THE SOMALIS IN THE EAST AFRICA PROTECTORATE
AND KENYA COLONY 1895-1963

By

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TO MY PARENTS
Summary

This thesis attempts to discuss the position of the Somalis in the East Africa Protectorate and Kenya Colony from the beginning of British administration in 1895 to the time when Kenya attained its independence in 1963.

The seven chapters are mainly intended as a historical survey of British administrative policy towards both the local Northern Frontier District (N.F.D.) Somalis and the so-called 'Alien' Somalis in the urban centres of Kenya. The main theme is the political and administrative problems associated with the Somalis in Kenya, but a social and economic approach of some of the problems involved is also included.

The first chapter deals with the Jubaland Somalis and their response to the British administration. The second discusses attempts by the British administration to pacify the Somalis in Jubaland and in the newly established N.F.D. The third deals with international aspects of the administration of a frontier people, and the impact of the Italo-Abyssinian conflict of 1935 and the Second World War. The fourth discusses the position of the 'Alien' or urban Somalis and their response to colonial rule. The fifth deals with the post-war social and economic position of the Somalis in Kenya. The last two chapters deal with the growth of national feeling among the Kenya Somalis and their response to the concept of Greater Somalia.
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Ogaden Somali
Gurreh Headmen
Somalis demonstrating in Kenya's Northern Frontier District
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Abbreviations

APP African Peoples Party
D.C. District Commissioner
G.J. Geographical Journal
I.A. International Affairs
I.B.E.A. Imperial British East Africa Company
J.A.H. Journal of African History
KADU Kenya African Democratic Union
KANU Kenya African National Union
KAU Kenya African Union
K.N.A. Kenya National Archives
Legco Legislative Council
M.L.C. Member of the Legislative Council
N.F.D. Northern Frontier District
NFDP Northern Frontier Democratic Party
NPPNL Northern Province Peoples National League
NPPNU Northern Province Peoples National Union
NPPP Northern Province Peoples Progressive Party
NPUA Northern Province United Association
P.C. Provincial Commissioner
R.H.L. Rhodes House Library: Oxford
S.G.M. The Scottish Geographical Magazine
S.Y.L. Somali Youth League
T.N.R. Tanganyika Notes and Records
U.O.S.A. United Ogaden Somali Association
INTRODUCTION

The Somalis inhabit a vast region in the Horn of Africa bounded to the East by the Indian Ocean down to the mouth of the Tana River in Kenya; to the west by Ethiopia to Longitude 42° and Latitude 12°; to the north up to Latitude 12°; and to the south by the Tana River up to 38° Longitude. This is in all an area of about 1,000,500 sq. miles. Throughout the period under consideration in this thesis, the Somalis were divided politically among the Powers to form British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, French Somaliland and some were divided between Ethiopia and Kenya. By 1960, the first two were united to form the Somali Republic, while the rest, including the area particularly considered in this thesis, were still struggling to secede and join the Republic.

This thesis attempts to examine the position of the Kenya Somalis from the start of the British administration in 1895 up to 1963 when Kenya attained its independence. The survey, which mainly deals with the area generally known as the Northern Frontier District (N.F.D.), has also included the other group of Somalis in the urban centres known to the British administrative officials as 'Alien' Somalis. The latter group, although they had a different history of immigration into the Protectorate and the Colony, had problems which were complementary to the local or N.F.D. Somalis and hence by their inclusion in the survey, it is hoped to give a clearer picture of the Somali question.
in Kenya as a whole.

But before discussing the main issues of the administration of the Somalis in Kenya between 1895 and 1963, it is worthwhile to give an outline of the main problems involved in governing the Somalis. These problems were inherent in the apparently obscure origin of the people; the question of the history of their migration into the Protectorate and the Colony; the geography of their country which was itself an obstacle to their position; and finally their attitude to the previous attempts of foreign rule.

The Origin of the Somalis

Although it is not the intention of this thesis to formalize a hypothesis about the origin of the people — indeed already much research has been done in this aspect by authorities on the Somalis\textsuperscript{1} — it is important to discuss the question here in view of the fact that it was one of the main obstacles which faced the British administrators in Kenya. In Kenya, where the administration was marked by the classification of the different races into different units, the question as to whether the Somali was an African "native" or a "non-native" was always raised.

In fact at a certain stage the N.F.D. Somalis were distinguished from the other Bantu tribes in the country.

and were called "tribesmen" instead of "natives". The other section, the urban or Ishaq Somalis were often referred to as "Aliens" or "non-native". It is important thus, not only from the point of view of the Kenya Somalis, but also for the political position of the Somalis in the general African scene, that the question of their origin and position should be clarified.

According to Somali tradition, the Somali people are divided into three main classes. Firstly, the Asha Somalis classed by Genealogists as "Semitic" owing to their traditional descent from the union of two Arab Proselytizers Sheikh Ishaq bin Ahmad and Darod bin Ismail with "Hamitic" women. Secondly, the Irir or Hawiye Somalis, classed as "pure Hamites" and regarded as the descendants of "Hamitic" people who were resident near the Red Sea Coast and the Gulf of Aden when the Arabs arrived, into whose families those Arab immigrants married. Thirdly, the low class Somali tribes known as Sup or Sab including the smiths and the hunters - Tomal, Midgan and Bon.  

Somali tradition was also frequently supplemented by writings from prominent people in the different parts of the Horn of Africa. Ali Ahmad Udum, the President of the Liberation Front of the French Somali Coast maintained

1. It is still not clear on what grounds the words "Semitic" and "Hamitic" are used in this context; whether they denote a difference in skin colour, physical features or linguistic variations.

that both the Danakil and Somalis were "Hamites" mixed with immigrants from Arabia and that this immigration together with the degree of integration among the immigrants had resulted in a predominantly Arabicized Somali nation.¹

However, subsequent research into the origin of Somalis is increasingly sceptical of the "Semitic" and even the "Hamitic" hypotheses. Writing in 1938, Sir Vincent Glenday, a prominent Somali administrator, quoted the Italian anthropologist Sergi, to illustrate his views on the subject. Sergi, after comparing the physical type of the Somali with that of other branches of the "Hamitic race", concluded that, "the Semitic ancestry of the Asha tribes has by the present time left no visible trace on the type and that the Somalis of the present day must be regarded from an anthropological point of view as pure Hamites .."²

J. Barton³ had even suggested that the Somali is not a "pure Hamite" and that the physical characteristics of the race show signs of interbreeding with Galla, Afar, Arabs, Abyssinians, Bantu and negroes.

I.M. Lewis who has amply dealt with Somali oral tradition stated in "The Somali conquest of The Horn of Africa":

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¹ Ali Ahmad Udum, Al-Danakil Tarikhiya wa Basbariya, pp. 42, 49, 109. The author is a Dankali born in French Somaliland in 1913.
³ J. Barton, "An account of the origins of the Galla and Somali Tribes", Ibid.
"Although it is thus possible to uncover the main trends of Somali movements and their general chronological sequence, Somali origins remain obscure. ... it is impossible to determine yet whether the Somali are to be regarded as independent Hamitic stock, or whether rather they are to be considered as a heavily Arabicized segment of that other great branch of the Eastern Hamites, the Galla, with whom they are also closely connected historically."¹

Later still I.M. Lewis was increasingly sceptical of the Semitic hypothesis and was of the opinion that "ethnically and culturally the Somalis belong to the Hamitic ethnic group. Their closest kinsmen are the surrounding Hamitic (or as they are often called 'cushitic') peoples of the Ethiopian Lowlands, and Eritrea - the traditionally bellicose Afar (or Danakil), the Galla, Saho and Beja."² But he did not altogether dismiss the fact that the traditional Arab ancestry claimed by the Somalis is part and parcel of the traditional and profound Somali attachment to Islam.³ These traditions, according to Lewis, "Commemorate the many centuries of contact between

³. Historians are not quite sure as to the exact date of Islamic penetration in Somalia but it was generally assumed that Islam has first arrived about the middle of the first century A.H. by Muslim traders from Arabia. Also it was certain that both the north and southern Somali coasts have unquestionably been in extensive contact with the Muslim world for almost a thousand years. All the Somalis are Sunnis of the Shafi rite, and the two main tariquas, the Qadiriya and the Ahmadiya, are similarly represented in both north and south. (See, Jami Umar Isa, Tarikh al-Somal fil-Usur al-Wusta Wal-Haditha, (Cairo, 1385-1965) pp. 13-16; I.M. Lewis, "Conformity and Contrast in Somali Islam", Islam in Tropical Africa, (1966), p. 255).
the Somali and Arabian Coasts which have brought Islam and many other elements of Muslim Arab culture to Somaliland."

Modern historical and linguistic research is, however, not only critical of the Semitic hypothesis of Somali origin, but has also questioned the validity of the word "Hamite". H.S. Lewis dismissed Somali tradition relating to Arabian descent as "both highly suspect and frequently irrelevant to the problem of origins."¹ Discussing the validity of these traditions H.S. Lewis further stated, "There can be no doubt that these tales contain little reliable historical material; but, even if we accept I.M. Lewis's contention that they mirror actual settlement of Arabs among the Somali, this would leave unanswered the question of where the indigenous Somali had come from". Analysing tradition collected and studied by Cerulli,² on the various Hawiye and Rahanwein groups, H.S. Lewis maintained that they affirmed the belief that Tunni, Hawiye, Ajuran and Jiddu Somali have been in the south for many centuries, as the written evidence indicated. In conclusion, he was of the opinion that the preponderant trend of Eastern Cushitic migration and expansion has been from the south and west to the north and east rather than the reverse and that the original

homeland of the Somali may be placed in the south-eastern highlands of Ethiopia. Moreover, he established that the Galla, Somali, Afar and Saho once belonged to a single speech community located in southern Ethiopia and presumably shared more common cultural elements than they do now, many centuries after their separation.¹

H.S. Lewis's hypothesis which questioned the "Semitic" origin of the Somalis was further supplemented by recent linguistic research into Somali and kindred languages. This has seriously questioned the use of the word "Hamite" even at a linguistic level. Greenberg had emphatically stated:

"As a matter of fact, even the linguistic use of the term Hamite should be abandoned. The Semitic languages do not occupy any special place in the total Hamito-Semitic complex... In other words, the non-Semitic languages of the Hamito-Semitic family do not form a linguistic unity as against Semitic. Therefore, the term Hamitic, which has been reserved for this use, does not refer to any valid linguistic entity.... The only remaining use of the term Hamitic is the complex term Hamito-Semitic and even here it can only lead to misconceptions regarding a special place for Semitic within the entire family.... I suggest the name Afroasiatic for this family as the only one found both in Africa and in Asia. In this way Hamitic could be entirely eliminated from use even as a linguistic term.²"

¹ H.S. Lewis, p. 42.
² Joseph H. Greenberg, Languages of Africa, (Bloomington, 1966), Ch. III, "Afroasiatic", pp. 42-65, p. 50. His point of view was also adhered to by Robert G. Armstrong, The Study of West African Languages, (Ibadan, 1966), an expanded version of an Inaugural Lecture delivered at the University of Ibadan on 20th February 1964, in which he criticized C. Meinhof, in his Die Sprachen der Hamiten, (Hamburg, 1912). The latter was a study of Fula, Hausa, Schiib, Bedauye, Somali, Masai, and Nama and which attempts to show that they are all "Hamitic" languages. Their views were also shared by Dr. Andrzejewski (Department of Language, S.O.A.S. London).
It is thus clear that modern research has consistently tended to repudiate the use of "Semitic" and "Hamitic" and to place the homeland of the Somalis in the African soil, in the highlands of Ethiopia, and the Somali oral tradition which overstates Arabian descent were regarded as suspect because of the great time depth involved. But owing to the fact that the British administration was established well before these studies into Somali origins were conducted and also due to the tremendous pressure by Kenya Somalis that they should be classed differently from the African tribes in the Colony and Protectorate, the question of Somali origin proved a major factor in the inconsistency of British Somali policy in Kenya. The question as to whether the Somali was to be regarded as a "native" or a "non-native" in the laws of the country proved a difficult problem throughout the British colonial period.

Somali immigration into the N.F.D.

Another problem involved in the administration of the Kenya Somalis at that time was due to the fact that the British administration was always inclined to regard the Somalis as recent comers to the N.F.D. and they were deprived of certain rights to which other groups in the country were entitled. Among these, the question of land tenure was outstanding whereby the Somalis both in Jubaland and the N.F.D. were considered occupants of crown land and had no right of ownership. The question of when the Somalis had actually crossed the Juba into Kenya was the
subject of another controversy which had its marks on the administration of the Somalis during the colonial period.

As far as the N.F.D. is concerned, the Somalis seemed to have come to the Province from two different directions: Abyssinia and Jubaland. The methods of infiltration were not the same; those from Abyssinia established themselves in the district by adopting the 'Shegat' system while those coming from the Juba appeared in a more warlike disposition. The immigration from the north seems to have been either caused or encouraged by the invasion of Ethiopia in the 16th Century by the Muslim leader Ahmad Gurre (or Gran) of the Muslim state of Adal who had Somalis among his forces. His army had over a period of time devastated Ethiopia almost to the point of collapse until the Ethiopians with Portuguese support defeated him in 1542. This victory closed the gateway to any Somali expansion to the west and diverted Somali and Galla pressure increasingly towards the south.  

On the other hand, I.M. Lewis has further established that by the seventeenth century the old Somali Ajuran sultanate on the lower Shebelle River, linked with the port of Mogadishu, was overthrown and Mogadishu itself was invaded and split into two rival quarters. The Ajuran

1. Shegat is a system, or custom among the Somalis and their kindred nomads whereby the tribe or section of a tribe may be allowed to attach itself to a stronger or more powerful tribe and live with it. The weaker section is called 'Shegat'.
and their allies, the Madanle, were driven southwards into what was known as the N.F.D. where they appear to have been the first inhabitants of the area. The Ajuran Madanle were then followed by another Somali clan, the Dabarre. In alliance with the Galla Boran who appeared on the scene, the Ajuran occupied the area between Buna in the N.F.D. and Liban in Ethiopia at the expense of the Dabarre who replaced the Madanle near Wajir. They in their turn, were soon displaced by an influx of Galla Wardy from the Juba River. By about 1850 these new Galla immigrants dominated the whole of the Tana River region. But the ascendancy of the Galla seemed short lived as they were eventually challenged by new Darod Somali immigrants from the north. The latter crossed the Juba to find a ready welcome from the Wardy Galla who needed their support against the Akamba and the Masai raiders from the west and south. The Darod Wardy alliance lasted until about 1865 when, as a result of an outbreak of a smallpox epidemic among the Wardy, the Somalis found their opportunity and thrust forward further south. In 1870 the Ajuran and the Boran Galla jointly drove out the Wardy from Wajir and by 1909 parties of the Darod had reached the Tana River and the Ajuran abandoned Wajir to the Ogaden Darod.

1. In a recent work on the Somalis, "The Pastoral Tribes of Northern Kenya 1800-1916", unpublished Ph.D. Thesis (London, 1970), E.R. Turton established that the Darod attacked the Wardy in 1867 and was of the opinion that the epidemic among the Boran of 1865 and 1867 never reached the mouth of the Juba or the coast. (See Turton, p. 77 footnote 2.)

After defeating the Wardy Galla the Somalis continued their movement towards the Lorian Swamp led by Abdi Ibrahim. With him was a party of the Abd Wak, Aulihan, Muhammad Zubeir, Herti and a few Marehan. Having originally started from Afmadu, the party arrived at a place visible from Garba Tulla named by the Somalis "BureBalaya" (the hill of sorrow and loss). As the name implies, the Somalis seemed to have lost considerably on the fighting which took place between them and the Meru, but it did not discourage them from proceeding onwards.

Leaving "BureBalaya" behind, the Somalis reached the Uaso Nyiro near Serchio. There they fell in with a party of Rendille and were obliged to fight. Being defeated they returned to Afmadu and the Deshek Wama. Sometime later, Abdi Ibrahim took his young men westward again, for his eyes had feasted on the water and the grazing of the Uaso Nyiro. He then established villages which became the resting place for Ogaden parties. In 1892 he started on his way to Garba Tulla, from where he tried to pass once more by "BureBalaya" where he was previously defeated and for this reason many of his men deserted him. The remainder were wiped out by a group of Meru and Rendille and Abdi Ibrahim himself was killed. However his move was significant in that it marked the biggest infiltration

1. The father of the prominent Abd Wak chief Stambul Abdi. The Battle between the Somalis and the Meru is described in K.N.A./DC/GRSSA 3/4 Garissa District Political Records Vol. II.
by Somali groups into the interior of the area to be
known as the N.F.D. and from then onwards large Somali
groups followed.

These later Somali movements into the N.F.D., as
I.M. Lewis had observed, should not divert attention from
the fact that Somali immigration into the N.F.D. started
much earlier. He remarked, "The striking character of
these later Somali movements has tended to divert attention
from the earlier Somali penetration of northern Kenya and
it is to some extent responsible for the impression given
by many accounts (including some of my own) that the Somali
occupation of the N.F.D. is altogether of comparatively
recent date." Recent research had also tended to prove
that Somali tribes inhabited an area generally associated
with the Wardy Galla from at least the beginning of the
19th century, also these tribes had long been in the area
and they were allies or 'shegats' of the Galla. So the
contention that the Somalis settlements in the N.F.D. had
just coincided with the establishment of the British
administration of the area could not be supported.

The most important sections of the Somalis in the
N.F.D. were the Darod and the Hawiya branches. The Darod
are principally of the Ogaden clan and are represented by
seven sub-divisions:- Muhammad Zubeir, Aulihan, Abd Wak,

1. See I.M. Lewis, "The problem of the N.F.D." p. 55;
Also for Somali invasion of the N.F.D. see R.G. Turnbull,
"The Darod Invasion"; "The Wardeh"; "Some notes on the
History of the Degodia".
2. Turton, p. 64.
Abdallah, Maghabul, Rer Muhammad and Habr Suliaman. Other Darod sections in the area are the Marehan who occupy the north eastern corner of Jubaland between Dolo and Serenli. Most important among their sub-divisions are the Rer Hasan, Rer Ahmad Weid, and Rer Eili Dera. The third section of the Darod present in Jubaland and the N.F.D. is the Herti subdivided into Mijertein, Warsengeleh and Dolbahanta. The Herti occupied the coast area around Kismayu, extending inland as far as the Deshek Wama. The Hawiya are less numerous in the N.F.D. than the Darod and are represented by the Ajuran, Degodia, Murille and Gurreh.

The Geography of the Somali country:

The two main Somali inhabited provinces in Kenya, in the period under consideration, were Jubaland and the N.F.D., Jubaland to the east and the N.F.D. to the west. The boundary between them ran from Unsi on the Daua to the Lorian Swamp, passing to the east of Eil Wak, and through the District of Wajir. From the Lorian Swamp it ran in a straight line south-east to Dicks Head (Ras Kiamboni) on

1. See Appendix I for Somali genealogical trees. Also see Handbook of Kenya Colony and Protectorate, pp. 250-2 and T.S. Thomas, Jubaland and the Northern Frontier District, 1917.


3. See Maps 1 and 2 (pocket).
the coast. Jubaland covered an area of approximately 46,740 sq. miles, and for the purpose of administration it was divided into four Districts of Gosha, Kismayu, Afmadu and Serenli.

In Jubaland the country consisted of a series of broad shallow valleys overgrown for most of the time with dense bush. A low ridge of hills runs north-east and south-west between Gobwen and Port Dunford. Immediately behind them the country is flat and thick with thorn bushes. Towards the north-west of the province the belts of bush are denser while towards the south open plains are larger and more numerous.

The two main permanent streams in Jubaland are the Juba and the Daua. The Juba rises in the highlands of Abyssinia and as far as Dolo it is known as the Webi Ganale. It then joins the Daua River and becomes the Juba. It is navigable throughout the year as far as Yonte but its banks and adjacent swamps as far as Serenli are the habitat of the tsetse fly. At that time in the Marehan country, in north-eastern Jubaland, water was to be found at several places, but the supply was small. In the rest of the Province there were no permanent water holes, except the wells at Wajir, Eil Wak, Afmadu, Fungal and Kauroa. In the Wajir District which was on the caravan route from Kismayu to Abyssinia, there were several hundred wells of clear, clean water, but there was no more water for seventy miles in any direction. The wells of Fungal and Afmadu on the
Lak Dera are about 180 miles south of Wajir and there was no water all the way. At Eil Wak, 118 miles to the north-east of Wajir, there was a collection of about a hundred wells, spread over an area of eight sq. miles but their supply was salty.

Water could be obtained from the Lorian Swamp, which properly speaking is in the N.F.D., and was then situated in the south-west corner of Jubaland Province. In the dry season it is a mud flat with a permanent supply of water in its midst. The Swamp is fed by the Uaso Nyiro River, the waters of which come down from the Aberdare Mountains and Mount Kenya. Another source of water is the Deshek Wama, a lake south of Afmadu, originally fed from the Juba River and the rainfall. The Lak Dera, which connects the Lorian Swamp with the Deshek Wama, is another source with a well defined river-bed. But apart from the two permanent sources, the Juba and the Daua, the rest of the watering places were too scant, too scattered and only good for parts of the year.

The geography of the N.F.D. is hardly different from that of Jubaland. The N.F.D. is about 95,000 sq. miles roughly equal in extent to Great Britain and Ireland; and holds a population of approximately 280,000. It is bounded to the north by Ethiopia, to the east by the present Somali Republic, to the South by Mount Kenya and the Tana River Basin and to the west by the Samburu District and Lake Rudolph. The N.F.D. was occupied and administered by the British in 1909 and was later divided into six
districts, Wajir, Garissa, Mandera, Moyale, Marsabit and Isiolo.

The terrain of the N.F.D. is mostly low lying, hot semi-desert with occasional rocky massifs. The rainfall ranges from 5 to 10 inches annually and many areas are so dry that only camels, sheep and goats can be kept. The grass and herbage watered by the rain soon withers and dies, scorched by a hot sun.

Donaldson-Smith, one of the first travellers through the N.F.D., described the country as low, barren and dry. Travelling westwards from the Juba and the Daua, he noted that there was not a single river of permanently rising water till the Omo and Lake Rudolph were reached. Springs were very rare, the wells were dug in stream beds only a few feet deep, and sometimes, when empty, took a day to fill up again. Such wells were found in Sidima and also in water courses which ran into the Uaso Nyiro south of Marsabit. Even the deep dug wells like the Eil Wak "the wells of God" though very numerous were filled up and not in use.

So the N.F.D. holds little permanent water, and the grazing is very sparse. Except for the Tana River, the Daua and the Uaso Nyiro, no permanent water is available in that vast expanse; and even those permanent water supplies were not always easily accessible for the Somalis for various administrative reasons. This was especially the case with the Tana, as we shall see later. Thus, in addition to the wide dispersal of the tribe throughout the
N.F.D., the problem to which the administration had to find solutions arose mainly from the immensity of the area and the aridity of the country.

The Attitude of Somalis to Foreign Rule before 1895:-

In addition to the above problems which the British administration had to face on the start of the administration in 1895, the attitude of the Somalis to the previous attempts of foreign rule by the Sultan of Zanzibar and the Imperial British East Africa Company (I.B.E.A.) did not ease their task. The administration of the area to be known as the N.F.D. did not start before 1909 and at the beginning British authorities had to deal only with Jubaland which was included in the British sphere as part of the territory administered by I.B.E.A. on behalf of the Sultan.

The Sultans of Zanzibar saw the importance of the Somali coast and particularly of Kismayu at the mouth of the Juba as a great economic potentiality. Majid, who showed considerable interest, died in 1870 and his death delayed further action of intervention in the way of exerting direct authority of the area. It was not till about 1872 that a Wali was sent to Kismayu. Hamed, who succeeded Majid, had just managed to complete a stone fort for the garrison, when an Egyptian force under McKillop Pasha appeared in 1875 in an attempt to subjugate the whole of the Somali coast. But the Egyptian occupation was only short lived.

1. For more on the period under the Sultans of Zanzibar see Turton, pp. 81-90.
After their departure, a Somali petition was sent to the Sultan of Zanzibar to establish a form of protectorate over Kismayu and to encourage the traders to visit the place. In reply, the Sultan sent an Arab Commission which was established in Kismayu and which proceeded to make itself highly unpopular with the inland tribes. It was generally accepted that throughout the period when the Sultans of Zanzibar ruled over the Somali coast their influence appeared "...never to have reached any more than a few miles beyond their walled towns." The reason seemed to be partly because of the attitude of the local tribes, the Tuni, the Herti and the Muhammad Zubeir towards the Arabs from one side, and the tension which existed between these tribes from the other: this factor greatly hindered the progress of administration. As a result, and as was later observed by the Company officials, "...during the twenty-five years that Kismayu had been subject to the Sultan of Zanzibar no effort had been made to improve the place, the country, or the status of the people..."

At this juncture the growing interest in the East African mainland motivated the institution of 1886 Treaty between Britain and Germany. The two Powers were competing for a sphere of influence in East Africa and had, by the

1. K.N.A./PC/NFD 4/6/1 Jubaland Political Record pre-1915.
above Treaty, agreed to recognize the sovereignty of the Sultan of Zanzibar over parts of the East African coast to a depth of ten miles including certain ports as far as Warsheikh. The two European Powers divided the hinterland along a line running northwestwards from the mouth of the River Wanga to the eastern shore of Lake Victoria Nyanza. The British Government took the northern zone while the Germans took the southern. Britain also accepted by implication, a German claim to a protectorate over Witu and the coast 'fronting that Sultanate'. In 1890 and in return for Britain's secession of Heligoland, Germany withdrew her Protectorate over Witu and over the adjoining coast up to Kismayu, and surrendered her claims to the territories north of the Tana. As a result, Jubaland fell into the British sphere of influence and the area was consequently handed over to the administration of I.B.E.A.

The Company, by agreement from the Sultan of Zanzibar, assumed responsibility by the concession signed on August 1st, 1889 and on the 5th March 1891 for the administration of Witu and the Wole of Jubaland. The boundary between Italian Somaliland and the Company's sphere was then the Juba River. The Company cherished the concession as 
"... the place is of considerable importance as the outlet

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of the trade of the Somali country of the interior, and
as the only harbour north of the Manda Bay (Witu) which
affords shelter to vessels at all seasons of the year. 1
To the Somalis, the Company like the Zanzibar Sultans
before it, was mainly concerned with the economic
exploitation of Jubaland. Further, the concern of I.B.E.A.
in the Juba-Tana area, after it had received its charter,
was to isolate the Witu Company, already operative there,
and to stake a prior claim, if possible, to the interior
beyond the German Protectorate. 2 As a result of this,
the Company adopted a new line of tribal policy towards
the Somalis which essentially aimed at securing the friend¬
ship of these Somali clans that lived in the interior,
instead of those that lived on the coast. In short the
Ogaden against the Herti.

Further still, the establishment of the Company did
not only present a reshuffle in the position of the
Somali tribes but it had also challenged their economic
position. The Jubaland Somalis had for a long time
mastered and acted as middle-men for the trade of the
interior. Indeed, as McDermott has put it:-

"The leading idea of the Company was to establish
such relations with the Somali tribes as would
ensure free commercial communication with the
interior, especially with the country of the Boran
Gallas,... a country supplying numerous products
for which there had heretofore been no access to
the sea save through the hands of the Somali
middlemen..." 3

2. Quoted by Turton, Portal to Salisbury 27-10-1889
FO. 84/1964. p. 126.
But the Company was never able to establish any sort of peaceful relations with the Somalis in order to achieve its goal and instead its period was marked by constant feud and bloodshed.

Attempting to win over the Somalis, the Company seemed to have followed two ways both of which hardly worked. At first the policy was to conclude treaties and pursue friendly attitudes towards the Somali sultans. At one stage, Baird Thompson, a Company official, was prepared to make "verbal agreement with the chiefs of Ogaden and Herti tribes on 5th May 1893 and one of the terms... was that all the Somali slaves seeking refuge in Kismayu would be returned on application to their masters so long as the Somalis remained peaceful."¹ The Somalis had by that time in their possession slaves both from the Boran Galla and other up-country tribes like the Pokomo, Wanyika, Akamba, Kikuyu etc. The Company managed to free about one hundred and ninety two by October 1892.² But the Somalis not having any interest for cultivation themselves, utilized these slaves mostly for stock raising and domestic works. However, the Somalis were generally less affected by the impact of the abolition of slavery than the Arabs down the East Coast, and the abolition was by no means a factor affecting the position of the Somalis. It was the fact that the Company had interrupted their position as middlemen in a legitimate trade towards the interior that had upset

1. K.N.A./C.P 68/19/64 R.C. Farrant to Acting Commissioner 27-7-1893.
2. Ibid.
them and hence accounted for the constant opposition.

The other method by which the Company tried to win the Somalis was by offering heavy subsidies for the very powerful chiefs and elders. The natural consequence of this was that they became more demanding and disobedient. At the time the prominent chiefs among the Jubaland Somalis were - Shirwa Ismail, Sultan of the Herti (Rer Ali Sulieman); Ali Nahar, Herti elder; Ismail Duban, Herti elder; Muhammad Jama, Herti elder; and Muhammad Guban, Herti elder. From the Ogaden section Murjan Yusuf, Sultan of the Ogaden (Rer Muhammad Zubeir), his sons Umar Murjan and Ahmad Murjan and Ali Jbraeil, a Muhammad Zubeir elder. From the Aulihan, Abdul ar-Rahman Mursal was the prominent chief. But once again neither the provision of subsidies nor negotiation with those chiefs helped to change their attitude towards the Company and consequently the Company had to deal not only with them but with their different sections.

In spite of difficulties, the Company went on with its intended economic programme of bringing the trade of the Boran country to its natural outlet at Kismayu. The stern wheeler 'S.S. Kenia' was built which, after exploring the Tana River, was placed on the Juba under the command of Captain Dundas with Mr. MacDougall as trader. Up to that time the Boran trade found an outlet via Bardera and Lugh to Barawa and Merka on the Italian coast; and the 'Kenia' was meant to divert some of this trade to Kismayu. Unfortunately, owing to the constant opposition by the Somalis, the 'Kenia' project did not materialize and the
whole scheme was a failure. Moreover, things were made worse by the Somalis again waging an outstanding claim against the Sultan for a debt of 'blood money' in respect of certain members of their tribe who had been killed by the Sultan's soldiers. The Somalis insisted upon this claim with warmth,\(^1\) which was a sign that they were either trying to take advantage of the Company's anxiety to compromise with them, or was an excuse to start fresh troubles.

In addition to the unsettled 'diya' claim with the Sultan of Zanzibar, the Somalis had another grievance which indulged the Company in further complications. The Somali elders claimed large proportions of land around Kismayu which, before I.B.E.A. established itself there, they had sold to Indian speculators. The title-deeds of these plots were registered at Zanzibar. Todd, the Company's representative, learning of these transactions, protested that the deeds should have been registered at Kismayu and also declared that all unoccupied plots belonged to the Company under the Company's treaty with the Sultan.\(^2\)

The Somalis, who were naturally annoyed by Todd's attitude, petitioned H.J.R. Pigott the administrator at Mombasa to remove him. But Pigott, being unaware of the seriousness of the situation, ignored the petition.

Meanwhile, Todd decided to hold a baraza (open meeting) with the Somalis in January 1893 in order to solve the land

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question and strong military precautions were arranged for by the Company officials. The Somalis in their turn agreed to attend the Baraza on condition that they be allowed to bring arms with them. Todd on his part had already implied to the Somalis his intention of arresting the principal Somali chiefs in the baraza in case he failed to come to an agreement with them. He explained to the seventy notables present his reasons for not recognizing their claims and pointed out that they were heavily subsidized by the Company.

The Todd baraza which proceeded in such a tense atmosphere had naturally ended up in a disaster. The Somalis were nervous on learning about the landing of the naval party and in the confusion which had followed Todd was stabbed on the neck by a Somali and shooting was exchanged between the two parties. Disturbances were not only confined to the meeting; fighting spread to the Somali villages. H.M.S. 'Widgeon' bombarded Somali villages consisting of about 2,000 armed men. A few days later combined forces of Somalis, Arabs and Indians attacked Kismayu and a series of fights were reported as a result of which the administration, not only in Kismayu but also in Lamu, Malindi and Mombasa down the coast was alerted.

On receipt of the news of the disastrous result of the Todd's baraza, Rennel Rodd, the Consul General at Zanzibar, proceeded to Kismayu. He ordered a station to be built and Todd was replaced in May 1893 by Baird Thompson who was himself succeeded by McDougall. To their greatest embarrassment the hundred Hyderabad troops which were sent from Zanzibar to garrison Gobwen under Hamilton at Turki Hill mutinied and half of them joined the Somalis with their guns and ammunition. Seven days later the first Somali rebellion occurred with a surprise attack on Turki Hill station. Hamilton was shot on August 11th and most of his men were killed.

As a result of these troubles, Somali property was confiscated, their slaves taken over and freed, their bank balances appropriated, and their ivory sold for the Company's personal benefits. These occurrences also gave rise to an interesting correspondence between the directors and the Foreign Office on the question of the responsibility for the conduct of the Somalis. When the Company was withdrawing from Witu the preceding month (July 1893) Her Majesty's Government insisted that the withdrawal should include the surrender by the Company of all administrative rights in the whole territory between the Tana and the Juba Rivers. Further, the Foreign Office warned the Company that they were not prepared to

1. K.N.A./C.P. 68/19/64. Farrant to Superintendent Lamu, 10-8-1893.
guarantee the protection of the Company against Somalis raids beyond the ten miles.

However, matters improved with the taking over of the Company's administration by Craufurd\(^1\) who replaced Rennel Rodd. When Gobwen was again raided by the Somalis in February 1894, they were met by the Company's forces and defeated. In June 1895, an expedition was undertaken through the country of the Herti and a tribute was paid by their Sultan, sheikhs and headmen. In addition, the quarterly report of the District for March 31st showed that the country was quiet and trade and revenue were much improved. The total customs of the year was stated as Rs.2,857,302 which added to Rs. 2790 for the previous quarter gave an aggregate of Rs 5,648 showing an increase of Rs. 1000 over the latter half of 1893 and Rs. 1200 more than the first half of the same year. Exports for March had also shown improvement; Rs.9084.39 were collected in addition to thirty-nine tusks of ivory worth Rs.5,000. These exports were the product of a raid on the Boran Gallas by the Ogaden and Herti Somalis.

Judging the position of the Jubaland Somalis as a whole, under the administration of I.B.E.A., it was obvious that the administration of the Company was mainly concerned with the economic and not the political affairs of the Somalis. No efforts were made to establish a sound system for future administration, in fact its manoeuvres

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1. Mr. Craufurd was especially sent out from England to take charge of Kismayu in October 1893.
had deepened the cleavage between the Herti and the Ogaden on one side and between them and its officials on the other. Moreover, the challenge it provided for their mastery of the inland trade had provoked them into constant feuds. In addition to this the Company had even failed to establish its own economic programme and the results apart from the brief period under Craufurd were utterly discouraging. In fact, as Turton has observed, in the period between 1891 and 1895 there was no year when the Company was not faced with a sizeable deficit. The export value of hides and ivory, the most important items of trade, were constantly falling as a result of the Company's miscalculation of the economic potentialities of the area.

As a result, it is not surprising to see that the Somalis had never welcomed the Company's administration and their attitude to it had largely affected their views and behaviour towards the Protectorate Government which had taken over in 1895 after I.B.E.A. had eventually surrendered its charter.

Chapter I
The Jubaland Somali: 1895-1916

On 1st July 1895, A.H. Hardinge, Her Majesty’s Agent and Consul-General at Zanzibar, declared a British Protectorate over the territory previously administered by I.B.E.A. The territory stretched as far as Kikuyu to the interior and embraced the whole Coast from Wanga to Kismayu. In the first place, Hardinge recommended that four provinces should be created: Coast, Ukamba, Tanaland, and Jubaland, to be administered respectively by Pigott, Ainsworth, Rogers, and Jenner, from Mombasa, Machakos, Lamu and Kismayu. These officers, to be known as Sub-Commissioners, should be directly responsible for Hardinge as Commissioner.¹

Hardinge had himself contemplated a visit to Kismayu to declare British rule in Jubaland but was delayed because of the Mazrui Rebellion.² Instead, he despatched a letter to A.C.W. Jenner, the appointed Sub-Commissioner to the Province instructing him to leave for Kismayu in July 7th and advising him as to the projected Government Somali policy in the future. This policy centred essentially upon a

² In February 1895, four months before Hardinge was appointed, a serious rebellion had broken out among the members of the Mazrui dynasty at Takaunga over succession. In August, the Mazruis who recognized neither the Sultan of Zanzibar’s rule nor that of I.B.E.A. were united in their opposition to the newly declared Protectorate Government. (For more on Mazrui and Arab reaction see, T.H.R. Cashmore, “Sheikh Mbaruk bin Rashid bin Salim el Mazrui”, Leadership in Eastern Africa, ed. Norman R. Bennett, (Boston, 1968), pp. 111-137.
First, Jenner was instructed to make clear to the Somalis that no change had taken place or was contemplated in the Sultan's position as Sovereign of the ten-miles radius round Kismayu and of the adjacent islands. Secondly, he was to assure the Somalis that Islamic teachings and customs would be maintained as before. Thirdly, Jenner's attention was partially directed to the question of the abolition of slavery and the violation in this respect reported in the conduct of the Company officials. These officials had, "on the grounds of expediency not only tolerated the existence of slavery in the town, but even occasionally returned to their Somali owners runaway slaves in Kismayu itself." However, Hardinge was anxious that Jenner should bear this in mind, but at the same time should not make any public announcement on the subject, and rather continue quietly to apply the Sayyid Barghash Decree until he could rely on the support of a larger and more trustworthy armed force than was at that time at his disposal.

Fourthly, on the question of his relations with the Somalis (apart from the question of runaway slaves), Jenner had at the time to be guided mainly by Craufurd's advice; and while insisting on proper respect being paid to the administration of Her Majesty's Government and to the flag of the Sultan in the town of Kismayu, outside it he had to avoid involving himself in disputes or raising complex

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1. K.N.A./PC/Jub. 2/11/3 Hardinge to Jenner 5-7-1895. Also see Introduction p. 21.
questions, provided he was able to postpone them consistently with the public interest. Fifthly, his attention was directed to his relations with the Italian Government on the Benadir to the north. The river Juba being the frontier between the British and the Italian spheres of influence in East Africa, it was inevitable that he would come into contact with the Italian authorities on the left bank. He was thus instructed to make a point of cultivating the friendliest possible intercourse and co-operation. Finally, in the absence of direct or regular communications with Zanzibar, Jenner was to rely to some extent on his own judgment and discretion and his knowledge of the general principles on which the affairs of the Protectorate were conducted, reporting to Hardinge whenever possible on points where he was in doubt.¹

Due to the delay of Jenner’s arrival, Hardinge had once more despatched fresh instructions to Craufurd who was acting on his behalf. The geographical limits of the Province were fixed except for the northern and the interior frontier which "must necessarily remain for some time to come undefined, but it will include the whole region west of the right bank of the Juba so far as it is known and the territories of the Somali chief Magan (Murjan) Yusuf, and of the Galla ruler of the Boran with both of whom the Sub-Commissioner should endeavour to establish such relations as may in his opinion be both politically and commercially,

¹ Ibid.
to the public interest." Further, the Province was divided into two districts each under a district officer and an assistant. The two districts to be Kismayu and Gosha—the former to comprise the Herti Somali's country and the latter to include the Ogaden.

As a former official of I.B.E.A., Craufurd realized that of all the policies mentioned, the most important and pressing one in dealing with the Jubaland Somalis was to obtain the allegiance of the Somali chiefs, a task which he as an experienced Company official must have realized was by no means an easy one, but without which no political or economic progress could be carried out.

The two distinct Somali groups in the Province, the Herti and the Ogaden, were by the above administrative arrangement placed into two separate administrative districts, Gosha and Kismayu. The Herti lived in the vicinity of Kismayu, Gobwen, Yonte and within a radius of about thirty miles of Kismayu. Their number had been roughly estimated to be about 6,000 with about 20,000 cattle; they had been loyal to the Company since 1892 when with the Ogaden (the two combined are called Kablalla) they attacked Tritton and McDougall who were returning on the steamer 'Kenia' from Gosha. The Herti were subjugated by the Company after six days' fighting. Thereafter no trouble arose. In July

1. K.N.A./PC/Jub. 2/1/1 Hardinge to Craufurd 30-10-1895.
2. The Marehan, who occupied the North-East corner of Jubaland are to be dealt with later.
1895, when Craufurd was the Company's Superintendent, he managed to undertake a successful expedition through their country where their Sultan Shirwa Ismail, his Prime Minister Ali Nahar, the sheikhs and headmen had been subjected and had paid tribute. In the following month, upon the establishment of Protectorate rule, Craufurd was once again in the Herti country with Jenner and once again he was assured of loyal support. In October of the same year Shirwa Ismail and Ali Nahar placed themselves, their families and their possessions under Government protection.

Having successfully achieved the support of the Herti, Craufurd had in November of the same year made an expedition to Afmadu, the Capital of the Ogaden section of the Darod. The Ogaden chiefly occupied the interior of the Province and were said to be about 12,000 strong with large numbers of cattle. Craufurd's expedition to the Ogaden country, like that to the Herti, was reported to have achieved its ends. The Sultan of the Herti accompanied Craufurd and his presence served to impress upon the Sultan of the Ogaden, Murjan Yusuf, the fact that a chief of equal rank and importance with himself regarded obedience and service to Her Majesty's Government as an honourable duty. Neither the Marquis of Salisbury nor Hardinge was slow to appreciate these efforts. Hardinge wrote to Craufurd to express his satisfaction "... shared by the Marquis of Salisbury, as this intelligence affords a fresh proof of your success and

2. K.N.A./PG/NFD. 4/6/1 Jubaland Political Record Pre-1915 p. 3.
ability in dealing with the Somali chiefs."

At this stage, whether it was the result of inter-clan rivalry between the different Darod sections or whether it was the result of the proximity of the Herti to Kismayu, the Herti’s submission appeared to be complete, and both Shirwa Ismail and Ali Nahar were appointed political officers of the Government. On the other hand, Craufurd had only just made a start with the Ogaden in his November expedition. From then on his attention was increasingly directed towards Afmadu and the turbulent Ogaden section. Being impressed by the above results, he had once again set off to their country in March 1896 where Hasan Birjin, on behalf of the Abdullah section of the tribe, declared his allegiance and paid a tribute of livestock. At Afmadu a public baraza was held and a deed of submission was signed and sealed by Sheikh Murjan Yusuf on behalf of the Ogaden. Once again Ali Nahar was present in his capacity as a political officer for the Sub-Commissioner.

Besides the Somalis, Craufurd was also successful in satisfying one of Hardingie’s requests included in his despatch to Jenner outlining the future policy in the area. Hardingie was anxious that the Sub-Commissioner should carefully handle and if possible completely subjugate the Gosha and the Boran chiefs as a step in facilitating a sound

2. See Turton, p. 192.
3. K.N.A./PC/NFD. 4/6/1 Jubaland Political Record pre-1915 p. 3.
administration for the Somali Province as a whole. The
District of Gosha was a narrow strip of land along the river
Juba, with a large 'colony' of about 25,000 or 30,000
inhabitants almost equally divided between the British and
the Italian territories. The Wagosha consisted of runaway
slaves of the Somalis. This 'colony' was founded by a
Bantu named Nasib Pondo who became a powerful chief until
deposed by the Italians. The Wagosha were essentially
cultivators and the whole of their land was most fertile
and was said to have a great future before it. On the
British side, Gosha was subdivided into six sub-districts.
One of Craufurd's successes was that he achieved their
submission; for, under headman Nasib Pondo they acknowledged
in writing the authority of the British Government.¹

The Boran Galla as well, under chief Afaleta (who
inhabited the country to the west including Eil-Wak and
Wajir) had shown signs of coming to terms with the British
administration. The country of the Boran could have proved
very profitable if secured by the Jubaland authorities;
for it was noted for its richness in horses, camels, mules,
cattle and ivory. All its trade previously went through
the Italian ports of Merka, Mogadishu and Barawa passing
just through Bardera and Lugh. This trade, if diverted to
Kismayu, would not only have definitely raised the revenue

¹ Nasib, was holding two sections of his tribe, one section
on the British and the other on the Italian side of the
river. In 1895 Hardinge approved of Craufurd's method
of obtaining from Nasib a recognition of his allegiance
to Italy for the territory held by him on the west bank
of the Protectorate and the Somali Province of Jubaland, but would also have involved the Somalis in a legitimate trade which would no doubt have assisted in their pacification. In short if a sound administration for Jubaland was to be achieved, it could easily be done through the development of Gosha, the Somali stock, and the exploitation of the Boran trade and Jubaland would by no means be a brake on the development of the Protectorate.

For a while, up to the beginning of 1896, it appeared that lasting peace might be achieved and Craufurd himself was able to report that the whole Province as far as the second degree north was in a peaceful state, the Somali and Gosha people having been brought under the administration of the Protectorate.¹ In fact a month earlier Hardinge's satisfaction with the situation in Jubaland was so great that he intended to cut the military strength in Kismayu. By March 1896 he instructed Craufurd to send him one of the two maxim guns, together with about sixty Sudanese and 'native' askaris which would be used by Colonel Ainsworth, Her Majesty's Sub-Commissioner, to put down disturbances in the Ukamba Province. As the Coast Province force was occupied with the operations against the Mazrui rebel "Mbaruk bin Rashid", the Jubaland force was to provide this assistance. Hardinge, who was very impressed by Craufurd's management of affairs in Jubaland had written to inform Craufurd, ".... the peaceful state of affairs which your

¹ P.R.O./F.O. 403/226. Enclosure in No. 250 Craufurd to Hardinge 30-4-1896.
fair and judicious administration has established in Jubaland will, I trust, make this reduction, for a short period, of your military resources...quite safe.\textsuperscript{1}

The peace in the province did not, however, last for any length of time. The Somalis had begun to show signs of discontent which occupied the efforts of the British administration up to the time when Britain ceded Jubaland to Italy in 1925. It was during the period when the authorities were busy quelling the Mazrui rebellion in 1895-6, and carrying out expeditions against recalcitrant tribes in the interior - expeditions against the Nandi in 1901, 1905, 1906; against the Embu in 1904 and 1906; against the Gusii in 1904 and 1908; against the Kipsigis in 1905; and against the Bagusu and Kabras in 1907\textsuperscript{2} - and moreover, when Britain was occupied with events inside the Mahdist state in the Sudan, the defeat of Italy at Adowa in 1896, and finally the Fashoda incident in 1898, that the Jubaland Somalis needed special attention.

As early as August 1896, the Acting Sub-Commissioner informed Craufurd\textsuperscript{3} that Ali Nahar, the most important chief of the Herti under Sultan Shirwa Ismail, had been stabbed in the back while saying his prayers by an outlaw named Muhammad Ali. The reason for this incident was that

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} E.N.A./PC/G.P. 73/44/15. Hardinge to Craufurd 24-3-1896. Craufurd had since 26-5-1896 been appointed Vice-Consul for the Sultan's mainland Dominions.
\item \textsuperscript{3} K.N.A./PC/G.P. 74/45/70 No. 52 Farrant to Craufurd 5-8-1896.
\end{itemize}
Ali Nahar had handed over the latter to be punished by the British Officials for a certain misdeed. At this stage, Ali Nahar was viewed with increasing suspicion by the Hertis who regarded him as a tool of the administration. Moreover, as Turton has suggested, the tendency of Jenner and the later Sub-Commissioners at Kismayu to rely exclusively on Ali Nahar for the implementation for their policies, must have provoked the Herti into continuous resentment and disobedience.1

Signs of discontent among the Somalis were not merely confined to the Coast. In the interior, Rogers, the Provincial Commissioner (P.C.) of Tanaland, had also reported that the attitude of the Ogaden Somalis there was causing great concern. Craufurd was informed that the Abdallah section of the Ogaden under Hasan Birjin were showing signs of unrest. The Abdallah were one of the most powerful and disobedient Somali sub- clans. They had managed to remain aloof not only from the Company’s authority at the end of the nineteenth century but also from that of their Sultan Ahmad Murjan and to keep away from their capital Afmadu. Now they were reported to be moving through the Waboni country towards the Tana with the intention of raiding the Galla.2

In addition, Uthman bin Isa, the Liwali of the Siu3 mainland reported that some Swahili traders who had gone to the Waboni forest from Wangeh to barter for India rubber, had

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3. One of the Islands of the Lamu Archipelago with whom the Somalis had strong historical connections during the 19th century.
Ogaden Somali
come across a large party of Somalis some sixty in number, who had taken away all their trading goods from them. Another party of Galla had also complained of Somali raids, killings and carrying off of their people by the Abdallah branch of the Biscaya Somalis.  

Rogers, in his capacity as P.C. was insistent that some measures should be taken against these Biscaya Somalis, otherwise the Wapokomo on the Tana would be afraid to cultivate at all on the northern bank. The Wagalla who were essentially herdmens and hunters were in the greatest distress, because whenever they succeeded in collecting cattle, they were sure to be raided by the Somalis; and the Waboni who were at the mercy of the Somalis were compelled to pay them tribute in ivory.

One of the possible solutions to the Somali menace suggested by Rogers to the Jubaland authorities was to place a small force at Biscaya and another at Afmadu, as these were the only two places where there was water; and if they were held, the Somalis would lose all their cattle and be compelled to surrender. In another despatch he suggested that a force of one hundred Sudanese would suffice to break them. Writing to Craufurd he stated:

"I have taken the opportunity of Major Hatch, the Officer Commanding the Protectorate troops, being present at Lamu to place before him all the information which I have and he agrees with me that two small columns operating against Biskiah

3. Ibid.
from Kiunga and Port Dujnford would bring about the desired effects... I beg that steps may be taken to obtain the sanction of Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for the necessary operations."

This was primarily an offshoot of an idea that Craufurd himself had adhered to which in essence meant that the control of Afmadu wells meant the control of the Ogaden. 2

It was not until two years later that Jenner himself had admitted as a result of a tour in the Ogaden country that:-

"What I have seen on this tour and during the recent expedition, leads me to think that we have unduly magnified their importance to the Ogadens. There are other places - such as Yak-a Dintu, Beledayuba, Subo - between Afmadu and Mabungu Kisungu and Fangal... which after a good rainy season could probably water many more cattle than Afmadu could, and provide better grazing than is to be found in the bush which surrounds Afmadu." 3

But at the time British Somali policy seemed increasingly to centre around the idea that it was only through force that the Somalis could be crushed rather than the possibility of settlement of the Somali troubles through an investigation into its causes. To carry out the latter policy the Protectorate Government needed to establish a sound administrative system and a proper machinery of government in order to cope with the complicated problems among the pastoral tribes who although numerically small were both war-like and aggressive; it was this type of government that the Company had previously failed to achieve.

In the absence of proper control, and because of differences in opinion between Mombasa and Kismayu as to the policies to be executed in respect of the Ogaden, they had grown more stubborn and indifferent towards the Government. Before the administration was able to seek a solution to the rising discontent among the Hertis and the Abdallah, it was once more faced with fresh troubles started among the Ogaden in the latter part of 1896 as a result of the death of their Sultan and the succession of his son Ahmad Murjan. Both Mombasa and Kismayu were once again at a loss as to the method of approach to the young Sultan. Craufurd was of the opinion that Ahmad Murjan's support for the administration could be achieved by the paying of a monthly subsidy of about Rs. 40 a month and small proportionate sums to be paid to one or two of his followers on the clear understanding that he rendered assistance to the Government. He defended his proposition on the grounds that, "pending the institution of direct control by the Government officials, the employment of the natives of the territory is a politic and economical proceeding."

But Craufurd had definitely misjudged the ability of the young Sultan who, apart from the support of his own clan, the Muhammad Zubeir, had no power over the rest of the Ogadens. Jenner was however quicker to perceive the weakness of Ahmad when he visited Afmadu in December of the same year. He informed Craufurd:

"He is not a strong man, as is evident by his pointing out to me that Hasan Berjan's position as chief of the Abdalla section of the Ogaden was a totally independent one, and that he, Ahmed, had no authority over him."

Moreover, Jenner was particularly annoyed with the young Sultan because he offered what Jenner had considered an insufficient present of cattle; and in addition he was three days late in showing up before the Sub-Commissioner.

In fact the Sultan did not wait long to cause more vexation to the Jubaland authorities and the Protectorate administration at large; and the beginning of 1897 witnessed increasing tension between the Ogaden and the Government. Hardinge was then determined to impose the Government's authority over the Ogaden and so, using the issue of an apparent raiding by the Somalis for slaves in the Boran country as an excuse, decided to strike a blow at the tribe. Assuming that Ahmad bin Murjan was instrumental in organizing the raid, and having consulted with Major Hatch and Craufurd, he pressed wholeheartedly for a punitive expedition against the Ogaden. He insisted on the use of force against the Ogaden because he maintained that their position was different from that of the other races in the Protectorate further inland. Taking the case of the Masai raids against the Akamba, he argued that the construction of the railway across Ukamba would enable both tribes to be repressed swiftly within the next two years. In Jubaland, on the other hand, he wrote,

"It is I think, imperative to act at once, especially with a people like the Somalis, who are fanatical and self-confident beyond measure, and where fanaticism and self-confidence have of late been dangerously excited by the Italian reverses in Abyssinia, and on their own Coast."\(^1\)

Hardinge had even gone further to suggest:--

"These people must learn submission by bullets - it's the only school; after that you may begin more modern and humane methods of education.... In Africa to have peace you must first teach obedience and the only tutor who impresses the lesson properly is the sword."\(^2\)

Continuing his plea to implement force, Hardinge had also pressed the Foreign Office to agree for the setting up of a station at Serenli and the purchase of a steam launch for the river. He also had in mind the occupation of a point at the junction of the Daua and the Juba rivers in close proximity to Dolo. But most important of all and in support of Rogers' suggestion, he expressed the opinion that the occupation of Afmadu was vital to the consolidation of the Government's position, because the Ogaden could easily cut the Government's communications by the river. Moreover he saw once more that the destruction of the Afmadu wells was important for the punishment of the Ogaden. The occupation was hoped to "ere long, make them as peaceful and submissive as the Hertis in the neighbourhood of Kismayu."\(^3\)

Hardinge had actually contemplated an expedition to Afmadu containing 200 men of the Indian Contingent under

1. P.R.O./F.O. 403/24\(^3\) Hardinge to Salisbury, 4-4-1897.
3. Ibid.
the Command of Captain Barratt. Meanwhile a demonstration of force would be made in the direction of Biscaya, the headquarters of the Abdallah, by sixty men of the Tanaland Soudanese Force, starting from Port Drumford under the Command of McDougall. The latter would act as a Sub-Commissioner in Tanaland in Captain Rogers absence, and his Command of the force would be specially valued because of his considerable experience both of Somali warfare and of the African troops necessary to put Hasan Birjin's people in check. He would also be able to prevent the Afmadu Ogaden from retreating and seeking refuge in his territory.1 Hardinge was so insistent on the despatch of the expedition that he suggested that, in order to enable the cost for it to be met they should, "defer till next year the occupation of Kitui, for which a sum of £1,400 has been granted to us, and to spend the whole of this sum upon the Afmadu expedition, whilst we might, I think, procure £600 by effecting other economies in various departments." This he justified as follows:

"Important as is the occupation of Kitui, it is far less so than the vindication of our authority in a region where the disasters which have attended the Italian arms, have reacted injuriously amongst a very ignorant, vain and fanatical race on the general prestige of Europeans." 2

Despite the repeated arguments for the use of force by Hardinge, Jenner and Rogers, the Foreign Office was by no means prepared to risk any further ventures in the Protectorate.

2. Ibid.
Salisbury had definitely ruled out the possibility of conducting a punitive expedition at the time, because "great demands are being made on Her Majesty's Government in connection with the African possessions and Protectorates... and they are not prepared to enter upon any further operations without the most urgent necessity." Salisbury was to a large extent influenced by Clement Hill in his decision and was bearing in mind the fact that the mutiny, which had a few months earlier broken out in Uganda, was occupying their attention and they were unwilling to enter into further obligations in East Africa until this mutiny had been quelled. Moreover, as Mungeam had already observed, Jubaland occupied a far lesser role in the proposed policy for the administration of the Protectorate whereas the Coast, as Salisbury had seen all along, was to provide a firm base for development of the interior. In this respect Mombasa was vital, but Jubaland was not. Hence Hardinge had had to be spurred to action against the Mazrui, but subsequently checked in his enthusiasm against the Ogadens.²

On learning about the Foreign Office's decision and so giving up hope for the despatch of an expedition, Jenner proposed to negotiate instead. He informed Hardinge that he intended sending a noted Shariff, a friend of the administration, who seemed to be held in great respect by the Ogaden, to mediate with them. His mission was especially

1. Quoted by Mungeam, p. 31, Salisbury to Hardinge. 29-10-1897 F.O./107/74.
important in view of a rumour that the Ogaden contemplated leaving Afmadu if an expedition was directed against them. Jenner intended to send the Shariff to warn them that should their plan be carried out, "they will forfeit all right to our protection if the Abyssinians come down upon them in their new place of abode." Moreover Jenner implied that he was willing to recommend to the Commissioner the remittance of a fine previously imposed on them on condition that the Ogaden came down to Kismayu and gave proof and assurance that they regretted their actions.

Hardinge, on the other hand, was too conscious of the possibility that the Ogaden would interpret this as an indication of a desire on the Government's part to retreat from an embarrassing position - and hence he instructed Jenner to refrain from such an act. Moreover, Hardinge had also turned down a suggestion by Jenner that the latter should himself proceed to the Ogaden country in an attempt to ease matters. His reason was that the Foreign Office had already decided to send an expedition to the northern and eastern frontiers of the Uganda Protectorates in order to obtain more accurate knowledge and cultivate friendly relations with tribes residing in that part of the British sphere. News of the expedition was sure to reach the Somalis and Hardinge was apprehensive of their reactions: they could easily interpret it as directed against themselves.

2. Ibid. Enclosure 3 23-6-1897.
3. P.R.O./F.O. 2/144/1 Salisbury to McDonald 9-6-1897.
As the dialogue and the search for a Somali policy continued, the Ogaden seemed more and more difficult to control. Abdallah raids on the Boran Galla on the Tana River, led by Hasan Birjin, and other Ogaden raids upon the Gosha, led by the Sultan's brother Hasan Murjan, had necessitated prompt action. Nevertheless, dialogue continued between London, Mombasa and Kismayu as to what measures should be adopted against the Somalis. Salisbury and Hardinge were inclined to think that an economic blockade upon the Ogaden would bring about the desired results, while Jenner was utterly resentful and sceptical of the outcome of such a policy.

The blockade which in essence meant the closing of the port of Kismayu in face of the Ogaden was opposed by Jenner on the grounds that, "it would not be to our advantage to adopt such a hostile attitude as blockading their trade when we are not prepared to take steps to bring them to reason." They could also still communicate with the Benadir ports and the expense of guarding the hundred-mile frontier would be an additional cost. Moreover, Jenner was of the opinion that:

"our prestige will suffer, as it will be evident that we are acting hostilely to the Ogaden, and yet dare not go up to Afmadu and attack them."

Further reports of Somali raids on the Galla, Arab and Gosha forced Hardinge once more to revert to advocating the use of force:

"till the occupation of Afmadu has been effected, there can be no permanent peace, progress or security in Jubaland...."
But Salisbury was still holding to the idea that until the Foreign Office was sure of ground at Uganda it seemed very desirable to postpone action in the Province. It was not until April 1898, when a renewed Somali offensive resulted in the burning of the Government camp at Yonte and killing of several people, that the Foreign Office consented to act. The Somali behaviour was then interpreted as a sign of suspicion from the part of the Somali tribes of the efficiency of the British administration. For this reason a provision was made in the Draft Estimate of 1898-99 for the establishment of a station at Serenli and the purchase of two Steam launches, one for the Juba and the other for the Tana. Moreover, approval was given to the despatch of a punitive expedition which went on through the whole of April, May and June.  

The operations appeared to have cost the Ogaden great loss of life and property and they in their turn managed to kill about twenty-eight of the Government Indian troops and shatter the rest of them in a surprise attack. However, by August the Ogadens began to show a desire for peace and Hardinge, who arrived in Kismayu in September, held a meeting with their Sultan. Hardinge decided to fine them five thousand head of cattle to be paid as follows:— one thousand within five days, two hundred more within ten days and the remainder within a month. Two of the chiefs were, further, to be held as hostages, pending the return of the remainder.

1. See The Times, 1-10-1898 "The Somali Rising."
of the rifles. After the settlement of the question Hardinge returned on September 20th and Jenner had then dissolved the Ogaden Expedition.

But despite the apparent friendship of the Sultan, the rest of the Ogadens were never really reconciled towards the Government. No sooner was the Ogaden Expedition concluded than most of the prominent chiefs began to prepare for fresh trouble. In the first place it was obvious that, despite Hardinge's satisfaction with the settlement of the fine, the Ogaden had been reluctant and slow to pay. Two-hundred-and-eighty head were still due in November and the situation was such that Hardinge had to communicate the affair to Salisbury laying the blame on the chiefs - the Sultan was not suspected as being instrumental in the delay.

The signs of discontent among the Ogaden had culminated in what was termed the Third Somali Rebellion, or the Jenner Campaign. Jenner left Kismayu on July 28, 1900 with a force of twenty police and ten syces on a two months journey through the Lornaj Swamp to Nairobi (the same as the one Dracopoli undertook to explore the Lak Dera). Arriving at Afmadu, the police and the Ogaden had a quarrel as to who should first draw water from the well. Jenner ruled that the police had prior right and in the confusion which followed

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1. K.N.A./PG/NFD 4/6/1 Major Quentin to Officer Commanding British East African Troops. 5-11-1898.
3. A syce is an attendant who follows on foot a mounted horseman or a carriage.
4. In other sources Jenner was supposed to be conducting a tour of inspection in his District.
Jenner was said to have flogged two Somalis. In his report Jenner admitted flogging the two men but he stated that it was done with the sanction of the Sultan Ahmad Murjan. The Ogaden who numbered between 3,400 and 6,800 composed of Muhammad Zubeir, Aulihan, Abdallah, Abd Wak and Rer Muhammad bitterly resented the flogging.

The incident was not taken seriously by Jenner who proceeded on his journey. On November 12, the District Commissioner (D.C.) of Kismayu, Mr. Blake, received information that three hundred Ogaden were following Jenner and in his turn at once informed the Officer-in-Charge of the Troops, Jubaland. On November 15, the Military authorities at Yonte heard of Jenner's death, Martial Law was proclaimed three days later. On November 20, definite news of the death of Jenner reached Kismayu.

The reasons given for the murder of the Sub-Commissioner varied. It seems that the incident mentioned above was only the climax to an already planned action. Jenner's hot temperament was no doubt something more than the arrogant Somali could accept and this was certainly one of the reasons for his murder. Moreover, the incident was said to be the revenge by a certain Ogaden chief, Hasan Yero, who had been detained for some time at Kismayu on Jenner's orders on suspicion of complicity in the murder of three 'friendly natives'. Although he was subsequently discharged, Yero seems to have conceived a violent hatred against the British.

1. K.N.A./PC/NFD 4/6/1 Third Somali Rebellion or Jenner Campaign, 1900.
authorities and against Jenner in particular. Upon it being known that Jenner was undertaking his journey, Hasan Yero with another Ogaden chief, Hasan Odel, carried out the plot to murder him.

Other sources state that while Jenner was on his journey, rumours prevailed that Umar Murjan, the Sultan's brother, Hasan Yero (Muhammad Zubeir), Hasan Warfa (Aulihan), and Hasan Odel (Abd Wak) were planning to attack him. In fact Ahmad Murjan was said to have warned Hasan Odel was definitely planning to attack Jenner saying, "if anything wrong will happen to Mr. Jenner it will be through this man or himself will have done it." On the other hand, the authorities were in doubt as to the position of Ahmad Murjan, not knowing for certain whether or not he himself was a party to the murder. It was established that shortly before leaving on his journey, Jenner had interviewed the Sultan at Kismayu on the subject of the murder of the three 'friendly natives' mentioned above. A fine had been inflicted which was not paid. It was obvious that he was fully aware of the plan, if not its actual instigation.

1. K.N.A./G.P. 71/26/66 Ogaden Punitive Expedition, Intelligence Reports, Sultan Ahmad Murjan to the Consul at Kismayu.

2. P.R.O./F.O. 403/296/114 Ternan to Salisbury 25-11-1900; Ahmad Murjan was later threatened with deportation then held at Kismayu where he escaped. Major Chenevix-Trench had attributed this to the fact that there was no clear agreement as to who was responsible for his custody. Colonel Hatch advised civil custody for the Sultan while Colonel Ternan recommended Military custody. To this Captain Ward had utterly disagreed. Even when the military guard was appointed it remained without effective control over the Sultan's appartments and thus he escaped. (R.H.L./Mss.Afr.S.583 Chevenix-Trench - papers on N.F.P., Kenya: 28-3-1902.)
Whether it was the result of Jenner's 'euphoric' approach to the Ogaden, the weakness of his intelligence system or his underestimation of the Ogaden's hostility, 1 his death had certainly confirmed the fact that despite their defeat by the Protectorate forces, aided by Indian troops, in the middle of 1898, the Somalis had never really accepted British control in the area. The motives for the murder of Jenner were certainly more than personal and careful investigation showed beyond doubt that all the Ogaden sections except one were in revolt. As a result Colonel Ternan, Her Majesty's Acting Commissioner and Consul General, left Mombasa for Jubaland with Lieutenant Hatch and a Company of K.A.R.. Having realized the extent of the troubles, he communicated with the Secretary of State and asked for permission to undertake yet another punitive expedition against the Ogaden - the Jenner Punitive Expedition.

The Times of January 18, 1901, declared that the Indian troops necessary to conduct the expedition had arrived in Kismayu five days before. On February 18 the Ogaden were defeated and Ternan informed Lansdowne that he had occupied Afmadu without opposition. 2

2. P.R.O./F.O. 403/308 Ternan to Lansdowne 19-2-1901; The experience gained in the recent Somali risings and the operations against the mutineers in Uganda necessitated the readjustment of the military forces in the two Protectorates. Brigadier-General Manning was appointed Inspector General and the preparation of a scheme for the formation of a Camel Corps for Jubaland and Yonte was recognized. Yonte was made the military headquarters of the Province. (K.N.A./PC/NFD 4/6/1 Jubaland Political Record Pre-1915)
The Ogaden were to pay a fine of 30,000 head of cattle with an annual tribute of 200 head and an ultimatum was sent to them that no peace could be entertained without the surrender of the five ringleaders in the Jenner murder.¹ At the time of the Jenner Punitive Expedition, the Biscaya Somalis on the Tana were reported by Rogers to have raided the Tana River tribes for the third time in a short period. Rogers decided to retaliate and raided a Somali village, killing twelve men, capturing 800 cattle and 4,000 sheep.

At this point, news of the murder of Jenner and the subsequent rising in Jubaland led Sir Charles Dilke to ask the under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the Commons whether these disturbances were in any way to be connected with the religious 'agitation' of the Sheikh Muhammad bin Abdallah.² in Northern Somaliland. But neither

1. Ibid., p. 7.
2. The Parliamentary Debates, 1900, Vol. LXXXVIII Commons, Sir Charles Dilke, "Murder of Mr. Jenner" 11-12-1900; Muhammad Abdille Hasan was born on 7 April, 1864, in the Dulbahante country in the eastern part of British Somaliland Protectorate. His father was a Bagheri Ogaden and his mother a Herti Dulbahante. He was the hero of Somali nationalism who led a 'Jihad' against the British Administration from 1899 to 1920. The British applied the name 'Mad' Mullah to the Sayyid, and the use of the word Mullah was apparently used by the British in corruption of a word common amongst the Indian Muslims in India for the religious Sheiks or (Mawlah) essentially denoting the piety and not the madness of the sheikhs concerned. (For more on the "Mullah" see Chapter VI, Douglas Jardine, The Mad Mullah of Somaliland, (London, 1923). Somaliya: Antologia Storico-Culturale, which contains reprints by I.M. Lewis, S. Touval, L. Silberman and Muhammad Ahmad Ali.) also see Leadership in Eastern Africa: Six Political Biographies, Robert L. Hess, "Muhammad Abdullah Hassan", ed. N. Bennett, (Boston, 1968).
the Under-Secretary of State nor the authorities in the East Africa Protectorate were clear as to whether these events were actually part of the general state of unrest in the northern portion of the Ogaden country. However, the subsequent movements among the Somalis had definitely had a religious appeal and later on - from the conclusion of the Jenner Campaign to the First World War period - Muhammad Abdille Hasan's connections either directly or indirectly were easily traceable.

Already, by 1902, rumours were in circulation that the "Mullah" was on the west bank of the Webe Shebelle, "that he was intending to move to Bardera and from then he will be compelled to cross over and go with the Ogadens."\(^1\) Eliot,\(^2\) had, however, no news of the "Mullah" actually crossing over but he informed the Foreign Office that the Officer Commanding in Jubaland was insisting that troops should be posted at Serenli in case it had taken place. Later Eliot assured the Foreign Office that there was no immediate danger of a general rising or organized revolt among the Somalis, and even if the "Mullah" crossed the Juba, they would not be glad to make common cause with him, though they might have felt compelled to obey him. But he warned that there was always a risk that a small section, impelled by personal animosities or desire to win a reputation for courage, might attack and kill Europeans travelling in the


2. Sir Charles Eliot, replaced Hardinge as Commissioner and Consul-General of the East Africa Protectorate (1900-1904).
country, as in the case of Jenner.¹

A look through the correspondence of the period certainly indicates that the "Mullah" had seriously tried to appeal to all the Ogaden both in Jubaland and the area later to be known as the N.F.D., despite the strict security measures² adopted by the British against the spread of his teaching. In February 1904 Captain Hannyngton informed Eliot that an emissary of the "Mullah" was travelling in the area preaching among the tribes. The emissary, Ahmad Jama, who was himself a Muhammad Zubeir had travelled widely among his people and the Abdallah. Hannyngton was very conscious of the possibility of him gaining adherents and had to make a number of trips throughout the District to warn the people against giving him refuge or listening to his doctrines. Not only that, he had also employed a northern Somali, a certain Dualla, to obtain information about him. Dualla confirmed that Ahmad Jama had actually told the Somalis that, "if the people would follow him he would attack the English and drive them out."³

According to Hannyngton, the Maghabul section had sent a deputation to impress the Government that they had nothing to do with Ahmad Jama or the "Mullah" doctrines. This could be acceptable in view of the fact that the

¹ P.R.O./F.O. 403/331 No. 41 Eliot to Lansdowne 21-4-1903.
² Jubaland was subjected to military administration for the period 1902-5 as a result of the continued risings. This was in itself a factor resented by the Somalis and was to a certain extent responsible for the increasing disobedience by the tribes.
³ K.N.A./P0/Jub. 1/4/7/1 J.A. Hannyngton to Eliot 17-2-1904.
Maghabul were at the time less inclined to defy the Government than the other tribes. But his assumption that the Muhammad Zubeir had sent Ahmad Jama away telling him "... to move on as they had had enough trouble for a space,"¹ and also that Mursal Umar, Aulihan, the father of Abd ar-Rahman Mursal, came in to consult him about the Sheikh and implied that he wanted the Sheikh arrested, are statements that cannot be substantiated in view of the later attitudes of both tribes.

In fact, the anxiety of Hannyngton himself about the possible danger of Ahmad Jama's movement all over the Somali country was obvious when he suggested to Eliot that, "both myself and the Sub-Commissioner Tanaland should be authorised to put Rs. 1000 or even 1500/- on his head dead or alive."² In addition he warned Jama's people, the Muhammad Zubeir, that if the Sheikh came to their area and they failed to seize him and send him to Kismayu, he would enforce a blockade against them and stop all payments of salaries to the Muhammad Zubeir (so called) loyal official. Hannyngton knew only too well that the key to the situation lay with Ahmad Murjan and the Muhammad Zubeir because no other section of the Muhammad Zubeir would care to go against Ahmad Murjan and no other tribe would go against the Muhammad Zubeir for fear.

Owing to continued threats and pressure by the administration, Ahmad Murjan submitted and it was through

¹. Ibid.
². Ibid.
him that the Sheikh Ahmad Jama was captured and brought to the Sub-Commissioner's office. This was not achieved without a fight with at least one of the Ogaden sub-sections, the Aden Kher, the Sheikh's own group, who bitterly resented his arrest. Major Harrison, the Officer in charge of the Province, informed Eliot that great credit was due to Captain Hannyngton, who by his skilful seizure of Sheikh Ahmad Jama "probably saved a serious rising among the Ogaden of Jubaland."  

Though the Muhammad Zubeir Sheikh was eventually caught, neither the tribes nor their religious leaders were frightened by the administration's move to prevent their risings. In fact, not only among the Ogaden but also among other Darod sections, deep sympathy with the "Mullah's" cause began to appear. By 27th December 1905 a Herti sheikh by the name Ashgar, of the Uthman Mahmud section, who had lately returned from spending some months in the country of Sayyid Muhammad Abdille Hasan near Illig, announced that he was ready to fight the Government, "and began to act as a Mullah."  

Ashgar, who resided on the Ruga plain about five hours' walk from Yonte was travelling between Yonte and Kismayu and attempting to rally the Shariff community of the town to join him. Captain Salkeld who was conscious of the nature

1. Ibid. 23-3-1904.
2. P.R.O./F.O. 403/342 Harrison to Eliot 16-4-1904.
4. Those who claim descent from the Prophet Muhammad; here they could either be Somalis or Arabs resident in Kismayu town.
of his movement issued a warrant for his arrest; but without success. He then moved against Ashgar who collected a large number of his Somali followers, and ultimately nipped his movement in the bud. Salked raided Ashgar's camp at the Deshak Wama on 2nd December 1905 and killed him and several of his followers. The other Herti sub-sections, Uthman Mahmud and Warsengeleh, were warned against any further movement. The death of Ashgar was once more viewed with relief as it had ended "what may have been a dangerous movement."¹

However, the Hertis did not let the incident pass without retaliation and on the 26th May 1906, Ali Nahar, their Regent, who was constantly under attack from his tribe for complicity with the Government, was murdered by five men of the Herti in revenge for the death of Ashgar.² The Sub-Commissioner of Jubaland did not altogether dismiss the possibility that the Uthman Mahmud and their Sultan, Muhammad Shirwa, were instrumental in the murder and though they did not actually commit it, "they were cognisant of the plot and in secret sympathy with it."³ He thus recommended the deportation of Haji Umar Ismail, whom he considered the most dangerous of the Herti. Also to be deported were Haji Jama Ismail and Samatar Ismail, his two brothers; Haji Farah Duffe (Umar Mahmud); Ahmad Abdi (Warsengeleh) and Muhammad Samatatar. But Sadler, the

¹ P.R.O./F.O. 403/366 No. 53 Grant (Admiralty) to Edward Grey 10-3-19.
² P.R.O./C.O. 533/15/337 Sadler to Colonial Secretary 19-6-1906.
³ P.R.O./C.O. 533/16/428 No. 144 Kirkpatrick to Commissioner E.A.P. 21-6-1906.
Commissioner at Nairobi, had strongly advised against severe measures against the Somalis advocated by Major Kirkpatrick and Colonel Harrison. He was of the opinion that the best way to deal with the matter was to impose a fine of a thousand head of cattle on the offending sections and to continue the embargo on their trade at the port of Kismayu until the fine was paid.¹ The Colonial Secretary consented to Sadler's request and 170 head of cattle were paid by the Herti; the rest was paid in money owing to outbreak of a disease among the Somali cattle.

A few years later, however, the influence of Muhammad Abdille Hasan's movement was still being felt among the Somalis and was still a factor in the problem of administering the Jubaland Somali. The Marehan² tribe, the third clan of the Darod, who had had a long history of tribal raiding and had the reputation of being one of the strongest tribes in the north east corner of Jubaland, was not unconnected with the "Mullah" episode. The Galti section of the Marehan was said to have actively taken part with Muhammad Abdille Hasan in northern Somaliland. This section's immigration into the Protectorate was naturally viewed with great concern by the Jubaland authorities, especially when it was learnt that a certain Abdallahi Mabo Igo was reported to be raiding ten miles to the east of Lugh and a few months earlier had sent a letter to the

¹. Ibid.
². For more on the Marehan see Turton, Ch. x, pp. 452-491; Mungeam, pp. 233-238; T.S. Thomas, pp. 49-50.
Marehan saying that the Sheikh had appointed him governor of Jubaland. The Marehan were also feared because of the quantity of arms they had acquired by trading on both sides of the river, and by 1911 concerted efforts were made by the officials on the spot to persuade the Government to disarm them.

But before the Government could move, the Marehan themselves had started a rising. In March 1913 a party of Aulihan crossed the river into British territory with a lot of stock and some rifles. This party, though ordered to report to the Government, was seized by the Marehan Farah Ugas section on the pretext of affording them protection. When instructed to hand them over, the Farah Ugas not only refused to do so, but stated that if the Government wished to fight them they were ready. Eventually, in January, a Marehan Expedition was launched under Colonel B.R. Graham, but the result of the operation was by no means satisfactory from the point of view of the Government. It was obvious that Graham had underestimated the gravity of the situation and the strength of the Marehan, and this was a natural consequence of the ignorance of events in the interior in general. In communicating the outcome of the Expedition to the Colonial Secretary, authorities in the East Africa Protectorate seemed to dwell upon another misconception: Belfield, the Governor at the

time, informed the Secretary, "the result though disappointing has I consider definitely committed the Aulihan to our side."¹

In fact no sooner was the Marehan Expedition concluded than the Aulihan themselves showed grave signs of discontent and declared war against the Government. The principal figure behind the Aulihan discontent was Abd ar-Rahman Mursal, the son of Haji Mursal Umar, both of whom were deserters from the Italian side. As early as 1898 Abd ar-Rahman had been implicated in the attempted Ogaden raid on Yonte; but neither that nor the Italian protest had deterred Jenner from giving him a position whereby he and another Somali escort were asked to garrison Bardera. Further, in 1900 he had also been sent to Serenli to assist in maintaining a trading depot.² In the Ogaden Expedition of 1901 he acted as the Intelligence Officer in return for the payment of a hundred rupees a month by the Government. However Mursal's friendship and aid to the Government did not continue after this.

From the beginning of 1910, Mursal was under continuous suspicion from the authorities. In March, he was said to have prevented his tribe the Aulihan from paying the blood money or 'diya' to the Rer Tulhak section of the Marehan because they did not pay the 'diya' due for Hasan Warfu of the Aulihan.³ Intelligence reports also tended to throw

2. P.R.O./C.O. 534/33 Summary of Intelligence regarding Abd ar-Rahman Mursal.
3. See T.S. Thomas, pp. 56-63 for Aulihan-Marehan relations.
some doubt on his loyalty and according to one, "Abdurahman Mursal has a following of many hundreds; his own tribe the Aulihan and many malcontents from other tribes on both sides of the river. He tells them that the Government when they come in strength will take away all their cattle and that they should trust to him to look after their rights. He promises them loot if they stand by him."¹ Two months later, Reddie was again apprehensive of Mursal's attitude and activities. He telegraphed the Acting Secretary of the Administration that Mursal together with Falari and Jiri - two Aulihan chiefs - had been gun-running and that Bili Ibrahim, another Aulihan chief, had declared against the Government and retired with the Rer Abubakr section towards Bil Wak trying to persuade the rest of the Aulihan to follow.

By October 1911, Mursal was also accused of being "... at the bottom of the murder of Deria Sherwa."² The latter was murdered because he was a friend of the Government and had helped the Administration in obtaining camels and information. The murderer, Tabari Jiri, was known by the Administration to be Mursal's right hand man; and it was thus assumed that Jiri would never have dared to murder someone from Mursal's tribe without first receiving his consent.³

In 1915, Abd ar-Rahman Mursal himself had visited

¹. K.N.A./PC/Jub. 1/17/1 No. 66 Reddie to P.C. Kismayu 17-5-1911.
². Ibid. J. Bois to Reddie 14-10-1911.
³. Ibid.
Nairobi and promised that the Ogaden as a whole would be willing to contribute money towards the expenses of the War, a claim too difficult to accept at this time when the Somalis, especially his own section, the Aulihan, and the Marehan, were occupying all the attention of the Government. Moreover, Mursal was reported to have returned from Nairobi, "...with a very large sense of importance and was apparently placing the widest construction upon the reception accorded to him there by the Government."\(^1\) In addition, he announced that when he was in Nairobi the Governor had given him all the country between Serenli and Wajir. These pronouncements, together with his threats to the Jubaland authorities over the settlement of the Aulihan-Marehan dispute proved to the administration that Mursal was prepared to defy the Government.

On 1st February 1916 Mursal had artfully suggested to Eliot, the D.C. of Serenli, that the askaris wandering about at night with their rifles often caused trouble with the 'natives', and so it was arranged that the rifles should be placed in the guardroom each night.\(^2\) The following night, Abd ar-Rahman Mursal marched to Serenli with 1,000 Aulihan, having informed them that he was going to attack the 'boma' (station) to show that he was not afraid of the Government. Lieut. Eliot was killed, and the askaris, unable to get their rifles from the guardroom were speedily

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1. T.S. Thomas, p. 56.
2. P.R.O./C.O. 534/33 Summary of Intelligence regarding Abd ar-Rahman Mursal.
overcome, sixty-five of them being killed. But, shortly afterwards, Mursal was defeated by the Government forces, and thereafter he fled to Abyssinia through the Gurreh country.

It is worth noting, at this juncture, the reasons for Mursal's complete change of attitude towards the Government, a change which had culminated in the sack of Serenli in 1916. The Somali point of view was that the movement of Mursal was inseparable from that of Sayyid Muhammad Abdille Hasan and that the Aulihan-Marehan dispute was only a pretext to embitter feelings towards the Government. According to Sheikh Abd al-Hakim bin Sayyid Muhammad Abdille Hasan, his father was in constant touch with Mursal, and that Mursal himself belonged to the Salihya Tariqa (religious brotherhood). This order was brought to Somalia by the Sayyid from Mecca and was responsible for the sense of unity among the Muslim Somalis, who joined his 'Jihad' against the British. Moreover, Sheikh Abd al-Hakim was certain that both Mursal and the "Mullah" had exchanged letters, copies of which were still in his possession. Nor was the British Intelligence in the East Africa Protectorate in any doubt about this. It was established that when Mursal fled to Abyssinia, "he wished to join the Mullah and had written to the latter proposing this."

1. Sheikh Abd al-Hakim is the youngest son of the Sayyid. In fact he was only one year old when his father declared the Jihad upon the British in the Somaliland Protectorate. I am grateful to him for the above information which he conveyed to me when I met him in Mogadishu in September 1970.

2. P.R.O./C.O. 534/33 Summary of Intelligence Regarding Abd ar-Rahman Mursal.
The British authorities were, moreover, of the opinion that the sack of Serenli was engineered from Abyssinia through Lij Eyyasu who had succeeded Menelik in 1913 and had become more and more identified with the cause of Islam, eventually announcing his conversion to Islam in April 1916. Lij Eyyasu was thought to be considering the formation of a Muslim Kingdom with himself as the head and had thus been in constant touch with Sayyid Muhammad Abdille and his movement.\(^1\) In this, he was thought to be helped by Mursal and other prominent Muslim religious leaders among the Somalis: Muhammad Yusuf, Jama Sahe, and Haji Arsha Muhammad who in December 1916 were reported to be endeavouring to persuade Lij Eyyasu's faction in Abyssinia of the advantage of joining the "Mullah".\(^2\)

T.S. Thomas was further of the opinion that German agents must have been at work and were definitely behind the attack on the Government's post. This theory was accepted owing to the fact that Mursal had a son working with the German East Africa forces. The Turks were also suspected of being at work through Sheikh Ali Nairobi. The latter was formerly in service in the British East Africa Protectorate and had been dismissed by Colonel Ainsworth in 1902; he then returned to Bardera after spending some time in Mecca. Finally, T.S. Thomas felt also that Mursal had taken advantage of the fact that Britain was engaged


elsewhere and thus attempted to throw off British rule and make himself paramount in Jubaland.

Apart from personal aims, the sack of Serenli by the Aulihan and their leader Abd ar-Rahman Mursal had a wider religious implication behind it. His support for Muhammad Abdille's movement and his contacts were unquestionable. Indeed, Mursal was himself described by the officials as "a potential second Mullah" ¹ who had, at a certain stage, tried to mobilize the Muhammad Zubeir, the Gurreh and other Somali tribes. But, like Ashgar's movement before, Mursal failed to mobilize the Somalis in a general rebellion against the British Administration. This was mainly due to the divisions among the Somali tribes themselves. In fact, while the Marehan-Aulihan quarrel was at its peak and while Mursal was attempting to rally all the tribes into a mass revolt, news reached Jubaland that severe tribal fighting between the Muhammad Zubeir and the Abd Wak in the newly established N.F.D. area was causing great concern. However, these inter-tribal fights among the Somalis were welcomed by the Government, who were certain that these quarrels "point to the improbability of any general combination of Ogaden tribes against us." ²

Despite this it was obvious that, from the establishment of British rule in Jubaland up to the time of the First World War, the Somalis had never actually submitted to the British rule. During the war and when Britain was occupied

¹ P.R.O./C.O. 533/173 Unrest in Serenli District 3-4-1916.
with events elsewhere the Somalis took up a considerable amount of her attention. The administration in Jubaland had to ratify a whole series of claims in connection with the attack on Serenli which meant going to great pains in extracting the amounts from the Aulihan. Many people, military and civil employees of the Government submitted their claims because their property had been looted and their men killed in action. The Somalis, on the other hand, felt without any doubt that it was the British Administration rather than themselves who should be blamed. Like the Company before them they had done nothing to improve the social and economic well-being of the tribes. They had been subjected to a military type of administration for at least four years, against whose oppression they had steadily stiffened their resistance, culminating in the sack of Serenli in 1916.

Moreover, one thing was clear, whether due to the neglect of the administration or to the continued unrest in the Province, Jubaland had never over this period actually contributed effectively to the economy of the Protectorate as a whole. Sir Charles Eliot had once written:

"It is difficult to hazard even a vague opinion as to the value of Jubaland. The general impression left by the country is certainly that it is arid and unpromising."

But he did not dismiss the possibility of the future prosperity of the Province if Jubaland was provided with irrigation and hence used for cotton cultivation. In addition

the Province would also support a considerable cattle industry for its essentially pastoral people.

The possibility that Jubaland could be transformed into a successful agricultural province was hindered by a number of factors. Firstly, the Somal had never been a landowner and had no agricultural tradition as had the up-country and the coastal population of the Protectorate. Secondly, the Somal was very much averse to the idea of labouring. It was the Kismayu Somalis who had warned and actually instigated the disturbances among the Berbera Somalis brought in by the authorities to work in the Powyland Plantation down the Coast. These Berbera Somalis were brought in in accordance with the Somaliland Native Labour Regulation of 1901 to work in Kilifi in 1913. According to the Report on the rioting by these imported labourers, "..... the Somalis at Kismayu told them that they were bound for a place where they would all die, that the work will kill them." Thirdly, the problem of transport was said to be another obstacle to the development of agriculture. The region was inaccessible and remote and there were no roads or regular steamer services to connect it with the other flourishing ports. Finally, the continuous unrest and opposition to the British rule convinced the authorities of the futility of introducing white settlement to start the cultivation of the rich banks of the Juba.

1. K.N.A./PC/C.P. 15/14/2 Plantation Agent to P.C. Mombasa March 1914.

2. Kirkpatrick, the Officer in Charge of troops, Jubaland had anxiously enquired about opening the district for white settlers; but for the above reasons it was not encouraged. (PC/Jub 2/2/2 Kirkpatrick to Sub-Commissioner Kismayu 6-5-1907)
The other aspect of economy, which might have improved the position of the Somali and added to the revenue of the Province, was trade. Even before the coming of I.B.E.A., the Somalis were the chief middlemen for the flourishing trade of the interior. This pattern was greatly disrupted with the advent of British rule. British administrators were inclined to appoint Boran agents in Kismayu to look after the caravans that arrived from the interior, to represent the British authorities in office, and generally to guide and protect caravans. Naturally, the Somalis felt that they were being deprived of this privilege. Moreover, the Somalis used to trade to a large extent with the Boran along the southern Abyssinian border but this was occasionally interrupted because it was believed that the Somalis were trading in rifles. As a result of continued suppression the Somalis frequently went their own way and indulged in a considerable amount of illicit trading, especially in ivory with the Waboni hunters of Jubaland and the Bajuns at the coast. These activities which were undertaken in order to avoid the restrictions at Kismayu imposed by the East African Protectorate Regulations were obviously a great loss as far as the revenue of the Province and the Protectorate at large was concerned.

The most important exports of the Province were ivory, rhino horn, ostrich feathers, hides, cattle, sheep and ghee (butter). These items were normally exchanged between

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1. K.N.A./PC/Jub. 2/2/2 No. 8 Acting Sub-Commissioner to Deputy Commissioner 7-1-1907.
Jubaland, N.F.D. and Nairobi; and were carried from Kismayu via the Wajir road to Moyale and southern Abyssinia. Another important outlet to this trade was via the coast from the port of Kismayu to Lamu and Mombasa. This latter route was always subjected to restrictions for political reasons as in the case of the blockades against the Ogaden and the Herti mentioned previously.

Apart from the restrictions on Somali trade owing to constant risings and livestock diseases such as rinderpest, the Somali was also generally very unwelcome in most parts of the Protectorate. The District Commissioner Moyale once remarked, "I believe that Somali traders do an infinite amount of harm in this District... I am of the humble opinion that all Somali traders whether from Jubaland or elsewhere should be excluded from this District unless they come here employed by, or with a reliable European."\(^1\)

Another handicap to the development of the Somali trade was the amount of goods smuggled or allowed to pass through the ports of Jubaland to the Italian side without the payment of ad valorem duty of 10% to which they were liable. This had threatened to cause the diversion of trade - especially hides - in future to Italian Somaliland and the loss of revenue was therefore imminent. The problem of the smuggling of hides, according to Captain Salkeld, was due to the shortage of customs and frontier staff to deal with the situation. He complained, "with only four

administrative centres, none overstaffed, between Lamu and Abyssinia, I fear little can be done."¹ The Chief of Customs was reluctant to establish an effective Customs Preventive Service because he thought it would be too expensive to justify its existence and he therefore did not recommend any change of policy. It was not until the war period that the export of hides regulations were tightened.

In addition to the above, no direct taxation was imposed upon the Somalis for the whole period under consideration in this chapter. It was found that a hut tax could not be effectively levied on the Somalis as they were nomads and owned practically no houses with the exception of a few Hertis dwellings in Kismayu township. It was then suggested that a tax of 5% on the Somali trade coming into Kismayu, viz. cattle, goats, sheep, ivory, ghee etc., should be imposed instead.² It was estimated that this tax would bring a revenue of 40,000 Rs., an equivalent to a hut tax on ten cultivating people and would take the place of an income tax. Another suggestion was to levy a water tax and hold the River Juba and other permanent wells such as Kurkanes and Afmadu. But this was considered to be risky and difficult to enforce, and at the same time too expensive to collect.

On consenting to the imposition of the 5% tax on Somali trade, Her Majesty's Commissioner suggested that out of the

². K.N.A./PC/Jub. 1/6/1 No. 27 Officer in Charge of Troops Jubaland to Officer in Charge of Troops B.E.A. 7-4-1902.
proceeds of the first year's tax, windmills should be erected at Kurkanez and Afmadu with large troughs for watering cattle. The Somalis would then appreciate how quickly and amply compensated they had been for a tax which they would not feel to any great extent.\(^1\)  But Lieut. Mead was in complete opposition to this 5% tax on Somali trade. He felt it was difficult to agree to the above suggestions without infringing upon the common right of every man to do what he wished with his own property. Further, the plan would prohibit the sale of horses, sheep, camel, goats, donkeys, ghee etc. throughout the Province of Jubaland and Tanaland except through an official broker.

Mead also argued that if the regulations were confined to the sale of these products of the Province, as far as they were the property of Somalis, they would transfer them to persons not subject to the same regulations. In addition, it would be necessary to prohibit Somalis carrying these articles of produce by dhow to Mombasa and Zanzibar or elsewhere. Under the treaty between Great Britain and Zanzibar, an export duty was already levied upon all the above-mentioned articles of produce except ghee, ranging from ten dollars for a horse to twenty-five cents for a goat, the duty normally being collected at the place of export. In conclusion, Mead suggested that:

"In view of the fact that Somalis pay no hut tax these duties might be increased. I would suggest this course as an alternative to the course proposed by Major Harrison and Mr. McDougall."

\(^1\) Ibid. Harrison to O/C Troops B.E.A.
I am inclined to think it would add nothing to the present cost of collection and would not hamper trade."

This suggestion was not accepted and in 1906 it was decided to purchase fibre from the Jubaland producers in lieu of a hut tax. But apart from this, no definite taxation policy was adopted. It was not until 1931 that a direct tax was imposed on the Somalis and by then Jubaland had already passed to the Italians.

So it was obvious that, at the period under consideration, Jubaland Province and the Somali were far from providing a satisfactory contribution to the economy of the Protectorate. Owing to continued political unrest and the lack of a definite policy on the part of the British Administration, the various possibilities for the betterment of the Somali Province were never studied. It was occasionally pointed out that the future of Jubaland lay in the cultivation of cotton, maize and sub-tropical products. Given that the Somalis disliked cultivation, the Wagosha, residents along the banks of the Juba, might nevertheless successfully have cultivated the land and the revenue of the Province could easily have been improved. In addition, Sir Charles Eliot himself was not without hope for the future economic prospects of the Somali, in comparison to those of the other groups in the Protectorate. He stated:--

"Should the Somalis show any inclination to adopt a more settled and civilised mode of life, they have sufficient intelligence and commercial

1. K.N.A./PG/Jub. 2/1/6 Mead to Acting Commissioner 7-4-1902.
2. K.N.A./PG/Jub. 2/3/1 No. 264/06 A. Linton (Agriculture and Forest Department) to Collector, Kismayu 8-3-1906.
aptitude to become a very important factor in the trade of East Africa."

Unfortunately, neither the Somalis intelligence nor the economic potentialities of the Province were exploited. The political unrest, inherent in the clash of interests between the Somalis and their administrators, the obvious dislike of British officials of the Somali, the tendency of the Somal to dislike foreign rulers, were all factors in the events which distinguished the period 1895-1916. These events, however, helped to formulate a specific attitude from the side of the British authorities towards the Somalis and remained the base for their future Somali policy. In 1914 Britain had secretly signed a treaty with Italy ceding to it the Jubaland Province in reward for the part played by Italy in the war. Although Jubaland was not in fact handed over to the Italian administration before 1925, the period 1916-25 was not marked by any success in the attempts to improve the welfare of the Somalis, on the contrary, all suggestions for political and economic progress were shelved pending the forthcoming cession - as will be seen in the next chapter.

CHAPTER II

The Development of the Somali Question: 1916 - 1925

In the previous chapter an attempt was made to examine the political and economic position of the Jubaland Somali up to the end of the First World War. This chapter traces the development of the Somali position not only in Jubaland but also in the newly formed Northern Frontier District up to the time when Jubaland was detached and handed over to Italian administration in 1925.

Although the N.F.D. was acquired in 1909, it did not come under effective administration until the post-war period. After its acquisition, events in Jubaland dominated all aspects of tribal life and the attempt by the British Government to draw a line between Jubaland and the new District in 1914 did not prevent unrest among the Somalis in both areas. Far from it, the Somalis of the N.F.D. caused the British authorities incessant trouble during the war - so much so that Wajir itself had to be evacuated between 1916-17 as a result of the sack of Serenli by the Aulihan.

The immediate post-war period was obviously spent in dealing with the aftermath of the troubles involving the Marehan, the Aulihan, and the Muhammad Zubeir and in devising

1. As previously stated (see Introduction p.15), the N.F.D. was acquired by the British East Africa Administration in 1909. This was done in order to counter continuing Somali westward expansion from Jubaland and to stop the ever increasing raids by Ethiopian soldiers on the tribes and the livestock of the region. (See The Somali Peninsula, p.13; and Drysdale, pp. 37-38). Also see Appendix II for the history of the six districts of the N.F.D.
the means by which their resistance could be crushed. It was also clear by then, that unless these tribes were pacified, no development could be effected in the whole of the Somali-inhabited area. But to carry on this programme of tribal pacification in the period 1916-25, the administration had by necessity to abandon two major features of British Somali policy normally adopted in the pre-1916 period. Firstly, the authorities had to substitute a more forward-looking policy for the earlier one of reprisal raids and the levying of tribal fines; and secondly, they had to seriously reconsider their policy with respect to the Somali - a policy maintained since the Government assumed charge of the Protectorate - which was "to leave them alone".

One of the most effective means by which the pastoral Somalis could have been brought to order was by the adoption of peaceful measures which in essence meant the reconsideration of their economic and social needs. Most urgent of these was the provision of adequate water supplies for their stock. In realisation of this, the Governor of the Protectorate, H.C. Belfield, agreed that a sum of £1,000 should be allocated to finance a proposed report on water supply in Jubaland by Messrs. J.H. Parkinson and H.E. Evans. The sum, which included the salaries of Parkinson and Evans, was approved and was met from the savings on the amount voted for special expenditure for the N.F.D. At the end of four months' survey in Jubaland and the N.F.D., Parkinson reported that

the majority of wells in Wajir and many at Eil Wak were non-productive due to choking by the accumulation of debris.\(^1\) Their recommendations did not go beyond a demand for the improvement and extension of existing wells and it seems to have provided nothing more than a practical and useful base for future work. It revealed nothing striking.

Once again in March 1919, the K.A.R. authorities instructed Major P.J. Jennings to proceed to Jubeland and investigate certain aspects of Jubeland administration. He was to present first a report on the water supply of Afmadu wells. In the course of his investigation, Jennings reported that there were two wells in Afmadu one under the military guard and reserved for the use of the garrison and the other used by the Somalis for stock watering and domestic purposes.\(^2\) He observed that the wells were located in the bed of a clearly defined water course - the Lak Dera - and that wells of similar depth could undoubtedly be opened up in the vicinity with favourable prospects of similar yield. He stressed the fact that the political significance of establishing permanent watering places in that valuable grazing district was apparent and could not be over-emphasized. This was obviously because Afmadu was the main area for the troublesome Muhammad Zubeir section.

Given such considerations, and the fact that Afmadu was a good grazing area, Jennings recommended that steps should

\(^{1}\) P.R.O./C.O. 533/154/368 Parkinson to Chief Secretary (Nairobi) 17-4-1915.

\(^{2}\) P.R.O./C.O. 533/215/1446 Jennings to A.A. (Initials only) K.A.R. 3-3-1919.
be taken to drill for water to augment the available supply and that the authorities should obtain a plant capable of drilling to a depth of two to three hundred feet. He then concluded that, "the expenditure necessary to establish a reliable watering place at this point, which is an important caravan route, would be very quickly recovered by making a small charge per head of stock watered. This charge it is believed, would be readily paid by the Somali owners, who appear to be wealthy in stock, a permanent source of revenue could therefore be established."^1

It was obvious, therefore, that for both political and economic reasons a successful British Somali policy in the Protectorate must centre around the solution of the watering problem. The Secretariat at Nairobi was not slow to grasp the idea and directed the attention of the Public Works Department (P.W.D.) to it:-

"the political situation in Jubaland undoubtedly invests this matter with additional urgency at the present time. The Mohammed Zubeir, the tribe principally to be benefited have behaved very well recently and handed in their rifles promptly in obedience to Government's orders. It is also probable that the distribution of tribes now contemplated will increase the population round Afmadu and render an improvement in the water supply an imperative necessity."^2

But to their great disappointment, the Secretariat was informed by the P.W.D. that fitters and supervisors for the installation of engine driven pumps for Afmadu wells were not available and no further promises were made in this direction either by the P.W.D. or the Government. The

1. Ibid.
matter was thus neglected despite the fact that subsequent examination of the soils of the N.F.D. and of Jubaland proved that they would both have responded to water provision. The Economic Commission had in June 1919 reported that the country between the Juba and the Lorian was well grassed and it was quite feasible to lead pipe lines from the Juba into the interior. Further, on the north side of the Uaso Nyiro, north of the alluvial plain, there were stretches of well grassed but practically waterless country, suitable for both cattle and sheep if water were led there from the Marsabit Lake. They specifically pointed out that boring might be tried with advantage in this area.\(^1\)

The Economic Commission's report was further enhanced by F.G. Jennings's second report on well boring in Jubaland. In his report of October 1922, he once more stressed the pressing need for permanent water in the area, without which "no serious development from a tribal, commercial, or agricultural standpoint is possible...".\(^2\) Jennings was also of the opinion that a great deal could be done by dams and reservoirs and the erection of break-waters in dried water courses that flood in the rain. He was very critical of the previous policy in regard to the watering facilities which amounted to flooding the Desheks (Lakes) with the Juba River; and described it as, "the most harmful incident that could have occurred and [one that] has acted

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2. K.N.A./FC/Jub. 1/10/7 conf. Jennings to Native Commissioner 2-10-1922.
detrimentally to the Somali". The Somalis then gave up their dams and efforts to secure water and expected the Desheks to be permanent while, in fact, they were dry for three years afterwards. In conclusion to his plea to aid the Somali by the provision of adequate water, Jennings stated:-

"I describe the Somali as a hard worker for Africa. He is perhaps too intelligent but show him a course which benefits his purse and his race and he will never leave it. It must not be lost sight of that before any marked progress can be effected Government must assist..."

Jennings did not only point out the most practical area where the Somali could be aided but had also proposed to carry out an experiment himself aimed at providing water in the vicinity of Afmadu if a young P.W.D. Assistant were assigned to him together with scrapers, chains and a small supply of tools. By this he proposed to develop dams within a thirty mile radius. The outcome of this experiment, he anticipated, would firstly demonstrate that the administration were really solicitous for Somali welfare and wellbeing; secondly, other sections would clamour to follow suit; and thirdly light would have been shed on Jubaland, thus enabling quicker development.

Unlike other officials, heads of Departments and travellers, Jennings had closely studied the possibilities of the Province and as a result he was very sceptical about the picture they had given that the Province was a thorny desert peopled by some delirious savages. In contrast, he

1. Ibid.
stressed that it was a wonderful stock country possessing large agricultural possibilities. He then warned that after twenty years of unproductive and costly administration, the situation should be faced and dealt with, otherwise, the expenditure would increase and the pessimistic opinion entertained would be enhanced. But despite this plea, and the previous ones to Nairobi and the Colonial Office, nothing positive emerged and the problem was neglected for a long time to come.

The failure to provide enough water for Somali stock was a major factor in the economic stagnation of the Somali country but it was by no means the only factor which accounted for the lack of development in the area. Another, closely connected with the stock watering problem, was that the administration had equally failed to provide routes and markets for an essentially stock-trading community. The Somalis possessed considerable potential wealth in cattle, camel, goats, sheep and donkeys which needed special attention regarding marketing and supervision.

The Somali trade was conducted through two channels; the local market inside the Province; and the outside market which involved selling to buyers in the big trade centres of the Colony. The former was conducted mainly by three groups - the Somalis (as masters of the cattle trade), the Gosha, (as masters of the agricultural produce) and the Indians and Arabs of the luxuries.¹ The encouragement of

¹. The Somalis exchanged trade items with the Indian and Arab traders. These items included rice, sugar, salt, spices, ghee, sim sim, oil, bananas, dates, tea, coffee, matches, clothes (local and European) hardware, knives, paraffin oil etc.
this trade by the different groups would no doubt have counted as a factor in the prosperity of the Somalis and hence their pacification. On the other hand, Somali outside trade which normally went to the Coast and down country could have easily been mastered through supervision and a regular customs policy. This could have also helped to divert the trade southwards instead of its being taken to the Italian ports to the north.

But owing to the dislike of the British officials for the Somali both as a person and as a trader the latter possibility was always jeopardized. This can be seen clearly in the response of the Senior Commissioner of the Coast Province to a proposal put forward in 1921 that the Somalis should be attracted to trading posts at the Coast. The suggestion had come from the authorities at Kismayu and the Senior Commissioner was furious and replied:

"I am in full accord with you regarding the trading centres but inclined to disagree that they should be on the Coast unless you are in a position to control the Somalis by the pass system. If the Somalis are allowed at points on the Coast they will establish themselves as they have done elsewhere and they cannot be got rid of without force. Again Somalis on the Coast are a menace to the whole population...."¹

The opening of the Somali area for trade with the Coast was therefore completely disregarded and not revived until after the Second World War. The same thing happened later down country.

Continually harassed by the authorities, the Somalis

¹ K.N.A./PC/C.P. 54/1442/49 McCellan to Senior Commissioner Kismayu 16-5-1921.
were more often inclined to engage in illicit trading with the Bajun, the Waboni, and other tribes across the Juba in the Italian side. This posed a serious threat to the economy of the Protectorate and the Colony as without doubt the value of smuggled ivory was greater than the amount legally obtained by the Government. In addition to the loss in the trade, the cattle trade which had considerable economic potential, suffered from diseases like rinderpest and East Coast Fever owing to the lack of veterinary supervision. In 1924, 60% of the Muhammad Zubeir cattle were lost owing to an epidemic of rinderpest.

This lack of interest by the administration towards exploring and developing the economic possibilities of the Somali territory was inherent in an idea which had more than once been proved unjustifiable. It was normally argued that Jubaland and the N.F.D. were no more than a drain on the economy of the country and, therefore, that investment in the region was not worthwhile. This argument continued throughout the period in which the British were in charge of the Protectorate and the Colony despite the fact that Sir Charles Eliot, had already outlined the future possibilities of the area.¹ His views were supplemented by the hearing of the Economic Commission when C.S. Gabriel, the only white settler in Jubaland stated,

"For the ultimate future Jubaland possessed enormous potentialities for cotton and sugar dependent upon

¹. See Chapter 1, p. 72-73."
the undertaking of a vast scheme of irrigation from the Juba river....The cotton produced should by reason of its quality and quantity be able to compete in the World's market and prove a source of supply for the industries of the Empire."^1

The same idea was expounded by H. Hasting-Horne, the Senior Commissioner, Jubaland in 1922 when he observed:—

"The richness of Jubaland once water is given would be evident. I will go so far as to say that Kenya, if pastoral development takes place, depends on this Province for such development. Moreover, the beef supply of the Colony can be made much cheaper by opening up the area."^2

Horne's views were more than once supported by the Jennings reports, referred to in this chapter, which were based on a serious study of the possibilities of the Province. But despite all these facts, the post-war economic position of the Somalis remained much the same as that of the pre-war period outlined in the previous chapter. Owing to the above attitude, the shortage of staff, the absence of a sound civil administration, and, above all, uncertainty about the future of Jubaland, the chance of pacifying the Somalis by improving their economic position was never taken up.

Another area in which the Government failed to satisfy the Somalis - and hence another factor in its failure to pacify them - was in the field of education. British administration in Kenya, like that of the Italians in Italian Somaliland^3 had virtually neglected education in Jubaland.

and the N.F.D. Apart from the Swedish Mission Stations at Yonte, Gobwen and Mofi which had been established since 1911, no other type of Government education was given. The sons of chiefs as well as other Somalis attended the Quran schools (Madrasa) which provided primarily religious education through the Sheikhs but very little reading and writing. Despite the Islamic fanaticism of the Somalis, they did not hesitate to send their children to the Swedish Mission for education when a chance was provided. It is worth noting here that the attitude of the Kenya Somalis to education was distinctly different from those in the Somaliland Protectorate where the religious sheikhs continually opposed the introduction of Government education. In Kenya, for political reasons Somalis were always conscious of the opportunities they got compared to the other communities in the country; and in fact they were always anxious that they should be treated equally if not better than the others.

Yet, while the Missions had already by 1920 produced a new élite among the Africans which had its greatest impact in western Kenya, especially central Nyanza and Kikuyuland,¹ the Somalis in the northern territories were struggling unsuccessfully to get some education for their children. Even private efforts to aid them were often discouraged by the authorities in Nairobi. The following letter from a certain Hasan Muhammad is an interesting example:

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¹ See Bothwell A. Ogot, "Kenya Under the British, 1895 to 1963", Zamani, p. 266.
"Some two months ago I decided to start a school for Somali boys and girls in Kismayu. I purchased a makuti (thatch) house on the outskirts of the township and added one large room, a well and a compound, I obtained the services of Abdurahman, a Mwalim who has lived in Kismayu for many years. He is a Hawiya Rahanwein. Unfortunately this man although an excellent teacher of koran and of writing is not capable of teaching English, Arabic, Geography, Arithmetic etc. There are now in the school over thirty Somali children who attended regularly. I would be very glad if the Government would consider the appointment of an Arab as a teacher and suggest that pecuniary help for this purpose might be obtained from the Educational Department."

The idea while being readily embraced by the officials on the spot did not meet with any positive response from the authorities in Nairobi. This occurred at a time when the Department of Education was considering the erection of a village school in every location in the rest of the Colony for all boys and girls under sixteen and when the issue of extending technical education by grants to other Missions - in addition to those already receiving grants - was receiving wide consideration. The Somali, however, was deprived from such privileges.

Major Hasting-Horne, who incessantly advocated a forward policy for the Somali since his appointment as Acting Senior Commissioner, did not hesitate to state his opinion on the issue of education of the Somalis. After a visit to the two stations of the Swedish Evangelical Fatherhood Society in Jubaland, he informed the Director of

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1. K.N.A./DC/Kis. 1/6/1 Hasan Muhammad to Resident Commissioner Kismayu (n.d.) attached to file dated 1920.
Education that the work of the Mission was useful despite the fact that the results were not great. He went on to say:-

"I was greatly surprised to find strict Somali and Nubian Muhammedans sending their children for instructions...We badly need a Government school here, non-religious, it would be well attended. We certainly lose by not having one...I think the time has arrived when we should do something."

He then concluded,

"The Somali is anxious to be instructed, can we assist him?"

But once again, Nairobi was against any forward policy in this direction. The Director of Education wrote to inform Major Horne that there were no funds and he was further debarred from any action "until the fate of Kismayu is definitely known." Kismayu was ceded to the Italians in 1925 and hence Somalis were not given any assistance from the British administration as far as education was

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1. K.N.A./PC/Jub. 1/9/3 No. 1031/20/68 Horne to Director of Education 12-10-1922; Major Horne's remark also shows that there was no foundation for the assumption by some Historians that the Somalis and their kin were averse to western influence. A.J. Hughes argued that "the Hamitic tribesmen of Kenya's remote Northern Province have had little contact with western influences, and their resistance to them was hardened by their Islamic faith." (See A.J. Hughes, East Africa: The Search for Unity: Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda and Zanzibar, (London, 1963), p. 17.

2. K.N.A./PC/Jub. 1/9/3 No. 20/7/23 J.R. Orr to Horne 3-11-1922; Horne was also rebuffed when he asked the Native Commissioner to sanction plans for the development of Jubaland in general. He was informed, "While I quite appreciate your keenness to push the development of the Province in which you are in charge, I regret to have to inform you that in view of the present financial position, and of the uncertainty of the future of Jubaland, it is useless to put schemes of expenditure on an area which is costing the Colony a great deal and yielding practically no revenue." (K.N.A./PC/Jub. 1/15 No. 2611/16 G.O. Maxwell to Hastings-Horne 17-10-1922.)
concerned. Major Horne had emphatically stated, on the eve of the cession of Jubaland that, "The chief reason why we have never really gained the hearts of the Jubaland Somali was because of our inability or unwillingness to help him in that direction."

It is obvious from the preceding pages that the search for a policy which would pacify the Somali through his economic and social development in the period 1916-25 met with no success. However, the administration had, during the same period reverted to its old policy of the use of force to achieve some measure of peace in the Somali territory. This in essence meant the conduct of military operations, disarmament and the restriction of tribal movement.

Since the sack of Serenli by Mursal and the Aulihan in 1916, the Government had seriously considered the re-occupation of the station; not only to inflict a severe lesson upon the Aulihan but also because Serenli was the key to the interior of the Province. But at the time the War Office was reluctant to launch a campaign into the interior as they realised that "military operations in this direction can never be carried out either effectively or economically until motorable roads are constructed from Kismayu and Yonte to Afmadu and Serenli." The question of the inadequacy of the means of transport in the Province was yet another obstacle in the development of the Somali

2. P.R.O./C.O. 533/175 War Office to Under-Secretary Colonial Office 24-10-1916.
country; a fact that had been incessantly pointed out by the officials concerned. Since 1913, the Chief of Customs had directed the attention of the administration to the fact that reliance on the Juba as a means of transport should be reduced. From his own experience, and that of the officers who preceded him up and down the river, they were convinced that the Juba even at its best an inconvenient, unreliable and costly means of transport. He strongly urged the immediate improvement of the road to Gobwen and the landing facilities at Kismayu; even if such measures were only temporary because the results would be worthwhile in the future. F.W. Major had also pointed to the possibility that even if private capital was being furnished for the construction of a railway or a road for motor transport to Serenli or other parts of the northern frontier it would also be worthy of consideration for political and military reasons.¹

At first the Foreign Office seemed reluctant to promise any improvement in transport in Jubaland. Although they were aware of the vital necessity of communications, they felt unable to consider making any start until the close of the German East African operations.² But after a short while sanction was given by the Foreign Office for the commencement of work on the road even though Nairobi itself hesitated owing to the shortage of labour. The Foreign Office had given its consent after taking into consideration

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¹ K.N.A./PC/Jub. 1/10/7 Secretariat No. 87 F.W. Major to Chief Secretary 12-9-1913.
² P.R.O./C.O. 533/189 W.C.B. Bottomley to Fiddes 20-6-1917.
the increasing influence of Muhammad Abdille Hasan's movement in the Province. The latter had instigated a series of risings despite the authorities' precautions; and, moreover, the British Government was also much influenced by the fact that the Italians had already made a motor road on the other side of the Juba, from Mogadishu to Bardera to Lugh. 1

Work on the Kismayu-Serenli road commenced on 25th July with a gang of 264 convicts and a section of four miles had been completed by August 31st. The Military Authorities had also arranged for some 600 prisoners of war to be sent to Kismayu to assist, and motor cars were provided to assist in the construction work. 2 But at this juncture, when the road building was only in its initial stages, the situation in the interior obliged the authorities to act immediately following disturbances in the Marehan country. A certain sheikh Muhammad Yusuf, who was formerly a resident in Jibuti, was said to be preaching a 'jihad' in the area north of Dolo. Muhammad Yusuf was also reported to be sending letters to all Somali tribes announcing the coming of the Mahdi. 3 Barratt, who was in charge of the patrol

1. P.R.O./C.O. 533/192 Porcelli to Jubaland Administration 4-1-1917.
2. The Kismayu-Serenli road was completed as far as Afmadu by March 1919 covering a distance of eighty miles. But for reasons military and political it did not extend beyond Afmadu except for a track cut as far as Diff, half way between Wajir and Afmadu. The road was said to have greatly facilitated the administration of the central and northern Jubaland and the N.F.D. (C.O. 533/216 Bowring to Milner 24-12-1919.)
3. P.R.O./C.O. 533/182 Paraphrased telegram from the Officer Administarting the E.A.P. to the Secretary of State for Colonies 8-6-1917.
sent to deal with the disturbances in the Marehan country reported that if Muhammad Yusuf's movement was not checked, he would become dangerous. The immediate reaction of the authorities was to re-occupy Serenli.

Despite the situation in German East Africa, the War Office was of the opinion that the re-occupation by troops of 5th Regiment K.A.R. had to proceed without delay. Also that the erection of a wireless station there, once the station was occupied, would facilitate easier communications with the interior.1 The idea of the re-occupation was made even more desirable by the reports that the 'friendly' Gurreh had suffered from simultaneous attacks by the Degodia and the Marehan.

Owing to the above factors, the re-occupation of Serenli was sanctioned. Barratt attacked the station on September 25th 1917 and was met by strong resistance from the Aulihan, who attacked the steamer wounding some of the crew. But at the end of the operation the Aulihans were defeated and both Mursal and Muhammad Yusuf were reported to have fled to Abyssinia, in December of the same year.

As in the previous attempts to establish peace by means of a military operation, the re-occupation of Serenli was a success. The Aulihan, who were attacked by a patrol of K.A.R. and the N.F.D. Constabulary were subjugated and for the first time the Aulihan and the Muhammad Zubeir

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1. P.R.O./C.O. 533/189 H.H. Faucet to Under-Secretary Colonial Office 19-6-1917.
were reported to have supplied labour for the building of a bridge over the Uaso Nyiro. The re-occupation had also saved the administration from an imminent revolt among the Muhammad Zubeir.¹

Carrying on with the programme of forceful pacification, the authorities both in Jubaland and the N.F.D. had proposed a joint plan against continued Somali resistance. A meeting took place in November 1918 between J.O.W. Hope, the P.C. of Jubaland, H.B. Kittermaster, Officer-in-Charge of the N.F.D. and Mr. Isaac, D.C. of Tanaland, with Colonel Philips from the Military authorities; and it was decided to disarm the Somalis.² Already by March 1919, the policy of disarmament was declared a success in the N.F.D. The Governor of the Protectorate congratulated the authorities there, "On the successful completion of the Somali disarmament in the Wajir and the Lorien area in circumstances demanding great judgement and skill on the part of those concerned."³

In Jubaland, J. Hope and Captain R.E. Rainsford, 5th K.A.R., proceeded to the Deshek Wama on 29th January 1919 for the purpose of issuing the order for a general disarmament. In southern Jubaland all the Ogaden (Muhammad Zubeir, Sheikh Ali, Maghabul) chiefs and also the Hertis were interviewed by the P.C. and an order was given for them to disarm on the 30th at Malka Dadtoh. A general baraza was also held

¹ P.R.O./C.O. 533/213 Bowring to Colonel Secretary 17-9-1919. Afmedu itself was re-occupied in December 1922 to ensure the pacification of the Muhammad Zubeir.
³ K.N.A./PC/NFD 4/1/5 W.J. Ronson (for Chief Secretary) to Kittermaster 25-6-1919.
at Yak Dimtu on 3rd February, and the order was once more explained in detail. Hoe promised the Somalis that no questions would be asked as to where the arms were obtained, and that the arms would be handed in by sections instead of by individuals. This was thought advisable as otherwise certain guns which had been stolen would not have been handed in.\(^1\) In all, the Muhammad Zubeir handed in 270 rifles and fourteen revolvers; the Maghabul, twenty-four guns; and the Sheikh Ali, five rifles. The Herti handed in six rifles, only a small proportion of what had been expected. Despite this Rainsford declared that the disarmament of the southern Juba side was practically complete and he even suggested that there was no longer a need to open up posts at the Deshek Wama.

Unlike the case in southern Jubaland, in the northern Marehan country the Government was uncertain as to the validity of subjecting the Marehan to the same policy of disarmament. The P.C. was of the opinion that, "Should unrest on the Abyssinian border not be settled in the near future, it would not be advisable to disarm the Marehan at present."\(^2\) Major Dunn, the Officer-in-Charge of Northern Jubaland, had been instructed by the P.C. to warn all the chiefs in his area to register all arms in view of future disarmament, but that this disarmament would not be effected until the administration was in a position to

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1. K.N.A./P0/Jub. 1/10/10 No. 10/20/4372 Rainsford to Assistant Commandant K.A.R. 15-12-1919.

2. Ibid.
guarantee their protection from Abyssinian raiders.  

Along with the above mentioned factors, the authorities introduced other means to bring about the pacification of the Somalis. It was thought that by issuing the Somalis with passes and by their registration, some measure of control over their movement and behaviour would be achieved. All the Provincial and District Commissioners were instructed that "no Somalis should leave their districts without such a pass." This policy more than any of the previous attempts to suppress them, gave rise to considerable signs of discontent; and the Somalis did not hesitate from pointing this out incessantly to the authorities in the Protectorate and later the Kenya Colony. When Edward Northey visited the N.F.D., the only problem the Somalis discussed with him was that concerning their restriction; and they asked that they should be allowed to wander at will and without passes in the N.F.D. and Jubaland.  

In addition, the Somalis all over Kenya were utterly opposed to the pending decision by the Government concerning

1. It is interesting to note here that the Italian administration north of the Juba, probably impressed by the results of the policy of disarmament on the British side, had decided to disarm the Somalis on their side during the Fascist era. In 1924, De Vecchi had denounced the "policy of weakness" adopted in the pre-Fascist period by arming the tribes of the upper Webi Shebelle against the incursions of the Ogaden Somali. But unlike the British experience in Kenya, the Italians were met with greater resistance in implementing the policy. (See Hess, p. 150).

2. K.N.A./PC/C.P. 47/1125 No. 3286/675 Hope to all D.C.'s Coast Province 18-5-1918.

their registration. The issue of the registration of all the natives of Kenya arose as a result of the passing of a new Ordinance repealing all the pre-1920 registration Ordinances, which had been introduced largely with South African pass laws in mind but which had not been put into effect.¹ Northey, Kenya’s Governor, decided to implement the new registration law which laid down that every African male over the apparent age of sixteen should be registered and should carry with him a registration certificate (the Kipande).² As far as the Somalis were concerned, it was reported that even the Telemugga, "who were at one time anxious to be registered and taxed, ... were the first Somalis in the N.F.D. to refuse, when they realised that their registration was at hand."³

The issue was also strongly rejected by the Jubaland Somalis and was the cause of a considerable amount of discontent, according to reports by the Officer-in-Charge of Jubaland in 1924. The latter pointed out that the Somalis were apprehensive of the Registration Act and that, "it had been widely circulated that they will be treated as the Wakikuyu in the Reserve."⁴ The possibility that they might be made to carry Kipandis like the other Bantu tribes was obviously beyond the endurance of the Somalis who had in no

⁴. K.N.A./PG/NFD 3/1/1 Report by Major J. Ward, Central Intelligence Officer, Kenya Colony April 1924.
way considered themselves as "natives" in the same sense as the other Bantu tribes in the Colony. This was to some extent also accepted by the Colonial administration; and in this case the Somalis were exempted from the Registration Act on the grounds of their constant opposition; and also owing to the extremely ill defined position of the Somali once the cession of Jubaland to Italy should be effected.

So far, apart from the success in the field of military operations and perhaps, in the policy of the disarmament of the Somali tribes, the Government had by no means been successful in formulating long term peace measures which were satisfactory both for the Somali and the local British officials. One of the obvious limitations to this, apart from the factors mentioned previously, was the fact that both Jubaland and the N.F.D. had suffered from the inadequacy of both the staff and the police force. Reporting on the position of Jubaland, the D.C. of Kismayu remarked that owing to this inadequacy "the District shows no progress since I was last here in 1917-18, its atmosphere is one of general insufficiency...I attribute this state of affairs, which has only gradually come to my knowledge, largely to lack of supervision." He complained that no taxes were collected

1. See K.N.A./PC/NFD 1/5/1 Wajir Annual Reports 1918-29; This is one of the cases when the British authorities were at a loss in placing the Somali as "native" or "non-native". Here it is clear that he was considered differently from the Bantu communities in the country under the pretext of the uncertainty over the future of Jubaland and the Somalis' opposition.


and no supervision for places like Gobwen, where political propaganda was at its height, was provided. The Kismayu office itself was in a general state of disorder with no files or records left.

The natural outcome of this neglect was that the intended policy of pacification had never come to fruition and because the tribes were unable to feel any progress in their position, the pattern of intertribal feuds was never checked. Feuds continued between the Degodia and the Aulihan, between the Aulihan and the Telemugga, between the Marehan and the Degodia and between the Degodia and the Gurren.1 So it might be said that in the period after the First World War there was no sign of peace either amongst the Somali tribes or between these tribes and the British administration.

But perhaps the major factor behind the failure of the Government's policy of the pacification of the Somali in the period 1916-25, was inherent in their inability to put the Somalis in distinct administrative areas. Since 1905 the administration of the Somalis in Jubaland, N.F.D. and Tanaland had occasionally been shifted from one district to another, and from province to province. The authorities were undecided between containing the whole of the Ogaden Somali into one administrative unit, splitting them between the N.F.D., and Jubaland, or adding only the Telemugga to either of the latter two. As a result of this indecision the Somalis, especially in the Tana River District, had

constantly posed a problem since they tended to move about causing clashes among themselves, with other Somali sections and with riverine Bantu tribes.

It was because of this state of affairs that the authorities had seriously considered the question of containing the Somalis into a reserve in the 1920's, though the idea of creating native reserves in Kenya was by no means a new one. Since 1905, the Imperial Government had recognised the principle of "Reserves for Natives" and a commissioner for Native Affairs was appointed in 1907. By 1915 the Crown Land Ordinance gave statutory recognition to 'native' Reserves and in 1926 about twenty-three of them were gazetted all over the Colony.¹ This policy of land reservation on racial and tribal lines served as the base for the theory of Separate development in Kenya Colony and Protectorate in the period between 1923 to 1952; and guaranteed land and labour for the white settler.

As far as the Somalis were concerned, the idea of creating a reserve was viewed from a different angle. The Somali owned practically no land and was inhabiting what was essentially Crown Land and further he was by no means a potential source of labour. The concept of concentrating him on a reserve was primarily meant for administrative convenience to pacify him and to check his south westerly drift towards the interior of Kenya and most important the White highlands. This was the main idea behind

¹. Ogot, Zamani, pp. 271-72.
Captain Salkeld's proposition of 1912 and 1914. ¹

Salkeld's recommendations concerning a Somali reserve were transmitted to the Secretary of State with the request that they might be considered in connection with the scheme for the administration of the N.F.D. and Jubaland. But the issue was not seriously discussed before 1918 when, as a result of increasing trespassing by the Biscaya Somalis on the Wapokomo property, the authorities in the N.F.D., Jubaland and Tanaland presented their views on the subject.

The N.F.D. view on the question of the reserve was presented by Mr. Deck in a despatch to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in July 1918. Deck was of the opinion that the Somalis should be concentrated on the Juba River and towards the Tana and to leave Wajir free for the Galla. ² This proposition led to a long controversy concerning the right of settlement of Somalis and Galla on the Wajir area, and also as to whether all the Somalis should be included in one administrative area or divided between two.

1. Salkeld divided the proposed reserve area for the Somalis into three divisions:-
   (a) the northern area comprising the districts occupied by the Marehan and Aulihan and gazetted as the Serenli district.
   (b) the central area of Afmadu district as gazetted.
   (c) the south western or Tana River district, i.e. that frequented by the Abdullah and Abd Wak. (See T.S. Thomas, p. 55; Also See T.H.R. Cashmore, Studies in District Administration in the East Africa Protectorate 1895-1918, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis (Jesus College, Cambridge, Nov. 1965), p. 328.

First, Mr. Hope, presenting the Jubaland point of view regarding the administration of the Somalis and the question of the Reserve, was of the opinion that as both Jubaland and the N.F.D. were similar, and the questions which arose affected one as much as the other, it would be more satisfactory if the two districts were put in the charge of one Officer. But that would only be possible if mechanical transport between Wajir and Kismayu were maintained: a railway built or failing that a sufficient service of light motor cars permitted. In the event of the above scheme being impossible, Hope put forward the idea of a Somali reserve in the Tana and Wajir areas to include the Abdwak, Abdallah, Aulihan, Maghabul, Sheikhal and Muhammad Zubeir (all Ogaden) and half the same tribes to be concentrated in the Deshek District and Biscaya. This essentially meant that he was averse to the idea that the Somalis should be evicted from Wajir because, he maintained, "Since 1910 the immigration of Somalis to Wajir has been tacitly allowed by Government and this has enticed more Somalis down from the north... It would be most unfair now to order them to move."2

On the other hand, Kittermaster, the Officer-in-charge of the N.F.D. was in full agreement with Deck's point of view regarding the Somali claim to Wajir and was very critical of Hope's attitude which supported the Somali claim.

1. K.N.A./PC/Jub. 1/10/7 Hope to Chief Secretary Nbi, 24-10-1918.

2. Ibid.
He stated:-

"...I cannot consent without protest to the formal recognition of the Somali claims to Wajir at the expense of the Galla... Our future relations with Abyssinia and Italy may make a vital difference to the expediency of allowing the Somali claim to Wajir and I advise that this aspect of the question should be carefully considered when a decision is being made."

Kittermaster was also very critical of Hope's suggestion regarding the division of Somalis in the reserve. He regarded as incomplete, the latter's suggestion that the Ogaden were to be included in the Somali Reserve but not the Hawiya. This in the case of the Rer Muhammad would put half of that section into the reserve and half outside, while the Fai etc. would be outside though with large numbers of relatives living among the Marehan. He also dismissed as being inequitable and inexpedient the alternative suggestions of, one, crowding all Somalis except the Galla-speaking Ajuran into the area proposed by Hope and, two, extending the reserve north and west. He rejected the former on the grounds that it would produce congestion and the latter on the grounds that it would entail the expulsion of the Galla and Galla-speaking Ajuran from territory they already occupied.

Kittermaster's own recommendations on the subject amounted to a request that the de facto arrangement should be allowed to stand and that the Somalis at Wajir should be included formally in the N.F.D. He informed the Chief Secretary,

1. K.N.A./FC/Jub. 1/10/7 Kittermaster to Chief Secretary 28-10-1918.
"...I state my opinion most emphatically that if it be found impossible to put all these northern territories under one officer the existing arrangement with more clearly defined boundaries will be more satisfactory than the proposed Ogaden reserve including Wajir."¹

The third point of view regarding the question of the Somali Reserve was put forward by J.W. Isaac, the P.C. Lamu, representing the Tana River opinion. He suggested that the question should first be considered from an Imperial standpoint, which in essence meant the control of Somali immigration from northern Somaliland into East Africa. This would curb the gun running which was bringing the country into much the same condition of lawlessness that existed in Uganda, during the rebellion of Mwanga and Kabarega.² In addition, he commented,

"The time has now come when we have sufficient military strength to deal with the situation finally and effectively, and to prove to the Somalis that these encroachments, and the defiance of law and order, do not pay, and to the Abyssinians that border raids must cease. We can also clear up the somewhat obscure position existing between ourselves and Italy, whereby undesirable Somalis are constantly trickling through Italian territory into British East Africa."³

J.W. Isaac, further argued that, if the Somalis were to be dealt with from an entirely local standpoint, the administration would not be able to solve the difficulties by enlarging Jubaland Province, taking in a strip of TanaLand, and then gazetting this area as a Somali Reserve. This would mean administering a larger Somali area which

¹. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
would be more difficult to guard and the cost of administration would tend to increase rather than decrease. His own suggestions for an alternative scheme considered solely from local standpoint amounted to four points.

Firstly, to make a census of the Somali population and their livestock while disarmament was progressing. Secondly, to establish some large pumping stations on the Juba River and run out canals for irrigating pasture land and watering stock - this to be paid for by Somalis. Thirdly, to apply the Native Authority Ordinance and compel Somalis to clear the bush where these canals run and thus establish permanent pastures. Finally to place all the Somalis in a Reserve along the Juba River and thus create a buffer state which would prevent immigration from the north. Once established along the River in Reserves with good grazing and abundant water, the Somalis would not wish to leave nor would they allow other clans to invade their areas.

In reply to these suggestions, Kittermaster altogether declined to tackle the question from the Imperial standpoint because, "if re-arrangements of any sort should be made with Abyssinia or Italy the question would take an entirely different complexion and would have to be viewed from a fresh angle." The N.F.D. authorities were also very sceptical about Isaac's suggestion of a reserve on the Juba kept going by pumping stations and irrigation. They were doubtful if enough pasture even by irrigation from the Juba valley could be obtained. Further, the Officer-in-charge

N.F.D. was unable to verify which of the Somali sections Mr. Isaac was intending to include in his reserve - the Herti, the Marehan or the Ogaden and what was he going to do about the Hawiya sections, to include them with the rest of Somalis or not.

Like the previous suggestions for the pacification of the Somali, the idea of creating a Somali Reserve did not meet with any success. Edward Northey, the Governor of the Protectorate, had then suggested yet another proposal for the pacification and the administration of the N.F.D. Somali. Northey was of the opinion that the administration of the N.F.D. at that time was both expensive and unsatisfactory. He explained:

"In a country so far distant and so unsettled the retention of the civil administration is wasteful and superfluous superimposed on the military who should I consider have quite a free hand and are quite capable of keeping law and order. The civil servants employed in this administration are much more urgently required in the more settled areas, and we can ill afford to keep them where they are." 

As an example of this anomalous situation the Governor pointed out the case of Kittermaster, who as an official of the Protectorate, was actually in charge at Gaddaduma in Abyssinia, which post the British were occupying in operations against the Tigre. Northey, backed by General Llewellyn, recommended that such administration as was required in the N.F.D. and also northern Turkana

1. The 'handing-over to Italy scheme' was also a factor in the failure of the Reserve policy because it was not then clear what boundaries and what tribes were going to be included in Jubaland and handed to Italy.

should for that period be carried out entirely by the military officers Commanding Detachments, to whom the necessary civil powers of Acting Assistant District Commissioner would be given. The suggestion was also agreed to by Sir Robert Coryndon.¹

In reply to the above suggestion, Fiddes had on behalf of Milner communicated a telegram to Northey to say, "N.F.D. proposal approved but in first instance new arrangements for administration must be regarded as experimental".² Moreover, he indicated that the authorities in London had approved the taking over by the military provided that no additional K.A.R. personnel would be required and that the Commandant would carefully select officers who were to take over the administration. The Military administration which eventually took over the affairs of the Somalis had certain obvious limitations. First, it did not in any way aid the programme intended by the Government for the pacification of the Somali. The various sections of the Somali clans found themselves more divided than ever. The Darod were split up under different forms of administration, civil in Jubaland and military in the N.F.D. This aspect was illustrated lately by the Senior Commissioner Kismayu who reported, "I found when I wished to get a general council to settle outstanding questions it was impossible.... The Tellemugga on the Tana are all under Sankuri (N.F.D.), a portion of the Mohammad

¹. Ibid.
Zubeir, Maghabul and Aulihan are under Jubaland. The arrangement deliberately fosters inter-tribal friction more especially when you take into consideration the difference between civil and military administration.1

In the N.F.D. itself at the time of the assumption of military rule in 1920, the boundaries between the different sub-districts were very vague. No definite administrative boundaries between Gurreh, Moyale, Wajir, Garba tulla, and Samburu existed. The result was that the control of the movement of the different tribes was very difficult, especially in Wajir where it represented greatest administrative difficulties with the Degodia and the Gurreh continually feuding.

On the Tana, the situation was far worse. On the eve of the Military administration, the D.C. Sankuri was informed that the Telemugga had been placed under the orders of Jubaland. In addition, it was stated that any question between the Telemugga Somalis and the other tribes on the Tana could be settled by the Assistant D.C. of Sankuri and the D.C. of Kipini,2 in the north, by the Assistant D.C. and the Officer Commanding Wajir. The officer at Sankuri had been made an Assistant D.C. in charge of Somalis in the area. This was done while in Jubaland itself Mr. Jennings was the Civil Officer in charge of all the Ogaden. This anomalous position of the Tana River Somali did not only

2. Kipini was then the Headquarters of the Tana River District. No sooner was the above arrangement made than it was decided to close it in 1922. Kipini and Kao were handed to Lamu in 1922.
prove difficult for the administration but the Somalis themselves led by the turbulent Abdallah section of the Telemugga, were not slow to realize the weakness of the position and therefore did not hesitate to tantalize the authorities.

In their fury at being subjected to military administration,³ the Abdallah were constantly in clashes with the Government. They were particularly indignant to the policy regarding their watering rights and their southward movement. The administration had limited their southernmost watering point on the Tana to Masabubu; a point which the Somalis thought utterly unsatisfactory. On the other hand, the administration was very anxious that, whatever the outcome might be, the Somalis must be kept north of Masabubu. This was viewed as a necessary measure if their southerly movement was to be checked and if the Pokomo and the Galla were to be protected. Further, to ensure the latter policy, the Tana River was declared a closed district and Somalis were not allowed to cross south of a line drawn between Masabubu and Dick’s Head except the Location of Chora, which was in the Ten Miles Strip - an area described by the Senior Commissioner Kismayu as, "useless and dangerous for health".²

Hasan Uthman, the Chief of the Tanaland Abdallah was instrumental in rallying Somali opposition to the disappointing British Somali policy, in the 1920's. Having

1. The Abdallah were placed under K.A.R. administration in August 1922.
2. K.N.A./PC/C.P. 54/1443/49 No. 1046/20/69 Senior Commissioner Kismayu 16-10-1922.
already had a bad record with the Protectorate administration, and having been severely censured in 1912 by Sir P. Girouard for his remissness and disobedience, the administration was not slow to ask for his deportation. Only a year before, in August 1922, Hasan Uthman had presented himself before the Chief Native Commissioner at Kozi, with a view to getting permission for himself and his people to water below Masabubu - he was already at Kozi with his people and their stock. Although he was informed by the Chief Native Commissioner that he was out of boundary and that the Government could not hear him until he had withdrawn beyond Masabubu and applied in writing for a watering place, he refused to obey the orders and the Abdallah were again found below the permitted boundary. Moreover, in August 1923, Hasan Uthman visited Lamu and asked to be administered from Lamu, the implication being that he and his people resented their subjection to Military administration. He once again renewed his appeal that the Abdallah should be allowed to water below Masabubu, and once again the authorities refused to hear him unless he submitted a written application - an order he resented.

However, the case of the Abdallah did not completely escape the sympathy of some of the officials on the Coast Province. The District Commissioner, Lamu, once suggested that there was reason in allowing the Abdallah south of Masabubu in that they were not on friendly terms with the Abd Wak who were immediately north of Masabubu, and that in a dry year there was not enough water for their stock
unless they were allowed to have access to the river. He repudiated the idea put forward by various officials in charge of Somali affairs that the only satisfactory means of dealing with the problem was to debar the Somalis from the river and that any of them appearing in its vicinity should be shot. In contrast, the D.C. argued that in consulting the Wapokomo, the tribe mostly affected by Somali appearance on the area, he found that provided access to the river was only allowed at gazetted watering points and no Somalis were allowed to live within five miles of the river, they would be glad to have the Abdallah in the hinterland. The measure would have created better opportunities for trade between the Somalis, the Bantu and the Coastal population and, according to the D.C., this would not entail any necessity for increasing the military or police strength. He said that Assistant District Commissioner, under the general control of the D.C., Lamu, should be posted at Sankuri for the civil administration both of the Somalis, Northern Galla and Korokoro.

It was obvious that the local administration was beginning to realize that the Somalis could not be crushed by military administration and that it was essential to put them under civil rule like other districts in the Colony and to provide them with gazetted watering places. This policy was more likely to have produced successful results than the force of arms. The fact that the military rule imposed upon the Somalis had its limitations was pointed out

2. Ibid.
by Mr. Fazan in his Handing-Over Report to Mr. Wade in 1923. In the first instance, the term of K.A.R. service for officers had been cut from five years to three so that there was very little chance of a military officer learning administrative duties. Secondly, intelligence collected by the military was not normally sent to Lamu and even if it was, one could not make much of it, without local knowledge. The result was that the Abdallah, because of the distance from them of the various Government stations like Kismayu, Lamu and the alienated K.A.R. administration at Sankuri, had enjoyed a position of complete independence obeying Government orders only in so far as it suited them. This position facilitated their contact with other Somali groups like the Herti who influenced them in the way of political thinking and their district was said to be, "a hot-bed of ivory poaching, and the rendezvous and haven of refuge of all Herti ivory traders."\(^1\) The Abdallah had never recognized the K.A.R. authority and with the exception of Chief Hasan Birjin had constantly refused to contact Sankuri. In this way they had also influenced the Rer Muhammad section who also refused to recognize the K.A.R. administration at Sankuri. Their Chief, Yusuf Gedi, who went to Lamu in June 1923 to claim the Sultanate of Rer Muhammad was instructed to report to Sankuri but he refused.

In 1924, the authorities were obliged, by the constant resistance of the Abdallah to change the boundaries of the Telemugga District in favour of the N.F.D. The eastern

\(^1\) K.N.A./PC/NFD 1/17 Garissa (Telemugga) Annual Reports 1923-1929.
boundary was defined along the old Provincial boundary. The western boundary was adjusted so that the five mile zone to the north of Sankuri was abolished and the left bank of the River was included in the Telemugga District. The southern boundary was changed to allow the Abdallah increased watering facilities on the Tana. This alteration added approximately 1300 sq. miles to the District.1

It was after this that Hasan Uthman had, on behalf of the Abdallah and all the Telemugga, submitted a petition to the D.C. of Lamu.2 The petition consisted of four main points. Firstly, Hasan Uthman stated that Biscaya, the home of the Abdallah was a long way from Sankuri. Secondly the Abdallah had been for a long time supervised from Lamu which was their natural headquarters and they saw no reason for the change. Thirdly, they argued that they were peaceful people and had given no trouble: the military authority usually governed troublesome people and they maintained they had done nothing to deserve being subjected to it. Finally, they pointed out that the military rule had proved harsh and unjust. The K.A.R. askaris had interfered with their women and commandeered their goats. In reply to the Abdallah petition the Governor Sir Robert Coryndon, who attended an interview with Hasan Uthman at Lamu, said that he was unable to give a definite answer immediately and that he would have to consult the Military Authorities in Nairobi.

1. On February 29th 1924, a special number of the Official Gazette was issued (proc. No. 84) in which the new boundaries between the N.F.D. and Tana River District were promulgated. (C.P. 54/1443/49 No. 405/15/7/2 Captain Mahony to Officer i/c N.F.D. Meru 17-10-1924.)

2. This was done verbally but recorded and attached to C.P./1443/49 Ag. D.C. Lamu to McCallan 3-7-1924.
Moreover, he pointed out that the impending cession to Italy of a large part of Jubaland would necessitate certain changes in the administration which would affect this issue.

The question initially responsible for raising the petition against subjection to the military was that of Somali watering and access points on the Tana below Masabubu. However, despite the lengthy discussion of the problem, the question was lost sight of or ignored. It is true that the order of 29th February 1924 granted some additional watering places on the Tana but the continual harassment of the Somalis from the newly-extended area meant that what was a partial solution in theory was no solution at all in practice. Not only that, Hasan Uthman was shortly arrested by the Officer-in-charge - Sankuri. However, he managed to escape to Lamu and later to Nairobi where he was recaptured by the authorities. After his deportation, temporary permission was given to the Somalis to water their stock at seven points below Masabubu but no sooner had that been granted than officials again complained that "Considerable damage has been done to Pokomo cultivation in the vicinity (a) by cattle trampling and grazing it (b) by looting by the Somali, women and children principally."3

It is obvious from the preceding pages that the Government had completely failed to implement the proposed

2. The seven points were: - Gabuba, Wallu, Hammar, Gurmusa, Abalatic, Bubesi, and Agarun Gabir.
programme for the better administration and pacification of the Somali tribes in the northern territories of the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya. The period 1916-25 witnessed no change in the social, economic and the political position of these tribesmen and the question of creating a proper and practical Somali policy, though frequently brought to the forefront by the officials on the spot, remained a dream that never came true. This was particularly due to the fact that the administration had till then failed to grasp the actual problems involved in the administration of these pastoral tribes - the result being the hesitancy and the muddle which distinguished the policies in the period under consideration. The situation was made even worse by the projected handing over of the Province of Jubaland to Italy. As previously stated, all the suggestions for the administration of the Somalis in both territories were either delayed or completely neglected pending a decision by London on the subject.

The negotiations with Great Britain for the transfer of Jubaland to Italy took place intermittently from 1919 to 1924. The first phase of the negotiations was concluded in September 13, 1919, when Lord Milner agreed to transfer a tract of Jubaland, including the port of Kismayu, to Italy. This was the one positive result of Article XIII of the Secret Wartime Treaty of London by which the British promised to compensate Italy if Britain enlarged its African holdings at the expense of Germany.\(^1\) But realizing that the

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British offer was considerably less than what they had actually demanded, the Italians broke off negotiations. In 1923 Mussolini seemed more prepared to come to terms over Jubaland but it was not until 1924 that both powers resumed negotiations. When on July 15, 1924, the Italians withdrew their claim for more land, Britain ceded Jubaland to Italy on the bases of the boundaries agreed between Milner and Sciaja in 1919.

The Somali question in the Kenya Colony was, however, no nearer a solution as a result of the decision on Jubaland. Far from it, the problems resulting from the drawing of an artificial boundary with no ethnic classification had actually added a new dimension to the already existing problems. Ever since 1920, both the Jubaland and the N.F.D. authorities had been at a loss to decide which of the Somali tribes was to remain in the N.F.D. and which of them was to be returned to Jubaland, in the event of the cession taking place. Kittermaster, in a memorandum on the Ogaden in the Northern Frontier District,¹ had advocated the idea that the Ogaden should be turned out of British territory and joined to the rest of the Somali tribes in Jubaland. But his proposition was vehemently criticised by the Jubaland authorities who were unable to understand how the Ogaden could be controlled and kept from returning, where they were to be placed in Jubaland and whether the Italian Government would be prepared to accept the extra

¹. Quoted by Jennings, Acting D.C. of Afmadu in his despatch to P.C. of Kismayu (K.N.A./PC/Jub. 1/4/7 No. 22/1/2Q 16-12-1920).
Ogaden in their new territory bearing in mind that for some years these Ogaden had not been living in the ceded area. The idea was further opposed in view of the fact that if all the Ogaden tribes were excluded, the camel supply at Wajir would not be sufficient to meet transport demands.

The idea of excluding all the Ogaden was then replaced with that of splitting the Muhammad Zubeir cattle and camel men between the two territories. As the country around Wajir affords better grazing for camels than that in southern Jubaland, the Kenya Government had for some time allowed the camel people to use the grazing in an allotted area of the British zone, conditional on their good behaviour when removed from the authority of their principal Headman and from full tribal control. On the other hand, the cattle people who had better facilities than the camel people for watering and grazing stock in southern Jubaland, were returned in 1921 to their proper grazing grounds around Deshek Wama. But in doing this both the British and Italian authorities clearly failed to foresee the seemingly obvious danger inherent in dividing a tribe as turbulent as the Muhammad Zubeir between the two different administrations.

With regard to the Aulihan, the administration had also

2. K.N.A./PC/Jub. 1/4/7 Enclosure. A copy of a discussion which took place at Garba Tulla on November 6th 1920 at which the following were present:- Lt. Col. J.M. Llewellyn - O.C. Troops, Jubaland, Mr. E.J. Waddington, Ag. Off. i/c N.F.D., Mr. H.B. Sharpe, Ag. D.C. Wajir. Enclosure in Salkeld to Chief Secretary 17-5-1920.
proposed to treat them in the same way as the Muhammad Zubeir by allowing some of them to remain in the British zone on condition they would register themselves and their herds; the others to be returned to the Aulihan country in the Serenli area. The case of the Marehan was, however, treated differently. The Marehan, in the northern part of Jubaland had never been allowed to encroach west of the proposed international boundary. The country west of the boundary was recognised as Gurreh country, and it had been the fixed policy of the Kenya Government, quite apart from any question of cession of territory to Italy, to prohibit any incursion of the Marehan into the country west of the proposed line. In particular, the Italian Government was informed by a Foreign Office note to the Italian Ambassador on December 23, 1921, that the claim of the Marehan to permanent water at Eil Wak had not only never been tacitly recognized, but had been strongly resisted.

The defects of a policy aimed at splitting off at least two of the Ogaden sections and at the complete stoppage of the Marehan from having access to watering facilities in British territory, are not difficult to see. Moreover, in a land of nomads an attempt to regulate tribal movement through demarcation of boundaries could only lead to further problems and the case of the N.F.D. and Jubaland was no exception. The nature of the country (difficulty of transport, lack of water, comparative absence of topographical detail together with the practical impossibility of confining
nomadic tribes within fixed boundaries), rendered any attempt at a continuous demarcation impracticable. In fact only a year after the cession reports of raids by the Aulihan across the north eastern border were common. Also, the cession by no means helped the administration to control the turbulent Abdallah section of the Ogaden and their ex-Sultan Hasan Uthman. The latter found his opportunity by establishing himself once again as a salaried chief among the Abdallah at the Juba, but in Italian pay. This situation helped him to tantalize the British administration from the other side. In short, the post-1925 period witnessed, in addition to the previous problems, the increased trespassing of tribes over an undefined border and, more difficult still, the control of the unchecked Italian banda.

The cession of Jubaland had, apart from serving the purpose of the Abdallah, pleased neither the average Jubaland Somali, nor the N.F.D. authorities, nor the authorities at Nairobi. According to the Intelligence Reports of Kenya Colony, the Jubaland Somali was very hostile.

1. P.R.O./C.O. 533/329/47 Cession of Jubaland: Boundary Delimitation February 1925. Although Jubaland was officially handed over in June 1925, the boundary was not yet demarcated. According to Convention between Britain and Italy this was to be decided by the Boundary Commission. The latter did not commence before 1927.


3. K.N.A./PC/O.P. 54/14/3/49 T.B. Butler to Officer Commanding Troops Nairobi, 14-3-1927.
to the cession for four reasons. First he realised that the methods employed by the two Governments were entirely different. Second, trade in Italian Somaliland was relatively much poorer and so he anticipated low prices for his cattle. Third, he believed that his existing system of chiefs and councils would be more or less abolished and that their powers would be largely usurped by appointed qadis and the powerful chiefs who resided in Italian Somaliland. Finally, during the war, the Somalis in the neighbouring territory suffered losses and starvation having had food and livestock requisitioned by the authorities while the Jubaland Somalis had had prosperous years.

Besides the dissatisfaction expressed by the Jubaland Somalis and the N.F.D. authorities over the outcome of the cession, the Governor of the Colony, Sir Robert Coryndon had himself bitterly criticized the decision by Britain over the cession issue, particularly as London had placed him in the embarrassing position of having to keep the whole affair secret. Writing to the Colonial Office, he complained:

"With reference to Jubaland Cession the public here naturally dislikes the thing going through without any notice to the Colony. They fully realise that it was an imperial matter, and had to be considered in that spirit; but it would have been simple for

1. Hess maintained that the Herti were hostile to Italian administration partly because of the anti-Italian feeling stimulated by the British Commissioner and partly because of their fear that any Colonial administration would favour the case of the Muhammad Zubeir. (see Hess, p.158).

2. K.N.A./PO/NFD 4/1/3 E.J. Waddington to Officer-in-charge N.F.D. 3-2-1925.
you to have given me some guarded statement which I could have made at the time or a few days before. You will understand that none of us like to have to rely upon the local colonial press for news of such matters as these; ... I did of course say that there has been correspondence, but that it obviously could not have been communicated at the time and cannot be disclosed now.... I am afraid I shall have a bad time in Kismayu in June, and will probably be mobbed by angry Somali chiefs."

A few years later, Sir Edward Grigg, who succeeded Sir Robert as Governor, was even more critical of the decision. He stated in a memorandum on Railway Development:

"The transfer was made without her knowledge (Kenya), and she was confronted with the assurance that her expenditure would be considerably reduced... The promise has not been fulfilled. She retains an equally long and far less convenient frontier which threatens much future trouble and expense. Owing to its character she has had to face an immediate increase of smuggling which entails for 1926 alone an estimated loss of £25,000 in ivory revenue and seems likely in a few years to destroy that branch of revenue altogether. In Kismayu and the Juba River, moreover, she has lost an asset capable of great future development both as a stock and crop producing area." 2

The cession of Jubaland to Italy on June 29, 1925 had, therefore, brought satisfaction to neither the Somali nor to his administrators. To the former it meant yet another artificial barrier planted between him and his kin; and to the latter, far from aiding the prospects of peace in the area, the cession had added a new dimension to the problem of an already undefined Abyssinian frontier.

The period 1916-25 had thus witnessed the development of the Somali question in its most acute form as a result of the failure of the administration to bring about a workable

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solution to the question of administration and pacification of the Somalis in the northern territories of the Colony. The period which followed, up to the Second World War, was not marked by any improvement in the position of Somalis as a result of the inevitable difficulties of controlling a frontier people - as we shall see in the next chapter.
Chapter III

Britain, Italy, Abyssinia, and the Administration of the N.F.D. Somalis 1925-1940.

In the previous chapter, the problems relating to the administration of the Jubaland and N.F.D. Somalis and the failure of the government’s efforts to pacify them were discussed. This chapter traces the position of the N.F.D. Somalis in the subsequent years up to the end of the Second World War - a period which was marked by the development of yet another aspect of the Somali question - the difficulty of controlling a frontier Province.

Naturally, the task of administering a province which shared boundaries with four different countries1 was not an easy one; especially when it is taken into consideration that these were artificial boundaries drawn with no consideration for geographical and ethnographical factors. Since the nineteenth century, trans-frontier migrations, raids, and feuds became very frequent between the tribes on the Kenya-Abyssinian border. With the cession of Jubaland and the further division of the Somalis, the situation between Kenya and Italian Somaliland once more became acute in that quarter. This was further worsened by the results of the Italo-Ethiopian conflict of 1935 and the International conflict of 1940.

As already observed, the cessions of Jubaland, an area where the Somalis had never really submitted, to

1. The N.F.D. was bounded by Italian Somaliland, Abyssinia, The Sudan and Uganda.
British territory, had by no means eased the task of the administration of the rest of the Somalis in the N.F.D. Attempts to control trans-frontier movement were first begun by the survey of the border between Kenya and Italian Somaliland by the Jubaland Commission of 1924/25, which commenced its work from Mandera working its way south to Kiunga. In 1928 the boundary between the two countries was demarcated and a report on the work of this Boundary Commission was published. The limitations of the boundary thus drawn were pointed out by E.H.M. Clifford, a member of the British Commission who remarked that the boundary....

"has this disadvantage that, as the topography of the country offers no natural lines, no obstacle is provided to raids or immigration by the nomad tribes who inhabit that region and peace on the frontier can only be maintained by effective police and administrative measures."2

The boundary line which followed longitude 41° running from Eld Earl to Kolbio was also criticized as being arbitrary and utterly meaningless running as it did "through the middle of nowhere for a hell of a long way."3 Naturally this line had in no way helped to check border trespassing.

1. Representing the British side in this Commission were: Lieut. Colonel L.N. King and Captain E.H.M. Clifford. Colonel Dotto Giovanni represented the Italian side. This Commission is known as the Boundary Commission to distinguish it from the previous Jubaland Commission of 1924.


The Telemugga Somalis in the N.F.D. were continuously under the pressure of fresh immigration from Italian Somaliland. No policing or economic measures would have prevented the Aulihan and the Muhammad Zubeir, who were legally residents in both countries from tresking backwards and forwards. Already by 1928 the District Commissioner of Wajir complained that "a large number of Bartiri and Italian Aulihan have crossed to the south side of the river."¹ In addition the Garissa administration was particularly apprehensive about the immigration of the troublesome Herti from Kismayu. Captain Mahony complained that "those Herti do much harm, and much of the anti-registration agitation in 1923 was due to them...the Herti were entirely responsible for the Muhammad Zubeir unrest in Jubaland in 1925."² Mahony was particularly concerned because the Herti were close friends with the Abdallah in his District and therefore they might have instigated trouble. Besides these continuous trespassing incidents by the Aulihan, the Muhammad Zubeir and the Herti, the Marehan of Italian Somaliland were constantly reported to have infiltrated in large groups since the cession and thus to have deprived the N.F.D. tribes, especially the Gurreh of some of the best grazing and watering areas in the District.

However, despite the incessant trespassing of tribes, the Kenya-Somalia border had, in comparison with the

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1. K.N.A./PC/NFD 4/1/7 No. 175/57/1 D. Stones to Senior Commissioner N.F.D. 26-3-1928.
Abyssinian frontier, given no major troubles. With the exception of 1939 when the border suddenly assumed a strategic and international importance - as Somalis were fighting on both sides of the line - the border seemed to have deserved no serious attention. It was not until 1953, with the emergence of the concept of 'Greater Somalia' that a serious boundary problem inevitably started between the two territories. In contrast, the Kenya-Abyssinian frontier had always proved difficult to guard; and the situation was made even worse by the almost complete lack of co-operation between the frontier officials on both sides of the boundary. The natural consequences of this was the immense difficulties in administrating the Somalis and their kindred tribes in the N.F.D.

The history of the frontier between Kenya and Abyssinia could be dated from 1891, when Emperor Menelik addressed letters to Great Britain and Italy defining the frontier of Abyssinia. On the Kenyan side he claimed "the Galla country called Asbore as far as the Samburu Sea, the Galla country known under the name of Borani, all the country of the Arussi to the limits of the Somalis, including also the Province of Ogaden." But Britain had then tended to underestimate the actual intentions of the Emperor. It was not until after the Battle of Adowa that Britain realised that Ethiopia was then a force that should be seriously reckoned with. Further, subsequent reports by travellers in the frontier region tended also to direct

attention to the magnitude of the problem. Donaldson-Smith, one of the first travellers through the area warned:—

"It is absolutely imperative that the British prevent the Abyssinians from advancing to any great distance .... aided by the French and Russians, the Emperor Menelik will see his dominions extending rapidly south and west, unless he be prevented from further conquest... A natural sequence to the extension of Menelik's conquest would be the occupation of a vast amount of the newly acquired territory by the French or Russians."¹

In addition, continued reports from the frontier reflected the serious condition there. In 1898, Adam Musa (a Somali interpreter), reported that a well-organized party of Ethiopians raided Buna and Takaba in order to obtain tribute from the Ajuran.² Turton has also attributed the failure of a Somali raid over the Boran in 1898 to the possibility that they had encountered a southward moving Ethiopian force instead of the Galla.³ Two years later, the Ethiopians descended upon the 'friendly' Gurreh⁴ and Eil Wak was occupied by them for about two months.

Somali clans, and also most of the Galla sections, had in the face of the Ethiopian advance pleaded for help from Britain. The Gurreh and the Degodia tribes, and the Aulihan led by Farah Ibrahim were all anxious for protection against Abyssinian incursions.⁵ All these factors led

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4. The Gurreh are Somalis who adopted the language and culture of the Boran Galla. They inhabited the area around Eil Wak and along the Daua as far east as Malka Re.
Harrington, the Head of the British Legation at Addis Ababa, to repeat his anxiety about Menelik's advance.

In 1902, Britain encouraged Mr. W. Butler, a private citizen to make a survey trip to the southern border of Abyssinia at his own expense and to arrange with Menelik a frontier between Abyssinia and British East Africa. Butler was also to instruct Captain Maud, the official British Surveyor accompanying the expedition, to map the Ethiopian outposts and the limits of Ethiopian occupation. With the consent of Menelik, the expedition left Addis in November 1902 to explore the southern frontier region between the junction of the rivers Ganale and the Daua in the East to N. 6°, E. 35°. This was taken as the southern terminal of the Sudan-Ethiopia boundary in the west, on the basis of a line agreed with the Emperor in 1900 as indicating roughly the line of the frontier. A treaty based on Captain Maud's recommendations was concluded in 1907, defining in general terms the boundary between Abyssinia and the Colonies of British East Africa and Uganda. It also provided for the settlement of the boundary in detail by a delimitation commission. The dissatisfaction over the Maud line was not only expressed by the subsequent Commission but it was also apparent from the writings of the authorities and travellers across the border. Commenting on the Line, Negley Farson remarked:

"An Anglo-Abyssinian border-line, drawn by a certain Capt. Maud in 1902-3, cuts through all the best grazing and watering lands of the Galla Boran and Somali tribes, so that not one tribe of either Boran

or Somali is complete in either territory, and as all the headmen remain in either Ethiopia or over in Italian Somaliland, life in the N.F.D. has been distinguished by Abyssinian bandit raids down into the N.F.D."

John Boyes was also very critical of the limitations offered by such a line. He stated:-

"It appeared that the Abyssinians had got everything that was worth having in that part of the country — all the land of any value being on their side of the frontier."

Major C.W. Gwynn, who was appointed in 1908-9 as British Commissioner to carry out the final demarcation of the line, suggested border changes which would allow the border to be really defensible. He realised that it was necessary, in carrying out demarcation in detail, to ensure that there should be such water points on the British side of the frontier as would enable police work to be carried out effectively in future. This entailed some minor rectification of Captain Maud's proposals and provided that the line near Moyale should be pushed slightly north, to give the British control of the wells necessary for continuous patrolling. But from the beginning, the Emperor seemed reluctant to consent to any definite demarcation let alone those which would be to the benefit of the other side. Gwynn found on his arrival at Addis, that owing to the Emperor's illness no step had been taken

3. Gwynn was accompanied by Capt. R.L. Waller, Dr. Drake-Brockman, Capt. Gordon and two non-commissioned officers. Their Commission was subsequently known as the East African Boundary Commission. (See Sketch Map 3 for Maud and Gwynn lines).
to appoint either a European or Abyssinian Commissioner. After some months delay, Gwynn then proceeded and carried the delimitation on his own. The Gwynn line was, however, never accepted by the Ethiopians.

Meanwhile, since 1905, on realization of the seriousness of the situation at the frontier, Captain Maud had put forward the idea of a travelling inspector backed by an armed escort to guard the frontier. J.A. Harrington who also suggested that some British representative should be placed on the frontier to ensure against Ethiopian violation, had in the same year chosen a Greek by the name of Philip Zaphiro to act on his behalf on the southern frontier of Abyssinia. His sphere of duty extended along the Red Line on Captain Maud's map; but later, owing to the action of the Abyssinians in these regions, Zaphiro was asked to extend his sphere southwards in order to cope with Abyssinian raids and the trade in rifles between them and the Ogaden Somalis. In 1907 Fort Harrington was built in British Moyale and the Moyale Boma was completed in 1909 with an Assistant D.C. and a garrison of K.A.R.

However, on his arrival at the station, Gwynn was very critical of Zaphiro's methods and maintained that though he had done 'extraordinary good work' in the past, he

1. All the Colonial Office was able to consent to previous to this was the establishment of the Boma Trading Company which maintained tenuous trading links at Dolo, on the Juba, at Moyale, on the Ethiopian frontier, and at Marsabit, 200 miles to the north of Meru. (See Mungeam p. 229). However, Gwynn was far from being impressed by the achievements of the Company.

was unable to check the incursions of the tribesmen and asked for his replacement. Zaphiro was said to have encouraged the Somali and Boran to sell their goods at Kismayu at the time when the administration was trying to place an embargo on all trade. But despite these limitations it had to be admitted that Zaphiro had acted almost single handed in dealing with the very difficult situations along the frontier despite the limited resources at his disposal.

His removal in 1909 and the steps which resulted in the formation of the N.F.D. in 1910 were the result of the efforts by Sir Percy Girouard the new Governor for the Protectorate. Girouard telegraphed the Colonial Office saying:

"I consider the time has now come to supersede Zaphiro and substitute control by officers of this Protectorate on the Abyssinian boundary. I regard this as essential both for administrative reasons and owing to the growing importance of trade in horses and cattle. I suggest that (a) frontier district should be formed with stations at Meru, Marsabit and Fort Harrington."

In March 1910, the N.F.D. was thus formed with J.O.W. Hope as Officer-in-Charge; but the problem still remained as to how to control the undefined frontier to the north and to stop Somali migration. In fact, since the formation of the District frequent feuds between the Degodia on both the British and the Abyssinian sides and the British Gurreh were reported. Owing to this situation,

1. K.N.A./PO/NFD 4/1/2 Political Record Book, Marsabit.
3. The Anglo-Abyssinian border problem had in fact mostly affected the Boran on both sides of the frontier. The Somali tribes mostly affected by it were the 'friendly' Gurreh and to a lesser extent the Degodia and the Ajuran. For more on the position of the Boran in Anglo-Abyssinian relations see Turton, pp. 266-312.
most of the time and the finances of the District were spent on settling trans-frontier raids instead of looking into the means by which the general position of the Somalis and their kin in the area could be improved. In April 1919, for example, major operations were carried out against the Tigre forcing them to surrender in October of the same year. The decision by Northey, the next year, to subject the N.F.D. to military instead of civil administration was primarily adopted because of the state of affairs along the Abyssinian border. In May 1920 continued Abyssinian raids in British territory during several months for the purpose of returning Boran refugees were reported. For this reason, the British consulate in southern Abyssinia was transferred from Gardula to Mega to improve co-operation with the British authorities on the other side.

However, as the administration of any pastoral people depended largely on the control of watering and grazing facilities, Anglo-Abyssinian relations in that area had centred mainly on that question. Gaddaduma, on the Abyssinian border, was the bone of contention between the two administrations. The different boundary lines contemplated were done with a view to its inclusion because of its wells which were the only available watering site for many miles in that region. If the Boran were to be checked and their constant clashes with the Somalis were to be minimized, the N.F.D. administration had to have Gaddaduma in its hands. Major Gwynn, who saw the special importance of Gaddaduma in its capacity both as a source of
water and as a pass from the upland districts to the western Golbo, did not hesitate when he modified the Maud Line, to include it into British territory. He had specially in mind the fact that the Gurreh in the British side were the most to be affected by it.¹

Kittermaster, the Officer-in-charge of the N.F.D. was also persistent in his demand that the wells in the vicinity of Gaddaduma and beyond should be retained by His Majesty's Government. He suggested that in case the Abyssinians protested against the measure, His Majesty's Charge d'affaires at Addis Ababa could be instructed to demand from the Abyssinians a sum of £50,000, being the amount estimated by Kittermaster as compensation due to the British tribes in respect of raids by Abyssinians. Pending the satisfaction of the latter claim the British authorities would feel obliged to retain the wells in order to prevent damage being caused by further raids.² Another suggestion pointed to the possibility of granting the Abyssinians an enclave in the Gadabursi district of British Somaliland so as to make that tribe entirely tributary to them.³

The Colonial Office was by no means ready to concur with the Foreign Office views. Read wrote to Sperling to express his doubts on the procedure proposed in relation to the control of Gaddaduma. He stated:

1. The wells of Gaddaduma, though in Borana country in Abyssinia were said to be primarily used by the Gurreh Somalis on the British side.


3. Ibid.
"We follow the idea as far as the demand for compensation goes, but it is not clear to us why when their demand is not complied with, we should then offer a territorial compensation instead."

But on the other hand, the British Government instructed His Majesty's Minister at Addis Ababa to inform Her Majesty's Government in Abyssinia that, "In view of their continued inability to maintain order in the frontier districts, His Majesty's Government must reserve to themselves the right to re-occupy Gaddaduma at any time should occasion require."2 The Abyssinians seemed reconciled for a while, however, when a gesture of co-operation was announced by Ras Taffari concerning the Officials administering the frontier. Taffari announced that he had been sent by the Empress on behalf of Her Majesty's Government to inform Dodds that:

"In view of the friendship the Ethiopian Government fostered for the British Government, it had been decided that Dejazmatch Desta should not proceed to the Magi Province...that the Abyssinian Government accepted the frontier line laid down by treaty and approved by King Menelik, and would take necessary measures to ensure this frontier was respected in future."3

Yet, no sooner was that declared, than the situation on the Kenya-Abyssinia border was reported as serious with the renewed Abyssinian raids on the British tribes. In December 1920 Britain had threatened the re-occupation of Gaddaduma which had been evacuated by them in October

3. Ibid.
1919. Gaddaduma was actually re-occupied in February 1921; and the officer commanding the detachment reported that the re-occupation was welcomed by the British tribes who were then able to use the wells. The re-occupation, which was carried out because of the state of lawlessness on the frontier was said to be only a temporary affair. As soon as the Abyssinian Government would make an effort to maintain order on the frontier, the British would be willing to withdraw. This had eventually happened in August of the same year when the Acting Governor of Kenya informed the Minister at Addis that Gaddaduma had been evacuated after a meeting between the British frontier authorities and Dej Dejazmatch Assafu which had taken place on the 25th July. After the meeting, the British Officials were satisfied as to Dejamatch's intentions and capability to restore order in the country. The Acting Governor was of the opinion that any other course would have resulted in hostilities.

The evacuation of Gaddaduma was not, however, followed by any prospects of peace in the area. The immigration into British territory of Abyssinian subjects continued until the end of 1922. Whole portions of the Borana Province were reported to be depopulated. Those immigrants had entered the N.F.D. providing further hardships to the tribes on the British side. The feuds between the Gurreh

1. P.R.O./C.O. 533/256/tel. 90 Northey to Colonial Secretary 15-12-1921.
3. Ibid.
and the Degodia both on the British and on the Abyssinian sides became so frequent that by October 1922 what was later known as the "Gaddaduma Convention" was signed as an attempt to put both tribes in order. The Kenya Government was represented by the Officer-in-Charge of Moyale and the Officer-in-Charge of Gurreh. On February 14th 1923 they decided on terms by which stock was to be handed over as agreed in the Treaty of Gaddaduma on 27th October, 1922. Both Chiefs, Burali, on behalf of the Degodia, and Chief Gababa, on behalf of the Gurreh received their due amount of the compensation.

It was also rumoured that the Abyssinian authorities intended to move the Degodia into the deserted Boran Province and to offer to the British Gurreh that part of the Yeben vacated by the Degodia.1 This was thought possible because the Gurreh, like the rest of the Somali tribes had shown considerable hostility when the British authorities contemplated the imposition of taxation upon the Somalis in 1923. Moreover, as the Acting Governor had remarked, "it is not impossible that some of them would accept such an offer especially as it would mean the exchange of a parched wilderness for a well watered and fertile country."2 What actually happened was contradictory to the former idea. With the continuous refusal of the Abyssinians to the settlement or the delimitation of the

2. Ibid.
frontier, constant migrations of Abyssinian tribes into Kenya continued as a result of maladministration, mis-government and oppression in the Abyssinian frontier districts.

The N.F.D. authorities, being constantly bothered about this trans-frontier migration, consulted the Foreign Office, impressing upon them the importance of inducing the Abyssinians to carry on a better administrative policy in their frontier Provinces. This would facilitate the return of the refugees across the border. In addition, the officials on the spot had already started a policy of repatriating the Abyssinian Degodia; a policy which had already shown signs of success. It was reported later that as a result of this, the Abyssinian Government really did make an attempt to improve conditions on the frontier by appointing Fitaurari Ayella in charge of the Boran Province.¹ No sooner had he taken charge than the Kenya Government, after consulting with Major A.T. Miles, His Majesty's Consul for Southern Abyssinia, and the Officer-in-Charge, N.F.D. decided that the issue of repatriation should be discussed further. Miles was instructed to inform Ayella that the Kenya Government had the tribe collected on the Daua River and was prepared to facilitate by all peaceful and humane measures his efforts to induce the Degodia to return to their own country.²

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¹ P.R.O./C.O. 533/348/151 Conf. Immigration of Abyssinian tribes into Kenya - Memo. 4-4-1924.
The Kenya authorities had earnestly dismissed the use of force to bring about the complete repatriation for two reasons. Firstly it would have required about six platoons to effect the return, secondly it would no doubt have resulted in a considerable amount of fighting. The difficulty was that, despite the peaceful approach by the Kenya Government, the Abyssinians had viewed with indifference the whole question of repatriation, and hence prospects of misunderstanding could not be dismissed. Northcote was then of the opinion that there were only two ways of preventing further incursions into Kenya from the north. These were by means of military and police forces on the boundary, and by causing the available grazing and wells along the border to be occupied to their utmost capacity. Once more the former expediency was dismissed because the District had only two platoons of soldiers and a few police at Moyale and at the Daua. The second method was found more feasible and was supported by the Officer-in-Charge of the Gurreh District who felt that there was enough room in that area for both the Degodia and the Gurreh. If the Degodia declined to return to Abyssinia, the saturation policy of allowing the border to fill up with people and cattle as quietly as possible should be adopted.¹

The Colonial Office, had on the other hand, once again rejected this alternative and were determined that all would be settled by the repatriation of the Degodia and their subjection to Fitaurari Ayella. The Assistant Under-

¹. Ibid.
Secretary remarked, "The Degodia are described as turbulent so we shall be well rid of them." In December 1925, Ras Taffari wrote to inform Bentinck that Ayella had been sent to the frontier to arrange with the British authorities for the repatriation of the tribe. Nothing further was heard until the 16th February 1926 when the Foreign Office sent an urgent enquiry as to the progress of the repatriation. It stated that the Kenya Government would create an impression of bad faith in the minds of the Abyssinian Government if it were unable to co-operate after instituting a better Government in the disturbed provinces of Abyssinia in the hope of inducing the Degodia to return. In consequence of this an urgent telegram was sent to Kenya asking what steps, apart from the use of compulsion, had been taken to encourage or discourage the repatriation since October 1925.

The Governor replied that, "Kenya is in no way committed to the Abyssinian Government in respect of compulsory repatriation nor could I support any such policy. Information at present to hand does not indicate that immigration had deprived our tribes of necessary water and grazing." On the other hand, Grigg had emphasised that, "It has always been made clear to the Degodia that their intrusion is most unwelcome and only regarded as temporary. Their return to Abyssinia has been a subject of constant discussion with their chiefs." He admitted, however, that this attitude

1. Ibid. Minute by Gilbert G.A. Gyrindle 2-10-1925.
was then governed by the impracticability of repatriating them by force, anticipating that it would be advisable to pursue the same policy with regard to future immigrations. These were bound to occur, until the capacity of the border country to absorb newcomers was exhausted, and those already established would resist further infiltration. The attitude of the Governor puzzled the Foreign Office who were unable to understand the 'change of policy'. Previously, whereas the Government of Kenya considered the intrusion of the Degodia as unwelcome, now they stated that they were not opposed to their presence in Kenya and were prepared to absorb them.¹

Besides the issue of the incursions of the Degodia which was a factor in the security of the British Somalis and their kindred tribes on the frontier of Kenya, and the failure of the Abyssinians to hasten the delimitation of the frontier, the N.F.D. administration was disturbed by another factor. The simultaneous disarmament recommended for the Somali and the Boran in both British and Abyssinian territories, the completion of which the British authorities were able to report had been successfully carried out in 1928, was never carried out by the Abyssinians. A telegram received from the Provincial Commissioner of the N.F.D. on 18th June 1930 indicated that, "recent troubles caused by recrudescence of Boran-Gurreh feud on the Abyssinian side of the boundary resulting in deaths by the Gurreh of 17 Boran tenants and return to British side of most of the

¹ K.N.A./PC/N.F.D. 4/1/7 Conf. L.S. Amery to Grigg 26-4-1927.
Gurreh, was due to failure of Abyssinians to disarm their tribes."\(^1\) He stated that various attempts to induce the Abyssinian Government to do it had failed and asked if it was possible to approach them through diplomatic channels. The attempt like that pursued in order to reach a satisfactory delimitation of the boundary between 1927-30 passed without results. Continued troubles, as a result of the possession of the Boran of rifles, went on against the Somali tribes on the British side.

However, another measure which was thought would be instrumental in forcing the Abyssinian tribes to retreat and hence would amount to a possible pacification of the frontier, was by the imposition of taxation on the Somali of the N.F.D. Up to the mid twenties, the Somalis had managed to evade taxation and attempts by officials on the spot to raise the issue by 1923 had not materialized. It was once again brought to the forefront by the Governor\(^2\) in connection with the re-opening of the Isiolo Quarantine station. The re-opening of the latter would have facilitated the movement of Somali stock from the Province to the other parts of the Colony and the contribution by the Somalis in paying the tax could have hastened its start. The Governor's despatch mentioned that at the meeting held at the Government House on 8th January, 1927, (at which Bottomley, Assistant under-Secretary of State, was present) it was decided that the imposition of taxation upon the Somalis was very desirable,

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1. P.R.O./.C.O. 533/401/16235 Governor to Colonial Secretary 18-6-1930.
2. In his despatch P.R.O./C.O. 533/327/1x.10354/27.
though it was recognized that care should be taken having had regard to the experience of British Somaliland. The Governor was however thinking of the tax in terms of the general improvement of the revenue and expenditure of the Colony. He remarked, "The time had arrived when the inhabitants of the N.F.D. could be called upon to contribute to the cost of their administration by the payment of a direct tax on similar lines to that imposed on the tribes in other parts of the Colony."2

It was Edward Denham, who as a result of his Safari in the N.F.D. in 1927, directed the attention of the authorities to the taxation of the Somalis as a factor to the pacification of the frontier. He remarked, "the fact that many of these tribes have come from Abyssinia, where they pay taxes, into Kenya territory where they pay none, is both bad for them and also for our administration...one check on immigration from Abyssinia should at least be in the imposition of taxation in British territory."3 When the Acting Governor had himself discussed the question of taxation with the Somalis, he found that they were opposed to any form of monetary tax. They urged that being purely a stock owning community, flocks and herds represented their wealth and their currency, and they could not pay tax in any other form. It was clear to the administration that the Somalis had then realized the justice of their being called upon to make some contribution.

1. The pronouncement of taxation in British Somaliland had brought about considerable trouble against the administration of the Protectorate.
2. P.R.O./C.O. 533/380 Minute by Parkinson 10-8-1928.
towards the cost of government and they promised that they would pay in kind. It was especially in the North Eastern region of the Colony that they requested Denham for this.

In the baraza held with the Somalis at Wajir on the 3rd July 1928, the Ogaden were represented by Aden Hassan (Sultan of the Aulihan), Mahdi Ali (Headman of Maghabel), Ali Muhammad Jama (Headman of the Muhammad Zubeir), Abdi Musa (Headman of Gurreh), and Dima Abdi (Headman of the Ajuran). They all insisted on the payment in kind.

The Colonial Office, then uncertain as to the outcome of any pronouncement over taxation, consulted with the Governor and the Inspector General K.A.R. on the subject because the imposition of tax upon Somalis was very closely bound up with the Military position in the N.F.D. The latter advised the Colonial Secretary that the issue would raise two questions. First that adequate protection of British tribes from trans-frontier raids was a condition that should be fulfilled before the imposition of taxation. This was obviously contradictory to Denham's idea whereby taxation was seen as a first step to guarantee Somali protection against such raids. Secondly, the Inspector General was of the opinion that support should be given to the Civil Authorities in the event of efforts to enforce the tax led to a situation which required military intervention. Moreover, in view of the experience in British Somaliland in 1920 and 1922 in connection with the attempt to impose direct taxation on the Somalis, possibility of unrest resulting from taxation could not be disregarded and thus the partial mechanisation of troops and re-organization
became necessary.\(^1\) Later, in the same despatch, the Governor was openly inclined to disagree with the imposition of taxation from purely political and administrative points of view. His reasons were that, "very little has been done for them (Somalis)... opening of the Isiolo Quarantine station might benefit native who would have access to it but it seems to me that practical steps for helping the tribes in this Province as a whole, especially in the direction of medical and veterinary assistance and education, ought to precede taxation."\(^2\) For these and for military reasons, the Colonial Secretary asked for the measure to be postponed. The Governor was subsequently instructed to refrain from publishing or introducing the Bill.

Despite the fact that the imposition of taxation was already announced officially at a Baraza at Bura\(^3\) on September 17 1928 on the basis of a poll tax of Shs. 20/-, the matter was postponed owing to the above instructions by the Colonial Office. The reaction of the N.F.D. officials was that of definite disappointment. The Annual Report of 1929 came out with an interesting remark from the Official-in-charge. He stated, "The failure to impose taxation after the pronouncement in 1928 acted unfavourably on the Galla and Somali tribes causing revival of the old idea that Government was afraid to undertake it..."\(^4\)

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2. Ibid.
3. The Headquarters of the N.F.D.
However, the Governor of the Colony was able in March 1930 to convince the Colonial Secretary that estimated receipts from taxation would be £16,646 which would make possible the erection of a hospital at Wajir, the centre of Somali population; also a hospital at Lamu which would serve some Galla and Pokomo in the Tana River District. Further the Government needed about £3,000 for the improvement of water boring, £8,030 as capital expenditure on a veterinary centre, and £2,587 chiefly to promote trade providing an outlet for livestock at that time hampered by disease. For all these reasons the Governor urged the Colonial Secretary to sanction the passing of the Bill at the April Session so as to enable collection in the current year.¹

The Colonial Secretary had in the end complied with Kenya's wish for the imposition of taxation. In a telegram he informed Grigg, "I approve of your announcing that taxation will be introduced generally in the N.F.D. as from the first January next, but I am only able to agree to a flat rate of 10/- a head for all concerned including Somalis."² The announcement that the tax was going to be in cash was regarded as "the most disturbing incident of the year."³ It had also caused considerable political feeling among the Somali tribes especially when their economic well-being as a whole was generally affected by the depression of 1929.

The depression had affected the circulation of cash,

2. P.R.O./C.O. 533/396/60043/108 Conf. Amery to Grigg 2-7-1930. Somalis were asked in 1931 to pay commuted tax but later in 1935 they paid individual tax.
because of attempted imposition of rigid quarantine and the endeavour to close the main outlet for sheep to the coast and the hinterland. The difficulty was, therefore, not in the acceptability of the duty to pay tax, but in the obstacles put on the tribes' way of obtaining the necessary cash for the purpose of paying. Sheep and goats were practically the only marketable livestock, and the tribes, say, from Moyale District, had to take their sheep and goats five hundred miles to the market: as a walk like that was obviously not going to improve the marketable value of stock, tax money was by no means easy to obtain. However, apart from prominent Somali chiefs like Sultan Stambul Abdi, who was reported to have deposited, "...his tax and that of his 5 sons early in December", the consensus of opinion was very much against the imposition of the cash tax and some of the tribes were reported to have crossed the boundary to escape payment.

Though the collection of tax was in a way beneficial from the point of view of revenue, it was ineffective as far as the check on the immigration of Abyssinian tribes was concerned. Despite the fact that the Abyssinian Government had expressed a wish, since 1927, to discuss the question of the delimitation of the frontier, they were very reluctant to join in the discussion to that effect. Far from it, Major Miles's reports from 1927 onwards revealed

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1. K.N.A./PC/NFD 1/7/2 Garissa Annual Reports (Telemugga) 1930.

2. For example, Stambul Abdi's arch enemy Kuno Jibrael was reported to have started to "sow the seeds of sedition" against him because of his attitude towards taxation. (Ibid). Stambul Abdi had in 1934 received a certificate of honour, the first one to be given in the N.F.D.
that conditions on the southern Abyssinian border were worse than ever and were a standing danger to Kenya Colony. The extent of disturbances could be seen from the claims of the Government of Kenya for the raids on the N.F.D. tribes which amounted to £25,000 against the Abyssinian Government. The Governor had even threatened to appeal to the League of Nations or the Hague on the whole southern frontier problem if Ras Taffari should prove unreasonable. When the issue was discussed in Parliament on 21st November, 1928, Austen Chamberlain suggested the publication of a white paper covering the period from 1915 onwards on these raids. Later, a report was prepared by Major Miles and Glenday regarding their enquiries in conjunction with the Abyssinian frontier Commission, into raids by Abyssinians into the Northern Territory of Kenya during the years 1925-26. 1 About 1930, the Kenya Government had again made overtures to Abyssinia for the demarcation of the frontier, but His Majesty's Government decided that it was worthwhile to test the ability of the Ethiopians on the British Somaliland-Abyssinian border first, a suggestion afterwards agreed to by Ras Taffari.

Meanwhile, a memorandum prepared for the Colonial Office on the meeting with Fitaurari Ayella at Moyale on 18th January 1931 pointed to the general state of lawlessness of the frontier once more. The Acting Provincial Commissioner drew Ayella's attention to the state of unrest

which had prevailed since May 1929 and pointed out nineteen incidents which occurred culminating in a big one near Gadama. It was generally believed that that state of affairs was due to the fact that the Abyssinian Boran were never disarmed. This had led to constant fighting between the Boran and the Degodia living with the Ajuran and Debel thirty miles south east of Moyale. Again in 1931, serious disturbances between the British and Abyssinian Boran against the Degodia and Ajuran took place. This series of clashes between the Boran and British Somalis was the result of the continuous push southwards of the Somalis into the N.F.D. The Boran, before the occupation by Britain and Abyssinia of the N.F.D., had owned the greater part of the area and pagan tribes living there paid tribute to them. They and their tribute tribes were gradually being driven back to the highlands of Dirre1 by the advance of the Moslem Somalis from the east. This push was clearly noticeable in the period between 1925-30 by the Moslem tribes mainly Gurreh and Degodia. The Gurreh had moved north and west into Abyssinia to avoid the taxation recently imposed upon the frontier tribes in British territory and the Degodia who moved west from the country of Bai in Abyssinia had come up against the Boran on the escarpment east and west of Moyale. Feuds between the advancing Somali tribes and the Boran began by isolated murders but annually increased until the feud had almost grown into a pagan-Islamic war.

1. Abyssinian Borana.
This state of feuding between the Galla and Somalis in British and Abyssinian territories was intensified by the general tension between the Somalis and Boran in the N.F.D. at that time. In Garissa District the Somali-Wardeh question which had existed ever since the establishment of the administration there, had in the period January to April 1931 nearly burst into flames.¹ The Wardeh Galla were originally slaves of the Somalis but they had grown rich and prospered as members of the Somali community. The Wardeh stock had in fact originally been given to them by their masters the Somalis for their subsistence; and since the Somali-Wardeh relations had worsened, the Galla would have wanted to leave but they were bound by the Lamu 50/50 Agreement. According to the Agreement, the Wardeh were to forfeit half of their stock to their masters, which would be anathema to them. The Government had to stand by the 50/50 Agreement; and the Somalis, though unwilling to allow the Galla to leave were also obliged to stand by it. In the Annual Report of Garissa District, the D.C. remarked that the affair between the two groups was reaching such a stage that all the Galla-Somali element in the Abdullah country were rounded up and brought into Bura, the District's Headquarters. The Galla were given the opportunity of crossing to the free Galla south of the River with their wives and children

¹ Since 1919, as a result of the Somali chase and eventual defeat of the Wardeh, an agreement was signed in Lamu to end the fight and provided for the payment by the Wardeh of 50% of their stock in case they decided to leave their Somali masters (See Appendix IV).
and 50% of their stock. But surprisingly enough the Galla themselves shortly returned to their Somali owners and the local administration attributed this to intimidation by the Somali Sheikhs and holymen.¹

While the N.F.D. administration was busy settling the affairs between the Somalis and the Galla both in the frontier and the interior of the Province between 1925-32, the Italo-Ethiopian relations were constantly deteriorating on their respective boundaries. This had eventually culminated in the attack of Abyssinia by Italian forces in "Wal Wal", the incident which kept the League of Nations talking for nine months in 1934-35.² The incident which was also the result of frontier problems between Ethiopia and Italy, had its repercussions on the administration of the Somalis in the N.F.D. In the first place the incident had prevented a possible solution to the chronic problem of the demarcation of the Kenya-Abyssinian boundary. It happened at the time when the Emperor had just agreed with His Majesty's Minister at Addis Ababa to a number of modifications to be made to the Maud Line; but the outbreak of the Italo-Ethiopian war prevented the matter being taken further.³

The War had, on the other hand, added to the already existing difficulties regarding the administration of the

1. K.N.A./PC/NFD 1/7/2 Annual Reports Garissa (Telemugga) 1932.
2. See Drysdale, The Somali Dispute, pp. 48-55.
3. Discussions on that issue were not resumed before 1947, when exchange of Notes between the British and Abyssinians rendered things possible.
N.F.D. Somal. However, this was not obvious at the beginning of the conflict as the Officer-in-Charge had remarked in November 1935, "On the western side of the District (Moyale), the theatre of warfare is so far removed that many of the tribesmen know little and care less about it. As ever, their main concern lies in the welfare of their stock, their personal needs and the incidence of rainfall." But the authorities were gradually being faced with the aftermath of the Italo-Ethiopian conflict. The Italians were incessantly reported as being actively occupied with the conscription of men from the Somali tribes in British territory like the Muhammad Zubeir, Aulihan and Maghabul who crossed over to Italian territory without passes. In addition, the compulsory enlistment of Somalis of Italian Somaliland meant that the latter would in their turn cross over to British territory during the rains thus aggravating the problem of the westward trek of Somalis into Kenya.

The War also meant that considerable military preparations and expenditure were necessary to guard the N.F.D. and its inhabitants. The administration was then busy shifting K.A.R. units from other districts to Moyale, Mandera and Eil Wak; camelmen, African police at Marsabit, lorries and mobile police were constantly shifted to the frontier. On the other hand, the Italo-Ethiopian war had given much incentive to the Somalis to join the police

or the army. In Garissa, constant streams of applications for enlistment in Police, tribal police and K.A.R. were reported; and in 1935 twelve Somalis were enlisted in K.A.R. and five others in the Police.¹

By July 1935, further repercussions due to the Italo-Ethiopian dispute were felt in the area. It was widely reported that Ras Desta had ordered his subordinate to collect large numbers of camels and other meat stock from the Gurreh and Gabbra in Gulgulla and the Hurrufi country as provisions for the troops. The direct result of these orders had been the influx of several large manyattas (villages) of both tribes into the Jara and Sankurar areas to escape persecution.² These problems increased with the eventual occupation of Ethiopia by the Italians and from then onwards reports of Italian banda maltreatment of British subjects and the capture of their livestock were very frequent. The D.C. of Moyale requested the Officer-in-Charge of the N.F.D. that a strong protest should be made to the Italians in regard to three incidents. First the capture of cattle by banda at Ramu Dimtu on 20th February 1936; the capture of goats and cattle at Girimou on the 22nd February, and finally the banda capture of twenty head of cattle at Ramu on 28th February.³ Also, the state of lawlessness in the area between Mega and the Daua River as a result of the Italians arming of the Gurreh

¹ K.N.A./PG/NFD 1/1/15 Annual Reports 1935.
³ K.N.A./DG/MLE/3/2 No. ADM 15/11/71 N.M. Grant to Officer-in-Charge Moyale 9-3-1936.
youth was a source of concern because the latter were then enabled to inflict a great deal of damage on the Gabbra tribe. This state of affairs naturally led to the flight of large numbers of tribesmen into Kenya and a great deal of trouble and anxiety between the Somalis and the Galla occurred. This in turn kept the British officials on the frontier extremely busy dealing with them.¹

Obviously one of the substantial problems resulting from the Italo-Abyssinian war was the refugee question. Since 1936 Eritreans - who had deserted the Italian forces, crossed over into Kenya. In the same year about 415 were reported to have reached Wajir and were later joined by about 1,000 civilians men women and children in 1937. In order to separate them from the rest of the Somali population the officials decided to send them to Isiolo where they were put in a concentration camp under K.A.R. escort. Even there, they proved to be a dilemma to the administration; they found that it was difficult to return them because of the harsh treatment they would be sure to meet from the Italians and on the other hand, they could not simply be left there because they would probably meet their end at the hands of the Kenya natives or the Somalis.²

The maintenance in the N.F.D. of Abyssinian refugees in such large numbers, not only involved substantial expenditure, but raised administrative problems of a serious nature in

the already burdensome Somali Province of the frontier, a fact that *The East African Standard*, was not slow to point out. In its issue of 26th August 1937 it wrote with regard to the refugees, "On the frontier they presented a problem in a part of the Colony that bristles already with difficult questions." It is also interesting to note that the case of the refugees did not escape the sympathy of the Kenya African nationalists. The Governor of Kenya informed Ormsby-Gore, "I notice there was an indignant letter in some of the English papers signed, amongst others, by Jomo Kenyatta, demanding "the right of political asylum for our black brothers" - apparently in Kenya - and protesting against the threat to expell Abyssinian refugees from Kenya." But far from being able to send those refugees back, the Kenya-Abyssinian border witnessed further infiltration by them on the eve of the Second World War.

Another problem which continuously occupied the mind of the N.F.D. authorities, was the interference by the Italians on the trans-frontier water and grazing rights which the British tribes, both Somali and Galla, had enjoyed under the Anglo-Abyssinian treaty of 1907. The problem of the undelimited boundary inherited from the pre-Italo-Ethiopian war period was once again a major factor in the problem of the administration of the Somali and his kindred tribes. The officials were always puzzled over the problem of whether to follow the Gwynn line or the Maud line. The adoption of the former would have exposed His

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Majesty's Government to possible difficulties with the Abyssinian Government and would also have involved responsibility for Abyssinian occupation of Gaddaduma which was situated south of the line. It was necessary, therefore, for the British administration in Kenya to impress upon the new Italian administration in Abyssinia that there had been no occupation by Abyssinian troops of places which were regarded as being under Kenya administration. For this reason, the Kenya Government was always inclined to follow the Maud line except for the area west of Malka-Murri where the Gwynn line had, in practice, been adopted. In this case Gaddaduma would not be counted as part of Kenya. But the general feeling was for leaving the question aside until the proper delimitation would be carried out.1

In the course of the War, however, it was rumoured that the Government had contemplated an arrangement involving territorial concessions to Italy as a solution to the urgent need for provision of watering facilities to the British tribes and as a gesture for a general settlement of the dispute between Italy and Abyssinia. In the House of Commons, Mr. Marsden asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he would give an assurance that no British territory should be handed over to Italy as part of any exchange arrangement arising out of the suggested peace terms for the promotion of settlement of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute.2 In reply, he was assured that there had never

1. The problem was that the Kenya administration had in most cases used the Maud Line; while most of the maps in Italian hands were based on the Gwynn Line.
been any question of the cession of British territory in that respect.\(^1\)

Later, in June 1936, the Governor of Kenya suggested to the Colonial Office the possible cession to Italy of the area in the north west corner of the N.F.D. as a move towards the solution of the watering problem for the tribes. He again modified his plan to include the area north east of the summit of Burrochuma. This he thought would be of considerable advantage to the Italians since the whole of the Gelubba tribe, which was then on both sides of the frontier, would have been included in the Italian sphere. The area also included good grazing grounds for the Gelluba...\(^2\) while the issue was being discussed, it was decided that Glenday should go to London on April 8th and thence to Rome where an Anglo-Italian agreement was to be negotiated concerning the position of Britain with respect to the Italian occupation of Abyssinia.

The history of the agreement dated back to 1935,\(^3\) when it first became clear that Signor Mussolini was planning an invasion of Abyssinia; the British Government appointed a Departmental Committee to examine what the effect on British interests would be if the invasion were successful. The Committee's findings became famous a year later as the Moffey Report. This report, while stating that an Italian

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1. Ibid.
conquest of Abyssinia would not be a serious threat to British interests, made certain recommendations that in the event of this taking place, "all the necessary measures must be taken to protect British and Egyptian interests."

The Agreement subsequently signed at Rome on 16th April 1938 achieved this. Also, the tripartite agreement between the United Kingdom, Egypt and Italy undertook to co-operate for the preservation of good neighbourly relations between Italian East Africa on the one hand and the Sudan, Kenya and British Somaliland on the other hand.\(^1\)

The Maffey report had also clearly stated that every effort should be made to assure full grazing rights beyond the frontiers of these Somali tribes under British protection, and suggested that the boundaries of British Somaliland, Kenya and the Sudan should be rectified "if possible."

After attending the April talks in Rome, Glenday was back to London where in a meeting held at the Colonial Office on 23rd June of the same year, the possibility of further cession to Italy of Kenya territory was discussed. This was part of an overall discussion on the frontiers of the Sudan, Kenya and Somaliland. It was stated at the meeting that "the Secretary of State was not disposed, at this stage to agree to the cession of any part of Kenya, or press the treasury to agree to pay for the building of the Kenya section of the Kismayu-Moyale Road as part of the price to be paid for the permanent acquisition by Somaliland of the grazing grounds beyond their present frontiers."

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2. P.R.O./C.O. 822/69-46598F. Note on the Meeting Held at the Colonial Office on Abyssinian Frontiers 23-6-1938. The area in question included the Diff-Wajir-Moyale Road.
In coming to this conclusion the Secretary of State had been influenced by a number of considerations. Firstly, the objection by Parliament and others to agreeing to the cession of a part of a British Colony which would probably involve the transfer with it of some five thousand British subjects. Secondly, the fact that it would not be possible to consult these tribesmen until after an agreement had been reached with the Italians for the cession of their land. And finally, the doubt whether even the cession of this area of Kenya, and the building of the road, would, in fact, be a sufficient inducement to the Italians to agree to the desired rectification of the Somaliland frontier. If this were found not to be the case, the British Government should be in a worse position than they were then, in that they should have disclosed to the Italians the fact that they had no absolutely insuperable objection to the cession of the north eastern corner of Kenya, which the Italians had coveted at the time of the cession of Jubaland.¹

In August 1938, Mr. Paskin, had on behalf of the Colonial Secretary, confirmed the fact that the Colonial Office was by no means agreed to the cession to Italy of a sufficient area in the north east of Kenya to include the Diff-Wajir-Moyale road, an area mainly inhabited by Somalis.² This decision was reached on the grounds of strategic, administrative and possibly political objections.

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¹ P.R.O./C.O. 822/89-46598F Note on the Meeting Held at the Colonial Office 23-6-1938.
² P.R.O./C.O. 822/89-46598E Minute by J.J. Paskin 6-8-1938.
But, however, the Colonial Office was able to make concession to the Italians by ceding the triangle Mandera-Eil-Mole-Eil Wak. Paskin had then concluded, "It is, however, satisfactory that he (the Colonial Secretary) sees no insuperable objections to the cession of this smaller area."  

Even for this area Glenday was very emphatic that the inhabitants would have to be consulted as to their wishes; he reminded the Colonial Office that when Jubaland was ceded to Italy there was a petition to the King from the inhabitants of that territory. Glenday further stated that if the inhabitants of area 'D' - that is Mandera-Eil Mole-Eil Wak2 - were asked in advance if they would agree to the cession of that area to Italy, they would strongly object. On the other hand if they would be given the choice of living in Kenya and being Italian subjects it would be impossible to accommodate them in Kenya. However, the issue was further delayed by the outbreak of the Second World War and the eventual defeat of Italy and the occupation by Britain of Abyssinia.

Despite all the muddle to which the Italo-Abyssinian War had exposed the N.F.D. administration, the only bright side to it as far as the Somalis were concerned was the effects it had on their trade. Although, in the case of Isiolo and Marsabit the effect was less marked, in Wajir and Mandera trade had boomed as a result of the war.3

1. Ibid.
2. See Map 4.
3. Consul G. Reece reported in the period from April to August 1936 that, "there are many individuals who have profited exceedingly by the war and the high prices paid for livestock; and the traders of Moyale and Mandera have also benefited considerably." (P.R.O./F.O. 371/20168 Report by Consul Reece, Mega - on events on his District, April-August 1936).
MAP 4. SKETCH SHOWING MANDERA-EIL MOLE-EIL WAK TRIANGLE
In Garissa, Somalis, especially the Aulihan and Abdallah took considerable numbers of stock to Kismayu in Italian Somaliland. Even after the market was closed to Somalis from Kenya great numbers of cattle continued to move over the border for sale by relations and friends of Somalis on the Italian side. In Kenya, the Lamu prices for stock steadily rose throughout 1936. Cattle fetched 25/- in January, 30/- in June, and 36/- at the end of the year. The price of ghee averaged 21/- per frasila most of the year and rose to 30/- in November and December. Hides were selling at 12/- per frasila.

After the Italian occupation, Colonel Settani, who had taken over the administration of the Abyssinian country from Nugelli, Mega and Moyale as Comissario, arranged plans with the District Commissioner of Moyale for the re-opening of the market and for trans-frontier trade. By August 1936 merchants from both sides of the frontier were reported to be busily engaged in bringing up goods for sale to the Italian troops and personnel and that was in addition to the normal trade in the district. British Somali traders were then in possession of large quantities of lira. The lira thus obtained was said to pass to Nairobi and thence

1. This was the result of Article 3(1) of the Treaty of Peace (covenant of the League of Nations) order 1935, providing that no person in Kenya shall make any loan to or for the benefit of any person resident in the Italian territory which term included the Colonies and dependencies of Italy. The sale of cattle which was giving credit was stopped.

2. K.N.A./DC/MLE 3/6/2 Conf. 1936 Intelligence Reports.
through the hands of two Indian money changers at Mombassa named Lalji Mangalji and Kangi Ibrahim. Local traders kept contact by wire with those Indians for information on the different rates. A certain demand existed in Nairobi and Mombassa for lira, for the purchase of Italian goods from Italian firms. The items bought were mainly blankets and beads.

The Italians were then anxious to prevent British Somalis from exporting the lira; and some traders had been forced to make considerable detours through the bush to avoid the banda on the main tracks, before reaching British territory. Traders who had their lira taken away from them had been told that they could have the value in goods, such as cloth and sugar but as the prices of these commodities was three to five times as high in Italian Somaliland as it was in Kenya, this was hardly an advantage. Unfortunately, towards the end of the year, in Moyale, the Italian embargo on the export of the lira killed Somali stock trade. Traders were given saving bank books and credited with the amounts due to them and promised that at some time in the future they might be enabled to withdraw these amounts and transfer them out of Italian territory. In Mandera also, owing to the impossibility of receiving payment in currency the stock trade with Lugh had ceased entirely.

So, apart from a temporary boom in trade, the Italo-Ethiopian War was a real setback as far as the administration of the N.F.D. Somali was concerned. Instead of devoting

1. K.N.A./DC/MLE 3/2 D.C. Moyale to Officer-in-Charge N.F.D. 4-8-1936.
time to the solution of the problems mentioned in the last chapter, the authorities were further absorbed by the aftermath of the war, the refugee problem, disease, interference with trans-frontier water rights plus the question of the unrectified frontier. This position had by no means improved in the next two years and the approach of the Second World War was to add a new dimension to the difficulties already mentioned.

On the eve of the War, the Italians concentrated their effort on recruitment largely among the Somalis. The D.C. Mandera stated, "I have been informed by an Officer of the banda that they do not like the Boran as askaris as they find them untrustworthy. Also the subject tribes such as Burji and Kansa, being subjects under Ethiopian masters are unreliable... I gathered that he looked upon the Somalis as most valuable material."¹ The recruitment of Somalis especially those who were British subjects, was, however, subjected to severe criticism by Sylvia Pankhurst, Editor of the New Times and Ethiopia News. In a letter to Sir John Withes, M.P., she remarked, "You will see that the Italians are being allowed to use natives of British territory, and that on a very large scale, to proceed with their war in Abyssinia....I trust that you will take such action as you are able both in Parliament and out, against this outrage, which is a breach of Mr. Macdonald's pledge."² In the edition of the New Times and Ethiopia News

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of 17 June 1939, she included an Article which explained the reasons why the Italians looked for Somalis as recruits.

It ran,

"In addition to their bickerings and disagreement the Italian white soldiers find it difficult to run all over the Ethiopian mountains to fight owing to their great altitude. They cannot go long distances on foot because their breath fails them, but the Ethiopian warriors can run continually day and night...for this reason the Italian Government has been forced to hire black mercenary soldiers from the British Colonies of the Sudan, Uganda, Kenya and British Somaliland who could keep up and fight the (nimble) Ethiopian people."

This article had actually appeared when only a few months before the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rome had informed the British Embassy that the Royal Ministry for Italian Africa had communicated to them that they had confirmed the instructions already given to the Governor General of Italian East Africa, "with a view to ensuring that in proceeding enrolment of Somalis in Italian forces the competent authorities should take every care to ascertain that these persons are not British subjects."

Besides the issue of recruitment, the start of World War II had also had its direct impact upon the administration of the Somalis in the N.F.D. On the start of the War with Germany, Mandera and Moyale were evacuated, and by August 1939 the families and children of Government employees were evacuated and some police posts withdrawn.

In September, the D.C's Moyale and Mandera were telegraphed


from Nairobi to move but shortly afterwards, when it was realized that Italy was not going to go to war with Britain, they were ordered to resume their posts. As a result, chaos followed and Somali property was exposed to looting and destruction. At Wajir two hundred and seventy five women and children were evacuated but nothing had happened. In Garissa District it was reported that with the outbreak of War between Italy and Abyssinia in September 1939, Garissa Somalis "took advantage of the occupation of the administration with emergency measures to adopt a threatening attitude towards the River tribes." Generally, the evacuation of the stations was reported to have marked a loss of confidence of the Government's capacity to maintain authority amongst the tribes.

In June 1940, War with Italy was declared and Wajir, Bura and Garissa area were the main theatres of war so far as Kenya was concerned. Air raids on Wajir continued between 13th, 15th and 27th June but only five men were reported killed in Wajir. However, the most serious situation arose when General Dickson decided in July that the tribesmen could not be allowed to use the Wajir wells. Normally about 1,000,000 head of mixed stock watered there. It was at first thought that water and grazing would have to be borrowed from the Central Rift Valley Province, but since two thirds of the camel people chose to move eastwards

1. K.N.A./PC/NFD 1/1/7 Annual Reports 1939.
2. K.N.A./DC/MLE 3/7/2 conf. Intelligence Reports July 1939.
instead of southwards, a serious situation was averted and all that was needed was to alter the Somali Line and borrow some grazing from the Uaso Nyiro Boran. In Moyale, a number of Somali villages of Mussurreh and Rer Muhammad Dakatch were caught by the Italian banda and were forced to move to Afmadu where they were obliged to stay several months before they returned.

At the end of 1940, the Italians still occupied Eil Yibo, Eil Sordu and Bulluk in the Marsabit District; also Moyale, Debel, Korrongil and Bura north of Wajir. From there they pushed down from Eil Wak as far as Eil Katula but in the beginning of 1941 the tide turned in Britain's favour and in one month the Italians were ejected not only from Kenya but from a large and important part of Somaliland.

However, looking through the documents, one finds that Somali attitude to the British position during the war was varied. Chiefs like Hilole Muhammad of the Aulihan and Stambul Abdi of the Abd Wak dropped their feud as a contribution to the War effort. On the other hand chief Ahmad Hasan of the Muhammad Zubeir was reported to have gone to the Italians and thus became an anti-British influence. On the general tribal level, the feelings of the N.F.D. tribes Somali and Galla were said to be friendly. Boran, Ajuran

1. Since 1934 A Somali-Galla line was drawn to separate the two groups in order to admit their movement and to see that the Somalis do not trespass on Galla grazing and watering facilities. See Map II.
and Gurreh offered to supply animals for rations and most of the Somalis proved most helpful in providing information regarding Italian movements. However, that was not true in the case of the Muhammad Zubeir and the Marehan who stood to gain water and grazing and hence were drawn to give very active support to the Italians.

After the end of hostilities, the British administration in the Northern Frontier renewed its efforts to deal with the aftermath of this War. A start was made to collect some of the rifles which the Italians had given to the Murille Somalis in Mandera District, Disarmament was also begun with the Aulihan in Jubaland near the British frontier in order to decrease the raids by armed game poachers across the border. Besides, the administration had to cope with the hundreds of deserters from the Italian forces, mainly Ajuran and Gurreh who had returned home after serving in the Italian side.

No sooner had the War ended and the Ethiopian Government resumed control over Abyssinia than several serious trans-frontier raids from Abyssinia by bandits occurred. On 21st April 1941 these raids led to the murder of Captain W. Keir, the D.C. of Mandera who was helping in the recovery of some looted camels belonging to the Gabbra looted by the Marehan and Herti Somalis from the

1. K.N.A./DC/MLE 3/7/2 Conf. Intelligence Reports 1940.
3. K.N.A./PC/NFD 4/1/11 Secret History of the War: 1939-44; War Diary of N.F.D. 1st June 1941 to September 1941 by Gerald Reece, Officer-in-Charge, N.F.D.
Nughelli area. The situation was made worse by the policy of the new Abyssinian Government when the Ras had initiated a temporary campaign against the Somalis in Borana and thus encouraged the Boran to murder the Moslem Somalis. The latter in their turn fled to Kenya making the position of the administration there even more difficult. Later this was supplemented by a series of Gelluba raids on the Rendille which occupied most of the time of the Officials.

In addition to the influx of deserters and the trans-frontier raids, the N.F.D. Somalis had suffered considerably from the fact that the price of food and cotton cloth had risen to nearly twice the figure that it was before the War.¹ This, together with the problems mentioned in the previous chapters made life for the Somalis extremely difficult. However, though the dimensions of the problem of the development of the Somali N.F.D. was too big, and perhaps too late to rectify, an effort was at least made in the post-War period to remedy the position in the five years development plan for the Colony in which the N.F.D. was included. How far this had succeeded in winning back the inhabitants of the neglected region will be discussed in later chapters.

¹ Ibid.
Chapter IV

The Position of 'Alien' Somalis in the East Africa Protectorate and Kenya Colony.¹

Before discussing the post-war position of the N.F.D. Somalis - it is worthwhile considering the history of the political development of the 'Alien' Somali in the urban centres of the Colony - in order to give a complete picture of the position of Somalis throughout the Protectorate and the Colony.

The term 'Alien Somalis' was applied by the British officials in Kenya to distinguish the Northern Frontier District Somalis² from "...those Somalis who are living in Kenya but who belong to tribes not normally resident in the Colony. they are immigrants and descendants of immigrants of British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, (including the country formerly known as Jubaland), Ethiopia and Aden."³

The use of the word 'Alien' in this context had, however, led to a series of troubles between the Somalis and the British Authorities whereby the Ishaq section, who were particularly affected by it, conducted an incessant campaign requesting the authorities to delete the word in view of

1. This chapter is an enlarged version of a paper I prepared in December 1971 for the Seminar on 'Colonial Rule and Local Response in the 19th and 20th Centuries' arranged by the institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London.

2. The majority of the Somali population in the East Africa Protectorate and Kenya Colony were the local inhabitants of the N.F.D. The so-called 'Alien'Somalis were scattered in various towns and were far fewer in number than those of the N.F.D.

its implications for their position in the Colony. But this was only one aspect of the clashes between them and the administration which started ever since their settlement in the country.

The 'Alien' Somalis — mainly Ishaq and Herti\(^1\) were to be found chiefly in Nairobi and Isiolo (in the Northern Frontier District). But as cattle traders they had moved with their stock to many other urban centres in Kenya such as Rumuruti, Gilgil, Kitale and Eldoret. In all these areas the problem of their settlement, stock allocations, and later the question of their position and social status as compared with other races in the Colony was a live issue which kept the British authorities busy through the whole period when Britain was in charge of the Protectorate and the Colony. This chapter deals with two most important areas where these Somalis are found and where their political activities mostly centred - Nairobi and Isiolo.

In Nairobi, the history of their settlement dated back to the period 1895-1900 or shortly before. According to Colonel J. Ainsworth's Diary of April 25th 1901\(^2\) and a report from the Governor of the Protectorate to the Colonial Secretary in 1916,\(^3\) at the time of the construction of the

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1. The Ishaq main sub-sections are Habr Awal, Habr Jaala and Gerhajis. The Herti sub-sections are: Warsengeleleh, Dulbahanta and Mijertein. See Appendix I.

2. Rhodes House MSS/Afr./s/381 Ainsworth Diaries. Also see Sir Vincent Glenday, "The Origin of the Somalis with Special Relation to their Political Development in Kenya", 1938.

3. P.R.O./C.0.533/170 Belfield to Andrew Bonar Law 13-10-1916.
Uganda Railway in November 1899 there were both Somali and Indian Communities in Nairobi. Further, the Commercial development of the town in 1900 had attracted a sudden rush of a mixed population of Indian traders, Arabs and Somalis. It seems that from then onwards the Somali community continued to build up to such an extent that Colonel Ainsworth was obliged to establish the system of the headman of camps. In April 1901 a number of Berbera and Aden Somalis who had collected and formed a settlement near the stream outside Nairobi were reported as being 'troublesome' and Ainsworth had found it necessary to ask them to elect a headman.¹

By 1906, these Somalis had collected a large number of cattle and were hence ordered, for veterinary reasons, to keep them in the Nairobi Commonage near M'bagathi (Embakasi). In complying with this order the Somalis seem to have established settlement villages inside the Common.

In 1916, the map compiled by Professor Simpson to illustrate his report on Nairobi showed that there were four Somali villages in the township itself. The one lying to the west of the township consisting of sixty four houses owned by fifty seven persons, was in the proposed European Residential area; the second of forty-four houses, in the protective zone; the third of six houses in the better class Asiatic Residential Area, and the fourth of twelve houses in the area 'D' or the business quarter.²

The other substantial 'Alien' Somali settlement in

1. R.H./Mss/Afr/s/380 Ainsworth Papers.
the Colony was in Isiolo - in the Northern Frontier District - which had a much more recent history than that of Nairobi. When the administration of the N.F.D. was first undertaken, the police force was largely composed of Berbers Somalis and when the force was disbanded in 1921 it was thought necessary to settle them somewhere in the Colony together with the ex-Somali soldiers demobilized after World War I. A settlement was started in 1923 for these 'Aliens' who were previously scattered in three locations, one at Isiolo township, another along the Garba Tulla Road and the third at Kipseng. The three were allowed to stay in Isiolo forming Campi ya Juu, Campi ya Garbu and Bulabesa. This settlement was further increased by the arrival of the Laikipia Somalis in 1929 at the time of the establishment of the Isiolo boma (station).

The history of the move of the Laikipia Somalis to Isiolo goes back to 1925 when it was decided to move "squatters" on the Laikipia European owned farms to the unalienated land between the Ngare Ndare and the Uaso Nyiro Rivers in the Northern Nyeri District. The Somalis complained that the Ngare Ndare was to a great extent a fly country, full of fever and extremely unhealthy for their families. The Senior Commissioner had thus allowed them to stay on the banks of the Uaso Nyiro on the unalienated farm lands there; but before they moved, rinderpest had broken out among their cattle. This gave the white settlers yet another pretext to persist in their demand for the removal of Somalis.
The administration was, however, unable to move them owing to the impending inoculation for rinderpest, and meanwhile permission was given to them to enter the Masai Reserve on the Kerio Province in order to dispose of their cattle. In 1927 it was discovered that a considerable amount of illicit trading with Suk for sheep was being carried out by some Somalis which resulted in clashes with the police. Once again, and because of this illicit trading Somali cattle had to be inoculated against Pleuropneumonia before Somalis could trade at Kerio Province and Samburu District.

Owing to draught conditions prevailing between November 1927 and June 1928, the Senior Commissioner Kerio strongly deprecated further introduction of Somali cattle into Suk or the neighbourhood Reserves. But despite this, in the Conference which was held at the Government House in June 1928 at which the Director of Agriculture and the Chief Veterinary Officer were present, it was once again decided that action should be taken to compel the Somalis to take their cattle into Suk if conditions there admitted of it or to move into Isiolo Quarantine area, where they should be subjected to the rules governing that area. 1

While the authorities were at a loss to decide where to settle these Somalis, the D.C. of Lamu had in September 1929 suggested to the P.C. of Coast Province that these Laikipia Somalis and other Somalis whom as askaris and syces rendered loyal and valuable services to the

Government in the N.F.D. and who were afterwards a source of anxiety and trouble, could be settled in the Island of Kiwayu to the north of his District. The area possessed excellent grazing, and water could be obtained by digging. The island was uninhabited by the Bajun tribe except for a small village to the south, and at one time it had been grazed by Herti Somalis, "... it is hilly, wind swept and exceptionally healthy. It would I reckon carry from 500 - 1,000 head of milk cattle. Rice, tea, sugar etc.- the main food of Somalis is cheaper there than up country."¹ But the P.C. was not in the least enthusiastic about the idea. In a letter to the Colonial Secretary, Nairobi, he stated:

"The estimate of the number of stock which can be grazed on the Island would allow of a few Somalis grazing there but it would do little to solve the question of how these people are to be dealt with...there are at present thirty-five head of Bajun cattle and about 200 goats which would have to be moved."²

The contradictory evidence of the P.C. as to the capacity of the island, proved enough to convince the authorities about the futility of the plan and the project was completely dropped. The N.F.D. administration thus decided to occupy Isiolo as the headquarters of the District in order to solve the problem which was becoming more and more embarrassing to the Government. The Laikipia Somalis were thus allowed in the Quarantine Reserve after the

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¹. K.N.A./PC/NFD 4/1/6 No. 1443 S.V. Cooke to P.C. Coast 6-9-1929.
². K.N.A./PC/C.P. 620/27 N. 17/2/3/1/10 P.C. Coast to Colonial Secretary, Nairobi 16-12-1929.
suggestion to move them to Kiwayu Island was rejected.
The occupation of Isiolo in 1929 had thus coincided with
the arrival of the Laikipia Somalis who joined the other
Somali sections already established at Campi Ya Juu,
Campi Ya Garbu and Bulabesa.

These 'Alien' Somalis both in Nairobi and Isiolo had
since their establishment in the above mentioned settlements
started a campaign for their social, political, and economic
security in the Protectorate and the Colony. Distinguished
among them were the Ishagia (commonly known as Ishaq Shariff
Community) who had a number of claims which they were
anxious that the British administration in Kenya should
always bear in mind.

First, they argued that as their country (British
Somaliland) though nominally under British flag had been
raided by the "Mullah", they had no means of living there
and that it was therefore the duty of the Government to
find them a place to live.¹ Second, they maintained that
they were the first Somalis to trade to any extent in Kenya;
and it was not until the opening of the administration in the
N.F.D. and the pacification of Jubaland that the Darod
Somalis followed. They thus felt that they should be given
priority over the Darod sections in matters concerning trade.

Third, their attachment of the word "Shariff" or "Ashraff"

¹. Unlike the Herti, who were themselves Darod, the
Ishaqia did not side with Sayyid Muhammad Abdille Hasan
in his 'Jihad' against the British. This fact was later
supported by M.H. Mattan, Secretary of the Ishaqia
Somali Association in a letter to the East African
Standard, on 4th April 1938 in which he said, "We have
sided with the British Government against the Mad Mullah
of British Somaliland."
to their community was not without significance. Sheikh Ishaq bin Ahmad, the founder of their clan was supposed to have been the cousin of the Prophet Muhammad; and it was to this claim the Ishaqia had attached the greatest importance in order to elevate themselves above the Darod. Moreover, this claim was adhered to in order to gain an Asiatic status which would put them on equal terms with Indians and the Arabs in the Colony. Finally, another claim which had had important implications in the history of their political development in Kenya was inherent in the fact that as soldiers and policemen brought by explorers like Carl Peters, leading settlers like Lord Delamare and Empire builders like Lord Lugard, they had rendered very valuable services to the British Government. Because of this the Somalis felt that they should be awarded special treatment. Nor was this fact denied by some of the leading British Officials in charge of Somali affairs. Sir Vincent Glenday, while Acting P.C. of the N.F.D. once remarked in connection with the Nairobi Somali "...neither must it be forgotten that there are amongst them ex-government servants with long and creditable service who, subject to the consideration of general policy, are yet deserving of consideration." Depending upon this, and the previous claims, the 'Alien' Somalis were persistent in their demand that they should be treated and classified differently not

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2. K.N.A./PC/NFD 4/1/6 No. 307/42/3 Conf. P.C. Isiolo to Colonial Secretary, Nairobi 25-6-1930.
only from the Africans but also from the Darod Somalis in the other parts of the Colony. This was the root of struggle between the Ishaqia Somalis and the British administrators in Kenya which dominated the period 1915-1963.

The first of these clashes started with their claim for a right of settlement in the urban centres of the Protectorate and the Colony. In Nairobi this demand had inevitably clashed with the proposed scheme of racial segregation and the advocacy of the settlers' rights. This was particularly the case when the Nairobi authorities contemplated the removal of the Somali villages within the projected European leasehold area. Under the pretext of health reasons, and depending on the fact that these Somalis were one of the most recent groups to move into Kenya, they were informed that they should have to move to an area outside the township somewhere near the Commonage.

Upon seeing the letter in the press from the Secretariat addressed to the Municipal Council in which the Governor undertook to effect the removal of their villages forthwith, the Somalis were furious. They had immediately consulted with their solicitors, Messrs. Shapley and Schwartz, two Nairobi advocates known for their sympathy with minorities in East Africa. The Somalis informed the latter that they had held a mass meeting of Somalis at the Nagarfa Plains on the 16th and 17th September 1916 attended by about five hundred people. Among these were five leading Somali chiefs all appointed by the Government - Husein Ali, Headman of

1. See Map 5.
Ishaq Habr Awal; Hasan Hersi, Headman of Ishaq Habr Jaala; Abu Bakr Sugule, Headman of Ishaq Habr Yunis; with one Herti chief Adam Jama and one Ogaden Chief Hasan Yusuf. At the meeting it was understood that all Somalis were unhappy about the projected removal and thus carried out certain resolutions which they handed to Messrs. Shapley and Schwartze.¹

These resolutions were embodied in Messrs. Shapley and Schwartze's despatch to the Secretary of State for the Colonies² on the proposed removal of the Somali villages by the administration of the Protectorate. Briefly, the Somalis considered that they had an absolute moral and equitable right to claim two things. First, compensation for their removal; and second a removal to a site near Nairobi. In addition, they were very annoyed at the fact that they were told to move only at short notice and without consideration of at least the position of women whose husbands were absent engaged upon military and administrative work as askaris and interpreters for the Government.

On the question of the site itself, the Somalis objected to it for three reasons. First, their business dealings necessitated their constant daily attendance in Nairobi; and Mbagathi being more than eight miles distant, it would not be possible for them to walk in and out from there. Second, Mbagathi was situated in a general game

¹. P.R.O./C.O. 533/171/703 Shapley and Schwartze to Chief Secretary Nairobi. 2-9-1916.
reserve, and, the Somalis generally possessing considerable numbers of herds of flocks, cattle, sheep etc., they would find such a location particularly unsuitable. Finally, they complained that Mbagathi had no fuel supply for the public. There was a Government forest but right of access to it was not implied.

But perhaps a more serious cause of dissatisfaction by the Somalis on the question of their removal from the township, was the position of the village in the European Residential Area (No. 1 on the map). The authorities had particularly pressed the Somalis there to move, because the village was on the principal road by which the European residents of Parklands proceeded to and from Nairobi. Moreover, it was maintained that the medical authorities had already discovered about twenty undisclosed cases of small-pox in the village. Not only that but the Somalis were annoyed at the fact that although they had consented to be moved to the Native Location, the authorities were unable to agree on the pretext that, "It is undesirable that Somalis should reside in this location in close proximity to the more uncivilised African native."¹

In their insistence that they should be allowed within the township, the Somalis put forward a proposition which they wished their advocates to place before the Colonial Office for consideration. The proposition was that the Government might erect for them in the New Native Location, houses approved by the Medical and Sanitary Authorities. In respect of such model houses, they suggested that they

should be given a lease say of 99 or 999 years at a rental of about 5%. The idea being that a scheme on such lines would have the advantage of settling the various tribes of Somalis in such a way that it would be easy for the Government to have administrative control over them. On the other hand, the Somalis having a permanent site in the country, would be increasingly likely to become useful members of society.

But far from considering their demands, both the Governor of the Protectorate and the Colonial Office had categorically objected to them. H.C. Belfield had in the first place disputed the statement that Shapley Schwartzé had been instructed by persons representing every tribe and every section of the Somalis in the East Africa Protectorate. For evidence, the Governor attached a statement in his despatch to the Colonial Secretary¹ by headman Hasan Yusuf of the Darod section, which implied there had been no co-operation with the Ishaqia; a matter not altogether unexpected when one considers the state of relations between the two groups at the time.

In regard to the rejection by Somalis to the Mbagathi site, the governor was of the opinion that the nature of the business undertaken by these people was almost entirely confined to stock trading, employment as gun bearers and headmen in charge of shooting parties. The last two were mainly employed by firms in Nairobi who specialise in this business, and access to Mbagathi across

the plain was a matter of no difficulty. Moreover, as far as stock was concerned, the Government anticipated that there would be ample grazing for stock in their new surroundings, whereas at that time such grazing as was available within the Nairobi Township was limited to certain classes of animals under the East Africa Township Ordinance of 19th May, 1904, Section 76. Belfield had also pointed out that "since 1906, the greater number of their cattle has for Veterinary reasons, been kept and grazed at the Commonage, close to the site of the new settlement and that under the contemplated arrangements they will be able to exercise closer supervision over them."

On the question of fuel supply on the proposed site he suggested that they could, by a monthly payment of Rs. 1 for fuel licence in respect of each family, obtain a sufficient supply from the Government Forest which was close at hand. Turning to the question of compensation, the Governor, holding to Ainsworth's view that their occupancy was always looked upon as a matter subject to the approval of the administration, hence concluded that the Somalis had no claims of any description to the land which they occupied henceforth, "they will not be entitled to any compensation for any loss or inconvenience which they may suffer by reason of the termination of their tenancy."

Taking into consideration all the points contained in the Governor's lengthy despatch and having concurred

1. Ibid.
with his view that the Somalis there were simply "squatters", the Colonial Secretary gave the following verdict to Read on the question:

"I think that the Governor makes a clear case for removal, and that he should be informed by telegram that the proposal is approved."

In another despatch the Colonial Secretary was only prepared to make one concession concerning the position of the families of Somalis absent on Government service; that they should be assisted in their removal by the authorities. Apart from this the Somalis got no help; far from it - the Colonial Secretary had accused Messrs. Shapley and Schwartz for engineering all the protest. It was assumed that the fact that the Somalis could pay the fees to the advocates and could also pay for elaborate reports showed that they were very flourishing and hence deserved no assistance from the Government.

It seems that some of them were allowed to purchase freehold plots in the Nairobi East Township "Eastleigh" in which individuals other than Europeans could purchase plots and settle. But, however, the majority were removed to Mbagathi against their wishes; and their removal was not followed by any definite plans for their settlement at that end. The Somalis were left to congregate inside the Common with vast numbers of their stock and were thus using the Commonage as a ranch.

2. P.R.O./C.O. 533/171/703 Colonial Secretary to Read 6-11-1916.
Upon discovering the situation, the authorities attempted to regulate their tenancy and so in 1929 they were ordered to pay two shillings a year for a temporary occupation licence on the Common and twenty-four shillings a year as a rent for a boma plot. Moreover, an area of thirty acres was surveyed with the intention that the Somali villages would be moved to it; but in fact they were not moved and although they paid the rent, the Somalis continued to occupy their huts on the Common. On top of that, about 1931 a proposal was made that these Somalis should be required to pay a grazing fee of fifty cents for each head of cattle and ten cents for each sheep and goat.

At this juncture the Somalis could no longer bear the oppression by the Nairobi Authorities and hence on the 1st March 1932, one of the first of the series of Somali petitions to the Secretary of State and the Colonial Office was started. In this petition which was sent through the Governor, the Somalis stated;

"Towards the close of Queen Victoria's reign they, at the suggestion of the Provincial Commissioner, left various scattered grazing areas which they occupied in and around Nairobi and collected at this spot, being informed that it had been given to them as a gift from the Queen."

The members of the Land Commission of 1933 were unable to find written evidence to support the above contention. In addition the Commission was still not satisfied with the oral evidence and were unable to see

for what purpose the Nairobi Commonage was originally instituted. But the Somali view both in Nairobi and the Republic\(^1\) points to the possibility that permission was given to some Somalis who served with Lord Lugard in Uganda during the Sudanese Mutiny and others who helped in quelling rebellions within the Protectorate, to reside in an area within or near the Common. The numbers of these Somalis and their livestock had since so much increased that it proved difficult to distinguish between those who were entitled to be there and those who were not.

The recommendations of the Kenya Land Commission regarding the Nairobi Commonage amounted to the proposition that an area should be marked off sufficient to provide accommodation for the Somalis who were residing there, subject to restrictions similar to those which were recommended for the Sudanese askaris at Kibera. Also provision should be made to provide grazing for slaughter oxen, transport oxen and trade cattle in transit. The area would then be handed over to the Municipality to administer as an integral part of the Township.\(^2\) But in their determination to satisfy the European settlers' demands, the Land Commission had further suggested that in case the area cleared by the Somalis was not developed as a National Park - as it was planned - its status should be that of unalienated Crown Lands in the Highlands, in

\(^1\) I am grateful for Mr. Ismail Muhammad Ali, Director of Public Relations, Ministry of Information, Mogadishu, for the above information.

respect of which Europeans should have a privileged position. Facilities for stock-raising in it should not be granted to non-Europeans unless very strong grounds existed. In this case the Commission did not see that the Somalis, apart from askaris of the Uganda Rifles had any special claim such as would justify an exception being made. They therefore recommended that Somali cattle should not be allowed to graze there. The Somali was thus limited to area 'D' where no privilege of race existed, or the 'C' area, where the Commission suggested that the definition of the term "native" in respect of such areas should be widened to include the Somali, the Nubian or Sudanese.¹

The situation remained like that, and there was no further evidence of any practical steps being made to regulate Somali settlement in Nairobi, apart from the increasing pressure by the authorities to disperse the Somali population as much as possible - and to no specified whereabouts. Up to the post-war period, the problem of over-stocking among the Somali cattle in the Common was a current issue. A comparative study of the number of stock kept by the Somalis since 1931 showed a marked increase. In 1931, the number of cattle kept by the twelve authorized families of ex-askaris was about 2,000. In 1942 it was 1,804 while the number actually recommended by the Game Committee was only 240.

It was obvious that the Nairobi Authorities had failed to solve the problem of Somali settlement and stock allocation for a long time after the Land Commission's Report. The District Commissioner, Nairobi had remarked, ten years afterwards, that:

"Although action has been taken to remove unlawful residents it is clearly necessary that far greater supervision must be given to this settlement than has been possible in the past and that the cattle which these families may possess in the Commonage must be strictly limited by branding."

But, however, the branding method which had helped greatly to solve the problem in Eldoret, was found very difficult to enact in Nairobi. The Eldoret by-laws provided for the branding of authorized cattle and the power to seize unauthorised cattle and impound them. If the pound fees were not paid within days and the Veterinary permit was not produced to authorise the removal of stock from the pound to some specified place, the cattle might be sold and proceeds handed over to the cattle owner. In Eldoret this was possible because the Veterinary Officer was unable, on account of quarantine restrictions to grant permits for the removal of the cattle from the Municipality; and, as a consequence all impounded cattle were sold. In Nairobi the situation was different as the Veterinary could not legitimately refuse to issue removal permits. An alternative suggestion was to interest European farmers particularly in Thika District to receive Somali cattle on their farms subject to the payment of grazing fees; but

the authorities were convinced that the result would be merely shifting but not solving the problem.

The post war period had thus witnessed great agitation by the 'Alien' Somali communities who were utterly disappointed as to the attitude of the Administration towards their problems. As late as 1946, the Somalis were once again informed that they had no right to be in Mbagathi area as by then the Government had definitely decided to develop it into a National Game Park. On December 4th the D.C. Nairobi visited Mbagathi and held a baraza with the Somalis, where he conveyed to them the final decision of the Government. The procedure for their removal, as explained by the D.C. was that the Government would set up a board,

"upon which the Somalis would be represented to value all the stock which will be removed and handed over to the meat control; the area is in quarantine for pleuropneumonia and that Government would compensate the owners by paying out to them the difference between the price paid by the Meat Control and the valuation made by the board."

When the Somalis did not dispense their goats by the required date, the Warden rounded up a hundred and ten and had them removed to the Meat Marketing Board. Also against the District Commissioner's wishes a large police force including three Europeans was sent to Mbagathi. At this juncture the Nairobi Somalis had joined with their kin in other parts of the Colony in a series of petitions to His Majesty the King against the harsh and inequitable

treatment which they had received at the hand of the Kenya Government. However, this did not help the situation and the Government continued their policy of pushing them out of the area, until 1968, when, after the major "Shifta" incursions they were moved out from Mbagathi without compensation for their plots or livestock.

In comparison with the position of the Nairobi Somalis, those in Isiolo did not meet with better treatment from the Colonial Administration of the time. As in Nairobi, the problem of 'Alien' Somali settlement and stock allocation dominated the period since the establishment of the Boma in 1929 up to the end of British rule in Kenya. They had been constantly moved from pillar to post through no fault of their own. No sooner had the Isiolo, Garba Tulla and Laikipia Somalis been allowed to build houses in the township than it was discovered that the area occupied by them was five miles outside the boundary of the Northern Frontier Province and inside the Meru Reserve. Moreover, the Somalis who possessed large numbers of stock were naturally encroaching upon grazing of the Meru tribe and the latter were no doubt indignant about the matter.

Negotiations for the inclusion of the five miles in the Northern Frontier Province failed; and those Somalis who had built houses were informed that they would have to move as soon as the new site had been chosen. On 21st January 1930, a Sites Board was held to investigate the possibility in the Quarantine Reserve to accommodate

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the rest of the Somali groups. They made their recommendations but no decision was taken in the matter. But, however, the tendency to move them from one location to another and the clear absence of any definite plans for their well-being had provoked the Somalis into action and the administration was faced with incessant protests and lists of grievances.

The Kenya Land Commission of 1933, had equally failed to solve the problem of the settlement of Somalis in Isiolo. In fact, its dealings and attitude towards the 'Alien' Somalis were largely prejudiced by a comment made by the D.C. of Isiolo at a District Commissioner's meeting of the N.F.D. in August 1929 when he was speaking of the probable consequences of gazetting a Somali Reserve. The minute read:–

"...Kenya is regarded by the Northern Somali as an Eldorado, and that there could be a further infiltration from Northern Somaliland, and that within ten or fifteen years the problem would have reappeared in a graver form; the area set apart for the Somali would have proved insufficient and the Somalis, having obtained political rights and power, would then again demand consideration of their claims."1

The Commission, therefore, did not commit itself to any specific policy as far as the settlement of the Somalis was concerned. Instead they followed the same policy as in their dealings with the Nairobi Somalis. It was suggested that any Somali might apply, on equal terms with other races, for a lease of land where no special privilege

of race existed, i.e. a 'D' area. In respect of 'C' areas, which were areas in which "natives" had prior rights, the Somalis were given the same privilege. In fact an area of 700 sq. miles available in the 'C' area in Isiolo was allotted to them; but it was an area which the Somalis considered extremely unsuitable and unhealthy.

Six years after the Commissions Report the latter area was considered by the Administration, who recommended that it could be developed on a Commonage basis where occupation and grazing rights should be granted and fees charged. In 1940, Mr. Edwards, a pasture Research Officer, carried out a survey of this area and advised that its carrying capacity was 4,712 cattle. Further, D.O. O'Hagen, D.C. of Isiolo had in handing over the District to J.C. Howes warned that, before the proposal to develop the area as a Commonage could be put into effect, and if the Somalis were to be confined to that area, it would be necessary first to eject all other Somalis - i.e. some 133 families who had come to the area previously on various pretexts and who were ranching on Crown Land. Secondly, the amount of stock owned by all Somalis to whom the Government had some obligation must be limited. Following this, a preliminary classification had been made of class 'A' Somalis (243 families) being ex-government servants and


2. Ibid.
residents and residents of Rumuruti, Garba Tulla and Wajir who were brought there by the government; and class 'B' Somalis who had no real claim to reside at Isiolo and had come there during the last ten years. The problem of evicting the latter proved to be the most embarrassing problem in the history of the Province's administration.

In addition to the question of class 'B', the authorities had in 1949 once again faced the problem of removing even the class 'A' Somalis because of the projected rebuilding of the Isiolo Government Boma and its raising to the status of a township. The Governor of the Colony ruled that the 'Alien' Somali population should be ordered to quit the Meru Reserve and move across the river into the N.F.D. They were given a period of ten years to make the move and families with a good record to whom the Government was under some kind of obligation were promised the sum of £50 to help them in the move.\(^1\) Just before the Governor made his pronouncement, the D.C. with the help of Farah Ishaq, a Somali interpreter from Mandera, made a complete list of all the houseowners in Campi Ya Juu, Campi Ya Garbu and Bulabesa to prepare for the removal of those Somalis.

However, Somali elders who were taken to see the site raised as many objections as possible. Despite the authorities obvious disregard of their views on the area, Intelligence Reports did however justify their complaints. The District Commissioner of Mandere had in 1943 pointed

\(^1\) K.N.A./PC/NFD 1/1/9 Annual Reports 1947-50.
out that:—

"A journey to the Somali leasehold area established the fact that the rivers certainly lacked water. A visit paid by the Water Bailiff to Isiolo revealed a sorry state of affairs in this connection. It seems clear that the rivers in the Somali leasehold area will never, with the exception of the Uaso Nyiro and the Isiolo stream flow in the dry weather again. Even the Uaso Nyiro had only twenty (cusecs) in it instead of guaranteed 45½ and the Isiolo River is no longer worthy of that name since it fails to struggle a mile or two below the villages. The machinery for controlling the indiscriminate use of water in the Upper reaches of these rivers appear to be inadequate to protect the right of the inhabitants of the lower reaches, and the steady trespass of the Somali stock southwards into the Meru and Nyeri Districts, is partly due to this."

The above comment on the projected 'Alien' Somali settlement did not lead to any changes of plans by the administration. In 1960, after more than twenty years of doubt and indecision, the authorities decided on the area and the plans for the rehabilitation of the Isiolo Native Leasehold Area were compiled and approved, and finance was provided. The scheme was on the point of being implemented in 1961 but both the Ishaq and Herti were still opposed to it. What happened was that the cattle owners were made to move outside the Township in case they possessed more than the number allowed, but in most cases the Somalis would leave the right amount with their families and friends in the boma and move into the leasehold area with the rest of the cattle. In this way, the leasehold area was just another location for the Somalis which did not altogether help to clear them outside the township as the administration would have liked. In fact the situation remained until

1. K.N.A./DC/MDA 3/1/2 Intelligence Reports 1943.
well after Independence; and it was with the emergence of the "Shifta" or freedom fighters movement that the Somalis themselves quitted the township, frightened by the police who were searching for "shifta" bands.

So, like their kin in Nairobi, the 'Alien' Somalis in Isiolo were equally disappointed with the British Somali policy in Kenya Colony, a policy which was marked by indifference and indecision. The main problem was, however, inherent in the fact that there was no proper system of repatriation apparently existing, either in Kenya Police or K.A.R., for discharged soldiers at that time; and these Somalis had for the most part had no desire to return to British or Italian Somaliland. Staying at Isiolo and Nairobi, they were regarded by the British officials as "unattractive, artful, untruthful, semi-sophisticated and lazy and not an asset to the Colony."¹ On the other hand the Somalis were unable to reconcile this attitude with the fact that, on account of their bravery and superior intelligence and the services they had rendered to the British Government, they were entitled to a far better treatment. The P.C. of Isiolo had himself remarked that, "no people with such a record are likely to be submissive or easily managed and the Isiolo Somalis are no exception."²

Besides the problem of settlement and the allocation of stock, the 'Alien' Somalis had another grievance against the British administration in Kenya which had an important

¹ K.N.A./PC/NFD 2/4/1 Clive to Cornwall Isiolo Handing-Over Reports 1932.
² K.N.A./PC/NFD 1/1/10 Annual Reports 1951-54.
bearing in their political development in the Colony. This was the issue of their general position and status in comparison to the other groups in Kenya - mainly the Asians and the Africans. According to the Native Hut and Poll Tax Ordinance of 1910, the Somalis were considered as "natives". The Ordinance read as follows:

"Native means any native of Africa not being of European or Asiatic race or origin, and includes any Swahili or Somali."

As was previously stated, the Somalis proved of great help to the administration as soldiers and policemen and with their intelligence they created a specially good impression among the leading settlers (like Delamare) and businessmen. This attitude resulted in a desire probably promoted by the Somalis themselves, to give certain of them a status above that of the "native" Bantu. As a result of this the Chief Native Commissioner had investigated the possibility of excluding the Somali from the definition of the above Ordinance so as to give him the position of Non-Native. He informed the P.C. Naivasha that:-

"The Sheikh U1 Islam has informed us that according to Arab literature etc. the Somali descendants of Isaak and Darod are of Asiatic origin and are accepted as such by the best Arab Authorities."

Consequently, in 1919 what was known as the Somali Exemption Ordinance No. 17, came into being. Its full

2. V.G. Glenday, "The Origin of Somali with Special Relation to their Political Development in Kenya", 1938.
title was:

"An Ordinance to provide for the exclusion of certain Somalis from the definition of Native as it appears in the Native Hut and Poll Tax Ordinance of 1910 and in certain other Ordinances."

But this Ordinance did not last long, being repealed by the section 22 General Revision Ordinance 4/1927, because of the difficulty of defining the term "certain Somalis". The latter Ordinance was itself finally incorporated in the interpretation and General Clause Ordinance Cap. 2 Revised Laws of Kenya which read as follows:-

"Native shall mean a native of Africa not of European or Asiatic Origin but shall not include a Somali or Swahili."

Although the Somalis were thus given the right to call themselves "non-natives", this had, however, by no means meant that they were given "non-native" status. The Ishaq Somalis had ever since embarked on an incessant campaign to get full "non-native" status and to pay the same tax required from the Indians and the Arabs. In order to achieve that end they had even further severed their connections with the Darod Somalis and adhered to the term "Ishaq Sheriff Community" in regard to themselves, the implication being that they were Arabs and not Somalis.

The history of 'Alien' Somali agitation for the payment of Non-native Poll Tax of Shs. 30 instead of Shs. 20 (the latter being the amount due for Somali Non-native Poll Tax) started towards the end of 1936. The

1. V.G. Glenday, Somali Ordinance, History of the Somali status.
2. Ibid.
cause of this agitation was that as a result of certain readjustments made in taxation, personal fees became cheaper and the Non-native Poll tax required of the Arabs and Somalis was reduced from Shs. 30 to Shs. 20 per annum. This reduction was brought about following on a survey of the number of Somali exemptions and half payments which had been permitted during the previous years. The authorities were of the opinion that the result of the survey had indicated that Shs. 30 was incommensurate with the means of the 'Alien' Somalis and that Shs. 20 was a more equitable rate. Somali Poll Tax was accordingly fixed to Shs. 20 per annum by the Non-native Poll Tax Ordinance No. 50, 1936.

In reaction to this, the Ishaqia consistently refused to pay the Shs. 20 tax on the ground that the Government was attempting to degrade them to the status of "natives". In 1937 they presented a petition to the Secretary of State for the Colonies through the Governor asking that they should be regarded as Asiatics and to have Asiatic privileges and obligations. They maintained that during the last twenty years the community had repeatedly and persistently made representations to the local Imperial Governments to the effect that they were neither foreigners nor aliens, nor natives of Kenya Colony but either by reason of birth or domicile, British subjects of Asiatic origin.¹ But these representations had met with no success.

¹ P.R.O./C.O. 533/4.80/38086/15 Petition: British Ishak Community sg. by Abdi Ahmad, Secretary of British Ishak Community 10-14-1937.
They further argued that they had purchased land and immovable property in Nairobi and elsewhere in the Colony; and that in Nairobi they had lived in the Asiatic Non-Native Township known as Eastleigh, in the permanent buildings belonging to themselves and built on freehold plots with 99 year leases. None of them lived in any location set aside for "natives" in Nairobi such as Pangani or Pumwani. Secondly, they were not subjected to the Law of Native Registration Certificate and were not required to carry the "Kipande"; instead they had passports. Thirdly, they were no more Somalis by reason of their long residence in Aden or other parts of British Somaliland than Indians or Europeans could be called African because they had lived for generations in various parts of Africa. Nevertheless, they argued, that they had all along been conveniently included in the category of Somalis for lack of careful investigation by the authorities concerned, and treated variously as aliens, foreigners and "natives" of Kenya Colony; and all sorts of laws inapplicable to them, had been applied lately on the subject of their nationality contrary to other laws of the Colony.

For all the above reasons, the Ishaq Somalis insisted that they should be given the Asiatic Status and hence they had to pay Shs. 30 in order to be considered on the same footings as the Indians. By February 1938 several Ishaq

1. Note here, the Somalis had previously declared their willingness to stay in the New Native Location when the authorities pressed them to move to Mbagathi. See p. 175 this chapter.
Somalis were already in g^a)l serving a sentence of civil imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of the Non-Native Poll Tax. During the period April 1937 to May 1938, the Ishaqia Community of Isiolo were frequently visited by their kin from Nairobi. Intelligence Reports pointed to the possibility that "these visitors endeavoured to induce the Isiolo Ishaq to pay Shs. 30 as Non-Native Poll Tax instead of Shs. 20."¹

It was not only through frequent visits but also by letters to the press and continued petitions that the Ishaqia both in Isiolo and Nairobi voiced their grievances against the administration. But to their greatest dismay, and despite all these efforts, the Ishaq were told in May 1938 that the Secretary of State for the Colonies had seen no change in the Somali status. This did not stop them from further attempts. Far from it; they made a second attempt in August 1938 by sending a petition to His Majesty the King. The Secretary of State for the Colonies was however unable to advise His Majesty to take any action. As before, the news of the rejection of their petition was reported to have been received with incredulity,² the Ishaq were still continuing to refuse the payment of the required tax.

The point of view of the administration with regard to the objection to granting these Somalis the Asiatic

¹ K.N.A./D0/MLE 3/8/2 Intelligence Reports 1937.
Status, was amply dealt with by Sir Richard Turnbull, the P.C. of Northern Province in a despatch to the Commissioner of Inland Revenue. Turnbull was of the opinion that the Ishaq had engineered this matter in order to gain some shadowy political end. He maintained that the object of this political agitation was three fold. First, to gain special rations and special privileges in prisons. Second, to escape from provisions of the township and Municipal regulations governing Africans; and third, to steal a march on the other Somali sections in East Africa, primarily the Darod Somalis with whom they were continually quarrelling. In short, he was openly against the grant of Asiatic Status to the Ishaq.

In addition, the fulfilment of these political aims by the Government would have meant greater repercussions inside and outside the Colony. Internally, the British officials were worried that giving the Ishaq a position politically superior to the Darod, would have meant the loss of the latter to the Ishaq. The Darod would then forget the enmity with the Ishaq and join them rather than to accept a subordinate position. Externally, apart from effects on the Ishaq communities in Tanganyika, Uganda and Zanzibar, Kittermaster had since 1930 warned off the

1. K.N.A./PC/GRSSA 1/10 R.G. Turnbull to Commissioner of Inland Revenue - Nairobi 19-12-1952. Turnbull had also anticipated that the Ishaq, if granted the Asiatic Status would then ask for an Ishaq member in the Legislative Council to watch over their interests. In the same despatch he decided that the N.F.D. Somalis should pay the N.F.D. Poll Tax as a middle course between the Native and Non-Native approach.

2. Then Governor of British Somaliland Protectorate.
repercussions from the outcome of a decision in favour of Somalis in British Somaliland. He warned that if the Somali was placed on the same footing as the Indian, the whole administration of the British Somaliland Protectorate would become involved. "To give them a status in Kenya so different from what they must have here" he argued, "would tend greatly to embarrass the administration of this Protectorate."  

Taking into consideration all the above mentioned factors, the authorities both in Nairobi and London had definitely decided against a move in favour of the Somalis. The result of this was that Somali feeling was running high on the eve of the War; and the realisation by the Ishaq that they had been let down by the British had materialized in considerable anti-British feeling among them. Not only that but they had also managed to join hands with the other Ishaq Communities in Uganda and Tanganyika, where in the quarterly meeting of the three groups in Nairobi on July 11th 1939, the leaders were asked to swear an oath of allegiance towards each other. But, however, the outbreak of the War produced a newer subject for discussion among the Somalis and there was then little mention of the agitation up to the end of 1939. This was also made possible by the absence of the ringleaders of the anti-tax movement such as Musa Ahmad and Abdi Isa both serving a sentence under the provisions of the Non-Native Poll Tax in the Lamu prison.

The outbreak of the War had, on the other hand, necessitated a change in the tax policy. It was found that in order to obtain an increased contribution towards the cost of war, a new personal tax based on income and with a War surcharge should take the place of the Non-Native Poll Tax.\(^1\) It was then suggested that a tax of Shs. 60 should be charged from all the male Non-Natives but it was realised that the full rate of Shs. 60 could not be paid by the poorer classes of Indians, Arabs or Somalis and the collectors were given wide powers to reduce the rate of tax to a level which they considered the individual was capable of paying. Moreover, the possibility of a flat rate of tax was utterly opposed, lest the Ishaq Community would grasp the opportunity and again claim Asiatic Status.

Thus the Somali tax was raised by ten shillings only, making the amount required by them Shs. 30. Yet as long as this amount was fifteen shillings short of the new sum due from the Indians, the Somalis still resisted it with equal vigour.

In communicating this to Gerald Reece, the D.C. of Isiolo remarked:

"One would have thought that the Ishaq would have welcomed this as a method of saving their faces and avoiding further civil imprisonment, but I was told by Maalim Awaleh Guled (Habr Yunis), (Ahmed Warsama (Habr Awal), and Osman Madar (Habr Awal) that they would insist on paying Shs. 45 in order to be regarded as Asians."\(^2\)

In fact from then onwards, the post-war period was marked by a more vigorous demand by the Somalis for Asiatic

2. K.N.A./PC/NFD 4/7/2 D.C. Isiolo to Gerald Reece 16-1-1940.
Status, by a heightening of their political feelings and an increased movement between the Isiolo and Nairobi in defiance of the Outlying District Ordinance of 1934 which was essentially meant to curb Somali contacts in order to weaken political activities.

Another feature of the post war period, was the attempt by the Ishaq to extend the agitation to the different Departments of the Government. In 1947, the United Somali Association\(^1\) protested to the Acting Labour Commissioner about the position of ten Somalis employed at 401 East African Command Workshop, with regard to their rates of pay. According to information provided by the latter Association, in April 1947, twenty Somalis were engaged in the East African Command Workshops at Shs. 1/50 per hour in the Asiatic rate.\(^2\) In mid April they were informed that from then onwards they would only receive Cts. -/50 per hour. In other words, the Government had decided that the Somalis should get the rate paid to the 'natives'. As a result ten Somalis were reported to have resigned but those who did not were allowed to receive the old rate of 1/50. From then onwards any newly employed Somalis would be asked to pay the new rate of -/50.\(^3\)

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1. Formed by the Amalgamation of the Darod and the Ishaqia Associations. At this stage they were more of pressure groups than nationalist parties.

2. This shows the inconsistency in applying the "native" and "non-native" status towards Somalis. Although Somalis were paying a special rate of "non-native" tax different from the Asians; here they were paid the same rate as the Indians up to April 1947.

At this point, the United Somali Association did not hesitate to wage a protest, and in a letter to the Command Secretariat at Nairobi they expressed their dislike for the idea that for the matter of wages the Somali employees of the Military were grouped as Africans. Further the Secretary of the Association pointed out, "Our country of abode had always been Somaliland which has no geographical link to the territory owned by the local Africans...as such the inclusion of our Community by the Military Authorities with Africans for the matter of wages is entirely unjustified and unreasonable."\(^1\) However, their case did not altogether escape the sympathy of some of those in charge. Colonel C. Tophman and the Brigadier Chief Engineer were of the opinion that, "Somalias should be classed on the same level as Asians in regard to rates of pay."\(^2\) This was because the cost of living had increased remarkably since the War and that the maintenance of families, clothing and food had accordingly increased. But their appeal was naturally dismissed by the Government as it would have given the Somalis the pretext to claim Asiatic status.

After a considerable period of discussion, the Military Authorities managed to get a mid course solution based on the advice of R.G. Turnbull,\(^3\) as authority on Somali affairs. He pointed out to those in charge that:

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1. K.N.A./Lab 9/127 Muhammad Farah to Command Secretary 7-11-1947.
3. R.G. Turnbull was then Liaison Officer, Headquarters, East African Command.
"The Ishaq Somali Community is small but politically conscious to an almost pathological degree. For many years they have been contending that they are not Somalis, but that they are Asians and are entitled to full Asian status both legally and politically. This contention is not accepted by the Government...complaints made by these people are more often than not to be regarded as moves in a political game, they should not, therefore, be taken as their face value...With regard to rates of pay for artisans, there can be no question but that the average Somali is more intelligent and potentially more highly skilled than the average East African Native. It would embarrass the Government if, for any purpose, these people should be classified as Asians; there would however be no political objection to their receiving special rates of pay as Somali tradesmen."¹

Accordingly, the Military Authorities decided in October 1949, to create a special pay segment for Somalis. It was agreed that a monthly rate of Shs. 100 to Shs. 200 should be charged according to skill.² The result was, therefore, that the Somali artisans were placed in a special class between the African and the Asian. This had no doubt brought to an end any hope that the Ishaqias might have contemplated of winning a decision in their favour; and thus, like the struggle for a right of settlement and land ownership in the Colony, the dream of an Asiatic Status came to a disappointing end.

In addition to the above grievances, the Ishaq Somalis were since 1934, the year when the Outlying District Ordinance was enforced, utterly dissatisfied with the attempt of the administration to restrict their movements inside and outside the N.F.D. In a letter to the East

¹ K.N.A./Lab. 9/127 R.G. Turnbull to Deputy Command Secretariat 2-4-1948.
African Standard, of April 4th 1938 M.H. Mattan had, on behalf of the Ishaq Shariff Community, indicated that they were not allowed to go out to the Northern Frontier Province for trading purposes. In another despatch to Gerald Reece, the P.C. of N.F.D., Mattan added:

"Our real brothers and visitors who come to Isiolo are not allowed to stay with us until they obtain an Outlying District Permit which authorises them a few days stay, we very earnestly request Your Honour to allow our own Community to enter Isiolo freely as the other towns of the closed Districts such as Narok, until they go back or else request Your Honour a permit for trading in the Northern Frontier Province which is entirely under Your Honour's free wish."

Mattan went on to list other grievances which included a complaint that in the event of the death of one of the Somali residents, order was always given for the destruction of his buildings, so as not to allow the next of kin to take it over. Also no Somali was allowed to own two shops in different places, even if he was able to carry on with the business of the two shops. Finally, on behalf of the Community, Mattan requested the P.C.,

"to delete the word 'Alien Somali' from the Outlying District Permit which is issued to the residents of Meru, Kipeig and Isiolo because as you know we are pure British subjects and therefore we strongly request your honour to abolish this word altogether and to use "British Isaak"."

Examining the whole episode of the relationship between the so called 'Alien' Somalis and the British Administration in Kenya, one is tempted to arrive at certain

3. Ibid.
conclusions. First, it was obvious that the officials had to put into practice certain restrictive measures in order to limit the constant movement of Somalis - if only for administrative convenience. But the administration's obvious limitation and greatest weakness was its inability to follow a clear line of policy towards solving the impending problems. Far from it, the policy followed was always based on attitudes rather than actual study and investigation of the questions involved. The institution of vague promises and counter promises, as was obvious in the questions of settlement and Asiatic status, and the indecision of the authorities was obviously beyond the endurance of any people, let alone the turbulent, intelligent and politically conscious Ishaqia Somalis. Sir Vincent Glenday had himself admitted that their attempts had failed because the problem had been tackled piecemeal. As far back as 1925 he pointed out to the Government the danger of evading the determination of a clear policy towards these Somalis. He never ceased to suggest that a clear policy as regards the paying of their taxes and, more especially, a clear policy as to the control of their migration and settlement in the Colony should be determined. He had emphatically stated:

"I venture very respectfully to suggest that had those being faced then we should not have found ourselves so deeply implicated by the migration of numberless Somali."

As Glenday himself, further observed, the weakest

2. Ibid.
point of the administration lay in the fact that they were unable to decide the status of the Somali was he a "native" or "non-native"? In some Laws of the Colony he was the one and in the rest he was the other. In fact, the Somali was considered a "native" in the following Ordinances:-

- Stock and Produce Theft Ordinance (Cap. 78)
- Native Registration Ordinance (Cap. 127)
- Native Authority Ordinance (Cap. 129)
- Resident Native Ordinance (Cap. 132)
- Native Foodstuffs Ordinance (Cap. 135)
- Native Arms Ordinance (Cap. 137)
- Employment of Native Ordinance (Cap. 139)
- Game Ordinance (Cap. 161)
- Arms Ordinance (Cap: 8/1925).

And "non-native" in so far as the following were concerned:-

- Native Estate Administration Ordinance (Cap. 15)
- Native Hut and Poll Tax Ordinance (Cap. 5)
- Native Exemption Ordinance (Cap. 128)
- Native Pass Rules (Cap. 138)
- Native Liquor Ordinance (Cap. 36/10)
- Native Tribunal Ordinance (Cap. 39/30)

In criticism of the above Glenday had remarked,

"It is interesting to note that a Somali is a Native under the Native Authority Ordinance but not under its Corollary the Native Tribunal Ordinance."\(^2\)

As a result of this lack of policy which was the natural outcome of the failure to understand their problems; plus the inconsistency between the policies and suggestions of those on the spot and the Government, the long standing  

1. In the introduction the importance of determining the origin of the Somali is dealt with. This chapter illustrates the difficulties which stood in the face of a practical Somali policy in view of the inability of the administration to decide whether to consider the Somali an African or an Asian.

2. Ibid.
enmity between the Darod and the Ishaq was gradually coming to an end. This was obvious when the Ishaqia and Darod Associations were amalgamated into the United Somali Association which began as a pressure group emerging later as an open nationalist party in support of Somali Secession from Kenya and the joining of the Somali Republic - as we shall see in Chapter VI.
Chapter V
The Post-War Social and Economic Position of the N.F.D. Somalis

The position of the local N.F.D. Somalis considered in the first three chapters, and that of the so-called 'Alien' Somalis discussed in the last chapter points to the fact that both had suffered from neglect and maladministration throughout the period from the commencement of the British administration up to the Second World War. This chapter traces the position of the N.F.D. Somali in relation to the projected Five-Year Development plan for the area, which hinted at possibilities of economic and social progress.

From the establishment of the first N.F.D. Government post in 1910 until World War II, the N.F.D. was regarded mainly as a convenient buffer between Abyssinia, the settled areas and the native Reserves of Kenya which neither required nor merited development, except for policing. Previous attempts by officials on the spot to effect any change, as observed in the previous chapters, did not result in any positive measures being introduced.

The reasons given for the lack of development in this predominantly Somali-inhabited area were twofold:- Firstly, the country was considered unprofitable, and it was thought that the population was too small to merit attention while there was so much to be done in the more densely inhabited areas of the Colony. Secondly, it was believed that the desert nature of the territory and the nomadic habits of the people rendered impracticable any
close form of 'native' administration. These reasons proved utterly unconvincing to the Somalis, and indeed it enhanced their claim for cession to join 'Greater Somalia', as will be discussed in the next chapter.

However, it was at this stage, and when a post-war development plan for the Colony was drawn up, that the administration was obliged to reconsider the position of the Somalis and the other pastoral tribes of the frontier area. It was then realised that, "unless adequate attention is given to the N.F.D. it will become a menace - or at least a serious nuisance - to the southern half of Kenya." In addition, the new attitude regarding the position of the N.F.D. Somal resulted from its being no longer the policy of His Majesty's Government in the Colonial Dependencies to measure the help given to native people entirely by the amount of money coming out of their territory. Even British Somaliland, which was formerly neglected in much the same way as the N.F.D. of Kenya, was then receiving generous assistance from the War Office and the Colonial Office. The result was that considerable progress was made in the development of social and other services for the betterment of the Somalis there.

In the N.F.D., although the Somalis for the past thirteen years had by direct taxation contributed about

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
£100,000 to the revenue of the Colony, in return they were given little more than a certain amount of protection and law and order. It had always been the policy to abandon rather than to protect the Somali-inhabited districts, as was the case in 1940. The results of this policy of indifference upon the Somalis were of no small significance. The defective British Somali policy which left the boundary between Ethiopia and Kenya undemarcated, coupled with the inability of the administration to see that the Somalis could water their stock freely in Abyssinian territory under the 1907 treaty, had marked effects on the attitude of the Somalis in the frontier to the existing Colonial administration.

The authors of the Post-War Five-Year Development Plan for the N.F.D., had by then realised, after nearly thirty years of faulty administration that something had to be done to improve the social and economic welfare of the Somalis in this neglected portion of Kenya, if those people were to become an asset to the Colony. The needs of the N.F.D. Somalis, both economic and social, centred around two important aspects. Firstly, as pastoral people the problem of the provision of adequate water-supply, the grazing and marketing of their stock must take precedence over everything. Visitors and experts who reported periodically on the N.F.D., had constantly stressed the fact that owing to the problems of overstocking and soil erosion, the country between the Highlands of Kenya and
Cape Guardafui was being seriously harmed.1 This had inevitably been a factor in the serious problem of the continuous Somali emigration to the southern half of Kenya. To remedy this situation, it was obviously necessary to improve conditions in the desert areas inhabited by the Somalis so that they could live in their own territory. And the provision of adequate water supplies, if brought about, would have provided a sound solution to the Somali question, not only economically but also politically.

Secondly, together with the economic question, the improvement of the social position of the Somalis was a pressing one. It was also necessary for the sake of the development of the Somalis that the questions of health, and above all, education should be reconsidered. In the Post-War Five-Year Plan it was confirmed that until the Second World War there was not a single proper school in the whole of the N.F.D. for the education of Somali children. The result was that, since there were practically no men in the territory who were literate, it was found impossible to make a proper start with any of the activities of the more detailed administration or social development. Moreover, as long as no facilities for education were provided in the N.F.D., the Somalis naturally tended to move southward to the other urban centres of the Colony, and, being unemployable, caused a lot of difficulties to the authorities.

1. This was also the case with some other territories in the Colony. The Kamba country had also suffered from devastation of the soil as a result of over-cultivation and over-grazing. (See History of East Africa, Vol. II, pp. 255-56).
It was obvious, then, that the administration should concentrate on the provision of enough water supplies for Somali stock, the marketing of the stock, and begin educating the Somali children. A start was made with the question of water facilities and the control of pasture, these being the most urgently needed at the time. The difficulty was that the N.F.D. itself holds little water, rainfall is generally low, and the grass and vegetation brought on by the rains soon withers and dies, scorched by a hot sun. Thus the main problem facing the administration was the immensity of the area and the aridity of the country. No doubt, in an area where the great majority of the people were nomads, who spent their lives searching for water and grazing, the protection of pasturing and watering of the stock presented daily work and anxiety.

The position in the N.F.D. until the 1940's was that owing to the scarcity of water supplies, all the country for miles around the few permanent well-systems and rivers was rapidly approaching complete devastation. Although from 1929 onwards A. Beeby-Thompson, a hydraulic engineer with considerable experience in the Sudan, had directed the attention of the administration to the deplorable conditions in the watering system in the N.F.D., pointing out, however, that the prospects of finding a sub-soil water in the N.F.D. were 'distinctly hopeful', the problem of Somali watering did not receive the necessary attention. The situation

remained that in Moyale District, apart from the township water supply and small permanent supplies at a few places such as Gurar, Debel and Bura, all the good wells were north of the Ethiopian border; and although the tribes on the British side had rights, by the treaty of 1907, to use this water supply freely, their doing so usually involved some sort of persecution or "escorting" by Abyssinian soldiers. In Mandera District the only water supply was the Daua River; and at Ell Wak in Wajir District tribes depended almost entirely on the wells of the Wajir Oasis and the Uaso Nyiro. The Isiolo and Garissa Districts depended mainly on the Uaso Nyiro and the Tana River. In the dry season all the animals in the N.F.D. had to be concentrated near the three big rivers and the very few permanent wells, the result being naturally the complete destruction of all the grazing in the area.

In 1943, therefore, the administration was moved to consider the problem of watering and overstocking, a solution for which was long overdue. A joint survey of the N.F.D. was made by D.C. Edwards, Senior Agricultural and Pasture Research Officer of the Kenya Agricultural Department, and by Dr. F. Dixey, a distinguished Geologist and water engineer (who was then Director of Water Development in Northern Rhodesia). The start of the survey was considered by the Provincial Commissioner for the N.F.D. as "the most important event of the year...(it) resulted not only in reports and recommendations of great value but also [in] the realization by many of the more sensible
tribesmen that something must be done by them and without delay to preserve the grazing of their own country."¹

The main impressions, observations and opinions of Mr. Edwards regarding the problem were embodied in his reports and recorded in the main body of the Post-War Five-Year Plan.² The following quotations from the latter would help to expose the problem:

"The outstanding impression gained from a comprehensive view of the better vegetation of the Northern Frontier District is that of localised extremely heavy utilisation coupled with extensive areas which are almost untouched. This state of affairs is, in the main, obviously the result of scarcity of water supplies."

More important still, Mr. Edwards pointed out that,

"There is no evidence to suggest that the region in general is incapable of supporting successfully the human and stock population which it at present contains if suitable distribution could be attained."³

His recommendation for remedying the situation was that together with better distribution of water supplies, it was essential that any improvement in that direction should be based upon a clearly defined plan of grazing control. "The basis of this plan" he maintained, "should be irrigation from the permanent watering centres and complete protection of the areas surrounding them during the rains." This was supposed, after a number of seasons, to improve and promote the recovery of the vegetation. It was also noted that the services of a full time pasture

¹ K.N.A./PC/NFD 1/1/8 Annual Reports 1940-46.
² See the Five-Year Development-Plan for the N.F.D. PC/NFD 2/1/3 Handing-Over Reports 1943-50.
³ Ibid.
officer backed by a research organization were essential for the success of the scheme. Also, a considerable force of native guards particularly in the early stages of the implementation of the project was necessary.

However, as an essential condition to the working of the above scheme, the author was of the opinion that it had to be accompanied by the stabilization of native occupation, by the control of immigration from outside the territory, and the pacification of the northern frontier. Once more the importance of political stability for any social or economic development in the N.F.D. was stressed, in order for results to be obtained. In conclusion, Mr. Edwards emphasized that the problem of restoring the vegetation of the devastated areas, and of preventing further destruction in this very extensive part of East Africa, was one which demanded resolute action; "unless decisive steps can be taken towards its solution, and that without undue delay, a much greater problem of native rehabilitation will undoubtedly arise."

In conjunction with his colleague, Dr. Dixey's Report also made observations and recommendations on the problem of water supply which were of no small significance for the future administration of the Somali in the northern territory of the Colony. He stated:-

"The problem of water supply is intimately bound up with that of grazing. As matters stand, in many places where there is permanent water, there is no grazing within reach, and where there is grazing, there is no water. Numerous new water points, both temporary and permanent, are required
in order to serve the unused or little-used grazing areas, and to rest the exhausted grazing areas around all the permanent water points."

Dr. Dixey's important scheme for the improvement of water supplies consisted essentially in the construction of tanks and boreholes, and indicated generally that permanent supplies of water would have to be obtained by drilling. Also, in view of the great depth of ground water, he suggested the use of pumping plant for raising water.

As was obvious, the observations and the recommendations of both Mr. Edwards and Dr. Dixey were complementary in view of the inter-relation between the problems of water supplies and grazing. The outcome of their research had convinced the officials in charge of Somali affairs that these schemes if implemented would have far-reaching effects on the economic welfare of the Somalis. When the Executive Committee of the Water Resources Authority did not wholeheartedly approve of the expenditure of a large sum of money on what they believed a "worthless desert", Gerald Reece vigorously protested:

"I need scarcely add that if this territory is to be saved, and if East Africa is not to be faced with a serious problem in connection with landless and unemployable Somalis, then the Dixey Scheme must be proceeded with vigorously, promptly and wholeheartedly...it must be attempted not only in order that our people may be protected from starvation in future, but also because the establishment of economic and well organized units on the land in the N.F.D. is the only known form of protection against the south-westwards movement of Somali tribes from countries outside the border."

1. Ibid.
2. K.N.A./PC/NFD 2/1/3 G. Reece to R.G. Turnbull 1948; Reece had since 1934 taken a keen interest in this aspect. He wrote elsewhere that what really mattered to the Somalis was "the stock...the grazing and the water which are the great and the only real consideration...to achieve any measure of administrating this country one must therefore continually bear in mind and consider this...I am prepared to confess that it has taken me a number of years to learn it." (PC/GRSSA 8/5/1 Pub. 24/2/17 Extract from G. Reece's Handing-Over Report 1934).
In 1950, however, the Dixey Scheme was approved in principle and a grant of £485,000 was made from the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund for the development of water supply in the N.F.D. But, unfortunately, when the Scheme was initially carried out, it was found that the main suggestion embodied in the Dixey recommendations in 1943 which pointed to the provision of the necessary water from boreholes, was unworkable. The experience and high cost of successive drilling had subsequently shown that reliance chiefly on surface water was more economical.\(^1\)

The first work which was undertaken was a pilot scheme of drilling bore-holes in the Samburu District between 1951-52. It was this experimental work which brought about the decision to rely mostly, in future, on surface works, and shallow bores and wells, and also to carry on work by direct labour. The scheme was originally due to close down in 1954;\(^2\) and as this meant that there was then less than three years left, work was carried on in four Districts at once - Isiolo, Gariisa, Wajir and Moyale.

In Wajir it was reported that great interest was shown by the tribes in the digging of water pans. Four new pans were completed, and two others cleared out and enlarged.\(^3\) In 1953, J.M. Elliot, the D.C. of Wajir also reported that the two most successful operations carried out

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2. Later on the time was extended. Work was carried on one district at a time.

by the Dixey scheme engineers had resulted in the
construction of the Afyat Dam and in the completion of a
permanent well system at Giriftu. But a year later
Elliot himself reported that although the Dixey Scheme was
a success in constructing dams, pans and tanks in the
Degodia territory, the result of well-digging in the
initial stages were most disappointing. A large number of
test wells were sunk in various parts of the Wajir District
but had to be abandoned - with the exception of the Giriftu
and El-Beu group of wells. Wells dug on the Uaso Nyiro
near Habaswein were reported by the Dixey Scheme Resident
Engineer to have been a failure. In addition, owing to
the shortage of staff and material little progress had been
made in Moyale, Mandera and Garissa Districts by the time
the scheme had terminated. The N.F.D. Somalis, far from
being impressed by the overall result of the scheme,
pointed out that apart from one or two wells, the British
administration had failed equally in the Post-War period
to provide a satisfactory solution to watering problems in
the N.F.D. 2

As far as grazing problems were concerned the results
seemed better, although the Somalis themselves deny that
there was any benefit gained from this. In 1949, a three-

2. This conclusion was arrived at as a result of my
questionnaire in the Garissa District. Also the
disappointment of the N.F.D. Somalis with the outcome
of the Dixey scheme was obvious later on, when A.A.Lord,
the areas' Representative at the Legislative Council,
raised the question of the needs in the area for more
water for animals, for boreholes, dams and the expansion
of the Uaso Nyiro. (See Legco, Debates Vol. LXXXVII,
11-5 to 21-7-61).
year grazing control and water development scheme for each District was approved by the African Land Utilization and Settlement Board, and considerable progress was reported. There was then a force of fifteen grazing guards in each district. In addition to assisting the tribal police in the prevention of trespass by members of one tribe on the grazing preserves of another, it was their duty to assist the elders to keep the stock away from the pastures in the vicinity of the permanent waters after the rain. Substantial progress was made towards a clearer definition of tribal grazing areas and the more systematic control of the use of dry and wet season pastures. In Mandera District an order was made under the Special District Ordinance excluding the Gurreh from grazing in the Murille country.¹

However, as was expected, the introduction of grazing control measures was utterly opposed by the 'Alien' Somalis in Isiolo. They maintained that since the Government had settled them in the Leasehold Area against their wishes, it was wrong that they should be made to pay fees and brand their stock as control measures. The principal reason behind the objection to the proposal was that by branding stock the Government would call a halt to the illegal cattle-trading between the Leasehold Area, the Samburu and Mukogodo Reserves, and the Meru Reserve. But despite the 'Alien' Somalis' protest, the proposals put forward by Mr. Edwards and Dr. Dixey concerning the regulation of grazing seemed at least for a while to be workable.

Yet, the provision of water supplies (even though only to a very limited extent) and the implementation of grazing rules were not the only factors in the lives of the essentially pastoral Somalis in the N.F.D. One of the many grievances put forward by the Somalis in the pre-war period had been on the issue of stock marketing; and the authors of the Post-War Development Plan for the area did not leave the question untouched.

As far back as 1931 efforts were being made to regulate trade between the N.F.D. Somalis and the Coast Province. Trading posts were established at Mkowe (on the mainland opposite Lamu Island). The P.C. of the Coast Province, Mr. Montgomery, endeavoured to persuade the Lamu and Somali traders to send their stock by sea to Zanzibar and thereby capture the meat market of that town from the station operating at Kismayu. The firm of Messrs. Cowasjee Dinshaw & Brothers was induced to run a ship, the S.S. "Ayamonte", on approximately fortnightly trips up and down the Coast. Unfortunately, the arrangement failed owing to the fact that a consignment of Lamu cattle arriving at Zanzibar was infected with rinderpest. Moreover, the P.C. of the N.F.D., Mr. Stone, was of the opinion that no attempt should be made to divert the Somali trade into any particular channels. He submitted that cattle from the N.F.D. should be allowed to proceed to Mombasa overland.

1. The Italians had two ships plying between Kismayu and Zanzibar, and the meat supplies of Zanzibar were almost wholly in their hands.
from Garissa, Bura, etc. and should not be forced to go
to Lamu for export elsewhere. But it was found that
Somali stock arriving at Mombasa market by the land route
was in the poorest possible condition and thus could not
compete with the local supply. Naturally, local
authorities in Mombasa complained that the influx of Somali
cattle from the N.F.D. had completely spoilt their local
market.

In addition to the inability of the administration to
provide the right outlet for Somali cattle, it was
occasionally admitted that the Somalis, together with other
pastoral tribes in the area, had never been granted the
benefits of a veterinary service. Their stock population
had not been estimated with any approximate degree of
accuracy. Much illness, including major diseases such as
rinderpest and pleuro-pneumonia existed, "uncontrolled or
controlled only to a limited extent by district administrative
officers, who cannot be expected to possess the necessary
technical knowledge or to have available the time required
for this purpose." As a result Somali cattle had always
suffered from diseases and there was a complete embargo on
export outside the Province. In addition to the problem
of routes and disease, Somali trade had also suffered from
the opposition from European farmers in the Rumuruti and
Laikipia areas, who themselves ranched native cattle and

1. P.R.O./C.O. 533/105 17009 Report of Tour and
Recommendations of the Chief Veterinary Officer to
N.F.D.
2. Ibid.
who feared competition.1 For these factors, Somali cattle which was then estimated at approximately 800,000 head and which could have been an item of no small importance in the economy of the Colony, had suffered severely.

In the Post-War Five-Year Plan, the problem of Somali stock marketing was given a fair treatment, because of the continuous criticism by experts that the N.F.D. was not in fact a 'worthless desert' and that it could easily have justified its existence by the export of cattle. It was realized, though very late, that not only the greater export of cattle would increase the purchasing power of the people and raise the standard of living in the N.F.D., but that there was a need for meat in Kenya. It was definitely ascertained that in the Central Province meat was needed, to ensure a better and more balanced diet for the "natives"; "A good deal of the money which is paid by the Kikuyu and others for our meat should be returned to them in exchange for their grain which is required here to make a better balanced diet for the pastoral nomads of this territory."2

In an attempt to pursue a better marketing policy a stock Inspector had been posted permanently to the N.F.D., and he had made a good start in the Garissa District with inoculations for rinderpest. A senior Research Officer had also started a Veterinary Survey of the whole territory and consideration was given to the marketing of sheep and

2. Ibid.
goats. Camels were not, however, considered economic beasts in the area.

But, on the other hand, the proposition put forward by Mr. Daubrey, Director of Veterinary Services, and adhered to by almost all the D.C's in the Province, which amounted to the maintenance after the War of the machinery of the livestock Control for the marketing of cattle, was far from being welcomed by the Somalis. They had certain grievances against these organizations during the War because they found that prices paid locally by the Livestock Control were based upon those obtaining at the places where the animals were required. This was unfair because in wartime the demand for mutton necessitated the bringing in of sheep from remote places like Mandera, and the tribesmen who brought them had to bear not only their proportion of the overhead expenses of the Supply Board, but also a proportion of the cost of the heavy losses and freight charges involved in transporting the animals over such long distances.

Once more the Somalis were burdened, to their detriment, with the formation of two marketing organizations in the post-war period, the Kenya Meat Commission (K.M.C.), and later the African Livestock Marketing Organization (A.L.M.O.), as government-controlled organizations for the marketing of livestock. These two, naturally under pressure from European stock-owning interests, did their best to hinder the movement of Somali cattle down country, doubtless by raising once more the bogey of disease.

Moreover, it had taken the Meat Commission in some cases a number of years to reach certain districts. In Mandera, for example, the D.C., P.M. Gordon reported that the Commission did not appear in the District for two years. But even more important, the Somalis had bitterly complained that the Meat Commission bought sheep and goats for an average of about 20% below the price paid by the Kikuyu and Meru butchers for some stock bought from them. The 'Alien' Somalis in Isiolo had suffered even more, and were becoming poorer because stock trade had then passed into the hands of the Meat Commission and the local tribesmen. The situation was made even worse by the declaration of the Emergency, which excluded the Kikuyu traders from coming to the District and hence helped the Meat Commission to tighten its grip on the Somalis.

The attitude of the Somalis to the A.L.M.O. which was based in Isiolo, was by no means better than that shown towards the K.M.C., especially by the 'Alien' Somalis who conducted an endless agitation to permit the sale of stock by private arrangements, or at 'open' auctions. This point was later stressed by Somali representatives from the N.F.D. in the Kenya Legislative Council. Ahmad Farah stated in his first speech to the House on 6 May 1959,

"I want the Government to realise that the economy and the livelihood of the people are greatly dependent on the sale of their stock and to pay for their taxes etc., but anything that can be done to make the restrictions on movement as small

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as possible will be greatly appreciated."¹

Once more on the 10th May, Ahmad Farah repeated and declared the attitude of the N.F.D. Somalis regarding A.L.M.O.:

"The African Livestock Marketing Organization (A.L.M.O.) is unpopular as a Government monopoly. It is appreciated that veterinary control of stock movement is necessary to prevent disease spreading, but why cannot people take their stock from the Northern Province to the Central Province to sell there under veterinary supervision to any buyer that offers? Why is the A.L.M.O. the middlemen? Why must Garissa sellers sell to the Kenya Meat Commission middle-man and not to direct purchasers?"²

The same questions were asked and doubts cast by his colleague Ali Aden Lord of the North Province East Constituency in July 1961. Lord emphatically stressed that the people in the N.F.D. had lost confidence in A.L.M.O. and wanted free marketing and public auction for their stock.³ But despite the repeated protests by Somali members, the Government's policy and attitude to the control of stock marketing through K.M.C. and A.L.M.O. remained unchanged. They strictly believed that the A.L.M.O. buying had given, and would continue to give, the sellers a better price than they would otherwise get.⁴

As a result, the Somalis remained completely dissatisfied with the Government's solution to the marketing problem, to almost the same degree as they were with the solutions to the problems of water supply and grazing.

². Ibid. Vol. LXXXV, 12th April to 22nd June 1960.
Apart from the economic problems, the post-war period had also necessitated solutions to the problems of the social and general welfare of the Somalis in the N.F.D. In the field of medical and health conditions, the N.F.D. had equally suffered from years of neglect. This was due to the mistaken notion that because the inhabitants of the area lived in a desert they suffered hardly any diseases. The Post-War Development Plan for the N.F.D. considered the health aspect of the Province. It revealed that as a result of a tour made by Dr. Paterson, then Director of Medical Services, in 1941, and by subsequent research that there was in fact a great deal of disease, and what had happened before was simply that, owing to the lack of proper medical facilities the people did not come into Government stations for treatment.¹ Dr. Heisch, the Medical Officer in charge began a survey in 1942 and found a high incidence of disease especially on the Uaso Nyiro, Isiolo and Garissa.² At Moyale there was dysentry, typhoid, and relapsing fever. There was also typhoid fever in the Mandera District. In short, it was also realized - as with the other problems, too late - that the Somalis were by no means healthy, and that they were in desperate need of much more medical attention.

A new hospital was then built in Wajir and small hospitals built of permanent materials were erected at Marsabit and Mandera. A semi-permanent building was

started at Moyale and another at Garissa. In Isiolo, a temporary structure of sunbaked brick with an attached roof had been built. Realizing how little medical help the Somalis had acquired, the authors of the Post-War Plan had recommended the enlarging of the existing medical facilities in the Province and the setting up of more in the various districts of the N.F.D. It was also recommended by all the D.C's, with the approval of the Medical Officer in charge, that sixteen dispensaries should be erected in the area. But to add to the existing problems, the absence of literate tribesmen in the N.F.D. because of the lack of schools made the recruitment of hospital workers from local people an impossibility. The difficulty arising out of this was obvious, in that other Africans would probably find it very difficult to work in a remote, undeveloped and climatically discouraging territory.

But despite the recommendations embodied in the Post-War Five-Year Plan, the problem of finding a solution to the health question in the N.F.D. remained during the following years. This was obvious from the continual complaints put forward by the N.F.D. representatives in the Legislative Council Debates. Ahmad Farah had in 1959 directed the attention of the Minister of Health to the question of medical needs for the people of the Northern Province. He stated that they had only one medical officer in the whole Province which consisted of six Districts and was inhabited by a population of approximately 500,000.
He remarked, "With this in mind it is not surprising to see here how we were forgotten people." He cited a living example of a regrettable tragedy which had happened to a loyal Somali chief of the Garissa District. While the latter was travelling on official duty, he was suddenly involved in a motoring accident about thirty miles from the Garissa Township. As there was no medical officer in Garissa, the patient had to be taken from the town all the way to Thika where he died. Hence, the member asked for an increase in the number of doctors, transport, and dispensaries, and for the provision of mobile medical units in the most remote areas. The same plea was repeated in speeches by Ahmad Farah himself, by Ali Aden Lord in 1961 and by Abd ar-Rashid Khalif in 1962 but according to Somali informants on the spot nothing positive resulted.

So far as the questions of water supply, grazing, stock marketing and provision of medical facilities for the N.F.D. Somalis were concerned, the Somalis were very disappointed with the outcome of the Post-War Development plan. Moreover, the promise by the Governor of the Colony, Sir Philip Mitchell, that the war efforts of the tribesmen of the N.F.D. were to be followed by substantial works - including the expenditure of £500,000 on water supplies, extensive improvement in medical and educational services and trade facilities, proved a dream that never came true.

It was in the field of education that Somalis'..."
disappointment was greatest and, too, much more justifiable. The position of the education of Somali children in the 1920's previously discussed in the third chapter of the thesis, did not see any positive change up to the period of the war. With the exception of the B.C.M.S. Mission school at Marsabit which started in 1931 with three European supervisors, followed by the start of the Isiolo Veterinary Training Centre which was meant to enable the pupils to take statistics of ghee (Somali butter) production in 1933,1 no systematic Government education was given in the whole area, before the 1940's.

It was not until 1942 that Gerald Reece, the Officer-in-Charge of the N.F.D., was able to report that consideration was being given to the question of education.2 Mr. Lacey, the then Director of Education, visited Isiolo and Wajir and made certain recommendations which were not adopted for some time later. Then Mr. Chaundy (the education officer from Kapengura) also visited Isiolo, Wajir and Garissa. As a result of his recommendations it was then decided to start experimental schools. Temporary bandas were put up at Balambala - on the Tana River - for the Riverine Bantu tribes, and at Isiolo for the 'Alien' Somalis children. At the Isiolo one, however, no progress was possible because the Education Department could not find a teacher. The Somalis were not educated and the Africans and Arabs were presumably reluctant to work in the

1. This was closed in 1934 and the children were returned to their homes.
N.F.D. and among the arrogant Somalis. In addition to this, the Standing Finance Committee was always reluctant to spend on Somali education. They rejected the proposal by the former Director of Education for the building of a school at Wajir at the cost of £4,000. And when a change was made and the money was voted for the erection of the school in 1945, Public Works Department were unable to build it owing to other commitments.¹

The authors of the Five-Year Development Plan for the N.F.D. had, as with other aspects of the advancement of the Somali, realized after nearly thirty-five years of administration that something should be done for Somali children, as some definite progress in connection with education was long overdue. It was also realized that little progress could be made with local self-government until there were a certain number of local tribesmen who were literate. There was a desperate need for clerks for office work, tax clerks for the Chiefs, literate interpreters, and foremen for a variety of tasks.² The three Local Native Councils that had been started had to be managed by outsiders owing to the lack of educated local tribesmen.

Since exactly the same education problem existed in British Somaliland, and where the authorities there had already made a good start under the guidance of an officer from the Kenya Education Department, it was proposed to

¹ K.N.A./PC/NFD 1/1/8 Annual Reports 1940-46.
adopt the same scheme as that of Somaliland in the N.F.D.

Brigadier Fisher, the Military Governor of British Somaliland, wrote in his Annual Report for 1943:

"The result of this neglect of education, is now most embarrassing to the administration, which must depend, even in the subordinate ranks of its service, on assistance imported very expensively from outside. We are impeded at every turn by the lack of trained and educated Somalis in all branches of Government activity."

The neglect of education in British Somaliland could, to some extent, be justified by the continuous opposition from the religious sheikhs there; but the case of the N.F.D. was completely different. Both the Somalis and the officials in charge of affairs in the N.F.D. had increasingly expressed a deep desire for learning among the inhabitants in the area, and were anxious that the Somalis should obtain the benefits of education like the rest of the Colony.

The proposals embodied in the Five-Year Plan for the N.F.D. maintained that it was preferable to concentrate, to begin with, on Wajir, being a suitable place as a principal education centre in the N.F.D. Also, judging by the experience in Somaliland, it was suggested that attention should be given to boys who were likely subsequently to become civil servants or to follow some other vocation for which there was an urgent need in the territory, thus enabling them to learn the work of policemen, clerks, veterinary, medical, or agricultural assistants, teachers, artisans, and mechanics etc. On the other hand, it was

1. Quoted in PC/NFD 2/1/8 Handing-Over Reports 1940-50.
2. See Chapter III where the education problem was discussed in the pre-war period.
planned to have schools for boys at all other district headquarters where they would be taught the elements of suitable introductory subjects with a veterinary or agricultural bias. Moreover, the tendency of the Somalis to move to the urban centres in the colony was realized, and provision was made for their education in the available schools in the towns where they usually settled.

But the future educational plan for the N.F.D. did not in fact copy the British Somaliland example which in the main centred round the subsidizing of the Quranic schools maintained by the Sheikhs and Mallims. In the N.F.D., these schools, which constituted the only form of education for the Somalis up to the World War II, were criticised because they provided only a very scanty education for the boys. The pupils were merely taught verses from the Quran, which they had to learn by heart without even knowing what they actually meant. This situation was, however a natural outcome of the fact that the N.F.D., as previously noted, was for a long time a closed district. Consequently, no contact was made between the Somalis and their religious sheikhs in the N.F.D. on one side, and those in bigger centres in the Somalilands or the Moslem coast of Kenya on the other. At least contact between the Somalis and the Ribat al-Riyadhah

at Lamu on the Kenya Coast could have improved the educational prospects of the Somali boys, and could have prepared them for a more sound system of education in the future. In view of all these factors, the type of Islamic education provided by the bush schools in the N.F.D. was generally very poor. For this reason it was decided - since it was impossible to supervise these schools, and since it would probably be unwise for political reasons to interfere with them - to leave them alone.

In 1946, a government African Primary School was started in Isiolo for fifty sons of the Ishaq and Herti Somalis who lived there. It was put under the able headmastership of Shariff Khullatein, who was on secondment from the Education Department of Zanzibar. Rapid progress was reported in the school by the end of the year and several boys were studying English together with religious instruction. In 1947 another school for Somalis was started in Garissa to accommodate forty boys, and work was started on building a school at Wajir which was completed in October of the same year. The school which had thirty boys, ten of whom were resident, was also supervised by Shariff Khullatein. His emphasis on religious observance and good manners amongst the pupils had been realised and praised by the Somalis.

The building of Government schools continued in the subsequent years. In Garba Tulla a Local Native Council School banda was completed in 1948. In 1949, the Wajir Primary School had both Standards I and II, and so did the

Garissa school. In Isiolo the Government Primary School was supervised by Muhammad Salim, assisted by Abdallah Aden and Muhammad Mahmoud. But the problem of obtaining teachers for these schools had always been difficult. This was clear when Shariff Khullatein had to go on leave in 1950, and no similar teacher was found to replace him at the Wajir school; and "rather than risk lowering the prestige of the school which has been very high with the tribesmen since its inception in 1948 therefore it was decided to close the school for the remaining two terms." The difficulty was that Somali teachers proved unreliable, and, as school in the Coast Province had been expanding rapidly, it had been very difficult to obtain good Arab teachers from that Province. The question of obtaining teachers from other parts proved equally difficult because the Somalis generally despised Kikuyu teachers and presumably other African tribes too. In addition it seemed that the Ministry of Education was reluctant to pay monthly wages to teachers. For all these reasons the problem of finding good teachers for the newly started Somali schools was a serious one.

Besides the above limitations, the officials on the spot in the N.F.D. were anxious to introduce different educational measures in the area which by no means helped to satisfy the hungry needs of the Somalis. In his Handing-Over report to R.G. Turnbull, the D.C. O'Hagen maintained that what the Somalis needed at the beginning stage was not

1. K.N.A./PC/NFD 1/1/9 Annual Reports 1947-50.'
a large number of schools but a few, efficiently equipped ones. This was, in a practical outlook, except that the reason he gave for it was unacceptable as far as the Somalis were concerned. He maintained, "It is most important that we should not educate the tribespeople in such a way that they will no longer be able to live their traditional lives in the hard conditions maintaining in this Province." This he further explained would tempt the educated Somalis to live in towns where there would be no work for them and would no longer be accustomed to the traditional diet.

On the other hand, O'Hagen was of the opinion that whilst the policy elsewhere in the Province was only to educate above Standard IV that number of boys who could be absorbed into useful employment with the Government or trade, the policy in the Leasehold area should be to educate all the children of 'Alien' Somalis so that they could seek useful employment down country and not lead a life of sitting in the coffee shops of Isiolo. But this policy of favouritism towards the turbulent 'Alien'Somali seemed short-lived. R.G. Turnbull reported in 1952 that the Government African School at Isiolo had to be closed for an indefinite period, the reason being that the Master Muhammad Salim had been found to have "most unorthodox extra-mural diversions." He was accordingly dismissed.

While the N.F.D. Somalis both local and 'Alien' were struggling to win a place in the educational possibilities

2. Ibid.
offered in the Colony, their kin in the other urban centres, especially Nairobi, reverted to self-help in order to gain some sort of education. In 1954, the Eastleigh Somalis started a school to provide the basic needs of education. Celebrating its first anniversary in September 1955, R.G. Turnbull, then chief Secretary, maintained that though the school did not conform to Government standards, it was solving a grave social problem. He further described it as the first example of self-help and real application to the task in hand that he had seen. Turnbull paid special tribute to Dr. Yusuf Ali Eraj, a Nairobi medical practitioner and a Pakistani, who had played an instrumental part in the establishment of the school by collecting the money needed.

By the close of the fifties, the Somali call for more education was achieving new dimensions, with the growing wave of nationalism in the Somali world. With the concept of "Greater Somalia in their minds, and having seen and heard that education in Somalia was much more advanced, the Somalis did not hesitate to press for more education. Moreover, in Kenya itself, the Somalis were already aware that the Bantu tribes were so much ahead of them in this field that they had for a long time been able to group themselves into formidable political parties, where they were able to make their voices and grievances heard.

2. Later in 1957 the Government the Naiyasha Primary School for the Nairobi Somalis with Standard V and VI. It was later developed into a secondary school.
Unfortunately for the Somalis, the battle for education, as in the issues of economy and other fields of social welfare, did not lead to any positive results. Shariff Khullatein, with all his experience in Somali education in the N.F.D., and as a nominated member of the Legislative Council for the area, in 1958 pleaded for the Somali case. He told the House, "We started schools there about twelve years ago but, since then, we had only one intermediate school."\(^1\) Ahmad Farah who succeeded him as a member, repeated the same appeal in 1959. A year later their points of view were enhanced by Mr. Coutts, the Acting Governor, who visited the N.F.D. after eighteen years. Coutts remarked that

"No longer interested merely in a subsistence way of life, the people of Kenya's Northern Province were looking to the future and taking an interest in the problem of education."\(^2\)

In 1961, Ali Aden Lord, the first elected member for the Council to represent the N.F.D. once more echoed his colleague's demand for education, and stated,

"We badly need more primary schools in places like El-Wak, Ramu, Lashanis, Bura, Tarbaj, Habaswein, Ijara, Sakha, Merti and all trading centres, and my people are ready to help in this work... We need also intermediate schools in every district and of course we must have one secondary school in the whole Province. We also need a trade school and adult education."\(^3\)

The situation was by no means better in the following year

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as was obvious from Abd ar-Rashid Khalif's words to the Council,

"The people of the N.F.D. have been left behind in the dark ages and they are living in ignorance and disease till today. That is because of the isolation and neglect of the Government of Kenya and the Ministry of Education in the past..."

Thus, it was obvious that on the eve of Independence the N.F.D. Somalis were far from satisfied about their economic and social position in the Colony. Although the Post-War Five-Year Development Plan was full of criticism for past policies and also full of suggestions for remedying the situation, the central Government in Nairobi seemed very slow to carry out any plans for the immediate development of the area. The result was that the call for "Greater Somalia" which originated in Mogadishu had found fertile ground among the dissatisfied Somalis of the N.F.D. and not only had the wave of Nationalism which swept through the Colony after the War left its marks upon the Somalis, but also the existing state of affairs, resulting from lack of political, economic and social cohesion with the rest of the country, helped to enrich the call for secession from Kenya and the joining of the newly formed Somali Republic in the 1960's.

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Chapter VI

Islam, Politics, and the Rise of Nationalism among the Kenya Somalis

As related in the previous chapter the Kenya Somalis were, until the post-war period, suffering from neglect and ignorance. Owing to this, the "Greater Somalia" concept which flourished in Mogadishu found a ready appeal among them. However, besides the social and economic grievances, the Kenya Somali nationalism had its deeper routes dating back to the start of the British administration in Jubaland in the late nineteenth century. In order to understand fully the origin of the movement it is important to trace the factors which helped the development of the concept of "Greater Somalia".

In almost all the Moslem countries in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, politics, Islam and the rise of nationalism were hardly separable; as was the case with the movements of Uthman Dan Fodio among the Fulani's in West Africa and that of Muhammad Ahmed al-Mahdi in the Sudan. Among the Somalis, Islam had also provided a unifying force for the otherwise scattered population and resulted in the movement of Sayyid Muhammad Abdille Hasan in British Somaliland between 1898-1920. The latter, while unlike the Sudanese Mahdi, did not live to establish a theocratic state. He, however, laid the foundation for the concept of a united Somali nation which was then adopted by the Somali Youth League in the post-war period.
The sense of unity among the Somalis which emerged in the movement of Sayyid Muhammad Abdille Hasan, was inherent in the teaching of the distinguished class of men of God known among the Somalis as Wadada or sheikhs. These religious sheikhs play an important role in teaching the young the Quran and elements of faith, solemnizing marriage and ruling according to the Shariah, in matrimonial disputes and inheritance, assessing damages for injury, and generally directing the religious life of the community. More important still, these religious leaders were significant in their opposition to two of the basic elements of Somali life - tribalism and blood money. In short, those sheikhs had constantly preached the message of brotherhood and hence initiated the concept of Islam as a unifying force among the Somalis. This is the most important factor in the teachings of the brotherhoods or "Tariqas" (the way) which expresses the Sufi or mystical view of the Muslim faith. These orders contributed to the national unity through Islam among the Somalis because they cut across tribal and sectional rivalries in a society where centralized political units were lacking. Prominent among these tariqas were the Qadiriya, the oldest order in Islam; and the Ahmadiya, which was an offshoot of the

Salihya and the Dandarawiya.

The Somali national hero, Muhammad Abdille Hasan was himself a disciple of Sayyid Muhammad Salih, the founder of the Salihya tariqa in Mecca. The former was also responsible for the spread of the teaching of the Salihya tariqa among the Somalis since 1895. His movement, as S. Touval observed, was essentially religious and its ultimate objection was the imposition of the Salihya precepts and way of life upon the population. But to attain that objection, political means were necessary. The political struggle inevitably had nationalist ingredients, and the ultimate religious objection of the movement had certain nationalistic aims as their corollaries.¹ The mixed aims of the movement were obvious when besides the religious motivation the Sayyid himself on several occasions spoke of grievances that the Somalis knew best, "the drought, the rinderpest, the British military, who were exporting animals for the war against the Mahdi - the holy man of the Sudan to whom God had given victory."²

In his quest to spread his religious and nationalistic message, Muhammad Abdille Hasan did not hesitate to invite all the Somalis in the different territories - in Ethiopia, Italian Somaliland and Kenya (then East Africa Protectorate) to join his movement. His emissaries and letters to the

Jubaland Somalis resulted in a number of movements to enhance his position. Ashgar, the Herti "Mullah" had started an unsuccessful movement among the Jubaland Somalis in 1905. An even more serious attempt to enhance the "Mullah's" position was manifested in the revolt by Abd ar-Rahman Mursal, an Aulihan Ogaden Somali in 1916 which resulted in the sack of Serenli. But as it was stated previously, although these movements were serious attempts to strengthen the "Mullah's" movement in the North, the East African Somalis of Jubaland were then too widely divided, and too much immersed in inter-tribal rivalries to join in a mass and united movement against the British administration. This lack of unity among the Somalis at the end of the 1920's had therefore prevented the growth of a national movement which could have strengthened the case of the "Mullah" and changed the face of Somali history.

However, it was the aftermath of the Mursal revolt and the general situation in Jubaland in the post-War period (which was distinguished with continued movements exhibiting distinct Islamic flavour in the Province) that resulted in considerable concern by the British administrative officials as to the position of the Moslem Somalis in that corner of the Protectorate. The Jubaland Province was then a corner where the British administration had suspected the existence of a potential Islamic movement

1. See Chapter I pp. 54-56.
2. See Chapter I for more on Ashgar and Mursal's movements.
which might have aimed at the shaking of British rule. This was obvious when in September 20th 1917, a circular letter was addressed to the Provincial Commissioners all over the Protectorate setting forth the theories held on the subject of the influence of Muhammadanism, and the Pan-African ideal of the "Ethiopian Church", on the future of the administration of the Protectorate.

The circular warned that the participation of "natives" of British East Africa in the campaign in German East Africa, whether as soldiers or as porters, had given rise to possible feelings of dissatisfaction with British rule. The service of these men had enabled them to enlarge their ideas by contact with "natives" of other African dependencies. Certain of the men who returned would have become acquainted with the Pan-African ideal of the Ethiopian Church, with native politics from Abyssinia and for the first time in the history of the Protectorate, "a conception may have arisen in the native mind of the possibilities of a black Africa." The circular then directed the attention to an important aspect:-

"It is in connection with a native conception of the idea "Africa for the African" that any conjunction of Islamic propaganda is to be regarded as a real danger. Islam would provide a cementing factor, and the consequent fanaticism would enormously increase both the military and political difficulty in dealing with such a movement. Converts are notoriously fanatical...In Eastern Africa Islam has tended to consider itself a political as much as a spiritual force, and there has recently been noticeable a tendency on the part of the natives to call themselves members of the Mohammedan nation."  

2. Ibid.
Looking through the replies of the P.C's of all the Provinces concerned with the above circular, it was noticeable that in most of them the administration was content that at that time there was no ground for supposing that a conception of the possibilities of a black Africa had arisen yet in the minds of the "natives" of the protectorate. However, an exception was made of "certain more advanced Somalis" who together with Swahilis had attempted the conversion of some "natives" in the township areas. Moreover it was observed that Muhammadan influence was even more marked with the Somalis in Jubaland than was the case with the Arab Coast. In Jubaland the Somalis were without exception Moslems and Islam plays an important part in the lives of the people. For this reason it was supposed that:

"the idea of "Africa for the African" perhaps exists there in a subdued form, and it seems possible that the idea would find active expression were it not for the fact that so many different schools of Mohammedanism are practised that there exists high inter-tribal feeling based on religious differences. It is, however, possible that the effect of the opportunities of contact with other African natives afforded by the war may produce a fusion of the sects and introduce a more orthodox form of religion."2

Thus, Islam and the Somalis were seen as a real danger to the British position in the Protectorate. It was feared that the fusion of the concept of Pan-Africanism with the possible unity preached by the Moslem Somalis would result in another Mahdism in East Africa. The Somalis were then

2. Ibid.
subjected to a gradual policy of alienation from the rest of the country. First from the Galla, among whom, "indications of some kind of a religious movement..." was already observed. Also the policies which followed, like the advocacy of the Galla rights against those of the Somalis and the marking of the Galla Somali line, were all steps in that direction.

In addition to the above, the Colonial Office was in favour of closer watch over the Somalis by means of travelling Commissioners moving with and amongst them. This was found essential, because otherwise new ideas might have taken shape in the minds of both the Moslem and pagan tribes in their vicinity without the Government being aware of it in good time. The Governor concluded his appeal to the Colonial Office by saying,

"Owing to the natives unprecedented intercourse with outside influences, it is particularly important that we should be familiar with what is going on in the native areas."

It was also against this anticipated political movement among the Somalis that a closer watch was observed over the Somalis in Jubaland and later the N.F.D. where both were subjected to military administration in contrast to the rest of the country.

For the same reason, religious sheikhs among the Somalis of the N.F.D. were greatly watched and restricted. Members of the Salihya Tariqa in places like Garba Tulla

1. Ibid.
were for some time the target for the British officials. The latter Tariqa was started in 1921 in Garba Tulla under the prominent Salih Sharif Ali. Because of his movement between Somalia, Mecca and other centres where the Tariqa flourished, he left his mission under the protection of a certain Sheikh Ahmad Aden who was actively proselytising among the Borens and Sakuye. The P.C. of the Northern Frontier District had once complained that, "they preach anti-government doctrines and smuggle ivory over to the Italians." The result was that they were threatened with the movement of their centre from Garba Tulla to Wajir or otherwise their mission would be closed.

In other parts of the N.F.D. similar orders were also carefully watched. In Moyale, Sheikh Yusuf, a prominent Degodia, a religious figure with a large following and a tariqa was several times subjected to police action. Sheikh Ali Abdi Nur - a Gurreh of the Darawa section - who moved from the Lorian Swamp to Mandera and who emphatically opposed the issue of registration certificates and the payment of poll tax by Somalis, was the target for the administrative officials. The man, as the D.C. reported, "visits Mecca regularly and is considered to be an extremely holy and influential person, was a pupil and is regarded as the successor of the famous Sheikh Ali Nairobi."

At the same time the N.F.D. administration got hold of Sheikh Haji Abd ar-Rahman, the son of the late "Mad Mullah" of Somaliland and gave him the post of Registrar of

1. K.N.A./PG/NFD 2/1/1 Handing-Over Reports 1927.
Mohammadan Marriages and Divorces at Wajir, in order that his activities and movements might be checked. He was reported to be of "doubtful character and bad antecedents." On the decision by the Government to introduce poll tax in the N.F.D., he was reported to have produced,

"a cousin, a follower of the late Mullah, and sent him into the bush to preach and pray for the failure of the Government to introduce poll tax." The latter was ordered to leave the District and was escorted out of it. Being offended at his cousin's treatment, Haji Abd ar-Rahman Mursal declared his intention of going on a pilgrimage to Mecca obviously with the intention of not returning. The D.C., feeling relieved, commented, "he had removed himself from the Province and his loss need not be regretted." In addition to the accusations by British officials against these religious sheikh, they were later occasionally accused of spreading Italian propaganda in the District on the eve of the War and were thus gradually discharged.

However, despite the continuous fear by the British administrators in Kenya that the Somalis - through the Islamic media - were going to wreck their position after achieving a sort of unity by the fusion of the concepts of Muhammadanism and Pan-Africanism, this did not prove to be true when the Somalis contemplated a political movement. When the spell of Somali nationalism spread to the Kenya Somalis, it was by no means directly through the religious

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
sheikhs or the tariqas,¹ nor did it at any stage contemplate a fusion with the other movements among the Bantu tribes except on very rare occasions. Despite this, the British officials had occasionally suspected a holy war 'Jihad' preached by the leaders of the existing political parties. In fact the post-war Somali nationalism although based on the concept of "Greater Somalia" which had its roots in the movement of Muhammad Abdille Hasan forty-six years ago, was essentially a political movement. Religious sheiks and members of tariqas had whole-heartedly embraced the concept of "Greater Somalia" which had flourished in the post-war period but their support did not amount to a call for a holy war. The movement was more of a Pan-Somali than Pan-Islamic or Pan African nature.

Kenya Somali nationalism was mainly an offshoot of the concept of "Greater Somalia" embraced by the Somali Club (later Somali Youth League) which was formed on the 15th of May 1943 in Mogadishu. Its professed aim was to unite all Somalis living in the Horn of Africa, to increase educational facilities, to help the sick and poor and to foster the Muhammadan religion.² The idea behind the

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1. I.M. Lewis had even stated that, "politicians and officials are not, as a whole, in sympathy with the tariqa movements which they view with clanship as a dividing force in Somali Society", see I.M. Lewis, "Modern Political Movements in Somaliland", II, Africa, Vol. XXVIII, 1958, p. 36.

2. K.N.A./PO/NFD 1/1/9 1947 Annual Report; The S.Y.L. was greatly encouraged by Ernest Bevin's plea for a 'Greater Somalia', a concept which he advocated after the war (See Drysdale, The Somali Dispute, pp. 63, 67, 68, 69).
formation of the club, although appearing at first to be primarily philanthropic, had gradually grown to be essentially political and nationalistic. Moreover, with the projected aim of the unity of all Somalis dispersed in Kenya, Ethiopia and French Somaliland, Somali nationalism in the post-war period had obviously constituted a challenge to the territorial integrity of both Kenya and Ethiopia. The danger lies, as I.M. Lewis explained, in the difference of the understanding of the meaning of nationalism to the Somalis on one hand and the other African states on the other. He saw the conflict inherent in:-

"the Somali concept of culturally defined national identity, an identity which is part of their traditional heritage, and the rather different concept of a territorially defined nationality, embracing different tribal and language groups, current in most of the other ex-colonies of Africa... In Kenya and Ethiopia the Somali nationalists appear as secessionists engaged in a separatist struggle with far reaching, and ultimately menacing, implications for the stability of other African states."

This conflict had ever since resulted in the continuous troubles between the Kenya Somalis and the central Government in Nairobi on one side and between the Kenya Government and the Somali Republic on the other. In Kenya the idea of a united Somali nation advocated by the Somali

1. I.M. Lewis, The Modern History of Somaliland, Preface; The conflict is also inherent as A.A. Mazrui explained, in the paradoxical wedding together of the concepts of identity and human dignity at the centre of African nationalistic thought. He stated:-

"The relationship is perhaps something of a paradox. After all, when a man seeks his own identity he is seeking those qualities which distinguish him from other men. But when he is concerned with asserting his human dignity, he is referring to those qualities which he shares with other men."

Youth League (S.Y.L.), had already by the beginning of 1947 had the greatest appeal to the Somalis in the N.F.D.; and branches of the League were started in Wajir, Mandera, Isiolo, Garissa, Moyale and Marsabit. At first it was supposed that only the town folk joined, they held weekly meetings and drill parades and confined their activities ostensibly to philanthropic works. But later on in the year, membership increased rapidly amongst the tribesmen and government employees. At this juncture, the British officials who were constantly worried about the prospect of a potential Islamic movement among the Somalis, feared that the League might turn into a fanatical Muslim Society; "Its leaders claimed divine aspirations and preached that a 'jihad' or holy war was nigh, which would rid the country of all the infidels." But, their fears dwindled when they realized that members of Christian and pagan African tribes such as the Amhara, Borji, and Boran were enrolled as members.

The progress of the S.Y.L. was so rapid that the D.C. Garissa reported that one hospital dresser from Wajir had managed successfully to recruit, "nearly all the tribal police, Somali Kenya police and other African government servants were soon favourite recruits." By May the S.Y.L. increased its membership in Garissa township alone to about 340 members and funds stood at Shs. 3700 and by the end of

2. Ibid.
the year it spread to the rest of the country. This increased activity was largely due to the fact that Garissa lies on the main road from Mogadishu to Nairobi thus receiving much of the League's propaganda through the weekly mail service. Moreover, the Garissa leaders proved skilful enough not to attempt any direct attack on the Government headmen at that stage, but in a skilful way they persuaded the tribesmen that in future all matters relating to Somalis such as tribal disputes, affrays, civil debts and bride price should come under the jurisdiction of the chosen leaders of the League instead of the headmen.

By the end of December 1947, it was reported that the leaders were so confident in the popularity of the move and they declared that "their aims were not only philanthropic but were chiefly directed towards fitting their members to take over the Government of their country at an early date."¹

This political aspect of the League was further stressed by the visit of the president of the Wajir branch in September of the same year to Mogadishu where it was agreed that the Kenya branches should be financially independent but should remain under the control of Mogadishu as regards policy.²

The leaders of the S.Y.L. had further found a ready ground for the spread of their political aims by the mounting discontent among the Somalis owing to the lack of progress in their economic and social welfare. They complained more vigorously against fixed barriers between

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2. Ibid.
the different tribes of the same race, the limited amount of wells and water-pans at their disposal; and the bad state of grazing. The P.C. remarked,

"The Somali Youth League has made political capital out of this by propaganda to the effect that as soon as it comes into power there will be no intertribal boundaries but all Somalis will live together happily and wander at will throughout the Horn of Africa."

He added,

"at the present propaganda of this kind is calculated to do the greatest possible harm to the Somali nation."

As the political aspirations of the League were gradually being expressed, the number of recruits throughout the Province was growing rapidly. In 1947 a meeting house was built in Mandera where membership was said to be particularly strong among the Murulle wealthy and sophisticated classes and the Eil-Wak Gurreh. A school was started by the branch and was reported to be "the most successful enterprise taken". Instruction was mainly in literacy and English and it was admitted that some of the younger members had genuinely benefitted from it. As with the case of other branches, the British officials were apprehensive of the League's activities; its membership especially increased in the District. The D.C. remarked:

"The danger, however, if the Mandera branch should at any time become actively hostile to Government can be appreciated when it is reflected that not only are numerous headmen members but also many of the Kenya Police who are local tribesmen and a few of the tribal police have joined. Many of the most influential and more sophisticated members of the community have joined its ranks."

1. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
In Isiolo, too, where the more politically conscious 'Alien' Somalis resided, the League's activities did not escape attention. The League had exerted a real influence in the District with branches at Merti, Muddu Gashi and Sericho. At these centres, the leaders were actively involved in converting the Boran to its doctrines, and not without some measure of success. They seemed to have "captured the interest of a number of the more sophisticated Boran shopkeepers and headmen with the result that the Boran rank and file in the Sericho area began to join the League."¹ And when the Government declared the League a political society, the Ishaq and Herti of the District were given the choice of either resigning their posts as Government headmen, or severing their allegiance to the League; both preferred the former. So, with the rising tide of national consciousness in the Province, the Ishaq, Herti, together with the Ogaden to the east, led by the powerful Muhammad Zubeir section, joined hands and enhanced the position of the S.Y.L.

By the beginning of 1948, it became clear to the Government that the League was definitely aiming at something more than just philanthropy. Complaints by officials that all over the N.F.D., the activities of the S.Y.L. had "threatened to bring the normal administration of the Somali areas to a standstill,"² became so frequent that the P.C. pointed out that, "an attitude of neutrality, aiming in the

direction of hostility rather than friendliness, should be shown towards the club," and added that he did not wish officers to attend the club meetings, with the exception of police officers who might be instructed to attend on duty. The P.C. stressed the importance of gaining more information about the League and advised the D.C's that "they could have, within reason, as much money as they required for intelligence purposes."¹

By the middle of May 1948 it was obvious to the administration that the aims of the League, though still described by League officials as being charitable and social, had become violently political and that was accepted both by the members of the League and those tribesmen who remained aloof from it. No doubt the League's activities had presented a real threat to the administration of the Somali areas and to the maintenance therein of the authority of the Government. The situation was reported to be particularly serious in Garissa District "where normal administrative work had been brought virtually to a standstill."²

After a final warning to the Garissa branch about their interference in the administration of the District had been ignored, the branch was declared by the governor-in-council to be an unlawful society and the announcement of the proscription was made at Garissa by the P.C. on June 6th of the same year. An inquiry under the provisions of the Special Districts Ordinance was held into the

activities of its leaders and under the provision of section 16 of the Ordinance, orders were given for their exile at Laiktung in Turkana District. Another group of Somali youngsters referred to by the P.C. as "corner-boy-type", who announced that they would continue to adhere to the League, were subsequently sentenced to eighteen months hard labour.¹

In spite of the action taken at Garissa, the League continued to wield a powerful influence in Isiolo, Wajir and Mandera but by the 20th of July all these branches were declared by order of the Governor-in-Council to be unlawful societies. The leaders of the League were accused as being men of no standing in the tribes' "but were opportunists, who under the cloak of running a social and cultural organisation, were lining their own pockets and acquiring positions of power."²

The accusations against the convicted leaders and the League as a whole were based on the following points - firstly, that the League had intended the setting up of unlawful 'courts'. In these 'courts' fines were to be levied for offences such as referring a dispute to a government headman; or acting as a guide to the tribal police. Secondly, unlawful drilling organized by the members of the League who had had service in the Kenya police or K.A.R. Thirdly, the spread of a legend that members of the League were immune from arrest and the Government had no power over the League.

¹. Ibid.
². Ibid.
Fourthly, encouragement by the members to defy the Government headmen and tribal elders. Finally, it was alleged that the means used by the League leaders to achieve their ends included promises by the S.Y.L. that no taxes would be paid or tribal or grazing control measures imposed under the projected League's administration. The League was also supposed to have assured the tribesmen that the British Government was shortly to leave the whole of the N.F.D. and that it would be replaced by S.Y.L. Government. The latter would be strong both in itself and as a result of an alliance which had been made between it Ethiopia and Russia. The P.C.'s remark to the last point is worth noting. He stated, "In this connection it is of interest to note that the salute of the club was the clenched fist - but of the right hand."¹ This proves how the attitude of the British officials had changed towards explaining the ideological aspect of the League and what was once thought to be a fanatical Muslim society had then changed into a potential communist party.

Besides the above listed accusations, the conscription of the S.Y.L. in the N.F.D. was also due to the fact that in 1948 representatives of the S.Y.L., actively operating in the N.F.D., participated at a Pan-Somali conference held in Mogadishu composed from delegates drawn from every Somali occupied zone in the Horn of Africa.² The conference

1. Ibid.
submitted a joint Memorandum to the Four-Power Commission of Investigation on Ex-Italian Somaliland with this request:—

"...We do not pretend that we can stand on our own feet at the moment, but ask the United Nations Trusteeship Council to decide questions relating to the formation, boundaries, and administration of a Somali Trust Territory to be known as Somalia; this territory to consist of all areas at present predominantly populated by Somalis."

As a result of this and the other factors related, the S.Y.L. was proscribed by the British administration in Kenya from 1948 till 1960. The twelve years which intervened did not witness a vigorous campaign to relieve the League's detainees but that was mainly due to the prevailing events. Recent writers on Somali Nationalism tended to explain the apparent failure of the attempts to revive the S.Y.L. to the fact that "the organization did not have deep roots, and... that the arrested leaders had attempted to use the organization for personal ends." But looking through the documents dealing with administration at the time, it is difficult to support Touval's statement without criticism.

It was obvious that since the proscription of the League, a very tight watch was exercised over the League's activities, and despite this, underground work was carried on. In 1951, the P.C. still reported that the S.Y.L. "is the only properly organized Somali nationalist movement at present in existence." and the apparent inactivity of

the League was later explained to be the result of the general disruption of communications with Somalia since the handing over to Italian trusteeship. This made it increasingly difficult for League sympathizers in the N.F.D. townships to keep in touch with the heads of the movement in Mogadishu. But despite this, attempts by faithful members were not altogether absent. In Garissa District, a shop was opened under the League's patronage at Biscaya. The shop served as "a useful centre for the dissemination of the League's propaganda - inevitably anti-British - and as a popular meeting place for the League's fathers."¹ In 1957 the P.C. noted serious attempts to revive the S.Y.L. in Garissa, Isiolo, Mandera and Wajir. In Garissa, a secret movement called 'Horset' believed to be the 'action' group of the S.Y.L. was discovered by the end of the year and was closely watched.² At Isiolo, youngsters were refused permission to start a club to be called the Somali Young Association, on the grounds that it might be a revival of the S.Y.L. At Mandera, reports of the formation of what was called the Darod Greater Somalia Association by Haji Muhammad Husein in 1958 also point to the incessant efforts to revive the League's activities. Hence, the fact that the S.Y.L. did not openly survive the 1948 proscription was therefore the result of continued Government suppression rather than the desire by the Somalis to give up its ideals altogether.

¹. Ibid.
At this juncture it is worth examining the dimensions of Somali nationalism embodied in the ideals of the S.Y.L. in respect of internal and external factors: the external factor being the incidence of the Arab attack on the Jews of Palestine in 1948; and the internal being the Mau Mau movement in the other half of the Colony. Both were interesting factors in connection with the position of Somalis between the Arab and the African Worlds.

In a secret minute on the activities of the Somali Youth League in the Northern Province of Kenya, R.G. Turnbull remarked:-

"It is noteworthy that already there has been a talk locally of disturbances in this territory being organized to coincide with a start of a big attack on the Jews by the Arabs in Palestine. The idea at the back of this (which has obviously been inspired from outside) is clearly not only that in both places there would be simultaneously a Jihad or holy war but that the attention of the British Government and our resources would, at such a time be diverted from the Somalilands."1

This was, however, by no means an indication that the N.F.D. Somalis had any direct connection with Arab nationalism either in Kenya or abroad. Far from it, relations between the Arabs and Somalis seemed to be cool if not hostile. In the N.F.D., the D.C. Wajir had in 1948 reported strained relations between the Arabs and the Somalis of the district, and observed that hostility to the Arabs was "one of the Somali Youth League creed."2 The state of relations between both reached its peak at the

close of the Idul Fitri celebrations of that year when a prominent Arab, Umar ba-Sabra, was badly assaulted by four Muhammad Zubeir youths. Nor was Arab-Somali relations any better in Ex-Italian Somaliland itself. This was clear from an article on the "Future of Somaliland" where Abdallah Isa, Secretary General of the S.Y.L., Mogadishu, adequately replied to an article on "African Spotlight is on Somaliland" in which the latter stated, "Xenophobia is present here in the universal hatred by the Somalis of the Arab Community." The Secretary General's reply to this allegation ran as follows:—

"Ever since the Italian occupation of Somalia the Arabs here meddled in politics and associated their interests with that of the Italian rulers. They have by their persecutions and active aid to the Italians made themselves very unpopular." 2

This perhaps explains why, although both the Somalis and Arabs in Kenya had similar secessionist claims, no direct joint action between the two people could be traced.

As far as the attitude of the Kenya Somalis to the African nationalism was concerned, the picture was somewhat different. Although Somali nationalists had never looked forward to the day when they would be regarded as part of Kenya, they were, however, not without sympathy with the Kikuyu, the Embu or the Meru rebels. R.G. Turnbull and almost all of N.F.D. administrators continuously stressed the point that it was unlikely that the Somalis would act positively for any movement down-country. Turnbull once argued:—

2. *Ibid*.
"With regard to the question of co-operation the S.Y.L. and K.A.U. or similar bodies it is not thought that the League could take any effective part in disturbances or strikes in the Colony; the League looks to Somalia for its instructions and any instructions created in the N.F.D. would be timed to coincide with trouble in Somalia rather than in Kenya." 2

Despite this, evidence of Somali sympathy and interest in the Mau Mau movement was not altogether lacking. This sympathy was a natural outcome of the Somalis respect for power, dignity and fighting for freedom. In fact Mau Mau had filled the Somali with respect for the Kikuyu whereas before a feeling of contempt, racial and also inherent in the clash between pastoral and agricultural groups, was obvious.

During the Emergency, the P.C. Northern Frontier reported that keen interest was taken particularly by Somalis in the use of the Kikuyus of violent methods in attempts to gain their political ends, "a dangerous seed had been sown in the Somali mind." 3 In 1954 the P.C. reported that the Mau Mau activities in the Meru District resulted in Isiolo being brought into the anti Mau Mau campaign. Fugitive Mau Mau groups entered various parts  

1. The foundation of Kenya African Union (1944) marked the emergence of the African in the full stage of Kenya's politics. It came as a result of the nomination of E.W. Mathu, the son of a Kikuyu medicine, and a graduate of Balliol College, Oxford, as the first nominated African in the Legislative Council. On his nomination there was no countryside political organization. Some leading Kikuyu Nationalists (among whom was Harry Thuku) felt that he could not act without some supporting body; therefore, the Kenya African Study Union later K.A.U. was formed. (see, History of East Africa, Vol. II, p. 33; and Harry Thuku: An Autobiography, p. 65.


of the Isiolo Leasehold area mixing with the 'Alien' Somali population and "rumours of smuggling fire-arms by N.F.D. tribes,"\(^1\) were prevalent. In 1955 the P.C. again stated,

"The Mau Mau movement which probably embraced most of Isiolo, Meru (and which was followed with sympathetic interest by many Somalis) gradually lost its power and attraction"...

but he went on to state,

"In July information was received that an alien Somali of the Herti section, Mohammad Farah Shaur, was harbouring a Mau Mau gang. Unfortunately the gang was not contacted, but sufficient evidence was obtained to bring a case against Mohamed Farah Shaur in court: he was sentenced to a years imprisonment.\(^2\)

In another source he was also fined Shs. 1000.\(^3\)

It is important to note here that Muhammad Farah was himself the former Vice-president of the S.Y.L. in the District and therefore his act was of no small importance considering the attitude of the S.Y.L. to Kenya African nationalism.

In the later years, at least a few of the Somalis were prepared to show more than just sympathy to the Kenya African cause. Some of the members of the Somali National Association actually joined KAU as members.\(^4\) This was obvious from the photograph (Plate XVIII) in *Harry Thuku: An Autobiography*. In the plate the pictures of two Somalis were included among the KAU group. One Muhammad Hasan (the

\(^1\) *Ibid.*

\(^2\) K.N.A./PC/NFD 1/1/11 Annual Reports 1955.

\(^3\) K.N.A./PC/NFD 2/4/3 Isiolo Handing-Over Reports 1941-56.

\(^4\) The Somali National Association was formed by the merging of the Ishaqia Association and the United Somali Association.
last one on the first row from the right), and the other -  
Ahmad Warsama (third from the right on the top row). The 
Somali National Association had further joined the Kalenjin 
Political Alliance Masai United front, Kenya African People's 
Party, Coast African Political Union to form the Kenya 
African Democratic Union in 1960 in opposition to KANU. But perhaps it could be argued that the Somali National 
Association - which was the result of joining together two 
of the organisations outside the N.F.D., the Ishaqia 
Association and the United Somali Association, must not be 
taken to represent the N.F.D. Somalis attitude. It is 
worth noting here that although the Somalis all over Kenya supported the secessionist movement and hence the idea of 
Greater Somalia; the degree of adhesion to it differed greatly between the local N.F.D. Somalis and the so-called 
'Alien' Somalis especially those in urban centres. It was 
due to this that members of the latter group, though still few in number, had occasionally joined the Kenya African 
parties.

However, besides the issue of the connection between 
Somali nationalism and that of the Arabs or Africans, the 
period since the proscription of the Somali Youth League in 1948 to 1960 had gradually witnessed the clarification and 
the growth of the concept of 'Greater Somalia'. Despite the co-operation of some of the 'Alien' Somali characters with

1. I am grateful for Mr. Muhammad Yusuf, the President of the Somali Independent Union, for the information and the names.

the Kenya parties, in the N.F.D., political leaders were continuously anxious to maintain a different identity for the N.F.D. until such time that it would join with Greater Somalia. When the issue of the representation of the N.F.D. in the Legislative Council was at stake, the Somali chiefs and elders of all areas in the N.F.D. declined to show any interest in the proposition that the N.F.D. should share with the Rift Valley Province a single elected member of the Legislative Council. They preferred to continue to be represented through official channels until such a time as they would be able to elect one or more members for the Province as a separate entity.¹

To their detriment, when the British administration had agreed to allow the N.F.D. a representative, it was an Arab and not a Somali that was nominated. He was Shariff Kullatein, a former headmaster in the District. His nomination was naturally followed by a vigorous Somali campaign to oust him which was backed by public opinion in Somalia. The issue of the Somali News of February 1962 had particularly criticized this as one of the weaknesses of the British administration in the N.F.D. The Paper commented,

"In 1958 an Arab was nominated by the Colonialists to represent the N.F.D., in the Kenya Legislative Council (Legco), of all Somalis in the Province and in Kenya an Arab to represent the interests of Somalis? what a shame! The people of the N.F.D. were never satisfied with the nomination which was against their choice."²

However, it was not until 1959 their efforts materialized

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in the choice of a Somali, Ahmad Farah, to represent them at the Council.

Yet with the approach of the 1960's, Kenya Somali nationalism witnessed a new stimulus which tended to dissociate it completely from any interests within the Colony and connect directly with Somalia. This was the unification and the independence of the former British Somaliland Protectorate and Italian Somaliland forming the Somali Republic. The Kenya Somalis then felt that the time had arrived when they in their turn should secede and join the two Somalilands as a step for the achievement of the Greater Somalia aspiration. Consequently, former grievances, economic and social, were brought to the forefront to strengthen the case for secession.

The reappearance of nationalist sentiments among the Somalis nomads prompted a number of petitions to the British authorities, requesting that the Somali-inhabited territory be detached from Kenya and be incorporated in the Somali Republic. The promise by the Governor of the Colony, Sir Patrick Rennison, that

"the present Kenya Government could have no part in ceding the Somali Districts of this Province to Somalia, but would be prepared to assist in the achievement of this object once independence in Kenya was a reality," was interpreted to mean that Union with Somalia was not just around the corner as the Somalis evidently thought.

It was at this stage that requests were received from the young Somalis to start a political party. This resulted

1. Touval, p. 150.
in the formation of the Northern Province Peoples' Progressive Party (NPPPP) in Wajir as its headquarters. It was an essentially secessionist party which had its branches all over the N.F.D. in Wajir, Mandera, Garissa, Isiolo and Moyale.

In August 1960, leaders of a delegation of twelve Somalis arrived in Nairobi in the hope of holding an interview with the Governor. They stated that their visit was mainly for the purpose of requesting that the Province be allowed to break away and join the Somali republic before February 1961 when elections were due to be held throughout the Colony under the Lancaster House Constitution. The delegates once more repeated the grievances of the restriction of movement out of the N.F.D. They complained that "it was easier for a Sudanese or an Ethiopian to visit Nairobi than for a Kenyan who has the misfortune to live in the Northern Province."  

Other grievances against the administration included the division of people in communal bases and the interference in politics. The delegates also complained that "there is not enough appreciation of Islamic religious laws."  

Speaking on the N.F.D. question at the Nairobi Airport, on his way to Rome, the Somali Prime Minister, Abd ar-Rashid Ali Sharmarke, called for a referendum among


2. Ibid.; It is important to note in this respect that the N.F.D. did not get a qadhi before 1945 when Sheikh Abdellah bin Ali Al-Muawia was appointed for the Province. Before, the Moslem tribes of the frontier had to depend on local religious sheikhs to deal with religious affairs.
the Somalis of Kenya's Northern Province to decide their future. He said that, "Somalia did not want to annex any territory but it was hoped that a Greater Somalia would be formed by 'peaceful and legal means'."¹

In consequence of the movements of the NPPPP and the backing of the leaders of the Somali Republic for the secessionist issue, the N.F.D. Somalis registration for forthcoming elections was never overwhelming and at the end of the year under pressure from Isiolo and Wajir leaders the boycott of registration in all districts was complete.² The leaders managed to impress upon all the Somalis that if they registered it would be an open admission that the Somali districts of the frontier were contented to remain under the independent African Kenya. The situation was such that the P.G. was certain that, "A referendum on the issue taken in 1960 would have produced a solid 'yes' (to secession)."³ By then, a considerable amount of what was termed as "Kenyaphobia" was prevailing among the Somalis.

Apart from the NPPPP, other political parties were formed among the northern tribes. The Northern Frontier Democratic Party (NFDP) whose headquarters was at Garissa was the first party to function there under the leadership of Yusuf Haji Abdi - a trader in Garissa township. It was followed by the NPPPP who opened a branch by November 1960 led by Nur Abdille (Aulihan), Khalif Nur (Aulihan), and Digo Maalim Stambul (Abd Wak).⁴ At the beginning the NFDP

¹. The Times, 14-11-1960.
⁴. The son of the prominent chief Sultan Stambul Abdi.
was opposed to the NPPPP's call for immediate secession and aimed at a reasonable period under British administration, during which time the people might be taught how to govern themselves and stressed that the improvement of educational and medical services and water resources should come first. Their support was mainly from the Abdallah section of the Ogaden but they were unable to attract the Orma and the Riverine tribes. The latter preferred to form their own party named the Northern Province Peoples National Union (NPPNU). The Abd Wak and Aulihan also asked for a separate party to be registered as the Northern Frontier Somali Association; but before its registration the leaders decided to join hands with the NPPPP in Isiolo.

Together with the increase in political feeling and political parties, the year 1961 witnesses a vigorous activity on the side of Somali nationalists owing to the release of Jomo Kenyatta. This indicated the imminence of a 'Black Government' in Kenya, and thus the desire by the Somalis to secede was enhanced. The Kenyatta release had also facilitated solidarity among the different Somali groups and parties. The Daily Nation announced that the Somali National Association had decided to throw in its weight with the radical NPPPP in supporting the secession of the Northern Frontier Province. Mr. M.A. Guled of the Association telegraphed the Governor urging secession and assuring that any decision reached at the Constitutional talks was not necessarily considered binding on the Somalis
Support for the N.F.D. cause did not only come from the urban Somalis but also from the Orma who had previously opposed the joining of the Isiolo Boran in the NPPPP. The Orma had then decided to "align themselves with the Somalis and come out openly against any form of liaison with KANU." At a general meeting in October all office bearers, who were Riverines and very pro-KANU," were voted out of office by Orma elements led by the chairman of the Executive Committee, himself an Orma."

Besides the release of Kenyatta, the Somalis were further moved by an important statement by the Governor of the Colony, Sir Patrick Renison, at the opening of the Constitutional talks at the Government House, Nairobi, on which he gave a number of broad hints on the likely development needed before full independence could be achieved. Referring to the future of the Northern Province and the growing movement among the Somalis living there for secession he promised that the representatives of the Northern Frontier people would be given an opportunity during the current talks to make their views known.

Following the Governor's speech, Ali Aden Lord had on behalf of the Somalis declared their point of view:

"With the removal of British rule the inhabitants of the Northern Province feared, at least, neglect, bad administration and disregard of their rights as citizens under an African Government, and worst, oppression, servitude, brutality, civil war and other evils which had become manifest in the Congo.

3. Ibid.
If the rights of the Kenya Somalis were ignored, they were prepared to take their case to the United Nations."

Meanwhile, delegates to the Kenya Constitutional Conference had on September 11th agreed, under the pressure of the rising tide of the demand for secession, to allow a delegation from the Northern Frontier Province to enter the conference on the 12th so that their views could be heard. The delegates arrived but the attitude of the African leaders to the whole issue had by no means made their case easier. The KADU leader, Ronald Ngala announced that it was his view:-

"that the northern territories were an integral part of Kenya and demand for secession, as such should not be listened to."

Leaving the Constitutional Conference on the same day, the Somalis looked more furious and vigorous in their demand to secede due to being disappointed by the Kenya African's attitude. The twenty-one angry N.F.D. chiefs and political leaders representatives of the NPPPP, NFDP, NPPNU and NPUA left the talks swearing that if the Province were not allowed to join the United Somali Republic, "there would be bloodshed and another Congo in Kenya." These views were shared by many of the Borana and the Rendille from the rest of the NFP.

1. The Times, 5-9-1961. His views were later supported by A.H. Farah in a letter to the Daily Nation on 11-9-1961.
2. Kenyatta, who was on a visit to Ethiopia had emphasized Ngala's view and declared that "the Northern Frontier Province is part of Kenya." and so he discussed it only in the general context of Kenya. (The Times, 20-11-1961).
3. The Times put the number as twenty-six.
It is worth noting here that the word 'Somali' came to include a wider section of the pastoral tribes in the north than it usually did before the wave of national feeling spread in the area. The Rendille had so much identified themselves with the Somalis that they not only adhered to the secession issue but they were instrumental in the events which followed - as would be clear in the next chapter.

The Borana, on the other hand, were divided in their attitude to secession. The Muslim Borana supported it while the others preferred staying in Kenya. The Muslim view represented by chief Guyo Jahairi maintained that, "if we do not get secession there will be bloodshed." Out of the twenty-four delegates to the Government House talks, two Boranas said that they did not want to secede from Kenya, Chief Gufu Sono, from Moyale, and Hasan Shera of the Northern Province People's Party wanted a Provincial autonomy. And only one Borana Chief Golgalo Godana of the Northern Province United Association wanted to remain in Kenya without any conditions.

While the N.F.D. Somalis were struggling at home to see their case won, the Somali Republic had in its turn conducted unofficial talks in London and the representative of the Republic had once more warned that:

"A serious situation is likely to arise among the Kenya Somalis unless the Province is allowed to opt on its future before Kenya wins self-Government."  

The talks had also touched upon the possibility of Somalia entering the projected East African Federation; but it was reported that Somali circles in London insisted that this would have to be dependent on a "satisfactory solution" for the Kenya Somalis.\(^1\)

However, with the rising tide of national feelings among the Kenya Somalis, the British press was active collecting information and reflecting the point of view of the Somalis in the N.F.D. The N.F.D. authorities announced the arrival in Wajir of a reporter from The Observer who came to meet the political leaders and was met by a number of demonstrations by the tribes obviously emphasizing their stand against any decision which would leave them in Kenya. Also back in London The Times had, after consistently following the development of National feeling among the N.F.D. Somalis, ventured to offer its opinion in the question which amounted to this:-

"In the long run, the only hope of peace though it would be accompanied by much grumbling, lies in the cession to Somalia of those areas now inhabited by Somalis, and the retention of the rest of the N.F.D. within Kenya. Whatever solution is adopted it will have to be adopted soon. The Somalis are getting restive."\(^2\)

Despite the Somalis demand for the secession of the whole of the N.F.D., and the partial secession indicated by The Times, and other N.F.D. non-Somali tribes, as the events went on there was no sign of giving up neither by the British nor the Kenya African leaders, and the issue of

1. Ibid.
Somali nationalism was held in the balance. Things were certainly more complicated by the announcement made by the Somali Prime Minister, Dr. Abd ar-Rashid Ali Sharmarke, that three agreements were already concluded with Russia. One of these was cultural, one dealt with trade and the third with economic co-operation, notably involving a long term agricultural and industrial credit of 40 m. roubles (approx. £14,500,000). This certainly had done some damage to the cause of Somali nationalism.¹

It is against this and the strong tide of anti-Somali feeling among the Kenya African parties that the next crucial steps in the development of Somali Nationalism in Kenya had to be viewed.

1. The growing Russian interest in Somali affairs was feared by Kenyans who considered that Somalia was being looked at by Russia as a stepping-stone to Eastern Africa. (see L.D. Doob, Resolving Conflict in Africa, (New Haven and London, 1970), p. 78 Appraisal by a Kenyan: John J. Okumu).

Later, leading Pan-Africanists were increasingly apprehensive of the Somali-Russian manoeuvres and warned against the danger of intrusion in African affairs. Kwame Nkrumah expressed his fears on the prevailing tendency of African States to seek a third party intervention. Probably having the issue of Somali-Russian manoeuvres in his mind he stated, in an article written in 1962:

"I have said that I understand the difficulties of these (African) States which are drawing away from the African Community back into that of Europe...Imperialism does not change its nature; it only changes its front..." (V.B. Thompson, Africa and Unity: The Evolution of Pan-Africanism, (London, 1969), p. 189 quoting Kwame Nkrumah, 'Africa fights the Common Market', Labour Monthly, London, September 1962, p. 421).
Chapter VII

The Failure to Attain Unity

Somali secessionist aims, as advanced in the last chapter, assumed more vigour in the spring of 1962. This was because of the opportunity given to the delegation from the N.F.D. to attend the Constitutional Conference at Lancaster House.¹ A week before the start of the Conference, the Somali Republic was once more very emphatic on the issue of secession. The Somali Embassy in London issued a statement emphasizing the demand of the Somali people in Kenya to secede and become united with the Somali Republic.² With the official backing of the Somali Republic and the six districts of the N.F.D., the Somali delegates to the Lancaster House Conference did not hesitate to put their claims openly, clearly and emphatically before the Conference.

The delegates³ reminded the Colonial Secretary that the N.F.D. was proclaimed a "closed District" in 1926 and a "special District" in 1934 and that the territory continued

¹. Towards the end of 1961, the Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs, Mr. Reginald Maudling, visited Kenya in preparation for the Constitutional Conference due to begin in London in 1962. He agreed with Ali Aden Lord, the representative of the N.F.D. at the Legislative House, to accept an N.F.D. delegation to the Conference.

². The Times, 7-2-1962.

³. The delegates were: Abd ar-Rashid Khalif (representing the NPPPP because Ali Aden Lord died just before the start of the Conference); Yusuf Haji Abdi (NFDP); A. Kholkhole, Ahmed Farah, Haji Galama Dido Sheikh Muhammad with N. Lawson and M.A. Murgian as Legal Advisers.
to be subject to these Ordinances, the practical effect of which was that the movement of persons to and from the N.F.D. had been closely restricted. This clearly illustrated a recognition of the separate identity of the territory. This recognition also emerged from legal provisions which ensure that Somalis were not amenable to process in the African Native Courts and in matters of personal law were subject to their own code and courts. It was a fact, the delegates concluded, that "no more than the most tenuous links have been forged between the N.F.D. and Kenya. This is no matter of chance, they added, when one takes into account the total absence of affinity with Kenya."¹

As Drysdale has rightly observed by admitting to the Conference an official delegation from the N.F.D., all of whom were pro-secessionist, the British Government appeared to give tacit acknowledgement that there was a case to answer.² But, on the other hand, the Kenya African leaders were by no means prepared to give any consideration or concession to the Somali claim for secession. Their views were once more assured by Tom Mboya - KANU's General Secretary - who had on many occasions said 'no secession'. Mboya accused the Somali Republic of encouraging N.F.D. secessionists and arousing fears against Kenya. He said that such conduct was inconsistent with the Somalis' profession of Pan-Africanism and African unity, at the last Pamfeeca Conference in Addis Ababa; and an interference in

¹. The Issue of the Northern Frontier District, pp. 15-16.  
Kenya's domestic affairs. On another occasion, he repeated, addressing the Foreign Press Association in London, that "there are a large number of territorial claims and counter-claims in that area, which we do not feel it would be advisable for anyone to open up as it could lead to very great complications." Paradoxically enough, Muhammad Ibrahim Egal, leader of the Somali Republic's delegation to the Lancaster House talks and the Minister for Education, argued the Somali case on the same lines, the profession of African unity. He stated in answer to Tom Mboya's claims:

"This manoeuvre of Mr. Mboya will not deter us from our goal of creating a greater Somalia which we feel is a step towards African Unity." 3

Amidst these conflicts the KANU delegates offered Somali Secessionists a portfolio in the Kenya Government which amounted to the appointment of a Northern Frontier District Minister who would head a new Ministry to deal with the Province. The offer was not only rejected by the Somalis, who declared that "unless we are recognized the right to secede from Kenya at the end of the interim period during which the British keep control of Kenya, Kanu's offer is completely pointless;" but it was also refused by KADU.

In an attempt to break the deadlock, the Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs informed the Conference that Her Majesty's Government had given very careful consideration to the views which had been put forward by the Somali

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Daily Nation, 24-3-1962.
delegation and by KANU and KADU. As a result, "They had come to the conclusion that an investigation should be undertaken in order to ascertain public opinion in the area regarding its future..." The announcement was followed later, on the same day, by another special session with the Colonial Secretary and the N.F.D. delegates. At this meeting Maudling considered a draft conclusion to the section of the Constitutional Conference dealing with the N.F.D. The conclusion, which was then included in a Report on the Conference, read as follows:

"...an investigation should be undertaken in order to ascertain public opinion in the area regarding its future...This Commission should be appointed as soon as practicable so that its report could be available and a decision on its findings taken by Her Majesty's Government before the new Constitution for Kenya was brought into operation..."

Finding later that the underlined words were too binding for Britain, the Colonial Secretary had actually omitted them from the final communique, but thanks to the protest by the Somali Government - they were reinstated.

As a result of this the Somali delegates and the Somali people generally were optimistic about the whole outcome of the Lancaster House talks. The attitude of the Somali delegates was revealed by Abd ar-Rashid Khalif on the 10th April on his arrival at Nairobi Airport, when he reaffirmed that he and the Somali delegates were satisfied with the outcome of the London talks, as the result of which Reginald Maudling had announced the setting up of a

2. The Issue of the N.F.D. p.10.
Commission to investigate the secession claims. He further stated:-

"We are confident that when the Commission had examined the various claims it must decide that the people are 100 per cent behind the plan for union with Somalia."  

However, Khalif himself would have preferred a referendum under United Nations auspices so that the people might be able to exercise self-determination. But nevertheless he and his colleagues agreed to the setting up of the Commission.

In the N.F.D. itself local opinion seemed to be equally satisfied with the outcome of the talks at that juncture. In Mandera, Muhammad Sheikh, the NPPPP delegate from the District to the Lancaster talks, was received with enthusiasm by the Mandera Somalis and the audience "seemed pleased with his report on proceedings in London." In Garissa the D.C. reported," the return of the delegates from the London Conference in a mood of confident assurance and general good will has brought about a general feeling of good will and hearty co-operation." In Wajir a meeting was held by Abd ar-Rashid Khalif and attended by all parties. The general tone of the meeting was said to be, "very optimistic on the outcome of the London talks."
Meanwhile, the efforts of the delegation from the Somali Republic present during the London talks materialized in the publication of a book, *The Somali Peninsula: A New Light on Imperial Motives*. The publicity given to this work resulted in wide support from the members of both Houses of Parliament and the British press to the Somali cause. Prominent among those was Lord Lytton, who in his maiden speech to the Lords on 15th May 1962, brought the question of the unity of the Somalis in Kenya and the Republic to the House. He stated that the Somalis are:-

"a different people of European structure and although coloured, different from the people who are negroes....I would suggest that none of this northern area, peopled by tribes of Hamitic stock, should be handed over to a Bantu administration."  

The Ethiopians, with their share in the divided nation were not slow to attack Lytton's speech. The *Ethiopian Herald* alleged, "Lord Lytton, an old Colonial hard in this part of Africa, should not be taken seriously." In retaliation the Somali Government accused the Ethiopians of hindering the progress of events in the direction of a solution of the Kenya N.F.D. Moreover, the Somali Government complained that with the apparent indifference of the British authorities arms and ammunition were being smuggled into part of the N.F.D. from across the Ethiopian frontier for the purpose of causing civil strife during the Commission's forthcoming visit.

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With such a tense atmosphere in which mutual accusations were interchanged, the Kenya Somalia relations appeared more hopeful with the visit of two distinguished African leaders, Jomo Kenyatta, President of KANU and Ronald Ngala, president of KADU. The two leaders were invited by the Somali Republic in July and August respectively and both received a cordial welcome from the Somali Government and people. In a welcoming speech to the KANU president, the Somali Prime Minister said, "The Somali people were proud to welcome a man who for forty years had done more than any other for the freedom of Africa."¹ He also stated:

"I think during the past many years the aim of colonialists or imperialists has been to divide our people. Everyone realised that, and, I think, it is our duty to get together, to create a new Africa, not the old Africa of divisions, with different Foreign Powers governing us, but Africa governed by African people."²

Carrying on the same theme of "Pan-Africanism" the President of the Somali Republic, Aden Abdallah Uthman, had remarked in his speech for Kenyatta:­

"We have learned that the outmoded concept of territorial integrity must vanish from our habitual thinking because its roots are embedded in colonialism, and it is incompatible with Pan-Africanism."³

Yet, despite this and Kenyatta's hearty concurrence with the Pan-African aspirations of the Somali leaders, his visit had in no way shown a change in his attitude to the

issue of Somali secession from Kenya. Far from it, on his
departure speech at Mogadishu Airport he had confirmed
what he had uttered on many previous occasions:—

"We and especially KANU, feel, and we have put it
clearly before the Somali Government, that we regard
the N.F.D. as part of Kenya. We also regard
Somalis who live in the N.F.D. and elsewhere in
Kenya as our brothers. They are part and parcel
of Kenya and we will like them to live in Kenya in
that fashion." ¹

However, one concession the African leaders were ready
to make in order to reach a satisfactory solution was in the
direction of the proposed East African Federation. Kenyatta
saw a way out in it, if after the independence of Kenya
negotiations were entered into between the interested
territories. Ronald Ngala, who visited Somalia a few
days after on August 11th was welcomed at Mogadishu Airport
by the Prime Minister. Touching on the question of
Federation the Prime Minister had this to say in his
welcoming speech:—

"It has been said that the problem of Somalis living
outside the Republic's present frontiers can be
solved by a federation of these territories. We
believe this to be true because we have no desire
for territorial aggrandisement. We wish only to
form one Federal Unit of a reunited Somali people
within the framework of a wider political Federation
of East and Central Africa." ²

In reply, Ngala confirmed the Prime Minister's views
and agreed that this would enable the question of
independence and federation of East African territories to
be discussed. He added:—

1. The Issue of the N.F.D., p. 25.
"If Somalia agrees to the idea, she will be helping us not only to deal with our constitution and hasten our independence but Somalia will be helping the hastening of the federation on which so many other problems are dependent."

No sooner had that been said than the situation in Kenya began to indicate a new direction as to the handling of the Somali secession issue. In August it was announced that in addition to the N.F.D. Commission, two other Commissions would proceed to the N.F.D. - a Regional Boundaries Commission and a Constituencies Delimitation Commission. The former was formed in accordance with the Report of the Kenya Constitutional Conference 1962 (Cmnd. 1700) in order "To divide Kenya into six Regions and the Nairobi Area for the purpose of giving effect to the Report of the Kenya Constitutional Conference, 1962, and in particular to Appendix II of that Report."2

The proposed visit of the two Commissions whose sole function was to recommend the delimitation of Regional and Electoral boundaries for Kenya's new self-governing constitution was seen by the Somalis as a breach of promise by the British. The Somalis were holding on to the fact that the Colonial Secretary had promised the N.F.D. delegates that the future of the N.F.D. would be decided by the British Government after public opinion had been ascertained by an independent Commission. Reports by the D.C's in the various N.F.D. Districts revealed clearly that the Somalis were very apprehensive of the outcome of

1. Ibid., p. 13.
these Commissions. In Mandera the NPPPP had arranged meetings at Rhamu on the 15th, at Asharpi on the 16th and at Eil-Wak on the 18th September in which the official party line to be adopted towards the N.F.D. Commission was explained and doubts about the actual movements of both the Constituencies Delimitations Commission and the Boundary Commission were reflected.¹

The N.F.D. representatives immediately submitted a memorandum to the Governor of Kenya protesting that if the Regional Boundaries and Constituencies Delimitation Commissions took evidence from the inhabitants of the N.F.D., "they can only conclude that the N.F.D. is now considered party to Kenya's new constitutional framework and that this was contrary to the undertaking that there would be no change in the status or administration of the N.F.D. until a decision on its future had been taken."² In addition, the N.F.D. representatives warned that if the purpose of these two Commissions was to drag the N.F.D. within Kenya boundaries in future, the response of the Somalis there would be the complete boycott of the Kenya general elections.

Meanwhile, the Daily Nation of 3rd September came out with the official statement from the Government regarding the terms of reference of the two Commissions:-

"It should be made clear that the presence of the Regional Boundaries and Constituencies Delimitations Commissions in Kenya in advance of the N.F.D. Commission does not reflect any change of policy on the part of Her Majesty's Government, and does not

2. The Issue of the N.F.D., p. 30.
in any way fetter the operation of the N.F.D. Commission in its specific function of ascertaining public opinion in the area."

Despite this the Somalis were still doubtful and hence Abd ar-Rashid Khalif, with his legal adviser, flew to London to meet the Colonial Secretary. But to his disappointment and that of all the Somalis, the Colonial Secretary preferred not to see him and the former returned after being duly warned by the officials of the Colonial Office to avoid arousing the feeling of the N.F.D. Somalis.

Shortly after, serious rioting was reported to have broken out in Isiolo, in the N.F.D. The cause of the riot was a clash between the NPPPP supporters and a group of Meru and Turkana who were present at a rally organized by KANU to preach the doctrines of anti-secession. On Sunday 27th August, the next day of the rioting, fresh fighting broke out in the N.F.D. when groups of Somalis and Turkana clashed at Campi ya Sheikh, three miles from Isiolo, the scene of violence on the previous day. The night curfew imposed on Sunday was continued on the following day. The total number of casualties was seventeen injured and two dead including a Somali girl. The area was not brought back to normal before tear gas, two platoons of the General Service Unit from Nakuru and police from Meru were used.  

The incident did not pass without a strong protest by Abd ar-Rashid Khalif, the M.L.C. for the area, who sent a telegram to the Governor of Kenya blaming the Provincial

administration for the clash. The incident according to Somalis, was made possible by the invasion of KANU members who were residents outside the Province. Their arrival was strongly objected to by the inhabitants who protested to the Local Authorities; but their protest was apparently ignored. Khalif remonstrated, "Responsibility for the incidents rests solely on the Provincial Administration. Prior appeals by the elders and political leaders to the authorities not to allow meetings of hostile elements in Isiolo were futile."¹

The effects of the Isiolo riots were instrumental in the change of attitude of the Government towards the sending of the Constituencies and Boundary Commissions to the N.F.D. inevitably because of the danger inherent in the situation there. The visits of the two Commissions while not altogether cancelled, were however postponed. The explanation given in the Report of the Regional Boundaries Commission avoided altogether the mention of the Isiolo riots as a factor in the decision of the Government, and attributed it to the following factors:

"Owing to difficulties in completing arrangements for the appointment of that Commission (N.F.D. Commission) it was not found possible to appoint it by the time we had completed our visits throughout the rest of Kenya and we decided that we ought not to visit the Six Northern Frontier districts presently administered from Isiolo until the Northern Frontier District Commission had been appointed and had at least commenced its work on the ground....We did not wish to embarrass the Government of Kenya by visiting the area when tribal feelings were running high....Secondly,

¹ Ibid.
because we had good grounds for believing that our presence at that time might well have given some to think that Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and in Kenya had chosen to disregard the undertaking given at the London Constitutional Conference, and would have sparked off inter-tribal clashes...

On October 5th the Secretary of State for the Colonies formally appointed the N.F.D. Commission of two members - G.C. Onyiuke, a Nigerian, and Major-General M.P. Bogert, a Canadian. Their terms of reference were:

"To ascertain, and report on, public opinion in the Northern Frontier District (comprising the Districts of Isiolo, Garissa, Mandera, Marsabit, Moyale and Wajir) regarding arrangements to be made for the future of the area in the light of the likely course of Constitutional development in Kenya."

According to an official Somali Government Publication the terms of reference, already a modification of the original undertaking which made no reference to the likely course of Kenya's constitutional development, were again modified if not rendered entirely useless by a confidential memorandum handed to the N.F.D. Commission on December 10th. And this Memorandum only came to light after the Commission had published its report on December 21st.

The Commission proceeded to the various districts of the N.F.D. in October using the public gatherings "barazas" as media to ascertain the opinion of the people. In Garissa District nine barazas were held; six primarily for the Somalis and three for the Riverine (Bantu) tribes.

In Wajir, where with few exceptions the population was Somali or half-Somali four barazas were held by the Commission. In Mandera three barazas were held in the township itself and at Rhamu and El-Wak. At Moyale, four barazas were held. At Marsabit which was the largest area visited, eleven barazas were held. In Isiolo four barazas were held for Muslim Boran and 'Alien' Somalis. Finally, in Nairobi, the Commission had also given consideration to the fact that "there might be certain people such as political leaders with a following in the N.F.D. who could throw light on public opinion there but who, for some good reason, might not be able to appear before us while we were there."  

On the whole, opinion on the N.F.D. pointed from the start to a majority in favour of Somali opinion. In Garissa all the Somalis, who were almost entirely Abdallah, Abd Wak and Aulihan who comprised two thirds of the population there were definitely for secession backed by the NPPPP and the NFDP. The others were represented by the NPPNL and the United Ogaden Somali Association (UOSA). The former supported Somali opinion while the other tended to lean towards Kenya opinion. The Riverine tribes were on the whole for Kenya opinion. In Wajir all were unanimously for Somali opinion. In Mandera - like Wajir - all were unanimously for the NPPPP policy of secession from Kenya.  

In Moyale opinion was mixed; the Ajuran were strongly for Somali opinion while the other Galla elements were against it.

1. Ibid., p. 17.
In Isiolo, where the 'Alien' Somalis were a majority in the township, support for the Somali opinion was overwhelming and even outside the township the Muslim Borana adhered to the Somali cause. In Marsabit the Commission itself admitted that the Rendille had "all strongly supported the Somali opinion..." but the Commission did not accept their opinion as given, the reason being that in view of differences between them and the Somalis it was strange that they should want to join the Somali Republic. The Commission were naturally unjustified in their act and were heavily criticized by the Somalis for distorting the picture.

In conclusion the N.F.D. Commission reported that they found the area supporting Somali opinion was the biggest in total population and size and its people were all in agreement on this matter. However, they differed - according to the report - on the means and steps by which the secession was to be effected. The opinion expressed verbally to the Commission was based on the premise that there could be no question of secession before Kenya achieved independence. On the other hand, Somali opinion as expressed in the written Memorandum by almost all supporters of the Somali view was somewhat different. The Memorandum requested that union of the N.F.D. with the Somali Republic should take place contemporaneously with the granting of Kenya's independence, that the establishment of a legislative assembly for the N.F.D. should take place before and not after Kenya's independence, and that the
secession of the N.F.D. from Kenya should take place immediately.¹

The Somalis were on the whole very critical of the Commission’s Report which, they commented, "had done its utmost to conceal the true strength of the opinion for secession." Drawing their own conclusions from the Commission’s findings they stated:-

"The Conclusion which must necessarily be drawn from the Commission’s own account of its investigations are that, of the six districts, five are clearly, by an overwhelming preponderance of opinion, in favour of the Somali view: these are the Garissa, Wajir, Mandera, Moyale and Isiolo districts."²

In Marsabit District where again the majority favoured the Somali opinion the Commission was accused of "discounting the Rendille and the Gelubbas, for reasons which do not bear any reasonable examination, when these people in fact comprise the majority of the population."³ Based on the data collected by the Commission itself, the Somalis concluded that "a recent census suggests that 87.76% of the total population of the N.F.D. declared for secession."⁴ Hence, the Somalis were of the opinion that the Commission had actually distorted the facts of the situation. Moreover, Abd ar-Rashid Khalif had vigorously protested against the Commission’s meeting of KANU and KADU in Nairobi after its tour in the N.F.D. had terminated.⁵

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2. The Issue of the N.F.D., p. 39.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. The Times, 16-11-1962.
The situation was further worsened by the commencing of the work of the Regional Boundaries Commission on November 9th. The latter, after touring the N.F.D. drew up a report which was met with equally severe criticism from the Somalis. They established that there was no evidence that, in the preparation of its report, the Boundary Commission had before it or took any account of the Report of the N.F.D. Commission. This was because the Boundaries Commission began its tour on the 22nd October at the time when the report of the N.F.D. Commission was still under composition. The Somalis were furious at the outcome of the latter Commission and its conclusions were not in any way to their credit. The Commission reported after meeting representatives of the Somalis in the N.F.D.:

"We would have considered it right to create a region consisting of the areas almost exclusively occupied by the Somali and kindred people, namely, the Mandera District; that part of the Moyale District lying East of the western boundaries of the existing constituency No. 44, the Wajir District; and that part of the Garissa District lying East of a line drawn three miles to the north and east of Tana River...including the Garissa township area."1

Being limited by their terms of reference which restricted them to dividing Kenya into six regions, they therefore preferred a middle-course solution and stated:

"After anxious consideration we have included the area concerned (NPP) in the Coast Region; one of the considerations which led us to this decision was that if at all some time in the future this area should cease to be part of Kenya its excision from the Coast Region would not adversely affect the viability of that Region or seriously upset the pattern laid down for Kenya as a whole."2

1. Daily Nation, 21-12-1962.
2. Daily Nation, 21-12-1962.
While a hint of secession could be seen from this, the Colonial Secretary, Nigel Fisher had himself ruled out any possibility of this being brought to light - when on behalf of the Kenya Council of Ministers, he requested that the N.F.D. should be split into three parts attaching to the new Coast, Eastern and the Rift Valley Regions. Amidst these exchanges, the African leaders had once more ascertained their stand on the issue in their fiery speeches at a meeting of the Northern Province United Association.

James Gichuru, Minister of Finance said:

"The Somalis are free to leave Kenya if they want. But they are not allowed to take part of Kenya with them. There will be no changes in our boundaries. If Somalia wants war, we are ready for it and Ethiopia is ready to back us if Somalia is aggressive."

Tom Mboya, Minister of Labour, added that the Government was resolved that, "If an inch of Kenya is taken by Somalia, the people of this country will shed blood to get it back."

The Somali Government, deploring these ardent statements by Kenya Government members, handed a note to Her Britannic Majesty's Government and requested an assurance that the statements made by the Kenyan responsible Ministers would not reflect the views of the Government of Kenya and would in no way influence the decision of Her Majesty's Government in connection with the wish of the Somali people in the N.F.D. Further, between December 3-5 the Prime Minister, Dr. Abd ar-Rashid Ali Sharmarke, and a delegation

1. Ibid.
2. The Times, 17-12-1962.
3. Ibid.
from the Somali Republic had talks in London with Prime Minister Macmillan and with the British Foreign Secretary Lord Home. Sharmarke emphasized that any denial by the British Government of the right of the people of the N.F.D. to self determination would be regarded by the Somali Government as "an unfriendly act" which would affect relations between the two countries.¹

By the end of 1962, it was obvious that Somali opinion was growing extremely vigorous on the issue of secession while Kenya's opinion was equally against it. After the publication of the N.F.D. and Regional Boundaries Reports on December 12th, a delegation from the N.F.D. led by Abd ar-Rashid Khalid visited the Somali Republic and a special session was arranged to debate the issue. A motion of moral and material support for the N.F.D. was passed.

In January, 1963, Somali feeling continued to run high and the British Government was once more handed a note urging that the N.F.D. be granted the right of self-determination. The Somali Government had also warned the British authorities that "it is prepared to accept as its own duty the assumption of Sovereignty over the territory and people in question."² A few days later, and on their return from the Republic, the N.F.D. delegates addressed a letter to the Governor, Mr. MacDonald, protesting that the assurance given to them on August 10th 1962 by the Kenya Government that nothing in the Regional Boundaries

1. Somali News, 9-12-1962; The Issue of the N.F.D., p. 47.
Report would prejudice the British Government's decision on the findings of the N.F.D. Commission, had not been honoured. They further requested that the Government of Kenya should see that there would be no change in the status or the administration of the N.F.D. before a "final decision on our future" by Her Majesty's Government; and secondly, that a final decision would be reached before Kenya's forthcoming elections.¹

A series of notes and memoranda were exchanged between the British and Somali Governments during the whole of January as the latter was growing increasingly restive about the developments of events.² Prime Minister Macmillan had, however, assured the Somalis that they would definitely be consulted before a decision on the N.F.D. was taken; but on the other hand he made it clear that the elections in Kenya were to precede the internal self-Government constitution and once more an assurance was given that like the recommendations of the Constituencies and Boundaries Commission it "will not prejudice the final settlement of the N.F.D. question". The reply was certainly unacceptable to the Somali Government who could not see that, "a postponement of elections in the Northern Frontier District will in any way prejudice Kenya's Constitutional progress towards independence."³

Amidst these diplomatic exchanges the situation on the

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¹ Ibid., p. 48.
² See Drysdale, The Somali Dispute, pp. 130-138.
³ The Issue of the N.F.D., p. 55.
Kenya frontier was going from bad to worse. About sixty men of the Kenya Riot Squad were reported to have been flown 230 miles from Nairobi to Garissa by the R.A.F. on 20th February when rioting broke out in the area.¹ Twenty-four people were injured in fighting between Somalis and Riverine tribesmen at a Kenya African Democratic Union's meeting. The fight spread to the Garissa township, after which a curfew was imposed and armed police patrolled the area.

At the same time a serious indication of the deterioration in British-Somali relations as a result of Somali concern over a British military exercise on the Kenya-Somalia border, was imminent. Abd al-Qadir Musa, the Somali Republic's Vice-Consul in Kenya announced in Nairobi on the 25th February that his Government was seriously perturbed at the implications of large scale military exercises due to begin in that area.² The British troops involved were estimated to number about 4,200, including detachments from Aden and an R.A.F. Canberra Squadron from Cyprus. The Somali Vice-Consul went on to say that "the British Government could not have chosen a more significant and provocative time and place to carry out military manoeuvres. Military manoeuvres are always used as a cover for other more sinister motives...If the British Government will not carry out its pledges to respect the will of the people of the N.F.D., it must

2. Ibid.
presumably suppress it with force."

Moreover, a further indication in the deterioration of relations followed the announcement by the Government of Somalia that it intended taking the matter of the N.F.D. - the majority of the inhabitants of which wish to secede from Kenya and join Somalia - to the international Court in view of Britain's delay in announcing the future of the area. Simultaneously, it was announced that the Somali Ambassador to Britain was being recalled for urgent consultations; and the Somali Parliament was being recalled for a special session to discuss the problem of the N.F.D. A motion revising relations with Great Britain "if the latter acts against the express wishes of the people of N.F.D. to reunite with their Motherland." 3

Unfortunately, the unceasing efforts by the Somali people both in the N.F.D. and Somalia and those of the Somali Government, did not meet with any success. Duncan Sandys, the Commonwealth and Colonial Secretary, announced in Nairobi on March 8th that Kenya elections would be held between May 18th and 26th after which the country would immediately become self-governing. More important still he stated that the predominantly Somali populated area of the N.F.D. should not secede but become Kenya's seventh region. His decision, he stated, was based on the fact that "the recently published report of the Commission showed that there was an element in the District which wanted to

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. The Issue of the N.F.D., p. 65.
secede and be united with the Republic of Somalia. It equally showed that there was another important element which equally strongly wanted to remain a part of Kenya."

He added,

"We not only the British Government but both parties here in Kenya, understand the desire of Somali people to express their own identities particularly when you get a people of one race living in a country with another race. But Kenya is a country which depends for its future on being able to recognize people of different races and prove it is capable of providing a home where people of different races can live honourably and amicably together."\(^1\)

The announcement, which was undoubtedly regarded by the Somalis as the climax of humiliation and disregard of the Somali case by the British, was naturally met with unanimous support from the Kenya leaders. Both Jomo Kenyatta, leader of KANU, and Ronald Ngala, leader of KADU, expressed their happiness at the outcome of the five and a half hours' talk with Sandys which resulted in the announcement of the inclusion of the N.F.D. within Kenya, "We have finally got the constitution we and our opponents fought for."\(^2\)

On the other hand, Somali feeling was as expected, immensely hurt by the announcement. On the spot the Colonial Secretary's decision over the N.F.D. was reported to have provoked, "immense indignation against the Government"\(^3\) which erupted into violence at Mandera on the

1. The Times, 9-3-1963.
2. The Times, 9-3-1963.
10th at Eil-Wak on the 14th and at Rhamu on the 17th. Meetings held by the NPPPP resulted in continuous violence. In Marsabit, violence necessitated the imposition of a curfew for about a week. At Moyale a great number of Somalis were arrested in connection with a demonstration. And at Isiolo reports that the Union Jack was torn down in a demonstration were circulated.¹

In the Somali Republic reaction was equally vehement. Besides demonstrations, speeches etc. the Somali Parliament had on the night of March 14th supported by seventy four votes to fourteen the Government's decision to break off diplomatic relations with Britain. The British ambassador there had been officially informed that the Somali Republic had broken off diplomatic relations with Britain.² The Prime Minister announced that his Government had decided on a breach because of Britain's policy over the N.P.D. of Kenya. Moreover, and perhaps as a reaction and a provocative measure, it was announced in Mogadishu in the same day that the president of the Assembly - Jama Abdallah Galib - and a group of members would leave for Moscow³ the following Monday at the invitation of the Soviet Government. The invitation, though explained by the Somali Republic as being a long-standing one and had no connection with the current emergency, could only be understood to mean a definite move in retaliation for British behaviour. The

¹ The Times, 11-3-1963.  
² Somali News, 18-3-1963.  
³ The Times, 15-3-1963.
Soviet-Somali manoeuvres, as observed before, was no doubt a factor in the declaration of the N.F.D. as a seventh region in Kenya. ¹

In Britain itself the Sandys statement did not pass unnoticed. M.A. Bottomley (Middlesbrough East, Lab.) told the Commons that:

"It will be most unfortunate if the Government leaves the situation where it is, to be settled between Kenya and Somalia at the time when Kenya becomes independent. This will be a very heavy burden on two developing countries, and I would have thought the last thing we wanted to do was to make it difficult for them to look after their internal affairs."²

The Observer also had something to say about the question. Admitting that the Kenya Somalis had a right to choose their own future and that they differ from the other Kenyans not just tribally but in every way, it had however pointed to the fact that the obstacle to justice in this case was the chauvinistic refusal of the Kenyan leaders to part with a large slice of Kenya on the map. It further stated, "this attitude of the Kenyan leaders is a serious consideration for the British Government...If London were unilaterally to offer the Somalis the right of secession, this would provoke a major crisis with the African parties and undo the hard-won constitutional progress of recent months. Yet the problem must be faced if Britain is not to leave a local "Korea" on African hands at independence."³

Unfortunately, none of these pleas was instrumental in bringing any change in British policy in the area.
in the N.F.D. the Somali leaders challenged both the British and Kenya Governments at the close of the two days' meeting at Wajir on the 20-22 March by resolving not to take part in the General Elections and by rejecting the offer of a separate region instead of secession. The Organizer of the meeting, Abd ar-Rashid Khalif, the Legislative Council member for the area, had in a message to Nairobi disclosed the decision of the meeting, which was attended by sixty political leaders, chiefs and tribal elders of the N.F.D. The meeting had unanimously decided - First, to oppose the partitioning of the Northern Frontier District Councils, the Legislative Council, African courts and Muslim religious courts. Secondly, to call for the resignation of chiefs from African District Councils, the Legislature Council, African Courts and Muslim religious courts. Thirdly, to refuse to take part in discussions with Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, the Governor, unless Britain was to change her decision. And finally to send a delegation to Somalia to put forward demands to its Government.¹

On March 24th thirty-three N.F.D. Chiefs were reported to have resigned their Government posts in protest. They delivered a letter of resignation to John Golds, the D.C., at the end of a meeting. This step was met with enthusiasm in Somalia, presumably since, as they were elected by popular votes, the chiefs were responsible for the N.F.D. and thus there was a feeling that the resignation of the chiefs would eventually cause the collapse of the

¹ The Times, 23-3-1963.
Somalis demonstrating in Kenya's Northern Frontier District in support of the chiefs who resigned in protest against the British Government's refusal to allow the district to join the Somali Republic.
administration. In addition to this, the chiefs refused to meet the Governor of the Colony on his arrival at Wajir on an unexpected visit. The latter confined his talks with the Provincial and District Commissioners.

Things were, however, made worse by the fact that Alex Kholkhole, the Vice-President of the NPPPP had been placed under a Restriction Order by the Government and removed from the N.F.D. Being in the forefront of the N.F.D. secessionist movement, his deportation from his homeland was seen in Somalia as a tribute to the success of his efforts. In the N.F.D. itself reaction to his deportation was vigorous. In Isiolo large crowds of Somali men and women demonstrated in sympathy with the exiled Kholkhole. In Nairobi and Mombasa Somalis waged protest as a result of the Government's decision to restrict Kholkhole to Kwale district in the Coast Province.

Not only the Somalis but even African leaders and their parties were critical of the Government's move against the NPPPP Vice-President. Both the Secretary-General of the African Peoples Party, M.D. Odinga, and his Vice-President, Wawire were against the act. Announcing that the APP intended to send a delegation to the N.F.D., Odinga stated:


2. A Rendille aged about thirty, a Primary school teacher who had his education at the B.C.M.S. Mission at Marsabit later joined as a partner in a trading business in the district. In 1963 he stood for the NPPPP and was defeated in the by-election in the Northern Province East Constituency caused by the death of Ali Aden Lord for whom he deputized at the Legislative Council during his illness. Kholkhole was one of the delegates for the Lancaster House talks.
"Preparation for war instead of peaceful development should be condemned."

Odinga had further described the action against Kholkhole as "a wrong move by the Government." and given an assurance that the APP would resist any step taken against nationalist leaders who were fighting for their people.

KANU's attitude to the Kholkhole case was different. They opposed the restriction without trial and M. Kibaki, the Party's executive officer, demanded that the Vice-President of the NPPPP should be brought to trial as soon as possible. When later three more N.F.D. leaders were detained, Paul Ngei, as the deputy leader for the opposition asked in the House of Representatives for the release of the four politicians. He demanded that the men should be brought to a judicial trial so that they might defend themselves, the men being arrested from their homes without having committed any criminal offence. But in answering the allegation Kenyatta assumed that the four men had been given money by the Somali Government so that they might create trouble in the N.F.D. and hence they deserved the imposed action. In retaliation to this, the President of the Northern Province Democratic Union remarked, "What would surprise everybody is the fact that the present Kenya Government follows the previous attitude adopted in the past by the Colonialist Government in the present affair.

of the people of the N.F.D. 1

After all this it was not surprising to see that the Kenya General Elections of April 1963 were completely boycotted by the N.F.D. Somalis. Out of the total of 41 seats in the Northern Eastern Region, 32 were boycotted. And out of 28 seats for the Regional Assemblies in the six N.F.D. Districts 24 were boycotted. 2 Moreover, the end of June, 1963, witnessed the start of a new wave of violence in the area. As a result an African District Commissioner was speared to death and a tribal chief seriously wounded in the N.F.D. Dudi Waber, the D.C. was on his way to Wajir from a tour of duty. 3 The fact that the Somalis had taken to violence as a result of the failure of diplomatic manoeuvres was also apparent in the formation of a new militant party in the N.F.D. called the National Liberation Party which was determined to work for the achievement of secession.

The Kenya African leaders then conscious of the imminent dispute between Kenya and Somalia and the repercussions it must have on the border did not hesitate to raise the point in the House of Representatives at its meeting on November 28th. The Leader of the opposition, R.G. Ngala asked the House to urge the Government to ascertain that the frontier line defence between Kenya and Somalia was strengthened against casual raiders from Somalia on Kenyan Police posts and Kenya citizens generally, and

2. Ibid. 26-4-1963; and The Times, 20-5-1963.
3. Two men accused of the incident fled to Somalia and the Somali Government was blamed for refusing to hand them back.
suggested that the Prime Minister must satisfy himself that a defence pact was made with Somalia covering such raids.¹

At this stage it became obvious that a border dispute between the neighbouring countries was inevitable and it was at this juncture that the question assumed more importance in the general African scene, though attempts by the Somali Government to bring the issue before the African States started well before this.² In fact the issue was put before the All-African People's Conference at Tunis in January 1960 and once more at its next meeting in Cairo in March the following year. Dr. Abd ar-Rashid Ali Sharmarke and the Somali delegates to the Monrovia Conference for Heads of African States in May, 1961, brought the question of the divided Somali nation to the notice of the African leaders. Besides the matter of Somalia under Ethiopia and French rule, the Kenya N.F.D. problem and its development since the cession of Jubaland to Italy in 1925 was explained.³ The same issue was brought up by the Somali delegation in Belgrade in September. In the following year Dr. Sharmarke repeated his plea for the liberation of Somalis in the N.F.D. and other territories at the Conference.

for African Heads of States in Lagos in January 1962, requesting a referendum for the subjected people in the three territories. In August and November of the same year, as previously stated, President Aden Abdallah Uthman and Sharmarke said to Kenyatta and Ngala in the name of Pan-Africanism that the Somalis in Kenya should be allowed to join the Somali Republic.

The Somalis were so persistent in presenting the issue to the African world that on February 8th 1963 Muhammad Aden 'Muro', leading a delegation of political representatives at the Afro-Asian Conference in Moshi, Tanganyika, referred to the N.F.D. secessionist demands as follows:

"The Somali Republic has no desire for territorial aggrandisement, there are indeed no benefits to be derived from that, but all our people are one in the desire that they should be united...come what may. We hope that this conference will impress upon our brothers from Kenya the danger of maintaining artificial Colonial boundaries. Accordingly we propose that the third Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference, having taken note of the desire of the Afro-Asian people to terminate every vestige of colonialism in their continents...to abolish or to adjust these frontiers to accord with the wishes of the people."

In retaliation to the above speech, the Kenya delegates walked out of the Conference shouting "aggressors".

On 25th March 1963, the Prime Minister of Uganda A. Milton Obote communicated with the Somali Prime Minister to say how strongly he felt that African boundary questions should only be discussed with African leaders. He was

critical of the Somali Government's view "that it would have been proper for Britain, as it were, to give away a part of Kenya's present territory."¹ This he wrote, would have been the "kind of arbitrary imperial action against which we have struggled to reach our independence."² But neither the opposition they met in Cairo in March 1961, nor the present attitude of the Uganda leader effected any change in the Somali persistence in continuing the campaign in Africa for the secession of the N.F.D.

On April 19th, 1963, a mission representing the Somali inhabitants of the N.F.D. left on a tour to a number of west and north African countries. The mission, led by Abd ar-Rashid Khalif,³ left Cairo on 14th April for Nigeria to explain the claims of the N.F.D. Somalis for independence and attachment to the neighbouring Somali Republic. Before leaving Cairo, Khalif told the press that the Kenya Government wanted to keep this region at all costs because it wanted to take over the important natural resources there, particularly an oil deposit which had already been discovered.⁴ The delegates stopped at Mogadishu on their way back from the tour, which included Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, U.A.R., Sudan, Libya and Tunisia. Khalif told the authorities in Mogadishu that all the people they had talked to had shown

¹. Drysdale, p. 146.
². Ibid.
³. Other members of the delegation were: Maalim Abbas Armin, Muhammad Ali Haji and Digo Maalim Stambul.
their sympathy with the Somalis' insistence on self-determination as a way to solve the N.F.D. question. He declared also that they all agreed that justice for the N.F.D. would be a contribution towards African unity.¹

The question was also brought forward by the Somali Republic's Foreign Minister, Abdullahi Isa, before the African Summit Conference at Addis Ababa in May 1963. At Nairobi, on his way to the Conference, the Minister announced that the Somali Government wanted a greater Somalia set up within an East and Central African Federation. He added, "we want Somalia to be united, but at the same time we want a united Africa."²

It was this conflict between the Somali interest, the Kenya interest and the concepts and declarations of Pan-Africanism that was the root of the problem. The Somalis on their side adhered strongly to the resolutions of the All-African People's Conferences held at Accra and Tunis in 1958 and 1960 respectively. The First All-African Peoples' Conference held at Accra on December 5-13 came out with the Resolution on Frontiers, Boundaries and Federation. It ran as follows:-

3 - Whereas artificial barriers and frontiers drawn by imperialists to divide African Peoples operate to the detriment of Africans and should therefore be abolished or adjusted;
Whereas frontiers which cut across ethnic groups or divide peoples of the same stock are unnatural and are not conducive to peace or stability;....
Be it resolved and it is hereby resolved by the

All-African Peoples Conference that the Conference:

(a) denounces artificial frontiers drawn by Imperialist Powers to divide the Peoples of Africa, particularly those which cut across ethnic groups and divide people of the same stock.

This was further supplemented by the resolution on Somaliland passed by the Second All-African Conference at Tunis on 25-30 January 1960, which stated:

The Conference "hails and supports the struggle of the people of Somaliland for independence and unity in order to give birth to a bigger Somaliland."2

But despite this and the continued Somali efforts, the Africa of the 60's was not in a position to lend definite support for such a case. The African leaders feared that acceptance of the principles of readjustment of former colonial boundaries would inevitably encourage separatist movements, like Katanga, and also destroy the political stability on which the wider unity of African States depends.3 Not even the friendliest African State at that time was willing to react positively on the Somali side. The Sudan with its southern-Sudanese question and the arbitrary Ethiopian border could hardly afford to lend support. The only move was seen in the consecutive press propaganda in commemoration of the anniversaries of Somali

2. Ibid., and Hoskyns, p. 246.
3. Drysdale, p. 162.
Independence where newspapers like Al-Ayyam and Akhir Lahaa had devoted some pages to explaining the problem of the N.F.D. to the Sudanese readers.¹ Nor was the general feeling of the African intellectuals in any way different from that of the political leaders. This was obvious from the writings later on of A.O. Cukwurah who was very critical of the Somali ethnic claims and maintained:

"Revindication of lost territories is not always practicable, especially where they have crystallised into new political formulae as solidified as the ancestral unit itself."²

And that of V.B. Thompson who was also of the opinion that:

"Regroupments of Peoples according to ethnic origins, as in the case of the Somalis or the Ewes or the Bakongos, while admirable from the point of view of a common language, are fraught with dangers which could even militate against the further growth of Pan-Africanism. Pan-Africanists aim at combating 'tribalism', and such regroupments would entrench this and probably, give rise to divisionist tendencies."³

But the cool response inside Africa to the Somali question did not, however, deter the Somalis from further action. The period between August and December 1963, when Kenya had finally achieved its Independence, was marked with fresh attempts by the Somalis to negotiate with Kenya and Britain in the hope of reaching a settlement. In August, talks between Somalia and Britain started in Rome on the future of the N.F.D.⁴ The British side was represented by

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4. See Drysdale for details on the Rome talks, pp. 154-158.
Mr. Peter Thomas, the British Minister for Foreign Affairs, and was joined by the Kenya delegation which included Governor MacDonald, Mr. Gichuru, Minister of Finance; Tom Mboya, Minister of Justice; J. Murumbi, Minister of State; Peter Koinange, Minister of State for Pan-African Affairs and Mr. Charles Njorojo, Kenya's Attorney General. As The Times, had observed, "This foreshadows a strong front by the Kenya Africans against any solution involving partition." The idea behind the attachment of the Kenyan delegation to the official party was "to overcome the difficulty of Kenya's status at a conference between sovereign states." The Somali side was led by Dr. Abd ar-Rashid Sharmarke.

From the beginning of the talks the Somalis felt that the British Government's attitude was not only that of avoiding its responsibility but that it tried to confine the solution of the problem to being one of Somali-Kenyan concern. Immediately after the end of the talks, Prime Minister Sharmarke held a press conference in which he indicated the responsibility of Her Majesty's Government for the failure of the talks and for any consequences which might derive from that attitude. He remarked, "The Somali delegation regrets that the conference in which it had such high hopes ended in a deadlock. The British delegation came to the conference with no intention of settling the

1. The Times, 24-8-1963.
2. Ibid.
problem of the N.F.D. but merely to explore the position of the Somali Republic which was in any case well known to them."  

The outcome of the Rome talks was, however, naturally viewed from a different angle by the Kenya delegates. Returning from the Conference they said that the two most important results of the Conference were Britain's insistence that Somalia should deal with the Kenya Government and the fact that Kenya had indicated that it was still willing to discuss the issue with Somalia. In short, no change had by any means occurred in the Kenya position. The leader of the delegation Mr. Gichuru went further to assert that Kenya would not feel bound by any recommendation by the Organization of African States if the Somali Government decided to refer the matter to them. And at any rate, the consensus of opinion in African circles pointed to the possibility that support was generally for Kenya rather than for the Somali Republic.

The failure of the Rome talks had further proved that the gap between the Somali and Kenya positions was too wide to be bridged. But paradoxically enough this did not convince the Somalis of the futility of further attempts. Far from it; twelve Somali chiefs, elders and politicians joined the Governor, the Kenya Prime Minister and five other Ministers for talks in Nairobi, in September. The gesture was actually made by the Kenya side in the hope that the Somalis might agree to renounce their demands for

1. Ibid.
2. The Times, 30-8-1963.
secession in exchange for some "internal" safeguards. As on other occasions, the Nairobi talks ended in failure with each side adhering more than ever to his position.

With the failure of efforts to bridge the gap between the two, the beginning of the 60's witnessed a new phase in Kenya-Somalia relations. The violence which had already started all over the disputed territory made the prospect of trouble in the North Eastern Region of Kenya, 53,000 sq. miles of desert inhabited mainly by the secessionist Somalis, real and dangerous. This naturally presented a critical situation for the newly independent Kenya and further a dilemma for the Organization of African Unity. Britain had slowly washed her hands of direct responsibility and left the burden to be taken by the two newly independent African States. No wonder a border dispute and bloodshed were imminent; but the question still remains to whose benefit and for what reasons British policy on the issue was to be explained.

Perhaps the reason, as Gerald Reece, then the Provincial Commissioner of the N.F.D., explained in a talk to some Rotarians in Nairobi, was inherent in the fact that the N.F.D. was considered a natural buffer. He said the main reason why they bothered about a small collection of people, who lived in what was too often described as 'a worthless desert' was that "it was a most useful buffer". In 1940 when they were very short of

1. K.N.A./PC/NFD 14/1 Press Cuttings East African Standard, 6-9-1946. Reece himself had on many occasions openly advocated the support of the Somali case. He once stated, "We hope that all Somalis who are now divided between four different Nations will form one unit and in due course become independent..." (Ibid.).
troops in Kenya they abandoned about half of the country to the Italians for reasons of expediency, and this served the purpose. In peace time it was also a very useful buffer for Kenya, because the Abyssinians were allowed to carry rifles, and consequently it was thought very inconvenient to have the Abyssinian frontier adjoining the Native Reserves of Kenya. More important still in the eyes of the British administrators was the presence of the N.F.D. under the administration of Kenya as safeguard and buffer against the westward movement of the Somalis towards the White Highlands. Indeed the Somalis themselves had always argued that if not for the harassment of the British, they would have spread as far as Tanganyika. The concept of the N.F.D. as a buffer was also conceived of from the ideological sense, since the British were already worried about a possible spread of Communist influence from Somalia and felt that the N.F.D. ought rather to be in British hands.

Also, British policy in the area was seen as of economic significance. The Somali Republic's view in the matter was that Britain was primarily interested in the economic potentialities of the area; because the N.F.D. was considered a supplier of livestock to Britain and the Commonwealth. Moreover, the N.F.D. was a unique area for ranching, for animal husbandry and mineral deposits.¹

¹. See p. 302 for the remark by Khalif on the oil prospects of the N.F.D. and the British decision on the N.F.D. issue.
For this reason, it was asserted "that the returning of this area to its original national territory, the Somali Republic, is naturally a loss to Britain's exploitation of this part of Africa."\(^1\) Hence Britain's decision.

Besides these factors, the British decision was said to be motivated by strategic factors. Kenya was useful to Britain as a military base. And finally it was possible that Britain did not want to offend the feeling of Jomo Kenyatta and his African colleagues who did their best to see that the N.F.D. remained in Kenya. But still the real reasons behind the British decision remained puzzling, at least to the Somalis, who were not sure whether it was mainly to safeguard British interest in Kenya or whether it was the usual British policy of 'divide and rule' in order to create permanent friction between the Somali Government and the Independent state of Kenya. However, one thing they were sure about was that the past and present policies of successive British Governments towards the Somali people and their territories had brought the Horn of Africa into a state of political tension and conflict, seriously impairing relations between the Somali Republic and neighbouring states. Also, according to the Somali view, the instability of the Horn of Africa, "is the creation of the British Government which will be held responsible for many consequences that may follow."\(^2\)

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2. The Issue of the N.F.D., p. 74.
It is not within the scope of this thesis to discuss the events which followed but it was obvious that since the time when Kenya had attained her independence, a lot of changes had occurred in the area. With the adoption by the Somali Government of the policy of peaceful co-existence with its neighbours, the complete absence of armed resistance at the present time and the increasing orientation of the territory as a part of Kenya, the attitude of the N.F.D. Somalis was gradually changing and prospects of the emergence of violent nationalism are not predictable.
CONCLUSION

It is obvious from the preceding chapters that the problem of administration of the Somalis was two-fold: in the first place, there were the difficulties facing the British officials due to the geography of the area, the constant movement of the Somalis into Kenya, and their attitude to any attempts at foreign rule. Secondly, from the Somali point of view there was obviously neglect under British rule: no successful policy with regard to their social, economic and political improvement was implemented. The N.P.D. was often dismissed by the British as "a worthless desert" and a burden on the economy of the Colony. The result was that British rule in Kenya had very little effect on the Somalis.

The first chapter of the thesis illustrated how, during the period 1895-1916 the British administration of Jubaland Province was never welcomed by the Somalis; the authorities had to despatch three major expeditions against the Herti, the Ogaden, and the Marehan. Somali opposition in Jubaland was increased by the influence of Muhammad Abdille Hasan's religious movement in Northern Somaliland. This had involved the administration in Jubaland in frequent clashes with the Somalis. It was only the continual inter-tribal clashes between the different Somali sections and sub-sections that prevented a general rising against the British.

From the second chapter it is evident that although it was realised that something had to be done to bring about
the pacification of the Somalis both in Jubaland and the N.F.D., the administration was at a loss to implement the various suggestions made in this respect. The possibility of the pacification of the Somali through social and economic advancement failed, as a result of the conflicting views between Nairobi, the officials on the spot, and the various government departments. Although temporary pacification was achieved by forceful measures, such as the re-occupation of Serenli and Afmadu, and the disarmament of the Somalis, permanent pacification proved impossible as long as the Somalis were not put into distinct administrative units. The problem was aggravated by the cession of Jubaland to Italy in 1925 and the consequent division of the Somalis once again. This planted an artificial boundary between the British and the Italian Somalis and by no means eased the task of their administration.

The third chapter discussed the international aspect of the administration of the Somalis in Kenya's Northern Frontier Province. The absence of any official British control over the frontier up to 1910 resulted in a continued state of lawlessness in the frontier area. The incidence of raids and counter-raids between the tribes on the Abyssinian and, to a lesser extent, on the Italian side, naturally brought about a series of conflicts between the administration in Kenya and those in Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland. The situation was further complicated by the influence of the Italo-Ethiopian conflict of 1935 and the Second World War. The result was that considerable difficulty was experienced
in protecting an already burdened Province against the influx of refugees across the border, and the temporary evacuation of Government stations which led to considerable hardships to the Somalis.

The position of the urban or 'Alien' Somalis in Kenya - as revealed in Chapter IV - was no better than that of their kin in the N.F.D. In the period between the two World Wars they were moved from pillar to post on the assumption that they had no right of settlement in the Colony. This was greatly responsible for the well organized and sophisticated political campaign launched by this group of Somalis against the British colonial administration. Their position was further complicated by the fact that they were far more politically conscious than the local N.F.D. Somalis and that they continually raised a number of difficult and complicated issues with regard to their status in the Colony. It was this that made them very unpopular with the colonial administration throughout the period under consideration.

The fifth chapter shows that in the post-war period both Somali sections were no happier at the proposed Post War Development Plan for their economic and social improvement. Once again although proposals were mooted, no definite results came out and the Somali remained one of the least satisfied with the results of British rule on the eve of independence.

The last two chapters discussed the growth of national feeling among the Kenya Somalis and showed that the tendency of the British authorities to rule the Somalis in the N.F.D.
differently from the rest of the country and the continued efforts to restrict movement inside and outside the Province, had alienated them. This had definitely accounted for the degree of adhesion that the N.F.D. Somalis had for the concept of a Greater Somalia which flourished in Mogadishu in the post-war period and which was propagated by the S.Y.L. The argument by the N.F.D. Somali political leaders that they were never meant to develop as a part of Kenya was accepted by all the Somalis. This was seen by them as the most legitimate justification for their secession from Kenya and their joining the Somali Republic after it had attained its independence in 1960. So strong was the Somali appeal for secession that they eventually managed to win the support of the 'Alien' Somalis in the 60's - although the latter had been less inclined to support them earlier on.

The Somali struggle for secession did not, however, end in success. The British Government's verdict against secession had far-reaching repercussions in relations between the Governments of independent Kenya and Somalia and no doubt in the general African arena. Although it is outside the scope of this thesis to discuss the position of the Somali in post-independent Kenya, it is worthwhile stating an opinion on the future of the area.

It is obvious that the Kenya Somalis - as is the case with their kin still under Ethiopian domination - had suffered from the aftermath of colonialism and Imperial expansion which left them divided despite their unity of culture, language and heritage. But, on the other hand,
modern Africa - as was stated in the last chapter of the thesis - is not prepared for further territorial subdivisions in the continent. It is for the leaders of these African States to negotiate means of peaceful co-existence of the different races within one territory rather than prepare for fresh troubles which none of them can afford.

In the case of the N.F.D. Somalis, I am convinced - after visiting the area in 1970 - that with the improvement of the facilities for education and health, the opening of the North Eastern Region, the degree of spread of the Swahili language, the enthusiasm with which Somali youngsters sing the Kenya National Songs and take a certain pride in being called Kenyans, this certainly shows that the future of the Region and its inhabitants is within Kenya. Moreover, the tendency by the Somali Government to maintain friendly relations with its neighbours, and the fact that the so-called 'Shifts' or freedom fighters had actually settled down to some sort of agriculture on the other side of the Somali border, indicates that armed resistance is not to be expected - at least in the near future.
Appendix I (a)

QURAYSHITIC LINEAGE OF THE PROPHET MOHAMMAD

Aqi

Hill

Sab

Somali

Digil

Irrir

Pre-Hawiya

Rahanwein

Tunni

Dir

Hawiya

Gadabursi

Ishaak

Darod

Kablalla

Sadch

Gerrah

Aissa

Appendix I (b) The Darod Somalis (1)

Sheikh Ismail Jiberti
Darod Ismail

Saddoh

Kablalla

Marehan

Kombi

Komadi

Herti

Gaileh

Mijertein
Warsangeleh

Dolba-

- hanta

Ogaden
Gidwak
Balaad

Maghbul

Miyr Walal

Makahil

Bahalla

Talamuga

Mohamed Zubeir
Aulihan
Suliman

Abd Wak

Abdullah
Rer Mohamed

Rer Yubye
Rer Hassan
Rer Guleed
Bah
Habr
Mohamed
Bah
Abubakr
Aden

(1) From T.S. Thomas, Jubaland and the Northern Frontier District, p. 12, and a table compiled by Brailsford, Assistant D.C., Lamu in 1925 see K.N.A./PC/C.P. 54/1443.
Appendix I (c)

The Marehan

Marehan

- Isaak
  - Rer Tulla
  - Rer Amir
  - Rer Wegieda
  - Iss
  - Rer Eili Dera

- Rer Ahmed
  - Rer Khalif
  - Hussein
  - Rer Gerard
    - Rer Ali
    - Rer Ahmed Weid
    - Rer Farah Ugas

The Mohamed Zubeir

Mohamed Zubeir

- Rer Abdallah
  - Mahad Rob
  - Yussuf
    - Rer Ali Manag
      - Rer Khalaf
      - Rer Higgas
      - Rer Amir
      - Rer Shera
      - Rer Ali Nasr
      - Rer Ali
      - Rer Guled
      - Rer Samaruter
      - Rer Samanter
      - Hassan
      - Khalaf
        - Rer Ugas Nur
          - Rer Ugas Guled
          - Rer Horsi
          - Rer Amadin
Appendix I (d)

The Aulihan

Aulihan

Rer Tur Adi  Rer Jibrail

Rer Hawash  Rer Songat  Rer Abukr  Rer Mumin Hassan

Ali  Afwa  Kassein  Wafatu  Aden Kheir  Afgab

The Hawiya

Hawiya

Bah Arbera  Bah Girei

Gurgate  Jiambelle  Gogondovo

Jidle  Digodia

Agai  Adeh  Murrile
Appendix I (e)

Hawiya (1)

Gurreh  Ajouran  Mobilen  Habr Gedir  Sheikhal  Abgal

Ishaak(Ishaq)

Habr Awal  Habr Toljaala  Habr Gerhajis

Saad Muda Awal  Issa Musa Awal  Ayub

Habr Yunis Aidagalla  Arab

Mohammed Abokr(Ibran)  Ibrahim(Sambur)  Musa Abokr(Jaalo)  Ahmed (Toljaalo)

(1) Another division of the Hawiya given by S.Touval, Somali Nationalism, p. 17.
Appendix II

A short history of the main Somali towns in the N.F.D.¹

(a) Garissa:-

Came into existence as a District in 1925, with its headquarters at Bura and later at Garissa in 1931. Prior to 1920 the district was part of the Tanaland Province. In 1920, it came under the control of Senior Commissioner, Jubaland, and in 1921 transferred to the N.F.D., then under military administration. In 1925 it became a district of the N.F.D.

(b) Isiolo:-

Isiolo District was established in 1929 by the amalgamation of the Samburu and Garba Tulla Districts. Garba Tulla, originally called Bulesa, was formed in 1917/18. When Bulesa ceased to be a sub-district of Wajir between 1925 and 1929, it was then merged with Samburu. Samburu had been administered from Archer's post until 1921 when a separate station was established at Barsalo. The latter was closed in 1929, the Samburu becoming part of the Isiolo District.

(c) Mandera:-

Became a District headquarters in 1910, and remained Capital of the N.F.D. until 1919 when it was moved to Meru. For a short period in 1940 the Italians invaded the District.

¹. Compiled from various notes in the Kenya National Archives.
From 1912 to 1923 Gurreh was administered from Moyale until 1923 when it became a Sub-District. In 1926-29 Gurreh was an independent district, but between 1929 and 1941 it was amalgamated with Moyale as a Sub-District.

(d) Wajir:

Wajir was first occupied by the British in 1912 to prevent the Boran being driven by the Somalis from the wells. Wajir District remained quiet at the outbreak of the 1914-18 War, especially after Mr. Deck, the Officer-in-Charge of the N.F.D. had removed the Aulihan, Rer Afgab, from the wells in 1914 and sent them to Serenli. In 1916 the sack of Serenli by Abd ar-Rahman Mursal with the Aulihan had necessitated the evacuation of the station for a short while as no troops were available to defend it. From 1921 to 1926 the Military took over the administration of Wajir District, as with the rest of the N.F.D. The Italo-Ethiopian war of 1935 affected the district, as did the international crisis of 1938.
Appendix III

Notes on some of the leading British Officials in charge of Somalis in the Protectorate and the Colony

(a) Glenday, Vincent G.:-

Assistant D.C., E.A.P., from 27th December 1913;
Acting D.C., N.F.D., January 1914 to June 1919; Officer-in-Charge, Somali disarmament, N.F.D., from March 1919;
Seconded as D.C. Berbers, British Somaliland, from the period March to September 1920; Assistant D.C., Nandi and trans-Ngora, from October 1922; D.C. 1926; On the Abyssinian Mission, 1927-28; Acting P.C., N.F.D. 1930-31, and again from March 1933; Senior D.C., 1934; P.C. in 1935; Governor and Commander-in-Charge, Somaliland from 1939.

(b) Hope, John Owen Webley, C.M.G. (1916).

3rd Treasury Assistant, E.A.P., from 17th May 1899;
Officer-in-Charge, N.F.D., in 1909; Acting P.C., Kenya 1915.

(c) Kittermaster, H.B., O.B.E. (1918).

Assistant D.C., E.A.P., from 18th December 1908; D.C. in 1915; Officer-in-Charge, N.F.D., from 1916; Secretary to administration, Somaliland, from August 1921.


Administrative Cadet, Kenya, from 1925; District Officer, from 1927; Acting Consul for Southern Abyssinia, from 1932 and Consul from June 1934; D.C. (on abolition of Consulate) from 1937; On military service 1915-19 and 1941;

1. From Colonial Office List, British Museum.
Senior Political Officer, Borana Province of Ethiopia 1941; Officer-in-charge of the N.F.D. 1939-45; P.C., N.F.D. from 1945; Military Governor of Somalia between 1948-53.


District Officer, Kenya, from 1931; Civil Liaison Officer, Headquarters of East African Command, in 1947; P.C., N.F.D., from 1948; Defence Secretary from 1955; Governor and Commander-in-Chief, Tanganyika, from 1958; Chairman, Central Land Board, Kenya, 1963-64.
This agreement is between the Somali chiefs Stambul Abdi, Hassan Asman, Shuria Hassan Dergen and Kafundi of the Ormar Wagalla.

They agree that if a Somali woman goes to the Galla or a Galla woman goes to the Somalis the dowry to be paid will be Rs. 500.

As to released Wagalla slaves now with the Somalis, the chiefs on both sides agree that if they wish to leave the Somalis they are at liberty to go with all their women and children but half their live stock is to remain with the Somalis and to become Somali property.

Provincial Commissioner,
27.7.1912.
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F.O. 403 Contd.

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1/14/4  Innoculation and vaccination 1916.

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4. HIGH CLASS RESIDENTIAL AREA
5. EUROPEAN COMMERCIAL AND RESIDENTIAL AREA
6. SITE OF CENTRAL MARKET
7. SITE OF GRANARY STORES AND GRAIN MARKETS
8. SHALLOW POND
9. WHEN RECLAIMED
10. SITE OF DWELLING OF HUTS TRADERS AND WORKERS
11. MUSLIM QUARTER AND SITE OF MUSLIM TRADERS
12. REFUGE AREA
13. SITE OF NATIVE HOSPITAL
14. SITE OF ISOLATION HOSPITAL AND QUARANTINE ETHIOPIAN RAILWAY LINE
15. SMALL VILLAGE 1, 2, 3

SCALE 1:20000 IN OR 66 inches to 1 Mile