THE GROWTH OF HEGEL'S LOGIC.

by

James Black Baillie

Oct. 1899
In the following essay I have sought to trace the process by which Hegel's Logic came to assume its present form. I have thought that by an analysis of the steps by which he was led to adopt his final conception of the principle and method of Logic, some light might be supplied not merely for understanding the work, but for determining its ultimate philosophical significance. The essay is from one point of view an introduction to Hegel's Logic and his system generally, and thus no more than the beginnings of a large undertaking; from another point of view it is a chapter in the history of philosophy. It was therefore not open to me to enter any criticisms on Hegel's views; and I have as nearly as possible avoided all suggestion of objections and difficulties. For similar reasons I have only indirectly had in view the many criticisms and interpretations that have from time to time been passed on the work. Examination of these in detail is an undertaking by itself, and I have refrained from any direct polemics against views not substantiated by the results of the enquiry.
CONTENTS.

INTRODUCTION p.1-16.

(a) Sources of material for the subject.

(b) Character of Hegel's interest in problem of Philosophy. Early philosophical conceptions.


(a) General sketch of Hegel's philosophy at this time: Result: p.24.

(b) Logic of this period. Logic and Metaphysics 25-41.

(c) Commentary and Criticism - permanent elements - Value and influence at this time of (1) Fichte (2) Schelling (3) Kant. Defects - line of further development - 41-56.


(a) Hegel in Jena: general position during this period: 57-65.

(b) Logic and Metaphysics: fundamental principles: 66-92.

(c) The nature of the advance made in this period: 93-102.

(d) Hegel's relations to Kant, Fichte and Schelling during this time: 103-124.

(e) The direction of his further development: critical determination of (1) the principle, (2) contents, and (3) method of his system. 125-143.
(f) The connection of these three elements; the line of progress; significance and purpose of the 'Phenomenology of Mind'. 144-159.

(g) Its value for the development of his final position; origin of the Logic: 160-168.


(a) The plan and method of the Phenomenology: more particular consideration of "Absolute Knowledge" 169-220.

(b) The Logic: Phenomenology and Logic: 221-237.

(c) The Logic and Absolute Knowledge: origin and character of the content of the Logic 238-263.

(d) Source and nature of the Method of the Logic: 264-277.

(e) More particular determination of the Method: 277-325.


CONCLUSION: p.367-387.

Relation between Logic, Nature and Mind. - Results -
INTRODUCTION.

The enquiry into the origin and development of Hegel's conception of Logic is from the start carried on under considerable difficulties. There is a scarcity of the material necessary for the purpose, more especially of material bearing on the earliest period; and there is the entire absence of any explicit statement by Hegel himself of the steps by which he passed from his earlier views on the nature of Logic to that conception of it which he ultimately adopted. Prior to the appearance of the first extended statements regarding logic and philosophy generally, which he gave expression to about 1799, we have only slight indications of the direction which his work and his thinking had hitherto taken, and hardly any direct knowledge of the books he had read. Some years later the influence of his immediate precursors, and more especially of his companion Schelling, is decidedly manifest. But too much importance cannot be placed on this fact. To begin with, in no case is Hegel the professed follower of any of those with whom he may agree very closely; opinions which he expresses are held and uttered as his own. We cannot attribute to others the origination of ideas maintained by Hegel himself, by whom indeed the results arrived at by previous philosophers were rather accepted as aids to his own development than conclusions admitted as final.
Further Hegel's very earliest expressed relation to Kant and Fichte is essentially negative; it is one of disagreement. He admits indeed that the principle adopted by each has in it 'speculative truth,' and is of value for philosophy, but he argues that the conception which each took of this principle was limited, so limited in fact as to make their attempts to work it out merely exhibit the insufficiency and self-contradictoriness of their conception. His relation to Schelling's views is to all appearance much more that of agreement and acquiescence. So much is this the case that at one period it is difficult to distinguish Hegel's own view from that of Schelling for whom he seems to act as defender and expositor. Even here however the agreement is not complete, as we shall show later on. But we are not at liberty to argue that he adopted another attitude during his early career to Schelling than he did to Kant or Fichte, that Schelling disagreed less with him on the whole than with the other two, that these latter never met with acceptance from him at any time but only with disagreement. The reason that we learn of this agreement is not because Schelling was the only person with whom Hegel could agree or had ever agreed but merely because the exigences of Hegel's career required him, after his installation as lecturer in the University of Jena, and on his entrance into the philosophical circle gathered there, to give

(1) 
Warke I. 'Diff. d. Ficht u. Sch. System.'
some declaration of his position. If there had been occasion for a similar declaration earlier in his career doubtless we might have discovered decided affinity with Kant or Fichte. When we remember that Schelling's was the primary philosophical influence at Jena when Hegel went there, that he was in fact the only considerable philosopher in the University, having left Jena about 1789, two years before Hegel arrived, it will seem natural enough that Hegel should on entering express himself in agreement with the already established and pronounced philosophical tendency of the University. The reticence and want of emphasis with which this agreement is expressed indicates even that it meant more than absence of disagreement. The agreement cannot have lasted longer than two or perhaps three years, and can hardly have continued after 1803, when Schelling left Jena and the 'Critical Journal' which they had jointly edited for about a year (1802-3) ceased to exist.

And Hegel's subsequent attitude to Schelling justifies us in minimising the influence exerted by Schelling no less than in the case of Kant and Fichte. For no sooner does Hegel discover, as he must have done by 1803, that Schelling's principle is inadequate to explain what it professes to solve, than Hegel breaks away from him and thenceforth pursues a course entirely his own. And After the publication of the 'Phenomenology'

(1) See the 'Diff., d. F. U. Sch. Syst.' ad fin.
(2) Also Kurze Fichte, 'Hegel's Leben u. Werke' p. 242 ff.
Rosenkranz, Hegels Leben, 108.
in 1806 and probably for some time previous to this, Hegel seems to have been in no appreciable degree influenced, still less assisted by his contemporaries. Finally, allowing fully for the influence exerted upon him by the philosophy of his day, and it cannot be questioned that Hegel finds himself to be one with it in principle, still the manner in which Hegel works out his principle in detail exhibits hardly more than a verbal similarity, a similarity of terminology, between his philosophy and the systems of his immediate predecessors.

We cannot therefore find our material for tracing the development of the Logic simply lying to hand in those works of his three great contemporaries which appeared while his own views were immature. If such were the only material available for our purpose, the development would remain a sealed book, or else the discussion of it would be a tissue of mere suggestions. The value of these works is at best merely indirect; they assist in bringing into relief by way of contrast Hegel's own views; to confine attention solely to them and their probable influence on Hegel's thought is entirely misleading. For this leaves entirely out of sight the decided and unquestionable influence exerted on Hegel by the study of Greek philosophy, and especially in his earlier period, of Plato. It is perhaps not too much to say that he received as much help from Greek philosophy for the solution of the problem set by the philosophy of his day and answered as he thought so inadequately by his contemporaries, as from
any system of his own time. (1) His reading in Greek philosophy had been
continuous for years, and his study of it was carried on during his
orientation in and appreciation of modern philosophy. So that by the time
he came to lecture in Jena (and certainly later) he seems to have had the
widest acquaintance with the history of philosophy of all the contemporary
representatives of the subject. Kant's knowledge of the history of
philosophy seems never to have been extensive, nor his interest in it
keen. Fichte's activity was wholly occupied with the completion and
development of the Kantian principle, and the satisfaction of the
philosophical needs of his own time as he understood them. Nor again had
Schelling concerned himself to any appreciable extent with the systematic
study of the preceding philosophers. Hegel however seems undoubtedly to
have possessed a wide and thorough acquaintance with the history of
philosophy before any part of his own system was published. The evidence
for this is found in the fact that the lectures on the history of
philosophy delivered in Jena 1805-6 (i.e. before the publication of the
"Phenomenology of Mind") were, with the exception of slight changes, and
considerable extensions, the same as those which he delivered later and
which now form part of his published works. (2) His opinions on the systems

(1) v. Rosenkranz 'Leben Hegel's' p.62.

(2) Rosenkranz 'Hegel's Leben' p.201.
of his immediate predecessors or contemporaries were therefore by this time already formed, and his judgments regarding their principles he never altered. (1) This being the case we do not seem entitled to suppose that Hegel's system simply grew out of his predecessors, and that the germs of all his conceptions can be found if we go no further back than Kant.

On the other hand it is true that Hegel himself considered that his system completed those of his immediate predecessors, and removed their limitations and onesidedness. But then this was not because he merely rearranged and restated their results in a more systematic, (or in another systematic) form or considered himself simply their truest expositor, but rather because it was itself a part of his own scheme of philosophy to view his system as a truer philosophy. For on the one hand it succeeded theirs in time and was therefore the latest step in the dialectic of the history of philosophy, and on the other hand the principle of the philosophy of his day, as he conceived it (Spirit, Mind, 'Geist') had become explicit, 'conscious of itself' in his system.

On the whole then we may conclude that reference to Hegel's more immediate antecedents can only serve to bring out by contrast, rather than by direct elucidation, the meaning of his principle or conceptions. But if

(1) Rosenkranz 'Hegel's Leben' p.201.
we treat their work as subsidiary, the only available material for our purpose must be sought in the record of Hegel's early history given in Rosenkranz "Life of Hegel," supplemented by the "Letters of Hegel" collected by Hegel's son, and also in relevant parts of Hegel's published works. To these therefore we must primarily confine attention. (1)

We shall most readily open up the subject of our enquiry if to begin with we indicate the direction from which Hegel approached philosophy, the attitude and interest he possessed or was led to adopt in regard to its problems, and the dominating ideas from which his system finally arose.

Hegel's earliest work lay in theology. His merely professional interest in the subject seems to have ceased probably a few years after leaving the theological seminary in Stuttgart, but his emancipation from the influence of the formal school-theology came much earlier still than his resignation of a theological career. It was therefore through theology that he worked his way into philosophy; it was out of the necessities of the former that he
became aware of the need of the latter, and the supreme importance of the problems of theology was felt by him all through his development. We shall see the bearing of this later on; we need only mention in passing the repeated recurrence of theological conceptions throughout his work to illustrate the significance which theology always possessed for him. In addition to theology, and next after it in interest, in his earliest period, history and law claimed his attention, (1) and it was the problems which suggested themselves to him in the course of his study of these subjects, pursued apparently without any definite aim at first, that induced him to seek in philosophy for some means of solving them. Thus we find him engaging in a critical examination of the main facts and ideas of religion, and seeking in Kant's philosophy, and apparently finding there some answer to his questions. From his letters to Schelling (2) we gather that he either accepted Kant's results entirely or accepted them provisionally and sought by the help of them to understand current religious conceptions. This interest in Kant's results meant primarily an interest in Kant's ethical and religious conclusions; which is indeed what we might have anticipated. For example he makes an attempt which he proposes to make to discover how far the conception of God derived from or based on

(1) Rosen. Leben p. 45. (2) Ros. 'Leben' 65 ff. ('Briefe,' 6ff.)
'moral faith' can be actually used in dealing with the physical world, in what way the moral progressiveness can be held to mean natural (physical) progressiveness, how a moral theology can be worked back into a physical theology.

Too much importance cannot of course be attached to such general statements as appear in the letters; the information conveyed is too indefinite. All we can safely draw from them is an indication of the kind of interest Hegel at the time possessed in regard to Kant's theories and the attitude he adopted towards them. That interest we repeat was primarily determined by the value or importance Kant's conclusions would have for the elucidation of religious ideas. Hegel's attention seemed to have been for long engaged upon the 'postulates of practical reason' solely in this connexion. Nor did the significance of Kant's fundamental principle—that the Ego is the absolute for and in experience—escape him; though his full appreciation of it was greatly assisted and in part determined by the efforts made by Fichte and Schelling just about that time (1794-5) to develop its meaning.\(^1\) Hegel's own reflection on Kant's principle and its execution led him in the first instance to adopt the same view of it, to regard it in the same light as Fichte, whose development of that principle started as is well known from the 'practical reason.' For to Hegel as to Fichte its primary importance was found in the spheres of

\(^1\) v. Third letter to Schelling.
morality and religion. On the one hand the self-legislative character of moral reason, and the conception of freedom thereby enunciated once for all, established man not merely as that which is of supreme and highest worth in the world, but also as a being that, as a rational end in himself, is by his very nature of equal rank with every rational spirit. On the other hand the determination of the object of religion according to and in terms of that which is the supreme element or factor in knowledge, the writing 'large' of the ego of finite knowledge and experience in the form of the absolute Ego, was not a difficult step to take and was rendered for Hegel during this period easier partly by the help of the contemporaries named, but still more because it seemed to afford ample satisfaction to the needs of the religious consciousness which he seems at the time to have been more especially endeavouring to understand. Neither however in the case of Fichte nor in that of Kant did he appear to accept more than the principle. We have his own explicit indication that he considered Kant's view required development, (1) and Fichte he seems never to have followed in detail (2).

The above point of view having once been gained, and its value for morality and religion to some extent appreciated, Hegel had taken up his first philosophical position, and obtained his earliest theoretical conviction. Much as he deviated from his original mode of construing that

---

(1) v. Third letter to Schelling.

(2) v. infra
position, nevertheless his starting point seems to have been made here. All that it meant to him at this time we have no means of accurately determining, as no explicit working out of his interpretation has been recorded. What we are quite able to determine is the general significance which in his view it possessed. His primary interest in the position was the value of it for the moral and religious life, both as a means of harmonising his own convictions and opinions on these subjects and of increasing their meaning for him. Its importance for science as such, or even for philosophy as such did not seem to appeal to him. He acknowledged willingly enough the significance and use made of it in this reference by others, (Fichte and Schelling). His interest in it was much more restricted, and it was not for some years that its wider significance became of supreme moment to him. He seems to have seen, for instance, in the conception of the absolute Ego precisely what was wanted to determine in some intelligible manner the religious conception of 'Spirit,' than which word (Geist) hardly any recurs in Hegel's utterances. We need not dwell further on this fact at present, and should not emphasise it so strongly did it not throw so much light on Hegel's attitude to the non-ethical and non-religious aspects of experience, for example on his view of Nature as a mere 'counterpart' of mind, as that which is in itself 'immanent.' It indicates an attitude of

(1) cp. "Briefe" I. p.10.
moral and religious self-assertion, an intensity of emphasis on these aspects of experience which was characteristic of Hegel from the beginning and which he consistently sustained to the end.

Naturally enough the hold which the above principles had on Hegel at the outset was not due to this merely intellectual appreciation of their intrinsic objective meaning as such and for its own sake, but was derived from the more or less emotionalised convictions and opinions which gave value to these principles, and which they helped to support. Such an unsystematic and uncritical adoption of principles so far-reaching in their nature and so comprehensive in content could have only one result—mysticism. And this seems to have been Hegel's intellectual attitude at the time of his leaving Switzerland for Frankfurt (1797). (1) He read the works of Eckhart and Tauler, and himself made ventures in indefinite theosophical speculation. His mysticism was the product of religious convictions supported by an uncriticised philosophical position. The convictions seem always to have remained with him; his aim in their regard being simply to understand them and systematise them. They do not seem to have been wrung from a severe mental conflict but were the result rather of a spirit of acquiescence. They seem simply to have been felt as ordinary necessities of life and adopted as such.

His theoretical tenets however begin in the Frankfurt period to change

(1) op. Ros. 101-2.
their form; his appreciation of their meaning and all its bearings gradually seems to grow upon him. He develops a new interest in them, an interest of a different kind. As hitherto he continues his work in history, ethics and more particularly religion. But his increased acquaintance with these subjects seems to have made him aware of the intimate and essential relation which these subjects have to philosophy. He came to see that from the indefiniteness of mysticism, the caprice of mere 'Schwärmerei,' and of a religious life based on feeling, there could be only one escape and defence, namely to make definite and precise the ideas and concepts employed; and this was the business of philosophy. He began to perceive that the problems of morality and religion are really only part of a larger problem the solution of which alone can guarantee a true appreciation of these two aspects of experience themselves, that the answer to the questions set by morality and religion is to be found, if our knowledge of them is to be sufficient as well as complete, in philosophy or metaphysic and not elsewhere. This new and larger interest in the subjects to which he had hitherto confined his attention removed finally the limitations of his view both of these subjects and of the principle which he had adopted to make them harmonious. We find him meeting the new problems he has to face not by abandoning the principle which had hitherto served him in the case of morality and religion alone but by deepening his appreciation of this principle. And his reason for this simple transition seems not difficult to find. Religion is the relation in which man stands to the highest
reality; the object of the religious consciousness names that highest reality, sums up the meaning of all reality into this its highest form or expression (God, namely) and all that is real and has a meaning in itself is contained implicitly in that Reality as such. This Highest Reality is then in a definite sense all reality whatsoever. Consequently when Hegel discovered that the problems of religion led him at once into philosophy he did not feel that he stepped into an entirely new sphere, that he would take up in philosophy an entirely different object. It was in a sense the same object that required to be dealt with; it was indeed because it was the same object that Hegel, in both philosophy and religion, that was his whole interest in the former for its own sake, and induced him to view the latter in the light of the results thereby attained. For both philosophy and religion deal with the whole of reality, the reality in itself is the same in both cases, but the expression of it, and attitude towards it are different in each case. This community of object-matter it was then which made possible and necessary for Hegel the transition to philosophy for itself, for its own sake. Still the 'motif' for such a transition must again be emphasised; it was primarily in the interests of and from the point of view of religion. Even when Hegel seems to have abandoned himself to philosophy for its own sake without any apparent ulterior or implicit reference, a little consideration will soon show us that he never loses sight of religion. To take only one indication; it will be impossible except on
this assumption to explain why religion should occupy the place it does in his "Philosophy of Mind," which is the most 'concrete' form of reality for Hegel. It was of the very spirit of his philosophy to assign to religion the place which he gave to it. It is true he places philosophy highest of all in the Encyclopaedia; but, though this does not substantially affect our contention, at the first stages of this new transition to the philosophical interest of which we are speaking, we note that he maintained that religion was highest, that "philosophy must cease with religion." (1) From one point of view we may even regard his whole philosophy as a prolonged attempt to 'reconcile philosophy and religion.' His introductory chapter to the Philosophy of Religion seems to possess little or no signification if it does not support the contention here maintained; (2) and this work was one of his latest utterances.

If the above explanation of Hegel's new interest in philosophy be accepted we can see not only how his interest came about, but why he should have appealed to philosophy to solve his problems and not to a special science, say the 'science of religion' in the ordinary sense. The latter would have left unsolved precisely Hegel's problem, which was to determine more completely and accurately the contents of the 'true' Reality, and not to state how this had been regarded by different ages and peoples, what

---

emotions it raised in them etc. etc. And we see too that such a
treatment and enquiry as he desires would not do injustice to religion as
such but would put it in perspective. While not allowing that the
religious consciousness alone expressed what was meant by Reality, it
would still admit that it expressed that reality truly, but would hold
that that reality was otherwise determinable, because it contained other
elements or aspects than those which had primarily significance for
religion, and because there were other forms of consciousness which sought
to express reality as a whole. Thus his change of attitude towards
religion, and his change of interest in the object of religion did not
lead him to a rejection of that principle which had proved of service in
the more restricted sphere hitherto of primary importance to him; rather
it led him to determine more accurately the content of that principle.
The above considerations then will sufficiently indicate the lines
along which Hegel approached the problem of philosophy, the motives which
led him to interest himself thoroughly in it, the demands he made upon it,
the needs he thought to satisfy by it, and the general point of view from
which he set himself to the task. The new interest which he developed
about this time soon manifested itself in definite form. He made a
general but incomplete, and apparently unfinished sketch of the various
parts of philosophy, showed this relation of the parts to each other and
in part developed each. It meets us as the expression of his first
definite views on philosophy and partakes of the nature of a scheme rather
than a system. It is probable that the construction of it had occupied him for some years, but it appears in its present form to belong more particularly to the years 1792-1800. As it is here that we meet with his first utterances on Logic we must first of all briefly indicate the general nature and content of the scheme and then determine more precisely the view of logic there found.
PART I.
1797-1860

After what has been already said we are prepared to find that Hegel's supreme principle is Spirit (Geist). What he is to attempt to do is to give some more or less systematic knowledge of the supreme Reality and the relation to that of other realities. His whole procedure therefore is determined by a judgment of value in virtue of which he decides beforehand what of reality is highest, or what 'highest' as applied to reality means. And the sphere of experience from which he draws this conception of highest reality is, as we see, primarily religion. At the very outset he names this highest reality Spirit. Why he should have adopted such a principle, why he should have begun there, apparently without any preliminary enquiry, with hardly any criticism of it, seems inexplicable on the ground suggested—namely the religious interest in the problem. For unquestionably this name would more accurately describe or indicate the nature of highest reality as understood and accepted in religion than any other name that could be found. In this sense then and from this point of view we may say that, if 'Geist' be taken as the password of Idealism, Hegel was idealist from the start. Idealism indeed was rather an assumption or dogma held at the outset of his philosophising than a final conclusion from it: a standpoint, not a result of philosophical enquiry.

It is also his religious interest in the task of philosophy, it is the dominating influence of the point of view and the claims of religion which determines his conception of philosophy throughout this period and
the purpose assigned to it and its instruments, thinking and reflexion. (1) Thinking, reflexion requires for its activity an opposition, in part an opposition to what does not think, in part an opposition between thought and what is thought about. Such an opposition is not overcome in thought itself and is essential to reflexion. But in religion all finitude (opposition of elements) is overcome; that which cannot be obtained by thought and which yet the mind seeks to attain is accomplished by religion. (2) Hence he maintained at this stage that "philosophy must cease with religion." It is not possible to gather much from the statements actually given by Hegel at this time. They are too abstract, metaphysical and indefinite. But still they none the less indicate the influence and importance of the point of view of religion on which we lay so much stress.

It must be noted however that in the earliest stages 'spirit' as applied to the highest reality has not the same determinate meaning which it comes to have later when the use of the term is made precise by a careful development of its content. A similar indefiniteness is found as indeed is natural and inevitable in most of Hegel's terms as used in the

(1) v. Ros. 94-96.

(2) Because in religion the finite life shares in, is a moment of identifies itself with the infinite life.
preliminary stage. Not that 'spirit,' even as found at first, is not
determinate; it is definitely meant to be employed as a principle; but it is
more a conception of a reality (namely highest reality, which for
Hegel is absolute reality) without any but the most general and indefinite
meaning being attached to that conception as such. Its nature therefore
such as it has is determined not so much by reference to the character of
'spirit' as actually found in experience, as by reference to the general
character of the reality which it is intended to designate. This character
contains such attributes as all-inclusiveness, determination of all by
itself, unity with itself, and the like. 'Spirit' perhaps even in
experience may seem to come nearest to what such a reality is; still
inasmuch as Hegel has not developed at this stage what he means by spirit
in its most fundamental nature, and has hardly done more than indicate what
'absolute' spirit means, we are forced to maintain that the term is used in
its vaguest and most general signification. This contention is still
further borne out when we observe the ease with which he slips into still
vaguer and even metaphorical phraseology when referring to the highest
reality. (1)

Highest (2) or absolute reality is that in which all opposition

(1) He uses a·q. the term "Life" to designate the Reality and treats it almost as the equivalent of "Spirit."
(2) Ros. 114-5.
terminates and is reconciled; it is one, and is the supreme unity; it is a self, which reflects or projects itself into difference, and finds itself in this difference; it is personal in the sense of being Ego, the 'absolute Ego', and possesses therefore 'absolute self-knowledge.' Self-knowledge in fact with all that that implies is the most determinate characteristic of Absolute Spirit. It presents, or lays before itself (darstellt) an other; and that other is Nature. That other is its own other, the other of its self and therefore in that other it knows merely itself. But that other is not simply presented to the mind (Absolute Spirit), it is not simply contained in it as an idea is in the consciousness of the knower; it is a 'living' reality, is completely and entirely real, it is the absolutely real other of absolute living spirit. This difference between a merely ideal other, and a real other Hegel is at pains to emphasise. He maintains that the other which is for the abstract simple 'Idea' of absolute spirit is not that which is the other for the real actual 'living' absolute spirit. The former is a purely logical other, the latter a real other; the movement, process or passing to the other in the first case is a logical process, in the second it is more than logical it is metaphysical. Still he does no more than indicate this difference; work it out he does not at this stage. The affinity between 'logical' and 'real' other cannot well be ignored. For nature has 'Ideality' with reference to Spirit, is 'ideally' a moment in it; 'the absolute unity of spirit is not real or absolute Ego in nature.' Still,
obscure as this difference is, Hegel maintained strongly that there was a difference between the two forms of otherness and that the difference was vital.

Beyond this very general statement regarding the relation of Absolute Spirit and Nature Hegel does not at this stage go. He merely indicates in the most abstract way that Absolute Spirit must gather up into itself all difference, all otherness, Nature included, and 'pass no more beyond itself.' Absolute spirit so regarded he speaks of as the 'absolutely simple negative unity,' the 'absolute mere nothing.' When he attempts further to describe Nature itself he does so both by positive and negative characteristics, but mainly the latter. These latter are determined simply by reference to absolute spirit, for which it is. Nature is spirit which 'does not know itself' as absolute spirit; it is absolute self-reflexion, but does not reflect itself, does not itself project itself, which is not for its own self the unity which reflects an other and knows in that other its self. Nature is not the purely negative simple unity of absolute spirit as such, which can be named the absolute non-ens. Positively determined on the other hand, he calls Nature that which, because the other, (an other e.g. which lacks the essential unity of that of which it is an other), is simply the absolutely discrete, that which is the purely differentiate and side-by-side-ness, pure quantitativeness, and indifference of itself to itself; hence its

(1) Ros. 113.
character of endleness, endless movement and change. He also speaks of Nature as knowledge (i.e. as distinct from self-knowledge); further as Life, but a 'formal' life, a life which is in itself, and not a life which is for itself.

In addition to these two problems presented to philosophy by nature and spirit, Hegel finds another in the abstract formal thought-determinations of reality as known, in the abstract characteristics of thought and being, "Geist" and 'Sein' and their relations. He says explicitly nothing at all about the relation of the contents of this last problem to those of the others. He does not seek to distinguish the logical ideal formal concepts from the realities as found e.g. in Nature, but beyond indicating that in the latter the former are 'sublated' nothing is said. (1) We are left however to conclude in a general way that the logical determinations are the abstract content of absolute spirit.

The obvious inadequacy of the above scheme thus generally stated is probably due to the fact that it pretended to be no more than a sketch of his general position in philosophy, that it was apparently not finished at least as regards spirit as such (which was dealt with only with reference to morality), and that he was not as yet fully aware of what was necessary in order to determine completely and systematically that Reality which he set out to know. What has been so far stated yields us the following

(1) Ros. 114.
conclusions:—

1. That Hegel's philosophical interpretation of reality at the earliest stage starts from, proceeds from the point of view of Absolute or Supreme Reality, which embraces in itself the whole of reality.

2. That such a treatment of the whole of reality has its source in a religious interest in reality as a whole; for it is only in religious experience that reality is taken as a whole, and in its totality; and that consequently the principle which is the assumption of the religious consciousness, (that Absolute Reality is Spirit) must hold in philosophy likewise for it is the same reality in both cases.

3. That philosophy is therefore with Hegel 'speculation' from the outset, and his interest in the fundamental aspects of reality is of this nature; and that being concerned with the whole as such it is necessarily System, raving for its principle 'Spirit' is necessary! Idealism.

4. That this absolute Reality appears, expresses itself or is expressible by three orders or most general and fundamental phases, or moments, the purely Ideal, Nature, and Spirit (or Mind) strictly; and that conformably with his main problem, his interest in and treatment of these phases is solely speculative; that therefore his conception of nature in particular is determined from the side of an: as a mode of spirit and in

(1) Ros. 102-3.
no sense as apart from spirit. (1) Hence from the beginning there is maintained a distinction between philosophical knowledge and 'ordinary' knowledge, between the philosophical view of Nature and the 'common' view held by 'common sense' or ordinary science.

5. That while a fairly definite connexion is expressly indicated between nature and absolute spirit, this is not clearly defined Hegel being rather at pains to distinguish them than to show their inner connectedness; that in any case no 'transition' in the strict dialectical sense is made from one to the other; that there is no 'transition' indicated from the Ideal (logic) to the real (nature or spirit), at most he merely indicates that they are distinct moments of the one spirit.

6. That his method of treatment and terminology employed in dealing with the ultimate reality as also with nature is primarily mystical, metaphysical and undetermined, and fettered by the obscurity of mysticism. His idealism at this stage is that of a religious mysticism not of absolute knowledge; his principle is dealt with in toto et abstracto and not in extenso et concreto.

(1) Ros. 116.
Such being his general position at this time we must now state in detail his view of logic. (1) And here at the outset we must steer clear of an error into which it is perhaps easy to fall, and from which Hegel's biographer seems hardly to have kept himself free, namely that of regarding Hegel's earliest scheme of logic as identical with his final view of its problem and content. This is certainly not the case. The mere fact that Hegel distinguishes emphatically between Logic and Metaphysic would itself sufficiently make this evident; and when we take note that he distinguishes between our knowledge of the absolute spirit and the knowledge which that spirit has of itself, and again is at pains as we have seen to distinguish the ideal thought-content of the real, or rather the ideal presentation of the real from the real itself without exhibiting the inner involution of the one with the other, the difference is clearly very marked indeed between his early and later points of view. And thus it comes about, as we shall see presently, that what is the Idea of absolute spirit or the absolute spirit qua Idea does not form part of logic at all, but rather of metaphysic. There is in short only the most distant resemblance between the logic of this period and its later form.

Hegel distinguishes from the Philosophy of Nature and philosophy of spirit what he designates 'theoretical' philosophy. The point of the

(1) Ros. 104 ff.
distinction, which is perhaps not happily named, seems plainly to be that whereas the two former discuss the relations and connections of concrete real objects as they actually exist, the last treats of the formal, abstract general concepts as concepts of what exist not simply as concepts but as real. It would be inaccurate to describe it as a discussion on knowledge, for only one part of it is concerned with knowledge; and it is not simply ontology, nor again is it merely logic; it comprehends all these parts of philosophy.

This theoretical philosophy he divides into Logic and Metaphysic. In the former he deals with the nature and formal character of being and of thought taken abstractly and generally, and taken also as over against and opposed to each other. The discussion of logic falls therefore quite naturally into three parts a. the determination of the general character of being (being i.e. in general the "real", not "pure" being), b. of the general character of thought taken also by itself, c. of the method by which being and thought in their separateness and distinctness may be and are related to each other. All these three are determined and indeed arise by our external reflexion, we abstract and fix in formal definiteness being and thought; not even (c.) therefore is the reflexion of the thing by itself, it is our reflexion on the relation of (a.) and (b.). Hence since reflexion or movement of any reality through itself and in itself is taken to be what knowledge means, and since this requires not reflexion upon the reality, but the reflexion by itself of the
content of reality logic is not concerned with knowledge, the latter falls out of its province and is dealt with by metaphysic. Such discussion by metaphysic is however still formal, ideal, because dealing with the conceptual nature of that which reflects or relates itself to itself.\(^{(1)}\)

'Logic therefore,' Hegel states, 'ceases where the relation \(\xi\) (c.) (above indicated) ceases.'\(^{(2)}\) It is true he suggests as an alternative name for metaphysic 'Logic of Reason', distinguishing it thus from 'Logic of Understanding'.\(^{(3)}\) But such a terminology is quite loose and misleading. For logic would then be the general name for the whole of theoretical philosophy; but in that case the above statement that logic ceases at relation of being and thought and that metaphysic succeeds to it has no meaning, and would be unquestionably opposed to Hegel's general position. Doubtless the term 'logic of reason' suggests a closer connexion between his earlier and later view than the term metaphysic; none the less the term 'logic' is clearly inaccurate and loose in this connection.

Logic then in Hegel's present sense deals with the purely abstract and formal determinations and characterisations of being and of thought, taken each in the definite meaning usually belonging to them as distinct and distinguishable entities. This does not as we shall immediately see imply that Hegel conceived them to be fundamentally opposed, and

\[\begin{align*}
(1) & \quad \text{See below.} \\
(2) & \quad \text{Ros. 110.} \\
(3) & \quad \text{Ros. 104.}
\end{align*}\]
unrelateable; all that this division of the subject matter of logic means is that these are the ultimate *genres* of what is determinable by external reflexion. The discussion in both cases does not confine itself to a simple statement or catalogue of the determinations of each; there is a strenuous endeavour to unite by some inner connexion these various qualifications. And this last feature marks Hegel's plan and method of thinking all along; it is systematic and systematic connectedness which is his dominant 'tendance.' Note that he is at first clear as to how this connexion is to be obtained, or what is its essential method: all we can claim is that it was an unhesitating presupposition that such connexion must be found and that he endeavoured in some measure to realise it from the first.

The discussion of being (the real) deals with its categories, which fall into two groups, those which determine being taken by itself, and those which determine its relations. In the first group we have at the outset *Quality*; this is the most immediate determination of being. Quality raises itself or gives rise to *Quantity* by virtue of the indeterminateness of its character which essentially implies limitation; for quality is limitation. Quantity again possesses as its forms the numerical *one*, numerical *plurality*, and numerical *allness*. If further we combine the concepts of quality and quantity we shall find that they are constitutive elements of Infinity. For this last is the negation of one quality through another, and of one quantity through another, or of a
quality through a change in its quantity or degree. From consideration of these we get two kinds of infinity, that which is the result of a quantitative determination of a quality, (the quality in this case persistently asserting itself and uniting therefore in the form of a quantified quality both determinations i.e. quality and undeterminateness i.e. quantity), and that which results merely from the passing of one definite quantity into another. Here then we find already the 'true' and the 'false' infinity.

Without further elaboration or analysis Hegel passes to the second group of categories, those namely of the relations of being. These are Substantiality, Causality, and Reciprocity. His conception and analysis of these were at this stage for the most part the same as that found in the later forms of his system. And we find even that here as later reciprocity is the category which leads the way to the notion, or concept as such (Begriff); and since Hegel at this stage takes the concept to be the absolute form of thought, reciprocity forms the stepping-stone on which we pass from the discussion of being to that of thought, it is the link which unites the 'natural' determinations of logic with the 'thought' determinations.

The elucidation of this inner connexion between the two is perhaps the most substantial and permanent contribution of this his early logic to his later system; and that he should have made that connexion clear to himself thus early in his development is in itself very significant and throws considerable light on his general point of view. For it indicates
to begin with that he thereby completely broke down the wall of separation between being as such and thought as such, which was set up by Descartes and which endured up to Hegel's own day. And it shows what for him the 'relation of thought to being' meant; the method he took to show their inner connectedness was not that of a critical analysis of thought, and its capacity for knowledge, nor was it that of a deduction of the one out of the other, the one (thought) being assumed as the ground, while the other was wrenched from it as a consequent. Rather to Hegel both are actual in their own right and with equal right. But they are connected essentially because the "subject" is also "substance", because substance has its truest form in spiritual substance, as 'substantia cogitans' i.e. as subject, that consequently reciprocity, which is the highest formal characterisation of substance will necessarily lead us to the concept or notion, the absolute form of thought. (1) Hegel thus turns from the form which this vital distinction (between being and thought) had received in his own day, especially at the hands of Kant, and takes the distinction in its final most universal form which was likewise the form which it originally received when it first appeared in the earliest stages of modern philosophy—the distinction namely between the 'two substances,' 'substantia cogitans,' and 'substantia materialis.' This was the root of the matter, and Hegel, we may say, made out that these were not in reality heterogeneous, that the former was not simply the abstract passive universal support of properties, but was that which determined its activity as its
own, was concrete and universal at once, and its content through and by itself, and related it to itself—was therefore Subject, which was at once all that substance could be and was more. And since thought was the content of the subject, the direct and immediate connexion was established between reciprocity as the completest determination of being and the concept which was the primary form under which thought appeared. (1)

We cannot however do more than give this general statement of what if expanded might lead to a long digression. (2) The above explanation will perhaps sufficiently indicate the point of view from which Hegel must have proceeded in order to establish a relation of whatever kind between reciprocity or the "paralytic infinity" as he then termed it, and the notion, the absolute "infinite" self-unity between universal particular and individual. Such a relation as he sought to exhibit is merely an instance consequence of a point of view which determined even from the start his whole conception of the content and purpose of Logic. According to this point of view mind and object, thought and being (reality) were elements in one total reality; they existed together side by side, and

---

(1) This connexion however was not established in the same way as later nor did the significance of the position above described present itself to him at this period in the way it did later. All we have is the general position. See below. p. 34. 61ff.

(2) See also below: de.
and were both realities, forms of the one comprehensive Reality. The
business of Logic (the abstract general science) was simply to state the
abstract content of this one Reality without limitation of that content to
the one element in the whole rather than the other. But just this
exposition of this content marks off Logic in Hegel’s sense from Logic as
ordinarily treated. The latter is “formal”, it deals with thought only and
is opposed to being. Hegel’s includes both thought and being. As opposed
therefore to “formal logic” in its usual traditional signification, Hegel’s
logic deals from the first with what is constitutive of all Reality; it is
“Transcendental Logic.”

In passing from this discussion of being to that of thought we may
merely note the very close similarity there is between these categories of
being as given by Hegel and the ‘table of categories’ in the first part of
Kant’s ‘transcendental logic.’ And in view of his opinion that the
possibility of the ‘completion of science’ was opened up by Kant’s system,
and would be realised by following out the principle it contained, such a
resemblance might perhaps have been expected. As in Kant we have quantity,
quality, relation so here we have quality, quantity, relation. “Modality.”
Hegel omits partly because it is clearly not a category of being in his
sense, and partly for a reason which will presently appear. But whereas

(1) See below. p. 424
(2) Ros. 10.
(3) p. 35
for Kant the order in which the categories were stated was immaterial, seeing that his purpose in the 'table' was merely to make a list, a catalogue, and to make it complete, for Hegel the order is of the first importance. For his aim is not simply to state all the categories, but to state them in systematic connectedness with one another; and for this purpose it is obviously essential that he should determine with what to begin. Hence Hegel starts with quality and that apparently for two reasons (1) because quality is the lowest most elementary determination of being we can find, and (2) simply in order that he might connect quality and quantity. To establish which, in the connection of these two elements, should be prior, could not have caused great difficulty, because the impossibility of getting quality out of quantity was a fairly obvious philosophical commonplace, and nothing was therefore left but to unite them by starting from the side of quality. We cannot however lay too much stress on this similarity between the two schemes of categories, pronounced and unquestionable though that similarity is. We have already indicated our reasons for not pressing too closely in Hegel's case an apparent dependence on his predecessors which might be discoverable in his terminology, and here we find, where he seems simply to borrow from Kant, a divergence which must not be overlooked. For Hegel does not mean by, for example, quality, what Kant included under that term. Indeed we might say that quality in Hegel's sense was not a category at all for Kant. For the latter, 'quality' is a general name for certain categories; for Hegel
it is in itself an abstract determination of being. But we cannot pursue further at present the connexion in detail between them. (v)

The connexion between reciprocity and the concept or notion (Begriff) having been indicated we have now to learn what the nature and feature of the concept itself is. It is in the first instance determinable from that relation to reciprocity. Substance as the universal differentiates itself, and is not merely differentiated (is not merely passively recipient). It therefore owns the opposites as its particulars; but relates them to itself, and distinguishes itself therefore from them, therby constituting itself subject of them, ideally (immunenntly) containing them, and not merely the substrate in which they "inhere." But in so uniting its differences in itself, distinguishing itself from them and yet relating them to itself, it is not a mere universal, nor a mere medley of differences, it is a self-relating individual. And these three are the 'moments' of the concept or the 'notion.' They are not external to reflexion, they are themselves realised in our reflexion, and accepted by it as its own moments. Our reflexion is their actual reflexion, it is the relation which they themselves possess with one another.

The point of this reference to 'reflection' becomes obvious when we bear in mind the content of the Logic. The categories of being form one part of the Logic, and in them we have the abstract moments of being as these are determined by (external) reflexion upon it; they are its reflected moments. In the notion we have content of mind proper; our mind
is the reality in question. The reflexion of its (the notion's) moments is the reflexion of our mind, thought proper. Our reflexion is one and the same with the reflexion of the moments of the notion. In the categories of being therefore we have the reflexion of being as it is; in the moments of the notion the reflexion of our thought as it is, "our reflexion." Thought and being however are not absolutely severed; for the notion is the "ideal reflexion of being." But what this further means, and how the "reflexion" of each is related Hegel does not here indicate.

The notion further appears as definitely determinate, i.e. concretely as universal, particular and individual. It appears also as judgment, and finally as syllogism. In the form of judgment Hegel considered two cases, one where the subject is subsumed under the predicate, the other where the predicate is subsumed under the subject; in the former case the predicate is first definitely pointed, in the second the subject. He sought to convert the purely negative character of the predicate in the infinite judgment into a positive character, to conceive the negation of being as the denial of a potentially necessary predicate. For this reason he did not mention modality as a qualification of judgment (1) the assumption being apparently that where as in this case all judgments become necessary, modality ceases to apply to them. Syllogism likewise took two forms, a

---

(1) Ros. 109.
relations of opposed predicates inside a subject which holds their
determination ideally in itself, and a relation of two opposed subjects
identified and united inside the reality of the predicates. This distinc-
tion gave him the hypothetical and disjunctive syllogisms.

These various determinations of the concept were not treated by Hegel
at great length, and the barest outline of his meaning is the most that is
indicated. We are simply led to conclude that these moments of the concept
have significance solely for thought, and inside the sphere of thought as
an actual reality

The separation which he at the outset makes between being and thought
he attempts in part to overcome by his doctrine of "Proportion," which is a
kind of methodology and aims at finding how they may be connected, by what
means or on what terms they may be brought together. As might be expected
this relating of the two \( \text{comes} \) in the first instance from the side
of thought; for this is the reflexion of being, and its own moments there-
fore have a relation to being as such. Hegel attempts to establish an
'equality' between the universal and the individual; and this by three
methods, Definition, Division and Proof. The first determines a given
subject by reference to and in terms of its universal, the second by
presenting the differences which the subject in its universality can
contain and in which that subject can particularise itself. So far the
'proportion' is determined solely by means of 'our reflexion,' our
'dialectical' treatment of it. In the case of proof however the reflexion is by and through the reality itself; the reality 'reflects itself'; it is the actual unity of the universal particular and individual; and proof just consists in this totality mediating itself through itself. This thoroughgoing mediation can be named 'construction,' and from another point of view, that namely of the complete equality' of the reflexion with itself, 'deduction.'

The foregoing statement of the nature of proportion, as will be seen, contains no reference directly to 'being'; and indeed we would naturally conclude from it that proportion meant not a relation of being to thought, but rather a relation among the component elements of the concept, i.e. between universal particular and individual. For the discussion seeks to determine by what methods a universal is to be formally equated with an individual. It would seem therefore more appropriate to have treated proportion as a subsection of the discussion of the concept. Still when it is borne in mind that the elements of the concept are not taken to be merely the moments of thought, but, as thought is the "ideal reflexion of the real," to be moments of or have direct reference to being, the proportion between being and thought is not inappropriate. And the need for bringing together in some way the elements of Reality already separated gives point to a separate discussion on the "proportion" of being and thought. In connection with this part of the Logic it is for our purpose necessary to note the identification of the process in proof with
the process of the real itself, which as it were proves itself; this has clearly a suggestion of the later attempts to determine the character of the real for and in itself, of the 'idea' as such. To this however we shall recur immediately.

With the discussion of Proportion Logic proper ends. What we have there is a somewhat systematic statement of the formal abstract determination of Reality furnished by reflexion. The content of the Logic is not self-mediated, but determined by reflexion from without. It is our reflective activity which constructs the Logic. When therefore an 'equality' or union is established between the form of reflexion and the content, when these are mediated through each other, when the content reflects itself and furnishes its own determination, we pass from the sphere where formal conceptions stand in various relations to each other, where, because in relation, these conceptions lie apart from each other and retain a character by themselves. The sphere to which we pass is named 'knowledge' (which is the 'equality' of reflexion with content). But it is to be noted that the content in question is metaphysical absolute content, and the knowledge is absolute knowledge; and hence the name given by Hegel to this sphere is Metaphysic. What he has to do in fact in metaphysic is to discuss absolute Reality abstractly, its formal but self-determined, self-explicating moments; and since this self-determination is only possible through its content, which is itself, the process of reflexion must implicate the absolute content; we have, in
This knowledge comprehends 1. a system of principles which form a complete sphere in themselves 2. objectivity 3. subjectivity. The first contains the discussion of the principles of Identity, Contradiction, Excluded Middle and Consequent. All his characteristic conceptions of these principles are already formulated and expressed in his early treatment of them. In particular we find him insisting on the necessity of contradiction as an element or factor in a concrete identity, which develops and thereby differentiates itself into opposites. His mastery of this fundamental principle at the outset of his philosophical career is very significant. His discussion of the second feature (objectivity) is in itself somewhat strained and unfruitful, though as an indication of his present attitude suggestive. By objectivity he understands, the Soul (or 'Monad'), the World, and the Supreme Being. And these are connected with one another, demand each other. Objectivity is a self-sufficient self-determining reality. This qualification is fulfilled by a self-conserving individuality; the primary form of objectivity therefore is the monad-soul, or simply the monad. Monads differ and various individual souls are included under one monad-genus as their ground. Thus we get a variety of generic monads, or monad-genera. The totality of these genera make up the world. But as such the world is a mere aggregate; this aggregate however has its unity and its ground in the
Supreme Being, which contains all differences and is the creative principle of the various monad-genera. The Supreme Being is the genus of the genera. But so conceived and as such it is simply the abstract universal for which the various individual genera exist and over against which they are placed. Consequently a completer, more inner, relation between this universal and its elements is found when it determines them as its own moments, posits itself as universal in their individuality, raises itself in short to self-conscious Subjectivity. Here alone have we that which is Ideality without qualification. Only when the Supreme Being is an Ego can all the endless multiplicity of its content become transparently recognised as its own. But again the Ego, as we know, is theoretical, and is practical. In both these cases however the subjectivity is not absolutely self-sufficient; for in both cases we have a limit which is not its own, in the former case in what is given to be known, in the latter in what is demanded as that which should be objective. Absolute subjectivity must therefore be distinct from both of these, it must unite both and be absolutely at one with itself, absolute form of subjectivity and absolute content at once; in which knowledge is eternal without any beyond; its concept immediately realising itself, its reality possessing ideal existence in itself. Such is the idea of Absolute Spirit, of the Absolute Reality. But even when Hegel has so determined this Supreme Being, the doubleness which we have noticed in Hegel's present attitude asserts itself here too. For in reference to the formal character of absolute spirit he points out
that while absolute spirit relates itself to itself and so makes of itself an 'other', this relation is one thing to absolute spirit, another thing to us; for absolute spirit it is that which is in-finite, that which is not, and is not determined as, a limit; for us on the other hand, i.e. for spirit which is in process of realising itself, that relation is an other to spirit, we take it in its otherness, it is over against and as contrasting with and so limiting absolute spirit.

This earliest scheme of logic will be seen on examination to contain at least the germ of his later and final logic. It indicates to begin with the point of view from which he regarded the problem of logic and the function he assigned to it in a system of philosophy. For Hegel philosophy has not to commence with a criticism of 'the nature and limits of knowledge.' Here at the very start he parts company with Kant. What philosophy has to do is to determine in and by thought the essential nature of Reality, absolute and finite. Acting on the principle which he later described as learning to swim by entering the water, Hegel at once assumes that the knowledge philosophy proposes to furnish is possible, is not to be sought or justified by a preliminary enquiry, but has simply to be expounded and exhibited. This was in the first instance due to the fact that Hegel started from a conception or principle (that of spirit) by which reality was to be explained and interpreted, a conception which as we saw agreed with the needs of religion and the general conclusions of the philosophy of his time. What he had to do therefore was to make clear the
content and implications of this principle. And, directly connected with this, in the second place it was due to the absence of any question regarding the relation of thought to reality (being). Whether thought is able to know or how far it can know being at all, is a problem which from the start he never seems to have considered, at any rate never discussed at length. These prima facie divided elements of experience seem never to have been dealt with or regarded by Hegel in absolute separateness; it was always as elements, factors, contents, in one total Reality that he considered them. This made it both possible and necessary for him to start from the whole as a whole, as a unity, and thence deal with those ultimate elements simply as different contents inside this one whole. There was therefore no initiatory problem regarding knowledge, philosophical or of any other sort. The only problem was to state in some system the content of the whole.

Now the universal conceptions, thoughts, forms constituting reality furnished the matter for a science which had been dealt with by all Hegel's active and prominent contemporaries to a greater or less extent—the science of Transcendental Logic. There was every reason therefore why Hegel who, for reasons indicated, adopted the principle common to all these thinkers, and characteristic of the philosophy of his time, should also in presenting his views systematically have found it necessary to state the fundamental conceptions of reality, in other words to make Transcendental Logic a necessary part of his system. And because for him there is no
The abrupt opposition between two ultimate elements in reality, thought and being, the Logic contains the formal universal conceptions, contents, of both, not of the latter only as in the case of Kant. These elements are from the start members of a whole; are as such on the same level; transcendental Logic therefore concerns itself with both, each furnishes content to the Logic. The whole Logic is thus the exhaustive statement of the formal determining conception of his own Principle. And this general position on which his Logic is formed, and from which it proceeds, remains virtually the same throughout all the history of his Logic; it is the general and indeed the only permanent element determining all its history; it is the vital principle in all its forms, the common germ from which they all spring.

The Logic then is from the first transcendental. So far Hegel came at once into line with his immediate predecessors, and again in dispensing with a preliminary criticism of knowledge he took the side of Fichte and Schelling against Kant. Hegel in all this must be considered if not the follower at any rate the independent and confessed pupil\(^{(1)}\) of Fichte and Schelling. But the discipleship seems never, even at this early stage, to have gone beyond the acceptance of the general position adopted, defended

---

\((1)\) Briefe I. 21.
and expounded by them. He was in fact too much bound over to Kant their common master to be simply a follower of Fichte or Schelling; and on the other hand too sympathetic towards and convinced of the value of the position insisted on by Fichte and Schelling to make it possible for him to attach himself exclusively to Kant. He was in short independent of all, and had his own reasons for adopting such positions as he shared with them. Thus we find that the Logic of Hegel markedly differs from that of all these prominent contemporaries; from the start it diverges into a path distinctly its own.

At the time the above logic was put into shape (between 1798 and 1800) Hegel must have been acquainted with the most important works of Fichte which had appeared up to at least 1796-7; and we have distinct evidence that he had carefully studied the 'Wissenschaftslehre' of 1794 as well as the 'Kritik aller Offenbarung.' (1) Yet there is hardly a trace of influence on the details of Hegel's Logic of the detailed and peculiar construction of the principle which Fichte expounded in the "W. L." And this in spite of the community of principle between Fichte and Hegel. Even if, then, as is most probable Hegel regarded the "W. L." as a form of Transcendental Logic we still find Hegel constructing a Logic (2) without immediate help either as to content or method from Fichte.

---

(1) V. 2nd and 3rd letters to Schelling. Briefe I. 10-17.
(2) It is remarkable that the influence of the "W. L." should have been so slight. One would have expected surely, as Lassalle, negative, especially Reality, which was so important with Fichte, would have retained in Hegel's Logic a form of Transcendental Logic we still find Hegel constructing a Logic (2) without immediate help either as to content or method from Fichte.
Again Hegel must also have become familiar with the earlier fichtenised views of Schelling as these are contained in Schelling's first philosophical writings:— "Ueber die Möglichkeit und Form einer Philosophie überhaupt" and "vom Ich als Princip etc." both 1795 and "Philos. Briefe über Dog u. Krit," 1796. Probably not much detailed help could be found in these works for his Logic as they did not themselves present a system. In any case they did no more than help Hegel towards an understanding of his fundamental principle; they could hardly determine the course of his Logic. Even Schelling's "Philosophy of Nature," we may note in passing, which appeared in 1799, bears little or no resemblance to the content of Hegel's "Philosophy of Nature" belonging to this time, so far at least as we can gather from the extracts from it given in the biography. It is possible however that Schelling's work may have appeared later than the time at which Hegel's sketch was formed.

Finally close as is the resemblance, as we have already noted, between Kant's transcendental Logic and Hegel's early Logic the differences are too striking to be ignored or to be considered differences of detail. For indeed the initial position of Hegel (that Philosophy is concerned with the whole, that the opposed elements in this whole are factors in one unity, not radical opposites) distinguishes completely the presupposition

(1)
v. 2nd and 3rd letters to Schelling Briefe I. 10–17.
of Hegel's Logic from that of Kant's, so completely in fact that "transcendental" "a priori" hardly means quite the same to Kant and Hegel, at least in expression. For Kant "transcendental" means primarily or ostensibly subject-constituted, applied to that which the subject (thought, understanding) must have in order that the object may be necessarily constituted, if it is to be possible object of knowledge, and it is for the sake of object that the conception must be transcendental or that transcendental conception is required. The whole point of idea of 'transcendental' turns for Kant on that initial distinction between thought and subject and object the consideration of which indeed his whole view starts and which to the end remains vital to it. Hegel, following Fichte and Schelling, seizes upon the kernel of Kant's theory, synthetic a priori conceptions and their "deduction," emphasises solely their constitutive function and character, plants himself firmly on the basis of Kant's whole structure, self-consciousness in its unity, and, casting aside Kant's presuppositions, deepens but at the same time transforms the subjective-transcendental conception into all-sustaining, all-pervading fundamental universal objective-transcendental conception. Hegel starts from Kant's result, but escapes or avoids his conclusions (the inferences from that result) by refusing to recognise or be influenced by the presuppositions from which Kant started. Hence it is for Hegel thought as well as being has also its fundamental 'transcendent-al' conceptions, and these, as well as those of being, fall inside the Logic.
Thus it is that while the categories of being in Hegel's Logic show close resemblance to Kant, the treatment of the notion which forms the second part of Hegel's Logic above has no analogue at all in Kant and by the nature of his view could not have. That Hegel should have taken this step so early in his career is extremely significant, and that his Logic should have held so closely by Kant as against Fichte or Schelling indicates very decidedly his historical affinities.

But it must not be supposed that Hegel fully appreciated at this time the significance and importance of transcendental Logic. The Logic is not a complete exposition of ultimate conception. The conceptions again are not exhibited as determinations of his single principle; they are not shewn to be moments of spirit, self-consciousness; they are assumed to be and accepted as such moments; but how or why is not established. In this respect his early Logic does not profess the same thoroughness as Fichte's W. L. And again it seems that on the whole the Logic is a subordinate preliminary discussion in his present scheme. His main interest and the important part of "theoretical philosophy" seems to be in "metaphysic." It is here that content 'reflects itself', it is here that the Idea is found of which nature is the 'other'. His idealism at this point is not at all logical idealism; but rather metaphysical idealism. His principle simply as a concrete fact contains in its concreteness all reality. The treatment of the formal abstract content of this principle seems to occupy a secondary place in the scheme.
And when we pass from such general considerations to take the 'theoretical philosophy' in detail its tentative provisional character becomes apparent. To begin with, the distinction of logic from metaphysic shows merely a close adherence to tradition. Since Hegel had not yet done more than named the principle of reality and viewed absolute reality as such in the light of it without determining completely and explicitly the nature of that principle itself, such a distinction was perhaps also inevitable in his scheme. The treatment of the formal conceptions as such naturally falls at this early stage apart from that of absolute reality.

The division again of logic into a discussion of the formal aspects of being, and of thought (thinking, Denken) shows in some respects a closer adherence to tradition than is found in Kant. Being is not taken in his later sense; it is not in this early view a category at all; rather it has categories. And it is the general use of the term being which makes it unnecessary for him to have what afterwards appears as the discussion of essence. The qualifications ascribed to being are, as we noted, taken directly from Kant. Hegel seems to have been at no pains to amplify them; or even closely to criticise them. A possible increase to their number does not seem to have occurred to him. The only modifications he introduces are primarily due to the need of systematising them, to weaving them into one texture. Such systematisation in fact is the sole contribution of Hegel to the discussion of the categories, seems indeed to have been his only
interest in the discussion of them. And it is this same interest which
induced him to connect the determinations of being with those of thinking.
In this way being and thought, as originally separated, are viewed and
merely distinguished inside reality; both are forms of reality; hence the
possibility of an inner connexion between their qualifications. As in
the case of being so in that of thinking the determinations related by
Hegel are those currently attributed to it; no extension or examination of
them is offered.

The doctrine of 'proportion' is made necessary to his scheme because
of the distinction so pointedly made between thought and being; it is
necessary to complete and to round off his logic; having separated he must
somehow bring the parts together. Beyond this significance, it seems in
itself artificial, and
\[\text{mention}\]
the forms included under it are simply
those accepted by logic, and belong ordinarily to the doctrine of thought
proper. It contains however, and this is its importance for us, Hegel's
earliest attempt to make logic "objective; in it Hegel seeks to leave the
subjective as such (thinking) and to state those formal determinations
which the real parts for itself, and which are not simply attributed to
it by external reflexion. This is particularly seen in his interpretation
of proof. Indeed it is difficult to see why, except on the general view
above stated that logic contains simply the formal character of the real, and
is constructed by means of 'external' reflexion, proof should not have been
included under metaphysics. Hegel has not yet identified the forms, laws,
modes of procedure, ways of thinking which hold inside the real with the reality; yet form and content of the real are kept in some way distinct. Hence under the doctrine of proportion he merely gives the formal character of proof as such, as a mode of procedure.

It is only in the metaphysic that we become acquainted with the content of the real. And here almost without exception, Hegel has simply adopted the results of his predecessors, and has merely connected them systematically by a method and for a purpose of his own. The first part, the system of ground—principles of the real, contains merely those principles which philosophy up to Hegel's day had shown to be necessary to experience. They are however interpreted and expressed in the characteristically Hegelian manner, i.e. they are viewed not as principles simply necessary to knowledge of the real, but principles in and of the real itself—they are not simply forms of reality they are reality itself. It is this conception of them in fact which seems to justify their place in his metaphysic; and this is significant for his whole attitude, which on this point at any rate he never changed. It is, for example, the content of the real which makes contradiction possible, as well as the solution of contradiction. Mere inconsistency of concepts in itself means nothing, for these concepts can only contradict if they possess content, and the contradiction they can exhibit is in virtue of that content. Contradiction therefore is the essence of the real. These principles however are not connected in any way with the other parts of his metaphysic; they are
treated as elements of the real, and nothing further is stated of them.

Then too the second part begins quite abruptly with the essence, or fundamental nature of the real. This part does little more than repeat the Leibnitz-Wolfian metaphysical conception of the real, and its difference from his later view of 'objectivity' is too glaring to need comment. The real is divided in the usual way into the self, the world, and God, and a monadistic interpretation of reality is given. That Hegel should simply have accepted without extensive enquiry the monadistic scheme of the world indicates the monistic character of his idealism at this period, and of his conception of spirit.

Yet a view which like Hegel's regarded spirit as the principle of the real could hardly have done otherwise without a more thoroughgoing interpretation of spirit. As we have indicated, all he was concerned about in the first instance was to hold this conception of the real. He had accepted the view that the selfhood of spirit is the primary reality, that Absolute Reality was spirit, and the natural form which such a conception at first could take would be that all reality is spirit; difference in reality meant plurality of spirit. His idealism meant at this stage reality is thinking beings (monadistic idealism) not as it did later, reality is thought (logical idealism). That he should have advanced from one to the other is significant for the interpretation of his scheme indicates the line of his development. This view of spirit which he adopted, and his conception of reality as thereby determined, account for
his early view of logic as a discipline separate from metaphysics, and also for the need of a metaphysics as distinct from logic. Hence too it is evident not only that they are not systematically connected, but that on such a view they do not require to be connected.

It is to be noted that there seems little connection between his view of the 'world' as given in the metaphysic and his view of nature in the philosophy of nature. In the latter, nature is the determination of spirit, spirit in itself but not for itself; in the former the 'world' is the totality of monad-genera. These views are perhaps compatible; but their agreement is at least not obvious.

Again in regard to the conception of Absolute Spirit this early view shows a striking and significant difference from the later. This early conception of the Supreme Reality was Deistic. All reality is not Absolute Reality; nor again are all finite realities 'moments' of the one Absolute Reality. Absolute Spirit is one reality among other realities; it is the supreme monad—genus. But it is distinct from is even separate from the others; for it alone is the absolute union of objectivity with subjectivity, that which is the other to it is itself, it knows no other but itself. Such a conception was perhaps natural enough on Hegel's early view of spirit. And this conception is a metaphysical idea; but while in some external respects it resembles the determination given to the 'Absolute Idea,' it cannot be at all identified with it. He is careful too to point out that this metaphysical idea of the Supreme Reality is only idea; is
not the reality itself—a difference on which we have already commented.

The transmutation of this metaphysical idea into the logical, and the removal of the distinction between the metaphysical determination of the Supreme Reality and the formal determination of this Reality in itself in all its completeness, we have to trace in his firther development.

It only remains to conclude this part of our discussion by pointing out the unsatisfactoriness of this early attempt to frame a scheme of logic. Its fragmentary character, its incompleteness, its unsystematic form, its uncritical treatment of its concepts, the ambiguous insistence on the distinction between form and content, thought and the real, a distinction which at one time seems abrupt at another hardly seems discoverable, the uncertainty and indefiniteness in statement, the merely relative independence of his point of view and even of his treatment,—all this is quite manifest from the foregoing. He seems in fact hardly to have been aware of the real nature of the problem he had undertaken, or of the kind of solution which would satisfy those needs on behalf of which he had turned to philosophy. And his conception of his problem seems to have been limited and overpowered by his close adherence to the results and views of his predecessors in the field, views which he had accepted perhaps too readily, and which he had not yet fully determined for himself.

Of one thing he seems to have assured—the necessity for thorough-going system in philosophy, and this with however limited success he
certainly strove to attain. (1) That such a claim was inevitable on his view of the subject and purpose of philosophy is obvious enough. With this as his aim he seems to have worked special parts of his scheme into a systematic form as they could well admit e.g. the treatment of Substantiality, Causality, and Reciprocity. On the other hand it is just as evident that certain parts of his early scheme are not systematically connected, and bear no resemblance except perhaps in name to his later results. This incompleteness of system seems due to the limited appreciation of the need for thoroughness, to the looseness of his terms, e.g. formal, abstract, etc. but mainly to the absence of any definite method for attaining it. The means by which system in the early scheme is brought about is that of analysis of the concepts and relation of them by external reflexion upon them. This relation may take the form of that of genus to species, (as e.g. in objectivity), or simply that of implication. A given concept C is analysed and found to contain a certain element A which characterised another form of reality; but A by itself does not fully determine C, we require for that purpose another element B. It is not A

---

(1) The conception of organism, organic unity, which is the basis of Hegel's idea of system, was early realised by him. It has especial form at this period in the sphere of ethics. v. Ros. 124 ff.

(2) It is to be noted that the idea of development, which essentially characterises Hegel's logic, finds its first employment in his treatment of the idea of freedom.
therefore which demands \( B \) but \( C \) which demands both; nor does \( B \) by itself fully determine \( C \). One category does not 'pass into' another; they exist side by side. Such connection as does exist is quite external. The process of uniting the different moments is not immanent in those moments themselves, but operating from without. The Logic is Logic of external reflexion; it is our reflexion, the reflexion of the subject investigating, that determines the content of the Logic and its arrangement. And when he declares that in metaphysic the content 'reflects itself', it is not made clear how this self-reflexion is related to the external reflexion. The concept of reflexion is as a whole uncritical, confused and undefined, and seems to have as many forms as there are matters to be reflected upon. There is philosophical reflexion as the process of philosophy as a whole; there is external reflexion in the Logic; 'ideal reflexion' characterising the notion; self-reflexion in the metaphysic—and these are in no way related or critised. There is therefore strictly speaking no one method in this early scheme; and this accounts for the heterogeneity and incompleteness which the system exhibits. He does indeed describe reflexion as a 'movement' but this simply applies to it as a process. And again he uses the term 'dialectic' to describe the process of negating, limiting, and defining the content; but it has no precise meaning for him; no meaning distinct from what it might have had for any one using it after Kant or Fichte, but yet not using it in their restricted and specific sense.

All these obscurities are perhaps inevitable in an early scheme
which is perhaps merely tentative, and too much ought not to be expected from it. Still these difficulties point the way to the course Hegel must pursue if his view is to gain clearness and completeness.
PART II.

THE GROWTH OF HEGEL'S LOGIC.
PART II.

We should expect the deficiencies, the errors, and uncritical positions which we discover in the early view to be gradually removed in the course of Hegel's development. And this is what to some extent is found in the next period to which we now pass. The more prominent defects are removed in the first instance. The difficulties and ambiguities underlying the distinction of Being (Seyn) and Thought (Begriff) are met and a definite interpretation offered of their nature and relation. The distinction of form and content as the basis of the separation of logic from metaphysics is dropped, and while this distinction is still in a sense maintained we shall find that it has another meaning, is determined in another way. The nature therefore of logic and metaphysics in this new view is in decided contrast to the earlier. And with this change also the uncritical adoption of the results, both in metaphysics and in logic, of preceding thinkers, to which we referred, vanishes. The breaking down of the abrupt distinction of content from form leads likewise to an assimilation of logic to metaphysics; the latter becomes more 'formal', the former more concrete. The incompleteness in systematic connexion between the elements of the two disciplines as also between the various parts of philosophy is in a measure removed by the adoption not so much of a philosophical method as of a more determinate philosophical point of view. A method in the strict sense he has not yet obtained. How far completeness
of system could have been realised by means of this principle we cannot
decide, as no detailed scheme similar to that already given is presented
in this period. What we have in fact is rather the analysis of terms,
principles and systems. We still find therefore greater precision and
definiteness in Hegel's conceptions, which come from a reconsideration
and examination of ideas and facts hitherto simply accepted or even
assumed. We thus have rather the elements and fundamental principles of a
system than an actual connected scheme.

We have only material to enable us to determine Hegel's general
attitude and the main influences which dominate his thinking in this
period. In a sense it is one of transition. Hegel becomes conscious of
his philosophical position and master of his terms. But still the
principles adopted at this time are not worked out and some of his
positions are in his later treatment modified or even abandoned. We
might perhaps naturally expect that Hegel in such a period of criticism
would prove establish and defend the position he actually adopts; but this
is not the case. True to his characteristic manner of exposition he works
from the principle, adopted as a conclusion, and we are left simply to
state what this is without being informed as to why or how he came to
adopt it. We shall therefore best bring out Hegel's view of logic at this
stage of its development by first of all indicating his general
philosophical position at this time and then stating more fully the place
and nature of this logic.
The period we are considering falls between 1801 and 1807, between the departure of Hegel from Frankfurt for Jena and the publication of the 'Phänomenologie.' Hegel was drawn to Jena in the first place because he felt that his apprenticeship was ended and that his 'Wanderjahre' had best be spent in filling some post at a university; and in the second place because Schelling, with whom he had for years kept up friendly correspondence, and with whose work and thinking he was thoroughly familiar, was teaching at Jena and advised his going thither, the university being at that time the literary and philosophical centre of Germany.

Such a step meant much intellectually as well as practically for Hegel. The hitherto dominant interest in religion pure and simple soon became almost wholly supplanted by the interest in philosophy; the religious view of facts in the world gives place to a purely philosophical interpretation of them; the indeterminate concepts of religious thinking are exchanged for the accuracy, definiteness and explicitness of systematic thought. And with this entire abandonment to philosophy comes a corresponding revulsion from the vaguer mysticism in which he had hitherto sought light and satisfaction. Mysticism he now characterises as a pictorial imaginative medium for the expression of the Idea or the Absolute; it is neither feeling nor science, but a 'trübes Mittelding' between both; it is a 'speculative feeling', or

(1) Ros. 182.
again it is the Idea bound by fantasy and emotion. He describes it roundly as a 'splendid rhetoric' which itself confesses the impotence of the medium through which it seeks to express the essence of reality. He will have the essence brought into definiteness, and that solely through the 'clear element' of thought, through the medium of determinate conceptions; for the 'clear element' is the universal, the concept, the notion (Begriff).

This all-importance of the purely philosophical interpretation of reality does not however imply the absence of that religious 'tendency' which we saw to be the essential form of his interest in philosophy and the source of his vital interest in it. This appears not merely from the fact that philosophy is to him a 'Speculative science,' whose object is Absolute Reality as such, but also from the nature of the supreme principle of Reality which he adopts, and from the place assigned to religion in his philosophy. He still holds Spirit to be the principle of Reality, (1) and in one sketch of philosophy he makes religion the final and highest moment of it. (2) The change of attitude may perhaps be best described by saying that whereas formerly he had a religious interest in the object of philosophy, he has now a purely philosophical interest in the object of religion, the object in both cases being ultimately the same.

It is otherwise impossible to appreciate the position he adopts on

---

(1) Werke I.395. Ros. 188. (2) Ros. 179.
certain points (more especially the place assigned to Mind (Spirit) in his treatment), or to connect the view of the present period both with what succeeds and with what preceded it unless we keep in mind that all along the Absolute for Hegel is Spirit. That this is the nature of ultimate Reality seems in fact never to have meant anything else for him. We have already indicated the origin of this position which Hegel consistently adopts all through his career, and we need not insist further on its significance.

The problem of philosophy as a speculative science is to determine this ultimate reality, and to interpret finite reality in the light of it. It is not one reality among other realities; if so, it would be a finite reality; it is rather the ground or basal Reality of all realities. Hegel had therefore to deal in the first instance with the usual general forms or kinds of finite realities that presented themselves; for thereby he would specify more particularly the problems and aspects of philosophy. And he is at no great pains to determine what these realities are; that had already been done by his predecessors and was in fact an obvious commonplace in philosophy. These most general and distinct finite realities are Nature and Mind. He takes these as palpably different facts of experience and seeks speculatively to systematise their content and to connect them with each other and with the Absolute Reality.

We need seek no other reason or origin than that just given for this distinction of these philosophical sciences, which indeed we have already met with in a certain form in the early period and which becomes a
permanent part of Hegel's philosophy in its final form. He simply takes Nature and Mind as distinct facts, and the most general of distinct facts and shapes them into a speculative scheme of the universe. It seems both untrue and unnecessary to treat them merely as 'deductions' from 'ideas.' For Hegel they are and seem always to have been the primary realities of the universe, dependent for their reality solely on the absolute. It was in the finite forms that Reality exhibited itself, and where it was immediately present and known. There seems little doubt that in the lectures repeatedly given at Jena on 'Philosophy of Nature' and 'Philosophy of Mind' (1) he discussed these facts primarily as we immediately meet them, seeking merely to interpret them from an absolute point of view. Each is in itself so far independent of the other, and in the first instance can be treated separately, presents a distinct order of facts. They are and must be also connected as aspects of absolute reality, and such connection is necessary to the completeness of speculative science. But the determination of this latter connection, while it occupies Hegel in the present stage more than in the preceding, and occupies him still more in the later form of his philosophy is imposed on those realities from without, does not exclude their peculiar character, does not transform their nature. They have and preserve their own reality and they, as distinct realities, are of interest in themselves and must be treated by forms and concepts peculiar to their

(1) Ros. 101.
We have little of distinctive importance regarding his explicit interpretations and conceptions of each of these philosophical sciences. We have however some indication of the relation of Mind as such to Nature as such as forms of Absolute Reality. There is indeed incorporated in Hegel's works an article from the 'Kritisches Journal der Philosophie' edited by Schelling and Hegel together at Jena which deals specifically with the 'Verhältniss d. Naturphilosophie zur Philosophie überhaupt'; but this article cannot be admitted to have been Hegel's production. In another article however in the same volume 'über d. wissenschaft. Behandlungsarten d. Naturrichts' we find the relation of Nature and Spirit as forms of the Absolute determined. From this it appears that the supreme expression discoverable for the Absolute is 'Sittlichkeit', that form of spirit in which the freedom of a people most completely appears, in which legality as such, and morality as such are found and identified. It would appear that this for Hegel completely expresses the nature of the Absolute. For here alone are body and soul through and through united; here only is subjectivity also objectivity; identity and reality posited as identical; individuality, the union of universality and particularity, completely realised. And these are the characteristic of

the Absolute. He distinguishes (1) inside the Absolute its actual finite appearance and existence for and in finite empirical consciousness (the body, the real side of Ethicality), and 'the living spirit, the absolute consciousness, the absolute and undifferentiated union of the ideal and the real of Ethicality.' It is the latter which is the absolute unity above spoken of; the former does not completely attain to the 'divinity' of the latter, though it still contains 'its absolute idea' and is necessarily bound up with it; hence the place and significance of religion. But this distinction, as he himself indicates, does not effect the determination of the Absolute as above given; it is merely a difference of aspect of 'Sittlichkeit.' This then is the essential nature of absolute spirit; in its absolute intuition (Anschauung) of itself is one and the same with self-knowledge of itself as itself, its absolute reality and its absolute identity and reflexion are identified. Such a union places spirit (mind) higher than Nature; for the latter is 'absolute self intuition, and the actualization of infinite diversity and mediation', i.e. the endless process of eternal relation of part with part; it does not know itself, does not intuit or view itself as itself. Mind does not know itself, and is at once the plurality of the universe, which it grasps, and is the implicit reality of that plurality. (2)

In this assertion of the superiority of Spirit to Nature (a superiority, the ethical importance of which Hegel was zealously eager to maintain and exhibit\(^1\)—hence for instance his expression the 'impotence' of nature) Hegel separates himself decidedly from Schelling, by whom he is otherwise at this period very much influenced, as we shall presently see. The latter at most merely coordinates the two (Spirit and Nature). The determination of different degrees of reality of Nature and of Spirit is one of the most important general positions established in this period. He maintains too that Nature in the totality of the content of Spirit, is the 'negative moment', or the phase of difference, externality, distinct from both the mere 'idea' and concrete real mind; but points out that it is an essential and necessary moment of the whole. In this last contention he again differs from Schelling, for whom Nature is as a 'precipitate' from the idea, and thereby a contingency, a 'happening,' and not a necessity. We are not given more definite information as to the relation of nature to mind or to that 'ideal' logic–metaphysical aspect of speculative science to which we shall immediately turn; we may note however that unlike Schelling, and the Romantic school generally Hegel adhered characteristically to a logical treatment of philosophy of nature, to the exhibition of the immanent reason in the objects of nature.

\(^1\) Ros. 187.  
\(^2\) Ros. 188.
Much more important for our purpose than the determination of the content and relation of the two forms of reality above indicated are the views which Hegel holds at this time on logic and metaphysics. It is here that the advance on his preceding position is so manifest; and it is here that the influence of Schelling is so pronounced. Logic and metaphysics together form again, as in the early period, the first of the triad of philosophical sciences; and, as in the case of the other two sciences (philosophy of nature and of mind), Hegel is in the first place and mainly concerned to treat logic and metaphysics together simply as an independent and self-subsistent part of philosophy, without immediate reference to either of the other two sciences. He does indeed seek more eagerly and perhaps more successfully to connect the first part of philosophy with the second (philosophy of nature), and seeks to determine the 'transition' from the 'idea' to nature or the real, to pass logically and in from metaphysics to a 'Realphilosophie', from the formal determination of reality, to its concrete actual content. But what we must observe is that this for Hegel is another and a different problem from the independent systematic treatment of the science in itself; the latter (philosophy of nature) does not depend on or wait for the former, nor are the results and content of the latter deduced or even in this period derived by the same

(1) Ros. 179, 192.
method as the conclusions of the former enquiry. It is very important to keep this in mind for the 'transition from logic to nature' in his later philosophy when thus regarded historically ceases to be the riddle and the enigma which it is usually considered. The Philosophy of Nature is all along a distinct branch of philosophy; just as Nature is from the first a distinct form of reality. Nature occupies a sphere of its own, and the treatment of it is as such distinct from that of the others. It is not a dependent branch of philosophy but a self-dependent, self-contained exposition; its distinctiveness of subject-matter ensures that independence. It is no more independent than the other parts of philosophy; but it is no less. It is so from the start and it remains so to the end. Thus as we shall find even at the last there is no attempt to sink away one part of philosophy in another, or to evolve one part from and out of the content of another (say Nature out of the Logic as such). The three parts of philosophy are moments of a single whole, but self-dependent moments, contained in and depending on that whole but not on each other in their separateness. But this is anticipating.

The independence of this first part of philosophy of the two other parts appeared also in a sense in the early period; and that logic and metaphysic should be a separate branch of philosophy, and should be in the first instance treated independently and in themselves seems obvious enough. They had always formed a part of philosophy, and the nature of philosophy itself demanded it. For clearly a science is
the most general way, and determine in the most universal terms the fundamental and essential character and nature of Reality as a whole; and such an expression of the Absolute in formal 'pure' 'simple' universality is what this part of philosophy specifically furnishes. Neither philosophy of nature nor of mind does this; each deals with a certain aspect or definite content of reality, not reality in its completeness. In a sense these two sciences themselves demand the other investigation, for only by its result can it be determined where and in what form the Absolute is most concretely revealed. And we find as a matter of fact that the nature of the Absolute as determined by metaphysics is that which the Absolute possesses in the concrete form of 'Sittlichkeit' above considered. (1)

(1) W. I. 304.
It seems again to be in virtue of this character which metaphysics possesses that it is treated as the first of the triad of philosophical disciplines, and this not merely in the earlier schemes but in his later philosophy; it furnishes the most universal, essential, fundamental and formal determination of reality, not as this specially appears in definite aspects in particular (in nature or in mind), but as it is in itself.

The name which Hegel assigns to this part of speculation varies a little in the course of the period we are considering, and is partly significant of the development he goes through. At first he calls it simply Logic and Metaphysics, on which in 1802 he proposes to publish a treatise. This became either a part of or gave place to a compendium dealing with the whole of philosophical science, on which he repeatedly lectured. This projected compendium (for there is no publication of such a work at this time) in 1803 is the earliest presentation of his 'System of Philosophy' as such. He calls it a 'System of Speculative Philosophy', and includes under it 1. Logic and Metaphysics or Transcendental Idealism. 2. Philosophy of Nature. 3. Philosophy of Mind. The two last he designates later (1805) as 'Realphilosophie.'

In 1806 Speculative Philosophy contains Phanomenology of Mind, Logic, and Philosophy of Nature and of Mind; Metaphysics as a distinct discipline being significantly

---

(1) Ros. 181.

(2) This term preserved in his final view: v. Lg. I. Vorrede I. ad fin.
omitted. With this change agrees a division of his system,\(^1\) which must have appeared late in this period, and in which the first part of his system is given as 'Logic or the Science of the Idea as such.' His own statements too in the course of his development during this period\(^2\) seem to indicate that gradual identification of logic with metaphysic which became his final position. But this point of view is not made explicit in \(\text{writings}\) fall within this period: we are compelled to regard metaphysic as different from logic, and requiring separate treatment.

The grounds for this position are clearly put forward in his various articles to the above mentioned 'Journal' which are all with one exception on subjects falling within the first of philosophical sciences \(\text{namely:}\) ('Transcendental Idealism').

Speculative science he maintains must start from the Absolute.\(^3\) This is nothing less than an axiom with Hegel; philosophy he declares has not and never had any other object. And this is not a postulate in the sense of being that which is never proved, but which must always be \(\text{neural}\) in order to make all proof possible. Rather it is present in every 'proof' and the whole of philosophy is just a laying bare of the content of the Absolute. Nor again does it appear as a 'demand' or a 'problem' at the end of philosophy on which we are merely to 'believe'; it is real throughout and

---

\(^1\) Ros. 179. \(^2\) W. I. 13, 19, I. 324 f. \(^3\) W. I. 103 ff XVI. 59. Absolute here used not as specifically absolute spirit.
from the first in all philosophy. (1)

And the Absolute has a necessary character; it is the one, the unity, the identity of all and every finite. The absolute means simply absolute identity, that into which every finite is refunded, which contains all opposites, that in and by which all opposition is conserved and at the same time as opposition removed. The opposites so united are expressible in various ways; in one form they appear as body and soul, in another necessity and freedom, in a third as Nature and Ego, again as subject and object, and finally as thought (Begriff) and being. These, as the most fundamental forms of opposition we know, Hegel treats as all involving one another, and uses e.g. the opposition between subject and object to express the same as that between thought and being.

The Absolute then is the identity of subject and object; and the identity of subject and object is the supreme principle of speculation of all philosophical knowledge. But it is likewise presupposed in 'common life' as well as in all philosophy; it lies at the basis of the 'common sense' of the ordinary understanding. (2) And in this fact lies the possibility and the necessity of philosophy. For it is because in common sense and the 'culture' arising out of it, this identity is lost sight of, although, or rather because the opposites have been fixed as such and their reciprocal

---

connexion overlooked, is still implicitly present and demanded, that philosophy is required. Whenever that which is only an appearance of the absolute is wrenched out of connexion with its source, becomes isolated, independent and fixed, the power and sense of unity has vanished from man's life, and can only be reinstated by philosophy. (1) 'Disruption, separation, fission is therefore the source of the need of philosophy.' Such a need, says Hegel, is the only 'presupposition' philosophy can have; it is all that presupposition means for it; and in strictness there is no 'presupposition', for the reason that if there were this would lie inside philosophy itself. And as we see this 'need' contains two elements, (a) the absolute itself, the ultimate identity above named, (b) the fact that consciousness has passed out of or away from this totality, has ceased to be aware of itself and only in and for this totality, has therefore 'fixed' itself as separate from it, and thereby also split the Absolute into fundamental but finite limited opposites.

Now this position which we have described is the general intellectual situation out of which Hegel's philosophical (logico-metaphysical) thinking at this time took its form, and from which all his philosophy in fact proceeded, and by which it is to the last conditioned. His conception of this starting point is later on deepened and modified but it remains

(1) W. I. 172 ff. - It is the absence of this necessity for this event that causes opposition to both religion & philosophy. This difference lies in this: religion proceeds by interesting 'belief' in man's becoming after the Absolute, while philosophy proceeds by contradicting the ground of consciousness. (Hegel)
substantially the same to the end. It is the 'terra firma' of his entrance into pure philosophy, and the groundwork of the mature philosophical convictions to which he now began to give utterance. As we shall immediately discover it is the general matter out of which he shapes his philosophy, the "φιλοσοφία" of which his scheme is the "πρῶτος".

Such being the raison d'être of philosophy, its business is simply to restore and reveal to consciousness that basal identity, (1) to reassert the supremacy and primacy of the absolute by explicitly exhibiting its actual presence in every finite and fixed reality, to show that all finite relative identities are merely "repititions" of one and the same ultimate identity, (2) to reduce all appearances of the absolute, (which are limited and finite expressions of it, and are set over against it as also against each other), to that one 'true' and only Reality. There are thus two moments in this procedure of philosophy, one which is the negation of the finite realities as such by the unlimited, infinite absolute reality, the other the assertion the preservation of the finite by virtue of its sharing in and being determined by infinite reality.

Now the medium through which this and procedure of philosophy is realised is by reason. Reason alone is adequate to the absolute; 'it is the manifestation of the absolute'; (3) the activity of reason is the

---

(1) W. XVI. Verhālt d. Scept (ad fin.)
(2) W. XVI. ibid.
(3) W. I. 189.
activity of the absolute, and Hegel's expressions warrant us even in asserting that reason is simply the absolute in us, and therefore in philosophy. For, as we found the absolute to be always the immanent principle of all philosophy, so he maintains philosophy is one in all ages because reason is one and single. The absolute identity, is a 'reason-identity'; the principle of absolute identity at the root of all philosophy is a 'principle of reason'; philosophy is the 'activity of reason' only. (1) Hence the statement that philosophy is the knowledge of the absolute is made equivalent in all respects to the statement that philosophy is the self-knowledge of reason. The business of philosophy is therefore merely put in another form when it is expressed as the resolution of all finite opposites, fixed and determinate (a determinateness due as we shall presently see to the action of understanding) into the one identity, the one infinite of reason, which alone is and can be absolute and unlimited. And as there is only one reason, and as 'every reason which has directed itself upon itself and come to know itself has produced a true philosophy', (2) every philosophy is in itself a constitutive and essential mode form of reason. And this is the only significance which the various philosophies which have appeared from time to time possess, and consequently so far as the inner essence of philosophy is concerned there

(1) W. I. 102 ff: XVI. Wesen d. philos. (2) W. I. 160.
is neither before nor after in philosophy, 'neither forerunners nor successors.' Every philosophy therefore finds its place in the one totality of reason, and the most opposed and contradictory forms of philosophy are the result of opposed factors or functions which are constitutive of reason itself. Particular concrete instances of such opposed philosophies we shall presently furnish.

Having then established what the aim and purpose of philosophy is we must now determine by what process it is to attain its result. We have already indicated the two moments or aspects attained by philosophy, the resolution, reduction of determinate opposites to the absolute unity of all opposition, the negation of the finite by the infinite, the destruction of all differences by the supreme identity; and the positing, assertion of that identity, that absolute, in all finite opposites, all relative identities.

To these two forms correspond two processes of reason by which they are realised; to the first, Reflexion, to the second, Transcendental "Anschauung", intuition, vision, direct immediate act of reason.

It must be borne in mind all along that these processes are not processes of our reason merely, in which case they would be distinct from the result and even that which is 'reflected' and could be thrown aside when the result was obtained. Such a conception of reflexion is necessarily false, because the whole meaning of Hegel's point of view is that all such

\[1\]
W. I. 178 ff.
distinctions (as that between process of our reason and process of the object) are merely finite, are not and cannot be absolute, but are themselves identified, their opposition overcome in the absolute, in the identity of reason.' It were therefore a manifest fatuity if those processes by which philosophy systematically constructs the content and nature of the absolute identity of all opposites, all distinction, were themselves based on or were merely one of the finite distinctions which fall inside that identity itself. Consequently the only alternative left is that reflexion is absolute reflexion, reason-reflexion, reflexion which is one with, is the same as that which is reflected, reflexion as indifferent to subjective and objective, which appertains to both equally and neither especially. And similarly of Anschauung. This will become clear as we proceed.

We saw that philosophy arose out of or because of the fixing, absolutising, of finite opposites. This 'fixing' 'positing' is the work of understanding. (1) Realities or aspects of reality are isolated and while set over against each other and limited by each other are still taken by understanding to be independent self-sufficient; beyond them understanding does not seek to go and indeed by its very nature cannot go; they are not therefore related to anything beyond or more ultimate than themselves. By understanding the task of philosophy could not be

---

(1) W. I. 172: 178 f.
accomplished, for it does not attempt to construe the absolute; there is no absolute for it, there are only finite limited realities fixed, and over against each other and all existing simply side by side. Understanding is indeed a kind of reflexion, but it is 'isolated, isolating reflexion', and is thereby distinguished from reflexion above named. What distinguishes the reflexion of philosophy is just the presence and relation of the Absolute to it. And as therefore the impossibility of construing the absolute was due to the isolating and fixing of the opposites in it, so this problem is only solved through negating these by, and connecting them with the absolute. Philosophical reflexion is necessarily therefore negative, and this in virtue of the relation to the absolute; it is 'the power of the negative absolute,' 'the negative side of the absolute,' 'absolute negativity.' Reason indeed is active even in understanding, for though the finite factors are fixed, yet one is limited by another, and this other requires a third to limit it and so on endlessly. This very forced progress to a complete totality sought by understanding is the work of reason. Understanding remains in finitude, and never reaches infinity, yet it still isolates the former and fixes, posits the latter as over against it leaves the two side by side and thereby finitely infinity. But in so positing infinity understanding in its 'conceit' is simply 'imitating' reason, for it negates the finite (as reason does) by the infinite, which none the less is itself a finite and exists side by side with the finite negated (which is not the case with the negation of reason). But when
understanding does fix and oppose finitude to infinity it destroys itself, for the maintenance of the one means the removal of the other. Reason alone however knows this, and thereby it destroys understanding itself, and translates its products simply into negatives.

This applies, of course, to all the finite isolated products of understanding. We are left therefore with merely reason without any opposites within it, pure reason with all finitudes resolved in it and negated by it. Now this self-identical of reason into which they can be resolved may in the last resort be one of two orders determined as distinct by the kind of reality contained in each or the way in which the absolute is expressed in each. These are the objective 'totality' or 'infinity,' and the subjective totality; the 'objective world' and the kingdom of 'freedom.' These are the final opposites presented to reason and by reason. But they are still not independent and self-subsistent; they are related to and subsist in the absolute. Reason therefore must destroy their opposition and with them. And this is effected in one and the same act; for it unites them by negating both; that is the only union they possess; for they only exist by being not united. Both are related to and exist for the absolute, and the absolute is one and is the identity; they are therefore identical, and each is posited as the identity. The

---

(1) Nature of this distinction in 'kind' determined below. (2) Cp. Spinoza's 'Infinite Man.' (3) W. I. 180.
absolute, the same identity is that which negates the fixed finitudes in the 'objective world' (world of sense) as also in the subjective world (intellectual world, world of freedom), and these apparently different worlds are simply the totalities, the infinities, the absolutes of finite realities which qua finite and fixed are undoubtedly distinct. But the one absolute determines them as totalities and hence they are different forms of the same identity, and are therefore truly and essentially identical and their apparent difference is negated by that reason-identity which constitutes each.

Thus we see that reflexion from first to last is purely negative, and the absolute in reflexion is simply the synthesis of opposites. The law of reflexion is therefore 'that everything destroys itself'; the life of each finite reality is its death. And this as we saw applies universally to everything except the absolute identity itself. It would apply even to reflexion itself, if this opposed itself to the absolute as a fixed element of reality. It must negate itself likewise, for if it did not, 'it would be determining itself by the law of contradiction'; it would assert itself to be reason and would be obeying the law of understanding only; it would posit itself absolutely against the absolute and yet maintain that the absolute is the only identity. The only law to which it can rightly

(1) W. I. 180 P: 180.
conform must therefore be that of self-annihilation. This self-annihilation just means that synthesis of opposites which constitutes the nature of the absolute identity. But synthesis of opposites is not really contradiction, but rather the contradiction which abolishes, sublates itself. And this is the signification of antimony. Antimony therefore is the supreme law of reason as reflection, of the negative side of speculation.

But as we saw there is another moment in the process of 'construing' the absolute. Reflexion maintains throughout that opposites must be negated, that their being cancelled in and by the absolute is their truth. But it does no more than this. There is a process which it even demands and presupposes, and yet which it does not and cannot perform, viz: bringing to the light of philosophic knowledge the positive side of reason. This element or aspect which defies all negation and endures throughout it is the identity itself which maintains and preserves the content negated; and this side of reason is Anschauung. (1) Anschauung does not 'fix' one opposite over against another; if it did so it would perform the work of understanding. And it cannot make 'real', or, so to say, 'precipitate', what is 'ideal', for this would be simply to determine the other side of an opposition, which only exists as an antimony, and has already been negated in reflexion.

Anschauung is concerned with the identity per se as reflexion is concerned

(1) W. I. 104 f: I. 123.
with finite opposites as such; and is present not merely in the case of the absolute identity, but also in that of those relative identities into which the absolute identity differentiates itself. For even these relative identities, e.g. the objective as such, is antinomical; for, though an identity, it is not primarily a 'fixed' identity of understanding, but is related to the absolute. (1) And what Anschauung does is to assert and insist upon what is merely indicated by reflexion, to substantiate and preserve what reflexion only demands and postulates. In the identity as such antimony is immanently present, and in antimony as such the identity is implied. Anschauung expresses the immediate oneness of the identity of reason to reason itself. It may function apart from reflexion; but in this case it is simply empirical, unconscious, the merely 'given'; the relative identity of the objective e.g. is accepted in this way as divided from the subjective. And similarly reflexion may operate by itself and produce pure antimony; in which case it furnishes indeed knowledge, but 'pure' knowledge, formal negative knowledge, knowledge which determines the content of the absolute by reference to that identity constituting its substance, but can do no more than produce this reference, it produces therefore antinomies and not the identity. Consequently if we are to have the truth of speculation in its completeness we must not have either

(1) W. I. 188.
reflexion without Anschauung or \textit{Ansicht}. The one is as absolutely necessary as the other. And the union of these two is what speculation seeks; this union is "transcendental knowledge," which alone fully satisfies philosophy. For by it the union of subjective and objective, intelligence and nature, consciousness and the unconscious, thought and being is accomplished, and that is philosophic knowledge, or as we have put it, the construing of the absolute. What therefore is known, or viewed (\textit{Ansicht}) belongs to both worlds at once: the one world is essentially identical with the other: being looked at from the standpoint of thought is the scheme of intelligence, intelligence from the standpoint of being is the scheme of absolute being. And obviously in philosophy, transcendental knowledge and transcendental Anschauung are one and the same; for in both that identity is completely present; the difference of expression 'denotes merely the preponderance of the ideal (formal negative) or real factor' in the absolute identity.

In the construction of the system of philosophy it is however maintained that the production of this system is the work of reflexion.\(^{(1)}\) For it alone is concerned with the finitude, the opposites, the different forms of identity, the manifold content of the absolute; and it is simply out of this plurality that system is constructed, and owing to which indeed philosophy is required. Reflexion therefore as the means by which

\(^{(1)}\) W. I. 188. 271
this manifold of finitude is finally revealed as a limited determination of the absolute identity, is necessarily the vital moving force in the shaping of the system, and its formal essence is just that antinomy, that synthesis of opposites, which constitutes the absolute.

But this being so it is very important to observe that we are thereby debarred from attempting to express through reflexion the absolute in the form of a single proposition, which shall be the fundamental supreme absolute ground-principle of the system, which shall be valid for understanding and from which the whole system may be known and constructed. Such an attempt is indeed simply nonsense. For propositions of this kind are limited, conditioned and do not contain a contradiction. If the expression of the principle contradicts itself it is not a proposition, if it do not contradict itself it is conditioned, limited. Now the absolute is the unconditioned ground of reflexion, its expression therefore must contain contradiction and cannot be given in a single proposition. Its only expression is in an antinomy. What in the absolute identity is united, the synthesis and the antithesis, must be expressed in two propositions, one expressing the identity, the other the opposition and division. Hence e.g. either the propositions A = A and A = B are quite inadequate to the absolute or else each expresses an antinomy and indeed the same antinomy.

(1) W. I. 188 f.
From the foregoing it is easy to see that what philosophy furnishes is nothing short of a totality of knowledge produced by reflexion and constituting in itself 'a system, an organic whole of concepts whose highest law is reason and not understanding.' (1) It is an organic whole whose ground lies in itself, and has no ground outside itself, an organisation of moments or forms of knowledge (Erkenntnisse) every part of which is itself the whole (through its implication of the absolute). As he elsewhere puts it 'every unit of knowledge is a truth, every particle of dust an organisation.' And the method by which this result is to be obtained is, as we might expect, neither synthetic, nor analytic, but rather development that is of reason itself and from itself; (2) it is not therefore the simple negation of its appearance, and mere resumption of it into its essence, but rather the construing of every appearance as a relative identity, and its own identity. No more precise account of this method however is given, though its purport is sufficiently evident.

In such a system it is clear on the one hand how the history of philosophical systems will be regarded, and on the other what place will be assigned to special contrasted and distinct modes of philosophising which have appeared in the course of that history. For we see that the consequence of maintaining that the problem and object of philosophy has

(1) W. I. 188: XVI. 86: I. 182.  
(2) W. I. 200.
at all times been one and the same, that philosophy is the self-knowledge of reason, is that the history of philosophy is itself one philosophy in different forms. Only on this view can we bring meaning into the history of thought, and find it something other than simply a collection of individual opinions. And thereby also we can judge a given system, for we can distinguish what it tried to do from what it actually accomplished, can distinguish the philosophy of the system from the system itself,\(^1\) and determine its nature and result accordingly. And in particular directly opposite forms of philosophy, e.g. scepticism and dogmatism, will thus be not absolutely disconnected and irreconcilable modes of thinking, but rather constituent aspects of the one content of reason. This must necessarily be the case, and an analysis of both the forms would show that neither is the whole or the negative of philosophy, but actually imply and require each other. All philosophy is sceptical and dogmatical at once. Scepticism as opposed to dogmatism is itself dogmatical, the complementary side of dogmatism; as an 'absolute' philosophy it is simply the negative side of reason—reflection.\(^2\) Dogmatism as an absolute scheme is the assumption by a finite, a conditioned, an opposite element of the nature and forms of the absolute identity itself. It would be outside our purpose however to exhibit in greater detail the position which Hegel here takes up; its

\(^1\) W. I. 200 ff. \(^2\) W. I. 201 ff: XVI. Verhältn d. Scept. passim.
general significance is all that here concerns us.

Of great importance is it for us to note that of the foregoing ground plan of a system of philosophy Hegel assigns the name Logic to that part which forms the content of reflexion proper and per se; and Metaphysic to that which was designated transcendental knowledge, and which was convertible as we saw, with transcendental Anschauung. This is made quite clear from a short statement of the content and character of logic and metaphysic respectively which is extracted by his biographer from the manuscript lectures of this period. (1) Here he distinguishes between infinite knowledge, knowledge of the absolute, and finite knowledge, knowledge of finitude. The former is the knowledge of reason without qualification (Vernunft-kenntniss); the latter is knowledge of reason as qualified by understanding. That is, that which is finite is in the absolute, has its source in reason, is not outside reason; but as it is for reason as it presents itself to reason, it is negated by it, has no self-subsistency, is related to the absolute identity, and to other finite facts. But in its finitude it can be and is abstracted from the absolute identity of reason, and thus in a sense robbed of its reason-character, and thereby fixed in its finiteness, becomes finite knowledge, knowledge of finite as such. This is the work of understanding. This knowledge of the finite

---

(1) Ros. 190-2.
determines the problem of logic. For a 'true logic' will seek to state systematically the forms of finitude, the formal elements of finite knowledge. It will include an exposition of those products of understanding, in which by its abstracting and fixing of finite elements of the content of reason it 'imitates' reason, though the identity it does produce is merely 'formal.'

And further since the forms of finite knowledge are really in and for reason, a constituent part of logic must be the significance and character possessed by those forms in this reference to reason. Such a significance we have seen all along is purely negative; hence this concluding portion of logic consists in the negative knowledge of reason, the sublating of finite knowledge by reason-knowledge.

The logic falls thus into three parts. The first contains the universal forms, laws or categories of finitude in general, both in its objective as well as its subjective aspect, stated simply as to their finiteness, as reflexes of the absolute. We must keep in mind that these forms are not in the first instance as such categories of reason. Hegel is stating in this part (and in the succeeding part) the elements which are for understanding per se, the content of finite knowledge, knowledge as it is determined by understanding. Taken by itself therefore it embodies, as we shall see presently, no philosophical conclusions; it is the work of 'isolated', limiting, finiting reflexion, not of philosophical reflexion, reflexion which we saw was purely negative. These categories are thus not

...
real identities but formal identities; not identities which are at once subjective and objective, but identities which contain no inner difference, no inner opposition. They are not relative identities, in the sense we defined above, but identities which as against each other are absolutely fixed. These realities therefore, which though opposed are for speculation identical, are taken in such formal identities of understanding to be qualitatively different and each merely self-identical. And these finite forms are reflexions from the absolute, the one light of the absolute is passed through the angular prism of finitude; all reality is thus broken up by it and separated into finite elements. But such finite determinations are only ideally\(^\text{(1)}\) opposed to each other by understanding; they are not real opposites, for real opposites understanding cannot construe; this can, as we saw, only be done by reason.

In the second part of the logic similarly we are still concerned with finite knowledge, 'isolated reflexion', understanding as such. In this part are considered the subjective forms of finitude, i.e. finite thought itself, understanding and its processes. These are the usual forms of concept, judgment and syllogism. It is in the first instance the concept, judgment and syllogism in their purely formal character, that he has here in view. He does use the term concept (Begriff) as applicable to the

\(^{(1)}\) By 'ideal' must here be understood abstract as opposed to concrete.
absolute itself, and employs the expression 'absolute concept' in this reference; and again he treats judgment as an unconscious identity of reason. But it is not concept and judgment as elements of reason that he deals with in this part of the logic. It is the finite limited concept, and judgment, formal, 'fixed', unreal (i.e. unphilosophical). He expressly points out that although syllogism expresses more clearly the nature and character of reason, and is indeed commonly ascribed to reason, still in this part of the logic he means syllogism as a formal process of thought, as it is for finite knowledge for understanding. Such a syllogism does not express speculative truth any more than the concept of understanding is equal to the nature of the absolute. To apprehend the absolute identity we must in fact remove it from the sphere of such concepts.

In the third part is stated the relation of reason to the foregoing forms of finite knowledge. The first and second parts contain no reference whatever to reason; they state simply facts concerning finite knowledge, the actual modes in which it appears. By its nature it cannot express philosophical truth, and it is therefore not until we come to this third part that we enter upon philosophy; for only here have we knowledge of or by reason. But it is only knowledge (by reason) of this finite knowledge,

(1) W. I. 79.  (2) W. I. 24.  (3) W. I. 211.
is only therefore as we have seen purely negative in character, it is 'negative knowledge of reason', it sublates finite knowledge by bringing it into a new relation, which is at once truer than the relations of finite knowledge as such, and the only true knowledge which the finite forms can really possess. This new relation is the relation to the absolute identity. Here then we have philosophical reflexion as contrasted with the isolated finite reflexion of the first two parts of the logic. Here as we saw the identities are 'relative identities', the opposites real opposites. Reason seizes upon concept, judgment and syllogism, destroys their limited character as they are for understanding, gives them the content and character of the absolute, and thus elevates them into expressions of infinite truth.

In this reference the concept as an expression for the absolute, becomes the 'principle of opposition and the opposition itself,' the one concept which differentiates itself into a plurality of determinate concepts, and yet remains one throughout the plurality. (1) So again of judgment. In it the identity of reason is unconscious, but it is still operative in it and is in fact expressed by the copula 'is', though by this copula it is not explicitly uttered. Rather this copula tends to obscure the reason element and in judgment we find the predominance of difference. (2) And syllogism he holds to be the very foundation of philosophical knowledge, the explicit

---

(1) W. I. 380.  
(2) W. I. 26.
expression of the nature of the identity of reason.

This third part closes the logic. He mentions indeed that there is usually given an 'applied' logic; but the content of this he holds to be partly too general and trivial, and to be, so far as it contains any philosophical significance, a part of the third division of the logic. The third part introduces us to the metaphysic or to 'philosophy proper', where we have the knowledge of reason per se, the sphere of the true Idea, the union of thought and being, reflection and Anschauung. (1) The distinction therefore of logic from metaphysic is, at least formally, definite and decided. He maintains it consistently and explicitly not merely in this sketch but elsewhere. (2) And he does not strictly coordinate logic with metaphysic as equally parts of philosophy; two parts of logic as was pointed out have no immediate philosophical significance. Logic he says expressly is in a sense an introduction to philosophy. (3) This view of logic however, while it obviously is justified in a manner by the conception of its subject-matter and that of philosophy, must be accepted in the light of his present treatment of logic and metaphysic. Hegel admits that he takes this distinction between the two, which has been so long maintained, for the sake of its convenience. (4) It had been customary apparently to make that distinction in philosophy, and to consider

(1) W. I. 356. (2) e.g. W. I. 181: 324. (3) Ros. 191. (4) Ros. 190.
one as introductory to the other. Hegel adopted it as a convenient method of distinguishing problems in philosophy, but pointed out in so many words that if logic is to be so considered then it must, to be an introduction to speculative science, be treated speculatively. He thus at once preserves historical usage and his own view of the subject. Hence the logic is not introductory in the sense that per se it is outside philosophy; this it cannot be for one part of it is knowledge of reason. Rather it is a first stage in philosophy.

What philosophy, 'transcendental knowledge,' and metaphysics, to which logic in that sense is introductory, has to accomplish, we have perhaps sufficiently stated already. 'It has,' Hegel says, 'previously to construe completely the principle of all philosophy' i.e. absolute identity, the union of thought and being, of subject and object. This is the essence of philosophy as of every true science; this is in philosophy the 'highest Idea', the 'pure Idea.' Or "The essence of knowledge consists in the identity of universal and particular: i.e. of what is posited under the form of thought and of being."(1) In it all the content of philosophy (of logic, of Anschauung) is taken up and presented in its pure absolute form, determined by its relation to the absolute identity. And such a philosophy is necessarily Idealism, because it takes neither of the

---

(1) W. I. 324: 356. XVI. Scepticism ad fin.
opposites contained in the identity (subject, object, etc.) abstracted from each other, but holds its highest Idea, its idea of Reason par excellence, as determining both indifferently, each being by itself unreal. (1)

When we seek more definite knowledge as to how this system can be exhibited and what precisely its result would be we can furnish from the remains at our disposal no accurate answer. We can however state that the conclusion reached in such a system, its final result is conceived in a distinctly Schellingian form. The 'highest Idea' he says, is 'die Nacht des göttlichen Mystyiums.' (2) 'Speculation,' he says, 'demands, in its highest synthesis of the conscious and the unconscious, the negation of consciousness itself. And thereby reason buries its reflexion of the absolute identity, and its knowledge as well as its very self in its own abyss.' (3) There is doubtless a certain degree of mere metaphor in such phraseology, though its philosophical purport is quite evident; it is indeed the legitimate consequence of his principle of absolute identity. And it is of significance and importance in view of that relation of philosophy and religion in Hegel, already noted, that such a conception is in entire agreement with his attitude in religion, where the principle of resignation, with its abandonment of self, its negation of all 'subjectivity' and reference to self is held to be fundamental. (4)

---


(a) Hegel expressly says that in metaphysics he can give nothing new, but only re-present metaphysics as it historically appears. Later 192
It will now have become evident from the foregoing statement that Hegel in this period has made a decided advance in his conception of the nature of logic. We have it is true no systematic exposition of his view, but we have sufficient to enable us to appreciate the distance he has travelled from his earlier position. It remains for us now to conclude this survey of his second period by bringing into relief the main features which characterise this advance. We must also indicate briefly in what essential respects he differed from his chief immediate predecessors, a difference which in this period he has already insisted upon in his criticisms of Kant Fichte etc. And finally we must point out in what direction his further development proceeds during the next period, the result of which finds its expression in the Larger Logic.

We would, to begin with, lay emphasis on four prominent and important results arrived at in this period which chiefly exhibit in what respects he advanced on the preceding. These are I. the acquisition of a determining fundamental philosophical conception, II. the ascertaining of the nature and procedure of the instrument of philosophising, III. the closer approximation of logic to metaphysic, through the assimilation of their content, IV. the naming of the method to be employed in constructing a system. In virtue of the first-named feature Hegel gains an independence of attitude in philosophy which places him outside the direct influence of traditional or current philosophy. The mere repetition of the results of
others which was found in the early period is now no longer possible or necessary. He has made up his mind as to what the nature of philosophy is, what is its fundamental principle, a principle which is not only that of a particular philosophy, but is that of all philosophy whatsoever. He does not profess to work out a system. He is rather content to exhibit this principle throughout the history of philosophy than to construct an entirely new system. (1) From this point of view he starts and by it he judges all that has appeared as philosophy. The principle is not expounded fully and requires more exact determination, which however it does not receive in this period. An identity which is the ground and unity of all opposites, that which reason, (whose identity it is and which determines the activity of reason,) seeks to exhibit at the end of its procedure as the essence of all opposed finite elements, is assuredly a wide enough designation for all that philosophy has done or seeks to do. But it was doubtless natural that Hegel in stating this principle for the first time should have laid emphasis rather on the unity, the identity of import in all systems than on their special differences. And, though this principle receives modification and a more definite content later on, it remains none the less in its general form a fundamental position in his system to the last.

It must be kept in mind too that this is not merely for Hegel at this

---

(1) Ros. 192.
or at any time a principle from which to regard philosophy in its inmost nature and in its history, it is necessarily also a principle by reference to which all the concepts of philosophy come to possess a really philosophical meaning at all. And if we keep these prima facie quite distinct spheres, to which this same principle applies, clearly in view, we will see how easy it was for Hegel to take up the position, which he as a matter of fact does later on, of finding the actual counterpart of the sequence of the concepts of the logic in the history of philosophy itself. It was a common principle which determined the content of both; why then should there not be an exact parallelism between the two? We seem therefore warranted in finding one of the clues by which Hegel determined the order and place in the sequence of the concepts of the logic in this conception of the nature of philosophy and the significance of its history.

For, we may, in passing, note again, Hegel was thoroughly acquainted with the history of philosophy before he wrote the Phanomenologie, 1806–7, and the logic did not begin to appear till 1812. He thus knew what the forms were in which the one principle of philosophy had appeared in the course of its history. What more natural than the suggestion that these had a necessary sequence? that this sequence was a logical one, (in his later meaning of logic)? and that thus they afford a clue to determining the sequence of the concepts. in the logic as such, and even put the thinker on the track of discovering the law of this sequence?
It is further of importance to note that Hegel does not work up to this principle which governs his philosophy; it is simply his starting-point, and fundamental notion; it arises from his conception of the need and function of philosophy in life, but has no other 'presupposition' and no other warrant as a principle. The significance of this lies in the fact that his system thus necessarily works from that principle which is at once its conclusion and goal as well as its starting place. And hence it is that the specific character which the philosophic method all along assumes is as he calls it 'deductive.' It could not be otherwise with such a beginning. He did not seem to think it necessary to establish his principle in the sense of give a ground for it; the only proof of which it admitted was to be found when it was systematically worked out and completely presented, i.e. at the end of the system, not at the beginning. Indeed it would be futile to try to prove or establish his principle in any other way, as we have already pointed out. And this modus operandi, here for the first time clearly expressed, remains permanent in Hegel's philosophy.

Thus we see that the securing of a definite point of view can remove two prominent defects of the preceding period, 1. the indeterminateness of the content of his scheme, and its arbitrary acceptance of traditional ideas, 2. the absence of connectedness in the content owing to the lack of a central determining point of reference, the various
conceptions cannot be 'deduced.'

Again the accurate analysis of the procedure of philosophy, the ascertainment of the significance of reason, of reflection, of Anschauung goes very far indeed to obviate the obscurities and remove the inadequacies of his early view. It is clearly of the first importance as a preliminary to the construction of any system, that the fundamental terms, the primary factors and functions necessary to that construction should be generally defined. This determination however does not give us the system itself; it is merely an essential presupposition to it.

Hegel again does not connect these factors systematically with each other; they are no more than definitely formulated, and in this sense are used throughout all his criticism of his predecessors. And this analysis has not merely a value for the accurate construction of a system; the definition thereby given to the terms settles the nature of the content of the system. Formerly we saw Hegel had distinguished the form from the matter in knowledge, the form of knowledge from knowledge itself, thought from being. In the second period these different factors are identified, and the determination of the above terms signalises this identification, which, though its form is changed, remains permanently in Hegel's system.

Reflection is a process which operates through and by means of this identification; it is a reflection of opposites, which are relatively identical, are what they are by sharing in, being determined by, the one
identity of reason. It is unnecessary to do more than point out the extreme importance of this step, which not merely gives a greater definiteness, precision, and consistency to Hegel's thinking than was found in his early view but stamps Hegel's thinking ever after as 'Identitats-philosophie.' For example it is simply this same notion of identity of opposites which appears when in the later logic the universals of thought the categories are at the same time determinations of reality (of the object, Gegenstand) or when opposed categories are viewed as moments of their own unity.

We must not however import more into his present position than is warranted. Reflexion, for example, must not be taken to be the dialectic in the latter sense of that term. It is negation, like the other dialectic, and it must be viewed also as dealing, like the latter, with what is both form and content, both thought and being. But unlike the latter it has not as such a positive side, it does not conserve the negated factors; the negation is produced by relating each to the absolute identity, i.e. is produced by what in the first instance is external to the process of reflexion itself; the positive side of 'philosophical knowledge' is referred to another sphere, that of Anschauung. As a matter of fact the
word 'dialectic' is hardly used at all in this period. No doubt it would have been in agreement both with his own previous and with current terminology to have used it as a designation for the process of reflexion in the sense already defined. (1) And from this point of view he could well have called logic as understood in this period, logic of reason (Vernunftlogik); dialectic. We would however have to distinguish this general use of the term dialectic from the later and specific sense. We are entitled to find in reflexion as defined in this period the source, the immediate forecasts of the later dialectic. To this however we shall presently return.

The divergencies from his early views already stated necessitate a change which is also an advance in his schemes of metaphysic. We are hardly justified in constituting a point-by-point comparison between the conceptions of the two periods. We cannot find so accurate a correspondence between them. The previous doctrine of 'proportion' is simply supplanted by the third part of the new logic; there is very little connection or similarity discoverable between them. The second parts of both logics do indeed correspond somewhat closely; the later seems unquestionably a more definite and precise form of the earlier. In the case

of the first parts however we are not entitled to affirm a close similarity, owing to the absence of any detailed discussion of this part in the logic of the second period. Doubtless the content of the two must have been similar, but to what extent we cannot fully determine. Both contain forms and categories of reality; but whereas in the early logic these are categories of 'being', in the second logic they are categories (laws) of finitude in general, both in a subjective and objective reference.

Both again regard the subject matter of logic to belong to understanding; but while the early logic is merely logic of understanding, and is illuminated by no analysis of understanding and its relation to reason, the second logic can be only in part viewed as a logic of understanding, contains one division devoted solely to the work of reason, and can in virtue of the close connection between reason and understanding as already determined be considered as entirely a logic of reason. This is as we saw in virtue of the nature of reflexion, with which logic deals, and in which the distinction between knowledge, (thought), and being, (a distinction vital to the early logic) is removed.

It is an obvious and necessary result of all this that logic should in this period become metaphysical, that the only distinction which obtains between the two should fall inside metaphysic itself. The distinction in fact is that between reason as primarily negative and reason as both positive and negative at once, reason in relation with finitude as such,
and reason as dealing with its 'infinite' content, the absolute identity.

And this approximation of logic and metaphysics is of vital significance. Metaphysics itself comes to be dealt with in terminology which holds directly of logic. The use of such terms as 'absolute notion' (Begriff), 'absolute Idea' (Idee) for the identity of reason indicates this. All that is required to bring his later position clearly into view is a still further criticism of his terms, and a more thorough systematisation of his fundamental ideas.

Finally we have the method characterised by which Hegel would establish his philosophical system. This method is described as development. As was already stated we have no complete exposition of the nature and meaning of this method, or of how it actually works in detail. That it should have been

(named development is a decided advance in precision of method on the previous period, indicates the form in which his system would appear, and points the direction his further advance will take. The conception of a developmental method (as distinct from the purely "deductive" method of Fichte and in part of Schelling) was in all probability suggested by Schelling's "Transcendental Idealism", where 'philosophy' is stated to be, and expounded as the 'history of the steps or epochs of self-consciousness', a history which starts from a position 'deduced' as fundamental necessary and indubitable and "allows the various acts" of self-consciousness to "arise" in a series

"Während diejenigen beiden sind die dritte Logik in einverleibt mit "Idealism", "Spekulation Idee", "Spekulation philosophie" - Scharen.
representing grades of complexity and explicitness of self-consciousness.\(^{(1)}\)

More than the general connection we cannot, owing to the incompleteness of our resources, indicate.

In all these ways then Hegel has made distinct and ascertainable progress on his early view. For the rest, it is not difficult to discover the defects and incompleteness of his views at this period and the next steps of advance. But before doing so it will be well to state as briefly as possible the nature of the relation to his greater contemporaries more especially to Schelling, which his views at this time exhibit. We say 'briefly', partly because such a statement is rather of the nature of a digression from our main subject, and partly because Hegel's views at this time are too generally stated to admit of an indication of any more than general affinities (or the reverse) between Hegel and his contemporaries.

We are not left in much doubt regarding Hegel's attitude during this period towards his immediate contemporaries. His main contributions to the "Critical Journal" were critical and expository discussions of their positions. It is important however to bear in mind that in these statements he is concerned primarily and indeed almost entirely with the fundamental conceptions of the various systems rather than with details he deals with their principles in the broadest and most general outline, not with particular parts of their system, or special developments of their principle. Hence we will not find, and cannot expect, that much direct light is thrown on the treatment of the nature and content of Logic by the examination to which he subjects those systems. The main interest for us of his criticisms lies in their accentuation of the central and fundamental principle which he had by this time gained for himself, in the confirmation we thereby find of the exposition we have given of that principle, and the manner into which it is brought by contrast with the positions he criticises. They merely signalise his attainment of a governing conception and his triumphant confidence in its truth; and perhaps too in a distant manner suggest the future system into which that conception will develop.

In all of them, we must observe at the outset, he found the recognition of the same general "speculative idea", the ultimate identity of subject and object. It was not this conception in its general form which separated Fichte from Schelling, and both from Kant or Jacobi. It was the manner in which this principle was grasped and expressed by each, the completeness
and explicitness with which the full meaning of that idea was maintained and exhibited in their several systems, which distinguished the one thinker from another. This principle he himself shared with all these thinkers; it is his own clear and complete conception of its nature which is the basis of his criticism or of his interpretation. His attitude towards all of them is thus at once sympathetic and critical; his criticism is, true to his unvarying method of treatment, essentially immanent.

Towards Kant and Fichte he takes up a position primarily antagonistic and negative. The genuine speculative (1) element in Kant Hegel finds in the problem and in the solution offered to the problem "how are synthetic a priori judgments possible." The very expression of this problem indicates and implies the ground idea of the unity, the identity of subject and predicate particular and universal, being, and thought. (2) This unity is not a product of these opposites, but the original and absolute identity of them, from which in fact they sunder themselves. The judgment formed from them is just the original and primal dividing, or severing (Ur-teil) of the elements in the unity. The possibility of this union lies in reason; the idea it expresses is an idea of reason. This original and ultimate principle of unity appears in Kant's Kritik in various forms. It is found in the

(1) Speculation means henceforward for Hegel the scientific comprehension of the Absolute qua Absolute, a science which starts from and deals with all reality from the point of view and vantage-ground of the Absolute. cp. W. I. 270-1.

(2) W. I. 20-21.
'synthetic unity of apperception', 'productive imagination', 'category', 'scheme', as also in 'the forms of intuition' Space and Time. In all these forms it is one and the same conception that is dominant and actually present. They describe different functions, but functions of one and the same unity of reason. (1) It is in the light of this ultimate unity that we are to explain and justify Kant's insistence on the concrete character of knowledge, on the reciprocal necessity of 'Anschauung' to 'Begriff'. (2) Unless again we regard the 'original synthetic unity of apperception', not as a go-between, not as a meeting-place for an isolated subject existing on one side and a world of objects on the other, but as the primal and absolute unity out of which, as from their ultimate germ subject and object proceed and in proceeding sunder themselves apart,—it is quite impossible to understand Kant's deduction of categories or forms of intuition. (3) For this reason then we must distinguish between the merely logical Ego which 'accompanies' presentations, and this all constituting unity of the subject with its object; we must separate the one from that of the other to give meaning to Kant's position. All that Kant establishes regarding the concrete character of experience, its unity, follows consistently from this his fundamental position, and justifies the above interpretation of his meaning.

(1) W. I. 23, 25. (2) I. 22. (3) I. 24, 25.
Still Kant himself did not fully comprehend the significance of his own essential conception. Instead of explicitly taking that identity in its truth its valid and ultimate meaning, that is as a concrete identity with diverse aspects, as the concrete final Idea, reason-constituted, and reason-determined, where the diverse elements were explicit ly and unequivocally posited as identical, because moments in that one primary unity, Kant held by that unity simply and solely in the form in which it appeared in judgment, where the divided dual elements are exhibited and maintained only in their duality. For in the judgment what is insisted on is primarily and indeed solely the diversity of the content; and for Kant the judgment is the primary form of knowledge. Productive imagination which is the proximate ground of judgments, and is in fact understanding, remains, (though in reality a pulse, a function, a potency of reason itself,) sunk in diversity. The absolute unity therefore never comes to light. The identity, the universal which it contains viz: the category, remains forever over-against, opposed to the particular with which in judgment it is united by the copula. The identity therefore is merely a relative formal abstract identity. The other element, the particular, does not exist in it, it comes to it, as a foreign element from without, which is necessary to it, but not a constituent, a moment of it. The identity of the two, of

(1) W. I. 25.
understanding and sense, of universal and particular, of notion and intuition is never completely and adequately established. Hence arise the 'thing-in-itself', the 'limitation of reason', the emphasis on 'human' reason, the dialectic of 'pure' reason, the 'fixed and insurmountable opposition between freedom and necessity etc. In all this Hegel finds nothing but the consequences of his limited and erroneous conception of the nature of that ultimate unity which it was 'his great merit' to have laid bare. Not that Kant is not forced in spite of himself to be truer to his own principle than his determination of it will logically allow. The idea of an "Intuitive understanding", for example, is the same idea as that of transcendental (productive) imaginative; and such an understanding Kant declares to be 'necessary.' Though he rejects the 'real' necessity of it while admitting the conceptual necessity, 'problematic' reality of it; yet the bare admission of it shows his transcendence of his own limitations, while the rejection of the absolute validity of the conception was after all due, Hegel thinks, to his resolution to be limited, subjective and consistent with his finite formal position. (1) Or again his emphatic insistence on the autonomy and spontaneity of reason likewise carries Kant beyond his restricted views; for this conception is in flat contradiction with the assertion of the necessity of an opposed non-rational element.

(1) I. 42–4.
over against and therefore limiting that freedom of reason. How can reason be free and autonomous, if by its very necessities it is for ever limited and hampered, modified and, it may be, even indirectly guided in its activity by this foreign material?

Hence, Hegel concludes, Kant's scheme though certainly in principle Idealism (i.e. a construction from and of the identity of opposites) is nothing more than merely formal Idealism. It contains the principle of the absolute unity of opposites, of reason-knowledge, but by its restriction to knowledge of understanding alone, ("finite"knowledge), to knowledge which remains riveted to the diverse counter-posed elements of the one Reality, instead of being genuine Idealism it becomes rather dualism. Its "critical Idealism" consists in nothing but the knowledge that Ego and things remain each fixed by themselves and unreconciled. The whole content of the philosophy is not knowledge of the absolute at all, but knowledge of mere subjectivity a criticism of the faculty of knowledge; a revised Lockeanism.

Now from the foregoing criticism of Kant we can gather with some accuracy some of Hegel's own conceptions concerning the content of logic and metaphysics, which at once extend and accentuate what we have already presented as his views at this period. We see at once how the above is a

review of Kant in the light of a pronounced philosophical principle, which transforms the notions and principles of Kant to its own purposes in the belief that the principle of Kant is thereby most truly conserved. "A priori" ceases to have the subjective 'nuance' which it has in Kant, its meaning is convertible with 'absolute identity'; 'universal and necessary a priori' means rooted in the reality of the one identity of reason; it is reason which has a priority not understanding as such. So again Hegel seems prepared to accept Kant's notions as far as they go, as expressions or forms of the absolute identity itself; but they are no longer mere notions of understanding but finite, fixed, limited notions of reason. Kant's Logic ceases therefore at a single stroke to be regarded merely as a subjective human apparatus for putting the tangled complexity of the world into harmonious order, and becomes essentially constitutive of reality, becomes at once objective and immanently determinant of it. And with this comes the introduction of notions of both subjectivity and objectivity, as we have already noted. Hence further it is in the same line of transformation that since the notions of Kant are notions of reason for Hegel, and reason is the ground identity, the absolute reality, Kant's 'transcendental' 

(1) I. 21, 24, 32 etc. (2) Kant himself deserves the great credit, according to Hegel, of not limiting reason to the forms of finitude; but rather placing reason as such above and beyond it. I. 57.

(3) p. 445
Logic should cease to be that which states 'the conditions under which experience is alone possible,' and become a 'metaphysical' Logic which exhibits the ground notions of all reality; and that in general 'transcendental' should cease to have the limited meaning it has in Kant, and become in every sense synonymous with 'metaphysical.' And finally we indicated how the possible knowledge of the absolute the reason knowledge (which Hegel does not give but which he all along implies or hints at) could be brought about. Such knowledge is no more than implicit in Kant. But Kant's error just lay in restricting himself solely to judgment as the form of philosophical knowledge. Hence the direction in which true final reason-knowledge can alone lie is in that form of knowledge which completes the judgment by making entirely explicit by thorough the identity it implies. That form is the syllogism. It is here that we have most clearly expressed and exhibited that 'triplicity which is the germ of speculation', and which it is one of Kant's merits to have disclosed. It is in virtue of this triple content and character of the one 'Idea', that there is and can be no ultimate

(1) I. 24, 28. With this may be mentioned the thesis defended by Hegel at his 'Habititation' in Jena: "Syllogismus est principium Idealisini." (Leben 157): but too much stress cannot in the nature of the case be laid on his"defence" of such a thesis.

(2) I. 33.
opposition between a priori and a posteriori, that one is \textit{material} in and through the other.

The above views which have now become fundamental for Hegel agree clearly enough with the content of the Logic of this period which we have already given. But they do more than this; they indicate the direction any further development on his part would be sure to take. With Fichte too Hegel stands in decided opposition; an opposition which he is never weary of reiterating. The ground of his opposition is precisely the same as in the case of Kant, and the criticism only differs slightly from that of the latter. For Fichte the primal principle and ground-fact is the Ego, Subjectivity, Thought, inward Self-consciousness. This is the absolute, the Identity. So far his principle is idealistic, and so far it is genuine speculation. But it is of the essence of his conception that nothing more lies in the Ego than the subjective content of the Ego. Hence all the detailed content which the object possesses comes externally to this mere abstract 'empty' form of Reality. (1) Or to put it in other words the objectivity has no self-subsistence, no reality on a level with the reality of the subject; object is dependent on it, and even produced and brought forward by it. This being so the identity is not an identity of both subject and object but an identity of subject only; the object does not share equal rights in the absolute unity; its rights to be at all is

(1) I. 118-9.
constituted by the subject. The whole system of Fichte therefore remains rooted in subjectivity alone; and the very reality of the objective world which he set out to explain does not possess the substantiality necessary to warrant any explanation of it; in short objectivity per se is not explained at all. So far as this principle has content, that content is subjective only, 'sensation', 'intuition', 'feeling', 'impulse'; and these and their complexities constitute all that objectivity means for Fichte. And this remains true not merely in the theoretical construction of Reality, but in the complementary or supplementary realisation of the objective sense-world through practical act of pure will. For here too there is nothing but subjectivity to start with, and out of subjectivity it does not pass, and cannot by its own logic pass. There is thus on Fichte's view no absolute Identity; there is only a relative identity, that of the subject and its content; there can indeed hardly be said to be an identity at all for the ultimate fact is a merely formal principle and the particular the filling in is and remains external to it, or forced into it extra. There is no objective content; nature is only sense-content, and has no subsistency of its own. The absolute identity therefore does not contain diversity of content, but rather one order of content into which the other is simply merged. It is impossible to regard Nature per se; it exists merely in

(1) I. 120.  
(2) I. 138-9.
relation and by reference to the empirical subject.\(^{(1)}\) The whole principle is therefore merely formal; its content limited, its reality solely subjective.

Again when we consider its method similar imperfection is found. That method consists in what is called 'Deduction.' Its nature is in point of fact a result and an implicit recognition of the finitude and incompleteness of the fundamental principle. For the ultimate primal and universal truth and certainty, pure Egoity, pure self-consciousness, is admitted to be itself incomplete; it is limited by another from which it is and must be abstracted in order to be obtained as ultimate principle.\(^{(2)}\) But this limitation is a conditionedness which in order to become absolute, the one identity, it must overcome, and overcome by embracing that other. The recognition of this conditionedness and thereby of the necessity of passing over to the other, of supplementing the incompleteness, of filling up the empty and abstract principle is the nerve of this "deduction" of the one out of the other.\(^{(3)}\)

That other stands in absolute contrary opposition; it is non-Ego. It therefore is and remains in itself foreign to that which it supplements. The deduction is not the result of an analysis of a content; but rather of the absence of any content at all; it is the result of a want, a need, a vacancy. The Ego starts the utmost abstraction, a mere negation of

\[^{(1)}\text{I. 120-129.}\quad ^{(2)}\text{I. 120-121.}\quad ^{(3)}\text{I. 122-3.}\]
all except itself, of objectivity in general; objectivity is to pure knowledge a mere minus. The deduction consists in taking up again that which was abstracted from, and attaching it on to the pure notion; in short changing the sign in the process, changing the minus into a plus. It is as if one had spent one's money and had nothing left but an empty purse; then proceeded to deduce money from the fact of the empty purse, the sole meaning of the empty purse just consisting in the absence of money. (1)

It is true that this completion cannot be recognised without the idea of the totality from which the abstraction is made. And there again lies the error of the whole procedure. For if this is so, then why was the absolute merely subjectively conceived; why was merely one term of the identity, one part of the whole taken as absolute? Why was the start and the construction not made from the whole itself, from the underlying unity? The only reason apparently was that this part, this subjectivity has immediate empirical certainty and truth, truth which every one can accept at once. (2) Since however Fichte restricts himself to this partial reality and yet insists on completing it, by passing to another and from this again to another, it is clear that this process by its very nature, if the objective world is to be gathered into the fold of the Ego, go on ad infinitum. No matter how many times ninety and nine have been safely housed, there must

(1) I. 123. (2) ibid.
ever remain still one outside the fold; for without that other still to seek the Ego would cease to be itself. The totality therefore is never really attained; it continues as always what is to be attained; the complete identity the absolute unity which is the goal of philosophical endeavour remains only an unfulfilled 'ought', a 'sollen.'

From all this therefore, and the above contains the essential errors in the scheme, Hegel concludes that by Fichte's principle and method absolute knowledge can never be attained. Fichte's idealism is an entirely barren knowledge; a mere 'formal idealism'. It is no true knowledge, which must begin from the absolute, and the absolute is not an abstraction, nor incomplete, nor a part. Its idealism is indeed like Kant's a kind of dualism; its identity its principle of unity is the merely relative principle of determination of one by an other, a casual connection of one with the other. An insurmountable opposition is the essence of its content and method; contradiction and not the resolution of contradiction is its inevitable result.

It is evident then that Hegel's differences from Fichte are based on the same grounds as in the case of Kant, and that the correction of Fichte's principle and method are to be found in the fuller and more concrete appreciation of the absolute Identity on the one hand and by the

(1) I. 117.
(2) I. 117, 123.
(3) e.g. that between freedom and necessity. I. 127-8.
use of 'true intellectual Anschauung' as the instrument of systematisation. (1) This we found already established.

It is significant for the understanding of the development which Hegel thinks at this time philosophy should undergo, and for the actual realisation of which we may reasonably infer Hegel now (1802) intended, or had already actually begun, to set himself to labour, that he considers that with Kant, Fichte and Jacobi an epoch in the development of the new principle of speculation has exhausted and completed itself. For in all these that principle has been conceived and expressed in a one-sided, limited, incomplete form, and all possible variations of that single form common to them all have been exhibited by them. That form is subjectivity, the idealism in all three is grounded on a restricted reference to one side, one pole of the absolute identity, that of the subject; their idealism is nothing more than the dogmatic metaphysic of subjectivity. In all of them the one primal reality is the subject; the objective world becomes mere appearance (Kant) or affection, determination of the sensibility of the subject (Fichte), or merely that whose reality is supported by and conditioned on belief (Jacobi). In all of them the absolute as such, as absolute identity is a mere beyond, for Kant a Ding an sich, for Fichte a

(1) I. 123. (2) I. 155 ff. (3) The separate consideration of Jacobi's fundamental ideas would yield no more light on Hegel's position and can be here dispensed with. cp. I. 112-120, 158.
Selling, for Jacobi a Glauben (for Glauben is the condition both of the objective world and of the absolute per se\(^{(1)}\)). In Kant the absolute Identity is a mere thought, a mere form of objectivity, is not actually realised by and in that which for him is the fundamental element—the notion, the form, the universal. In Jacobi the opposition found in experience is only overcome by what is beyond for knowledge, and the attainment of this beyond which is to reconcile opposites is merely subjective, it is a belief, a 'yearning'. Fichte then is a union of the bare formal objectivity of Kant with the yearning the mere subjectivity of Jacobi, in the form of a 'demand'; which however is still not an absolute identity but still confined to subjectivity.\(^{(2)}\) Thus these three exhaust the possibilities of this one-sided conception of the principle of Idealism, without satisfying the needs of absolute knowledge. Their system begins and remains in the process of reflexion, of relativity, of duality, of diversity; and this characterises their entire exposition. It is because these forms of philosophy complete the cycle of systems based on the 'absoluteness of finitude', and rooted in the one-sidedness and limitation which characterises a time of culture, discipline, development (Bildung)\(^{(3)}\), that a true philosophy may be expected to rise to its full completeness through and by way of the negation of the absoluteness of their positions.

\(^{(1)}\) I. 102 ff.  \(^{(2)}\) B. 116-7.  \(^{(3)}\) I. 155-6.
And the time for the appearance of such a development of philosophy has now come, says Hegel. Not that the negation of those systems means their annihilation; they contain what is of essential philosophical significance. For in their thought, by that ceaseless process of negation of opposition and finitude, is recognised to be, what it in truth is, infinite, 'the negative side of the absolute.' May we not fairly discover in all this the words of the herald who was himself to become the apostle of Absolute Idealism?

The disagreement which Hegel shows with the positions of the thinkers above considered is based upon principles explicitly and consciously in harmony with those of Schelling. That connexion is so close in form and expression at this time that it would involve needless repetition to state and compare their several positions. We find the same general conception of the nature and meaning of the absolute identity (1); the preservation of both opposites alongside the negation of each per se (2); the dividing, negative function of reflexion (3); the character of the absolute as the "the indifference-point" of subject and object (4); and the difference between subject and object as simply quantitative, due to a 'preponderance' of the real over the ideal factor. It is to be observed


(5) I. 264.

(a) cp. Leben 214:5
however that we have only grounds for asserting a general community of principle; further comparison of views of Hegel with those of Schelling, beyond what can be gathered from what we have already stated, is not open to us. Their logic and metaphysic would presumably be the same in content for Hegel remarks, both Fichte and Schelling in their respective ways had like himself attempted to state in some systematic form Logic or Speculative Philosophy. (1) The difference of treatment between Hegel and Schelling on these points, so far at least as discoverable, is that Hegel deals confessedly with logic as a distinct and separate discipline of philosophy and acknowledges its importance; while Schelling fuses logic with metaphysic proper. (2) This difference between them seems of less importance at first sight than it really is; for we shall see that it is just the separation of problems regarded as identical by Schelling, that seems to be characteristic of Hegel's own system.

Other instances of divergence between them, of a more pronounced and deliberate kind, can also be found to exist at this time, alongside the general ostensible agreement. There is a difference in the conception of method in the two cases, a point on which Hegel laid ever increasing importance as he proceeded. Hegel's fundamental conception is that of development, transition from lower to higher, and ordered involution of

(1) Ros. Leben. 183. (2) in 'Trans. of Hegel.'
the later with the earlier steps in the process. Applications of this we have already had to a certain very limited extent in these schemes or sketches of schemes of philosophy and its parts which we had so far stated. The fuller consciousness of its importance grew with his intellectual development till he finally arrived at that conception of the method which he could and did regard as the very pulse-beat of the life of absolute truth, its only final medium of expression. It is the lack of development which he considers the primary defect in Schelling's system. And this is easily seen to be true of Schelling's system as exhibited in the work which had appeared just before Hegel came to Jena—the "Transcendental Idealismns." There is connection for there is both "deduction" and "construction" in the system; but there is no development in any proper sense of the term. Like Fichte, Schelling starts from what he calls fundamental supreme principles and from these as the highest, ultimata of speculative knowledge proceeds to educe or deduce the remaining content of the system as deriative though of course constitutive and necessary elements in the whole. This is the reverse of a developmental method. And moreover there is no inner connectedness of part with part; there is the connection of a single purpose in the system, but not the objective self-connection of the content itself. It is by the seemingly arbitrary

(1) Leben 182.
'Machtspruch' of an external agent that the whole obeys an ordered plan. These and similar defects of method (and it would be easy to discover others) would be readily perceptible to Hegel, to whom system was second nature, and for whom the significance of development was becoming ever more manifest.

And indeed he did not rest content with merely recognising this defect in a general way; we find some indication of his views regarding the function of development in the 'system of Identity' mentioned in the only article in which at this time he deals with Schelling. (1) He there points out that while the two philosophical sciences of Intelligence and of Nature are both sciences of the content of Identity, yet because the content of each is itself, the one Identity, the sciences cannot be left side by side and opposed but 'must be regarded as forming one continuity as one connected science.' So again mind is not merely in its totality 'mind but also carries with it the self-construction of nature'; and vice-versa. Or further 'the original identity must unite both (the negative synthesis, synthesis by negation of opposites, and real positive synthesis of them) in the Anschauung of the objective process of the Absolute in its complete entirety.' Now this conception of an immediate and necessary continuity between the contents of the respective opposed sciences of the absolute, may

(1) I. 20 ff.
not seen in direct contrast with Schelling's own views as e.g. in the introduction to the "Trans. Ideal." But it ought to be pointed out that the conception has at least no warrant or support from Schelling himself, for whom those sciences were palpably different ways of stating objective truth, the objective unity of subject and object. They were different because that unity was construed on a different basis in each case in the one case from object, in the other from the subject; and their respective constructions were as different as object is from subject. Hegel probably supposes he is in agreement with Schelling in his interpretation; but it seems to indicate the presence of a conception alien to Schelling's own view, and peculiar to Hegel himself. Hegel has however not shown in detail how it could be brought about, so that it would be valueless to expand it further.

But again not merely in the method but in the nature and meaning of philosophy, Hegel differs from Schelling. For the latter philosophy has its origin in poetry, is by itself a subjective activity, which remains inside the limits of its identity, and can only be again delivered from its subjectivity, can only pass beyond these limits into complete objectivity by means of Art. Art is the deliverer the coadjutor, the essential "the only and true and external organon und document" of philosophy, the creative productive function necessary to realize the objectivity philosophy.
demands. With Hegel on the other hand philosophy has its roots in
religion, has its own functions and instrument complete in itself, is a
self—closed activity, lives and moves in the clear transparency of the
notion, of conceptions, and as contrasted with religion is the
reflective process by which the immediate unity of the individual with the
universal present in religion is reproduced in the sphere of conception and
of thought. It is hardly necessary to point out how this profound difference
of point of view, purpose, and content of philosophy would affect the
respective systems of the two thinkers.

Finally there is a specific advance and transcendence of Schelling's
point of view. That 'quantitative preponderance' of the polar opposites in
an indifferent neutrum did not long satisfy Hegel. By his work in ethics
primarily but also by other considerations to be mentioned presently it was
not long before he broke through that conception of an indifferent unity of
opposites. Mind was seen to be higher than and not on a level with
nature. But with such a radical change of conception of the relation of
the opposed elements in the absolute there would necessarily come a change
in the conception of the absolute itself. And this change we shall find
taking place. How soon Hegel split with Schelling after their first
collaboration in 1801 we cannot exactly say. Certain it is that his warm

(1) "Trans. Ideal." Absch. VI. 3 ff.
agreement did not last long. We find him writing in his note book during this Jena period that "a short time will make it clear what Schelling's philosophy essentially is. Judgment upon it stands so to say before the door; for many already understand it. Indeed philosophies like these required for their not so much argument or evidence as simply empirical experience how far they can lead us."

Surely these words would loosen for ever any relations of intimate union or intellectual sympathy which Hegel had for Schelling, and leave Hegel again, but at a very much higher level of attainment, in the independence which he possessed before committing himself to the philosophical influences of Jena. 

(1)

Leben 544.
In order to understand the line of development which leads Hegel to the position which he finally adopts, and the reasons which induced him to alter the views which he held during the period we have just reviewed, we must bear in mind the demands which he expected philosophy to satisfy. These were that it should be the complete explication of the knowledge of the Absolute, that the system of such knowledge should be determined by the inner and immanent connexion of its contents, and that the nature of the Absolute should be shown to be mind, spirit, (Geist). These are for Hegel simply claims, postulates, fundamental contentions which must be made by those who would fulfil the task of philosophy. He does not seek to prove them, or rather he takes the only possible proof of them to be the actual realisation of them by philosophy; they characterise his personal interest in philosophy and the predominating influences which were active throughout it.

Now in spite of certain appearances to the contrary Hegel did not give way on any of these points during the second period; they existed side by side with positions which were in themselves incompatible with them. It is of course on the third point that this seems less evident. It certainly is impossible at the same time to hold that the absolute, the unity of subject and object, is mind, and also that the absolute is the identity of subject and object which is equally indifferent to both, in the sense that it is indistinguishably both at once and not one more than the other. For the nature of mind holds more directly of the subject than of the object, and
consequently the Absolute would not be equally indifferent to both subject and object. And this view Hegel undoubtedly allowed to fall in the background at this time. But we are not entitled from the records left us to infer that that position had been even temporarily abandoned. For not to mention that the influence of Schelling lasted at the most for so short a time, after which Hegel brought again and finally into prominence the supreme importance of the conception of Spirit, we find throughout this period continual fluctuations between the Schellingian conception of the Absolute and that which he hitherto held and later established. At one time he regards the Absolute as the 'Indifference point' of subject and object, at another he takes the Absolute to be most properly concrete individuality that union of universal and particular which is the nature of intelligence. Or again the Absolute is supremely 'Sittlichkeit'; at another time a characterless Identity. Further when describing, (1) (in semi-theological terms, it is true,) the nature of God he does in such wise as to indicate that God as such was not a mere nucleus of reality, but a living active self-consciousness. This attitude of hesitancy and ambiguity he abandons by maintaining the position of the supremacy of mind over nature, of subject over object, the position which as we already pointed out marks his abrupt and decisive disagreement with Schelling.

(1) Ros. Leben 192-3. (a) v.sup. p.63.
But it is important to note that this was no more than the reassertion of that principle which was indubitable dogma with Hegel all along. And having now adopted this position, he sought to establish it and to elaborate its complete import during those years immediately preceding the appearance of the 'Phänomenologie', when his separation from Schelling, or as Hegel preferred to say, 'the Schellingian school', was once for all signalised in the famous preface to that work.

This contention that "mind is higher than nature" is no mere secondary and unimportant difference from the view that the one is of the same value as the other for the Absolute, where both are identical; it becomes the foundation of that doctrine of degrees of reality which characterises Hegel's system, it determines the point of view from which a system is to be obtained by stating the fundamental reality in it, and it indicates the line of development which he must immediately follow in order to obtain that system. Let Hegel once abandon the position that the Absolute is the indifferent identity of both subject and object and there was nothing possible for him except to maintain that the Absolute should be per se mind.

It must however be observed on the other hand that this did not mean the annihilation of the view that the Absolute is unity of subject and object, of all opposites. On this he is at one with Schelling and also with Fichte. The point is what most accurately and completely expresses the
nature of the Absolute? Mind and nature, subject and object together are
the Absolute, and are opposed in it; is the Absolute the neutrum of both or
is it one rather than the other? There is no third position possible. (1)

Now it is stating the same problem to ask are subject and object on the
same level of reality, of content, of import, of meaning, have they both in
all and every respect the same nature; or is the content of one higher than,
superior to the other? Hegel maintained for a time the former alternative
in the period we have been considering. For it there appears that each is
simply a 'relative identity', the 'preponderance' of one or the other
opposite is due to the point of view from which the Absolute is regarded,
all philosophy consists in the 'repetition of one and the same identity',
the Absolute is the 'indifferent unity of both.' Henceforward however he
adopts the second alternative, and thereby breaks with Schelling. All his
subsequent philosophy is simply the complete establishment and exposition of
this view. The plan by which he sought to obtain this result, we shall
presently indicate. We have merely to note that this explicit adoption or
rather readoption of Mind as the fundamental philosophical principle is what
leads him to abandon the Schellingian attitude of the second period and

(1)

We might say that the initial difference between Fichte Schelling
and Hegel just consisted in the alternative adopted by each respectively.
Fichte chose the latter giving none but a subjective reality to object;
Schelling chose the former giving equal reality to both; Hegel chose the
latter giving merely a superior reality to the subject.
determines finally the current of his subsequent thinking.

The reasons for this advance seem to have been cumulative. We have already insisted perhaps sufficiently, on the essentially religious and moral motives which led Hegel to abandon himself to philosophy. These fashioned his interest in its problems, and in a manner predetermined the result. Mind always appeared to him as the deepest, most real of realities. This is seen for instance in the place which he assigns to Morality in his scheme in the second period. It is there taken to be the fullest most concrete expression of the absolute. (1) Again the actual relations of mind to nature in moral experience, the very idea of freedom seemed to compel him to place one on a different plane from the other. (2) And on the other hand in intellectual experience the difference was also equally clear. The very meaning of knowledge meant the dominance of mind over nature, of subject over object, a superiority and prerogative which had been established by Kant in such a way as to have become almost self evident. Moreover the meaning which Hegel gives to philosophy in particular would seem necessarily to lead him to this position. Philosophy as we saw was the self-knowledge of reason; the identity which is the ultimate fact is the identity of reason. But if so, then reality must be primarily mind, which is concrete self-consciousness; reason, mind must contain and not be co-

(1) W.I. 392.  (2) op. Ros. Leben. 137.
ordinate with object, nature, 'necessity.' It is impossible to treat all philosophy (philosophy of nature included) solely in terms of reason, and impossible to speak of 'the self-knowledge, the self-intuition of the absolute,' 'absolute knowledge' (1) which the absolute possesses of itself and yet maintain that the absolute is merely the indifferent identity of both mind and nature. Rather it is in nature of that self-knowledge that it must be 'higher than' it.

There is further to be calculated the influence on Hegel for years of Plato's philosophy, in which assuredly there is little indication of an equality of value or significance between mind and nature. And the conception of this relation derivable from Plato was confirmed and more systematically elaborated by Aristotle with whom in the later years at Jena Hegel became intimately acquainted and whose influence upon him henceforward is pronounced and effective. And finally in addition to all this we must take note of a characteristic of Hegel's mind which made it impossible for him to acquiesce for long in such an identity as Schelling offered. This was his deep appreciation of the fullness, the richness, the multiplicity of the content of the world. When therefore he saw the results to which such a view as he advocated in and out of the "Critical Journal" really led and were actually tending inside the School of Schelling how it denuded

the universe of its plentitude of difference, and converted it at best into
a monotonous repetition of a characterless indifferent identity, it is small
surprise that such a position should not be long attractive to a mind fully alive by nature, knowledge and experience to its varied meaning. All
these factors therefore taken together seem to make it inevitable that Hegel should find satisfaction only in the principle that the absolute is mind, and should seek to 'demonstrate' that it is so.

The mention of the last of the above influences leads us to another aspect of philosophy which, as we have already stated, must be insisted upon and realised, if it is to attain its end—the completeness of the knowledge of the content of the absolute. This was obviously present and operative in the second period, though it is not itself carried out. As it appears there however it is certainly defective and questionable, and it henceforth undergoes decided modifications. We found that Hegel made a somewhat abrupt distinction between infinite knowledge and finite knowledge, between the knowledge which is concerned with the absolute identity qua absolute, and that which deals with the finite realities taken as finite. And we found that the latter was dealt with by reflexion per se finite and infinite, was determined by understanding and by reason in its negative aspect, and formed the sphere appropriated by logic; while the former was dealt with by transcendental knowledge which was one with transcendental Anschauung, was determined solely by reason and that in its positive aspect, and formed the sphere of Metaphysic and philosophy
proper.' And Logic we saw had at best merely a negative value for
metaphysic, the finite had significance for the absolute only where and in
so far as it was negated. Now such a result was soon seen to be unsatis-
factory in many ways. For in the first place how could the knowledge of
the absolute be complete if the content of the absolute was removed? and
what content remained after all the finite content was abstracted from the
absolute as such? How was it possible to 'construe' the absolute at all
when the opposites which appeared were viewed simply as negations and were
merely negated? And since these finitudes belonged to the sphere of logic
what remained then for metaphysic, for transcendental knowledge to do? All
finitudes being as such excluded from metaphysic nothing was to be done but
to show the 'repetition' of one and the same identity throughout all
reality. 'Construing' it could only mean exhibiting its self-identity
everywhere, not showing how it maintained itself as different or in
differences, but showing that all differences were not differences at all
but the same identity. All differences were finite and could only appear
in the view of finite knowledge to be different. For infinite knowledge
there was literally nothing but the one identity. But such a metaphysic
in the attempt to give complete knowledge of the absolute succeeded or
might succeed in giving completeness but utterly failed to give knowledge.
Nothing was to be gained or received from the continuous manifestation of
the same identity; in knowing it at one step we knew all that was to be
known. In addition this identity could hardly be exhibited in the differences, for there were no real differences for it at all. These all held good merely inside the sphere of the finite and were already negated in logic (in 'philosophical reflexion'); the differences were for the absolute indifferent. What made them different was the absence of that positive element, the identity, found and discussed in metaphysic; when this appeared or was exhibited the differences vanished. In transcendental knowledge therefore, in that 'union of reflexion and Anschauung' nothing could be dealt with but the absolute identity which was at best refunded into those realities which had a mere semblance of difference—a procedure either impossible, or inadequate and false, the former of these really are no different realities into which the identity is to be refunded, the latter if these are such realities. And further it is also evident that such a metaphysic seems perilously near to a discussion of what is a merely abstract identity of understanding, against which Hegel had already waged war. The logic had been the negative assertion of an absolute whose positive reality was exhibited in metaphysic; but the negative activity of this absolute which appeared in the logic had wiped out as with a sponge all the plentitude of content which would have given meaning to the positive assertion of its identity and left nothing to be considered but a characterless blank. No real knowledge of the absolute was given in the logic itself; at best only a knowledge of what the absolute was not;
yet when the metaphysic seeks to supply this knowledge of the absolute identity there is nothing in particular to know except that the absolute identity alone is. It is not open to show that this identity is determined as different; there is no getting back to the differences at all for the simple reason that they have been already abolished in the logic in order to find place only for the one absolute. It is as if all the wealth of the world were reduced by a process of elimination to a single species of commodity—which thereupon turned out to have by nature of the case no exchange value whatever. It certainly seemed therefore that with such an absolute what had been attained was not an identity which substantialised the various opposites of knowledge but rather one which remained apart from them altogether and at most destroyed the substantiality they possessed in finite knowledge. It was in fact an absolute identity which did not appear abstract merely because it had established itself by destroying everything which offered itself as a rival to its supremacy—the lion which herded with the flocks and became lord of them by the might of its hunger.

And this result was not the fault of the logic, but rather of the metaphysic; the logic because negative of the finite content did not demand the metaphysic, the metaphysic rather demanded a negative logic; it was because the metaphysic was so conceived that the logic was negative to prepare for it. For metaphysic there was literally only one reality; and yet in spite of this finite elements actually existed. It was plain that the
completeness of the knowledge of the absolute ought somehow to find a place for these finite realities, which would at once do justice to their reality while refusing to take them as simply finite. Hegel appreciated the importance of this intensely, and soon felt it impossible on these intellectual and other grounds already indicated, to find satisfaction in a picture which secured the harmony of its effect at the price of the monotony of its colouring. And he saw that there was only one requisite necessary to attain a different and more satisfactory result—namely to alter the purely negative character of all finitude. This was the sole ground of objection, the source of all the barrenness of the result of his previous conception, and here accordingly the change should be effected. The finite factors the finite opposites should not be entirely negated, and all differences vanish before the one identity; they should be posited.

But note that by retaining as he did the conception of an absolute which must be infinite in the sense of including all and determining all, and one and identical (just as formerly) the character of finitude as hitherto conceived was not entirely changed but only partially so. The finite opposites were to be both posited, substantivalised, and negated as well. The mere insistence on the latter had turned the absolute into the immediate tomb of the finite; the insistence on the former only would give immortality to all finitude, and destroy the meaning of the absolute. To avoid both these results required him to demand the negation as well as the preservation of the finite.
Indications indeed are not lacking that the importance of both these factors had occurred to him even when holding the view which he henceforth abandons. For as we saw above the finite realities are related to the absolute, are therefore in a sense posited in it, though the positing is purely negative, they are only related to it in order to be negated by it. Similarly again by asserting that the finite as such was the province of understanding, and yet that knowledge of understanding was 'not entirely opposed to that of reason, but rather intimately connected' with it, we have clear suggestion that a positive character belonged even to that which was negated by reason. And when it is maintained that reflexion, negation, is merely one side, the negative side, of reason the same idea is in a measure contained. The truth is that the purely negative treatment of finitude which is undoubtedly the dominant tone of this period was due to an over emphasis on the merely negative side of the activity of reason, which was perhaps a natural exaggeration when he had for the first time seized the significance of an absolute philosophy. If then the consequences to which this led did not by the nature of the case realise that knowledge of the absolute which he sought this purely negative activity of reason must be qualified.

Now the positive aspect or moment of reason had hitherto been contributed by \( \text{Anschauung} \); and the positive element was we saw the identity. The

\( \text{(1) Ros. 190.} \)
negative moment of reason was \textit{unfocal} to it, and belonged to metaphysic. If therefore a positive character was to be contributed to the finite realities as such it could only come from the \textit{A\'nschauung} of metaphysic. But in that case the relation between reflexion and \textit{A\'nschauung} must cease to be so external, the one must share the nature of the other, must be found with it.\(^{(1)}\) They must in fact become one activity with two inseparable moments, a single moment with opposite poles, a functional unity of two factors; reflexion must function with \textit{A\'nschauung}, \textit{A\'nschauung} must be negated and negate with reflexion; all externality of relation between the two must vanish. This then would give the completeness of knowledge desired; nothing finite would in such a case be left out; every finite would get its due, and find its place in the absolute; its positive reality would be conserved by the positive function introduced; and yet the absolute would likewise hold its place as absolute because every finite is to be negated, and negation in such a case can only come from the one absolute and infinite reality. And nothing more nor less than such a unity of negative and positive function would satisfy Hegel's demands; and nothing else except such a unity conceived somehow just as that sort of unity and no other.

\(^{(1)}\) It is true he says that \textit{transcendental reflexion} and \textit{A\'nschauung} are \textit{unfocal}, but the point is that in spite of this \textit{unfocal} identification, they still remain side by side as distinct factors or processes, neither is abandoned, or gives way to the other; and they are not alternatives.
It is not, be it noted, by laying greater emphasis on understanding as opposed to reason that this new result is to be brought about. True it had been by the denial of that fixity contributed by understanding that the negation of the finite had been maintained in the logic. But this fixity, we must observe, was attributed to an unauthorised and indefensible act of understanding, which 'robbed' finitude of its reason-character, and stemmed the flux of its own essential negativity. The nature of understanding was determined from the point of view of reason, and as this was purely negative in character it had no right per se to fix and determine finitude, and was much nearer in so doing, so far at least as philosophy was concerned, to illusion than truth. Now however when the positive element of the finite becomes emphasised and insisted on, understanding assumes another and a most important place in Hegel's treatment; but this is because the positive element sanctions the fixity of the finite which is the work of understanding, not because understanding of itself asserts a positive element to belong to the finite. Here as before it is reason that settles the place and value of understanding; it is because reason demands and asserts a positive aspect in the finite in order to attain that completeness of knowledge desiderated, that the claims of understanding to substantiate the finite are allowed to hold good, just as it is reason which determines how far they are valid. No doubt this role which

(1) Ros. 190. (2) 56. 184
understanding usually plays influenced Hegel at this juncture, and no doubt his reaction from the barrenness of an absolute identity would find greater resource and satisfaction in the definiteness the concreteness of the world as determined by understanding, and would induce him doubtless to insist on the recognition of its claims per se, and this might suggest the necessity for asserting that positive aspect of the finite already mentioned. Still in spite of this, and in spite of the extraordinary prominence he henceforth attaches to understanding, which he declares to be "die verwundersamste und gröszte oder vielmehr die absolute Macht," (1) it is clear for the above reasons that it is the positive character derived in the manner and for the purposes stated that gives force and authority to the claims of understanding, and not understanding, which fuses a positive content into the purely negative activity of reason. And this will become still more evident as we proceed.

Now, since the above considerations indicate the line of development which Hegel is to follow in order to attain that completeness of knowledge of the absolute desired, if we can lay bare the plan and the means he adopted to obtain that method which would realise that end we shall have gone very indeed to disclose the clue to his Logic. We cannot however

---

accomplish this till we deal with the third essential characteristic of philosophy on which Hegel insisted. We may note in passing that it was impossible to make the change above described by itself. Along with such a change were necessarily involved the abandonment of the absolute as hitherto conceived, and a change of attitude towards the finite opposites, subject, object, Mind, Nature etc. The latter could not henceforth be viewed as indifferently the same and identical with each other; with the insistence on the positive character of each finite opposite these finite facts required to be considered per se, and their relations to be determined by reference to each other as well as to the absolute. Hence the possibility of asserting that one was 'higher than the other.' The third characteristic which in Hegel's view philosophy must have was, we saw, the systematic connexion of its content. During the period we have considered there is obviously enough an attempt at systematic connexion, and with some measure of success. But it is equally clear that this connexion was not thorough nor was it brought about by the inner relation of the content. The parts of the logic were not directly connected with each other, nor was there any except an external relation between logic and metaphysic. There was lacking that inner necessity in the scheme, which could only come through development. He had indeed hinted that this was the proper method by which to attain the system he required. But the law of this method he had not yet formulated. All the parts of his scheme have
this much connexion that they are all determined by reason, which alone in
fact gave them philosophical significance. But more than this they can
hardly be said to possess. The law of the logic is one principle of
connexion; that of the metaphysic another. The former is antimony, the
latter the immediacy of Anschauung. But one proceeds independently of the
other, and no direct relation is established between them. Finitude is
laid waste, and no connexion between the finite elements exists except that
of a common ruin by a common enemy; and then without any evident prepara-
tion we enter at a single stride into the impregnable citadel of the
absolute. We are not led up to the absolute through and by means of
finitude; simply by the magic might of anschauung the absolute rises and
takes shape before us. How we come by such a method is not established, nor
is it shown how we get possession of the two-edged sword of reflexion.
These are not so much distinct forms of knowledge, as distinct kinds of it,
and one is arbitrary in starting point and procedure as the other.

Again the same objections can be raised, and for the same reasons,
against the relation which exists between the identity of the absolute and
the finite opposites, and finite differences. These are placed over and
against each other in immediate and unreconcilled opposition and no
connexion, organic or other, is exhibited between them. The result is as we
saw they occupy two different spheres, in the one there is no identity in
the other no difference.
There is further no inner connexion stated between the various functions understanding, reason, anschauung, negative and positive reason; and yet all the knowledge supplied in the scheme is derived from these sources. They are, as it were, various closed chambers of knowledge, all important in themselves, but one hardly more so than the other, for each contains distinct information, and with no evident unity or connexion between them except that they all exist together under a common roof.

There is finally to be noted the ambiguous character of reflexion and anschauung in the scheme. At one time he seems to distinguish between reflexion and the object of reflexion, between anschauung and what is 'angeschafft'; at another time he seems to make no such distinction whatever. The general position he takes up inclines him towards the latter rather than the former; and as we saw any other view would make his position meaningless. For its essential import is to insist on the identity of each with the other; and he is concerned not with the psychological process of thought, but with its result. Still the other view does appear either as a survival from his earlier scheme or because as a matter of fact the terms in question were ambiguous. The effectual removal of this ambiguity was clearly imperative before any system could claim to be thorough; and its deliberate removal would go a long way to attain that systematic completeness desired. Such an undertaking is indeed what Hegel set himself, the final outcome of his efforts appearing as part of what we now know as the Phenomenology of Mind.
It is evident from the foregoing indication of the defects in
systematisation of the content of knowledge that if Hegel was fully to
attain his ideal of system decided changes required to be made. For the
purpose of the construction of the system he desired, one thing was
absolutely necessary, and would indeed be sufficient, there must be a
unity of method governing the whole procedure from first to last. This was
the radical defect of the construction of the scheme he had formed in the
second period; though this defect was in the nature of the case, for the
parts of the scheme contained forms of knowledge each determined by a
different principle. Since the parts were external to each other and each
had a distinct method of procedure there could be no one systematic whole
determined by a single method. Method is necessarily dependent on content,
if the system is to possess that character of inner necessity which Hegel
sought. But the various functions above specified, negative and positive
reason etc., were not to be abandoned as valueless when the new advance was
made. Rather that advance proceeds along the lines indicated by them; they
are in reality permanent factors in his system. But inasmuch as the defect
of his present scheme lay in allowing each to do its work independently
he was bound to remove this defect if he would accomplish that purpose
he has in view. And this could only be done and would be satisfactorily
done, if each factor were shown to be a function of a single activity, a
moment in a single process. Hence the remaining problem to be
settled was how to obtain such a method.

Now it is impossible to understand how Hegel overcame these three kinds of defects which rendered his second scheme unsatisfactory unless we realise that no one could be removed without a corresponding alteration in the others. They were all necessarily involved in each other. It was at once impossible and useless for him to attempt to discover a true and thorough method of systematisation without taking account of the completeness of the content of the system; and similarly he could not determine the completeness of the content without immediate and essential reference to his fundamental principle. And it is again clear that the primary fact on the meaning of which all else depends, is the nature of that fundamental principle itself. If once this is determined all the other elements (the method and the contents) will appear at once, or be easily determinable; for on that depends everything else in the system. The first problem then is to determine the nature and meaning of his ground principle. That principle which henceforward is the fundamental tenet of his system is as we have seen that the Real of Realities is Mind. The Absolute, Ultimate Reality, is not the mere of Indifference; it is not the mere quantitative equilibrium of the opposed poles of reality, (subject, object etc.); it is one rather than, more than the other. One is actually superior to the other, higher than it, because embracing in itself what the other is yet something further which lifts it above the other. And therefore the absolute can be expressed more truly by this one
than by the other. Since that which is higher contains in itself as a moment what is characteristic of the other, the absolute is primarily and essentially and in the last resort the higher of the two. This is what in reality the absolute is; this is what in reality is absolute, what is absolutely Real.

But if Hegel has once risen above the position of Indifferent Identity has once established that there is a difference, namely a difference in degree of reality, between these polar opposites, and that this difference is vital and fundamental, he has thereby set himself a unique and distinct problem. That problem is to establish and exhibit this in philosophical, i.e. for him systematic form. It does not and cannot remain a mere conviction; the other two essential demands which he makes on philosophy force him to work it out in detail. Philosophy must not be merely love of knowledge, but must actually be real knowledge. And it can only be called real knowledge if it is complete knowledge, knowledge of the whole. This is simply what it claims to be, less than this will not satisfy it. But knowledge of the whole must be a whole of knowledge, must be system, and must by the nature of the case be a necessary system. Philosophical truth is and must be therefore system of philosophy.

Incidentally therefore any principle which claims to furnish philosophical knowledge and yet cannot or does not furnish it in this form is thereby on this ground alone self-condemned. Thus when we are offered as a principle that we know the absolute immediately by feeling or
by anschauung, nothing more can be supplied us, no
construction no opposition. But we do not thereby get philosophical
knowledge, rather we get a substitute for all philosophy, not a system of
truth but that which renders any such system as dispensable as it is
impossible; and indeed the satisfaction thereby sought is not the
satisfaction of science, but rather that of religious enthusiasm, something
nearer to cultured mysticism than explicit knowledge, not truth but rather
edification.

Hegel then must work out his new conception systematically. And this
is the more necessary when the difference which he asserts is as vital
as he believes it to be. For all finitude is embraced under one or other of
the fundamental opposed realities subject object etc., and hence the
assertion of the superiority of the one over the other must affect all
reality, be present throughout it, and must therefore be thoroughly
established everywhere, if it is to be ultimately valid at all. Nothing
less than this will satisfy; a more general exposition of his contention
will not suffice; he must show it to hold at every step where subject is
brought into relation with object, mind with nature, etc. For take up
reality at any point and we shall find that there we have ipso facto a
relation between these two opposites; the reality we deal with either
belongs to, is a part of the world of nature only, or of mind only, or
partly of one partly of the other. But in any and every case that
relation is in some form present; one opposite cannot be taken by itself
without further reference, it must imply and be related to the other. Consequently if this superiority is to be real it must be shown to exist wherever that relation exists, it must be shown to hold in short of every phase or part of reality.

And it is not only necessary to do so, it is in the nature of the case quite possible to do it. For we have this relation appearing in different ways, in different spheres embracing one order of fact at one place, another at another. We have it now for example as the relation of perceiving to perceived, now as that of observation to observed, now as that of an assertion of a law between facts, or again in conduct, in moral action. All these are different, and yet all imply and express this same fundamental relation. Now each of these because different can be treated separately and by itself; we can isolate it from others, and regard it simply as it stands. Hence we can examine each of these various forms where the relation holds, and show that in every form without exception this superiority is discoverable.

Hence then the maintenance of the supremacy of mind is simply the other side to, has as its necessary complement, the complete and detailed exhibition of this supremacy over all reality. It means that mind is to embrace its object i.e. not to exclude it (that would be dualism); nor to negate it (that would be solipsism); nor to be on a level with it (that would be the Indifferentism of Schelling); but to contain it in itself. This alone for Hegel is Idealism.
24.

Now it was to solve this problem and establish that position that Hegel wrote the "Phenomenology of Mind." Such being the general nature of the problem which he has to solve, it is not difficult to see that to accomplish his purpose the enquiry will conveniently fall into two parts. In one part he will be exclusively engaged in showing, that mind, when and wherever we find it in relation to an object, is actually 'higher than' its object, actually contains that object in itself, that only in so far as an object is the mind's own, is the mind's own self, is it an object for and ever against mind at all. In such an enquiry there will be no need to confine attention to any one form under which the relation exists. Any and every form will have to be considered. It must be shown that wherever the relation exists, throughout the whole range of the life of mind, an analysis of the relation will in all cases show that the essential character and content of an object is mind-constituted mind-determined, that its being as an object for consciousness is the same as its being for itself, that its constitutive moments are determined by mind and for mind. Here then we have no special regard for the ultimate form under which such a relation is most truly expressed, or indeed is only expressed truly and fully at all. This will of course be in the background of the enquiry all along, for it is the final result to be arrived at, and in a measure determines the enquiry from first to last. Still because it is only at best one form of

(1)This phrase will become more precise as we proceed.
the relation, it will not in this part be treated in any other way except simply as a special form of the relation in question. For not merely the true form of the relation, but untrue, in the sense of imperfect forms of it must be considered. In some cases e.g. in perception the object seems and is ordinarily taken to be quite external to mind; the latter seems to exist by itself, it is merely 'given' to mind from without. Yet this is a form of the relation of mind to an object, and for that reason alone must find a place in the enquiry. In others again e.g. the moral order or religion the object seems entirely determined or at least mainly determined from mind itself, is a sort of effect of its own activity; but here we have also a relation of an object to mind of a certain distinct type. And between the apparent pure externality of the object to mind, and the apparent simple 'manifestation' of mind in its object there is room for considerable variety of forms of the relation, all of them actual relations, but all more or less imperfect (when judged from the final and true form). All these then must be dealt with separately, for all have claims to consideration because in all of them mind is established in relation to an object. From the point of view of this enquiry it is in the first instance of no importance what degree of perfection any relation may possess what degree of inwardness its terms may have to each other; the determination of this degree is an after result, discovered in the course of enquiry and by it. The mere fact that the relation actually is discoverable, falls inside
the experience of mind, the mere fact that mind is related to an object no matter how that object may present itself, or what special attitude mind may take up towards it is all that is necessary to warrant the discussion in the enquiry of the relation thereby established. Every relation because it exists must be dealt with simply because it expresses a determination, a definite pulse in the life of mind. Every relation because it exists is necessary to mind, for in each and all mind is determined differently, and the richness of its experience is not summed up in any one only.

The question regarding the truth of any given relation thus takes the form, not of whether it has any truth at all; the fact that mind is so determined with reference to an object itself implies that it has truth, for any relation is a determinate part of the experience of mind, and is necessary to it. And because necessary to it, each form of the relation is, taken by itself, true; for in each mind is closed with its object, is satisfied and rests with it, there is an 'agreement between the mind and the object', (1) and the symbol or indication of this agreement is the 'certainty' the mind possesses in dealing with the object in question—a certainty which is present in every form under which the relation appears. Since then every instance of the relation must be ipso facto true for mind, the further and second question is what amount or degree of truth does each

(1) The ordinary conception of 'truth.'
possess; what degree of intimacy is expressed by any given relation, how far does the object dealt with at any point realise express the actual and essential nature of mind, how far is the mind in dealing with the object explicitly aware of itself as being in its object, as being at one with it as well as its own self. To express it briefly and from another point of view, the degree of truth of a given relation between the mind and its object is determined by reference to and in virtue of the fundamental primacy and supremacy of mind in the relation; the fact that each relation does have truth at all, no matter what the relation be, is due to the inner unity of mind with its object in every case.

Looked at in this way therefore the enquiry deals with all actual relations between mind and objects because they are true and in virtue of their truth. But it at once distinguishes itself from two other enquiries which hardly concern it at all. It does not deal with the history of any given relation in itself, does not show how any relation arose, out of what factors or processes it was produced. Such a discussion was excluded because it was not the genesis of the relation that was philosophically important, but the relation itself, not the process but the product, not the origin but the actual meaning. Nor again is the above enquiry concerned with the consequences which result when a given relation is established. Each relation is regarded simply as a particular form of experience with a distinct character, appearing in a way distinct from other relations, having
conditions and a nature of its own. From such a treatment of the relation we can exclude all the detailed content of the particular sphere of experience constituted by the relation in question and determined in all respects by it. For example in the relation between mind and its object found in perception, we can analyse its nature simply as a relation, can determine its constitutive factors, can show that in it the object appears as a thing and its qualities and is in this form a particular mode of the activity of mind; but in so doing we need not state what particular things and qualities there are in the sphere of experience to which perception is appropriate. Similarly of the relation of mind to its object for example in morality. It is the form and character of any relation, not the varied content which it embraces and determines, that is considered in the above enquiry. It will therefore deal with all the different relations in which the mind can stand to its object, but will not include either the genesis of those relations or a systematic statement of all that is contained under them. To include the former would be at once irrelevant and unphilosophical; to include the latter is impossible and unnecessary, for all the forms treated of (with the exception of the last, as we shall see) are imperfect and can neither contain nor exhibit the full truth which alone will completely and without reservation satisfy mind.

But it is clear from what has been said that if we are not to have here a genetic history of mind nor an explicit system either of imperfect or perfect knowledge of incomplete or complete truth, we have at least
elements of both history of mind and of truth. For each mode considered by itself expresses an essential and necessary attitude of mind, and in each there is truth. All modes or relations of mind to objects are simply to be taken as they actually appear or have appeared—that is we are to have a history of these various forms. And all such relations are regarded solely with reference to the kind and degree of truth they possess. Hence the enquiry is a historical analysis or analytical history of the kinds of truth of which the mind is capable.

Or again if we consider the relation of the mind to an object as the essential characteristic of all that is named Experience, the enquiry in question may be named a constructive history of the forms of experience.

Once more if we take consciousness to be the fundamental form under which mind exists, that which constitutes its very existence the enquiry can be looked at as a philosophical history of consciousness.

Or finally regarded as an analysis and statement of the functions, the activities of mind in its relation with reality we may view it simply as a transcendental psychology. All these various expressions merely indicate different aspects of precisely the same problem.

To carry out this enquiry is then the first part of that problem which Hegel was forced to undertake and to solve if the principle he sought to

(1) Phan. d. Geistes Einleit 27.
establish was to be fully developed. Such an undertaking was precisely what he sought to accomplish in his "Phenomenology of Mind," the origin and purpose of which is contained in the general statement we have just given.

We must defer for a moment any further exposition of the content of the Phenomenology. It is of immediate importance to note that the analysis and discussion contained in it must have occupied from about 1803 (1) till the time of its publication 1806-7. For it was from this time onward that the breach with Schelling became ever wider; and his examination of the various forms of experience seems at once to have created and confirmed his difference from him. All along he had maintained with Schelling that subject was one with object; in the Phenomenology he proceeded to examine and analyse this in detail. It was this analysis that was the vital problem on the answer to which depended the nature of the relation between those opposed elements of reality and the character of the unity which held them together. This enquiry alone could give Hegel any new result of his own, as it alone could establish a final philosophical position. Not that Schelling or Fichte or even Kant had not likewise maintained the 'unity of subject and object'; nor had they neglected the enquiry into the relation subsisting between them. It was neither such an enquiry nor the fact of the unity which distinguished Hegel's problem from theirs or made necessary his new and

(1) He promises to have the Phen. published by the autumn of 1805. Briefe I. 52.
distinct analysis. It was rather the character of the enquiry and the nature of the unity which distinguished him from them and which compelled him to reundertake an enquiry and establish in his own way a result which in their general form were similar to those of his predecessors. For instead of as in the case of Schelling\(^{(1)}\) as also of Fichte beginning consciously and explicitly with and from the bare absolute unity of the two stated in the form of a single principle and thence 'deducing' from this highest fundamental fact all the content of experience, Hegel neither starts from that unity nor does he even admit the validity of expressing in the form of a single proposition the principle of all philosophy. Schelling and Fichte start from the supreme fact, which should rather be conclusion and result than a starting point; but a beginning in philosophy should properly be the simplest truth and not the highest. Hegel on the other hand takes up the position that if subject and object are one, then in all cases where in experience we find them in relation we ought either to find them actually expressing this unity, or else by their imperfection, their incompleteness their inner disagreement revealing to analysis the presence in them in every case and thereby pointing towards and 'leading up to' that complete explicit unity which is their inmost reality. Let us then, he seems to say, instead

\(^{(1)}\) Viz. in "Trans. Idealism."
of starting from the highest form of their relation start from cases where they are obviously separate and opposed and let us by examining these see where and why they fall short of and how near they approach to their essential unity. This was clearly a different procedure from that of either Fichte or Schelling, and held in itself prospect of a conclusion different in character, though necessarily not in principle from theirs. The suggestion of such an enquiry may possibly have come from Schelling's conception of the content of philosophy being simply the history of self-consciousness, though it is manifestly suggested also as simply the reverse process of establishing idealism from that of Fichte and Schelling.

There were moreover two secondary but very important reasons for undertaking the enquiry contained in the Phenomenology. There was first a consideration of practical importance. Hegel had a distinct and in that sense a new philosophical point of view, and a new philosophical truth to lay before the world, and being new it was distinct from the ordinary conceptions of his immediate audience in the lecture room, and of the larger philosophical public. If then he was to succeed in establishing the claims of his own view, if he was to get his new truth understood, he was bound to meet his audience half-way. This implied that he should treat the forms of experience familiar to his audience and deal with them in such a way as at once to appreciate their conceptions of these forms and indicate the significance which his own view compelled him to attach to them. This was the more necessary because each of those forms laid claim
to possess a truth of its own a claim which the natural consciousness was prepared to admit as absolute. Hegel admitted this claim on the part of those various forms to possess truth and thereby stood on the same level with his audience; but by a pedagogic device he converted these several forms of truth discoverable in experience into steps by which he might lead his public up to his own final point of view. Thus he at once enriched and enlarged the conception of truth and of experience familiar to his audience by doing justice to each form in which the mind experienced truth, and by bringing all such forms within the sweep of his analysis; while at the same time he thereby conducted others to the position at which he himself stood. Looked at in this way the Phenomenology is a preparatory book to Hegel's philosophy, the preparatory textbook to Absolute Idealism. (1)

The other reason which made the enquiry necessary was theoretical. Hegel's philosophical point of view was in the first instance merely one among others which had also appeared in the course of history, and prima facie had no more right to be considered final truth than any of the others. Yet it was of its very essence to lay claim to be absolute and true philosophical position; all others were at best simply imperfect forms or precursors of it. Such a claim was not merely opposed to the

---

(1) Phän. Vorrede 20.
similar contentions of other thinkers who had appeared in the past, and who likewise claimed to have the final truth, but came into abrupt collision with the views of his immediate antecedents and contemporaries, who equally claimed to have fashioned the final scheme. He was therefore bound to defend his claim and establish his position, and this could only be accomplished to his own satisfaction and that of others if he systematically proved the truth of his own view.

Now only one method of proof was open to him. For he held on the one hand that his own view was the absolutely true and on the other hand that the views of others were likewise true, but imperfect. His proof therefore had to reconcile both these positions. And this was only possible by showing that the truth the other views contained was true by being a form or experience of his own, and was imperfect because it did not completely but only implicitly contained his view and was thus at the same time out of agreement with its own immanent principle. And on the other side he had to show that his own view actually and explicitly expressed the truth implied in the other imperfect views and really contained whatever truth was present in them. This second part of the proof is merely the counterpart of the first, and indeed is obviously presupposed by the first itself. If then Hegel could establish both these claims he would completely justify theoretically not merely to himself but to the philosophical public the claims he had put forward on behalf of his own philosophy. Regarded in the light of this purpose, the Phenomenology may be considered the systematic
proof of the standpoint of absolute idealism. (1) It was then to accomplish all these ends above indicated, viz.: to remove the defects of his preceding position introduce and establish his new conception that the enquiry contained in the Phenomenology was undertaken. In what manner this the first part of his problem was carried out we shall presently state.

(1) Logik I. Einleit p.31: also p.57.
It is not difficult to discover what bearing such an enquiry will have on the other two essential factors in philosophy, its content and its method. For while the systematic and exhaustive discussion and grounding of the principle of Hegel's philosophy form the problem and purpose of the Phenomenology, it must not be supposed that the enquiry is a by-product of his system a mere introduction, external and independent of it. This we shall show later on more fully is not the case; and meanwhile we may merely note that Hegel himself considered that the work was a constitutive part of his system. (1) It is inevitable then that the enquiry would determine both content and method as well as principle. Now all relations between subject and object, the whole contents of experience are to be passed in review from the most extreme forms of opposition between these two elements, up to their closest most explicit affinity. And in all of them subject and object are to be shown to be essential one, subject being 'higher than', the determining ground of and including the object. The whole content of experience will thus appear as moments or modes of the ground reality of experience. Since then all experience is to be embraced, since in all that unity between subject and object is to be exhibited, nothing of experience will be omitted from the content of philosophy, and every content

(1)
Briefe I. 52: Log. I. 1st Preface ad fin, note: The change of title there mentioned seems obviously due not to change of point of view regarding the work; but to external reasons.
will have that place in experience which it is entitled to as a moment in the one experience of the one reality, mind. Consequently on this new view and as a result of this new enquiry there will not be a merely abstract characterless 'indifferent' identity, the finite varied content of experience will not exist simply to be negated. Both the unity and the differences will be maintained and preserved, and the one by means of and because of the other. Thus the only and complete content of philosophy will be the whole diversity of experience which alone reveals and where alone is found the meaning and content of that absolute which is the only object of philosophy. Not the absolute per se as an identity indifferent to though uniting subject and object, but that absolute, that unity, only in and through its own wealth of varied content is what henceforward is to be found in philosophy. The absolute because essentially and truly mind is not merely at once substance and subject, but is preeminently and primarily subject, (1) a unity containing and revealing all its diversity to itself and preserving it because possessing it as its self, and thus knowing, containing, exhibiting nothing but what it reveals—the whole contents of experience. That the absolute is subject not substance, that all the reality of the absolute can only be what it reveals, that all experience is just the laying out in extenso of the

(1) Phanomenologie: Preface.
content of the absolute—all these are mutually implicative or even convertible statements. That then will be henceforth the actual and only content of philosophy on Hegel's principle.

And it is clear that this advance which he is to take is just the counter-stroke of his previous negative attitude towards all finitude. Not merely does he maintain and preserve all finitude through and by means of the absolute; the tendency of this new view even seems to be to do full justice to them at the expense of the absolute itself. It is clear that this complete preservation of finitude is a necessary consequence of the supremacy of subject over object. But of this again.

With such a determination of principle and content, the method of philosophy must necessarily appear (if only, so to say, unconsciously and naturally) by means of and in the course of the enquiry itself. Not that Hegel could possibly be unaware of the method by which this 'system of experience' was to be constructed until he had well begun. He must certainly have had a conception of the course the enquiry was to follow from the start. But it is equally clear that he could only become fully conscious of the richness and full significance of that conception after it had been thoroughly and comprehensively used. That general conception was undoubtedly that of development, a method which he had already suggested as the only appropriate one for philosophy, a method 'neither synthetic nor analytic.' This conception he found lacking even in his
philosophical comrade Schelling, (1) and it is stating this divergence from another point of view to say that the method of philosophy was the weapon of separation of the one from the other.

But what can development mean, except that we must begin from the lowest form of experience, the form where subject and object stand furthest apart from each other, and from that point work up and through all the various relations of subject and object which will and do show various degrees of closeness of union between these opposite poles, till we reach a point where they are explicitly and without any reservation absolutely one? Granted that subject and object are identical, are one in inseparably unity, granted that the absolute is and must be the identity of these differences, (and this is the cardinal certainty from which Hegel starts, a certainty which he maintained with confidence from the Jena period onwards), still though that is ultimate and absolute truth, yet the absolute must not be 'shot out of a pistol' at us; it is too rich and concrete to be either appreciated or expressed at the start and, as it were, at a single stroke; we must begin at the lowest level of its reality and work from that. True we begin with the absolute, it is the 'terminus a quo' of all genuine philosophy; but we must not begin from and at the absolute, it is for our enquiry, for the system, the 'terminus ad quem';

(1)
Rosenkranz Leben 189.
only at the end are we brought actually face to face with it in its full truth. Thus then the only beginning with which we can properly begin is at that point of experience (which throughout is determined by the fundamental unity of subject and object) where subject mind and object stand ostensibly so far apart while yet maintaining a connexion by referring explicitly to one another. And since further it is their fundamental unity that is the one final ultimate fact for the connexion of both, the one theme of our enquiry the succeeding forms of experience will naturally be determined on the one hand from this starting point on the other from the ultimate goal; in other words by the degree of explicit realisation of the essential unity of these two opposites named. Thus then the method consists in the systematic connexion of all the forms of experience (actual moments appearances of the absolute) a connexion which exists because all have a place and must be maintained in the one absolute, and which is brought about by the immanent inner critical reference by each of its actual form (a form common to every experience, subject—object) to its essential determining vital nature, of its actual content to the ideal of all experience. Only so does each form stand preserved limited and connected with every other in the one system of experience. The whole thus forms an organic development; its moving vital principle is nameable as dialectic; and only by such a method can the demands of system be met and completely satisfied.

It is clear in what consists the advance in this conception of the
nature of the method over that of the preceding period. Anschauung and Reflexion are no longer different and contrasted functions of the one mind; they are fused into one single process without losing their essential nature (the expression respectively of the positive and negative content and processes of reason), yet without preserving their individual distinctiveness. The process of negating and that of positing, and that by one and the same act of reason. This advance is precisely what is necessary to remove that artificiality of contrast of these two functions.

But now no sooner will this enquiry of the Phenomenology be completed than another problem will present itself for solution, a problem already implicit in the Phenomenology all along but only becoming perfectly visibly prominent at the end of that enquiry. If the unity of subject and object is the one all-dominating reality of all experience, and if the modes of this unity are just the modes of experience, then does not the problem suggest itself to state in systematic connectedness the essences qua essences, the modes of unity qua unity which have been the ground reality throughout the whole of the Phenomenology. We have those various concrete relations of subject and object in experience; can we not, must we not proceed further to extract or abstract the inner kernel of ultimate truth exhibited and possessed by all the several moments of experience, the vital essence contained in and determining each mode of experience, each relation of subject to object, and constituting it a
necessary pulse in the life of the absolute. There is in every mode such a vital essence, namely the identity, the unity which is the ground of the connexion of subject and object in each case. And each such unity, each several essence will be a specific truth, the ultimate truth namely of each mode. The complete system of such unities such essences will of course cover the same area as that of the Phenomenology, namely the whole of experience, the content of the absolute. The only difference will be that whereas in the Phenomenology we have the concrete existent temporal actual appearance of experience, in the other enquiry we shall have nothing else but the abstract 'formal' conceptual 'pure' essentialities stripped of all direct reference to the diversity and tangibility of existent experiences and expressed and connected simply in and through the purity and simplicity of their true character. The content of this new science being the inner reality of each mode of experience, and this inner reality being as we saw the principle of connection of the various modes; it is further evident that the method which this new science will follow will be none other than that of the Phenomenology itself; it needs none other and it can find none other. The only difference will be that the method will in this new science be formed and exhibited in its transparent simplicity and purity; for here it is operating upon and with and through a content which is itself transparent and 'pure.'

But what else can this new science be but just what has been hitherto
known as Logic? It will appear and is indeed evident that these vital essences can only be concepts thoughts as such; and these have been and are always the matter of Logic. But if then Logic is this ultimate final absolute science par excellence it is clear that it will cease to be distinct from and lie outside 'metaphysic'; will cease to be an 'introduction' to metaphysic will become an independent and self-dependent science; will cease to be validly divisible into logic of understanding and logic of reason; will cease to be a 'negative logic of reflection', and will become in very deed the ultimate absolute all-embracing science, with an ultimate absolute method—will be speculative philosophy in its truest form.

Thus the transformation of Hegel's principle and the systematic establishment of its content, implied, paved the way for, and indeed necessitated his epoch-making Reformation of Logic. He was undoubtedly aware that this was his next step after the Phenomenology, which, he indicates to Schelling, is "merely the beginning." Not that there was no Logic at all similar to his own already given to the world. Fichte's "Wissenschaftslehre", and Schelling's "Transcendental Idealismns" were after all merely attempts to establish by itself Logic or speculative philosophy as a complete and independent science. But neither of them saw at all clearly

(1) Briefe I. 79.  
(2) Leben 179, 188-9.
that this was really what they were trying to do; and in Fichte's case both principle and method were wrong, in Schelling's while the principle was in a way sound there was no proper method, no 'development'. (1) The importance and significance of Hegel's reformation consisted not merely in the soundness of the principle and the perfection of the method, but in the careful, precise and sharp distinction of the problems of Logic. Logic with him ceases to be mixed up in and with the concrete existent forms and characteristics of the experience we find ready to hand; Logic is pure Logic, deals with pure notions and essences, Logic handles the conception as such. All that holds of existent experience, as concrete embodied historico-factual appearance of the absolute is dealt with in a distinct science—in the Phenomenology. Notions, essences, thought-unities in their 'purity' and ultimacy are dealt with in another science—in Logic alone. It was exactly that confusion of problems that characterised both Fichte and Schelling and even Kant; all of whose work is in truth restricted to what characterises phenomenology of mind. (2)

How all the changes are brought about we must now proceed to determine.
PART III.

THE GROWTH OF HEGEL'S LOGIC.
PART III.

The problem of the Phenomenology is perhaps best stated to be the 'Enquiry into and Examination of the reality of Knowledge.' (1) This is not the only or the fullest expression for it; others will meet us as we proceed, and some have been already indicated. But the above seems for our immediate purpose the most accurate and precise, and we will therefore at the outset make clear the import of its meaning. To begin with it must be noted that the discussion does not in any way concern the possibility of knowledge: it does not enquire whether there is really knowledge at all or even whether knowledge is of the real. Hegel simply accepts in the first instance the fact that there is knowledge, and accepts this fact in much the same way that it is accepted by the ordinary consciousness. (2) And with this he must also admit the claims of all forms of knowledge to be actual knowledge, at least prima facie. Whether and what knowledge is possible, what are the conditions of possible knowledge, or again what are the limits of knowledge he does not at all investigate.

Now knowledge taken in this very general sense is not, strictly speaking, science, and yet is wide enough to include the latter. But it is science with which Hegel is primarily concerned, and this in its highest

(1) W. 2. 67.  
(2) ibid.
most perfect shape as Speculative science. Consequently not knowledge as such, but scientific knowledge par excellence is his main interest. And it is evident that this ideal knowledge, this ideal of science is present to Hegel throughout the whole argument, and is as much a reality for him as knowledge in general. He does not merely lead up to this conception; it is active all along. It was presupposed as we saw before writing the Phenomenology; and this conception of this supreme science is operative throughout the investigation. It is not simply an "ideal" of science which cannot be attained; it is emphatically actual science, the most real, the truest form of science attainable; indeed strictly considered it is the only veritably true science. Only in this its highest form does knowledge become real science, truly and really knowledge. The phrase 'reality of knowledge' has thus a double meaning. All knowledge is real knowledge which is knowledge at all; all the knowledge that appears bears this character, and the highest is at any rate as much a form of knowledge as all the other forms, and is real in the same sense as they are. But just in virtue of this community between all forms of knowledge it is necessary to signalise the difference between what is par excellence knowledge true science, and what is ordinary knowledge. Regarded in this light true science is the only real knowledge; in it we have knowledge as it truly is; knowledge "really." And this twofold interpretation of 'reality' gives rise as we shall see to a twofold conception of the problem. On the one hand it is an investigation into every form of
knowledge, on the other an enquiry concerning true and absolute acience.

When knowledge is taken in its widest significance there is only one general characteristic common to all its forms, that namely by which knowledge is knowledge— that it is the relation of subject to an object, the presence of an object for and to consciousness. Such is indeed the ordinary conception of knowledge. But the ordinary view distinguishes between the presence of an object for consciousness and the existence of the object by itself, as it is apart from such a reference. And this distinction it expresses by maintaining that while in the former case we have knowledge in the latter case there is truth, for the truth is the essence of the object, the object as it is in itself without further reference. This view of the difference between knowledge and truth Hegel agrees to adopt without close scrutiny, partly because it is the ordinary conceptions of knowledge with which he has to deal, and by accepting these he has committed himself likewise to the ordinary interpretation above given, partly because it provides him with a distinction of immediate use for his own enquiry and a point of departure for it. For it is clear that in that distinction between knowledge and truth we have the means at once of determining what true science is and of investigating all other forms of knowledge as knowledge. (1) This will become evident if we consider what is the relation between the two factors named.

(1)
Phan. 17.
All knowledge has for its content truth; truth is not merely the goal or aim of knowledge, it is all that any form of knowledge can contain. Knowledge indeed may be even asserted to be identical with truth. But this statement is ambiguous; for if truth is taken to mean, as it ought to mean, the whole truth and nothing less, then obviously it was to emphasise the difference between knowledge and truth, and to deny their absolute identity that the above distinction was drawn. At the same time however it must be maintained that in some measure knowledge at all times and in every form contains and claims truth. Hence it is necessary as well as convenient to distinguish between the truth which there is for consciousness in every form of knowledge, the truth which is possessed by consciousness wherever it is related to an object, wherever there is an object for it; and the truth of the object in itself, the complete essence of the object, which may or may not actually be for consciousness, but which is all that the object is and contains. Now it seems in the very nature of the case that these two forms of truth will approximate. For the nature of knowledge of the truth being true knowledge, since "the whole alone is the true," it is impossible to rest content in anything short of the complete truth. And it is equally manifest that this truth will be attained more completely by some forms of knowledge than by others, more completely according to the measure in which the object in itself, in its truth, is for consciousness. Hence

(1) Between existence of object for us and existence for itself.  
(2) Phan. 16.
it becomes very easy to admit that for every degree of approximation to the truth in its completeness there is a specific corresponding form of knowledge. If then we turn this result which appears as an inference, into premises and a starting point for discussion we can say that every form of knowledge, every mode in which an object is for and to consciousness is different from every other just in the degree of identification of the object in itself with the object for consciousness and can be investigated from that point of view.

Further, truth, according to the usual conception, consists in the 'agreement of thought with its object.' Translated into the above terms, this means that truth is the agreement of the object for consciousness with the object as it is in itself. If then the only truth is the whole, and if partial truth means merely partial agreement between the object for consciousness with the object in itself the only complete resting place for knowledge is where the agreement becomes absolute, where the two are identified, where thought and the object are identical. Such an identification therefore is the ideal of truth, the truth of knowledge, the absolutely true, and this is precisely the meaning of Speculative Science in Hegel's sense, and with this as an ideal all other forms of truth and of knowledge can be compared.

(1) "Form" here and throughout this statement of the Phän. (unless otherwise indicated) = "Gestalt."
Now if we give the abstract statements and conceptions more concrete shape we shall see at once their significance for the investigation we are considering. Truth is realised when thought 'agrees', 'corresponds' with its object. But 'thought' is simply the abstract expression for the Ego, for the Subject, Mind. The Ego, as Hegel is never weary of saying, means thought. Consequently that which the object is to 'agree' to attain truth at all (whether partial or complete) is the Subject, the Ego itself. In absolute truth, in absolute science, we saw thought, notion was identical with object; in such truth the object was its notion, the notion its own object. In absolute science therefore subject and object and its other will be one. But so Subject will be to itself object, Ego will be to itself non Ego, Consciousness will be simply Self-consciousness. In other words the absolute truth and reality of knowledge, science, is the presence to consciousness of its own self; Self-consciousness is the truth of that relation of mind to its object which constitutes knowledge. Only when the externality of the object to mind has ceased, only when thought is identified with its object, have we absolute truth, absolute knowledge; and such identity is only possible, has no place except in self-consciousness.

Now what object is it that the self has to itself in such knowledge? What is its 'self'? This is nothing other than thought. But if the presence of thought to itself is the absolute truth, then the truth of the object as it is in itself, above signalised as distinct from knowledge as such, must simply be thought, the notion. The object in itself is the
truth of the object, the object in itself is its essence, and this essence is just the notion of the object, the thought which constitutes the object is the object as it is in itself. If so then it is not the object in all its details, in all its plurality of content which is expressed in its notion, but the essence of the object, the object as it is in itself (an sich). Hence the self which is present in itself, and thereby constitutes absolute truth must be the totality of the essences, the notions which constitute and determine reality as a whole. Thus the complete and systematic exposition of these would give absolute knowledge, speculative science, and would alone satisfy the demand for the 'supremacy of mind', 'the omnipotence of reason.'

As compared with this ideal of science ordinary knowledge presents a decided contrast. Here all we have is the presence of an object to and for consciousness; and this is distinct from the truth, from the object as it is in itself. In knowledge as we usually find it consciousness falls in some sense apart from and outside its object; these are not so much identified as set over against and opposed to each other. Far from Subject and object being identical, they appear as the most absolute difference possible. Still let the difference be asserted to be as absolute as possible it is evident, even from the view currently taken concerning their relation, that on the one hand consciousness has some knowledge some truth, that is, there is always some identity some agreement between subject and object; and on the other there is a closer intimacy, a nearer agreement and identity between
consciousness and its object in some spheres of experience than in others, though in none short of absolute truth is the distinction and opposition removed entirely. Now that there is truth at all implies that the essence of the object, the object as it is in itself, is in some form or degree present to consciousness; and that consciousness should vary in the extent of agreement simply means that consciousness can differ in its relation to truth.

These two facts combined with that conception of absolute truth already outlined, not merely suggest the analysis of the various forms of knowledge with a view to establishing the degree of truth they contain, but indicate at the same the line along which the enquiry is to proceed. For in the Phenomenology Hegel investigates knowledge with a view to discovering the truth of knowledge, that knowledge which is absolutely true, contains and reveals absolute truth. Knowledge, to repeat, consists in the presence of an object to consciousness. But Hegel does not consider the object qua object; to do this would be simply to increase our knowledge of the object as such. He has to investigate the relation established in any form of knowledge, the way in which mind (consciousness) appears when an object is present to it. In other words it is consciousness in relation to objects, and the forms that relation assumes, that is the object of enquiry. All these forms are forms of knowledge; and the point of the investigation is first to disclose the true form, the truth, of knowledge. Now the truer form of knowledge meant a greater 'agreement' between consciousness and its
object and vice versa. Hence it is that, since in all knowledge there is besides distinction of consciousness and object, 'agreement' between them according to the truth contained in any given form, a change in the truth means a change at once of the object and of the form of consciousness. A difference in the form of knowledge is only possible by a difference in both form of consciousness and object of consciousness. That this should be the case follows at once from the nature of truth and of knowledge. (1) These are constituted by a relation, the former of the notion of an object to the object itself, the latter by the presence of an object to consciousness; and these two apparently different relations become as we saw essentially one and the same relation by the identification of thought and consciousness. That relation then being necessary it is obvious that a change in the degree or forms of knowledge means a change in both terms through which the relation is constituted. And when therefore we investigate knowledge with a view to determining its truth, that form of it which alone contains and furnishes absolute truth, absolute science, in which alone the goal of knowledge is absolutely realised, it is in the nature of knowledge and of truth that every change in the form of knowledge, the determination of a higher, a truer knowledge should mean an alteration both of the form of consciousness and of the object. (2)

---

(1) The very wide meaning which is given to knowledge in this enquiry must be carefully kept in mind. It is the presence of anything("etwas") for consciousness.

(2) Phân. 69.
Now there is only one way in which this enquiry can be prosecuted. It is assumed at the start that there is absolutely true knowledge, that there is only one such form of knowledge, and that all other forms of knowledge cannot give absolute truth. At best these latter contain merely implicitly that absolute truth, and if we regard truth as one, the truth they contain is truth in virtue of this implicit identity of their form with absolute knowledge. The investigation of these forms then with a view to discovering their truth can consist solely in the comparison of the truth of knowledge with the actual knowledge in a given case. And this comparison cannot and must not be external, in the sense that the standard by which knowledge is judged is brought to it from a sphere outside consciousness in which is present that relation to an object. The comparison, the criticism is immanent. For the truth of knowledge and the knowledge itself both fall inside consciousness; both belong to, are contained in, consciousness, the knowledge obviously so, the truth also because it is the truth of knowledge. It must not however be supposed that the conception of absolute truth is explicitly present at every stage or form of knowledge and that it is by means of this that the comparison is made. This is neither necessary nor possible; in fact that this should be the case would be absurd. It is not necessary, because every form of knowledge as we saw, (and as indeed is perhaps obvious enough) has its own truth, that which is for it, the object in itself, the essence of the object which exists for it, and it is by this that the comparison need alone be made. And it is not possible, because that conception of absolute truth is not attained, does not become evident to
consciousness till the end of the investigation itself. No doubt we may say it is absolute truth which is explicitly present in the truth of any given form of knowledge; still this is not what is actually present and by which the truth of that knowledge is determinable. The truth of any given form of knowledge, and that knowledge itself, the object \(^{(1)}\) as it is for consciousness, and that which consciousness accepts as the essence of that object, the object 'in itself', are both in consciousness. Consciousness has in itself both the standard and the knowledge compared by the standard \(^{(2)}\). Hence it is that the comparison is immanent; the investigation of knowledge and the knowledge investigated both fall inside the one consciousness; the investigation is of consciousness by consciousness, and the enquiry just consists in whether the knowledge corresponds with the truth, both of which are present in consciousness.

It might indeed be suggested that the enquiry is impossible, for the only knowledge there is \(^{(3)}\) of the object as it is in knowledge, that it is impossible to get behind this to the truth of the object the object as it is in itself, or again that the only truth is just the object as it is for consciousness. But the mere fact that in consciousness there is knowledge of an object implies the distinction between this and the essence of the object itself.

\(^{(1)}\) In the widest sense.  
\(^{(2)}\) Phan. 69.  
\(^{(3)}\) Phan. 70.
If then it is found by the above method of procedure that knowledge does not correspond to the truth, the knowledge must be altered. But this alteration is at once a negation of the former knowledge and the introduction of a change in the object, a new truth. It is the latter because the object present to consciousness and of which there was knowledge was simply the object necessary to that act and form of knowledge. The change therefore in the knowledge arising out of the above comparison necessarily implies a change in the object, would not be a change without it. And by this change consciousness becomes aware that what was previously present as the essence, as the truth in contrast to the knowledge, is not in reality the essence but merely the essence for consciousness, not really the truth, but the truth for it. This in fact is just what the change means, the recognition what previously was present as the truth was after all only truth for consciousness, and the substitution of another truth (another "an sich") in place of that which has appeared merely relative to consciousness. (1)

Again it is the former (the negation of the previous knowledge), for that knowledge has shown itself not to correspond to the truth of the object present to it, is in that sense false and is removed and replaced by the succeeding knowledge. Still it is not simply abolished or utterly false. (2)

(1) Phan. 71.  
(2) Phan. 30 f.
The mere fact that the changed knowledge proceeds from and succeeds to the previous form means that this new knowledge is determined by the preceding and is therefore not the absolute denial of it but merely the negation relative to the preceding knowledge, i.e. is a determinate limited negation of it. (1) In this the preceding form is, while negated, at the same time preserved, and maintains its reality in the succeeding, for it determines the character of the latter. And further because the truth which is compared and contrasted with each form of knowledge, is the truth of that knowledge and of no other, the changed knowledge is the immediate and only outcome, the immediate negation, of the proceeding.

It is by the combination of all these factors then that the science of the phenomenal forms of experience is constructed and obtained. None are thereby omitted, all have a place in the context of experience. All are limited, finite and in part untrue; yet their untruth does not mean their annihilation; their untruth means no more and no less than that, by the immanent process of their own content, each brings to view its inner truth, becomes therefore absorbed in that truth, which again because a new content of experience establishes a new form of experience ipso facto the negation of but at the same time the result of and therefore containing the preceding.

It is this character of negation a determinate negation, as in fact resulting determination which is the nerve of the process.

(1) Phan. 47, 65.
No other method could lead up to, by inner and immanent necessity, the truest form of knowledge; and by no other method could it be ascertained that all modes of experience had been included in the system. By no other method therefore could the two ends of the enquiry be realised to exhibit all experience as the organised content of the absolute, and prove, justify, establish the position of absolute Idealism, that substance is subject. And again no other method would be suitable for this purpose; for the method is one with the content itself, is not brought externally to it, is essentially bound up with it, to refuse to acknowledge the one is to deny the claim and meaning of the other. It is the content which imposes upon itself and reveals itself through this method; for that content, being the moments of mind which can and does abstract itself from any particular content, and yet posit each moment as its self, must thereby have its own immanent movement.

This process then is the inner critical exposition of the mind's content (experience) to itself, and is named a dialectic movement. It consists in nothing other than in asserting in bringing into explicit and complete distinctness that identity by which, and in virtue of which the opposed elements subject-object, in inseparable unity throughout experience. Instead of leaving them opposed and expressing them as is done in the judgment or proposition (where their separateness is emphasised) this method regards their identity their unity alone. Hence the propositional form and with it the process of establishing proving by reference to and by means of reasons and grounds are sublated in and are not appropriate to the true
speculative procedure. (1) It accomplishes by that movement of inner connexion what is otherwise established by more or less external proof. And just this insistence on complete and full presentation of that inner unity constitutes the distinctive feature of dialectic process as compared with that method which leaves to Anschauung (2) the insight into that unity without exposing its entire content to view.

Such is the ground plan of this Science of Experience. All the forms modes of mind are taken simply as they exist side by side, as facts in the history of conscious experience, as 'appearances' of mind. Phenomenal they are too in another sense that namely of being appearances of true and perfect science. (3) In either or both cases the science which gives the analysis and synthesis of all these phenomena of mind's experience is accurately named Phenomenology of Mind.

In passing from this general statement of the matter and method of the enquiry itself we must remove at least one possible obscurity which seems to hang over the investigation from the start. It is not evident from the above whether the process as described to be found actually taking place in the consciousness investigated or whether the several moments in the process appear in the significance ascribed to them solely for the consciousness investigating. Does the consciousness which is engrossed

(1) Phan. 51-2.  (2) e.g. Schelling.  (3) Ph. 62.
in actual experience become aware that on the appearance of a new truth the form of consciousness, the form of knowledge must likewise be altered, that the new truth present to the mirror of consciousness means that the mirror itself has likewise revolved, and must necessarily revolve with it? Clearly the ordinary consciousness is not actually aware of such a change; the change is as it were behind its back and in spite of itself. Consequently there is a moment of truth, of essence known, and of what is to consciousness which does not come to light in the actual living unobserving consciousness, but only to the investigator. Still this is obviously only a formal difference; for the content of each new truth must be present to the ordinary consciousness; must indeed be explicitly present. It is merely the process by which it enters and becomes aware of the truth, and so possesses a new experience, it is only the origination of the new forms which becomes explicit to the investigator in a way which is not present to the consciousness embedded in experience. And it is this double reference of the problem which gives rise to the double significance of the essence, the truth, the object in itself, which appears in the investigation and is necessary to it. For the truth while at first simply taken as distinct from knowledge alone was seen to possess a twofold aspect, that in which it appeared as truth for consciousness, and that in which it was the truth apart from this reference to consciousness, and in virtue of

(1) Phan. 71-2.
which the mode of consciousness was changed and a new truth constituted.

It will not serve our purpose at all directly to furnish any systematic account of the actual argument of the Phenomenology itself. Our primary interest in it lies in its plan and purpose which we have already given, and more particularly in its conclusion. We must restrict ourselves therefore to stating in a sentence by what steps Hegel reaches the result of the Phenomenology.

Taking experience as it 'naturally' presents itself to mind, there are three primary and specifically distinct objects to which consciousness can stand in relation, can know, with which it can identify itself. The broadly distinguishable objects are: what exists as object in space and time, as 'external' to mind; the self, mind as such, the subject as a self; and what is at once itself and external object, what is neither of the former specifically, but is both at once. These three give the general attitudes of mind, known as consciousness (of objects), self-consciousness and reason. Each has its own special modi; e.g. in the first the most elementary, the simplest mode is that where consciousness and objectivity merely meet at particular points, so to say, the stage of merely immediate awareness of objectivity—sense knowledge sensuous consciousness. Another modi again is where that original opposition is still posited but almost and implicitly overcome. And so on for the various modi of these three ground-forms of mind.

Now the argument consists in beginning with that general form where
the essential and implicit identity between the opposed elements in the relation is least asserted, namely at the stage of consciousness; and moreover begins with that particular mode in consciousness in which there seems least of all identity, where mind and object stand furthest from complete exhaustive oneness namely at the stage of sense-consciously. It then proceeds by the method and means already indicated to show that one mode when examined leads on to, finds its truth in another, the modes of consciousness finding their truth in self-consciousness where the identity is more manifest, and this latter again finding its ultimate truth in reason, where mind reaches its richest expression. Reason is thus the truth of consciousness, the highest mode of mind. It embraces all reality; and is all reality; objectivity and subjectivity are one. This is, therefore, the final general stage of the whole enquiry.

But the argument is not yet exhausted. For as we reach reason at first, that identity is merely abstract and formless. The rest of the enquiry is then devoted to completely exhausting all that this, the chief and final result which was to be established, contains. The procedure is again determined in the manner in which the three ground-forms of the whole enquiry were established, namely by reference to the distinctive spheres in which reason can stand in relation to its object. It is one with and in that kind of object which as a whole is named Nature, which is immediately identical with it, but which qua nature and because merely immediately present to reason is only implicitly identified with mind as reason. Again by consideration of the unity of reason with Nature we are
led on to the unity of reason with its self, self-consciousness of reason, mind concrete mind proper. From this again we pass to what is the truth of both the outwardness, the external identity of reason with nature, and of the inwardness, the internal identity of reason with its self. This is the absolute explicit and complete unsevered identity of reason with all reality without exception, where individual mind is one with absolute mind, where the absolute reality is absolute reason, absolute personality, subject. This sphere is in the first instance that of religion and in the second instance that of absolute knowledge. This last then is the final complete and without qualification the truest mode of mind, highest truth of experience, the result and the realisation of the whole enquiry. As it is this form of mind which is, as we said, of supreme moment to our enquiry we pass to consider it separately.

This conclusion of the Phenomenology of Mind is of the greatest significance not merely with reference to the various forms of mind which have appeared in the course of the enquiry but also in regard to Hegel's philosophy as a whole, and more particularly, as we shall see presently, in regard to the Logic. It is essential therefore for our purpose that the import of "Absolute Knowledge" should be fully appreciated. Let us recall the problem which the Phenomenology seeks to solve. We saw that it sought to state systematically all the attitudes which consciousness takes up towards what is presented to it as an object, and to exhibit the truth of each form which showed itself, and by consequence therefore to state that
form which was without qualification the final and completely true relation which consciousness could take up to its object. The enquiry presupposed, as a convenient though necessary starting point, the opposedness of object to consciousness, the separation of consciousness on the one side from the object of which mind is conscious on the other, and presupposed also the conception of truth which, equally with the other presupposition, is found in ordinary thought as it currently appears. And it is by means of the inner connexion and initial distinction between these two presuppositions—between the relation of the object to consciousness its presence for consciousness, which constitutes knowledge, on the one hand, and the object as it is in itself, the idea of truth on the other—that the enquiry proceeds, and that the stages of its movement are determined. It is in virtue of the fact that the object is for consciousness (and in that sense external to separate from it) that it is possible for mind to be cognisant of its truth, and it is because in truth mind knows the object as it is in itself that the separateness of mind from the object can be shown and can be found to vanish.

Now it is in the very nature of such an examination into the 'truth of knowledge' that the results arrived at in the course of it should in effect be double-sided in character. The enquiry affects mind on the one side and the object of consciousness on the other, and affects them simultaneously; a determination of the one implies a determination of the other. This is not merely a certain object present to consciousness, but a certain mode of consciousness peculiar to that object present to it; and
these proceed pari passu. Hence it is that an analysis of the truth contained in a given moment or form of knowledge has reference to both sides of the relation constituted in and by knowledge. Thus a change or modification of the truth of a given form of knowledge means a change both on the part of the object of consciousness and on the part of consciousness. In short the truth of the object in any given case means also a truth of consciousness, a specific pulse or moment of its life, a phase of mental, (spiritual) experience, a fact in the life of mind; the development of the one proceeds throughout by the side of the other a higher truth in the one case just means at the same time and in the same sense a higher truth in the case of the other. The knowledge of the truth and the truth of knowledge pass from stage to stage together.

Further it results from the nature of the initial contrast between truth and knowledge that the enquiry should be a determinate process towards a definite conclusion. The 'truth of knowledge' means not merely the truth at a given stage but the final and absolute truth. In this sense also the enquiry has a double reference, a reference not merely to the nature and significance of the knowledge immediately under consideration, but also to the highest and truest form under which knowledge can appear in spiritual experience. And it is just as true to say that the truth of any given form of knowledge determines the final truth, as to say that the latter is what implicitly determines the former. For it is of the nature of any given form of knowledge (except the first) that it should be the truth in the first place of what immediately proceeds it and by implication the truth of all
that has gone before, that it should include it in itself as a moment in its own content, and thereby determined by itself. Thus just as in any given case the truth in question is determined by what precedes, and is what it is by virtue of that which precedes and which it contains, as the final form is the last determination of the truth, depending on because containing, and evolved out of the preceding. On the other hand again it is equally and perhaps more obviously true that it is the presence of the final form as the ideal and end at each stage in the process which determines the truth of each form of knowledge. The mere fact that in each there is truth and that this truth is not annihilated implies that it shares in the nature of the perfect form of knowledge.

What this final form must be is evident from the contrast between truth and knowledge already mentioned. Since knowledge consists in the presence and yet opposedness of an object to consciousness and since the consciousness of the object in itself (its truth) means the dissolution of the opposition between the object in itself and the object for consciousness, it follows that the final and complete truth of knowledge can only then be attained when the objectivity of the object and the truth of the object have been entirely and without reserve identified. Now the objectivity of an object just consists in its being for consciousness in the maintenance of a self-subsistence in contrast with and in that sense apart from consciousness; its being for consciousness and its objectivity are interchangeable terms. But it only maintains that subsistence and apartness in so far as and so long as
the contrast persists between the object in itself and the object for mind; because it is in virtue of the "in itself" of the object that it is possible for the object to subsist over against to be for consciousness. If then this "in itself" which constitutes its positivity—substantiality becomes itself object of consciousness, is itself for consciousness, then clearly objectivity opposedness of the object to consciousness has ceased to exist.

Thus we see that the final form of knowledge means and contains not merely the identification of the object in itself and the object for consciousness, but also the identification of the object itself with mind.

Reciprocally again such a conclusion equally signifies that mind is identified in true knowledge with the object; for since the opposition has vanished, the result leaves neither of the factors necessary to knowledge alone and by itself to constitute the perfect form of knowledge. The argument as we saw had a double reference throughout, a reference both to the object and to mind, and truth affected both equally. Hence in the final absolute and completely true form of knowledge mind and its object are absolutely one, the final truth of the object is the complete truth of mind, the ultimate being of the one is identical with that of the other. And this highest form is not simply an ideal to which all the preceding forms point and which determines the process of the enquiry; it is itself a definite actual form among other forms of knowledge; the truth of knowledge is at once the absolute truth of mind, that form of mind in which it most completely and truly exhibits its essential self, and the absolute content of object—
ivity, the inmost and ultimate essence of reality as a whole.

Now we have but to bear in mind these various aspects and determining facts of the enquiry which have just been stated in order to make more explicit the definite content of absolute knowledge. The three significant elements are: the double-reference first mentioned, the character and conditions of the process of the enquiry, and the result at which it finally arrives and must arrive. Since the truth obtained at each stage registers a moment of the object as well as of mind, the deepening of the knowledge of the truth of the object, i.e. the increased explicit consciousness of its inmost essence, means at the same time a more explicit expression of the essential and ultimate content of mind. But since mind becomes explicit only to itself, this unfolding of its content is simply the increasing of the consciousness of itself by mind, the development of self-consciousness. And again since the evolution of the content of consciousness is synchronous with the gradual disappearance of the distinction between mind and its object, the abolition of external objectivity is the establishment of complete self-consciousness; the objectivity which is there found is also and essentially subjectivity and conversely. The process of the enquiry thus leads first of all to the assimilation of the object to and with the content of mind as such, and thereafter evolves into complete explicitness the inner and entire nature of mind in all its determinate relations to itself; the whole argument being therefore a gradual approximation by mind to its own essential self.
We found the first steps in this self-consciousness actually reached when the moment reason was attained; and thence forward it will be noted mind is occupied solely and consciously with its self, in some one or other of the forms under which it is presented to itself. Reason is not simply a "function" of mind among other functions; it is a phase or form of actual mind; it is that form namely in which mind abstractly and explicitly expresses its oneness with itself in its object. It is the first the immediate and therefore formal and merely general statement of the mind's own nature; for the bare consciousness that its object is itself, that itself is one with all reality, that all reality is itself, is the first moment in which mind appears explicitly as what it actually is. It is not in reason conscious of its self as distinct from the reality of which it is conscious; it is conscious of itself in all reality. The opposition between consciousness and reality had already been overcome in the discussion of understanding; and the consciousness of self as opposed to a consciousness of reality asserted to be distinct from an individual self had also been passed in review.

The reason therefore mind first appears in its truth, having the character of universality, as conscious only of its self wheresoever and whenever it has an object presented to it, as one with all objectivity, as subjective and objective at once. And this which is the first statement of the truth of mind is the first indication of the result of the whole enquiry. For reason is not merely the nature of mind, it is at the same
time the nature of all reality; is not to be set over against reality; that would take us back to the opposition already overcome; there is no distinction between reason and reality, the one is without reservation the other. Reason is therefore the truth of objectivity. Reason however is not completely realised mind, and it is thus distinct from further developments of mind. It is merely the first approximation to the ultimate truth regarding mind and its relation to objectivity. In short reason is essentially mind, but reason does not exhaust the content of mind. Only when reason is further developed does it exhibit the complete reality of mind.

This step having been taken the argument from reason onwards slightly alters in complexion. Mind has now ceased to be distinct from its object, or to be conscious that it is so. The further process of the argument consists therefore in mind becoming more inward to itself, in the deepening of its consciousness of its own reality. In reason mind has established itself as the ground reality of the world; with it all inner opposition between mind and objectivity has ceased; there is no reality left to which it is foreign, no reality whose nature it does not determine. The only development which remains possible therefore must consist in the more intimate consciousness by mind of itself, a process by which mind is shown to be more concrete, richer in content and which finally lays bare the ultimate and abstract nature of mind, the highest, the completest form under which it appears.

All along, be it observed, mind is both objectivity and subjectivity,
its realisation of its itself is not confined to a subjective sphere; its explicit reality is essentially the negation of any opposition between the two; what it shows itself concretely to be, it is objectively quite as truly as subjectively. It may be said that in the argument seems to have passed away from any reference to the objective; to a very narrow meaning (to what lies "outside" consciousness), and if so entertained would make the whole argument meaningless. For mind has already been shown in reason to be by itself and one with objectivity even in that narrow sense in which it can be restricted to externality in the form of 'nature', and the very reason for moving to mind as it fully appears in and its allied forms, is that there that of mind with objectivity, that inmost unity of mind and reality is more closely and explicitly and consciously realised and expressed, and therefore mind in these forms is more truly itself.

Further because mind has been established as the one all-pervading all determining all embracing reality, this gradual process of realising its content reaches a stage (in the sphere of inner reality) where objective realised self-subsistent mind is contrasted with, is opposed to the inner consciousness of its self which the individual mind possesses. Out of this contrast, which is also an inner though not explicit union, religion, as we saw, arises. Now it obviously lies in the very nature of Hegel's principle hitherto developed that the ultimate absolute reality, which is the object with which consciousness in religion is concerned, should be
convertible with absolute mind. This after what has been said hardly needs to be proved. But again it is characteristic of religion to lay its emphasis not upon the specific individual who is religious but upon the object with which the religious mind is concerned, namely the Absolute Reality. That is the one all-absorbing fact before the religious consciousness, before which that consciousness itself seems to fade into insignificance. In religion, in short, the individual reality is transcended, another reality asserts itself higher than and containing itself the transcended reality. Hence it is for this reason that in religion mind reaches a deeper consciousness of its own reality, makes more concrete its own nature than was possible in the case of morality. For in the latter mind is conscious of itself in individuals, its reality as the universal principle is explicitly and concretely established in the sphere of finite individual minds, without direct implication in that result of the ultimate and absolute mind which contains and is the fundamental reality of both the merely immediate reality with which reason is concerned and of the self-immediate reality which appears in morality. But in religion it is this ultimate Reality as such, in the totality of its contents, nature is especially, indeed solely determined. Instead of absolute mind being either implicitly present or insufficiently realised we have there in the religious consciousness its actual content as it is in itself made explicit and determinate. And the development of mind into concreteness being simply the expression of a consciousness itself, we see that in religion absolute
mind becomes actualised and self-conscious. In other words in religion we have the absolute nature of mind, as the ground reality of the world, completely and definitely expressed.

Now we have just seen that religion has its whole significance and interest in the absolute essence which is its object; it eliminates or delimitates the individual in the sense that the religious mind occupies the sphere of Supreme Reality, is consciously one with it, plants itself in it, and claims direct and immediate relation with and cognisance with it. It places itself so to say at the point of view of Absolute Reality. But from this consideration, only a very short step is necessary deliberately and without qualification to take up the actual position of the Absolute as such. In fact such a step is already implicit in that transcendence of the individual just spoken of. And this step Hegel has no hesitation in taking. Indeed he was logically compelled to take it not merely by the above consideration but by the very nature of his principle, a principle which also made it easy for him to do so. For since mind has been established as the absolute essence of all reality, individual mind and absolute mind are thereby identified; and since the concreteness and reality of mind consist in self-consciousness, we have in the self-consciousness of individual mind the concreteness of absolute mind itself, the realisation of the one combines with it and expresses that of the other. When therefore in religion the individual asserts and maintains its unity with absolute mind, and claims that in absolute mind it is conscious of its own essence, its own self, that
the absolute mind is itself and that its own self-consciousness just means the complete and explicit union with the absolute, it is evident that the identification is as emphatic as it could be, that the elimination of the individual as such is secured, and that the standpoint of the absolute can be confidently assumed.

This position is established in the result obtained by consideration of religion: the highest and final form of religion is shown to be revealed religion. That this should be the highest form is simply the direct consequence of the nature of his fundamental principle. For given that Reality is essentially mind, and that the self-consciousness which appears in religion finds the self of which it is conscious in the absolute essence of the world, it is in the nature of the case that the highest form under which that relation to the absolute is expressible should be that of the immediate and direct consciousness of its content and nature, or in other words should be the direct manifestation by the absolute of its inmost reality to the mind whose self it consciously is. If true religion is found where absolute mind is the self of the religious consciousness, it obviously follows that, the nature of self-consciousness being that of the direct coming to and presence in consciousness of the content of the self, the truest expression for the relation established between the absolute and the religious mind is that of manifestation, immediate outgoing of its reality, direct communication of the content of the former to the latter; and this is the character of revealed religion. But while in revealed
religion the assumption of the standpoint of the absolute as it is in itself and for itself without reservation, i.e. without reference to the individual, is assured and indeed made necessary, while in fact revealed religion simply means that in it we are immediately placed at the position of absolute mind as such, (for otherwise it would not be revelation at all) yet in religion at any rate the individual is not explicitly and positively eliminated. If this were the case it would not strictly be revelation, for revelation implies necessarily revelation to a mind which in some sense is distinct from the source of the revelation. Still the individual is only preserved in such a sense as to make it entirely compatible with the direct presence of the absolute. And this obviously can only be done by the thorough identification of the individual with the absolute mind, or as it is otherwise expressible, of the human with the divine nature, a complete unity which Hegel explicitly maintains. But this while it seems to reassert the separate reality of the individual, restores us to the position of the absolute by that very indifference of the content of individual and absolute mind. Still the maintenance of that distinction is necessary to religion as such. Hence it is that in religion the Absolute is not completely and explicitly determined as it essentially is. In religion the absolute content is merely "represented" (verwirklicht) to consciousness; it is not explicitly expressed in terms adequate to its nature, but in symbolic or incomplete form. The content is certainly revealed in its fullness, but the form in which this takes place is not the form which
expresses that content in its truth, an inadequacy due to the nature of
religion and to the maintenance of that distinction between absolute and
finite mind.

Thus in religion absolute mind is not determinately and absolutely
self-conscious. In order to become so one step and one only is necessary,
that the form in which it is consciousness of its self should absolutely
correspond and be adapted to the self of which it is conscious. But to
obtain this, any such distinction as that which is necessary to religion,
must clearly be abolished. The absolute mind must be the sole reality for
which and by which its own content is explicitly determined. But this
result is only obtainable and is accurately attained when to its content is
given the form of its inmost self. The absence of this is all that is
wanting to that content as it appears in revealed religion; and to adopt this
step is to express completely and truly the essential and final nature of
absolute mind. When absolute mind gives to its content the form of its
self, knows itself only as it is in its self without further reference it
has become perfectly conscious of itself, has attained the highest phase
of its reality, has expressed its deepest ultimate truth. But to know itself
in and through the form of self, is to comprehend its reality in its own
form, to identify its reality with its own truth, and to find the one in the
other, to have as its object the self for which the object is present. And
this is simply to realise its own notion, the notion of its self, that by
which it is what it essentially is; to be outwardly and to itself solely what it is inwardly and in itself, to be both objectively and subjectively merely and completely its self means nothing other than the realisation of its very truth, its notion. This self which knows itself, in its own notion, and in that notion has realised itself is simply absolute knowledge; knowledge of the absolute content of absolute mind by absolute mind is perfect and final knowledge, is true science.

Not, be it noted, merely knowledge about mind, nor again simply a knowledge which is for mind. It is a form or mode of mind which is absolute knowledge; highest mode of mind is literally convertible with absolute knowledge; for here we are dealing with knowledge as a living activity, as an active process, not as a product. Here then absolute mind is completely explicit and concretely realised. And with this it is obvious that the standpoint of absolute mind has been fully and unequivocally adopted. This knowledge of which we speak has no limiting reference to individual finite mind; it is solely the standpoint of the absolute from which such knowledge is regarded, and from which the knowledge is furnished. It is without unlimited, in-finite perfect absolute knowledge to which we have attained and which is here considered.

Such a point of view is clearly the logical and final conclusion of the result arrived at in revealed religion; no other step was left to take, and this step taken was at once possible and necessary. Absolute knowledge is thus the necessary conclusion of the Phenomenology. It follows indeed from
the two ground principles and vital contentions of the enquiry, that reality is essentially mind, and that mind is in its essence self-conscious.

Thus in absolute knowledge the limitations of individual knowledge are removed, the conscious contrast and opposition between the object and the consciousness to which it is present have been completely overcome, "natural" consciousness has been conducted up to the point of view of true knowledge, (1) the various forms and moments of universal view have been successively passed in review and made explicit to it as its own. (2)

This result however does not mean, indeed it seems both paradoxical and absurd to suppose it can mean, that when we reach absolute knowledge in the course of the enquiry we are literally transported out of all possible and 'actual contact with and relation to the individual self-consciousness which we saw to be a factor necessarily to be regarded when dealing with religion, and which in fact is the mind we are in the first instance more immediately aware of. We saw that in revealed religion absolute mind was explicitly identified with the individual finite "human" mind; that the content of the former is revealed, made manifest to the latter, that the content of the latter is in reality that of the former. Now this relation is double-sided; the very meaning of such revelation implied that the reality of both was

(1) Phan. p. 22, 62. (2) ibid. 22, 23, etc.
actually and explicitly the same in content; the individual was conscious of the absolute as its self, the absolute was conscious of itself in and through the individual. And it is admitted that the content of both religion and absolute knowledge is the same. Hence therefore the further determination of that content which establishes/absolute knowledge without qualification is likewise and at the same time the determination of the content of our finite self-consciousness. We are bound to admit this if we would make all those elements consistent which we have already mentioned. But if so we see at once that there is no inherent impossibility in the assumption of the standpoint of absolute mind, and no need to suppose that in such an assumption we are transported into a wholly different sphere. The complete knowledge of self and by self which absolute knowledge furnishes is expressible by and is determinative of our own self-consciousness; that is to say, mind as we know it determined in the manner indicated attains to and furnishes absolute knowledge. We might state this position otherwise by saying that while in both revealed religion and absolute knowledge the content is the same and in both the individual is essentially identified with absolute mind, the content of mind is in religion regarded from the side of the individual primarily, in science primarily from the side of mind and without qualification. And this position agrees with the relations existing between the 'particular' and the 'universal' individual.

(1) Phan. p. 504.
which were indicated at the outset.

Now this consideration has not merely the significance which it obviously bears on its surface viz.: that in Science (Wissenschaft) we have a mode of mind, a kind of knowledge which is actually real, and neither impossible nor untrue. Regarded more closely it has also the indirect importance of indicating what such science will furnish, what in detail the content of such knowledge will be. The knowledge in question is absolute, is knowledge of the absolute. That which is absolute, ultimate, unconditioned, is mind or, more particularly, mind in its own essence. Now it is this absolute essence which is asserted to be the self the reality of the religious consciousness, and it is this essence which is the content of both absolute and individual mind. But the essence of mind, the mind's inmost self, that which in it is both objective and subjective, absolutely real, is thought; or expressed as a multiplicity of thoughts. And thought mediating itself with itself, thought which has the form of self and therefore possesses that living movement characteristic of concrete self-consciousness (mind) that mediation and self-reference which is the nature of mind, is a notion. (2) In absolute knowledge therefore which is the realisation of the nature of mind, the complete expression of its notion, not merely is the nature of the knowledge simply the notion of mind, but the knowledge supplied is simply of the notions which constitute the mind's own essence.

(1) Phan. 22, 3.  
(2) p.27, 43, etc.
by which it is what it is. Mind knowing its self (thought) in the form of self (self-referring unity) absolute essence, of the character of mind, self-constituting, self-determining notion—that is the principle, nature and content of absolute knowledge.

Since then it is only those notions which constitute the essence of mind of which absolute knowledge consists, and since it was the absolute essence which was the self of the religious consciousness, we see how it is possible at once to claim to have attained to absolute knowledge without qualification, and yet not to pass beyond the sphere of individual mind, to make such knowledge attainable by finite mind. The notions therefore which are the ultimate and absolute essence of finite mind are identical with those of absolute mind, and the determination of those notions in the former reference is at the same time the satisfactory determination of them in the latter. The essence of particular mind is a competent guide to the essence of universal mind.

It should be noted in this reference that the content of absolute knowledge is as a matter of fact in a sense circumscribed and limited. It is not all and every kind of knowledge; it is, as appears indeed from the whole enquiry, one form or mode of knowing among the various other forms which have appeared in the course of this genetic history of knowledge. It has or furnishes a specific kind of knowledge, is a determinate relation of consciousness to an object, and in that sense and for that reason it is limited in character. The fact that it is solely with notions that it deals
would itself indicate that it is restricted. It is noteworthy indeed that as we approach in the enquiry towards the complete expression of mind, towards true knowledge the object of knowledge, that which is presented to consciousness becomes gradually more universal and abstract in character. That is in the nature of the case. For the attainment of absolute truth means at once the extension of the area covered by the object of knowledge and the determination of that object as the absolute essence of reality as a whole; only so, is ultimate truth ascertained. And these qualifications are obviously limitations of the nature of the truth arrived at. It is not the whole of absolute reality in its wholeness and in its detail that is professedly the content of absolute knowledge; it is simply the essences the notions which are the ground realities of the absolute that it determines. We may indeed go so far as to say that it was only such elements in the absolute that could be known in their absoluteness, as in fact it was only such elements which were common to individual and absolute mind, only by such was individual in contact with (so to say) absolute mind. To suppose that in absolute knowledge we have the absolute as it is in its literal detailed entirety fully and completely aware of itself, conscious of itself as a concrete life seems far too grotesque and impossible a presumption and is in reality as we have already shown not by any means necessary in order to make valid and possible the claim to have attained and to possess absolute knowledge.

Still the nature of this relation asserted to be characteristic of
absolute knowledge requires to be carefully guarded and qualified. For in a very definite sense it might be maintained that restriction is precisely what is not predicable of such knowledge. It embraces within its compass the whole of reality, and the notions though necessarily abstract are with equal necessity concrete, they contain in themselves all reality are at once subjective and objective, self-mediating essences. In short then in so far as (1) it is one form of knowing (though the truest) among the other forms which have appeared and which are necessary to mind, (2) it deals merely with the essences, the notions of Absolute Reality, this knowledge is limited in character; but in the sense that it deals with the concrete essence of all reality it is not restricted.

From this we are led to determine what relation the content of this final absolute knowledge bears to that of the preceding; in what relation the truth determined in and by absolute knowledge stands to that contained in the other mode of knowing which appeared in the enquiry. And on this point we are not left in much doubt. In the first place it holds in the case of science as it does of every stage in the process of the enquiry, that the truth possessed by each mode of mind, each form of consciousness, contains in itself the truth of the preceding form; the latter, as we saw, is not merely superseded by the former, is not merely negated by it, it is preserved and maintained in it. The very meaning of higher truth implies on the one hand that in it we have attained a fuller insight into, more complete and essential conception of the object than was obtained by the
by the preceding conception of it, and on the other that the truth arrived at and in the previous stage is so far as it is true contained in the later and higher truth. The highest absolute truth therefore must contain in itself all the truth which has appeared in the course of the enquiry.

Now there is only one way in which this is possible and comprehensible: the truth possessed by absolute knowledge must be the absolute and complete truth of a reality which has been presented in various ways to consciousness in the course of the enquiry. For if as is assumed the truth attained by absolute knowledge is different from the truth attained at the preceding stages, and if also the reality whose truth is to be known were also assumed to be different at each stage, then clearly we should have no common ground whatever for the various moments of the truth, to which they could refer, and by which they could be compared. It is true that in a sense the object is also distinct at each stage; the object as it appears to consciousness in perception for instance is not the same as the object as it appears in 'observing reason.' But it is because perception is different from 'observation' that the object is constituted differently in the two cases: in each case we have the one reality as a fact present to consciousness, but the attitude consciousness takes up towards it, the mode of mind in each case determines it differently. If this were not so, we repeat, if both ultimate object (reality) and truth were quite different in each case than no relation of higher and lower truth could be established or asserted.
This point is made still clearer by a second consideration by means of which the relation between the absolute truth and the preceding can be determined. It is one mind which is present and operative throughout the whole of the enquiry; all these modes of consciousness which have appeared are modes of one mind and all are necessary to it. Hegel calls this concrete mind 'the individual' and regards it on the one hand as the 'universal individual' which has passed through and entered into actual possession of all those forms which appear in the course of its history as given in the 'Phenomenology,' and now here in the enquiry produces or reproduces the process of its history, thus becoming fully conscious of itself; and on the other hand as the 'particular individual' which must pass through all these stages in the predicative history of universal mind, must become conscious of all these forms as its own. As these two aspects are from the point of view of the aim of the enquiry the same in significance, their differences may here be regarded for our immediate purposes as irrelevant. Now just for the reason that there is only one mind throughout the enquiry, and that this necessarily contains in itself all these moments, or phases of its reality that truest and highest mode of mind, absolute knowledge, must contain in itself, i.e. as part of its own content all the plurality of content found in the life of mind taken as a whole. All the forms of consciousness which have passed before us are

(1) Phan. 22, 23.
different and distinguishable truths of mind, necessary modes in which it stands to reality, to an object. There is not simply one mode and one truth for mind, namely the truest mode, absolute knowledge. This would mean that there was only one kind or phase of experience; a statement which is false to experience itself. If indeed there were only absolute knowledge, we might easily maintain that there could not be absolute knowledge at all; it would have neither meaning nor content. All the forms that have appeared are taken as forms all equally essential to and constitutive of experience; one cannot be literally a substitute for the other. We cannot e.g. by possessing absolute knowledge ipso facto and in the same sense be moral, or vice versa. Mind is too rich to be able to be gathered up into and exhaustively represented by one form of consciousness even the highest; and is equally too poor to be able to do without any. All of them are pulses in the life and reality of mind, all of them are constitutive aspects and elements of its own experience, each of them expresses and contains a truth necessary to the full representation of its life and experience, a necessary and true moment of its explicit reality.

Again because each phase of mind's experience is a truth of mind, and since, as we saw, such a truth has a double reference, a reference not only to the mode of mind but to the object present to consciousness, the truth at each stage will mean likewise the expression of a determinate truth of

(1) Phen. 22, 23.
reality. Consequently the richness of the experience of mind means at the
same time the richness in the truth and content of reality. Mind then
being one throughout its experience, and exhausting in these various modes
its own content will by that same process exhaust the whole truth contained
in experience. The multiplicity and diversity in the content of truth is
bound up with the multiplicity of the modes of mind; and the one mind by
the different attitudes to objectivity becomes acquainted with and contains
in itself the whole realm of truth. Absolute knowledge therefore will
and must exhibit as its content all the truths which make up the multiple
experience of mind. It must do so, because the existence of the various
truths of reality (which it is its nature as absolute truth to state) are
bound up with the existence of the modes of mind; the plurality of the
content of truth is only and is exhaustively found in and by means of these
forms of consciousness. If therefore absolute knowledge would not be simply
a bare repetition of self-consciousness, it must take up into itself all the
truth which makes up the experience of mind. Only from the latter in short
is the content of absolute knowledge drawn; only from the truth there found
is the absolute truth determinable. And this includes not merely the
forms of mind preceding the last, but the last itself also as a form of
mind. For the notion of science, of absolute knowledge itself, because a
truth of reality, a part of the whole truth of experience, falls inside the
(1)
Phan. 72.
sphere of absolute knowledge and is determined as part of its content, as we shall see later on.

Now from the considerations which we have adduced it becomes easy to determine the relation in question. Every mode of mind contains and expresses a truth of experience; every one is essential just for that reason. Each is a specific moment in the living reality, mind. All these modes together contain the whole truth of experience. But since in absolute knowledge mind knows itself as its self, in the form of self, and mind is the entire and absolute reality, the complete knowledge of the notions of mind must clearly exhaust the whole content of reality. None of the other forms considered possess this characteristic, for in none of them does the mind profess to know its self as it is in itself; none of them exhaustively embrace the whole area of reality, express the whole nature of mind. Thus then absolute knowledge will not merely contain and make explicit the ultimate nature, the absolute truth of reality, it will also contain the whole truth of reality, will be the sphere of complete absolute truth. But if so, then clearly it is as a form of knowledge covers when taken solely by itself precisely the field exhausted by the whole enquiry of the Phenomenology. For this as we have pointed out embraces the whole truth of experience. But in that case, if the final form of knowledge has as its object the whole truth of which mind is capable, and if the whole sphere of

(1) Logik. I. 34: III. 328.
truth has been exhausted by the various and different forms of mind which have appeared in the enquiry, then it is evident that the content of truth as it is laid bare in the former must be identical or correspond with the truth as it has appeared in the latter. It cannot be the same, for obvious reasons already indicated. The truth in the two cases must therefore correspond. In other words the notions which appear in the absolute truth in science, appear in the Phenomenology as forms of consciousness, as modes of mind. (1) And this holds good of every form without exception under which mind has appeared. (2) For, as Hegel puts it, "as mind in its concrete existence is not richer than science, neither is it in its content poorer." Since mind is one and self-contained, since all the truth of which mind is capable of experiencing is passed in review in the course of the enquiry in those forms in which mind actually experiences it, and since finally science is the absolutely true form of mind and therefore containing and exhausting its complete and ultimate truth, it is clear that the whole of that truth which is necessary to the complete exposition of the range of truth attained and possessed by mind must likewise appear as the content of a science which professes simply to furnish complete truth in its absolute and perfect form.

It must not be supposed that we have here two different truths of the one experience or again two different experiences of the same

---

(2) 602: 609/10.
complete truth. We cannot have the former, for truth is one, experience being one and mind itself one. To suppose that we could have two truths would mean with that we had not exhausted the area of truth known to mind, or that the one mind could have totally diverse experiences. But the former alternative is excluded by the assumption that the Phenomenology has passed in review all the mind's truths; and the latter by the fact that one mind simply means one experience. Again we cannot have two different experiences of complete truth for the like reasons. Absolute knowledge is certainly an experience; but it is only a part or moment of it. Absolute knowledge when completely developed with all it contains covers the whole area of experience. Consequently that which at once constitutes science a determinate mode of experience, and yet makes it possible for it to embrace all experience can only be the attitude taken up by mind in absolute knowledge, the character of the truth which it contains and reveals. Or to put it otherwise the one truth appears or presents itself differently in experience taken as a whole and in absolute knowledge which embraces in its scope all experience. In the former (in experience) truth appears in concrete form as mode attitude of mind, as it historically exists and actually exhibits itself in time. In the latter (absolute knowledge) itself one mode of experience, truth appears in the form of truth, as truth, abstract ultimate abstract.

This form as we saw is that in which mind knows its essence as itself and in the form of self,—the notion of mind explicitly and concisely...
stated as notion. Thus it comes about that what is specific form of experience, determinate form of mind appears in absolute knowledge as a notion, concept (Begriff), a determinate moment of absolute truth. Still in spite of this difference it must not be supposed that there is any vital opposition between the form (particular manifestation) of mind as such, and the notion; that the notion is external to the form of experience, and is merely brought to it so to say from without. So far indeed from this being the case it is rather the intimate and vital connexion between them which must be insisted on. For the notion is not merely the resulting final truth of mind, it is also the ground of the form of mind itself; it is at once the culminating point of experience, and the ground of experience. The movement towards the perfect form of mind, does not merely complete itself in the notion; but the notion is the ground the inner principle of that movement itself. (1) Each concrete form of experience, the actual existing form of mind contains and is in its essence and inner nature a notion.

This indeed is just what we might have expected. For on the one hand it is mind's own inner and ultimate truth which is gradually evolved by the process of the enquiry, a result which by the very nature of the process could not be obtained unless it were contained immanenter in the preceding forms. And on the other hand absolute knowledge explicitly professes to state the full and essential content of mind, and can only do so if its

(1) Phan. 45. Logik I. 8.
peculiar content is actually the inner truth of each phase of experience in
which mind appears. It is to state the same fact in other words, because
each movement of mind's experience is a form of knowledge (relation of
consciousness to an object) and of truth, and because absolute truth
is the content of absolute knowledge that the inner relation between absolute
knowledge and the preceding forms of experience is established and the
content of the one is the ultimate ground of the other. In both cases we
have knowledge, in both cases truth and in both cases the whole of
experience is covered. But in the one case the whole truth appears as all
the actual modes of concrete mind, as real appearances of real mind, in the
other case (science) the whole truth appears as the whole essence, the
complete essential content of mind. In the one case truth in its diversity
is extended or distended in time over and in the form of experiences of mind
which appear as distinct from each other in the actual history of mind, which
differ from one another as experience occupying different moments in the
history of mind; in the other case truth is as a whole and at once contained
in and expressed by a single distinct form of experience, whose characteristic
it is to contain the whole essence of mind, an essence whose diversity
consists in the determinate difference of one notion from another. The
common element throughout the whole truth is in the one case simply the fact
that the various experiences are experiences of one mind, which concretely
appears in all, and in each in a specifically different form, in the other
case the complete truth is expressed in the same specific form, namely in the
form of the notion, the essence of mind. But in spite of this close connexion between the truth as it appears in science, and the truth as it appears in concrete experience we must guard ourselves against a simple identification of the two. We have seen that what appears as part or moment in science has appeared and is found concretely as mode of mind's existence in experience. But it must not be inferred from this that we have merely to consult the latter in order to find the former, that we have merely to go over all the modes of mind as they have appeared, determine the essence of each of these and express the result as systematic science, as absolute knowledge. In short absolute knowledge is not simply and literally a reproduction in essentia of the modes of experience, a mere restatement sub specie aedificati of the historical appearances of truth. There is no such merely step for step correspondence between them. There is a specific determination in the content of truth as it appears in absolute knowledge; without this indeed it would not be a different mode of experience. We have stated wherein this determinateness consists, and it is in virtue of this specific character that the development and systematisation of the content of absolute knowledge pursues a course of its own without any explicit reference to those modes of mind whose essence they are. "The pure notion," as Hegel puts it, "and its further development depend solely on its own pure characteristic determinateness."(1) That absolute

(1) Phan. 609.
knowledge will contain and exhibit the complete and absolute truth of experience is indeed guaranteed by the fact that it is mind in its essential character which is to be represented in and which is to be satisfied by absolute knowledge; the unity of mind guarantees the completeness of the exposition of its essential nature. The ultimate identity therefore between the complete truth of absolute knowledge and the complete truth of experience is thus guaranteed by the fact that it is the one and the same mind whose truth is expressed in both, in the former as essence, in the latter as concrete appearance. An explicit and deliberate reference to the latter in order actually to determine and evolve the content of the former is therefore at once irrelevant and unnecessary. In the last result they cannot but be the same. Hence while in the main we may look for and will discover a general correspondence, a detailed agreement need not be expected.

In regard to one important factor however both the Phenomenology as a philosophical exposition of the modes of experience, and the exposition contained in absolute knowledge are unreservedly agreed—the method by which the process is carried through, by which the system exhibited is developed. This is the same in both. After what has already been stated it is evident enough that the method cannot be different in the two cases. We saw that the essence of each form of mind was a notion, and the movement from one to another is precisely a notional movement. Again it is the one

(1)
Phan. 45, 70, etc. Logik I. 7, 8, 40, 41.
mind whose complete truth is systematically expressed in each case. And for the attainment of system of scientific coherence and connected development there is only one true method. The nature of this method as it is pursued in the Phenomenology has already been indicated. The only difference between the process of the development in the Phenomenology and that in absolute knowledge is not in the principle by which the development in either case is obtained but in the nature of the object matter dealt with by each. In the former mind is ostensibly divided from its object, and the discovery of the absolute truth of knowledge was found to consist just in the gradual approximation to final explicit identification of the two opposed elements. In the latter that opposition has been overcome, truth appears in form of truth, content and form of truth are identical; and here the process of the system of absolute knowledge consists in the development of truth in the form of truth. In the former the method was applied to mind simply as concrete actual mind; in the latter it is applied to the truth of mind as truth. The method is bound to be the same for the method was all along immanent in the content of the enquiry. The method which has brought out each step and stage is the vital immanent activity of each stage and from itself. Hence the further development of the content of any particular stage, if it is to be really true must follow the inner movement which determines the essential nature of each stage itself. Only so could any stage develop its explicit content into system. And this is all that absolute knowledge can do if it is to realise itself in a system; it must,
that is to say, simply develop its content in the character and determinate
ness which that content possesses. We might have say, a special develop-
ment of parts of mind (as this appears in C, BB, of the Phenomenology) and
call this special development the System of Ethics (or as it is called
later in Hegel's career, the Philosophy of Law); or again we might have
similarly a special development of religion, and call it Philosophy of
Religion, and yet in all these cases have application of one and the same
method. Similarly it is this one method which must operate throughout the
development of absolute knowledge, which is simply one mode of experience
like these others, one offshoot from the root and mainstem of all
experience, mind.
In what has just preceded we have stated, as completely as is necessary for our purpose, the character and content of Absolute Knowledge. We have shown its place in the concrete experience of mind as an existent fact; we have seen that it is the inevitable and necessary outcome of the enquiry into the truth of mind, and have stated in what respects it differs from, and in what it agrees with, the preceding modes of mind. The importance of a precise determination of absolute knowledge for the development of Hegel's Logic cannot well be over-estimated. For, in fact, as must have become already evident, absolute knowledge is simply that science which appears in his system as Logic. (1)

Absolute Knowledge is not science in general, but science lifted into its abstractness, science in its inmost essence, the very notion of science, science in its final principle, its ultimate terms. It is not a descriptive analysis of any and every science, but the definite determination of a special science, namely, essential science, science of the

(1) Phän. 29, 45. Logik I. 8. 34, 35.
essences. Such a science was for Hegel Logic. That this identification of Absolute Knowledge with the Logic was in no sense an after-thought on Hegel's part is quite evident from the passages referred to, and indeed from the nature of absolute knowledge itself. But if then Hegel established the Logic as the final and complete truth of mind and maintained precisely the same position when working out the Logic itself the significance of the nature of Absolute Knowledge as stated in the Phenomenology for the determination of the nature and content of the Logic in the form in which we now have it, is manifestly very great.

Between the appearance of the Phenomenology in 1806-7 and that of the first volume of the Logic, 1812, we have no published writings of Hegel to assist us in the discovery of the process by which the Logic as such was being constructed. We have, indeed, one publication which while it did not appear in printed form till after his death was in its substance produced during this interval. I refer to the "Philosophische Propaedeutik". (1) Important as are these

(1) Werke XVIII.
collected notes of Hegel's lectures(1) to the Gymnasium pupils in Nürnberg during his Rectorship, and helpful as they are in the elucidation of some points in his scheme, it is impossible for two reasons to find them of value for the determination of the last stages in the development of his Logic. In the first place, the contents of the logical parts of these notes are in their main elements entirely the same as those found in the final systematic statement, and in their details only on unimportant points divergent from it. They, therefore, in no way indicate any better than the final Logic itself how his positions were obtained. In the second place, the form in which these notes were furnished was determined solely with reference to the needs and capacities of those to whom they were given; so that what does not appear in them cannot be assumed to have been absent from the mind of the author himself, or to have been not yet grasped by him; and what does appear in them qualifies its presence there and was in its matter and method there presented by the fact of its being adapted to the intelligence of those

(1) The lectures were begun in 1808 and after continued correction finally in 1811 took the shape in which we now have them. Op. Rosenkranz "Preface to *Proleg.*" W.XVIII.p.VI. Leben Hegels.p.249.
who listened to it. Hence, for instance, it is significant that the compressed inner and immediate connection of one part with another, and its immanent development out of it by the strenuous application of 'the only true philosophical method' (1) hardly appear at all in these notes. What is found and what indeed gives them their value, is primarily the precise distinction of one element from another, the definite delimitation of one part from the succeeding, and the grouping of the elements under general headings — exactly what was necessary for the beginner in philosophy, but not, therefore, a completely philosophical exposition.

In the absence, then, of any direct assistance from Hegel's utterances between 1807 and 1812, we must seek to determine the mode of the construction of the Logic by such aid as the Phenomenology can supply, and that identification of Logic with absolute knowledge, which we have already mentioned, furnishes a satisfactory and entirely trustworthy clue by which to attain this object. For not

(1) There is hardly any indication of an explicitly adopted philosophical method at all in the "Propaedia". Yet Hegel's method had been used in constructing the Phän, and its importance recognised.
merely is this identification consciously made in the Phenomenology, but it is ratified and repeated in the statements made in the Logic itself. This indicates, indeed, that Hegel had attained his final philosophical position by 1806 (or perhaps a year or two earlier, for the Phenomenology was written between 1803 and 1806), and that the general scheme and plan of his system was explicitly present to him from that time onward. And this general scheme as well as the fundamental point of view do not seem in any important respect to have been altered at any subsequent period. We are justified, therefore, in passing from the Phenomenology at once to the construction of the Logic. We need not pause to gather up the results hitherto attained or to indicate in what respects development in his view has taken place. This will be better dealt with after the discussion of the Logic itself.

We propose, then, to show how from the nature and import of absolute knowledge the construction of the Logic arose and was determined. And we shall try to exhibit this first of all with reference to the general nature of the
content of the Logic; secondly, with regard to the method pursued in the Logic; and finally by reference to the particular parts and steps of the Logic.

But to begin with, it is necessary to state as clearly as possible the relation in which the Phenomenology stands to the Logic, so far at least as this has not already been dealt with. We have considered from the point of view of the Phenomenology the relation in which absolute knowledge as a mode of mind stands to the other modes of the mind’s experience. We have now to consider from the point of view of the Logic what relation the whole enquiry of the Phenomenology bears to the purpose of the Logic. It is the same problem regarded from two standpoints; in the one case from that of the Phenomenology per se, in the other, from that of the Logic per se. We must carefully guard ourselves therefore, from trespassing on ground already covered.

Absolute Knowledge or Logic, then, is like every other mode of knowledge of which mind is capable, in the first instance a fact which exists in the experience of mind. It is not itself unreal, it is an actual mode of concrete
mind: not the only mode, but one which exists beside others. It is one form of experience, and appears as an existent fact in the history of mind. (1) This being character, its existential appearance is what is common both to Logic as treated by the Phenomenology, and Logic as a 'fait accompli' in the system. This aspect of the Logic we shall see is of vital importance.

In the next place, there is a more inner connexion between Logic and Phenomenology. The latter professes to be the antechamber to the former, and the former "presupposes" the latter. (2) The sense in which the Phenomenology is to be regarded as the presupposition of the Logic is not difficult to determine, if we bear in mind the nature of the two sciences in themselves. The Phenomenology is the philosophical statement of the modes of experience which mind possesses: it takes these modes simply as modes and merely as existent facts in experience, and criticises and systematises them. The Logic deals with the absolute truth

(1) Phän. 603.
(2) Logik. I. 34, 35.
of the highest mode of mind. The first science, therefore, deals with this highest mode simply as a mode, the second science with the content, with the truth that this mode contains. Consequently the object matter of the two sciences is not the same. Thus the content of the one cannot be the logical presupposition of the content of the other. Each science is qua content sui generis. If this were not so, then the two sciences would be one and the same science, and the first step in the logic would be the immediate outcome of the last of the Phenomenology, whereas the notion of science is only found towards the end of the Logic, and the beginning of the Logic is determined by turning back to the beginning of the Phenomenology (as we shall presently see). The presupposition can only refer then to the form of the science of Logic, to the character of the content found there. This character, as we have seen, is the absolute unity of truth with certainty, of thought with reality, of the notion (Begriff) with being (Sein). Such a unity is presupposed in the logic, it is not established there; the Logic starts under the assumption and its whole procedure
depends on the assumption that the opposition of those elements has been entirely removed. The very meaning of "pure truth" requires and implies this: and the whole of the Logic from first to last contains pure truth and that alone. If then, it contained anything implying that opposition, it would not contain what it professes to deal with. Thus that initial presupposition of the character of the content of Logic cannot by the very nature of the Logic be established inside the Logic itself; but being granted and allowing the Logic to start from it, and presuppose it not merely at the beginning but all through the Logic the various truths which possess this assumption, i.e., those truths in which the above-named opposition had been entirely overcome, can be systematically exhibited. But just because that specific character of the content of Logic is (1) not self-evident, (2) a philosophical truth, (3) is presupposed by the Logic, it requires to be justified, and philosophically established. And this not merely for the sake of other people, i.e., those who do not prima facie accept it, but for the sake of the system itself, for the unity and com-
pleteness of the system, which just because claiming to exhibit absolute truth, must show that it already and also in some sense contains other truths as well. Now this character of the content of Logic it is which the Phenomenology philosophically establishes and does so in the manner we have shown. It is, therefore, the presupposition of the logic in the sense that it is the justification of what the logic assumes at the start and throughout its enquiry; it establishes the presupposition of the logic. It is not logically bound up with the Logic; the Logic indeed could be prosecuted without any such justification of its point of view, and is, in fact, carried out without any reference to that presupposition. For this character of the content of Logic cannot be described as in any sense a logical assumption of the Logic. A logical assumption is made at the outset, the first step depends on it and the rest follows without any further reference to it. But in the Logic this character belongs to and is possessed by every step and movement of the Logic, at the end as well as at the beginning. There is no more justification for treating this character as the logical assumption of the Logic, than for calling
extensity the logical assumption of space as dealt with in Geometry. It is simply the character of that space for Geometry. What the Logic deals with first consists of such elements as possess that quality of being "pure truth". If there were no such elements, the science of Logic as understood by Hegel, would be simply impossible. But that there are such elements is what the Phenomenology establishes. What those elements in extenso are, and what their relations, is exhibited in the Logic, and it is in this sense that the Phenomenology is the presupposition of the Logic. It is not the logical presupposition in any strict sense of this term; for the truth of the logic as science does not depend on, is not guaranteed by the fact established by the Phenomenology; the Logic guarantees its own truth, is a self-closed science, depends for its truth solely on itself. Nor is it the historical presupposition of the Logic, in the sense that the Phenomenology must necessarily have preceded the Logic in time; for each science is in itself complete, and the order in which they appear depends not on their content, but on the aims of
their author personally. The Phenomenology is the philosophical presupposition of the Logic; it establishes as a philosophical position the point of view from which the Logic starts; and the existence of the Logic as a science depends upon that position. The Phenomenology "justifies" as a philosophical truth the character of that content with which Logic deals; this justification can only be given in view of, and by, reference to content and knowledge which do not bear that character, and consists simply in showing that such content as Logic deals with is the highest and truest content known by mind. The "justification", therefore, is a "deduction"; the nature of the Logic is established through the process of inner analysis and development from other forms of knowledge, and by exhibiting Science as their final truth.

There are other senses in which we may regard the Phenomenology as the presupposition of the Logic. We may, for instance, take it to be the process by which the individual is convinced of the standpoint of the Logic. In this sense it is for the subject approaching the system the
first step to the understanding of it. It undoubtedly has this function; but important as this subjective purpose is, it cannot be considered to exhaust the nature of the work; it is determinative of its purpose, but not constitutive of its content. The science is an objective science; a philosophical "Science of Experience" (1), is necessary to the system, and is the first part of the "System of Science" (2). And again if it had only this subjective significance it would be singular that it should leave off precisely where the system in extenso should begin; it hardly seems probable that, though the subject is guided successfully through error and untruth, he will thereby be helped to the understanding of the truth itself. We, therefore, confine ourselves to having indicated the essential relation in which the Phenomenology stands as a presupposition to the Logic.

But finally, we must state the relation which the content of the Logic bears to that of the Phenomenology. Both cover the whole of reality, in the one case, as the content of actual experience, in the other as the content of absolute truth; in the one case as temporal - spatial

---

(1) Phän. 72.
(2) Logik. I. 8. The change made in the title later does not seem in any way vital.
reality, in the other as absolute ultimate reality. Each science is complete in itself and is self-determined, i.e., determined by the inner nature of its own content; and yet each goes over the same field. No sphere of reality, therefore, lies outside either. But in that case each can be regarded as containing the whole of Hegel's philosophy (1), each contains the system as a whole in a different form. And this paradoxical as it seems is unquestionably true; though it is only partially true. For each, while containing the whole system, is itself merely a part of that system. This arises from the difference in the immediate object-matter in the two cases. On this difference, however, we can dwell further here without either repeating what has been said or anticipating what follows.

But though each science can be regarded as covering the whole system, this does not mean that the system has two beginnings, nor again that there are two Systems. It is one and the same principle which is present in both sciences, in the one science (the Phenomenology) the principle appears explicitly as a result at the end of the enquiry; in the

other it is explicit at the beginning; in both cases it is operative throughout. The difference of science, as we have said, lies in the difference of immediate object-matter; and the difference of beginning is determined by that object-matter. There is, as Hegel insists, no absolutely initiatory philosophical science, though in each philosophical science as such we must begin at the absolute beginning for that science. (1) While, therefore, in the Phenomenology and the Logic we begin in each case at the beginning, the system, as such, begins absolutely with neither; each begins simply on its own account. There are, indeed, differences in value for the system between these two sciences; for the one (Logic) states in ultimate form the complete and absolute truth contained in the System, while the other contains the truth of the System in the concrete forms of actual experience, the essence of which, as we have seen, is itself just the ultimate form as it appears in the Logic. But this does not lessen the necessity for each science in itself.

Is is not, therefore, the area of reality covered by each science, which makes them distinct, but the way in which the reality is regarded in the two cases. And when we ask what constitutes the distinction, there is only at this stage, one answer to be given. In the Logic Mind, the whole of whose experience was passed in review in the Phenomenology, expresses the content of its experience in that form which for mind is ultimate and without reservation absolute, irreducible, self-subsistent and simple. But this form is just the notions the thoughts which constitute its nature qua mind. Mind per se, i.e., regarded abstractly as mind, is not a blank, nor is it a tabula rasa. It has a determinate content, which is that by which mind is mind. This content is thought or thoughts, the notions. And since these were proved constitutive of those various forms of experience, the reflection upon or with these notions is bound to cover the same area of reality as the previous science, and what it does to or with these forms of experience is simply to lift them into their absolute ultimate mind constitutive form, express them, in short, in their
absolute essentiality. There seems no other way in which to express the difference between the content of the two sciences. Why they (the forms of experience) should have this ultimate essence, and what this ultimate form does to the concrete actual form, are questions which are not answered in the System, and must seem to Hegel to require to be answered.

But we have already anticipated that development of the logic out of this conception of Absolute Knowledge, which we now proceed to state.
The primary and fundamental fact in the Logic is its content. From this and from the character which it possesses everything else in the Logic (both the method and as we shall the steps) is in the last resort determined. It is necessary, therefore, to deal in the first place with the general nature of this content.

It follows from the position which Absolute Knowledge occupies in the Phenomenology that the content of the Logic is to begin with, that of reason and of reason only. For all the later moments of that enquiry were simply further determinations of reason. But reason is not to be regarded simply as a "function" of mind, among and alongside others, e.g., perception, understanding. It is in a sense a "function", it is the truest function, but it is more than function. Reason as such is essentially mind, and moreover, it is the essence of mind, as reason first appears, therefore, it is simply impliciter all that later appears as explicit determinations of it. And since reason was proved to be the essence and truth of the other preceding forms of mind, all that specifically belongs to them will be preserved
in and exhibited in the form and as the content of reason. The nature of reason just consists in the identification with itself of all that is present to it, all that it knows; reason determines it explicitly as itself. But this means that the only content of the Logic will be that which reason gives to itself. It will not come from without, it will be self-determined, constituted by reason and for reason. But this is simply to express in other words that reason, the source of the Logic, is in the Logic explicitly self-conscious. Or again, since reason is mind, and is true mind, the Logic is the exposition by mind of the content of its true self, its essential nature; the Logic is the self-consciousness of mind in its truth.

Further, it must not be supposed that this can imply that the Logic is something in any sense external to mind as an actual reality. For Logic is not merely the self-consciousness of reason (mind), but in Logic mind is most truly, most completely self-conscious is, therefore, most truly mind. Logic is in reality, the truest actual form in which mind exists. Logic is not separate from mind, it is
literally and without any reservation actual mind, - it
does not "belong to" mind, is not "the way mind works", it
is the mind's own essential reality. When mind is most
truly itself, when it is most completely explicit, most
fully self-conscious, conscious of its true self as its
self, it appears as the science of Logic. Logic is not
simply the true science, it is true mind; it is not simply
the absolute form of knowledge, it is the necessary and
final mode in which mind must exist. It is the necessary
result of the Phenomenology because reason is the truth
of mind, and Logic is the truth of reason. Logic is as
Hegel puts it, "the crown of the life of mind". This fact
is of supreme importance for the determination and the
accurate appreciation of the nature of the Logic - For
thereby Logic becomes not a barren catalogue of forms; it is
a living reality; it is endowed with all the vitality of the
self-determining, self-moving, ceaseless activity of con-
crete mind itself. The mere fact that Logic is self-con-
cious, self-referrent mind means that its content possesses
the actual life which is mind's essential and inalienable
characteristic and that in virtue of that life the exposition in the Logic is possible, for the Logic, indeed, is the very essence of that life itself.

But again, this self-consciousness of mind is not the barren consciousness by the mind of its own Ego; the Logic is not the repetition of the bare Ego, the formal unity, the abstract identity of mind with itself. This, though it would of course be active self-consciousness, would never yield any content except one single content - the Ego as such. Not only is this not the true logical content, but that content is not even the mere repetition in different forms or by different expressions of that one formal Ego, such different expressions being concealed as having no value and no meaning in themselves, but merely in so far as they half conceal and half reveal the Ego, which all the while is indifferent to them. This might perhaps be assumed to be the case from the fact that the Logic is merely confined to the mind as such, is merely self-conscious mind; for since mind does not go without for its content, the content might be thought to be nothing but a formal self.
Such a possibility is provided against by the next characteristic inherent in the nature of Absolute Knowledge.

It is the final moment in the position that reality is one with mind, that all reality truly interpreted is reason, that the truth of reality is reason, that mind is the ultimate essence, the one all-comprehending reality. The self, therefore, which is conscious of itself in the Logic is not, and cannot be in any way a formal self; it in its unity embraces and is identified with the comprehensive totality of the whole of reality. Reason does not merely negate, it contains in itself all the preceding truths of mind; its very nature is to show all aspects of reality to be identical with itself; this, indeed, is just what to be their truth means. Hence far from their being only one formal content in the self which is conscious of itself, as Logic, its content is rich with all multiplicity and variety which reality as a whole contains. The fact that it is one reason, one mind, which is conscious of itself throughout all reality and the fact moreover, that each ultimate essence of reality possesses in the Logic the form of mind itself
(the notion) do not destroy or render meaningless the diversity of the world. Rather the whole significance of the enquiry lies in establishing the reverse of this position, in giving value to that diversity, and yet identifying it in its entirety with mind. Thus there is secured the fullness and diversity of the content of the Logic. Self-consciousness of reason where stated explicitly must give infinite multiplicity of detail, endless difference in its realisation, the self which is conscious of itself is endowed with all the riches of reality, and reality contains infinite diversity. Mind's self only attains the fullness of its own life when it finds itself in and one with all the fullness of experience. The content of the Logic, therefore, while merely the exposition of self-conscious mind in its truth, must still be as manifold as the variety of experience. (1)

Once more, the identification of reality with reason, with mind, means the same, in this case, as subsuming the object under mind, determining mind as higher than the

---

(1) Anything else would be either Scepticism, Solipsism, or Identitätsystem.
object, as establishing that substance must, when analysed, lead to and necessarily i.e., logically pass into Subject. All these expressions are essentially equivalent. Now the subject here meant must, at least at the final stages of the enquiry, (Religion and Absolute Knowledge), be, as we saw, the ultimate subject, the absolute as subject. We are compelled to adopt the point of view of the absolute in Religion, and Absolute Knowledge was merely the completely final expression for the result established in religion. Hence in absolute knowledge we have not a knowledge about the absolute by the finite mind, nor a Knowledge which lies external to any subject finite or otherwise. It is the self-consciousness of subject as such, of the absolute subject itself. Logic is, therefore, not a possession of the absolute; it is actual absolute mind actually conscious to its self as subject of its own essence in the form of its self. Logic as the completed organism of truth is just absolute subject laid bare and exposed to its self as it essentially is. That the Logic can be anything short of this, we see to be impossible when we observe that it
realises and must realise in itself two supreme ends of the Phenomenology. It is the realisation of the ideal of Knowledge: the opposition between certainty and truth, between thought and object, between mind and experience (reality) is to be completely overcome in the Logic, and the ideal of knowledge just consists in overcoming that opposition and establishing a positive actual identity between these elsewhere and otherwise opposed elements. And that realisation can only take the form which we find in the Logic, where the content of Knowledge is determined from and by the nature of mind itself, - for here there is still knowledge, both consciousness and an object (Self) present to it, and yet the Knowledge is the highest perfect ideal, the elements opposed being one and identical in content. And secondly, at the same time, it is concerned with the highest Reality of mind, the Reality of religion. It merely carries one step, and the only remaining step further the experience of religion. In this latter, mind occupies the sphere of the Absolute, asserts its unity with it, identifies itself with it. If religion is a valid experience, the Logic,
which merely states explicitly and in the form of the mind's own self the content which is already present in religion, namely, the content of absolute mind, absolute subject, then the Logic must inevitably be the self-consciousness of absolute subject. The Logic, therefore, is the meeting place of both those ends, ultimate knowledge, and ultimate Reality; it is both at one and the same time. And it is important to note that they must involve one another, that the attainment of the one is at the same time, the possession of the other, - for this is secured by the establishing of the more general position that reality is one with mind (reason). Ultimate Knowledge would not be absolute unless it were the actual expression of absolute Reality; and this again would not be Absolute Subject unless it knew itself in the form of self, in absolute knowledge. Hence it comes about that merely to attain the point of view of the ideal of Knowledge, to have overcome the complete opposition between Knower and Known, to have reached, in short, truly objective Knowledge is ipso facto to know the Absolute as it knows itself(1).

Assuredly the Logic is the thought and work of the individual thinker, of Hegel personally and of them who follow him, i.e., of finite minds. But just because when such an individual deals with such knowledge as realises the highest truth, namely, the knowledge where mind is one with its object (and that is certainly the ideal of truth), all limitation of knowledge to finite consciousness has been removed, there seems no meaning whatever in suggesting that the Logic is still knowledge which belongs to a finite mind. (1) Finitude has by the assumption been eliminated; the knowledge is therefore purely objective and qua truth in no sense subjective (except to the Absolute Subject). For the Logic then to become what it claims to be, all that is required is to take up the standpoint of Absolute objective Knowledge. And this standpoint as we saw is that of the notions which constitute the essence of reality.

(1) The same holds good even of the order of exposition pursued in the Logic; for this is necessarily determined by the nature of the content as we shall see; and with the first step of the Logic Absolute Knowledge begins.

(2) Hegel's own way of putting this position is that in such knowledge the individual knower has merely the function of "looking on", (Zusehen).

Cp. Phän. 69.
But if Logic is thus the Knowledge by the absolute Subject of itself, the Logic must be at once Speculative Philosophy, true Theology, and Absolute Revelation - and that it is so Hegel affirms in almost so many words; as indeed to hold that the Logic has these aspects is merely to regard its truth now from the point of view of the thinker, now from that of the Absolute Subject. Speculative Knowledge is the term used all along by Hegel (and others of his time) for the actual knowledge of the absolute; it is natural, therefore, that it should be used as an alternative for the Logic. (1) That the other terms are valid is evident from his own statements. The Logic is "die Darstellung Gottes wie er in seinem ewigen Wesen, vor der Erschaffung der Natur und eines endlichen Geistes ist." (2) Such an exposition is what a genuine theology at least has for its object. And again when dealing with the various determinations in the course of the Logic he almost invariably indicates this theological reference, by regarding the notions as "predicates" of the Absolute. This is the purport of

(1) Cp. Phän. 29.
(2) Logik. I. 36.
the Logic in its beginning and in its end. (1) Every moment of the logic is an element in the whole absolute truth, truth as it is for and as determined by absolute subject, whose content it is at every step in the exposition. That finally the Logic is conceived of as Revelation is likewise evident. This is not merely on the general ground that it is the self-exposition, the self-expression of the absolute subject; for that reason alone it would doubtless unquestionably deserve the name of Revelation, which just means the actual showing forth by absolute mind of itself as it actually is. But Hegel's own explicit statement is that the "true form of mind is just to be what is revealed or manifest" ('Das Offenbare'), that this is its very notion (2); as it is as we have seen, simply the notion of mind, (which is its essential substance) that the Logic makes explicit. Mind in the Logic appears to its self in the form of self; that is, is manifest, as immediately revealed to itself.

Nay more, so complete is the identity between the Logic and

the idea of Revelation that Hegel states not only that Logic is Revelation, but quite explicitly that Revealed Religion itself is speculative knowledge. His words are "God is only attainable in pure speculative Knowledge, and is only in that knowledge, and is only that Knowledge itself; for He is Spirit, mind (der Geist) and this speculative knowledge is the Knowledge given in and possessed by revealed religion. The former knows Him as Thought, (or pure Essence), and knows this Thought as Being and as Existence, and this existence again as the negativity of its self, consequently as self, as this and as universal self; but that is just what revealed religion knows."(1). These words completely bear out the claim to designate the Logic as Revelation. We have merely to remark that the distinction between the Logic and Revealed Religion which might seem lost sight in the above statement is, as Hegel goes on to show, and as we have already stated, that in the latter this knowledge of God is merely immediate, that is in the form of "Vorstellung"(2), in the former that Knowledge is completely

(1) Phän.571.
(2) Phän.594.
and absolutely explicit, mediated and developed. Still, however, when we insist on the supreme importance of this distinction between the two, the "identity of content" (1) and their essential affinity, even in general character (of being self-revelation of the absolute Subject) remain none the less pronounced and unambiguous. And this is of supreme importance as indicating the line and development which Hegel’s thought has followed, and the governing tendencies of his philosophy. We pointed out at the start the essentially religious motif which determined his thoughts, and here we find that in his finished system not merely is religion one of the highest modes of experience, but the very highest is itself a form of revelation. The significance of this relation between philosophy and religion for Hegel cannot, however, be considered at this stage, and must be deferred till we reach our conclusion. We have merely to indicate here the theological character of the Logic, which itself, indeed, is but a consequence to be drawn from the general nature of the content of the Logic. Absolute truth could only be

(1) Ibid.
so if that truth were the Truth of Absolute Subject, and
the Absolute Subject of real Experience is the same for re-
vealed religion as for Logic. In the former it is presented
as such; in the latter it is simply exposed explicitly as
the ground of all incomplete experience.

It is furthermore, the nature of the Logic that its
content as such should contain no fundamental opposition
with itself. Its content is simple, self-contained and
self-subsistent. There is in it nothing whatever of that
contrast and opposition which affected the other modes of
mind and forms of knowledge. The fundamental and
characteristic opposition or contrast found in all others
was, as we say that between thought and being, between
notion and reality. And it was precisely this which had
been overcome in the Logic. Hence in the content of the
Logic, and in every moment and stage of it without exception
this opposition has vanished. In the Logic, therefore,
thought and being, subject and object are absolutely one
and identical. A thought has place in the Logic just be-
cause of the absence of any such contrast within its nature.
A notion just means that in which thought and being are one, for the notion is the essence, and the essence of reality is notion. (1) This result follows indeed necessarily from the fact that mind contains all reality, that ultimate Reality is Absolute Subject. But if in the Logic thought and being are absolutely one, then, since in preceding dogmatic philosophical systems (e.g., more especially of the Wolffian School) the difference between Logic and Metaphysics just turned on the difference between thought and being, Hegel's Logic is also and at the same time Metaphysics and can be so named. (2) For it covers both the content of logic in the old sense, and also the content of the former Metaphysics. (3) This latter content falls under the well known heads, Ontology, Cosmology, Pneumatology, Psychology) and Theology. The subject-matter of these branches of Metaphysics, as that was conceived by the schools in question, forms the greater part of Hegel's Logic, is dealt with in fact in the first and second parts of the whole work.

(1) Cp.Phän.p.43-5
(3) Propäedentik.XVIII.93,94. Logik.I.54,55.
under the title "Objective Logic" (1). The content of the former logic occupies the third part of his Logic, under the title 'Subjective Logic'. (1) It is not the objects dealt with by former logic and metaphysic that distinguishes Hegel's Logic from those branches of philosophy, but the way in which those objects are conceived. It is this indeed which is characteristic of Hegel's view, and which induces him to entitle his work Logic and not Metaphysic; and the choice of name is significant for the difference between him and them, as well as for the light it throws on his own position. While the above named sciences, Cosmology, Psychology, Theology, treated their subject-matter as substances with certain 'attributes' or "forces", or 'activities', as substrata with predicates, without enquiring into the meaning or legitimacy of these terms, Hegel's enquiry just consists in stripping these notions naked and examining them in their own simplicity and purity without reference to the specific subject-matter of these sciences, that is, without reference to "world", "soul" or "God." (2) In

---

(1) The meaning of 'Objective' and 'Subjective' will appear later.
(2) Logik. I. 55.
the case of Ontology the notions are already for the most part abstract and 'pure', so that less outward alteration is necessary. When, therefore, the conceptions are regarded thus formally and abstractly as pure essences in their ultimate and absolute form, it is clear that the subject-matter of such a science holds much more closely of Logic, as logic was usually understood than of metaphysic as then conceived, logic being indeed traditionally assigned to the discussion of concepts, notions. Hence it is that when speaking of Kant's Logic, Hegel can regard Kant's 'Transcendental Logic' as corresponding at least in part to his own 'Objective Logic' (1). Thus whereas in former philosophy, and indeed in his own early system as we saw, Logic either preceded or was subordinate to Metaphysic, now Metaphysic is absorbed into Logic and indistinguishable from it; a result which however, is obviously brought about only by a reinterpretation of the content of logic and of Metaphysics. In this metamorphosis of Metaphysic into Logic, Hegel considers that he is in the direct succession from Kant and his

(1) Logik.I.49.
immediate followers.\(^{(1)}\)

Now the importance of this identification of Thought with being in the notions which are the contents of the Logic lies in this, that it is the very nerve of the 'concreteness' of that content which Hegel so much insists on, and makes possible as well as necessary development from step to step in the Logic. For it is in itself the principle of diversity; it contains in itself differences. Each notion is not merely a 'thought' of the subject; it is that and at the same time and in the same sense objective, a \(\text{anegen}\), a constitutive reality. But just in virtue of that double reference in a single moment it shares in the diversity of concrete experience. For this diversity was found before; it appeared in the form of mode of mind and mode of object present to mind, each being more or less set over against the other. This opposedness has been removed, but the diversity on which it was based and which appeared throughout all experience is not abolished but simply preserved in the inmost ultimate essence of all experience. It still remains, therefore, in all its \(\text{plurality}\). Just


\(\text{a}\) with the summit of universal particulars (I.36, 258); but summit in the same seat this.; \(\text{an}\) Thought, Thought is with the same Thought everywhere; there is a plurality of ultimate nothingness.
because the notions are concrete, are constitutive of reality, they contain necessarily what is alone concrete, namely experience. And experience containing variety of content, the notions cannot all have the same content, but must be various as experience. The fact that the Logic is at the same time metaphysic, therefore, determines and necessitates the detailed content of the Logic, determines that the being which is one with thought shall be presented in all the wealth and richness of its content. Because it is metaphysic the Logic must embrace all reality, express it in its ultimate nature, because it is Logic this ultimate, nature is thought. In this ultimate synthesis of what in the other modes of mind and of knowledge appeared as opposites and over against each other, in this absolute unity of primal differences (for thought and being are the primal opposites inside experience) lies the clue to the completeness, to the detail and to the inward connexion of the content of the Logic. Granted that experience is one, and its concrete content must be inwoven, inwardly related, part

determining part directly and of itself (i.e., not because of or through external agency of any kind); granted that it is diverse and the parts of experience must be maintained, and that by themselves, in their distinctness from each other.

But if the Logic is Metaphysic, if the fundamental determining principle is this absolute original "a priori" synthesis contained in the notion, then we see (1) that the Logic must be kept distinct from reality as ordinarily understood; (2) that the development inside the Logic is self-contained, is not properly speaking brought about, either in regard to content or to process, by 'reference to experience'; (3) that there is in its content no contrast between subjective and objective. The first point is evident when we note that reality in its ordinary sense means the details, the multiplicity in temporo-spatial existence. The Logic, however, contains notions pure thought—unities of diverse elements; the very meaning of a notion is that it should be a unity of multiplicity. The Logic cannot, therefore, in its content be the same as reality (2). But if by reality is

(2) Propædeutik. § 1, 2, 4, 5.
understood not sense-reality, but true essential actuality, 
then the Logic is just the exposition of that Reality; for such reality is determined and self-determined by its essence, the inner vital unity. And this unity as unity and as essence (not as sensuously concrete) is what the Logic contains. (1)

The second point we have already mentioned. It is quite misleading to assert by way of interpretation of the Logic, and still more as by way of objection to its pretensions and its purpose, that the Logic is constructed by a covert unannounced but necessary and implicit 'reference to concrete experience'. So far as there is truth in this view, it is much too general to be of any value either as interpretation or as objection. For if it means that at every step in the Logic the writer is inside experience and is dealing with the content of experience, then surely that is self-evident; that is what the writer professes actually to do, and far from being an objection it is Hegel's own express purpose. If, however, it means, as it ostensibly

(1) Log.I.47. "Das System der Logik ist des Reich der Schatten, die Welt der einfachen Wesenheiten, von aller sinnlichen Concretion befreit."
does, that at each step the writer "in his own mind" appeals to experience, that is, to the details of experience to find out what he is to do, and merely picks up his notions out of experience. He pieces them together, his own thought being thus regarded as something external to and apart from the experience to which he appeals, then this is a complete misconception of the content of the Logic. The whole argument of the Phenomenology is to establish that in the Logic this opposition is entirely overcome. And being an objection it is based on a misunderstanding of the very meaning of the notions with which the Logic deals. In them we are already and thereby dealing with experience; experience does not lie 'outside them'; rather they lie inside experience, for they are the essences of experience. It is truer, therefore, to say that experience implies the Logic, than that the Logic implies experience. In short, and this is what should be meant by this statement regarding the relation of the Logic to experience, in the Logic we do not require to appeal to experience, because we are already in it. The Logic, therefore, is constructed and safely
constructed; by reference to its own peculiar content alone; the characteristic determinateness of each notion is what makes the construction possible. All that we want inside the Logic is just the notions: wherever we have these we have the essential unities with which the Logic deals, with which alone it works, to which alone it confines its attention. Only so could that inner necessity, characteristic of the science of Logic, be obtained. There is no doubt - whatever, that such a construction with and of notions alone will not be outside experience; "in the air", if only we admit at the start, that these notions are not mere thoughts but at once also essences of experience (and this has been established in the Phenomenology), and if we can actually find these notions (and these we can find wherever we have unities of multiplicity).

And finally the last point is clear after what has been just said. In the content of the Logic there is no subjectivity as opposed to objectivity. The notions are not subjective categories opposed to objective fact; all from the beginning to the end of the Logic are at once subjective
and objective, essence of reality. We do not, therefore, require to translate our subjective thoughts into terms of reality, nor to talk of a "correspondence" between the two. They are without qualification, the inner being of reality. With the one we have the other. To hold otherwise is to go back upon the positions which the Logic assumes to have been removed, and of which it professes to contain the ultimate truth and essence.

Now then, if we gather together into a single sentence all these separate aspects of the content of the Logic, we shall see at once how the Logic as the organism of Truth came into existence. For, given that reality is the totality of experience, that the truth of all objects in experience is their essence, that the essence of experience is reason, that reason is mind's true self, that knowing itself in the form of self is true self-knowledge, that so to know its self is to know its constitutive and constituting notions; and given again, that the one absolute mind, the one absolute subject which contains all Experience and is all Experience (for experience is one) is in nature and substance the same
as individual human mind, that the ultimate essence of each, the self of each in the form of self is the same, is notion.
given all this and the Logic as the systematic and expanded exposition of the essential contents of the totality of experience, the exposition of the ultimate and multiple experience-content of the Absolute Subject, by the simple process of autonomous self-knowledge of mind, - rises bodily before us. Such then is the content of the Logic. It is the basal element in the science, that which determines everything else that falls within its scope. So far, however, we have dealt merely with the body of the Logic, and that generally. Its soul lies in the method by which all the members are to be fitly joined together. To this, therefore we must now pass.
The nature of the method of the Logic is to be found in the nature of the content of the Logic; for, indeed, it is simply an essential and fundamental element in that content. No method creates the content of the science which it subserves; rather it is determined by that content and the kind of connection of which it is capable. Its function is to unite systematically the elements and objects peculiar to the science. Since then we found the content of the Logic to be the necessary outcome of the nature of absolute knowledge, we should expect likewise to discover that the method of the Logic has its source in that same mode of experience.

The Phenomenology, we saw, was a philosophical science whose aim was to determine the truth of and in mind's experience. It established this by showing that the one mind present throughout all experience determined itself in various modes which differed one from the other in the degree with which they realised truth, i.e., the unity between mind and its object, each mode being at the same time a realisation of the actual content of mind. Thus the
last stage was not merely the complete truth of experience, but also contained most explicitly the complete and essential content of mind. Now the method adopted to bring about this result is immanent in the subject-matter itself; it is mind which possesses each mode, determines each, and by reference to its own content and nature alone moves from one to another. In no case does mind go beyond itself; the process is autonomous and self-directed from the start. And moreover, in each mode mind does not come externally so to say to the mode in which in a given case it finds itself, does not come with the wealth of all its other experience to shame the poverty of a given form of its experience. Rather each mode is only shown to be poorer than the immediately succeeding mode. The entire principle of advance, therefore, must be found active at each and every stage as such. The method of constructing the science, in short, must be an essential factor in the very nature of every moment in the science. But all that is found and is contained in each mode of experience, each moment of the enquiry is simply a form, a mode, a definite realisation of
mind. (consciousness). There is, therefore, no separation whatever between the modes of experience and the principle of connection of those modes; the method of relating them into one whole and the specific content of each mode are determinations of one and the same reality. The content of the science and the systematisation of the content are both moments of the same fact. And that one fact is mind. This, then, which is true of the whole process of the Pheno-
menology is likewise true of its last moment.

And, indeed, it is more evident in this case than in that of the others. For in preceding modes of experience there had always been the contrast between the truth of the mode in question and the actual content of the mode; Mind was out of agreement with its own essential nature, a contrast essential to the character of experience as the completely concrete existence of mind, and by which contrast the forward movement of the enquiry was, as we saw, determined. In Absolute Knowledge, however, that contrast is removed from the content of this mode of mind, and in its mind is completely and absolutely one with itself; mind
knows itself as mind and in the form of self. Here then the method of systematically determining the content, and the content itself are transparently and emphatically one and the same.

It must be observed that the method is not confined merely to experience as a whole; but is a determining element in each mode of it; each mode can be further developed in itself by that method. For, to repeat, it is one and the same mind which is present in all experience and in each mode of it, and determines each and all by the same process because it (mind) is the same throughout all. Thus it is then that the method employed to systematise the totality of all minds' concrete experience is the method employed to construct systematically the content of one mode - the Logic. Hence, too, it is that in the Logic method and content of the science are must be essentially moments of one and the same fact, are indeed together just that fact itself. For besides the content of the science, the notions, and their principle of this ordered connection there is absolutely nothing else in the Logic.
Again we saw that when the analysis of a given form of knowledge (mode of experience) brings to light the inner truth of that knowledge, or truth which is other than that actually possessed by the knowledge itself; the presence of this new truth as object to mind implies and brings about a change of attitude on the part of mind itself, a new mode of experience, in short. (1) But absolute knowledge has as its content just the inmost ultimate essences, truths, of all experience, of all modes of experience. Hence what in the Phenomenology is a changing from one attitude of mind to another, an alteration of the angle of reflection, (an "Umkehrung des Bewusstseins") must find its counterpart in the Logic. It will correspond to the change from one notion to another. The 'Umkehrung des Bewusstseins' is just in fact the 'projection' which appears in actual concrete experience, of the 'Uebergang', the transition from one notion to another in the Logic. For indeed the process of the Phenomenology is at bottom a Logical process. (2)

(1) Phän. 68,9.
(2) Phän. 45
And finally, the method of the Phenomenology does not consist in simply weaving together the various modes of experience. This would put them all on the same level. They are indeed all equally modes of experience; and all modes of experience are determined by the same method; for mind to which all experience appertains is one throughout all experience. But all modes of mind have not the same content. They differ in the degree of their truth, i.e., in the completeness of their realisation of the nature of mind, in the extent to which in each the initial opposition between mind and its object has been removed, in their approximation to the absolute union and the identity between mind and its object. (1) The modes of experience, therefore, are connected not merely by belonging to our experience, but by forming stages in the realisation of the truth of experience. In other words the method of connection is not simply a process of immanent implication of one mode with another, but is a process determined throughout by an end - an end, however, which lies not outside, but is itself immanent in the process from the start. The method is that of Develop-

(1) These expressions, as we saw, mean the same.
ment. But the content of Absolute Knowledge is simply the essential content of all experience; it embraces all experience, all reality, not merely as a whole, but in its manifold variety. The various modes of experience contain and exhibit experience in its multiplicity, and the content of absolute knowledge is the essence of these modes. Its content, therefore will likewise consist of graded approximations to a final end. The end in one case is complete truth of experience of knowledge, in the Logic it is the absolutely true and perfect Reality, absolute notion of Absolute Subject. Now this Subject contains all reality, no phase of experience lies outside its sphere. The essence of each mode of experience because the essence, the ultimate, of that mode must therefore belong to, be in fact, determined by Absolute Subject itself. Were this not so the only reality would be its own Reality as such, would, in short, be mere unity, pure Ego, mere self-identity. But if it contains the diversity of all reality, then within the scope of the self-knowledge of the absolute subject (the Logic) every essence of reality must fall, for it is its own self in the
form of self. But every such essence will be its concrete self more or less completely and explicitly. Were this not the case, then every reality would be equally the same, equally indifferent to Absolute Subject; whereas we already found in the Phenomenology that all modes of experience differed in their content, in their degree of truth. But if those essences do exhibit more or less fully the self of absolute Subject, then clearly from the point of view of the process of self-knowledge there is only one systematic way of uniting these notions, these essences, and that is by exhibiting them as a gradual development towards the unfolding of the complete self which is to be known. Hence the method of the Logic like that of the Phenomenology is necessarily and essentially that of development.

For these three primary and fundamental elements then, (the essential union of method with content, the 'transition' from one content to another, and the developmental character of the process) the method of the Logic is directly indebted to that made use of in the Phenomenology. Further than this, however, the methods of the two are not connected; for each
science as we saw, is self-contained, the process in the Logic is determined by its own subject-matter as such, without reference to that of the Phenomenology. Still the possession of these common elements is obviously sufficient to identify the two methods as simply and solely one and the same method (1) applied to subject-matters which taken by themselves are different from each other, an identification which is the more necessary and apparent when we bear in mind that the essential content of both sciences is the same, the content of the Logic being merely the essence of experience. It is, indeed, this community of content which makes possible and necessary identity of method.

Now this method is not confined solely to these two philosophical sciences; the same method is made use of in the other parts of Philosophy, the Philosophies of Mind and of Mind,(2) But if it is necessary and essential to all the sciences and in the same sense essential, i.e., in all we have that union of method with content of the science, it is clear that we can only grasp and appreciate the

(1) Logik I. 7, 8, 40, 41.
(2) Logik I. 41. note.
nature of the method per se if we eliminate the specific character of the content of all these sciences. For since the method is in the same sense common to all, and since further in each and every one it permeates all the moments of their content without regard to the specific differences amongst those moments we can only get at the method per se if we logically separate the method per se from this varied content with which it is associated. But again, since the very nature of the method is that it is essential to, is the very soul and moving force of the content it is as clear that the only reason why such a method can operate in such varied spheres is that the determining principle of all the content is from first to last the same. It must be in virtue of that ground principle that the method is the same in all those sciences, for the simple reason that the method is regarded as in no wise separated from or external to the content which it determines. But there is only one such principle, one such common all-determining reality in all those sciences, and that reality is mine, self-conscious reason, spirit (Geist). Since then, method and principle
are all that appear throughout these philosophical sciences, and since method and content are so intimately blended as we have indicated, they must be two moments of the same concrete fact, two determinations of a single reality. The conclusion, therefore, is irresistible that the method per se is nothing other than self-consciousness qua process, the essential and universal mode, manner or form in which that living activity which constitutes the very nature of mind, and makes it an endless self-initiating, self-determining movement actually operates. There is absolutely nothing else except mind which conforms to the nature of the method; for it is mind alone that the content constructs itself, systematises itself by a process immanent in and constituting that content itself. Only when the content of a science is mind is there no distinction between the content which forms the body of the science, and the method which is its inmost soul.

Such, therefore, being the case, it is at once clear that only in sciences whose content is fundamentally and absolutely constituted by mind itself can it be possible to
make use of a method which is to be immanent in that content itself, in which the method of constructing the sciences is not in any way alien to the content, in which from the start no gulf separates mind and object, in which the systematisation is in fact 'accomplished by the content itself'. (1)

But this being so, the whole substance and process, the principle, form, and matter of Hegel's entire system becomes at once transparently luminous. For to maintain that Reality is subject, that Reality is mind, is reason - constituted just means that the entire content of reality moulds itself into a system of reason, that the process of constituting itself into such a system is self-determining, it lies in the very nature of its content that it should do so, for its content is the living self-relating autonomous activity of mind. And on the other hand, to hold that the process by which the content constructs itself into system lies not outside the thing itself, but is immanent in it is precisely the same as to hold that the reality is mind-constituted, that Reality is Subject. Wherever we determine the content of a science by that content itself, wherever

(1) Logik. I. 42.
it is determined solely from it by itself, we ipso facto there assert the other position that Reality is mind, is Subject. (1) Hence, merely to attain to and to claim the possession of purely objective knowledge, knowledge which is true 'whatever the individual subject thinks or does not think', is precisely the same as to assert that the content of the knowledge is self-determining, self-systematising, and that is to say that reality is reason. In short, and in fine, the method and the principle, (Reality and Subject) are incissolubly bound up together. This method simply is Absolute Idealism, and Absolute Idealism has not and cannot have any other method. The method means no more and is

(1) Hence it is, we may note in passing, that in dealing with the various parts of Philosophy, Logic, Nature, Mind, Law, Religion, etc., Hegel does not impart into the several discussions anything foreign to the special object-matter itself. In dealing, e.g., with Nature, he does not introduce forms of thought peculiar to mind as such, does not mentalise nature, or 'spiritualise' it. He makes the object-matter of nature as it stands, with the character it actually possesses, determine itself with its own categories, by its own inherent immanent principles, force, energy, mechanical action, affinity, etc. And merely so to deal with it, merely to make it determine itself, sufficiently by itself and through its own terms and principles, is what constitutes the objective self-determining science of nature, and is what gives it a place in his system of Philosophy, makes it a constitutive moment of his fundamental principle. Just as conversely it is the determination of the object-matter of 'nature' by that ultimate principle which makes possible and necessary that objective self-determining science of nature.
no less than Absolute Idealism in actual operation, working itself out in detail. It is the method which is the distinguishing rhythm of absolute Idealism; it is this which distinguishes it from all other forms of philosophy which have historically appeared, which constitutes it in short, a distinctive philosophical system(1). It is this too, which distinguishes absolute science from all other forms of science whatsoever; for their difference from it will be found just to lie in the fact that the content of these sciences and their mode of syst-matisation do not have have that inner and essential unity characteristic of absolute Idealism; if they had they would and must 'ipso facto' fall within its scope.

But it is not for our purpose sufficient merely to state thus in its general and ultimate form the nature of the method of the Logic. Nor can we even rest content with having in addition shown its broad and primary elements (i.e., these three aspects above given) to be already implicated in the Phenomenology, in virtue of that intimate union which subsists between the content of the Phenomenology and that

of the Logic. We must further show how, by what process, the method actually operates in the characteristic form peculiar to the Logic itself. We cannot gather this simply by turning back to the procedure of the Phenomenology; because, as we saw, the procedure of the Logic is determined solely by means of, and by reference to, the characteristic content of the Logic itself; the Logic is a self-determining, self-contained science. And no immediate light is furnished by saying that the content of the Logic being the notions of mind, or mind in its notion, the method consists simply in explicating this notion, in allowing this notion to obey its own nature, to move, develop itself. This is, as we have just said, the ultimate essence of the method; but what we want to know now is how this explication, this movement, this development actually proceeds and goes to work; what are the essential pulses of its life, the accents of its rhythm. In giving these we are of course at the same time stating the essential procedure of the method throughout the whole system; for the content of the Logic embraces the whole system. But while we are then stating
the essential elements in the system as a whole, we are also and are primarily dealing with the method as it is in the Logic in particular. The method here appears in its most abstract and ultimate moments, because in the Logic we have the most abstract and essential content of reality.

To begin with, the method is, as already said, the inner activity, impulse, force and movement of the notions of mind. And since these notions are the mind's own self in the form of self, this activity is, as distinct from the notion itself, the movement of reflection simply, self-referent, self-determining. This is the only force, activity inherent in the notion as such. And such reflection may, since all reflection is knowledge, be regarded as the process of self-knowledge of the notion, for the process is inherent in the notion itself. The method can in this way be considered as simply the process of self-knowledge of mind per se, mind in its notion. Now in every one of its notions, mind is realised; each notion as such is egoised, is endowed with, is the expression of the nature of the Ego, mind. This

nature is self-consciousness, self-reflection. Each moment of the Logic, therefore, being moment of the Ego, exhibits and must contain all the moments of the method, the process of self-reflection. The completion of this process in every notion is just what egoising a notion means; if a notion is the Ego it must realise all the moments of the process of self-reflection. Now the Ego in every notion is concrete, its several moments are actually present; it is not bare abstractness, bare identity; just because it is conscious of self as self it has difference, it has content. (1) It distinguishes its self from itself; and distinction implies division; difference and difference implies means content.

And again, it cannot be merely abstract formal self for the reason that it unifies in itself the other element to thought; in the notions thought and being are as we saw, one and identical; the notions, are therefore, concrete because the condition under which alone they could be formally abstract has been removed. Hence that distinction of self-from itself, just mentioned is neither meaningless nor illegitimate; it is both possible and necessary because

(1) Phän. 603.
in the notions the self unites without extinguishing the distinction of these two elements.

The self-reflecting of the notion (1), therefore, if it is to be at once complete and systematic consists simply in laying bare and inwardly, thoroughly inter-relating the moments contained in each notion, each pulse of the Ego. Those moments have already almost come to light. The self is to be identical; it is to be one and the same self throughout the whole content of the notion. Every notion is as such, and by its very nature as universal; this is what is meant by being essence, ultimate, absolute. And this universal nature is its own identical self, that by which it is and remains what it is. The first step, therefore, is to take the notion simply as it immediately is, and what it immediately, what it fundamentally is, what in the first instance, the notions means, is universality. But this is no sooner admitted than by the inner nature of the notion itself it asserts likewise the differences, the particular elements within itself. For there would be no meaning in an identical self unless it had elements in which and through which

---

(1) Logik.III.329.ff.
it could appear as different; there would be no meaning of universality in the notion unless it covered, permeated by its universality elements, which per se were particular. And the differences do not, and by the very nature of the notion, which is concrete, cannot lie outside the notion itself, are not picked up and externally brought to and opposed against the first immediate universal. They are determined by and from the universal, the identity itself; itself asserts the presence of these elements. But merely to assert these is to assert what is opposed to is other than the first; the first is universal, its own other therefore, that which is at the opposite pole of thought, is particular. It is not a contrary opposition to the first; it is not simply the bare general opposition of a \( A \) to \( A \), where the opposites have absolutely no relation to each other except the fact that the one is entirely excluded from the other. The opposition must be such that both terms are concrete, both must have positive content; for the mere negation of a term is never part of the content of any term. In the opposition, therefore, the one opposed term has a
content the very nature of which refers to, contains actual points of contact with the other; the one opposite must in itself imply the other; what it is just by referring to and distinguishing itself from that other. Its other is just such as to be its own other, that which is necessary to and is present in the determination of its own special character, and from which it must distinguish itself specifically in order to be what it is. If we examine the matter closely, then we will see that this is precisely the character of the opposition existing between these two moments, the first, universal, and the second difference, and that is all that opposition between these means. But since it is the universal itself which contains this other, the asserting of this other, the asserting of the particular by the universal, means, seeing that the notion is self-contained, does not pass out of itself, that the first has turned itself into its opposite, it has become particular. But thereby the first has negated itself; the second moment which has come to view is the negative of the first, it negates the first; the second is its (the first's)
negative. Since, however, this negative results from the first, since it is the universal itself which passes into this negative, and again since it is the notion as such which is operative in both first and second, this negative is not the annihilation of the first, the first is so to say merely disbanded into the second, it is maintained by it, though not stated or asserted in it. If this were not so, the notion itself would vanish, for mere difference, mere particular is what it emphatically is not. The negative, though negative of the first or rather because its own negative contains the first itself.

This second moment is necessarily \(1\) because that is the diversity which the notion contains and without which it would be merely an abstract formal universal, and \(2\) because it is that by which the universal is universal at all, and therefore \(3\) it merely asserts the explicit content of the universal, and there was no other step left for that universal except merely to assert that by which it is what it is. Either it must assert this as content or be and remain a formal universal.
But now the notion is expressed as mere difference, mere diversity. So stated, however, it quite obviously is not subsistent. For the notion is not mere diversity, and the notion as mere difference is in contradiction to itself. The contradiction does not consist in setting the universal, which the notion is in the first moment, over against the difference which it is in the second. This certainly would be and can be regarded as a contradiction of the nature of the notion, which is to be concretely both. But the point on which the next moment turns, the nerve of the next moment, that which makes this second moment go further in spite of and because of itself, does not lie in setting the universal over against this difference. (1) For (1) the movement must be self-determined at every step, i.e., by each moment per se, whereas that process of determining it would be purely external to the content of the second; (2) all that that process could establish would be that the second as such is inadequate to the complete nature of the notion, is inconsistent with it. But this is irrelevant

(1) This is a common misunderstanding of the nature of the method.
and due to a misunderstanding. For as we saw, the second is the notion itself, just as much as the first is not inconsistent with the notion. The notion is qua content completely present in the second, just as it is completely present in the first. And indeed, even more so, for the second contains the first. (3) Merely to point out that the second must complete itself by the universal, if it would be the entire notion, would not tell us in what way this completion is to be brought about, what direction to take in order to bring it about. This whole conception of the process is, in short, purely external and inadequate to the nature of the method.

There is only one way in which the next moment can be supplied and that is by the nature of the second itself. This second is the notion as difference, as diverse. But as mere difference, as absolute difference, it is different not merely from something else, it is different from itself; difference as such is difference completely; it is to itself different. To put it otherwise this negative because negative of a positive which it itself contains is negative of its own self. For the notion does not and cannot go outside
itself, it is self-contained; and since the negative expresses this notion, contains all its content, when regarded as merely negative, the content of which it is the negative is the negative itself. Or again, the second is the notion as simply the other as otherwise; but since that to which it is other, is inside itself, it is its own other. Thus we conclude that the next moment must be the negative of the first negative. Whereas then in the first step forward the movement consisted in the asserting by the universal itself of the difference which it contained and implied, the second step is due to the unity, the universal, the identity implied in the difference itself, if it is to be difference at all. The 'negation of the negative' simply means the bringing into light again of the universal. For there is nothing else which is negative of difference, except the universal, the unity, the identity. It was into its other that the first universal passed; each is therefore other to the other, each is negative of the other. Consequently when the first negative is itself negated, it can only be by its other, the universal. The negation of the
The negation of the negative is thus the assertion of the universal. But this assertion is a reassertion; for the universal as such had already been asserted at the start. And since the notion is the same notion all through, the universal is the same universal in both cases. The difference between the two is not their universality but their content. In the first universal we had nothing but the immediate character of the notion as such; what it is when we first take it as a notion; the mere assertion of the universality, negating nothing itself, but negated in the assertion of its own other. The last universal, however, is the negative of and therefore contains in itself and as itself the other of the universal *per se*, that which the universal *per se* would have to assert in order to be universal. The last universal is *qua* universal the return to the first, *qua* negative of the second negative, containing in itself that which forced the first into the second. The last step, therefore, is a reassertion of the absolute character of the notion, the universal, with the full content of that notion itself, that by which the notion is notion and the
universal a universal. It contains explicitly in itself all the moments of the notion, for it contains both the preceding, and these are the only two poles of the notion. This return then just because it is a return to the beginning is the last moment of the notion. There is no further negation possible. With it the moments of the notion are exhausted. It is the notion as notion, as concrete totality. It is the complete truth of the notion, or shortly and generally the complete absolute truth at once the reality of the notion, and the notion itself.

These three moments, therefore, the first universal, its negative, and the negative of this second, exhaustively and explicitly exhibit and express the self-knowledge of the notion. They exhaust the pulses of its self-consciousness. To be conscious of its self as self, to be conscious of the distinction the division of self from itself implied in being self-conscious, and finally to be conscious of self in and by this distinction, surely leaves no other moment of knowledge open to it; no other pulse of reflection upon itself. And we see that the process of knowledge from
beginning to end is determined not by external reflection, but by the notion itself. The notion is egoised; determines itself from itself; is present as self throughout the movement; its own inner activity, the activity which it has in virtue of being self-conscious controls and moulds it at every step. It is this which makes it assert itself in these various moments. It is because the notion is egoised, is endowed with, is made of self-consciousness, that the determination of itself at each step is possible; the determination is self-determination. It is the same force which at once separates its moments and brings them together; for they are the moments of the same self which because they are its moment is conscious of itself in each and in all. The whole significance of the movement lies in this fact. For thereby we see that each moment is and must be positive, an affirmation of self. And this presence of a positive in a negative is the inner principle of the whole movement. A negative is not bare negation and exclusion; to be negative it must be and contain what it is negative to, its positive. All that negative here means is, in fact, just what includes
and implies its own positive. It is determinate negative; negation with a content, negative of a determinate content which is and must be positive. And it is positive for the reason that it is the same self of the notion which determines itself now as positive (universal) and now as negative of this universal and negative of it because proceeding from it and counterposed to it. It is, further, because of the positive content of this negation that the process of negation has a limit. The negation of and in a notion does not go on endlessly. It is solely by negation that the process in any given notion continues, but it is by negation that it is likewise brought to a close. And it is brought to a close precisely when that which is the positive in the negative is so brought out by this process of negation itself, that negation is no longer possible, i.e., when there is no further moment in the notion. This terminus to the process in a given notion is indicated and confirmed by the return to the starting-point. If the process is to continue at all further it must be by reference to (not the notion considered, but ) another notion; and this we shall see
immediately is what takes place. The only other way the process could continue would be by mere negation, mere exclusion and annihilation. But this is inadmissible by the nature of the negative itself which determines the process.

This principle of negation which we have just sought to explain, may be regarded as the nerve of the whole method. It is for this reason it is called Dialectic. It has, as we see, a definite significance. It is not negative in general nor any sort of negation. It is negation of a certain sort. Doubtless all other kinds of negation have this as their ground and source. But the negation here understood must be carefully distinguished from them. Negation here is the relation which subsists between that which has a certain significance, and that which it essentially implies, through which it is what it is, but from which it must be distinguished, in order to have that significance. It is therefore only such a relation as holds within a concrete, self-contained and self-determined whole; this alone possesses such a nature as to admit of its content being determined in that manner. And this whole must be organic to
itself, possess a self which is determined into elements antithetic to and therefore implying each other. It must, in short, be such a concrete whole as, in fact, the notion and the egoised mode of self-consciousnes, must necessarily be. The antithetic moments above given universal and particular, unity, identity and difference are the type and the universal form of what negation means; for these, in fact, are the ultimate antitheses, the absolute negativities into which the self, which constitutes every notion from first to last, necessarily falls. They are the primary distinct pulses of the life and movement of every notion; and they are the ground of whatsoever antithesis and negativity any given notion may assert. For each possess these fundamental constitutive elements, the elements by which alone, indeed, the notion is a notion at all. For the rest, these differences are those of content alone. (1)

It is the character of the negation which determines the inner necessity, the absolute living connectedness of the whole process as a process. We see at once the intimacy of the union between the parts when we bear in mind that it

(1) Cp. Phän. 29,
lies in the nature of the process that there is and can be only one negative to a given position, and this negative must inevitably lie in that position itself. It would not be the negative of that position unless it were the negative which that position demands; and that position can only demand one negative for it has only one self-determining self. A notion has in itself one significance and that alone. Hence the immanent character of the process. Hence the completeness of the system. Hence its all-inclusiveness. It is just in this negativity that the true secret and meaning of reason lies; as it is only by this negativity that reason could determine itself into system. (1) The negative is, in short, the one and the only possible lever of absolute Idealism. Only by means of it can idealism be established as at once absolutely complete and absolutely immanently necessary.

But we have not yet exhausted the entire significance of the method by thus stating its ultimate and final moments. We have seen that the process starts from the universal which in the first place, the notion immediately is, i.e., which

it is when taken as it stands; when viewed simply as notion, it is in itself primarily a universal. This is the necessary and only starting-point for the process, because it is the ground-fact in the nature of the notion. And from this universal, this identity, this positive, this immediate, the method proceeds by difference, negation, mediation to its completed result, the reestablishing of the identity, the positive, the immediate. But all these stages in this process of self-knowledge of the notion the same value for the notion or for its knowledge of itself. We are not at the end of the process just where we were at the beginning. This would indeed stamp the whole process as futile and inane; we should in such a case be no worse off at the beginning than the end. Each moment is indeed determined by the notion itself; each is a realisation, a mode of it. But each does not realise it, reveal it, exhibit it to the same extent, in an equal degree of fulness. For since the process is one of self-knowledge, self-determination of what is from the start necessarily a concrete fact (a notion, a pulse, a realisation of mind, of self-consciousness) the
process just because a process of what is in itself a concrete whole must exhibit different degrees of approximation towards the complete exposition of that whole. If it did not do so there would not be a single whole at all or else in process whatever; there would be only an abstract formal unity, and the process mere passage, indeed mere repetition of the same unity. And these degrees of fullness in the realisation of the notion mean nothing more than degrees of its truth. Just because one step contains the preceding it is nearer to realising the notion, nearer to its truth, i.e., its full agreement between itself and its content (1) (its universal and that by and through which it is a universal). Thus it is that the negative (the second moment) is 'higher' than the first; it contains the first, and therefore because itself a moment and because containing another moment, it is ipso facto truer than the first. Hence it is that though the whole process as a process of self-knowledge is directed and determined at every step by negativity, the negativity at each step has not the same value, has not the same truth. All the stages are equally negative moments.

(1) Cp. Logik. III. 27 ff
but all the negative moments are not equal. The process, in short, is the same but the result is not.

While then the first negative is determined in the same way as the second, the second has a much higher significance for the truth than the first, just because in it a higher truth, indeed, the highest truth of the notion is established. In the first negative a higher truth is contained than in the initial moment, but because it maintains the notion simply as negative without equally exposing its essential positive, the first negative is incomplete even as a negative. It mediates and contains the first step, but does not mediate itself. The second negative removes this defect and completely establishes the negativity of the notion, the absolute self-mediation, self-negation by self-position, by itself and through itself, explicitly realised. These negatives Hegel distinguishes as 'formal negativity' and 'absolute negativity'. (1) It is absolute negativity which is of such supreme importance. By it and by it alone is the supreme truth of the notion established. It is the inner principle and soul of that notion; its inmost life;

(1) Logik.III.343.
by that it is established as truth, and by that it establishes its truth. It is the supreme principle of all speculative truth; the inner activity of all the life of mind. For by it all opposition is absolutely sublated, all difference absolutely removed as isolated diversity; for it is the absolute opposition of all opposition, the absolute difference of all difference.

At the end of the process, then, we are not where we were at the beginning. By the last negative the full and complete reality of the notion has been expressed; its complete truth is laid bare. Each moment contains the preceding, the last, therefore, contains all the notion without omission of anything; in it we have the notion explicit completely realised. The immediate, the universal, therefore, which we return obviously cannot be the same as that from which we started. The second universal holds explicitly in itself all the moments to which the first universal was as such opposed. The difference, therefore, between them is not far to seek. The first immediate universal was nothing more than universal as such, the notion was taken
in its first intention, in its first potency; the universal is thus abstract, indeterminate. The second universal contains all the moments of the notion without exception, itself included; it is determinate, possesses explicitly a certain content. It is the content of the result which distinguishes it from the first universal. The immediacy, therefore, which the result possesses is only in form the same as the starting point. The result is indeed immediate only in its form, only immediate because the mediation necessary to arrive at the result has been removed by the exhaustion of the negativity of which the notion is capable. The immediacy of the result is absolutely determinate, the universal carries all the content of the notion with it. And this is only brought about by the process of the method; or, in other words, the content of the universal in the result, the determinateness preserved by its immediacy is not abstract or indeterminate nor is it arbitrarily picked up, it is derived, proved, deduced, necessarily evolved.
This conception of the content of this self-knowledge of the notion is of supreme significance for the Logic.

For it is by means of and in virtue of this content that System is made possible, that systematic totality is obtained by the method.

I. For in the first place, once we have established the result of the process in a given notion, and discovered the content, its determinateness in the truth the realisation of the moment with which the process began, we thereby at once declare that the beginning itself was incomplete, and that the beginning itself, therefore, is imperfect, untrue. But in so doing, we set the determinateness of the result over against the beginning, and thereby assert that the beginning is itself determinate. This, however, means that the beginning is itself mediated: for all determinateness implies negativity, and therefore mediation. The beginning, therefore, is itself derived deduced or mediated product. Its determinateness demands, deductions as much as the determinateness of the resulting content: for only by such a process is it a necessary beginning. It matters not that the determinateness of the beginning (the universal)
is different from that of the result, the content of the notion; this difference does not affect the method by which the determinateness is and must be derived and deduced. And so to deduce the beginning does not imply that the method takes a new turn; any more than it is true that the method as such lies outside or is external to the beginning, imposed upon it, and only becomes the method proper in the active explicit self-relation which characterises the result. It is the same method all through the process; and remains the same when it deduces the determinateness of beginning as it was when it deduced the result from the starting-point. The deduction of the determinateness of the beginning is therefore both necessary and possible. For the determinateness of the result is actually mediation of the notion with self, it contains the whole notion, all its moments. The last moment, therefore, establishes complete mediation as essential to the notion. But this simply means that every moment is mediated, and therefore the beginning for the reason that it is a moment. But again it is by means of and by way of determinateness that this whole
process of mediation is carried through; the last step, therefore, is likewise determinate. Since however, this mediation of the beginning is a process backwards, it has its result in the removal the sublation of determinateness from which it starts. But this means that the determinateness at which it arrives is indeterminateness. And it is this indeterminateness which was and is the character of the beginning. The whole process of deducing the character of the beginning, in short, is merely the application of the same method to the content found and deduced in the result of the first process. Just because this is the concrete whole actual notion, which necessarily means in this its final moment mediation so it is possible and necessary to deduce all the elements of its content, of which elements the beginning is one. The last moment of the first process is the whole content of the notion and contains all the preceding moments. But for that reason the other moments are contained and are mediated in it. To express this mediation is the purpose of the reverse process of the method. It is not working over again what was done before,
nor is it necessary for the truth already established in the result of the first process that this reverse process should be gone through, in order thereby, so to say, to start the truth obtained. That truth is necessary as the outcome of the method already applied. This reverse process is simply the stating explicitly the fact that the last moment of the notion contains mediated in and through itself all its moments. There is no other way it can contain them, and no other meaning in containing them except just that it mediates each and all through itself and therefore mediates the beginning. If it did not do so it would be an abstract untrue moment, like the others it professes to have overcome. The reverse process is necessary therefore, in order really to secure and preserve what has been obtained, and in order to prove, deduce, derive necessitate every determinate moment of that content. And the reverse process is possible because the content obtained in the first result is not when obtained deserted by the method which derives it; it remains by the very nature of the method inhabited, dominated by the method itself, and thus makes the mediation of the beginning possible.
II. In the second place, in virtue of the content obtained in the result of the process of the notion we have not merely the backward movement of the process already described, we have also a forward movement, a movement beyond the given notion. For that result, as we saw, overcame all the negation in the notion and reasserted immediacy, the universality with which we began. But this immediacy, albeit, the entire content of the notion, is qua immediacy a new beginning. We have once more an immediate content as at first, and immediacy is just what constitutes a beginning for the method. And this content passes by the same process as that hitherto used on to another content. What is mediated result in one notion is immediate beginning for another; what is end here is at once beginning for a further process, which leads to the establishment, the deduction of another content, another notion. Now it is by this process from content to content that the system of the Logic as a system is obtained. This passage, this transition (1) from content to content, from notion to notion is made possible

(1) This passage, this transition, is the counterpart in Logic of the Umkehring of consciousness which appears in the "Phán"
by the fact that it is the one reason, the one mind which determines every notion, which constitutes it, which makes it the concrete reality it is, and is made necessary by the fact that as determination of the one reason as moments of one self-consciousness they must be organically connected with each other, they must form a "system of reason." (2) What in particular any content, any notion shall lead to depends on the content in question. That they can be connected is evident from the fact that it is one and the same method which governs mind as a whole and mind in its specific determinations, the various notions; for these notions are mind, are pulses of its own being, are its egoised content. The same process, therefore, by which the moments of a given notion are determined, its self-knowledge completely determined, must be used in the self-knowledge of mind as a whole, mind in its entire concrete unity. Hence the process from content to content, notion to notion, by which the System of the Logic is constructed is simply the process of determining the moments of mind as organic unity. That in the case of a given

(1) Logik.I.33.
(2) Logik.I.35. (a) ye.aln 256f
notion are moments of that notion, in the case of mind
as a whole are moments of mind, its content, the notions.
In the former case we have a particular notion; in the
latter the ground fundamental notion, the notion of notion,
the notion of mind itself, not a determination of mind, but
mind as mind. The process of self-knowledge of mind as
mind, notion of notion, is the same as that of a particular
notion; the moments of mind in the former case, the notions,
correspond to the moments of the notion (the element) in
the latter case. For it is one and the same mind which
determines both, and the process of self-knowledge is the
same in both. One notion, one content leads to another,
forces itself into another for precisely the same reason,
and by precisely the same method that one moment of a notion
moves into another.

It is not difficult after what has been said to see
what the character of this process must be. The result
contains the beginning, and the process is from content to
content, each succeeding content holding within itself the
preceding, the preceding, preserving itself in the succeeding,
in its other. The beginning, therefore, at every step is
enriched by the determinateness of the result towards which it moves, and every new step contains every pulse of content which has preceded it. Every step is therefore richer than the preceding. The process is from abstract to concrete. But this means not merely that the content extends in area in amount, does not mean merely that each result implies a new increment of content. It means more. Since every result contains all the preceding stages, each result for that reason is inward to itself, mediates itself through itself. To hold in this result all the preceding means simply this reflection into self, inner through self-mediation. Every enrichment of the content, every new determination of the notion is, just because a determination from and by the notion itself, (i.e., a determination by the inner necessity of the notion), a reflection of the notion into itself. Only by so doing can it at once retain all the preceding and mould the new determination out of what it possesses. Every step is so far complete in itself, that it is one notion, one self-mediating universal; it does not fall into pieces; it is a simple organic unity. Every
further determination of this notion must therefore be by a process of inwardising, by reflection into self; there is no other way it can be obtained, conformably with the inner necessity which is to hold the whole together. The concrete, therefore, is not simply an externalisation, a going beyond itself, a further determination, but an inwardising, a going into self, an inner determination. It is not simply a process in extension, but in intension; a progress in extensity, and at the same time in intensity. The pulse of the method of mind is at once diastole and systole.

The growth in completeness, is not that of a plant which merely grows outward, but that of spirit, of mind, at once all-pervading, and self-containing. Thus "Das Reichste ist das concreteste und Subjektiviseste, und das sich in die einfachste Tiefe Zurücknehmende das Nächligste und Ubergreifendeste. Die höchste Zugeschärfteste Spitze ist die reine Persönlichkeit...". (1)

The method, we see then, faces two ways, starting from each new beginning it goes forward to the new result, backward to the old beginning, for it is an ever recurring

(1) Logik.III.349.
process in two directions\(^{(1)}\). And this double movement taken place at every step and constitutes that step itself, is absolute necessary to it as a step. They are at the same time not two processes; they are one and the same process. Primà facie it seems a different process to go back from a result to mediate its beginning, and to go forward to extend its content. But the one process is implied in the other, is explicit in it. In order to go forward we must go backward, for only thus can we get a new determination, and only thereby do we carry all the preceding with us into the new result; and in order to go backward we must go or have gone forward, for only thereby does mediation of the beginning become both possible and necessary. The movement of the method is therefore neither a pendulum movement nor a simple movement, but, like the content which it dominates, is self-completing, circular. This metaphor is, however, not adequate to illustrate it completely; and indeed it is perhaps not possible to find

\(^{(1)}\) It is, therefore, not to be identified with the infinite regress or infinite progress; in the latter the two ends never meet; in the above the movement would be impossible unless they always did.
any metaphor which will accurately represent it. For it is the highest, the richest, the most ultimate movement of the highest absolute Reality. There are two possible misunderstandings of this process which it is advisable to obviate.

1. That the "return to the beginning" does not mean to the absolute beginning as such of the System. There is only one such beginning, as we shall presently see. But each step is ipso facto a beginning; not an absolute beginning for the System, but a relative beginning for the new advance. The first beginning is at once the absolute beginning of the System, and the relative beginning for the result which immediately proceeds from it in particular. Every other beginning is also relative in view of its result, that result for which it specifically is a beginning. Every beginning to the process, with the exception of that of the whole system, is relative. Every notion has a beginning, its immediacy is just its beginning. The process of the notion completes itself by returning to this; in completing itself it must ipso facto return to this, for it contains it mediately. Just this return to its beginning rounds it off to the completeness of a notion to a unitary pulse of
mind. And just the immediacy to which it returns constitutes its new beginning. There is, therefore, no need and indeed no meaning in going back to the absolute beginning at every step. The return is only to the proximate beginning. If this were not so, the absolute beginning as such would be re-mediated at every step. But that would, if it were different in each case, mean that its own necessity was not absolutely established; and this would refute the whole process of the method. Indeed the suggestion is obviously absurd. Each new beginning explicitly contains within itself all the previous content; that is the actual content of that beginning and it is only to this beginning that the new result needs or can return.

(2) It must not be supposed that the beginning in any case is determined from the result, gets its content from the result, and so anticipates its result. This is not the case. The beginning needs no more and has no more explicitly or by anticipation than what it actually possesses. For its immediacy it is sufficient to possess simply the universality, (1) which is its characteristic; that is its

(1) Logik.III.349.
only and complete determination. True, in a sense, it is provisional; but in the process of self-knowledge itself it is known as imperfect and in that sense provisional. For the process goes from it as a beginning, knows it as a beginning and therefore as imperfect. But none the less it is also known and fixed as necessary to that process itself is necessary to the complete self-knowledge of the notion; for only by negating immediacy, is the complete truth, the entire reality of the notion obtained.

Such then, stated abstractly, is the process of the method of the Logic. That process only takes place in and through the content, the steps of the Logic. The indication of these, the remaining problem we have still to consider. We have tried, however, to show that the nature of the process, the principle of the method lies in that very movement of self-consciousness, of concrete mind, which is common both to the Phenomenology and the Logic, and which indeed is the process by which the Phenomenology itself has already been constructed into a "Science of Experience". Mind is the ground fact of the Logic: the process of self-knowledge,
self-consciousness, as a process, is the spring of its method. Just that duality in unity, that double activity of a single function, which constitutes the very being of mind, of self-consciousness, is the nerve of the whole process.

Put from the statement we have given of the method, it will be evident that the process is by no means simple but complex; it has various aspects and can hardly be accurately characterised by any single name. Regarded as a whole, i.e., as embracing both beginning and end, the process is best described as that of development. A development implies an end. The end here is "concreteness". This means, however, no more and no less than completeness in the exposition of the content of that Reality which the Logic has to exhibit, namely, absolute subject, Absolute Mind. This Reality contains all experience, its notions are the ultimates of all experience; and it is a single complete whole. The more then of its content that is expressed the concreter is that content, the closer does it approximate to the exhibition of that single Reality. And this concreteness is obtained
by self-knowledge; and the more this advances the more does it contain of the content of this Reality; it must carry with it in its process all the content of the knowledge already gained. The increase in self-knowledge just means that this increase carries with it all the content of its previous knowledge; and because this content is the content of that Reality, Absolute Mine, this increase is an increase in the area of its content, in its embodiment; the content is 'thickened', is nearer the organic whole which constitutes that single Reality. Since this process is essentially one of self-knowledge, and self-knowledge of an absolute Reality, this end "concreteness" can be indifferently identified with truth, or with Reality.

The "concreteness" does not mean, as is so often supposed, an identification or infusion with a "matter" which is lacking from the abstract. If this were so, and if, as is objected by those who hold this view, this matter is incorporated from without as the process goes along, the process would be, indeed, as they maintain, delusive, arbitrary and illogical. But as a matter of fact the process
to concreteness falls inside the same sphere as that to which the abstract itself belongs. The concrete notion is a notion in the same sense and for the same reason that the abstract notion is a notion. The notions cannot possibly and do not require to fuse with or draw in a 'Matter' ab extra, in order to become 'concrete', for 'concreteness' does not mean and is not explained by any reference to a 'matter' which lies outside the notions as such. The notions have and must have content of their own to start with, in order to be notions. And the 'concreteness' is concerned with this content. They are moments of the one Absolute Mind, and have the concreteness which it possesses and no other. The process from abstract to concrete here considered falls entirely and solely inside the System of Logic itself, and is due to that, and is confined to that alone. The importance of this will become evident when we have later to refer to the Philosophy of Nature.

While the process is as a whole best described as Development we must qualify this in two ways.
First, development here does not mean or imply that only the end is significant, that with the attainment of the end and the preceding vanishes, that thus with the establishment of the last notion all those that preceded it and went to fashion it are cast into oblivion and abandoned as valueless. The development is not like the evolution of a world, or of the human race, or even of a political movement, to where the steps that marked the process to its goal remain behind as mere vestiges of bygone activity, as fossilised deposits, strewing the highway and indicating the course it has travelled but sharing and moulding in no way the actual pulsing life of its final product. Rather it is like a finely constructed piece of music with a simple dominant motif, every part of which reveals to the artist the plan of the whole, yet contributes itself to form that whole, and all the parts none the less possessing a value in themselves by exhibiting in ever increasing perfection the governing idea of the whole. The development consists in short, in reasserting at every step all that has been obtained, in gathering together at every stage all our
wealth for each new investment in the mines of truth, in laying up for ourselves treasure in heaven and utilising it to work further in the present. We need not at each investment recount and transfer our actual solid wealth; a promise to pay on demand will completely * our purpose. What we have obtained is registered at each step in the 'immediacy' of each new beginning. Would we know actually what each notion fully means, i.e., contains, we have but to refer to what had preceded it, that out of which it has arisen; this is so to say the exposition of its content; in a sense indeed, this is actually its exposition. Every pulse of what has preceded is necessary to a given notion, constitutes determines that notion; and every moment of it has a place of its own, has a value of its own, a place and a value which have been determined in the movement which preceded the establishment of the notion whose moment and content they are. Without all of these indeed it would not be higher, more concrete. Every notion is true, is a truth, though not complete truth. Thus the final notion gathers into itself all that has preceded, the whole Logic is its
exposition; it is, in short, the notion of absolute Mind expressed as a single thought, it is the notion of Science, (mind self-knowing) is the notion of absolute truth, the notion of the Logic itself.(1) But of this later.

Hence, we may note in passing, the attempt to determine the relation of the movement of the process of the Logic to time or to movement in time is in the nature of the case an impossible undertaking. Such a problem has no meaning; that it seems a problem is simply due to a misunderstanding of the meaning of the conception of development which is found in the Logic. It is essential to the time process that bygones should actually be bygones. But the whole process of the Logic consists in actually and necessarily preserving and maintaining what precedes at each successive step that is reached; these cannot possibly be left out or neglected when a given stage is reached, any stage which has already appeared.

ii. In the second place, development in the Logic has the peculiar characteristic that the end rather appears as a result attained, than a factor moulding the process itself.

(1) Cp. Logik.III.327,8.
The end is not thrown over against the stage which is reached and is not opposed to the beginning with which we start in order to determine and direct it; as is the case, e.g., in the development by an ideal in the ethical or aesthetic sense. Rather the process is determined from within by the stage or moment itself. Each moment is not more determinate that is actually necessary to constitute it a moment, and it possesses of itself to the next immediately necessary moment. (1) The mere fact of a beginning and the need for passing beyond it is, of course, an admission that there is some beyond which determines it as a beginning, and as incomplete. But the point is that it is not this final end, final concrete which as such moulds the step which must follow the moment with which we start, but the immanent reference of that moment to its own immediate other, its own negative.

But again if we look at the process not as a whole, but in its pulses, its moments, there are various ways in which the movement can be regarded and named. If we have

in view the essential function of negativity which plays such a part in it, the method may be conveniently described as Dialectic. (1) The process of the self-knowledge of the notion consists in thinking contradictions, i.e., unifying contradictions. To think and harmonise contradictions is the essential function and nature of reason, for these contradictions are both made and solved by reason (2). But dialectic because characteristically negative does not really exhaust the meaning of the method. For (i) the beginning is, as such, not negative and yet is determined by the process; (ii) every negative is, as such, necessarily positive, contains a positive and ends in a positive, so that the process can in one way be regarded as movement from one positive content to another; (iii) the process as a whole is a development which as described is essentially positive. Dialectic, in short, merely indicates the immanent reference of one content of reason to another, its limitation by that other, and so the absence of self-containedness and isolation in any one content.

---

process of dealing with the content of any given moment we can describe it as a conjoint and simultaneous use of analysis and synthesis. It is analysis in so far as it finds the succeeding moment in the preceding, evolves the former from the content of the latter; it is synthesis in so far as it finds that other moment in the preceding itself and so unites what it separates, the other of a given moment is its own other, is united necessarily with it (2) This analytic-synthetic function of the method is perhaps best considered merely an analysis of the function of Dialectic itself.

Or again the process may be regarded as a continuous application of the principle of the Syllogism(3). The whole functional activity of mind, as self-knowing duality in unity, may be viewed as a concrete syllogism. In the process, of the method the first premiss would be the immediate reference of the immediate with which we begin to its other. This premiss can be looked at as analytic (bearing in mind that it is not merely analytic). The second premiss would

---

(1) Logik.III.336.
(2) Logik.III.343.
(3) Hence the method is "Deductive" and can be named "Deduction".
be the reference of the negative to itself; which, (with like reservation) we can name synthetic. The conclusion is the return and union with the beginning. Or again, with reference to the content proper, the first premise is the extension of the notion beyond itself. The second its reflection into self, the third the concrete union of these two. (1)

Finally, the pulses of the movement can be taken as forming an incessant repetition of a Triplicity. (2) This is a predominant characteristic of its nature. We start with the immediate, pass to mediation, return to the immediate; we have positive, negative, and positive again; similarly identity, difference, identity. This triplicity is characteristic of the Syllogism likewise and is connected with that function. Still this triplicity which characterises the movement is no more than a characteristic; it is external to movement as such, is merely an external characteristic. The process could quite fairly be regarded as a Quadruplicity. (3)

(1) Logik. III. 349.  
(3) Logik. III. 344.
For we have first the immediate with which we begin, secondly, the first negative, thirdly, the second negative, and fourthly, the final positive return to the immediate. Too much stress therefore, cannot be laid on the merely external aspect of triplicity which the movement may, nevertheless, reasonably be considered to bear.
The method which we have just described is the organ, the instrument, the soul of the system of Reason, the Logic. It determines it completely in its beginning, its middle and its end, and every step in the same way and for the same reason. We have already shown the source and nature of the general content, the body of the Logic; and we have now learnt the source and character of the method, the soul of the system. All that remains to us, in order to complete our exposition of the origin of this, Hegel's final and complete Logic, is to show how the members, the parts of the system grew out of and were determined by the nature of those two primal factors in the system, the content and the method. We need not exhibit this for every part - to do so were to re-state the whole science, and moreover if we consider any parts of the system, we shall indicate by implication how the other parts are to be dealt with and determined. This results from the character of content and method already stated. It will therefore be quite sufficient for our purpose if we show how the more prominent parts arose and are related, if we deal, in short, with the main divisions or moments of the Logic. All the others fall under them, and the connexion between them is an instance of the way all other moments are connected. But in addition it will be important, and even necessary, to consider more particularly how the beginning of the
Logic is obtained and what it means, and also what is the significance of the conclusion of the Logic. The last two points are important in view of the difficulties they contain, their place in the system and the interpretations which have given them. Our last discussion then falls under three heads, (1) to deal with the main divisions of the system, (2) to consider the beginning of the system, (3) its conclusion.

At the outset we must make two general observations. It must be borne in mind that the working out of the system of the Logic is regarded by Hegel as in no relevant sense a subjective process. For the content as we have learned is at once subjective and objective, it is in itself and absolutely true. However therefore we regard the process as it goes on in the subject knowing or constructing the system, any reference to the individual knower which would imply a limitation in the truth or objectivity of the result, must by the nature of the case be ruthlessly excluded; if it were admitted it would take us back to those forms of knowledge ("finite" knowledge, as Hegel terms them) which we are assumed in the Logic to have passed entirely beyond.

All that the individual knower does, is, just as in the case of the process of the Phenomenology, merely to "look on" (1) and let the content construct itself. And even if

(1) Phän 69.
we take account of the strenuous activity of the thinker, who undertakes the terrible toil of thought required in the Logic, the same result holds. For here, too, his thought must be regarded as solely concerned with absolute truth, truth whose content is at once objective and subjective. Whether therefore the mind which knows the process be regarded as passively reflecting, merely a spectator, or as actively operative, the result is the same; in both cases we have truth without any limitation or qualification whatsoever. Hence it is indifferent to Hegel whether the knowing of the truth be described as 'looking on', or 'constructing'; the former term seems to be used when he has regard to the objectivity of the truth, the latter when he considers the subjectivity of the same truth, which is in all cases both subjective and objective.

Secondly, it must not be supposed that Hegel began at the beginning without knowing the end to which he was proceeding. This is logically impossible, it is indeed in itself absurd (1). ---

As we have discovered the source of both content and method of the Logic in the Phenomenology, so too, we again turn to it for light on the main divisions, the chief moments of the System. And this is not difficult to discover (2). We saw that absolute knowledge is not merely

(2) Phän. 596, ff.
the truest mode of Knowledge, but has for its content all
the content of experience; its object is experience in its
essentiality. Moreover, absolute Knowledge is the Know-
ledge of the one absolute Subject. In that Knowledge, and
by the fact that experience arrives at that form, substance
is completely absolutely Subject. The object known by this
Subject is itself; and this self is the implicit totality
of all experience, it contains in organic unity the ground
notions of reality, the inner essences of those modes of
mind which make up experience. Its one and only object is
its self, which is the one and only Reality. Now experi-
ence has as a whole, one object, absolute reality itself.
It is one universal mind which is determined by means of
the various modes of experience, and it is one universal
object to which it is related throughout experience and in
relation to which it takes up those different attitudes
constituting experience. But this one reality which is
known in detail by experience "sub specie temporis", is the
same reality which is known "sub specie aeternitatis in
its totality as the one Reality and by the one Subject
whose Self it is. Consequently the primary determining
moments of the object as known in experience are in their
essence the moments of the Self of this absolute Subject
which knows its own essence in the form of self. What the
Subject does in absolute knowledge is just to know the
moments of that object which is the ground reality of all
experience as moments of its self, and in the form of its self. Now the primary and fundamental moments of the object when known in experience have already appeared in time after time at the various stages of the Phenomenology. For instance, when the object was set entirely against consciousness in the first stage ("consciousness") the moments of the object were immediate in being or existence, its determinate existence for itself and therefore for another, in its essence, (each corresponding respectively to a specific mode of consciousness). Similarly at each stage those three moments are discovered, the moments indeed have not the same content in each case; they have however the same character. They exhibit the three forms in which the object must and can appear in order to be exhaustively determined by any given mode of mind, at any given stage of Knowledge. There is first the object, as it simply is for consciousness, as it simply is in order to be object at all, its existence immediately and without any further qualification, its "that-ness"; secondly, there is the object in all its specific content and determinateness; and finally, the true and complete actuality of the object. There is no further moment in it; and every one of these is necessary and distinct. We shall find that these general moments are present in every general mode in which mind has experience, in consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, etc. Now, precisely the same potencies of the object are necessary when the mode of mind is that of absolute Knowledge. And
this for precisely the same reason that they were necessary in the previous modes of mind. For in every mode we have the one mind operative, and operating uniformly in each case. Hence the Self of the absolute Subject which is object to itself in absolute Knowledge has three fundamental and primary determinations, potencies, moments of realisation. This self is the one and only object to the absolute Subject and the knowledge of that object, and can be completely exhausted in and by those three forms of its reality. What the self has to do in absolute knowledge is to know itself in those three moments, and know those three moments as itself (1).

But to discover what these three actually are we cannot appeal directly to the Phenomenology; all that we learn from its argument is that there are and can only be three primary modes, and that these moments have certain characteristics. The specific nature of the moments of the object in absolute knowledge must be determined by means of the special content of that knowledge itself. Now that content, as we have found, is the notion of Reality (the Self, Mind, Subject) in the form of its notion, its Self, (Mind). It is the notion as at once subject and object, at once thought and reality, the ultimate and absolute union of thought and reality, i.e., truth in the form of truth.

This is the content, this is, stated in its ultimate and abstract nature, the object in absolute knowledge. Now the peculiar feature of this object is that we can determine at once, simply from a consideration of the notion itself, what are its fundamental moments. For that notion does not require to wait for determinations coming from without, as was the case in the previous modes of knowledge; its determination and all its content lie and must lie wrapped up in itself simply as it stands. For that object is at once object and subject; - in it content and thought are united, are transparent to each other, knowledge and object are identical. All its determinations therefore must come from within itself; there is no possibility of finding them elsewhere and no meaning in seeking for them outside itself.

It is evident then what these moments must be (1). The notion in absolute knowledge is the concrete unity of knowledge and reality, of thought and being; these do not stand over against each other as in previous modes of knowledge, being is in it simply pure essence of reality, notion, and notion is simply true being. But though they exist in this unity, they still maintain their distinctness; they are inseparably one; but this difference is not obliterated, though each does not, as in the previous modes of knowledge, maintain itself apart from the other. Now it is just in this fact of the concrete living unity of those two,

(1) Log. I. 49 ff.
hitherto counterfeit elements, that the various moments of the object in absolute knowledge are to be found. The unity of these elements is here the ground fact. The development, the explanation of this unity will bring out those different elements. Each is the whole unity, and different from the other; each is the whole notion itself, for that notion is concrete, and not analysable into separate elements; if it were we should again be adopting the point of view of the previous stages of knowledge. Since then this notion is the one content of this absolute knowledge, and is the truth of the opposition between the elements in knowledge, (thought, and reality, subject and object, etc.,) what were polar opposites previously are here simply forms of one and the same concrete unity, each of which is the entire notion. Thus the notion is on the one hand being notion, notion as being notion implicit, notion in itself; and on the other, it is notion as notion, notion in the form of notion, notion explicit, notion for itself; in each case the whole notion. But further, while these two moments are each the whole notion, the notion in its unity; it is equally necessary to insist on the distinctness the difference of these moments, for the notion is unity of their differences. But as differences of and inside one and the same unity they cannot as different each be considered separately; the only way they can be dealt with as different is when considered together.
that is, immediately related to each other as standing simply in one relation inside this single concrete unity constituting them. There is only one form which this relation can, from the nature of the case, take, that of mediation of the one through and in the other; for the notion is mind, self-knowledge, self-reflection, and each moment is transparent to the other.

Now these three determinations of the single concrete notion constitute a mark of the three general divisions into which absolute knowledge (the Logic) falls. And the character of each determines the designation appropriate in each case. The notion as being* gives us the Logic of the notion of Being, the Logic of Being, or, if we make use of the term usually employed to designate the reference to being* as distinct from thought, we may call it the Objective Logic, Logic of the object, of objectivity. The notion as notion gives us the Logic of the notion as such or, to point the contrast to objective, we may call it appropriately the Subjective Logic, i.e., Logic of the Subject of subjectivity. Between these two lies the Logic of the relation of the differences in the notion. The mediation of the one through the other is not reciprocal, for the two are not on the same level of completeness in the explicit realisation of the notion; the notion qua being* does not exhibit the notion so fully as the notion when it is explicit to itself. Hence the mediation is from the one into
the other, a passing from the immediacy and externality which characterises being into the inwardness and exposedness which characterises the notion as such. The Logic of the notion as such presupposes the mediating process; it could not be explicit and completely self-determinate unless this had taken place. This process of mediation may be described as the system of the Reflected Determinations of the notion, of determinations which have meaning only in and by reference to one another, the system of contrasted counterposed antithetic opposites which the notion contains. Or if we view it as the mediation of being into notion as such the process of inwardising of the notion to itself, of reflecting its outward being into its inner essence, we should call it the Logic of the notion as Essence, the Logic of Essence, a term which suggests both the process of contrasting of opposites peculiar to this division of the Logic, and the inner purpose of that process. Strictly speaking this division falls under neither of the other two, or rather belongs in part to both. But since it is preferable to retain the term subjective Logic exclusively for the Logic of the notion as such, because we have here more particularly the subject as Subject, it is more convenient to subsume the Logic of Essence under Objective Logic.
It is thus that there are three fundamental divisions of the discussion of the Logic, while the work itself falls into two parts. The full meaning and content of these fundamental moments in the System are not by any means given in the brief and summary description above stated. All that we have done is to show how these general moments are determined. Nor must it be supposed that these three contain the other moments of the Logic in the sense that the former are determined apart from the process of the Logic itself, and subsume the others under them. Rather the significance of being, of Essence and of notion is determined inside the Logic itself; take their place in the System as other moments do. All that we have to note is that being, essence and notion are the primary distinguishing elements in the discussion as a whole and that these elements are simply the several moments of that notion which is the ground fact in absolute knowledge, in Logic.

It is evident that these moments in the discussion are determined in no other way than by means of the content and method of the Logic as these have already been defined. For that notion is nothing other than the self of absolute Subject in the form of self; as mind, as true self-consciousness its content is duality in unity, diversity in identity, and because self-knowing its process is just that of mind itself as living movement, as actively relating itself to
itself. And out of these two factors, its self (content) and its knowing (method), those fundamental moments of the whole System of self-determination, and self-knowledge, which is absolute knowledge, is the Logic as science of the Absolute Subject, necessarily proceed. Just as in the case of any mode of mind which appeared in the Phenomenology (consciousness, reason, etc.) we had three pulses in which that mode appeared and completely realised itself, so in absolute knowledge, which is likewise a mode of mind, the same three stages are necessary and sufficient to exhaust its content. And for precisely the same reason and in the same way is this triplicity brought about in every case, in the case of the "untrue" modes of knowledge as well as in the absolutely true mode - for the reason namely that each and all are realisations of mind. In this single fact lies the key to every hall, chamber and closet of Hegel's System; it is the primary bar in the Whole composition, the one germ of the entire organism. His system can be summarily described as nothing other than the appreciation and exposition of the meaning of that one fact.

It is clear from the way in which the various divisions of the Logic are described that too much stress need not be laid on the mere terminology used to designate them. And indeed, while this division of the content of the Logic is itself necessary, the terms applied to them vary in Hegel's own statements. In the Propaedentik (1) he divides

(1) W. XVIII. Propaed. p.93.
the Logic into the treatment (1) of the categories, (2) of the determinations of reflection, (3) of the notions. Yet this implies no variation from his fundamental meaning, for the category is just the notion in its first intention, in its first immediacy, in the first moment in which reason is one with its object, is certain of its self alone (1). Again, he even makes the term category synonymous with the whole 'Objective Logic' (2), or further, the notion as such is not merely the 'Subjective Logic', but the notion as notion contains both subjectivity and objectivity (3). This last we shall explain shortly. Or finally, he speaks of the first two moments Being and Essence, as if they were not moments of the one notion at all (4). Yet in none of these cases need we suppose that he has departed in any way from his essential meaning. The changes are sometimes simply variations, sometimes due to looseness of expression, particularly in the Propaedentik, where we might expect such looseness, sometimes they are merely used to give emphasis to his statement, as in the last quoted instance.

It is significant in this reference to note that though the whole Logic is the work of reason in its truth, absolute knowledge, yet he speaks as if certain parts of

(2) Werke XVIII, p. 123.
(4) Log. III. 31. 32.
it corresponded to or were even dealt with by modes of mind and which contain that opposition between mind and object which it was the very purpose of absolute knowledge to have overcome. Thus the first part of the content of the "notion as notion" is described as "the sphere of the mere understanding" (1); while the last (third) part of that content, the concluding notion of the system, the Idea, is spoken of as appropriated by 'the sphere of Reason' (2). We seem similarly warranted in suggesting, and indeed we have an explicit statement to the effect (3), that the first two divisions of the content of the Logic, Being, and Essence, belong respectively to (that is, are the notions of and in) the spheres of immediate (sense) knowledge and perception as dealt with in the Phenomenology. Though there is no doubt that there is and, for reasons already given, must be this general relation, or general parallelism, between the content and course of the Logic and those of the Phenomenology, which entitles Hegel to allot spheres in the above manner to Understanding and Reason, etc., and justify him in the other two cases as well, and though it is unquestionable that the actual explicit content of the Logic was readily suggested to Hegel from the consideration of the course of the Phenomenology, still we must not lay too great stress on such a parallelism. It is partly

(1) Log. III. 32.
(2) Ibid. 63.
misleading, partly inaccurate. It is the former because the logic is the product of reason without qualification and deals solely with notions of reason and has its course determined by the nature of the notions as such. It is the latter because, as Hegel explicitly indicates in another passage (1), Understanding is not confined to the first division of the 'Notion as notion'; rather it is the general function of the determinateness in all the content of reason, that by which determinateness position, positivity in the content of reason takes effect. It is in short a specific pulse or mode of reason itself, and not an activity for or apart from and independently acting upon it. The explanation in fact and justification for the assignation of parts of the system to Understanding, or Reason lie in this that reason as complete, concrete, absolute mind contains and must contain the truth of all the various modes of experience, the lowest as well as the highest; and moreover, it must maintain the truth of each mode in that degree or moment of truth which it possesses. This indeed is all that 'preserving' its truth means. None the less, those moments, each and all, are determined as moments of reason, as its own and by itself. It is then these two features of its activity which make it possible at once for the content of the Logic to be solely that of reason and still in certain of its parts assignable to

(1) Log. I.7.
modes or moments of experience other than that of reason alone. These other modes (understanding as distinct from reason) are contained in, subsumed under, moments of reason and their truth is truth of reason alone, but because their truth the truth furnished in experience by them, it can by itself be regarded even in the Logic as still assignable to these distinctive modes. Thus it is that it is possible to speak of one part as belonging to understanding, another to reason, though all the Logic is in fact determined by reason alone. Reason furnishes the content of all the modes of mind, itself among others, itself being thereby distinguished from others. It is not that understanding per se itself functions in the Logic and produces or moulds those notions which are assigned to it; it is understanding as moment in and of reason, as determined, permeated by it alone that is meant. It is easy to see that the 'sphere of reason' must be the last which appears in the Logic, for in it reason which determines the Logic ab initio reaches its complete content in the last stages, and that complete content is nothing other than its own complete self. And this fact conversely throws light on what the final stage actually means and can only mean — namely, as we shall presently show the whole Logic in its totality. Properly interpreted then there is no contradiction or obscurity in assigning certain parts of the Logic to Understanding and Reason respectively.
It is unnecessary to deal further with the three chief moments of the Logic than has already been done in the statement of their origin, nature and connection above given. To exhibit their connection more fully would require a statement of their entire content, and to furnish this would mean a re-statement of the whole Logic. Suffice it then that they are the primary moments of that notion of mind which is the beginning and the end of the Logic and contains as notion of mind all the moments of which the Logic is merely the exposition, for the moments of that notion as such are simply the primary moments of the Logic. Mind is the truth of reality, and its (mind's) own notion contains the fundamental determinations of reality. And there seems little doubt that these moments as above stated were for Hegel the first beginnings of the construction of the Logic; they were together the germ from which the larger organism of the Logic as we now have it started. They formed the ground plan, the governing idea of the whole. And further, their nature and connection were the pattern and clue to the construction of the rest of the Logic. For in each the notion mind, self-knowing, is present; for each is a notion, an egoised realisation of mind. Just therefore as the notion of mind itself which starts and lays the ground of the Logic must, in order to realise (know) itself completely appear
to, posit, manifest itself in three pulses, stages or moments, so again each moment of that ultimate notion must itself define, determine itself in a similar manner and for precisely the same reason. Hence each must have three determinations. The question that required solution in each case was what are these determinations? The difficulty it should be observed was not the general character of these determinations; this was already known, for the method by which they were realised was the same for the whole as for the part, and with the nature of the method he was long since familiar (1), and of its universal necessity and applicability throughout the whole range of his system or as he held of any system of philosophy he was likewise long since absolutely convinced. What remained to him therefore was the strenuous labour of determining the actual content of the Logic, of inwardly and by logical necessity uniting content to content, notion to notion.

It would however be utterly absurd to suppose that he had to construct both the material as well as the instrument of his investigation. This would indeed make Hegel the creator of the world. He was neither creator nor even inventor; he was no more than discoverer. But a discovery presupposes what is already there waiting to be discovered. It is entirely to misunderstand the whole meaning of the

(1) The Phän. being an example of it.
Logic, and the essential spirit of Hegel's work to regard his Logic as a web spun solely and simply on the loom of his own mind; and still more so if his whole procedure be regarded as an attempt to substitute omniscience for his want of science, as if he would make up for ignorance of the actual world with its throbbing activity by becoming a past master in the knowledge of a world with which we have no concern. His Logic is the outgrowth and, for Hegel, the culmination of his knowledge of science and scientific principles and results. It presupposed in his case, not merely a wide and prolonged acquaintance with the various aspects of experience, with philosophy and history in its various forms, but a systematic study of the various discrete natural sciences; and on his view to a complete appreciation of the Logic such knowledge as he himself possessed before constructing it is indispensable(1). Only so does it have 'body'. It was only after a ripe knowledge of what in experience had already become the common property of the educated world that his Logic was constructed. Experience therefore in the widest sense (including science as ordinarily understood) furnished the raw material out of which he shaped the Logic (2). But if this is so it is clear that the concepts, the notions with which he has to deal already lie at his hand. Experience

(2) Op. Log. I. 10.11. ff: "Philosophy requires no special terminology", ibid, 12: "The objects of Logic and their expressions are the common stock of knowledge." ibid, 13.
had already in the history of mankind shaped itself by, had informed itself by means of the ground notions which were its ultimate truths and these notions had come to utterance in the form of language, and were thus bequeathed as universal property to the mind of educated civilised man. Hegel simply avails himself of the wealth of deepened experience which he inherited from the past. What he had to do with it was to organise it by a principle of inner necessity. Thus it is that we find the Logic contains the notions of experience with which men are already long familiar. It is the connection, the setting, the systematic union of them which is Hegel's work; nothing more.

In regard to the detailed construction of his final System of Logic it is significant that from the first forms in which it is presented to the last there, is little important change to record. The Logic of the "Propaedentik" which contains the first explicit exposition of it, has on the whole the same shape, order and content as the Larger Logic, and the Logic of the Encyclopaedia. The 'Propaedentik' is not so full, nor so complete, nor so inwardly systematised as in the other cases. But this difference, as already indicated, can be explained by the purpose for which, and the individuals for whom, the Logic as contained there, was designed. It need not imply any essential difference from the others or any incompleteness in the
author's conceptions at the period when the Logic of the 'Propaedeutik' was written. Besides this, this Logic as we now have it is the collection of notes of Hegel's Lectures delivered from time to time, from probably 1808, (the period when he entered the Gymnasium at Nürnberg) to 1812, or even later, till 1816 the year when he left for Heidelberg. We have therefore here his latest thoughts on the Logic as well as the earliest, those which he held when the first volume of the Larger Logic appeared 1812, and those which he held while he was actually elaborating the Logic. And the editor of these notes has assigned no specific dates to any specific parts; we are therefore unable to affirm that there are any actual and essential deviations from the final Logic, or where these may occur. On the whole the probability is that there could not well be any; for it is highly improbable that Hegel would commit unfinished declarations to his pupils; and again, since the lectures to them and the actual elaboration of the Logic were going on simultaneously, the natural inference would be that the Logic as we now have preceded the Logic of the 'Propaedeutik', the latter being the modified and attenuated form in which Hegel sought to introduce his pupils to his Logic; the latter being, in short, extracted from the real systematically constructed Logic. Any deviations in expression or terminology, and there are such, found in the Logic of the Propaedeutik can be explained in
a similar way. We will not therefore consider further the statement of the Logic found in the Propaedeutik, but will now pass from the exposition of the fundamental moments of the Logic to show shortly how the actual beginning of the Logic was made.

The process of determining the beginning of the Logic, important as it no doubt is, seems none the less in itself very simple. At the outset we see that the beginning must be found in the first fundamental moment of the notion, namely, the notion simply in its immediacy as it is in itself, the notion as being. The point to discover is with what in this notion must we start, in order completely to determine being itself. What is the first absolute truth of being, and so of the Logic as a whole? Now the Logic is to contain the whole truth of science, and of reality. The beginning to the Logic must therefore not be sought for outside the Logic itself. And again, it must not as logical beginning be determined from or by means of any other content inside the Logic; if it did so the beginning would clearly require to be sought in the later content, a procedure which would involve a νότερον πρότερον. But further, since the process consists in establishing deducing content, since the development just consists in the exposition of content, the beginning which is to exclude all such content by the nature of the process, must
be either without any content at all or with the minimum of content, the point where there is content just before vanishing altogether.

Now the meaning of content as this is found in the Logic is that mediation is required in order to establish it. But it is logically impossible for that to be first mediated which is the starting point of all further mediation. The content which it does have therefore, and unless it have in some sense content it cannot be a truth, must be other than mediated content, it must be non-mediated or immediate. And since it is to be absolutely the first, it must be absolutely immediate, not a particular immediate, distinct from others, but the one immediate. But the one immediate is simply abstract immediacy as such. And immediacy without any further qualification is nothing more nor less than mere being, being pure and simple, bare abstract being-ness. The first determination of the absolute is merely that it is; what it first posits as Absolute is its being; what we first find when we approach it is just that, without further qualification, it is. Its bare being is its first determination.

We may reach this in another, perhaps more direct way, thus. The Logic is the 'notion of Science', the pure knowledge which is the result arrived at in the 'Phenomenology' Pure knowledge as we have learned is the absolute unity of object and of mind, of being known and thought knowing, of
'certainty' and 'truth'. Just because from the outset to the completion pure knowledge is entirely self-contained, cannot pass beyond itself for anything, its beginning must lie immanent in the very idea of pure knowledge itself. Now the unity spoken of is absolute, unqualified; all reference to an other, to what is different and likewise to mediation (for difference implies mediation) must be in that knowledge completely removed. But if so what we have is an entire absence of difference. Since, however, knowledge implies difference, mediation, this complete absence of difference means that Knowledge itself ceases to be an element in it; this mere undifferentiated unity ceases to be Knowledge at all. It is merely an immediate, mere immediacy. But not immediacy as contrasted with mediation; what we must have at the absolute beginning is absolute immediacy, i.e., without any such contrast, immediacy in its ultimate form. And this is nothing other than mere being, being without any qualification, without implication of difference at all. In it therefore nothing is presupposed, for no content determines it; no mediation is present in it, because there is nothing in it to be mediated. If it presupposed anything it would ipso facto not be mere immediacy, mere being. The Logic therefore begins at the absolute beginning, at the point which presupposes nothing beside itself. Such a beginning was the only one possible
and was absolutely necessary for a science which claims to hold within itself the complete system of absolute truth.

But from two sides this absoluteness, this absence of any presupposition in the beginning has to be guarded, or at any rate qualified. For we have in the first place to make such a beginning consistent with Hegel's cardinal position so strongly emphasised, that there is nothing thinkable which does not contain at once mediateness and immediacy, that these two are inseparable. Where is the mediation of the beginning of the Logic? Hegel replies that its mediation lies in the 'Phenomenology'. It is there 'shown' 'proved', established: that pure knowledge is the truth of all relation of mind to object; i.e., pure knowledge is there mediated. In the Logic this mediation is presupposed, is accepted as finished. Pure Being, with which the Logic starts, is simply pure knowledge in its immediacy. Hence the beginning of the Logic, like everything else, is at once immediate and mediated. That the mediation falls inside another sphere than the Logic (viz. inside the Phenomenology) is irrelevant to, does not affect the fact that the beginning is mediated. For the mediation is none the less true, none the less scientifically (Philosophically) established; and all that required to be shown was merely that this pure immediacy, the first actual moment
of pure Knowledge was not merely immediate but was also, as everything "in heaven, nature and mind" must be, mediated. The beginning is a beginning for the Logic, for it is made in and by pure Knowledge, and that it is the necessary and absolute beginning is determined by the Logic. But in that pure Knowledge is itself mediated, (i.e., deduced, established as a necessary truth, proved and thereby united with truths outside itself) the absolute beginning of pure Knowledge, pure Knowledge in its simplest immediacy, is not a mere independent arbitrary assertion, but likewise an established mediated truth.

But in the second place we must qualify the character of the immediacy of the beginning by its relation to the procedure and content of the Logic as a whole. Here again it is seen to be not merely immediate, but also necessarily mediated. And this from two considerations, the nature of the process pursued in the Logic and the nature of the result arrived at. It lies in the nature of the process that the development from the beginning should take place by a further determination of that beginning itself. The transition to the next moment, like every succeeding transition, does not mean that the preceding moment is entirely negated and abandoned. The first still remains in the second, is immanent in it. But by remaining thus as the basis in and throughout the further moments of the Logic, the beginning itself becomes a moment in the further
developed content, i.e., it is mediated. And this mediation just consists in removing what in the beginning was one-sided, namely, its maintaining itself qua beginning as self-subsistent while all the time its very meaning as beginning for science implied its connection with the other content. From this point of view the further development of the content of the science is necessarily the mediation of the otherwise purely immediate beginning.

Again, the very meaning of the "result" necessitates mediation of the starting point. The result is by the nature of the process the most true, the original truth. the beginning itself therefore depends on it, is indeed produced by it; that result is its ultimate absolute ground. It is the complete concrete truth for which that beginning is a beginning at all, and from which 'to be a beginning' has a meaning. The beginning is not a somewhat per se, it is the start for and of a somewhat, which determines the beginning as its own, and not as a somewhat in general, not a beginning in general. The immediacy of the beginning is for this reason mediated.

It is true that both the above means of mediating the beginning are simply two sides of the same fact. In the former case we can regard and do regard the beginning as the ground and the result the dependent and derived element; in the latter the result is the ground and the beginning derived and in this way a mediated result. In both cases
the immediate beginning is mediated. But this twofold view of that mediation is not at all a double mediation of the beginning; it simply follows from the nature of the method by which the science of the Logic is constructed that that mediation can be looked at in two ways. The movement, as we saw, proceeds in cycles and goes from cycle to cycle of truth. That is, the essential primary and most vital fact in the whole science, not the character of the beginning, nor the fact that the beginning is mediated; these are only important as consequences of that method. The whole science represents a cycle, for the science is self-knowledge of Absolute Subject by itself. From this which is the primary nature of the science and its method, the immediacy and mediation of the beginning are determined.

Thus we see that what has and constitutes the beginning cannot rest content there, for its beginning is itself as undeveloped, without content, and only by its further development from that starting-point does it fully know itself, only after its knowledge has been completely developed is its content thoroughly mediated. The further development is necessary for the same reason that the beginning is necessary only so is the science established, every element proved, deduced. And again, because of the necessity of each moment, because each moment is mediated, proved to be necessary and true, the beginning no less than every succeeding moment is in no sense arbitrary. It is built into the science by the same process as any other part.
The whole process lies in the inner union of content with content; it is the nature of the content itself which determines the movement. Each moment is determined as necessary, and its character determined by the content of the science; and the reason for each moment must lie in that content. The nature of the beginning, and the reason for the beginning with which the science does start must, likewise lie in the content of the science of pure Knowledge. And mere being is simply pure Knowledge in its indeterminate immediate unity. That pure Knowledge should necessarily have mere being as its first moment, lies in the nature, the meaning of pure Knowledge itself. This mere being is the first content of pure Knowledge. And in virtue of its indeterminateness, its utter abstractedness, this which is the absolutely immediate is at the same time absolutely mediated. It is mere being, nothing further; all determinateness must, because it is beginning, be entirely excluded. It would not be the beginning unless it were taken thus in its mere immediacy; and as so taken it must be mediated, abstracted and abstract.

This then is the one and only beginning to the science. The beginning is therefore absolute for that science; i.e., it could have no other beginning. But the beginning is obviously not absolute per se, it is related to, relative to, mediated by other content. It is not self-subsistent per se; it is the beginning for a body of truth and so
organic to and connected with the whole. And no other beginning was possible to a system of absolute truth. There is nothing else which could have served the purpose. For the nature of that system demands that the beginning should be (a) absolute (b) without presupposition (c) a necessary moment in pure knowledge (d) positive factual (1) If we take any other content we shall find it will not satisfy those conditions. If the content should have any concreteness it could not satisfy (a) and (b); and if it have no concreteness whatever it is simply mere being. If the content be a particular fact but taken quite abstractly, quite formally, e.g., the ego, or the notion of the ego, then this is not an absolute beginning, it is merely abstract, and is a particular being. Should we again start with what is given by mere intellectual Auschauung, then either its content is concrete or merely immediate. If it is the latter it satisfies (a) (b) and (d), but not (c); for intellectual Auschauung shows none of its content as necessary, as proved as mediated, but merely asserted. If it is the latter then it does not satisfy (b) and provides no means of guaranteeing the necessity of the various elements of this concrete fact from which it starts. No other beginning in short, not even the conception of mere beginning itself (2), will satisfy the demands of Absolute Knowledge.

(2) I. 68.
We come now to our last point, the meaning of the final result of the Logic - the Absolute Idea. We give an interpretation of this because of its bearing on the other parts of the System, Philosophies of Nature and of Mind, partly because it seems to have been generally misunderstood and partly because it illustrates and in a manner sums up our interpretation of the plan and content of the Logic. Our statement need only be very brief.

The moments of the Logic are determinations by the absolute Subject of its own self, its own content, are realisations, manifestations of the Absolute. To be moments of the one absolute notion is to be pulses of absolute truth. But throughout the Logic the one Absolute mind is not merely exhibiting its content, but progressively realising, determining its own complete absolute self. This we saw was a vital element in the whole process. Now in the course of this self-knowledge the first two fundamental moments of its notion Being and Essence gradually lead the one into the other and the final truth of Essence is shown to be Substance and its correlate accident. This again when developed into its complete significance is seen to be Reciprocity. But Reciprocity as explicit reference to and implication in each other of elements opposed to each other but still belonging to the same sphere, the same immanent identity leads inevitably to the notion as notion
in which that identity is made absolutely explicit and the opposed elements in consequence do not merely imply each other, but are explicitly moments of the same one fact, the identity within which they stood opposed.

The significance of the transition from Reciprocity to the Notion lies in this that in it the notion passes from being Substance and becomes Subject; the absolute is shown to be, is proved to be not merely substance but also and at the same time more truly Subject! It corresponds in a general way to the identification or union of object with subject established in the Phenomenology when Reason was reached. Or again, it can be regarded as the proof inside the system of absolute truth of the standpoint and principle of absolute Idealism. It is this transition which to Hegel is of supreme moment; it is this which contains the kernel of his system; in the establishing of this lies his own claim to possess a distinctive philosophical position. It heralds in the sphere of the notion, in the system of pure Reason, the Logic, the positive advance which Hegel makes on the system of Spinoza, or on all systems which like his have substance as their ultimate principle (1).

By this transition then the absolute ceases to be substance, ceases to be determinable by the notion as Being or as Essence and is established as subject as a self, as a notion qua notion. The discussion of the notion as notion therefore is the third and final part of the Logic. From

(1) Log. III. 10 ff.
the very nature of the system it follows that the preceding
moments Being and Essence are not simply negated but have
become and are preserved as moments of the notion as such.
They cease to be moments of the absolute on their own ac-
count and become determining factors, phases or functions
in the absolute as explicitly notion. They therefore do
not have in the notion as such the character which they
have as self-subsistent and independent; they are merged
in this which is their unity, their foundation, their
identity and their truth, and they cannot be when posited
as explicit elements in that identity what they are or have
been when taken as simply moments in the process by which
the notion is established, deduced, proved. Still this
does not mean either that we have to examine and state them
over again in the light of this their truth or that the
notion as such has no nature or content of its own apart
from that supplied by or coming from Being and Essence.
Both of these interpretations of the result arrived at are
easily seen to be false after the exposition of the method
already given. Being and Essence still retain the content,
the truth which they have, show themselves to have, and
more or other truth than this they cannot have, for that
exposition exhausted their inner ultimate nature. And
again the notion as such has determinations specifically
its own; otherwise it would not be a distinctive moment at
all. What the above statement means is merely that in the
notion we have explicitly before us the ground principle
the inner reality which determines what Being and Essence
are, on which they ultimately depend for their content,
which is their 'ratio essendi', their active ground, the
one source of their common life. All that they are there¬
fore remains still, but since the notion is thus their
truth, what they are is now regarded as proceeding from,
as attributable to, as active moments of the notion. The
notion contains all that they have shown themselves to be in
bringing it (the notion itself) to the light as their explicit truth. And now the notion as such proceeds to
furnish and determine its own pulses, the functions which, quâ distinct moment of the absolute, it actually possesses.

The notion then cannot in any way be regarded as
merely abstract and formal. It is the Absolute in its
truest form, as Subject; it contains all preceding content
which absolute Knowledge has exhibited; and it is, like
every other moment of the Logic, absolute truth, at once
thought and reality. On no ground whatever therefore can
it be considered a mere form without contact, objectivity,
reality, as if the latter had to be brought to it in order
to free it from its formality. By its very nature, as well as by the nature of the Logic as such, the notion already
contains reality, the reality which it has as being at once
subjective and objective, as being a moment of the absolute
as such. Now the peculiar reality which it does have is
that of the Subject as such. In it the absolute is demonstrated to be Subject, the notion as such is the Absolute as Subject. The notion is then nothing other than the pure form of Ego, Mind, Reason, Self-consciousness (1). The moments of the notion are those of the Ego itself. The notion as notion is simply the ultimate form and reality of mind.

Not that in the mere notion we have the concrete actual Ego as we find it, say in the Phenomenology; nor again in the mere notion as such, have we the complete truth of mind. For the notion is not mind qua existent as is the case in the Phenomenology; it is its inner ultimate truth, not its actual existence in time and concrete experience. And again the notion as such must be further developed in order explicitly to exhibit its full content. Now the first step in this latter process is to show what the notion is in itself, in its inner moments. Hegel describes this part as the notion in its subjectivity. It must not, however, be confounded with the subjectivity which characterises 'finite knowledge'. The notion as such is both subjective and objective like any other moment of absolute truth, were it not it would not fall inside the Logic at all. What the term here means is the absolute notion in its inwardness, in its inner undeveloped self, the notion in itself. It is the subjectivity, the to-itself-ness, of the notion, not the notion as a subjective fact of our minds. The complete

realisation of this phase of the notion leads to the complete realisation of the notion of its complete exposition, which, in contrast to the first phase, is called the objectivity of the notion; the notion in its realisedness. The term 'Objectivity' must be similarly explained as in the case of 'Subjectivity'.

All the time be it remembered we are dealing with the absolute Subject; it is the absolute Reality which is now subjectivity and now objectivity of the notion. The final stage is obtained by the union of those two moments. Such a unity is called the Idea, the notion at once subjective (to itself) and objective (outwardised, realised). This is the final union of notion with its reality. The reality is not brought in ab extra; it is the reality implied and contained from the beginning. It is the reality which a notion has as truth (as union of thought and reality). While then this reality to which it arrives is deduced, derived out of the notion itself (1) it is not a reality external to the notion, all it means in fact is the complete exposition of the content of the notion, the notion becomes concrete to itself. The reality is not that of temporal or sensuous existence, not the reality of a particular 'matter' regarded as external to the notion. There is no attempt to deduce existence in time and space out of the notion. All

(1) Log. III 24 ff.
the reality deduced by this process is a reality which is already contained implicitly in the notion from the start, and indeed in the whole Logic. The content of the Logic, as we saw, is not external to reality, it is inside reality, inside experience; for it is the essence, the truth of experience. Every element of content in the Logic is at once subjective and objective, at once thought and reality. There cannot therefore at the end of the Logic be any exclusion of reality from the notion. And the deduction of the reality of the notion cannot be conceived as a deduction of a reality which from the start was never inside of, never was an in the content of the Logic as such. The Logic professedly excluded the multiplicity of sense-reality; what it was to be concerned with was the inner essence, the ultimate grounds of reality. It therefore deals with the inner content of sense-reality (whose truth is Being), but not with sense-reality in its manifold existence. Hence it is entirely beside the mark either to seek for such reality in what is deduced from the notion, or to regard the procedure as smuggling in reality from without. The reality deduced by the notion, is that which it has as the ground and essence of the absolute; that and none other.

This realisation of the notion as Idea is simply mind at once conscious of self, and distinguishing itself from itself is conscious of itself in that distinction. And
the complete expression of this, the form in which this is realised most perfectly and fully is where the notion is to itself in the form of itself, in the form of notion. Here we have the final truth of the notion, here indeed we have the absolute truth. This stage Hegel calls the Absolute Idea. This Idea is not the idea of the absolute as if it inhere in, belonged to, were a description of the Absolute. It is nothing other than the absolute itself in its truest, perfect form. It is absolute Subject, absolute Mind, in the form of mind, conscious of its self in the form of self. It is not simply perfect truth, it is also at the same time perfect absolute Personality (1). The preceding ideas then of the True and of the Good were not regarded as mere ideas, as what had no reality. They were regarded as determinate moments of the reality of the notion (2). It is the very meaning of the 'Idea' to be real, to have nothing opposed to itself except itself. But if so then the absolute Idea, which is the concrete union of both the ideas of the True and of Good, can be nothing but the absolute Subject in its completeness as absolute and as subject, as containing all content, as finding itself in all content, without imperfection, incompleteness or limitation, eternally one with itself. It is Personality

(2) The essences, the notions of the spheres which in the Phenomenology appeared as 'culture' (Bildung) and 'Morality' (Sittlichkeit).
in its absolute realisation, at once subjective to itself and objective to itself, and that without process, but simply as absolute continuous self-identity.

In the absolute Idea we have simply the truth, the absolute Subject, mind, in its own essential element, i.e., in its inmost truth, in its pure notion. We have notion at once and completely transparent to itself as notion. This Idea is not so much in itself a content of the absolute, as that form in which the absolute is truly itself.

This absolute Idea does not furnish any determinateness to this its notion; does not in fact give a determinate notion at all. It is a purely universal, the absolutely universal form of the truth of the absolute, that form in which it must be in order to be absolute truth at all. If we insist on regarding this Idea as none the less a content, we must guard our statement by pointing out that thus content is merely and solely universal, is not determinate, as in the case of the content of the other notions of the Logic its being absolute form, mere notion, is in short its only content, its complete nature. But because it is this in itself barren of determinateness, it is impossible to develop the Logic further. The Logic only moves from content to content, from determinateness to determinateness. Since, however, this Idea gathers up all the preceding, its content, its determinateness, lies in what has preceded. All the content of the Logic is the determining content of
the Idea. And indeed it is evident that this Idea does not
as such exhibit because it does not require content. Be-
cause it is to contain all that precedes, and because this
is the entire truth of the absolute, the final Idea cannot
but be mere universal form of that truth, without any dis-
distinctive content of its own; if it had the content of the
absolute would not be exhausted. It is the mere abstract
universal form of that Reality which is the all containing
ground and all determining principle of the whole course
of the Logic. This it is that what is discussed under ab-
solute Idea is not content as such, but merely this uni-
versal form which constitutes that Idea; and this form is
the method by which the content is determined, by which the
Idea proceeds.

Here then we have the absolute truth about the abso-
lute; here we have truth in the form in which it is abso-
lute. It lies in the nature of the case that this absolute
Idea is not a functionalensorSubject which is but does not
manifest itself. Its very being consists in its revelation
of itself as what it is in itself. And this revelation
is its content, viz. the whole Logic itself. This absolute
Personality is therefore not a somewhat beyond our reach,
an existent per se and apart. Absolute Personality and
Absolute Truth, absolute Subject and absolute self-knowledge
are one and the same concrete fact. In the absolute Idea
then we have the absolute Subject merely in its final form.
Its content has been given in the process which led up to it. In it we have the truth in the form and knowing itself as the true. In the Absolute Idea we have Absolute Subject knowing itself, the true, the notion in the form of the true, in the form of itself, the notion. But again it is the truth which contains within itself all the preceding content of the Logic. The content which it possesses is therefore the content of the Logic.

The content of the Logic must therefore be the content of this self-knowledge, of this truth in the form of truth, which makes up the meaning of Absolute Idea. But if so then the conclusion is evident, that the Logic is nothing other than the exhibition and manifestation in extenso of the Absolute Idea. The Absolute Idea is simply the Logic itself; the Logic is nothing but the self exposition of the Absolute Idea. It does not stand by itself merely as a name for the absolute. It must also necessarily contain all that precedes. And since it is the final moment, since it cannot possibly determine itself further, (for it is the complete notion of the Absolute) all its content, all its determination must be found alone in what preceded it. Previous notions not merely gathered into themselves what went before but led on to other truths. The final truth just because final has nothing to do but gather into itself what preceded. It is not something by itself apart from
what led up to it; indeed it can hardly be said by itself to mean anything at all; the two are indissolubly united. What it is is simply what it contains and means; and this is the whole Logic. The absolute Idea is just the Idea of absolute knowledge, of absolute truth, and the exposition of this is the Logic. And if we bear in mind that Knowledge in such a case does not mean something in our heads, or again something apart from reality, but exposition of absolute mind itself in the form (self) of mind, we shall readily see how the term Absolute Idea can be the designation at once of supreme Personality, absolute Reality and of absolute truth.

This conclusion, which it would be futile to labour further, agrees entirely with the meaning and purpose of the Logic. From first to last we were dealing with the content of the Absolute; each moment was moment of the Absolute; and the whole is nothing other than that content in its entirety. And the Logic was to contain every truth of the absolute, the truth of itself Absolute Knowledge as such, included. It was to cover all experience and here we find that what was highest mode of experience, highest reality of mind (absolute Knowledge) is highest truth attainable; and that as the highest experience was just the Logic, so the highest truth of the Logic is just the idea of the Logic itself. The Logic was the whole of Hegel's
System and that in its ultimate form, for it was the exposition of the ground of all experience; and here we find that the Absolute Idea is named 'the only object and content of Philosophy' (1); and the Logic is 'its self-movement'.

-------------

(1) Log. II. 328.
CONCLUSION.

Before passing from this Hegel's final Logic we must state the relation in which it stands to the Philosophy of Nature and that of Mind. Much ambiguity has gathered round this question: Hegel's own expressions, while they indicate that he was not unaware of the problem involved, equally show that the question was not of supreme moment to him, or to the thoroughness and completeness of his System. Had it been as vital to his system as has been supposed there seems little reason to doubt that a mind of Hegel's order with its boundless appreciation of the value and the demands of rigorous systematic connexion in all that claims to be science, would not have been contented to leave the relation between Logic, Nature and Mind, so loose and external and even casual in statement as we actually find it to be. What indications of relation he has given make it clear that their connexion is merely architectonic in character, not that of organic system.

To begin with, the relation is not that of an inward logical methodical 'transition' from Logic to Nature and thence to mind. This is plain from the nature of the case and from Hegel's own statements on the point. For it is of the very nature of the Logic (i) to be a complete closed
and self-closed science (2) to embrace with its scope the entire area of reality, of experience, (3) to contain the richest and highest notions of experience, as well as the lowest and poorest. Now on any one of these grounds it could not possibly require or leave room for a 'transition' from Logic to Nature, in the same way in which there is transition from one notion to another in the Logic or from one part to another in 'Nature' or 'Mind', and no other form of transition is legitimate or possible if inner systematic connexion is to be established. The first characteristic makes transition impossible because if the science of Logic is already complete, as with the "Idea" it emphatically is, then there is no motive, no inner necessity no inner incompleteness of content making essential a movement to bring about the desired completeness. And moreover, even if the Logic were not completed with the 'Idea', assuredly the required completion could not be brought about by 'Nature', which is eo ipso distinct in content from the Logic. That completion could only be established in and by means of an element homogeneous with that of the other content of the Logic, namely, that pure notions, absolute essentialities, ultimate reality - anything else would destroy the very character of the Logic itself.
The second ground again is equally fatal to 'transition', because if the Logic does, as it has been shown to claim to do, cover the whole field of reality, just as in a different way the Phenomenology did, then it is evident that the content of Nature must by the end of the Logic already have fallen inside the Logic itself in that form and element peculiar to the Logic, namely the content of Nature in its essentiality, its ultimate notions. And this indeed we find to be the case (1). The fundamental conceptions employed in Philosophy of Nature, Quantity, Mass, Causality, Mechanism, etc., all have their place in the System of abstract absolute truth which is the Logic. But if this is so then to say that Logic must complete itself by passing to Nature is clearly absurd. If the Logic already contains the essences of Nature, it already has all of Nature necessary for its purpose, and all that Nature can ultimately give.

And what is true of Nature is 'mutatis mutandis' true of Mind (1). All its ground notions are likewise contained inside the Logic; Knowledge, Purpose, Goodness, etc.

Finally the third factor makes 'transition' impossible, because if transition existed at all it would be from Logic to Nature and thence to Mind. But if Nature

is to be the first stage in the completion of Logic then
certainly the very meaning of the method requires that
nature should contain all that is in the Logic and some-
thing 'higher'. As a matter of fact, however, Nature does
not contain all that is in the Logic itself; it does not
contain, e.g., the 'Ideas of Knowledge' or of 'Goodness'.
And it assuredly does not contain anything whatever that is
higher than what is found in the Logic. On the contrary,
it is quite unequal to the highest notion of the Logic.
While, again, the transition from the last notion of the
Logic to the first content of Nature is really not an
'advance' in any sense whatever. The contents of both are
simply heterogeneous.

All the reasons, therefore, from the nature of the
Logic per se, make directly against any supposition of
'transition' from one to the other.

But, further, Hegel's own statements (1) establish
this same contention quite conclusively. He there says ex-
plicitly that the relation of the 'Idea' (i.e., the Logic
in its totality (2)) to Nature is 'not that of an actual
process, and transition, as in the case when the subjective
notion (in the Logic) passes in its totality into object-
ivity.' 'For the pure Idea there is no further immediate
determination which is not just as much posited (in it and
by it) and is notion'. These words require no comment and

(1) Log. III. last paragraph.  [352. 3
(2) Log. III, 352. 3.
ought by themselves to preclude completely the conception of 'transition' out of or beyond the Logic itself. It is evident from them that Nature is not supposed or intended to give a concreteness to the Idea which it does not possess and yet which might be necessary to it for its completeness. No doubt it is of the essence of the movement of the method that the content in the Logic should become more concrete as it goes forward; and no doubt again Nature is more concrete than the Logic. But the essential point is that all the concreteness and 'reality' necessary or possible for the notions, they have already obtained in the course of the Logic itself, that the concreteness they possess is a concreteness conformable with their own nature which is to be essentiality, pure notion, and that hence the concreteness which Nature itself possesses is irrelevant to them as essences, and therefore does not constitute Nature into a methodically determined advance on the Logic.

What then is the relation between Logic, Nature and Mind? Since there is no transition from the last stage of the one to the first of another, and since no other kind of connexion can establish absolute continuous systematic connexion or is permissible for that purpose, it is clear that such connexion as they do possess must be brought about in some other way and for some other purpose than that of rigorous system. Let us bear in mind three important facts: (1) That the connection, such as it is, is con-
ceived according to Hegel as referring solely to the whole totality, the notion of each (Logic, Nature and Mind) taken as notion simply; the connection is between the 'Idea', the notion of Nature, and the Notion of Mind, without further reference. (2) That the question of the relation of Logic to Nature and Mind is parallel, indeed similar to that of the relation of Phenomenology of Mind to Logic, in both it is a relation of concrete existence to pure notion. (3) That Hegel throughout the whole of his development had been endeavouring at once to treat these three as correlated, and independent sciences, and yet to show how the content of each, the object dealt with by each was related to the others. The problem of this connexion was not new. All along these sciences of Logic Nature and Mind had been regarded as independent in the first instance. Their subject matters were primarily distinct from one another, and for that reason required separate treatment. He did not start with one and from that proceed to 'evolve' the others, and indeed he assigned them different values at different stages of his development, and thus, while treating each as self-dependent, regarded their relation differently. So it comes about at the end of his development that the connexion between them is not the prime concern; each science stands by itself in the first place and is important for its own sake; the connexion between is a subordinate question, and as it were an afterthought.
From the above three facts mentioned we can see (1) that the connection between the Logic as a whole, the idea of the Logic, (The Idea proper) and the notion of Nature, the idea of Nature as a whole and of Mind need not be the same, and cannot à priori be asserted to be the same as that between any elements in each of the sciences taken separately. (2) That just as there was no transition from Phenomenology to Logic, no passage from existence and actual experience to pure notion, but rather existence (Dasein) and pure notion were each capable of independent treatment and were each simply dealt with as different kinds of material for philosophy, which could not create its material but had merely to accept it, so there need be no transition from pure thought to concrete, actual existence (Dasein) in the form of Nature or of Mind. For indeed, as Hegel admits (1) the reality which belongs to Nature and Mind is 'certainly concreter' than that possessed by the notion (Logic), which however though more 'formal' than the other, is concrete all the same. (3) that the three sciences, like their subject-matters, having been regarded from first to last as independent, and treated independently of each other, with sole reference to the specific matter of each and without importation of content or principles of one for the determination or modification of the content of the other, the establishment of a connection between them is

(1) Log. III. 26/27.
of merely architectonic interest and importance, and cannot affect the peculiar procedure and content of each science by itself. And it is, we may not, in passing, because of this self-dependence of each science, and the indifference to its connection with the others that it is illegitimate to consider Nature and Mind as 'applications' of the Logic, in the sense that they are the result of consciously applying the method and content of the Logic to their material. The Logic is of course as we saw the fundamental constitutive essence of their content, just as it is likewise of the content of the Phenomenology. And for this reason we can say we have in Nature and Mind 'in concrete' what we have in the Logic in pure abstraction, and in this sense it is legitimate to call the sciences of Nature and Mind, as Hegel himself does (1), 'applied science'. But all that this means is that Nature and Mind themselves function and work according to the notions contained in the Logic not that we can discover simply by making use of the content of the Logic itself, how they actually do work.

The key to such connection between Logic, Nature and Mind, as is established, is to be found in the fundamental fact common to all of them. This is the fact that they are all aspects of the one absolute reality taken in its totality; and that absolute is Mind. It is because of this that connection is either possible or necessary. Each

---

(1) W. XVIII, 148.
expresses the Absolute in a specific manner, Logic as pure Idea (for this, as we saw, is not mere formality, but is the Absolute Notion of Absolute Mind itself), Nature as externality, and Mind as concrete unity of the inwardness of the former and the outwardness of the latter. This would seem to suggest that we have in these three the methodically connected moments of the one Absolute Mind taken in its totality as the Absolute. But it is useless to attempt to disguise from ourselves that this cannot be actually the case. For in addition to the objections already urged we may point out further (1) that the Logic does not go over totally into Nature; it holds too much back to allow us to regard the latter as containing the former absolutely. (2) that further what is called the outwardising of the Idea 'in the pure externality in Space and time' which characterises Nature does not carry with it the peculiar content of the Logic, and is itself not an accurate description of Nature per se, for surely Mind, consciousness, likewise exists in the externality of time. (3) Concreta mind does not contain all Logic and all Nature as its moments, but is rather their complement. No doubt it was difficulties of this description, and other reasons such as we have brought forward which induced Hegel not to use the same method of connecting Logic, Nature and Mind as a whole which he had employed in connecting their several parts. They were all found as ready-to-hand
material of philosophy, and their connection is not that of an inner systematic unity, but that of external metaphori-
cal half-mystical, half-theological suggested unity. Each is by itself accurately enough named, and named as they were adopted to begin with, e.g., as their specific matters required. But their connection is merely pointed at, as that of a bridge not of an essential bond. The Logic in its pure freedom 'lets itself out' from its inward freedom to the other freedom of free externality in Nature. It feels an 'impulse' to pass beyond itself (1). It is the 'creator' of Nature (2). All this may be valid as a pictorial representation of one of the profound secrets of the universe; but it cannot honestly be considered, and can hardly have been regarded by Hegel, as serious statement of a scientific truth. Similar metaphors are applied to the connection of Nature and Mind, into which however we have no need to enter in detail.

The conclusion therefore is plain. These several sciences were each pursued severally and independently as their matter required, and as this was found presented in experience; and the validity of the systematic connection in each case stands by itself without any immediate reference to a connection with the other sciences. The connection between them is brought about externally; for the

(1) Log. III ad fin.
(2) Log. III. 26.
specific reality belonging to each is not the reality belonging to the other and does not produce it out of itself; their specific reality is simply found and remains separate from that of the others; the meaning and relations of the specific reality (concreteness) of each does not seem to have been ever an object of enquiry for Hegel. But this absence of inner connection of the three does not affect the inner connection of each science by itself, nor the validity of the one method for each science. For objectivity of science is just as we saw Absolute Idealism.

It is not in place here to offer any criticism; our purpose has been not to estimate Hegel's position, but to throw light upon the position he held by showing how he came to adopt it. We have now completed the history of Hegel's Logic from its earliest stages up to its final form. All that remains for us now to do is to indicate the points and nature of the advance of the last period over the preceding and gather up the general results of the whole enquiry. But first of all we must say a word regarding the later stages of the history of Hegel's Logic. With the publication of Hegel's Larger Logic in 1816, his final position had been established and completely expounded. But with every new edition of the Logic, and particularly of the various editions of the "encyclopædia", changes were made in the body of the work, and some have argued from this that if these changes did not mark any radical
alteration in Hegel's fundamental point of view and method of the Logic at any rate they show that the method cannot be regarded to have the infallibility and absoluteness Hegel claimed for it in the Larger Logic. That these changes indicated no change whatever in Hegel's conception of the matter and method of Logic may be taken to be quite certain. They are alterations in detail made partly for pedagogic reasons, (in the case of various editions, of the 'Encyclopaedia' Logic, where much is omitted and much compressed), partly for the sake of clearness, fullness and explicitness. The main body of the Logic, its ground plan remains in every respect the same. But that the changes showed an incompleteness in the scope of absolute knowledge, or an inadequacy in the method, and were a concrete refutation of the claims of the Logic, implies a total misconception both of the principle of the science and of Hegel's estimate of his own work. It is surely open to hold that the notions of Reality are the ultimate content of the Absolute, and the knowledge of them furnishes absolute Knowledge, without requiring that any system of such Knowledge should be beyond the reach of modification or improvement. Absolute Knowledge, absolute truth refers only to the content not to the degree of completeness with which that content has been systematised, and any disagreement with the principle and nature of the former, on grounds which are relevant solely to the latter, is due to a pal-
pable confusion. And moreover, Hegel himself did not claim that he had worked out his system as completely as was possible or might be desired; and was very far from being conscious of omniscience. Both in the first volume of the Logic which appeared in 1812 and in the last (1816), he expressly apologises for the imperfection of the work which he offers to the public, and claims, in view of the unusual obstacles in the way of a reformation of logic, their indulgence for its short-comings (1). The Logic, he suggests 'is capable of more perfection and elaboration in detail, though the method is in spite of the incompleteness of the system the only true one it can follow'. And all his later modifications or emendations must be interpreted in the light of this conception of his own task.

This consideration holds good also, we may note in passing, of the position assigned to the Phenomenology in the 'Encyclopaedia'. The position it has in the 'Philosophy of Mind' does not indicate that Hegel had changed his views regarding either the value to his system of the Phenomenology, or its place in it, as has been supposed. For as a matter of fact, he regarded it in the same way and discussed it in a similar fashion, coordinating it with psychology, long before the 'Encyclopaedia' of 1817 was written. During his Rectorate in Nürnberg he lectured on both Psychology and Phenomenology, and while we can readily see that the Phenomenology of the Propaedentik and that of the

(1) Log. I. 6,41, 42. Log. III. 3, 4.
'Encyclopædia' of 1817 are the same, we are informed by Rosenkranz that the Psychology of the same period is precisely the same as that which appeared in the 'Philosophy of Mind' of 1817.

The advance which Hegel makes on his preceding positions will now be seen to consist essentially in (1) the accurate determination of a philosophical method, (2) the establishment of the supremacy, the absoluteness of mind. By the former 'reflexion' and 'Auseinandersetzung' of the previous period were fused into a single function or process, and with that fusion all the obscurities, the distinctions consequent upon their separation, namely of reason from understanding, of logic from metaphysics, of the identity from its differences (finitudes) fell away at one stroke. The identity is not to be merely 'Angeschaut', but to be expounded explicitly, developed. The absolute is not to be 'the night in which all cows are black', but by the liquid light of a transfusing dialectic is to be the inexhaustible plenitude and riches of the noon-day of Nature, History and all Experience.

By the latter again the conception of Development is established completely; the 'indifferent unity' of Mind and Object is removed, and the ideas and ideals of human

(1) v. Preface to Propaedeutik, W. XVIII.15, also W.XVII.337.8.362.
experience are determined as the grounds and determining content of all reality, without at the same time doing less than justice to the 'substantiality' and 'self-deendence' of nature and objectivity.

On these two fundamental changes everything else depends; the transformation of the conception of Logic; the identification of the absolute with all experience, leaving it no life of its own apart from what it there contains and reveals, an identification of which that impossibility above described, of passing out of one sphere of its realisation, the Logic, directly and immanently to another, Nature, is simply the result and counterpart; finally the self-containedness and independence of each of the philosophical sciences, as indeed of all sciences using the one method, each science being but a fragment (1) of the content of the one reality which in its totality is completely expounded, 'in abstracto' in its essence, in the Logic.

---

(1) Log. III ad fin. W. 351
If we look back over the whole history we have passed in review, we shall find one factor which has been prominent and dominant throughout it from beginning to end—the conception of the intimate connection between philosophy and religion. We pointed out at the start that the aims and content of these were directly and closely associated in Hegel's view; and the course of his development has been a continuous substantiation of our contention that for Hegel they are rooted in the same fact, and issue in the same result, the union of man with the Absolute. Hegel did not, as we saw, recognise at the outset the essential identity of import between philosophy and religion, but in any case the fact that he approached philosophy from the side of religion shaped his interest and determined his conception of philosophy, and kept the two in immediate, intimate connection from first to last. At first philosophy was a mere appendage or support to religion; then religion was the 'completion' of philosophy; next it was a sort of obscure philosophy; finally it held 'in concrete' and sustained in the form of representation and feeling what philosophy exhibited in the form of the notion, in its essential truth, philosophy being thus higher than religion. The fundamental object of and in both is the Absolute, and the conception formed of the nature and principle of Reality determined at once philosophy and religion. In the first stage we have, as we saw, a deistic interpretation
afterwards the monism of a neutral substance and finally the idealistic monism of reason, of mind. With such a conception as this last it was inevitable that the difference between philosophy and religion should be one of form only or even merely one of degree of explicitness, that the highest form of religion should be revealed religion (religion whose content is mind) and that philosophy should simply carry into its truth, into the true form of mind, what revealed religion only asserted de facto. His Logic is nothing more nor less than the next and completing step to the claims assumed in actual revealed religion. If the latter is justified in asserting that the human is one with the dûrin, that the Absolute is mind, then and for the same reasons the Logic is justified in claiming to be absolute knowledge, for this contains merely the ultimate notions of mind. A monism of Spirit in religion has as its confirmation, completion and counterpart, a monism of thought in metaphysics; Pantheism in religion becomes panalogism in philosophy. Hegel's whole theoretical activity therefore can be regarded as a reconciliation of philosophy and religion. Religion and philosophy are shown to be not two opposed but merely two different attitudes towards the same object. The one is as necessary as the other and fulfills the same function in different ways. It is because of this identity of purpose and object-matter that religion does not form part of the content of the Logic (1). There is

(1) Log. Ill, 328.
no idea corresponding to religion in the Logic for having the same object as that of the Logic it is impossible that it should occur there. Philosophy is simply another way (the highest way) of presenting, exhibiting, the one absolute Reality; religion presents in a way peculiar to itself (1). Hence Logic cannot contain modes or ways of exhibiting the Absolute which have a similar purpose to that which determines itself. Throughout Hegel's whole development the conception of the purpose, content and value of religion plays a very prominent part; it supplies a continuous influence, the significance of which is evident enough in the result, and the continual importance of which it must have had for Hegel personally and privately in the conception and the working out of his system it is hardly possible to exaggerate.

It will also be clear that throughout his entire history the one underlying dogma and principle is the ultimate reality of Mind (Geist). From this position he never wavered, not even under the Schellingian influence. And we may say it is the key to his whole development. It is not proved as we should prove a position, by going outside it and establishing it by a process from elementary and easily admitted premisses where every one has common ground. Hence arises for Hegel the peculiar conception of the proof

(1) So also does Art.
of which it is susceptible. By the process just suggested we could prove it at the start and from that go forward. But Hegel's process of proving it is by revealing it at the close of the System which has implicitly depended on it for content and method all along. This we saw was the case in the Phenomenology which is the complete exoteric proof of the principle he adopts. But his whole philosophy can in his view be regarded as the prolonged and continuous establishment of his fundamental position. Indeed we may say that the System is nothing but his ground-principle in extenso, in the fullness of its content.

This process of proof he must early have seen; for we find him remarking in his Note-book in Jena that "the principle of a system of philosophy is its result" (1). And such a contention it need hardly be pointed out not only differentiates Hegel from Fichte and Jacobi and Schelling, but in the last resort constitutes Hegel's claim and title to a unique place in the history of human thought. For from such a conception of proof all that is peculiar in Hegel's system is determined. By it Mind is established as 'higher than Nature', as the Absolute; by it the values of forms of Knowledge and systems of truth are determined; by it finally his own system is established as the truth because the outcome of the history of human thought. In

(1) Ros. Leben. 545/6.
short this notion of the nature of proof is the nerve of his developmental method. And his view of proof combined with his view of the essential character of mind, which because mind is necessarily transparent, clear, self-revealing, self-expressing, (a character which again was 'self-evident' to him, and only required 'shewing') - these contain in germ his whole explicit system. Hence the Logic, which is merely the clearest expression, the simplest utterance of the 'pure' abstract content of absolute mind in its entirety, whose character is just to be self-reflecting, self-evidencing. Hence it is at once Logic, Metaphysic, Ontology, cosmology, theology and criticism.

Thus the ground fact of the System begun as a dogma, was maintained as a contention, was then asserted on objective grounds (ethical, etc.) to be the 'highest truth', this assertion fixed the character of the proof capable and necessary for establishing the position and finally the position was exhibited as at once the highest truth and conclusion of the whole system, - Absolute is Subject.

Hence Hegel's idea of philosophy, his principle of philosophy and his method are all intimately and indissolubly connected. That the Absolute is Mind determines method, plan and content. Because all the content of mind is its own, no reality is lost or annihilated in the system, because mind is absolute, truth and reality have degrees
and can be connectedly arranged in a developed system; and because each element has its finite place, its full truth is only seen in the whole to which it belongs, and not when taken by itself; because finite it is permeated with the life of the whole; whole and part are indissolubly united. Thus, while the kernel of Spinozism is contained in the words 'omnis determinatis est negatio,' that of Absolute Idealism is simply the counterstroke, 'omnis negatio est determinatio'.