A Thesis
on
Spinoza and Hegel

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Spinosa and Hegel.

Although historical considerations are necessary to the understanding of the terminology of a system of philosophy, and even the point of view from which it must be regarded,—considerations, namely, as to its relation to its immediate predecessors, its place in the history of philosophy, the advance made by it upon those positions from which it set out,—still these do not form an integral part of the system itself, as an organic whole, claiming to be an explanation of the world and all things as they are. Moreover such an explanation,—such a system,—must proceed from the thought of an individual, and the thought of an individual is necessarily a totality, more or less complete, not a compound of disconnected thoughts called from here and there, and thrown together into a merely external whole. It is idle, therefore, to set the thoughts of a thinker one against one another, to note how in one passage he makes a statement which it seems to contradict in another, as if the apparent inconsistency
were really due to weakness on the part of the philosopher, to deficiency of logic in his thinking. Where a speculative thinker is in earnest, when he is not designedly concealing his true thought, or blamably careless, his system must necessarily be seen to depend on one principle, which forms the unifying bond of its whole, and which is carried more or less thoroughly into all its details of the system. The inadequacy of its explanation of the universe which it offers must be seen to be due not to accidental oversight on the part of the thinker, but rather to the principle itself, which is the expression of his very soul. It is another mistake to suppose that a philosophy may be a matter of no real import to one who believes in it, may have no influence on his life, and that such a principle may be added to it or taken away from it at random. No great philosophy was ever of this nature, and it is the inconsistencies which are generated and critics discover in such systems show partly that different aspects of principles, which must necessarily contain differentiation within themselves, are grasped by the different thinkers according to their subjec-
dispositions, and partly that the system itself is an inadequate explanation, and therefore is becoming analyzed, in order that a new synthesis may result, giving a higher and truer account of the universe.

The systems of Spinoza and Hegel are systems of this kind, each purporting to give an adequate and complete explanation of the universe, in so far as philosophy may deal with it. They may be regarded as nodes in the growing tree of philosophy, in which all the thoughts, theories, systems, that preceded are brought to a centre, and from which again diverge new lines of thought to be concentrated anew in another system. An self-clinging system of the nature must inevitably take a monistic form, just because it must be a totality; it cannot, for instance, have God and the world in opposition to one another as distinct beings, nor can its principle be that the universe consists of an infinite number of beings independent of one another, and therefore all equally finite. Rather, all such principles must take their true place as moments in a higher principle of Unity, under which they have their relative truth. Some form of Deism, some form of individual...
it seems, must always be, but only to be taken up again in some corresponding form of monism. The system of Spinoza and Hegel then are monistic in this sense, and so far furnish a basis of comparison. But the materials which they had with which to build their system were very different in the two cases. Hegel speaks of it new material, the deposit of thought which it individual finds in the world, and which he has to assimilate in order that he may rise above it, and this saying might be applied in reference to this difference between himself and Spinoza. Between the deposit of the world-spin which Hegel found before him, and that which presented itself to Spinoza, there is almost no comparison. Natural science in the 19th century was only at its birth, before the close of the first quarter of the 19th it had reached vast proportions; and science is a portion of the thought of the world which has to be taken up by the philosopher.

Between Spinoza and Hegel also had come the series of philosophers in Germany between Schleiermacher and Schelling, and that in England from Locke to Hume, so that the purely philosophical material had become much more weighty. Hence the "content" of Spinoza seems much inferior to that of Hegel, his principle seems abstract, as if he had done
little more than state it, whereas he really carried it almost as far as it was possible for him to do at that time. A further consideration is that his system had always a practical purpose; it aimed at demonstrating what was its only true good, its ultimate ideal for which men should strive, and which when achieved would not vanish or change its nature in their hands. Perhaps this is in a sense the aim of all systems, but at any rate Hegel has not put it so definitely before him, and he therefore embraced in his system matters which have no direct connection with such an aim. He has rather formed a system of knowledge, extending his principle broad the sciences which come within the range of human thought. Yet though their aim was this somewhat different, the fundamental part of each system is the found in the metaphysical principle a principle on which all the rest depends, and therefore it is in a companion on this basis that the values of their contributions to philosophy will last appear.

The fundamental principle of these two systems then is in a manner one and the same—the unity of all things in God. They reject any view of the supreme being which places him as it were outside of this own universe, away beyond it
in an eternal space, whose only eternal souls among these creatures may reach him. This, they held, would be to make him a finite being among other finite beings, for even if he is to be conceived as infinite, the finite which are placed over against him necessarily limit and render the infinity to finitude. On the contrary they held that there is no reality that is not in God, while God is in all things, is immanent in the universe. The notion of the immanence of God is what is especially characteristic of both Spinoza and Hegel, and it must in some manner be held by all truly philosophical systems. But it must not be considered that the immanent Being, as the God of Spinoza, is somehow a different thing from the in which this immanent. This explicitly denied by Spinoza, and must be held to be contrary of Hegel also. The immanent rather is identical with that in which it is immanent, or they are only different sides, different aspects of the same reality. It unifies the two, it is, as an independent creature beside God, in which, as in a sentient being, He works out His designs. "Without the world," Hegel said "God would not be God," and Spinoza speaks in the same strain, denying even its possibility, any other world. So also the finite individuals are th
world would seem to lose their independence, becoming only modes or manifestations of the Divine Being.

The general idea of the two systems being thus the same, it is yet treated in different ways, and has in it an idea of conception entirely different from that which it takes in the other. The general idea might be said to be the reduction of all things to an identity in unity in which Being and Thought fall together, but in Spinoza the unity is viewed rather as Being than as Thought, not as a thinking Being, as Hegel rather as Thought than as Being. For while all is reduced to a unity of Thought and Being, Spinoza emphasize Being, Hegel Thought. Then it is a cardinal point with Spinoza that Thought is only one of an infinite number of possible attributes of God, it is Sub stance, of which attribute known only one other is known to us, Extension. Thought is thus no more a distinctive characteristic of the Supreme Being than any other attribute; so at least it seems according to Spinoza's fundamental view, they in the end is unconsciously driven to allow thought a higher place. The impossibility, however, of predetermining thought as a determination from Absolute Substance is Spinoza's view when we find that it attributes an after-life and determination to ideas.
no determination, that is, which proceed from it, are received
they are merely for its finite understanding, which cannot
know substance as it is in itself, can know it only as
it is for it. Thus it happens that our understanding
knows substance only under the attributes of thought and
extension, while it is implied that other beings might
know it under other attributes.

This view of the attribute is the only one possible if we consider
Spinoza's whole system. Thus he defines attribute as 'that
which the understanding perceives of substance, as constituting
its essence, and speaks, again of attribute as 'that
a substance, only thatattribute' is a term used in relation
to the understanding, which attributes to substance such and
such a nature.' (1) The meaning plainly is that, substance in itself
the attributes are not to be applied. They have hitherto been
regarded by Pollock, as 'affine aspects of substance and
opposed to the above view; but it is quite evident that an
'aspect' is entirely relative to an observing being, and
mean nothing to the Being in whom the aspect an
distinguished; and the only observing being have possible
in thinking man. This view of the attribute known
shows us at once the inadequacy of Spinoza's principle of
Pure Being, for it keeps the system open to at least two

(1) "Deus per attributiones intelligi, non per attributiones serieatis separatum. Substantium substantia, talem substantiam substantiam, ipsam substantiam. &c.," Sp.
"Substantiam substantiam, talem substantiam, taliam substantiam &c.," cf. Pollock's Essays, p. 163, 
&c.
fatal objection. The first is that it understanding which 'makes' or 'creates' the attributes is itself a mode of one of them. A certain being may indeed still be attributed to it, as a mode of the Absolute Substance, but it cannot be said to have thought in reality, just as substance has not thought in itself. Thus it mode, like its totality, would stay being an not in themselves determined by the attributes which may be applied to them, and indeed may equally with substance have an infinity of attributes which known have any bearing on its reality as the mode. But this is to move in a circle, for we cannot have the mode at all without its prior attributes, yet it appears that its nature of its attributes is independent upon these modes.

The second objection is that while thought is placed in an equality with extension, and to other possible attributes, it is yet higher than they, insomuch as it is not extension, for instance, that appends the attributes to substance, but understanding, though these all the attributes, itself included, are such as it on attribute, thought, perceive as constituting its essence of substance; they are aspect of substance to thought. Thought then inevitably vindicate for itself its own place as against the abstract be
to which Spinoza would subordinate it.

The same result follows from a further consideration of
Substance, in that which is in another, though what also it
is conceived, whereas Substance is in itself, self-existent
and conceived through itself, alone. Then although it
modes depend upon Substance, Substance can by no
means be said to depend upon the modes, and the essence
of the latter is reduced to a new contingency, so that it
is impossible to see why they are, or even what they
are, as distinct from Substance. Spinoza even holds that
it mode as separate divinities in extension and through
one their existence to the imagination alone, that is, the
have no existence in reality. There seem no way,
at all events, by which from the Absolute Unity, Simple
Indivisibility of the infinite Substance, the many finite
may be reached, and in fact it seems only by a
kind of true defence that Spinoza does attain to the
The attributes cannot mediate between the modes and Sub-
stance, as in the case, and the only other means Spino-
za have are the infinite Mode (1) which proceed directly from
essence of body, unlike the finite modes, each of which can
be determined by another mode of the same kind.

the infinite mode when examined are found to represent the
sum of the finite modes; this then is intelligence, as sum
of all finite act of intelligence (intelllectus infinitus), infinite
and never changing; and in the sphere of contiuous Motion and
Rest, which may be regarded as an infinite mode, form together
the sum of all finite motions, which also is constant and
unchangeable. These then are not true infinity such as
a self-determining subject is, but merely infinity because
unconceivable by an intelligence, or in fact any intelligible
since each from a whole which has no limit within
which it may be grasped. They furnish though no
better medium between the infinite substance and the
finite modes than the attributes themselves. The sum of
its parts presupposes the parts already. The transition
cannot be made at all unless we consider of the
infinite substance as differentiating itself into the finite
number of finite substances, yet impressing itself in each.
This is a reality Speina's ultimate meaning, although
it necessary barrenness of his first principle. Being
prevented him from carrying it out completely,
then he holds that 'all things follow necessity from
the divine Nature'; in that from the Nature in itself the
necessarily follows an infinite assembly of things in infinite
way. The nature of the finite world, therefore, is not
an accident of the Divine Will, as if God had need of something which He could only attain through the creation of the world as a means; rather it would belong to the nature of God, and is as necessary to Him as the 5 it. Thus, while in the first aspect it mode seemed unnecessary, and meaningless in reference to God, now they are shown to be necessarily connected with this nature.

Yet this is not really self-determination in its true sense of self realisation, still less is it self manifestation, which Hegelian hold to be the meaning of the world-process from the Divine standpoint. Such self realisation, self manifestations cannot be considered except under the form of time; that is, we must be able to consider the self as existing before its complete realisation and manifestation; but with Spinoza (as is fact with Hegel also), it all just is; there is no to be when God is concerned, His whole nature is at one in its entirety, and the universe encompasses this nature. Everything is considered and specific actualisation, without time-refuse, and it is only to the finite being that there is any future, any realisation that is not yet complete, any knowledge that is attainable but not yet attained.
intellect (such as that of mankind), will, emotion, an alien
impossible to such a Being as this; it seems indeed as if
Being was all that could be attributed to it, a
Pure Identity, into "Soundless Sounding" cannot get its
accentuation in itself. (2) Will especially is a function
of the finite, equivalent to necessary consent of the mind
to its ideas, while that which is will is merely due to
confused and inadequate ideas of the cause of our acts, in
God there are no inadequate ideas, nay, no ideas at all;
no inadequate ideas, for Spinoza says that so far as an idea is
conceived in God, not merely in the individual mind, it is
adequate true, and corresponds to its object. Then is well
nothing said here knowing for what is meant by an idea con-
ceived as in God is the idea just in relation to its
ideation, with which in that case it necessarily corres-
ponds. In God in himself there are no ideas, understood
as will, even the idea of himself as constantly spoken of as
belonging to him is only one of the modes of his Substance, and
belongs to himself no more than other modes.

(1) Jacobi. (2) Schelling thought that the ontological proof
of God’s existence, as involved in his essence, was meant to imply
that nothing more than Being is to be found in his essence,
that his existence is in that sense identical with the essence.
Although the men words might bear the interpretation, it is
of course not at all what Schelling in his predecessor inten
tended of it (note).
As Mr. Newton, Spinoza expressly denies that God has any care for us, towards his creatures; it can only be said that his love for God is in a sense the love of God for himself. It is in this connection that Spinoza’s denial of ‘Final Cause’, has its place. This conception he holds is of merely human reference and can by no means be applied to God. We ourselves use things as means to certain ends, but we apply the idea of ‘Final Cause’ away from ourselves in two ways. First, we suppose certain created things to have been created by God for the good of man, as the highest being in the world, and secondly we regard creation itself as a means for some ultimate purpose of God, or as a means of adding to His perfection. Either of these views of the universe is denied by Spinoza.

The former he opposes because of the necessity with which all things flow from the nature of God so that a human being, like any other thing, is just one of the necessary modes of God, and has no higher place than they except in so far as he has a greater quantity of perfection, that is, of reality, beyond. But this higher quantity of reality belonging to him does not in any way affect the quantity belonging to others, so as to subordinate them to him, as if they were created for his use.
again, God being defined as the Absolute Substance, the only self-existent Being, there is nothing without Him that could move them to action, the higher reality to which He could attain. Hence to suppose creation a process through which God rises to high perfection is absurd. All things, as He has shown, simply are; there is no process when it comes to Him. a process could only have its place in the finite world, where each mode is determined by another, and itself determines a third. But even here there is no advance as a whole, no gradual development of the universe; the totality of thought, for example, remains always the same.

The method of Spinoza leads itself to this result. One of its chief objections is that mathematical method, as employed out of its own sphere, is that it cannot by any possibility apply to a process, a development in the real world, such as in desire, love, etc. It is a purely internal way of regarding things, and cannot be only tabulated, a show in its logical interconnection, the result of the process. The growth, the advance, of the living being, its abstraction, cannot reach cannot transform for thought. Spinoza’s idea was taken how all things follow with mathematical necessity from the nature of God, accurately defined;
but in reality we find him turning to prove even for
such determination as he finds it necessary to apply to
Divine Being. Mode of extension or thought cannot be seen
to follow necessarily from the nature of God, unless we
define Him so that they are already involved in Him
and have only to be deduced. This is what Spinoza
did, and afterwards we find Hegel acting similarly.
In its pure meaning therefore, it is possible Spinoza reduces
it to this, that the whole of reality is unity, and
a mere unity, - Pure Being, without determination. In it
is one of the peculiar doctrines of Spinoza, that all
determination is simply negative; hence it would seem (as
he expressly admits it) that the Absolute is in itself
purely indeterminate, absolutely free from the qualification
that belong to finite things. If we abstract from the deter-
mination of things, we reach in it and only in it pure
self identity of Being, without difference, which Hegel afterwards
made his starting point, but just as Hegel, so also to
Spinoza, God is as well All-determined as it is indeterminate.
Although his main principle seem to reduce it world and so
to an abstract Being, yet his aim was to find all things in

(1) E.g. § 41 (9) It must be noted the nature of a new essence
and in truth, good absolute indetermination, God, is an eternal
entity it becomes good to some perfect Ennimi, so good
ruins and so is a nature of good, and in so far, and so

(2) § 48-76,...
and to show how they necessarily belong to this nature. Thus, this is the absolutely Perfect Being; this nature is unlimited, and it seems at times as if Spinoza meant that that the understanding sees in God is really in him. (thought, emotion, and form the mode), only we cannot conceive them as they are in him, because of its limitations of our faculties; and there is an infinite number of other qualities constituting this essence which we cannot conceive at all. Determination itself is regarded by Spinoza as equivalent to limitation from without, limitation by another, finite, as God is the Being that is, such limitation is of course impossible in him. The notion of self-determination is not to be found in Spinoza, and a supposed God would certainly have been rejected by him as introducing both will and final cause into the notion God. To one who regards the universe under the form of eternity, that is, as out of time, any activity on the part of the Principle of the Universe is out of the question. A "timeless act" is inconceivable, and it will be found that Hegel's theory is open to criticism on this very point. So also a will whose whole content at once is, and that all even as an event in time one for all occurring, but as in eternity, is no longer what, if we are strict in use of terms, we should call

So far the Spinoza is thoroughly consistent with his principle in passing by any conception of self-determination on the part of an absolutely perfect being. Then we may say that God is Spinoza at once nothing, and all, as he has two aspects: in the one we can only say that he is no attribute can be applied to him, no qualification; in the other, all that is, is part of God, an impression of God. And not only so, but all that can be is already in him; there is no possible limitation, all is wholly real, and it is only for finite understanding that there appears a to-be-a-perfect to come in a Universe as part the nature. In the one aspect God is nature naturans, in the other, nature nativitatis: this is the very notion of Substance afterwards given by Hegel, that which is, yet is only its accident; without these it is not, yet in a sense it is, prior to them. Substance is accordingly the sum total of the accidents, manifesting itself in them as their absolute negativity, that is, being as an absolute privy, and at the same time as the abstract all content. This content however is nothing but that very manifestation. Yet while its substance is this seeming negativity in reference to its mode or affection, it is to be remembered that only what is positive in the world has a right like applied to it. We speak of evil in the world of impietousness, ugliness, disorder, but in very truth, say, Spinoza, these things are not in it, they are in me, in position and have an

(1) Wallace-Living, Hegel, p. 235
by no means to be attributed to God. This may be called its metaphysical Optimism of Spinoza, for it would have been an ideal standard set up by us, towards which we regard God as striving in Nature. But as he has shown, there is no such striving in Nature, no ideal and its pursuit by God, no justice at all. All that is good is perfect, just in so far as it is; evil then is, metaphysically regarded, another name for finitude; it finite is evil imperfect because it is not God, the infinite. This notion is one which in some form must be held by every philosophy that would seek to unify existence. Unless in an absolute two Gods, a good and an evil, as J. S. Mill for example, he proposed "Evil itself must be shown to be in some way a Good, in some way a necessary moment in the realization of the Thought of God. But Spinoza does not so far as this; he really denies its existence in some Nature; for the finite of a mode is a thing; if, of course, nothing real, it is only its negation of being, and such a thing can be called imperfect only when compared with a second thing by an external observer.
Spinoza has no conception of the difference between limit of a finite number of persons, and a limit of an individual thing. In the metaphysical part he allies at any rate to the former the limit case. The soul as soon as consciousness is attained, in becoming a limit of person himself, it disappears as limit whereas in the limit of a thing it is never a limit for it, but only for an observer. Personality is for Spinoza constituted by the number relations between the individual and surrounding universe; this man stands higher than other beings, only because of the innumerable relations between his body and the extended world, and no man is higher than another according to the aptness of his body let affected by the external; according to this aptness of the body is the range of the mind.

It is only quantity of being or reality that is the criterion between things. How far then does this really form a distinction between finite things? Spinoza himself objects, as he did afterwards to the application of terms of quantity, such as 'one', to the infinite Being (1), so that there can be no comparison of finite things with him, on this side at all events. But even within the realm of the finite things can be no talk of greater quantity of being, except perhaps in the case of extended things. Spinoza's method would thus lead us to suppose that perfection was a new reality.

of bulk. This, of course, is very far from its meaning, but in reality finite beings can not, any more than the infinite Being, have notions or quantity attributed to them in themselves. Thus, one Unity, a practical truth, has an entirely different meaning from the numerical unit. It is only in this context that being may be compared, and so Spinoza would seem to have God in Himself contemplative, so also it would seem that it being with less content is nearer to God than the Being with fuller content. The other aspect of God, however, as including within Himself as content, as the nature, all that is, He also has considered, and so we might reach the true notion, that it being which developed and realized its inner self to full completion, full individuality, was the most perfect. This is the view Spinoza takes when he comes to treat definitely of individuals, leaving his abstract substance, the nature nature, and turning to the varied universe which flows from Him — the nature nature.

Spinoza does not however regard the nature nature as entirely distinct from the nature nature; within the former there is still present the Spirit that gives it its reality, even in the individuals that are found there. An individual has two aspects, its essence (to ἐστὶν ἐστὶν) and its essence (to ὁ ἐστὶν); its essence is necessary indeed, as all things are necessary, but does not follow
directly from the nature of God; it is determined within its
own sphere (entirely in thought) by another essence or
existence of the same kind, so that all things are bound
together in such a way that one depends upon or is connected
with all the others within its attribute. But the characteristic
of finite things is that their essence is not involved
in their essence, so that it is indifferent to its essence
of man whether only one man or twenty men, or indeed
any at all exist; whereas, the essence of God is involved
in his essence, so fact his very essence itself. Spinoza
does not carry out truly the view of essence, which
is exactly that of Scholasticism; it would involve the
conclusion that only one essence of each kind such as
man existed, whereas, he had already stated that
each thing is an abstraction of the imagination, and
there is essence in sensus naturalis (1) But, so far from this,
he rather holds that every individual has a well essence,
existence, only its essence is determined directly by God,
and is a part of God's eternal essence. (2) The essence of each
particular thing is its essence to possess its own existence,
when one that essence has been determined ABC; its power is
derived from God himself, and hence the thing can never be
destroyed from within, but must necessarily be destroyed by some
more powerful thing from without. Thus, nothing burnt apart
from God, so powerful that it cannot be thus destroyed.
and have the continuity of the existence of finite things. Yet it seems it never destroyed in itself as it is a part of God, although it is impossible to conceive how the impulse, or the force, to exist belonging to a thing, should continue after that existence has passed away. We might almost suppose that the essence is rather that of the kind, or race, as suggested above, so that it continually perseveres, the race, while individuals perish, and even advance in development. It race is, according to modern theories, for the impulse to exist is also an impulse toward greater perfection. Indeed the immortality (1) of which Spinoza speaks toward it close that this can by no means be said to be a personal immortality, and (apart from the theory of adequate ideas) might be claimed equally for every individual thing, especially as Spinoza insists on life, as a rational thought, as present in all things (omnipresent).

The peculiar impulse each thing to continue in and advance its own reality takes in man at first, at its highest, of adequate knowledge, which is one with its knowledge and as of God (itself); it is only thus that man is really active. This means rather that its impulse which man receive has not attained full freedom, man to reach that perfection in which striving is no more necessary. The eternity involved in this might mean that only when perfect activity is possible is such eternity attained. But this is not so; if it were it would relegate to absolute

(1) Not 'eternity'; it does not use it and 'immortality'
death the vast majority of mankind; it is so far as a thing is active, but only so far, that it is eternal, inasmuch as its activity is that of God. All things then being animate, they are also to a certain extent active, and therefore to that extent eternal. So far as they are passive, they are not so. The passivity in other words does not belong to the thing itself; it is just another name for finitude, which as was seen is negative to the thing itself. We have in fact reached in this finite thing that pure abstraction of Being which we characterize of Substance, only now it takes the form of an activity, yet an activity which is purely abstract in its context; it material of activity can only be given by the affection or relation of the thing with other outside of it. It is only through passivity that a body can be active, and if the passivity, these affections, are only imperfection in it, nothing real in relation to it, its activity must remain unexercised. The notion that is wanting here also is that of self-determination on the part of animate beings, or above on the part of God. Activity must mean self-determination, and for this there must be a material, which at first is eternal to the individual (passive affection), but is to be taken up and converted into a means for its own development. It is the transformation of the passion itself into action that is necessary, but before this is possible,
the passion must itself have some reality, some relation to the
unseen being of the thing. Spinoza indeed is never far from this
view, as in his treatment of the action of reason upon
the passions. Reason he holds, is not only the essence of man,
but is that whereby he rises out of its bondage to nature
in which he finds himself, and in virtue of which
finally he is, immortality, in Spinoza's sense, guaranteed him.
It is by knowing the passions in their true worth and
value, by seeing how they are related to the infinity of
other events which are perpetually occurring around us,
and influencing us, and above all by relating them
to that intuitive knowledge of God which is the highest
attainment of reason, — it knows not in, it knows as, the same of all
things — that we rise above the passions. So they are
transformed from passions into activities, expressions of
reason, and are reduced to a means of self determination
on the part of the rational man. In so far also a man
completes this process, in so far as he passes from absolute
passivity, as in the state of natural selfishness and sense
knowledge, to the state of pure activity, pure Reason, — in
so far is he immortal, and this immortality is given
at once man becomes, by the exercise of his reason, man, truly
a part of God, and thus enjoys that eternity which must
belong to a part of God. This shows the real nature of
eternity, which Spinoza attributes to man, a being
cannot become a part of God in this way; he must already be so 

acceding to Spinoza's theory, the eternity belonging only to the 
esse, which is already a part of God's essence, and to 
which the particular man in whom it is expressed is 
guile indifferent. But, as words, it is the botanicus, eternitas 
(on of the definite mode) that is eternal, not the individual. 

Then is an aspect of Spinoza's theory which has not 
hitherto been referred to, but which shows how a principle 
when carried to its extreme length, may herein to involve 
itself opposite. Thus it is that Spinoza's Monism becomes 
a Platonism, indeed an Atomism. This is involved in his 
theory of the parallelism of thought and extension, or, as we 
may say, mind and matter, when however Mind is at 
all to be understood as a self-conscious Mind, but include 
consciousness and even "self-conscious" states of mind. An 
example of this, in modern science, would be the feeling experienced 
preceded by a reflex action, of which known as an act-conscious, but 
modern theory tend to regard these actions as having at some 
time with evolving the race, conscious acts, which under 
the action of habit become less so, and finally "sink below the 
threshold of consciousness." In Spinoza, it appears that it is 
not to every action in an organic being that a mode of thought 
corresponds, but to every body, even atom, organic or other 
wise. Nature then has two aspects; according to the one 
it is men matter, to the other men mind, and to every
division of matter there is a corresponding portion of mind.
But what then, are individuals, and especially self-conscious in-
dividuals? As to the absolute reality of these, Spinoza holds
that it dissolves itself in extension; not truly in extension itself,
but only as regarded by the finite imagination, which makes
arbitrary divisions here and there, and calls them "things." So
thought also must be a totality, except as imagination
which divides it into points and ideas, first as it divides
extension into things. All individuals belong to that aspect
of Substance, in which it is regarded not as the is
in itself, but as the imagination carries
him, differentiated into the varied world of nature.

In another way, however, the reality of the individual
must be contained, or rather it disappears. Not only is
extension divisible for imagination, but it is infinitely divisible,
and hence small as quantity in take, there should be
a mode of thought to correspond. But on the other hand,
Spinoza, like all philosophers of his time, believed in Simple
ideas; that is, thought is not, like extension, infinitely divisible.
Putting this aside, it is seen that every simple idea corresponds
to a certain mode of extension, a certain body, and
comprising idea, has corresponding corporate bodies, a relation to Spinoza
puts it, it more corporate it body, it own corporate its idea,
the idea being this, in a way permanent to its body. But a
corporate body is very far from being an individual; it contains
all a new group of atoms, and then is nothing to show that

it's idea is other than a mere group of simple ideas. Its description in this aspect is pure Atomism; it step could not logically be taken from it. The Being is the Being, but when it is arbitrarily taken, this is all that results, an infinity of atoms, which on one side are modes of thought, on the other, modes of extension. Even a conscious being is impossible here, for consciousness implies at least a unity of the whole present in each of its points, whereas here we cannot get beyond the point. It is only by a further appeal to experience, and a further modification (his principal parallelism) that Spinoza gets beyond this, to individuals, and especially to the human individual. Self-consciousness is introduced by the doctrine of the idea idea, which corresponds to the mind as the mind itself to the body; of this second idea there may be a third, and so on ad infinitum. This indeed again raises the question of thought infinitely above extension, or any other possible attribute. Thought is again asserting its true position against the abstraction of Being on which Spinoza's principle rests. The idea idea means knowledge; the idea the body; in the latter there is just the idea without further reflection upon it, in the former the idea itself becomes known, consciousness becomes self-consciousness. Thus it is that Spinoza is compelled to speak of himself as it were, to acknowledge the superior of thought.
But 'known' implies a subject knowing, and for the subject there is no place in th. system; he can be neither entension nor thought. But Spinoza considered th., he might have been led to a high unity of th. world taken as given us; from th. consideration of th. individual as uniting in himself a certain entension and a certain thought: though identical with another, he might have come to regard entension and thought (as a whole) not as abstractly parallel to an another, a parallel thing, and united by a merely indifferent substance, a neutrum which is neither of its aspects, and thence, the being viewing farther in reality is a neutrality, but so closely united in a Being who also is real, and apart from whom they have no reality.

It was characteristic of th. time known to ignore th. subject and to regard mental states as very similar states of entension. Th. latter are bound together in an indissoluble connection of cause and effect, and so Spinoza it would be thought also is governed by similar laws of cause and effect, which in it following one another just as, and in correspondence with, th. natural world. Th. mode and connection of th. world of ideas is th. same as that of th. world of things. (1) A finite thing is determined here and back by another finite thing, and a corresponding process goes on in th. mental sphere. Th. principle and law of association are even foreshadowed by Spinoza; according to th. they can indeed cause one another.

(1) Lit. II. 7 + Scholium.
in different ways. So stated, it then is quite untenable, it is untenable if physical world that on thing cause another, or one motion another, but it is still an untenable mental world. Neither a physical thing an an idea is an independent entity having "power" in itself. It is not thing that act in the physical world, but it on Being that acts in and through them. In the light of modern philosophy it seems still more absurd to attribute independent causality or action of any kind to ideas in themselves. An idea is a state of some being, apart from whom it has abstract without reality; it can therefore have no action in itself, if there is any action at all it is to Being, it subject that acts. Again there is no order and connection in it world, thought as a whole corresponding to that is the world of intention. Not even in the world of intention is there one universal rule in the sense in which Spinoza demand, it with agitation the order (of mechanical laws), is broken; it Being who expresses this reality in nature has her a high impress, or may say, then in the mechanical world, in fact it has created a new order of beings, to its thought, then must necessarily be in the mind of each subject an orderly process from men feeling to thought, from self-consciousness, from consciousness of the unity of the Self with God, and to all this there may, though it is still an unverified hypothesis, be corresponding nerve motion in the individual body; but the thoughts of one individual are totally disconnected from the thoughts of another,
or at least they are not connected as they are in the individual, in
as the body and its movement are connected with other bodies.
So that here again the parallelism of Spinoza receives a check. He
identity of thought and matter has impressed has found an echo
in modern philosophy with psychologists such as Spinoza and
Maine, their theory closely resembling that of Spinoza. They hold
that the universe and the world of thought are nothing
more than two sides of the same reality; just as Spinoza main-
tained they were. To every mode or matter there corresponds a
mode of thought, and the latter is abstract apart from the other.
Thus the universe of matter, and the thought which accom-
panies it are just the same thing, but we know the latter more
directly than the former. What is implied in this theory is
that the action of mind upon matter a i.e. 
causation
passing between the two, is an absurdity, since the same thing
in matter itself, can have no effect upon itself. This has been
explicitly asserted by Spinoza, from the metaphysical point of
view, but he found himself compelled, in dealing with the living
man — the nearest example of the identity of mind and matter,
to give up his parallelism, or rather his identity of the two, and
to allow an infinite power on the side of mind as compared with
matter, the body, and all that concerns it. (1) The same
result necessarily follows with the modern philosophers of this
school. What is wanting when they formulate their theory is a
subject, a being behind thought and matter, and it was just
in introducing a being of this kind that Spinoza was compelled

(1) On the Identity of Mind in Spinoza of Martinian 1780 239, 286
to fall back on a more ordinary view of the 'power' of mind or body. Instead of its being a substance of Spinoza's, the modern atomism gives us an unknown creature of the atom (material and spiritual in one), from which all visible things have arisen. To no other subject has there any claim, and it is only by logical sleight of hand that they can introduce such. The truth is probably that the only activity is the universe is that of spiritual being, of infinite and finite, and it is absurd to speak of causation or any other relation as within the Places of thought a matter in themselves, apart from the Being in whom they are united. All relation is on the side of the Being, and it is only as in this that the world is the thought world. In the world of matter are related one another. The question then of the 'power' of thought on matter is absurd, unanswerable, as there is, and can be no power at all, nor even existence, in reality itself. The power, all on the side of the individual, finite or otherwise, and back alone is any action possible. What is meant by the power of matter over thought is just the power of the infinite Being who acts in the universe upon finite beings, by the power of thought over matter an independent 'utterance' of ourselves in the universe. Such utterance is, and therefore so far as goes, the action of thought (that of a spiritual being) or the material universe must be accepted as a fact. Thus when the spirit, as is said, 'will' an act, and this act takes place through its physical body, this may loosely be called its action of thought upon matter. (1)

(1) On the act of the soul in material universe in Locke: Metaphys. BL III. Ch. 1.
It has been shown that the system of Spinoza, starting from an abstract notion as its first principle, is unable to pass to the world as we find it, but is compelled to remain with its own Being, indeterminate Substance, as if this were the whole, the

*truly of the universe. It is in the knowledge of this principle

that man is to find his highest blessedness; breaths it, and

thereby to act in accordance with it, in virtue itself, and virtue

is its own reward, is itself blessedness. Surely this is a higher

principle than that of Kant, who God is but the dispensation

of happiness as the reward of virtue, and yet it is a lower

for after all the God of Kant is a personality, as a being who

is merely a blind unconscious force, from whose nature follow

"an infinite number of things in infinite ways." But even this

infinite number of things, in saw, Spinoza was unable to deduce

from his first principle of Substance, which shows differentiation

only to the finite observer, an observer who is himself an object;

real differentiation. Thus it is only from experience that

Spinoza takes his attributes, which are express of a Substance to the finite intelligence. (1) By attributing these known

with nature rational, eternal, we see, he again cuts himself

off from the real world, and the gulf between its attributes,

\[\text{(1) Historically, Spinoza's procedure was at variance with that given above.}\]

\[\text{He started with the divinity of thought and intention, inherited from}\]

\[\text{Descartes, but unwilling to abide in this position, he united them by}\]

\[\text{placing the God of Descartes above them, and depriving him of the title}\]

\[\text{of Substance to which was allotted the supereminent Being only.}\]

\[\text{Off Martinus Spinoza, Philosophy, Cl. II}\]
in the nature of man, and the definite mode in the nature of man is impossible. It would indeed be easy to maintain that the definite mode can just as attributes themselves regarded as in the nature of man, but this would not help us, for from the infinite mode themselves there is again no step to finite individuation. Nothing as we know them. The infinite modes are just the sums of these, and are therefore unintelligible apart from a finite but finite mode contained in them.

In spirit of these defects, and apart from the intrinsic splendid and religious depth of his system, it is the great merit of Spinoza that he sees that a true philosophy must comprehend the universe as a whole, must take as God, nature, man, and explain their relations to one another; how in all there is one Unity, and though attempted with all his power towards in what way this Unity is to be thought. Its essential meaning the system seems to be the development of one principle, which yet has two aspects. (1) God is at one an abstract self-identity, and at the same whole of the universe, and all that is in it. It is according as it is, on a side of these aspects is emphasized that Spinoza is called an Atomist or a Rationalist, Pantheist; in the one case the universe seems to be derived all reality from an abstract, indeterminate Unity, or God; in the other God as a Being is some way apart from the universe seems to be derived, and all that we have instead of a personal God is a necessary order of nature, in infinite

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and thought, there is vital truth in the doctrine in its entirety, not a necessarily experienced, if the whole universe is to be thought as united to God, as can only have a union of this kind, not one in which they are supposed both to exist simultaneously at first, and afterwards as attached to one another, or in which one spring suddenly into being from it other. We must regard the universe as necessarily related to God, as in a sense expressing His very nature, hence it must not be regarded as an accidental adjunct, but as in a way His very Self. So again the infinite being must not be regarded as just other than the words a being outside of it to whom we can attach no predicates (for all our predicates are drawn from the world we know), who therefore must be labelled as the Unknowable, this is always the outcome of Deism; Goodness, Beauty, Truth, all belong to the Unknowable, and if God is totally other than it, they can no longer be applied to it. They can no longer be mere absolute for as it is assumed that any other world might equally well have been created — that of which we have chosen (1) for this is another necessary conclusion of Deism: if the universe is truly an accidental creation of God, a creation which in an instant or having suddenly come into existence, then other worlds must have been possible, must have had a potential existence in God, a potential existence in the universe, if it is an actual existence. What is of more importance is that Absolute Truth, which an all gained in our experience of the world at any rate, though not from it, would then become only th
In the possible, inscrutable, an arcanum, in which truths are part of
the universe.

Hegel also sought to demonstrate the unity of all things
for his own time, a time differing vastly from that of Spinoza,
and demanding therefore a different and deeper explanation.
Nature, especially in its parts, is more than a dead matter,
a world of bodies, held together by mechanical connection. Hegel
viewed the world as a world teeming with spirituality, expressing a
spiritual meaning in every part and therefore bound for
more closely to the world of thought than at the intensity of
Spinoza, so much so that nature finally disappears in thought
and is an end with a thought world, in whatever way we
regard it, of which in ourselves are but temporary manifesta-
tions. God himself, All Being, vanishes, at least Being
becomes so unimportant to thought that its reality may be denied
yet the two aspects of the unity are emphasised. Hegel as
Spinoza, on the one side stands the totality of thought.

"God as the is in the creating before the creation of Nature
on a finite Spirit's; on the other side, the Natura and the finite
Psychic, yet at a just this scale of the totality I go over into
Nature, the transition is an absolutely necessary one. God
and the world are an necessary born another, that is they
are a unity, its members which an abstraction apart from
the whole; with side must be non-emphasised. It is true that
Hegel really tends today to stress on the self I thought, a
God as it were, and perhaps this is right, but it should not
be carried so far as to deprive the universe of existence;
it exists in relation to God just as it is in relation to it.
the universe as an organic whole is the "expression" of Himself, "manifestation," or what we will, and it relating such an expression to Being or when it is the expression is a necessary one on both sides. We may say then with Spinoza that the universe, a an infinite number of things in infinite ways proceed necessarily from the nature of God.

That which lies at the root of the Hegelian philosophy is the logic, the system of the Categories, a form of thought, while in the objective forms of reality, reality being nothing more than the expression of thought. There is no question here of freedom.

If subjectivity, when reason is concerned; it is only the reaction of feeling, an unreason subjectivity, that leads us into error. Where we rigidly think, we cannot but reach reality, though the full meaning of the latter can be known only when we have thought out with Hegel the whole philosophy of the Absolute. The form of finitude in which Hegel places his System is striking; Spinoza also held that the whole System of the Universe could be deduced from the Nature of Substance, but he did not regard his own System as a complete one; Hegel on the contrary regards his logic as containing all the categories possible to thought, the only one to be found in nature, and this only in itself conscious in spirit. Kant also had thought a complete system of his Categories might be drawn up; but it is evident that many of the given by Hegel are by no means explicit. The ordinary concurrence,

(1) Cf. Prof. Land (in Knight's "Free Essays on Spinoza") on Aristotle's familiar maxim, or the best, to the effect that which is intrinsically formed, which can be nothing but itself everything.
and that at majority of them have become so only in the slow development of the race. Still higher categories may in each must, remain implicit, and await further progress for their explicitation. It might seem impossible to pass beyond the abode of ideas, but this is just the form of the whole which requires filling, and which it is maintained must be constantly developing for thought into high differentiation. The idea of completeness relates to a certain extent to whole philosophy as high; thus he regarded its history as philosophy or philosophy itself, as the impetus of the categories in the progress of thought, yet he seemed to hold that thought had with his own philosophy reached its furthest limit, the idea was now explicit in its completeness. Yet the idea had been implicit in some inadequate form in every philosophy that had preceded and it seems almost arrogance that he should impose upon his philosophy at least it attained adequate form. So in the philosophy of Right and of History it received adequate embodiment at last in a state on the model of it Preussen Empire of his own time. But on the other hand, the distinction into the philosophy, that the thought from which made up the grand system of metaphysics has successively developed themselves outwardly in the history of philosophy, and it history of mankind, Science Art, and Religion, may still remain abiding true, though we do not admit that the development came to an end with the beginning of the century.

The logic then set out with the design of showing how pure thought develops within itself from the beginning
when it is indistinguishable from it regains thought to its
fulness, in its ldea. Or in very reality, or in the content
of thought which develops itself, a distinguished from thought in
its subjective aspects; but it is side cannot be clearly separated.
In the beginning, i. Puen Being, which is equally Nothing, it was
absolutely identical, Puen Being is just empty thinking, and it is
from this that the whole process takes its start.
They is a certain similarity between the beginning and that
Spinoza. The Spinoistic Substance in itself is a beginning only for
thought, not in reality; for in the actual world there is no
beginning nor end; Substance manifests itself in its entirety,
for him who could comprehend it. So also with Hegel, pure
Being (which is identical with Spinoza's Substance) is not for it
most part regarded as a real beginning, but only as a logical
one, it point at which systematic thinking must set
itself in order to comprehend in an adequate whole all
its principles, which again are the fundamental principles
of thought i. God and of reality itself. The real world
known is at first kept distinct from this process, Hegel is
not dealing with a process in reality; in reality, in him
as Spinoza, all it forms are at one in them entirely,
it is only to the subjective thinking that they come as a
process. So it individual the world (natura) and the world
of thought is embodied in the institutions, manners, customs,
form of art, and in like great just a kind of inorganic
nature. Letting it sink into his nature, he converts it into
his own, and it is this process that for the individual, logical forms successively present themselves; so also for the race, to which it is beginning nature alone; the organic natural, and thought are embodied in it. But it is assumed by Hegel that all rationality, the whole system of its categories, or in other words, all that is possible in thought is then implicit in nature, only in an inadequate form, from which it is raised in spirit to perfect adequacy. The importation which attaches to the logical and its forms finally dissolves the ideal system, and gives it that characteristic which distinguishes it from the system of Spinoza. The logical forms (the Idea in its perfect expression), become hypostasized, and receive a certain reality, which at least becomes the only true reality. All other forms of existence become reduced to an accident, a contingency, beside it; it is fact become, in all, the universal Real.

Thus, though the system begins with the identity of thought and being, thought is more real than being, and finally usurps the whole of reality. This very phrase, as common to Hegel and his followers, expresses the result; although it has been stereotyped, yet it is on both sides no intelligible meaning can be attached. In the less objective all form, known by thinking of thought and being, it expresses that belief which he found the accepted basis of modern philosophy, viz. Socrates—"the belief namely, that it only true being is thinking, intelligent being." Yet in his own that as early as Spinoza, it characterizes of thinking as applicable. At Absolute Being, he himself had been
questioned, involving as it does for us at any rate, not an absolute but a relative
existence; time, the not-self which is opposed to Being,
and without which that Being cannot be called into activity.
Even in Spinoza, however, it was impossible to the men than
with this dualism, the whole subsequent system showing the
necessity of attributing some kind of intelligence to the
finishing Being. But the admission that Being must be thinking
Being is very different from it implies that through Thought and
Being are the same thing, that Thought is Being. There must always
be a distinction between Being and function itself and its activity
in its "expression", "manifestation"; there are two aspects of a
whole which can never be held apart, except by a "distinction
of reason", yet they can never be forced into one another
become an identity, more than a unity. We cannot say
regard them as a unity of "things" or realities; they are at
of applicable at all, is so only in the Being, and is the same
abstraction as that Being considered in itself. It is better known
to regard the unity only as the reality, i.e., thinking Being; a
Being without thought being unthinkably self-contradictory, and
therefore must be regarded as non-existent.

(1) "In itself" has a different value to \( \text{the thinking, thinking...} \)
Hegel's hyperactivity of thought, he led to the same Panlogian being given his theory, meaning is merely that all natural, all spiritual forms an instinct with reason, but that only reason is, only the rational is real. It means moreover that all the rational is real, that thought as a whole is embodied somewhere, and it is only for the finite individual that the thought is not assimilated in its completeness. There is a high value in this, for apart from being, it is only thought that is in the world for the individual; it is only thought that places on Being in relation with another, without it they would remain wholly apart. Hence from an Absolute Point View, abstraction from other individuals in whom alone after all it exists, thought may well be regarded as totality, and as a reality in the Universe, especially is the value in the description of how the real thought comes to itself, comes to self-consciousness by a gradual process in the individual. But Hegel, as has been said, tends to deprive the individual of all reality whatever, unless this formless totality of thought, to reduce his system to a mere illusion, at least a mere contingency. Yet contingency and illusion should be the same thing to an Absolute System, or at least contingency and ignorance, Spinoza had seen this, and regarded it as the contingency of natural affairs a merely due to the fact that we did not know how they followed from the nature of God. Hegel, on the other hand, with his System
of rationality, finds himself compelled to admit everywhere the existence of irrationality, contingency. (1) He speaks of art as liberating "the real import of appearances from the semblance and deception of the bad and fleeting world," and imposing "a phenomenal substrate a higher reality born of mind," and of history, with its "mass of irrelevant circumstances." The inability of the principle asserts itself, for it is just in being, inexisting, that we find the irrationality and contingency to be. For then is no bridge, no point of union between the thought-system and the unimportant individualities in whom it is to express itself. There is no reason why it should be this individual, or that, who should become the vehicle of a certain form of thought; no limit seems necessary to the number of beings in whom such form should be exhibited, and there seems nothing to bind thought to advance in a certain gradual progression through individual existences, no reason for instance why "numin" should not take its place in the world before "pure being." Hence in the history of philosophy, of the State, of the

(1) In Spiro's, 'inadequate ideas' in human-animating, corresponding to Hegel, contingency. In if every state of body be its corresponding state of mind, and its latter, the idea of the former, it seems impossible that an idea should rise in other than adequate; and if we argue from the necessity with which all things thought and intimated follow from the nature of God, it results in the same. The confusion, due to the contingency in Spinoza's way the word 'idea' as identified now with it connotes (the mental world) a physical fact (a sensation or sense movement), and again with the idea of an object, which is entirely different. Only the latter sense are often inadequate ideas, and it assumes a subject towards an object may be presented.

(2) v. Rieser, Hegel's Phil. of Fine Art (Introduction) Ch. 6.
world itself, and in nature, Hegel finds himself hampered by the continual occurrence of this "contingency."

Then an ill wanting, however, evidence of another view, according to which all finite individuals, and nature itself, have their relation to a purpose, a meaning which it universe has in itself, and it is this view which raises Hegel's objection so much above Spinoza's, to whom no purpose or meaning was possible. In this view it Being of the Absolute is given its full value, and God appears as an Infinite Being, with an infinite thought, which he, constantly manifesting as his very self throughout the universe; Nature, therefore, appears as a means to an ulterior end, it has Final Cause apart from which it has no value. This Final Cause is no other than that man may through nature know God for an Absolute Spirit which is to take Nature, its opposite back into itself, is just the particular finite spirit of mankind.

The real Absolute is given in the logical system, "God and the eternal reason." The world, therefore presupposes mankind, a similar finite being, and we are thrown back on that question to which there can be no answer—Why the existence of man? To which we can no longer apply the word 'manifestation', which has a meaning only in reference to a being for whom the manifestation takes place. 'Manifestation' is just as illegitimate as 'modification' when a thinking being is concerned. If man were only a manifestation of God,
we should have to suppose some other Being for whom God so manifests Himself in men. In fact, it is impossible for thought to attach any meaning to an Immanence of any sort, such as is implied here, of one being in another. A Being, such must be totally separated from another in reality, it is only by thought, this activity in general that they are related. Hence it is only in this sense that the Immanence of the finite Being in the finite individual can be spoken of; it is the Thought, the activity of God, the manifestation of Himself to us, that may be taken up into our souls, and in this sense only the may be immanent in us. But then it is, of course, no theory of its immanence of the finite beings in relation to the infinite. That they exist must be sufficient, it why and how an problem, probably incapable of solution. After all, the idea of an absolute coaction of the finite being, each at his own time, is perhaps the only to all one and this immanent way of continuity of existence, would depend wholly upon God.

A teleological conception of the universe is compelled to check itself at man; of him no explanation of the kind is possible. We cannot regard him, as Hegel did, only as a vehicle for the evolution of its thought of the Absolute, but rather with Kant, as in some way an End in himself. Neith thought alone in Being, individuality is itself, has value, but the union of the two in the real being. Life in this, its truest sense, is what alone is of importance, and view which give the highest place to one aspect only, whether thought or mere being, an equally inadequate.
The dialectic method of Hegel is one which seems removed to a certain extent from that of Spinoza, which claimed to deduce all things in geometrical fashion from the intuitively given nature of God, or, in one substance. Hegel's method is neither Deduction nor Induction, but is at once analytic and synthetic. Starting with a certain notion, he holds that to else observe this notion will appear to unfold itself, producing from itself first its opposite, then reuniting this with itself, and so resulting in a higher notion. In this way, with the right beginning, we may have the whole system of the Categories, arriving at last at that one which is the truth, the goal of all the others, and involves all them as moments within itself. Moreover it claims to prove that it finite thought which thus reaches out the relation of it returns to another is really placing itself at an absolute standpoint, retaining the process by which its absolute thought developed itself from its beginning to its present position. "The determination is the self-implying and of the concrete content." (1) It is in such statements that Hegel seems to be claiming for his method more than will be granted, as if he had at least discovered the secret of the Universe, and learned how God is. His thought, in all the reality of His Being. The whole of the Hegelian system may be said to lie in this method, and this method is here for more closely related to System than is the case with Spinoza. It is true that in its latter it is difficult to determine how for his method is really important in relation to his fundamental principles.

and some have attached more value to it, as one bears, as
and, who claim that much of Spinoza's philosophy has its point
apart from the method, whereas, Insommo asserts, that the method
is at the root of the philosophy, and penetrates every detail. Either
view may have its relative truth; it is probably known that his
elsewhere method and system are closely connected with one another
and exercise a determining influence on each other, so that not only
does Spinoza set out his system as deduced mathematically from
the notion of Substance, but he is unable to represent it univer-
sely otherwise than as such a whole of geometrically related
points, without inner movement in themselves. And Hegel
that relation is still closer; as it has been said, his method is his
system. With him the simplicity which is the guiding principle
of the method shows itself in every detail of thought, of nature
and of Spirit. Each is at one a universal determined through
particularly to singularity, or each contains in itself those
three moments; not only so but each moment may be regarded as
at time, as either of the others. In each detail, however, is one
of the moments that is more emphasized, though nevertheless
the others are implicit in it. The process then may be regarded
as the implication of those implicit moments, or their assertion
of themselves against the predominance of the dominant moment.
This to-and-fro movement, which in human thought would be the
work of the understanding, and that tend to remain fixed,
without further advance, is here regarded as the inner
movement, thought itself, abstraction being made from any
subject, such a would be necessary to assert any movement
of thought, until not only is its subject abstracted from, but is finally forgotten altogether. Though Hegel's philosophy it is necessary to remember that in thought, as such, movement, development, is as much an absurdity as animal life in a stone.

It is not thought that develops itself, but the subject, the thinking Being in whom it thought has its existence; its forgetfulness of this fact is due much of the strangeness of Hegel's system.

This threefold movement, notion, contradiction of notion, unity of them two, is what constitutes the truth of the whole universe to Hegel, and he has endeavored not merely to state this, but actually to show us, the movement throughout the whole realm of thought, not only pure thought, but nature and its spiritual world as well. It is in this latter that, as might have been expected, its artificiality and inadequacy of the method show itself. As long as we concerned with pure thought, a priori conceptions, gathered in empiricism, yet not derived from empiricism, yet belonging to the activity of the mind, it might very well be that all these notions should be connected with one another, in fact they necessarily are so, inasmuch as they can be conceived as belonging in their completeness to one individual mind, either that of the definite Being, or at least an infinite 'Psychological Individual'. The whole thought of the Being must form a rational unity, and this unity must be organic, its unifying mind expressing itself in all its parts, so that each is an organ, at whole is each of the parts. In it (assumed) perfect individual it whole
unity of thought will be seen induced in the primary moment, it first a lowest element of it whole. Not only so, but in the
stupendous of which Hegel speaks, it seen to be really the method
of pure thought, whereas the notion of progress a necessary to it
is considered. Advance to high notion is only possible (within
pure thought) through the contradiction of the previous notion con-
sciousness, any sort is only possible through consciousness of
difference. Thus we might say that what first appears is the
consciousness, the psychological individual is a mere "bliss", mere
affection, but this is not strictly true, for it can be conscious
of this only through simultaneous consciousness of a difference, and
this only is further development possible. Thus, the principle
Hegel is valuable within the realm of pure thought, and the at-
tempts which he made to carry it out completely a far
as was possible for him, he, had the greatest influence upon
philosophy since. It is a different matter however when we
come to the natural world, and the spiritual world of reality,
politics, art, religion and philosophy. It is true that so
far, individual knowledge is concerned, it development
may still be similar to dialectic, but this need not mean
that it advance corresponds to the relation of the
objects in nature successively regarded, so that there is in
nature a corresponding process. Not even when in replace the
individual by the race is it so, for though again that which
first strikes the race is the broad general aspect, nature,
Space and Time for instance, then the general it
physical world—which is a differentiation as it was of space and
time,—last of all its most special aspects, such as man himself,
and though we may say this advance corresponds in a sense to
the natural relation, yet this is only in the most general way,
and in any case the process is merely of differentiation. So again
in morality, it seems as if abstract right was the first, and sought
its own realization through individuals in the objective world,
whereas the process of history is rather to the freeing of the individual,
so that at first there was only an objective morality (of the traveler,
for instance) which it was impossible for the individual to
transcend, until change from without placed him in a new
position. But also the process is a the differentiation, though it
is true that with each advance, the individual while freer than
before becomes united with others in a new, objective, unity.
Abstract morality, though logically it grows only becomes known
to the individual through its advance of his own morality, and
is never completely known, while also the morality of the individ-
ual is in many cases higher than the objective morality of the
state, and indeed advance of it latter is only possible through
that of individual morality. Thus it is only in the most
general form that the Hegelian method can be applied to
Nature and Spirit. Yet it root within the method, the notion
of organic progress through differentiation to new unity, i.e., as
has been said, of the utmost value, and is really an agency
for further advance in scientific knowledge. So the general
form it is applicable to nature, to the individual man.
to humanity as a whole, and especially to Hegel’s view of the infinite being, where it becomes absolutely free self-determination; with man the self-determination is not wholly free. This notion is a much higher and more adequate one than that which is the outcome of Spinoza’s method, necessary ex equo nam, the recognition and acceptance of which is his equivalent for freedom. Spinoza’s idea is reduced to a moment in that of Hegel, not immediately but only subordinated to a higher. So we may expect that Hegel’s notion, dominant as it is at the present day, may have its way for higher; we need not accept it as the ultimate truth of the universe, but may still expect, when its application has become fairly complete to find it subordinating into a subordinating place before a still more adequate expression of that truth.

In spite of the apparent dissimilarity of the two methods of Spinoza and Hegel, there is yet a great resemblance underlying them. Each believes he has discovered the true way of thinking the universe as a whole — it forms the universe apart from its content, and in this respect the immense immensity of Hegel may readily be granted. In his notions of process, development, moment, an eternity for an adequate to the universe than that of logical sequence, mathematical necessity. All eternity? Hegel, however, it must be said, was largely due to the great advance in science between Spinoza’s time and his own, which brought with it notions of development and process to the front, whereas in Spinoza’s age it is great advances made in mathematics had led men to regard it as the only method for the discovery of truth.
Again, each claims to derive from a single starting-point in thought the whole variety of the universe. – God, nature, man. Spinoza from the notion of Pure Substance, Hegel from that of Pure Being (note, which are really identical) set out to conquer the world of thought, yet without reference to experience. It may be said also that the principle of movement is at home in each, – Hegel, namely, which is for Hegel differentiation, and to Spinoza is equivalent to determination. But with Spinoza an idea is substance or existing, and proceeds to deduce all finite existences as the substantial existence itself with negation. Hegel remains throughout at logic in the realm of thought; the negation there is not negation of reality, but logical negation a contradiction. At the same time it has been shown that negation of reality is for Spinoza a mere affair of the imagination, and he, therefore, no reference to reality as a matter fact. It is only in the transition from Logic to Nature that Hegel transfers his logical notion of contradiction to that of a real process, though his negated idea (nature) is for us non-reality but the idea in itself (at logic). Each also holds that his method may be carried out without reference to experience, yet throughout it with some of their philosophy they are constantly compelled to return for their notion of that experience which they nominally disclaim! (1) There has been shown sufficiently in Spinoza, and it appears everywhere throughout the Philosophy of Nature and of Spirit in Hegel. The most glaring example of all of course is the transition from logic to nature referred to above. This is described by Hegel as a passing over to the

(1) cf. Palèton's 'Philosophy of Religion,' Vol. I., p. 46.
from into the latter, a process which dialectic thought, in reaching
its conclusion of the Logic, finds itself compelled to take, just as
it has been compelled to pass from Being to Nothing, Something to
Other, One to Many and the like. (1) But it is absurd to claim this
transition as a necessity of thought; in an hazy as thought
it is, really fulfilling abstraction previously made from
experience. And Hegel honestly faced the fact I would have
heralded his dialectic, as he frequently does, as a real process,
least of all this transition from Logic to Nature. Possibly within
thought it companion of the relations between Logic and Nature
is that between One and Many, Identity and Difference might
be allowed, as well as, that of Spirit itself within, their paths, as
Identity in Difference. But to regard the transition as real
in any sense is absolutely impossible, and yet this is indeed
that way— which Hegel would have to take it. (2) Against this
 however must be set his declaration that "the Spiritual is alone
the real; it is a process, a that which exists in itself; thing
that which relates itself to itself and becomes determined;— it
becomes, that is, alien existence, and an object to itself; and
lastly that which in the alien existence remains as itself,
I shall it already for itself." (3) So that it appears that only
in Spirit does each what is absolutely real; but what is
meant is that whatever reality Spirit has, is supposed to be
given to it by the categories, of which it is the outcome, exposing
Spirit a process some how the alien existence, and it is this
idea of a real process that must be opposed.


(3) Phenomenology of Consciousness. Preface
Hegel’s system as well as Spinoza’s seems to deny any validity to the notion of freedom. It is true that in the Philosophy of Right he admits to the full the notion of Will as Self-determination, but this self-determination eventually means determination not by the subjectiv e self, — after all the real individual, — but rather by the objective, universal self, which is embodied in the world around us. This seems to escape from the terrible progression of thought which we, all human beings, really as its instruments, feel is only a means of the progress, it is the negative through which the development must move. All life is transferred to the universal standpoint, and it is the universal, not the individual, that really lives, and is eternal. Hence, action ceases, therefore the activity of the self at all; this may be conceived of as the action: — this is admitted, — but consciousness does not in any way react upon the activity, which you or you apart from the conscious self that observes it. We might say, as an example here seem true, that there are two selves, the subjective, with its corresponding interests, remaining however, to Hegel, a passion spectator of all that passes before it; and the objective, which realizes itself through the subjective individual, and is the same, though at different stages of development, as all individuals. The attribute will in any true sense to the individual is therefore impressed on the theory; and with it morality and responsibility alike must go. Even if an attribute evil, as some do, to the subjective self (in the above sense), and good only to the objective self, responsibility nevertheless disappears;
For the individual would then be unable to do a good act of his own accord, and with absence of power, absence of responsibility must certainly be united. Subjectivity, therefore cannot be called the principle of evil, and moreover the existence of the Subject is, as necessary a matter as the action of the Absolute through him. Will, the real self of the individual must equally be the source of the Good as of the evil which is done by the through it. But now the thesis as a springs that only the individual is itself reduced to an illusion, but will on the part of the Absolute being also become an impossibility, there is no self determination, no self properly speaking, all is a mere matter of present reality, so it is with Hegel. The notion of the individual giving himself up to learn the meaning of the world, a meaning full of spirituality, disappears in that of a development which takes place just so, and can take place no otherwise. Now it seems, that there is a necessary system of thought which is always and which by the necessity of its nature has gone into externality in the physical world as we find it. Here then is no place for a free self-determination of a personal being; in spirit of his assertion that he changed the substance of Springs into Subject, that is in reality no Subject; it alone is in Being for the first time in Nature. 1 Spirit comes after Nature, 43 but a new form of existence for the logical Idea. In unless we regard its process from logic through nature to Spirit as real one there is no meaning in Hegel's phrase.

It is impossible that this should be set forth merely as a way of thinking Spirit, rationally conceiving it. If all this is so, then can be no limiting, no self-determination in the matter; hence also there is no self the determined. In the beginning there is pure thought, pure nature, the Spirit; but pure thought is in a will, which is possible only in a Being, a thinking Being it is true, but has then is an yet no Being in it case; Nature, the first Being, and still it is not a thinking Being, will there be possible only with the final stage of the process, and then the process is completed, so that there is nothing to will. On the other hand, just as Spinoza seems often to refer to the process of which he speaks, as if it were a kind of self-determination, so also Hegel constantly maintains that the last stage of the process is equally the first, a Spirit is the beginning just as it is the end. This is opposed to the other extreme; the process, ceasing to be real, becomes now a timeless one, or no process at all. We can to regard it as just such specific activity, as to regard it as one, Spirit, yet containing in itself the moment, Logic a pure thought, and Nature, and yet they are not moments, which imply a past process, but just as the return to Hegel (Spinoza is therefore a mistake Hegel, in the regard, as is Heidelberg, thought as Heidec said) Hegel, is after all 'but invisible extension, extension but invisible thought.' (1) This is a view of the Hegelian system that may readily be held, and indeed it is the only alternative to the view which led to the material view of Heineken and others of the Hegelian left. Yet it is a

(1) "Religion and Philosophy in Germany"
position which cannot be maintained any more rationally than
the latter; for as we have seen reality cannot thus be conceived as
a logical form, but must be in time and space. Activity is necessary
as Being, and along with being and life must disappear also;
will in a process, which is on I absolute necessity. It is only
a knowledge that the phrase "sub specie activitatis" can apply, and
knowledge not so far as it is an activity, a becoming, but so
far as it is content, what it knows. All knowing, equally with
any other activity is in time, but its content is in a sense out of
time, (insomuch as it is only 'ideally' real), and hence it may
be said that sub specie activitatis. So the content of will is in
the sense, as thought-content out of time, but will is not so, an
to the process whereby it is realised. Its knowing will as
self-determination is thus, denied of the Supreme Being, still more
must it be denied of the finite individual.

There is a third way however in which the liberty of the latter
is taken away by Hegel; that is in his connection with the State
and other institutions amid which he is born. This is a phase
of the "objective" self mentioned above; it expresses itself through
individuals in these institutions, and through their different
forms develops itself. But Hegel constantly speaks as if the
individual as such had no part to play upon the stage at
which the Absolute is in his time (i) as if the development

(i) Phil. of History (Engel) p. 55. "Phil. of Right" Professor Apart in Snegg's "Hegel's
Phil. of the State of History" (Eng.). The problem of the present world as opposed to both in regard being
individuals.\"
took place in a sense outside of the individuals, and they were only the
medium. It almost seems, as if it were immoral to attempt the
transcendence of one's surroundings, as if it were not individuals who
show the way to further progress; I rather lay stress on the fact that
the individual is unable to transcend himself, to find his high nature, and this is true in a sense,
for without society's morality, goodness of any sort would be
impossible; the individual receives an inheritance from the past,
but it is his duty to transmit it inheritor, with an increase,
stoicism, and hence lies the necessity for a belief in will.
The same spirit is the constant protest of Hegel against the "+be
[t. Sollen] which Kant and Fichte had emphasized as characteristic
of the moral life; inasmuch as it spirit when they had said
is united to a body, it can never reach a perfect morality, it
must always be striving to subdue its passions of the body,
which in the past will always strive against themselves. Hegel
protest as right idea for it, it is directed against its tendency of
Kant and Fichte to regard their bodily passions as quiet apart
from the moral activity of the Soul, a only hindrance to
it, a tendency which even Spinoza had relined, though it
really rises above it. Hegel pointed out that this leave the
Practical Reason a will without content; it becomes purely for
willing, and therefore will nothing. It is only through the
passions that it spirit can really will anything; as Spinoza
had said, Reason is only powerful in form, an affective
its bodily passions, emotions, emotions, can just as much the
material of will as they are the material of the Innate Reason.
and it must be seen that it is only through them... But on the other hand Hegel tends to regard the realization as always completed, as if it were not enough, and to minimize the fact of constant struggle which really characterizes morality, and can even if at all only in the higher stage of religion. Thus, he says, speaking of this separation of the abstract form of will, and the natural man or its impulse and emotion, "it must only lie in the mediation of the two, and the mediation is no new postulate [an 'ought to'], but is its nature and a reality accomplished and always self-accomplishing." This is how in optimism which seems to regard time nearly as all that is necessary to being a human being to perfection, as if the individual were the mere spectator of the process of mediation between his will, in the universal reason to which it becomes equivalent to Hegel, and his natural desire, and as if it were just the realization of their reason through their desires, which alone on the side of the individual, that is important. Its deadly struggle toward goodness, often to be given up in despair, is left aside, and in so far the looking from a universal standpoint, from which we see that it is always the good that is real in the ideal. But here it may be with the race as a whole, with the individual it is unfortunately not so in many cases; it seldom must always be a factor in the life of the individual, in the stage of morality enter and probably even the high stage of religion also. Moreover, the necessary infinity of the process is really one of the way.
in which it necessarily immortality is most readily felt, as Kant
had seen, and this question, the immortality of the soul is just
on these points in which Hegel fails us, and can give no satis-
factorily answer. It is true that it is incapable of being a thinking
sense, that it can only be shown, is not inconsistent with
the nature of Reason and of the self as a rational and active Being
but for even so much as this, there is no place in the Hegelian
system. the individual is subordinated to universal Reason for whose
realization only he exists. Plato had seen that the most rational
ground for belief in the immortality of the soul is its activity,
this struggle against the power of nature until legal death
that false view of immortality however as a time of reward for
what it has suffered on the earth in resisting the passions was
rightly opposed by both Spinoza and Hegel. It is from especially
protected against it, holding virtue with its own reward, the
blessedness itself, and insisting that the virtues of life should be
sought quite apart from such an immortality of perpetual bliss
— all it teaches a set over against itself inasmuch of the former life
there is no mean compromise that the soul should at death im-
mediately cease its struggle, becoming at once either wholly good or
wholly bad, rather we must suppose that under new conditions
it search after perfection goes on as before, — then a new third
set, before it make itself an ideal it has attained. The only thing of the
other wise lies in the idea that in this new life the soul
is as it were 'renew born', that it is a wider life, in
which we at least of our finitude is removed.
In Hegel's system, also the Principle of Monism, with which he starts may in one aspect be held to lead us, to its opposite, an
individualism or Phenomenism similar to that which was the logical
outcome of Spinoza's philosophy. In the latter, the Absolute
substance seems in a certain regard to disappear in an infinite
number of atomically being, and similarly in Hegel the Universal self
Absolute Spirit, with which we commensurate deprived at least of
mistake, which I found belonging to individuals only, though
whom it manifest itself. This is consequence of regarding
thought a the only reality, then seems in fact the
distinction drawn between reality, as is appropriated to thought
and substance, as attribute to individuals, and the latter is
regarded as of no importance in comparison with the former. There
is a constant tendency in Hegel to push the Absolute as only
realized thorough the world of humanity, it become is fact
identified with humanity, and is therefore a mere name for an
infinite number of individuals. We cannot ever say the absolute
Spirit a in each of them, far apart from the fact that the
world constitutes no real existence for the Absolute, it is rather
the institution of humanity that Hegel regards it as
finding realization. But as far as being is concerned this
is a pure Phenomenism; a supreme Being is impossible in the
system as wth Materialism which it found its consistent
outcome. Only finite individuals have what we mean by reality
in mistaine, and though Hegel depreciation it valued the mistake
its utmost, in comparison with the reality of the Absolute.
idea, it is after all that which chiefly concerns the individual himself. What is real then (to us) turns out to be a world of finite individuals, when existence remains an insubstantial problem, and this is just what is meant by Platonism. Thought has here, by itself, what we name Being, existence, just as Being is named by Kant. Pure thought, but Hegel's Absolute is in itself just thought, or a totality of thought determined. It constitutes bound together in unity; this is said to create nature, and this is done by itself as Absolute Spirit through individuals which are part of nature. Outside of this finite individual, Absolute Spirit does not exist; before this existence there is only thought and nature. Before nature, there is but Pure Thought. If we both conceive thought, then is seen that of the finite beings, there is no Absolute Being.

It may fairly be said that the 'natural dualism' of thought and nature is left unresolved by Hegel. It is true that the whole line of his system would lead to the denial of any reality to the latter apart from the former. The 'Panologism' is defined by Friesman, "a system in which the reason is everything, so that mean to same thing, is reason is nothing" (§ 328). But it is very hard to accept such a theory absolutely, and on the other hand there are an infinite number of phrases in Hegel which go to prove that nature has been a reality which is not that thought, but rather its opposite. The nature is the other's thought, the "matter", it seems [thought] and it itself" (88), and constant references to the contingency, the irrationality of nature, and history in general, all show this. Contingency seems to be due to the appearance of the natural, as if they were really a somewhat

(1) Philosophy of History - p. 18.
in which thought, the essence is striving to surpass itself, but can do so only with difficulty, repeating itself over and over again in its attempt to reach an expression nearly adequate, yet never attaining it, and therefore bound to continue its effort to all eternity?

So it is a natural question to ask why spirit should only in the nineteenth century be rising to its complete nature, coming to a perfect knowledge of itself, if it were not that the motion of its development, nature, was not adequate to its needs. No one has described more finely than Hegel the struggle of spirit to reach this self-knowledge, especially in morality and religion, but the struggle would have no real meaning if it were taken "all that is natural is actual, and all that is actual is natural." Nature or the other thought is not different from it, in intense, in spirit, as an attitude of substance without relation to the attitude of thought. The two substance things be its effects ever been, and will only be done away with when it is clearly seen that "the thing thought in matter has any reality in itself, matter has an independent existence which might without it in its name of substance, matter is a fact in being and the more fact that in can comprehend them shows this (being is incomprehensible by thought.)." They are merely the one of the activity of being (thought), the other its speech, in that it metafor us can only speak of the relation in metaphors. But then in predicate naturalness of nature, and when we deny it, in an error, using 'nature' in two senses, be it from sense we called a nature it being who expresses himself through it, or the latter in speech only of the dead matter, abstracting from the being who gives it its existence and existence is only it as unity.
But in neither case can nature be spoken of as "existing in uncertainty and unbridled contingency." Only two meanings can be attached to this contingent. It is either that which we do not know at present, when it is purely subjective, or it is it imperfect, which can it is again required to subject itself to the standard, but the standard may have objective validity. In this sense, however, it is to be applied to the contingent of Hegel; it means that our thought tracing out a preconceived line of development, a preconceived meaning in the universe, is thwarted by the presence of existence which do not accord with our notion; instead of accepting this as guides for better idea, and changing his notion of the purpose accordingly, Hegel would stamp them as irrelevant, as no meaning at all, for the existence which find themselves in a world when they are not required. This is the result of a spurious attempt to rationalize existence, which can only in the result of patient study of nature and men; we must take our thought forms from the teaching of nature not try to force them upon her.

One of the most obvious criticisms that may be directed against Spinoza and Hegel alike refers to their views on Immanuel Kant's views. Immanuel Kant held that all things are seen in their truth only by reason of consciousness, which means, in only a time altogether, so that abstraction is supposed to be made from all time altogether. As a result, it holds that all consciousness of time and space are mere ideas of the imagination, whose attempts to see things in their
realism, as opposed to the view that it is the totality to which time con-
stitutes into a single point, space into an indivisible whole. This
means merely that all things are conceived as logical, as a
real whole, so that their interconnection are grasped at one as
necessary unity. They must be real things, and not the
real things, an act of, above all else, of time, as time
duration, as the only the whole of point of Being, whereas the
point is
wholly untouched by it. God is 1. man the only real being
is Spinoza's system but the action has been applied elsewhere
to the real beings (as Kant's things in themselves) supposed to not
be in a dependence upon them. At the root of all is the
idea of a permanent being which is identified with the real
existence of the thing, and is contrasted with its phemenone
a manifestation, which alone, it is held, is subject to the form
of time. It might have been seen that inasmuch as the pheno-
menon do not exist apart from the substance, an nothing apart
from it, and it substance on the other hand is nothing apart from its
phenomenon, therefore whatever applies necessarily there must also
apply to the substance itself. It is the comparison of the substance with
any one of its phenomena that gave rise to the idea of time
whereas, it is much more true that such a single phenomena
has no existence in time, has no real existence at all. It is
the substance which exists in its phenomena and
therefore in time. In other words a Being existing out of time
is just such an abstraction a Being apart from its pheno-
menon, its activity, which lies at the root of all Spinoza's
system. If the infinite Being is not to be regarded as a
new identity (and on an even closer plane this is impossible). He 
must be regarded as an Act, Being, Activity, instance itself, 
implies change, and that too is it Being that Act; but 
change is absolutely inconceivable except as a time. Hegel's polemic 
against the Spinozist infinite is well known; such an infinite 
as time is, a mere, a correlative regarded, an infinite to which 
no end so beginning can be conceived, and it is but imagine 
that he refers them, just as Spinoza had done.

The infinite, in the other hand, is such as in the unlimited, instant, but 
it seems that it limits itself, in order to rise to a high nature, 
by the surpassing of this self set limit. But the polemic cannot 
by any means destroy the fact that if any rational view of God 
is taken, he must be regarded as just such an infinite 
as the former, as well as a self-developing Being and so a 'true' 
infinite. In apart from idle speculation as to the Essence of God 
in himself, he is but just what we can know of him, and this 
knowledge itself must both the form an infinite process. It is 
only absurd to suppose that the whole Divine Nature can be given 
to us at a single moment. We may apply the term 'Absolute' 
Goodness, Power, and the like, but they are after all mere forms, 
which must be fulfilled in and through the slow process 
of expansion. In the religious emotion of ecstatic love to God, perhaps 
He is most intimately present (man, but this emotion itself 
takes a higher form according to its context, what is known and 
believed about God, therefore here also an infinite process, 
necessary. Moreover, all action with Uniform must be the 
manifestation itself, and it is not an act one for all
but is continually going on. He perceives, as well as creates the universe, and not only so, but develops it, and the purpose in it; this also requires that he be conceived as acting through definite time, which is an infinitesimal.

Not only must the activity of the infinite Being be regarded as carried on through definite time, but it might even be said that an activity must have spatial supervision, that an activity which has not such supervision is, just as much as a timeless act, an abstraction. Then in know that our own thought is always ultimately compressed. All conceptions are arbitrary and supposed. A different from this invariably take a spatial form; the other world, this world, a world, a space, and then seems in reason why the space should not be the very same space as this, our space, as any other space is inconceivable. Moreover, the boundlessness of the universe is surely competent to contain multitudes of forms of life besides this earthly form, and why should not the other life take place in it as well as the first? There have been times when we have left such things as Spinoza and Hegel, the necessity of space as a form of existence. It has been held by Kant and later by Hegel that "things-in-themselves" are not in space, and that their real activity does not concern itself with space, but only affects it in the way, in one faculty, an such that in can perceive the act only in spatial. This is partly true, partly untrue (Spiritual). Being is such is not in space, nor is it time, as other-wise, it is not mere activity, not mere event, but it acts only in space and time, and its attempt to do away with either only results in an effort to conceive the inconceivable. The Being itself apart from the activity is a mere abstraction.
without appearance"; no Being without manifestation, and it must be true at all events, only in unity of it two moment. It is only by thought that in an abstract on it on hand from it activity, or it other from it subject, so as to think it latter as own an element which is necessary both from. Apart, they are just not

retaining, the distinction is not a sure one. It is often conceived known that the potentiality of future activity place the Activity Being entirely away from his present activity, so that he seem to contain within himself, apart from him and space, the possibility of its activity. But this is really not so; it is again in the unity of the two, it is united together with, or is constituted by, the past activity as it appears in the natural world, that the potentiality lies. This is clear from the fact that every action has an influence upon all future activity, individual, and is the natural conclusion from the truth that all individual is in his acts, and they is him; hence the close connection of all his actions with one another, and the future is a closely related to the present as the present to the past. Them and space have no existence apart from Being, but within the Being, apart from time and space.

It is instructive to find what each of the great modern systems tends at time, to become an absolute movement in religion, little removed from that of Baha’u’llah for example. Many have regarded its absorption of the individual in unity with God as the aim of Spinoza’s system and certainly the clarity portion of it the least plausibility to this view. We have then of an eternity for the individual gained by absolute surrender to God, so that the love of God seems to transform the soul, and breathe into it eternity. Yet the eternal soul is just part of the eternal essence of God, and the no reference to the individual is well
it is impressed. It is as if the highest good of the individual were
said to be the recognition of his own mediocrity, and of his absolutely
God, in whom also he himself has any reality. Yet again it is
said that the definition in highest knowledge of God and of all
things in them is what is eternal, and that so far as the individual
attains to this knowledge he is filled with the love of God as the cause
of it for that arises from it. Then it seems rather as if in eternity
they wholly on the side of the knowledge, that the individual meaning
merely that he has the eternal knowledge and the love that accompanies
it. Yet eternity is fact is not time, it is not immortality.
In a moment of time, the individual is lifted up to God, and
so far as he has this eternal knowledge he abides with this.
It seems as if the whole of its other had been a preparation for the
idea, all it demonstration tending towards it. So Hegel it has
been held that the religious element is what is really dominant,
and throughout Hegel he kept it in view, so that the Philosophy
of Religion gives the rationale of his system. He also speaks of the
metaphysical union with God; "the third in the elimination of the evil
of the separation, the punishment of the subject from God, the effecting
that man feel and know God within himself, as this subject, being
himself to God, give himself. He assumes, it satisfaction than God
in his heart, be united with God. This is the culture, the culture
is not merely relation of knowledge, but act. Its act is logism itself.
It certainly, that man is accepted by God, received into grace.
"These form of the culture, its inner culture, is devotion, knowledge
this metaphysical, it unites together." (a) He in here at once the

(a) Pusey, "Religion," quoted in the
similarity and difference between Hegel and Spinoza, between the
Christian and the child of Judaism. Hegel speaks of the
individual foreseeing God in himself, having God in his heart.
Spinoza of man as an eternal essence, man as part of and in God.
Hegel again insists on the necessity of activity on the part of the
individual, so that it acts by his own, a freely an act
of grace coming from without, and independent of himself;
whereas, Spinoza it is rather as if there was no action in the
matter at all, either on the part of the individual nor that of
God; certainly the nothingness is entirely wanting, for even
it long God is not a long on the part of God toward man, but it
should mean nothing more than the long man to God, or to
himself as God. But on the other hand, the rejection
of Hegel leads to deprive the individual altogether of the right
of individual action; the universal thought is that which
expresses itself through the individual, and it would take
away all meaning from freedom, or self-determination if
in sin it just this significance of determination by the universal
thought. Whether this is regarded as abstract Reason someway
endoing and having power to realize itself, or as the Reason of
God, who thus becomes the only self-realizing being, - in either
of these cases the individual becomes a non-entity, or cannot
even give him the name of individual. To say that this
Universal Reason is the true self of the individual, and
therefore that a submitting himself to it he is really free,
does not alter the objection, for the question is as to the existence,
at all of an individual, or self whether true or false, and it is
the certainty of this that Hegel fails to gain us. According to
impartial union, which he speaks of, becomes a barren phrase, as
well as the activity of the self which is to attain to this union;
and with this must go all question of immortality. Of what
need is the vehicle when the journey is finished? If a self means
a being whereby thought realizes itself, then when this necessary
stage is reached it seems only natural that the being should
disappear into the unknown region from where he sprang, while
otherwise being take its place and carry forward the evolution of
thou.
Is does the principle of eternity hold here? Does the same individual
serve indifferentiy for imnumerable stages? At all events what
is meant by a personal immortality is an impossibility in the
Hegelian system, and equally with it the religious union of the
self with God. Here again in might ask, what relation can
such Beings have with one another? Yet Hegel, like Spinoza,
was a of an intensely religious disposition. They seem overwhelmed
by his greatness, God, the absolute Power and Goodness, so that
it mere man seems nothing to them; God is the all and
it appears that the only good possible for the finite man is
just to be himself i.e. the Infinite Being. In the religious
aspect the whole activity of the universe is transferred to God
He alone it One Real Being Who is active; hence Spinoza the
maintains that everything necessarily follows from God.
In Hegel it assertion as against Spinoza of Final Cause i.e.
personal Spirit, and this working is seen in the universe,
since the Thought is the Final Cause of all that is. Then, through Purpose, Meaning, Aim, End, and this and that through all that is, everything is subordinate to the end—coming to itself of
absolutely Spirit; and as is characteristic of Final Cause, this is at beginning, is implicit in it. Widely as they differ, for instance, in the very concept of Final Cause, Spinoza and Hegel alike tend to destroy individuality and independence in man; he is after all a self, and though so far is absolutely independent of all other beings or selves, although the general outcome of the two systems is the de-
preciation of individuality, yet on the other hand both are com-
pelled finally to recognize its value. Each has a theory of the
true activity of the individual; activity according to the Reason,
which may or may not be in accord with the Reason of the
Supreme Being, though Hegel this seems again to be merged in
a universalized by the objective and necessary development of the state
and humanity.

Looking back on these great systems, we see that they
stood in a necessary relation to their times, summing up
periods of great philosophical interest, and unifying all the
philosophy and science of their day in one whole. Hence they are
monistic systems, subordinating all that exists to the Supreme Being,
with whom wecribe the universe is necessarily united. Such a form
must always be taken by a theory that would grasp the universe
as a whole, whereas to those who take their starting point in the
individual, and even the monistic thinkers, when small to pass from
the unity to its differentiation, he is compelled to make a new beginning
with the individual, these see only a number of unrelated indivi-
dualities in the world. The latter is the case with Spinoza
and even from instinct with Hegel. It is possible, however, with a mystical
explanation, to take a somewhat similar view; in this case all things follow
from God's nature with an absolutely uncontrolable necessity, the aspect of all
events regarded in itself; all the effects therein whether
material or spiritual seem to be absolutely dependent upon one another,
then seems no place for any new action of will, no place for independent
spiritual activity; it is just a dead cause of necessity from
which there is no appeal; the possibility of miracles, of prophecy, of any
thing that could go against this necessary cause, is denied, so is
also all action of will, divine or human, or intellect in any true sense,
and therefore all final causes. This is the Spinozistic view of the
universe; God, the supreme Being, is placed in such absolute
determinations that there is no step by which he as a personal
Being may reach and act upon his Universe. Again he is
just identified with the necessary order itself throughout the
universe, so that personality is an impossible attribute.

In the second place the universe may be viewed in instinct with
a Divine Purpose, its necessary laws becoming only means whereby
the great final cause is realised. The Infinite Being has become
related in the closest manner with the Universe; it is without
the other, becomes an abstraction. Necessity now becomes identical
with the Freedom of the Being, with his free Self-realisation in the
Universe. "The truth of necessity is Freedom." Thought and will are
restored to him, and are to be found expressed in nature. The
whole process, which to Spinoza had seemed merely on a necessary
sequence, becomes now a gradual progress toward an end,
and which it is true we can never realise to ourselves,
but which as far as it can be conceived by us, in may identify
with an own End, an own Ideal, and in turn our true freedom.
In general, as the system itself had been unable to allow
the individual an independent life; the purpose which it
intends does not apart from its action particular individual,
its hypothesis, becomes a reality w light which that of
the individual, though when it acts, fades away. The end is
implicit in the beginning and therefore necessarily works out
its realization.

The inadequacy of both there is due to abstraction as such
if an abstract from a Being who works in the Universe,
we cannot regard it latter otherwise than as an absolute
necessary cause, without meaning it purpose. On the other
hand, if in lay terms on the Abstraction of the purpose that
is impressed, we are abstracting from it firm, individuality
of whom independent existence and activity we have known
in ourselves, and therefore fail to gain an adequate account
of the universe. The Spinozistic and Hegelian views of evil are
a consequence of their fundamental positions; thus the terms
Good and Evil cannot by no means be applied to such a series
of necessary events as the Spinozistic universe, they can only
become relative terms applied by the imagination with respect


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upon at different times. They have no meaning as defined by the individual for himself, and realisable by himself. The amount of reality any at any time is absolutely determined by his own fact. So again, as Hegel, Good and Evil to become meanings, terms. Absolute evil is impossible, for it could mean only that the purpose of Supreme Being is the universal. Real evil, which cannot be; in other words, that all things in evil (relatively) inseparable as the process is not complete, is the purpose of Evil attained; but this would be just to deprive evil its meaning, as it is held that the purpose will certainly be attained. So in the individual, in so far as he is but a medium for the process of absolute, Good and Evil are alike inapplicable sine. It is assumed that he cannot act against this process. When he looks at the individual himself, apart from the process, Hegel takes a true view, and admits the whole reality of Evil as it seems to the individual when trying to attain the ideal, which he has driven back, and which even when attained, change acts in a higher Mind will now become, it assertion of his subject, disposition against the determination. Reason; man's Evil is so far as he refuses to identify himself with this determination, and to make the ideal it offers, his own. Here again, however, Hegel seems to look upon the process as a necessary one, inevitably finding its way in the man and even in the individual. Hence the latter he treats it as a gradual, but certainly occurring change from enslavement to passion and sense, to a rational power in the passion, a freedom which is
exercised through them. The freedom seems the last step in its process, as if it previous stage were an inexorable effort towards this result, not just the manifestation of freedom itself.

This question of evil is a difficult one in any system, but more especially in a monistic theory such as that; Spinoza is clear; it may consist of view it possible for them to do that which they took, namely, explicitly or implicitly to deny it any reality in the universe, to identify it with the negative, incompleteness, imperfection, which is a necessary moment in any process. Some such meaning is indeed all that is possible, for we cannot hypothesize evil as an evil spirit working against God in the world; cannot make it an illusion acting upon man from without, for it is only as taken up into a man's will that an act can be evil. We must regard it as one side of the finite, which as a fact belongs to the nature of man, and to universe as incomplete; why this finite should be in a question which cannot be answered. To ourselves it is enough to know that in an infinite, but that through consciousness the finite and independent activity, we can rise above it, that our whole life is just an infinite process towards a wide being. At each moment in an endless (an ideal, an ought-to be, which is the expression) it divine human is us, and which just because it is an ought-to-be implies that we can attain it; so far as in fact to do so, in an morally evil. Such facts as this moral evil, Good, Individuality,
Personality, and the like are facts, that can by no means be left out of sight in a philosophical system; an implication which does away with them altogether, or in any way tends to lessen their reality for the ordinary man, is an inadequate one; and this is the peculiar danger of all monistic systems, owing to the fact that they take as their starting-point a supreme Being, who contains in himself all things, and seems to demand that no other Being, Sub- stance as such, be set up beside himself. It is danger which Spinoza and Hegel cannot be said to have escaped, and when they speak of this matter, it is only because the principle with which they start necessarily shows its inadegacy, and it is only to go to the other extreme, so that what was once an Absolute Monism seems now an Absolute Pluralism. A perfect system can be formed only when each of these moments or aspects is given its true form, their relation to each other adequately shown, so that on the one hand the Absolute Being, on the other the Finite Man, shall each have his own reality, neither being merged in that of the other. So only can religion on the one hand, morality on the other hold their place.