the mode of thinking an abstraction is by constant reference to the individuals possessing the property.77 Notwithstanding, Bain initiates his readers in the psychological science by serving up a verbal definition that is but a connotation of the class-name Mind and the expressed community between individuals.

Though Bain well knows that diversities dropped are not yet extinguished for all that, his scientific interest is nonetheless marked by an expressed will to affirm abstract properties common to all minds. This process of defining by generalization is thought to constitute one of two distinct regions of research. Bain looks on abstraction, classification, naming and definition as so many necessary steps in the ascertainment of inductive generalizations. The search for general principles by way of induction is the second important area of research, and in Bain's estimation, the goal of scientific inquiry.78 It is evidently the subject of the general or universal mind which engrosses Bain's attention, for whom a knowledge attained in the highest possible degree of generality is most desirable.79 As for the abstract, Bain figures that it is really but the simple, while the concrete is usually the complex.80

Given his particular views concerning the character of general knowledge, Bain cannot afford to lose sight of the points of difference that particularize things. As such, he is careful not to exaggerate "the mind's power of giving a preference of attention to some of the attributes of a concrete object, as a wheel, or a shilling. We may think much of the roundness, and little of the size; but we cannot think of the roundness, without thinking of some size or colour."81 Though Bain's approach to the subject of classification and its implied backdrop of neglected characters seems matter-of-fact, it is well to locate his position on the issue of the "important" and "insignificant" in classifications.82 For such properties as start into great prominence are exclusive of other attributes, some of which Bain not only deems less important, but factually groundless as well.

In pursuing the question concerning the essentials of psychological experience, Bain's characteristic mode of thinking appears in greater relief when his views on the subject are contrasted with others of an opposite nature. As Bain well knows, there is
nothing like contrast to sharpen the outline of things." When a meaning is but dimly perceived by any one", writes Bain, "the fault most frequently lies in the non-recognition of the opposite, that is, the thing to be excluded or denied, the supplying of which renders the notion luminous at once." In search of a 'luminous' understanding of things psychological, we turn to James Ward as his conceptions furnish a ready supply of such opposites. The choice is obvious. Ward was the most forceful critic of both atomistic and mechanistic theories of the mind propounded in mid-nineteenth century Britain, and of Bain's associationist psychology in particular.

We know what Bain considers to be the essentials of mental life. They are spelled out in his introductory remarks, and are attained by way of analysis and generalization. We first come upon Mind or the Subject world, and already find it opposed to the Object world according to the principle of relativity. It seems that as opposites these two spheres define and mutually explain each other: what pertains to the one does not characterize the other, as things should be that bear different class-names, connote different properties, and are mutually exclusive. Bain first tries his hand at a negative definition with the result that Mind reads as a product of computation. Bain believes that,

...Mind is definable, in the first instance, by the method of contrast, or as a remainder arising from subtracting the Object World from the totality of conscious experience. It happens that the Object World is easily defined or circumscribed; the one well-understood property, Extension, serves for this purpose. Hence the alternative, or the correlative Mind, can be circumscribed with equal exactness.

Bain soon runs into problems because things that overlap cannot be so clearly marked off. And he has to admit that Object experience is still conscious experience, that is, Mind. He thus turns the page and proceeds with a positive definition. Having subjected the human mind to an initial dissecting operation, Bain is more than ready to expose the properties of Mind for scientific examination. "Now, it has been found possible", he writes, "to sum up all the properly mental phases in a small number of general properties, whose enumeration (which is strictly speaking a Division) is all that can be offered as a positive Definition of Mind."

Summed up into a synthetic whole called Mind, the bare essentials of mental life
consist of no more nor less than three general and ultimate properties. All mental facts, -and Bain is insistent on the point, can be subsumed under some one or other of these classes of phenomena. And they are, "Feeling"; "Volition, or the Will"; "Thought, Intellect, or Cognition." Bain adds:

There may be an inductive operation required to ascertain the fact that the properties of a complex class or notion do actually go together in nature. Thus, Mind is defined by the three facts -Feeling, Will, and Thought; -but this supposes a foregone induction, to show that these three properties always concur -that where there is Feeling, there is also Will, and where there is Will, there is also Thought. To affirm that Feeling, Will, and Thought are associated is a real proposition. The definition of Mind tacitly assumes that this conjunction is established; hence Mind feels, Mind wills, Mind thinks, are verbal propositions. Yet since they imply, when taken together, that the three distinct facts are united in nature, they may be considered as having the reality of predication underneath.

On Bain's understanding, the designation Mind thus signifies generalization applied to a group of properties, the co-inherence of which has been established inductively. It is as conjoined through a process of classification, then, that this group of properties constitutes a unit; a whole, that is, which is nothing but an "aggregation" of the essential attributes of the human mind.

To summarize: though it is said to be the "deepest of all relations", the subject-object "couple", riven by opposition on account of the principle of relativity, is thereby separated, while the unextended Subject is set aside by Bain for further analytic dissection. While the summum genus Mind logically divides into the threefold Feeling-Intellect-Will species, each of which finds itself partitioned yet again and some of these parts further dissected, we find ourselves among parts at all times, some of which are said to be irreducible and thus the foundation stone of the whole. Bain lays the cornerstone of the psychological structure in sensation, of which he speaks as a state of consciousness.
In defence of inductive generalizations: the need of psychological salients

But that is just Ward's problem, as it were. He claims that to call a sensation a state of consciousness is pure abstraction. For he thinks that it ignores certain psychological facts, the importance of which has not been given due consideration nor adequately recognized by certain philosophers, Bain not excepted. No less false a start is Bain's initial consideration of the human mind by the doctrinal and methodological lights of relativity and classification. For again, says Ward, the pulse of mental life finds no resonance in Bain's rendition of the movement of the human mind, while important subjective elements of psychological experience are overlooked.

Ward argues that there is no meaning nor merit to an analysis of mind whose constituent elements are abstracted from their context of individual expression. He himself contends that the several elements found to be ultimate must be considered in their relation to each other. For what is important by Ward's standard is to give an "orderly exposition of nature's weaving." It is this prolegomenon to a systematic psychology which constitutes Ward's particular innovation. Evidently, Bain and Ward's handle of things psychological by the tool of analysis is different. While the one focuses exclusively on the trees and reckons their tally a sufficient account of the wood, the other reminds us not to lose sight of the wood among the trees and warns that there is more to the wood than can be said about the trees. I here quote Ward at some length because in sounding off contrary views, his words evince Bain's propensity to abstract thinking.

Many admirable works have been written purporting to furnish analyses of mind; but almost all of them, in common with other works on psychology, proceed at once to the examination of special facts, such as Sensations, their authors apparently considering it unnecessary to discuss at any length the relation of the several elements of mind to each other. While cognitions are under discussion, emotions are out of view, and volitions in their turn are treated regardless of both; so that though the special analyses and descriptions are excellent, the tout ensemble of mind is never exhibited at all: we lose sight of the wood among the trees. The reason of this is not far to seek. First, in most states of mind as we know them some one aspect or element is
prominent, the rest being obscure or of secondary interest. Hence, in common language, and very generally in psychology too, these obvious and obtrusive differences between one state and another have been regarded as concrete mental states, instead of being in reality only abstractions.\textsuperscript{94}

Ward pleads the case for a general analysis of individual human experience, while Bain furnishes a special analysis of the common and salient facts of Mind. Because fuelled by ideas of separation, generalization and classification as procedurally indicated in science, Bain's analytic impulse does not originate the search into the nature and connexion of all ultimate elements deemed indispensable to the proper representation of a concrete mental state. That is Ward's self-appointed task. Bain's own analysis of Mind is meant to express the defining points of community among mental phenomena by way of a digested subject-matter. Definition in his mind stands for nothing more than abstraction or generality.

As always, it is the establishment of inductive generalizations which directs the course of Bain's thought on matters psychological. He puts it to us that "[t]he greatest fallacy of all is the supposition that something is to be desired beyond the most generalized conjunctions or sequences of phenomena."\textsuperscript{95} To endeavor to rise to the most general laws and thus regard them as the all-sufficient explanation of natural phenomena, now that, says Bain, is the proper scientific attitude of mind.\textsuperscript{96} "Any farther explanation", he adds, "is as incompetent, as it is unnecessary and unmeaning."\textsuperscript{97} Bain is confident that there is nothing to speak of behind the veil of phenomena. The veil is the story all told.

PREDILECTION FOR ANALYTIC DISSECTION AND THE ISOLATION OF THEORETICAL PROBLEMS: BAIN

Show and tell

Refracted through the language of relativity and classification, the human mind has undergone a process of 'abstractive separation' at the hand of Bain and has, as such, lost all concrete embeddedness. Like some work of art displayed in a showcase, Mind
is shown in its general qualities—designated as Exhibits Feeling, Intellect and Volition respectively, while its changing character is duly recorded. Implicated in Bain's theory of relativity is the idea that mental transitions necessary to conscious life translate into a busy to-and-fro of discrete mental states. Distinctness must evidently attach to mental impressions that, in the experience of change, are said to be neither felt nor thought except as different from others. This assumption of separateness in mental expression underlies Bain's attempt at abstract psychological representation.

The attraction of parts such as Bain recognizes and promotes in his writings is evidenced by the methodical arrangement of his topics: never given a bird's-eye view of the psychological terrain, we bear witness instead to a division of the mind into constituent parts. And if Bain's intention is to be an executant in the logic of classification as applied to science, it is because the dictates of philosophic method rule in his nature.

Bain prefesses his work on *The senses and the intellect* by the remark that,

> a systematic plan has been introduced into the description of the conscious states in general, so as to enable them to be compared and classified with more precision than heretofore. However imperfect may be the first attempt to construct a Natural History of the Feelings, upon the basis of a uniform descriptive method, the subject of Mind cannot attain a high scientific character until some progress has been made towards the accomplishment of this object.

Bain's categorial approach to the human mind points to a set number of classes among which all mental phenomena must be distributed. His divisions are those of the Senses, the Intellect, the Emotions, and the Will. While these psychological categories are introduced in due order of succession, the subregions within each division are presented by turns.

Subsumed under the general head of Feeling, for instance, are muscular feelings, sensations of organic life and of the senses proper, emotions of tenderness, fear and anger as well as aesthetic and ethical ones, all of which are said to constitute "distinct" states of consciousness. Bain's intention is to "attain an orderly style of procedure", while effecting a philosophical classification of the feelings and delineating their respective peculiarities.
No less important to Bain is the attempt to parcel out the division of Intellect and to render its natural subdivisions with as much precision as possible. He deems this compartmentation justified, for he thinks that "although we can hardly ever exert this portion of our mental system in separation from the other elements of mind - Feeling and Volition, yet scientific method requires it to be described apart." So though his piecemeal approach to the topic serves up partial considerations only, Bain yet holds that this partiality of view is "indispensable to a clear exposition."  

Neither logically indispensable nor scientifically required, this segregation of parts is, as it were, inadequate, writes Ward. For he fears that psychological facts ill-assimilated to classificatory slots are thereby kept out of sight, the most important of which he deems to be the fundamental distinction "between the subject, on the one hand, as acting and feeling, and the objects of this activity on the other." Eschewing all attempts at a definition of mind by subject-matter and at a characterization of subject-matter by way of some "negative differentia of inextension", Ward's final position is that,  

"Psychology cannot be defined by reference to a special subject-matter as such concrete sciences, for example, as mineralogy and botany are; and, since it deals in some sort with the whole of experience, it is obviously not an abstract science, in any ordinary sense of that term. To be characterised at all, therefore, apart from metaphysical assumptions, it must be characterised by the standpoint from which this experience is viewed."  

Pondering the relation of feeling to cognition and conation from the psychological standpoint, Ward contends that "...we have always in any given "state of mind" attention and feeling on the one side, and on the other a presentation of objects. Attention and feeling seem thus to be ever present, and not to admit of the continuous differentiation into parts which gives to presentations a certain individuality, and makes their association and reproduction possible."  

Bain's way of proceeding is strikingly different. He asserts that "the totality of mind is separated into factors, each discussed in isolation, before they are brought together." Though his plan seems to open up the possibility of a synthetic understanding of things psychological, there is yet very little in the way of a thorough search of the human mind that would attempt to penetrate its nature as a whole. The
nearest approaches to a more integrated discussion, -that which treats of the influences of Feeling and Volition upon Intellect,\textsuperscript{111} as well as of the control of Feeling and Thought by Volition,\textsuperscript{112} represent no more than two chapters in Bain's psychological treatises.

In his general survey of the mental constitution, Bain sets about the exploration of psychological regions with the searchlight of analysis. His scientific exposition is clearly stamped with the impress of anatomic thinking. Rather than render a panoramic view of the human mind, Bain's interpretation gives a broken view of mental life such as constitutes a segmentation of psychological knowledge.

Any other way of proceeding is incomprehensible to Bain who professes to know "how facts ought to be dealt with in order to rear general principles."\textsuperscript{113} Expressly committed to "the method of accurate and minute induction", Bain swears by its canons.\textsuperscript{114} Considering it to be the "right way" of working a scientific question, he deplores the fact that "[t]he natural tendency for the imperfectly cultured intellect is, - instead of expressing a fact truly and conceivably, to express it any way that is easiest;"

instead of expressing it repeatedly and with continual improvement in precision; to rest satisfied with expressing it once -instead of cutting it up into its smallest divisions, and confining the view to one part at a time, to keep looking at it in the lump; and instead of recording every principle that a fact involves, to notice only those that serve a present purpose. The corrective of this can only be a well-directed practice of the accurate method... Until the human intellect has once got into the train of a right procedure, its powers must in great measure run to waste in this as well as in every other line of exertion.\textsuperscript{115}

Bain thinks that in order to reduce the complications of natural phenomena, it is necessary to isolate the influences bearing on the matter under study and to view each by itself. To resort to any other method than that of abstractive analysis is a hopeless expedient from Bain's perspective. He speaks of this separative approach as "the groundwork of scientific method throughout", "one great practical maxim of induction", and, as it were, "nature's method of working".\textsuperscript{116} Hence, all attempts at viewing things and their operations as wholes are condemned by Bain as telling the "weakness of the unscientific man" and of the "un-analyzing mind".\textsuperscript{117} In his logical and other
disquisitions on the subject of scientific methodology, Bain's particular stand on analysis, abstraction, and classification explains his marked attention to parts rather than wholes in the treatment of scientific topics.

Analysis by abstraction and by logical division

Bain distinguishes between concrete partition, analysis by abstraction, and analysis by logical division. While concrete analysis is said to involve an actual separation of substances, the focus of Bain's interest is that which follows on abstraction. He tells us that abstractive analysis proceeds by way of a decomposition of wholes into parts and that any one whole is fully accounted for by an enumeration of its parts. Bain sees but a slight difference between analysis and abstraction in that abstraction means viewing one point of agreement and neglecting all others, whereas analysis presupposes in addition to this that all aspects of a given concrete can be abstracted by turns. Bain warrants the use of this method of abstractive analysis in psychology.\(^8\)

It bears remembering that introspection is not only a relevant source of psychological knowledge but the alpha and omega of psychological inquiry, as far as Bain is concerned. Intent on providing a qualitative analysis of mental phenomena, Bain relies on introspection as the explorative tool with which to achieve the analytic target. Efforts such as Bain directs toward the analytic end are best understood by probing the relation between analysis and psychological methodology, decipherable by a perusal of his logical treatises.

Bain looks on analysis and on the experimental and deductive methods as the logical methods par excellence of the science of psychology; that is, as the express machinery by which to attain psychological knowledge. He speaks of psychology as "a highly analytic science", and of analytic ability as the defining mark of the scientific faculty.\(^{119}\) Here as elsewhere, analysis is understood to mean the search for component parts, the enumeration of which tells all that needs to be said about wholes. Involved in scientific analysis are processes of identification, classification and abstraction which Bain thinks of as the only means of attaining to high generalities. He writes:
To identify, classify, and abstract, is to separate or analyse, so far as the case admits; the separation being no longer actual, as in Chemistry, but mental or ideal. To identify and classify transparent bodies is to make abstractive separation, or analysis, of the property called transparency; or to view its functions, powers, or agencies alone and apart from all the other powers possessed by the individual transparent bodies. Now the investigation of nature turns exclusively on this abstractive separation.\textsuperscript{120}

As processes of discovery, the topics of identification, abstraction, classification and naming constitute the subject of Bain's book on definition, which he considers to be a branch of logical method along with those of deduction and induction. Bain's attempt at a scientific definition of Mind by a post-mortem examination of its subject matter thus clearly reflects the logical underlay of his psychological construction.

With natural classification as Bain's target, his attention is given to the systematic arrangement of a number of related objects under higher and lower genera, while generalities are chosen according as they cover the most facts and have the richest connotation. According to Bain, this "golden rule of classifying" is what constitutes philosophical classification as it is applied in natural history.\textsuperscript{121}

Bain holds that Mind generalized is a concept, and as a class-name, connotes the Feeling-Intellect-Will properties which constitute its definition. The fact that Bain's positive definition of Mind is also a Division entails that it "must conform to the laws of Logical Division."\textsuperscript{122} Logical division is itself an aspect of classification and both unquestionably engage Bain's attention.

Bain argues that an anatomizing of psychological life by way of classification and definition must be in keeping with logical rules of division. Under his consideration are the general properties of Mind as well as the ultimate functions of Intellect. As Mind and Intellect are said to be analyzable by logical division, Bain insists that both general properties and intellectual functions must be classified in accordance with certain rules. He lists them as follows: "Each of the parts must contain less than the thing divided"; "[a]ll the parts together must be exactly equal to the thing divided"; and "[t]he parts must be opposed", that is, 'mutually exclusive'.\textsuperscript{123} Now consider Ward's take on post-mortem examinations of the mind.

Presentations, Attention, Feeling are not to be regarded
as three co-ordinate genera, each a distinguishable state of mind or consciousness, i.e., all alike included under this one supreme category. There is, as Berkeley long ago urged, no resemblance between activity and an idea; nor is it easy to see anything common to pure feeling and an idea, unless it be that both possess intensity. Classification seems, in fact, to be here out of place. Instead, therefore, of the one sumnum genus, state of mind or consciousness with its three co-ordinate subdivisions, cognition, emotion, conation; our analysis seems to lead us to recognise three distinct and irreducible facts, Attention, Feeling and Objects or Presentations as together, in a certain connexion, constituting one concrete state of mind or psychosis. 124

Bain's own portrayal of the mind is marked with contour lines. In keeping with ideas of separateness, opposition, and mutual exclusion, he intends the parts of his fragmented Mind and Intellect to be exhaustive so as to ensure that wholes are divisible without a remainder. Note his words.

The ultimate analysis of the Mind, whether in whole or in part, might be tested by logical division. Thus, Mind as a whole is divided into Feeling, Volition, and Intellect; and to this division the logical tests should apply. The three departments should exhaust the mind without going beyond it; and they should be mutually exclusive. So in the Intellect, the analysis into Discrimination or Difference, Agreement or Similarity, and Retentiveness, professes to be an ultimate analysis; the three functions ought to contain all that is intellectual and nothing more; while each should contain nothing in common with the other two.125

Ward whose approach to the topic is altogether different from that of Bain, puts his analysis to a different use. Of Bain's examination he asks:

What are we to understand by such ultimate analysis? Is it the exhibition of all the distinguishable facts into which all that can enter into anyone's consciousness can be resolved, and analogous therefore to the chemical resolution of all the varieties of matter into sixty-six elements? Or is it rather the determination of what is always present wherever there is consciousness or psychical life at all, and therefore analogous to the inquiry of the physiologist: what are the invariable characteristics of animal life? In the one case the elements reached might exist apart, just as nitrogen and
nickel may; in the other they would coexist and together constitute one concrete "state of consciousness".  

Sidestepping the contentious issue, Bain maintains that the enumeration of classifiable parts is an adequate summative pronouncement on Mind as a whole, and constitutes a thorough investigation of its meaning. Given the affirmation, one might expect that any allusion to a recalcitrant leftover in the form of a Substance or Ego would be anathema to Bain, whose analysis must be tested by logical division. Indeed, such a notion strikes him as "fictitious, incompetent, and unnecessary." His contention is that "the notion of a Substance distinct from all attributes is a thing unknowable. We can know body by its sensible properties, and mind by our conscious feelings, thoughts, and volitions; and we can know nothing beyond." Unwilling for his part to eclipse the fact of psychological presentation, that of an object to a subject, in every concrete mental state, Ward makes the point that "whether seeking to analyse one's own consciousness or to infer that of a lobster, whether discussing the association of ideas or the expression of emotions, there is always an individual mind or self or subject in question. It is not enough to talk of feelings or volitions: what we mean is that some individual, man or worm, feels, wills, acts - thus or thus."

Himself committed to the idea that the sum of the parts must equal the whole without exceeding it, Bain is not about to acknowledge the relevance of Ward's point. To accept the truth of an Ego for psychological purposes is in Bain's estimation to take a retrogressive step. He is sure that "our only progress from the obscure to the plain, from the mysterious to the intelligible, is to find out resemblances among facts, to make different phenomena, as it were, fraternize." There is little doubt that Bain's preoccupation with generalization and philosophic classification outweighs any consideration bearing on the explicit recognition of the psychological conception of a subject. He warns: "I am not prepared to occupy space with unintelligible doctrines, confused analysis, fictitious phenomena, abstractions raised to the rank of real things, and all the rest of the bad side of Germanism."

Notwithstanding the objections, Bain's concern with logical division persists. While said to be applicable to classifications with definite bounds, such as Mind, Sensation and Intellect, Bain recognizes that logical division fails in classifications formed out of combination or development, as relate to associative mental growths, for
instance. He concludes that "Psychology contains scope for Classification, both according to Logical Division, and according to Ramification or Composition." As Bain considers sensations to be ultimate and emotions compounded from simpler elements, he thinks of the former and not of the latter as mutually exclusive and thus potential isolates. Emotions in his book "are subject to the golden rule of classification, but they do not present a case for logical division."

Hence if we are to gauge Bain's focus in reading the script of psychological life, we must probe the full significance of his words on analysis and the natural history method by the light of the logic of the psychological science, as set out in his logical treatises. In doing so, we find that while introspection is a source of psychological knowledge, what constitutes the knowledge scientific and valid is the fact that it has been analyzed into elements; that generalities drawn from particulars have been reached inductively and results validated by Mill's canons of experimental proof; and that deductive applications have been obtained from these inductions. Indeed, says Bain, "how can we reach the important laws of Mind -such as Relativity, Association of Ideas, the operation of the Feelings, and the Will -except by observation and induction of the facts of self-consciousness, occasionally aided by external indications."

Scientific analysis is given special prominence in Bain's psychology because needed for purposes of generalization and inductive elimination, that is, for discovery and proof. As Bain represents it, analysis stands for a "clearing of the way." An abstract Mind is the end product of the dissecting process.
Endnotes


8. The terms 'positive' and 'metaphysical' are Comte's words. Mill is a positivist in the Comtean sense as regards the methods and philosophy of the sciences generally. He holds that Comte's Cours de Philosophie Positive presents a sound view of philosophy


40. Generally speaking, Mill made much of this explanation of origin in association as regards the formation of ideas. He did stress the need to validate the results of psychological analysis by the test of induction. See, for instance, Mill, J.S. (1978). Essays on philosophy and the Classics, vol.11, 'Bain's psychology', 1859, pp.348-351.


42. Ibid.

14, 17, 35, 209, 213-216.


Edward Elgar, pp.147-149.


I accept J.C. Rees' argument which attempts to redress the imbalance created by the long-standing criticism made of Mill's principle of self-protection as stated in *On Liberty*. It has been traditionally maintained that in arguing that a certain category of actions was the agent's own concern only, Mill meant to imply that they were free of social consequences. Rees argues instead that Mill quite readily recognized that actions of a self-regarding nature may and do indeed, at times, affect others. While others have interpreted Mill's principle of self-protection as founded on a division of conduct having or not having effects on others, Rees articulates a revised version of the principle. He contends that Mill's intent was to articulate a division of conduct into actions which either do or do not affect the interests of others. Rees, J.C. (1985). *John Stuart Mill's On Liberty*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp.139-151.

Generally speaking, one of the problems lying at the heart of this debate centres on the difficulty in reconciling several aspects of Mill's thought as it is spelled out in his social, political and philosophical writings. Some critics have wondered whether his theoretical formulations have done justice to the richness and complexity of human nature. While I accept Rees' interpretation of the principle of self-protection as the meaning intended by Mill in *On Liberty*, I think that a fuller understanding of Mill's views on the relation
of the individual to society is gained when all psychological and philosophical writings by Mill are considered.


75. Ibid, pp.7-8, 38.


84. Ibid, p.565.


94. Ibid.
96. Ibid, p.126.


111. Out of eight chapters dedicated to the topics of movement, sense, instinct and intellect, this discussion features as a sub-section of one chapter only, that entitled 'Compound association'. Bain, A. (1868). *The senses*, pp.556-560.

112. Out of 26 chapters dedicated to the topic of the emotions and the will, this discussion is the subject of one chapter only, 'Control of feelings and thoughts'. Bain, A. (1875). *The emotions and the will*, pp.358-382.


114. Ibid.


CHAPTER 3

FEATURES OF THOUGHT

THE TENDENCY TOWARD ATOMISTIC THINKING

PRELIMINARY REMARKS

By atomistic thinking, I here mean the tendency to build up and explain wholes by means of atomies in combination, and to treat these minute parts as entities or individuals; as consisting, that is, of discrete units. I have already discussed the predilection shown by Mill and Bain for the isolation of subject matter in theoretical discussions. In the previous chapter, the focus on the analytic dissociation of parts from wholes was important as bearing the inclination to abstract thinking. In here gauging the proneness to atomistic thinking as defined above, it is the status given to these compositional atomies that centers the present discussion. I am specifically interested in probing the nature of these atom-like parts by establishing Mill and Bain's treatment of them as discrete entities.

MILL AND ATOMISTIC THINKING

Mill's mind is dissecting. It is not simply that he favours and practises the dynamitic resolution of questions generally, but that he tends to analyze and interpret minutely as well. And as he thinks that philosophical thinking is amiss within the departments of ethics and politics, he is most eager to think and speak clearly.

Because the sciences of human nature and of society constitute the theoretical underpinning of Mill's reformist program, he insists that they be philosophically sound. Mill fully intends to point out the remedial way by bringing precision of methodological thought in the Moral Sciences. For he finds them in a "backward state" of scientific
development when compared to the progress made in physical science. Mill is convinced that it is only insofar as the methods of physical science are applied to them that the Moral Sciences can be helped onward.

The 'science of individual man'

It bears noticing that in certain domains of human inquiry, precision of thought comes to Mill by way of an atomistic analysis of the matter under study; that is, by the breakup of wholes into the smallest components and the treatment of these parts as discrete and self-contained units.

As Mill understands it, society is nothing but an aggregate of individuals, and its social phenomena but a resultant complexity of elemental psychological facts and situations combined. "In social phenomena", he writes, "the elementary facts are feelings and actions, and the laws of these are the laws of human nature, social facts being the results of human acts and situations." It thus stands to reason -at least to Mill's, that the comprehension of man's "nature as an individual being" is a worthy field of scientific inquiry. As supporting frameworks go, Mill considers the 'psychological-ethological' scaffold to be an indispensable theoretical stand when working at the construction of a positive social science.

In accordance with Mill's logic of the Moral Sciences, psychology, ethology and sociology are ranked in an ascending order of theoretical and methodological dependence: as the most complex study, the social science rests on ethology, which itself rests on psychology. These branches of scientific knowledge are all the more difficult in Mill's estimation as man is "the most complex and most difficult subject of study on which the human mind can be engaged."

Though its predictions can never be perfectly accurate nor its assertions universal and precise, Mill yet trusts the science of human nature to yield general propositions and predictions which are generally verifiable and almost always true. His is the idea that the laws of the formation of character (ethology) constitute the main object of scientific inquiry into human nature, while the general laws of mind (psychology) compose its abstract portion. In order that this study of human thoughts,
feelings and actions be truly scientific, Mill requires that its approximate generalizations or empirical laws gathered from observation of life and human affairs be deducible from known universal laws of human nature.⁵

In pondering the method best fitted for ascertaining the derivative laws of the science of human nature, Mill considers that "it is impossible to obtain really accurate propositions respecting the formation of character from observation and experiment alone, we are driven perforce to that which, even if it had not been the indispensable, would have been the most perfect, mode of investigation, and which it is one of the principal aims of philosophy to extend";

namely, that which tries its experiments not on the complex facts, but on the simple ones of which they are compounded; and after ascertaining the laws of the causes, the composition of which gives rise to the complex phenomena, then considers whether these will not explain and account for the approximate generalizations which have been framed empirically respecting the sequences of those complex phenomena. The laws of the formation of character are, in short, derivative laws, resulting from the general laws of mind; and are to be obtained by deducing them from those general laws; by supposing any given set of circumstances, and then considering what, according to the laws of mind, will be the influence of those circumstances on the formation of character.⁶

As Mill has laid the foundation stone in psychology, he obviously believes that there is such a thing as "a distinct and separate Science of Mind".⁷ His is indeed the view that this psychology has all the character of a science. By this he means that its phenomena are causally related and within reach of observation and experiment, and that each follows after another in uniform order.⁸ Confident that laws of succession among mental states have been well ascertained, Mill turns his logical skills to the methodological requisites of ethology, bending its course around the way of psychology. His conclusion is that "[a] science of Ethology, founded on the laws of Psychology, is therefore possible..."⁹

It would be quite a science that could predict with certainty the feelings, thoughts and actions of individuals throughout their lives. But Mill has no such illusion when it comes to the philosophy of human nature. For he realizes that neither
circumstances surrounding individuals nor agencies determining their character can be foreseen and known in their entirety. Notwithstanding the imperfections, Mill considers that the study of human nature is a legitimate branch of scientific inquiry. As such, it constitutes the "science of individual man", as distinct from the "science of man in society".10

As the study of the phenomena of social life, Mill considers that the 'science of man in society' investigates the play of external circumstances upon collective human masses. He distinguishes it from the 'science of individual man' by the fact that it "is principally concerned with the actions not of solitary individuals, but of masses; with the fortunes not of single persons, but of communities."11

Given the theoretical and methodological dependence of the more complex upon the less complicated studies, the science of society presupposes the advance of other branches of human knowledge, namely, psychology and ethology. As Mill understands it, social phenomena are but phenomena of human nature complicated by the action of situations combined. And as the phenomena of human feeling, thought and action are regulated by fixed laws, so are the phenomena of society. Mill claims that all political and social reasoning is grounded on principles of individual human nature.12 He writes:

The actions and feelings of human beings in the social state, are, no doubt, entirely governed by psychological and ethological laws: whatever influence any cause exercises upon the social phenomena, it exercises through those laws. Supposing therefore the laws of human actions and feelings to be sufficiently known, there is no extraordinary difficulty in determining from those laws, the nature of the social effects which any given cause tends to produce.13

Mill holds that the true method of the social science is deductive. As it is a concrete deductive science, Mill insists that there be an accordace between two sorts of evidence, namely, that which consists of a priori deductions derived from the principles of human nature (conclusions of psychological and ethological theory) and that which generalizes the results of observation a posteriori (empirical laws).

While observation occasionally verifies the conclusions deduced by reasoning (as in political economy),14 it is yet the a priori reasonings (the psychological and ethological laws), which, at other times, afford the verification of the results gathered
from experience (as in social dynamics).\textsuperscript{15} In the latter case, it is specific experience which suggests the sociological laws, while the deduction from the universal laws of human nature verifies them. This inverse deductive method is Comte's particular innovation in sociological methodology, and Mill chimes in with him on the point of logic.\textsuperscript{16}

Of course, one may question the validity of this criterion of verifiability, if the scientific consideration of man's 'nature as an individual being' is to serve as a point of vantage from which to comprehend social phenomena. For while the conception of man as a mere individual stripped of all social covering holds Mill's interest as theoretical starter, others would reject this notion of an human isolate and atomy for having no counterpart in real life. And then one may question the completeness of Mill's psychological analysis of the ultimate facts of mental life as well as the sturdiness of his starting block, mounted, as it is, on a sensationalist frame. Mill is himself well aware that a synthetic outlook is only as comprehensive as the prior analysis has been thorough and penetrating. Witness his words.

Nobody's synthesis can be more complete than his analysis. If in his survey of human nature and life he has left any element out, then, wheresoever that element exerts any influence, his conclusions will fail, more or less, in their application. If he has left out many elements, and those very important, his labours may be highly valuable; he may have largely contributed to that body of partial truths which, when completed and corrected by one another, constitute practical truth; but the applicability of his system to practice in its own proper shape will be of an exceedingly limited range.\textsuperscript{17}

Mill's positivist tendencies, his logical views concerning generalization and classification, and his philosophical adherence to the Benthamite method of detail are worth remembering here. I have already pointed out that in accordance with Mill's 'abstract' turn of mind, those ingredients of man's psychological makeup judged to be connotatively vague and somewhat elusive have been left out, whereas others have deemed them essential to a proper depiction of psychological life. Mill's ultimate analysis of the psychological facts is perforce incomplete from their point of view.

For his part, Mill considers that it is by such analytic and inductive tour de force
that universal laws of human psychological nature are determined, and thus constitute, along with the ethological laws, an essential "part of the data of sociology."\textsuperscript{18} Mill's retort to his critics would undoubtedly be that feelings, cognitions, volitions and sensations, we know; but a thinking principle, we know not, nor ever can know.

That, of course, is not the whole story, as told by Mill. For epistemologically and psychologically speaking, one is mindful of the fact that Mill is a phenomenalist and sensationalist, holding that ultimate knowable reality is phenomenal, and that while we are unquestionably Humean bundles of impressions, the original elements are sensations.\textsuperscript{19} The sensation is the epistemologically interesting here, and the enticing and promising atomic unit of psychology. For it is upon the platform of associative growths raised from the flooring of psychological atomies that Mill's expectation of moral and intellectual improvement is grounded. And it is this psychological stand constructed in accordance with a sensationalist framework, which, together with the ethological structure erected upon it, is supposed to afford a fine view of the social landscape.

This is Mill's vision: the pillars of psychology and ethology are to carry the arch of the social science. Trusting in his theoretical foothold, he stands on the view that "the phaenomena of man in society result from his nature as an individual being."\textsuperscript{20} And should the general laws of human nature and some historically informed sociological theory conflict, Mill is unhesitant: the psychological and ethological laws carry the day. As far as Mill is concerned, "we may know that history has been misinterpreted, and that the theory is false."\textsuperscript{21}

Now it might be thought that so complex a phenomenon as that of society and so intricate a study as that of the social science reared upon the ground of a sensationalist psychology, rest on a somewhat precarious basis, namely, the human isolate and the psychical atom. Nonetheless, this is how things stand for Mill. While the notion of an individually distinct sensation as psychological building-block and knowable atomic existent rings true to him, others treat it as a "psychological myth."\textsuperscript{22} While the conception of "man as a mere individual" claims Mill's attention and guides his psychological and ethological disquisitions, it is repudiated by others because bereft of social relevance and human significance.\textsuperscript{23} Mill's tendency toward atomistic thinking
is here apparent.

The human isolate

As Mill contends that the "truths of the social science are but statements of the manner in which those simple laws [of the science of Mind] take effect in complicated circumstances", it is well to understand just what his project of a "pure mental philosophy" entails.24

Mill's thought on the matter is suggestive. He writes as though no true appreciation of the human social condition is possible unless gained by way of a prior isolation followed by a compartmentalization of human nature as an object of scientific study. Mill's strong relish for methodological analysis as well as his atomistic turn of mind are here evident. Inclined as he is to break into small pieces, he disposes of a whole -that of human nature, by resolving it into discrete, self-contained and irreducible components, one of which labelled 'man as a mere individual' leads him into the blind alley of abstraction. For the postulation of an human isolate is a perplexing conception indeed. I quote Mill at some length here so as to show how he applies the analytic procedure to the study of human nature.

Man, who, considered as a being having a moral or mental nature, is the subject-matter of all the moral sciences, may, with reference to that part of his nature, form the subject of philosophical inquiry under several distinct hypotheses. We may inquire what belongs to man considered individually, and as if no human being existed besides himself; we may next consider him as coming into contact with other individuals, and finally, as living in a state of society, that is, forming part of a body or aggregation of human beings, systematically co-operating for common purposes.

Those laws or properties of human nature which appertain to man as a mere individual, and do not presuppose, as a necessary condition, the existence of other individuals (except, perhaps, as mere instruments or means), form a part of the subject of pure mental philosophy. They comprise all the laws of the mere intellect, and those of the purely self-regarding desires. Those laws of human nature which relate to the feelings
called forth in a human being by other individual human or intelligent beings, as such... form the subject of another portion of pure mental philosophy, namely, that portion of it on which morals, or ethics, are founded. Finally, there are certain principles of human nature which are peculiarly connected with the ideas and feelings generated in man by living in a state of society... This branch of science, whether we prefer to call it social economy, speculative politics, or the natural history of society, presupposes the whole science of the nature of the individual mind; since all the laws of which the latter science takes cognizance are brought into play in a state of society... Pure mental philosophy, therefore, is an essential part, or preliminary, of political philosophy.25

Mill's conceptual starter is telling. It is the consideration of 'man as a mere individual' and understood 'as if no human being existed besides himself'; that is to say, the 'solitary' individual. Now this is all the more interesting as it stands in sharp contrast to some of Mill's other pronouncements. In reviewing F.W. Newman's lectures on political economy, for instance, Mill is quick to point to the delusion under which the author writes on the subject of permanent union. He portrays Newman as thinking "that human beings began by being solitary and isolated", and pronounces against the idea.26 "Whether there was ever a time when human beings lived in a state of entire isolation", Mill admits that "we have no means of knowing".27

For all his fine words, Mill's own tendency toward atomistic thinking is none the less real. This is evident in another and oft-quoted statement of his.

The laws of the phenomena of society are, and can be, nothing but the laws of the actions and passions of human beings united together in the social state. Men, however, in a state of society, are still men; their actions and passions are obedient to the laws of individual human nature. Men are not, when brought together, converted into another kind of substance, with different properties; as hydrogen and oxygen are different from water, or as hydrogen, oxygen, carbon, and azote, are different from nerves, muscles, and tendons. Human beings in society have no properties but those which are derived from, and may be resolved into, the laws of the nature of individual man. In social phenomena the Composition of Causes is the universal law.28

On Mill's methodological recommendation, the investigator of the science of
human nature conducts his experiments not on the complex facts, but on the simple ones of which they are compounded. It is said that causal laws thus separately ascertained compound their effects so as to give rise to the complex phenomena. As society on Mill's account is but a collection of distinct human beings - the "unit" of the whole being the individual, its laws are nothing but the laws of the thoughts, feelings, and actions of individuals in the aggregate. These individuals' actions and passions are said to be "obedient to the laws of individual human nature"; that is to say, of man considered 'as a mere individual'. That is the long and short of Mill's message on the logic of the human sciences, and Henry Sidgwick, for one, finds it somewhat perplexing. His criticism evinces Mill's atomistic turn of mind.

Recognizing the fundamental importance of the 'social factor' in the development of the individual mind, Sidgwick remarks that "[i]t could not, indeed, ever have been denied that a most important part of the conscious thought and feeling of any individual received its character - whether by inherited tendencies or by sympathetic apprehension or both combined - from the current thoughts and prevailing emotions of the society of which he was a member";

and that, accordingly, any adequate attempt to trace the development of his conscious life must soon include or pass into a sociological investigation. This, at any rate, is recognised in the work of J.S. Mill... He seems, however, to have held that the sociological laws obtained by a study of this history of humanity ought to be shown to be derivative from certain ultimate laws of human nature, independently ascertained... Sidgwick obviously has a problem with this way of thinking. He writes:

Now it is undeniable that the aggregate of the actions of man in society constitute a more complex fact than the aggregate of the actions of any single individual; society being the whole of which individuals are parts. But it does not follow that, as Mill conceives, a psychology exists or can be constructed independent of sociology, and such that all the laws ascertained by the latter are capable of being resolved into the more elementary laws of the former. In saying that 'men in a state of society are still men', it is implied that we have some means of knowing them adequately out of a state of society... But I cannot perceive that we have any such means of
knowing the properties of men in this supposed elementary, non-social, condition,-so far, at least, as the most important and interesting departments of their mental life are concerned. The men whom we are able to observe are all social beings who have grown up from infancy under social influences; and, if in studying the mental phenomena of such a being we abstract hypothetically all that is due to sympathy and imitation, and endeavour to ascertain the laws of what remains, the result we obtain will not carry us far towards explaining the thoughts and emotions of actual men.\textsuperscript{32}

Sidgwick concludes that "[t]he individual adult man,... as known to us by experience, is what he is in consequence of having grown up in social relations; and we have no ground for saying -as Mill has done...- that the laws or uniformities of his actual behaviour as a member of a community are derived from the laws of his hypothetical behaviour as an abstract individual."\textsuperscript{33}

Sidgwick's words contain kernels of truth. Having analytically reduced things of a psychological and social nature to their simplest expression -the atom-like sensation and the human isolate, Mill shows the tendency to synthesize by juxtaposition of seemingly self-contained and distinct elements. Mill's 'moral man', for instance, is composed of distinct parts, and the result is a juxtaposed combination of a dutiful social individual and of a sympathetic selfish one, both irreducible dimensions of man's impulsive nature. As Sidgwick notes,

the perplexed and perplexing character of [Mill's Utilitarianism] is due to the effort to combine the self-sacrificing sociality of Comte with the socialised selfishness of Bentham, and yet to answer the question which both evade. The moral man of Mill is to be "disinterested" like Comte's; yet he is to be controlled entirely by "sanctions" (pleasures and pains) like Bentham's...\textsuperscript{34}

Likewise, Mill's analyzed 'man in society' is made up of two elements: the individual, itself made up of discrete and distinct parts forming separate foci of scientific study, and the social.

Sidgwick rightly remarks upon Mill's appreciation of the importance of the social factor in the progress of the human mind. The claim was indeed Mill's that "the human beings themselves, on the laws of whose nature the facts of history depend, are
not abstract or universal but historical human beings, already shaped, and made what they are, by human society." Admittedly, it is the idea of cooperation, and not isolation, of persons and interests, that overrides Mill's thought in his preoccupation with the cause of human improvement. In his ethical writings, for instance, Mill regards the fact of sociality as the ultimate sanction of the happiness morality. He writes:

The deeply rooted conception which every individual even now has of himself as a social being tends to make him feel it one of his natural wants that there should be harmony between his feelings and aims and those of his fellow creatures.

Mill takes pains to admit this, but yet makes no attempt to square his logical exposition of the moral sciences with such statements. It is well to keep Mill's bounding tendencies in mind here. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Mill intends to assign limits to individual and collective power in order to guard the expression of some of his most cherished virtues, namely, self-protection and self-dependence. In contradicting the economic theory of dependence, for instance, Mill's message is, not that people should have nothing to do with one another, but rather, that they learn to cooperate and work with each other "in relations not involving dependence." But note the composite nature of his thought on the matter. It would appear that the improving influences of association are possible only by first severing the ties of servile dependence through exclusion. It is as intact, screened and circumscribed entities, who are sociable to boot, that individuals enter relations of cooperation. This theoretical move, I say, is key to an understanding of Mill's analytic and atomistic thought. It is as elusive a clue as the difference is subtle between theorizing about human nature as though beings are a compound of two elements, the 'individual' and the 'social', and conceiving of human beings as indivisible wholes. As James Ward reminds us, "no logical analysis -nay, further, no logical synthesis -is adequate to the fulness of things."
The psychical atom

The belief that an idea concerning human nature can be fully understood in terms of simple concepts is erroneous by Ward's judgment. And he figures that reductionist explanations are wholly out of place in a psychology whose standpoint is that of individual experience. He declares any argument invalid that attempts, as Mill's does, to evolve all complex facts of consciousness out of atomic elements. For he sees this as obliterating the significance of the psychological subject.

A psychological reductionism such as Mill practises is further condemned by Ward for abolishing the distinction between subject and object while disregarding all elementary facts that do not admit of psychical association and reproduction. Irreducible facts such as those of attention and feeling, which, by Ward's account, pertain to the pure Ego, are, as acts and states of the subject, neither presented nor associated. And "what is not presented", adds Ward, "cannot, of course, be represented." Only objects can be.

Ward argues that no 'state of mind' is fully accounted for without the explicit recognition of a subject as psychologically factual and conceptually necessary to its proper representation. It follows from this that all facts of psychical life cannot be included under the label, 'objects', and regarded as 'contents of consciousness'. Nor can they be worked out of simpler atom-like elements -such as Mill's "single undivided" sensations, and united by association.

Ward points out that a subject which is never presented cannot be resolved into objects that are themselves revivable and associative; it is something distinct from these objects. He contends that "wherever there is psychical life or consciousness at all, there are facts the whole of which cannot in the same sense be represented as feelings, phenomena, presentations, or states of consciousness." He fears that any attempt to render psychological experience as yet limited to objects must fail. "A sensation", writes Ward, "is not mere content of consciousness, psychical object, datum, or presentation; if it is actual at all, the subject must be conscious of it, it must be apprehended, it must be received."

As Mill intends to rid the positivist science of Mind of all fictitious entities,
mysterious principles, and realized abstractions, no such admission is forthcoming on his part, to be sure. He stands to the terms and principles of an Association Psychology that has been promulgated and expanded by its "reviver and second founder", James Mill, and further developed and completed by Alexander Bain and Herbert Spencer.  

Mill believes that large varieties of complex mental phenomena explainable by associative laws have been developed from "simple" elements, each said to be an originally "distinct" state of consciousness and to have a "separate existence". His is the claim that "the higher mental phenomena are so well known to unfold themselves after the lower, that sensational experience, which is so violently repudiated as their origin and source, is, from the necessity of the case, admitted as the occasion which calls into action the mental laws that develop them."\textsuperscript{1} [I]ndividual" sensations are, for Mill, "as truly states of Mind" as thoughts, emotions and volitions are.\textsuperscript{2}

Mill stands on the two leading doctrines of the a posteriori psychology. And they are: "first, that the more recondite phenomena of the mind are formed out of the more simple and elementary; and secondly, that the mental law, by means of which this formation takes place, is the Law of Association."\textsuperscript{3} The composition and generation of more intricate states of mind from simpler ones in accordance with mechanical and chemical laws are highly interesting facts for Mill.\textsuperscript{4} He contends that "[t]he idea of an orange, for example, is compounded of certain simple ideas of colour, of visible and tangible shape, of taste, of smell, of a certain consistence, weight, internal structure, and so forth:"

yet our idea of an orange is to our feelings and conceptions one single idea, not a plurality of ideas... In this example, however, the original elements may still, by an ordinary effort of consciousness, be distinguished in the compound. It was reserved for Hartley to show that mental phenomena, joined together by association, may form a still more intimate, and as it were chemical union -may merge into a compound, in which the separate elements are no more distinguishable as such, than hydrogen and oxygen in water; the compound having all the appearance of a phenomenon sui generis, as simple and elementary as the ingredients, and with properties different from any of them...\textsuperscript{5}

Such as Mill understands them, cases of 'mental chemistry' and 'mental
dynamics' are unproblematic. His difficulty is logically, and not psychologically, grounded, concerned as he is with the nature of the evidence and the methods of inductive proof. There is, as he claims, a necessity "to be exigent as to the evidence for the validity of the analysis by which a mental phenomenon is resolved into association." 54

On Mill's view, all complex mental states are elaborated from some psychological atomies at first individually separate and independent, and united by associative laws. But as Ward sees it, the fact that certain ultimate elements (as psychical objects) imply a relation to a subject of consciousness, and, as such, are distinguished from it, make against the atomistic hypothesis as favoured by Mill. Ward figures that if we let certain elementary facts such as objects stand for both the act and state of the subject as well as for their cause, then all complex psychological life may doubtless be evolved from basic elements, each said to constitute a distinct and complete conscious state. But then, one is including two elementary facts (attention and feeling) under the name of some other (objects or contents of consciousness). Ward gives a very different rendition of psychological experience. On his view, the fact of presentation entails the relation of objects to subject. Attention and feeling (as the activity and state of the subject), as well as objects, are distinct and irreducible facts, and together, in a certain connexion, constitute a concrete state of mind. While object facts possess properties of association and reproduction, subject facts do not.

Ward finds it difficult to conceive "of isolated simple objects as the psychical atoms, so to put it, of which our mature perceptions and intuitions are built up". 55 For to conceive of such 'simple objects' requires that we think of them "without relations to other objects, either temporal, spatial, substantial or causal", while we yet have no means of reaching them by real analysis. 56 But as Ward remarks, "we know directly... by actual decomposition -that many, nay most, of the objects we ordinarily take to be homogeneous and single are really heterogeneous and compound; and we have indirect evidence that such complexity exists even further than we can directly trace it." 57 And he adds:

But whatever grounds we may have for regarding our ordinary sensations as complex, we are certainly not warranted in attributing this complexity to association as
we know it. Without attaching any importance to Mill's conception of mental chemistry, we shall, I think, do well to speak of the complexity of our ordinary sensations as due to combination.  

True, Ward's criticism would come at a later period, but, then again, Mill had long ago committed to, and would remain a lifelong advocate of, "the à posteriori mode" of speculation in psychology.  
The atomistic hypothesis evidently arouses Mill's interest and conviction. To speak, as Mill does, of 'single undivided', 'distinct', 'individual' and 'separate' sensations implicates him in the belief that the basic associative elements and building-blocks of the psychological structure have marked individuality. That is to say that they originally exist as self-contained and distinct entities. For critics of Ward's stamp who see grounds for rejecting the conception of isolated 'objects', the atomistic hypothesis is simply false.
BAIN AND ATOMICISTIC THINKING

In thumbing the first pages of Bain's psychological treatise on The Senses and the intellect, the question of relativity comes up at once. It is worthy of notice for this idea of a conscious change as necessary to mental life gives shape to Bain's conception of the nature of psychical objects. In his hand, the notion of a psychological to-and-fro is used as a beacon guiding the search after an understanding of mental phenomena.

The individuation of mental states

Psychologically speaking, toing-and-froing is the most general fact of consciousness, writes Bain. He adds that this recurrent experience of mental change constitutes and warrants our sense of difference between passing mental impressions. It is said that each mental state is always felt and known in relation to, and as different from, some other mental state, and as felt and known, implies the "contrast, co-relative, or negative of that." Otherwise expressed as the principle of relativity, this "sense", "feeling", or "consciousness of difference" constitutes our discriminative power. As the first fundamental law of mind, Bain deems it the foundation of all intellectual exercises. He gives discrimination the priority in the growth of mental life, holding that "we discriminate first, and trace agreements in difference afterwards." 

'Bright' would have no meaning to us, would never have been named or marked as a quality, if we had not had before us things of unequal magnitude, whose difference or contrast affected our minds with a lively impression. On Bain's theory, then, we are mentally alive or conscious only inasmuch as we feel and know differences, and, as such, are discriminative; that is, as we are "distinctively affected by two or more successive impressions".

Bain relies on the fact that we can neither feel nor know anything except in the experience of change, as giving assurance of the discrete nature of mental phenomena. "In every feeling", he contends, "there are two contrasting states; in every act of knowing, two things are known together." Bain's view is that feeling, like knowledge, in the last resort, "is a transition from one state to another"; and both states are involved
in feeling or knowing either. In the initial stages of Bain's investigation, then, the business at hand is quite clear. No sooner started on the psychological inquiry but we are already tendered ideas of distinctness, separateness and discreteness as qualifying features of mental impressions.

James Ward, for one, disputes the fact that every mental experience is nothing but a transition or difference. Bain's mistake, he argues, stems from his exclusive focus on the classification of the salient facts of Mind. Ward thinks that had Bain turned to an analysis of mind as a whole and fully recognized the importance of attention as an ultimate constituent of concrete mental life, he would not have confused movements of attention and qualitative differences among presentations. Consider Ward's words.

The mistake, if mistake indeed it be, is perhaps accounted for by the fact that Dr Bain, in common with the rest of his school, nowhere distinguishes between attention and the presentations that are attended to. To be conscious or mentally alive we must have a succession of shocks or surprises, new objects calling off attention from old ones; but, over and above these movements of attention from presentation to presentation, do we find that each presentation is also itself but a transition or difference?

As pointed out to Bain, a difference between presentations is not the same as the presentation of that difference. Ward himself observes that the comparativity of intellectual knowledge (the presentation of difference) and the differential theory of presentations (a difference between presentations) are altogether different claims. He warns against blurring the distinction between perceptual and intellectual knowledge. Ward considers that Bain's extractive understanding of psychological life by the light of relativity renders atomistic abstraction by reducing an otherwise embedded mental experience.

Undeterred by the critical estimate, Bain maintains that we must first recognize impressions as differing in order to have an impression of anything. "We begin by discriminating changes of impression", writes Bain; "this process is necessary in order to our having even a sensation; the more delicate the discriminating power, the greater the number of our primary sensations." Trusting that in order to feel and know there must be a change of impression or mental shock, Bain reiterates his belief in the twofold
nature of all psychological experience. "The first, the deepest, the most fundamental experience of the human mind", he argues, "is Relation, Relativity; this is implicated in the very nature of consciousness. The doubleness, the essential two-sidedness of every conscious experience is a fact that has no forerunner."70

Bain's occasional reference to the course of mental life as a "stream of consciousness"71 belies his construal of its unfolding. For implicated in his theory of relativity is the idea that the course of psychological life is felt and known as a series of "mental transitions",72 that is to say, as a busy to-and-fro of "distinct"73 mental states. This is truly an altogether different experience from that of a continuous mental flux. In fact, Bain admits as much. He tells us that "[t]he stream of thought is not a continuous current, but a series of distinct ideas, more or less rapid in their succession; the rapidity being measurable by the number that pass through the mind in a given time."74

As mentioned in the previous chapter, distinctness must originally attach to mental impressions that, in the experience of change, are said to be neither felt nor thought except as different from others.75 Bain's start in psychological inquiry is noticeable in that impressions show individuating marks from the first. His is indeed the claim that as a discriminative element, each sensation or idea "has a character or individuality."76

Bain's particular take on relativity leads to the idea that "two distinct presentations are necessary to the comparison that is here implied".77 This was a ground of dispute for those who held that one cannot begin with such differentiation. For, as they argued, objects must first be recognized before they are compared, and such recognition does not depend upon, nor start from, the postulate of distinct presentations.78

Bain understands the problem differently. And so his impressions, like so many introspectively discernible, individual and numerically distinct units, are said to constitute the facts of self-consciousness.79 Bain claims that it is by observation of, and induction from, such facts that the law of relativity is reached.80 This assumption of primal discontinuity in mental expression underlies Bain's attempt at psychological representation, and betrays his atomistic conception of mental advance.
In theorising about psychological unfolding or mental growth, it is clear that Bain and Ward take their start from altogether different conceptions of conscious change and of its underlying processes. Bain argues that we are only as mentally aware as we are psychologically discerning, that is, capable of recognizing mental impressions as individually distinct and independent. Depicted as originally discrete, these elementary impressions are said to swell into complex accretions by a process of associative build-up, thereby exhibiting convergence in psychological development. On Bain’s account, all complexity in mental life is due to association.

Psychological recognition means something very different for Ward. It involves a process of gradual specialization of a psychological continuity into presentations of greater complexity and definiteness which are yet and always parts of one whole. "Development", for Ward, "implies change of form in a continuous whole." He fears that "[p]sychologists have usually represented mental advance as consisting fundamentally in the combination and recombination of various elementary units, the so-called sensations and primitive movements, or, in other words, in a species of "mental chemistry"." And he adds:

If we are to resort to physical analogies at all - a matter of very doubtful propriety - we shall find in the growth of a seed or an embryo far better illustrations of the unfolding of the contents of consciousness than in the building up of molecules: the process seems much more a segmentation of what is originally continuous than an aggregation of elements at first independent and distinct.

As represented by Ward, distinctness in psychical objects comes as a result of an on-going process of segmentation which individualizes parts and makes their associativity and revivability possible. Ward distinguishes between the "functional" and the "atomistic" view of presentations, and is quick to reject the atomistic assumption of original independence and individuality in presentations. "The primum cognitum" Ward regards "not [as] a plurality converging towards explicit unity but [as an] implicit unity diverging into definite plurality." No association nor reproduction of parts is therefore possible on Ward's terms without a prior recognition or assimilation of impressions. Assimilation is thus a more fundamental process than association, and is
not to be confused with it. Ward writes:

The view here taken is (1) that at its first appearance in psychical life a new sensation or so-called elementary presentation is really a partial modification of some preexisting presentation, which thereby becomes as a whole more complex than it was before; and (2) that this complexity and differentiation of parts never become a plurality of discontinuous presentations, having a distinctness and individuality such as the atoms or elementary particles of the physical world are supposed to have.87

The 'mere sensation' as psychologically experienceable

In Bain's book of psychological knowledge, there is nothing but association and reproduction, and the postulation of a plurality of originally discrete impressions. Here as elsewhere, classification is in order. Bain tells us that the new impression meets up with the old and resurrects its like or conjunct amidst "remnants of departed sensations"; at first "separate", numerically distinct impressions become united by the bond of association.88 Though he acknowledges the coherence of mental trains, Bain is careful not to overstate the point. He remarks that no amount of adhesive or attractive connexion among impressions need sink the fact of their individuality and independence.

True to his methodological word, Bain deals with his psychological facts by limiting his view to one thing at a time, "and that the least possible thing".89 He thinks of these "smallest divisions" as the "primitive germs" of psychology.90 Bain thus begins his exposition by assembling his germinal materials, namely, those of movement, sense and instinct. As the original "endowments of our mental constitution", muscular feelings and sensations furnish Bain with the type of an "elementary" unit suitable for the building of his psychological structure.91 All classes of combinations are said to be elaborated out of these fundamental building-blocks with the help of the intellectual powers.92

Given Bain's reliance on philosophical classification as scientifically warranted, all of his basic units are subsumed under the generic name 'states of consciousness' and
bear the name in their turn. As he looks on psychological experiences of elementary units as real, Bain is committed to the view that individuals undergo "transitions" of "sensations". He speaks alternately of our passing "from a sensation of warmth to a sensation of light"; of being differently affected by the "sensation of mere light" and the "sensation of lustre", as well as by the "sensation of the sweet in sound" and the "sensation of smartness".

While denied experiential reality by Ward, the "mere sensation" yet figures prominently in Bain's repertoire of psychical objects as a discrete, psychologically elementary, and knowable existent. Sensations, we are told, are "the mental impressions, feelings, or states of consciousness, resulting from the action of external things on some part of the body, called on that account sensitive." Bain claims that as we have "distinctness of organ" as well as "distinctness in the outward objects", so we have distinctness "in the inward consciousness". He sees fit to speak of experiencing a series of discrete sensations as these impressions are referable to numerically distinct objective events. Bain would have us believe that a presentation of, say, x (the action of some external thing perceived by the senses) constitutes an x presentation (the corresponding state of consciousness).

With Bain as the guardian of their original independence, sensations are rendered so "distinct" and "discrete" as to be able to associate and "stand side by side" with some other proximate or like impression, and to preserve their "identity" when no longer actual through local embodiment. Bain contends that though "past or extinct", the "vanished individuals may be made to re-appear" such that each sensation might have a "resurrection" under the form of an idea or "vestige". As regards the probable seat or embodiment of a sensation when revived, Bain hypothesizes that "[t]he renewed feeling occupies the very same parts, and in the same manner, as the original feeling, and no other parts, nor in any other assignable manner... For where should a past feeling be re-embodied, if not in the same organs as the feeling when present? It is only in this way that its identity can be preserved; a feeling differently embodied would be a different feeling."

While denied status by Ward, sensations are recognized by Bain as psychologically experienceable and "associable elements". His discussion of the
effect of repetition on the adhesive process (contiguity) exemplifies his tendency to atomize and singularize.

This leads us to remark on the effect of repetition in making any single impression adherent. The separate taste of sugar, by repetition, impresses the mind more and more, and by this circumstance becomes gradually easier to retain in idea... So it is with all the senses, high and low. Apart altogether from the association of two or more distinct sensations in a group, or in a train, there is a fixing process going on with every individual sensation, rendering it more easy to retain when the original has passed away, and more vivid when, by means of association, it is afterwards reproduced in idea.103

Lest one should think that the reoccurrence of an event is the main factor contributing to the formation of contiguous bonds, Bain reminds his readers that the power of similarity is always operative and in fact needed for the work of cohesion. It is quite clear to Bain that "when the cohesive link between any two contiguous actions, or images, is confirmed by a new occurrence or repetition, obviously the present impression must revive the sum total of the past impressions, or reinstate the whole mental condition left on the occasion immediately preceding."104

As Bain is wont to say, the reproduction of former impressions by a present one "of the same kind" is "really and truly" a case of the associative operation of "like recalling like", wherein the new and the old are "precisely identical".105 What is here taken for granted by Bain is "that a present occurrence of any object to the view, recalls the total impression made by all the previous occurrences, and adds its own effect to that total."106

Bain conceives of impressions as so many well-defined and "detached" "units", which, by cohesive and attractive links, become "associates" and "members" that are "strung together" into "sequences", "threads", "aggregates and trains".107 He figures that it is in the power of associative laws to "bind separate sensations to each other".108 So though originally distinct, and while always fully "individual" in character, impressions on Bain's view yet partake of a life marked by "partnership", "companionship" and 'solidarity'.109 And this is where Ward parts company with Bain. What seems so obvious to Bain is not only disputed but completely rejected by Ward as well as by others.
The confusion of psychological and physical standpoints

Several aspects of Bain's thinking on the matter struck Ward as problematic. While both Bain and Ward, for instance, maintain that no association of presentations is possible prior to an identifying process by which impressions are recognized, they yet have a radically different understanding of its workings. Bain renders perception a matter of classification, and while defending similarity as a distinct principle of association, overstates the discontinuous features of mental phenomena.

Ward underscores the importance of assimilation in immediate cognition, and while he regards contiguity as the only admissible principle of association, it is the interconnected nature of presentations which takes precedence in his mind. He also denounces Bain's adoption of the physical standpoint as methodologically defective and inadequate to the comprehension of the nature of psychical objects. His criticism affords a different view of the matter, and in challenging Bain's remarks, sets the atomistic dimension of the latter's thought in greater relief.

Take the case of the associative operation of 'like recalling like' as illustrated by Bain in his discussion of similarity. His is the view that in cases of absolute identity between the new and the old, the present impression resuscitates its like among previous impressions, whence their "collation". Cases such as these lead to what Bain calls "coincidences of past and present". He says that "when things are identical, the operation of similarity, in making the present case revive the former ones, is so certain that it is not even mentioned".

Ward agrees that it isn't worth mentioning. Not, however, because the idea is so obvious as to need no justification -as Bain would have us believe, but because the latter's rendition of recognition is so blatantly ill-conceived from Ward's viewpoint. In lieu of similarity, Ward puts forward the notion of assimilation according to which "repetition does not mean the birth of a new presentation but further growth or some analogous change in the old." While Bain entertains the possibility of a plurality of qualitatively identical, though numerically distinct, presentations, Ward rejects it.

In puzzling over the sense in which Bain understands the word 'like' as pertains to psychical objects, Ward suggests that he has confused the psychological with the
physical. He writes:

In our everyday experience of the external world numerical distinctness is given either by spatial or by temporal marks. Thus I range on a plate a number of digestive biscuits out of the same tin. Here I have \( a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_n \), the subscript numbers denoting merely different positions. I eat one of these biscuits every day at lunch and again have \( a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_n \); the numbers here denoting repetitions of qualitatively identical events, i.e., merely temporal distinctness. Now what the atomistic psychologists do is simply to equate the psychical to the physical. Here as in many other cases they seem to apply the formula: The presentation of \( x \) is an \( x \) presentation...

In the present case we should have: The presentation of \( n \) identicals is \( n \) identical presentations.\(^{115}\)

Ward denies that the presentation of \( n \) identicals is the same as \( n \) identical presentations. He argues that "[a] number of forms or colours are only known to be qualitatively identical by matching them all to one standard. To match them severally to as many distinct standards would leave us just where we were. The presentation of qualitative identity with numerical distinctness, in other words, requires a one in the many."\(^{116}\) And he adds:

The terms of a series such as \( a_1+a_2+a_3 \) may represent the physical events of stimulation; or they may be the psychologist's own private memoranda. But it is difficult to assign to them any meaning for the cognising subject before spatial or temporal plurality or overt comparison is possible. And since explicit identification involves of necessity a one in many it seems reasonable to suppose that a vague psychological unity or continuity is differentiated or specialised before logical generalisation is possible.\(^{117}\)

Consider Bain's psychological exposition of the sensations. With a view to setting forth their characteristic marks as sensations, a reference to their bodily origin and to the physical agents of stimulation is part of Bain's natural history approach and his first consideration. We are told that while externally caused, sensations are "impressions reaching the mind through different avenues of sense".\(^{118}\) Bain argues for the view that because referable to distinct bodily organs and assigned to numerically distinct physical occurrences, sensations have peculiarities all their own, and, as such,
are experienced as distinct and discrete states.\textsuperscript{119} It is thus as 'individual' impressions of sound, sight, and the like that sensations can associate and form aggregates.\textsuperscript{120}

Ward disputes the claim that the presentation of distinct physical events of stimulation constitutes distinct presentations, individuated by such events. "From the physical standpoint and in ordinary life", he writes, "we can talk of objects that are isolated and independent and in all respects distinct individuals. The screech of the owl has then nothing to do with the brightness of the moon: sound and light, owl and moon -any one may go and leave no gap in the order of things to which the others belong. But for me they are parts of one whole...\textsuperscript{121}

Ward argues that the true character of presentations as parts can only be grasped by attending to the individual's percept, and not to the physical thing. But for someone like Bain who shows little relish for organismic talk, an individual thing is but a sum of qualities to be taken apart and each distributed like type. Consider Bain's words.

External things usually affect us through a plurality of senses. The pebble on the sea shore is pictured on the eye as Form and Colour. We take it up in the hand, and thereby obtain the impression of Form, together with the Tactile sensation of the Surface. Knock two together, and there is a characteristic Sound. To retain the impression of an object of this kind, there must be an association of all these different effects. Such association, when matured and firm, is our idea, our intellectual grasp of the pebble. Passing to the organic world, and plucking a rose, we have the same effects... When fully acquired, any one of the characteristic impressions may revive the others; the odour, the sight, the feeling of the thorny stalk, -each of these by itself will hoist the entire impression into the view.\textsuperscript{122}

If the preservation of individuality spirits all reformist enterprise, psychologically regarded, that is, then the challenge becomes that of explaining the embedment of concrete mental experience. Ward calls Bain to task on what he perceives to be the failure of atomistic psychologists to adequately account for the process. His position is that "[p]resentations do not really crowd into Mansoul by the avenues of Eyegate, Eargate, &c., there to form bonds and unions as in Bunyan's famous allegory."\textsuperscript{123} As it is, Ward writes,

we cannot help asking how presentations, supposed to be
originally distinct and isolated, become eventually linked together. For neither the isolation nor the links are clear. Not the isolation, for we can only conceive two presentations separated by other presentations intervening; nor the links, unless these also are objects, and then the difficulty recurs. It disappears, however, if for contiguity we substitute continuity, and suppose the 'associated' objects to be parts, not isolated wholes.\textsuperscript{124}

For his part, Bain thinks that Ward makes too much of the continuity of mental life. He therefore sees no need to substitute the term "continuum", as is Ward's wont, for the designations "train, series, sequence, transition".\textsuperscript{125} Bain deems it misleading to speak, as Ward does, of mental successions and 'associated' objects in terms of parts and wholes. He submits that "[a] train of impressions, presentations, ideas, may have any amount of coherence and dependence, that we may choose to assign; while the word does not sink the circumstance of plurality. That the successive members of a train should be regarded as parts of one whole, is not only unnecessary but misleading. The idea of part and whole is extended beyond ordinary usage..."\textsuperscript{126} While Bain treats the point in issue as a mere logomachy, Ward, meantime, is rewriting the script of mental life by innovating an entirely new conception of the human mind and of its unfoldment in time.

**Perception as a matter of classification**

In the eye of Bain, mental advance stands as a bottom-up process of acquisition: it proceeds from the foundation of basic components, and while "adding unit to unit, under the retentive or adhesive attribute of our nature", issues in psychological complexes.\textsuperscript{127} Note that though Bain and Ward both speak to a power of recognition, they comprehend its workings in very different ways and thus put it to an altogether different use. Ward's idea of a process of assimilation as operative in immediate cognition does not obtain in Bain's psychology. Recognition or identity on Bain's view involves a process of dissociation which can only operate through association.

On the face of it, Bain and Ward seem to agree. Bain readily admits that in order to have the idea of a pebble or a rose -that is, an "agglutination"\textsuperscript{128} of characteristic
qualities combined wholly by association, we must first recognize the basic constituents. But recognition in his opinion involves a process of classification in which psychical components are first isolated and then put together in a sequence as so many beads threaded on a string. Bain never once relinquishes the view that as small and "distinguishable" units, mental impressions are isolable and as 'associable elements', therefore, can be assembled together in a connected sequence. The following quote represents Bain's understanding of recognition, and as so defined, evinces the atomistic bent of his thought on the matter. He writes:

...if we see a fire, and feel the warmth, we dissociate the conjunct impression by identifying the sight with former impressions of the same colour, and the warmth with former experiences of warmth. As soon as we have a past to refer to, however limited, we separate every compound sensation into its elements... we can see that the mind after an experience, longer or shorter, must arrive at the state representing our habitual conduct in the matter -namely, that every complex sensation is instantaneously taken to pieces by filing every separate ingredient on its own thread... Hence, Mr. Spencer justly describes perception as a process of classification. Of course there can be no perception until some accumulation of separate impressions has taken place... but when this has been obtained by means of our growing stock of agreeing impressions, we are prepared for the work of combining and associating in the manner attempted to be explained in the text. Not to say that the dissociation was operated only through an association (of similarity) for every element separately.

If one believes in the persistence of earlier apprehensions and in their further modifications by later ones, there is no need to resort to the association and reproduction of ideas in order to explain the process of recognition. On a Wardian view of things, there is from first to last but one image in an ever increasing complexity and definiteness of pattern. And if there is but one continually growing presentation, then classification is obviously out of place.

For his part, Ward contends that "as we see a certain colour or a certain object again and again, we do not go on accumulating images or representations of it, which are somewhere crowded together like shades on the banks of the Styx; nor is such
colour, or whatever it be, the same at the hundredth time of presentation as at the first, as the hundredth impression of a seal on wax would be. There is no such constancy or uniformity in mind. Obvious as this must appear when we pause to think of it, yet the explanations of perception most in vogue seem wholly to ignore it. Such explanations are far too mechanical and, so to say, atomistic.\textsuperscript{131}

Bain's account sounds a different note. "Supposing the first impression of scarlet is called a sensation", he writes, "the combined trace of thirty impressions, revived in the presentation of the thirty-first, would be a perception, as being something more than the effect strictly due to the present stimulus."\textsuperscript{132} As far as Ward is concerned, "assimilation or simple recognition"\textsuperscript{133} is not a process of association at all. His point is that in immediate cognition, impressions simply do not have the individuality which association implies. Hence those who rejected atomistic explanations held that though perception entailed a gradual distinctness in parts, it never started from, nor at any time involved, an independence of units.

It is Bain's trademark to begin with differentiation and to treat presentations as together a plurality of distinguishable units. He stands firm in the belief that "individuality or distinctiveness" attaches to sensations, no less than to ideas.\textsuperscript{134} By his account of the process, recognition is due to an attraction of qualitatively identical, though numerically distinct, impressions. Far from being deposed, association thus features as sole operative principle. Bain tells us that by the identifying power, "every distinguishable impression recalls the previous stamps of the same", in which case the new and the old "are brought face to face" and ultimately "stand side by side".\textsuperscript{135}

Association at the hands of Bain is that most important theoretical device by means of which psychical objects are kept in order and the preservation of their identity insured. For so long as present and past mental phenomena are said to 'stand side by side' in pearl-like fashion by the controlling power of associative and reproductive agents, law reigns, and the individuating marks of impressions remain intact at all times.
Endnotes


14. This method is called by Mill the direct deductive method. Mill considers political economy to be a separate department of the social science.


38. Fred Wilson, for one, contends that when it comes to the methodology of the social sciences, Mill fails to understand the relevance of social relations in structuring the social whole. According to Wilson, social laws cannot be deduced from the laws of individuals taken in isolation, whereas Mill himself held that they could be so resolved. Wilson writes: "When [Mill] claims that the deduction of the laws for the complex social wholes can be deduced a priori from the laws for the parts, that is, from the laws for persons taken individually, he is claiming in effect that there is no need for a composition law, or, what amounts to the same, no need to take into account the social relations which, by virtue of holding among individuals, constitute the social whole out of those individuals. Mill suggests that in the social sciences, the individual cases act "conjunctively", in just the way that they act in mechanics". See Skorupski, J. ed. (1998). *The Cambridge Companion to Mill*. Fred Wilson's 'Mill on psychology and the moral sciences', pp.239-245; W. Donner's essay 'Mill's Utilitarianism', p.277; A. Ryan's essay 'Mill in a liberal landscape', p.530.


42. As mentioned in the previous chapter, James Ward contends for the explicit recognition of a subject or pure Ego in psychology. According to Ward, every concrete state of mind entails the presentation of an object, or complex of objects, to a subject. See Ferrier, J.F. (1866). *Lectures on Greek philosophy and other philosophical remains*. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood, pp.82-85.


139


56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.


64. Ibid, pp.5, 321.


78. Ibid.

79. See, for instance, Bain, A. (1849). *The human mind, Chambers's Information for the People*. With respect to the introspective discernment of individual impressions, Bain excepts those instances of combination in which the constituent elements are not separately discernible, as in cases of mental chemistry.


81. Ward postulates the conception of an "objective continuum" in which presentational differences are merged, and which constitutes the backdrop out of which distinct presentations are elaborated. By continuum, Ward means "a series of presentations changing gradually in quality, i.e., so that any two differ less the more they approximate in the series." He argues that it is this particular conception of presentations which warrants and sustains the belief in the unity and continuity of consciousness. See Ward, J. (1886). *Psychology, Encyclopaedia Britannica*.


84. Ibid.

86.Ibid.


98.This is Ward's point, to which I will return presently.


103.Ibid, p.349.


114.For an example of Bain's individualized and numerically distinct impressions, see his illustration of the workings of similarity in diversity. Bain, A. (1842). On toys, Westminster Review.


116.Ibid.

117.Ibid.


CHAPTER 4

FEATURES OF THOUGHT

THE TENDENCY TOWARD MECHANISTIC THINKING

PRELIMINARY REMARKS

If the commitment to naturalistic explanations makes for mechanistic interpretations of natural events, then certain points raised in previous discussions may well be said to evince Mill and Bain's mechanistic turn of mind. As already remarked, both Mill and Bain regard the methods of physical investigation as scientifically reliable and trust to their applicability in the moral sciences.¹

Mill and Bain regard the assumption of uniformity in nature as the fundamental underlay of inductive generalizations. They acknowledge it to be a great influence in the subjective and objective worlds. Theirs is the view that events and actions of a psychological and physical nature occur in an orderly way, and, as such, are subject to uniform laws. Both uphold the doctrine of the invariable causation of human actions. Believing that all questions about human beings are answerable in naturalistic terms, Mill and Bain treat ontological causes, finalist notions, and metaphysical conceptions as explanatorily powerless.

Again, if mechanistic interpretations of phenomena exclude the consideration of wholes as causal agents, then Mill and Bain's recourse to this type of explanation is undeniable. As pointed out in chapters 2 and 3, Mill and Bain stand on the view that science goes about its business analytically by dissecting wholes into constituent elements.² Both conceive of scientific explanation as proceeding by way of the parts to the whole.

The reduction of wholes to particle-like elements brings abstract parts into focus. While the parts thus become vitally important in the explanation of the whole, the latter, being but a summative account of its elements, has yet no explanatory power
with respect to them. Consider Mill and Bain's take on Mind. As a whole, it is said to have no properties of its own but those which are the 'feeling-thinking-willing' qualities of its parts. While Mill and Bain think its composite nature decipherable by way of analysis and synthesis, others see the difference between a synthetic comprehension of objects of knowledge and a synoptic understanding of their nature as living wholes.

And again: if the attraction for a Newtonian type of explanation bears out a mechanistic turn of mind, then so does the postulation of a 'psychical atom' and 'human isolate' when used as a basis for psychological and sociological reasoning. For note that explanation in Newtonian mechanics proceeds by way of "micromechanisms": structural explanations are distinguished from teleological ones by their accounting for wholes in terms of the corpuscular structure and the combining tendencies of parts.

Highlighted in the previous chapter is the way in which Mill and Bain compound and explain wholes by means of atomies in combination. Their contention is that a science of society whose progress depends upon the theoretical and methodological development of the less complicated moral sciences, must secure its structure on the ground of psychology. The foundation stone of it all is the psychical atom. These discrete and distinct parts display noticeable powers of independent life at the hands of Mill and Bain. As separate individuals, they are not only said to retain their identity but to be linked in mechanical and chemical unity by arithmetical relations, and to be capable of turning out other individuals in the associative buildup.

Thus mental growth does not serve as evidence of the intrinsic power of the whole, but of the causal agency and explanatory sufficiency of elementary parts. Mill and Bain would have us ask what need there is to identify an unifying and regulating principle inherent in the whole when each element is originally constituted a single and complete individual, and order prevails under associative rule. With Association psychology as the theoretical cornerstone of sociological construction, the scientific inquiry into human nature and society rings with a mechanistic sound. The kind of scientific explanation privileged by Mill and Bain is one that accounts for psychological and social phenomena in terms of the structure and combining tendencies of microscopic parts.

While the previous chapter focused on the characteristics of the elementary parts
of which wholes are composed, the present one unfolds in two ways. The first part centres on Mill's analysis of the relationship of components to one another and to wholes as it reveals a mechanistic understanding of activity, unity, order and causation. As the topic is broad and its coverage extensive, Bain's mechanical rendition of psychological activity is the exclusive focus of the second part of the chapter.

MILL AND MECHANISTIC THINKING

Mill contends that as a branch of knowledge inclusive of pure mental philosophy and ethology, the science of human nature is a necessary prelude to the science of society and government. The study of Mind is in fact the association substructure of the social building: "...a true Psychology", writes Mill, "is the indispensable scientific basis of Morals, of Politics, of the science and art of Education". Thus generalizations bearing on human thought, feeling and action, and induced by the systematic observation of particular individual minds, are applicable to the scientific study of the human social condition. As Mill thinks of society as a confederation of human beings living together under a common government, he regards all social phenomena as phenomena of human nature complicated by the play of circumstances upon the collective whole.

Promoting the gospel of the Composition of Causes in social phenomena

As the contour of the social landscape is mapped by Mill upon the configuration of its separate elements, the mathematical computation of the simple laws governing individual human actions and motives is the resolvent of the complex laws of social phenomena. Mill figures that the congregation of human beings into society has no transformative effect upon its individual members: neither the nature nor the properties of persons are subject to conversion, as chemical elements are, in their combined role. Conceptually speaking, it is Mill's 'man as a mere individual', put and held together with the threads of an Association Psychology and acting in conformity to its laws, who enters into social relations and engages as an autonomous unit in cooperative activities.
Hence notwithstanding the complexity of its phenomena and their dependence on a great many causes, the study of the collective actions of human beings presents no insurmountable difficulty from Mill's viewpoint. For he thinks that we can always trust our knowledge of the laws of individual human nature in the effort to understand the conduct of man in society. No doubt we can. But then again, Mill's words bear remembering:

Men, however, in a state of society, are still men; their actions and passions are obedient to the laws of individual human nature. Men are not, when brought together, converted into another kind of substance, with different properties; as hydrogen and oxygen are different from water, or as hydrogen, oxygen, carbon, and azote, are different from nerves, muscles, and tendons. Human beings in society have no properties but those which are derived from, and may be resolved into, the laws of the nature of individual man.9

No organismic nor even chemical analogies are here drawn by Mill in the effort to comprehend the behaviour of individuals in the aggregate. Holding with a mechanistic mode of thinking, Mill misses the point that in becoming members of society, human beings become something more than individuals. Society does not therefore consist of a nucleus of mere individuals, as we seem meant to assume on Mill's logical view, but of individuals-en-rapport, so to speak. From this social state originate relations and properties other than those belonging to persons merely as individuals. Fred Wilson's remark is to the point.

This behaviour that appears only in groups, these properties that people have only in groups, is precisely the behaviour that defines those groups, that is, the reciprocal and coordinated behaviour that constitutes social relations.

...we see Mill totally missing the significance of social relations. This is ironic, of course, because, as we suggested, it takes him back to the philosophy of his father and the earlier generation of utilitarians. It is even more ironic because, as we have also seen, he is at the same time fully aware of the importance of social relations! Mill came out of his mental crisis recognizing the limitations of the social thought of his father, but as we now see he could never quite escape those limitations.10
As analogous to a mechanical mixture, then, the complex social whole Mill considers to be summated by its parts. As represented in his logic of the social science, these distinct human units exhibit the typical mark of mechanical compositions: they neither lose their independence, individual influences and activities, nor rearticulate their identity as they socially interact. In setting out the synthetic structure of society, Mill ensures that the unity of its members is never so close as to bear the impress of the regulative and coordinating power of the social whole with respect to the behaviour and interaction of its parts.

So though Mill banks on the cooperative spirit as an essential feature of social emancipation, he never goes so far as to conceive of his individuals as organically bound by their relation to the whole and to each other in the whole. This is not to say that from Mill's perspective, the parts are merely "self-regarding" -to borrow Smuts's word,¹¹ and, therefore, indifferent to one another and to the whole. On the contrary, we are sure to find Mill insisting in true utilitarian spirit on the subordination of selfish interests to the general welfare, and emphasizing the importance of strong feelings of cohesion, sympathy, and fellowship among its members as binding forces of social existence. We also recognize in him a readiness to admit and in fact substantiate society's claim to assist the mental advance of the masses via the instrumentality of political institutions and social arrangements.¹²

But this does not yet constitute organic thinking. For we can also count on Mill guarding against the absorption of personal identity in some greater collective whole, while we can anticipate his rejecting the holistic conception of society as irreducible to the corps of individuals. It bears remembering that Mill's plan of social reform is workable only in so far as individuals are led to break out of servitude. Individuals on Mill's view that are seen as engaging in cooperative relations must first be recognized as free and independent agents. That which unquestionably holds Mill's attention is the individual as the unit of society whose deliverance from oppressors is his rescue mission.¹³

Thus cooperative activity on Mill's terms involves an interactive exchange of autonomous individuals, and does not result from the pressure of the correlating and directive power of the social whole on the parts, as takes place in organic unity. As Mill
conducts his analytic study of society by viewing it through the lens of individual actions and motives, it is evidently not the whole but the part which is the dominant explanatory element in the causal concept.

Mill is certain that as a subject of scientific inquiry, society has no different properties than those derived from the principles of human nature, individually considered. By Mill's terms, this qualifies as surety that "in social phenomena the Composition of Causes is the universal law." By the composition of causes, Mill means that within certain departments of inquiry as, for instance, political economy, mechanics and the social science, the law of a complex effect is the joint result of the separate laws of all determinative causes, each of which contributes its share of influence towards the cumulative result. In line with Mill's interpretation, we are meant to understand that the conjunct effect of many causes is identical with the sum of their separate effects. Mill thinks that this principle holds true in cases of social and mechanical causation alike. Here the technics of the complex physical sciences serve Mill's purpose and inform his mechanical theory of society, while shaping his conception of causation.

Mill likens the deductive social science to the science of mechanics and thus looks on physical concepts as applicable to the understanding of the social structure. For he thinks a parallel exists between the physical and the social worlds. His claim is that both mechanical and social phenomena result from a conflict of forces and admit of a concurrence of causes, the joint operation of which exemplifies the mechanical mode of conjunct causal action. Mill contends that,

[i]n [mechanics], we can compute the effects of combinations of causes, whether real or hypothetical, from the laws which we know to govern those causes when acting separately; because they continue to observe the same laws when in combination which they observed when separate: whatever would have happened in consequence of each cause taken by itself, happens when they are together, and we have only to cast up the results.15

Mill's contention is that questions of philosophic method must be grounded in the study of natural philosophy. As he sees it, physics furnishes the proper model, both as regards the processes by which to attain truth and the methods by which to estimate evidence.
Consider his reasons.

The physical sciences...have been brought to so advanced a stage of improvement by a series of great men, and the methods by which they are cultivated so entirely preclude the possibility of material error when due pains are taken to arrive at the truth, that all persons who have studied those subjects have come to a nearly unanimous agreement upon them... It is almost unnecessary to remark in how very different a condition from this, are the sciences which are conversant with the moral nature and social condition of man.16

Mill makes urgent appeals to adopt the true method of philosophizing in the social science in accordance with the prevailing practices of the physical sciences. He figures that "the same process through which the laws of many simpler phenomena have by general acknowledgment been placed beyond dispute, must be consciously and deliberately applied to those more difficult inquiries."17 Mill thinks that he has found a way to cast off all dabbling in the subject by probing the nature of the inquiry into social phenomena with the searchlight of the logic of the deductive branches of physics.

The Social Science...is a deductive science; not, indeed, after the model of geometry, but after that of the more complex physical sciences. It infers the law of each effect from the laws of causation on which that effect depends; [that is],...by considering all the causes which conjunctly influence the effect, and compounding their laws with one another.18

That the rule of arithmetic sums and differences should prevail when assessing the collective effect of concurrent social causes is not a problem for Mill. The difficulty, as he sees it, has to do with the actual work of computation itself. Equally problematic is the determination of all causal influences bearing on the production of any one social effect, as Mill considers it beyond anyone's mental grasp.

That, however, which Mill seems to take for granted is this: supposing all causal tendencies jointly operating on social changes to be known, he believes that each one in combination with others would act, through the laws of human nature applied to a particular set of circumstances, as it does when separate. Mill figures that each social fact is thus shaped by the cumulation of many such causal influences, which, in their conjunct agency, conform to the very same laws as those governing their separate
action. That is to say that each exercises its effect according to its own law as a separate agent. This, says Mill, is "exemplified by the joint operation of different forces in mechanics", [whereby] "the separate effects of all the causes continue to be produced, but are compounded with one another, and disappear in one total." \[19\]

Now Mill does say that any one cause may be counteracted (mutual interference of causes) and its effect modified (intermixture of effects), through contact with other sets of agencies. He indeed talks of a "consensus", \[20\] and, thus, of uniformities of coexistence obtaining among the elements of the social state. And in stressing the mutual interdependence of the social data, he in fact legitimates the analogy to the natural body by referring to society as a "social organism". \[21\]

And yet Mill's conception of the synthetic union of causal influences is no more organismic for all that. For human actions on his view are not centrally controlled and thus not conditioned by their own causal tendency to subserve and promote the end of the social whole. They are determined instead in accordance with psychological and ethological laws. \[22\] Indeed, as stated in Mill's logic of scientific inquiry applied to the moral sciences, the properties of individuals taken alone are unaltered when these same individuals form social groups. As the properties of the whole thus depend on the properties of its elements, it is not subject to new laws. Mill maintains that the laws governing the collective actions of persons are no different from those observed by these agents when acting separately. This does not attest an organismic, but rather, a mechanistic, way of thinking about society.

Hence, the social whole whose structure is negligible because resolvable into its parts, is but the effect of external causes; it is not, as an internal principle of change, its own cause. As such, it possesses no explanatory power with respect to the activities of its parts. Whereas parts act as one or holistically in teleological causation, that is, in conformity to a plan, the operation of causal agencies is given an altogether different interpretation in Mill's sociological speculations. Alike the actions of mechanical parts, these determinative causes each act in conformity to rules, that is, to their own laws as separate agents. And as their separate effects are additive, the compound activity of the social structure is the mathematical resultant of individual human activities. \[23\]

Mill is unhesitating in pronouncing the composition of causes the general state
of affairs in social phenomena. Having identified the principle with the law of the composition of forces in dynamics, Mill understands it to mean "that though two or more laws interfere with one another, and apparently frustrate or modify one another's operation, yet in reality all are fulfilled, the collective effect being the exact sum of the effects of the causes taken separately." If mechanism is indeed a matter of degree as Smuts seems to think, then both Mill's conception of structure and function as relates to parts and whole and his notion of causation realize it in his sociological disquisitions.

Changes and conversions: 'Mental dynamics' and 'Mental chemistry'

In treating of the synthesis of elements, Mill's eyes are fixed on the parts all along for the fortunes of these human units - their individual well-being through emancipation and cultivation, lay heavily on him. And as conceptions of well-being go, Mill's claim is that, happiness being a good, the good of the whole is but an extension of individual goods.26 His adherence to the utilitarian creed is marked by the following reflection, which he shares with Thomas Carlyle.

Though I hold the good of the species (or rather of its several units) to be the ultimate end, (which is the alpha & omega of my utilitarianism) I believe with the fullest Belief that this end can in no other way be forwarded but by the means you speak of, namely by each taking for his exclusive aim the development of what is best in himself.27

And to George Grote, he writes:

The general happiness, looked upon as composed of as many different units as there are persons, all equal in value except as far as the amount of the happiness itself differs, leads to all the practical doctrines which you lay down... The good of all can only be pursued with any success by each person's taking as his particular department the good of the only individual whose requirements he can thoroughly know; with due precautions to prevent these different persons each cultivating a particular strip of the field, from hindering one another.28

It can hardly be said of Mill that facts about the social whole take precedence in his mind over those about individuals. For as he sees it, the process of collecting in human masses brings about no new social entity with properties and uniformities of its
own, as is true of chemical combinations, and even truer, of organic wholes.

Mill well knows that in the latter cases, there is a breach of the principle of the composition of causes: at some point in the shift from separate to conjunct action, the laws of the elements change into "heteropathic" laws, which are themselves not compounded of the laws of the separate agencies.\textsuperscript{29} Mill considers it important that these special laws be subsumed under more general ones and that departments of knowledge such as chemistry, physiology and psychology be rendered deductive sciences, thereby allowing for sharper foresight and prediction.\textsuperscript{30}

While the composition of causes is said to obtain generally, though not universally, in all classes of phenomena, Mill argues that the science of psychology exemplifies both modes of the conjunct action of causes, the mechanical and the chemical.\textsuperscript{31} We know that Mill assigns 'Mind' no other meaning than that of the sum of its thinking-feeling-willing properties. If, as is his claim, the abstract components and their relations are the only avenue of knowledge towards an understanding of the nature of the whole, then the reduction of Mind to simpler constituents does in fact confer explanatory power to the part.

Psychologically speaking, it bears noticing that it is not merely "when considered as swelling an aggregate" that a part has significance for Mill; in itself, it may have moment as well.\textsuperscript{32} As wholes are constituted in very different ways, parts have different characters and functions according as the change undergone by them as interactants is transmissive or transformative. Thus if one wishes -as Mill undoubtedly does within certain domains of discourse, to preserve the identity of the part while claiming the resultant whole to be more than the sum of its constituents, then the concept of chemical mechanism is appealing. The search for organic analogies is bound to be abortive under the circumstances, for here the identity of the parts is lost and irrecoverable through the process of combination. Mill has a liking for this idea of "mental chemistry",\textsuperscript{33} in fact, makes too much of it, as far as Bain is concerned.\textsuperscript{34}

Take happiness as a concrete whole, for instance. In backing the cause of utilitarianism, Mill's self-appointed task is to reconcile duty and self-regard, while arguing for the utilitarian standard as the sole criterion of morality. The ingredients of happiness are thus a subject of great interest to him. If individual conduct conducive to
the general happiness is to be a realizable moral goal, all human actions cannot be prompted by purely self-regarding motives. In order to transcend the narrow confines of the self and its immediate interests, the search for happiness must implicate something more than self-seeking activity to further one's own pleasurable ends.

As a concrete whole, therefore, happiness is irreducible to simply self-serving practices. While said to be more than the sum of its parts, happiness, as Mill conceives of it, is made up of elements -as, for instance, virtue, which are particularly attractive to him, and the preservation of which he advocates. Mill thinks that he has uncovered the psychological mechanism involved in processing parts, namely, in making disinterested virtue a part of happiness. He writes:

Virtue, according to the utilitarian doctrine, is not naturally and originally part of the end, but it is capable of becoming so; and in those who live it disinterestedly it has become so, and is desired and cherished, not as a means to happiness, but as a part of their happiness. There was no original desire of it, or motive to it, save its conduciveness to pleasure, and especially to protection from pain. But through the association thus formed it may be felt a good in itself, and desired as such with as great intensity as any other good... Whatever is desired otherwise than as a means to some end beyond itself, and ultimately to happiness, is desired as itself a part of happiness, and is not desired for itself until it has become so.35

Lest virtuous and self-regarding conduct should seem as strange bedfellows, and, as "metaphysical parts"36 of happiness, introspectively indiscernible, one need only recall the properties of chemical compounds, for chemical analogies afford Mill aid in making his point.

A chemical structure produced by the combination of elements is an altogether different substance. With properties and laws of its own, it is more than the sum of its parts. While no trace of the properties of the ingredients is observable in the new compound, the identity of the components is not permanently lost and thus irremeable. For the ingredients along with their properties can be made to reappear through the process of chemical analysis. Mill himself concedes that "the idea of chemical composition is an idea of transformation, but of a transformation which is incomplete; since we consider the oxygen and hydrogen to be present in the water as oxygen and
hydrogen, and capable of being discovered in it if our senses were sufficiently keen".37

Mill's appropriation of chemical concepts and categories for psychological purposes prompts the following comment. "That a complex feeling generated out of a number of single ones, should be as unlike to any of those from which it is generated, as the sensation of white is unlike the sensations of the seven prismatic colours, is no unexampled or rare fact in our sensitive nature."38 The import of this truth is clear to Mill: he believes it to be of a kind which, once ascertained, "evidently opens a new and wider range of possibilities for the generation of mental phenomena by means of association."39

Mill's liking for this idea of 'mental chemistry' has significant bearing on the matter at hand. It allows him to reason from chemical analogies with the result that virtue as a part of happiness is preserved after all, and when considered as 'swelling' this resultant whole, secures the 'happiness' theory from charges of being a doctrine worthy only of selfish 'swine', whose sense pleasures would be the only objects of pursuit.40

As Mill sees a likeness between chemical and psychological phenomena, he thinks it appropriate to borrow concepts of structure and function from chemistry. Yet by his own admission cases of heteropathic effects are not all alike in that the ascertainment of their causes requires different modes of investigation. I here quote Mill's words at some length.

Take, for instance, the heteropathic laws of mind; that portion of the phenomena of our mental nature which are analogous to chemical rather than to dynamical phenomena... The product, in these cases, is generated by its various factors; but the factors cannot be reproduced from the product; just as a youth can grow into an old man, but an old man cannot grow into a youth. We cannot ascertain from what simple feelings any of our complex states of mind are generated, as we ascertain the ingredients of a chemical compound, by making it, in its turn, generate them. We can only, therefore, discover these laws by the slow process of studying the simple feelings themselves, and ascertaining synthetically, by experimenting on the various combinations of which they are susceptible, what they, by their mutual action upon one another, are capable of generating.41

Obviously Mill does not think the analogy so distant as to abandon the
comparative search altogether. Notwithstanding the marked differences between the two classes of phenomena, his use of chemical analogy in fact allows him to speak of a synthetic union of parts of a greater intimacy than would be possible if arguing from mechanical analogies only. But though Mill's analogical move should call to mind the creative advance exhibited in passing from physical mixtures to chemical compositions, he has not yet managed to circumvent mechanism for all that.

If the preservation of the identity of components is a mark of mechanism, as is Smuts's claim, then the concept of mechanism, though of a very different character from that displayed in physical combinations, is yet applicable to chemical structures. For the identity of elements, while masked in chemical combinations, is nevertheless ultimately retained. Hence if the concept of mechanism is applicable to chemical structures, then also to psychological complexes by force of Mill's analogical reasoning; and if applicable to cases of 'mental chemistry', then perforce to cases of 'mental dynamics'.

Settling order under Associative rule

As a construction of Mill's doing, then, mechanism is reared by associative building. As yet another example of the fact, let us consider how order comes about in the psychological world of Mill's conception. One first notes that so long as "the law of association as the governing principle" reigns undisturbed in the psychological realm, order is said to prevail. But then again the order of which Mill speaks is realized mechanically. There is no mistaking the fact that associative laws are but laws of the parts, the whole being without an ordering principle of its own. Thus on Mill's terms all movement, that is, all change, in psychological life is explicable by laws according to which parts interact, as is the explanation of motion in mechanics.

As psychical elements are linked together and recall one another in accordance with laws of association, they behave in fixed and uniform ways in relation to each other. And as mental phenomena cohere, attract, and resuscitate one another in law-like fashion, they establish regular patterns which are themselves objectively determined both by the order established in the universe and by the "more or less interesting nature"
of these impressions.\textsuperscript{45}

Lest one should think that interest, in settling order, bears evidence of subjective determination and selection - that is, active determination by a selective subject or self, one need only probe Mill's meaning to decide against the idea. For all that he intends to say is that "when we have seen two objects or had two feelings together, we think of them together, and not otherwise; and...the strength of their connexion in our remembrance, depends jointly upon the number of previous conjunctions in fact or in thought, and upon the intensity of the original impressions."\textsuperscript{46} And in determining which among the many ideas associated with any one idea will actually be recalled, Mill has no misgivings about conferring power to the object itself by assigning the idea, and not the subject, the active role of selective agent. Note his words.

...every sensation or idea is far from recalling, whenever it occurs, all the ideas with which it is associated. It never recalls more than a portion of them, and a portion different at different times... The selection which it makes among them depends on the truth already stated, that we seldom or never have only one idea at a time...

An idea $A$, coexisting in the mind with an idea $B$, will not select the same idea from among those associated with it, that it would if it occurred alone or with a different accompaniment.\textsuperscript{47}

Providing the "fixed law of connexion"\textsuperscript{48} is operative, then, the psychical part will be subjected to its command and will work cooperatively with others in accordance with its rules, and not towards the maintenance of the whole. Irrespective of its function within the psychological whole, and in fact, with Mill abnegating the idea of the whole altogether, the part obtains its work permit, so to speak, via the instrumentality of the associative law. An adequate account of things psychological by Mill's terms thus states that under certain assignable conditions, certain psychological events follow according to mental laws.

Mill figures that there is no need to assume some kind of "Substance" as the connecting bond between phenomena.\textsuperscript{49} In fact, in proposing a plan for resolving the philosophical difficulties which, in Mill's mind, attach to the ideas of unity, whole and parts, he thinks he has found a way around Substance altogether. On the subject of Matter, let us consider the following, says Mill.
...let us only then, think away the support, and suppose the phaenomena to remain, and to be held together in the same groups and series by some other agency, or without any agency but an internal law, and every consequence follows without Substance, for the sake of which Substance was assumed... Descartes thought that a material medium filling the whole space between the earth and the sun, was required to enable them to act on one another; but it has been found sufficient to suppose an immaterial law of attraction, and the medium and its vortices dropped off as superfluities.50

And what seems to a naturalist of Mill's stamp like a good idea in regard to Matter must surely be worth its salt when applied to the subject of Mind. Or so he seems to think. For within the domain of psychological discourse, it is indeed clear that Mill feels no need to suppose any other directing head than that of the associative law of thought, as the efficacious agency of order and bond of union between parts. Considered as a question of psychology, the Ego or Self cannot lay claim to the title as Mill denies it substantive reality.51 He has all along made very clear that "efficient causes" in the form of voluntary agencies would constitute no part of his discourse, psychological, logical, or other.52

So be it, the "great fundamental law of Association of Ideas" can have all the "power" and explanatory "sufficiency" claimed for it by Mill.53 But, as a consequence, it will be noticed that the automaticity implicit in the operation of the associative law renders Mill's conceptions of order, unity, parts and whole, "mechanical".54 Simply observe just how powerful, autonomous and self-acting mental phenomena have become by means of the law of association: mental complexes are said to "shape themselves" out of simpler elements while psychical objects (such as the idea of an end in view) are represented as the source of the unity and coherence belonging to trains of thought.55 Consider Mill's explanation of the latter circumstance.

The ideas all follow one another in an associated train, each calling up by association the one which immediately follows it; but the perpetual presence or continual recurrence of the idea of the end, determines, within certain limits, which of the ideas associated with each link of the chain shall be aroused and form the next link.56

Mill's language gives the impression that the human mind is operated by automation:
as its autopilot, the principle of association is that most indispensable device regulating psychological operations.

The essentiality of association is everywhere in evidence and here instanced in the following words by Mill. Truths, he claims, which give a science its scientific constitution by putting an end to its empirical period are those "which are fit to form the connecting links among the rest: truths which are to it what the law of gravitation is to astronomy, what the elementary properties of the tissues are to physiology, and we will add...what the laws of association are to psychology."57 Obviously, that which is said to make the psychological science positive is not about to be set aside by Mill.

It is unmistakably clear that within the realm of Association psychology, it is the "tie of an association",58 however produced, which holds things together in the system. But that is not the whole story as told by Mill. For he goes on to talk about associations which, if "sufficiently riveted", can "do their work spontaneously" without volitional interventionism; that is, without requiring any active effort of attention.59 If so, there would seem to be nothing left but for the human mind to assume a passive character, under the conditions stipulated by the associationists. And yet they insist on the need to distinguish between an active and a passive mind.

Mill seems untroubled by the thought, and unhesitating in his pronouncement, that the mind "is active as well as passive".60 A restless James Ward would later contend that "altogether passive the mind is not even in sensation", for the subject must receive it.61 There is obviously no such thing as a passive mind for Ward. Mill is himself content to declare the mind "a mere recipient of impressions", meaning one and only one thing by it, namely, that in sensation, "the mind...does not act, but is acted upon".62 There is obviously such a thing as a passive mind for Mill.
BAIN AND MECHANISTIC THINKING

If a psychological treatise on the human mind is to read different from a collection of instructions bearing on the design, construction and operation of a machine, it must suggest a solution to the problem of activity. Bain offers to do so. And Mill takes him up on it with a view to broadcasting "the first capital improvement which Mr. Bain has made in the Association Psychology as left by his predecessors": namely, that of recognizing an "active element, or spontaneity, in the mind itself."63

In search of psychological activity: SPONTANEITY

But surely Mill is mistaken here. For Bain's discussion of spontaneous activity is cast in physiological, and not psychological, terms. Mill might have minded his own words, for he himself, while pointing to the physiological discovery of the "originating power" of the grey matter, refers to this activity as "the spontaneous energy of the nervous centre".64

If purposeful and active beings are the social desideratum -as it seems to be for Bain and Mill alike, then we are entitled to ask, along with James Ward, what exactly is the psychological equivalent of this so-called "physiological truth".65 Ward would undoubtedly remark that if we are to transcend the realm of mechanism, and therefore, to give credence to this notion of activity as psychologically real and relevant, then we must avoid confusing physical and psychological standpoints at all costs. Let us first consider Mill's words as relate to Bain's doctrine of spontaneity.

[Mr. Bain] holds that the brain does not act solely in obedience to impulses, but is also a self-acting instrument; that the nervous influence which, being conveyed through the motory nerves, excites the muscles into action, is generated automatically in the brain itself, not, of course, lawlessly and without a cause, but under the organic stimulus of nutrition; and manifests itself in the general rush of bodily activity... This doctrine...supplied him with a simple explanation of the origin of voluntary power.66

Because Bain agrees with Mill in thinking the mind passive in sensation, he sees
reason to ground his theory of voluntary power in some fact of the type that can explain the active half of the mental phenomena. He goes about this by broadening his repertoire of primordial elements. The problem that faces Mill and Bain is by the former's own admission a cause of trouble for associationists; and it is that "activity cannot possibly be generated from passive elements". James Ward does not have this problem because he treats the idea of a single subjective activity -of which purposive movement and intellection are but special cases, as a matter of psychological fact and an inescapable truth. There is no such thing as a passive mind for Ward.

The activity of which Ward speaks is that of being conscious or attending. Unlike those many different types of which Bain speaks, Ward regards this single all-important activity of the subject as an essential constituent of each and every concrete mental state. He holds to the view that as subjects, we are always active. Bain, as we know, is uncompromising on the subject of the Ego, refusing to accept it as valid psychological datum. And yet he wants to be seen as settling the dispute. But then, note the nature of his concession to Ward.

Now it is our duty to receive any suggestions calculated to improve our nomenclature of the ultimate facts of mind. I accept the doctrine of the Subject in the meantime, with certain provisos. One is that it shall not be a nucleus and hiding-place of mysticism; another, that I may take it up and put it down as may seem convenient. I admit, however, that this last begs the question at issue, namely, whether it is any more than a verbal convenience, or useful fiction. Yet I do not see any insuperable difficulty in making the mind the collective 'Ego', when Mr. Ward admits that the three facts, Feeling, Conation, Cognition, include everything. As to "the peculiar stress everywhere laid on Attention" by Ward, Bain confesses that it is "somewhat discomposing." He counters Ward's suggestion with his own by substituting the designation "mental tension" or "conscious intensity" for the term 'attention', while trying to restrict the use of the latter word. As Ward considers the terms 'tension' and 'intensity' to be of different dimensions, he does not believe that they are comparable. At any rate he seems to think that,

[the really important question is whether the contrast of Subject and Object is of such a fundamental character as to justify the resolution of psychological facts into two
entirely distinct categories - the one subjective faculty or function of Action-under-Feeling or Consciousness on the one side, and a Field of Consciousness, consisting of Objects, Ideas or Presentations, on the other... Some modern psychologists... have not been... guarded; for they have rejected the concept of subjective activity altogether. They hold the doctrine here called Presentationism... 73

As Bain makes little of Ward's theoretical innovations, he is still on the lookout for some form of primitive activity that can prove conceptually adequate in grounding his theory of voluntary power. He locates its type in the workings of the nervous system, which is said to be the originating source of this active element. The question has a wide import for Bain whose conviction is that "without spontaneity, the growth of the Will is inexplicable." 74 And if inexplicable, then so is the notion of psychological beings displaying purpose and forethought. Clearly then, Bain's choice of an active element is of consequence.

On Bain's view the Mind complex is made up of three parts, namely, feeling, intellect and volition. Volition is given the following explanation: "[a]ll beings recognized as possessing mind can not only feel, but also ACT. The putting forth of force to attain some end marks a mental nature. Eating, running, flying, sowing, building, speaking - are operations rising above the play of feeling. They all originate in some feelings to be satisfied, which gives them the character of proper mental actions... To this feeling-prompted activity we give the name Volition." 75 As the will is said to be a growth, mental action of a voluntary nature must develop from a parent source of activity, whence Bain's search for a primordial active element. As he sees it, the volitional tread must be secured on the foothold of primitive movements: we must first get going - albeit ramdomly, before we can be said to display volitional powers.

The doctrine of spontaneity serves Bain's need. He hypothesizes that human beings have an internal reservoir of nervous power which spontaneously discharges itself independently of any external stimulation. This "self-prompting" nervous force which proceeds from the nerve centres to the muscles and thus issues in muscular motion and bodily movement, is designated by Bain spontaneous activity. 76 In line with his hypothesis, self-originating muscular activity is the tendency of the moving system to go into action irrespective of any antecedent sensational or volitional stimulus.
Bain's consideration of activity as a more intimate property of the constitution than sensation is premised on spontaneity. He claims that random movements, centrally fuelled and self-prompted, serve to bring objects within reach, which, in turn, become the many sensuous stimulations that activate the circles of nervous mechanism. "Movement", writes Bain, "precedes sensation, and is at the outset independent of any stimulus from without; ...action is a more intimate and inseparable property of our constitution than any of our sensations, and in fact enters as a component part into every one of the senses, giving them the character of compounds while itself is a simple and elementary property."77

Bain thus looks on spontaneity as a necessary supplement to the doctrine of the circuitous course of nervous conveyance from sense to movement.78 Prioritizing action over sensibility, Bain marks the antithesis between movement and sensation as the most vital distinction within the sphere of mind. Conscious testimony of the fact has in Bain's opinion physiological translatability. His is the speculation that the motor influence which proceeds from the brain to the muscles and issues in muscular movement has as its psychological concomitant the feeling of exerted power (active mental state). "No other hypothesis", says Bain, "so well represents the total opposition of nature between states of energy exerted, and states of passive stimulation."79 No other hypothesis, retorts Ward, has so well "tended to sustain an undue separation of so-called 'sensory' from so-called 'motor' presentations,"

as if living experience were literally an alternation of two independent states, one wholly passive and the other wholly active, corresponding to the anatomical distinction of organs of sense and organs of movement. The subject of experience or Ego does not pass to and fro between a sensorium commune or intelligence department and a motorium commune or executive, is not in successive intervals merely receptive or merely active, still less always passive; but is rather always actively en rapport with an active Non-Ego, commonly called the External World.80

This is a far cry from Bain's position, to say the least. And yet in regarding spontaneity as a primitive human endowment and an important source of active power, Bain believes that he has effected a clearing in the psychological world by differentiating his account from prior passive renditions of the mind. The conditions of
clearing are on Bain's own terms, however. For while he assures us that we are not merely passive recipients of outward impressions but psychologically active beings as well, the phenomenon of activity is yet cast by physical processing.

We are led to believe that we are fundamentally active by the light of Bain's doctrine of spontaneity. Now we may choose to follow Bain's lead. Only, we must know how he has set the course. We must realize that as projected by him, the awareness of activity is intimately connected with feelings of muscular movement which are themselves supposed to be physiologically determined by the nervous force issuing from the brain via the motor nerves. So though Bain tells us that the mind is active, the activity of which he speaks is that of muscular motion and bodily movement, and the stimulus to which he points as its originating source is not mental, but physical. Contrary to Mill's words, the active element or spontaneity is not to be found in the mind after all, but in the brain. Bain himself describes it as the "spontaneous discharge of the active energy of the nerve centres".

In acknowledging the existence of active and passive states (feelings of exerted energy and sensations), Bain thinks that he has found a way of speaking of psychological activity. But then to talk up active mental states does not render activity. For a muscular feeling, as such, does not constitute a psychical act. As Ward would say, this is "to look for evidence of subjective activity in the wrong place". To say nothing, then, of the fact that an 'activity' cannot be generated from a 'state' of feeling, it bears noticing that under Bain's tendance, the initiative of this physically construed activity exists in the nerve centres. Bain assumes that it is only as it is guided by sensibility that spontaneous activity takes on the form of voluntary exertion, thereby expressing the volitional mood of our psychological being.

In one place, Bain lists the spontaneous force as one of three stimuli productive of muscular motions, the other two being attributed to the stimulation of the feelings and to the influence of the will. Obviously, no stimulus can be called 'mental' which is by turns spoken of as the "central stimulus in the nervous system", a "mode of power originating with the nerve centres", a "self-acting muscular and cerebral energy", a "central influence", and a "rush of nervous power to the muscles". By speaking at every turn of "the existence of a fund of energy" and of "a high permanent charge of
nervous power", Bain is actually stating a fact of the nervous mechanism, and not of psychological life.\textsuperscript{87} And as he will call no action 'mental' which is not 'feeling-prompted',\textsuperscript{88} it would seem that he has failed to describe and explain psychological activity; a situation, which, if true, sets him back to square one in resolving the problem of activity.

It will be further noticed that we have not yet transcended the realm of mechanism. For this activity is initiated, operated and governed as if by a machine -that of the nervous system, which is clearly uninfluenced by the mind. This activity is caused by, and relates to, a process that involves a strictly physical as opposed to a psychological event. That is to say that it is regulated by physical circumstances. Psychologically powerless we are, then, in the face of an activity labelled 'self-originating', 'self-prompting', 'self-acting', 'spontaneous'. Rather than being described, in psychological terms, as ourselves causal agents of activity, we are in fact portrayed by Bain as mechanically operated on by the automatic workings of nervous centres. The nerve centres are the ones that are represented as the "agency" of action, and of an "activity that seems to sustain itself" at that.\textsuperscript{89}

In search of psychological activity: VOLITION

If spontaneity is the theoretical ground upon which to secure the volitional tread, the foothold might be thought somewhat precarious, because too mechanistically construed to serve as a reliable explanatory basis for the likes of purposive and forethoughtful beings. But as Bain thinks his theory of volition well grounded, we may well turn a hand to the theory itself in search of a conception of activity that shall prove psychologically meaningful. We begin by observing that, at the hand of Bain, voluntary activity unfolds out of something physical, -the nerve centres, the workings of which are self-sustaining, and, as it were, unaffected by psychological effort, as is true of all operations by automation. And then as we search Bain's associationist psychology to penetrate the nature of the concrete purposive individual, we realize that conative action or movement has not a subjective initiative.

In this "psychology without a subject",\textsuperscript{90} we have Bain tendering a representation
of motives as conflicting inter se and a conception of the voluntary resultant as determined by prior states of feeling. Bain reasons that "[a]s in material phenomena, we may have a plurality of forces conspiring or opposing each other, the resultant being arithmetically computable, so in mind we have motives uniting or opposing their strength, the effect being computable (although not with numerical exactness) by adding together those on each side, and noting which is the larger amount."91

It would seem that as Bain's story goes, we, as synthesized agglomerates of feeling-thinking-willing parts, and but passive, thereof, in the face of struggling psychical 'objects', are rendered subjectively helpless in determining the volitional outcome. And the reason for this is not hard to find. For it is quite plain that the notion of self-determination is anathema to Bain who thinks of it as "having a lurking reference to some power behind the scenes, which cannot be stated under the form of a specific motive or end".92

Ward, for one, contends that "the phrase 'conflict of motives', though it may often suffice for descriptive purposes, is a metaphor that has strictly no psychological warrant."93 Bain, on his part, thinks that the emasculation of the self is justified. For he fears that to admit the conception in psychological parlance is likely to bring about a state of lawlessness in the mental realm.94 There is no mistaking Bain's intention here: he will not parley with the enemy. "If Self-determination", he writes, "is held to imply something different from the operation of the motive forces of pleasurable and painful sensibility, coupled with the central spontaneity of the system", there is an imputation on the sufficiency of the common analysis of the mind. Feeling, Volition, and Intellect, as explained with full detail in the present work, must still leave a region unexplored. A fourth or residual department would need to be constituted, the department of 'self' or Me-action, and we should set about the investigation of the laws (or anarchy) prevailing there, as in the three remaining branches. The preliminary question, however, has yet to be disposed of, whether there be any residuum when the phenomena comprised under the common division are taken away. I cannot light upon anything of the sort; and in the setting up of a determining power under the name of 'self', as a contrast to the whole region of motives generated in the manner described, I see only an erroneous conception of
In unfolding the growth and mechanism of the "Active machinery", Bain's exposition is meant to relate and explain the activities of an agent through which voluntary power is exerted and ends achieved. Yet in his book, the only agency seen as exerting the said power is the Will itself. Bain, furthermore, casts off all subjective initiative by securing voluntary acts within the grip of motives and fastening the reins of control onto the intellect, thereby appointing it the guide and regulator of the Will. "When 'I' walk in the fields", writes Bain, "there is nothing but a certain motive, founded in my feelings, operating upon my active organs; the sequence of these two portions of self gives the whole fact. The mode of expression 'I walk' does not alter the nature of the phenomenon." Bain contends that, 

[The whole series of phrases connected with Will-Freedom, Choice, Deliberation, Self-Determination, Power to act if we will -are contrived to foster in us a feeling of artificial importance and dignity, by assimilating the too humble sequence of motive and act to the illustrious functions of the Judge, the Sovereign, the Umpire.

As mentioned earlier, Bain's conception of volition is that of a purposeful mental action induced and determined by a feeling. And in accordance with his tripartite view of the mind, Feeling is one of three leading divisions that includes sensations and emotions, all of which constitute psychical states or objects, respectively. Now though Bain readily speaks of human beings as resolute and determined, it is yet the Will -that is, one of a threesome said to constitute the psychological individual, which is seen to display agential power, by acting upon the muscular system so as to answer emotional prompts. In Bain's psychology, then, it is the Will itself rather than the purposeful individual working for ends which is "crowned with powers of general command", and, as an agent, is meant to take over the function of activity.

It is thus little surprising to find it in "the power of the will" to "work for pleasure or to remove pain", and to "act at once on a motive". We need not hesitate, then, and in fact are encouraged by Bain, to trust in the decisive power of the Will to act for the best whenever faced with opposition. For Bain assures us that it -the Will, that is, and not the subject of experience, knows to "side with" such "interests" as "the
deliverance from pain and the furtherance of pleasure. And in exhibiting its regular mode of working, Bain would have us believe that "the typical will neither deliberates nor resolves, but passes, without interval, from a motive state to an action."

In fact so judicious is this constructive Will at the hand of Bain that in the attempt to form new mental combinations, the volition is that which "singles out" what is needed among previous acquisitions so as to "make the selection and adaptation suited to the end in view." Witness Bain's words.

Out of the two sentences, 'I am going out for the day,' 'I am coming home for the night,' a third sentence is constructed, 'I am going out for the night,' by no further effort of volition than this, namely, to arrest the current of articulation at a certain point in the first, to pass into the second, suspending vocal articulation till the word 'the' is reached, then to tack on the remainder, 'night', to the words already enounced from the other.

Bain explains that "[t]he intellectual forces bring to mind the former acquisitions bearing on the situation, and if no one previous form is strictly applicable, the volition singles out part of one and part of another; and makes successive trials, if need be, until the want is satisfied." If we are willing to concede that it is within the power of the Will to make a "selecting effort", then we might as well go all the way and claim along with Bain that it is "quite equal to the task of cutting down and making up, choosing and rejecting, sorting and re-sorting".

It is however difficult to conceive how a Will can be said to deliberate, resolve, single out, select, detain, control, or otherwise assume agential activity, which is itself but an abstractly devised 'division' of the composite Mind and presumably but a third of the empirical Ego, and which, along with feeling and intellect, Bain labels by turns 'modes', 'attributes', 'faculties', 'energies', 'functions', and 'properties'. Ward would say that such theoretical pronouncements are possible only by equating terms which are nonetheless of different dimensions, and by psychologizing in ignorance of a subject which is yet everywhere implied. From the outset Ward objects to Bain's terminology. "To talk of the intellect as to talk of the will is", according to Ward, "to lapse back into the old faculty theory of mind that we claim to have outgrown. It is the individual subject that thinks as it is the individual subject that wills."

Bain may have thought that he could dispose of the subject or pure Ego by
bargaining the terms of an agreement about it with Ward. Recall that insofar as Ward recognizes feeling-thinking-willing parts to be all-inclusive of the mind as a whole, Bain will consider "making the mind the collective 'Ego'".110 Bain seems to think that "so long as human conduct can be accounted for by assigning certain Sensibilities to pleasure and pain, an Active machinery, and an Intelligence, we need not assume anything else to make up the 'I' or 'self'."111 To say nothing of the fact that the pure and the empirical or collective Ego are not one and the same thing,112 Bain's somewhat cavalier attitude towards the doctrine of the Subject, -thinking that he could somehow 'take it up and put it down as may seem convenient', would give a handle to his critics, of which the most formidable was James Ward. Ward, as we know, stands on the recognition of self and of subjective activity as irresolvable psychological facts.113

Critics such as Ward and others were not content to pay lip service to the notion of a subject of experience. For they were intent on substantiating the psychological reality of active and directive individuals, thereby substituting in the process non-mechanical explanations for passive and deterministic accounts of the human mind. In their view, the psychological answer to the question of voluntary activity needed to be given a clear formulation, namely, by recognizing volition as the work of the subject who strives to realize ends. I here quote Ward's words at some length so as to mark the conceptual differences that polarize Bain and Ward on the topic of psychological agency.

Psychology without a soul -as the 'rational psychologists' described soul -is quite possible but not psychology without a self, a being that in its acquaintance and intercourse with objects -that is, directly or indirectly, with other selves -feels and acts. Let the substantiality of this being be interpreted how it may, the actuality of it is past question and therefore never questioned... Of what nature the agency is to which we owe our sense-data is a problem but to suppose that we ourselves are only phenomenal and resolvable into sense-data is after all impossible; for how then do we come to talk of the phenomenal as distinct from the real? But when we know both it is possible perhaps to talk of 'degrees of reality'; not, however, if we deny our own reality altogether.114

In vindicating the duality of subject and object in the unity of experience, critics
of Ward's stamp protested against the objectification of Mind and vehemently opposed the associationist reification of the objective factor of psychical life. They believed that to collapse the subjective side of experience into mere 'contents of consciousness' - that is, to resolve the knower into the known, and to then transfer the activity of the self to the psychical objects themselves, was, theoretically speaking, to render the concrete individual functionally powerless and psychologically insignificant.115

As Bain recognizes neither self nor subjective function as fundamental and irreducible psychological facts, the agency of activity which on a Wardian account is assumed by the subject appears in his book on the side of the object. It ensues from this that in searching his treatises for an explanation of activity, the concept tends to elude us as both meaning and agential determination are difficult to decipher. It is for these reasons that Bain's objectors judged his account of activity to be lacking in credibility. Consider Ward's dilemma.

If I were to say to a child: It is the spoon that eats the porridge, and the fork that eats the meat, he would be puzzled; and still more puzzled if I were to add: But, of course, it's you that eat the breakfast. If any one were to say: The poems themselves are the poet, or the laws themselves are the legislators, we should confidently declare such statements nonsensical... Is empirical psychology to end in incongruities and contradictions which philosophy is hereafter to set right?116

Ward considers it a misapprehension of subjective agency and a misuse of psychology's final word concerning the self to claim that "the thoughts themselves are the thinkers",117 or again, to talk of a "sensation, as cognisant of extension, resistance, colour".118 For not only does this transfer of activity from subject to object baffle the understanding; more importantly, it is experientially unmeaning to the concrete psychological individual. In prioritizing conative activity over cognition, Ward's psychology is meant to invalidate mechanical conceptions of activity by privileging the experience of determined persons and rendering its expression psychologically credible without disfiguring the face of reality.

Though the foothold of spontaneity seemed a somewhat precarious base for the voluntary advance, we nonetheless willingly engaged on the volitional tread along with Bain in search of a conception of activity that, while stateable and understandable in
non-mechanical terms, would prove psychologically significant. But now we find that Bain's theoretical move is somewhat labored under the disadvantage of conceptual vagueness. As agential indetermination renders Bain's concept of activity elusive, it thereby casts discredit on his account of volition while the experience of purposive and forethoughtful agents is psychologically underrepresented yet again.

In search of psychological activity: THOUGHT

Setting purposive movement aside for now, we turn to intellection in the hope that Bain's reasons for claiming to have put activity on the psychological agenda are good and cogent. For surely Bain's avowed intention to provide an exposition of cognitive powers rather than products of cognition will make intellection known as a case of psychological activity. The agency of action has of course to be determined. And here Bain's conception of the workings of associating principles gives his thought away as regards agency. But let us first ascertain what Bain wishes to accomplish by his writings on the intellect.

In the science of mind we have to deal not with cognitions, things cognized, or the products of cognition, but with the cognitive powers, with the forces, functions, or attributes of mind called intellectual. A classification of our cognitions may throw light upon the cognitive powers; we must make use of them in illustration, but what we have mainly to deal with, is the process, or the means of arriving at those cognitions. The means are, as I believe,...the three primary powers of Difference, Agreement, and Retentiveness. Consequently I consider that the unfolding of the mechanism of the intellect consists in the systematic exposition of these powers, and in the reference to them of all the popularly recognized faculties.119

One first notices that Bain seems to equate terms which -as was argued.120 belong to different categories. In the above quoted passage, he speaks of 'Difference, Agreement, and Retentiveness' as variously 'powers', 'forces', 'functions', 'attributes' -and elsewhere as "operations", "properties", "activities", "processes", "energies", "faculties", "exercises" and "aptitudes", as though these terms were substitutable.121 But surely the word 'function' which in signifying a performance of some sort implies activity,
connotes something very different to that suggested by the word 'property' which means a quality belonging to an individual or thing. And what are we to make of powers which Bain calls by turns 'aptitudes', 'processes' and 'attributes', irrespective of semantic differences between the terms?

By sampling Bain's psychological output, we may possibly gain insight into the notion of activity as instantiated by intellection. We thus begin with his introductory remarks which bear on the definition and divisions of Mind. Bain there tells us that "THOUGHT, Intellect, or Cognition" is one of three "properties", the sum of which "classes of phenomena" (including Feeling and Volition) "is a definition of mind, by a positive enumeration of its most comprehensive qualities." Of the division of Thought, as such, he has this to say.

The concluding attribute of the mental constitution is THOUGHT, Intelligence, or Cognition... The first fact implied in it is Discrimination, or sense of difference... Another fact is Similarity, or sense of agreement, which is interwoven with the preceding in all the processes of thought... A third fact or property of the Intellect is Retentiveness, commonly understood by the familiar names 'memory' and 'recollection'. This power is essential to the operation of the two former powers...

Determined as he is to lay down boundaries between departments, Bain thinks that "after the foregoing enumeration of Intellectual attributes, we can draw the line between Thought and Feeling, which is to complete the definition of mind, so far as is needful at the outset." In his wrap-up, Bain reaches the following conclusion.

In proportion as a mental experience contains the facts named discrimination, comparison, and retentiveness, it is an Intellectual experience; and in proportion as it is wanting in these, and shows itself in pleasure or pain, it is of the nature of Feeling. The very same state of mind may have both an intellectual side and an emotional side; indeed, this is a usual occurrence...

The exercise of Thought is greatly mixed up with Volition also, but there is rarely any difficulty in distinguishing the two functions. Indeed, it is hardly possible for us to exist in one exclusive state.

With Intellect thus placed in proper perspective and confined within borders, Bain makes a pledge: his treatment of Thought will aim "at a full exposition of the
Intellectual properties." Let us take stock of his words, then, for the purpose of comprehending his position in relation to the notion of activity. Three points seem clear so far.

Firstly, though Bain intends, under Intellect, to expound cognitive powers and not cognitions nor products of cognition, he yet talks about 'Thought, Intellect, or Cognition' as alternately 'properties', 'functions', 'qualities', 'exercise', 'attributes', 'processes', 'activities' and 'state', while 'sense', 'power', 'property', 'attribute' - and elsewhere "mode" and "faculty," are terms referable to discrimination, similarity (comparison) and retentiveness.

Now while Bain himself uses these terms interchangeably, it is difficult to think of them as being of the same dimensions and as severally suggestive of activity. For though such words as 'process' and 'exercise' indeed imply action, others, as 'attribute' and 'quality', do not, while some - 'thought' and 'cognition', for instance, are yet ambiguous in that they may mean either an act or a product of this act. As regards Bain's analysis of mind, Ward has this to say.

At the outset we are told of three properties or functions of Mind, as if there were no difference between predicking property and function; whereas, as soon as we raise the question, we become aware that while everything has properties, functions - unless metaphorically employed - pertain only to agents. If Mind is to be viewed as having functions it must be viewed as an agent. When we look for a description of the three functions, we find in each case that an enumeration is given us instead, and that the facts enumerated are ranged under three different categories. Feeling includes certain impressions, states or modes of excitement; Will comprises certain actions, and Intellect includes certain powers. Now states, actions and powers are certainly not congruent conceptions: a state or an impression is not a function, though to receive an impression or to change a state may be; a function again is not an action, but the performance of an action, and even powers are not functions though necessarily presupposed in them. Hence, no sooner introduced by Bain to the topic of intellectual activity than we can't seem to get the hang of it because stated in indefinite terms.

Secondly, a book on the intellect which purports to be by turns an exposition of
the "cognitive powers" and of the "Intellectual properties" - and again, of the "attributes of Thought" and of the "activities of the intellect", \(^{129}\) not only speaks of mental 'acts', but of mental 'states' as well, in this department of Mind. Bain's terminology is indeed proof of it as we shall see presently. Problems arise, however, when the same intellectual fact is said to be both a 'function' and a 'state', and again, an 'activity' and a 'feeling'. For then the concept of activity tends to elude us yet again.

Consider the following. According to Bain, discrimination, similarity and retentiveness are intellectual 'powers'. We are told, for instance, that when we "exercise...the identifying function", we exemplify the "power of similarity", while the "discriminating function" attests the "power" of difference.\(^{130}\) Bain is quick to remind us that were we not empowered to retain impressions in the first place ("power" of retentiveness), "we could not discriminate" and "we could not identify", as such.\(^{131}\) There is so far nothing objectionable in these ideas as thus expressed by Bain, whose pledge, be it recalled, is to expound the 'activities' of the intellect.

Bain's plan does not go off without a hitch, however. For while we seem meant to conceive of discrimination and similarity as severally 'powers', 'forces', 'functions' and 'processes', Bain also refers to them as the "feeling" or "sense of difference" (discrimination) and the "feeling" or "sense of agreement" (similarity) respectively.\(^{132}\) On the topic of the consciousness of difference, Bain writes thus.

Discrimination or Feeling of Difference is an essential of intelligence... The beginning of knowledge, or ideas, is the discrimination of one thing from another. Where we are most discriminative, as in our higher senses, we are most intellectual. Even with reference to our pleasures and pains, we perform an intellectual operation when we recognize them as differing in degree...\(^{133}\)

Bain looks on the "conscious state arising from Agreement in the midst of difference... [as] equally marked and equally fundamental. Supposing us to experience, for the first time, a certain sensation, as redness; and after being engaged with other sensations, to encounter redness again; we are struck with the feeling of identity or recognition; the old state is recalled at the instance of the new, by the fact of agreement, and we have the sensation of red, together with a new and peculiar consciousness, the consciousness of agreement in diversity..."\(^{134}\)
It seems safe to assume that in speaking of 'consciousness' of agreement and difference, Bain is not using the term in the Wardian sense of attention, which word implies subjective activity. For not only does Bain reject the notion of a single subjective activity as an irreducible psychological datum; he in fact relegates attention to an altogether different domain. Indeed Bain considers attention to be an exercise of volition only, and physiologically reducible at that, being in the nature of a nervous stimulant ("cerebral energy") to voluntary muscles. Bain's conception of attention is formed by physiological casting, and thus shaped, is of no psychological import: to fix the attention is in Bain's book to direct nervous currents which prompt muscular movements.

By 'consciousness' of difference and agreement, then, Bain actually means a 'feeling', as such. And we know that in Bain's psychology, 'feelings' constitute 'states' of mind, -that which Ward designates 'contents of consciousness'. Bain's expression is thus ambiguous: by his construction, the facts of discrimination and similarity implied in Thought are spoken of as both 'activities' and 'states'. Ward's critical estimate of Bain's exposition speaks to some of these difficulties. I here quote his words at some length.

...although at the outset Prof. Bain has distinguished Feelings as made up of states from Intellect which consists of powers, yet he passes by an easy transition from discrimination to a "consciousness of difference," and then to a "feeling of difference"... Nobody confounds painting with pictures or singing with songs, yet here we have just such a confusion of the activity implied in consciousness with the objects or products of that activity. Nay, in some sort the case is even worse. When we are told that as intellectual the mind discriminates, we expect to find that, apart from this activity, the "states" of which it is conscious are not discriminated. But presently we see the tables turned: the function seems now to belong to the "states", and not to whatever is conscious of the states: the singing arises from the song, and not the song from the singing... Every process presupposes appropriate material; but the process is more than the material for all that. Here we have process, material and product continually confused, because all alike are styled states of consciousness. Nothing hides so effectually as familiarity; once
committed to this one term, therefore, it is small wonder if the constant element, the activity implied in 'conscious', the 'I think' which, as Kant said, must be conceived as accompanying all my presentations, should drop out of sight... It may be argued that neither the 'activity' which risks escaping attention because concealed in a 'state', nor the 'feeling' which chances to appear under the guise of a 'power', make for an intelligible conception of intellectual activity.

Thirdly, having adopted a threefold partition of the mind, Bain seems chargeable with an inconsistency, namely, that of including feeling in the intellect. But of course Bain thinks that his classificatory scheme of the feelings provides a ready-made answer to the objection. The question at issue here is whether Bain's procedure keeps his conceptions both of activity and of agency of action from being muddled. Recall that in delimiting the spheres of Thought and Feeling, Bain avers that insofar as we discriminate, identify and retain, we undergo an intellectual experience. Short of this, and insofar as we are simply pleased or pained, our experience is said to be of an emotional kind. He writes:

When the mental outburst is characterized mainly by pleasure or pain, we are said to be under a state of feeling. When the prominent circumstance is discrimination of the two distinct modes of the transition, we are occupied intellectually... In states of enjoyment or suffering, we cannot be strictly devoid of the consciousness of difference; but we abstain from the exercise of the discriminating (and the identifying) function, and follow out the consequences of a state of feeling as such, these being to husband the pleasure and abate the pain, by voluntary actions.

Bain thus seems to distinguish between intellectual activity and emotional susceptibility. But presently we are told that "the very same state of mind may have both an intellectual side and an emotional side..." Now this is somewhat confusing. Just when the conception of intellectual activity seemed within reach and our psychological experience of it thereby validated, it escapes the understanding yet again. For we now realize that the experience of which Bain speaks is that of a 'state of mind' which he describes as two-sided. Bain seems to have shifted gears here: conceptually speaking, it is as though having gone to ground some place, intellectual activity now resurfaces...
under the guise of a 'side' appendant to a 'state', and to a 'feeling' at that. In support of his point, Bain puts sensation forward as one such example of a two-sided state of mind, which, as he claims, comes "partly under Feeling, and partly under Thought."141

We are meant to understand that inasmuch as a feeling has intellectual properties—as, say, an intellectual sensation, "whose character it is to call forth the sensibilities to difference and to agreement", it is best comprehended under the head 'Thought'.142 But if so, then it would seem that Bain's exposition of 'Intellect' does not consist solely in the unfolding of "the thinking function of the mind."143 And if not, then Bain's exposition must be sufficiently clear as to enable us to distinguish between cognitive power and cognition as such, and, hence, to determine the answer to the problem of intellectual activity.

Classification, as we have seen, is a hard-and-fast rule by Bain's book. Now though "States of Feeling" are said to be "one of...three distinct manifestations of our mental nature", Bain readily admits that "an absolute line of separation is not always possible" between Feeling and Thought.144 Bain thinks that the delineation of the feelings is complicated by the fact that they have what he calls "aspects", "properties" or "characters".145 This is what Bain has to say by way of explaining his Natural History approach to the feelings.

A feeling may have a certain volitional aspect, together with its own proper characters: thus the mental state caused by intense cold is of the nature of a feeling in the proper acceptation of the term; we recognize it as a mode of consciousness of the painful kind, but inasmuch as it stimulates us to performing actions for abating, or freeing ourselves from, the pain, there attaches to it a volitional character also. In like manner, every state that can be reproduced afterwards as a recollection, or retained as an idea, has by that circumstance a certain intellectual character.146

According to Bain's plan, then, feelings not only have characters as Feeling, but volitional and intellectual aspects also. And by intellectual characters, Bain here means the "Susceptibility to Discrimination and to Agreement", as well as the "Degree of Retainability, that is, Ideal Persistence and Recoverability."147 Bain is inconsistent in his meaning, however. For elsewhere he might just as well be talking about the discriminating power itself, and not simply the discriminative susceptibility, as being
the rightful property of sensations and ideas alike. In arguing the case for the identical seat of actual and revived feelings in the brain, for instance, Bain says the following:

The identity between actual and revived feelings shortens our labour by enabling us to transfer much of our knowledge of the one to the other. The properties that we find to hold of sensation in the actual, we may after a certain allowance ascribe to the ideal. Thus the qualities of the sense of sight in any one person, as for example, its discriminating power, would belong likewise to the visual ideas. The senses are in this way a key to the intellect.148

It bears noticing that while Bain could have assigned the power to the subject, he chose instead to credit the sensation with an intellectual power. This incongruous story lands him in trouble. For it turns out that as agents of action, sensations and ideas are in this way the discriminators. Travelling the intellectual distance from this suggestion to the idea that 'the thoughts themselves are the thinkers'149 involves no far journey here.

For all his talk of 'Thought' as an exposition of cognitive powers, Bain has still not settled the question of intellectual activity in any definite or intelligible way. For difficulties are numerous: note the vague terminology, the representation of intellectual facts of an otherwise evasive character, the projection of contour lines of yet indefinite marking, and the delineation of 'States of Feeling' of dubious appendage. All of these render Bain's meaning uncertain as regards activity and agency of action. An additional source of perplexity, -that of an ambiguity in his expression as pertains to the associative law, further complicates Bain's text.

It is somewhat ironic to note that though Bain along with Mill insists on distinguishing between the scientific and the politico-ethical senses of the term 'law' (law as assertion, law as command),150 it does not keep him from occasionally confounding the two meanings. This happens when Bain ascribes action to the associative 'law' as its agent while conferring powers of command to it, which governance implies the exercise of authority. It happens, then, when Bain overlooks the distinction between associative 'law' (as "statement of uniformity")151 and intellectual 'power' (as process) as such, and construes intellectual operations as the work of laws (principles) and powers alike.152 The following words by Bain are a case in point.
It now remains to show how the force of reinstatement by Similarity can operate in carrying forward the work of Acquisition. We have seen that the associating principle of Contiguity must needs be the groundwork of Acquisition in general; but when any new train can bring up, from the past, some nearly similar train, the labour of a separate acquirement is thereby saved; the points of difference between the new and the old, are all that is left for Contiguity to engraft on the mental system.

When a workman is to be taught a new operation in his art, there will necessarily be, along with certain matters of novelty, a large amount of identity with his already acquired habits; hence, in order to conquer the operation, he will require to repeat it just as often as will suffice for fixing, by the plastic operation of Contiguity, all those original steps and combinations.153

Even though Bain's express intention is to exemplify the workings of the retentive power under the title of the law of contiguity or adhesiveness,154 he yet overshoots the mark. For it is only too often the principle itself and not the power as such, which is seen to be operative in the performance of intellectual work. Numerous are the instances in which Bain speaks of the "operation of the adhesive principle" and of the "plastic power of Contiguity", and again, of the "operation of the force of Contiguity" and of an "adhesiveness [which] comes in aid" in the work of acquisition.155

Under these circumstances, the ability to act which the word 'power' implies thus becomes the possession of the 'law', which makes for a confused and perplexing account of both activity and agency of action. It is because represented by Bain as forces that laws, like some constituted authority and ruler, exert power as such, and in exercising influence, are said to "regulate the stream and Succession of our Thoughts".156

Noting that Bain's laws of Relativity, Contiguity157 and Similarity are identified under different names, we are at once struck with the fact that the varying use of terms is problematic. For Bain refers to intellectual 'powers' and associating 'laws' in terms of seeming interchangability. Discrimination, for instance, is said to be both a 'law' and a 'power'.158 The workings of the retentive power or "plasticity"159 are represented under various titles -retentiveness, adhesiveness, contiguous association and contiguity, each designation standing for both a 'property' or 'force' and a 'law'.160 And as to the 'consciousness of agreement', both 'power' and 'principle' are also called by the same
name, that of Similarity.\textsuperscript{161}

With laws thus designated powers, we seem meant to believe that principles can carry out all sorts of intellectual functions and operations. "[A]s if generalizations could effect anything", Ward would say.\textsuperscript{162} This roundabout way of tackling the problem of activity does not make its conception nor that of the agency of action any clearer for all that. Bain tells us, for instance, that \textit{Similarity} or sense of agreement refers to the "power of recognition", that is, to the "identifying function"; as such, it is an intellectual activity.\textsuperscript{163} He then adds:

This power of recognition, identification, or discovery of likeness in unlikeliness, is another means of bringing to mind past ideas; and is spoken of as the \textit{Associating}, or \textit{Reproductive} principle of \textit{SIMILARITY}. We are as often reminded of things by their resemblance to something present, as by their previous proximity to what is now in the view. Contiguity and Similarity express two great principles or forces of mental reproduction; they are distinct powers of the mind, varying in degree among individuals -the one sometimes preponderating, and sometimes the other. The first governs Acquisition, the second Invention.\textsuperscript{164}

Ward would undoubtedly remark that this intellectual activity in which associative laws are spuriously employed tells Bain's failure to acknowledge the centrality of the subject as a fundamental psychological datum.

\textbf{The disempowerment of the self}

An activity the performance of which is but the function of a part (be that part Volition or Intellect) -and therefore deemed psychologically distributive rather than unitary, is liable to get lost through wasteful spread. Some might think of this as an unfortunate circumstance to be avoided at all costs. So it appeared to Bain's objectors who set about to reclaim a psychological activity wasted by what they judged to be a conceptually indistinct, experientially irrelevant, and rhetorically ineffective rendition of psychological experience.

Bain, as we know, deals a share of activity to working parts of a mental threesome. But the concrete individual as a psychological entity and complex whole is
given no share as such, being of disposable use as far as conceptions go. Bain thinks his allotment fair; his critics did not. The fact is that dispossessed of directive and unifying control as a self under the associationist rule, the psychological individual is as a mechanically operated construction—an assemblage of feeling-thinking-willing parts, whose actions are united and regulated by forces over which it has no power, as such.

Rather than regard the feeling-thinking-willing person as the centralizing force of psychological experience, Bain vouches for "threads of mental ongoings and movements" consolidated in one organized train whose unity is mechanically determined.¹⁶⁵ It might seem that this voucher serves individuals ill, if used to authenticate the unitive character of concrete experience. For consider Bain's piece of supporting evidence.

The region of Mind proper is defined or circumscribed by the peculiarity expressed by the term Consciousness... Its leading property is as follows: It is the unity, the consolidation, or the centralisation of the operations of mind. Under it all the threads of mental ongoings and movements are reduced to one complex thread, whose course is indivisible... The unity of the conscious thread is clenched by the fact, that a large portion of the muscular apparatus of the body is subservient to the operations of the mind; and as no part can be used in two ways at the same instant, it becomes often a matter of necessity that these operations should take their turn instead of acting simultaneously. There being but one great executive apparatus for the consolidated circles of the mind, there can be as it were but one stream of execution or of movements requiring the use of such apparatus.¹⁶⁶

And again:

It seems to me, therefore, that what determines the unity of consciousness, as showing which local currents have found means to actuate the collective currents, is the unity of the executive; that is to say, the active mechanism and the higher senses. We can employ our organs of expression to express only one feeling at a time; we can employ our senses in only one act of attention, or body generally in only one act of the higher volitions.¹⁶⁷

Rather than regard the feeling-thinking-willing individual as the agent of
psychological activity, Bain vouchsafes an explanation of agency the underside of which is a ringing condemnation of subjective function. Come the disempowerment of the self and what ensues from this does not surprise: "mental agencies" are found here and there, and this fact notwithstanding, Bain's ideas concerning agency come over neither clearly nor credibly. For somehow capable of producing an effect on their own are the likes of impressions, emotional prompts or motive agents, intellectually efficacious feelings, intellectual powers, energies of contiguous adhesion and of attraction of similars, associating laws, links of reproductive connexion, cohesive bonds and attractive forces, contiguity and similarity, volitional forces.

In fact, Bain has so orchestrated his psychological composition that through the machine-like operation of these self-sufficient agents, subjective activity, directive and purposive, drops out of sight, and things - "movements", "impressions" and "states" alike, are seen to "commence", "persist", "endure" or otherwise "flow of their own accord". And should this not yet render a verdict in favor of subjective non-intervention, Bain further tenders the idea that 'links of connexion' can themselves act the part of controlling and directive agent by exerting a determining influence in recall. Indeed, Bain would have us believe that the selective act is the function of a link. Consider his words.

When the cold touch of polished marble has been associated with many different forms, it will not recall any one in particular. The hand placed on a wooden surface tells nothing, because so many known things have the same touch; either a plurality of different objects will be recalled, or someone will be singled out by other links of association, or there will be no revival at all.

So long as he is free to psychologize by means of physical conceptions, and, as such, to use terms derived from mechanical forces, Bain is confident that order and unity will prevail in the mental realm. For he banks on the help of associative laws, on their 'power', that is, to attract and cohere, and in doing so, to bring about order and unity. In reflecting on the "magnetism of similarity", for instance, Bain avers that "out of chaos order arises, as soon as similarity begins to draw together the agreeing elements of the discordant heap."

Let "experience and association establish channels of communication" between
psychical elements, then, and the outcome seems inevitable and somewhat predictable. As might be expected, and unless counteracted, says Bain, "sensations [give] birth to ideas, to emotions, and volitions"; a pleasure "works for its own continuance or increase"; "the intellect [tends] to flow in the direction of the strongest associations"; the will "secures pleasure and alleviates pain"; and "associations established in the growth of volition bring forth action". Barring the effect of counteracting forces, these are but a few foreseeable outcomes. One is tempted to add -and I here borrow Bain's words, that so long as the parts are fine in themselves and well adjusted to one another, "the machine then goes on well, and may be said to be in good order."

One might venture to say that expectation is the name of the game in associationist quarters. Like a well-oiled machine, Bain's psychology is contrived so as to be effective in generating "bonds of attachment" that are "strong enough to raise us above...uncertainties". That is the goal, in fact, the hope: each "fixed joint alliance" forming "an inseparable couple or aggregate in the mind", and conscious states succeeding each other with "invariable" and "unfaltering sequence". Bain writes:

Our whole security in the matters of this world is based on the expectation that what is to be may be inferred from what has been; and this not merely in the region of brute matter, but equally so in the region of mental sequences. That there should be any part of the mind, owing to superior sanctity, exempted from the rule of uniformity, must make us very uneasy, until we can trace a circle round it, so as to hem it in and keep it clearly apart from the region where law prevails. We should be very much relieved to think that it was but a very small portion of our mental nature; and, if I may judge from my own feelings, we should be still more rejoiced to find that the whole supposition was a mistake.

Bain's hope is grounded in the belief that "rigorous constancy is the glory of the character; the higher the constancy, the predictability, of the agent, the higher the excellence attained." And why not indeed insist on a uniformity of mental sequence, as Bain looks on it as holding "the possibility of predicting the course of human actions when the data are known, with the same certainty as the course of nature." This seems reasonable on his part. Only we must realize that it is a machine-like psychological
construction -fixedly determined in direction and operation, which Bain puts together so as to accommodate utilitarian interests.

Turn whichever way we may, there is no escape from the operation of irremovable cohesive and attractive forces which are lodged here and there, -in conscious states, associative laws, and intellectual powers severally, and whose manner of working exhibits a regularity and automaticity of action. This, if anything, is mechanization with a vengeance, and one among several reasons why Bain's book of psychological knowledge often reads like a treatise of physical science. As Bain has generously gifted his laws, states and powers with attractions, repulsions and cohesions, they are one and all the means by which the aggregation into psychical masses comes about, and as thus endowed with power, are given dominion over all, at the expense of the psychological subject.\textsuperscript{197} The latter is as a mere onlooking spectator, acted upon by the powers that be. According to Bain,

\begin{quote}
[s]tates of consciousness have degrees of intensity and duration; they are single or compound; they aid or thwart one another; they have their laws of emergence, increase, decline; in all which particulars they observe analogies to physical forces; so that the intellectual habits of accurately estimating physical agencies may, with due allowances, be of service in dealing with the complications of mind.\textsuperscript{198}
\end{quote}

So long as Bain feels free to promote the self-actualization of impressions by granting them powers of adhesion and attraction, we can presumably dispense with self-determination, that is, with determination by a subject. "We are then at the other pole", writes Ward; "[i]n place of a subject conserving or retaining its presentations, we have these, under certain circumstances, "tending to grow together or cohere"; and instead of this subject comparing its presentations and connecting them, we have these, whenever they recur, "tending to revive their like among previously occurring states"."\textsuperscript{199}

Bain trusts in the ability of impressions to cohere and attract, and, as such, to establish relations among themselves through interaction. Seemingly relying on their own attractive and cohesive pull, Bain's impressions are thus seen as fending for themselves. And should there be a show of strength, we are sure to find that the one will overbear the other by the power of the stronger. "We turn...to Coloured Surfaces",
illustrates Bain, "where light and shade, colour and lustre, prominently enter, as in a landscape, a spectacle, a picture, a room, a human face. Here the object consists of an aggregate of masses of colour, which are associated by whatever force of retentiveness or adhesion belongs to the impressions of colour. If we repeatedly gaze at a picture, its different patches of colour seize hold of the mind and connect themselves in their natural order, so that the one can recall the rest, and the whole can exist and be held in the view, when the actual object is no longer present." And in recounting the battle of attracting similarities, Bain declares the struggle a win in favor of the stronger contestant who is here seen to perform -be it noted, without subjective intervention.

In the example of language -a certain passage before the mind may bring up, from the past, another passage resembling in expression, but differing in sense; or a passage resembling in sense, but differing in expression: this shows that both peculiarities have a power of attraction, each for its own kind, although one prevails, and is thereupon called the stronger attraction. ABC is liable to bring up ADE, the likeness being struck on A; or BFG, on the likeness of B; or CHI, on the likeness of C. The attraction of B for some combination where it enters, and of C for a combination where it enters, have to be overcome by A, in order to secure the recovery of ADE. Now, the less active B and C are, the more easily will A predominate and effect the recall...

Come the disempowerment of the self, and before long mental agencies crop up everywhere: sure enough, they are found here and there in Bain's psychological treatises. But as credible agents, they are neither here nor there to the active and determined individual who knows himself to be psychologically misrepresented unless deemed indispensable to their operation, and, therefore, incapable of conceptual removal without destroying the thing itself, namely, psychological activity.
Endnotes


3. In the philosophy of psychology and of the human sciences, the doctrine which asserts that the properties of the whole can be defined by the properties of the parts is called descriptive individualism. Holism posits the explanatory necessity of the whole in relation to the parts.


30. Ibid., pp.374-376, 482.


36. In refuting Hamilton's argument that we perceive wholes before we know the parts, Mill points to the distinction between integrant and metaphysical parts. In defending his
father's psychological theory, Mill writes: "It does not concern Mr. Mill's theory whether we know, or do not know, a man as such, before we distinguish, in thought or in perception, his head from his feet [integrant parts]. What Mr. Mill said was, that our idea of an object, whether it be of the man, or of his head, or of his feet, is compounded by association from our ideas of the colour, the shape, the resistance, &c., which belong to those objects. These are what philosophers have called the metaphysical parts, not the integrant parts, of the total impression. Now I have never heard of any philosopher who maintained that these parts were not known until after the objects which they characterize; that we perceive the body first, and its colour, shape, form, &c., only afterwards. Our senses, which on all theories are at least the avenues through which our knowledge of bodies comes to us, are not adapted by nature to let in the perception of the whole object at once. They only open to let pass single attributes at a time." Mill, J.S. (1867). An examination of Sir William Hamilton's philosophy, pp.316-317.


40. According to Mill's understanding of utility or the 'greatest happiness principle', right actions are those promotive of the general good, and wrong ones, those tending to the opposite. His is the claim that "the ultimate end, with reference to and for the sake of which all other things are desirable -whether we are considering our own good or that of other people -is an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments, both in point of quantity and quality..." Mill, J.S. (1957). Utilitarianism, pp.10-11, 16. In its overtones, Mill's conception of pleasure is not "swine"-like, for he regards utility in the largest sense as "grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being". Mill, J.S. (1977). Essays on politics and society. Toronto: University of Toronto Press; 'On liberty', 1859, p.224. He considers that the self-perfecting individual engaged in the pursuit of utilitarian ends can reach them only by the cultivation of a noble character. Hence, Mill's complex conception of happiness can be analyzed into many ingredient parts, all of which are essentials of well-being; one such leading essential is the free development of individuality. Ibid., p.261.

On Mill's attempt to free the utilitarian theory of the spirit of selfishness, see Bain's critical assessment, in Bain, A. (1871). Darwinism and religion, Macmillan's Magazine,


59. Ibid., pp.450-452.


66. Ibid., pp.355-356.

67. Ibid., p.354.


On the influence of habit upon activity, see Mill, J. (1869). *Analysis*, vol.1, p.395.


71. Ibid.

72. Ibid.

73. Ward, J. (1933). *Psychological principles*, p.70; see also p.63. On Ward's theory of attention, see ibid., pp.60-73. What Ward calls "Presentationism" is called "Sensationism" or "Associationism" by others; "the first", he explains, "because sensations are regarded as the elements or atoms of which its 'contents of consciousness' ultimately consist; the second because the combination of these elements is supposed
to be effected by a sort of 'cohesion' among those that are contiguous and by an 'attraction' of those that are similar." Ibid., p.23.


76. Ibid., pp.69-70, 298.


philosophy', pp.311-316.


83.Ward would argue that it is "precisely for this reason [that] activity is not to be regarded as presentational at all", that is, as a content or object of consciousness, as is a muscular feeling, for instance. See Ward, J. (1933). Psychological principles, p.137.


88.As Bain will have it, an action is mental in so far as it is preceded by a mental stimulus in the form of a sensation, emotion or desire. The antecedent of spontaneous activity -be it noted, is physical, not mental.


97. Ibid.
98. Ibid., p.406.


105. Ibid., p.573.

106. Ibid., p.574.


112. Ward calls the empirical Ego or 'Me' the self as presented (self-known), while he refers to the pure Ego or 'I' as the self-knowing. See his discussion of the presentation of self, self-consciousness and subjective being, in Ward, J. (1933). Psychological principles, pp.361-382.


123. Ibid., p.5.
124. Ibid.
125. Ibid., pp.5-6.
126. Ibid., p.8.

131. Ibid., pp.5, 335.
134. Ibid.


140. Ibid., p.6.

141. Ibid., p.2.


144. Ibid., pp.6, 73.

145. Ibid., pp.74, 322.


149. See endnote 116.


156. The underline is mine. Ibid., p.326. See also Bain, A. (1851). What is philosophy?, Chambers's Papers for the People, 12, No.92, 1-32.

157. As a power of mental reproduction, the retentive 'property' of the mind is exemplified by Bain "under the title of Association by Contiguity". Bain also names this principle of contiguous association "the law of Association proper, of Adhesion, Mental Adhesiveness, or Acquisition." Bain, A. (1868). *The senses*, pp.324, 327-328.

158. Ibid., pp.5, 321, 565.


171. As, for example, states of strong excitement, which, according to Bain, have "the power of detaining the attention and the thoughts". Bain, A. (1875). The emotions, p.33: see also pp.13-14, 18-21. See also Bain, A. (1870). Logic, Part first, p.105. Bain, A. (1884). Mental and moral science. Part first, p.22.


173. Ibid., pp.462, 513, 531.


180. That is, non-intervention by the subject.

182. One notes that of Bain's many examples of terms which are said to be derived from the mechanical and physical sciences and to be rhetorically efficient in aiding the understanding, several form part of his own psychological discourse. And they are: 'inertia', 'momentum', 'impulse', 'resistance', 'cohesion', 'attraction', 'adhesion', 'repulsion', 'equilibrium', 'streams and currents', 'storms', 'stimulus', 'reaction', 'resistance', 'tension', 'balance', 'waves', 'magnetism', 'fusion'. On the use of such comparisons in benefitting the understanding, see Bain, A. (1893). *English composition and rhetoric. Part first*, pp.141-142, 154-157, 164-165. Also Bain, A. (1849). *Rhetoric and Belles Lettres. Chambers's Information for the People.*


PART III

THE ASSOCIATION PSYCHOLOGY’S SOCIO-POLITICAL AGENDA
PART III

THE ASSOCIATION PSYCHOLOGY'S SOCIO-POLITICAL AGENDA

INTRODUCTION

In an exchange with the literary writer A.C. Benson in 1897, Henry Sidgwick would recount the social ideal which had fired his reformist aspirations in the early 60s, under the joint influences of J.S. Mill and A. Comte. "What we aimed at from a social point of view", relates Sidgwick, "was a complete revision of human relations, political, moral, and economic, in the light of science directed by comprehensive and impartial sympathy; and an unsparing reform of whatever, in the judgment of science, was pronounced to be not conducive to the general happiness."¹ As a standard-bearer in the cause of social reform, Mill had applied himself to the study of society and of its institutions. And as had his father James before him, he would stand on social changes guided by the light of theories of human nature.

Surveying the turn of events from his late nineteenth-century vantage point, the statesman and author John Morley held that by J.S. Mill's time, "the fabric of abusive and tyrannical misgovernment had been brought to the ground, and it had become necessary to restore conservative and historic sentiment to its place in social life."² Without denying Mill's historic turn of mind, Morley's story rings true only insofar as it is completed by the tale of the former's ongoing preoccupation with collapsing social hierarchies. Mill was clearly committed to the reform of tyrannical influences of all sorts. As such, he was engaged in the overthrow of coercive authorities - a marked interest sustained over time and displayed in his writings. Mill was determined, moreover, to counteract the ill effects of collapsing social hierarchies, by doing away with threats of social unrest and intellectual anarchy.

Just as his father had done at an earlier time, John Stuart Mill would also "look out of his window",³ and realize the degenerate political, intellectual and moral condition of his country. There are those, such as Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, lawyer and publicist, who deplored the fact that "Mr. Mill...never loses an opportunity of
speaking with contempt of our present 'wretched social arrangements', the low state of society, and the general pettiness of his contemporaries". Stephen's objection notwithstanding, the fact remains that Mill's undying concern with the redress of social wrongs and corrupt practices is telling evidence of a troublesome social experience, of which he spoke without reserve.

As one of Mill's intellectual companions who partook of a similar experience, Bain was also unable to stand the exercise of oppressive power, and thus bore a hand in the fight against forces of deterioration stifling individual character. Mill's somewhat uneasy state of blended interest and misgiving as regards the unfolding of social events was also Bain's concern: this freemasonry was based on some common experience of social hopes and vexations. As we shall see presently, Bain's revision of the Association Psychology bears the impress of this shared commitment to remedying social ills.

Despite certain differences in opinion, Bain frankly admired Mill as a philosopher, sociologist, political thinker, and expositor in practical ethics. "Who", asks Bain, "shall sum up Mill's collective influence as an instructor in Politics, Ethics, Logic, and Metaphysics? No calculus can integrate the innumerable little pulses of knowledge and of thought that he has made to vibrate in the minds of his generation."

As a Philosphic Radical and supporter of the utilitarian cause - shaped as this tradition was by the thought of Bentham and the two Mills, Bain approved of J.S. Mill's political and social writings generally. He granted him "a first-rank standing among the speculative thinkers of Europe" in the departments of the moral and political sciences, while pronouncing him one of "the really great theorists in society". Mill's own rendition of the radical and utilitarian thought of the mid-thirties is given us while rethinking the orientation of the London and Westminster Review. Mill held that

the Review ought to represent not radicalism but neoradicalism, a radicalism which is not democracy, not a bigotted adherence to any forms of government or to one kind of institutions, & which is only to be called radicalism inasmuch as it does not palter nor compromise with evils but cuts at their roots - & a utilitarianism which takes into account the whole of human nature not the ratiocinative faculty only - the utilitarianism which never makes any peculiar figure as such, nor would ever constitute its followers a sect or school - which fraternizes with all who hold the same
Axiomata media (as Bacon has it) whether their first principle is the same or not - & which holds in the highest reverence all which the vulgar notion of utilitarians represents them to despise - which holds Feeling at least as valuable as Thought, & Poetry not only on a par with, but the necessary condition of, any true & comprehensive Philosophy.  

As a matter of fact, Bain minded the substance of Mill's discourse on the topic of society and of politics, and heeded the call of reform.

As early as 1839, Bain had set about familiarizing himself with Mill's published ideas, which would soon prove fruitful in allowing the possibility of epistolary exchange with the latter. Speaking of those earlier years, Bain remembers that "Mill's political and other articles, as might be expected, had a wonderful fascination for me." Not surprisingly, he took up at the time a course of reading on political and historical philosophy, as recommended by Mill.

Having "realized [his] dream of meeting Mill in person" in 1842, Bain figured that by then he "had a very full acquaintance with his [Mill's] views on Philosophy and Politics, as well as a complete appreciation of his whole manner of thinking." It would remain true to the very end that barring certain differences in questions of fact, Bain was always willing to recognize Mill's "political sagacity and prescience". Consider Bain's estimate of Mill's Representative Government, which, together with the latter's Political Economy, he regarded as constituting Mill's political outcome.

In that short work, he has concentrated the results of his powerful intellect, his logical discipline, and profound study of human nature, his familiarity with all political systems of all times, his official experience in government, his knowledge of parties, his forty years' intercourse with men of political and public eminence, and his never-ceasing interest in his fellowmen. He has produced a work that may long continue to be, as it now is, the statesman's and the elector's manual. The man of passive intellect is safe in adopting it word for word; the man of active intellect (the author's preference) will differ from one-tenth or one-twentieth of it, and appropriate the remainder as political daily bread. Mr. Mill's familiar conversation, remarkable on all subjects, is unrivalled on politics.

As acute social observers, Mill and Bain viewed the scene of human life from
similar perspectives, and, as such, held certain prized social values and interests in common. As driving influences, these concerns centered their intellectual attention, bringing a course of corrective action to counter the trend toward conformity and depersonalization. The fundament and impelling force of Mill and Bain's unified action was a picture of society, which, given its social and moral imperfections, needed retouching — or so they thought, with the reform brush. Its characteristic strokes would bear the mark of their life experiences and convictions, and of their hopes for the future.

Chapters 5 and 6 consist in an exploration of some of the ways in which Bain's psychological ideas express these shared social concerns, and were in fact worked into tools for fashioning social reality and bringing it into a desired form. Given Bain's professed allegiance to Mill and his utilitarian orientation towards social action, an analysis of his thinking on psychological matters bearing no relevance to the historical-social context in which he participated would seem incomplete. Karl Mannheim's words, written in the 1930s, bear noticing here. As a leading influence in the development of the sociological concept of thought, he held the following opinion.

Just as it would be incorrect to attempt to derive a language merely from observing a single individual, who speaks not a language of his own but rather that of his contemporaries and predecessors who have prepared the path for him, so it is incorrect to explain the totality of an outlook only with reference to its genesis in the mind of the individual. Only in a quite limited sense does the single individual create out of himself the mode of speech and of thought we attribute to him. He speaks the language of his group; he thinks in the manner in which his group thinks.

Men living in groups do not merely coexist physically as discrete individuals. They do not confront the objects of the world from the abstract levels of a contemplating mind as such, nor do they do so exclusively as solitary beings. On the contrary they act with and against one another in diversely organized groups, and while doing so they think with and against one another. These persons, bound together into groups, strive in accordance with the character and position of the groups to which they belong to change the surrounding world of nature and society or attempt to maintain it in a given condition.15

As I admit the force of Mannheim's words, the endeavor to locate Mill's social
and political commitments becomes important in contextualizing Bain's psychological ideas. Hence, an understanding of Bain's thought will be sought in its collective, rather than individual, context of experience, by relating Mill's experiences and values as well.

For reasons of space, I shall confine my discussion to the subject of Mill and Bain's joint preoccupation with the collapse of social hierarchies and with the ensuing destabilization of the social and moral orders. Their resolve to prevail over all forms of tyrannical power will be the main focus of the last two chapters. Used as tools in eroding the power of coercive authorities, Mill and Bain's pleadings in defense of the individualistic cause will be the subject of chapter 5, while their vindication of democracy will be discussed in chapter 6. Both chapters will also give point to their determination to reconcile opposition breeding social disorder and intellectual anarchy.
Endnotes


7. This is not to say that the tradition was shaped by these individuals only. See, for instance, Halévy, E. (1966). *The growth of Philosophic Radicalism*. Boston: Beacon Press.


13. Ibid., p. 103.

14. Letter from Dr. Bain, (Professor of Logic in the University of Aberdeen, and Author of several philosophical works,) to Mr. Westerton, Chairman of Mr. Mill's Committee, University of Aberdeen, King's College Public Library, Department of Special Collections and Archives, Bain papers, p^ Bain, A1, 1865. See also Bain, A. (1969). *John Stuart Mill*, p. 53.

Chapter 5

The Association Psychology's Socio-Political Agenda

The Reform of Tyrannical Abuses: Pleading the Individualistic Cause

Preliminary Remarks

Mill read his age as one of struggle between conflicting principles, which, unless brought into just relations and reconciled with one another, would threaten the whole fabric of society. The despotic exercise of power by the mighty men of old had created a climate of despondency whose adverse conditions attracted Mill's attention, for he was engaged in checking the autarchical tendencies of his age. In the estimate of Mill and Bain alike, the face of social reality was disfigured by deep injuries: opposition of political interests between propertied and unpropertied classes, alienation of feeling in industrial relations between capital and labour, conflict of social and political stands between collectives and minority groups.  

Agreeing in the need to widen the scope of individual liberty and to eradicate long-standing political abuses, Mill and Bain devoted time and effort to the redress of deep-rooted social ills. Mindful that despair often breeds violence, they attended to the problem of poverty as such, and deplored the wretched condition of great masses of people. They firmly reproved the ignorance and want of cultivation in citizens, and the natural indolence of mankind. They rebuked the despotic tendencies of government. Mill himself intensely loathed the yoke of conformity and uniformity of opinion and practice, and the deification and oppressive power of custom, mere opinion and habit. And in denouncing the immoderate idolatry of instinct and prejudice, he diagnosed the mental and moral malaise of the people.

When Mill "moves in the midst of the breathing and living world of men", a panorama of the social landscape unfolds before his eyes. Represented by him in terms
of light and shade, nuanced, that is, by his social interests and misgivings, this chiaroscuro grows darker according as it expresses the tone of Mill's fears. To the extent that he accentuates its somber parts, Mill paints a picture of a troublous social reality in which a submissive and will-less individual branded a "pinched and hidebound type of human character", is lost in a crowd of "cramped and dwarfed" human beings.4

Thus circumstanced in a world unimproved by the touch-up of theoretical constructions, Mill takes his bearings and cries havoc. For he feels himself surrounded by persons whose minds are "bowed to the yoke"5 and whose attitudes are those of compliance to the will of coercive authorities. His embattled experience as an emancipationist betokens his commitment to free people in bondage to oppressive powers. Bain was aroused, and, as a companion of Mill and combatant in his own right, strove along with the latter to eliminate every form of tyranny over the mind of man.6

As the river of human life winds through the valley of morality, Mill and Bain course the area only to find the waters of intellectual and moral life stagnant. They are appalled by the behaviour of the masses, whose minds, they think, are misguided by intellectual fallacies and moral prejudices. As he reads from the script of reality, Mill is disturbed by realizing that "the general tendency of things throughout the world is to render mediocrity the ascendant power among mankind".7 He has no difficulty identifying the agency of despoliation. For he notes that "even in what people do for pleasure, conformity is the first thing thought of; ...peculiarity of taste, eccentricity of conduct, are shunned equally with crimes: until by dint of not following their own nature, they have no nature to follow... Now is this, or is it not, the desirable condition of human nature?"8 Mill's answer is an emphatic No.

Mill had gone in pursuit of the "wisdom of society"9 only to pronounce the search abortive. He had drawn from the book of concrete life and felt disquiet at the read. For he deemed people unwilling and unable, in their state of ignorance, to fulfil the conditions necessary to their intellectual and moral emancipation. After all, an act of liberation such as Mill prescribed, required the active use of a people's faculties. But it was only too clear to him that the effort after self-betterment was not forthcoming. Masses of passive and careless people wanting in public spirit were allowed to wallow in their ignorance. In Mill's mind, the power of choice was not yet within their reach.10
In fact, both Bain and Mill reproved what the latter described as "the natural indolence of mankind; their tendency to be passive, to be the slaves of habit, to persist indefinitely in a course once chosen". Decried by Bain as the source of "moral obliquities", indolence was projected as "the parent of intellectual error" and a sin against prudence. And yet as acquisitions go, prudential forethought ranked high in Mill and Bain's books, for deemed to be a constitutive property of moral wisdom and one of the requirements of a progressive social state.

Apprehending the danger of mental stagnation through disuse of the intellectual and moral powers, Mill's distinct voice sounds to caution. "We ought not to forget", he writes, "that there is an incessant and ever-flowing current of human affairs towards the worse...which is only controlled, and kept from sweeping all before it, by the exertions which some persons constantly, and others by fits, put forth in the direction of good and worthy objects... A very small diminution of those exertions would not only put a stop to improvement, but would turn the general tendency of things towards deterioration..."

Mill's social analysis was trenchant. He thought his age deficient both in intellectual competence and in humane qualities. For his part, Bain argued that stagnation of mind impairs the intellect. He reasoned that "[i]n seeing after the comfort of our fellow creatures as well as our own, we must learn to take into account, that occupation of mind, whether engrossment by feeling or succession of thought, is as essential to them as warmth, wholesome food, or pure air". Bain looked on intellectual and moral cultivation as one of the most dignified human pursuits. Arousing a people's desire of self-cultivation was Mill and Bain's challenge.

In working up a liberative act by thinking out the conditions of an intellectual and moral revolution, Mill and Bain were not blind to the numerous misdoings needing correctives. Mill targeted his efforts where needed, namely, on those faulty institutions and social arrangements swarming with abuses. For they were seen to have detrimental effects in degrading morality, confining intellection, and stifling the growth of individual character. This state of affairs was particularly distasteful to Mill and Bain, as they were staunch advocates of the view that "of all the things that a man has got to do, the most vital is to improve his character." Hence by Mill's instigating and Bain's
supporting the overthrow of all forms of coercive authority, they hoped to install a mood of protest into their people against oppressive social hierarchies.\textsuperscript{18}

While seeking a remedy for this disease of the body social, Mill shook a disapproving finger at academical institutions. In his estimation, they had failed to provide an education formative of intellectually powerful minds inspired by the love of truth, and of principled individuals prepared to combat the enfeebling influences of the age. "Is it astonishing", he asks, "that great minds are not produced, in a country where the test of a great mind is, agreeing in the opinions of the small minds?"\textsuperscript{19}

Uncultivation was just as dreadful as "malcultivation"\textsuperscript{20} to Mill, who thought both injurious to the intellect in breeding unquestioned and false opinions. This intellectual affliction was also deemed by him to spell instability for the fabric of society. Both Mill and Bain believed that unchecked idleness and mental dullness killed all interest in the common good by giving vent to selfish impulses, thereby spreading divisiveness wherever these were expressed. Inactivity was thus thought to be a hindrance to the perfecting of man's inward nature.\textsuperscript{21} And with education "so wretchedly imperfect",\textsuperscript{22} the fall-off in energy of intellect and strength of will ran ever deeper. Mill feared the worst.

I do not perceive that, in the mental training which has been received by the immense majority of the reading and thinking part of my countrymen, or in the kind of knowledge and other intellectual aliment which has been supplied to them there is any thing likely to render them much less accessible to the influence of imposture and charlatanerie than there ever was...\textsuperscript{23}

Mill's anxious concern was caused by anticipation of yet another danger, namely, the cultivation of the anti-liberal disposition, and, thus, the flourish of repressive conservative tendencies. As it were, Mill and Bain were of one mind in this regard, joined in waging war against traditionalism while fighting for the cause of universal education.\textsuperscript{24} Used to convey warning and direction, Mill's distress signal was as resonant as sounding brass in urging the seriousness of the problem. Those, like Bain, who heeded Mill's call, would contend against the resisters of change, agreeing with Mill that, in this respect, "none are so illiberal, none so bigoted in their hostility to improvement, none so superstitiously attached to the stupidest and worst of old forms
and usages, as the uneducated".25

Both Mill and Bain campaigned hard for the overthrow of customary and common modes of belief, and the substitution of the rule of cultivated reason for the idolatry of instinct and prejudice.26 In Mill's mind, to conform to custom, merely as custom, was to take a stand against the spirit of improvement. He held that "he who does anything because it is the custom makes no choice".27

Yet Mill and Bain required exercise of judgment: to miss out on the opportunity of choosing freely was to them to omit a duty. For they believed that the motive to unfetter the prisoners of social injustice was called forth only by the invigoration of the individual faculties, intellectual, moral and active, through actuation and choice. Theirs was the conviction that the thirst for liberty and improvement comes with the growing desire to the unrestrained exercise of the faculties. Mill himself portrayed the striving and energetic character as "the foundation of the best hopes for the general improvement of mankind."28 To adopt the progressive principle, then, was to stand for the emancipation from the yoke of customary and thus passive thinking.

Custom, for Mill, was decidedly despotic. For he considered that by enervating the thoughts, feelings and energies of the people, it stifled the voice of individuality. As an observant of his time, Mill was well aware of the disjunctive views, however.

The commonplaces of moralists, and the general sympathies of mankind, are in favour of the passive type. Energetic characters may be admired, but the acquiescent and submissive are those which most men personally prefer. The passiveness of our neighbours increases our sense of security, and plays into the hands of our wilfulness. Passive characters, if we do not happen to need their activity, seem an obstruction the less in our own path. A contented character is not a dangerous rival. Yet nothing is more certain, than that improvement in human affairs is wholly the work of the uncontented characters...29

Mill's prescriptive rule leaves no doubt: the stance adopted by the self-willed and spontaneous individual who wishes to break through the social tyranny must be an attitude of nonconformity and resistance to the dwarfing and threatening forces of custom.30

In decrying the worst features of the existing system of society, Mill and Bain's
first concern was to restore persons to their dignity as freethinking beings. Mill held that "[w]hat the poor as well as the rich require is not to be indoctrinated, is not to be taught other people's opinions, but to be induced and enabled to think for themselves." Mill and Bain therefore insisted on the need to "eradicate the undue veneration for authority", believing this excision to be essential both to the act and to the state of liberation. Bain wrote: "We live in dread of tyranny. Our liberty is a serious object; it weighs upon our minds. Now any weight upon the mind is so much taken from our happiness..."

Mill himself aimed to emancipate the masses from the bondage of a good many tyrants and false worships. Evils such as he anathematized were -to name but a few, the "double yoke of priestcraft and of reverence for superiors", the "yoke of conformity", the yoke of "unity" and "systematization", the "tyranny of the majority" and "of the prevailing opinion and feeling", the "despotism of custom", the "law of force", the "appetite for power", the "apotheosis of instinct" and the "evils of subjection".

As social fetters binding persons in slavery, these despotic evils were sharply rebuked by Mill and Bain alike for impeding the development of individuality. They were joined in their evildoing by a whole tribe of errors perpetuating erroneous beliefs in the intellectual and moral worlds: indifference to truth, bias, mere habit and inculcation, perversions of the understanding, a priori fallacies.

In applying counterpoises and correctives to these pernicious mental and social ills, Mill no less urgently impressed men as defenders of liberty against the oppressive tendencies of political institutions and centralised powers. For "a State", argues Mill, "which dwarfs its men, in order that they may be more docile instruments in its hands even for beneficial purposes -will find that with small men no great thing can really be accomplished..." In Mill's experience, social injustice was a fact of life. According to his read, "[a]ll history proves that in every nation of the earth, the powers of Government have uniformly been monopolized in the hands of a privileged few, who, accordingly never failed to abuse those powers for the benefit of themselves and of their connections..."

Rendered inoperative by so many social and political malfunctions, a society such as Mill and Bain contemplated required maintenance and rebuilding, just as faulty
equipment does. In engineering the construction of a well-oiled social machine, Mill figured that society had a long apprenticeship to serve in the transformative process towards its moral and intellectual excellence. But though not always sanguine, Mill's hope for an improved state of society was yet undeterred because sustained by the belief in the transitional character of the age to which he belonged.47

Both Mill and Bain trusted in the regenerative power of institutional improvements directed towards a healthier state of the individual and of society.48 Theirs was the attempt -each within his own particular field of endeavor, to re-design society so as to make room in the social order for the beneficent forces of wisdom and virtue. In projecting the realization of an altered social structure according to the utilitarian-associationist plan, they called for a "levelling" of those social and political institutions festered with the rot of "great social sinister interests".49 The aim was to "lower the heights of society" in realizing a greater "dissemination of power consistent with efficiency", while fostering educational reforms that would "permanently raise the depths".50 In Bain's estimate, the destructive agency of Mill was great in this regard.

His influence must be taken along with Bentham's and his father's; and a more formidable trio, for the work of pulling down rotten structures, never came together. I call the whole of his doctrines regarding the greatest political problem of all -the elevating of the class that needs to be elevated -in an eminent degree sound in themselves and prolific of the best consequences, although we may not be able to single out any one distinctive or separate result. When both parties in the State were helping to poison and delude the working men, he (after his father) was steadily occupied in sweeping away the refuges of lies -in teaching them self-dependence, and in warning them against bubbles and expectations of immediate relief.51

Mill and Bain definitely meant business, and, therefore, got down to it. To cause any one ill-disposed ruling body to fall into a flattened mass through the force of pressure was a decidedly serious activity requiring time and effort. The payoff was well worth the cost of labour, thought Bain, as the call for liberty and freedom from restraint yields results. To put it in his own words, "it gives one already the sense of breathing a peer atmosphere."52
223

THE JUSTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUALISM

It is clear that both Mill and Bain considered the interests of the individual to be paramount. While Mill spoke out in defense of the political and economic independence of the individual, Bain joined him in praising the merits of individual initiative and autonomy. In fact both wrote in high praise of these values as standing for securities against intrusive and arbitrary authorities, while in effect undermining their foundation. Strength of character and originality of mind were also commended by Mill as the mental requirements of a progressive state of society. Mill and Bain were both determined, therefore, to promulgate such ideas as would prompt the search for, and advocate the preservation of, an individual's identity and autonomy.

Vibrant is Mill's voice when spelling out the essentials of self-emancipation. Necessaries such as he plays up are the protection of the greatest liberty of private life, the preservation of the spirit of independent thought, speech and action, the safeguard of the asylum of individuality, and the need for mental refinement by way of an intellectual and "internal" cultivation of the individual. Mill in fact believes that the necessities of a progressive society engaged in the pursuit of utilitarian ends are conditional upon "each taking for his exclusive aim the development of what is best in himself"; that is, upon the growth of noble human aspirations. Society will in turn oblige its members, thinks Mill, by contributing to the growth of thriving individuals.

Now this conception of society as a "medium" of self-realization was unappealing to later critics of an evolutionary bent. Those, like Benjamin Kidd writing in 1911, who believed in the interrelatedness of societal efficiency and organismic structure, would argue that the distinguishing mark of a productive society was the growing subordination of the individual to the organic social process. Kidd thought that this governing process over-rode all individual interests for the sake of the greatest potency of the social organism. He was thus critical of what he considered to be the old view of society. According to Kidd,

...the attempt has continued to be made to enunciate the principles of human development from the standpoint that society is to be considered as a "social organism", but while as yet there is no clear idea of a social organism with its own laws and its own consciousness
quite distinct from, and extending far beyond, those governing the interests of the individuals at present comprising the State.\textsuperscript{58}

Standing on these ideas, Kidd argued that in this process of "socialization",\textsuperscript{59} the individual ceases to be a matter of first importance.

Now, if Kidd's conception of society involves the idea that the meaning of the individual is subservient to the larger social meaning, Mill will not go that length.\textsuperscript{60} The contrast between the two views is striking. While Kidd would come to regard society's evolution as a process of progress towards an organic stage of social subordination, Mill, in mid-century, was busy vindicating the "sovereignty of the individual"\textsuperscript{61} and fighting for his emancipation from the claims of society. Bain's sympathetic response to Mill's call seals their fate as principled individuals vibrating at the opportunity of protecting mankind from attack or encroachment. Mill's On liberty is telling in this regard. Consider Bain's reaction to it.

The chapter...entitled "The limits to the Authority of Society over the Individual", helps us better to his [Mill's] meaning. He lays it down as an axiom that society should interfere only in what concerns itself. One might suppose that this would have passed as self-evident, instead of being cavilled at on all hands. ...to refuse the axiom itself argues some defect of intelligent comprehension. As a piece of vigorous composition, this chapter is not inferior to any in the book; it is admirable as an exposition in practical ethics, and might be enshrined as a standing homily in the moral instruction of mankind. It does what homilies rarely do, namely, endeavour to draw precise lines between social duty and individual liberty; and reviews the more notable instances where society continues to tyrannize over minorities.\textsuperscript{62}

Both Mill and Bain conceive of society as a union of human beings aggregated as "confederates" for common purposes.\textsuperscript{63} Beyond all doubt, it is the emancipated and self-governing agent which they see as the fulcrum of social change.\textsuperscript{64} Theirs is the shared idea that as the pivot of society, the individual must be kept safe from harm caused by the destructive forces of assimilation. It here bears noticing that Mill and Bain's prioritizing the value of the individual over that of society is a defensive move on their part, as they are concerned to guard against individual absorption by
assimilation.65

Hence if society is to progress along Mill's plan, it must foster the development of intellectually and morally sound characters. As society's prosperity is thought by Mill to have its rise in the good individual,66 its essential conditions are those qualities which make for individual well-being, namely, "self-respect, self-help, and self-control", all of which are exercised in the pursuit of self-appointed ends.67 But note that by Mill and Bain's accounts, self-rule seems to call for enclosure. It is as if self-command is best achieved by way of fencing in the self so as to ward off the danger of subservience by coercion. This is significant: distrust and concern over the turn of social events are revealed in this defensive reaction of theirs, which bears the marks of a troubled social experience.

Mill himself writes as though thriving is all but impossible unless individuals are first bounded and protected, and thereby given the scope necessary to deliver the stroke of freedom in as forcible a manner as is needed to fight oppression. As staunch advocates of individual independence and autonomy, Mill and Bain are convinced that arm's-length relations are best achieved by breaking out of servitude. They seem to think that to be delivered of an emancipated state first calls for a severance of dependent ties by inducing a state of separation that spells the curtailment of arbitrary power.68

In playing up self-reliant qualities, Mill's words attest his conviction. For in pitching his idea of a good utilitarian society, he banks on individuals being "self-protecting", "self-dependent", and "self-governed".69 That is to say that Mill entreats all individuals to safeguard their own rights and interests, to rely on their own doings, and to guide their conduct by their own feelings of duty and conscience.70 Mill in fact champions the cause of self-emancipation, defending the view that "over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign" in the pursuit of the good life as he sees fit.71 He is thus relentless in warning individuals that the well-being of society is possible only insofar as individual empowerment is not curtailed.

Re-echoed within the wider social context of a self-regulating mechanism of industrial functioning unhampered by intrusive external controls, Mill's words are resounding and definitive. And Bain chimes in with him on the point: individual virtues of self-reliance and self-command are incompatible with attitudes of submission and
compliance to the will of restrictive authorities.\textsuperscript{72}

Mill brings to a focus the need to remove restraints placed upon individuals by limiting the authority of society over their lives. His plan of social organization encompasses an area of individual life "within which the individuality of that person ought to reign uncontrolled either by any other individual or by the public collectively".\textsuperscript{73} Mill thus marks the limits of individual, collective and governmental agencies, on the ground that it is imperative to protect the sanctity of private life with powerful defenses against infringements of liberty.\textsuperscript{74}

There is no disputing the fact that both Mill and Bain were alerted to the dangers of self-absorption, seeing in this intense preoccupation with oneself the motherlode of self-centeredness. The problem called for immediate attention for it was only too clear to Mill that,

interest in the common good is at present so weak a motive in the generality, not because it can never be otherwise, but because the mind is not accustomed to dwell on it as it dwells from morning till night on things which tend only to personal advantage... The deep-rooted selfishness which forms the general character of the existing state of society, is so deeply rooted, only because the whole course of existing institutions tends to foster it...\textsuperscript{75}

As implacable enemies of selfishness, they were of one mind in emphasizing a unity of feeling and of action among individuals sharing a community of interests.\textsuperscript{76} But as they were ever on the look-out for oppressive social evils, they were acutely sensitive to the pitfalls of a cohesive social unit marked by an excess of stifling uniformity.

Mill and Bain distrusted those who rallied under the banner of social solidarity only to give free expression to coercive tendencies. Theirs was the common endeavor to accentuate and promote the growth of individual differences in the effort to countervail harmful forces of assimilation, whose rise Bain attributed to "the love of domination and of uniformity".\textsuperscript{77} Theoretically elaborated by Mill into an analysis of social variations, society was seen as contributing to the realization of individual life plans framed in accordance with one's character.\textsuperscript{78} Mill pressed the fact that,

human nature is not a machine to be built after a model, and set to do exactly the work prescribed for it, but a tree, which requires to grow and develope [sic] itself on
all sides, according to the tendency of the inward forces which make it a living thing.\textsuperscript{79}

Mill's distaste for copycat models was provoked by the need to sunder the yoke of uniformity and to free mankind from all forms of bondage. An "ideal of self-development" as well as a type of "excellence in conduct" were his leading principles guiding the work of "perfecting and beautifying" human beings.\textsuperscript{80} For Mill looked upon the cultivation of individuality as a revelation in the light of which "human beings become a noble and beautiful object of contemplation."\textsuperscript{81}

Mill and Bain had no intention of shaping human existences after a single mould. Mill himself wished to construct as many rational and responsible centres of improvement as there were individuals.\textsuperscript{82} But vigilant as Mill and Bain always were against potential attack upon individuality, theirs was a wish couched as a warning. For they held that the erected structures would only be as stable as the social ground upon which they stood was levelled, that is, cleared of all 'sinister' irregularities, unequal conditions and unwarranted distinctions.\textsuperscript{83}

Both Mill and Bain meant to facilitate the rise of mankind from a submissive to an independent state. Unfaltering in the profession of their credo, they were, in their united reform action, principled in, and guided by, the belief that "the well-being of a people must exist by means of the justice and self-government of the individual citizens".\textsuperscript{84} Such individualistic impressions as Bain's picture of the mind evokes have their rise in the attempt to defend against all forms of oppression by way of inducing self-mastery. It might be well, then, to view Bain's portrayal of mental function in this perspective.

INDIVIDUALIZING TENDENCIES IN BAIN'S PSYCHOLOGY

The vindication of intellectual individualism

Problems of social cohesion and differentiation were by-products of industrialization and commercialism. They not only colored Mill and Bain's social experiences, but were also items of topical interest to commentators and thinkers of an earlier age. Steven Shapin has examined the role of these social preoccupations in the
development of early nineteenth-century Edinburgh phrenology. In so doing, he has pondered the relation between social perceptions and accounts of natural reality. His reflections on the matter are interesting because suggestive of possible ways in which the social underlay of Bain's psychological disquisitions might have affected his theoretical constructions.

Shapin focuses on this factor of individualism and differentiation as part and parcel of the social experience of the phrenologists. And he wants to argue that while this key aspect can be said to find expression in the phrenological conception of mental function, it can also be seen to have a context of use in directing efforts toward, and promoting, certain social ends.

As I see it, Bain's project bears the distinctive mark of its executor's reformist spirit as well. For it seems that in his bid to abide the authority of reason and the decisions of the intellect, Bain charges himself within the covers of his psychological treatises with the task of justifying the need of self-ruling individuals. Uniquely rendered in value-laden terms, his many attempts at human characterization which distinguish his psychological undertakings attest his commitment to promoting the cause of the self-directive individual. Moreover, his candid advocacy of an individualistic empiricism by the prescription of the "rule of trial and error" is a decided refutation of any despotic exercise of power breeding overdependence.

In relating the seventeenth-century changes in ways of ascertaining truth about the natural world, Shapin construes the shift towards intellectual individualism as a vindication of the authority of individual reason against textual and traditional authority. Nothing so defines the modernist features of science in Shapin's eyes as this accent on the primacy of reason and sense experience over trust, text and tradition, in securing natural knowledge. He writes: "There is probably no other sensibility that more strongly links seventeenth-century and late twentieth-century moderns than the recommendation of intellectual individualism and the rejection of trust and authority in the pursuit of natural knowledge."

Typified as the seventeenth-century rhetoric of individualistic empiricism are the following modernist maxims, as summarized by Shapin: "rely not on the testimony of humans but on the testimony of nature; favor things over words as sources of
knowledge; prefer the evidence of your own eyes and your own reason to what others
tell you. And Shapin adds:

Here is the root idea of modern empiricism, the view
that proper knowledge is and ought to be derived from
direct sense experience. And here too are the foundations
of modern mistrust of the social aspects of knowledge
making: if you really want to secure truth about the
natural world, forget tradition, ignore authority, be
skeptical of what others say, and wander the fields alone
with your eyes open. As John Locke said, "We may as
rationally hope to see with other men's eyes, as to know
by other men's understandings. So much as we ourselves
consider and comprehend of truth and reason, so much
we possess of real and true knowledge...In the sciences,
every one has so much as he really knows and
comprehends. What he believes only, and takes on trust,
are but shreds."

Bain would carry Locke's words with him, to be sure. And yet he has his own
social problems to negotiate. And his psychological expression bears the impress of
these concerns. His phrasing lends color to the idea that by advocating the supremacy
of the self-directive intellect and downplaying 'shred'-like beliefs and borrowed ideas,
Bain intends to undermine the authority of an elitist old school. It would seem that his
illustration and explanation of an efficient employment of our intellectual tools is not
only meant to "assist us in using them to the best advantage", as he is wont to say. It
is also intended to serve as a course of study in self-rule.

Working toward this objective, Bain makes a typical move: just as gamecocks
are set into a pit to fight, so casts of mind are set by him into opposition as if to wage
the battle of the fittest. This idea of conquest is in fact given special prominence in
Bain's psychology. Indeed not only is the clashing of forces a theme song in his book,
recurring so often as to characterize his work, it is also that the confrontation is decisive
in that there is a gainer. And Bain is sure to press the point that gain is by struggle.

Note, as an instance, the following contention by Bain.

The taste for what is true and certain has much to
contend against, and at times its struggles rise to the
tragic and sublime. The total submission of the entire
being to what has been proved by evidence is the
crowning-point of the scientific character; it is the
ascendancy of truth and reason, the victory of pure
intelligence over all the workings of sense and passion, a still small voice making itself heard amidst the war of elements.92

We see Bain making thrusts at the "unscientific" cast of mind while exhibiting the merits of the "scientific or logical intellect".93 And it is as he pits them against one another that his psychological expression is, as it were, colored with a slight 'axiological' tinge.94 As such, it leaves the reader with no doubt as to the "mental superiority" of the "intellectual and cultivated nature".95 Note that this intellectual excellence which meets with Bain's approval is known only to the individual who strives "to extricate himself from the prevailing modes of viewing natural appearances".96

Bain's psychological representation of character differences, -uniquely rendered by him in war-like terms,97 is 'axiological' in overtone. Consequently, scientific propensities such as he himself supports are given prominence. In thus giving the high sign of mental excellence through the use of comparative language, Bain's book of psychological knowledge in effect opens up a world at the best it can be. While offering directions as to how to get there, his account seems meant to inspire belief in the perfectibility of both man and society. It is in this context of ideas that Shapin's attempt to comprehend phrenology as a social phenomenon is suggestive. His point is to show that natural knowledge may not only express and justify social interests and concerns. It may also be a signal of an ideal social order.

As Shapin remarks, "people do not just justify; they may also seek to discredit and undermine social institutions. Institutionalized cosmologies will tend to reflect the practical concerns of the dominant institutions. However, discontented social groupings may elaborate cosmologies which are not "like" the dominant institutions in which they live, but which are, rather, signals of an ideal social order or tools crafted to subvert the dominant order."98

While expounding his psychological theories, Bain's marked tendency toward value distinctions might well be read as a sign of warning as well as of direction. The fact that faulty and corrupt social arrangements were intellectually and morally degradative was reason enough for Bain to sound the warning bell, thereby calling attention in his psychological writings to the need for intellectual and institutional
changes. Psychology would in this way serve as Bain's channel for the expression of his practical concerns.

In truth both Mill and Bain were conscious of living in a world of changing opinions and institutions. Mill looked on the social arrangements of his time as "merely provisional", while his was an age "in which the world of opinions is a mere chaos". Mill and Bain also noticed that individual strivings after self-improvement were at a low ebb. They therefore understood that the social gains which they sought, though by all means achievable, were realizable only in an intellectually and morally improved state of society. And that spoke of a time yet to come.

Projected as benefits of this future state of society were such advantages as those of universal freedom and suffrage, moral and intellectual excellence, higher forms of national character, deference to mental superiority, and an enlarged scope for individual spontaneity. In the meantime, Mill and Bain figured that they could only as yet assist, guide and direct the course of thought toward its coming. This they did by treading, each in their respective field, a path of theoretical innovations, guided, all the while, by the beacon of this ideal picture of social organization. They felt confident that this innovative search would lead the way to the desired end. To Henry Taylor Mill would write:

It is not to you that anything need be said on the necessity of keeping a true ideal before one, however widely the state of facts may differ from it, and the extreme peril, both of having a false ideal, and of having no ideal at all, between which states politicians both speculative and practical seem to be divided.

Mill yielded to none in recognizing the trappings of visionary thought. He held, as such, that no theoretical knowledge was worth its weight in gold unless associated with its practical complement. Bain no less than Mill favoured a personal acquaintance with the transactions of world affairs and an actual experience of the intellectual and moral tendencies of the times as necessary conditions of clear vision. But they also realized that clear vision involves foresight. As Mill probed the relevance of ideal social conditions in the here and now, his regard for the future was also undergirded by the need to deprecate false ideals of human society.

As is true of all trodden ways, paths wind and bend according to the particular
use for which they are made. Mill and Bain’s theoretical tracks follow the course of their intellectual commitments and practical concerns. Theirs was the belief and hope that this projected path of travel would open in a place promotive of individual and general welfare.

In assisting the realization of this progressive state of society, they specifically chose to lead individuals on the way to an improved state of “intelligent opinions”. For they firmly believed in the power of “living convictions” to bear influentially upon the actions of individuals. And were it not, they thought, for the likes of active persons committed to making the world better, there would be little hope of change. In Mill’s book, this energetic character stands for “that which struggles against evils”, and “that which endeavors to make circumstances bend to itself”. In Bain’s book, it is “the parent and the guardian of liberty.” Itemized, therefore, because central a consideration on Mill and Bain’s social agenda is the development of this rational, discriminative, decisive, self-controlled and “strong-minded” individual.

As a guide in taking action, Mill’s critical appraisal was also Bain’s: “society demands, and anticipates, not merely a new machine, but a machine constructed in another manner. Mankind will not be led by their old maxims, nor by their old guides; and they will not choose either their opinions or their guides as they have done heretofore”. Mill, however, was well aware of the fact that no high-flying principle nor doctrine would ever convince those whose minds were unprepared to receive its impress. A revamped mental training was therefore needed that would enable individuals to appreciate the force, and trust in the power, of persuasive affirmations and positive creeds. Of the highest import in Mill and Bain’s eyes were studies leading to a proper estimate of evidence. Bain remarks:

The faith that above all others dignifies and perfects human nature, is faith in evidence or in proof... There are certain tests or criteria of whether or not a statement agrees with the fact of things, and these tests are called the proof or evidence of the affirmation; and when a man has brought himself to appreciate these, and to bow to them with the whole force of his nature, he may be considered to be a truly rational being, or a being at one with the decrees and ordination of the world. This faith in evidence is not an instinct, but a growth confirmed by the force of habit, and acquired in defiance of many of
our most powerful natural impulses. It is produced by large dealings with the actual world, and by the cultivation of the exact sciences, or the departments of knowledge which have been brought to express with perfect accuracy the invariable order of nature.112

As both Bain and Mill see it, so much rides on the confirmation of this growth. Bain figures that "[t]he aptitude for judging according to the reasons of things, if it were more widely possessed, would be seen to ramify in endless ameliorations of the lot of humanity. Besides the success that would attend expectations so based, it is in the nature of such reasonings to command agreement among different minds and thereby conduce to harmonious co-operation, where at present the rule is distraction and discord."113

Mill and Bain thus agreed in the view that new intellectual beginnings, solidly anchored in the ground of cultivated judgment, should proceed on the basis of a rejection of all common-sense, customary, traditional and a priori modes of thinking, for construed as dogmatic, oppressive and resistant to change. As an instance of this, mark Mill's appraisal of the doctrine of innate principles: it stood in his eyes "as the greatest speculative hindrance to the regeneration so urgently required, of man and society..."114 As to "the notion that truths external to the mind may be known by intuition or consciousness, independently of observation and experience", says Mill, this,

is, I am persuaded, in these times, the great intellectual support of false doctrines and bad institutions. By the aid of this theory, every inveterate belief and every intense feeling, of which the origin is not remembered, is enabled to dispense with the obligation of justifying itself by reason, and is erected into its own all-sufficient voucher and justification. There never was such an instrument devised for consecrating all deep-seated prejudices.115

Bain concurred with Mill's opinion that to supersede such modes of thought as were unsubstantiated by experience and thus rooted in human prejudices, marked the beginning of a new intellectual era. This rejection was of moment to Mill and Bain, as it stood for the demise of all forms of tyrannical activity and authority.116

Both the fomentation of a resistance to degenerative institutions and the
incitement to a moral revolution were justified in Mill and Bain's eyes. For they deemed these radical measures favourable to the perfectibility of human nature, and, therefore, helpful to the desired end of social improvement. "When a society requires to be rebuilt", says Mill, "there is no use in attempting to rebuild it on the old plan...better institutions and better doctrines must be elaborated..." Correctives such as would dislodge old habits and forms of authority while reinstating reason as the recognized standard of right, were part and parcel of their ameliorative social schemes. Note Bain's concern: "No less is more incessantly taught to men than that they should use their intellectual faculties, and yet they have often found it an easier task to make the most slavish submissions to spiritual and temporal despotisms."

As emblematic of promissory social changes, these measures to which Bain gave full assent marked his theoretical innovations in the colors of reform, and gave his constructions definite shape. His psychological expression takes on a slight 'axiological' tinge as a result. Inasmuch as Bain's psychological discourse reflects these aspirations, it is as the communication of a signaller whose purpose is to instill belief in, and arouse enthusiasm for, a future social state guaranteeing the preservation of individual agency. With psychology as the protective conduit, the transmission of Bain's communication is ensured: his is the message that the scientific cast of mind is the lead-in to the promised land. To speechify in 'axiological' style by marking text with the accent of one's convictions does help in the way of getting the message across.

The liberationist appeal of the scientific intellect

Now when it comes to the subjects of the human mind and of scientific knowledge, Bain has a unique way of speaking to the ideal without resorting to the 'oughts' and 'musts' of normative talk. Short of making prescriptive statements as such, his factual discussions are nevertheless punctuated by the use of comparative language. And when Bain intends them to be regarded as models or authoritative standards, his value-laden conceptions serve to determine, guide and regulate proper behaviour.

Bain's depicted world of factual knowledge is as a borderland between the actual and the ideal. To suggest that something is perfect, for instance, involves a value
judgment. It implies that this thing is better than some other, and as perfect, has normative appeal. Now these value judgments, I say, are interspersed throughout Bain's scientific texts, and uniquely characterize his work on the subject of the human mind. Though they are not written in the official language of rules and in words expressive of obligation, his theoretical pronouncements are nonetheless prescriptive and directive in tone. They have the normative appearance without the substance, so to speak.

In light of this, I use the term 'axiological' to refer to Bain's tendency toward value distinctions as shown in his psychological explanations. And I borrow the word from E.J. Dijksterhuis who uses it as descriptive of a certain mode of thought in his work on 'The mechanization of the world picture'. In pondering the scientific legacy of antiquity, for instance, Dijksterhuis speaks of the "typical Hellenic habit of thinking in axiological antitheses, of always wanting to decide which of two comparable activities, properties, or qualities is the higher, the better, the nobler, or the more perfect." This point of view may reasonably be said to be a striking feature of Bain's thought on psychological matters.

Clearly marked by Bain as the two opposing constituents of an antithesis, the contrast of the scientific intellect to the common mind is a case in point: while differences are emphasized, the first, like some standard would be, is yet seen to advantage. The comparison is in fact expressive of inequality. It would seem that Bain has decided which of the two casts of mind is the better. His reflections on science -in themselves a significant release when moved by psychological conveyance, are telling in this regard.

According to Bain, the intellect's highest reach is that afforded by generalization, which is said to be its worthiest task. No sooner entered upon the subject of science than Bain's scientific propensities are immediately evident. Note the claims: while he deems the generalizing power to be "the foundation of mental excellence", and generality, the "glory" of science, the generalizing sweep is considered "a step towards the centralization of the empire of science". Bain clearly puts a high value on scientific knowledge: as truth beyond compare, it is deemed the "perfect form of knowledge". His is the belief that science

is the most perfect embodiment of Truth, and of the ways of getting at Truth. More than anything else does
it impress the mind with the nature of Evidence, with the labour and precautions necessary to prove a thing. It is the grand corrective of the laxness of the natural man in receiving unaccredited facts and conclusions.122

This faith in evidence or proof it is indeed, promises Bain, which "above all others dignifies and perfects human nature".124 Because he believes the fundamental abstract sciences to be constructed "according to the highest perfection of reason", he regards them as "the greatest instrument of rational culture".125 Bain's confidence in the ways and means of science knows no bounds. The claim is indeed his that by comprehending the course of nature's changes through "laws of the highest and most commanding generality", "perfect vision" would be consummated.126 He writes: "The path of science, as exhibited in modern times, is towards generality, wider and wider, until we reach the highest, the widest laws of every department of things; there explanation is finished, mystery ends, perfect vision is gained."127 Wishing to make good his promise, Bain's promotion of, and program in, scientific training specifically aims at fostering those inductive habits of mind conducive to the attainment of true abstractions and great reigning laws.128

Abundance of precept is here readily supplied by Bain, and instanced in some such statements of his as bear on scientific methodology. Consider the following: as "one of the very highest branches of the education of the human mind", the inductive approach is said to be the "right procedure" and the "right way" of working a question of interest; and given that "we see but in part", "we ought always surely to confine our vision in this way"; in fact "there is no habit for which it is more necessary that minds should be put under a specific training than this"; as such, parts "ought...to be recorded separately, and looked at separately"; for this is "how facts ought to be dealt with in order to rear general principles".129 When he intends his words to be convincing on the subject of mental training, Bain does not shrink from normative talk.

Nothing less than a stark contrast drawn from the realm of the concrete will do in order to set his scientific faculty in high relief. We are told as such that "there is a standing hostility between the Artistic and the Scientific modes of looking at things".130 As an oft-recurring theme in his repertoire of oppositional pairs, the antithesis of art and science serves Bain's purpose as it sets the "luxury of sense" against the "labour of the
intellect", and the "common" or "natural mind" against the "scientific mind". As in all cases in which Bain plays out his one-on-one confrontations, he makes sure that there is a gainer by the encounter.

Bain's umpiring on the side of science and of "the higher knowledge" (generality) is intended to preserve what he considers to be "the true point of view of the world" from the "multifarious allurements of sensible objects". If one is to stand on truth, says Bain, then, clearly, the sanctums of scientific investigation must be protected from the likes of "blind passion", "unenlightened instinct" and "personal bias". Abstractive analysis is here Bain's guard. This methodological device appeals both to his logical and to his practical interests. Beyond that of being a necessary aspect of generalization, analysis does indeed seem to have great possibilities. For it is as a weapon in the hands of Bain, whose service in the campaign for truth licenses him -or so he thinks, to use it for advantaging the scientific intellect over the common mind.

Mill had himself played up the liberationist aspect of analysis, contending that,

[the habit of philosophical analysis, (of which it is the surest effect to enable the mind to command, instead of being commanded by, the laws of the merely passive part of its own nature,) by showing to us that things are not necessarily connected in fact because their ideas are connected in our minds, is able to loosen innumerable associations which reign despottically over the undisciplined or early-prejudiced mind.]

Mill presumed that without those habits of analysis and abstraction, "the mind is the slave of its own accidental associations, the dupe of every superficial appearance, and fit only to receive its opinions from authority..."

Perceiving truth to be at stake, Bain means to encourage any analytic attempt to neutralize the "totalizing influence of a complex object", which, we are told, is fomented upon the soil of poetry. For as he sees it, art yields not truth but feeling, and as emotionally charged, has corruptive potential if projected as a truth-bearing pursuit. Analysis services Bain's need: it has both subversive power as regards the break-up of wholes, and illuminative potential with respect to the highlight of the scientific cast of mind. Indeed Bain's handling of analytic work is so mannered as to ensure that in commending the sharpness of its analytic blade, the scientific intellect is seen to have an edge on the competition.
Bain gives it the advantage, in true verbalistic fashion, by an effective use of choice words. In this way does he impress scientific intellects as morally worthy because incisive, and therefore, skilled at cutting into the thick of things with the edge tool of analysis. His is indeed the claim that as the analytic power "resists" the attractive force of aggregates and "isolates" their individual effects for study, it thereby constitutes "the moral element of the scientific intellect". The intellectual posture taken by Bain toward this discussion is anything but neutral. Conveyed to his readers is the idea that "[s]cience checks the extravagant departures from truth in Art, and is thus a medium of purifying Art productions."\textsuperscript{138}

To recapitulate then: Celebrated by Bain and Mill alike because vitally important in restructuring the social order was the inauguration of a reformation of minds to be effected by the inculcation of sound habits of reasoning. Nothing for Bain was so effective a training tool as that of science in operating fundamental changes in the constitution of thinking modes, whence his accent on the scientific intellect as the exemplar of a disciplined mind. Aimed at evoking response, his psychological pronouncements have social resonance and import.

Bain's rendition of the development of this "cool intellectual nature"\textsuperscript{139} is decidedly on his own terms, and his remarks seem meant to pique the interest of would-be freethinkers. Note how this acquirable possession is said to come only to those who undergo intense training, and are, as such, engaged in operations of resistance against oppressor occupation. Despotic forces such as Bain thinks likely to usurp careful judgment, and, thus, call for the counterpunch of reason, are the likes of "popular" considerations, "superficial" and "apparent" regards, and "dominant" feelings.\textsuperscript{140} That, therefore, which in an individual's repertoire of beliefs is stamped with the 'shred'-like mark of an all too "common", 'popular', "poetical", "fanciful", "un-emancipated", and, as Bain would add, compliant way of thinking, must be lobotomized.\textsuperscript{141} All in the name of truth, of course, and for the ends of instituting self-rule.

At the hand of Bain, then, the scientific and analytic intellect,\textsuperscript{142} whose "moral" quality is warranted by the effective use of a dissecting reasoning faculty and "cool eye", has its rise in the foundering of the unscientific character, whose shackling handicaps are those of an "untutored mind" and "common eye".\textsuperscript{143} As is the case in Mill's society,
so it is in Bain's psychology: both the "sovereignty of the individual" and the "dominion of reason" come by rising in rebellion against the "trammels" of coercive influences.\textsuperscript{144} And both these purpose-built theoretical constructions of Mill and Bain attest their common determination to accomplish one good turn, namely, the rise of the self-directive individual.

**Constructive association: the institution of self-rule**

Manoeuvres such as Bain performs in the hope of instituting self-rule are seen in his theoretical formulations and illustrative examples. Take, for instance, Bain's chapter on constructive association,\textsuperscript{145} in which he speaks of the intellectual forces of similarity and contiguity as the associative underpinnings of imaginative, creative and originative operations. In evincing the workings of mental constructiveness, Bain seems intent on showing that even without a firsthand knowledge of things, individuals need not deal in secondhand mental merchandise, so to speak, in the form of borrowed and derivative ideas.

If the goal is to conceive of the yet unexperienced, Bain's recommendation is to go with the methodological likes of individual "struggles", "tentatives" and "trials", while relying on "chance" occurrences.\textsuperscript{146} The good word, says Bain, is that in the construction business, all that one ever needs is an intellect and a volition in good working order. Of course, Bain, meantime, is hard at work showing that with an intellect in gear, supplying, that is, all elements requisite for the combination, the new construction, of which there is no previous direct perception, does take place "as a matter of course".\textsuperscript{147} This rendition by Bain of an alliance of individual mental states united in the service of particular ends -his insistence, moreover, on a "happy combination" of elements which "takes place of its own accord",\textsuperscript{148} has further practical and sociological resonance. For his words sound like there is neither need of intermediaries nor threat of intermeddlers when standing on one's own two feet.

Upon Bain's word, the process seems simple enough: so long as the mind "incubates in patient thought", engages "in trials of all kinds on the chance of making lucky hits", and encounters "no serious obstruction from the feelings", "at last the proper
elements come together in the view, and fall into their places in a fitting combination". But Bain's matter-of-fact presentation should not blind us to the significance of this "process of groping", as the matter stands in his mind. For this "rule of 'trial and error'"-deemed by Bain "the grand and final resort" in all purposive operations, is beyond all doubt his choice expedient to the end of shaping self-determined individuals.

Note how success and ingenuity characterize Bain's individual in search of truth, whose self-induced efforts and uncoerced struggles involve him "in trials and operations far removed from the beaten paths of inquiry". Clearly, the realm of the self-made and sovereign individual lies out of the reach of commonness. Bain's writing is as an inducement to act upon the subaudible message, and it reads: don't ask what others can do for you, but what you can do for yourself. Laid down as a guiding principle, Bain's prescription for the recovery of liberty thus designates self-mastery as a sovereign remedy. As Bain spells out the necessities of autonomous and creative life, we seem meant to understand that it is better to feed upon the essentials of self-sustaining practices than to dabble in the stagnant waters of dependency. Self-preservation is the name of the game, and Bain counsels his readers to keep their volitional armament at the ready.

Here as elsewhere, volition is the handmaid of reason. Cast by Bain in the positivist matrix and stripped therefore of all subjective relevance, volition is, as it were, cut out for the work of selection and adaptation suited to the desired result. Inasmuch as the mind is plied by the intellect with the elements required for a new combination, Bain is certain that "[a] voluntary effort is quite equal to the task of cutting down and making up, choosing and rejecting, sorting and re-sorting; the feeling of the end to be served is the criterion to judge by, and when this is satisfied, the volition ceases, the stimulus being no longer present." So much for the "selecting effort"; in the construction business, volition works by trial and error. But Bain will not leave it at that. For he is concerned to train every effort toward self-rule, thereby preparing individuals by exercise to withstand the ill effects of despotic forces. A resilient intellect, doubtless scientific, and perforce analytic by Bain's preference, is here an asset; partiality, one of the despots. Consider, for
instance, the emotional "clog" with which the analytic intellect is made to contend in constructive association, as it attempts to exercise self-government. And here I let Bain speak for himself. Quoted at some length is his exemplification of constructiveness in the sensation of touch.

I can acquire the touch of an orange, that is, the bulk, the weight, and the softness of the surface. I have acquired also the touch of a marble table... By a voluntary exertion of the mind, directing the view on the round figure of the orange, and on the touch and specific gravity of the marble, I can make to emerge a new conception - the collective impression of a marble ball equal in size to the orange. Part of the difficulty, in this trial, consists in the disassociating or separating of elements that have grown together in the mind... Thus, even when we operate upon subjects very conceivable and retainable, ...new difficulties may arise to clog the constructive operation. The mere effort of analysis is itself something considerable; it is not a favourite avocation of the untutored mind, with which associative growth is more congenial than disassociating surgery; and when the analysis has to be applied to break up favourite combinations, and constitute others of an unattractive kind, we become aware of the tyrannical influence that the likings and dislikings, the sympathies and antipathies, exert over the intellectual processes.156

Mill, not surprisingly, thinks it a most happy choice for Bain to have included in his treatise on Association an analysis of this intellectual process of construction.157 And why not welcome Bain's innovation indeed, as it serves the philosophic radical's practical turn. For note that at the very point at which Bain speaks of overstepping the bounds of experience in the work of creation and discovery, his words seem meant to bid us never abdicate the dignity of self-rule. For not only do the new aggregates grow out of experiential elements whose acquisition and command entail both self-determined activity and self-reliance. What is more, the very fact of their production by way of a self-correcting voluntary process of trial and error assumes and affirms the existence of self-willed, self-dependent and self-directed individuals. Self-given authority comes by way of struggles and tentatives in Bain's book, and his construal of the work of volition in the constructive process expresses both the desirability of sovereign ambitions and their attainability by individual efforts.
But that is not the whole story, as Bain intends it. For presumably the artistic mind is just as independent and as resourceful as the scientific intellect is. That is to say that it is equally invested in the volitional work of "trying and rejecting", while shaping constructions of the imagination. And yet when the 'scientific' and the 'artistic' are set into rivalry, -being, as it were, a demonstrative display of strength arranged by Bain to showcase the former, his penchant for the analytic intellect is only too clear.

There is indeed a playoff hero in Bain's tale. Construed in its bearing on the inauguration of self-rule, Bain's attempt to determine "[w]herein lies the remarkable difference in these two forms of constructiveness" reads as a pronouncement for the scientific mind. And that is because a training in the ways and means of science such as Bain advocates, stands in his eyes for the promise of personal liberation.

It all turns, for Bain, on that which is said to be the regulating power of the creative effort, whether nature or feeling. Bain here moves into the light of his preferences by bringing the question to bear on the truth-value of artistic productions and on the merits of the "truth-seeking artist". Within this context, his words tell his scientific propensities. In fact it has everything to do with the corruptive potential of 'feeling'. For consider that insofar as constructions are "a pure effort of intellect" -and Bain deems scientific ones to be, they are made to order, so to speak. They are produced, that is, in accordance with natural laws and bounded within the realm of known realities. They can therefore be trusted. In imaginative combinations, however, it is not nature but emotion which, according to Bain, "is the regulating power, the all in all of the creative effort." The problem, for Bain, is that "[i]n substituting the license of imagination for the restraints of truth, we incur serious liabilities." 

In pronouncing it one of the three fundamental properties of the mind, Bain does allow 'feeling' to bear its share of influential power within certain domains. But power is not yet sovereign control in Bain's book. And when it comes to matters of truth, intellect is Bain's reigning governor. Bain in fact believes that "the influence of the emotions, while just and legitimate in the artistic sphere, is usually a source of corruption and bias in the combinations that have truth or practice for their end." Arm's length relations between the two powers seem to give Bain assurance that truth will not be tampered with. He deems it necessary to distance intellect and feeling. For
his is the fear that when unduly exalted, a "reigning feeling" is something of a despot, and, as a "king passion", is likely to spell the suppression of the rational expression.\(^{166}\)

"We see the power of an emotion", writes Bain, "not merely to give its own character to the conceptions formed on all subjects, but to induce belief in the full and exact reality of such conceptions."\(^{167}\) And he adds: "This is the way that our feelings lord it over our beliefs or convictions."\(^{168}\)

Bain's words read as a warning that associating bonds "forged in the hot fire of passion"\(^{169}\) can only misdirect the search for truth. He believes that "[t]here is an important contrast of the Intellectual and Emotional Temperaments, visible in the successions of thought in the two modes of mind. In the one, the intellectual forces by themselves govern the reproduction of thought... In the other, the feelings sway the course of reproduction, and intellectual relations bear a subordinate place. The one favours rationality of judgment, or decisions according to strict evidence; the other is the stronghold of every fallacy."\(^{170}\)

At the hand of Bain, then, emotions are often projected as "needing restraint", and in the work of teaching, for instance, definitely require "management".\(^{171}\) Bain is himself confident that there is no better way of imposing restrictions upon flights of fancy than the conditions of truth and reality. And those, he claims, are within the reach of the intellect only, while "art, aiming at the agreeable is adverse to imposing restraints or self-denial."\(^{172}\) Consider his words.

The artist's standard is feeling, his end is refined pleasure; he goes to nature, and selects what chimes in with his feelings of artistic effect, and passes by the rest. He is not even bound to adhere to nature in her very choicest displays; his own taste being the touchstone, he alters the originals at his will. The scientific man, on the other hand, must embrace every fact with open arms; the most nauseous fungus, the most loathsome reptile, the most pestilential vapour, must be scanned and set forth in all its details.\(^{173}\)

In pronouncing them uneasy intellectual bedfellows, Bain wishes to express the specific distinguishing qualities of each character. But note that as thus engaged in fixing the boundaries of each, Bain is all the while marking their respective contribution to the store of true beliefs. His psychological delineation of character is, once again,
touched up with brush strokes typical of the portraitist's 'axiological' style. Quoted below are the concluding words of Bain's *Senses and the intellect*.

...there is, and always will be, a distinction between the degree of truth attainable by an artist, and the degree of truth attained by a man of science or a man of business... The scientific man has not wantonly created the diagrams of Euclid, the symbols of Algebra, or the jargon of technical Anatomy; he was forced into these repulsive elements, because, in no other way, could he seize the realities of nature with precision. It cannot be supposed that the upmost plenitude of poetic genius shall ever be able to represent the world faithfully, by discarding all these devices in favour of flowery ornament and melodious metre. We ought not to look to an artist to guide us to truth; it is enough for him that he do not mis-guide us.\(^{174}\)

So long as Bain has his say, nothing shall stand in the place of judgment and reason, for they are the means by which to know and value truth. And truth is the necessary condition to the attainment of Bain's objective. The hope is that as human activity is guided by the force of true beliefs, scientifically ascertained and interiorized to the full, it will effect the liberation of the individual from injustice and oppression. "Each highly-cultivated intelligence", writes Bain, "combining exactness with extent of acquirement, is a luminous body thrown out on the dark ways of human life."\(^{175}\)

Bain's good lying in pledge is Mill's credo.

The virtuous Will as the theoretical acknowledgement of self-command

Never so significant a construct as when seen in the light of this objective, Bain's carefully crafted Volition has undoubtedly got its job cut out for it. Theoretically reconfigured so as to accommodate Bain's particular specification, it is thereby fit to register the desirability of self-restraint. And here Bain's idea of self-control is that of a power whose superior strength is once again revealed by vanquishing obstacles. It is of importance to Bain's planned effect that the conquest of opposite forces by the Will be seen as a condition of its sovereign state.\(^{176}\)

Consider the operation of the Will which is said to be "disposed to operate of its own accord",\(^{177}\) and whose exploits are given the 'axiological' treatment by Bain. His
is the prescription that if it is to be "the highest and noblest of all the active impulses of man", the well-disciplined Will must, as "a higher order" of activity, prevail over "lower propensities" - be they appetites or instincts, while acting on the inspirations of the intellect. This volitional pursuit of intellectual and moral ends, themselves the perception of the intellect only, Bain calls conduct according to right reason. Now Bain cannot see how "action can be more elevated than intelligence, or that a man can carry into effect more than he sees... Energy following up reason and the generalities of prudence, right, and social good, and tested by overcoming occasionally all the inferior propensities of one's being, is the true definition of will; and the more elevated the character of the intellectual grasp, the more does the will stand apart from the other forces and activities of the being." 

Anticipating, therefore, no greater volitional rise than that encountered in the region of the intellect, a pretend traveller making his way through the Will would yet need to abide by the law of the land. And that would be to "obey the mandate to work for pleasure or to remove pain", which Bain deems the "great", "final", "true" and "crowning" ends of all pursuit. Here as elsewhere in the psychological world according to Bain, there is conflict. Bain's theoretical move is a predictable one: as "hostile motives" meet head-to-head in the area of the Will, the battleground is identified and "strongholds" erected so as to ensure that the noblest of motives can triumph over "strong temporary and passionate risings." Bain writes: "The inner life of every one is a sort of battle ground, or scene of incessant warfare; and the issues of those recurring contests are momentous both to the person's self and to other beings. The estimate that we form of any creature as an agent, depends upon the motives that predominate in the actions of that creature. The training of the young has a principal reference to the development of certain motives into superiority over the rest."

A glimpse at some of Bain's earliest writings when he was himself a student at Marischall College, Aberdeen, reveals his penchant for the rhetoric of warfare. The subject of the following quotation is that of virtuous conduct, as Bain thought about it in 1839.

Duty ought ever to have the first place in our regard. It is distinct from all the other principles of our nature by being appointed the ruling power. Other tendencies may
have to be checked, and for no other reason than that they rebel against it. Conscience is the rightful governor of the human soul, and the dignity of our nature consists in its being always able to enforce its dictates, and suppress every murmur and every threatening of rebellion among the lower propensities. It was, however, the aim of the Creator that the lower propensities should be made by discipline to coincide with the voice of conscience, and thus render its authority more easily enforced. They have power but no right to rule...Thus although duty is all sufficient for the purpose of direction, it becomes important for frail beings such as we are, to command the assistance of the emotions...

Whether treating of hostile motives or conflictual sources of activity, Bain's way of resolving the problem is typical. Instances of disturbance, "resistance" and "dominance" surfacing in the volitional realm are sure to warrant a counteraction; and in counterposing ideas of "restraint", "check" and "subjection" to this antagonistic expression, Bain's execution is performed so as to validate the virtuous Will. Insofar, then, as the victor Will has achieved mastery in the struggle against difficulties, Bain thinks it entitled to assume its 'noble' role as the obedient executive of the intellect's directives. Such activity of the "fully-formed executive" as meets with Bain's approval is "the unexcited, unimpassioned, rational, justly calculated operation of the will."

Bain fears that,

[The desire of ease at one time and of excitement at another, the gratification of appetite, and the predominance of strong emotion, would be more than sufficient to counterbalance duty or prudence, if there were not a peculiar and distinct tendency or power to carry into effect the results of reason or the judgments grounded on our intelligence... With opposing instincts, opposing habits, and, at the same time, an opposing social exterior of public opinion, any kind of proceeding must be intensely difficult, and must require a high development of pure will.]

Represented as the reconciliation of prudence and duty, Bain's 'virtuous Will' has individualistic significance as well. He has so fashioned it as to stand for the theoretical acknowledgement of self-rule. As Bain plays it out in his psychological work, this self-rule is itself the enactment of a volitional individual whose "self-formed or Independent conscience", though "at first derived and implanted", is no longer "influenced either by
fear of, or by reverence to, any superior power whatsoever". Bain's message is, let this "self-sustaining" conscience be the sole judge. For he trusts that though guided by the light of personal convictions only, conscientious individuals will yet adopt personal, social and moral duties as their own approved conduct. According to Bain,

[O]ur tender feelings, our sympathies, our sentiments of the fair, the equal, and the consistent, if liberally developed and well-directed, impel us, as it were of our own accord, to respect those interests of our fellow-feelings that are protected by the enactments of society...The conscience, which was at first derived and implanted, is now independent, or self-sustaining.190

While thus prompting to active duty, Bain's words subscribe to an individual's right to self-government as essential in realizing the necessaries of individual and collective well-being. Inasmuch as he has a hand in forming right-thinking individuals, Bain definitely means to inculcate in his readers views in accord with these expectations. Made up of elements, Bain's 'virtuous Will' is derivative excellence shown in feeling-prompted activity of a voluntary kind. Needed to operate on the Will, as Bain reminds us, is emotional driving power. Dissatisfied with previous accounts of voluntary activity, Bain readily supplies the theoretical need by psychologically and physiologically innovating on the subject of motivation. Though full of voices psychological and physiological, Bain's book dealing of the incitements to action has yet further resonance.

Most instructive in this respect is his treatment of the emotional spurs of self-regard and disinterestedness. Bain has so construed them that as formative elements of the moral sense (conscience) and phases of ethical conduct, self-regarding motives (interest) and sympathetic impulses (duty) have not only psychological motivity.191 They have physiologically induced liberalist appeal as well. I mean to say that in resorting to physiological means of strengthening his psychological account of virtuous, and thus, autonomous, conduct, Bain's physiological explanations bear out the right to self-government.
Registering the desirability of self-government by physical conveyance

By way of understanding the ways in which the physiological underpinnings of Bain's psychology carry legitimating messages of self-rule, I once again draw from Shapin's work on the development of Edinburgh phrenology. Shapin centres the attention on the use of the human body as a way of consolidating social experiences -of which the phrenologists's perception of a collapsing hegemonic society was one, and as a way of getting certain jobs of social work done. He writes:

Basic, of course, to the phrenological cosmos was the perception of a collapsed mind-matter hierarchy, no rigid boundary protecting the "spirit" from contamination by the "body". The brain was the organ of the mind, and the mind could legitimately be discovered by observation of its corporeal residence...Not only were the valleys to be exalted; the mountains and hills were also to be made low.

The mind-matter hierarchy was not the only hierarchy the phrenologists collapsed. Man was now, more than in any existing philosophy, definitely part of nature; he was, indeed, a natural object and a natural product. What is more, nature was a good nature; happiness followed automatically from conforming to natural laws.192

Resounding in similar tones, Bain's psychological and physiological representations are as liberating projections implicitly registering the desirability of self-government by negotiating the conditions of its establishment. As the qualities required to achieve this end, self-activity, self-discipline and self-definition are Bain's goods; physiology, his means of delivering them. We are not to forget, says Bain, that "a human being is an extended and material mass, attached to which is the power of becoming alive to feeling and thought, the extreme remove from all that is material; a condition of trance wherein, while it lasts, the material drops out of view..."193 This intimate relation of mind with a material organism,194 the elucidation of which was deeply interesting to Bain, was the fulcrum about which his reformist hopes turned.

If we are to comprehend Bain's psychological ways, it behooves us to think of the mental fact as a two-sided fact. For he will suffer no 'mind' breaking away from its material "companion".195 In fact so close is this alliance that "it seems" to Bain "as if we might say, no currents, no mind."196 In trying to gain acceptance for the view of mental
and nervous currents proceeding together "as undivided twins". Bain claims that no mental phenomenon is adequately represented if considered in its pure mental existence. When contemplated in company with a certain condition of the brain and nervous system, however, Bain thinks that the conception of any one mental phenomenon is made that much clearer by the gain in physiological insight.

In hope of practical gain, Bain is willing to invest in the view that "the line of mental sequence is thus, not mind causing body, and body causing mind, but mind-body giving birth to mind-body..." Body-and-mind, then, is the model on which Bain's psychological science is based. In trailing the beaten tracks of mental and nervous conveyances alike, Bain thus requires and legitimates the use of "cerebral highways" as the scaffolds of "streams of consciousness". Given the subjective and objective reference of his mental terms, the two-sidedness of mental phenomena looms large in his treatises. But then again, psychological truth is Bain's enterprise with a double-edged mission. While investigating the relationship of physical circumstances and mental qualities, Bain seems bent on ensuring that the suffering of a people through toil, poverty and ill-health will not go unnoticed.

Cast in the mold of Bain's conceptual thought, the human spirit offers no evidence of being a self-supporting, controlling and independent agent. In denying Spirit paramount rank, Bain also refuses to grant it supernatural and intervening powers. He beats the drum for the view that "the mind is completely at the mercy of the bodily condition; there is no trace of a separate, independent, self-supporting, spiritual agent, rising above all the fluctuations of the corporeal frame." So convinced is he of their inseparable association that Bain looks at the scrutiny of nerve fibres and cells as an endeavor worth its gold in information of a practical kind. He holds that a reference to physiological generalities is highly serviceable in discussions respecting the mind, for effective in many ways: either as assisting clear psychological conception, as suggesting facts of psychical experience while confirming the evidence of subjective analysis, or as helping psychological expression.

Denouncing all affectation of subjective purism in psychology, Bain intends to get a "handle" on things mental, and, as such, to unravel the complicated skein of human nature, by a grasp of physical facts. The resolution of psychological
complexity is not Bain's only design, however. For to uphold the validity of self-discovery as a search grounded in self-determined and disciplined activity is the unstated goal.

By keeping his eyes on the prize, Bain directs his steps toward it, knowing fully well that first things must be done first. As a step in the right direction, the topic of physical well-being is Bain's first consideration. His remarks on the subject are not only meant to instruct his readers in the "necessaries of a healthy existence", thereby moving them to a course of virtuous action marked by autonomy, "individual efficiency" and self-discipline. In specifying their right to these essentials, Bain's words are also designed to inform against the oppressive exercise of power and to condemn the attack on self-knowledge.

In spelling out the need for a "hedonics" as a legitimate field of study, for instance, Bain believes that "the obstacles to a science of happiness are not solely due to the gaps and deficiencies in our psychological knowledge; they are equally owing to the prevailing terrorism in favour of self-denial at all hands." And he adds:

Many of the maxims as to happiness would not stand examination if people felt themselves free to discuss them. You must work yourselves into a fervour of revolt and defiance, before you call in question Paley's declaration that "happiness is equally distributed among all orders of the community". I do not know whether I should wonder most at the cheerful temperament or the complacent optimism of Adam Smith, when he asks, "What can be added to the happiness of the man who is in health, who is out of debt, and has a clear conscience?" When the greatest philosophers talk thus, what is to be expected from the unphilosophic mob? The dependence of health on activity is always kept very loose, it may be for the convenience of shutting our mouths against complaints of being overworked. To render this dependence precise is a matter of pure psychology.

It bears noticing that mental improvement is here at stake for Bain. He writes:

Fear, care, anxiety, are hostile to culture by lowering the tone or energy of the mind; while what power is left concentrates itself upon the subject matter of the anxious feeling. On the other hand, general vigour of the system, good health, easy circumstances, are all in favour of
mental improvement, provided the force thus made available can be reserved and devoted to that end.209

On Bain's recommendation, then, "a man must exercise his muscles, must feed himself liberally, and give time to digestion to do its work, must rest adequately -all for the greatest energy of the mind, and for the trying work of education in particular."210 Knowledge is, for Bain, both liberating and empowering as it affords along with self-control the command of the means of happiness, while "ignorance implies large dependence on others, and on the accidents of things".211 He figures that "it is only by knowledge and skill going along with adequate force of resolution,"

that we can so use the resources of the world on the one hand, and so control the impulses of our own nature on the other, as to maintain the highest possible pitch of vitality, and cause a constant current of our finest emotions and activities. In possessing the command of our own existence we have a lordship or a kingdom, if we would so consider it; for it may well employ the highest gifts of a ruler to govern it well; and if we run it to wreck and perdition great is the fall thereof.212

Bain thinks that as a two-sided study, psychology has something to contribute in this respect. For in bearing the connexions of the physical with the mental, he insists that "[s]uch study is the only corrective of a prevailing popular error, namely, the undervaluing of physical causes in moral and intellectual effects."213 In giving mental relevance to bodily nourishment and health -all the while, preparing the seedbed for autonomous and moral individuals with the physiological plow, Bain writes out a psychology that has reformative appeal. The following words by James Mill meet with Bain's approval, and are quoted in the latter's biographical work on the elder Mill.

Dwelling upon the importance of Aliment, or nutrition, he [James Mill] puts admirably a truth that mankind have been very reluctant to receive. "The physical causes must go along with the moral; and nature herself forbids, that you shall make a wise and virtuous people out of a starving one. Men must be happy themselves, before they can rejoice in the happiness of others; they must have a certain vigour of mind, before they can, in the midst of habitual suffering, resist a presented pleasure; their own lives, and means of well-being, must be worth something, before they can value, so as to respect, the life, or well-being, of any other person. This or that
individual may be an extraordinary individual, and exhibit mental excellence in the midst of wretchedness; but a wretched and excellent people never yet has been seen on the face of the earth."^{214} 

As far as Bain is concerned, "[i]t hardly admits of question that any great augmentation of human happiness that may be achieved in the future, must proceed, first, upon a better standard of worldly circumstances..."^{215} 

This preoccupation with the bodily routine of every-day life as the complement of the mental routine is central to Bain's work. When ruling on the physical determinants of psychological expression, no mental phenomenon escapes Bain's eyes: feelings, intellectual functions, moral habits, one and all, are declared the dependencies of physical forces. Both mental and physical life as portrayed by Bain are alike fluctuant, varying in accordance with bodily conditioning. Unsurprisingly, the thematics of hunger and nourishment, fatigue and rest, health and disease, are subjects in the study of which Bain is assiduous. Mill himself trusted Bain to treat these topics "as materials towards building up a nobler and happier scheme of human existence."^{216} 

Significant are the following considerations to which Bain is particularly devoted. And they are: the conditions of physical and mental activity, the proper distribution of blood supply to the brain and other bodily needs, the economy of nerve and mental forces, the consumption and production of vital energy, the circular course of mental and nervous conveyances, and the expenditure of surplus nervous power. These highlight and instance Bain's allegiance to the principle of the persistence of force and to the law of self-conservation, to the sensory-motor paradigm and to the doctrine of spontaneous activity, all of which, by naturalizing the mind, have practical relevance and liberationist appeal as self-operating instruments of human well-being. 

Bain himself tells us that he finds no subject of human interest more captivating than this mind-body relationship. Worthy of notice here is the fact that Bain brings this relationship to bear on questions respecting the happiness of individuals. This is Bain's intention fully expressed without ambiguity.\(^{217}\) Relevant to the purpose though not explicitly uttered is Bain's wish to sell his readers on the qualities of self-support and self-reliance as begetting a state of tranquil happiness. And for cause as Bain deems contentment to be "a virtue of great importance to society generally".\(^{218}\) His words seem
to suggest that in addition to this contented state, the taste for self-reliant qualities is acquirable by observing the conditions of healthy physiological functioning.

Notwithstanding his partiality to the pleasures of rational culture, Bain's advice is to do first things first. For he fears the evils of ill health, poverty and toil, seeing that in starving the natural appetites, these social ills foster discontent and corrupt human existence. Bain issues a warning: "Human beings cannot be contented without the gratification of the natural appetites". The cautionary tale is given in light of his belief that "virtue and wretchedness are incompatible." 

As the prime requisite of happiness, health is, for Bain, a pressing matter, for he believes that the very foundation of a harmonious existence is here at stake. "That prime requisite, Health", writes Bain, "is very imperfectly secured in the lowest grades even of respectable citizenship. The public registers have demonstrated that mortality and disease diminish at every rise in the scale of wealth." Bain therefore devotes time and attention to the subject of bodily and mental vigour, insisting that it must exist in plenty. "It is manifestly essential", cautions Bain, "that each one should have vigour sufficient to bear up against all unavoidable labours and burdens; without this, life must be a perpetual sense of oppression."

In his argument for an improved state of mental health, bodily vigour is Bain's first claim, having initially postulated the dependency of mental force upon nervous power. His political-economy approach to self-preservation centres on an "economical adjustment of waste and supply [which] should be commenced from our earliest years, and not, as usually happens, after a conscious reduction of vigour has roused the individual to a sense of imminent danger." His prescription is that draining agencies must be limited and extravagant "expenditures" shunned, while restorative "incomes", husbanded. Nutrition is here the best support, says Bain, because this ready supply of blood to the brain activates the nervous flow.

The ebb and flow of cerebral action has significance for Bain, whose contention is that high and low tides of nervous current run alongside streams of high and low spirits. Bain is bent on showing that alike remedial agents which bear on the treatment of disorders, high nervous tides have therapeutic application. His is the hope and promise that with the corresponding mental surge, spirits rise, and with optimism on the
increase, mental stress can be alleviated. Bain's submission is that any small increase of bodily vigour has power to restore in that it "will often suffice to dispense a whole crowd of irritations and annoyances, and to renovate the entire tone and colour of the thoughts."\textsuperscript{225} Bain's words hint at the idea that it is within any one individual's power to redirect nervous funds to more pressing psychological needs by exercising self-control. Essential a preparation for this, thinks Bain, "is an education in a sound bodily regimen,"\textsuperscript{226} which course allows for the possibility of meeting one's needs by one's own efforts; that is, without external compulsion. Bain deems it a necessity, however, to stipulate the conditions of an improved cheerful tone. Of importance is the need to "[i]ncrease the supports and diminish the burdens of life."\textsuperscript{227} His is the contention that, it is especially necessary to cheerfulness, that a man should not be overworked, as many of us are, whether from choice or from necessity. Much, I believe, turns upon this circumstance. Severe toil consumes the forces of the constitution, without leaving the remainder requisite for hilarity of tone.\textsuperscript{228}

Holding on to his body-and-mind model as the beau ideal of mental-material alliance, Bain reminds his readers that the mind cannot function on the type of an "all expenditure, and no supply" mechanism: if it is to manifest itself, every psychical phenomenon needs its quota of oxygen, carbon and other nutritive materials.\textsuperscript{229} As blood is the source of nervous power, a goal to good health is to increase both its quantity and quality, says Bain. And for cause: in making the physical basis of susceptibility to pleasure, cerebral vigour, "both abundant and well-directed",\textsuperscript{230} is the eye of the psychological problem. Its conservation "is the kind of health that directly bears on happiness."\textsuperscript{231}

In specifying the needs of psychological restoratives while holding out the therapeutic potential of nervous rises, Bain's promise is also intended to warn against the evils of ill-being associated with intemperate lifestyles. In arguing for the principle of the limitation of human nature, Bain shoulders the view that human beings are restricted both in capacities and in sensibilities by the very laws of their being. Not only does Bain here mean to ground self-understanding in physical fact. He is also intent on censuring any discussion which overstates individual potential while overselling human enjoyment.\textsuperscript{232}
Bain has misgivings about ideal longings as he thinks them "liable to unfit us for seizing the actual." He designed, no doubt, to discourage the growth of unreasonable expectations in his readers, Bain's stricture also serves the purpose of counselling them on the dangers of rash actions, while underscoring the importance of realistic self-appraisal. In the face of "the known evils of precipitate volition", self-control is what is needed, argues Bain, whose recommendation is that in a show of motivational strength, the deliberating impulse must prevail over hasty promptings.

Human nature on Bain's view is limited, then. In accordance with his rendition of the principle, human beings are bound by the limited fund of energy or force available for distribution throughout the system. Holding to the restriction of energetic supplies, Bain speaks out in defense of a rule of conservation said to pervade physical world and mental sphere alike. As the back-bone of his thought on psychological matters, this law of the correlation of force expresses the fact that moving power is embodied in various and mutually convertible forms. Bain admits the nerve force to membership in the group of correlated forces in nature, thereby extending the principle of conservation to the realm of mind through its material side. Believing that force is neither created nor destroyed but transmuted in manifestation, Bain holds that any and all questions pertaining to psychological functioning must underscore the importance, and point to the necessity, of an "educated disposal of the forces" at hand.

Once again, we revisit notions of sound economy, proper balance and thrifty expenditure, as "well-regulated" minds are in demand. Inasmuch as responsibility and regulatory agency lay with individuals, Bain figures that these 'well-regulated' minds make for happiness. Practically speaking, the imposition of the principle acts as a buffer, keeping indulgences of all kinds within safe limits. At the hand of Bain, the regions of mind and body have become temperate zones marked by an avoidance of extravagance. Mark Bain's words as he ponders the subjects applicable to happiness.

...the exaggerating tendencies of artistic embellishment, to be guarded against, relate mainly to the possibilities of happiness; giving an overstrained account of what human nature can do, and can enjoy. The romancist uniformly oversteps the limitations of the human faculties, and throws out lures to make us attempt too much; an exact knowledge of the physical and the mental laws, and of that crowning aspect of them, the
general law called Correlation or Persistence of Force, is the best counteractive.238

Affirming the correlation of the physico-mental and physical forces, as well as the correlation of the mental forces among themselves, Bain claims that all mental and bodily acts are processed at a cost, and, as expended powers, are physically taxing. His psychological exposition is thus replete with details relevant to the maintenance of counterbalances, for projected as the mental endowment of self-poised individuals. Bain reasons that "just as we might maintain that a standing army is both loss and gain, so the excitement of the feelings to stimulate the intellect, is in one view a loss, inasmuch as there is a large expenditure of force in keeping up the flame, and in another view an unquestionable gain, seeing that in point of fact the impressions received at the time strike deeper."239 He concludes:

It would be better on the whole if the requisite effect could be produced without stirring up excitement; for if we must have excitement, the cost must be paid in a reduction of the general force of the mind. Hence the disinterested retentiveness is what economizes intellectual power, and issues in the maximum of acquisition. The discrimination and the retention practised in cool blood draw least upon the powers of the brain; they can be longer continued without exhaustion, and consequently can do most towards stirring up knowledge and acquirement.240

Bain warns his readers that the juggle of several and often competing physical and mental requirements is no easy handling. In his attempts to bring the issues into focus, he takes pains to show them that cerebral charges underlying mental work (physico-mental) drain the forces available for physical processes (muscular and visceral work); that mind as a whole is stinted by the demands of non-mental functions; and again, that psychological modes of expression are bounded by the mutual energetic requirements of mental manifestations.241

Below the surface of words run the swift currents of convictions. Messaged as an underlying theme and marked by individualist strength is Bain's very own moving principle: 'balance through self-command'. Appendant to the message is his assurance that the sole admissible restrictive is those which individuals have in their own hands. Resulting from prudential restraint, these self-imposed regulations, by countering the
ill-effects of unbalanced forces and "rebellious impulses", afford the only viable equilibrants and alternatives to states of dependency. And this makes for happiness. "The securing of Happiness in any considerable degree", Bain remarks, "supposes METHOD, or a plan of life, well conceived, and steadily adhered to." Some individualities are so unfitted for prudential foresight, that they must either come under the sway of others or be left to the accidents. A being of a higher order, looking before and after, will desire a plan, and endeavour to abide by it. Forming an estimate of life as a whole, such a being has a settled tone of mind corresponding to that, not being much elated nor much depressed, by the fluctuations on one side or the other. If attainable by the individual, this settled and balanced estimate is worthy of the highest endeavours.

Acting against the threat of social unrest, Bain's parry is Mill's countermove: both wish to break the mould of overreliance and passivity by touting balance and contentment as the condition of energetic and striving persons. Mill called for active and self-helping characters as needed for social improvement and peaceful coexistence. Bain would take up the gauntlet by crafting a psychology that was thought to be the making of self-governing individuals. Mill had written:

He who is continually measuring his energy against difficulties, learns what are the difficulties insuperable to him, and what are those which though he might overcome, the success is not worth the cost. He whose thoughts and activities are all needed for, and habitually employed in, practicable and useful enterprises, is the person of all others least likely to let his mind dwell with brooding discontent upon things either not worth attaining, or which are not so to him. Thus the active, self-helping character is not only intrinsically the best, but is the likeliest to acquire all that is really excellent or desirable in the opposite type.

Such "'beau ideal' of character" as Bain himself entertains displays similar qualities: topping the list are "the coolness and balance of the system" as well as "a strictly estimated regard in the pursuits of life." While thus engaged in bringing warring elements to a state of psychological and physical equipoise, Bain sees the need to combat every assault upon human vitality. Clearly, relief from distress is an important issue for him. He is wont to tell his readers
that "the susceptibilities of the mind to enjoyment should be gratified to the utmost, and the susceptibilities to suffering should be spared to the utmost."247 Framed within this context of ideas, his theoretical consideration of pains as bodily depressants lowering vital functions reads as an expression of the need to alleviate burdens, labours and toils. Bain's concern was also Mill's. Note the latter's words: "In opposition to the "gospel of work", I would assert the gospel of leisure, and maintain that human beings cannot rise to the finer attributes of their nature compatibly with a life filled with labour... To reduce very greatly the quantity of work required to carry on existence, is as needful as to distribute it more equally; and the progress of science, and the increasing ascendancy of justice and good sense, tend to this result."248

But though burdens while borne shouldn't oppress, they must yet live in memory, adds Bain. For he fears that "the retentiveness for the pains and discomforts of ill-health, and for the enjoyments thereby forfeited, is not good enough in the mass of men; and needs to be re-inforced by inculcation and reflection."249 If self-control is to win it over moral inability, -and that it should is Bain's unflagging belief, then the personal experience of suffering and distress ought to be memorable. For Bain contends that "what is termed self-control, prudential restraint, moral strength, consists in the intellectual permanency of the volitional element of our feelings."250 No doubt is "the preservation of our individual efficiency, with a view to our social duties" the conduct of Bain's choice, for displaying qualities of moral rectitude and autonomy that appeal to his utilitarian taste.251

Bain's explicit and frequent reference to the pains of physical privation, toil, impotence, indignity, attests his willingness to address the problems and to work at their resolution.252 He seems determined, moreover, to do so in a way that will help his readers find themselves as individuals, that is, as industrious, temperate and frugal persons.253 And here we best keep in mind that the path of discovery formed by Bain's tread runs in the direction of self-rule. Bain's readers are meant to understand that if this reconstruction of the human character is to amount to a moral revolution, certain conditions must be present. Bain's warning might be read as a summons to attend to a duty, that of prudential forethought. He is sure that,

[i]f a man's existence is regular, free from overwork and harassing trouble, his moral habitudes will prosper
accordingly. Eating cares, and excessive toil injure the system at some point or other, and the injury may happen to light upon the property of plastic adhesiveness.\textsuperscript{254}

There is no misreading Bain's counsel against failing and oversight: if adverse to the attainment of moral habits, life circumstances must be altered so as to favour the efficacy of the plastic power, so essential a property in the work of moral acquisition. He writes:

Physical vigour in general, and those modes of it that are the counterparts of mental vigour in particular, must be reckoned among the conditions of Retentiveness. Other things being the same, acquisition is most rapid in health, and in the nourished and fresh condition of all the organs. When the forces of the system run strongly to the nervous system in general, there is a natural exuberance of all the mental manifestations; and energy of mind is then compatible with much bodily feebleness, yet not with any circumstances that restrict the nourishment of the brain.\textsuperscript{255}

Given prominent display in his psychological framework, Bain's physical theory of pleasures and pains takes on added dimensions when projected in the light of his practical concerns. Bain believes that while pain as a nervous drain undermines well-being, its removal benefits individuals in that with it comes energetic upsurge. Pleasure itself Bain connects with augmented vitality. Now pleasure (intensified well-being) and increase of vital power are intimate associates in Bain's mind, and these ideas give hedonistic definition to his psychology.\textsuperscript{256}

Formed according to Bain's specifications, the volitional pursuit of pleasures and avoidance of pains (deemed the will's default function) is not a theoretical construction designed to reflect an inferior kind of selfishness. In promoting a "far-sighted and resolute self-interest",\textsuperscript{257} the volitional plan seems contrived instead to express and help realize the human potential for self-determination as part and parcel of happiness. Suggestive in this respect is Bain's principle of self-conservation (law of pleasure and pain), which he regards as "the groundwork of Volition".\textsuperscript{258} Just as heroes embody ideals, self-conservation, as seen through Bain's eyes, instantiates self-rule.

Insofar as they exhibit the preservative tendencies of self-acting impulses, Bain seems to think that pleasurable states yield good results. And to the extent that these
self-feeding pleasures tend to call forth self-guided behaviour, they also register Bain's goal, namely, self-mastery. As Bain's fundamental law of self-conservation makes plain, pleasures can induce action by themselves. Indeed, Bain is convinced that "states of pleasure are connected with an increase, and states of pain with an abatement, of some, or all, of the vital functions."259 This link between emotional and active states is deemed by Bain a primordial fact of human nature and "the deepest foundation of the will", without the basis of which volition simply cannot get going.260 Bain writes:

Suppose...that the movements arising out of mere physical exuberance, should be accidentally such as to increase the pleasurable feeling of the moment; the very fact of such increased pleasure would imply the other fact of increased energy of the system, and of those very movements then at work. The pleasure would in this way feed itself, and we should have something amounting substantially to a volition...So long as these movements add to the pleasure, so long they add to their own stimulation.261

As Bain seems intent upon showing, it is not only that a pleasurable state gets us moving and keeps us going without assistance or control, "the pleasure thus feeding itself".262 This absence of external control is doubtless appealing to Bain. But equally significant in his eyes is the fact that as a self-sustaining stimulus and chief support of human existence, self-conservation stands for, and gives expression to, the self-regulating impulses of human beings. This law of pleasure and pain, says Bain, is "in many respects the foundation, the mainstay, of our being; it is the principle of self-conservation -the self-regulating, self-acting impulse of the animal system."263 And he adds: "Our course in life from first to last, although most at first, is trial and error, groping and feeling our way, acting somehow, and judging of the result; and the general tendency of the law in question is to sustain us when we are in a good track, to turn off the steam when we are in a bad track."264 What need of interventionist assistance have individuals, Bain would have us ask, whose innate tendency toward self-conservation bespeaks their self-supporting capabilities?

Because instrumental in safeguarding against the adverse contingencies of life and in keeping us on the right track, generally, pleasures and pains warrant Bain's approval as giving monitorial security and control to resourceful individuals. No less
impressive for Bain is the redeeming property of the nervous framework. With Bain as the interpreter, current influences going their mental and nervous rounds between the brain and the organs of sense and movement are rendered into the welfare conveyances of mankind. Bain seems determined to move his readers to rely on the protection of sense "guardians" and to trust in the responsiveness of the muscular "executive". And for cause: as indispensable monitorial devices in the work of self-maintenance, they also provide means of expressing the need for autonomous individuals.

Thus pledged to the sensory-motor paradigm as a token of human engagement in the world, Bain does not think of sensation without responsive movement. In fact, he argues that full consciousness of a sensational state exists only insofar as there is a motor response. As every mental act involves a round of sensation and thought ending in outward displays, no corresponding nervous action, says Bain, exists without a completed circle of effects: nerves, brain and muscles are all implicated in the transmission of the nerve force.

Underlying the surface of Bain's utterance is yet again the moving force of his commitment to the cause of self-mastery. As Bain's 'executive' obeys the call of the sensory 'guardians', its varying responses are so many acts measured, the regulatory mechanism, self-operating. Whether movements chime in with the gladsome influences, or serve to repress the disagreeable ones, both muscular attitudes are as barometers of fluctuating states of existence. Reading the varied pulse of life, Bain seems to say, rests within the power of any one individual, whose assistance in signals interpretation (life preservation) is self-generated, and given in the workings of the nervous system.

Whatever the prompts to human action, Bain is especially fond of the natural human impulses born out of the muscular and nervous energy of the bodily frame. He speculates that as an internal reservoir of power, this overflow of moving force proceeding from the nervous centres to the muscles spontaneously discharges itself prior to, and independent of, any sensory stimulation. As an unprompted energetic flow, central activity is, for Bain, a fundamental property of the system; a nourished condition of the nerves and nerve centres is its sustenance. Copious in states of health, yet a mere trickle during hunger and fatigue, spontaneous energy, Bain claims, "is the response of the system to nutrition -an effusion of power of which the food is the
social bearings among which is the fact that "[i]t is both directly and indirectly hostile to monarchical or despotical rule, and is, therefore, the parent and the guardian of liberty." 273

On Bain's showing, spontaneity supplies the first impulse, conservation, the crucial primary link, and self-preservation, the initial volitional cast, while an "activity confined to specific channels, by a few great leading motives", and regulated by the intellect, constitutes Bain's idea of an "educated executive". 274 Now I have suggested that the physiological underpinnings of Bain's psychology generally -and of his volitional theory specifically, carry legitimating messages of self-rule. As Bain's theoretical lead and axiological bent make plain, this power rests with self-directed, self-reliant and well-disciplined individuals. Erected by Bain upon the basis of spontaneity, does the volitional superstructure not evince the need of such individuals?

Psychology's call for self-directed, autonomous and well-disciplined individuals; the validation of the independent conscience

Spontaneous activity, elaborated by Bain into a central psychological doctrine, meets his practical interest as a tool for promoting human well-being. Bain casts about how he is to reach this welfare state. The doctrine answers his needs. He submits that a physically regulated natural activity, at first spontaneous and directionless, comes at last, when associated with feeling and thought, to be controlled and rerouted into channels for the furtherance of utilitarian ends. 275 But then again, should we arrive at destination on the back of Bain's associated terms, the future so contrived and predictable is "a place we already know". 276

Predictable may human volitions be, wishes Bain, whose theoretical carving of a rule-bound Will is inspired by the belief that "...according as we reduce Will to law, we foster good habits; according as we withdraw it from regularity and prediction, we unsettle the pursuit of virtue." 277 Bain fears that "[w]here there is no uniformity, there is clearly no rational guidance, no prudential forethought." 278 Bain, of course, is working to theorize in sympathy with those moral revolutionaries whose cause is that of the perfectibility of human nature. And he heartily believes that "fixing moral bents or
habits" contracted as a result of self-imposed "control", "well-placed discipline", "restraint", "resistance", "culture" and "self-command", makes for moral revolutions.  

Though an admittedly difficult task, Bain is yet determined to make of virtue a necessity by helping individuals find pleasure in moral excellence, the likelihood of which is strengthened by his belief that such emotions as the pleasures of love and benevolence can be increased by culture.  

As to the possibility of prudential acquirement, Bain deals with the problem as if he was organizing a military operation. He figures that just "as you fortify a building to withstand the tempests, or increase the power of artillery to demolish a citadel", so you build up "an immense fortress, a mental stronghold of prudential forethought" against all types of reckless behaviour.

Thus supplied with "virtuous" motives in the likes of self-regarding and disinterested impulses, Bain's "pure" and "healthy" Will may indeed gain attention as an activating force sustaining the work for personal, social and moral ends. But it needn't stand for that only. For this contracted Will admits of an individualist interpretation as well. Bain himself tells us so much, while playing up the derivative excellence of a "citizen conscience" whose formative elements include, among others, prudential and sympathetic impulses. Once again, physiological speculation helps him make his point.

Ethically stamped with the marks of interest and duty, the motivational spurs of self-regard and sympathy - and the pursuit of moral ends generally, have not all hedonistic translatability. Bain himself concedes that the ordinary course of the will (pursuit of pleasures, avoidance of pains) does not always square with the attainment of happiness. For though virtuous motives have important social, moral and utilitarian bearings, and, as virtues, are mediate ends of pursuit, they yet often require, as in the case of sympathy, that we relinquish pleasures for self altogether. "Instead of being a source of pleasure to us", writes Bain, "the primary operation of sympathy is to make us surrender pleasure and to incur pains."

Sympathy, in its pure and fundamental character, is the possession of an idea, followed out irrespective of pleasure or pain... In the conflict of motives, this principle of action plays an important part; its predominance is the foremost motive to virtuous conduct. It subsists upon a vivid perception of the pain
or misery of others...286

Supposing the Will's operations influenced by pleasure and pain only, how, Bain would have us ask, can we deliberately work for ends that may not necessarily bring us pleasure? Bain himself admits "that we must face the seeming paradox -that there are, in the human mind, motives that pull against our happiness."287 However paradoxical a phenomenon, Bain's account of the experience must needs be psychologically credible if it is to suggest the possibility of virtuous, and thus, autonomous, behaviour. He fears that "Disinterestedness is as great a puzzle and paradox as ever. Indeed, strictly speaking, it is a species of irrationality, or insanity, as regards the individual's self; a contradiction of the most essential nature of sentient being, which is to move to pleasure and from pain. In renouncing this fundamental principle of our mental constitution, we are always on the verge of absurdity and lawlessness... And yet Disinterestedness is a fact of our constitution, and without it there would be nothing that we should call great virtue in the world."288

We can be sure that though Bain is bent on vindicating disinterested action, he will not do so by compromising his theory of the Will. For in "having regard to our greatest good", the volitional contract drawn by Bain is the most reliable, "rational" and "sane" means of guaranteeing personal welfare without external aid, while sanctioning protective activity.289 As Bain puts it, "[i]n every well-constituted human being", the "well-disciplined deliberative Will" brings about a "well-guarded happiness of life".290 Bain reasons thus.

Sympathy cannot exist upon the extreme of self-abnegation; the regard to the pleasures and pains of others is based on the regard to our own... But this is not all. We must retain a sufficient amount of the self-regarding element to consider happiness an object worth striving for... Should we cease to evince any interest in our own personal welfare, or treat our own happiness with indifference, we practically lay down the position that happiness is nothing; the consequence being to render philanthropy absurd and unmeaning.291

Bain thus finds an answer in the attempt to define a mental area restricted for the protection and conservation of the individual (Will), while contending for a distinct spring of human action in the form of a fixed idea whose motivity is underpinned with
physiological speculation. That is the conjecture by which Bain's theoretical needs are supplied when accounting for disinterested conduct, itself deemed "the greatest nobility of virtue". By way of understanding this physiological underlay, let us first consider what Bain has to say on the subject of the fixed idea.

If the will be defined the pursuit of pleasure and the abstinence from pain, then disinterested conduct, involving frequently self-sacrifice, must spring from some other part of our nature. Now, as we are able, by means of our own experience, to form ideas of other men's pains and pleasures, we are disposed, according to the principle in question, to act these out, even although we forfeit a certain amount of pleasure, or incur a certain amount of pain.

Sympathetic or prudential we cannot be, however, without some power of recalling the good and evil consequences of actions, as actually experienced. "Both Prudence, and the Power of Sympathy with others", says Bain, "presuppose the tenacious memory for pleasures and pains... Virtue...reposes on a property allied to Intellect, a mode of our Retentiveness, the subject matter being, not the intellectual elements commonly recognized, but pleasures and pains." Inasmuch as the ideal life of pleasure and pain ministers to prudential restraint and vicarious sympathies, then it meets with Bain's approval. Even though he construes the influence of certain impassioned and fixed ideas (fear, for instance) as jeopardizing mental equilibrium, generally, he yet contends that the remembrance of good and evil (ideas of pleasure and pain) forms "the basis of a well-balanced moral agency" for showing "steadiness of purpose". The low retentiveness for good and evil, however, spells imprudence and mischief and is not conducive to far-sightedness. "[N]or can social virtue ever take root in a soil," adds Bain, "that has been unable to produce the ordinary measure of self-preservation." He writes:

It is the natural aptitude for effectively retaining, and on occasion reviving, the impress of the evil and the good that we have passed through, coupled with all the circumstances that favour that retention, which is the true foundation, the sine qua non of the active resolution, the perpetual will for self-preservation and safety...If the intellectual element is sound, all is sound.

Strength of ideal motive in the form of recovered pleasures and pains is on
Bain's view what constitutes moral wisdom, prompting the precautionary will and sustaining disinterested behaviour through the influence of the fixed idea. Now the motive influence on action of a fixed idea would be wholly inexplicable, claims Bain, "unless on the assumption that the mental, or revived, image occupies the same place in the brain and other parts of the system, as the original sensation did...Now, there being a muscular element in our sensations, especially of the higher senses -touch, hearing, and sight -this element must somehow or other have a place in the after remembrance or idea."

Bain has no intention of secluding ideas in new chambers of the brain, apart from the recipient apparatus. For should ideas be stored up in "a cerebral closet shut-off", he well sees the theoretical difficulty in claiming for them the power to influence human conduct by acting themselves out in opposition to the will. This closeted occupation of a sensation when revived in idea is an illegitimate inference, declares Bain, whose commitment -be it recalled, is to the doctrine of the circuitous course of nervous action. Bain writes:

The idea of a cerebral closet shut-off is quite incompatible with the real manner of the working of nerve. Since, then, a sensation, in the first instance, diffuses nerve currents through the interior of the brain outwards to the organs of expression and movement, - the persistence of that sensation, after the outward exciting cause is withdrawn, can be but a continuance of the same diffusive currents, perhaps less intense, but not otherwise different.

As a hypothesis of his own making, Bain thinks that "the return of the nervous currents exactly on their own tracks, in revived sensation" yields advantageous results. But for the truth of the hypothesis, he does not see how it would be possible to live a life of ideas. And on this point, we note that to maintain the identity of past impressions is important to Bain who looks on the remembrance of pain experienced as the intellectual requisite for prudence and sympathy. And so he asks, "...where should a past feeling be re-embodied, if not in the same organs as the feeling when present? It is only in this way that its identity can be preserved; a feeling differently embodied would be a different feeling." Obviously, Bain's concern for the ideal life of pain is valid only insofar as the identity of any one past feeling is preservable.
Bain is fully aware, furthermore, that his account of fixed ideas as acting themselves out by pressing upon bodily organs lacks credibility but for the recognition of a muscular element in present and recovered impressions alike. Given his construal of the working of nerve action, Bain thinks himself justified in the belief that in recollection, "[t]he rush of feeling has gone on the old tracks, and seizes the same muscles." His reflections on the course of nerve action and on the local embodiment of sensations and ideas together constitute the physiological underpinnings of influential ideas whose very fixedness has great appeal for Bain. For it has explanatory power as regards disinterested conduct. Consider Bain's words.

The only way that I am able to explain the great fact of our nature, denominated Sympathy, fellow-feeling, pity, compassion, disinterestedness, is by a reference to this tendency of an idea to act itself out... But for some such domination of an idea, I see nothing in the constitution of the human mind that would make us sympathize with other men's pleasures and pains... The mere operation of the will...is strictly within the limits of self-conservation. But the intellect, which can form ideas of the mental condition of other sensitive beings, tends to make those ideas actualities; or induces the conduct that they would suggest if the pains or pleasures were personal to ourselves. This is sympathy and disinterested action...

It would seem that whether the motive agency be the will or the fixed idea, both constructs are part of a psychological composition in which self-mastery is carefully realized. Left to itself - that is, operating unhampered under its ordinary motives, the volitional executive under Bain's tendance would render us "masters of ourselves". And should the fixed idea offer resistance to the will, Bain yet substantiates the autonomy claim by clearing up the problem of disinterestedness, itself an essential ingredient of an "independent" conscience. With the motive influence of a fixed idea validated by marking it "a determining principle of human conduct", Bain is now theoretically prepared for some combative action on the moral front. By way of understanding his conduct, let us first consider the following words as Bain wrote them in his psychological text. He submits that,

there must be in society a preponderating number that at last adopt the social duties as agreeable to their own judgment and sentiment... In a free and equal society, a
clear majority of the full-grown members must be of this mind... Temporal and spiritual despotisms have established themselves, and maintained a sense of law and dispositions to obedience, that the general community, freely consulted and not overawed, would never have responded to. The conscience of a Russian serf, as of a subject of Xerxes or Tiberius, is a sentiment of pure dread; the conscience of an Englishman, or an Anglo-American, must contain a certain approval of the laws he is called on to obey.  

Designed to bring about the demise of temporal and spiritual despotisms', Bain's campaign forms a phase of the war against the "Slavish Conscience". Having thus taken his position in defense of self-governing individuals, he guns for moral improvement and accountability by the development of the "Citizen Conscience". "Moral improvement", writes Bain, "is obviously a strengthening of this so-called Moral Faculty, or Conscience -increasing its might (in Butler's phrase) to the level of its right." As he sees it, moral training aims at inculcating "a habit of suppressing certain active tendencies of the mind, and fostering others; and this is done by a special discipline -like training horses or making soldiers." As both expositor and promoter of the growth of a "well-developed conscience", Bain means to erect individual centres of moral responsibility on the foundation of self-determination by sounding the liberationist appeal of moral excellence. All the while he is sponsoring his readers' civic education in the ways and means of individual and collective welfare.

It is clear to Bain that the more "dissenting" and "independent" the conscience, the more "self-originating" the obligations, whereby moral activity is carried out at "the individual's own promptings". "...this is conscience", writes Bain, "by which ultimately man becomes freed from the influence of the mere praise and blame of others, for his convictions become his guide and rule." And this uncoerced conformity of conduct to moral principles is virtue.

Intent on "building up characters of moral self-restraint" acquired by the unconstrained subordination of selfish impulsion to social and moral duty, Bain might thus attract attention as a revolutionist, inciting a quiet rebellion against over-governing and despotic authority. After all, Bain himself hoped to accomplish one good turn in moving self-directed, strong-minded and autonomous individuals to rise from the ranks.
Using psychology as the channel for the expression of his liberal reforms, Bain makes a point of showing that self-government -otherwise construed by him as virtuous self-control, comes by personal liberation from domination by restrictive agencies and unruly powers. Bain sees clearly that the instigation of moral self-restraint is what makes for moral revolutions, and he tells us plain in his book of psychological knowledge. His validation of an 'independent' conscience is a telltale sign of his revolutionary ways.

In fitting individuals to be powers in themselves, Mill believed he had the measure of self-governing persons. He spoke of "great energies guided by vigorous reason, and strong feelings strongly controlled by a conscientious will". Bain was thought to have the necessary qualifications for planning the psychological pattern to suit self-controlled characters. As should now be obvious, strength of will and of reason would be the repeated design on his paper.
Endnotes


2. Mill and Bain's recourse to Malthusian explanations of the problem is a prominent feature of their ameliorative social schemes. Mill's immediate palliative to the distress by way of instruction and individual accountability focused the discussion on the importance of self-help and on the necessity of thriving by one's own energies rather than on the problem of misgovernment. This is not to say that Mill discounted the importance of political reforms. Indeed, "I should be very sorry", he writes, "to extenuate the miseries of misgovernment". While himself a strong advocate of the radical restructuring of human institutions, his concern at the time was to show that misgovernment was not the only cause of the distressed condition of the working classes. At any rate, Mill held that the relevance of interventionist proposals should always be judged in terms of their tonic effects on desirable human qualities. As good Malthusians, both Mill and Bain believed that an excess of population compared with the means of subsistence was the causative factor of the misery. Mill himself thought that if labourers kept their numbers down below the means of employment, "no men would then be ever out of work", while their wages would procure a comfortable living. Mill was confident that if only the masses were educated, human misery could be alleviated "in a great degree". Mill, J.S. (1986). *Newspaper writings*, vol.22, 'Question of population [1]', 1823, pp.80-81; vol.25, 'Constraints on communism', pp.1179-1180. Mill, J.S. (1891). *Principles of political economy with some of their applications to social philosophy*. People's edition. London: Longmans, Green, p.584. Mill, J.S. (1909). *Principles of political economy with some of their applications to social philosophy*. 7th ed. London: Longmans, Green, p.948. Mill, J.S. (1957). *Utilitarianism*. New York: The Liberal Arts Press, p.20. Mineka, F.E. & Lindley, D.N. (1972). *The later letters of John Stuart Mill, 1849-1873*, vol.16, letter of Mill to Peter Deml, 22 April 1868, p.1389; letter of Mill to Charles Eliot Norton, 24 Sept. 1868, p.1442. Mill, J.S. (1965). *Principles of political economy with some of their applications to social philosophy*. 7th ed. Vol.2. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp.188-189, 208, 351-354, 358-359, 367-368. Mill, J.S. (1967). *Essays on economics and society*. Vol.5, 'Chapters on socialism', pp.712-715.


3. John Grote's words, used in his critique of Mill's utilitarianism. As part and parcel of his criticism, Grote comments upon the failure of the utilitarian philosophy to capture both the richness of human relatedness and the fulness of real life. Grote, J. (1870). An examination of the utilitarian philosophy. Cambridge: Deighton, Bell, p.129.


Socialism. Men and ideas in the formation of Fabian Socialist doctrines, 1881-1889.
and John Stuart Mill. Father and son in the nineteenth century. London: Hutchinson,
pp.396-397.

New York: Anchor Books; 'Civilization', 1836, pp.52-54.


6. See, for instance, letter of Bain to Mill, 14 march 1859. Rare books and manuscript
Press, pp.68-75.
(1968). The moral improvement of mankind. The social and political thought of John
of America, p.85.


8. Ibid., p.265; 'De Tocqueville on democracy in America [II]', 1840, pp.178-179, 194-
198.


10. Mineka, F.E. & Lindley, D.N. (1972). The later letters of John Stuart Mill, 1849-
See also Bain, A. (1850). Education of the citizen, Chambers's Papers for the People,
1, 1-32.

Bain, A. (1868). The retentive power of the mind in its bearing on education, Fortnightly Review. 4, 237-249.

Green, p.463. Bain, A. (1861). On the study of character, including an estimate of
phrenology. London: Parker, Son, and Bourn, West Strand, p.121.


pp.281-283.


52. Letter of Bain to Mill, 14 March 1859. Rare books and manuscript room, National Library of Scotland, Scotland.


For a late nineteenth-century discussion of the meanings of 'individualism', see Whittaker, T. (1888). *Individualism and State-action*, *Mind*, 13, 52-62. According to Whittaker, "philosophical and psychological individualism" views society and state in terms of relations of individuals initially isolated, "yet assumed to possess already all human attributes", whose advantages are realized in the social and state organisation. From the point of view of the political ideal, Whittaker understands the term 'individualism' to mean the spontaneous inner unfolding of human life unfettered by authoritative external control. He locates Mill as an individualist in both senses. See also Anon. (1910). *Individualism*, *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 14, 11th ed., 486-487.

later writings. It bears mention, however, that even in what Collini singles out as contributing to the distorted picture (contemporaneous critique), one finds, amidst the distortions, certain views that are both historically informative and intellectually relevant. Hence an appreciation of these views well repays the reading of such works. By Collini's own admission, "it is essential to recapture what contemporaries thought that they were arguing about". Collini, S. (1979). *Liberalism and sociology*, pp.13-16, 18, 20-32.


58. Ibid.


60. As Mill's tendency toward mechanistic thinking has already been discussed, I will here confine my remarks to the following points. When Mill refers to society as a 'social organism', it is not the idea of the subordination of the part (individual) to the whole (social process) that captures his thought. Mill speaks of a 'consensus' among social phenomena in two contexts: when debating the merit of separating certain branches of social inquiry (such as theoretical politics) from the general science of society, and when deciding upon the appropriate method applicable to the social science. Under those two conditions, he admits the analogy borrowed from physiology (expressed in such terms as the 'body politic' and the 'body natural'). He deems it appropriate when describing the interdependent nature of the various parts of the social body. Mill thus speaks of the study of 'Social Statics' (Comte's term) as the theory of the 'consensus' existing among contemporaneous social phenomena. Mill, J.S. (1974). A system of logic, vol.8, pp.898-899, 906, 918.


On Mill's individualistic utilitarian ethic (social happiness attained by way of individual happiness and self-perfection), see Robson, J.M. (1968). The moral improvement of mankind, pp.127-129.


70. On the recognition of these qualities as essential aspects of Mill's individualism, see Donner, W. (1991). The liberal self, pp.149-150. More generally, Donner is concerned with the principles of development and self-culture underlying Mill's ethics as well as his social and political philosophy.

On individualist formulations of the political ideal and the change from an emphasis on self-reliance to a preoccupation with self-development, see Collini, S. (1979). Liberalism and sociology, pp.28-29, 31.


It was Mill's contention all along that human beings are motivated by other than self-regarding interests. Of the many influential motives bearing upon conduct, Mill recognized the pursuit of spiritual perfection, feelings of moral obligation, and sympathetic tendencies. But though he viewed sympathy as a natural constituent of human nature, Mill conceived of man as essentially selfish. He held that "of the social
virtues it is almost superfluous to speak; so completely is it the verdict of all experience that selfishness is natural. By this I do not in any wise mean to deny that sympathy is natural also; I believe on the contrary that on that important fact rests the possibility of any cultivation of goodness and nobleness, and the hope of their ultimate entire ascendance. But sympathetic characters, left uncultivated, and given up to their sympathetic instincts, are as selfish as others". Mill, J.S. (1885). Three essays on religion. 'Nature', pp.47, 49; 'Utility of religion', 1850-1858, pp.110-111. Mill doubted whether the untutored man was more powerfully motivated by benevolence than by selfishness. "The truth", he writes, "is that there is hardly a single point of excellence belonging to human character, which is not decidedly repugnant to the untutored feelings of human nature". Ibid., 'Nature', p.46. Mill thought that other-regarding virtues were realized only by the application of artificial discipline.


Collini has argued that by limiting the extent of legitimate coercion by society, Mill hoped to raise the level of concern for the well-being of others. Collini, S. (1977). Liberalism and the legacy of Mill. The Historical Journal.

See also Bain, A. (1848). Review of Whewell's Of a liberal education in general: and with particular reference to the leading studies of the University of Cambridge, Westminster and Foreign Quarterly Review, 49, 441-463.


80. Ibid., pp.262-263, 266.


83. On the subject of the inequalities of human condition, see Bain, A. (1898). *Education as a science*, p.420.


88. Ibid., p.69.

89. Ibid., pp.69-72.

90. On Bain's reaction to Locke, see Bain, A. (1868). *The senses*, p.326.

91. Ibid.


By the use of this term, I mean to draw attention to Bain's tendency towards value distinctions, as it expresses itself in descriptive statements of psychological import. An explanation of the term follows shortly.


In the realm of morality, Schneewind points to Mill's eventual acceptance of commonsense morality on the basis that it provides the middle axioms needed for applying the


120.Dijksterhuis, E.J. (1986). The mechanization of the world picture. Pythagoras to Newton. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, pp.75-76, 78. This is not to be confounded with that which is sought in value theory, the branch of philosophy concerned with the nature of value and the determination of that which has value. I am only interested in exploring the many ways in which Bain's statements attest his tendency to think in 'axiological' constrasts; a tendency, that is, to make use of value-laden conceptions in his theoretical work.


142. The intellectual character, that is.


145. According to Bain, constructive association refers to the fact that "by means of Association, the mind has the power to form new combinations, or aggregates, different from any that have been presented to it in the course of experience." Bain, A. (1868). The senses, p.570.

146. Ibid., pp.572, 574, 593-596.

147. Ibid., pp.584, 602, 605-606.

148. Ibid., pp.572, 582.

149. Ibid., pp.582, 587, 593-595.

150. Ibid., p.592.

151. Ibid., pp.416-417, 574.

152. Ibid., pp.595-596.
153. Ibid., p.574.
156. Ibid., pp.579-580.
159. Ibid., p.604.
160. Ibid., p.608.
161. Ibid., p.599.
162. Ibid., p.600.
164. This point will be further investigated in chapter 6. Mill himself saw the importance of maintaining "a due balance among the faculties"; see Mill, J.S. (1960). *Autobiography*, pp.76-79, 100-101.


184. Besides the Will, Bain refers to central spontaneity, sensation, emotion, habit, and mental excitement in the form of a fixed idea as sources of activity.


188. When describing this mental state, Bain uses various names, namely, conscience, the moral sense, the sentiment of obligation. Bain, A. (1875). The emotions, pp.288, 467, 469. Bain, A. (1861). On the study of character, p.238.


190. Ibid., p.469. See also Bain, A. (1850). Education of the citizen, Chambers's Papers for the People.


194. That is, not only with the nervous system and brain as the pre-eminent mental organ, but with the entire bodily system, senses, muscles and viscera. Bain, A. (1876). Mind and body, pp.4, 12. Bain, A. (1884). Mental and moral science. Part first, p.4.


198. Bain considers Mill's "disregard of the physical conditions of our mental life" as one of "his greatest theoretical errors as a scientific thinker." He adds: "He might have educated himself out of this error, but he never did. I do not mean to say that he made no allowances for the physical element of our being; my contention is, that he did not allow what every competent physiologist would now affirm to be the facts. I am afraid that, on both these errors [the other being his "doctrine of the natural equality of men"], his feelings operated in giving his mind a bias. Whatever be the explanation, the effect
was practically injurious." Bain, A. (1969). John Stuart Mill, pp.146-147; see also p.79.


202. In this context of ideas, Bain contends that the terms 'shock' and 'current' are words applicable both to the bodily and to the mental sides of phenomena. He speculates that there is a concomitant nervous shock for every mental change; as the one is more or less intense, so is the other. Used by Bain to refer to the simplest mental state, the term 'shock' expresses the fact that change of impression is necessary for consciousness. Fundamental to conscious life, this mental change Bain renders as the law of Relativity. Bain, A. (1876). Mind and body, pp.40, 43, 45, 81. Bain uses the term'impression' in reference to both a physical and a mental phenomenon. See Bain, A. (1884). Mental and
moral science. Part first, p.216.


208.Ibid., pp.151-153; consider Bain's footnote as well.


229. Ibid., pp.3-4.


240. Ibid.


According to Bain, the natural course of a completed nervous circle takes its start in sensory impressions and ends for the most part in muscular action. Though some nerve currents go their rounds without stimulating muscles, Bain contends that the phenomenon essentially involves the whole course of the completed circle.


According to Bain, the grey masses are the nerve centres, which originate and reinforce nervous power. Bain, A. (1868). The senses and the intellect, p.16. Bain, A. (1884). Mental and moral science. Part first, pp.6-7.


272. Ibid; see also pp.118-119.


303. Ibid., p.341.

304. Ibid., p.338.

305. Ibid., pp.339-340.

306. Ibid., p.344; see also p.345.

307. Ibid., p.345; see also p.342.


311. Ibid., p.472.

312. Ibid.


314. Ibid., p.139.


CHAPTER 6

THE ASSOCIATION PSYCHOLOGY'S SOCIO-POLITICAL AGENDA

THE REFORM OF TYRANNICAL ABUSES: PLEADING THE DEMOCRATIC CAUSE

THE VINDICATION OF DEMOCRACY

Altering the socio-political landscape

Mill and Bain's project for an improved social structure aimed at altering the distribution of active power in society so as to widen the basis of participation in its exercise and in the benefits of freedom. Anti-elitist in intention, the plan was to democratize society so as to make room in it for the beneficial forces of wisdom and virtue by the collapse of political abuses and corrupt social practices.

Levelling out social and political irregularities was not Mill and Bain's only goal, however. They also aimed to elevate the working classes by the spread of knowledge, as an education directed towards the "perfection of the reasoning powers" was deemed essential to their material, mental and economic improvement while required by the "citizen-ruler" in search of "political wisdom".¹ Both Mill and Bain defended the extension of the suffrage to the labouring classes on the basis that the effect of its exercise was good mental discipline and adequate "protection against political despotism".² Mill wrote:

I have long felt that one of the most desirable consequences of party reform would be the presence in the H. of C. of some of the elite of the working classes...the most numerous of all classes ought not to be without, what every other class has -representatives in Parl who can speak from their own knowledge of the wants, the grievances, and the modes of thought & feeling of their class -of all which Parliament ought to be fully informed, to enable it to legislate wisely and justly
not for class interests but for the general interest...³

Mill held that any improvement in the social and economic condition of a people turned on the grant of political rights. Political enfranchisement stood in his eyes as both the foundation and the safeguard of human worth and happiness.⁴

Ardent defenders of social equality and tolerance though they were, Mill and Bain yet hoped to induce the mass of people to defer to "the authority of the instructed, in morals and politics".⁵ Mill was sold on this power as "the grand instrument of the regeneration of mankind" whose modus operandi would be the liberating influence of mind over mind.⁶ As a precondition to the attainment of this end he recommended that steps be taken to improve the social organisation, one of which was to remove "great social sinister interests".⁷ To a friend he wrote:

[although we ought to arrive if we can at a general system of social philosophy, and to keep it always in our own view, we ought not to address it to the public, who are by no means ripe for its reception, but to avail ourselves of the good which is in them, to educate their minds by accustoming them to think rightly on those subjects on which they already think, to communicate to them all the truths which they are prepared for, and to endeavour to alter those parts of our social institutions and policy which at present oppose improvement, degrade and brutalize the intellects and morality of the people, & by giving all the ascendency to mere wealth, which the possession of political power confers, prevents the growth of a pouvoir spirituel capable of commanding the faith of the majority, who must and do believe on authority...⁸]

Representative government

For all his belief in the historical conditioning of social and political change, Mill yet held that institutions and forms of government are worked by human voluntary agency, and, as such, are a matter of choice. His use of reason in deliberating matters of politics and social arrangements allowed him to treat the question of political organization as a search into "the ideal type of a perfect government".⁹

This is Mill's way: though based in its inception on the results of observation
and induction, his interpretation of social change is given its particular version by the
consideration of social systems, arrangements and relations in their best form, as ideal
and inspiring examples of institutional excellence. His are not unhistorical ideals. For
Mill believed in the relativity of all social and political construction to the changing
circumstances of society and to the stages of human progress. But though he would
never erect his theoretical structure "independently of all forecasts of wind and
weather", his work is nonetheless laid down according to some ideal picture of social
organization.

Both the definition of a model form of government and the determination of the
institutional means by which to promote this authoritave ideal were on Mill's political
agenda. Inasmuch as it made effective use of the wisdom of society, a representative
constitution had the advantage over other forms of government and therefore proved
acceptable to Mill. He wrote:

> All government which aims at being good is an organization of some part of the good qualities existing
in the individual members of the community, for the
conduct of its collective affairs. A representative
constitution is a means of bringing the general standard
of intelligence and honesty existing in the community,
and the individual intellect and virtue of its wisest
members, more directly to bear upon the government,
and investing them with greater influence in it, than they
would in general have under any other mode of
organization...

As the journey of a lifetime, and with Bain keeping step, Mill tramped a
political ground lined with stepping stones of his own making. Raised by him to
facilitate the democratic crossover were institutions of national education, schools of
public spirit promotive of political discussion and activity, graduated extension of the
suffrage, political representation in proportion to numbers, and plural voting in favour
of education. Used as means of progress in human affairs, they were Mill's preferred
ways of directing the course of thought, fuelling movement, and paving the way toward
the realization of his political ideal.

And here Mill and Bain's conception of the ideally best polity was one in which
the sovereignty or supreme controlling power resided in a body representative of the
whole people. A popular body it was, therefore, that ought to have among all other
lawful powers (as, for instance, the Crown and the House of Lords) the preponderance of real political strength; that is, the final control of all the operations of government. Lest it retained this ultimate control, Mill feared that a people would "give themselves up to tyranny". He deemed it evident, that the only government which can fully satisfy all the exigencies of the social state, is one in which the whole people participate; that any participation, even in the smallest public function, is useful; that the participation should everywhere be as great as the general degree of improvement of the community will allow; and that nothing less can be ultimately desirable, than the admission of all to a share in the sovereign power of the state. But since all cannot, in a community exceeding a single small town, participate personally in any but some very minor portions of the public business, it follows that the ideal type of a perfect government must be representative.

Mill and Bain's political stand favoured an elective national assembly whose individual representatives were eligible by the qualification neither of wealth nor of property but of mental competency. Indispensable as a deliberative body, this representative assembly was yet said to lack the proper qualifications for the business of administration. Mill thus advocated the separation of the office of "control and criticism" from that of "skilled legislation and administration".

The need of checks as securities for responsible government

While pressing the need of a Commons watchdog as a check against executive abuses, Mill and Bain were also bent on curbing the practice of governmental interference in private affairs. Bain argued that to stand for political liberty was to persist in opposing the tyranny of governments whose restraints on individuals were excessive. "We live in dread of tyranny", he wrote; "[o]ur liberty is a serious object; it weighs upon our minds." Mill himself contended that to call forth the appetite for freedom was to encourage the likes of active, self-helping, and energetic individuals whose exertions would benefit both private and collective interests. Self-government was thus seen by Mill and Bain alike as a necessary countermeasure without which
political freedom was incomplete. Consider Bain's take on liberty.

The curtailment of Individual Liberty is a necessary effect of government; and the degree of this curtailment is a vital consideration in Political theory. In order that men may act together in society, each must in part subordinate their own actions and wishes to the general scheme. Obviously, however, individual liberty, which is in itself a chief element of well-being, should be restricted in the least possible degree; and the burden of proof must always lie upon the proposer of restraint.24

Mill's own version of democracy would instantiate this ideal of freedom by the institutional embodiment of security for rectitude of governmental purpose.25 His was the thought that while engaged in the "superintendence and check" of the executive, the legislative body would itself be liable to the criticism of the people.26 And on that score, Mill argued that "[t]he only security against political slavery, is the check maintained over governors, by the diffusion of intelligence, activity, and public spirit among the governed."27 Bain himself played up the role of the energetic character, casting it as the parent and guardian of liberty.28

Questions of liberty were not Mill and Bain's sole vantage point from which to view objections to misuses of political power. For matters of human development were also deemed relevant to the subject. In point of fact, they not only looked upon popular institutions as a means of social and political education by public business. They also regarded government as a "central depository, and active circulator and diffuser" of knowledge and experience.29 To their minds, therefore, a good government signified not intrusive force, but direction and guidance as such.30 Political institutions were thus only as good as they were responsible. And responsibility was meant to comprehend the following terms, as stipulated by Mill.

It consists partly of the degree in which they [political institutions] promote the general mental advancement of the community, including under that phrase advancement in intellect, in virtue, and in practical activity and efficiency; and partly of the degree of perfection with which they organize the moral, intellectual, and active worth already existing, so as to operate with the greatest effect on public affairs. A government is to be judged by its action upon men, and by its action upon things; by what it makes of the
citizens, and what it does with them; its tendency to improve or deteriorate the people themselves, and the goodness or badness of the work it performs for them, and by means of them.\textsuperscript{31}

Mill and Bain not only pressed the need of checks as securities for a responsible government whose "highest & most important of...purposes is the improvement of man himself as a moral and intelligent being".\textsuperscript{32} They also stood for a government by mutual compromise. They were partial, that is, to the institution of a parliamentary democracy alive to, and full of, the voice of antagonism to the powers that be. Looking on Parliament as a "Congress of Opinions", Mill held that "[a] place where every interest and shade of opinion in the country can have its cause even passionately pleaded...is in itself, if it answered no other purpose, one of the most important political institutions that can exist anywhere, and one of the foremost benefits of free government."\textsuperscript{33}

**Sounding for danger in democratic governments**

Mill himself abominated "all class ascendance".\textsuperscript{34} He thought that with no recognised political organs for those "on the shady side of the social edifice", and no arena for them to fight out the battle of opposing forces, governments had tended to be despotic by overruling adverse interests and claims.\textsuperscript{35} The despotism of a "class legislation"\textsuperscript{36} was no trivial matter for Mill whose concern was to sound for danger in political institutions and democratic governments. Bain would make a record of it. He noted:

Mill, having not only inherited, but also shared, his father's responsibility in urging upon this country a great extension of the suffrage, considered it a part of his calling to set forth all the possible dangers of placing power in the hands of the majority...
Mill is exceedingly sensitive to the welfare of small minorities, who have so little chance under the government of a majority; though, of course, equally ill off under a minority distinct from themselves.\textsuperscript{37}

In drafting corrective measures and securities against the evils incident to "falsely-called democracies", Mill was especially critical of the "class legislation of the uneducated".\textsuperscript{38} As he saw it, political infirmities loomed large on the horizon of this
evil. One of the greatest was the tendency of representative government towards "collective mediocrity".\(^3\) His was a warning that too low a standard of political intelligence concentrated in the hands of a numerical majority was a mischief attendant with grave dangers. Particularly problematic for Mill was the potential encroachment on the province of a skilled executive by an intellectually deficient popular assembly.

Unless an "instructed minority" obtained a fair share of power and influence in the representation, Mill was sure that the clamourous "instincts" of the democratic majority would prevail over the voice of rationality.\(^4\) But strengthen the corrective and antagonist power of truth and reason, he suggested, by giving it a fair hearing, and the voice of "superior wisdom"\(^4\) will level up the standard of political intelligence in the legislature. A "government of the wisest" such as Mill advocated meant that "the omnipotence of the majority would be exercised through the agency and according to the judgment of an enlightened minority, accountable to the majority in the last resort."\(^4\) Mill was firmly persuaded that,

> if the presence in the representative assembly can be insured, of even a few of the first minds in the country, though the remainder consist only of average minds, the influence of these leading spirits is sure to make itself sensibly felt in the general deliberations, even though they be known to be, in many respects, opposed to the tone of popular opinion and feeling.\(^4\)

Bain's concern was Mill's prediction that minorities without political clout - whose influence, that is, was reduced to naught by governments of inequality and privilege, would be unable to exercise the vital function of antagonism in political deliberations. As such, they thought that society's prosperity was a measure of the power of minorities to resist the perverse tendencies of its government's ruling authority.\(^4\)

While determined to guard minorities against the majority rule, Mill was wont to admit that "it is not the uncontrolled ascendancy of popular power, but of any power, which is formidable."\(^4\) By whomever exercised, Mill doubted not that authority and power had corruptive potential.\(^4\) He looked on the love of power as "the most evil passion of human nature".\(^4\) His was the opinion,

> that power over others, power of coercion and compulsion, any power other than that of moral and intellectual influence, even in the cases where it is
indispensable, is a snare, and in all others a curse both to the possessor and to those over whom it is possessed; a burthen which no rightly constituted moral nature consents to take upon itself, but by one of the greatest sacrifices which inclination ever makes to duty.  

Bain concurred with this opinion, fearing that the love of interference and control leads to intolerance and the suppression of individuality. "Authority, government, power over others", he wrote,

is not an end in itself; it is only a means. Further, its operation is an evil; it seriously abates human happiness. The restraint upon free agency, the infliction of pain on individuals, the setting up a reign of terror - all this is justified solely by the prevention of evils out of all proportion to the misery that it inflicts. This might seem self-evident; but is not so. The deep-seated malevolence and lust of domination in the human mind make the necessity of government a pretext for excesses in severity and repression; to which must be added the opportunity of preying upon the substance of the governed.

Central to Mill and Bain's socio-political thought is the idea of progress through struggle and "resistance" as required to fend off the tyrannical tendencies of ruling powers. According to Bain, "[t]he only cases where power is not excessive are those where the people are unusually recalcitrant: this is, in some degree, true of the British, who, in certain instances, would much resent being over-governed. The important practical inference is that power must always be made to justify itself."

Though committed to the idea of an egalitarian society, Mill and Bain were yet inclined to tip the political scales in favor of the educated, allowing greater political weight to intellectual and moral superiority. "Entire exclusion from a voice in the common concerns", wrote Mill, "is one thing: the concession to others of a more potential voice, on the ground of greater capacity for the management of the joint interests, is another. The two things are not merely different, they are incommensurable."

It is not useful, but hurtful, that the constitution of the country should declare ignorance to be entitled to as much political power as knowledge. The national institutions should place all things that they are concerned with, before the mind of the citizen in the
light in which it is for his good that he should regard them: and as it is for his good that he should think that every one is entitled to some influence, but the better and wiser to more than others, it is important that this conviction should be professed by the State, and embodied in the national institutions.54

The making of leaders: cultivating conscience and intellect

In thus standing their ground on the importance of a greater share of influential power for "the better and wiser",55 Mill and Bain's was a position maintained on an uneven social surface after all. For it was based on a residual preservation of hierarchy. They were no exclusionists, however. Concerned with fostering educational reforms that would bear directly on the intellectual and moral state of the people, Mill and Bain worked hard to raise the depths of society so as to open the way for the meritocratic determination of leadership.56

Wherever and by whomever exercised, true leadership for Mill and Bain alike was accessible only to those who partook of the virtues of self-restraint and public spirit. Mill's "ethico-political" probe into, and prospective analysis of, the labourers' economic condition, for instance, makes this point plain.57 In wrestling with "the great economic question of the future", Mill concluded that a greater diffusion of economic power from capital to labour could only be done "by the prudence, forethought, wise restraint, & habit of cooperation, of the working people themselves."58

The reality was otherwise, however. Mill himself admitted that prospective material benefits firmly rooted in self-serving motives of gain and profit were far more compelling to the uninstructed masses than the appeal to the necessary pursuit of human excellence.59 This "thinking-against-one-another" mentality was condemned by Mill for breeding moral indifference by sanctioning selfish economic pursuits.60 In fact, both Mill and Bain feared the likes of passive, self-interested and unrefined individuals because they read problems of idleness, self-indulgence and mental dullness as fostering strife and discontent. The deep-rooted selfishness of this "uncultivated herd" stood in their eyes as a precursory sign of social unrest and a bar to social and moral improvement.61 Mill's observation was that,
the strongest propensities of uncultivated or half-cultivated human nature (being the selfish ones, and those of a sympathetic character which partake most of the nature of selfishness) evidently tend in themselves to disunite mankind, not to unite them, to make them rivals, not confederates.62

Mill was sure that as the fit between an enlightened people and a fair and cooperative society was good, order would prevail. So that the human mind could resume its peaceful course "undisturbed by convulsions or anarchy", selfishness would need to give way to fellowship, and Mill meant to press the point.63 This is noticeable in his attempt to address some of the social questions of the working classes.

To be independent of master manufacturers, to work for themselves and divide the whole produce of their labour is a worthy object of ambition, but it is only fit for, and can only succeed with people who can labour for the community of which they are a part with the same energy and zeal as if labouring for their own private and separate interest (the opposite is now the case), and who, instead of expecting immediately more pay and less work, are willing to submit to any privation until they have effected their emancipation.64

Mill looked upon the cultivation "of conscience & of intellect" as the means by which to fit mankind for a future state of society combining "the greatest personal freedom" with "noble" experiments in co-operation and a fair apportionment of the fruits of labour.65 As principles go, liberty and social equality were Mill's choicest examples of creeds whose very truth, once settled, would lead convinced individuals from a state of intellectual chaos to one of harmony.66 Among the conditions of stability and progress was the need of self-restraint without which freedom and justice were unrealizable, and for which Mill and Bain called time and again as the equilibrant of the social and moral orders.67

Recognizing the voice of authority in morals and politics

Reading up on the writings of the St. Simonian school in the early 30s, Mill had found their speculations as well as those of Auguste Comte both philosophically appealing and scientifically powerful. Their systematized ideas on the development of
historical societies opened out to a view of history as divided between stable ("organic") and sceptical ("critical") periods with respect to opinion and conviction. These ideas were not only philosophically convincing but morally compelling to Mill. Their acceptance, he thought, impelled to reformatory activity of a moral, political and social kind. Society's disordered state no longer seemed so intractable a problem to Mill who now looked upon it as a temporary rather than a normal phase of human affairs. Of his state of mind at the time, Mill has this to say.

I looked forward, through the present age of loud disputes but generally weak convictions, to a future which shall unite the best qualities of the critical with the best qualities of the organic periods; unchecked liberty of thought, unbounded freedom of individual action in all modes not hurtful to others; but also, convictions as to what is right and wrong, useful and pernicious, deeply engraved on the feelings by early education and general unanimity of sentiment, and so firmly grounded in reason and in the true exigencies of life, that they shall not, like all former and present creeds, religious, ethical, and political, require to be periodically thrown off and replaced by others.

Mill thus set himself upon the work of expounding and inculcating in his people a belief in reasoned principles and doctrines whose truth, he hoped, would be confirmed by expert judgment and recognized by general consent. For he had a tall order to fill: his was the aim to revitalize and reorder society by substituting reason for old and ill-gotten forms of authority as the standard of right and responsible governance in political and moral matters.

Mill and Bain stood by the view that in "natural" and wholesome states of society, worldly power and moral influence were in the hands of society's fittest managers whose united opinions and recommendations won a people's acceptance and sponsorship. As the lifeblood of organic periods, positive creeds such as stood the empirical test and commanded assent were thus vitally important to settle, and Mill well knew it. For he was himself thoroughly grounded in the view that "it is what men think, that determines how they act." If only Mill and Bain had their way, conscience and intellect would be decided powers in the land.

Yet Mill related his moving in an age of political and moral "transition" when
no new creeds had yet risen from the breakdown in fundamentals outgrown. Times of "weak convictions, paralysed intellects, and growing laxity of principle" were of particular concern to him. Not only was the threat of "intellectual anarchy" real to Mill, what with a creedless people knowing not whom nor what to believe. Social unrest was also to be feared and likely to spring, he thought, from the fact that society's would-be fittest managers of power were yet not its actual monopolizers. Mill nonetheless predicted that,

...the changes in the visible structure of society which are manifestly approaching, and which so many anticipate with dread, and so many with hope of a nature far different from that which I feel, are the means by which we are to be carried through our present transitional state, and the human mind is to resume its quiet and regular onward course; a course as undisturbed by convulsions or anarchy, either in the political or in the moral world, as in the best times heretofore, but far more favoured than any former period in respect to the means of rapid advancement, and less impeded by the effect of counteracting forces.

Trusting the masses to accept the scientific opinions of consentient minds as authoritative pronouncements, Mill sought agreement on political and moral doctrines. He thought along with Bain that rationally grounded creeds would be advanced and upheld by revolutionizing the methodological basis of belief. His claim was that "he who can throw most light upon the subject of method, will do most to forward that alliance among the most advanced intellects & characters of the age, which is the only definite object I ever have in literature or philosophy so far as I have any general object at all."

Mill and Bain not only contended that this methodological development implied a gain in recognition for the authoritative voice of the 'wiser' in moral and social matters. They also argued for its necessitating fundamental changes in the constitution of a people's thinking modes, so as to enable them to pay "intelligent deference" to mental superiority. Mill had earlier contended that "each person of distinguished intellectual powers, whom society has not sense enough to place in the situation in which he can be of the greatest use to it, is a reproach to society, and to the age in which he lives. It is here, if any where, that improvement may be hoped for; and we hope it is
here that we shall, in time, see it contended for."82

The "moral discipline of obedience" was as an ever recurring theme in Mill and Bain's productions as such.83 Politically and psychologically speaking, to press for order was to urge obedience.84 It might well be said that Mill and Bain had a stake in keeping order and that their peacekeeping mission was geared to fostering habits of submission to proof.85 Theirs was indeed the view that yielding to the authority of reason would restore some semblance of order. Rational doctrines and opinions held with one accord would consolidate further the moral, intellectual and social power of their propounders.86

As Mill himself admitted, "deference to mental superiority is not to go the length of self-annihilation - abnegation of any personal opinion."87 But as the applicability of his reformist schemes turns on the valuation of mental ability, Mill's restructured social order must be favourable to the reverential spirit.88 Note his words.

It is, without doubt, the necessary condition of mankind to receive most of their opinions on the authority of those who have specially studied the matters to which they relate... Any doctrines which come recommended by the nearly universal verdict of instructed minds will no doubt continue to be, as they have hitherto been, accepted without misgiving by the rest. The difference is, that with the wide diffusion of scientific education among the whole people,...their faith, however implicit, would not be that of ignorance: it would not be the blind submission of dunces to men of knowledge, but the intelligent deference of those who know much, to those who know still more.89

Mill thought that for the masses to agree on the implements for change - that is, on re-modelled political institutions and social arrangements, social power needed to pass in the hands of the most competent whose united authority would give currency to their political and social doctrines. Mill's contention was that those "who can succeed in creating a general persuasion that a certain form of government or social fact of any kind, deserves to be preferred, have made nearly the most important step which can possibly be taken towards ranging the powers of society on its side."90

Far from being the whole of social power, then, mere numbers and property were but some of its elements in the overall scheme of things. For Mill deemed
intelligence the powerhouse of society, and a mighty force to contend with in its action on the will and on opinion as such. His was the claim that "[w]hoever deems more highly of wisdom than he deems of rope-dancing, or at most of cotton-spinning, cannot think less of it than that it ought to rule the world".

Mill was sure that respect for their "betters" would come by giving effect to the intellectual and moral transformation of a people. Singled out by him as centrally important in unleashing human potentiality were social influences the likes of which were said to mark individuals as they were and as they could become. Among the principal claiming Mill's attention were the exercise of authority, the distribution of power, the conditions of rule and obedience, and the relation of equal and sympathetic association, all of which seem to have penetrated Bain's psychological writings. At the hand of Mill, political reform played as a prelude to the prioritizing of intellectual discipline and moral training. Mill spoke of the necessity "to contrive, establish, and work the machine of a responsible government" committed to the idea of universal education as a prerequisite to the execution of this project. Gained through formal schooling, life experience and self-culture, an education conducive to the development of rationalistic practices and moral habits was Mill and Bain's preferred means of liberation from intellectual and political restraints.

In meeting Mill and Bain's expectations, not only would an improved constitutional framework defeat power plays, but also usher in a fit and responsible government bent upon the intellectual and moral betterment of the people. Mill made allowances for the constitutional embodiment of political principles conferring greater political weight on the educated. His was the concern that, democracy, in its very essence, insists so much more forcibly on the things in which all are entitled to be considered equally, than on those in which one person is entitled to more consideration than another, that respect for even personal superiority is likely to be below the mark. It is for this, among other reasons, I hold it of so much importance that the institutions of the country should stamp the opinions of persons of a more educated class as entitled to greater weight than those of the less educated...

Removing the monopoly of wordly power from the hands of an irresponsible few was
deemed by Mill to be necessary,

ere the most virtuous and best-instructed of the nation will acquire that ascendancy over the opinions and feelings of the rest, by which alone England can emerge from this crisis of transition, and enter once again into a natural state of society.99

As one of Mill's terms, qualification for power and fitness for it were meant to correspond.100 Exemplified in the actions of the leaders of society, reason and duty would thus become the guiding and restraining principles in exercised power and freedom.

This much at least was clear to Mill and Bain: the influence of 'intellect' was as the power-broker's. When duly exerted, it would not only affect the distribution of economic, social and political power, as was Mill's plan; it would also determine in the psychological realm the reach of mental powers, thereby tipping Bain's hand in the process. Thus Mill and Bain's respective attempts to rename the leading powers of the land, social and psychological, turned on defining and securing a position of authority for the virtuous and energetic character, while acknowledging the dominion of reason as embodied in the intellect. "Who says it is not important", Mill writes, "that those who are at the head of the State should have reverence for intellect? But will they ever have that reverence until intellect shall be the source of their own elevation?"101

Both Mill and Bain held that rationally grounded moral and political creeds would prevail only as the workings of "Man and Society" were studied scientifically.102 As apostles of the scientific method, they represented its application to the subjects of morality and politics as the saving grace of researchers whose resultant unity in opinion would be the very consolidation of their intellectual and social power.103

Methodologically sound research into human nature and society was also important to the practical interests of humankind, they thought, by affording reliable ground for an insightful understanding of futurity, and of the means by which to reap its benefits and evade its difficulties.104 "It is only in the present", wrote Mill, "that we can know the future; it is only through the present that it is in our power to influence that which is to come."105 Belief in a future amenable to foresight and control was the rational basis of prudential conduct, and as a condition of social stability, therefore, Mill and Bain sought to instill it into the minds of their people.106 Concern over intellectual
and social unsettledness underlied Mill and Bain's remedial work in philosophy and psychology respectively. The prefatory words to Mill's Logic of the Moral Sciences, for instance, attest the fact.

The concluding Book is an attempt to contribute towards the solution of a question, which the decay of old opinions, and the agitation that disturbs European society to its inmost depths, render as important in the present day to the practical interests of human life, as it must at all times be to the completeness of our speculative knowledge: viz. Whether moral and social phenomena are really exceptions to the general certainty and uniformity of the course of nature; and how far the methods, by which so many of the laws of the physical world have been numbered among truths irrevocably acquired and universally assented to, can be made instrumental to the formation of a similar body of received doctrine in moral and political science.\(^{107}\)

The lead of the speculative intellect

Justified by Mill and Bain against a perceived threat of social and intellectual anarchy, the regeneration of society was said to depend upon the mental qualities of superior minds. Both agreed with Comte that the leading agent of social progression was the speculative intellect whose generation of opinions and convictions was exclusive to itself.\(^{108}\) I quote, at some length, and in Mill's own words, those Comtean ideas whose truth he would himself propagate.

The natural progress of society consists in the growth of our human attributes, comparatively to our animal and our purely organic ones: the progress of our humanity towards an ascendancy over our animality, ever more nearly approached though incapable of being completely realized...

But as our more eminent, and peculiarly human, faculties are of various orders, moral, intellectual, and aesthetic, the question presents itself, is there any one of these whose development is the predominant agency in the evolution of our species? According to M. Comte, the main agent in the progress of mankind is their intellectual development. Not because the intellectual is the most powerful part of our nature, for, limited to its inherent strength, it is one of the weakest: but because it
is the guiding part, and acts not with its own strength alone, but with the united force of all parts of our nature which it can draw after it. In a social state the feelings and propensities cannot act with their full power, in a determinate direction, unless the speculative intellect places itself at their head. The passions are, in the individual man, a more energetic power than a mere intellectual conviction; but the passions tend to divide, not to unite, mankind: it is only by a common belief that passions are brought to work together, and become a collective force instead of forces neutralizing one another. Our intelligence is first awakened by the stimulus of our animal wants and of our stronger and coarser desires; and these for a long time almost exclusively determine the direction in which our intelligence shall work: but once roused to activity, it assumes more and more the management of the operations of which stronger impulses are the prompters, and constrains them to follow its lead... Personal interests and feelings, in the social state, can only obtain the maximum of satisfaction by means of co-operation, and the necessary condition of co-operation is a common belief. All human society, consequently, is grounded on a system of fundamental opinions, which only the speculative faculty can provide, and which, when provided, directs our other impulses in their mode of seeking their gratification. And hence the history of opinions, and of the speculative faculty, has always been the leading element in the history of mankind.\textsuperscript{109}

Mill's eagerness to work the spirit of the statement in his Logic of the Moral Sciences was Bain's opportunity to accommodate its specifics in his Psychology. Both thought that wisdom ought to occupy the managerial chair as such. Standing up for a redistribution of worldly power by means of education, Mill asked that "the State...yield obedience to intellect".\textsuperscript{110} Bain would oblige with a redeployment of psychological forces in which the intellect reigns supreme among mental powers, while the executive willingly abides by its directives.

**The primacy of Association Psychology**

It would seem that the forestalment of a progressive state of society was the very fuel that drove Bain's contribution. In Mill's book on social changes, Psychology would
feature as the foreword to the body of writing on Society. In setting the tone for things to come, Psychology's opening statement, therefore, mattered. As preliminaries go, Mill and Bain deemed the associationist account of the mind most satisfactory. This should not surprise. For their choice of means to the end of social improvement was made on the basis of their encouraging practices steeped in the utilitarian tradition. And this stipulation presupposed an associationist understanding of mental functioning. Mill himself tells us so much. Vocal in the need of universal education, accumulated scientific knowledge, self-cultivation, and wise modifications in social and political institutions, Mill further recommended,

first, that laws and social arrangements should place the happiness or (as, speaking practically, it may be called) the interest of every individual as nearly as possible in harmony with the interest of the whole; and, secondly, that education and opinion, which have so vast a power over human character, should so use that power as to establish in the mind of every individual an indissoluble association between his own happiness and the good of the whole, especially between his own happiness and the practice of such modes of conduct, negative and positive, as regard for the universal happiness prescribes; so that not only he may be unable to conceive the possibility of happiness to himself, consistently with conduct opposed to the general good, but also that a direct impulse to promote the general good may be in every individual one of the habitual motives of action, and the sentiments connected therewith may fill a large and prominent place in every human being's sentient existence.111

What intellectual mechanism could possibly operate the formation and cementation of 'indissoluble' associations such as would bring individual minds to their wholesome, dignified and free states?112 A model of mind was needed that would lend itself to this kind of manipulation. Banking on "the wonderful pliability of the human mind",113 Mill sought help from the Association Psychology. Bain would assist with a contribution unique to his situation, serving up a model conception of psychological organization governed on democratic principles as a small-scale example of moral restraint and intelligent leadership to which both individuals and powers in the land should conform.
THE INSTITUTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC RULE IN BAIN'S PSYCHOLOGY

The government of Mind

It might well be thought that Bain's representation of psychological organization is as his understanding of political society in that both are conceivable as defined by government and thus understandable in terms of a relation of rule and obedience. Indeed, notwithstanding disparate notions of Law as treated in science and politics, the willing submission of Inferiors to the authority of a Superior such as describes a government by consent seems just as fundamental a conception to Bain's psychological, as it is to Mill's political, disquisitions. Bain's plain resolve, for instance, to keep order among unruly mental forces while expounding psychological theories can be understood to express the need for governance in matters of the mind. As Bain well knows that stability under a constituted authority is impossible without compliance to its direction, this call to order in the mental realm tells of his plan to render "inferior" susceptibilities and impulses obedient to discipline and thus ready to abide by the decisions of the Intellect.

Psychological Superior and Inferior

As the first consideration, it bears noticing that such basic notions as those of 'superior and inferior', 'rule and obedience', are as frames of the mind, giving supporting structure to Bain's psychological construction. Invested with sovereign power on Bain's own initiative, the "superior" Intellect is the crowning glory of the mental "constitution", and everything else within the realm finds a place in relation to it. Bain's expression is one of praise when speaking on the topic of the Intellect. And the vocabulary of travel and rank in which he tells of its powers is clearly designed to impress while suggestive of grandeur and importance.

With Bain as guide in the exploration of the impressive region of the Intellect, we touch at a place of promise for we have clearly entered the realm of 'the great'. No sooner begun on the psychological course but we are met with the principle of relativity
which starts as a "great" mental law and a "supreme" generality. Retentiveness is itself described as a "great fact of the mind", "a grand generalization", and the "foremost law of mind"; as a "higher power", it is a means of reproduction, and as reproductive, it constitutes "the virtue of the Intellect".8

From Bain's point of view, the identifying process or power of agreement is also "a great means of mental resuscitation", while both retentiveness and agreement are held up as "great leading functions."120 And when exercised in the performance of intellectual operations, all three "great functions" of the Intellect are said to display such "beautiful" workings as to represent in their principled expression "the supreme laws of mind".121

It is plain that when seen through Bain's eyes and related in his own words, retentiveness is yet but a foothill in his scheme of things intellectual. For it is found at the base of a greater height still. Raised by Bain to a "position of command",122 the ranking Similarity is indeed an intellectual elevation of no small dimensions. Bain tells us that by "this greatest faculty of the intellect", "we ascend to the brightest heaven of invention."123 As "the main foundation of all high intellectual power, capacity, originality, invention, and genius", it ably sustains "the highest operations of intellect in mature life."124

In describing the operations of this "attractive faculty" and "grand property of the Intellect",125 Bain never fails to remind us that we here take in the view from a "higher" vantage point.126 And his rhetorical strategies are put to use in conveying this very idea of grandeur. We are told that "this great faculty [is] the glory of our nature", "the law of Gravitation of the intellectual world", "the greatest mark of honourable distinction belonging to humanity", and compared to contiguity, "is the nobler of the two".127 At the hand of Bain, similarity is thus laced with the mark of nobility.

Bain's text sometimes reads like a travelogue taking us through lowlands as well as hilly regions of varying magnitude. As the Intellect is designed to work the elementary materials of Feeling into an elaborate network of associative growths and to embrace comprehensive world-views by which to guide the Will, it occupies a pivotal place in Bain's structure. Given a directive role to play in the unfolding of psychological life, the Intellect plainly rises above the other "regions of mind".128 Thus
raised into prominence by the very centrality of its role, the Intellect peaks out as a promontory would overlooking a lowland, that of instinctive feelings and activities.\(^{129}\)

It is because classified and ranked that Bain's regions and subregions of the Mind appear as psychological elevations of varying altitude. Both Bain's topical arrangement and choice of words attest the fact. We are told that muscular feelings (active sensibilities), appetites, sensations, and organic affections (passive sensibilities) constitute the primitive in the region of Feeling. As primitive sensibilities, they belong to what Bain deems the inferior region of the Mind, and along with instinctive actions (including the germs of volition), they constitute what might be called the lowland of the mental organization. According to Bain, "this is the region wherein man may be most extensively compared with the brute creation, whose intelligence and education are comparatively small."\(^{130}\)

Thus suggestive of a marked turning-point in mental development, Bain's systematic arrangement of psychological topics evinces the crucial role played by the Intellect in effecting this transformation from the primitive to the cultivated Self. What comes before Bain's treatment of the Intellect refers to that which is primitive in the mental world and involves intellect in the least possible degree or not at all. All refinement and maturation in emotions and volitions arise from the action of the Intellect, after it has worked the primitive sensibilities and rudimentary activities into the cultured pearls of the Mind.\(^{131}\) As such, the treatment of the emotions and the will follows Bain's detailed examination of our cognitive powers.

Of the primitive sensibilities, muscular feelings and sensations are particularly interesting to Bain. For in proportion as they are discriminated, retained and compared, in that proportion do they rise to a higher rank in the scale of feeling. Bain considers that as ministers to thought, they are of the highest kind; in generating 'Feeling', that is, as pleasures and pains, they rank among the lower sort, though they are not without practical appeal.\(^{132}\)

Hence even the ground surface of the lowland is marked with important rises, and Bain's phraseology attests the fact. States of feeling are given rank on a scale of prestige relative to the Intellect, and their meaning conveyed in the language of polarity and hierarchy.\(^{133}\) We are told that knowledge-giving states are "high" and "superior"
whose qualitative nature is feeble, while the character of "low" and "inferior" feelings that have little reference to thought is shown in pleasure and pain.\textsuperscript{134} Bain's words here tell his misgivings about Feeling in general. For he seems to think of feelings as edge tools, which, unless blunted by the force of prudential motives, are cutting when sharpened with the whetstone of peremptory, and therefore, misguided passions.

Centrally positioned midway between the "primitive" and the "cultivated" dimensions of our psychological being, -and instrumental in converting the one into the other, the Intellect is that which confers wisdom while gathering the yield of experience.\textsuperscript{135} Enlightenment only comes to those who heed Bain's warning, however. Mindful that successful resistance spells the downfall of government, Bain insists on the need of a powerful Intellect ready to battle against subversive elements. His word to the wise is that the "larger" views of the "superior" Intellect must carry the day in the fight against the "narrow" regards of the "inferior" appetites, passions and instincts.\textsuperscript{136} Bain means to encourage the rational pursuit of ends, and his hopes lie with the Will whose operations are "intended to enforce the conclusions of the reason against the instinctive and passionate impulses."\textsuperscript{137}

The relation of rule and obedience in Mind

Having vouched for the Intellect's superiority to the opponent feelings in directive power,\textsuperscript{138} Bain is all the readier to exhibit a relation of rule and obedience as he is himself concerned with proving the governability of the human mind. By representing moving impulses as obedient subjects of the Intellect's rule, Bain would in this way extend to psychology notions he'd already entertained while debating the merits of a Government by consent. He had there insisted on the need of rational compliance with the regulations of governing powers for the maintenance of a well-ordered society. According to Bain, "[w]hen a government, based on the superstitious prostration of the mind, gives place to one recognised by the reason, on the grounds of its contributing to the well-being of the society, a step of progress has been achieved."\textsuperscript{139} Intelligent deference, as such, proved acceptable to Bain who deemed it a requisite of good citizenship. He had written:
It is essential that the government, whether political, moral, or spiritual, should ground itself upon motives that are all-powerful with the people... The surest of all foundations of government is the direct approbation of the community: obedience will then be spontaneous and certain...

The French writers on politics are accustomed to distinguish between Material and Moral Order; meaning by the first the preservation of individual rights and privileges, and the full enforcement of the law against wrong-doers; and by the second, the willing submission of the people, and their full approbation of the constitution and doings of the government. Grumbling, discontent, and dissatisfaction, expressed or unexpressed, are opposed to Moral Order; actual outbreaks and open defiance threaten the maintenance of Material Order.140

Similarly so with psychology, Bain seems to think. For he believes that as warring elements fighting to determine conduct, the "impulses of blind passion and unenlightened instinct" are opposed to psychological order, unless schooled in discipline and brought to work together under the lead of the Intellect.141 Thus rule and obedience is the unwritten code not only of discipline but of honour in the psychological world of Bain's design. It is all too clear that Bain looks on the practice of obeying as a training in moral discipline.142 As such, the acquired moral ability to openly resist sensual solicitations, strong appetites, and exciting emotions in strict obedience to intellectual and volitional forces stands well with Bain whose contention is that,

although authority may be carried too far in human life generally, yet as no human being is ever emancipated from its sway, an education in submission is as essential a preparation for going out into the world, as is an education in a sound bodily regimen.143

If "conduct inspired by enlarged views of the entire compass of being" is to prevail over that "guided by passion" -arguably Bain's intention here,144 the workings of sense and passion must be reclaimed by tutelary authority from a wild condition to a cultivated state, and thus brought into the service of the Intellect. Bain, you see, works for moral strength and for the repression of immediate gratification by the consideration of remote consequences. And he would argue that just as the sense of common safety
secures the social bond of obedience to governmental regulations, so should a regard for private and collective welfare constitute the psychological tie of compliance to the Intellect's rule. Bear in mind that Bain is wise to the problem of disorder, social and psychological, and prudential restraint he regards as instrumental in approaching a state of equilibrium. He writes:

The immediate impulses, or prime movers of human action, are the natural instincts, passions, emotions, and energies of the human constitution. The likings and aversions, and all the potent stimulants that act on our frame, are the influences most easy and congenial to yield ourselves up to. The fact, however, is, that if we abandon ourselves at random to each prevailing impulse that seizes us...we shall soon terminate our existence in a wreck. Among the moving powers that act on us we must suppress some and regulate others; we permit one to have a larger sway than the rest, because it is safer and more useful, and because it helps to keep the others under...

When we depart from the primitive device of choosing a king passion, and introduce the speculative and scientific intelligence into the conduct of our lives, we make a step exactly identical with the interposition of scientific laws and scientific reasonings into agriculture, navigation, or the administration of justice...

Both Mill and Bain seem to think that just as stable governments rule by a people's consent, so should the management of Mind draw on the motive power of Feeling while entrusted with the guidance of orderly conduct. As Bain lays it down, this regulatory agency is also expected to rein in the passions and suppress the "rebellious impulses of human nature" while working the emotional impellers of action. For Bain fears that "[t]he passions without the intellect are brutish".

Observe that this call by Mill and Bain alike for the "progress of our humanity towards an ascendancy over our animality" must rest upon the establishment of a governorship of the Mind, and thus upon the institution of a relation between a governed and a governing class of psychological phenomena. Also note that while seeing this project out, Bain's insistence upon the taming and working of moving impulses by intellectual and volitional management makes for responsible psychological governance because promotive of mental advancement.
Mill had already spoken to the issue of responsibility in civil authorities as tending to the intellectual and moral improvement of citizens.\textsuperscript{152} Bain would put this idea forward in his psychology, having elsewhere provided the rationale for the existence of authority on the basis of its benefitting the governed.\textsuperscript{153}

The taming of the Psychological Inferior

Of all stimulants of activity, direct and indirect, feelings in their strictly emotional character and immediate impulses exhibited without reasoning are the objects of Bain's greatest apprehension. Prudential regards and disinterested impulses, however, are given a royal assent because stamped and mediated by intellect and experience.\textsuperscript{154} To speak plain, Bain mistrusts what he calls "great mental excitement".\textsuperscript{155} And the reason for this is not hard to find. Note Bain's words.

Whenever a feeling strongly occupies the mind, the objects in harmony with it are maintained in the view, and all others are repelled and ignored. There is a fight between an emotional excitement and the natural course of the intellectual associations; facts, considerations, and appearances that would arise by virtue of these associations are kept back, and a decision is come to in their absence. It is not that the mind declares that to be a fact, whereof the contradiction is actually before it; it is that, under a one-sided fury, the contradiction that would otherwise come forward remains in oblivion. Emotion tampers with the intellectual trains, as a culprit would fain do with the witnesses in his case, keeping out of the way all that are against him.\textsuperscript{156}

It is quite certain that any variety of intense feeling, as the passion of fear or that of anger, for instance, that should leave the mind in an "inflamed" rather than "a cool and collected condition", "shaken", as it were, "from its calm centre", will be found to exercise an unbidden ascendancy.\textsuperscript{157} Bain finds all circumstances deplorable in which an individual's "intellect is no longer at his command".\textsuperscript{158} As he sees it, "[t]he deep-seated intellectual corruption due to the ascendancy of the feelings has been a theme for reflecting minds to dilate upon, and yet we cannot say that it has been sufficiently set forth."\textsuperscript{159}

As a staunch advocate of "coolness, composure" and a "healthy balance of the
mind”. Bain defend the need of checks against perverted psychological dominants. As such, containment and suppression of emotional despots, "rebels" and "Vandals", "king" and "disorganizing passions", "agitating" feelings, "reigning" desires, and "tyrannical" likings and dislikings are called forth by him as the responses of master spirits and intellectual natures.

Bain writes:

The devotion of the mind to incessant pleasure, and the pressure of misery and care, are wholly adverse to the general cultivation of the intellect, —a cultivation that, in the last resort, reposes on the ready sensibility to difference. The best atmosphere for a high culture is a serene condition of mind, with no more pain than is necessary to stimulate pursuit, and no more pleasure than imparts an inducement to go on with life. The energy of the brain is thus reserved for the neutral stimulation that impresses every kind of difference, and in this way stores the intellect with distinctive images. The maximum of intellectual excellence implies at once a sparing resort to pleasure, and a tolerable exemption from misery.

Knowledge, intellectual self-control and rational deliberation, "however the storm of potent impulses may rage", all spell success for Bain's social project by insuring a "well-guarded happiness of life" while conducing to "the welfare of human society." "The destroyers of our happiness", says Bain, "are the apprehensions of distempered fancy, superstitions, and vulgar errors...While there are so many real evils in the world, it is an object to be freed from the imaginary. By long consent, knowledge is power; still more emphatically and specially, knowledge is composure.

Bain is wont to say that in matters of truth and practice, emotion has no claim to the throne and therefore no right to usurp careful judgment and reason. Rational belief depends upon the handling of, and acquired trust in, evidence. Bain figures that where habits of submission to proof are wanting, "belief is the same thing as happy emotion". And this speaks to the absence of knowledge. For Bain looks on knowledge as identical with affirmation and belief. "It is impossible", writes Bain, "and not desirable, to exclude emotion from the life of the intellectual man, but the less of it there is, the more will pure intellect flourish.

Then again, the working of emotion, as voluntary motive, is a matter altogether different from the working of intense emotion, as such. So that as motive influences
go, the consideration of ethical emotions is yet another story. For at the hand of Bain, morality is built on an intellectual foundation, and thus impelling impulses necessary to "a well-developed moral sense" are bound by the Intellect's regulation.\(^\text{170}\) Note Bain's words.

A good retentiveness for acute pains has not the intellectual importance possessed by the memory for sights and sounds, but it has a twofold practical importance. In the first place, on it depends the exercise of the will in the way of prevention. When a feeling ceases in the actual, it can have no volitional power, except as it is vividly presented in idea; and on this ground, the more lively the recollection, the more energetically are we moved in our precautionary labours as regards the future. The degree of retentiveness for pain is thus the intellectual foundation of Prudence. It is, in the second place, the foundation of Sympathy, or the power of entering into the feelings of others when suffering under a like infliction.\(^\text{171}\)

Observe that Mill and Bain's resort to prescribing moral practices steeped in the utilitarian philosophy through the channels of psychology was their way of shaping the consciences of their own and future generations.\(^\text{172}\) Bain hoped to mould the moral sentiments of his time by investing the deliberative (Intellect) and executive (Volition) branches of the psychological government with regulatory authority such as would guide the emotional impellers of moral action while restraining the impassioned states.

Here the psychological authority would be neither a despotism nor a monarchy, but something alike a republic in which power is held by, and distributed over, all fundamental divisions of the mind, namely Feeling, Intellect and Volition. And just as Mill had staked a claim to a 'government of the wisest' in which the majority's influence is exercised through the agency of an enlightened leadership, so would Bain sound the merits of rational governance by recognizing the Intellect's ultimate authority.

**The making of the democratic Mind**

As exemplified in the schemes of Reid, Stewart, Brown, Hamilton, Kant and Herbart, Bain finds fault with previous philosophical classifications in their handling of certain mental facts.\(^\text{173}\) Some he considers defective for having misconceived
emotions and thus blurred the boundary lines between feeling, cognition and conation. Bain fears that when overlooked as a major level of classification, 'Feeling' has been denied its rightful share of influence for the sake of a greater concentration of power in 'Knowledge'.

Rather than resolve feeling, as some had done, into cognition or volition, thereby stripping it of its locus standi so as to consolidate the power of some other, Bain treats Feeling, Intellect and Will as distinct genera and fundamental powers of the mind. In Bain's democratically constituted psychological organization, power is held by all fundamental properties and not by some one attribute only. Bain in fact defends against their being one ultimate fact embracing all three general properties. As well does he deny the possibility of submersible and inefficient departments of the mind.

The essentials of free governments as Mill conceived of them in broad terms are thus powerfully realized on the psychological stage. Well acquainted with the view that the distribution of power bears significantly on human development, Bain deals out shares of power to each of the three ultimate mental properties. And though these general properties can be seen as potentially disabling influences on one another by reason of their extensive reach of power, Bain has in fact so contrived the workings of the mind as to actually limit the wrongful use of power. Both Mill and Bain deemed it important to strike a balance among fundamental powers.

The power of Feeling

Feelings are the moving power of Bain's government of Mind just as the people are the moving heart of Mill's representative government. In furnishing both elemental and complex materials of associative growths, emotional rudiments and compounds are indispensable to the built-up Mind whose structure is only as stable as it is grounded on, and representative of, them. Inasmuch as Feeling is influential in contributing the materials of intelligence and of morality and in transmitting emotional drive, to that extent it partakes of the overall power of the mind.

As the powertrain of the mental constitution, feelings definitely exert force and this is shown in Bain's choice of words when adverting to their influence on activity and
on intellect. To begin with Bain allows that,

[a] small portion of feeling or emotion is essential to intellect, as giving an interest in the exercise of Discrimination, and in the other intellectual functions. But this need be very little, and the required amount is soon exceeded: anything amounting to excitement, in the common meaning of the term, passes beyond the mark, and begins to tell against the intellectual vigour...Propriety and rationality of conduct subsist upon delicate distinctions; any one in a fury of excitement is disqualified from such delicacy.176

In their qualitative character as pleasure, pain or indifference, strong feelings are seen as powerful forces determining the influence of fixed ideas. Through the tendency of these dominant ideas under violent excitement to act themselves out against the will and to assume control of actions, feelings have impelling power, albeit indirect. While the perverted and despotic influence of fixed ideas condemns them, overpowering feelings also rouse Bain to protest for being potential emasculators of associative forces and voluntary power alike.177 Bain fears that as "unhinging and disorganizing passions", they "interfere fatally with the steadiness and balance of our judgment".178

As excitative accompaniments of ideas, intense feelings are also said to be powers of intellectual concentration by ensuring the prolonged existence of these ideas in the mind. But as the persistence of one intense idea spells the eclipse of all others unrelated to it, feelings have obviously not only assisting but impeding power as well. It is as obstructive forces that they are bound to exercise tyrannical power over intellectual processes.179 Note Bain's words.

It has already been observed, that a strong feeling will rebut all ideas incompatible with itself, however strongly they may be suggested by the forces of association...A current of violent emotion, besides overbearing hostile considerations that may be actually before the mind, can so obstruct, I might almost say paralyze, the workings of association, that such considerations, however near, shall not be allowed to come on the stage. This is one of the characteristic influences of emotion. Intellect cannot perform its ordinary functions in the presence of strong feeling.180

Feelings are also said to have volitional as well as intellectual power. Bain
thinks that in their volitional character, they are so influential as to have the power of
discriminative selection. He thus sees fit to talk of their inducing, prompting,
determining, guiding, controlling, governing, directing, ruling and commanding
voluntary activity in pursuit or in avoidance. Even obedient bodily organs are said to
submit to their authority.181

As they admit of being discriminated, identified and retained, feelings also have
intellectual power and moral appeal to boot. For they may constitute ideal pleasures and
pains necessary to the acquisition of moral habits, or then again, be sources of
perception and thus yield knowledge.182

The powers of Intellect and of Will

Intelligence is a powerhouse in its own right, as shown in Bain's handling the
subject of discrimination, retentiveness and agreement in ways intended to give these
forces authority.183 As a department establishing rules for associative and reproductive
activity, the intellect shows itself a forceful leader in governing and directing acquisitive
and inventive operations.184

On the face of things, directive powers do not seem to be the intellect's exclusive
possession, however. For at Bain's hands, we see the Will crowned with powers of
general command over bodily organs while given directive power over movements.
With the will in gear, voluntary forces are deployed in as many ways as must needs
result in effective and controlled action. Bain speaks by turns of the will's power to
further present actions in obedience to present feelings, to choose movements and
perform intermediate actions in hope of gratification or relief, to imitate, and to stir
one's stumps on the mere wish to see them moved.185

Checks and balances in Mind

As is true of the exercise of political influence, so it is of psychological
authority: no one power of the mind is allowed to rule the situation "as if there were
nothing besides to divide the force of the constitution."186 Checks are Bain's guarantee
of responsible psychological governance as surely as Mill's controls are a security for rectitude of purpose in politics. Mill and Bain are united in the view that well-constructed democracies must have built-in and practicable mechanisms for checking governmental abuses of power so as to obtain the good faith of leaders in promoting mental advancement.

In his considerations on representative government, Mill insists on a clear separation of the functions of representative bodies from those of the executive government. Pressing for checks as needful protection against governmental errors, Mill maintains that while exercising control over the executive branch, the legislative body must itself submit to the power of other departments and abide by certain limitations as such.

Bain's functional view of the mind seems to meet Mill's criteria. Directive and executive functions such as the Mind fulfills are discharged by distributing them among different departments, those of the intellect and of the will. Bain is also bent on devising means of protecting against abuses of power. His come in the form of stabilizing forces, counteracting influences, and counter-insurgency operations. We have Bain telling us, for instance, that the intellect is in a reduced state in the presence of strong feeling, and, as such, must occasionally abide by the limitations of this obstructive force. "When an emotion possesses the mind in anything like fury", he writes, "nothing that discords with it can find a place, while the feeblest link of connexion is sufficient to recall circumstances in harmony with the dominant state."

Bain's response is to ensure that counter-insurgency operations are within the range of the will whose rescue mission consists in the repression of rebellious and violent emotions. Himself a staunch advocate of self-control, Bain thinks that feelings need restraint and regulation and that volitional control is just what is needed to submerge furious emotional manifestations. As a resistive force empowered to compete with and check passionate outbursts, the will has need of reliable instruments of repression. Happily, the voluntary muscles are under the "government of the will", and Bain submits that it runs its interference by means of them. He writes:

We can, under ordinary circumstances, arrest the diffusive stimulation of the muscles, so as to put on a calm exterior while a fire is raging within. This is the
most simple and direct mode of bringing the will to bear upon a state of mental excitement. The muscular part of an emotional wave can be met by a counter current proceeding to the same muscles... The two forces being homogeneous, that is to say, being both of them in the nature of stimulants to voluntary muscles, the one may overbear the other by the power of the stronger.192

Note that the will's counteractive operations are best carried out by drawing on the intellect's own power to guide the course of volitional power into the proper channel. At that, the power of self-control in the repression of feeling is not unlimited, and Bain is clear on the point.193 A powerful intellect, however, is an asset, says Bain, because as a "counteractive" in its own right, it can "offer a certain strength of resistance to the detention of the mind on one class of ideas."194

With excitement in check, then, the will can combine its stabilizing force with the reproductive powers of the intellect and indirectly influence recall. Powerless on its own to reproduce thought despite its being willed in the pursuit of an end, Bain's carefully crafted volition is so designed as to be only capable of altering the effects of the strictly intellectual forces.195 But within those limits, it is yet thought within the power of the will to oppose the power of the intellectual associations. It would seem that the intellect must once again abide by limiting rules.

In laboured recollection, for instance, the will's authoritative rule applies to its power of arrest and selection. It works by directing and fixing the attention on mental objects till these resuscitate forgotten trains of ideas.196 Again as a force assisting the work of constructiveness, the will's power resides in its command over the attention by virtue of which command, previous acquisitions are selected and adapted to others in new combinations suited to particular ends.197 This control over ideas by the will very much assists the check of emotional excess by directing the attention and the intellectual train upon counteractive mental states. Bain remarks:

When we have to calm down a very troublesome agitation, we commonly bring both methods into play - the direct restraint of the muscular movements, and the transfer of the mental attention to ideas suggestive of the opposite mental condition. The custom of coercing the flow of ideas and the attitude of attention, is an extremely valuable one, both for purposes purely intellectual and for the general government of the temper
and the feelings. We may consider it as belonging to the highest branch of self-discipline.\textsuperscript{198}

Be it understood that under all varieties of volitional effort, voluntary control of thinking trains and feelings is never anything else than muscular intervention for Bain.\textsuperscript{199} Also note that the sway of the will's authority under Bain's democratically conceived Mind is itself limited by the reach of emotional and intellectual powers. Bain writes:

> When, by a stroke of the will, we aim at diverting the current of reflections in profound sorrow or intense anger, we have to fight, by means of this one power, the two remaining forces of our nature leagued against us; we have to resist the currents of association or intellect proper, and the fury of excited feeling at the same time.\textsuperscript{200}

Though Bain occasionally speaks of the will as having command of the thoughts,\textsuperscript{201} it bears noticing that the will's privileges do not actually extend to commanding the resources of the intellect. Bain will not stand for that. As he looks on directive and executive functions as essentially separate, he has made sure that associative and reproductive effects are exclusive to the intellect and therefore out of the will's reach. Mark Bain's words.

> There is no power of adding to the energy of the associating bond either of contiguity or of similarity, by a voluntary effort. The reproductions of the intellect are withdrawn from the control of volition. One thought cannot be made to succeed another, by mere will, as one movement of a limb may be made to succeed another.\textsuperscript{202}

The modes of volitional interference with intellectual activity may indeed be only indirect, and the will, powerless to act on associative links and reproductive bonds as such. But it must be said for the other side that while necessary to the education of the will, associative forces are themselves unable to supersede and dispense with the inherent stimulus of the will. For associations are directive and not impulsive. As Bain puts it, "[t]hey are 'reason the card', not 'passion the gale'.\textsuperscript{203}"
The establishment of a government of the wisest

It would seem that Bain has set Feeling, Intellect and Will in authority with a view to establishing a democratic rule in his psychology, the beneficial influence of which would be seen as the work of a government by mutual compromise. This view was consistent with Mill's principle of 'antagonism' in acknowledging the importance of counters for the progress and vitality of democratic institutions. While specifically designed to guard against abusive power, the checks and counterforces of Bain's predilection also argue his determination to secure a "well-guarded happiness of life" for individuals.²⁰⁴ It would seem, however, that the pleasures of a harmonious life are within reach of those only who recognize Intellect as the ultimate controlling power.

Bain well understands as does Mill that the uncontrolled ascendancy of power spells danger for liberty and autonomy. And so it is that an Intellect such as he authorizes must itself abide by the limitations of the other powers of the mind. As such, it has not absolute authority. But though Feeling and Will are evidently allowed an important share of influence on Bain's view, it appears that the Intellect is entitled to a greater share of power as it is the ordering agent, the depository of knowledge and experience, and the signpost for responsible conduct.²⁰⁵ "By the intellect", writes Bain, "we make large generalisations of what is good for the future as well as for the present, and of what is good for society at large as well as for the individual"; and the will's mandate is to obey "the rules dictated by these intellectual considerations".²⁰⁶ As regards the emotional and intellectual properties, Bain deems the intellectual the more important. For,

by means of it the ideal life is maintained; and no emotion can be looked upon as powerfully manifested, or as existing in the form of a 'propensity', without having a strong ideal persistence.²⁰⁷

Bain remarks that "the great fact of persistency of impression, a distinguishing property of the intellect, runs through everything: there can be neither emotion nor volition without it."²⁰⁸

On the political front, Mill had argued the incommensurability of two questions, the one deciding the basic right of all to a political voice in the common affairs, and the
other determining the grant of a more substantial voice to some by reason of greater competence for the management of joint concerns. It might well be said that Bain not only appreciates the distinction, but in fact embodies it in his psychology by tipping intellectual characters as the likely winners in the game of life.

Bain inclines his ear to the consolidation of the political power of 'the better and wiser'. In like manner, he is disposed to assign a superior influence to Intellect even though it must itself draw on the united forces of all parts in guiding conduct. In this respect Bain's conception of the Intellect's reach of influence is as Mill's ideal representation of the role of an enlightened minority in a rational democracy: though both meant to be decisive influences, they are nonetheless 'accountable to the majority in the last resort'.

One must realize that as Bain represents them, Feeling, Intellect and Will do not simply stand as the three fundamental divisions of the Mind, but in fact map onto three temperaments whose predominant characteristics are the emotional, the intellectual and the active respectively. And so far as that is concerned, Bain is only too willing to scale mental characteristics, thereby tipping his hand in the process. As the discussion of the previous chapter would have made clear, intellectual natures are sure to come out at the head. But not without some struggle.

So that the Intellect can rule supreme, Bain is prepared for a psychological battle, and battle-ready readers, he hopes, are his allies. Thinking it possible to reposition any one division of the mind relatively to the other two by means of education, Bain seizes on the point to strike down Feeling as wasting excitement. He remarks:

...by a judicious starving regimen, an over-emotional nature may be toned down, and fuller play given to intellect and volition... An exceedingly useful part of our moral discipline relating to this head is the restraint of those exciting motives, more than once referred to, whereby the will is prompted to act to a degree disproportioned to the real enjoyment or suffering of the individual. Every initiative within reach should be brought to bear for the establishment of so valuable a habit; and the difficulty of the case renders all of them not too much... The human powers attain their maximum of efficiency only when a confirmed superiority is gained
over flurry, excitement, needless fears, and extravagant ebulitions; but, as this is a triumph over one of the very greatest of human weaknesses, the whole force of favouring circumstances must chime in with the acquisition. Good initiatives, supported by the aids to plastic growth in their full measure, must be invoked to the struggle.²¹⁰

Bain counsels that for the directive Intellect to act with the united forces of emotion and volition, exciting emotions must be quelled and motives bearing on our interest and duty educated into a higher development. With a view to raising the Intellect's position relative to Feeling, Bain intends his words to strike home. His readers are reminded that "[a]n intellectual and cultivated nature strives to maintain the ascendancy of the intellectual associations over the suggestions of emotions. The dominion of reason is another expression for the same fact."²¹¹

The training of Bain's choice specifically aims at strengthening certain motives into superiority over the rest. In the top rank of noble impulses are sympathetic and prudential regards, which Bain looks on as guarantees for virtue and for stable political union.²¹² We should however never know the benefits of good and virtuous conduct, warns Bain, were it not for the intervention of the retentive and cohesive Intellect whose applications "to confirm both prudential volitions of mental growth, and those that respect the interests of others, constitute an important chapter of the human mind."²¹³ As regards the will, the intellect's control over the executive is such that its growth, working, and education would amount to little without progress in intellectuality.²¹⁴ Bain reckons that "[T]he Will is to a great extent the product of the Retentive function of Intelligence".²¹⁵

Bain tells us that no small amount of intellectual power is needed to sustain the remembrance of good or evil in idea. Bear in mind that this memory for good and evil figures prominently in his theoretical account of sympathy and prudence, being, as it were, "the basis of a well-balanced moral agency".²¹⁶ And here it is that the Intellect leads the trinity of mental powers, unequalled in its ability to fortify, discipline and educate the mind into a higher state of well-being. Note Bain's words.

The thoroughly educated man in this respect is he that can carry with him at all times the exact estimate of what he has enjoyed, or suffered, from every object that has
ever affected him, and, in case of encounter, can present to the enemy as strong a front as if he were then under the genuine impression.217

The enemy, for Bain, is gathered up in a "storm of potent impulses", present and raging.218 Acting as restraining defences are the anticipation of future good and evil as well as the painful memory of ill effects brought on by self-indulgent behaviours and imprudent considerations.

As admitted by Bain, the possibility of responsible and moral conduct turns on the intellect's power to develop certain memories into motive powers, and thus to sustain the work of a "well-disciplined" Will by supplying such ideal "bulwarks" as will countervail against temporary solicitations.219 In no quarter does the Intellect's abiding sense of bad consequences and permanent interests interpose to greater effect for the discipline of minds and the happiness of individuals.220 In everyday life, the Intellect's knowledge is as yet an unmatchable and indispensable resource available to devise expediends, guide human activities, and achieve ends. This is exemplified in the following illustration by Bain.

The intelligence...arranges the work to be done for each day, and the action to be performed under every situation; and, as the successive moments arrive, the memory presents the operation with its animating motive, and the organs are inspired accordingly. The result of the whole is manifold and complex, but the mental laws are few and simple. We must have a certain development of the intelligence, in the shape of memory of the succession to be observed, of the behaviour to be adopted under each definite circumstance, and of the pains and pleasures that sustain the requisite labour.221

Far be it from Mill and Bain to deny the place of an educated activity and of motives to the will among the psychological requisites for responsible conduct. Indeed, both recognize the importance and press the need of emotional sustenance as well as of intellectual guidance, and look on willpower as needed for individual enterprise. Yet they are convinced, and in this conviction, keen to propagate the belief, that unless headed by the intellect, feelings and volitions are unable to use their power to the full. It is a similar concern which underlies their support of a government of the wisest whose greater number, Mill thought, would best exercise their power through the
agency and according to the judgment of an enlightened leadership. It is this emphasis on competence which has opened the door to the condemnation of Mill's political thought as elitist. But as C.L. Ten suggests, "[m]any of Mill's proposals may best be seen not as ends in themselves, but as attempts to give strength to his conception of the role of Parliament in the social and political life of the community."\(^{222}\)

This advice seems to hold good in the case of Bain as well. His assignment of the Intellect's impressive share of power may best be read as bolstering his view of the significance of reason in the psychological life of the "well-constituted human being".\(^{223}\)

As was Mill's intention to wield a moral influence through the medium of his philosophical writings,\(^{224}\) so was Bain's wish to morally impact on society through his psychology. In raising the position of Intellect vis-à-vis the other psychological divisions, Bain seems to have intended his readers to be less and less the slaves of isolated and passing impulses so that they may "take a higher rank as 'free agents'."\(^{225}\)

And the development of free agents was the very makings of moral individuals, and thus, of progressive societies. Such was the relevance of psychology to democracy: Mill and Bain hoped that open-minded and insightful individuals exercised in the pursuit of cooperative ventures while practiced in sympathetic awareness, good judgment, and virtuous conduct would make for a tolerant, generous and liberal society. These individuals Mill and Bain intended to be the leading powers in the land. Bain's special assignment was to work out the psychological blueprint that would be their making.
Endnotes

1. Words in quotation marks are Bain's. See Bain, A. (1850). Education of the citizen, Chambers's Papers for the People, 1, 1-32.


Bain papers, A letter from Dr. Bain, (Professor of Logic in the University of Aberdeen, and Author of several philosophical works,) to Mr. Westerton, Chairman of Mr. Mill's Committee. University of Aberdeen, King's College Public Library, Department of Special Collections and Archives, p^A Bain, A1. Bain, A. (1884). The Public Libraries Act, The Aberdeen Free Press, 26 March, no.4716, 6.


57. Mill's investigation of the subject of political economy is not exclusively theoretical, but has what Henry Sidgwick called an "ethico-political" dimension. That is to say that in addition to the strict investigation of economic laws, Mill's exposition is also an inquiry into the best possible form of social organization, as well as an attempt to justify certain social ideals. According to Sidgwick, this ethical aspect of Mill's work is not to be confused with what he calls the ethico-political dimension of the deductive economics of an earlier generation, whose science sanctioned the then existing economic order as approximately perfect. As Sidgwick notes, this cannot be said of Mill, whose dissatisfaction with the actual economic conditions of his time brings out the practical element in his teaching. Sidgwick, H. (1879). Economic method, Fortnightly Review. 25, 301-318. On Mill's rejection of the existing type of social life as the ultimate type of social perfection, see Mill, J.S. (1965). Principles of political economy, vol.3, pp.753-755.


60. Mannheim used the expression 'thinking-against-one-another' to characterize the world of free competition in Mill's time as well as the then prevalent mode of reasoning in the management of human affairs. Mannheim, K. (1934). Rational and irrational elements in contemporary society. London: Oxford University Press, pp.28-29.


On Mill's "cooperative individualists", see Broadbent, J.E. (1968). The good society of


See Bain, A. (1875). The emotions, p.199.


See Bain, A. (1875). The emotions, pp.503-504.


127. So highly does Bain think of this power of agreement that, in his opinion, "the description of all that it does, or of all the operations that it sustains, could not be given in fifty volumes and probably will not be completed for five centuries to come." Bain, A. (1842). On toys, Westminster Review. Bain, A. (1898). Education as a science, p.36.


Included in instinctive actions are primordial and thus untaught actions of all kinds: reflex actions (actions admittedly withdrawn from the mental sphere), primitive combined and harmonious actions (such as locomotive rhythm), bodily manifestations of feeling (such as the bodily expression of anger), spontaneous activity, and self-conservation (primordial link between feeling and movement: pleasure with augmented, and pain with lowered, vitality).


Mill himself does not escape thinking in axiological contrasts, employing the vocabulary of polarity and hierarchy for rhetorical effect. We thus hear, for instance, of "higher" and "lower" mental states, of "noble" and "base" phenomena of mind, of "higher intellectual and moral phenomena", of "elevating" as well as "mean" and "degrading" associations. See Mill, J.S. (1978). Essays on philosophy and the Classics. Vol.11. Toronto: University of Toronto Press; 'Bain's psychology', 1859, pp.348-350,


As examples, see Bain, A. (1875). The emotions. pp. 410-412.


According to Bain, mental excitement is a state of feeling which is neither pleasurable nor painful. It operates indirectly, by gaining the attention and detaining the thoughts. This operation is designated by Bain the 'Fixed Idea'. He writes: "Thus our conduct is ruled partly and principally by our pleasures and pains, through the proper and legitimate operation of the Will, and partly by our emotions, through the stand they take as persisting Ideas." Bain, A. (1875). The emotions. pp. 13-14, 16-17, 33, 379-382.

Bain, A. (1868). The senses, pp. 345, 342. According to Bain, mental excitement is a state of feeling which is neither pleasurable nor painful. It operates indirectly, by gaining the attention and detaining the thoughts. This operation is designated by Bain the 'Fixed Idea'. He writes: "Thus our conduct is ruled partly and principally by our pleasures and pains, through the proper and legitimate operation of the Will, and partly by our emotions, through the stand they take as persisting Ideas." Bain, A. (1875). The emotions. pp. 13-14, 16-17, 33, 379-382.


Ibid, pp. 21-23.


175. As Bain uses it, the term 'department' may refer to either Feeling, Intellect or Volition. Bain, A. (1868). *The senses*, pp. iv, 2-4, 6, 8, 57, 668. See also Bain, A. (1889). On feeling as indifference, *Mind*, 14, 97-106.


The human mind. Chambers's Information for the People.


208. Ibid, p.52.


CONCLUSION

In viewing Bain's psychological task within the utilitarian framework, I was first struck by Mill and Bain's shared manner of thinking on issues of logical, psychological and sociological relevance. To determine how certain ways of thought as well as social attitudes common to Mill and Bain function in the latter's texts thus became the two aims of the present research. I have suggested that it is both as Bain thinks his psychology in abstract, atomistic and mechanistic terms and as certain psychological doctrines tell the tale of his social commitments that his psychology can be seen as carrying utilitarian resonances.

While laying out the details of intended proceedings in the introduction, I very briefly and rather tentatively remarked on this community of intellect as the possession of mid-nineteenth century radical-utilitarians whose leading light was John Stuart Mill. The thing was assumed until such time as the proposition could stand on a firmer foundation. Reaching the goals stated in the introduction grounds the statement in fact inasmuch as the research is regarded as evidence for the claim.

As a first contribution in the subject, the present research stands as a record of the attempt to understand from collected source materials the style of mid-nineteenth century utilitarian-associationist thought in its bearing on psychological theorization. Mill and Bain may be seen as first-stringers in a line of thinkers whose works are thought to exhibit this community of intellect. Herbert Spencer and George Henry Lewes are among those whose contributions might well repay close study in this respect. By way of making inroads into a broad and challenging topic, Mill and Bain's writings have here been the target of attention for they have proven an apt resource in bringing this utilitarian-associationist thought to notice.

I have spoken of a thought pattern shared by Mill and Bain alike to express the complex of tendencies toward abstract, atomistic and mechanistic thinking that characterize their scientific reflections on mind and on society. My point was to show that these ways of thought have acted as utilitarian influences determining the direction of psychological thinking.
I have argued that both Mill and Bain think in abstract terms—being as it were preoccupied with generalized knowledge while showing a predilection for analytic dissection and the compartmentalization of subject matter. Their particular stand on the logic of scientific methodology together with their positivist commitments were decisive factors in their casting mental life in the mould of classes and categories. This led to an analysis of mind whose definition would consist in an enumeration of classifiable parts taken out of their context of individual experience. An abstract Mind is the end product of the dissecting procedure carried out by Mill and Bain. While at their hands the sumnum genus Mind logically divides into the threefold Feeling-Intellect-Will species and each in turn undergoes further dissection, we as witnesses of their psychological pronouncements find ourselves among isolated parts at all times.

Mill and Bain's treatment of psychology's basic components as originally distinct and discrete entities would bring their tendency toward atomistic thinking into focus. Mill and Bain were joined in the view that the development of scientific psychology was among the theoretical and methodological requisites for the creation of a positive social science. The base of associative growths raised from the flooring of psychological atomies (sensations) constituted the platform from which they addressed the people on their need of intellectual and moral improvement. Basic to the utilitarian argument for human progress was the belief that the mind's ideas were derived from experiential and atom-like elements whose intellectually induced connectivity signified mental flexibility. This in turn expressed the human potential for conversions of unrefined to enlightened opinions.

With mental advance construed as a swelling of originally discrete elements mechanically and chemically united into psychical aggregates, Mill and Bain's thought is not only atomistic. For the summing-up of component parts as an adequate reckoning of psychological and social wholes focuses their attention and shows an inclination to mechanistic thinking. Holistic renditions of mind and of society as irreducible to the body of mental states and individuals are meaningless to Mill and Bain. In line with their reflections on the logic of the moral sciences, the interaction of distinct human and mental units never bears the impress of the regulative power of the whole and thus cannot be explained by the purpose they subserve in relation to the whole. An adequate
account of things psychological by Mill and Bain's terms states that under certain assignable conditions, certain psychological events follow according to fixed mental laws. Rendered powerless as a directing head the psychological subject has been edited out.

While unity, order and causation are given a mechanistic interpretation, Mill and Bain yet insist on the need to distinguish between an active and a passive mind. Bain's psychological disquisitions on activity, the reliability of which Mill guaranteed, were not void of mechanistic implications however. Bain's concept of spontaneous activity is formed by physiological casting and has no psychological translatability. Mental action of a voluntary nature springs from the energetic rush of nerve centres whose workings like all operations by automation are self-sustaining and unaffected by psychological effort. As one of Bain's abstract parts and main divisions the Will works like some automated machine, unmediated by a purposive and forethoughtful self, by acting upon the muscular system in response to emotional prompts.

The Intellect, like some mechanically operated tool for working on the mind's primitive constituents, fares no better as agental indetermination renders Bain's concept of activity elusive. Associative and reproductive functions are lodged here and there - in conscious states, associative laws and intellectual powers alike, and are performed in machine-like fashion. Mental ongoings and movements succeed one another in accordance with mechanical laws. As a subject deprived of intellectual and volitional control under associationist rule, the psychological individual amounts to a buildup of mechanical parts, each with a definite function, whose operations are coordinated and regulated by forces over which it has no power.

While serving as a case study for use in illuminating the subject of intellectual styles, the present research also draws interest by marking and spelling out psychology's relevance to society. In a day when commercialism and an increasing egalitarianism could potentially eclipse individuality, psychology was intended to serve as a safe harbour and conduit for the expression of character. As the theoretical foundation of practical politics, ethics and the art of education, the science of mind as Mill and Bain thought of it would so fashion the psychological mould as to be specifically effective for the formation and development of strong moral characters. With mental processes
marked for social integration, psychology was meant to signal the need of, while assigning importance and worth to, autonomous and competent individuals in an evolving society.

Mill and Bain's call for independence and freedom from restraint sprang from their determination to ward off the dangers of subservience by coercion. While trusting in the regenerative power of institutional improvements aimed at implementing healthier states of individual and collective being, Mill and Bain also banked on the spread of knowledge and pursuit of self-cultivation as means of curbing misuses of power. Impressed with individualistic marks, Bain's psychology called out energetic supporters of social reform while defining the role of independent, free-thinking and self-governing individuals in the overthrow of spiritual and temporal despotisms. As choice expedients to the end of shaping rational, self-reliant and morally-minded characters, Bain's exhibition of trial and error experiments, confrontational stands of sense and intellect, and physiologically driven instances of liberation was designed to show the utilitarian-associationist product to advantage. Tailored to suit utilitarian purposes, this person would display great energy guided by strong reason, and intense feelings well under control of a conscientious will.

With a view to altering the socio-political landscape by widening the basis of participation in the exercise of power, Mill and Bain meant to work out the pattern, and guide the development, of master spirits and free agents. While pronouncing for the right of enlightened and virtuous individuals to bear social and political influence, Mill and Bain paid homage to reason and duty as standard rules of conduct by which to judge the merits of psychological, social and political governance. Mill urged the importance of intelligent and public-spirited citizens whose critical sense and political voice were needed to ensure the good faith of parliamentary democrats and to guard against abuses of power. Bain vouched for responsible psychological governance by recommending the virtuous will as a suppressant of rebellious emotions while recognizing the intellect's ultimate authority on the subject of human guidance. Mill and Bain believed that the adoption of rationalistic practices and moral habits by its members would make for a free and tolerant society.

I will allow myself one last reflection on the subject of psychology's past
relevance to society. Many in our day look on psychology's early departmental divergency (differentiation into several branches of inquiry) as signalling the start of its scientific development. These same individuals accordingly prefer to speak in terms of psychologies rather than a psychology as rendering a truer representation of the science's beginnings. The idea of a diverging psychology takes precedence in their minds over that of an unifying one, and thus shapes their historical understanding of the science's coming into being. No sooner constituted a positive science, they say, than an expansionary psychology was extending its fields of interest to include analytic, genetic, pathological, individual, experimental, comparative and other studies. Reflections of the sort, while historically accurate in many respects, do not adequately recognize the whole gamut of views propounded by late-nineteenth century psychologists engaged in the work of reconstructing the science of their day. The history of turn-of-the-century British psychology tells a tale in this respect.

We are not to forget that one of the very problems of psychology at the time was the definition of psychology itself. General psychology as it was called was an attempt by its supporters to define such concepts as constituted the common ground presupposed in all special departments of the science. As introductory discussions go, the proper determination of psychology's subject-matter, standpoint and scope was seen as central because relevant to the resolution of questions bearing on knowledge and conduct. Let us say that psychology marked its general pronouncements as socially integrable.

Though no longer pursued in compliance with philosophy's speculative and transcendental interests, general psychology was yet thought to bear conclusions of interest to philosophy. The will to bear a hand in the resolution of questions of fundamental importance to humankind was ever psychology's intention. That it could lead individuals to live a better life was the core belief of a general psychology whose reflections on matters of common concern to all special departments, while consistent with a certain socio-political vision, were meant to be a force for good. Laying out the problems of a general psychology thus served a wider social purpose.

A retelling of psychology's beginnings that should exclusively focus on its divergent tendencies would fail to recognize the efforts of its early contributors to
enunciate the basic conceptions of the science in a way that made for the possibility of a good life for all individuals alike. I should find it rewarding if the present research is thought to have helped recover the voice of some of these original builders.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Archival Sources


Aberdeen, Scotland. Aberdeen University Library. Department of Special Collections. W. Minto Papers.


Edinburgh, Scotland. National Library of Scotland. Rare Books and Manuscript Room. MS 618, f.11, MS 3650, f.165, f.167-172, MS 10074, f.290, MS 10076, f.36, f.62.


Primary Sources


Bain, A. (1838). A comparison of the styles of the principal writers of the ages of Queen Elizabeth and Queen Anne. Essay for the Blackwell Prize. Unpublished manuscript, Aberdeen University Library, Department of Special Collections, Aberdeen, Scotland.

(1839). The sin of cruelty to animals. Essay for the Gibson Prize, Marischall College. Unpublished manuscript, Aberdeen University Library, Department of Special Collections, Aberdeen, Scotland.


(1845). On the impediments to the progress of truth arising from the abuse of language. Essay for the Blackwell Prize. Unpublished manuscript, Aberdeen University Library, Department of Special Collections, Aberdeen.


(1848). Review of Whewell's *Of a liberal education in general; and with particular reference to the leading studies of the University of Cambridge*, *Westminster and Foreign Quarterly Review*, 49, 441-463.


(1850). Education of the citizen, Chambers's Papers for the People, 1, 1-32.


(1851). What is philosophy?, Chambers's Papers for the People, 12, no.92, 1-32.


(1859). The emotions and the will. Original manuscript, Aberdeen University Library, Department of Special Collections, Aberdeen, Scotland.


(1861). On the study of character, including an estimate of phrenology. London: Parker, Son, and Bourn, West Strand.

(1862). Free will, Chambers's Encyclopaedia, 4, 507-509.


(1864). Mind, Chambers's Encyclopaedia, 6, 465-466.


(1865). The emotions and the will. 2nd ed. London: Longmans, Green.


(1866). The feelings and the will, viewed physiologically, Fortnightly Review, 3, 575-588.

(1866). The intellect, viewed physiologically, Fortnightly Review, 3, 735-748.


(1868). The retentive power of the mind in its bearing on education, Fortnightly
Review. 4, 237-249.


(1868). Will, Chambers's Encyclopaedia. 10, 198-199.


(1871). Obituary notices, Proceedings of the Royal Society. No.130, iii-x.


(1876). Mr. Sidgwick's 'Methods of Ethics', Mind. 1, 179-197.

(1879). The growth of the will, Popular Science Monthly. 15, 10-13.


(1881). Mr. Spencer's psychological "congruities" (I), Mind. 6, 266-270.


(1887). On teaching English: with detailed examples, and an enquiry into the definition of poetry. London: Longmans, Green.


Secondary Sources


(1868). Review. J.S. Mill's Auguste Comte and positivism and Examination of


(1876). Mr. Bain on the emotions and the will, Spectator, 49, 629-631.


B. (1903). Dr. Bain's effect on aesthetics, Alma Mater, 21, 10.


Baillie, J.B. (1903). Professor Bain and metaphysics, Alma Mater, 21, 12.


---


---


---

457-480.


(1866). Review. Bain's The senses and the intellect and The emotions and the will, Fortnightly Review, 4, 767-768.


Lindsay, T.M. (1877). Recent Hegelian contributions to English philosophy, Mind, 2, 479-485.


Malthus, T.R. (1803). An essay on the principle of population: or, a view of its past and present effects on human happiness; with an inquiry into our prospects respecting the future removal or mitigation of the evils which it occasions. 2nd ed. London: Bensley.


Muller, F.M. (1876). The original intention of collective and abstract terms, *Mind*, 1, 345-351.


(1890). Dr. Pikler on the cognition of physical reality, Mind, 15, 545-550.


(1904). The present problems of general psychology, *Philosophical Review*, 13, 603-621.


Watts, R. (1868). *Utilitarianism as propounded by J. Stuart Mill, Alex. Bain and others*. 


