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Sovietology in Post-Mao China,

1980-1999

Jie Li

PhD in History

The University of Edinburgh

2017
Declaration

I declare that this thesis has been composed solely by myself and that it has not been submitted, in whole or in part, in any previous application for a degree. Except where states otherwise by reference or acknowledgment, the work presented is entirely my own.

Parts of this work have been published or will be published as either journal articles or book chapters as the following:

**Journal Articles:**


**Book Chapters:**


Signed:
Acknowledgments

I thank my supervisors Dr Felix Boecking and Dr Iain Lauchlan for their guidance and instruction. Thanks to my family. They support me in all things, from finance to spirit. I could not have completed the thesis without their understanding.
Abstract

The breakup of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991 has had a variety of significant repercussions on Chinese politics, foreign policy, and other aspects. This doctoral project examines the evolution of Chinese intellectual perceptions of the Soviet Union in the 1980s and 1990s, before and after the collapse.

Relying on a larger body of updated Chinese sources, this thesis will offer re-evaluations of many key issues in post-Mao Chinese Sovietology. The following topics will be explored or re-examined: Chinese views of Soviet policies in the early 1980s prior to Mikhail Gorbachev’s assumption of power; Chinese perceptions of Gorbachev’s political reform from the mid-1980s onward, before the outbreak of the Tiananmen Incident in 1989; Chinese scholars’ evolving views on Gorbachev from the 1980s to 1990s; the Chinese use of Vladimir Lenin and his policies in the early 1980s and early 1990s for bolstering and legitimizing the CCP regime after the Cultural Revolution and the Tiananmen Incident, respectively; and the re-evaluations of Leonid Brezhnev and Joseph Stalin since the mid-1990s.

First, the thesis argues that the changing Chinese views on the USSR were not only shaped by the ups-and-downs of Sino-Soviet (and later Sino-Russian) relations, China’s domestic political climate, and the political developments in Moscow. Even more importantly, views changed in response to the earth-shaking event of the rise and fall of world communism in the last two decades of the 20th century.

Second, by researching the country of the Soviet Union, Chinese Soviet-watchers did not focus on the USSR alone, but mostly attempted to confirm and legitimize the Chinese state policies of reform and open door in both decades. By examining the Soviet past, Chinese scholars not only demonstrated concern for the survival of the CCP regime, but
also attempted to envision the future direction and position of China in the post-communist world. This included analysis of how China could rise to be a powerful nation under the authoritarian one-party rule, without succumbing to Western democracy and the sort of collapse that doomed the USSR. In short, Chinese research on Soviet socialism has primarily served to trace the current problems of Chinese socialism, in order to legitimize their solutions – rather than a truth-seeking process devoted to knowledge of the Soviet Union.
Lay Summary

The breakup of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991 has had a profound impact on China. The Soviet dissolution has had a variety of significant repercussions on Chinese politics, foreign policy, and other aspects. This doctoral project examines the Chinese intellectual evolving perceptions of the Soviet Union in the 1980s and 1990s, before and after the collapse. The research will focus on what Chinese scholars had learned the lessons of the Soviet demise, and how they used their subject of study to legitimize the communist one-party rule in China after the end of the Cold War.

It is going to show, that the Chinese views on the Soviet Union had been influenced and shaped by the ups-and-downs of Sino-Soviet (and later Sino-Russian) relations, China’s domestic political climate, and the political developments in Moscow. Moreover, the research found that many Chinese scholars did not see the Soviet downfall as a precursor of a similar collapse in China itself; rather, it was regarded as a sign of the rise of the Chinese model of socialism. According to them, the USSR after its first leader Vladimir Lenin had deviated from what they saw as true socialism, while China has consistently practiced true socialism by taking its local conditions into account. Therefore, the fall of the Soviet Union was the fall of a state but not of socialism. Chinese-style socialism would not die and it would be the future of mankind.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

Research background

The breakup of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991 has had a profound impact on China. The Soviet dissolution has had a variety of significant repercussions on Chinese politics, foreign policy, and other aspects. However, many myths about post-1991 Chinese Sovietology have been circulated and perpetuated by a body of secondary literature.¹ This project attempts to clarify some of these relevant issues and rectify inaccuracies in the existing scholarship, many of which have been unclear or misunderstood in previous studies. For example, as we will see in the literature review section, some such studies claim that the Chinese government has allocated considerable funds for Chinese Soviet-watchers (for those scholars who study and research the state of the USSR) across the country. This was supposedly done to illustrate the negative consequences of the Soviet demise after 1991, and to provide advice for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime in preserving its own authoritarian system. In fact, funding for Chinese scholarship in the humanities and social sciences (including Soviet studies) faced financial cutbacks throughout the 1990s. The academic trend of

highlighting negative lessons from the Soviet Union might only be a sudden upsurge and short-term fervour indicative of the limited financial resources available. In other words, such studies might not comprise an adequate systematic and state-supervised research project in the long run.

Moreover, others have argued that most Chinese scholars after 1991 have concluded that the last Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, and his liberalization were the fundamental catalysts in bringing down the Soviet Union. In reality, Gorbachev and his liberal programs were by no means the only, or even the most significant, factor in the USSR’s dissolution, as represented in Chinese analysis in and after 1991. Chinese scholars presented a much broader historical view and offered a more systemic analysis of the multiple reasons for the collapse. Since the mid-1990s, some Chinese scholars have traced the roots of the tragedy back to the administrations of Leonid Brezhnev and Joseph Stalin, arguing that conservative forces and the rigid communist system were the decisive factors in bringing it about – rather than the figure of Gorbachev alone.

Drawing upon a larger body of updated Chinese sources, this thesis will offer re-evaluations on many key issues in post-Mao Chinese Sovietology. The following topics will be explored or re-examined: Chinese views of Soviet policies in the early 1980s prior to Gorbachev’s assuming power; Chinese perceptions of Gorbachev’s glasnost (openness) and political reform from the mid-1980s to the outbreak of the Tiananmen Incident in 1989; Chinese scholars’ evolving views on Gorbachev from the 1980s to 1990s; the Chinese use of Vladimir Lenin and his policies in the early 1980s and early 1990s for bolstering and legitimizing the CCP regime after the Cultural Revolution and the Tiananmen Incident, respectively; the re-evaluations of Brezhnev and Stalin since the mid-1990s; and the influence of Sino-Soviet (later Sino-Russian) relations, Soviet political developments, and China’s domestic situations on Chinese scholarly writings on
the USSR.

**Post-Mao Chinese Sovietology in perspective**

According to Gilbert Rozman, Chinese Sovietology has been the second most important school of Soviet studies after the Anglo-Saxon scholarship, with one of the largest body of Soviet Russian specialists in the world. From 1949 to 1976, Soviet studies in China under Mao Zedong were profoundly affected by the ups-and-downs of Sino-Soviet relations. China saw the USSR as both mentor/enemy and as a positive/negative model over time. When Stalin was in power, China closely emulated the USSR on nearly everything; once the Sino-Soviet conflicts escalated in the late 1950s, however, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) started to attack the Soviet Union as a sworn enemy. During the peak time of Sino-Soviet friendship in the 1950s, the PRC government encouraged Chinese people to learn from the USSR and translate the Soviet experience into a Chinese reality. From the 1960s onward, the rapid deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations was accompanied by drastic changes in Chinese academia. Chinese scholars were required to switch from their previous glorification of the USSR to intensive denunciations of the Kremlin. During this period, there was virtually no Sovietology and no genuine academic research on the country at all. Since that period, there has been a widespread theory that Chinese Sovietology under Mao, like other academic disciplines, was predominantly enslaved to the state’s agenda; this theory is nearly universally accepted.

It is true that there was no visible academic community of Soviet studies in Mao’s China. Under Mao’s reign, the humanities and social sciences were either abolished or

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Chapter 1

suppressed. During this time, few published articles and books concerning the Soviet Union were written by trained Soviet or Russian specialists; in fact, few such academics were living and working in China during this period. Thus, the contents of academic publications concerning Sovietology are actually no more than news reports, political propaganda, and essay translations (normally from Russian to Chinese, but sometimes also from other European languages to Chinese).

China at this time simply did not have a genuine field of Sovietology operating within its universities; the higher education system had almost ceased to function, due to the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. Chinese writers who were writing about the Soviet Union were authorized to do so only upon the request and permission from the CCP. These writers were mainly teaching staff in the departments of history or political economics at various universities, and bore no titles of the professorship. Some of them were even employees of Party propaganda units, journalists, Soviet-returned students, and Red Guards (this was more common during the Sino-Soviet split). As we will see in subsequent chapters, even in the wake of Mao’s departure in the early 1980s, Chinese scholars were still in the process of working out old issues dating back to the Mao era. Because of political fear and ossified mental habits, hard as they tried to embrace the new age, these scholars were still accustomed to transposing academic discussions from the plane of scholarship to that of Marxist analysis of class struggle.

After the passing of Mao, Sino-Soviet relations remained strained in the early 1980s. The new Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, after taking the helm, began to introduce reform and open door policies. The moribund Soviet economic and political systems that had been practiced in China for more than three decades under the disguise of Maoism were

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4 For one such example, see the following book published under Mao: Renmin Chubanshe [People’s Publishing House], ed. Sulian xiuzheng zhuyi shixue guandian pipan [Critique of Soviet Revisionist Historiography] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1976).
Chapter 1

now under serious re-assessment and heavy criticisms by Chinese scholars. After the mid-1980s, the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations, the rise of Gorbachev, and his liberalization in the name of glasnost all led to a turning point in Chinese Sovietology. The emergence of Gorbachev in 1985 drastically changed China’s political and intellectual atmosphere. His strong willingness to overhaul the obsolete socialist system through intense political reform in the USSR held great appeal for Chinese intellectuals. Stimulated by the relaxed political environment in the 1980s under the liberal-minded CCP leaders Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, Chinese scholars began to view and discuss the Soviet Union and its reforms in a more positive and objective way. The subsequent discourse of Chinese Sovietology was largely shaped by the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, Gorbachev’s decision to remove the power monopoly of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in March 1990, and finally the tectonic change of the USSR in 1991. These three events shaped Chinese perceptions of the past Soviet socialist system and ushered Chinese Sovietology into a new era.

In this thesis, the researcher will follow Robert Daniels in defining Sovietology as “the specialized study of the Soviet Union from the standpoint of the familiar academic disciplines: history, economics, geography, occasionally sociology and anthropology, and above all political science.” 5 In Daniels’s opinion, “Sovietology, of course, was never a discipline unto itself, let alone a monolithic academic cult,” 6 and “Sovietology did not constitute a peculiar discipline, a unique method, or a single set of conclusions.” 7 Some Western scholars also draw a clear line between Sovietology and Kremlinology, the latter being defined as either “an approach that seeks to explain Soviet society primarily in terms of the political jockeying for power that takes place among the men in the Kremlin,” 5

6 Ibid., 115.
7 Ibid., 120.
or as “a subcomponent” of Sovietology. In this research, like Daniels, the investigator does not separate the two disciplines and uses the term “Sovietology” in an inclusive way, encompassing the study of all aspects of the Soviet Union, with a focus on the two quintessential issues: Chinese perceptions of Soviet foreign relations, and Soviet leaders and politics.

The use of the term “Sovietologists” (or Soviet-watchers) in this thesis for those who study and research the state of the USSR is based on Christopher Xenakis’ definition. Xenakis defines US Sovietologists broadly, to include “political scientists, economists, sociologists, historians, diplomats and policy makers, working in academia, government, private think tanks, and the media.” He uses the terms “Sovietologists,” “Soviet experts,” “foreign policy analysts,” “Cold War theorists,” and “political scientists” interchangeably, citing the examples of George Kennan, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Richard Pipes, and Strobe Talbott. These individuals are both Soviet-specialists and policy makers, while Hedrick Smith and Robert Kaiser are also Soviet-watchers and journalists simultaneously.

In terms of this elastic definition of the field and the diversity of scholars’ backgrounds, the situation in China is generally similar to the situation in the US as described by Xenakis. For example, as we shall see in subsequent chapters, although some Chinese scholars specialize in either Soviet or world communism, most of those mentioned and quoted in this thesis are generalists rather than specialists in Soviet studies. On the other hand, unlike the US, some Chinese writers mentioned in the thesis do not have academic qualifications. They are either Party bureaucrats, media reporters, 

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11 Ibid., 4.
university students, or even secondary school teachers, whose thoughts on the problems of the Soviet Union have been published in various academic journals and official newspapers. Their articles often express more political zeal than scholarly expertise or analytical insight. Generally speaking, the descriptions by Xenakis of US Sovietologists could also be applied to the Chinese situation. Chinese Soviet-watchers are a diverse group, rather than representatives of a single school of thought or central theory. Their publications never imply a complete homogeneity of views. However, although their academic training is in different disciplines and by no means confined to Soviet studies, their research and publications are relevant to Sovietology in one way or another.12

The educational levels of Chinese Soviet-watchers are varied (Table 1). One case in point involves the Institute of Soviet and East European Studies (Sulan dōngou yánjiusuo), which was renamed as the Institute of Russian, East European, and Central Asian Studies (Eluosi dōngou zhōngyá yánjíusuo, or IREECAS) in 1992.13 IREECAS is the largest powerhouse in research of the former Soviet Union in the PRC. It is affiliated with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), which is China’s most prominent organization specializing in the humanities and social sciences and under the control of the State Council and Party supervision.

IREECAS employs more than 100 administrative and academic staff, recruiting China’s most well-known intellectuals in the field and academics from all over the country. There are several categories of scholars at the Institute.14 First, some older scholars (born before 1949) often do not possess any academic degrees, and are essentially self-taught Soviet-experts. The best examples are Liu Keming and Ma Weixian,

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12 Similarly, Robert Desjardins in his book on post-war French Sovietology also includes not only the scholarship of French Soviet specialists but also the writings of French historians, economists, and political scientists, whose works are orientated only incidentally toward the USSR. See Desjardins, *The Soviet Union Through French Eyes, 1945-1985* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988), 10.
13 For the convenience of narrative, the researcher will use the name of IREECAS throughout the thesis.
14 All the information of IREECAS’ scholars’ backgrounds can be found at its official website [http://euroasia.cssn.cn/](http://euroasia.cssn.cn/) [accessed January 1, 2017].
both of whom are veteran scholars and former IREECAS directors in the 1980s. Second, some scholars attended university, but attained their BA degrees before 1949 (Xu Kui and Xing Shugang); others received a BA after the founding of the PRC (Li Jingjie, Zhang Wenwu, Huang Tianying, Chen Lianbi, Liu Gengcen, and Zhao Changqing). This would have been on the eve of the Cultural Revolution, when most of the PRC universities were going to cease to function. Third, for those with postgraduate credentials, some were awarded Master’s degrees in various Chinese universities (Peng Dapeng, Xu Zhixin, and Pan Deli). There is also a group of academics holding a PhD or equivalent. For instance, there are several people from the older generation who have associate doctorates from the Soviet Union before 1991 (Jin Hui, Li Renfeng, and Lu Nanquan). The younger generation (born during and after the 1960s) either obtained doctorates in Russia after the collapse (Xue Fuqi and Zhang Hongxia), or in Chinese universities, either from IREECAS (Xing Guangcheng and Liu Fenghua), CASS (Zheng Yu and Jiang Yi), China Foreign Affairs University (Zhang Shengfa), or Beijing University (Bai Xiaohong). Their majors range from Soviet (or Russian) studies and international relations, to political science and economics. None of them has sought any academic degree from the West, although some of them have stayed in Western universities as short-term visiting scholars (Xu Kui and Zhang Shengfa).
Table 1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Full-names (their former affiliated institutions)</th>
<th>Years of Birth</th>
<th>Highest Degrees Awarded</th>
<th>Major Research Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liu Keming (North China University; International Liaison Department or ILD at China’s Foreign Ministry)</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>High school graduated, 1938</td>
<td>Soviet economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xu Kui (ILD)</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>BA in Law, Beiping Chaoyang University (China), 1948</td>
<td>Soviet history</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jin Hui (ILD)</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>Associate Doctorate in Economics, Moscow State University (the Soviet Union), 1955</td>
<td>Soviet economy and politics</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### The Most Prominent Soviet-watchers in IREECAS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Full-names (their former affiliated institutions)</th>
<th>Years of Birth</th>
<th>Highest Degrees Awarded</th>
<th>Major Research Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Xing Shugang (ILD)</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>BA in Russian Language, Chinese Northern University (China), 1949</td>
<td>Soviet foreign policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lu Nanquan (Renmin University; ILD)</td>
<td>1933</td>
<td>Associate Doctorate in Economics, Moscow State University (the Soviet Union), 1960</td>
<td>Soviet economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chen Lianbi (ILD)</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>BA in Russian Language, Nanjing University (China), 1964</td>
<td>Soviet nationalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chang Qing (ILD)</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>BA in Russian Language, Liaoning University (China), 1964</td>
<td>Soviet nationalities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## The Most Prominent Soviet-watchers in IREECAS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Full-names (their former affiliated institutions)</th>
<th>Years of Birth</th>
<th>Highest Degrees Awarded</th>
<th>Major Research Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Li Jingjie (ILD)</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>BA in Russian Language, Nanjing University (China), 1965</td>
<td>Soviet foreign policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wu Enyuan (Institute of World History at CASS)</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>PhD in History, CASS (China), 1987</td>
<td>Soviet history</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhang Shengfa</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>PhD in Law, China Foreign Affairs University (China), 1995</td>
<td>Soviet history, Sino-Soviet relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xing Guangcheng</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>PhD in International Politics, CASS (China), 1991</td>
<td>Soviet politics and foreign policies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other renowned Chinese Soviet-watchers based in other PRC institutions share similar academic backgrounds with those in IREECAS (Table 2). One important figure that will be mentioned in the thesis is Gao Fang (born in the 1920s), a professor of
international relations at Renmin University and an expert in the history of world communism, who does not possess any academic credentials at all. Another is Huang Zongliang (born in the 1940s), vice-director of the Institute of Russian Studies at Beijing University, who obtained his BA at Beijing University in the 1960s. Yang Kuisong and Shen Zhihua (both born in the 1950s), professors at East China Normal University and specialists in the Sino-Soviet relations, acquired their BAs and post-graduate credentials, respectively, after 1978.

There are also two well-known Soviet-specialists based in the Central Party School (CPS). Jiang Changbin (born in the 1930s), former director of the Centre for International Strategic Research at CPS, possesses only a BA degree in Russian Literature from the Harbin Institute of Foreign Language Studies. After being awarded the MA in History from Beijing Normal University in 1989, Zuo Fengrong (born in the 1960s), a professor at CPS, went to CPS to study her PhD in International Politics under the supervision of Jiang Changbin. She remained to teach in CPS after earning her doctorate in 2001.

The last example is Chen Zhihua (born in the 1930s), a researcher in the Institute of World History at CASS and a canonical scholar on Leonid Brezhnev, who studied in the USSR and gained his BA from the University of Leningrad in the 1950s. Among all the Sovietologists mentioned in Table 1 and 2, only Zuo Fengrong is a female scholar. As we...
will see in subsequent chapters, women were remarkably underrepresented at the apex of Chinese Sovietology in both decades.

Table 2:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Full-names (their former and current affiliated institutions)</th>
<th>Years of Birth</th>
<th>Highest Degrees Awarded</th>
<th>Major Research Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gao Fang (Beijing University; Renmin University)</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>Beijing University dropout, 1947</td>
<td>World socialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chen Zhihua (Institute of World History at CASS)</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>BA in History, University of Leningrad (the Soviet Union), 1959</td>
<td>Soviet history</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiang Changbin (Harbin Institute of Foreign Language Studies; Central Party School)</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>BA in Russian Literature, Harbin Institute of Foreign Language Studies (China), 1959</td>
<td>Soviet politics</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### The Most Prominent Soviet-watchers in Other Chinese Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Full-names</th>
<th>Years of Birth</th>
<th>Highest Degrees Awarded</th>
<th>Major Research Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Huang Zongliang (Beijing University)</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>BA in Politics, Beijing University (China), 1965</td>
<td>World socialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shen Zhihua (Beijing University; Renmin University; Chinese University of Hong Kong; East China Normal University)</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>MA dropout in History, CASS (China), 1982</td>
<td>Cold War history, Sino-Soviet relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yang Kuisong (Renmin University; CASS; Beijing University; East China Normal University)</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>BA in Party History, Renmin University (China), 1982</td>
<td>Sino-Soviet relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zuo Fengrong (Central Party School)</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>PhD in International Politics, Central Party School (China), 2001</td>
<td>Soviet history, world socialism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To summarize, there are basically three groups of Chinese Soviet-researchers represented in this thesis. These researchers have different academic backgrounds and their writings demonstrate this diversity. The older generation grew up under Mao and regained its momentum in research after the 1970s, after the stifling academic period resulting from the Cultural Revolution. This generation of scholars generally displayed a nostalgic attitude toward socialism and positive views on the Soviet Union (Liu Keming, Xu Kui, and Gao Fang).

Second, there is the generation of middle-aged scholars, whose formative years were undermined by the disastrous Cultural Revolution, but who also came back to research and writing after 1976 (Zhang Shengfa, Xu Zhixin, and Pan Deli). This generation, however, lived through very bitter experiences under Mao; they thus showed their support for Gorbachev’s reforms in the 1980s and levied consistent criticisms (albeit not very fierce) toward the rigid Soviet socialist institutions in both decades.

Finally, the younger generation, born in and after the 1960s, attended universities right after Mao’s death and brought vigour to Soviet studies (Xing Guangcheng, Zuo Fengrong, and Zheng Yu). They grew up in the age of reform and had more exposure to the influence of Western scholarship. However, as seen in their writings in and after the 1990s, they were not necessarily against Soviet communism; most of them were educated in the Chinese system and employed by state institutions. Like many in the older generations, they were actually part of the establishment intellectuals.

Regarding the language competence of post-Mao Chinese Soviet-watchers, China began to invite foreign language tutors to teach its university students in the late 1970s. In the case of CASS, the Academy hired US and Japanese professors to conduct foreign

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22 The point is illustrated by Tani Barlow and Donald Lowe, *Teaching China's Lost Generation: Foreign Experts in the PRC* (San Francisco: China Books & Periodicals, 1987).
language courses for its graduate students from the early 1980s onward; these language courses thus became a long-term part of the Academy’s graduate training system. In the case of Chinese Soviet-specialists in IREECAS, most of them had a rigorous grounding in Soviet culture and history, and could work with Russian sources with ease. Their articles since the early 1980s demonstrate that these scholars were well informed about the up-to-date Soviet archives and information. Many of them made trips to the USSR for academic exchanges and research visits. They constantly quoted from a large volume of Russian primary documents, including speeches by Kremlin leaders, Soviet journals and newspapers, reports from TASS, and direct comments of Western Sovietologists. Former IREECAS Director Wu Enyuan had journal articles and book chapters published in the Russian Academy of Sciences. Some scholars even published their research outcomes on the Soviet Union in Western languages; for example, Xing Guangcheng wrote a number of articles in English, and Dong Xiaoyang presented a conference paper at the World Congress of International Council for Central and East European Studies in the UK in 2001.

As the name suggests, IREECAS employs scholars specializing in the former Soviet Union and Russia as well as in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Many scholars there have a number of linguistic endowments in different regions. For example, in his three

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23 Xu Zhenzhong, “Benyuan jiaoxue dongtai” [Information about Teaching and Curricula at Our Academy], Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan yanjiu shengyuan xuebao, no. 3 (1983): 36.
articles published in the 1980s, Huang Tianying used references including original documents in Chinese, Russian, English, French, Hungarian, and Polish.\textsuperscript{28} The IREECAS official bimonthly journal of \textit{Sulian dongou wenti} (Matters of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, or MSUEE), which accepts submissions from all over China, is also a showcase of the language versatility of Chinese Soviet-analysts across the PRC.\textsuperscript{29} Cao Shengqiang, a professor of international relations at Shandong University, cited substantially from Anglo-Saxon scholarship (including books written by Thomas G. Paterson, Thomas W. Simons, and Robin Edmonds) in his 1996 article to assist his interpretation of Soviet-East European relations.\textsuperscript{30} Cao Liqin, a lecturer of Korean studies at Jilin University, even quoted the Korean archives to support her arguments in the 1991 article on the Soviet-North Korean relations under Gorbachev.\textsuperscript{31}

It is also worth pointing out that some articles published by MSUEE used only Chinese and Russian sources. These works were normally written by the middle-aged generation of scholars like Chang Qing, Li Jingjie, and Huang Zongliang, who studied at Chinese or Russian universities before the Cultural Revolution and were rarely exposed to Western scholarship during their formative years. In extreme cases, some scholars exclusively referenced sources in the Chinese language; these included the Chinese translations of the works of Marx and Lenin, and of other Soviet leaders’ speeches and talks. Those articles were mostly produced by the older generation of scholars, such as


\textsuperscript{29} The journal was renamed as \textit{Eluosi dongou zhongya yanjiu} (Russian, East European and Central Asian Studies, or RECAS) in 1992. For details, see \url{http://www.oyyj-oys.org/Index.html} [accessed January 1, 2017].


Liu Keming, Xu Kui, and Gao Fang, who were less educated or attended universities before 1949. They often understood and used only the Chinese language to undertake their research on the USSR.

Apart from revealing the excellent language abilities of Chinese Soviet-analysts, the information above also demonstrates that most of those scholars were establishment intellectuals employed by either CASS or other Chinese state higher institutions. They had the privilege of visiting the Soviet Union and becoming familiar with various foreign language materials, which outsiders may not have been allowed to access. Particularly during the 1980s, when China’s archives were largely closed to the general public, it was politically problematic and logistically impossible for an independent scholar outside the official circles to gain access to these materials.

Almost all Chinese Soviet-watchers included in this thesis come from the following three kinds of institutions: the first is IREECAS, which carries a great deal of weight in Soviet studies in China. IREECAS is also the headquarter of the Chinese Association of East European and Central Asian Studies (CAEECAS), which administers the membership of Chinese Soviet-specialists across the country. IREECAS constantly plays a key role in hosting and organizing the annual meetings of CAEECAS. Moreover, the reputation of IREECAS extends beyond the academic realm. Many highly ranked Party officials pay visits and deliver speeches at the Institute, and these are occasionally publicized in the headlines of Renmin ribao (People’s Daily), the PRC’s largest Party

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33 The Chinese Association of Soviet and East European Studies (CASEES) was founded in 1982 and renamed as the Chinese Association of East European and Central Asian Studies (CAEECAS) in 1993. The membership of CAEECAS mainly includes Chinese scholars specializing in Soviet, Russian, East European, and Central Asian studies from the PRC institutions. CAEECAS coordinates research activities of those fields across the country. The funding source of CAEECAS is provided by CASS or other private donations. See “Zhongguo dongou zhongya xuehui zhangcheng” [The Constitution of the CAEECAS], Eluosi dongou zhongya yanjiu, no. 4 (1993): 96.
mouthpiece. Second, this thesis’ scope includes attention to scholars in Soviet studies from other institutions in CASS, such as the Institute of World History and Institute of Marxism-Leninism. Last, the investigation also includes Chinese Soviet-watchers from provincial academies of social sciences and other universities (including the party schools), particularly to those with units, departments, and journals devoted specifically to research on the USSR.

Though the training and recruitment of Chinese scholars in Soviet studies vary somewhat between institutions, the teaching philosophy and normal procedures are often nearly identical within the PRC. One example is the Graduate School at CASS, which focuses mainly on research and is exclusively designated for the training of graduate students. Though the school renounced the Soviet-style educational method in the 1980s and decided to begin importing Western training elements, CASS continued to use Marxism-Leninism as the philosophical principle framing studies of the post-Mao domestic and international situation. The Academy indicated that social sciences should be based on the guidance of Marxist-Leninist theories in seeking solutions to the practical problems of socialist modernization. CASS required all graduate students (both Masters

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34 Two examples here: in 1985, Premier Zhao Ziyang delivered a congratulatory speech to the Institute, for commemorating its 20-year founding anniversary. See “Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan sulian dongou yanjiusuo chengli ershi zhounian,” [The 20-Year Founding Anniversary of the Institute of Soviet and East European Studies at CASS] Renmin ribao, May 4, 1985. In 1998, Wang Daohan, president of Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits and former mayor of Shanghai, came to IREECAS and delivered a speech during the permanent council member conference of CAEECAS. See “Zhongguo dongou zhongya xuehui zhaokai changwu ishihui,” [The CAEECAS Holds the Permanent Council Member Conference] Renmin ribao, May 7, 1998. However, in both occasions, Renmin ribao did not reveal much information on the contents of both speeches.

35 For a list of PRC institutes that have facilities for research of the Soviet Union, see Rozman, “China’s Soviet Watchers in the 1980s,” 444-45.


37 Like most of Chinese universities after Mao’s death, CASS restored to accept graduate students in the early 1980s.


39 Ma Hong, “Shehui kexueyuan yanjiu bixu jianchi makesi zhuyide lilun zhidao” [Research of Social
and PhDs) to complete the compulsory courses on Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, and Deng Xiaoping Theory during their first year of study; only then could students take courses in their own disciplines and begin writing graduation theses. In fact, the general requirement used to evaluate the academic quality of graduation theses across all majors was the question of how well Marxism had been utilized to raise, analyse, and resolve problems.

Like other Chinese higher institutions, graduate students at CASS were selected for communist party membership based on their academic performance and, most importantly, their political virtue. Such practice continued in the 1990s and beyond. Moreover, elsewhere in China Party bureaucrats are in charge of school administration rather than professional scholars. This administrative role is usually titled dangwei shuji (Party Secretary). It is noteworthy that upon graduating, many graduate students at CASS have been promoted to be Party secretaries (rather than academic scholars), where they assume administrative duties in different departments and schools within CASS. One such example is Meng Qinhai. After obtaining a graduate degree in Chinese Literature at CASS, he became the Party Secretary and Vice-Director of IREECAS from 2005 to 2009. This is evidence of the so-called “scholar-bureaucrat” tradition termed by

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40 All the courses proposed by CASS must get the prior approval from the CCP Central Propaganda Department. See Renmin Chubanshe [People's Publishing House], ed. Huqiaomu yuzhongguo shehui kexueyuan [Hu Qiaomu and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2007), 258.

41 Xu Zhenzhong, “Benyuan jiaoxue dongtai” [Information about Teaching and Curricula at Our Academy], Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan yanjiu shengyuan xuebao, no. 6 (1983): 29.


43 Deng Liqun, “Woyuan juxing shoujie yanjiusheng biye dianli” [The Graduate School is to Hold the First Graduation Ceremony], Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan yanjiu shengyuan xuebao, no. 6 (1981): 75.


45 Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan eluosi dongou zhongya yanjiusuo [Institute of Russian, East European, and Central Asian Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences], http://euroasia.cssn.cn/zgskyeoys/bsgk/bsgqslq/201007/t20100729_1899644.shtml [accessed January
Dorothea Martin, which indicates the tradition of integrating academia into the broader communist system of cadre promotion. In addition, a survey of the backgrounds of Chinese Soviet-analysts in IREECAS and other universities in the PRC reveals that a large number of them have been retained by their own institutions after graduation. They tended to stay in their institutions until retirement, and rarely changed their working units once they were hired. This phenomenon of academic inbreeding was common in 1980s China. In 1983, nearly one third of master degree graduates from CASS stayed and worked for their own departments. In 1989, CASS President Hu Sheng demanded that the Academy overcome its problem of academic inbreeding. However, the issue was not resolved until the late 1990s, when CASS announced that its job positions would no longer give priority to its own graduates.

Funding, academic freedom, and writing style in Chinese Sovietology

Unlike the natural sciences, which enjoy abundant funding and a level of autonomy in China, the humanities and social sciences are consistently underfunded and subjected to political intrusion in the PRC. This is largely due to the politically sensitive nature of the subject matter(s). Generally speaking, most of the potential projects in the humanities and social sciences in post-Mao China have been evaluated for research grants by the

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47 Back then, the problem was also rampant in the field of Chinese science. See Cong Cao, *China’s Scientific Elite* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2004), 116.
48 Ma Hong, “Bayanjiu shengyuan bancheng jianqiangde makesi zhuyi baolei” [To Make the Graduate School Become a Strong Fort of Marxism], *Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan yanjiu shengyuan xuebao*, no. 6 (1983): 1.
50 Fang Keli, “Jingxin jiaoyu yange guanli” [Strong Education, Close Supervision], 12.
51 Cong Cao, *China’s Scientific Elite*, 181.
National Planning Office of Philosophy and Social Science. The Office was founded in 1991 and its predecessor in the 1980s was the Social Sciences Council. The Office is a branch of the Central Propaganda Department (CPD) and the CPD is directly responsible for the CCP Central Committee. The National Planning Office and its provincial branches are the largest source of funding for social science research in China. They aim to direct Chinese scholars into the areas of study which best serve the interests of the Party. Even Chinese scholars wishing to apply for foreign funding must gain approval from this Office; these cases are not always successful.

Such funding procedures and organizational relations demonstrate that financial allocation for the humanities and social sciences in the PRC is ideologically driven. Decisions are influenced more by politics than by scholarship; the reality is that the humanities and social sciences have been poorly funded in post-Mao China. One article revealed that many scholars from these disciplines are forced to pay journal editors in exchange for the publication of their papers. Another article revealed that although the Beijing Academy of Social Sciences is funded by the Beijing city government, most of the time the city government had to collaborate with private companies in seeking funding for the Academy. In the wake of the Tiananmen Incident, allocations of funding in social sciences were more tightly controlled. On the other hand, since Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour in 1992, when China began to accelerate reforms and herald a new era of openness, social science funding increased significantly.

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54 Ibid., 118.
55 Ma Qiang, “Ruhe baituo gaoxiao renwen sheke keyande kunjing” [How to Solve the Problems in Research of the Humanities and Social Sciences in Higher Educational Institutes], *Xibei minzu xueyuan xuebao*, no. 3 (1998): 124.
57 “Jinnian guojia sheke jijin kaishi shenqing,” [This Year’s State Fund for Social Sciences is Open for Application] *Renmin ribao*, June 1, 1990. The application guideline stated that applicants should fulfill the requirements of “upholding the Four Cardinal Principles and opposing bourgeois liberalization.”
market economy after Tiananmen, the priority of social science awards mostly went to projects with applied research on Chinese socialism.  

A number of secondary sources claim that the Chinese government has allocated considerable funds encouraging Chinese Soviet-watchers to draw lessons from the Soviet demise after 1991, and to provide advice for the CCP regime in preserving its own communist system from similar dissolution. The PRC-based scholar Guan Guihai, associate dean of the School of International Studies at Beijing University, even suggests that while it is generally difficult for Chinese scholars in the social sciences to obtain national research funds, since 1991 this has become much easier if the research has something to do with the Soviet Union.

In reality, however, the generous state funding support for Chinese Sovietology claimed by the authors above was a myth. To give one example, CASS had been plagued by the issue of insufficient funding throughout the 1980s and 1990s. CASS President Hu Sheng complained about the lack of money for research, as well as the dismal living and working conditions for staff, twice during the CASS annual meetings in 1985 and 1991. As a national key research institute, CASS was placed under the direct jurisdiction of the State Council and was totally dependent on the financial support of the state. However, such state support was far from satisfactory. The working conditions of the Academy were still substandard at the end of the 1990s. Most of the staff in CASS lacked computer

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62 Ibid., 169.
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and internet access in 1998. In 1996, CASS even signed cooperation agreements with foreign foundations in Germany and Taiwan, which garnered funds to assist research. CASS leadership never ceased efforts to secure governmental funding for the Academy. Their efforts were unsuccessful until 1999, when several members of the CCP Central Committee (such as Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji) made an inspection tour of CASS, for commemorating the 22-year founding anniversary of the Academy. The Party leaders announced that they would seriously support the increase of funding and the improvement of living standards for the institutional staff.

In the case of IREECAS, the Institute similarly struggled to secure funding for its research activities and the publications of its flagship journal of MSUEE (called RECAS after 1991). In 1996, IREECAS scholar Lu Nanquan revealed many difficulties in the Institute. His working report highlighted the meagre funding support, the loss of scholars due to insufficient salaries, and the increased price of the institutional journal that resulted in the decreased subscription rate. He suggested that in order to overcome these problems, IREECAS should take advantage of the Soviet collapse, “using our research outcome to serve the Central Committee (zhongyang), in exchange for their attention and support.” In 2000, IREECAS decided to publish one more institutional journal in addition to the extant RECAS. The new journal was entitled Eluosi dongou zhongya shichang yanjiu (Market Studies of Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia), the focus of which was the pragmatic study and locating of the market opportunities in the Commonwealth Independent States (CIS). It was intended to offer advice to Chinese

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63 Ibid., 403.
64 Ibid., 199-200.
65 Ibid., 238.
67 Ibid., 85.
entrepreneurs, thus seeking alternative funding sources for research.  

Situations like this were not confined to IREECAS, for other PRC academic institutes and journals specializing in Soviet and Slavonic studies were also under the threat of the deficit-chopping axe. In 1991, during the annual meeting of CASEES (called CAEECAS in and after 1993), one of the issues was how to raise money for research activities and academic meetings for the Association in the future.  

In 1993, during the third council conference of CAEECAS, many participants aired grievances on the same issues raised by Lu Nanquan in his 1996 report. These included the difficulty of publishing research outcomes in the field, the loss of scholars, and the pervasive funding problems facing Chinese institutions as well as CAEECAS. At the end, CAEECAS even proposed to report to the Party about these problems and to ask for solutions.  

In 1983, Sun Hongyou, editor of Sulian wenti yanjiu ziliao (Research Materials on the Soviet Union), wrote that the journal was severely underfunded by Anhui University, and therefore could not have afforded to organize other research activities and conferences. These financial difficulties were still problematic when the journal was renamed as Eluosi yanjiu (Russian Studies) in the 1990s. In 1996, Ha Yucan, director of the Institute of Russian Studies at Anhui University, acknowledged that the journal was struggling for survival despite great efforts to keep it afloat. The journal was finally terminated in 2000, due to “the reasons of funding and human resources.”  

IREECAS Director Zhang Wenwu strongly argued that “the present system in which the
state monopolies the funding allocation and the administration of research would not be compatible with the needs of reality,” and “the reform orienting toward an open and flexible system is needed.” 75

One major reason for the financial cuts in Chinese Soviet studies from the 1990s onward was the increasing dominance of economic and academic marketization after Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour in 1992; this is when the CCP announced that China would further its economic reform. 76 Since the 1990s, Soviet studies, like other academic disciplines in China, has become swamped by growing market forces and commercialization. Chinese scholars in the humanities and social sciences have been particularly hard hit by the effects of the market economy. On the agenda of the 1995 CASS annual meeting was a discussion on how to maintain research quality and improve working conditions in the face of significant reforms in China. 77 At the same time, Beijing Review reported that many professors from Beijing University, an institution famous for its arts programs, were so underpaid that they were forced to moonlight or take second jobs. 78

There is also much to be said with respect to academic freedom within the field of Chinese Sovietology. Since the early 1980s, China has worked to reverse Maoist policies, implement reform and open door policies, promote thought liberalization, and reflect on the Cultural Revolution and communist system. Deng Xiaoping once promised that the

76 In 1996, one scholar complained that the state did not have good policies to protect academic journals during the wave of Chinese market economic take-off in the 1990s. See Zhang Zhenhua, “Zhengfudui xueshu qikan bixu shixing baohu fuchi zhengche” [The Government Must Have Policies to Protect and Support Academic Journals], Qiqi haer shehui kexue, no. 6 (1996): 20.
government would promote the social and political status of Chinese intellectuals;\textsuperscript{79} he claimed the state would loosen its grip on scholars, improve their living standards, and bring their talents into full play in post-Mao modernization.\textsuperscript{80} After the mid-1980s, China went even further to curtail the political intrusion on scholars, due to the impact of Gorbachev and his glasnost, and the relatively liberal administrations under Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang. As a result, the Chinese academic community began to look relatively more open and cosmopolitan than ever before in PRC history.\textsuperscript{81}

Second, after the early 1980s, Chinese scholars began to have access to a variety of Western scholarly works, as well as to original Soviet archives. Most of these scholars had CCP memberships. As we will see in subsequent chapters, some of them were academic elites and were occasionally invited to contribute articles to Renmin ribao and other PRC official newspapers, which are privileges for any intellectuals even in today’s China. They were endowed with the right and opportunities to read many foreign documents not open to the public, and to go abroad to meet Soviet and Western scholars. Such privileges provided them with opportunities to acquire crucial knowledge on the USSR, acquaint themselves with foreign scholarship on Sovietology, and learn more about the dark sides of Soviet socialism. Indeed, in 1982 CASS had academic exchanges with more than 30 countries.\textsuperscript{82} For example, IREECAS Director Xu Kui visited the USSR 15 times before 1989.\textsuperscript{83} Similarly, frequent academic exchanges occurred between


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Chinese Soviet-watchers and the USSR in other PRC universities.\(^{84}\) While the exchanges of IREECAS scholars with the West had slightly declined after Tiananmen, frequent visits to CIS states and Eastern Europe were unaffected, even after 1991.

This being said, post-Deng China is still not a wholly democratic country free of any political interventions. In the early 1980s, the social sciences in China were asked to act in accordance with the freedom of academic research and government guidelines simultaneously. In 1988, *Renmin ribao* required that the research of the social sciences should meet the practical needs of reforms and economic development.\(^ {85}\) Before the Tiananmen Incident, Chinese scholars attempted to garner more freedom for their research and dared to criticize the control from the Party.\(^ {86}\) After the crackdown on the demonstrations, however, the CCP regime immediately reverted to constraining Chinese intellectuals and academic research. In subsequent years, *Renmin ribao* published accounts of the systematic discipline of individual Chinese scholars, as well as the imposition of strictures on the humanities and social sciences.\(^ {87}\)

Regarding the academic journal articles included in this thesis, it should be mentioned here that this research is based wholly on the “national core journals” (*Guojiaji hexin qikan*) published in the PRC. All of them are available for purchase in Greater China and downloadable from any recognized Chinese university. The project engages mainly with the following four categories of journals for investigation:

\(^{84}\) Xue Lin, “Xibei minzu xueyuan haosumin jiaoshou fangsu guilai” [Professor Hao Sumin at the Northwestern University of Ethnology Returns from His Visit to the Soviet Union], *Xibei minzu yanjiu*, no. 2 (1991): 281.


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The first are those journals focusing on research in the humanities and social sciences in general (*Shehui kexue yanjiu, Shijie jingjiyu zhengzhi*). Second are those journals dealing with problems of socialism or communism in the world (*Dangdai shijie shehui zhuyi wenti, Shehui zhuyi yanjiu*). The third group forms the core of this thesis’ research; they concentrate on questions and issues relating to the former Soviet Union (later the Russian Federation and other CIS states after 1991) (*Sulian dongou wenti, Eluosi yanjiu*). Last, the research scope also includes relevant articles in various university journals (*Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan yangjiu shengyuan xuebao, Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao xuebao*).

All the journals selected for this project accept submissions from all over China. Most (but not all) of the contributors are academics, and the journals maintain acceptable quality standards and have a good reputation in the Chinese academic world. Some of them, such as *Sulian dongou wenti* and *Shehui zhuyi yanjiu* (Socialism Studies), are the very best PRC journals in their fields. The backbone of the research is the IREECAS journal (*Sulian dongou wenti* or MSUEE). This journal distinguishes itself from other journals, as it publishes numerous articles demonstrating Chinese Sovietologists’ academic exchanges with foreign countries, speeches of visiting CCP officials, and research agendas and other related administrative documents regarding Chinese Soviet studies.

It goes without saying that Chinese articles are generally checked by editors for political acceptability prior to publication. Though their funding sources are varied, Chinese academic journals (like other kinds of journals in China) are subject to censorship. Journal editors often reject findings that are at variance with the prevailing Party line, requiring contributors’ work to demonstrate adherence to Party values. In the

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88 For a list of the 1980s PRC journals on the Soviet Union, see Rozman, “China’s Soviet Watchers in the 1980s,” 440-41.
opinion of Hu Zuyuan, a scholar at the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences, “The responsibility of editors is not only making sure that submissions have met the publication standard, but also vetting if those have conformed to Party line and policies.”

Indeed, scholars often censor their own works before submitting them, particularly when touching upon such politically sensitive subjects as Soviet studies. They take great care to formulate their ideas in politically acceptable language, which inevitably impacts on the content and quality of the writing. As Margaret Sleeboom-Faulkner once wrote in describing the disastrous effects of such self-censorship within CASS, “A slight nuance can change its entire meaning.”

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, many journals claimed that the nature and goals of their respective publications were either to use Marxism as a guideline for research, or to serve the needs of Chinese socialism and modernization. Though prior to 1989 editors in the PRC still retained a level of independence in pursuing their initiatives, in the wake of the Tiananmen Incident the Party began to require all publications in China to be streamlined and brought under firm control. The Party would closely monitor the production and circulation of publications. For example, the effects of this were clearly felt by MSUEE, which had once proposed to cease its tradition of internal circulation and put the journal into the public market. However, because of the Tiananmen Incident, the

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93 Gu Jiaxi, “Pianji yaozuo chu makesi zhuyide duli panduan,” [Editors Should Make Independent Decisions Based on the Principle of Marxism] Renmin ribao, April 8, 1988. The writer remarked that when making decisions, editors do not need to ask the Party all the time.
95 Internal circulation (niebu faxing), according to Gilbert Rozman, means publications “are not to be taken
journal had to postpone this decision until 1992.\textsuperscript{96}

In addition, there are many problematic aspects of the journals included in this thesis. At times, these problems may render the research process more challenging than one might expect. First, many articles do not reveal the educational and working backgrounds of authors. Readers thus have difficulty discerning the academic expertise of authors, as well as identifying with the institutions with which they are affiliated. Authors of the articles also did not disclose their personal information in their writings, sometimes using a \textit{nom de plume} or even \textit{nom de guerre} for authorship. Very occasionally, the journals would publish the information on academic conferences or seminars, but most of them are very short abstracts in nature, and they often do not reveal the names and identities of the participants.\textsuperscript{97} This situation was most evident in the 1980s; things have been improving since the mid-1990s, when China learned to meet international standards in publishing academic articles. Even then, however, many journals still declined to provide background information on authors. The investigator has thus had to do independent research; this includes utilizing internet resources, and more informal channels such as personal contacts and connections with relevant Chinese universities.

Another noteworthy issue involves the writing style of Chinese authors in these journals. Namely, their quotations from foreign writers, such as Lenin and other Soviet leaders, have not always been standardized. Most of the time the authors seem to be conveying the main idea of primary and secondary sources, without actually quoting them.


\textsuperscript{97} Rozman also feels great puzzled about the published information on IREECAS conferences. See Rozman, \textit{The Chinese Debate About Soviet Socialism, 1978-1985}, 25.
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The quotations are more like summaries than direct references. Sometimes, these articles do not show the origins of the quotations in footnotes or endnotes, particularly those from Russian and other foreign texts. In the most serious cases, some articles do not include any quotations or bibliographies. There is no information on whether the sources are in Chinese or in other foreign languages, or whether they are from the originals or from translations. Besides, the translations from Russian to Chinese in PRC academic journals are sometimes quite hasty and problematic.

Last, the practices of duplicate submission, redundant publication, and even plagiarism are widespread. Many articles in various journals consulted are wholly or partially identical to each other (differing in title only). For example, IREECAS scholar Li Jingjie’s 1980 article on the Warsaw Pact in *Renmin ribao* was a slightly abridged version of another article he published half a year later in MSUEE. Zhao Longgeng, another IREECAS scholar, published two articles in 1989 on Gorbachev’s nationality policy in two different journals. Except for the difference in titles, the content of the two papers is almost exactly the same. To tackle the issue of academic integrity, in 1997, Xiao Hong, an editor of *Bianji xuebao* (Acta Editologica) – China’s most authoritative journal for investigating and determining the impact factors of PRC academic articles,

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100 For details, see Yuan Wang, “Fanyi waiguo zhuzuo yaorenzhuan jiaoding” [Check Carefully When Translating Foreign Academic Works], *Lishi yanjiu*, no. 4 (1981): 186-92.


recommended that Chinese journals not accept duplicate submissions (*yigao duotou*) under any circumstances, and must take legal actions against those contributors who violate guidelines.\(^{103}\) The situation consistently occurred in the 1980s and 1990s, although many of the problems gradually disappeared in the 1990s.

**Literature review**

The first problem regarding secondary scholarship has to do with the role of Mikhail Gorbachev in Chinese Sovietology. Scholars of this literature observe that Chinese Soviet-watchers began making positive comments about the Soviet leader immediately after he assumed power in 1985.\(^{104}\) However, these scholars turned against Gorbachev soon after the Tiananmen Incident in 1989.\(^{105}\) Moreover, some authors (such as Guan Guihai, Gilbert Rozman, and David Shambaugh) argue that most Chinese scholars after 1991 considered Gorbachev and his liberalization to be the fundamental catalysts in spelling the collapse of the Soviet Union.\(^{106}\) The literature seems to agree that Chinese scholars were univocal in assessing Gorbachev’s individual actions and failings, and that they overstated the implications of Gorbachev and his liberal programs for China, both in the 1980s and 1990s.

As will be demonstrated in coming chapters, Chinese scholars had actually presented


a broad historical view and offered a systemic analysis of the multiple reasons for the collapse, rather than being preoccupied by the so-called “blame game” targeting Gorbachev.\(^{107}\) Firstly, most Chinese academic articles concerning the USSR did not present positive views on Gorbachev in and after 1985. Many of them remained suspicious and wary of the new Soviet leader, and some of them even challenged the sincerity and feasibility of his policies. Only after about a year with Gorbachev at the helm did Chinese scholars begin to review his glasnost and political reform positively. However, Chinese scholarship remained critical of Gorbachev’s foreign agenda, which was characterized by the concept of New Thinking, until the end of 1987. This is when three major obstacles plaguing Sino-Soviet relations began to resolve and bilateral relations gradually improved; these obstacles were the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, its large troop deployment along the border of China, and Moscow’s support of Vietnamese military intervention in Cambodia.

Secondly, a full-fledged Chinese attack on Gorbachev did not appear either in the wake of the Tiananmen Incident or after the Soviet disintegration. Instead, strong Chinese criticisms emerged in early 1990, when Gorbachev was elected as the President of the USSR and initiated the process of terminating the CPSU power monopoly in March 1990. After that, China became aware of the negative ramifications of such a move against PRC communist one-party rule.

Thirdly, while Chinese scholars considered Gorbachev as one of the agents responsible for bringing down Soviet socialism, Gorbachev and his liberal programs were by no means the only elements or the biggest factors in the USSR’s dissolution.\(^{108}\) In fact, Chinese perceptions of Gorbachev throughout the 1980s and 1990s were quite evolutionary. Views changed in response to domestic and international politics, and Sino-

\(^{107}\) The term “blame game” is coined by Shambaugh, see *China's Communist Party*, 48.

\(^{108}\) At least, not as portrayed in Chinese analysis in and after 1991.
Soviet (later Sino-Russian) relations. For instance, Chinese scholars evidently had a good impression of Gorbachev’s concepts of humanistic socialism and *glasnost* after the mid-1980s. This positive assessment was owing to the open political climate in China at the time, and the need of the CCP to initiate its own political reform in order to facilitate economic modernization. Some articles even demanded that the Chinese government learn from Gorbachev in doing political and economic reforms simultaneously. After the collapse of European and Soviet socialist regimes in the early 1990s, Chinese scholars changed suit and attacked Gorbachev’s method, arguing that economic rejuvenation should precede political reform. However, after the Sino-Russian relations consolidated in the mid-1990s, Chinese criticisms of Gorbachev gradually subsided.

Actually, Chinese Soviet-watchers were doing research on different Soviet leaders throughout the 1980s and 1990s, particularly on Lenin, who featured prominently in Chinese writings and claimed equal importance to Gorbachev. After 1991, many scholars attempted to find causes other than Gorbachev for the havoc wreaked on the USSR, such as peaceful evolution and the inherent problems of Soviet socialism. They remarked that Gorbachev might have been manipulated by the West, and that the last Soviet leader was not wholly responsible for the downfall. Some scholars even trace the roots of the downfall back to the administrations of Brezhnev and Stalin, arguing that the conservative force and rigid communist system (rather than the figure of Gorbachev) were decisive.

Second, some secondary literature argues that the “lesson-drawing” from the USSR after 1991 was a state-directed and long-term research project collectively undertaken by Chinese Soviet-experts across the state.\(^{109}\) In their view, Chinese Soviet-specialists had consistently followed the Party’s needs, and had continued their efforts to analyse the

\(^{109}\) The term “lesson-drawing” is produced by Marsh, see *Unparalleled Reforms*, 107.
implications of the Soviet collapse on the Chinese socialist regime in and after the 1990s.\textsuperscript{110} In order to investigate whether the Chinese government did indeed have such a clear mission and systematic agenda, it is helpful to revisit the details in the primary documents in CASS and IREECAS, respectively.

On the eve of the Soviet disintegration in October 1991, there was an institutional meeting conducted by CASS President Hu Sheng; the participants were from various affiliated institutes and included those from IREECAS. Hu Sheng wanted scholars to summarize “the lessons of Soviet reforms and the great changes of socialism in the world.”\textsuperscript{111} But in March 1995, four years after the Soviet demise, CASS announced its 20 key research areas for the coming years. Of these 20 research areas, only the \textit{History of the Soviet Union} was directly relevant to Soviet studies. There were three other areas having something to do with the study of world socialism (\textit{Studies on Marxism, Studies on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, and Studies on the Schools of Foreign Marxism}). The rest of the research areas included subjects like \textit{Modern Chinese} and \textit{Market Economic Research}, and had almost nothing in common with the abovementioned themes.\textsuperscript{112} In December 1998, Hu Sheng’s successor Li Tieying (vice-chairman of the CCP Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress and president of CASS from 1998 to 2003) demanded that CASS scholars specializing in international studies pay attention to the following six areas: the histories of the Soviet Union and CPSU; the translations of Soviet archives; Japanese history; Islamic studies; WTO research; and EU and the Euro.\textsuperscript{113} Thus, it seems that Soviet studies in CASS after 1991 was considered more of a “normal” research topic, rather than an ad hoc study that had a pragmatic and


\textsuperscript{112} Ibid., 190.

\textsuperscript{113} Ibid., 227.
specific purpose. Indeed, it seemed far from being a state-directed research project with the long-term goal of analysing implications for Chinese socialism. Both Hu Sheng and Li Tieying had directed the CASS research priorities that included Soviet studies as listed above; however, those agendas had more to do with internal institutional requirements than with top-down state orders.

Besides, although the collapse of the USSR seemed to be a crucial event for the CCP regime, the episode did not pose any imminent threat to the survival of the Party rule. This is in contrast to the case of the Falungong religious movement (Buddhist Law Society). On July 1st, 2000, CCP Secretary General Jiang Zemin and Premier Li Peng paid a visit to CASS. Jiang in particular argued that CASS should “organize all of its best scholars together to criticize Falungong,” and promised that “the state will provide all kinds of support.” Two days later, Li Tieying supervised a large meeting of more than 60 scholars from CASS, and ordered them to immediately establish “a research assignment” (keti) based on “the spirit of the Central Committee” (zhongyang jingshen), with the purpose of attacking the “heresy” (xieshuo) of Falungong.

Last, unlike the case of Falungong, neither Hu Sheng’s and Li Tieying’s speeches concerning Soviet studies mentioned funding sources – either from the state or elsewhere. Given the evidence of the bleak financial conditions presented above, it is very unlikely that Soviet studies would have even enjoyed the same level of importance and support as did the study of Falungong from the CCP.

In IREECAS, some articles appearing before and after 1991 did challenge the academic community, as well as the general public, to pay more attention to the changes

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114 On how the Falungong movement troubled the CCP, and how the Chinese government launched a state-wide campaign to suppress it since the late 1990s, see James Tong, Revenge of the Forbidden City: The Suppression of the Falungong in China, 1999-2005 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

of the Soviet Union. However, these demands were often made by scholars wishing to study the Soviet experience in order to aid China’s reforms. Other times, they stemmed from the desire of MSUEE’s editorial board to elicit more papers dealing with the ups-and-downs of the Soviet Union. In 1994 and 1996, RECAS published two articles reporting the research agendas of IREECAS in 1995 and 1996, respectively. In the 1994 paper, only three items out of the 24 research targets were related to the USSR; these included the history of the Soviet Union, the historical lessons of the Soviet turbulence, and the Sino-Soviet relations. In the 1996 paper, there was only one category (the causes and consequences of the Soviet collapse) concerning Soviet studies among the 29 research priorities. In both reports, a large portion of the key research areas was devoted to the studies of Russia, Caucasus, Central Asia, and other CIS states that gained independence after 1991.

As for documents regarding CAEECAS, before the demise of the Soviet Union, the Association did encourage its members to study the failure of Soviet political and economic reforms, drawing lessons for China. However, after the end of 1992, the official research topics were geared toward CIS states rather than the former Soviet Union. In every subsequent CAEECAS annual conference, more time was dedicated to discussions of Russia and Central Asia (both of which border China), and their future

relations with the PRC. In 2000, CAEECAS announced its five research agendas for the 21st century during the fifth annual conference in Beijing. The topics were Russian politics, economy, foreign policy, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe. It seems that Soviet studies in and after 2000 would amount to little of significance in China.

Indeed, the number of articles in the IREECAS journal with topics and themes related to the former Soviet Union in almost every discipline (either history, foreign relations, or politics) declined markedly after the mid-1990s. There were actually very few of them appearing by the end of the 1990s. On the other hand, the numbers of publications researching the Russian Federation and Central Asia, and their relations with China, increased noticeably after 1992. Such situations were not confined to IREECAS, and similar trends occurred in other Chinese academic journals as well. Although they are by no means current-affair journals, the trend nonetheless reflected the shifting needs and interests of Chinese Soviet-watchers in the 1990s, the changing landscape of world politics, and the reorientation of China’s foreign policy (in which the PRC attempted to form an alliance of authoritarian regimes encompassing China, Russia, and Central Asia against the democratic West after the end of the Cold War).

After the fall of the USSR, China began to establish good neighbourly relations with the post-Soviet states like Russia and the Central Asian republics, most of which share borders and seek business opportunities with China. Many articles in Chinese academic journals began to focus on research topics relevant to newly independent CIS states.

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122 “Zhongguo dongou zhongya xuehui diwujie nianhui jiyao” [Minutes of the CAEECAS Fifth Annual Conference], Eluosi dongou zhongya yanjiu, no. 4 (2000): 75-81.

123 For details, see the coming part of the thesis on Soviet foreign relations.
rather than the former Soviet Union; the former held more practical value for China in the
new era. Once again, the funding constraints described above made Chinese Soviet-
analysts unable to invest more time on their prior research subjects. The studies on the
Soviet successor states in and after the 1990s also reflected the effort of Chinese scholars
to seek alternative funding opportunities, which would also sustain their research in the
future.124 As such, the trend of gleaning negative lessons from the Soviet Union might be
only a sudden upsurge and short-term fervour most noticeable from the late 1980s to the
mid-1990s. Thus, it is not best described as a systematic, long term, and state-supervised
research project.

Apart from these issues, there are two problems regarding the use of sources in the
prior secondary literature on Chinese Sovietology. First, many authors of the secondary
literature (such as Guan Guihai, Minglang Zhou, and Shambaugh) claim that since 1991
the Chinese government sponsored many Chinese scholars and institutes for the study of
the Soviet collapse. However, these authors reference few sources corroborating their
claims, whether in the main texts or in the footnotes.125 Jeanne Wilson does reference
sources in her article, explaining how she knows that the Chinese government had been
encouraging and funding PRC Soviet-analysts to do lesson-drawing research on the
Soviet demise.126 However, the information she quotes is from two secondary sources
written by Christopher Marsh, both of which are problematic because they do not give

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124 In 1994, CAEECAS decided to establish four research centres specializing in Russia, Central Asia, Far East, and Ukraine, respectively. It proposed to invite Chinese entrepreneurs to join their annual meetings, and stated that all research outcomes would offer to serve the needs of business sector. See “Zhongguo dongou zhongya xuehui zhaokai lishihui huīyì” [CAEECAS Holds the Council Conference], *Eluosi dongou zhongya yanjiu*, no. 6 (1994), 92.
readers the origins of such information.\textsuperscript{127}

Second, the assumption of most secondary literature is that Chinese Sovietology has become a mere “lesson-drawing” approach since 1991, designed and authorized by the PRC regime. Within this perspective, previous literature has often selected and analysed a full range of Chinese articles on Soviet studies published in and after 1991. The major concerns of those chosen papers mostly involve the causes of the Soviet demise, and how China might avoid making the same errors as did the USSR.\textsuperscript{128} From these Chinese articles, one gets the sense that since 1991, the “lesson-drawing” approach has become the sole avenue for Chinese research on the former USSR. Many of the quoted Chinese publications focus on discovering the inherent problems of Soviet socialism and the mistakes of Gorbachev’s reforms.\textsuperscript{129} By reading these secondary sources, one gets the sense that Chinese Sovietology is indeed an instrument crucial for the CCP regime as it reflects on its own survival after 1991.

\hspace{1cm} \textbf{Methodology, sources, and thesis structure}

In order to clear up misunderstandings about Chinese Sovietology, the researcher has chosen a unique approach to reveal the true nature of Soviet studies in post-Mao China. First, the project will use IREECAS as the backbone of the research. The investigator will focus on the publications in the bimonthly official IREECAS journal of \textit{Sulian dongou}.\textsuperscript{127,128,129}

\textsuperscript{129} In this internet age, it is quite easy for people to gather the academic articles they want. However, such technological convenience may lead to biased research and therefore lead to distorted subsequent analysis. For example, if you go to the section of “Chinese Academic Journals” on the Digital Library Service website of the researcher’s alma mater—China University of Hong Kong, and type the words “Soviet collapse” under the subsections of “subject” or “key words,” you will immediately be able to see and download a large amount of articles on the issue published in and after the 1990s, but they could not reflect the whole picture of the subject. For details, see https://easylogin1.alumni.cuhk.edu.hk/login?url=http://tra.global.cnki.net/KNS50/Navi/Navi.aspx?NaviD=1.
wenti (Matters of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe or MSUEE), as the primary source for analysis. The IREECAS journal not only publishes articles written by the IREECAS’ employed scholars, but also accepts submissions contributed by other scholars across China. It can thus be used as a medium that reflects the historical development of Soviet studies in post-Mao China. In addition, because the CAEECAS was funded and organized by CASS and IREECAS respectively, the IREECAS journal also publishes many documents regarding the administrative and logistical issues of both the CAEECAS and IREECAS itself. From these materials, it is possible to glean important, detailed information, such as the annual research agendas of Chinese Sovietology.

Second, the investigator will also examine other PRC humanities and social science publications regarding the research on the USSR, mostly focusing on the four categories of journals previously classified. By engaging these publications (either from the IREECAS journal or others) the study will not be limited to those publications merely learning lessons from the Soviet collapse after 1991. Instead, it will pay attention to various thematic research projects diverging in focus and analysis between the early 1980s and the end of the 1990s. Such a methodology may reduce a certain bias that argues that Chinese Sovietology is “lesson-drawing” in nature, and instead direct the audience to review Chinese Sovietology as a whole from a more objective perspective.

Third, the research intends to examine the thinking of Chinese Sovietologists against the backdrop of political and social changes in China from the 1980s to 1990s. The project will be based not only on the analysis of primary sources already undertaken, but will also attempt to locate the developments of Chinese Sovietology amid the rapid changes in the social and political environment of the first two decades of post-Mao China. This time span covers many important events occurring in both China and the USSR, such as the commencement of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, Gorbachev’s rise, the
Chapter 1

Tiananmen Incident, and the Soviet disintegration. Such a methodology should give readers a clear picture of the evolution of Chinese Sovietology, and a sense of how the wider arena of Chinese social and political history in these two decades had an impact on these scholarly writings. Therefore, in order for this research to be successfully located in the rich fabric of the intellectual activities of contemporary China and in the changing environment, the investigator has also identified the following three kinds of documents that may be beneficial to the dissertation:

**Articles in PRC official newspapers and journals concerning aspects of the former Soviet Union:** *Renmin ribao* (People’s Daily, owned by the CCP Central Committee); *Guangming ribao* (Guangming Daily, published by the CCP Central Propaganda Department); *Hongqi* (Red Flag, renamed as *Qiushi* or Seeking Truth after 1988 and under direct control of the CCP Central Committee); *Beijing Review* (China’s only national English weekly news magazine published in Beijing by the China International Publishing Group), etc.

**Writings and speeches of PRC officials and leaders on the matters of the Soviet state:** *Mao Zedong wenji* (Selected Works of Mao Zedong); *Deng Xiaoping xuanji* (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping); and other contemporary Chinese leaders’ related speeches scattered among the current Chinese newspapers.

**Chinese and English translations of works and speeches of Soviet leaders from Lenin to Gorbachev:** as Chinese scholars always cite the words of Soviet leaders (such as works of Lenin and Stalin and memoirs of Khrushchev and Gorbachev) to support their arguments in articles, it is important for the researcher to check the accuracy of those quotations.

The investigator has obtained most of the essential primary sources listed above from the two-month fieldwork in the University Service Centre at the Chinese University of
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Hong Kong (CUHK), or it has been downloaded from the Digital Library Service at CUHK. Both sites contain a large quantity of PRC official and unofficial reading materials, as well as a substantial amount of Chinese scholarship on Sovietology.

The dissertation will be divided into seven chapters. In addition to the Introduction, Chapter Two will offer an account of the relationship between the Chinese communist regime and Chinese Sovietology, and how the discourse of Chinese Sovietology writings intertwined in the principle of post-Mao Chinese state-building – “socialism with Chinese characteristics;” the Confucian tradition; the Marxist theoretical framework; and the legacy of Chinese historiography.

The two core parts of the thesis consist of two chapters each and they will examine the two quintessential issues: Chinese scholarship on Soviet foreign relations and Soviet leaders and politics, respectively, in chronological order from the 1980s to 1990s.

The first part (Chapters Three and Four) will dwell on the discourse of Chinese scholarship on the foreign relations of the USSR. This will include topics ranging from criticisms of Soviet hegemonism to discussion on Moscow’s relations with Yugoslavia and the Third World in the 1980s, and from the changing views on Gorbachev’s New Thinking to reflections on Lenin’s early Soviet rule after the Tiananmen Incident.

The second part (Chapters Five and Six) scrutinizes Chinese perceptions of Soviet leaders and politics. It will first look at how Chinese scholars used Lenin and his writings in the early 1980s to help the CCP regime in rebuilding the Party institutions and the people’s faith in communism after the Maoist disaster. It will also examine the evolving views of Chinese scholars on Gorbachev’s glasnost and liberalization since the mid-1980s, against China’s political climate leading up to Tiananmen. Last, the thesis will analyse two phenomena in 1990s Chinese Sovietology – reflecting on Brezhnev’s stagnation and Stalin’s rigid centralization.
Finally, the last chapter will summarize the state and vista of Chinese Sovietology in both decades. It will argue that by researching the country of the Soviet Union, Chinese Soviet-watchers did not focus on the USSR alone, but mostly attempted to confirm and legitimize the Chinese state policies of reform and open door in both decades. In short, Chinese research on Soviet socialism has primarily been concerned to trace the current problems of Chinese socialism, in order to legitimize their solutions – rather than a truth-seeking process for the knowledge of the Soviet Union.

According to the topic of this PhD thesis, the investigator was meant to undertake fieldwork in Beijing, rather than in Hong Kong. In fact, the investigator applied to IREECAS in Beijing in the summer of 2014, in order to obtain permission to interview scholars and peruse archives there. However, IREECAS declined the application and did not provide a written explanation for such denial. Therefore, as a foreign scholar, the investigator was unable to apply for a visa to enter the PRC. It is the investigator’s guess that the application was denied due to the project’s politically sensitive nature. As such, the investigator has chosen to do the fieldwork in Hong Kong instead, without an opportunity to interview the relevant people. It is worth noting that the IREECAS administrator warned the investigator in a prior conversation that the Institute does not have any official or secret archives stored within. A researcher would thus be forced to rely on two methods – interviewing the scholars there or reading their journal articles. Besides, many IREECAS academics indicated to the investigator that they did not accept e-mail questionnaires as an alternative form of interview, due to the strict disciplinary requirement of CASS.

As a result, the author has not had at his disposition all the necessary materials. He has had to study the subject by sifting through the documents, but without meeting the essential people and getting first-hand information. The work has been written outside the
country to which the subject relates. A certain degree of limitation is perhaps impossible to avoid, inasmuch as the author is merely an interpreter of the writings of Chinese scholarship, rather than an on-the-spot witness of the events and situations described. Having said this, it is hoped that the thesis still retains a stamp of originality in this well-chosen topic.
Chapter 2

Knowledge and Power

Introductory remarks

Existing secondary literature on this topic primarily focuses on the way Chinese Soviet-watchers have learned from the Soviet demise in and after 1991, but little attention has been paid to how this research was used to legitimize Chinese communist rule in the 1980s and 1990s. This thesis will focus on not only the lessons that Chinese scholars have drawn from Soviet socialism and its final collapse, but more importantly, how Chinese Sovietologists used their construction of analytical narratives and interpretations of the events in the USSR to justify PRC state policies, alter people’s perceptions on socialism after 1991, and rationalize the communist one-party dictatorship in China.

Before going into the four core chapters, this chapter will offer an account of the relationship between the Chinese communist regime and Chinese Sovietology, and how the discourse of Chinese Sovietology writings intertwined in the principle of post-Mao Chinese state-building – “socialism with Chinese characteristics;” the Confucian tradition; the Marxist theoretical framework; and the legacy of Chinese historiography. The chapter is intended to give readers a survey of how the various narratives, interpretative frameworks, guiding thoughts, and philosophical concepts shaped the political motives and ideological assumptions of Chinese Sovietologists in both decades.

The Chinese state, ideology, and Chinese Sovietology
Chapter 2

The secondary literature’s conclusion regarding large state funding and the nature of long-term research in Chinese Sovietology might be based on an unspoken assumption. Namely, there may be an assumption that there should be a crucial interaction between scholarship and politics, and a cosy relationship between the government and the academy in Chinese Sovietology (like similar relationships in the West). David Shambaugh once remarked that IREECAS is “more than an academic organization, it was performing an important intelligence function for the CCP and the Chinese government,” and that such a function “is exemplified by the fact that the institute has off and on, over the years, been under the jurisdiction of the International Liaison Department of the Central Committee of the CCP.”

First (and as shown in Table 1 in the Introduction), it should be clarified, that the Soviet and East European Division (the predecessor of IREECAS) fell within the jurisdiction of the International Liaison Department (ILD) affiliated with China’s Foreign Ministry before the 1980s – not the Central Committee of the CCP as Shambaugh claims. Moreover, many of IREECAS’ first generation of scholars (such as Xu Kui and Liu Keming) were former staff of the Division in ILD. During the Cultural Revolution, however, the Party radical Kang Sheng governed ILD and the functioning of the

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130 For the strong ties between Sovietologists and governments in the West, see Arnold Buchholz, ed. Soviet and East European Studies in the International Framework: Organization, Financing and Political Relevance (Dobbs Ferry: Transnational Publishers, 1982).

131 Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party, 49.

132 The full Chinese name of ILD is Zhongguo zhongyang duiwai lianluobu. The common abbreviation is Zhonglianbu. For more information on this issue, see Wu Xiuquan, Huiyiyu huainian [Recollection] (Beijing: Zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1991). The author was the PRC’s first Deputy Foreign Minister in charge of the Soviet and East European Division in ILD.
Department was undermined.\footnote{Wu Xiuquan, 
\textit{Huiyiyu huainian} [Recollection], 395.} After the passing of Mao, CASS began the process of reorganization, including the recruitment of academic staff from ILD and elsewhere.\footnote{Renmin Chubanshe (People’s Publishing House), ed. \textit{Huqiaomu yuzhongguo shehui kexueyuan} [Hu Qiaomu and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences], 10-13.} This was not because CASS wanted to gather personnel for the purposes of foreign intelligence, but simply because there were virtually no experts left to undertake academic research on the outside world. After the Cultural Revolution, CASS essentially had to begin from scratch. After 1980, the Soviet and East European Division was reorganized to become a branch of CASS and an academic research unit of IREECAS; it was no longer subordinate to ILD. The former staff of ILD who had been transferred to IREECAS in the early 1980s also became scholars engaging in academic research thereafter.\footnote{For the history of CASS and IREECAS from the late 1970s to early 1980s, see Zhongguo Shehui Kexueyuan [The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences], ed. \textit{Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan biannian jianshi, 1977-2007} [A Short Chronicle of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 1977-2007], 12-44.} Unlike the cases of Condoleezza Rice and Zbigniew Brzezinski in the US, there is little evidence to suggest that IREECAS scholars were subsequently relocated to government service during their tenures, or after retirement. Chinese Sovietologists do not have dual roles, unlike Brzezinski.

Second, while Party officials and leaders occasionally visited CASS and IREECAS to deliver speeches on research involving the Soviet Union and its importance, these were more akin to official rhetoric than a serious call for systematic research plans. This is illustrated by the lack of evidence demonstrating coordinated efforts or actions between the government and scholars afterward. Generally, Chinese research and writings on the Soviet Union (either from CASS or elsewhere) were initiated on the basis of individual
scholarly interest. Even then, these scholars were sometimes required to heed the Party’s call in ensuring their research was within the limits of the permissible.

Third, under Mao Zedong Chinese intellectuals were greatly disdained by the state, due to their independent thinking and potential political disobedience.\(^\text{136}\) Although the treatment of Chinese intellectuals substantially improved after 1978, the CCP regime remained suspicious of those from the humanities and social sciences. This is evidenced by the clear contrast in funding allocations for the natural sciences on one hand, and the humanities and social sciences on the other (as presented in the last chapter). Moreover, most of the organizers and participants in the 1987 and 1989 state-wide student demonstrations were majoring in subjects like philosophy (Yan Jiaqi) or history (Wang Dan), which only incurred the ire of the Chinese government toward scholars from those disciplines. The tension became more severe after the Tiananmen Incident. For example, during the chaotic events in 1989, many CASS scholars joined the pro-democratic demonstrations. Some of them were arrested while others later fled China.\(^\text{137}\) In the wake of Tiananmen, the Party tightened its grip on CASS and those in the social sciences. CASS graduate students were required to undergo military training before taking their professional courses.\(^\text{138}\)


\(^{137}\) For examples, both Yan Jiaqi (director of the Institute of Political Science) and Su Shaozhi (director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism) were under house arrest after Tiananmen and later exiled in the US. See Zhongguo Shehui Kexueyuan [The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences], ed. Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan biannian jianshi, 1977-2007 [A Short Chronicle of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 1977-2007], 132-41.

\(^{138}\) Sleeboom-Faulkner, The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), 126.
In the 1990s, the CCP appointed the Director of the Central Propaganda Department Wang Renzhi and the Central Committee member Li Tieying to be CASS Vice-President and President, respectively, in order to further its control of the Academy. It seemed that CASS was no longer a favourite of the Party after Tiananmen. In the 1990s, many CCP leaders came to CASS delivering speeches, in which they requested scholars to align their research with the needs of socialism. Such talks sounded more like oblique criticisms, political demands, and warnings aimed at keeping scholars in line, than legitimate requests for the production of academic works in keeping with the specific purposes of the state. While IREECAS’ Lu Nanquan had proposed that Chinese Soviet-watchers exchange their scholarly outcomes with the government after 1991 (as presented in the last chapter), such statements seemed more like fundraising and fishing for political capital than like genuine attempts to produce strategic research beneficial for the state.

Fourth, as Xenakis describes, the US government largely increased funding for Soviet research during the Cold War, and its higher education “became an instrument of national policy.” This occurred when the contest between the superpowers was at its peak. Through their academic endeavours, American Sovietologists “just tried hard to transform the Soviet state into democracy, which served the American interest.” On the other hand, while conflicts between Beijing and Moscow intensified under Mao, the bilateral relations gradually improved after Deng Xiaoping took charge, and both sides

139 Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, 49.
141 Xenakis, What Happened to the Soviet Union?, 125.
142 Ibid., 61.
became strategic partners after 1991. Since the 1980s, China generally has not perceived the Soviet Union (later the Russian Federation) to be its biggest enemy or global competitor (as did the US during the Cold War). Therefore, the Chinese government did not feel a need to expend the same level of resources as did the US in studying the USSR. Although Beijing was initially concerned about repercussions of the Soviet demise for China after 1991, these fears were short-lived. As discussed in the preceding chapter, the numbers of academic articles and research agendas concerning the USSR diminished after the mid-1990s. The Chinese political leadership seemed to no longer deem Sovietology worthy of significant attention.

Finally, total dependence on government funding caused problems in US Sovietology during the Cold War, which “led to a situation where the intelligence agencies or the military were able to set the academic agenda.” By contrast, the constant state of insufficient financial support from the Chinese government in both decades may suggest that it was not necessary for the Party to set the research agenda in Chinese Sovietology (although Chinese scholarship did fall prey to political intrusion from time to time). Besides, as Xenakis reveals, the relatively generous research funding before 1991 “had provided the American Sovietologists a chance for their career fulfilment,” and “they were quick to recognize this and to seize the opportunity to co-opt with the US

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143 On the scale of support of the US government to American Sovietologists during the Cold War, see David Engerman, *Know Your Enemy: The Rise and Fall of America’s Soviet Experts* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 6.

government.” 145 On the other hand, given the relatively warm relations between both states since the 1980s and the absence of generous financial support in the field, Chinese Soviet-watchers did not have to strive for their rise of status and fortune in conjunction with Sino-Soviet (Russian) relations.

Indeed, a number of research institutes set up in IREECAS during the 1990s were funded by private organizations, not the CCP regime. For example, the Centre for Russian Studies was established in 1995 and funded by “private companies, foreign organizations, and personal donations.” 146 And again, the funding sources of the Chinese Institute for Research in International Affairs (founded in 1999) were “dependent on the domestic and foreign capital investments and donations.” 147 These new academic units aimed to provide advisory services to the general public and private enterprises, rather than the government. These academic units have the ability to gradually achieve autonomy – at least in economic terms.

To conclude, although politicization of scholarship in China is common, in terms of Chinese Sovietology the intellectual complex did not have the sort of significance and influence on the decision-making realm that is described in the secondary literature. 148 The sort of Party demands displayed in the articles from IREECAS and elsewhere (i.e. the demands of studying the Soviet Union and serving Chinese socialism) were basically

146 Xing Guangcheng, “Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan eluosi yanjiu zhongxin chengli” [The Centre of Russian Studies at CASS Established], Eiuosi dongou zhongya yanjiu, no. 2 (1995): 96. Unfortunately, the article did not identify the funding source providers.
147 “Zhongguo guoji wenti yanjiusuo chengli,” [The Chinese Institute for Research in International Affairs is Founded] Renmin ribao, June 4, 1999. Unfortunately, the article did not identify the funding source providers.
slogans that failed to represent the reality of the situation. The official rhetoric served as
the declaratory but not the operational doctrine. Those speeches were intended to
mobilize, but not patronize, the intellectuals to do the research.

Chinese Soviet-watchers might function as advice-providers for the PRC government
through either their publications or participation in conferences, but they were by no
means the primary actors in the CCP policy-making process. In some cases, those
scholars’ suggestions went against the will of the Party. As we will see in Chapter Five,
during the pre-Tiananmen period scholars’ demand that the Chinese government imitate
Gorbachev’s pursuit of political reform was ignored by the Party conservatives, and even
Deng Xiaoping himself. Most of the time, their research outputs were not the
authoritative statements of the Chinese government, but were more likely explaining or
confirming Party policies for reinforcing the legitimacy and authority of the CCP rule.
Their research was shaped by China’s political climate and foreign relations, but the
writings could not themselves alter the course of the national agenda.

Existing secondary literature focuses primarily on what lessons Chinese Soviet-
watchers have learned from the Soviet demise in and after 1991, but little attention has
been paid to how those scholars used their research to legitimate Chinese communist rule
in the 1980s and 1990s. According to the secondary scholarship, Chinese Sovietology
after 1991 has consistently emphasized the role of Gorbachev and his policies, which (in
the eyes of the Chinese communist regime) brought about the downfall of the Soviet
empire. Previous secondary literature seems to overly concentrate on the writings of
Soviet studies in China in and after 1991. The theme of the so-called “lesson-drawing” in
the 1990s has been mistakenly regarded as the central theme of post-Mao Chinese Sovietology. For example, Marsh demonstrates that Chinese Sovietology was only evident around the fall of the USSR in the late 1980s and early 1990s. He points out that almost all of the articles published by Chinese scholars specializing in Soviet studies after 1991 contain some discussions or implicit hints about the collapse of communism.149 Shambaugh writes that after 1991 Western Sovietology may have languished due to the passing of the Soviet Union, but in the PRC the situation is reversed – Chinese research on the USSR persists and flourishes in the new political climate.150

Moreover, apart from the two works produced by Rozman,151 many scholars neglect the state of Chinese Sovietology in the 1980s. Most of the literature also overlooks some research issues in the 1990s, such as the revival of research on Brezhnev and the reassessment of Stalin after the mid-1990s. Research in the 1990s confirmed and legitimized Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping’s post-Tiananmen agendas of renouncing the past Soviet model of economic development, opposing leftism, and saving Chinese socialism by speeding up the process of reform and open door. By depicting Brezhnev’s stagnation and Stalin’s rigid centralization as the primary causes of the Soviet collapse, Chinese writings suggested that state legitimacy comes more from economic results than democratic politics. They argued that economic prosperity, rather than political reform, should be the guiding principle for the survival of Chinese socialism after the fall of the

150 Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party, 11-13.
Soviet Union. The new trends in Chinese Sovietology in the 1990s are crucial for an understanding of post-Mao Chinese Sovietology as a whole. The historical developments of Soviet studies in China in the 1980s and 1990s are actually two sides of the same coin. Both decades are interconnected, and one cannot see a clear picture of the subject without looking at the 20-year trajectory.

Furthermore, contrary to the descriptions in the secondary literature, it is not correct to say that Chinese Sovietology after 1991 was only concentrating on the dark sides of the Soviet Union, drawing negative lessons for China’s use in preserving its own communist regime. As we will see in Chapter Four, Chinese scholars since 1989 have drawn parallels between the early Soviet Union and China after Tiananmen, when both regimes were facing international sanctions and isolation. These scholars argued that China might learn from Lenin’s teachings that encouraged engagement in formal relations with the West, while concentrating on economic development and maintaining a proletarian dictatorship. They manipulated the symbol of Lenin and his post-1917 foreign policy, in an attempt to shore up and legitimate Chinese communist power after the Tiananmen crisis.

To summarize, in the eyes of Chinese scholars after 1991 the state of the Soviet Union was not only a political example that should be learned from and a grave mistake that should be avoided, as claimed by most of the previous scholarship. As noted above, the interpretation of Lenin’s open policy after Tiananmen and the revival of research on Brezhnev since the mid-1990s both demonstrate that Chinese scholars viewed the former Soviet Union as both a warning from the past, as well as an image of a possible Chinese state in the future. By examining the Soviet past, Chinese scholars not only demonstrated
concern for the survival of the CCP regime, but also attempted to envision the future
direction and position of China in the post-communist world. This included analysis of
how China could rise to be a powerful nation under the authoritarian one-party rule,
without succumbing to Western democracy and the sort of collapse that doomed the
USSR.

Central to my analysis is the premise that Chinese Sovietology writings in the 1980s
and 1990s evolved primarily as a response to China’s then-contemporary challenges and
concerns facing individuals. Political developments of the PRC and personal involvement
(direct or indirect) with ongoing political and social events in both decades, influenced
and motivated Chinese Soviet-watchers’ changing perceptions of their subject study.
Post-Mao Sovietology writings are inseparable from scholars’ own participation in the
social and political discourses of contemporary China, and from their embrace or
elaboration of ideologies that served and justified their political claims and current state
agendas. In short, to research Soviet socialism has primarily been to trace problems of
Chinese socialism as experienced by scholars at the time of their research; this was done
in order to legitimize socialist solutions, rather than to seek truth about the Soviet Union.

Going through the issues of Chinese Sovietology writings in both decades, there are
three threads behind the façade of the analyses of Chinese Soviet-watchers. At first glance,
there are different scholars researching diverse topics related to the USSR in their articles,
which should be called *the individual narrative*. Moreover, many of those articles argued
that after the death of Lenin, the Soviet Union was no longer socialist in nature. Stalin’s
oppressive regime, Brezhnev’s ossified policies, and Gorbachev’s *glasnost* were all signs
of the departure of socialism. Such a collective argument could be regarded as the secondary narrative.

More importantly, there is an overarching master narrative drawn from the most common conclusions of post-Mao Chinese Sovietology: firstly, scholars argued that throughout the history of the Soviet Union, only the first leader Lenin had wholeheartedly and consistently practiced what they saw as true socialism. Lenin’s premature death resulted in the demise of genuine socialism, and it was left to other countries to revive the system in the future. In other words, most Chinese scholars’ research on the Soviet Union in both decades began under, and subscribed to, the banner of Lenin. Secondly, according to the Chinese Soviet-watchers presented in the thesis, although having experienced many ups-and-downs, China still cleaves to a classical Leninism that constructs socialism by taking local conditions into account. Chinese writings made it clear that the fall of the Soviet Union was mainly due to the post-Lenin leadership that did not practice enough socialism or deviated from authentic Marxism-Leninism. It resulted in the Soviet system failing to realize its full potential. This problem had little to do with true socialism but rather the distortion of it. According to those Chinese scholars, since the Soviet Union had stopped practicing bona fide socialism after Lenin, so the collapse of the USSR was the collapse merely of a state – but not of socialism. Socialism would not die and China is a true socialist state; therefore, the PRC will not fall. In sum, China under the CCP is true to Lenin’s immortal legacy, and this would guarantee the success of socialism in China.

In research of the Soviet Union in both decades, Chinese scholars can be said to agree on one point: since 1949 the CCP has generally lived up to Lenin’s expectations,
and it has applied the stand, viewpoint, and method of Leninism in building the country. The Party has scientifically analysed China’s national conditions and constructed socialism according to its own circumstances. In their eyes, Lenin symbolizes the fundamental principle of Chinese state-building – “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” which is the new concept of socialism defined and promoted by post-Mao China after 1978. In other words, socialism could incorporate everything for its own strengthening and survival. The term not only conveys that China’s socialist system should be a product of Sinicization of Marxism-Leninism, but also re-defines that socialism is not a doctrine; instead, it is a conflicting and self-contracting theory – you can ipso facto put whatever you want inside as long as it is conducive to Chinese socialist modernization. Notably, this theory is also unchallengeable.

The conceptual guideline of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” has been in place from the departure of Mao Zedong up to present. Chinese Sovietology followed this official principle closely in both decades. Scholars used it as the theoretical premise that would govern and lead their writings and research on the USSR. This research paradigm had already been determined in the early 1980s, and post-Mao Chinese Sovietology is the product of 1978 – but not of 1991. Academia was not only learning lessons from the USSR, but also doing evidential research on the legitimation of the renewed application of orthodox Marxism-Leninism in China. Soviet studies in China in both decades remained true to this post-Mao political mandate, which heralds Deng Xiaoping’s proposal to repudiate the post-Lenin Soviet model, construct socialism according to Chinese conditions, and build a powerful China under the communist one-party rule.
Although the arguments are not monolithic, despite the varied output, scholars’ conclusions mainly centre on this core narrative and interpretative framework. Their research outcomes are the result of learning lessons from Moscow, and are also a prerequisite for legitimizing CCP rule and the Chinese way of practicing socialism.

**Chinese-style socialism, Chinese scholarship, and Chinese Sovietology**

What is “socialism with Chinese characteristics”? It is a term invented by Deng Xiaoping, who formulated and developed the concept by observing the reality of China through his years serving in the Chinese leadership since 1949. Deng believed that Marxism-Leninism is not dogma, and that learning those theories should not be divorced from reality. He criticized that Soviet model as not applying to the realities of China and argued that Chinese socialism should incorporate elements of capitalism.

After the end of the Maoist decades, in the opening speech given to the CCP 12th National Congress in 1982, Deng encouraged learning from the experience of foreign countries and using them as a lesson for the cause of China’s post-Mao modernization. He formally put forward the term “building a socialism with Chinese characteristics” in the speech. He described it as the basic conclusion the Party had reached after reviewing the long history of the country. Two years later, Deng went further to substantiate the concept in a talk with a Japanese delegation. While reaffirming that China should “adhere

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to Marxism and keep to the socialist road,” he claimed that “by socialism we mean a socialism that is tailored to Chinese conditions and has a specifically Chinese character,” and “this calls for highly developed productive forces and an overwhelming abundance of material wealth.” 155 The term looks like a grand but extremely vague expression that perfectly fits Deng’s basic approach: stretching the acceptable ideological framework to allow the country to pursue policies that work. In early 1992, in order to accelerate the reforms and strengthen the CCP rule after the Tiananmen Incident and the fall of communism in Europe, Deng remarked that socialism is “the ultimate achievement of prosperity for all,” and it should “achieve superiority over capitalism.” He made it clear that by doing so, China was still following the road of socialism but not capitalism.156

In the opening speech delivered at the CCP 13th National Congress in 1987, another milestone in accelerating China’s reform and open door after the 1978 Third Plenary Session, Premier Zhao Ziyang summed up the definition of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” in the following words:

Socialism with Chinese characteristics is the product of the integration of the fundamental tenets of Marxism with the modernization drive in China and is scientific socialism rooted in the realities of present-day China. It provides the ideological basis that serves to unite all the Party comrades and all the people in their thinking and their action. It is the great banner guiding our cause forward.157

Zhao argued that because the world was changing so rapidly, “Marxism needs further

extensive development.” He called for “all Marxists to widen their vision, develop new concepts, and enter a new realm.” He said that “the historic contribution of Marx and Engels is that they transformed utopian socialism into scientific socialism,” and remarked that integrating the Marxist theory with Chinese conditions is exactly the hallmark of scientific socialism.\textsuperscript{158} What Zhao meant is that China should persist with the socialist system that had been established by Mao, and that socialist ideology could not be altered or challenged. That being said, the utopian thinking and practice of the past should be disregarded, and contemporary conditions needed to be studied and explored in order to guide China through reforms, and on to modernization under the communist rule.

From the words of Deng and Zhao above, the neology “socialism with Chinese characteristics” can be seen to serve four purposes. First, the concept legitimizes Mao’s efforts in building socialism as according with the practice of integrating Marxist orthodoxy with China’s realities. In effect, this preserved faith in the Chairman after the disastrous Cultural Revolution. Second, the term implies that China should accept socialism and the CCP dictatorship as its destiny. It defines socialism as still being superior to capitalism, despite the fact that China had suffered greatly under Mao. Third, the axiom demonstrates that China needed to learn from more advanced examples of capitalism, in order to strengthen its own socialist system and fortify the Party’s rule that had been devastated during the Cultural Revolution. Last, and most importantly, the motto serves to justify Deng’s policies as the continuation of – but not deviation from – those of Mao Zedong. It served to legitimate the direction of the post-Mao regime as

\textsuperscript{158} Ibid., 69-70.
being still socialist in nature.

In 1983, in a speech in remembrance of the centenary of Karl Marx’s death, CCP Secretary General Hu Yaobang commended that both Lenin’s victory in the October Revolution and Mao’s triumphant revolution in 1949 were examples of integrating the universal truth of Marxism with the concrete realities of the two countries.\textsuperscript{159} One month later, Deng Xiaoping made the same point during a talk with an Indian delegation, putting Lenin and Mao on an equal footing.\textsuperscript{160}

Deng always spoke of the first Soviet leader highly. In 1956, he identified China’s 1950s endeavour to peacefully transform capitalist industry and commerce with “the one which Lenin had in mind but was unable to take.”\textsuperscript{161} After the death of Mao in 1985, Deng was not shy to say that he admired Lenin’s moderate approach to socialism, symbolized by the New Economic Policy (NEP). Deng perceived NEP as the path that China should be taking.\textsuperscript{162} During his summit meeting with Gorbachev in 1989, Deng again praised that “Lenin was a true and great Marxist.” He said this was “because it was not books that enabled him to find the revolutionary road and to accomplish the October socialist revolution in backward Russia but realities, logic, philosophical thinking, and communist ideals.”\textsuperscript{163} In Deng’s mind, Lenin was an example of Chinese-style socialism

\textsuperscript{163} Deng, “Let Us Put the Past Behind Us and Open Up a New Era,” May 16, 1989, in Deng, \textit{Selected Works of}
personified. For Deng, Lenin, Mao, and he himself were the great Marxists who shared the same legacy of building socialism by integrating theories with practice and learning from different things, while upholding the faith of proletarian dictatorship and communism – this is socialism with Chinese characteristics.

On December 13, 1978, Deng Xiaoping made a speech during a Party central working conference, which would serve as the keynote address for the forthcoming Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP – and which signalled the departure of Maoism and the beginning of post-Mao China’s reform and modernization. Deng remarked:

What shall we learn? Basically, we should study Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought and try to integrate the universal principles of Marxism with the concrete practice of our modernization drive. Only if we study these well will we be able to carry out socialist modernization rapidly and efficiently. We should learn in different ways – through practice, from books and from the experience, both positive and negative, of others as well as our own. Conservatism and book worship should be overcome. So long as we unite as one, work in concert, emancipate our minds, use our heads and try to learn what we did not know before, there is no doubt that we will be able to quicken the pace of our new Long March. Under the leadership of the Central Committee and the State Council, let us advance courageously to change the backward condition of our country and turn it into a modern and powerful socialist state.164

Deng’s words can be summarized in two parts: post-Mao China should uphold Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, while adapting those orthodox principles to the realities of the country. On the other hand, Chinese people should study the new situation in the world and be open to new thoughts, in order to transform China from a backward state under Mao, to a powerful and modernized socialist country in the future.

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In 1986, eight years after the Third Plenary Session, Peng Dingan, president of the Liaoning Provincial Party School, featured an article entitled “The Historical Responsibilities of Contemporary Chinese Marxists” in Renmin ribao. In the first part of the article, the author praised the 1978 Third Plenary Session as “a breakthrough in Chinese history,” and commended the courage of the Chinese leadership for putting forward the theory of “constructing socialism with Chinese characteristics” during the Plenary Session. Peng remarked that Deng Xiaoping’s introduction of the theory was unprecedented, since no one in the history of the CCP before had conjured up such an inspiring vision of the future. In his opinion, the founding of the Soviet Union in 1917 was the first successful example of “integrating communist theories with the local conditions of a state.” However, because of Lenin’s premature death, the task remained incomplete in the communist world, and “it will leave China to achieve the goal of constructing socialism with Chinese characteristics.”

In the second part, Peng predicted that there would be “four difficult, great, and glorious historical assignments (lishi keti)” for contemporary Chinese Marxist theoretical workers. First, they should uphold and continue to study Marxism. Second, they should apply Marxist theories to new realities and the current world situation. Third, they needed to use new concepts and new theories to substantiate, enrich, and develop Marxism to a higher level. Last and most importantly, they must learn from the past bitter experience of building socialism in China under Mao, and remember the negative lessons and failures of other communist countries in constructing socialism. He concluded, “Both upholding

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and developing Marxism are our historical responsibilities as well as our contributions to China and the whole world.” 166

In the realm of academia, the principle of constructing socialism with Chinese characteristics seems to have become the theoretical guidance for research in the humanities and social sciences in the PRC after 1978. The editorial board of *Dangdai shijie shehui zhuyi wenti* (Problems of Contemporary World Socialism) wrote in the inaugural issue of the journal in 1983 that “studying the different kinds of socialism in foreign countries has become a trend in China,” and the goal of the journal was “asking Chinese scholars to contribute their articles based on Marxist stand, attitude, and methodology, to research of the problems of contemporary socialism, for facilitating China’s socialist modernization.” 167 Two years after, Zhao Mingyi, a scholar of law at Shandong University, published another article in the same journal and asked that Chinese scholars focus on three aspects with regard to researching contemporary world socialism: thoughts of various socialist schools; comparative studies of various socialist models in the world; and differences between non-scientific and scientific socialism, which needed to be judged by the criteria of “whether socialism has been integrating Marxist fundamentals with actual conditions and realities of various countries.” 168 At the end, he summarized the significance of studying contemporary world socialism in China, which included upholding and developing Marxism, providing lessons and experience for

166 Ibid.
167 Bianjibu [The Editorial Board], “Bianzhe dehua” [The Editors’ Words], *Dangdai shijie shehui zhuyi wenti*, no. 1 (1983): 3. The journal is funded by the Faculty of Social Sciences at Shandong University.
constructing socialism with Chinese characteristics, reforming the current Chinese socialist system, supporting revolutionary struggles in other countries, and ensuring the final victory of Marxist scientific socialism in the world.” 169

In 1988, Wen Jize, former president of the Graduate School at CASS, delivered a speech commemorating the School’s ten-year anniversary. He commended that while the turmoil during the Cultural Revolution imposed by the Gang of Four had abused Marxist theories and caused suffering for the Chinese people, yet the 1978 Third Plenary Session and the CCP 13th Congress that had just taken place in 1987 “eventually found a path of constructing socialism with Chinese characteristics and led China into a new historical stage.” 170 As a result, Wen remarked that there would be “a great and difficult task facing CASS graduate students in learning and developing Marxism.” Apart from upholding Marxist principles, he said, the task for all graduate students would be to “eliminate the mechanical understanding of Marxism and learn new theories to enrich and develop Marxism, for analysing and studying the practical problems of China.” 171

In 1998, Hu Jintao, then the vice-president of China and the future CCP secretary general from 2002 to 2012, commented in a speech commemorating the 20-year anniversary of the 1978 Third Plenary Session that Chinese theoretical workers should carry forward the spirit of the Plenary Session in applying Marxism to the actual

169 Ibid., 79-80.


171 Wen Jize, “Huiguhe xiwang” [Retrospect and Expectation], 4-5.
conditions of China. He said that they should also uphold the Deng Xiaoping Theory of “constructing socialism with Chinese characteristics,” for “researching new conditions, resolving new problems, and moving Marxism toward the future.”

In the same year, another article appeared in *Beijing daxue xuebao* (Journal of Peking University). The author Zhang Baosheng was the PRC Vice-Minister of Education. He made an interesting argument regarding the relationship between the ethos of the 1978 Third Plenary Session and post-Mao China’s humanities and social science research. According to him, because those disciplines had been decimated during the Cultural Revolution, and because the spirit of the Third Plenary Session involved such values as emancipating the mind, seeking truth from facts, and using Marxist theories to study and explore new ways of building socialism with Chinese characteristics, one could surmise that the Session had contributed to revitalized research. He argued that “the line prescribed at the Third Plenary Session has become the foundation of post-Mao humanities and social science research.” He argued that post-Mao Chinese humanities and social sciences should serve the needs of economic modernization, strengthen research on Deng Xiaoping Theory, develop Marxism, and make a contribution to the principle of building socialism with Chinese characteristics. In short, what Zhang Baosheng meant is that without Deng Xiaoping and his new principles that were put

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forward at the 1978 Third Plenary Session, there would have been no rebirth of China’s humanities or social sciences after the death of Mao. As a result, Deng Xiaoping Theory and the post-Mao China’s principle of constructing socialism with Chinese characteristics should become the theoretical framework of, and guidance for, China’s humanities and social science research after 1978.

Regarding the relationship between Deng Xiaoping’s concept of Chinese-style socialism and Post-Mao Chinese Sovietology, it is first worth noting that the concept of socialism with Chinese characteristics and Deng’s speeches on the Soviet Union not only became the theoretical framework of research of Chinese humanities and social sciences (including Sovietology), but they also influenced the quoting and writing styles of many Chinese Soviet-watchers. In 1994, there was an article written by Liu Seqing, editor in chief of *Xiandai guoji guanxi* (Contemporary International Relations). The author used more than 50 quotations from Deng Xiaoping’s selected works, solely for arguing that China’s direction of reform and open door was successful. By contrast, the Soviet Union did not build socialism by integrating Marxist theories with its realities, therefore leading to its demise. In his 1998 article, Guo Jianping, an associate researcher at the Central Party School, cited almost every speech of Deng Xiaoping from the 1950s to 1990s in order to prove that Deng’s appraisal of the rigid Soviet model and its unsuitability for China were true. It seems that both authors were happy to allow Deng to speak for

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174 Liu Seqing, “Xitong yanjiu shenru linghui dengxiaoping waijiao zhanlue sixiang” [Systematic Studies on and Thorough Mastery of Deng Xiaoping’s Diplomatic Strategic Thoughts], *Xiandai guoji guanxi*, no. 5 (1994): 24-33. The journal is published by the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, which is the PRC’s largest graduate school in studying international relations and world diplomacy.

175 Guo Jianping, “Dengxiaoping lunsulian moshi” [Deng Xiaoping on the Soviet Model], *Eluosi dongou*
them when it came to analysing the Soviet Union.

Moreover, while not quoting Deng’s words, both Li Yunhua (an IREECAS scholar) and Huang Zongliang (vice-director of the Institute of Russian Studies at Beijing University) closely imitated Deng’s rhetoric in their own articles. The language used by these two authors appears in almost the same vein as when Deng spoke during his southern tour in 1992. On this tour, the Chinese leader was intent to return the attack by the Party conservative force after the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, and called for the acceleration of reform and open door in the wake of the demise of world communism. Following Deng’s southern trip, when summarizing Soviet lessons for China’s future reforms, Li Yunhua said that “by observing the lessons of Soviet building socialism for more than 70 years, we must realize that the open policy will be a long term strategy,” and China should guard against “the interference from both the left and the right, but leftism is the primary threat.” 176 As for Huang Zongliang, he stated in 1993 that “Marxism-Leninism is an open system that embraces different schools,” and “being indulged in quarrelling over whether the road of reform is capitalist or socialist would only render the socialist theories ossified.” 177

By comparing the quotations above with Deng’s original in 1992, one finds a surprising similarity in wording and language style, and wonders if those words come


from the same person.\textsuperscript{178} As such, we can see that Deng’s understanding of the Soviet Union and his definition of socialism deeply influenced the thinking, mind-set, language style, and even grammar and syntax of Chinese Sovietology writings.

Second, as we will see in subsequent chapters, both the status of the first Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin and the concept of socialism with Chinese characteristics attached a great significance to Chinese Sovietology writings in the 1980s and 1990s. Chinese scholars always put Deng Xiaoping and Lenin on the same pedestal and stated that Deng had long followed Lenin’s principle of building socialism according to one country’s special conditions. This was particularly true in the 1990s, when Lenin’s policies coincided with China’s interests. At the time, Chinese Sovietologists used the interpretation of Lenin’s writings to bring vigour to the weakening legitimacy of Chinese socialism after the Tiananmen suppression and the demise of world communism, and to give a new impulse to Deng’s policies and future reforms against the post-Tiananmen leftist offensive. Chinese scholars used Lenin to help rebuild the authority of the Party and communism in China.

As early as in the 1950s, Deng Xiaoping had already recognized that China should follow the path “which Lenin had in mind but was unable to take” for building socialism.\textsuperscript{179} In 1985, after China had come out of the disastrous Mao era, Deng admitted to Robert Mugabe, prime minister of Zimbabwe, that he still did not know what socialism


meant after more than 30 years of building socialism in China. But he mentioned that “Lenin had a good idea when he adopted the New Economic Policy,” which championed the market economy and open society, while upholding the one-party rule. At the end of the conversation, Deng concluded that the correct way was to “build socialism with Chinese characteristics,” which means to apply the universal principles of Marxism-Leninism to China’s own realities.\(^{180}\)

In 1989, a few months before the Tiananmen Incident, Huang Nansen, a philosophy professor at Beijing University, published an article in *Makesi zhuyi yanjiu* (Studies on Marxism), which was funded and administered by CASS. He summarized the following four essences of Leninism: Leninism is a pragmatic Marxism (*shijiande makesi*); some elements of Leninism may only apply to the age when Lenin was still alive, and today we need to develop Leninism to make it more relevant; Leninism is socialism with Russian characteristics based on the Russian tradition and mentality; having said this, Leninism still has universal value for present day world socialism.\(^{181}\)

In 1992, a few months after Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour, Zhu Guocheng, a scholar at the Chengdu Cadre College in Sichuan Province, remarked at the beginning of his article that “Lenin’s theory has close relations to China’s policies and it is the theoretical foundation of our socialist construction.”\(^{182}\) In his opinion, not only China’s economic policy, but also Deng’s political reform (or, more accurately speaking, administrative


reform) had originated from Lenin’s party construction program after 1917, such as separation of the state and the Party, increasing the working efficiency, and combating the cumbersome bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{183} Zhu Guocheng even argued that China’s “special economic zone” and “one country, two systems” both originated from Lenin’s policies during the early Soviet Union, when the country borrowed heavily from capitalist elements to strengthen its socialist economy.\textsuperscript{184}

In 1995, Li Shenglu, a scholar at the Sichuan Provincial Academy of Social Sciences, identified the following three concepts of Deng Xiaoping with those of Lenin: everything must be based on practice, rather than theory; the key of building socialism is economic development, not political struggle; and socialism and capitalism are not in contradiction.\textsuperscript{185} He praised, “Deng Xiaoping’s thinking in reform and open door is in fact using Lenin’s theory to build socialism with a Chinese character. He has inherited and developed Leninism.”\textsuperscript{186} In 1999, Ye Qingfeng, a professor of socialist studies at the Central Party School, made it clear that “the path launched by the Third Plenary Session is a return to and a logical continuation of Lenin’s New Economic Policy,” and “The New Economic Policy is exactly the direction of China taken since 1978.”\textsuperscript{187}

In 1993 and 1995, there were two articles written by Gao Fang (a professor of international relations at Renmin University in Beijing) and Sun Chengshu (a professor of

\textsuperscript{183} Ibid., 52-53.

\textsuperscript{184} Ibid., 51.


\textsuperscript{186} Ibid., 33.

\textsuperscript{187} Ye Qingfeng, “Lunliening wanniande shehui zhuyi sixiang” [Lenin’s Thoughts on Socialism in the Evening of His Life], \textit{Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao xuebao}, no. 4 (1999): 72.
philosophy at Fudan University in Shanghai), respectively. Both articles concluded that there were three breakthroughs of socialism in human history. The first was the birth of Marxism symbolized by the publication of *The Communist Manifesto*; the second milestone was the Lenin administration in the early Soviet Union from 1917 to 1923; the last landmark was the period of time represented by Deng Xiaoping’s launching of reform and open door policies in 1978, and his putting forward of the idea of “socialist market economy” during his southern trip in 1992. Interestingly, both authors’ articles excluded the once-hailed post-Lenin Soviet model as one of the breakthroughs of socialism in world history. Moreover, they tended to agree that Deng’s post-1978 direction was more a vision inspired by Lenin’s post-1917 administration than by Marx’s *Manifesto*. As Sun Chengshu commented:

> There is a clear line linking between Deng’s reform programs and Lenin’s policies. Deng’s dictum of socialism with Chinese characteristics has behave us to rethink socialism. He is entitled to be the greatest Chinese Leninist in the contemporary era.

Last, the concept of socialism with Chinese characteristics was not only intended to legitimize Deng Xiaoping as a true disciple of Leninism, or the post-Mao PRC regime and its reform direction as a product of genuine socialism. To some extent, as we will see in subsequent chapters, the use of the term in post-Mao Chinese Sovietology was also

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190 Sun Chengshu, “Dongfang shehui zhuyi lilunde disanci feiyue” [The Third Breakthrough in Oriental Socialist Theory], 9.
meant to protect and save Mao’s image and status; these had been severely damaged before his death in 1976, owing to the Chairman’s highly repressive policies carried out in China from 1949 onward. Deng Xiaoping once remarked in 1960:

Mao Zedong Thought and Marxism-Leninism are one and the same thing. Mao Zedong Thought not only adheres to the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism, but also adds much new content to the treasure house of Marxism-Leninism. Therefore, we should not separate Mao Zedong Thought from Marxism-Leninism as if the two were different things.191

After Mao died, Deng did not change his tune; rather, he went even further in 1983, saying that both Mao’s founding of communist China in 1949 and Lenin’s October Revolution in 1917 were examples of integrating the universal principles of Marxism-Leninism with the local conditions of the two countries, respectively.192 Not only Deng, but other CCP leaders like Li Ruihuan and Jiang Zemin, also expressed similarly positive views on Mao after the 1980s. These leaders linked Lenin, Mao, and Deng together as examples of practicing what they saw as true socialism, by taking local circumstances into account.193 In 1998, CCP Secretary General Jiang Zemin commended that while Mao was integrating Leninist theory with Chinese conditions to achieve a successful revolution in 1949, it was Deng who creatively used Leninism to facilitate China’s modernization after 1978.194

194 Jiang, “Shishi qiushi, jiaotashide qianjin,” [To March Forward by Seeking Truth from Facts and Doing
In academia, Yu Lin, chief editor of *Shehui kexue zhanxian* (Social Science Front), which was funded and administered by the Jilin Provincial Academy of Social Sciences, wrote in 1981 that “Maoism is the collective wisdom of the CCP,” and “it has nothing to do with Mao’s personal character and the mistakes he made in the evening of his life.” He concluded that “Maoism is a product of integrating Marxism-Leninism with the practice of Chinese socialist revolution.”

In 1993 and 1995, both Hu Sheng (CASS president) and Wang Zhen (an associate professor at Dalian College of Political Science in Liaoning Province) published articles on the Sino-Soviet relations under Mao. There are three points worth summarizing from these works: Mao’s mistake was not that he copied the Soviet model mechanically, but that he extricated China from the Soviet model in a rushed and ineffective manner. Mao’s break with Moscow in the 1960s was a good and serious decision, and it signalled the beginning of China’s farewell to the unsuitable Soviet model; Mao’s subsequent programs (such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution) were all explorations searching for alternative ways of establishing a socialist society in China. Both authors concluded that Mao’s past experiments, regardless of the costs, were the origin of Deng’s 1978 reform programs and the theory of building socialism in a Chinese way.

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Deng Xiaoping once told the Italian Journalist Oriana Fallaci in 1980 that CCP “will not do to Chairman Mao what Khrushchev did to Stalin.” In 1997, Yang Xiaoyan, a lecturer at Beijing Technology and Business University, criticized that Khrushchev’s 1956 secret speech – which revealed and condemned Stalin’s supposed crimes – was the origin of the 1989 East European turmoil and the final collapse of the Soviet Union. In fact, Mao Zedong might have already sensed sentiment. He said in November 1956, a few months after the release of Khrushchev’s secret speech, that the USSR had two swords – one was Lenin, another was Stalin. And regarding the possibility of Stalin being denounced and the fate of the Soviet state being in danger, he remarked that “Once this gate is opened, by and large Leninism is thrown away.”

In this regard, post-Mao Chinese Soviet-watchers seem to have taken heed of Mao’s 1956 admonishment and understood Mao’s premonition perfectly. They seem to have realized that although China was able to blame the Soviet model created by the post-Lenin Moscow leaderships, nevertheless both Lenin and Mao, the fundamental pillars of the socialist states, could never be overturned under any circumstances. Otherwise, the consequences for China would be disastrous, akin to those of the USSR in 1991. Therefore, as we will see in subsequent chapters, scholars generally aligned Lenin and Mao with the direction of post-Mao China in their writings and research on the Soviet

Union; this served as self-imposed boundaries for their research, beyond which they were unable to go.

Moreover, according to Zhu Guocheng and Gao Fang, the post-1917 Lenin administration equalled Deng’s post-1978 reforms. Both paths symbolized what they saw as true socialism, which meant integrating Marxist theory with local conditions. Both measures were “the middle way marching toward socialism,” which distinguished them from the leftist errors committed by Stalin and the rightist tendencies represented by Khrushchev and Gorbachev. This perfectly encapsulated the research outcomes of post-Mao Chinese Sovietology in the 1980s and 1990s: after Lenin, the Soviet Union was no longer socialist in nature. The demise of the Union was due to leftism and rightism after Lenin, so the collapse of the state in 1991 had nothing to do with the nature of socialism. Chinese Sovietologists appear to have concluded that the backwardness of Chinese socialism in pre-1976 times was not due to socialism or Maoism, but that the culprit was the Soviet model invented by post-Lenin leaderships. After 1978, China returned to what it deemed as the right path of true Leninism – Deng’s reform and open door directions, and socialism with Chinese characteristics, which were intended to guarantee the success of PRC modernization even after the demise of world communism.

Chinese historiography and Chinese Sovietology

In order to further understand the nature of contemporary Chinese Sovietology and

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how Chinese Soviet-watchers used their writings to serve the CCP regime, we need to trace the tradition of Chinese historical research. The interplay of scholarship and politics has a long history in China, in which scholarly research (particularly in the fields of the humanities and social sciences) has been easily turned to political uses.\textsuperscript{201} The situation has been exacerbated since the communists took control in 1949. Unlike in democratic countries, where intellectuals generally have more autonomy, the CCP regime (like others in the socialist world) expects intellectuals to be cogs in a machine, not independent thinkers. As a result, the practice of Chinese scholars in the field of Sovietology is largely the result of the mentality of traditional Chinese intellectuals. Chinese Sovietologists support the party-state as a priority, by legitimizing socialism and reform agendas in their writings. Through their research (as presented in this thesis), Chinese Soviet-watchers are directly or indirectly participating in defining the reform process, and devising and legitimizing reform ideology and propaganda. Their writings often say more about China than about the Soviet Union. PRC Sovietologists in both decades constantly sought to capitalize on their research of the USSR. By doing so, they attempted to further China’s interests and seek solutions for its own socialist system. It became a striking example of scholarship in which traditional criteria of evidence and argument, objectivity and truth, are largely overruled by normative political considerations.

Like PRC scholarship in the field of historical research, there are two trends in Chinese Sovietology writings: the Confucian tradition and Marxist theoretical framework. In the first case, ancient Chinese classics, such as \textit{Confucians} and \textit{Mencius}, are always

full of descriptions of Chinese thinkers appealing to examples of ancient kings. Those distant personages are presented as concrete embodiments of moral qualities for present societies. Jonathan Unger once commented:

The recording and interpretation of history has, for the past two millennia, contained a special significance in China. More than in most other countries, history was and its considered a mirror through which ethical standards and moral transgressions pertinent to the present day could be viewed. This perspective on history was based in Confucian doctrine, which admonished followers to plumb the past for such lessons. It became a method of commentary about contemporary times that members of the literati class learned how to manipulate, sometimes as a means of flattering an incumbent emperor and government.

Burton Watson contends that there are two functions within the tradition of Chinese historical research represented by *Shiji* (Records of the Grand Historian), which was written by Sima Qian in the Han dynasty (206 BC–220 AD). According to Watson, firstly, “these works were intended not primarily as objective records of the past but as guides to moral and political conduct.” Secondly, “it was the creation of a new golden age in the present by a wise application of the moral values appropriate to the times.” Indeed, writing history in China, despite the intent of historians to portray the past as objectively as possible, is in fact still a political enterprise. The past is continually reconstructed to meet the needs of the state. In this case, the PRC regime, akin to its imperial forebears, has always impinged on scholars in a manner reminiscent of the dynastic rulers in

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validating the rule of the state.²⁰⁵

Second, since the founding of the PRC, Marxism has become the guiding principle of Chinese scholarly research in the humanities and social sciences, and the field of history in particular. Marx once remarked, “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it.”²⁰⁶ It is the Marxist determinist vision of history and its appeal to voluntarism that have been used by the party-state to legitimize the communist regime and its own policies. Under such a Marxist framework, the CCP regime demands that PRC historians use whatever means necessary to appropriate and shape the past for contemporary political purposes.²⁰⁷ Chinese scholars in the field are regarded as not having been able to organize a field of their own. Neither are they able to define and act autonomously according to the self-set rules of their own academic “game.” Instead, scholars are compelled to think and work according to rules set by the Party. For them, interpreting historical documents without the guidance of Marxism-Leninism has simply been impossible after 1949.²⁰⁸

Reading through the secondary literature as presented in the Introduction, one may get a feeling that Chinese Sovietology after the Soviet collapse had a strong sense of

²⁰⁵ For details, see Merle Goldman, Timothy Cheek and Carol Lee Hamrin, eds., China’s Intellectuals and the State: In Search of a New Relationship (Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1987).
urgency and crisis. The secondary literature has portrayed the Soviet demise as causing a great deal of concern among Chinese Soviet-watchers, who supposedly worried about the ramifications on the PRC’s one-party rule and the fate of socialist China. In reality, however, according to this author’s reading of Chinese post-mortems on the USSR after 1991 scholars did not view the collapse of the Soviet Union as a sign of the coming downfall of China, but the source of its renewal. Chinese scholars re-invented and re-conceptualized the image and norms of Chinese socialism as not only the tomorrow of world socialism, but also the tomorrow of humankind.

In 1987, *Beijing Review* published an article just before the 13th Party Congress. It indicated that, while learning from the West and opening to the outside world would facilitate socialist modernization, China was nonetheless in “the preliminary stage of socialism,” and building socialism in China “will be a long-term project.” In the wake of the Tiananmen Incident and the turmoil in Eastern Europe, many Chinese scholars suggested that the presently grim situation by no means indicated the ultimate failure of socialism. They argued that difficult political circumstances were sometimes caused by the capitalist peaceful evolution. They remarked that the history of socialism is far shorter than that of capitalism, so the advantages of socialism have not yet become evident to the world in so short a time. In their opinion, learning from the failure of the socialist countries in Eastern Europe would enrich China’s socialist theories and buoy the PRC’s confidence in upholding socialism. They agreed that socialism needs to be developed and explored, and continued reform is the only hope for socialism in the future. They all

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In fact, after the Soviet collapse in 1991, some Chinese scholars went further to say that the failure of Soviet socialism and Gorbachev’s reforms had actually bolstered the confidence of the Chinese people and demonstrated the correctness of Chinese-style socialism. They argued quite optimistically that the USSR and China were two completely different models of socialism, and that there would not have been the rise of the Chinese model without the Soviet demise. They predicted that the revival of socialism was now imminent in China and that the 21st century would be the century of socialism with Chinese characteristics. They concluded that Chinese-style socialism had absorbed the negative lessons of the Soviet model and integrated Marxist theories into its own circumstances. Therefore, it should be an example to the world in the future, and would be marching toward its final victory with confidence.\footnote{Li Dezhi, “Jiu history jinai zhongguo mei youxin li shi jiyu” [Historical Opportunities That China Faces in the 1990s], \textit{Shehui zhuyi yanjiu}, no. 5 (1992): 42-43. Li Xingfeng, “Dengxiaoping yudangdai shijie shehui zhuyi” [Deng Xiaoping and Contemporary World Socialism], \textit{Makesi zhuyiyu xianshi}, no. 2 (1994): 32-41. Zhang Zesen, “Jiansheyou zhongguo tesede shehui zhuyiyu shijie shehui zhuyi disanci weida feiyue” [Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and the Third Great Leap of World Socialism], \textit{Shanghai
By presenting the contrasting performances of socialism in China and the USSR, scholars argued that socialism in China was very different in nature to that of the USSR, and was more sustainable because China had combined Marxism with its local conditions. Their sophistry was to interpret the demise of the USSR as not the end of socialism, but as the revival of Chinese-style socialism amid the ashes of the Soviet past. They were happy to say that China and its distinctive socialist system would prove to the world that socialism might still be a powerful force, and that Chinese-style socialism represented the future of mankind.

The post-1991 narrative of Chinese Sovietology writings is still largely influenced and determined by the Marxist five-stage grand theory explaining the historical development of human society – that is, from slavery to feudalism, capitalism, socialism, and finally to communism. This grand theory is still a powerful formulation that legitimizes the status of Chinese socialism and guarantees the position of China in the future world, amid the great despair resulting from the tragic collapse of the Soviet Union. Their writings answered pressing political questions in simplified, clear-cut, and comprehensive terms that resulted in a strong appeal for the CCP regime. Such narratives became dominant at the time when socialism in the world was facing an unprecedented

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crisis. In arousing the revolutionary spirit and the hope for the survival of Chinese socialism, these scholars seem to have surrendered standard academic rigour in their writings. They played the roles of prophets and offered sharp, clear guidelines for future action. Their thoughts reflected a Marxist determinism that “man makes history,” as well as its voluntaristic interpretation of history, which portrays socialism as historically inevitable. This inevitability thus demands the participation and activity of individuals in realizing the inevitable, and inspiring people to conceive or create new future possibilities. Post-1991 Chinese Sovietology writings lie at the core of such Marxist worldview.

In the post-Mao era, Deng Xiaoping’s precept of “seeking truth from facts” was not only a call for integrating Marxism with Chinese conditions to build socialism, but also a demand for intellectuals to explore whatever means necessary for strengthening the weakened legitimacy of the CCP after the disastrous Cultural Revolution, commanding support of his reform and open door policies. CASS President and historian Hu Sheng once said that “the goal of the historical research is to summarize past lessons for serving the needs of the present.” He argued that “we need to research the past events that have been selectively chosen and have strong ramifications on the present.” According to David Shambaugh, the goal of the majority of post-Mao China’s American-watchers is “not to write studies for policy elites, but rather to view the world through a Marxist-Leninist lens, write theoretical treaties, and hence justify policy in ideological terms.”

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213 On Marx’s original, see Karl Marx, Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy, eds and trans. T. B. Bottomore and Maximillian Rubel (London: Watts, 1956), 63.


says that these individuals’ collective task “is generally to transmit and perpetuate doctrine, not to create knowledge or foster independent thinking.” and “they must work within definite bureaucratic and intellectual confines.” It is reported that their research outcomes have never been a simple matter and have somewhat become the sources of legitimation for governmental policies.\textsuperscript{216}

Post-Mao Chinese Sovietology as presented in this thesis registers all the Confucian and Marxist influences that have characterized the past Chinese scholarly tradition, such as adapting orthodox theories to fit reality and explain the present, using the past to serve contemporary politics, propagandizing anti-imperialism and the West, and embracing determinism and the inevitability of socialism. By researching the Soviet Union and quoting substantially from Marx, Lenin, Mao, and Deng, Chinese Soviet-watchers did not focus on the USSR alone, but mostly attempted to confirm and legitimize the state policies of reform and open door, and to propagandize and predetermine the final victory of socialism in China.

In order to further illustrate the Confucian and Marxist impacts on post-Mao Chinese Sovietology, it is helpful to examine the use of \textit{shi} (standing for historical facts or historical materials) and \textit{lun} (standing for historical interpretation or theory),\textsuperscript{217} and their association with the concept of socialism with Chinese characteristics. There are three typologies that have been used in Chinese history writing since ancient times: \textit{yilun daishi}


(theory takes the lead over historical materials); *luncong shichu* (interpretations and theories evolve from historical materials); *shilun jiehe* (combinations of historical materials and theory, in which theoretical approaches have priority over historical materials). These three paradigms could also find strong expression in contemporary Chinese Sovietology writing, which is, in fact, a derivative of Chinese scholarly tradition.

After 1949, the narrative structure of *luncong shichu*, which was embracing the spirit of Western historiography and essentially a liberal tradition that had dominated the Republican era (1911-1949), gradually became marginalized and lost its prominence in the emergence of Marxist historiography that prevailed during the Maoist decades. This school of historical writing is committed to objectively discovering the past, and is based on rigorous and impartial scrutiny of primary sources, and letting the historical narrative speak for itself. This paradigm is certainly at odds with post-1949 Marxist guidance, which dictates history writing as the most effective and powerful means to legitimize and reinforce political ideology. Its goal is not to faithfully reconstruct the past, but to use the past to legitimate actions and agendas of the present-day regime.

According to Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, there was mainly a contest between two philosophical concepts in historical writing under Mao: *yilun daishi* and *shilun jiehe*. The former was represented by the orthodox historians Guo Moruo and Fan Wenlan, who accepted the Party line as the official *lun* to guide history writing and argued that Marxist-Leninist principles should be the compass for all PRC historians. The latter was upheld by

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218 Ibid., 431.
Jian Bozan (a professor of history at Beijing University) and Wu Han (a leading scholar in the history of Ming Dynasty and vice-mayor of Beijing), who did not take Marxism-Leninism for granted and did not regard it as an instrument aimed at comprehending history. Rather, they perceived this ideological assumption as merely an auxiliary aid to assist research.\textsuperscript{220} For them, “Marxism-Leninism was not to be found as an inherent principle of history; but inherent principles in history could only be found with the help of Marxism-Leninism.” \textsuperscript{221}

Under Mao, the conviction of shilun jiehe was quickly placed outside the boundaries of orthodox historiography in the PRC, while the theory of yilun daishi took the lead and became mainstream in the realm of historical research. Yilun daishi looks at everything from a holistic point of view, from which the past has to be explained. For those scholars belonging to this school, the precondition for writing history is not working on historical records, but understanding totality in its claim for the future. This model is congruent with the CCP regime’s deterministic claim that Marxism-Leninism should be the universal law governing historical research and legitimizing its power.\textsuperscript{222}

After the end of the Mao era, shilun jiehe, with the paradigm’s new interpretation under new circumstances, gained ascendance in Chinese scholarly research after the 1970s. In the early 1980s, Dai Yi (a professor of history at Renmin University) and Jin Jingfang (a professor of history at Jilin University) published articles in *Renmin ribao* and

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\item[220] Susanne Weigelín-Schwiedrzik, “History and Truth in Chinese Marxist Historiography,” in *Historical Truth, Historical Criticism, and Ideology*, eds. Schmidt-Glintzer, Mittag and Rüsen, 432.
\item[221] Ibid., 433.
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Shehui kexue zhanxian (Social Science Front), respectively. Both of them argued that both of the concepts yilun daishi and luncong shichu had become outdated in the new era. In their opinion, Marxism-Leninism is not dogma, and historical research should develop new theories and enrich communist classics under the framework of Marxism-Leninism. They stated that shilun jiehe absolutely complied with Deng Xiaoping’s slogan of building socialism with Chinese characteristics, and it should be considered the best method of historical research, as the concept conveyed a strong sense that historical work should expand theories in light of the conditions of the country in question.223

The renewed emphasis on the thesis of shilun jiehe should be understood in the context of China at the beginning of the reform era. In January 1983, CASS Vice-President Huan Xiang wrote a report entitled “The Tasks of 1980s Chinese Social Sciences.” The author argued that Chinese social sciences should be upgraded, making the discipline more modernized and less dogmatized after the Mao era. He wrote that the tasks of Chinese social science scholars should explore how China could achieve modernization from within socialist model. However, these scholars were not able to challenge the historical conclusion that only socialism could save China.224 One year later, IREECAS Director Liu Keming stated in his report that studying the Soviet Union should serve the needs of China, its reform policy, and the purpose of building its own brand of


socialism." In 1986, an official document disseminated in the Sixth Plenary Session of the 12th CCP Central Committee declared that while Marxism-Leninism was the guiding principle, “the theory also needs to be developed in keeping with historical and scientific advance.” The document concluded that the task of China’s Marxist theoretical workers was “to apply Marxist basic principles and methods to the creative solution of new problems.” 226 In 1988, Hua Sike, a scholar at Central China Normal University, suggested that under the new circumstances, Chinese social science workers should articulate a renewed understanding of how both socialism and capitalism could aid in China’s modernization.227

From the aftermath of the Tiananmen Incident to the end of the 1990s (particularly after Deng’s southern tour in 1992), there was a new development of the *shilun jiehe* thesis. In 1992, after surveying the discourse of *shilun jiehe* throughout PRC history, Jiang Dachun, a researcher at CASS Institute of Modern History, argued that the thesis in contemporary China should no longer be guided by orthodox Marxism, but by the new line of socialism with Chinese characteristics.228 In 1994, Hu Jintao, then the secretariat of the CCP Central Committee, redefined the concept “Marxist” in his speech delivered at the Central Party School. He argued that upholding Marxism was not sufficient, and “a

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225 Liu Keming, “Jianguo yilaide sulian dongou yanjiu” [Soviet and East European Studies since the Founding of China], 4.
person who possesses the ability to develop Marxism is a true Marxist.” 229 In 1998, in the aftermath of the fall of world communism, CASS President Li Tieying in his annual CASS report wrote that when socialism was in crisis, it was also an opportunity for Chinese scholars to contribute something new to the revival of socialism. And by this “something new,” he meant none other than Deng’s dictum of building socialism with a Chinese character, which Li Tieying considered as the future theoretical framework for China’s social science research. 230 As such, we can say that the renewed emphasis on shilun jiehe in the 1980s and 1990s is a new kind of yilun daishi in disguise. The only difference was that the lun (theory), which had previously been the orthodox and dogmatic Marxism-Leninism, had been replaced by Deng’s flexible and seemingly inclusive slogan of building socialism in a Chinese way – it was new wine in an old bottle.

Concluding remarks

As demonstrated in this chapter, in order to grasp the narratives and analyses of the Soviet Union, one has to examine Chinese Soviet-watchers in their historical context. In so doing, we see that Soviet-watchers’ perceptions of the USSR and their direct or indirect involvement with ongoing or specific political and social circumstances in contemporary China motivated as well as constrained their rendering of the subject study.

Post-Mao Chinese Sovietology, in other words, was inseparable from these scholars’ participation in the social and political discourses of their own times, and from their embrace or elaboration of ideologies that served to justify their political claims.

In sum, Chinese scholars projected Sovietology not as an autonomous realm, but as the legitimizer of post-Mao state policies. It led to the moulding of the scholarship in the image of political goals and assumptions. This is seen in the concept of socialism with Chinese characteristics, which is a grand but marvellously vague expression that perfectly fits Deng Xiaoping’s basic approach: stretching the acceptable ideological framework to allow the country to pursue policies that worked. Post-Mao Chinese Sovietology also became a malleable tool that could be reinvented to serve different political purposes regardless of academic authenticity. By doing so, Chinese Sovietologists sought to make Chinese-style socialism meaningful and valued. Writings on the Soviet Union have largely reflected China’s prevailing political climate as well as the current strategy of reform and open door. Although changes in the Soviet Union and in Sino-Soviet (and later Sino-Russian) relations have mattered, China’s domestic concerns have been primary. We can say that Chinese Sovietology is an epiphenomenon of PRC politics.

In 1992, Li Huibin, a professor at Central China Normal University, divided the formation of the concept of building socialism with Chinese characteristics into three stages, from the time after Deng took power. It began with the Third Plenum in 1978 to the 12th Party Congress in 1982, which focused on summarizing the past lessons of building socialism since 1949. The conclusion of this stage was that learning about foreign experience was essential, but that by doing so China should not copy other
models mechanically – rather, Chinese socialism must integrate with Chinese conditions.
The second stage lasted from 1982 to the 13th Party Congress in 1987, at which time the
theory was further developed. During this period, the CCP leadership emphasized that
China was still in the primary stage of socialism; therefore, the country should
concentrate on developing the productive forces and use whatever means to construct
socialism. The theory had finally taken shape and become systematic from 1987 to the
demise, Chinese leaders had reached a consensus about making the principle of socialist
market economy integral to China’s future development. The concept defines not only an
economic reform with Chinese characteristics, but also a political institution with a
distinctive Chinese style, which involves upholding a proletarian dictatorship while
resisting Western multiparty democracy and pluralism.231

Li Huibin’s description of the three phrases of formation and development of
socialism with Chinese characteristics corresponds to the discourse of post-Mao Chinese
Sovietology writings in these two decades. As we will see in the coming four core
chapters (Chapters Three to Six), in the 1980s Chinese Soviet-watchers focused on
criticizing Moscow’s policies and learning lessons from the Soviet system. They argued
that China should extricate itself from the model of Soviet socialism, reform its own
economic and political institutions, and embrace the advanced elements of the West. After
the transitional period from the Tiananmen Incident to the aftermath of the Soviet

231 Li Huibin, “Jiansheyou zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi lilunde xingcheng fazhan” [Formation and
Development of the Theory of Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics], Shehui zhuyi yanjiu, no. 6
collapse, the turning point came in 1992, in the wake of Deng’s southern tour.

Socialism with Chinese characteristics, the dominant framework for post-Mao Chinese Sovietology in the 1980s and 1990s, involved two pillars: learning from capitalist elements and retaining a socialist essence. Chinese Sovietologists in both decades were reiterating and reinforcing both points in their research and writings. While learning from capitalism was important, maintaining socialism was fundamental. Particularly after the tragic denouement of the USSR, the latter value was more pronounced; this was in and after the 1990s, when the former Soviet Union had turned into a relic of the past. The country became less and less a subject of serious academic study in China, but remained a symbol for Chinese scholars: reminding the domestic audience of the significance of deepening economic reform and open door policies as the key to keeping socialism vital, while upholding the fundamental importance of one-party dictatorship. For Chinese Soviet-watchers, this was the first and foremost lesson drawn from the failed experiments of the USSR.
Part One—Chapter 3

Part One
Analyses of Soviet Foreign Relations
Chapter 3
Topics in the 1980s: From Soviet Hegemonism to Gorbachev’s New Thinking

Introductory remarks

In the early 1980s, when the Sino-Soviet relations were in estrangement and the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had exacerbated the bilateral relations, the CCP regime called for the state-wide denunciation of the so-called Soviet hegemonism (baquan zhuyi). After that, Chinese Soviet-watchers became preoccupied with criticizing Soviet hegemonism in their writings. This chapter will show that both the real Soviet military threat along the PRC border after Moscow’s incursion into Afghanistan, and the historical memory of the past Russian invasion of China played key roles in intensifying the hostility of Chinese scholars toward the USSR in the 1980s. The criticisms gradually receded after Mikhail Gorbachev took power in 1985, and the label of Soviet hegemonism finally disappeared from Chinese Sovietology writings in the late 1980s, when the bilateral relations had normalized.

Moscow’s relations with Yugoslavia and the Third World also became popular topics in 1980s Chinese writings. In the early days of the decade, the CCP regime was attracted by Yugoslavia’s intransigence toward the Kremlin and, most importantly, Belgrade’s trajectory of reform that deviated from the orthodox Soviet model. Many Chinese writers
supported wholeheartedly Yugoslavia’s stand in its conflicts with Moscow since the end of the Second World War. The trend reflects China’s ambition of challenging the Soviet domination of the socialist camp, and its aspiration to embrace Yugoslavia’s trajectory of reform, which mixed central planning and market mechanism, and is exactly the path the PRC has taken since 1978.

Chinese perceptions of Soviet-Third World relations should also be viewed in the context of China’s Third World policy direction in the 1980s, when the CCP regime was determined to end Maoist isolation and become a partner of the underdeveloped nations. Chinese scholars always had strong sympathy for the Third World and stood by the side of those countries through their criticisms of Soviet aggression in the region. Many of these scholars argued that Soviet behaviours were contradictory to Lenin’s internationalism. In the Chinese mind, Moscow’s unequal treatment of some Third World states evoked memories of China in the past, when the country had also been bullied and weakened by Tsars and the Kremlin after 1949. Chinese scholars strongly promoted and defended the case of the Third World in their articles. The writings demonstrate China’s determination to challenge Moscow’s authority, appeal for redress for past historical wrongdoings, and promote the moral superiority of Chinese socialism over that of the USSR.

As such, seen from the 1980s Chinese criticisms of Soviet foreign policy, Chinese Soviet-watchers not only attempted to learn from the negative lessons of Moscow, as secondary sources have previously claimed. Most importantly, those scholars also endeavoured to propagandize and justify PRC’s post-Mao domestic and international
agendas through their subject study.

Last, the chapter will examine China’s evolving perceptions of Gorbachev’s foreign policy that was defined by his concept of New Thinking from the mid-1980s onward. As noted in the Introduction, the existing secondary literature on Chinese Sovietology indicates that Chinese scholars began making positive comments about Gorbachev immediately after he assumed power in 1985, but that soon after the Tiananmen Incident in 1989 they had become completely hostile to the last Soviet leader. This chapter, however, is going to show that most Chinese commentators on the USSR took a dim view of Gorbachev upon his assumption of the leadership in 1985. Only around one year after Gorbachev was in power did Chinese scholars start to review his policy more positively. The shift is owing not only to the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations since the late 1980s, but also the relatively open political environment under the leadership of Premier Zhao Ziyang. Since then, many authors praised Gorbachev’s New Thinking as a return to what they saw as true Leninism, and predicted that it would make a significant contribution to the communist world.

The chapter will also argue that there was no sign of massive criticisms of Gorbachev in Chinese writings in and after the 1989 Tiananmen uprising. Instead, Chinese scholars still seemed to admire, and produce positive evaluations of, the Soviet leader during this anti-liberal period in contemporary China. There are many reasons for this. The most important is that after the end of the Cold War, the CCP regime perceived the West as a much greater danger to the survival of the regime than the USSR. It saw the Soviet Union led by Gorbachev as a much-needed partner with which China could confront Western
power politics.

**Analyses of Soviet hegemonism**

After the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan in 1979, not only did the Kremlin become a global political target, but the event also became a source of escalated tension between Beijing and Moscow – and this at a time when bilateral relations had been handicapped by conflicts since the 1960s. Deng Xiaoping, who was the vice-chairman of the Military Commission and already the preeminent leader of China after the passing of the Mao era, understood the gravity of the Soviet military threat to Chinese security. In a CCP Central Committee meeting in 1980, he claimed that “opposing hegemonism will be on our daily agenda,” and “the struggle against hegemonism is a grave task constantly confronting our country.”  232 Deng also realized that, by siding with the world to resist Soviet hegemonism, China would be able to re-embrace the global community after the long isolation under Mao. The situation was no doubt beneficial to his reform and open door policies. As he stated in the meeting, the event had “provided us with rather favourable international conditions for our four modernizations,” and “expanded the ranks of the international forces ranged against hegemonism.”  233

Deng Xiaoping once defined “hegemonism” (baquan zhuyi) as denoting the situation when a country “becomes arrogant” and “acts like an overlord and gives orders to the

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233 Ibid., 248.
world.” 234 David Shambaugh in his book on Chinese scholarly perceptions of America has devoted several pages to ascertaining the Chinese concept of hegemony. A Chinese scholar at Renmin University defined the term in the following words during an interview he gave to the author:

When we use this term in China, we mean big countries that try to control or interfere in smaller countries. Many scholars mix up imperialism and hegemony. We do not know if it is a system or a policy. Before the 1980s we thought it was a system, like Soviet social-imperialism. We now define hegemony as a policy. For example, in the past when we called the United States imperialist we meant the system; today we use hegemony to describe its foreign policy. 235

Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, accusations of so-called Soviet hegemonism had carried weight within Soviet studies in China. In the first issue of *Xiandai guoji guanxi* (Contemporary International Relations) in 1981, the editorial board stated clearly that the journal was committed to “opposing hegemony, safeguarding world peace, and striving for a favourable international environment.” 236 In June of the year, IREECAS expressed its founding mission in a proposal submitted to the leadership of CASS. One of its agendas was “serving the global struggle against hegemonism and achieving our socialist modernization.” 237 Even other institutes within CASS, such as the Institute of West Asian Studies and Institute of African Studies, all indicated in their founding reports that, *inter alia*, the guiding principles of their research would be

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235 Shambaugh, *Beautiful Imperialist*, 79.
236 Zhubian [Editor in Chief], “Bianhou” [Postscript from the Editorial Board], *Xiandai guoji guanxi*, no. 1 (1981): 64.
“studying the implications of Soviet hegemony for those regions.” 238 Meanwhile, in the first issue of MSUEE, IREECAS Vice-Director Liu Keming criticized the Soviet leadership for causing the first socialist country to degenerate into “a social imperialist state,” and making the USSR become “the principal source of turmoil in the international society.” 239 The author argued:

In order to safeguard world peace, it is essential to do research on policies, theories, and origins of Soviet hegemonism, reveal the true face of it, and make people realize its nature and danger. This is an important mission of our studies of Soviet problems. 240

The application of the term hegemonism throughout the history of the PRC has been quite evolutionary. In the early days of the regime, the use of the term was in the context of confrontations between the “two camps” during the Cold War. It was limited to describing the capitalist US and its allies only. 241 During the early days of Sino-Soviet discord in the late 1950s, China started to criticize Moscow’s policy of peaceful coexistence with the West and its intention to control Beijing via the construction of long-wave stations in Chinese territory. 242 In the early 1960s, when Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated, the PRC intensified its attack on the USSR, accusing Moscow of promoting its own values and institutions abroad in a way that resembled 19th century

238 Ibid., 51.
240 Ibid., 1.
According to Shambaugh, the changing point occurred in 1968, when the term “hegemonism” was employed by the Chinese to denounce Soviet aggression of Czechoslovakia and the “Brezhnev Doctrine.” This is because the Brezhnev statement justifying the Soviet invasion had provided a basis for possible future intervention in other socialist states. China immediately felt the danger of such logic and responded vociferously to Moscow. The occasion stood as the major component in the escalation of Sino-Soviet tensions and the Kremlin was thereafter equated with hegemonism in China. By the early 1970s, Chinese scholars had begun to fuse “social-imperialism” together with “hegemonism” when referring to the Soviet Union, which was being described as “socialist in word, imperialist in deed.” In their point of view, “Imperialism refers to capitalist countries while hegemonism refers to countries regardless of system.”

It should be noted that under Mao, the Chinese definitions of both “imperialism” and “hegemonism” were highly emotionally charged rhetorical notions intended for ideological polemics that undercut adversaries’ positions – rather than rigorous concepts. The label of hegemonism pegged by the Chinese was an indication of the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations, and of Mao’s intention to challenge Moscow’s leadership and authority in the communist world once Stalin had departed. After this point, China no

244 Shambaugh, Beautiful Imperialist, 78.
246 Shambaugh, Beautiful Imperialist, 78-79.
longer recognized the USSR as a socialist state and started to identify Moscow as equal to the imperial West.

After the passing of Mao, many Chinese scholars were still locked in Maoist rhetoric in the early 1980s. In 1981, CASS Vice-President Qian Junrui demanded that Chinese scholars use “Mao Zedong Thought” to “guide our research on the present questions of international relations.” He emphasized that Mao’s “Three Worlds” concept was still “our theoretical basis and strategic framework,” which guided “the country’s cooperation with the Third and Second World, and resistance to the superpowers and Soviet hegemonism in particular.”

To take an example, the prestigious IREECAS scholar Xu Kui used the words “hegemonism,” “global expansionism,” and “socialist imperialism” more than ten times to depict Soviet activities in the world in his 1981 five-page article.

Chinese scholars may define hegemonism by the West as the oppressiveness of capitalism and colonization. In the case of the Soviet Union, they used the term to refer not only to the Soviet Union’s violation of others’ sovereignties, but also Moscow’s poking its nose into other countries’ affairs, as well as its unequal treatment of the socialist member states by subjecting them to the Soviet model. It was a term used by the Chinese to target Moscow’s paternalism or paternalistic vision in the socialist camp of

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249 For a case study on the perceptions of contemporary Chinese scholars on Western imperialism, see Shambaugh, Beautiful Imperialist.
which China was a member. Up to the early 1980s, using the language of hegemonism to portray the Soviets in the PRC reflected China’s ambition of competing with the Kremlin for leadership in the Third World and the socialist camp. The term, as used by the Chinese, attempted to emphasize that China was a true socialist country while the USSR was not, and to emphasize that the faults of Sino-Soviet conflicts were on the side of the aggressive Moscow.

Chinese criticism of Soviet hegemonism is not only the legacy of the Mao era. The Chinese have long had vivid memories of Tsarist Russia as one of the Western intruders who conspired to take over China over the centuries. In their research on the history of Russian invasions of China and its killing of Chinese inhabitants during the Boxer Uprising and Russo-Japanese War in the early 20th century, Chinese scholars in the early 1980s always equated Tsarist behaviours with contemporary Soviet chauvinism. In the eyes of the Chinese, Moscow’s present search for global supremacy was no more than a Tsarist tradition, “disguised by the cover of ‘socialism’.” Moreover, some Chinese scholars in the early 1980s tended to fault the present Soviet regime for being reluctant to abrogate the unequal treaties that the Tsarist government had signed with imperial China. In their writings, they demanded the return of the lost territories that had resulted from those treaties.

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252 Zhou Weiyuan and Shi Yikui, “Beijiaerhu yidong diqude lishi zhenxiang” [The Historical Truth of the
in this way, these scholars hoped to mobilize support for China’s stand in the Sino-Soviet border negotiation taking place then.\textsuperscript{253}

Moreover, at the time the Sino-Soviet relations were still in a stalemate, aggravated by the long-time shadow of Tsarist intrusions and Sino-Soviet conflicts since the 1960s. It is thus no surprise that the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, a country neighbouring China, would produce a grave perceived threat to the PRC in the early 1980s. In January 1980, an anonymous commentary with a sinister tone appeared in \textit{Renmin ribao}:

\begin{quote}
Once the Soviet Union has pushed its military force into the Persian Gulf and Indian subcontinent, it sends a dangerous signal. It shows that the USSR will continue its attack on Iran, Pakistan, and other countries. People should not assume that Moscow would target Afghanistan only. There is an urgent question before us: which country will become the next Afghanistan?\textsuperscript{254}
\end{quote}

Chinese scholars not only were critical of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, but also felt suspicious of Moscow’s desire in advancing on China. IREECAS scholar Yu Sui warned, “Both the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and its support of Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia would pose a grievous threat to the security of Asia and China.” \textsuperscript{255}

Xing Shugang, an IREECAS specialist in Soviet foreign relations, pointed out that “Soviet troops stationing in Asia is nothing other than encircling the PRC, sowing discord between China and its neighbouring countries, and obstructing the progress of China’s

\textsuperscript{253} On the Sino-Soviet border talk in the early 1980s, see Li Huichuan, “Zhongsu bianjie tanpande zhengjie hezai?,” \textit{Renmin ribao}, June 17, 1981.

\textsuperscript{254} “Zhide zhuyide dongxiang,” [We Need to Pay Attention to the Situation] \textit{Renmin ribao}, January 5, 1980.

modernization.” It seems that Chinese accusations of Soviet hegemony were not merely politically motivated. The Chinese did not want to see Moscow’s expansionism becoming rampant in the world, as China would likely suffer from this situation. Chinese denunciation of Soviet hegemonism indicated not only China’s long memories of Russian humiliation, but also its feeling of being uncomfortable and insecure when Moscow extended its large military presence on the Chinese border.

In reality, Chinese perceptions of Soviet hegemonism were quite evolutionary throughout the 1980s. In the early days of the decade, compared to the US, the USSR was described by a scholar as being “the most ferocious hegemonist.” Beijing Review once stated that “the US is on the defensive in their contention, therefore, the major threat to world peace today comes from the Soviet Union.”

After Gorbachev took charge in 1985, the negative view of Chinese scholars gradually abated while the positive assessment became more prominent. In his 1987 article Xing Shugang argued that China should not condemn the Soviet Union as being non-socialist merely because of its display of erroneous hegemonist tendencies before. He remarked that hegemonism was only “a policy of Moscow” but it was “the nature of imperialist and capitalist states,” and predicted that “hegemonism would by no means forever exist in Soviet foreign policy formulating.” In 1988, Gu Guanfu, a professor at

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259 Xing Shugang, “Guanyu sulian duiwai zhengce xingzhide tantao” [Discussion on the Nature of Soviet
the China Foreign Affairs University, even suggested that Soviet foreign policy should not be described as being purely hegemonic after the 1970s, as “it has contributed to national liberation and anti-colonization movements in the Third World to some extent,” and it was different from “hegemonism of the imperial West.” In light of Deng Xiaoping’s remark in 1978 (that socialism is incompatible with hegemonism) the change of Chinese perceptions from the mid-1980s onward indicated not only the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations, but also China’s recognition of the USSR as a true socialist country.

As demonstrated above, from the mid-1980s Chinese scholars no longer viewed hegemonism as the inherent nature of the Soviet system; rather, hegemonism was perceived as only a temporary policy of the Kremlin. As long as Moscow reversed such policies, China would drop the denigrated term accordingly. Indeed, the Chinese label of hegemonism in describing the Soviet Union was mostly related to China’s security concern of the three obstacles (the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, its large troop deployment along the border with China, and Moscow’s support of the Vietnamese military intervention in Cambodia) in preventing the Sino-Soviet rapprochement in the 1980s. Once those obstacles were removed and Sino-Soviet normalization finally came in 1989, the term “Soviet hegemonism” gradually faded from Chinese writings.

Moreover, China under Deng Xiaoping adopted a pragmatic approach in domestic

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and foreign policies: it would no longer engage in Maoist radicalism. During the 1989 Sino-Soviet summit, Deng frankly told Gorbachev that he personally hated the senseless polemic exchanges between both sides under Mao. Deng might not want to see Soviet hegemonism rippling across the world, but what he needed most was a peaceful international environment conducive to China’s modernization. Once the bilateral relations improved and the demise of the Soviet Union became reality, language surrounding Soviet hegemonism thus ground to a halt and the coinage was no longer valid in Chinese vocabulary.

In the 1990s, when the USSR had ceased to exist, the PRC no longer pegged the Soviets as hegemonists. Instead, owing to the Western sanction after the Tiananmen Incident, “hegemonism” or “power politics” (qiangquan zhengzhi) became synonymous with the West (particularly the US). Chinese officials used these terms to describe those countries that invoked the banners of human right and democracy to force their values and political systems on the Third World – the so-called “peaceful evolution.”

Treatment of Soviet relations with Yugoslavia and the Third World

With regard to Soviet foreign relations with other countries in the 1980s, the analysis

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of Chinese scholars corresponded closely with the tone of post-Mao China’s state policies. They attempted to respond to and legitimize China’s official agendas through their research. There is one particularly significant example of the Chinese treatment of the Soviet-Yugoslavian relations.

Although Mao Zedong once branded Yugoslavia as “revisionist,” a derogatory term used to stigmatize any socialist countries opting for capitalist reforms, in the 1980s Yugoslavia became the centre of attention in the PRC. Under Deng Xiaoping, China’s foreign policy resembled Yugoslavia’s stance of being non-aligned and non-confrontational. Chinese leaders greatly admired Belgrade’s spirit in defiance of what was seen as Moscow’s overlordship, evidenced by Party Secretary General Hu Yaobang’s 1983 high appraisal of “Josip Tito’s principles of independence and equality among all communist parties, and of opposing imperialism, colonialism, and hegemonism.”

Several articles by Chinese scholars in the 1980s shared the official claims to promote the case of Yugoslavia in their research. Jiang Qi, a professor of international relations at East China Normal University, regarded Moscow’s expelling Belgrade from the socialist camp in 1948 as owing to the latter’s uncompromising attitude. He remarked, “It was the origin of anti-hegemony struggle in Eastern Europe.” Cai Kang, another

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266 “Jiaqiang youhao hezuo zengjing gming youyi,” [Strengthening Close Cooperation and Promoting Revolutionary Friendship] _Renmin ribao_, August 19, 1984. The Editorial stated that both “China and Yugoslavia are pursuing independent and self-reliant foreign policies, and regarding world peace and human progress as major goals of our common international agendas.”
268 Jiang Qi, “Sudong guanxide yanbian” [The Evolution of Soviet-East European Relations], _Jinri sulian_
scholar at East China Normal University, wrote, “The non-aligned policy has evolved from a strategy of Yugoslavia to an international movement,” and “it has broken through the shadow of Soviet-type foreign policy model first time in socialist history.”  

Apart from its non-aligned foreign policy, Yugoslavia’s economic model (which had shaken the dominant position of Soviet-style socialism) also became an important reason to gather the Chinese support of Belgrade’s struggle against the Soviet rivalry. When ailing President Josip Tito’s health condition deteriorated, the event became a paramount concern of *Renmin ribao* in the first half of 1980. At the time, the official organ of the CCP carried day-to-day reports from Belgrade, wishing for Tito’s recovery and glorifying his contributions. After Tito’s death, during the memorial ceremony held in the Yugoslavian Embassy in Beijing, the first CASS President and CCP ideologue Hu Qiaomu paid the following tribute to Tito and Yugoslavian inspiration:

> Comrade Tito’s greatest contribution to the contemporary communist movement was that he and his close comrades-in-arms were the first ones to recognize that socialism should not be confined to one model. He initiated a new way of building socialism suited to the concrete conditions of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia, under the leadership of President Tito, had boldly begun exploring the ways of socialist construction in the early 1950s. It did not follow the over-centralized economic pattern introduced by the Soviet Union. Led by Tito, the Yugoslav people have broken away from the conventional Soviet methods which were formerly considered inviolable, and have blazed a new trail to develop a socialist economy. The Yugoslavian example provided valuable experience for other countries to choose their own road of socialist construction according to their specific conditions.²⁷⁰

In the mid-1980s, Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang expressed his gratefulness to the

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²⁷⁰ “Tietuo zuixian renshi shehui zhuyi buying yige moshi,” [It Was Tito Who Was the First One to Realize that There Should Not Be One Model of Socialism] *Renmin ribao*, May 7, 1980.
Yugoslavian hosts, for “their experience of building socialism has greatly encouraged the Chinese people to draft our own reform programs.”  

In the contemporary international socialist development, Yugoslavia’s socialist path is the most remarkable. Not only because it has turned itself from one of the most backward European nations to a moderately developed country, but also because it has contributed immeasurable theories of practicing scientific socialism to the world. The Yugoslavian experience of socialism has never been an easy journey, its lessons are worthy of study and attention.

In the wake of the Maoist decades, China found that the Soviet model disguised by Maoism had turned China poor and backward. China under Deng was eager to find a new way to make China a prosperous and strong socialist country. Yugoslavia’s reform experience initiated by Tito, which included the mixing of central planning and market mechanism, and took a distinctive approach to socialism by disregarding the orthodox Soviet methods, struck a chord with the Chinese. Such a distinctive model is exactly the direction of post-Mao China’s reforms. Many academic articles throughout the 1980s expressed their approval of Yugoslavian socialism in preference to the dogmatic Soviet orthodoxy, and showed a strong desire to learn from Belgrade.

Even in the wake of Yugoslavia’s falling apart in the 1990s, Chinese Sovietologists

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still attributed the Soviet-Yugoslavian rift after World War Two to the Kremlin, and put the blame squarely on Moscow’s chauvinism and intolerance of Belgrade using its own method to construct socialism. In 1996, four years after China had joined the Non-Aligned Movement as an observer, Li Xing and Zhou Xuemei (both were scholars at Beijing University) argued that the 1948 Soviet-Yugoslavian confrontations had inspired many subsequent dissent movements in the socialist camp, such as the 1968 Prague Spring and the 1980 Polish Solidarity uprising. They remarked that “the Yugoslavian model had shaken the dominant position of Soviet socialism and inaugurated the diversification of socialist models in the world.”

As such, Chinese scholars’ open advocacy of Yugoslavia’s position in its conflicts with Moscow was due to not only China’s similar stance in non-aligned policy and anti-Soviet hegemony, but also to China’s receptivity to Yugoslavia’s unique reform experience. After the PRC became economically successful in the 1980s, Chinese scholars would sometimes speak of Yugoslavia as a sort of maverick, as a countervailing weight to the Soviet brand of socialism. This in turn would validate the exception of the Chinese way of practicing socialism. The treatment of Yugoslavia, in particular, reflects the increasing confidence of Chinese scholars. They were arguing that Moscow should

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274 Li Xing and Zhou Xuemei, “Lunsulian moshiyu sudong guanxi” [On the Soviet Model and Soviet-East European Relations], \(E\)luosi d\(o\)ng\(q\)\(u\) zh\(o\)ng\(y\)a yan\(ji\)u, no. 2 (1996): 63-64. Shen Zhihua, “Lunyijiu sibanian sunan chongtude jieguo” [Consequence of the 1948 Soviet-Yugoslavian Conflicts], Shiji\(e\) li\(sh\)\(i\)\(,\) no. 5 (1999): 14-18.


276 Li Xing and Zhou Xuemei, “Lunsulian moshiyu sudong guanxi” [On the Soviet Model and Soviet-East European Relations], 63-64.
accept a less centralized and more diverse socialist world.\textsuperscript{277} Chinese scholars’ clear-cut stand on supporting the post-Mao CCP policy of integrating Marxism with China’s concrete circumstances, and heralding the vision of the rise of Chinese-style socialism, could be reflected in their analysis of Soviet-Yugoslavian troubled relations.

Having said this, it should be noted that China was extolling Yugoslavia mainly because it was disobedient to Moscow and committed to building a version of socialism that was independent of the Soviet model. It does not mean that Chinese scholars would be supporting any deviation from orthodox socialism. As we will see in the next chapter, Chinese writings were critical of what they saw as Gorbachev’s betrayal of socialism and submission to the West since the late 1980s. In reality, China’s endorsement of the Yugoslavian example is a sign of China’s determination to reform socialism – but not to renounce it.

In the 1980s China did not fail to notice the rise of the Third World, which would play a crucial role in international relations and become a partner with China to contain the superpowers – at least in the CCP’s strategic worldview. During his 1982 talk with Javier Perez de Cuellar, secretary-general of the United Nation, Deng Xiaoping remarked that the international influence of the Third World “has increased considerably,” and “cannot be overlooked.” He stated that the foundation of China’s foreign policy was “opposing hegemonism and safeguarding world peace,” which was also “the position and immediate interests of the Third World.” Therefore, it would be essential for China and

\textsuperscript{277} The Soviet Union in the early 1980s was still unwilling to recognize that China’s post-Mao reforms are genuinely socialist in nature. See Marsh, \textit{Unparalleled Reforms}, 131-32.
the region to “strengthen unity and cooperation.” 278 Concomitant with this strategic perspective, Chinese scholars attempted to use post-Mao China’s Third World policy as their theoretical framework for analysis. Quoting from IREECAS scholar Zhang Jinglin:

The foundation of our foreign policy is unifying the Third World, allying with the peoples who cherish peace and justice and oppose hegemonism. Our scholars should comprehend and resolutely carry out those policies as a whole and undertake the battle against superpowers’ hegemony in a more effective way. 279

As will be discussed, Chinese scholars in the 1980s seemed to view Soviet relations with the Third World through the prism of Sino-Soviet friction. Their arguments on the subject look more like explaining and demonstrating China’s different treatment of the Third World, rather than genuine research of the Soviet policy in the region. In their articles, Chinese scholars strenuously promoted and defended the case of the Third World. Their arguments indirectly symbolized China’s stance in challenging the Soviet authority, appealed for the redress of past historical wrongdoings on China done by Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union, and promoted the moral superiority of Chinese socialism over that of the USSR.

During Mao’s later period, China did not receive much goodwill from the Third World, mainly owing to Mao’s excessive obsession with bringing Chinese-based socialism to the poor nations. Such a strategy of exporting revolutions had caused resentment in numerous countries, particularly those in Southeast Asia, where it led to a

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widespread anti-China sentiment.\footnote{Paul Bolt, \textit{China and Southeast Asia's Ethnic Chinese: State and Diaspora in Contemporary Asia} (Westport: Praeger, 2000), 43-47.} With the onset of the Cultural Revolution, the foreign policy of China had become heavily ideology-driven. Before Mao’s death in 1976, the PRC was crippled not only by economic stagnation but also international isolation. In the wake of Maoist decades, the new leader Deng Xiaoping expected PRC foreign policy to detach from the radical determinant of Maoism and return to the realities of modern international politics.\footnote{Deng, “The Present Situation and the Tasks Before Us,” January 16, 1980, in Deng, \textit{Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping}, 2: 248-49.} The post-Mao leadership envisioned that China would become a progressive anti-colonial Asian power symbolized by its break with the Kremlin and the Maoist burden, and a true friend of the underdeveloped world.\footnote{This point is illustrated by the following source: “China’s Role in a Multipolar World,” \textit{Beijing Review}, January 7, 1985, 42.}

In tune with the official view, some Chinese scholars portrayed Moscow as having taken advantage of numerous turbulences to interfere in the Third World, subjecting others to its beck and call.\footnote{Xing Shugang, “Guanyu sulian quanqiu kuozhang zhanluede jige wenti” [Several Questions on Soviet Global Expansionism], 8-9. Zhang Zhen, “Luelun suliande ‘huanhe zhengce’” [On the Soviet ‘Détente Policy’], \textit{Guoji wenti yanjiu}, no. 4 (1982): 19. Xie Xiang, “Bashi niandai sulian yatai zhanluede zhuanbian” [The Changes of Soviet Asia-Pacific Policy in the 1980s], \textit{Sulian dongou wenti}, no. 5 (1987): 45.} These articles tend to exaggerate the gravity of Soviet hostility and Moscow’s ability to dominate the world, although such radical views had trailed off after Gorbachev’s accession. Most of the writings presented above seem to conclude that the Soviet Union had achieved complete failure in its relations with the underdeveloped countries, become the only troublemaker and common enemy of the world, and ended up in having no friend in the global society.

Meanwhile, Chinese official organs attempted to foster a new image of China. They
posited that the country was far from being isolated in the international community after the death of Mao; rather, it had joined the whole world to contain the advance of the superpowers.  

In 1981, Foreign Minister Huang Hua suggested to his Canadian colleague Mark MacGuigan, that China and the West should establish close ties on the basis of containing Soviet aggressive behaviour in the Third World. On another occasion, he remarked that by carrying the banner of anti-hegemony, China would be able to increase its influence in the Third World, which would be conducive to its global status and open door policy.

In 1982, scholar Zhang Jinglin claimed that, along with a broad base of the Third World countries, “An international anti-Soviet camp consisting of China and the West has developed rapidly.” Two years later, both Li Jingjie (an IREECAS researcher) and Zhou Jirong (a professor of political science at Beijing University) agreed that after becoming stabilized and strong, China would play a larger role in international affairs, namely by halting the war and safeguarding peace. These authors seemingly made use of their subject study to argue that China after Mao was far from being separated from the world. Instead, China under Deng was re-engaging the world and earning respect from

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international society by joining the global campaign against the Soviet advance. As a result of such sharp Chinese denunciations of Moscow’s expansionism, the West became eager for Chinese cooperation and sought to aid Chinese reforms, in order to ally with China in resisting the USSR. 289

There are three other reasons for why Chinese scholars had a strong bias toward the Third World and sympathized with those countries involved when it came to Soviet-Third World relations. The first one may be historical. In the eyes of the CCP, both China and other underdeveloped countries shared the common experience of falling prey to imperialist encroachment in the past, 290 and China, in particular, had been invaded by Tsars since the early modern period and treated unfairly by the Soviet regime after 1949. 291 This historical background of complicated Sino-Soviet Russian relations was deeply rooted in the collective Chinese mind, and inevitably affected the writings of Chinese scholars. 292 Several articles in the 1980s evidenced a strong grudge against the unequal relations between Moscow and the Third World. They condemned the forced Soviet model of socialism as a kind of neo-colonization, which did not benefit the Third

290 The point is illustrated by “Disan shijie deixueqi shidangdai toudeng dashi,” [The Rise of the Third World is the Most Significant Issue in Contemporary Time] Renmin ribao, April 1, 1983. The commentary called upon China to side with the Third World for fighting with the “power politics,” because of the “common history of having been oppressed and enslaved.”
292 For how the loss of territories to Tsarist Russia and the atrocities committed by the Soviet army in Northeast China toward the end of World War Two had traumatized PRC intellectuals after 1949, see Yan Li, “In Search of a Socialist Modernity: The Chinese Introduction of Soviet Culture” [PhD dissertation, Northeastern University, 2012], 37.
World, but instead made them backward and isolated.293

Moreover, in the early 1980s some Chinese writings voiced their criticisms of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as being contradictory to Lenin’s principle of internationalism.294 On the other hand, they portrayed China as having wholeheartedly supported the Afghan resistance and the emancipation of other Third World nations, while never meddling in their affairs. According to those writings, China was the true disciple of Lenin’s teachings, while Moscow’s behaviour was incompatible with Leninist internationalism.295 This picture of the PRC as enlightened and committed to fulfilling its internationalist responsibility to the Third World is not a contemporary invention. Mao Zedong once put forth that CCP members should “build China into a great and powerful socialist country, and help the broad masses of the oppressed and exploited throughout the world in fulfilment of our great internationalist duty.” 296 In the 1980s, Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang said that the aid work to the Third World was China’s “compelling

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internationalist obligation.” 297 As Liu Fengming (a professor of international law at Wuhan University) summarized in 1983:

Our foreign policy is proletarian internationalism as well as the socialist foreign policy with Chinese characteristics. The starting point of our independent foreign policy is in the fundamental interests of the Chinese people and the peoples around the world. It is the combination of patriotism and internationalism. It is for safeguarding world peace. As a member of the Third World, China will unswervingly safeguard the unity and right of the region, and regard financially supporting those countries as our major international responsibility.298

Thus, we can see that post-Mao China was aspiring to gain the upper hand over the Soviet Union in the name of the struggle against hegemonism, and more importantly, in the fight for moral leadership over the Third World. By using Lenin’s internationalism to accuse Moscow of being chauvinistic, self-serving, and exploitative in its relations with the underdeveloped countries, Chinese scholars instead would project a fair, humble, and benevolent image of Beijing, enabling it to assume the moral high ground vis-à-vis Moscow.

Last, from the early 1980s onward the post-Mao reforms led to substantial expansion of Chinese national power and a notable growth in its international prestige and influence, while the Soviet Union was in the grip of economic difficulties. Chinese scholars shared a growing pride in what China had accomplished so far vis-à-vis what they saw as the demoralized USSR. Yang Zhangming, a professor at Tongji University in Shanghai, said that many Third World states had been influenced by China and Yugoslavia to develop

socialism according to their own conditions, while distancing themselves from “some socialist states that would offer aid, but with aid, came interference.” 299 Du Xiaoqiang, a scholar at Qinghua University, suggested that after China’s success in reforms, its distinctive style of socialism might “weaken the impact of the Soviet model on the Third World.” 300

Deng Xiaoping remarked in April 1987 that when China fully developed it should not only “have blazed a new path for the peoples of the Third World,” but also “have demonstrated to mankind that socialism is the only path and that it is superior to capitalism.” 301 The Chinese regime at this stage lost no time in seizing the opportunity to portray China as the beacon of the Third World, by professing its respect to other countries’ sovereignties and institutions, publicizing its divergence with the Kremlin, and promoting the friendship and brotherhood between China and the developing nations. This was done in the hope that Chinese-style socialism would have greater appeal than the Soviet model, and take root in not only the poor countries but the wider global society as well.

**Changing views on Gorbachev’s new thinking**

Since the middle of the 1980s, Sino-Soviet relations gradually improved. The sign of rapprochement had appeared even before the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev. In December
1984, during the visit of the first Vice-Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Ivan Arkhipov, for the first time in 25 years Chinese media publicly conveyed warmth in its official relations with the Soviet Union. Chinese officials signed agreements calling for a substantial increase in trade and scientific exchanges, spoke optimistically about the future of bilateral relations, and expressed gratitude for the assistance given by Moscow in the 1950s.\(^{302}\) Once Gorbachev succeeded the deceased leader Konstantin Chernenko, the new Soviet boss stated that the USSR would like to restore the friendly relations with the PRC based on the principle of peaceful co-existence.\(^{303}\) CCP Secretary General Hu Yaobang wasted no time in reciprocating by replying that China also wished to “restore the neighbourly relations with Moscow.”\(^{304}\)

Under the background of Sino-Soviet rapprochement, in a meeting for celebrating the 20-year founding anniversary of IREECAS in May 1985, Huan Xiang, CASS vice-president, asked the IREECAS scholars to increase research on Soviet foreign policy since Gorbachev took power, and Sino-Soviet relations within the new Soviet foreign agenda.\(^{305}\) After that, the foreign policy of Gorbachev became a popular subject of study for Chinese scholars.

Gilbert Rozman on several occasions indicates that Chinese scholars began making

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positive comments about Gorbachev immediately after he assumed power in 1985,\textsuperscript{306} but that soon after the Tiananmen Incident in 1989 they had become completely hostile to the last Soviet leader.\textsuperscript{307} This argument may contain a kernel of truth in the case of Chinese perceptions of Gorbachev’s political reform, which will be examined in Part Two of the thesis. On the other hand, from the ascension of Gorbachev in 1985 to the aftermath of the Soviet demise, Chinese analyses of Gorbachev’s foreign strategy were somewhat different.

As we will see, after Gorbachev’s ascension to power in March 1985, Chinese scholars generally expressed reservations about his new foreign direction. However, after 1987 they became quite positive to the foreign agenda of the new Soviet leader. The researcher’s reading shows that in and after 1989, Chinese scholarly writings still spoke highly of the Soviet leader. Only around 1990/1991 did Chinese scholars slowly turn hostile to Gorbachev and his foreign policy characterized as the “New Thinking.”\textsuperscript{308} Views changed not only in response to the ups-and-downs of Sino-Soviet relations and China’s domestic political climate, but also in response to the political developments in


\textsuperscript{308}According to Gorbachev, the New Thinking symbolizes his new initiatives in domestic as well as international politics; see Mikhail Gorbachev, \textit{On My Country and the World}, trans. George Shriver (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 187-93. However, Chinese Sovietologists mainly use the New Thinking as a term to define Gorbachev’s foreign policy; see Zhao Yuliang, “Duishehui zhuyi jingxing quanman dezai renshi” [The Renewed Comprehension of Socialism], \textit{Shijie jingjiyu zhengzhi}, no. 1 (1989): 36. The author defined the New Thinking as “being originated from new thoughts on relations between the USSR and the world. Under its guidance, the USSR has reflected on its past hegemonism, and as a result, it makes fundamental adjustments to its foreign policy. Such adjustments will greatly change the nature of the international society.”
Moscow.

From Gorbachev’s assuming power in early 1985 to 1987, many Chinese commentators in MSUEE remained suspicious of the Soviet leader and felt uncertain about his future manoeuvres and agendas. Some authors depicted Gorbachev as having a practical consideration in designing his new schemes, such as creating a good international environment to facilitate his domestic reform, attracting potential foreign investment to the Soviet economy, and counterbalancing US advances while increasing Soviet influence in the world. As Li Jingjie commented:

Soviet foreign policy after Gorbachev took power will still target on increasing the country’s economic and military strengths, and maintaining its superpower status. For a long time to come, the new Soviet leader conceivably will pay more attention to economic construction and create a peaceful international environment for domestic reform. But as a whole, the image of the USSR will remain the same in the global society. Its foreign policy is not going to have much difference.\textsuperscript{309}

According to the IREECAS researcher Huang Tianying, Soviet Third World policy after Gorbachev took power was little different from that of his predecessors. Moscow’s aim was still “focusing on the grand vision of competing with Washington.”\textsuperscript{310} He argued that although Gorbachev had announced that the Soviet Union would no longer force other countries to practice socialism (the so-called “Directing Socialism” or \textit{yishehui zhuyiwei fangxiang}), the underlying cause of this compromise was not a change in attitudes, but because “Moscow’s own financial problems have made it realize that pouring money into the Third World for constructing socialist system there is not


feasible.”

The author summarized the motives of Gorbachev’s revision on foreign policy in the following words:

The readjustments are in form not in substance. The changes are designed for giving Moscow time and space to consolidate its strength for future competition with Washington. Moscow will nonetheless continue to employ such policy in certain countries, which are deemed to be strategically crucial to the Soviet Union and its competition with the West.

In terms of Gorbachev’s new orientation in the socialist camp, like Huang Tianying’s analysis, Zhu Ruizhen and Shan Lingkui (both were IREECAS researchers) did not regard the readjustments put forward by Gorbachev as genuine efforts to improve the conditions of the world. They argued that Gorbachev’s proposal at the CPSU 27th Congress, which involved recognition of the equality and diversity among the socialist states, was no more than “a strategy of strengthening the unity of the Soviet bloc and roping China in Moscow’s sphere, for contending with the West.” According to the authors, considerations of domestic economic reform reigned supreme in Gorbachev’s mind, as “both the recent success of economic reforms in Eastern Europe and China have challenged the authority of the USSR in the socialist world.”

At the same time, the writings in MSUEE found echoes in scholarly interpretations within other Chinese academic journals. Dong Bainan, a researcher at the Shanghai Institute of International Affairs, remarked that Gorbachev’s new détente with the

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312 Ibid., 34-35. For Gorbachev’s foreign policy announced at the 27th CPSU Congress, see Mikhail Gorbachev, Speeches and Writings (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1987), 1: 3.
capitalist world was “wooing Western Europe and Japan, in order to divide the West led by the US.” Both Jia Bei and Gu Guanfu (both were researchers at the China Institute of International Studies in Beijing) argued that there were certain flaws in Gorbachev’s New Thinking. First, the concept was still oriented toward the Soviet-American global contest and the mind-set of a bipolar world. Second, while on the surface the New Thinking seemed to reverse the past Brezhnev’s hegemonism, Gorbachev still avoided talking about some crucial issues related to Sino-Soviet relations, such as troop withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Soviet-supported Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. To quote from Gu Guanfu’s final conclusion:

Gorbachev’s foreign policy readjustments have no much difference with before and no feasibility at all. They are mere propaganda gambits. Gorbachev’s plan is still largely in word but not in deed. We receive the vibration of the sound, not the application of the principle.

The main reason for China’s lukewarm reactions to the New Thinking during the early days of the Gorbachev administration was the tense Sino-Soviet relations at that time, notably the unresolved question of the three obstacles plaguing the two countries. In 1985, the CCP regime expressed its concern regarding Gorbachev’s reluctance to resolve these unsettled problems after he assumed power. In 1986, Hu Yaobang complained to

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journalists that, “Sino-Soviet relations have not made any headway since Gorbachev assumed power.” 319 Five months later, Chinese Foreign Ministry made a public statement describing the Soviet partial troop pull-out from Afghanistan as being “void of practical significance.” It pointed out that “the Soviet action is designed to moderate the pressure from the international community only.” 320 At the same time, some Chinese Soviet-watchers also expressed their resentment against what they saw as Moscow’s insincere approach toward removing the three obstacles. They pointed out that this behaviour ran counter to the principle of New Thinking.321

After the end of 1987, owing to the gradual improvement of Sino-Soviet relations, Chinese Sovietology writings tended to display a more positive attitude to Gorbachev’s foreign policy. Since then, Chinese scholars started to view Gorbachev’s foreign agenda as a genuine gesture accorded with the interests of both the Soviets and the peoples of the world. The MSUEE editorial board published an article in the first issue of 1988, asking that Chinese academics should pay more attention to the new views of foreign policy thinking in the Soviet bloc:

Recently, some Soviet and East European leaders and scholars have put forward many new arguments on globalization, world economic integration, technological revolution, war and peace, etc. Gorbachev’s New Thinking is getting increasing attention from the international society. For deepening our understanding of the contemporary world, we should do more research on those theories and arguments on international affairs in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.\footnote{322}

In an article published at the end of 1987, Huang Tianying explicated that Gorbachev had started to understand that “cooperation but not competition” was the key for good relations between socialism and capitalism.\footnote{323} Regarding the policy on China, he said that the Kremlin would no longer regard any countries not belonging to the Soviet bloc as being necessarily non-socialist in nature. The new Soviet leadership now “genuinely recognizes that the PRC is a true socialist country.”\footnote{324} In 1988, a small seminar took place in IREECAS that was attended by several scholars, in order to discuss the New Thinking and exchange views on Soviet foreign relations after Gorbachev. During the meeting, Liu Ping, a professor at the Central Party School, argued that Gorbachev’s New Thinking was “by no means the duplication of Khrushchev’s peaceful co-existence in the 1960s.” IREECAS researcher Li Jingjie extravagantly praised the New Thinking as “the greatest theoretical breakthrough since Lenin.”\footnote{325}

In his 1988 article, Yan Zhu, a CASS scholar in Russian Literature, remarked that the New Thinking was the antidote to Soviet hegemonism. He said, unlike the previous

\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{322} Bianjibu [The Editorial Board], “Jingyibu jiaqiandui sulianhe dongou guojiaide yanjiu” [To Strengthen Research of the Soviet Union and East European States], Sulian dongou wenti, no. 1 (1988): 3.
\item \footnote{323} Huang Tianying, “Sulian ‘xinde zhengzhii siwei’ zaiwaijiao shijian zhongde yunyong ji qi cuizaiude kunnanyu wenti” [The Application and Problems of Soviet ‘New Political Thinking’ in Foreign Policy], Sulian dongou wenti, no. 6 (1987): 10.
\item \footnote{324} Ibid., 13.
\end{itemize}
Part One—Chapter 3

Kremlin leaders, “Gorbachev always stays true to his principle.” 326 According to Wang Yushu, a professor at the Jilin Provincial Party School, Gorbachev had renounced the flawed Brezhnev Doctrine, which included such components as “common law” and “proletarian internationalism,” and acknowledged Stalin’s crimes and his improper methods for dealing with other socialist allies. In his opinion, “the Soviet leader starts to agree that Soviet socialism should not be the only model for emulation,” and “the international communist movement no longer has a ‘centre’ now, and there would be no leading communist party to shepherd socialism.” 327

Similar to the MSUEE articles, works in other Chinese academic journals in the late 1980s were in open espousal of Gorbachev’s New Thinking. Some writers pointed out that Gorbachev’s New Thinking was integral to Lenin’s principle of peaceful coexistence, 328 while others emphasized that Gorbachev’s conception had even corrected many deficiencies of the theories raised by Lenin, such as the inevitable decay of capitalism. 329 Qiu Gengtian, a professor at the Central Party School, drew parallels between Deng Xiaoping’s notion of “one country, two systems,” which had been used for resolving China’s territorial problems in Hong Kong and Macao, and Gorbachev’s New Thinking. The author attested that both concepts were “based on the principle of peaceful

co-existence between socialism and capitalism.” They “have no longer viewed the world in black and white, and have broken the traditional way of thinking and charted the way in a new epoch.”  

In his 1989 article, Dong Bainan delineated the evolution of Sino-Soviet relations in the second half of the 1980s. According to him, there were two stages of development since Gorbachev’s rise: the first was from March 1985 to 1986, when the Kremlin stubbornly refused to acknowledge the three obstacles, and Sino-Soviet relations were still in a stalemate. From 1987 and 1988, when Moscow began to discuss the issue of border demarcation with Beijing and withdraw troops from Afghanistan, to early 1989, there appeared a strong potential for settling the deadlock between the two countries. 

As we have seen in those articles presented above, evolving attitudes to Gorbachev and the New Thinking roughly correspond with the changing climate of Sino-Soviet relations described by Dong Bainan.

More to the point, Chinese growing interest in and positive assessment of Gorbachev’s New Thinking may have also been encouraged by the new spirit of post-Mao China, which calls for forsaking the past communist doctrines and promoting the renewed comprehension of Marxism. In late 1986, MSUEE carried an article that included a letter of Wu Xiuquan, the PRC’s first deputy foreign minister in charge of Soviet and East European affairs. Wu demanded that the current Chinese research on the

USSR and Eastern Europe uphold “the scientific attitude of seeking truth from facts,” and observe the lessons from the past by avoiding “the flaws of one-sidedness and oversimplification,” as well as “the black-and-white approach.”

In the subsequent landmark event of the 13th CCP Congress in October 1987, which called for moving the reforms forward at a faster pace, the new Party Secretary General Zhao Ziyang indicated in his keynote speech, that people should “discard some theses which are utopian and formulated by our predecessors within the limits of their historical conditions,” and “further develop the theory of scientific socialism on the basis of new practice.” Zhao also repeated the long-time CCP policy of “double hundred flowers,” in order to offer fresh encouragement for exploration of many long-ignored issues in socialism. His advocacy of the theory that China is only at the initial stage of socialism provided an impetus, recognizing that China borrows from theories and practices of other socialist countries which have many things in common. This call appealed to China’s Soviet-specialists to follow closely the Soviet changes and gave a big boost to far-

332 After Mao’s death, Deng Xiaoping raised the motto of “seeking truth from facts” to temper the rigid interpretation of Maoism and encourage and guide the people to liberate their minds, which would serve to legitimize his rule and open up new avenues for reform and open door policies. See Deng, “Mao Zedong’ Thought Must Be Correctly Understood as an Integral Whole,” July 21, 1977, in Deng, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 2: 58.


334 The Hundred Flowers Campaign launched by the CCP in 1956 was originally for promoting the flourishing of arts and sciences as well soliciting advice from the people on Party building. However, once the criticisms exceeded the boundary of Party toleration, Mao Zedong immediately ordered to crackdown those who dared to vent their resentment in the form of Anti-rightist Campaign in 1957. For details, see Roderick MacFarquhar, The Hundred Flowers (London: Atlantic Books, 1960).

reaching scholarship. Since then, not only Chinese intellectuals, but also the official Chinese media, began to appreciate Gorbachev and his reforms.

Finally, one of the important aspects of Zhao’s 13th Congress report is that the PRC intended to undertake the first major political reform since 1949. Zhao stated that one of the purposes in this was to establish a system of consultation and dialogue, whereby the CCP might allow the people to have their own say in national and international affairs. In the talk, he clearly demonstrated the relationship between the Party reform and open policy, and how the latter could contribute to the improvement of the former:

Under the new circumstances of reform and opening to the rest of the world, it has become even more important to improve the Party’s work style. Reform and the open policy have helped to substantially reduce negative practices that were common in the past, such as subjectivism, coercion and commandism, practices that resulted in setting excessively high targets, giving arbitrary directions and resorting to struggle and punishment without good reason.

Some pieces of writings in MSUEE in the late 1980s had responded to the ethos of Zhao’s speech. By analysing the relationship between Gorbachev’s glasnost at home and his foreign policy abroad, the scholars suggested that the internal political reform and policies toward the outside world might have mutual impacts on each other. They remarked that both endeavours would push socialist regimes, such as the Soviet Union,

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339 Ibid., 32.
340 Ibid., 37.
further in the direction of liberalization.

IREECAS scholar Xing Shuguang wrote that the deepening of glasnost and democratization in the USSR would make the design of its foreign policy “based on the interests of the peoples of the world,” rather than those of the Soviet state. 341 Another IREECAS scholar Xu Zhixin predicted that once the Soviet Union was transformed into a democratic state, its long-time “great power chauvinism,” “cult of personality,” and “despotic rule” would finally expire. 342 While both authors above considered that Gorbachev’s political reform would affect Soviet foreign policy, Li Jingjie presented the opposite view — the New Thinking would also make a difference on Soviet domestic environment. He said that under Gorbachev, the Soviet Union no longer needed to create “external enemies” in order to maintain the terror necessary for effective rule, so there would be fewer class enemies and political prisoners at home. Moreover, Moscow decided to cut its military spending, and to allow the West to investigate its nuclear weapon facility. The Kremlin would also permit its citizens to engage in more business activities and academic exchanges with the world. Both measures would “make the USSR become more open” and “clear the way for further reforms.” 343

As will be discussed, the celebration of Gorbachev in China culminated before the Sino-Soviet summit in May 1989 and lasted after the troublesome moment of the Tiananmen Incident until early 1990 — when the Chinese once again changed their

341 Xing Shugang, “Guanyu sulian duiwai zhengce xingzhide tantao” [Discussion on the Nature of Soviet Foreign Policy], 8.


perceptions of Gorbachev after he initiated the process of terminating the power monopoly of the CPSU. The existing secondary literature indicates that soon after the Tiananmen Incident in 1989, Chinese scholars had become completely hostile to Gorbachev. However, the researcher’s findings show that during and after the 1989 Tiananmen uprising, no major criticisms of Gorbachev appeared in Chinese academic writings. Instead, Chinese scholars still seemed to admire, and produce positive evaluations of, the New Thinking during this anti-liberal period in contemporary China.

Upon the news of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in early 1989, there began a final clean-up of the three obstacles in blocking Sino-Soviet rapprochement, and an upsurge of Chinese commendations for the New Thinking appeared. Both Yang Yunzhong (a scholar at East China Normal University) and Gu Guanfu attributed the replacement of confrontation by mutual understanding and dialogue between Moscow and Washington to the New Thinking, and stated that this was the first time in history that there was a true détente between the superpowers – and this was owing to Gorbachev’s efforts.

In another article, E Huancheng, an associate professor at the Ningbo Party School in Zhejiang Province, praised Gorbachev for being “the most educated and knowledgeable

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Soviet leader since Lenin,” saying that he possessed “the best personal quality compared with other leaders from Stalin to Brezhnev.” He said that Gorbachev’s outstanding character would “ensure the final success of the New Thinking.” 346 IREECAS scholar Zhao Guilin reiterated that Gorbachev had fundamentally transformed the Soviet image in the world, and refuted the arguments that “Gorbachev has been kowtowing to the West, exploited by the peaceful evolution, therefore he compromised too much to the US and rendered the loss of Soviet great power status.” 347 In his conclusion, the commentator even foresaw that “Gorbachev’s domestic and foreign success will one day completely alter the terrain of world politics.” 348

There are several reasons why Gorbachev was decidedly not a subject of ridicule in the eyes of Chinese scholars in the wake of the Tiananmen demonstrations. First, between 1989 and 1990, the Chinese official view still considered that the Soviet Union was “with us” and there was no direct attack on Gorbachev. After comparing the foreign policies between China and the USSR in his late 1989 article, Jia Qingguo, dean of the Institute of International Relations at Beijing University, summarized many commonalities between Gorbachev’s New Thinking and Deng Xiaoping’s open door principle, such as politically peaceful co-existence, mutual economic benefits, and independent foreign policy making. He concluded that “both leaders have spoken almost in the same vein.” 349

348 Ibid., 60.
349 Jia Qingguo, “Zhongsu waijiao sixiangde bianhua jiqidui guoji guanxide yingxiang” [The Changing Sino-Soviet Relations and Their Implications for International Relations], Shijie jingjiyu zhengzhi, no. 11 (1989):
In the wake of the Tiananmen Incident, China did not consider that Gorbachev and his liberalization policies posed an immediate threat to its socialist system. In fact, the West was perceived as a much greater danger to the survival of the regime than the USSR. In late 1989, Deng Xiaoping complained that “some Westerners are trying to overthrow the socialist system in China.” In the early 1990s, the CCP demanded that scholars working in the social sciences “build up the Great Wall of Steel (Gangtie changcheng) in the realm of ideology against the attack of capitalist peaceful evolution engineered by the international hostile forces.”

Second, the Sino-Soviet relations had been in tension since the 1960s. Deng Xiaoping had been waiting eagerly for the Soviet response to remove the three obstacles for the eventual normalization of bilateral relations. When the Sino-Soviet summit meeting finally took place in May 1989, both sides placed great emphasis on the principle of mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs and normalized the relations between the two countries. Having learned the lessons of history, they were committed to not letting ideological disagreements disrupt cordial bilateral relations. All this is

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reflected in the main import of Deng’s summit conversation with Gorbachev – putting the past behind them, opening up a new era, doing more practical things, and indulging in less empty talk.355

Moreover, it was Gorbachev who mended the Sino-Soviet fences after a protracted period of mutual distrust, repairing the relationship almost entirely on Chinese terms. Gorbachev may not have personally agreed with China’s strategy of violence in handling the Tiananmen Incident,356 but even when he was pushed by Western reporters during his visit to Beijing in 1989, the Soviet leader refused to comment on the student movements,357 and he did not encourage the Soviet media to criticize the Chinese government after he returned to Moscow.358 It may, therefore, have seemed ungrateful for the Chinese state to start criticizing someone who had made a significant contribution to the Sino-Soviet rapprochement, and who had adopted a neutral position when China was experiencing domestic problems.

Third, the Chinese leadership had by then taken stock of the Sino-Soviet frictions under Mao Zedong, and did not want to be at odds with a large and powerful country that had the longest land border with the PRC. Harmony and rapport between the two countries would be the primary considerations, despite the fact that some officials and scholars might feel suspicious of Gorbachev’s reform programs.

Because international sanctions were already being imposed on China and the West was exerting pressure on the PRC to change course after Tiananmen, the CCP also saw the Soviet state as a much-needed partner with which China could confront Western power politics.\footnote{Gu Guanfu and Chun-tu Hsueh, “Sino-Soviet Ties Grow Steadily,” \textit{Beijing Review}, September 3-9, 1990, 11. The authors indicated that during Premier Li Peng’s trip to Moscow in early 1990, both states “deemed it necessary to denounce the attempts or actions of any countries to impose their wills on others or seek hegemony of any form anywhere in the world.”} After the Tiananmen Incident, many Chinese Party leaders were keen to maintain relations with Moscow, expressing their hopes that the USSR would still uphold the cause of socialism.\footnote{John Garver reveals that during the final days of the Soviet demise, the CCP provided Moscow substantial aids for saving the enfeebled Soviet regime. John Garver, “The Chinese Communist Party and the Collapse of Soviet Communism,” \textit{The China Quarterly} 63, no. 133 (March 1993): 9-11.} During his state visit to Moscow in April 1990, Chinese Premier Li Peng spoke to Soviet journalists that “socialism could have different models,” and in his understanding, “Gorbachev’s reforms have not deviated from the tradition set by the October Revolution.”\footnote{“Lipengzai mosike juxing jizhe zhaodaihui,” [Li Peng Holds Press Conference in Moscow] \textit{Renmin ribao}, April 27, 1990.} In May of the year, Qiao Shi, a member of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee, said to a group of CPSU delegates in Beijing that “China always pays particular attention to the Soviet reforms,” and he hoped that “the USSR can overcome difficulties and march toward socialism.”\footnote{“Qiaoshi huijian sugong zhongyang daibiaotuan,” [Qiao Shi Meets the CPSU Delegation] \textit{Renmin ribao}, May 31, 1990.} In addition, by the 1990s the US had achieved “superhegemonist” status, forcing other countries to follow the Western model of development, and China suspected the Americans of having the intention of relegating China and various other nations to subordinate roles on the world stage. The unexpectedly quick American victory in early 1991 in the Gulf War further exacerbated
Beijing’s sense of vulnerability.⁶³

Fourth, according to Yan Sun, under the pressure of mounting domestic tensions leading up to Tiananmen and facing the prospect that international communism was in deep crisis everywhere in the world, the CCP leadership saw the compelling need to expedite the process of normalizing China’s relations with the Soviet Union. From their perspective, a new and cooperative relationship with the world’s largest socialist country would help the CCP to showcase the fact that Beijing and Moscow were joining force in reforming socialism, while at the same time allowing the Party to present the rapprochement as a great diplomatic achievement for the Chinese people. Both effects, as the CCP leadership hoped, would enhance the regime’s position in dealing with the deepened legitimacy crisis that it was facing. However, after the Tiananmen Incident, the Chinese communist state immediately faced its gravest crisis in its 40-year history. The image that Beijing had built during the years of reform and open door was shattered almost overnight. Moreover, the tragedy became a defining moment in which international communism lost any moral strength that it once might have possessed.⁶⁴ Therefore, it was wise for Beijing to avoid criticizing Gorbachev at this critical juncture. It would certainly have eroded further the legitimacy of the CCP regime and the cause of international communism, and would have brought the roof crashing down on the whole show should the Chinese leadership have chosen to oppose Gorbachev publicly.

Last but not least, many Chinese official organizations were facing ideological

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remoulding after the Tiananmen Incident. The CCP mouthpiece journal *Hongqi* (Red Flag, renamed as *Qiushi* or Seeking Truth in 1988), which used to be owned by the Central Party School, was placed under the immediate control of the Party Central Committee after the quelling of the Tiananmen demonstrations. On the other hand, compared to other academic institutions across China, the Party had treated CASS relatively leniently. The large-scale shake-up of CASS did not take place until February 1990, and the process officially wound up in August of the same year. During this period, the CCP dispatched crop of personnel to keep a tight rein on CASS, in order to reinforce the Party rule in administration, shower scholars with thought education, and penalize the dissenting academics. As we will see in the next chapter, it was roughly in and after this stretch of time (February to August 1990), that many Chinese writings in MSUEE (the journal was under the direct jurisdiction of CASS) began to turn hostile to Gorbachev.

**Concluding remarks**

This chapter has studied the analyses of Chinese Soviet-watchers on Moscow’s foreign policy against the larger context of PRC’s political setting in the 1980s, and investigated how scholars placed China’s official agendas centrally in their research. In the 1980s, Chinese discussions on Soviet foreign relations with other countries corresponded closely to PRC’s real security concerns on its border, its historical

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365 “Qiushi’ zazhi gaiwei dangzhongyang zhuban” [The Ownership of ‘Seeking Truth’ Has Been Transferred to the Party Central Committee], *Qiushi*, no. 17 (1989): 6.

366 Margaret Sleeboom-Faulkner, *The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)*, 126.

memories of the wrongdoings done by Tsarist Russia and the USSR, and the principle of post-Mao China’s Soviet policy. As demonstrated in this chapter, and contrary to the claims of the previous secondary literature, the motive of Chinese Sovietology writings was largely to legitimize the post-Mao PRC state agendas, rather than to study and criticize the actual Soviet policies.

Its research of Soviet hegemonism, Soviet-Yugoslavian conflicts, and Soviet-Third World relations all reflected Beijing’s ambitions of challenging the orthodox Soviet model of economic development in the socialist world, competing with the Kremlin for leadership in the developing countries, and projecting a fair and benevolent image of Chinese socialism vis-à-vis Moscow. Since the mid-1980s, Chinese perceptions of Gorbachev’s foreign policy characterized as the New Thinking were also changing in sync with Sino-Soviet relations, as well as with the ups-and-downs of the political climates in both countries.

As has been demonstrated, Chinese Soviet-watchers did not present many vicissitudes of Soviet international manoeuvres in their writings; instead, through research on the formation and evolution of Soviet foreign policy, they attempted to adjust their analyses to align with China’s vision of itself and the world. Their writings function to highlight lessons learned from Moscow, legitimize the CCP rule and the Chinese way of practicing socialism, and to envision the future direction of China in the reform era.

The next chapter will follow the Chinese discussions on Soviet foreign agendas in the 1990s. At first, it will focus on Chinese perceptions of Gorbachev across the 1990 divide. As will be discussed, the turning point appeared in March 1990, when Gorbachev decided
to relinquish the CPSU power monopoly. The CCP leadership received this message with great trepidation, as such a move from Moscow would produce unwanted repercussions in its one-party communist dictatorship. Since then, Chinese scholars started to dispense negative views on the last Soviet leader, criticizing his New Thinking as not only a deviation from Lenin but also the root of the dissolution of European socialism.

The chapter will also investigate the use of Lenin in Chinese Sovietology writings after Tiananmen. Scholars argued that Lenin’s post-1917 foreign policy of engaging with the West while upholding the communist party dictatorship, was the best way for China to weather the Tiananmen crisis. Their interpretation of Lenin’s works tapped into the context of the international sanctions which were being imposed on China after the Tiananmen Incident, and corresponded closely to Deng Xiaoping’s post-Tiananmen agenda of keeping the country in a low profile while seeking a way to overcome the crisis.
Part One

Analyses of Soviet Foreign Relations

Chapter 4

The 1990s’ Changing Views on Gorbachev’s Foreign Policy and the Use of Lenin after Tiananmen

Introductory remarks

Existing secondary literature on Chinese Sovietology indicates that soon after the Tiananmen Incident in 1989, Chinese Soviet-watchers had become completely hostile to the last Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, and that their criticisms did not stop even after the collapse of the USSR in 1991. This chapter, however, demonstrates that strong criticism of Gorbachev by China did not appear until early 1990, and not immediately after Tiananmen as existing secondary scholarship claims. After Gorbachev was elected President of the USSR, and after he initiated the process of terminating the power monopoly of the CPSU on March 15, 1990, both the CCP and Chinese scholars became aware of the possible negative ramifications of such a move on the PRC, which has remained committed to one-party communist rule. After that point, they started to view Gorbachev negatively, criticizing his agendas as being against Lenin’s principles. Having said this, the wave of Chinese criticism was a short-term phenomenon. It gradually subsided after the mid-1990s as a result of the marked improvement in Sino-Russian relations after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and, most importantly, as a result of China’s own reflections on the lessons already learned from the Sino-Soviet ideological
disputes that had taken place under Mao Zedong.

The chapter will also examine the use of the first Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin by Chinese scholars in the early 1990s. Contrary to the descriptions in the secondary literature, it is incorrect to say that Chinese Sovietology after 1991 was only concentrating on the dark sides of the Soviet Union, studying its negative lessons for China’s use in preserving its own communist regime. After the Tiananmen Incident, China became the target of global outrage, due to the brutal military crackdown over civilians ordered by its ruling Communist Party during the pro-democratic demonstrations in the summer of 1989. After Tiananmen, Chinese scholars manipulated the symbol of Lenin and his post-1917 foreign policy, in an attempt to support Deng Xiaoping’s post-Tiananmen agenda of buying time and keeping a low profile – all while finding a way out of international isolation and re-connecting with the world. This chapter demonstrates that Chinese scholars had drawn parallels between the early Soviet Union and China after Tiananmen, when both regimes were facing international sanctions. Those scholars argued that China might learn from those of Lenin’s teachings that encouraged engagement in formal relations with the West, while concentrating on economic development and maintaining a proletarian dictatorship.

By upholding the work and teaching of Lenin, Chinese scholars not only attempted to support the Chinese communist regime after the Tiananmen crisis, they also made an effort to safeguard and legitimize Deng Xiaoping’s position in China after 1989, when the Party conservatives launched a series of attacks on his reform and open door policies taken since 1978. According to the scholars, Deng’s long-standing policy represented
what they saw as the true Leninist legacy of building socialism by combining economic liberalization and the political one-party rule, which was the best way to weather the post-Tiananmen challenges, as well as the future direction of world socialism after the end of the Cold War.

**Chinese perceptions of Gorbachev across the 1990 divide**

One thing that should be noted is that Chinese perceptions of Gorbachev from the mid-1980s onward were quite evolutionary. Views changed not only in response to the ups-and-downs of Sino-Soviet (and later Sino-Russian) relations and China’s domestic political climate, but also in response to the political developments in Moscow. The investigator has found that China’s strong criticism of Gorbachev did not appear until early 1990, and not immediately after Tiananmen as existing secondary scholarship claims. After Gorbachev was elected President of the USSR and initiated the process of terminating the power monopoly of the CPSU on March 15, 1990, both the CCP and Chinese scholars became aware of the possible negative ramifications of such a move on the PRC, which has remained committed to one-party communist rule. In a speech made immediately afterward on March 18, CCP Secretary General Jiang Zemin issued the following warning:

> Our Party is the ruling party, which means that the Party has an absolute leadership over the

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state organs. If we renounce this leadership, then the Party will no longer enjoy ruling party status. Therefore, all the state organs, including the People’s Congress, the government, the Supreme People’s Court, and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, should be under the leadership of the Party. Any thoughts on or practices involving weakening or undermining the authority of the Party are wrong.369

In reaction to the alarming announcement after the 28th CPSU Congress in July 1990 that the monopoly of communist power in the Soviet Union had been officially abolished, Jiang made the following more severe criticism in September of that year:

After Soviet-American détente and the turmoil in Eastern Europe, there are indeed many communists in the world who have doubts about the future of socialism, and are even losing faith in it. But the reality has proved that this kind of thinking is terribly naïve.370

Afterward, some articles in the Chinese official media started to criticize the deviation in the socialist world without referring to the name of Gorbachev. One day after the two-year anniversary of the Tiananmen Incident, Renmin ribao commented that the setback of the international communist movement was “due to the sabotage of the opportunists and rightists inside the socialist bloc,” and “the bourgeoisie has never ceased the effort to place their proxies in communist parties, for imposing the mischievous Western strategy of peaceful evolution on socialism.”371 In the wake of the August Coup in 1991 Moscow, Guangming ribao issued a warning that “the anti-socialist deviational forces have penetrated into the Party,” and stated that countering such tendencies would

be “the biggest task of our theoreticians and the Party.” 372 One week after the August Coup, *Guangming ribao* published another article that came just short of openly attacking Gorbachev and his liberal programs:

Some thoughts against Marxism and Leninism are rampant in today’s international society. They have crept into the communist parties of some countries and become the guiding principles of those parties. Those thoughts are the fundamental origin of the crisis of some socialist states. The opportunists inside the international communist movement flaunt the banners of ‘diversity,’ ‘universal human value,’ and ‘democracy is the highest principle of socialism’ to confuse the masses. They are in fact writing off the class struggle, socialism, and proletarian dictatorship. They stand for using the Western model to replace the communist leadership and its theoretical premise of Marxism. 373

A series of IREECAS journal articles criticizing Gorbachev’s foreign policy appeared after the first half of 1990. In his article, IREECAS scholar Huang Tianying targeted Gorbachev’s plan to establish Soviet diplomatic relations with South Korea. He argued that the Soviet leader’s purpose was “seeking economic aid from Seoul, at the expense of its long-time communist ally of North Korea.” The author foresaw that Gorbachev’s decision would cause the situation in the Korean Peninsula to deteriorate. 374

In early 1991, Yuan Shengyu, dean of the Shanghai Institute of International Affairs, made a list of Gorbachev’s East European policies to condemn. The list included Gorbachev’s pampering the formation of the multiparty system in the region, agreeing to have East Germany annexed by West Germany, and giving a green signal to the

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374 Huang Tianying, “Sulianyuan nanchaoxian guanxide fazhan qiji yingxiang” [The Development and Impacts of Soviet-South Korean Relations], *Sulian dongou wenti*, no. 6 (1990): 82-83.
disbandment of the Warsaw Pact – all for “trading benefits from the West.” 375

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Cao Shengqiang, a professor of history at Shandong University, did not think that Gorbachev had implemented the Sinatra Doctrine in Eastern Europe (unlike Yuan Shengyu). He believed instead that Gorbachev, like his predecessors, had imposed not Sovietization but glasnost on the region, whereby the Soviet leader became “the grave-digger of East European socialism.” 376 Unlike the previous scholars’ arguments that praised the New Thinking for its historical innovation (as cited in the last chapter), Wang Yanwei (then a PhD philosophy student at the Central Party School) argued that the past Soviet leaderships had already formulated the concept and “Gorbachev was only duplicating the term only.” 377 An in-depth investigation appeared in IREECAS researcher Jiang Yi’s 1995 article. According to the author, socialist ideology and universal human value are two sides of the same coin in terms of the definition of New Thinking. However, “If there is incompatibility appeared between the two elements, Gorbachev would rather favour the latter and do without the former.” In


376 Cao Shengqiang, “Dongou shehui zhuyide xingshuiyue suliande guanxi” [The Ups and Downs of East European Socialism and the Soviet-East European Relations], Eluosi dongou zhongya yanjiu, no. 4 (1996): 41-42. A Chinese book published in 1999 also held the view that Gorbachev had deliberately forced Eastern Europe to accept his New Thinking and democratic socialism, and disciplined those regimes who refused to reform according to Moscow’s will. It criticized that Gorbachev was fully responsible for the dissolution of socialism in the region. The book was edited by a group of Chinese scholars and published by Xinhua Press affiliated with China’s most important state-sponsored broadcasting office of Xinhua News Agency. For details, see Zhang Weiyuan, Cao Changsheng and Yang Yinzi, eds. Sulian xingwanghe shehui zhuyi qianjing [The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union and the Prospect of Socialism] (Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 2010), 332. I will discuss the Chinese analysis of Gorbachev’s role in causing the Soviet demise in detail in the next chapter on Soviet leaders and politics.

Jiang’s opinion, socialist ideology was “the bond to preserve the Soviet-East European alliance,” and once it was taken away, “socialism in Europe would disappear without trace.” 378 As he finally concluded:

Gorbachev’s New Thinking was a utopian idea and out of touch with reality. His democratic socialism and universal human value had been influenced more by Western thoughts, and were antagonistic to the principle of Leninism. We can say that Gorbachev’s such package of thoughts was exactly the theoretical origin of the Soviet demise.379

As demonstrated in the last chapter, both Chinese officials and intellectuals showed little difference in their perspectives on Gorbachev before and after the Tiananmen Incident. It was only after early 1990, when Gorbachev started the process of constitutionally terminating the one-party system in the Soviet Union, that the CCP became nervous. After that point, Chinese scholars began to sense its potential implications for China, which were far more ominous than the effect of the New Thinking and glasnost that had allegedly fuelled the student unrest in 1989.380 As was evident in the writings presented in the last chapter, Gorbachev’s slogans of plurality and universal human value would not cause concern for the Chinese socialist regime, as many Chinese scholars generally agreed with these ideas before the middle of 1990. However, this behaviour of Gorbachev’s in overturning the dictatorship of the communist party was absolutely unacceptable to the CCP. At that time Beijing was confronting the perceived

379 Ibid., 54.
threat from the West of “peaceful evolution,” 381 and the Chinese leadership similarly feared that the abandonment of socialism by the Soviet Union would reignite pro-democracy sentiments at home and challenge its legitimacy. Following this, the last Soviet leader was doomed to become the focal point of attack by the Chinese.

Having said this, Chinese Sovietology writings never excoriated Gorbachev in the 1990s, and the torrent of attacks had gradually subsided by the middle of the decade. One major reason for this may be the improvement in Sino-Russian relations after the tragic collapse of the USSR. Once in power, Russian President Boris Yeltsin announced in November 1992 that Russia would tilt its foreign policy toward Asia, and that Sino-Russian relations would top his agenda.382 Two days later, Yeltsin told the visiting Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen that China and Russia should not turn back the clock to when both sides were at each other’s throats, and suggested that ideological differences should not become a barrier to normal bilateral relations.383 With this overture from Russia, China decided to consolidate relations, and the agreement was enshrined in the Sino-Russian Joint Declaration signed by both countries during Yeltsin’s visit to the PRC in December 1992.384 Finally, during Jiang Zemin’s reciprocal visit to Moscow in September 1994, both sides confirmed the nature of their future new type of

381 For an analysis on the pre-1992 Chinese short-lived thesis of peaceful evolution, see Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party, 55.
cooperation – “constructive partnership” (jianshexing huoban guanxi).\textsuperscript{385}

Second, Chinese scholars’ analyses show that many aspects of Gorbachev’s New Thinking, such as peaceful co-existence, respect for sovereignties, emphasizing equality, and a refusal to export revolution and ideology, bore a strong resemblance to Deng Xiaoping’s vision of international policy making.\textsuperscript{386} Indeed, as presented in the last chapter, some Chinese scholars concluded that the foreign policies of Gorbachev and Deng were almost identical with each other, and that they both made major contributions to Marxist-Leninist theories of international relations.\textsuperscript{387} Apart from China’s disagreement with Gorbachev’s political democratization and a fear of the impact of glasnost on China, the CCP regime in fact accepted Gorbachev’s concept of New Thinking – as this was seen to be in accordance with China’s long-time principle of regulating foreign relations.\textsuperscript{388} Most Chinese scholars included in this research are establishment intellectuals in the PRC,\textsuperscript{389} and thus might have felt obliged to change suit and heed the Party call to criticize deviationist tendencies after the turmoil in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. However, if those scholars displayed their exorbitant criticisms of the New Thinking,


\textsuperscript{388} For comparison of the foreign policies between Deng and Gorbachev, see Deng, “The Principles of Peaceful Coexistence Have a Potentially Wide Application,” October 31, 1984, in Deng, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 3: 102-103, and Part Three in Gorbachev, On My Country and the World, 169-278.

\textsuperscript{389} On the prosopography of post-Mao Chinese Soviet-watchers, see the Chapter of Introduction.
such negative views might seem to be self-contradictory to their positive comments not long before.

At the end of the 1990s, some Chinese writers once again reversed their positions, lending their sympathy to Gorbachev’s foreign policy. Kang Zhiwen, a professor at the Heihe College in Heilongjiang Province, portrayed Gorbachev as a victim of the West. He criticized the US for exploiting the Soviet predicament to pressure the Kremlin to give up socialism. As a result, Gorbachev was “incapable of action except giving in to American demands.” IREECAS scholar Lu Nanquan felt puzzled by some Chinese scholars, who had once accused Brezhnev of being “a social imperialist” because he had ordered the suppression of the Prague Spring. These scholars had also denounced Gorbachev as “a communist traitor,” when the last Soviet leader refused to send troops to crush the anti-communist uprising in Eastern Europe. Rong Zhi, a researcher in the Institute of International Studies at CASS, defended the New Thinking as “a wise decision” in his 1999 article. He extolled Gorbachev’s efforts in normalizing the Sino-Soviet relations and concluding the Cold War. He asked that Chinese scholars “assess Gorbachev’s policy objectively and not slander him as a traitor or a capitulationist categorically.”

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390 Jialin Zhang offers another reason for the Chinese government’s restricting academic circles from excessively criticizing Gorbachev, because the CCP regime feared “those discussions have also revealed some of the fundamental flaws of socialism, which, if publicized, could rock the confidence of the average Chinese citizen in China’s current system.” Zhang, *China’s Response to the Downfall of Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union* (Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace: Stanford University Press, 1994), 5.


393 Rong Zhi, “Qianxi sulian bengkuide yuanyin,” [The Causes of the Soviet Demise] in *Sulian jubian*
Third, although the CCP regime had concerns about the fate of Chinese socialism after the crumbling of the USSR, the disintegration of the Soviet Union ended up benefiting the PRC more than anything else. In the aftermath of the Tiananmen Incident, the Chinese government still worried gravely about potential attempts of the West to relegate China to a subordinate role in the post-communist world. However, the CCP leadership increasingly realized that the downfall of European socialism and the weakened USSR would offer the PRC a better chance to restore what it saw as its rightful place, in a multipolar world no longer controlled by the superpowers. In 1989, Deng Xiaoping was still not sure what the international direction would be in the coming years, and he urged the Chinese people to “observe the situation coolly” and “act calmly.” \(^\text{394}\) In 1990, Deng became more confident and optimistic about China’s future in the world. He said, “The situation in which the United States and the Soviet Union dominated all international affairs is changing,” and “China will be counted as a pole” in a multipolar world. \(^\text{395}\) Immediately after the Soviet collapse, Deng joyfully claimed in 1992 that “Socialist China should show the world through its actions that it is opposed to hegemonism and power politics,” and “China is a steadfast force for safeguarding world peace.” \(^\text{396}\)

Last, after the Soviet collapse, Russia and other succeeding states to the USSR
seemed unlikely to be in a position to sustain armed forces and its past superpower status; therefore, the main potential threat to Chinese security had been removed. China wanted the CIS states on its borders to remain stable, for otherwise grave problems would be created for the PRC. Because of the CCP’s efforts to normalize Sino-Russian relations in the early 1990s, both states achieved arms control, border settlement, and trade resumption in the post-Soviet era.\textsuperscript{397} The prospect of bilateral relations after 1991 looked far brighter than in the pre-1991 time. After the Cold War the CCP leadership not only needed good relations with Russia in diplomatic terms, but also expected to retain Russia and other CIS states as a counterbalance in resisting the Western notion of peaceful evolution, which they saw as an existential threat.

In addition, Chinese leaders in the 1990s tried hard to secure the border demarcation with the surrounding Soviet successor countries (Russia included). They sought to further trade relations with those states and take advantage of their rich energy resources to sustain China’s fast growing economy. They also wanted to cooperate with the CIS states to combat religious extremism and national separation in China’s north-western territory.\textsuperscript{398} Therefore, it was a rational decision for Chinese scholars after 1991 not to indulge in negative criticisms of the defunct Soviet socialism founded by the Russians in 1917, since this would arouse suspicions on the Russian side and ultimately harm the relationship.

Indeed, from the mid-1990s onward, some Chinese Soviet-watchers took into


account the bitter lessons learned from the Sino-Soviet hostilities that had taken place under Mao Zedong, in which name-calling and exchanges of verbal attacks had severely damaged relations between the two countries. They made it clear that this tragedy should not be repeated. In a 1999 speech delivered to a conference commemorating the 50-year anniversary of the establishment of Sino-Russian relations (at which the Vice-Director of the International Liaison Department of the CCP, Cai Wu, and the Russian Ambassador, Igor Rogachev, were present), IREECAS Director Li Jingjie cited the main import of Deng Xiaoping’s conversation with Gorbachev in 1989 – “putting the past behind and embracing the future” – and made it clear to Chinese scholars that they should “no longer cling to the old scores of history” when they were conducting research into Sino-Russian relations in the future. In another article published at the same time, Pan Zhengxiang, a scholar at the Chinese University of Science and Technology, retraced the sorry history of Sino-Soviet relations and asked Chinese scholars to take the lessons of the past into account in their future research. He instructed them to “uphold the notion of seeking common ground while preserving differences,” and warned them “not to engage in open polemics and in criticizing Party or state leaders on the other side by name” in order to “prevent a repetition in the 21st century of the historical tragedy.”

Moreover, in a 1995 article Ye Shuzong, a professor at Shanghai Normal University, asked Chinese scholars to learn a lesson from the painful memory of Sino-Soviet polemics after the early 1960s. He pointed out that the mutual recriminations and

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vituperation had contributed to China’s self-imposed isolation and the emergence of political radicalism that had culminated in the disastrous Cultural Revolution. After that point, China refused to learn from the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s initiatives in reforming the moribund Stalinism, denouncing his plans as “revisionism” (xiūzhēng zhuyì); this was a pejorative term used by Mao Zedong to describe Khrushchev’s programs as being equivalent to a revision of orthodox Marxism. The author finally concluded that it was these sorts of meaningless squabbles that had made China “waste the opportunity to reflect on Maoism and develop the economy, and remain backward until the late 1970s when the outside world had changed more swiftly than ever before.”

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**Lenin and the fate of Chinese socialism after Tiananmen**

The foreign policy of Vladimir Lenin started to draw the attention of Chinese scholars in and after 1989, when China became a political pariah owing to the ruling Communist Party’s brutal military crackdown on civilians during the pro-democratic Tiananmen demonstrations in the summer of that year. Chinese perspectives in the wake of the Tiananmen Incident argued that the PRC might learn from Lenin’s policy in War Communism (1918-1921), when the newly-born Soviet Union was besieged by imperialist military encirclement. At the time, Lenin adopted a foreign policy that encouraged engagement in formal relations with the West, while concentrating on economic development and maintaining a proletarian dictatorship. Such principles were

akin to Deng Xiaoping’s post-Tiananmen agendas of buying time and keeping a low profile while finding a way out of the Western sanctions and re-connecting with the world. As Yu Liangzao, a lecturer at the University of Hubei, summarized in his 1991 article, “China should learn from Lenin’s post-1917 peaceful-coexistence strategy, by pursuing the continued economic cooperation with the West and upholding the open door policy,” in order to “overcome the international sanctions, change China’s global image, and finally restore its rightful place in the world.”

After the CCP’s military crackdown in 1989, China was facing four consequences. First, internationally, many countries in the world endorsed the political and economic sanctions against China, as a form of punishment for its armed suppression over civilians and its infringement upon human rights. Second, domestically, the Tiananmen Incident was followed immediately by an intensified intra-CCP power struggle, wherein the conservative Party members attempted to seize the opportunity to criticize Deng Xiaoping’s reform and open door policies after 1978, and push China back to the rule of Maoism. Third, the event paralleled the failure of communism in Eastern Europe and the USSR from 1989 onward, and many Chinese people almost entirely lost their faith in socialism. Last, combining all the causes above, China after 1989 was at a crossroad; from the top leadership to ordinary people, all felt deeply puzzled about the future direction of China and had no concrete idea about how China would weather the

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Tiananmen crisis.

In late 1989, the new Party Secretary General Jiang Zemin gave a warning to Party cadres about hostile international forces and the critical situation of the CCP:

At present we must realize that our party is in peril and the international hostile forces are engineering the plot of peaceful evolution to push the CCP on the verge of death. We should be acutely aware of the urgency of current situation. All cadres should work together to safeguard our Party and ensure socialism in China will survive the test and remain undefeated.\(^{404}\)

Deng Xiaoping also expressed his concern about the issue. He believed that the West had “the same attitude towards China as towards the East European countries,” and that the West was “unhappy that China adheres to socialism.” \(^{405}\) Deng said that Chinese people did not fear being isolated. He remarked, “No one can shake China’s determination to build socialism,” and “no matter what changes take place in the international situation, China will be able to hold its ground.” \(^{406}\)

From late 1989, a flood of official articles circulated in China, invoking Lenin and his writings as a model that could be useful in combating Western attacks and safeguarding socialism in China. A commentator in *Guangming ribao* commented that Lenin’s theory about the inevitable death of capitalism had not been outdated in the contemporary era. He said, “It is correct for China to adhere to the socialist path,” and


believed that “socialism will replace capitalism in the future.” Another article in *Qiushi* (Seeking Truth) described Lenin’s writings as “a good weapon” for China to employ to “fight with the international vicious tendencies of peaceful evolution.” Li Zhun, vice minister of the Central Propaganda Department, wrote in *Renmin ribao* demanding that “comrades working in ideology apply theories of Marx and Lenin in their research works for the battle against the peaceful evolution.” Another article in *Renmin ribao* required all Party cadres to achieve “a high level of understanding of Leninist theories,” with a view to “grasp the world situation, uphold the communist conviction, and cope with the complicated international environment.”

In response to the calls of Party authorities, Chinese scholars started to follow the example of the early Soviet Union when the country was threatened by Western military intimidation, and asked the PRC to learn from Lenin’s wisdom of how to break through foreign encirclement. According to a scholar at the Guangxi University for Nationalities:

Today when capitalists are mounting intensive attacks against socialism, the international
communist movement is at the moment of low tide. Under such circumstances, to study Lenin’s experience and theories on upholding and developing Marxism will have a great practical significance for us to march toward the socialist path unswervingly under today’s stormy international climate.412

The IREECAS scholar Jiang Yi wrote in an article that, when the newly-born Soviet Union was beset by imperial hostility, Lenin still realized that Soviet socialism was in need of peace and respite for economic recovery.413 After that, “peaceful co-existence with the West became the major principle of Soviet foreign policy.” 414 Yu Liangzao in another article argued that China should heed Lenin’s strategies during its difficult time; these included strengthening the one-party rule, fighting bloated bureaucracy and corruption, and remaining vigilant of imperialist interventions.415 Even in the late 1990s, when China had extricated itself from isolation and re-embraced the global society, Li Zhencheng, director of the Institute of Marxism at the Central Party School, still remarked that Lenin’s counter-encirclement methods in the early 20th century were a useful example for not only Chinese socialism, but also the future of world communism:

At the time, the struggle between the international hostile forces intending for sabotaging the October Revolution and the Soviet communists for safeguarding the fruit of the Revolution, was a life-or-death final showdown between the proletarians and the bourgeoisies. It ended with the victory of the former and the outcome would be honoured by history. The struggle was one of the greatest events in the 20th century and it has been celebrated by peoples from all over the world. We can see that in a non-military battlefield,

413 For Lenin’s policies in state administration and economic development when the Soviet Union was experiencing internal and external problems in the early 20th century, see Lenin, “The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government,” in Lenin, Collected Works, February-July 1918, 27: 257-77.
a war without bloodshed could be more prolonged, intensive, and brutal. Fortunately, at the
time the imperialists did not have an effective and systematic strategy of peaceful evolution.
It would be helpful for us to seriously study and sum up the lessons from this event, for
subsequent campaigns against capitalist rivals.\(^{416}\)

Making use of Lenin is not unknown in PRC history. During Lenin’s 90th birth
anniversary in 1960, the CCP regime under Mao Zedong’s instruction published several
harangues in the name of commemorating Leninism in official newspapers. This was an
attack on Khrushchev’s détente with the West and was also meant to defend the Chinese
struggle against imperialism right through to the end.\(^{417}\) Lenin’s theories developed
during War Communism had also been employed by Mao to serve and legitimize his
radical policies in the fanatical periods of the Great Leap Forward and Cultural
Revolution.\(^{418}\) After Tiananmen, the contemporary application of Lenin and his policies
highlighted China’s apprehension regarding the Western peaceful evolution, the
implications of European communist demise for China, and concern about the country’s
position in the world after Tiananmen.

The use of Lenin in Chinese Party organs and Sovietology writings can also be
considered as a legacy of traditional Chinese historiography – using the past to serve the
present (\textit{yishi weijian}).\(^{419}\) Chinese are traditionally in the habit of appealing to examples

\(^{416}\) Li Zhencheng, \textit{Sulian xingwangde chensi} [Reflections on the Rise and Fall of the USSR] (Beijing: Gaige

\(^{417}\) Zuo Fengrong, “Zhongsu dalunzhan” [The Sino-Soviet Big Quarrel], \textit{Dangdai shijie shehui zhuyi wenti}, no.

\(^{418}\) Zhang Wenhuan, “Xuexi makesi zhuyi bunengzou jiejing,” [There is No Short-cut in Learning Marxism]

\(^{419}\) On Chinese scholars’ use of history to serve their regimes in imperial and contemporary times,
respectively, see On-cho Ng and Q. Edward Wang, \textit{Mirroring the Past: The Writing and Use of History in
Imperial China} (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2005), and Huaiyin Li, \textit{Reinventing Modern China:
in history to serve the present agenda, and drawing such examples from within Chinese history is only one end of the whole spectrum. As Dorothea Martin remarks:

The main task of Chinese historians in world history since the mid-1950s has been to trace the revolutionary movements of the modern world in such a way as to reveal the inevitable victory of socialism over capitalism and to depict the victory of the Chinese revolution as the logical outgrowth of this global revolutionary trend.420

World history in China functions not only to promote China’s own desired reading of history, but also to serve the political needs of the state and Party. Gotelind Müller-Saini reveals that in and after the 1990s the CCP regime increasingly focused on ensuring that the official party view of foreign history was transmitted via the official media and textbooks, and that the state agenda guided the audience perceptions toward legitimization of PRC policies.421 Lenin’s foreign policy and his rule during the early Soviet Union were selected as examples, as they had gone well with the stance and interest of China after Tiananmen – that is, since both regimes were bound by the shared traumas of Western sanctions and the common aspirations of rising to be global powers amid international hostility. The Soviet Union under Lenin was viewed as the cherished precedent of a golden age upon which present action of the CCP regime had to be based or rationalized. Chinese Sovietology’s use of Lenin to promote socialism – like exploiting past foreign humiliation in order to fan anti-Western nationalist fervour – was an effective measure to strengthen the Chinese communist regime when it was experiencing domestic difficulties. Jin Zenglin, a researcher at the Heilongjiang Provincial Academy of Social

Sciences, pointed this out quite frankly in his 1992 article on why Chinese Sovietologists should review Lenin’s foreign policy in the early Soviet Union:

History is a mirror. It can guide people to week through the old and bring forth the new. Although there has been a great deal of change since more than seventy years ago, the present international environment is different with that the early Soviet Union was facing. However, there are still some similarities between the two periods. So we need to research on Lenin’s policy to understand the current grim atmosphere and raise our revolutionary spirits.422

**Lenin and the post-Tiananmen reform and open door policies**

The use of Lenin in 1990s China was not only a political expedient in the face of Western sanctions, it was also a symbol of a long-term strategy for China’s economic success and state building after the demise of world communism. After the Tiananmen Incident, Premier Li Peng pledged, “China will not return to the old way of self-isolation under any circumstances,” notwithstanding the international sanctions.423 At the time, Deng Xiaoping was aware of the predominance of the conservative forces within the Party, and their exploitation of the grim international climate to push the PRC back into radicalism and anti-reform. He stepped in and elaborated the vision of China’s post-Tiananmen development for outflanking his foes in a series of speeches. In late 1989, Deng demanded that China “double its GNP” amid the turmoil in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, in order to “demonstrate the superiority of socialism.” He warned that the


PRC “should maintain friendly exchanges” with the West, and “should not criticize or condemn other countries without good reason or go to extremes in our words and deeds.”

In a subsequent speech publicized in 1990, Deng required China to contribute to the world by promoting “a new international political and economic order.” He said, “If we can go on in this way for 50 or 60 years, socialist China will be invincible.”

According to the words above, Deng’s laying great emphasis on economic development was not only a remedy for breaking the post-Tiananmen deadlock. It was also a political tool for strengthening the CCP regime, and a means to the ultimate end of China achieving a powerful status following the demise of orthodox socialism in the wake of Tiananmen and the collapse of European communist regimes. Further to his attack on the Party old guards, Deng embarked on an ambitious inspection tour in southern China in early 1992. He delivered several landmark speeches along the way, making clear that the greater danger to China came from the left rather than the right, and warning that the people would topple those who opposed reforms. He urged the Party members not to fear “elements of capitalism” and not to argue “whether the road is capitalist or socialist.” After Deng’s preaching, Jiang Zemin immediately began to toe the line and pressed the CCP to be “more emancipated, bolder, and faster” in learning achievements from the West.

Complying with the tide, the government’s mouthpiece newspapers and journals immediately set off a chain reaction entertaining Deng’s ideas, and clearing the decks for a strong defence for reform and open door policies. At this juncture, the use of Lenin appeared on PRC’s front-pages as a means of keeping abreast of Deng’s call, and gathering support for China’s renewed momentum to resume reforms in full force.

An article in Renmin ribao pointed out that “learning from capitalism has absolutely complied with Lenin’s theories,” and the fundamental reason for Soviet economic backwardness and its final demise was because “the post-Lenin leaderships had not correctly handled their relationship with capitalism.” Another article in Qiushi put it bluntly, that in Lenin’s mind “socialism should not be an isolated system,” and in fact, “it should be a more open society than capitalism.” Against this backdrop, CASS President Hu Sheng weighed in and rebutted the leftist hostility to capitalism in Renmin ribao. He argued that “socialism should inherit the good tradition from capitalism but should not be antagonistic to it.” The author quoted Lenin’s The State and Revolution to demonstrate that “proletarian dictatorship could only obtain the fruits of socialist revolution by learning from the achievements of capitalism.” Hu Sheng finally condemned the leftist thoughts as being “utterly absurd and reactionary.”

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429 Lu Luping, “Nuliba duiwai kaifang tigaodao xinde shuiping” [To Promote the Open Door Policy to a New Level], Qiushi, no. 8 (1992): 19.
430 For Lenin’s theories on the transition from capitalism to communism, see Vladimir Lenin, The State and Revolution: Marxist Teaching on the State and the Tasks of the Proletariat in the Revolution (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), 82-86.
A number of academic works had predated Deng’s southern tour in early 1992; these articles advocated the acceleration of reforms and mutually beneficial interaction between socialism and capitalism, against the negative example of the Soviet Union.\(^{432}\) After Deng’s tour and throughout the 1990s, many articles attempted to use both Lenin and Deng to enhance China’s renewed momentum in revitalizing reforms.\(^{433}\)

In fact, there were already numerous publications in the 1980s that supported Deng’s reform and open door policies, through the study of Lenin’s writings.\(^{434}\) The 1980s


articles were meant to eradicate the Maoist legacy that had obstructed PRC’s modernization and open door for three decades, and this legacy eventuated in the widening gap between China and the advanced world at the beginning of the 1980s.

In April 1980, an article commemorating Lenin’s 110-year birthday appeared in *Guangming ribao*. The author claimed that according to Lenin, the fundamental task of socialism was not “class struggle” and “political campaigns,” but “developing the productive forces and commodity economy,” by “learning the advanced technologies and management experience from capitalism.” 435 Concurrent with the official tone, Yang Yanjun, a researcher at the Harbin Academy of Social Sciences, took Lenin’s Soviet Union as an example and put forward that after consolidating power, a socialist regime should promptly “shift to economic construction rather than engage in continued revolution.” 436 Xia Daoyuan, a translator at the Central Compilation and Translation Bureau and an expert in the international communist movement, went on to say, “Learning Lenin’s discourse on state capitalism will be of great significance for cleaning up the ultra-leftist poisonous weeds, which were produced by the reactionary group led by

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Lin Biao and Jiang Qing.” He argued that the agendas in the period of the New Economic Policy (1921-1928), which emphasized on economic construction and learning from the West, should be the blueprint of socialist modernization in China.\(^{437}\)

In short, Leninism in Chinese Sovietology writings had served as a tool for helping to legitimize the Chinese communist regime and justify its state policies in the 1980s and 1990s. References to Lenin in the 1980s were used in an economic sense in support of post-Mao leadership. These demonstrated China’s determination to merge itself into the world economic system, since the PRC at the time had already swept away the Maoist remnants of the Gang of Four but was still mired in economic crisis inflicted by Mao’s rule. On the other hand, when post-Mao reforms had been fully-fledged but the conservative force was rampant after Tiananmen, the rhetorical use of Lenin in the 1990s was more a political manoeuvre to reinforce the post-Tiananmen mandate of continued economic liberalization and anti-leftism, while still maintaining self-reliance and evading political Westernization. The symbol of Lenin served to imbue the Chinese people with a sense of guarding against the peaceful evolution, and of the inevitable victory of socialism over capitalism.

On closer inspection, the use of Lenin by Chinese Sovietology writings was less relevant to the context of contemporary China’s international relations. As mentioned in the preceding chapter about Gorbachev and as we will see in the next chapter, since 1987 Chinese scholars had argued that both Gorbachev’s concepts of New Thinking in international relations and glasnost in political liberalization were a return to Lenin’s

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\(^{437}\) Xia Daoyuan, “Yijiu yibanian lieningyu ‘zuopai gongchan zhuyizhe’ zaiguojia ziben zhuyi wenti shangde zhenglun” [Lenin’s 1918 debate with the ‘Left Communists’ on the Questions of State Capitalism], 66.
original principle of true socialism. Some of them even demanded that the Chinese government study Gorbachev’s programs and imitate his way of reforming the socialist political structure. However, after 1990 and the Soviet demise in 1991 in particular, Gorbachev was no longer a favourite figure owing to the change of the political tide. Chinese scholars increasingly refrained from mentioning his name and taking his programs as an example; instead, they had to forsake Gorbachev. In the eyes of the CCP, on the other hand, Lenin commanded high respect and was one of the most authoritative communist leaders in human history. Compared to Gorbachev and any other communist leaders in the world, using Lenin to mobilize the support of China’s reforms would implicate little political risk in Chinese Sovietology writings, particularly in the days after Tiananmen when China was facing the comeback of the Party conservative force.

As we will see in the next chapter, in the early 1980s Chinese official organs and scholars had quoted Lenin’s theories to attack the legacy of Mao. Back then, the first Soviet leader was seen as a symbol of humanistic socialism in direct contrast to Maoist tyranny and oppression. Lenin’s writings were cited to help China recover from the trauma of the Cultural Revolution and switch to the path of reform and open door. After Tiananmen, the exemplar of Lenin was invoked to fortify the Party’s rule and tighten its grip on power. This time, Lenin was used for defending China’s stand of practicing true socialism, but not the socialism perverted by Gorbachev and his followers, who were seen as leading the Soviet Union into chaos and finally, disintegration. In both the early 1980s and early 1990s, the symbol of Lenin was used to legitimate the regime of Deng Xiaoping.
as a socialist government adhering to the norm of orthodox communism, but not the kind
of socialism distorted by Mao and Gorbachev.

It is true that many Chinese scholars made reference to Lenin’s rule in the early
Soviet Union in order to offer guidance to China for coping with hostile Western
sanctions after Tiananmen. Still, we need to note some differences between the early
Soviet Union and China in the wake of the Tiananmen Incident. First, unlike socialism in
the early 20th century, which was a rising political force after the founding of the Soviet
Union, communist regimes and ideology in the early 1990s were dying remnants.
Western capitalism might have felt the need to nip the early Soviet Union in the bud by
force, for fearing its menace would spread across the world and threaten its own survival.
However, after the Tiananmen Incident and even in the wake of the Soviet demise, China
was not in a perilous situation. The West neither sent troops to threaten China’s survival,
nor had complicity in working with those whom Party authorities judged as opportunist
within the CCP to overthrow the Chinese regime. Second, unlike what it had done with
the early Soviet Union, in and after the 1990s, the capitalist West did not show wholesale
hostility to the PRC, and did not sever their diplomatic and trade relations with China
(although short-term sanctions had been applied). Afterward, China did not implement
another militarized War Communism or adopt autarkic methods to counter the Western
attacks.

Indeed, the biggest fear of the CCP regime and Chinese scholars in the early 1990s
seemed to be the emergence of the US as the sole superpower in the world, after the
demise of world communism. Some considered that Washington would not only seek to
Part One—Chapter 4

prevent China from prospering and restoring its greatness in the world, but also wield its unchecked power to bludgeon other countries into submission.\(^{438}\) However, after Soviet socialism passed from the scene, the Chinese promptly realized that the post-communist system had spurred greater global competition rather than greater global hegemony. They could not conceal their delight in witnessing the emergence of a multipolar world, in which China would reap the benefits and make itself a crucial factor in the global balance by being integrated into the new world order.\(^{439}\) Therefore, what most concerned the CCP regime after the eclipse of the USSR was by no means the real military threat from the West (which had been a reality in the early Soviet days), or its modern analogy of the peaceful evolution (which was actually more of a calculated invention and piece of propaganda used to fuel support for the Party after Tiananmen).

In reality, the use of Lenin and his foreign policy in 1990s Chinese Sovietology writings was less pertinent to China’s thinking on its relations with the West and the world at that time. Rather, Chinese scholars tended to use the symbol of Lenin and the interpretation of his writings to defend Deng’s policies and support his position at home after Tiananmen – that is, when socialism in China was in burgeoning crisis and the Party conservative force attempted to challenge reform and open door directions taken by Deng since 1978. Let us look at several pieces of evidence. First, according to Xiao Feng, a

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researcher in the Institute of Contemporary World at CASS, Lenin and Deng Xiaoping appeared to converge at two pillars: “upholding socialism” and “developing the productive forces and undertaking the open door policy.”  

In this way, the use of Lenin serves two functions: firstly, it demonstrates China’s ruthless determination to resist political liberalization and the pollution of bourgeois thoughts (upholding socialism). Secondly, it symbolizes that the CCP regime would cleave to economic capitalism by learning from the advanced West (developing the productive forces and undertaking the open door policy). The two points deterred the attacks made by the political dissents and the Party conservatives, respectively. This combination of the two directed the path that China would take.

Second, Wei Dingguang, a professor at the Nanjing Institute of Politics, argued that after Lenin’s death, both Stalin and Mao “had not properly handled Lenin’s legacy of opening to the outside world,” and only Deng Xiaoping “has carried through Lenin’s goal” and “upheld the open door direction as part of the socialist state policies.” Liu Min, a scholar at the University of Nanjing, went further to put Deng in a higher position than Lenin. She pointed out that unlike Lenin, who had employed the open door policy as “a means to survive” and as “mainly for the contact with the West,” China under Deng had been transformed into “a socialist country that embraces all nations in the world

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regardless of their political systems.” 442 It is thus evident that quoting Lenin’s writings was more about Deng than Lenin. The authors apparently tried to elevate Deng’s standing and speak for his policies. Deng, not Lenin, was the real focus of the Chinese scholars.

Last, Li Daxin, a scholar at Shandong University, indicated that socialist elements “could be drawn from capitalism,” and both socialism and capitalism “could be in complete harmony but not in competition.” 443 To corroborate his argument, the scholar quoted both Lenin’s formula and Deng’s comment during his celebrated southern tour in 1992, 444 in order to emphasize that socialism and capitalism could have positive ties. In particular, he argued that the nature of socialism was to be a hybrid of various institutions and elements, as long as they could enrich the power of the socialist states. 445 In Deng Xiaoping’s mind, there was indeed no specific definition of socialism. For him, socialism and capitalism could be interconnected and it made little sense to label these two systems.

It is such examples of Deng’s pragmatism that have produced the famous slogan

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445 Li Daxin, “Shehui zhuyi yinsu nengfouzai ziben zhuyi neibu chansheng?” [Can Socialist Elements Be Drawn from Capitalism?], 54.
“constructing socialism with Chinese characteristics,” a very vague slogan that Deng himself was unable to clarify. As he admitted in 1985:

In building socialism, the central task is to develop the productive forces. We are adopting all measures to develop them, including use of foreign funds and introduction of advanced technologies. This is a great experiment, something that is not described in books.\footnote{Deng, “Reform and Opening to the Outside World Are a Great Experiment,” June 29, 1985, in Deng, \textit{Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping}, 3: 134.}

To summarize, first, the Chinese method of drawing an analogy between the post-Tiananmen PRC and the early Soviet Union was to create a tense and hostile external environment and to keep the Chinese people in a state of perpetual tension. This was conducive to strengthening the legitimacy of the CCP rule in the wake of the Tiananmen Incident, when the Chinese communist regime was discredited at home and came under strong fire from international society. The crisis became even more evident following the cascade of collapsing European communist regimes in and after 1989. The Chinese leaders feared lest the snowball of the political upheavals shaking Eastern Europe and the USSR should threaten their own survival. Therefore, by invoking the example of the beleaguered early Soviet socialist state under Lenin and the terms “the peaceful evolution” and “the international hostile forces,” the CCP regime was able to use the bogey of potential national anarchy and unbridled foreign anti-China sentiment to hang on to power.

Indeed, China had been subjected to Western imperial thrashing in the past. The country’s traumatic national experiences still loom large in the Chinese psyche today. In China, a country long suffering from the invasion of others, this defensive fear has not
only taken deep roots but also long sponsored appropriate countermeasures, both culturally and politically. As a result, Chinese officials and scholars resolved to exploit and intermingle such sorry historical memories and the precedent of the early Soviet Union that had been similarly falling prey to Western sanctions. In so doing, they were able to appeal to the deep-rooted Chinese victim mentality, and present the communist regime as endeavouring to resist China’s victimization in the international community again. They made use of the example of the early Soviet Union to mobilize and enhance the enthusiasm of Chinese people, and directed them to embrace a new wave of self-strengthening reform for getting the better of the post-Tiananmen sanctions. Therefore, they achieved the goal of strengthening CCP legitimacy after the end of the Cold War by playing the cards of the traditional Chinese victim mentality and an exaggerated post-Tiananmen international hostility.

Second, debates over the lessons of the failure of communism in Eastern Europe and the USSR from 1989 onward coincidentally paralleled the intra-CCP power struggle after the Tiananmen crisis. The epochal event in Moscow at the end of 1991 provided a motor for the leftist countercurrent, which questioned many of the fundamental directions taken by China under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership. Interpretations of Lenin’s writings became a major ideological weapon in the struggle between the forces for and against reforms in the CCP.

After Tiananmen, Lenin was used as a device to limit the scope of reform-oriented

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447 For details, see Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Baogang He and Yingjie Guo, Nationalism, National Identity and Democratization in China (Aldershot; Brookfield USA: Ashgate, 2000).
criticism, and he was seen as a man who had come to appreciate the need for substantial market forces. Chinese scholars argued that Lenin remained fundamentally relevant to China’s socialist reform and open door policies. In their opinion, the first Soviet leader did not oppose capitalist elements, though he also was not dependent on them. He advocated establishing a regime with the combination of a strong proletarian dictatorship and market economic mechanism. Chinese scholars claimed that Deng’s reform and open door agendas after 1978 were emblematic of Lenin’s theories. Their conclusion served to defend Deng’s post-Tiananmen policy of accelerating reforms and resist the attacks of the Party leftists, who attempted to challenge Deng’s position and policies. The use of Lenin after Tiananmen demonstrates that most Chinese officials and scholars had generally stood by on the side of the reformist wing, and largely supported and defended reforms in the communist system. They did not suggest tight controls in China even in the wake of Tiananmen and the Soviet disintegration.

Third, the three year period between the Tiananmen Incident and the disintegration of the Soviet Union was an earth-shaking period that nearly convulsed the CCP regime. The Chinese reformist leadership led by Deng Xiaoping understood very well that only by successfully carrying out the reforms would the Chinese communist state be able to regain the legitimacy that it had lost. They were eager to explore a new way of dispelling tough resistance by the hardliners and make a breakthrough. They needed to regenerate the Party that was still in a coma after experiencing a heavy blow by the Tiananmen crisis and the ensuing collapse of communism in Europe.

As seen in this chapter, it is apparent that both Chinese officials and Soviet-watchers
were trying to use the interpretation of Lenin’s writings to create new momentum. They intended for this momentum to revive China’s reform and open door policies, and to further the cause of socialist modernization that had been championed since 1978. Lenin was a means to rally support for the forces of pro-reform. Afterward, China was bolder in embracing economic liberalization while still refusing to transform its quasi-Leninist political system. Especially after Deng’s southern tour in 1992, the CCP formally adopted the concept of “socialist market economy.” China then registered unprecedented economic growth and experienced profound social transformation throughout the rest of the 1990s, a phenomenon that continued in the 21st century. As Jean-Philippe Béja comments, “The Tiananmen tragedy remains a knot that must be untied and a barrier that must be removed in China’s continuous advance toward modernity.” The use of Lenin after Tiananmen was seen to be the best way for China to untie the “knot” and remove the “barrier.”

Last, we may conclude by saying that 1990s Chinese Sovietology’s main purpose in quoting Lenin’s foreign policy in the early Soviet Union, as well as his willingness to learn from capitalism, was to construct a rallying point. This rallying point was intended to re-legitimize and reconceptualise the post-Mao state policy of building an amorphous socialism with a distinctive Chinese flavour, amid the setback of the Tiananmen crisis when the Chinese party-state had become an internationally shunned regime, and worldwide socialism had reached a dead end. Scholars put Deng and Lenin together in

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their articles, demonstrating that Deng was the true disciple of Lenin, who was seen as the embodiment of post-Mao China’s direction. They argued that Deng had further developed and flourished Lenin’s theories alongside Chinese realities, and made great strides in socialist modernization. To quote from the final thoughts of Ye Zicheng (a professor at Beijing University) in his 1997 article:

Open door policy is the essence of socialism with Chinese characteristics. It carries on the legacy of Marxism-Leninism and brings it into full play today. The policy holds an important place in China’s socialist construction. We can even say that socialism with Chinese characteristics simply means opening socialism to the outside world.450

The use of Lenin demonstrates that Chinese scholars viewed the former Soviet Union as both a warning from the past as well as an image of a possible Chinese state in the future. The example of Lenin’s post-1917 open policy reveals that Chinese scholars regarded the continued reform to be the best measure for saving socialism after Tiananmen. In their understanding, only a strong, stable, open, and wealthy state could ensure that the socialist system would survive in the long term. After Tiananmen, Chinese scholars not only demonstrated concern for the survival of the CCP regime, but also attempted to envision the future direction and position of China in the post-communist world. This included analysis of how China could rise to be a powerful nation under the authoritarian one-party rule, without succumbing to Western democracy and the sort of collapse that engulfed the USSR – all of which had been evidenced by the use of Lenin after Tiananmen, as presented in this chapter.

Concluding remarks

In conclusion, then, the shift of Chinese perceptions of Gorbachev across the 1990 divide had little to do with the barometer of Sino-Soviet relations at the time. In fact, both countries had achieved rapprochement and ended past conflicts while still under the Gorbachev administration. After Gorbachev’s abolition of the CPSU power monopoly in March 1990, the CCP regime interpreted that such a move would pose a threat to China’s own communist dictatorship. Following this, Chinese scholars looked at Gorbachev’s behaviour with great anxiety and started to explicitly attack his foreign policy after early 1990. Nevertheless, Chinese scholars reduced their criticisms of Gorbachev in and after the mid-1990s, as a strategic partnership was created between the PRC and Russia after the end of the Cold War, and with the increasing amount of bilateral economic and security cooperation. Moreover, some Chinese Soviet-watchers took account of the bitter lessons learned from the Sino-Soviet hostility that had taken place under Mao Zedong, in which name-calling and exchanges of verbal attacks had severely damaged relations between the two countries. They made it clear that this tragedy should not be repeated, and this understanding also restrained them from excessively criticizing the last Soviet leader.

After the Tiananmen Incident in 1989, interpretation of Lenin’s writings by Chinese scholars generally supported Deng Xiaoping’s reformist policies and legitimized his position at home against the comeback of the leftist offensive. Chinese scholarship put Deng and Lenin on the same level and stated that Deng had long followed Lenin’s
principle of building socialism. Moreover, Lenin’s foreign policy and his rule during the
early Soviet Union were selected as they had meshed well with the stance and interest of
China after Tiananmen, since both regimes were bound by the common aspirations of
rising to be global powers amid international hostility. Chinese scholars praised Lenin’s
agenda that embraced reforms and learning from the West, while persisting with
communist dictatorship, as the key to saving the PRC from the setback of Tiananmen and
to keeping socialism vital in the future.

In early 1993, Wu Xiuquan sent his New Year letter to IREECAS, and asked that the
Chinese scholars researching on the regions of the former Soviet Union commit
themselves to “strengthening academic exchange and enhancing mutual friendship.” 451
However, as seen in this chapter, Chinese Sovietology could never be as simple as
“strengthening academic exchange” or “enhancing mutual friendship.” In 1997, Party
Secretary General Jiang Zemin disseminated the following words in his inaugural lecture
at the CCP 15th Congress:

Deng Xiaoping Theory is the principle to understand the world. It has correctly analysed
and made scientific judgments of the characteristics of contemporary era, the international
situation, the failure of some socialist states, the lessons of developing nations, and the
experience of advanced countries. The world is changing rapidly, and Marxists in any
countries must tackle with this matter seriously. Deng Xiaoping Theory defines our Party
line and international strategy. It requires us to comprehend, carry on, and develop Marxism.
By doing so, we can only call ourselves as true Marxists, and sticking to old habits would
get us nowhere.452

While not a determinant in China’s foreign policy making, Chinese Sovietology is

not able to remain outside the confines of Chinese politics. The Party guidepost always transcendsthe academic norm. In response to the Party call, Chinese Soviet-watchers have to trim their aims, align the subject on the basis of ideology, and consign Soviet studies to the backstage of “Party line and international strategy,” in order to “comprehend, carry on, and develop Marxism.” Seen from Part One of the thesis, Chinese Sovietology, by providing both principles and tactics, had been making assessments and proposing solutions on economic and political aspects of contemporary China, friendships and struggles in PRC’s international relations. Through the interplay of politics and scholarship, scholars projected and envisioned the future of China in the post-communist world.

Part Two of the thesis will investigate the changing Chinese views of Soviet leaders and politics, through discussions of Chinese Soviet-watchers on different Soviet leaders and their political agendas in the 1980s and 1990s. The next chapter will study how Chinese scholars exploited the policies of Lenin and Gorbachev to tackle the political situation in 1980s China, after the disastrous Mao era and before the gathering storm of the Tiananmen Incident, respectively. It will show that many Chinese scholars interpreted the writings and programs of Lenin and Gorbachev in their favour. Their goal was mainly to use the policies of these two Soviet leaders to support the reformers in their power struggle against the conservatives within the CCP, reorient the direction of post-Mao Chinese socialism, and legitimize reform and open door policies set by the Party.
Part Two

Analyses of Soviet Leaders and Politics

Chapter 5

The 1980s Chinese Perceptions of Lenin’s Socialism and Gorbachev’s Glasnost

Introductory remarks

After the death of Mao Zedong, when China gradually initiated reform and open door policies, Soviet leaders’ political agendas were no less appealing to post-Mao China than were Western agendas. This chapter will show that Chinese scholars made tactical use of the writings and programs of Vladimir Lenin and Mikhail Gorbachev; this was done to grasp the nettle of Chinese socialism in the 1980s, after the disastrous Cultural Revolution and before the gathering storm of the Tiananmen demonstrations in 1989, respectively.

According to the secondary scholarship, Chinese Sovietology after 1991 has consistently emphasized the role of Gorbachev and his policies, which (in the eyes of the Chinese communist regime) brought about the downfall of the Soviet empire. In reality, however, Chinese Soviet-watchers were researching various Soviet leaders throughout the 1980s and 1990s – and particularly Lenin, who featured prominently in Chinese writings and claimed equal importance to Gorbachev. In the early 1980s, Chinese scholars used the first Soviet leader, Lenin, and his writings to rebuild faith in socialism and to disperse scepticism of the CCP regime after the disastrous Mao era. While some pieces of work resorted to using Lenin’s socialist humanism to attack Maoism and Chinese communist rule, most of the time Chinese scholars used Lenin to strengthen the weakening legitimacy of Chinese socialism without tarnishing the image of Mao, and to command
support for new leader Deng Xiaoping’s open door policy and future reforms. Their main argument pointed out that Lenin’s moderate approach to socialism should be China’s model after Mao.

From the mid-1980s onward, Gorbachev’s *glasnost* (openness) became a popular topic in China. Back then, many Chinese Soviet-watchers praised Gorbachev’s *glasnost* and political reform as a return to Lenin’s orthodox socialism. They were keen to learn from Gorbachev’s programs and portray them as *deus ex machina* for China, in the hope that his thinking might become a stimulus for further political change in the PRC after the initial economic reform that had begun in 1978. Indeed, as we will see in this chapter, the previous secondary literature has noted the enormous impact that Gorbachev and his political liberalization policy known as *glasnost* (openness) had on 1980s China. It has been reported that Gorbachev’s program inspired the former Party Secretary General Zhao Ziyang’s political reform proposal on the eve of the Tiananmen Incident in 1989. He was held in enormously high esteem among Chinese intellectuals in the 1980s. His enthusiasm for freedom and the reform of socialism were instrumental in stirring up the student protests in Tiananmen Square. Demonstrators used his example to pressure the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping into abandoning the authoritarian rule of the Chinese government. Moreover, the existing literature points out that Chinese Sovietologists admired Gorbachev’s political reform as a model for China’s democratization in the 1980s.

This chapter will clarify that the popularity of Gorbachev and his programs in China was not only owing to the extraordinary openness and budding democracy of the Chinese political environment after the mid-1980s. The impact of Gorbachev’s policies after the mid-1980s can also be seen in Chinese scholars’ use of them to support the reformist Secretary General Zhao Ziyang in his power struggle against the Party conservatives.
Part Two—Chapter 5

leading up to the Tiananmen Incident in 1989. Moreover, the chapter argues that the attractiveness of Gorbachev’s glasnost policy to 1980s Chinese scholars was not because it symbolized Western-style democracy; instead, they embraced glasnost as a type of “democracy under socialism,” and saw it as being equivalent to the “neo-authoritarianism” of Zhao Ziyang that championed pluralism under a strong government.

The Use of Lenin in early 1980s China

After Mao Zedong died in 1976, China was on the brink of a precipice: the country needed to deal with its dire economy, and the people needed to heal the trauma of the decay of social morale. Most importantly, the Party was facing the two mammoth tasks of rebuilding state institutions and restoring its citizens’ faith in communism; both of these had been heavily ravaged by Mao and his radical socio-political movement of the Cultural Revolution.

In the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee taking place in late 1978, which signalled CCP’s complete departure from past Maoist politics and opened the door for future reforms, Deng Xiaoping, chairman of the Party Central Committee and the de facto Chinese new leader, stated that China’s most imminent problems were its self-isolation and economic and technological backwardness.453 After the passage of time, he increasingly realized that Mao’s legacy in China largely consisted only of spiritual and moral disruption.454 In Deng’s mind, it was not only the leftist ideology that was inimical to China’s coming post-Mao reforms. Since the emergence of the Democracy Wall movement in 1978/1979, Deng increasingly felt uncomfortable with China’s widespread

scepticism of socialism, which had been bred by decades of Maoist terror. After squelching the Democracy Wall movement, Deng seriously criticized “a small number of persons” who had attacked the CCP by “raiding Party and government organizations,” and “slandering Comrade Mao Zedong.” He argued that “it is not enough for us to keep on resolutely eliminating the pernicious influence of the Gang of Four,” and warned, “Both the ultra-Left and Right currents of thought run counter to Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought and obstruct our advance towards modernization.” In order to shore up the post-Mao regime, Chinese officials and scholars in the early 1980s acted in concert to find the right formula from the creeds of the first Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin. They hoped to clean up the dregs of Maoism and restore what they saw as true socialism, as well as to discourage deviation from Marxist orthodoxy.

Two significant articles were published in Renmin ribao in 1980, one of which was edited by the CCP Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, and the other of which was written by IREECAS scholar Song Hongxun. Both articles reiterated Lenin’s teaching that it is compulsory to persevere in the priority of economic construction, once proletarian revolution has taken hold in a culturally and socially backward country like China. Both articles concluded that economy, not politics, is the linchpin for consolidating the proletarian dictatorship. Referring to Lenin’s work, Qi Shirong, a professor of history at Beijing Capital Normal University, emphasized that “violence is by

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455 Democracy Wall was the first political dissent movement in Post-Mao China, which demanded the institution of democracy and the rule of law, to replace the Party dictatorship. For the panorama of the movement, see Chapter 3 in Richard Baum, Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 66-93.


no means of the essence of proletarian dictatorship.”  

Chun Yuyu, a professor in the Institute of Contemporary Socialism at Shandong University, strongly criticized China’s past abuse and mechanical understanding of “continued revolution” (buduan geming). Chun brought in Lenin’s speech to emphasize that exaggerating the importance of revolution had been destructive for China in the past.  

On the other hand, another group of works played a role in safeguarding the role of Chinese socialism by quoting Lenin’s phrases. In 1980, an article appeared in *Beijing Review* commenting on the case of former PRC statesman Liu Shaoqi, whose course for modernization had been rejected in political struggle and who died at the hands of Mao in 1969; the article eulogized Liu’s great contributions to the Chinese revolution. The editorial took advantage of the posthumous rehabilitation of Liu in 1980, to demonstrate that the CCP “has restored the true qualities of Mao Zedong Thought,” and “has firm unity within its ranks and firm unity with the people.” The article quoted Lenin’s following words to pay respect to the CCP and defend its position:  

The attitude of a political party towards its own mistakes is one of the most important and surest ways of judging how earnest the party is and how it in practice fulfils its obligations towards its class and the toiling masses. Frankly admitting a mistake, ascertaining the reasons for it, analysing the conditions which led to it, and thoroughly discussing the means of correcting it – that is the hallmark of a serious party.  

In scholarly writings, while in complete agreement with reinstating socialist humanism (shehui zhuyi rendao zhuyi) in Lenin’s terms, Ma Jihua, a researcher at the
Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, considered humanism to not be an abstract concept. He remarked that many slogans derived from bourgeois humanism, such as “freedom, equality, fraternity, democracy, and human right,” are “oppositional to Marxism-Leninism.” After encapsulating all the essentials of Lenin in constructing socialism in an economically backward country, both Wu Renzhang (an IREECAS scholar) and Xu Pohan (director of the Institute of Scientific Socialism at the Shanxi Provincial Academy of Social Sciences) averred that, while focusing on the productive forces is indispensable, the most fundamental tenet of Leninism is upholding the proletarian dictatorship and communist one-party rule.

The two categories of writings above are not contradictory but complementary to each other. Both Party mouthpiece papers and scholarly works adroitly manipulated the tenets of Lenin’s thought, in an attempt to renew the CCP legitimacy after the discredited Maoist era. They did this by undercutting the position of residual radical and conservative forces, and arresting the cynicism and crisis of faith in communism – two of the biggest political and ideological tasks haunting Deng’s early rule.

To confront the post-Mao crisis, the early Deng regime also attempted to find a way to overhaul the outdated Maoist institutions. Deng once boiled down all his thoughts on Party reform in a talk to an enlarged meeting of the Politburo in 1980. His standards consisted of several elements, such as institutionalization of the Party system, facilitating the economy, parrying the errors done by the Cultural Revolution, and most importantly, strengthening but not enervating the Party dictatorship.

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democracy was no different to that of Mao, who viewed “the extension of democracy in the party” as a way to “strengthen discipline” and “an essential step in its consolidation and development.”

Deng did not regard Mao as having created the wrong system; rather, it was the bad elements of the system that distorted Mao’s behaviours. Most importantly, Deng perceived that Mao had actually undermined the CCP during his rule, so it was essential for the post-Mao political reform not to de-centralize the Party power, but to reinforce it for ruling the PRC more effectively. This thesis has been corroborated by Frank Dikötter and Michel Bonnin. Both scholars argue in their books that Mao’s numerous mass political campaigns not only destroyed the social fabric of China, but also hollowed out the communist ideology and ultimately buried Maoism. After the departure of Mao, the new CCP leadership realized that the prior personalized and dogmatic politics had led to bureaucratic inefficiency, and the absence of systems of responsibility and administrative regulations.

To keep up the tempo, Chinese scholars took great efforts to invoke Lenin’s writings and the early Soviet rule for promoting China’s socialist political reform (or, more accurately speaking, administrative reform). First, China under Mao had suffered from rampant bureaucratisms, and curbing the infestation of bureaucratic practice was a major

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466 Ezra Vogel also holds a similar point of view. He remarks that during the Cultural Revolution, Deng “was convinced that China's problems resulted not only from Mao's errors but also from deep flaws in the system that had produced Mao and had led to the disastrous Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution.” Ezra Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011), 44-45.
agenda of Deng’s political reform.\textsuperscript{469} Some writers remarked that, according to Lenin, the root of bureaucratism is found in the legacy of old society, feudalism, and colonization.\textsuperscript{470} Others argued (by drawing on Lenin’s works) that the disease of Soviet bureaucratism had originated in the Tsarist tradition, the pathetic economy, and a low level of education of the masses before 1917.\textsuperscript{471}

As a commentator in \textit{Beijing Review} pointed out, in Lenin’s view all the Soviet Union’s problems after the October Revolution could be traced back to its “semi-Asiatic conditions.”\textsuperscript{472} China, according to the author, “was much more backward than Russia in Lenin’s time,” and the past backslide of the Cultural Revolution was a “typical feudal-bureaucrat autocracy home-grown on the ruins of the millennia-old feudal empire.” The commentator finally suggested that the CCP was only “a victim of feudalism,” and “eliminating the influence of feudalism institutionally and ideologically, therefore, is necessarily an urgent task in Party building in the period ahead.”\textsuperscript{473} The conclusion of these arguments can be summed up as stating that bureaucratism and other negative vestiges in the socialist states are by no means the intrinsic problem of socialism; instead, they are the dross from old tradition and old society.

Second, Chinese scholars appreciated several of Lenin’s points in reference to the early Deng political reform. Using Lenin’s work encouraging mass participation in governmental administration, Xiao Lifeng, a professor at the Zhongnan University of


Economics and Law in Hubei Province, argued that proletarian democracy is far superior to bourgeois democracy; in the former system it is the people who have the oversight of the state, while the exploitative class dominates in the latter system.\footnote{Xiao Lifeng, “Lunjianshe gaodu minzhude shehui zhuyi zhengzhi zhidude jichuhe zhangai” [On Basis and Obstacles of Constructing a Highly Democratic Socialist Political Institution], Shehui zhuyi yanjiu, no. 3 (1982): 3. On Lenin’s original, see Lenin, “The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government,” in Lenin, Collected Works, February-July 1918, 27: 235-77.} According to IREECAS scholar Xu Yunpu’s survey, the Soviet state institutions under Lenin were “a highly democratic socialist system,” and “a thousand times better than bourgeois democracy.” In his view, Lenin’s creation “should be the right direction for all future socialist democratic developments.”\footnote{Xu Yunpu, “Liening shiqide suweiai guojia zhidu” [The Soviet State Institutions under Lenin], 14-15.} 

In addition, aside from having agreed with Lenin’s thesis that proletarian democracy should be advanced over bourgeois democracy, and that it is the highest form of democracy in the world, scholars Hong Yunshan (a researcher at the Sichuan Provincial Academy of Social Sciences) and Wang Lixing (a researcher at the Shandong Provincial Academy of Social Sciences) argued (by quoting The State and Revolution) that in order to facilitate the implementation of proletarian democracy, proletarian dictatorship (the synonym of communist party dictatorship) is essential. In their final judgment, proletarian dictatorship should exist until the state enters the stage of communism.\footnote{Hong Yunshan, “Makeside guojia xueshuohe wuchan jieji guojiade benzhi” [Marx’s Thesis on the Nature of Proletarian States], Shehui kexue yanjiu, no. 2 (1983): 44. Wang Lixing, “Lieningde wuchan jieji minzhu sixiang” [Lenin’s Thoughts on Proletarian Democracy], Shehui zhuyi yanjiu, no. 5 (1984): 18. On Lenin’s original, see Lenin, “The State and Revolution,” in Lenin, Collected Works, July-September 1917, 25: 381-492.} 

Seen from the comparison between Deng and the Chinese writings presented above, scholars’ arguments on the characteristics of Lenin’s rule in the early Soviet Union largely resonated with the thrust of Deng’s various speeches. Under the full cover of the most authoritative communist leader Lenin, Chinese scholars ascribed all the past defects and wrongdoings in socialist China to the imperial and feudal tradition before 1949 – the
They suggested that all impoverishments and sufferings of pre-1976 PRC had little to do with the true nature of socialism or even Mao himself. Their assurance of the absolute superiority of proletarian democracy and the fundamental necessity of holding fast a proletarian dictatorship was undoubtedly welcomed by the Deng regime, which at the time desperately sought a theoretical basis for keeping the corpus of Mao unimpaired and ensuring the long-term survival of communist rule in China.\(^{478}\) China specialist Willy Wo-Lap Lam once commented that Deng’s blind faith in the absolute necessity of CCP leadership, and his intolerance of people who oppose socialism, had demonstrated that the Chinese leader “never tried, or dared, to exorcise totally the Chairman’s ghost,” and he “was nothing more than Mao’s disciple.” \(^{479}\)

There is a more telling example illustrating why Lenin was so relevant to the political context of China in the early 1980s. Deng Xiaoping had been quite enthralled by the first decade of the PRC administration, when Mao’s personal power was subordinated to the collective leadership or democratic centralism of the CCP. He once stated, “Comrade Mao Zedong’s leadership was correct before 1957,” \(^{480}\) and complained that since the Great Leap Forward “this fine tradition has not been upheld, nor has it been incorporated into a strict and perfected system.” \(^{481}\) In his speech on Party reform in 1980, Deng prioritized tackling the over-concentration of power in the hands of an individual, as “it hinders the

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\(^{477}\) The post-Mao CCP regime also had such judgment on the nature of the disastrous Cultural Revolution. See Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhongyang Weiyuanhui [The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party], *Guanyu jianguo yilai dangde ruogan lishi wentide jueyi* [Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the PRC] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1981), 211.

\(^{478}\) Ibid., 171.


practice of socialist democracy and of the Party’s democratic centralism.” 482 He was fully aware that the over-concentration of individual power in leaders had become “one important cause of the Cultural Revolution,” and urged “no further delay in finding a solution to this problem.” 483 Even in the wake of the Tiananmen Incident, when the situation required the CCP to tighten the political screws in China, Deng still requested the Party to maintain “a strong collective leadership.” He said, “It is unhealthy and very risky to base the destiny of a country on the prestige of one or two individuals.” 484

In the early 1980s, the use of Lenin to corroborate the significance of democratic centralism in Party building had gained momentum, particularly after the release of Deng’s speech on political reform in August 1980.485 Under the umbrella of Lenin and his words, some articles compared the Soviet Union after Lenin and China during the Cultural Revolution. They made it clear that both periods had seriously violated the norms of democratic centralism and resulted in personal dictatorship and factional strife. 486 Others asserted that democratic centralism is the principle of intra-party democracy. They demanded that democratic centralism be re-enforced for rebuilding Party democracy in post-Mao China.487

An article appeared in 1985 that challenged the long-time Chinese understanding of “democratic centralism,” which had been mechanically interpreted as a simple equation

482 Ibid., 320.
483 Ibid., 328.
of democracy plus centralization. The author Shao Xing, a professor at the Central Party School, suggested that the Chinese translation of “democratic centralism” change from minzhu jizhongzhi to minzhude jizhongzhi, which would clarify its fundamental differences with the concept of bourgeois democracy and would be closer to Lenin’s definition. This was the first time in the PRC that a scholar unequivocally pointed out, in view of Lenin’s original work, that the term “demokraticheskii tsentralizm” (democratic centralism) should include both the adjective “demokraticheskii” (democratic) and the noun “tsentralizm” (centralism). “Demokraticheskii” is being used to modify the main word “tsentralizm.”

In another article published one year later, IREECAS scholar Li Yuanshu also studied the problematic Chinese definition of “democratic centralism” against Lenin’s original, and recommended that the Chinese translation be corrected by reprinting the word “centralism” in bold, for putting accent on the importance of the phrase in this context. Li argued that in Lenin’s organizational principle, the Bolshevik Party should be the combination of “strong collective leadership and iron discipline.” It was exactly such a powerful Party that had kept score during the victory of the October Revolution and withstood the harsh civil war and international hostility after 1917. Moreover, Li remarked that it was Stalin who had overturned the democratic centralism created and reinforced by Lenin after the latter’s pre-mature death, and since then the USSR had evolved into a state saddled with tyranny and ideological fetishism.

Before the 1949 liberation, British journalist James Bertram wrote that he, being from a Western context, felt puzzled by the self-contradictory term “democratic centralism” and asked Mao Zedong for clarification. Mao answered:

On the one hand, the government we want must be truly representative of the popular will: it must have the support of the broad masses throughout the country and the people must be free to support it and have every opportunity of influencing its policies. This is the meaning of democracy. On the other hand, the centralization of administrative power is also necessary, and once the policy measures demanded by the people are transmitted to their own elected government through their representative body, the government will carry them out and will certainly be able to do so smoothly, so long as it does not go against the policy adopted in accordance with the people’s will. This is the meaning of centralism. Only by adopting democratic centralism can a government be really strong.  

Mao’s response came at a time when a strong Chinese government was needed in resisting the Japanese aggression in the 1930s. Upon the end of Mao’s radical era and at the beginning of the 1980s, when China was ready to return to normal politics, the 1982 PRC Constitution stipulated that democratic centralism should be the guiding principle for the actions of the CCP, and defined the term in the following words:

Within the Party, democracy is given full play, a high degree of centralism is practiced on the basis of democracy and a sense of organization and discipline is strengthened, so as to ensure unity of action throughout its ranks and the prompt and effective implementation of its decisions. Applying the principle that all members are equally subject to Party discipline, the Party duly criticizes or punishes those members who violate it and expels those who persist in opposing and harming the Party.

The Constitution also specified that there are two essential elements making up democratic centralism. While the second guideline states that the Party must be the representative of “the broadest masses of the people,” the most important clause is that the CCP should form “a high degree of ideological and political unity,” and should be “in adherence to the socialist road, to the people’s democratic dictatorship, and to Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought and in the concentration of our efforts on socialist modernization.” Clearly, the Russian original of democratic centralism in Lenin’s works has every signature of the ideological tradition of Chinese communism. Both of

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492 Ibid., 94.
these stress Party discipline and strong collective leadership, while keeping distance from Western liberalization and democracy. The term is not directed toward the expansion of individual rights, but for the power concentration of communist party. Lenin’s definition of democratic centralism was no doubt an effective tool used by the CCP in the early 1980s – useful for rebuilding intra-party democracy and erasing the lingering throes of Maoist dictatorship and factional struggle, while making a serious effort to strengthen the CCP rulership as it drove China into modernization.

Last, Deng Xiaoping on several occasions bluntly stated that the goal of his early 1980s political reform was to facilitate China’s modernization and economic development.\textsuperscript{493} Chinese scholars were also quoting Lenin at this time to promote Deng’s purpose. In 1984, Ren Jianxiong, a scholar at the Sichuan Provincial Academy of Social Sciences, described how Lenin in his later years had urgently felt the need to reform the Soviet political structure and shake off its economic backwardness. The scholar presented the substance of Lenin’s political reform after War Communism (1918-1921), which included distinguishing the responsibilities of the Party and of the government, allowing people to enjoy the right to manage state affairs, curbing bureaucraticism, achieving high working efficiency, training cadres with professional knowledge, and promoting a large number of young personnel.\textsuperscript{494} These agendas are almost identical to Deng’s mission published in his 1980 speech on reforming the Party and state institutions, and expediting the economic growth.\textsuperscript{495}

In the early 1980s, several articles also invoked Lenin’s words to say that socialism has no fixed model and people should not build socialism using only books and


experiences. They urged China to construct socialism based on its own conditions, and to draw lessons from either socialism or capitalism. The authors remarked that Lenin’s New Economic Policy (NEP, 1922-1928) would be exemplary for China, and associated War Communism and Stalinism with the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution under Mao. Deng once admitted that he did not know what socialism really meant, but he did know that socialism is certainly not pauperism, which was the situation under Mao. To quote his words in 1985:

What, after all, is socialism? The Soviet Union has been building socialism for so many years and yet is still not quite clear what it is. Perhaps Lenin had a good idea when he adopted the New Economic Policy. But as time went on, the Soviet pattern became ossified. We were victorious in the Chinese revolution precisely because we applied the universal principles of Marxism-Leninism to our own realities.

Whether the New Economic Policy was the correct model for China under Deng is not relevant in this context. The most important thing is that both Deng and Chinese scholars had been using the symbols of Lenin and his NEP as a public declaration for post-Mao China to renounce its past Soviet and Maoist shackles, and to live up to its claim of building and reforming socialism in a very different way.

**Lenin and post-Mao Chinese socialism**

As evident in the writings above, the influence of Lenin in the political context of early Deng’s China are multi-dimensional. First, throughout the 1980s Deng had stated

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unequivocally that, while he was itching for the reversal of Maoist radicalism, post-Mao China should “distinguish between socialist democracy on the one hand and bourgeois, individualist democracy on the other.” 500 Chinese people must be “under the leadership of the Communist Party,” and “cannot adopt the practice of the West.” 501 Some scholarly writings on Lenin in the early 1980s, while ostensibly paying lip service to the official line of opposing bourgeois liberalization, boldly attacked many dark sides of the CCP regime: continuous revolution, class struggle, and the trampling of human rights. By drawing upon Lenin, scholars were advocating for Chinese people to have a real say in managing state affairs and ultimately to rebuilt what they saw as true socialism. They claimed to target the derailment of the Cultural Revolution; in essence, their writings seemed to be an unspoken disguise for criticizing Mao and his tyrannical rule. 502

Moreover, the central point of these writings was demanding the restoration of “people’s democratic rights,” and the authors considered such rights to be inseparable from true socialism as defined by Lenin. 503 People’s democratic rights in the context of these works did not seem to conform to the thinking of Deng, who linked “democracy for the people with dictatorship over the enemy, and with centralism, legality, discipline and the leadership by the Communist Party,” and stressed “the importance of subordinating personal interests to collective ones, interests of the part to those of the whole, and

immediate to long-term interests.”  

Because these scholars signalled a discrepancy with (though not an outright rejection of) the orthodox CCP ruling philosophy, it was convenient to draw upon Lenin. That is, Lenin was a sacrosanct symbol and figure who might instigate less political danger. Thus, Lenin’s thought was applied to Chinese writings in order to ask for the return of humanistic socialism, if not wholesale democracy in the Western sense; this occurred in the early 1980s when the vestiges of Maoism were still rampant in the PRC.

Second, once Mao died in 1976, Deng had to wait for several years to outdo his rival Hua Guofeng (allegedly Mao’s designated successor), and to rise to the dominant position of the Party in the early 1980s. During this interim, Deng was facing intensive competition for power from Hua Guofeng. In a 1979 speech, Deng employed Mao’s maxim “seeking truth from facts” to symbolize his pragmatic approach, and to oppose the dogmatic stand of “two whatevers” upheld by Hua. Deng accused that the “two whatevers” “did not represent Marxism-Leninism,” and were “merely peddling the old stock in trade of Lin Biao and the Gang of Four in new guise.” He even argued that the contest of these two political lines (Hua and himself) was the life-and-death struggle for the mandate to rule China after Mao. One may assume that if Hua Guofeng proclaimed

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506 Hua Guofeng’s claim that “we will resolutely uphold whatever policy decisions Chairman Mao made, and unswervingly follow whatever instructions Chairman Mao gave,” which first appeared in “Xuehao wenjian zhuahaogang,” [Study the Documents Well and Grasp the Key Link] Renmin ribao, February 7, 1977. Whether Hua indeed said these words remains open to question. However, he once said that “we must take the banner of Chairman Mao as a family heirloom and pass it to our subsequent generations.” See Hua Guofeng, “Zaimaozhu xi jianingtang luocheng dianli shangshi dianhui zu shang,” [A Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the Chairman Mao Memorial Hall] September 9, 1977. 360doc gerentushuguan [360doc Personal Library], http://www.360doc.com/content/13/0818/19/9851038_308104611.shtml [accessed January 1, 2017].

507 Deng, “The Organizational Line Guarantees the Implementation of the Ideological and Political Lines,”
that he had full legitimacy to succeed Mao, then Deng may have needed the umbrella of an ultimate figure of authority in the communist world to sustain his competition with Hua. The use of Lenin appears to be the best vehicle for serving Deng’s purpose in his political campaign against Hua and extricating China from Mao’s residue.

At the time, some Chinese scholars seemed to have been involved in the Deng-Hua rivalry and positioned themselves on Deng’s side in an effort to undermine Hua. A number of them cited Lenin’s debate with the left communists during the early Soviet Union, to serve their purpose in their articles.508 One example of this is the article written by Yang Yanjun, a researcher at the Harbin Academy of Social Sciences. Although the author did not mention the name of Hua Guofeng, he remarked that the goal of socialism is “developing the economy” but not aiming at “world revolution and class struggle.” 509 He praised Lenin’s stand on “prioritizing the economic development and criticizing the high-sounding style of the left communists,” who opted for “marching toward communism at the time when the Soviet Union was still underdeveloped.” 510 In some ways, Yang’s veiled attack seemed to target Hua’s assertions, as the Chairman announced that he would wholeheartedly follow Mao’s order of continuous revolution and class struggle, and proposed an over-ambitious plan for China to achieve industrial and agricultural modernization within ten years – this at a time when the country was still

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509 Yang Yanjun, “‘Zuopai gongchan zhuyizhe’ de gugou zhengcehe liening duitade pipan” [Lenin’s Criticism of the Domestic Policy of the ‘Left Communists’], 5.

510 Ibid., 13.

mired in a dismal economic state after the Cultural Revolution. Hua soon became the target of the CCP reformers, and his Maoist and bombastic style quickly turned into the source of his eventual downfall.

At the time Chinese scholars had wisely used Lenin for symbolizing Deng, whereby they attempted to break down the outdated Maoism and its incarnation in Hua and other leftists, and usher the PRC into a new age. According to Zhidong Hao, the goal of the new leadership headed by Deng Xiaoping after the death of Mao coincided with the goal of intellectuals to find out what had gone wrong in the Cultural Revolution. With Deng’s support, they first began to pave the way for a climate that tolerated more questioning, in an effort to overcome Mao’s dogmatism. From 1978 onward, with the help of intellectuals, Deng began to win the debate and forced Hua and his followers to suffer through self-criticism. The debate led to the firm establishment of Deng’s position in the Party. It also guaranteed the government’s shift from class struggle to the economy, a policy established in December 1978.\footnote{Zhidong Hao, \textit{Intellectuals at A Crossroads}, 101.}

Third, the use of Lenin in the early 1980s was also propitious in justifying Deng’s regime as the legitimate socialist government after the rejection of radical Maoism. Mao Zedong once commented:

\begin{quotation}
It was through the Russians that the Chinese found Marxism. Before the October Revolution, the Chinese were not only ignorant of Lenin and Stalin, they did not even know of Marx and Engels. The salvos of the October Revolution brought us Marxism-Leninism. The October Revolution helped progressives in China, as throughout the world, to adopt the proletarian world outlook as the instrument for studying a nation's destiny and considering anew their own problems. Follow the path of the Russians – that was their conclusion.\footnote{Mao, “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship,” June 30, 1949, in Mao Tse-tung, \textit{Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung}, 4: 413.}
\end{quotation}

Mao’s words actually reveal an undeniable veracity that, although the PRC was
created by Mao and his communist fellows, the founding principle and genesis of Chinese communism came from Lenin and the Soviet Union. In a 1979 speech, Deng pointed out squarely that Lin Biao and the Gang of Four were targeting not only Mao, but most importantly, Marxism-Leninism. At the same time, Party veteran Chen Yun in another speech put post-Mao China into the larger picture of the international communist movement, and argued that the fate of the CCP regime would affect the “victory of world communism.” According to him, the USSR after Lenin was no longer a socialist state in nature, as its intra-party democracy had been encroached upon since Stalin took power. He argued that post-Mao China should recover intra-party democracy and normal Party life – a return to Leninist norm. In other words, the CCP is an international socialist Party belonging to the global communist movement, and it is a truly Leninist Party, but by no means an indigenous product created by Mao. Consider, for example, that in a speech made by Ye Jianying, marshal of the People’s Liberation Army, the term “Marxism-Leninism” always precedes “Mao Zedong Thought.” Such a writing format became common in China after Mao’s death, and we can find many of these examples in the speeches and works of PRC officials from 1978 onward.

Deng once divided socialism into “utopian socialism” and “scientific socialism,” the latter of which included “the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong

Thought.” 519 Subsequently, Gao Fang, a professor of the history of communism at Renmin University, outspokenly remarked that both China under Mao and the USSR under Stalin had practiced utopian socialism, which plunged both states into “chaos and darkness.” He, therefore, demanded that post-Mao China return to the path of scientific socialism set by Lenin.520 The arguments above redefined the Chinese communist regime as a true Leninist state, the Maoist past being only an aberration but not the nature of the CCP. Deng’s rule was perceived as following the path of Lenin – orthodox socialism, not the socialism distorted by Mao. In sum, post-Mao China has devolved Mao’s role to the Party as a whole, and the CCP has identified itself as a legatee of Lenin rather than of Mao.

Having said this, the paradigm of Lenin in early 1980s China by no means functioned to overrule Mao. Mao founded the Chinese party-state in 1949, and his fate and the PRC are always inter-connected, so it would be out of the question for Deng to obliterate the unsurpassable landmark of Mao’s position through any measure. According to Yang Haikun, a professor of law at Suzhou University in Jiangsu Province, socialist democracy as defined by Lenin was not only antagonistic to “personal dictatorship and patriarchism,” but also incompatible with “anarchism and bourgeois liberalization,” which are the targets of every Chinese communist leader.521 Seen from the examples cited above, the use of Lenin after Mao’s death was mostly intended to cut away the bad side of Maoism only, and not to totally root out the status of Mao. As Deng once said, “Criticizing Comrade Mao’s personal mistakes alone will not solve problems.” He believed that it was “the faulty systems and institutions of the past” that pushed Mao “in the opposite direction.”

In reality, the use of Lenin in early 1980s China could be regarded as protecting or saving Mao’s place in history. CCP Secretary General Hu Yaobang once defined the quintessence of Maoism as “the integration of Marxism-Leninism and present Chinese realities,” which was “the only correct road opened by Mao for our future.” Hu equated Mao’s strategy of liberating China through encirclement of the cities from the countryside with Lenin’s victory of the October Revolution. He said that both courses were the same as they were “examples of seeking truth from facts and achieving successful revolutions by integrating the universal truth of Marxism.”

Hu’s words echoed Deng Xiaoping who had used the same motto “seeking truth from facts” to absolve Mao’s crimes and banish the remaining Maoists, while establishing his own credentials as China’s new leader and preparing the country for the path of socialist modernization.

From Deng’s point of view, the best part of Mao’s rule was before the Great Leap Forward in 1957, and during those years Mao “developed Lenin’s theory of Party building most comprehensively.” According to the CCP verdict, Mao only made mistakes in the evening of his life, a period that was the antipode to true Maoism. It seemed that true Maoism appeared before the emergence of the Great Leap Forward and it was equivalent to Leninism. The aim of post-Mao China was to return to true Maoism as well as Leninism. As American scholar David Goodman comments, the essence of the reforms launched in 1978 highlighted Deng’s obsession with “the golden age of the

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525 Ibid., 2: 56-57.
526 Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhongyang Weiyuanhui [The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party], Guanyu jianguo yilai dangde ruogan lishi wentide jueyi [Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the PRC], 272.
unforgettable 1950s,” when the collective leadership, inner-party democracy, style of honesty, cleanliness in government, and frugality in enterprise were the norm. In Goodman’s view, Deng was not “an innovator,” but rather “a traditionalist,” who was eager to restore the good sides of Maoism and legitimize contemporary politics.  

In 1981, Jiang Yihua, a professor of history at Fudan University in Shanghai, described War Communism as being equivalent to the direction under Mao, while the New Economic Policy symbolized Deng’s path of reform and open door. In the conclusion of his article, Jiang remarked that the formulation of the New Economic Policy was a result of Lenin having learned from the mistakes of War Communism. According to Gilbert Rozman, in the mind of Chinese Sovietologists in the 1980s, War Communism epitomized a rigid system that aimed to eliminate private property, commodity production, and market exchange. On the other hand, the New Economic Policy represented a moderate approach allowing small businesses, cultural diversity, and faster economic growth under the one-party rule, which is a model of value for present-day China and similar to the economic policy that Deng had carried out after 1978. In 1982, IREECAS scholar Ye Shuzong controverted some scholars’ arguments that War Communism was a leftist error while NEP was a clear manifestation of true Leninism. Ye demonstrated that the two programs were different stages of socialist revolution, and NEP could not have been conceived without the precedent of War Communism:

Lenin was a human being but not God. As a human being, his thoughts were changing from time to time. Both War Communism and the New Economic Policy were the ways used by Lenin to construct socialism. Such measures could not be found in the books of Marx.

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From War Communism to the New Economic Policy, every stage was the inseparable part leading to the development of Leninism.\(^{531}\)

Ye’s stand on Lenin was exactly the same as Deng’s view on Mao, evidenced by his 1977 speech entitled “Mao Zedong Thought Must Be Correctly Understood as an Integral Whole.”\(^{532}\)

Last, some Chinese scholars in the early 1980s greatly appreciated Lenin’s notion that socialism could be founded in a backward nation without previous experience in the capitalist stage.\(^{533}\) In their opinions, an economically backward country like China could reach the final victory of communism by learning from Lenin’s teachings, such as persisting in a proletarian dictatorship, observing advanced elements from all over the world, and most importantly, seeking truth from facts to build socialism.\(^{534}\) Chinese scholars’ defence of Lenin on this point was attempting to excuse the economic and social backwardness that still existed in China after more than three decades of the CCP rule. Lenin’s statement was being used to explain that the extensive poverty in early 1980s China was not due to Mao or the intrinsic Party rule, but rather to historical legacies of the feudal past – or something else altogether.

Through the enduring lustre of Lenin, scholars attempted to bring vigour to the weakening legitimacy of Chinese socialism after the Cultural Revolution, and to provide a mandate for Deng’s policies and future reforms. Interpretation of Lenin thus became a solvent of the old order as well as a catalyst for major changes in early 1980s China.

\(^{531}\) Ibid., 72.
\(^{533}\) On Lenin’s original, see Lenin, “On the So-Called Market Question,” in Lenin, Collected Works, 1893-1894, 1: 79.
Their introduction of Lenin’s argument laid the groundwork for the “primary stage of socialism” theory built on by the later CCP Secretary General Zhao Ziyang in his keynote speech delivered during the 13th Party Congress in 1987. In Zhao’s words, because China had attained socialism without proper capitalist experience before, the PRC may use whatever means is available to catch up with the advanced countries, including commodity economy and other capitalist elements. The use of Lenin’s argument also opened the path to Deng Xiaoping’s word-juggling of “socialist market economy” propounded in the early 1990s. The slogan envisions the future development framework of China, namely economic capitalism plus the guaranteed Chinese Communist Party monopoly. China in the early 1980s wanted to wriggle out of the Maoist model in economic terms, but still needed to retain socialism in political terms. Hoisting the flag of Lenin was a much-needed convenience for the PRC, as Lenin’s model of manipulating unorthodox methods to achieve orthodox socialism in a backward state bears the stamp of the Zeitgeist of post-Mao China. This Zeitgeist can be defined as: there is no universal truth, only the truth according to the tide is truth.

**Glasnost and China**

Former CCP Secretary General Zhao Ziyang once said that Soviet glasnost had more impact than “Western values, concepts, and political systems” in encouraging “China’s intellectuals, youth, and young workers to demand more democracy” in the 1980s. When Zhao was in power in the mid-1980s, with Deng Xiaoping’s approval he organized and supervised the first political reform group since the founding of the PRC, in order to

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design a proposal for the institutional restructuring of the CCP. Wu Guoguang, former advisor to Zhao and the chief editor of the Renmin ribao in the late 1980s, has revealed that during this period of formulating political reform, Zhao’s aim was to learn from Gorbachev and implement economic and political reforms in China concurrently. The Secretary General always asked the staff to obtain the minutes of the CPSU Congress (at which Gorbachev had delivered his speeches), in order to give him inspiration for China’s political reform. In addition, Zhao occasionally invited over the PRC ambassador to Moscow together with some well-known IREECAS Soviet specialists such as Wu Renzhang, Wang Qi, and Zhao Naibin – in order to provide him with seminar talks on Soviet glasnost. After he was removed from the leadership owing to his unwillingness to endorse the Tiananmen crackdown ordered by Deng Xiaoping, Zhao admitted that his thinking on political reform had changed in 1985/1986, when he was “aroused somewhat by events in the broader international environment and problems that had emerged in the Eastern Bloc.”

After the mid-1980s, not only Zhao Ziyang, but also other CCP leaders, such as Tian Jiyun and Bo Yibo, expressed their admiration for Gorbachev’s program and their willingness to learn from the Soviet experience. The official recognition obviously stimulated intellectual interest. In a speech given to the National Social Sciences Congress in April 1988, CASS President Hu Sheng complained that China had not previously carried out much research on Soviet politics owing to the Sino-Soviet conflicts,

539 Wu Guoguang, Zhaoziyang yuzhengzhi gaige [Political Reform under Zhao Ziyang] (Hong Kong: The Pacific Century Institute, 1997), 306.
540 Ibid., 181.
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with the result that Chinese scholars lacked knowledge of recent developments, such as *glasnost*, in the Soviet Union. Hu urged Chinese people to conduct research into “Soviet political and economic structural reforms immediately,” as “those reforms are analogous to what China has undertaken,” stating that such comparative studies were “necessary and beneficial.” 543

At the same time, some Chinese scholars expressed their great appreciation for, and excitement about, Gorbachev and his political reform. 544 On hearing the Soviet announcement at the 27th CPSU Congress concerning the termination of the concentration of power in the hands of the Communist Party and the life-long tenure of the Secretary General, Gao Fang predicted that Gorbachev might become “a proletarian George Washington” and bring “a blessed message to socialism.” 545 Zhao Yuliang, a professor of economics at Beijing Jiaotong University, foresaw that Gorbachev’s reform would be “another epoch-making revolution comparable to the one under Peter the Great in Russian history.” 546 At the time, the Gorbachev fervour had influenced the Chinese language and writing style, evidenced by a piece of editorial statement in *Shehui zhuyi yanjiu* (Socialism Studies) in early 1989:

> According to socialist new thinking (*shehui zhuyi xinsiwei*), in the future, we will publish more articles rethinking the past, present, and future of socialism. We will emphasize on the aspect of being “new” when choosing the submissions. In line with the current trend of “*glasnost*” (*gongkaixing*), the journal in the future will let readers know more about our selection criteria, and invite you to participate in the selection process. 547

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544 British scholar Archie Brown recalls that during his study visit to China in 1988, he “encountered massive support among Chinese intellectuals, including those with expert knowledge of the Soviet Union, for the political reform process underway and for the great expansion in cultural freedom in the Soviet Union.” Brown says, “Gorbachev was held in enormously high esteem and there was a yearning for a ‘China’s Gorbachev’.” Archie Brown, *Seven Years that Changed the World: Perestroika in Perspective* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 107.
As discussed in the last chapter, Chinese scholars only started to have a good impression of Gorbachev’s foreign policy in late 1987, owing to the problems of Sino-Soviet relations at the time. However, a positive Chinese assessment of Soviet political reform had already appeared as early as 1986. In Renmin ribao, one commentator praised the new Soviet cultural policy for breaking through dogmatism and making a bold move to encourage the emergence of many dissenting works that were unthinkable in the past, such as sponsoring the production of movies that would address current Soviet social problems.\(^\text{548}\) IREECAS scholar Zhou Xiangguang in a special report (zhuangao) strongly agreed with the new Soviet direction, stating that only by being accompanied by political restructuring could economic reform become successful.\(^\text{549}\) At the same time, other Chinese scholars also appreciated Gorbachev’s courage in reforming the ossified Soviet political system after he took power.\(^\text{550}\)

In contrast with the Chinese reaction to Soviet foreign policy in the 1980s, China’s positive response to Soviet glasnost and political reform was far more obvious and appeared not long after Gorbachev took the helm. The reasons were manifold. The most important of these was the extraordinary openness and budding democracy of the Chinese political environment after the mid-1980s. At a national symposium in 1986, Vice-Premier Wan Li had already called for the introduction of “a more democratic and scientific policy decision-making process” in the CCP.\(^\text{551}\) In 1988, one author publicly


demanded the end of censorship in China.\textsuperscript{552} The National People’s Congress (NPC), the national legislature of China, vetoed a personnel appointment recommended by the CCP, which was unprecedented in PRC history and, as the \textit{Renmin ribao} reporter described, “a manifestation of the increased democratic awareness of NPC members.”\textsuperscript{553} In the realm of academia, in 1986 the editorial board of \textit{Shehui kexue yanjiu} (Social Science Research), funded by the Sichuan Provincial Academy of Social Sciences, published an article in which, after a re-examination of the disastrous decade of the Cultural Revolution, it was suggested that China learn from the West in “instituting political democratization and allowing intellectuals to be critical of those in power.”\textsuperscript{554} At CASS, a new policy issued in early 1989 encouraged scholars to “apply research methodologies that are not concerned with Marxist theory, as long as they abide by the Chinese Constitution.”\textsuperscript{555}

Second, since the mid-1980s China had placed political reform high on the agenda. In 1986, Deng Xiaoping acknowledged that, “without political reform, economic reform cannot succeed,” and “the success of all our other reforms depends on the success of the political reform.”\textsuperscript{556} Back then, even the Party conservatives, such as Peng Zhen and Bo Yibo, voiced their support for initiating political reform in China.\textsuperscript{557} In response to the official mandate, several articles appeared in various journals. The authors proposed that

\textsuperscript{554} Bianjibu [The Editorial Board], “Duiwenge delishi fansi” [The Historical Re-examination of the Cultural Revolution], \textit{Shehui kexue yanjiu}, no. 5 (1986): 129.
\textsuperscript{556} Deng, “Help the People Understand the Importance of the Rule of Law,” June 28, 1986, in Deng, \textit{Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping}, 3: 167. However, in the minds of Deng and the Party old guard, their definition of political reform was different with that of Gorbachev, let alone Western-style democracy. For them, political reform is the knee-jerk reaction of the Chinese authoritarian state seeking to retain its power.
China should closely scrutinize the process of political reforms in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and argued strongly that economic modernization could not be realized without socialist democracy.\textsuperscript{558} Seen from the perspective of such scholars’ profound esteem for \textit{glasnost}, those Chinese observers of the Soviet Union might either have been genuinely impressed by Gorbachev’s program, or have wanted to speed up China’s own \textit{glasnost} and seek to highlight the achievements of Soviet political reform in order to give the Chinese regime the extra push that was needed for the adoption of similar measures.

Last, although Sino-Soviet relations were mediocre at the time, the diplomatic deadlock did not translate into China’s total rejection of Gorbachev’s political reform. In a press conference held in 1988, Premier Li Peng stated that the prerequisite of the improvement of bilateral relations must be the removal of the three obstacles, and urged Gorbachev to do so accordingly. However, when being asked about his view on Soviet political reform, the Premier answered that he was delighted to note “the dynamic atmosphere of the last 19th CPSU Conference,” and gave his “best wishes for the success of the Soviet reforms.”\textsuperscript{559} Li Peng’s words demonstrate that Maoism had been removed from the PRC after 1978. Chinese communist leadership understood how to evaluate the Soviet Union more objectively and recognized the need to de-ideologize international relations.

There are two features in Chinese writings to expatiate on how scholars had made use of Gorbachev and \textit{glasnost} to speed up China’s political change after the mid-1980s. First, after 1986, many articles attempted to demonstrate that Gorbachev’s reforms were a


return to Lenin’s orthodox socialism. Some writers argued that Gorbachev’s economic restructuring was inspired by the New Economic Policy in the 1920s,560 and some contended that the concept of glasnost originated from Lenin.561 Others appreciated Gorbachev’s efforts in either re-establishing the people’s right to participate in state affairs,562 or in reinstating democratic and humanistic socialism.563 They argued that both had been developed by Lenin, but later sabotaged by Stalin, and had not been fully revived by the Soviet leaders after Stalin. It might be correct, based on the opening speech of the 27th CPSU Congress in February 1986, to say that Gorbachev’s reforms were a return to true Leninism;564 however, Chinese scholars had a tactical consideration in placing Gorbachev and Lenin in the same category.

Since Gorbachev’s program of glasnost had spread to China, Chinese intellectuals were keen to learn from it and portray it as a lesson for China, in the hope that Gorbachev’s thinking might stimulate further political change in the PRC after the initial economic reform that was begun in 1978. It should be noted that a short-lived campaign against bourgeois liberalization had emerged in the first half of 1987, after the 1986 student demonstrations and the forced resignation of Secretary General Hu Yaobang, who

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was accused of being sympathetic to bourgeois thinking.\textsuperscript{565} Although the event was not large in scale and was nothing like the type of political persecutions that had taken place under Mao, Deng Xiaoping had made it clear in late 1986 that slogans against socialism and soft approaches toward bourgeois liberalization would not be tolerated.\textsuperscript{566} It is therefore understandable that Chinese scholars chose to use the less risky figure of Lenin to channel their arguments during this sensitive period, making their interpretations less vulnerable to attack. Quoting Lenin to boost Gorbachev’s positive image might generate less political trouble and be more acceptable to the Party old guard, who were not very familiar with Gorbachev’s ideas. A balancing act was required in coverage of this theme.

Second, while Soviet political reform had been making headway since 1985, Zhao Ziyang’s political reform had remained a work-in-progress since the mid-1980s, and was stillborn on the eve of the Tiananmen Incident. Zhao’s reform proposals included the power decentralization of the CCP, the separation of the Party and the state, the introduction of the rule of law, reform of the National People’s Congress, the institutionalization of the civil servant system, and permission given to other parties to compete with the CCP in rank-and-file elections.\textsuperscript{567} The CCP Secretary General once revealed that the slow progress of his political reform and the difficulty of putting it into practice were mainly the result of Deng Xiaoping’s orthodox thinking and his interference preventing any bold experimentation.\textsuperscript{568}

Before the 13th Party Congress in 1987, Chinese scholars began to mention the need for China to initiate a political restructuring. To take an example, Song Mengrong, vice


\textsuperscript{567} For the detail, process, and nature of Zhao’s political reform, see Wu Guoguang, \textit{Zhaoziyang yuzhengzhi gaige} [Political Reform under Zhao Ziyang].

\textsuperscript{568} Zong Fengming, \textit{Zhaoziyang ruanjin zhongde tanhua} [Zhao Ziyang: Captive Conversations] (Hong Kong: Open Books, 2007), 33.
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president of the Liaoning Provinicial Party School, took the case of the Polish uprising in 1980 and demonstrated that “the productive forces could not be developed further without the change of old political system,” and “the ruling party should undertake the political reform before structural problems have accumulated to a point of explosion,” otherwise the situation might generate political crisis and jeopardize socialism.569

After the 13th Party Congress in 1987, Zhao’s plans for political reform were warmly welcomed by Chinese scholars.570 However, after seeing that Zhao had not translated many of his promises into practice, from 1988 onward the attitude of Chinese scholars became more demanding. Xiao Gu and Yang Xinyu (both professors of Russian language at Fudan University) insisted that the Chinese government should learn from Gorbachev and implement political and economic reforms simultaneously.571 After criticizing the absence of democracy from post-Mao politics, Xu Hongwu, a professor of Marxism-Leninism at Beijing Normal University, requested that China take notice of Gorbachev, and argued that “apart from glasnost, there is no way for China to introduce democratic politics.” 572 Zhou Yuansheng, then a PhD law student at Renmin University, remarked that it was essential for the PRC to establish “glasnost with Chinese characteristics.” 573

The reason why Chinese scholars zealously supported Zhao’s proposals and consistently pressed for further political reform activity might have been the intensification of the power struggle between Zhao and the conservative forces in the

569 Song Mengrong, “Congshehui zhuyi guojia tizhi gaige shijian kangaige shiji” [Political Structural Reforms: A View from the Socialist Countries], 4.
CCP leading up to the Tiananmen Incident. Firstly, if one compares Zhao’s report to the 13th Party Congress and Deng’s conservative approach to political reform, one finds they are similar in substance. However, Zhao’s speech to the Congress was largely for public consumption. The report needed Deng’s prior approval before it was delivered, and thus it may not reflect Zhao’s real intentions for political reform. In his publications, Wu Guoguang reveals that Zhao’s agenda was more radical than the 13th Party Congress speech suggested, and the CCP Secretary General even said that China’s future political reform should go one step further than Gorbachev’s glasnost. Zhao also recalled that the political reform report presented at the Congress would have been more open and liberal if Deng had not interfered so much during the writing process. Moreover, unlike Zhao and his followers, some key CCP leaders did not favour the direct adoption of Gorbachev’s program for China even before Tiananmen. While Zhao on some occasions demanded that political and economic reforms in China should operate in tandem, both Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and Premier Li Peng were cautious about any radical approach toward reform, claiming that Gorbachev’s political reform model was unsuitable for China, on the grounds that the two countries had very different social, political, economic, and geographical conditions.

As the power struggle in the higher echelons of the Party escalated in the period before the student demonstrations, some Chinese scholars seemed to position themselves

576 Wu, Zhaoziyang yuzhengzhi gaige [Political Reform under Zhao Ziyang], 314.
on the side of the reformers in an effort to weed out the conservatives. David Shambaugh reveals that the time when Chinese scholars were commending Gorbachev’s *glasnost* “was precisely the time that Zhao Ziyang and his advisers were pushing political reform,” and that it also coincided with “a fierce intraparty debate within the CCP, and considerable swelling opposition to Zhao and his reforms.”  

Prior to the Tiananmen Incident, Wang Chongjie, a scholar at Liaoning Normal University, affirmed that “*Glasnost* is a power to break down the arrogant, ossified, and stagnant forces in the socialist countries.” Wang Yizhou, a researcher in the Institute of Marxism-Leninism at CASS, stated unequivocally that China should learn from Gorbachev’s political reform how to “overcome the inertia, conservatism, and dogmatism among the cumbersome bureaucracy,” and “get rid of the politics of septuagenarians.” Shen Yiming (a researcher at Qinghua University) argued that through Gorbachev’s *glasnost* socialist pluralism had spread all over the world. He boldly commented:

> We should not exclude the possibility that there could be several Marxist parties existing side by side in a socialist state. Although the struggle to achieve political pluralism is extremely fierce, however, political pluralism will be an irresistible trend nonetheless, as long as the ruling party starts to admit its weakness and gives way to a more correct reform line; therefore, a healthy pluralist political mechanism will finally emerge.

There is another reason explaining why Gorbachev’s *glasnost* had become a desideratum of 1980s China. As already noted, the former CCP Secretary General Zhao Ziyang was a lover of *glasnost*. He was favoured and supported by many Chinese intellectuals in the 1980s as a patron of political reform. Although on the surface...

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580 Shambaugh, *China’s Communist Party*, 56.
584 Ibid., 22-23.
585 Merle Goldman, *Sowing the Seeds of Democracy in China: Political Reform in the Deng Xiaoping Era*
Zhao’s ideas looked more liberal than those of the Party old guard, in the eyes of Richard Baum Zhao’s thoughts on political reform still “stressed the need for strong, centralized technocratic leadership throughout the ‘primary stage of socialism’,” and he was not an advocate of “Western-style liberalism, but of Chinese-style ‘neo-authoritarianism’.” Chinese-American scholar Yan Sun has also defined Zhao’s style as “elite democracy.” Indeed, after having been purged in the wake of Tiananmen, Zhao revealed that he would never have countenanced a multi-party system but had advocated a reformed one-party dictatorship. He said that “neo-authoritarianism is good for a developing country.”

The concept of “neo-authoritarianism” did not escape the attention of Chinese scholars in the 1980s. A 1989 article in Jingjixue zhoubao (Economics Weekly) stated that, “China needs a new kind of Gorbachev-like strongman.” Zhao Liqing, an associate researcher at the Central Party School, openly remarked that, “present-day China needs democratic authoritarianism.” In his opinion, for the sake of economic modernization, “circumscription of personal freedom is essential,” and “a powerful government with sufficient authority” would be the best type of government to ensure the social and political stability necessary for reforms. According to the author, China should consult Gorbachev’s political reform model. It is interesting to note that some 1980s Chinese scholars tended to regard Gorbachev’s glasnost as a kind of government-led protection of citizens’ rights and supervision of bureaucratic conduct. They expressed the hope that some such guided democracy, whereby the people would gradually be given more say, would be introduced, while popular participation would be within limits fixed by the

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588 Zong, Zhaoziyang ruanjin zhongde tanhua [Zhao Ziyang: Captive Conversations], 153-54.
Party. According to their definition, this was “democracy under socialism,” which, in their understanding, was equivalent to Zhao’s concept of neo-authoritarianism that champions pluralism, diversity, and efficiency under a strong government.\(^{591}\)

Similarly, many Western scholars make it clear that Gorbachev’s glasnost was not the same as Western democracy.\(^ {592}\) His goal was either “a democratized one-party system”\(^ {593}\) or “a more enlightened dictatorship.”\(^ {594}\) Russell Bova reminds readers about “the Russian heredity of Gorbachev’s policy,” and remarks, “While glasnost did involve a significant increase in the flow of information and liberty, it was Gorbachev who maintained his hand on the control valve.”\(^ {595}\) With regard to the Chinese understanding of glasnost, we need to compare the Chinese translation of gongkaixing (publicity or transparency) and the English equivalent of openness.\(^ {596}\) The meaning of gongkaixing is a little different from that of openness. Gongkaixing conveys the impression that political transparency will be circumscribed by the top echelons of government to a certain extent. It is an authorized openness, not a complete openness; in other words, gongkaixing is openness licensed by the central government, rather than a fundamental political right of the citizens of a country. This difference is equivalent to the difference between rule by law and the rule of law. Lowell Dittmer profoundly captures the subtle difference between the


\(^{596}\) Walter Laqueur argues that glasnost should be translated into “transparency,” which “could be interpreted as a step toward democracy, but it isn’t democracy.” Laqueur, The Long Road to Freedom, 272.
Chinese and Western concepts:

The concept of “publicity” (gongkai) in contemporary China is derived from the age-old concept of the “public” (gong). In the Confucian classics a prominent polarity exists between the terms of “self” (zi) and “public” (gong), which is linked to an opposition between selfishness (zisi) and selflessness (wusi). The juxtaposition corresponds to the Western “public-private” distinction, though it is more invidious. Selflessness is lauded for having the interests of all the people in mind, as selfishness is condemned for a cognitive or even a moral failure to perceive the self in terms of a more comprehensive social organism to which the person’s fate is inextricably connected. The Western concept of the “private” is less pejoratively defined than the Chinese, with a strong strain going back at least to Adam Smith construing the private sector as making an almost necessarily positive contribution to public welfare. Private interests per se are sanctioned by the free market model in economic thoughts, by social contract theory in politics, and by the adversary tradition in jurisprudence. The public is, to be sure, also positively evaluated in the West (e.g., “public interest”, “public weal”), but even though it is favourably evaluated it has subtly different connotations from the Chinese concept.597

Seen from these perspectives, glasnost seems to be akin to Chinese traditional thinking on political philosophy and statecraft. While the fact that Chinese scholars cloaked Gorbachev in the mantle of Leninism suggested that their understanding of his ideas was still orthodox in nature, their interpretation of glasnost also appeared to converge with the substance of Zhao Ziyang’s neo-authoritarianism.

Concluding remarks

Arriving at the conclusion of this chapter, first, Lenin’s name could be used to help rally Chinese communists against the radical policies that had long prevailed. On many issues, his views were introduced in an effort to justify new policies or rally support behind new proposals in the early 1980s. His stand was invoked to weaken the hold of Maoist remnants in favour of utilizing all possible resources for economic construction, and to support reformers in their pursuit of more sweeping changes. Having said this, the use of Lenin was by no means for leading the attack on Mao, but rather for defending the legitimacy of Chinese socialism founded by the Chairman. His theory was intended to

help save the CCP regime that had been paralyzed by the Cultural Revolution. The first Soviet leader was seen by Chinese officials and scholars as an epitome of the new kind of image the Party forged for itself after the maelstrom of the Cultural Revolution. The Chinese writings played on these positive associations of the Grail of Lenin, making him the moral centre of its representation of post-Mao China.

Second, the existing secondary literature seems to have exaggerated the impact of Gorbachev on 1980s China. Previous scholarship suggests that after the mid-1980s Chinese Soviet-watchers identified Gorbachev’s concept of glasnost and his political reform with Western democracy, and used Gorbachev and his ideas to push the Chinese regime toward political democratization on the eve of the Tiananmen Incident. This chapter, however, has shown that 1980s Chinese scholars interpreted glasnost in a way designed to serve their own purposes, and that this interpretation was quite different from democracy in the Western sense. The Chinese definition of glasnost remains circumscribed by China’s own mentality and history, reflecting the traditional Chinese understanding of human values and political culture.

Moreover, few Chinese scholars used Gorbachev and his programs to put pressure on the CCP to introduce some form of political Westernization. Instead, most scholars manipulated the symbol of Gorbachev to support the reformist wing led by Zhao Ziyang in their factional warfare against the Party conservatives leading up to Tiananmen. In short, Chinese scholars did not regard Gorbachev and his programs as having the potential to transform the political landscape of the PRC; rather, they perceived Gorbachev and his agenda as a tool that could be used to define, create, and legitimize a reformed communist system on their own terms.

The next chapter will turn to the topics in the 1990s. At first, it will re-examine the reasons for Chinese criticism of Gorbachev since the early 1990s. In contrast to the view
of the secondary literature, the investigator found that Chinese scholars’ scorn for Gorbachev after Tiananmen was not primarily owing to his role in promoting democratization. Rather, it was because of Gorbachev’s soft line approach toward dissent when communism in Europe was on the verge of collapse. By drawing attention to Gorbachev’s soft line approach, Chinese critics justified China’s use of the Tiananmen crackdown and the brutal measures adopted by Deng Xiaoping to preserve socialist rule and social stability. Moreover, the chapter will study the Chinese debate about the policies of Leonid Brezhnev and Joseph Stalin starting from the mid-1990s. Many scholars argued that the Soviet state since Stalin was no longer in line with what they defined as true Leninism, and as a result, the post-Lenin policies paved the way for the final collapse. They concluded that China after the end of the Cold War should observe the lessons of Brezhnev and Stalin. The country needed to be economically liberalized and prosperous while persevering in the communist one-party rule.
Chapter 6

The Misuse of Gorbachev after Tiananmen and the 1990s Debate about the Two Soviet Leaders

Introductory remarks

Existing literature points out that Chinese Sovietologists admired Mikhail Gorbachev’s political reform as a model for China’s democratization in the 1980s. However, after 1991, because of its impact on China’s pro-democracy movements as perceived by the Chinese government, the same Chinese scholars consistently criticized Gorbachev and his liberalization policies for being the fundamental catalysts in bringing down the USSR. This chapter is going to argue, however, that Chinese scholars’ scorn for Gorbachev after Tiananmen was not primarily owing to his role in promoting democratization; rather, it was because of Gorbachev’s soft line approach toward dissent when communism in Europe was on the verge of collapse. By drawing attention to Gorbachev’s soft line approach, Chinese critics justified the Tiananmen crackdown and the brutal measures adopted by the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping to preserve socialist rule and social stability.

Moreover, the secondary literature argues that most Chinese scholars after 1991 concentrated on criticizing Gorbachev and his liberalization as the fundamental catalysts in triggering the collapse of the Soviet Union. In reality, Chinese Sovietology writings never excoriated Gorbachev in the 1990s, and the torrent of attacks had gradually subsided by the middle of the decade. Gorbachev and his liberal programs were by no
means the only, or even the most significant, factor in the USSR’s dissolution, as represented in Chinese analysis in and after 1991. This chapter also reveals that after the demise of world communism in the early 1990s, many Chinese academic writings appeared to excite debates on the two Soviet leaders – Leonid Brezhnev and Joseph Stalin.

Many scholars blame the legacies of these two Soviet leaders as the cause of the collapse in 1991. According to them, after Stalin took power, the Soviet Union started to deviate from what they saw as true Leninism. These writings contrasted the legacies of the two Soviet leaders with Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatism, and served to shore up Deng’s post-Tiananmen line of accelerating economic development and anti-leftism, which he promoted during his 1992 southern tour. However, while Chinese Soviet-watchers criticized the negative policies of the USSR, they did not condemn socialism. They targeted the imperfections of the Soviet economic apparatus rather than its political repression. Their conclusion confirmed the CCP’s post-Tiananmen policy of liberating economic force while keeping a tight leash on political control. They argued that economic prosperity, not political reform, was the reigning principle for the survival of Chinese socialism after the fall of the USSR.

**Gorbachev and Tiananmen**

As analysed in Chapters Three and Five, there was no immediate attack on Gorbachev and his domestic and foreign policies in the wake of the Tiananmen Incident. Extensive research shows that Chinese writings from Tiananmen to early 1990 were still keen at lauding Gorbachev’s humanistic socialism and glasnost. When talking to a Soviet delegation in September 1989, Wan Li, chairman of the Chinese National People’s Congress Standing Committee, said that “the Soviet Union and China are both carrying out reforms, and can share each other’s experience in many fields.” He expressed his
“sincere wish for the success of reforms in the USSR.” At the time, many scholars argued that Gorbachev’s reform programs were socialist in nature; they also suggested that China should learn from the Soviet experiment, and expressed their goodwill on Gorbachev’s final success. Although a number of articles had noted some negative effects resulted from Gorbachev’s liberalization, their overall assessments were nonetheless positive. IREECAS researcher Xing Guangcheng even broached the subject of Gorbachev’s vision of democracy and the multiparty system under socialism, and discussed the possibility of promoting the multiparty system in other socialist countries.

A portion of the secondary literature suggests that after 1991 Chinese scholars tended to blame Gorbachev’s programs, such as glasnost and liberalization, for being the fundamental causes of the downfall of the USSR – those scholars felt extremely nervous about the negative implications of these policies for China. First, a perusal of the primary documents in which Chinese scholars expressed their criticisms after March 1990, when Gorbachev was launching his process for ending the CPSU monopoly, reveals that most scholars did not oppose Gorbachev’s political reform of socialism. Some disputed

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Gorbachev’s notion that political reform should precede economic reform, and remarked that the former should serve the needs of the latter.\textsuperscript{603} Others criticized Gorbachev’s program for being too Western-oriented, and in particular criticized his termination of the CPSU power monopoly as an incorrect method of political reform.\textsuperscript{604}

Second, not every Chinese scholar had engaged in criticizing Gorbachev after early 1990. Particularly after Deng Xiaoping had released his southern tour speech in 1992, which heralded the wave of anti-leftism and urged a breakthrough in reforms, some Chinese scholars started to display their sympathy and poured out positive re-assessments on Gorbachev and his political agenda.\textsuperscript{605} IRECAS scholar Li Jingjie reminded the Chinese scholars doing research on Gorbachev’s reform programs that they should observe the lessons under Mao, when China had mistakenly determined Khrushchev’s reforms as being “revisionist.” He commented that the episode had resulted in not only the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations, but also the later calamitous Cultural Revolution, which was Mao’s invention to “avert the Soviet capitalist restoration in China.” \textsuperscript{606} Li believed that “socialism could not exist without democracy,” and admired Gorbachev’s courage for learning from “the capitalist political civilization.” \textsuperscript{607}

Zhu Huanghe, a professor at Jiangxi Normal University, did not agree that Gorbachev


\textsuperscript{606} Li Jingjie, “Sugong shibaide lishi jiaoxun” [Historical Lessons of the Failure of the CPSU], 1.

\textsuperscript{607} Ibid., 8.
was “a traitor of world socialism,” and did not think that a single person could have so much power as to overthrow a 70-year regime. In his opinion, there was nothing wrong with undertaking both political and economic reforms concurrently, and it was “the system not the person” that bore responsibility for the collapse.  

Third, this chapter further posits that Chinese scholars’ scorn for Gorbachev after 1990 was not primarily owing to his role in promoting democratization and changing the nature of socialism; rather, it was because of Gorbachev’s soft line approach toward dissent when communism in Europe was on the verge of collapse. This point has been overlooked by the previous secondary literature. By drawing attention to Gorbachev’s soft line approach, Chinese critics justified China’s actions in the Tiananmen crackdown and the brutal measures adopted by Deng Xiaoping to preserve socialist rule and social stability.

In fact, what the CCP Secretary General Zhao Ziyang and Gorbachev shared in common was that both the CCP and Chinese scholars would have had difficulty in claiming that their respective ideas on reform were in contravention of socialism. Firstly, according to their own words, neither of the communist leaders had ever thought of recommending the overthrow of the socialist systems operating in their respective countries. After being purged, Zhao revealed that what he had wanted was democracy under the CCP and rule of law in a socialist China. In his official speeches Gorbachev always emphasized that his goal was “socialist democracy,” which involved “self-control” and “the unity of rights and duties.”

Secondly, at the 1987 13th Party Congress, Zhao expressed a firm resolve to shatter the “current political structure, which took shape during the revolutionary war years.”

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608 Zhu Huanghe, “Qiansulian jiujing weihe jieti” [Why Did the Former USSR Collapse], 59.
According to him, the system was “no longer suited to our drive for modernization in economic, political, cultural and other fields under conditions of peace, or to the development of a socialist commodity economy.” The revolutionary “political structure” Zhao was referring to was none other than the institutions created by Mao after 1949, of which unpleasant vestiges remained even after 1976. As noted, many Chinese scholars approved of Gorbachev’s endeavours in re-assessing past errors and returning the Soviet Union to the fundamental ethos of Leninism. These efforts by Gorbachev corresponded with Zhao’s proposal to transform the socialist state, which had been created through war and revolution, into a state designed to achieve construction and modernization. This notion was a shared consensus among the CCP leadership even after Zhao’s purge, and was consistently implemented both in and after the 1990s.

In actuality, although in the eyes of Chinese communists writing in the 1990s both Zhao’s political reform and Gorbachev’s glasnost had some negative impacts, the CCP indictment of Zhao was not because Zhao had suggested dismantling Party rule as part of his political reform. Rather, as State Council spokesman Yuan Mu intimated, it was because of the mistake Zhao made in “supporting the turmoil and splitting the Communist Party Central Committee.” Zhao’s removal was thus “only a measure of Party discipline.”

The statement points to the cause of Zhao’s purge as being his refusal to endorse the


CCP’s decision to use force to put down the Tiananmen demonstrators, which, in Deng Xiaoping’s eyes, was not only injurious to state interests but also a betrayal of socialist principles.

Zhao’s biggest failing, manifested in his disagreement with the method of suppressing the Tiananmen protests, was his tolerance of dissent and his respect for human rights. These were similar to Gorbachev’s “humanistic socialism,” a characteristic that was attacked by some Chinese scholars after 1991 as being too soft and compromising toward the anti-communist upheavals in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.  

Zhao’s liberal attitude toward dissent was well known even before the Tiananmen Incident. He once remarked that the campaign against bourgeois liberalization should not be too excessive, and that the people who had committed mistakes in the eyes of the Party should be allowed to “keep their posts and give full play to their professional knowledge.”  

He said, “When in the course of emancipating his mind a person expresses views that are a bit too liberal, we should not say that he is advocating bourgeois liberalization.”  

Similarly, one of the aspects for which Gorbachev was heavily criticized by Chinese scholars was his neglect of Marxist class struggle and his sympathy for the enemies of socialism. Many scholars explicitly questioned why the Soviet leader did not send troops into Eastern Europe when the communist powers there were being overthrown, and crush domestic anti-socialist forces when the Soviet state

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Therefore, to some extent, the all-out post-1990 Chinese criticism of Gorbachev had more to do with the Soviet leader’s renunciation of the use of force in suppressing the anti-socialist movement than with his political reform. These criticisms could be considered as a surreptitious way of justifying the CCP’s brutal suppression of the Tiananmen demonstrations, which was seen as an effective and prompt method of defeating anti-party forces.

Judging from the publication dates of the writings, in the wake of Tiananmen, Chinese scholars had few criticisms to make of Gorbachev. However, after the Soviet economy deteriorated and domestic turbulence began to unfold in 1990, coinciding with Gorbachev’s announcement of his decision to terminate the power monopoly of the CPSU, many Chinese scholars stopped praising Gorbachev, and after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 their criticisms intensified. The contrasting pictures of post-1989 China and the post-1990 USSR (or Russia after 1991) led some to conclude that Gorbachev’s failure was not caused by socialism, but because he had not made a firm commitment to socialism. They argued that the chaotic situation in many post-socialist states demonstrated the disastrous outcome for a country of renouncing socialism, while the fact that China had survived demonstrated the positive outcome of taking a firm stance to support the continuation of socialism in the country.\footnote{Shao Huaze, “Shenru xuexihe yanjiu shehui zhuyi lilun” [To Conduct Thorough Research into Socialist Theories], \textit{Shehui zhuyi yanjiu}, no. 6 (1990): 2. Li Dezhong, “Jiushi niandai zhongguo mianlinde lishi jiyu” [Historical Opportunities That China Faces in the 1990s], \textit{Shehui zhuyi yanjiu}, no. 5 (1992): 42. Cai Song, “Ershi yishiji jiangshi shehui zhuyi fuxinde shiji” [The 21st Century Will Be the Century of Socialist Revival], \textit{Shehui zhuyi yanjiu}, no. 6 (1995): 40.}

In hindsight, such criticisms of Gorbachev might have given the public the
impression that soft approaches and lax ideologies brought about nothing but tension and mayhem in a socialist country, whereas tough measures ensured order and stability. Their attacks on Gorbachev’s relaxed attitude served to justify not only the CCP’s violent crackdown on the Tiananmen protesters, but also Deng’s post-Tiananmen announcement of his intention to maintain stability in China (which was synonymous with retaining the CCP’s monopoly of power) at any cost, with a view to the domestic audience.619

Moreover, the CCP regime had reportedly been disappointed with the inability of the communist leaders in Eastern Europe to implement a “Chinese solution” that would save those nondemocratic regimes in the interest of maintaining the stability of the whole. The Chinese government seemed to have argued that it was nothing but the negative consequence of Gorbachev’s liberalization and his desire to pursue a different course which led to the demise of European socialism. Chinese communists thought that the Soviet Union could have retained the military ability to end protests in 1989, but that it was unwilling to pay the bloody cost necessary to crush them. The CCP regime saw the Tiananmen example as a ray of hope, and wanted to show that violence remained a real option for European communist leaders in 1989. In the end, it failed to transfer the Tiananmen model into the European context, which had deeply annoyed the Chinese leaders.620

As such, Chinese scholars were seemingly mounting efforts in defence of Deng’s iron-fist policies, which had successfully preserved socialist rule and propelled China down the road to prosperity since the 1990s. They compared this with the faltering Soviet Union that would eventually lurch into disorder and break down under Gorbachev’s liberalization and hands-off approach. The conclusion was that strong authoritarian rule

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that ensured political stability was far preferable. In short, they were criticizing Gorbachev’s soft line approach as well as defending the CCP’s rationale for its violent suppression of student demonstrations in 1989.

Last, as demonstrated in the preceding chapter, in the 1980s many Chinese scholars had thought highly of Gorbachev’s inspiration in undertaking political reform for facilitating economic modernization. However, in the 1990s most of them dismissed such an idea as one of Gorbachev’s weaknesses and a precipitating cause of the Soviet breakup. The changing tone of Chinese Sovietology writings tied in with the shake-up of the CCP in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Incident, when Deng made a comeback and reasserted his supreme position in China. While both Zhao and Gorbachev championed the notion that economic reform is a product of political restructuring, Deng consistently remained wary of such a concept and emphasized political stability but not political pluralism. He found it good enough to have economic prosperity under the one-party rule, and felt there was little need to tackle the communist institution. This was particularly evident after Tiananmen, when the CCP became simply a delivery vehicle for material progress or a self-preservation machine, claiming the modern mandate of heaven with no greater purpose than to hold on to power.

Therefore, Chinese criticisms of Gorbachev after 1990 were a response to the return of such Deng’s orthodox line, which focused on the sheer survival of the communist regime by economic means. It also disregarded any political demands, while making it clear that the policy of prioritizing political liberalization did not comport with socialism, and was not a future direction of the PRC in the post-communist world.

**Revival of research on Brezhnev**

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In 1997, Chen Zhihua, a researcher in the Institute of World History at CASS and a prominent scholar on Leonid Brezhnev, commented that Chinese research on Soviet history had overwhelmingly focused on the periods of Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, and Gorbachev, while overlooking the 18-year rule of Brezhnev, which was “the time when the Soviet Union started to decline,” and “the key to understanding the historical lessons of the Soviet downfall.” Chen’s remark is not altogether correct. In reality, Chinese research of Brezhnev and his administration had flourished in the 1990s.

Throughout the 1980s, Chinese inquiries on Brezhnev were mostly seen in the IREECAS journal; many writers did not have positive views on the Soviet leader, because his conservative thinking was running afoul of China’s reform and open door policies. Some articles examined the bureaucracy and life-long tenure cadre system under Brezhnev, and remarked that the Soviet ruling machine had become more ossified and less efficient since the 1970s. Others concentrated on the analysis of Brezhnev’s concept of “developed socialism.” They compared the living standards between the USSR and the West, and concluded that the Soviet Union was by no means a developed country with an advanced economy and material abundance. The articles criticized the notion of “developed socialism” as a utopian belief and a political calculation to keep the Soviet Union as the leader in the communist camp. However, the social and economic stagnation under Brezhnev had not fallen within the purview of analysis until the 1990s.

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In 1992, Deng Xiaoping embarked upon a trip to China’s southern provinces, where he repeatedly urged the need for learning from capitalism and rekindling China’s all-round economic development – particularly after the setback of Tiananmen, in which the Party conservative force attempted to attack and quash Deng’s policies taken after 1978. Deng stressed that it was “the achievements of the reform and the open policy” that had helped China to weather the Tiananmen crisis. He argued that the PRC should “make socialism develop in a healthier direction,” in order to overcome the panic caused by the worldwide defeat of socialism. He especially emphasized that he could not tolerate “slow growth” and “stagnation.” He pointed out that “it is necessary to fundamentally change the economic structure,” and “to establish a vigorous socialist economic structure that will promote their development.” Deng seemed to fully understand that, after having squandered what legitimacy communism had in the brutality of 1989 and the Soviet demise, the only resource of the CCP regime was economic performance, which meant putting more food in the shops and improving the living standard of the Chinese people.

Moreover, another important purpose of Deng’s 1992 southern tour was to win the factional warfare and succeed in having his reform strategy prevail after the Tiananmen backlash. The fact that his trip at first received no official media coverage and Renmin ribao did not publish anything about it until one month later was a testament to the strength of CCP leftist opposition. In his talk, Deng asserted that the reason for the failure of European socialism had little to do with democracy, and more to do with the lack of security and prosperity. During the trip, Deng attempted to make moves against the Party conservatives, saying those insufficiently enthusiastic for reform should go.

In response to Deng’s messages, on June 4th, 1992, three years after the Tiananmen

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626 Ibid., 363.
Incident, *Renmin ribao* published an article saying that China should “give up the highly centralized socialist economic system borrowed from other countries before,” and “overcome the problem of the leftist thinking.” 627 On the same day in 1993, another article in *Renmin ribao* indicated that “leftism is the biggest enemy of socialism.” 628 In scholarly writings, Wu Xingtang, vice-president of the Chinese Association of International Communist Movement Studies, praised Deng’s speech in early 1992 as “the guiding principle for studies in international relations and the communist movement.” Wu sneered at the leftist thinking, which put blame on “the excessiveness of reforms and insufficient class struggle” as the main factors for causing the Soviet demise. He concluded that the real intention of leftism was for “obstructing Deng’s reformist line.” 629 Gao Fang in another article also strongly attacked the leftist tendencies. The author attributed the failure of Soviet socialism to economic, not political, factors. He said that “leftism was the true gravedigger of the USSR, while rightism was only putting a nail in its final coffin.” 630

In and after 1992, many pieces of academic work seemed to lavish attention on the Soviet Union under Brezhnev. 631 Unlike the 1980s writings presented above, which focused on the aspects of ideology and political administration under Brezhnev, in the 1990s Chinese scholars were targeting his obsession with the status quo and ignorance of

true reality, which made the Soviet economy lag behind the West more and more. The commentaries meshed with Deng’s emphasis on economic growth and anti-leftism after the Soviet demise. As IREECAS scholar E Huancheng wrote, “Comrade Deng Xiaoping once remarked that the priorities of development are scientific technologies and the productive forces, and such remark inspires us to seek the true reason of Brezhnev’s failure.” The author concluded that the Soviet problems had surfaced under Stalin and escalated in Brezhnev’s time, which he termed as “the long medieval ossified rule.” He said that the Brezhnev administration had rendered the subsequent reforms launched by Gorbachev insufficient to rescue the Soviet system.632

Another IREECAS scholar, Liu Guanghui, described the USSR after the 1970s as “a pool of lifeless and stagnant water.” He found that the biggest reason for Brezhnev’s unwillingness to take up reforms was his predecessor Khrushchev’s rashness in improvising the reform programs that had contributed to the chaotic economic situation – thus causing the CPSU to become tired of such adventure and to itch for stability. He concluded that the lesson from Brezhnev was that socialism should “persist with reforms forever.” 633 After criticizing the Brezhnev administration for being “conservative and rigid,” Huang Zongliang, vice-director of the Russian Studies Institute at Beijing University, concluded that a socialist country should always find a balance between reform and stability. While a stable environment could ensure the success of reform, nonetheless reform should always be prioritized in order to maintain stability and prosperity.634

In the late 1990s, IREECAS senior researcher Xu Kui retraced Brezhnev’s early life and trajectory to power, and studied his personal attributes and characters, such as

“mediocrity, lack of innovation, being pleasure-seeking and vainglorious.” He argued that these explained why the Soviet Union since the 1970s had been fraught with personality cults, incorrigible bureaucracy, and economic deterioration. He commented that the era of Brezhnev was “the turning point when the Soviet Union went from prosperity to decline.”

In late 1998, Chen Zhihua (in his new book funded and published by CASS) re-examined Brezhnev and his time. At the beginning of the book, Chen wrote that his analysis was in accordance with the motif of Deng’s speech in 1992, which was the theoretical framework of the project. The author said that the rule of Brezhnev was not only the dividing line for the USSR’s turn from strength to weakness, but also “the bane of the final demise in 1991.” In his view, “Studying Brezhnev’s period is a must in finding out reasons for the downfall.” He finally contended that the crumbling of the USSR was not historically inevitable. The state under Brezhnev was ripe for reforms, but he “slept through it,” as it were. Brezhnev might have helped the Soviet Union survive, but he had missed the chance to transform the sorrow into strength in the 1970s.

A number of secondary sources point out that Chinese Soviet-watchers after 1991 almost unanimously blamed Gorbachev and his reform programs as the major factors in capsizing the Soviet Union. David Shambaugh even suggests that this so-called “blame game” persisted throughout 1990s Chinese Sovietology. Those works have obviously overlooked the revival of research on Brezhnev in Chinese writings since 1992. Unlike the 1980s’ sporadic inquiries on Brezhnev presented above, the 1990s writings were more

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636 Chen Zhihua, *Bolieriniefu shiqide sulian* [The Soviet Union under Brezhnev], 1.
637 Ibid., 4-5.
638 Ibid., 24.
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divergent in views and had a focus, pertaining to the state agenda set by Deng Xiaoping during his southern tour in 1992.

First, the renewed discussion on Brezhnev was a product of a more open political milieu resulting from Deng’s 1992 landmark speech. Accordingly, Chinese intellectual debates became, to a limited degree, more lively and animated than the dreary period after 1989. In the wake of Deng’s southern tour, the spirit of “seeking truth from facts” was re-emphasized to give a new impulse to the study of socialism.641 Although the general political climate in China was still uncertain, this modest progress had made it possible for scholars to discover more objectively the problems of the USSR, and to diversify the roots of the collapse. It provided encouragement to reinterpret and challenge the prevalent one-sidedly views that were mainly concerned with the cause of Gorbachev.

Second, unlike the post-Tiananmen official and academic analysis, which argued that the peaceful evolution engineered by the West had played a prominent role in jolting Eastern Europe and the USSR, the debate on Brezhnev and the moribund economy under his administration marked the termination of the peaceful evolution thesis, which seemed to be an exaggerated accusation that the Soviet collapse was simply a victim of Western subversion.642 The doctrine of peaceful evolution was more a propaganda trick than a genuine academic argument. The Party hard-liners had used the threat of peaceful evolution as the justification to shut down reforms.643 Mao Zedong once said that “the fundamental cause of the development of a thing is not external but internal.” 644 Some

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642 For the analysis of Chinese perceptions of the peaceful evolution, see the previous chapter on Soviet foreign relations. Shambaugh also has a survey on the pre-1992 Chinese short-lived thesis of peaceful evolution, see China’s Communist Party, 55.
643 Deng once indicated that the Soviet collapse could not be attributed to the peaceful evolution statement. He said, “Some theoreticians and politicians have used this thesis in an attempt to jettison the economic reform policy. Their thinking is not safeguarding but negating socialism.” Zong, Zhaozhiyang ruanjin zhongde tanhua [Zhao Ziyang: Captive Conversations], 42.
Chinese scholars also remarked that putting blame for the Soviet downfall on external factors such as the peaceful evolution was either “superficial” \(^{645}\) or “one-sided and noxious.” \(^{646}\)

Seen from his 1992 speech transcript during the southern tour, Deng Xiaoping believed that the chief cause of turmoil in socialism was not the imperialist peaceful evolution. The problem lay with the internal factors, such as poverty and the underdeveloped economies in many socialist countries. In his view, the only way for China to survive after the Soviet dissolution was to continue the open door policy and reform the past economy characterized by centralized control and enforced egalitarianism. He argued that abandoning the path of reform set in 1978 would only lead the country to the sort of catastrophe befalling the USSR. \(^{647}\) In Deng’s mind, to admit that the socialist system itself has fundamental flaws was more important than to blame foreign machinations. Instead of giving the excuse of the so-called peaceful evolution and ignoring true problems, China after 1991 should face up squarely to reality and meet the challenges ahead.

As Joseph Fewsmith demonstrates, firstly, after the Tiananmen Incident and the Soviet demise, Deng needed to rely on economic development to convince those who no longer believed in socialism, and to restore the Party legitimacy through its ability to “deliver the goods.” \(^{648}\) Moreover, following the ouster of Zhao Ziyang, the conservative faction was clearly directed at Zhao’s former patron Deng Xiaoping and attempted to undercut his reform policy, which was being criticized for neglecting politics and ideology and concentrating merely on economic development. Deng would interpret the


\(^{646}\) Chen Lin, “Sudong yanbian yuanyinzhi bianxi” [Analysis of the Reasons for the Changes in the Soviet Union and East Europe], 53.


conservative manoeuvre as an effort to challenge his position in China and have the country revert to the old days of Mao. To strike back, Deng must ensure the reform process would become “a national rallying cry” and survive his own death. Since 1992 some scholars also concluded that, if the impact of glasnost and the peaceful evolution were rational explanations for the collapse, then it was because the inherent weakness of the Soviet socialist system that had made it become unable to resist the restoration of capitalism and democratization. By dispensing the assertion of peaceful evolution, Deng won the power battle over his Party rivals, ensuring a state-wide consensus to embrace his strategy of faster growth, enhanced economic reform, and greater interaction with the outside world. Similarly, the research on Brezhnev in the 1990s also signalled the return of a down-to-earth and critical approach in studying the Soviet demise, and the repudiation of seemingly non-scholarly and irrelevant official rhetoric.

Last, as we have seen, there was a distinct change in Chinese Sovietology writings in the 1990s, from attacking Gorbachev’s liberalization to condemning Brezhnev’s conservatism. After that, Gorbachev became the lesser of two evils and was rarely seen as the cardinal source of the downfall. In and after 1992, when China had come out of the shadow of Tiananmen and the Soviet demise, and was at the height of campaigning for anti-leftism, the practice of criticizing Brezhnev’s orthodoxy instead of attacking Gorbachev’s liberalization was instrumental in encouraging more innovation to keep the socialist regime vital. The discussion of Brezhnev played a role in affirming and promoting China’s market-oriented path, thereby revivifying the pace of reform that had slowed in the wake of the 1989 repression. Chinese writings intended to take advantage of the study of Brezhnev to give credit to the ethos of Deng’s 1992 speech, and to enlist

649 Ibid., 71.
support for his future vision for China in the post-communist world.

There is one more illustrating example demonstrating that Chinese scholars had taken advantage of the use of Brezhnev, in order to give the Chinese regime the extra push that was needed for the acceleration of reforms in the 1990s. In 1996, CASS funded and published a book “Yuzongshuji tanxin” (Chatting with the Secretary General). The book is a collective project written and edited by a group of CASS scholars, which consists of more than 20 academics from different institutes at CASS and includes the IREECAS scholar Xing Guangcheng. The book title is quite misleading. In reality, it is not a record of face-to-face interview with the Party Secretary General Jiang Zemin; instead, Jiang appears as the *dramatis personae*, which the authors use as a form of communication to channel their views on the future development of China.

The book starts with the full text of Jiang Zemin’s 1995 speech “Zhengque chuli shehuizhuyi xiandaihua jianshe zhongde ruogan zhongda guanxi” (To Correctly Handle Certain Important Relations in Building Socialist Modernization). The content of the speech is in fact no different from Deng’s 1992 southern tour talk, both of them espousing the goals of technological innovation, acceleration of economic modernization, and further opening to the outside world. The authors commented that China at the time was at a crossroads and its reforms were facing a bottleneck, in which economic disparity and corruption were rampant across the country. As a result, many people doubted if the market economy was still compatible with socialism, and whether the third generation of the CCP leadership led by Jiang was able to maintain the economic growth and Party

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651 Zhongguo Shehui Kexueyuan [The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences], ed. *Yuzongshuji tanxin* [Chatting with the Secretary General] (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 1996), 2-3.

dictatorship in the post-Deng era.\textsuperscript{653}

The solution given by the authors was “reforms, reforms, and reforms,” since this was the only way and “China has no choice.”\textsuperscript{654} To elaborate the point, the authors presented the example of the Soviet Union under Brezhnev in the following section entitled “\textit{Lishi jiaoxun: cengjing youguo yige bolieriniefu}” (A Historical Lesson: Once Upon a Time There Was the Person of Brezhnev).\textsuperscript{655} According to the section, there were three critical moments in Soviet history. After the first wave of Khrushchev’s incomplete reforms, his successor Brezhnev balked at “the knot and complexity of the social and economic structural problems.” He, therefore, chose to eschew reforms. He wanted to preserve the status quo and was reluctant to move forward. When the last wave of reforms came in the 1980s, the last Soviet leader Gorbachev had to employ “the radical method of liberalization” to reshuffle the moribund system. Unfortunately, such measures brought “the counter-effect of instability and the ultimate collapse.”\textsuperscript{656} The authors warned:

> Absolute stability does not exist. The lesson of Brezhnev was that not to push reforms, not to persist in reforms, not to carry reforms through to the end means only that the Party, state, and socialism will not be able to have genuine security, and that the final result will be a thorough instability.\textsuperscript{657}

Unlike what Jeanne Wilson remarks that the book was to “commend Jiang’s vision of reform based on a 1995 speech,”\textsuperscript{658} upon a closer reading, the tone of the authors appears to be more like an admonition. They argued that the reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping should not be stalled or slowed down once Deng retired, otherwise China might face the fate of the USSR ahead. China specialist Willy Wo-Lap Lam reveals that in the late 1990s,

\textsuperscript{653} Zhongguo Shehui Kexueyuan [The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences], ed. \textit{Yuzongshuji tanxin} [Chatting with the Secretary General], 3-4.
\textsuperscript{654} Ibid., 12.
\textsuperscript{655} Ibid., 16.
\textsuperscript{656} Ibid., 17-18.
\textsuperscript{657} Ibid., 19.
Chinese intellectuals increasingly felt unsatisfied about the dearth of initiative and the roll-back of reform, and “there were signs that the more liberal among Jiang’s advisors were urging the president to take bolder steps in reform.” 659 According to the book authors, unlike other Chinese scholars, who tended to “wait and annotate” the speeches of the leaders in their research, this time these CASS academics would like to “use a new way of thinking to tackle leaders’ theories” in this project. As such, in this book they decided to “invite Secretary General Jiang Zemin and the third generation leadership for heart-to-heart talks,” and “contribute our limited knowledge to finding solutions to China’s present problems.” 660

Indeed, unlike the previous writings presented in this thesis, the book reflected a change – namely, that these Chinese scholars were attempting to take the lead rather than follow the tide in drawing the lessons of Soviet socialism and its implications on China’s future to influence the government.661 Their eagerness for making the Party leadership hear their voice demonstrated the anxiety of those scholars. They seemed to worry that post-Deng China would become the USSR under Brezhnev, which was content with the status quo and losing momentum for bolder reforms in the face of economic uncertainty. It might eventually result in the equivalence of the Soviet failure in China. They argued that the third generation of Party leadership should not just accommodate Deng’s legacy to move on, as “a politician with broader vision and greater historical sense will choose the deepening of reforms.” 662

Moreover, the discussion in the book was not only about examining the negative lessons of the Soviet demise, but also about presenting an important message for China’s

660 Zhongguo Shehui Kexueyuan [The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences], ed. *Yuzongshuji tanxin* [Chatting with the Secretary General], 8-10.
661 In the postscript, the authors revealed that there was a possibility they might present the research outcomes of the book in the form of a report to the CCP, for providing reference for future policy-making. See Ibid., 289.
662 Ibid., 16-17.
future direction in moving toward the path of state-led capitalism. The authors argued that amid the economic difficulties at the time, China might confront two possibilities: going back to orthodox socialism (symbolized by Brezhnev’s rule) or slipping into wholesale capitalism (represented by the Gorbachev administration), and that either way, China would probably end up getting nowhere. Instead, they recommended a third option, in which China should practice laissez-faire economy under a strong state control. They advised that China should not go too far in economic privatization and liberalization, drawing on the negative example of the USSR under Gorbachev. They argued that maintaining public ownership was still the key to the future success of reforms. Their advocacy of a state-led capitalism as the future direction of the Chinese party-state, in which the state is the principle actor in directing the market and economy, was not only a lesson drawn from the pre-1991 Soviet Union. It also resonated with the thesis of the Chinese new-left movement, which became an intellectual trend from the 1990s onward. The themes of the new-left are common to this approach: reassertion and expansion of the role of the state, appeal for the self-renewal of the Party authority, the need for strong governmental intervention in a market economy, and a scepticism, if not outright hostility to, China’s integration into the Western political system.

Re-assessment of Stalin

663 Ibid., 144-47.
664 Guan Guihai once revealed, that many 1990s Chinese Soviet-watchers had argued that one of the main causes of the fall of the USSR was the rush introduction of private ownership under Gorbachev. See Guan Guihai, “The Influence of the Collapse of the Soviet Union on China’s Political Choices,” in China Learns from the Soviet Union, eds. Bernstein and Li, 512.
665 Ibid., 147-54.
Apart from Brezhnev, another Soviet leader had become the subject of avid study in 1990s China. Joseph Stalin has long been a controversial figure in China. After the founding of the PRC, Mao Zedong glorified the Soviet Union led by Stalin, saying that it had guided China in the struggle for national liberation, and regarded the USSR as leader of all the oppressed countries in the world.\textsuperscript{668} In fact, Stalin personally disliked Mao and always gravely misunderstood the situation of Chinese socialist revolution. For example, according to Beijing University professor Niu Jun, Stalin had belittled CCP military strength and repeatedly requested that the CCP make a compromise with the Guomindang (Republican Party) led by Chiang Kai-shek during the Chinese Civil War period (1946-1949), which deeply irritated Mao.\textsuperscript{669} Mao also profoundly sensed the distrust of the Soviet leader, and was not able to challenge Moscow’s authority in the socialist camp until Stalin’s death in 1953.\textsuperscript{670} Although having harboured grievances against Stalin, Mao still refrained from criticizing him in the wake of the new Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev mounting an attack on his predecessor at the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956. This was because he understood that consigning Stalin to purgatory was detrimental to the unity of the socialist world as well as his rule in China. Mao remarked, “It is the opinion of the Central Committee that Stalin’s mistakes amounted to only 30 per cent of the whole and his achievements to 70 per cent, and that all things considered Stalin was nonetheless a great Marxist.”\textsuperscript{671}

After the passing of Mao, against the trends of cleansing the remnants of the Gang of Four and opposing leftism symbolized by the Maoist legacy, Chinese Party organs in the early 1980s started to level their criticisms at Stalin and his policies. In 1981, an article in


\textsuperscript{670} For Sino-Soviet relations under Mao, see Lorenz Luthi, \textit{The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

Renmin ribao remarked that Stalin’s cult of personality was oppositional to Marxism-Leninism, and equated the cult with the kind of fanaticism occurring during the Cultural Revolution. A half year later, a commentator in *Beijing Review* contrasted Stalin’s “grievous deviations” with Lenin’s “tremendous contributions.” He wrote that Stalin had violated “the principle of collective leadership and the system of democratic centralism,” and practiced “great-nation chauvinism and again interfered in the internal affairs of certain countries.” It should be noted that in the early 1980s, several articles appraising Stalin published in various Chinese academic journals not only criticized Stalin for creating an ossified political and economic system, but also showed contempt for Stalin’s inappropriate moral conducts; these included being conceited and arrogant, as well as having a propensity for the use of violence. Zhou Biwen, a researcher at the Central Party School, stated that “it is time for China to stop treating Stalin as God.”

After the second half of the 1980s, the image of Stalin in the minds of Chinese scholars was gradually transformed from deity to human, and eventually from human to a devil-like villain. Many academic articles in the late 1980s began to attack almost every aspect of Stalin: from his attempt to seize the Chinese territory through the post-war Yalta Agreement, a disastrous agricultural policy, a rigid political system, failed

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675 Zhou Biwen, “Shilun sidalin” [On Stalin], 44.


economic planning, 679 and his problematic writing on Philosophy. 680 Wu Wenjun, president of the Lanzhou Academy of Social Sciences, in his 1989 article even undertook research on Stalin’s childhood, which is rare in Chinese writings. The author revealed the tense family relations in which Stalin had grown up, and explained his later cruelty by the abusive treatment he endured as a child. 681 Most importantly, while Chinese scholars in the early 1980s were bold to remark that Stalinism was the distortion of Leninism, in the late 1980s some writings were not shy to point out that Stalinism was equal to feudalism and a legacy from Tsars, which had nothing to do with what they saw as true socialism at all. 682

These intensified criticisms of Stalin in the late 1980s were mainly owing to the following three factors. First, as IREECAS scholar He Li revealed, while having many problems, the Soviet model established by Stalin was nonetheless accepted by Chinese academic circle in the early 1980s as the universal yardstick of socialism. At the time, Chinese scholars still recognized that the Soviet model was synonymous with Stalinism, but the model needed a fundamental fine-tuning to adjust to the modern society. 683 However, after the late 1980s, China started to deepen its economic reform and launched a war on the Soviet model that had harmed China in the past. As Deng Xiaoping announced in 1988:

Frankly, when we were copying the Soviet model of socialism we ran into many difficulties. We discovered that long ago, but we were never able to solve the problem. Now we are

solving it; what we want to build is a socialism suited to conditions in China.\footnote{Deng, “We Must Emancipate Our Minds and Think Independently,” May 18, 1988, in Deng, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 3: 256.}

Second, Moscow’s re-assessment of Stalin under Gorbachev held great appeal for Chinese scholars. It coincided with the relaxed political climate since the mid-1980s generated by the liberal-minded CCP leaders Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, and more importantly, the popularity of Gorbachev’s \textit{glasnost} in China.\footnote{In his article, Su Shaozhi, director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism at CASS, compared Zhao Ziyang’s endeavours to redress the wrongdoings of the Cultural Revolution with Gorbachev’s efforts to sweep away the 1930s negative residue. See Su Shaozhi, “Lun ‘xinliweitan’” [On “New Leviathan”], \textit{Dushu}, no. 5 (1988): 207.} Some scholars were truly impressed by Gorbachev’s determination to face the past and demanded that China learn from him.\footnote{An Suhua, “ ‘Gongkaixing’ yuanzeyu sidalin wenti” [The Principle of “Glasnost” and the Question of Stalin], \textit{Dangdai shijieyu shehui zhuyi}, no. 6 (1987): 5-6. Wu Jing, “Congsulian chongping lishi kanshixue zaigaige shehui gongneng” [On the Social Function of Historiography in the Reform Era: The Soviet Re-assessment of Historical Events], \textit{Shijie lishi}, no. 5 (1988): 134-36.} CASS President Hu Sheng remarked in 1988 that China in the past had never engaged in genuine research of Stalin, therefore “we do not have good ideas on many questions.” Right now, “when the Soviet Communist Party decided to reverse the verdicts on many previous unjustly charged cases under the impact of \textit{glasnost},” he urged Chinese scholars to “follow suit and conduct research into such issue.”\footnote{Hu Sheng, “Shehui kexue mianlinde xingshihe renwu” [The Situation and Tasks Facing the Social Sciences], \textit{Zhongguo shehui kexue}, no. 4 (1988): 6-7.}

Last, although China had embraced reform and open door policies after Mao’s death, the relaxation was more about economic liberalization than political democratization, and Chinese people were not allowed to criticize Stalin’s counterpart in China – Mao Zedong. Chinese studies of Stalin still operated in the shadow of the many remaining statues to Mao. In 1980, Deng Xiaoping said that China “will not do to Chairman Mao what Khrushchev did to Stalin.”\footnote{Deng, “Answers to the Italian Journalist Oriana Fallaci,” August 21 and 23, 1980, in Deng, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 2: 344.} But things changed in the late 1980s when, motivated by Gorbachev’s challenge to the orthodox hagiography of Stalin, the Chinese started to
question Mao’s own brutality – though this was by no means a large scale open attack. In 1989, the Shantou University history professor Zheng Shaoqin, who had studied at the University of Leningrad in the late 1950s, wrote that the cult of personality created by Mao “had wreaked havoc in China and exacted an enormous human toll on Chinese people. The depredations were many times than those in the 1930s USSR.” 689

Two weeks prior to Gorbachev’s state visit to China and one month ahead of the Tiananmen Incident, *Beijing Review* conducted an interview for several IREECAS scholars. All of them blasted Stalin and expressed aversion to his monocracy, when the Chinese authorities had not officially reappraised the former Soviet leader. It is noteworthy that one of the scholars Wu Renzhang, an expert on the Soviet economy, said in the interview that he recommended that Stalin’s portrait be removed from Tiananmen Square, because “his status is different from that of Marx, Engels, and Lenin,” and “is not on the same level as the other three are.” 690

Since 1976 China has consistently superimposed Mao Zedong’s profile next to those of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin in official discourse, in the form of oft-reproduced group portraits – the so-called *Maen liesimao* (Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao), for demonstrating their equality in ideological terms and significance, whitewashing Mao’s past misdeeds, and legitimizing the post-Mao Chinese communist regime. Both Mao and Stalin were officially canonized as the successors of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, as the best disciples of the dead communist sages. Both of them were depicted as incarnations of Marxist-Leninist wisdom and omniscience. However, as evident from Wu’s words, the Soviet-watcher omitted Mao’s name in this context and it was certainly at variance with the regime’s ideological discourse. He obviously hinted that both Stalin and Mao were the

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same, but that their conducts were not in tune with the norm of true communism created by Marx, Engels, and Lenin. Both of their standings were not in the same league as those of the other three. Moreover, we should remember that it was Mao who had vigorously opposed Khrushchev’s 1956 secret speech and praised Stalin’s legacy. The 1980s negative Chinese assessment of Stalin ironically demonstrated Chinese scholars’ unstated admission of Mao’s mistaken judgment about Khrushchev in the 1950s, which led directly to the later Sino-Soviet schism and a series of disastrous Maoist policies that had left a deep scar on China.

In the wake of the Tiananmen Incident and particularly after March 1990, when Gorbachev ordered to abolish the CPSU power monopoly, criticisms of Stalin in Chinese writings became silent. After Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour in early 1992, China began to reflect on its past inefficient socialist economic system, for the take-off of a new wave of reforms after the backlash of Tiananmen. In late 1992, the new CCP Secretary General Jiang Zemin delivered an opening speech at the 14th CCP Congress. He remarked:

This new revolution is not going to change the nature of our socialist system; instead, it is a self-improvement and a further development of socialism. However, it is also not a simple repair to our economic structure, but a fundamental reform of it. The past economic system was born under the special historical circumstances, and it had once played a key role in our socialist construction. However, as time goes on, the system becomes increasingly unfit for the requirement of modernization.691

Jiang’s words revealed that after Tiananmen and the perdition of European communism, China had no intention to change its political system to adjust to the post-communist world. However, the CCP was eager to tackle its economic institution in order to make the regime more viable after the worldwide crisis of socialism.

Encouraged by the official announcements, Li Zongyu, a researcher in the Institute of

Studies of the International Communist Movement at the CCP Central Bureau for the Compilation and Translation, reactivated the attacks on Stalin in late 1992. In his article published in *Xiandai guoji guanxi* (Contemporary International Relations), the author made the point that all problems of the former Soviet Union had originated from the Stalinist model after Lenin. He contended that such a model had overly excluded the capitalist elements and obstructed the productive forces and economic development, when Soviet socialism was still in its infancy – thus contributing to the subsequent dissolution of the state. In his opinion, both Deng’s theory of building socialism with Chinese characteristics and the goal of the 14th Congress in establishing a socialist market economy, were “a breakaway from Stalin’s formulaic understanding of Marxism and the highly centralized plan economic system founded by Stalin, respectively.”

Afterward, throughout the 1990s, numerous articles appeared in various academic journals and studied the Stalinist model for helpful lessons in building socialism in China. Most of them resembled the tone of Li Zongyu’s article; they were criticizing Stalinism as a distortion of Leninism and socialism, the origin of leftism in the international communist movement, and a fundamental cause of the Soviet demise. In the late 1990s, several articles generated new arguments and went further to attack the Stalinist model. Unlike some erstwhile Chinese writings, which justified that the Stalinist economic institution was absolutely essential during the period of war, but not necessary in the time

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of peace, Wu Kequan, a researcher at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, dismissed the historical inevitability of the Stalinist model and concluded that such a highly militarized but inefficient system was by no means a measure of building socialism under any circumstances.

Both Wen Yi (a researcher in the Institute of World History at CASS) and Li Zongyu challenged China’s long-time assumption that industrialization is equal to modernization. They argued that the Soviet economy under Stalin was actually not modernization but a strange form of industrialization, which was extremely wasteful and at the expense of people’s livelihoods. In their opinion, the Soviet Union was a paradox of industrial plenty in the midst of consumer poverty. They criticized that China since Mao had followed such a wrong path in constructing socialism, and made it clear that the USSR had never realized modernization up to the day of its demise.

Unlike Khrushchev’s criticism of Stalin at the 20th CPSU Congress, which detailed and gave examples of how Stalin engaged in physically torturing his enemies, most of the time, Chinese scholars in both decades did not delve into Stalin’s crimes against humanity. This was because such an action would open the door to denouncing his Chinese analogue of Mao, which was a forbidden zone in China at all times. On the other hand, both Khrushchev and Chinese scholars criticized Stalin as a person, and some flaws of his policies; however, they only made efforts to condemn the man but not the system, and did not display an undercurrent of heterodox thought. They rarely touched the fundamentality of the institution established by Stalin, and were concerned about not socialism itself but

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its problems. While the 1980s Chinese writings manifested their distaste for the tyranny of Stalin and the problems of the Stalinist political system up to a point, the 1990s articles mainly focused on the imperfection of Stalin’s economic apparatus. In a nutshell, Chinese scholars were more direct and bolder in criticizing some negative elements of Stalinism prior to Tiananmen, although this was by no means an attempt to question the dynamic of socialism that had produced such a leader.

The post-1991 Chinese re-evaluation and criticisms of Stalin should be analysed in a broad spectrum after Deng’s southern tour in 1992. In a book on Stalin’s political life published in 1997, the authors Jiang Changbin and Zuo Fengrong (both were professors of international politics at the Central Party School) wrote in the Epilogue (Jieshuyu) that the project was inspired by Deng’s 1992 talk. It was Deng’s remarks on the nature of socialism and the Soviet model that had made the authors “become enlightened.” They decided to use Deng’s theory as the “guiding principle” in conducting research into Stalin. According to them, the Soviet model, which had consigned the country to the ash heap of history, was, in fact, the Stalinist model – and this model should hold the responsibility for the downfall. They contrasted the lethargic and inflexible Stalinist model with the pragmatic Deng model, which focused on combining Marxism with China’s peculiar conditions.

Many Chinese writings after Deng’s southern tour also pointed out that the rightist tendencies practised by Gorbachev in the late 1980s were, in fact, an outcome of Stalin’s leftism. Gorbachev’s restoration of capitalism was a bounce-back to the long history of stagnation and self-seclusion caused by Stalin. At the time, the last Soviet leader had no

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698 Jiang Changbin and Zuo Fengrong, Sidalin zhengzhi pingzhuan [The Political Biography of Stalin], 623.
699 Ibid., 624-25.
choice but applied extreme methods to save the falling USSR. Such a conclusion accorded with the ancient Chinese proverb *Wuji bifan*, which means when things are forced to become worse they begin to go to another extreme for retaliation. While some 1980s Chinese writings targeting Stalin might in fact be indirectly blaming Mao’s political repression in China, the 1990s criticisms on the ossification of the Soviet model created by Stalin could also be considered as a foil to attack Mao’s past leftist economic (not political) policy. This policy was similar to that of Stalin, as both leaders favoured heavy industrialization and exploitative economy as their repertoires.

Post-1991 Chinese Sovietology put the Stalinist economic model and the discredited leftism in 1990s China on an equal footing. By arguing that Stalinism was the root of the Soviet demise and retracing its damage on China under Mao, scholars justified Deng’s 1992 statement that leftism has done more harm than good to China, and like rightism, it could also destroy socialism. Therefore, they used their writings to defend China’s post-Tiananmen policy of accelerating economic reform and open door, and to assist the CCP reformers’ efforts to thwart the comeback of the leftist offensive.

The revival of research on Brezhnev and the re-assessment of Stalin’s model in 1990s Chinese Sovietology are two sides of the same coin. They are the two components of the principle that argues the decline of Soviet socialism had originated from Stalin and had been exacerbated by Brezhnev’s stagnation. The final demise of the country was due to

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the post-Lenin leaderships’ deviation from Lenin’s principle of building socialism. Chinese scholars tended to highlight the intrinsic relations between the two leaders. While Xu Kui defining the Brezhnev administration as “Neo-Stalinism,” 704 Gao Fang described that the USSR under Stalin was already “a patient with early symptoms of cancer,” and Brezhnev later aggravated the situation that led the country into “the terminal stage of cancer.” As a result, when Gorbachev came to power, the Soviet Union had no hope of recovery at all and it became a totally spent force. 705

Both research trends not only served to checkmate the resurgent leftist thinking after Tiananmen, but their rationales could also be explained in the following ways. First, the research outcomes justified Deng’s consistent understanding that the problem was not socialism but the outdated Soviet model. 706 The underlying concept of Chinese writings is that there was nothing wrong with socialism itself, and that Soviet leaders had ill intentions to destroy this good system.

Second, after the demise of the USSR, Deng re-emphasized during his southern tour that China is still in the primary stage of socialism and it should make use of any means necessary to build socialism. Therefore, he announced “the more elements of capitalism will be introduced and the more capitalism will expand in China.” 707 The writings of Chinese Soviet-watchers were also pertinent to Deng’s call. Through analysis of the rules of Brezhnev and Stalin, a common judgment appeared that argued that self-complacency, sheer immobilism, and rigid economic planning are fatal to socialism. By observing the

704 Xu Kui, “Bolieriniefu niandai: sulian zouxiang shuaiwangde guanjianxing zhuanzhe shiqi” [The Era of Brezhnev: Major Turning Point of the Soviet Union], 33.
lessons of Moscow, China should not be constrained by the orthodox mode of development. It should be more open to innovative experiments. It should learn something new from a market economy and replace the problematic Soviet model—developing the so-called “Chinese-style socialism” underscored by Deng.708

Third, according to James Etheridge, before 1989, the Chinese leadership attempted to push the price reform, in order to accelerate the process of dismantling the plan economy and establish the market mechanism. Unfortunately, the experiment failed and resulted in skyrocketing inflation, rampant corruption, and an extraordinary sense of uncertainty concerning what the reforms would lead to, which created widespread frustration and fear among the people. Moreover, the economic crisis led to a deep division within the Party leadership. The reform-minded leaders led by Zhao Ziyang were facing fierce challenges from the Party old guards, who believed that the price reform had damaged the CCP’s control of China’s political power and undermined the legitimacy of the Party. These setbacks resulting from the price reform brought all the accumulated societal problems to the surface and piled up the people’s resentments. Most seriously, it greatly increased the faith crisis among everyday Chinese by directing it toward the CCP’s qualification and capacity to rule the country. After witnessing the rapid rise of pro-democracy tides in Eastern Europe and Gorbachev’s promotion of glasnost in the Soviet Union, many Chinese, particularly intellectuals and university students, became increasingly convinced that it was time to shift the emphasis of China’s reform project to the political sphere, exploring the prospect of transforming the party-state structure and creating new political institutions with checks and balances. They believed that doing so could ensure the better management of the state economy and a cheerful prospect of

708 Ibid., 360. Zheng Yifan (a researcher at the Central Compilation and Translation Bureau) once remarked that “the achievement of China’s economic reform since 1978 is the best testimony to the incorrectness of Stalin’s notion of ‘socialism in one country.’” Zheng, “Yiguo jiancheng shehui zhuyi lilun xinping” [A New Comment on the Theory of Socialism in One Country], 11.
Chinese people’s livelihood.  

In sum, the economic situation in the late 1980s was also a factor in touching off the Tiananmen crisis. As such, by holding out the negative example of the Soviet economies under Stalin and Brezhnev and using the discussion to their advantage, Chinese scholars created a rallying point for urging and supporting the CCP’s post-Tiananmen efforts, in order to normalize the distressed economy and revive its reform process in the shortest possible time. As we have seen in their discussion above, it was not just an economic issue for the Chinese leadership, but it was also a major political issue concerning the legitimacy of the Party – especially given its unwillingness to implement political reform and its decision to brutally crack down on the pro-democratic Tiananmen demonstrations. Thus the CCP would desperately seek to regain its weakened legitimacy in China by fixing the past economic disorder and catalysing a new round of economic take-offs, after the wholesale collapse of world communism.

Last, while stressing reform and open door directions, Deng in his 1992 talk did not forget to defend “the dictatorship of the proletariat” and “the Four Cardinal Principles.”

In the 1990s, Chinese Sovietology concentrated on the economic aspects of Brezhnev and Stalin while ignoring their political policies, and such a tendency was in tune with Deng’s 1992 guidelines. That the research focused on economic problems suggested that scholars seemed to have believed that the breaking apart of the Soviet Union was mainly due to economic illness but not the deficiency of political institutions. Having observed the economic troubles in the times of Stalin and Brezhnev, the writings appear to suggest that state legitimacy comes from economic results and consumer satisfaction, and socialism would be going down the wrong road if it could not deliver economic benefits.

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709 For details, see James Etheridge, China's Unfinished Revolution: Problems and Prospects since Mao (San Francisco, Calif.: China Books & Periodicals, 1990).
to the people. The findings gave credibility to Deng’s faith that only a strong one-party rule could ensure the effective implementation of rapid economic development. They justified the post-1991 China’s state agenda of taking precedence in economic modernization while downplaying the importance of political restructuring. Their conclusions conveyed a message that it is economic affluence, not political reform, that matters the most for the survival of Chinese socialism after the fall of the USSR.

Concluding remarks

To conclude this discussion of the 1990s Chinese writings on Soviet leaders and politics, a few points are worth noting. First, in contrast to the secondary literature that suggests that Chinese criticisms of Gorbachev after Tiananmen were to do with his role in embracing democratization and the disruptive repercussions this brought to China, this chapter has shown that the negative attitude of Chinese intellectuals toward the last Soviet leader after 1989 was more the result of Gorbachev’s failure to use tough measures to prevent socialism in Europe from collapsing than anything else. Their criticisms of Gorbachev served to justify the Chinese government’s brutal crackdown on civilian protests and to glorify the Party’s role as a bastion of state unity and stability. Many Chinese scholars were seemingly mounting efforts in defence of Deng’s iron-fist policies, which had successfully preserved socialist rule and propelled China down the road to prosperity since the 1990s. They compared this with the faltering Soviet state that would eventually lurch into disorder and break down under Gorbachev’s liberalization and hands-off approach. The conclusion was that strong authoritarian rule that ensured political stability was far preferable.

Second, the 1990s Chinese debate about Brezhnev and Stalin revolved around the backgrounds of the aftermath of Tiananmen and the collapse of world communism. The
discussion confirmed that Deng Xiaoping’s 1992 agendas involved renouncing the past Soviet model of economic development, opposing leftism, and saving Chinese socialism by speeding up the pace of reform and open door. While ostensibly examining policies of the two Soviet leaders, in reality, Chinese scholars were making pointed references to Chinese reality against the Soviet precedent. They not only learned the negative experience of the Soviet past, but also attempted to sum up lessons for China’s future direction and the prospect of its communist regime. By depicting Brezhnev’s stagnation and Stalin’s rigid centralization as the primary causes of the collapse, their writings suggested that state legitimacy comes more from economic results and consumer satisfaction than democratic politics, and socialism would not be attractive to the people if it could not deliver economic benefits to them. As can be seen from the second part of the dissertation, including the Chinese use of Lenin in the early 1980s, their changing views of Gorbachev in both decades, and the re-assessments of Brezhnev and Stalin in the 1990s, the major conclusion of Chinese Soviet-watchers also reiterated a thesis. Namely, the survival of Chinese socialism lies on good economic performance and political stability, but not dynamic transformation of the communist ruling institutions.
Chapter 7

Chinese Sovietology and Post-Mao State Policies

Summary of the research

In this final chapter, the investigator will first present a summary of major findings and points of analysis made in various chapters of this dissertation. This is followed by an analysis of how the Chinese debate on the Soviet Union responded to China’s ever-changing political environment in both decades. This analysis will focus on how Chinese Soviet-observers propagated the three fundamental post-Mao state agendas and issues (including one-party dictatorship, state-led capitalism, and the rise of Chinese nationalism) before concluding with some final thoughts.

There are several findings of the thesis that are different from the views of previous scholarship. First, Chinese Sovietology in the 1980s and 1990s, like other fields in the humanities and social sciences in the PRC at the time, was consistently underfunded by the Chinese government. Many institutes were unable to provide research funding for scholars specializing in Soviet studies. Many academic journals researching the USSR struggled to survive, and some even ceased to exist, because of the bleak financial conditions. Therefore, it is not true that there has been a close relationship between the government and Chinese Sovietology in the PRC. Even after the Soviet collapse, Chinese Soviet-watchers did not play the role of intelligence reporters for the CCP regime, and thus the state did not spend a large amount of money on the scholarship in exchange for such service.
Second, post-1991 Chinese Sovietology has been far from the sort of state-directed research project that would have a long-term effect on the development of Chinese socialism. The so-called “lesson-drawing” agenda in the scholarship claimed by the secondary literature seems to be in doubt. After the collapse, Soviet studies gradually lost importance in China. Chinese Soviet-watchers spent more time and effort on studies of Russia and other CIS states bordering the PRC. The situation is not only indicative of the limited financial resources available for such scholarship, but also reflects the reorientation of China’s state policy after the Soviet demise, and the attendant results of the shifting needs and interests of Chinese Soviet-watchers from the 1990s onward. The academic trend of highlighting negative lessons from the Soviet Union might have been only a sudden upsurge and short-term fervour in the early 1990s. In other words, such studies might not comprise an adequate systematic and state-supervised research project in the long run.

Third, regarding the role of Mikhail Gorbachev: firstly, the study found that most Chinese academic commentators on the USSR did not have positive views of Gorbachev either in 1985 or afterward. Only around one year after Gorbachev took the helm did Chinese scholars start to view his policies more positively, when the three obstacles discussed had started to be resolved and bilateral relations were gradually improving.

Secondly, my findings also demonstrate that during and after the 1989 Tiananmen uprising, no major criticisms of Gorbachev appeared in Chinese academic writings. Instead, Chinese scholars seemed to still admire, and produce positive evaluations of, his programs during this anti-liberal period in contemporary China. Most importantly, this
investigator has found that strong criticism of Gorbachev by China did not appear until early 1990, and not immediately after Tiananmen (as existing secondary scholarship claims). After Gorbachev was elected President of the USSR, and after he initiated the process of terminating the power monopoly of the CPSU on March 15, 1990, both the CCP and Chinese scholars became aware of the possible negative ramifications of such a move on the PRC, which has remained committed to one-party communist rule. After this, the last Soviet leader became a *persona non grata* in China.

Thirdly, the existing secondary literature seems to have exaggerated the impact of Gorbachev on 1980s China. Previous scholarship suggests that after the mid-1980s Chinese Soviet-watchers identified Gorbachev’s concept of *glasnost* and his political reform with Western democracy, and used Gorbachev and his ideas to push the Chinese regime toward political democratization on the eve of the Tiananmen Incident. This thesis, however, has demonstrated that 1980s Chinese scholars interpreted *glasnost* in a way designed to serve their own purposes, and that this interpretation was quite different from democracy in the Western sense. The Chinese definition of *glasnost* remains circumscribed by China’s own mentality and history, reflecting the traditional Chinese understanding of human values and political culture.

Fourthly, few Chinese scholars used Gorbachev and his programs to put pressure on the CCP to introduce some form of political Westernization. Instead, most scholars manipulated the symbol of Gorbachev to support the reformist wing led by Zhao Ziyang in their factional warfare against the Party conservatives leading up to Tiananmen. In short, Chinese scholars did not regard Gorbachev and his programs as having the
potential to transform the political landscape of the PRC; rather, they perceived Gorbachev and his agenda as a tool that could be used to define, create, and legitimize a reformed communist system on their own terms.

Moreover, in contrast to the secondary literature suggesting that Chinese criticisms of Gorbachev after Tiananmen were to do with his role in embracing democratization and the disruptive repercussions this brought to China, this thesis has shown that the negative attitude of Chinese intellectuals toward the last Soviet leader after 1989 was largely the result of Gorbachev’s failure to use tough measures to prevent socialism in Europe from collapsing. Their criticisms of Gorbachev served to justify the Chinese government’s brutal crackdown on civilian protests in Tiananmen and to glorify the Party’s role as a bastion of state unity and stability.

Finally, some of the secondary literature authors argue that after 1991 most Chinese scholars focused on criticizing Gorbachev and his liberalization policies as the fundamental catalysts in triggering the collapse of the Soviet Union. In reality, Chinese Sovietology writings never excoriated Gorbachev in the 1990s, and the torrent of attacks had gradually subsided by the middle of the decade. Gorbachev and his liberal programs were by no means the only, or even the most significant, factor in the USSR’s dissolution, as Chinese analysts claimed after 1991. Since the mid-1990s, many Chinese scholars have traced the banes of the tragedy back to the administrations of Leonid Brezhnev and Joseph Stalin, arguing that conservative forces and the rigid communist system were the decisive factors in bringing it about, rather than the figure of Gorbachev alone.

Fourth, unlike the description in the secondary literature, it is not correct to say that
Chapter 7

Chinese Sovietology after 1991 was only concentrating on the dark sides of the Soviet Union, studying its negative lessons for China’s use in preserving its own communist regime. As we have seen, Chinese scholars since 1989 have drawn parallels between the early Soviet Union and China after Tiananmen, when both regimes were facing international sanctions and isolation. These scholars argued that China might learn from Lenin’s teachings encouraging engagement in formal relations with the West, while concentrating on economic development and maintaining a proletarian dictatorship. They manipulated the symbol of Lenin and his post-1917 foreign policy, in an attempt to bolster and legitimize Chinese communist power after the Tiananmen crisis. After Tiananmen, Lenin was used as a tool to limit the scope of reform-oriented criticisms, and he was seen as a man who came to appreciate the need for substantial market forces. Chinese scholars claimed that Deng Xiaoping’s reform and open door policies after 1978 were emblematic of Lenin’s theories. Their conclusion served to defend Deng’s post-Tiananmen policies of accelerating reform and resisting the attacks of the Party leftists, who attempted to challenge Deng’s position and directions taken after 1978.

Last, in the eyes of Chinese scholars after 1991 the example of the Soviet Union was not only a past lesson that should be learned from and a grave mistake that should be avoided, as claimed by most of the previous scholarship. As we have seen, the interpretation of Lenin’s open policy after Tiananmen and the revival of research on Brezhnev and Stalin after the mid-1990s both demonstrate that Chinese scholars viewed the former Soviet Union as both a warning from the past, as well as an image of a possible Chinese state in the future. After the collapse, Chinese scholars argued that
continued reform was the best way to revamp socialism. In their understanding, only a strong, stable, open, and wealthy state could ensure the survival of the socialist system in the long term. By examining the Soviet past, Chinese scholars not only demonstrated concern for the survival of the CCP regime, but also attempted to envision the future direction and position of China in the post-communist world. This included analysis of how China could rise to be a powerful nation under the authoritarian one-party rule, without succumbing to Western democracy and the sort of collapse that engulfed the USSR.

While not a determinant in China’s policy making, Chinese Sovietology has not been able to stay neutral. The Party guidepost always transcends the academic norm. The scholarly writings offered a fertile source of insights into China’s policy behaviour in both decades. When Sino-Soviet relations were in tension in the early 1980s, apart from criticizing Moscow’s social imperialism and hegemony (as a response to official Chinese condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Kremlin’s interference in other countries’ affairs), Chinese Soviet-watchers also seriously studied the problems of Soviet socialism as a lesson for China’s post-1978 reform and modernization. They commonly argued that China should wean itself off the rigid post-Lenin Soviet model, which had previously held China back and caused socialism to lose its attraction.

After Gorbachev launched his glasnost and political liberalization in the mid-1980s, and under the relaxed political environment and encouragement of the liberal-minded Premier Zhao Ziyang, Chinese scholars began to discover that socialism could not be reformed by economic means only. Since China had suffered a great deal under Mao,
Chinese scholars seemed to understand that political initiatives should also be introduced that would make socialism more efficient, tolerant, plural, and democratic; Gorbachev’s programs thus provided a relevant example for them to learn from.

In the wake of the Tiananmen Incident, when China was facing international sanctions as well as the more general setback of world socialism, PRC Sovietologists invoked the example of Lenin’s foreign policy-making during the early days of the Soviet Union. They suggested that continued reform and open door policies could become a way to weather the crisis. Such arguments corresponded to Deng Xiaoping’s post-Tiananmen agenda of self-strengthening.

After the Soviet demise in 1991, Chinese scholars switched to studying negative lessons of the collapse (such as the rigid economic policies of Brezhnev and Stalin), with the aim of preserving Chinese communist rule, maintaining social stability, and seeking China’s future position in the post-communist world.

The main argument of this thesis is that changing Chinese views on the USSR were not only shaped by the ups-and-downs of Sino-Soviet (and later Sino-Russian) relations, China’s domestic political climate, and the political developments in Moscow. More importantly, views changed in response to the earth-shaking events of the rise and fall of world communism in the last two decades of the 20th century. As we have seen in the thesis, the concept of socialism with Chinese characteristics became the guiding thought and teleological narrative in the treaties of Chinese Sovietology writings in both decades. As noted in Chapter Two, after 1978 the framework of socialism with Chinese characteristics was used only because the CCP was unwilling to acknowledge the extent
to which its present policies were an implicit repudiation of its Maoist legacy and its own past. This formula was intended to hide the fact that socialism is being abandoned as China speeds along the capitalist road Mao so vehemently condemned. It is a formula designed to save face and to discourage critiques of class and exploitation under modern Chinese capitalism, but most importantly, it also serves as an excuse to preserve the one-party rule permanently.

As shown in the thesis, the principle of socialism with Chinese characteristics had three main functions in the discourse of Chinese Sovietology in both decades: a cause (or excuse) for explaining the Soviet demise; a fundamental argument for justifying the communist dictatorship in China after the collapse of international socialism; and a determining factor for propagandizing and reinforcing CCP’s reform and open door policies, in order to keep Chinese socialism vital after the end of the Cold War. The hidden consensus of Chinese Sovietologists after 1991 is that the causes of the tragic denouement of the USSR had little to do with what they defined as true socialism, but rather the distortion of it. Since the Soviet Union had stopped practicing genuine socialism after Lenin, so the collapse of the USSR was the collapse of a state – but not of socialism. Socialism would not die and China is a bona fide socialist country; therefore, the PRC will not fall. In sum, they saw that China under the CCP had been true to Lenin’s immortal legacy of advancing socialism by taking the country’s own conditions into account, and such an endeavour would guarantee the future success of socialism in China even after the fall of the Soviet Union.

As such, Chinese Soviet-watchers working under the ideological guidance of
socialism with Chinese characteristics seemed to have already known the truth about the USSR and the reasons for its final demise, and therefore they only consulted the Soviet past in order to find justification for what they conceived to be the truth. Their writings were largely limited to verifying that their pre-existing theoretical commitments were correct. Their interpretations were based more on their own ideologically inspired assumptions than on objective investigation. Research on the Soviet Union in both decades, therefore, could be considered as more of a rationalization of their opinions about the legitimacy of Chinese socialism, China’s domestic politics, and state agendas, than an academic attempt to reconstruct and discover the Soviet past. Scholars demonstrated the purported causal relations between the Soviet past and the political views they upheld for China’s future. They mainly used their interpretation of the events in the USSR to speak for the political agendas that were believed to represent the correct directions of Chinese socialism and modernization, and to justify ongoing reform programs. Thus Chinese Sovietology in both decades served to render Party policies and principles understandable and plausible.

Sovietology has been a useful tool for the overall task of propagating Marxism-Leninism and the Chinese way of practicing socialism. As discussed in Chapter Two, this overall theoretical framework is quite similar to the tradition of history writing under Mao. This tradition emphasizes the pragmatic purposes of academic research. Chinese Sovietologists presented, used (or misused), and appropriated their subject study for explaining, legitimizing, and even changing Chinese realities, rather than reconstructing Soviet realities. Their writings and analyses were produced for political reasons at the
cost of objectivity in representing the truth. The simplistic doctrine of socialism with Chinese characteristics had been applied to Chinese Sovietology, which in effect rendered the scholarship a mouthpiece for Party ideologies and agendas. Chinese Sovietology research has thus failed to reveal much of the Soviet reality, but instead has resonated with Party ideologies and served to legitimate the political claims of those in power in China. The goal of the scholars has been to address state policies and satisfy the ever-changing needs of contending political forces in China – rather than to seek accurate knowledge of the Soviet Union.

As will be demonstrated in later sections, Chinese Sovietology in both decades was not only an extension of PRC politics, the passive legitimizer of a predetermined notion of political change, or even of a short-term political policy. Many Sovietologists were also active adapters and creative developers in the political realities of China.

Researching post-Mao Chinese Sovietology in both decades involves not only knowing and understanding the study of the Soviet Union by Chinese scholars, their changing perceptions of the demise of Soviet socialism, and how they measured the profound impacts of the collapse on the PRC. More than that, researching Chinese scholarly investigation reveals, directly or indirectly, such realities as: the reorientation of China’s foreign policy-making in recent years; the background, shift, and dynamics of the reform programs; and how the CCP regime drew lessons from the collapse and accommodated its domestic policies in order to survive in the post-communist world. As discussed, these Chinese writings convey and demonstrate policy principles and future directions for the CCP regime after the downfall of communism. Those include
maintaining political stability as a fundamental principle, developing a fast-growing economy as a top priority, replacing Marxism-Leninism with fanatical nationalism, and promoting nationalism as a new ideology to keep the Party in power. These issues have been strongly shaped and reinforced by the way in which CCP leaders have perceived the events in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Many of these issues converge with the arguments of Chinese Soviet-watchers presented in the thesis.

**Chinese Sovietology and the one-party dictatorship**

After the 1989 turbulence in East Europe, there was a worldwide sense of euphoria that the Western liberal model would triumph over communism after the end of the Cold War. Such wishful thinking had been applied to anti-authoritarianism uprisings in the former Soviet bloc as well as in China.\(^{711}\) However, after the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the PRC made little progress in the sphere of political reform; it still refuses to adopt Western democratic values or to share its centrally controlled political power with the people. In short, there is no sign that political liberalization is imminent, which is very frustrating to some Western China-watchers wishing to see that the PRC might follow the Soviet Union toward disintegration.\(^{712}\) As a result, the post-Cold War expectation of a trend toward freedom and political democracy has not been delivered. The new era, rather than being a time of democracy and freedom, will be one of growing tensions and

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sometimes confrontation between the forces of democracy and the forces of autocracy.\textsuperscript{713}

Since the early 1990s, many Chinese Soviet-watchers (as presented in this thesis) have started to rethink the Leninist Party norms. However, they did not recommend the fundamental or piecemeal transformation of Leninist Party-style frameworks into CCP rule. Instead, their writings generally supported the post-collapse CCP regime in consolidating its one-party rule and maintaining the status quo and political stability. Scholars rarely doubted the crucial role of the CCP; rather, there was a strong belief among Chinese Soviet-analysts that it is in the interests of the country, as well as the people of China, to remain unified under a central, authoritarian government. Post-1991 Chinese Sovietology has actually been encouraging people to believe that the Chinese style of autocracy still has strong international appeal. Scholars argued that the renewed Chinese model of combining an increasingly open economy with a closed political system can be a successful option for development in many Third-World nations.

Instead of dealing with the potential death of Chinese socialism after the Soviet collapse, Chinese writings have been happy to confidently portray the PRC as a successful model of how to create wealth and stability without having to give way to political liberalization. Such scholars were quick to say that post-1991 China has actually provided a more attractive alternative to the liberal model, and a different approach to building a powerful state and new world order, without succumbing to democracy, Western power politics, and the tragedy that buried the USSR. As their arguments suggest, scholars seemed to state that the death of world socialism after the late 1980s might offer

an opportunity for China to refurbish its authoritarian institution. They believed that the updated model could enhance the PRC in terms of wealth and future global influence. It would make the country stronger than it was in the past and more effective in resistance to Western subversion. In their opinion, the new direction would not only create a new kind of legitimacy for the regime, but also offer a hope and potential blueprint of development for many poor nations beleaguered by globalization and Western liberalization.

Why do such views prevail among contemporary Chinese intellectuals (post-Mao Sovietologists included), who have been strongly influenced by the liberal tradition of their May Fourth predecessors in the Republican periods (1911-1949)?

According to Huayin Li, modern Chinese intellectuals’ strong admiration for a centralized political and economic system originated in the 1930s. This was when Republican China was facing repeated failures in marching toward modernization, owing to internal strife and external threats. The crises made many Chinese intellectuals believe that a strong and centralized power is indispensable to successful reforms in a backward country like China, and that a democratic government might weaken the state and render it incapable of competing with other countries economically. Particularly, they were impressed by the enlightened dictatorships of Germany under Adolf Hitler and the USSR under Joseph Stalin. They argued that those authoritarian models could be instrumental to China’s rapid industrialization. As a result, many of them were attracted to the version of authoritarianism promoted by the Chinese Communist Party thereafter. Huayin Li argues that many post-Mao Chinese intellectuals have inherited such a mentality from their
predecessors in Republican China. Scholars working after Deng took power have tended to favour and justify the ongoing reform policies that aim to drive China into modernization through the combination of market economy and a benign and efficient authoritarian regime.\textsuperscript{714} As presented in this thesis, we can see that this tradition of Republican China has left a strong imprint on post-Mao Chinese Sovietology writings.

Unlike communist powers in Eastern Europe, which involved the non-indigenous founding of regimes, the CCP itself made a powerful appeal to many Chinese citizens who wished to see China reassert itself as a powerful nation, after a century of humiliation at the hands of foreigners. In this regard, anti-imperial sentiments and national pride were of great importance both in the foundation of the CCP regime and in its persistence. They contribute to a certain degree of guarantee of the survival of socialism in China. From 1949 onward, the CCP regime has survived the crises of the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, the Democracy Wall movement in 1978/1979, and the 1989 Tiananmen Incident. The collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union should by no means be considered as the fatal test for the regime, which has endured many internal and external turbulences in the past. Therefore, the Chinese leadership could have confidence that it was capable of dealing with any potential threat to its own survival in the future.

Chinese Sovietologists in both decades generally considered the current PRC authoritarian political system, despite its many flaws, to still be the optimum one for the country. As seen in Chapter Five, even when scholars in the mid-1980s demanded that

\textsuperscript{714} Huaiyin Li, \textit{Reinventing Modern China}, 44.
China learn from Gorbachev’s *glasnost* and undertake political and economic reforms simultaneously, they viewed Gorbachev’s liberalization through the prism of their traditional Chinese mind-set. In other words, they were still motivated by a desire to see China become powerful, rather than democratized. After the Soviet collapse, Chinese scholars found their faith bolstered upon seeing that Western democracy and liberalization might not bring the kind of peace, prosperity, and stability as had been expected to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in the post-communist period.\(^{715}\) Some scholars even demonstrated a heightened sense of scepticism toward Western institutions, viewing the promotion of democracy by the West in the Soviet bloc as an elaborate strategy designed to lead to the collapse of socialism. The fear was that such a conspiracy would next be aimed at Chinese disintegration after 1991.

Like the Chinese leadership, upon learning lessons from the USSR Chinese scholars in their post-1991 writings attempted to convince the Chinese people that their nation faced the possibility of breakup, and that Western democratization would be the destructive force behind this breakup. As we have seen, Chinese scholars thus used the case of the Soviet collapse as a reason to subscribe to the virtues of a strong central government and disdain the weakness of democratic reform. They believed that large and diverse states like the PRC and the USSR need order and stability in order to prosper. They saw that the vacillations and chaos of democracy would impoverish and shatter their country, and in the case of the Soviet Union had already done so. They knew from the Soviet precedent, as well as their nation’s long and turbulent history, that political

\(^{715}\) Christopher Marsh also holds such a view. See Marsh, “Learning from Your Comrade’s Mistake,” 268.
disruptions and divisions at home invite foreign interference and depredation. They argued that strong rule at home is necessary if the country is to be powerful and respected in the world. After the collapse, Chinese scholars argued that the changes in the Soviet Union did not symbolize the failure of socialism, but occurred precisely because the country had given up socialism. These scholars generally denounced post-Lenin Kremlin leaders such as Stalin, Brezhnev, and Gorbachev as the main factors in the decline of Soviet Marxism-Leninism. Unsurprisingly, they suggested that the dissolution of the USSR was due to human error, rather than to flaws inherent in the institution.

As Randall Peerenboom argues, the West has experienced a growing fear since the Cold War, as China has become an increasingly important and influential country in world affairs. The PRC’s continuously anti-democratic model might have a significant impact on the diffusion of democracy throughout the world. The author notes that many countries in the world, such as Russia, Vietnam, Latin America, and various nations in Africa, are all looking closely at China and taking heed of its pragmatic approach to markets without democracy.⁷¹⁶

Indeed, as presented in the thesis, Chinese scholars did not feel that the Soviet collapse was a problem for China; instead, they viewed it as a chance for socialism to be renewed, and for the rise of the new Chinese model in the world. Scholars hoped that the renewed Chinese authoritarian regime would not only replace the past Soviet model, but would inspire the world in the 21st century and provide a viable alternative to Western democracy that has failed to resolve the very pressing issues of social inequality and

human well-being for many poor countries. Such views have firmly permeated Chinese scholarly research on the Soviet Union since 1991. Thanks to the chaos in the former Soviet bloc after the Cold War, China after 1991 has actually stuck more firmly to its socialism. As Dingxin Zhao comments, the collapse of the USSR and the so-called Western conspiracy “may ironically have stabilized the Chinese regime.” 717

Chinese Sovietology and Chinese state-led capitalism

Chinese Sovietologists in both decades consistently put forth a strong view that pragmatism and performance-based legitimacy, not ideology or politics, should be the pillar of an authoritarian one-party regime. Specifically, only economic prosperity could keep socialism vital. Their early 1980s reflections on the backwardness of Soviet socialism that had influenced China under Mao; criticisms of Gorbachev’s over-emphasis of political reform and neglect of economic restructuring since the late 1980s; the use of Lenin in demonstrating the significance of continued reforms and learning from capitalism amid the international sanctions after the Tiananmen Incident in the early 1990s; and a re-assessment of the rigid Soviet economic system through debate on Brezhnev and Stalin since the mid-1990s. All of the above demonstrate that Chinese Soviet-watchers had used their subject study as a supposedly legitimate vehicle for justifying China’s economy-first reform orientation. They lobbied strongly for China to renounce the socialist economic system and embrace the capitalist market economy, while still maintaining a one-party dictatorship.

Chapter 7

Why did Chinese Sovietologists advocate borrowing capitalist elements and building a market economy to sustain the CCP one-party rule? Such pragmatism (or apparent contradiction-in-terms) not only derives from their reflections on China under Mao and the Soviet collapse, but is also a tradition of Chinese intellectuals.

Qu Lindong, a professor of history at Beijing Normal University, published a book in 2007. He presents the example of Hu Sheng, a PRC historian and former CASS president from 1985 to 1998, to illustrate that historically Chinese intellectual thinking has been an example not necessarily of swimming with the political tide, but, sometimes, has demonstrated a genuine commitment to their country.\(^\text{718}\) According to the author, Hu Sheng in his 1981 book *Congyapian zhanzhengdao wusi yundong* (From the Opium War to the May Fourth Movement) argued that socialism is absolutely inevitable in China and is the fate of the country. This is because the predominance of imperialism and feudalism in modern China made the development of capitalism impossible; therefore, an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal socialist revolution guided by the Chinese Communist Party was the precondition for China’s state building.\(^\text{719}\)

In 2000, the year of his death, Hu Sheng’s new book *Congwusi yundong daorenmin gongheguo chengli* (From the May Fourth Movement to the Founding of the People’s Republic) changed the tune. While persisting in his conviction of the inevitability of socialism in China, Hu Sheng now spoke for the progressive and beneficial elements of capitalism, and suggested that China should learn from capitalism in order to strengthen


\(^{719}\) For details, see Hu Sheng, *Congyapian zhanzhengdao wusi yundong* [From the Opium War to the May Fourth Movement] (Beijing: Beijing renmin chubanshe, 1981).
Qu Lindong comments that Hu Sheng’s revision could be partially explained by the wholesale change of economic and political situations in China since the 1990s. That is, Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour in early 1992 triggered a new round of economic reform that made China’s transition to capitalist-oriented market economy acceptable and irreversible. The Party patriarch openly criticized the leftist thinking within the CCP, in which hard-liners demonstrated an inability to understand the realities of China in their stubbornness in adhering to outdated orthodoxy. Therefore, Hu Sheng may have felt both obligated and justified in making some theoretical changes to show his support for Deng’s call for innovative thinking in ideological and theoretical fields.

On the other hand, Qu also thinks that Hu’s reinterpretation was not necessary a display of his conformity to the updated political line. He points out that Hu’s arguments in both books, however seemingly self-contradictory, did reflect his actual thinking. Like many other modern and contemporary Chinese intellectuals, Hu Sheng was committed to offering a historical justification of the Party’s renewed reforms aimed at transforming the motherland. It was his commitment to making China strong and powerful, not serving the Party’s agenda, that contributed to Hu’s boldness in reformulating his arguments. The “Hu Sheng phenomenon” (*Husheng xianxiang*), to quote from Qu, “symbolizes the Chinese intellectuals that are willing to revise their reasoning for what they believe to be the true solution to China’s plight and future, even at the expense of contradicting,

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720 For details, see Hu Sheng, *Congwusi yundong daorenmin gongheguo chengli* [From the May Fourth Movement to the Founding of the People’s Republic] (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2000).

721 Qu Lindong, *Lishi shidai shanbiande jilu* [Record of the Changing Historical Moments], 218.
disregarding or overturning their previous statements.”  

In his 1999 article, Zhang Hanqing, a professor of international politics at Beijing University, summarized the three lessons that Chinese scholars had drawn from the demise of world communism: to renounce the Soviet model and explore new ways of building socialism; to uphold the leadership of the CCP and maintain state unity; to rethink capitalism and take correct attitudes toward capitalist elements for constructing socialism. Zhang remarked, “The lessons derive from not only the observation of the Soviet collapse, but also a wake-up call after we have witnessed how a large state with a great history like the USSR lurched into turbulence.” Like Hu Sheng’s writing, the research outcomes of Chinese Sovietology (particularly after 1991), were not necessary for speaking for the Party. The views more or less reflect Chinese scholars’ real understanding of what a large country like China needs in its future development – political stability and tangible economic results that would benefit the Chinese people, contrary to the negative precedent of the Soviet Union.

In fact, economic Westernization in China was a reaction not to the Soviet collapse, but to the complete chaos of the Cultural Revolution in the late 1970s, when the CCP could no longer be proud of the Maoist ideological dogma. It therefore attempted to regain a kind of legitimacy by restricting its ambitions to economic objectives and presenting a commitment to a general interest that no longer ignored individual interests. The reforms taken since 1978 are in fact demonstrative of the process of shedding the

722 Ibid., 219.
past wasteful and inefficient Soviet socialist model. The reform movement of learning from the West and capitalism had already started soon after Mao’s death. It was a model very different from its Soviet equivalent. Indeed, it was the pre-collapse domestic experience, not the Soviet disintegration in 1991, that had taught the Chinese the lesson that there was a need of combining reform and stability, with priority being given to economic tasks over political ones.

The late Soviet model presided over by Gorbachev, which aimed at a fundamental transformation of the socialist system and allegedly brought the USSR to the precipice of breakdown, only made the Chinese stick firmer to their goal of pursuing material prosperity. Learning from Gorbachev’s lesson (seen from Chapter Six), Chinese Soviet-watchers argued that state legitimacy comes more from economic results and consumer satisfaction than a democratic election. In their opinion, the Soviet collapse was not due to Western economic pressure in the form of trade denial and sanctions, but to the failure of the centrally planned economic model and Gorbachev’s unsuccessful attempt to integrate the Soviet command economy into the capitalist world system. The basic message is that the Soviet model was flawed but not irredeemable, and that Moscow had a chance to reform if it delivered needed benefits to the people with little delay, while solidifying the control at the top. If the Cultural Revolution had rendered the CCP regime unable to resist economic Westernization, the collapse of the USSR assured many Chinese people further that it was economic capitalist revolution that offered the best method of preventing their nation from suffering a similar sort of tragedy.

Economic liberalization without political freedom was embraced by contemporary
Chinese Sovietologists, which is little different from the themes that many Chinese intellectuals since the Self-Strengthening of the 1870s have advocated: attaining wealth and power, enhancing the nation and its international dignity, and preserving unity and preventing chaos. These visions resonate deeply with Chinese Sovietology writings and lend the CCP both legitimacy and continuity with the past.

While the post-1991 Chinese Sovietologists suggested using the capitalist economy to renew socialism upon the Soviet collapse, this should not be interpreted as a deviation from the orthodox communist ideology and goal. As Sujian Guo indicates, the components of the communist goal set by Mao did not change under the post-Mao regime, since Marxist-Leninist communist ideology does not rise in opposition to industrialization or modernization; rather, it mandates a strong commitment to industrialization and economic fulfilment. In his opinion, the forced industrialization under Mao and controlled marketization under Deng amounted to the same thing. They were both pursued in the name of a Utopia that serves as a legitimate source of the political regime. Economic capitalism taken after 1978, became an intermediate goal necessary for nudging China toward a utopian goal of communism. Therefore, the post-Mao regime’s commitment to modernization does not contradict its commitment to the ultimate goal of the communist ideology.724 Such a commitment was only reinforced after the Soviet collapse. It is not surprising that many Chinese Soviet-watchers identified the cause of the Soviet collapse as the country’s lack of a firm and clear stance on socialism, and its failure to reform its moribund economic system to keep socialism vital. They openly declared that Chinese

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socialism would not die and it is still the future of mankind. While disregarding the Soviet model and endorsing economic Westernization, their writings in both decades are still governed by this ideological goal of marching toward communism, as described by Sujian Guo.

**Chinese Sovietology and the rise of Chinese nationalism**

After the collapse of world communism, nationalism has become a logical response to the decline of socialism as a coherent and meaningful ideology in the PRC. Chinese people are now indoctrinated with nationalism as a new faith to supplant Marxism-Leninism.725 The rise of Chinese nationalism from the 1990s onward also affects post-Mao Chinese Sovietology. Many writings of Chinese Soviet-watchers examined in the thesis play an equal role in constructing the conceptual basis of such nationalism and using it as a tool to legitimize the political agendas of the CCP regime in the post-communist world. This involves post-Tiananmen criticism of Gorbachev’s soft line approach toward dissents; debate on Lenin’s post-1917 foreign policy in the early 1990s, when the post-Tiananmen international sanctions were being imposed on China; and renewed research of Brezhnev and Stalin since the mid-1990s. Instead of learning how to integrate China into the world system after the negative precedent of the USSR, Chinese writings have often seemed to argue that the West is aiming for China’s disintegration after the Soviet demise, and preventing China from receiving well-deserved respect in the

family of nations. They argued that only a centralized and powerful state could resist Westernization, political chaos, and economic breakdown, as well as bring wealth and stability to the Chinese nation. In their opinion, Chinese-style socialism would become a universal model for the future of the world, the ultimate fate of China, and the common identity of the Chinese people.

As seen from the thesis, the language of their writings has been exceedingly nationalistic and patriotic in tone. Moreover, they have asserted that the CCP saved the country after the shockwaves of 1991 and revived its greatness on the world stage, a statement that appeals to contemporary Chinese people’s patriotism and nationalistic feelings, which are also a result of the CCP’s domestic mobilization efforts from the 1990s onward. To a degree, Chinese Soviet-watchers succeeded in linking the challenges facing communism to the fate of China. Against the negative Soviet precedent, in the name of stability and order as the necessary preconditions for China’s continuous development, they made the regime the representative of China’s vital national interests.

Seen from the Chinese Sovietology writings analysed in the thesis, there are two themes comprising the formation of nationalism discourse in and after the 1990s. Firstly, according to Wang Hui, the idea of “saving the nation overriding enlightenment” (jiuwang yadao qimeng) had permeated the minds of Chinese intellectuals throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Since Deng Xiaoping took power in 1978, China’s reform and open door policies were a response to the near-collapse of Maoist socialism. This started after the Tiananmen Incident and culminated in the Soviet collapse, which had led to an unprecedented sense of China being on the verge of a breakdown. Afterward, many
Chinese intellectuals concluded that the West led by the US would be consumed with identifying the next enemy of China after the Soviet demise. They interpreted many 1990s Western manoeuvres, such as the 1991 invasion of Iraq, the 1993 China’s losing its bid for hosting the 2000 Olympic Games, and the 1999 NATO bombing of Chinese embassy in Belgrade, as being deliberate imperialist expressions meant to weaken the Third World – and China in particular.\footnote{Wang Hui, *The End of the Revolution: China and the Limits of Modernity* (New York: Verso, 2009), 62-65.}

Such post-1991 anti-West nationalist feelings in China find their origin in its modern history, when the country was facing the Western partition and humiliation. To quote from Paul Cohen, it is “a psychological salve to wounded feelings, something the Chinese found emotionally satisfying because of their profound sense of victimization in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.”\footnote{Paul Cohen, *Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 99.} Nationalism has gained wider appeal and stronger momentum after the Soviet collapse in 1991. The Soviet demise was incompatible with the traditional Chinese mentality of dayitong (grand unification) that takes state sovereignty and unity as the foremost priority. China could not tolerate any attempt by foreign forces to divide their country.\footnote{On the analysis of China’s tradition of grand unification, see John King Fairbank, *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968).} Many Chinese scholars (as discussed in this thesis) have regarded the West, led by the US, as being primarily responsible for triggering the Soviet downfall. As Joseph Fewsmith remarks:

> Chinese intellectuals believed after the Soviet Union had done everything that the US had asked, including getting rid of socialism, that the US had done little to help the peoples of the former Soviet Union. Rather, it was believed, America was perfectly happy to watch...
Russia and the other republics of the former Soviet Union fall into a position from which they would never be able to challenge the US again. 729

Dingxin Zhao also comments that “Chinese intellectuals are disappointed by the post-1991 Russia’s chaotic internal politics and poor economic performance,” and “by the fact that Western countries were actually less interested in assisting Russia in its painful democratic transition than in weakening its international positions.” 730 In 1997, IREECAS researcher Yan Xuetong wrote that “a new wave of anti-China sentiment has been sweeping across the US since the Soviet collapse.” The reason he gave is:

Americans seem to suffer from an ‘enemy-deficiency syndrome,’ a product of the Cold War mentality. The end of the Cold War removed the Soviet Union as the arch rival of the US. To maintain national cohesion, it is necessary to invent a hypothetical enemy. Now it’s China. 731

This post-1991 concern about the country’s survival involves a sense of being under siege, and a belief that the West is not against authoritarian regimes or even socialism – but against China. This has translated into a growing nationalism, or the so-called “west-against-us mentality,” 732 that calls for the Chinese people to be united under the CCP to resist what they deem as the Western conspiracy.

Secondly, the post-collapse “China threat” theory seems to have pushed Chinese scholars in their support for the CCP regime and their appreciation for the country’s post-Tiananmen economic achievements under the one-party authoritarian rule (rather than the

730 Dingxin Zhao, The Power of Tiananmen, 338.
democracy-first approach endorsed by the West). Since then, many Chinese people have increasingly shown their admiration for the PRC government’s strong ability to maintain economic growth and political stability, avoid the fate of the Soviet Union, and resist the Western intervention.

Historically, China is a nation with a penchant for authoritarianism, a long-held fear of anarchy, and an attitude of reliance on order and a strong leader. China adopted communism as a means of shaking off imperial rule, and did so in a way that combined communism with nationalism from the start. China has been distinct since 1978, because it is attempting to transform its socialist society through reforms, rather than simply abandoning communist rule outright. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, such a tradition has been reinforced more strongly than ever before. The CCP regime, the only Marxist giant state in the world, attempts to produce an image that communism, dictatorship, and patriarchy are the avatar of Chinese civilization. The Party tries to reinforce the relations between Chinese nationalism and its authoritarian tradition. As such, communism in China after 1991 has been honoured as a sign of the Chinese identity, which creates a moral and ideological boundary that separates it from the democratic West. The CCP’s authoritarian political model has successfully tied itself to the identity of the Chinese nation. As Lan Quanbin, a professor at the Central University of Nationalities, wrote in 1997:

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Today, when socialism is experiencing a setback in the world, some people in the West have predicted that socialism will disappear in the 20th century. However, China’s experience of building socialism with Chinese characteristics has demonstrated that socialism in China is still strong. China and socialism are undivided. To love China means to love socialism. Patriotism and socialism are inseparable.\textsuperscript{736}

The CCP revolution has a long history and tradition of being both communist and nationalist. After the collapse, the Party regime portrayed itself as the historic agency that has restored national unity and political independence, saved the country from foreign peaceful evolution, and rejuvenated its economy amid the collapse of international communism. Many Chinese people feel uncomfortable with the post-Cold War international order authorized by the West. They refuse to bend to the Western norm, and instead accept such claims from the Party.\textsuperscript{737} Gleaned from their writings presented in the thesis, many Chinese Sovietologists argued that the Soviet demise did not weaken the norm of communism; rather, it strengthened the CCP regime and the Chinese way of building socialism. What Soviet-watchers wanted to defend was not a communist regime but the principle of a strong Chinese nation allegedly opposed to, and resisted by, the West after the demise of the USSR.

**Final thoughts as the conclusion of the thesis**

As stated in Chapter Two, the previous secondary literature seems to argue that post-Mao Chinese Sovietology only became relatively evident after 1991, and the scholarship was the by-product of the CCP regime’s own fear of following the USSR into disorder.


\textsuperscript{737} Zheng Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation, 128.
and disintegration. Seen from the secondary sources, Chinese Soviet-analysts indeed had exerted a great deal of effort to study the Soviet collapse, in support of the preservation of the PRC’s communist rule. However, the secondary literature focuses mainly on how Chinese Sovietology studied and learned from the Soviet Union in the 1980s and 1990s, but largely ignores the issue of how Chinese Soviet-watchers legitimized what they saw as the authenticity and correctness of Chinese-style socialism in both decades.

As noted previously, Chinese-style socialism – the so-called socialism with Chinese characteristics – has been officially put forward by the new CCP leadership since Mao’s death. The concept has been gradually reaffirmed as a unique Chinese development model, which involves a combination of an open market economy and a closed and repressive polity. The Chinese model of socialism is by no means an expedient resulting from the concern about the Soviet collapse, but a product and outcome of the long-time socialist crisis of its own. It originated from reflections on the disastrous Mao era in the late 1970s (the crisis of faith in Maoist socialism), which was reinforced by the 1989 Tiananmen Incident (the crisis of faith in Dengist socialism) and, finally, was crystallized by the rethinking of the Soviet demise from the 1990s onward (the crisis of faith in fundamental socialism). These three political crises did not shatter the confidence of Chinese Soviet-watchers. Instead, as noted above, they argued that the post-Lenin Soviet Union was not socialist at all, but that on the other hand China has persisted with socialism consistently. The collapse was the outcome of Moscow’s renunciation of socialism, but not indicative of a problem with socialism itself. Since then, the CCP regime has successfully stood as a testament to the resilience of communist rule. It has
been able to stave off the repercussions of the collapse and consolidate its power by upholding and improving the methods that have been hailed since 1978.

Since the end of the disastrous Mao era, China has been committed to building socialism by taking its own conditions into account, and not simply learning other models mechanically. After experiencing the three crises of socialism mentioned above, Chinese scholars seem to have become more optimistic about the future of socialism, and the Chinese party-state has been following the socialist path more clearly than ever before. The collapse of the USSR was not a disaster, but actually the best opportunity (or excuse) for Chinese scholars to reassert the superiority of Chinese-style socialism, and for the CCP regime to cling to power by implementing its unique Chinese model of development in the post-communist world. As such, we can say that post-Mao Chinese Sovietology is the product of 1978, but not of 1991.

The discussions of Chinese Sovietologists in both decades reflect the traditional Chinese zhongyong (moderation) mentality: not going to extremes, but resolving problems by treading the middle way. Seen from their writings on socialism, Chinese scholars always criticized the Soviet practice as a dogmatic adherence to orthodox communist law, and instead promoted the pragmatic and flexible Chinese application of Marxist norm. They argued that China has consistently walked through the middle way symbolized by Lenin, and such a middle way is also the future path of world socialism. As Dong Yuehua, then a PhD history student at Remin University, commented in 1999 that the reason for the Soviet collapse was that the Kremlin leaders had always gone to two extremes: either rigidly sticking to Marxist doctrine or completely renouncing it.
the other hand, he argued, China always cleaves to socialism by improving the system but not shaking off it. So China would exist and would never fall.738

Research on Chinese Sovietology in both decades suggests that after the PRC had experienced several socialist crises, the attitude of Chinese scholars toward the Soviet Union was no longer one of wholesale acceptance (like that in the 1950s), nor of wholesale rejection (like that in the 1970s). The major conclusion of scholars in the field is that one should not learn from other socialist states in a mechanical, unthinking manner, but should follow the country’s own way of keeping socialism vital and achieving modernization. It is hoped that the Chinese experience of learning from the USSR, both positive and negative, will contribute to our understanding of socialism and facilitate the reforms and developments of China and other Third World countries in the future.

James Miles once recalled that “the Soviet Union’s today is our tomorrow,” the official CCP slogan of the 1950s, when Beijing’s relations with Moscow were at their most intimate, had become a subject of ridicule among Chinese intellectuals in the 1990s. Since they saw events across the border as a precursor of a similar collapse in China itself.739 However, seen from the post-1991 Chinese Sovietology writings, while there was a sign of faith crisis, scholars did not stop learning from the USSR and did not start to renounce socialism. Instead, they advocated a reformed socialist path, for making a better and powerful China in the post-communist world. They might probably agree, that learning from the Soviet Union would continue in China and the process would never

terminate, as long as China is still a one-party state, even it no longer practiced socialism in a classical Marxist sense.
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