Putting the Dog Back in the Park: 
Animal and Human Mind-in-Action

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In this article we use actual instances of human conduct with animals to reflect on the debates about animal agency in human activities. Where much of psychology, philosophy, and sociology begin with a fundamental scepticism over animal mind as the grounds for its inquiries, we join with a growing body of work that examines the continuities between animals and humans, and accepts the positive possibilities of anthropomorphising animals. We are interested in the reason and intelligence that animals display in their activities with humans. Inverting the typical approach of explaining canine reason by reference to the behaviour of their wild counterparts, we describe human–canine action as it occurs in the widespread, historically assembled, and spatially situated activity of dog walking in parks. We treat dog walking as a living accomplishment of owner and dog methodically displaying intent and producing social objects.

THE PLACES OF HUMAN–ANIMAL MIND

Philosophers, ethologists, neuroscientists, builders of robots, animal rights groups, and others have fiercely debated the relations between animal mind and human mind (Bekoff & Jamieson, 1990; Griffin, 1992; Midgely, 1983; Nagel, 1986). A persistent impulse in these debates has been the delimitation of what an animal is and what a human is, or if you like, the boundary between animal being and human being. Related scientific investigations of canine mind and human–canine psychology (Bergler, 1988) have proceeded mostly from the premise that dogs are quite naturally different from humans. Although we do not deny the difference between dogs and humans, we are wary of the next move that is made by many ethologists, psychologists, zoologists, and neuroscientists to sunder dogs from their place beside us as fellow subjects. In her reading of Charles Darwin’s The Expression of Emotion in Man and Animals, Crist (1999, 2002) recovered a positive and bold anthropomorphism as a constitutive stance in Darwin’s studies of animals and insects. For Darwin there was an “evolutionary continuity” (Crist, 1999, p. 49) between all animals that in turn unavoidably included mental and behavioural continuities, and this came with the further implication
that there was no “sceptical disjunction between observable body and un-observable mind” (Crist, 1999, p. 50).

As her examination of the use of language in portraying animal behaviour continued, Crist pointed toward the growing mechano-morphism and scepticism of 20th-century ethologists such as Lorenz and Tinbergen, and sociobiologists such as E. O. Wilson. Crist alerted readers to the selective abandonment of Darwin’s language of continuity and his close analysis of anecdotal evidence. In the interests of the later sciences of animal behaviour, generic and “frequency laden” (Crist, 1999, pp. 143–149) observations of animals’ activities were prioritised to provide quantitative measures. Descriptions of episodes of animal interactions, where they were still included as evidence, were disengaged from local historical particulars and generalised. Animal skills, accomplishments, calculations, and characters were subordinated as illustrations of underlying innate release mechanisms or, as Crist (1999) elegantly expressed it, the “calculation of genes” (p. 126). In sympathy with Crist’s reading of Darwin and a growing body of antisceptical treatments of animal mind (Arluke & Sanders, 1996; Cox & Ashford, 1998; Gaita, 2003; Goode, forthcoming; Shapiro, 1990), our ambition in this article is to return to Darwin’s “powerful view of animal life as experientially meaningful, authored, and temporally cohesive” by way of a language of a shared lifeworld. Our approach to animal mind touches on critiques from various quarters in psychology (Hutchins, 1995) and ethology (Bekoff & Jamieson, 1990) that human and animal cognition have been removed from the local settings in which they are embedded. Once cognition is formalised in laboratory configurations and statistical methodologies, it becomes desocialised and decultured, losing the ecology of tasks that provide both resources and problems for humans and animals. Consequently we suggest that laboratory-based studies of canine cognition have involved “taking the dog out of the park.”

Observations of the reasoning, intellectual abilities, and emotional life of dogs in experimental settings have been carried out on the basis that each individual dog has a mind. Mind, in this view, is possessed by individuals and is an indirectly accessible interior place whose physiological home is the brain wherein its reason, intelligence, and personality reside. Mind, then, is taken to be in some way a play of inner representations (symbols, mental images, pictures, etc.) looked upon by a canino-monculi (the dog equivalent of homunculus). If one holds that a dog’s mind is inside its head, then whether the dog’s body is in a laboratory or assisting a rescue team is merely incidental. Yet if we follow Wittgenstein’s (1953) critique of “the inner” and “the outer” as it was taken up by ethnomethodologists (Coulter, 1983) and others (Baker & Hacker, 1984), then as Ryle (1949) put it,

The statement the “mind is its own place,” as theorists might construe it, is not true, for the mind is not even a metaphorical “place.” On the contrary, the chessboard, the platform, the scholar’s desk, the judge’s bench, the lorry-driver’s seat, the studio and the football field are among its places. These are where people work and play stupidly or intelligently. “Mind” is not the name of another person, working or frolicking behind an impenetrable screen; it is not the name of another place where work is done or games are played; and it is not the name of another tool with which is work done, or another appliance with which games are played. (p. 16)

In this article we look at the occasioned character of a park’s features (Zimmerman & Pollner, 1970) where the joint conduct of animals and humans actually and naturally occurs as a lived activity, in contrast to the scientific studies of animal cognition as constructed via experiments (of-
ten in the highly artificial environment of the laboratory). If we are suggesting that “animal minds are wild minds, shaped by a history of environmental pressures” (Hauser, 2001, p. xvi), then these minds will not be found by looking “inside their heads” but instead by studying animals’ practical skills in the “wildness” of wherever it is that they inhabit. To read Hauser (2001) somewhat against his own intentions, we would extend the “wild world” to include human culture in its rich heterogeneity.

The term animal is itself too vague, whereas cat or dog or bat and especially the presence or absence of the qualifier pet provide different kinds of expectations of animals and of the different things we do jointly with these animals. We have historically secured sociologies guiding our relations with dogs that we constantly draw on and use. With dogs these are still more finely categorised by, for instance, breed of dog, such that certain breeds are known to be “good with children,” “vicious,” “swimmers,” “energetic,” “easy to train,” “mostly for show,” “nervous,” whereas others are not or are at some point in between on a scale (see Goode’s remarks on Katie’s character arising from being a Corgi). All of this resides in our stock of everyday knowledge without us even ever having a living relationship with an actual dog.

Goode made a striking start on the analysis of dog–human forms of life in his autoethnographic study of playing stick and ball games with his dog (“Katie”). In this remarkable book, he pursued “an adequately detailed account of the lived order of playing with a particular dog at a particular time and place” (Goode). Drawing on ethnographic notes, daily observations, and video recordings, he presented a “punctilious” account of play with his dog to help the reader see the content of play with a dog (what play with a dog actually consists of) in its living detail. As a player of dog games, he provided a “production account” of the variations of fetching and getting the ball past Katie. There are a number of “motifs” or recognisable structures to the play, not just getting the ball past but also “pursuit and capture” that entailed Katie catching the ball with Goode playing free-kicker and Katie being “goalie.” Alongside close descriptions of how each of these variants is accomplished by dog and human, Goode showed how Katie or he initiated switches between the variants. Rather than concentrating on what animals cannot do, he was constantly attentive to what it is possible for humans and dogs to do and how it is possible:

All these motifs are mutually doable actions in which man-dog players of ball games could engage given their asymmetrical bodily and conceptual possibilities. At the same time these possible mutual doings are what creates the players and the games. That is, it is in their doing that players and games are constituted, rather than the reverse. Thus, it would be an unimaginable game to play the free kick style of play with [Katie] trying to get the ball by me. The sheer physical insensibility of it precludes it as a possible game for dog-man players. (Goode)

Goode also provided useful critiques of several other ethnographic approaches to studying dogs. He was wary of researchers who gather talk about dogs from interviews and other sources and treat these discourses as adequate accounts of conduct with dogs. At the very least such studies are ethnographically inadequate because they are premised on the notion that what people do with dogs can be fully established from what people say about what they do. Equally Goode critiqued symbolic-interactionist approaches such as those of Arluke and Sander (1996). These approaches treat objects as shared symbols (e.g., a playing with a stick becomes symbolic redefinition of an object), thereby distorting the object’s constitution in the “thick” of the play between owner and dog. Although he applauded the willingness of such researchers to treat animals as “far
more than a biological piece of machinery,” Goode spelled out with force how dogs should not be
declared as “virtual persons” nor, even worse, should they be equated with “linguistically disabled humans” as symbolic interactionists frequently do. He drew on his earlier research (Goode, 1994) with a child born deaf, blind, and quadriplegic to make it clear how different the two are:

While a formal feature of relationships with dogs and with persons who have no language is that the
language-using human is in the position to speak on behalf of the dog or the disabled person, comparing these two types of lived orderliness as lived everyday realities reveals massive observable differences between the two. (Goode)

Finally Goode, though impressed by Shapiro’s (1990) Schutzian-style reflections on everyday conduct with his dog Sabaka, found himself dissatisfied with Shapiro’s account because of its “generality” and its pursuit of the “other’s subjective experience of reality as the object of analysis.”. As Goode went on to argue, in response to the critique of his earlier work by Lynch (1997), being able to access the “inner” experience of the other is not a requirement of being able to coordinate interaction with them. Moreover, those who have followed Sacks’ (1992a, 1992b) studies of conversation and mind suspend the notion that individuals understand one another. Rather, there is demonstrable evidence that individuals have procedural competence in conducting joint actions (e.g., being able to take and offer turns in conversation, select next speakers, respond to greetings with greetings, etc.). Our article shares with Goode’s comprehensive study of human–animal play a commitment to examining actual instances of joint conduct and the research policies of ethnomethodology (Garfinkel & Wieder, 1992). However, whereas Goode described his instances to respecify theories of play, we have a more traditional ethnomethodological (and conversation analytic) concern with mind (Coulter, 1979; R. Watson, 1994) and draw on instances of walking together.

TAKING THE DATA OUT OF THE PARK

The short study that we present in this article was limited in the access we had to dogs in the city. We observed and recorded dogs only in parks, not dogs inside houses (Haraway, 2003), dogs at work with police, dogs in veterinary surgeries (Roberts, in press), nor dogs herding sheep (Cox & Ashford, 1998). Our data was limited to the lives of the dogs we saw in the park and did not include their lives beyond the park. In short, the study was not intended to be an exhaustive collection of the various communities of which dogs are members. We spent 2 days shooting video in two city centre parks in Gothenberg, Sweden. Our approach to shooting was observational and nonintrusive, echoing the style of wildlife films (Burt, 2002; Crowson, 1979). It is also a style familiar to social psychologist and sociologists in its desire to record naturally organised and naturally occurring activities. We chose such a style because we wished to look at dog walking without disrupting or interrupting: to “stalk” the dog walkers as one might normally stalk deer or some other “wild” animal (Lorimer, 2004). In this sense our methodology was nonexperimental. We did this to gather observed instances of quite ordinary dog walking in parks. In our use of naturally we are not trying to suggest objective, naturalistic, or existing without human influence, will, or work. Rather, it is a sense of the term that arises out of conversation analysis (CA) and ethno-inquires (ethnomethodology):
“naturally” has to do with spontaneity, fluency, and an apparent lack of guile, calculative design and reflective deliberation. The contrast between “naturally” produced activity and rational deliberation is akin to the distinction between natural language and artificial (logical) language in 20th-century philosophy of language. … Another relevant use of “natural” was Alfred Schutz’s (1962) “natural attitude”: a pervasive pre-reflective orientation that characterizes living-in-the-world. To speak of a pre-reflective “attitude” is not to mark a deficiency of insight or intelligence, but rather to speak broadly of a rarely interrupted condition of worldly engagement. (Lynch, 2002, p. 533)

Our method of describing dog walking then involved ways of having it occur without our interrupting it. In a methodological sense, various interruptions include, for instance, stopping the walkers to interrogate them with a questionnaire or structured interview to ask them what they were up to or how they were doing it.¹ In his use of a video camera to record ball play with his Corgi, Goode worried that he had ruined the game. Because he was both the sole camera operator and one of the central players, the process of setting up the equipment to record each game of ball left “Katie in a prolonged anticipation, dropping the ball repeatedly at my feet while I fumbled with the apparatus. Thus, the quality of play is seriously compromised for her from the outset” (Goode). To reiterate, our desire was not to gain objective and unbiased “data” as if we were not present and did not come to the research with various commitments, specifically toward animals as social subjects (McHugh, Raffel, Foss, & Blum, 1974). Our methodology, although observational and rooted in the close inspection of video recordings, was undoubtedly also participatory in the sense that we had insiders’ knowledge of dogs and dog walking.

Approximately 30 instances of dog walking were recorded with a mini digital video camcorder. We reviewed these as a group using Adobe Premiere on an Apple Macintosh G4, and the clips replayed repeatedly and in some cases in slow motion. Twelve clips were selected for further review on the basis of the quality of their footage, their representativeness of aspects of the walk in the park, and their contrast with one another (e.g., numbers of dogs being walked, numbers of individuals with dog, size of dog, etc.). We then viewed these clips several times employing methods for video analysis developed from CA approaches (Heath, 1997; Heath & Hindmarsh, 2002; J. R. E. Lee & Watson, 1993; Lomax, 1998) and discussed what we could see in setting-relevant terms. On the basis of these close inspections of the video, we wrote a shared description that forms the first part of the results in the next section. The analysis and explication of this description forms the second part. The initial version of this article contained 12 instances and was consequently very lengthy. Subsequently we edited the material down to five clips that deal with some key features of the walk: the use of the path, mutual awareness, play, the use of the lead, and practices of passing by and bypassing other walkers and exiting the park. Our concentrated analysis of a few instances was justified not only in terms of practicality. Gaita (2003) wrote in response to Eugene Linden and Jeffrey Masson’s exhaustive batteries of anecdotes about animals wild and domestic:

What is one supposed to with hundreds of uncorroborated accounts that animals can do this or that extraordinary thing—count, talk, grieve, show remorse? Either one shrugs one’s shoulders or one wants more careful description and more systematic and controlled observation, always with an eye on the

¹Such accounts were of interest, and we discussed experiences of dog walking, dog-training courses, and so on. We also read a collection of popular dog-training manuals and histories of dogs’ involvement in human activity (Lemish, 1996; Philo & Wilbert, 2000).
conceptual questions involved in the description and in the accounts of what more careful, controlled observation might show. One wants in other words, science in friendship with a scientifically sophisticated philosophy and that is exactly what Linden and Masson seek to escape. Or, more accurately, they do not understand the philosophical pressure to scepticism about consciousness. (p. 108)

Not only did we not wish to fall foul of using mere quantity of observations rather than careful descriptions to convince our readers, but we also did not want to use endless facts as a way of settling a conceptual argument. As Gaita (2003) noted, it is not a factual question whether parrots can talk: “Many of our perplexities about animals are not a function of our uncertainty about the evidence, but of our uncertainty about how to describe the evidence and how it bears on our willingness to apply key concepts” (p. 111). Whereas Gaita relied on well-told biographical stories to show how to apply concepts, we relied on the use of recorded single instances of dog walking. This is a way of analysing empirical material that has been a constituent and reasoned part of ethno-inquiries from their outset. Before closely analysing a long transcript of a conversation, E. A. Schegloff (1987) wrote

An analytic machinery which is meant to come to terms with the orderliness of interaction, and especially the orderliness of conduct in interaction, and to do so by explicating the orderly practices of the participants in interaction (conversation or otherwise), should be able to deal in an illuminating manner with single episodes of talk [or other forms of join conduct] taken from “the real world.” There is a constitutive order to singular occasions of interaction, and to the organization of action within them. (p. 102)

Or to paraphrase Sacks (1992), if there is ordering going on everywhere, then wherever you start you will find a piece of that ordering to begin your analysis. With that in mind we visited two parks nearby with our camcorder.

DESCRIPTIONS AND ANALYSIS OF DOG WALKING

In this first, hopefully quite ordinary episode of observing events in the park, the dog and owner maintained visual contact to coordinate their walking together (see Figure 1). They watched one another’s progression along the path, seeing meanderings, pauses, and so on. Although the owner’s look was harder to fathom, the dog’s over-the-shoulder look was easy to spot (Frame 6) because it involved an obvious stopping and then turning of its anterior (Frame 6). Not only did the dog and owner maintain awareness of one another’s positions in the park, but the dog also visibly checked on its owner, and thus one another’s actions were glance-available (Sudnow, 1972).

For the walker (be it the dog or the man) in the rear position, checking on the location of the front walker could be done quickly and regularly. (They probably remained constantly in the field of vision.) Though checking position could be done regularly with the owner controlling from the rear, “where are we walking to” appears to have been more of a problem if we assume the owner was selecting which path to take. How might the owner have shown his selection? The dog and the man were walking together but at different paces, meaning that the walker in the front position was findable by the other walker. Given the Dalmatian’s yo-yoing, the dog was most often in this front position, though sometimes the owner was. Being in first position is not the same as being in
charge of where the walking group is going, of course. If we do not want to take the dog’s subordinate position entirely for granted and we wish to explicate just how walking “directedly” is done, then we can see here it was not through an owner issuing directions (or commands) to his dog. Indeed, it is striking how little the owner did in relation to the dog beyond merely continuing to walk steadily along the path. This is what the dog saw in Frame 6 as it neared the junction. As we noted earlier, the owner could see the dog seeing him and this provided for the visibility of its query as a form of “are we still going the same way,” whereas in other observations of the dog looking, the owner would call out to wait, gesture, or depart from the path into the grass.
In fact, it was so blindingly obvious that the path was being used by both walkers in coordinating the walk that we did not see it. Paths are, after all, a ubiquitous spatial feature of mobile life forms recognisable to a multitude of actors beyond the human (Lorimer, 2004). Predators can use paths to follow and find their prey. Migratory herds constantly reuse old paths to find their way across landscapes. Primitive robots blindly follow paths laid down for them around storerooms. As both the ethnographers and the dog could see, the owner never strayed from the path. He walked slowly down the middle, breaking stride only once to look back at his dog when he passed it while it was stopping to relieve itself. The dog was not so much yo-yoing away from the owner as veering off to sniff or add its contribution at well-scented dog landmarks, then returning to the path ahead of the owner. The path was an “oriented-object” (Garfinkel, 2002) for the dog and owner that extended ahead of them, projecting a direction for the walk. By his ongoing self-positioning in the middle road, the owner selected this as their path, which had only, for the time being, a single way ahead. The dog’s look was analysable by its relation to the next adjacent feature—the crossroads. The dog’s query, although not formulated in words, could be found to be such a question in the “sequence of events and actions that constitute one cohesive episode” (Crist, 1999, p. 205).

Finally, we can speculate briefly here on the routine nature for owners and dogs walking through this park, along this particular path. The owner arrived here at mid-morning along with a number of other walkers. Used routinely by dogs and owners, this city centre park forms a shared historical territory for both: the paths, traversed daily and known for their length, their junctions, lampposts, views, scenting opportunities, and so on.

The first thing the clip in Figure 2 shows is that there is a pace to walking together, which in this case was fairly rapid, and that its rapidity was perhaps in some way set by the dogs, which, for the first stretch of the walk, were constantly pulling ahead. The pace for its continuation relied also on the owner’s acceptance of it by her not reigning in the dogs. It is striking on the video how she held her arms at right angles with the leads, very much like horses’ reigns. At the time of the observation, we wondered whether she was a professional dog walker. This assumption stemmed from this unusual manipulation of the leads in tandem with her walking with two dogs (where one dog was an observable norm). From our own experiences of dog walking, we were aware that stepping up the pace of the walk encourages the dog to walk ahead and not to sniff around or stop to relieve itself. A second thing the clip shows is that dogs walk in different ways and that coordinating this particular unit of three close walkers, one on two legs, and two on fours legs, was a challenging task for all concerned, especially with two leashes involved that could get tangled in knots. Each dog, as even this brief clip clearly shows, had its own character, the black dog more puppy-like and playing with the leaves, the golden retriever sniffing around and moving more slowly. It reminded us at the time that dogs learn with age how to walk on a leash past lampposts without going to the side opposite from their walker and getting snagged.

Once again, the central point of analysis here is that the owner and the two dogs were engaged in walking together in this particular park with its crisscross of paths, its geography of junctions, lampposts, trees and, in this fine Swedish autumn, fallen leaves. Across their path lay just such a drift of dry leaves, which the owner kicked up once. In the previous section we made much of the use of the path by the walkers in their visual organisation of the walk. In this episode we have a found feature on this path “today” and the actions for which it provided an occasion. Various things lying on the path, and in the way, might be analysed by walkers as obstacles to be gotten around, discarded food the dogs would like (and the owner not) or sticks to be collected for play.
The drift of leaves, as announced in the owner’s kicking them up, has the possibility to be something other than just leaves.

At the outset of being among the leaves, the dogs were busy scenting in among them, apparently oblivious to the owner’s attempt to initiate play. It was only when she kicked up some leaves for the third time that one of the dogs finally saw the offer, jumped, and tried to snap the leaves in his mouth. Before analysing the leaf kicking and its consequences, we can profitably take a brief

FIGURE 2 Going off the path—the features of the path. A woman with two dogs, one black, one gold, walked briskly along the centre of the path in the park, a short leash for each dog held in each hand (Frame 1). The dogs slowed and walked off the path beneath a tree where many leaves had fallen. The owner followed their slight detour and kicked some leaves up (Frames 2 & 3). There was no response from the dogs to her first kick. Then she kicked for a second time. On her third kick the black dog ran around a bit, trying to catch the leaves. The other dog briefly tried to join in and then, instead, returned to sniffing the ground. From the dogs’ turning around off the path the leashes get crossed and the owner switched hands before they walked on. She kicked leaves in various directions, perhaps to direct the movement of the black dog to avoid crossing leashes again. The owner held the leashes high, close to her body, moving them almost as reins are used to guide a horse or strings to control marionettes. They continued walking off the path in the grass and leaves, the dogs in front and the owner skipping a step to keep up.
detour via the system of turn taking in CA (Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974). The fact that talk done predominantly in “turns” has adjacency, means that it can provide for (or not provide for) relationships between preceding and succeeding turns. One of the devices used incessantly by speakers in the sequential organisation of conversations is that of adjacency pairs: question–answer, invite–response, greeting–greeting (Sacks, 1992). If the first half of one of these pairs is produced, it is typically another speaker’s business to provide the second half adjacently. The feature of interest here is that the meaning of the first action is tied to how it is handled by the second action. As such, a “serious” question could be reshaped as a joke by its response or vice versa. Moreover, it is the business of the agent providing the second half of an adjacency pair to show an understanding of the first action as part of the response. In other words, by responding to an invitation by producing a polite refusal, you are showing that you understood you were being offered an invitation (and not being insulted, told a story, etc.).

To return to embodied interaction between humans and dogs, we can treat the display and recognition of actions from human to dog, and back and forth, similarly. What we do not have are quite the same “turns” of action; yet an action such as kicking leaves can be several things. It could remain a self-amusement, an ongoing lone activity, or it can be responded to by the other agents as the initiation of play. By making a playful response, the black dog took it as an opening gambit in a play episode. In this case the dogs turned and assumed positions facing their owner with their tails up. By changing their body orientation to face the owner, stopping their locomotion ahead, and crouching forward slightly, they were displaying understanding of the owner’s kicking of leaves as an invitation to play together. As it happens, only one dog then started jumping and trying to catch the leaves while the other continued to snuffle. It is not only owners that can offer potential starting moves in a play episode. Goode (forthcoming) described the “vulgar availability” of his dog Katie’s requests to him, and any other willing human, to play “stick” by bringing a stick to them in her mouth. As Goode’s example and our own observations illustrate, either dogs or humans can produce invitations to do something else in the midst of another activity. There are, of course, limitations on what kinds of events invitations between dog and owner can predicate (e.g., an invitation to “go for coffee” and what other obligations and expectations go with such an offer). However, our interest here is not so much in tracing these limits as it is in seeing that an invitation can be extended and the ways this is accomplished.

Given by the end of the clip that the group had returned to walking across the park, we can begin to access how the brief play episode was brought to a close and walking together resumed. Having swung ahead of the dogs, the woman, facing backward, pulled first on the lead of the golden dog at the back (between Frames 4 & 5). This request via the lead got the golden dog underway, and subsequently the black dog joined it in walking as the golden dog passed by the black dog’s position. The owner also got the group moving by stepping backward and cross-stepping to turn around to the front while still travelling to the right of the frame (Frame 5). Once again these were moves that could be understood by the dogs (and the ethnographers) against the backdrop of their ongoing progress along the park path. The recommencement of the walk happened very quickly. The dogs did not attempt to seriously hold their ground (unlike in several other of our observations), and the owner had to run so she could get enough slack to swap the crisscrossing leashes between her hands (Frame 6).

As shown in Figure 3, while the small dog was sniffing around, the owner was standing, staring up at the authors filming her from some benches on top of a hill (see Frame 1). Then the woman pulled the dog onward. The pulling on the lead signaled the dog not only that its owner wanted to
move on but also that it was being pulled in a particular direction, a direction that was clear in relation to the uninterrupted path and the unfolding of their walk (as going this way). The pull was used in sequence with a shake of the lead as a way of communicating further emphasis for the dog to move along. Note that the tension in a lead is \textit{mutually} produced—a tug of war with a rope needs two to perform. A “command,” then, is not transmitted from owner to dog, like a packet of information. Pace and direction was grounded here in the action of pulling on the leash, and was felt by both parties in the tension. Off the leash a dog can have a greater distance from its owner, as

FIGURE 3 Leashed and leashed pass by. An owner was waiting. Behind her, her small dog was pulling taut its extendible leash while stopping to sniff. After a long time (at least 20 sec) she looked at the dog, took three steps toward it (away from their forward direction on the path), and pulled on its leash. The dog walked on, then snuffled a little longer before being pulled on the leash once more. Very quickly the dog ran ahead, pulling the leash taut again. Looking ahead (presumably at the other couple with a dog approaching—out of the camera view), the owner took the opportunity, when the dog had stopped to sniff another lamppost, to reel it in. They moved forward close together, the owner using the leash once more to curb the dog to her side. She switched the lead from one hand to the other, moving the dog from the inside of the path to the far side (see sketch), away from the oncoming group, whose dog-member was also walking very close to them, also on the outside edge of the path relative to their direction. As they passed, the big dog looked across his owner to the other dog. After they had passed by, the small dog ran ahead to the full extension of the lead again. The other dog was patted by one of its fellow walkers and continued walking close to them.
in the case of the Dalmatian (see earlier discussion). Its problem is that it has at least two things to watch: first, the one that it always watches (its owner), and second, a passing dog, a passing person or a squirrel, and so on. The dog on an extendable leash does not have to locate its owner by looking around. The owner is there at the end of the lead. Extending the lead signals the dog through sound (the whirr of the ratchet) and the sensation that the owner is moving further away from the dog. As a dog gets to know its lead, the dog can anticipate its limit and run ahead in a way that slows as the lead reaches its maximum extent. Intuitively we might think of the leash in terms of what it gives us as owners/walkers: a means of stopping our dog from running away or making the dog go where we want it to, or making our dog follow us wherever we go. Let us consider instead for a moment what the lead gives the dog: a proximity to its owner in motion or at rest; a means of sensing where its owner is—ahead, to the side, or behind—or where its cowalker intends or wants to go; a way of sensing changes of pace in the walking; and a means of controlling some of its owner’s movements. Along with the path, the lead is a mutually relevant artefact that binds humans and dogs together in their cultures of walking.\(^2\)

Of interest here beyond the mutual use of the lead in walking together is how the lead is involved in passing other walkers, be they groups or lone walkers. In the original video clip, the two groups passed by one another with no discernible pause or break of stride. This was not accidental, though it was elegant and economical. When the owners rearranged their group, they took the inside track of the path. The dogs were reigned in tight and moved to the outside of the path. The two units were going to meet one another in a head-on encounter on the path. In anticipating this, the owners projected ahead that they would bypass one another rather than stop. Given that paths have the possibility of providing the spatial basis for a meeting and that dogs expectedly will stop and check one another out by smell as well as by look, each unit had the opportunity to decide whether would pursue an encounter.

\(^2\)There are other kinds of human–animal artefacts utilized for the arrangement of walking—a horse’s saddle; cattle prod; a stick for geese; and leads for pigs, horses, sheep, and many other animals.

\(^3\)A quite different approach was taken by Roberts (in press) in which she showed how animal directed utterances are used in managing conversation between veterinarians and owners.
Let us shift to one of the often remarked upon “benefits” of dogs for their owners. Dogs provide what Sacks (1992) called “tickets” to start conversations between people who are previously unacquainted. Thus dog walking provides a means for owners to decrease their loneliness and social isolation through meeting other people while out walking. Under most circumstances city dwellers do not initiate conversations with people with whom they are unacquainted unless by way of some legitimate mechanism (Sacks’ ticket) that provides a basis for a conversation. Initiating a conversation with a stranger could be treated as an unwelcome advance, a chat-up line or begging, and so on. The clip in Figure 3 shows how the use of dogs as tickets for their owners/walkers can be avoided, even if the dogs may well want to check one another out at length.

What is again apparent from this “antisociable” event in humans and dogs walking together is the asymmetry in the organisation. If we already have the moral expectation that a dog ought to be accompanied by a competent walker and not the reverse (though we can point out briefly that a man walking alone in a park is seen as less suspicious if he is accompanied by a dog). What we saw this time was the shifting of the dog(s) to the outside edge of the groups walking together when they passed by one another on the same path. There was not, then, a random distribution in the parts of the walking units. The dogs, if “reigned in,” could be placed to the inside or outside. The owners shaped the unit in this way so as to pass by another walking unit without pausing, let alone stopping. We are not saying that this was a law of the park pathway. We are pursuing what particular social object this arrangement produced in terms of an encounter. Although the dog was in an asymmetrical position where authority lay with the owners, it was not totally passive in this. After the successful manoeuvre past the small dog and owner, the large dog was given a pat on the back as reward. In some sense, this was a gesture to confirm and recognise that the dog did the right thing. In other words, the pat recognised the dog’s agency, recognised that it was a “good” dog in an encounter where it had the possibility to do other things (such as lunging at the small dog, barking, etc.).

UNLEASHED MEETS THE AUTHORS

From the on-the-path camera angle we used for the next video clip (see Figure 5), we could easily see the owner and dog leashing up long before they were close by on the path (Frame 1). Bringing her dog into a side-by-side walking position on the leash, the owner kept it walking on the edge of the path (Frames 2, 3, & 4) while she stayed on the inside track. In this dog-to-outside arrangement, once again the possibility of encounter was minimised. We could walk around on to the grass to greet the dog (i.e., her use of the path and position of the dog to avoid meeting other walkers in the park was defensible). Such an elaborate and odd move on our part could be read as interest in the dog or, alternatively, as intrusive or threatening. The video clips further reveal that, like two walkers deep in conversation with their heads turned toward each other, the owner and dog were exchanging glances with one another. A byproduct of this is that neither the owner nor dog offered a glance to the oncoming ethnographers (though the dog snuck a quick glance at their backs once they had passed).

“Rewarding” is a well-known and pervasively used method of dog training and of the organisation of everyday conduct with them. (We have already noted its occurrence in the previous section.) The owner gives food treats and/or spoken praise and/or a clap at the conclusion of an event where the dog has displayed “good behaviour.” In the example shown in Figure 5, we find some-
thing of consequence in the timing of the giving of a reward, because the reward was not finally
given until the completion of an extended period of side-by-side walking. The dog, then, had to re-
main focused on walking at the side of its owner. The giving of the treat marked the end of the
side-by-side walking together, as did the removal of the leash. In the rewarding’s spatio-temporal
organisation, the dog had to go to the owner to get its treats, and in a straightforward manner the
owner frequently took this opportunity to bring the dog in close. More subtly, dogs can find that

FIGURE 5 As we walked along the path with the camera toward the young
woman and her young dog, she bent over the dog to leash it before continuing
to walk toward us on the edge of the path. The woman watched the dog
carefully, perhaps because of its youth, and held the leash in two hands, a
 grip that gave her more control and made reeling the dog in easiest. The
dog’s head was turned slightly toward her as he walked, and he looked at her
several times. Once past us, the pair stopped, and she gave the dog a treat as
it wagged its tail, after which she took the leash off, and she and the dog ran
across the grass farther into the park.
they are being rewarded for doing something specific. They can locate the action and project backward from its point of completion. The black dog in this case was not being rewarded constantly during its side-by-side walking. In addition, the visibility of the rewarding allowed the ethnographers to find what was occurring and why such a reward was given.

In the previous examples (Figures 3 & 4) we noted that during the passing of the two groups the owners reigned in their dogs and passed quickly without stopping to greet one another. In this case we have two different kinds of walking-together passing in the park: owner and dog, and three walkers without dog.

Drawing on a further concept from CA, that of membership categorisation devices (Sacks, 1992a; D. R. Watson, 1993), we find that the park as a setting provides a device for the possible categorisations of persons (and other living beings, objects, and features). So we have as available linguistic categories most obviously walkers, dog walkers, and pram walkers, and beyond that, bench sitters, joggers, picnickers, sunbathers, game players, cyclists, feeders of ducks, and so on. In addition, many parks come with a staff: gardeners, wardens, guides, and so on (Hester & Francis, 2003). Compared to phone calls (which are organised around the caller and the called), the park’s categories of occupants have a richness. What we see in parks is structured by the use of the “consistency” rule such that having selected a park as a basis for categorisation, we can expect that all the types of occupants we observe should be consistent with what we would ordinarily expect to find in a park (J. D. R. Lee & Watson, 1993; Sacks, 1992b). When we come upon a dog and a person walking in the same direction, we see them as an owner walking his or her dog.

The park activities described earlier may be further categorized. Walking in the park generates categories, and in turn those categories are used in the organisation of walking. Walking in the park can be done “alone” or as a “together.” “Togethering sets” (Ryave & Schenkein, 1974) include, most obviously here, a dog connected to a walker by a leash (owner and dog) and also a woman pushing a pram (mother and child). Hester and Francis (2003) noted that on approaching individuals while walking, the approacher produces spatial-oriented features such as “to the right,” “coming toward me,” and so on. In fact, the two cited spatial analyses, which are also those involved in the clip shown in Figure 5, produce spatial relations that can then be utilised in passing. A walking unit approaching on the right chooses to pass on the left. What is obvious in the Figure 5 clip is that the woman and the dog conspicuously displayed on which side of the path they would be travelling (to the extent that the dog was made to walk off the path).

Having discussed the various organisational and recognitional methods of side-by-side walking, rewarding, and occasioned classes of human and animal park inhabitants, we wish to examine the animal categories. There is a relevance for the human component of the walking set as to whether, for example, two walkers both have the same type of dog and might recognise this through smiling at one another, doing a greeting, and so on, or both just have a dog and whether this might be a basis for having something in common. What, though, of the dog? Although it cannot bring to bear all the resources that people have as language users, we can surely grant dogs competence in differentiating a walking-together group that includes a dog and one that does not.

4Sacks (1992a) used the example of the doctor’s surgery providing the categories of doctor and patient. D. R. Watson (1993) used the example of the queue formatting its members as first in line, second in line, and last in line. However, note that setting should not be equated with place because “doing karate” or “making a phone call” can be a setting that allocates various categories.
For the Dalmatian in Figure 1 and the black dog in Figure 5, the ethnographers were a human-only group. In Figure 3, in which the small dog met the bigger dog, the big dog looked across and checked out the smaller dog. Other categories of groups include groups with children. Dogs are notorious for spotting joggers and wrongly categorising them as humans requiring chasing and biting (where a police dog could correctly catch a fleeing suspect). Owners generally have accumulated experience in dealing with various classes of approaching groups in parks that might excite, frighten, outrage, or disinterest their dog, and they reorganise their arrangement of walking accordingly.

It is perhaps worth reflecting here on how dogs are instructed in how to deal with various park-related events. Consider that dogs begin as puppies, jumping up at everyone, straining on their leash to bark or lick at every passerby. In the clip in Figure 5, we see an owner still perhaps wary of her young dog. Eventually, if all goes well (which it so often doesn’t), dogs are taught to ignore other people in the park. But not quite: It is not that they ignore other walkers. They still notice approaching groups (as the dog in Figure 5 did and as did the Dalmatian in the first example). What they then ought to do is walk past the oncomers without jumping up at them. They are learning to dwell in the city, to live as city residents that know the appropriate way to walk in the park as opposed to a farm dog, fighting dog, or foxhound (whose behaviour in a park we cannot predict, which is part of the problem of a dog out of its culture). The dog has to learn to become an urban dog that does not bother those that are not its friends (the Dalmatian of Figure 1 being such a dog) while at the same time its owner must learn what continues to bother the dog. One of the owner’s problems then is to urbanise his or her dog, and the park is one place for the dog to be in public in the city and learn how to be an acceptable canine member of the public (because it can be put down if it gets this wrong by, say, biting a child).

What we believe was coming out in Figure 6 and in the preceding clips is the importance of body-to-body orientation. The owner could turn her back to her dog, or, in this example, turn her front to her dog. With a glance the dog would see that the owner was “waiting” if the owner was showing her front and was immobile. Why didn’t the dog go immediately to the owner if it saw the owner waiting? A first answer to this question is that “waiting” is our observers’ formulation of what the owner was doing, not necessarily the dog’s. Essential to the park is a certain freedom for dogs that they do not have on pavements, or in shops, pubs, buses, and so on. As we argued at the outset of this article, owner and dog are walking together, and over and over in the cases we looked at, we saw that dog and owner’s paces and interests in the walk frequently diverged yet they managed to maintain their walking-together state. Part of this activity inevitably involved catching up and waiting for one another, and this was something that both walkers did. The owner did not do anything to hurry the dog such as calling its name. The owner summoned the dog close when the dog reached the end of the path at its own pace.

At the outset, our argument was that canine mind could be understood through observation of the mixed species activity in the park, a particular place with spatial features used during a walk. As a walking-together group (or a walking unit or some other placeholder for this mobile entity), the owner and dog were still using a path, producing features in the course of their walk, its beginning, its middle, and its end (an end which the owner had arrived at first). To reiterate: The path provided direction and a succession of sequential properties for the woman-and-dog pair in their walking together. With a path in use having these directional properties, the barriers ahead became the end of the walk in the park (rather than its entrance point). A host of other features were constituted: The path’s direction was toward the road rather than away from the road, the way
home was to the right, the way ahead was downhill, and there was no one between here and the end of the path. It may not be incidental that the owner arrived first, given that it was her responsibility to leash the dog and perhaps to enforce this as the end of the walk in the park. There were, after all, ways in which the walk might have continued by reversing back up the path or running off it into the grass, and these are the kinds of add-ons dogs often try, to the frustration of their human companion.

It is in these kinds of ways that walking together in the park is brought to an end when those walking together are not walking side by side (see Figure 7). One of the things that side-by-side spatial proximity would give a unit is that they would both arrive at the end of the path at the same time.
time and would continue, almost without pause, walking together beside the road. (The Dalmatian owner in Figure 1 leashed earlier in preparation for ending their “walking in the park.”) To summarise, we have treated the ending of a walk as the lived accomplishment of those walking together arising out of how they were walking together (i.e., side by side, in close proximity, or at a distance) with the materials at hand (i.e., leashes, collars, hands, necks, paths, and roads).

WALKING TOGETHER WITH A COMPANION

In analysing dog walking, not only were we committed to treating dogs as competent, skillful, playful, and often infinitely patient companions (Goode, forthcoming), but we also had a preexisting interest in what could be called the “phenomenology of walking” or “doing walking” as a lived accomplishment of those who do so. In Ryave and Scheinken’s (1974) study, they showed how “doing walking” on busy pavements involves production and recognition tasks of walking together and walking alone. They noted that walking together is a “settinged activity” (p. 269) because its relevance appears as a function of time, place, and participants. And that setting provides bases for seeing, noticing, and describing some people as walking together and others as walking alone. The “normal appearances” of walkers on pavements are tied to the setting, and visual organisation arises through shared methods for analysing and producing those appearances. Seemingly simple tasks like walking alone or walking with someone else or as a “group” on the pavement are complicated by other social situations that can be inadvertently (or purposefully) produced on crowded pavements through pace, distance from other walkers, or direction of route. For example, following someone, walking side by side, can lead to accusations of rudeness, spying, or picking-up, and related apologies like, “I’m sorry, it appears that I’m following you but really I’m not.” Dogs, of course, do not make apologies for misinterpreted following behaviour. They can, however, like many other animals, disguise their following. Equally, lost dogs are known to walk side by side with passers by in an attempt to join them. This display of accompanying someone is obviously observable because such dogs may get restrained and passed on to the authorities or often are simply shrugged off and told, “Beat it!” Similarly, while out with their owner, dogs will briefly walk along with other groups before returning to their owner.

FIGURE 7 Dog leashed at exit.
Using our video data, we aimed in this article to extend and/or shift Ryave and Scheinken’s (1974) analyses of walking together to walking together that involved dogs. The questions we raised were: (a) How is the togetherness set of dog and walker/owner recognised, (b) how is the togetherness set of dog and walker/owner produced, and (c) what are the particular navigational problems encountered by and as part of a person walking with a dog? Our earlier descriptions begin to provide answers for these questions. The solutions to these problems are then occasions for showing intelligence or stupidity on the part of a dog, such as when a dog on a lead constantly walks on the opposite sides of lampposts.

The space that walking produces ahead and behind arranges for walkers a depth of territory of mutually relevant features. That is, it is a space we are always walking into, out of, passing by things and moving toward things. In the potentially sociable arena of the park, it is also a space where groups are approaching, falling behind, walking in parallel, resting nearby, and so on. Leaves lie across the path ahead. The entrance lies behind. Other walkers are coming toward us, or we are catching up with them. The walker is far from a static observer in front of a landscape (Wylie, 2003) or an immobilised perceiver in front of an image (Lynch, 1994). Walking is a joint engagement. In their joint engagement, the participants nevertheless bring different things to one another’s attention and expect that different things will engage the other’s attention.

In the clips it was clear that walking is not done unequipped. The lead, the path, the ball or stick, the reward, are a basic lexicon and/or store of oriented-objects (what Latour might call “quasi-objects”) or the equipment for this practice. Michael (2000) coined a new compound noun to encapsulate what we referred to in our analysis as walking units: the hudogledog (human–doglead–dog). For his actor-network theory inspired work, this mixed-collective noun is important in recognising the cogency of dog, human, and lead, and the coagency involved in such a “co(a)gent.” Much in sympathy with our own analysis, Michael is interested in how animals, objects, humans, and machines are combined as a singularity, or a unit. His reflection arose out of a situation in which he found himself sitting in the park with his child watching dog walkers in his local park. For his analysis, as for our own, the dog’s lead in extendable and fixed lengths was important as a tool for tugging. As we have pursued the importance of leashes, paths, and the orientation of human bodies to suggest what dogs might have available to them, we must also be wary of adding all that leash, path, and so on give us as competent users of language. As Sharrock and Coulter (1998) warned

That a dog can be said to see (what for us as concept-users) is its “bone” in virtue of its discriminant conduct in respect of that object, does not entail that a dog knows what a bone is: analogical predication of expressions such as “sees its bone” are derivative from full-fledged, linguistic-level, human predications. … The determination of what, in a particular situation, some person or animal can correctly be said to see is a function of how the creature stands in relationship to what the rest of us can say and to the “social distribution of knowledge” within which we are also situated. (pp. 158–159)

MINDING THE WAY AHEAD

As we noted at the outset, we undertook this article to restore the animal world portrayed by Darwin and other earlier naturalists as “a place of knowledge, emotion, intention, thinking, and memory”
Our move away from privileging the abstract intellect and theory’s problems is one that is familiar to ethnomethodologists, and philosophers of mind influenced by Ryle (1949) and Wittgenstein (1953). Such a move often involves rescuing human reason and the grammar of ordinary language from the elitism of the intellect and the blindness of theory. Too often canine mind is approached with assumptions that such actions as navigating through space or catching leaves in a game or even walking itself are outward results of mental/symbolic operations going on inside the brain of a dog (Goode, forthcoming). An individual consciousness that operates in a multitude of “environments” then becomes a mysterious (and devilishly complicated) meeting of the environment outside with the sundered consciousness inside. Because, to use a technical term, cognition stuck inside the skull-bound brain has no distribution, it then requires shared “tools” and predispositions or evolutionary universals so that it can cope so well (as it does) in so many different places. Such terrifyingly complicated theoretical problems begin to dissolve if we situate reasoning in the places built by our cultures to exercise it, one of which is, of course, the park.

Our study, though in many ways divergent, can still be profitably allied with approaches from ANT and others quarters that “rather than assuming separation between humans and animals in the conferral of rights by the former upon the latter … is an emerging analytic that attempts to see these as already ‘in relation’ ” (Michael, 2000, p. 137). We can investigate what we attribute to dogs and expect of them, not just by what we say about them but by what we do with them. We can formulate from our activities with dogs, as we have done in this article, something of how we live with them and they with us. If we abandon Cartesian “brains in vats” (Latour, 1999) in favour of the practical activity and practical reasoning that are done in any particular setting as the work of the members, be they human or nonhuman, then we need no longer worry about what we will find inside the head of the dog or inside the head of a human and how communication could possibly occur between these two isolated brains.

Goode’s respecification of play has provided us with a novel way of bringing forward ethno-inquiries and conversational analysis into domains that involve significant yet otherwise ignored life forms in our forms of life. Although Goode rapidly dispensed with “mind” as irrelevant to his investigation of play, we have retained an interest in using actual episodes to pursue matters such as where walkers “intend” to go next and how intended actions are produced and recognised in the lived work of a particular practice. It is the work of Coulter (1983) and R. Watson (1994) and others (Carlin, 2003; Schegloff, 1992; Silverman, 1998) that has consistently taken Harvey Sacks, in particular, as a successor to Wittgenstein (1953) in developing a thorough respecification of mind. Mind has been shifted away from mental, cognitive terms toward, and replaces in our analyses, the speaker–hearer of talk, with the producer–recogniser of intelligible action:

Whereas most discourse analysts concern themselves with the putative “cognitive” competences of “speakers” and “hearers,” inferring complex mechanisms of disambiguation, inference, interpretation, and the like, thus courting the “intellectualist legend” against which Ryle warned nearly half a century ago, CA (at its best) disparages all such talk, being preoccupied with the logical properties of actually

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5 Crist (1999, 2002) used Fabre on wasps and Darwin on worms to question the “basic assumptions of science and common sense about what sorts of organisms are capable of intelligence and what are not, and about what sorts of organisms are able to experience life and what are assumed to be little more than robots” (Crist, 2002, p. 7).
produced utterances, sequences, etc. construed as *sui generis* properties, i.e., as in significant respects, analysably “cohort independent.” (Coulter, 1999, p. 178).

On such a basis we have investigated some actual methods, techniques, devices, and myriad practices involving humans and dogs. It’s obvious that dogs are good walking companions. They offer this to their owners, and the owners have the obligation to be good walkers with dogs. We hope it has become apparent how rich and varied are the encounters when humans and dogs walk together in parks (and other places of canine hospitality and interest).

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