Deconstruction as Political Practice:
A study of Derrida's *Politics of Friendship*
and related texts

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Declaration.

I hereby declare that, except for reference to the sources cited, this thesis is entirely my own work and that no part of it has been submitted for any other degree or qualification.

Alexander Thomson

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I would like to acknowledge the assistance of Professor Cairns Craig, my supervisor, and the influence of Professor Geoffrey Bennington, supervisor of the dissertation for my MA at the University of Sussex. The Arts and Humanities Research Board of the British Academy funded the final two years of this work, and I am grateful to my parents for financial assistance in the first year of the project. Thanks go to the staff of the Edinburgh University’s Main Library, New College Library and Law Library, and of the National Library of Scotland. The administrative staff of the Department of English Literature at the University of Edinburgh, and my fellow postgraduate students within the Department have been invaluable. In particular, without the support and advice of Kathryn Nicol, with whom much of this work has been discussed, this thesis would not have the shape it does.
MY THESIS IS a study of the question of politics in the work of Jacques Derrida. I focus in particular on Politics of Friendship together with those texts most closely related to it, including 'Force of Law,' 'Passions,' The Gift of Death, Specters of Marx and Adieu: to Emmanuel Levinas. I describe the political development of Derrida’s work from his seminar on Nationality and Philosophical Nationalism in 1983, to its culmination in the publication of the full-length text of Politics of Friendship in 1994.

The increasing emphasis applied to the word deconstruction itself over this period, concluding in formulations such as 'no democracy without deconstruction' and 'deconstruction is justice' suggests Derrida’s own increasing understanding of his work as a political practice and accompanies the development of Derrida’s seminars from the question of philosophical nationality to the decisive issue of responsibility. By reading Politics of Friendship within the context of this movement within Derrida’s work, I consider: 1) the relationship between deconstruction and democracy; 2) Derrida’s concern with language, nationality and responsibility; 3) Derrida’s performative problematization of the political status of his own texts.

On the basis of this analysis of how Derrida understands ‘deconstruction’ to be a political practice I then proceed to answer two further questions:

The first is whether Derrida’s political practice can be interpreted in such a way as to generate a political theory. I argue that careful attention to Derrida’s occasional references to ‘depoliticization’ and ‘repoliticization,’ and in particular to his work on Carl Schmitt, makes available a theory of deconstruction as depoliticization. I develop this reading through a reading of Derrida’s work on undecidability, and a comparison with his work on the ‘re-trait’
before contrasting Derrida's work with that of Jean-Luc Nancy and Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe.

The second question concerns the relationships between politics and ethics, and between Derrida's writings and those of Emmanuel Levinas. Through a close reading of Derrida's essays on Levinas I suggest that the difference between their work can be understood in terms of the distinction Levinas draws between the political and the ethical. I argue against Simon Critchley that while Derrida's work does share concerns with that of Levinas, it may also be read as a political problematization of his understanding of the ethical relation to the Other. Where Levinas places ethics before politics, Derrida's work opens up the possibility of a revaluation of politics itself, while from the perspective opened up by *Politics of Friendship* ethics itself becomes politically problematic.
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Note on Translations

I have made no changes to the published translations of Derrida’s texts, even where these are unsatisfactory. Unless otherwise stated, all emphases are those of the original texts.
Introduction.

My thesis is addressed to what I perceive to be two major interpretative problems in relation to the texts of Jacques Derrida. The first problem refers specifically to the political dimension of Derrida's work; the second concerns our understanding of his work in general. The first problem has suggested the central themes of my thesis, the second its methodology. In this introduction I will elaborate these two problems further and situate my thesis as a response to them.

Derrida claimed in 1994 that deconstruction is 'literally the most ethical and political way of taking seriously what is implied by the very concepts of decision and responsibility.' In another interview given three years earlier he stated that deconstruction follows an exigency 'without [which], in my view no ethico-political question has any chance of being opened up or awakened today' [POI 364 / 375]. Yet many commentators have refused to accept that his work is political at all. The form of this misunderstanding is set out clearly by Geoffrey Bennington, whose Legislations: The Politics of Deconstruction contains detailed refutations of many of these attacks. More recently, Morag Patrick's Derrida, Responsibility and Politics has updated this defence. As Bennington suggests in his most recent book, 'the political demand made of Derrida by a variety of commentators is the demand for the concept "politics" to be placed in the very transcendental position it is self-righteously supposed to reduce and explain, but to which it remains blind.' From Derrida's

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point of view, not only is the deconstructive questioning of politics neither a simple rejection of politics nor a rejection of the tradition of political thought, but it is the necessary precondition for thinking about politics at all. My aim in this thesis is to evaluate this claim. This project can be helpfully broken down into two subsidiary questions: 'how is deconstruction political?'; 'what does deconstruction have to say about politics?' By taking seriously the first of these questions and reading deconstruction as a political practice in its own terms, I propose to answer the second question. This means engaging with the politics of deconstruction at a level denied to those who, like Thomas McCarthy and Simon Critchley, have condemned deconstruction for being unable to give rise to a political practice. McCarthy, following closely the attack on Derrida made by Jürgen Habermas in his *Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, argues that Derrida’s work — while broadly political in scope — can only give rise to a ‘politics of the ineffable.’ He takes what he calls ‘Derrida’s withdrawal from the specificity of politics or of empirical social research’ to be evidence of a retreat to theology or mysticism. Derrida’s key terms are ‘elastic,’ ‘vague’ and ‘ambiguous’ and his ‘notion of a “grammar” of responsibility is at best an airy abstraction.’ Having reduced Derrida’s work to a ‘philosophicopolitical’ programme or system, McCarthy wonders: ‘is it the case, as Nancy Fraser has put it, that the politics of deconstruction amounts to little more than the deconstruction of politics?’ The interest of McCarthy’s thesis here is that Simon Critchley, a less impatient reader of Derrida’s work, reaches essentially the same conclusion in his *Ethics of Deconstruction*, asking ‘is there not

an implicit refusal of the ontic, the factual, and the empirical — that is to say, of the space of doxa, where politics takes place in a field of antagonism, decision, dissension and struggle? In this sense, might one not ultimately speak of a refusal of politics in Derrida’s work?” [ED 200]. This argument is circular. Critchley and McCarthy are only able to condemn deconstruction for failing to generate a political practice by presuming a distinction between theory and practice which is unsustainable from Derrida’s perspective. It is only once we appreciate deconstruction as a political practice in and of itself, I suggest, that we can evaluate the contribution to be made by deconstruction to political theory.

The second problem to which my thesis responds is methodological. If we take seriously Derrida’s problematization of the relationship between singularity and the general, we can neither reduce his work to the expression of some fundamental thesis of deconstruction nor consider it to be a set of absolutely heterogeneous and singular operations. It has become common, following Rodolphe Gasché’s influential The Tain of the Mirror: Deconstruction and the Philosophy of Reflection, to consider Derrida’s work in terms of a quasi-systematicity which recognises this problem. On this account Derrida’s texts form a series of interventions in particular contexts in which much the same thing happens each time; the texts throw up a series of apparently transcendental terms on the basis of which it is possible to rethink traditional philosophical problems, but which also put their own transcendental status into question. Gasché calls these terms ‘infrastructures’ but it has become more usual to refer to them as ‘quasi-transcendentals.’9 The difficulty of this approach is that it can only accommodate a rather reductive sense of the internal historicity of Derrida’s work. As Derrida insists in his ‘Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism,’

his earlier work is a necessary precondition for later developments; this should serve to remind us that deconstruction is also an attempt to take seriously the empirical historical inscription of any theoretical discourse. For Gasché, the development of Derrida’s work is to be considered at best contingent to its philosophical rigour, and at worst in teleological terms; we can only understand the later work on the basis of the earlier texts in which Derrida’s own philosophical inheritance is more explicit. However, Derrida himself — and this remains entirely consistent with his rejection of teleology — has insisted that his earlier ‘more academic or philosophically more reassuring’ texts were an ‘irreversibly necessary condition’ for what followed; their necessity however is not logical, that of ‘a fundamental or foundational’ condition [DAP 79]. Rather, I suggest, we should read Derrida’s work in the manner in which he reads. By suspending the traditional or metaphysical conception of the history of an author’s work — in which the work unfolds a central thesis or applies a method; in which the earlier work prepares for the later or in which the later work occludes the profound insights of the earlier; in terms of decisive breaks or revisions — we must develop other ways of assessing the development, the mutations and the continuities, of the discursive strategies within his work.10 This requires careful attention not only to the systematicity of the texts, but also a persistent attention to the features of each work which resist incorporation into such a history.

Moreover, by reducing the occasion of Derrida’s work to the philosophical issue to which he refers, Gasché obliterates any sense of a connection between Derrida’s work and its other contexts. While there can be no question of reducing Derrida’s work to a symptomatic expression or product of a particular political context, recognising the internal heterogeneity and planes of consistency of that work must include some sense both of the relationship each text negotiates with the other works signed by Derrida and of those so-called external

(political, social, historical) contexts which are inscribed into Derrida’s work as the occasion for each text. Richard Beardsworth’s *Derrida and the Political* is a good example of the pitfalls of a relatively systematic and philosophical approach. As Bennington has argued, the clarity and authority of Beardsworth’s argument is bought at the price of a number of key reductive decisions, and deconstruction is reduced to a set of somewhat mystifying theses about ‘the aporia of time.’ Moreover, for Beardsworth deconstruction appears to be largely a philosophical response to philosophical problems, as the dialectical resolution of a set of political antinomies between Kant and Hegel, and between Heidegger and Levinas.

Yet a brief consideration of the performative context of even a short text such as ‘History of the Lie: Prolegomena’ suggests that its political dimension extends beyond the philosophical. Aside from its more typical Derridean concerns — with the relationship between the concepts of history and truth, with Nietzsche, with the fable, with performative or illocutionary force, with secrecy and testimony — the essay is directly linked to some central concerns of *Politics of Friendship* and can be read as a lengthy gloss on some elliptical comments made in the final chapter on ‘history qua fraternization, which begins in a non-truth and should end up making non-truth true [...] a history of truth. A matter, more precisely, of a trial of verification, qua the history of a becoming-true of illusion’ [POF 274 / 305]. Nor can the public performance and subsequent publication of the paper, or the broadcast of a radio interview extending the discussion, be strictly demarcated from the political context written into the paper. Presented in New York, and published in the *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal* of the New School for Social Research, the paper locates itself in a series of texts concerned with the truth written or published in New York:

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an essay on truth and politics by Alexandre Koyré written in exile during the Second World War; Hannah Arendt’s ‘Truth and Politics,’ published in the New Yorker; an inaccurate article published in the New York Times accusing Derrida and other French intellectuals of a failure to acknowledge the ‘truth’ of the persecution of Jews in Vichy France; a letter in response to this article which draws attention to Derrida’s signature on a petition to President Mitterand calling for precisely such a public recognition of French responsibility for these crimes. As Derrida himself argued on another occasion against similar accusations, ‘the text is always a field of forces, heterogeneous, differential, open [...]’. That’s why deconstructive readings and writings are [...] also effective or active (as one says) interventions, in particular, political and institutional interventions.15 Given both the internal historicity and the performative force of Derrida’s texts as political interventions, we should not be too quick to conclude where their philosophical or political significance lies.

There are generally three strategies available when considering a concept such as ‘responsibility’ in Derrida’s work. The first is to locate Derrida’s treatment of the concept alongside a set of previous philosophical responses to the same problem within the philosophical tradition that Derrida appears to be working in; the second is to compare or relate his work to philosophical contexts to which he does not explicitly refer; the third assumes that his work advances more-or-less philosophical arguments which can be abstracted from a particular context and repeated independently of the project of reading within which they may have arisen. Keith Peterson’s reading of Derrida’s work on responsibility and decision in relation to Hegel, Nietzsche and Heidegger fits the first model;

Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s attempt to relate Derrida on responsibility to Wittgenstein on decision and rule-following fits the second; Geoffrey Bennington’s work on unpacking Derrida’s ‘deceptively simple’ arguments tends towards the third. None of these strategies is in itself inappropriate; in combination with each other they can yield powerful and perceptive responses. In this thesis I have tended to follow the third strategy, with some consideration of the other two; but by balancing these with a sense of the internal historicity and performative context and address of Derrida’s work I have attempted to generate a distinctive response to the question of the politics of deconstruction.

In my first chapter, by focusing on the change of use of the term deconstruction between ‘Letter to a Japanese Friend’ (1982) and ‘Force of Law’ (1991) and Politics of Friendship (1994), I draw attention to the political mutation within the trajectory of Derrida’s work in order to make available an approach which does not reduce the political dimension of Derrida’s work either to the expression of some fundamental law or insight, or to the political translation of différance. Furthermore, I seek to emphasise the relative heterogeneity of Derrida’s texts by comparing two different accounts of democracy-to-come available within his work, and on this basis argue that the politics of deconstruction does not end in ‘democracy-to-come,’ but that this must itself be only a provisional and polemical moment in a broader argument concerning the nature of politics. This leads in turn to a wider contextualisation in chapter two of both the shift in deconstruction in its development as a political practice, and of the implied concept of politics. I take Derrida’s seminar on


nationalism and philosophy as a nominal or exemplary starting point and suggest something of the consistency of Derrida’s concern with the problem of philosophy and nationalism. On the basis of this analysis of deconstruction as political practice, in chapter three I develop my own analysis of the contribution deconstruction has to offer to political theory, while in chapter four I suggest that this is a more convincing way to approach the politics of deconstruction than that offered by ethical categories. The key text throughout is Politics of Friendship. I do not attempt to argue for the centrality of this text in Derrida’s recent work — although I think such an argument might be convincingly made — but take it as a provisional starting point. In choosing to focus on a particular period within the development of Derrida’s work, and to focus on those texts which contribute most to the analysis of the theme with which I am concerned my argument risks circularity; but I take this to be a necessary risk, and a risk that may be the chance of a productive reading — a reading that manages to follow without repeating.18 Even if we must not try to predict the coming of the other, we must prepare for it as best we can, writes Derrida in ‘Psyche: Inventions of the Other’: ‘Letting the other come is not an inertia open to anything whatsoever [...]’. But one does not make the other come, one lets it come by preparing for its coming.’ In this sense, I can only hope that my thesis will be itself deconstructive; since the other cannot be invented, ‘the initiative or deconstructive inventiveness can consist only in opening, in uncloseting, destabilizing foreclosure structures so as to allow for the passage toward the other’ [PSY 55 / 53; 60 / 60].

1. Deconstruction and Democracy

1.1 Introduction.

At its broadest, Derrida’s principal concern in Politics of Friendship is ‘to think and live a friendship, a politics, a justice’ [POF 105 / 128]. Considered more narrowly, the book is an investigation of the traditional conception of friendship in political philosophy. A historical survey of texts by several major political thinkers, from Plato and Aristotle to Jean-Luc Nancy, via Cicero, Augustine, Montaigne, Nietzsche and Carl Schmitt, amongst others, is interwoven with a discussion and analysis of the recurrent structure and limits of the concept of friendship in their work. On a third level, and in its most modest formulation, Derrida’s aim is merely to ask ‘what is meant when one says “brother”, when someone is called “brother.”’ He is ‘wondering [demande], that’s all, and request[s] [demande] that it be asked [demande], what the implicit politics of this language is’ [POF 305 / 339]. On the basis of the first statement I have offered of his concerns, Politics of Friendship would appear to be the nearest Derrida’s work will have got to being political philosophy as we usually understand it — that is if we could ever be sure that this concern wasn’t precisely the inspiration behind
all his books. However we would then have to account for the two refinements of this aim I have suggested. What kind of political thought can be organised around the category of friendship? How can an analysis of the ‘implicit politics’ of language lead us to ‘a politics, a justice’? Moreover, what are we to make of Derrida’s provocative and apparently monstrous identification of deconstruction with democracy itself? For in one of those scandalous passages that has come to characterise one of the voices of his work over the last twenty years, Derrida remarks that there is a ‘self-deconstructive [auto-déconstructrice] force in the very motif of democracy, the possibility and the duty for democracy itself to de-limit itself. Democracy is the autos of deconstructive self-limitation [auto-délimitation]’ [PoF 105 / 128]. On the one hand, deconstruction is to be found at work within democracy; on the other, democracy itself is already inscribed within deconstruction. Or as Derrida puts it in more telegraphic fashion: ‘no deconstruction without democracy, no democracy without deconstruction’ [PoF 105 / 128]. My aim in this chapter is to evaluate this claim.

Even to someone who is acquainted with Derrida’s work such a claim for ‘deconstruction’ may seem surprising. In an interview with Richard Kearney conducted in 1981 Derrida comments that ‘I have never succeeded in directly relating deconstruction to existing political codes and programmes.’1 Not only did Derrida refuse to elaborate his own understanding of the political implications of his writing for many years, but the word ‘deconstruction’ itself has a complex history, and he has regularly refused to grant any particular privilege to ‘deconstruction’ as a description of his work. In a famous attempt to come to terms with the word ‘deconstruction’ itself, his ‘Letter to a Japanese friend’ dated 10 July 1983, Derrida expresses a certain amount of dissatisfaction with the word ‘deconstruction.’ It ‘imposed itself upon me’ [LJF 270 / 388], Derrida complains, and ‘has never appeared satisfactory to me’ [LJF 272 / 390]: ‘I do not think, [...] that it is a good

word’ [LJF 275 / 392]. More importantly, Derrida suggests that it is only one word amongst others: ‘For me, for what I have tried and still try to write, the word has interest only within a certain context, where it replaces and lets itself be determined by such other words as ‘écriture,’ “trace,” “différence,” “supplement,” “hymen,” “pharmakon,” “marge,” “entame,” “parergon,” etc. By definition the list can never be closed’ [LJF 275 / 392]. All these words — which Rodolphe Gasché labels ‘infrastructures’ in his The Tain of the Mirror and which it has become commonplace to call ‘quasi-transcendentals’ — operate within particular texts of Derrida’s in broadly comparable ways. ‘Deconstruction’ is one word amongst the others on the list, rather than the transcendental guarantor of the list’s identity. ‘Deconstruction’ is an example of ‘the trace’ as much as ‘the trace’ is an example of ‘deconstruction.’ So in coming to terms with Derrida’s understanding of the relationship between deconstruction and democracy, we will not only have to account for his use of ‘democracy,’ but also his use of ‘deconstruction.’ That his identification of the two occurs in the course of a ‘genealogical deconstruction of the political (and through it to the democratic), [through which] one would seek to think, interpret and implement another politics, another democracy’ [PoF 104 / 128] has the consequence that: ‘at stake would thus be a deconstruction of the genealogical schema, a paradoxical deconstruction — a deconstruction at once genealogical and a-genealogical, of the genealogical’ [PoF 105 / 128]. In other words, neither democracy nor deconstruction can escape their encounter unscathed.

To approach Derrida’s statement, a preliminary sketch of the ways he has employed the word ‘deconstruction’ will be helpful. If we follow Derrida’s account in his ‘Letter to a Japanese friend’ we can broadly distinguish three areas of meaning for ‘deconstruction.’ Derrida reminds us that deconstruction is first of all a translation of two prominent words in the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, Abbau and Destruktion [LJF 270 / 388].

Grammatology for example, Derrida speaks of ‘deconstruction’ when he describes his own work, with that of Nietzsche and Heidegger, as ‘inhabiting [...] in a certain way’ the concepts of Western thought [GRA 24 / 39]. While Derrida rarely appears as closely allied to Heidegger as he does in Of Grammatology we cannot ignore the fact that the word ‘deconstruction’ must remain marked with at least a minimal reference to its translation from the work of Heidegger. Indeed translations of Heidegger into both French and English now use the term without any reference to Derrida. Secondly, as in the passage I have already quoted, deconstruction can be considered as simply one in a series of terms which Derrida has made use of in his work. Some are borrowed from other texts, some are neologisms suggested by the structure which Derrida has found at work in the text under consideration. However Derrida himself has often used deconstruction as a convenient name of this series of terms, as a label for his work as a whole. Yet it is not to be considered ‘an analysis or a critique,’ nor a ‘method,’ ‘an act or an operation’ [LJF 273 / 390-1]. Instead, and this the third meaning, and the one to which Derrida will attach most importance, deconstruction is what happens: ‘deconstruction takes place everywhere it [ca] takes place, where there is something (and is not therefore limited to meaning or the text in the current and bookish sense of the word’) [LJF 274 / 391]. On this model, deconstruction can be the name both for the object (what happens) and (somewhat abusively) the work which seeks to describe this object (with an essential reference to Heidegger). A further complication is only alluded to in this text, but developed at length contemporaneously in Mémoires for Paul de Man, lectures written after de Man’s death in 1983. This is the fact that deconstruction had also become

by this time the name for a diverse body of academic discourses, particularly in the United States, with varying degrees of attachment to Derrida’s own work. While Derrida occasionally distances his own work from that of ‘deconstruction’ in this sense, he has never disavowed his influence, and in ‘Some Statements and Truisms...’ he comes to terms with the ‘necessary’ academic and institutional formalization of his work as ‘deconstructionism’ or a ‘philosophy of deconstruction’ [SST 88-9].

Given this complex linguistic background, the use of deconstruction in the statement ‘no democracy without deconstruction,’ as in the related claim that ‘deconstruction is justice’ [FOL 15 / 35. Emphasis only in French] appears somewhat ambiguous, to say the least. It might certainly be said to add a new dimension to our understanding of the word ‘deconstruction.’ My hypothesis is that this apparent change in use of the word might be profitably linked to two other significant mutations in Derrida’s work. Firstly it can be compared with an increasingly explicit thematic attention to overtly political questions. There is a qualitative shift between Derrida’s political work prior to the period I am interested in — focused largely around the question of the proper name7 and the institution of the university — and essays such as those on Nelson Mandela and racism collected in Psyché (1987) or the project of his seminar on philosophy and nationalism (1983-7). This shift towards political themes culminates in the publication of Politics of Friendship in 1994, which recapitulates and develops many of the concerns of this period in Derrida’s work. Secondly, Derrida’s attitude towards his own role as a public intellectual appears to have changed. Despite a reticence earlier in his career to even allow photographs of himself to be

6 The case of Paul de Man’s work is perhaps the most complex. As Rodolphe Gasché points out, de Man seems closest to Derrida when he is not using the word ‘deconstruction’ and furthest from him when he is. The Wild Card of Reading: On Paul de Man. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1998. 22.

published, since the middle of the 1980s Derrida has appeared regularly to give interviews on radio and television, as well as in newspapers and scholarly journals, three volumes of which have been published since Positions (1972): Points de Suspensions (1992), Echographies: de la télévision (1996), Sur Parole (1999). Derrida’s political interventions, which had previously been largely focused on the educational establishment, have expanded to include public debate on a wide variety of issues. These political activities cannot be considered as simply extrinsic, or contingent to the political development of Derrida’s work. To reduce Derrida’s work to a set of theses and then claim to deduce its politics on that basis, as Thomas McCarthy does, must miss the extent to which the politics of deconstruction are bound up with its form and practice. As Geoffrey Bennington has suggested, we should read Derrida’s ‘more or less visible interventions in concrete political situations’ as ‘not merely the circumstantial acts of a philosopher elsewhere, and more importantly, developing theories or knowledge, but continuous with each act of deconstruction from the start.’

Derrida has been insisting on this since beginning his 1968 paper ‘The Ends of Man’ with the axiom that ‘every philosophical colloquium necessarily has a political significance’ [MAR 111 / 131]. In an interview in 1977 Derrida affirmed this claim: ‘philosophical activity does not require a political practice; it is, in any case, a political practice’ [POI 69-70 / 74]. Deconstruction must be understood as both a philosophico-political practice that implies a correlative theory and as a philosophico-political theory whose elaboration is coterminous with its consequent political practice. Derrida’s provocative identification of deconstruction with democracy will open up this discussion.

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8 Many texts relating to these activities were collected in Du droit à la philosophie. Paris: Galilée, 1990.
But while this claim in Politics of Friendship is certainly startling, the reference to democracy is by no means an isolated case in Derrida’s work, at least since his reference to ‘the form of democracy’ in ‘The Ends of Man’ [MAR 113-4 / 134-5]. Throughout the texts surrounding Politics of Friendship there are insistent references to democracy, and ‘democracy-to-come’: for example in The Other Heading [OH 78 / 76], ‘Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism’ [DAP 83-5], Du Droit à la philosophie [DP 70-1] and Specters of Marx [SoM 169 / 269]. In fact, Derrida offers at least two apparently divergent approaches to the concept of democracy. In order to respect the heterogeneity of these texts, and for clarity, I will look at these two arguments separately. The first is the question of ‘democracy-to-come’ which dominates Politics of Friendship. In the first section of this chapter, I will set out the main framework of that book, focusing in turn on the concept of friendship and its relation to the analysis of democracy, and on what Derrida calls ‘democracy-to-come’ as a re-writing of diﬀérance. In the second section I will look at Derrida’s association of democracy with literature and its relation to the problem of censorship, his analysis of the secret, and his concern with the distinction between the public and the private sphere. In the third section I will make a provisional assessment of the utility of Derrida’s work on democracy by contrasting it with the radical democratic theory of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. Does deconstruction finish in democracy? Is Derrida’s appeal to ‘democracy-to-come’ to be considered an end to the question of the politics of deconstruction, the political product or outcome of Derrida’s thought? Or is democracy perhaps a familiar name on an unfamiliar path; not a necessary conclusion to the deconstructive project but an example in an ongoing argument concerning the very nature of politics? When Claude Lefort gave a paper to Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy’s Centre for Philosophical Research on the Political in 1980 he threw out this challenge addressed to his audience, which included Derrida: ‘How can they handle ontological differences with such subtlety, vie with one another in exploiting the combined resources of Heidegger, Lacan, Jakobson and Levi-Strauss, and then fall back upon such
crass realism when the question of politics arises? [...] They are unable to discern freedom in democracy, because democracy is defined as bourgeois. They are unable to discern servitude in totalitarianism. 11 If we understand Politics of Friendship as Derrida's belated response to Lefort, what sort of a response would it be?

1.2 Deconstruction and ‘Democracy-to-come.’

NOT ONLY DOES Politics of Friendship contain the most extended analysis of ‘democracy-to-come’ in Derrida’s work, but the book as a whole can be read as being determined by the relationship between democracy and friendship. In The Nicomachean Ethics it is friendship which forms the junction for Aristotle between the question of justice and that of the proper constitution of the city, between ethics and politics. It is there that democracy is famously characterised as a political association modelled on the friendship between brothers [NE 209-10]. Such an analogy is in no way neutral in Derrida’s view, and he seeks to develop the possibility of another reading of politics, of friendship and democracy, which would escape the rhetoric of brotherhood, and what he calls the logic of fraternization. To understand and assess the claim being made by Derrida we need to consider: his account of friendship and fraternity; the relationship between friendship and democracy; his account of justice as a political translation of différance; and the consequences for thinking about politics — or in other words, what exactly Derrida means by ‘democracy-to-come.’

1.2.1 Friendship and Fraternization

*Politics of Friendship* is structured by a discussion of the concept of friendship in the history of Western philosophy. The focus of Derrida’s argument is the continuity within the concept of friendship from its canonical formulation in Aristotle to contemporary accounts such as those of Bataille and Blanchot, and crucially, through and in spite of the apparent break in the tradition inaugurated by Nietzsche. For Derrida this reversal is encapsulated in *Human, All Too Human* when Nietzsche overturns the famous aphorism, attributed to Aristotle, ‘O my friends, there is no friend’: ‘Enemies, there is no enemy! shout I, the living fool.’ However, for Derrida, this apparent reversal is not what it seems to be. Attempting to overturn the established values and hierarchies of Western thought, Nietzsche succeeds only in unveiling the conditions of possibility which have always governed and conditioned that thought: ‘Nietzsche’s upheaval would [...] interrupt less than recall (and call again for) a rupture already inscribed in the speech it interrupts’ [PoF 27 / 45]. The significance of Nietzsche’s work in *Politics of Friendship* is not that it introduces something absolutely new to the tradition of thinking about friendship, but that it exposes a structure that has always been present within that tradition, in this case, the reversibility of the relationship between friend and enemy. Or, as Derrida describes it, a friend could not be my friend if he was not, at least potentially, capable of being my enemy: ‘the two concepts (friend/enemy) consequently intersect and ceaselessly change places’ [PoF 72 / 91]. In his essay ‘Force of Law’ Derrida asserts that ‘deconstruction is generally practiced in two ways [...]. One takes on the demonstrative and apparently ahistorical allure of logico-formal paradoxes. The other, more historical [...], seems to proceed through readings of texts, meticulous interpretations and genealogies’ [FoL 20 / 48]: here the name of Nietzsche stands for the focal point at

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which the structural analysis of the conditions of possibility and impossibility of the concept of friendship intersects and interrupts the empirical history of the development of that concept within Western philosophy.

The classical model from which Derrida begins is that of Aristotle. Yet he argues that Aristotle’s very definition of friendship is already on the verge of contradiction. For on the one hand it is characterised by the value of reciprocity [NE 194] and equality [NE 200-1; 202-3] between those men who resemble each other [NE 196-7]. These values of equality, reciprocity and resemblance will also found both justice and the state [NE 192-3, 207-8]. The highest form of friendship is that founded on virtue rather than pleasure or utility, and on equality; this reciprocity distinguishes true friendship from that found in the relationship between father and son, man and wife, ruler and subject or elder and younger [NE 203]. Yet on the other hand, Aristotle’s account of friendship is interrupted by elements which threaten the very possibility of this equality in friendship. Firstly, because for Aristotle friendship is defined by the act of being friends with someone rather than by that of being befriended. Friendship is active. Yet friendship by definition continues in the absence of the friend, even in the event of their death. On the basis of a brief reference in the Eudemian, but not the Nichomachean, Ethics, Derrida finds within Aristotle what he (Derrida) had been saying about friendship since Mémoires for Paul de Man: that the possibility of the death of the friend inhabits the possibility of friendship itself.13 If friendship is always a priori potentially asymmetrical, since my dead friend can never return my friendship, could there ever actually be a perfect friendship [POF 12-13 / 28-29]? This brings in the second moment of disturbance in Aristotle’s account. Friendship is premised on wishing the best for the friend, but the very best would be for the friend to become a God. [NE 204-5]. Three problems follow from this: a God cannot be a friend, because of his absolute remoteness; friendship is predicated on loving the other as he is and therefore depends on his remaining human; God

needs no friend because he is self-sufficient [PoF 222-3]. On this account too, even the concept of perfect friendship would be impossible, because self-contradictory. If friendship founded on equality is impossible, then friendship must always be irreducibly dissymmetrical.

On this basis Derrida argues that the Greek model of friendship will always already be inhabited by a more Judeo-Christian model: 'a problematic scansion [...] would have introduced dissymmetry, separation and infinite distance in a Greek philia which did not tolerate them but nevertheless called for them' [PoF 232]. Or in other words that 'the philosophical horizon of philia [...] carries in its determination, in the very form of its finity qua horizon, the potential but inexorable injunction of its infinitization, and hence also that of its Christianization' [PoF 233]. To grasp the full implications of Derrida’s argument it is important to stress this dynamic within the text. Derrida ‘will not follow Nietzsche,’ he notes, nor ‘Nietzsche’s sons’ [PoF 33 / 51]. On this basis, Derrida’s concerns about friendship would apply at least as much to the work of his post-Nietzschean contemporaries Bataille, Blanchot, Levinas and Nancy as to Aristotle and Montaigne. Both the final section of the book, and several explicit comments within the text make this clear [PoF 293-305 / 325-38; 46n.15 / 56-7n.1]. So I cannot agree with John Caputo who asserts that Derrida’s model is ‘largely inspired by [...] his Jewish friends’ Levinas and Blanchot.14 Simon Critchley’s account of the text is similarly misleading since he attributes ‘a crucial place in [the] exposition and argumentation’ of Politics of Friendship to Blanchot.15 Similarly, Derrida’s analysis would apply to both the Greco-Roman and the Judeo-Christian model of friendship. A crucial change between the earliest versions of the text and its final publication reinforces this point. Discussing the rupture in the concept of friendship, what is phrased as a

question in the earlier texts — ‘shall one say that this fracture is Judeo-Christian?’ [PoF(a) 644; PoF(b) 385] — becomes a statement: ‘one can no longer speak here of a simple fracture and say that it is Judaeo-Christian’ [PoF 293 / 325].

What the thought of this fracture — the necessary asymmetry within friendship — exposes is twofold. The texts on friendship, Derrida argues, are opened up to two recurrent questions of number. The first, which responds to the paradox that ‘true’ (equal) friendship is impossible, or nearly impossible, is that the texts tend to refer to a very few, legendary friendships from which to define the conditions of friendship as such. The second is that friendship is by definition exclusive. The paradigmatic experience of friendship, Derrida suggests, can be seen to be determined by what he calls ‘the question of number’: as both the necessity of enumerating or counting friends, and as an implicit limit to the number of friends I can have. Since friendship is always defined by the act of loving, being loved is not enough to qualify as friendship. Conversely there must be a limit to the number of people I can (actively) love. In the *Eudemian Ethics* Aristotle argues that ‘it is not possible for affection to be active in relation to many at once’ since it takes time to test a friendship, and friendship is an experience reserved for humans (not immortals). As an active experience, friendship is by definition an exclusive experience. I cannot be friends with everyone, Derrida explains, ‘one must choose and prefer: election and selection between friends and things, but also between possible friends’ [PoF 19 / 37]. This shows up in the canonical discourses as a recurrent question: how many friends can be true friends, how many friends can one have? However, even if any actual (finite) friendship would be exclusive, in theory at least, I could be friends with anyone. Derrida seeks to separate out this possibility in friendship from its exclusive aspect, even though he knows they are inexorably connected. What would it mean to think what Derrida calls *aimance*, an experience of friendship which

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eluded the distinction between active and passive? This would have to be a relation without distinction, without the exclusion of those who are not my friends. *Aimance* would be a quasi-transcendental condition of friendship, a relationality prior to any activation or instantiation in the act of befriending. The grammatical form of *aimance* recalls Derrida’s famous neologism ‘*différance,*’ and in his essay of that name we find the comment that: ‘that which lets itself be designated by “différance” is neither simply active nor simply passive, but announces or rather recalls something like the middle voice, that it speaks of an operation which is not an operation, which lets itself be thought neither as a passion nor as an object of a subject upon an object[...]’ [MAR 9 / 9]. *Aimance* would be something like a middle voice of friendship.  

Friendship for Derrida is split between these two contradictory moments. Friendship, as election by decision, is made possible by the multiplicity of possible friends amongst whom I choose, with whom I am already in a relationship of neither active or passive affection, but *aimance*; but I betray this multiplicity of possible friends by preferring my friends, even by calling them friends. The necessity of this betrayal and exclusion is what Derrida calls the logic of fraternization, and which he claims dictates the relationship between friendship and brotherhood. To understand the significance of fraternization for Derrida and its consequences, we need to bear in mind his thought of responsibility. This begins with what Geoffrey Bennington calls ‘a deceptively simple’ argument which I will summarise briefly here.  

Responsibility, Derrida argues, is only responsible if it is not the unfolding of a program or the following of a set pattern: that would simply be obeying a rule, and in doing so I could disavow responsibility — I would only be obeying orders, rather than acting in my own name. Yet as soon as I determine a course of action I must betray some others, and the infinity of others — ‘I cannot respond to the call, the request, the obligation,

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18 *Interrupting Derrida.* 25.
or even the love of another without sacrificing the other other, the other others’ [GoD 68 / 98]. I am destined to an absolute responsibility before the wholly (infinite and completely) other which I can only transgress. This is not a responsibility which I could ever fulfil: it is infinite not because it is a task larger than any individual could complete but because as soon as a responsibility can be fulfilled, there is no responsibility. Responsibility is the thought of inevitable irresponsibility; and any attempt to think responsibility in terms of obligation or the categorical imperative, or in any limited sense, are irresponsible from Derrida’s point of view. Responsibility is infinite or it is not responsibility at all, but merely acting out of obligation to a determined, finite set of others:

If I conduct myself particularly well with regard to someone, I know that it is to the detriment of an other; of one nation to the detriment of an other, of one family to the detriment of another family, of my friends to the detriment of other friends or non-friends, etc. This is the infinitude that inscribes itself within responsibility; otherwise there would be no ethical problems or decisions. [DAP 86]

The principle of fraternity is what dictates the choice between others, and therefore the becoming-irresponsible of friendship. For if friendship can be with anyone, friendship as brotherhood contradicts it, by naturalizing the bond. ‘The brother is never a fact’ [POF 159 / 184] declares Derrida, ‘fraternity requires a law and names, symbols, a language, engagements, oaths, speech, family and nation’ [POF 149 / 171]. Derrida’s aim is not some nihilistic assault on the family but to draw attention to the ‘renaturalizing rhetoric’ of ‘the process of fraternization’ [POF 202 / 230]. A natural bond dictates my allegiances, and thus disables responsibility and decision: where it is a question of a debt which requires to be paid off, I cannot take responsibility for it.

While friendship and brotherhood seem to be opposed in Derrida’s account, this is not in fact the case. The traditional concept of friendship is split between two moments, one

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of *aimance* and one of fraternization, but only the latter is of the order of the possible. One does not follow the other. Brotherhood is always already at work within friendship, predicting my choices and cancelling my responsibility. For even if I do not privilege my friends in any way, I will always already have preferred them simply by calling them my friends. *Aimance* is not a present moment in a temporal scheme, but the necessary condition of friendship. Without the suspension of my choices, and the possibility of being friends with just anybody, I could never have any friends at all; but as soon as I have a friend, I have determined him as a brother.

1.2.2 Democracy

The political implications of Derrida's reading of the concept of friendship rest on the traditional association of brotherhood and friendship with democracy and justice. This can be shown quite clearly in Aristotle's work, and Derrida offers several further points of comparison. The important question for us here is whether this association is purely linguistic — only a matter of names — or if there is a more logical or conceptual relationship at work.

For Aristotle, not only is friendship a virtue, but it is fundamental to the welfare of the state and to justice itself. In his *Politics* Aristotle describes three forms of constitution: monarchy, the rule of one man; aristocracy, the rule of a few men; and polity [*politeia*], the rule of all. Each constitution is working well when decisions are made which benefit the whole of the people rather than just the rulers. When this is not the case, each constitution
becomes its own deviant form: tyranny; oligarchy; democracy.\textsuperscript{20} In the \textit{Nicomachean Ethics}, Aristotle compares these paradigmatic constitutional forms with forms of friendship. Monarchy is said to be like the friendship between a father and son; aristocracy is compared to the friendship between man and wife; and polity to the friendship between brothers [NE 211]. There are however two complications we should note which arise from this scheme. I take the first from Geoffrey Bennington, who has argued that the position of ‘democracy’ as the least bad of the deviant constitutions makes it the best constitution, if we deny the possibility of the ideal functioning of the state; moreover, the distinction between polity and democracy seems to be confused from the start. How could we distinguish between the many ruling on behalf of the many, and the many ruling on behalf of the people?\textsuperscript{21} The second complication is introduced by the analogy with friendship. Aristotle claims that monarchy is the best constitutional form. Yet he has also argued that friendship is vital to the well-being of the state. From this account, polity (or democracy), modelled on the equality of the relationship between brothers — the exemplary form of friendship — should be the best constitution. There can be little or no justice or friendship when one man, or a few men, rule, since there is little or nothing in common between the rulers and ruled, but when the many have some degree of equality there will be more friendship and justice rather than less. On Aristotle’s account then, democracy is the exemplary politics of friendship and since Derrida takes this to be an exemplary account of democracy, the founding analogy of his text is established: ‘democracy […] is rarely determined in the absence of confraternity or brotherhood’ [PoF viii / 13].

Derrida gives several further references for this fraternal rhetoric within accounts of democracy: ‘from Plato to Montaigne, Aristotle to Kant, Cicero to Hegel, the great


\textsuperscript{21} Geoffrey Bennington. ‘Demo.’ Paper given to the ‘Deconstruction Reading Politics’ conference at Staffordshire University, 29 July 1999.
philosophical and canonical discourses on friendship will have explicitly tied the friend-brother to virtue and justice, to moral reason and political reason' [POF 277 / 308]. However Derrida's argument is that there is more at stake than simply the rhetoric of republicanism. It is the logical structure which underlies both the concept of friendship and democracy in their traditional interpretations which Derrida is interested in, but this is a structural model which he claims can be found from Aristotle to Nietzsche and then to Blanchot and Nancy beyond. This raises a major problem for Derrida's readers. What is the advantage in distinguishing a concept so broad that it can contain the whole tradition of Western political thought; and what would this concept have to do with resolving problems in any particular state, today or in the past? Would we not do better to focus on distinguishing between different models of democracy, whether on a historical or a theoretical basis? How can Derrida justify making almost no reference to contemporary analyses of the democratic state? Not only does Derrida's strategy appear to risk effacing what may be most valuable in democratic theory, whether theoretically or empirically based, by reducing it to the expression of some underlying framework but would also leave Derrida open to the charge of proposing — in Thomas McCarthy's phrase — 'a politics of the ineffable.' What seems a reasonable objection cannot be answered until we have considered Derrida's analysis further. What Derrida is interested in are the limits to the concept of democracy as such, but since any reading of democracy must first presume the identity of the concept, these limits cannot come into focus within those readings. If Politics of Friendship is read as an attempt to bring these limits into focus, the test of Derrida's analysis will not be how well it conforms to pre-existing interpretative norms, but its applicability and utility. We might say that Derrida operates with a strategy of calculated indifference to the theory and practice of democracy, in order to focus on what places restrictions on both. This is undoubtedly a violent procedure. But if Derrida is correct, then any discussion of democracy which does not pass through

22 'Politics of the Ineffable.' passim.
some form of deconstructive questioning will be guilty of either naivety or a far worse violence.

Turning to Derrida’s account of democracy, we can see that democracy is structured around the same problematic dichotomy as friendship:

With this becoming-political [of friendship], and with all the schemata that we will recognize therein — beginning with the most problematic of all, that of fraternity — the question of democracy thus opens, the question of the citizen or the subject as a countable singularity. And that of a ‘universal fraternity.’ There is no democracy [pas de démocratie] without respect for irreducible singularity or alterity, but there is no democracy [pas de démocratie] without the ‘community of friends’, without the calculation of majorities, without identifiable, stabilizable, representable subjects, all equal. These two laws are irreducible one to the other. Tragically irreconcilable and forever wounding. The wound itself opens with the necessity of having to count one’s friends, to count the others, in the economy of one’s own, there where every other is altogether other. [POF 22 / 40.]

This passage contains within it a remarkable condensation or compression of the argument of Politics of Friendship, so we will need to proceed slowly in unravelling it. What Derrida calls ‘the wound’ in democracy is already present in the double movement which we discerned in the structure of friendship. Friendship is instituted by a decision taken in the context of absolute possibility — anyone could be my friend — but at the same time friendship is guarded or restricted by a question of number — I cannot be friends with everyone. The same goes for democracy. Democracy contains both a universal appeal — equality for all — and necessary limits which condition and govern that appeal. These mostly form around the question, again, of fraternization: of the naturalization of the decision which would limit democracy and equality to the members of one state, to one set of boundaries or one people, grounded in a spiritual identification which need not, but always potentially could, be expressed in a violent particularism or an ideology of nation, blood or soil.

There are three sets of problems introduced into the concept of democracy by this structural homology with friendship, all exemplified for Derrida in Plato’s Menexenus. There democracy is described as aristocratic: ‘a form of government which receives various names,
according to the fancies of men, and is sometimes called democracy, but is really an aristocracy or government of the best which has the approval of the many' [PoF 95 / 117].

As for friendship, so the question of democracy revolves around a question of number: 'If the word “democracy” allies itself or competes with that of aristocracy, it is because of number, of the reference to the required approbation of the greatest number' [PoF 101 / 124]. Derrida does not expand this point further, but it would be possible to find many of the most dominant concerns within the tradition of thinking about democracy suggested here. Where democracy is defined in opposition to oligarchy or aristocracy, there will remain an uncertain borderline between ‘the few’ and ‘the many.' Rather than try and distinguish one from the other, or true democracy from aristocracy — and this will form the substance of the debate within democratic theory over forms of democracy — Derrida simply insists that this question will persist within democracy. In turn, this would make such debates as those over representative and direct democracy\(^\text{23}\), the question of bureaucratization of the political sphere\(^\text{24}\), and the extent of the influence of business or other interests over democratic decision-making, not only inevitable but also necessary and interminable.

The second set of problems, on which Derrida focuses at some length, can be seen at work within the assertion in the Menexenus that ‘the basis of this our government is equality of birth. [...] we and our citizens are brethren, the children all of one mother’ [PoF 95 / 117]. In this referral of democratic equality to a principle of birth, Derrida sees the same suspension of decision that was at work in the fraternization of friendship: ‘Everything seems to be decided where the decision does not take place, precisely in that place where the decision does not take place \emph{qua} decision, where it will have been carried away in what has always-already taken place: at birth' [PoF 99 / 121]. The law of the polis is determined in


advance by a natural law: ‘nature commands law, [...] equality at birth founds in necessity legal equality’ [PoF 99 / 121]. This is ‘the place of fraternization as the symbolic bond alleging the repetition of a genetic tie [...]. In more modern terms one might speak of the foundation of citizenship in a nation’ [PoF 99 / 121]. The foundation of democracy in the naturalization of the law repeats the effect of fraternization on the thought of friendship, locking up decision and therefore any chance of responsibility:

Such a bond between two structurally heterogeneous ties will always remain obscure, mystical, essentially foreign to rationality — which does not mean simply irrational, in the equally modern sense of the term. It will always be exposed, to say the least, to the ‘sophistications,’ ‘mystifications,’ and perversions of rhetoric. Sometimes to the worst symptoms of nationalism, ethnocentrism, populism, even xenophobia. [...] Are we certain that throughout all the mutations of European history (of which, of course, the most rigorous account must be taken) no concept of the political and of democracy has ever broken with the heritage of this troubling necessity? Made a radical, thematic break with it? This is the question we are concerned with here [PoF 99-100 / 121-2].

Democracy founded on a supposedly natural bond will always be a limited or conditioned form, and equality in this case will never be justice. Derrida draws on Nicole Loraux’s work to ground this argument in a historical analysis of the relationship between autochthony and the Athenian state, but his assertion is that this analysis ought to be extended to every state or democratic politics in the history of the concept.25 Any franchise based on birth will institute inequality, just as it would if it were to be based on wealth, property or gender. A qualification for citizenship based on a period of residence only substitutes one similar law for the law of ‘natural’ birth; residence is taken to be as good as having been born to the right bloodline, or on the right soil. Derrida’s claim is that just as friendship could not be thought without the notion of brotherhood, and that election and exclusivity were part of the

concept's very definition, so the concept of democracy itself must also be similarly self-
contradictory. The principle of equality and its naturalization in terms of birth can never be
reconciled.

The third foundational limit to the concept of democracy, alongside the question of
number, and the problem of fraternization as naturalization, is the question of the sister
which contributes a dominant undercurrent to *Politics of Friendship* as a whole. It can be
seen to develop most obviously from the association of friendship with brotherhood in the
texts of the tradition. For Aristotle, the highest model of friendship is that between men. The
relationship between husband and wife is defined as friendship between a superior and an
inferior [NE 203] and can therefore become the model for an aristocratic constitution [NE
211]; moreover there is no mention at all of the sister, or of the daughter [PoF 202 / 228].
Yet Derrida wonders what room is left for friendship between women, or between men and
women. ‘This double exclusion of the feminine in this philosophical paradigm,’ he writes,
‘would then confer on friendship the essential and essentially sublime figure of virile
homosexuality’ [PoF 279 / 311]. The exclusion of women from the discourse of the tradition
on politics and friendship confirms this hypothesis. For example, Derrida notes of Carl
Schmitt that ‘not even in the theory of the partisan is there the least reference to the role
played by women in guerrilla warfare, in the wars and the aftermath of wars of national
liberation [...]’ [PoF 156 / 180-1]. Derrida emphasises the hegemony of a discourse which,
when it recognises the existence of the woman, neutralises her difference. For example, in
Kant’s reading of modesty: ‘It would equalize the sexes by moralizing them, getting the
woman to participate in universal fraternity: in a word, in humanity. The modest woman is a
brother for man’ [PoF 274 / 304]. The problem Derrida poses through his insistence on this
exclusion is whether politics itself, all the concepts and models we have of politics, might
not be founded on the absence of women, or at least on the neutralization of sexual
difference. In which case it would be impossible to address inequality between the sexes
within politics, except at the cost of reducing the sister to a brother. What future for
democracy if it has always been rhetorically organised around a model which excludes the woman, or the sister, if, as Derrida says, 'a political phallogocentrism has, up to this point, determined its cosmopolitical democracy, a democracy, qua cosmo-phratrocentrism' [PoF 263 / 294]? This problem may not be just any problem among those of the text. Derrida registers the importance of this question as one of 'the two major questions of “deconstruction”: the question of the history of concepts and (trivially) so-called “textual” hegemony, history tout court; and the question of phallogocentrism. Here qua phratrocentrism' [PoF 278 / 309]. The possibility seems to be left open here as so often in Derrida’s work that, in the form of the question set out by Paola Marrati, sexual difference is not just one difference amongst others, or that this question must at least remain open.26

These final two questions appear to be addressed as much to any politics or any state as they are to democracy in particular. In the latter case, the concept of politics appears to be de facto and de jure exclusive of women. Following the logic of the former instance, any political system which restricts political equality — or the allocation of resources, welfare, security — to its citizens rather than its non-citizens will define itself by an act of political exclusion, as not only limited democracy, but as injustice: if justice is a principle of equality, can it be limited by law to the occupants of the state rather than its neighbours? The question raised by these analyses is whether politics could ever take account of the sister, or be said to be just. Following some reflections on the challenge posed by the figure of the sister to a political tradition constructed on the rhetoric of fraternity, Derrida formulates this more general problem and proposes two options for dealing with this situation. The first would be to ‘admit that the political is in fact this phallogocentrism in act [...] political virtue [...] has always been virile virtue in its androcentric manifestation.’ If politics is by definition founded in inequality, should we seek to displace politics altogether? The emancipation of

women, ‘woman’s slow and painful access to citizenship’ would then appear to indicate that ‘politics’ itself was disappearing. Our problem would then be that of thinking about what would replace politics as such, rather than how we might modify our current political situation, and of ‘carrying oneself’ beyond the political, beyond the name “politics”; and by forging other concepts, concepts with an altogether different mobilizing force’ [PoF 158 / 183]. The second option Derrida formulates would be to keep the “old name” of politics, but to ‘analyse the logic and the topic of the concept differently, and engage other forms of struggle’ [PoF 158 / 183]. Not only does Derrida refuse to decide between these options, he insists that there can no longer be a choice. Not only must we invent a new politics, as well as a new concept of politics, but we cannot simply give up on the old concepts. We must negotiate with them, or attempt to think them through differently. This in turn suggests that we must read Politics of Friendship itself in terms of this double strategy.

1.2.3 Différence and Justice.

Having examined Derrida’s extension of the structural dynamics he sees at work in the concept of friendship to democracy, we are in a position to understand Politics of Friendship as a ‘genealogical deconstruction of the political (and through it, to the democratic)’ and what kind of way this is ‘to think, interpret and implement another politics, another democracy’ [PoF 104 / 128]. This project would be equivalent to a combination of the two options Derrida describes in the passage I have just referred to: on the one hand thinking through the old names of politics; but on the other hand seeking to think a new concept of politics. The focal point for this process in the book is the redescription of the traditional concept of democracy in terms of what Derrida calls ‘democracy-to-come,’ which I will now present in a relatively systematic form.
The key to understanding 'democracy-to-come' comes in the relationship between democracy, equality and justice as itself a question of number. For before any of the issues I have discussed so far, which define a democratic space which must be limited in number, constituted by exclusion, and haunted by the risk of relapsing into oligarchy or demagoguery, it is the very question of enumerability which contradicts and frustrates the democratic appeal: 'the question of the citizen or the subject as a countable singularity. There is no democracy without respect for irreducible singularity or alterity, but there is no democracy without the "community of friends," without the calculation of majorities, without identifiable, stabilizable, representable subjects, all equal' [POF 22 / 40]. That is to say, it is not the empirical or theoretical contradiction of the equality which grounds democracy which must come into question, but the very structure or possibility of equality itself which is the problem. The limits of democracy do not begin after the question of equality, and are not even separable from that same question. The very becoming citizen-subject, to be a subject, a citizen, like any other, introduces already a violent imposition into the heart of democracy. The violence of fraternity begins not when counting goes wrong, but with the necessity and principle of counting. So far I have dealt with the problems of the 'community of friends' and of the calculation of majorities: but the relationship between 'respect for irreducible singularity or alterity' and 'the citizen as countable singularity' must also be addressed.

Derrida's description of democracy here is directly parallel to his account of responsibility in The Gift of Death: 'responsibility [...] demands on the one hand an accounting, a general answering-for-oneself with respect to the general and before the generality, hence the idea of substitution, and, on the other hand, uniqueness, absolute singularity, hence nonsubstitution, nonrepetition, silence and secrecy' [GoD 61 / 88-9]. The concept of responsibility is structured by the same dilemma as that of democracy: on the one hand, the undeconstructible condition of justice [FoL 14-15 / 35-6] is the demand for absolute respect for each and every other, as other; on the other hand, there is the necessity
of law, which can only address the singular as an example of a general rule. In the passage above, this continuity of structure is confirmed by Derrida’s concluding words: democracy is violence, ‘there where every other is altogether other’ [PoF 22 / 40]. This is a translation of a phrase which Derrida analyses at some length in The Gift of Death as a compact expression of the dilemma of responsibility, the sentence ‘tout autre est tout autre’ [GoD 68 / 98; 82 / 116; 87 / 121]. There is no easy translation of this sentence, although David Wills’ ‘every (one) other is every (bit) other’ is clear enough. The phrase states an equivalence between two undecidable phrases, which might refer to absolute alterity (the wholly other) or every (individual) alterity. This suggests an unstable equivalence between the absolute alterity of each other and the being alike in being other of every other. Derrida pushes this to paradox by replacing the absolutely other with the name of God, and apparently demonstrating that every other is God, or that God is every other [GoD 86-7 / 120-1]. Responsibility only begins in this situation of infinitization, as we have seen, where my duty is owed unconditionally to each and every other, rather than to some others rather than others — whether this restriction is based on family, nation or state allegiances — or to my friends. That ‘democracy-to-come’ is infinite responsibility follows from that moment (although not strictly temporal) in which I could be friends with just anyone, in the multiplicity of possible friends, and Derrida’s attempt to think an experience of aimance prior even to the distinction between active or passive. This is an experience or condition rather than a logical or historical situation, irreducible to language or discourse. This law of ‘irreducible singularity or alterity’ for Derrida names democracy as democracy. It is the recognition of absolute and infinite responsibility, responsibility for every other as wholly other. It is a paradoxical law prior to and irreducible to all law.27 This is not a thinking of equality as such, but something like an equality beyond equality; for to claim equality with the other is to reduce the other to

the same: ‘It would therefore be a matter of thinking an alterity without hierarchical difference at the root of democracy’ [PoF 232 / 259].

This critique of the concept of equality is undertaken in the name of justice as a hyperbolic and excessive form of equality itself. In fact, this passage between ‘irreducible’ and ‘countable’ singularity takes us towards one of the more persistent themes throughout Derrida’s recent writing, ‘justice as the undeconstructible condition of any deconstruction’ [SoM 28 / 56; cf. FoL 15 / 35]. As Geoffrey Bennington has suggested, to consider justice in terms of this impossible aporetic — ‘an alterity without hierarchical difference’ [PoF 232 / 259] — can be seen as a translation of the early concept of différance. For one of Derrida’s central concerns has been the relationship between singularity and totality, the possibility of thinking difference without reducing it to the same. A singularity is only singular to the extent that it cannot be described as being like anything else; yet as soon as it is a singularity, it must always be, at least minimally, like something, and ultimately everything, else, even if only by virtue of being singular. This is Derrida’s peculiar twist on conditions of possibility: the condition of being a singularity depends on not being a singularity, its possibility on its impossibility. Were there to ever be anything absolutely singular it would be unrecognisable. Thus there can only be non-singular singularities and non-absolute difference. If each difference is even minimally distinguished from every other difference, they might all be said to be nothing but the traces of all the other differences. However these differences, or singularities, are still different, or singular, and thus cannot be accounted for or named in terms of anything else. Something will always remain or resist, whether the order of questioning is logical, ontological or ethical.

In his essay ‘Différance’ Derrida refers to several of his own texts, as well as sources in Levinas, Nietzsche and particularly in Heidegger, in order to propose ‘différance’ as the name for this field of non-absolute differences which is itself neither a word nor a concept.

28 Interrupting Derrida. 44-45, 12.
However ‘différence’ cannot be a final name, since the word is only another one of the non-absolute differences, and can only provisionally claim to name them. Derrida often suggests that this can be understood in terms of exemplarity. Effectively, any mark, or a difference capable of functioning as a mark (even a blank) signifies not only itself, but also its own condition as mark, as being like, but unlike, every other mark, that is every other thing. On the one hand the mark is unique, on the other it is a copy of every other mark. Thus each mark, each event, each decision, is exemplary, according to the fortuitous compression of meanings in that term: both the model and only a sample, the paradigmatic case, and only a typical one. Transferring this to the question of the citizen-subject, we could say that the identity of the subject can never be exhausted by his being-citizen, that something will escape. However this ‘something’ is nothing interior, not a residue of consciousness or subjectivity. What escapes is the inexhaustibility of the reference to every other subject, or difference that constitutes the subject. However just as différence is only a provisional or strategic name rather than a ‘truth’ — ‘strategic because no transcendent truth present outside the field of writing can govern theologically the totality of the field’ [MAR 7/7] — so in thinking about politics and responsibility we are forced to rely on names which cannot be entirely satisfactory. Derrida asks ‘in what sense may one still speak of equality — indeed of symmetry — in the dissymmetry and boundlessness of infinite alterity? What right does one have to speak still of the political, of law, and of democracy?’ [POF 233/260].

Like friendship, Derrida argues, democracy is to be thought in terms of a double movement. On the side of its appeal to equality and to the rule of the many, rather than the few, democracy has an emancipatory value: but there can be no democratic state or democratic theory which will not limit this appeal by grounding it in an association of citizens organised around a naturalising principle which locks up and neutralises the possibility of political responsibility. The very structure of the concept of democracy implies that there can be no full democracy in the terms of the ideal which determines the concept, there will be no democracy which does not sustain an anti-democratic current, no democracy
worthy of the name. For the concept of friendship, Derrida tentatively distinguished *aimance* from fraternization. For democracy, Derrida separates out the principle of what he calls ‘democracy-to-come.’ Democracy-to-come is what makes democracy what it is — the principle of equality or emancipation attested to by the name of democracy — but like *aimance*, it is immediately effaced. It can never be made present or presented as such; the ‘to-come’ indicates that it is permanently deferred. Yet it provides a principle against which any state which claims to be democratic may be judged. The arithmetic of friendship — not only the quantification of true friendship evident in the traditional texts, but the fact that it is necessarily structured by a drawing of limits, by an act of exclusion — is analogous to democracy considered as a matter of calculation. Before all the classical difficulties of defining democracy — how many people defines the ‘rule of the many’; how to protect the rights of the minority from the will of the majority; how to calculate the opinion of the people; how to preserve the rule of law from the dictatorship of the many — the difficulty of democracy will be a question of number. For every citizen must be considered as equal under the law, as being equivalent to one another, as being precisely subject to a law of generality; as countable, and counting equally. Not only will a democracy have to consider its own limits, criteria for membership (a democracy is not the rule of just anyone, but its own citizens), but in arraigning its subjects as subjects it is already inflicting injustice on them. ‘Irreducible singularity’ resists calculation.

It should be clear by now that Derrida must not be taken to be arguing for an ideal of democracy to which no actual or empirical democracy will live up to, or which a democratic theory could describe. The mutual co-implication of ‘democracy-to-come’ and democracy as fraternity are not merely the result of a gap between the empirical and the ideal, but an inexorable necessity. Democracy, and perhaps politics itself, can be nothing other than the negotiation within countable categories, in the name of an undeconstructible limit which is nicknamed justice, or ‘democracy-to-come.’ Derrida remarks of his attempt to think another friendship, that it would have nothing to do with community, being ‘of the
order neither of the common nor of its opposite, neither appurtenance or non-appurtenance, sharing or non-sharing, proximity or distance, the inside or the outside, etc. This friendship would have nothing to do with ‘community’:

Not because it would be a community without community, ‘unavowable’ or ‘inoperative’, etc., but simply because it would have nothing to do, with regard to what is essential in that which is called friendship, with the slightest reference to community, whether positive, negative, or neutral [PoF 298 / 331].

A community must always presuppose a decision as to who is or who ought to form part of it. We can assume that the same strictures might apply to democracy, and that Derrida is attempting to think something which would not be recognisable democracy, but whose promise may be found to be contained within democracy. If Politics of Friendship operates in the terms set out at the end of the last section, we might expect ‘democracy-to-come’ to function as both a name for a concept of politics thought beyond politics; and the conditions of a prolonged negotiation with actual existing democracy. It is this compression which informs Derrida’s recurrent query: ‘would it still make sense to speak of democracy when it would no longer be a question (no longer in question as to what is essential or constitutive) of country, nation, even of State and citizen — in other words, if at least one still keeps to the accepted use of this word, when it would no longer be a political question?’ [PoF 104 / 126-7]. Derrida’s use of ‘democracy-to-come’ would serve as a strategic intervention which combines both a reference to actual political conditions; and an attempt to think towards something which would exceed the order of politics — or at least the conventional use of it. However, having set out the structure of what Derrida calls ‘democracy-to-come,’ his choice of the term remains to be explained. As I have suggested, there can only be a strategic

justification for this, rather than an absolute one. The reference to democracy is fairly clear however, so what requires explanation is the reference to futurity written in to the 'to-come,' Derrida's displacement of the French word *avenir* (future) into *à-venir* (to-come). This is the final element we require to begin to assess Derrida's deconstructive genealogy as a politics of the promise.

1.2.4 The Promise of Politics.

In the 1981 interview to which I referred at the opening of this chapter, Derrida specifies a double strategy with regard to politics:

> the difficulty is to gesture in opposite directions at the same time: on the one hand to preserve a distance and suspicion with regard to the official political codes governing reality; on the other, to intervene here and now in a practical and *engagé* manner whenever the necessity arises. This position of dual allegiance, in which I personally find myself, is one of perpetual uneasiness. I try where I can to act politically while recognizing that such action remains incommensurate with my intellectual project of deconstruction.30

Adapting this suggestion to the terms of *Politics of Friendship* I have suggested that Derrida's intervention in that text consists in re-writing one of 'the official political codes governing reality,' democracy, in terms which attempt both a political transformation in the here and now, and to gesture to the necessity for a continual re-thinking of the basic concepts of politics itself. Just as the neologism 'differance' should be accorded no special privilege in reading Derrida's work, but located as a strategic response to his institutional and theoretical surroundings — roughly the hegemony of a structuralism (and of a structuralist Marxism) informed by a crude Hegelian reading of the relationship between difference and identity —

30 *Dialogues with contemporary Continental thinkers.* 120.
so the phrase ‘democracy-to-come’ is coined in an attempt to effect a certain kind of transformation. What remains to be clarified is the nature of this as a form of political practice. The answer lies not so much in the word ‘democracy’ as in the ‘to-come.’

Derrida’s account of democracy-to-come seems extremely ambiguous from the point of view of more conventional political theory. It proceeds neither from analysis of the history of the democratic state form, nor from the observation of what democracy means in the contemporary world. Nor does it consist in constructing practical and pragmatically oriented normative models for the functioning of a political democracy, or of adapting such models to local conditions. While Derrida clearly expresses a hope that there will be more democracy rather than less in the future, on the condition that ‘democracy’ is understood not as one state form amongst others, but something like a principle of equality and emancipation, he is unable to make any concrete suggestions as to how this might be brought about. Instead what Politics of Friendship establishes is: 1) the possibility and the necessity of criticising any current form of democracy in the name of an ideal principle of ‘democracy-to-come’; 2) the necessity of attempting to think toward a political relation which would be more ‘democratic’ than any democracy imaginable — but could for these reasons perhaps no longer be called democracy or even political. All this is signified by Derrida’s qualification that democracy remains ‘to come.’ Strictly speaking, however, deconstruction prohibits any prediction as to whether in fact there will be any more or less of what we call democracy in the future, nor whether another form of political system or thinking will emerge or not. The futurity of the ‘to-come’ is of another order:

For democracy remains to come; this is its essence in so far as it remains: not only will it remain indefinitely perfectible, hence always insufficient and future, but, belonging to the time of the promise, it will always remain, in each of its future times, to come: even when there is democracy, it never exists, it is never present, it remains the theme of a non-presentable concept [PoF 306 / 339].

Rather than ‘democracy-to-come’ Derrida might have chosen to insist that there is no democracy worthy of the name; or that democracy, like justice, is an experience of the
impossible. None of these descriptions is not true of democracy in Derrida’s terms, but in attesting to a ‘democracy-to-come,’ Derrida also affirms something within democracy that does confirm the possibility of there being more democracy rather than less.

This is the dimension of the promise within democracy. Insisting on it reinforces not only the fact that what we call democracy can never be fully present; but that something of democracy is already present here and now. While stripped of any specific content, this affirmation remarks something within democracy, the gap between the two logics which makes necessary the negotiation. This negotiation is the possibility of there being greater justice, a more equitable distribution of resources or power; but it must also be the risk of the opposite being the case. This is not a utopian social thought.31 For it locates the promise of ‘democracy-to-come’ in the past as much as in what we call the present, and gives no grounds for thinking that it will or will not come to pass in the future. ‘Democracy-to-come’ is what opens to the future, but it is not the future thought in terms of a future-present. Without this opening to the future there would be no democracy at all. Beyond democracy, we are called to imagine another experience of democracy, or of friendship, of equality. But we can only imagine this as monstrous, frightening and disturbing, as ‘absolute danger’ [GRA 5 / 14]. Any promise, Derrida insists, is indissociable from a threat, since the necessary condition of a promise is that it might not come true.32 So the structure of democracy is caught between the promise of emancipation, of there being more democracy, more justice, more equality, and the threat of there being less democracy, of the disappearance of the democratic moment in its fraternal recuperation. The ‘futurity’ of the ‘to-come’ in ‘democracy-to-come’ is not of the order of something for which an arrival could be predicted; nor is it to be associated with a teleology — it is entirely possible that there have been ‘more’ democratic societies in the past. What Derrida is describing is more like a

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principle of disruption which opens democracy as we know it to the possibility of something else happening. Because this 'something else' cannot be specified, it could be 'good' or 'bad' — more equality or less equality. What is clear is that it must not be thought of as the arrival of 'democracy-to-come' itself. What Derrida also calls 'justice,' a condition of absolute respect for every singularity in its singularity is not just difficult to describe, but is also potentially the worst violence, since law, politics, and democracy, the mechanism of negotiation between different injustices would no longer be possible. To think 'democracy-to-come' is also in some sense to hold off this threat; to defer the possibility of the worst violence, the violence which would abolish politics, while seeking to negotiate for a less violent politics in the here and now.

In seeking to reaffirm this democratic promise, but without resigning the right and the necessity of negotiating an improvement in what we now call democracy, Derrida's text is structured as a re-enactment of that promise. The book's heavily marked performative dimension draws attention to this. By repeating so much of the traditional conceptualisation of friendship and of democracy, Derrida does not dismiss it, but confirms its necessity and importance. Derrida does not reject the tradition, but places his work within it or alongside it. In particular, by repeating the traditional apostrophe 'O my friends there are no friends' he underlines the structure of any communication:

We would not be together in a sort of minimal community — but also incommensurable to all others — speaking the same language or praying for translation against the horizon of a same language, if only to manifest disagreement, if a sort of friendship had not already been sealed, before all contracts [...] a friendship prior to friendships, an ineffaceable friendship, fundamental and groundless, one that breathes in a shared language (past or to come) and in the being-together that all allocution supposes, up to and including the declaration of war [PoF 236 / 264].

32 This is dealt with at length by Derrida in 'Avance,' a foreword to Serge Marcel's Le Tombeau de Dieu Artisan. Paris: Minuit, 1995. 34-40.
Aimance, preceding and making possible any so-called friendships, bears witness to the possibility of friendship, just as Derrida, in writing about the texts of the tradition repeats not only their sense of the importance of friendship, but their assumption of responsibility for the experience and the theory of friendship and of politics.

1.3 Democracy and Literature

DERRIDA’S ANALYSIS OF ‘democracy-to-come’ in Politics of Friendship proceeds on the basis of the deconstructive genealogy of one concept of the political, which seeks to derive it as a form of political association defined in terms of a mode of relation between citizens, specifically the traditional association of democracy with brotherhood. In this section of the chapter I will draw out another set of analyses in which Derrida is concerned with two rather different political concepts, but still within the horizon of the question of democracy-to-come. If Derrida’s discussion in Politics of Friendship might be said to focus on the idea of equality, then this second analysis relates to democracy defined by freedom of speech, and to the concept of politics derived from a distinction between the public and private sphere. As a starting point I take Derrida’s essay ‘Passions.’ There Derrida explicitly links democracy and literature. ‘Literature […] ties its destiny,’ he writes, ‘to a certain noncensure, to the space of democratic freedom (freedom of the press, freedom of speech, etc.) No democracy without literature; no literature without democracy’ [PAS 28 / 65]. In making this connection, Derrida again appears to be linking democracy with deconstruction, since a concern with literature has been at work since his earliest texts; indeed his (abandoned) dissertation was a
phenomenological study of the literary work. However the status of literature in deconstruction is complex. By examining the fate of literature in deconstruction, I consider more closely Derrida’s assertion of the relationship between literature and democracy. Following this, I turn to Derrida’s closely related work on the secret and its relation to the distinction between public and private.

1.3.1 Deconstruction and Literature.

A version of ‘Passions’ was first published as Derrida’s own contribution to Derrida: A Critical Reader. Given this context, not only is Derrida’s essay playful and humorous in tone, but he seems particularly interested in playing on his audience’s expectations of him — for example editor David Wood’s suggestion that he contribute ‘an oblique offering.’ After satirising and questioning the situation of the book, likening it to a sacrificial ritual, and commenting on the perceived ethical turn in deconstruction, Derrida confesses that he wants to tell his readers a secret. But the secret turns out to have been given away all along. For Derrida confesses that ‘all I wanted to do was to confide or confirm my taste (probably unconditional) for literature, more precisely for literary writing’ [PAS 27 / 63]. This may have been a open secret, for Derrida’s passion for literature has always been well known, from both the essays collected in Dissemination, the two essays on Jabès in Writing and Difference, and his interest in and texts on writers like Joyce, Ponge, Blanchot, or Celan. In

fact Derrida has been often accused of liking literature too much, or of reducing philosophy to literature,36 as he acknowledges when he explains: ‘Not that I like literature in general, nor that I prefer it to something else, to philosophy, for example, as they suppose who ultimately discern neither one nor the other. Not that I want to reduce everything to it, especially not philosophy. Literature I could, fundamentally do without, in fact, rather easily’ [PAS 27 / 64].

Derrida goes on to emphasise that what he likes in literature is not a matter of aesthetics, nor is it simply a question of preferring novels to other forms of prose. Instead his preference for literature is its connection with democracy, and freedom of speech:

I have often found myself insisting on the necessity of distinguishing between literature and belles-lettres or poetry. Literature is a modern invention, inscribed in conventions and institutions which, to hold on to just this trait, secure in principle its right to say everything. Literature thus ties its destiny to a certain noncensure, to the space of democratic freedom (freedom of the press, freedom of speech, etc.) No democracy without literature; no literature without democracy [PAS 28 / 68].

This apparently offers us the possibility of a more historically-based account of democracy within deconstruction than the conceptual exploration of ‘democracy-to-come’ in Politics of Friendship but it also raises two immediate difficulties. The first problem is the fact that Derrida has offered several answers to the question ‘what is literature?’ The second is that at least one of those definitions has questioned the existence of literature at all: is the literature which is tied to freedom of speech that same literature of which Derrida notes that ‘there is no — hardly any, ever so little — literature’ [DIS 223 / 274]? On the one hand Derrida tells us that ‘literature is a public institution of recent invention, with a comparatively short history, governed by all sorts of conventions connected to the evolution of law, which allows, in principle, anything to be said’ [DAP 80] but on the other hand it is a distant possibility, perhaps impossibility itself.

Perhaps we should not try too hard to reconcile Derrida’s statements on the subject of literature, as perhaps on other topics. As Rodolphe Gasché puts it, ‘Since what we might call Derrida’s “performative turn,” such plurality appears to be inevitable,’37 since each statement is necessarily bound to its context and to its own singular structure as a response. However in this case, turning to Derrida’s well-known early essay ‘The Double Session’ can help us clarify his comments on the relationship between democracy and literature. In this essay Derrida comes closest to posing what he described in his thesis defence as one of the key questions of deconstruction:

What is literature? And first of all what is it ‘to write’? How is it that the fact of writing can disturb the very question ‘what is?’ and even ‘what does it mean?’ To say this in other words — and here is the saying otherwise that was of importance to me — when and how does an inscription become literature and what takes place when it does? To what and to whom is this due? What takes place between philosophy and literature, science and literature, politics and literature, theology and literature, psychoanalysis and literature? [...] Why am I so fascinated by the literary ruse of the inscription and the whole ungraspable paradox of a trace which manages only to carry itself away, to erase itself in marking itself out afresh, itself and its own idiom, which in order to take actual form must erase itself and produce itself at the price of this self-erasure.38

In ‘The Double Session’ Derrida poses the question of literature, as he puts it, ‘between Plato and Mallarmé’ [Dis 183 / 225]. He proposes one reading of mimesis based on Plato, and then juxtaposes it with another interpretation of mimesis which he finds to be both at work and thematised within Mallarmé’s text ‘Mimique.’ However, as with his reading of friendship from Aristotle to Nietzsche, this does not mean that Mallarmé invents or discovers a new version of mimesis, which overturns or disproves Plato’s arguments. In the early pages of his text Derrida sets this out quite clearly. These ‘proper names,’ he notes, ‘are not real references but indications for the sake of convenience and initial analysis’ [Dis 183 / 225]. What Derrida finds in Mallarmé is a general possibility within mimesis as such, but

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which a traditional interpretation of Plato has dismissed — we might think of this as a Mallarméan moment already present within Plato’s writing. This moment also passes between philosophy and literature, but to show that there is a ‘literary’ moment within philosophy’s account of the relationship between image and copy, truth and fiction, is not to privilege one account (philosophical or literary) of this relationship. While literature is able to pose questions to philosophy which might not be available within its history [DAP 80], literature is in its turn a philosophical concept. If a certain avant-garde literary practice exposes this dimension of mimesis more readily than other texts, this does not make it an experience restricted to these texts.

Traditionally, a mimetic object is either considered to be a transparent copy, to be judged according to the truth of the thing imitated, or it is considered qua copy, and judged according to the truth of its re-presentation of the object copied; mimesis is the performance of a ‘truth.’ In ‘Mimique’ Mallarmé describes the scene of a performance which imitates nothing except itself, and which might be considered as a mimetic act which escapes the order of copy and original. Derrida argues that this possibility already inhabits, not only every so-called copy, but everything which is capable of being copied or imitated. Thus the order of truth is subsequent to the order of imitation: there is repetition before the unique, and non-absolute difference before either singularity of difference, self or other. Around a thematics of the hymen, as that which both separates and joins, Derrida advances the possibility of thinking an ‘in-between’ which cannot be organised around oppositions such as inside / outside, truth / falsehood [DIS 212-222 / 261-274]. This argument within the text is doubled by the second section of ‘The Double Session.’ Here Derrida argues that the structure of what he calls the ‘re-mark’ resists any attempt to exhaust the meaning of Mallarmé’s work by thematic criticism. Writing in the context of Richard’s analysis of Mallarmé in which the blank, or whiteness is proposed as the exemplary theme of his writing, Derrida shows that the blank, the possibility of distinction between two terms in a series, must remain a term within that series, and thus cannot be considered the ultimate
theme, any more than any of the other terms in the series can. Each mark, in fact, is both an exemplar member of the series of all marks, and a mark on its own. It refers both to itself, and to the fact of its being distinguished from all other marks: this is the structure of différance. The re-mark is an attempt to formalise a structure inherent in every mark whereby it not only functions as a mark, but is doubled, since it also marks its own status as a mark. The mark is in other words divided, since this structure introduces a gap or delay between the moment in which the mark labels itself as a mark, and in which it marks whatever it refers to. This also defeats any attempt to idealise a mark, since it will never be complete in itself, referring to every other mark.

This structural restance (remainder), exemplarity, différance, re-marking, effect of the hymen, supplement, contamination, is what Derrida likes in literature — and wherever else it might be found. It is this, rather than any other code which he relates to democracy, except under the guise of the fortunes of literature as a historical set of institutions and definitions, defined legally or generically within a culture. The significance of the truth / fiction opposition is not only that it determines the traditional account of the relationship between philosophy and literature, but the account of all meaning and of all events of meaning (events as meaning). It therefore determines the very possibility of assigning a meaning to such terms as 'literature':

If this handbook of literature meant to say something, which we now have some reason to doubt, it would proclaim first of all that there is no — or hardly any, ever so little — literature; that in any event there is no essence of literature, no truth of literature, no literary-being or being-literary of literature. And that the fascination exerted by the 'is,' or the 'what is' in the question 'what is literature' is worth what the hymen is worth — that is, not exactly nothing — when for example it causes one to die laughing. All this, of course, should not prevent us — on the contrary — from attempting to find out what has been represented and determined under that name — 'literature' and why

[Dis 223 / 275].

The literary signifies that there is something within any text which opposes or resists, and is certainly irreducible to any thematic description. 'This handbook of literature' refers both to Mallarmé's text, and the work of Derrida's which describes it and becomes in its turn a
handbook of literature. Thus Derrida proposes two tasks. Firstly, we must pursue the structural or deconstructive analysis of the concept of literature, and secondly its historical or genealogical aspect — 'what has been represented and determined under that name.' Two things are at stake. Derrida is proposing both the possibility of thinking the entire heritage of metaphysics otherwise — whether conceived in terms of an opposition between truth and fiction; of critique as unveiling; of philosophy as truth against literature as fictionality; or of history against myth — and the genealogy of the historical codification of this possibility.

The irreducible literary moment or trace within a text is thus the deconstructive moment which shows not only that the oppositions on which philosophy and everything that participates in it (even those disciplines to which philosophy is opposed, which must therefore be contaminated by it) are not natural, but depend on a more general structure, for example, that of différence, or 'democracy-to-come.' The literary moment is impossible to the extent that it shows itself only through its effects, but is in itself only a principle of non-closure, of the impossibility of the complete analysis of a text, of reducing it to transparency — that which remains. On this basis we can see that the 'literary' also undermines the stability of a final opposition between literature and philosophy. Both 'philosophy' and 'literature' supervene on this field of undecidability, and are effects of more or less historical stabilizations of that undecidability.

The relationship Derrida perceives between democracy and literature operates on both the two levels we have distinguished. Not only is there a relationship between literature and freedom of speech in a certain tradition of law, cast as the right to say anything, pseudonymously or anonymously, but this legal apparatus testifies to a less transient, but more opaque structure. This is not a necessary connection, and Derrida calls it a 'great good fortune' [DAP 80]. In fact, of course, the right to free speech, to say anything as literature, is limited. If free speech is a condition for what we call democracy then a correlate of this must be that there will always be censorship of literature. There must always be some code, if not of censorship, then another's right to privacy or a law against libel or slander, which
regulates what can be said in the public sphere. Even if this is not externalised in a legal requirement, it is a responsibility which comes with writing; the possibility of a self-censorship by the author. Again we might understand this in terms of the hyperbolic experience of absolute responsibility again: the irresponsibility of being able to say anything precedes and is the very condition of the responsibility which is imposed upon it to limit it. We cannot imagine a democracy without a debate on the possibility or the need for censorship. Without this debate, we would no longer be in a democracy: the society which did not debate censorship would no longer be democratic. Yet at the same time, on Derrida’s account, ‘each time that a literary work is censured, democracy is in danger’ [PAS 28 / 65].

Derrida has given several interviews in which he has discussed the role of the media in contemporary society, which illustrate this paradoxical situation. In an interview published as ‘Another Day for Democracy,’ Derrida reflects on the relationship between ‘democracy-to-come,’ public opinion and the question of the media. This makes apparent that the relationship between democracy and freedom of speech is subject to constant negotiation and demands the most extreme vigilance. For example he specifies that a free press should also allow a ‘right to reply’; ‘France is one of the rare countries which recognises the […] right of response. It’s a fundamental right.’ However Derrida goes on to suggest that this right is so attenuated as to be threatened: from interpretative violence, abusive simplification, insinuations, which ‘most often go without an immediate and public response, on the radio, on the television, and in the newspapers. […] To the extent that the right to reply does not receive its full extension and its effectiveness (again, an infinite task), democracy as such will be limited. Only in the press? Certainly, but the press is everywhere today […]’ 39

Within the fundamental opening of democracy, guaranteed or accompanied by freedom of speech, what we might call hegemonic or anti-democratic forces are at work. Derrida speaks

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approvingly elsewhere in interviews of the diversification of the media, and of the dangers posed by monopolization of the press. To the extent that speech is free, not just as a right enshrined in law, but in terms of economic and social conditions, we might speak of democratization; to the extent that it is conditioned or limited, anti-democratization. These forces can never cancel each other out: there can never be ‘full’ or ‘present’ democracy, but nor can the restriction of the freedom of speech ever crush the very possibility of speaking without any controls. Or as Derrida puts it in his ‘Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism,’ ‘it is obvious that if democracy remains to come, this right to say anything, even in literature, is not concretely realized or actualized’ [DAP 80]. The title of the interview to which I have referred brings out this problem: the published translation bears the name ‘Another Day for Democracy’ but it might equally have been translated as ‘Democracy adjourned’ We see the same sense of deferral and promise that structured the concept of democracy-to-come in Politics of Friendship.

1.3.2 The Politics of the Secret

Throughout the period of Derrida’s reflections on ‘democracy-to-come’ and often in the same texts, an association is made between literature and ‘the secret.’ In this section I will describe this association, and argue that it enables us to think of democracy-to-come as in part a problematization of the public / private distinction on which the concept of politics is often founded, particularly in the tradition of liberal political thought.

Derrida’s use of the term ‘secret’ can be directly connected to the questions of exemplarity and différance which I have already described. Derrida gives a long account of the secret in ‘Passions,’ and it is possible to read this description as articulating precisely the connection between literature (the trace, the remark), or différance, and democracy that we
have been following. Derrida combines the modes of affirmation or testimony (‘there is something secret’) and indication (‘there is something secret’), based on the close relationship between the French phrases ‘il y a la secret’ and ‘il y a là un secret.’ Mixing the two modes of address (claiming both that ‘there is a secret’ and that ‘there is a secret’) gives the text a performative dimension which precedes and overflows the apparently apophatic presentation [PAS 24 / 56]. For the secret is approached entirely in terms of what it is not. The secret is not an art hidden within the human, either that of artistic genius or of the transcendental imagination, nor is there a question of election for anyone who knows the secret [PAS 24 / 56-7]. The secret is not an unconscious representation, whether recoverable or reconstructible by psychoanalysis. It is not of the order of subjectivity, nor of the resistance to the Hegelian system, neither existential nor Kierkegaardian; nor is it either sacred or profane [PAS 24-5 / 57-8]. The secret is not an effect of religious revelation. It belongs ‘no more to the private than to the public’ [PAS 25 / 58-9]. The secret is not any form of interiority, but a structural effect, irreducible to the conceptual distinction between inside and outside. It is not of the order of secret as we understand it in terms of possible revelation — any secret which could be revealed is not an absolute secret in Derrida’s sense. The secret withholds itself from the order of truth as either adequation or unveiling. The secret must remain foreign to ‘knowledge and of historical narrative, and outside of all periodization, all epochalization’ [PAS 27 / 62]. In other words, the secret is another word for the experience of singularity — for what resists all categorization or generalization, but cannot be recognised by any law.

Translated into political terms, Derrida draws on the secret — this principle of absolute singularity — to affirm a dimension of privacy which could be thought beyond the opposition between the public and the private, and perhaps therefore irreducible to any politics: ‘I have attempted to think an experience of the secret and of singularity to which the public realm has no right and no power’ [DAP 81]. It is worth bearing in mind here that the distinction between public and private has been used on the one hand to reserve a realm of
experience from a political intervention — often in the liberal tradition, economic activity, religious belief or morality — while on the other hand it registers a boundary which can always be crossed by the state: the private person as citizen is already wholly bound to the law. The non-absolute secret, a secret which can be passed on or revealed, from which Derrida distinguishes his own account of the secret, would be equivalent to this right to privacy; a right which has been violated in advance, as a revocable concession made on the basis of a prior public claim to know everything. This is again clear from Derrida’s ‘Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism’:

this secret is not something that I keep within me; it is not me. The secret is not the secret of representation that one keeps in one’s head and which one chooses not to tell, it is rather a secret coextensive with the experience of singularity. The secret is irreducible to the public realm — although I do not call it private — and irreducible to publicity and politicization, but at the same time, this secret is that on the basis of which the public realm and the realm of the political can be and remain open [DAP 81].

The secret is not a question of any particular or possible content, but of a political limit. This limit would entail both a desirable restraint on the power of the state, but also a limit which generates political responsibility as such. Only to the extent that each citizen is not a citizen — that is, in the terms of our previous discussion, is not a countable singularity — is there any need for calculation, for negotiation. Only once there is infinite responsibility is there any responsibility at all. The secret may not be anything, but the principle of the secret is irreducible if there is any politics at all. It is perhaps in this sense that the secret, literature and freedom of speech are found to be the necessary conditions of democracy, rather than through an accident of history. In ‘Passions’ Derrida proposes just this, linking the secret to ‘a hyperbolic condition of democracy which seems to contradict a certain determined and historically limited concept of such a democracy, a concept which links it to the concept of a subject that is calculable, accountable, imputable and responsible’ [PAS 29 / 66-7]. What
Derrida describes as the exemplary secret of literature is that of a principle of *restance* — that which remains — on which might be articulated a thought of resistance.\(^{40}\)

### 1.4 Deconstruction and Radical Democracy

I began this chapter with Derrida's provocative identification of deconstruction and democracy. After considering Derrida's account of 'democracy-to-come' and his discussion of the relationship between literature and democracy, we can provisionally formulate some conclusions. Derrida is attempting to think something like a constitutive flaw in the concept of democracy, which generates on the one hand 'democracy-to-come' as an ideal of justice which democracy can never reach, beyond enumeration and equality; but on the other hand which opens the possibility of an analysis or a criticism which would permanently bear witness to this gap, and seek to reduce it, without claiming to know how to do so. Derrida calls this situation 'democracy-to-come,' but it is a structural effect of what he elsewhere calls deconstruction. Deconstruction would also name the approach which best claims to represent or think this situation, proposing this critique of any existing form of democracy, while stressing a principle of ruin within the concept itself which rules out proposing an ameliorative program or solution. Derrida's work on democracy has a certain amount in common with a heterogeneous body of political theory which it is convenient to group under the label of radical democratic theory. This is broadly left-wing in political affiliation and

\(^{40}\) Derrida suggests this connection with explicit reference to 'the secret of literature' in *Resistances: de la Psychanalyse*. Paris: Galilée, 1996. 38-41.
characterised by a rejection of revolutionary practice in favour of a commitment to furthering the critique of liberal democracy within the democratic system. In particular, radical democracy calls for a re-evaluation of the space of politics in terms of opposition and dissensus rather than a search for consensus and agreement — for an ‘agonistic’ (Chantal Mouffe) or ‘antagonistic’ (William Connolly) democracy rather than what Bonnie Honig has called the traditional aim of political theory, the displacement of politics itself. Radical democratic theorists have been prepared to accept the incommensurability of competing political claims rather than seeking to reconcile such claims within a broader rational discursive horizon or an overarching political theory or theory of society. In her introduction to Dimensions of Radical Democracy, Chantal Mouffe identifies as typical concerns of radical democratic thought: a dissatisfaction with both liberal and communitarian theory; a suspicion of rights as masking historical and ideological or economic interests of particular groups; an attempt to distinguish political and economic liberalism; an interest in active citizenship dissociated from a theory of national identity or unity. In similar terms to Derrida’s, Mouffe concludes: ‘our understanding of radical democracy [...] postulates the very impossibility of a final realization of democracy. It affirms that the unresolvable tension between the principles of equality and liberty is the very condition for the preservation of the indeterminacy and undecidability which is constitutive of modern democracy. [...] Radical democracy also means the radical impossibility of a fully achieved democracy.’

In this section I will attempt to evaluate Derrida’s work on the concept of democracy by comparing it with the notion of radical democracy, in particular as it is advanced in the work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. Through this comparison, and a discussion of Claude Lefort’s analysis of the relation between democracy and totalitarianism, I will be able to formulate

both the constitutive limits of radical democratic thought and the alternative offered by the deconstructive thinking of democracy.

1.4.1 Hegemony and Deconstruction

The work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe has been possibly the only sustained attempt from within the discipline of political theory to negotiate with deconstruction.⁴³ Not only does their theorisation of radical democracy, first proposed in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, predate Derrida’s own turn to the question of democracy, but in formulating their theory they draw explicitly on his writing. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy attempts three things at once. Grounded in a re-reading of the Marxist tradition intended to draw out an alternative logic for the Left — without discarding the Marxist heritage — and in particular to adopt and adapt Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, their book proposes both 1) a diagnosis of the political and historical situation of the last two hundred years and 2) of the contemporary scene in terms of radical democratic emancipation and neo-conservative reaction to it; and 3) also a rethinking and redirection of socialist strategy on the basis of the first two objectives. This last aim is met by two criteria. Firstly, by embracing post-structuralist thought to help theorise the field of the social and to recognise the limits of political intervention, and secondly by the widening of traditional left-wing politics. Laclau and Mouffe drop the notion of a unified working class as the motor of revolution; accept that economic conditions may not necessarily be primary; and seek to establish what they call a chain of equivalence between various otherwise distinct political struggles — between ecological and feminist

⁴³ See Bennington. Legislations. 6n.6.; Interrupting Derrida. 198n.4. For a general account of Laclau and Mouffe’s work see Anna Marie Smith. Laclau & Mouffe: The Radical Democratic Imaginary. London: Routledge, 1998.
politics as well as more traditional socialist struggles, for example. Importantly, where traditional political theory has either worked from empirical observation or a projected ideal of a political body, Laclau and Mouffe place their emphasis very heavily on method rather than on conclusions; they attempt to think of politics as unending. Where most political theory has proposed endpoints or utopianism, or at least an end to politics, Laclau and Mouffe want to pass on a mobile conception of politics in terms of strategic gains and demands rather than universal, often disabling, conceptions of aims and means, ‘the two extremes represented by the totalitarian myth of the Ideal City, and the positivist pragmatism of reformists without a project’ [HSS 190]. The theory of hegemony, they emphasise, offers a way of thinking contingency rather than historical necessity [HSS 3; 6].

The socialism the two authors put forward is subordinated to a wider project, of maintaining and working within what they call ‘radical democracy.’ In relation to this end, ‘socialism is one of the components for a project of radical democracy, not vice versa’ [HSS 178]. This drastic reformulation of the role and aims of socialism, traditionally seen as the absolute transformation of both the political sphere and of civil society — including the abolition of such a distinction — on the basis of the internal contradictions of capitalist economics, depends largely on the diagnosis of the theoretical and empirical-historical situation which Laclau and Mouffe put forward. This is where deconstructive and other post-structuralist thought comes into the equation. For it is from post-structuralism that Laclau and Mouffe come to their major premises: the social is to be taken as ‘the constitutive ground or “negative essence” of the existing, and the diverse “social orders” as precarious and ultimately failed attempts to domesticate the field of differences’ [HSS 95-6]. They follow Hindness and Hirst’s influential critique of Althusser, and in particular their attack on determination and causation: ‘The social formation is not a totality governed by an organizing principle, determination in the last instance, structural causality, or whatever’
From Derrida they take the impossibility of fixing meanings, although they correctly see that there must be partial fixings of meaning, interventions, which they call articulations (and these articulations imply a relation in which both elements are transformed): ‘The practice of articulation, therefore, consists in the construction of nodal points which partially fix meaning; and the partial character of this fixation proceeds from the openness of the social, a result, in its turn, of the constant overflowing of every discourse by the infinitude of the field of discursivity’ [HSS 113]. Radicalising Gramsci, they claim that we need to think of a plurality of political spaces, which are not to be totalised into one political claim or struggle.

A radical thinking of democracy attempts to recognise both the space of emergence of new political subjects and the conflictual and antagonistic nature of the social sphere. The competing claims of various political particularisms represent for Laclau and Mouffe both a response to the fragmentation of the social sphere and resistance to its subsequent homogenisation, articulated within the historical legacy or residue of the liberal-democratic egalitarian imagination. The task of the New Left is to deepen and radicalise this egalitarianism — against any essentialism, including that of a class-based socialism — with a commitment to a political pluralism. To this end they supplement the demand for equality with a demand for liberty [HSS 184]. This pluralism is called for and made possible by the nature of the social sphere as they conceive it: ‘It is to this plurality of the social that the project for a radical democracy is linked, and the possibility of it emanates directly from the […] displacements which take place within that plurality’ [HSS 181]. Laclau and Mouffe recommend a strategy whereby separate political struggles are articulated together, not so much as alliances but through a process of mutual transformation: a logic of equivalence must be established between the distinct conflicts (‘anti-racism, anti-sexism, and anti-

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capitalism' [HSS 182], for example) which entails a dissolution of the autonomy of the spaces in which each of these struggles is constituted. All must become 'the equivalent symbols of a unique and indivisible struggle' [HSS 182]. Laclau and Mouffe oppose the notion of each struggle being autonomous, since this would imply a closed totality, and instead demand political logics which intervene in the constitution of identity, but refuse to dominate or produce an 'ultimate foundation' of the social. Acknowledging these multiple spaces of struggle constitutes their vision of radical democracy as 'pluralist' [HSS 184].

Even on this brief account it is apparent that there is a basic compatibility between a deconstructive and a radical democratic approach. However, before comparing the two strategies, I will set out three reservations with regard to Laclau and Mouffe's account. The first concerns the status of radical democracy itself. There seems to me an ambiguity within the logic of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy which is not clarified in the later work of either author. Either radical democracy is the objective of radical democratic practice — a 'radicalization of democracy,' for which, as Laclau puts it in a later text, contemporary social struggles 'create the preconditions' — or it is the dimension of democracy as already in existence which makes such a radical democratic practice possible. To put it another way, having argued for a model of politics considered as unending struggle to replace both the liberal teleology of progress towards consensus and revolutionary socialism, does a more sophisticated, but equally teleological model of the ends of politics creep in: the ideal social and discursive conditions for such a political process? Or is radical democracy a re-description of the relationship between politics and the social sphere — akin to recent work on civil society — designed to recognise a radical potential already at work within democracy, which forms the preconditions on which a better socialist project is to be built, with the objective of 'the abolition of capitalist relations of production' [HSS 192]?

My second reservation concerns the logic of equivalence by which specific oppositional political struggles are to be articulated. In *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* Laclau and Mouffe insist that ‘the discourse of radical democracy is no longer the discourse of the universal’ [HSS 191] but also that through the category of equivalence, different political struggles may be articulated. But are these two claims compatible? The possibility of a radical incommensurability between political struggles or demands cannot be dealt with in these terms; indeed it is ruled out in advance. Laclau and Mouffe’s first formulation of equivalence appears to return the universal under another name, as the universal right to contribute to the socialist struggle. The argument that ‘For the defence of the interests of the workers not to be made at the expense of the rights of women, immigrants or consumers, it is necessary to establish an equivalence between these different struggles’ [HSS 184] may have been borne out by the apparent equivalence of the contradictory demands made on behalf of economic and trade protectionism, workers’ rights, anarchism, and environmentalism by the disparate elements of the recent anti-capitalist and anti-globalisation protests around the globe. But it still seems uncertain both in theory and in practice whether the formal equivalence between these demands is not merely an effect of their opposition to an ill-defined status quo. Laclau has subsequently offered a revised account, which appears to accept this criticism. The logic of equivalence is now to be understood in terms of universalism and particularism.46 Any particularist demand — for higher wages or against a minimum wage, for freedom of the press or for formal privacy laws, for cheaper food or against the influence of supermarket chains — makes a universal claim at the same time, and that this universal logic of each particular claim makes it available for articulation with other struggles: ‘there is no logic of pure particularism.’47 However the possibility that demands

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47 *Contingency, Hegemony, Universality*. 305.
might be irreconcilable cannot be dealt with within this schema: in fact, the future for the left depends on precisely this universal articulation of emergent particularisms, but the foundation of this universal remains not ‘an empty signifier,’ as Laclau wishes, but an anti-system or anti-State stance.\textsuperscript{48}

My third reservation about Laclau and Mouffe’s account of radical democracy can be more clearly related to Derrida’s work, and in particular to the confrontation between Claude Lefort and Derrida’s philosophical friends involved in the Centre for Research into Philosophy and Politics to which I referred in the introduction to this chapter. Lefort’s work plays a crucial role in \textit{Hegemony and Socialist Strategy} and I will argue that the difficulties of his analysis of democracy are carried over into the radical democratic project.

\subsection*{1.4.2 Democracy and Totalitarianism}

Laclau and Mouffe draw on Claude Lefort to draw together several arguments, which although they do not emphasise this fact, are vital to their project in \textit{Hegemony and Socialist Strategy}. In particular they depend on Claude Lefort’s distinction between democracy and totalitarianism. Firstly, this distinction serves to guarantee the radical potential of democracy itself. They recognise an inherent danger in their own account, ‘from the moment at which this space of equivalences ceases to be considered as one political space amongst others and comes to be seen as the centre, which subordinates and organizes all other spaces’ [HSS 186]. This danger is of a final closure of the space of the political which has ‘paradoxically’ been made possible by ‘the very logic of openness and of the democratic subversion of

\footnote{\textsuperscript{48} For a rigorous attempt to deal with such irreconcilable demands see Jean-Francois Lyotard. \textit{The Differend: Phrases in Dispute}. trans. Georges Van Den Abbeele. Minneapolis: U Minnesota P, 1988.}
differences' [HSS 186]. The name for this closure is totalitarianism. Without this point of reference, the specificity of their account of democracy would lose its purchase, and they would be simply describing the nature of politics as such, rather than being able to draw specific strategic recommendations within the general field of politics. Secondly, Lefort’s account of the historical development of totalitarianism, grounded in the attempt of the Socialisme ou Barbarie group to draw a line between their own socialism and that of the Soviet Union, at a time when other left-wing intellectuals were defending or ignoring the failings of existing State-Socialism, both distances Hegemony and Socialist Strategy from less reputable socialist forms and injects a sense of crisis into the text: once liberal democracy has become no longer the target for socialism but its very foundation, totalitarianism becomes not only the enemy, but also an ever-present menace. Thirdly, Lefort’s account of the empty space at the centre of democracy provides a reassuringly philosophical and historical account to which they can refer. However, in relying on Lefort, Laclau and Mouffe neutralise the radicality of their own project, as we shall see.

Lefort’s influential account of democracy can be summarised in the claim that under a modern democratic regime, ‘the locus of power becomes an empty place.’ This is, he claims, its ‘revolutionary and unprecedented feature’ and implies ‘an institutionalization of conflict.’ [...] Democracy is instituted and sustained by the dissolution of the markers of certainty. The historical roots of democracy lie in the loss of the identification of the body of the monarch with the body politic, the liberal detachment of the individual from society, and the disengagement of civil society from the state. These conditions combine to generate a form of society in which the place of power is contested, and some form of balance of

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forces is necessary.\textsuperscript{51} By contrast, totalitarianism — 'the major fact of our time' — is defined by 'the development of the fantasy of the People-as-One, the beginnings of a quest for a substantial identity, for a social body which is welded to its head, for an embodying power, for a state free of division.'\textsuperscript{52} Under such a regime, 'it is denied that division is constitutive of society.'\textsuperscript{53} The importance of such a distinction for Lefort is that it opens up a possibility within socialism to criticise certain forms of State socialism, but also that it provides a principle of a certain kind of political realism. As he argued when presenting his paper 'The Question of Democracy' to the Centre for Philosophical Research on the Political in 1980, it no longer becomes possible to summarily dismiss democracy as 'bourgeois.'\textsuperscript{54} To attempt to present democracy as in some way concealing subtle forms of totalitarianism becomes at best naïve, at worst dangerous and cynical. There are some curiosities about Lefort's account, as we shall see, not least the free intermingling of psychoanalytic, historical and political arguments, but it has been drawn upon by a number of recent theorists, including not only Laclau and Mouffe, but also Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, for example in their paper 'The Re-treat of the Political.'\textsuperscript{55} However, their account develops the logic which Lefort seems determined to resist, but which was immediately raised against him when he gave the paper: 'Does not present-day democracy conceal a totalitarian threat? Is not democracy another, perhaps more subtle, form of totalitarianism?'\textsuperscript{56} What Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy do share with Lefort is a concern with the representational or imaginary dimension of the political sphere; when considering his arguments from Derrida's point of view, however, there is less common ground.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{52} Political Forms of Modern Society. 292., Democracy and Political Theory. 20.
\item \textsuperscript{53} Political Forms of Modern Society. 297.
\item \textsuperscript{54} Democracy and Political Theory. 10.
\item \textsuperscript{56} This account of this encounter comes in Simon Critchley. \textit{The Ethics of Deconstruction}. Oxford: Blackwell, 209-210.
\end{itemize}
If we read *Politics of Friendship* as a response to Lefort, there is indeed little room for dialogue. For the logic of democracy-to-come, as I argued in relation to the issue of freedom of speech, is precisely an attempt to distinguish between democratizing and totalitarian (anti-democratic) movements within the so-called democratic state itself. Indeed, Derrida's concern to distinguish between the promise of equality within democracy — but a paradoxical equality which would exceed or ruin the very boundaries of the state, taken to its limit — from the reductive dependence of citizenship on some principle of autochthony, from the naturalization of the political decision, can be productively read as a blurring of the distinction between totalitarianism and democracy, considered as conceptual forms. The very possibility of partially disentangling the logics suggests that the opposition may still be maintained, up to a point, as a useful historical category. But the essential task for Derrida is clearly not to fortify the boundaries of democracy by threatening it with the spectre of the totalitarian, but to provide a principle against which democracy might also be judged. Lefort's historical derivation of the categories in question itself runs into trouble. For while his model claims to be historically aware, it must remain unable to account for historical change. If totalitarianism is effectively the end of politics, if we could ever imagine a full totalitarianism, we would be unable to conceive of political resistance to that system. Attempting to answer this dilemma, concerning the political success of civil society in Poland, Lefort argues that 'the vulnerability of the totalitarian system in a crisis situation stems from the fact that the internal social divisions are subordinated to a general division between the sphere of power and that of civil society.' But if civil society can offer a principle of resistance, it must already be at least potentially politicized. Lefort has no apparent solution to this problem. At one point he refers to 'forms of resistance to the totalitarian project' which while not 'conscious, political resistance' are 'social relations that

57 *Political Forms of Modern Society.* 310.
elude the grip of power,58 but elsewhere he provides the only possible convincing resolution of the problem, which is to argue that no totalitarianism is ever total. 'In emphasizing the logic of totalitarianism,' Lefort admits, 'I do not at all wish to suggest that it is insurmountable.' We must distinguish between what totalitarianism 'ideally' is and what it is 'in actual development.'59 Lefort's psychoanalytic vocabulary, in which the social body is the site of an imaginary identification, obscures the extent to which his categories depend on an idealised dualism. If no totalitarianism is ever total, the opposition with democracy will not hold: rather than an ideal of totalitarianism, we are left with an ideal opposition, which risks, as Simon Critchley argues, leaving Lefort as an apologist for liberal democracy [ED 211-2].

This difficulty of keeping the concepts of democracy and totalitarianism distinct in turn sheds some light on Derrida's work on democracy. As I have argued in this chapter, both what Derrida calls 'democracy-to-come,' the effect of a twist within the logic of democracy which leads it to contradict its own promise, and his more historical reading of the relationship between literature and democracy, might lead us to the conclusion that there is no democracy, or 'or hardly any, ever so little.' If Derrida is read as offering a genealogy of the type which Laclau and Mouffe undertake, this would render his work either self-contradictory, or effectively useless. However, the deconstructive genealogy of the concept has a quite different effect. The problem of defining democracy as a concept is twofold: internally, democracy is always contradicting its own promise; externally it can never be rigorously separated from other political forms. But these structural or conceptual problems provide a kind of ground for both a continual critique of democracy — no democracy ever lives up to its name, so there can be no temptation to be satisfied with democracy as we have it — and a point of opposition to the kind of historically-based political theory which serves

58 Political Forms of Modern Society. 300.
59 Political Forms of Modern Society. 313.
to justify and naturalise actually existing democracy, or indeed, any imaginable democratic politics. But this is also done in the context of an affirmation of the positive content of the concept of democracy (equality, freedom of speech) without any triumphalism, and an extension of the possibility of positive political effects to both civil society and the state apparatus. For if the opposition of democracy to totalitarianism on which Laclau and Mouffe depend does not hold up, their dogmatic opposition to the power of the state can be questioned, and the interminable strategic and contingent negotiations with the political as we experience it can begin.

1.4.3 The Limits of Radical Democracy

We are now in a position to formulate the principal differences between Derrida’s work on the concept of democracy and that of Laclau and Mouffe. Mouffe suggests in her introduction to *Dimensions of Radical Democracy* that ‘the problem [...] is not the ideals of modern democracy, but the fact that its political principles are a long way from being implemented.’\(^60\) However for Derrida the problem is not just the distance of modern democracy from the ideal of democracy, but an internal dehiscence in the concept and ideal of democracy itself. Whereas Laclau and Mouffe are able to formulate strategic models based on the principle of narrowing the gap between the reality and the ideal of democracy, — even if they do not wish to reduce that gap altogether and project an end to politics — for Derrida such work, however necessary, requires a supplementary project. That project would be the deconstructive concern with the limits inscribed within the concept of democracy itself and which cannot be diagnosed as the effect of historical circumstances; nor resolved

\(^60\) *Dimensions of Radical Democracy*. 1.
by strategic and historical intervention. In this section I will demonstrate the difference that Derrida’s conceptual analysis makes for thinking about politics, and the importance of insisting on that difference.

For Laclau and Mouffe the historical existence of democracy is the necessary precondition for radical political action. This necessity is bolstered in their argument by the spectre of totalitarianism and functions to guarantee both the historical pertinence of their work (which they distinguish from normative or prescriptive theorising) and its pragmatic realism. As I have argued however, for Derrida the opposition between totalitarianism and democracy cannot be made absolute on a historical basis, but is closer to being the effect of an internal contradiction within the concept of democracy itself. Because this problematizes the possibility of defining democracy in contrast to other historical political regimes, democracy must in some sense also function within Derrida’s work as a name for politics as such. In Politics of Friendship Derrida writes of attempting ‘to think, interpret, and implement another politics, another democracy’ [POF 104 / 128]. Throughout this chapter I have assumed that ‘democracy’ is the name of that particular political system which Derrida has been seeking to think. But the syntax is ambiguous and another interpretation can be suggested. What if politics and democracy are synonymous? Once we accept that we cannot rigorously tell the friend from the enemy, or the self-interest of the many from the good of the many, and moreover, that this is not a reversal but the very foundation of the logic of friendship and of politics, wouldn’t democracy not only be the political form par excellence but also the very name of politics as such? ‘We are dealing here, as regards number,’ Derrida suggests ‘with an analogy between friendship and the polis, between friendship and what constitutes the political as such’ [POF 212 / 239]. The difference between Laclau and Mouffe and Derrida would on this account appear to be that the former offer a historically situated political theory while the latter is attempting to rethink the concept of politics itself.

This opens up the possibility of a critique of the ideal of democracy which would no longer keep the name democracy. While Derrida may choose to retain the name here, in his
formulation of a ‘democracy-to-come’ his work presumes the possibility that in another time, in another space, the term could be disregarded or jettisoned. However the strategic options for Laclau and Mouffe remain more limited, since their argument depends on the affirmation of the existence of both an ideal and a reality of democracy. Derrida leaves open the possibility of a more radical political theory or practice, even if maintaining that possibility requires considerably less detail to his strategic political suggestions, as is certainly the case in Politics of Friendship. Simon Critchley has argued that ‘what the infinite ethical demand of deconstruction requires is a theory of hegemonization, that is, an account of the political conceived in terms of strategy and tactics, power and force [...] and most importantly, the question of identification, of social movements, and the credibility of the party form. The logics of deconstruction and hegemony need to be soldered at this point, I think, in a reciprocal relation of supplementarity.’61 However what he is calling for is a theory of political deconstruction as the symptomatology of political movements and a political programme based upon it; or in other words, the development of rules, and precisely the kind of naturalisation of the decision which restricts the possibility of a democracy-to-come. The rethinking of the space of politics which Derrida announces under the guise of a genealogical deconstruction of the concepts of democracy and friendship may not be strictly incompatible with the project of radical democracy, but it overflows it and exceeds it. Radical democratic thought would be inscribed within the space of politics whose possible understanding is opened up by deconstructive thought.

This is not how Laclau and Mouffe see things. For their account depends on the possibility that deconstruction can be subordinated to their account of hegemony. They tend to reduce deconstruction to a theory of the ‘constitutive outside’ which provides one tool for their analysis of the incompleteness of the social sphere. It is for this reason that Chantal Mouffe can only reflect on a political approach which would be ‘informed by

61 Critchley. Ethics—Politics—Subjectivity. 283.
deconstruction' rather than accepting that deconstruction is already both political theory and practice. In responding to some comments by Ernesto Laclau, Derrida has made much the same point. While agreeing with most of Laclau's analysis, Derrida emphasises that there is something missing from it, something which deconstruction offers, but the theory of hegemony or of radical democracy cannot: 'there is, in the opening of a context of argumentation and discussion, a reference — unknown, indeterminate, but none the less thinkable — to disarmament.' Politics as violence 'can only be practised and can only appear as such on the basis of a non-violence, a vulnerability, an exposition.' Moreover,

This is not the dream of a beautifully pacific relation, but of a certain experience of friendship perhaps unthinkable today and unthought within the historical determination of friendship in the West. This is a friendship, what I sometimes call an aimance, that excludes violence; a non-appropriative relation to the other that occurs without violence and on the basis of which all violence detaches itself and is determined [DAP 83].

Like the secret, which opens the possibility of a resistance to all politicization while disrupting any opposition between the public and the private, so aimance interrupts while keeping open the closure of politics as necessary violence. (Contra Mouffe, deconstruction is not simply 'hyperpoliticizing' but also interrupts politics.) Politics as violence is to be thought on the basis of aimance rather than vice versa. But this suggestion is itself political, and therefore violent in its turn. The relationship between aimance and political friendship is not based around the opposition of 'a beautifully pacific relation' to violence. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, while perhaps a necessary form of political violence, lacks the concern of deconstruction for this impossible moment of non-violence. It is this concern which makes deconstruction a more radical political theory than that of Laclau and Mouffe, as I will briefly suggest.

The performative dimension of democracy-to-come enables Derrida to think affirmatively, without programming the future in terms of a particular historical

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62 Mouffe. 'Deconstruction, Pragmatism and Democracy.' 1.
configuration of forces. The promise of democracy is to be found not only in so-called democratic regimes, but in every political situation, and as in the case of the foundation of politics on the distinction between public and private, the definition of political space is greatly extended by deconstruction. This would mean that there is a promise of democracy within the apparatus of the state, as well as outside it, and a promise of change within every oppositional or conservative social or political movement, which does not depend on the establishment of a chain of equivalences, but which can include the recognition that opposing demands may be radically incommensurable. Repressive state structures can be thought of as only temporary 'stabilizations of power' [DAP 83]: conversely there will be no state structure that is not 'repressive' in this way. As Derrida remarks: 'In order to continue to pose the question of the political, it is necessary to withdraw something from the political and the same thing for democracy, which, of course, makes democracy a very paradoxical concept' [DAP 85]. Derrida's work offers a less certain and more disconcerting account of both politics and democracy than Laclau and Mouffe can. Ultimately I suspect that to the extent that their objectives are identified with a particular political system (that of 'radical' democracy), rather than with any external criteria, Laclau and Mouffe remain unable to negotiate between rival political claims within that space, except in terms of their politicality: the degree to which they affirm and maintain the plurality of democracy. Derrida however, despite the extreme asceticism of his political thought, can maintain criteria for distinguishing the totalitarian and democratic tendencies within any political system, even if any such distinction must remain a provisional judgement, and can never be absolutely upheld. This gives Derrida's work its distinctive affirmative dimension. As he describes his own strategy in *Politics of Friendship*,

63 ‘Deconstruction, Pragmatism and Democracy.’ 9.
the apostrophe ‘O my friends’ also turns toward the past. It recalls, it points to that which must indeed be supposed in order to be heard, if only in the non-apophasic form of prayer: you have already marked this minimal friendship, this preliminary consent without which you would not hear me. Otherwise you would not listen to my call, you would not be sensitive to the element of hope in my complaint [PoF 236 / 264].

The paradox of deconstruction as political practice is that while taking the form of a ‘complaint,’ as an interminable work of mourning or of bearing witness to disaster, it is able to maintain an element of hope, the promise of something different. In this, deconstruction is perhaps more radically democratic — open to whatever happens to come to pass [arrive] — than any theory of radical democracy.

1.5 Conclusion

IN HIS ESSAY on ‘Derrida and politics’ Geoffrey Bennington helpfully formulates the relationship between deconstruction and democracy as one of exemplarity: ‘Deconstruction then, on the one hand generalises the concept of politics so that it includes all conceptual dealings whatsoever, and on the other makes a precise use of one inherited politico-metaphysical concept, democracy, to make a pointed and more obviously political intervention in political thought.’64 Bennington makes clear the duality of the deconstructive approach to politics. ‘Deconstruction’ names both a rethinking of politics as such, both its extension and its limits, and a strategic or context-specific engagement with a particular

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64 Interrupting Derrida. 32-33.
political moment; these are inseparable. It is clear however that the boundaries between these two movements within deconstruction are also variable, and that it may not be possible to distinguish them so precisely. I have argued in this chapter that from at least two points of view, ‘democracy’ for Derrida labels the possibility of politics as such. Both in terms of its classical roots and the structure of democracy’s appeal, democracy names the space of politics and justice itself. Considered in terms of the secret, as a constitutive disruption of the opposition between public and private, democracy again names the possibility of the foundation of politics. This understanding of democracy clearly exceeds such distinctions as that made between the democracy and the totalitarian in radical democratic theory. But does this in turn mean that Lefort was correct to accuse Derrida and his friends of being ‘unable to discern freedom in democracy, because democracy is defined as bourgeois [and] unable to discern servitude in totalitarianism’? Is the concept of democracy as Derrida understands it, as McCarthy claims, ‘ineffable’? Would this confirm our lingering suspicions that a messianic politics is a politics that waits for an interruption that could only come from outside the system within which that politics functions?

Only by bearing certain factors in mind can we avoid rushing to such a hasty and dismissive conclusion. The first is to do with context. Politics of Friendship offers a deconstructive genealogy of the concept of democracy. This is clearly not the same thing as a critical analysis of the various historical and theoretical forms that the concept of democracy has taken. But such an analysis is not ruled out by Derrida’s work; indeed, in some sense, it is both required by it and called for at the same time. For if the necessary prerequisite for action in any particular situation is as much knowledge as possible, even if that knowledge can never make a decision, without programming it, and if a decision must be made without submitting to a theoretical rule — democracy should take this or that form — we are obliged to undertake the closest possible historical and empirical study. But we must do so without expecting that this will take away the decision itself. Rather than rejecting history in favour of philosophy, Derrida has often insisted on the necessity of more,
and more sophisticated, historical work. This would be historical work that did not seek to submit the example to the rule (waves of democratization, a theory of modernity or post-modernity, globalisation). The second factor we should bear in mind is that the performative dimension of Derrida’s text re-marks it as a contingent contribution. To assess his account of democracy-to-come as a political strategy would require detailed analysis of the public space in France, of the reception of the book, of the effects of the original seminar ‘Politics of Friendship’ on those who attended it, on the after-life of the book, an after-life which has yet to begin, in some senses. We would also have to read the book in more detail as a response to Nancy, Blanchot and perhaps also Levinas.65 If an appeal to democracy seems politically naïve now that ‘democracy’ has become the rule not the exception (but is this the case, what kind of criteria would define democracy?) wouldn’t the possibility of renewing the criteria for judging democracy be an important counterbalance to a certain democratic triumphalism? The third significant factor is that as I have attempted to underline throughout, Derrida’s intervention on the concept of democracy is not a final end or destination for deconstruction (if not for politics itself, as Bennington acknowledges): but that this intervention is only one of the (infinitely) many possible, more or less political, deconstructive operations. It is also in some sense an attempt to describe what is happening. This means a constant affirmation of a potential for democratization, and risk of the totalitarian at work everyday, everywhere, not a holding out for a revolutionary transformation by some external force.

The risk of Bennington’s account, and this can be seen to some extent in the many politically quiescent receptions of Derrida’s work, is that while deconstruction is certainly considered to be political, the deconstruction of political thought and of politics as such is forgotten: if democracy-to-come is the answer, what work is there left to do? Derrida

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65 I have begun to do so in the article I have already cited, ‘Against community: Derrida contra Nancy,’ and in chapter 4 below.
chooses to maintain the name of democracy at one point, in one 'here and now.' Our response to Derrida, the response called for by his re-inscription of the democratic appeal — 'O my democratic friends...' [PoF 306 / 340] — will have to take its own time and its own strategies.
2.
Deconstruction
as Political Practice.

2.1 Introduction.

IN THE PRECEDING chapter I argued that Derrida’s work on democracy must be understood as
both an attempt to intervene in a specific political and historical context, under the name of
democracy, and an attempt to think the limits, and therefore the possibility of a
transformation, of the concept of politics itself — but perhaps so extensive a transformation
that none of the old names would be appropriate, and for which ‘democracy-to-come’ is only
one of the possible names. However this leads to a potential confusion in the terms of the
discussion. Since it is generally understood as a label for a particular state form, re-thinking
‘democracy’ risks restricting the scope of politics to the questions which relate to the
management and allocation of resources within a state, ruling out in advance the possibility
of a political appeal beyond the borders of the state, perhaps even beyond what is
conventionally understood as the domain of international relations. As Derrida argues, ‘the
foundation of modern citizenship in a nation’ repeats the foundation of democracy in a legal
principle of equality symbolically tied to a natural equality based on birth. This is ‘the place
of fraternization as the symbolic bond alleging the repetition of a genetic tie' [POF 99/121]. This restriction of political power or social goods to citizens of one state rather than another (leaving on one side the case of those without state to which we will return) is a programming of politics; there can be no question of political responsibility when the decision is naturalised, when it is predicted in advance along set criteria. The apparently natural location of politics within the state is in and of itself unjust. The institution of the boundaries of the state is an act of exclusion, a performative discrimination between political friends and enemies. The demand of justice calls instead for a politics thought beyond the boundaries of the state. My suggestion in this chapter is that one strand in the development of Derrida’s work between the ‘Letter to a Japanese Friend’ and the publication of Politics of Friendship may be considered an attempt to focus and refine precisely this problem.

I will extend my reading of Politics of Friendship by locating it in the context of Derrida’s seminars. Derrida’s seminar work, I argue, provides a reasonably consistent basis on which to examine any putative development of Derrida’s work, and thus suggest how we might read the three developments in his work which I identified in the ‘Introduction’ to my first chapter: a thematic shift in emphasis; an increasing engagement with the role of a public intellectual; a polemicization of the word ‘deconstruction’ itself. More specifically, by focusing on his seminar of 1983 on philosophical nationalism I will demonstrate that Derrida considers all discursive practices to presuppose a certain kind of political decision. Derrida’s discussion of the implicit relationship between philosophy and nationalism works through an over-determined example of what must remain an irreducible structure of any theoretical or other communication. This brings us to another dimension of the ‘implicit politics of language’ [POF 305/339]. The concepts of politics are all grounded in particular languages; but so is their deconstruction. My claim is that some of the more peculiar aspects of Derrida’s work must be seen as the result of a particular concern to draw attention to and negotiate with the irreducible political decision which is presupposed by virtue of simply writing in one language rather than another. Accordingly I will show that Politics of
Friendship must be read as, at least in part, a work addressed to a specifically French national philosophical context. Derrida’s work on Heidegger of this period raises the same issues, and the form of his complex text Of Spirit evinces the same political negotiation. Crucially for any reading of Politics of Friendship, I argue that the apparently supplementary essay ‘Heidegger’s Ear: Philopolemology (Geschlecht IV)’ must be considered as central to the wider work. In the final section I conclude by arguing that the work which Derrida pursues later in the name of hospitality may be read as a further development of this same political negotiation (and intervention) for which deconstruction has become the name.

2.2 Philosophical Nationalism.

Derrida himself suggests that the sequence of investigations conducted in his seminars might provide a revealing context for Politics of Friendship. In the ‘Foreword’ he notes:

I count on preparing for future publication a series of seminar studies within which this one actually finds it place, well beyond this single opening session, which thus presupposes its premisses and its horizon. Those that immediately preceded it, then, if it is anything but useless to recall the logical development at this point, were centred on: Nationality and Philosophical Nationalism (1. Nation, Nationality, Nationalism [1983-84]; 2. Nomos, Logos, Topos [1984-85]; 3. The Theo-logical Political [1985-6]; 4. Kant, the Jew, the German [1986-87]); and Eating the Other (Rhetorics of Cannibalism) [1987-88]. Subsequent seminars concerned Questions of Responsibility through the experience of the secret and of witnessing [1989-93] [PoF vii / 11].

My hypothesis is that this sequence can help us understand not only Politics of Friendship, but also the development of Derrida’s thought over the period with which I am concerned.
The significance of Derrida's seminars has rarely been recognised: perhaps because so few sessions have been published in their original form. *Politics of Friendship* itself is the most extensive work to be attributed to the seminar, although in a greatly revised form, as a prolonged preface or introduction to the seminar itself — while the second version, published in *American Imago*, is described as two single seminar sessions [PoF(b) 390], the final book is introduced by Derrida as a distended exposition of a single session: 'this work replays, represents, only the first session [...] less a first act than a sort of preview' [PoF viii / 12]. Elsewhere, only the first of his seminars on nationalism (1983-4), and two of a much later course on hospitality (1995-6) have been published verbatim. Yet many of Derrida’s published conference papers, articles, interviews and essays bear traces of his seminars, as I show in this chapter, through a discussion of several of Derrida’s key texts both before and after the publication of *Politics of Friendship* itself.

In this first section I focus on Derrida’s four year study on ‘Nationality and Philosophical Nationalism.’¹ Not only does Derrida draw attention to it as the starting point for the sequence which leads to *Politics of Friendship*, but he returns to the material discussed in this seminar on a regular basis, and presumes its conclusions throughout his subsequent work: for example in his recent addresses to UNESCO (1996) and to the European Parliament (1997).² More importantly perhaps, grasping the central argument of this seminar is crucial to understanding Derrida’s account of responsibility and decision, as I will show with reference to *The Gift of Death*. On this basis we can both appreciate the importance of the national philosophical dimension of *Politics of Friendship*, and assess the re-formulation of deconstruction as political practice.

¹ Whereas in *Politics of Friendship* Derrida dates this seminar from 1983 [PoF vii / 11], in *Du Droit à la Philosophie* he suggests that it was a ‘necessary development’ of the 1983-4 seminar of that title [DP 53n.1].
2.2.1 Nationalism, Cosmopolitanism, Exemplarism.

The first session of Derrida’s seminar on ‘Nationality and Philosophical Nationalism’ has been published as ‘The Onto-Theology of National Humanism: Prolegomena to a Hypothesis.’ Its central claim is deceptively straightforward. Derrida proposes that there is a significant connection between philosophy and nationality:

The national problem, as we shall have ceaselessly to verify, is not one problem among others, nor one philosophical dimension among others. Even before any elaboration of the concept of nation and of philosophical nationality, of idiom as national philosophical idiom, we know at least this much — it’s a minimal but indubitable predicate — namely that the affirmation of a nationality, or even the claim of nationalism does not happen to philosophy by chance or from the outside, it is essentially and thoroughly philosophical, it is a philosopheme [ONH 10].

Nationalism — or the thinking of the nation — belongs to philosophy, just as philosophy belongs to the nation. This claim will turn out to have implications both for our understanding of the nation, and for our conception of philosophy. For once worked through to its conclusion, what Derrida is proposing is that via the question of idiom philosophy is already national — and therefore already political. This irreducible political dimension of any philosophical (or other) utterance is what we are concerned with here. It is irreducible because the question of idiom — what Derrida describes as both ‘a scandal’ and ‘the very chance’ [ONH 3] of philosophy — is unavoidable for philosophy. Philosophy cannot happen without language:

in so far as the only possibility for a philosophy, for philosophy itself to speak itself, to be discussed, to get (itself) across, to go from the one to the other, is to pass through idioms, to transport the idiom and translate itself via or rather in the body of idioms which are not closures or enclosings of self but allocutions, passages to the other [ONH 4].

To make clear what Derrida is suggesting here, it is worth bearing in mind the general understanding of philosophy which he inherits from Husserl, as he acknowledges in several places [SoM 74-5 / 125-6; SST 91-2; DAP 81-2]. Following Husserl’s arguments in Ideas I,
Derrida underlines the 'necessity of posing transcendental questions in order not to be held within the fragility of an incompetent empiricist discourse [...] it is in order to avoid empiricism, positivism and psychologism that it is endlessly necessary to renew transcendental questioning' [DAP 81]. Husserl argues against 'sciences of the dogmatic standpoint' which 'take their start from the primordial givenness of the facts they deal with (and in the testing of their ideas return always to these facts). Such sciences — and naturalism, historicism and psychologism in particular, as Husserl argues in 'Philosophy as a Rigorous Science' — are unable to account logically for their own premises. In the essay to which Derrida devoted his first major published work, 'The Origin of Geometry,' Husserl asserts that 'all [merely] factual history remains incomprehensible because, always merely drawing its conclusions naively and straightforwardly from facts, it never makes thematic the general ground of meaning upon which all such conclusions rest, has never investigated the immense structural a priori which is proper to it.' However Derrida proceeds to turn Husserl's own arguments against him. Derrida's own study of 'The Origin of Geometry' suggests that the possibility of even the most abstract and universal science — geometry — both requires a finite origin within the world, and depends on a necessary passage through language or some form of inscription: 'Historical incarnation sets free the transcendental, instead of binding it. This last notion, the transcendental, must then be rethought.' Deconstruction presumes the questioning which philosophy as a universal science or a

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science of the universal can put to any discourse of empirical facts, but also presumes that philosophy in its turn can never escape its own inscription in the empirical and contingent, and moreover, that this inscription is the very condition of possibility of philosophy.

The very condition of philosophy, 'its chance' in Derrida's words, is its idiomatic passage through language. That this is also a 'scandal' for philosophy will help us understand Derrida's point: 'A scandal: i.e. what makes philosophy trip and fall, what stops it in its tracks if the self-styled philosopher considers that philosophy is essentially universal and cosmopolitan, that national, social, idiomatic difference in general should only befall it as a provisional and non-essential accident that could be overcome' [ONH 3]. In his later essay presented to a UNESCO conference, Derrida puts it this way: 'philosophy names at the same time here a discipline which is part of the "humanities" and that which claims to think, elaborate, criticise, the axiomatic of the "humanities", singularly, the problem of their humanism and their presumed universalism.'8 While Derrida is apparently subordinating the natural or human sciences to philosophy understood as universal knowledge, as Greater Logic in the Hegelian sense, there is a sense in which Derrida at the same time challenges this very transcendental claim in the name of the empirical remainder that has always, within philosophy, named that which cannot be philosophy. Derrida clarifies this in 'The Onto-Theology of National Humanism':

So if I insist on this problem — on the fact that the situation of the philosophical international I'm talking about is not determinable on the basis of a social or human science — this is not in order to reconstitute a higher critical, transcendental or ontological authority over the human or social sciences, but also in order to problematise a certain authority of the same type that a given social science might claim over the treatment of this problem, and as to its competence to deal with it [ONH 8].

The return or challenge of the empirical would be the observation that no philosophy is outside of one language or idiom or another, which will be in turn be overdetermined or

8 Le Droit à la philosophie du point de vue cosmopolite. 8.
inflected in relation to one national language or another. Derrida argues that ‘I have tried to show how in apparently regional scientific practices, in ontologies that philosophy says are regional, one can find general deconstructive movements, where the ground falls way or shifts, disorganising or calling into question the beautiful order of dependence between a fundamental ontology and regional ontologies’ [ONH 8]. A further objection might be that Derrida’s use of idiom is too vague. In Monolingualism of the Other, one of the voices of the text objects to a similarly broad claim that ‘a language is no idiom, nor is the idiom a dialect.’ The other voice replies: ‘I’m not unaware of the necessity of these distinctions. Linguists and scholars in general can have good reasons for upholding them. Nevertheless in all rigor and stretched to their extreme limit, I do not believe them to be tenable’ [MON 8 / 23]. Language for Derrida is a diffuse and heterogeneous system in which particular idioms, dialects or languages can only be isolated by means of an ethico-theoretical decision.

There are two consequences of Derrida’s claim, one for thinking about the nation, and one for philosophy as such. Since a nation is a philosopheme, it can never be accounted for on the basis of the kind of evidence available to the human sciences: it is not the possible object of an ethnography, a discourse of racial characteristics, a linguistic or social analysis. No such discourse can examine the nation without presupposing in advance a definition of the nation. This definition is philosophical: ‘the self-positing or self-identification of the nation always has the form of a philosophy which, although better represented by such and such a nation, is none the less a certain relation to the universality of the philosophical’ [ONH 10]. Nationality is no ‘thing’ but a spiritual or cultural concept. There is nothing ‘natural’ about the nation. Conversely, philosophy, whether it openly theorises its relation to nationality, will always already be engaged in such a relation, by virtue of happening in language. Nationality, Derrida writes, ‘can never be an object of study, meaning by that a theme or a problem that one has before one and in which one is not really and gravely situated, circumvented, precomprehended, in what is precisely a historical and philosophical situation with respect to which no overarching view is possible — and in the first instance
for the obvious reason that the question is set out in a language, in an idiom, and with certain features of the national idiom’ [ONH 5]. Derrida’s choice of example also requires some qualification. To demonstrate that philosophy is national and that nationality is philosophical he turns to Fichte’s *Addresses to the German Nation*, a set of public lectures given in Berlin over the winter of 1807 to 1808 which explicitly address these questions and whose significance is much debated — as Etienne Balibar puts it, ‘the ambivalence of Fichte’s political philosophy is one of the great commonplaces of our culture.’ Derrida’s choice of Fichte is designed to exemplify his own principal claim, since even Fichte’s overtly nationalist philosophy is not concerned with any ‘German naturality or factuality’ [ONH 13]. As an idealist philosophy, it is concerned with truth as such, rather than with a particular ‘German’ truth: ‘This nationalism does not even present itself as a philosophy, but as philosophy *itself*, philosophy par excellence’ [ONH 13]. Fichte serves to illustrate this structure of exemplarism which Derrida sees as being central to both nationalism and philosophy.

Derrida’s main interest in Fichte is that within the *Addresses to the German Nation* there is no apparent contradiction between the national spirit of philosophy and Fichte’s own cosmopolitanism, which he inherits from Kant (compare, for example, ‘Toward Perpetual Peace’ with Fichte’s ‘Outline of the Right of Nations and Cosmopolitan Right’). Fichte speaks of a ‘German philosophy’ which is ‘strictly, earnestly and inexorably opposed to any foreign philosophy that believes in death’ but which is not based on any racial or ethnic characteristic. The ‘true criterion’ for being German is whether ‘you believe in something absolutely primary and original in man himself, in freedom, in endless improvement, in the

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eternal progress of our race.'\textsuperscript{12} Fichte’s is a philosophy of spirit, which he opposes as a philosophy of life to any foreign philosophy of death. But this lends a certain equivocality to both nationality and philosophy. Derrida argues: ‘you can see quite clearly that everything that ought thus to withdraw it from reappropriation into a Nazi heritage (Which is biologising, racist, etc.) remains in essence equivocal’ [ONH 16]. Even a spiritual nationalism can provide criteria on which to combat enemies of the state or ‘enemies within, the false Germans, who even though they speak German, are Germans living on the German soil, are essentially less authentically German than certain ‘foreigners’ who, etc.’ [ONH 16].

In his seminars Derrida traces the development of this relationship between the German language, the German nationality, and philosophy. Derrida refers not only to Fichte, Nietzsche (‘inexhaustible on this subject’ [ONH 17]) and Heidegger, but also to Arendt [MON 84-90 / 100-109; Hos 89 / 83] and Adorno: ‘at the very moment when the latter opposes all philosophical nationalisms, Heidegger’s \textit{Jargon der Eigentlichkeit} [‘Jargon of Authenticity,’ the title of Adorno’s book on Heidegger. AT], he nonetheless reiterates in his ‘Reply to the Question: “What is German”’ […] the affirmation of a “metaphysical character of the German language”’ [ONH 22-3].\textsuperscript{13} In the 1986-7 session, ‘Kant, the Jew, the German,’ described in ‘Force of Law’ as concerning ‘the varied but insistent recurrence of the reference to Kant, indeed to a certain Judaism in Kant, on the part of all those who, from Wagner and Nietzsche to Adorno, sought to respond to the question “Was ist Deutsch?”’ [FOL 65n. / 72], writers covered also include Cohen, Buber, Rosenzweig, Scholem and Benjamin. However, Derrida’s interest is not only in German national philosophy. He comments in ‘Interpretations At War: Kant, the Jew, the German’ that ‘the spiritualist determination of national exemplarity does not belong to the German nation only. What would one say were it to be stated that it does not belong to it except in an exemplary

\textsuperscript{12} The \textit{German Nation}. 125.

manner?’ [KJG 89], and in *Monolingualism of the Other* he imagines a larger study, entitled ‘The Monolingualism of the Host: Jews of the Twentieth Century, the Mother Tongue, and the Language of the Other, on Both Sides of the Mediterranean.’ [MON 78 n.9 / 91]. In ‘Interpretations at War: Kant, the Jew, the German’ Derrida also refers to Renan [KJG 88-91] and a 1984 paper addresses Descartes’ use of French rather than Latin [DP 283-341].

Derrida’s interest in this problem is not a matter of historical curiosity. Nor is he attempting to reveal nationality as an ideological component which could be stripped away from philosophy; although he does refer to Marx as a philosopher whose interest in the problem takes this form [ONH 18]. Rather, Derrida is seeking to expose one symptomatic effect of a wider structure, which he calls ‘the exemplarist logic in which we have recognized the profound strategy of all nationalisms, patriotisms or ethnocentrisms’ [POF 237 / 265]. Here is a lengthy account of this structure taken from *The Other Heading*:

The value of universality here capitalizes all the antinomies, for it must be linked to the value of *exemplarity* that inscribes the universal in the proper body of a singularity, of an idiom or a culture, whether this singularity be individual, social, national, state, federal, confederal, or not. Whether it takes a national form or not, a refined, hospitable or aggressively xenophobic form or not, the self-affirmation of an identity always claims to be responding to the call or assignation of the universal. There are no exceptions to this rule. No cultural identity presents itself as the opaque body of an untranslatable idiom, but always, on the contrary, as the irreplaceable *inscription* of the universal in the singular, the *unique testimony* to the human essence and to what is proper to man [OH 72-3 / 71-2].

Derrida’s point is that there is no assertion of an identity which doesn’t claim also to be an identity like any other. This would be the case whether the identity in question was that of a single individual, of a family or of a nation. But as soon as I claim to be an individual like every other, or like any other, I am also making a presumption about a certain universality of the concept of the individual. The historical and global extension of the concept of the ‘nation’ from its place of origin bears witness to the portability of the philosophical claim made in the French and American Revolutionary constitutions to bear witness to the universal right of national self-determination. Every nationalism is also then a humanism
since it implies that the proper political essence of man is to associate in nations. Like every other form of association or political collectivity, it is an exemplarism.

The overdetermined relationship between political identity and nationality suggests that philosophy is inscribed with a political (at least passively polemical) value as soon as it happens in one language rather than another, as an effect of the impossible but insistent identification of the universal with the singular. In the next section I turn to some further texts of Derrida’s both in order to show the continuity of their concerns with those of the seminar, and also to reinforce what may seem a exaggerated assertion that political violence and responsibility begin with the use of language itself.

2.2.2 Language and Responsibility.

The continuity between the question of language or idiom, national or otherwise, and that of responsibility could be demonstrated by reference to any one of a number of Derrida’s texts. I will focus on two: The Gift of Death, which casts the problem in theoretical terms, and Monolingualism of the Other, to be discussed in the following section (2.2.3), which both enact the problem performatively and begin to offer suggestions as to how it may be handled in general. Both texts have their origins in the period 1991-2 and both are quite plainly concerned, at least in part, with the political negotiation of the question of idiom.

In fact, not only does the second half of The Gift of Death demonstrate the importance of the problem of language in Derrida’s thinking of responsibility, but the question of language can help us read this difficult text. Derrida is concerned with Kierkegaard’s reading of Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac, with what Kierkegaard calls the teleological suspension of the ethical. Abraham’s decision can be understood by no-one, since no-one else can take his place. This discussion follows a lengthy reading of the fourth
of Patočka’s *Heretical Essays on the Philosophy of History* in which Derrida has suggested that the Czech phenomenologist’s account of Europe as responsibility deploys a radicalised Christian account which can puncture Heidegger’s own thinking on responsibility. With the turn to Kierkegaard in the second half of *The Gift of Death* Derrida appears to be drawing his own account of responsibility from *Fear and Trembling*. Indeed, some commentators have taken this as revealing the extent of Derrida’s own debt to Kierkegaard. Responsibility, Derrida argues, must be infinite or it is not responsibility at all. The infinitization of responsibility is what begins or makes possible any responsibility at all, but also which disables the possibility of being able to claim to have done one’s duty: ‘Guilt is inherent in responsibility because responsibility is always unequal to itself: one is never responsible enough’ [GoD 51 / 77]. Derrida presents this as an extension (but this is also a revision) of Kierkegaard’s understanding of Abraham’s impossible decision to sacrifice his son towards an account of the decision in general. What is for Kierkegaard the exceptional decision of Abraham is for Derrida the kind of decision that must be made every day if there is to be any responsibility at all.

For Kierkegaard, the paradox of Abraham’s position is that as a singular individual he is required to disregard the universal law of ethics in order to fulfil his absolute duty to God, or as Derrida puts it, that ‘the ethical can therefore end up making us irresponsible. It is a temptation, a tendency or a facility that would sometimes have to be refused in the name of a responsibility that doesn’t keep account or give an account, neither to man, to human’s, to society, to one’s fellows, or to one’s own’ [GoD 61-2 / 89]. Derrida’s radicalisation of the

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The concept of responsibility suggests that there can be responsibility only where duty is absolute. If a duty is only the enactment of a finite set of obligations there is no question of responsibility. If the absolute is identified with alterity as such, rather than with the absolute alterity of God, we must transgress this obligation all the time. The sacrifice of ethics for an absolute duty to the other is not simply what deconstruction may attempt to do but is 'the most common and everyday experience of responsibility [...] isn’t this also the most common thing?’ [GoD 67 / 97]. A generalised duty or obligation precedes ethics or ethical duty. In the terms we encountered in Politics of Friendship, a duty to the incalculable precedes any calculable responsibility. Calculable responsibility in its turn, betrays and sacrifices responsibility itself. Derrida’s examples walk a fine line between melodrama and pathos. There is his cat, to which he will return in a later paper: ‘How would you ever justify the fact that you sacrifice all the cats in the world to the cat that you feed at home every morning for years, whereas other cats die of hunger at every instant? Not to mention other people’[GoD 71 / 101]. Yet Derrida continues, ‘How would you justify your presence here speaking one particular language, rather than there speaking to others in another language?’ [GoD 71 / 101]. There can be no question of responsibility without the necessary adjunct of such apparently excessive or absurd questions. Infinite responsibility, the ordeal of the undecidable choice between coming to the assistance of one other rather than another, is the necessary condition of responsibility.

David Wood, in particular, has questioned not only Derrida’s example, but the structure of his argument at this point in his work. In an interview he comments:

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A very important truth is being obscured by an exaggeration. We do not have obligations to each and every other cat in the universe. My special obligation to 'my' cat is actually part of what teaches me about obligation to cats in general. I may have an obligation to any other cat in the universe, but not to all other cats in the universe. There is a true negative form of this principle, which is that I would not be able to justify turning away any cat that turned up at my door; but I would be justified in closing the door if an entire army of cats descended upon my house.17

Wood's point is that while Derrida is right to point out that the excess of responsibility must always destroy a claim to have done enough, the satisfaction of good conscience, the emphasis on the incalculable ignores the real and apparent practical constraints on individual responsibility — I am not a health care organisation, or an animal sanctuary. Wood is right: the calculable notion of responsibility cannot be enough from Derrida's point of view: within the horizon of the incalculable, everyone must (and does) negotiate with their calculable responsibility. There is also perhaps a sense in which understanding responsibility as excessive or transgressive, as unfulfillable, renders any lesser concept of duty, or doing good, uninteresting or naïve: why bother to do something for one other, if by doing it I am still doing harm to the other others? I think this is indeed one of the questions raised by Derrida's account, but I suspect that this is, at least in part, his intention. Wood worries that there is 'a paradox in the insistence on avoiding good conscience: Might not anxiously avoiding good conscience offer a back road to ... a good conscience.'18 It seems to me that it is this very paradox with which Derrida is most concerned when in 'Passions' he expresses his concerns about an ethical deconstruction [PAS 15 / 38].

What is important here is to emphasise that Wood has taken Derrida at the level of his rhetoric, rather than at the level of the structure of his argument. In other words, this is

18 'Time, Space, Deconstruction'.
not about what a subject can do. The decision is not taken by a subject, but for a subject. The
decision is already inscribed within the subject; it would be more appropriate to suggest that
the subject is taken by the decision. In fact, as Derrida puts it in Politics of Friendship: ‘A
theory of the subject is incapable of accounting for the slightest decision’ [POF 68 / 87]. So
this is not an ethics, a prescription that we must act out of concern for all the cats in the
world, but a statement of a structural condition which precedes us each time that we think we
have decided, or have acted responsibly. Derrida’s question ‘how would you justify being
here speaking one language?’ demonstrates this. As well as being about choices a subject
may have made, or may think they have made, this excessive, non-subjective dimension of
Derrida’s account of responsibility is also about those choices which they cannot possibly
have made; which is brought into focus neatly by the issue of national or philosophical
idiom. As Derrida also writes in The Gift of Death:

By preferring my work, simply by giving it my time and attention, by
preferring my activity as a citizen or as a professorial and professional
philosopher, writing and speaking here in a public language, French in my
case, I am betraying at every moment all my other obligations: my obligations
to the other others whom I know or don’t know, the billions of my fellows
(without mentioning the animals that are even more other others than my
fellows), my fellows who are dying of starvation or sickness. I betray my
fidelity or my obligations to other citizens, to those who don’t speak my
language and to whom I neither speak nor respond [...] [GoD 69 / 98-9. My
emphases].

If by speaking in one language rather than another, I am already betraying my responsibility,
Derrida does not imply that we should not speak — staying silent would be a worse crime.19
My argument is that this is a relocation of the argument from the realm of ethics, in which ‘I’
may make a decision, to the realm of politics. It is our involvement in a public sphere, which
extends beyond that narrow public realm which is defined against the private, in a public
decision taken as to which language we are able to engage in, to think in, in which we have

19 On the impossibility of a non-response, see ‘Comment ne pas parler: Dénégations’
been born and come to consciousness, which makes us pre-originarily irresponsible, already friends with some others rather than other others. It is the public space itself, 'to which I sacrifice my so-called private space' which renders my language exclusive, since 'each of those who listen or read, and to whom I neither respond nor address myself in the proper manner, that is, in a singular manner' is already sacrificed, even in my supposedly private moments [GoD 69 / 99]. Communication — a response or an address — is already a matter of political responsibility.

The discussion of *tout autre comme tout autre* which I touched on in the first chapter returns, precisely in the form of 1) a translation of Derrida’s arguments about communication, the structure and iterability of the mark and 2) a reinscription of exemplarism as the principle not just of identity politics in its worst sense, but as the principle of the relation of identity to politics in the widest possible sense, from the moment that I articulate myself in language, or even when I respond by not responding. Both within the state and in the relations of the state to its neighbours, a structural principle of exemplarism is at work as soon as I identify myself, that is as soon as I am idiomatic. This is why Derrida must also draw attention to the impossible situation in which the very idiomatic nature of the phrase ‘*tout autre est tout autre*’ is already irresponsibility itself, a statement of its own inadequacy to describing the situation it seeks to draw attention to:

The essential and abyssal equivocality, that is, the play of the several senses of *tout autre est tout autre* or *Dieu est tout autre*, is not, in its literality (that of French or Italian, for example), universally translatable according to a traditional concept of translation. The sense of the play can no doubt be translated by a paraphrase in other languages; but not the formal economy of the slippage between two homonyms in the language that can here be called singularly my own [...] We have here a kind of *shibboleth* [...] like a secret within one’s so-called natural or mother tongue. One can regret such a limiting function or on the contrary take pride in it; one can derive some national prestige from it but either way there is nothing to be done or said about such a secret of the mother tongue. It is there before us in its possibility, the *Geheimnis* of language that ties it to the home, to the motherland, to the birthplace, to economy, to the law of the *oikos*, in short to the family and to the family of words derived from *heim* — *home, heimlich, unheimlich, Geheimnis*, etc. [GoD 87-8 / 121-2].
The etymological relationship between *oikos* and economy, to which Derrida often returns, highlights two important points. 1) Derrida continually refers to etymology not in order to appeal to an original meaning for any particular word, but to insist on the material or empirical origin of languages, words and concepts. 2) The rethinking of politics, the politics to come which Derrida calls for or hopes for in *Politics of Friendship*, is a thinking of politics beyond the *polis*, or beyond the state, but it must also therefore be thought beyond both the bond with a family, metaphorical or literal, or an attachment to a homeland or other place of origin. The danger Derrida takes, since he must write in one language that is 'singularly his own' is that of privileging the language into which he was born, even if not the state or place. In turning to another example, Derrida's strange and violent text *Monolingualism of the Other*, I will show this impossible negotiation — how to think beyond the home, or beyond economy read as the law of the home or the hearth — at work.

2.2.3 Deconstruction in France.

*Monolingualism of the Other* can be taken to be a performative demonstration of the structure that Derrida gives a more conventional account of in ‘The Onto-Theology of National Humanism’ and *The Gift of Death*, that language conveys a political responsibility which precedes and exceeds the subject who speaks. Written predominantly in the first-person, and in an impatient and angry tone, it is structured as an apparently perverse criticism ('without wishing to hurt [his] feelings' [MON 12 / 29]) of the poet Abdelkebir Khatibi, whom Derrida describes as an old friend [MON 10 / 26]. Referring to their common French Algerian background, Derrida makes a claim to be the exemplary Franco-Maghrebian present at the conference on bilingualism at which the first version of the text was read, held in Louisiana in 1992. In order to ‘decipher the essence of the Franco-
Maghrebian from the paradigmatic example of "the most Franco-Maghrebian," the Franco-Maghrebian *par excellence* [MON 11 / 27] Derrida imagines himself saying: 'I therefore venture to present myself to you here, *ecce homo*, in parody as the exemplary Franco-Maghrebian' [MON 19 / 39].

The text is accordingly based around the exposition of one central aporetic phrase, Derrida's assertion that 'I only have one language, it is not mine' [MON 1 / 13], or, in an expanded form, that

*We only ever speak one language — or rather one idiom only.*

*We never speak only one language — or rather there is no pure idiom.*

[MON 8 / 23]

Derrida describes some of the events of his childhood, focussing in particular on his appreciation of linguistic differences, and the relation between Algiers and Paris — and indeed, France as a whole — across the Mediterranean. He suggests there was a more powerful sense of marginality to growing up in Algiers than there would be between another province such as Brittany and Paris. His understanding of French culture is both as a colonial culture and as his so-called mother tongue. This he claims makes him a more exemplary Franco-Maghrebian than his friend, who can always have recourse to a language which was not colonising. Whereas Khatibi has never been a French citizen, Derrida has been: not only that but in 1943, along with all the Jewish French citizens of Algeria, his French citizenship was removed by the Vichy French government. Citizenship for Derrida 'does not define a cultural, linguistic, or, in general, historical participation. It does not cover all these modes of belonging. But it is not some superficial or superstructural predicate floating on the surface of experience' [MON 14-5 / 33]. In other words, like nationality, it is an idea, rather than the possible object of an empirical science, but it is not simply a contingent intrusion on a universal subject. Like nationality, it is also inherited at birth, and therefore precedes the subject. As in *Politics of Friendship*, citizenship implies a politics of the birth-place, of the autochthony which is at stake here; but so does a maternal language: 'Birth, nationality by
birth, native culture — is that not our theme here? [...] the language called maternal, [...] birth as it relates to soil, birth as it relates to blood, and birth as it relates to language, which means something entirely other?" [MON 13 / 30-1]. That 'language is not mine' implies a pre-original dispossession of language against which a linguistic purism or nationalism will always be a defensive reaction. That 'I only have one language' means that I must continually negotiate with the political privilege I cannot help but ascribe to it.

But Derrida's aim is not to reconstitute his personal experience as the basis for an argument ('not the beginning of some autobiographical or anamnestic outline, nor [...] an intellectual bildungsroman' [MON 70 / 131]), nor simply to offer a model by being the 'most' non-identical, or the most displaced person. The text must be read as a performative provocation based around the central quasi-logical proposition: what Derrida describes as his own neurotic cultivation of the French language, his desire to write, in particular, absolutely accurate, non-provincial French. Derrida here complicates what might be an assumed revalorisation of the linguistic situation of the colonised subject — and this is the significance of his reference to Khatibi's work on bilingualism, and also to Eduardo Glissant's work on the French Antilles — by situating himself both at the margins and at the centre of French language and culture: 'Though the "non-mastery [...] of an appropriated language" of which Glissant speaks qualifies, above all, more literally and more sensitively, some situations of "colonial" alienation or historical servitude, this definition [...] also holds for what would be called the language of the master, the hospes, or the colonist' [MON 23 / 44]. All language is colonial, we might say. This 'constitutive' lack or alienation however is not negative, since it is the very condition of our 'possessing' anything, including ourselves. Furthermore, there is perhaps the basis of some form of resistance being elaborated here as well:
The master is nothing. And he does not have exclusive possession of anything. Because the master does not possess exclusively, and naturally, what he calls his language, because, whatever he wants or does, he cannot maintain any relations of property that are natural, national, congenital, or ontological, with it, because he can give substance to and articulate [dire] this appropriation only in the course of an unnatural process of politico-phantasmatic constructions, because language is not his natural possession, he can, thanks to that very fact, pretend historically, through the rape of a cultural usurpation, which means always essentially colonial, to appropriate it in order to impose it as 'his own.' [...][MON 23-4 / 45].

Derrida describes himself as having been dispossessed not just of the language of authority, but the so-called maternal language too, and this is to be taken as exemplary of the situation of every subject. Every subject is first of all hostage to the language of the other, every home is already opened to the other, every state is already the place of the other — 'what is proper to a culture is not to be identical to itself' writes Derrida elsewhere [OH 9 / 16]. The recognition of this 'universal structure' [MON 63 / 121] does not produce the impossibility of politics, but its vital condition: and it calls for the recognition of the difference within this structure, to recognise and denounce or combat the most violent forms of exemplarism, in a general economy which is unavoidably that of exemplarism, and of violence. ‘This debate with monolingualism,’ Derrida writes, ‘will have been nothing other than a piece of deconstructive writing. Such writing always attacks the body of this language, my only language, and what it bears the most or in the best way, namely the philosophical tradition that supplies us with the reservoir of concepts I definitely have to use’ [MON 59 / 115. First emphasis Derrida’s, second emphasis mine]. In Derrida’s case, then, deconstructive writing must be first and foremost an attack on, or a negotiation with, the French language.

In the light of this discussion, of deconstruction as the negotiation with the language of the other, of that language which is my only language and yet is not mine, another way of reading Politics of Friendship is opened up. One of the many startling comments in his essay on monolingualism is Derrida’s remark that the French dispossession of their Algerian Jewish citizens ‘taught me the disasters toward which incantatory invocations of the mother
tongue will have pushed humans headlong.' ‘My culture’ continues Derrida, and we must also hear the implied sense of ‘your culture’ or ‘every culture’ in his words,

was right away a political culture. ‘My mother tongue’ is what they say, what they speak; as for me, I cite and question them. I ask them in their own language, certainly in order to make them understand me, for it is serious, if they indeed know what they are saying and what they are talking about. Especially when, so lightly, they celebrate ‘fraternity.’ At bottom, brothers, the mother tongue, and so forth pose the same problem [MON 34 / 61].

Here Derrida announces the project of Politics of Friendship itself, the interrogation of the value attached to brotherhood. But rather than being just any political problem, of a problem of political philosophy as such, given this context, it becomes clear that Politics of Friendship does not have just any relation to the language in which it was written. To question the value of ‘fraternity’ in the tradition is explicitly to challenge a French tradition of philosophy. Just as Politics of Friendship is a negotiation with thinkers whom we might presume to be Derrida’s philosophical friends, so it must also be read, at least in part, as Derrida’s negotiation with the culture, language and philosophical tradition which he has inherited: which is his only culture, but yet not his. This is made plain in a parenthetical aside, in which he writes that

This book set itself up to work and be worked relentlessly, close to the thing called France. And close to the singular alliance linking nothing less than the history of fraternization to this thing, France — to the State, the nation, the politics, the culture, literature and language which answer for the name ‘France’ and, when they are called by this name, answer to it [POF 264 / 295].

It is precisely the French revolutionary slogan with its equation of liberty, equality and fraternity which Derrida has in mind, as well as the apparent repetition and celebration of that fraternity in the work of his friends Blanchot and Nancy on community. This would also account for Derrida’s reference, in the very first chapter of the work, to Montaigne as ‘another reader hailing from my homeland’ [POF 2 / 18]; for his discussion of Michelet’s ‘andro-gallo-fraternocentrism’ [POF 236-9 / 265-7]; for the section on Victor Hugo [POF 264-7 / 295-9]. Yet, because Politics of Friendship is written first of all in French, the book
may not be taken as a simple disavowal or rejection of its own national-linguistic philosophical context. Just as democracy and friendship are both criticised but reaffirmed in the book, so the book must also be considered a national affirmation, as a result of the same structure which Derrida has identified in ‘The Onto-Theology of National Humanism.’ In other words, Politics of Friendship can only proceed by thinking through its own national situation; an intrinsic part of its project must be the political questioning of this implied politics of language. Like Monolingualism of the Other, and by extension, all of Derrida’s work, it must be read as a performative self-problematization of the status of deconstruction. When he suggests a one line definition for deconstruction in a set of Mémoires for another friend, Paul de Man, Derrida proposes ‘plus d’un langue.’ This idiomatic French phrase means both more than one language, and not one language. By being written in French, and by virtue of being both translatable, but not being absolutely translatable (the condition of all linguistic utterance), the phrase acts out its own meaning.

In this first section of the chapter I have argued, on the basis largely of Derrida’s seminar on nationality and philosophy, that because I am within language, political decisions precede me. This is a concept of the decision as something for which I am responsible, even if I could have done nothing about it, and with the violence of which I must negotiate, as soon as I inherit a language which is not mine. Deconstruction, it is beginning to appear, might be the name for the exemplary vigilance which keeps watch over this violence. In this light I will turn to Derrida’s readings of Heidegger over the same period. Not only do these also stem from the seminar on nationalism, but they also put deconstruction itself into question. Finally, they culminate in an essay entitled ‘Philopolemology: Heidegger’s Ear (Geschlecht IV)’ which is bound with Politics of Friendship in its French edition, and is a crucial supplement for understanding both that book, and Derrida’s political thought as such.
2.3 Derrida and Heidegger: Spirit and Nation.

Despite several critical works on the subject, it remains somewhat unclear what position we can ascribe to Derrida’s thought in relation to that of Heidegger.20 My intention in this section is not to attempt to settle this question once and for all. Instead I wish to focus on the particular position of Heidegger within the modulation of Derrida’s thought that I am pursuing in these first two chapters, in which the deployment of ‘deconstruction’ accompanies both a consistent attention to questions of politics, and the re-valuation or reinscription of some of the names of politics. To recall some of these for a moment: democracy, as ‘democracy-to-come’; nationalism as an inescapable horizon of thought and language, which renders both a priori political; responsibility, thought against itself. When I discussed the various meanings of deconstruction on which Derrida draws in the last chapter, I emphasised that the term at least in part must remain a translation or a borrowed word from Heidegger — a French, and now English, substitute for Abbau and Destruktion. Reading this later work, in which Derrida deploys and manipulates the vocabulary of deconstruction in an explicitly provocative and political manner, we should take care not to forget that this reference is always implied. So when Derrida claims, for example, that ‘deconstruction is justice’ [FoL passim] we must presume this to imply at least a minimal reference to Heidegger. Since this revaluation of the word ‘deconstruction’ accompanies the apparent ‘politicization’ of Derrida’s thought, it seems necessary to devote some space to considering the significance of this in relation to the place of Heidegger in his work. The issue is given a further twist in the context of the so-called Heidegger Affair, in which Heidegger’s own

political affiliations were raised once again in the most public fashion in France and the United States.  

This is not to say that Derrida’s work does not stand in a critical relation to that of Heidegger. On the contrary, Derrida has continued to question at length the political dimension of Heidegger’s texts, both in seminar work and in published texts, and moreover, most of the work to be discussed here had been set in motion before the renewed controversy over Heidegger’s own political involvement. In this section I will examine one thread of Derrida’s *Auseinandersetzung* (critical debate or dialogue) with Heidegger, that which centres most explicitly around the question of nation and politics. Just as Monolingualism of the Other may be read as a performative negotiation with the political responsibilities of a language which is inherited rather than chosen so I will suggest that Derrida’s reading of Heidegger bears a significant, and politically significant, performative dimension. From this perspective, I will conclude, the inclusion of a long essay on Heidegger in the French edition of Politics of Friendship must be read as an important supplement to the movement of the main body of the text: its absence in the English edition is a major omission. The essay appended to Politics of Friendship bears the sub-title ‘Geschlecht IV.’ Two other essays have been published under this title, and all three can be considered as supplementary to or coextensive with the aims of Derrida’s seminar on ‘Philosophical Nationality and Nationalism.’ Derrida has described the first as a ‘short preface’ [OS 7 / 22] or ‘an introduction’ [GES II 161 / 416] to that seminar, the trajectory of the second is announced within it [ONH 13]. A third instalment was at one point circulated as a photocopy by

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21 For Derrida’s comments on the Heidegger affair see the interview entitled ‘Heidegger, the philosopher’s hell’ [POI 181-90]. There are further comments on this subject in the other interviews in the collection [POI 193-5; 286-7] and in the English translation only, another interview dealing with Derrida’s own entanglement in the argument: ‘The Work of Intellectuals and the Press’ [POI 422-54].
Derrida but has not been published [GES II 183 / 439; 188 / 446].\textsuperscript{22} Derrida’s major work on Heidegger of this period, \textit{Of Spirit}, is not directly a part of the series, but takes its bearings from the same texts of, and the same questions addressed to, Heidegger [OS 7 / 22]. I will give a brief account of these texts, in which it should become clear how the question of nation is situated with regard to Derrida’s work on Heidegger, and how I take Derrida’s own work to be responding to this question, before discussing the relationship between ‘Heidegger’s Ear: Philopolemology (Geschlecht IV)’ and \textit{Politics of Friendship}.

\textbf{2.3.1 Geschlecht.}

At the heart of Derrida’s \textit{Geschlecht} series of essays lies the interpretation of one highly ambiguous word in German, found not only in Heidegger but also in Fichte’s account of the nation [ONH 13], \textit{Geschlecht}. In Derrida’s first essay on the subject, ‘Geschlecht: sexual difference, ontological difference,’ his interest in this word is already apparent. In the essay, Derrida focuses on \textit{Geschlecht} as a term for sex, whether male or female, and Heidegger’s apparent ascription to \textit{Dasein} of an asexuality. By examining closely a seminar course given shortly after the publication of \textit{Being and Time} Derrida clarifies what is nowhere made clear within the published book, that not only is \textit{Dasein} neutral in sexual terms, but that this is not the traditional assumption of philosophical discourse that being is to be understood from the normative standpoint of masculinity. Instead, by choosing the word \textit{Dasein} rather than \textit{Mensch} (man) Heidegger deliberately implies that sexual difference is not essential to \textit{Dasein} — but at the same time the possibility is raised that sexual difference cannot be reduced to the object of an anthropological or ethical discourse, from which Heidegger has

\textsuperscript{22} See also the reference in John Sallis. ‘Flight of Spirit’ in \textit{Of Derrida, Heidegger, and Spirit}. 148n.1. David Farrell Krell refers to ‘that third generation of “Geschlecht” which he has promised and we will not allow him to forget’ in ‘Spiriting Heidegger.’ 36.
already distinguished the project of fundamental ontology. By insisting on the neutrality of *Dasein*, moreover, Heidegger implies that *Dasein* must be thought prior to the binary distinction between sexes, beyond the either-or implied in neuter (*ne-uter*), rather than as simply being without sex; or even, read carefully, prior to negativity or the logic of dialectic and opposition, as such. From this Derrida teases out the possibility of thinking a preoriginal sex, neither male nor female, which would not be asexual, but ‘a predifferential, or rather a predual, sexuality — which does not necessarily mean unitary, homogeneous, or undifferentiated, as we shall see later’ [GES I 387-8 / 402]. What would be at stake in pursuing this reading is the possibility of thinking sexual difference without thinking opposition.

The difficulty in general is that *Dasein* is only in dispersion. Being is not an essence prior to beings themselves, it is nothing other than its own distribution amongst them. As Heidegger puts it in *Being and Time*, ‘*Dasein*’s facticity is such that its Being-in-the-world has always dispersed [zerstreut] itself or even split itself up into definite ways of Being-in’.\(^{23}\) It is announced in the pre-ontological analytic, but cannot be removed from *Dasein* as existents, as being there in the world. The consequences of the argument are not drawn out at this stage. In ‘Geschlecht II,’ however, Derrida begins to fill out the implications of Heidegger’s use of *Geschlecht*, and in particular in his reading of Trakl, which he has hinted at in ‘Geschlecht I’ (‘Much later, at any rate thirty years later, the word “*Geschlecht*” will be charged with all its polysemic richness: sex, genre [*genre*], family, stock, race, lineage, generation’ [GES I 385 / 400]) and pursued as part of the nationalism seminar [GES II 161-5 / 415-20]. Reading Trakl, Heidegger calls forth the full range of meanings of *Geschlecht*, as the name for the *Dasein* of *Mensch*:

the word “generation” [Geschlecht] here retains the full manifold meaning mentioned earlier. For one thing, it names the historical generation of man, mankind as distinct from all other living beings (plants and animals). Next the word “generation” names the races, tribes, clans and families of mankind. At the same time, the word always refers to the twofoldness of the sexes.24

Derrida locates this in the context of a summary of the results of his seminar (‘the paradoxical but regular association of nationalism with a cosmopolitanism and with a humanism’ [GES II 162 / 416]), and suggests the filiation between Heidegger and Fichte, but also Heidegger’s adherence to the schema of what he has already suggested might be thought of as a national humanism. As Fichte did with the concept of the nation, Heidegger is careful to distinguish the Geschlecht of mankind from a ‘biological fact.’ The consequence is a difficult balance between the original dispersion and the unity implied by Geschlecht as ‘one generation [in which] there is a unifying force.’25

Derrida is concerned to show that there are metaphysical axiomatics which intrude into the attempt to think pre-ontologically: that the being Geschlechtlich of Dasein is not contingent but originary and inescapable. So for example, the word Geschlecht itself has an ‘irreducible bond to the question of humanity versus animality, and of a humanity whose name, as the bond of the name to the “thing”, if one can say that, remains as problematic as that of the language in which the name is written’ [GES II 165 / 419]. It is the hand, in this case, by which man is to be distinguished from the animal. The hand, Heidegger claims in ‘What is Called Thinking,’ is that which is proper to man; in distinction from every other Geschlecht, including the ape. The analogy made by Heidegger between poetry and thought and authentic handiwork (Handwerk) gives rise to a discourse of authentic, non-technical activity, lifted from the realm of utility, profit, calculation, trade or commerce. Heidegger binds thinking to a thought or situation of the body, and especially of the hand. He will also

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25 ibid.
claim that his discourse on technics is not only a protest, but an act of resistance against the professionalization of university under the Nazi regime; the submission of philosophy to imperatives of technical productivity. Derrida notes that this argument has ‘equivocal effects: it opens up to an archaistic reaction toward the rustic artisan class and denounces business or capital, notions whose associations then are well known’ [GES II 172 / 427]. Just as Fichte seeks to understand the nation in terms which are not simply those of an empirical discourse, but spiritual, so too Heidegger refuses to draw on the biologist’s account of the hand as a hand that grips, or uses tools. Instead for Heidegger the human hand is distinguished from that of the animal, and in turn this human hand comes to distinguish the animal from the human as such. This, like the ascription of national exemplarity, may be an unavoidable distinction, but it is one that should not be taken for granted. Is it necessary to insist again that Derrida’s aim is not to confound the differences between concepts, beings, human and animal, but precisely to think those differences in a more diffuse manner? Such borders blur themselves, Derrida claims: ‘Elsewhere I have tried to show that, as every opposition does, this absolute oppositional limit effaces the differences and leads back, following the most resistant metaphysico-dialectic tradition, to the homogeneous’ [GES II 174 / 429].

The implicit consequences are taken on to seminar and other work: can Dasein for Heidegger be thought prior to Geschlecht, that is division into sexes, generations, humanity, nations. Derrida’s questioning tends to take two forms. On the one hand, as in the discussion of animality, he is concerned to show that Heidegger makes metaphysical choices or decisions. Derrida would prefer to think a regime of differences without such oppositions as that between man and animal, or man and woman. In ‘Geschlecht II’ he distinguishes his ‘dissemination’ from Heidegger’s ‘polysemy,’ still governed by an original principle. However once we bear in mind that these decisions are unavoidable from Derrida’s point of view, the other form his questioning takes becomes obvious. Rather than convict Heidegger of failing to escape metaphysics, Derrida seeks to see what elements within his text do
gesture towards something else. The potential for thinking another, a third, sex, beyond or prior to the binary division into male and female would be one of these moments in which Derrida finds resources in Heidegger for thinking (beyond) the constitutive failures of metaphysics.

2.3.2 Of Spirit.

Given the extensive interest in the political implications of Heidegger's work, it is unsurprising that Derrida’s reading of Heidegger in *Of Spirit*, elaborated before the so-called Heidegger affair had become a *cause célébre*, has also attracted a fair amount of commentary. In view of this, and of the complexity of the text itself, I will confine myself here to those observations which seem most pertinent to the argument I am pursuing in this chapter. In particular, I am interested in what distinguishes the singular performance of this reading, originally a paper presented to a conference at Cerisy, both from the two earlier essays on *Geschlecht*, and from some remarks made by Derrida at an earlier colloquium at the University of Essex, to which he refers in the text [OS 8 / 23] and from which both an outline of Derrida’s comments and a transcript of the ensuing discussion have been published.26

At the Essex colloquium Derrida had raised four points: the privilege attached to questioning in Heidegger’s work; the privilege attached to essence (for example when ‘the essence of technology is nothing technological’ in ‘The Question of Technology’); the structure of *Dasein* in relation to animality; and the problem of epochality as a principle of

gathering. The same themes guide *Of Spirit*, and as with the *Geschlecht* essays (in which the theme of *Geist* is announced: from [GES II 192 / 450]: ‘the ambivalence of the fire or the flame of the spirit, which is at once the Good and the Evil’), the pivotal text for reading Heidegger becomes again the 1953 writings on Trakl. What marks out *Of Spirit* is its systematic account of the use of the word ‘spirit’ in Heidegger’s work, around which the other points are organised. Derrida finds three stages in the trajectory of ‘spirit’: at first, in *Being and Time*, Heidegger refuses spirit as a category, but later in the Rectorate discourse, spirit returns, held in quotation marks, and associated with the political problems of destiny and the nation. Derrida’s reading at this point runs in parallel to his work on Fichte which I have already discussed. On the one hand ‘spirit’ takes us beyond an empirical or biological discourse of race; but on the other hand, it is still attached to a nationalist affirmation: Heidegger ‘confers the most reassuring and elevated spiritual legitimacy on [...] National Socialism.’ Yet ‘by taking the risk of spiritualizing nazism, he might have been trying to absolve or save it by marking it with this affirmation’ [OS 39 / 64]. In the third step of this path, Heidegger’s Trakl commentaries seek to reinstate the word spirit, but stripped of its Christian and metaphysical connotations.

The situation Derrida finds played out in Heidegger’s words then, is that which we have seen to characterise the discourse of national philosophical humanism as such: if these texts are read as the attempt to avoid the worse violence, the violence of an allegedly biologically determinate racism, they may only do so by the path of the universal, yet even the supposedly universal is already marked as a national affirmation, a political decision, as violence. This path is also the path of the return of spirit as a humanism, as Derrida argues in connection with Heidegger’s thinking of *Dasein* as human not animal, and of a privilege granted, once again, to the German language: spirit may only be truly spoken in German. Derrida queries both of these assumptions, but the fundamental problem of the text is that of the unavoidability of passing through spirit, of some form of spiritual determination. While he can draw attention to the metaphysical decisions which foreclose on the distinction
between human and animal, and privilege one language over another, Derrida cannot escape the problematic affirmation of philosophy and spirit, which are already not only Occidental but national. I will quote two crucial passages from the text to show the centrality and ineluctability of this problem.

Because one cannot demarcate oneself from biologism, from naturalism, from racism in its genetic form, one cannot be opposed to them, except by reinscribing spirit in an oppositional determination, by once again making it a unilaterality of subjectivity, even if in its voluntarist form. The constraint of this program remains very strong, it reigns over the majority of discourses which, today and for a long time to come, state their opposition to racism, to totalitarianism, to nazism, to fascism, etc., and do this in the name of spirit, and even of the freedom of (the) spirit, in the name of an axiomatic — for example that of democracy or ‘human rights’ — which, directly or not, comes back to this metaphysics of subjectity. All the pitfalls of the strategy of establishing demarcations belong to this program, whatever place one occupies in it. The only choice is the choice between the terrifying contaminations it assigns. Even if all forms of complicity are not equivalent, they are irreducible. The question of knowing which is the least grave of these forms of complicity is always there — its urgency and its seriousness could not be over-stressed — but it will never dissolve the irreducibility of this fact [OS 39-40 / 65-6].

This is the same problematic structure to that which Derrida has set out in his seminar on philosophical nationality. The discourse of the social or human sciences cannot be opposed except on the basis of transcendental gestures, however provisional or short-lived (or quasi-transcendental), which by restoring philosophy as a universal explanatory force rest on metaphysical foundations, however carefully these are qualified or subjected to ironic presentation. Spirit returns. This is unavoidable:

I do not mean to criticize this humanist teleology. It is no doubt more urgent to recall that, in spite of all the denegations or all the avoidances one could wish, it has remained up till now (in Heidegger’s time and situation, but this has not radically changed today) the price to be paid in the ethico-political denunciation of biologism, racism, naturalism, etc. If I analyze this ‘logic,’ and the aporias or limits, the presuppositions or the axiomatic decisions, above all the inversions and contaminations, in which we see it becoming entangled, this is rather in order to exhibit and then formalize the terrifying mechanisms of this program, all the double constraints which structure it. Is this unavoidable? Can one escape this program? No sign would suggest it, at least neither in ‘Heideggerean’ discourses nor in ‘anti-Heideggerean’ discourses. Can one transform this program? I do not know [OS 56 / 87-8].
Derrida here gives an indication of how he understands his own procedure in Of Spirit and it is important to note that he does not judge Heidegger, while pointing out the equivocations of his work. I have already suggested in this chapter that responsibility precedes the subject; that being born into one language rather than another is already a political decision for which I am culpable, if not fully accountable. Here Derrida formulates this problem in terms of 'a program.' Yet if this program has dictated to Heidegger, and to Derrida in his turn, neither can avoid their responsibility for an attempt to come to terms with that program. Derrida nowhere suggests that his work is to be preferred to Heidegger's in any straightforward way. In the long footnote which appears to retract sections of the argument over the status of questioning in Heidegger, Derrida describes an affirmative engagement which precedes questioning, and which can be traced within Heidegger's work; yet this is something which Derrida has been describing in his own terms for several years at this point [OS 129-136n.5 / 147-54n.1]. While Derrida clearly wishes to isolate aporias and limits, 'axiomatic' decisions in Heidegger's text: it is to exhibit these features of 'the program' rather than escape it. One of the consequences of the 'contamination' to which he refers is that 'Heidegger' and 'Derrida' as proper names denoting discrete bodies of work cannot be adequately distinguished.

This dimension of the problem has often been commented on. What has not been dealt with is the way Derrida's response is inscribed with a national dimension: and in particular a confrontation between the German and the French language. This, it seems to me, repeats and complicates the identification between Heidegger and Derrida in the text. David Farrell Krell has noted that at the climax of the book, when Derrida comes to read Heidegger on Trakl, and identifies spirit as fire, he uses a word which is common to French and German — shared, but different, in each language. That word is flamme. In other words at the conclusion to the book 'spirit' [Geist, l'esprit] becomes that which German and French hold in common. The question of spirit is a 'thoroughly French question' [OS 4 / 16], as Derrida comments earlier in the book, and the relationship between German and French
comes to replace, at least in the book’s performative dimension, the question of translation between Greek, Latin and German (‘Spirit / soul / life, pneuma / psyché / zoè or bios, spiritus / anima / vita, Geist / Seele / Leben — these are the triangles and squares in which we imprudently pretend to recognize stable semantic determinations’ [OS 74 / 119]) and perhaps even of the exclusion of Hebrew from this problem [OS 100-2 / 165-8].

Spirit names both that which puts into question and ghosts, or haunts the empirical, and the necessary return of metaphysics: ‘However we interpret this awesome equivocity, for Heidegger it is inscribed in spirit. It is of spirit [de l’esprit]’ [OS 41 / 67]. But in naming spirit in French, the national dimension of the book is affirmed. Where Heidegger explicitly claims that Geist can only be named in German, by translating it, Derrida cannot fail to repeat this claim on behalf of the French national idiom in which he speaks. But by naming this equivocity as ‘de l’esprit’ Derrida is also naming his own book. Not only is spirit best spoken in French, but the book itself must be read as the exemplary exposition of spirit, as not just the ‘formalisation’ but also the ‘exhibition’ of the ‘terrifying mechanisms of the program’, to refer back to the passage I have just quoted at length. Derrida also draws attention to the reference in his title to an eighteenth-century text by Helvetius. This earlier book, of which his is a repetition, was condemned, banned and burnt. Might we not take this to imply that Derrida’s book of spirit is not only a book of fire, but another book to burn? From the moment that it is written in one language rather than another, however translatable that might make it, Of Spirit is the performative affirmation of the ‘terrifying’ program. Just as in Monolingualism of the Other Derrida plays out the ambiguity of his own relation to France itself, so in this text Derrida seeks to account for and respond to the necessary inscription of deconstruction into a metaphysics of spirit

My claim is somewhat stronger than that of Geoff Bennington who sees Of Spirit as an exemplary deconstruction: ‘what deconstruction will always have been saying on its own
account, in its own name, this is deconstruction’s very signature.\textsuperscript{27} It also exceeds Simon Critchley’s claim that while Of Spirit is a responsible engagement with its own politics through a reading of Heidegger, Derrida does not manage to decide and therefore ultimately refuses politics.\textsuperscript{28} Derrida has written his own book of fire, his own book of spirit, his own book to burn, a book which burns. In doing so he foregrounds the decisions which have already been made for him, and which bind him to one language rather than another, and that language to one tradition rather than another, one set of religions rather than another, and thus to one set of political decisions rather than another. In doing so, Derrida (contra Critchley, as it were) raises the question of the very possibility of politics, of a political decision as something I could take: and repeats deconstruction (contra Bennington) as a work of violence, of a national exemplarism and spiritual metaphysics which are unavoidable and with which we can only negotiate.

2.3.3 Europe as Responsibility.

Another of the arguments of Of Spirit has important consequences for this discussion. Derrida begins a project of linking Heidegger’s discourse on Europe with that of other contemporary thinkers, in this instance Valery and Husserl. In doing so he at once returns to one of his oldest themes, and pushes this political discourse and practice that deconstruction cannot help but be even further. For crucially, not only is Europe identified with philosophy, but with responsibility itself. So the situation we are describing cannot be one in which deconstruction figures a return of responsibility to a flawed Western metaphysics.

\textsuperscript{27} Bennington. ‘Spirit’s Spirit Spirits Spirit.’ in Derrida, Heidegger and Spirit. 91.

\textsuperscript{28} Simon Critchley. ‘The Question of the Question’ in Derrida, Heidegger and Spirit. 101-2.
Responsibility is also always already a political concept, not the neutral ground of politics, or of political reflection, but already the taking of one side rather than another, and always on the side of the fraternal friend, rather than that of the other. This question of responsibility would make The Gift of Death a companion piece to Of Spirit, as Derrida turns from showing Heidegger’s Trakl reading to be finely balanced at the crossing of a Christian metaphysics with a path to something completely other, to Patočka’s genealogy of Europe as responsibility itself. The problem is flagged up in Of Spirit:

What I am aiming at here is, obviously enough, anything but abstract. We are talking about past, present and future ‘events,’ a composition of forces and discourses which seem to have been waging merciless war on each other (for example from 1933 to our time). We have here a program and a combinatorial whose power remains abyssal. In all rigor it exculpates none of these discourses which can thus exchange their power. It leaves no place open for any arbitrating authority. Nazism was not born in the desert. We all know this, but it has to be constantly recalled. And even if, far from any desert, it had grown like a mushroom in the silence of a European forest, it would have done so in the shadow of big trees, in the shelter of their silence or their indifference but in the same soil. I will not list these trees which in Europe people an immense black forest, I will not count the species. For essential reasons, the presentation of them defies tabular layout. In their bushy taxonomy, they would bear the name of religions, philosophies, political regimes, economic structures, religious or academic institutions. In short, what is just as confusedly called culture, or the world of spirit [OS 109-10 / 178-9].

David Krell reads this passage as privileging a figure of the desert over the European forest and wishes to recall that there is no pure outside, Judaic or otherwise, to this economy of violence: ‘To be sure, not in the desert. Yet the desert has often enough run red to the sound of “sibboleth,” a sound uttered without hope in many tongues. The prophetic discourses of the desert, propagated in other lands, have often enough served as clarion calls to closure of the triangle and violence in the wood.” But if this is what Derrida’s appeal to the desert is for, it is only to the extent that Judaism has always figured Europe’s outside. Instead, we might take this as a reference to another thinking of place, one that would be thought beyond the opposition of desert and forest, beyond the possibility of a sacred place: what Derrida

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29 David Farrell Krell. in Derrida, Heidegger and Spirit. 31
refers to in *Specters of Marx* as a desert in the desert [SoM 167-8 / 266-7] or in his text on the Platonic *chora*, as the giving place to place. The old problem of deconstruction is at work here: on the one hand we try to name the condition of possibility, but we can only name it under the name of what is to hand, what we have inherited. That is, here, a desert space.

Even before beginning *Of Grammatology* by linking logocentrism to ethnocentrism [GRA 3 / 11], Derrida was exploring the limits of the West. In his thesis, *Le problème de la genèse dans la philosophie de Husserl*, Derrida writes: ‘This idea of Europe is the idea that is born in Europe; it is the idea of philosophy that is, in its absolute originality, as Husserl tells us, a European idea. In fact, Europe is not the cradle of philosophy, it is itself born as spiritual signification, from the idea of philosophy.’ Constituted by its outside, bearing its other within, Europe just is the program of Western thought, whether in its Eurocentric or anti-Eurocentric poles: ‘Avowal, guilt, and self-accusation no more escape this old program than does the celebration of self’ [OH 26 / 31]. Writing in *Of Grammatology*, Derrida suspected that this structure Derrida could be found in the work of Levi-Strauss: ‘the critique of ethnocentrism has most often the sole function of constituting the other as a model of original and natural goodness, of accusing and humiliating oneself, of exhibiting its being-unacceptable in an anti-ethnocentric mirror’ [GRA 114 / 168].

In *The Other Heading* a third stage is written into the thinking of national humanism: we know it passes via a cosmopolitanism, but Derrida now asserts that it also passes through a privilege assigned to Europe as the avant-garde, the leading force, the head or header of the ‘human’ and ‘national’ world. This can be schematically set out as ‘I am (we are) all the more national for being European, all the more European for being trans-European and international; no-one is more cosmopolitan and authentically universal than

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the one, than this “we” who is speaking to you’ [OH 48 / 49]. A nationalism, or the national affirmation of one idiom rather than another, also implies that ‘what is proper to a particular nation or idiom would be to be a heading for Europe, and what is proper to Europe would be, analogically, to advance itself as a heading for the universal essence of humanity’ [OH 48 / 49]. In other words, philosophy itself:

Europe is not only a geographical headland or heading that has always given itself the representation or figure of a spiritual heading, at once as project, task, or infinite — that is to say, universal — idea, as the memory of itself that gathers and accumulates itself, capitalizes upon itself, in and for itself. Europe has also confused its image, its face, its figure and its very place, its taking-place, with that of an advanced point, the point of a phallus if you will, and thus, once again, with a heading for world civilization or human culture in general. The idea of an advanced point of exemplarity is the idea of the European idea, its eidos, at once as arché — the idea of beginning but also as commanding [...] and as telos, the idea of the end [...] [OH 24 / 29].

Because Europe is identified with responsibility, our response to this situation is difficult. Derrida formulates it in terms of a series of aporetic duties: for example that of striking a balance between the nationalistic tensions of linguistic difference and homogenization of universal translating machine [OH 58 / 58], or how to keep Geist and esprit apart without making one simply an incomplete translation of the other, truer, word: ‘The same duty dictates respecting differences, idioms, minorities, singularities, but also the universalizability of formal law, the desire for translation, agreement and univocity, the law of the majority, opposition to racism, nationalism and xenophobia’ [OH 78 / 76-7]. Derrida has no option but to take up the old name of Europe (and culture, identity): if to be European is to be responsible, we must only be more so, but only by transgressing the path of responsibility as European, by thinking responsibility against itself [cf. OH 17 / 22]. As we shall see in the final section of this chapter, this might mean both 1) to see what resources already open Europe, within its old name, to its outside and 2) at its borders (figurative and quite literal) to welcome what is already inside, not just that which appears to come from the outside [OH 82-3 / 80-1]. Derrida’s memorandum to himself, that ‘I am a good European intellectual’ [OH 82 / 80] once again reminds us in our turn of the implacable program of
which he is writing. Deconstruction as political practice in this mode aims to appear at the head of this program, but in such a way as to both commend and demonstrate ways of thinking the program itself differently.

2.3.4 Hearing the Other in *Politics of Friendship*.

Turning from *Of Spirit* back to *Politics of Friendship*, Derrida appears to have moved away from the problem of responsibility. Friendship, and the decision have replaced what may be too European, too pious a discourse on responsibility. Instead the distinction between friend and enemy reinforces the violence of the political inscription of the text. However, the book is not without a link back to Heidegger. ‘Heidegger’s Ear: Philopolemology (*Geschlecht IV*)’ is an essay on Heidegger which deals with many of the same themes but which also seems to stand on its own as a reading of the place of the concepts of ‘friendship’ in Heidegger. The text was published in the French edition of *Politics of Friendship* and I will here read it as having a supplementary relation to the main body of that book: as both the completion and the rendering incomplete of the text.

Derrida begins with a relatively obscure passage from *Sein und Zeit* in which Heidegger refers to ‘the voice of the friend whom every Dasein carries with it.’³² Leaving aside the suggestions of Christopher Fynsk and Jean-Luc Nancy that this passage opens a possible reading of *Dasein as Mit-sein*, Derrida instead links this brief mention forward to both the reading of Trakl, and to the seminar work of the 1930s in which Heidegger also makes explicit reference to hearing. There are two dimensions to Derrida’s argument. Firstly he suggests how, on the basis of Heidegger’s later work, this reference to the voice of the

³² *Being and Time*. 163.
friend — a mode of hearing which is neither sense perception nor intellectual faculty —
prefigures, calls for, and almost hears the approach of, the thinking of Being as event
[Ereignis], as world-disclosure and the four-fold, which will characterise the work of the
later Heidegger, to which Derrida is much closer than he is to Being and Time. But Derrida is
also suggesting that Heidegger here prefigures his own interest in aimance — as I discussed
in the first chapter, a ‘middle voice’ of loving, neither active nor passive, ontologically prior
(even if not factually) to the distinction between friends: which Derrida in effect equates
with the calling of / for a politics beyond friendship modelled on fraternity. He comments:

Heidegger is pushed by a ‘destructive’ necessity to try to hear and understand
[entendre] φιλάνθρωπον before the Platonic and Aristotelian φιλία. He translates
φιλάνθρωπον of which he speaks a great deal, by das Leiben, loving, before any
distinction between the loving of love and the loving of friendship, what in
French, in a seminar I am devoting to these questions, I call aimance [G1V 180
/ 368].

While Derrida carefully marks this as a “destructive” necessity, not many lines beforehand
he has drawn attention not only to the difference, but also the similarity between the
Heideggerean and the Derridean mode, if we can accept this distinction provisionally.
‘Deconstruction, or rather “Destruktion,” he writes, commenting on Heidegger, ‘is also an
experience of the appropriation of the tradition, and this deconstructive appropriation
signifies first, it calls itself, it calls heifit: “open our ear.”’ What Derrida does not remind us
is that on several occasions he has drawn on the metaphor of hearing to suggest that what he
has been doing in his work is precisely ‘a process of appropriation (Aneignung) and of
transformation. [...] The word Aneignung is used at least twice in this context, and
something more remarkable still, not only to designate the welcome of the tradition but also
its “destruction.”’ In ‘Tympan,’ Otobiographies, and ‘Of an apocalyptic tone recently
adopted in philosophy’ Derrida has associated deconstruction with something very similar.33

33 ‘Tympan’ [MAR ix-xxix / i-xxv]; Otobiographies. Paris: Galilée, 1984.; ‘On a
Newly Arisen Apocalyptic Tone in Philosophy.’ trans. John P. Leavey, Jr. in Peter Fenves
For both these reasons, above and beyond the general difficulty of distinguishing Heidegger and Derrida, this would appear to be another text in which Derrida performatively problematises the issue of the propriety of a text, or of what is proper to an author.

The second focus of Derrida’s text is in the possibility of polemos, which Heidegger also appears to assign to this philein, in his reading of Heraclitus. Where aimance for Derrida would be ‘a passivity beyond passivity’, for Heidegger it appears to be linked to a rhetoric or metaphors of violence and struggle. Derrida looks particularly askance at the implication that what is proper to the belonging together of people (of a nation?) is their communal struggle. Polemos and philein are ‘originarily the same’ for Heidegger [GIV 209 / 410] and ‘what we identify as the history of the world, for example, political history’ [GIV 210 / 411] is Kampf or struggle. In the work leading up to Of Spirit it was the privilege attached to questioning, later modified in a lengthy footnote, and to essence which came into question. Here it is the subordination of difference as ‘dissociation, disjunction, scission, dissenion, or secession’ to ‘gathering’ [GIV 209 / 409-10]. When Heidegger speaks of the relation between beings in terms of harmony, he appears to reinstall values based on ‘the reciprocity of the there-and-back, the going and coming of exchange. A serious problem when one tries to draw the consequences of this mutuality in the moral and political field of friendship.’

Derrida then echoes the key themes of Politics of Friendship when he asks:

What would be the political carrying-distance of a thought or an experience of que? that would no longer respect this law of reciprocity and would appeal to dissemblance, heterogeneity, dissymmetry, disproportion, incommensurability, non-exchange, the excess of every measure and thus of all symmetry? All these words are not synonyms of course. A democracy to come should give to be thought an equality that is not incompatible with a certain dissymmetry, with heterogeneity, or absolute singularity, an equality even requiring them and engaging them from a place that remains invisible but that orients me here, from afar, no doubt beyond the Heideggerian aim [GES IV 183 / 372-3].

As with the problem of spirit, at the very least, Heidegger’s association of world-history with struggle, with Kampf and polemos is equivocal. This ambiguity leaves the thought of Being open to some unpleasant interpretations. Derrida’s example is of the possibility of Hitler
understanding Mein Kampf in a Heideggerean manner: ‘I speak, like you, Heidegger, of our responsibility, of the mission, of the “historical spiritual mission of the German people”’ [GES IV 211 / 412-3]. Derrida is cautious about concluding: ‘these strategies [...] are never totally objectifiable, thematizable, and formalizable. This limit is even the place of decision, of decision in general, of political decision in particular, its tragic condition of possibility, there where decision cannot finally let itself be guided by a knowledge’ [GES IV 211-2 / 413]. Yet this is what Heidegger will not have ‘sufficiently thematised or formalised’ [GES IV 211 / 413]. The community of struggle is not first a community which then struggles, but is community as struggle itself: ‘this force is also the spiritual force of the west, what gives to the German people the exemplary unity of its historical mission in order to make the people of spiritual historicality a people “geschichtlich-geistige”’ [GES IV 203 / 400-1].

This is why the essay is situated at the end of Politics of Friendship. With the thought of différence reconfigured in terms of violence, politics and ‘democracy-to-come’, Derrida is attempting to think aimance prior to or making possible the distinction between friend and enemy. But for Derrida aimance does not have an empirical or factual existence (and thus cannot be deduced with reference to a pre-Socratic thinker) or an affinity with any one language or the other (hence Derrida’s worry about finding such a good idiom in which to express exemplarity — tout autre est tout autre). This suggests another context within which to read Politics of Friendship. Alongside deconstruction as the thinking of a ‘democracy-to-come,’ and as the re-marking of the inevitable political decision which language makes for me (national affirmation, exemplarity) can we not see deconstruction as simply this political rewriting of Heidegger? Derrida’s cultured, French, European discourse in its shameful exhibition of its own violence, its appropriation of the discourse of others, and its idiomatic happening, would then be an attempt to accept this situation, and then to act within it. These ‘readings’ must be read as an exemplary political practice, not as a theoretical program which could be detached from or applied to this or that more or less pressing ‘political’ situation. In the next section I will turn to another of Derrida’s seminars,
on hospitality, to try and show Derrida's own response to this situation, before beginning, in the following chapter to elaborate my own response.

2.4 Deconstruction as Hospitality.

In the third section of this chapter I argue that Derrida's reconfiguration of deconstruction as a political practice, a practice of acknowledging and negotiating with its inexorable political dimension and its inscription into various political discourses emerges in seminars and essays subsequent to the publication of Politics of Friendship in terms of the question of hospitality. I have already shown that in his work on the problem of philosophical nationality, and in his reading of Heidegger, Derrida is concerned to raise the inevitability, and even the necessity, of certain kinds of political decision, while attempting to acknowledge and perhaps alleviate the attendant violence of such a decision. Derrida's theoretical and practical engagement under the name of 'hospitality' — the object of Derrida's seminar in 1995-6 — is deconstruction as a political practice at its most explicit, developing themes which remain implicit, for example, in Derrida's work on witnessing and on the gift; but moreover, I suggest, hospitality reveals deconstruction to have always already been political. The main sources for the material of the seminar on hospitality are the two published sessions and Derrida's later text on Levinas, 'A Word of Welcome.' However, the work is also prefigured in Specters of Marx. Once again, Derrida's discussion is most easily approached through his structural analysis of the concept of hospitality: on this basis we will also be able to see the role his various examples play in his work on hospitality, and in particular, the place of Kant and Marx.
2.4.1 Hyperbole and Hospitality.

This passage from the second published seminar on hospitality ‘Pas de l’hospitalité’ (which can be translated as both ‘step of hospitality’ and ‘no hospitality’ [HOS 75 / 71]) is worth quoting at length, since in it Derrida sets out the main features of his claims about hospitality:

In other words, there would be an antinomy, an insoluble antinomy, a non-dialecticizable antinomy between, on the one hand, The law of unlimited hospitality (to give the new arrival all of one’s home and oneself, to give him or her one’s own, our own, without asking a name, or compensation, or the fulfilment of even the smallest condition), and on the other hand, the laws (in the plural), those rights and duties that are always conditioned and conditional, as they are defined by the Greco-Roman tradition and even the Judeo-Christian one, by all of law and philosophy of law up to Kant and Hegel in particular, across the family, civil society, and the State [HOS 77 / 73].

Derrida draws attention to the fact that the traditional concept of hospitality is a limited one. It is governed both by the value of reciprocity, and by the notions of law and of rights. Drawing on Benveniste’s account of the origin of hospitality Derrida argues that hospitality has generally been determined as mutual obligations between peoples. Hospitality is presumed to be a pact between two states or nations, two families or groups. It is laid down as a law, and as a right available to whoever is subject to that law. On this basis hospitality falls foul of two objections from Derrida which I have already discussed in other contexts. Firstly, if hospitality is the following of a rule, an acting out of obligation to the other, it cannot be the object of a responsible decision, but remains the unfolding of a programme. Secondly, if hospitality is only offered in expectation of a return, even in the minimal terms of knowing that one also has the right to hospitality, it is not freely given, but is conditioned or limited. Offered or owed only between those who are presumed to be equal, hospitality

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shares the structure we have already seen in Derrida’s analysis of the concept of friendship. As a bond between one group and another, or some groups and some others, the laws of hospitality must also enact exclusion. Even if hospitality were to be offered universally to any other human, it would still be a limited hospitality — and perhaps the very definition of a humanism. Can hospitality be offered to the non-human other: whether animal, vegetable or mineral?

In practice however, hospitality is rarely to be offered to every other human as such. Derrida uses the example of an absolute stranger or foreigner as the limit question of hospitality:

we would have to note once again a paradox or a contradiction: this right to hospitality offered to a foreigner ‘as a family,’ [Derrida uses Benveniste’s terms] represented and protected by his or her family name, is at once what makes hospitality possible, or the hospitable relationship to the foreigner possible, but by the same token what limits and prohibits it. Because hospitality, in this situation, is not offered to an anonymous new arrival and someone who has neither name, nor patronym, nor family, nor social status, and who is therefore treated not as a foreigner but as another barbarian. [Hos 23-25 / 27-9]

Derrida takes both the self-characterisation of Socrates in his Apology and Oedipus as figures of the absolute stranger, the stranger to the law of the city, who asks for protection in the name of the law of hospitality. What these examples suggest, and which Benveniste also describes as the original model of hospitality on the basis of its etymology, is a right and a duty offered between Greek nations, or between the Greeks and certain other peoples, but not to all (the barbarian). Derrida takes this to be the general structure of a limited hospitality. Moreover, the barbarian is an outsider first of all in language, he speaks in a language which is not recognised as language, is not without importance. Derrida insists that this is another characteristic limit of hospitality:
the foreigner is first of all foreign to the legal language in which the duty of hospitality is formulated, the right to asylum, its limits, norms, policing, etc. He has to ask for hospitality in a language which by definition is not his own, the one imposed on him by the master of the house, the host, the king, the lord, the authorities, the nation, the State, the father, etc. This personage imposes on him translation into their own language, and that’s the first act of violence [HOS 15 / 21].

Put more concisely, hospitality becomes limited as soon as I ask the stranger to divulge his name, to announce his arrival in my language, and not in his.

Derrida opposes another way of thinking about hospitality to all these limited forms of hospitality which are or have been practised, formulated or theorised. Like both the alterity beyond equality of ‘democracy-to-come,’ and justice thought beyond any determinate law, the status of this unconditional hospitality is hard to define. It is neither a truth nor an essence of hospitality of which all actual forms of hospitality would be flawed copies, pale imitations. It is not an Idea of hospitality towards which we could work, or towards which the world is progressing by some secret teleology. Yet in the same way that Derrida claims that law bears witness to justice, and democracy bears witness to a ‘democracy-to-come,’ but which can never appear as such, limited hospitality is linked to unconditional hospitality. We are caught between ‘two plurals that are different at the same time’: pure dispersion (‘n + n + n, etc.’) — nothing other than the various (conditioned) laws of hospitality — and the transcendental situation where one form of hospitality (an unlimited one, if you like) would govern the entire series: (‘One + n.’) [HOS 81 / 77]. This being between is the mode of the quasi-transcendental: a Law of the law, which must also be a law like any other, and thus become part of the series of all laws, while claiming to govern the series, but in fact generating the opening to infinity of the series [HOS 81 / 77]. Let us follow the argument more closely for a while.

Derrida offers two main figures of this unconditional hospitality. The first follows from what we have already discussed, and consists in the offering of hospitality to the unknown, without even asking for a name:
absolute hospitality requires that I give not only to the foreigner (provided with a family name, with the social status of being a foreigner, etc.), but to the absolute, unknown, anonymous, other, and that I give place to them, that I let them come, that I let them arrive, and take place in the place I offer them, without asking of them either reciprocity (entering into a pact) or even their names [Hos 25/29].

The second figure for absolute hospitality is that of the possible substitution of the host for the guest. If the host, as master of the house, were to offer unconditional hospitality, would that not be to make the guest, in his turn, the master, and for the master to become the guest? This would no longer then be hospitality, which is precisely the offering of hospitality by the master. It is not surprising that Derrida quickly argues that absolute hospitality is also impossibility itself. Both the French idiom, hôte meaning guest and host, and the etymology offered by Benveniste, in which hospitality is the product of the merging of guest and master, suggest this situation.

It also seems clear that Derrida’s object here is substantially similar to that of Politics of Friendship. What he has called limited hospitality has the same structure as friendship as fraternity, and of a democratic model understood in these terms: a limited duty offered or owed only to members of my family, or the state understood in terms of birthright, of native birth, as a homeland, as a natural or naturalised bond, modelled on the home, and subject to the law of the home, which is also the circulation of obligation without an excess, economy as reciprocity. Absolute hospitality is the figure of a hyperbolic duty which not only cuts across or exceeds these forms of obligation and of politics, but is heterogeneous, transgressive and violent. I have argued in the first two sections of this chapter that the form of much of Derrida’s work has been structured as a negotiation of the contradiction between both these duties, and of the impossibility of their reconciliation, so that that very negotiation must be experienced as violent. We might also expect Derrida’s work on hospitality to have this form. This can be seen when we expand the near constant reference to Kant in these texts.
2.4.2 Kant and the Cosmopolitical.

Kant appears to have a particular place in Derrida’s work on hospitality. Three essays of his are referred to regularly, as the very model of a politics which would enact a limited hospitality, and therefore which we must seek to think beyond. While it would be possible to claim, following recent work on the irreducibility of Kantian problematics to political thought, and to international relations in particular, that this privileged reference to Kant follows from an empirical importance of his work, this would be a little misleading. It would also risk rendering Derrida’s analysis at least irrelevant, and at worst incorrect, if it could be proved that there was a way of thinking international relations which successfully broke with Kant. I suggest that the place of Kant is again to be thought of as exemplary: that is as both the best example, and just another example; both paradigmatic and merely typical.

I will pass quickly over the least frequently mentioned essay, ‘On a Supposed Right to Lie From Philanthropy’ to the more regularly cited ‘On Perpetual Peace’ and the presumed ‘Of Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View.’

Derrida’s point in discussing Kant’s justification of the absolute value he assigns to the obligation not to lie reiterates the question of secrecy which I have expounded in my first chapter. Kant argues that ‘to be truthful (honest) in all declarations is [...] a sacred command of reason prescribing unconditionally, one not to be restricted by any conveniences.’ Derrida argues that Kant in this text both founds morality on this principle of transparency, but also threatens the possibility of resistance by insisting that there can be no case of lying to the authorities: he ‘secures social right in public right. But simultaneously [...] he destroys, along with the right to lie any right of [...] resisting the demand for truth,

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confessions or public openness’ [HOS 69 / 65]. For Kant, the unconditional law of truthfulness outweighs the law of hospitality and demands its transgression. The example cited is that of being required to hand over someone to whom you have offered hospitality and your protection. However for Derrida, this Kantian host has acted in an exemplary manner, by offering hospitality to the stranger only in so far as he is still a subject of the law: ‘Hospitality is due to the foreigner, certainly, but remains, like the law, conditional, and thus conditioned in its dependence on the unconditionality which is the basis of the law’ [HOS 73 / 67 ]. Just as the secret represents a principle of resistance to the public sphere, or to the State, a right to non-response, a resistance to the law in the name of the law, so here Derrida implies, against Kant, that the ‘infinite idea’ of hospitality should also be the principle of a possible resistance to the State or the judiciary.

However it is Derrida’s use of the essay ‘On Perpetual Peace’ which is more germane to my argument here. In his reading of this essay Derrida links his account of hospitality to the problem of the cosmopolitanism, which in its complicity with nationalism, with the national affirmation of even the most universalist philosophy, we have seen Derrida questioning. At the heart of ‘On Perpetual Peace’, Kant formulates the principle of relations between states in terms of hospitality, and thus, as Derrida notes in ‘A Word of Welcome’, cosmopolitical terms: ‘The law and cosmopolitics of hospitality that he proposes in response to this terrible alternative [between a utopian irenism and the violence of realpolitik] is a set of rules and contracts, an interstate conditionality that limits, against the backdrop of natural law reinterpreted within a Christian horizon, the very hospitality it guarantees.’ [ADI 101 / 175] Peace, for Kant, retains a trace of war: an armed peace is simply the suspension of war; peace is not natural, but instituted, and so perhaps not really peace at all [ADI 86-7 / 154-5]:

Kant does not say this, but can it not be thought, either with or against him, that an institutional peace is at once pure and impure. As an eternal promise, it must retain, according to a logic that I tried elsewhere to formalize, the trace of a threat, of what threatens it […] [ADI 89 / 158].
Derrida does not condemn Kant for proposing only a limited hospitality. But he argues that what is brought out in Kant’s essay is the limit to hospitality which must operate everywhere:

We know this only too well: never will a Nation-State as such, regardless of its form of government, and even if it is democratic, its majority on the right or the left, open itself up to an unconditional hospitality or to a right of asylum without restriction. It would never be ‘realistic’ to demand this of a Nation-State as such. The Nation-State will always want to ‘control the flow of immigration’ [ADI 90 / 159].

From this point of view, and this repeats the structures of responsibility in question in Derrida’s work on ‘democracy-to-come,’ the Nation-State can never be just. The flow of immigration will always challenge the boundaries of the state, and to the extent that the State seeks to enforce restrictions on immigration (even if some restriction is always necessary) it will be less just. It is not fortuitous, Derrida writes, that it is the thinker of a universal right to cosmopolitan citizenship in ‘On Perpetual Peace’ who so limits the right to hospitality in terms of the law of veracity, of telling the truth, and of the right to the secret: ‘who destroys at its source the very possibility of what he posits and determines in this way’ [HOS 71 / 67] by commanding that the guest be handed over to those seeking to kill him. The figure of the absolute other, of someone without a place, or a state, without the means to return the obligation of hospitality, is the one to whom hospitality or the right of sojourn is not owed. We have several names for these unfortunates: in Britain, ‘asylum seekers’, in France ‘sans papiers.’ But we might also adduce the problems of international relations as limited hospitality more consistently to a widening economic North / South divide, to the question of sanctions enforced against a people under International Law, and of a hospitality owed to a people even if not to its leader. I believe one of the reasons Derrida formulates the problem of hospitality in this way is because it is immediately apparent that this is the problem of frontiers, and of the frontiers of the State, thus the problem of the polis as such.

Concluding the second published seminar on hospitality, with which I began this section, Derrida asks:
In giving a right, if I can put it like that, to unconditional hospitality, how can one give place to a determined, limitable and delimitable — in a word, to a calculable — right or law? How can one give place to a concrete politics and ethics, including a history, evolutions, actual revolutions, advances — in short, a perfectibility? A politics, an ethics, a law that thus answer to the new injunctions of unprecedented historical situations, that do indeed correspond to them, by changing the laws, by determining citizenship, democracy, international law etc., in another way? So by really intervening in the condition of hospitality in the name of the unconditional, even if this pure unconditional appears inaccessible, and inaccessible not only as a regulatory idea, an Idea in the Kantian sense and infinitely removed, always inadequately approached, but inaccessible for the structural reasons, ‘barred’ by the internal contradictions we have analyzed? [Hos 147-149 / 131].

It is the question of ‘really intervening in the condition of hospitality in the name of the unconditional’ that is surely at stake here. My suggestion is that we must read deconstruction as precisely this intervention. Furthermore, from this point of view, we are able to bring this chapter towards its conclusion by arguing that there deconstruction as political practice, which, beyond the reinscription of the necessity of ethico-political decisions, takes place as a set of ethico-political decisions, can be understood as both the theoretical and practical attempt to negotiate with these laws in the name of another law. On this basis, and on this basis only, is there a possibility of better laws, of more equality, of more democracy, even when these terms will never be just enough, equal enough, democratic enough. I will examine this first in relation to Derrida’s (practical, performative) call for a (theoretical, constative) New International in Specters of Marx, and then in relation to a (more practical, more performative) intervention in the question of refugees in a short text published as part of Marx en jeu. On this basis, it should become clear that the question of politics is for Derrida not only the negotiation of responsibility, without any guarantees or certainty, but also the challenge made to the limits of the state, in the name of what lies beyond the state, and perhaps even beyond of the field of politics and law as narrowly defined.
2.4.3 Figures of Hospitality in *Specters of Marx*.

I am going to focus on one relatively short passage of Derrida’s *Specters of Marx*, a difficult text which has caused some controversy, particularly over the adequacy of Derrida’s treatment of Marx. I do not have space to deal with this topic here. Instead I wish to focus on the book’s subtitles, ‘The New International, and the State of the Debt’, read beyond the reference to Marx, and as just such an attempt to intervene in the conditional in the name of the unconditional suggested in *Of Hospitality*.

Derrida’s most obvious ‘complaint’ in *Specters of Marx* comes when he offers a list of ten plagues. It is not immediately obvious how we should read this list. Is it a list of the only ten? The most pressing ten? In which case, on what criteria is it based? In selecting his list, Derrida acts, intervenes, chooses, prioritises — all these are political acts. But he must do so on the basis of an impossible and irresponsible decision. So much so, that in *Politics of Friendship* he gives no examples (and draws attention to this fact) since to choose some not others could not be justified. In *Aporias* however, Derrida offers us another way to read the ten plagues of *Specters of Marx*, which would account for its apparently arbitrary formulation. Writing specifically of *The Other Heading* — but we can easily apply this to *Specters of Marx* — Derrida comments of his examples:

they concerned the question of Europe, of European borders and of the border of the political, of politiea and of the State as European concepts. Nine or eleven times, they involved the same aporetic duty; they involved ten — plus or minus one — commandments considered as examples in an infinite series in which the ten could only count a series of examples.38

The series of examples of what calls for responsible action must be infinite. Not only because of the logic of exemplarity as the infinite field of différance itself, but because the for there to be any responsibility it must be by definition an infinite task.

Now of the examples given in *Specters of Marx* — unemployment, refugees and the homeless, economic war, the free market, the foreign debt, arms industry, nuclear proliferation, inter-ethnic wars, mafia and drug cartels — it is the tenth which stands out as the signal of a ‘plus or minus one,’ as the extension of the list to infinity. What appears to be just one of Derrida’s examples might also be the example which governs all the others:

For above all, above all, one would have to analyze the present state of international law and of its institutions. Despite a fortunate perfectibility, despite an undeniable progress, these international institutions suffer from at least two limits. The first and most radical of the two stems from the fact that their norms, their charter, the definition of their mission depend on a certain historical culture. They cannot be dissociated from certain European philosophical concepts, and notably from a concept of State or national sovereignty whose genealogical closure is more and more evident, not only in a theoretico-juridico or speculative fashion, but concretely, practically, and practically quotidian. Another limit is strictly linked to the first: This supposedly universal international law remains, in its application, largely dominated by particular nation-States. Almost always their techno-economic and military power prepares and applies, in other words, carries the decision. As one says in English, it makes the decision [SoM 83-4 / 138].

The value attributed to international law is not that of a good in itself, but of a necessary evil. Just as Derrida described the limits inscribed within the very concept of democracy, so here he does the same with international law. The New International, as a rethinking of international law is figured by the problem of the limited hospitality of the ‘particular nation-States’ who dominate it. For the law to develop, these states would have to cede their control rather than dictating the decision. Only in this event would the law have a chance of being more just. Marx himself comes to stand in for the stranger within the text: ‘Marx remains an immigrant chez nous, a glorious, sacred, accursed but still a clandestine immigrant as he was all his life’ [SoM 174 / 276]. We are to receive Marx’s work, as we would an immigrant. He has not yet been received, could not ever be completely received, but his work should be neither domesticated or appropriated; nor simply turned back at the border. (The same might be said of Heidegger, or of Derrida.) The impossibility of determining whether any problem, any thinker, any event is one event among others, or the event of events, problem of problem, text of texts, is paid tribute to in Derrida’s thinking of exemplarity. Derrida’s
restless attempts to formulate these problems, from friendship to hospitality for example, from justice, to unconditional hospitality, to democracy-to-come show this, as does his reticence in adding pathos to his text from using individual examples.

To read Specters of Marx as this kind of text rather than a philosophical or theoretical text can be confirmed from an interview given four years later, on the occasion of a play dealing with Marx and influenced by Derrida. The book is not a ‘return to Marx’ Derrida suggests; but an attempt to remain critical of all the dogmatisms of the Marxist tradition, ‘and to a certain philosophy, to a solely philosophical reading of Marx. One must also say that, since the effondrement of certain so-called communist States, Marxist studies have tended most often (not always but often) to a certain académisme.’

Deconstruction as a reading practice, and this is by definition a political practice, is also this work of hospitality, of hearing the text on which deconstruction is working. Not only is the key political issue of Specters of Marx that of hospitality, of reinventing the law in the name of the law, but its textual and performative mode is that of giving hospitality: but also therefore at risk of being an appropriation rather than a letting-come.

2.4.4 Deconstruction as Hospitality.

It seems appropriate to introduce one final example to the discussion at this point. I have argued that deconstruction in this phase of Derrida’s work, and perhaps, throughout, might be considered as hospitality. The figures of hospitality in Specters of Marx suggest this several years before the seminar on hospitality and ‘A Word of Welcome.’ If hospitality is to be considered one of the political translations of ‘deconstruction’ or perhaps of ‘différance’ –

\[Marx\ en\ Jeu\ 54\]
as I have suggested in the first chapter we might consider Derrida's analysis of democracy and democracy-to-come — I think it right to draw attention to some of Derrida's 'practical' political engagements of the same period. For example, in 'Pas de l'hospitalité,' Derrida refers to the 'so-called Pasqua Laws and the “standardization” that now subjects Algerians to the same conditions as other foreigners for their coming to France.' This reversed the previous Evian agreements which had permitted Algerian citizens to enter France without a visa. Derrida comments: "'The time of the Evian agreements has passed," a collaborator of M. Pasqua replied to us when we were protesting against the said standardization' [HOS 147 / 129]. 'Standardization' speaks the very language of 'equalisation' and of hospitality against which Derrida has set his complaint, while his use of 'collaborator' raises once again the spectre of the Vichy French removal of citizenship from Jewish French Algerians, 'without the slightest intervention or demand on the part of the Germans' [HOS 143 / 127]. However we might have referred also to Derrida's comments on the dispute of the wearing of the veil by Muslim children in French schools in a text for Helene Cixous, that other exemplary Franco-Maghrebian [MON 93n.9 / 114-5n.]40, or his earlier statement in 'Kant, the Jew, and the German' of solidarity for Palestine [KJG 39-40]. Reversing the statement which I quoted at the beginning of my first chapter, these political engagements must be considered as having a philosophical dimension.

One text in particular brings these themes, of hospitality, and of Derrida's own political engagements, together. It is the transcription of an improvised contribution to a meeting organised around the question of the 'sans-papiers.' This names at the same time both a specific context: the 'sans-papiers' was the name given to the 300 people evicted from the Church of St Bernard in Paris, an event to which Derrida refers twice in 'A Word of Welcome' [cf. ADI 20 / 46, 101 / 176]. (It is perhaps not insignificant that the hospitality

It is a polemical and angry piece of writing. Derrida objects that the ‘sans-papiers’ are being denied their human rights, under EU law and the Geneva Convention, that the legislation fails to distinguish between those without papers who have been living and working in France for up to fifteen years and illegal immigrants, and condemns the failure of leftist politicians to oppose the law. He also sets the legislation in a French context, referring back to earlier legislation in 1938, and 1945, and the apparent contradiction between this and France’s self-image as the home of the rights of man and of the right to asylum. (Although, as we have seen, these are not incompatible, as the logic of exemplarism prescribes a direct correlation between patriotic pride and an allergic particularism.) However, more widely, Derrida sees this as symptomatic of upheavals everywhere, of what in another context he refuses to call ‘globalisation’ but insists on ‘mondialatinisation’ to bring out the sense in which this is a Westernisation of the world.

Derrida’s argument operates on several levels. Firstly it is a contestation at the level of language, beyond a simple rhetorical confrontation. Two phrases, ‘délit de l’hospitalité’ and ‘sans-papiers’ itself bear the brunt of this attack. The first, a crime of hospitality, he calls shocking – it contradicts the imperative within hospitality as law, rather than as crime: ‘What becomes of a country, I ask myself, or a culture, or a language, when one can speak of a crime of hospitality, when hospitality can become, in the eyes of the law and its representatives, a crime?’41 (This is understandably not the place for Derrida to bring out the sense in which any form of hospitality is also a crime of hospitality, a transgression of the law of absolute hospitality.) The second puzzles him — what are the sans-papiers lacking? — and he answers that it is their relation to the law (droit), they are without right (droit). Yet this is clearly only the case from within one determinate law. We might also add that as we have seen in the seminar on hospitality, language is clearly not simply one problem among

41 *Marx en Jeu* p74
others at this point, given the difficulty of asking for hospitality in the name of the other. As soon as someone is a ‘sans-papiers’ there is a problem within the terms of that definition: what do they lack? Contestation on this level — even that of vocabulary — is necessary and possible. We must fight against it, Derrida argues, ‘by analysis, protest, struggle’\(^{42}\)

Beyond the question of language, Derrida states, this intervention functions as an affirmation. He is speaking ‘for the sans-papiers’: this is a delicate situation. He speaks up for them, and on behalf of them, but without wishing to speak for them. He is speaking for their right to speak, their right to be recognised by the law, to be speaking citizen-subjects: or at least foreigners subject to the law of hospitality rather than those outside it altogether. Then we should also listen to them. In this we can see Derrida accepting his own role as a public intellectual again. In a position to be heard, he seeks to speak. As an intervention, in the name of the unconditional. Thirdly, and again unusually for Derrida, he is also making a call for further action, even to the point of civil disobedience. ‘We should without doubt help our friends sans-papiers in an individual fashion, locally, day after day, with all the material or symbolic, financial, juridical or legal aid, wherever there is need. Many are doing so, in theatres, churches, commisariats, or tribunals; we must thank them, but they are not numerous enough.’ But then he also calls for ‘civil disobedience,’ the defiance of the law in the name of a higher law: ‘In the name of a more elevated law [the citizen] will not obey such and such a legislative proposition which he judges iniquitous and culpable, preferring thus delinquency to shame, and the prétendu crime to injustice.’\(^{43}\)

Finally, however, this must be a fight to change the law. Beyond the public declarations and demonstrations. Even while there is a higher law (absolute hospitality, democracy-to-come, justice) which will always be transgressed by an actual law, the law

\(^{42}\) Marx en Jeu. 83  
\(^{43}\) Marx en Jeu. 90
itself must be remade, transgressed. As in *Specters of Marx*, what is called for is a remaking of the law, in the name of the law:

all the most urgent questions of our time, everywhere that — in Israel, in Rwanda, in Europe, in America, in Asia, and in all the churches of St Bernard in the world — millions of ‘undocumented immigrants’ (*sans papiers*), of ‘homeless’ (*sans domiciles fixes*), call out for another international law, another border politics, another humanitarian politics, indeed a humanitarian commitment that *effectively* operates beyond the interests of Nation-States [Adi 101 / 176].

Deconstruction as hospitality would be not only the affirmation of the (higher) law, but the contestation of the (actual) law, struggle against the (actual) law: and, as I show in the next chapter, simply the invention of the law as such: the happening of *any* law.

2.5 Conclusion.

DECONSTRUCTION, I HAVE argued in this chapter, may be read as political practice: as both the intervention in the law in the name of the law, but also as an attempt to perform, exhibit and thereby problematize the political decision which precedes the responses of the subject, even a deconstructive subject seeking to respond to voice of the other. In one sense, then, these texts are all radically contingent for the reader. These are Derrida’s own responses, his own coming-to-terms with the responsibility which precedes and exceeds him. Their value for us can only be that of an example; if they were prescriptions our responses would be irresponsible, would conform to a rule. However they are also exemplary in pointing up the decision, the invention of the law, and the chance and the possibility of something else which
constitute experience for Derrida: at the borders of the *polis* the state is already expropriated, already exposed to its outside, already in question, de-naturalised. Politics is already in deconstruction, already caught between the unfolding of a rule and the impossibility of a decision. In other words, we are carried towards the rethinking of the very possibility of politics itself, to which I will turn in the next chapter.
3.
Deconstruction
and Depoliticization.

3.1 Introduction

In the last chapter I outlined what I take to be Derrida’s development of deconstruction as a political practice in the years following his seminar on nationalism and philosophy. In Specters of Marx Derrida suggests that this project may be understood in terms of a paradoxical fidelity to ‘a certain spirit’ of Marx. On the one hand deconstruction operates as a critique of the ‘gap between an empirical reality and a regulating ideal’ in order to attempt to make ‘reality’ correspond to the ‘ideal’ as closely as possible [SoM 86 / 143]. On the other hand, deconstruction involves putting the concept of that regulative ideal into question [SoM 87 / 143]: it is a ‘radical critique, namely a procedure ready to undertake its self-critique’ [SoM 88 / 145]. For example, Derrida is not only able to criticize the treatment of the sans-papiers in the name of the laws of hospitality; but he can also demonstrate the limits of the laws of hospitality themselves in the name of a hyperbolic or absolute hospitality in which we can recognise the contours of ‘democracy-to-come’ and ‘undeconstructible justice’ as they were outlined in my first chapter. As a political practice in its own right,
deconstruction requires the performative problematization of its own political interventions in an attempt to negotiate as responsibly as possible with the impossibility of absolute responsibility. However, I have also suggested that this political practice constitutes, or at least implies, an attendant political theory. In order to evaluate Derrida’s claim in Specters of Marx that ‘there will be no repoliticization, there will be no politics’ [SOM 87 / 144] without the combination of strategies he has suggested, in this chapter I turn my attention to this implied political theory.

In order to give the discussion a focus I will consider Derrida’s work as a contribution to the current debate within political theory as to the very specificity, nature and limits of politics. Several strands within contemporary political thought may be said to constitute such an investigation. Their shared concern is with the possibility of acting politically at all; to repoliticize in the face of a perceived depoliticization. This depoliticization is not simply evident at the level of socio-historical observation, but within political theory itself. In her Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics, Bonnie Honig argues that a distinction can be drawn between theories of politics which aim at reducing ‘dissensus, resistance, conflict, struggle’ and those theories which affirm this political realm. On one side Kant; on the other Nietzsche: ‘Kant soothes and seals the ruptures Nietzsche celebrates and aggravates.’ Jacques Rancière has argued in a similar vein that there is a fundamental conflict between philosophy and politics. Philosophy can only ever function as a rational policing of the inequality which founds politics; “what is called “political philosophy” might well be the set of reflective operations whereby philosophy tries to rid itself of politics, to suppress a scandal in thinking proper to the

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exercise of politics. This theoretical scandal is none other than the rationality of disagreement.\textsuperscript{3} At stake is not only the possibility of acting politically, but of thinking politics at all, let alone thinking politics politically.

Derrida nowhere proposes an explicit definition of the political. However, as we have seen, beyond the question of democracy \textit{Politics of Friendship} may be read as a meditation on the concept of politics itself. Similarly, the development of deconstruction as political practice can be considered as a process of coming to terms with ‘the implicit politics’ of language [POF 305 / 339]. Rather than attempting to violently abstract or deduce a theory of politics from those aspects of Derrida’s work I have already dealt with, I propose that the problem may be usefully approached by collating a number of scattered references to ‘depoliticization’ and ‘repoliticization.’ For example in ‘Marx and Sons,’ a response to criticisms of \textit{Specters of Marx}, Derrida draws attention to a distortion of his words by Gayatri Spivak, who glosses the passage I have referred to above (‘there will be no repoliticization otherwise’ [SOM 87 / 144]) as ‘we won’t politicize.’ Derrida’s own account is that he ‘was insisting on the fact that, in the absence of the conditions I define in this context, we will not succeed in repoliticizing, something I obviously desire and which it plainly seems to me desirable to do.’ Derrida has rarely been this explicit about his political aim; but the question is immediately made more complex: ‘But, of course, a repoliticization always involves a relative depoliticization, an awareness that an old concept of the political has, in itself, been depoliticized or is depoliticizing.’\textsuperscript{4} This complex relationship between repoliticization and depoliticization is the object of this chapter.


I begin by giving an account of the influential contribution made to the debate on the nature of politics by Carl Schmitt, before considering Derrida’s response to it in *Politics of Friendship.* What Derrida calls a ‘spectrality’ of the political not only renders Schmitt’s attempt at a pure definition of politics impossible but opens up an alternative account cast in terms of depoliticization and repoliticization. In the second section I suggest both how this account of the political might be developed by following closely Derrida’s work on the decision and the undecidable and how it avoids the danger of Schmitt’s work. By means of an analogy with the concept of the *retrait* I then distinguish deconstruction as a theory of depoliticization from the account of the political in the work of Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, who have made the first major attempt to relate deconstruction to politics. Their work however retains a Heideggerian inflection which Derrida is concerned to avoid.

### 3.2 Derrida and Schmitt

THE PLACE OF Carl Schmitt in the schematic genealogy set out in *Politics of Friendship* is ambiguous. On the one hand, Schmitt can clearly be situated as just another example within the larger framework of political thought from Aristotle to Nancy; but on the other hand, since Schmitt makes the friend-enemy distinction the foundation of the concept of politics

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itself, his work must inevitably receive some kind of privilege in a book concerned with precisely the same question — even if Derrida’s aim is to problematize rather than to confirm it. Derrida emphasises Schmitt’s relationship to the Nietzschean reversal in the tradition, given the centrality of the figure of the enemy in his writing. One reading of Nietzsche, Derrida writes, ‘would lead back to a tradition of modernity which, in a naturally differentiated and complicated fashion, goes back at least to Hegel,’ a tradition which ‘takes on systematic form in the work of Carl Schmitt’ [PoF 83 / 101]. He also remarks on the Hegelian features of Schmitt’s theory; the general importance of negation, antagonism and opposition [PoF 139-40 / 160-2; 162 / 187; 164 / 190] and his Hegelian doctrine of the State [PoF 120 / 140]. Yet the importance of the concepts of friend and enemy to Schmitt, and for the definition of the political with which Derrida is concerned in the book — even if not throughout the work, or in his other texts — suggests that the two and a half chapters devoted to The Concept of the Political is an exemplary point from which to tackle Derrida’s own understanding of politics.

3.2.1 Politics in the Age of Depoliticization

The central statement of Carl Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political, is that ‘the specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy.’ Schmitt immediately explains that this is a ‘definition in the sense of a criterion and not [...] an exhaustive definition or one indicative of substantial content’ [CP 26]. His intention is to define the essence of politics and ground political thought in a fundamental distinction analogous to those made in aesthetics, between the beautiful and the ugly, and in moral philosophy, between good and evil. This distinction between friend and enemy, Schmitt argues, is autonomous: it exists independently of any other criteria. Utility,
beauty or goodness do not necessarily define the friend in the political sense, just as the harmful, ugly or evil are not necessarily the enemy [CP 27]. This distinction is more profound than the association of politics with the state: the state is political, but the state is not a sufficient definition of the political [CP 19-20]. ‘Friend’ and ‘enemy’ in their political sense must also be understood without reference to psychological factors; these terms are not the expression of any feeling of enmity or affection: ‘an enemy exists only when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity. The enemy is solely the public enemy, because everything that has a relationship to such a collectivity of men, particularly to a whole nation, becomes public by means of such a relationship’ [CP 28]. The identity of the enemy is established and authorised by the state; conversely, for the state to be a political entity, it must establish enemies. Even if the political entity is not actually engaged in a violent struggle or combat with its enemy, the relationship is predicated on the possibility of killing, of war, and of the state’s mobilisation of the lives of its subjects [CP 33]. The possibility of war with the enemy is the final determinant of the politicality of the state: ‘in the orientation toward the possible extreme case of an actual battle against a real enemy, the political entity is essential, and it is the decisive entity for the friend-or-enemy grouping; and in this (and not in any kind of absolutist sense) it is sovereign. Otherwise the political entity is nonexistent’ [CP 39. cf. 45-6].

It should be clear from this that Schmitt’s definition of the political can provide criteria against which a state or a political situation might be judged to determine something like a degree of politicality; the extent to which it is properly political. However, in doing so Schmitt has also introduced the possibility of the relative or total disappearance of politics. Accordingly, much of The Concept of the Political reads like a complaint against the various possible threats to politics discussed by Schmitt. So for example, a world without war, ‘a completely pacified globe, would be a world without the distinction of friend and enemy and hence a world without politics’ [CP 35. cf. 53-7]. However the threat of depoliticization also takes less extreme and more diverse forms in The Concept of the Political. Too great an
emphasis on party politics rather than on 'the political attitude of the state' leads to 'banal,' 'parasite- and caricature-like' forms of politics. These forms only retain a reference to the ultimate criterion of the political through both 'some sort of antagonistic moment' and 'everyday language, even when the awareness of the extreme case has been entirely lost' [CP 30]. The equation of politics with party politics which is possible 'whenever antagonisms among domestic political parties succeed in weakening the all-embracing political unity, the state' would be a further symptom of depoliticization [CP 31]. The surrender of sovereignty — the right of the state to determine its own enemies for itself [CP 38-9] — to an international body would also be depoliticizing [CP 50]. Moreover, in political theory, not only the pluralism of Cole and Laski [CP 40-45] and liberalism [CP 61, 69-72] but any philosophy based on an 'anthropological optimism' [CP 64] will threaten the possibility of politics itself by ignoring the decisive category of the political distinction between friend and enemy.

Schmitt claims that his analysis is a neutral and objective deduction of the distinction required to define the political — that it 'favours neither war nor militarism, neither imperialism or pacifism' [CP 33] and could be described as neither optimistic or pessimistic [CP 63]. 'It is irrelevant here,' Schmitt writes, 'whether one rejects, accepts or perhaps finds it an atavistic remnant of barbaric times that nations continue to group themselves according to friend and enemy.' His concern 'is neither with abstractions nor with normative ideals, but with inherent reality and the real possibility of such a distinction' [CP 28]. However this claim is undermined by his own admission that 'all political concepts, images and terms have a polemical meaning. They are focused on a specific conflict and are bound to a concrete situation; the result (which manifests itself in war or revolution) is a friend-enemy grouping, and they turn into empty and ghostlike abstractions when this situation disappears' [CP 30]. Schmitt has in mind 'words such as state, republic, society, class, as well as sovereignty, constitutional state, absolutism, dictatorship, economic planning, neutral or total state' but 'above all [...] the use of the word political' [CP 30-2]. He specifies that this must be the
case even when the use of the term is portrayed as 'nonpolitical (in the sense of purely scientific, purely moral, purely juristic, purely aesthetic, purely economic, or on the basis of similar purities)' [CP 32]. So there can be no purely analytic or neutral definition of the political, since the use of the word will always be inscribed in a polemical context.

Schmitt’s understanding of the context of his own polemical definition of the political is usefully summarized in a conference paper entitled ‘The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations.’ Although written in 1929, two years after the first publication of The Concept of the Political, the paper was included in the third edition of that book (1932) so we can presume that Schmitt considered them to be thematically linked. Schmitt’s broad purpose in it is to undertake a general diagnosis of the state of depoliticization of Europe following the 1914-18 war. He undertakes three specific tasks. The first is to provide a general account of the historical circumstances which have led to what Schmitt perceives to be the depoliticization of Europe. Schmitt describes this in terms of successive cultural shifts. The second is to give a specific characterisation of the current era, the technological age, as the climax of this process. The third task, which follows logically from the previous two but precedes them in the rhetorical arrangement of the argument is to open the path for a repoliticization by identifying a new enemy for Europe. In doing so Schmitt conforms to the thesis of the earlier essay that the essence of politics depends on the distinction between the friend and the enemy. In this case Schmitt argues that the new enemy for Europe is Russia, which epitomises the ‘anti-religion of technicity’ [ND 131] and by effecting ‘a union of Socialism and Slavism’ has seized ‘our knowledge and technology as weapons’ [ND 130].

Like his 1922 text Political Theology, in which he argued that ‘all significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts,’ Schmitt’s genealogy of the depoliticization of Europe in ‘The Age of Neutralizations and

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Depoliticizations’ rests on a secularisation thesis. What Schmitt here calls ‘depoliticization’ is not merely a conceptual possibility but an historical event, a consequence of certain identifiable developments in European culture and history subsequent to the demise of theology as a foundational discourse. Schmitt makes clear however that what he describes is not to be taken as either a necessary nor a universal process: it is not a theory of ‘cultural dominance’ or a ‘universal historico-philosophical law’; not to be understood as either a continuous line, or in terms of progress or decline; nor to rule out the possibility of different stages co-existing within the same country, or even the same family [ND 132]. These precautions notwithstanding, Schmitt’s account is somewhat reductive. He interprets the last four hundred years of European history on the basis of a reaction to the theological and political turmoil of the sixteenth century. Cultural developments, he argues, are driven by the search for a neutral sphere on which to ground cultural practice in which agreement can be reached through debate rather than conflict. However ‘in each new sphere, at first considered neutral, the antitheses of men and interests unfold with a new intensity and become increasingly sharper’ [ND 138] ensuring that the process is continuous. Theology is succeeded by a metaphysics based on natural science in the seventeenth century, to be followed in turn by a humanitarian morality in the eighteenth, economics in the nineteenth, and technology in the twentieth century. In the terms established by The Concept of the Political, a succession of depoliticizing tendencies have dominated European politics and thought, seeking to subsume the properly political in the name of a rational resolution of conflict in a higher set of values. This depoliticization is most intensive in the development of nineteenth century liberalism as an accompaniment to the dominance of the economic models, since in the liberal doctrine of the neutral state ‘the process of neutralization finds its classical formula because it has also grasped what is most decisive: political power’[ND 138. cf. CP 69-73].
However, in the triumph of technology, the process of neutralization enters a new phase. This is a result of what Schmitt considers to be the instrumental nature of technology: it is ‘refreshingly factual’ and ‘serves everyone’; since progress is now understood not in religious, moral, or even economic terms, but in technological terms, technology becomes an ‘absolute and ultimate neutral ground’ [ND 138]. Technology appears to offer no criterion for evaluation of the ends to which it is put: ‘Technology itself remains culturally blind. Consequently, no conclusions which usually can be drawn from the central spheres can be derived from technology as such and nothing but technology — neither a concept of cultural progress, nor a type of cleric or intellectual leader, nor a specific political system’ [ND 139]. The paradoxical result is that the age of greatest neutralization also holds the greatest potential for a repoliticization. The very neutrality of technology, which makes it available to ‘every strong politics’ might also be the end to neutralization: ‘The present century can only be provisionally understood as the century of technology. How ultimately it should be understood will be revealed only when it is known which type of politics is strong enough to master the new technology and which type of genuine friend-enemy groupings can develop on this new ground’ [ND 141]. It is in this context that Schmitt proposes his own analysis of politics as a contribution to the repoliticization of both political thought and politics as such.

To summarize: on the basis of a historical depoliticization Schmitt proposes a repoliticization of political thought. Only by grasping the properly political distinction between friend and enemy as the basis of politics can political theory adequately think a practical repoliticization. This political distinction between friend and enemy is in turn defined by the possibility of war, ‘armed combat between organized political entities’ [CP 32], and in particular on ‘the real possibility of physical killing’ [CP 33]. The state’s political authority resides in ‘the real possibility of deciding in a concrete situation upon the enemy and the ability to fight him with the power emanating from the entity’ [CP 45] and the concomitant power of life or death over its own citizens [CP 46-8]. Even if it does not actually declare war, a state remains political to the extent that the possibility of such a
decision on the enemy is left open: ‘when it no longer possesses the capacity or the will to make this distinction, it ceases to exist politically’ [CP 49]. It is the curious nature of this decision, whose presence, even if only virtual — as a possibility rather than a fact — is the necessary condition of politics as such, on which Derrida’s response to Schmitt in Politics of Friendship centres.

3.2.2 The Spectrality of the Political

The importance here of Derrida’s reading of Schmitt in the central chapters of Politics of Friendship is that in The Concept of the Political and its subsequent supplement, Theory of the Partisan, Derrida finds a ‘spectrality’ of the political. Schmitt’s attempt to define a pure concept of the political, which Derrida suggests is almost phenomenological in rigour and intent [POF 87 / 106], is destined to failure: the ‘concretion of the concrete, this ultimate determination to which Schmitt ceaselessly appeals, is always exceeded, overtaken — let us say haunted — by the abstraction of its spectre’ [POF 117 / 137]. Not only does this ‘spectre’ ruin Schmitt’s repoliticization of the concept of politics, but Derrida concludes that it is ‘lodged within the political itself; the antithesis of the political dwells within, and politicizes, the political’ [POF 138 / 160]. The spectre comes before the political, and is not only the ruin of politics, but also its possibility — it ‘politicizes’ the political. Schmitt’s attempt at a pure definition of the political ‘capitalize[s] “en abyme”’ [POF 115 / 135] all the difficulties of any similar project; but in doing so they open up another reading of politics, a deconstructive reading, or what we might call, following Specters of Marx, a political hauntology. This phantasmatic political theory might be read as the quasi-foundation of the politics of deconstruction. Foundational, since this is the text in which the concept of the political itself comes under the most intense scrutiny; but only quasi-foundational since what is uncovered
is an effect which ‘ruins in advance and from within’ [POF 144 / 166] such oppositions as that between politics and the political; between political theory and political practice; between foundation and superstructure. Derrida’s reading of Schmitt cannot provide a firm basis from which to deduce the politics of deconstruction, but may be read as a particularly condensed example of the political dimensions of his work in general. Derrida’s discussion resists easy summary, since it is discursive rather than systematic, often repetitive and punctuated with a number of lengthy digressions. At the risk of over-formalising Derrida’s approach, I have summarised his argument around three moments where the ‘spectrality’ of the political interrupts Schmitt’s attempt to define politics.

1) One of the key distinctions on which Schmitt’s account depends is that between the public enemy and the private enemy. The political enemy is not ‘merely any competitor or just any partner of a conflict in general. He is also not the private adversary whom one hates’ [CP 28]. The importance of this clarification is that it removes the definition of the political from the psychological or merely personal realm. Here, as elsewhere, Schmitt would like to appeal to ‘daily speech’ [CP 30] for the sense of his definitions, but ‘German and other languages do not distinguish between the private and the political enemy’ [CP 29]. So instead Schmitt appeals to classical sources, referring to the difference between hostis and inimicus in Latin, and between polémios and ekthrós in Greek, and in particular to Plato’s contrast in the Republic ‘between the public enemy (polémios) and the private one (ekthrós)’ in the context of the ‘antithesis of war (pólemos) and insurrection, upheaval, rebellion, civil war (stásis)’ [CP 28-9n.9]. Derrida does not disagree that such a distinction is made in Republic, but suggests that Schmitt does not specify ‘what type of relationship or connection this is’ [POF 89-90 / 110]. He notes that Schmitt’s gloss on Plato — ‘the dominant idea here is that a people cannot wage war on itself and that a ‘civil war’ is never but a rending of self but

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would perhaps not signify the formation of a new State, or even of a new people' [CP 29n.9] — seems ‘hardly Platonic’ [POF 90 / 112]. Derrida argues that the difference between polemos and stásis is not directly equivalent to the distinction between domestic politics or civil war and inter-state war, but signifies two different orders of conflict. Both depend on a natural order: Greeks are naturally the enemies of Barbarians, and naturally the friends of other Greeks. Civil war would then be a sickness or disease of friendship, which could not be explained in terms of enmity [POF 92 / 113]; which would then suggest that the distinction has little bearing on Schmitt’s attempt to ground politics in the polarity of friend / enemy.

Derrida argues that the ‘prevailing determination of civil war’ [POF 121 / 142] in Schmitt’s theory is the consequence of Schmitt’s need to map the structure of inter-state relations inside the State. The possibility of civil war, of a war within the State confirms the inter-State war as the paradigmatic case of the political. It is the potential ‘armed combat’ to which it could give rise which makes the internal politics of a State political at all [CP 32]. This would also account for Schmitt’s insistence on the definition of an enemy of the State in Greek and Roman law [CP 46-7]. Schmitt’s haste in reading Plato seems to be occasioned by a disinclination to complicate this structure, and Derrida is able to draw on Plato to suggest that this structure cannot be so simple. Furthermore, Derrida reminds us that in Republic Plato is concerned with an ideal State, and that ‘as long as this unity [of justice and power] remains out of reach — that is for ever — the conceptual unities that depend on it […] remain ideal entities’ [POF 91 / 112]. For Plato, ‘the purity of the distinction between stásis and polemos remains in the Republic a “paradigm,” accessible only to discourse’ [POF 114 / 133]. In practice, they cannot be distinguished. Derrida refers to the following passage: ‘is it possible for anything actual to match a theory? Isn’t any actual thing bound to have less contact with a truth than a theory, however much people deny it?’ So for Schmitt, drawing on Plato is a highly ambiguous move, since rather than grounding his concept of the political

8 Republic. 192.
in the concrete, in everyday language, it removes politics itself to the realm of ideal entities, while in the world itself there will never be a clear distinction between a public enemy and a private enemy, between inter-state war and civil war, and perhaps even between friend and enemy.

This points to a further problem. As I discussed in my first chapter, for Derrida there can be no question of simply opposing the public and private. Yet for Schmitt, the possibility of making this distinction founds his definition of the political. If the public enemy and the private enemy cannot be rigorously discriminated, the purity of the political must be interminably suspended. Derrida suggests that Schmitt’s attempt to refound politics by policing the boundary between public and private is symptomatic of the impossibility of establishing such limits: ‘at every point when this border is threatened, fragile, porous, contestable (we thus designate so many possibilities that “our time” is accentuating and accelerating in countless ways) the Schmittian discourse collapses. It is against the threat of this ruin that his discourse takes form’ [PoF 88 / 107]. Elsewhere Derrida asks: ‘Why does Schmitt take no account of the fact that the police and spy network — precisely the police qua spy network [...] — points to what, precisely in the service of the State, ruins in advance and from within the possibility of the political, the distinction between public and private?’ [PoF 144 / 166]. Derrida’s intention is not to dismiss Schmitt’s theory out of hand, despite this apparent incoherence at its centre. His interest in Schmitt is as much in the ‘heritage’ of his work [PoF 84 / 102] as in the work itself. The spectrality which ruins Schmitt’s attempt to secure the definition of the political is one which will haunt any attempt to define the political. If it is felt more strongly in The Concept of the Political than in other similar theories, it is perhaps testimony to the rigour of that text.

2) It is perhaps owing to this rigour that Schmitt accepts at least one sense in which the concept of the political cannot be ‘pure.’ I have already referred to Schmitt’s insistence that ‘the use of the word political’ will always be polemical [CP 30]. On the one hand this would
seem to place Schmitt beside Plato: accepting the inaccessibility of the ideal entities he is describing. There could never be a ‘purely political’ state — or a purely political State, indeed — because the political as a concept is only an ideal. On the other hand, however, Schmitt appears to rehabilitate the purity of the concept from another direction: in the concrete and polemical distribution of the use of the concept. Schmitt, Derrida claims, ‘would like to be able to count on the pure impurity, on the impure purity of the political as such, of the properly political’ [POF 116 / 136]. This purity cannot be found in theoretical terms, precisely because of the nature of politics:

The concept of the political undoubtedly corresponds, as concept, to what the ideal discourse can want to state most rigorously on the ideality of the political. But no politics has ever been adequate to its concept. No political event can be correctly described or defined with recourse to these concepts. And this inadequation is not accidental, since politics is essentially a praxis, as Schmitt himself always implies in his ever-so-insistent reliance on the concept of real, present possibility or eventuality in his analyses of the formal structures of the political [POF 114 / 134].

But if the purity of politics cannot be given in conceptual terms, Schmitt turns to an equivalent idealisation of political praxis to ground his argument, and to a form of knowing which ‘is not in the mode of theoretical knowledge, but in one of a practical identification: knowing consists here in knowing how to identify the friend and the enemy’ [POF 116 / 136]. However, as Derrida argues throughout Politics of Friendship, and as I discussed extensively in my first chapter, this possibility is available neither in theory, nor in practice. Schmitt’s hyperbolic insistence that ‘one can and must know — first of all practically, politically, polemically — who is the friend and who is the enemy’ [POF 116 / 136] suggests to Derrida that ‘perhaps [...] the concrete finally remains, in its purity, out of reach, inaccessible, unbreachable, indefinitely deferred, thereby inconceivable to the concept (Begriff); consequently as “spectral” (gespenstisch) as the ghost on its periphery, which one opposes to it and which could never be set apart’ [POF 117 / 136-7]. Schmitt’s insistence on the concrete, Derrida argues, is an equally illusory or problematic basis for a definition of politics as the attempt to define politics in conceptual terms.
Derrida’s main piece of evidence for the remarking of this failure within Schmitt’s text, and thus for the irreducibility of the spectral to the political, is the contortions of Schmitt’s argument when attempting to define the ‘real possibility’ of war without which ‘the political entity is nonexistent’ [CP 39]. War is the most extreme manifestation of political enmity. If there is no possibility of war with another state, or within the state, there is no real enemy — either because the state is failing in its duty to determine friends and enemies, or because it is too weak to wage war — and politics itself is threatened. Schmitt takes some care not to suggest that war is in and of itself desirable. War ‘does not have to be common, normal, something ideal, or desirable. But it must nevertheless remain a real possibility for as long as the concept of the enemy remains valid’ [CP 33]. Derrida argues that this ‘real possibility’ of war does not belong to the ‘conventionally Aristotelian opposition of potentiality and act’ but is ‘something altogether different: the radicalization of a possible reality or a real possibility’ [POF 124 / 147]. Referring to the German text, Derrida insists on a word which is missed from the English translation of the passage I have just quoted. War must remain ‘als reale Möglichkeit vorhanden bleiben’: as Derrida translates it, ‘présente comme possibilité réelle,’ or in English, ‘present as a real possibility’ [POF 124 / 147]. Beyond the opposition of a possible war to an actual war, Schmitt seems to require that war is not merely a possibility but somehow already ‘present.’ According to Derrida, this serves to separate two lines of argument: war can be the transcendental condition of possibility for politics, but without becoming its telos, ‘the aim, the finality or even the content of politics’ [POF 126 / 149]. The ‘presence’ of this ‘real possibility of war’ also becomes the criterion against which the degree of politicization of a state, a situation, or indeed the world in general, is to be judged. The important question for Schmitt is always that of knowing ‘whether such a friend / enemy grouping is really at hand’ [CP 36], or in Derrida’s translation, ‘is or is not present as possibility or as real actuality / effectivity (als reale Möglichkeit oder Wirklichkeit vorhanden ist oder nicht)’ [POF 131 / 155]. Where the English translation addresses the
problem as one of verification, of the real friend-enemy rather than a false friend-enemy,

Derrida stresses an ambiguity in the logic of the original text:

The syntax of this question, which we have already cited, does not admit of a decision on whether the double alternative (oder ... oder) is of the order of presence (vorhanden ist oder nicht) or of the order of modalities of this presence (real or effective/actual possibility, real possibility or real effectivity/actuality; reale Möglichkeit oder Wirklichkeit). In the first case the grouping of the political (friend / enemy) would always be present, in one mode or the other; in the other, it could be present or not [PoF 131-2/155].

The question would be not whether the apparent friend-enemy grouping is a true or false grouping but either: a) whether the grouping is present or not; or b) in what mode the grouping is present. Derrida stresses that there can be no decision between these alternatives; yet he suspects that by ‘relying on a logic of inference, of proof, of indication and of testimony,’ Schmitt decides ‘for the presence of the political’ [PoF 133 / 157]. To hold in mind both questions would be to allow for a spectrality of the political; to never claim to be absolutely sure if there is or is not any politics. But Schmitt ‘decides […] either in terms of positive and univocal signs of the presence of the political, or in terms of what the disappearance of these signs witnesses of their possible and permanent presence’ [PoF 133 / 157]. For Schmitt, depoliticization, which as I suggested in my discussion of ‘The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations,’ is a historical rather than a theoretical or conceptual possibility, and can be attested to in historical terms, merely testifies to the permanent presence of politics.

3.2.3 Spectrality and Depoliticization

Derrida’s demonstration that Schmitt’s discourse is ‘ruined in advance’ by a spectrality of the political might be construed to be in itself depoliticizing, or symptomatic of a
depoliticization of philosophy or of political thought. There can never be a pure concept of political. Does this mean there is no possibility of a repoliticization? This argument can however only be made if we retain a similar understanding of depoliticization to that operated by Schmitt. Depoliticization would be the name or the symptom of something historical. But Derrida’s work undermines that possibility. The spectrality of the concept is not a historical possibility which comes to affect the concept from outside, but its very condition of possibility. If spectrality is in some sense a depoliticization, the announcement of the impossibility of a total politicization or of the absolute presence of the political, this possibility does not accompany or follow a pre-given concept of the political, but precedes it. Politics itself would be an effect of depoliticization. This understanding of politics would not imply an end to politics, but the necessary basis for any attempt to think radically about politics, or even to think politically at all. In a passage which echoes the lines in *Specters of Marx* which describe deconstruction as a repoliticization, Derrida proposes:

> two types of rejoinder to the Schmittian project [...], two distinct sides of the same answer to *The Concept of the Political*, that is, to the reconstruction of the political. On the one hand, we seem to be confirming — but not by way of deploiring the fact, as Schmitt does — an essential and necessary depoliticization. This depoliticization would no longer necessarily be the neuter or negative indifference to all forms of the social bond, of community, of friendship. On the other hand, through this depoliticization [...] one would seek to think, interpret and implement another politics, another democracy [PoF 104 / 127-8].

The repoliticizing potential of deconstruction, which Derrida claims is the only potential path for a successful repoliticization — ‘there will be no repoliticization, there will be no politics otherwise’ [SoM 87 / 144] — depends on a prior depoliticization. This depoliticization is not, as it is for Schmitt, the diagnosis of a historical depoliticization ‘out there.’ It is the depoliticizing discovery of a depoliticization already at work within both the concept of the political and the practice of politics. On this at least, Schmitt is correct:
the inadequation to the concept happens to belong to the concept itself. This inadequation of the concept to itself manifests itself pre-eminently in the order of the political or political practice, unless this order — or rather, its possibility — would situate the very place, the phenomenon or the ‘reason’ of an inadequation of any concept to itself: the concept of disjunction qua the conceptual being of the concept [PoF 114-5 / 134].

If, as Derrida argues, the concept of politics cannot be secured by theoretical discrimination, nor even, as Schmitt hopes, by appeal to the ‘concrete,’ within ‘this political practice that history is’ [PoF 114 / 134] any concept or practice of politics should manifest the limits of this problem. The ‘spectrality’ of the political must be addressed by any political thought which hopes to be in any way adequate to its object.

It is this configuration which I will explore for the remainder of this chapter. However, rather than focus explicitly on the notion of ‘spectrality,’ I will pose the problem in terms of depoliticization and repoliticization. The difference between these approaches may be thought of as two ways of asking the same question. The first might ask ‘What is the spectrality of the political?’ The second, with a change of emphasis, would be ‘What is the spectrality of the political?’ The first question would lead us back to Derrida’s work, even if it was to elaborate those places where the principle of ‘spectrality’ had imposed itself upon him. Rather than returning the question to one set of texts, the second question, whose impetus I will follow here, opens politics itself to the principle of spectrality. The initial question would lend itself to a more exclusive reading of Derrida’s claim that deconstructive questioning is the necessary condition of a repoliticization, in which he appears to be claiming a unique priority for his own texts, or those of his followers. The other question, almost a democratization of deconstruction itself, would seek to direct attention to the ways in which deconstruction can be said to be already at work, and not just in certain texts, but in ‘this political practice that history is’ [PoF 114 / 134]. The radical question of politics would not be found exclusively within the work of Derrida but within politics itself. It is this radical potential which I propose to analyse in terms of depoliticization and repoliticization.
3.3 Deconstruction as Depoliticization

DECONSTRUCTION CANNOT PROVIDE a definition of the political. The principle of spectrality proper to the being-concept of the concept ruins any such attempt from within. This is not the same thing, however, as saying that there is no such thing as politics, nor that there can be no philosophical reflection on politics. For Schmitt, reflection on the concept of the political was an essential preliminary to a successful politicization. For Derrida, it seems, reflection on the impossibility of the concept in general must precede either the study of a specific concept, or of the reality that that concept seeks to name. In this section I will begin to outline what such a deconstructive reflection on politics might look like, drawing not on examples of moments in his texts at which Derrida himself relates deconstruction to world events, but on his account of the decision and the undecidable. This will enable me to formulate deconstruction in terms of effects of depoliticization and repoliticization. Passing through this conceptual work will make clear the distinction between depoliticization in Derrida’s work and the use made of the term by Schmitt. Finally, by comparing Derrida’s work on Benjamin with his analysis of Schmitt I will be able to suggest that Derrida is concerned with the possibility of a quasi-revolutionary politics which bypasses the moment of the sovereign and exceptional decision — war or revolutionary violence — in order to think something like a revolutionary politics of the everyday.

3.3.1 Undecidability and the Decision.

Derrida has written extensively on the concept of decision, but without proposing a single or unified theory. In this section I will attempt to summarize some of this work without
systematising it. On this basis, in the next section I elaborate an understanding of politics in terms of depoliticization and repoliticization.

Derrida’s account of the decision claims to draw on both a traditional philosophical concept of the decision as well as on an appeal to our everyday experience of the decision. We can helpfully distinguish between these traditional or common-sense propositions which serve to define a decision, and Derrida’s complication of the discussion. So, a first and reasonably uncontroversial proposal might be that a decision arises in a situation where there is a choice between two or more alternatives. There must be also be an element of hesitation between the choices. If I knew in advance what my choice would be, there would not be a decision; or rather, a decision is only necessary to the extent that my choice is not certain or predictable in advance. A decision must thus be distinguished from a situation in which I follow a rule or a programme: ‘A decision that didn’t go through the ordeal of the undecidable would not be a free decision, it would only be the programmable application or unfolding of a calculable process’ [FoL 24 / 53]. It also seems fairly incontestable that there is some relationship between the decision and the singularity of an event — a decision happens once and once only. A new set of circumstances requires a new decision. To ask whether a decision can be repeated is to test this proposition. Derrida’s answer is ‘no.’ In a discussion of his work, he gives the example of marriage: ‘If you think when you get married it’s enough to make the decision once and not the day after, then it’s not a promise, it’s not a decision. And the second decision is as new as the first. The content is the same — and it is different.’ To follow a decision made earlier would be to follow the rule set by that earlier decision: to repeat the decision, like reaffirming a vow, is to make it again, in different circumstances. Only if there is the possibility of a different outcome is this still a decision.

All of this seems to correspond to everyday experience and to what we generally mean by the word ‘decision.’

Derrida complicates the concept by drawing some rigorous conclusions from the propositions I have set out. For example: if a decision does not follow a rule, then a decision can never be predicted or determined on the basis of any amount of knowledge. We can prepare for a decision, try and take into account as many factors as possible, and try and predict as many of the outcomes which would follow from it as we are capable of:

The instant of decision must remain heterogeneous to all knowledge as such, to all theoretical or reportive determination, even if it may and must be preceded by all possible science and conscience. The latter are unable to determine the leap of decision without transforming it into the irresponsible application of a programme, hence without depriving it of what makes it into a sovereign and free decision — in a word, of what makes it a decision, if there is one. [POF 219 / 247]

Because the instant of decision is ‘heterogeneous to all knowledge’ we can never be sure if a decision has been taken. This is what requires Derrida to qualify his argument here with ‘if there is one.’ From this follows a second conclusion. If the instant of decision is heterogeneous to knowledge, not only can we never be certain if there is a decision or not, or if there has ever been a decision or not, but no concept of the decision will ever be able to account for any decision. This is not to claim that no-one ever has an experience of what we generally call a decision; but that no concept of that decision is strictly possible. A third conclusion would suggest a similar problem with the conceptualisation of the decision. If the undecidable is a necessary and constitutive element of the decision, a theory of the decision would also have to be a theory of the undecidable. In the language of transcendental philosophy, undecidability is a necessary condition of possibility of a decision. ‘The undecidable,’ Derrida notes in Politics of Friendship, ‘— that is to say, the condition of decision’ [POF 219 / 247]. The concept of the decision would not be able to tell apart the decision and the undecidable: ‘the ordeal of the undecidable,’ is ‘never past or passed, it is not a surmounted or sublated moment in the decision’ [FOL 24 / 54]. Here another flaw is
inscribed in the concept of the decision, and Derrida draws a further conclusion. A decision cannot be fully conscious. When Derrida speaks of a passive decision [POF 68-9 / 87-8], he does not mean to disprove that anyone has ever made a decision, but that any thing which could be called a decision cannot be accounted for on the basis of the intentions of the person making it. In fact, no concept of a decision can account for the making of a decision. It can describe what we think of as a decision, but can never explain or dictate a single decision [POF 68 / 87].

Bearing in mind Derrida’s conclusions from his reading of Carl Schmitt, that the inadequation of a concept to itself is a necessary function of its being a concept, we should not perhaps be too surprised that his conclusions here apparently devastate the concept of the decision. This may be the case, but at the same time Derrida is confirming not only the possibility of attempting to think about the decision, but also the importance of doing so. The difficulties of a conceptual analysis of the decision call both for a new way of thinking about what we call the decision, and an attempt to think both the concept of the decision and the concept of the concept differently. So for example, Derrida’s essay ‘Force of Law: the “Mystical Foundation of Authority”’ may be read as an attempt to do just that. Derrida’s discussion of the relationship between law and justice focuses heavily on the moment of decision in which the law is applied to a particular case. As I have just suggested, for Derrida the experience of judgement is that of an impossible moment of decision, while justice is constituted by the contradiction between the universality of law and the singularity of the subject before the law. There is only a chance of justice being done if the law is interpreted according to the individual case, but in so far as the law is not tailored to the singularity of this case, it is also violence. To the extent that the law accommodates the individual, justice can be seen to be done; and the decision will be a decision rather than the unfolding of a law without regard to the specificity of the case at hand:
Each case is other, each decision is different and requires an absolutely unique interpretation, which no existing, coded rule can or ought to guarantee absolutely. At least, if the rule guarantees it in no uncertain terms, so that the judge is a calculating machine; which happens, and [which will always happen in part, according to an irreducible mechanical or technical parasitism which introduces a necessary iterability of judgements; but to that extent] we will not say that he is just, free and responsible. But we also won’t say it if he doesn’t refer to any law, to any rule or if [...] he [...] leaves aside all rules, all principles[^10] [FoL 23 / 51].

The instant of the decision, of the undecidable choice, is what Derrida calls an aporetic or paradoxical situation. If there is a moment of decision, it is the moment of the suspension of the rules — in a legal judgement, the moment in which the law is invented, reinterpreted, confirmed or modified by its passage through a single case. Yet at this moment the decision is not yet a decision, while as soon as it is a decision, the law has been destabilised, re-fixed, or the decision has invented a new rule, to which the next case must be applied.

There is apparently no moment in which a decision can be called presently and fully just: either it has not yet been taken according to a rule, and nothing allows us to call it just, or it has already followed a rule — whether received, confirmed, conserved or reinvented — which in its turn is not absolutely guaranteed by anything; and moreover, if it were guaranteed, the decision would be reduced to calculation and we couldn’t call it just [FoL 24 / 54].

This moment is not only irreducible to the order of justice, but is a moment of violent and transgressive illegality. For in the moment of decision there is no law; moreover the law is itself unstable and is constantly being re-made. This can only happen through a violent and illegitimate action which cannot be justified by any law in its turn. For this reason Derrida suggests that the ‘very moment of foundation or institution’ of the law, ‘[...] the operation that amounts to founding, inaugurating, justifying law (droit), making law, would consist of a coup de force, of a performative and therefore interpretative violence that in itself is neither just nor unjust and that no justice and no previous law with its founding anterior moment could guarantee or contradict or invalidate’ [FoL 13 / 32-3]. The law is made only in a

[^10]: This sentence has been expanded on republication in French in Force de Loi. I have included the additional material in square brackets.
moment of illegality. This is what Derrida refers to as the ‘mystical foundation’ of authority or law, and as ‘a violence without ground’ [FOL 14 / 34].

The moment of decision belongs to neither the order of knowledge nor that of the decidable. But equally, the temporality of the undecidable remains unable to include the decision. It is worth clarifying slightly that the ‘instant of decision’ has no ontological status. It is not of the order of being present. As in the case of Schmitt’s analysis of the political, we might think of the passage through the undecidable as an account of the spectrality which haunts any decision. What Derrida describes in *Politics of Friendship* as thinking in the mode of ‘the perhaps’ is a way of thinking about this elusive concept: ‘the crucial experience of the *perhaps* imposed by the undecidable […] is not a moment to be exceeded, forgotten or suppressed. It continues to constitute the decision as such; it can never again be separated from it, it produces it *qua* decision *in and through* the undecidable […]’ [PoF 219 / 247]. We can recognise here another approach to hauntology, to suspending the suppositions of ontology that existence is determinable, or can answer to questions of the form ‘is it?’ ‘By specifying recurrently:’ Derrida writes, ‘“if there is one,” by suspending the thesis of existence wherever, between a concept and an event, the law of an aporia, an undecidability, a double bind occurs in interposition, and must in truth impose itself to be endured there’[PoF 38-9 / 59]:

Thus we regularly say – but we could multiply the examples – the gift, *if there is one*, invention, *if there is any such thing*, and so forth. This does not amount to conceding a hypothetical or conditional dimension (‘if, supposing that, etc.’) but to marking a difference between ‘there is’ and ‘is’ or ‘exists’ – that is to say the words of presence. What there is, if there is one or any, *is* not necessarily. It perhaps does *not* *exist* nor *ever* present itself; nevertheless, there is one, or some; there is a chance of there being one, of there being some [PoF 39 / 59].
3.3.2 Decision and Depoliticization

Having set out the basics of Derrida’s account of decision, I will draw on that model to give an account of what deconstruction has to say about politics. The similarities are perhaps already apparent. The concept of decision embodies many of the problems we saw exemplified in the failure of Schmitt’s attempt to define the purely political. Where for Schmitt, a spectrality of the political preceded and ruined a pure politics, so ‘the undecidable,’ Derrida comments, ‘remains caught, lodged, at least as a ghost — but an essential ghost — in every decision, in every event of decision’ [FoL 24 / 54]. Just as we can never say for sure that there has been a decision, or what a decision is, so we can never say for certain what would constitute a pure politics, since anything, event or decision or concept, which we wished to call political is inhabited by its opposite, a principle which disrupts its politicality from within. It is this which I call ‘depoliticization’ and we can understand it by analogy with the undecidable. Any political decision must pass through the undecidable, and will never be present to itself as a result, but always inhabited by this undecidability. A political decision, like any decision, must have something of the undecidable lodged within it. Equally, it is not a decision, as I argued in chapter one, where it follows a rule, for example, — and this is the burden of Derrida’s argument in Politics of Friendship — nowhere that political choices are restricted or predetermined on the basis of the ‘natural’ value attributed to a family, a people, a homeland, a nation or a State. If the political decision is structured like a decision in general, above and beyond any programming of the decision by the natural values of politics — let us say where it is governed by a politics-to-come — it must necessarily set a rule, as soon as it is made. In other words, there would no longer be a decision, as soon as there is a decision. There is no politics — no decision — where a rule is unfolded / unfolds, and a rule unfolds / is unfolded by every decision. The political decision is divided against itself. The undecidable would become the very name for the political — ‘what dwells within, and politicizes, the political’.
yet at the same time, the political would then become the impossible, that which remains to come, the trace, différence. As we have seen, the undecidable is not simply the suspension or refusal of decision. It is the condition of decision, and if it rules out any final conceptualisation of the decision, it also prompts a necessary deconstructive questioning which would seek new ways of thinking about a decision. My hypothesis here is that the same can be said for politics.

The impossibility of defining the political for Derrida suggests that we should not seek to give a deconstructive theory of the political any content. As soon as politics has been defined depoliticization has taken place, and a law established, which will subsequently require further politicization to challenge or expand the definition of the political. Instead of trying to think of politics in terms of a concept or a content, a set of practices or descriptions, we should think instead of a grammar or syntax of politics, which any attempt to give a definition to politics would participate in. Moreover, any political ‘event’ or ‘decision’ would also be part of this grammar. Since there is never any fully present politics (concept or event) this is a grammar of politicization and depoliticization. The decision is politicising, it challenges and suspends the political status quo, but it is also depoliticizing, as it sets new political precedents. This structure can be illustrated with reference to the notion of political friendship at the heart of Politics of Friendship. I showed in chapter one that Derrida was concerned to separate two logics at work within the concept of friendship, and of democracy: aimance as the thought of a non-determinate ground of friendship from an active, discriminating and exclusive befriending. The decision which determines friends proves to be the naturalisation of the decision itself. The figure of the brother, inseparable from the philosophical definition of the friend, represents this inevitable prediction of the rule.

If the friend-enemy choice were to be taken as the definition of politics, we could describe aimance as the politicization of the decision, and brotherhood — what Derrida calls fraternization — as its inexorable and inevitable depoliticization. Aimance, as we know, can appear only as a trace within the naturalised decision in which friends and enemies have
been determined: no decision without depoliticization, the re-establishment of norms. If there is a moment of politicization, it is the point at which political identity is cast into doubt, and when established models are open to revision or alteration. It is that moment in which the state is faced with a choice which will define its laws and its political actions. The event of politicization is the point where a decision has to be made without any criteria. But this moment is never available as such. It is impossible. There can be no politics of the moment of politicization, since it has no content, nothing that can be acted upon — it is the suspension of all decision. (It is also the suspension of both security and sovereignty.)

Politicization itself cannot become the subject of any political movement, or the promise made to the electorate of any political party. Any political decision, any political event must be an experience of depoliticization by definition; it sets a rule. This may be setting a precedent, demanding one policy not another; but it can never be asking for the undecidable or the suspension of decision. Politicization cannot be the object of a political demand; what complicates this structure is that every political demand, while depoliticizing, will attest to the possibility of a repoliticization.

However, if politicization would then be the rarest thing, the name of the impossible itself, another effect would also make it perhaps the most commonplace thing. I emphasise again: if there is a decision, there is a decision wherever there is an event. There is no law without the event of its application, and its own reinvention, and no political event without politicization. Even if politicization cannot be the content of a formulation of policy, it is irreducible in the moment of the formulation of policy. This is certainly the most ambiguous and difficult point to be grasped in mapping Derrida’s account of the decision onto politics considered in terms of depoliticization and repoliticization. In Politics of Friendship Derrida explains that ‘without the opening of an absolutely undetermined possible, without the radical abeyance and suspense marking a perhaps, there would never be either event or decision’ [POF 67 / 86]. This is what I have called the moment of politicization, a moment which is not a present moment, which is heterogeneous to the time of politics or history.
Derrida continues: ‘But nothing takes place and nothing is ever decided without suspending the perhaps while keeping its living possibility in living memory.’ This suspension of the perhaps makes possible ‘rules and laws, contracts and institutions’ in ‘the order of law, politics or morality’ but it also ‘violence done to the perhaps, to the possible that makes them possible’ [POF 67 / 86]. Politics is depoliticization, but is made possible by an irreducible, but indeterminate politicization.

What Derrida is trying to invent is a way of thinking about the world, in its spatiality and temporality, which would be adequate to describe it in its happening; that is in the coming of the unknown which characterises it as the place of a time which is out-of-joint, which must remain heterogeneous to any history, any physical or temporal science, even to imaginative recreation:

deconstruction is not, in the last analysis, a methodical or theoretical procedure. In its possibility as in the experience of the impossibility that will always have constituted it, it is never a stranger to the event, that is, very simply, to the coming of that which happens. Certain Soviet philosophers told me in Moscow a few years ago: the best translation of perestroika was still ‘deconstruction’ [SoM 88-9 / 146].

Derrida never ceases to insist on this in the texts of this period: ‘I have often had occasion to define deconstruction as that which is — far from a theory, a school, a method, even a discourse, still less a technique that can be appropriated — at bottom what happens or comes to pass [ce qui arrive].’ Once we accept this is the case, that ‘deconstruction happens,’ we can begin to appreciate deconstruction as both ‘the maximum intensification of a transformation in progress, in the name of neither a simple symptom nor a simple cause’ [FoL 9 / 24] but also, again, hospitality not only to the other, or to the passive decision within [POF 69 / 87] but to that which happens. To claim that the experience of politics is the experience of the impossible, is not to claim that politics is impossible; or that politics is not,
since we are no longer able to oppose being and not being, possibility and impracticality, happening and not happening. Deconstruction as a theory of politics would not be the same as claiming that politics is at an end. If there is any politics at all, then politics must already have begun. Politics as a name for what might be — what happens, if it happens — would at the same time be the name for its own disappearance. But this disappearance is not a historical possibility, it is not of the order of an event, although it is the necessary accompaniment of the event. While the virtuality and spectrality, the undecidability at the heart of the decision must frustrate any attempt such as that of Schmitt's to tie down, to reconstitute the political in its essence, to make politics present, to actualize and effect a repoliticization, a repoliticization is not alien to the experience of politics either. Without the suspension of certainty in the political decision there would be nothing that we could call politics.

The experience of 'what happens', of 'this political practice which history is' [PoF 114 / 134] would be that of the complex combination of politicization as the experience of the impossible itself and politics as an effect of depoliticization, as the programming of its own decisions. Where Schmitt offers a historical analysis of depoliticization, as something which has happened to Europe, but which a sovereign decision might displace, I argue that Derrida opens up a structural diagnosis of politics as depoliticization, and one which, with no relation to history as narrative, will prove much harder to recuperate, to recover from, or to repoliticize. However to see the importance for Derrida of thinking this way, we need to turn again to Schmitt, but also to the correspondence between Schmitt, Benjamin and Heidegger to which Derrida refers obliquely in 'Force of Law.'
3.3.3 Rethinking the Revolutionary.

Derrida’s sense of the danger of Schmitt’s account of depoliticization as a historical category becomes quite plain in his reading of *The Concept of the Political*. Referring to Schmitt’s insistence that politics depends on ‘actual / effective conflict’ as its ‘most extreme possibility’ [CP 35], Derrida goes on to draw ‘the extreme consequence of these propositions, the one which would seem to us as unavoidable as it is properly disastrous’ but which Schmitt does not grasp:

If it is true [...] that the rarer or the more improbable the situation of exception or of decision (war, hostility, the political event as such, etc.), the more decisive, intense and revealing it is, and in the end the more it politicizes [...] then one must conclude that rarefaction intensifies the tension and the revealing power (the ‘truth’ of the political): the less war there is, the more the hostility, etc. This is less a default of ‘common sense’ than it would appear, to be sure, but it does inevitably lead to a change in all the signs, and therefore to having to measure politicization in terms of the degree of depoliticization [PoF 129 / 152-3].

Once this equation has been made clear, it becomes apparent that the depoliticization of the technological age for Schmitt is ‘in truth an over- or hyperpoliticization’ [PoF 129 / 153]. Depoliticization would be ‘but the supplementary and inverted symptom, the abyssal hyperbole, of a hyperpoliticization’ [PoF 133 / 157]. In Schmitt’s later work, *The Theory of the Partisan*, the figure of absolute hostility, of the force of the greatest potential for a repoliticization, is that of the revolutionary war. The blurring of legal and conceptual boundaries represented by the guerrilla or the partisan testifies to both the depoliticization of the world — no longer can we distinguish between the violence licensed by law, and violence against the law, or between regular troops and irregulars; the properly political is less apparent than ever — and the possibility of the most violent repoliticization. The exemplary political figures of the age for Schmitt are Stalin and Mao.

Not only does Derrida think this a dangerous proposition, but he shows it to be a consequence of any attempt to define politics in terms of determinable friends and enemies.
The figure of the revolutionary war for Schmitt is that of fratricide, the moment when the brother becomes an enemy.\(^\text{12}\) Yet, as I discussed in my first chapter, for Derrida there can never be a natural brother — the absolute friend is an ideal, a legal fiction, a spectre — or an absolute enemy. The concept of friendship is always contaminated by the potential of enmity, exposed in Nietzsche’s reversal of the Aristotelian formula, and can never be secured except by an idealisation, such as the analogy with brotherhood, itself the naturalization of a non-natural bond. The spectrality of the concept of the political, as of the concept of friendship, which means that neither can ever be established in any degree of purity, suggests that a theory such as Schmitt’s risks conferring philosophical legitimation on revolutionary violence as such without any concern for its aims, means or objectives, and is not only dangerous but incoherent. A brother is never wholly a brother, a friend is never a friend for certain, politics may always be just the playing out of programmed choices. For Derrida this suggests that we can only think friendship or politics in terms of an economy of friendship and enmity, politicization and depoliticization, but from which the poles of the opposition have been removed. There can be no absolute politicization, and no absolute depoliticization — no end to politics, no pure politics — but only an economy of relative violence. Derrida’s rethinking of the decision in terms of undecidability, and the rethinking of politics in terms of depoliticization opened up by it, are concerned, at least in part, to question the political theory of the exceptional moment of revolutionary violence which follows any theory which attempts to think the possibility of a fully present politics; and of absolute repoliticization.

This impulse lies behind not only Derrida’s reading of Schmitt, but his discussion of Benjamin’s essay ‘Critique of Violence’ in the second part of ‘Force of Law.’ One subtext to the essay, is the literal and figural correspondence between Benjamin and Schmitt, with

Heidegger forming a third party to the debate [FoL 48 / 114; 66n.6 / 72]. Derrida comments on Benjamin’s diagnosis of the “degeneracy” of a parliamentarism powerless to control the police violence that substitutes itself for it’ that it ‘is very much a critique of violence on the basis of a “philosophy of history”: a putting into archeo-teleological, indeed archeo-eschatological perspective that deciphers the history of droit as a decay (Verfall) since its origin’; moreover ‘the analogy with Schmittian or Heideggerean schemas does not need to be spelled out.’ Derrida’s concern is that all three thinkers base their premises on a narrative of loss, of the fall from an origin of some form of purity. But in diagnosing this loss, each prepares the way, within quite distinct political allegiances, to the possibility of some form of revolutionary violence. Derrida is not against revolution as such, but he is very much against a traditional way of thinking revolution. Commenting on Benjamin again, Derrida calls it ‘revolutionary, even marxisant, but in the two senses of the word “revolutionary,” which also includes the sense “reactionary,” that is, the sense of a return to the past of a purer origin’ [FoL 46 / 111]. Concluding the post-script to the essay, Derrida confirms this: ‘This text, like many others by Benjamin, is still too Heideggerean, too messianico-Marxist or archeo-eschatological for me’ [FoL 62 / 146]. By disavowing the inevitability of contamination, in their desire to return to the conditions of a pure origin, whether of a certain form of violence (Benjamin), or mode of being (Heidegger), or of politics (Schmitt), all three thinkers are unable to think critically and responsibly about their own position. Each threatens to unleash the worst violence in the name of a ‘purer violence’ and loses the sense in which Derrida wishes to reinstitute calculation, to rethink politics and law as interminable

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negotiation, a negotiation which must seek to negotiate without a determined horizon of expectation or a particular goal in mind.

What Derrida proposes is not the end of revolution, however, but an extension and revision of the concept:

What I am saying is anything but conservative and anti-revolutionary. For beyond Benjamin’s explicit purpose I shall propose the interpretation according to which the very violence of the foundation or position of law must envelop the violence of conservation and cannot break with it. It belongs to the structure of fundamental violence that it calls for the repetition of itself and founds what ought to be conserved, conservable, promised to heritage and tradition, to be shared. [FoL 38 / 93-4]

Benjamin’s opposition of a ‘law-making’ to a ‘law-conserving’ violence depends on the revolutionary situation — his example is the general strike — in which a new founding of the law is at stake [FoL 34-5 / 84-5]. However, for Derrida, we cannot know whether or not we are in the middle of a law-founding moment; precisely because such a moment can never be said to be ‘present.’ The event and the effects of a decision can only be revealed in retrospect: ‘those who say “our time,” while thinking “our present” in light of a future anterior present do not know very well, by definition, what they are saying.’ Instead, as I have shown in relation to the decision, for Derrida ‘the whole history of law’ is that of its continual refoundation and reformulation: but crucially, ‘This moment always takes place and never takes place in a presence’ [FoL 36 / 89]. Like the decision, which calls for its own reaffirmation, for another decision, but which becomes law as soon as it has been done, so the violent foundation of the law calls for confirmation and conservation which is also violence. On the one hand, the violence of the suspension of all laws, on the other hand the violent suspension of that suspension in the rule of law. ‘Deconstruction is also the idea of — and the idea adopted by necessity of — this différentielle contamination’ [FoL 39 / 95]. Politics is the mixture of these two forms of decision, two forms of violence which cannot be opposed in the manner Benjamin wishes (rigorously) or in terms of Greek and Judaic origins. This suggests a complete revision of the concept of revolution. By analogy with Schmitt, we
might say that the moment of revolution or of violent overthrow is the possibility of a pure and present politicization. The danger of such an analysis is that it will tend to a glorification of violence for its own sake. But for Derrida there can be no question of such a politics. However, his overturning of the logic of the revolutionary could in some ways be considered more radical, if it didn’t subvert the traditional concept of the ‘radical’ as well. Instead of the moment of revolution becoming the defining moment of the political, every moment, every decision is to be considered revolutionary. The revolutionary moment of the exception, the suspension of all rules, can no longer be imagined to be something that could or would take place, and therefore no longer something to call for or aim at. Revolutionary politicization can no longer be thought of as something that could be made present, it is not of the order of possibility. Instead the revolutionary is the order of the perhaps. But this ‘perhaps’ is not found in the exceptional moment, but makes an exception of every moment and every decision.

If there is a politics of Derrida’s work it lies here, in his insistence on the revolutionary act of interpretation, of foundation of the law, of negotiation and calculation. This is where we must work most patiently to show that his messianism without messiah, which he is at pains to distinguish from that of Benjamin, is a messianism without content, without expectation of anything coming: no revolution, no God, nothing.15 But by relocating the messianic to the structure of event-hood itself, to the everyday negotiation with the law, with responsibility and duty, Derrida radicalises the possibility of thinking politically. If the political is the moment of absolute uncertainty, but such uncertainty that we do not know where it is to be found even, everywhere, then the political is both the most common and the least common experience. The possibility of change, of something else happening, of justice, of more equal distribution of wealth or power is witnessed to and attested to by every event; although this possibility is indissociable from the threat of less justice, less equality, less

15 ‘Marx and Sons.’ 250-1.
democracy. The challenge of deconstruction is to find ways of thinking and acting which are adequate to this not-knowing, to the radical condition of the perhaps. Alexander Garcia Düttmann suggests to Derrida that this is the case: ‘on the one hand, we could be talking in the name of reformism, because each decision calls for another one. We face an ongoing process of reform after reform after reform. But at the same time we could radicalise that thought into something like a permanent revolution.’ Derrida confirms his proposal, echoing the passage from ‘Psyche: Inventions of the Other’ with which I concluded my introduction: ‘When I referred a moment ago to messianicity without messianism, I was describing a revolutionary experience. [...] But when I insisted on the fact that we must nevertheless prepare the revolution, it was because we must not simply be open to whatever comes. The revolution, however unpredictable it may be, can and must be prepared for in the most cautious slow and labourious [sic.] way.’16

Such a thought of depoliticization will always be open to two accusations. The first is that it is too theological, too messianic, too abstract, or not concrete enough. Yet clearly from Derrida’s point of view, any theory which presumes to label, identify or name a present politics, a determinate concept of the political, is being more messianic, in seeking to make some particular future arrive, to make something in particular happen. The other potential accusation would be that this is not radical at all, since it is not radical according to traditional political paths and codes. Certainly, if the degree of radicality of a theory were to be measured in term of the incomprehension and misunderstanding that have accrued to it — for example Slavoj Žižek’s mystified complaint that ‘Derrida’s “radicalization of Marx” is in fact ‘its exact opposite: the renunciation of any truly radical political measures’ 17 — then we would quite easily be able to prove that Derrida’s revolutionary politics is more radical than traditional concepts of revolution. As Geoffrey Bennington comments: ‘the need to

16 ‘Perhaps or Maybe.’ 11.
compromise, negotiate, with the most concrete detail of current arrangements of right: this is what defines deconstruction as radically political.\textsuperscript{18} Deconstruction is an affirmation of what happens, and of the revolutionary reinvention at work in every political decision, and so clearly cannot be simply opposed to politics as it already exists. As I argued in the discussion of radical democracy in my first chapter, this means thinking politics within and beyond the state as much as against the state\textsuperscript{19}; and as I emphasised in the second chapter, deconstruction demands an intensive engagement with the law, within and beyond the state. In the next section I will expand this account by contrasting Derrida’s rethinking of politics with that of his friends Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, while in the conclusion I will attempt a provisional formalisation of the relationship between deconstruction and depoliticization.

3.4 The Politics of the \textit{Retrait}

\textbf{It will not} have escaped the notice of anyone reasonably familiar with the work of Derrida that what I have been describing as a structure of depoliticization and repoliticization is homologous, not only to the relationship between the decision and the undecidable, but also to what Derrida terms ‘the \textit{retrait}.’ Such an analogy offers more than just clarification, since

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understanding the relationship between deconstruction, depoliticization and re-trait will enable us to contrast Derrida’s work with that of his friends Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy. In a group of texts associated with the Centre for Philosophical Research on the Political, Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe offer some preliminary reflections on a post-deconstructive rethinking of the political. These texts are of interest not only for themselves, and for the critical responses they have provoked but because Derrida mentions in a note to his discussion of Schmitt that Politics of Friendship might be read as a ‘modest and belated contribution’ to the work of the Centre, which ‘was important for my own’ [PoF 137 n.25]. His contribution may be ‘modest and belated,’ but I will argue here that Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe’s account of the political repeats the structure we saw in Schmitt and Benjamin in which politics is thought of the order of something which could come to presence.

3.4.1 Heidegger, Being and Technology.

Heidegger’s essay ‘The Question concerning Technology’ provides a helpful starting point from which to approach the thought of being. Heidegger is concerned to elucidate man’s relationship with modern technology, and characterise it as a particular mode of historical existence. For Heidegger, ‘the essence of all history [Geschichte] is determined’ from a ‘destining [Geschick]’ [QT 306]. This destining is a determined mode of concealment of the fundamental truth as aletheia, unconcealment. The history of being for Heidegger is the history of this concealment, and can only be uncovered through a destructive enquiry into the origins of Being in its concealment. Only through listening to the essence of the mode of destining, can we understand man’s predicament, which is one of ‘danger’ but also of the possibility of ‘a freeing claim’[QT 307]. This much could be said of any epoch of Being’s destining. However, ‘when destining reigns in the mode of enframing, it is the supreme
danger' [QT 308]. Enframing [Gestell] is what Heidegger has called the essence of modern technology, which is nothing technological. Modern technology's characteristics are of drawing energy from Nature and of storing it. There is a fundamental difference, Heidegger suggests, between 'the work of the peasant' which 'does not challenge the soil of the field' and agriculture as a 'mechanized food industry' [QT 296]. Similarly, a windmill 'does not unlock energy from the air currents in order to store it'; by contrast the hydroelectric plant across the Rhine turns the river itself into a water power supplier [QT 296-7]. It is not technology itself which threatens man — 'the potentially lethal machines and apparatus of technology' — but 'the actual threat has already affected man in his essence. The rule of enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth' [QT 309]. However Heidegger turns the logic around. 'The extreme danger, not only for man's coming to presence, but for all revealing as such' is still a granting; a saving power [QT 313]. Ultimately, 'the closer we come to the danger, the more brightly do the ways into the saving power begin to shine and the more questioning we become' [QT 317].

This clearly fits into the general structure of Heidegger's account of Being as concealment and unconcealment. The object of the destructive (or deconstructive) coming to terms with the tradition of Western thought is to recover the original character of Being, which has been forgotten or covered over. We cannot think the ontic-ontological difference, the difference between Being as sending and Being as its beings or sendings, as such. This difference will only appear as its own non-appearance, as its withdrawal or concealment behind the various epochs of being. Joseph Kockelmans glosses this aspect of Heidegger's thought:
History of Being, therefore, means the sending of Being. And in the various ways of sending, the sending itself, as well as that mysterious 'it’ which sends, holds itself back in the various manifestations in which Being 'shows' itself. Modern technology is the last of these ‘manifestations’ or epochs: ‘To hold back means in Greek epoché. That is why we speak of epochs in Being’s sending. Epoch does not mean primarily a certain period of time in the coming-to-pass of Being’s truth; it means the basic characteristic of the sending itself, that is to say, this holding-itself-back in favour of the various manifestations of the gift, namely, Being with respect to the discovery of beings.20

Metaphysics has been the history of the forgetting of what makes it possible, of the concealment of being. This is why metaphysics is nihilism for Heidegger. The important point to grasp here, as Miguel de Bestigui makes clear, is that modern technology represents the final stage of nihilism: ‘Metaphysics is the way in which the abandonment of being happens in the forgottenness of being. Seinsverlassenheit is Seinsvergessenheit. Yet this forgetting is not simply a form of absence or an effacement: it rules or reigns over the whole of being in such a way that the truth of being becomes unattainable. In its completed form, nihilism in the form of technology, it rules as will to power, the most disastrous unleashing of power amidst beings as a whole.’21 But according to the logic set out in ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ the epoch of modern technology holds not only the greatest danger, but also the greatest and most powerful potential for the ‘saving power.’

The form of Heidegger’s argument here strongly recalls both Schmitt’s argument in ‘The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations’ and Derrida’s criticisms of The Concept of the Political. For Schmitt too the modern era is the age of technology. While Schmitt’s account of the technological era sees its roots in the ‘apparently hybrid and impossible combination of aesthetic-romantic and economic-technical tendencies in the nineteenth century’ [ND 133] rather than an original sending of Being given form in a determined

constellation of presencing, there is a structural similarity between the two accounts. For both Heidegger and Schmitt the age of technology is the age of the most extreme neutralisation and danger of the forgetting of being, respectively. Conversely, this also makes the age of technology the age with the greatest potential for the restoration of politics or of an originary relationship to Being. Derrida finds in *The Concept of the Political* a logic by which the possibility of the total disappearance of the political acts instead as a hyper-politicization, and it would seem that the same might be said of the closure of metaphysics as technology for Heidegger. In ‘Force of Law’ Derrida compared his reservations about Benjamin’s thought to his concerns about that of Heidegger: both are too archeo-eschatological. In other words, both think history in a circle, and are interested in the coming to presence of something which has been lost or concealed but which was originally present.

This problem is in fact tackled at length in Derrida’s work on Heidegger, and especially in *The Post Card*. In ‘Envois’, the long first essay of *The Post Card*, Derrida sends up the notion of sending, and in particular the ‘decisive’ elements of Heidegger’s thought — the sense that now is the destined moment for the revelation of Being. What he calls the postal principle, or destinarance is an attempt to displace the sense of truth as aletheia, predicated upon the possibility of its own reception, of its possible being brought into presence. This is elaborated at some length in the more theoretical essay ‘The Factor of Truth’ in which he famously argues that truth is determined by the necessary possibility of it not being revealed; that a communication must always, to some extent, go astray, and that a letter never arrives at its destination. In ‘Envois’ Derrida puts the whole problem more playfully:

> It’s the end of an epoch. […] The postal principle *does not happen to différence*, and even less to ‘Being,’ it destines them to itself from the very ‘first’ *envoi*. […] The post is always *en reste*, and always *restante*. It awaits the addressee who might always, *by chance*, not arrive.

> And the postal principle is no longer a principle, not a transcendental category; that which announces itself or sends itself under this heading […] no longer sufficiently belongs to the epoch of Being to submit itself to some transcendentalism […] [PC 190-2 / 205-6].
While from this passage Derrida does not appear to distinguish either différance and Being, the key emphasis is on *by chance* and on the possibility of the non-arrival of the postal principle. His effort is to think an indeterminacy of destination; that is the possibility that Being will *not* arrive at its ‘destination’ or that this arrival is controlled by chance; or is beyond the opposition between chance and necessity. A few lines later however, another distinction is introduced:

*Tekhnē* (and doubtless he would have considered the postal structure [...] a metaphysical and technical determination of the *envoi* or of the destiny (Geschick, etc.) of Being; [...]}; now *tekhnē*, this is the entire — infinitesimal and decisive — *différance*, *does not arrive*. [...] *Tekhnē* does not happen to language or to the poem [...] this can mean simultaneously that it does not succeed in touching them, getting into them, it leaves them virgin, not happening to arrive up to them, and yet it has to happen to them like an accident or an event because it inhabits them and occasions them [PC 192 / 207].

Technics cannot be thought apart from Being, or from différance. In insisting on this Derrida opposes a reading in which technics comes second, in which the technical is a blight which befalls being or différance; and in which some form of purification might still be possible.

The ‘infinitesimal and decisive’ difference may be taken in part as a difference between Heidegger and Derrida. Turning now to another of Derrida’s essays on Heidegger, we will see how this decisive difference will help reiterate the difference between deconstruction as depoliticization and the *retrait* of politics.

### 3.4.2 Derrida's *Retrait.*

Derrida's own account of the *retrait* is most decisively set out in his essay ‘The *Retrait* of Metaphor.’ A companion piece of sorts to ‘White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy,’ in the essay Derrida gathers his thoughts on Heidegger and the question of
metaphor. It is perhaps worth recalling at this point the argument of the earlier essay. In
‘White Mythology’ Derrida argues that since metaphor is a philosophical concept, it cannot
be used to explain away philosophy; for example to demonstrate that philosophy is nothing
but an effect of language, or that in Nietzsche’s words, ‘truths are illusions of which one has
forgotten that they are illusions’ [MAR 217 / 258]. ‘Metaphor,’ Derrida writes, ‘remains in
all its essential characteristics, a classical philosopheme, a metaphysical concept. It is
therefore enveloped in the field that a general metaphorology of philosophy would seek to
dominate’ [MAR 219 / 261]. Even if all the other concepts of philosophy could be accounted
for as the metaphorical usage of language, the concept of metaphor itself would remain to be
accounted for: ‘the metaphor of metaphor. This extra metaphor, remaining outside the field
that it allows to be circumscribed, extracts or abstracts itself from this field, thus subtracting
itself as a metaphor less’ [MAR 220 / 261] and disabling its own claim to be able to dominate
the field of philosophy. The structural principle of what Derrida elsewhere calls différence,
and much else, returns: ‘The field is never saturated’ [MAR 220 / 261]. Yet since philosophy
can only ever describe this ‘field’ metaphorically, via the non-absolute coincidence of sign
and meaning, we could also formulate a claim such as: there are only metaphors, there are
only non-proper meanings, out beyond the coherence of an opposition between proper and
improper meaning, the true and the metaphorical use of language. This situation, which
Derrida describes as one of ‘supplementarity (between the concept and the field)’ [MAR 229
/ 273] we have already encountered as différence.

In ‘The Retrait of Metaphor,’ having first answered a series of criticisms put to
‘White Mythology’ by Paul Ricouer, Derrida establishes some of the connections between
his work and that of Heidegger, referring not so much to Heidegger’s brief comments on
metaphor as such, but to the general structure of his work. Derrida proposes under the name
of the retrait in which we are interested, to approach a group of problems: not only the
question of Übersetzung and Übertragung, of translation / transfer and metaphoric transfer;
but also the question of Ereignis — of proper, propriation, de-propriation — as a question of
event, and of metaphor; and the question of the home, of economy as the law of the house. The word *retrait* appears ‘to be the most proper to capture the greatest quantity of energy and information in the Heideggerian text’ [RM 114 / 77]. Derrida proposes ‘retrait’ as an idiomatic French expression which can condense three motifs of Heidegger’s later work, bringing out the linguistic and theoretical relationship between these moments, which I summarise in my turn.

1) Derrida suggests that we might understand the ontic-ontological difference in terms of metaphor. Metaphor belongs to metaphysics, considered as a ‘suspensive withdrawal of Being’: both ‘being hidden’ and ‘dissimulation or veiling.’ Metaphysics would itself then become a metaphorical system, a veiling of Being: ‘as a tropical system and singularly as a metaphorical detour [metaphysics] would correspond to an essential withdrawal of Being: unable to reveal itself, to present itself except in dissimulating itself under the “species” of an epochal determination [...]. Being would only allow itself to be named in a metaphorico-metonymical divergence’ [RM 116 / 79]. But since metaphor would remain a metaphysical concept it could not be an accurate name for the relation between Being and being, which could not be of the order of the distinction literal-metaphorical. ‘Consequently,’ Derrida writes, ‘if we cannot speak metaphorically on its subject, neither can we speak properly or literally. We will speak of being only quasi-metaphorically, according to a metaphor of metaphor’ [RM 117 / 80]. In other words, the same quasi-transcendental status which Derrida accorded to metaphor in ‘White Mythology’ and which renders radically indeterminable the possibility of distinguishing metaphorical from proper use of language, might be read as a translation — or a metaphor — for Being in its withdrawal. From this point of view, *retrait* would be both a translation and not a translation from Heidegger; an approximation to *Entziehung* and *Sich-Entziehen* of Being. The withdrawal of Being gives place to a discourse which cannot name it, except abusively, quasi-metaphorically.
2) Secondly, Derrida, draws attention to Heidegger’s own concern to show that his language cannot be read as metaphorical (understood in its metaphysical determination as the familiar detour which illuminates the unknown) in such passages as: ‘Discourse about the house of Being is not a metaphor, transporting the image of the ‘house’ toward Being, but it is by way of appropriating thinking the essence of Being, that we will one day be able to think what ‘house’ and ‘to inhabit’ are’ [RM 119/ 83]. But this is not to imply that the relation between the terms has been simply inverted: we do not know Being, as a fixed point from which we can understand ‘dwelling.’ The relation between ‘Being’ and ‘house’ would again not be of the order of the proper or the improper; and the statement of this would itself not be metaphorical or literal, but a withdrawal of the possibility of understanding the relation in those terms.

3) Derrida finally returns to ‘trait’ as a translation. He discusses the overlapping of two semantic chains in Heidegger’s German: one based around Ziehen (relation) and the other around Reissen (cut, mark). Riss, which Derrida translates as ‘trait,’ names definitional relation itself. It is a cutting, a division, the separation of elements, which neither belongs to the elements thereby separated, but is nothing other than their relation. It thus is not. In being traced, it is withdrawn. But it is also more originary than the elements it divides, since they are not until they have been distinguished:

It does not precede the two properties which it causes to come to their propriety, for it is nothing without them. In this sense it is not an autonomous, originary, instance, itself proper in relation to the two which it incises and allies. Being nothing, it does not appear itself, it has no proper and independent phenomenality, and in not disclosing itself, it withdraws, it is structurally in withdrawal, as a divergence (écart: splitting aside), opening, differentiability, trace, border, traction, effraction, etc. From the moment that it withdraws in drawing itself out, the trait is a priori withdrawal, unappearance, and effacement of its mark in its incision [RM 124-5 / 88].

There is thus an analogy between the re- of the re-trait, and the Heideggerean Ent-Ziehung (with-drawal), and Ent-fernung (dis-tancing), and ‘the Ereignen of the Es gibt which focuses
all of Heidegger’s late thinking, in precisely this trait where the movement of the Enteignen (dispropriation, retraction of propriety) happens to empty out all Ereignis’ [RM 125 / 89]. ‘Retrait’ also translates the Aufriss, the ‘totality of traits’, which Heidegger names as the incision which names language: ‘the trait of the incision is therefore veiled, withdrawn, but it is also the trait that brings together and separates at once the veiling and the unveiling, the withdrawal and the withdrawal of the withdrawal’ [RM 126-7 / 90]. This transport or translation is not all one way however — ‘the deal works, it is already at work in the other’s language. I would say in the other’s languages’ — for re-trait comes to mean the retracing (re-treating) as well as withdrawal [RM 126 / 90-1].

Derrida’s reinscription of these developments in Heidegger’s thought in another language, and by way of a quasi-metaphoricity which cannot be effaced, sets his own work against Heidegger’s insistence on the original rooting of his language in the Greek origin of Being, and in Gasché’s words, ‘although it still repeats the question of Being, inscribes it, and thus remains altogether extraneous to this still-philosophical question.’22 Heidegger has claimed that his words are not metaphorical. Following Derrida’s arguments in ‘White Mythology’ we know he disagrees.23 The detour of metaphor does not happen to an originally pure language, since the possibility of translation and of metaphorical transfer is an original possibility. In fact it seems to me that the re-trait can be mapped onto the quasi-concept of depoliticization that I have been sketching out. Depoliticization for Derrida is not an accidental or contingent possibility in an originally political context, but is a necessary condition of the political. Just as the re-trait rewrites the withdrawal of being in terms of metaphor as permanent detour rather than truth, so Derrida’s version of depoliticization removes the possibility of a recovery of an authentic politics. There is no originary


politicization; hence we should only speak of a re-politicization. There are only relative depoliticizations and repoliticizations. Like the trait, which is only as re-trait, as disappearance and re-tracing, so politics is only as depoliticization and re-politicization.

3.4.3 The Politics of the Re-trait and the Re-trait of the Political

We are now in a position to turn to the thesis of the ‘re-trait’ of the political proposed by Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy in the context of the Centre for Philosophical Research into the Political. In their opening address to the centre, they give two senses for the phrase: ‘withdrawing the political in the sense of its being the “well-known” and in the sense of the obviousness (the blinding obviousness) of politics, the “everything is political” which can be used to qualify our enclosure in the closure of the political; but also as re-tracing the political, re-marking it, by raising the question in a new way which, for us, is to raise it as the question of its essence.’ What is clear from this somewhat obscure definition is that its authors are proposing both a historical argument and a philosophical argument. A thesis about the state of the world today accompanies a philosophical understanding of both the ‘closure’ of the political and the potential for a new understanding of politics. In a programmatic paper given at the end of the Centre’s second year, Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy clarify their understanding of the phrase, in the light of the papers delivered to the Centre. Here they recognise three ways of understanding the retrait of the political: in terms of a Hegelian Aufhebung of the political as the absorption and sublimation of the political by the state; the subordination of the political, along Marxist

lines, to an ontology of the individual; and their own understanding, derived from Heidegger via Derrida. Their explanation confirms the dual nature of their diagnosis. On the one hand, they state, 'Our retreat accompanies, in reality, a retreat of the political itself within and from the epoch of its world domination.' On the other hand, 'our retreat operates in relation to the political in general and absolutely, and that is to say in relation to the intrinsic political determination of the onto-theology of Realpolitik as it appears through the theoretical face of the Hegelian state or through the empirical face of the calculation of forces.' In particular, we should note the Heideggerean thesis that this is the 'era of the world domination' of politics, which Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy admit is largely inspired by Heidegger’s work on technology. There are two sides to this claim: one philosophical, that this is the age of 'the actualisation or the installation of the philosophical as the political, the generalisation (the globalisation) of the philosophical as the political — and by the same token, the absolute reign, or domination of the political' — and the other that this thesis is confirmed historically in the determination of the horizon of the age by totalitarianism.

The equivocation between the historical and the philosophical dimension of their argument persists in the details of Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy’s diagnosis of the retrait of the political in the modern age. They are concerned by the disappearance of the specificity of the political (which is to be distinguished in particular from the economic); the reduction of politics to ‘banal management’; and what, drawing on Hannah Arendt, they class as the triumph of a definition of man as worker and producer, the occupation of public space by the social rather than the political, and a loss of political authority in the world. It is in this context that they propose to extend Claude Lefort’s work on the totalitarian to show that the loss of sovereignty which makes available a reincarnation and reimagination of the social body to fill the empty place of power is not just a characteristic of specifically totalitarian

25 Retreating the Political. 139.
26 Retreating the Political. 110.
27 Retreating the Political. 126.
societies. They define a 'soft totalitarianism' within liberal democracy. While they draw the apparently pessimistic conclusion that there is no possibility of recovering the political from its withdrawal, the retrait of the political is also the setting free of a new possibility. This 'something' is a way of thinking politics which no longer depends on the notion of a political subject; which replaces any question of ground, subject or class with a notion of finitude; and which raises the central questions of 'relation' and of the constitution of social identity. The later work of both writers, but particularly that of Nancy, can be read as an attempt to develop such a mode of thought.

A lot seems to hang on Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy's assertion, echoing Sartre, that totalitarianism is 'the unsurpassable horizon of our times.' I argued in chapter one while discussing the work of Claude Lefort, from whom Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy derive much of their definition of totalitarianism, that the opposition between the totalitarian and the democratic needs to be rethought. Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy clearly begin to rethink this opposition, but solely in terms of revealing an unthought totalitarianism within the democratic. I suggested that in thinking politics after Derrida's work, we would need to make the reverse claim, and find democratic resources within the totalitarian. The politicization of civil society in Eastern Europe in the years following the closure of the Centre for Philosophical Research into the Political seems to bear out this thesis. To deduce that the social has excluded the political is to foreclose on its potential politicization. In Simon Critchley's words, 'the thesis of the withdrawal cannot be a partial withdrawal, it must be total. The analysis of the dual closure of the philosophical and the political must see

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28 Retreating the Political. 128.
29 Retreating the Political. 122-3.
31 Retreating the Political. 126.
totalitarianism as the final figure in the development of political forms. While Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy cannot be said to share the political views of either Heidegger or Schmitt, their work also seems to repeat the same structure. The hypothesis of a total closure, like that of a final neutralization or the most extreme danger, serves to announce or herald the potential for something new. This has the apparently paradoxical effect of both postponing that arrival (since it cannot be seen to be already at work) and predicting its content or form.

Depoliticization, understood in the sense I have been suggesting Derrida’s work makes available would be constructed to avoid precisely this problem. No politics, no politics to come or new way of thinking politically will avoid being a depoliticization; conversely no form of politics as depoliticization will not attest to the possibility of a repoliticization. By thinking these two possibilities together in the same moment, in the same concept, a deconstructive thought of the politics of the retrait would both revalue politics itself, even in its most apparent triviality — as ‘banal management’, as interminable negotiation and calculation — while maintaining the possibility of an equally necessary critique of the limits of any actual politics. This complex of depoliticization and repoliticization operates at the level of the concept; no way of thinking about the world which does not pass through it will be able to avoid the far more banal thesis of a historical depoliticization. This does not rule out the possibility of speaking about the world, although it might suggest a certain hesitancy about totalizing hypotheses. In Politics of Friendship Derrida insists that what Schmitt cannot acknowledge, having posited the technological as a secondary, and inauthentic neutralization of the purely political, is that the ‘delocalization’ of the territorial drive in modern warfare is not a displacement of an original politics of autochthony, but that ‘telluric autochthony is already a reactive response to a delocalization

and to a form of tele-technology' [POF 142 / 164]. What is at stake in Schmitt's work, but more so in Derrida's commentary is 'the relations between the history of the political and the structure of theoretical concepts which one claims to articulate upon it' [POF 143 / 164]. What distinguishes Derrida's own work is the rigour with which it refuses to leave the order of the conceptual to make a claim upon the world. The 'inscription' of the re-trait, Derrida writes, 'as I have attempted to describe it in the trace or in difference, succeeds only in being effaced (n'arrive qu'à s'effacer)' [RM 125 / 88]. Taken as the structure of repoliticization which is only as depoliticization, this would also then bear a fundamental similarity to the time of friendship as aimance through which Derrida thinks the essence of the political, an essence which is only in its own contamination, its not being essential: 'such a time gives itself in its withdrawal. It occurs only through self-effacement [Il n'arrive qu'à s'effacer, also: 'It succeeds only in effacing itself']' [POF 14 / 31]. As I have insisted, deconstruction is not just an attempt to think through the concept of depoliticization; it must have the form or the effect of a depoliticization as well. But as an attempt at re-politicization, might not its most distinctive feature be its own self-effacement? Not only a modest withdrawal before the texts on which Derrida writes, but also before politics itself? This would in turn prevent the attempt to thinking the retrait of politics as depoliticization from becoming a reduction of politics or the necessity of political calculation in the name of an essence of the political, however subtly thought out.
3.5 Conclusions

Since his ‘Letter to a Japanese Friend,’ which I discussed in the introduction to my first chapter, Derrida has offered a number of accounts of what he means by deconstruction. These comments made in an interview in 1991 are typical: deconstruction does not name a ‘fundamental project’ or even ‘the techniques [Derrida] use[s] for reading and writing’ [Poi 357/367]. Deconstruction is not even one thing: ‘I have never had a “fundamental project.”’ And “deconstructions,” which I prefer to say in the plural, has doubtless never named a project, method or system’ [Poi 356/367]. Moreover, ‘there is deconstruction, there are deconstructions everywhere’ [Poi 357/367]:

In contexts that are always very determined, it is one of the possible names for designating, by metonymy in sum, what happens or doesn’t happen to happen, namely, a certain dislocation that in fact is regularly repeated — and wherever there is something rather than nothing: in what are called the texts of classical philosophy, of course and for example, but also in every ‘text’ in the general sense that I try to justify for this word, that is in experience period, in social, historical, economic, technical, military etc., ‘reality’ [Poi 356/367].

Beginning the conclusion to this chapter I will summarize and formalize my analysis of deconstruction as depoliticization and repoliticization by focusing on the relationship between deconstruction as ‘one of the possible names for [...] what happens or doesn’t happen to happen’ and that more determined mode of deconstruction which happens within Derrida’s texts. In particular I am concerned to demonstrate that the necessary and inevitable institutionalisation of deconstruction which Derrida describes in his paper ‘Some Statements and Truisms...’ can be understood as more or less directly equivalent to what I have designated as depoliticization. Derrida’s paper ‘Some Statements and Truisms about Neologisms, Newisms, Postisms, Parasitisms, and other small Seismisms,’ to give it its full title, was given to a conference entitled ‘The States of Theory’ in 1988.33 Derrida used the

33 The proceedings were published as David Carroll ed. The States of Theory. New York: Columbia UP, 1990.
opportunity to address the status of the heterogeneous body of work loosely known as theory within American universities at the time, and the place of ‘deconstruction’ within it. It is a revealing paper, not least because Derrida addresses the genealogy of deconstruction as a theoretical project, and makes some suggestions about its relationship to various Marxist and historicist modes of reading, which were gaining currency at the time against the more formalist deconstructionism popularised in the wake of the so-called Yale School. However the paper also offers a way of understanding deconstruction as itself a theoretical discursive formation both in terms of what it shares with a number of competing theories, and in terms of what distinguishes it from these other theories.

Derrida proposes an attempt to tabularize the various theoretical approaches currently on offer in the academic battlefield (Kampfplatz) [SST 72] or market-place [SST 73-4]. This attempt at a taxonomy of theories, however, is made impossible by the very nature of these theoretical ‘jetties.’ Each jetty ‘is only a theoretical jetty inasmuch as it claims to comprehend itself by comprehending all the others’ [SST 66]. Every theory presumes a claim to account for every other theory, even if this is only by virtue of being situated in relation to other theories: it is ‘the institution of a new statement about the whole state and of a new establishment aiming at state hegemony. Each jetty has a hegemonic aim, which isn’t meant to subjugate or control the other jetties from the outside, but which is meant to incorporate them in order to be incorporated into them’ [SST 68]. Any attempt at generating a meta-theory will merely replicate the implicit project of each theory; Derrida quotes Heidegger and Lacan: ‘there is no metalanguage’ [SST 76]. The quotation not only formalizes but exemplifies the problem. Derrida’s meta-commentary on the problem of a metalanguage is both the repetitive instantiation of that very problem and an attempt to account for this situation. Derrida’s conclusion is not that we should give up attempting theoretical explanations. On the contrary, we need to develop more and more rigorous formulations of this problem. This doesn’t preclude engaging with ‘reality’ or history — ‘what happens or doesn’t happen to happen’ [PO1 356 / 367] — but is the necessary
precondition of a responsible engagement [SST 77]. ‘Reality’ or ‘history’ are themselves concepts, with their own ‘reality’ or ‘history.’ To institute a theory in the name of such concepts without reflecting on their genealogy is simply to institute a less coherent, less vigilant, theory.

Derrida’s language here — ‘institution’ — suggests that the ‘establishment’ of a theory may be considered by analogy to the institution of the law in general. That this is the case is made explicit by the example Derrida gives of another conference, ‘The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man,’ at which he presented ‘Structure Sign and Play’ in 1966. This conference has subsequently been taken as the moment of the arrival of both structuralist and post-structuralist thought to literature departments in the USA. The reality or truth of the fact that this conference took place is not in question; but Derrida argues that for the conference to become an ‘event’ in the narrative of deconstruction in America, another kind of evaluation must take place:

if something happened there which would have the value of a theoretical event, or of an event within theory, or more likely the value of an advent of a new theoretical-institutional sense of ‘theory’ — of what has been called ‘theory’ in this country for about twenty years — this something only came to light afterwards and is still becoming more and more clear today. [SST 80]

Derrida’s point here depends on his analysis of the structure of the event in general. In his essay ‘Psyche: Inventions of the Other’ this is set out briefly in the context of a discussion of the concept of ‘invention.’ An invention, as an event, ‘always presupposes some illegality, the breaking of an implicit contract; it inserts some disorder into the peaceful order of things, it disregards the proprieties’ [PSY 25 / 11]. An event cannot be predicted in advance, and like a decision, can only occur in a moment of the suspension of the law. Yet as soon as it has occurred the event is recuperated by a programme. The legal confirmation of the event of an invention by patent laws or some form of right of property testifies to the structure of the event as such; that invention begins by being susceptible to repetition, exploitation, reinscription’ [PSY 28 / 16]. Invention is ‘never private’ [PSY 28 / 15]; the legal institution of
an invention is only a response to its prior iterability. This means that, as for a decision, we can never be certain if an event has occurred: 'of this event, one is never sure' [PSY 56 / 54]. In 'Force of Law' Derrida takes the foundation of a nation state to be the best example of the institution of the law in general; and therefore we presume of the structure of an event [FoL 23-4 / 52]. In an earlier text he also takes this as a privileged examples. Using the text of the American Declaration of Independence, Derrida shows in some detail that the status of the Declaration, considered in terms of speech act theory, is very uncertain indeed. The constitution is signed by the self-proclaimed representatives of the people of the United States: yet the people in whose name the signatories of the constitution sign is not constituted as a people until the event of signing has taken place. Further, the signatories have no authorisation to sign until the people in whose name they sign has been constituted. Thus at the moment of signing there is a transgression, an illegal and illicit constitution of a law by representatives of a body which has not yet been brought into being, and who are therefore in no position to legislate:

This people does not exist. It does not exist before this declaration, not as such. If it is given birth, as a free and independent subject, as a possible signatory, this can only be by the act of this signature. The signature invents the signature. 34

The founding moment of the institution of the law, Derrida writes, 'implies a performative force' [FoL 13 / 32]; what he elsewhere calls 'perverformative'. 35 This should remind us that what Derrida has to say about theoretical events — and the 'event' that 'The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man' may have been — applies to events in general and to the possibility of an event as such.

The most interesting passages of 'Some Statements and Truisms...' for my present purpose come when Derrida dramatises his conceptualization of the event in terms

35 'Marx and Sons.' 224-5.
of his 'theoretical jetties.' The description of the jetties is clarified as a double movement which replicates that of the event and the decision: an opening to the other, or a moment of undecidability which is the condition of something happening (arriving — the French for 'to happen' is 'arriver') or of a decision being taken; and an immediate reinscription of law and programming in general. Derrida writes that each jetty is double: 'I will call the first the destabilizing jetty or even more artificially the devastating jetty, and the other one the stabilizing, establishing or simply stating jetty.' Derrida characterises this as follows. In the word 'jetty,' he writes:

I distinguish, on the one hand, the force of the movement which throws something or throws itself (jette or se jette) forward and backwards at the same time, prior to any subject, object or project, prior to any rejection or abjection, from, on the other hand, its institutional and protective consolidation, which can be compared to the jetty, the pier in a harbor meant to break the waves and maintain low tide for boats at anchor or for swimmers. Of course, these two functions of the jetty are ideally distinct, but in fact they are difficult to dissociate, if not indissociable [SST 84].

In the phrase 'the states of theory' Derrida wishes us to hear the idea of a static or stasis inducing force, as well as the disruptive or path-breaking dynamic. These two jetties are not equally opposed: one supplying momentum, one solidifying and hardening the outcome. Only the stabilising jetty moves, or hardens, it is 'essentially edifying' [SST 93]. The destabilising jetty is not, it cannot be said to exist, since as soon as we pose a question which can be given the form 'what is' we have stabilised, attempted to fix the jetty.

In terms of deconstruction as a theoretical jetty we might be tempted to distinguish Derrida's own work, as the original or destabilizing jetty, and the institution of deconstruction in America to be its stabilization. However, Derrida insists that this is not the case. His own work must in and of itself be its own stabilization; or a stabilization of that destabilization which it both attempts to draw attention to, and of which it must be an effect. So the deconstructive jetty could refer to three things. Firstly, 'neither a theory nor a philosophy [...] neither a school nor a method [...] not a discourse, not an act, nor a practice
[...] It is what happens, what is happening today in what they call society, politics, diplomacy, economics, historical reality' [SST 85]. Secondly, the forms of resistance provoked or inspired by 'what happens,' a quasi-theoretical set of resistances to particular modes of reading, interpreting, writing about 'what happens.' These forms of resistance in turn generate their own stabilizations: 'the very thing which exceeds at the same time the theoretical, the thematic, thethetic, the philosophical and the scientific provokes, as gestures of reappropriation and suture, theoretical movements, productions of theorems'[SST 87].

Derrida takes Rodolphe Gasché's *The Tain of the Mirror* as an example. Gasché risks reconstituting the second deconstructive jetty as 'a philosophy of deconstruction' [SST 89-90]. Deconstruction, to summarise, would refer to three experiences: the destabilization which *is not* but remains the necessary condition for that which happens, and its concomitant stabilization ('a resistance which produces theories' [SST 87]); a theoretical discourse which attempts to describe this structure while being an example of it; the further institutionalisation of this discourse in certain academic or journalistic contexts which 'isn't bad, it isn't an evil, and even if it were one, it would be a necessary evil' [SST 88].

On this basis I will make a provisional definition of what I have been calling depoliticization and repoliticization in Derrida's work. We can broadly distinguish three levels or modes of depoliticization. 1) The first would be the depoliticization operative within the events and decisions of what is called politics. Following the argument of *Politics of Friendship*, depoliticization would be at work wherever the political decision follows a rule — that is wherever there is a decision — and either follows or founds a naturalized sense of political responsibility, in which political equality or justice is limited to the one group rather than another. It is clear that this sense of depoliticization is necessary for there to be what we call politics. From one point of view it looks very like the definition of politics in its most common current form, as the management and allocation of the resources of a state amongst its citizens and a select group of other fraternal friends in the form of overseas aid. Yet from Derrida's point of view, as soon as this becomes the total definition of politics,
we could no longer speak of politics, since there would be no outcome which has not been programmed in advance. To the extent that there is an auto-deconstructive motif within politics, that is to say that politics can be put in question, or puts its own foundational decisions into question, politics itself bears witness to democracy-to-come. 2) The second form of deconstruction as depoliticization is the theoretico-practical description or definition of this situation within deconstruction; a set of strategic interventions in the political field which may be said to be both examples of any political event and as an attempt to account for, as far as possible, the necessary depoliticizing effect of any political discourse. This defines deconstruction as a political practice, as it was set out in the preceding chapter. By affirming the depoliticization of traditional political thought, this mode of depoliticization would be an attempt to repoliticize, without predicting an outcome, or instituting a doctrine. 3) The third order of depoliticization would be the depoliticizing effect within the second mode of depoliticization, which cannot avoid an instituting momentum. The possibility of a reflection such as this one in which I am engaged demonstrates the possibility of this further depoliticization of Derrida’s own strategies. Again, as with Gasché’s re-philosophising of deconstruction, this makes the project at worst a ‘necessary evil’ [SST 88].

Derrida’s most suggestive and explicit comments on repoliticization come in ‘Force of Law’ with a direct reference to the possibility of emancipation:

Politicization, for example, is interminable even if it cannot and should not ever be total. To keep this from being a truism or a triviality, we must recognise in it the following consequence: each advance in politicization obliges one to reconsider, and so to reinterpret the very foundations of law such as they had previously been calculated or delimited. This was true for example in the Declaration of the Rights of Man, in the abolition of slavery, in all the emancipatory battles that remain and will have to remain in progress, everywhere in the world, for men and for women. Nothing seems to me less outdated than this emancipatory appeal [FoL 28 / 62].

Discussing these comments in his ‘Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism,’ Derrida is somewhat concerned by Simon Critchley’s surprise at them. He reiterates his position: ‘I believe there is an enormous amount to do today for emancipation, in all domains and areas
of the world and society. Even if I would not wish to inscribe the discourse of emancipation into a teleology, a metaphysics, an eschatology or even a classical messianism, I none the less believe that there is no ethico-political decision or gesture without what I would call a “Yes” to emancipation’ [DAP 82]. Taken together these statements confirm the suggestions I have been making. Politicization is broadly equivalent to emancipation; however every step is also a depoliticization, which in turn requires more politicization, further emancipation. This is why the notion of a code of human rights is problematic for deconstruction, since it claims a universal and natural value, rather than leaving itself open to negotiation, challenge, and political revision. If more politicization or emancipation is the object of deconstruction, the difficulty comes in trying to formulate a politics or a political demand which could achieve such an end, without resigning oneself to the depoliticizing tradition of teleology, eschatology and metaphysics. No political theory can supply the solution to this question without falling foul of one of these traditional traps. Not only can there be no adequate theory of this politicization; if there is politicization at all, we will be unable to recognise it until after the fact. Only when the law has been cast into doubt by the arrival or event of something unpredictable can emancipation be seen to have taken place. The challenge deconstruction poses is of thinking and acting politically in a way you judge to be the most open to this event of emancipation, even while you attempt not to prejudge the issue.

The structure I have set out in this chapter is well described in these remarks:

All that a deconstructive point of view tries to show, is that since conventions, institutions and consensus are stabilizations, this means they are stabilizations of something essentially unstable and chaotic. Thus it becomes necessary to stabilize precisely because stability is not natural; it is because there is instability, that stabilization is necessary; it is because there is chaos that there is a need for stability. Now this chaos and instability, which is fundamental, founding and irreducible, is at once naturally the worst against which we struggle with laws, rules, conventions, politics and provisional hegemony, but at the same it is a chance, a chance to change, to destabilize. If there were continual stability, there would be no need for politics, and it is to the extent that stability is not natural, essential or substantial, that politics exists and ethics is possible. Chaos is at once a risk and a chance, and it is here that the possible and the impossible cross each other [DAP 83-4].
In this context we can understand depoliticization as the effect of a stabilization in the political field. What Derrida calls ‘chaos and instability’ becomes another name for what he calls ‘democracy-to-come’ and ‘justice’ elsewhere. Depoliticizing stabilizations of this field of forces are necessary; but until we think chaos itself as fundamental, which is what deconstruction offers to political theory, no kind of political thought will be able to grasp the ‘chance to change’ or destabilize. As I have argued, Carl Schmitt’s attempt to repoliticize by thinking the essence of the political risks bringing the worst violence, and to some extent this is also Derrida’s concern with Benjamin’s affirmation of a messianic violence. Deconstruction is apparently both the most radical and perhaps the most ascetic alternative to such theories, by seeking to discover a revolutionary potential in the everyday, to discern the possibility of destabilization attested to in the maintenance of the law, and to put into question political theory as in and of itself depoliticizing. Yet Derrida insists that repoliticization only has a chance if a decision could be thought without criteria, without rules or any defined or expected outcome. In the vocabulary of his essay ‘Psyche: Inventions of the Other,’ ‘the only possible invention is the invention of the impossible’ but ‘an invention of the impossible is impossible. […] It is in this paradoxical predicament that a deconstruction gets under way [qu’est engagee]’ [PSY 60 / 59]. But this is not to resign ourselves to just anything happening. As Derrida argues in ‘Force of Law,’ ‘incalculable justice requires us to calculate’ [FOL 28 / 61]. This calculation will not be without risk, but even in the worst circumstances, ‘there is no ethico-political decision or gesture without what [Derrida] would call a ‘Yes’ to emancipation’ [DAP 82].
4.
Politics against Ethics: Derrida and Levinas.

4.1 Introduction

The structure of deconstruction’s difficult engagement with politics which I have set out in the preceding three chapters has struck many of Derrida’s readers as bearing close similarities to the ethical critique of politics in the work of Emmanuel Levinas. Indeed, this has become a central reference point for political readings of Derrida in recent years. This has not always been the case. In an extended review article which was first published in 1988, Geoffrey Bennington is surprised to find little reference to ethical questions in the three books on which he is commenting, although that is where ‘almost by definition, our real interest lies: Derrida’s persistent location of “ethico-theoretical” decisions at the root of

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supposedly pure theoretical concerns […] is proof enough of that.’ A little later Bennington comments that ‘freedom, quaintly enough, is nonetheless what Derrida is all about.’ While Bennington’s rhetorical phrasing — and this is at least in part his intention — raises an ambiguity about the assumption that ‘we’ make that ethics ‘comes first,’ he does locate a gap in the earliest book-length philosophical readings of Derrida’s work. He is only able to refer to one article by Robert Bernasconi on a possible ethics of deconstruction. More than a decade later, this is probably the area in which Bennington’s article most shows its age. For alongside the publication by Derrida of increasingly explicit work on political questions, there has been a great deal of discussion of the ethical dimension of his thought, mostly published in English, and including several more important articles by Bernasconi.

The key text for the discussion of the relationship between deconstruction, politics and ethics remains Simon Critchley’s The Ethics of Deconstruction, published in 1992, and following Critchley, the relationship between Derrida’s work and that of Emmanuel Levinas has been of particular importance in this debate. It seems plausible that at least some of the recent growth of interest in Levinas’s philosophy in English language work in the humanities

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is a by-product of Derrida’s persistent engagement with Levinas. Given the polemical context of the reception of ‘deconstruction’ this has led to the paradoxical position that Levinas’s work has been taken to offer not only an ethical alternative to deconstruction, but that deconstruction has been seen to be merely derivative of Levinas’s work. In the ‘Foreword’ to the first paperback edition of the English translation of Levinas’s major text *Otherwise than Being* in 1998, Richard Cohen makes such a claim when he asserts that ‘Heidegger’s celebrated disciple in France, Jacques Derrida, staked out his own career by borrowing Levinas’s notion of the trace of diachrony, and ethical structure. He nonetheless purported to bend it for Heideggerean purposes [...]’ [OB xv]. As I will argue however, the insistence by Critchley and others that the ‘ethical’ dimension of deconstruction depends on Derrida’s relation to Levinas is somewhat misleading. The exchange between Derrida and Levinas is complex, not least because both their texts and that which they are seeking to describe resist straightforward philosophical analysis for intrinsic reasons. The extent to which Derrida borrows and manipulates Levinasian terms in his recent texts can only complicate the problem, but a close reading of *Adieu: à Emmanuel Levinas* will demonstrate that their positions can be distinguished.

In this chapter I set out what I take to be the fundamental distinction to be drawn between the positions of Levinas and Derrida, drawing on Levinas’s work in *Totality and Infinity* and Derrida’s early essay ‘Violence and Metaphysics.’ I draw on this distinction to assert that there is a particularly significant difference between their work when we turn to the question of politics. I claim that Derrida offers a specifically political critique of the ethical relation in Levinas’s work, and that this provides another important context for *Politics of Friendship*. 
4.2 Derrida and Levinas

In this section I will focus the problem of the relation between ethics and politics through a discussion of the first of Levinas's major philosophical works, *Totality and Infinity,* and Derrida's response to that book in his early essay 'Violence and Metaphysics.' The key issue for assessing the relationship between Levinas and Derrida is whether the changes in Levinas's work between the publication of *Totality and Infinity* and of *Otherwise than Being,* arguably made with Derrida's criticisms of the early work in mind, successfully overcome the problems Derrida finds in it. If this is indeed the case, both the later Levinas and Derrida may be said to be following the same project, and turning to *Otherwise than Being* and Derrida's later book on Levinas, *Adieu,* in the following section will only be able to reveal political or strategic differences subsequent to a common (ethical) theoretical project. If this is not the case, then we should expect *Adieu* to bear out the same criticisms of Levinas that Derrida makes in 'Violence and Metaphysics.'

I have encountered a particular methodological problem in writing this section of my thesis. Since deconstruction has been concerned to put the whole notion of propriety into question, there can be no possibility of rigorously distinguishing commentary from critique within Derrida's readings of other texts. (Although this may also be a useful exercise to the extent that it is possible.) This problem is most intense with those authors with whom Derrida has most in common; Heidegger, Levinas, Blanchot. Elsewhere in my thesis this has not been an issue since I have been concerned to reconstruct Derrida's own thought, and the question of the originality of his work has been suspended. In this chapter, where the difference between Derrida's work and that of Levinas is itself at stake, to simply distribute their work in terms of a fundamental opposition would be to regress to a pre-deconstructive methodology. Particularly in the sections discussing Levinas's texts — for example the paragraph concerned with the place of the State in *Totality and Infinity* — I have attempted
to avoid reducing his work to one voice or one argument, against which Derrida’s own work could be simply contrasted.

4.2.1 The Ethics of Emmanuel Levinas.

I begin my discussion of the relationship between ethics and politics in Levinas and Derrida by specifying how Levinas understands ethics. This is not however an easy question to answer — particularly since, as Robert Bernasconi has argued, Levinas’s use of the term itself changes as his work develops, and perhaps even in response to Derrida’s criticisms. In this section I focus on Levinas’s first philosophical work, *Totality and Infinity*, since this is the text to which Derrida formulates his most lengthy and complete reply. This requires the reconciliation of two apparently contradictory statements by Levinas. In the preface to the work Levinas appears to indicate that he will be following a path broken by Husserl: ‘Husserlian phenomenology has made possible this passage from ethics [*l’éthique*] to metaphysical exteriority’ [TI 29 / 15]. Yet elsewhere Levinas insists that his rethinking of metaphysics is itself ‘ethical [*éthique*]’ [TI 43 / 33]. To make sense of what Levinas is arguing, it is necessary to consider his argument as operating with two very different ideas of ethics. The first meaning of ethics is conventional; the second, with which he is seeking to replace the first, is a specialised understanding of the term, within the context of his broader metaphysical claims. So to understand the concept of ‘ethics’ in Levinas’s work, it will be necessary to sketch briefly the major themes of *Totality and Infinity*.

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Levinas argues that thought, action or intentionality in general are made possible by the prior presence of that which is other. Each takes place as transcendence, as a movement outside the self. The tradition of metaphysics, Levinas claims, has precisely aimed at what is beyond the world, yet has consistently failed to appreciate the radicality of what is outside, choosing instead to understand the unfamiliar in terms of the familiar, the unknown in terms of what can be known, the other in terms of the same [TI 33 / 21]. Yet what makes possible the awareness of something else, whether beyond the senses, beyond the natural world, or beyond the self, is the absolutely other: 'this absolute exteriority of the metaphysical term, [...] is, if not demonstrated, claimed by the word transcendent. The metaphysical movement is transcendent' [TI 35 / 24]. The totality of the self-same is always already breached by the transcendence or infinity of the absolutely other. Levinas attempts the re-foundation of metaphysics in this relation to the other considered as absolutely other, rather than as an other modelled on the familiar; only this could provide a philosophy which would be adequate to the world itself. This new form of metaphysics must be opposed to Hegelian philosophy as a dialectic of negativity since the relation between the same and the other is to be thought 'cutting across' the logic of contradiction or opposition [TI 40-2 / 30-2], and beyond the Hegelian reconciliation of difference in totality [TI 150 / 161]. It must also exceed all ontology, up to and including the work of Heidegger [TI 27-8 / 13; 46 / 36; 89 / 88-9], which 'presupposes metaphysics' [TI 48 / 39]. To pursue philosophy as ontology 'is to subordinate the relation to someone, who is an existent, (the ethical relation) to a relation with the Being of existents, which, impersonal, permits the apprehension, the domination of existents (a relationship of knowing)' [TI 45 / 38]. This argument leads Levinas to specify that the relation with the other as absolute alterity [Autre] is the relationship with any

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7 Following standard practice in translating Levinas, I will use 'other' for both 'autre' and 'Autre' and Other only for 'autru' when it is not qualified by 'absolute' or 'person,' for example. It is generally accepted that Levinas himself is inconsistent in his capitalization of the terms.
particular other person [Autrui]. More specifically, it is in the face of the other person that the absoluteness of their difference from me is encountered.

The sense in which Levinas uses the term 'ethics' [éthique] positively is as a description of this face-to-face encounter with the Other. In the passage quoted above, the relationship to an existing being is 'the ethical relation' [TI 45 / 36]. More broadly, this is an ethical relation with the world in general. It thus makes possible a mode of thinking about the world which would respect the dimension of exteriority rather than, as Levinas claims all previous Western philosophy has done, reducing the other to the same. Levinas sometimes describes this new way of thinking as metaphysics, sometimes as 'theory' and sometimes as a form of 'critique': 'critique does not reduce the other [Autre] to the same but calls into question the exercise of the same. A calling into question of the same — which cannot occur within the egoist spontaneity of the same — is brought about by the other [Autre]. We name this calling into question of my spontaneity by the presence of the Other [Autrui] ethics / ethical [éthique]' [TI 42-3 / 33]. There is however an ambiguity in this description. Ethics is here the name for the relation to the other, rather than for a theory of that relation: Levinas's work is not in itself an 'ethics.' Yet the name itself returns us to the more conventional meaning of 'ethics' which would belong to Western philosophy, and which Levinas is trying to avoid. The sense of 'ethics' for Levinas is not that of the determination of a moral code whether from a theory of virtue; by the observation of a moral sentiment within human nature; or as an abstraction from the ethical life of a particular community. Levinas claims that it is the work of Husserl which has enabled him to escape from the hold of the traditional understandings of ethics. But Levinas still calls the 'metaphysical exteriority' to which this 'passage' has led 'ethical.' While we might hold apart these two meanings for the same word more or less successfully, many commentators on Levinas have suggested that the problem can be resolved (at least in translation) by distinguishing the nominal and
adverbial aspects of the French *I'étique*.\(^8\) ‘Ethics’ would then continue to name the familiar dimension of moral philosophy, while ‘the ethical’ would be reserved for the more profound sense of ‘ethics’ as metaphysics or transcendence itself. While helpful, it should be noted that such a distinction is rarely rigorously observed by the translators of Levinas, since it has no basis within his language and must already depend on an interpretation of his work.\(^9\)

The bulk of *Totality and Infinity* consists of a series of analyses which Levinas proposes to describe the nature of the ethical relation of the self to the world: for example, of Desire, of sensibility, of the face, of fecundity, of dwelling, of the erotic. The ethical relation cannot be described strictly ‘in terms of experience, for infinity overflows the thought that thinks it’ [TI 25 / 10]. It is also difficult to grasp it theoretically, for what Levinas refers to as ‘thematization and conceptualization’ are ‘not peace with the other, but suppression or possession of the other’ [TI 46 / 37]. The problem which Levinas faces in his work is that what he wishes to describe as ‘infinity’ and as ‘transcendence’ is irreducible to the order of theoretical explanation, yet is already at work in both theoretical and experiential relations to the world. So ‘metaphysics’ is not ‘a philosophy of transcendence that situates elsewhere the true life to which man, escaping from here, would gain access in the privileged moments of liturgical mystical elevation, or in dying’ [TI 52 / 44]. Yet nor is it ‘a philosophy of immanence’ — by which Levinas appears to mean Hegelianism — ‘in which we would truly come into possession of being when every “other” (cause for war), encompassed by the same, would vanish at the end of history.’ The relationship with the other must be described ‘within the unfolding of terrestrial existence, of economic existence’ [TI 52 / 44]. Accordingly, Levinas’s analyses often seem to be suspended between the two poles of


\(^9\) In ‘Violence and Metaphysics’ Derrida emphasises that ‘as this determination does not offer itself as a *theory* of ethics, in question then is an Ethics of Ethics’ [WD 111 / 164].
everyday experience and of theoretical description, both of which, pursued in isolation, would ultimately converge as the ‘totalization of history’ [TI 52 / 44].

To some extent these analyses complicate the rather bold and stark terms in which Levinas has set out his central argument — as the opposition between totality and infinity, or the ontological and the ethical — and which is apparently mapped over onto both the relation between transcendence and history, and that between the subject and the State. Totality is directly associated throughout the book with the State [TI 301 / 336, 305 / 341], as is ontology: ‘Ontology as first philosophy is a philosophy of power. It issues in the State and in the non-violence of the totality, without securing itself against the violence from which this non-violence lives, and which appears in the tyranny of the State’ [TI 46 / 37]. Meanwhile the dimension of interiority (which, like Derrida’s use of the secret which I discussed in my first chapter, is not a form of containment, but the principle of an irreducible singularity, of the being-called-into-question of my self by the relation with the other other) is consistently opposed to history: psychic life ‘interrupts historical time’ [TI 57 / 51]. Set out in these terms, Levinas’s work would lend itself to being read as a crude anti-Hegelianism. In political terms it would seem to be either apolitical — a total rejection of and disengagement from the state and an alternative focus on the question of transcendence — or anarchist — simply opposed to the state form as such. These alternatives could perhaps be clarified if it could be established whether Levinas understands the state to be the name of the political entity as such, or as the legal apparatus and institutions which enforces the law within the state. However, a brief look at the use of labour in Totality and Infinity suggests that this first response will not do. Levinas is writing in a philosophical context which is dominated by the Marxist and existentialist reading of Hegel popularised in France by Kojève.¹⁰ So when

Levinas argues that every labour ‘presupposes a primordial hold on the things, possessions, whose latent birth is marked by the home, at the frontier of interiority’ [TI 163 / 175] it seems reasonable to suppose that his argument is intended to complicate the post-Hegelian account of being in terms of work. Rather than defining man’s existence in terms of a dialectical operation performed upon or against the world, Levinas insists that man’s labour proceeds from an original dwelling which is a dwelling with the other. In doing so he seeks to break a path between the materialist analysis of existence as labour, and either the idealist account of man as intentional consciousness or the transcendental account in which meaning is to be found beyond the world. Labour itself attests to the ethical relationship with the world within which it takes place. Transferring this argument to the problem of the state, one would assume that if infinity can only be thought from within the finite (labour), which must bear some trace of what transcends it (dwelling), then presumably the State must also bear some trace of the ethical.

The ultimate figure of the ethical relation in *Totality and Infinity* is in the epiphany of the face. It is before the face of the other person [*Autrui*] who is absolutely other that the subject is called into question. The face of the Other [*Autrui*], writes Levinas, is a ‘moral summons’ [TI 196 / 213]. Freedom does not consist in the exercise of the free will of an individual, but in the experience of the contestation of my freedom by the other: ‘the other [*Autre*], absolutely other [*autre*] — the Other [*Autrui*] — does not limit the freedom of the same; calling it to responsibility, it founds it and justifies it’ [TI 197 / 214-5]. Responsibility is an effect of the ethical relation. From the metaphysical establishment of subjectivity in relation to the infinity of transcendence — both figured and experienced in the face of an other (‘it remains terrestrial’ [TI 203 / 222]) — Levinas deduces the conditions of responsibility. The relation with the other precedes the possibility of a struggle with the other: ‘War presupposes peace, the antecedent and non-allergic presence of the Other [*Autrui*]; it does not represent the first event of the encounter’ [TI 199 / 218]. If the relation with the other is perceived as struggle it is because such a perception remains within ‘the
idealism of a consciousness of struggle’ [TI 199 / 218]. The peace of the ethical relation with the face of the Other comes before violence, although it remains unclear whether this is a temporal or a logical precedence. Responsibility is a question of the infinite response to this peaceful relationship. The absolute alterity expressed in the face of the other also conveys ‘the presence of the third party, the whole of humanity’ [TI 213 / 234]. (For Levinas this is a community ‘instituted by’ language which amounts to brotherhood between men [TI 213-4 / 234].) Before the face of the whole of humanity, as the Other [Autrui] who faces me and the other others who face me through his eyes, the subject is faced with ‘the call to infinite responsibility’ [TI 245 / 274]. Levinas calls for an assumption of responsibility, a turn from possession to generosity [TI 50 / 42]. ‘To welcome the other,’ he writes, ‘is to put in question my freedom’ [TI 85 / 84].

It is this asymmetrical relationship between the subject and the infinite transcendence of the other which Levinas calls ethical. Only when this relation is taken into account is there any possibility of something like ‘ethics’ in the sense that we usually come across it. Yet this ‘ethical’ relation is founded neither in a neutral ground (a relationship between beings which would be mediated by the relationship of beings with Being) nor in a principle of finite responsibility (based on the equivalence of the same and the other) but on the asymmetry of the relation itself. This asymmetry summons the subject as responsibility. As Levinas puts it, ‘to be judged does not consist in hearing a verdict set forth impersonally and implacably out of universal principles’ [TI 244 / 273] for this would presume a relation with others set out in terms of reciprocity or universality. Instead, ‘the exaltation of the singularity in judgement is produced precisely in the infinite responsibility of the will to which the judgement gives rise’ [TI 244 / 273]. Levinas insists:

The summons exalts the singularity precisely because it is addressed to an infinite responsibility. The infinity of responsibility denotes not its actual immensity, but a responsibility increasing in measure that it is assumed; duties become greater in the measure that they are accomplished. The better I accomplish my duty the fewer rights I have; the more I am just, the more I am guilty [TI 244 / 273-4].
As soon as I admit that I am responsible to the other, in whatever measure, it will never be enough: for there to be any responsibility, there must always be more responsibility. From the point of assumption of any responsibility onwards, the more I presume myself to be responsible, the less responsible I then become. This is the ‘ethical’ message of Totality and Infinity, which renders the common understanding of ‘ethics,’ in the sense of an obligation I could fulfil or a life I could possibly lead, unable to account for the true dimensions of responsibility.

There is however a slightly more complex relationship between the ethical relation and justice. We might have already presumed this to be the case, on the basis of the argument that the transcendence of the infinite must not only be thought not from within the finite, but must also be found to be traced within the finite. Levinas introduces a structure to mediate the passage between the ethical relation of the face to face encounter with one other person, which testifies to the relation with absolute alterity itself, and ‘terrestrial’ or ‘economic’ existence, in which there will always be more than one other person. This is the concept of ‘the third’ (tiers). ‘Everything,’ Levinas argues, ‘that takes place here “between us” concerns everyone’ [TI 212 / 234]. The rest of the world is present for me in the eyes of the Other, and ‘the presence of the face, the infinity of the other [Autre], is a destituteness [dénuelement], a presence of the third party (that is of the whole of humanity which looks at us), and a command that commands commanding’ [TI 213 / 234]. I am commanded to command, because the third party is joined to me ‘for service’ [TI 213 / 235]. In commanding I fail to be responsible, just as no-one exists in the pure state of the ethical relation; but I am commanded to command because there must be justice within the world, which Levinas associates with language [TI 213 / 234] or discourse: ‘Metaphysics is enacted where the social relation is enacted — in our relations with men’ [TI 78 / 77]. Far more so than in the case of the State, the mechanisms of justice, even though they must be based on a formal equality between men [TI 212-4 / 234-6] rather than on the dissymmetry of the relation to the absolute other, attest to the transcendent.
Even from this brief summary it will be obvious that the work of Derrida which I have discussed in the preceding chapters has immediate points of comparison with the themes of Levinas's argument that I have just laid out. However rather than attempt a tabulation of the similarities between Levinas and Derrida I turn instead to Derrida's reply to *Totality and Infinity*, the essay 'Violence and Metaphysics.' This will help to establish both the basic parameters of Derrida's response to Levinas and the trajectory of the encounter between the two thinkers within which both Levinas's second major text, *Otherwise than Being*, and Derrida's own later texts, must be situated.

4.2.2 Ethics, Metaphysics and Violence.

'Violence and Metaphysics' is Derrida's first essay on Levinas. It was also the first major consideration of Levinas's thought to be published in France — indeed Jacques Roland describes Derrida as 'Levinas's first reader in the sense in which Heidegger was Husserl's first reader'¹¹ — and ran in two consecutive issues of *La Revue de la Metaphysique et de la Morale*, before being collected in revised form in *Writing and Difference*. The essay is broadly divided into two halves. In the first Derrida gives a sympathetic account of Levinas's work up to and including the publication of *Totality and Infinity* while in the second, he formulates three criticisms of his work. However, the distinction between the two halves is not as clear as it might be. Derrida is asking similar questions of Levinas throughout, and when he does come to propose his objections, he comments ambiguously that 'the route followed by Levinas's thought is such that all our questions already belong to his own

interior dialogue, are displaced into his discourse and only listen to it, from many vantage points and in many ways' [WD 109 / 161]. What Derrida means by this will be crucial for an attempt to clarify his relationship with Levinas. If Derrida is being sincere, his statement could mean that he considers his own project to be a continuation of that of Levinas, even to the point where he formulates what are apparently criticisms of Levinas. However, as I will argue, not only do these criticisms seem substantial, but they never appear to be retracted in Derrida's subsequent essays on Levinas. In which case Derrida might be read as expanding on a point which Levinas has only partly grasped, to the point where Levinas's own work comes to seem inadequate to the possibilities it opens up — perhaps in the same way that Levinas considers the work of Husserl to have made the passage from ontology to ethical metaphysics possible. Alternatively, it is also important to consider the possibility that this is merely a rhetorical flourish, a modesty *topos*. For it can be shown, I think, that what Derrida undertakes in this essay is entirely consistent with the other work he undertakes at the time, which would imply that there is no special relationship with Levinas — or that if there is, it must be internal to the logic of Derrida's work, and not acknowledged explicitly within the argument of his essay. This is the assumption from which I will proceed.

All of the problems which Derrida locates in *Totality and Infinity* follow a similar pattern, which is a familiar one in Derrida's early work, and in particular, throughout *Writing and Difference*. This similarity can be highlighted by a comparison of the original and the revised versions of the essay, which show that Derrida recasts his concerns to fit with issues raised in other essays in the book. As Geoffrey Bennington has argued extensively, Derrida's early work largely takes the form of revealing transcendental or metaphysical presuppositions in discourses which claim to have somehow got beyond metaphysics.12 So in *Writing and Difference*, texts by Freud, Foucault, Bataille and Levi-Strauss, amongst others, are all debunked, and shown to presume metaphysical foundations. To take the essay on

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Foucault as an example, Derrida argues that the attempt to write a history of madness, understood in terms of an unreason defined by exclusion from reason itself, runs the risk of ‘confirming metaphysics in its fundamental operation’ by ‘construing the division [of reason and madness, which Foucault seeks to locate within history. AT] as an event or a structure subsequent to the unity of an original presence,’ [WD 40 / 65] rather than as a ‘dissension [...] a self-dividing action, a cleavage and torment interior to meaning in general’ [WD 38 / 62]. Derrida proposes another project, which rather than thinking through either the historicity of the concept of madness or the light that this might shed on the historicity of history (as the project of reason), would seek to think the grounds of what both makes possible and depends on the distinction between madness and reason, the very ‘historicity of philosophy’ in general: ‘The historicity proper to philosophy is located and constituted in the transition, the dialogue between hyperbole [i.e. madness, which exceeds reason. AT] and the finite structure [i.e. a historically situated concept of reason. AT], between that which exceeds the totality and the closed totality, in the difference between history and historicity’ [WD 60 / 94]. The first stage of the argument is derived from Husserl’s criticism of naturalism as a self-refuting scepticism, while the second constitutes Derrida’s more distinctive contribution, as I discussed in the first section of my second chapter. What is peculiar to Writing and Difference is the attempt to think this account of historicity in terms of ‘economy,’ perhaps as a result of the inclusion of Derrida’s essay on Bataille, ‘From Restricted to General Economy.’ So in the essay on Foucault Derrida comments that ‘the relationship between reason, madness, and death is an economy’ [WD 62 / 96] and in the revisions of ‘Violence and Metaphysics’ a number of references to economy are also added, several of which will be crucial for my reading.13

It is within this general structure that Derrida performs what might be considered to be a rather unfair preliminary situation of Levinas’s work. For he recasts the project of *Totality and Infinity* in terms of an opposition between the Greek and the Judaic traditions. This is an argument which is nowhere evoked in *Totality and Infinity*, and Levinas’s references to transcendance as God [TI 246-7 / 276-7; 293 / 326], and the ethical relation with the other as religion [TI 40 / 30; 80 / 79] draw precisely on the God of Descartes and the Good beyond being of Plato. Derrida insists however that Levinas’s attempt to think beyond philosophy as ontology can be understood as the Greek discourse of philosophy being transcended by a Judaic other which it cannot account for. If Levinas’s project can successfully be assimilated to that of Foucault or Levi-Strauss as an attempt to get beyond metaphysics, then the apparent unfairness of this situation will be justified, and Derrida will have exposed a structure which is presupposed but not stated within *Totality and Infinity*. However, if the position is rather more complex, and we cannot simply compare the attempt to escape philosophy from the perspective of the human sciences with the attempt to refound philosophy within philosophy, then this gives us a clear entry point to Derrida’s arguments against Levinas, which will depend on distorting Levinas’s work in this way. Let us follow the second hypothesis for the moment and use it to help set out the basic questions which Derrida puts to Levinas, underlying all of which can be seen this presumed opposition between the Greek and Jewish traditions. These questions concern: 1) the problem of language in Levinas’s work; 2) the relationship between totality and infinity itself; 3) Levinas’s relation to Heideggerean ontology; 4) Levinas’s relation to Husserl’s phenomenology.

The question of language is the most pervasive in the essay and relates directly to the possibility of establishing a meaningful distinction between Greek and Jewish thought. As Derrida had argued in his ‘Introduction’ to Husserl’s *The Origin of Geometry*, the discourse of philosophy must have a finite origin; an origin which can neither be fully recovered nor fully disowned. Once philosophy has been born in Greece, it cannot think the non-Greek, or
the non-philosophical, except by reference to itself. Or, to put this argument in Levinas’s terms, philosophy can only think the other in terms of the same, thus reducing the other to the same. But the attempt to call philosophy itself into question runs into the difficulty of finding a language in which to do so. ‘Will the other of the Greek,’ Derrida asks ‘be the non-Greek? Above all, can it be named the non-Greek?’ [WD 82 / 122]. Further on in the essay he adds, ‘will a non-Greek ever succeed in doing what a Greek […] could not do, except by disguising himself as a Greek, by speaking Greek, by feigning to speak Greek […]?’ [WD 89 / 133]. Derrida does not answer this question directly, but in his conclusions he argues that Levinas’s project is that of an empiricism, which ‘always has been determined by philosophy, from Plato to Husserl, as nonphilosophy: as the philosophical pretention to nonphilosophy, the inability to justify oneself, to come to one’s own aid as speech’ [WD 152 / 226]. In other words, Derrida’s claim is that Levinas cannot escape philosophy, and creates a philosophically incoherent discourse in trying to do so: but this would be something like an honourable failure, since ‘this incapacitation, when resolutely assumed, contests the resolution and coherence of the logos (philosophy) at its root, instead of letting itself be questioned by the logos’ [WD 152 / 226].

At its most extreme this complaint against Levinas takes the form of suggesting a complicity or parallel between his work and that of Hegel: ‘The other, for me, [Derrida is glossing Levinas. AT] is an ego which I know to be in relation to me as to an other. Where have these movements been better described than in The Phenomenology of The Mind?’ [WD 126 / 185]. In a long passage [WD 98-100 / 146-8; cf. VM 345] and a footnote [WD 320n.91 / 227n.1; cf. VM 472] added to the essay before its republication in Writing and Difference Derrida spells out what is almost a shocking challenge to a thinker whose work takes as its horizon the violence of philosophy as the thinking of totality: ‘Levinas is very close to Hegel, much closer than he admits, and at the very moment when he is apparently
opposed to Hegel in the most radical fashion\textsuperscript{14} [WD 99 / 147]. When he makes this comment Derrida has a specific similarity in mind, between Levinas’s and Hegel’s analyses of the face, yet he goes on to suggest that this is a more than an incidental correlation: ‘a situation he [Levinas] must share with all anti-Hegelian thinkers’ [WD 99 / 147]. Later on in the essay Derrida compares Levinas to Kierkegaard and Feuerbach as fellow anti-Hegelian (and therefore, in retaining the logic of dialectical opposition, perhaps still too Hegelian) thinkers when he questions the return in Totality and Infinity of terms proscribed in Levinas’s earlier texts [WD 109 / 162]: the same and the other, interiority and exteriority. Derrida’s intention here is consistent with his earlier concerns about speaking Greek, that of thinking through ‘the necessity of lodging oneself within traditional conceptuality in order to destroy it’ [WD 111 / 164-5].

The difficulty of escaping Hegel, who, as so often in Derrida’s texts, stands for philosophy as such in its own claim to completion, leads us to the condensation of this general concern with the problem of escaping the language of metaphysics around the second of the four questions which I listed above, that of the relationship between totality and infinity itself. In a footnote appended to the conclusions of his essay before its revised publication Derrida refers to the Science of Logic: ‘Pure difference is not absolutely different (from nondifference). Hegel’s critique of the concept of pure difference is for us here, doubtless the most uncircumventable theme. Hegel thought absolute difference, and showed that it can be pure only by being impure’ [WD 320n.91 / 227n.1]. The question which Derrida poses in the section of the essay ‘Of the Original Polemic’ may be read as a re-translation of precisely this problem. If Levinas makes use of the concept of exteriority in

\textsuperscript{14} Cf. the discussion of ‘desire’ in its Levinasian and Hegelian forms at WD 92-3 / 137-8. Derrida suggests here that despite their differences — ‘Hegelian desire would be only needed, in Levinas’s sense’ — a closer reading of Hegel might reveal Levinas to be more Kierkegaardian — and therefore in a sense more Hegelian — than he would admit: ‘Despite his anti-Kierkegaardian protests, Levinas here returns to the themes of Fear and Trembling.’ It appears that Derrida is here announcing the programme undertaken in the second half of The Gift of Death [GoD 83-84 / 116-7].
Totality and Infinity, having warned against this in Time and the Other, Derrida suggests, it is because while what he seeks to describe is non-spatial, it can only be understood on the basis of a spatial analogy. To think an exteriority beyond the philosophical space in which exteriority can only be thought as non-interiority, and thus recovered for the same, Levinas cannot not proceed within the terms of the tradition. In other words, and following the argument that there is no extra-philosophical language, ‘it is necessary to state infinity’s excess over totality in the language of totality; [...] it is necessary to state the other in the language of the Same; [...] it is necessary to think true exteriority as non-exteriority’ [WD 112 / 165].

Within language, philosophical concepts and metaphors cannot be opposed, any more than philosophy could be simply reduced to a metaphorical basis, a point touched on in the discussion of ‘White Mythology’ and ‘The Retreat of Metaphor’ in my third chapter. Derrida describes what it is hard not to read as his own project at this early stage of his career (the first version of this essay was published in 1964, his ‘Introduction to The Origin of Geometry’ in 1962):

Philosophical language belongs to a system of language(s). Thereby its nonspeculative ancestry always brings a certain equivocality into speculation. Since this equivocality is original and irreducible, perhaps philosophy must adopt it, think it and be thought in it, must accommodate duplicity and difference within speculation, within the very purity of philosophical meaning. No one, it seems to us, has attempted this more profoundly than Hegel [WD 113 / 167].

The reference to Hegel later in the essay confirms that just as Derrida does not think ‘true’ exteriority can be thought except as ‘non’-exteriority, so he does not think that pure difference can be thought by any attempt at a heterology. Such a thought of pure dispersal would be the object of the empiricism he attributes to Levinas, and only possible as ‘a

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15 Hegel is famously described in Of Grammatology as ‘the last philosopher of the book and the first thinker of writing’ [GRA 26 / 41].
16 On the difficulty of heterology, see Rodolphe Gasché. The Tain of the Mirror. 79-105.
Moreover, for the same reasons, we cannot think philosophically the absolute alterity which Levinas calls the Other, and with which the self can enter into an ethical relation. As pure difference can only be impure in Hegel, so Derrida claims, absolute alterity can only be finite or non-absolute alterity. The positive infinity invoked by Levinas remains a prisoner of the traditional opposition: ‘I cannot designate the (infinite) irreducible alterity of the Other [autrui] except [sic] through the negation of (finite) spatial exteriority’ [WD 114 / 168]. Alterity cannot be made present — or cannot be named, and the distinction is perhaps not as clear as it might seem — except as the ‘unthinkable-impossible-unutterable beyond (tradition’s) Being and Logos’ [WD 114 / 168]. Incapable of being brought to presence, alterity (if there is any) would appear as its own disappearance within totality: a structure, that is, whose effects in Derrida’s work would be common to those of several other concepts I have already discussed — the re-mark, the re-trait, différance, and the spectrality of the decision, for example.

This crucial distinction between what we might call finite alterity (inscribed within totality) and infinite alterity (as the excess over totality) is brought out by Derrida as a confrontation with Levinas over the name of God. In Totality and Infinity Levinas invokes religion as a name for the transcendence of the relation to the other. Derrida argues in return that God can only be thought within philosophy as a positive infinity, and cannot then be opposed to history or totality as Levinas would wish it to be. If God is taken to be the name of alterity (exteriority, transcendence, infinity) would not God then be ‘nothing (determined) [...] because he is everything? and therefore is at once All and Nothing, Life and Death. Which means that God is or appears, is named, within the difference between All or Nothing, Life and Death. Within difference, and at bottom as Difference itself. This difference is what is called History. God is inscribed in it’ [WD 115-6 / 170]. Just as Jewish thought cannot be simply opposed to Greek thought, so God cannot be opposed to philosophy. However there is a further displacement to be undergone. If Derrida insists that infinite alterity as the excess over totality can only be thought as finite alterity considered to
be within totality, he does not understand totality in quite the same way as Levinas does. Absolute difference cannot be thought except within an infinite series of finite attempts to think difference, and would not escape its own inscription as a possibility within finitude, within language, and within the world; or, to borrow Derrida’s words: ‘Within history which the philosopher cannot escape, because it is not history in the sense given to it by Levinas (totality), but is the history of the departures from totality, history as the very movement of transcendence, of the excess over the totality without which no totality would appear as such’ [WD 117 / 173]. There is an originary complication and co-implication of totality and infinity which cannot be reduced to any form of dialectical opposition, however sophisticated.

The third and fourth of the problems into which Derrida shapes his general concerns about language are established in parallel, in two sections entitled ‘Of Transcendental Violence’ and ‘Of Ontological Violence.’ The first concerns Levinas’s reading of Husserl, and the second his relation to Heidegger. In both cases, Derrida is concerned to demonstrate the argument we have just discussed from its reverse side. Having argued for totality as itself the history of its own departures from totality, Derrida now goes on to bring to light these departures within the totality, and precisely within the phenomenology and fundamental ontology with which Levinas has sought to break. In the terms of the distinction between Jewish and Greek thought which I have been following, having shown that Levinas’s ‘Judaic’ writing was more Greek than it claimed, Derrida goes on to argue that the ‘Greek’ writing of Husserl and Heidegger is already more ‘Jewish’ than Levinas would give them credit for. The material on Husserl largely repeats work published elsewhere,17: that the notion of horizon signalled by the place of the ‘Idea in the Kantian sense’ in phenomenology, of horizon as both an opening and a limit, makes phenomenology itself

already the site of an opening to alterity [WD 120 / 177]; and that the notion of the living present, as the movement of temporalization, is ‘the absolute form of the opening of time to the other in itself’ [WD 133 / 195]. The section on Heidegger corrects Levinas’s rather brutal reading of the ontic-ontological difference. Derrida argues that since the difference between Being and beings is not, Being cannot appear except as already dispersed, disseminated amongst beings, in difference. Heidegger cannot simply be said to have subsumed beings under being, or more precisely in Levinas’s terms to have subsumed the relation with the other (ethics) to the Being of the other (ontology) [WD 135 / 198]. Without the ‘dissimulation of Being by the existent there would be nothing, and there would be no history’ [WD 144 / 213]. Derrida argues that the ontic-ontological difference which the thought of Being seeks to think is presumed by Levinas, even as he disowns it. The “inversion of the terms” ontology and metaphysics that Levinas proposes’ leaves the thought of Being ‘forever out of reach.’ Turning Levinas’s argument on its head, Derrida claims that Levinas’s text is the more traditional one: ‘the question of Being cannot budge the metaphysical edifice of Totality and Infinity (for example)’ [WD 143 / 211]. Ontology cannot be exchanged for ethics, the thought of Being for the thought of the relation to the other, because Being has nothing opposed to it: neither ethics, nor infinity, nor God. God can be an example of an existent — whether the most elevated or the most typical — because the name of God is written within the field opened by the question of Being.18

I suggested above that Derrida might have been somewhat impertinent in framing Levinas’s text in terms of the distinction between Judaism and Greek. Yet in reading ‘Violence and Metaphysics’ it is clear that the distinction is appropriate to describing the structure of Totality and Infinity as Derrida understands it. For Derrida, at least, the ethical relation to absolute alterity can only be thought of in terms of non-absolute alterity. The

absolute other can only be thought of by a return to the same. Levinas's attempt to refound metaphysics as ethics must fail, since 'Jewish' alterity cannot escape 'Greek' alterity. It is however, unclear as to whether Levinas is not himself aware of this in writing *Totality and Infinity*. As I suggested briefly above, there is a way of looking at his analyses which already presupposes a more complex relationship between philosophy and the ethical relation, between transcendence and totality, than that of simple opposition. This in no way refutes or makes Derrida's essay irrelevant. But it would mean that we would have to interpret his claim to be asking questions from within Levinas's own trajectory quite carefully. For the question would then no longer be whether the problems to which Derrida draws attention are ones of which Levinas is aware and with which he is seeking to come to terms, or whether they are structural problems of which he is unaware. Nor would it be a case of deciding which of the two thinkers could most effectively claim to have solved the problems. Instead the question would be whether these are problems which can be solved or not: whether they are problems which Derrida claims to have dealt with, or whether his complex repetition and analysis of Levinas has only proposed a different way of dealing with problems which must necessarily occur within such attempts to exceed philosophy but which cannot be reconciled within them, and which it will be the virtue of Levinas (and Derrida in his turn) to have highlighted for us. The difference is perhaps that between a critical reading, which claims to have revealed previously unseen difficulties in a text, and a deconstructive reading which unsettles the possibility of saying in what sense the problems have been uncovered. In any case, since the focus of my argument here is on how Derrida's work differs from that of Levinas, I will develop his own understanding of those differences, rather than assessing whether his reading of Levinas is 'correct' or not: moreover to answer the latter question would require being able to attribute a stable meaning to *Totality and Infinity*. 

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19 This is Robert Bernasconi's suggestion in 'Derrida and Levinas: The question of the closure of metaphysics.'
4.2.3 Two Concepts of Economy.

Having considered Derrida’s four key criticisms of Levinas in ‘Violence and Metaphysics,’ I now turn to their implications for the question I am pursuing in this chapter of ethics and politics. I have argued that the focus of Levinas’s argument in Totality and Infinity is on what he calls the ethical relation in terms of transcendence and infinity encountered in the face of the Other [Autrui]. Derrida’s questioning of Levinas’s concept of transcendence can hardly leave the ethical relation unaffected. For a start, the ethical relation can no longer be simply opposed to totality, nor to the State, as Levinas appears to suggest it can be — although as I have also tried to suggest above, this issue is complex. In which case, wouldn’t Derrida’s argument imply the possibility of a re-evaluation of the State in parallel with his re-evaluation of totality? Does Derrida reject Levinas’s ethical imperative out of hand on the basis of his criticisms of the ethical relation as transcendence? I will approach these complex questions through a consideration of the conclusions that Derrida draws for his own work, rather than those which concern that of Levinas, in ‘Violence and Metaphysics.’ By focusing on the way in which Derrida’s use of the term ‘economy’ must be distinguished from the meaning which Levinas gives to it, and in keeping with Derrida’s general aims in Writing and Difference, I will open the possibility of a broader comparison of their positions.

There is a key structural device in ‘Violence and Metaphysics’ which has been curiously effaced in the English translation. In both the final two sections of the essay, in which Derrida compares Levinas with Husserl and Heidegger respectively, the argument takes a parallel turn, as is already perhaps suggested by the similarities between their titles: ‘Of Transcendental Violence’ and ‘Of Ontological Violence.’ This turn is signalled in each case by a similar sentence, each of which begins a paragraph and is further emphasised in the revised version of the text by being italicised. (The English translation, for no apparent reason, removes the paragraph break preceding the first of these sentences.) At both points in the text Derrida has been concerned to show that the thought of Husserl and Heidegger
respectively, is not as violent as Levinas has claimed (as a form of respect, and as *Gelassenheit*, or letting-be, respectively), which makes Levinas’s reading in its turn appear violent, forced and intrusive. However Derrida then specifies, of phenomenology and ontology:

*We do not say absolutely peaceful* [WD 128 / 188, cf. VM 444].
*We do not say pure nonviolence* [WD 146 / 218, cf. VM 466].

By this manoeuvre Derrida avoids returning to the argument which he is opposing in Levinas. For as I pointed out in my discussion of *Totality and Infinity*, Levinas specifies that the relation with the face of the other is one of a fundamental peacefulness. The transcendence of absolute alterity is peace. Just as Derrida does not believe absolute alterity can be thought, nor that difference can be considered absolute, so he will oppose the possibility of a pure peace. Philosophy as ontology cannot be opposed to metaphysics as ethics in the manner Levinas wishes, or even as violence to peace. Derrida’s demonstration that Levinas’s readings of Husserl and Heidegger are somewhat impatient appears to confirm that such an opposition can itself only be made violently.

Consequently, the subject of philosophy is situated in an economy of violence, and within ‘the infinite passage through violence [which] is what we call history’ [WD 130 / 191], providing that these terms are understood to be extended beyond the use Levinas makes of them in *Totality and Infinity*. The clearest statement of this situation and the possibility of response to it is worth quoting at length:

There is war only after the opening of discourse, and war dies out only at the end of discourse. Peace, like silence, is the strange vocation of a language called outside itself by itself. But since *finite* silence is also the medium of violence, language can only infinitely tend towards justice by acknowledging and practicing the violence within it. Violence against violence. *Economy* of violence. An economy irreducible to what Levinas envisions in the word. If light is the element of violence, one must combat light with a certain other light, in order to avoid the worst violence, the violence of the night which
precedes or represses discourse. This *vigilance* is a violence chosen as the least violence by a philosophy which takes history, that is finitude, seriously; a philosophy aware of itself as historical in each of its aspects (in a sense which tolerates neither finite totality, nor positive infinity), and aware of itself, as Levinas says in another sense, as *economy*. But again, an economy which in being history, can be *at home* neither in the finite totality which Levinas calls the Same nor in the positive presence of the Infinite [WD 117 / 172-3].

Derrida makes explicit at two points in this passage that his understanding of ‘economy’ is not one that he shares with Levinas. [l.6, l.12-3] By asking about the difference between their respective understandings of ‘economy’ we may be able to better understand what Derrida means by violence here, and its relation to the question of ethics and politics. For Levinas, ‘economic existence’ is thought alongside ‘terrestrial existence’ as the site of a ‘relationship with the other that […] is not a totalization of history but the idea of infinity’ [TI 52 / 44]. Metaphysics would be given a place within economic existence, but would also be the transcendence of that existence. Similarly, when Levinas comes to discuss labour, which he claims depends on the metaphysical relation, labour ‘remains economic; it comes from the home and returns to it, a movement of Odyssey where the adventure pursued in the world is but the accident of a return’ [TI 176-7 / 192]. Economy for Levinas names the return to the same rather than exposure to the other, and he continues the reference to the Odyssey in his essay ‘La trace de l’autre’: ‘To the myth of Ulysses returning to Ithaca, we would prefer to oppose the story of Abraham leaving his country forever.’ Derrida takes up the reference to the Odyssey in a footnote to his conclusion to ‘Violence and Metaphysics.’ ‘Levinas,’ he writes, ‘does not care for Ulysses, nor for the ruses of this excessively Hegelian hero, this man of *nostos* and the closed circle, whose adventure is always summarized in its totality’ [VM 320n.92 / 228n.1]. However for Derrida, who quotes Joyce’s ‘Jewgreek is greekjew’ as the final line of his essay, Joyce and Hegel are on his side, since they also acknowledge that

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20 cited at WD 320n.92 / 228n.1.
there can be no pure opposition between the Greek and the Jew, between the return and the non-return, between the economic and the non-economic.  

So in the long passage I have just quoted, 'economy' comes to stand for something like the principle of contamination which will prevent totality being opposed to infinity, and an ethical relation to absolute alterity being opposed to the temporal and terrestrial order of the State and of politics. This 'economy of violence' is being contrasted with Levinas's attempt to think metaphysics as pure peace. Derrida exaggerates the point when he comments later in the same paragraph that 'metaphysics is economy' [WD 117 / 173. cf. the original version: 'L'économie est metaphysique.' VM 433]. This is either scandalous in ethical terms or unacceptable in philosophical terms from the point of view advanced in *Totality and Infinity* in which metaphysics is neither economy nor violence, but opposed to both. Derrida's aim is to reinscribe Levinas's philosophical strategies, which claim to describe the origin and ground of metaphysics, within the system which they seek to describe, as one strategy amongst others, as one form of violence in an economy of violence. In doing so Derrida need not necessarily be read as passing judgement on Levinas; either for the violence of his work (which is inevitable anyway on Derrida's account) or for naivety, since elsewhere, as we saw, Derrida acknowledges both the ruse necessary for Levinas to 'speak Greek' and that Levinas contradicts his own previous rejections of the language of ontology, suggesting that his own work operates on a strategic basis. Derrida's economy, then, is neither finite totality or infinite alterity, but the circulation between the two, which he names history. As he writes in his conclusion: 'we live in the difference between the Jew and the Greek, which is perhaps the unity of what is called history' [WD 153 / 227].

In restoring philosophy to its inscription in history Derrida insists that both philosophy and history must be thought differently and the use of terms such as economy,  

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21 Joyce's work also appears in a somewhat Hegelian light in Derrida's 'Introduction to The Origin of Geometry.' 102-3.
inscription, and writing are all attempts to describe this situation. However, ethics and politics would also require to be re-worked. In Totality and Infinity, as we have seen, Levinas makes use of the opposition between history (totality) and metaphysics (transcendence) in terms of the relation between politics and ethics. Within history, is the State, whose accomplices include ontology, the economic relation which returns the other to the same, and the violence of politics. Outside history, but ‘reflected within’ it [TI 23 / 7], is the ethical relation to the Other, which is peace itself, while justice is somewhere between. The existence of war does not refute these arguments because it ‘presupposes peace’ [TI 199 / 218]. Peace, and the ethical relation, come first. Politics, Levinas argues in his Preface, is ‘the art of foreseeing war and of winning it by every means’ and ‘the very exercise of reason’ [TI 21 / 5]. So while Levinas cannot be straightforwardly accused of withdrawing from ‘concrete’ politics — as I have argued his work locates the evidence of transcending in the finite totality — there is a sense in which this dynamic remains within his work. The priority granted to the ethical relation lends itself very easily to a prioritising of ‘ethics’ over politics. For Derrida, this opposition cannot be sustained. Indeed, his argument can be read as a specific contestation of this point. By refusing to deduce politics (totality, violence) on the basis of ethics (the relation to the Other, transcendence) but by showing both gestures to be possibilities inscribed within the (non-finite) totality, Derrida insists instead on the irreducibility of violence. Meanwhile, for Levinas there is already a name for this violent contestation of the ethical relation to absolute alterity: politics.

Another way to phrase the question at issue would be to ask whether ethics or politics comes first? For Levinas, ethics can clearly be said to come first. Even if only reflected in, rather than present within, the finite totality, the infinity of the ethical comes first, whether that priority is understood as a logical dependence or an ethical value. For Derrida the situation is rather more complex. By seeking to think both politics and ethics — or totality and infinity — as inscribed within the same economy, Derrida refuses to prioritise one over the other. There is no ‘first’ place for Derrida in quite the same way as there is for
Levinas. We might focus this by saying that any original will always come second for Derrida; or that what he is seeking to describe is a relation in which there are only secondary terms, rather than a first term and a second term or terms. Furthermore, when Derrida elaborates his own account of the trace, there is also a key difference from the trace as Levinas understands it. The trace within the totality for Levinas is of something which has come first, even if it is 'a past whose meaning could not be thought in the form of a (past) present' [WD 132 / 194]. Derrida takes up this notion of the trace, for example in 'Différence,' but gives it no particular priority in relation to the other examples in that essay. The Levinasian formula of the trace as 'a past that has never been present' [MAR 21 / 22] is juxtaposed to the concepts of trace in the work of Freud [MAR 18-21 / 19-22] and Heidegger [MAR 23 / 24]. This is again unacceptable to Levinas, for whom the transcendence of the absolute Other has a metaphysical priority, indeed is metaphysics. For Derrida the trace is not a second term which alludes to a non-present first term. Instead, it needs to be thought of as a second term which alludes only to its own secondariness, and its relative equivalence with, or its différence from, an infinite number of other second terms. There is no 'first' term. Levinas, however, can be read two ways. Either he is simply proposing a transcendental term, which must be problematic from Derrida's point of view; or he is aware that this manoeuvre is unjustifiable, but chooses to reinscribe certain terms for strategic reasons. Whichever of these is the case — and it may not be possible to decide between the two interpretations — Derrida can be seen to be undertaking a distinctly different operation. In fact, this basic structure will continue to determine the relationship between Derrida and Levinas, as I demonstrate in the remainder of this chapter, before expanding and confirming the suggestion I have just made, that Derrida opposes Levinas's ethics with a rethinking of politics.
4.3 The Ethics and Politics of Deconstruction.

The importance of the relationship between ethics and politics for the argument of my thesis can be seen from the fundamental question which Derrida poses in *Adieu*, of the relationships between 'an ethics of hospitality (an ethics as hospitality) and a law or a politics of hospitality [...] whether the ethics of hospitality that we will try to analyze in Levinas's thought would be able to found a law and a politics, beyond the familial dwelling, within a society, nation, State, or Nation-State' [ADI 19-20 / 45]. It is precisely this form of question, but posed instead to 'the impasse of the political in Derrida's work,' that Simon Critchley has answered in the negative: 'in the rigorous, quasi-transcendental delineation of undecidability as the dimension of political responsibility, is there not an implicit refusal of the ontic, the factual, the empirical — that is to say of the space of *doxa*, where politics takes place in a field of antagonism, decision, dissension, and struggle? In this sense might one not speak of a refusal of politics in Derrida's work?' [ED 200]. Even in Critchley's later texts, in which his reading of Derrida is more subtle and nuanced, he is still demanding a political supplement to deconstruction, and in particular a reconciliation with the work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe:

The logics of deconstruction and hegemony need to be soldered at this point, I think, in a reciprocal relation of supplementarity. For if what deconstruction lacks in its thinking of the political is a thematization of democratization as hegemony, then what the theory of hegemony lacks is the kind of messianic, ethical injunction to infinite responsibility that prevents it collapsing into a voluntaristic decisionism. If ethics without politics is empty, then politics without ethics is blind.22

By over-simplifying the relationship between Levinas and Derrida, Critchley is able to identify deconstruction with 'ethics' understood in opposition to 'politics' and then to condemn deconstruction for failing to supply the 'politics' which by his own definition of

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deconstruction it cannot. Yet neither the relationship between Levinas and Derrida, nor the relationship between ethics and politics — in general, or in the work of either — can be so boldly stated. In this section I begin by putting Critchley’s argument into question, with reference to Levinas’s second major work, *Otherwise than Being*, and Derrida’s later responses to Levinas. I then extend my argument to suggest that the distinction between an ethics of hospitality and a law or politics of hospitality is central to Derrida’s project in these texts, read alongside *Politics of Friendship*.

4.3.1 Levinas and Derrida: Is There an Ethics of Deconstruction?

In this section my aim is to see if the apparent differences I have set out between the positions of Levinas and of Derrida are maintained in their subsequent work. I will look first at Levinas’s response to Derrida, in his essays ‘Wholly Otherwise’ and ‘God and Philosophy’ and in his next major work *Otherwise than Being: Or Beyond Essence*, before turning to Derrida’s comments on Levinas in *Alterités*, on which Simon Critchley relies heavily. The question remains whether Derrida and Levinas are saying the same thing, but in different ways, or whether there is a significant difference between their work, and how this will affect the way in which they each think the relationship between politics and ethics. Concluding this section I discuss the basis of Simon Critchley’s argument that the two thinkers can both be considered to share a common ‘ethical imperative’ within their work.

Most commentators on the relationship between Derrida and Levinas have focused on the extent to which Levinas can be seen to be responding to Derrida’s criticisms in his work following the publication of ‘Violence and Metaphysics,’ and particularly in *Otherwise
than Being. In his essay on Derrida, ‘Wholly Otherwise,’ Levinas himself suggests one framework for approaching this question: of turning Derrida’s arguments against him. Levinas comments that he is tempted to question Derrida’s own recourse to logocentric language in resisting logocentrism, noting ambiguously that this ‘is a course Derrida himself, perhaps, has not always disdained to follow in his polemics.’ It is hard not to interpret this as a comment on Derrida’s treatment of Levinas’s own work. It would appear from this that Levinas believes that he and Derrida share a common aim, but employ different strategies. We would then have to interpret the development of the concepts of ‘the saying’ and ‘the said’ between the publication of Totality and Infinity and of Otherwise than Being on this basis: as a refinement of Levinas’s own strategy in response to Derrida, around the question of language. What Levinas refers to as the ‘chiasmus’ between his thought and Derrida’s would involve a difference in strategy rather than in their fundamental aims. In which case, the only one of Derrida’s complaints to which Otherwise than Being responds would be the problem of the language of ontology. That this is certainly the major shift in his work is confirmed by Levinas’s own comments on his career in an essay called ‘Signatures’ published in Difficult Freedom. There he notes that ‘the ontological language which Totality and Infinity still uses in order to exclude the purely psychological significance of the proposed analysis is henceforth avoided.’ Recognising that Totality and Infinity was still structured around the experience of a subject, Levinas adds: ‘the analyses themselves [in Otherwise than Being] refer not to the experience in which a subject always thematizes what he equals, but to the transcendence in which he answers for that which his intentions have not encompassed.’ If Levinas thinks he has responded to Derrida by dealing with the

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question of language, we should be able to find no other significant change in the structure of his thought between *Totality and Infinity* and *Otherwise than Being*. I will look at these two questions in turn. The question remains not whether Derrida is 'correct' about Levinas, but whether there is any reason for him to revise his position after *Otherwise than Being*.

It is the new emphasis placed on the terms 'the saying' and 'the said' which constitutes the biggest change between the two books. (They first appear in the closing pages of *Totality and Infinity* [TI 260 / 291].) They orient the attempt to resolve the difficulty which Levinas perceives within the earlier book — that the language of metaphysics cannot simply be used against itself. Transcendence is no longer discussed in terms of 'exteriority' nor in terms of any experience given to a subject. Instead the subject is more emphatically located as an effect of transcendence, and transcendence itself is located beyond the reach of ontology. Rather than something which can be approached in language, but not in philosophical terms, the ethical relation to the infinite becomes something which escapes language as such. Anything which could be thematized within language would be inadequate to describe the transcendence which precedes the subject. To formalise this situation, Levinas uses 'the said' to refer to the ontological order of the world, including language, and 'the saying' to refer to the pre-ontological dimension. The problem of the *il y a* which Levinas formulates in his work prior to *Totality and Infinity*, that being cannot be opposed to non-being, because non-being would still be a modification of being, non-presence would be the presence of an absence, is reformulated in linguistic terms. The 'saying' of the utterance is never exhausted in the 'said': 'Is not the inescapable fate in which being immediately includes the statement of being's other not due to the hold the said has over the saying?' [OB 5 / 16]. This distinction can be seen to lie behind another major shift in

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26. *What remains after this imaginary destruction of everything is not something, but the fact that there is [il y a]. The absence of everything returns as a presence, as the place where the bottom has dropped out of everything, an atmospheric density, a plenitude of the void, or the murmur of silence.* Emmanuel Levinas. *Time and the Other.* trans. Richard A. Cohen. Pittsburgh: Duquesne UP, 1987. 46.
vocabulary between the two books. Where previously Levinas had spoken of the face, now he tends to refer to the skin. The exposure of the self to the other doesn’t begin in the situation of face to face communication, but in the very exposure of the skin to the world. This exposure is itself signification, the saying which testifies to the transcendence of the ethical relation. Responsibility begins not so much with ‘the face which the Other turns to me’ [TI 215 / 237] as in the experience of ‘a passivity more passive than all passivity, an exposure to the other.’ Saying as exposure is not ‘dissimulating and protecting itself in the said, just giving out words in the face of the other, but saying uncovering itself, that is denuding itself of its skin, sensibility on the surface of the skin, at the edge of the nerves, offering itself in suffering’ [OB 15 / 31].

However, despite a change in vocabulary and methodology, it is not immediately clear that the structure of Levinas’s thought has changed significantly at all. While Adriaan Peperzak has claimed that this shift turns Levinas from an existentialist phenomenology to a approach not dissimilar to that of Derrida’s,27 and Jacques Rolland interprets the break with Totality and Infinity as being so radical that in his Parcours d’Autrement he does not discuss the earlier book at all,28 it is worth pausing to consider the relationship between the two works. Nowhere does Levinas suggest, for all the change in his approach, that Otherwise than Being is intended to replace Totality and Infinity. Levinas in no way implies that the earlier work has been simply superseded, and that study is referred to by name three times in the notes [OB 191n.42; 191n.8; 199n.23]. But since most of Levinas’s other philosophical studies are also cited in this way, perhaps we could read Otherwise than Being as a finalisation of his system, in which the place of all the other texts is accounted for; or perhaps just as further reflections on the developments which occur in the final stages of Totality and Infinity. While the relationship between being and that which is ‘other than

27 See Bargo. Levinas between Ethics and Politics. 146-7.
being’ [OB 3 / 14] may substitute for the relationship between totality and infinity, the structure of this relationship remains the same, despite the increasing sophistication of the description of a relationship which by definition resists thematization. Levinas’s object remains the thought of a beyond, an outside of being, which can be associated with the Platonic Good beyond being, with God, and with the ethical relation. His account of responsibility as substitution for the other, in which the subject is described as a hostage to the other, as well as his appreciation for the work of Husserl and Heidegger, are deepened in *Otherwise than Being*, but not fundamentally altered.

This claim can be confirmed by a reading of ‘God and Philosophy,’ an essay in which Levinas responds explicitly to ‘Violence and Metaphysics.’ Without mentioning Derrida by name, he begins with a reference to one of Derrida’s conclusions, that ‘not to philosophize, is still to philosophize.’29 Levinas argues that the opposition between faith and ontology does not hold. So while the God of the Bible can only signify something philosophically unverifiable within philosophy, and religion has to resort to the language of ontology (adverbs of height) to express the ‘beyond’ of ontology as the ‘most high,’ Levinas asks: ‘Over and beyond being does not a meaning whose priority, translated into ontological language, would have to be called antecedent to being, show itself?’30 Alongside terms which are recognisably those of *Otherwise than Being* — disinterestedness, substitution — Levinas clearly restates the basic premises of *Totality and Infinity*. Infinity, he argues, is not subject to an oppositional dialectic:

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29 Emmanuel Levinas. ‘God and Philosophy.’ in *The Levinas Reader*. Séan Hand ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 1989. 167. The reference is to Derrida’s citation: ‘It was a Greek who said, “If one has to philosophize, one has to philosophize, if one does not have to philosophize (to say it and think it). One always has to philosophize”’ [WD 152 / 226].

30 ‘God and Philosophy.’ 168.
not-being-able-to-comprehend-the-Infinite-by-thought would signify the condition — or the unconditionality — of thought, as though to speak of the non-comprehension of the Infinite by the finite did not amount to simply saying that the Infinite is not finite, and as though the affirmation of the difference between the Infinite and the finite had to remain a verbal abstraction, without consideration of the fact that through the non-comprehension of the Infinite by thought, thought is posited as thought, as a posited subjectivity, that is, is posited as self-positing.\footnote{31}

This passage becomes much clearer if it is read as a response to Derrida. The difference between the Infinite and the finite is not simply given in language ('a verbal abstraction') but is the difference between what conditions and makes possible, and what is made possible but is unable to think its own conditions of possibility. When Levinas continues to write of the Infinite, in the same terms as those of Totality and Infinity, as 'a desire beyond satisfaction'\footnote{32} it seems clear that he considers Derrida’s essay to be posing a question of language only, and not querying the very basis of Levinas’s thought, and that the frameworks of Totality and Infinity and of Otherwise than Being are roughly interchangeable. Certainly Levinas’s conclusion to ‘God and Philosophy’ would suggest that he believes himself to have refuted Derrida. Referring to Derrida’s charge, from which he began, he comments that ‘not to philosophize would not be ‘to philosophize still.’\footnote{33} As I have argued however, Derrida suggests that the differences between his thought and that of Levinas are not simply linguistic or terminological. If he is hesitant in ascribing a definitively critical position it is not so much because he recognises a kindred project to that of his own work in Levinas but because of the unusual nature of his own work; like all his work his reading of Levinas seeks to affirm rather than oppose. Geoffrey Bennington gives a useful summary of the difficulties that have attended the attempt to distinguish the two thinkers:

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item[31] ‘God and Philosophy.’ 176.
\item[32] ‘God and Philosophy.’ 177.
\item[33] ‘God and Philosophy.’ 186.
\end{itemize}
[Derrida’s] ‘radicalisation’ [of the concept of alterity] can always look (and to Levinasians has often looked) like just the opposite, a reduction of the radicality of Levinas’s own thinking, insofar as it seems to protest against Levinas’s absolutising of the other, and to that extent to make the other less other than is the case in Levinas. But in this paradoxical domain we should be wary of such a linear logic. Derrida’s construal of alterity as always less than absolute in fact constitutes a thought of the other as more other than the absolute other.

I can find little to disagree with in Bennington’s account of the relationship. In the same article he goes on to draw out the challenge deconstruction presents for thinking ethics; I will take a different approach here, and argue that the specificity of Derrida’s later work is not to be found in a *rapprochement* with Levinas, but in its explicit contestation of ethics in the name of politics.

In making this argument I am aware that I am more or less directly contradicting that which has been put forward by Simon Critchley in his *Ethics of Deconstruction* and defended elsewhere, that Derrida’s reading of Levinas cannot be like his other readings, because there is a privileged relationship between Derrida and Levinas which amounts to the uncovering of an ethical imperative in deconstruction. His reading of this relationship has been influential if not definitive, so it is worth spending a little time analysing why my conclusions here should be so different. Critchley’s reading is largely based around Derrida’s second essay on Levinas, ‘At this very moment in this work here I am’ but the major authorization for Critchley’s argument comes from Derrida’s statement in a seminar discussion published in *Alterités*, that “faced with a thought like that of Levinas, I never have an objection. I am ready to subscribe to everything that he says” [ALT 74, cited ED 10]. While Critchley acknowledges Derrida’s qualification that ‘that does not mean that I think

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34 *Interrupting Derrida*. 44. cf.: ‘Levinas opposes to Husserl’s difficulties in the *Cartesian Meditations* with the problem of the other the sense that the is absolutely other than me, and Derrida defends Husserl on the grounds that that other is in some sense the same as me.’ 204n.8.

the same thing in the same way' [ALT 74, ED 10] and the possibility that the 'differences of idiom, language or writing' [ALT 74, ED 11] Derrida refers to might be significant ones, he insists that these comments 'do make the point rather well that the privilege accorded to Levinas in the discussion of Derrida's work is not without foundation' [ED 11]. Without minimizing the differences between the two thinkers, Critchley's claim is broadly that something happens in both Levinas and Derrida's texts which makes their relationship different to that between Derrida and the other writers on whom he works: most tellingly perhaps, what Derrida calls his 'point of almost absolute proximity to Hegel.'

It is not however clear to me that Critchley is correct in deducing what he does from the comments he cites. The discussion is reasonably extensive, and Derrida is at great pains to distinguish his thought from that of Levinas, and he is particularly keen to emphasise his reservations with regard to the word 'ethics.' He begins by referring to Heidegger's 'Letter on Humanism,' in which Heidegger argues that the question of being is prior to the question of ethics, and that an ethics can never radically put into question the meaning of being. Derrida calls for a genealogical questioning of the history and meaning of the word 'ethics' in the name of a responsibility which comes before any determined 'ethics.' He acknowledges that Levinas, thinking of a similar responsibility, speaks of ethics in a wholly other manner, but, he reminds us, 'it is the same word' [ALT 71]. He imagines Levinas's response: 'this semantic transformation of the word 'ethics' reconstitutes or restitutes that which was the hidden condition of possibility of ethics, dissimulated in some way by Greek and German thought' [ALT 71]. While he has less difficulty with this use of 'ethics' he wishes instead to think the singularity of the coming of the other which would 'exceed the limits of ethics' [ALT 71]. He concludes that 'whatever the complexity of the relations


between ethics and law, for example in Kant, the problem remains, as much for one as for the other, that one risks reinscribing the relation to the other within the general, within calculation. It is this worry before this generality that, without having anything against ethics, I have too much reticence to use the word easily’ [ALT 72]. From the perspective of a reader of Politics of Friendship it is clear that this worry concerning ethics has not subsequently been displaced. When Derrida sets out what he seeks to do in the book, it seems highly significant that it is ‘to think and live a friendship, a politics, a justice’ [POF 105 / 128]. Not, it would appear, an ethics. If for Derrida, Levinas’s attempt to think the relation to the other risks remaining caught within a metaphysical account of transcendence, so the word ‘ethics’ is also hazardous.

Derrida’s reservations about an ‘ethics’ of deconstruction are made more explicit in ‘Passions.’ There he warns against the ‘remoralization of deconstruction, which naturally seems more attractive than that to which it is rightly opposed, but which at each moment risks reassuring itself in order to reassure the other and to promote the consensus of a new dogmatic slumber’ [PAS 15 / 38]. In the face of criticism, in other words, deconstruction should not seek to present itself as moral or responsible, when to do so would be to disable the possibility of responsibility. Even to act out of a sense of duty would be to fail to act responsibly since it would be a response based on an obligation: ‘it would be too easy, and precisely, natural, programmed by nature: it is hardly moral to be moral (responsible, etc.) because one has the sense of the moral’ [PAS 16 / 39]. Instead Derrida is responding to that which ‘still remains open, suspended, undecided, questionable even beyond the question, indeed to make use of another figure, absolutely aporetic. What is the ethicity of ethics? The morality of morality? What is responsibility?’ [PAS 16 / 40]. There seems little in this that Levinas would disagree with, but Derrida makes their difference clear: ‘let it not be said too precipitately that these questions or propositions are already inspired by a concern that could by right be called ethical, moral, responsible, etc.’ [PAS 17 / 41]. In the situation in which we find ourselves, we should not presume to use the word ‘ethics’ any more than any other
word. In Critchley’s own response to this argument he takes the same tack that Levinas did in responding to Derrida, and argues that if it is a question of words, there are good reasons for returning to the word ‘ethics,’ stressing in particular the polemical context of the book, in the debate over the value of deconstruction. However Critchley, following Levinas, continues to miss the other difference in Derrida’s account of Levinas, which is not merely a matter of names, but of the structure of the attempt to think absolute infinity within the finite. That these questions remain at issue can be confirmed from Derrida’s most recent book on Levinas, Adieu; as can my proposition that they make a critical political difference.

4.3.2 Ethics, Politics and Hospitality

Adieu contains both Derrida’s funeral oration for Levinas, and a lengthy paper delivered a year later to a conference on Levinas, called ‘A Word of Welcome.’ It is the latter on which I will focus here, since in it Derrida gives a complex account of Levinas’s work, which reinforces all the points I have made so far. Most importantly, the central question of the text is the one which underlies this whole chapter. Derrida states:

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38 Robert Bernasconi has suggested that Levinas himself began to respond to Derrida’s concerns about the use of the word ‘ethics’ in his later work. See ‘Justice without ethics.’

I will be guided by a question that I will in the end leave in suspense, being content simply to situate some of its premises and points of reference. It would concern, on first view, the relationships between an ethics of hospitality (an ethics as hospitality) and a law or a politics of hospitality, for example, in the tradition of what Kant calls the conditions of universal hospitality in cosmopolitical law: "with a view to perpetual peace."

The classical form of this question would perhaps be found in the figure of a founding or legitimating foundation. It might be asked, for example, whether the ethics of hospitality that we will try to analyze in Levinas's thought would be able to found a law and a politics, beyond the familial dwelling, within a society, nation, State or Nation-State [ADI 19-20 / 44-5].

The essay can be roughly divided into two parts on the basis of this passage. Derrida will on the one hand 'analyze' what he calls 'the ethics of hospitality' in Levinas's thought; and on the other hand, he will pose some political questions of this ethics. In this section I focus on Derrida's discussion of Levinas's work in terms of hospitality, while in the next I turn to look in more detail at the question of politics: both at Levinas's later essays on political problems, and at Derrida's response to them. Once again it is necessary to try to disentangle Derrida's commentary on Levinas from the points at which he objects or queries Levinas's trajectory; it seems to me, however, that in Adieu Derrida voices once more the same concerns he first set out in 'Violence and Metaphysics.' By pursuing the question of hospitality in Levinas's work, Derrida is able not only to link Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being, but also to pose a crucial question to Levinas.

*Totality and Infinity*, Derrida suggests, may be read as the description of a work of hospitality. Even if the word 'hospitality' itself rarely appears, the word 'welcome' does. Levinas, Derrida claims, re-describes intentionality as hospitality: as the welcome offered to the other, on the basis of the other's welcome. The welcome of the other should be heard as a double genitive. It is both a welcome given to the other, and a welcome that has been made possible by the pre-original welcome by the other. Receptivity and reason themselves are both to be thought of in terms of a welcoming which precedes any reception (the play is on *accueil* and *recueil*). What appears to be simply a commentary on Levinas is in fact designed to bring out a critical difference. From the first chapter of 'A Word of Welcome,' Derrida is
asking whether we can speak of a pre-original welcome. Derrida states: 'if it is the other alone who can say yes, the "first" yes, the welcome is always the welcome of the other. One must now think the grammars and the genealogies of this genitive. If I put quotations marks around the "first" of the "first" yes, it was to accede to a scarcely thinkable hypothesis: there is no first yes, the yes is already a response' [ADI 24 / 53]. We could make Derrida's point more dramatically by saying that the accueil of the other will always be a recueil. Now this is a fine distinction, but crucial to understanding Derrida's argument. The difference between a first 'yes' and a 'yes' that is already a response would be of the same order as the difference between an absolute alterity, which precedes the economy of the same, and the alterity which Derrida is interested in, which is already inscribed into a different economy, of same and other. It is also a difference to which a long passage is devoted in the ninth chapter of Politics of Friendship, but which is central to both of the shorter versions published before the book as a whole [PoF 250-2 / 280-2; PoF (a) 638-41; PoF (b) 377-80]. Derrida links responsibility to the response to the other. He stresses that 'one answers for [...] , before, by first responding to: this last modality thus appearing more originary, more fundamental and hence unconditional.' Accordingly, when discussing the question of 'answering before,' he notes 'this expression seems first to modalize the 'responding to.' One answers before the other, because first of all one responds to the other.' This would accord with the usual reading of responsibility in Levinas, in which responsibility comes in my response to the face of the Other. However Derrida appears to disagree, gently but critically:

But this modalization is more than and different from an exemplary specification. And it plays a decisive role whose effects we should register. The expression 'before' marks in general, right on the idiom, the passage to an institutional agency of alterity. It is no longer singular but universal in its principle. One responds to the other, who can always be singular, and must in one respect remain so, but one answers before the law, a court, a jury, an agency authorized to represent the other legitimately, in the institutional form of a moral, juridical, political community [PoF 252 / 282].

By underlining the legal and institutional apparatus implied within the very structure of responsibility, Derrida stresses that the relation to the other is always mediated.
The consequences, as in ‘Violence and Metaphysics,’ are that it would not be possible to think a pure peace outside the totality of what for Levinas is the realm of violence, the judicial system and the State. Turning to the question of justice, broached in *Totality and Infinity* and expanded in *Otherwise than Being*, Derrida makes precisely this point. Derrida notes the ambiguity in Levinas’s account of justice. On the one hand the necessity of justice is dictated by the arrival of the third, who interrupts the ethical relation of the face-to-face. But on the other, this interruption is *necessary*. Infinity as pure peace cannot be thought except from within the conditions of violence. Derrida suggests that this apparent equivocation can be explained on the basis that the ethical relation is already violent. It is not the coming of the third that introduces violence, but which brings justice, and the possibility of negotiating with the violence of being face to face with the Other. When Levinas approaches all these issues in another essay, ‘Peace and Proximity,’ he still thinks of a responsibility which is ‘in its *immediacy, anterior to every question*’ and of a question of justice which is necessary, and immediate, but still somehow secondary [ADI 32 / 64-5]. For Derrida, justice comes first, since the third ‘would protect against the vertigo of ethical violence itself.’ This is a warning that pure peace is also already violence and that ‘ethics could be doubly exposed to such violence: exposed to undergo it but also to exercise it’ [ADI 33 / 66]. Derrida feels (and it is no stronger than that) that Levinas ‘would be tempted to appeal not *to* justice but *against* it’ [ADI 30 / 62]. Where for Levinas peace can be opposed to violence, for Derrida pure peace is only thinkable as the worst violence. Derrida speaks here of perjury [*parjure*]: ‘Like the third who does not wait, the proceedings that open both ethics and justice are in the process of committing a quasi-transcendental or originary, indeed, pre-originary, perjury. One might even call it *ontological*, once ethics is joined to everything that exceeds and betrays it (ontology, precisely, synchrony, totality, the State, the political, etc.)’ [ADI 34 / 69]. Derrida is again pushing Levinas’s thought to propositions which he might not accept. The reduction of the (pre-ontological) ethical relation to ontology, of infinity to totality, and to the State is the scandalous truth which Levinas wishes
to forget. It is, with reference to ‘At this very moment in this work here I am,’ the originary contamination of the ethical relation by ontology from which ethics cannot simply be abstracted. For my argument here what is most important to note is that the legal and political mediation of the relationship to the other is effaced by Levinas’s prioritization of the relation with the singular Other [Autrui].

As in his earlier essay ‘At this very moment in this work here I am,’ Derrida once again links his account of Levinas to the question of gender. Levinas’s definition of alterity, the welcoming par excellence is the feminine: ‘This absolute precedence of the welcome, of the welcoming, of the welcoming [accueillance], would be precisely the femininity of “Woman,” interiority as femininity — and as “feminine alterity”’ [ADI 43 / 81]. While referring to his earlier reading of Levinas, in which he had stressed ‘the traditional and androcentric attribution of certain characteristics to woman (private interiority, apolitical domesticity, intimacy of a sociality that Levinas refers to as a “society without language,” etc)’ [ADI 43 / 82] Derrida suggests a different approach this time. For it would be possible to argue that what Levinas does is not to obliterate sexual difference in the name of a neutrality before ontology or empirical sexual difference, but to mark the very opening of ethics itself (‘even if silently’ [ADI 44 / 84]) with sexual difference. Derrida’s point is that sexual difference is ‘indissociably linked’ to ‘the experience of pervertibility […]’, which at once calls for and excludes the third’ [ADI 43 / 81]. Again this is a subtle disfiguration of Levinas. Derrida comments in ‘Choreographies’ that ‘Levinas indeed senses the risk factor involved in the erasure of sexual difference. He therefore maintains sexual difference: the human in general remains a sexual being. But he can only do so it would seem, by placing (differentiated) sexuality beneath humanity which sustains itself at the level of the Spirit.’40

In ‘A Word of Welcome’ Derrida appears not to be simply reversing the priority accorded to

each — putting sexual difference before humanity — which would re-essentialise sexual difference, and make it potentially a founding discourse (of an ethics, a politics, an ontology) but to dissolve the possibility of thinking a priority. He does this on the basis of the possibility opened up by Levinas’s reinscription of sexual difference on absolute alterity, the ethical relation. Even if Levinas, and this is Derrida’s suspicion, is wary of justice, and of sexual difference, both justice as calculation and humanity as sexually differentiated are such as to form the indissoluble medium or matrix within which an argument for or against either could find its place. It would be possible to argue once more that this marks the shift from the critical reading of gender in Levinas to a deconstructive reading, in which it is no longer possible to ascribe one interpretation either to Levinas or to Derrida. It is not a relevant question to ask whether this is Levinas’s intention, or whether it is simply an effect of sexual difference itself, once marked in a text. Instead Derrida affirms a movement or a possibility which exceeds both his own text and that of Levinas.

It is the introduction of the terms Derrida has developed in his seminar on hospitality that most clearly marks out ‘A Word of Welcome’ from his earlier considerations of Levinas. Derrida uses the motif of hospitality for two purposes. Firstly, he is able to link Totality and Infinity to Otherwise than Being, despite the reformulation of the situation of the subject between the books. The transition from the subject called upon to welcome the other to the subject considered as hostage to the other seems almost inevitable or predictable, on the basis of the ambiguity of the word hôte in French: ‘The host [hôte] is a hostage in so far as he is a subject put into question, obsessed (and thus besieged), persecuted, in the very place where he takes place, [an] emigrant, exile, stranger, a guest [hôte] from the very beginning [...]’ [ADI 56 / 103]. The reversibility of the relation between host and guest which is illuminated by the etymology of hôte is a prior function of the structure of hospitality. Secondly however, the concept of hospitality will form the hinge on which
Derrida will link his reading of the ethical relation in Levinas to the problem of Levinas’s own messianic politics. As I discussed in my second chapter, Derrida’s understanding of hospitality involves distinguishing an absolute hospitality from any actual customs, codes, ethics, laws or politics of hospitality, to which it must be heterogeneous. When Derrida describes Levinas’s work as an ethics of hospitality he implies that it must by definition be a limited hospitality, and thus transgress unconditional hospitality: similarly, we saw that Kant’s cosmopolitical hospitality between states could never be hospitable enough for Derrida. This suggests that Derrida’s attribution of an ‘ethics of hospitality’ to Levinas is more than a neutral act of description, but the ascription of a failure to think hospitality responsibly enough. In a note which links Adieu to the concerns of Politics of Friendship Derrida implies as much. Derrida reminds us that in the earlier text he has tried to ‘suggest that “the determination of friendship qua fraternity [...] tells us something essential about ethics”’ [Adi 144-5n.69 / 122-4n.1]. While Derrida often refers to his own texts, it is unusual for him to have cited his own words here and implies an acknowledgement of the awkwardness of advancing a highly critical argument in an essay which is generally a gesture of approval. In this footnote, Derrida proposes a reading of Levinas which would focus on the relationship between humanity as fraternity, the figure of the father of mankind and filiality as ‘the father-son relationship’ in his work [cf. PoF 304-5 / 338-9]. Given the similarities of vocabulary and interests between Levinas and Derrida, I read this as strong suggestion that one way of reading Politics of Friendship would be as a critical response to Levinas, above and beyond any of those thinkers who receive more explicit attention in the book. In which case, the important question within both Adieu and Politics of Friendship would become that of the distinction between the respective ‘messianic’ politics of the two thinkers: perhaps even that Derrida might be opposing his own politics of hospitality to Levinas’s ethics of hospitality.
4.3.3 Two Forms of Messianic Politics.

Before looking at Derrida’s comments on the subject, it is worth reviewing what Levinas himself has to say about politics. The basic framework is once again dictated by the ambiguity of the relationship between the infinite and the finite. For Levinas the infinite precedes and makes possible philosophy as ontology, violence and the State as such. Yet the infinite can only be thought through the finite. In theory at least, the State itself, despite Levinas’s violent attacks on it, should testify to the priority of, and bear the trace of, the Infinite peace of the ethical relation. Levinas does indeed argue something very close to this in his essay ‘Politics After,’ with reference to Israel. He is suggesting that there is a way to think the state of Israel which does not on the one hand reduce it to politics — ‘recourse to unscrupulous methods whose model is furnished by Realpolitik’ — and on the other to ‘the irritating rhetoric of a careless idealism, lost in utopian dreams, but crumbling into dust on contact with reality or turning into a dangerous, impudent and facile frenzy which professes to be taking up the prophetic discourse.’41 There is a path, in other words, between politics as an economy of violence (in Levinas’s sense) and the infinite peace of the ethical relation. Levinas insists that ‘beyond the State of Israel’s concern to provide a refuge for men without a homeland and its sometimes surprising, sometimes uncertain achievements, has it not, above all, been a question of creating on its land the concrete conditions for political invention?’42 Politics in Israel, we are to understand, may not have always been guided by ethical principles, but Israel itself marks the possibility of an ethical invention of politics, or the invention of an ethical politics. What suggests this for Levinas is the visit in 1977 of President Sadat of Egypt to Jerusalem, which signifies something which neither Israel’s enemies in the Middle East nor Israel’s friends in the West can see. This would be something


42 ‘Politics After.’
like the suspension of the choice to be made between ethics and politics in favour of some wholly other logic, the possibility of peace as such. Sadat’s visit could be compared, one imagines, to a trace of infinite peace, a Messianic intimation of God beyond being, peace beyond war. As is clear from this one example, Levinas’s messianic politics is inextricably tangled with his own Zionism. It cannot fail to pass through this one example, the State of Israel. The important issue here is how far Levinas’s politics might be said to pass through this example, or whether the politics of ethics as first philosophy begins and ends in Zionism.

It is Levinas’s own political engagements that seem to cause Derrida the greatest difficulty in Adieu and in a number of places he records his own disagreement with specific statements made by Levinas. With reference to the passage from Levinas I have just discussed, Derrida asks, ‘Has this political invention in Israel ever come to pass? Ever come to pass in Israel?’ and continues ‘I am among those who await this “political invention” in Israel, among those who call for it in hope, today more than ever because of the despair that recent events, to mention only them, have not attenuated’ [Adi 81 / 147].43 Derrida plainly does not agree with Levinas that Israel can be taken as a privileged place of political invention. Elsewhere, Derrida also objects to Levinas’s characterisation of Christianity in terms of a “political indifference” which would explain why it “has so often become a State religion.” This thesis, Derrida notes, is ‘rather confidently advanced, if I may say so, and rather quickly asserted’ and in particular rules out any examination of a State religion in Islamic lands or in Israel itself [Adi 75 / 137]. In general however, Derrida’s reading maintains the same form as that of the first part of his essay, and consists in advancing two readings of Levinas’s messianic politics, one of which seems more satisfying to Derrida than the other, but neither of which can be quickly or easily attributed to Levinas himself.

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43 See also Derrida’s comments on the situation in Palestine when speaking at a conference in Israel [KJG 39-40].
Derrida is generally sympathetic to that dimension of Levinas’s thought which seeks to think a messianic politics — or to think beyond politics — which is attested to within the everyday political realm. Just as Derrida was keen to revalue the notion of justice in Levinas, which rather than coming second (but at the same time) to the face-to-face ethical relation might be seen as in some sense primary, so he is keen to revalue politics. All those elements of Levinas’s writing which emphasise that we start within politics, and that ethics is not simply exterior to that order, can be taken up. So for example, Derrida approves strongly of the title of one of Levinas’s Talmudic readings: ‘beyond the state in the state’: ‘Beyond-in: transcendence in immanence, beyond the political, but in the political’ [AdI 76 / 138]. The difficulties for Derrida begin when Levinas turns to a specific state. The general form of this objection may be imagined if I quote a further line from the first example of this section, on the messianic politics of Israel which are witnessed by the visit of Sadat: ‘That is the ultimate culmination of Zionism, and therefore probably one of the great events in human history.’ Levinas here inscribes a messianic potential within an exceptional political moment, and the possibility of going beyond-the-state-in-the-state within the borders a particular state. He makes Israel an exception to the general rule. Derrida interrupts a quotation from another essay of Levinas, following the claim that ‘Israel is no less isolated in its struggle to complete its extraordinary task than was Abraham, who began it four thousand years ago’ to comment that ‘this passing remark on the isolation of Israel can be disputed, indeed it is to my mind disputable’ [AdI 78 / 141]. It is the election of Israel within Levinas’s political thought about which Derrida is most concerned: and which we would have to link to what he says of election in general in Levinas’s thought: that ‘illeity’ designates ‘sometimes the interruption of the face to face, sometimes the very transcendence of the face to face’ [AdI 60 / 110]. Sometimes, in other words, illeity is the mediation of the

44 ‘Politics After.’ 194.
election of absolute responsibility by the question of justice and the intervention of the third, sometimes it is absolute responsibility, or election itself in the face to face.

Derrida is sketching out the structure of what in my second chapter I followed him in calling the logic of exemplarity at work in Levinas’s ethical thought and his political writings. Levinas may be using a particular engagement with the political situation of Israel and of Judaism generally to open up the possibility of thinking beyond the politics of the nation-state as such. By making Israel the exemplary site of this transformation of politics, however, Levinas risks taking the path of greater violence within the economy of violence, of returning a messianic politics beyond politics to a violent particularism. This ambiguity can be found within Levinas’s Talmudic readings and in particular Derrida refers to Levinas’s phrase ‘a recognition of the Torah before Sinai’: ‘It is not a question, for Levinas, of calling into question the election of Israel, its unicity or its universal exemplarity, but, quite to the contrary, a question of recognizing a universal message for which it has responsibility before or independently of the place and the event of the gift of the law’ [ADI 66 / 119-120]. When Levinas explains his own work, Israel always takes on a universal significance. The state or person on whom Levinas is writing is always a figure of a universal state or person, of any state or person. As John Llewelyn puts it: “Israel” refers both to the particularity of a people and the particularity of a person, no matter to what people that person does or does not belong.” Yet this cannot erase the fact that the name of Sinai is ‘a metonymy for the border or frontier between Israel and the other nations, a front and a frontier between war and peace’ [ADI 64 / 117]. In which case what would it mean for there to be a ‘recognition of the Torah by the peoples or the nations for whom the name, the place, the event Sinai would mean nothing?” [ADI 65 / 119]. There is an undeniable

oscillation in Levinas’s writing between this universalist appeal and the particularism of his Zionism.

The contradiction here derives from the very structure of Levinas’s thought: the announcement of the Infinite in some finite place. However, within the economy of violence which Derrida calls différance, there is a certain political danger which comes from attaching a priority to one element, even as a figure for all the others, whether this be a figure of absolute responsibility, or of ethics — or the ethicity of ethics. This danger is one which thought as such is subject to. In my second chapter I argued that Derrida is expressly concerned with the discursive enactment of the politics of brotherhood rather than the politics of friendship: of the impossibility of evading political decision which prefers the same rather than the other, if only by speaking in one language, one idiom, rather than another. Derrida is thus somewhat less sanguine about the possibility of assigning a political irresponsibility to Levinas than those, like Richard Beardsworth, who have condemned his Zionism as a nationalist particularism: ‘his ethical justification of the politics of Israel, Levinas reproduces the same “logic” as Heidegger’s attempt to ground National Socialism on fundamental ontology.’46 As I have shown in the preceding chapters, the burden of deconstruction is to demonstrate that any political thought will of necessity have this form. No politics will not collapse the politicizing decision into a programmed rule. So from Derrida’s point of view the important question becomes how this is handled: is it by privileging one state or one language as the authentic site of a repoliticization, or is it by seeking to describe this problem as the very basis of politics. Rather than condemning Levinas, Derrida works to determine two movements within his work, one of which is a determined messianism, the other of which is something else sheltered within that thought. If the law (the Torah) can be unbound from the moment of its revelation (made available before Sinai), ‘this thinking of substitution leads us towards a logic that is hardly thinkable,

almost unsayable, that of the possible-impossible, the iterability and replaceability of the unique in the very experience of unicity itself [ADI 70 / 128]:

What announces itself here might be called a structural or a priori messianicity. Not an ahistorical messianicity, but one that belongs to a historicity without a particular and empirically determinable incarnation. Without revelation or without the dating of a given revelation. The hypothesis I am venturing here is obviously not Levinas’s, at least not in this form, but it seeks to move in his direction — perhaps to cross his path once more. “At the heart of a chiasm,” as he said one day [ADI 67 / 121-2].

What is the difference between these two messianisms? Perhaps that where for Levinas the promise of another politics can be found in one place rather than another, for Derrida the promise shows up nowhere and everywhere, but absolutely not ever here, in one place. By a strange kind of logic the absolute difference of Levinas seems to turn into a particular finite politics whereas the non-absolute difference of Derrida turns into a non-finite politics, a politics of non-place rather than a politics of place. Yet the form of Derrida’s reading is such that we cannot simply separate the two. For by the logic of deconstruction as itself hospitality, Derrida both affirms this difference, but effaces his own place. There is no possible return to good conscience, in which Derrida’s choice is good and Levinas’s is bad.

So when considering an essay in which Levinas opposes the State of Caesar to the State of David, Derrida maintains both the force of his objection to such oppositions in ‘Violence and Metaphysics’ and the sophistication of a reading strategy which refuses to assign such an opposition to Levinas. At first sight, Levinas appears in this essay to be opposing Judaic and Greek thought as Derrida claimed he did in Totality and Infinity. So much so, in fact, that Derrida asks:

If one took it as a rule to speak of ‘politics’ as soon as the word ‘State’ appears, in a more or less rigorous translation of Polis, then one would have to ask if this rule applies in the expression ‘State of David,’ or if the alternative between the State of Caesar and the State of David is an alternative between a politics and a beyond of the political, or an alternative between two politics, or, finally, an alternative among others, where one could not exclude the hypothesis of a State that would be neither Caesar’s or David’s, neither Rome nor Israel nor Athens [ADI 74 / 136].
If the politics of the ‘State of David’ is entirely heterogeneous to that of the ‘State of Caesar,’ is it still a concept which we would recognise as political? The choice, Derrida suggests, might be that between two politics, both of which would transgress the pure ethical relation, but one of which would be less violent than the other. Or it might be between politics and ethics as such, in the senses in which Levinas understands the terms, and which we have seen to be relatively consistently opposed in his work. Or it might be between two alternatives ‘among others,’ and in which the choice between a Roman or Jewish politics would not be absolute and nor, one presumes, would the opposition between them.

It is essential in other words, that when Derrida writes of two forms of messianic politics, we do not rush to assign one to him and the other to Levinas. The relationship is more complex. The messianism without any determinable messiah opens up the possibility of any determined messianism. Derrida writes of a difference that he wishes to ‘sharpen [aiguiser]’ [ADI 101 / 175] between what he calls in his introduction ‘two very close, but perhaps heterogeneous, paths’ [ADI 21 / 47]. This difference does not necessarily pass between Levinas and Derrida, but between a messianic politics and the politics of a messianism without messianism: ‘a structural messianicity, an irrecusable and threatening promise, an eschatology without teleology, [dissociated] from every determinate messianism: a messianicity before or without any messianism incorporated by some revelation in a determined place that goes by the name of Sinai or Mount Horeb’ [ADI 118-9 / 204]. It seems to me that these arguments in Adieu belong with those Derrida advances elsewhere. Without assigning a definite position to Levinas — but not without making his own judgement on some of Levinas’s particular engagements — Derrida poses one key distinction to be made when discussing either Levinas or his own work. The distinction is that between a messianism in which something is presumed, or known to be coming, or at the very least that what is coming will be recognised as such when it arrives, and a way of thinking a messianic arrival which could be totally unexpected, a complete surprise. What
kind of messianic coming would it be if the Messiah were only recognised some time later — or not at all?

This would also be the distinction which Derrida has already considered in Politics of Friendship, in terms which recall unmistakably his queries about Levinas’s thought elsewhere. Derrida comments on the concept of revelation that ‘the event of revelation would reveal not only this or that — God, for example — but revealability itself’ [PoF 18 / 36]. The phrase is borrowed from ‘Violence and Metaphysics’ and the implied argument is that of all three of Derrida’s major essays on Levinas. Derrida continues by asking ‘Is there an alternative here? Must one choose between these two orders? […] Must one choose between the priority of revelation (Offenbarung) and that of revealability (Offenbarkeit), the priority of manifestation and that of manifestability, of theology and theiology, of the science of God and the science of the divine, of the divinity of God?’ [PoF 18-9 / 36]. Derrida adds a note which includes the comment: ‘What I called elsewhere iterability might not dissolve this alternative but might at least give access to a structure of experience in which the two poles of the alternative cease to oppose one another to form another node, another “logic,” another “chronology,” another history, another relation to the order of orders’ [PoF 25n.29 / 36n.1]. Since to claim to choose revealability over revelation would be to turn revealability into a revelation, there can be no question of choosing. Instead the problem must be approached in terms of a double logic, which recognises this paradox, and seeks to enact and acknowledge that to name revealability returns it to revelation. Both Derrida and the later Levinas can be seen to be operating within the grip of this paradox. Derrida’s implication however, is that not only does he dispute the fact that Levinas names the revelation of revealability in traditional terms, as God, but that he maintains a priority for one or the other, rather than attempting to think beyond the possibility of attributing priority. Or to put it in the terms I used earlier, that Levinas still thinks of ethics as coming first, and certainly before politics, when Derrida is concerned to show that both politics and ethics come second. This is what makes Derrida’s own political thought a messianism without messiah.
4.4 Conclusion

I CONCLUDE THIS chapter with a short illustration of the kind of political problems which attend Levinas’s work. Without presuming to judge Levinas’s own response, it is possible to see that Derrida’s work avoids this particular difficulty. Following the Israeli intervention in Lebanon and the massacres of an unknown number of Muslim Palestinian refugees in the camps of Sabra and Shatila in Beirut by Christian Phalangist militia men who had been ordered into the camps by the Israel Defence Forces, Levinas and Alain Finkielkraut gave a radio interview in France. Certain of Levinas’s comments betray the complexity of the problems here, and in particular of the relationship between ethics and politics. These comments betray those problems in both senses of the word, however; they mark them out in the starkest terms, but they also fail to do the questions justice. While Levinas argues that there are no limits to responsibility, he also notes that ‘there is certainly a place for defence, for it is not always a question of “me,” but of those close to me, who are also my neighbours’. In other words, there must always be a calculation of responsibility, and there must therefore be instances in which the (primary) ethical imperative be transgressed in the name of (secondary) political imperatives. Levinas specifies ‘I’d call such a defence a politics but a politics that’s ethically necessary. Alongside ethics, there is a place for politics.’ All the problems I have discussed in this chapter are present here in miniature.

Although Levinas recognises ‘a direct contradiction between ethics and politics, if both these demands are taken to an extreme’ their co-existence is more ambiguous. On the one hand ethics transcends politics, ‘there is also an ethical limit to this ethically necessary political existence’, but on the other hand, as soon as there is ethics there must also be


48 ‘Ethics and Politics.’ 292.

49 ‘Ethics and Politics.’ 293.
politics 'alongside' [my emphasis] — this relationship is 'necessary.' While ethics and politics must co-exist, politics must still be judged against ethical criteria. Levinas appeals to the old ethical idea which commands us precisely to defend our neighbours. My people and my kin are still my neighbours. When you defend the Jewish people, you defend your neighbour.' The political problematization of the 'old ethical idea' (and politics occurs alongside ethics) begins when there are no longer reliable grounds on which to decide who my neighbour is. As Levinas writes: 'The other is my neighbour, who is not necessarily my kin, but who can be. But if your neighbour attacks another neighbour or treats him unjustly, what can you do?' While Levinas is clearly not condoning the events in the Beirut camps, he does seem to ascribe a priority to 'my people and my kin' who happen to be 'my neighbours.' Richard Beardsworth has argued that in doing so, 'the unjustifiable sacrifice of one other against an other has become a justifiable defence of the “Other” of the Jewish neighbour against the homeless Palestinian.'

What is at stake in this problem is precisely that which Derrida raises: the possibility of either founding a politics on an ethical basis or of questioning politics from an ethical standpoint. Levinas appears to give priority to the 'old ethical idea which commands us precisely to defend our neighbours.' [My emphasis]. Yet he gives no indication of how we are to decide when our neighbours are our kin, and when they are just our neighbours. It seems to me that this bears out the ambiguity of the ethical structure of Levinas's thought. If the 'ethical' is given a priority over juridical and political laws, there is a danger that ethics — even an ethics of hospitality — will dictate the priority of the same over the other, of the family over the stranger, of my nation over another nation. This seems to me to reinforce both Derrida's concerns over the structure of Levinas's philosophy and his reservations about the name of ethics. On the basis of a reading of 'Violence and Metaphysics' I have

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50 Derrida and the Political, 144.
51 'Ethics and Politics,' 292.
shown that there is a consistent objection in Derrida to the priority given by Levinas to the ethical relation as the beyond of being, which goes beyond the question of names. There can be no question for Derrida of putting ethics first, and politics second: for Derrida there is only the mediated regime of justice, of politics, and of ethics as code, within which a ‘pure’ peace, God, or an ‘ethics beyond ethics’ will appear as a calculated possibility, rather than being what precedes, surpasses and makes possible any calculation. It is clear that, as I have argued throughout this thesis, Derrida is interested in a structure for which ultimately no name can be given, since every possible name is already implicated within the structure — a principle of relationality, not some secret thing which could be revealed. But does this mean that ‘ethics’ and ‘politics’ are equally good names for this situation? My suggestion is that it does not. If the reinscription of a name is strategic, we would be looking for names which play to the emancipatory moment of ‘democracy-to-come’ rather than the naturalising moment of fraternization. Politics is already the name of dissensus and dispute — ethics is rooted in a community, or a presumed consensus of some sort, even if not in a thinking of blood or race.

There is a precedent for this strategic reinscription of politics against ethics within Derrida’s work itself. His famous early analyses sought to demonstrate a consistent priority given to speech over writing in the history of philosophy. This priority is never absolute, but recurrently appears. Writing, as the sign of a sign, is seen as secondary compared with speech, which in turn is often seen as an enfeebled representation of some interior sign. When Derrida seeks to rethink this system, he only has the words of metaphysics with which to do it. The idea of a generalised textuality which he is interested in is one in which there would be no unique self-presence, no first term from which another term would be derived. No first place in other words, only second places. But rather than invent another term to describe this peculiar economy, Derrida returns to the word which he already has available, the word which already names a secondary sign, and which he generalises to encompass signs in general. That word is of course writing. In Of Grammatology, where Rousseau
condemns writing as 'representative, fallen, secondary, instituted' [GRA 17 / 29] Derrida takes writing, as the 'signifier of a signifier' to describe 'the movement of all language' [GRA 7 / 16].\textsuperscript{52} I believe that the same argument could be made about the relation between ethics and politics. If the word ethics comes naturally to Levinas at the point where he tries to think the 'Good' 'beyond' 'being' is this not in itself the return of a metaphysical value? We are perhaps not even so very far from a particular trajectory within Levinas's own thought here. Robert Bernasconi has argued that Levinas himself comes to realise this, at Derrida's prompting, and begins to suggest other words for the ethical relation, even after he has stripped away the language of ontology in Otherwise than Being.\textsuperscript{53} But if there is a traditional priority ascribed to ethics over politics, and if not throughout the tradition, at least in the work of Levinas, there not already a 'second' term to describe the general economy of violence which Levinas has tried to save ethics from? And would that word not be politics?

However the point goes beyond a simple linguistic quibble. Everything I have been concerned to argue in this thesis has led to the conclusion that not only is Derrida's work political, and perhaps 'first' and foremost political, but that it must also lead us to a revaluation of politics itself. In the last chapter I argued that Derrida's account of the decision affirms every decision as the potential site of an opening to the other, of something else happening. Every decision, whether it leads to 'better' or to 'worse,' whether it is emancipatory or not, testifies to the possibility of that 'better,' in attesting to the possibility of something else. I don't think it is an oversight on Derrida's part that throughout the texts I have been considering, he regularly discusses law, politics and justice, but only rarely does he mention ethics.

This is also a question of the polemical context in which I have been concerned to argue against Simon Critchley's understanding of the ethics of deconstruction. By equating

\textsuperscript{52} I owe this point to Bennington. \textit{Legislations}. 27-28; 56n.43.  
\textsuperscript{53} Bernasconi. 'Justice without Ethics.'
Levinas and Derrida, Critchley’s reading not only blurs the important difference to be thought between them (if not assigned to either one of them) but reduces the strangeness of the pre-original response in Derrida’s work by treating it as ethical and personal rather than political and inter-subjective. In doing so, Critchley avoids acknowledging the necessary complicity and irresponsibility which Derrida has been trying to bring into focus. Derrida takes an austere path towards the possibility of the political. As I argued in my second chapter, this also involves a rigorous self-interrogation in order to try and acknowledge the necessary violence of any discursive utterance, for example the national exemplarism of philosophy. However Critchley fails to appreciate this point. Reading Specters of Marx, and Derrida’s call for a New International, Critchley allows himself this criticism, in parenthesis (paradoxically, set in the body of a commentary on Derrida, such an aside gains far more weight than it could have done as an argued point):

[...] who would be the enemy of such a New International? The logic of Derrida’s argument would seem to entail that the enemy would be any form of nationalism, whether French, Israeli, British or whatever. [...] An open question for me would be as to the sufficiency of this notion of ‘the enemy’. Namely, that nationalists are fairly easy enemies to have [...] .

On this basis, Critchley finds Derrida guilty of providing only the ineffable politics that Critchley himself has extracted from his work. As I have argued, there can be no possibility of simply opposing nationalism for Derrida. Critchley’s incomprehension is not surprising if we bear in mind both Derrida’s remark that a national idiom will always come as ‘a scandal’ to ‘the self-styled philosopher’ [ONH 3] and Critchley’s appeal in the closing pages to the ‘properly Socratic moment’ in which politics is put into question by the philosopher: ‘There is, I believe, an urgent need to re-establish the political link between philosophy [...] and citizenship’ [ED 237-8]. For Derrida, the philosopher is always already on the side of their own city, and it is that which must come into question. If there is an ethical imperative in

54 Critchley. Ethics—Politics—Subjectivity. 279.
deconstruction, Derrida's concern is to show that this imperative will always already have been broken, betrayed, transgressed, as soon as I have begun to speak, or remain silent, in one language rather than another. But by recognising and beginning to negotiate with this necessary political transgression of the ethical, Derrida affirms the opening to something else which would be neither ethics nor politics. 'Democracy-to-come' is not the name of a political project to be initiated, nor of a regulative ethical ideal against which our democracies are to be measured — although it is perhaps both of these to some extent. Rather, 'democracy-to-come' is a name for a combination of both a politics of waiting without expectation, and an incessant and impatient negotiation.

Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, would not the de-naturalisation of decision that I discussed in my first chapter lead us to question ethics as an ethnics. I coin the neologism in order to suggest that any appeal to eth(n)ics repeats the naturalisation of the political decision. The understanding of politics with which Derrida is concerned in *Politics of Friendship* would be an attempt to keep the brother apart from the friend and from this perspective would appear to be exactly directed against something like Levinas's own thought. What Levinas's tendency to find the messianic revealed in an actual place, in the homeland of one people rather than another, warns us is not that we should simply turn against all nationalisms or particularisms. For there is no way we could do that without installing a more naïve nationalism in their place, in thinking we have become cosmopolitan or universalist philosophers. Instead it is to think this inevitability through to its limit, to the point where it opens to another politics, a new thought of friendship, a new thought of democracy; while seeking to intervene, to the best of our ability, in the here and now. But this intervention must not follow a rule, and will therefore not be susceptible to the kind of theorisation that Critchley demands. No analysis of the world will adequately prepare us for a decision as to what to do, will be able to remove the chance and the risk that is a decision, here and now, in 'this political practice that history is' [*POF* 114 / 134], this 'infinite passage through violence' [*WD* 130 / 191].
Conclusion

IN THE INTRODUCTION to this thesis I announced two areas of interest. One concerned the political dimension of Derrida’s work; the other was broadly the problem of responding to or following Derrida. On the basis of the four studies undertaken in this thesis it is evident that these two questions cannot be rigorously distinguished. The problem of reading and interpretation is as much a political question as it is a methodological one, while the category of response is itself central to Derrida’s political reflections. Most importantly perhaps, theory and practice are co-implicated throughout what it has been convenient to continue referring to as deconstruction. All of Derrida’s texts must be read as a response in a certain context, even if the limits of this context cannot be strictly delineated. This means that there are no conclusions to Derrida’s work; no generalisable rules; no political slogans or aims. The difficulties of responding to such work are evident in an interview he gave in 1991. After receiving a series of answers which clearly fail to satisfy him, the interviewer asks bluntly ‘Is there a philosophy of Jacques Derrida?’ To which Derrida can only reply ‘No.’ ‘There is thus no message,’ prompts his interlocutor. ‘No,’ confirms Derrida [POI 361 / 372]. No philosophy, no message, therefore, one would presume, no politics, certainly no political philosophy. Indeed Derrida is asked this very question shortly afterwards: ‘Could one say that between the philosophical work and the work of writing that are yours, on the hand, and politics on the other, one should not want to establish links?’ ‘The links,’ he states, are not immediately identifiable, according to the codes in force. There are links, of course, you have no doubt of that, but here or there they may pass through trajectories that are not plotted on the map of politics. They in turn politicize discursive zones, bodies of work, places of experience that generally are taken as apolitical or politically neutral. There are discourses and gestures whose code and rhetoric are apparently highly political, but whose foreseeable submission to exhausted programs seems to me seriously apolitical or depoliticizing. And vice versa, if you like […] [POI 363 / 374-5].

It is this complex of problems I have been concerned to cast light on in this thesis. In
concluding, I wish to summarise the results of my reading of Derrida; not by repeating the endpoints of the analyses undertaken, but by recasting the terms of the question, and of the answer. Then I will make some suggestions as to the paths which it seems this reading of Derrida opens up: paths between deconstruction and political theory; and between deconstruction and politics itself.

It has become a commonplace — for Derrida and for his readers — that deconstruction is a work of infinite patience. Following Levinas and Blanchot, Derrida has negotiated with the possibility of a passivity beyond passivity. From this stem many of the complaints levelled at his work: deconstruction is the patience of a reading which never takes a position in relation to the real world; a patient attention to opposing ways and paths which cannot choose a path; the suspense of the decision in the undecidable which can never take the necessary political decision. I will take Gillian Rose's objection to Blanchot as emblematic of this line of criticism. In her remarkable essay 'Potter's Field,' Rose comments on the suggestion in The Writing of Disaster (Rose does not mention this fact, but the original version was a shorter text called simply 'Discourse on Patience') that what is left to us in the face of the worst disaster is passivity:

I will not believe it. [...] it requires a work, a working through, that combination of self-knowledge and action which will not blanch before its complicity in power, activity beyond activity, not passivity beyond passivity. For power is not necessarily tyranny, but that can only be discovered by taking the risk of coming to learn it — by acting, reflecting on the outcome, and then initiating further action.

Echoed in this are not only Rose's own criticisms of Derrida, but also those of many others — I need not refer once again to Thomas McCarthy and Simon Critchley. Derrida himself occasionally seems on the verge of formulating this same criticism:

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1 Maurice Blanchot. 'Discours sur la patience (en marges de livres d'Emmanuel Levinas),' Le Nouveau Commerce. nos. 30-1. (1975) 19-44.
such a reading may perhaps seem too philological, micrological, 
readerly—complacent, too, with the time it allows itself when matters are 
urgent, at just the moment when one should no longer wait. At a moment when our world 
is delivered over to new forms of violence, new wars, new figures of cruelty or 
barbarity (and not always to this 'just' and necessary barbarity that Benjamin 
sometimes called for against the other, the barbarity of the old culture), at a 
moment when hostilities are breaking out, no longer resembling the worst that 
we have ever known, the political and historical urgency of what is befalling us 
should, one will say, tolerate less patience, fewer detours and less bibliophilic 
discretion. Less esoteric rarity. This is no longer the time to take one's time, as 
a number of our well-intentioned contemporaries must no doubt think […]
[PoF 78-79 / 97].

Derrida is prepared to subscribe to this thesis up to a point. 'Absolute urgency' is not an 
accident which has befallen us, but is 'the law of decision, the event and responsibility, their 
structural law, which is inscribed a priori in the concept.' Infinite responsibility dictates not 
having the time to take one's time: 'our answers and our responsibilities will never be 
adequate, never sufficiently direct' [PoF 79 / 98]. But rather than responding to the urgency 
of the decision by giving in to its demand, which is not a problem of the times, but of the 
concept itself, Derrida demands the right to take his time, in order not to decide in advance, 
without reflecting, by presuming to know what a decision is, what politics is, or how we 
might know these things. As Geoffrey Bennington has argued, that would include the urging 
of this urgency — which if it is structural and unavoidable, cannot be recuperated by, 
resolved by or become dependent on a historical account.3 As I have suggested, theory is 
always practice. To theorise is always to decide for one action rather than another, within 
one language rather than another. To commend 'passivity' is already an 'activity.'

Yet to commend 'patience' does not seem to be much of an answer to that pre-
eminent political question: 'what is to be done?' To understand Derrida's point, I believe it is 
necessary to distinguish two dimensions of patience. The first would be that of the word's 
original meaning — not so much waiting as enduring in the face of suffering. The political

3 Geoffrey Bennington. 'Emergencies.' Interrupting Derrida. London: Routledge, 
2000. 162-79; cf. 24-5.
practice of deconstruction would be that of suffering. There is a consistent thematic strand throughout Derrida’s political texts which would reinforce this reading. He regularly speaks of — and to — ‘chaos’ itself. This is a chaos which is both ‘a risk and a chance’ as we have seen; but it is also ‘the worst against which we struggle’ [DAP 84]. Derrida’s own response seems caught between the risk and the chance. In a paper given in the United States, prior to the delivery of the paper that would be published as Specters of Marx Derrida goes over many of the themes of the subsequent text. But certain passages read more like the Blanchot of The Writing of the Disaster than any in the subsequent and more notorious version of the text:

This is what one has to know: It is against the background of this disaster; it is only in the gaping and chaotic, howling and famished opening, it is out of the bottomless bottom of this open mouth, from the cry of the Khæin that the call of justice resonates.

Here then is its chance and its ruin. Its beginning and its end. It will always be given thus as the common lot [en partage], it will always have to be at once threatened and made possible in all languages by the being out of joint: aus den Fugen.4

Justice is inseparable from the disaster; of this, deconstruction is the exemplary witness. But that is all. This is perhaps Derrida’s most patient response, and his most constant. For there is an uncanny resonance between such a claim and that of his ‘Introduction’ to Husserl’s ‘Origin of Geometry’:

If there is any history, then historicity can be only the passage of Speech, the pure tradition of a primordial Logos toward a polar Telos. But since there can be nothing outside the pure historicity of that passage, since there is no Being which has sense outside of this historicity or escapes its infinite horizon, since the Logos and the Telos are nothing outside the interplay (Wechelspiel) of their reciprocal inspiration, this signifies then that the Absolute is Passage […]

This movement is also Danger(ous) as the Absolute [l’Absolu d’un Danger].5

At the risk of completing the circle, we can turn back to Blanchot:

The disaster [...] is outside history, but historically so [...] The disaster is the impropriety of its name and the disappearance of the proper name (Derrida); it is neither noun nor verb but a remainder which would bar with invisibility and illegibility all that shows and is said — a remainder which is neither a result (as in subtraction), nor a quantity left over (as in division). Patience again.6

Deconstruction as patience is perhaps just a name for our improper dwelling in the face of the disaster. But it also consists in the recognition that to think in the mode of the perhaps is not only to admit a necessary and inexorable uncertainty with regard to answering the question ‘what is to be done?’ but also to admit the necessary possibility that nothing can be done; that the worst is also possible. However it would be a mistake to think that this is Derrida’s only response.

The second dimension of Derrida’s response would be less patient, more hasty — but then it seems to me less than certain that patience is in fact possible. Can patience ever be patient enough? As soon as I am conscious that I am waiting for something, even for something indeterminate, I am already acting impatiently. Somewhat paradoxically it would appear that there could never be a pure patience, an absolute patience, a waiting which was not aware of itself as waiting — for then there would be no waiting at all, not even the possibility of the slightest patience. Patience would have to be measured in degrees of impatience. From this point of view, certainly closer to that of Blanchot and Derrida than of Rose, there could only be an economy of impatience, and the choice for every participant in that economy would be between different degrees of impatience. Deconstruction, I have argued, is an attempt to describe this economy, the theory and practice of political patience — or impatience, but the distinction appears to be very slight, almost nothing, at this point. ‘Impatience is never justified’ Derrida comments while describing his own impatience

towards certain formulae in the work of Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe and Paul de Man.7 There can never be any justified action within this economy of impatience, neither a 'passivity beyond passivity' nor an 'activity beyond activity.' But there is never any inaction, either. The impossibility of choosing between different politics of impatience, different strategies of violence, is what Derrida has described as an 'hiatus' in Adieu, while in Politics of Friendship he says of one such choice: 'we must be patient at the crossroads and endure this undecidable triviality. Without it — and this is the thesis and the decision — no decision would be possible, or ever any friendship. There are we. In this very place? No, there' [POF 123 / 145].

This does not mean that we do not choose or decide; and to some extent, that in itself is enough, since for Derrida 'there is no ethico-political decision or gesture without what I would call a 'Yes' to emancipation' [DAP 82]; any decision is worth something. But the difficulty would then be of ensuring that there is a decision. But since this is something that can't be ensured, since a decision, Derrida argues, is impossible, there can be no easy answer. In a more general form, this is still the very problem dictated within Derrida's texts.

We 'must calculate, negotiate the relation between the calculable and the incalculable, and negotiate without the sort of rule that wouldn't have to be reinvented there where we are cast, there where we find ourselves; but we must take it as far as possible' [FoL 28 / 62], as Derrida writes in 'Force of Law.' Even if, as the problem is set out in 'Psyche: Inventions of the Other,' what is at stake is an impossible invention of the impossible, presumably there are ways of thinking or acting which give the impossible more of a chance than other ways of thinking or acting. My response to Derrida is to reflect on the possibility of a productive articulation of deconstruction with political theory, precisely in order to give politicization a chance. The remainder of my conclusion will consist of three suggestions as to what form

such an articulation might take. They are all practices of impatience; each is less patient than the one before, and each is doubtless less patient than Derrida’s own work.

[1] What Derrida calls a deconstructive genealogy of the concept would seem to have an immediate chance when grafted into the realm of political discourse and political theory. Derrida has himself taken some steps along this path, but the task is much wider. Such concepts as security, sovereignty, representation, but most of all perhaps that of property call out for deconstructive analysis; both in terms of the tradition of thought from which they arise, but also in terms of their everyday polemical and political use. This would be an interminable task; but it is not incompatible with the strategic use and redevelopment of the terms in question. So for example, it would be possible to transplant deconstruction to international relations theory. The political challenge at the border of the state — a challenge made by and to the figure of the refugee, the asylum seeker or the economic migrant — corresponds to one of the structural limits of politics. A political decision enforces limits, defines the interior and exterior of a state, while showing these limits to be always already permeable, and crossed. Such a decision already takes the realm of politics beyond the state. Only once this has been recognised, does politics have a chance of becoming more than the programmed distribution of goods to the citizens of a state. However the affirmation of this chance can, and perhaps must, be articulated with various strategic interventions: for example either the affirmation of cosmopolitan or internationalist treaties and organisations, or their critique. The task of thought would be to judge as could best be done which moment is most propitious for either. I have shown that Derrida’s comments on hospitality, the cosmopolitical, and International Law are consistent with this proposition. Two further (local) examples: [1] To affirm multi-culturalism, a multi-ethnic vision of society, an end to violent particularisms and nationalisms, a renegotiation of the power settlements between the genders; but at the same time to seek to question the very nature of ‘culture’ or ‘ethnicity’ of ‘gender’ or of ‘nation.’ These are the words of a political lexicon that already dictates the
decision by separating multiple ‘cultures’ at the same time as it claims to bring them together. [2] To acknowledge devolution as the chance of a redistribution of power, the possibility of a new politics (more female parliamentary candidates, proportional representation) while seeking to resist the inevitable restabilizing and nationalist tendencies that have accompanied it. This would also be a case of translating deconstruction not only from one institutional context to another, or showing deconstruction to be already at work there, but from one national or state context to another, and from one philosophical idiom to another.

[2] There seems to me to be a potential for constructing a descriptive political theory on the basis of the account I have sketched out in chapter three of deconstruction and depoliticization. My analogy here is with Deleuze and Guattari’s work on deterritorialization and reterritorialization in A Thousand Plateaux. The burden of the concepts of deterritorialization and reterritorialization is to describe the way in which entities (political, material, biological) — or in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms assemblages, or bodies without organs — interact with each other, or are constantly constructed and departing along lines of flight. The basic distinction comes from the French language relation of terre for earth and territoire for the territory which is constructed upon it. The earth, Deleuze and Guattari claim, is absolutely deterritorializing, it is a surface which precedes and makes possible its own reterritorialization, the construction of territories, boundaries, distinctions and differences upon or across it. The earth however is also re-territorializing, since their dynamic materialist model sees the world in its entirety as a complex of flows of deterritorialization and reterritorialization. All state forms for example are re-territorializing, and establish instruments and mechanisms of territorialization: cartography, the military, the book itself are vectors of re-territorialization. Capitalism however is a powerful deterritorializing force. The two processes or dynamics cannot strictly be separated:
How could movements of deterritorialization and processes of reterritorialization not be relative, always connected, caught up in one another? The orchid deterritorializes by forming an image, a tracing of a wasp; but the wasp reterritorializes on that image. The wasp is nevertheless deterritorialized, becoming a piece in the orchid’s reproductive apparatus. But it reterritorializes the orchid by transporting its pollen. [...] a veritable becoming, a becoming-wasp of the orchid and a becoming-orchid of the wasp. Each of these becomings brings about the deterritorialization of one term and the reterritorialization of the other; the two becomings interlink and form relays in a circuit of intensities pushing the deterritorialization even further.8

Deconstruction opens the possibility of an analysis of political events or policies in terms of their relative depoliticizing and repoliticizing tendencies. These effects would be inseparable. If deconstruction prohibits the prediction of the future, but requires some calculation, one more impatient, more stabilising or depoliticizing version of deconstruction might be given over to such a project. For example, within an identity politics, it would be possible to isolate the repoliticizing impact on old institutions, settled boundaries and orders of affiliation, but the co-original prediction of the political decision along new lines.

[3] The third, and most impatient, of my proposed paths for a deconstructive political theory or a deconstructive politics concerns the shift from deconstruction as an academic concern to the wider public sphere. This is again a matter of context. Where Derrida, for example, has been cautious about his public gestures or interventions, given the relationship between the institution of philosophy and the media in France, there is no reason why the same path need be followed in the Britain.9 The spheres of law and of the media in particular seem to be pre-eminent sites for deconstructive political practice. Derrida himself seems to recognise this possibility when in ‘Force of Law’ he compares deconstruction with the general strike:

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Today, the general strike does not need to demobilize or mobilize a spectacular number of people: it is enough to cut the electricity in a few privileged places, for example the services, public and private, of postal service and telecommunications, of radio and television or to introduce a few efficient viruses into a well-chosen computer network or by analogy, to introduce the equivalent of AIDS into the organs of transmission, into the hermeneutic Gesprach.

Can what we are doing here resemble a general strike or revolution, with regard to models, structures but also modes of readability of political action? Is that what deconstruction is? Is it a general strike or a strategy of rupture? Yes and no. Yes, to the extent that it assumes the right to contest, and not only theoretically, constitutional protocols, the very charter that governs reading in our culture and especially in the academy. No, at least to the extent that it is in the academy that it has been developed. [FOL 37-8/ ]

The first theoretical site of deconstruction, its necessary (contingent) historical origin, may have been within the academy but there is no natural or essential limit to its mutations, grafts or reach.

However, the negotiation with any and every possible path which is demanded by Derrida’s work must also of necessity be a test of patience. I do not believe there is an easy or instant solution to the problematic articulation of deconstruction with politics, either outside or inside the academy. Since any such attempt must always be depoliticizing, we should not perhaps leap to conclusions. But since a conclusion to a negotiation with the impossible will always be just that — a leap — not only will no conclusion ever be possible, of the order of the possible, but no impossible conclusion will be in and of itself without an appeal to an emancipatory ‘yes.’ A yes to politics itself in the face of the disaster, to the impossibility of patience, and the possibility of a productive impatience.
Works by Jacques Derrida.


—. *Schibboleth: pour Paul Celan.* Paris: Galilée, 1986


—. *Feu la Cendre.* Paris: des femmes, 1987


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**Works by Other Authors.**


Schürrmann, Reiner. *From Principles to Anarchy: Heidegger on Being and Acting* trans.


