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Mediated Voices: Nation/State-Building, NGOs and Survivors of Sexual Violence in Postconflict Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina

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PhD in Sociology

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Declaration

I declare that this thesis was composed by myself, that the work contained herein is my own except where explicitly stated otherwise in the text, and that this work has not been submitted for any other degree or processional qualification except as specified. Parts of this work have been published in Hamel, M. (2016). ‘Ethnic Belonging of the Children Born out of Rape in Post-Conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda’, Nations and Nationalism, 22(2): 287-304.

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Abstract

Mass ethnic violence, including genocide and ethnic cleansing, can take a variety of forms, but sexual violence often remains a key and defining feature. In the Bosnian war of 1992-1995 following the break-up of Yugoslavia, it is estimated that between 20,000 and 60,000 rapes were committed; and estimates are that between 250,000 and 500,000 rapes were committed during the Rwandan genocide in 1994. And yet the experiences and needs of these survivors of sexual violence can often remain marginalised through post-conflict reconstruction processes and beyond. Drawing on ethnographic and multi-method research, this dissertation explores and contrasts the post-conflict experiences of women who suffered from wartime sexual violence in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina and the programmes offered by key NGOs that continue to work with them. Focusing on policies and experiences of re-integration and the creation of a sense of social belonging, I show that these women represent a distinct category of civilian victims of war, whose post-conflict needs and experiences are often marginalized by both their states and their communities.

The thesis’ empirical core draws on ethnographic fieldwork, which included participant observation of ten key NGOs, four focus groups with HIV-infected individuals and women survivors of sexual violence, semi-structured and unstructured interviews with 17 survivors, 23 NGO staff and a Rwandan government representative, as well as informal conversations with all of these actors and members of the local communities. This ethnographic data was complemented and contextualized with official statistics, as well as government and NGO documents, and with interviews conducted at UN Women and the UN Trust Fund.

The main substantive findings of this dissertation are that following the end of the ethnic violence in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the two states embarked on very different post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Rwanda has been characterized by an important process of nation-building, with the state outlawing ethnicity in favour of national unity, and implementing gender-sensitive policies to promote women’s rights. In contrast, the Bosnian-Herzegovinian state implemented policies mostly
geared towards state-building, based on the rationale that the institutionalisation of ethnicity could only truly be accommodated through strong state institutions. The dominance of ethnic politics however overshadows other political agendas, such as gender policies, policies that have still not lead to transformative changes at the local level. These macro-policies importantly influence post-conflict experiences, most especially those of women who had survived sexual violence.

My findings are suggestive of the complexity of the post-conflict experiences of the women I met, mostly in terms of social reintegration, where the macro-policies of post-conflict reconstruction continue to powerfully shape both their everyday lives and the work done by the NGOs. In Rwanda today, the women I interviewed mostly wish to be fully socially accepted and treated as part of their communities, with the NGOs offering them holistic support. But in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the women I interviewed today mostly demand legal recognition by the state, with the NGOs actively lobbying for this on their behalf. And yet, due to a shared experience of continuing everyday marginalization within both societies, as civilian victims of war, in both places the women often rely on NGOs to negotiate their social position within their states, nations and communities. This mediation role is structurally complicated by the NGOs’ relationships to donors and to the pressures of the state in which they operate. The impact of this is that through their mediation role NGOs reconstruct the women’s experiences in order to align with the priorities of the international donors and states in which they operate. Consequently, the contrasts between the work done by NGOs in each country are clearly visible, despite the similarity of the war crimes experienced: Rwandan NGOs actively seek to increase women’s empowerment within their social community, while the Bosnian NGOs actively aim to increase the women’s voices within more explicit political agendas.

The thesis’s key theoretical or intellectual contribution, therefore, concerns its relevance to intersectional scholarly work on post-conflict and gender studies. More specifically, my findings suggest that a shift occurred immediately following the end of the armed conflicts, where the women who had experienced wartime sexual violence and who were socially located outside the scope of justice of their ethnic enemies, suddenly found themselves outside the scope of justice of their own ethnic
or national communities. Extending Mann’s (2004) and Opotow et al’s (2005) typologies of ethnic violence and moral exclusion, I then develop a specific framework for understanding the underlying moral shifts experienced by the survivors of sexual violence. In doing this, I seek to capture this gendered moral and social relocation and its consequences on the everyday lives of the women and the NGOs that work with them. This forms the basis for my theoretical contribution that the women moved from ethnic women to moral outcasts in the aftermath of the ethnic violence, and that this exclusion is contextually shaped since the priorities for social reintegration are different in Rwanda to BiH. Addressing these priorities then requires different forms of post-conflict inclusion.
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Chapter 1. Introduction

This thesis explores the post-conflict experiences of some women who survived wartime sexual violence, and the efforts of some key NGOs who work with them. The conceptual focus is on social belonging and social reintegration, analysing how these women are socially reintegrated within their ethnic and national communities in the aftermath of the violence, and how the NGOs mediate this reintegration.

This research sits at the intersection between the fields of gender studies and nationalism and conflict studies. Indeed, as the stories of these women will demonstrate, their lived experiences are embedded within the ethnic politics and gender norms of their respective countries and their local communities. As a researcher interested in genocide and ethnic violence on the one hand, and women’s rights on the other, researching women survivors of sexual violence allowed me to anchor my personal interests as a feminist and an engaged citizen on the situation of vulnerable groups affected by war, conflict and political oppression.

Research Problem

Sexual violence is a key component of ethnic violence, and it is widely accepted in the academic literature that sexual violence was used as a weapon for ethnic cleansing in both the Rwandan genocide (1994) and the Bosnian war (1992-95). It is estimated that 250,000 to 500,000 individuals were raped in Rwanda (Hudson, 2010: 264), with estimates pointing to 20,000 to 60,000 rapes in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) (Skjelsbaek and Smith, 2001: 53-4). In the aftermath of genocide and ethnic cleansing, processes of ethnic reconciliation are often necessary for peaceful
reconstruction and co-habitation. There are, however, some individuals, such as the men and women who suffered for wartime rape, whose experiences during the conflict put them at risk of distinctive forms of social stigmatisation. Indeed, much research has been widely conducted on the stigma of rape and its consequences for the survivors of sexual violence (Carey, 2001; Cockburn and Zarkov, 2002; Krug et al, 2002; De la Rey and McKay, 2006; Pankhurst, 2008).

As a result of the stigma associated with rape, post-war social inclusion and belonging is generally harder to achieve in comparison with other types of civilian victimizations during war. Moreover, because they were targeted for sexual violence due to both their sexual and ethnic identities, these survivors need to be reconciled not only with the enemy group, but also with their own dual identities (Sideris, 2001: 59). As Skjelsbaek argues (2012: 44), ‘because rape in war targets both the ethnic and gendered identity of its victims, this dual identity violation creates a possibility for dual identity construction in the aftermath’. The stigmatisation experienced from the community, in addition to their personal journey towards rebuilding their social identity, creates barriers for the social reintegration of these individuals in the aftermath of the violence.

This research explores these barriers and how they are experienced, negotiated and mediated. I also analyse the work done by key NGOs to facilitate this social reintegration. The use of sexual violence as a weapon of war has been theorized and documented by previous research, with an important body of research documenting wartime rapes during the Bosnian war (and in contrast to other contexts) (Mackinnon, 1994; Seifert, 1994; Allen, 1996; Chang, 1997; Littlewood, 1997; Ghiglieri, 2000; Mertus, 2000; Rosenman, 2000; Thornhill & Palmer, 2000;
A growing body of research is also emerging on the consequences of wartime rape, focusing especially on the medical, psychological and sociological impacts of this practice (Hamilton, H.B., 2000; Carey, 2001, UNHCR, 2003; Hagen & Yohani, 2010; Aolán, Haynes and Cahn, 2011; Medica Zenica, 2015). However, the long-term post-conflict experiences of the survivors of sexual violence remain under-studied, and studies that provide a comprehensive contrast between the two contexts are even less common (one rare example is Staveteig, 2011). This research therefore contributes to the academic fields of both nationalism, conflict and gender studies by offering an analysis of the contrasting post-conflict experiences of women in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina approximately 20 years after the end of the ethnic violence.

It is worth noting that this thesis limits its scope to some women’s experiences of social belonging and social reintegration within their national or ethnic communities. I do not attempt to provide a comprehensive portrayal of the post-conflict experiences of all men and women survivors of sexual violence. The same is true for the analysis of the programmes and services offered by the NGOs I observed. The focus of this study is limited to an analysis of the programmes and services offered to women who suffered from wartime sexual violence, and does not provide an account of the work done with other beneficiaries or the internal politics and structures of the NGOs. So while I cannot claim empirical generalizations from these two contexts, I aim at theorizing and explaining the post-conflict experiences of some women survivors of sexual violence in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the relevant programmes and services offered by some NGOs, in relation to their social relocation within their ethnic/national communities. This said, however, I also hope
that theoretical insights from these empirical findings might usefully contribute to an understanding of the same social phenomenon as experienced in other, similar post-conflict contexts.

**Arguments and Findings**

This thesis consists of nine chapters. Two main substantive chapters provide ethnographic accounts while the two others situate these experiences within the aid sector and within the states’ macro-policies of gender and ethnicity.

Chapter Two provides the theoretical framework with which I examine the experiences of the women I met. It first argues that during the ethnic violence, women had imposed upon them the role of embodying the nation and its boundaries. Through their bodies, they were the gateway into the nation’s purity and survival, and thus made vulnerable to sexual violence in armed conflicts. Once the violence had ended, the perceived ‘dirtiness’ of their bodies was transferred to their moral value, justifying their moral exclusion. Drawing on Mann’s (2004) and Opotow et al’s (2005) frameworks of ethnic violence and moral exclusion, I design my own framework to capture the post-conflict experiences of moral exclusion, highlighting the process from where the women were relocated from being outside the scope of justice of the enemy group to being outside the scope of justice of their kin group. I then argue that the NGOs working with them try to address this moral exclusion by targeting their increased agency, voice and empowerment, but that their work remains constrained by the state policies of post-conflict reconstruction.

I then explain in Chapter Three how I empirically examined these processes through a contrast ethnography of two contexts, since the specificities of one context
provide a commentary on those found in the second, deepening our understanding of the experiences examined. I also explain that an ethnographic approach, complemented by interviews and secondary sources was chosen since it allowed me to analyse these processes and their consequences from the viewpoint and experiences of the survivors of sexual violence and NGO staff. Of course, conducting this type of research involves important ethical concerns, and I engage in this chapter on the challenges faced and their impact on the data collected.

Chapter Four then presents the historical background of both contexts, explaining the consequences of sexual violence as a weapon of war, and how these were addressed by the NGO sector from the ethnic violence in the 1990s to the present. It then examines the ethnic and gender policies implemented by both post-conflict states, providing the contexts within which the experiences of the women I met are embedded, and the political context that influences the work done by the key NGOs I observed.

The following four chapters then present the substantive findings. Chapter Five uses official statistics and government documents to analyse the degree in which ethnicity and gender are accommodated in both post-conflict states, connecting these specific policies to broader policies of post-conflict reconstruction. I suggest that in the Rwandan context, an important process of nation-building is occurring, with ethnicity being outlawed in favour of a broader, more inclusive national identity, one which includes the implementation of gender-sensitive policies. However, I show that these top-down attempts to promote gender equality and remove ethnic identities have still not been fully incorporated at the local level. This is contrasted by the Bosnian-Herzegovinian context, where ethnicity has been institutionalized within the
state, but where access to services and political opportunities depends on the political entity (Republika Srpska and Federation of BiH) and ethnicity. The focus has therefore been on strengthening state institutions (state-building) to accommodate this ethnic diversity. This has the consequence that, despite both countries suffering from ethnic violence, they differ in their process of ethnic reconciliation, which influences the social reintegration of the survivors of sexual violence. Moreover, I argue that the population experiences these contrasting policies of state/nation-building through state institutions, which inevitably impacts their day-to-day lives. In the cases of the survivors of sexual violence, I argue that these macro-policies continue to powerfully shape their experiences of social belonging, since they find themselves somewhat excluded from the post-conflict state due to their dual identities both as civilian victims of war and as women.

Chapter Six then draws on ethnographic data to present the post-conflict experiences of women who survived sexual violence during the Rwandan genocide, and the work done by some organisations that continue to work with them. I argue that these women mostly demand to be socially reintegrated as valued human beings within their community, and that the NGOs I observed respond to this need by providing holistic support to assist these women in reconstructing their social value, helping them to accept themselves and to accept living with others in the society.

Chapter Seven examines the post-conflict experiences of the women I met and the work done by some NGOs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, data that provides a commentary on the Rwandan experiences. Here I argue that, in contrast with the Rwandan context, the women I met in BiH mostly wish to have their rights legally recognized by their state, in effect institutionalising their status as survivors of sexual violence.
The NGOs I observed seem to be responding to this demand by actively lobbying the state for legal recognition of these civilian victims of war. Both ethnographic chapters therefore raise questions around to what extent these contrasts are explained by the NGOs themselves, who might not only respond to the needs of their beneficiaries, but also shape them, and to what extent this is influenced by the broader aid sector.

I therefore move my focus towards aid in Chapter Eight, where I explore these questions, analysing the relationships among state, NGOs, and donors. It argues that the NGOs I observed in both contexts undertake the role of mediating the women’s experiences, navigating the strategic interests of the donors. These mediated experiences are therefore not directly the women’s experiences, but rather experiences that NGOs reconstruct in order to align with the priorities of the international donors. These donors’ priorities are however also embedded within the macro-policies of gender and ethnicity implemented by the state, which not only influence donors, but also influence the programmes and services prioritized by these NGOs. This has the consequence that despite the similar crimes against women that occurred in both states, Rwandan NGOs promote women’s empowerment within their local communities, while Bosnian-Herzegovinian NGOs promote the inclusion of women’s voices in the political arena.

Finally, Chapter Nine argues that while the contrasted policies of state/nation-building influence the work by NGOs and shape the experiences of social reintegration of the survivors of sexual violence, what remains unaddressed are the moral violations that these women continue to suffer in the aftermath of the violence. In this chapter, I argue that regardless of the specificities found in each
context it is the ideology of woman-as-nation which continues to justify their moral exclusion. Therefore, I argue that the women moved from ethnic women to moral outcasts in the aftermath of the ethnic violence, and that this exclusion is contextually shaped since the priorities for social reintegration are different in Rwanda to BiH. Addressing these priorities then requires different forms of post-conflict inclusion.
Chapter 2. Theorizing Social and Moral Exclusion

This chapter first defines key concepts used in this thesis, before theorizing the experiences of social exclusion of the survivors of sexual violence. I argue that in the aftermath of the ethnic violence, the women face a moral exclusion that is justified by their changed social value (or social self), as a result of the rape experienced. NGOs working with these women attempt to address this changed moral value by increasing their agency, empowerment and voice, but they remain constrained by macro post-conflict policies. These do not provide the framework within which the personal sense of self of these women can be reconstructed, since they instead facilitate the reconstruction of their ethnic or national identities.

Defining Key Concepts

When referring to the concept of nation, I refer in this thesis to Anderson’s definition as ‘an imagined political community - and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign’ (Anderson, 1991: 6). First, a nation is imagined because it is impossible for any human being to know every member forming that nation. Second, a nation is limited because nations inevitably possess boundaries that distinguish them from other states. Third, it is sovereign because nations emerged in the context of the Enlightenment, which promoted the idea that sovereignty lies in the hands of the people. Finally, it is a community because regardless of the inequalities within that nation, each member can equally participate in it (Anderson, 1991: 6-8). Anderson’s definition is extremely important when analysing the social inclusion of women who experienced wartime sexual violence, because the acts of imagining and
of creating boundaries and communities influence whether or not the women are integrated in their nation.

Moreover, approaching this thesis from a constructivist epistemological viewpoint, when speaking about ‘ethnicity’ or ‘ethnic groups’ in this thesis I refer to Eriksen’s understanding of ethnicity as ‘an aspect of social relationships between agents who consider themselves as being culturally distinctive from members of other groups with whom they have a minimum of regular interaction’ (Eriksen, 2002: 12). Ethnic groups then use myths of common origin and kinship to mark these boundaries (Eriksen, 2002: 13). I mostly use this term when referring to the groupings found in BiH, while I mostly use nation in the Rwandan context, as a result of their policy of nation-building, which will be described in more depth in the subsequent chapters.

The concept of community has been widely discussed in the academic literature, moving from a more traditional understanding of community as social interactions in a specific geographic area (Hillery, 1955; Gusfield, 1975) to more abstract conceptions of community (Delanty, 2003). For the purpose of this thesis, I adopt Delanty’s (2003: 187) analysis of community, as ‘possibilities for belonging based on religion, nationalism, ethnicity, lifestyle and gender’. Complementing this definition with Putnam’s (2000) analysis of social networks, I also imply that communities entail identification and membership of these different sources of social belonging. ‘For most of us, our deepest sense of belonging is to our most intimate social networks, especially family and friends. Beyond that perimeter lie work, church, neighbourhood, civic life, and [an] assortment of other “weak ties”’ (Putnam 2000: 274). Based on these definitions, the community I refer to when speaking
about the social inclusion of the women I met can vary from their neighbourhood, to their village, to their gender, religious, ethnic and national group.

Furthermore, by social belonging, I refer to the emotional attachment and commitment to people, social groups and culture (Calhoun, 2003: 558; Yuval-Davis, 2011: 10). Belonging can be a choice, or imposed by others (Guibernau, 2013: 26). As explained by Guibernau (2013: 28),

Belonging fosters an emotional attachment; it prompts the expansion of the individual’s personality to embrace the attributes of the group, to be loyal and obedient to it. In return, the group offers a ‘home’, a familiar space – physical, virtual or imagined – where individuals share common interests, values and principles, or a project. Belonging provides them with access to an environment within which they matter.

Therefore, when analysing the sense of social belonging of the women I met in Rwanda and BiH, I explore their emotional attachment to their nation and community, and their social worth within this environment. This is strongly intertwined with the concept of social integration. For the purpose of this thesis, I refer to social integration as the equal access to benefits, services and scope of justice available to members of the in-group, which I discuss in more depth below (Opotow, 1990: 2; Tugendhat, 1993: 5-7).

To achieve social reintegration, a certain degree of social belonging is therefore needed, since access to services will be fully granted only if members of the group offer these women ‘a familiar space’. Chapters Six and Seven will explore these concepts in relation to the experiences of the survivors of sexual violence, where for these women, being socially reintegrated would for example mean that they would have their voices and rights valued and promoted by their
community and national group, enforcing their access to the benefits of the in-
group (participation in the community life, employment opportunities, etc.).

As this thesis will demonstrate, social integration for the survivors of sexual violence is a process strongly dependent on various actors, such as the post-conflict state, NGOs and the national group, but these women exert a certain agency in creating or not a sense of belonging to these actors. These contrasts between these two concepts therefore explain the conceptual focus of this research, which is to analyse how women experience social belonging in post-conflict Rwanda and BiH (research question 1), and how the NGOs that work with them and their state facilitate their social reintegration (research question 2).

Finally, it is worth noting that I am using the term ‘post-conflict’ for purposes of simplicity, referring to the period following the ethnic violence and the signing of the peace accords. ‘Post-Conflict’ does not suggest in this thesis that the tensions at the core of the previous armed conflicts are completely resolved, but it refers to this reconstruction period after the violent conflict.

**The Embodied Nation**

Existing theories on gender and nationalism provide the necessary theoretical grounding on which to understand the consequences of wartime sexual violence on the women and their national group. In this thesis, I argue that the women’s bodies were used as the battlefield upon which the nation could be destroyed, giving them the role of embodiment of the nation. This role of ‘bodies of the nation’ creates
important consequences in the aftermath of the violence, with these women suffering from a moral exclusion because of the aggression committed to their bodies.

Theories of embodiment (Thapan 1997; Witz, 2000; Backett-Milburn and McKie, 2001; Howson, 2005) suggest that the human body has been appropriated by society to construct and embody gender. For instance, Thapan (1997: 1-2) argues that the body is crucial to a person’s sense of identity, and that the body possesses symbolic and cultural values that differ across societies. In this case, the importance of the female body should not be understood only in biological terms, but through the social context in which it is being discussed. It is indeed argued that ‘gender is embodied and bodies are gendered’ (Howson, 2005: 143). The female body is no longer perceived as an individual ‘property’ since it has been appropriated by the nation to establish gender relations and cultural values. Based on this assumption, a connection between the female body and the nation can be made. As Wenk (2000: 70) suggests, personification has been used throughout history as a way of representing ideas that cannot be illustrated. This is the case of the concept of ‘nation’, and nationalist discourses have used women’s bodies as the personification of the nation in order to foster a sense of belonging to this abstract concept. To do so, women’s bodies became the body of the nation through which future generations are reproduced.

Moreover, women’s bodies are also used to embody ideas of national supremacy through values of chastity, fecundity and purity (Enloe, 1990: 54, Mertus, 1994: 16; Yuval-Davis, 1997: 45; Cockburn, 1998: 162; Mookherjee, 2008: 38). Mosse (1985: 90) explains that at the beginning of the 19th century, nationalist discourses started to use female symbols to represent the nation. Many female figures, such as Marianne
The metaphor of family is indispensable to nationalism. The nation is depicted as one great family, the members as brothers and sisters of the motherland or fatherland, speaking their mother tongue. The family of the nation overrides and replaces the individual’s family but evokes similarly strong loyalties and vivid attachments. Even where local allegiances are tolerated and real families given their due, the language and symbolism of the nation asserts its priority and, through the state and citizenship, exerts its legal and bureaucratic pressures on the family, using similar kinship metaphors to justify itself.

This suggests that nationalist discourses make a connection between the private (having children) and the public (survival of the nation) (Blom, 2000: 17). Due to their role as cultural reproducers of the nation, the role of embodying the nation is
therefore imposed on women, reducing them to their motherhood (Enloe, 1990: 54; Yuval-Davis, 1997: 45; Cockburn, 1998: 43).

This role as cultural reproducers of the nation becomes increasingly important when group identity intensifies or when the nation feels threatened by another group, and even more so when a woman is raped (Yuval-Davis, 1994: 413). In these contexts, women as mothers and wives become politicized and are instructed to participate in the nationalist agenda by producing more members of the nation, and by conserving the nation’s purity (Enloe, 1990: 44; Milic, 1993: 120; Moghadam, 1994: 18; Mostov, 1995: 522; Cockburn, 1998: 43). This means that survivors of rape, especially those who had children born out of rape, are perceived first as hurting the nation’s respectability, and second its survival and reproduction. As Yuval-Davis (1997: 30-33) explains, since the future of the nation depends on its continuous growth, reproductive rights become extremely relevant to nationalist ideology. When the nation is constructed in ethnic terms, the pressure to bear more children is closely entwined with the need to protect the purity of the bloodline, legitimizing a greater government control over what is defined as “appropriate” sexual behaviour and what becomes “deviant”, such as having sexual intercourse with an outsider (Yuval-Davis, 1997: 37; Cockburn, 1998: 43; Mayer, 2000: 13; Peterson, 2000: 69).

In this way, the female body becomes the nation’s body, through which both the nation and its boundaries are reproduced (Eisenstein, 2000: 47; Mayer, 2000: 18). Moving beyond the metaphor of nation-as-woman, by becoming the body of the nation, there is a more problematic ideology of woman-as-nation. Indeed, in the very influential book ‘Purity and Danger’, Douglas (1966: 142) mentioned how
The body is a model which can stand for any bounded system. Its boundaries can represent any boundaries which are threatened or precarious. The body is a complex structure. The functions of its different parts and their relation afford a source of symbols for other complex structures.

This is especially true of the female body, where in patriarchal society it is the entry point into the group (Douglas, 1966: 156). In the case of ethnically defined nations, their bodies serve the purpose of carrying the distinction between the insiders and outsiders of the nation. Woman-as-nation suggests the fusion between women’s bodies and the nation’s boundaries, between “Our Women” versus “Enemy/Other Women”. As Yuval-Davis (1994: 413) argues:

Gender divisions often play a central organizing role in specific constructions of ethnicity, marking ethnic boundaries and reproducing ethnic difference. (…) The “proper” behaviour of women is often used to signify the difference between those who belong to the collectivity and those who do not.

More importantly, this also means that raped women and the children born out of rape now embody the “Other”. Sexual violence as a weapon of war therefore transforms the raped women into dirty and sinful individuals (Mertus, 1994: 18) who disturb the social order. Dirt and purity are used to impose social order on lived experiences and when something, or someone, is considered dirty or an anomaly, it reinforces the boundaries of the category within which it/they are not included (Douglas, 1966: 4, 47). Moreover, Douglas (1966: 48) notes that

There are several ways of treating anomalies. Negatively, we can ignore, just not perceive them, or perceiving we can condemn. Positively, we can deliberately confront the anomaly and try to create a new pattern of reality in which it has a place. It is not impossible for an individual to revise his own personal scheme of classifications. But no individual lives in isolation and his scheme will have been partly received from others.

This thesis will demonstrate that in the cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda, the population engages in a negative response to the survivors of sexual violence,
instead of creating a new pattern that challenges the taboo and stigma associated with rape.

**From ethnic identities to personal sense of self**

As the substantive chapters will demonstrate, the women I met who experienced wartime sexual violence suffer from stigmatization and social exclusion in the aftermath of the violence. Most immediately, the experiences described in this thesis demonstrate how some women are still struggling with the construction of their ethnic and gender identities, while other women have reached a certain level of empowerment by disassociating themselves from the status of victimhood in favour of rebuilding their identities as survivors (Green, 2009: 41). However, scholars such as Green (2009: 41, 118) and Forsyth (1999: 63) suggest that stigmatization and exclusion disrupt the construction of the self, with the result that the survivors’ identity as moral and good persons is questioned. Stigmatization may therefore lead to a loss of self, with ‘former self-images crumbling away without a simultaneous development of equally valued new ones’ (Charmaz, 1983: 168). I therefore argue that regardless of the ethnic or civic nation found in the post-conflict state, there is a shift from ethnic identities to moral identities in the aftermath of the violence, where underlying these difficulties of ethnic and gender identification is a deeper loss of moral self that is caused by the consequences of wartime sexual violence.

Because the day-to-day experiences of these women are framed by their ordeals during the war, the process of stigmatization experienced is first understood as a continuation of the ethnic violence. The academic literature provides a number of theories explaining the character and nature of ethnic violence. Most notable is Mann’s ‘Types of Violence and Cleansing in Inter-Group Relations’ (2004: 23-24).
Table 1. Types of Violence and Cleansing in Inter-Group Relations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Violence</th>
<th>Types of Cleansing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>Partial (abandoning of identity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. None</td>
<td>Voluntary Assimilation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Multi-culturalism/toleration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Consociational/Confederalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Institutional</td>
<td>Discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coercion</td>
<td>1. Official language restrictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Segregation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Policed Repress</td>
<td>Selective policed repression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Policed partial repression of out group language &amp; culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Policed out group settlement/displacement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Violent</td>
<td>Generalized Policed repression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression</td>
<td>1. ‘Pogroms’, communal riots, some forms of rape</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Violent settlement/displacement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Unpremeditated</td>
<td>‘Mistaken’ war, civil war &amp; revolutionary projects, fratricide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass Deaths</td>
<td>‘Callous’ war, civil war &amp; class war &amp; revolutionary projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Premeditated</td>
<td>Exemplary &amp; civil war repression, systematic reprisals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass Killing</td>
<td>1. Forced conversion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Politicide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Classicide</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

His framework of ethnic violence undoubtedly explains the character of violence in BiH and Rwanda through an escalation of ethnic tensions towards premeditated mass killings and total cleansing. The framework also demonstrates how first and foremost, it is the ethnic identities of the individuals involved that caused tensions during the ethnic violence, and not the personal sense of self.

However, I argue in this thesis that in the aftermath of the violence, the women I interviewed do not experience social exclusion solely because of their ethnic impurity (due to their close contact with the enemy ‘Other’), but more importantly because the perceived dirtiness of their bodies is now also imposed on their moral character. There is therefore the belief that the social self of these women is now ‘bad’ and ‘immoral’. Tugendhat (1993: 5-7) theorized how individuals are socialized into being members of a community, with set rules on what is considered ‘good’ or ‘bad’. This set of rules, or moral values, both encourages and discourages certain behaviours, as a continuum from very bad to very good. Individuals engaging in some of these behaviours can therefore be deprecated or highly esteemed, based on their conformity with the community’s set of moral rules. Staub (1990: 54; 1993: 341) suggests that this set of rules is established in order to build the community’s sense of self and identity, and, as described above, in times of ethnic conflict the purity and morality of the group may be promoted.

I however nuance this argument, suggesting that in the case of the Bosnian and Rwandan ethnic violence, the discourses of ‘othering’ focused on the purity of the ethnic group and its identity, and less so on its morality. As presented above, the norms towards sexual behaviours had more the purpose of preserving the purity of the ethnic bloodline than preserving the morality of its members. However, since
moral norms play a role in distinguishing who is included and excluded from the benefits of being a member of the community (Deutsch, 1975: 142; Tugendhat, 1993: 5-7; Opotow, 2004: 105), the elite used a moral discourse to render certain groups eligible for violence and human rights violations (Opotow, Gerson and Woodside, 2005: 305). Indeed, as argued by Opotow, Gerson and Woodside (2005: 305), those within the boundaries of fairness ‘are morally included and seen as deserving fair treatment. Those outside are morally excluded, beyond our moral concerns, and eligible for deprivation, exploitation and other harms that might be ignored or condoned as normal, inevitable, and deserved’. However, as Mann’s typology demonstrates, it is the politics of ethnic dynamics, and the identity of the groups involved that was threatening during the ethnic violence, and not their moral self. Therefore, the moral exclusion experienced during the ethnic violence was justified by the immorality of the enemy ethnic group as a whole, which is why the women describe in Chapters Six and Seven that they were targeted during the ethnic violence because of their ethnic identity.

However, as shown in the following table from Opotow, Gerson and Woodside (2005: 306), I argue that a new form of moral exclusion is witnessed in the aftermath of the violence, with the survivors of sexual violence suffering from narrow and subtle exclusion. This exclusion is different to the wide and blatant one that was at play during the ethnic violence, but this time the women are excluded not because of their identity, but because of their moral self. Unlike with the moral exclusion experienced during the ethnic violence, this post-conflict exclusion is now justified by their individual impurity, and therefore by their personal sense of self. This moral exclusion occurs through various physical, social and economic types of exclusion,
but underlying all of these is the social understanding that these women are now excluded from the boundary of fairness due to their past experience of sexual violence. The experiences related in the substantive chapters indeed highlight how some women are actively bullied and intimidated by their community, while others experience a milder form of moral exclusion where their needs and rights are being ignored and uncared for by their community. This is a result of disintegrated moral obligations towards these outcasts and the belief that they are undeserving of the fairness and resources available to the in-group, with society accepting the outcomes of this exclusion on the lives of these individuals (Opotow, 1990: 2; Opotow, Gerson and Woodside, 2005: 303-306).

**Table 2. Manifestations and Extent of Moral Exclusion.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Subtle</th>
<th>Blatant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Narrow</td>
<td>Rudeness, intimidation and derogation (e.g. Bullying and sexual harassment)</td>
<td>Persecution and violence directed at particular individuals or groups (e.g. hate crimes, witch hunts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wide</td>
<td>Oppression and structural violence (e.g. racism, poverty, domestic violence)</td>
<td>Direct violence and violations of human rights (e.g. ethnic cleansing, mass murder, inquisitions)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Based on the theories presented so far, it would not necessarily be surprising that the women are perceived as ‘immoral’ by the perpetrators themselves, and that the perpetrators blame the women for their suffering, arguing that they brought it upon themselves as outsiders to the perpetrators’ scope of justice (Bandura, 2004: 39-45).
As expressed by Bandura (2004: 40), ‘people do not usually engage in harmful conduct until they have justified, to themselves, the morality of their actions’. However, what is paradoxical in the cases of the women I interviewed is that the social exclusion currently experienced comes from members of their own ethnic or national group (Staub, 1990: 56). This is something not necessarily recognized by the state in either country – which will be discussed in the next section.

Some scholars have attempted to understand why victims of crime might be blamed for their situation, as is the case for many of the women I met. The ‘just world theory’ (Lerner, 1980; Hafer 2004) argues that individuals believe that the world is fair, and that the injustice experienced by innocent victims threatens this sense of a fair and rational world. To preserve this sentiment of safety, individuals will then blame the victims, maintaining the belief that their suffering was deserved. However, Lerner (1980) - the original contributor of the ‘just world theory’ – also suggested that a sense of closeness and identification with the victim may increase compassion towards that individual.

If we identify with the inflicter, we are likely to condemn the victim, as a way of maintaining the inflicter’s integrity. On the other hand, if we have identified with the victim, then obviously we will blame and condemn the person who “caused” the harm (Lerner, 1980: 91).

Based on this theory, rape survivors faced two possibilities: members of the ethnic/national group would support their kin women and condemn the perpetrators for these crimes, or they would blame these survivors in order to maintain their belief of a just world. In the aftermath of wars that caused immense suffering, one would expect that the belief of a just world would have already been destroyed by the ethnic
violence, and that members of the group would support their kin women. This, however, is not happening in practice.

Instead, many women are blamed for their rape, suggesting that the crime was caused by their behaviour or character (Lerner, 1980: 96; Hafer, 2004: 122). The impurity of their body reflects on their own moral self, resulting in the character of the women concerned being questioned. ‘People “identify” with and try to help victims who, on the basis of the best information available, appear to be worthy of help by virtue of their innocence, lack of culpability for their fate, and high personal worth’ (Lerner, 1980: 107). This can be particularly disturbing for the survivors of sexual violence, since they were imposed upon them the embodiment of their nation, and are now blamed for this embodiment. This may lead to a feeling of injustice - as is clearly observed in the Bosnian-Herzegovinian context - where the women themselves do not comprehend the rationale behind their social exclusion.

Victim-blaming is not observed with other victims of the Bosnian war and Rwandan genocide, such as widows or individuals who were physically tortured, but it is extremely common for both the men and women who experienced wartime sexual violence. I therefore suggest that there is something distinct and inherent about sexual violence as a crime that encourages victim-blaming instead of prosecuting the perpetrators. This may originate from a deep patriarchal set of moral values. A shift therefore occurred between the conflict and the post-conflict period, in which the women’s sense of social self changed and pushed them to the margins of their own group. Drawing on Mann’s and Opotow et al.’s models, I then propose a specific model for women who experienced wartime sexual violence that captures this shift from ethnic purity to immorality.
Table 3. Specific Typology for the Survivors of Sexual Violence in Rwanda and BiH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period of Time</th>
<th>Experiences of the Survivors of Sexual Violence</th>
<th>Group committing the exclusion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Conflict</td>
<td>Escalation in the type of violence and cleansing Embodiment of the nation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>Premeditated mass killings and total ethnic cleansing Blatant and wide moral exclusion justified by the ethnic identities Sexual Violence in War</td>
<td>Enemy Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Conflict</td>
<td><strong>Move from Ethnic Identities to the Moral Self</strong> Narrow and subtle moral exclusion justified by the spoiled moral character of the survivors of sexual violence Occurring at the same time as processes of post-conflict reconstruction</td>
<td>Kin Group</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A few points should be made about this framework. First, it incorporates Mann’s framework, suggesting that during the pre-war and war periods, the violence and moral exclusion that justified this violence were embedded within the ethnic identities of the groups involved. The moral exclusion was a group exclusion, where it was the ethnic identity of the group that justified the exclusion, and not the individual set of individual identities that form one’s sense of self. The ethnic women had imposed upon them the role of embodying the nation, and this put them at risk of sexual violence. However, once their bodies were used as a battlefield, a shift occurred where the impurity of their body was transferred to their moral character.
Having their bodies – and therefore the body of the nation – ‘spoiled’ by the enemy group, these women now started to be considered ‘sinful’ by their own group in the aftermath of the violence. Since their impurity could no longer be justified by their ethnic identity – an identity they share(d) with their group - their kin group now justified this impurity as a result of their own personal sense of self. This is an important shift from group moral exclusion to individual moral exclusion. This shift is now included in this proposed framework, clearly showing how the exclusion now experienced also comes from the kin group of these women, and not only the enemy group. Chapters Six and Seven demonstrate in more depth how this moral exclusion takes form, such as through inability to secure employment, unequal access to services, etc. In a sense, for these women, the violence has ended, but the moral aggression they suffered during the armed conflict is still present in the aftermath, though with different manifestations and to a different extent. I argue throughout this thesis that this remains the main moral transgression that these women experience in the post-conflict period.

**Mediating the Experiences**

Moral exclusion takes considerable time to address, and in this case, it is only by transforming social norms, and the moral rules at their core, that women (and men) who experienced wartime sexual violence will be reintegrated within their community (Opotow, 2004: 105). This process may take considerable time, but is still possible. As Opotow (1990: 12) suggests, the process of moral exclusion allows individuals and society to modify each other:

In one direction, individuals internalize the prevailing social order, reshape their perceptions of others, reconfigure their moral community, and engage in symptoms of moral exclusion such as dehumanization, victim blaming,
psychological distancing and condescension. In the other direction, moral exclusion emerges from individuals; their attitudes and behaviours reshape the social order, redefining group entitlements, narrowing the scope of justice, and reinforcing the perceptual distortions that gave rise to them.

Individuals have the power to transform the social order and to redefine the moral values of their community. However, since survivors of sexual violence are excluded from this decision-making process, many of them now rely on NGOs to bring about this transformative social change.

To achieve this, women’s NGOs tend to provide programmes that target women’s empowerment, voice and agency. Voice refers to women being represented in various spheres (political representation is one example) and have their concerns and needs heard (World Bank, 2014: 7), while agency refers to ‘the ability to make decisions about one’s own life and act on them to achieve a desired outcome, free of violence, retribution, or fear’ (World Bank, 2014: 3). Empowerment refers to economic, social and political power shifts between gender groups that allow women to implement the choices made about their lives (Batliwala, 2007: 560; Munoz-Boudet, Petesch, Turk and Thumala, 2012: 21). These processes are perceived as crucial for improving women’s rights and social status, since it is argued that increased agency, voice and empowerment are crucial for an holistic improved livelihood (improved health, increased income, etc.), and that limited agency restricts access to services and opportunities (World Bank, 2014: 2).

These processes are inter-connected and are all necessary for the social reintegration of the survivors of sexual violence, but may result in different programmes within the NGOs. For example, whilst NGOs may agree that institutional changes are needed to transform gender power relations, empowerment
programmes will often take the form of microcredit, land ownership, etc. (Batliwala, 2007: 563). In contrast, increasing voice may instead focus on the inclusion of women in political institutions (World Bank, 2014: 7). Due to the nature of these programmes and the often inability of the post-conflict state to achieve these processes, NGOs are often the actors with the ability to promote these processes for marginalized groups, such as survivors of sexual violence (Fisher, 1997: 443).

Indeed, as a result of the ‘New Policy Agenda’ in the 1990s, NGOs have been attributed with the role of fostering post-conflict reconstruction and strengthening civil society (Tarry, 2000: 109). This has increased both their roles and influence in conflict and post-conflict societies, as the following quote suggests.

A mutual dependence between governments and NGOs has resulted, with NGOs increasingly looking to public donors to contribute to their projects, and governments relying on NGOs to deliver humanitarian aid and other services in complex emergencies and in peacebuilding operations (Bennett, 1994: xiii).

However, the academic literature has so far been extremely critical of the role of NGOs, suggesting that their autonomy and agency are seriously constrained by two actors: states and donors (Bennett, 1994: xiii; Tarry, 2000: 109). Consequently, I argue that the NGOs I observed in both contexts undertake the role of mediating the experiences of the survivors of sexual violence, providing them with services to increase their voice, agency and empowerment, while at the same time operating within the parameters imposed by their donors and the state in which they operate.

The focus of the ‘New Public Agenda’ is on poverty reduction and the Millennium Development Goals (now the Sustainable Development Goals) - and more recently on international security - meaning that important sources of funding
are prioritizing programmes associated with these issues (Hayman, 2006: 16-19). It is suggested that states have a strong interest in aligning with these international priorities, providing them with increasing opportunities to receive funding and to strengthen their civil society (Whitfield, 2009: 1). International priorities therefore align with the need to increased women’s voice, agency and empowerment, but here the NGOs face the difficult challenge of promoting these processes to a group of marginalized women: the survivors of sexual violence.

Indeed, as argued above, the women who experienced wartime rape are positioned outside the scope of justice of their nation, and the NGOs working with them need first of all to reintegrate them as members of the nation before being able to support them as women. This requires additional programmes that may not be included within the SDGs (or previously within the MDGs) and that are specifically designed for post-conflict societies. This therefore puts the NGOs I observed in a situation whereby the needs of their beneficiaries may require specific programmes, whilst the NGOs themselves also need to align with the national strategic interests of their donors and of the state in which they operate. This may not always provide the necessary institutional changes needed for the reintegration of the survivors of sexual violence (Hamilton, K., 2000: 53).

**Relation between Nation/State-Building and Social Reintegration**

This situation is complicated in post-conflict states, where I also argue that the policies of post-conflict reconstruction strongly shape the social reintegration of the survivors of sexual violence. Theorists of post-conflict reconstruction agree that:
A mixture of measures aimed to rebuild both the Nation and the State are needed. The basis assumption remains that state-building and nation-building are two different, albeit necessary, elements to guarantee the reintegration of a State into the peaceful international community after a conflict (Fischer and Quénivet, 2005: 11-12).

For peacebuilders, state-building refers to the task of reconstructing the institutional structures of the state (government structure, elections, rule of law, police forces, etc.), and its physical structures, such as schools and roads. In a post-Cold War context, international actors involved in state-building also assert that this reconstruction is only possible through the establishment of a liberal economy based on the Western model (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 11; Diamond, 1999: 78-88; Fischer and Quénivet, 2005: 14; Hippler, 2008: 552). By contrast, nation-building usually refers to a certain degree of identification with a common language, history and culture (Tilly, 1975: 608; Smith, 1991: 76), allowing the establishment of a sense of national identity and loyalty to the state (Colley, 1992: 6). This can be extremely complex in the aftermath of ethnic violence (Hobsbawm, 1997: 360; Hechter, 2000: 65).

Whilst often described in the literature as a dichotomy, I argue that both sets of policies are needed for broader post-conflict reconstruction, and for the reintegration of the survivors of sexual violence. The following section will analyse in further detail how each process influences individual experiences of belonging, demonstrating how they both remain intertwined and crucial for the processes of social reintegration.

**Social Belonging through State-Building**

Theories of post-conflict reconstruction refer to state-building as the reconstruction of government institutions and structures, governance, and state
capacity-building, alongside economic development. First, in terms of governance, the academic literature on post-violence reconstruction tends to privilege the establishment of a democratic government and political culture in post-conflict societies (Manning, 2006: 725; Oberschall, 2007: 198-199; Hippler, 2008: 552; Loizides, Kovras and Ireton, 2010: 2). This democratic governance should involve functioning municipal administration and legal courts, and be committed to the accommodation of minorities. It should also include free speech and freedom of association, a constitution that secures civil and political rights, and an electoral system that promotes moderation (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 33; Hechter, 2000: 138; Reynolds, 2002: Introduction). The aim is to create conditions where access to state services is accessed by all, rejecting a winner-take-all approach that could fuel further ethnic resentment. However, no consensus has been reached in the academic literature on which constitutional design should be implemented to achieve this stable society.

For instance, proponents (Lijphart, 1977: 54-55; McGarry and O’Leary, 2004: 17; Loizides, Kovras and Ireton, 2010: 2) of a system that acknowledges and accommodates the ethnic identities at the source of the conflict support the establishment of consociationalism, a system in which power-sharing and the federal structure are based upon ethnicity. This system would mean that the survivors of sexual violence would have their rights secured as members of their ethnic group, since consociationalism promotes the maintenance of multi-ethnic politics. Individuals would therefore have the incentive to maintain a sense of belonging with their own ethnic group.
However, other scholars such as Horowitz (1993: 35-36) suggest instead that a transition from a multi-ethnic democracy to a political culture based on special-interest politics is crucial. Horowitz criticizes consociationalism for strengthening divisions between ethnic groups, and proposes instead the establishment of a unitary state, where competition occurs between cross-ethnic groups with similar political interests rather than between ethnic groups. This should be achieved alongside an important process of nation-building, creating incentives for individuals of different ethnicity to share similar political interests (Horowitz, 1993: 35-36).

Snyder (2000: 70) argues that political leaders face the challenge of appealing to their constituency for political power. However, in the aftermath of ethnic violence, this need for mass support can lead to discourses of ethnic supremacy and be an obstacle to peacebuilding. Fearon and Laitin (2000: 855) also suggest that political competition in divided societies can be a direct cause of ethnic violence, because political elites can legitimise their political power by claiming their group faces an external threat. Finally, Mann (2004: 231-235) argues that the democratization process can be an explosive issue in divided societies, since control over the state means control over a high number of resources. Changing identities at the local level would therefore facilitate democratic consolidation, but more importantly for this thesis, it would mean that the reconstruction of the sense of belonging of the survivors of sexual violence is not necessarily constrained by ethnic politics, thus creating opportunities for these individuals to reconstruct their sense of self independent of their ethnicity.

The type of constitutional design adopted by the post-conflict state therefore has impacts beyond the political or institutional level, since it directly influences whether
individuals have the incentive to mobilize based on political interests which are not embedded within ethnic identities.

**Social Belonging through Nation-Building**

Nation-building generally refers to a certain degree of assimilation or cohesion under an inclusive national identity (Deutsch and Foltz, 1966: 118; Weilenmann, 1966: 40; Fischer and Quénévet, 2005: 17-18), but in cases of post-conflict societies, it also entails the implementation of mechanisms of truth, justice and reconciliation. These mechanisms are crucial for group cohesion because they establish individual accountability and allow individuals on the margins of society to be included in the reconciliation process. This process provides not only the necessary tools upon which ethnic reconciliation and group cohesion are possible, but also facilitates the social reintegration of certain victims of war. The establishment of truth and the prosecution of war criminals are necessary steps in the process of healing, shame removal for the victims and social inclusion under an inclusive group identity (Sarkin, 1999: 800; Loizides, Kovras and Ireton, 2010: 6).

This body of the literature provides a direct response to the argument presented above, on how women who were raped during the previous ethnic violence find themselves outside the scope of justice of their kin group. These mechanisms of truth, justice and reconciliation directly attempt to reverse this social pattern, allowing the women to be reintegrated within the scope of justice of their in-group, transferring their experienced blame, shame and immorality to their perpetrators (Sarkin, 1999: 799; Cockburn, 2001: 27-29). To do so, the rule of law should be effectively restored, as well as becoming fair and trustworthy enough for the population to favour court rulings over private revenge. Mechanisms regarding the
reintegration of war offenders should also be implemented (Minow, 1998: 77-78; Mobekk, 2005: 277-278).

The establishment of truth and reconciliation processes in divided societies can, however, be extremely challenging, as can be demonstrated by the Rwandan context. Aoláin, Haynes and Cahn (2011: 171) and King (2011: 139) argue that despite the success of Gacaca courts, it remains difficult for crimes of sexual violence to be prosecuted in some cases because of the absence of witnesses. The relative absence of crimes of sexual violence in the Gacaca courts demonstrates how the truth about the past conflict can be constructed in a way that denies some victims reconciliation and justice, and ensures the relative absence of sexual violence in public discourses. As King (2011: 139) suggests, women ‘were not allowed to say anything related to rape because doing so could lead the rapist génocidaire back to prison and in turn be considered as a crime committed by these women. Further, they did not see any support from the judges or other community members’. This is something that will be discussed in more depth in Chapter Six, and is a direct consequence of the change in the women’s moral value, who now find themselves outside the scope of justice of their own community. This therefore prevents or complicates their access to mechanisms of truth, justice and reconciliation, which are normally allowed to members of the in-group.

Finally, nation-building also includes the strengthening of group cohesion under a national identity. It is argued that ‘the greater the love felt by the members of a population for their country, language and state, the more these values become a common good that brings them to the whole’ (Weilenmann, 1966: 40). Divided societies should then foster a certain degree of assimilation to particular values,
language, history and culture as a transition from tribal or ethnic affiliation to national identification (Smith, 1991: 76; Colley, 1992: 382; Hobsbawm, 1997: 360-363; Hechter, 2000: 64-65). This ideology of civic nationalism may challenge the concept of woman-as-nation, but since I argued above that the post-conflict period is characterized by a shift from the ethnic to the moral, where it is not the women’s ethnic identities that were questioned, but rather their social moral value, a move towards civic nationalism may still not reintegrate the survivors of sexual violence into the community’s scope of justice.

**Discussion**

It can therefore be argued from the above theoretical framework that the women who suffered from wartime rape face social exclusion in the aftermath of the violence, as a result of their socially perceived low moral value. Differently from the ethnic war, where the rape was spoiling their ethnic *identities*, it is now their personal *self* that is being questioned by members of their community, since the perceived ‘dirtiness’ of their bodies has now been equated with their morality. This is something that will be discussed in Chapters Six and Seven. However, while the NGOs may provide programmes that allow them to reconstruct their personal sense of *self*, through increased agency, voice and empowerment, they operate in a context where the post-conflict reconstruction mostly targets a reconstruction of the nation’s *identity*, which will be discussed in further depth in Chapter Eight. Indeed, the policies of state or nation-building all share the same consequence of influencing the type of social belonging available to the survivors of sexual violence, such as mobilizing around ethnic or national identities. Yet, these policies do not challenge the moral norms that are at the core of the exclusion experienced by these women.
With the women and the states operating at different conceptual levels, the NGOs therefore have the role of bridging the gap between these micro and macro experiences. These concepts will be brought forward in Chapter Eight.

This thesis aims to explore how these experiences take form in two specific contexts, and addresses two broad main research questions:

1. *How are women who suffered from wartime sexual violence experiencing social belonging 15-20 years after the end of ethnic violence?*
2. *How do NGOs and state policies influence these experiences of social reintegration?*

These research questions shaped my research design, which will be discussed in the next chapter.
Chapter 3. Methods and Data

This chapter will discuss the methods used to conduct this research. It will first discuss the research design, before elaborating on the methods used. It will then discuss the ethical concerns related to this research and the actions implemented to address these concerns.

Contrast and Interpretative Research Design

To address the research questions, I undertook in-depth fieldwork observation and interviews in two contrasting contexts, in order to highlight the similarities and differences of the women’s post-conflict experiences across these contexts.

Following Mill’s method of agreement (1843: 454), these two countries were chosen because of their shared experience of ethnic violence and of wartime sexual violence, and because of important differences in their post-conflict settlements. It is argued that both conflicts drastically changed the ways in which war rape has come to be understood, with the International Court of Justice for the former Yugoslavia being the first international tribunal to prosecute individuals solely on the basis of crimes of sexual violence (Peterson and Runyan, 2010: 161). However, the countries differ in their views on ethnic accommodation, and despite gender-sensitive policies, both still face the challenge of promoting gender equality in the post-conflict setting (as described in Chapter Five). Furthermore, the Bosnian-Herzegovinian and Rwandan contexts present an interesting contrast in relation to the work conducted by NGOs to address the needs of this population, and the international aid made available for these civilian victims of war. It is worth specifying that NGOs were
chosen instead of state-run programmes in order to analyse whether their programmes and services align with the post-conflict reconstruction methods implemented by the state, or whether non-governmental organisations negotiate different practices of post-conflict reconciliation.

Following Geertz’s approach in *Islam Observed* (1968), this research bases itself on the rationale that an ethnography of the women’s and NGOs’ post-conflict experiences allows me to draw out the particularities of each context, which when contrasted highlight the similarities and differences across these contexts. They then form a commentary on each other, which is why the particular experiences in Rwanda can be fully understood only in contrast to the experiences in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and vice-versa.

**Two Targeted Ethnographies**

I conducted targeted ethnographic fieldwork in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina because it allowed me to observe the work done by the NGOs and to engage with the women and NGO staff. As Streeck (1983: 9) mentions of micro-ethnographies, ‘[they] seek to combine the exhibition of organizational processes in face-to-face interaction with the pursuit of applied issues’. A targeted ethnography was therefore appropriate in this case, since this research is not an observation of the NGOs as wholes, and instead focuses tightly on the programmes and services offered to their beneficiaries, and on their mediation role between their beneficiaries and the state. This approach was favoured over others because of the interpretative nature of this research. In order to gain the understandings and perceptions of my research participants, it was important to engage personally with them through a variety of
research methods, and a targeted ethnography allowed me to do so through participant observation, focus groups, and semi-structured and unstructured interviews (Davies, 1999: 4; Fielding, 2008: 267).

My fieldwork took place over a total period of seven months in 2013, in which four months were spent intensively with the NGOs and the women. It is worth noting that my time in the field in Rwanda was considerably longer than in Bosnia-Herzegovina for a variety of reasons. First, Bosnia-Herzegovina was my second ethnographic site, which meant that I arrived in BiH with a clearer research focus than in Rwanda; I needed more time to develop my research angle in Rwanda, which was not the case in BiH. Second, the experiences of the women and of the NGOs are different in each context, as will be described in Chapters Six and Seven, which meant that the fieldwork conducted was also different. For example, the organisations I observed in BiH did not provide the same variety of programmes as in Rwanda, so I spent less time observing each organisation in the former. Moreover, as the experiences on the ground are different in both countries, so is the experience of the researcher. I found Bosnia-Herzegovina a difficult field site, which I will explain in more detail below. For the purpose of this thesis, the data collected in this latter field site is sufficient, but more research in that context should be conducted for future projects.

The purpose of this thesis is not to determine what is true or false, but rather to analyse the perceptions and interpretations of my research participants on their post-conflict experiences. Moreover, the analysis conducted is a result of my own interpretations of these individual perceptions. As noted by Dewalt and Dewalt (2002: 30), ‘our personal characteristics as individuals - our ethnic identity, class,
sex, religion and family status - will determine how we interact with and report on the people we are studying’. There is therefore the possibility that the data collected was influenced by my identity and presence in the field, which may have influenced the behaviours and discourses of some individuals (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983: 111; Davies, 1999: 3; Carpenter, 2012: 364). For example, it may have been possible that some staff members exaggerated the difficulties they face in order to encourage more support for their organisation. I however do not believe that this happened in practice, since the staff members were aware that my research would not necessarily be used to promote their aid sector, and they were aware that the names of the organisations would be anonymised, therefore the thesis would not promote their specific organisation. Dickson-Gomez (2004: 153) also warns about the potential dilemma of an outsider explaining participants’ suffering without misinterpreting their memories of trauma and violence. This has been an important challenge, and throughout the research process I constantly questioned my interpretations of the data, ensuring that I did not form assumptions and make claims that were not substantiated by my data.

Some steps were implemented whilst conducting this research to limit potential bias, as explained above. The data was collected through participant observation, semi-structured and unstructured interviews, as well as focus groups, which allowed me to contrast the data and to ensure that I was not misinterpreting some statements (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983: 24; Davies, 1999: 85). Despite these steps undertaken, I acknowledge the possibility of bias in the respondents’ behaviours and narratives as a result of my presence in the field, and acknowledge my identity as a researcher who is also an atheist, a Western woman and an outsider from these
countries and experiences. Since as researchers we are not excluded from the social world we research, my identity and personal experiences have therefore probably influenced the way I approached this study (Dewalt and Dewalt, 2002: 30-31). One such example can be found in Rwanda, when I was attending an educational session for HIV-infected individuals at Organisation D. The session focused on safe sexual behaviours and practices, and the sexual norms discussed aligned with more traditional Christian values. Participants however started to ask me questions about sexual norms in the Western World, showing disbelief of certain behaviours. This is a banal example, but demonstrates how my social values and norms may differ from those of my research participants, and that these embedded values may have influenced my understanding of the consequences of sexual violence, and the resulting stigmatisation.

Finally, it is worth specifying that whilst this research focuses on women who experienced wartime sexual violence, this type of abuse can also be practiced on men and children. My focus was chosen for theoretical and practical reasons, but also because women represent the vast majority of the victims of sexual violence during armed conflicts. One should, however, be careful not to naturalise women as victims. It can be quite straightforward to understand wartime sexual violence as a dichotomy between male aggressors and female victims. Doing so, however, would be harmful, since it renders gender roles static (women as passive and men as aggressive) and marginalizes the male victims of sexual violence, making it even harder for them to receive assistance and resources. It is worth noting that women also participated in encouraging sexual violence, as demonstrated by the case of Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, the former minister of Family and Women’s Affairs in Rwanda,
who became the first female génocidaire prosecuted for her role in encouraging rape as a weapon of war (Peterson and Runyan, 2010: 161).

**Participant Observation in Two Fields**

My fieldwork first involved participant observation of grassroots and international organisations working with women who had experienced wartime sexual violence. In Rwanda, this included five grassroots and international non-governmental organisations in Kigali and in the Eastern province. Most services for survivors of sexual violence are currently being provided in Kigali, which is why I wanted to observe NGOs in this capital: some organisations were chosen because of their reputation in the field (Organisation E), others because they represent international organisations (Organisations A and B), and some others because they are grassroots organisations (Organisations C and D). I also observed the Eastern branch of Organisation E to draw out the particularities of this organisation in a rural setting. Due to the limited scope of this research where it was impossible to observe the work of all organisations working with survivors of the genocide, I chose these five organisations as I believe they represent well the NGO sector in Rwanda. From international to grassroots, from large to small NGOs, these five NGOs each represent the variety of the NGO sector in the Rwandan context.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, I observed the work done by five grassroots organisations that work with mothers, widows and survivors of sexual violence. These organisations were located in Sarajevo and in another municipality in the centre of the country, which I anonymise for purposes of this research. Prior to conducting fieldwork, I had decided that my research would focus on Bosnian Muslim women for ease of access in the field (most women who seek NGOs support identify as
Bosnian Muslim) and because they represented the majority of the women raped during the war. I am aware that this focus contributes to the lack of research on Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croat women. However, for the purpose of this research, this focus and the fact that the majority of Bosnian Muslim women who were victims of sexual violence during the war currently live in the Federation of BiH, meant that I chose NGOs that were established in that entity. Moreover, as with the Rwandan context, most organisations operate in Sarajevo, the capital. However, I also engaged with an organisation located in another canton in the Federation of BiH (Organisation J). These organisations were specifically chosen because of their reputation in the country (Organisations G, I and J), one because it is a grassroots organisation (Organisation F) and another because it was recommended to me by one of the women I interviewed (Organisation H). Similarly to Rwanda, I chose these organisations because I believe they well represent the variety of the aid sector in BiH. Of course, an exact representation of the aid sector in both contexts is impossible to achieve for this research, and this was not the intended purpose. Whilst my rationale for including organisations in my fieldwork was based on the need to include contrasting NGOs (international to grassroots, large to small), the ethnographic nature of the research prevents any generalisations to the wider aid sector across both contexts.

Observation was conducted with the purpose of developing a clearer understanding of the work done by these NGOs, of the relationship between the organisations and their beneficiaries, and finally of the mediation role they undertake (Walsh, 1998 in Seale, 1998: Chapter 17; Bryman, 2004: Chapter 14). Participant observation as a method normally involves a long-term observation of research
subjects but as discussed above, a targeted ethnography was conducted in each organisation. This focused research agenda meant I spent less time doing participant observation with each organisation than a normal ethnography would entail (Lambert, Glacken and McCarron, 2011: 20).

My participant observation of the NGOs’ activities provided me with an initial understanding of the range of services offered to their beneficiaries, of the participants’ behaviour when participating in the activities, and of the relationship between the women themselves and the staff members. I was able to conduct this direct observation in their natural setting on a day-to-day basis without strongly impacting the research participants, and as a result I developed a better understanding of their ordinary behaviour and experiences (Davies, 1999: 71; Dewalt and Dewalt, 2002: 1-2; Bryman, 2004: Chapter 14; Gomm, 2008: 269). The data gathered through this participant observation was mostly useful to address my second research question, i.e. *How do NGOs influence the women’s experiences of social reintegration?*

In addition, using participant observation as a first method of data collection offered me the opportunity to build close relationships with the research participants, mostly with the women (Dewalt and Dewalt, 2002: 40-45; Bryman, 2004: Chapter 14). Building relationships of trust, respect and friendship was crucial to conducting my fieldwork. Participant observation allowed the women to get to know me during the activities, and helped create relationships of trust in which they felt comfortable speaking about their post-conflict experiences, which paved the way to answer my first research question (*How are women who suffered from wartime sexual violence experiencing social belonging 15-20 years after the end of ethnic violence?*). This
was also important to achieve early on in my fieldwork because of my position as an outside researcher, and the possibility that the women might have been uncomfortable in speaking to me about their past (Walsh, 1998: 226).

There are, however, a few weaknesses associated with using participant observation as a research method of which I was aware. First, the researcher being the primary research instrument in participant observation, I had to ensure that my observation was not too narrow and excluded important facts or events, or that my interpretation of certain behaviour was not inadequate (Walsh, 1998: 221; Dewalt and Dewalt, 2002: Chapter 4; Bryman, 2004: Chapter 14; Gomm, 2008: 292). This was controlled in the field by keeping extensive field notes and by discussing with my interpreters some situations or behaviours that I found puzzling. There was also the possibility that the organisations observed might have had an incentive to keep things secret in order to be perceived in a favourable light. There is a chance that what was considered ‘ordinary’ during my observation was in fact a cover made by these organisations (Walsh, 1998: 231; Bryman, 2004: Chapter 14). However, I do not believe it to be the case for this research, as in most cases I was able to support the claims made by the staff members through other sources of data, such as official documents or the interviews and focus groups conducted.

Finally, while some scholars (Davies, 1999: 70-71; Dewalt and Dewalt, 2002: 18; Silverman, 2006: 82-85) have also warned against the risk of ‘going native’ - which refers to becoming so involved in participant observation that one’s status as a researcher is lost and events or behaviour are instead interpreted from the worldview of the research participants - this was not as much an issue in this case because of the
nature of the ethnographic research which was narrow and targeted, and over a limited period of time.

**Focus Groups**

Focus groups were organised in both places with women who survived sexual violence and with groups of beneficiaries. In Rwanda, I conducted four focus groups: two focus groups with HIV-infected individuals and two focus groups with women who were raped during the genocide (there was no overlap between the experiences in these focus groups). The two focus groups organised with the rape survivors contributed data that directly addressed my first research question, and the focus groups with HIV-infected individuals were conducted in order to understand the similarities and differences in stigmatization that these different groups of individuals may face. The focus groups with HIV-infected individuals were very helpful in providing a nuanced analysis of the post-conflict experiences of the rape survivors. These focus groups were held in the offices of the organisations I observed during educational training and group counselling sessions. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, I conducted one focus group during a knitting session with 20 women who experienced wartime sexual violence. These women were chosen since they had already formed a group as members of the same organisation, a clear advantage. Indeed, the focus groups in both field sites were conducted in group activities already planned by the organisations, which meant that all participants knew each other. The groups were therefore organic groups, since they were either groups of income-generating activities, HIV-infected individuals, or women who experienced wartime rape. I chose to conduct the focus groups in this manner thinking that the women may be more comfortable expressing themselves in a group setting, where the other
women involved all share the same trauma. In practice, the group setting created an atmosphere of emotional support where it became easier for the participants to overcome feelings of shame or embarrassment (Morgan and Kruger, 1993: 12-17; Kitzinger, 1994: 112; Cronin, 2008: 233). Focus groups were however not conducted with NGO staff members because of the complexity of their work schedules.

Focus groups were included in this ethnographic research because they are ideal ways to explore opinions in the context of a group dynamic, especially in my case when they already form constituted groups. This was especially interesting in order to contrast the group dynamic and social belonging within the groups in Rwanda to the group in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Furthermore, since I am not part of the same culture as the research participants and have not suffered from the same trauma, focus groups were helpful in allowing the respondents to raise issues that I had not planned for and to discuss issues without imposing my prior knowledge or biases, or lack of knowledge. Indeed, the group dynamic inherent to focus groups allows ideas and opinions to be shared, nuanced and clarified without constant intervention from the researcher. Other participants might also challenge statements made by others, which can prevent participants from embellishing their accounts and misleading the researcher (Fern, 1982: 1-2; Morgan and Kruger, 1993: 17-18; Kitzinger, 1994: 105-112; Bryman, 2004: Chapter 16; Cronin, 2008: 228).

Moreover, focus groups were ideal for this research because of the sensitivity of the topic. Focus groups can be used when researching sensitive topics, as research on HIV has demonstrated, because of the concept of ‘strength in numbers’ (Kitzinger, 1994: 111). As will be explained below, face-to-face interviews on sensitive topics might be difficult to organise, especially when the researcher is perceived as an
outsider. However, there are some limitations associated with using focus groups that I had to address.

First, there was a chance the information discussed might not be directly associated with the research, since focus groups do not give the researcher strong control over the research process (Bryman, 2004: Chapter 16). However, this was mitigated through the use of probes following interesting remarks and by conducting unstructured interviews as the last stage of my research, and in practice the focus groups generated interesting data to answer both of my research questions. Moreover, Cronin (2008: 240-241) warns of the possibility of creating a group effect, where a consensus is made despite individuals disagreeing with each other. This could happen if some individuals are more talkative and dominant than others. In these cases, the data collected may only be representative of a few individuals, and may understate disagreements and opposition within the group. This issue occurred in both contexts, where some women were more dominant than others, and seemed to be wishing to promote their message in contrast to others. Whilst Cronin would suggest trying to include the more reticent speakers into the group discussion, I decided not to target any individual and probe them to engage in the conversation in case they did not want to share private information on this specific topic. However, since this research does not attempt to provide a representative account of the post-conflict experiences of all women, the data gathered through the focus groups was analysed as individual perceptions and understandings, and not as a group consensus.

**Unstructured and Semi-Structured Interviews**

In addition to participant observation and focus groups, I mostly conducted unstructured and semi-structured interviews with women who had experienced
sexual violence and the NGO staff members working with them. In Rwanda, I conducted in-depth interviews with ten women survivors of sexual violence during the genocide and 16 staff members. The survivor narratives all come from Tutsi women aged between 35 and 60 years old, who are members of a survivors’ organisation and mostly live in the Kigali Province (see Annex 1). Additionally, I engaged in non-formal interviews with around 30 survivors through attending counselling sessions, income-generating activities sessions, and follow-up health meetings. I also conducted an interview with a representative of the Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, I engaged in in-depth interviews with six women survivors of sexual violence, and seven NGO staff members. The survivors of sexual violence include women of 35 to 60 years old, who are all members of a women’s organisation, all identify as Bosnian Muslims, and live in the Sarajevo Canton in the Federation of BiH (see Annex 1). Throughout my fieldwork in Bosnia-Herzegovina, I also engaged in non-formal interviews with around 20 survivors of sexual violence through attending income-generating activities sessions.

The interviews were conducted with the women in order to generate data to answer both my research questions, but more specifically on their experiences with the NGOs and their experiences of belonging and stigmatisation within their families, communities and more broadly, their state (see Annex 2 and 3 for the list of questions). With the NGO staff, the interviews were mostly targeted on the second research question, which is to understand the work done by NGOs to reintegrate the women. The interviews were also aimed at understanding the process in which the programmes and services are created, and whether the perceptions that the staff
members have of the post-conflict needs of the women influence the type of services available.

All women interviewed in both places were chosen based on their past experience of sexual violence and because of their affiliation to an NGO in order to limit the ethical risks. Interviewing women active in the NGOs ensured that they had access to psychological support in case of psychological distress during the interviews, and provided me with access to these women without having to directly contact them, perhaps putting them at risk of having the truth about their past becoming known in their community. This, however, has some implications for the analysis of the data. First, it meant that the majority of the women I interviewed came from either the Kigali Province or Sarajevo Canton, which is why the data cannot be generalized to all women who suffered from wartime sexual violence. There is indeed an urban bias, which means that this targeted ethnography mostly include the experiences of women having access to services in cities in contrast to survivors living in rural areas. Second, engaging with women active in NGOs also means that the experiences of those women who did not join an association are absent from this thesis. As I explained above, this decision was made for ethical reasons, but it is worth keeping in mind that this group of women may share specific socio-economic conditions that foster their involvement in NGOs, in contrast perhaps to those women who did not join an association.

Furthermore, the age range of the women interviewed also means that the experiences told are only those of women who were teenagers and older during the war. I did not have the opportunity to discuss with women who were perhaps raped when young girls. Of all the women with whom I conducted formal interviews, only
one respondent in Rwanda did stay in proximity of where she was living during the genocide, with all the other women attempting to rebuild their lives outside their community. This woman is also the only survivor who openly discussed her child born out of rape.

Once back from fieldwork, I also conducted two semi-structured interviews through Skype with an international organisation operating in Rwanda, and with an international organisation operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I also conducted a semi-structured interview with two staff members of UN Women and the UN Trust Fund in New York, for a total of 42 interviews for this research. These last interviews were conducted in order to fill in some gaps from my fieldwork on the work done by NGOs in both contexts, and in the case of UN Women and the UN Trust Fund, to understand how donors may influence NGOs. This research angle opened up while I was in the field, with many NGO staff mentioning the impact that donors and donors’ priorities have on the work conducted on the ground. I therefore wanted to get a glimpse into the perspectives of international donors, which was not an easy task for this research. For instance, I contacted the UNFPA in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Red Cross, International Alert, UNDP Rwanda, UNDP Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Office of the Special Representative for Sexual Violence, the UN Action Plan, Bloomberg Institute, Medica Mondiale and DFID, who all either did not respond to interview requests or declined a research interview.

As mentioned above, the interviews conducted in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina allowed me to ask specific questions on my research and probe on specifically relevant data, allowing me a deeper exploration of the perceptions, interpretations and understandings of my research participants of their experiences of
social belonging and of the work done by NGOs (Arksey and Knight, 1999: 32-34; Mason, 2002: 63-65). This was ideal for enabling a direct contrast of the specificities of my two contexts (Bryman, 2004: Chapter 15). While the NGO staff member interviews were mostly semi-structured, the interviews with the women who suffered from sexual violence were unstructured. Indeed, I started and ended these interviews with open questions, first asking if there was anything in particular they wanted to speak about. The responses from this first question then directed the rest of the interview, which generated interesting data that will be analysed in Chapters Six and Seven. I still prepared an interview guide ahead of the interviews which included general open questions aimed at eliciting data on the friendship and social relations maintained in their communities, as well as the support they receive from the NGOs, but these questions only served as resources to guide the discussion, and each interview differed in the topic emphasised (Fielding and Thomas, 2008: 246-7). This flexibility that I had in probing, creating new questions or adapting my interview guide depending on the answers provided produced a variety and richness to the data collected (Seale, 1998: Chapter 16; Mason, 2002: 64-65; Bryman, 2004: Chapter 15; Fielding and Thomas, 2008: 250-251). It also meant that no one interview was the same. For example, most of the women interviewed in BiH either still had their husband or their children, while all women in Rwanda were single/widowed with many of them having lost a child during the genocide. Family relationships were therefore more discussed in BiH than in Rwanda, and this enables a direct contrast of my two contexts.

Furthermore, in most cases, my interviews resembled more of a dialogue between my respondents and myself, which allowed me to nuance and clarify certain answers.
This dialogue strongly differed from the one in the focus groups, where the participants mostly discussed between themselves through a somewhat more superficial conversation. Instead, the interviews produced a space where the women were comfortable to engage more deeply into their personal lives, often leading to highly emotional discussions. This however strongly increased my understanding of their war and post-conflict experiences and perceptions (Arksey and Knight, 1999: 32-34; Mason, 2002: 63-65; Bryman, 2004: Chapter 15; Rubin and Rubin, 2005: 129-147; Fielding and Thomas, 2008: 248).

However, there is a consensus in the academic literature that face-to-face interviews might be uncomfortable for some individuals, especially when the topic discussed is personal or sensitive as is the case with this research (Arksey and Knight, 1999: 34). This is the main obstacle that I faced in my research, since only a minority of women I met in both countries agreed to be interviewed. We were able to hold informal talks, but the idea of sharing their personal experiences formally, for research purpose was an uncomfortable thought for many of them. Furthermore, Seale (1998: Chapter 16) warns about the importance of establishing a relationship of trust with the interviewees since this will impact their willingness to disclose personal information and to tell the truth; participants may adapt their responses in order to please or mislead the interviewer. There is then a risk associated with interviews that the answers given are different to the actual behaviour of the respondents, and the researcher has no real way of knowing this only through research interviews (Bryman, 2004: Chapter 15; Fielding and Thomas, 2008: 249). The fact that I was not able to observe the women interact in their local community for ethical concerns, as explained below, meant that I could not personally observe
whether the claims made in the interviews are consistent with the social stigmatisation they described. However, I am fairly confident that the information provided in the interviews does not strongly differ from the real perceptions of the women, since the sincerity of the emotions felt during our encounters could not have been put on show to mislead me.

Fielding and Thomas (2008: 255) also warn about the impact of differences in social position between the researcher and the participants on the validity of the interview. As mentioned above, as a Western white woman, I probably represented a certain power and privilege that was not available to some research participants. The perception interviewees have of the researcher can therefore influence their willingness to disclose some information, and this can be aggravated when the researcher is perceived as exploitative or representing geopolitical power relations (Fielding and Thomas, 2008: 255). This was especially a concern in Rwanda, where power relations between Rwanda and the Western world might have been reflected in our personal relationships. In these cases, interview responses might be distorted and unrepresentative of the participants’ true perceptions. This was controlled when conducting the interviews by ensuring that I reflected on the impression I gave the research participants by trying as much as possible to challenge the assumed power relations (Thomson, 2010: 20). This was a challenge in Rwanda since my ethnicity alone comes with certain assumptions and distinguished me from my participants. I however dressed modestly and took the public transport instead of taxis or private cars to travel to the organisations, which helped me to decrease to a certain extent the power imbalance between myself and the Rwandan women I met. However, due to the fact that I was younger than all the women I met, the possibilities of echoing
power relationships were greatly limited. Instead, the women took on a more authoritative role of educating me about their experiences. This is supported by some findings that suggest interviews about sensitive topics are often more open when the researcher is ‘different’, i.e. an outsider. This is based upon the hypothesis that the outside researcher is perceived as less threatening, and as a stranger that needs to be educated on this topic (Fielding and Thomas, 2008: 256; Paluck, 2009: 47). This happened in both contexts, but more so in Rwanda, where the women opened up and discussed personal matters to an extent that I had not anticipated. I believe this happened more so in Rwanda due to the few opportunities that these women had of telling their stories to outsiders, in contrast to the women in BiH who had often spoken to other researchers before meeting me. Regardless, my identity as an outsider was a clear advantage for this research, since I did not represent a potential source of stigmatisation.

Fieldwork in both countries also entailed the use of a translator, which the academic literature considers an acceptable solution to the language issue (Williamson et al, 2011: 382). However, conducting research in a language other than the study language is inherently challenging because of linguistic and cultural differences. It is argued that some words might not have an equivalent in the study or original language, and that some concepts might not be understood similarly between cultures (Davies, 1999: 77; Kapborg & Bertero, 2002: 55). This situation is further complicated when working with instant interpretation, where the risk of misinterpretation is greater. For instance, Kapborg and Bertero (2002: 54-55) detect three occasions where misinterpretation may arise: when the researcher addresses a question to the interpreter, when the interpreter translates this question to the
participant, and when the interpreter translates the participant’s response to the researcher. In all these situations, there is a risk that the questions might have been misinterpreted, misunderstood or modified. The key issue in cross-language research is therefore the challenge of attaining a translation that maintains both the intended meaning and its relevance in the study language and culture (Davies, 1999: 77; Kapborg & Bertero, 2002: 55). Since interpreters are influential agents in the generation of data, I put in place a few mechanisms suggested by the academic literature to limit misunderstandings in the research interviews and focus groups.

First, it is argued that inadequate translations and understandings of the participants’ responses are reduced when the interpreter and the research participants are members of the same culture (Freed, 1988: 316; Kapborg & Bertero, 2002: 53; Temple and Edwards, 2002: 7). Temple and Edwards (2002: 7) also suggest that collaborating with an interpreter who comes from the same culture as the research participants might increase the participants’ comfort and desire to speak up, since the interpreter is often perceived as trustworthy. This can, however, be a challenge in divided societies, where the interpreter’s identity might create tensions with the research participants. Taking this into account, I decided to work in both places in collaboration with local women who were recommended to me by other academics who previously worked on similar topics, reducing the risks of misinterpretation since the interpreters were already aware of the context (Williamson et al, 2011: 383). In Rwanda, my translator was trained as a social worker and worked for a few years with HIV-infected orphans. In BiH, my translator worked as a journalist and did some translation work for the Red Cross in the aftermath of the war. They both
have mixed identities from their parents and both fiercely condemn ethnic politics and divisions within their country.

Moreover, as is suggested by some scholars (Freed, 1988: 316; Williamson et al, 2011: 383), I met and discussed with both interpreters before collecting data in order to clarify the type of information/data that I specifically sought. This was also a good opportunity for them to go over the interviews/focus groups’ questions guide and to raise any issues. For instance, my translator in Bosnia-Herzegovina suggested printing some translated copies of the interview questions that the women could read before deciding to be interviewed or not. Finally, the position of the interpreter and their commitment to confidentiality were also discussed in those meetings (Freed, 1988: 316).

In practice, my translators were incredible women who played an important part in forging meaningful relationships with the women who experienced wartime rape. They became active in the research process and asked questions during the focus groups or unstructured/semi-structured interviews. Their local knowledge allowed them to probe on some answers by referring to local events, which highlighted even more the specificities of each context. They provided instant translation and also transcribed the recorded interviews into English, while I transcribed the interviews already in French or English. But more importantly, they also undertook the role of cultural mediator, bridging the cultural or social distance between the women interviewed and myself.
**Documents**

Finally, I drew on some documents, such as official state statistics and annual NGO reports, to complement my data. I first drew on official statistics of state employment and state services, in order to go beyond my respondents’ perceptions and illustrate the gender and ethnic composition of the public sphere, aimed at explaining the social location of these survivors as ethnic women. These statistics can sometimes be misleading, as the criteria for including or excluding some cases are not always explicit. This can be ambiguous when working with ethnic or gender identification (Seale, 1998: Chapter 15; Davies, 1999: 160-167; Bryman, 2004: Chapter 10; Macdonald, 2008: 288). I then analysed the last annual report available for each NGO in order to access their financial data and establish relationships between themselves and their funders, since as Chapters Six and Seven will suggest, donors’ priorities have a strong impact on the NGOs’ services, and inevitably on the women themselves. In some cases, the last report publicly available was published in 2011-2012, and for some organisations no annual reports were made public. I made the decision to only analyse reports that have been made public, instead of asking for insider access to the non-published reports, since I wanted to analyse the information the NGOs choose to disclose to the public and to financial donors. By doing so, I was able to get a glimpse of the way the NGOs present themselves to the public and their potential donors, the intended audience. This provided interesting data that highlights which programmes are prioritized by the NGOs and their donors.

**Analytical Strategy**

This thesis follows an inductive approach, meaning that the language, categories, and themes discussed in this thesis directly emerged from the data.
collected in the field. This required an extensive reading of my interview transcripts to identify certain themes and key words that were discussed by my research participants, and these categories were subsequently used to code my interviews, observation notes and informal conversations (Thomas, 2006: 238-239). I recorded my informal conversations and observations in my notebook, and analysed these sources of data using the same conceptual categories that emerged from my interviews.

Therefore, the concepts discussed in this thesis - trauma, alternative families, holistic support, etc. – are those that were discussed directly by the women and the NGO staff I interviewed. For example, the women in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda used the word ‘trauma’ in its English form to describe their mental state in many occasions. These research interviews have therefore informed my use of these categories, since ‘in inductive coding, categories are commonly created from actual phrases or meanings in specific text segments’ (Thomas, 2006: 241). It is however worth noting that this language aligns with the wording used in the NGOs documents, which demonstrates that the women have internalized some of the NGO language to describe their own experiences. This may raises questions on how women who are not members of NGOs describe their post-conflict experiences, but for the purpose of this thesis, I have decided to keep this language since these are the concepts and terms that the women use to describe and understand their own experiences. Therefore, using these concepts throughout my analysis first limits any risks of misinterpreting these individual experiences, but more importantly it contributes to the reader’s understanding of interconnectivity between the women’s experiences and the NGOs work.
Ethical Concerns

Due to the sensitivity of the topic researched, a few ethical concerns had to be addressed during the completion of this thesis. It is worth noting that this research abided by the University of Edinburgh’s Level 2 ethics guidelines (http://www.sps.ed.ac.uk/research/ethics/postgraduate_research_ethical_procedures), and by the British Sociological Association’s ethics guidelines (http://www.britsoc.co.uk/media/27107/StatementofEthicalPractice.pdf).

The purpose of this research is to investigate the post-conflict experiences of the women who experienced wartime sexual violence. Discussions about social stigma, family loss, or illness, for example, can create psychological stress for the women. Whilst the purpose of this research is to focus on the post-conflict period, the women still discussed their experiences of sexual violence during the ethnic violence, which could also lead to psychological distress. A few mechanisms were therefore put in place to limit the potential psychological risks. Participants were first informed in their consent form that they could leave the focus group or interview at any moment and without providing any reason. I followed Thomson’s (2010: 20) advice and agreed to meet with participants in the circumstances in which they feel most comfortable to do so (at home, early in the morning, in the presence of others, etc.). In the end, only one interview was conducted outside of the organisations, which will be discussed in Chapter Seven. Instead, all focus groups and interviews were organised in the organisations’ buildings (unless asked otherwise), a place the participants knew and in which they were comfortable. This meant that staff members were in proximity in case the women became distressed. The use of qualitative methods when working with trauma survivors can also be challenging.
since no one can predict how they will react during the interview process (Rosenblatt, 1995: 148). My interpreters and I created an atmosphere where empathy and sensitivity were central to the interviews conducted (Thomson, 2010: 27). However, both my interpreters and I ensured that we did not take on the role of untrained therapists (De Marrais and Tisdale, 2002: 121).

Moreover, some studies (Rosenblatt, 1995: 144; Cromer and Newman, 2011: 1542) also suggest qualitative research on trauma survivors may benefit the participants by providing them the opportunity to tell their stories to someone who is listening, showing empathy and taking their pain seriously. I believe this process happened in Rwanda, where despite some emotional interviews, the women were extremely happy to share their past to individuals who were listening to them, free of judgement. However, I do not think that this same process happened in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is an important reason why my fieldwork period in Bosnia-Herzegovina was shorter than in Rwanda.

Indeed, I spent less time conducting research in BiH than in Rwanda for the reasons mentioned above, but mostly because of the emotional distress experienced by the women, my interpreter and myself. First, I developed a strong impression when conducting research with the women who experienced wartime rape in Bosnia-Herzegovina that whilst the interviews did not create psychological distress, it contributed to their anger towards the government and international community. The women were angry towards their lack of recognition in Bosnia-Herzegovina and towards the lack of change. Most women had already spoken about their past in the judicial system, to other researchers, and one woman (Dalija) even met Angelina Jolie as part of her visit to BiH. None of this has changed their situation, and at the
end of my stay in BiH, I developed the impression that I was contributing to their
disappointment since I was not be able to grant them the changes they wanted –
which primarily focused on legal recognition. For instance, the women were told that
my research would not directly benefit them, but they still asked if I would be able to
present my findings to their government. As Chapter Seven will argue, the women
are looking for mediators who will promote the inclusion of their voices within the
state policies, and I had the strong impression that they were hoping that my research
would act as a mediation tool. The interview process itself was therefore not
distressing, but it contributed to their anger and disappointment, and after a few
interviews I realised that I could not conduct the same fieldwork in Bosnia-
Herzegovina as I had in Rwanda. I found that there was something distinct about the
Bosnian-Herzegovinian context that made it emotionally difficult to conduct research
without being able to provide changes to the women’s lack of legal recognition. This
led me to develop a strong sense of guilt, which has been difficult to shake off since
my return from fieldwork.

In addition, scholars who have done research on sexual violence warn of the
existence of psychological risks to the researcher because of the sensitivity of the
topic. For instance, Rebecca Campbell mentions that ‘studying sexual violence, as a
woman is, almost by definition, an emotional experience’ (Campbell, 2002: 35). She
also mentions that working with victims of sexual violence challenges the
researcher’s beliefs in justice and security, and strengthens our perception that
women are never truly safe. Finally, she mentions how hearing in repetition about
the suffering of others is a painful experience (Campbell, 2002: 70). Despite putting
in place some mechanisms to limit the psychological risks to myself, such as setting
a clear schedule between work and social activities, and maintaining a support system, I started to be affected with this research during my stay in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It might have resulted from the fact that BiH was my second field site and that after my intense fieldwork in Rwanda, I was perhaps more vulnerable to these stories. But the fact remained that hearing various stories of rape and sufferings was a difficult experience that I was able to cope with at first, but one interview in particular in BiH was quite challenging. This story is partly described in Chapter Seven but without the exact details, because of the cruelty and violence of the crime. Since I first heard that story, I have told its details to only one other person, and this is a story that I will keep with me forever. That moment therefore represents for me the shift in which I realised the impact that this research had on myself, but also at this point on my translator.

Indeed, for research like this, it is also important to protect the emotional safety of the interpreter. As Turner (2010: 213) mentions, research assistants can also suffer from anxiety and psychological distress when conducting fieldwork. Being from the same culture as the research participants does not guarantee that they have been confronted with these issues before, or that it is easier for them to discuss traumatic experiences. This is an issue that occurred in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where my translator also started to show signs of being emotionally affected by the stories heard. We held debriefs following our meetings with the women, we did a few social activities together and with her husband, but this could still not prevent both of us from being emotionally affected by the research. At a certain point during my fieldwork, she admitted she had trouble sleeping because she could not forget the stories of the women we met. After speaking about it, I asked her if she wanted to
continue the project, or if she preferred taking a step back. She decided to keep working together, but from that moment on, we both felt challenged by the research.

After my first trip to Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was therefore decided that I needed time to recover from my fieldwork. At this point I was still hoping to return into the field, but after taking into consideration the impact that my presence had on the women themselves, and the emotional challenges to both my translator and myself, it was decided that a return trip would not be conducted for this research. These ethical concerns therefore provide one explanation why the data in Bosnia-Herzegovina is limited in contrast to the Rwandan context, and demonstrate the difficulty of conducting intensive fieldwork research on a sensitive topic like this one.

This also meant that I had to be aware of my emotions when analysing the data collected, since it is argued that the emotions felt when researching difficult topics can influence the process of data analysis (De Marrais and Tisdale, 2002: 121). For example, I was always composed in my interviews and controlled my emotions, but I can still associate some interviews with the intense emotions I suppressed. I did not want this to tarnish my data analysis, which is why I did not undertake any data analysis while on fieldwork, and allowed around three months after my return from fieldwork before starting to analyse the data collected.

In addition to the psychological risks associated with this research, another ethical concern was the issue of confidentiality and anonymity. A consent form was provided to all individuals interviewed specifying their right to confidentiality and anonymity. The consent forms were translated into the primary languages of the participants. The participants (both staff members and survivors) accepted being
named by a pseudonym, protecting their identity, and it was agreed that all identifying factors would be removed from the research in order to present the findings in a way that cannot identify the participants (Davies, 1999: 51-53; Crow et al, 2006: 418; Wiles et al, 2008: 418). This explains why the names of the organisations are removed, as well as any descriptive factors such as place of residence or in-depth family history. Instead, a chart with general socio-demographic information of the women interviewed is included in Annex 1, but specific details about the women’s lives have been intentionally removed in order to prevent them from being identifiable. This also means that a chart with the dates spent in each organisation is not provided, in order to prevent the association between the women interviewed and the organisation of which they are a member. Finally, the participants were told that their words would probably be quoted in my thesis, and that this thesis is to be published. Moreover, only my translators and I had access to the raw data, and anonymity was and will be ensured every time the data is shared with other scholars or published.

Furthermore, ethical issues also arose as a result of the political climate in Rwanda. For instance, it is illegal in Rwanda to ask participants about their ethnicity or to self-identify. I therefore did not ask about ethnicity, and instead used words such as community and genocide survivors. A few women however used the terms ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ in their responses, but mostly when speaking about themselves. As will be described in Chapter Six, the term ‘Hutu’ was consistently avoided, and these women used the term ‘Interahamwe’ instead. It was also important when working with the organisations to ensure that my research did not jeopardize their relationship with the government, which again explains why the organisations were
protected by removing their names in this thesis. Furthermore, the protection of the participants’ confidentiality and anonymity could have been a challenge in a political climate where the government might want access to raw data. This could have been quite problematic as the case of Thomson (2013: 140) demonstrated, where her research visa was revoked because she refused to identify her participants or to give government representatives access to her raw data. Precautions were therefore undertaken, such as keeping my observation notes and transcripts anonymized through the use of a codebook. The names of the individuals were kept in a different notebook than the interview notes, and my tape recorder and signed consent forms were safely locked away. Electronic files were emailed to my email address, removing any saved files from my computer (Thomson, 2010: 31; Begley, 2013: 82; Thomson, 2013: 152). However, once my research visa was accepted, the government did not contact me again or ask for any information regarding my research.
Chapter 4. Contrasted Post-Conflict Responses

This chapter provides a brief overview of the use of sexual violence in Rwanda and BiH and its consequences in the aftermath of the ethnic violence, before explaining the response of women’s NGOs and the resulting post-conflict policies of ethnicity and gender. It will suggest that in both places women’s bodies became the battlefield upon which the nation was attacked (Yuval-Davis, 1994: 413), but structural differences created contrasted NGO and state responses.

Similar Crimes, Similar Consequences

It is widely accepted that during the Rwandan genocide, sexual violence was used by both combatant forces as a weapon of war (U.S. Department of State, 1995: section 1c). According to the United Nations (1998: section 3.10), it is estimated that many thousands of women and men were victims of sexual violence during the few months of the genocide, with other sources claiming the number of rapes reached between 250,000 and 500,000 (Hudson, 2010: 264). Moreover, 15,700 cases of raped women and hundreds of forced pregnancies were recorded by the Ministry for the Family & the Promotion of Women. These numbers, however, clearly underestimate the reality of sexual violence during the genocide since they do not take into consideration the reluctance of both women and men to admit they were sexually abused because of fear of social rejection (United Nations, 1996: section 16). However, because the number of rapes may become an extremely powerful tool for political propaganda, the exact figures might never be known. And yet, according to international organisations such as Human Rights Watch, almost every Tutsi woman who survived the genocide suffered from sexual violence (Skjelsbaek and Smith,
2001: 5). As René Degni-Ségui, the former UN Special Rapporteur for Rwanda, noted in 1996, ‘rape was the rule and its absence was the exception’ (quoted in United Nations, 1998: section 3.10).

The use of sexual violence during the genocide was extreme due to the pre-war propaganda. Prior to the genocide, political propaganda sexualized Tutsi women, which led to an understanding that sexual violence was an appropriate tool for vengeance and hatred (West, 2005: 7; Wood, 2006: 327). For instance, the ‘Hutu Ten Commandments’ portrayed Tutsi women as less noble and chaste than Hutu women¹ ('Hutu Ten Commandments’, 1990). Tutsi and Hutu women were perceived as representing the whole ethnic group, and consequentially the gateway through which the group could be destroyed (West, 2005: 17). ‘In this sense, rape served as a marker of ethnicity - a deliberate strategy to target women in their role as child bearers to destroy the purity of the ethnic group, by forcing them to give birth to “impure” babies’ (Hudson, 2010: 265). This was especially dreadful in Rwanda, where ethnic ties were still extremely relevant. Both men and women were so integrated within their community to the point Westerners had declared that the individual did not exist in Africa; such as was the case in Rwanda. The use of sexual violence during the genocide was therefore clearly intended as a crime against the whole ethnic group through this immoral conceptualization of nation-as-woman (Bop, 2001: 25).

When the genocide started, there was a race to rape, mutilate and force into sexual labour Tutsi women. Reports also suggest that many women (both Hutu and

¹ To quote, ‘Every Hutu must know that our Hutu daughters are more worthy and more
Tutsi) were forced to marry their captors or sold to the *Interahamwe*, the Hutu paramilitary organisation (United Nations, 1998: section 3.10). Women of all ages were targeted, including girls as young as ten and elderly women. Women who were also normally perceived as ‘chaste’, for instance nuns, were also targeted by the policy of mass rape (United Nations, 1996: section A.2.a.ii).

Sexual violence during the genocide took two distinct forms, witnessed in different areas of the country, and demonstrative of the systematic nature of these acts: gang rape and forced incest. These rapes suggest forced impregnation was less at the core of the policy of mass rape (in contrast to Bosnia-Herzegovina), with the subjugation, humiliation and destruction of the ethnic group instead the prime motivation. This can also explain why the HIV virus was used as a weapon in order to cause the delayed death of the women who survived their sexual abuse (United Nations, 1996: section A.2.a.ii).

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Bassiouni Report (1994), commissioned by the UN regarding the use of rape in Yugoslavia, reported that sexual violence was widely used by all sides, against both men and women, but that the largest numbers of rapes were committed by Bosnian Serbs against Muslims (Bassiouni Report, 1994: 60). Most of the literature on the subject tends to agree that the majority of perpetrators were part of the Serbian army, but it is also accepted that it would be misleading to ignore the atrocities committed by the other sides, including UN peacekeeping forces (Stiglmayer, 1994: 147; Benderly, 1997: 66). Moreover, whilst it is agreed that some perpetrators acted on their own initiative, there were similarities in the overall pattern of sexual violence that suggest a systematic rape policy was implemented in some areas (Bassiouni Report, 1994: 60). The evidence recorded not only suggests sexual...
violence was used as a weapon for ethnic cleansing during the Bosnian war (with an estimation of 20,000 to 60,000 rapes), but also that this practice was highly organised (Skjelsbaek and Smith, 2001: 53-4).

Sexual violence during the Bosnian war involved an ethnic component that was necessary for the strategy of ethnic cleansing. Victims were targeted based on their gender, but mostly because they were Muslims, Croats or Serbs (Stiglmayer, 1994: 84-85). During the armed conflict, sexual violence took three main forms. First, sexual violence was used as a tool to create forced exile (Korac, 1996: 137). The general pattern was the following: Serbian soldiers entered a Muslim town and sexually assaulted women from different ages out in the public view. Days later, the soldiers came back to the same town, and offered safe passage to the residents on the condition that they never return. Still terrified by the violation of the women, most residents accepted, easing the process of ethnic cleansing through forced exile (Allen, 1996: 62; Nikolic-Ristanovic, 1996: 202). Second, both men and women held in concentration camps were randomly chosen to be raped. In the cases where men were violated, soldiers often did not engage directly in the sexual assault, but instead forced men of the same ethnicity to abuse each other. And third, camps emerged during the war in which women were raped systematically over a long period of time in order to impregnate them (Stiglmayer, 1994: 135). These camps are clear evidence of the use of sexual violence as a weapon for ethnic cleansing, since the main purpose of these camps were to impregnate Muslim women with Serbian children (Allen, 1996: 63-65; Skjelsbaek, 2001; 54). For instance, the slogan of the Serbian policy of mass rape was ‘You will give birth to a chetnik\(^2\) soldier’ (Meznaric, 1994:

\(^2\) Chetnik here refers to Serbs.
Most women/girls survived these camps, but many were released only when their pregnancy achieved a stage where a safe abortion was impossible (Allen, 1996: 63).

In addition to these three main forms, sexual violence was also witnessed outside militarized areas in ethnically-mixed localities. For instance, sexual assaults occurred during interrogation procedures or against refugees seeking assistance. Furthermore, women involved in mixed marriages were also vulnerable to acts of sexual violence as punishment for marrying outside the ethnic group and threatening the survival of the group, or as a punishment for the behaviour of their national group. Women were still targeted based on their ethnicity in areas free of combat as a punishment and as a way of distinguishing between ethnic groups (Nikolic-Ristanovic, 1996: 197; Carpenter, 2010: 66).

Moreover, forced pregnancies were extremely successful for the purpose of ethnic cleansing since ethnic purity was at the core of nationalist discourses in the former Yugoslavia (Korac, 1996: 137; Cockburn, 1998: 162). As explained by Morokvasic (1998: 76), the post-communist nationalist governments of the former Yugoslavia expected women to bear more children in order to secure the existence of the national group. In essence, in a time when the nation became described in organic terms, ethnic purity became at the core of nationalist discourses and it became the responsibility of the women to preserve this purity (Morokvasic, 1998: 75-76). For instance, the Draft Law on Serbia’s Population Policy (1990) rewarded families with three children but punished childless couples through increased taxes. The intention was to stimulate the growth of the Serbian population, and it was believed that every Serb should contribute either biologically or economically to the survival of the
nation. In addition, administrative procedures surrounding abortions became increasingly complicated (Milic, 1993: 113). The same reproduction race occurred in Croatia, where posters announced that ‘each unborn baby is an unborn Croat’ (Morokvasic, 1998: 76). Moreover, in cases where parents possessed mixed identities, it was the father’s identity that was transmitted to the children, prevailing over the mother’s nationality (Skjelsbaek and Smith, 2001: 55; Carpenter, 2010: 18).

With the protection of ethnic purity at the core of the conflict, wartime rape was used as a tool to destroy and humiliate the other group by producing children that would be perceived as belonging to the aggressors’ ethnicity (Korac, 1996: 137; Nikolic-Ristanovic, 1996: 202).

In both contexts, sexual violence affected the lives of its survivors on multiple levels and on a long-term basis. As Hagen and Yohani (2010: 15) explain:

Although rape is traumatic regardless of when it occurs, during war, rape tends to be of a greater magnitude, frequency, and intention. Given our current understanding of the long-term effects of this type of trauma, it is perhaps one of the most violent and effective tools of war.

The first consequence of sexual violence remains its impact on the physical health of its survivors. Whilst rape is always physically harmful, in times of war it takes elements of sadism and extreme brutality that is rarely witnessed in “ordinary” rape. This is the case since the women targeted are not perceived anymore as purely individual women, but instead as embodiments of their ethnic group. The aggressors might be motivated in their actions to inflict as much pain and hatred as they can in order to humiliate and destroy the enemy, which is why wartime sexual violence often occurs alongside other types of physical injuries, including torture and mutilation (Hagen and Yohani, 2010: 16). Furthermore, survivors of sexual violence
are extremely vulnerable to sexually transmitted disease, such as HIV. For instance, in Rwanda, 1% of the population was affected by HIV before 1994, but this number reached 11% in 1997 (Hudson, 2010: 264). All of the physical consequences of wartime sexual violence have a long-lasting impact, and the women who survived rape may not survive its resulting injuries (Hagen and Yohani, 2010: 19).

Another main consequence of sexual violence is the psychological trauma associated with rape. The traumatic experience of wartime rape is not necessarily different from “regular” rape, and may involve post-traumatic stress disorder, depression or anxiety, and can lead to harmful behaviour such as self-harm or suicide (Hagen and Yohani, 2010: 19). What is different from “regular” rape is that in a context of post-conflict reconciliation, women not only need to face the reality of rape, but then need to do so in a context of national grieving. These women may in addition have to face the grief of having lost family members and friends, and for some, their homes. Women who have been impregnated as a result of rape, and those who committed abortion, infanticide or abandoned their child after birth can also suffer from strong psychological trauma. Finally, some women may also feel guilty for having been raped, or for having survived when so many did not (Hamilton, H.B., 2000: 5). Accepting the past for these women is extremely challenging, especially when they are rejected by their community and when the aggressors are not prosecuted.

Indeed, the psychological distress associated with war rape is often aggravated when the survivors of sexual violence are blamed by their communities, and when the perpetrators are not prosecuted. As a Rwandan testifying at the Fourth International Conference of Women at Beijing explained:
Raped women are doubly punished by society. First, judicial practice does not grant them redress for rape as long as graphic evidence is not brought out into the open. Second, from society’s point of view there is little sympathy, for at the moment that men and children died without defence, these women used the sex card, “selling their bodies to save their lives.” Thus, they are judged from all sides, and even among their families they are not easily pardoned. Even worse, people reproach them for having preferred survival through rape (quoted in Newbury and Baldwin, 2000: 5).

Klaric et al (2007: 173) demonstrated that the women victims of war in BiH (sexual violence, torture, etc.) still suffered serious psychological trauma more than a decade after the end of the conflict, possibly due to the role that social and/or ethnic marginalization play as an obstacle to post-conflict reconciliation. The offspring of the survivors of sexual violence are also affected by this exclusion, which makes it extremely hard to address (UNHCR, 2003: 24). Social exclusion from the ethnic/national group as a result of the rape is therefore one of the most devastating long-term consequences of wartime sexual violence, since it remains a challenge that needs to be addressed by the women and their offspring many decades after the ethnic violence. This social stigmatization impacts many decisions in the aftermath of the conflict, such as continuing or not one’s pregnancy, seeking justice or publicly seeking outside assistance, which will in turn influence the ways in which the survivors of sexual violence experience this period of post-conflict reconciliation (UNHCR, 2003: 24). This marginalization from society also means that it becomes difficult for these women to access housing, job opportunities or land ownership (Newbury and Baldwin, 2000: 6-9). Survivors of sexual violence are therefore increasingly vulnerable to poverty and further exploitation (Hagen and Yohani, 2010: 20).

Finally, studies demonstrate that women’s needs are often far from the government or NGOs’ priorities in times of social reconstruction. Survivors of sexual
violence are provided insufficient resources and inadequate services, and when services are available, they might not be financially accessible (Handrahan, 2004: 431; Pankhurst, 2008: 31).

**From Emergency Relief to Empowerment**

Before 1994, Rwanda had developed a strong civil society, and the existence of many non-governmental organisations meant that when the genocide occurred, they quickly responded to the needs of its victims. This is especially true for women’s groups, who took a leading role in reconstructing the country. Indeed, with the government unable to fully address the growing needs of its population, new and old women’s organisations took a vibrant and creative role in providing essential services to the women and child victims of war (Newbury and Baldwin, 2001: 98-100).

Most organisations targeted the socio-economic needs of women before 1994, but the genocide drastically changed the NGOs response towards crisis relief with many NGOs emerging after 1994 focusing specifically on war trauma. Health and counselling services to victims of war (sexual violence, torture, etc.) were therefore developed, and are still widely provided by women’s organisations (Newbury and Baldwin, 2001: 100-102, 109-111).

The scope of the programmes offered by women’s organisations has however widened over the past decade, including poverty relief, educational training and microcredit, to name a few. Women’s NGOs have also been extremely successful in bringing more attention to gender issues within their local authorities, with a growing number of organisations involved in lobbying and awareness campaigns for women’s
political and economic empowerment (Hamilton, H.B., 2000: 8-11). Their role has brought more attention to gender issues, helped by the Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion, which nominated officials in each prefecture who ensure the consideration of gender issues by local authorities (Newbury and Baldwin, 2001: 116-117).

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, unlike with the Rwandan context, there were no NGOs providing services to the population before the war started. Instead, all services were provided by the communist government, and there was limited political space for the development of a strong civil society. However, with the consequences of the war being far too numerous for the state to respond, organisations emerged to address the needs of the population (Walsh, 2000: 2). The first women’s organisations to emerge during the conflict did so in Sarajevo and Tuzla and were funded by the international community. They reacted to the crisis by providing a variety of services, such as food distribution, shelter for refugees, medical care (especially for rape victims) and psychological counselling (Mulalic, 2011: 43-44).

Once the war ended, more women’s organisations emerged and continued to provide humanitarian assistance to a deeply affected population through prioritized psychological support. However, by 1997 the international funding towards humanitarian assistance, in particular psychosocial support and medical care, began to decrease in favour of income-generating activities. New programmes such as educational training and microcredit started to emerge, in order to revitalize an economy largely dependent on international aid (Walsh, 2000: 5-7). Over the past decades, women’s organisations have therefore widened their scope to include
economic, political and legal assistance, promoting women’s rights in the post-
conflict setting (Mulalic, 2011: 42).

In both contexts, the shift from emergency assistance to broader support of
women’s rights and empowerment contributed to gender mainstreaming within the
post-conflict setting, which provided certain opportunities for women victims of war
to have their specific needs recognized. This will be analysed in further depth
Chapters Six and Seven. However, the development of women’s organisations in
both contexts remains constrained by the macro-state policies of gender, but also of
ethnicity. With the women’s bodies becoming the body of the nation during the
ethnic violence, macro-state policies of gender and ethnicity inevitably forge local
attitudes towards the post-conflict reintegration of survivors of sexual violence.

**Contrasting Post-Conflict State Policies**

In Rwanda, the extreme violence ended in July 1994 with the victory of the
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which was mostly comprised of Tutsis living in
exile since the country’s ethnic violence of 1959, led by Paul Kagamé. A transitional
government was soon implemented based on the criteria set by the Arusha Accords
signed in 1993; this framework lasted until 2003 (Reyntjens, 2004: 178-186). These
criteria included power-sharing, rule of law, return of refugees and the merging of
the government and rebel armies (Arusha Accords, 1993). The first transitional
government included both Hutu and Tutsi members, but it is believed that Pasteur
Bizimungu acted as President of Rwanda in order to make peace with the Hutu
majority while securing RPF control over the government (Reyntjens, 2004: 178-
181).
In 2003, the transitional period officially ended, and national elections took place for the first time since 1994 (local elections first took place in 2001). The Mouvement Démocratique Républicain (MDR), the political party of the previous Prime Minister - and the main opposition party - was banned from these elections for accounts of divisionism. In this case, divisionism refers to open opposition or disagreement with government policies, and the RPF’s crackdown on the MDR had the result of neutralizing civil society (Christian Aid, 2004: 7; Reyntjens, 2004: 184; Yachat Ankut, 2005: 21; Beswick, 2010: 241). Paul Kagamé was again elected President of Rwanda and consolidated a one-party system that is still present today (Burnet, 2011: 310).

The Tutsi-led government implemented a policy of national unity that makes ethnic identification illegal. This policy is part of the country’s Constitution, where Article 9.2 specifies that the government should work towards eradicating any divisions within society (mostly ethnic) in order to promote national unity (Constitution of Rwanda, 2003: 4). Moreover, ethnic discrimination is now punishable by law (Law No. 47/2001), where under Article 3 individuals, groups and organisations that commit any form of discrimination - including ethnic - through writing, speech, or any other act or medium may face prison sentences. However, despite its policy of national unity, it is still believed that in practice the RPF is reserving positions of power for members of the Tutsi elite, and that its practice of nation-building acts as a cover for domination by the Tutsi elite (Reyntjens, 2016: 66).

The current political situation in Rwanda is categorized by a lack of free speech and free political competition, and open disagreement with government policies is
subject to punishment (Hintjens, 2008: 12; Beswick, 2010: 236; Human Rights Watch, 2014, Accessed 24 June 2014). This was clearly observed through my fieldwork period in Rwanda, where some participants interviewed for this research emphasised their desire to keep their identity protected, especially NGO staff, since they did not want to put themselves in a precarious position with the government because of their comments. This has often put researchers in difficult positions in Rwanda, where some had their research permits revoked because they refused to provide raw data or information about their participants to the government (Thomson, 2013: 140). There was also a rumour spreading around when I was in Kigali that the phone communications of certain individuals, including researchers, might be recorded by the government (in order to purchase a SIM card in Rwanda, the number has to be attributed to a passport), which could explain why Begley (2013: 82) suggested code words to provide information to individuals outside the field. Whilst this was only a rumour, the fact that the population believed the government could be involved in this type of surveillance is revealing of local perceptions of the regime (Beswick, 2010: 242).

Most importantly for the purpose of this study, the post-conflict period has included gender-sensitive policies as a result of the RPF’s willingness to promote women’s rights, but also as a result of the advocacy work conducted by women’s organisations as suggested above (Burnet, 2008: 372; Ansoms, 2013: 1115). Some examples of these laws promoting gender equality are the Inheritance Law of 1999, the Land Policy of 2004 and the Organic Law of 2005, which all promote gender equality in terms of land rights, ownership and inheritance (Ansoms, 2013: 1115-1117). Moreover, the current Constitution implemented gender quotas in Parliament
and in the Senate, with Article 76 specifying that out of the 80 members of the Chamber of Deputies, 24 have to be women, and with Article 82 specifying that women should comprise at minimum 30% of the Senate (Constitution of Rwanda, 2003: 18, 20). Gender equality is included as one of the fundamental principles in the Constitution (Article 9.4), which states that ‘building a state governed by the rule of law, a pluralistic democratic government, equality of all Rwandans and between women and men reflected by ensuring that women are granted at least thirty per cent of posts in decision-making organs’ (Constitution of Rwanda, 2003: 4). Finally, another example of the gender-sensitive policies implemented by the government is Law 59/2008 regarding the prevention and punishment of gender-based violence (GBV). This law is important for gender equality because it includes a clear definition of GBV and conjugal rape, as well as establishes serious penalties for the aggressors (Law No. 59/2008, 2008: 89).

Furthermore, the government created government bodies that deal directly with gender rights issues, such as the Ministry of Family and Gender Promotion, which coordinates all government action regarding gender equality, and the Gender Monitoring Office, which ensures public institutions promote gender rights and equality (MIGEPROF, 15 July 2013). The political sphere was therefore transformed since the genocide, with gender-sensitive policies at the core of the current government’s political platform.

The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina ended in 1995 with the Dayton Accords, which implemented a fragmented political system that ensure the political representation of the three main ethnic groups: Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks. This triple power-sharing system was adopted at the state, entity and cantonal levels. For instance, at the state
level, the three groups have to be proportionally represented within the Parliamentary Assembly; in the cabinet, 2/3 of the ministers should come from the Federation and 1/3 from the Republika Srpska; and the Presidency is comprised of three individuals, one from each constituent people (Bieber, 2006: 68-70). As mentioned in Article V of the *Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina* (accessed 2014), ‘the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall consist of three Members: one Bosniak and one Croat, each directly elected from the territory of the Federation, and one Serb directly elected from the territory of the Republika Srpska.’ This triple power-sharing is also found at the entity or cantonal level, and whilst the exact settlement might differ, the aim remains a proportional representation of the three main constituent peoples (Bieber, 2006: 68-70).

Moreover, the Federation of BiH was divided into ten cantons, with Bosniaks or Croats forming the majority group in each canton. The legitimization of these ethnic divisions was intended as a temporary measure, since it was believed the return of the displaced population would change the demography of the entities and cantons. However, to date, the trend has been for returnees to move to regions where they represent the majority group, which maintains and consolidates the ethnic identities that were at stake during the ethnic violence, greatly limiting any efforts towards nation-building (Guzina, 2007: 228).
In terms of gender policies, the national government implemented the ‘Law on Gender Equality’, which prohibits discrimination based on gender or sexual orientation, and defines gender-based violence (‘Law on Gender Equality in BiH’, 2003). Furthermore, Bosnia-Herzegovina is currently a potential candidate for European Union membership. In order to join the EU, Bosnia-Herzegovina needs to align some of its policies - including gender policies - with the priorities and values of the European Union. The ‘Gender Action Plan’ therefore specifies the equal rights of men and women, including equal remuneration and equal treatment in front of the law and in accessing social services. Bosnia-Herzegovina has further aligned its gender policies with policies implemented by the EU, such as the Millennium Goals (‘Gender Action Plan of Bosnia-Herzegovina’, 2007). The Agency for Gender Equality of Bosnia and Herzegovina was also created, whose main role is to report on the status of gender equality in the country, and to facilitate coordination and the
implementation of the ‘Gender Action Plan’. Two centres were also established at the entity level: Gender Centre of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Gender Equality Gender of the Government of Republika Srpska (‘Agency for Gender Equality’, Accessed 20 July 2015). At first sight, these gender-sensitive policies seem modest when contrasted to those implemented in Rwanda, but it is worth keeping in mind that women’s roles in the public sphere in Rwanda were strongly limited, while women under the communist government in the former Yugoslavia enjoyed greater gender equality (Tomsic, 1980).

Discussion

To conclude, this chapter demonstrated how women’s bodies were used as a battlefield in which the nation could be destroyed both during the Rwandan genocide and Bosnian war as a result of the ideology of nation-as-woman (Yuval-Davis, 1994: 413). Similar crimes were committed in both contexts, which resulted in women’s organisations undertaking important emergency relief in the immediate aftermath of both conflicts. Over the past decades, women’s organisations have however widened their scope, promoting women’s empowerment and rights in each context. Both states were committed to gender equality in the aftermath of the violence, but their contrasting policies of ethnic reconciliation raise important questions for the social reintegration of survivors of sexual violence. The following chapter will analyse these state policies of gender and ethnicity, arguing that these macro-policies continue to powerfully shape the post-conflict experiences of social belonging of the women I met, who find themselves somewhat excluded from the post-conflict state due to their identity as civilian victims of war, and as women.
Chapter 5. Experiencing the Post-Conflict State

The purpose of this chapter is two-fold: firstly, it will examine the character of the post-conflict state through the state policies of ethnicity and gender, arguing that while both states commit to a process of gender equality, they strongly differ in their process of ethnic reconciliation. Indeed, I argue that the state of Rwanda mostly favours the redefinition of the Rwandan nation through nation-building, while the Bosnian-Herzegovinian state mostly favours strong state institutions through state-building, maintaining the rigid and fixed ethnic lines from the war. More importantly, I argue that these policies have a strong impact on the type of social belonging available to the survivors of sexual violence, since the institutionalisation of ethnicity in BiH fosters social belonging with one’s ethnic group (Lijphart, 1977: 54-55; McGarry and O’Leary, 2004: 17; Loizides, Kovras and Ireton, 2010: 2), while a unifying national identity in Rwanda promotes a social inclusion that erases ethnicity (Deutsch and Foltz, 1966: 118; Weilenmann, 1966: 40; Fischer and Quénivet, 2005: 17-18). It is worth noting that a focus on state-building does not preclude nation-building and vice-versa, but that these are instead implemented at different degrees. For example, Rwanda is still strongly involved in processes of state-building, while the Bosnian state is not strongly involved in either, but even less so in the processes of multi-ethnic nation-building. Moreover, the Rwandan state’s focus on redefining the nation does not necessarily result in a change in ethnic identification at the local level, as will be argued in Chapter Six. By arguing here that the Rwandan state prioritizes nation-building while the Bosnian state prioritizes state-building, I am not arguing that these states are not involved in the other process,
but instead that the local population mostly experience the post-conflict state through nation-building in Rwanda and through state-building in BiH.

Second, this chapter will also examine how these policies of nation/state-building shape the experiences of the population, through their experiences with the post-conflict state. Indeed, Lange and Schlichte (2015: 772) argue that ethnic diversity may impact states by communalizing state power, where the interests of certain ethnic groups are favoured over others. As they argue, ‘highly communalized states also treat the civilian population differently depending on their ethnicity, with certain groups having superior access to public goods and services’ (Lange and Schlichte, 2005: 772). This chapter analyses whether the civilian population – more specifically the survivors of sexual violence – experience equal access to state services by focusing on specific state institutions, such as welfare assistance, state employment, and the political environment. These state institutions were chosen based on the premise that processes and decisions of state/nation-building are often undertaken at a political and elite level that tends to exclude the involvement of ordinary citizens. However, political decisions regarding the type of post-conflict reconstruction approach implemented inevitably impacts the peoples’ day-to-day lives. One important way in which the people are confronted and impacted by the ideology of state/nation-building is through the provision of state services, such as health care, education and welfare assistance. Whilst the provision of state services may contribute to conditions leading to ethnic violence (one of such example is through the education system, see Lange, 2012), they may also contribute to post-conflict reconciliation. Indeed, top-down post-conflict reconstruction practices are reproduced within these state institutions; but people – specifically for this study,
women - experience these practices of post-conflict reconstruction through its relationship with the abstract ‘state’. By looking at these institutions, I argue that these macro-policies continue to powerfully shape the post-conflict experiences of social belonging of the women I met, who find themselves somewhat excluded from the post-conflict state due to their identity as civilian victims of war, and as women. This demonstrates that even if nation/state-building involves policies that facilitate the social reintegration of civilian victims of war (Sarkin, 1999: 800; Loizides, Kovras and Ireton, 2010: 6), there is something distinct about sexual violence as a weapon of war that fosters this shift from ethnic women to moral outcasts in the aftermath of ethnic violence.

From Ethnic Erasure to Multi-Ethnic State

Ethnic identification is currently prohibited by the Rwandan government in favour of a broader Rwandan national identity. A clear change in the government’s understanding of the nation can therefore be observed in the population censuses of 1991 and 2002. In Imagined Communities (1991: Chapter 10), Benedict Anderson uses examples from Southeast Asia to show how the choice to incorporate certain categories or labels in a census reflected the perceptions of the colonial state. Through time, the categories were changed or reordered as a result of these changing perceptions. The same process is observed in Rwanda, where in the 1991 population census, ethnicity was not only included as a category, but was used as the main category to analyse data. However, following the 1994 genocide, any mention of ethnicity was completely removed from the 2002 population census. Religion is still included in the census, but unlike Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is not associated with ethnic affiliation. The population censuses of 2002 and 2012 therefore reflect the
Rwandan state’s constructed nation as one that is inclusive and erases ethnic identities.

However, a certain sense of separation among returnees (Tutsis in exile during the genocide), those granted the title of survivors by the government (Tutsis), and those who identified as Hutu or Twa still exists in Rwanda today, as will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Six (Hintjens, 2008: 6). Moreover, despite its policy of national unity, it is still believed that, in practice, the RPF reserves positions of power for members of the Tutsi elite, and that this practice of homogeneous nation-building acts as a cover for domination by Tutsi elite (Reyntjens, 2004: 187).

These nation-building efforts, however, have not been accompanied by a process of state-building since the political environment is characterized by a one-party rule where freedom of association, opposition and expression remain limited (Beswick, 2010: 227-242; Human Rights Watch, 2014, Accessed 24 June 2014). In a sense, Rwanda adopted a system of post-conflict reconstruction that aims at addressing social and ethnic divisions before promoting free political competition (Uvin, 2001: 92; Paris, 2004: 190-96). The Rwandan state is an example of a state that is first committed to group cohesion and national unity (whether it has been successful or not so far) through an important process of nation-building before undertaking democratisation and a state-building process that could potentially lead to conflict if these divisions are not first addressed (Hippler, 2008: 562; Bardos, 2012: 95; Darden and Mylonas, 2012: 85).

As for the Bosnian-Herzegovinian context, twenty years after the end of the war, Dayton’s political settlement among Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks is still at the core of
the political environment of the country. Whilst changes to this political settlement have been demanded by certain groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Observation, 12 November 2013), the state’s inaction is very revealing of the process - or lack thereof - of multi-ethnic nation-building. Indeed, the ethnic segregation observed during the war is not challenged by the new state, but is instead institutionally consolidated. For example, the *Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina* (accessed 2014) explicitly divides the population between members of the three constituent peoples and other national members. The following sentence, found in the preamble of the Constitution, is revealing of the different class of citizens: ‘Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs, as constituent peoples (along with Others), and citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina hereby determine that the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina is as follows…’ (*Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina*, accessed 2014).

This not only puts an emphasis on group belonging, but specifically on the three main groups, meaning that Roma, Jews or members of other national minorities hold an inferior status within society. For example, until 2002, no seats were reserved for representatives of the national minorities at the entity level, and up to now members of a national minority cannot hold the position of state president and cannot be candidates for the House of Peoples of the Parliamentary Assembly (Guzina, 2007: 227-228; European Commission, 2013: 7; Kennedy and Riga, 2013: 174). This is especially relevant for the Bosniak women who suffered from wartime sexual violence, since they are entitled to a superior group status purely based on their ethnic identity. However, the reality of their post-conflict experiences reflects how this does not happen in practice, as a result of their stigmatisation as rape survivors.

Second, as Guzina (2007: 226) mentions:
One can be a Serb, Croat, Bosniak, Roma or a member of any other national group, but one cannot be identified only as a Bosnian citizen. Rather, one is first a member of the constituent peoples or “others”, then a citizen of the entity in which he or she lives (which, at this point, just reinforces ethnic identification) and, finally, a citizen of the Bosnian state as a whole.

This quote is consistent with other research conducted on national identity in Bosnia-Herzegovina that suggests the population is reluctant to accept and endorse an overarching state identity (Kostic, 2008: 385). Instead, individuals who identify as Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats are more likely to identify with the symbols of Serbia and Croatia than with those of Bosnia-Herzegovina. For instance, political parties in the Republika Srpska have expressed the view that state symbols have been imposed by the international community, namely through the Office of the High Representative, and are not representative of the three constituent people (Kostic, 2008: 391). This lack of unity in terms of national identity remains institutionalized, as the example of the 2013 Bosnian census demonstrates.

The 2013 census was perceived as a very important moment for the country, since no census had been conducted since the end of the ethnic war, with the last census in 1991. The questions of the 2013 census clearly reflect the Bosnian nation as one divided along three main ethnic groups. For instance, Question 24 asks for the ethnic/national affiliation of the individual. What is especially interesting is that even if this question is optional, it is still asked in addition to questions on citizenship (Question 19 on state citizenship and 19.1 on entity citizenship). This demonstrates that citizenship and national affiliation are perceived as separate identities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Furthermore, by having the set categories of Bosniak, Croat and Serb, it maintains the institutionalization of the ethnic divisions and makes these categories more important than other ethnic identities (Roma, Jews, etc.). There are therefore
two categories of citizens: those who belong to the main ethnic groups, and the others.

Furthermore, Question 26 asks about the mother tongue of the individual. Again, there are three set answers: Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian. What is extremely interesting in that case is that there is only a 5% difference between the three languages. They are even more similar than British English and American English (Fischer, A., 2006: 313). However, despite being almost the same language, the census institutionalizes the differences, again suggesting a very divided and rigid conception of the nation and its ethnic groups found within BiH.

The contrasts between the political settlements and environment in each context are clearly visible, and the local population experience these ethnic policies through their contact with the post-conflict state.

**State Employment**

In Rwanda, the state’s efforts to challenge ethnic divisions at the local level certainly led to changing norms in the country, where state employment and services are not provided based on ethnicity anymore. A contrast can instead be found between the returnees, survivors of the genocide and others. For example, there is no data on employment per ethnicity for obvious reasons, but data is available on employment of genocide survivors, which provides an insight into the opportunities and barriers faced by survivors of sexual violence.

According to the National Institute for Statistics of Rwanda (2008: 34), at the time when the census was taken, only 23% of male and 21% of female genocide survivors were employed. Women were generally more involved in agricultural and self-
employed work (private sphere), while the majority of employed men received a permanent income from formal employment (public sphere). It is also interesting to compare regional employment, since proportionally more women who declared themselves as involved in the labour force lived in the Southern province - a region described as poor in comparison to the rest of the country - with the less economically involved living in Kigali, an urban setting. This may not necessarily be a representation of work opportunities in the South versus in Kigali, but instead represents the living conditions of the survivors of the genocide. For example, the women I interviewed in Rwanda suggested that survivors of the genocide living in the Southern province tend to be poor compared to those living in Kigali. The number of active women in the South may therefore be a result of the important financial needs of these women, who, despite psychological or physical injuries that may render employment difficult, absolutely need to secure work to survive. This is perhaps not the same situation some women faced in Kigali, where they might have more opportunities to receive credit and financial support from survivors’ organisations.

Moreover, being economically active does not necessarily mean adequate living conditions. In terms of salaries received by survivors of the genocide, 67.4% of active men and 81.5% of active women received less than 5,000 Rwandan francs per month, maintaining them below the poverty line (National Institute for Statistics for Rwanda, 2008: 39). This would suggest the lasting consequences the genocide has on its survivors maintains them in marginalized positions within the workforce, again reinforcing this division among the survivors, those who were not targeted in 1994, and returnees.
In terms of employment in the public sector, the government’s policy of national unity and removal of ethnic discrimination is also observed. According to Law Nº86 of 2013 for public service, an individual may be recruited as a civil servant as long as he/she holds Rwandan nationality, is aged 18 or over and was not prosecuted for crimes of genocide. This policy was also included in the country’s Constitution, where under Article 126, ‘public servants are recruited, posted and promoted in conformity with the principle of equality of citizens, through an objective, impartial and transparent system on the basis of the competence, merit and integrity of applicants of both sexes’ (Constitution of Rwanda, accessed 2012: 32). This is a change from the pre-genocide period, where public administration was traditionally dominated by one ethnic group. In practice, however, the ethnic composition of the public sector remains Tutsi-dominated to a certain extent. This of course cannot be officially proven by statistics, but certain scholars such as Hintjens (2008: 13) have argued that the public administration sector is dominated by returnees from Uganda, and individuals I have met in Rwanda corroborated this statement.

For example, I engaged with individuals who were recent university graduates or graduated less than a decade ago. They told me that ethnic discrimination was still happening in the country, but not in terms of Hutus-Tutsis; rather, the more pervasive discrimination is between returnees and those who stayed in Rwanda during the genocide. The young professionals I spoke to mentioned that returnees were favoured for public administration positions and were often offered the highest positions. This is also demonstrated by the change from French to English as the official language of the state, which again was perceived by the population as an indirect way to favour the domination of Tutsi returnees in the public administration
sector\textsuperscript{3} (Hintjens, 2008: 13). This language dynamic was extremely interesting to observe when engaging with public administration employees in Rwanda. For example, when I was in Rwanda, private meetings with government workers were often done in French, but I was asked that all official communications – letters, emails – be written in English. The use of the English language in Rwanda will eventually become more widespread, transcending the divisions between returnees and those who stayed, but it cannot be denied that at the time of change, returnees had a better chance of securing public administration positions due to their prior knowledge of English. This again puts many survivors of sexual violence in a disadvantaged position, since all the women I met could only speak Kinyarwanda.

As for Bosnia-Herzegovina, fixed ethnic identities lead to inequalities and discrimination at the individual level. For example, one of the main challenges faced by Bosnia-Herzegovina (regardless of its entity) in its post-conflict transition is employment opportunities for its population. BiH has one of the highest unemployment rates - 28.4\% in 2013 - in Europe and in the Balkans (Bajramovic, 2010: section 2.4; World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/country/bosnia-and-herzegovina). More importantly, this high level of unemployment is considered long-term unemployment, with 50\% of the unemployed being out of work for over five years. This partly explained why many Bosnians left the country to find employment abroad, sending remittances to family members left behind (Ministry of Civil Affairs of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 2010: 13). There are also inequalities within the population in terms of access to the job market, with certain groups feeling discriminated against in the workplace.

\textsuperscript{3} It is worth clarifying that a large number of Tutsi returnees are English speakers from Uganda.
For example, as described by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (2010: 29),

ECRI notes with regret that public sector employment remains far from respecting the ethnic breakdown of Bosnian society as registered in the last (1991) census. Where available, figures show that the composition of local administrations is often heavily weighted in favour of whichever constituent people is in the majority in that area, at the expense of all other groups. Minority returnees experience difficulty in accessing both public and private sector employment.

These inequalities based on ethnicity however still favour the three main constituent groups. Whilst individuals who identify with these three groups might suffer from discrimination in the regions where they represent a minority group, their employment opportunities and rates remain higher than those who identify with a national minority group, such as Jews and Roma. According to the International Labour Organization (2009:14),

the Roma population is far more likely to be poor than members of the majority, as indeed is the case in other countries in the region. A recent report on the Roma and Internally Displaced Persons in South-East Europe found that the unemployment rates of the Roma population were over 70% higher than those of the non-Roma population living in the vicinity.

Furthermore, when looking specifically at employment in the Public Civil Sector, a similar pattern of ethnic discrimination can still be observed. There was an attempt to address this discrimination in 2002, when the Office of the High Representative imposed the ‘Civil Service Law’, aimed at regulating the ethnic employment in the state administration. In the first few years following the end of the war, state institutions lacked the support of Republika Srpska, and thus included few Serbs, which led to this need for reforms. The ‘Civil Service Law’ now requires proportional ethnic representation for the three constituent groups within the civil servant force and prohibits discrimination based on ethnic identity or religion. As for
the RS, a system of proportionality was not adopted, but instead the Law ensures the protection and promotion of national equality within the civil service. However, despite the efforts undertaken and the progress made in changing a fragmented public administration sector into a more professional one, there is still a struggle in maintaining the requirements of ethnic representation and professionalization (Bieber, 2006: 44-45). The public administration sector remains a domain where ethnic ties and fragmentation is still observed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is a concern for the European Commission, which in their 2013 progress report (p. 11) suggests the following:

The issue of financial sustainability of public administration at all levels needs to be addressed. Continued fragmentation and politicisation of the civil service system remain an issue of concern. The development of a professional, accountable, transparent and efficient civil service based on merit and competence requires further attention at all levels of government. The supreme audit institutions should resume cooperation.

The understanding that Bosnian citizens are first members of a group, before being sole individuals is therefore reproduced in the public administration sector, and is not challenged by the Bosnian state by fostering a sense of national unity (Richmond and Franks, 2009: 64). Reforms undertaken over the last few years to render the civil service sector more professional have focused on building and developing state institutions that will be efficient (state-building), but did not target the ethnic fragmentation that was at the core of the ethnic violence (nation-building).

In theory, this should advantage the survivors of sexual violence I spoke to because of their inclusion within the three main constituent groups. However, if we do not take into account certain issues such as the trauma and physical injuries experienced, the women I met may struggle to find employment because of their
situation as internally displaced individuals. Indeed, according to an Amnesty International report (2006: 14), discrimination based on ethnicity has been endemic in the post-war period, remaining an important obstacle to the successful reintegration of returnees and displaced people. For example, Kondylis’ research (2010) has clearly demonstrated an association between displacement and unemployment in Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to the data analysed, Bosnian individuals who were displaced as a result of the war are 16-19% more likely to be unemployed than those who stayed. A few factors might explain this situation, such as weakened or missing social networks and employment interruptions associated with displacement. Since the economic context in BiH involves high numbers of informal employment, jobseekers may rely on their social networks as an entry point into the informal labour force. Displaced individuals find themselves disadvantaged in this economic reality, where they have to rebuild their social networks in their new places of residence. This, compounded with their work interruption, makes it harder for displaced individuals to secure employment compared to those who stayed in the country (Kondylis, 2010: 246-247). This therefore adds another layer that prevents survivors of sexual violence from successfully reintegrating into the labour market.

**Welfare Assistance to Civilian Victims of War**

Social welfare and the state’s allocation of resources present another medium through which daily life is affected by the government’s ideology towards nation/state-building. This is especially relevant in a context of post-conflict reconstruction, where consequences resulting from the war continue and where war survivors often need government support to improve their living conditions.
Analysing the allocation of resources is a good way to understand the position that civilian victims of war are granted in the post-conflict state.

First, according to the Constitution of Rwanda, the government is entitled to provide limited financial assistance to survivors of the genocide, under the *Fonds d’Assistance pour les Rescapés du Génocide* (FARG). This financial assistance was established by the government in order to support the survivors of the genocide, specifically the Tutsi survivors. As confirmed by Thérèse and Laura, staff members of Organisations A and B (13 May 2013), in order to be covered by this fund, one has to be an individual who identified as a Tutsi and lived in Rwanda during the genocide. Indeed, Law N°69 of 2008 specifies that the fund is aimed at supporting individuals who were targeted in the genocide against Tutsis, with no mention of Hutu moderates. FARG thus prioritizes assistance to Tutsi survivors who are included in the following categories: widows or orphans, elderly without families, individuals whose homes were destroyed, and finally handicapped and HIV-infected individuals. Children are covered under this fund if they were born before December 31, 1994, to parents who are considered survivors of the genocide (Law N°69/2008, 2008). Based on these criteria, children born out of rape are excluded from this financial assistance and from recognition as survivors, since they were born in 1995. Women and survivors’ organisations, however, are lobbying the government to modify these criteria in order to recognise the rights and needs of children born out of rape.

Moreover, based on a report prepared by the National Institute for Statistics of Rwanda (2008: 23), in 2008, 56% of female survivors received assistance from FARG, whilst 53% of men did so. Some regional variations can be observed, such as
in the Southern province, where 58% of women receive financial assistance compared to 42% in the Northern province. As for health insurance, 66% of women received FARG assistance (63% of men), with only 15% of both men and women being insured through the state system of *mutuelle de santé*, and 13% of women (12% of men) being without any medical insurance (National Institute for Statistics of Rwanda, 2008: 23, 29).

These numbers reflect the financial dependency that many survivors of the genocide - mostly women - have towards the state. The situation, however, varies between regions, where women survivors living in the Southern province and in Kigali are more likely to be supported by FARG than women living in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, a result of various factors such as land fertility, consequences of the genocide, and social networks. What is important here to analyse is the specific recognition that survivors of the genocide receive from the state, which results in financial compensation. In order to be granted the title of a genocide survivor and so access its associated rights, one must have identified as a Tutsi during the genocide, which not only challenges the state’s policy of national unity, but also creates a certain division between those Tutsi rape survivors whose rights are recognized, and the Hutu/Twa rape survivors. For the women I met who all identified as Tutsis, the state policies of welfare assistance privilege the recognition of their rights, and yet they all still struggle economically.

What this policy, but also the practices of state employment demonstrate is that there are certain limitations to the Rwandan state’s policy of ethnic erasure. Whilst in theory these policies tend to favour unity, their implementation has the result that some individuals may still feel disadvantaged in comparison to Tutsis, especially to
Tutsi returnees. This is something that will be discussed in Chapter Six, but the data presented in this section illustrates the extent to which the official state policies of ethnic erasure impact these women on a daily basis: while they are not ethnically discriminated, their identity as genocide survivors results into a more subtle state exclusion.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, when looking at the distribution of state benefits divided by category, the 2012 data (see Annex 4) of the Federation shows that the highest number of beneficiaries received compensation due to their low income, followed by those receiving different social welfare, including those claiming survivors benefits (Institute for Statistics for the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 2013: 30-33). These numbers are supported by the UNDP, which also mentioned that ‘the second most prevalent type of social beneficiary in BiH are the disabled and those people who are surviving dependents of the policy’s direct beneficiary, namely disability and survivor benefits’ (UNDP, 2007: 27). When comparing the beneficiaries within that category, it does seem that more individuals are receiving benefits under the title of ‘survivor’, than that of ‘military’ or ‘disability’. As with Rwanda, civilian victims of war are therefore entitled to state support in the aftermath of the war.
Graphic 1: Percentage of the population receiving disability, survivor or military benefits.


However, this does not necessarily mean that the level of assistance is the same between the categories. For instance, according to the UNDP (2007:42):

The social protection system in both entities provides war veterans, war invalids and their families with a broad range of benefits and in amounts significantly higher than similar benefits provided to other categories of population in social need. It is not an isolated case for the total monthly benefits of the above mentioned categories of the population to be two or three times the average net salary in BiH.

The following graphics clearly show this difference in terms of monetary aid. At both the entity and national level, pensions represent the highest state expenditure (8.2% of the BiH GDP, 8.3% of the Federation GDP and 10% of the RS GDP in 2005). When comparing the other transfers to individuals, it is clear that at all levels, veterans are prioritized over other beneficiaries.
Graphic 2: Transfers to individuals as a percentage of BiH GDP.


Graphic 3: Transfers to individuals as a percentage of the Federation of BiH GDP.

The comparison reveals the importance that war veterans have in terms of social benefits, and the numbers presented above demonstrate an inequality between those who fought during the war and the civilian victims (including survivors of sexual violence). This could imply that war veterans are favoured within the social welfare system in contrast to civilian victims of war. This contextualises the injustice that the women I interviewed mention in Chapter Seven, where their aggressors are seen to receive state compensation. Unequal welfare assistance therefore has the impact, even if not necessarily intentional, of creating a citizen v. sub-citizen dichotomy between the military aggressors and the women I interviewed.

Furthermore, since the allocation of resources is divided between the state and entities, the actual financial aid received by the beneficiaries varies according to geographical location. These differences are also observed at the cantonal level in the Federation of BiH, depending on factors such as the size and wealth of the canton (UNDP, 2007: 41). This lack of universal criteria and standard processes leads to
great inequalities in terms of social assistance. Moreover, the UNDP (2007: 42) also argues that financial assistance remains low, and that the different levels of government are often unable to respond to the needs of the population due to their financial limitations. This is of particular importance for the survivors of sexual violence since the assistance provided is often insufficient to cover their needs, and information regarding the type of assistance available to civilian victims of war is often absent.

Finally, in terms of aid to refugees and displaced people, the process is again split between the entities. Whilst the exact criteria differ in each entity, in general war refugees are entitled to accommodation, health services, food, clothing, and more. However, in practice, only a few services are guaranteed by the entities, which tend to focus on housing and infrastructure, and even then it is quite common for the entities to provide assistance only to refugees from their own national group (UNDP, 2007: 86). As a survivor of sexual violence displaced from the war, a woman may then feel discriminated first as a civilian victim of war, and second as an internally displaced individual.


A few observations can be made from these expenditures, but the most important remains the difference between the funding given to housing and psychosocial programmes. In the Federation of BiH, there is a clear focus on reconstruction of housing units, and the amount spent for that purpose remains considerable compared to the funding spent on psychosocial programmes. Of course, costs associated with rebuilding a house might be far greater than the annual wage of a psychologist. However, when considering that all NGOs I engaged with as part of my fieldwork mentioned the challenges they faced in providing counselling services to their beneficiaries, it still suggests that a choice was made not to spend more money on counselling services. This perhaps reveals a certain type of post-conflict ideology regarding the needs of survivors, in which basic needs, such as accommodation, have priority over psychological well-being. Certainly housing is truly a priority, but, as will be discussed in Chapters Six and Seven, the long-lasting psychological consequences of sexual violence still affect the survivors’ lives. It is thus worth keeping in mind the considerable difference in the state’s expenses on infrastructure and psychological assistance. The financial limitations of the state are also an obstacle to the provision of state welfare, and the European Commission (2013:37) outlined the situation as the following: ‘on social inclusion and protection, vulnerable groups (children, Roma and returnees) are not adequately protected, whether at State or Entity level, or in the Brcko District’.

Unlike in Rwanda, where being a survivor of the genocide entails a certain recognition and financial assistance, it seems that in BiH, civilian victims of war are not adequately supported by the state, who might prioritize financial support to ex-combatants. This is revealing of the nature of the post-conflict state in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, where a lack of nation-building policies maintains the ethnic divisions of the state, reinforcing group rights over individual rights. This has the consequence that certain groups, such as the women who suffered from sexual violence, may have their rights as ethnic group members recognized, but are underprivileged in both state employment and welfare assistance as civilian victims of war.

**Challenges to the Structural Integration of Women**

Both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda have implemented gender-sensitive policies in the aftermath of their ethnic violence. These policies are aimed at promoting gender equality and preventing gender discrimination in the private and public spheres. Through an analysis of state employment and welfare assistance, I argue that despite the progress observed in both contexts, women remain structurally excluded and marginalized from the public sphere. The marginalization experienced by most women, compounded with the complex layers of social exclusion experienced by women who suffered from sexual violence during the Bosnian war and Rwandan genocide provides the structural context for the limited integration opportunities these women face in the post-conflict state.

**Rwanda**

The genocide of 1994 profoundly changed Rwandan society on many levels, including the gender paradigm. Due to the disappearance of large numbers of Rwandan men, women’s roles and involvement in the reconstruction of the country have greatly increased, ascribing them roles that were never allowed before the genocide. Economic realities for many female heads of household led them to undertake paid employment or commercial activities that were strictly reserved for men prior to 1994. Women have therefore increased their participation in the
economic, social and political domains, which was supported by government laws and policies. For example, the RPF-led government implemented policies regarding gender-based violence, maternal rights and gender quotas. Overall, it can be argued that the social position of women in Rwandan society has improved following the end of the genocide (Burnet, 2011: 303).

However, despite the progress observed, numbers show that women are still under-represented in the public sphere. For example, labour force participation rate numbers for 2012 suggest that 71.7% of women and 75.6% of men are economically active. There is, however, a rural-urban divide, where in rural Rwanda, 75.8% of men and 73.9% of women are active, and in urban areas 75.2% of men and 60.9% of women are active (National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda, 2015: 18). According to World Bank indicators (http://data.worldbank.org/country/rwanda), 87% of women were involved in the labour force in 2012 (86% of men). In terms of unemployment, 0.4% of women were registered as unemployed (0.8% of men). These numbers suggest that women are more integrated into the workforce than their male counterparts, which do not support the official statistics of the Rwandan government.

Moreover, according to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (2002: 107), women are mostly included in the labour force in rural areas, where they remain self-employed and work on their own land. In addition, ‘women are scarce in such professional categories as employers and salaried workers, which require a reasonable level of education and some material and financial capital base, as a prerequisite. Such professions are more common in the secondary and tertiary sectors that are located mainly in the urban areas’ (Ministry of Finance and Economic
Planning, 2002: 107). For instance, the Rwandan government implemented a national action plan - Vision 2020 - to improve the economic situation of the country and reduce poverty over the next few years. The full participation of women in the workforce has been mentioned as a key element of economic growth, since ‘women represent 52% of the population, yet despite progress, they do not participate fully in socio-economic and political spheres of life’ (Republic of Rwanda, 2013: 86). There is therefore a gender divide in the Rwandan labour force: whilst a high portion of women are working, they are mostly self-employed and cultivate their own land, and remain excluded from professional work, which in turn restricts them to the private sphere.

In addition to the urban-rural divide, there is also a regional variation that is witnessed in Rwanda.

**Graphic 7: Women’s Labour Force Participation Rate, Rwanda, 2012.**

The rate of active women in urban areas is lower than the national average (60.9%) in only two places: Kigali City (59.5%) and the Western Province (56.0%). In terms of the rate of active women in rural areas, the rate is again lower than the national average (73.9%) only in two places: Kigali City (61.0%) and the Southern Province (70.6%). It is therefore interesting to notice that for both indicators, Kigali City fares worse than the national average for employed women, which may be surprising considering the work opportunities the Rwandan capital offers. However, this confirms reports by the Rwandan government that women tend to be employed in agricultural work instead of professional work. Kigali City provides opportunities for professionalised work; however, when taking into consideration that many women who suffered from sexual violence in the genocide later moved to Kigali, this helps contextualise why women face challenges in securing employment, as will be discussed in Chapter Six.

Moreover, when looking at specific state employment, a gender gap can also be found in the education sector. For instance, at the primary school level, schools have an almost equal number of male and female teachers. In 2010, 13,337 women were primary school teachers, compared to 13,417 men (Republic of Rwanda, 2010: 12). This pattern, however, is completely transformed at the secondary and higher education levels, where it is estimated that men represent 70% of the workforce (National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda, 2011: 11). This gender divide increases when looking at positions of authority in both primary, secondary schools or in higher education institutions.
In the public administration sector, the National Institute for Statistics of Rwanda and the Gender Monitoring Office recorded that in 2011, 54.5% of civil servants were men, with 45.5% women (National Institute for Statistics of Rwanda, 2011: 10). High numbers of women employed in some sectors - judges, districts’ councils - is observable, but some sectors remain heavily male dominated, as summarized in the table below.


Table 4: Public Administration staff by gender, 2011.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutions</th>
<th>Women (%)</th>
<th>Men (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Districts</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provinces (2010)</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>75.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Districts (2010)</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>63.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sectors (2010)</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>64.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supreme Court</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judges</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>60.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courts and Tribunals</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judges/higher courts</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>69.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judges/primary courts</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>55.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Prosecutor</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General prosecutors</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In the public health sector, data for employment is quite limited, but does provide an analysis of the gender divide found in this sector.
The graphic shows that women seem reasonably integrated within the health sector workforce, but a visible shift occurs when looking at positions as general and specialist doctors. As with the cases of employment in the education and public administration sectors, these official statistics illustrate how policies of gender equality may allow opportunities for women to be employed in the public sphere, but these policies have still not lead to transformative changes in terms of gender equality in decision-making positions.

Finally, in terms of politics, Rwanda implemented a system of gender quotas to ensure representation of women in government. This gender quota is included in the Constitution, specifying that women should comprise at least 30% of government representatives (Constitution of Rwanda, accessed 2012). The following graphic shows gender representation in the Rwandan government in 2011, but it is worth noting that in 2013, almost 64% of the parliamentary seats were held by women,
making Rwanda the country with the highest number of women in government in the world (World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/country/rwanda).

**Graphic 10: Gender representation in the Rwandan government, 2011.**


The inclusion of women in politics remains a progressive step towards a change in gender roles and stereotypes, and has influenced the participation of women in other spheres of life. However, the role of women in the government has not necessarily been associated with a rise in women’s legislative rights, with some decisions – such as the increase of weekly working hours from 40 to 45 hours, and the increase of working days from five to six days a week - which clearly limit the economic activities of women, who are often also responsible for household chores (Burnet, 2011: 314). Moreover, while state policies favour the inclusion of women at the national level, women’s participation in local government politics remains constrained.
These numbers therefore demonstrate that whilst the policies of gender equality open up possibilities for women to be included in the public sphere, and in this case in politics, it seems that these policies may benefit only those women who already possess a higher status in society, and possess the language skills and education to be considered as a representative in the National Parliament. The statistics presented above clearly demonstrate that women are still under-represented in the public sphere, but what is not necessarily shown, but is implied by these statistics, is that if only a limited number of women successfully integrate into public state employment, these women need to speak the official state language (English) and have certain educational training that allow them to undertake professional positions. The women I met in Rwanda are therefore constrained in attaining these positions, due to the consequences of wartime rape.
**Bosnia-Herzegovina**

The inclusion of women in politics has been traditionally quite low in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the latest numbers suggesting that women comprised only 21% of the Parliament in 2013 (World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/country/bosnia-and-herzegovina), and no woman is currently included in the Council of Ministers (Council of Ministers, 2014) or is a member of the Presidency (Presidency of BiH, 2014). This weak participation of women in politics can be traced over an extended period of time and through diverse state institutions. For instance, since the end of the war in 1995, Bosnia-Herzegovina has been ruled through a system of power-sharing that institutionalizes ethnicity, but ignores gender proportionality. No mechanisms have been put in place to ensure the inclusion of women in politics (such as quotas), meaning that whilst the country’s presidency is equally shared between Croats, Bosniaks, and Serbs, no women have been elected to this level yet. Moreover, a clear gender divide is also found at the ministry level, where both in the 2004 and 2008 elections, inclusion of women in the Council of Ministers was very weak. In 2004, 10% of ministers were women, with no women ministers in 2008, and 20% of deputy ministers were women in 2004 and 2008 (International Labour Office, 2011: 45).

A low participation rate of women in politics is also observed at the local level. For example, in the 2008 local elections, 35.3% of the total candidates were women. However, both in terms of elected mayors and councillors, male representation remains extremely high.
All of the data presented above suggests that participation of women in Bosnian politics remains quite low, and that women are excluded from the highest positions within the government, namely the Presidency and Council of Ministers (European Commission, 2013: 17). Moreover, the weak inclusion of women within state politics is also observed through diplomatic appointments, yet again demonstrating a certain exclusion of women.
Through the institutionalization of ethnicity within state politics as a result of the Dayton Accords, and through the absence of mechanisms securing gender equality, the government is currently prioritizing ethnic identities over gender equality.

Furthermore, in terms of employment, Bosnia-Herzegovina is characterized by a low level of women’s participation in the workforce (European Commission, 2013: 17). A few factors could explain this situation, and the European Commission (2013: 17) suggested that for example discrimination in terms of maternity rights is still present in the country.
However, when tracing gender employment historically, the current level of women’s employment shows a clear increase from the last decades, suggesting an improvement in women’s representation within formal employment. This trend started in the aftermath of the Second World War, with the rise of socialism in the former Yugoslavia. Whilst employment figures varied in former Yugoslav countries, the rapid industrialization witnessed in the region fostered social changes that led to the abandonment of a more traditional lifestyle and paved the way for women’s employment. As Tomsic wrote in 1980 (p. 89), ‘industrialization created opportunities for the employment of the young generations of both sexes, and the employed included more and more women, as the number of employed married women and mothers accordingly increased’. These positive changes, however, did not mean that women were undertaking positions of leadership within the workforce; since they remained a mostly unskilled labour force, they undertook jobs that were
similar to the traditional gender division of labour, and rare were the women who undertook leadership positions (Duric and Dragicevic, 1965: 15; Tomsic, 1980: 94).

Whilst women’s employment has increased over the past decades, important challenges are still present, especially for vulnerable groups. According to the Ministry of Civil Affairs of Bosnia-Herzegovina (2010: 29), vulnerable groups and individuals suffering from physical or psychological disabilities experience difficulty integrating into the workforce since they face specific challenges that limit their employment opportunities. The challenges faced by the women I interviewed will be discussed in Chapter Seven, but here it is important to stress that whilst their struggle to secure employment can be contextualized and understood as part of a larger trend of unemployment amongst Bosnian women, rape survivors still share specific circumstances (trauma, illness) that is not necessarily shared by other women, and put them on the margins of women’s employment.

Furthermore, a certain contrast between the employment figures in the Federation of BiH and the Republika Srpska can be observed. When compared, the employment and unemployment rates for both men and women are worse in the Federation of BiH than in the RS. When looking specifically at women, employment rates increase by around 7% in the RS in comparison to the Federation of BiH.
Furthermore, whilst a certain variation in employment figures can be observed between the two entities, data from the Rural Household Survey (2012: 8) recorded figures for rural areas similar to the national average in 2012, suggesting that no strong variations between employment opportunities in urban-rural areas can be found. This thesis is not aimed at analysing the various factors that can explain these variations; instead, these figures contextualise the experiences of many civilian victims who were displaced from the RS during the war and settled in the Federation of BiH in the post-conflict stage. Based on these figures, women living in the RS are more likely to secure employment than those living in the Federation of BiH.

When looking at specific state sectors, it can first be observed that women are highly integrated within the education sector.
Based on these numbers, women represent the majority of employees in the education sector, with the sole exception of the academic staff at institutions of higher education, where 60.2% of the workforce are men. Although a few years have passed since this survey was conducted, extreme situations would have needed to occur to completely change this trend of gender differences in educational sector employment in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Furthermore, when analysing this trend in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (the RS excluded) over a multi-year period (2002-2008), a similar pattern of women’s participation is also observed.
Graphic 17: Employment in Pre-School and Primary School Institutions by gender, FBiH.


Graphic 18: Teachers in secondary schools and High Education Institutions by gender, FBiH.


What these graphics demonstrate is a contrasting situation with Rwanda, where women in BiH represent the majority of the workforce in the educational sector even in secondary schools, while the same gender gap can be observed in Higher
Education Institutions. Again, women’s involvement in the education sector fares quite well in BiH, but strongly decreases in higher positions, as well illustrated with the graphic below.

**Graphic 19: Women’s Employment in the Education Sector, Federation of BiH.**


This high inclusion of women might not be necessarily surprising, since the education sector has traditionally been associated with women’s work skills, which means that as women’s participation in the labour market remains low, women still undertake positions associated with traditional women’s work.

However, data from 2007 regarding enrolment in the Federation of Bosnian’s universities show that of all students enrolled in the Academy of Education, 92% were women (Federation of BiH Federal Office for Statistics, 2008: 47). When comparing these statistics with the employment figures of 2010-2011, the difference between the higher education enrolment of women in the Academy of Education and the actual number of women working in the education field is striking. Out of 46,536
employees in the education sector in 2010-2011 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, only 61.7% were women, and 38.3% were men. These proportions are very different to the ones found in the Academy of Education in the Federation of BiH, suggesting that women’s enrolment in this department does not necessarily result in employment opportunities afterwards. Whilst no data is available on higher education enrolment in the Republika Srpska, it would remain extremely surprising that a major difference between the two entities could be observed. Instead, it seems that men are more likely than women to find employment in the education sector, and further research on the factors influencing this situation should be conducted.

In terms of public administration employment in Bosnia-Herzegovina, another gender gap can be observed. Data collected from the Federation of BiH Federal Office of Statistics (2008: 81) shows that in 2007, out of the 36,423 public administration employees in the Federation of BiH, 41.4% were women and 58.6% men. In 2012, the total number of public administration employees increased to 39,434, but the proportion of women stayed almost the same at 41.9% (Institute for Statistics of Federation of BiH, 2012: 28). However, as with the education sector, the majority of students enrolled in the Faculty for Public Administration in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2007 were women, with a percentage of 58% female students and 42% male students (Federation of BiH Federal Office of Statistics, 2008: 47). Again, the gender proportion found within the Faculty is not reproduced in the workplace, raising questions about the structural factors that may limit women in undertaking paid employment in their field of specialization after their degree. For instance, even if the state policies promote gender equality in state
employment, policies of maternity rights or nursery costs may constraint women’s opportunities to join the labour market.

A different pattern is however found in the public health sector, where data from 2010 shows that of the 27,627 total public health workers in the country, 76.5% were women.

**Graphic 20: Public health workers in Bosnia-Herzegovina by gender, 2010.**

![Bar chart showing gender distribution of public health workers in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 2010.]


These numbers seem to have remained constant for a few years now, since in 2007 75.9% of public health workers in the Federation of BiH were women (Federation of BiH Federal Office of Statistics, 2008: 81). The representation of female workers in the public health sector is also observed at different levels of responsibilities, with 60.5% of doctors and 82.3% of nurses and medical technicians being women. Unlike with Rwanda where women were under-represented as doctors, Bosnian women represent the majority of the workforce in the public health sector.
Furthermore, unlike the public administration and education sectors where the gender ratios found in the Federation’s universities were not reproduced in the workplace, the public health sector is in fact hiring more women than men. When comparing solely 2007 statistics from the Federation of BiH, 37% of medical students were men. However, in that same year, the percentage of men hired in the public health sector reached only 24.1% (Federation of BiH Federal Office of Statistics, 2008: 37, 81). All the data presented so far can therefore illustrate the specificities of the Bosnian context: women share opportunities to participate in the public sector labour force, but may be more inclined to join professions that are traditionally associated with women’s care, such as education and nursing. However, the inclusion of women in roles as doctors and in other decision-making positions, whilst limited in some sectors, demonstrate a certain women’s empowerment in BiH. Of course, this empowerment is limited by the economic conditions of the country, which experiences high level of unemployment. Regardless, these opportunities for women highlight the specific conditions of the survivors of sexual violence I met, who were all unemployed. Their unemployment can therefore not be equated with their gender identity, but is instead a result of the consequences of wartime rape, and of the stigmatization they experience within their community.

The difficulty for women in securing employment in Bosnia-Herzegovina may explain why more than half of women are receiving welfare assistance from the state.
The data collected show that, in 2010, around half a million individuals were receiving social assistance of all sorts, and that whilst the differences between the men and women recipients is minimal, there have consistently been more women beneficiaries than men. Moreover, within the ‘survivor’ category of beneficiaries, the UNDP (2007: 27) suggests the majority of recipients are elderly women over 65 years of age. According to their data:

In 2001, 26% of 65+ female population benefited from survivor pensions compared to 3% of elderly male population in RS and for female and male elderly population, the beneficiaries are 22% and 2% in FBiH, respectively. In 2004, the percentage of female beneficiaries had declined somewhat for BiH, from 24 to 19%, but was still much higher than the recipient male population (UNDP, 2007: 27).

The employment figures in Bosnia-Herzegovina thus reveal that while some changes in ethnic patronage through reforms occurred, gender equality is far from being achieved in terms of access to public employment. The post-conflict state in
BiH has focused strongly on accommodating ethnicity within the public sphere, but this has not been met with a similar process for gender equality.

**Shared Macro-Level Exclusion for the Survivors of Sexual Violence**

Finally, in this chapter I first argued that the Rwandan state promotes a Rwandan nation that erases the ethnic divisions at the core of the genocide. This requires a reconstruction of the nation, aimed at forging a sense of national identity that will unite the divided groups under a larger Rwandan identity, by adopting laws and policies that foster this unity. This ideology is strongly articulated through state institutions, policies and laws, but underlying divisions are still present in the country. Instead of representing straightforward ethnic divisions, they are instead based on shared experiences during the genocide. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the state has not been involved in processes of nation-building since the nation remains divided along rigid ethnic identities, reinforced by the Dayton Accords. By maintaining the ethnic divisions at the core of the violence, the nation is not being seriously redefined in the post-conflict period. Instead, it is believed that effective and democratic institutions can accommodate these rigid divisions.

These contrasted policies of ethnic accommodation are reproduced in the state employment and welfare assistance, where in theory they should not lead to any discrimination for the survivors of sexual violence I interviewed, but in practice these women share a similar struggle to be integrated and not considered as sub-citizen in the post-conflict state. Indeed, I argued that in both contexts, women remain under-represented in the public space and at various levels are confined to the
private sphere. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, it can be argued that the state prioritized ethnic accommodation over gender equality in state employment, while the Rwandan context demonstrates a strong state involvement in the improvement of women’s positions within society. However, despite the progress observed in Rwanda, women remained in large part excluded from the professionalised workplace. It can therefore be argued that at the macro level, the women I interviewed in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina share the same structural constraints.

This therefore raises questions on whether the survivors of sexual violence experience similar post-conflict experiences of social integration at the micro-level, which will be explored in the next two chapters. Indeed, Chapters Six and Seven will explore the post-conflict experiences of some survivors of sexual violence and some NGOs working with them, observing certain similarities and contrasts between the experiences in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina. I will demonstrate in these chapters that these women moved from ethnic women to moral outcasts in the aftermath of the ethnic violence, and that their need for social belonging remains embedded within the local context.
Chapter 6. The Changing Boundaries of Survivors’ Social Belonging in Rwanda

This chapter provides an account of my encounters with some survivors of sexual violence and some NGO staff, and analyses perceptions and interpretations of the post-conflict environment. I demonstrate that social reintegration and rebuilding social relationships are the main priorities of the women and staff members I interviewed based on the rationale that it is only through reconstructing their social networks that the various spheres of the women’s lives will be improved. For example, NGOs undertake the role of creating alternative families of survivors as new forms of social belonging for these women. I argue that this is an attempt for the women to redefine their sense of personal self, aided by the NGOs, in a context where the impurity of their body was transferred to their moral value, building on the work of Mertus (1994) and Yuval-Davis (1994).

Disintegration of the Communities

The women I engaged with during my fieldwork in Rwanda generously shared their individual stories and experiences from the genocide onwards. These stories vary on an individual basis, but certain similarities help to conceptualise the post-conflict experiences of these civilian victims of war. In order to understand their post-conflict experiences, however, it is important to understand the trauma experienced during the Rwandan genocide.
For ethical reasons, discussions with the survivors about their past and their experiences during the genocide were not planned for when preparing for fieldwork, meaning that the focus of the interviews was on the post-conflict period. There was, however, a space in the interviews, both at the beginning and at the end, where the interviewees had the possibility of voicing any points they wanted to share. More often than not, stories came up about the genocide, and the atrocities they either experienced or witnessed. Their experiences during the genocide still follow them every day of their lives, and after meeting a few women, it became obvious that their post-conflict experiences could not be analysed separately, without prior knowledge of their past.

Indeed, their need for social reintegration cannot be understood before first understanding how the social fabric of their lives disintegrated during the genocide. For example, Agathe (29 May 2013) started our interview with her personal story, sharing her past for nearly one hour. Her parents were killed when the genocide started, and she escaped with her younger siblings, whom she calls ‘the children’.

My real problems started when I went to Kanombe commune. People recognized me as a survivor in my family because they knew my family was killed. I had to lie that I was a Hutu so that I wouldn’t be killed.

Denial of one’s identity, as in the case of Agathe having to pretend to be a Hutu to survive, was a widespread and common decision made by Tutsis living in Rwanda in 1994. For example, Rose (29 May 2013) made the same conscious decision when facing the Interahamwe: ‘When I reached the Musambira parish I went to hide in the church. Two days later many Tutsis joined me. They came to ask for my papers and I said I was from there but I didn’t have papers with me’. This is not a surprising choice and was even a necessary lie in order to protect one’s life, but, combined with
the pre-genocide propaganda that dehumanized this minority population, it certainly complicated the process of self-identification in the aftermath of the violence, as will be explained in a subsequent section. Keeping her true identity secret meant that Agathe was not killed in Kanombe, but her secret came with the price of becoming ‘the wife’ of some militiamen.

In that place they didn’t kill with machetes but by throwing people in the river saying that they are sent to make business in Tanzania. Where I was, they asked me if I had papers so that they can check if I was telling the truth. The time came when some people who were part of the killers groups came there and asked me to become their wife so that they could keep my secret. (…) They told me that they had guns and if I don’t accept they have to force me. Three men came and took the children away. When I stayed alone, they raped me one by one all night, telling me that they will throw me in the river afterwards (Agathe, 29 May 2013).

Agathe suffered from gang rape, a type of sexual violence that was widely used during the genocide. The violence and dehumanization that occurred alongside the rapes can also be witnessed in the case of Valentine (29 May 2013).

When the war began, they came home and killed my uncles with stones. My mother, my sisters and brothers and I, they forced us to sign a debt recognition, telling us that we are waiting to follow Habyarimana at his funeral. They put me in a hole. (…) I didn’t want to remove my underwear. They threw me a rock on my head and I saw a flow of blood on my head. Then all three, they raped me one by one in that hole. (…) My father was there and implored them not to kill me like that. Then they brought a seven years old boy there in the crowd and they made him have sex with me, which made me very sad.

There is something very poignant about this story, not only because of the brutality of the rapes, but also because of the location where they were conducted. The hole where Valentine was kept was in fact a toilet hole, and in doing so the Interahamwe matched Valentine’s personal and social value as being dirty. This dehumanization process was not limited to Valentine, but to other Tutsis as well.
When I got home we went to hide in the bushes during three days, some other days in a cemetery. And the final day, they brought me where they killed my uncles in a toilet. They brought petrol and burned us. God saved me and my little baby on my back. All the people on me were burned to death and I survived. When Inkotanyi\(^4\) came they took us from that hole of toilet and took us home telling us that we would be safe (Valentine, 29 May 2013).

Here, not only were the Tutsis also perceived as ‘dirty’, but the next quote from Rose (29 May 2013) also suggest that they were also perceived as ‘sinful’. Rose, after being raped by more than eight men, was able to make it to a church, where she was hoping to be safe from the killers.

We sat there from nine am up to four pm. We were like 3,000 people and they didn’t know how to kill us without wasting their bullets and we were too many for them to kill one by one. They had to find a way. They brought a tank and it fired on us. There was a flow of blood on me from the dead bodies next to me. I spent the night among the dead bodies. I was hungry because all I had to eat was dust. (…) At four am, when I woke up, they were searching for survivors among the dead using knives. They hit me many times with their knives trying to see if I was dead. I didn’t feel it because I was like dead and lost too much blood.

There is again something very telling about the location of these crimes. In a religious country as was Rwanda in 1994, it first sounds astonishing that massacres were committed in a church. But perhaps this is very telling of the perceived attributes of the Tutsis, as unworthy of the Church or God’s protection.

The physical injuries that resulted from the rape, and also from other forms of violence, were a central feature of the stories of the women I met. Their physical injuries were sometimes visible, and sometimes they either wanted to show them to me, such as removing their wig to show the burns of their heads, or asked me to touch them. These injuries were an important subject of discussion not only because they impact their day-to-day lives, as will be discussed below, but also because they

\(^4\) The RPF.
are constant reminders of past trauma. However, in addition to these physical injuries, a few women I met were also infected with HIV/AIDS as a result of the rape, ensuring the lasting consequences of the rape on their lives.

I was married and I had a ten months child [when the genocide started]. My husband abandoned us during that war. He was a Hutu. I saw everything. I was beaten, raped, and cut all over my body. I was tested HIV positive (Marie-Louise, 27 June 2013).

This is also the case of Josèphine (26 June 2013), who became an Interahamwe wife during the genocide, meaning that she was forced to engage in sexual relationships with these men in exchange for her life. ‘We were asked to become the Interahamwe wives or to be killed during the genocide. In front of that choice I preferred to follow other women who decided to take that choice too.’ After the genocide, Josèphine however discovered that she was HIV positive, which was a great source of shame for her because of the widespread belief that this was a disease that only affected prostitutes.

Organisation E took us and we were tested HIV positive. They used to say that AIDS came from animals. We didn’t agree to be tested because in the beginning they used to say that AIDS affected prostitutes only. It was a shame. And in that time they used to take blood in Kigali to be tested. I didn’t believe them when they told me that I was infected. I didn’t believe them because I knew it could affect prostitutes only (Josèphine, 26 June 2013).

Accepting her illness was extremely hard for Josèphine, not only because of the stigma associated with HIV/AIDS, but also because of the lasting consequences of the infection.

After the genocide I was sick, my husband and my two children killed. I stayed with my three children and my sickness that I couldn’t accept in my heart. And when the genocide stopped, the Interahamwe left us and went away. Life didn’t spare me because I had to fight for it. (…) I was thinking that it was better to die, so I was expecting AIDS to kill me because others didn’t do it (Josèphine, 26 June 2013).
The women’s bodies were therefore again the battlefield upon which the communities could be disintegrated, but this time through HIV infection.

Moreover, all of the women interviewed experienced migration throughout the genocide, since they had to flee their home in order to survive. For most of them, it is through this journey that they experienced sexual violence, being allowed to survive either by choice or by pure luck. This is the case of Céline (5 June 2013), who travelled almost 140 kilometres, crossing through different towns and different homes and shelters until she was rescued in the Western province.

Then we arrived at Mushubati. I followed some women to a school. At two am I saw people coming towards us, asking for our papers. I was spared that night. At nine am in the morning, a little boy came to tell me that some people wanted to see me. I asked who were they? He didn’t want to tell but I didn’t have a choice. I followed him but I told my children to come with me. When we got there I found out that they were soldiers on a roadblock. They asked me to enter in the house alone. When I got inside they raped me. When they finished what they were doing to me, they asked me where I was from. I told them that I was from Kibuye. They let me go.

The case of Céline is especially troubling since she strongly believes that the men who raped her knew about her identity and consciously decided to spare her life. This implies a certain gender dimension to the genocide, where the men were killed and the women were raped. The vast majority of the genocide victims were indeed men, and it is understood in Rwanda that there are not enough male survivors of the genocide for every female Rwandan to find a husband (observation of Organisation D, 10 June 2013). Of the more than 30 women survivors of sexual violence I talked to during my time in Rwanda, the vast majority were widows from the genocide, meaning that there was clearly a gender divide between those who were spared and those who were undoubtedly killed. This can perhaps be first explained by the patriarchal structures within Rwandan society and the gendered nature of war.
(women ‘survive’ while men fight), where soldiers needed women to undertake certain chores.

That day they [Interahamwe] started killing many people. We were hiding in houses. They came and set free every Hutu by asking identification cards. We stayed. In a few days my family was killed. (...) They used to take us one by one, like five women a day taking them to celebrate their marriage with one of them in one of the houses after they killed the owners. Days passed and one day G. came to say that he wanted women for sex. They took us every day to his house, picking some of us they liked, bringing back others. They also used to give us some kind of drinks that was like drugs. It was in a rainy season. They also took us to bury a dog and a cat they killed. They took me to a woman where they made me work as a house girl, cooking for them all night and bringing them food in the morning. I used to cook beans in a barrel. After all that, they used to come back at night and beat me with their guns (Oda, 2 July 2013).

However, I suggest that beyond the gender dynamics, the patriarchal understanding of biological reproduction of one’s group being carried only through paternity also explains why more women than men were allowed to survive the genocide. It was understood that Tutsi women could not continue the reproduction of their group without Tutsi men. This patriarchal understanding of group reproduction also meant that for a few women I engaged with, they also experienced forced impregnation. This is the case of Oda, who mentioned above that she had to cook for the Interahamwe during the genocide.

One day I didn’t cook because I heard that the Inkotanyi were coming for us. When the Interahamwe came back and found out that I didn’t cook, one of them pierced me with his bayonet under my breast. I fell down and bled to death. There’s one Interahamwe who took my little sister. He came and carried me at St. Famille. When I got there, people were dying a lot. My wounds were infected. A few days later we got rescued by the Inkotanyi and they treated our wounds. That is when I found out that I was pregnant from the Interahamwe. It was bad for me. My wounds were treated and after I regained my strength, Inkotanyi made me have an abortion (Oda, 2 July 2013).
This last sentence is especially powerful, since it implies that the *Inkotanyi* had a role to play in the decision to abort that child. This clearly illustrates the patriarchal understanding of group reproduction that influenced the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war, since instead of seeing a pregnant Tutsi woman who would give birth to child raised as Tutsi, the *Inkotanyi* instead likely saw a child with the attributes of an *Interahamwe*.

However, another woman, Jeannette, was also impregnated as a result of rape, but gave birth to the child in the aftermath of the genocide, which she found difficult to accept.

Days later, one of them [*Interahamwe*] took me to his house and raped me. I spent a week there. Every time he used to go kill people during the day and come back at night bringing others like me. After a week, we were rescued by the *Inkotanyi*. *When did you know that you were pregnant?* After 4 months. *And how did you take it?* It was hard for me to get pregnant of a child you didn’t plan and from someone you don’t know. And it was worse when I knew I was infected (Jeannette, 9 July 2013).

These are only glimpses into the personal stories of the genocide of the women I met during my time in Rwanda, but these experiences during that 100-day period still affect their post-conflict experiences almost 20 years later. The context and their surroundings have changed: as mentioned by Valentine (29 May 2013) when speaking about the toilet hole where she was raped, ‘Today there’s a big tree in the place where was the hole.’ These changes, however, have not erased the physical and psychological injuries of the women I met. Indeed, what remains constant is that their moral exclusion started as soon as the genocide started and their body was used as a battlefield, and continues in the aftermath of the genocide.
Reconstructing Social Relationships

Rwanda has made significant progress in its post-conflict reconstruction, which has drastically transformed its surroundings. In my first few days in Kigali, while I was waiting for the Rwanda National Ethics Board to approve my research visa, I went to the Gisozi Genocide Memorial. From the outside, the Memorial is immaculate, with vegetation and gardens surrounding the mass graves. Outside the entrance is the memorial flame, a constant reminder of the atrocities that occurred in Rwanda in 1994.

The memorial includes an indoor exhibition on the history of the genocide, starting from the pre-colonial period to the current post-conflict state. The memorial is well organised and maintained by the Aegis Trust, and acts as a reminder of the genocide and as evidence of mass crimes that cannot be denied. The memorial also acknowledges the use of mass rapes as a weapon of war during the genocide, and mentions the difficulties of addressing this trauma due to the number of victims and the prioritization of resources (Observation, 21 May 2013).

I visited many parts of the country during my time in Rwanda and was surprised to find genocide memorials throughout the country. These memorials of course change in size and purpose, with some being used more as ‘museums’, while others seem to be acting as reminders of the past, as the photograph below shows.
I arrived in Kigali shortly after the beginning of the 19th year commemoration, and banners were present on the streets of the city; songs about the genocide and the perils of denying it happened were shown on the TV channel operated by the Ministry of Broadcasting and Information. Whilst the city did not show any lingering signs of the violence, except for the walls of the Parliament, the 1994 genocide was constantly in the background. I interpreted the space as a metaphor of the Rwandan population, where on the surface one would not necessarily notice the trauma and violent past that this country has suffered, yet it follows them every step of the recovery process. This is something that was confirmed throughout my time in Rwanda, where the experiences of the genocide still very much influence the post-conflict experiences of the women who suffered from sexual violence.
Voices from the Inside

Through my interactions with some women who suffered from sexual violence, it became clear that they still suffered from trauma. The level of trauma experienced varies from woman to woman and even between days, weeks, and months, but it is something that all the women I met have endured in the aftermath of the genocide. It is worth noting that the term ‘trauma’ was used by the women I met to describe their state, but according to a few Rwandans I spoke to, this term was not present in the Kinyarwanda language prior to the genocide, or at least it was not commonly used.

The women told me that, at first, the trauma of the genocide, and of the sexual violence, was extremely strong and contributed to their state of social isolation.

I don’t really remember the year I met Organisation C. But I remember that when I [learned] about it, it was like I lost my mind: I never went to pray, I didn’t like to approach people, I was thinking that no one could listen to me whatever I would tell (Céline, 5 June 2013).

All the women I met experienced different levels of trauma as a result of the rape itself, but added consequences of the act can increase the suffering experienced. For example, as explained above, some women were infected by HIV/AIDS as a result of the rape, and this added another layer of trauma. ‘I went to be treated at a crazy people hospital at Ndera. I was always naked because I got crazy thinking about the way they took off my clothes… also because I was tested HIV positive’ (Valentine, 29 May 2013).

Their psychological distress was also hard to address in the aftermath of the genocide when they felt that they were surrounded by the génocidaires. ‘I went mad again because I was living among killers all around me’ (Joséphine, 26 June 2013). For others, the trauma was so strong that some of them wished they would have died.
instead of surviving the genocide. ‘I wanted to die on my way back home’ (Céline, 5 June 2013). Others even attempted suicide in order to liberate themselves from this pain. This is the case of Jeannette (9 July 2013), who, in addition to the loss of her family and the sexual violence, also gave birth to a child born out of rape. ‘I could even stand in the middle of the road hoping that a car could kill me, crying day and night. I tried to kill myself many times’.

The psychological distress experienced by these women may have led some of them to develop suicidal thoughts, but the isolation felt also has an impact on their access to services such as access to justice.

I didn’t like to go there [gacaca court] because every time I tried to go there, it drove me crazy. Every time they talked about that time I wasn’t good. So I preferred not to go. I was invited to go see people who killed my family. I was told that they accepted that they were guilty but I never went there (Marie-Louise, 27 June 2013).

This quote by Marie-Louise illustrates the struggle she faced when attempting to get justice and reparation for the crimes committed against her and her family. Recollecting the events from the genocide can sometimes re-traumatize civilian victims of war, and this is something that Marie-Louise experienced during the testimonies.

However, when I was in Rwanda in 2013, it was evident that the women did not experience trauma to the same extent as they did after the genocide. In a group therapy session with approximately 30 women held by Organisation D, I asked the women what helped them after the genocide. They said the organisation taught them the word of God, gave them material and financial support, and, most importantly, psychological support (Observation Organisation D, 31 May 2013).
The psychological support given by the NGOs operating in Rwanda seems one of the most important services provided after the genocide. ‘Organisation C gave me the peace of heart. They wiped away my tears. That is the first thing I can say they did’ (Olive, 29 May 2013). All survivors interviewed mentioned the importance that feeling listened to had on their trauma healing. ‘The director prayed for me and I felt like my heart was in peace because finally someone listened to me’ (Rose, 29 May 2013); ‘after days of talking I was free of that charge in my heart’ (Joséphine, 26 June 2013). The opportunity to not only speak, but to feel heard, is very important for these women, giving them the feeling that they are not alone.

We could spend two days just talking. That helped us feel that we were not alone anymore. (...) What I was saying is that before I was lonely, I was thinking that I wasn’t capable of coming out of my house and go somewhere, but because of Organisation C and other people who I live with and the fact that I joined some associations, it helped me to break the chains in my heart, move from that darkness and feel better (Agathe, 29 May 2013).

However, I would take this argument further by arguing that it is not only the possibility of being listened to that leads to trauma healing, but also being listened to by individuals free of judgement. Going back to the case of Marie-Louise, who tried to testify in the gacaca courts, the possibility of being listened to and speaking about the crimes committed against her did not provide her with the same sense of relief as described by Rose and Josephine - on the contrary. This may imply that the conditions in which the women are allowed to speak, as well as the character of the individuals who are listening, all have an impact on the possibility for trauma healing, and consequently show them that they are worthy individuals. For example, after conducting interviews with these women, many of them mentioned the importance of this moment, where they were able to speak about their lives in a safe
space. ‘I will never forget that you took the time to listen to me’ (Agathe, 29 May 2013).

This need to be listened to can also explain why some women found their religious faith crucial for their trauma healing process. For them, praying and feeling listened to by God are crucial for the process of self-acceptance. ‘I also go pray. That is what gives me peace’ (Joséphine, 26 June 2013), and

I was a Catholic. I didn’t change. I go pray because it makes me forget what I was before. (…) I pray a lot. When you think about the past and how we raised our children after that life, I pray a lot (Célestine, 27 June 2013).

However, due to the disputed role of churches during the genocide, there are still some individuals who might feel alienated by religious teaching.

Is religion helping you in your day-to-day life? No. I don’t even participate anymore. We were practising Adventists, the good ones. But my family was chased by our friends at the church and one pastor killed my father. I also heard that my mother had been given [away] by the sons of a pastor. So I gave up on religion. Sometimes I try to pray but I am not strong at that (Oda, 2 July 2013).

In the case of Oda, she is rejecting her faith because of the role that religious men played in killing her family. The role of the Christian Church in the Rwandan genocide has been analysed by some researchers, such as Carney (2012), and a few women I met (Rose and Jeannette) were attacked by the Interahamwe while they were taking cover in a church. It was thus a surprise on my part that Oda was the only woman I met who personally struggled with her religious faith. It however confirms the idea that not all channels available to increase the women’s voices are worthwhile for some women, and that they must develop a relationship of trust with those who listen. This is not always an easy thing due to their stigmatisation.
Regardless, it seems that religion provides for most women a way to understand their suffering. On many occasions, the women seemed to be removing their agency and putting it into God’s hands. For example, Agathe (29 May 2013) was speaking about the suffering she experienced during the genocide, and concluded: ‘that is what God gave me.’ Other women also mentioned that they survived because of God’s plan. ‘Because God wanted us to survive and tell what happened in that time, God saved me and I was healed’ (Jeannette, 9 July 2013). I interpret this as in order to accept what happened to them, the women need to believe that this was all part of God’s plan. This may lead them to remove to a certain extent their own agency, as well as the agency of other Rwandans. This might be a reaction to witnessing atrocities during the genocide, and the resulting difficulty of accepting that this was purely caused by human agency. It might be easier for trauma healing to hold onto this idea that, despite all this suffering, God had a plan. This belief might also explain why religion remains important in the aftermath of the genocide, whereby some women might believe that their social reintegration and the improvement of their living conditions is again part of God’s plan.

I will always be grateful for what God gave me through Organisation C. (…) We were told that we could come pray and tell our wishes in prayers. It made me be in a sharing relationship with God. God heard my prayers and I got a job here (Rose, 29 May 2013).

This is also perhaps why Marie-Louise (27 June 2013) wanted me to share this message through my research: ‘tell them to pray for us. Also I don’t have a shelter, we pay the rent but it is very hard. So they have to pray for us’.

Joining an association and nurturing their religious faith were described as important steps towards trauma healing for some women. ‘They [the NGO] brought
back my hope in life’ (Marie-Louise, 27 June 2013); ‘when I cry I feel free because they killed my child and everyone I loved. And when I came here I started feeling the change in my heart’ (Olive, 29 May 2013). However, as mentioned above, whilst there has been important progress in terms of trauma healing, the trauma experienced can sometimes be triggered and increase at some points in the women’s lives. ‘Now I have hope and I want to live. Problems come only when I face poorness and I have no one I can speak to’ (Oda, 2 July 2013). As the case of Oda illustrates, an increase in trauma is often associated with a change in living conditions, such as financial challenges or illness. This also explains why when I directly asked the women what the most important NGO services for them are, counselling services are always mentioned alongside other services.

For some, especially those infected with HIV/AIDS, it is the medicine provided that was crucial. ‘What is the service that Organisation E gave you that most helped you? The counselling service and the ARV because they gave us our medicines’ (Jeanette, 9 July 2013); ‘they give us medicines and it helps us so much. They also organise meetings between us and they counsel us about life’ (Célestine, 27 June 2013). This combination between counselling services and services targeting basic and physical needs was a constant feature of my encounters with these women.

The most important is the counselling service. They gave me Nadège to advise me. She made me take my medicines and now I am fine, I came back to life. I accepted my situation. Also they helped me in bad situations like paying my rent when I was down. (…) I was helped by Organisation E in everything. They gave us hope and treated our wounds. They pay my ticket to go take my pills every month (Marie-Louise, 27 June 2013).

I interpret this quote by Marie-Louise as suggesting that the women I met achieved a certain degree of trauma healing because of the wide support provided by the
organisations, which not only counsel them, but also address the basic and physical needs of these women. By receiving support in every sphere of their lives, the women are able to overcome trauma and achieve social reintegration. ‘Step by step I finally accepted who I was and I stopped thinking about vengeance. Here they helped a lot and gave me everything until now’ (Valentine, 29 May 2013).

Social reintegration was another point discussed by all women in my formal interviews, who all felt, to different extents, stigmatised and marginalised by their local community. ‘My life went bad again because I started taking care of another one like me [infected with HIV]. People were calling us “crazy”’ (Joséphine, 26 June 2013). This stigma was at times so strong that for some women, such as Oda (2 July 2013), it removed their hope in a better future: ‘long ago I felt like I lost my will to live, the stigma around me made me want to die, asking God why I survived.’ Whilst the women mostly feel stigmatised by those individuals who are not considered survivors of the genocide, they may also face stigmatisation from other survivors who did not suffer from rape. This stigmatisation is experienced through social rejection, where the women I met are verbally abused and excluded from participating in social interactions in their community. For example, Joséphine (26 June 2013) survived the genocide because she became the wife of an Interahamwe, and because of this she feels rejected by other survivors. ‘Because we were hiding in the bushes and lands, before we got to hide with that Interahamwe, people we left behind didn’t like us anymore because they knew we got rescued by the same killers who were hunting them.’ According to her, others think that she should have died instead of becoming the sexual partner of a génocidaire, which means not only engaging in sexual relationships with a killer, but with a man from the enemy group.
This is extremely revealing of the moral exclusion experienced by these women, showing this association between mind and body, where once their bodies were tinted by the rape, their morality became compromised.

With time and with the support of the NGOs, some women I met have, however, learned to overcome this stigmatisation, even those infected with HIV/AIDS.

I was almost dead because I used to stay in the house thinking that people knew and that there was shame on me. (…) They used to fear me because of what happened to me, they put me in some kind of quarantine, never asked me water or anything else. I also didn’t like to talk or to approach people. But now I am changed, things are fine. They visit me. I can give them what they ask me if I have it. Also people I pray with visit me (Céline, 5 June 2013).

This means that for some women, even if stigma is present, whether because of their experience of rape, of bearing a child born out of rape or because of their HIV infection, it is possible to ignore the situation and to look ahead. ‘Do you fear that those who are not survivors learn about your past and reject you? They keep us in that stigma because they think they know about us but we don’t care’ (Célestine, 27 June 2013).

However, what is consistent with almost all the women I met is that while some feel confident enough to face stigma, they will still try to hide the truth about their past if possible: ‘I try to show people that I am fine because I don’t want people to know my problems’ (Joséphine, 26 June 2013); ‘you can’t go tell your problems to someone who doesn’t understand you’ (Célestine, 27 June 2013). This reinforces my previous argument that speaking about one’s past is not always conducive to trauma healing since it may lead to further stigmatisation. These women need to choose who they can disclose their past to, and those to whom they cannot. It is worth mentioning
that almost all the women I met do not live in the same neighbourhood or village that they lived in during the genocide. A few of them moved to Kigali and others moved to other villages, and this migration was described as their decision to stay away from a place associated with loss and trauma, as well as from a place where their past might be known by others. There are, however, some women who never kept their past secret, despite comments made by their neighbours.

I never kept my problems secret. People used to listen to me, others put me in the stigma saying that I was infected. (…) Some of them are good people who have good hearts and help me. Others are bad and tell others to not come close to me saying that I am crazy and I have HIV (Marie-Louise, 27 June 2013).

This quote is especially powerful, due to the association between being ‘crazy’, and being a rape victim who is also HIV-infected. The women may not have explicitly mentioned this, but underlying all their stories is this shift from a body that was spoiled through rape during the genocide to the depreciation of their value as human beings in the post-conflict period.

This explains why all women share the perception that it would be impossible for those who have not suffered from rape during the genocide to understand their situation, to care about them and to avoid blaming them.

*Why have you decided to keep the secret in your community?* It is not that easy and if you are able to talk, they wouldn’t believe me. *Why would they not believe you?* No, it is not that they wouldn’t believe me but they don’t care (Jeannette, 9 July 2013).

At first, they may not feel understood because non-survivors may struggle to comprehend the reality and scale of these crimes, and to believe that this could really happen to a human being.
And no one can understand me when I say that I have problems. Those are my first difficulties. (...) It means that it is unimaginable things. Things that you can tell someone and he can’t understand that it can be real. That is the only thing. They face that problem, the fact that these are sad events. Can someone live with these sad events and feel free when that person is with others, live with them without problems? They don’t understand it, it become a question for them. *J: they think that it is the impossible thing.* Unthinkable things (Agathe, 29 May 2013).

More serious than that is however the fact that many individuals will not believe that these events could have happened to innocent victims, and that these women must have done something to be treated this way.

Also when *gacacas* started, they didn’t want to listen to me because they were saying that I was a fool. Then I decided to keep silent until I came here, I met a counsellor and they helped me to talk about my past. Marie-Louise also helped me to talk. But all my neighbours don’t like me. [In] the *gacaca* [it was] decided that I was going to be paid for my damaged properties but when I went to follow-up on my case so that I can be paid, I found out that the man who was going to pay me sold everything and ran away. His wife insulted me in public saying that I was lying about my situation, that I didn’t get AIDS from the *Interahamwe* but because I had a good time with my Tutsi friends and that I made it all up (Oda, 2 July 2013).

This is especially true for the women who were infected with HIV, since local beliefs at the time were that it was a disease that only affected prostitutes, as explained above. Contracting HIV/AIDS as a result of rape, as well as forced impregnation, thus added additional layers of stigmatisation for the women who survived sexual violence, and contributed to the devalorisation of their social worth. This suggests that the stigmatisation experienced varies from individual to individual, based on a multitude of factors such as the degree of self-acceptance or self-exclusion, the strength of social networks and the nature of the consequences of the rape.

The social marginalisation experienced by the women I met is also aggravated by a certain type of ‘gender crisis’, in which they reject their gender identity and roles.
within society. As expressed by Oda (2 July 2013), ‘many times I did not like to be called a woman.’ This rejection of their gender identity was observed during my time in Rwanda as the refusal of their social role as wives or mothers.

In terms of their role as wives, many women interviewed feel uncomfortable with the idea of getting (re)married: ‘I didn’t want to marry because I was afraid of my situation’ (Joséphine, 26 June 2013), and

My husband [a Hutu] came back after the war and begged for forgiveness explaining me that he didn’t want to kill me because they would have asked him to, so he preferred to run away. I forgave him and because I didn’t want to marry twice, I let him come back (Marie-Louise, 27 June 2013).

This is also illustrated by the cases of Céline (5 June 2013), who also rejects to a certain extent members of the opposite sex: ‘I hate men but I thank God because today never a man has stepped on my door trying to woo me, to fall in love with me’; and of Jeannette (9 July 2013): ‘I may never get married because every time I see a man I see a devil.’ These comments are especially powerful when taking into consideration the Rwandan culture, in which girls are expected to get married in order to hold a certain status in society. Their unease towards members of the opposite sex is not surprising for women who survived sexual violence, but it remains a socially marginal attitude outside of Rwanda’s heterosexual norms. As expressed by a man infected with AIDS in a group counselling session (14 June 2013), ‘a man is the head of the household, he is financially responsible.’ Considering the survivors of sexual violence I met lived in difficult conditions, this refusal to become involved with another man is extremely powerful since it goes not only against gender expectations, but it also prevents them from improving their economic conditions.
Second, some women suffering from this kind of ‘gender crisis’ are also rejecting their roles as mothers. This was mentioned in some interviews when respondents explained to me how they had abandoned their children or found it hard to love them. This was especially true for the women who were impregnated as a result of rape.

It was hard for me to get pregnant of a child you didn’t plan and from someone you don’t know. And it was worse when I knew I was infected. (…) I could even stand in the middle of the road hoping that a car could kill me, crying day and night. I tried to kill myself many times. I never loved that child because every time I see her, she reminds me of the past. She is my wound that will never heal. But slowly it may pass. I never told her about her father (Jeannette, 9 July 2013).

However, whilst this is inevitably a crisis experienced by Jeannette, who was impregnated through rape, other mothers who did not have children born out of rape also told me how they struggled to take care of their children. ‘Even the child I had, I did not love to see him because he came from my genital organs’ (Céline, 5 June 2013). These women had to be helped by the organisations and ‘re-educated’ into their roles as mothers, but for some, tensions with their children are still present.

Moreover, for other women I met, survival during the genocide meant that they were separated from their children or had to abandon them in order to find safety: ‘I came and reached Nyamirambo, leaving my children [behind]. (…) Still I don’t know where my children are’ (Joséphine, 26 June 2013).

These personal gender and sexual identities are aggravated by the gender norms found in Rwandan culture. There is a certain social status related to being a wife, and then a mother, and one’s marital status influences one’s social position. The cultural value placed on marriage is something that was often discussed during my time in Rwanda. For example, after a few weeks in Kigali, I started to notice that some individuals were not called by their name, but were instead called ‘Maman X’ or
‘Papa X’. When discussing this with my translator, she informed me that, at the community level, it might be perceived as disrespectful to call adults by their own names. Instead, one might want to call them ‘Papa X’ or ‘Maman X’, or sometimes even ‘Maman (name of the child)’. This could perhaps suggest that being a father or mother is one of the most respectable statuses one could gain in Rwandan society. Once I became aware of these ethics, I started to notice that the NGO staff members often referred to the women survivors of sexual violence as “les mamans” (the mothers), again reinforcing this idea that women are referred to by their marital status and motherhood as a sign of respect.

This emphasis on marriage and motherhood can place these women in a marginalised position. For example, Agathe (29 May 2013) expressed this when saying that ‘the first thing is that I am not a woman and I am not a girl.’ Since being a ‘girl’ in Rwanda refers to being a virgin, while being a ‘woman’ refers to being married, there is an association between virginity/single life, and sexual relationship/marriage that suggests that sexual relationships are acceptable only when they occur between married individuals. Because of her past, Agathe is challenging this dichotomy, and finds herself without any social status.

Furthermore, none of the women I met remarried after the genocide. Whilst some explained this was because of their unease with men, this could also perhaps be explained by the stigma associated with rape, and by the changed demographic where there are currently more women than men in Rwanda. It is also worth noting that the social status associated with marriage and motherhood is granted only to individuals who are engaged in what is considered an acceptable relationship. For
instance, stigma is still placed on Jeannette, despite her being a mother, because of the origin of her child.

They know that I have an illegal child because I was never married. So because they don’t know my story, and because after the genocide girls used to have sex with soldiers, people think that I had my child the same way as these girls (Jeannette, 9 July 2013).

The stigma experienced and the gender norms found in Rwandan culture thus complicate the process of socially reintegrating women who suffered from sexual violence, since they justify their moral exclusion. However, this does not mean that these women do not forge meaningful relationships with other survivors of sexual violence or with other individuals in their communities.

It became obvious through speaking with the women that a strong sense of belonging has been forged between the survivors themselves, creating groupings within the society that are not totally removed from ethnicity. During my time in Rwanda, I started to understand that whilst the terms ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ were not explicitly used, the individuals I met who were old enough to be alive during the genocide still perceived a certain distinction between these ethnic groups. This identification is not necessarily based on hatred, but instead seems based on a sharing of experiences. My translator explained this (10 June 2013) at one point, mentioning how there are not any tensions between these groups, but people have the tendency to regroup with others who share the same experiences from the genocide. She gave me the example of Butare University, where the students had nicknames for each other depending on where they found refuge during the genocide. She assured me that these nicknames were not racist, but she still erased these names on the sheet of paper she used in case anyone else would see them. My time spent in Rwanda
allowed me to observe interactions within the country, and my observations and interviews support this idea that there are four divisions within the country at the moment: returnees (Tutsis who lived in exile during the genocide and now found themselves holding privilege positions), survivors (Tutsis granted the title of survivors by the government, which means Tutsis who were targeted during the genocide), those who lived in Rwanda during the genocide but were not targeted (this include Hutus, from génocidaires to the individuals who took no part in the genocide), and finally the Twas (who remain a marginalised group). This sense of belonging amongst individuals who shared the same experiences during the genocide necessarily involves a sense of belonging amongst individuals who identified as part of the same ethnic group during the genocide, but divisions within those who previously identified as Tutsi are also found.

In my conversations with the women who experienced sexual violence, ethnic relations surfaced, with some women explicitly using ethnic terms while others referred to these shared experiences of the genocide. It was clear for all the women I interviewed that they were targeted during the genocide because of their ethnicity. As mentioned by Célestine (27 June 2013) when asked why was she targeted by sexual violence in 1994, she answered ‘they wanted to see the beauty of a Tutsi’, and Valentine (29 May 2013) stated, ‘they said they wanted to see how a Tutsi vagina looked like.’ Both quotes are extremely powerful, since they bring together both the ethnic and gender component of the genocide, quite explicitly in the latter and more subtlety in the former, referring to feminine qualities normally associated with women. This suggests that being Tutsi meant something during the genocide, but being a Tutsi woman led to a different set of expectations and sufferings.
All women I interviewed, however, made a net distinction between their aggressors, who they named the *Interahamwe*, and Hutus in general.

[The organisation] helped me and found me a sponsor so that I don’t have to beg the *Interahamwe* for food. (…) They also taught me how to behave when I am amongst the *Interahamwe* who did that to me and who live in my neighbourhood (Valentine, 29 May 2013).

This meant that whilst many women could not perceive themselves as forgiving the *Interahamwe* for their acts, some of them were still saying that they can live and interact with all Rwandans, which was part of the healing process: ‘I accept to live with different people, what was impossible to me in that time’ (Agathe, 29 May 2013). For her, but also for all the women I met in Rwanda, engaging with individuals who identified as Hutus during the war but were not part of the *Interahamwe* is now possible, but implied a strong process of trauma healing and of accepting one’s fate. Once this has been achieved, these women might feel that they can freely participate in the social life of their community.

*Are you invited to events in your neighbourhood?* Yes, even in wedding ceremonies. I was alone before and people didn’t want me to be with them, but now I am with everyone in every activity, like I am a mediator in our cell (Céline, 5 June 2013).

However, as the next quote by Jeannette suggests, being able to interact with members of the other ethnic group does not necessarily mean the women are totally comfortable in their presence. ‘All of them [her neighbours] are my friends. Before I never loved to speak to a Hutu but when I finally accepted my fate, I started to talk to everyone. But I feel free with survivors only’ (Jeannette, 9 July 2013).

All the women I encountered explained how they felt free only with other survivors, suggesting that not only is there a certain distance between them and those previously identified as Hutus, but also between them and the returnees who did not
live in Rwanda during the genocide. For example, this was implicitly suggested by Agathe when I asked her whether she feels free to be herself with members of her community: ‘Do you feel free with others? Not everyone, but some of them’ (Agathe, 29 May 2013); and this was clearly expressed by Célestine (27 June 2013) when she noted that ‘we live in a village of people from abroad [returnees] and they don’t like us. They think that we are Interahamwe. We keep quiet and stick together.’ Moreover, I observed this first-hand one morning at Organisation D. I arrived at the organisation and the director, counsellor and program manager were sitting in a circle with a group of around five men and women. The situation seemed serious, and I was later told that a fight started between two women in this income-generating group. They had a fight regarding the finances of their group, and one woman (a Hutu) tore a picture of the other one (a Tutsi). The second woman claimed that the first one did that because she wants to kill her, and events leading back to the genocide were brought into the fight (“your family did this”). Both women share some similarities in the post-conflict period (poverty, illness, etc.), but their identity during the genocide can still create tensions today. This event suggests that whilst the women I encountered were able to socially interact with members of different ethnic backgrounds, divisions and tensions might still be present between them and those who have different experiences of the genocide. This is well summarised by Agathe (29 May 2013):

Today I finally feel like I am being healed by prayer, I accept to live with different people, what was impossible to me at that time. (…) But today my life is not that easy due to many reasons like meeting people when I don’t want to approach them and in that case I have to stay away.
Moreover, this sense of belonging and solidarity found between those granted the title of ‘survivors of the genocide’ can be explained by this shared experience of suffering during the genocide.

That is the important thing [to] live in a society of people who experienced the same problems as you. One can say that I am a widow and I don’t have any children. Another one can say [about someone else] that she doesn’t have a shelter and nothing to eat. All of that and living with [these] people gave me peace of heart. I realised that there are many people who experienced the same problems as me (Agathe, 29 May 2013).

This quote clearly illustrates the importance for Agathe of engaging with individuals who share similar suffering. These shared experiences help the women I met to accept their own past, since they realise they are not the only women who suffered during the genocide. Strong ties were built through these experiences, which the women could perceive as exclusive to “their own kind”.

[Organisation E] knew that there were some Hutus who had AIDS but not because of reasons like ours. Organisation E came looking for Tutsi survivors. We were proud to be chosen, we were thinking that we had some kind of secret because of that (Joséphine, 26 June 2013).

This quote is extremely powerful since it demonstrates the bonds created between women who share the same experiences of the genocide, in this case being infected with HIV/AIDS, and the separation that is created with other women who also have HIV/AIDS but did not get infected in the same way. This even leads some women, such as Céline (5 June 2013), to refer to the other Tutsis/survivors as members of her family.

After I was healed, I prayed God asking why was I the only one left in my family? Was that because I was the last born in my family? I used to tell God everything I had in my heart. And I heard God telling me that he will show others like me. And I replied that every time I look around I see no Tutsis and I was sure that they all perished. I didn’t know what God wanted to tell me. But as days passed, he showed me my family, my people and I
realized there were many Tutsis that survived. That made me come back to normal life.

The women I met often mentioned this idea of alternative family. For example, Jeannette (9 July 2013) mentioned that ‘when I joined the group, I met women in my situation and we talked about our lives. They became like my family because some of them are of the age of my mother’. Céline (5 June 2013) also expressed that ‘there in Gatenga, I have no other family except other survivors, but not my real family.’ These alternative families are comprised of survivors of the genocide, but also the staff members working for these NGOs: ‘Organisation E came when we needed it, they are our answer because I saw them as my mother and my brothers’ (Oda, 2 July 2013); ‘I am grateful for what Organisation C did to me because they became my family. I am Olive who have no husband, no children because they were killed’ (Olive, 29 May 2013). Moreover, during my observation with Organisation D, I attended a group therapy with around 30 women survivors of sexual violence. We spoke about the impact this organisation had on their recovery, and many women mentioned how this organisation, i.e. the staff members and the other women, became their family and their parents (Observation, 12 July 2013).

Again, it is important to stress that this sense of belonging is mostly based on shared experiences - not ethnic hatred - and in the case of the staff members, on their willingness to listen to the women’s stories. For example, a few women I met told me after our interviews that I could see them as my sisters, because I took the time to listen to them and to learn about their experiences. All of this might suggest that the relationships created reproduce familial networks and support, perhaps as an attempt to rebuild one’s family network in the absence of surviving family members.
This might explain why this strong sense of belonging that the women I encountered felt towards other survivors also leads to expectations of members of that group, almost like familial expectations. For instance, because of their common experiences, most of my respondents believe that stigma and exclusion should not happen between survivors. As Oda (2 July 2013) mentions:

I live in a village of widows and orphans. So they are my friends. But because I always go for my physiotherapy session because I was beaten badly, people say that my body is losing control. Even my friends Tutsi say that and it makes me very sad because they know and they are not supposed to say so.

Finally, another issue that challenges the social reintegration of women who suffered sexual violence is their reintegration into the local economy. During my time in Rwanda, I noticed that genocide survivors live in more difficult and precarious living conditions than other Rwandans, possibly as a result of diverse factors, such as migration during the genocide, loss of the family home, and the break-up of familial and social networks, to name a few. As mentioned above when speaking about trauma, extended support - including financial assistance - is extremely important for trauma healing and social reintegration. The NGOs I observed responded to this need by providing income-generating activities, skills training, or credit, which allows many women to secure some income. ‘I can get some money from there [the NGO] and solve some problems and it helps our lives’ (Jeannette, 9 July 2013).

For example, a lot of women I met were undertaking some income-generating activities, whether through the organisations or not, or undertook skills training that may lead to employment. ‘Now I finished tailoring courses, also helped by Organisation C, which gave us means and a place where we meet and learn. I may
get some small jobs’ (Agathe, 29 May 2013); ‘they gave me money to start a small business but it was very hard because it was my first time starting my real life in Kigali’ (Joséphine, 26 June 2013).

For some women, the psychological or physical consequences of rape prevent them from securing employment, but in these cases the NGOs try to support them through financial assistance and credits. ‘I am always home because I am not capable. But when I get some money from the [NGO], I use it to cultivate my land’ (Valentine, 29 May 2013), and:

My job was to clean everywhere, cut grasses in the ground [of the organisation]. But after when they [Organisation C] realised that I wasn’t able to accomplish the job because my back is broken, they lend me some money. And here when you borrow money, and you pay it all back, they can give you more. Today I use the money they gave me. (...) Then Organisation C gave me a house. That is the most important thing that I put before God (Rose, 29 May 2013).

For example, Agathe (29 May 2013) explained how the cow she received from Organisation C and other skills training were very important for improving her living conditions:

For example, because they gave me a cow, that cow helped me very much in a way that I could get milk and get some money for personal use. And some other things that they helped me with is that we planned for a project, and they promised us that we could start an association and buy a sewing machine. They finally bought those machines for us and gave us the means to learn how to use them. They did a lot for us but problems will never be resolved. (...) They also told us to create a saving and credit association so that we could benefit from that money. I asked to join and they accepted me.

As Agathe specifies, economic empowerment will not necessarily resolve all their problems, but it is perhaps a first step towards broader social empowerment. Some women were still aware that the NGOs sometimes struggle to secure funding for their programmes or to find more sponsors, which directly impacts the services
offered. ‘Sometimes I think that one day they will stop helping us. And I don’t have the means to build a house or to get some money when it stops’ (Céline, 5 June 2013), and,

Organisation E helps us. There are also some of us who are stronger than me, they created cooperatives and Organisation E organised some training about business. Organisation E also made them get some loans. They pay them back every week. But because many days I go for the physiotherapy sessions, I can’t afford to start a business when I am supposed to pay back every week. Every few months FARG send some money but it is not enough. The children that I raised are married and I stay with my children and I try to manage what I get. Organisation E doesn’t help us anymore because their sponsors stopped sending help. (…) They used to have sponsors and when we came here, they used to give us some small money we called a ticket. And with that money I could buy sugar and do some other things I needed to do. They also used to give us some flour for the porridge. Now they stopped. It would be better if it was brought back again like before (Oda, 2 July 2013).

Oda’s case is a clear example of how income-generating activities may be very helpful for these women, but other factors – such as physical injuries – still prevent them from fully participating in these activities.

My time spent in Rwanda and my interactions with the women who suffered from sexual violence during the genocide thus suggest that whilst some women are able to secure a certain income for their livelihood, they still remain on the outside of the more formal labour force in Rwanda. Their living conditions are indeed still precarious, and some important financial challenges are yet to be addressed, resulting from the trauma, illness and exclusion experienced.

The problems that I face are because of my illness that never heals. Because of all those problems, it means that I take all the money I can get to the hospital. And there come problems of studies for the children. I have to find them food and shelter because I don’t live with them. They study in boarding schools. That is how things are. I mean that my capabilities and my needs don’t match (Agathe, 29 May 2013).
This need to socially and structurally reintegrate their community, as identified by the women, is central to the post-conflict experiences of the women interviewed. This was also discussed with the staff members of five NGOs working with these beneficiaries.

**Staff Interpretations of these Experiences**

According to staff members, trauma healing remains a constant challenge for these women. ‘Even now we have some women who are unable to accept themselves and who attempt suicide’ (Thérèse, psychologist, Organisation A, 13 May 2013). Trauma healing is understood as a long-term process that is difficult to measure since, according to Nadège (Counsellor, Organisation E, 26 June 2013), it is impossible to know if the women are totally healed. She also believes that sexual violence is the strongest trauma associated with the genocide, more so than mourning, mutilations, and injuries. Many staff members emphasized that trauma healing is a long-term process, agreeing that it varies from individual to individual. ‘You cannot come for one session and think you are healed. It's a process, some will take months, others will take years. Another one might never even heal, because their minds have been totally destroyed’ (Janvier, Programme Director, Organisations A&B, 23 May 2013).

Some staff members also explained how trauma healing does not necessarily have a linear progression. Women can feel better and then a stimulus will make them return to a more traumatized state. ‘Sometimes we face a situation where the person we have comforted for example in 2000, comes back for counselling because maybe something happened that is releasing some emotions’ (Vestine, sponsorship program, Organisation C, 4 June 2013). This is something observed on a larger scale during
the annual National Commemoration of the Genocide. ‘The National commemoration period brings back flashbacks; they [survivors of sexual violence] start behaving funny. Those who can speak reduce a lot their trauma’ (Marie-Chantal, Counsellor, Organisation C, 13 May 2013). Organisation C specified that they remain open during the commemoration period especially for that reason (Vestine, 4 June 2013).

Whilst the staff members all agreed that trauma healing remains a challenge for their beneficiaries, they also agreed that there are still some women who have never spoken about their past. According to Marie, the social worker of Organisation E (5 July 2013), there are two types of women: those who speak up and those who prefer keeping their past secret. ‘We have accepted that there are some mothers that still want to keep it private. They don't want to meet other women, to get to know that they have the same past. And then we respect that’ (Janvier, 23 May 2013). Keeping this secret, however, has a big impact on, and consequences for, the women and their trauma. ‘People who still come [for counselling] are the people who find it hard to open up, they get lonely, they keep their loneliness, they want to be by themselves, they won't open up, they would not get healed so quickly’ (Brigitte, counsellor, Organisation B, 18 June 2013). It was suggested that these women are harder to help and to reintegrate into their community. Counselling services that involve creating a safe space for these women are thus necessary to help them open up and accept their situation.

Organisation C started in 1995, but we have some women who up to now, cannot talk about what happened during the genocide. But we let them come here, listen to other testimonies, to see how others are comforted. You cannot force [them]. If they are willing [to speak], you cannot miss
this opportunity. You have to [help them] straight away (Vestine, 4 June 2013).

It was also believed that the women who experienced rape, in comparison to other survivors of the genocide, ‘find it hard to talk about it. If they talk about it to the counsellor, they will ask her not to tell others’ (Marie-Chantal, 13 May 2013). This is especially true for Tutsis, since not only do they have to live with this strong trauma, but they have to do so with a broken social network as a result of the mass killings.

It was almost the same [the trauma experienced by the Hutu and Tutsi women], almost but a little bit different because for example, a Hutu who was sexually violated and maybe has a family, she would then have that, she would feel that maybe… I have an example of one, she had her children, all of them, she was sexually violated but she maybe has HIV, she's feeling bad because she is infected with HIV, suffering all that. But the Tutsis have lost everyone, and also have HIV due to sexual violence. So it's a little bit different. The first one gets comfort from her children, the second one does not have anyone to comfort her (Brigitte, 18 June 2013).

This is also true for the women who feel rejected by their family members because of their past, and for those who experience a sense of guilt for having survived when so many others did not.

They think they want to stop their lives but when we take care of them, they feel like they are loved and cherished. For example one told me that she didn’t want to live because she was thinking that her family didn’t love her because they died alone and she survived while they were supposed to die together. But now she is fine (Marie-Chantal, 11 June 2013).

These two quotes clearly illustrate the role that family networks play in trauma healing and may explain why the women interviewed all mentioned creating an alternative family with other survivors in the organisation they visit. Social relationships, in this case family networks, were perceived by my respondents as crucial for the well-being of the women, but negative family relationships also have a detrimental effect on personal healing.
Moreover, it was also suggested that trauma healing is harder for those women who were impregnated as a result of the rape.

Those who raped, it was fine to a certain extent, but it was worse for those who had children with those Interahamwe. What type of differences were there between the women who were raped and those who had a child born out of rape? Some differences… those who were raped said “at least I did not have these children. At least I did not give birth to the child of someone who does not love me” (Françoise, 24 June 2013).

In order to address this situation, the organisations I met in Rwanda all provide individual and group counselling, using different psychological approaches to support these women. However, one element included in the therapy session that seemed a natural decision for the organisations was the inclusion of religious teaching. Religious teaching is used as a tool for counselling by Organisations C, D and E, whether it is through prayers or through the teaching of the Bible.

The way we help them, because our counselling is biblical, is based on the Bible, it's Christian. We tell them that God loves them still, they are women, God created them in its own image, He wanted that woman to be a woman, He loves her. Even with all that happened, God still sees her the same. She's still a woman, and God is pleased with her as a woman, not as a man. So accepting yourself, you are pleasing God. And secondly, there are some people who feel that they can't never get married, they hate men you know, that kind of angers them, and you tell them, some of them, it takes a long time, a process for them to come to an understanding. So the closer they get to God and get to know Jesus, they get to love God, so the easier it becomes for them to get healed. But those who don't want to pray, who don't want to listen, they remain the same. They take longer to get healed (Brigitte, 18 June 2013).

According to Brigitte, there is a connection between the degree of trauma healing and religious faith. Following this way of thinking, it would suggest that Oda, who previously mentioned having rejected her religious faith, would take longer to heal than the other women who regularly attend church or pray. Whether this is true or not is another matter, but Rwanda being a country where the population is mostly
religious, it is not necessarily surprising that some NGO staff members see the potential for trauma healing in religion. Religion is also used when speaking with the women who had children born out of rape, as a way to help them accept the identity of their child.

We used to tell them that this child, even if he was conceived by accident, that if God accepted that this child was to be conceived - because there are many women who cannot conceive - God accepted to conceive that child, you conceived that child, it's because He had a plan for that child. This child has no faults. It's the father of this child who is the killer, but this child is not the killer. So the counsellor adds her own words with the Bible (Vestine, 4 June 2013).

There are a few arguments for using religious teaching to complement the counselling services. One of them is that religious faith will comfort the women at all times, ensuring a sustainable healing that does not totally depend on the counselling sessions.

The reason [we use religious teaching] is that trauma can only be healed by God. It's only God who knows how to deal with His people, He knows the pain they are feeling. Other teachings of other counselling ethics could be very helpful but they work continually, people always have sessions with the counsellor. But when you teach them about, if you teach them Christian counselling, it heals them completely. They get healed and they don't always come for counselling. If they get to know that God loves them, that God cares for them, that He understands their pain, He is always with them. And they accept that, they accept the love of God, and then they will be healed wherever they are, they will not need the counsellor again. Like if you use the other kind of counselling, they always come back (Brigitte, 18 June 2013).

It was also expressed by Vestine (4 June 2013) that by teaching these women the words of God, they will not only be comforted, but will also be able to comfort others.

Every Monday and Thursday here, they come for counselling and to pray. We tell them that the comfort comes from the words of God. It comes from Jesus. Myself I cannot comfort you because I do not have words to comfort you. But when you tell them to focus on Jesus, who will comfort them,
that's why those who are comforted, they go and they comfort others. But if it was just a normal counselling, if I'm comforted and I find someone who needs counselling, I will tell her "go to Organisation C, there is someone who can comfort you. I cannot do that myself". But when you have been comforted through the words of God, you can also comfort others.

The religious teaching provided by Organisations C, D and E was definitely not something unique about Rwanda, since even the Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion uses religious teaching and the Bible to promote gender equality (15 July 2013). However, in the case of these NGOs, the teaching undertakes the role of spiritual healing, helping women to feel comforted, loved by God, feeling that they are equal to others in the eyes of God, and that God has not abandoned them.

Furthermore, it was also perceived that religion allows women to share their deepest emotions through their individual relationships with God.

There are things that they cannot tell us, that are very deep. Even if they come and they talk, there are things that they cannot tell us. But we tell them, "if you think that you can't be open to me for some things, you can go and pray and release everything to Jesus". And when they do like this, they feel free. You will see that sometimes they will come back and tell you other things. They will be telling you "I'm free now. I prayed and God has been answering my prayers. I'm free" (Vestine, 4 June 2013).

Recalling my previous argument regarding the women sharing their experiences with only a few individuals, it also seems that some things cannot even be disclosed to the chosen confidant. I interpret this as a limitation of healing trauma through meaningful social relationships. Trauma cannot be totally healed by feeling accepted and listened to by others, and a certain degree of self-acceptance is also needed when things cannot be shared with anyone else.

The problem would be if you don't accept yourself. But if you accept the way you are, they [the neighbours] will say [gossips about you] and it will be over. There are some who are like that but with time they get to open to people, they get counselling, they get healed. So it is really the perception
of one self that can really (cut). Yes, the individual acceptance (Brigitte, 18 June 2013).

It is argued that self-acceptance allows oneself to heal and move forward regardless of the stigma experienced, and religion can be a tool for this self-acceptance. ‘It is because of the words of God that they accepted themselves, that they were able to speak between themselves’ (Françoise, 24 June 2013). To reach a degree of self-acceptance, the women first and foremost need to feel as valued human beings once again. According to Eric, the director of Organisation C (7 June 2013), when the women,

Feel that people are listening to them, the healing process is on. The Tutsis still feel subconsciously dehumanized after the genocide, so being listened to make them feel like worthy human being, especially when a Muzungu [Caucasian person/Westerner] is listening. It makes them realise that they have the same needs as others.

This quote successfully summarizes the importance of trauma counselling, whether with or without religious teaching. Beyond addressing the traumatic memories of the genocide, counselling provides companionship to women who may feel isolated within their community, and whose morality is constantly questioned by their neighbours.

Through counselling they started to feel like now "oh, you mean I'm important". (…) When the person was telling me her testimony, I would tell her what I felt in my heart. I would say, "no you are important", maybe they are telling you "I'm just nothing, nobody loves me". "No, you are very important". Like now three people have completed university because of just telling them "you know, you are not what you think you are. You are a great person. You have to study". They say "Me studying? No, I can't even get anything in my head. No". I said: "Go register. You are going to school and you are going to make it". She did it and found herself studying, and all the trauma started going away and now she completed [university]. Like three people so far. In the first place they would feel their lives were just messed up, not accepted, feeling like they are just useless, no hope for the future, they can't manage anything. They ask "why should I even study?", "why should I even work?", "for what, for whom? I am just alone". But
now they feel they have to live, they have to survive (Brigitte 18 June 2013).

This even suggests that once a process of re-humanization is achieved, opportunities arise for these women. Indeed, throughout their lives, the women will find themselves at different places on the spectrum of trauma healing. It was suggested that this influences their social reintegration in terms of access to services and employment.

And you must know that those people who wish to work, they are the ones who are already comforted. Because the ones who are not comforted, they don't have a desire to survive, they don't want to work, they say "why should I work? I don't have my children, they are all killed. I don't need to be beautiful because my husband was killed. Why? I don't need to live" (Vestine, 4 June 2013).

In this case, Vestine makes a direct connection between the level of comfort reached and the desire to be an active citizen included in the formal economy. This may explain why many organisations require survivors to attend counselling services before being registered in the income-generating activities.

All the people who come here, they can't receive the loan if you never received counselling. This is our rule, if I can say like this. You go into that office after you have gone to counselling. Because we have realized that at the beginning, when we were still searching what to do, the people who never received counselling are the ones who are unable to pay back (Vestine, 4 June 2013).

The impact of counselling on the success of the income-generating activities is well described by Laura (Clinical Psychologist, Organisations A&B, 23 May 2013):

So some of the women have felt more able to then start businesses, be more confident, I think it is also about hope, hope for the future and something with, I did a bit of research on the impact of the groups, and I think that positive emotions and hope are being quite important. So I think it's hard to measure (laugh), but I think it has an impact on women to start income-generation, or start businesses, or even to start thinking further ahead.
It therefore seems that a sustainable livelihood can only be achieved after psychological needs have been addressed, which in a sense reverses Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (1954). In this case, the need for self-esteem and love and belonging (third and fourth layers) need to be provided for the needs of safety and security (second layer), such as employment, to be fulfilled. The same is also true in terms of health (second layer of needs). For instance, it was mentioned how women infected with HIV were reluctant to access their local health clinic for fear of being stigmatized:

When we started providing care treatment, (...) it was because most of the women were not going out to get their ARV. So we asked "why?", and the women said "how can I go there, in the same queue as the person who raped me? How can I go where my neighbour is, and they know that I don't have a husband? They will ask how did I got HIV" (Janvier, 23 May 2013). The solution by Organisation A was to develop a survivors’ clinic, creating a safe space, free of judgment, where men and women infected with HIV can access medical services.

Based on these interpretations of the post-conflict situation of women who suffered from sexual violence, I thereby propose that a new pyramid of needs - based on Maslow’s work - can be developed. I do not aim to argue that the need of love is prioritized over safety, but rather that it is only when the needs of love, belonging and self-esteem are addressed that safety and security for these women can be totally fulfilled and sustained.
It is important to stress again that, first and foremost, physiological needs have to be addressed. Whether it is by providing housing, food assistance or loans, if these needs are not first fulfilled, the opportunities for trauma healing remain extremely difficult.

Addressing other challenges like people basic needs, having adequate housing, having adequate facilities for life… how can you reconcile when your basic needs are not met? (…) How can you give someone counselling or expect someone to sit with you and talk about their feelings when they are hungry, worried about the school fees and stuff? (Laura, 23 May 2013).

However, once basic physiological needs are addressed, I argue that these cannot be sustained if a certain degree of social reintegration is not then achieved.

In addition, the degree of trauma healing has influence over access to another service provided: justice. According to Flora, a legal adviser for Organisation E (5
July 2013), only the women who achieved a certain trauma healing went to the *gacaca* court, with those still traumatised finding it hard to become active participants in this process. Some in fact rejected the opportunity to seek justice in the *gacacas* because they wanted to keep their past secret.

You prepare her to testify in the *gacacas* and at one point she says: “why are you uncovering me? Why uncover myself? I’ve lived with it for a long time, there is no need to uncover myself. I have to keep the secret to myself (Thérèse, 13 May 2013).

This has important implications, since there is often a consensus with peacebuilders of the importance of justice for peaceful post-conflict reconstruction. My interactions with the women, and the staff members in Rwanda however nuance this idea, demonstrating that justice may not always be beneficial for some participants, and that some individuals may prefer reparation through other forms than traditional justice.

Finally, the staff members I met also agreed that the continued trauma experienced in 2013 by the women who suffered from sexual violence has improved in comparison to the level of trauma experienced in the aftermath of the genocide, opening up opportunities.

The first time they came, and if you compare the first time they came and where they are now, it is a total change, a complete change. The first time when they came, they would come to cry, not wanting to do anything, not thinking about their value, not thinking about anything to do, feeling so hopeless and feeling like they are not accepted, [like] they are nothing. So it's like they didn't have a future, no hope, nothing like that. If you compare now, they have changed completely. (...) Because of teaching the words of God, continuously as they would come all the time, they continuously changed, developed until they felt [that] they were people. They feel that they can put make-up, if they are young ones they feel they can go to school, if they are old people they feel they need a house, they need somewhere to stay, they need something to do. But in the first place, they
didn't feel like that. No, no, no, no. They felt like nothing, nothing, they didn't have anything in their heart like that (Brigitte, 18 June 2013).

These staff members observed a lot of progress, but there was a shared understanding that the stigma and social exclusion experienced still have a detrimental impact on the prospects for trauma healing.

All agreed that the stigmatisation and marginalization these women face results from the gender norms found within Rwandan society. First, they told me that there is a strong stigma associated with rape that is reinforced by certain cultural gender norms. For instance, virginity before marriage is still encouraged and women are often blamed for their sexual abuse.

Yes, there is just a massive, massive stigma about rape. Even I know some of the women who joined Organisation E but (...) did not feel able to talk about the rape with other women who have not been raped. (...) I think it is pretty much if you have been raped you have been spoiled (...) I think it is still very much in the culture about being a virgin (Laura, 23 May 2013).

In cases where women were raped while they were still ‘girls’, it is extremely hard for them to find a husband, in part because of the context in which they ‘lost’ their virginity. ‘If she [the survivor of sexual violence] was a girl when she was raped, she will never get married. If she was married, her husband will reject her, it kills her inside and she gets traumatized’ (Marie-Chantal, 11 June 2013). This is also supported by Thérèse (13 May 2013), who said that:

The women who feel stigmatized are mostly girls. (...) So for those who were girls during the genocide, they feel stigmatized because it isn’t easy to find a husband, a man that will accept a girl that everyone knows has been raped. And in the Rwandan culture, it is a misfortune for this girl.

Some staff members also believe that the women remain marginalized in their community due to their close ‘contact’ with the militiamen.
The girls who were raped, what frustrated them is that their communities know that they were raped by the Interahamwe, so they are not sure if they will be able to get married, or remarried. (…) A lot of them told us “are there really some men who will dare marrying us since we got raped by those Interahamwe?” And it is even worse for those who had these children (Françoise, 24 June 2013).

I was told of a few examples of women who were rejected by their husband, family and community because they were raped by the Interahamwe. For example, Thérèse (13 May 2013) mentioned the example of one woman: ‘when the husband was coming home drunk, said “you, you were raped. I was wrong to marry the wife of an Interahamwe”. And the children of the husband, who was a widow, were assaulting the woman on a daily basis’. This is truly the continued moral aggression that the survivors of sexual violence face in the aftermath of the violence: their bodies were used as the battlefield upon which the nation could be destroyed, and now its consequences justify these women’s social exclusion. However, it is worth mentioning that not all women were rejected by their husbands and/or family members. The staff members I met all knew some examples of women whose husbands stayed with them in the aftermath of the genocide. ‘There are some husbands that accepted them. They saw that this violence was used as any other weapon during the genocide’ (Thérèse, 13 May 2013).

The staff members also mentioned that ‘many [women] hide [their past] because they are afraid that the husband will not accept that situation’ (Vestine, 4 June 2013). However, keeping one’s past a secret is more difficult for women who also suffer from HIV/AIDS or who had a child as a result of their rape. As confirmed by Brigitte (18 June 2013) when speaking about women infected from HIV/AIDS:

Being sexually violated, no one would just know if you are not telling him, except for the people [who live] in the same neighbourhood. But most
people would leave their neighbourhood and find other places where they are not known. So that was a very big issue. If I do not open up and tell that I was sexually violated, you would not know. But if I am HIV positive, with time you will see it. So that was a problem.

It was therefore suggested that it remains extremely difficult for women suffering from AIDS to hide their illness because of its physical visibility, such as body rashes or white spots on the tongue and mouth, or because of its resulting infections, such as tuberculosis. Moreover, Marie (5 July 2013) told me that certain behaviours are often understood to be associated with illness, such as anger or dirtiness. This suggests that AIDS-infected survivors of sexual violence are more easily socially identified, and therefore stigmatized, at certain points in their battle against the disease because of its physical visibility.

In addition, there is another belief rooted in wider gender norms that fosters the social marginalisation of these women: the belief that women infected with HIV became infected because of prostitution. This was something brought up by the women themselves, and was again confirmed by Marie (5 July 2013), who noted that sex workers often use rape as an excuse to explain why they are infected with HIV. The community thus often believes that survivors of sexual violence are lying about the rape in order to justify their situation, and will easily consider them ‘prostitutes’ and blame their situation on sexual promiscuity, as the case of Oda showed.

Furthermore, it was mentioned by the staff members that the nature of HIV/AIDS as a disease fosters the marginalization of infected individuals. Most immediately, HIV-infected individuals often find themselves stigmatized and excluded by their community due to the fear that they will spread their infection. Brigitte (18 June 2013) gave the example of a young woman ‘[whose] bosses, after getting to know
she is infected, had to chase her. They are like “no, this person is infected. She might also cause infections to us.”

A similar situation was described for women who were impregnated as a result of the rape:

There is a big stigma associated with having a child outside of marriage. And that's in all of society, but then the rape is an added thing and then, a massive challenge if the woman gets married, the new husband often doesn't want to accept that child, so will treat him very, very differently (Laura, 23 May 2013).

Having a child born out of rape adds another layer of stigmatization, especially when the child’s father is described as a killer.

I know there are some women who have had that problem, like they are chased from their family completely because they refused to abort their child, or because they had the child of the person who killed their entire family. There are women who have been chased from their family like that (Janvier, 23 May 2013).

This potential for stigmatisation also leads some women to abandon their child in order not to be associated with him/her.

In our culture, rape is like a taboo, so the mothers were most of them hiding the fact that they have children born from rape. So they did not want to be associated with their children and as a result most of them took the children to live with some relatives so that people did not ask the mother "whose child is this?"(Janvier, 23 May 2013).

Abandoning one’s child or refusing to be associated with him/her further complicates the family relationships for the mother, the child and to a certain extent the extended family, who can sometimes have a say in the decision. It is argued that this allows women to avoid a certain degree of stigmatization until they feel ready to face community gossip, but my time in Rwanda suggests that many women are still reluctant to disclose the truth about their child.
I think the challenge (...) was the verification of recruiting or finding women who did had children born out of rape because of that stigma. I'm sure there are many women out there who haven't access the support because they don't want to talk about it and admit it (Laura, 23 May 2013).

It is also worth mentioning that women may isolate themselves from their community because of their experience. As mentioned by the women when discussing their unease with members of the opposite sex, some staff members also believed that some raped women actively reject others. ‘Those ones who were raped have something in particular: they hate men, even they can hate their own father, their brothers, and own children’ (Marie-Chantal, 11 June 2013).

Addressing the stigma associated with rape, HIV and bearing children out of marriage is, however, extremely difficult for the NGOs. According to Nadège (26 June 2013), more work should be done to change social norms, but this remains a very challenging task. It was suggested that organisations are limited in helping survivors of sexual violence reintegrate into society since they have a limited impact on changing cultural values and social beliefs. These beliefs are especially hard to change for the NGOs operating in Rwanda, because they face the challenge of educating a population about sexuality in a context where sexual relationships remain taboo. Sexuality is not openly discussed in Rwandan culture, and religion still strongly dictates sexual behaviours.

I observed this during my fieldwork, where sexuality consistently remained a difficult topic to openly discuss in the organisations working with genocide survivors. For instance, during a class on development given by Organisation D, teenage girls were warned about how certain sexual behaviours might have a negative impact on their economic development. The girls agreed that they had to
resist temptations, temptations such as cookies and candies. But in that moment, it was clear that they were not referring to cookies and candies in the literal sense, and these were instead used as metaphors for sexual temptations (Observation, 13 June 2013). Nadège (26 June 2013) also explained how pregnant women often hide their pregnancy since it is proof they had sexual intercourse, which is supposed to remain hidden. This kind of everyday or banal reluctance to openly discuss sexual matters makes it extremely difficult for the government and the NGOs to raise awareness and improve understandings of rape and HIV. My time spent in Rwanda also suggests that the country is still very much influenced by Christianity, which continues to dictate sexual behaviour. The Christian ideology thereby possibly contributes to the stigmatization of individuals undertaking ‘marginal’ sexual behaviours. For example, at one point during my observation with Organisation D, I was attending a sexual educational session for individuals infected with HIV, and the education provided still followed the religious belief and norm of heterosexuality. At a certain point, the participants started to ask me questions about sexual norms in ‘the West’, sexual norms that were perceived as marginal and deviant from Rwandan culture.

However, despite some limitations, the staff members also agreed that the campaigning and the advocacy work done by both the government and the organisations have still helped to diminish the marginalization and stigmatization experienced by women who suffered from sexual violence.

[The stigma] was so high but as people got to know the truth, the reality and the teachings through the radio, through the government's teachings, they got to a level of accepting them in the society, getting closer to them, helping them. (...) Yes, they changed because people got to know… we have here less cases where people are stigmatized, where they are telling us our neighbours don't even get water from us, they can't get anything from us, you can't get anything from them because of the stigma, because they
know we are suffering from HIV because we were sexually violated. But the cases [decreased] as years went by from the genocide (Brigitte, 18 June 2013).

As mentioned above when speaking about trauma, the staff members also believe the level of stigmatisation varies from individual to individual based on their circumstances, and also because of their level of self-acceptance.

It depends on the woman… if she considers that being raped is a huge burden for her. So the community acceptance also depends on the individual acceptance. If she accepts herself, it is easier for her to adapt in the community. (…) But if she feels on a daily basis as if she’s psychologically feeling the rape, it is difficult for her to be integrated even if she changed environment (Thérèse, 13 May 2013).

This was something widely supported by the staff members I met in Rwanda, and complements the previous argument of self-acceptance leading to trauma healing. It shows that self-acceptance, trauma healing and social reintegration are all interconnected.

You know, when something is marginalized or stigmatized is when…. the way the person has accepted his condition contributes to being marginalized. But when the person has accepted that she's HIV positive, that she was raped, she opens up about it, people start to accept her (Vestine, 4 June 2013).

There is thus an understanding that trauma healing is a necessary step towards social reintegration, since the level of self-acceptance will directly impact the likelihood of successful social reintegration, and the level of stigmatisation reinforces the trauma experienced.
This was well summarised by Marie (5 July 2013), who said that the ‘level of difficulty to re integrate society depends on the trauma. For some women it is extremely hard, they still have some periods of crisis, while it is easier for others.’

One criterion that influences the social integration of these women is their social location. For instance, some staff members expressed the idea that social reintegration is harder in rural villages than in Kigali. According to some, social norms and expectations are stricter in the rural communities than in Kigali, and a certain sense of social control is exerted in the villages that is not found in the cities, or at least not to the same extent. For example, ‘in the village it is more difficult to re integrate the community because everyone is aware of your situation, and the social pressures are stronger. In Kigali, you might not even know your neighbour’ (Nadège, 26 June 2013). A few staff members I met shared this belief, and explained
that it is harder to hide one’s past in the rural communities because of the close community ties.

In the city, you go in the night, in the morning, you go to your activities, and there is no social control. But when you are in a rural community, there is a social control. We know what you eat, we know how you live in your home. So I would say that the women who live in cities, whilst they are also miserable as in the rural regions, those who want to keep their secret feel better compared to the women in the rural regions because we saw in the gacacas that the truth was known by everyone. So even if they keep the secret, people will know? People know she was raped, people know what she goes through on a daily basis, people know that she doesn’t have anything to eat, people know (laughs) everything, everything. So it is harder for a woman in the rural communities? Yes (Thérèse, 13 May 2013).

These quotes suggest that for these staff members, the rural communities, where social ties are stronger in comparison to urban areas, do not provide a supportive space for the women who suffered sexual violence, and instead contribute to stigmatization and social exclusion. However, Brigitte (18 June 2013) disagreed that a generalisation can be made between rural and urban areas.

Do you find that there is a difference between women who live in the city and those who live in the villages in terms of their speaking up? It depends I think on the person. Because we have communities in different places in Rwanda, rural areas where people are healed. So I think it depends on the person, we cannot generalise that.

Whilst Brigitte disagreed with this distinction, the majority of the staff members I met still believed that some rural communities might be a source of anxiety and stigmatisation for the women instead of providing supportive social networks. It is believed that the social control exerted in the villages prevents women who suffered from sexual violence from successfully reintegrating within their neighbourhood. Instead, a more individualistic life in Kigali might allow the women to live their lives
in a more anonymous way, giving them the choice to disclose or not the truth about their past.

Furthermore, the staff members from Organisation E, located in the Eastern Province, mentioned that there are important differences between the Rwandese provinces. According to Jean, the program manager of the Eastern branch of Organisation E (9 July 2013), the East provides more opportunities for social reintegration due to specific factors. First, the Eastern region’s soil is very fertile, allowing women survivors of sexual violence to live on their land. This is, however, not always the case in other regions such as the South, which has been traditionally poorer than the other regions due to infertile soil. Second, the violence of the genocide did not impact every region equally, with the Eastern region being the least affected and the South one of the most affected region, if not the most. The RPF entered Rwanda through Uganda and first reached the Eastern Province before fighting across the country. All of these factors might impact the social reintegration of these women: ‘There are a lot of vulnerable survivors in the South. In the East, the province is rich, with fertile land. In the south, it isn’t productive as elsewhere so it remains a big challenge’ (Jean, 9 July 2013).

Differences in living conditions led to another point of discussion during my interviews: poverty and the challenges currently faced by the women who suffered from sexual violence. In addition to the need for trauma healing and social reintegration, all staff members interviewed also perceived the financial needs of these women as the cause of (and financial assistance the solution to) many of their issues.
The biggest problem women come to the social services for help is poverty. Poverty increases, aggravates their trauma. When Organisation E contributes to diminish their poverty, there is also a bigger change. For instance, when women have some money to start an income-generating project, they can then afford to buy food and take their HIV medicine with food, which decreases the side effects. So the decrease of poverty is also decreasing the trauma to a certain extent (Marie, 5 July 2013).

This connection between poverty and trauma/social exclusion was expressed by almost all staff members I interviewed, reinforcing this two-way relationship between trauma healing and income/employment security. As discussed above, a certain degree of trauma healing is first needed before the women can sustainably fulfil their economic needs; however, financial struggles can also increase trauma.

And there is also quite a big link here between material needs and trauma. (…) I feel maybe that's quite important in this society, if you have a house, if you have the things you need, then you're less likely to go back to some of the traumatic experiences. I think poverty and hunger and [these] things keep people in trauma somehow. Because that constantly reminds them of maybe what they lost during the genocide, how their life has not been prosperous. (…) So I think for a lot of people they feel like having these material things would mean that their life would be OK, and that it would be much easier to move on from trauma (Laura, 23 May 2013).

It is believed that poverty might return the women to a traumatized state, despite the level of trauma healing and self-acceptance reached.

Even poverty causes them to be more traumatized. It's another trauma, another face of another trauma in this generation. People are healed, they feel they are accepted, forgiven, they are feeling strong, they feel they have accepted themselves, but because of poverty, they tend to think “If I had a family, maybe I would be better”, “If I had my children, now they would be grown up and maybe I would be in a better position”. So it brings them another trauma (Brigitte, 18 June 2013).

Going back to the pyramid of needs presented above, these quotes suggest that there is a certain impasse: trauma cannot be reduced if financial needs are not first addressed, but the financial needs cannot be sustained if trauma is not reduced. Moreover, according to the staff members, financial needs still remain one of the
most important challenges faced 19 years after the end of the genocide, which makes this especially important to address.

So the [women’s] main wish now is for their children to go and finish university. The mothers [also] say: “I have something that earns me some money, then I am happy”. So that's their wish: to own a small business. It could be having a small thing in the market, maybe selling vegetables you know. But if she has a source of income, a main one... So there's two [wishes]: education and having a stable source of income. And some of them have been talking about a shelter. They say: “this house, it was constructed 15 years ago. It is collapsing”. If you have heard about this problem of houses, they are not done very well, they are collapsing. The mothers say: “I want to have a house where even when I die I know that my child can live there”. “I know when I get old, I have a place I will not be kicked out for not paying rent by having my own house”. So for me I can say these three are the main wishes that I have heard from the mothers (Janvier, 23 May 2013).

Some of the financial needs of the women include securing a stable source of income, housing and education for their children, and financial assistance for their medical needs. Poverty and unemployment are obstacles to their social and structural reintegration, and the staff members interviewed all agreed that income-generating activities are needed in order to also address other issues, such as trauma and social marginalisation.

I was telling you about the wishes of 30 women. I noticed that the majority wishes to have an income-generating activity. You asked me if the women were working and their living conditions. Most of them are miserable. They cannot eat as everyone else, and they are vulnerable compared to others. They wish to have an income-generating activity in order to change their living conditions (Thérèse, 13 May 2013).

The financial struggle experienced by some survivors of the genocide, including women who suffered from sexual violence, was also described as an obstacle to post-conflict reconciliation in Rwanda. As a previous example illustrated, in a disagreement between two women who were part of the same income-generating group in Organisation D, events that occurred during the genocide were quickly
brought into the argument. The organisation had to step in and the staff’s solution was to have the women reconcile if they wanted to remain part of this income-generating group. When discussing this with Fabrice, the program manager (20 June 2013), he mentioned that fights like these are rare, but do happen. It may start because of money, but then tensions from the genocide may arise, whether explicitly or not. The NGOs I observed thus focus on the importance of reconciliation, promoting inclusive identities of Rwandaness.

For instance, some organisations I encountered focus solely on providing services to survivors of the genocide, but the use of ethnic labels have been removed within the organisations. As for those organisations that include individuals who identified as ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ during the genocide, they do not create divisions between the two groups. ‘I never take them as a Tutsi or a Hutu. I take them as they came to me and when they are all here in a group, I can’t know they are Hutu or Tutsi’ (Marie-Chantal, 11 June 2013). The focus is instead on reconciliation, and on fostering a sense of unity between all beneficiaries that erases ethnicity, which of course aligns with the government’s ideology. For example, the staff members of Organisation D also said that they do not speak about the genocide and the reasons that caused it, because this is something from the past and the focus should be on reconciliation and reintegration instead. In a sense, the beneficiaries are encouraged to speak about the past for trauma healing, but certain things about the genocide - such as the ethnic dimension of the violence - remain taboo (Observation, 18 June 2013).

I know a lot of reconciliation groups who are bringing perpetrators and survivors together and doing activities together. I think there is so much reconciliation work going on here. Some of it work, some of it doesn't. I think it's also a buzzword in the government, because it's very much their
agenda, so NGOs are kind of fitting in with what the government agenda is... (Laura, 23 May 2013, emphasis by Laura).

This is consistent with the post-conflict state processes of nation-building and ethnic reconciliation, which will be discussed in more depth in the subsequent chapters.

However, even if the organisations remove ethnic identity from their official language, some staff members were aware that most individuals, and even the younger generations, still know which group they belong to (Observation, 10 June 2013). Furthermore, survivors’ organisations often only include members who are granted the title of survivors, i.e. those who identified as Tutsis and lived in Rwanda during the genocide, and their staff members might also be survivors themselves. Despite their strong focus on reconciliation, some survivors’ organisations nonetheless keep a certain distance between the different groups in order to address the specific needs of the survivors. My time in Rwanda suggested that whilst most staff members did not explicitly acknowledge this divide, there was an underlying understanding that total reconciliation had still not been reached.

I think people can [grasp] what people are really feeling, but I think there is a certain taboo. There is very much a sense that everyone is Rwandan and we are working towards development and reconciliation and I think that's helpful certainly, but on the flip side it can... it can put a surface, face over what people are truly feeling and I worry that some reconciliation projects are painting over the surface and not really addressing people's deep feelings and concerns. So you know, I'm sure if you did some nice questionnaire about reconciliation, people would tick the box saying "yes, yes, yes", but I still worry about what's really deep inside (Laura, 23 May 2013).

A lack of total post-conflict reconciliation does not necessarily mean that the women I met have not developed meaningful relationships with both survivors and non-survivors, as was explained above. These relationships are perceived by the staff members interviewed as necessary for trauma healing, and as crucial for the well-
being of these women: ‘Especially with survivors, they really want to have a family of their own and recreate a network that they lost’ (Laura, 23 May 2013). The staff members perceive these meaningful social relationships as crucial for their beneficiaries since it is through social belonging and relationships of love and friendship that the women will be able to look ahead and think about their future. ‘If they are free to talk, it's because they feel they are accepted’ (Vestine, 4 June 2013).

It was suggested that one of the most important needs of the women who suffered from sexual violence is to feel loved and accepted.

Most people when they are traumatized, they don't come asking for things, no. Not really. They, most of them, except for those who have really gotten some level of healing, but those who are not, they feel they just need love, they need someone to talk to, someone that listens to them, and maybe if they have a problem, they would tell you later as you go on with them (Brigitte, 18 June 2013).

This was also supported by Marie-Chantal (11 June 2013), when suggesting that family relationships are especially important for healing:

If you have no brother, no father, no mother, there’s no interest in having all that money and you start wasting it. But when you have a family, they care for you, when you are in trouble they come to rescue you. Identity is a great thing.

However, in a context where many women lost their family networks because of the genocide, the staff members often described their organisations as providing an alternative family for these women: ‘God is by their side, they have relatives here. All Organisation C’s members are their relatives’ (Brigitte, 18 June 2013). This was often a result of the relationships created within the organisations, but some NGOs such as Organisation C explicitly set out to provide an alternative family to the survivors of the genocide: ‘[Organisation C] provides an alternative family for people who do not have a family anymore. The organisation sets out to create a
family. They have a feeling of belonging at [Organisation C], when they are together’ (Eric, 7 June 2013). This alternative family is also reproduced at the local level, such as when the women live with other individuals who share the same experiences from the genocide.

They have their fellowship, they have days where they can meet, they contribute money between themselves so that they can support each other. It's like an alternative family for the widows and orphans. Because the people who end up in these communities, there are many widows and orphans, widows without children, so when they are together it's like a family. A widow who lost her children will see those orphans there like her own children. It's a way of comforting each other when they are together. Because these people are used to live in loneliness, but when they visit each other, when they meet for fellowship like the women you met, they have a common point (Vestine, 4 June 2013).

According to the staff members, these senses of belonging and having built alternative families are based on shared experiences and understanding of the genocide. They have found that sharing stories with those who also suffered helps the women feel accepted and understood, something that cannot necessarily be reproduced with everyone.

It has helped the mothers to know that they are not alone. When we go out to give the money, the women are together. Actually, one group has asked where they can meet regularly, not necessarily when we go to give them money. They have come together to share experiences. When they meet for school visits [it] gives them a chance to speak. Because they trust each other, they know they have the same past and they talk. And after one of them speak, the others say: "I thought I was the only one who had these problems but now you are worse than me". So it's like helping them to take themselves out of this kind of [cycle] that I was raped, killed or attacked so when they hear from another person they are relieved. So this sense of human belonging has been restored at least (Janvier, 23 May 2013).

Here, the use of ‘human belonging’ by Janvier is very powerful, showing how first and foremost the women wish to be accepted as equals and valued human beings. This can then create opportunities for them to be understood by others, and the
NGOs explicitly set out to provide these alternative families free of stigma and judgement.

Because of this community, they share the same experiences, they understand each other. When for example you say “I have been raped”, for example while giving a testimony during a meeting, you will find that others will come and comfort you. They will tell you “do not worry. You will live because you survived”. So they comfort each other instead of rejecting [each other]. This helps them so much. They even say: “I have found a home to rest”. “I have found a home where I can talk and have some people listen to me” (Vestine, 4 June 2013).

Shared experiences of the genocide also influence the relationships between the staff members and the beneficiaries, with the majority of the staff members I met being either international workers or returnees/survivors themselves. This has an impact on the relationships created, where the staff members who are also survivors of the genocide are forming meaningful bonds with the women.

But those who have really bad trauma, they come here. Because we have Maman L., she got [a lot of] training about counselling, she knows how to talk to them. And herself, she had a very bad experience during the genocide. She lost her five children during the genocide, her husband… and for her it is easy to communicate with them because she can understand their pain and sorrow. And for them it is easy to be open (Vestine, 4 June 2013).

The identity of the staff members and of the beneficiaries of the NGOs might have an impact on the sense of belonging forged within these organisations, especially in a context of recent ethnic violence. In a sense, survivors’ organisations acknowledge the specific needs of genocide survivors, and the strong relationships created within these organisations maintain exclusive ethnic group boundaries. This is something these organisations constantly need to mediate, where the recognition of the survivors’ specific needs and rights can foster social distance with other vulnerable individuals.
To conclude, the previous two sections analysed the post-conflict needs and experiences of some women who experienced sexual violence during the genocide through their own voices, and through the voices of the NGO staff members who work with them. It demonstrated that reconstructing meaningful relationships with the local community is prioritized by both groupings, since social/self-acceptance is often perceived as the key to social reintegration and improved living conditions. The final section will now analyse whether these ideas influence the work done by five NGOs in Rwanda.

**Holistic and Needs-Based Approach**

**Organisations A and B**

The first two organisations I observed in Rwanda were both international organisations located in Kigali but with their headquarters in the United States (Organisation A) and in the United Kingdom (Organisation B). Working as partners on similar issues, they share an office in a very nice district of Kigali, where a lot of international workers are living, attracting restaurants, clubs and other NGO offices. The organisations were clearly identifiable from the street, with a sign outside the gate identifying them. They had their offices in the second floor of the house, a small space that was mostly reserved for the staff members and not necessarily designed to accommodate the beneficiaries, unlike the other organisations I observed.

I first interviewed Janvier. We met in his office and conducted the interview in English. Sitting across his desk, the interview started very formally, but soon enough it became more relaxed, with Janvier laughing and smiling and sharing some details
about his personal life. But the main focus remained on the work of Organisations A and B, and their current priorities.

The current focus of Organisation A, created in 2008, is to provide financial support and assistance to the children born out of rape during the genocide, mostly in terms of access to education, support for their mothers, and more generally, support for the survivors of the genocide. As for Organisation B, created in 1995, the focus is to provide technical and financial support to holistic programmes administered by survivor-led organisations. This organisation acts as a capacity-building organisation, helping survivors’ organisations to implement their own projects.

We are two organisations although we work in one place, but the mission of [Organisation A] is a world where the rights of survivors are respected, in dignity. So that's the main mission and we work with survivors’ organisations to achieve this, building their capacity (Janvier, 23 May 2013).

Based on this information, Organisations A and B are two organisations that acknowledge and recognise the specific needs and rights of the survivors of the genocide, which, as discussed above, has important benefits but also some limitations.

We fund other programmes like income-generating, educational, health programmes, and care treatment for women who are infected with HIV. As for [Organisation B], it is registered in the US, not in Rwanda, but they have a partnership with [Organisation A]. (…) And the main objective is first to raise awareness about the women and children, women who were raped during the genocide and as a result have children. So the main work is advocacy and raising awareness through photographs and through the media. We are also providing educational support for the children (…) but also connecting mothers to health facilities (Janvier, 23 May 2013).

Providing holistic support to survivors of sexual violence and their offspring is a priority for Organisations A and B, since it is believed that targeting one area only does not benefit the survivors.
We are looking at how we can support the mother and the child in a holistic manner because providing school fees alone is not enough. We may provide the money, but then the child cannot go to school because the mother is harassing him. That's now our approach, looking at how can we take a holistic approach to supporting our target group (Janvier, 23 May 2013).

This was also supported by Laura, who I interviewed in a café popular with international tourists and workers, located in the district of Kacyiru. We had scheduled to meet at the organisation’s office later that day, but out of coincidence met in that café. I found this very revealing of the presence of international aid workers and volunteers in Rwanda, where certain spaces seem to have been designed especially for the Westerners now inhabiting the country.

I think one of our recent approaches, what we call a wrap-around approach, so thinking that if you just give one target intervention, maybe health, there's still many, many problems that these women face so a wrap-around approach being targeting lots and lots of different areas, so it could be health, education, income-generation and bringing it all together. Maybe legal advice, counselling and realising that these are multiple challenges and that different women need different parts of that program (Laura, 23 May 2013).

According to Laura and Janvier, this holistic approach and the programmes implemented are of course influenced by donors’ interests, but are also led by the beneficiaries themselves, following a bottom-up approach that allows survivors to share suggestions and criticisms of the programmes.

The more we work with the beneficiaries, the more they or we identify additional needs. For example, with Organisation B it started with a photography project and then the women said: "what would make a massive difference to us is school fees." So then we responded to this need, and then they were saying: "we really need help with talking to our children about what's happened". So we responded to that need as well (Laura, 23 May 2013).

This was also supported by Janvier (23 May 2013), who repeated Laura’s idea:
Our programmes are drafted from what the beneficiaries think the priority is for them. So what we do is, for example, when we did the educational support for the children, and as we interacted with the mothers, our psychologists together realised that mothers were having issues now, of telling their children how they were born... issues of disclosure. So I don't sit here and say: "the women need this". No, I speak to them, and then they tell me: "this is what we need". And I develop projects, I make decisions guided by their wishes.

This bottom-up approach ensures that the voices of the beneficiaries are not only heard, but also influence the types of programmes implemented. However, since this organisation also needs to respect the interests of its donors, its staff members are put in a position where they need to mediate with both groups of actors in order to operate, as will be explained in more detail in Chapter Eight.

Finally, this bottom-up approach also means that support varies depending on the individual, as staff members try to understand the source of the ‘problems’ for each woman in order to provide an adequate response.

Before we go out to help them, I think we need to map why is the individual having this problem. Because perhaps the way I do with one person may not necessarily be the same approach with another person. So to put up one programme and to say: "we are going to help children in this way", is I think, to be guided by sort of like a pilot. (...) I think it's a bit of a challenge to design a program and say: "this is how I'm going to do it", without getting it from them first. Actually what we have done now is if there is a problem, we sit with them and ask: "what do you think is the best way to address this?" (...) And looking at their past, finding a way how we can help them to make use of the services. So, back to where we were, whatever we need to do, it should be from their needs. (...) Because otherwise, I can sit here, and say: "I want to do community counselling, let's say, in this district." And when I go there in the community counselling, I find that two women are here, another two women 10-15km from another, 20km away. And even where they are, they might not be willing to meet and share. But once we know, we go to the women and say: "this is what we have in mind. Do you have an idea how to go about it?", they will [tell] us. Some would prefer, like one woman, "I'd rather join the group in the other village than the group in my village" (laugh). You see? So, I think that approach is the best (Janvier, 23 May 2013).
Overall, Organisations A and B can be considered survivors’ organisations that, in accordance with the voices and interpretations of the beneficiaries and staff members, provide holistic support to women who suffered from sexual violence during the genocide.

**Organisation C**

Organisation C is a grassroots religious organisation that was created by a survivor of the genocide in order to support the widows and orphans of the genocide. Created in 1995, this organisation’s main purpose is to provide healing and comfort to survivors through holistic support. Located in a popular district of Kigali for international organisations and hotels, the organisation consists of two buildings accessed through a gate. When in the compound, the main building is used for offices and the large reunion hall is used for larger reunions of survivors, for mass, and is sometimes rented out to outside companies for income-generating purposes or for weddings. In the back is the guesthouse.

The first time my translator and I went to this organisation, we were offered refreshments on the small terrace of the guesthouse, by a garden that was being tended to by a worker. Cars were parked in front of the guesthouse, there were a few men and women walking around, coming in and out of the guesthouse and the reception hall. It was busy and felt very different to the offices of Organisations A and B, which were mostly restricted to the staff members. Instead, this organisation had an openness that allowed beneficiaries to come in and out, to stop for mass and to meet with the staff members and the counsellor. Whilst this also meant that they could also be in contact with the visitors of the guesthouse and the reception hall, this did not seem to prevent survivors from visiting the organisation.
I visited their main office in Kigali, but the organisation also works with local communities, extending the reach of their organisation into different provinces. For example, they also have a health clinic outside Kigali, and another centre in the Eastern province.

Actually [Organisation C] works with communities, this means that we have beneficiaries in different areas of the country. So for instance beneficiaries who live in [a district outside Kigali], we gathered them in one community where they have their leaders so it would be easy for us to reach them because we will be working with their leaders. So when you go on field visits in those communities, they tell us [who are] the orphans who need support. And other times those orphans can come here, so that's how we work (Vestine, 4 June 2013).

These field visits ensure that beneficiaries do not always have to travel to Kigali for support. This limits their travel costs, and may not require them to take time off work or from working on their land.

The main purpose of this organisation, as expressed by Eric, the Director (7 June 2013), is to provide comfort to widows and orphans of the genocide. He mentioned that they focus on these groups because they remain the most vulnerable individuals in the aftermath of the genocide. Their vision is to help with healing, and to diminish the grip of the genocide on people's lives. To do so, they focus on counselling services and the need for community belonging. Their aim is explicitly to provide an alternative family for people who no longer have a family.

Whilst the focus remains on trauma healing, it is also believed that this healing should be provided through holistic support, which is why they have three main departments: counselling, income-generating activities and a sponsorship program. This was discussed with Vestine (4 June 2013), who is also Eric’ daughter:
The main mission of [Organisation C] is to comfort widows and orphans. But the comfort we have to give them is holistic, so it's a special counselling, or I don't know how I can say, more counselling but also material counselling, material comfort. Because you cannot comfort someone spiritually, yet he needs to eat, he needs to study and you leave him like this. So the comfort must be whole... yeah holistic.

This is again consistent with the voices and interpretations discussed in the two first sections, and follows the approach that trauma healing is a priority, but cannot be totally reached without extending support to other spheres of the women’s lives.

It is me who started this department of Sponsorship Programme because when [Organisation C] started, the main focus was on counselling. Because many people were hurt because of their experiences during the genocide, then after the people who have been counselled realised that they needed to live, to survive. They could not survive without studying, without developing themselves, that's how an idea came that we should search for some people who can support them to go ahead in their studies (Vestine, 4 June 2013).

Sitting privately in her office, it was evident towards the end of the interview that Vestine is emotionally involved and committed to the women and children that they support. For instance, she was very emotional when speaking about a woman who passed away a few days before I started my observation with this organisation. She and her father are emotionally committed to this organisation, and an alternative family was truly created there.

**Organisation D**

Organisation D is another grassroots organisation, located near Kigali city centre and created in 1996 by Françoise, a returnee. The organisation was not announced outside the gate (i.e. there was no sign), but while I was waiting outside the gate one day, a man walked by and wondered why I was waiting to enter an organisation helping vulnerable individuals, which let me to believe the whole neighbourhood must know the purpose of this organisation, despite the lack of signage. When I first
visited the organisation’s offices, I was also a little curious to see the portrait of Paul Kagamé in the hall used for group sessions.

During my stay in Rwanda, this organisation was always full of staff members and beneficiaries attending group therapy sessions, educational sessions or skills training for adolescents. Every morning we were welcomed in the small building behind the main house, where the adolescents were meeting up to sing and dance before splitting into groups for skills training in hairdressing or sewing and tailoring. I sat a few times with the hairdressing group, and the young women sat in a circle, laughing and chatting. The relaxed atmosphere found in this organisation was also replicated in my relationships with the women who suffered from sexual violence and other beneficiaries attending the organisation, as well as the staff members.

Françoise welcomed me with open arms to her organisation, and took the time to explain the whole evolution of the organisation from 1996 until now. At first, the organisation focused only on providing support to women who suffered during the genocide, since it was believed that helping women would inevitably help the children.

At first, four or five women came with the children. I welcome them, and went to the church to ask for a space where we could meet, where we could at least speak to each other and I thought: “if they tell me everything that happened, I can at least get people to help them”. (…) The mission, why I thought of this is because I thought that: “if I help the women, I automatically help the children. I should also help them to express themselves, to speak up about things that happened to them” (Françoise, 24 June 2013).

The original focus was to provide a safe space where the women could share their stories, space that was urgently needed and difficult to find at that time.
Our customs prevent us from speaking up about things that happened, because if you are a girl, a woman, mostly a girl, and you tell that you were raped, you could stay alone without anyone daring saying “I would still like to marry you, etc.”. It was a taboo. So we started by speaking up. (…) When I first came here, I thought that I was the only one that suffered so much, and I still had my children and my husband. Others were raped, had nothing, did not even have a house, nothing to eat, no clothes. So I thought: “I should help them to become themselves again, so that they can continue to be proud Rwandan women” (Françoise, 24 June 2013).

The last sentence is extremely interesting, since helping others to be “proud Rwandan women” focuses on the gender identity of these women, but at the same time also provides an inclusive identity that erases ethnicity. Different from the previous organisations that focus on genocide survivors, this organisation originally accepted (and still does) women of all ethnicities.

Only Tutsis came at the beginning because the Hutus were scared. But after, because we are nevertheless a Christian organisation, people heard that we were signing, praying, etc., and some Hutu women came but were still scared. We did not separate them, because I thought: “if we want to give a good example, to reconstruct our country we need to accept all women that suffered”. This is why we mixed them. We did not only accept women who were raped, we also accepted women who have HIV/AIDS, who have suffered in various ways. We did not separate them. We even did not ask them whether they are Tutsi or Hutu. We welcomed them. We welcomed them with open arms (Françoise, 24 June 2013).

This organisation has a different perspective from the previous three organisations, which is that the women who suffer(ed) from rape, HIV/AIDS or poverty all share common experiences, regardless of the origin of their struggle. This was perhaps a bold move in the aftermath of the genocide, and was definitely not accepted by everyone.

At first the women were scared and did not like it, mostly the Tutsis. They told me: “why are you mixing us like this? These people have killed us. Why are you mixing us?” I told them: “you know, we are all created in God’s image, we should not get divided. I do not know you, you do not know me. I do not ask you who you are, if you are Hutu or Tutsi. If you want to come here, just come, but do not ask the question. All the women
who come here do not come because they seek revenge or to gain something. It is only to speak, to share what happened to us. And if they are among us some Hutus who suffered, why not welcome them?” At first they did not like it but we insisted, I said: “right, we are all the same. If we want to show a good example, that we are all Rwandans, we cannot divide people” (Françoise, 24 June 2013).

When I conducted my observation with this organisation, their work had considerably expanded from the initial counselling services provided to women. Now, the organisation provides income-generating activities to their beneficiaries, individual and group counselling services to survivors of the genocide, including survivors of sexual violence and individuals suffering from HIV/AIDS, health education, and finally sewing/tailoring and hairdressing training skills to adolescents not attending school. It is worth mentioning that while at first this sort of vocational training may seem to reinforce traditional gender roles, the situation is a bit more complex. For example, I visited many times the Kimironko market in Kigali. This market has many fabric stalls, where clothes can be tailor-made. Both men and women are hired as tailors, and from the explanations I was given, it is more one’s educational background than gender that facilitates this line of work. It would thus be too simplistic in this case to argue the income-generating activities are limiting the women to their traditional gender roles, since the educational background also has a strong impact on the type of work they can do.

The organisation provides support to more than 3,300 individuals from all parts of the country. These beneficiaries, however, now have to cover their own travel to Kigali because the organisation does not have any funding to cover everyone’s transportation, or to open centres in other provinces. The individuals who come to the organisation are grouped based on their main need, and the services provided will differ according to these groupings. For example, the women who experienced rape
have their own group that meets once a month for group therapy (Observation, 10 June 2013).

We started with the women that were raped, those who have HIV/AIDS, and then after we realised that they had children who were staying at home and who had nothing. So we started to give them food, and we constructed 41 houses in Kabeza, and then we brought here those children who are at home and who aren’t doing anything. We started teaching them some skills, such as sewing, baking bread, card making. So we have not really changed, it evolved like this, but we got a lot of demands after. We got a lot of people who came to us, that said: “we would like to be in your organisation”, etc. I believe that the skills training that was last added was how to braid hair. That’s it, since the beginning we loved others (Françoise, 24 June 2013).

Again, very similar to the previous organisations is this holistic support provided to the beneficiaries. This support is nonetheless highly dependent on the financial assistance of donors, and the organisation had to reduce its programmes and services due to lack of funding over the past few years, and the staff members are not working full-time because the organisation cannot afford to pay their full salaries. For example, the organisation possesses the installations to produce bread, and a few years ago they were making their own bagels to sell. When I was conducting my observation, the installation was still there and functional, but the programme had been cancelled due to lack of funding. They also provided lunch to the adolescents attending the training, but this also had to stop due to economic hardship (Observation, 13 May 2013). This economic hardship and the consequences it has on Organisation D will be discussed in further details in Chapter Eight.

Organisation E

The last organisation I observed during my time in Rwanda is a well-known women’s organisation that is located in Kigali, but has regional branches in each
province of the country. I conducted participant observation in Kigali and in the Eastern province.

In Kigali, the organisation is located in a busy part of town with shops, restaurants, and some hotels nearby, but is outside of residential districts, unlike the previous organisations I observed. The main difference with the previous organisations is the range of services provided under the roof of this organisation, divided into different departments: a health clinic, counselling, social services, legal/judicial assistance, pharmacy, laboratory, data management, family planning and finance. It was evident during my participant observation that they were receiving more funding than the previous organisations, and that this financial stability has allowed them to become more professionalised, having hired, for example, doctors, trained psychologists and lawyers. Its funding is part private and part public, with the Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion also providing funding to the organisation (Observation, 25 June 2013). Additionally, according to one of the organisation’s doctors (27 June 2013), the health clinic was funded by other NGOs from 2005 to 2010, but since then the Ministry of Health has financially supported the clinic’s work.

Organisation E’s response to the needs of their beneficiaries, including women who experienced sexual violence, is to provide holistic support that targets different areas of their lives. The separation of this holistic approach into different departments however means that each department focuses on a specific issue, meaning that one individual may be helped by multiple professionals depending on his/her circumstances.
When entering the building through the main entrance for beneficiaries, one first walks through the waiting room of the health clinic. In general, the survivors of sexual violence will receive medical services first, and then, if needed, will be referred to counselling and social services. According to that doctor, their physical problems tend to worsen during the April commemoration of the genocide. When speaking with him in his consultation room, he proudly showed me a DVD on the involvement of men in fighting GBV. He received it the year before in a training course on GBV, describing the training now offered on this issue to doctors, and their role in referring their patients to the police and to the counselling services.

The counselling services are upstairs and are comprised of one small room, divided on one side with two desks for the counsellors and on the other side with a small consultation room. The space is not ideal for holding consultations: the other counsellors present in the room can hear what is being said and a certain sense of privacy is absent. This department is, however, run in a very professional manner, with trained psychologists providing services, supervised by some university professors and, in some specific cases, European specialists. The psychologists of the different regional branches meet on certain occasions to discuss heavier cases and suggest treatment. They use a holistic approach in the counselling sessions, meaning that the behavioural approach, religious approach and psychoanalysis are all used, for example. The department has a weekly schedule, with Monday-Wednesday being reserved for HIV screenings and individual counselling. Thursday and Friday are then reserved for group therapies, and at all times the psychologists are required to fill in reports when not interacting with the beneficiaries (Observation, 25 June 2013). According to Nadège (26 June 2013), their workload is considerable and it
can be quite frustrating at times since counselling is not a priority in the eyes of the
government, but also sometimes even in the eyes of the beneficiaries themselves,
who will miss their appointments. However, whilst the counselling services focus on
trauma healing for the survivors of sexual violence, the department of social services
is in charge of their social reintegration in their community.

The social services department provides income-generating activities and
financial support to these women, and their overall mission is to help the women feel
equal to others. According to Marie (5 July 2013), they collaborate with the
counselling department, but their work remains more practical, providing concrete
support to women who suffered from sexual violence. For example, they undertake
home visits to evaluate how the women are reintegrating into their community. They
can then determine the roots of the problems (poverty, bad neighbourhood, self-
isolation, etc.) and work with community leaders to implement a strategy. This
organisation was the only one I met during my time in Rwanda that had some staff
members working only and specifically on the social reintegration of the survivors of
sexual violence. This may, however, be a result of the resources available to
Organisation E, allowing them to hire a large number of professionals working in
different departments, and not a representation of the lack of attention given to social
reintegration by the other organisations.

In addition to these departments, the women are also provided legal/judicial
assistance. Flora (5 July 2013), who works in the department of Justice, Advocacy
and Information, explained to me how they assisted women through the gacaca
system when these courts were running in Rwanda. They helped arrange for
counsellors or volunteers to go with each woman to the gacaca courts in order to
either speak for them or to be there for emotional support. They also raised awareness about the importance of the women’s testimonies, since they were often the only way to know the truth about what happened. Their support was mostly needed in 2010-2011 when the women who experienced rape were very active in the gacaca courts, but in 2013, they were mostly in charge of helping women with other general legal issues, giving advice and educational training about their rights (inheritance, land rights, family conflicts, etc.), and the training of ‘parajuristes’ (volunteers who advise members of the organisation in their community).

The holistic and professional support provided to the members of Organisation E was clearly well-organised in Kigali, but I also travelled to their branch in the Eastern province in order to observe any differences. That branch was established in 2000, after the one in Kigali but before the other regional branches. According to the staff members there, this branch was more developed than the other regional ones. Their work is also more involved at the local community level, where they provide counselling services and train volunteers to help individuals living with HIV and/or with trauma. From 2004 to 2013, they trained 320 psychosocial counsellors, 100 ‘parajuristes’ and 80 health workers. These volunteers facilitate and raise awareness about the importance of social reintegration, and educate the community about the needs of the survivors. Each community also has their own individual responsible for the community’s development, who help women start income-generating groups to ease their social and economic reintegration. According to Jean (9 July 2013), everybody works together to reintegrate the beneficiaries to live in a peaceful and reconciliatory way with others. Their health clinic was first opened for raped women and those with HIV to receive medical access, but the branch now works towards
facilitating the reintegration of the survivors of sexual violence so they can go to their local neighbourhood health clinic instead of having to travel to the organisation’s clinic.

However, securing funding for the Eastern branch is also a challenge faced by the staff members, who, in collaboration with another NGO, built a centre with accommodation and conference rooms that can be rented out. With the money raised by this centre, they are financially helping their beneficiaries through income-generating activities and through credits. Paying the salaries of the staff members is however another challenge constantly faced by this branch, and Organisation A is currently funding Organisation E’s income-generating activities project for women who suffered from sexual violence.

**Discussion**

This chapter highlights a complex situation of social relationships, in which trauma, illness, sense of belonging, and social and structural reintegration are all inter-connected. The women’s voices suggest that in order to secure their social reintegration, the different spheres and areas of their lives have to be improved, since it would be impossible for them to overcome stigmatisation, for instance, without improving their living conditions. Therefore, the women aim towards an extended process of rebuilding their lives that is not limited to one specific need. This perhaps suggests that these women, first and foremost, want to be accepted in their community and nation as respected individuals who belong and hold a certain social status, allowing them to improve the diverse spheres of their lives. In a context where the genocide and the civilian survivors of the genocide are officially recognised by
the government, it seems that these women are mostly hoping for social reintegration and an identity that would not necessarily exclude them from the rest of the population.

This was consistent with the interpretations of the staff members, who also agreed that first and foremost, these women want to be accepted in their community as valued human beings. This may explain why the NGOs aim to create alternative families of survivors as new forms of social belonging for these women. By doing so, the women redefine their sense of personal self, feeling supported and valued as human beings, which then help them to feel accepted within their local community.

The experiences of stigmatization related in the first section also highlighted this shift from ethnic women to moral outcasts. At the core of their experiences is the moral exclusion exerted by the local community, resulting from the ideology of woman-as-nation (Yuval-Davis, 1994), in which the women are perceived as ‘dirty’ and ‘sinful’, because their bodies were spoiled during the genocide (Mertus, 1994: 18). Indeed, the experiences related in this chapter illustrate a strong process of victim-blaming (Lerner, 1980; Hafer, 2004) which reinforces the social boundaries between these women and those who have not suffered from wartime rape (Douglas, 1966: 4, 47). This process of victim-blaming and the ideology of woman-as-nation justify the social, economic and physical exclusion experienced by these women, and yet the NGOs I observed were unable to transform these moral norms. They instead focus on rebuilding the identity of these women so that they can be re-included within the scope of justice of their community, instead of transforming this scope of justice (Opotow, 1990: 2, Opotow, Gerson and Woodside, 2005: 303-306).
Chapter 7. State-Building and the Fight for Legal Recognition in Bosnia-Herzegovina

I arrived in Sarajevo a few months after the end of my previous fieldwork in Rwanda. My first few days were spent confirming interviews and exploring the city, and the spatial contrasts between these two countries became instantly visible, at least in the two capitals. Whilst signs of the genocide could not be easily discerned in Kigali (except for the Parliament Building and the Genocide Memorial), the space was different in Sarajevo. The impact of the Bosnian war was visible on some buildings, on the streets of the city centre with the Roses of Sarajevo\(^5\), and even the Historical Museum of Bosnia-Herzegovina showed signs of the war. Throughout my time there, I discovered more of the city, and discovered spaces that flourished under Tito’s era or under the former Yugoslavia, but that are now left to their own fate. One of them was ‘Tito’s Park’, as named by my translator, which was a national park before the war, and became the front line between the Serbian and Bosnian armies during the siege of Sarajevo. Of all the places that my translator and her husband wanted to show me of Sarajevo, this was the first one they brought me to. It was not only significant for them that this represented the front line during the siege, but the husband told me how he used to come here to play when he was a child. According to his recollections, this park had a beautiful lake where people swam, with a restaurant on the side busy with customers, and families having picnics and barbecues all over the park. The image he portrayed of the park was very attractive, but so disconnected to its present state. On that day, the park was totally empty, and

\(^5\) The Roses of Sarajevo are marks from shell explosions that were filled with red resin after the war.
except for the few stray dogs that followed us around. As for the lake and restaurant, their current state (as the picture shows) could not reflect the flourishing description given by the husband.

‘Tito’s Park’, photo by author.

Discovering the surroundings of Sarajevo, and seeing first-hand the impact the war had on its environment and this space, made me wonder how survivors of war can successfully rebuild their lives when their surrounding space is a constant reminder of the trauma experienced?
This chapter will explore this question by analysing the voices and interpretations of the women I met who suffered from sexual violence and of some NGO staff members who work with them, before analysing how these voices and interpretations may influence the work done by five NGOs operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It will argue that various needs are still to be addressed, but that both the women and the staff members interviewed believed these needs could be fulfilled only through legal recognition of rape survivors. This is an attempt to address the social and moral exclusion experienced by these women as a result of the ideology of woman-as-nation (Yuval-Davis, 1994), in which their social worth is devalorized as a consequence of the rape. The response to this moral exclusion is the main contrast between the women’s and NGOs’ experiences in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina, since it is through legal recognition that the NGOs wish to re-integrate the women within the scope of justice of their group (Opotow, 1990: 2, Opotow, Gerson and Woodside, 2005: 303-306).

**Fighting for Legal Recognition**

Unlike with my interviews in Rwanda, the Bosnian women I interviewed did not share many details about their wartime experiences. I followed the same ethical procedure of not asking the women about the war in order to avoid pain or trauma, but there was a space for the women to take control of the conversation. They however did not use that space to really expand on their war experiences. These war stories vary on an individual basis, but certain similarities form a basis upon which a sense of solidarity has been solidified between these women throughout the years.
For example, Emina lived in a municipality near Sarajevo during the war, a municipality now in the Republika Srpska, near the frontier with the Federation. When the war first started, her life did not change drastically, until July 1992.

That horrible year, my husband and I were still working even if the war had already started, but our area was quiet. Kindergartens were closed, so I used to bring my daughter to my mother. It was like that until the end of July, because one day, while I was working, the road from my job to my mother was blocked. These were just three kilometres, which at the same time was both near and far (Emina, 14 November 2013).

When violence reached her municipality, she was brought to a concentration camp, where she was sexually abused.

Very soon, the Serbs took me to the camp with a lot of other women. Some of [the other women] were my cousins and cousins of my husband. I was there for seven months and a half. During that period I did not see my daughter or mother, and I could not hear anything about my husband. The Serb soldiers were torturing us, we were raped, beaten... It is even hard to explain. But among all of this, I was suffering because of those three kilometres (Emina, 14 November 2013).

The gendered nature of the Bosnian war is explained by this quote, with Emina being separated from her husband and placed into a camp where she was allowed to survive, but instead suffered physical, and inevitably psychological, torture. Emina’s experience in this camp was extremely painful, and is shared by many others. A lot of the women I interviewed, as well as those with whom I informally spoke, were brought to these camps. ‘In the camp I was abused physically and mentally’ (Lejla, 14 November 2013). This is where the moral transgression experienced by these women started: their bodies became the body of the nation.

It is difficult to explain. We all survived war in our own way. War is war for everyone. I was only 18 when it started. I was a child. And after four years of suffering, being raped, separated from my family, 'living' in camps with no food or water... I thought I would never be able to be a normal person again (Dalija, 8 November 2013).
For some women, witnessing atrocities committed to others within the camp was a strong enough experience to induce psychological distress. For example, Amina (15 November 2013), now living in Sarajevo and working for a women’s NGO, described at the end of our interview some of the atrocities she witnessed when incarcerated in a camp. Some of these stories are especially powerful, such as the moment when a Bosniak woman, who was already pregnant when brought to the camp, had to give birth surrounded by Serb soldiers who were waiting for the child to be born in order to terminate his life. The cruelty of the act described is extremely shocking, but illustrates the process of ethnic hatred and dehumanization that occurred during the Bosnian war. In this case, the cruel violence exerted over an innocent new-born baby perhaps illustrates the rationale behind using rape as a weapon of war, which is to humiliate the other ethnic group and attack their biological reproduction. I cannot be certain of the reason why these individuals committed this act, but it can still be hypothesized that they were aiming to prevent the reproduction of the enemy group.

However, not all women were kept in a camp during the war, and for some the war reached into the confines of their own homes. This is the case of Sajra, originally from Eastern Bosnia. The description she gave of the pre-war era confirms arguments that inter-ethnic relationships were normalized in the former Yugoslavia.

I got married at 18. When the war started my son was 18 months. We were a very happy family. I lived in the family home of my husband, and we were with his parents. They, unfortunately, are no longer alive. Until 1992, we were singing and laughing everyday in our house with our friends, who were mostly Serbs. But nationality was not important until 1992 (Sajra, 14 November 2013).
However, things changed when the war started, and Sajra and her family were attacked in their own home.

My story is very tragic. (...) After 1992, most of our friends came to our house, but then they beat my husband and took him to the camp. After seven days they came again. I was nursing the child, and they beat me and raped me. My father-in-law found me on the doorstep, unconscious, with the baby in my arms (Sajra, 14 November 2013).

The rapes experienced by the women I interviewed occurred at the hands of a variety of actors, such as soldiers or local police officers - as was the case of Bakira (8 November 2013). In the case of Sajra, this occurred at the hands of her neighbours, Serbs who she considered her friends before the war. Similarly to the Rwandan genocide, the Bosnian war brought neighbours against neighbours. This had an important impact on post-conflict reconciliation at the local level, which will be discussed in further depth below.

Furthermore, the process of ethnic cleansing does not only include mass killings, but also mass displacement. It is common for rape to be used as a weapon of war to force women to leave their community, and for houses to be destroyed to prevent any return. This is what happened to Anida, who mentioned that her ‘house was burned by [her] Serb neighbour’ (14 November 2013). It is that same neighbour, along with another man, that raped her at that time.

In addition to the physical violence experienced, including sexual violence, the women I spoke to also experienced the loss of their family members. A few women survived the war with their husbands, but many of them lost their husbands or sons during the violence. 'The same Serb killed my husband along with 34 other men. There was a witness who saw him killing my husband and other Bosniaks with a few
of his criminals. That is the wound that has no date’ (Anida, 14 November 2013). For some, the bodies of their loved ones have never been found and are still considered missing persons. ‘In July 1992, my husband was taken and until today I do not know where he finished his life’ (Emina, 14 November 2013). The mass killings disrupted family networks, and most women I spoke to experienced the loss of a family member, mostly men family members, whether in their close or extended family.

I need to say that they killed my 24 years old brother. It has totally defeated my parents, especially my mother. She, after that day, has not stopped crying. We wondered what was he guilty of. He was an exemplary athlete and a good man (Sajra, 14 November 2013).

Finally, all the women I met during my time in Bosnia-Herzegovina remained affected by the crimes committed against them and their family members, impacting their post-conflict experiences. As mentioned by Lejla (14 November 2013), ‘they stole my house, my soul, my school, everything’.

For example, the women interviewed mentioned experiencing a range of emotions resulting from the war, such as anger, shame or fear. Being fearful was mentioned as one reaction in the aftermath of the war, and through the interviews I gained the impression that overcoming that fear was crucial for the women’s well-being. For example, it was important for Emina (14 November 2013) to mention that she is not afraid of everyone, even if she feels that some people do not want to tell the truth about the war. The desire to actively overcome fear and to retake control of one’s life was clearly visible. Engaging with the women who survived sexual violence in BiH was very different from the interactions in Rwanda in terms of the body language and emotions expressed by these women. While some women in Rwanda expressed sadness and a certain hopelessness towards their situation, the women interviewed in
BiH felt angrier and were somewhat more active in fighting for their rights. For some, I was probably not the first researcher they met, which means that they were not all new to the interview process, which could have put them at ease compared to others in Rwanda. However, the feeling of injustice and anger at the way they were treated was sometimes explicitly mentioned, but was always an emotion underlying my interviews and interactions with the women. As Emina (14 November 2013) expressed, 'I am very sad because of the injustice that was done to us'.

In addition to these emotions, some of their reactions and behaviour in the aftermath of the violence might be characterised as resulting from trauma. ‘I can say that I am a normal person again, but I still have to use sedatives. (...) If somebody screams, I start shaking’ (Dalija, 8 November 2013). It is worth noting that while I did not bring up the topic of trauma myself, since I did not want to ascribe the term ‘trauma’ if they do not identify their state as one of being traumatised, the term ‘trauma’ was sometimes used by the women themselves. Even when not explicitly stated, the descriptions of their psychological distress still illustrate a certain degree of trauma.

I felt like I had a person in my body, which was constantly choking me, I couldn't go to the store alone or to throw trash. If I didn't see my husband in front of me in the supermarket, my heart would begin to pound (Sajra, 14 November 2013).

These women all agreed that psychological distress is a normal reaction to the suffering experienced and may take a long time to overcome.

It was very hard to come to this point where I'm now. It was very hard at the beginning, when I started fighting with my trauma. Once trauma is trauma for whole life. And you cannot get rid of trauma for good (Dalija, 8 November 2013).
This quote is especially powerful, showing the long-term character of trauma, and that even if some degree of trauma healing is achieved, the women will never be able to completely overcome these past experiences. The women interviewed however mentioned that external support, including medication, is the first step towards trauma healing. 'I want to send a message to all women that they cannot cure by themselves. (...) You should not be ashamed. I went to a neuro-psychiatrist and even today I'm going. I have my treatment and I feel good' (Sajra, 14 November 2013). As with the women interviewed in Rwanda, all Bosnian women interviewed also mentioned the importance of their religious faith for their process of self-acceptance.

Faith in Allah is [important]. I was a refugee in a place where Catholics were a majority. I felt the need to go to the mosque, but none of the mosques were near by. I decided to go to the church and pray in my own way. I felt wonderful! Faith gives me the strength to never give up and always work on myself (Lejla, 14 November 2013).

Although the psychological distress experienced varies from individual to individual, some specific experiences were common, such as the loss of a husband or son and the lack of a resting place for these loved ones, as explained above. During the interviews, many women showed pictures of their deceased sons or husbands, and for some these photographs are part of the only remains they can keep hold of. Some women have either never found the bodies of their family members, or have never received confirmation of their fate. The absence of a memorial or resting place for their loved ones was extremely painful for the women I met.

I'm a strong woman, but it was hard after everything. And it still is because I never found out where is the body of my husband. I would feel more relaxed if I could go to his grave and pray. (...) I find it hard... I'm constantly visiting anniversaries and places of suffering of Bosniaks, sympathizing with all the families who lost their loved ones (Emina, 14 November 2013).
Mass graves are yet to be discovered and bodies yet to be identified in the former Yugoslavia, and this is something that was often narrated by the women I met. Perhaps this prevents these women from attaining closure with the past, but more immediately it prevents them from knowing the truth about the crimes committed during the Bosnian war.

Furthermore, another shared element at the core of their psychological distress was the rape itself, and the stigma associated with it. The women I met felt stigmatized at different levels, and all coped with it in various ways in the aftermath of the violence. 'Everything is on an individual basis, it depends how strong we are and how ready we are to talk. A large number of women will die, but will not reveal that they were raped’ (Bakira, 11 November 2013). This quote from Bakira illustrates the desire to hide the truth about one's past, and this is something mostly discussed with women in relation to their husbands. For example, among those women I met who were still with their husbands, some never told them about the rape while others disclosed everything to them. Some women were rejected by their husbands due to the rape experienced. Situations vary from individual to individual, but one thing that was agreed upon by all women I met - in addition to those I interviewed - is that there is never a good time to tell one's husband about the rape (Observation, 21 November 2013). When asked why in particular there is never a good time to bring up this topic, Emina mentioned that if one's husband was also in a camp, that is another story. But if the husband did not witness what happened during the war, the context in BiH means that the husband would not understand (21 November 2013). I interpret this as the cultural and social norms found within Bosnian society rendering sexual violence a taboo subject that needs to be hidden,
which prevents transformative changes in the ways the morality of the rape victims is also perceived as spoiled by the rape.

However, while the women I met discussed the possibility of being rejected by their husbands, they also discussed their rejection of their gender identities and roles, as well as their complex relationships with members of the opposite sex, similarly to the women in Rwanda. In a patriarchal society such as BiH, where gender roles are still very well-known, the attitudes of some women I spoke to towards the opposite sex might be an obstacle towards their social reintegration. A few women have expressed their lack of trust and disgust towards men. ‘No, I don't believe in men anymore. After all I've gone through, I don't trust them. In the camp I was abused physically and mentally, and the rapists were men’ (Lejla, 14 November 2013). It is not surprising that some women are uncomfortable with men because of their experience of sexual violence. But this discomfort still impacts their personal lives 20 years after the end of the conflict. For example, Anida (14 November 2013) mentioned how when a man is supposed to visit her in her home, she asks her sons to stay with her because of the fear she feels towards men. The difficult relationship the women interviewed had with members of the opposite sex was an obstacle that some of them had to overcome in order to engage in sexual and romantic relationships with men.

The beginning was hard. I hated all men. And I started wondering if I was normal and [if] I liked the same sex. I thought all men are morons. I was 18 years old when I was raped for the first time and that was my first sexual experience. You can imagine how I felt. It's not easy when you decide to make love for the first time with your husband or boyfriend, and I was forced [to do] it. The rapists were drunk and you can't imagine what they did to me. After that it was hard to make contact with other men. Even if I went for coffee with a man and we started a relationship, I was wondering
how to explain [to] him why I am arrogant when it comes to sex (Dalija, 8 November 2013).

I remember discussing this with Dalija and sensing her disgust and anger towards the acts committed to her, especially since these were her first sexual experiences. Rebuilding trust towards members of the opposite sex was extremely hard for her, but this is something that she still managed to achieve with time. But this difficulty of engaging with men is not only specific to Dalija because of the nature of her first sexual experience, since even some women who were married during the war find it hard to engage with members of the opposite sex: ‘If I didn't have my husband, I would never talk to any man’ (Sajra, 14 November 2013). Regardless of this complex relationship, a major contrast with the women I met in Rwanda was that even if they all encountered difficulty building relationships with men, some of the widows or unmarried women I spoke to in Bosnia-Herzegovina did overcome this obstacle and either got remarried or became involved romantically with men. 'Now I live a completely different life. After the war I got married again, I delivered two more kids and I divorced again’ (Lejla, 14 November 2013).

Furthermore, unlike with some women in Rwanda, most mothers I met in BiH found their motherhood extremely helpful for their well-being. It seems that most children of the women interviewed know about the sexual violence suffered by their mother during the war, and that the children have decided to support them. 'My daughter was five years and a half when the war began. A lot of things she saw while I was trapped. I did not have much to explain. She understood all and she is my greatest support' (Emina, 14 November 2013).
The loving and supporting relationship between the mothers and the children were emphasized by a few women.

My kids are my life, they are as good as gold, not only because they are mine. They support me. We are friends. Even if they don't have the same father, they love each other and they survived my divorces (Lejla, 14 November 2013).

This quote illustrates the importance of motherhood for Lejla, but this was something consistent with the other women I met. Of course, this represents the experiences of only some women. As will be discussed in the next section, the interviews with the NGOs’ staff members present a different portrait of the situation, and, according to them, a lot of children either rejected or blamed their mother for the rape. This, however, was not witnessed in the cases of the women I spoke to, perhaps demonstrating that relationships remain very personal and can change from individual to individual. It is also worth noting that none of the women I spoke to in BiH had a child born out of rape, and those mothers might have a totally different experience of motherhood than those described here.

Family relationships, especially the support received by their husbands and children, were described as having helped, and still helping, these women overcome trauma. This is especially important, since it does demonstrate that family and social networks are crucial for trauma healing, something that was often denied to the women in Rwanda. Social belonging may therefore be the key to addressing the post-conflict needs of survivors of sexual violence in both contexts, and elsewhere.

If I didn't have [my family] on my side, I would not be able to cope with my trauma. Because I have them, I didn't have much time to think about myself. I have four sisters and a mother. And even now, I talk about what happened to me because I don't want them to forget that (Dalija, 8 November 2013).
Dalija is the only woman from BiH and Rwanda that I met in her home, shared with her sisters and mother. Dalija was quite nervous at first when we started the interview, smoking a few cigarettes and pacing around the room. But after getting to know each other, she relaxed and opened up, and introduced us to her sister and mother, who were sitting in the next room. I was wondering at first why Dalija was willing to let two strangers - one of them a foreigner - into her house to discuss her needs as a rape survivor, but after hearing her speak about her family support, it became evident she considered her home a safe space, where she is supported by the people she loves. We went to her house only once, but met her twice in Organisation H, and a bond was strengthened between us three, I believe, because of this first encounter in her safe place.

Furthermore, in addition to their family relationships, I also asked if the women were comfortable engaging in conversations with individuals in their local community, such as when using public transport, etc. Again, the degrees of interaction with the community vary depending on the individual, but they all agreed that they could not find a support group outside the organisation and their family members. Interactions and opportunities to develop friendship with members of the community are indeed limited. For example, Sajra (14 November 2013) mentioned she feels different from other women who have not suffered like her, and this prevents her from developing meaningful relationships with these women. Another example is Emina, who used to work but now finds it extremely hard to spend time with people who did not experience trauma: ‘the others who have not suffered do not care if you need them, they phone only if they need you’ (Emina, 14 November 2013). Based on her explanation, those who did not experience rape during the
Bosnian war cannot provide the level of care and support she needs. Finally, there is also the example of Anida (21 November 2013), who said that she limits her conversations with those who haven’t suffered to greetings, since she feels unable to talk to others except at Organisation H. According to her, she cannot talk about her past because people who have not suffered are either not interested, or do not understand. Even some people in her extended family do not understand her. This is a belief shared by many women in BiH, but also by many women interviewed in Rwanda.

All of this perhaps seems repetitive, but these repetitions are important to demonstrate the similarities between the two groups of women in their difficulty at forging meaningful relationships with individuals who did not experience sexual violence during the war. As was well-summarised by Dalija (8 November 2013):

Women who were not sexually abused can listen to my life story, support me, give advice but they cannot understand me fully. You can show compassion to me, but it's not the same. For me, it's easier to talk to someone who is also a victim of some kind of violence, especially sexual violence.

This difficulty in forging meaningful relationships with those who have not experienced sexual violence can perhaps be explained by the presence of stigma within the community, where the raped women are often blamed or given names. Similarly to Rwanda, a strong process of victim-blaming is occurring in BiH, where the women who experienced sexual violence during the war are perceived as sinful and immoral. This has the consequence that some women are now excluded from social interactions within their community and family gatherings, and have lost friends and romantic partners because of their past. And when these relationships survive, these women mentioned feeling vulnerable and at threat of verbal abuse,
which might lead some women to hide the truth about their past from their local community.

I try not to leave the impression of a person who has survived an enormous physical and psychological trauma and torture. I live in a building that was built for the families of [camp] inmates. There mostly live women victims of sexual violence, who were also in war camps. I dislike that label, so when I hear someone say this, I say: "We get an apartment because my husband was an inmate" (Sajra, 14 November 2013).

This quote by Sajra is very interesting, since by mentioning that she dislikes the label of survivors of sexual violence, it means that this label comes with certain assumptions and stereotypes that she does not think represent her situation. Based on the data presented so far, we can assume that this label possesses negative connotations about the moral characters of its grouping, which Sajra challenges by using her husband's time in a concentration camp as the justification for their living arrangements. However, this is something that is not always feasible, and even if some women decide to keep their past a secret, it is still possible that neighbours know the truth about the rape. The problem is not necessarily that the community is aware of the situation, but more their reaction. 'This is a province. Everyone can listen to me, but someone can abuse it, laugh...' (Dalija, 8 November 2013). A lot of women interviewed also believe that the Bosnian community does not understand what they have been through, and punish them instead of punishing the war criminals. 'Serb soldiers got rewarded for what they did during the war and me as a victim I don't get a shelter in Sarajevo. When your own people don't understand you...' (Anida, 14 November 2013). This again pinpoints the moral aggression that these women currently face in the aftermath of the war, where their social exclusion is justified by a patriarchal understanding of their bodies as representing the impurity of the nation, and therefore should be excluded.
The women I met felt that Bosnian society was more sympathetic towards war criminals than women who experienced sexual violence. The lack of justice and the presence of war criminals in the communities were therefore mentioned in the interviews as traumatic elements in their lives. For example, it was described above that Anida’s house was burned down during the war. She also mentioned that ‘now it's up to my house that he [Serb man who burned her house] made his villa, with sports facilities and a café’ (Anida, 14 November 2013). Anida then suggested that this is one of the main reasons why she would never think of going back to her hometown, since seeing her aggressors free in the streets would only increase her problems.

The topic of justice created some heated conversations. The women interviewed all mentioned their desire for justice, but also for ‘justice to really be justice' (Anida, 14 November 2013). First, they mentioned the problem of impunity, and the slow process that is justice in BiH. 'The two perpetrators of rape were arrested and have been released. I heard on the news last night that one again was arrested. Well it all goes slowly, not enough criminals are in jail' (Anida, 14 November 2013). Second, the women were clearly upset about the witness protection procedures, with some women such as Lejla refusing to testify because of the witness protection problems. 'Victims have no support when they go to testify. If the prosecution orders me to testify, the police comes to my door no matter if my family knew that I was raped’ (Bakira, 11 November 2013). One such problem is that some women do not feel that their identity is sufficiently protected.

I went to testify to the BiH Court. And on my way back home, I met some friends and [we went] for coffee to my house. (...) Suddenly my sister came and she said that my phone had rung ten times. I looked up, I didn't know
the missed number. Later, I called back to see who that was. “Is that Dalija?” it was a man's voice. I said: “Who is that?” “Goran, a Chetnik from [a community]”, he answered. I said: “It is Edna, you are wrong”. And he said: “Will you forgive me?”. I just cancelled the telephone connection. Immediately I called the Prosecution of BiH and told them what happened. The point is, they [criminals] all know who is going to the prosecution, who is going to testify. They are all connected (Dalija, 8 November 2013).

In addition to the witness protection problems, the women also discussed as a group (Observation, 21 November 2013) that testifying in court can also be very emotionally challenging. This does not prevent all women from testifying, but it is still something they need to consider.

I'm not afraid to be a witness against those who committed the war crimes. It is only sad that women who testify in court are not protected. I made the statement to the prosecution and after that I was called to testify. There I experienced a shock! First, it was the first time that I [went to a] courtroom, and the lawyer of the accused person provoked me. Then I started to cry. The prosecutor then said that we will have a 20 minutes break so I calmed down. Imagine, they left me alone in a room for 20 minutes! Then again I survived that terrible 1992... The trial resumed after 20 minutes, and the lawyer again continued to provoke me (Emina, 14 November 2013).

Testifying in court also means that evidence about the rape and the killings is being shared. This can help shed a light on the actual events that occured during the war, but it also means that those involved learn private details about the women's lives. 'I realised that the lawyer and the prosecutor knew all about me: who I am, who my parents are, where I am from... They were looking for any evidence against me, but they found nothing' (Emina, 14 November 2013). However, while the women are asked to share private details about their lives, some of them do not necessarily feel that they are being cared for by this system. 'When they need me to testify, they call me and are really kind to me. And if I ask for something, all doors are closed for me. Is that justice?' (Dalija, 8 November 2013).
Furthermore, some women I met also suggested that the judicial prosecutors are often uncomfortable with prosecuting crimes of sexual violence. 'It seems to me that our prosecution would be happy if we say that the victims have not been raped and that the crime was not committed. It's really embarrassing' (Emina, 14 November 2013). Bakira (11 November 2013) pushed this even further, suggesting that the criminals' rights have precedence over the rape survivors' right to justice.

After testifying at the Court of BiH, we are nobody's care. The state sided with criminals. If during the testimony the victim sees that the offender has two lawyers, you can imagine how much the trial costs. And it is all paid by the BiH Government. On the other hand, raped women do not have the privilege of having the State pay a lawsuit against the criminals or refund their money [due to] fear and the trauma experienced. Today it is better to be a war criminal than a victim. The criminal defence is paid by the State, the family of the criminals from the RS have no problems in life. All glorify the criminals as if they were heroes, and RS helps their families in everything (Bakira, 11 November 2013).

This quote illustrates a few issues that some women interviewed mentioned, such as the difficulty in prosecuting crimes of sexual violence and the resulting feeling that the aggressors are being favoured by the judicial process. However, this quote by Bakira also implies that there is a tension between the Federation of BiH and the RS in terms of prosecuting war criminals. This has an impact at the individual level, where some women who experienced sexual violence during the war now feel the other entity is protecting their aggressors. This is the case with the women I met, but this feeling is probably also shared by many Bosnian Serb women who were raped by Bosniaks during the war and feel the Federation of BiH is protecting them. This implies that a strong divide exists within the population between the ethnic constituent groups of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Ethnicity was of course discussed with the women I met, since they themselves believe that they were targeted during the war because of their gender and ethnic identities:

I was raped because of my nationality. They, Serbs, wanted to destroy Bosniaks. I can't say that Bosniaks didn't rape other women, but it is a minority. Serbs wanted to overtake the Eastern part of Bosnia and they did not choose a weapon. In fact, women were the strongest weapon (Dalija, 8 November 2013).

Some women were very explicit in the fact that rape was used as a weapon of war, and suggested that this was aimed at destroying their ethnic group. ‘The Chetniks’ goal was to disgust men from Bosniak women and [for them to] never have children again. They wanted us as a nation to disappear’ (Lejla, 14 November 2013). I asked the women about the importance of their ethnic identity in the aftermath of the war, and whether they perceive some tensions between the different nationalities in BiH. All of them agreed that their friendship with other women who experienced rape during the war transcends ethnicity. As long as there are some shared experiences of sexual violence, the women feel that they can understand each other. ‘In the organisation there are women of all nationalities. I don't mind. It doesn't make any difference. If we have the similar destiny, why not talk to them?’ (Dalija, 8 November 2013). Emina (14 November 2013) also agreed that through the organisation she met women of different nationalities who share the same goal, and the same suffering.

Indeed, the women I engaged with developed a sense of belonging with other women who experienced sexual violence, and to the staff members working in the organisations. 'The president of Organisation F is my second mother' (Dalija, 8 November 2013). This sense of belonging with the other survivors of sexual violence
is, first and foremost, based on their shared experiences of rape during the war, grouping women because of their shared violent trauma and gender identities whilst transcending the ethnic identities that were at the core of the violence. 'I found myself here, in this little room with all these women. We have the same pain, we share our feelings and experiences. Here and through my organisation I met a lot of wonderful women' (Emina, 14 November 2013). This bond is easily witnessed when in the company of these women. For example, during the knitting sessions in Organisation H, it was evident that the women share a strong bond of solidarity and friendship. The two times that I sat in their sessions, they were in a little room with almost no space to move around, all sitting very close to each other. There was a lot of laughter and joking. They seemed very comfortable in this environment. They were smoking and speaking loudly. As mentioned by Emina, I could believe that the women rediscovered themselves in this small room. 'I feel very nice when I'm here in the association, in the women’s section. Only here I'm understood in a right way. I can share my feelings with all these women. I feel very strong when I'm here’ (Lejla, 14 November 2013). Sajra (21 November 2013) also mentioned how she feels safe in this organisation, and enjoys spending time with other women who also suffer from some kind of trauma. Sajra has the support of her husband, but the organisation still provides her with a sense of solidarity, belonging and safety that is important for her.

This kind of organisation helped me to get over my trauma. It is much easier to talk about certain problems or feelings with a woman, than to a man. I'm a member of [Organisation H] from the very beginning and it's my second home. Me and other women found our peace there. We are separated into groups. All of us have some kind of war trauma. We meet once a week. Sometimes we sit and keep quiet, another time we laugh, then cry... We share our feelings (Dalija, 8 November 2013).
Joining an association and meeting other women who also suffered from rape during the war also helped the women in their trauma healing. 'Only here among the women in the association do I feel that I am not alone, that not only I am suffering, I am learning how to fight with life and to live better' (Anida, 14 November 2013).

However, their perceptions of ethnic reconciliation within their local community are more complex than how they experience ethnic divisions within their organisations. For example, Sajra (14 November 2013) mentioned how she identified herself first by her gender, before her nationality. In terms of nationality, she is still comfortable with individuals who do not identify as Bosniak Muslim.

I am a woman first then a Bosniak. That is my nationality. But I don't mind having people with other religion as friends. I'll give you an example. When my husband and I were released from the camps, we escaped with our son to [a city in Central Bosnia]. There we got accommodation in a village where mostly Serbs lived. As they heard who we are and where we came from, I had the feeling that they were afraid of us. I walked up to one neighbour and told him: "Do not be afraid of us, you are not guilty of anything." After that we always greeted each other and talked. They had the same feeling towards us like we had for Serbs who have abused us in [our home town].

Sajra also mentioned that she is not afraid of her rapists anymore, and that when she visits her home town, she is in good terms with some of her previous Serb neighbours because they did not hurt her. However, when asked if she would consider moving back to her home town:

I could never return to live [there]. I just feel that we are not welcome. [This city] is empty, [there is] a lot of unemployed people. They want you to be afraid to come back. You feel it in the air that they hate you, they still live like it is 1992’ (Sajra, 14 November 2013).

Sajra thus has a complex relationship with Serbs, since she is comfortable with making Serbian friends outside of her hometown and establishing relationships with the Serbs that she previously knew, but re-establishing herself and her family in her
hometown seems unthinkable, partly because of the presence of Serbs in the city. This perhaps suggests that space and context are extremely important in ethnic reconciliation as it is not necessarily the ethnic attributes that prevent reconciliation, but also the memory of violence in that place.

Another example of a complex relationship with members of another ethnic group is the example of Dalija. Dalija makes a distinction between the Serbs who committed war crimes and those who did not take part in the war. According to her, she never paid attention to her nationality and the nationality of others, but this does not prevent her from being ascribed a certain religion or nationality.

I never paid attention to nationalities. I don't separate people like that. (…) I had a relationship (after the war) with a man who was Serb. He is not guilty for the war or for what happened to me. But his mother was not happy because I was a Muslim and I just gave up, I didn't want to be with him anymore (Dalija, 8 November 2013).

In this case, Dalija was willing to establish a romantic relationship with a Serbian man, but regardless of the minimal importance she gave her ethnic identity, the label 'Muslim' was nonetheless imposed on her, complicating that connection.

These are only two examples, of course, and every woman has a different experience with Serbs or Croats. For example, none of the women I met came from the city of Mostar, and their relationships with the Bosnian Croats would certainly be as complex as the relationships described here. These personal struggles, however, take place in a context wherein communities and local municipalities in Bosnia-Herzegovina are now segregated based on ethnicity. These divisions, however, play an important role in the social reintegration of the women I spoke to, since the women are not only stigmatized because of their experience of sexual violence, but
are stigmatized in a community that has already disintegrated. Successful social reintegration is therefore difficult to secure because the individuals living in these same communities are themselves not fully reconciled or reintegrated. This, I suggest, is one reason why the women I spoke to did not focus on reconstructing their relationships in their communities as much as the women I met in Rwanda, and instead focused on their structural reintegration at the state level.

When speaking with some women about their day-to-day needs and reintegration within their local and national communities, the survivors interviewed all mentioned the importance of being economically active. ‘I live with my daughter who recently got a job. Additionally, I knit and sell my products. I make real homemade juices and jams that I also sell. I find a way to earn a living’ (Emina, 14 November 2013). Anida agreed with Emina that it is important to remain active, and explained how she would die or become crazy if she had to stay at home (14 November 2013). She described Organisation H as her life because it gives her the opportunity to be economically active. This is consistent with the stories of the other women interviewed, who are all unable to secure employment outside of their organisation. 'Most of us are not ready to work' (Dalija, 8 November 2013). However, they perceived their economic dependency on the NGOs as a result of their unsatisfactory legal rights. 'We have a big problem because we have no rights. The government provides more rights to our executioners than to us’ (Bakira, 11 November 2013).

Significantly, all the women I met were unsatisfied with the financial compensation they were supposed to receive from the state.

No matter what we are covered with the Law for Civilian Victims of War - based on which we receive 250 euros a month - a woman live on the
margins of life. It is not enough for the basic needs. Medications are very expensive. Most raped women do not work. They have a personality disorder… (Bakira, 11 November 2013).

Whilst Bakira’s depiction of the women who suffered from sexual violence is perhaps problematic and encourages further stigmatisation, her belief that the financial compensation received is not enough to pay for medicine and basic needs was shared by many others. ‘Isn't it sad that my mother is receiving 167 KM every month because she has lost her son? And who can survive with this amount? For whom has he fought for?! Everything I have, I got from international [people]’ (Dalija, 8 November 2013). In this case, this has led many women to believe the government is not interested in helping them, the raped civilian victims of war.

From the government I expect a lot, but I doubt we'll ever get anything. When the state or the courts need us to testify, then they pat us on the shoulder. And when we come and seek for help, all the doors are closed to us (Lejla, 14 November 2013).

For some, they even believe that they would receive more support abroad than in their home country.

I would like our government to give us more support, so that we are put into the law to get health care, to be socially secured. It may sound silly, but sometimes I am not able to wait an hour in line at the doctor. We do not have any advantage. Women who are victims of sexual violence are not protected. What will happen to our children when we die? The brother of my husband told us that we would get everything we need if we went to live in Australia (Sajra, 14 November 2013).

Dalija (8 November 2013) also hoped to leave BiH: 'If I could take my family with me outside of this country, I would go. I was offered to go, but only me. I didn't accept'. This seems quite paradoxical, that civilian victims of war believe they would receive more support from another country than their own state, which witnessed the atrocities committed during the war, but it is something that many women believed.
They shared a belief that they were sub-citizens, and that the post-conflict settlements between the two entities created further challenges.

We do not have the option of returning to our original homes. For example if I want to go back to my pre-war home, the perpetrators are still free, so it means I'm not safe in my house. I repeat, it is better to be a war criminal than the victim, at least in our country. Mostly, these [raped women] are women who have lived in the present-day territory of RS, which is of genocidal creation, resulting in our blood. Raped women simply cannot exercise their right to retirement, or those who have this right do not go in the RS. Most of the women never went to their birthplace after the war (Bakira, 11 November 2013).

Resettlement has been an issue mentioned by many women interviewed, who all lived in what is now Republika Srpska during the war. It is perhaps less of an issue for other raped women, depending on the current ethnic composition of their hometown.

Finally, the women I spoke to also mentioned their desire to create a special legal category for civilian victims of war that would be specifically for survivors of sexual violence. ‘I expect from the state to separate the category “raped women” from other women who have some trauma. Now we are all the same, the widows and me are the same. This is not fair’ (Dalija, 8 November 2013). Dissatisfaction with their current rights was the topic that angered all the women I interviewed. Their tone and body language changed when speaking about this, and it was obvious that whilst being a member of a survivors’ organisation provides them with some services and opportunities (trauma counselling, income-generating activities, sense of belonging, etc.), the main need still unaddressed more than 20 years after the end of the violence is their legal recognition. ‘We have to fight for ourselves. For example, nobody is asking us if we need something, how we buy medicines... There is no law that applies only to the victims of sexual violence' (Dalija, 8 November 2013). As
expressed by Bakira, but also underlying my every encounter with the women who experienced sexual violence in BiH, is the feeling that, 'from all this, the government is showing us that we are undesirable in the society’ (Bakira, 11 November 2013).

While the women in Rwanda mostly experience their moral exclusion by their local community, it seems that the women in BiH mostly experience this exclusion by the post-conflict state. As mentioned above, since these women live in communities that are already divided, legal recognition would allow a personal relationship between these women and the state, institutionalising their rights and services without first having to reintegrate their community. This may be a reflection of the lack of process of nation-building, where the lack of integration between the three constituent groups means that survivors of sexual violence do not need to first integrate their society in order to improve their living conditions.

**Voices of the NGOs’ Staff Members**

Through their work and individual experiences, the staff members of five NGOs operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina have developed individual perceptions and understandings of the post-conflict experiences of women who survived sexual violence. It is worth noting that I am including Bakira’s perceptions in this section as well, because of her role as a practitioner. However, as can be observed in her responses, her position as a practitioner is never far removed from her personal experiences as a survivor of sexual violence.

First, all staff members interviewed believe that women who experienced ethnicized sexual violence still suffer from a certain degree of trauma decades after the end of the conflict. I met with different psychologists while in BiH in order to understand that trauma.
One have symptoms of PTSD, some of them hardly fall asleep, some women are re-experiencing the traumatic event and have problems falling asleep and have nightmares, they are afraid of everything... These are the main symptoms. I have not met a single woman who does not have some kind of a problem. They all take medicine either to sleep or for relaxation. Women who did not immediately began to talk about the trauma, it is now [harder with them]. They don't want to talk, but the trauma is so strong and simply they cannot continue with their normal life. They need faith and confidence in a therapist so that they can start to talk (Nejra, Psychologist, 21 November 2013).

This quote illustrates the various forms that trauma can take, but also the different solutions offered: namely, medicine and trauma counselling. Moreover, Adna, the psychologist at Organisation F (6 November 2013) also suggested there are different types of trauma, with varying degrees of seriousness: 'Those women who lived here and who were refugees, they had a bit different, or let me say, less dangerous kind of trauma [than the survivors of rape]'. It was either expressed or assumed by some staff members that there was a certain continuum of trauma ranging from survivors of war, to survivors of war with deceased family (mostly sons for the women), to survivors of rape, and finally to survivors of rape who were forcibly impregnated. ‘The greatest pain is to lose a child, and the greatest humiliation is to be raped. We all share the same pain, and no matter how you turn your life, with such trauma it is terribly difficult’ (Amina, President of Organisation I, 15 November 2013).

According to the staff members interviewed, however, there are some conditions that impact healing after such trauma. A key factor regularly mentioned is family support. ‘Where there is an understanding of the family it is much easier. [However], men will not easily agree to talk about his wife who was raped' (Nejra, 21 November 2013). For example, when speaking about Bakira, Adna (6 November 2013) mentioned that Bakira was able to be a public figure despite her experience of wartime rape because ‘she had luck, because her husband supports her just like it is
written in the books. Her family is really strong even if they all suffered a lot.’ This is consistent with the voices of the women themselves, with some of them mentioning the importance of their family support. What is very interesting about Adna's quote is her mention of luck. It seems that, in her opinion, being totally supported by one's husband after rape may still be a rare phenomenon.

Support from the broader local community was also mentioned as another factor that facilitates trauma healing.

The second [thing that] helps is through the religious communities. We are religious people and faith institutions could give support. I think of it... During the war, the Islamic community has given a statement [when there were the mass rapes] in every mosque to attract attention of men to accept these women, to help them. That was really helpful (Nejra, 21 November 2013).

In this case, the religious communities themselves are perceived as important actors in supporting the women who experienced war rape, with faith helping women to accept themselves and their past. However, unlike in Rwanda where relationships with God were mostly personal, it seems that religious actors may also be expected to play a role in this process in BiH, as the previous quote illustrates.

Furthermore, all individuals interviewed also believe that speaking about the events through counselling sessions is crucial for trauma healing. ‘Challenging situations can only be overcome through conversation. You must enter deeply into the core issues. Women who have closed [themselves], this [can] lead to suicide, excessive medication, transmitted trauma to children and families...’ (Bakira, 11 November 2013). It was assumed that survivors of sexual violence cannot confront their trauma without external help and support.
Trauma has no date and it is never late to work on the traumatic experience and the treatment may still be beneficial. We will keep working on encouraging women to come and share their stories, to learn to fight and deal with their trauma, to testify against their rapists... It is never too late to feel free and to help oneself (Adna, 6 November 2013).

Of course, some individuals may perceive this as respondent bias, suggesting these staff members perceive trauma healing as dependent on external help and support because of their need for funding for these programmes. Whilst this may be true to a certain extent, and this may have motivated a few of Bakira’s answers, it is, however, still consistent with the perceptions of the women themselves. The women I interviewed acknowledged the importance of external help and support, whether through family networks or the support of the organisations, to their well-being. Of course, these opinions come only from women who have joined an association in Bosnia-Herzegovina and it would be important to observe if women who have not joined any association are also able to achieve a certain degree of trauma healing on their own.

External support by NGOs can take various forms, so I asked one psychologist to describe her counselling sessions. The first aspect that Nejra mentioned was this idea of looking ahead.

Basically it is psychotherapeutic support, dealing with traumatic experiences, helping in re-socialization, leaving the past behind and moving into the future, working on re-living. The victims begin to live normally, because many of them are still in traumatic experiences, and time is just passing them by (Nejra, 21 November 2013).

In practice, this means that Nejra is helping the women to identify the different events that occurred in their lives since the end of the war.

I also have an exercise for them (drawing circles on a piece of paper). If the rape happened in 1992, I tell them to make as much steps as possible to number 2013. I want them to realise that time is passing by, and also to talk
about all the nice moments they have had in these years. I tell them that there are good and bad things in life, it's like dirty laundry – you wash it and put it into a closet (Nejra, 21 November 2013).

Whilst this is done in good faith by showing the women that they lived through some happy moments since 1995, it also unwillingly contributes to a perception held by donors that trauma should not necessarily be experienced 20 years after the end of conflict, as will be explained in further depth in Chapter Eight.

Nejra also targets other issues at the core of the trauma, and does not just focus on showing the women that a lot of time has gone by since the end of the war. This exercise is complemented by targeting the emotions felt, such as shame and anger.

Mostly I insist on understanding trauma, then on processing it because a woman has a mass of shame or even feelings of guilt. They confuse their role with the role of the criminals. Criminals should be ashamed, not the victims. (…) Also important is to work on the feelings of anger and sadness. Traumatised people are usually experiencing anger and sadness, because they fell helpless (Nejra, 21 November 2013).

Nejra therefore directly addresses this moral exclusion experienced, where the women may internalize the idea that they are the ones to blame for the rape, or that they are deserving of this suffering. However, it is mostly the process of being able to speak up about one's past in a safe space, free of judgement, that renders the counselling sessions helpful for trauma healing.

I encourage the patient to cry, because usually they were not able to cry. During the act of rape they had to be deaf and numb, they were not allowed to defend themselves, not allowed to get angry, or cry. That's why I insist that now through therapy they have to express sadness, anger, and to cry (Nejra, 21 November 2013).

All of these processes are used to show the women that they are equal to others, especially when the women feel like sub-citizens in regards to their legal rights.
'Then we work to restore self-confidence. I try to show them their good side, to show them that they are valuable. This is very important' (Nejra, 21 November 2013).

The difficulty in accepting oneself and feeling accepted by one’s community, as perceived by the staff members interviewed, was also discussed in relation to the stigma of rape in Bosnian society, which results in various degrees of social exclusion for women who experienced rape. The fact that rape and sexual relationships are often perceived as taboo subjects contributes to this stigma, where rape victims are blamed and their morality is seen as compromised by the act.

For our mentality, [rape] is still taboo. It is said that raping is the thing that “one does not need to know”. It is not easy to [be] reminded every day [about] the rape. We usually say that it is a risk to speak, and a pity to be silent (Amina, 15 November 2013).

This stigma fosters social rejection from family and friends, and encourages gossips within the community, which prevents these women from maintaining a sense of belonging and meaningful relationships with their community. This stigma also greatly increases for women who were impregnated as a result of rape, since in addition to the stigma of rape, strong moral judgements are made on women who were impregnated by an enemy man and who are now raising this child as single mothers.

Only a few women who were raped came to counselling. They usually required individual treatments, and during group treatment nobody talked about personal experiences, it was more a general discussion. I remember that a few women became pregnant and gave birth to a child whose father was the rapist. This was their second secret that will stay with them until they die (Adna, 6 November 2013).

The stigma was therefore understood as impacting the women’s willingness to disclose the truth about their past.
I think stigma exists, but also again, I want to return to the beginning, when war happened. Women were encouraged to speak. And they had big hopes that something would happen, [something] positive, that citizens and family, neighbours and the government would respect and help them. But no, most of them decided to stay silent’ (Petra, President of Organisation J, 19 November 2013).

This, however, depends on the individual, and was witnessed in my interviews with the women themselves, where some women never told their husbands about their rape and other women told their family members, including their children. This quote by Adna explains the progression some women have experienced, starting from keeping their rape a secret to testifying in court:

First of all, women who were victims of sexual violence took a long time to start talking about it, due to our culture, environment and cultural characteristics of our society. There were few women that [mentioned] sexual violence as a problem, either in groups or in individual sessions. (…) Recently it appears that more and more women [go] on trials, as witnesses for war crimes of rape. Now after 20 years they tell stories about rape. When I asked one of them why now, she told me: "my husband was killed, and I was raped. At that time I had two daughters, two and four years. I was able to go to America, where I was struggling in life, and for their education. Now they are adults and have their own families. They are only now able to understand my story. That's why I recently decided to tell them the truth and also to appear as a witness in court. If I had told them earlier, I would not have been understood in the right way" (Adna, 6 November 2013).

In Adna’s example, the possibility of being understood by others was an important factor in this woman’s decision to open up about her rape. This is why staff members described family support as especially important for the healing of survivors of sexual violence. However, the staff members interviewed also discussed the family rejection experienced by many women:

Unfortunately, there are few cases where men accepted and supported his wife, who was a victim of sexual violence. It happens that even today the victims of sexual violence are still tortured, but now from their families. Women certainly know what can happen and that's why they do not decide to talk (Adna, 6 November 2013).
It is also believed by Bakira (11 November 2013) that the number of husbands who accepted their wife despite the rape resulting in pregnancy, and who in turn accepted the child as their own, remains minimal. These perceptions were shared by the staff members interviewed, but it was again stressed that these situations vary from individual to individual. When asked why some families might exclude the women and others not, Bakira (11 November 2013) suggested the following explanation:

Women who have been immediately accepted by the family were usually with their husbands or family members in the camps. Therefore, they were aware that women did not have a choice. Such husbands or families are the only ones able to figure out sexually abused women. Some men went out of the country thinking that nothing would happen to their wives and children. They found it difficult to accept that their women were raped, and that's why they left them.

There are a variety of ways in which family networks have supported or not women who experienced rape during the Bosnian war. The fact remains, however, that disclosing the truth about one's rape to others remains an important choice in the lives of these women and may lead to stigmatization, which is why some women do not make that choice.

I met women who have the support of their families; the husbands and children know that the woman was raped. Many husbands left their wives because they were raped. There are women who are hiding from their husband and children that they were raped. There are women who are testifying in court, but their families do not know. I know a case where the husband knows that his wife was raped, but he is abusing her now, and she suffers because she is financially dependent (Nejra, 21 November 2013).

For some, the risk of the family finding out about the rape prevents them from gaining access to the services provided by the NGOs. This is why some organisations, such as Organisation J, extended their services to other regions of the country. Some women might not have the time or money to travel to the organisation, but some women also do not want to explain to their family why they
had to leave town that day (Observation, 19 November 2013). Providing local services to survivors of sexual violence can thus increase the reach of these services, by including women who would not otherwise travel to the organisations.

Moreover, whilst family relationships were frequently discussed by the staff members interviewed, some also expressed their perceptions regarding social exclusion faced in the community. These staff members mentioned that women may be labelled within their communities as rape survivors, bearing with it all the negative connotations associated with rape.

I spoke with them, most of them and they saw what happened to women who started to speak openly about their experiences, some of them [the communities/neighbours] marked them as negative person, or they always tried to find some explanations for why it happened. “This with her”, or like that (Petra, 19 November 2013).

I push this argument further, suggesting that in addition to these negative connotations, a moral judgement is made on these women, as the quote by Petra suggests, where the moral character of the rape survivor is questioned. Furthermore, even if some women decide to remain silent, the neighbours might often already know what happened during the war, which can perhaps provide one explanation (along with the destruction of their homes) as to why all the women I interviewed did not permanently return to their previous home. For example, Adna was not raped during the war and yet: ‘during the war I lived in Grbavica. I knew exactly which women were raped’ (Adna, 6 November 2013).

The stigmatization exerted by Bosnian society against rape survivors was acknowledged by all staff members, who agreed that raising awareness, educating the younger generations about the use of mass rapes during the war, and a change of
attitudes within Bosnian society were all needed in order to reduce the stigma and social exclusion experienced.

All the people who live in BiH, we need to work more regarding raising awareness on this topic, so that each person shows respect to women who survived sexual violence, and don’t blame her. I really think that we made mistakes in that process, and now [the survivors] are starting to speak openly and people are realizing that each of us need to change our attitudes regarding survivors of sexual violence and to give them respect, so that they really feel the dignity in their lives (Petra, 19 November 2013).

These attitudes are perhaps difficult to transform when rape, and the mass rapes committed during the war, remain taboo and are not necessarily discussed with the young generations.

Last week, [we screened] the film “For Those Who Can Tell No Tales”, that is a film about women who survived sexual violence in Visegrad, and after that film we had a panel discussion. And then really we realized most of the people did not understand that problem. It was a full cinema, more than 100 people, but they really did not understand what happened to the women. They want to forget that story. Especially the youth, most of them mentioned that it was the first time they heard that these kinds of problems exist in our country. It means that we also need to do advocacy work and raise awareness to prevent similar things in the future (Petra, 19 November 2013).

However, it is also believed by the staff members that stigmatisation and social exclusion vary based upon the region where survivors live. First, the staff members explained how survivors now live in different parts of the country, but also all over the world, such as the UK.

Sarajevo was in the middle and a place where they could find safe shelter. Mostly, those women were Muslims and the Serbian soldiers expelled them. How they came here and what they have been through, that is their own story. But I know that they were finding their way to survive. Mostly they moved into empty flats, and the owners were Serbs who went to Serbia. This solution was temporary. After the war, they had to go back to their home or somewhere abroad. Some of them decided to stay in Sarajevo of course, or in some other cities in our country. The biggest problem was that their houses in their hometowns were destroyed (Adna, 6 November 2013).
The migration experienced during the war means that many women are now living outside their hometowns, with many living in Sarajevo. Their current place of residence, however, has an impact on their legal rights, due to the differences between the RS and the Federation of BiH. The legal rights of rape survivors were the main factor discussed when speaking about their social reintegration. The staff members perceive the lack of legal and state recognition as the main obstacle faced by these women, and argued this needs to change. ‘What we think when we speak about integration, survivors' integration, it is very important that we, for example in BiH, have a law that treats all survivors the same way’ (Petra, 19 November 2013). The absence of a law for survivors is believed to impact their full reintegration, including access to justice, employment, and housing.

This population [survivors of sexual violence] has not been entered into the law of our country as a legal group, so this is our third attempt to change things with the Federal government so that they [can] include this group of people into the law, to recognize them so that they can equally use the law when they need it – [with access to] social help, health care, dwelling issues, personal non–materialistic damage compensation for the time spent in war camp with option to get them back to the work force to make them self-sufficient (Tarik, 14 November 2013).

There is, however, already some state support available for the civilian victims of war, where they can receive monthly financial support. However, according to the members interviewed, this support remains minimal and non-specific to the survivors of rape, and most women are unaware of their rights. ‘Women do not know their rights’ (Bakira, 11 November 2013). This was also expressed by Petra (19 November 2013):

I realized that some survivors do not have basic information regarding their rights. (…) I visited some survivors and I tried to help them. When I saw them, they didn't have [some] basic things. You know, in one family I saw that the mother did not have [enough] to give bread to her daughter, and
then I asked her: “ok, did you receive your status? Did you apply for status?”. She looked at me like “what is status?”, she didn't understand me, and then I explained: “OK, do you have financial support every month?”. She told me: “no, I don't have, I have never heard about it”. And then I realized that she did not have any information. After that we helped her and she finally received status. And in this canton, but I'm sure in other places in BiH also, we can find a lot of similar cases. It means that survivors need to have [that] information.

This strong focus on legal rights can be explained by Lucy’s comments, the programme manager of Organisation F, who after our interview mentioned how in contrast to other post-conflict societies, BiH is a mid-developed country, meaning that the women’s basic needs are often covered. Instead, she argued, they need empowerment, self-fulfilment and the establishment of women’s rights (13 November 2013). Whilst only Lucy explicitly mentioned this, this belief was underlying every interview conducted with the staff members in BiH.

The current financial compensation granted by the state is, however, described by the staff members as crucial for the women’s social reintegration, especially those who might not be able to secure employment. Employers normally do not know about the women’s past, but the consequences of the rape, in addition to other factors such as education level, may still prevent some women from being employed. ‘When it comes to recruiting these women, the employer can't really know their story. But these are usually women with low education or are mentally or physically unable to work’ (Adna, 6 November 2013). To address this, many staff members argued that income-generating activities within women’s organisations are necessary for financial stability.

We would like to bring our members to normal life through employing them and making them financially independent - knitting etc. - so they do not feel like they are not able to participate everyday life. (…) Accepting
these people as self-sufficient members of society will then be easier (Tarik, President of Organisation H, 14 November 2013).

These income-generating activities, which will be discussed in more details in the next section, however, are often not enough to cover the totality of the women’s expenses. For example, the consequences of rape often include physical injuries or illness that still demand treatment. As mentioned by Nejra (21 November 2013), ‘any person with trauma after sexual abuse can have a house, an apartment, a job, but usually they all have health problems like high blood pressure, problems with the stomach...’ The costs associated with these treatments or medicine are sometimes hard to cover by the women. ‘We don't only ask for money, we need treatment’ (Bakira, 11 November 2013).

Financial compensation from the state is important in these cases, but to receive this compensation, women need to disclose the truth about the rape experienced. ‘Those women who have reported sexual violence, and if it is confirmed that they were victims of that crime, receive a decent monthly fee. All this is thanks to [Organisation F]. But those who do not speak do not have anything’ (Adna, 6 November 2013). This may prevent some women from accessing compensation because of their reluctance to disclose the truth about their past, but this is not something that was discussed by the staff members when discussing the need for more legal rights. Indeed, all NGO staff members interviewed mentioned the importance of legal rights, but the process in which the women would be qualified to receive these rights (which would probably necessitate that they officially disclose their experience of rape) was not discussed. This could be problematic for some women, but this is still perceived by the staff members interviewed as the main solution to reintegrate survivors, since it would institutionalise the holistic services
appropriate for them, such as medical services, financial compensation, housing benefits, and more. As mentioned by Tarik (14 November 2013): ‘[for our beneficiaries] to be recognised by the law is our top priority’.

However, at the time I was in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the adoption of a law specifically for survivors of rape was proving difficult. Petra (19 November 2013) believed that this could be explained by the belief that these are only women’s problems:

The other aspect, I really think most of them in this post-war period do not take very seriously this problem, because most of them think it is a problem only for women. [They think] that women need to work for women. But now it is a problem for all of us, men and women. And we need to ask together [what are] the [women’s] needs.

The absence of a specific law for rape survivors was the main disappointment expressed by the staff members, and there might be a gender element associated with the failure to pass a law, in which the crimes of sexual violence committed against women, yet alone against men, are not legally recognized to the same extent as other war crimes. The next section will then analyse how the voices of the women and the perceptions of the NGOs’ staff members may influence the work done by five NGOs operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and how the fight for legal recognition has been included in the work of these organisations.

**Claiming Legal Rights through State Lobbying**

**Organisation F**

The first organisation I was introduced to in Bosnia-Herzegovina is a women’s grassroots NGO that focuses on advocating for the inclusion of a gender perspective
in law and policies. The organisation is located not far from the city centre, higher on the hills in a residential part of town where people were going about their daily business; at the corner of the organisation’s street were police guarding the gates of an embassy. The neighbourhood was quiet, and residential houses and small apartment buildings surround the organisation. There was no sign on the street to identify them, as one might expect bigger organisations such as Oxfam or MSF to have, or even some organisations in Rwanda. The only hint we had that this house was actually the office of an NGO was the address, and a small printout with the name of the organisation on the doors. One would not be able to identify this building when driving or walking past without having a closer look. There was also no movement, or ins and outs; the doors were locked, and my translator and I had to wait for someone to let us in.

When we first visited the organisation, there were only three staff members on the premises. No beneficiaries were present. This was in clear contrast with most organisations in Rwanda. This is where I met and conducted interviews with Adna and Lucy, the clinical psychologist and programme manager of this organisation.

Adna was among the signatories who formed this organisation in 1996. Sitting in the conference room, with our scarves and coats on because of the cold in the building, she calmly answered my questions. Her calming and soft presence in the room gave me no doubt that survivors of the war might feel comfortable opening up to her. By the end of our meeting, the dynamic resembled more a conversation and sharing of ideas than a formal interview process. She explained that the first services provided were counselling services to women who were sexually abused during the war, and to those who returned to BiH in 1996-1997. According to her,
This type of women had the same or even worse problems. They lived in the Eastern part of Bosnia and they had to come back to Sarajevo; their houses in their home towns were destroyed, mostly they have lost their husbands... they couldn't find themselves in that chaos. There were also women who had been forcibly expelled from their homes and came to the new environment without any income, homeless (Adna, 6 November 2013).

The first women who were provided counselling services were thus women, rape survivors or not, from what is now part of the RS and whose prospects of returning to their home town were shattered for multiple reasons, such as the changed political and ethnic context and the destruction of their homes, amongst others. The counselling offered involved many specialists, such as a psychologist, psychiatrist, social worker, and volunteers who provided psychosocial support. Whilst these services were open to women who were affected by the war, Adna, however, noticed a difference between those who were raped and those who were not.

Only a few women who were raped came to counselling. They usually required individual treatments, and during group treatments nobody talked about their personal experiences, it was more a general discussion (...) Women who were victims of sexual violence took a long time to start talking about it, due to our culture, environment and cultural characteristics of our society. There were few women that mentioned sexual violence as a problem, either in groups or in individual sessions (Adna, 6 November 2013).

This perceived difference perhaps explains why many organisations in both Rwanda and BiH regroup survivors of rape together, and why a law specifically for rape survivors is demanded in BiH.

The idea to start with psychosocial support came as a result of the consequences of the war, but also ‘because at that time you could not get access in the government or in our municipalities [to psychosocial services] because they did not have the capacity to face those problems’ (Lucy, 13 November 2013). This gap was instead filled by grassroots and international NGOs, leading Lucy to suggest that ‘[the
NGOs] are the ones who have the expertise of working with those women’ (Lucy, 13 November 2013). Whilst the psychosocial programme ended a few years ago, the organisation still runs a SOS Line where beneficiaries can phone for advice, and can receive one-on-one counselling sessions with Adna. However, due to the capacity limits of the organisation, a lot of cases have to be referred to other organisations or to state institutions (Lucy, 13 November 2013).

Following the implementation of this programme, the organisation expanded its mission, which now focuses broadly on empowering women in the public and social sphere. According to Lucy (13 November 2013), the focus may change depending on the political and social climate, but in general the organisation focuses on human rights, gender equality and peace and reconciliation, all influenced by UN Resolution 1325, resolution which promotes the inclusion of women in peacebuilding processes. To achieve these goals, the organisation hosts conferences, publishes reports, and organises activities for educational purposes and to raise awareness. The rationale for focusing on gender rights is connected to the previous analysis of staff perceptions, in which basic needs are mostly covered in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but gender equality is yet to be achieved.

In Africa, I worked with HIV/AIDS children, women who don't have education at all, are illiterate, but here in Bosnia it's so different. It's more on the strong patriarchal point of view. [The women] don't have access to everything (Lucy, 13 November 2013).

The organisation’s focus has changed since its inception, and has moved away from more direct services of psychosocial support to focus on education, advocacy and empowerment. Unlike my observations in Rwanda, the focus was removed from income-generating activities and counselling services. For instance, Organisation F
aspires to integrate women’s rights and sexual rights into the schools’ curriculums in order to educate the younger generations about these aspects, and hopefully lead to a change of attitudes in Bosnian society (Lucy, 13 November 2013). However, despite the change of focus towards women’s rights, the organisation still wishes to engage and support male and female victims of gender-based violence, including women who experienced ethnicized sexual violence.

It's [also] probably to bring back the psychosocial support again, to go back to very basic principles. (...) We still receive a lot of calls [on the SOS line]. It's sometimes men as well who are calling... you know those domestic issues. And they cannot get information in the government, sometimes they are afraid as well [to talk about it] to the police, so that's why they are calling this SOS line. So we want to go back to this, and we hope that we can get funding to have like a crisis centre (Lucy, 13 November 2013).

As this quote illustrates, funding is an issue. Throughout the interview, Lucy stood by the radiator, trying to warm up, and the tone of the conversation heated up when discussing the civil society sector in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As a woman who worked in this sector in different countries, Lucy was clearly disappointed by the sector in BiH, which despite its strengths, still seems to possess limitations, as analysed in further depth in Chapter Eight.

**Organisation G**

The second organisation I was introduced to is a well-known organisation because of its founder: Bakira Hasecic, a rape survivor from the Bosnian war. Bakira is well-known in the Bosnian community, and everyone has their own opinion about her, whether researchers, members of the general public or staff members from other organisations.

Bakira Hasecic is everyday talking about rape, [about] how to protect raped women. She is fighting for their rights, she was a witness at the court on
many cases and she is not hiding her identity. All this means that her trauma is still very much alive! And can you imagine what would happen if she kept her feelings inside. (...) She knows all the rapists by heart, where they are now, if they are prosecuted... (Adna, 6 November 2013).

This quote by Adna is extremely interesting, since it presents a complexity and even contradiction with some of the things she mentioned above. Adna and other staff members indeed suggested in the interviews that speaking about one’s past is a crucial step towards trauma healing. This is exactly what Bakira is regularly doing, but according to Adna, this keeps her trauma alive. This at first may seem like a contradiction, but it may instead suggest that the objective of making survivors of rape speak about their past is to allow them to accept themselves, and to look ahead. Perhaps the fact that Bakira is perceived as constantly speaking about the past is understood as her not having reached a degree of trauma healing that allows her to look ahead. This understanding, however, may be quite problematic, since it suggests that a survivor of rape speaking openly about the rapes committed during the war is still perceived as traumatized. This not only contributes to sexual violence being silenced in Bosnian society, but also may constrain the actors who are allowed to speak about it, i.e. not the survivors themselves.

Furthermore, whilst I personally did not immediately observe any concerns with the organisation, except the absence of members in the organisation’s office, other researchers have expressed concerns regarding the protection of their members’ anonymity (Helms, 2013; chapter 6). Bakira and her organisation might produce different types of reactions, but the work done by this organisation should still be analysed.
My translator and I met Bakira, her daughter and another staff member in Bakira’s office, a short tram ride from the city centre. When entering her office, I was first intrigued by the numerous pictures of war criminals and related newspapers articles glued on the office’s walls. Bakira then asked us to have a look at her computer, where she showed us Facebook pictures of a house being rebuilt. We were informed that this house was located in the RS, and was the scene of the killing of 70 Bosniak Muslims during the war. The local authorities were thinking of raising the water level of the river nearby, which would have submerged a few houses, including this one. Bakira interpreted this action as Bosnian Serbs trying to get rid of evidence of ethnic cleansing in the RS. Opposition to raising the water level started in the locality, but was rejected on the grounds the house was already destroyed and no one lived there, so it would not be an issue if it was gone. Bakira’s organisation thus raised some money, and with the help of volunteers, rebuilt the house in 15 days. According to her, police officers verbally abused them during the process - officers that included some of Bakira’s rapists (Observation, 11 November 2013). Seeing this, as well as the photos and newspaper articles on the wall, gave me the impression that this organisation was motivated by demands for justice, recognition and accountability for the crimes committed during the Bosnian war.

Unlike with other NGO staff members, interviewing Bakira was extremely complex since her position as a practitioner overlaps with her position as a survivor. I approached our conversation by focusing on her experience as a practitioner, since it became clear at that point in my fieldwork that her public involvement as a woman who had experienced sexual violence was uncommon, and not necessarily representative of the post-conflict experiences of the majority of survivors. Bakira
also had an authoritative presence in the room that I slowly started to perceive as self-importance throughout my time with this organisation. For example, during the interview process, she was quite dismissive of some questions, and unlike with all other research participants (women included) where the interviews resembled more a conversation, I imagine my interview with Bakira better resembled ‘elite interviews’. At one instance, she asked her daughter to join us and answer questions on her behalf while she was overseeing the process and also undertaking some tasks on the computer. Whilst I did not have the occasion to see her interact with members of her organisation, I did wonder how the survivors I met would respond to her attitude and approach.

Organisation G started as an association that supported women of all ages who were raped during the war. This is still the purpose of this organisation, but since 2006, men who were sexually abused during the war have also been invited to join. Beneficiaries come from all nationalities, including Roma, and membership is on a voluntary basis (Bakira, 11 November 2013). When discussing the work done by this organisation, it became evident the focus was first on legal rights.

Our biggest success is that we, in the Federation, got legislation, a law on civil war victims, by fighting and testifying in the ICTY and the Court of BiH. This applies only to women with recognised status of women victims of war and who have a place of residence in the Federation. We also have health care, child allowance... (Bakira, 11 November 2013).

Justice for the crimes committed was also discussed by Bakira and her daughter as a way to end impunity. ‘If someone is deciding to commit such a crime, this will remind him that he would be under the hand of justice, he will not go unpunished’ (Bakira, 11 November 2013). There was, however, a strong geographical component of this organisation, which was fighting for the legal recognition of survivors of
sexual violence but only in the Federation of BiH. Indeed, Bakira makes a clear distinction between the importance of lobbying the government in the Federation of BiH, as opposed to the RS. This comes from the understanding that most rape survivors who were living in the RS during the war are not returning home. This understanding clearly influences the work done by the organisation in trying to secure recognition and rights for survivors in the FBiH.

This law doesn't exist in the RS, but we do not need to take care of it. I say this because only a few Bosniak women returned to RS. It is hard for them every day to face the rapist or murderer of their family, or to be under the pressure every day after the trial (Bakira, 11 November 2013).

I interpret this as even if this organisation welcomes members of all nationalities, there might still be certain divisions amongst the survivors, with Bosniak Muslims being perhaps prioritized in the fight for recognition. Whilst it is true that many Bosniaks did not return to the RS, there are without doubt women who have experienced sexual violence living in that entity. This could perhaps suggest that, for this organisation, Bosnian Serbs living in the RS who were victims of sexual violence during the war remain segregated from this fight for recognition because of their place of residence, and probably also ethnic identity. In a sense, ethnic politics are still very powerful in BiH, and this also impacts the work done by NGOs operating in the country. However, Bakira also suggested that women living abroad of any ethnicity should not be allowed to receive the same compensation from the government as those living in BiH: ‘It would not be fair if women who live abroad also receive compensation’ (Bakira, 11 November 2013). It would thus be wrong to suggest ethnic identities are the main reason why some women might be prioritized over others.
Women and men of all nationalities are in our organisation. They hang out every day, visit each other and do not pay attention to nationality. A victim is a victim. She has no nationality. You'd be surprised when you see a group of 40 people all happy together and cooperating, helping each other, going together to the doctor (Bakira, 11 November 2013).

In addition to advocacy work, the organisation also provides different services, such as financial assistance, workshops and counselling services.

We only apply to projects that are actually implemented in the form of workshops. The last time we had workshops with UNDP. At the end of each workshop, participants adopted conclusions that concerned the victims’ needs. These conclusions are referred to the authorities. But they mostly end up in a drawer and none of them have started yet to implement or apply them in any way. The workshops are mostly about health care, communication skills at the trial, how to overcome trauma, how to deal with victims of trauma. (...) Lately, we organised a session for our members with a therapist, and they can call the therapist themselves. It's never too late to start talking, and this is the beginning of healing (Bakira, 11 November 2013).

Moreover, even when these services are provided, these can still become channels to lobby the government, as is the case with workshops that aim to influence policy-makers. ‘We made a brochure [with] concrete conclusions, [with] what we really need. It is still somewhere in someone’s drawer, and none of the authorities ensure that they are implemented’ (Bakira, 11 November 2013). These services are also dependent on donors and are not prioritized to the same extent as the fight for justice and recognition.

We occasionally can help women. We depend on donations from the state budget and the international community. But there is no specific project. The victim [can] say she needs a cow and that it will feed five children, but you cannot give it to her (Bakira, 11 November 2013).

This is not drastically different from the work of Organisation F, but while Organisation F focuses on empowering women within the public sphere, Organisation G focuses on a specific type of civilian victims of war: survivors of sexual violence. In both cases, however, the main objective is very similar, which is
to influence policy-making and enable their beneficiaries to gain equal status as citizens, as opposed to sub-citizens. This comes at a time where the changing of state institutions and state policies present some opportunities for these organisations to influence the outcome of the process of state-building, and ensure that survivors of sexual violence are integrated in the reconstruction of the country.

It is all called our fight for justice and truth so that it could never happen again to anyone. (…) We are left to continue fighting and to constantly send the message that something like this will never be repeated. This message must constantly be present everywhere, because women finally have the right for protection. (…) We mostly help ourselves, but we lack the help of the state (Bakira, 11 November 2013).

**Organisation H**

The third organisation I was introduced to in Bosnia-Herzegovina was recommended to me by Dalija. According to her, if I wanted to hear the stories of the survivors, I had to visit this organisation. I was first invited on a Thursday, since this is the day where the survivors of sexual violence meet to knit together.

The organisation is located in a busy commercial district of Sarajevo. Surrounded by shops, cafés and restaurants, there are no signs that this grassroots organisation is located in this area. The busy atmosphere surrounding the organisation almost gives it an anonymous feel, where individuals are able to come and go without necessarily being noticed. This is a clear contrast with Rwanda, where some organisations were either clearly noticeable through signs on the street, or had their own house/building segregated from other premises. It was starting to become clear that the space held by the organisations was of course influenced by the funds available, but also impacted the space available for survivors in both places: segregation but recognition for survivors in Rwanda; lack of recognition but ‘integration’ for survivors in BiH. It is very common for organisations in Rwanda to have their own premises and to be
identified from the street, but my time in Bosnia-Herzegovina with these five NGOs draws a different portrayal. Whilst some organisations in Bosnia-Herzegovina (such as Organisation J) may better resemble the space used by organisations in Rwanda, it seems that the organisations I observed in Sarajevo were integrated in the surroundings, as with any other shop.

Once there, my translator and I met first with Tarik, the president of the organisation, a man who was himself tortured during the Bosnian war. The organisation was created in 1996 and includes citizens of BiH who were kept in war camps during the war. In 2013, the organisation included around 6,000 members, more than a third of whom were women. It has branches in a few municipalities, and its main goal is to research and raise awareness of the crimes committed in camps during the war, as well as supporting camp survivors (Tarik, 14 November 2013). ‘In 2000, we were looking for data from Foca, Rogatica, Kresevo, Kiseljak… we were trying to identify people in need of help to get them back to their normal lives’ (Tarik, 14 November 2013).

Organisation H aspires to provide a variety of services that would support the camp survivors in different spheres of their lives, but needs remain too large to fulfil.

Looking at the very beginning, we made [some] minor steps for [a] few individuals but they were short-term solutions. That is why we are [now] seeking for long-term solutions. Food help and packets with used clothes are not the only things we need, like we got from the Germans in 2003. We need medicines and we get 2,000KM, which is not even 0,30 pf per person, and the majority is in need for more than that. The fact is that projects like that cannot meet the requirements of 6,000 people (Tarik, 14 November 2013).

As this quote illustrates, part of the programmes depend on local and international donors. This mediation between the needs of the camp survivors and the perceptions
of the donors will be addressed in Chapter Eight, but here it is worth spelling out that
this organisation cannot successfully operate without the financial support of donors.
It therefore constantly needs to apply for funding and to propose projects that could
be of interest to these actors. This is not an easy process, as described by Tarik:

Unfortunately we were not taken seriously neither from the local
government or the international community, so the process that we’ve taken
is going harder and harder but we are trying to send projects and
suggestions to the local as well as international donors (Tarik, 14
November 2013).

And when some programmes are funded, it does not necessarily cover the needs of
all of the beneficiaries.

We have good cooperation with the Swiss and American embassies, where
they send 30 people in need of psychotherapy to the mountains, but that is
once a year for 30 members, so eight organisations send three or four
members. That is nothing (Tarik, 14 November 2013).

This dependency on local and international donors seems to limit, and at times
preclude, the provision of programmes to civilian victims of war, which will be
addressed in Chapter Eight.

Regardless of the need for funding, this organisation still provides general support
to individuals who were kept in war camps during the war, often tortured, beaten and
sexually assaulted. There is a sub-section of the organisation that focuses specifically
on individuals who were victims of rape during the war, and mostly women have
joined this sub-unit. ‘Of course they [survivors of sexual violence] come to us as we
are the only organisation providing some sort of support for them’ (Tarik, 14
November 2013). This organisation is evidently not the only organisation that
provides support to these civilian victims of war, but it is true that within the
organisations I observed in Sarajevo, this organisation was the most involved in the personal lives of its beneficiaries.

For example, Organisation H provides income-generating activities through knitting sessions. Women who experienced sexual violence meet once a week to knit together, and then sell their products on the street and in markets. The second time I visited the knitting group, the organisation had hired a designer who, for the next few months, was going to help the women design and knit products more ‘fashionable’ for selling purposes. This was especially interesting to witness, since the main income-generating activity provided reinforces the gender stereotypes found in a patriarchal society, in which women are traditionally involved in feminine skills such as knitting. BiH provides various employment and educational opportunities for women, so it is quite revealing that income-generating activities would be restricted to this traditional skill, especially considering that some of these women were formally employed before the war.

However, whilst this income-generating activity group was described as very important for the women I met, the organisation still kept a strong focus on the legal recognition of its beneficiaries.

It is a shame that war sex crimes have not been recognised in the form of law. They [the survivors] have problems with being a witness, meeting those criminals responsible for sex crimes, they even meet their assailters on the street walking freely and all that happens due to the lack of an organised system of law (Tarik, 14 November 2013).

The issue of recognition within the law may seem quite repetitive so far, but clearly demonstrates that organisations with different types of beneficiaries (women; survivors of sexual violence; individuals who were kept in war camps) all share the
same focus towards influencing policy-making and legal recognition of the survivors’ needs. For the three organisations discussed so far, this is their priority, even if they provide other types of programmes for survivors.

**Organisation I**

The fourth organisation I met in Sarajevo is an organisation that focuses specifically on mothers who were living in Srebrenica during the war. When I was in Sarajevo in 2013, there was a gallery near the Sacred Heart Cathedral: Gallery 11.07.95. This Gallery acts as a reminder of the crimes committed in Srebrenica in 1995, culminating on July 11, 1995, into what many consider a genocide against Muslims. This gallery had a strong impact on my desire to speak to an organisation dedicated specifically to those who survived or lost family in Srebrenica, as well as also observing the position that survivors of sexual violence might have in this association.

Based in Sarajevo, a short tram ride from the city centre, we met Amina, the president of the organisation, in her office. Before conducting the interview, we sat in their conference room and had an informal discussion with staff members and beneficiaries. They showed us products made by some women, mostly food items such as jam and preserves. These were produced because of the cooking skills of the mothers and their access to the food items needed, such as strawberries or other fruits. Again, the production of jams and preserves was an important income-generating activity for these mothers, but it still did not challenge gender norms, as advocated by many staff members. Reflecting the warm Bosnian hospitality, we were then invited to have lunch with the women, and a refusal on our part would have been greatly frowned upon. The women were laughing around the table,
chatting in Bosnian and asking a few questions about my presence in Bosnia and in their organisation. Observing them, it was quite interesting to witness a certain hierarchy, where Amina had a certain authority or respect in the room that everyone acknowledged. Despite this hierarchy, it was evident that the women cared for each other and shared a strong friendship. This ‘sisterhood’ that I witnessed was consistent with the voices of the women I interviewed, who all agreed that they forged a strong sense of belonging to the other women in their organisation. In this case, shared suffering and understanding are very powerful in bringing individuals together. After being unable to witness the dynamic between the staff members and beneficiaries in Organisations F and G, it was a welcome change to see in practice the relationships that I witnessed in the day-to-day practices of NGOs in Rwanda.

After lunch, we were invited in Amina’s office to conduct the formal interview. As with Bakira’s office, one wall was covered with newspapers articles and photos reporting about Srebrenica and the work done by this NGO: one newspaper article showed Amina and other members protesting by holding signs in a street; another one showed a picture of former US president Bill Clinton when he visited the mass graves in Potocari in September 2003. Amina then explained how the organisation was created in 1996 at the federal level, and was granted in 2002 a permit at the state level in order to operate throughout the country. At first the organisation included 8,116 women, who all shared the same purpose of learning the truth about what happened to their husbands, brothers or sons (Amina, 15 November 2013). ‘As our men were taken from us and trapped, we did not know their fate’ (Amina, 15 November 2013). Initial activities thus centred on discovering the truth about their missing family members.
Every month we organised a demonstration. We wanted to warn the world that we do not know where are the male members of our family, and to invite the world to stop the bloodshed in our country because they could prevent it (Amina, 15 November 2013).

The focus then changed once the women started to learn about the fate of the missing. At this point, the organisation started to advocate for the proper remembrance of their family members, probably providing them with a sense of closure (something that not all women I spoke to have reached because of the missing bodies of their husbands, for example).

When we found out they were all dead, we tried to help to ensure the people money and everything we need to find the bodies of our loved ones. In 1996 the ICTY had already started working and they came for the exhumation of the bodies. They started to take out the bodies of our children, and we identified them. After that, we needed to find a place for burial. We conducted a survey among 12,500 women of Srebrenica on where they wanted to bury their loved ones. One location was suggested by the authorities, another location we proposed - that was the place where they were all killed and where we were raped - that is in Srebrenica Potocari, and a third location was the Sarajevo Canton. And so 83% of us said that it had to be in Potocari. The High Representative in BiH, Wolfgang Petritsch, ruled that it would be in the Potocari cemetery, in the RS. We mothers said: "If our children did not have the right to live, we mothers have the right to bury them back where they came from." (…) So we got a place of burial in 2001. We laid the foundation stones, in 2002 were placed the tombstones and on March 31th 2003 was the first funeral and 6,000 coffins went to Srebrenica (Amina, 15 November 2013).

As this quote suggests, the space where the bodies of their loved ones should be buried was an important decision by the women, but also involved political actors. In a sense, mass graves remain a political vehicle and by having the bodies buried in Potocari, this organisation and political actors are confirming that genocide was committed on this soil.

Following the ‘opening’ of the cemetery in Potocari in 2003, the organisation continued its work by raising awareness of the war crimes that occurred in this
region. For example, it made a request to the European Parliament in 2008 to adopt a resolution on Srebrenica, and this was adopted in 2009. ‘We woke up Europe, because every 11th of July the flag in front of the European Parliament is at half-mast. So they remember and remind the world that genocide occurred in Srebrenica’ (Amina, 15 November 2013). In addition, the organisation is also fighting for justice for the crimes committed: ‘We are searching for truth and justice’ (Amina, 15 November 2013). This fight for justice is occurring in the national courts and in the ICTY, but the organisation has also targeted the United Nations and the government of the Netherlands because of their perceived failure in Srebrenica.

By resolution 819 we were supposed to be protected, and we did not. We got the rejection of the Court in Strasbourg. But it will be remembered that we were looking for justice. Maybe in 50 years [we] will have someone who will open that question - the question of the protection of human beings. So we consider this as our success and our failure at the same time (Amina, 15 November 2013).

This organisation is constantly fighting for their rights to be protected by either international or local actors. It also supports those children who lost their parents during the war and women who were sexually abused (Amina, 15 November 2013).

There is a strong focus on motherhood in this organisation, and it seems the trauma of losing a husband or son is the primary suffering that bonds the members of this organisation, transcending ethnic divisions and other types of trauma. Amina herself speaks about the members of the organisation as ‘mothers’, and whilst she recognizes that some of them were victims of sexual violence in Potocari, this is not at the forefront of the organisation’s mission.

This strong focus on motherhood is a clear contrast to the first organisation I observed, Organisation F. As mentioned above, Organisation F advocates for gender
rights and for changed norms in a more patriarchal society. In this case, however, Organisation I is working within the more conservative parameters of gender roles. By using their position as mothers, this organisation undertakes some actions that are probably more accepted by the society, since they are conforming to the stereotypes of caring mothers. It is thus consistent with their position as caring mothers that they advocate for a place of burial for their loved ones, and for the crimes in Srebrenica to be remembered. This perhaps explains the importance of this organisation, and the support it gathered from Bosnian society. For example, a previous member of the OSCE mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina mentioned that when this organisation was protesting in the streets, political actors had to listen (25 April 2015).

**Organisation J**

Finally, my translator and I decided to leave Sarajevo and make our way to a city in central Bosnia-Herzegovina, where we were invited to meet a well-known women’s organisation. Unlike all the organisations we met in Sarajevo, this organisation has its own property, comprising of two large buildings. This is perhaps explained by the financial support received and the reputation of this organisation, or perhaps because of its location outside of Sarajevo. We were invited to wait in the kitchen of the back building, which now serves as a safe house for women who are victims of domestic abuse. The building was cold, and as we were trying to warm up with tea, we could hear a few women coming in and out of the house, very discreetly. The house was not at its full capacity at that moment, but ordinarily can accommodate up to 25 people for up to six months (this can, however, be extended in some cases). This number apparently decreased from 60 to 25 in 2003 due to a lack of funding. This safe house was the first thing we observed in the organisation,
and it suggested that the organisation either changed its focus from survivors of wartime sexual violence, or expanded its mission to include services for victims of domestic abuse.

We were then invited to meet Petra, the director of Organisation J, in her office. Organisation J was established in 1993 and its main focus was to support women and children who experienced sexual violence during the war. One of the first services provided during the war itself was medical support.

We established our medical department where women could get medical support, as I mentioned gynaecological support and regular medical support. And also I want to mention that at that time, especially when we speak about gynaecological support and help, some of the women didn't want to come to BiH and to [Organisation J] with their pregnancy. The pregnancy was a result of the war rape, and they wanted to stop that pregnancy. Some of our doctors helped them regarding their abortion. In that period, it was a big stigma so they didn't want to go to the hospital and do it that way (Petra, 19 November 2013).

The medical services offered were not only treating injuries from the rapes, but also offered abortions to those impregnated as a result of rape. Of course, these treatments came hand in hand with counselling services.

Through psychological support we tried to give them counselling, individual therapy work and then we developed group therapy work, where women with different trauma were included in the group therapy. They tried to help each other, to express their emotions or recover from their traumatic experiences and give new meanings after the therapy work (Petra, 19 November 2013).

Once these more immediate needs were covered, the organisation realised that women who were raped during the war also had personal problems that prevented their trauma healing and social reintegration. For example, some women were unable to take good care of their children, so the organisation opened a kindergarten and nursery. Furthermore, many women were living in precarious conditions due to
financial instability. The organisation thus implemented vocational training programmes.

Some of them decided to keep their children with them, but they had a lot of economic problems because they didn't have support, some of them from families, from society, and then we tried to organise vocational training for women, especially for women who did not finish secondary school. During the war, most of the women and girls needed to leave their school to save their life or like that, and then we organised vocational training for them, such as working on the silk, tailoring, hairdressing, printing on the textile machine, working on the computer, like that. And what we also succeeded in that period was to sign a protocol with our public institutions, the department for employment. It means that they, together with [Organisation 5], organised final exams where they can give them a certificate after they finish the vocational training. It means that when they receive the certificate, the certificate is valid and then they can record it in their working book or card, and then they can find easy jobs. It was very, very important (Petra, 19 November 2013).

This vocational training is again similar to other organisations, where feminine skills such as tailoring and hairdressing are being taught. This training, however, also provides computer skills that could help the women find employment as administrative assistants.

Finally, the organisation also realised that many women had to leave school as a result of the war, so they helped these women to return to school to finish their secondary education or university degree (Petra, 19 November 2013). Organisation J uses a needs-based approach in its work, which not only justifies why these services were added to the medical and counselling services provided originally, but can perhaps also explain why it is now including other vulnerable individuals, such as victims of domestic violence and trafficked individuals. This approach is also similar to the one used in Rwanda, where the organisations provide support to the different spheres of the women’s lives.
In addition to these services, the organisation also includes an education and awareness aspect to its work, very consistent with the work done by the other organisations I observed in the country:

From 1996 we also tried to educate our community, our representatives from government's institutions on what is trauma, how they can recognize some psychological consequences, how they can develop sensitive approaches to survivors, whether he's a doctor, nurse, teacher, or some other person who work in a municipality or like that, and they tried to develop sensitive approaches to vulnerable categories. After that period, we also spoke about domestic violence because survivors of domestic violence have a lot of psychological consequences and then it is very important that we have very a sensitive approach when we communicate with them (Petra, 19 November 2013).

It was explained in the second section that this organisation attempts to transform the gender norms in Bosnian society through educational activities with the younger generations. This last quote suggests that education is also provided regarding the trauma and psychological consequences of rapes and domestic violence, which may again lead to transformative changes at the local level.

**Discussion**

Certain similarities between the experiences of the women interviewed with the experiences of some women in Rwanda can be seen, mostly in terms of a restricted sense of belonging, stigmatization and the need for trauma healing. These similarities are explained by a shared ideology of woman-as-nation in each context, which justified the use of women’s bodies as a battlefield during the ethnic violence, and now justifies the imposition of their bodies’ impurity into their sense of social self (Mertus, 1994: 18; Yuval-Davis, 1994: 413).

However, the main difference observed lies in the type of social reintegration the women are demanding. The women interviewed in BiH all wished for legal
recognition of their rights, which they believed would facilitate their social and economic reintegration. This is in line with the perceptions of the staff members, who also perceived state and legal recognition as the main solution for the reintegration of the survivors. The interviews conducted suggest that, for these staff members, counselling services, medical services, education and training, income-generating activities, housing support and community awareness are all programmes that respond to the needs of the survivors. However, to facilitate these programmes, legal recognition of the survivors of wartime sexual violence is a necessary step. This may therefore explain why lobbying the government for legal recognition of the survivors of sexual violence is a main priority universally adopted by all five organisations analysed in this chapter. Legal recognition, in this case, is therefore the response prioritized for the reintegration of these women into the boundaries of fairness of the in-group (Opotow, Gerson and Woodside, 2005). By targeting the institutionalization of their rights, the women and the NGOs aim to provide access to the resources available to the in-group, providing opportunities for these women to socially and structurally reintegrate their society (Opotow, 1990: 2; Tugendhat, 1993: 5-7).

Finally, the analysis of the women’s and NGOs’ experiences in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina has highlighted important contrasts in terms of social reintegration for the survivors of sexual violence. Not only are the women’s perceptions of their social reintegration divergent, but so is the NGOs’ response.

It can therefore be argued that the main contrast is found in the proposed solution to the micro and macro exclusion experienced by the survivors of sexual violence. In Rwanda, the state proposes to redefine the nation, its values and its identity (nation-
The women then attempt to redefine their own identity in the process, aided by the NGOs that aim at challenging the gender norms and stigmatisation faced by the survivors of rape. In BiH, since there is no strong attempt to redefine the nation, multi-ethnic state-building instead opens up possibilities for ethnic groups to have their rights institutionalised and interests protected by the political elite (McGarry and O’Leary, 2004: 17; Lange, 2015: 683). The women then want to address their micro and macro exclusion by being legally recognized by the state, with the NGOs lobbying the state on their behalf.

These chapters therefore demonstrate that the women moved from ethnic women to moral outcasts in the aftermath of the violence, but that their need for social belonging remains embedded within the local context, witnessed through contrasting priorities of social reintegration. The interviews conducted with the staff members have however highlighted the influence of other actors: donors and the state. It is therefore crucial to broaden the analysis to these actors, analysing whether the women’s experiences are embedded within the aid sector. The following chapter will therefore analyse if the relationships between the NGOs-donors-state can explain certain specificities highlighted in each context.
Chapter 8. Mediated Relationships: NGOs, States and Donors

This chapter examines whether specificities of the NGOs response in Rwanda and BiH can be understood by the aid structure in each context, resulting in the NGOs undertaking a role of mediating their beneficiaries’ needs and the donors’ priorities.

I argue that the programmes implemented by the NGOs I observed are partly determined by their relationships with local and international donors, and by the state in which they operate. In Rwanda, the state has a stronger control over the type of programmes implemented in comparison to donors (Kagamé refusing American aid is one example of such control), while in BiH it can be argued that the international community has on occasions a stronger decision-making power over the programmes implemented in comparison to the post-conflict state. The NGOs response therefore differs, with actors prioritizing capacity-building and civil society development in BiH, as opposed to individual and community empowerment and reconciliation in Rwanda. Consequentially, in BiH, NGOs mostly target the legitimization and institutionalization of the women’s voices, which does not necessarily entail their increased agency or empowerment. In Rwanda, the focus is mostly on empowerment, both personal and economic, but, again, this does not result in increased voice or agency for the women I met (Batliwala, 2007: 563; World Bank, 2014: 7). Indeed, the experiences of the women suggest how their social reintegration cannot be fully achieved solely with the support of the NGOs. Instead, changing gender norms should create transformative changes in the way the women’s bodies continue to embody the nation in the post-conflict state (Hamilton, K., 2000: 53). In this chapter, I therefore nuance the argument that both the agency
and autonomy of NGOs are seriously constrained by their relationships with states and donors (Bennett, 1994: xiii; Tarry, 2000: 109) by suggesting that NGOs actively mediate the experiences of survivors of sexual violence with the strategic interests of both donors and states. These mediated experiences are therefore not directly the experiences of the women, but experiences that NGOs reconstruct in order to secure funding and assistance from international donors and the state in which they operate.

It is worth noting that throughout this chapter, interviewees use ‘International Community’ to refer to one set of actors. This is extremely problematic, but reveals a common understanding of international actors sharing the same vision and priorities in terms of international aid, in practice acting as one body. Interestingly, whilst the ‘International Community’ refers to the same agents within each country, it actually refers to a group of different actors. For example, a lot of projects in BiH are currently funded by the European Union, and the financial reviews of the organisations observed suggest financial sponsorship by specific European states. Therefore, the ‘International Community’ refers mostly in this case to European and Western donors, which still does not mean that they share the same vision and priorities. However, in the Rwandan context, political tensions between the Kagamé regime and Western countries have seen Western aid considerably reduced over the past few years (which will be discussed in more depth below), and instead, during my stay in Rwanda in 2013, China had replaced Western donors and was financing most construction projects in the country, building new roads and infrastructure (The East African, 29 December 2012). However, while China was perceived as an important donor to economically boost the country, the NGOs I observed still mostly turned towards Western countries for financial support.
NGO and Donor Relations

The aid sector is globally characterized by mutual dependency between NGOs and the national/international donors (Hayman, 2006: 16-19; Whitfield, 2009: 1). The situation is not different in BiH and Rwanda, but considering that BiH was under international supervision for many years, this raises the question of how this mutual dependency has shaped the aid sector in BiH in contrast to Rwanda.

The data I collected suggest that regardless of international supervision, the aid sector in each context is characterized by similar dependency on the financial support of international, local and state donors, where donors can choose where the money should be directed. Each of the NGO staff members I interviewed voiced the struggle they faced, and still face, in receiving grants for their work.

If you look at the donor mapping, from 1997 up to 2011, their funding actually is only 3%, which is cross-cutting, which is divided into four sections: women, returnees, youth, and integration. So we are sharing the 3%, which is divided into four sectors. How can the organisations access those funds in general in Bosnia-Herzegovina? (Lucy, Organisation F, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 13 November 2013)

Furthermore, according to Tarik (14 November 2013), calls for proposals launched by national and international donors, including those by private organisations, sometimes receive 100 to 200 applications each, which means that his organisation might have designed an important project proposal but access to funding is so competitive that it will still not receive funding. Sometimes they do not even know why they were rejected, and failure to secure funding for important work can be interpreted as a lack of support for the target population. ‘When you take in consideration all those years, it is logical to feel abandoned. I will get back to the
point again where those people (beneficiaries) feel like they do not exist and of course they are disappointed’ (Tarik, 14 November 2013).

This inevitably impacts the scope of the programmes offered. For example, Organisations A and B in Rwanda had to reduce their targets in order to ensure the financial assistance to children born out of rape for attending schools would be sustained over the years, regardless of the donors’ decisions to keep or remove funding.

(Currently, does the funding vary? Do you have a year where you can help a certain number of children and then the year after you have fewer donors and you have to cut back on some programmes?) Fortunately, that has not happened. We have been consistent and initially, we started with 150 children. We had little funding, so when the funding came on, we scaled up to 500. More funding came up we scaled up to 800. Our target was 1,500, but when we reached 800, we said: "ah, we need to be careful of the future". So we held it there and what the foundation is doing is to build reserve, to ensure that those who we are committed to now will be able to be supported through their education. So currently we are not taking on any new students until we have reserved enough money to see them through (Janvier, 23 May 2013).

This quote demonstrates well the strategic decisions taken by organisations, which are always aware of the possibility of losing their core funding in the near future. This threat was constantly on the minds of the staff members, who, even when funding is allocated, need to plan ahead for the time when the funding will be withdrawn. The chronic threat of financial cuts necessarily influences the NGOs’ decision-making processes when deciding which programmes to implement or not. Indeed, some NGOs may be more willing to implement short-term projects with measurable goals, since it might allow them to fully implement their project, instead of risking starting a project that they will be unable to see to term.
This need for financial support also means the organisations I visited in both countries have to make strategic decisions to attract donors. These may vary depending on the nature of the donor itself (whether a government body, individual donor or international organisation). I however noticed that underlying all these various strategies is the attempt to provide the human stories behind their programmes, hoping for individual donors to personally connect with their beneficiaries. For instance, it was explained above how Organisation C in Rwanda implemented a sponsorship programme for students. This programme is, however, completely dependent on international and local donors.

We started with very few students, like five or six, then because many people were interested to help those orphans, we have gained more sponsors through mini organisations around the world, from Germany, from the US, from the UK and other individuals who were willing to support those orphans. (…) So what I do, we have many orphans who come to us, orphans we fund. (…) I make profiles of these orphans, take pictures, put all the information that the person who would be willing to support might need, and I send them to organisations. So the organisations search for sponsors and we communicate with each other in that way (Vestine, 4 June 2013).

By creating the profiles of these children, Vestine attempts to humanize these stories, but more importantly, she is working towards deconstructing the stereotypes and social constructions associated with the label ‘orphans’, to show the individuality of each child. This same process was witnessed with survivors of sexual violence, where in order to convince donors to support specific programmes for them, NGOs attempt to challenge reductionists’ understandings of war survivors as unworthy of help, by reconstructing their moral value.
Of course, when this process of re-humanization is achieved, the personal relationship that individual sponsors develop with the person they are financially supporting provides them with the right to influence where this money will be used.

We always present our needs to the [sponsors]. And if the sponsor says: "I would like to sponsor a child for secondary school or university", you have to use that money according to the need of this sponsor. If you want to change, you must tell him before. For example, if you are supporting an orphan in university and the person stops suddenly to study, you cannot use that money for another person who needs studying before we have phoned the sponsor. The sponsor always had the last word about how this money will be used (Vestine, 4 June 2013).

Accountability is therefore not only required for institutional donors, but also for individual donors who may in some occasions have the power to influence how the money is spent.

Organisation D in Rwanda also depends on individual donations for some of its programmes, such as counselling services. For example, in 2012, Organisation D received 2,700,000 RWF from personal donors, funding 48 counselling sessions benefiting 1,440 individuals. These personal donations come from around the world, with funds collected in Rwanda, the United States, and Switzerland, among others. Their dependency on international individual donations also means that some groups are sometimes invited to visit the organisation. On one occasion (31 May 2013), we were sitting outside with survivors of rape (around 30 women), and a few women from the United States - members of the same church - were invited to sit with us to hear the survivors’ testimonies. The encounter led to some Rwandan women sharing their stories of suffering during the genocide, and some American women sharing their own personal stories of suffering, such as domestic violence. Some American women were taking pictures of the Rwandan women when they were sharing their
stories, even if they were crying or showing some distress. This made me extremely uncomfortable, since a certain devalorization of the Rwandan women was clearly happening, whereby while the foreign women wanted to show their sentiment of solidarity, some of them still - perhaps unintentionally – transgressed the dignity of the Rwandan women, and their right not to have their moments of vulnerability taken advantage of. It made me realise that some individuals might feel more compelled to act by stories of suffering than by stories of empowerment, but also that vulnerable groups may not always be perceived as entitled to the same respect and dignity as others. Of course, this involved only some specific individuals, but it made me wonder if the progress made by Rwanda is actually a cause of its problems, where despite the blatant need for support for survivors of the genocide, the lack of visible intense suffering has turned the donors’ attention away.

Moreover, despite the money received through individual donations, Organisation D is also funded by the national government and women’s organisations established in Rwanda, such as ‘Pro-Femmes’.

Pro-Femmes is helping us to support the women who work or have started a business, small businesses. I see Pro-Femmes as the representative of the government. So Pro-Femmes is actually the middleman between the government and the civil society? Yes, yes the middleman. And Pro-Femmes let you determine in which project to invest this money? Yes, absolutely. We just need to make a report (Françoise, Organisation D, 24 June 2013).

Pro-Femmes currently financially supports some women in starting their own business. In Organisation D, one group of approximately ten women is supported per year, receiving around 1,000,000 RWF (around £1,000). This means that many women are ready and willing to start their own income-generating activity, but the organisation does not necessarily have the means to support them (Observation, 10
June 2013). This is not something unique to Organisation D, and even if the organisations are able to attract individual sponsors, they all still strongly depend on grants by international and local organisations.

The contrast between the two contexts is instead found in the types of programmes funded by donors. Donors do indeed have a strong influence on the types of services offered to survivors of sexual violence in Rwanda and BiH.

So sometimes I guess if we find a donor wanting to fund specific activities, then we might explore with the country office whether those are [possible] and if they are, they might go for that. We wouldn't do something completely different, but even if it was within our three priorities but not the number one priority, but they [the country office] still want to do it and this donor is willing to fund it, then we would go for it (Policy & Programmes Grants Coordinator, Organisation L, 20 May 2015).

Some organisations even deliberately transform their programmes and services to align with the donors’ interests in order to secure funding.

But some of the NGOs they are changing their focus, like for example they are the ones who adjust themselves with the donor in order to get funds. That's very typical in Bosnia. But not for us because we want to focus on [women’s issues]. (...) That's the problem, but we never, in my own opinion, we don't want to be identified like: “because the institutions or the international organisations want this, we will do it”. No (Lucy, Organisation F, 13 November 2013).

This idea is especially interesting, since it suggests that whilst Organisation F is not changing its focus, other organisations in BiH do so for the purpose of attracting donors. This is consistent with research conducted by other scholars, such as Elissa Helms, who suggested that most NGOs, in the first few years after the Bosnian war, changed their focus in order to conform to the shifting priorities of donors (2013: 91). This could be extremely problematic since, as Chapters Six and Seven demonstrate, organisations operating on the ground are often those with the expertise and knowledge to assess the needs of the population, in contrast to international
donors. Aligning the NGOs’ responses to the issues currently mainstreamed by the relevant donors - such as the Department of Foreign and International Development, UK (DFID), USAID, and UN Women - thus places the NGOs in a complex situation where they need to reconstruct the needs of their beneficiaries in order to align with their donors’ priorities.

Moreover, when looking at the financial review of Organisation F, it was able to secure the largest number of grants in 2013, out of the organisations I observed. As the following table demonstrates, this funding comes from Bosnian state institutions, UN Women and international organisations.

**Table 5: List of Donors for Organisation F, BiH, 2013**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donors 2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Friedrich-Gbert-Stiftung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCI-HUG Trnova</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Women- Belgrade Centre for Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNV (Netherlands Organisation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCAF-Atlantic Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Vision International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundation Open Society Institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marta Drury</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centar Kanton Sarajevo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Fund for Women</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


If Lucy is right in suggesting her organisation did not change its focus to attract donors, it could perhaps suggest their work is already of interest to this variety of donors, work that is now focused on building women’s rights and civil society.
This issue of emergency relief was also mentioned by a majority of staff members in both contexts. According to them, both institutional and individual funding tends to focus on emergency situations, as well as cases spoken about in the media and through popular discourse. ‘Naturally things that are in the news are what people will ask about. So that probably gets more interest’ (Policy & Programmes Grants Coordinator, Organisation L, 20 May 2015). Rwanda and BiH are both perceived as post-conflict states that have moved, to a certain extent, away from the trauma of their ethnic violence. ‘BiH is not so much in the news, it is viewed as being on the edge of Europe so more developed, and I think for some it is maybe not seen as high a priority as some others’ (Policy & Programmes Grants Coordinator, Organisation L, 20 May 2015). The same was also said about Rwanda:

There aren’t many who give money anymore. *Do you know why?* Actually, we were surprised because there was a group of women that was helping the children born out of rape. But about 3-5 years ago, they stopped. We did not understand because when you start something, especially for the children’s education, you don’t stop right in the middle of it. It surprised us, and the money was not sent to us, it was sent directly to the school. So we did not understand. When we asked them why, they said that it is because of the economic crisis. And the economic crisis is everywhere. And others told us that Rwanda is a country that is developing itself, it isn’t a country at war. So they go to the Congo instead. *Translator: There is no emergency.* Yes, there is no emergency. It’s a shame. (Françoise, 24 June 2013).

A few programmes are therefore associated with development aid (economic empowerment), and some with emergency relief (counselling, medical services). This means that some donors might expect some needs to be already addressed within so many years after the end of a conflict as an attempt to move towards development aid.

There is a challenge with fundraising. Especially now that it is 19 years after the genocide. Many people ask: "why after 19 years kids are still
going to secondary school?", for example. And we have a big number of 19 years, 18 years old who are going senior 4, senior 5. Someone will say that that person should be finishing the second maybe the first year of university. (…) And you know, it's a challenge then to convince the donors that this issue needs to be addressed (Janvier, Organisations A&B, 23 May 2013).

The previous quote illustrates the pre-conceptions that some international donors may have of the post-war context, showing a certain distinction between the relief that is associated with emergency response, and the one associated with long-term development. Another example of this was noted by staff members of Organisation D, who mentioned that counselling services were first funded by a Dutch NGO, but the NGO stopped its funding in 2000, arguing the emergency situation had ended and the country’s focus was now on economic development (Observation, Organisation D, 10 June 2013).

The same process occurred in BiH, where the economic and political development of the country (i.e. relief associated with long-term development) is often mentioned as being part of the donors’ priorities.

The key thing is all about economic development, and within that there is some specific support to some marginalised groups so we can put vulnerable women in there. I'm not aware of focused funding for women in BiH. (…) The other thing I should say is that there might be some donors that are more interested in the political side, in encouraging democracy and good democratic behaviours and patterns with people, so I suppose there is that civil society aspect as well (Policy & Programmes Grants Coordinator, Organisation L, 20 May 2015).

The focus on political and economic reforms in Bosnia-Herzegovina has certainly meant that funding moved from emergency relief (including support for women) to political and economical development, especially now that the country is attempting to join the European Union.
After the war [up to] five years actually, there was a lot of funding for women's issues. You know when it comes to psychosocial support, education, etc. But after that, definitely the funds are moving to other sectors. Right now we don't have enough [funding] because no one or not many donors are giving funding for women's issues (Lucy, Organisation F, 13 November 2013).

Furthermore, according to my interviewees, the need to measure the outcome of these programmes is also driving the aid available to organisations.

The [donors] need something that can be measured, outcomes that are measurable. Counselling sometimes is not easy (laugh) to... (...) I am sorry to say this but people, most people don't get the value of what counselling can add to one's life, because this is not something tangible, you cannot measure it by tangible indicators. So many people have been asking: "how do you measure that counselling has improved this person's life?". Because you know, it's not like IGA: I earn 50,000RWF per month, I was earning 20,000RWF. So that's the challenge, to convince the donors that this will make a difference in the women's lives. And yet, it is a very important aspect of building the lives of the women (Janvier, Organisations A&B, 23 May 2013).

When looking at the list of donors for Organisation B in 2013-2014, all of them were international donors (Big Lottery Fund, Inspire!Africa, The Alan and Babette Sainsbury Charitable Trust, L.I.F.E. for Health), and their biggest financial sponsor was DFID. Using the example of DFID, since it is a good example of an international donor affiliated with an international government and is the major donor for UK NGOs (Wallace, 2003: 205-6), it becomes interesting to analyse the programmes DFID prioritizes. An interview with DFID was denied, but it was mentioned by email that ‘in terms of criteria for funding different organisations, this varies depending on the purpose of the intervention, although DFID always places a high priority on delivery of results and value for money’ (email, 30 January 2014). This is consistent with Janvier’s perception that programmes with measurable outcome are more attractive to some donors than other long-term programmes such as trauma healing (Hudock, 2000: 18).
DFID’s total aid per country demonstrates a geographical focus on parts of Asia and Africa, and both BiH and Rwanda are included in their 2015/2016 budget.

**Figure 4: DFID Total Project Budget for 2015/2016 by Country.**


Almost half of the budget is geared towards projects in Africa. It is however worth mentioning that these numbers may vary, since only a few months ago Europe was granted only £80,000 for the 2015/2016, but this number now reaches £10.2 millions, probably as a result of the current refugee crisis in Europe.
DFID implemented 19 projects in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 2004 to 2016, and its annual budget for 2015/2016 is £999,000. It is the country with the smallest annual budget, representing 0.01% of the total DFID budget (DFID, http://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/countries/BA/, 1 November 2015). In Rwanda, 72 projects were or will be implemented between 2002 and 2021, for a total of £65,818,456, representing 0.78% of the total DFID budget (DFID, http://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/countries/RW/, 1 November 2015). It hosts a similar number of projects as other African countries such as Uganda, Kenya and the DRC,
but its 2015/2016 annual budget is considerably smaller than for these countries. Whilst both countries face an important post-conflict reconstruction process, the political, economic, and social contexts of each country still affect the aid available.

As discussed with Lucy (13 November 2013), Bosnia-Herzegovina is not considered a developing state, so the needs of the population are different than those of developing countries, and the financial support offered aligns with the needs of a mid-developed country. When analysing the 19 programmes implemented, a certain focus towards processes of state-building, such as strengthening state and financial institutions, can be found, which may perhaps be a result of the international rule in BiH that focused on transforming multi-ethnic politics in the aftermath of the war. The following chart presents the programmes funded at approximately £1million or higher, as well as any programme directed towards reconciliation or gender rights.

**Table 6: Projects implemented in Bosnia-Herzegovina by DFID, 2004-2016**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title of Project</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount (£)</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening Public Expenditure Management III Project in BiH (SEPARB)</td>
<td>To have a comprehensive medium term budget planning process linked to government priorities at canton, entity and state level, scrutinised and reported on by the parliament and civil society.</td>
<td>2,999,237</td>
<td>Post-Completion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEPARB</td>
<td>To assist the central and entity governments of BiH to establish and develop functioning, stable, professional administrations through the design and implementation of appropriate institutional strengthening strategies, the capacity building of civil</td>
<td>2,578,144</td>
<td>Post-Completion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Amount (USD)</td>
<td>Status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Administration Reform Fund</td>
<td>Strengthened and harmonised administrative capacity for management of public administration reform across state and entity governments.</td>
<td>2,100,000</td>
<td>Post-Completion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to Flood Recovery in Serbia and BiH</td>
<td>The establishment of flood defence measures in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the restoration of public sanitation services in Bosnia and Herzegovina.</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>Implementation*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid Coordination and Effectiveness Project in Bosnia</td>
<td>The creation and adoption of a functional aid coordination architecture, to facilitate development and improvement of process of planning, programming and management of external funds in line with BiH development priorities.</td>
<td>949,999</td>
<td>Post-Completion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated National Planning</td>
<td>Integrated planning mechanism developed to strengthen DEP and relevant government stakeholders to devise effective strategic policy and financial planning at all levels of government.</td>
<td>918,358</td>
<td>Post-Completion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Mainstreaming**</td>
<td>To improve understanding around theoretical and applied methodologies for efficient gender mainstreaming.</td>
<td>4,028</td>
<td>Post-Completion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data Retrieved from DFID, ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina’
http://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/countries/BA/projects/

*Only project that is currently implemented in BiH by DFID. All other projects are in the post-completion phase.

** Last programme on the list.
The table illustrates this focus on political and economic programmes, as suggested by a few staff members, with all the largest programmes targeting capacity-building of state institutions. The important gap between capacity-building and gender mainstreaming is apparent in this table, with a mere £4,028 invested in this project from 2008 to 2010. It was the least-funded project in the country, preceded by Support for Organisation of Swap Workshop at £34,888. This focus towards strengthening state institutions can perhaps be explained by Soeren Keil’s argument that the need for a stronger state is perceived by international actors as a way to overcome ethnic politics (ASN Convention, 23 April 2015). This rationale was behind the Dayton Accords, where US elites shared ‘a domestically informed view that “liberal legalist” frameworks would not only make multiethnicity possible but that the creation of multiethnicity itself was a valuable aspiration’ (Kennedy and Riga, 2013: 164). In this case, it is hoped that through strengthening the Bosnian state, the relationship between the three main constituent ethnic groups will be resolved.

It can therefore be suggested that this understanding of conflict resolution necessarily impacts the grants available for BiH, which prioritize capacity-building and strengthening civil society as part of a broader process of democratic consolidation and state-building. In practice, this privileges state policies that reform state institutions and civil society, and provides another explanation why the organisations I observed mostly prioritized state lobbying and legal recognition for their beneficiaries as a means of securing a location in civil society for them (as explained in Chapter Seven). In this case, the local and international aid received is focused towards increasing and legitimizing the voices of these women, but, as we
saw in Chapter Seven, this does not necessarily lead to increased agency or empowerment. To achieve increased agency and empowerment, both the state and the population should share the belief that behind the increasing voices of the survivors of sexual violence are valued human beings who suffered, and still suffer from a moral transgression of their rights.

In Rwanda, not only are the number of projects implemented greater than in BiH, but the actual funds granted are also immensely higher. The programmes implemented cover different areas, such as poverty reduction, health, education, economic and financial planning, as well as conflict resolution and gender rights. More projects are currently being implemented, and these also include programmes of gender rights and genocide reconciliation, as the table below illustrates. It is worth noting that only the programmes receiving the most funds are included in this table, followed by the best-funded gender rights and genocide reconciliation programmes on the list.

<p>| Table 7: Projects Implemented in Rwanda by DFID, 2002-2021 |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------|----------------|
| Title of Project                  | Description                      | Amount (£)     | Status         |
| General Budget Support to Rwanda- | To improve the effectiveness of   | 105,849,999    | Post-Completion|
| Second Three Year Phase          | government budget in achieving   |                |                |
|                                  | the economic, social and         |                |                |
|                                  | governance targets of the        |                |                |
|                                  | Economic Development and Poverty |                |                |
|                                  | Reduction Strategy.              |                |                |
| Rwanda Education Sector Program  | Equitable access to quality      | 97,428,501     | Implementation |
|                                  | education that provides          |                |                |
|                                  | opportunities of livelihoods     |                |                |
|                                  | for all Rwandans.                |                |                |
| Programme of Support to          | To sustainably increase the      | 35,184,999     | Implementation |
|                                  | agricultural productivity of     |                |                |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mitchell Imba</th>
<th>The new evidence can be used to monitor progress, assess impacts, and refine strategies.</th>
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<td>Mitchell Imba</td>
<td>The new evidence can be used to monitor progress, assess impacts, and refine strategies.</td>
<td>The new evidence can be used to monitor progress, assess impacts, and refine strategies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Area</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Cost (USD)</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture in Rwanda</td>
<td>poor farmers by transforming Rwandan agriculture from a subsistence-based to a more commercial-based sector that accelerates agricultural growth. This will help address challenges that may limit agriculture productivity, reduce the rate at which poverty is falling, increase inequality and hamper improvements in food security and malnutrition. The programme will result in increased agricultural productivity, food security and incomes of poor households and contributes towards the MDG’s by helping to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger and promoting gender equality and empowering women.</td>
<td>34,013,930</td>
<td>Post-Completion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vision 2020 UMURENGE Programme</td>
<td>Accelerated reduction of extreme poverty in targeted Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme sectors.</td>
<td>33,141,532</td>
<td>Implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Protection Support to the Poorest in Rwanda</td>
<td>To increase the coverage of social protection and to strengthen social protection systems for the poorest by providing financial aid to the Rwanda Local Development Support Fund (RLDSF) and technical assistance to RLDSF and the Ministry of Local Government. This will benefit an additional 55,000 poor households (approximately 217,680 individuals) each year with social cash transfers, helping them to meet their basic needs and to better manage risks. This contributes</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
towards our MDGs, and will contribute to reduced poverty, vulnerability and hunger in Rwanda.

(15 programmes…)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening Prevention of Gender Based Violence in Rwanda</td>
<td>To strengthen violence prevention mechanisms for women, girls and boys in Rwanda by scaling up promising practices in violence prevention. This will contribute to tackling the social norms which lie behind violence against women and children. This contributes towards our MDGs by promoting gender equality and the empowerment of women, contributing to a reduction in violence against women, girls and boys.</td>
<td>4,600,000</td>
<td>Implementation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2 programmes…)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom/Rwanda Care and Treatment of Genocide Survivors Infected With HIV/AIDS Project</td>
<td>To offer community based care including anti-retroviral treatment (ART) and comprehensive services to 2500 HIV + women genocide survivors and their families.</td>
<td>4,249,447</td>
<td>Post-Completion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(8 programmes…)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support for the Genocide Research and Reconciliation Programme in Rwanda</td>
<td>To increase the use of research and evidence to inform reconciliation and social cohesion processes in Rwanda by 2016, by supporting Aegis Trust to develop an accessible archive, to strengthen research on the Rwandan Genocide and to develop and roll-out a peacebuilding education programme to schools and communities in Rwanda.</td>
<td>2,564,999</td>
<td>Implementation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
When looking at this table, there are sharp contrasts between those programmes funded in BiH and those in Rwanda. First, there are no programmes in BiH that target reconciliation between the three main constituent groups, unlike with Rwanda, where the aid available actually aligns with the policies of nation-building and reconciliation.

I guess it's [the programmes] partly grant-dependent, so different grants or awards will target some areas, so you can get grants like DFID. The British Government Fund for International Development is really pro income-generating activities... So I guess it comes two-ways: our beneficiaries sort of identified needs and our partners identified needs, and then we have to find grants that match that. (…) DFID is backed by the UK government, so they have certain criteria that they want projects [to include] and not others (Laura, Organisation A&B, Rwanda, 23 May 2013).

Moreover, the funds available for gender rights and genocide reconciliation, whilst small in contrast to the highest-funded programmes in Rwanda, are still considerable compared to the £4,000 for gender mainstreaming in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Second, the Rwandan programmes all prioritize community empowerment - more specifically poverty reduction - instead of state-building, and the amounts reserved for community empowerment are considerable. This perhaps explains why all the organisations I observed provided holistic support to the women who suffered from sexual violence, focusing on their personal well-being and empowerment. Indeed, the donors’ alignment with the government’s campaign for poverty reduction (Hayman, 2009) means that even women who suffered from sexual violence during the genocide mostly receive programmes that prioritize their economic empowerment. Chapter Six however demonstrated that unfortunately, economic
empowerment has not yet lead to increased voice and agency due to the continued stigmatisation of rape survivors and its resulting moral exclusion.

In both contexts, the lack of transformative changes in the revalorisation of the survivors of sexual violence can be partly explained by the changing donors’ interests throughout the years following the conflict. This shift in priorities is contextual and is mostly removed from the bottom-up approach that was mentioned by many staff members in my interviews. For instance, when asked specifically which issues are now prioritized by international donors in BiH, Lucy (Organisation F, 13 November 2013) answered:

Actually, after the war, you know there was a lot of funding going to providing psycho-social support, providing capacity-building with those institutions, social workers, psychologists, like what we were doing during that period, and it's pretty much a lot of different networks with supporting domestic violence, supporting trafficking, those areas for the last five years. And then after that it came again with this issue about social inclusion, developing the gender action plan, or national action plan of Bosnia. (…) And then recently the 1325 [UN Resolution 1325] in support of the women's participation in peace and reconciliation, because they don't have a voice in terms of decision-making when it comes to participation in the policy-making. So it's changing once in a while according to what’s on the ground, what the international community [wants] as well. According to this quote, what is constantly missing from the international priorities is the social reintegration of these women. During my interview with a staff member at the UN Trust Fund, it was mentioned that social reintegration programmes are under-funded within the issue of sexual violence in armed conflicts. This was partly explained by the length of the programmes for social reintegration.

It's a long process, the reintegration process has been running for almost ten years now, and they are equally important to provide for such extent. Reintegration is not a two to three years program, it's really something much longer both for the ex-combatants as well as for the survivors. So I think that’s also something that has to be calculated when we do
programming, that is not that fast as especially if you are doing medical reparation or something like that, or even livelihood, but to really work with community-based interaction and really look at stigma and the reconstruction of the social fabric, it takes a lot of time (staff member, UN Trust Fund, 23 April 2014).

However, later on in the interview, she also mentioned that programmes of social reintegration in conflict zones often privilege the reintegration of ex-combatants, instead of civilian victims of war.

I think especially in conflict settings, this might be just my personal opinion, often it tends to be that when the conflict ends, the most direct things to happen are the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the ex-combatants. That is something that the international community often provides a lot of funds for, and the victims or survivors of the conflict and GBV are kind of asked to wait basically. And sometimes in the best case scenarios after a while more attention are given to them. There is so much more than these few ex-combatants that caused all this harm and I think that creates also a lot of tensions in this society when you see that often the perpetrators are given support for reintegration before actually the women or the survivors, or the conflict-affected communities. I can understand that they feel neglected and the interests of the donors are not as great after 20 years of when the peace was negotiated (staff member, UN Trust Fund, 23 April 2014).

These quotes reinforce the argument that donors may rely on short-term, measurable goals, which are not compatible with trauma healing, social reintegration and overall increased agency. More importantly for this research, I however argue from these quotes that whilst the reconstruction of the social fabric of both the ex-combatants and the survivors of sexual violence require long-term involvement, reintegration of ex-combatants takes precedence. Of course, some individuals may suggest that it is imperative that individuals involved in the violence are demobilized, but is underneath the focus on ex-combatants a tacit understanding that women’s reintegration is not as strongly in the interests of international donors as demobilization? The invisibility of the moral exclusion of the survivors of sexual
violence is then again reproduced in the donors’ priorities of post-conflict reconstruction.

This is detrimental for the women, since the donors also have the power to influence national policies (Whitfield, 2009: 2). According to the 2005 Paris Declaration, which makes official state ownership over the aid received, donors need to align and harmonise their priorities with the receiving state’s policies (Paris Declaration, 2005: 3-8). However, in practice, this sphere of influence is reciprocal between states and donors. For example, the Dayton Accords were imposed by the US and EU as an attempt to implement a peace settlement, one that institutionalised multi-ethnicity. It is therefore not surprising that Western donors do not target programmes for ethnic reconciliation. Since BiH is currently attempting to join the European Union, it may provide European donors with a certain power to influence instead local governance policies. Moreover, Western aid has considerably decreased in Rwanda as a result of the tensions and disagreements between Western political leaders and Kagamé’s regime. In this sense, humanitarian aid is also used to politically influence the recipient governments to adopt policies that align with the donor-states priorities (Whitfield, 2009: 1). This further complicates the mediation role of the NGOs I observed, that then not only need to align with the donors’ priorities and the state’s ideology (as will be argued in the next section), but may also find themselves in the crossfire when a donor’s priorities and the state ideology do not align.

\[6\] Both Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina have adhered to this declaration.
However, since DFID is not an international donor focused on gender-related issues, the UN Trust Fund and UN Women are instead good examples of important international donors that provide funding specifically for programmes related to women’s rights. The UN Trust Fund is an intra-agency fund (including UN Women, UNFPA, UNICEF, etc.) that funds programmes related to issues of gender and gender-based violence. In 2014, they oversaw 78 programmes worldwide (staff member, UN Trust Fund, 23 April 2014). On their website, it notes that:

**The UN Trust Fund to End Violence against Women**, an inter-agency mechanism managed by UN Women on behalf of the UN system, supports innovative and pioneering programmes aimed at preventing and responding to all forms of violence against women and girls. Since 1996, the UN Trust Fund has awarded US$95 million in grants to 368 initiatives in 135 countries (UN Women, https://grants.unwomen.org/).

When analysing the following map of the grants awarded globally by the UN Trust Fund since 1996, there is a certain regional dispersion where, even if some countries received more grants (India and Peru are the two countries with the highest number of grants allocated with 17 and 16), no clear priority zone can be seen, unlike with the case of DFID.
When looking at BiH and Rwanda, BiH was awarded five grants (totalling US$1,578,981) and Rwanda eight grants (totalling US$3,121,392) over that period.

However, all UN institutions depend financially on the amount of money UN member states are ready to allocate them. For example, in 2014, UN Women received US$14,833,741 allocated to the UN Trust Fund to End Violence Against Women, and US$1,922,731 allocated to the UN Trust Fund for Gender Equality (UN Women, 2015). In comparison, UNICEF received US$5.169 billion in 2014 (UNICEF, 2015), and the UNDP received US$793 million in core funding and US$3.8 billion for specific projects and countries (UNDP, 2015: 41).

You know this may sound like a lot, but in the end when it comes to programming, you may be talking about hundreds of thousands of dollars only. Which for a problem of this magnitude, it doesn't come to... almost anything. And that is sometimes the problem with trying to find out what the international community is doing. Because of, in the Security Council or in the general assembly, you hear all of these things but sometimes the
programming on the ground is peanuts, it's very, very small (staff member, UN Women, 23 April 2014).

This probably explains why organisations that are successfully funded by UN Women still need to rely on other sources of financial support to cover their programmes, since even the funding provided by this UN agency is insufficient to cover all expenses of one organisation, as demonstrated in the table below.

**Table 8: List of Donors for Organisation J, BiH, 2013-2014**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donors 2013-2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Norwegian Embassy in Sarajevo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embassy of the United States in BiH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIDES Foundation- US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christlicher Friedensdienst cfd, Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Security, BiH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees, BiH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation J’s canton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation J’s municipality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narko-NE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>King Boudouin Foundation and GIZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s World Day of Prayer, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louis Leitz Stiftung, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation J’s international branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UN Women- Project Office in BiH</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundation Open Society Institute</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


With the money received from the UN member states, UN Women and the UN Trust Fund send annual calls for funding proposals for projects lasting two to three
years, with funding requests ranging between US$50,000 and one million dollars. NGOs, UN country offices and local governments are all eligible to apply (staff member, UN Trust Fund, 23 April 2014). The call for proposals can either be quite general or thematic if funding for a particular issue is available. For example, two years ago the UN Trust Fund established:

A special funding window on addressing violence against women and girls in conflict, post-conflict and transitional settings, and there we funded four programmes working in eleven countries for around 3.5 million dollars. (…) Currently some of our programmes are very transitional justice focused, and focus of course on accountability but also focus on reparation and reconciliation, etc. (staff member, UN Trust Fund, 23 April 2014).

According to the staff members interviewed, UN Women and the UN Trust Fund do not have certain issues that are prioritized through funding, except in the cases of special funding windows. Otherwise, the funds granted depend on the quality of the proposals. As explained, ‘this is a program of such magnitude, you know violence against women in general, and we are a small funding in that sense, so we have very rigorous criteria’ (staff member, UN Trust Fund, 23 April 2014). When asked to provide more details about the funding process, it became evident that the UN Trust Fund operates independently from thematic or geographical priorities.

We have a very rigorous process where we actually involve all these 18 different UN agencies in the review, technical review of these proposals and based on the scoring, so based on the strength of the proposal, we then provide funding. So this is done first on the sub-regional level, where people have this regional or national knowledge, and then that's sent up. The shortlist of applications is then sent to HQ, where we have a committee of all these different UN agencies that sit together. So if you have a program focusing on children then maybe UNICEF are the ones to review [it] because they have that expertise, or if it is about HIV and violence against women then UNAIDS for example will take part of that. So we try to of course have a regional balance in the places where we work, but really it is based on the strength of the proposal. So sometimes we wish to fund, we can see that the needs are very large and especially in that area, so you wish you can get a very strong proposal from there but we cannot, we really
have to work with what we get and fund the best programmes (staff member, UN Trust Fund, 23 April 2014).

The previous quote provides a clear insight into the funding process, but also illustrates a complex situation in which the target population or countries with important needs are not necessarily funded by UN Women, which can be detrimental for the beneficiaries themselves. By operating this way, the beneficiaries are dependent on the NGOs’ ability to draft successful grant proposals, effectively putting the NGOs in a mediating role between UN Women and the beneficiaries. This could be problematic for some grassroots organisations that might not have the expertise or knowledge of drafting high-quality grant proposals. This is why Organisation K provided grant-writing workshops to their local partners in Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC, in order to increase their opportunities and skills as mediators (17 July 2014).

Of the around 2,500 proposals received every year, only 1% are successful. In terms of budget, in 2013 the US$8 million trust received proposals for a total of US$1.1 billion (staff member, UN Trust Fund, 23 April 2014). The difficulty in securing funding from UN Women is witnessed anywhere in the world, but it was mentioned that Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda received greater support on this issue than other countries.

Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda in particular [receive] much more [support] than any other countries. Even with the huge gaps that you observed and that they neglected, both Rwanda and BiH are cases of sustained support from the international community, even on this issue for a long period of time. Both support to survivors as well as impunity issues, not [any] other countries has had that kind of response with an international court, plus the national court following up, with the number of convictions that there has been, etc. (staff member, UN Women, 23 April 2014).
The explanations for this are unclear, since according to both staff members, the UN Trust Fund does not prioritize specific countries. Regardless, Rwanda and BiH have still received greater support from the international community than other countries for issues of sexual violence. The focus however differs in each country.

In Rwanda we definitely worked with survivors of sexual violence in the past, although I know that in recent years our UN Women office is much more focused on gender response, budgeting of national authorities and economic empowerment, working with women on cross-borders trade. They target all women engaged in cross-borders trade rather than specifically sub-set of survivors of the genocide (staff member, UN Women, 23 April 2013).

In BiH, the country office was granted around US$1,000,000 for a period of three years. The focus is more on legal aid, however, helping women to navigate through the judicial process, and on referral and coordination processes (staff member, UN Women, 23 April 2013). Despite this perception held by these staff members, the amount granted to the UN Trust Fund for the prevention of gender-based violence is still very negligible compared to other humanitarian support.

For example, peacekeeping operations for 2014/2015 were awarded a budget of US$7.06 billion (United Nations, 2015: 2/3), and I described above how the UN Trust Fund fares in comparison to other agencies such as UNDP and UNICEF.

Just to put things in perspective, 8 millions dollars would give you money to set up a decent reparation programme for example for survivors of sexual violence in one small country like Liberia or Sierra Leone - out of 190 countries and more in the world, so one type of intervention in one small country. And obviously peacekeeping operations, the big ones, cost between 600 million and 1.2 billion dollars. All the humanitarian appeal, the hundreds of millions for each big crisis, DDR [disarmament, demobilization and reintegration] programmes are sometimes, the big ones, are ten of millions, hundreds of millions sometimes. So it's very little, very, very little money (staff member, UN Women, 23 April 2014).
However, even if gender-related issues in post-war countries receive less attention than other humanitarian support, such as assistance to ex-combatants, both staff members mentioned that the issue of sexual violence in armed conflicts is currently receiving a greater share of attention than other topics related to gender-based violence. ‘Compared to the smaller world of international community support to gender equality, women's empowerment, women's rights [and] violence against women in general, the issue of sexual violence in conflict does receive plenty of attention comparatively within that much smaller pool’ (staff member, UN Women, 23 April 2014). And yet, programmes are clearly still lacking, suggesting the difficulty of securing assistance for victims of gender-based violence, showing the certain invisibility of these victims. It is hoped, however, that this sector will receive more money in the next few years after the years of austerity are over: ‘These windows come and go’ (staff member, UN Women, 23 April 2014).

The limited availability of funds inevitably leads to fierce competition between organisations, especially those who have a small annual budget. For example, if these organisations apply for funding from the UN Trust Fund, the Trust Fund needs to adjust the funding allocated in order to ensure that a smaller organisation can successfully absorb the amount granted.

Actually before we used to give grants for $100,000 for three years and this year we lowered it to $50,000 because we see that the majority of women's organisations who really dedicate their full attention to these issues cannot absorb $100,000. We read their proposal but we think this would be ten times their annual budget. It's very clear that it is very difficult for them to absorb that amount of money (staff member, UN Trust Fund, 23 April 2014).

Smaller organisations are, however, often the actors that directly target issues of sexual violence, as was witnessed in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda. Bigger
international NGOs will often include some programmes on GBV and sexual violence in armed conflicts, but these are part of their larger agendas.

We always compare ourselves with child protection, which is often easier to raise funds for issues affecting children generally, and one of the main differences that I see is that all the big INGOs in the GBV world are not exclusively focused on GBV. And there isn't a UN agency focusing on GBV. It's a huge part of UN Women mandate, it's a big part of several agencies’ mandate, hence why we have inter-agency funds. But the same thing happens with INGOs. Some of the INGOs that sent proposals to the UN Trust Fund that seem to work on violence against women, this is a small percentage of their portfolio. All of the main child protection actors work exclusively on child protection. That makes a bit of a difference (staff member, UN Women, 23 April 2014).

There is thus a dilemma faced by donors that goes beyond the quality of the applications received. Indeed, it seems that the size of the organisation will influence the amount granted by donors; bigger NGOs can absorb larger funds as opposed to smaller NGOs. However, smaller NGOs are often the actors who work directly on specific gender-related issues, such as specific support for survivors of sexual violence. As was well-summarised by the UN Women’s staff member:

In development, you have this thing where all the chains, all this links in a chain, and the money tends to stay in the first few, and less and less trickle down, and then when you get to the ground, with the people who are actually doing the work, it is a lot less money. This is one of our biggest problems (staff member, UN Women, 23 April 2014).

For example, when looking at the financial report of Organisation C in Rwanda, the organisation I met in either country that was the most active with women who suffered from sexual violence, their funding sources are limited to other organisations and their partners in the US and UK. Even the financial assistance provided by the Ministry of Health in Rwanda was only allocated for their health clinic, which was not specific to survivors of sexual violence.
Table 9: List of Donors for Organisation C in 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donors 2010</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organisation C’s branch in UK &amp; US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comfort Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Health, Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSPIRE!Africa</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


In a sense, this organisation is an organisation that engages on a daily basis with women who suffered from sexual violence, but their funding is limited compared to other bigger organisations, such as Organisation E, in Rwanda.

Table 10: List of Donors for Organisation E in 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donors 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Femmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARG (Fonds d’Assistance pour les Rescapés du Génocide)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAFOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IREX</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Based on this annual review, Organisation E received in 2010 funding from both the umbrella organisation Pro-Femmes, which acts as a middleman between grassroots organisations and the Rwandan government, and from FARG, the assistance fund for survivors of the genocide.
Finally, whether small or large, all organisations need to mediate and negotiate their presence within that sector, and maintain good relationships with donors. Maintaining good relationships also entails mediating the relationships between the beneficiaries and the donors’ needs and interests. As explained by Laura (Organisations A&B, 23 May 2013):

A person contacted us the other day and wanted to sponsor some students through school, which we said: "that's fantastic", but then she said: "why can't we bring our university students here to help out". And well... if it is managed well it could be really beneficial, and a really good partnership, but on the other hand, it could always be a waste of our resources having to organize a big group of students... But there are definitely ways we could do it, but there's always the constant challenge between getting money and pleasing our donors, and then also making sure that the beneficiaries are protected, and get what they need and not what other people want them to have. And then obviously, as with all development work, the type of sustainability of it. Making sure the projects are followed-up, making sure they do work.

In this case, the organisation found itself in a difficult position where its desire to please and attract donors may actually divert resources and attention from the people they are supporting. A certain disconnect between the interests of the national and international donors, and the actual needs of the beneficiaries are observed in each context.

What the international community wants, because ok, transitional justice that's a hot topic right now but local communities or the women in these municipalities don't even know how, what's transitional justice, what is related to transitional justice, what is happening with these people, there are a lot of women and family children who don't have basic services, who don't have access to health insurance, and you're talking about something that is beyond their comprehension to understand. And you give millions of money to fund those conferences, why don't you focus on the very basic things? (Lucy, Organisation F, 13 November 2013).

In this case, and as the quote suggests, large sums of funding for women’s empowerment and involvement in the political sphere are offered in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, but if some groups of women, such as the survivors of sexual violence, are unaware of their rights, a certain disconnect between what is funded and what is actually happening will remain observable.

**Aligning with State Ideology**

Grassroots and international organisations do not operate in a political vacuum, where their agency is completely independent and removed from local political actors. For example, Médecins Sans Frontières constantly need to negotiate with local governments for access and provision of services, as was the case of the Ebola Response or the war in Sri Lanka. This is especially true for NGOs working in conflict and post-conflict societies, which are still operating in a political and social context that is framed by the past experiences of violence. There are thus some requirements that NGOs need to fulfil in order to be allowed to operate.

For example, organisations operating in certain countries require state permission, often entailing a government permit, to operate. The need for government approval can sometimes mean the organisations have to align with the government’s ideology in order to be granted a permit. In the Bosnian-Herzegovinian context, the organisations I observed did not mention any strict requirements or ideology they had to follow. For example, when speaking with Organisation L, an international women’s organisation operating worldwide but with headquarters in the US and UK, the Policy & Programmes Grants Coordinator in London (20 May 2015) mentioned that she was not aware of any restrictions or ideology their organisation needs to follow in BiH, unlike with Rwanda or other countries. ‘We have a lot more control on us in Rwanda from the government and we have to do a lot to comply with them, and we have difficulties with governments in other countries as well. I haven't
specifically heard about that in BiH’ (Policy & Programmes Grants Coordinator, Organisation L, 20 May 2015). Good relationships with the state still need to be maintained, including for possible partnerships, but Bosnian state control over international and grassroots humanitarian organisations seems limited.

However there are a few laws and policies regarding the establishment of funds and associations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, such as the ‘Federation Law on the Associations of Citizens’ (1995), the ‘Law on Humanitarian Activities and Organizations of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (1998), the ‘Law on Foundations and Funds’ (1998) and the ‘Law on Associations and Foundations (RS)’ (2001). These laws are very general, with only a few ideological requirements. A political requirement can be found in Article 29 of the ‘Federation Law on the Associations of Citizens’ (1995), which stipulates that a ‘relevant ministry will refuse a request for enrolment if by its statute goals [the association] instigates or invites to forcible violation of constitutional order, independence, unified or territorial integrity of Federation’. Moreover, Article 2 in the ‘Law on Humanitarian Activities and Organizations of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (1998: Article 2) stipulates that:

Humanitarian activities, as defined by this Law, shall encompass activities by which humanitarian aid in the form money, goods and services, without compensation and without conditions concerning territorial, national, religious, political and other affiliations, shall be provided to natural and legal persons who, through no fault of their own, find themselves in need for such aid (because of reduced health and working capability, state of war, elemental catastrophes, etc.)

Finally, Article 3 of the ‘Law on Associations and Foundations (RS)’ (2001: Article 3) also stipulates that:

The statute and activities of an association or foundation may not be contrary to the constitutional order, or directed at the violent overthrow of
the constitutional order, nor may they be aimed at disseminating of ethnic, racial or religious hatred or discrimination prohibited by the Constitution and the law.

These legal documents all prohibit ethnic, racial or religious discrimination in the provision of services by humanitarian organisations, and organisations guilty of discrimination may face fines or removal of their permit. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the laws in the Federation of BiH also prohibit challenges to the territorial integrity of the Federation, which is a powerful ideological statement by the government. These laws therefore impose a certain ideological alignment on the organisations wishing to operate in BiH, but this state control remains rather limited.

Rwanda is however different, with the government exerting a stronger control over the NGOs registered in the country. First, NGO permits need to be renewed every year, as is the case with other countries such as Burundi, and reports need to be provided to government bodies for the permit’s renewal. These measures are not extraordinary, but are taken very seriously by organisations working in Rwanda.

I would say that the requirements are similar from country to country, but we take things very seriously in Rwanda. In Rwanda we do not accept that for example a NGO comes and decides to start their activities like this, like in other countries where there’s some non-sense. In Rwanda, it is stricter (Organisation K, 17 July 2014).

For Organisation K, this is perhaps stricter than in Burundi and definitely different than their experience in the DRC, but this state control over what humanitarian organisations are allowed to do or not is not something specific to the Rwandan context.

In the DRC, we asked for our permit three years ago and we still have not received it. It is very, very long. The project will maybe end before we get it. I know another organisation that had the same experience in Haiti, who
asked for a permit and the project ended before it got it. It did not prevent it to work, as it is not preventing us from working in the DRC because we got the local approvals and everything, but let’s say that in Rwanda, well this is it, we know that we need to be careful about what we say. But the fact that a country asks us for a permit, this is normal. Otherwise anyone would do whatever. So there is a control over who comes work in the country, what they are doing, where the funds come from, and this is legitimate for a government (Organisation K, 17 July 2014).

Pushing this even further, whilst a certain level of state control over the work done by humanitarian organisations is legitimate, I would also argue that it is directly in line with the Rwandan government’s policies of post-conflict reconstruction, where a certain level of social control is exerted in order to prevent divisionism. In this case, the control that is extended to grassroots and international organisations is part of these efforts of eradicating divisions by ensuring that organisations are not holding discourses or programmes that are harmful for the reconciliation process. A representative of the Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion hinted at this during an interview, expressing that partners have to align with the government strategy for gender mainstreaming in order to coordinate these efforts (15 July 2013). As mentioned by a staff member, ‘we cannot develop a project if the main lines of the project do not align with the main lines of the country’ (Organisation K, 17 July 2014).

But more importantly, not only do NGOs have to align with the government policies, but the Rwandan government actively uses NGOs to implement its policies of nation-building. Indeed, I argue that NGOs and donors prioritize programmes of community empowerment because of the strong influence of the Rwanda government, where strong control over the aid sector means that NGOs are expected to pursue nation-building. For the most part, aligning with the state ideology of national unity is not necessarily a difficult challenge faced by NGOs operating in
Rwanda, but organisations whose beneficiaries are limited to survivors of the genocide can still be seen as dividing the population.

A lot of Comic Relief has to sit with government ideas here. So for example, the government here are really promoting inclusion, and not wanting projects solely for survivors which is a controversial topic, but it is very hard for us to get funding from Comic Relief now because they are working with the Rwandan government and don't want to be seen as sort of benefiting one group only (Laura, 23 May 2013).

The previous quote illustrates this tension between inclusion and the need for programmes targeting survivors of the genocide. This is a dilemma faced by Organisations A and B which affects their access to funding, but also represents a broader moral dilemma of whether responding to the needs of their beneficiaries also creates a social distance between the survivors and the rest of the population who share similar needs.

I think the challenge for the future of Organisation A is that the country's sort of policies and ideas is all about reconciliation, and not sort of highlighting the differences and you could debate that survivors organisations are still keeping things quite separate. And I think like with the grant from Comic Relief, I think we have to think more and more creatively about how to be more open and to work with all communities and things. On the other hand, we sometimes believe that survivors need specific assistance, and once they have that they will then feel more able to reconcile and be part of the community. So I think that's an on-going debate, the government definitely not anti any of the work we are doing and supported, but I think there's always an ongoing challenge with what is the current agenda and the current step forward, and making sure we fit with that and don't rub anyone up the wrong way (Laura, 23 May 2013).

Survivors of the genocide, including survivors of sexual violence, are recognized by the state in Rwanda, but this special recognition may still contribute to a certain social isolation if the beneficiaries’ engagement and interactions with non-survivors remain limited. Recognition of the specific needs of genocide survivors therefore provides opportunities for NGOs to directly target survivors, but in doing so they
might struggle to secure funding if their programmes are perceived as encouraging divisions within the population, which is inconsistent with the government’s priority of nation-building.

Furthermore, the government still possesses some humanitarian priorities that may not always be the priorities of the grassroots and international NGOs. For example, there is a strong focus on individual economic empowerment - helping individuals to become active economic agents - that is sometimes inconsistent with programmes for gender equality.

If [the government] says this year, we want every farmer to own a cow, or this health service for everyone, well they will put some pressure over everyone to contribute. But a project on violence against women, there cannot be expenses for agriculture, herding, healthcare other than for women who experienced violence. So this is when there can be some challenges at times. (…) It happened for example this year during the March 8th celebrations. The authorities wanted us to pay for some expenses for vulnerable populations. It was not corresponding to the main lines of our project. Our partners received a lot of pressure, they put pressure on our team and it goes up to me and I say: “well no, we cannot, it does not fit into our project. We can do something else but not that”. So there is that type of pressure (Organisation K, 17 July 2014).

State pressure can then be exerted on organisations to develop new programmes that target the state’s priorities. This staff member was, however, quick to clarify that this is not something specific to Rwanda, and this type of pressure is also felt in the DRC. This is probably felt strongly in Rwanda because the government has a lot of state programmes that it wants to implement, and one way of doing so might be to have humanitarian organisations on board and contributing to the state programmes (Organisation K, 17 July 2014).

There is therefore a constant mediation faced by some organisations between ensuring the needs of their beneficiaries are met while maintaining good
relationships with donors for funding purposes, and, in the Rwandan context, ensuring good relationships with the state. This perhaps also explains why institutional capacity-building is not prioritized in Rwanda. Unlike in BiH where NGOs are involved in state-building, state-building in Rwanda is strongly associated with national security, meaning that only state actors can engage in capacity-building. Ensuring good relationships with the state therefore means that despite international criticisms over processes of state-building and democratic governance in Rwanda, none of the NGOs working in that context pursue state-building.

Moreover, aligning with the state ideology not only provides an organisation with the opportunity to operate in Rwanda, but strong ties with the government are often believed to lead to more funding opportunities. For example, Organisation E had strong ties with the government, and the resources available for this organisation were greater than those of smaller grassroots organisations. There is, of course, no evidence demonstrating certain NGOs are favoured over others, but as was well-summarised by a staff member in Organisation K (17 July 2014):

Let’s supposed that the government got some funding to work on an issue such as gender-based violence, and that within that funding there are some funds available for the civil society. Well that money will go to the civil society. Now what is the process, what are the criteria, will anyone have access to that money, will if we are on very, very, very good terms with the government (laughs), if we never criticized, will we have more easily access [to the funding] than others? I would think so. But this is not written, this is not official. But we can suppose so.

**Discussion**

This chapter demonstrated that the NGOs operating in BiH and Rwanda constantly mediate their relationships with donors and state actors in order to ensure
the needs of women who experienced sexual violence are met, while attracting sources of funding and aligning themselves with the state ideology toward post-conflict reconstruction (Whitfield, 2009: 1). Donors’ interests influence the type of programmes implemented, perhaps not to the extent where organisations drastically transform their aims and objectives, but to the extent that some programmes might become prioritized over others in order to secure funding (Hayman, 2006: 16-19). For example, this chapter has demonstrated that capacity-building is currently prioritized by donors in BiH, with community empowerment being the priority in Rwanda. Through their mediation role, NGOs therefore to a certain extent reconstruct the women’s experiences in order to align with the priorities of the international donors and the state in which they operate. This has the impact that whilst the women who experienced wartime sexual violence share a common moral exclusion in the aftermath of the violence, the NGOs’ responses currently differ as a result of these contextual donor priorities. This chapter argued that in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the NGOs’ response mostly targets the legitimization and institutionalization of the women’s voices (legal recognition), which does not necessarily entail their increased agency or empowerment. In Rwanda, the focus is mostly on empowerment, both personal and economic (holistic support), but again this does not result in an increased voice or increased agency for the women I met, since in both contexts there is a continued association between the impurity of these women’s bodies and their morality (Mertus, 1994: 18). I argue that in both cases, the NGOs attempt to reintegrate the women first and foremost as members of the nation, which however requires a transformation of the ideology of woman-as-nation. The
strategic interests of donors may however not prioritize programmes that would foster these transformative changes (Hamilton, K., 2000: 53).

Moreover, this chapter argued that as a result of the ‘New Policy Agenda’, NGOs in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda have been attributed the role of fostering post-conflict reconciliation - in this case of promoting processes of social reintegration for the survivors of sexual violence – which resulted in NGOs undertaking the role of mediator between the individual experiences and the post-conflict state (Fisher, 1997: 443; Tarry, 2000: 109). Indeed, organisations are required to align with state policies and ideologies, which in Bosnia-Herzegovina is not necessarily a constraint, but in Rwanda brings different challenges. It was demonstrated that the Rwandan government exerts stronger control over NGOs operating in its territory than the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, where in Rwanda NGOs are expected to pursue nation-building. This confirms the argument that the Rwanda state has a strong control over its population, including civil society. This chapter has also argued that state ideologies and policies likewise influence the donors themselves (and vice-versa), who in return will tend to fund NGO programmes that already align with state ideology and priorities.

This is especially important, since it demonstrates that the NGOs find themselves as the actors who mediate the micro and macro exclusion experienced by the survivors of sexual violence, through their programmes and services. Influenced by the needs of their beneficiaries, their donors’ priorities and their state policies, the organisations I observed continually mediate the macro-policies of the post-conflict state with the individual experiences of post-conflict reconciliation.
This thesis has thus demonstrated so far that the contrasts found in the ways the women who suffered from sexual violence wish to be socially reintegrated and in the ways the NGOs support these beneficiaries are in fact embedded within the different policies of post-conflict reconstruction implemented by the post-conflict state. Therefore, I argue that the women who suffered from sexual violence moved from ethnic women to moral outcasts in the aftermath of the violence, and that this exclusion is contextually shaped since the priorities for social reintegration are different in Rwanda to BiH. Addressing these priorities then requires different forms of post-conflict inclusion.
Chapter 9. Conclusion

This research has sought to explore the post-conflict experiences of women who survived wartime sexual violence, contrasting the experiences of the women I met in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina, with a conceptual focus on their social belonging and social reintegration within their community. It has also sought to explore the role played by NGOs to mediate this social reintegration. It has focused on two broad main research questions:

1. How are women who suffered from wartime sexual violence experiencing social belonging 15-20 years after the end of ethnic violence?
2. How do NGOs and state policies influence these experiences of social reintegration?

Social vs. Legal Integration of the Survivors of Sexual Violence

The empirical findings of this research first suggest that the women I interviewed in both contexts still suffer from stigmatisation and social marginalisation almost 20 years after the end of the ethnic violence as a result of several factors, such as the trauma experienced, the stigma of rape, the illnesses associated with rape, financial struggles, and so on. These experiences, as related in Chapters Six and Seven, were shared by the women in the same context but also across the two contexts, despite individual variations. Indeed, the stigmatisation and exclusion experienced varies from individual to individual, with some women feeling completely excluded while some others feel reintegrated to a certain extent within their community. These experiences, I argue, are a result of the ideology of woman-as-nation, in which the women’s bodies were used as a battlefield upon which the nation could be destroyed during the ethnic violence (Douglas, 1966: 142; Yuval-Davis, 1994: 413). Their role
as embodiment of the nation (Eisenstein, 2000: 47; Mayer, 2000: 18) made them vulnerable to crimes of sexual violence during the war, but more importantly, it justifies their moral exclusion in the aftermath of the violence. Indeed, the stigmatisation experienced, as described in Chapters Six and Seven, is a result of processes of victim-blaming in which the women are blamed for their experience of sexual violence, suggesting that the rape was committed because of their behaviour or moral character (Lerner, 1980: 96; Hafer, 2004, 122). This process of victim-blaming does not occur to the same extent with other civilian victims of war, therefore I suggest that there is something distinct and inherent about rape as a weapon of war that fosters victim-blaming. This may be a result of the patriarchal set of moral values, where the ‘dirtiness’ of the women’s bodies has been transferred to their moral value.

However, what is common for all women interviewed is that regardless of the social inclusion experienced, they all developed a strong and meaningful sense of belonging with other survivors of sexual violence that is not reproduced with non-survivors. Alternative families have been formed in each context, based on shared experiences of sexual violence, and these social bonds prove difficult to reproduce outside of these groups. Indeed, another crucial empirical finding of these chapters is that regardless of the similar experiences of marginalisation, the women I met in Rwanda and the women I met in BiH had contrasting ideas as to how their social reintegration should be achieved. In Rwanda, the women mostly wish to be accepted and reintegrated into their local community, and to feel like valued members of the community. In contrast, the women in BiH mostly wish to be legally recognised by their state, to have their specific rights as civilian victims of war, and as citizens,
recognized by the post-conflict state. In both contexts, this need for social reintegration is an attempt to transform the boundaries for fairness of their national or ethnic group, securing a place for the survivors of sexual violence within the group’s scope of justice (Opotow, 2004: 105; Opotow, Gerson and Woodside, 2005: 305). I argued in this thesis that the contrasts found in the response to this moral exclusion are a consequence of the macro-policies of post-conflict reconstruction implemented in each state.

As Chapter Five demonstrated, the Rwandan state is characterized by an important process of nation-building, where ethnicity has been outlawed in favour of a broader national Rwandan identity, and where gender-sensitive policies were implemented to promote women’s rights and gender equality. Despite the limitations of these policies, the state has been highly involved in redesigning what it means to be Rwandan. This creates individual opportunities for re-identification and repositioning within one’s local community (Sarkin, 1999: 800; Loizides, Kovras and Ireton, 2010: 6). I suggest that this provides opportunities for the women who suffered wartime rape to be relocated within their community, which is why their social reintegration has become the key to meeting their physical and safety needs. This is, however, contrasted by the Bosnian-Herzegovinian context, where ethnicity has been institutionalised within state institutions, based on the rationale that ethnicity can only be accommodated through strong state institutions (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 33; Hechter, 2000: 138). I argued in Chapter Five that state employment and public services are still structured around ethnic identities. This promotes group rights over individual rights. This creates a political context where
the women I met believe that their physical and safety needs can only be achieved through legal recognition by their state.

Chapters Five, Six and Seven therefore contribute to both the fields of gender and conflict studies, showing how macro-processes of post-conflict reconstruction have an impact on the lived experiences of civilian victims of war, specifically on the women who survived a certain type of crime: sexual violence. The academic literature already provides a framework from which post-conflict reconstruction through state/nation-building can be theorized, and this research contributes to this framework by demonstrating how these policies impact social belonging for marginalized groups in the aftermath of ethnic violence. To my knowledge, this is a novel contribution to both academic fields, and may have policy implications for peacebuilders in post-conflict societies.

**Mediated Experiences of Survivors of Sexual Violence**

In addition to analysing the experiences of the women I met, this thesis also shed a light on the work done by some key NGOs working with this type of beneficiary, and the complex relationships they maintain with their donors and the state in which they operate, which provides original data on the role of NGOs in post-conflict societies. Chapters Six and Seven first provide the empirical findings that despite the similarity of the crimes experienced in both contexts, the NGOs operating in Rwanda and those operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina privilege different approaches. I demonstrated that both sets of NGOs provide the necessary programmes of trauma counselling, income-generating activities and medical services. However, the main contrast can be found in their strategy to facilitate the social inclusion of these women. My data showed that the NGOs in Rwanda prioritize the social recognition
of these women by providing them holistic support. They then attempt to support them in all spheres of their lives, and consequently help them to feel empowered within their community. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the NGOs I observed instead prioritize the legal recognition of the rights of the survivors of sexual violence, actively lobbying the state on the women’s behalf.

This argument was supported by my empirical findings in Chapter Eight, where I also suggest that the NGOs’ mediation role is further complicated by their relationships with donors and the state in which they operate. The NGOs I observed all struggle financially, resulting in their financial dependency on national and international donors. I demonstrated that this dependency relationship influences the types of programmes offered by the NGOs in both contexts, where the donors’ understandings and ideologies of post-conflict reconstruction influence how NGOs respond to the needs of the survivors of sexual violence. Moreover, organisations are required to align with state policies and ideologies. In Bosnia-Herzegovina this is not necessarily constraining, but in Rwanda this can bring different challenges. I demonstrated that the Rwandan government exerts a strong control over NGOs, which are required to align with the state’s ideology of national unity. Their complex relationships with the donors and the states have the consequence that despite the similarity in the crimes experienced, the NGOs’ responses in BiH and in Rwanda privilege different approaches. Indeed, NGOs in Rwanda mediate the social relocation of their beneficiaries within the local community (prioritizing empowerment), while NGOs in Bosnia-Herzegovina mediate the social integration of their beneficiaries within the political institutions (prioritizing inclusion of women’s voices in the political agenda). I argue that these contrasts are a result of the
mediation role exerted by NGOs in each context, where since the state policies favour the construction of ethnic and national identities while the women suffer from a loss of self, the NGOs are the actors that mediate these experiences through their programmes. These mediated experiences are therefore not directly the experiences of the women, but experiences that NGOs construct in order to secure funding and assistance from international donors and the state in which they operate. This data is important for theories of post-conflict reconstruction, since it demonstrates that nation-building, whether through the strengthening of ethnic or civic identities, will not foster post-conflict reconciliation for certain civilian victims of war – such as survivors of sexual violence - if it focuses solely on addressing the ethnic divisions at the core of the violence instead of challenging the ideology of woman-as-nation. The same is true for state-building, where even if the ethnic rights of the survivors of sexual violence are institutionalized, their social location on the margins of society prevent them from fully accessing these rights.

The implication therefore is that the crimes experienced during ethnic violence remain embedded within the local political context, and that regardless of the universality of suffering and consequences of these acts, the responses remain localised and contextualised. These chapters provide an important and novel contribution, since whilst previous research has been conducted on NGO responses in each country and on the dependency relationships between state-NGOs-donors, to my knowledge no existing research has contrasted the NGO responses of two countries for crimes of wartime sexual violence, connecting them to the macro-processes of post-conflict reconstruction. By moving away from the NGOs-donors, donors-states and NGOs-states relationships to a broader analysis of the impact of
post-conflict reconstruction ideologies on the NGO sector, this thesis provides an original understanding of the mediation role that NGOs play in post-conflict societies. It demonstrates that beyond NGOs having the responsibility of promoting reconciliation for marginalized groups (Fisher, 1997: 443), they are crucial actors in bridging the gap between the individual desires for social reintegration and the macro-policies of identity construction.

**Ethnic Identity to Moral Self**

The main theoretical contribution of this thesis concerns its application to intersectional scholarly work on post-conflict and gender studies (Cockburn and Zarkov, 2002; Eifler and Seifert, 2009; Helms, 2013). Indeed, this study provides an original understanding of women and nation in the context of nation/state-building. Expanding on the literature of nation-as-woman, the theoretical findings of this study are that the women who suffered from sexual violence moved from ethnic women to moral outcasts in the aftermath of the violence, and that this exclusion is contextually shaped since the priorities for social reintegration are different in Rwanda than in BiH. Addressing these priorities then requires different forms of post-conflict inclusion.

To demonstrate this, I argued in Chapter Two that during the ethnic violence, women who experienced wartime rape were socially located outside the scope of justice of their ethnic enemies, which made them vulnerable to these crimes. In the aftermath of the violence, a shift occurred whereby these women suddenly found themselves outside the scope of justice of their own ethnic or national communities. I argue that regardless of the ethnic or civic nation found in the post-conflict state, there is a shift from ethnic identity to moral self in the aftermath of the violence,
where underlying these difficulties of ethnic and gender identification is a deeper loss of moral self that is caused by the consequences of wartime sexual violence.

Using Mann’s (2004) and Opotow et al’s (2005) typologies of ethnic violence and moral exclusion, I developed an original model that captures this shift. I suggest that once women’s bodies were used as a battlefield, a shift occurred where the impurity of their body was transferred to their moral character. This shift results from the nature of sexual violence as a crime that encourages victim-blaming in patriarchal settings. Therefore, since the kin group could not justify the impurity of these women through their ethnic identity – identity they share(d) with their group - the kin group justified it instead as a result of the women’s own immorality. This, I argue, remains the main moral transgression that these women experience in the post-conflict period. This new model has important implications, since it situates the underlying post-conflict social exclusion experienced by the women with whom the NGOs work, and will contribute to furthering our knowledge of the experiences of these civilian victims of war, possibly applying this same model to other contexts where sexual violence was used during ethnic cleansing.

**Ethical Reflections**

Conducting research with women who suffered from wartime rape in post-conflict societies is a very difficult process, with important ethical issues and logistical challenges. For ethical reasons and for ease of access, only women who are members of non-governmental organisations were interviewed and included in this thesis. The experiences of these women may therefore vary from those of women who now live abroad or who are not members of any organisation. Choosing women who are already members of NGOs also had the result that all women identified as Tutsi or
Bosnian Muslim. It is generally accepted by the academic literature and national discourse that the highest number of rapes were committed against these groups. However, Hutu women, as well as Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat women, were also victims of wartime sexual violence. Further research could therefore include the experiences of women who identify as belonging to different ethnic groups, perhaps showing the similarities or differences that their ethnicity plays in their post-conflict experiences. For example, are the needs and rights of the Tutsi and Bosnian Muslim survivors of sexual violence more easily recognized than those of the Hutu or Bosnian Serb women?

Moreover, for theoretical reasons, this research only focuses on women who survived wartime rape. I am definitely not denying that men were also the victims of this type of abuse during the wars. As much as the post-conflict experiences of the women who survived wartime sexual violence is under-studied, the experiences of the male survivors of sexual violence are even less researched. Another avenue for further research could therefore be to analyse the social inclusion and belonging of men who experienced sexual violence during these conflicts.

Finally, because of the difficulties of conducting this type of research, a limited number of women were officially interviewed. Their experiences provide a valuable and original insight into their lived experiences, mostly when contrasting the experiences in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is however worth stressing that I am not attempting with this research to generalize these experiences to all women who survived wartime rape.


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## Annex 1: Research Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Socio-demographic Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agathe</td>
<td>Rwandese; Tutsi; 30-40 y/o; single; no children; no occupation; lives in a locality in Kigali Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valentine</td>
<td>Rwandese; Tutsi; 40-50 y/o; widowed from the genocide; has children; cultivates her land; lives in a locality outside Kigali Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olive</td>
<td>Rwandese; Tutsi; 40-50 y/o; widowed from the genocide; child killed in the genocide; tailor; lives in Kigali Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rose</td>
<td>Rwandese; Tutsi; 30-40 y/o; widowed from the genocide; has children; owns a small business; lives in Kigali Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Céline</td>
<td>Rwandese; Tutsi; 40-50 y/o; widowed from the genocide; has children; no occupation; lives in Kigali Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joséphine</td>
<td>Rwandese; Tutsi; 50-60 y/o; widowed from the genocide; has children; no occupation; lives in Kigali Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Célestine</td>
<td>Rwandese; Tutsi; 40-50 y/o; widowed from the genocide; has children; cultivates her land; lives in a village outside Kigali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marie-Louise</td>
<td>Rwandese; Tutsi; 40-50 y/o; separated from her Hutu husband; has children; no occupation; lives in Kigali Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oda</td>
<td>Rwandese; Tutsi; 40-50 y/o; widowed from the genocide; has children; no occupation; lives in a village of survivors and orphans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeannette</td>
<td>Rwandese; Tutsi; 40-50 y/o; single; child born out of rape; tailor; lives in the Eastern Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emina</td>
<td>Bosnian Muslim; 40-50 y/o; married; has children; sell knitting and food products; lives in a town in the Sarajevo Canton, FBiH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dalija</td>
<td>Bosnian Muslim; 30-40 y/o; single; no children; no occupation; lives in Sarajevo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sajra</td>
<td>Bosnian Muslim; 50-60 y/o; married; has children; no occupation; lives in a village in Sarajevo Canton, FBiH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anida</td>
<td>Bosnian Muslim; 40-50 y/o; widowed from the war; has children; no occupation; lives in Sarajevo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lejla</td>
<td>Bosnian Muslim; 40-50 y/o; widowed from the war and divorced; has children; no occupation; lives in a village in Sarajevo Canton, FBiH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bakira</td>
<td>Bosnian Muslim; 50-60 y/o; married; has children; works for Organisation G; lives in Sarajevo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 2: Database of Questions for the Survivors of Sexual Violence

• If you want to tell me about yourself, about your day-to-day challenges, about your past, how you met this organization, etc.
• What is the most important service that your organization provides you? Why?
• Are there some activities, services or training not provided by your organization that you would like to see implemented?
• How do you feel when you are at the organization? With the other women?
• What are the needs that you have in your day-to-day life?
• How did your family reacted after learning of your sufferings during the war? How are they now reacting?
• How is your community/ethnic group reacting after learning about your past sufferings?
• Do you have friends outside the organizations? Are they all from your ethnic group? Have they all suffered from a similar trauma?
• Are you invited to social gatherings in your family? In your community? How does it makes you feel?
• Do you think that all Bosnians/Rwandan are equal?
• Do you think that you are equal to other Bosnians/Rwandan?
• Does your family and community think that you are as valuable as other Bosnians/Rwandan?
• What defines you the most: being a woman or a Bosniac, Croat or Serb/Tutsi, Hutu, Twa?
• Why were you targeted during the war?
• Have you forgiven your aggressors? The other group?
• How is religion helping you to heal?
• Can you describe a normal day for you?
• How have your social relations with your friends and family changed after the war and after joining the organization?
• How is your relationship with your children?
• Are you working? Are you able to provide for yourself?
Annex 3: Database of Questions for the NGO Staff

- When was the organization created? What is its mission?
- What programs does your organization provide to survivors of sexual violence? Which ones have priority, are the most important?
- How is the decision of implementing some programs made (headquarters, government, etc.)?
- How does the need for funding from international or local donors affect the choice of programs implemented?
- What are the challenges that your organization faces?
- How stigmatized, excluded are the survivors of sexual violence? Their children? How are they perceived within the community?
- How strong is the stigma of rape? Of bearing children outside of marriage bonds?
- How is social exclusion addressed by your organization?
- How does the specific Bosnian/Rwandan context, government efforts, makes social exclusion, stigma hard/easy to address?
- Are some survivors of sexual violence more easily reintegrated into their community/family than others? Which factors influence this social reintegration?
- Are women living in rural areas more stigmatized than those in city areas?
- What are the main needs of the survivors of sexual violence?
- How do you reconcile the gender and ethnic identities of the women? Is the ethnic identity of the woman taken into account when providing counselling? Different counselling based on the ethnicity?
- How does religion plays a role in the process of trauma healing?
- How important are family/community ties in Bosnia-Herzegovina/Rwanda?
### Annex 4: Social Welfare in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina

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