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Reconstructing the Emergence of Teach First:
Examining the Role of Policy Entrepreneurs and Networks in the Process of Policy Transfer

By Emilee Rauschenberger

THE UNIVERSITY of EDINBURGH

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy to

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Within the disciplines of education and political science, the phenomenon of the voluntary transfer of policy ideas or practices from elsewhere, or “policy borrowing”, is often the topic of intense debate and study. The study of policy transfer also has strong links with the field of diffusion. Scholars in these fields study cases of policy transfer to understand (1) what motives and mechanisms cause policy diffusion and transfer, and (2) how policies are adapted, or reinvented, in the process of being transferred. The majority of such studies have focused on state-to-state cases of policy transfer involving predominantly government actors. Yet, a growing but still limited number of studies have considered the ways policy entrepreneurs have initiated transfer and utilized networks to bring about and implement policy ideas taken from elsewhere. Teach First provides a unique case-study through which to investigate the role of policy entrepreneurs and networks in shaping the process of policy transfer and reinvention.

Teach First launched in 2002 as a non-profit organization and innovative teacher training programme based in London. The scheme, proposed and implemented by leaders within the private sector but heavily funded by the central government, was publicly linked to the U.S. programme Teach For America (TFA). Like TFA, Teach First’s purpose was to improve the schooling of disadvantaged pupils by recruiting elite university graduates to teach for two years in under-resourced schools. My research aimed to uncover how and why this policy was first conceptualized and launched as well as how it was reinvented in the process by those individuals and groups involved. Thus, through a case-study of Teach First’s emergence, this study investigates: What roles do policy entrepreneurs and networks play in policy transfer and diffusion processes? and How are policy entrepreneurs and networks involved in reinventing policy during the transfer process?

To explore these research questions, I carried out semi-structured interviews with more than 50 individuals from various sectors who were involved in the creation of either Teach First or TFA. After transcribing all interviews, I used a form of narrative analysis to reconstruct the policy story of how Teach First emerged. In the process, I uncovered and accounted for the diversity of motives, institutional pressures, and contextual factors shaping Teach First’s development with a focus on
the policy entrepreneurs and networks. Drawing on previous research in policy transfer, innovation-diffusion, and institutionalism to analyze the policy story, I concluded that both policy entrepreneurs and networks were responsible for bringing about transfer of TFA to England and shaping the nature and extent of its reinvention. This temporal process was furthered shaped by the highly politicized nature of initial teacher training in England, which limited the autonomy of policy entrepreneurs and forced further adaptation of Teach First in ways that its original sponsors had not intended. I also discovered that, while the TFA model played an influential role in this process, TFA was not generally used as a guiding model during implementation. Furthermore, I argue that in the process of mobilizing support for Teach First and implementing the idea in its first year, a new network emerged and represented a potentially influential new voice in education.

This study aims to contribute to (1) the knowledge of the roles of policy entrepreneurs and networks in policy innovation, diffusion, and transfer and (2) the growing but still limited research on Teach First. This study also provides a foundation for further studies of Teach For All, an organization co-founded in 2007 by Teach First and TFA, which works to spread the programme globally. Through Teach For All, at least thirty-eight other countries now have programmes modeled on TFA and Teach First, though little research has examined how Teach First came about and spread in this way. Finally, the research also illustrates the value of a methodology not often used in transfer studies – narrative reconstruction – through which data is formed into a storied narrative to account for the complexities of the contexts and the socially-constructed views of the diversity of actors involved in policy-making and transfer.
DECLARATION

I, Emilee Rauschenberger, declare this thesis is of my own composition, based on my own work, with acknowledgement of other sources, and has not been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification.

Emilee Rauschenberger

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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFT</td>
<td>American Federation of Teachers (national teacher union in the U.S.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATL</td>
<td>Association of Teachers and Lecturers (U.K. teacher union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATS</td>
<td>Articled Teacher Scheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BITC</td>
<td>Business in the Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CATE</td>
<td>Council for the Accreditation of Teacher Education (U.K.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCCUC</td>
<td>Canterbury Christ Church University College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSR</td>
<td>Corporate Social Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTC</td>
<td>City Technology Colleges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DiES</td>
<td>Department for Education and Skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLC</td>
<td>Greater London Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLA</td>
<td>Greater London Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTP</td>
<td>Graduate Teacher Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILEA</td>
<td>Inner London Education Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTASC</td>
<td>Interstate New Teacher Assessment and Support Consortium (U.S.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOE</td>
<td>Institute of Education (associated with the University of London)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITE</td>
<td>Initial Teacher Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITT</td>
<td>Initial Teacher Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEA</td>
<td>Local Education Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTS</td>
<td>Licensed Teacher Scheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAHT</td>
<td>National Association of Head Teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NASUWT</td>
<td>National Association of Schoolmasters Union of Women Teachers (U.K.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBPTS</td>
<td>National Board for Professional Teaching Standards (U.S.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCATE</td>
<td>National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education (U.S.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCLB</td>
<td>No Child Left Behind (U.S. federal education policy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEA</td>
<td>National Education Association (national teacher union in the U.S.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFER</td>
<td>National Foundation for Education Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUT</td>
<td>National Union of Teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ofsted</td>
<td>Office for Standards in Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PGCE</td>
<td>Post Graduate Certificate of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMPU</td>
<td>Prime Minister’s Policy Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QTS</td>
<td>Qualified Teacher Status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCITT</td>
<td>School-based Initial Teacher Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHA</td>
<td>Secondary Heads Association</td>
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<td>SHINE</td>
<td>Support and Help In Education (philanthropic foundation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEAC</td>
<td>Teacher Education Accreditation Council (U.S.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TfL</td>
<td>Teach for London</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFA</td>
<td>Teach For America</td>
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<tr>
<td>TTA</td>
<td>Teacher Training Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCET</td>
<td>University Council Education and Teachers</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>U.S.</td>
<td>United States</td>
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction to Topic

Within the disciplines of education and political science, the phenomenon of the voluntary transfer of policy ideas or practices from elsewhere, or “policy borrowing”, is often the topic of intense debate and study. Educationalists have considered which school policies could or should be “borrowed” from elsewhere given the differences in national contexts since the nineteenth century (Noah & Eckstein 1969; Phillips 2000). In contrast, political scientists began studying the phenomenon of policy transfer more recently, in the last decades of the twentieth century (Wolman 1992; Dolowitz & Marsh 1996). Such studies of policy transfer grew out of the diffusion tradition in policy studies within the U.S. Policy diffusion scholars used quantitative methods to analyze the patterns in which policies spread among American states as well as across nations and regions. Policy diffusion researchers predominantly focused on explaining the process and conditions for diffusion rather than considering the content of policies that were being diffused. Such analyses often ignored agency and decision-making dynamics within governments, and hence contributed little understanding as to what happened to policies as they spread to other countries. In this field, scholars debated whether the diffusion and appearance of policies across groups of nations was evidence of convergence, or “the tendency of societies to grow more alike, to develop similarities in structures, processes and performances” (Bennett 1991, p.215), at the policy level or whether the diversity of national circumstances led to policy divergence.

Consequently, political scientists began to study cases of policy transfer to understand (1) what motives and mechanisms were causing policy diffusion and transfer, and (2) how policies were adapted, or reinvented, in the process of being adopted. Mapping policy transfer processes became of particular interest to scholars from the 1990s onward as forces of globalization integrated societies, making policy transfers seemingly more common. In the past two decades, both political scientists and educationalists have scrutinized the agents, the context, and the outcomes of policy transfer as well as the process through which the transfer comes about (Finegold et al. 1994; Dolowitz 2000; Evans 2004; Steiner-Khamsi 2004; Beech
2006; Benson & Jordan 2011). Treating policy transfer as both an independent as well as dependent variable, researchers have successfully identified a range of variables that may affect the process and outcome of policy transfer (Dolowitz & Marsh 1996; 2000) and attempted, in various ways, to construct the model of the transfer process (e.g., Evans & Davies 1999; Phillips & Ochs 2003).

However, much of what we know about the topic has been gleaned from empirical cases in which governments and policy-makers are the prime donors, agents, and recipients of a transferred policy. Thus, the field suffers from “methodological nationalism” (Dale & Robertson 2009), or the tendency to use the nation-state as the de facto unit of analysis and comparison, and the majority of studies have focused on elected officials, political parties, or bureaucrats as agents of transfer. To account for the effects of globalization and emergence of new forms of governance, policy transfer scholars have begun to shift their attention on actors and instances of policy transfer that are initiated by individuals or organizations outside of government. A handful of scholars have investigated the role of think tanks (Ladi 1999; 2005; Stone 2000; 2001b), philanthropic organizations (Stone 2009; 2010), and supra-national governmental institutions such as the European Union (Bulmer & Padgett 2005; Bulmer et al. 2007).

These studies are challenging traditional government-centric views of policy transfer and call attention to the growing importance of policy entrepreneurs and networks in policy transfer. Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) note that policy entrepreneurs may be among the agents of transfer. However, such actors have not often been the focus of study in cases of transfer. Additionally, the role of policy networks in policy transfer has also received limited scholarly attention. How agents of policy transfer, and policy entrepreneurs in particular, may be empowered or affected by local or international networks has not been considered.

To facilitate further study into policy entrepreneurs and networks, scholars can begin by drawing on insights from related literature within the field of public policy. Political scientists offer richer conceptualizations and empirical insights into both policy entrepreneurs (Roberts & King 1996; Mintrom 1997; Mintrom & Norman 2009; Oborn et al. 2011; Beeson & Stone 2013) and policy-related networks (Rhodes & Marsh 1992; Haas 1992; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993; Aldred 2007; S J Ball 2008). In public policy literature, policy entrepreneurs are generally considered individuals who operate “from outside the formal positions of...
government” and who “introduce, translate, and help implement new ideas into public practice” (Roberts & King 1991, p.147). Although variations of the term exist, Page (2000) suggests that a “true” policy entrepreneur “identifies the policies or practices to be transferred and persuades or otherwise moves others to adopt” such policies. Policy entrepreneurs can be distinguished from paid policy actors who are employed by an organization “to look at practices elsewhere and make recommendations based on them” (Page 2000, p.3). He also suggests that policy entrepreneurs in policy transfer are understudied because they are often embedded in organizations, making it difficult to untangle “precisely how an idea came on to the agenda of an organization” (Page 2000, p.4). As a result, organizations – rather than individuals – tend to be more studied in cases of policy-making.

In addition, public policy scholars have offered numerous theories and insights into the role of such networks in policy-making more generally. For example, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) proposed the advocacy coalition framework to describe how policy is formed in various sub-systems by competing coalitions, each consisting of diverse but like-minded individuals. The actors come from various sectors and coordinate their actions to spur policy change over long periods of time (e.g., a decade). Similarly, Haas (1992) offers the concept of epistemic communities, or international networks of knowledge-based experts. Haas details how such networks of experts shape policy-making through defining and describing policy problems and their causes, framing the issues for wider debates, and promoting particular policies in both national and global contexts. Again, the role of such networks and the policy entrepreneurs within them has been neglected in policy transfer studies due to scholars’ tendency to focus on government actors and nation-states when selecting and analyzing cases of policy transfer.

These studies reveal that policy entrepreneurs and networks are prevalent in regular modes of policy-making and highlight the need to account for their involvement in cases of transfer and reinvention of policy ideas. Still, only limited attention has been given to policy entrepreneurs and networks in bringing about policy transfer (Stone 2004a; 2009; 2010). This study aims to address this gap in the literature by examining the creation of Teach First, a prestigious leadership and teacher training programme initially based in London. The emergence of this programme represents a case of policy transfer that was initiated and led by leaders from the private sector. Hailed as an idea based on Teach For America (TFA) in the
U.S., Teach First was initially proposed and subsequently set up by the London business community in 2002 to help improve pupils’ achievement in disadvantaged secondary schools. Teach First appears to be a prima facie instance of policy transfer that was led by actors located outside, but with the aid of, central government. I chose Teach First as a case-study of policy transfer to investigate what role policy entrepreneurs and networks played in bringing about and implementing the transfer. In addition, I consider how policy entrepreneurs translated and adapted, or reinvented, TFA in the process of the transfer and utilized networks to further their goals.

In order to understand the scope and extent of reinvention, this study examines in detail the process of Teach First’s creation. The idea surfaced in 2001 and by mid-2003 Teach First was set up and was poised to train 186 new teachers in a six-week summer training. In the study, I then reconstruct, through a type of narrative analysis, this time period to uncover the events and individuals as well as the evidence and interpretations that drove this process and led to a particular policy outcome. By doing so, I aim to account for the differing subjective views of those involved and understand how transfer was shaped by individuals’ interpretations and their peer networks which informed their actions. In this way, I adopt an interpretive approach to the study of transfer. In reconstructing the policy story, I incorporate histories into the narrative to place individuals, organizations, and institutional contexts into proper focus. Finally, I also ground the analysis in a comparative look at both Teach First and TFA to shed light on how contexts differed and how actors’ understandings of TFA’s particularities were limited.

This approach allows for the illumination of detail of interaction of actors at a particular moment in time. Reconstructing the policy story of Teach First ultimately brings researchers up close to the policy entrepreneurs and networks responsible for bringing about the transfer of TFA to England and reshaping its reinvention during that formative period. However, the story also reveals how this temporal process was furthered shaped by the highly politicized nature of initial teacher training in England, which limited the autonomy of policy entrepreneurs and forced further adaptation of Teach First in ways that its original sponsors had not intended. In this way, the study provides deeper insight into the processes of transfer and reinvention as negotiated collaboration among policy entrepreneurs, their networks, and government actors.
In this introduction, I first provide an overview of TFA and Teach First to provide a greater understanding of both organizations. I also briefly describe how leaders of both schemes joined together to form Teach for All to promote the transfer and replication of their programmes abroad. Secondly, I link these developments to my study’s aims and objectives, describe the research’s origins and scope, and highlight how it contributes to knowledge in the field. Finally, I provide an overview of the structure the study.

1.2 Context of the Study: TFA, Teach First, and Teach for All

What is Teach For America?

Before Teach First emerged, there was Teach For America (TFA). TFA was, and still is, a prestigious programme that recruits, trains, and places high-achieving and mostly non-education graduates in low-income urban and rural schools across the U.S. to teach for two years. As Teach First was modeled on TFA early on, it is important to understand the essence and development of the U.S. programme. Since its launch in 1990, TFA drew national attention to the failure of the American schools to provide all children, regardless of socio-economic background, with a high-quality education. The TFA programme was the brain-child of Wendy Kopp who, as a senior at Princeton University in 1989, proposed the programme in her undergraduate thesis. Her idea for TFA was inspired, in large part, by President Kennedy’s Peace Corps and President Johnson’s National Teacher Corps, both established during the height of the Civil Rights Movement. Like these programmes, Kopp’s plan was to recruit top graduating university students for the two-year programme in order to capitalize on this population’s “idealism” and “indecision” and train them over the summer to teach full-time in low-income schools in need of teachers.

The programme’s original goals were both practical and ideological, aiming to help alleviate the country’s teacher shortages and also “revolutionize the way Americans view teaching” (National Association of State Directors of Special Education 1990) by making teaching attractive to America’s “best and brightest”. In addition, Kopp theorized that the experience in the programme would expose a generation of young people to the problems of schools in low-income communities, thus inspiring them to become life-long advocates of education reform. Later, Kopp
would declare that these goals were the means through which TFA aimed to accomplish its visionary mission of “closing the achievement gap” between high- and low-income communities. Adopting the mission statement, “One day, all students in this nation will have the opportunity to attain an excellent education”, TFA became a call to reform American education (Kopp 2001).

Within a year of graduating, the 21-year-old Kopp launched her idea as TFA by raising $2.5 million from business leaders and foundations, hiring a young staff of approximately 20 people, and creating a Board of Advisers and Directors comprised of leaders from business, education, and government. In 1990, its first year, TFA recruited, trained, and placed 500 top graduates in low-income schools in five regions: Los Angeles, New Orleans, New York City, and rural areas of North Carolina and Georgia (Kopp 2001). In their schools, the new TFA teachers, or “corps members”, were employed as full-time teachers in primary or secondary schools while they continued to work toward certification in their respective school districts. The new corps members had training over the summer in teaching methods, curriculum, and classroom management while also gaining some experience teaching in summer school.

Over the next two decades, TFA expanded and evolved its programme in what I suggest are three distinct stages. In the first phase, from 1990-1995, TFA recruited an annual cohort of around 500 to 700 elite graduates, thus establishing it as a prestigious and selective organization. With its civic-oriented mission and significant corporate support, TFA garnered considerable positive attention from national media, helping to raise its profile among a wider audience. However, Kopp struggled to put the organization on secure financial footing which somewhat hindered her ability to build a strong reputation for TFA amongst private donors and the philanthropic community. Kopp also struggled with managing the growing organization with bases across the U.S. (Kopp 2001). TFA also experimented with pre-service training models, initially employing teacher educators but then choosing to develop its own training curriculum.

Meanwhile, TFA garnered intense criticism from the education establishment for its limited training, including a scathing assessment of TFA by Darling-Hammond (1994) who accused TFA of harming minority students and attempting to de-professionalize teaching. Such arguments also stemmed from Kopp’s (1992; 1994) calls for states to abolish teacher licensure laws and empower districts to hire
and train teachers directly, effectively by-passing schools of education. Although Kopp was able to survive such criticism, she already had, in some respects, alienated the education establishment. Part of this stemmed from Kopp and her colleagues’ inexperience and idealism, through which they saw their work as apolitical due to its successes in meeting the need for more teachers (Russo 2012).

In its second developmental phase, spanning 1995-2000, Kopp received guidance from business contacts in reforming TFA’s internal structure and management, enabling the organization to run more smoothly and efficiently (Kopp 2001). With these changes, TFA found itself on stronger financial footing and garnered more support from its growing list of sponsors, donors, and expanding alumni network. This was a period of adolescence for TFA during which Kopp utilized the lessons from the early years to create a more stable and business-like organization while still recruiting between 700 to 1000 graduates annually. As it slowly expanded, TFA worked at the state and district levels to build new partnerships and lobby in favor of laws that enabled TFA to operate.

The third phase of TFA began in 2000 when TFA set ambitious expansion plans for the organization, aiming to quadruple its annual cohort size from 1,000 to 4,000 and enter new regions across the country by 2005 (Kopp 2001, p.183). To do so, TFA became an active advocate for its interests on Capitol Hill (Russo 2012), ensuring TFA’s federal funding and laws sanctioning its work were protected. Meanwhile, TFA aggressively recruited graduates, fundraised relentlessly, and negotiated entrance into new school districts. While keeping its acceptance rate between 11 and 15 percent, TFA continued to expand until 2013, at which point it recruited its largest cohort of nearly 6,000 graduates and placed them in 48 regions. By 2013, TFA’s annual budget reached nearly $300 million dollars, an increase from roughly $10 million in 2000. TFA’s funding primarily came from private and corporate donors, many of whom were linked to the standards and testing movement, charter schools, and efforts to deregulate teacher training.

While expanding, TFA as an organization became more sophisticated in managing its public relations and in influencing policy-makers. Relatedly, many TFA alumni became leaders for reform within schools and at the district and state policy levels. The most high profile and controversial figures among TFA alumni have been Michelle Rhee (former Washington D.C. school chancellor), Kevin Huffman (Education Commissioner in Tennessee), and John White (Louisiana State
Superintendent). As a result, there has been renewed scrutiny of its operations, its ideology, and its effects in predominantly poor and minority-populated school districts. Academics (e.g., Bentley 2013; Labaree 2010), journalists (e.g., Joseph 2014; Miner 2010; Simon n.d.), and even former alumni (Rubinstein 2011; Strauss n.d.) became increasingly critical of TFA’s management, motives, and impact in schools and on policy-makers. The influence of TFA was especially controversial in post-Hurricane Katrina New Orleans where TFA played a role in redesigning and staffing schools (Vanacore 2011; Frith 2014). In addition, the organization also courted controversy after the 2008 recession by continuing to expand while school districts laid off hundreds of veteran teachers (Sawchuck 2009; Toppo 2009).

Perhaps as a result of growing criticism and/or a rebounding economy, TFA’s applicant numbers peaked in 2013 and began to decline by more than 20 percent in the next two years, forcing the organization to reduce its cohort size to 4,100 in 2015 (Garcia 2015; Rich 2015). Still, TFA’s annual funding base has continued to increase, surpassing $300 million the same year. This may signal a fourth phase for TFA in which the organization needs to evolve once again to meet a changing political and educational environment. Arguably, further organizational change is already underway as Kopp stepped down as CEO in 2013 to head the international organization Teach For All (though she remains the organization’s chairman). Nevertheless, TFA remains a permanent part of the educational landscape and a formidable influence in education policy at all levels (Russo 2012).

What is Teach First?

Teach First, the first so-called adaptation of TFA, appeared in England in 2002 when the idea for the scheme was proposed by members of London’s business community as a way to address underachievement in disadvantaged London schools. The idea won backing from influential leaders in business, education, and New Labour and was launched with government and private funding. Initially named Teach For London and led by a former McKinsey consultant, Brett Wigdortz, Teach First became a non-profit organization that marketed its scheme as a “leadership development” programme. Its mission was to raise pupil achievement by recruiting and supporting elite graduates to teach for two years in disadvantaged secondary schools. By summer 2003, Teach First had recruited 186 top graduates to be placed in 43 partnering schools around London. The organization also partnered with
Canterbury Christ Church University College, which provided both the initial summer training and ongoing support to programme participants with the goal of attaining Qualified Teacher Status within their first year teaching.

Since 2003, Teach First has recruited hundreds of top university graduates annually, earning praise and funding from all major political parties. With such support, the programme expanded to Manchester and the Midlands in 2006 and 2007 respectively and continued growing in both size and geographic scope in the years that followed. As it expanded into new locations, Teach First partnered with universities in each placement regions. The Teach First organization and universities jointly run the scheme’s summer pre-service training institute which lasts six weeks. While participants learn to teach they also receive training in business leadership and management and have opportunities to network and intern during the summer holiday with many of the scheme’s blue-chip sponsors.

In 2008, Ofsted praised the scheme following its assessment of 200 of its trainees in London (see Ofsted 2008). In 2011, Teach First began officially placing teachers in primary schools (after piloting the idea for three years) with the goal of providing roughly 5% of all primary teachers while pursuing its larger goal to provide a fifth of all England’s teachers in disadvantaged schools (Richardson 2011). Two years later, in 2013, it began placing its teachers in early years education, working with children ages three to five. Teach First also developed its programme internally, especially in terms of its leadership/teacher training. Notably, after 2008 and in response to the Bologna Process, Teach First revamped its training and now enable trainees to gain a masters-level PGCE while completing the programme (Buie 2010).

By 2015, Teach First was the U.K.’s largest graduate recruiter with a cohort of 1,685 trainees (Teach First 2016). Notably, Teach First’s newest cohort came from 128 different universities and nearly a quarter were “experienced professionals”, suggesting the organization has widened its recruiting scope beyond only elite graduates to enable its expansion. The scheme now operates in 11 regions across England and Wales. The scheme has become a popular and prestigious route into teaching, and its leadership acts as an influential voice in education policy. Teach First has become well-known to wider audiences in recent years through the release of Wigdortz’s (2012) memoir and through the 2014 BBC Three documentary series which followed six of its new teachers (Rainey 2014).
The Global Spread of TFA/Teach First: Teach for All

While both TFA and Teach First rapidly expanded their programmes, the CEOs of both organizations – Kopp and Wigdortz – co-founded another organization, Teach for All, in 2007. Teach for All became a separate non-profit organization aimed at supporting individuals in setting up a TFA/Teach First model in their home country. Launched at the annual Clinton Global Initiative in New York with help from McKinsey and two philanthropic foundations (Dillon 2011), Teach for All’s espoused mission is to “expand educational opportunity internationally by increasing and accelerating the impact of these independent social enterprises” (Teach for All 2015). To do this, Teach for All assists entrepreneurial individuals in developing a viable business plan, securing local government support, identifying potential donors, and raising funds. Once established, each new organization receives a “country relations manager” from Teach for All who acts as a mentor in sharing organizational experience, programme knowledge, and other resources. In addition, this person reports progress and experiential lessons back to the Teach for All organization and its network partners.

However, to become and remain a part of this global network, individuals (or “social entrepreneurs”) starting TFA/Teach-First-type programmes must faithfully uphold to the network’s “unifying mission” and “five core principles” (Teach for All 2011) which pertain to recruitment, training, placement, alumni, and measurable impacts. With the help of this network, TFA/Teach First-inspired programmes have been started in 38 countries within the last nine years. The following table lists the TFA-inspired programmes that have been established thus far:

Table 1: Teach For All Member Organizations & Year First Cohort in Schools
*TEACH South Africa has an unclear relationship with Teach For All as its status as a member of the network has changed repeatedly over the years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR of 1st COHORT</th>
<th>LOCATION (COUNTRY)</th>
<th>PROGRAMME NAME (Translation)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>Teach For America</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>Teach First</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Based in U.S.</td>
<td>Teach For All, founded by TFA &amp; Teach First</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reconstructing the Emergence of Teach First
Page 10
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR of 1st COHORT</th>
<th>LOCATION (COUNTRY)</th>
<th>PROGRAMME NAME (Translation)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>Noored Kooli (Youth to School)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>Iespējamā Misija (Mission Possible)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Teach First Deutschland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Teach For Lebanon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>TEACH South Africa</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>*India</td>
<td>Teach For India</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Enseña Chile (Teach Chile)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Teach For China</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Renkuosi Mokuti! (Let’s Teach!)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Teach For Australia</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Teach First Israel</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Enseña Peru</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Enseña Por Argentina (Teach For Argentina)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Ensina! (Teach)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Teach For Bulgaria</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Teach For Pakistan</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Empieza Por Educar (Begin to Educate)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Enseña Por Colombia (Teach For Colombia)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Teach For Malaysia</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Teach for Austria</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Teach For Japan</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Enseña por México</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>Teach For Nepal</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Teach First NZ</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Philippines</td>
<td>Teach For the Philippines</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Teach For Sweden</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>Teach For Bangladesh</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Teach For Belgium</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Enseña Ecuador</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>Teach For Qatar</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Teach For Romania</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>Teach For Slovakia</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Teach For Thailand</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>Enseña Uruguay</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Teach For Armenia</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Anseye Pou Ayiti (Teach For Haiti)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>Enseña por Panamá (Teach For Panama)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Teach First Danmark</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Teach For France</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Teach For Ghana</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL** 40
This recent and rapid international spread of the TFA/Teach First models – and the Teach For All network designed to assist such transfers – represents a distinct phenomenon and invaluable opportunity to study the ways in which policies are moving, changing, and affecting schools, teachers, and education policy across the globe. Research into this expanding network has only just begun with scholars examining individual programmes in Australia (Rice et al. 2015), Argentina (Friedrich 2014), and India (Blumenreich & Gupta 2015) while others compare two or more programmes in Latin America (Cumsille & Fiszbein 2015; Friedrich 2016). Meanwhile, other scholars are focusing on the Teach for All organization and its network (McConney et al. 2012; Olmedo et al. 2013; Londe et al. 2015; Friedrich et al. 2015; Straubhaar & Friedrich 2015). There have also been some quantitative-based evaluative studies carried out on behalf of certain bodies: the Inter-American Development Bank’s study of Enseña Chile (Alfonso et al. 2010) and of Enseña Peru (Alfonso & Santiago 2010) and Australian Government’s commissioned study on Teach For Australia (Scott et al. 2010; Weldon et al. 2012; Weldon et al. 2013).

1.3 Motivation for the Study

Clearly, TFA and Teach First represent programmes that are sources of policy transfer as they continue to be replicated in other countries by individuals and networks outside of government. Their involvement in Teach for All appears to be something of a policy franchise and represents novel ways education policy has been and continues to be conceptualized, transferred, formed, and implemented in different times and places. However, what the work of Teach for All means in practice is not well understood as few have considered what the origins and similarities between TFA and Teach First really are. While considerable amount of research has been and continues to be carried on TFA, there is very limited research on Teach First. This is a handicap for scholars who are beginning to turn their attention to Teach for All, as they seem to be treating Teach First and TFA as essentially the same thing or simply ignoring Teach First in favor of TFA. But is this assumption true? Was Teach First a case of policy transfer and, if so, to what extent does it reflect or differ from TFA and why? While “Teach For—” programmes
dominate the list of organizations in Teach for All, there are three “Teach First–” programmes (Israel, Germany, Denmark). These cases illustrate the importance in understanding how and why TFA was first transferred to England and what role of policy entrepreneurs and networks played in that process. Identifying the policy entrepreneurs and the networks that were utilized to bring about Teach First will also shed further light on the ways in which such actors and networks remain and directly influence local policy contexts as well as facilitate further transfers abroad.

1.4 Purpose of Study

Research Aims, Scope, and Significance

The aim of my research was to explore: What roles do political entrepreneurs and networks play in bringing about and implementing a policy transfer? I examined this question by studying the emergence of Teach First. I sought to uncover and explain how and why Teach First emerged in England in 2002, thus establishing how policy entrepreneurs and networks brought about the transfer and adapted it to the U.K. context. To do this, I focused on four objectives:

1. determine who was involved in supporting or opposing Teach First, what their interests and views were, and what role they played in the emergence of the scheme
2. identify why Teach First was proposed in 2001 and launched in 2002 (i.e. what circumstance, interests, problems led to its proposal)
3. examine how the scheme was launched by tracing the process through which it gained funding and official government support as well as examine how the scheme was implemented in its first year
4. determine what role TFA played, along with institutional structures, in the process of conceptualizing, launching, and implementing Teach First

The study addresses these objectives through the analysis of primary data collected through semi-structured interviews with approximately 50 individuals involved in the creation of Teach First or TFA. In this way, the study aimed to uncover the origins of Teach First and how it related to TFA.
With this aim, my research was limited to certain time periods: from the establishment of TFA (circa 1990) to the end of initial implementation of Teach First in mid-2003. Individuals and sponsors that became involved with Teach First after this period were excluded from the study. Relatedly, I do not consider the actual summer training of Teach First graduates, their performance in schools, nor how the programme developed thereafter. The purpose of my study is also limited to understanding the formation of the scheme. Thus, this study is not an evaluation of the effectiveness, utility, or long-term effects of Teach First. For the purposes of comparing Teach First with TFA, I consider the origins and development of TFA up until 2003. However, I do not assess, judge, or compare the performance or efficacy of either programme nor suggest one is in any way superior or inferior to the other. Rather, this thesis is an exploratory case-study of policy transfer employing a phenomenological and historical approach to understanding the circumstances and contexts as well as individuals and organizations that led the establishment of Teach First.

The study aims to contribute to the field of knowledge in primarily three ways. First, empirically, the study documents and provides insight into a particular instance of policy-making in the U.K. Through the voices of individuals present at the time, I piece together a multi-faceted and contested account of how Teach First was originally established. Secondly, the study provides an opportunity for theory-testing and development through a rich qualitative case-study of policy transfer. More specifically, the analysis of Teach First aims to shed light on the role of policy entrepreneurs and social networks in bringing about and implementing a policy transfer. The insights drawn from this study can be utilized in future studies of policy transfer and diffusion as well as other types of phenomenon related to policy entrepreneurs and how they utilize networks.

Insights drawn from this study are particularly helpful for future studies of the Teach First, the Teach for All network, and TFA/Teach-First programmes abroad – all three areas that are in need of more empirical investigations. For future studies of Teach First, my study provides a snapshot of how Teach First began and thus provides the first phase in any historical study of its development and the origins of its distinct characteristics. For future studies of Teach For All and the spread of the TFA/Teach First model, my study provides an assessment of how TFA and Teach First developed in distinctly different contexts and ways.
Thirdly, I add value to the study of policy transfer by utilizing a new methodology – narrative reconstruction – as a means through which to study policy transfer processes. This approach and method of analysis enables one to bring together multiple concepts and levels of analysis to understand how policy transfer came about through the experiences of those who were there. This approach relies on “thick” contextual knowledge and so history becomes an important means through which to ground and interpret data.

**Origins of Study: Personal Experience with TFA and Teach First**

I chose to carry out research on Teach First because of my past experience as a TFA corps member and as an employee of Teach First. I first became interested in education while completing a federal work-study programme in disadvantaged schools in East Manhattan and Brooklyn as a political science undergraduate at New York University. As a result, I was interested in teaching in low-income schools and thus, upon graduating in 2004, I joined TFA. For the next two years, I taught in a Baltimore City middle school while earning a Master’s in teaching. The systemic and structural challenges facing schools and pupils in Baltimore directed my interest in education policy and teacher training. After completing TFA, I relocated to Washington D.C. to teach in a charter school run by a TFA alumna.

In 2007, I moved to Manchester, England to become a “leadership development officer” providing pastoral support to participants in Teach First. While working at Teach First, I and other staff members who were TFA alumni participated in bringing ideas from TFA into Teach First. I often unintentionally did so because I had assumed the programme was a replica of TFA. However, I was surprised when some of my colleagues rejected or disagreed with TFA’s ideas and practices, and I began to realize that Teach First’s values and culture – not simply its structure – differed from TFA in subtle but significant ways. The experience also made me realise how I, myself, had uncritically accepted some of TFA’s discourse, assumptions and narrative, which I now began to question further. As a result, I subsequently left Teach First to study how and why Teach First was established and in what ways was it connected to TFA.
1.5 Overview of the Study

This thesis consists of nine further chapters divided into three main parts. In the first section, which contains Chapter 2 and 3, I situate the study in the related literatures and explain the research design and methodology employed to carry out the study. In Chapter 2, I critically review three research perspectives – policy transfer, diffusion of innovations, and institutionalism – that informed and guided the study. In addition, I provide an overview of the research on TFA and Teach First to date. In the process, I identify notable gaps in the literature and propose the research questions to address this while also furthering the stated aim of the study. In Chapter 3, I discuss the rationale for the qualitative research design I adopted and describe the methods of data collection and analysis I undertook during the study. I also discuss issues related to validity of the data, pro-innovation bias, and challenges of elite interviewing.

In the second section, I present the study’s empirical findings and related discussions. This section, consisting of six chapters (4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9), is organized into three analytical phases: (I) the conceptualization, (II) mobilization, and (III) implementation of Teach First. Each phase is presented through two chapters, the first detailing the empirical story of Teach First and the second providing critical analysis of that period.

Thus, Chapters 4 and 5 examine the initial conceptualization of Teach First, which began in 2001 and ended in mid-December 2001 and documents how business leaders came up with the idea for Teach First and why they decided to pursue the idea. While Chapter 4 describes the main players, organizations, and events of this phase, Chapter 5 discusses the personal interests, organizational agendas, and actors’ social learning that shaped policy preferences and decision-making leading to the Teach First proposal.

In Chapters 6 and 7, I examine the second phase of Teach First’s emergence pertaining to how support leading to the scheme launch was mobilized. Thus, Chapter 6 starts in mid-December 2001 and chronicles how and why individuals and organizations across multiple sectors were tapped and came together to form a coalition of support for the new initiative, leading to the launch of Teach First in July 2002. Chapter 7 provides a comparative analysis of the policy contexts in which
TFA and Teach First initially emerged and how policy entrepreneurs utilized their networks to shape and politically advance the evolving idea for the new programme.

In Chapters 8 and 9, I consider the third phase of Teach First’s emergence – its implementation – which began in August 2002 and continued mid-2003. Chapter 8 documents how Teach First’s founders set up the organization, recruited top graduates and London schools onto the scheme, and selected a university with which to partner and provide teacher training. Chapter 9 discusses how the policy network built to facilitate the launch of Teach First also contributed to its implementations. I examine how policy entrepreneurs drew on this network to inform the culture and practices of the new Teach First organization. In Chapter 9, I also examine the evolution of teacher education policy and practice in England and how the implementation of Teach First was very much shaped by the norms, regulations, and interests of those within this context.

Finally, the third section of the thesis consists of a single concluding chapter (10) in which I offer further analytical insights gleaned from each phase of Teach First’s emergence and provide overarching analysis of the transfer process. More specifically, I discuss the critical points in the policy story at which Teach First was reinvented and how the English programme represented a similar but markedly different version of its American predecessor. I also consider what insights the case of Teach First offers in regards to policy entrepreneurs and networks in the process of policy transfer more generally. At last, I also reflect on the limits of the study and suggest areas for further research.
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Rationale and Structure of Chapter

In this chapter, I review three different literatures – policy transfer, institutionalism, and innovation-diffusion. While my study centres on a case of policy transfer, my analytical focus centers on the roles of policy entrepreneurs and social networks in the transfer process. To better investigate and understand the role and effects of such entrepreneurs and social networks in policy transfer, I argue that policy transfer studies need to incorporate insights from institutional literature as well as those from innovation-diffusion studies. Thus, in this literature review, I examine and draw upon research in three different traditions to expand policy scholars’ views of networks and how policy entrepreneurs use networks to instigate, facilitate, and shape policy transfer.

Consequently, I draw on three major research traditions – policy transfer, institutionalism, and innovation-diffusion – to inform my study. Each tradition looks at how change comes about, albeit from different angles (policy-, institutional-, or social/network-based). For each literature, I review the development of the field before examining in more detail how each tradition conceptualizes networks, entrepreneurs, and innovations as well as processes of transfer, diffusion, and change. The first body of research reviewed is the policy transfer literature, which provides insight into the processes, mechanisms, actors and motives for international policy transfer. Research in this field offers comprehensive frameworks and rich accounts of how new ideas and networks are spreading globally and shaping government agendas and policies nationally. I also review what the transfer literature, as well as the policy sciences more generally, has learned about policy entrepreneurs and networks.

Next, I review institutionalism literature as this research tradition complements the more state-oriented and policy-centric perspective of policy transfer and provides a deeper understanding and insights into contexts and how they shape not only policy but also the views of actors. Thus, concepts and debates within institutionalism provide understanding of how societal structures shape the everyday life, including all aspects of the policy transfer process. Studies of
institutional construction and change illuminate how prevailing contexts constrain and empower actors and shape outcomes. The powerful multi-faceted role institutions play in shaping societal regulations, norms, and culture is often underestimated and under-theorized in the policy transfer literature. Through concepts such as institutional entrepreneurship, networks, and competing logics, the literature illuminates how agency is not only shaped by wider institutional structures but, conversely, how institutional structures are also changed to accommodate and absorb new ideas. The institutional literature is also critical to understanding networks as networks and institutions may be considered co-constitutive and co-evolutionary, meaning that networks and structures both build and shape one another. Thus, to understand one requires an understanding of the other.

Finally, I also examine the research in the diffusion of innovations perspective. This body of research examines the development and spread of innovations within social systems over time. This perspective, rooted in a number of disciplines, offers further insights into how an innovation is spread through various communication networks. In contrast with “policy diffusion” research, which typically adopts a macro-level with governments as units of analysis, the diffusion of innovation research is carried out at a more micro- and meso-levels with its focus on individuals and networks. A look at this literature helps illuminate why people accept or reject new ideas and how the pace of diffusion can be quickened with the help of opinion leaders and heterophilious as well as homophilious networks within society. This literature also illuminates how innovations can be shaped and changed by those adopting them, and hence sheds light on the process of adaptation, or “reinvention”.

It is my purpose throughout the chapter to critically review these literatures and highlight the areas in which the three theoretical perspectives overlap. In such areas, the literatures offer complementary insights that challenge and/or expand on each other. I also point to the gaps in the literatures, but overall, I prioritize the need in all three literatures to better understand the role of policy/institutional entrepreneurs and the networks they use and/or build within and outside government to promote their innovation. To address this area, I argue there is a need to bring the focus on networks and the temporal aspect of innovation-diffusion studies into policy transfer research and pay close attention to sequence of events alongside actors and outcomes.
Furthermore, there is a need to complement policy transfer studies with network-related concepts in the other two literatures to understand how the transfer process, as it unfolds over time, directs and shapes the formation of new networks and affects relationships within established networks. On this point, questions emerge such as: What types of sub-networks exist in a given context? What roles do they play in furthering policy transfer? and How does that role or the sub-networks themselves change as the policy transfer process progresses? These questions call for an analysis of power and influence within the network as well as produced by the network. With these questions in mind, we see how cases of policy transfer that are not centered in, nor implemented by government, might represent a more complex transfer process than traditional cases.

With these points in mind, I begin by examining the three literatures discussed above. Afterwards, I discuss how my study addresses gaps in the literature before moving forward to briefly review the existing literature on TFA and Teach First. The literature on TFA and Teach First shed light on how these programmes have been understood and highlights how little is yet known about Teach First and the ways it has emerged and changed policy contexts in England.

2.2 The Policy Transfer Perspective

From Policy Diffusion to Transfer in Political Science

The roots of the policy transfer literature in political science emerged in the 1960s as a central focus of comparative policy studies (Dolowitz & Marsh 1996). Research in this area first took the form of investigations into how policy innovations diffused among American states (Walker 1969; Gray 1973; Menzel & Feller 1977; Foster 1978). Such early research drew upon the diffusion studies and findings first developed in the fields of sociology and communication studies and consolidated in the first edition of Rogers’s work, *Diffusion of Innovations* (1962). Political scientists adapted its key terms, redefining *diffusion* as “any pattern of successive adoptions of a policy innovation” (Eyestone 1977, p.441) and redefining *innovation* as “a program or policy which is new to the states adopting it, no matter how old the program may be or how many other states may have adopted it” (Walker 1969, p.881). In later research, the definition of diffusion was broadened to refer to a
process in which “policy choices in one country affect the policy choices in other countries” (Meseguer & Gilardi 2009, p.528)

Thus, the policy diffusion research proceeded to analyze the patterns in which policies spread among American states as well as across nations and regions. Among its first and most enduring insights into policy spread is the idea that geographic proximity or “regionalism” appears to play a major role in influencing the adoption of new policies (Foster 1978). These studies mostly draw upon quantitative methods of large samples of adopters across time and geographical territories in order to analyze patterns of adoption and adopter attributes. Such policy diffusion studies offered “spatial, structural and socio-economic reasons for a particular pattern of adoption, rather than on the reasons for the diffusion itself” (Bennett 1991, p.221). As a result, diffusion in terms of policy was often treated by political scientists as a subtle and indirect spread of policy over time, displaying an “apolitical” and “neutral” character (Stone 2001a).

Still, policy diffusion studies sparked questions as to why governments tended to adopt policy innovations found elsewhere, leading to a major debate in the field over the phenomenon of policy convergence, defined by Kerr (1984, p.3) as “the tendency of societies to grow more alike, to develop similarities in structures, processes and performances”. The phenomenon was observed and theorized by scholars in the 1970s and 1980s although they proposed differing causes. Two notable macro-level arguments put forth to explain convergence were “world education culture” and “world system/dependency” theories. The argument for a world education culture was put forth from scholars led by John Meyers and working from the new institutionalist perspective, which stresses the impact of cognitive-cultural elements of institutional environments. Meyer and his colleagues argued that global models of schooling spread in response to ideological and other institutional pressures to emulate western nation-states’ models of mass education (Meyer & Rubinson 1975; Meyer et al. 1977; Meyer 1977; Meyer & Rowan 1983; Boli et al. 1985). Meyer and colleagues (1992; Meyer et al. 1997) continue to assert that policy diffusion, driven by the pressures for development and accompanied by beliefs in technical rationality, caused policy convergence and isomorphism.

Meanwhile, other scholars explained policy convergence from the post-colonial/critical perspective, which combined two macro-sociological views – (1) world polity (Wallerstein 1974b; 1974a), and (2) dependency theory (Frank 1975).
Such world polity/dependency scholars argued that the convergence of education models globally was due to rich, more powerful countries imposing their policies on poor, less powerful countries, dividing the world system into North-South and core-periphery. As a result, they rejected the idea that convergence occurs more-or-less voluntarily and suggested transfers were being imposed or coerced. Those working in education suggested instead that educational transfer is a type of colonisation with the powerful forcing their models and practices on subjugated populaces (Carnoy 1974; Altbach & Kelly 1978; Arnove 1980).

While new institutional and dependency scholars did not specifically mention or analyze the “policy transfer” as a process, their work theorized its outcomes through large N-cases, documenting similarities in education structures, materials, and practices (e.g., Benavot et al. 1991). However, other researchers began to question how transfer actually occurred and thus, started to focus more on the processes of cross-national policy transfer in the 1990s. Illustrating a nuanced approach to the causes of convergence, Bennett (1991) argued that policy convergence among nations was the result of policy diffusion, or transfer, caused by (1) emulation stemming from rational decision-making of policy makers to engage in direct policy copying, (2) elite networking caused by transnational policy communities, (3) harmonization resulting from coordination of nations at the transnational level, or (4) penetration stemming from the involvement of external actors and interests.

As debate over the existence of policy convergence among nations continued, criticism of the diffusion paradigm grew, suggesting it was only concerned with the spread of ideas and thus was ignoring fundamental questions affecting the national variation of globalized policy models. Consequently, scholarly interest turned to policy-oriented learning, or “lesson-drawing” (Rose 1993), and studies of policy transfer (e.g., Westney 1987; Wolman 1992), a term adopted for all types of policy movement across borders that can occur through various pathways and sparked by different mechanisms. Like Bennett (1991), political scientists began to examine the motives and contexts that shape transfers, especially among developed countries (e.g., Cox 1993; Dolowitz 1997). In order to provide greater coherence for the policy transfer field, Dolowitz and Marsh (1996, p.344) reviewed key concepts and defined policy transfer as “a process in which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions etc. in one time and/or place is used in the
development of policies, administrative arrangements and institutions in another time and/or place”. Dolowitz and Marsh (1996; 2000) also provided a comprehensive framework and typologies for researchers of policy transfer.

**Educational Borrowing: Studies of Policy Transfer in Education**

For educationalists, the interest in voluntarily importing educational practices from abroad into one’s home context, or policy “borrowing”, was sparked with the establishment and expansion of national school systems throughout the 19th century and 20th centuries and was a defining debate in the emergence of comparative education (Phillips & Schweisfurth 2008). Early “travelers’ tales” of education systems abroad were mainly descriptive and historical in nature. Later, policy-makers sent civil servants to other countries on fact-finding missions and sparked debates regarding whether foreign education policies should be imported given national contextual differences. Such debates moved forward with the works of Bereday (1964) and Noah and Eckstein (1969) who advocated for the use of empirical social science methods.

This led to greater debate in the field over methodology and theory in the following decades. Thus, “borrowing” was considered a voluntary action although, as noted by many scholars in the field (e.g., Phillips & Ochs 2004), the term “borrowing” is problematic since it suggests the taking of something that would eventually be returned, which is not the case in any kind of policy transfer. Using the term “borrowing” also suggests a one-directional flow of policy from the lender to the borrower, simplifying a very complex process of negotiation and adaptation. To remedy this shortcoming, other terms have been suggested most notably the idea of policy borrowing as “translation” (Dale 2006; Cowen 2009).

Thus, in past decades, studies of policy borrowing in comparative education expanded and diversified. Incorporating theories from further afield, scholars developed new concepts and perspectives, examining more imposed transfers (Carnoy 1974; Altbach & Kelly 1978). Schriewer (1988) built on Luhmann’s (1982; 1985) theory of self-referencing societies and introduced the concept of “externalization”, while David Phillips critically examined cross-national policy attraction (Phillips 1989). Such scholars were among the “first generation” of researchers employing a more theoretically-informed and contextually-grounded
approach to policy transfer in education (Steiner-Khamisi 2012). The work of these scholars has been organized, by their approaches, into four main strands or theoretical lenses: (1) New Institutionalist/Social Positivist, (2) Dependency, (3) Phenomenological/Culturalist, and (4) Transcendental /Meta-theoretical (Perry & Tor 2009; Spring 2008). As noted earlier, the first two perspectives were rooted in the works of Meyers and colleagues and Wallerstein, Frank and colleagues respectively, which drew on policy diffusion, sociological new institutionalism, and post-colonial literature.

In contrast, comparative educationalists such as Phillips and Steiner-Khamisi represent the Phenomenological/Culturalist theoretical approach to policy transfer in comparative education. Culturalists question the idea that a common global education model and culture exists and instead emphasize the differences in seemingly similar ideas as they are expressed through local contexts. Researchers employing a phenomenological approach have used micro-level analysis to illuminate the implementation of transfers, offering an explanation of how globally transferred policies can vary significantly depending on national contexts. Focusing on the “politics of borrowing and lending”, these theorists have challenged the uni-directional and all-powerful nature of global forces espoused by macro-level approaches. Instead, scholars of this approach (e.g., Steiner-Khamisi 2004; 2000; Ochs & Phillips 2002; Chisholm 1999; 2007) explore the power of cultural interpretations and national politics in shaping transferred educational ideas. Their studies point to the existence of a wide variety of alternative knowledge bases, models, and practices in education.

Some also question to what extent transfers actually take place (Whitty et al. 1992; Halpin & Troyna 1995), suggesting that similar education policies emerged in the U.S. and U.K. in the 1990s not necessarily because of “direct policy exchange” but for purposes of legitimation. In addition, these exchanges of ideas were rooted in transnational policy networks that shared “mutually reinforcing versions of reality which reflect shared reference groups and assumptive worlds” (Whitty & Edwards 1998, p.223). By exploring cases of policy transfer in various national and local contexts, these scholars show the idiosyncratic nature of policy borrowing. Their qualitative methods reflect the need to understand the way in which contexts shape ideas and implementation in both expected and unexpected ways.
Similarly, the Transcendental/Meta-theoretical approach also pays close attention to how policy is socially constructed and advocates for a multi-level analysis of policy transfer. Such theorists (Luhmann 1997; Schriewer 1988; Dale 2000) attempt to account for the interplay between micro- and macro- forces shaping policy transfers and their outcomes. They draw heavily on the social constructivist perspective of Bourdieu (1989) and acknowledge that both global convergence and national variation is occurring as a result of policy transfer and diffusion. Both of these latter approaches have proven popular among educationalists and studies employing them have increased in the past two decades (Steiner-Khamsi & Waldow 2011).

Policy Transfer Across the Disciplines

With rare exceptions (e.g., Steiner-Khamsi 2012), scholars working on policy borrowing (and lending) in comparative education and those examining policy transfer (and diffusion) in political science do not engage in dialogue with each other. Yet, in the 1990s, perceptions of educational policy borrowing between the U.S. and U.K. sparked several studies in both disciplines (Wolman 1992; Whitty et al. 1992; Wohlstetter & Anderson 1992; Finegold et al. 1994; Whitty & Edwards 1998; Dolowitz 2000) and attracted new scholars to the field. In the 21st century, both camps of researchers increasingly share a common focus on the roles non-government actors and networks in the processes and outcomes of transfer. From here on, I move forward by drawing on both literatures to review the state of the field.

Policy Transfer Frameworks

There have been a number of conceptual frameworks proposed by scholars to help understand policy transfer as a distinct phenomenon. I briefly review four here: two from the political science field and two from the education field.

The most cited policy transfer framework, proposed by Dolowitz and Marsh (2000), extends their earlier work (Dolowitz & Marsh 1996) and conceptualizes policy transfer researchers as both an independent and dependent variable. This suggests studies can provide insight into policy transfer as a process and/or a policy
outcome. To facilitate investigations, Dolowitz and Marsh’s proposed framework is organized around six inter-related questions:

1. Why do actors engage in policy transfer?
2. Who are the key actors involved in the policy transfer process?
3. What is transferred?
4. From where are the lessons drawn?
5. What are the different degrees of transfer?
6. What restricts or facilitates the policy transfer process?

Dolowitz and Marsh’s framework provides a typology of possible answers to these questions. Although their framework draws from a wide range of studies, it relies heavily on Rose’s (1991; 1993) concept of “lesson-drawing” and Bennett’s (1991) work on convergence. The framework provided much needed synthesis of the field at the time and has served as a guiding framework for many investigations. However, some scholars argued that Dolowitz and Marsh’s (1996; 2000) framework can mask the complexity of the transfer process (Page 2000; Stone 2001a; Radaelli 2000).

To address this complexity, Evans and Davies (1999) propose an alternative multi-level framework aimed at accounting for global and international forces alongside state-centered forces. Evans and Davies posed the questions: What domestic, international and transnational circumstances are likely to bring about policy transfer and how? To answer them, Evans and Davies created a multi-faceted model by combining five theoretical frameworks: (1) international structure and agency, (2) the epistemic community approach, (3) domestic structure and agency, (4) policy network analysis and (5) formal policy transfer analysis. Their meso-level map also argued for the need to integrate the role of policy networks and lesson-drawing occurring at the micro-level at various points of the policy transfer process. While providing an innovative way of addressing complexity in policy transfer in the age of governance and globalization, the model use is limited to addressing basic questions about the conditions, scope and dimensions of the transfer (Benson & Jordan 2011). Furthermore, though Evans and Davies state that no study of policy transfer is complete without referring to the implementation aspect of policy, they do not develop any device nor attempt to guide any deeper analysis of the transfer process.
Meanwhile, adopting a multi-level, meta-theoretical approach, Dale’s (1999) proposed framework focuses on transfer “mechanisms” and aims to compare the effects of globalization as a form of policy transfer distinct from other theories of policy “borrowing” and “learning”. In his framework, Dale identifies seven mechanisms of policy transfer that vary along eight dimensions. His work challenges the assumption of voluntariness of traditional perspectives and highlights the role of global pressures and underlying power relations that shape transfer processes. Notably, Dale (1999) emphasizes that globalization differs from “imperialism” or “colonialism” since its effects are felt by all countries, not only less powerful ones. Thus, transfers stemming from globalization are “not the result of the imposition of a policy by one country or another... but a much more supranationally constructed effect” (Dale 1999, p.8). Through his theorizing the effects of globalization, Dale also challenges the “methodological nationalism” – the tendency to take governments at the level of nation-state as the units involved in transfer – of the policy borrowing approaches, suggesting actors not related to government nor policy communities could be involved.

In contrast, Phillips and Ochs (2003) propose a four-stage model of voluntary policy borrowing by incorporating the works of Schriewer, Steiner-Khamsi, and Mark Bray. It includes subcategories of actors, motives, and contextual factors to guide researchers. The stages occur in a circular fashion. The first stage, Cross-National Attraction, is further subdivided into two categories: Impulses and Externalizing Potential. Impulses are the preconditions and/or sparks that generate initial interest in borrowing from abroad, and eight possible impulses within the borrowing context are indentified. In the first stage, the model specifies six possible elements of a policy (the “foci of attraction”) that have “externalizing potential”, or rather, could be borrowed. In the model’s second stage, Decision, actors’ motives for transfer are examined and four types of decisions are identified: theoretical, phoney, realistic/practical, and quick fix. These decision-types reflect different motives and modes of learning but do not offer ways in which the decision to transfer may be affected by forces beyond or below the national-political sphere. The third stage examines implementation and focuses on the factors and significant actors that shape the new policy, including people and institutions that resist or support the change as well as the speed of change. The fourth stage,
Internalisation/Indigenisation, entails the analysis of the adapted policies that have “become” part of the system.

In sum, these models represent attempts to consolidate learning on the policy transfer and offer competing approaches to the phenomenon – some more macro- or multi-level with consideration of wider networks and power while one focuses on the complexity of local actors and context shaping instances of transfer. Yet, virtually all the models do not provide explanatory theories of policy transfer and neglect to address how policy transfer relates to other policy-making processes, both criticisms of the policy transfer approach (James & Lodge 2003). Hence, many have called for policy transfer to be combined with other perspectives for empirical investigation (Evans 2009; Benson & Jordan 2011).

Forms of Policy Transfer and the Role of Learning

The term policy transfer has become an umbrella term for all types of transfer, whether they are voluntarily adopted by policy makers or imposed by an outside actor. Within the education field, these two categories are commonly referred to as policy “borrowing” and “lending” respectively. Between these two extremes is a spectrum of transfers that can occur through varying mechanisms such as diffusion, pressure from supranational organizations, international networks, or coerced by occupier or an authoritarian regime at home (Phillips & Ochs 2003; Dolowitz & Marsh 1996). These various types of transfer help answer Dolowitz and Marsh’s first question: Why do actors engage in policy transfer? Thus, the distinguishing factor between these types of transfer is the prime agent(s) of transfer and the motive for transfer. However, researchers acknowledge that the presence of multiple actors in the process, such as international consultants and other non-government actors, makes it more difficult to distinguish between these “forms” of transfer (Dolowitz & Marsh 2000; Perry & Tor 2009).

A key debate related to the forms of transfer is the role of knowledge and learning in the process of policy-making (and transfer). Concepts such as “lesson-drawing” (Rose 1991), “policy learning” (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993; Raffe & Spours 2007), and “social learning” (Hall 1993; Boehmke & Witmer 2004) all aim to capture how actors’ knowledge and learning shapes the decision-making and policy development. These concepts represent a policy-as-learning approach to studying
policy change and is rooted in work of Hugh Heclo (1974) who declared “policy making is a form of collective puzzlement on society’s behalf” (p.305). In the literature, “lesson-drawing” specifically and policy learning in general is treated as a necessary precursor to transfer. Yet, few studies of policy transfer question the processes of sensemaking involved in the diffusion of an idea through social networks. Most often, a policy innovation is treated as a single idea that undergoes adaptation to fit a new context rather than a fuzzy idea up for multiple interpretations both in its original context and its new locality.

Studying policy learning among individuals involved in the transfer process can provide a glimpse into the social networks, institutional pressures, and other factors related to the transfer process. Probing the manner in which ideas are presented and interpreted can illuminate the potentially diverse motives and rationales of actors and expose differences in understanding as well as actors’ social influence that would be overlooked otherwise. Also, paying more attention to the role of social learning within policy transfer may help explain the scope of policy change, such as when and why transfers result in either an incremental or “first order” change, general reform or “second order” change, or a radical paradigm-shift in policy or “third order” change (Hall 1993). Thus, there is valuable potential for integrating a policy-as-learning approach with the transfer process literature. Doing so would require scholars to see policy-related learning as an ongoing activity and a key component of transfer, rather than simply a precursor to transfer. In addition, a focus on policy learning would help link transfer processes to the broader literature on policy-making and change.

**Actors Involved in Policy Transfer**

Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) specify nine broad categories of actors that are involved in policy transfer:

1. elected officials
2. political parties
3. bureaucrats/civil servants
4. pressure groups
5. policy entrepreneurs and experts
6. transnational corporations
7. think tanks
Clearly, the term “actor” does not necessarily denote an individual person but can refer to groups, corporations, networks, and other bodies. Elected officials and bureaucrats, the most common actors examined in policy-making and implementation studies, have also been common actors studied in cases of policy transfer. This is understandable given scholars’ tendency to focus on national governments as the prime unit of analysis, although Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) recognize transfer within local levels of government and between sectors as well as between nations.

In an attempt to account for the effects of globalization and emergence of new forms of governance, scholars have begun to focus their attention on actors outside government, in civil society, and in international networks and organizations that may facilitate cases of policy transfer. For example, Dale and Robertson (2002) examine how regional bodies such as the European Union, North American Free Trade Agreement, and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation have varying degrees of influence on its member states’ education policies. Others consider how international organizations spread policies. For example, Burde (2004) examines the role of an international non-governmental organization in importing foreign “best practices” to Bosnia-Herzegovina while Jones (2004) explores how the World Bank influences educational policy through its educational loans and ideological beliefs.

Furthermore, Stone (2000) analyzes the role of think tanks in transferring ideas about privatization. Drawing on the concepts of “social learning” and “epistemic communities”, her study highlights the unique role of think tanks in producing and distributing policy-related knowledge, their involvement in advocacy and transnational networks, and their ability to spark organizational transfer. In addition, Stone’s (2010) examination of the Open Society Institute shed light on how an international philanthropic foundation can create and manage an international policy network that engages in governance and diffuses ideas and norms that influence policy. These examples highlight how researchers are exploring the diversity of actors and networks that, although not centered in government, are facilitating policy transfer. Still, more empirical research is needed on transfer facilitated by policy entrepreneurs and networks outside government.
Objects and Sources of Policy Transfer

What is actually adopted in the policy transfer process can vary considerably. Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) identify eight different categories: “policy goals, policy content, policy instruments, policy programmes, institutions, ideologies, ideas and attitudes, and negative lessons” (p.12). They also assert that “policies” and “programmes” are not the same concepts as a “policy” suggests a theory of action that can result in multiple programmes while a “programme” is a “complete course of action in and of itself” (2000, p.16). Similarly, Phillips and Ochs (2003) specify six broader categories of policy elements that may be transferable: a policy’s guiding philosophy, ambitions/goals, strategies, enabling structures, processes and techniques.

This gives scholars a flexible itemized list of possible objects of transfer, though it says little about how different policy elements may shape the transfer process itself. This is a question that has been taken up by a limited number of policy diffusion scholars (Makse & Volden 2011; Wejnert 2002) and relates to a central concept within the diffusion of innovation literature (i.e. how the characteristics of an innovation affects its rate of adoption). In this vein, Wejnert (2002) discusses how a policy’s “public vs. private consequences” as well as its “benefits vs. costs” can influence an actor’s decision to adopt. In addition, Rose (1993) hypothesized that transfer more often occurs when programmes “have single goals; the problem in focus is simple to understand; a direct relationship between problem and solution is determined; side-effects are perceived to be minimal; a programme’s performance in a given environment is known about and the outcomes of its transfer are easily predicted” (Nedley 2004, p.187).

The source of transferable policy or policy elements can vary from the international level down to district and local levels, although the most common unit of analysis among transfer scholars continues to be the national governments. Again, this trend has led the field to suffer from “methodological nationalism” (Dale 2005) with the majority of studies examining transfers between the U.S.-U.K. (Whitty 2012; Cook 2008), as well as among European countries (Hough 2005; Turbin 2001; Bache & Taylor 2003; Bulmer & Padgett 2005), Australia and New Zealand (Thrupp 2001; Dale 2001; Fawcett & Marsh 2012). Meanwhile, policy transfer studies in developing countries tend to focus on the flow of ideas from developed to less developed nations though a notable minority have looked at “south-south” transfer
among developing countries (Nedley 2004; Morais 2005; Chisholm & Steiner-Khamsi 2009). Despite this focus on the national-level, it is widely recognized that policy transfer can happen at many levels of policy-making – from among city, state, or provincial governments to national, regional, or global levels of policy-making (Bray & Thomas 1995). In addition, transfers can take place horizontally (e.g. from district to district) or potentially from policy learning among home countries (Raffe et al. 1999; Raffe 2007) – as well as vertically (e.g., from local to national levels) among these units. It is important to note that policy transfers can also stem from other policy sectors and from past experiences.

**Degrees of Transfer**

Within the literature, “degrees of transfer” refers to the extent to which a policy is transferred wholesale into a new environment. This relates back to debates on why actors decide to engage in transfer in the first place since their learning, rationales, and intentions dictate to some extent the transfer proposed at the onset of the process. Still, the process can alter the intended degree of transfer, and thus this question implies an assessment of overall outcome of policy transfer. In response, Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) specify four different degrees of transfer: (1) copying, which involves “direct and complete transfer”, (2) emulation, which “involves transfer of the ideas behind the policy or program”; (3) combinations, which involve the transfer of “mixtures of several different policies”; and inspiration, in which “policy in another jurisdiction may inspire a policy change, but where the final outcome does not actually draw upon the original” (p.13). Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) also distinguish between transfers that are successfully completed and those that are not carried out due to being “inappropriate” or “uninformed”. These are policies that fail to be implemented as a result of insurmountable resistance or contextual incompatibility.

These conceptual categories lead to some interesting and yet unexplored questions. To what degree must a transfer resemble its foreign counterpart to be considered a successful transfer? Though scholars expect some adaption to the original policy concept due to differences in context, Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) suggest policy failure can be the result of an “uninformed” or “incomplete” transfer. However, these categories do not reflect the ways in which policies may be changed
through negotiations among policy actors with varying interpretations of the policy. Instead, the focus in the literature appears to emphasize the motivations and intention of the lead actors supporting the transfer. Few scholars examine how the intentions and interests of those in favor of policy transfer might change and evolve over time during transfer process, perhaps as a result of negotiation, further policy learning, or structural influences during the decision-making process. These issues are usually only addressed at the implementation stage, as clearly indicated in Phillips and Ochs (2003) model. In other words, focusing only on questions regarding whether a transfer “succeeds” may miss the important point of how policy outcomes (especially transfers that take the form of institutional changes or new organizations) can be produced at the point of “decision” through negotiated “settlements”, as theorized in by institutional scholars (e.g., Rao & Kenney 2008).

Factors restricting or facilitating the policy transfer process

Given the complexity of policy processes, the number of contextual factors that help or hinder the transfer process are innumerable. Still, Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) echo predictions of Rose (1993) who suggests that a policy’s complexity, and its compatibility with previous policies and the structural/institutional and cultural context, can constrain or facilitate its transfer. Lack of “suitability of context” and “resistance” to the transfer are commonly cited inhibitors within studies of education policy transfer (Phillips & Ochs 2003). However, these points reflect a rhetorical or retrospective (i.e., functional) argument based on outcomes rather than objective reality unless a phenomenological approach to transfer is used.

Surveying the range of transfer studies in different social policy fields, Stone (1999) notes that policy transfer may be significantly affected by “time, institutional architecture, political culture, and state structures”(p.54). Other scholars have also identified social or policy networks as a critical component of transfer. Networks of actors promoting policy transfer can influence the particular path the process takes (Mintrom & Vergari 1998; True & Mintrom 2001) and the level of controversy a policy sparks in terms of a moral debate can hinder a policy’s transfer (Mooney & Lee 1999). In this area, the diffusion-innovation and institutionalism literature become particularly relevant and useful in understanding how institutional structures and social networks affect the transfer process.
2.3 Policy Entrepreneurs and Networks in Policy Transfer

As mentioned in earlier sections, national governments and their official actors have so far been the most common subjects of policy transfer studies. However, policy entrepreneurs and policy networks are two concepts gaining popularity in the policy transfer literature, although both have longer histories in related fields of public policy studies. First, I will briefly bring together and discuss the theoretical work on “policy entrepreneurs” found in the literatures of policy diffusion, governance, and transfer. Secondly, I will likewise review the evolution of the policy network concept and approach in these three literatures. Finally, I will propose that bringing together these two concepts – policy entrepreneurs and policy networks – is helpful in studying cases of policy transfer that reflect new governance modes of policy-making. This discussion will also be useful in relating the policy transfer literature to related concepts in the “diffusion of innovation” literature.

Policy Entrepreneurs and Innovation

In his influential work *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, Kingdon (1984) introduced his “policy streams” theory of policy processes and established the concept of “policy entrepreneurs” who, he argued, often play an influential role in policy change. In Kingdon’s policy streams model, which rejected rational and linear models of policy-making and instead built on Cohen et al.’s (1972) “garbage can” model, there are three separate but related policy streams – problem stream, policy (solution) stream, and politics stream. When the three streams intersect, a window of opportunity for policy action is created. Kingdon suggested policy entrepreneurs recognize and/or help such windows come about. He first conceptualized policy entrepreneurs as individuals who could be inside or outside of government but whose “defining characteristic… is their willingness to invest their resources—time, energy, reputation, and sometimes money—in the hope of a future return” (p. 122 as quoted by Mintrom (2000), p.57). For Kingdon, policy entrepreneurs could recognize opportune moments or “windows” in which to interject their innovative ideas into the policy process, referring to this ability as “social acuity”.
As the concept was taken up by other researchers in the field, its meaning expanded. Policy entrepreneurs were seen as those possessing the ability to define problems, build teams, and lead by example (Mintrom & Norman 2009). However, while Kingdon stressed that a policy entrepreneur can be identified by his/her willingness to accept risk, Walker (1981) and Polsby (1985) argued the defining role of policy entrepreneurs was to provide and develop innovative ideas. Roberts and King (1989; 1991) furthered the idea of a policy entrepreneur as an innovator, rather than risk-taker, by linking the concept of policy entrepreneur to the work of economist Joseph Schumpeter (1939; 1934). Schumpeter, a prominent scholar of modern entrepreneurial thought, had suggested that an entrepreneur’s main function was to innovate, and he argued that the entrepreneur takes on risk only “indirectly and at one removed” (1939, p.104). By this, Schumpeter meant that the entrepreneur experienced limited risk since he/she is primarily challenging the status quo, not supplying capital or resources (Roberts 1992). Instead, in Schumpeter view, the capitalist bore most of the risk in an entrepreneurial venture. Roberts and King’s (1989, 1991) work further reinforced the idea policy entrepreneurs are not primarily risk-takers but mainly innovators.

Meanwhile, Roberts and King (1989; 1991) developed the concept of “policy entrepreneurs” in other ways. They altered Kingdon’s definition by asserting that “policy entrepreneurs” are individuals who operate “from outside the formal positions of government”. In their view, policy entrepreneurs “introduce, translate, and help implement new ideas into public practice” (Roberts & King 1991, p.147). They are among a larger class of “public entrepreneurs” who engage in “public entrepreneurship” defined as “the generation of a novel or an innovative idea and the design and implementation of the innovative idea into public sector practice” (Roberts 1992, p.56). Innovation, in this context, is any new idea that is technological or administrative in nature. In their view, public entrepreneurs are involved in the multiple stages of policy formation, from phases of conceptualization and policy agenda-setting through decision-making, and implementation. As a result their role is multi-faceted and includes idea generation and problem-framing, cultivating networks among a wide variety of stakeholders, attracting media support, and carrying out administrative duties and evaluative activities related to implementation.
Furthermore, Roberts and King (1991) proposed that public entrepreneurs are of four types:

1. *Political entrepreneurs*, who hold elected leadership positions in government;
2. *Executive entrepreneurs*, who hold appointed leadership positions in government;
3. *Bureaucratic entrepreneurs*, who hold formal positions in government, although not leadership positions; and
4. *Policy entrepreneurs*, who work from outside the formal governmental system to introduce, translate, and implement innovative ideas into public sector practice.

It is important to note that while these individuals differ in their location and authority within (or outside) the political structure, they are united by their endeavor to bring innovative change to a public policy issue. Roberts and King also stress that to be labeled “public entrepreneurs”, individuals must be involved in the multiple stages of developing an innovation. This conceptualization of a “policy entrepreneur” is not common among policy transfer studies using Dolowitz and Marsh’s approach since the implementation phase of transfers is not generally explored in-depth. And while policy transfer studies in comparative education have often examined implementation phases, there has been little examination of the role of policy entrepreneurs as conceptualized by Roberts and King, Mintrom, and other political scientists.

The existence of four types of a public entrepreneur allows for the conceptual possibility of “entrepreneurial teams” composed of the various types. Roberts and King (1996) advanced such a concept following their empirical, in-depth qualitative investigation of six public entrepreneurs. These six, five of whom came from outside government, formed a team who engaged in “collective entrepreneurship” throughout the 1980s to finally bring about state school choice in Minnesota in the form of open enrollment in 1988. Roberts and King (1996) noted that entrepreneurial teams can be highly effective for a number of reasons: (1) their diverse backgrounds and combined mix of skills and expertise, (2) common vision and commitment to change, and (3) the presence of mutual accountability and divided responsibilities. Such a diverse team can, in turn, help build a diverse network of supporters and can avoid the perception of “groupthink”.

Despite Roberts and King’s conceptual insight into collective forms of public policy entrepreneurship, scholarly focus has remained on individual actors, not
collaborative teams. Using quantitative methods, Schneider et al. (1995) compare public entrepreneurs to their private sector counterparts by exploring the conditions leading to the emergence of such change agents in the public policy sphere. Based on their work, Schneider et al. (1995) proposed a framework for understanding how and why public entrepreneurs emerge and operate, given specific contexts. This model was then utilized and combined with Event History Analysis, a common quantitative method employed by diffusion scholars, in subsequent studies to assess how contextual variables influence the behavior of policy entrepreneurs (Mintrom 1997; Mintrom & Vergari 1998; Mintrom 2000).

The main insights from these empirical studies of policy entrepreneurs are twofold. First, when other factors are controlled for, evidence suggests that the presence of a policy entrepreneur significantly increases the likelihood of a state considering and adopting a certain policy (Mintrom 1997). Similarly, when the work of policy entrepreneurs is linked with their involvement and utilization of policy networks, the probability of success in achieving their innovative policy goals increases (Mintrom & Vergari 1998). Mintrom (1997) also suggests that American policy entrepreneurs who use external, interstate networks were more effective in getting innovative policies onto state legislative agendas, but internal (intrastate) networks were more influential in bringing about the adoption of the policy at the state level.

These results suggest that policy entrepreneurship and policy networks are, perhaps, inseparable, and should ideally be examined together to better understand their operation and impact. The need to study networks alongside the work of policy entrepreneurs becomes even more clear when considering the possibility of a team of entrepreneurs working together to tap into various networks to cultivate a new network that can support the adoption as well as implementation of an innovative policy. Oborn et al. (2011), who empirically investigated a policy entrepreneur in London, argue that such actors can do more than open a policy window; a policy entrepreneur can also build a network through which policy agendas can be enacted.

A final insight into the role of policy entrepreneurs comes from Beeson and Stone (2013). They also use the term “policy entrepreneur” in their exploration of how one private individual, Ross Garnaut, significantly influenced Australian policies regarding the economy and climate change. Beeson and Stone (2013) distinguish between “policy entrepreneurs” who are generally focused on a specific
issue they wish to influence, and “public intellectuals” who offer their opinion on a range of issues from outside government (usually in a university). However, unlike Roberts and King, they argue that policy entrepreneurs may be based within or outside of government and may work in full public view or behind the scenes and “target decision-making elites in political parties, government, and corporate offices, or the key players and interests in policy communities” (Beeson & Stone 2013, p.2). This modification of the concept of policy entrepreneurship is understandable and helpful given the emergence of more networked forms of governance in recent decades.

The concepts of public and policy entrepreneurs as developed in studies of domestic policy-making can provide a useful start to understanding how policy entrepreneurs operate in cases of policy transfer. This is a topic that has generally been neglected by the policy transfer literature, particularly in education. In many ways, Ball and colleagues (Ball 2007; 2008; 2012; Ball & Junemann 2011) are tackling this gap through examining and mapping the development of entrepreneurial networks of private, non-profit, and philanthropic individuals and organizations enacting education initiatives in England. Yet, their analysis is limited in its application in policy transfer cases as their network-mapping approach and focus on discourses neglects the temporal and dynamic social processes at work in specific cases of innovation-adoption.

Still, there is much promise in this using the concept of policy entrepreneur, especially combined with network analysis, to consider how and from where new policies come about. Together, these tools can help unpack policy transfers that take unconventional forms under collaborative governance modes of policy-making. The concept of policy entrepreneurs can also be linked and complemented by the notion of institutional entrepreneurs, a point I explore later on.

2.4 Policy Networks in Political Science

While policy entrepreneurs have not often been examined by policy transfer theorists, the topic of policy networks has gained more attention. This is likely due to the new trends in policy-making brought about by ideas of collaborative governance (Bevir & Rhodes 2003; Bevir et al. 2003) and the phenomenon of
globalization (Ladi 1999). Notably, the concept of policy networks has a longer history in the field of public policy studies, particularly in the U.S. with its more decentralized and federal structures of government. Thus, roots of the policy network concept partially lie in American pluralism and the research on sub-national governments (Rhodes 2006).

The policy network perspective rejects the rational model of policy-making and offers an alternative to the linear and rationalist stages-heuristic models of the policy process (Carlsson 2000). Rhodes (2006) defines policy networks as “sets of formal institutional and informal linkages between governmental and other actors structured around shared if endlessly negotiated beliefs and interests in public policymaking and implementation” (p.424) He further adds that actors within these networks are “interdependent and policy emerges from the interactions between them”. Similarly, Kenis and Schneider (1991) offer the following alternative description of a policy network:

A policy network is described by its actors, their linkages and its boundary. It includes a relatively stable set of mainly public and private corporate actors. The linkages between the actors serve as channels for communication and for the exchange of information, expertise, trust and other policy resources. The boundary of a given policy network is not in the first place determined by formal institutions but results from a process of mutual recognition dependent on functional relevance and structural embeddedness. Policy networks should be seen as integrated hybrid structures of political governance (Kenis & Schneider, 1991, p. 41-42 as quoted by Carlsson 2000, italics in original).

Among political scientists, the concept of “policy networks” in general are most often used in three main ways: (1) “as a description of governments at work, (2) as a theory for analyzing government policy-making, and (3) as a prescription for reforming public management” (Rhodes 2006, p.426). In an attempt to explain how governments work, scholars have conceptualized a number of different types of networks that appear to exist, and thus the term “policy network” is a broad category that covers a number of subcategories. Building on previous studies of policy networks, Marsh and Rhodes (1992) propose that policy networks be viewed on a continuum based on the degree of integration between its members. This continuum contains five types of policy networks ranging from issue networks (which are less
integrated) to policy communities (which are highly integrated). They also posit that networks can further be differentiated on the basis of their (1) membership composition, (2) the extent of inter-dependence between their members, and (3) the distribution of resources among members. Using this criterion, Marsh and Rhodes (1992) suggest there are five types of policy networks: policy communities, professional networks, intergovernmental networks, producer networks, and issue networks. While varying in their degrees of integration, stability and exclusiveness, these networks can also differ in terms of what types of common interests prevail – economic, professional, or political.

Besides identifying what types of networks exist, scholars also use these terms to describe how governments work through networks. Networks serve as avenues for the intermediation of interests (utilized more in the U.S. context), inter-organizational collaboration (utilized more in the European context), and governance (utilized more recently in the U.K, U.S., and European contexts) (Rhodes 2006).

Policy Networks in Relation to Policy Learning and Transfer

Policy networks are often discussed as key sites of policy learning and transfer. Policy networks are key features of Haas’ concept of epistemic communities, through which policy ideas are formulated, shaped, and put forward, some which may represent policies transferred from other places. Haas (1992, p.2) defines a epistemic community as “a network of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge”. Within these networks, actors share common principles and beliefs about the nature and causal links in a policy area and notions of valid evidence. As a result, epistemic communities produce knowledge that is widely respected and are able influence political debates and policy-making.

Relatedly, policy networks are also at the heart of Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s (1993) advocacy coalition framework to policy change over a significant period of time (i.e, a decade). An advocacy coalition is comprised of “people from a variety of positions (elected and agency officials, interest group leaders, researchers) who share a particular belief system – that is, a set of basic values, causal assumptions, and problem perceptions – and who show a non-trivial degree of coordinated activity over time” (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993, p.25). These
coalitions compete with each other to dominate policymaking in sub-systems, which are issue-specific networks. Such sub-systems, they argue, are common site for policy-making because elected officials rely on civil servants who regularly consult with interest groups on an issue. Thus, advocacy coalitions and networks are intimately intertwined and represent means and sites of policy-learning, -making, and even transfer.

More recently, Evans and McComb (2004) offer the concept of a “policy transfer network” which differs from others in that it is created in an ad-hoc fashion in order to facilitate a specific policy transfer. The concept draws on elements of the advocacy coalition framework and applies them to the policy transfer process. Evans and McComb theorize that a policy transfer network exhibits limited membership by (1) extending to those who have shared beliefs and provide inputs and resources to advance a certain policy transfer but (2) excluding those whose views are not seen as supportive. This approach focuses upon actors and their knowledge and sense-making as they learn through the transfer process while also taking into account the organizational structures and interpersonal relationships that shape the context.

**Bringing Together Policy Entrepreneurs & Networks to Understand Policy Transfer**

Clearly, both policy entrepreneurs and networks are implicated in policy transfer on various levels. Though some scholars have already begun examining such phenomenon (Sissenich 2008; Cao 2012; Legrand 2012; Ball & Exley 2010; Ball 2012; Beeson & Stone 2013), more work is needed, particularly on the formation and evolution of such networks. This becomes ever more important because, as Stone (2010) points out, civil society has become a key driver in “creating new transnational processes and networks of policy-making” (p. 272). She further argues that such non-governmental networks appear to collaborate with government in ways that do not disrupt “hierarchies [by] opening participation and dispersing power” but instead “represent new constellations of privatized power” (Stone 2010, p.272). For this reason, emerging policy entrepreneurs and related networks need to be further examined. Given this need, the concept of a policy network is a promising tool for analyzing policy transfer processes, not least because it is a “meso-level concept that links the micro-level of analysis, dealing with the role of interests and government in particular policy decisions, and the macro-level of
analysis, which is concerned with broader questions about the distribution of power in modern society” (Rhodes 2006, emphasis added).

2.5 The Institutional Perspective

The institutional perspective brings important conceptual frameworks and theoretical insights into understanding how “contexts” shape those actors, networks, and processes involved in policy transfer and vice versa. Although this body of literature focuses on the development of societal institutions, including organizations, it also provides insights into the complex role of social networks in shaping society. For this reason, institutionalism is a perspective that enables a deeper probing of the ways in which “contexts” can be better understood and studied in policy transfer research and, significantly, how social networks in this process may promote or stifle and ultimately shape innovation. Before focusing on these relevant points, I first ground my discussion in a brief examination of the development of institutionalism.

The Development of Institutional Theory

Institutional theory views the social world as made up of institutions – consisting of enduring rules, practices, and structures that set conditions on action. Thus, through institutional theory, scholars theorize and investigate how institutions emerge, are sustained, and shape society. They consider how institutions are reproduced and are modified by individuals and organizations. Institutionalism is a growing research perspective that scholars in a number of fields have adopted, most notably in the disciplines of economics, political science, sociology, and organizational studies. The value in the institutional perspective lies in its ability to connect present events and processes of the social world with those of the past. Furthermore, the perspective encompasses both macro- and micro-approaches, bridging the gap between them and providing meso-levels of analysis as well. Finally, institutional theory can be widely applied to social phenomenon and thus can transcend boundaries between social science disciplines and its subfields, creating a space for dialogue and cooperation (Scott 2014). The literature on institutionalism can help illuminate how policy transfers, and the networks and entrepreneurs
involved, are shaped by institutional contexts as they are translated, negotiated and implemented in new contexts. Next, I selectively review the development of institutional literature across three disciplines – political science, sociology, and organizational studies – before proceeding to examine current debates and key concepts.

**Early Institutional Theory in Political Science**

Institutionalism is an interdisciplinary field of research that emerged in the mid 19th and early 20th century. It developed in response to questions regarding the organization of modern society, its nature, and massive changes happening within it since the arrival of the Industrial Revolution and the rise of the nation-state. While scholars in Europe and the U.S. focused on addressing such issues, they also theorized how such environmental structures shape the choices and behavior of individuals. These issues remain at the heart of institutional theory, despite its considerable evolution over time.

The roots of institutionalism in political science can be traced back to Alexis de Tocqueville (1835), who first theorized that civil society actively organized and built institutions when state power was weak. Following his observations of American society, political scientists of the time focused on political bodies – documenting the origin and philosophical basis of such formal political institutions. This trend continued until the 1930s when many political scientists shifted away from the study of institutions and adopted the behavioralist approach to studying politics, focusing on individuals’ interests, voting patterns, party formation, and shifts in public opinion. Thus, political scientists became predominantly preoccupied with the theorization of political attitudes, behavior, and the distribution of power in society until the 1970s when institutions again became a primary focus through work on new institutionalism.

**Early Institutional Theory in Sociology**

During the same time, sociologists took a rather different approach to institutional theory than political scientists. Sociological theorists sought to explain how societal institutions developed to meet the needs of societies and the role culture played in influencing both individual behavior and institutional structures. Scott
identifies three different strands of early sociological thinking that contributed to the development of institutional theory, all of which evolved in the late 19th and early 20th century and led to distinct but related conceptual contributions.

The first set of works that jumpstarted the development of institutional theory in sociology were by Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim, and Max Weber. Marx led the development of the European tradition of institutional analysis with his theoretical ideas on the nature of human history and society. Marx rejected Hegel’s philosophical view that the material world was not real but an expression of a deeper, abstract idea or spirit. Instead, Marx argued that the material world was the real one and that the driving force in society through history was economic gain. Witnessing the Industrial Revolution, he postulated that the structures of mass oppression and exploitation only appeared to participants to be external and objective. In reality, he argued, such structures are products of human interests and activities and are justified by ideas and ideologies that seek to uphold them. Such ideologies create a “false consciousness” in which people misinterpret reality (Marx 1844; 1845). Thus, Marx theorized the way in which economic interests structured institutions and was among early institutional thinkers to express the notion of reality being a social construct. In addition, Marx utilized Hegel’s concept of dialectics, a reference to the struggle to resolve contradictions, or conflict, to explain the conditions for social change within society.

While Marx sought to explain the changes in society at the onset of industrial capitalism, Durkheim focused his attention on the sources of social order. He came to view society as shaped by normative and cognitive frameworks that are constructed through human interaction yet are experienced by individuals as objective. Thus, his work emphasized the influential role of symbolic systems, including knowledge systems, beliefs, and moral frameworks (Morrison 2006), and studied these elements as the basis of social institutions such as the family, religion, and education in addition to the economic and political institutions studied by political scientists. In his work, Durkheim introduced the concept of “social facts” to refer to the “ways of acting, thinking and feeling which possess the remarkable property of existing outside the consciousness of the individual” (Durkheim 1982, p.51). Scott (2014) summarizes social facts as “phenomena perceived by the individual to be both external (to that person) and coercive (backed by sanctions)” (p.14). Durkheim’s work also brought attention to the role of rituals and ceremonies
in expressing and reinforcing various types of beliefs, not only religious. These concepts led the development of sociological institutional theory, which would later be incorporated into new institutionalism.

Weber built on the ideas of both Marx and Durkheim and, in many ways, tried to bring together their contrasting approaches to understanding social systems. Weber argued that the social sciences, unlike the natural sciences, studied human social action in society and thus needed an interpretive approach which seeks to understand the individual’s inner and subjective states to explain human action and behavior (Morrison 2006). He argued that rational behavior could stem from different logistics – concerned with either upholding tradition, addressing emotion, abiding by ultimate values, or strategically reaching practical goals (Weber 1978). As Weber applied his interpretive theory of action to understanding bureaucratic structures, he developed a typology of different administrative structures (traditional, charismatic, and rational-legal) based on varying sources of legitimate but ultimately subjective authority (Weber 1958). Although Weber did not use the term “institution” in his writings, his study of bureaucracy set a precedent for how institutions could be approached and theorized.

Meanwhile, an alternative strand of sociological institutional research began with the work of Herbert Spencer (1876) and William Graham Sumner (1906). They likened society to a biological organism that developed specialized institutions to serve specific functions (Scott 2014). Their studies were comparative and historical and gave insight into the origins and operation of institutions in different societies. In their work, they viewed an institution as both a concept and a corresponding structure and introduced the idea that society increases in structural complexity over long periods of time as society evolves. This refers to the progression of human activity from the individual level to more organized and then institutionalized structures. Although the biological analogy Spencer first likened society to was eventually discarded, the central focus on institutions, levels of activity within society, and the functional purpose of environmental structures became enduring ideas that promoted theoretical development in institutionalism.

Finally, another strand of sociological work contributing to institutional theory began with the works of Charles Cooley (1902) and, later on, W. I. Thomas (1928) and Herbert Blumer (1969). They brought attention to the complex and interdependent relationship between society’s culture and organization and an
individual’s own personality and behavior, suggesting an early form of structuration theory. The works of George Mead (1930; 1934) and Alfred Schutz (1932) furthered this interactive, interpretive approach, bringing attention to the importance of individuals’ own interpretations of situations and the influence of such interpretations on their decisions and actions. Thomas supported this idea, stating, “If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequence” (Thomas & Znaniecki 1927, p.81 as quoted in Rogers 2003, p. 219). This interpretive view and the works of Cooley, Thomas, and Blumer helped promote empirically-based research on the micro-level of institutional processes, a topic that has been overshadowed by the macro-level analysis that still dominates the field. However, as new institutionalism emerged in the late 1970s, a handful of scholars again utilized the micro-level interpretive approach, starting notably with Lynne Zucker (1977).

**The Emergence of New Institutionalism**

A series of works published in the late 1970s and early 1980s captured scholars’ attention and led to the development of what many call the “new” institutionalism. The new institutionalism drew heavily on recent developments in ethnomethodology and phenomenology in the 1950s and 1960s. Ethnomethodology is an alternative branch of sociology first developed by Harold Garfinkel that focused on the micro-level decision-making of individuals, specifically how individuals make sense of society in their day-to-day interactions with it. Among his insights was the significance of face-to-face interactions in facilitating the construction of common cognitive understandings and the proposition that, after such interaction, an individual reforms his understandings and intentions (DiMaggio & Powell 1991). This approach to understanding micro-level social processes, as opposed to Parson’s and other institutionalists’ focus on macro-level analysis, also challenged the dominant focus on rules and norms that had started with Durkheim. Garfinkel argued that human action is not motivated by rules and shared norms and values, which are still open to diverse interpretations, but by common cultural and cognitive understandings that develop among individuals through interaction.

Similar ideas were echoed by sociology scholars working in phenomenology, an approach originating in philosophy that “stressed the in-depth exploration of the meanings associated with symbols” (Wuthnow 1987, p.42). In their influential work
The Social Construction of Reality, Berger and Luckmann (1966) sought to understand how commonsense, everyday knowledge shared among ordinary people organized and reproduced society. Agreeing with Garkfinkel that everyday face-to-face interactions are most important to sense-making, Berger and Luckman considered social realities—that is, what we regard as real and meaningful—are created through reciprocal, fluid, and flexible interactions on a constant basis. However, Berger and Luckmann moved to the macro-level of analysis to explain the existence of institutions. They argued that institutions are symbolic systems that are constructed over time and thus are “experienced as possessing a reality of their own, a reality that confronts the individual as an external and coercive fact” (Berger & Luckmann 1966, p.58). Berger and Luckmann’s work introduced the term “social construction” into the social sciences and were among the first to suggest that “beliefs” were not primarily internalized and subjective but were manifested in external behaviors and structures. These arguments had profound effects on the scholars who went on to establish the “new” institutional theory.

In the context of these theoretical developments, John Meyers and his colleagues introduced an alternative view of institutions and organizations that privileged their cultural-cognitive origins and elements. First, Meyer and Rowan (1977) challenged structural-contingency and resource-dependency theories, which view organizations as strategic actors steered by managers responding and adapting to environmental circumstances. Instead, they examined how and why formal bureaucratic organizations had become so prevalent and similar across modern societies and focused on explaining the effects of the institutional contexts, primarily the widespread social understandings embedded in such contexts (1977, p.346). In a later work, they describe institutional contexts as “the rules, norms, and ideologies of the wider society” (Meyer & Rowan 1983, p.84).

Meyer and Rowan (1977) argued that institutionalized ideological forces drive the growth and prevalence of formal organizations in modern society, declaring “once institutionalized, rationality becomes a myth with explosive organizing potential” (p.346). This, they argued, is a result of institutional rules that “function as myths depicting various formal structures as rational means to attainment of desirable ends” (p.345). Formal structures are defined as blueprints for organizational activities including its internal organization, programmes, and positions (p.342). These formal structures are offered by the institutional
environment as templates or “building blocks” for forming organizations that “are considered proper, adequate, rational, and necessary” (p.345) and hence desirable and essential for organizations to adopt.

Meyer and Rowan (1977) stressed the power of beliefs that are “rationalized”, referring to beliefs that are designed in ways that “specify the design of rule-like procedures to attain specific objectives” (Scott, 2014, p.50). Rational beliefs are the basis of myths, they argued. Meanwhile, as organizations conform to the myths of their institutional environment, they adopt organizational structures ceremonially to increase their external legitimacy rather than improve efficiency. Furthermore, Meyer and Rowan argue that institutional isomorphism not only helps legitimate organizations but also promotes their stability, survival, and success. However, because organizations incorporate formal structures are based on external criteria, they must loosen or “decouple” structures from one another and from internal organizational work. Scholars of organizational studies had observed the phenomenon of decoupling of formal and informal activities before. However, new institutional theorists made the aspect of “decoupling” central and provided an explanation of why it occurred (Jepperson 2002).

In another foundational work, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) built on Meyer and Rowan’s ideas and further cemented the concept of institutional isomorphism, defining it as “a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions” (p.149). They then set out their argument that the increasing isomorphism among organizations occurs through three mechanisms – coercive change stemming from peer or societal pressures, mimetic change in response to internal or external sources of uncertainty, and normative change brought about primarily by professionalization. In some ways, their explanation for institutional isomorphism relates to policy transfer theorists’ debates on policy convergence and the causes and motives for such similarities in educational policies and structures. While institutionalists focus on the diffusion of structures, or “institutional transfer” (e.g., Locke & Jacoby 1995), policy transfer scholars tend to focus on the movement of policy. However, these two entities – structure and policy – are very much related. Marsh and Sharm (2009) suggest both perspectives would benefit from a more dialectical synthesis of agency and structure and need both the pattern-finding (emphasized by diffusion studies)
and process-tracing (emphasized by transfer studies) to fully explain either phenomenon.

DiMaggio and Powell (1983) also made another major contribution to the field with the introduction of the concept of “organizational field”. They argued that coercive, mimetic, and normative mechanisms facilitate the diffusion of institutional effects through a “field” of organizations, an adaptation of Bourdieu’s idea of “social fields”. DiMaggio and Powell defined organizational field as “those organizations, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life [including] key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services or products” (p.148). Around the same time, Scott and Meyer (1983) also proposed a similar concept – a sector. Both ideas refer to a meso-level field of analysis that includes inter-connected populations of organizations that are not necessarily bound to one geographic locality. The introduction of a new unit of analysis was an important step forward that enabled scholars to identify a diverse but connected set of relevant actors and organizations on which to focus their attention. The concept of field, or sector, has also led to a limited number of studies on the influence of one sector on another through the transfer ideas or practices (e.g., Hwang & Powell 2009).

While the analyses of Meyer, Rowan, Scott, DiMaggio and Powell and others developed new institutional theory at the macro-level, Zucker (1977) examined the “microfoundations” of institutions. The micro-level approach seeks to understand the process of institutionalization in contrast to the macro-level approach that treats institutionalization as a state, without explaining how it is achieved (Zucker 1991). Without a micro-level foundation, Zucker suggested that scholars would be left with simply examining the content of institutions, which limits the potential for explanatory theory-building.

The ideas of Meyers and colleagues invited scholars to challenge or expand such propositions through empirical research, leading to the development of additional strands of new institutional theory, notably historical and rational choice institutional perspectives (Schmidt 2010). However, the enduring theme of the new institutionalism literature is that institutions construct actors and their interests through shaping society’s culture and others’ perceptions of reality. Such theoretical insight influenced the related and relatively newer field of organizational studies (March & Olsen 1984; 1989), offering an alternative to resource dependency and
strategic contingency models, and led scholars to re-examine notions of organizational learning (DiMaggio & Powell 1991).

2.6 Key Concepts and Current Debates in Institutional Theory

Consolidation of Research into a Three-Pillar Framework

The study of institutions in both the new and old institutional literature led Scott to revise the conceptualization of institutions as comprising of three pillars, or elements, which “together with associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life” (Scott, 2014, p. 56). In this framework, first detailed by Scott in 1995 and based heavily upon DiMaggio and Powell (1983), institutions are made up of regulatory, normative, and the cultural-cognitive elements, and each can be defined and differentiated from the other by the type of motivation for compliance, enforcement mechanisms, underlying logic, types of indicators, affect, and bases of legitimacy.

Legitimacy, in this context, refers to “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, belief, and definitions” (Suchman 1995, p.574). Unlike some organizational theories that consider legitimacy as a commodity or resource, institutionalists view legitimacy as “a condition reflecting perceived consonance” with prevailing rules, laws, normative values, or cultural cognitive frameworks (Scott 2014, p.73). Furthermore, while legitimacy confers status and power on institutional structures, organization forms, and/or practices, such structures and their legitimating bases can still be contested and privilege some individuals over others (Martin 1994). With this point in mind, I discuss each of Scott’s framework delineating the three institutional elements before turning to how his framework has furthered developed in the institutional theory in the past decade.

First, the regulatory element of institutions is perhaps the most evident, with scholars all acknowledging that institutions limit and habitualize actions and behaviors. Thus, Scott (2014) describes the regulatory pillar as “a stable system of rules, either formal or informal, backed by surveillance and sanctioning power” (p.64). Thus, scholars examine how rules, inspections, rewards, and punishments – ranging from the formally legalized (i.e., laws, jail time) to more communal
consequences (i.e., classroom rules, school punishments) – influence behavior. This element of institutions relies on coercive mechanisms and derives its legitimacy from being legally sanctioned. Scott (2014) also suggests that the power of regulatory systems – backed by force and/or sanctions – stems from its ability to affect individuals emotionally, creating feelings of “fear, dread, and guilt,” or “relief, innocence, and vindication” (p.63). While rules are seen as constraining, the rewards from following them can be empowering with individuals receiving certain status, licenses, or other benefits. Scott further makes two notable points on regulatory systems. The first is that “when coercive power [i.e., sanctions, force] is both supported and constrained by rules, we move into the realm of authority [in which] power is institutionalized” (Scott, 2014, p.61). Secondly, economic institutionalists, who liken regulatory systems to “rules of the game in a competitive team sport” (North, 1990, p. 4), point out that those who set and enforce the rules are not necessarily neutral actors. This point was taken up by historical institutionalists who argue that governments develop their own interests as actors somewhat separate and autonomous from society.

While some scholars give primacy to the regulatory aspects of institutions, others emphasize the normative element of institutions, which shapes how such formal and informal rules are interpreted and applied. Scott (2014) describes the normative pillar as relying on collectively shared rule systems, consisting of both values and norms, which “introduce a prescriptive, evaluative, and obligatory dimension into social life”(p.64). In his definition, *values* are “conceptions of the preferred or the desirable, together with the construction of standards to which existing structures or behavior can be compared and assessed” while *norms* refer to “how things should be done [and] define legitimate means to pursue valued ends” (Scott 2014, pp.64–65). In other words, normative systems determine both the generally-accepted logic of how things should be done as well as what ultimate goals should be pursued. In this way, normative elements of institutions shape the “appropriate” ends and the means of individual and collective action.

Moreover, while some values and goals are espoused for everyone, others are reserved for specific groups or types of individuals, leading to a differential of values, norms, and goals based on *roles*, defined as “conception of appropriate goals and activities for particular individuals or specified social positions” (Scott 2014, p.64). On this point, Scott (2014) argues that *roles* are “prescriptions” held
externally by others but also internalized by individuals and can be either formally constructed (such as in organizations) or more informally understood as a guide to action. Thus, through roles, normative systems can both impose constraints on social behavior as well as “empower and enable” social action, conferring on individuals “rights as well as responsibilities, privileges as well as duties, licenses as well as mandates” (Scott 2014, p. 64). Such normative systems are evident in the form of certification and accreditation set by standard-setting bodies (that expect voluntary compliance rather than regulatory agencies that enforce it) (Ruef & Scott 1998). Other empirical indicators of normative roles could likely be found in less formalized but still communally-voiced expectations concerning various social roles (i.e., parenting, religious congregation obligations, etc).

The normative elements of institutions are understood to affect individual behavior through the social shaming or shunning of disobedience while honoring and rewarding individuals and groups who fulfill expectations. Unlike regulatory systems, which are backed by legally sanctioned force, normative systems are less explicit and base their authority in the moral/social obligations that are externally imposed by others in society and internalized by individuals. Thus, instead of being guided by rational instrumentality based on self-interest, individuals within normative systems consider a given situation and make decisions that seem appropriate given their particular role. In this way, normative institutional elements shape identities and guide individual behavior.

While Durkheim and other early sociologists embraced a predominantly normative view of institutions, new institutionalist scholars highlighted the ways in which institutions operate on a deeper, cultural-cognitive level. Scott (2014) defines the cultural-cognitive element of institutions as “the shared conceptions that constitute the nature of social reality and the frames through which meaning is made”, noting the hyphenated label “recognizes that internal interpretive processes are shaped by external cultural frameworks” (p.67). This much less empirically visible institutional structure stresses the use of wider symbols and meanings to makes sense of “reality” as we experience it through the ongoing stream of experience and events. To explain what is happening, researchers must not only analyze an event or action but also what meaning, or interpretation, the actors involved were operating on as individuals with different societal roles or cultural perspectives. Given differences in personal backgrounds and social roles, some
actors may act upon very different rationales or interpretations of events than other actors.

Yet, as Berger and Luckmann (1966) stressed, cultural-cognitive frames do not simply occur in one’s mind but are formed through interactions with others and the environment. Individuals follow and rely on cultural-cognitive frames in their actions, not out of obedience to the law or fulfillment of obligation, but because actors fail to question their taken-for-granted assumptions. As a result, they render other beliefs or types of behavior “inconceivable” or illogical (Scott 2014, p. 68). In this line of thinking, individuals’ roles in society are not so much based on normative obligations than on powerful templates. These cultural-cognitive templates designate certain types of actors that are guided to action through corresponding scripts, much like a drama which depends on actors to enact it (Berger & Luckmann 1966).

Cultural-cognitive systems operate on many nested levels, from the organizational sphere to local situation to sector/field logics and dominant political and economic paradigms. As a result, such cultural systems are fragmented and often contradictory but “penetrate and shape individual beliefs” while still being malleable to individual constructs which modify those frames (Scott 2014, p. 68). Unlike normative systems, which often require maintenance or rituals to maintain, cultural-cognitive forms prevail with less effort as they provide the foundation for sensemaking. Scholars suggest that individuals assume dominant cultural-cognitive frames, not to avoid punishment or social stigma, but to feel competent, confident, and connected to others, rather than disoriented, confused, or at odds with their community.

Cultural-cognitive frames, which also vary in the extent which they have been institutionalized, have been examined by scholars on the macro-level/international level (as exemplified by Meyers and colleagues) as well as at the meso-levels of sectors (DiMaggio & Anheier 1990) and organizations (Martin 1992; 2001). The methods used to study cultural-cognitive institutions have evolved from long-term ethnographic studies of communities (or organizations) based on observation to more quantitative surveys that capture views within a group or community. More recently, however, with computer-based qualitative analysis programmes available, scholars have turned to methods such as content and discourse analysis and network analysis to interrogate a wide variety of materials such as organizational reports, political speeches, and media stories (Scott 2014).
In studies of cultural systems, the media is considered a particularly powerful avenue of cultural-cognitive legitimation due to its role in disseminating information about organizations and sectors and by condoning or condemning its practices. Thus, because media enables the sharing of experience and knowledge, the discourse found in media both reflects and creates public opinion and perception (Gamson & Modigliani 1989; Pollock & Rindova 2003; Rindova et al. 2006). Due to this ability to influence the public, the media represents “a site on which various social groups, institutions, and ideologies struggle over the definition and construction of social reality” (Gurevitch & Levy 1985, p.19 as quoted by; Gamson et al. 1992, p.3). Both positive and neutral media attention can increase the legitimacy of new organizations or sectors by establishing and raising its profile among the public, and thus increasing its acceptance by fostering the public perception of it as a “standard cultural category” (Sine et al. 2005, p.211). In this way, new organizations may gain credibility and status, which further confirms their legitimacy.

In sum, the three pillars of institutions discussed here provide an integrated framework for understanding and investigating how structures shape actors and agency. Regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive elements of institutions represent powerful, complex, and inter-related organizing structures. While each pillar rests on different mechanisms, logics, and bases of legitimacy, most empirical cases examining institutional forms usually represent more than one element. These elements can be powerful when intertwined and mutually reinforcing. In many cases though, one element will assume primacy. However, the presence of multiple elements can also expose contradictions and cause conflict between them and often prompt institutional change (Dacin et al. 2002). Most notably, the existence of these different institutional pillars continue to fuel debates around which rules – legal or normative/cultural-cognitive – assume primacy in shaping human behavior and thus throw into question whether individual and collective decision-making is more based on rational/instrumental reasoning or embedded in social/situational logic.

Networks in Institutional Theory

In this section, I discuss the relationship between institutions and networks – (1) how institutional contexts structure and shape social relations in and across organizational fields and (2) the role of networks in reflecting and preserving, but
also challenging and reorganizing, organizational and institutional contexts. In the process, I illustrate the view, articulated by Owen-Smith and Powell (2008), that social networks and institutions are co-constitutive and co-evolutionary. As a result, a study of policy transfer focusing on social networks benefits greatly from a firm grounding in institutionalism with complementary insights from network theory.

Owen-Smith and Powell (2008) argue that institutions and networks cannot be studied in isolation because they “mutually shape one another”, leading to a “co-evolutionary process [that] creates, sustains, and transforms social worlds over time” (p.596). Their view is rooted in new institutional theory in which scholars have argued that networks have played a central role in transmitting institutional effects, namely rules, norms, and taken-for-granted ideas. According to Scott (2014), “relational systems”, or social networks, (along with symbolic systems, activities, and artifacts) were among the four types of carriers, or vehicles, that “allow us to account for how ideas move through space and time, who or what is transporting them, and how they may be transformed by their journey” (Scott 2014, p.95). Strang and Meyer (1993) also highlight and contrast the nature of relational carriers versus symbolic carriers of institutional effects in their study of institutional conditions affecting diffusion. Scott (2014) names examples of “relational systems” within each type of institutional pillar: (1) governance and power systems as reflective of regulative pillar, (2) regimes and authority systems as reflective of the normative pillar, and (3) structural isomorphism and identity-based networks as reflective of the cognitive-cultural pillar.

Studying how such relation systems, or networks, act as carriers of effects as well as new ideas are important for understanding how policy transfer works as well as how institutional structures change. While noting the overlap between the concept of carriers and the study of diffusion, transfers, and learning (among other topics), Scott (2014) highlights that scholars in all fields are in agreement that carriers, including networks, are “never neutral modes of transmission, but affect the nature of the message and the ways in which it is received” (p.96).

The view that networks act as a carrier of institutional effects has its roots in Meyer and Rowan’s seminal article (1977), which stated that all organizations are embedded in both relational and institutionalized contexts. While Meyer and Rowan focused on the role of “rational myths” in developing institutional contexts, they argued the increase in the number and spread of rationalized myths was due to the
increasing density and complexity of relational networks (1977, p.351). Moreover, Meyer and Rowan suggested that centralized states, trade and professional associations, unions, and inter-organizational coalitions represented the organized networks at the centre of the transmission process of institutional myths, thus helping stabilize and standardize relational networks.

Like Meyer and Rowan (1977), DiMaggio and Powell (1983) also suggested that the professions and the modern state – with their networks spanning organizational and field boundaries – have been influential rationalizing forces. In their view, networks play a central role in translating institutional pressures into organizational isomorphism. In their concept of *organizational fields*, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) incorporated network theory concepts (namely relational and structural embeddedness) into institutional theory to widen the analytical view of researchers. They suggested that organizations are best understood as part of distinct *organizational fields* that include the “totality” of organizations that were either *connected*, meaning interacting in some type of relationship with each other, and/or *structurally equivalent*, meaning occupying a similar network position as the another (although not necessarily interacting).

Furthermore, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argued that status hierarchies within inter-organizational and personal networks of a field shape the patterns of communication and information exchanges. This “commonly-recognized hierarchy of status”, reflecting a centre and periphery structure, directs “information flows and personnel movement across organizations” (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, p.153). Clearly, in DiMaggio and Powell’s view, networks acted as carriers of institutional effects. Thus, in the new institutional view, networks serve to transmit institutional beliefs and practices in distinct ways.

In addition to explaining how networks transmit institutional effects, Owen-Smith and Powell (2008) make an additional point – that networks are stamped and highly influenced by institutional categories. They emphasize that “networks are shaped by social comparison processes in which institutional categories are highly influential” (Owen-Smith and Powell 2008, p.599). Owen-Smith and Powell assert that the same elements that give institutions their force – i.e., “cognitive categories, conventions, rules, expectations, and logics” – also “condition the formation of relationships and thus the network structures that function as the skeletons of fields”(2008, p.596). To illustrate this point, Owen-Smith and Powell highlight three
notable empirical studies: Galaskiewicz and Burt (1991), Palmer et al. (1993), and Davis and Greves (1997). Building on these insights, one can begin to see how networks and institutions are intertwined and difficult to study in isolation.

To show how networks and institutions co-constitute each other, Owen-Smith and Powell (2008) highlight a longitudinal study carried out by Scott et al. (2000). Scott and his colleagues examined the dramatic institutional change in the healthcare system in San Francisco Bay between 1945 and 1995. The study traces the emergence of new rules, new belief systems, and new modes of governance as well as new types of healthcare organizations and new modes of financing, managing, and delivering services to a range of factors – i.e. new legislation, the increase of medical specialization, and the growing complexity of service delivery. These developments spurred further changes in social networks, such as the appearance of new inter-organizational alliances and coalitions, new network linkages created by accreditation bodies, new affiliations between organizations across and beyond the healthcare field, and shifting organizational control structures.

These network extensions and realignments, in turn, expanded the boundaries of the field and brought in new players who, with their novel ideas, continued to reshape the meaning of healthcare. During these dramatic shifts in the field, institutional meanings within these networks also began to change. The taken-for-granted understandings within the healthcare field shifted, and three distinct logics – professional, public, and corporate – came to compete alongside one another within the now complex and multi-level field. Thus, Scott et al. (2000) is a unique study that helps illustrate Owen-Smith and Powell’s (2008) argument that networks act as carriers for institutional effects and hence cannot be studied without considering their institutional context. Scott et al. (2000) illustrates how institutions and social networks co-evolve, continually affecting one another over time.

By highlighting these studies, Owen-Smith and Powell (2008) emphasize that networks are more than simply “the scaffolds and circulatory systems of organizational fields” (p.596). Rather, networks act as “the source of ‘horizontal’ distinctions among categories of individuals, organizations, and actions, as well as ‘vertical’ status differentials” (Owen-Smith and Powell 2008, p.596). Networks, they argue, “reflect key micro-level interactions that influence institutional dynamics” (Owen-Smith and Powell 2008, p.598). Thus, while institutions “shape [network] structures and condition their effects”, networks “generate the categories
and hierarchies that help define institutions and contribute to their efficacy” (Owen-Smith and Powell 2008, p.596). As a result, institutions and networks must be seen as intertwined, constantly influencing and shaping each other over time. Any effort to understand social networks must take institutional processes into account, and vice versa.

Agency and Institutional Change: The Concept of Institutional Logics

For the study of policy transfer focusing on policy entrepreneurs and their narrative accounts of policy development, it is important to understand how institutions and networks shape people’s perceptions and agency. Networks are carriers of institutional effects. Networks are also conduits through which institutional logics flow. Thus, policy entrepreneurs can draw on multiple logics to innovate and change contexts. To illuminate how this may work, I briefly review the concept of institutional logics.

Friedland and Alford (1991) proposed the concept of institutional logics to help explain institutional stability (as opposed to change) and account for why diffused new organizational forms were institutionalized or not. In doing so, they were building on the similar concept in Jackall (1988) and the related concept of “logics of actions” (Fligstein 1987; 1990; DiMaggio 1991; Boltanski & Thévenot 1991). Friedland and Alford (1991, p.248) defined institutional logics as “a set of material practices and symbolic constructions which constitutes its organizing principles and which is available to organizations and individuals to elaborate”. They came up with this concept after noting that social scientists were concentrating their analysis on individual agency and/or the power of organizations, effectively ignoring how societal environments inevitably shaped both.

After identifying five dominant macro-level institutions in modern Western society, Friedland and Alford (1991, p.248) proposed five broad, corresponding types of societal-level institutional logics: (1) **capitalism**, based on “accumulation and commodification of human activity”, (2) **the state**, based on “rationalization and the regulation of human activity by legal and bureaucratic hierarchies”, (3) **democracy**, based on “participation and the extension of the popular control over human activity”, (4) **family**, based on “community” and human activity motivated by “unconditional loyalty” and “reproductive needs”, and (5) **religion**, or **science**, based
on “truth, whether mundane or transcendental, and the symbolic construction of reality”. Friedland and Alford went on to argue that these logics are “symbolically grounded, organizationally structured, politically defended, and technically and materially constrained, and hence have specific historical limits” (1991, p.248-9). Moreover, they stressed that dominant institutions were “potentially contradictory” and thus offered both individuals and organizations “multiple logics” with which to interpret, act, and enact their environment.

From the late 1990s, scholars – primarily led by Patricia Thornton and colleagues – developed this concept further (Thornton 2004; Thornton & Ocasio 2008; Thornton et al. 2012). Thornton and Ocasio (1999) expanded the categories of societal-level institutional orders and corresponding logics from five to seven by adding the professions, the corporation, and community (their replacement for democracy) and drew on Scott’s Three Pillar framework to revise the definition of institutional logics to include all three elements. Thus, Thornton and Ocasio (1999, p.804) redefined institutional logics as “the socially constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality.” Empirically, they employed the concept to investigate executive power and succession in the higher education publishing, finding that executives’ focus and power as well as the criteria for succession of executives changed as the field’s logics shifted from personal and professional-based values to more market-based values. Thornton (2004) continued this investigation into the mixed logics of the market and the professions to more fully explain evolutionary change in the higher education publishing industry in the U.S.

Meanwhile, others also contributed to the conceptual development of institutional logics. Haveman and Rao (1997) examined how such structures co-evolve with organizational forms that express them, thus highlighting the dynamics between the societal level and organizational fields. Likewise, Scott and colleagues (Scott et al. 2000; Ruef et al. 1998) investigated the healthcare field in San Francisco and detailed how institutional change occurred as the logics of the field shifted from being based on professionalism to being heavily based on the logics of the state, market, and the corporation. Ocasio and Thornton (2008) provide further insights by summarizing and discussing four ways prevailing institutional logics shape individual and organizational action by:
1. **Influencing collective identities and identification**, the former which Ocasio and Thorton (2008, p.111) define as “the cognitive, normative, and emotional connection experienced by members of a social group because of their perceived common status with other members of the social group”, which emerges out of social interaction and leads to increased cooperation, shared norms, and common interests among group members.

2. **Conditioning (or setting up the rules and means) in contests for status and power** and noting that “social actors rely on their understandings of institutional logics in the competition for power and status and in doing so generate the conditions for the reproduction of prevailing logics” (Ocasio and Thorton 2008, p.112).

3. **Providing social classification and categorization**, thus shaping individual cognition as detailed by DiMaggio (1997).

4. **Structuring attention**, meaning that institutional logics direct the attention of individuals and organizations to certain types of problems, solutions, and shape how those are linked and explained and how those issues relate to individuals’ identity and interests.

More recent work continues to demonstrate the utility of institutional logic concept, with Skelcher and Smith (2015) theorizing the novel ways multiple institutional logics are combined to create hybrid forms of organizing in the non-profit sector. Institutional logics represent a relatively new approach to understanding the content and meaning of institutions and how those shape individual action and organizational structures. The approach differs from earlier approaches in new institutionalism in at least two significant ways: (1) by no longer focusing on isomorphism at various levels but instead examining “the effects of differentiated institutional logics on individuals and organizations in a larger variety of contexts”, and (2) by incorporating the embedded agency of actors (albeit embedded in prevailing institutional logics) and considering ways actors select and change institutional logics (Thornton & Ocasio 2008, p.100). In a way, the aim of institutional logics approach parallels that of phenomenological/transcendental policy transfer approaches in that both seek to explain the processes of diffusion and account for convergence, divergence, and how the macro and the meso/micro co-construct and modify each other. Since a transferred policy can represent programmes, organizations, and other types of institutional elements, policy transfer and institutional scholars often examine similar cases. Thus, there are scholars who...
combine both approaches in their studies of transfer and change (e.g., Bulmer & Padgett 2005; Ferner et al. 2004; Laguna 2010).

**Institutional Entrepreneurs**

The concept of an “institutional entrepreneur” emerged from DiMaggio’s (1988, p.14) suggestion that “New institutions arise… when organized actors with sufficient resources see in them an opportunity to realize interests that they value highly”. In this way, DiMaggio offered institutional entrepreneurship as a way to solve the so-called “paradox of embedded agency” and theorize the role of actors in creating new and changing established institutional structures and practices. Thus, such entrepreneurs are those who envision an innovative organizational form or practice to advance certain goals or interests and thus challenge the prevailing institutional structure. Building on DiMaggio’s (1988) work and studies of institutional entrepreneurship since, Battilana et al. (2009, p.68) define an institutional entrepreneur as an actor that both initiates and actively participates in the implementation of “divergent changes”, which are changes that “break with the institutionalized template for organizing within a given institutional context”. Linking the concept to diffusion-innovation research, they suggest institutional entrepreneurs are a type of change agent that take the form of an organization, groups of organizations, an individual or a group of individuals.

Institutional entrepreneurship can be examined at many levels from the sub-organizational to the field and institutional levels. While Lockett et al. (2012) noted most studies have primarily been at the organizational level, they advocate for more research to examine institutional entrepreneurship at the intra-organizational level – among individuals and groups of individual (e.g., Hardy & Maguire 2008; Battilana et al. 2009) – in order for scholars to account for the complex nature of subjective interpretations, interpersonal relations, and the power dynamics underpinning them.

To answer questions regarding what factors spur and enable (as well as prevent and stifle) institutional entrepreneurship, researchers have begun exploring a range of topics. These topics, often referred to as *enabling conditions*, range from characteristics of actors’ to various aspects of the environments in which they are embedded. Battilana et al. (2009, p.74) divide these characteristics into two categories of enabling conditions – *actors’ social position and field characteristics* – which, they argue, are not independent but intertwined categories. This stems from
the point that, while environmental factors empower or constrain an actor’s agency (and hence entrepreneurship), an actor’s perception of field conditions is shaped by their social position, or location, within it – a position that is not static but nevertheless reflects the power relations within the field (Oakes et al. 1998). Thus, Battilana et al. (2009) argue that the two categories of enabling factors shape, and possibly interact, with one another.

In terms of actors’ social position, scholars have considered how actors’ “subject positions” – which refers to both “an actor’s formal position as well as all socially constructed and legitimated identities available in a field” (Battilana et al. 2009, p.77) – significantly determine access to resources and hence affect the potential for actors to become institutional entrepreneurs. Actors whose “subject positions” provide them widespread legitimacy and the ability to build bridges (or networks) among diverse stakeholders can access more resources to become institutional entrepreneurs (Maguire et al. 2004). However, some studies (i.e., D’Aunno et al. 2000; Maguire et al. 2004) have found that actors occupying positions at the periphery of a field may be more likely to become institutional entrepreneurs pursuing change. According to Lockett et al. (2012, p.357) this may be because such actors are:

(1) most disadvantaged by current institutional arrangements and thus have agency for change (Haveman & Rao 1997)
(2) less embedded in current institutions and so have less difficulty “throwing off” current norms and values;
(3) more likely to be exposed to, or be part of, alternative fields with different ways of working;
(4) more likely to be exposed to “contradictions” in the current institutions (Seo & Creed 2002)

Still, many actors in peripheral field positions lack the power to influence and enact change. Instead, actors occupying central positions in a field that have authority and access to resources appear to be best placed to enact change though may be less inclined to do so. Moreover, actors who engage in multiple fields appear more likely to engage in institutional entrepreneurship as they are exposed to a greater diversity of ideas (e.g., Boxenbaum & Battilana 2005)
Meanwhile, in regard to the enabling role of field-level characteristics, researchers have suggested that dramatic changes in environments (i.e., jolts, crises, social upheaval, technological disruptions, etc.) provide opportunities for institutional entrepreneurship by weakening taken-for-granted assumptions and making environments more receptive to new ideas (Fligstein 1997; 2001b; Holm 1995; Greenwood et al. 2002; Child et al. 2007). In addition, Delbridge and Edwards (2008) have suggested, after studying change and developments in one industry over two decades, that actors can also bring about the enabling conditions that allow individuals’ to act as institutional entrepreneurs, a conclusion also supported by Powell and Colyvas (2008). Battalina et al. (2009) also note the degree of heterogeneity and institutionalization within a field can also affect the potential for institutional entrepreneurship. Finally, Ocasio and Thornton (2008) discuss two other environment circumstances that may enable actors to engage in institutional entrepreneurship: (1) structural overlap, or “when individual roles and organizational structures or functions that were previously distinct are forced into association (e.g., mergers, acquisitions,) (p.116) and (2) competing logics, or when multiple institutional logics are present, contradictory, and competing, allowing for actors to elaborate, recombine, or alter them to promote change.

The research on cases of successful institutional entrepreneurship typically focuses on three clusters of activities institutional entrepreneurs engage in to bring about, or implement, divergent change. These sets of activity, which are usually ongoing, evolutionary, and intertwined, are: “developing a vision, mobilizing people behind that vision, and motivating them to achieve and sustain it” (Battilana et al. 2009, p.78). Notably, these activities mirror the work of teams of policy entrepreneurs in Roberts and King’s (1996) study. To understand how institutional entrepreneurs develop a vision, researchers examine how actors frame problems, solutions, and narratives to legitimize their position and motivate others to support them (e.g., Markowitz 2007). In determining how others are mobilized to support change, studies have examined how institutional entrepreneurs use discourse and gain access to – as well as utilize – resources, formal authority, and networks. Battilana et al. (2009) note that most studies focus on discourse and highlight the need for more research to understand how resources are garnered and put to use. Finally, investigations into the implementation of change led by an institutional entrepreneur have entailed analyzing how they counter, or overcome, political
opposition and “institutional defenders” who benefit from the status quo and defend existing beliefs and practices (DiMaggio, 1988; Levy & Scully, 2007).

On a final point, Hardy and McGuire (2008) identify two contrasting types of narratives regarding institutional entrepreneurship in the research literature. They note that one approach “is more actor-centric and focuses on the deliberate strategies of particular institutional entrepreneurs” while the other is “more process-centric and focuses on the struggles associated with institutional entrepreneurship” (p.211, emphasis added). Suggesting that the former reflects the approach taken up by the majority of empirical studies, Hardy and McGuire (2008, pp.211–212) deconstruct the two narratives (which they stress are not two distinct, mutually exclusive categories), and outline actor-centric narratives as those that:

1. portray the institutional entrepreneur as possessing a degree of reflexivity or insight (Seo & Creed 2002; Mutch 2007) and superior political and social skills
2. focus on how the institutional entrepreneur intervenes strategically to produce institutional change through the mobilization of discourse, resources, networks, and social capital in creative ways (see Fligstein 2001b; Fligstein 2001a)
3. marginalize other actors who (if present) play minor, supporting roles
4. portray institutional entrepreneurship as a “relatively rational, linear, win-win problem-solving activity”
5. tend to minimize or relegate conflict to the background
6. result in new or changed institutions that usually do not suggest or reflect a radical reconfiguration of power relations in the field but rather appear to be changes that Colomy (1998, p.276) refers to as “elaborative” rather than “reconstructive” in scope
7. assume a functionalist orientation portraying the enacted change as an improvement on the prior status quo
8. often fail to problematize the subjective notion of “better” institutional arrangements
9. typically neglect to question who actually benefits from – and who is disadvantaged by – institutional entrepreneurship

In contrast, Hardy and McGuire (2008, p.211) describe process-centric narratives as those that:

1. focus on institutional entrepreneurship as an emergent outcome of activities of a number of dispersed actors with divergent interests and who face considerable difficulty in achieving effective collective action (Wijen & Ansari 2007; Lounsbury & Crumley 2007)
2. emphasize diffuse struggles over – and through – meaning, where gains for one group may imply significant losses for others, providing greater scope for examining conflict as well as failure
3. reflect researchers’ interest in how particular outcomes are negotiated materially and discursively
4. lead to outcomes that are more varied in scope and impact, ranging from little or no change to radical transformations in the field
5. are more likely to acknowledge the disadvantages and potential negative outcomes of institutional entrepreneurship (see Khan et al. 2007)
6. pay attention to the opponents of institutional entrepreneurs and other field actors who often construct counter-frames (Creed et al. 2002), counter-narratives (Colomy 1998), and/or counter-discourses (Munir & Phillips 2005) to legitimate, defend, or strengthen their own position

Hardy and McGuire’s (2008) analysis, which to some extent echoes of Roger’s (2003) advice on minimizing pro-innovation bias in diffusion studies, reminds researchers who investigate cases of innovation not to ignore or marginalize alternative accounts and perspectives that may expose hitherto undetected conflict or unexpected outcomes.

While the concept of institutional entrepreneurs has refocused a number of scholars on change agents in institutional fields, it has attracted some criticism, stemming from claims it promotes an instrumental and disembedded view of agency (Delmestri 2006; Meyer 2006). However, overall the concept of institutional entrepreneurs mirrors, and in many ways expands, the role of policy entrepreneurs but from another angle. Both concepts, however, help enable researchers to trace the origins and emergence of new ideas, policies, and institutional arrangements and the actors and forces that seek to counter them.

2.7 The Diffusion of Innovations Perspective

The innovation-diffusion perspective is “a particular type of communications research” (Rogers 2003, p.47) which offers a general, arguably universal, process model of social change based on regularities observed in the innovation-diffusion process. The modern innovation-diffusion research tradition grew from micro-level studies of the spread of technical innovations among a population in the 1940s and 1950s. However, the first theorizations of the diffusion phenomenon appeared around 1900. These studies explored how and why innovations spread and discovered early on that social relations and networks among individuals play key roles in the process. In time, diffusion studies also illuminated how individuals’ knowledge, culture, and other contextual factors influenced their decision whether or
not to adopt an innovation. Thus, the process of innovation diffusion is “essentially a social process in which subjectively perceived information about a new idea is communicated from person to person” (Rogers 2003, p.xx) and as a result, “the meaning of an innovation is thus gradually worked out through a process of social construction” (p.xxi). This resonates with the concept of policy-making as “social learning” in which decision-makers collectively “puzzle” (Heclo 1974) about the causes and meanings of problems. Thus, I take the position that the diffusion of innovation provides a related and complementary perspective to both policy transfer and institutional literature, a point I illustrate throughout this section. I proceed by reviewing the development of the research perspective before discussing its central features and themes.

**The Development of Innovation-Diffusion Research**

The beginnings of diffusion research (which also, by extension, represents the roots of policy transfer studies) emerged in the early twentieth century in Europe with the work of some of the forefathers of sociology: Gabriel Tarde, George Simmel, and two groups of diffusion researchers in Britain and in Germany/Austria. Tarde provided insights into the variables in the diffusion process and noted that the rate of adoption for a successful innovation usually followed an S-shaped curve, with only a few people adopting a trend at first, and then the number of adoptees increasing exponentially for a time until the number of new adoptees generally leveled off again. He also noted opinion leaders’ adoption helped increase the overall rate of adoption, implicating the role of networks in the diffusion process. Finally, Tarde also observed that innovations that resembled already-accepted ideas tended to be more successfully diffused, foreshadowing the concept of perceived compatibility of an innovation.

Around the same time, Simmel came up with the concept of the stranger as someone who did not arrive and then leave a social group but one who came and remained part of a group but still retained the freedom to go, much like a trader. According to Simmel (1950, p.402), a stranger is one who:

is fixed within a particular spatial group, or within a group whose boundaries are similar to spatial boundaries. But his position in this group is determined, essentially, by the fact that he has not belonged to it from
the beginning, that he imports qualities into it, which do not and cannot stem from the group itself.

As a German Jew trained in philosophy and one of the first university lecturers of sociology, Simmel himself embodied, to some extent, the concept of a stranger as one who is part of a social group but still not considered by others as one of that group. Simmel’s concept identified a type of individual (the cosmopolite) more likely to bring new ideas to insular populations and highlighted the need to consider network structure and social distance of actors in diffusion.

Finally, British and German/Austrian anthropologists contributed to innovation-diffusion by introducing the concept of diffusion. They studied diffusion as the introduction of innovation in an attempt to explain how social change in a population comes about. However, this group’s views became less relevant as they failed to consider how innovations were created in the first place and resisted the idea that an innovation could be changed, or reinvented, in the process of its diffusion.

Still, from the 1920s until the 1960s, research on diffusion developed rather independently in strands of different disciplines with researchers employing various methods (i.e., surveys, statistical analysis, interviews, observations) to examine particular types of innovation in their field. For example, anthropologists focused more on cultural groups and technological innovations using participant observation while early sociologists tended to use quantitative research methods to study a single innovation as it spread across geographic territories. This led anthropologists to highlight the influential role of indigenous knowledge systems in encouraging or constraining diffusion while sociologists offered early insights into how environmental factors affected diffusion.

However, it was a study by two rural sociologists (Ryan & Gross 1943) focused on the diffusion of hybrid corn in Iowa (which puzzled experts at the time) that led to the central questions that sparked to the emergence of a more coherent innovation-diffusion paradigm. The defining questions of that paradigm became:

- What variables are related to innovativeness?
- What is the rate of adoption of an innovation over time, and what factors (i.e., attributes of innovation) explain its speed of adoption?
- What role do different communication channels play at various stages in the innovation-decision process?
Ryan and Gross’ (1943) study also set the template for future diffusion research design, which consisted of a large number of survey interviews followed by quantitative coding and analysis to understand the significance of different variables. The first publication of Everett Rogers’s *Diffusion of Innovation* in 1962 further organized and established diffusion as a distinct field of research that spanned diverse disciplines from marketing, technology, communication, and public health to political science, geography, and sociology.

In the recent decades, the elements and processes of innovation-diffusion have been examined across cultures and nations, leading to the development within the field of broad generalizations based on evidence suggesting trends that remain consistent across various contexts and disciplines. Still, with the onset of globalization and development of new technologies such as the internet, innovation-diffusion scholars continue to explore how the process of diffusion is affected by changes in communication and the diminishing relevance of spatial distance.

**The Innovation-Diffusion Process**

The diffusion of innovations is a process that actually has two main parts – (1) innovation-development process, or the generation of the innovation, and (2) innovative-decision process, or how an individual decides to adopt or reject an innovation. Although most research has examined the innovative-decision process, most recognize the importance of considering the initial innovation-generation stage. During the innovation-development process, a problem or need is recognized, or becomes prioritized, and an innovative solution is generated to address it. This process can involve basic and/or applied research and is often funded by companies or governments although this is not always the case. Innovations can be generated by lead users who are ahead of the marketplace and develop their own innovations, which interested companies then commercialize (Von Hippel 2005; 1986). Within the process of developing an innovation, the most critical point is the decision whether or not to move forward and diffuse the innovation to others, leading to the second stage of the diffusion of innovation process – the innovative-decision process. Once the decision is made to diffuse an innovation, then individuals in the social system must pass through five stages which entail (1) learning about the innovation,
(2) being persuaded to adopt/reject it, (3) deciding to adopt/reject it, (4) implementing or using it, and (5) continuing to utilize it.

Still, the innovation-decision process is also viewed as a whole among a population of actors over time. In this case, diffusion is defined as “the process in which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social system” (Rogers 2003, p.5). Thus, the study of the innovation-diffusion process entails looking at four key elements: the innovation, communication channels, time, and a social system. A closer look at each of these elements provides a better understanding of diffusion and how it relates to areas of the policy transfer and institutional perspectives.

The first element, innovation, is defined as “an idea, practice, or object that is perceived as new by an individual or other unit of adoption” (Rogers 2003, p.12). As the definition indicates, whether or not an idea is actually new or only presented and perceived as such is not important in the study of diffusion. It is sufficient for the innovation to be considered new to the person adopting it regardless of its newness, which may be “objectively” measured by the time elapsed since its first discovery or use. Instead, Rogers argues that “newness” of an innovation may be expressed in terms of an individual’s awareness of it, persuasion to see it favorably or not, or a decision to adopt. Moreover, Rogers (2003) uses the term “technology” and “innovation” synonymously but points out that he is using the term technology in an abstract sense – as a “design for instrumental action that reduces the uncertainty in the cause-effect relationships involved in achieving a desired outcome” (Rogers 2003, p.13). Thus, technology can also refer to innovations that are only idea- or information-based, such as religions, political philosophies, or a news event. In policy transfer studies, this type of “soft” innovation is the focus of Stone’s (2010; 2004b) studies of the transfer of ideologies and norms through trans-national networks and organizations. Of course, such ideational innovations can be challenging to study since the origin and spread of such information is often times difficult to observe and track. Consequently, the majority of innovation-diffusion research is most often on innovations with both material and immaterial components.

To diffuse, knowledge of an innovation must be shared through communication channels, defined as “the means by which messages get from one individual to another” (Rose 2003, p.18). The two communication channels in the innovation-diffusion literature are mass media and interpersonal. While the mass
media can rapidly transmit messages about an innovation to large numbers of people, thus making them aware of a new idea, diffusion studies have revealed that person-to-person communication, either individually or in a group, is much more influential in persuading another to adopt an innovation (Rogers 2003). Relatedly, evidence from diffusion studies suggests that most individuals base their judgment of an innovation on others’ subjective evaluations of the innovation rather than on scientific evidence regarding its value or effectiveness. While the evaluation of formal studies is not completely irrelevant, especially to those who first adopt the innovation, peer influence is clearly paramount in the process of innovation-diffusion.

The third element of the innovation-diffusion studies is \textit{time}, which is considered in during the process of diffusion in three ways – (1) how long an individual takes to decide to adopt or reject an innovation after first learning of it, (2) what type of actors adopt an innovation relatively early or late, and (3) the rate of adoption in a system (typically measured in terms of how many individual adopt in a given time period). Studies suggest \textit{how long} individuals take to decide to adopt or reject an innovation varies considerably. However, by sorting adopters into categories reflecting their adoption sequence (\textit{innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority, and laggards}), researchers have found that innovators and early adopters are generally more highly educated, more cosmopolitan, and of higher socio-economic status while those with less education, mainly local ties, and lower socio-economic status tend to be later adopters.

Furthermore, researchers were able to define the five categories of adopters mentioned above due to the common S-shaped curve they found most innovation-diffusion produced (based on the rate of adoption in the social system). This attention to temporal sequencing and cause-and-effect of social influence, wherein early adopters influence the decision whether to adopt or not of others after them, is a unique strength of the innovation-diffusion literature. I argue, with others, that researchers studying cases of policy transfer need to pay closer attention to time frames and the sequencing of events and decisions (i.e., Dussauge-Laguna 2012).

The fourth element of innovation-diffusion is a \textit{social system}, defined as “a set of interrelated units that are engaged in joint problem solving to accomplish a common goal” and members may be “individuals, informal groups, organizations, and/or subsystems” (Rogers 2003, p.23). Whatever the form, the members of the
social system are bound together in some common role or objective. The *structure* of a given social system is defined as “the pattern of arrangements of the units in a system”, which includes formal hierarchies, norms, and patterned communication flows, “gives regularity and stability to human behavior in system” (Rogers 2003, p.23). This complex structure is examined to understand how norms, opinion leaders, change agents, and other structural elements affect the diffusion of an innovation. The use of members of a social system as the units of study provides much flexibility in defining the relevant actors in a case of diffusion.

**Criticisms of Innovation-Diffusion Research**

Rogers (2003) identifies four strands of criticism that diffusion studies suffer from: (1) pro-innovation bias, as researchers tend to treat innovations as inherently “good” or desirable, (2) individual-blame bias, as problems are often seen in terms of deficiencies attributed to individuals rather than systemic flaws, (3) recall problem, since individuals’ memories of how and why they adopted an innovation may not be accurate, and (4) issues of equality as the consequences of innovations tend to benefit those with more education and higher socio-economic status.

**Perceived Attributes of Innovations**

Innovation-diffusion scholars note that how the innovation is perceived among potential adopters is key to understanding their reaction to it. In innovation-diffusion, how others perceive an innovation is the primary basis for their decision to adopt or reject it. Thus, diffusion researchers have examined this concept extensively and identified at least five types of attributes of innovations that generally increase or decrease its likelihood of being adopted by others and thus, widely diffused. The five attributes of innovations are: *relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, trialability*, and *observability*.

The first attribute, *relative advantage*, refers to the “the degree to which an innovation is perceived as being better than the idea it supersedes” (Rogers 2003, p.15). This definition encompasses a vast range of different factors depending on the innovation and the context into which it is introduced. Notably, relative advantage can be viewed in terms of economic factors or more social factors such as prestige. Other common relative advantages include convenience and satisfaction. The
greater an individual perceives an innovation to have relative advantage, the more likely it is they will adopt the innovation.

The second attribute, *compatibility*, is “the degree to which an innovation is perceived as being consistent with the existing values, past experience, and needs of potential adopters” (Rogers 2003, p.15). The greater an innovation is perceived is compatible, the more likely it is to be diffused. It is important to emphasize that judgment of compatibility rests on three planes – *values* suggesting morals and beliefs, *past experience* suggesting experiential knowledge, and *needs* suggesting desires and/or actual needs. Diffusionists argue that *compatibility*, along with *relative advantage*, are the most significant in explaining the rate of adoption for an innovation.

The third attribute of innovation in the innovation-diffusion literature, *complexity*, is “the degree to which an innovation is perceived as difficult to understand and use” (Rogers 2003, p.16). Mirroring Rose’s (1993) hypothesis in policy transfer, the *complexity* attribute suggests that more simple or easy to understand innovations will more likely be diffused that complex ones. On this point in particular, but other attributes as well, it is important to keep in mind the ways an innovation can be positioned in order to make others perceive it in a favorable way, from giving the innovation a particular name to incorporating market research on targeted audiences to inform the framing of the innovation. The literature on institutional entrepreneurship highlights other strategic ways that problems, solutions, and inspiring stories can be discursively framed to appeal to audiences.

Finally, the fourth attribute, *trialability*, refers to “the degree to which an innovation may be experimented with on a limited basis” while the fifth attribute, *observability*, is “the degree to which the results of an innovation are visible to others” (Rogers 2003, p.16). The greater the perceived *trialability* and *observability* of an innovation, the more likely it is to diffuse. In other words, innovations that can be adopted on a trial basis and its results observed in the process are more likely to be diffused. One may also observe the effects of an innovation through a live demonstration or an already tested example. In this way, potential adopters can reduce the uncertainty and risk associated with a new idea, making it easier to judge the innovation.

Some scholars have suggested other categories of attributes for an innovation. Moore and Benbasat (1991) propose *voluntariness of use* defined as “the degree to
which use of the innovation is perceived as being voluntary or of free will” (p.195). Others have suggested the social prestige or image, meaning the degree to which an innovation is likely to enhance one’s social standing, should be a separate attribute rather than lumped into the relative advantage category (i.e., Holloway 1977 as cited in Rogers (2003)). Moore and Benbasat (1991) also highlight that the perceived attributes of an innovation may differ from the perceptions of actually using the innovation.

The concept of perceived attributes of innovations links and expands on areas within the policy transfer literature. In policy transfer, scholars speculate on the type of policies that are easier to transfer than others, suggesting that the “complexity of a programme affects its transferability; the more complex a policy or programme is the harder it will be to transfer” (Dolowitz & Marsh 1996, p.353). This concept is similar but related to diffusionists’ “attributes of innovations” concept. The difference being that diffusion scholars are taking “adoption” as the dependent variable while transfer scholars take “transferability” as such. In attempting to predict “transferability”, Rose’s (1993) hypotheses focus on the degree of complexity, amount of information available, and whether results are observable or predictable. Clearly, there are similarities between Rose’s hypotheses and the attributes of innovation typology.

However, a key difference is the basis of judging an innovation. While transfer scholars seem to make judgments of a policy’s traits themselves, diffusion scholars determine an innovation’s attributes by how they are perceived by others, reflecting a more social constructionist (rather than a positivist) view of knowledge and learning. Scholars working in the policy diffusion strand have drawn on innovation-diffusion’s typology of innovation attributes (e.g., Clark 2000) but generally have not employed a qualitative approach, thus limiting their ability to understand individuals’ translational processes in informing perceptions.

Reinvention

The concept of reinvention refers to the “degree to which an innovation is changed or modified by a user in the process of adoption and implementation” (Rogers 2003, p.17). Reinvention can occur to the innovation itself and/or how it is used or implemented (Rice & Rogers 1980). The occurrence of reinvention was first noted by Charters and Pelligrin (1972) in their study of how the innovation of
“differentiated staffing” was implemented in four schools. Rogers (2003, p.181) suggests that it was primarily because their study looked at the implementation stage that reinvention was discovered. Consequently, while early diffusion scholars discouraged or looked down upon reinvention, diffusion scholars began to examine this concept in the 1970s and how to measure it. Some suggested reinvention should be measured by the degree the innovation is altered from its “mainline” version as propagated by a change agent.

Evidence from studies of reinvention has lead diffusion researchers to suggest that: (1) reinvention occurs often at the implementation stage, and (2) the ability to reinvent an innovation helps increase its rate of adoption and institutionalization (Rogers 2003). The reasons why reinvention occurs vary but stem from either the innovation itself or the person/organization adopting it. Lack of knowledge and a desire to make an innovation appear locally generated are among the many reasons diffusion scholars have found innovations are reinvented. Notably, the concept of reinvention relates to the concepts of social learning/translation and contextual adaptation of ideas in policy studies.

_Innovators and Change Agents vs. Opinion Leaders and Champions_

In the literature, the diffusion of an innovation can be attributed to innovators, change agents, and opinion leaders. Although ideal types, these categories reflect trends in roles played by individuals in diffusion who often have certain attributes. Innovators are those who come up with or identify a new idea for diffusion. They represent the first category of adopters in a given S-curved diffusion model. According to studies, they are usually venturesome individuals who, like Simmel’s stranger, often associate with innovative peers outside their local social system. In addition, innovators often have access to significant financial resources (either their own or others) in order to absorb potential losses from an unsuccessful innovation. In addition, innovators often possess considerable technical knowledge and have a high tolerance for uncertainty about an innovation. Finally, innovators – like early adopters – tend to be more highly educated and cosmopolitan, of a higher socio-economic status, have greater exposure to mass media and interpersonal communication channels, have higher rates of social participation and more contact with change agents.
Relatedly, change agents are those who advocate for the adoption of a new idea on behalf of a change agency. They provide “a link between a resource system with some kind of expertise and a client system” (Rogers 2003, p.368). They usually have a high level of expertise regarding the innovation being defused, often making it difficult for them to relate to target audiences. As a result of their position between two groups – experts and audience – change agents often play an important yet sometimes limited role in promoting diffusion. To facilitate the diffusion process, change agents are expected to (1) highlight or even dramatize the importance of a problem, (2) build positive relationships with audiences and learn of their perspectives on the issue, (3) persuade audience to adopt the innovation and encourage its continued use beyond adoption and after the change agent is gone. Both change agents and innovators, thus, are not typically leaders or even full members of the targeted communities in which they aim to launch their innovation.

In contrast, opinion leaders are members of a social system who are able to “influence other individuals’ attitudes or overt behavior informally in a desired way with relative frequency” (Rogers 2003, pp.37-38). They are simply “people who influence the opinions, attitudes, beliefs, motivations, and behaviors of others” (Valente & Pumpuang 2007, p.881). Relatedly, champions are “charismatic” individuals who throw their “weight behind an innovation, thus overcoming indifference or resistance that the new idea may provide in an organization” (Rogers 2003, p.473). Thus, while opinion leaders are influential within particular networks, champions are typically set in an organizational context in which they often hold some formal position of authority. Of course, it is also possible (and likely) for one person to be both.

These ideal types are important as they serve to support the study of institutional- and policy entrepreneurship and highlight the importance of actors’ positions and relationships with others in a given social field. The research behind these roles also warns against assuming the innovator or initiator of ultimately success policy transfer or new institutional arrangements are the centre of influence.

**Diffusion Networks**

Among the most useful insights the innovation-diffusion literature provides is a look into how social networks are utilized in the spread of a new idea. As Granovetter (1973, p.1360) stated, “In one way or another, it is through these
networks that small-scale interaction becomes translated into large-scale patterns, and that these, in turn, feed back into small groups”. These networks are illuminated through patterns in communication flows as well as their use in facilitating sequential adoptions (or, theoretically, rejections as well though this is much less studied). One of the most important findings regarding communication channels occurred early on in the 1940s when investigations into the role of mass media found that it did not have all-powerful effect on individuals’ adoption decision as previously thought. Instead, mass media was found to spread awareness knowledge of an innovation to opinion leaders who informed others in their community of the new idea (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944; 1944). This “two-step flow model” of communication turned scholarly attention to how mass media channels and interpersonal channels interacted to shape perceptions of innovations (Rogers 2003, p.304).

However, the two-step flow model was misleading because it did not consider the timing nor the source and communication channels of different types of knowledge. Later studies revealed that mass media channels primarily served to spread awareness knowledge of an innovation, or knowledge of its existence, among much of a population, not simply leaders. Meanwhile, opinion leaders and other person-to-person communication channels played a more influential role in persuading actors to adopt or reject a particular innovation because they provided how-to knowledge about how to use an innovation and/or principles knowledge about what an innovation actually worked (Rogers 2003, p.173).

Finally, diffusion scholars starting with Tarde have highlighted the significance of homophily and heterophily within diffusion networks. These terms refer to “the degree to which two pairs of individuals who interact are similar (homophily) or different (heterophily) in certain attributes” (Rogers 2003, pp.305-306). “Certain attributes” refer to individuals’ occupation, education, socio-economic status, and beliefs among other things. Evidence suggests that heterophilous networks help facilitate diffusion because they often serve as a link connecting two different cliques of actors, exchanging information between two socially-dissimilar groups of people. Meanwhile, homophilous networks can often represent an “invisible barrier” to diffusion, slowing down an innovation’s rate of adoption, since the members of such networks are rather dense and insular and, hence do not interact and exchange information with individuals in other networks (Granovetter 1973; 1981). Thus, whether innovative or traditional in its norms, a
network that tends to be homophilous is less able to encourage adoption of innovations on a wider scale.

**Overlap Between Innovation-Diffusion and Institutional Perspectives**

As a case of policy transfer prima facie, the emergence of Teach First also serves as an instance of innovation-diffusion and institutional change. Colyvas and Jonsson (2011) noted there was much conceptual muddling between the two literatures, particularly regarding “successful” diffusion and “institutionalization”. I review their argument briefly here to help distinguish between these concepts and demonstrate how both literatures can offer insight into the study of policy transfer.

First, Colyvas and Jonsson (2011) note that diffusion scholars often equate the widespread adoption and use of an innovation (its ubiquity) as evidence of its institutionalization without considering whether the new idea or practice has the legitimacy to persist long-term (e.g., fads, fashions, etc). Relatedly, Colyvas and Jonsson point out that some rules or ideas are institutionalized but rarely used or acted upon. To aid in clarifying how diffusion and institutionalization differ and relate, Colyvas and Jonsson (2011) argue that diffusion is focused on “the spreading, or how things flow” while institutionalization refers to the “stickiness, or how things become permanent” (p.28). They also highlight that diffusion is based upon “reinforcement and contagion” while institutionalization is based upon the “reproduction and integration into cultural and cognitive frames” (p.28).

In addition, Colyvas and Jonsson offer a useful way of conceptualizing how diffusion and institutionalize relate. They suggest that the diffusion of an innovation is considered in terms of behavioral elements (“how widespread a practice or organizational structure has become”) and institutionalization is considered in terms of its cultural and cognitive aspects (“how legitimate it is”). With this distinction, they present a simple 2x2 table with diffusion categories (yes/no in terms of spread) as the rows and institutionalization categories (yes/no in terms of legitimacy in a legal, normative, and/or cognitive-cultural sense) as the columns.

Innovations that diffuse widely and gain widespread acceptance as legitimate represent the top-right cell in the table but is the most observable phenomena, and hence, the most studied type of innovation. In contrast to those “successful” innovations, other innovations that neither diffuse nor gain widespread acceptance
are complete “failures” and occupy the bottom-left cell. Meanwhile, the top-left cell features innovations that become ubiquitous but not accepted or deemed appropriate. Finally, the bottom-right cell contains innovations that had a very limited spread/adoption total but were widely accepted as legitimate legally, normatively, and/or cognitive-culturally. These types of innovations occupy a kind of grey-area between “success” and “failure” and are rarely studied. This framework highlights how the spread of an innovation and its institutionalization are linked yet not necessarily dependent on each other.

This brings attention to the importance of understanding the processes leading to both “adoption” and “legitimacy” for the success of policy transfers, which arguably need both to succeed. Studying social networks, which are central in both innovation-diffusion and institutional literatures, can help researchers understand how a policy innovation imported from elsewhere diffuses through a social system and builds institutional legitimacy. Thus, drawing upon the literatures on innovation-diffusion and institutionalism serve to provide deeper theoretical insight into the role of networks in policy transfer processes including the implementation phase.

Research Questions: Drawing on the literatures to investigate the gaps

In this chapter, it has been my aim to review concepts from three theoretical literatures to complement each other and provide a multi-perspective analysis of the creation of Teach First and especially focusing on the role policy entrepreneurs and networks play in the process. In the course of this chapter, I emphasize that while these three literatures have distinct origins and offer different perspectives, they also share considerable conceptual overlaps. Nevertheless, there remain gaps in the three literatures that I aim to address in the course of this study. One of the pressing areas in need of attention is non-government policy transfer and, relatedly, the significance of policy entrepreneurs and related social networks, both already existing and newly emerging for the purpose of transfer. Thus, I aim to understand: What is the role of policy entrepreneurs and networks in the policy transfer and diffusion process?

To this end, the study addresses the following research questions:
1. Who were the policy entrepreneurs advocating for Teach First and what were their motivations?
2. How did policy entrepreneurs utilize networks and institutional structures to achieve their aims?
3. How did they, as actors embedded and enmeshed in institutional structures, change that same context?
4. In what ways did institutional structures shape policy entrepreneurs’ goals and strategies and ultimately the policy outcome?

While the overall aim of the research is to uncover and explain how and why Teach First emerged in England in 2002, and thus establishing how and what ways the scheme was (and was not) a transfer of TFA, these theoretical questions regarding policy entrepreneurs, networks, and relevant institutional structure are examined as well. Finally, before proceeding to present the results of my empirical investigation, I examine the literature on both TFA and Teach First.

2.8 Background Literature on TFA and Teach First

Research and Debates Regarding TFA

In the U.S., TFA has been a polarizing force in educational debates over teacher certification, effectiveness, and retention since its founding. The organization’s first years were marked by rather disjointed training and high attrition rates among corps members (Kopp 2001), leading to initial harsh criticism of the TFA from the education establishment. However, as TFA expanded, debate soon turned to whether the programme produced effective teachers, particularly in comparison to traditionally certified teachers. Three notable studies (Raymond et al. 2001; Decker et al. 2004; Xu et al. 2007) concluded TFA teachers were equally and, at times, more effective than traditionally certified teachers. Meanwhile, three other studies (Laczko-Kerr & Berliner 2002; Pilcher & Steele 2005; Darling-Hammond et al. 2005) argued against such a notion, claiming that the performance of TFA teachers in the classroom was inferior to those holding full certification.

All of these studies are limited in their generalizability to the entire TFA teacher population. All the studies with the exception of Decker et al. (2004)
collected data on teachers in only one region. In addition, all the studies except one (Xu et al. 2007) assessed TFA teachers in the elementary or middle school level and “achievement” was always measured in terms of student achievement in maths and reading. Meanwhile, TFA teachers are placed in a wide range of grade levels and subject areas. Furthermore, all the studies mentioned above focus almost exclusively on urban schools, ignoring the TFA’s increasing number of teachers in rural communities. Thus, again, the results of the studies can only provide a glimpse into how effective a typical TFA teacher may be. Moreover, debates over these studies show significant differences in research design and methodology, including what teachers TFA’s trainees should be compared against and how should differences between student groups be accounted for. Thus, the results of these quantitative “teacher-effectiveness” studies have been contradictory and used selectively by TFA supporters and adversaries alike in debates about the scheme. These studies continued to focus critical attention on TFA’s training and also prompted further debates regarding the retention rate of its alumni in teaching (Donaldson & Johnson 2010; Donaldson 2008; Boyd et al. 2005).

Although studies of TFA’s effectiveness were contradictory, many politicians, businesses, and major media outlets continued to portray a positive public image of the programme through the years, helping it retain a generally positive image publicly. Numerous mainstream media stories about TFA – ranging from books and television documentaries to magazine and newspaper articles – have appeared since its launch in 1990. These stories generally emphasized the success of TFA and its corps members (Viadero 2004; Greenwell 2008; Azimi 2007; Foote 2008) or sought to defend TFA and/or debunk negative “myths” about the organization (Rotherham 2011; Koerner et al. 2008; Lowe 2010). Others have highlighted the notable careers of its alumni (St. John 2010; Higgins et al. 2011) and called for more public support for TFA when its federal funding appeared threatened (Cohen 2011; Anderson 2010; Klein 2003). In addition, books by TFA alumni describe and reflect upon their experiences in the classroom (Ness 2003; Johnston 2003; Sentilles 2005; Piekara 2011). Politically, TFA has enjoyed the support of every presidential administration since its inception, with former president George W. Bush encouraging young people to serve in TFA (Klein 2003). Moreover, some of TFA’s corporate sponsors often run promotional fundraising campaigns that not only bring money to TFA but also spread awareness of its work (Miner 2010).
Still, despite the many endorsements of TFA, critical critiques continue to call into question TFA’s mission, methods, and effect on schools and teacher professionalism. Veltri (2010; 2008), a teacher educator who mentored hundreds of TFA corps members, provides qualitative insights into why graduates enter the scheme and how they are socialized in the organisation and the profession. She also discusses how TFA negotiates with district and federal governments. Other studies have analyzed TFA’s “master” narrative, discourse, and underlying assumptions about the nature of teaching, education, and equity. In this vein, Cradle (2007) examined the values, viewpoints, and social capital of TFA’s founding staff, arguing the programme embodied the interests, perspectives, and power of elites. Similarly, Popkewitz (1998) identifies ways in which TFA’s marketing and training rely on certain constructed ideas of poverty, the urban/rural child, and a missionary-type of teacher while also endorsing a largely experiential view of learning. More recently, Lahann and Reagan (2011) use documentary analysis and interviews to argue that the TFA programme operates with an organizational philosophy that combines elements of neo-liberal ideas and progressive values. Bentley (2013) adds to the debate by critiquing TFA’s highly publicized model of teaching as a remedy for educational inequity and inequality while Cann (2013) argues TFA promotes the same false myth as “white teacher savior films” in which “white teachers, with little training and experience, perform miracles in urban classrooms where trained, experienced teachers have failed” (p.1).

Finally, other studies have focused on the ways TFA and its alumni are affecting education policy and practices. Kretchmar and colleagues (2014; 2014) scrutinized TFA leadership’s and notable alumni’s close links with business interests, reform-minded philanthropists, and the charter movement in the U.S. Media stories have also highlighted these links, suggesting TFA and its alumni promote a conservative, pro-corporate, and anti-union agenda in education policy (Sommer 2014; Strauss 2011b; 2011a; 2012a). Another notable study by McAdam and Brandt (2009) challenges the TFA narrative which claims it is creating a cadre of committed educational advocates. In this study, survey data indicated TFA alumni, a decade after they finished their TFA teaching, were less engaged in activism, civic-service careers, and civic behaviour (such as voting) than control groups. According to McAdam and Brandt, this suggests that some TFA alumni experienced disillusionment or service burn-out from their TFA experience (a conclusion also
voiced by Brewer (2014)). Meanwhile, other researchers have examined the careers of alumni after TFA (Boyd et al. 2005; Téllez 2011; Donaldson & Kappan 2011).

The studies and debates reviewed here are a wide sampling of the questions and debates that have surrounded TFA since its founding. TFA, which is now the largest single source of new teachers in the U.S., is a unique and influential programme but one that plays a deeply controversial role in education reform. Despite its contested status, TFA attracted international interest and soon sparked cases of policy transfer in 2000s.

**Current Research and Issues regarding Teach First**

Research studies of Teach First have been limited but are increasing in number. The earliest study, by Hutchings et al. (2006), was commissioned by the Teacher Training and Development Agency and examined Teach First’s innovative features, considering how those may be applied to mainstream training routes. Utilizing data from this initial evaluation, Smart et al. (2009) argued that the discourses used in Teach First marketing and by its participants reinforce middle-class values and stereo-types of poor communities, obscured advantages in schooling enjoyed by more wealthy families, and ultimately provided additional social capital to its trainees. In these ways, the Teach First programme and its participants, while well-intentioned, were reproducing middle-class privilege.

Meanwhile, Stephen Ball and his colleagues include Teach First among their investigations into new education-business partnerships, emerging policy networks and communities, and the rise of education philanthropy (Ball 2007; Ball 2012; Ball & Junemann 2012). Ball (2007) suggests that Teach First represents how that “philanthropy is increasingly incorporated into state policy and is an avoidance of both bureaucratic and market difficulties [and] provides a form of ‘fast’ and often very personal policy action” (p.126). In a more recent work, Ball (2012) refers to Teach First as another example of “the mobility of policy ideas via networks of business philanthropy” (p.110). However, his analysis of Teach First is based on his interviews with Wigdortz and others involved with numerous business-education partnerships, and thus do not examine Teach First in-depth. Instead, his work maps wider network relations, highlights individual biographies, and examines policy discourses. Similarly, Leaton Gray and Whitty (2010) examine the nature of Teach
First’s training model and discourses in a wider discussion of how New Labour reforms have shaped teacher professionalism. Leaton Gray and Whitty (2010) argue that Teach First represents a “shift in the nature of teacher professionalism” (p.12) as it downplays professional preparation (i.e., education studies) and emphasizes generic leadership and management skills. The programme also treats its participants more like self-interested customers than developing professionals.

In addition, research on the effectiveness of Teach First teachers in the classroom has begun. Ofsted evaluated Teach First in 2006-2007 and reported that approximately half of the 202 trainees evaluated achieved an “outstanding rating” by QTS standards, a third were rated “good”, and the remaining were found “satisfactory” (Ofsted 2008, pp.5–6) which, it was noted, were commendable outcomes and on par with other good initial teacher training courses. Ofsted (2008) also noted trainees were highly committed to “countering educational disadvantage” and highlighted ways many Teach First participants were positively impacting schools. However, the report did note that roughly half of the trainees seen were only “satisfactory” in managing pupils’ behavior and suggested that their competence in classroom management “could have been improved with more sustained, focused training and supervision in the school from an early stage in the year” (Ofsted 2008, p.11).

Meanwhile, Muijs et al. (2010; 2013a; 2013b) conducted a study commissioned by Teach First. Using mixed-methods, they found the scheme’s second-year teachers were somewhat effective, helping their schools raise test scores and taking on some leadership roles. More recently, Allen and Allnutt (2013) studied Teach First using quantitative methods and a much smaller sample size than Muijs et al. (2010). They concluded that Teach First teachers produced modest gains in terms of pupils’ GCSE scores.

These studies, coupled with Teach First’s ambition to expand, have prompted discussions regarding the scheme’s potential to operate in other parts of the U.K., particularly in Scotland’s schools (Murtagh 2011). While Scotland’s General Teaching Council changed its policy in 2010 to allow Teach First alumni with PGCE’s to teach in Scotland (Buie 2010), the reaction to potentially bringing the scheme to Scotland has been mixed. Teach First has reportedly found support among some government leaders in region (Sutherland 2011). Moreover, the Donaldson Report (2011) recommended consideration of the scheme, commenting...
that Teach First could “complement” the standard ways of entering the profession. Still, some critics have called the scheme elitist and pointed out almost half of Teach First alumni leave the classroom; moreover, with public funds limited, many leaders doubt government’s ability to fund the scheme (Sutherland 2011). In 2013, it was reported that Teach First had met with some Scottish local authorities to discuss the potential for expansion there but Scotland’s largest teaching union, the Educational Institute of Scotland (EIS), remains opposed to the scheme (Denholm 2013).

Clearly, there is substantially more research on TFA and its impact than on Teach First. Reviewing this literature highlights the need for further empirical research on Teach First and the effects of its rapidly expanding work, not least because leaders of Teach First help export its model worldwide through its involvement in Teach for All.
3.1 Introduction: The Evolution of My Research Focus and Design

The focus and design of my study evolved over the course of my doctoral studies. From the beginning, I wanted to understand how the idea of TFA had spread to the U.K. and, in the transfer process, how and why Teach First was different from TFA. I originally planned my research as a qualitative comparative case-study of policy transfer examining three programmes – Teach First, TEACH South Africa, and Enseña Peru – all of which had been modelled on TFA. To this end, I planned to utilize interviews, observations, and focus groups to discover how each programme emerged in its own unique contexts and the role of global policy networks played in the process. This, I reasoned, would help shed light on how policy transfer occurred and was reinvented in new localities.

However, during the course of preparing for and conducting my first interviews on Teach First, I identified the need for a more historical and interpretive perspective that took into account the complexity of contexts and diversity of actors’ views. In other words, I realized the complexity of situated actions and contexts was immense and difficult to untangle, and I became preoccupied with understanding in-depth just how Teach First emerged. As a result, I refocused my study on Teach First exclusively to understand, within a set time period (2001-2003), how the idea appeared, gained approval, and was implemented. By limiting my focus exclusively to Teach First, I was able to carry out an in-depth study that provided for a more nuanced analysis of what transpired, how, and why.

This revised goal reshaped my methodological approach as I sought to understand the complexity of human actions and the motivations behind them. As a result, I adopted an interpretive paradigm, which is a perspective shared by researchers in symbolic interactionism, phenomenology, and constructivism alike (Crotty 1998). Those adopting this paradigm consider reality as socially constructed and dependent on meaning derived from contexts and social interactions. Consequently, understanding social reality depends on an individual’s point of view, or perspective, and thus is inextricably tied to one’s location in the social context. Moreover, in the interpretive paradigm, social reality is seen as negotiated and thus
dynamic and in a constant state of being reproduced. Hence, social reality is also a social process. Thus, I drew from the traditions within the interpretive paradigm to redesign my study as a qualitative investigation, employing semi-structured interviews with a wide range of individuals and social networks involved in the emergence of Teach First as a prima facie case of policy transfer. To understand and interpret the interviews, further research data was collected from a wide variety of sources including media accounts, books, diaries, and other academic studies. Following the data collection phase, I adopted a reconstructive form of narrative inquiry in order to interpret and reconstruct the “story” of Teach First from the diverse accounts I gathered from approximately 50 interviewees.

Throughout the study, I maintain a focus on entrepreneurs and networks in the policy transfer process. Although studies of social networks often utilize more quantitative approaches to map and study such structures, there are many potential benefits of employing a qualitative approach in network research. Hollstein (2011) states that studies seeking to focus on understanding the concrete interaction between actors can benefit from investigating the strategies and network orientations “at the level of individual actors” (p.410). In this way, the richness of qualitative data has the potential ability to (1) explain the problem of agency, (2) uncover linkages between network structure and network actors, and (3) address questions regarding the constitution and dynamics of social networks. Furthermore, qualitative studies can also enable the exploration of new or unexplored “forms of networks, integration patterns, and network practices” (Hollstein 2011, p.406).

Thus, I adopted a holistic, ethnographic approach in my study that was “marked by utmost openness toward its subject matter and aimed at achieving as comprehensive as possible understanding of the phenomenon in question” (Hollstein 2011, p.410). To this end, as much data as possible was collected from multiple sources to shed light on the phenomenon from various angles. In the following sections, I discuss how I carried out my data collection and analysis in more detail and discuss other challenges related to the research process I undertook.
3.2 Data Collection

3.2.1 Interview Method and Selection of Interviewees

I collected first-person accounts on the emergence of Teach First, as well as TFA, through semi-structured one-on-one interviews with individuals who had been involved with the programme prior to and/or during its first year. In total, I carried out 51 interviewees: 10 related to TFA and 41 related to Teach First. (For a list of all TFA and Teach First interviewees see appendices 1 and 2 respectively, and for a diagram of key Teach First interviewees see appendix 3.) I chose to use semi-structured interviews for my study rather than structured or unstructured approaches. Semi-structured interviews are the most commonly used method in studies employing interpretative, and particularly phenomenological, modes of analysis. This is because semi-structured interviews allow “the researcher and participant to engage in a dialogue whereby initial questions are modified in the light of the participants’ responses and the investigator is able to probe interesting and important areas which arise” (Smith & Osborn 2003, p.57). Thus, I selected this method as the most productive manner in which to gain insight into individuals’ experiences, values, and viewpoints.

With one exception, all interviews were conducted over the telephone, or in two cases, through Skype (using only audio), as this was often most convenient for both interviewees and myself. For me, telephone interviews were preferred because interviewees were dispersed over a wide range of locations, both in the U.K. and the U.S., and a few in other countries. Using the telephone to conduct interviews saved both time and money during the data collection period. Only one interview was carried out face-to-face, as preferred by the participant, although later on a second interview with this participant was conducted over Skype (again, using only audio). Telephone interviewing is not commonly used in qualitative studies and hence, I return to a discussion of my experiences with this medium below.

My initial set of interviews was with individuals involved with launching TFA. These interviews were carried out in early 2012. I identified and selected these individuals based on a 1990 TFA-published promotional document that listed the individuals on the organization’s first board of directors and board of advisors as well as all its staff members. I attempted to contact as many of those individuals as I
could find emails or phone numbers for through internet searches. Unfortunately, given more than twenty years had passed since TFA’s creation, I had only limited success in finding many. However, I found ten individuals that agreed to be an interviewee. Of the ten, I spoke with three former staff members, two advisory board members, one independent advisor to Kopp, three teacher educators and one researcher involved in TFA’s first summer institute.

In the case of Teach First, I began my data collection by interviewing its founding CEO, Brett Wigdortz and other individuals who had been involved in Teach First’s founding as identified in media accounts of the time. From these interviews, I identified additional interviewees to contact based on the narratives told. I also asked interviewees to suggest the names of other individuals they recalled as being involved in the launching of the programme but had not yet mentioned. Thus, through interview data and snowball sampling, further participants were identified, contacted, and interviewed. I made it a priority, however, to contact individuals from various sectors and with different roles related to Teach First. Whether simply “advisors” or funding sponsors, I sought out a diverse range of individuals to speak with in order to obtain a rich account of Teach First’s emergence.

Upon the publication, in late 2012, of Wigdortz’s own memoir about starting Teach First, I compiled a list of all the staff members and contacted them for interviews. By 2013, I had interviewed 32 individuals from government, universities, foundations, businesses, and Teach First. This represented the bulk of my primary data. Later on, after transcribing and analysing data, I carried out a set of additional nine interviews in the first half of 2015 to verify other accounts and widen the diversity of perspectives included in the study.

3.2.2 Access and Consent

To gain access to participants, I first contacted each person individually through an email from my university account. The contents of the email introduced myself as an American PhD student at the University of Edinburgh who “was examining how and why prominent individuals from a range of organizations and sectors came together to establish TFA and Teach First”. After a brief description of my doctoral research, I described how I had learned of their involvement in the
emergence of either programme and requested a telephone interview with them at their convenience. Formal consent was not solicited in writing other than individuals’ responses but was discussed during early in the interview process.

If individuals I emailed for an interview did not respond to my initial request within a week or two, I sent them a follow up email to ask if they had received my initial interview request and stated that I would still like to interview them. In that second email, I stressed that I would value their unique perspective and be appreciative of any time they had available to speak with me. If they responded favourably, a mutually agreed time was then set up to speak. There was only one exception to this pattern of interview coordination, which was one high-profile policy-maker who literally called me within minutes of receiving my email and said he had 20 minutes to talk right then. Though not fully prepared for this interview, I took the opportunity to interview this individual, a chance that may have not be possible later.

My approach to gaining access to interviewees may be described as “minimalist” in the sense that I was straightforward and brief in my initial interview request. I feared a longer and more formal email would either not be fully read or potentially dampen the reader’s interest in participating. Instead, I simply stated who I was, the focus and purpose of my study, and emphasized my eagerness to interview them because of their involvement with Teach First, however small or large their role actually was. When a previous interviewee referred an individual to me, I usually stated this in my email to him/her. In this way, I signaled I was directed to them, hoping this would further encourage their participation. Using this direct but minimalist approach, I aimed to catch their attention, convey my overall purpose, and emphasize my interest in their help. Upon reflection, though, this lack of detailed information on my study could have been resolved without losing the desired tone of the email by attaching an informational sheet describing in detail the research aims, outcomes, and participants’ rights.

Notably, a handful of interviewees requested the questions in advance of our interview. In response, I always sent a general outline of my questions to them. However, in most other cases, I did not give interviewees any questions ahead of time as I hoped to avoid formulated responses and cultivate more of a candid conversation when I called. Given that some researchers indicated that telephone interviews were often shorter than in-person interviews, I also wanted to avoid
creating an expectation that simply answering the set of questions was all that was required. In retrospect, providing an outline of topics for discussion to the participant prior to the interview could have helped them better prepare for the interview by allowing them time to revisit their memories and contemplate their answers.

3.2.3 Interview Procedure and Questions

The procedure I used for carrying out interviews was straightforward. In preparation for the interview, I researched the background of the interviewee on the internet, gathering biographical details that helped me become somewhat acquainted with the person. In this process, I noted details that seemed related to their views and involvement with Teach First. Later, I often asked about these details during the interview, which was helpful in sometimes uncovering network connections or understanding the person’s viewpoint. Other times, doing so alerted me to the irrelevance, or lack of connection, between individuals or experiences, which was equally helpful.

When I called participants to start the interview, I typically began by explaining who I was and how I had come to study this topic. I sensed that my brief story of becoming a TFA teacher myself and then moving to England to work for Teach First established an open conversation and common link with my interviewees that enabled me to begin building a positive rapport. I then briefly described my study again, how I came to know of their involvement in Teach First, and asked permission to record the interview, which all but one agreed. Many interviewees were accustomed to being interviewed and hence expected such formalities. With interviewee’s permission, I recorded each interview using an ear-microphone attached to an Olympus digital recorder.

Before proceeding to ask my questions, I asked interviewees to notify me in the course of the interview if they did not want certain comments on the record or if they wished any details to be considered “anonymous”. I did not explicitly offer anonymity to interviewees since I contacted them for their particular role in launching Teach First. At the time, none of them asked me not to use their real names in my study, and so I was operating on the assumption that I had permission to use their identity in my written work. Of course, some interviewees asked certain
quotes not be attributed to them or stated when information should be considered “off the record” and thus not included in any reporting. I, of course, followed these instructions and only reported on information that was freely shared with consent.

Overall, interviews ranged in time from 13 minutes to two and a half hours, depending on the time interviewees had available and how much they could recall. Most interviews, however, lasted approximately 30 to 45 minutes. Each interview was unique in terms of its pace and sequence of questioning. Although the questions varied for each interviewee, the general outline of interview questions was:

1. **Personal Background Questions:**
   a. When you became involved with Teach First, what was your position/job at the time? What were your job responsibilities?
   b. Had you been involved in the education sector prior to this time?
   c. Which university did you attend? How had you decided, or proceeded, on your particular career trajectory from there?

2. **Policy-Oriented Learning and Social Network Questions:**
   a. How did you first learn of the idea for Teach First?
   b. Who approached you with the Teach First idea?
   c. Who else was supporting the idea?
   d. What were your initial thoughts or reactions to the idea? Did you have concerns about the idea?
   e. What problem(s) did you see Teach First addressing?
   f. How did others in your department/group think of the idea?

3. **Policy-Borrowing/TFA-related Questions:**
   a. Upon learning of (or becoming involved in) the Teach First idea, what was your level of knowledge, or awareness, of the American programme, TFA?
   b. What was your view of TFA?
   c. How did your knowledge (or view) of TFA shape your view of the idea for Teach First?
   d. Did you consider Teach First to be modeled on (or a replication) of TFA or something different?
   e. In what ways did you think the idea behind Teach First/TFA needed to be changed or adapted to work in the U.K.?

4. **Action/Advocacy Questions:**
   a. What actions did you take, or roles did you take on, to develop or promote Teach First? Why?
   b. What were the main challenges in moving the idea forward? What were the arguments/rationales for and against the idea?
   c. Who was opposed to the idea? How was opposition to the Teach First idea overcome?
d. Which factors or individuals were influential in your views?

Although I seldom asked explicitly about an individual’s personal or professional networks, I usually asked follow-up questions regarding how the interviewee knew so-and-so or how and why certain contacts were tapped for additional support or resources. I also asked for interviewees to recommend the names of others who they felt played important roles in launching Teach First. In this way, I was able to gather details about existing and emerging social networks and their uses in the diffusion of the Teach First idea.

To understand interviewees’ personal histories, I asked about their own educational background and career paths. However, for a number of interviewees, details of their professional biographies were already available on the internet (i.e., through LinkedIn or on their current employer’s website), and thus I was able to incorporate these details into my interview questions to probe deeper into personal and professional narratives. Occasionally, I had difficulty integrating these biographical questions into the interviews as some interviewees did not expect them or fully see the relevance of such questions. However, most interviewees were happily willing to describe their professional backgrounds and career choices. Interestingly, through retelling their backgrounds and shifts in career, many interviewees seemed to open up further to explaining the origins and influences on their views and actions in regard to TFA and/or Teach First. This phenomenon encouraged me to draw upon social psychological perspectives (i.e., Lave and Wenger (1991) and Weick et al. (2005)) in my later stages of analysis of interview data. These perspectives highlight how an individual’s identity shapes how he/she understands and makes sense of the social world and his/her own role in it.

Hence, my interviews were a mix of questions about their professional experiences, involvement with Teach First/TFA, and how their knowledge and views of these programmes emerged and spurred them to act. Through these sets of questions, I gained valuable qualitative data despite the fact that all but one of my interviews were conducted over the telephone or Skype (using audio only). It is worth noting that, at the end of the interview, I generally asked participants if there was anything they would like to add or a topic I had not brought up but they thought was important. This often led to some interesting final thoughts and reflections that
added to the richness of the data. Other times it allowed the interviewee to reveal contextual nuances and topics that I had not been previously aware of.

### 3.2.4 Reflections on Using the Telephone for Qualitative Interviews

My study is unusual in the fact that I relied almost exclusively on telephone interviewing for gathering in-depth qualitative data from participants. While telephone interviewing is an accepted and well-studied approach for collecting quantitative data (and the most widely used method for conducting surveys in industrialized countries (Bryman 2008)), face-to-face interviews are considered more appropriate for data collection in qualitative studies. Through conducting a systematic review of the literature on the use of telephones for qualitative interviewing, Novick (2008) found that few research books addressed the topic and scholarly discussion on the topic in academic journals was limited. Novick also reported that comments from researchers using telephone interviews had low expectations of gathering rich, high-quality data and several admitted using the telephone only when an in-person interview was not possible.

There are several disadvantages of telephone interviewing that have led to this widespread preference for in-person interviews among qualitative researchers. Such disadvantages include (1) the supposed difficulty of building rapport and hence trust between the researcher and interviewee, (2) the inability to see visual or non-verbal cues between the researcher and participant, (3) the reliance on telephone infrastructure or mobile reception to reach participants, and (4) the decreased opportunity to take short breaks during the interview (Irvine et al. 2010). Shuy (2002) suggests such disadvantages may negatively affect the quantity, quality, and type of information one can capture in an interview. Researchers also tend to assume that in-person interviews are preferable because they offer the advantages of allowing the researcher to build rapport with interviewees and, in some cases, set the ambience of the interview (Stephens 2007). As a result, face-to-face interviewing remains the preferred mode of data collection in qualitative research involving semi-structured and in-depth interviews (Sturges & Hanrahan 2004).

Telephone interviews, however, do offer some distinct advantages for both researchers. As often discussed in the context of quantitative data collection,
telephone interviewing (1) eliminates the costly and time-consuming task of traveling to participants, (2) allows one to reach a geographically-dispersed population, (3) enhances the safety of the interviewer, and (4) allows for the possibility for the interviewer to be monitored by a supervisor (Bryman 2008).

Despite the stereotypes against telephone interviewing, a small but increasing number of qualitative researchers have used telephone interviews in their studies and shared insights gleaned from their experience. For example, Taylor (2002) and Sturges and Hanrahan (2004) both initially conducted in-person interviews before switching to telephone interviews for their studies of adolescent boys and prison visitors and guards respectively. In these studies, the researchers concluded that the information gathered in both types of interviews was equally robust in terms of breadth and depth. Similarly, Stephens (2007) initially conducted semi-structured face-to-face interviews with elite macro-economists before using the telephone to conduct five additional interviews. He found telephone interviews were largely just as successful as those conducted in-person although he noted that, without visual cues, the interview required more direction and fewer interruptions from the researcher. He also suggests that telephone interviewing allows the researcher to gain more control of their social space as he/she is not seen by the participant and thus is free to take notes or do other interview-related activities.

Flexibility was also identified as a key advantage for those using telephone interviews, notably Harvey (2011) and Holt (2010). Harvey (2011) conducted qualitative research on elites using telephone interviews and noted providing flexibility in the timing and locations of interviews was critical to maximizing response rates. Similarly, from her experience interviewing 20 single parents in impoverished communities by telephone, Holt (2010) noted that participants may reschedule, or even end the interview, more easily and with “no embarrassment or difficulty in re-arranging the appointment (as there may have been had I turned up at their door)” (2010, p.116). In this way, she notes that telephone interviews give not just the researcher but also allows interviewees a far greater degree of control over their circumstances than a face-to-face interview may.

Notably, Holt (2010) goes further to challenge stereotypes against telephone interviewing by suggesting that the absence of visual and non-verbal cues can be an advantage of telephone interviewing as “everything had to be articulated by both the participants and myself” and thus produced “a much richer text… from which to
begin analysis” (p.116). In addition, she points out that telephone interviewing does eliminate the researcher’s chance to gain “‘ethnographic’ information derived from participants’ homes, communities and, indeed, their ‘selves’” (Holt 2010, p.115). However, she reasons this may be an advantage as it “enabled the subsequent discourse analysis of data to ‘stay at the level of the text’” (Holt 2010, p.115).

Lastly, Trier-Bieniek (2012) boldly argues in favor of using the telephone for qualitative interviewing, suggesting it can empower some participants. She conducted semi-structured telephone interviews on a sample of 39 women on a range of sensitive topics and traumatic experiences. Consequently, Trier-Bieniek (2012) argues telephone interviewing may be characterized as “participant-centered” and suggests such interviews “yield the potential for more honest discussions because of the anonymity involved” (p.642). Her interviewees indicated they would not have typically agreed to be involved in an academic study but were more willing to do so through a telephone interview. This, they indicated, was because a telephone interview allowed them to remain in the comfort of their own surroundings and relieved them of the concern of how they were presenting themselves. Thus, the telephone interview was alluring, in part, because participants just had to answer questions and “take part in a conversation” (Trier-Bieniek 2012, p.640).

With such positive insights into the potential for telephone interviews to accommodate participants and yield quality data, it should be no surprise that telephone interviews for the collection of qualitative data are slowly becoming more common (Block & Erskine 2012). This trend is helping to address the gap in critical discussions of the realities of using the telephone, and more recently Skype (Deakin & Wakefield 2013; Hanna 2012; Janghorban et al. 2014), for qualitative interviewing. This increasing acceptance of telephone interviews encouraged me to utilize this medium and provided some insight into how best to conduct them.

In my study of Teach First, I found telephone interviewing to be a valid and efficient way to collect valuable data from my participants. I conducted all my interviews over the telephone or Skype (using audio only) with the exception of one interview in-person. As a result, I did not have a large comparison group from which to judge what type of interview yielded the most useful results. (However, such a comparison would not likely have been much help as questions varied by participant and the specific role and experiences of each person differed considerably.) Still,
from my experience using the semi-structured telephone interviews as my primary mode of data collection, I offer some useful reflections.

From the onset of my research, I chose to request telephone interviewing rather than in-person interviews for several reasons. First, the most logical rationale behind this decision was efficiency – to conduct as many interviews as needed with limited resources (namely time and money). Since my interviewees were dispersed around the U.K. and abroad, telephone interviews were pretty much necessary. Secondly, I decided to conduct interviews over the phone in order to help persuade individuals I contacted to participate in my research. Since many of the individuals I wanted to speak with were elites – government officials, corporate executives, union heads, etc. – I assumed their schedules were busy and thus time and flexibility important.

In hindsight, I believe interviewing by telephone was preferable to in-person in my study for an additional reason – the disconnect between interviewees’ current circumstances and my research topic. Teach First had launched more than a decade prior to my study, and hence, most of my interviewees were no longer in jobs that were directly related to Teach First. Most individuals had moved on in their careers while others had relocated to other countries and some had retired. The positions or settings in which they occupied at the time of our interview were not often relevant to my research topic. Thus, since most of my interviews took place during the business day (as requested by participants themselves), the use of the telephone rather than face-to-face interviews was likely helpful in ensuring that my interview was not seen as a disruption or intrusion into their current workplace.

The quality of the data I obtained from telephone interviews was generally high, allowing me insight into decision-making, social networks, and individuals’ personal viewpoints. With many interviewees, I felt able to establish a degree of trust and rapport with them by explaining how my own background related to TFA and Teach First. However, I did find the lack of visual cues difficult to manage. When I needed clarification on a comment, I could not indicate without verbally interrupting the participant. To deal with this, however, I wrote down questions or unfamiliar terms to ask about later in the conversation.

I also found there are some drawbacks to the freedoms telephone interviewing allows. First, while I found the flexibility and control a telephone interview provides researchers and interviewees an advantage, it can also lead some
interviewees to multi-task and hence affect the quality of the participants’ responses. For example, one interviewee was providing short, straightforward answers, and I struggled to effectively probe his responses. Later in the interview, he asked if I could repeat a question because he had just been “overtaking a car on the motorway”. Although I immediately offered to call him back at a later time, he insisted on continuing the interview, but I sensed his answers were not as complete as they could have been if we had sat down to an in-person interview.

Second, in a telephone interview, researchers have less control in determining when an interview ends, which can be understandable but frustrating. While working through my series of questions, some interviewees would indicate they had to go soon. While I usually asked for 30 to 45 minutes for the interview in my email request, I did graciously accept whatever time a participant was willing to give me because I wanted to secure their participation. Thus, while inviting individuals to telephone interviews and being flexible may help lure individuals into participating, they may not always allot enough time to answer all the researcher’s questions. This was simply a trade-off I was willing to accept in order to gain access and maintain a positive rapport with my interviewees. Fortunately, most participants indicated I could contact them again if I had any additional questions afterwards. I took advantage of such offers later on in the analysis process and emailed or re-interviewed key participants, most of who responded helpfully.

In conclusion, although face-to-face interviews remain the dominant interview technique in the social research field, I found telephone interviews enabled me to reach a large number of geographically dispersed individuals whom I needed to speak with and did not prevent me from gaining valuable, quality data in the process. From my experience, I recommend to others that telephone interviewing not be considered only a second-rate alternative to in-person interviews but an equally effective method of data collection. However, some modifications to one’s strategies for conducting interviews should be made to ensure the lack of visual cues does not inhibit the flow of communication. I also recommend others be aware of the tradeoffs of telephone interviewing – what one gains in flexibility, access and efficiency sometimes comes at the cost of losing control of the timing of the interview and, occasionally, losing the interviewee’s full attention.
3.2.5 Other Key Sources of Data

In addition to interview data, I collected a range of other documents related to Teach First’s first years. Particularly important documents were early newspaper articles on Teach First, a TTA programme evaluation of Teach First’s first years, and an archived diary of one interviewee that revealed the key dates of meetings related to Teach First. In addition, an interviewee provided the internal financial records kept by Teach First during its first year. These sources were used to both complement and triangulate the interview data I collected. Moreover, I conducted extensive background research into the organizations involved in launching Teach First and their respective institutional settings to shed light on the contextual influences alluded to in interviews.

Finally, I also gathered background data on interviewees through extensive and exhaustive Internet searches. Combining such personalized background research with the qualitative interviews reflects a type of data collection that Ball and colleagues (Ball 2016; Ball & Junemann 2012) have referred to as “network ethnography”. Unlike Ball and Junemann, I did not focus on mapping networks but rather understanding conceptually how networks were used to manage the diffusion and transfer of a policy idea. Still, Ball and Juneman’s research on business and philanthropic networks in education (including Teach First) reinforces our shared approach that emphasizes the importance of personal histories and social relationships in the formation and spread of policy ideas.

3.3 Data Analysis

3.3.1 Analytic Approach: “Reconstructive” Narrative Analysis

In the course of my research, I employed a strand of narrative inquiry to collect and analyze my data. Narrative inquiry, with roots in postmodernism, social constructionism, constructivism, and feminist theory, is an overarching term that refers to personal and human dimensions of experience over time and accounts for the relationship between an individual’s experience and their cultural context (Clandinin and Connelly 2000). There are various forms of narrative inquiry, depending on one’s philosophical orientation. Yet, at its core, within this mode of
inquiry, researchers can consider individuals’ accounts as a window into a knowable reality.

In the context of narrative inquiry, *narrative* refers to a discourse form in which events and happenings are configured into a temporal unity by means of a plot. In simpler terms, narratives are texts that are thematically organized by plots. To analyze my data, I adopted a particular form of narrative inquiry that is less common among qualitative research and entails building an explanatory story through the “emplotment” of data consisting of accounts of events and happenings. This type of analysis is termed *narrative analysis* by Polkinghorne (1995), though I have opted to rename this approach *reconstructive narrative analysis* for the sake of clarity. This is because many scholars use the term “narrative analysis” to refer to the collection and analysis of stories told by interviewees as the primary sources of data (e.g., Wells 2011). However, Polkinghorne uses the term “narrative analysis” differently to refer to “the procedure through which the researcher organizes the data elements into a coherent developmental account” (1995, p.15). While both types of analytical approaches involved the use of narratives, they are fundamentally different in the type of data used and the analysis produced. To understand the difference (and the method I adopted), I briefly explain Polkinghorne’s discussion of the use of narratives in qualitative research.

Polkinghorne calls for the recognition of two distinct types of narrative analysis – the paradigmatic-type and the narrative-type. In short, the paradigmatic-type “gathers stories for its data and uses paradigmatic analytic procedures to produce taxonomies and categories out of the common elements across the database” while the narrative-type “gathers events and happenings as its data and uses narrative analytic procedures to produce explanatory stories” (Polkinghorne 1995, p.5). Polkinghorne differentiates between these two categories of analysis by using the work of Bruner (1986) to argue that each is based on a distinct form of cognition: *paradigmatic* and *narrative*. According to Polkinghorne (1995), paradigmatic reasoning “operates by recognizing elements as members of a category” (p.5) and is a process of linking “the particular to the formal” in order to make generalizations (p.10). Polkinghorne highlights that knowledge based on paradigmatic reasoning has been the more commonly accepted form of academic knowledge and has been promoted by the Western scientific tradition. This form of knowledge is based on
rationality and logic and reflects a positivist orientation toward knowledge and its creation.

In contrast, narrative reasoning “operates by noticing the differences and diversity of people’s behaviour… [and] attends to the temporal context and complex interaction of the elements that make each situation remarkable” (Polkinghorne 1005, p.11). Narrative reasoning combines elements into an emplotted story to explain human behaviour. Polkinghorne describes how knowledge based on experiences and carried through stories, or narratives, has traditionally been categorized as “expressive” and more based on emotion than logical reasoning. Bruner (1986) was among the first in the cognitive sciences to argue that narratives are legitimate forms of reasoned knowing and hence, both paradigmatic and narrative cognition produce useful and valid knowledge.

By incorporating Bruner’s ideas into narrative-based qualitative research, Polkinghorne (1995) argues there are two main types of narrative inquiry based on these two types of cognition. He terms the type that utilizes paradigmatic reasoning in its analysis, analysis of narrative, while labelling the type that uses narrative reasoning, simply narrative analysis. He states:

In the first type, analysis of narratives, researchers collect stories as data and analyze them with paradigmatic processes. The paradigmatic analysis results in descriptions of themes that hold across the stories or in taxonomies of types of stories, characters, or settings. In the second type, narrative analysis, researchers collect descriptions of events and happenings and synthesize or configure them by means of a plot into a story or stories (for example, a history, case study, or biographic episode). Thus, analysis of narratives moves from stories to common elements, and narrative analysis moves from elements to stories.

(Polkinghorne 1995, p.12 emphasis in the original)

I propose another way to conceptualize the difference between Polkinghorne’s analysis of narratives and narrative analysis is to see the former as a process of deconstructing others’ narratives to uncover meaningful categories and themes across accounts while the latter is a process of constructing an explanatory narrative from given accounts of various reported events and happenings. Thus, to avoid confusion between Polkinghorne’s “narrative analysis” and others’ various uses of the term, I prefer to rename Polkinghorne’s term “reconstructive narrative analysis” to signal that this approach uses data to produce narratives rather than analyse others’ narratives.
Notably, both types of narrative inquiry rely mainly on what Polkinghorne terms *diachronic*, as opposed to *synchronic*, qualitative data. According to the *Oxford English Dictionary* (2016), *diachronic* is a term that means “concerned with the way in which something has developed and evolved through time”. Thus, Polkinghorne (1995) uses the adjective to refer to data that “contain temporal information about the sequential relationship of events” (p. 12). Such data are often personal accounts that describe when and why an action or actions took place and how those actions affected what happened next. In contrast, *synchronic* is a term that means “concerned with something as it exists at one point in time”, according to the *Oxford English Dictionary* (2016). Hence, Polkinghorne (1995) employs the term to describe data that “lack the historical and developmental dimension” and instead “are framed as categorical answers to questions put by an interviewer” (p.12). Synchronic data usually provides information about current circumstances or personal views of an interviewee.

Although both paradigmatic (or analysis of narratives/deconstructive) and narrative (or narrative analysis/reconstructive) forms of analysis use diachronic data, Polkinghorne (1995) emphasizes that the former relies on data told *in stories* while the latter relies on data that are “descriptions of events and happenings” (p.15). A researcher employing the latter form of narrative analysis (reconstructive) then interprets and combines these descriptions – which are typically responses to questions such as “How did this happen?” or “Why did this come about?” – to form a plausible theory of events to create a narrative. As Polkinghorne (1995) notes, “The story constituted by narrative integration allows for the incorporation of the notions of human purpose and choice as well as chance happenings, dispositions, and environmental presses” (p.16).

In the process of developing the story, data from sources other than interviewees can be used such as information from media accounts, personal and public documents, observations, journals, and articles among others. The types and numbers of data sources a researcher utilizes are only limited by the time horizons with which he/she has framed the study. The researcher’s job then is to interpret and selectively integrate all these sources to create an emplotted narrative to explain a phenomenon. To this end, I chose to employ Polkinghorne’s described narrative analysis, (which I refer to as reconstructive narrative analysis from here on) to
interpret and synthesize my collected data into a plausible developmental account of how and why Teach First emerged.

3.3.2 The Process of Analysing the Data

As reconstructive narrative analysis is not a common methodology in qualitative studies of policy transfer, I admit I did not initially realize this was the most fruitful way forward in my case study. Since the data I gained from interviewees was not generally lengthy storied accounts, but rather descriptions of events, meetings, decisions taken, and personal viewpoints, I did not consider using narrative inquiry initially. I was, at that point, unaware of Polkinghorne’s use and purification of the term and did not yet see my study in the light of historiography.

Instead, I began my analysis by seeking to establish a casual timeline of events complemented by thematic analysis based around the relevant actors, networks, and contexts shaping the process and outcomes of the policy transfer. To do this, I first experimented with using the indexing and Table of Attributes features of Microsoft Word to thematically code my data, following a process developed by Hahn (2008). Unsatisfied with the pace and outcome of my results, I then turned to using Dedoose, a relatively new form of qualitative analysis software. Dedoose is an online-based application for mixed-methods research developed by scholars at the University of California – Los Angeles. Using this program, I developed and applied a much more extensive set of thematic codes and sub-codes to my interview transcripts and began utilizing its analysis features to isolate, examine, and cross-reference the data. (These sets of codes are available to review in Appendix 4.)

However, I came to realize I could not fully capture, using conceptual themes, the complexity of the transfer and reinvention processes nor the intersection of personal and professional influences. I knew I needed to organize the data into a story that brought together the actors as real characters with unique histories and views located not only in networks and organizations but in wider shifting contexts. Thus, I began to look for an analytic approach that could support the use of data to create a policy transfer story, with plots and subplots, which could illustrate the complex connections and patterns revealed by the data.

This revelation led me to adopt a reconstructive narrative analysis approach as depicted by Polkinghorne (1995). Though I shifted my approach to the data, the
time I had already spent coding and sub-coding transcripts had helped me “get close” to the data and know most of my interviewees’ biographical details, network contacts, and said responses by heart. This proved extremely helpful in the next step of my analytical process – building the story of Teach First.

Among the first steps in the process of forming a narrative for Teach First was organizing the events identified in the data along a before-after continuum. This process requires the researcher to deal with “the temporal and unfolding dimension of human experience” (Polkinghorne 1995, p.16). To begin this process, I grouped the appearance of actors, their meetings and decisions, and other events into three phases, roughly reflecting policy transfer stages of cross-national attraction, political decision-making, and implementation (e.g., Phillips & Ochs 2003). These stages, which became Phase I, II, and III served to help establish a beginning, a middle, and an end to the emerging policy story. I then re-examined and analysed the interview transcripts and secondary data for each phase to begin filling in temporal sequences and linking cause-and-effect happenings within these periods. This was not a simple process, but I highlight the main steps I took.

Focusing on one phase at a time, I began to build the narrative for each phase. In Phase I, I was aware of the need to “set the scene” so to speak and thus focused on grounding the interview data in the organizations and individuals involved as well as the immediate contexts related to these entities. In Phase II, I built the narrative through organizing my writing into sectoral accounts. This made the most logical sense to me and enabled me to discuss groups of inter-related actors, their social networks, and relevant contexts. In Phase III, the focus became the implementation of Teach First, and hence I shifted into emplotting the data based on milestones achieved in its formation. For each phase, I examined and incorporated, gradually, the data I had previous coded including:

1. chronological clues regarding events, actions, and meetings
2. interviewees’ biographical data, (e.g., education, career history, etc.)
3. interviewees’ knowledge and view of TFA and source of that knowledge
4. rationales for action in support/opposition of the idea for Teach First, and
5. references to prevailing contexts and networks that served to shape (empower or constrain) action and/or opinions
Building the story was a slow and detail-oriented process that required me to repeatedly read accounts, paying close attention to every reference to sequences, personal connections, and underlying contexts that shaped the meaning. Stitching together data to form an evolving plot was a continuous process of triangulating a wide variety of primary and secondary data sources in addition to my interviews. In my first drafts of each phase, I initially drew upon and incorporated as much of the interview data as possible to create the most comprehensive, collective retelling of events. Although every detail would not turn out to be needed (as some did not move the emerging plot forward), I did not make those judgments until later in the analytical process. My first priority was to bring all the interview details together.

Then, to complement and further contextualize the interview excerpts, I incorporated information on the context and history of the organizations, sectors, and politics of the time period. This contextual research helped uncover relevant network configurations, status hierarchies, and other institutional structures that were not usually clear from interview accounts alone. Next, in addition to interview data and contextual data, I also incorporated interviewees’ biographical data in order to further illuminate their personal perspectives and show how individuals’ views were often deeply shaped by their life histories and constructed identity.

By combining these three types of data, I ended up writing an expansive empirical story for each phase of Teach First’s development. My initial drafts of Phase I, II, and III (Chapters 4, 6, and 8) were very detailed stories varying in length, between 37,000 and 54,000 words each. By creating this thorough story of events, I was able to begin to identify significant shifts in the narrative and discovered inconsistencies between accounts that revealed individuals’ particular positions within networks. In identifying these critical points, I moved to a higher-level of analysis – identifying wider themes coming together as a plot, including the development of the policy idea, shifts in influence between actors, casual sequences, and the formation of new networks. Thus, I began to revise and condense each chapter – taking out material that was redundant, cutting out information not relevant to outcomes, and editing or simply summarizing lengthy quotes. This type of revision in the creation of narratives is referred to as narrative smoothing (Polkinghorne 1995; Spence 1986). All the while, I continued to develop my secondary analysis of the policy transfer process and related insights into the roles of policy entrepreneurs and social networks.
However, the mega-narrative I had constructed (and which constantly refined) also exposed contradictions amongst accounts and highlighted missing details (e.g., dates or network links) that left unanswered questions. Sometimes, those contradictions alerted me to mistakes in my chronology or casual sequence. In these cases, I then re-examined that part of the narrative and came up with different possible scenarios, which I then narrowed down through a process of elimination based on the existing data and contextual clues. If a conclusion to the contradiction did not become apparent, I attempted to resolve the discrepancy (and to test the validity of my constructed chronology and meaning of events) by re-interviewing a handful of key participants, emailing others with clarifying questions, and seeking out additional interviewees whose perspective could potentially provide further clarification. This situation is common in reconstructive narrative analysis as Polkinghorne (1995, p.15) highlights:

If major events or actions described in the data conflict with or contradict the emerging plot idea, then the idea needs to be adapted to better fit or make sense of the elements and their relationships... The creation of a text involves the to-and-fro movement from parts to whole that is involved in comprehending a finished text.

In this way, the process of putting together my empirical data and analyzing it was a messy multi-step process that stopped and started as I tried different tools and discovered new meanings in the interview data inline with my increasing understanding of particular contextual nuances. I was struck by how often I felt my work was akin to what historians and detectives alike must do – interview participants, verify accounts, develop possible theories, explore contexts and pay close attention to sequences – building a collective narrative yet being ready to revise the story or subplots if confronted with contradictory evidence or newly-discovered meanings. In the end, my analysis produced both the empirical and discussion chapters of my thesis. While empirical chapters detailed the action-oriented story of Teach First’s emergence I had constructed, my accompanying discussion chapters expressed my analysis of the plots, subplots, and factors influencing the action. In this way, the combined narration and discussion aimed to make sense of the data and bring an order and meaningfulness that was not apparent in the interview data themselves.
3.4 Additional Considerations

3.4.1 Considerations of Validity

Through qualitative interviewing, individuals recall their memories of the topic at hand. A common obstacle to interviewing participants about events in the distant past is that memories fade and can become distorted over time. I interviewed individuals regarding events which occurred ten years ago or more. Hence, I was keenly aware, as were many of my interviewees, of the difficulty in recalling situations and sentiments accurately. To anticipate and address possible mistakes in memory recall during the interview and analysis process, I familiarized myself with the ways memories can be distorted. According to Schacter (2002), there are seven ways in which memories are corrupted. These are:

1. transience, or when memories fade
2. absent-mindedness, or being distracted from the task at hand and forgetting what was done automatically
3. blocking, or sudden loss of memory such as not being able to remember a name when about to make an introduction
4. misattribution, or confusion about who did what and when
5. suggestibility, or incorporating new knowledge or experiences into “old” memories
6. bias, or being influenced by what’s going on currently or common stereotypes
7. persistence, or not being able to get rid of unpleasant memories that haunt us

These sources of memory errors are important to consider as Teach First was a programme that came about through coalition-building amongst individuals both inside and outside of government. There were no official policy texts or accompanying “context of text production” (Bowe et al. 1992) through which to aid in the data collection and analysis of policy formation. Consequently, my data was primarily the recollections of individuals. Thus, I made a point to anticipate and attempted to counter potential errors of memory in those accounts.

In the course of my interviews, all seven sources of errors in memory recall identified by Schacter (2002) were potentially present. Thus, during interviews, if
individuals could not recall memories likely due to transience, absent-mindedness, or blocking, I usually offered any background information, aiming to prompt additional recall. In these instances, interviewees were usually aware of their problems of recall and were apologetic. If the interviewee still had no clear recollection of an event after more background details were provided, I accepted this and moved on. Other potential inaccuracies in memory recall were more challenging to identify but more important to understand. Misattribution errors were anticipated and did occur in some interviews. However, many such errors were relatively minor and easy to identify and correct through triangulation with other interviewees’ accounts. Exact dates in particular often eluded interviewees. Instead, I was able to estimate when events or decisions occurred by asking them what had happened up to that point (sequencing) and/or asking about other events at the time (i.e., what the season it was, notable current events, etc.).

For other interviewees, memories were also potentially corrupted by bias, consciously or subconsciously, revising the past to fit the present or enhance one’s own role. I attempted to identify such biases by contextualizing and triangulating interviewees’ accounts. By investigating not only the background of individuals but also the history, practices, and influence of organizations and wider networks, I aimed to gain additional insight into the thinking and perspective of each interviewee as an individual. This helped me in constructing a more dynamic and hopefully more accurate account of what was happening at the time.

Finally, I identified suggestibility as a potential for data errors in my study for at least two reasons. First, Teach First continued to thrive and expand in the years following its creation, thus interviewees may have confused or forgotten details about its original form. Secondly, in September 2012, Teach First’s founding CEO, Brett Wigdortz, published a memoir of the scheme’s founding and development. In it, he provided details that others may have relied on and incorporated into their own recollections to fill in gaps in their memory. However, after completing all my interviews, Wigdortz’s written account did not seem to widely influence others’ accounts as half my interviews occurred before the book’s publishing and most other interviewees afterwards said they had not read the book. For interviewees who had read the book, they named Wigdortz’ account as the source of recall for certain details. By becoming thoroughly familiar with Wigdortz’s account and the contexts
at the time, it became possible to account for potential suggestibility errors stemming from this source.

To further address potential errors in memory and to confirm or correct the accuracy of interviewees’ recollections when they conflicted, I re-interviewed some individuals for a second time during my analysis process. I also sought out additional interviewees that could shed more light on conflicting accounts. During this process, I also identified (again) the need to explore individuals’ backgrounds, organizational histories, and relevant contexts to explain conflicting points in their recollections, which were often times clashes of perspectives rather than memory.

3.4.2 Consideration of Pro-Innovation Bias

In the diffusion literature, researchers have drawn attention to a pro-innovation bias among studies, which stems from studies of profitable innovations funded by change agencies and the methodological ease of studying “successful” cases of innovation rather than unsuccessful cases. First noted in the 1970s by Rogers and Shoemaker (1971) as well as critics of diffusion studies (e.g., Downs & Mohr 1976), the pro-innovation bias refers to the latent assumptions in many diffusion studies that “innovation” (like “efficiency”) is inherently good, that innovations should be diffused rapidly and adopted by all members of social system, and that innovations should not be rejected nor reinvented. This bias, Rogers (2003) argues, can lead researchers to “ignore the study of ignorance about innovations, to underemphasize the rejection or discontinuance of innovations, to overlook re-invention… and to fail to study anti-diffusion programs” (Rogers 2003, pp.106–7). He concludes that such blind spots in diffusion research limit the perspective.

For researchers to address this bias, Rogers (2003, p.115) recommends investigating the broader context in which an innovation diffuses, such as:

1. how it was decided to conduct the research and development that led to the innovation in the first place
2. how the initial policy decision is made that the innovation should be diffused to members of a system
3. how the innovation of study is related to other innovations and to the existing practice(s) that it replaces
Rogers asserts that by illuminating the broader system in which the diffusion process occurs, pro-innovation biases can be addressed. He also recommends focusing on uncovering the motivations for adopting or rejecting an innovation, noting such “why” questions have rarely been rigorously studied by researchers but also present methodological difficulties in doing so.

In my study, I utilized these suggestions by drawing from multiple perspectives – innovation-diffusion, policy transfer, and institutionalism – to widen the focus of the study. More specifically, I choose to analyze how and why the innovation (Teach First) was conceptualized and how actos’ motivations played into the decision to diffuse and adopt the innovation. In addition, I examined the motives of both supporters and opponents of Teach First and how the scheme was related to other innovations as well as the existing practice(s) and policies in teacher training. Finally, I followed the implementation of Teach First to uncover how it was reinvented in practice.

3.4.3 Challenges of Interviewing Elites

Many of the individuals I interviewed were among the power elites, meaning they held influential and/or powerful positions within the field they were located (i.e., business, government, or education, etc.). Interviewing such individuals presents unique challenges in accessing, interviewing, and interpreting data (Walford 1994; 2011; 2012). I discuss here a few of those challenges I found relevant to my own research.

In terms of access, I found the overwhelming majority of interviewees willing to participate in this study. Their willingness to be interviewed was likely due to several factors, but chief among them seemed to be a shared pride in being involved in launching Teach First. Several expressed the wish that such a programme had been around when they were young graduates and others spoke of Teach First as a noble initiative that they were pleased to still be associated with. Just as others have noted that gaining access to elites can be particularly difficult when the policy at the centre of the research is controversial and/or fiercely contested (Walford 1991; Whitty & Edwards 1994), the opposite may be likely as well, meaning access is eased when policies are rather uncontroversial and seen as largely successful.
Meanwhile, other interviewees with more critical perspectives appeared willing to be helpful and to give their insider view of what happened. All interviewees were aware I was a PhD student as well as a female and an American, which in some cases may have prompted some to be less threatened and/or more willing to participate in my study (Mickelson 1994; Deem 1994). While I did not usually reference my involvement in TFA or work for Teach First to gain access to interviewees, I did so while introducing myself during the interview.

After gaining access to elites, Ball (1994) highlights the ways in which such powerful individuals often have a stake in the outcomes of the research project and are experienced in controlling interviews, ensuring certain topics are emphasized while others dismissed. Thus, Ball suggests that interviews with elites should not be considered by the researcher as separate from the subject being studied but instead part of the “play of power” that shaped it. As a result, Whitty and Edwards (1994) suggest this makes elites more difficult to interview and makes decoding their accounts harder than other types of interviews. Yet, Ball insists that elite interviewing is not a flawed instrument for studying policies or the powerful but rather a richer and more challenging exchange of information that researchers need to take care in analyzing. To some extent, I adopted Ball’s “game-like” perspective retrospectively in helping make sense of conflicting accounts.

Finally, while analyzing transcripts, I was keenly aware of Cookson’s (1994) argument that powerful individuals commonly use a “power discourse”, embodied in social scripts, that appear value-free or apolitical but, in reality, are uncritical of structural inequalities and power asymmetries among classes. He describes power discourses as a “coded language” through which ideological perspectives are expressed and supported by political, economic, and social power. He emphasizes that, through such language, underlying power relations or class interests are ignored while the pursuit of universal ideals or values such as democracy is highlighted. More specifically, Cookson (1994) argues that power discourses of elites are communicated often through language that conveys “the benefits of hierarchy, social authority, moral righteousness, reasoned judgment and reliance of the facts” (p.124). Relatedly, Cookson notes that, if the listener does not accept the message of the discourse, then it is treated by the interviewee that the listener has essentially “failed to understand and not because the message is flawed” (p.124).
I took these points into consideration as I conducted and analyzed interviews and formed an understanding of contrasting perspectives in order to avoid being naïve and unwittingly presenting an inaccurate picture of the social world. However, while some researchers (i.e., Mickelson (1994)) advise interviewers to take on “confrontational” stance to challenge elites’ accounts, I consciously chose to adopt an “inquisitorial” stance, as advocated by Priyadharshini (2003). I listened uncritically and carefully to interviewees’ accounts to understand their unique perspective and to build a positive rapport with them, asking questions for context and understanding rather than challenging their stories. Using an inquisitorial stance to interview elite participants enabled me to gather valuable data while also treating interviewees and their accounts with respect. In this way, I sought to collect as accurately, objectively, and ethically as possible. While I was conscious that stories may be altered to present participants or ideas in a certain light, I was able to interrogate accounts through comparing and analyzing them rather than during the interview.
CHAPTER 4: PHASE I: THE ORIGINS OF TEACH FIRST

Introduction: The Circumstances Leading to the Teach First Proposal

This chapter examines the initial conceptualization phase of Teach First in which the idea for scheme was first proposed. This phase began in the summer of 2001 and ended when efforts shifted toward advocating for the scheme in mid December 2001. During this period, an investigation took place in which education-related problems were identified, evidence gathered, and solutions formulated by individuals and organizations within the London business community. This initial phase of development culminated in the proposal for a scheme dubbed “Teach For London”.

The story of Teach First starts with the work of two influential business coalitions based in London, Business in the Community (BITC) and London First. The older of these two organizations was BITC, a high-profile national coalition of hundreds of large businesses across the U.K. established in the early 1980s. BITC’s mission to engage businesses in improving communities overlapped with the work of London First, a business-led coalition established in 1992 “to make London the best city in the world in which to do business” (Anon 2015). I briefly highlight the history and development of these two organizations to illuminate their agenda, influence, and roles generally and in education initiatives specifically, both which set the stage for the emergence of the idea for what later became Teach First.

4.1 BITC and Corporate Social Responsibility

BITC was founded by Stephen O’Brien and fellow business leaders in 1982 in response to two events – (1) a 1980 conference, organized by government, in which American business leaders shared regeneration strategies of Baltimore and Detroit in the 1970s, and (2) the appearance of riots in depressed urban areas around England in 1981 (Grayson 2007a). As a result, U.K. business leaders established BITC to help struggling communities, modeling their work on organizations engaged in urban regeneration. Early supporters of BITC included IBM, British Petroleum, Shell, British Steel, Marks and Spencer, Barclays Bank, W.H. Smith, and Midland. The coalition’s underlying focus became promoting corporate social responsibility
(CSR), which for BITC entailed “businesses seeking to minimize their negative environmental and social impacts and maximize their positive environmental and social impacts within an ethical decision-making framework” (Grayson 2007a, p.5). The history of CSR is often related to corporate philanthropy, which emerged in the 19th century industrial era in both the U.S. and the U.K. but waned in the early 20th century Britain as government took the lead in improving conditions of the new industrialized society (Tomkins 2009). However, the ethos of corporate philanthropy re-emerged in the 1980s in the form of CSR as governments scaled back their budgets and privatized industries, increasing business’s influence and role in social policy. The original mission statement of BITC promoted CSR principles and cross-sector cooperation, stating:

“[BITC] is an association of major UK businesses committed to working in partnership with each other, with local and central Government, voluntary organizations and trades unions to promote corporate social responsibility and revitalize economic life in local communities” (1988) (quote cited in Grayson 2007a, pp.70–71).

At its core, BITC aimed to “inspire, challenge, engage, and support business in continually improving its positive impact on society” (Grayson 2007a, p.11). To this end, BITC cajoled its corporate members into becoming involved in partnerships, arguing that such collaboration benefitted both businesses and communities. Throughout the 1980s, BITC primarily organized business support for local enterprise agencies in an attempt to revive local economies around the U.K. depressed by corporate closures. Its work received additional recognition and support in 1985 when the coalition was designated as one of “The Prince’s Charities”, a group of non-profits for which Charles, Prince of Wales, acted as patron and/or President. In the 1990s, BITC widened the scope of its work, directing corporate attention and resources to a range of social problems such as the environment and diversity in the workplace. In this way, BITC’s CSR was not only about philanthropic donations or business-community partnerships but also pressured businesses to operate more ethically.

Since its inception, BITC attracted the most influential leaders across the private, voluntary, and public sector to its mission, working collaboratively on developing and implementing goal-driven initiatives. As CEO, O’Brien was a driving force for change within and beyond the business community. Julia
Cleverdon, who joined BITC in 1988 as its Director of Business and Education after spending years building business-education partnerships at the Industrial Society, recalled being drawn to BITC by O’Brien’s ability to inspire action. “O’Brien had the ability to get to the most senior level in business and really engage them in the issues,” Cleverdon recalled, adding “I hadn’t realised enough that the power of BITC was that it only played in the boardrooms” (Davidson 2007). Cleverdon, herself a prolific networker with a persuasive manner to match, became a mentee of O’Brien. She then became BITC’s second CEO when O’Brien left in 1992.

In the five years leading up to the emergence of Teach First in 2001, BITC rapidly expanded in size and income. This was due, in part, to its merger in 1995 with the Action Resource Centre, a similar well-established coalition, as well as strong support for BITC from the Blair government. In this period, the number of executive secondees serving on staff (still primarily coming from member companies but also from government departments and executive agencies) grew from around 100 in 1995 to more than 250 by 2001, with the number of permanent employees increasing in nearly identical numbers. Meanwhile, BITC’s annual budget tripled from approximately £5 million in 1995 to £15 million in 2001, with public sector grants providing an additional £2 to £5 million annually starting in 1997. By 2001, BITC was clearly hitting its stride by diversifying its social aims and reaching into more executive boardrooms, government corridors, and local communities to inspire action. In the capital, BITC had another influential ally with which to collaborate – London First.

4.2 London First: Influencing Urban Planning and Policy

While BITC expanded its agenda and organizational reach, former BITC CEO Stephen O’Brien founded a new coalition, London First, in 1992 to promote the interests of London’s business community and develop the capital as a competitive, “world-class” city. The formation of the organization was encouraged by the then Conservative government to help provide a vision and policy coordination in the capital since the abolition of the Greater London Council in 1986. Thus, London First’s declared goal was to:
“establish a strategic framework for the capital and to pull together current initiatives. The group will apply business principles to policy issues ... in partnership with others, business leaders can provide the spark by developing a credible vision for the future and promoting action towards that vision”


Thus, while BITC represented businesses across the U.K. and organized initiatives in various regions, London First focused their efforts exclusively on making London an attractive city in which to do business. Though the missions of the two business-led coalitions differed, their work often overlapped in addressing problems such as unemployment, regeneration, and homelessness. In addition, the two coalitions maintained a close relationship since both organizations were London-based and had many members in common.

Like BITC, London First was set up as a non-profit organization; however, unlike, BITC, it was funded solely by the dues and other donations provided by its member organizations, including The City (Corporation of London). London First’s early members included leading U.K. companies such Grand Metropolitan, National Westminster Bank, British Telecom, and British Airways. Regional utilities also joined the newly formed coalition, as did large London-based international companies. By the early 2000s, London First was supported by approximately 300 corporations from more than a dozen sectors. Although property and housing, professional services, hospitality, and retail sectors provided the largest pools of members for London First, companies from the media, IT, healthcare, transport/infrastructure, and entertainment sectors were also members. According to London First (2003, p.2), its members represented 17 percent of all employees in London and contributed nearly a quarter of the capital’s gross domestic product. While universities, further education colleges, churches, and third sector organizations were also members, private interests dominated the coalition (Newman & Thornley 1997).

Throughout the 1990s, the coalition lobbied for greater government investments in London with the aim of making London attractive for international companies, investment, and tourism. London First also produced strategy planning and policy recommendations for central government, which had stepped in to manage London since the 1986 dissolution of the Greater London Council.
Recommendations often took the form of reports incorporating surveys of the private sector. The coalition lobbied on a range of issues such as urban regeneration, regional development (e.g. East London), and affordable housing (Kleinman 1999a). The business-led coalition was particularly concerned with transport and air quality, and like BITC, it championed the building of public-private partnerships to tackle social issues.

In these roles, London First developed a close relationship with political leaders.

London First had a very deep connection with local government in London. It had been responsible for promoting the idea that London should have its own elected mayor and things like that. So London First knew the political world and [could] get around extremely well.

– Stephen O’Brien, CEO, London First
Interview, 31/05/2012

While London First was not the only large influential business coalition in the capital, it served to represent the views of big business, especially global firms. London First’s main rival was London’s century-old Chamber of Commerce and Industry. The Chamber had more than 3,000 members and tended to reflect the views of small and medium-sized companies although it also had large multinational companies as members. However, its influence was fragmented across the capital (Newman & Thornley 1997). Another influential group was the Confederation of British Industry (CBI). Set up in 1965, CBI had a membership of more than 100,000 companies and other organizations nationally, and thus it focused more on national and international issues. While CBI lobbied to influence planning in London on behalf of the private sector (Newman & Thornley 1997), London First took the lead role in this area.

Moreover, in contrast to the Chamber and CBI, London First’s leadership believed its role was to be more of an innovator and catalyst for action than as a representative of all business (Kleinman 1999b, p.165). As a result, London First took the lead in advocating for corporate interests and shaping policy related to the long-term planning and management of the capital, and at times supported more controversial initiatives (such as a traffic congestion charge). In this way, it was more progressive and creative than its more conservative counterparts.
In 2001, the leaders of London First and BITC both decided to enlist McKinsey and Company to help assess how they could support London’s disadvantaged schools. The leaders of the two coalitions described coming to this arrangement but under different circumstances. According to BITC’s CEO Julia Cleverdon, the desire to improve schools stemmed from a meeting of school and business leaders in the summer of 2001 (Cleverdon 2012). The high-profile event was held at the royal family’s Highgrove Estate and brought together headteachers and business leaders to discuss the progress of BITC’s “Partners in Leadership”, a peer-mentoring programme first set up in 1996 by a KMPG executive before being branded and launched country-wide by BITC. The aim of Partners in Leadership was to improve school leadership by offering business expertise in management. The partnership was also seen as beneficial to business leaders for providing the opportunity to engage with and learn about the operation of schools (Ball & Junemann 2012, pp.99–100).

At Highgrove, the Prince of Wales remarked that while successful, the scheme seemed of limited help to headteachers. Thus, he recommended that a formal assessment be carried out to determine how businesses could better support London schools. As a close personal friend and advisor of Prince Charles, Cleverdon took the suggestion seriously and, in response, had the BITC Education Leadership Team meet the next day to discuss how to better support schools. In this meeting, the managing director of McKinsey & Company offered to have his consultants produce a pro-bono study on the topic. This study would produce the idea that evolved into Teach First.

BITC’s Director of Education, John May recalled McKinsey’s eagerness to help BITC. May was responsible for leading BITC education-related projects. He was a former primary school teacher who had become a headteacher by age 28. Having successfully turned around two struggling schools during the 1990s, May joined BITC in 1999 to help schools in a different way.

Business in the Community [was] a club, at that time anyway, for the largest companies in the country who want to do good in the community. And certainly the most popular activity the companies chose was to be involved in was education. And it was my role to create national campaigns and programmes that companies could get into and to account manage a wide range of companies and help them to develop their…
corporate responsibility activity dedicated to education. And ideally, to bring the two together, because it [was] my view and the view of the charity [BITC], that actually rather than going off and doing your own thing, if one can get companies to work collaboratively on a cause, actually the sum of that is better than its parts.

– John May, Director of Business and Education, BITC
Interview, 2/05/2012

May recalled, “McKinsey approached Business in the Community to say, ‘look, we’d love to do a piece of pro-bono work for you’ and… so we took McKinsey up on their offer and combined with London First.” It was agreed that McKinsey should carry out a study into how business might help to support raising achievement in London secondary schools.

The leaders of London First had a somewhat different perspective. According to O’Brien and Kiley, they had been responsible for recruiting McKinsey to carry out the study. O’Brien had hired Kiley in early 2001 to find ways London First could become involved in education. “London First didn’t have a track record, deliberately, of working the education sector til Teach First came up,” O’Brien recalled (Interview, 31/05/2012), “because we didn’t want to confuse the business world by doing something that was similar [to what] Business in the Community was running.” But O’Brien said he had decided it was time for London First to engage with local schools because “the corporate responsibility movement had rather lost its way in terms of making a real difference in education”. Thus, O’Brien, who met Kiley previously in the 1990s while visiting New York City, said he immediately hired Kiley when she moved to London in 2001 “to help me improve the position of schools in London.”

Kiley was an American whose husband had recently been recruited by London’s new mayor, Ken Livingston, to be the city’s Transport Commissioner. Upon arriving in the capital in January 2001, Kiley was welcomed into London’s social, political, and business networks.

When we first moved to London, I got to know the Mayor right away… and we got on very well. He said, “Well, I want to help you find things you want to do and I know this man who is very involved with the whole charitable sector and he’ll have a lot ideas for you.” And he introduced me to Stephen O’Brien who was head of London First. And Stephen said,… “I want you to come work for us and have a look at education.” And I was on a lot of boards when we lived in New York and was active in the non-profit sector across the board, a
lot of things connected with education. And so, he asked me to look at schools and see what kind of programmes were going on in New York that could be brought over and it would make sense and that sort of thing. So I said “ok”, that I’d be happy to and it would be interesting for me. And he was very supportive. And all of London First was very supportive of [me] who knew nothing about schools in England.

– Rona Kiley, Director of Business and Education, London First Interview, 30/04/2012

Although Kiley knew little about education in the U.K., she was an experienced advocate on social issues, including education, in the U.S. Born in 1943 and raised in a small Pennsylvania town, Kiley had attended an all-white high school as the U.S. Civil Rights Movement gained momentum in the 1960s. The lack of racial diversity within her school sparked Kiley’s interest in social inequality.

It was the time of life that women didn’t even think about careers, but I knew I wanted to do something and I got very caught up during my years at university in civil rights. It was during that era that people went on freedom rides to the South and tried to integrate restaurants and things like that. And I got involved with that… I went on a few freedom rides my freshman year, and then I did some tutoring with minority students in low incomes areas of Philadelphia... and it had a huge impact on me.

– Rona Kiley, Director of Education and Business, London First Interview, 30/04/2012

These experiences prompted her to earn a degree in social work, focused on community organizing, in 1965. After graduating, she worked with foster children as a social worker and then worked temporarily with people connected to the Kennedy and Johnson administrations and the founding of the Peace Corps, which further fueled her interest in social issues. Kiley then lived a few years in Chicago, where she worked and learned from another influential civil rights advocate and organizer of the time, Saul Alinsky, before moving to Boston where she gained her master’s degree in social work. She later worked for a federal grant programme helping low-income students gain admission to higher education and helped draft guidance and counseling policy for the state.

During this time, Kiley met and married Bob Kiley, who was then Boston’s Deputy Mayor. Subsequently, in 1975 her husband was appointed to revitalize Boston’s mass-transit system, a job he did so successfully that he was recruited to improve New York City’s deteriorating transport system from 1983 to 1990. Then, throughout the 1990s, he worked in private equity and served as CEO of the New
York City Partnership – a business coalition working to address the city’s social and
economic problems. While her husband had high-profile jobs, Kiley also worked for
a number of well-regarded organizations in Boston and New York including the
NAACP-affiliated Legal Defense Fund, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights,
and the Nature Conservancy. She admitted that during this time, “I had learned
something about raising money” and became a prolific networker – both skills which
she utilized for the non-profits she worked for to help raise their profile and attract
wealthy donors. Still, Kiley said she remained committed to social work goals and
youth education, seeing education “as a means of improving the social status of
young people... I mean, I think of education as really the route to civil rights”
(Interview, 30/04/2012).

In her new position at London First, Kiley said she saw an opportunity to
continue her aim of being “an agent of change”. Kiley recalled she initially worked
in a small unit of London First that was involved with the universities, most of which
were members of the coalition. In this position, she met all university Vice
Chancellors in the London area and learned about the university system. As Kiley
settled into her new role and considered how London First could help schools, she
decided to recruit McKinsey as a partner in coming up with an initiative due to her
previous relationship with the firm.

I had worked with McKinsey when I lived in New York – not on their
staff but in the non-for-profit work I did, especially with the Nature
Conservancy. One of the lead partners of McKinsey was one of my
major contacts. And he just loved the Nature Conservancy and wanted to
change it and mold it and do studies and do things... So he was my
mentor [while I was at] the Conservancy and did a lot of work. And I
knew that McKinsey had the capabilities of being very helpful, and if you
got McKinsey to do a study that it would be respected and looked at. So,
I said to Stephen [O’Brien] that if we are going to do something
meaningful, we really should get somebody like McKinsey to work with
us. So that was my idea.

– Rona Kiley, Director of Business and Education, London First
Interview, 30/04/2012

Although the McKinsey’s London office was only a five-minute walk down the
street from London First’s office near Trafalgar Square, McKinsey was not a
member of London First. However, McKinsey was a member of BITC, so Kiley
discussed her idea of involving McKinsey with O’Brien, who was receptive to the suggestion.

I knew McKinsey pretty well. We talked about it and McKinsey’s role as supporters of BITC… So I talked with Julia Cleverdon at BITC, who was my successor, and Rona Kiley about what we could do. From there, [we decided] to see if we could get McKinsey to look at the whole position of corporate responsibility in London and come up with some suggestions as to what we could do to show our support and that was the beginning of [Teach First].

– Stephen O’Brien, CEO, London First
Interview, 31/05/2012

Combining these accounts suggests that London First and BITC were discussing the possibility of tapping McKinsey for help when, in August 2002, the BITC education team convened to take action on Prince Charles’s recommendation for a study. For these reasons, the head of McKinsey in London then extended his firm’s services free-of-charge.

In sum, in 2001, both BITC and London First wanted to focus on helping London’s education sector but for different reasons. BITC was following up on the Prince’s suggestion while London First was hoping to jumpstart their engagement in education. As a result, BITC and London First teamed up and involved McKinsey in helping them come up with potential ways that businesses could support struggling London schools.

4.3 The McKinsey Study

A team of McKinsey consultants was assembled to carry out the study, which was scheduled to take three months – from early September to early December 2001. The team was led by senior McKinsey partner Nick Lovegrove, who had in recent years worked on a number of government projects, including an overhaul of the BBC and an influential report on town and country planning reforms, both engagements on a pro-bono basis (Hirst 2002). However, because senior partners typically share their time across a number of clients, the day-to-day management of the team was delegated to others, notably John Kirkpatrick, a Cambridge graduate who had joined Civil Service Fast Stream and worked for twelve years for the Department of Employment (which merged with the Department of Education in 1996). He had
recently completed an MBA and decided to join McKinsey in 1999. He recalled, “McKinsey [was] looking to diversify their sources of recruits and I was looking to diversify my experience and career into the business world and the two matched well.” At the time, Kirkpatrick said that McKinsey’s work within the public sector was primarily limited to pro-bono engagements because “government wasn’t prepared to pay for it” (Interview, 13/05/2015).

Kirkpatrick said the pro-bono study he managed on behalf of London First and BITC examined the problem of low attainment among pupils in London secondary schools.

The question that was in their minds, which was the question that animated the study, was that secondary education in the U.K. was a problem. From a London First perspective, this is a problem for London businesses, which was who they represented, because they can’t get recruits that they want and they’re concerned by the state of the education and environment in which they operate. From Business in the Community’s perspective, they would have shared that to the extent that they were London businesses but also had a long history in corporate social responsibility and the general thought that there might be something that business could do, or at least could catalyze, to achieve improvement. So the question that the two of them wanted to ask us was – Is there something useful that business can do to improve secondary education in London?

– John Kirkpatrick, McKinsey consultant/manager
Interview, 13/05/2015

Kirkpatrick selected two junior associates to be on the team of consultants carrying out the study, one of which was Brett Wigdortz, a 28-year-old American who had joined the firm in 2000 and specialized in East Asian markets. Wigdortz was the most junior member of the team and had been recently rotated into McKinsey’s London office in early 2001 to gain additional experience. Originally from New Jersey, Wigdortz had earned an Economics degree from Virginia’s University of Richmond in 1996 and then took a two-year position at Honolulu’s East-West Centre, a research organization founded and funded by the federal government since 1960. The position allowed him to work and earn a Masters in Economics at the University of Hawaii. Wigdortz’s work and studies took him to Jakarta, where he also reported on the political and economic upheaval Indonesia was experiencing in 1997. A year later, he returned to the U.S. and worked briefly at the Asian Society, a
non-profit based in New York City, before joining McKinsey and being posted in their new Southeast Asian offices in Jakarta.

Wigdortz (2012) pointed out he had never worked in a bank or business, but at McKinsey he subsequently “learned the skill of condensing complex ideas into simple structures, and how to convince experienced bankers that I knew what I was talking about” (p.34). While in Southeast Asia, he helped banks and other financial institutions set up insurance units, retain high-net worth clients, and follow McKinsey’s “War for Talent” – a strategy for attracting and keeping the “best employees” to increase profits (Wigdortz 2012). When Wigdortz was sent to McKinsey’s London in 2001, financial projects were suddenly in short supply and thus Wigdortz applied for the pro-bono study on London schools. Despite Wigdortz’s lack of expertise in education, Kirkpatrick selected Wigdortz as part of the research team.

To carry out the study, Kirkpatrick said the team did “a combination of information gathering from written sources and talking to relevant people... to try and reach some broad, evidence-based conclusions about the state of the system” (Kirkpatrick Interview, 13/05/2015). Wigdortz (2012) described the methodology of the study as McKinsey’s method of “looking at a problem ‘without boiling the ocean’” (pp.38-39), a euphemism referring to analyzing “absolutely everything”. Through this strategy, the complexity of a client’s given problem was simplified and divided up using a technique know as a “logic tree” in which possible solutions were defined using the “mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive”, or MECE, principle. This required all possible factors or causes be categorized in a way that did not overlap but covered all possible options. The outcomes identified through these procedures were then prioritized based on other pre-determined criteria to assess which areas have the potential to make the most impact on the problem. In this way, the team identified promising avenues for future solutions, which then formed the work stream on which each team member led on independently.

Wigdortz was assigned to focus on “teaching” and recalled spending two weeks quantitatively analyzing Ofsted reports and calculating statistical correlations to determine trends in the data. Wigdortz also visited schools to interview staff regarding possible interventions. The conditions inside schools shocked Wigdortz, who noted a lack of order in school hallways, basic levels of instruction occurring in classrooms, and a low expectation of pupils as voiced by some teachers (Wigdortz
Later, Wigdortz (2012, p.41-44) reflected that these schools visits, which he recalled as “horrifying” and “eye-opening”, led him to believe that these schools were suffering from a lack of leadership at all levels – among teachers, administration, and wider society – a “leadership gap” for which he felt pupils were unfairly paying the price.

With data collected and analyzed, the team concluded that “the greatest determinant of whether a school had great or poor results was the background of the students in the school, which was heavily segregated by income” (Wigdortz 2012, p.37). Kirkpatrick said they decided that, “of the things that might have any scope for external intervention, leadership and the quality of teaching were the two biggest influencers of the standard of achievement in schools”. Kirkpatrick recalled they then brainstormed interventions that might appeal to their clients.

Therefore we looked for proposals that would make a difference to one or both of those variables, …only a subset of which of course was things that business might have an interest or a role in. Then one does a variety of consultancy things like assessing the various proposals that emerged against various criteria, mapping them against desirability-versus-achievability-type assessments and coming out with the things that we thought were the likeliest to make a difference.

– John Kirkpatrick, McKinsey consultant/manager
Interview, 13/05/2015

Kirkpatrick admitted, however, that the data analysis was actually far from conclusive but indicated it was sufficient for the purpose of promoting plausible action-oriented results.

If I’m honest this was by no means the most analytically rigorous study that McKinsey ever did, and I hope that even Brett [Wigdortz] would admit that – he did most of the analysis. I say [because] although there is plenty of data, it’s very, very hard to draw any genuinely, statistically robust conclusions from any of the data about anything... But if I stand up the broad contention that quality of teaching is what primarily determines educational outcomes, there are only two possible responses to that. One is that it intuitively sounds right, and the other is that statistically it can’t be demonstrated. But, because our audience was business, we were able to apply the consultants’ way of thinking which is, “ok, how can one tell a compelling and well-evidenced story that we genuinely believe to be right that will interest and impress the business community and... will enable us to make clear recommendations that they might buy into”. And the quality of our analysis is more than robust not for that purpose... The point is that the academic standard of
statistical analysis in education policy is very high. We simply weren’t playing in that world.

– John Kirkpatrick, McKinsey consultant
Interview, 13/05/2015

Wigdortz (2012), meanwhile, did not echo Kirkpatrick’s admission, but instead stated, “We prided ourselves on the intellectual rigour of our analysis” (p.19). Through his analysis, Wigdortz insisted that: “Even taking deprivation levels into account, ‘excellent’ teachers can increase the percentage of pupils who gain 5+ A*–C GCSEs by 40% over what would normally be expected” (quote noted by Smart et al. 2009, p.35). As the team considered what initiatives they should propose to improve school leadership and teaching quality, Wigdortz became convinced he had an answer.

4.4 Conceptualizing a Graduate Recruitment Scheme

At this point in the study, with data collection and analysis essentially complete, Wigdortz described coming up with the idea for a scheme aimed at attracting talented elite graduates into teaching at disadvantaged schools. He explained his thinking that led to the scheme was based on McKinsey’s “War for Talent” and the concept of leadership.

I remember staying in my office all night one night writing a business plan for Teach First, which was about five pages, and basically the whole idea of Teach First centered around the idea of leadership… The approach that my thought processes [was] based on is this War for Talent, [which] was something that McKinsey used and it’s something that I learned and it’s just the idea that – what attracts talent? … What attracts the best talent is the idea of leadership. You know, talent wants to have leadership opportunities.

– Brett Wigdortz, Lecture at Cambridge (2011)

In this way, Wigdortz described the “War for Talent” as a significant influence in his conceptualization of Teach First.

The War for Talent was a term first devised by a team of McKinsey consultants in 1997 to describe how companies were scrambling to attract and retain talent, particularly at the senior and executive levels. Based on data gathered from large top-performing U.S. companies, the consultants wrote a report detailing why
“many companies had hundreds of vacancies they couldn’t fill” (Michaels et al. 2001, p.1) and urged companies to make talent recruitment a top priority. The consultants argued that globalization, deregulation, and the rapid development of new technologies had increased the need for executive and managerial talent, and that talent had become critically important due to the economy’s increasing reliance on “knowledge workers”.

They also attributed the heightened labour market competition to the growing trend of talented workers moving frequently to other companies for promotion, a type of career climbing that emerged after massive corporate downsizing in the 1980s which eroded traditional employee-employer relationships based on loyalty in exchange for job security (Michaels et al. 2001). Given this business environment, McKinsey advised companies to adopt the War for Talent “mindset” to attract and retain talented workers. The firm coached companies on how to aggressively seek out new talent pools, craft irresistible “employee value propositions” (essentially hiring agreements) to attract talent, and provide ample feedback, coaching, and leadership opportunities to retain top talent. The War for Talent philosophy, which took a militaristic tone and promoted evolutionist thinking by celebrating the survival of the ‘fit’ and rejection of the ‘unfit’ (O’Mahoney & Sturdy 2015, p.7), resonated with many business leaders and shaped recruitment practices in large companies despite criticism from various quarters (e.g. Gladwell 2002), especially after the 2001 collapse of energy-trading company Enron (due to accounting fraud) that McKinsey had highly praised in its research. In 2001, McKinsey’s research was published by Harvard Business Press, with which McKinsey had a long-standing and close institutional relationship, further diffusing the War for Talent concept among business elites. In this way, the War for Talent became what some called a battle plan, but essentially a business strategy, in which companies were urged to “elevate talent management to a burning corporate priority” (Chambers et al. 1998).

Wigdortz was well-versed in the principles of the War for Talent as he had been responsible for helping financial institutions utilize such strategic advice while in Southeast Asia. Wigdortz said the War for Talent helped him conceptualize his idea for using “leadership” to recruit top graduates into teaching. In his mind, attracting such elite graduates could alleviate “the leadership gap” he observed in schools and satisfy business’s desire to develop leadership in schools and possibly
recruit such leaders to their business. After coming up with the idea, Wigdortz shared it with Kiley who linked his idea to TFA.

Basically, I think I had written this idea about the War For Talent and I showed it to Rona [Kiley] and at that point she said, “Oh you should talk to my friend Sue Lehmann who does this similar thing in America.” I hadn’t heard of Teach For America at that point but then Rona connected us.

– Brett Wigdortz, McKinsey consultant
Interview, 30/06/2015

Whether this connection through Kiley happened informally before concluding the study or more formally after presenting results to the leaders of BITC and London First remains unclear. In his book, Wigdortz (2012) described Kiley linking his idea to TFA after formally hearing the results of the study. Kirkpatrick was unable to recall when they first learned of TFA but indicated it played a role in developing their idea. Whatever the exact timeline of events, Wigdortz insisted he first came up with the idea to attract top graduates into teaching and Kiley then brought his attention to the existence of TFA. Kiley and the McKinsey team then conducted a series of interviews to learn more about TFA – again which could have happened before or after the study’s results were shared formally with London First and BITC. To move forward, I return to the narrative of events, placing the formal McKinsey-client meeting first and interviewees learning more about TFA afterwards.

4.5 Response to McKinsey’s Results

Once Wigdortz came up with his idea to attract talented, elite graduates into disadvantaged schools, he described Kirkpatrick as supportive of the idea though other McKinsey colleagues were skeptical. Nevertheless, Kirkpatrick agreed to allow Wigdortz to, for the first time at McKinsey, present his idea to BITC and London First at the upcoming client meeting (Wigdortz 2012, p.46). The client meeting took place in early December 2001 at the offices of London First. The leaders of the McKinsey team explained their data analysis and conclusions in the form of a PowerPoint of more than 50 slides filled with graphs summarizing the structure, governance, and financing of the U.K. education system and detailing the
organization and performance of London schools, which varied by borough\textsuperscript{1}. Among the several factors they identified as impacting student achievement, they argued that teaching quality and school leadership were the most influential. The McKinsey team then proposed two recommendations, one of which was Wigdortz’s idea. Wigdortz presented his scheme to recruit talented university graduates into inner-London schools.

Wigdortz’s idea was new to some but not all of the individuals in the room. For Kiley, the idea was similar to a programme she was already familiar with – TFA.

We got the study… and [one of] the answers [was] getting better teachers in the schools. Obviously I knew about Teach For America, but I had never worked with them. I had a former colleague of mine work for them… I had friends whose children did Teach For America. But I didn’t know that much about the details of it. I knew that really bright young people did it and wanted to do it and had amazing experiences. Some had bad experiences [though] too.

– Rona Kiley, Director of Business and Education, London First Interview, 30/04/2012

After the meeting, Kiley, Wigdortz and Kirkpatrick learned more about TFA through phone conversations with its stakeholders.

I didn’t know Wendy [Kopp] at all, but I knew Sue Lehmann who was one of the founding board members of Teach For America. And that’s who we talked to on the phone who got us all excited about this. [Initially] we didn’t know if we could do it, but we decided that after talking to Sue Lehmann and to Wendy Kopp, we got enthusiastic, and thought it was worth a try to see what we could do.

– Rona Kiley, Director of Business and Education, London First Interview, 30/04/2012

Lehmann was an independent management consultant who shared Kiley’s passion for Civil Rights issues. She had started her career working for McKinsey in 1966 and gone on to consult for a number of big businesses and non-profit organizations.

What inspired me to get involved [in TFA] is the opportunity to change kids’ lives. I went to university during the Civil Rights Movement. I sat with my feet in the reflecting pool at the Washington Monument when Martin Luther King told us about his dream, and it became my dream and the dream of my friends at the University of Michigan, … as a small incredible group of people, [we] have committed our lives to making sure

\textsuperscript{1}I base this description on a revised July 2002 version of that McKinsey powerpoint presentation provided to me by Wigdortz.
that “One day all children will have the opportunity to attain an excellent education” [TFA’s mission statement].

– Sue Lehmann (Anon 2011)

In the early 1990s, Lehmann supported TFA as the start-up struggled financially and faced mounting skepticism after being strongly criticized by Linda Darling-Hammond at Columbia University’s Teachers College.

I met Wendy [Kopp] at the time that TFA was being challenged by the educational establishment. At the time, it looked like this was a brilliant idea but wasn’t going to get anywhere, and I became involved because I became so angry at my generation for having encouraged people like Wendy to stand up and be counted and the moment there were questions from the educational establishment about TFA, my generation was joining in the fray and was not there to stand up and say “this has to be”.

– Sue Lehmann (Anon 2011)

Because of her passion for TFA’s mission, Lehmann had encouraged others to support TFA, and she herself personally lent $60,000 to TFA on one occasion when Kopp desperately needed to meet payroll (Kopp 2001).

The role these conversations played in developing the idea for Teach First differed in the accounts of Kiley and Wigdortz. In Kiley’s view, the idea for what became the Teach First scheme came from her connection to TFA. “They [McKinsey] didn’t propose it,” she recalled, “they came out with two needs that schools of London had… [which] were very general things… We all knew about the Teach For America model, but we hadn’t initially thought that’s what was going to come out, so it wasn’t a shock by any means.”

Wigdortz, on the other hand, described TFA as playing a minor role, that of a helpful reference for his idea. Wigdortz said, “What I did do is once I was writing the business plan I then used TFA as one of my data sources basically” (Interview, 28/03/12). Later, in his 2012 book, he wrote that upon learning more about TFA, he viewed the programme as “an interesting model” but one that he felt did not fully “translate into the British context” (p.51-52). In this way, Wigdortz suggested that TFA played a minimal role in the development of Teach First, though all other interviewees recalled TFA being a guiding model and inspiration.

Ironically though, while Kopp shared her experience in starting and leading TFA with those in London, she indicated that she did not want to be associated with setting up a replica of TFA in the U.K.
Wendy [Kopp] talked to us. I mean, she was very nice and she eventually came just as we were about to launch… But then of course, Wendy didn’t want us – we wanted to call ourselves Teach For London, or Teach For Britain – but Wendy said “No, we’re not a franchise. If you do that, I won’t talk to you.”

– Rona Kiley, Director of Business and Education, London First
Interview, 30/04/2012

Nevertheless, Kiley recalled her conversations with TFA led her to believe that such a programme could work in the U.K. O’Brien, supported the idea as well because he, too, was already aware of TFA.

We already knew Teach For America because I visited them once a long time ago… I used to visit the U.S. quite often to see what was going on there… And Rona [Kiley], of course, knew exactly what she was talking about.

– Stephen O’Brien, CEO, London First
Interview, 31/05/2012

Thus, O’Brien said he thought the idea of a programme similar to TFA in London was “an excellent suggestion”.

The basic idea was that the quality of teaching isn’t where it ought to be and top level graduates were not coming into teaching, and therefore if you could attract them into teaching, you might make a huge difference in the profession and therefore too in school children’s performance. And that was the idea, very simply, that everybody bought… that this was a root for changing the quality of teaching in school… I think we never really valued teachers in the way we should, and so many of our schools suffered from pretty low-quality leadership and low-quality teaching… So it was changing that and that was what people understood.

– Stephen O’Brien, CEO, London First
Interview, 31/05/2012

Although Kiley and O’Brien endorsed the idea, BITC’s leadership was less certain. May recalled having doubts about the underlying premise of the scheme.

I must confess that to start off with I was initially fairly cynical, or at the very least agnostic, about whether one could have an effect. As a trained teacher myself, I recognized that there are a whole set of skills that you develop as a teacher that perhaps it would be hard to have with people coming directly out of university with very little training. And all the other sort of mega issues that everybody always puts up as a concern.

– John May, Director of Business and Education, BITC
Interview, 2/05/2012
Kirkpatrick also recalled the skepticism BITC’s leaders had of the idea of recruiting recent graduates to become teachers in tough schools with limited pre-service training.

[For] the Business in the Community clients, the concern was what we were [proposing] was putting probably sub-standard, brand new novice teachers, however talented these people were, in front of some very difficult classrooms – it wasn’t obvious that that would work. And we persuaded them that it was nonetheless a good idea [by] reminding them of what the alternative was... supply teachers and London heads scouring the labor market of assorted commonwealth countries to recruit teachers, and [saying], “Look, a programme [like TFA], with a measure of quality assurance behind it in terms of the sorts of people you’re gonna get – it may not be perfect, indeed it isn’t the ideal, but it’s gotta be a whole lot better than the alternative that you are currently dealing with.” And that argument… persuaded them that it was at least worth trying.

– John Kirkpatrick, McKinsey consultant/manager
Interview, 13/05/2015

May also credited TFA in convincing him of the merits of such a scheme.

[After] having done a little bit of reading around Teach For America, I was then struck by how successful it had been, but also noticed that whilst the story of Teach For America was a very positive one, there were also plenty of people within the profession in the U.S. who were detractors as well.

– John May, Director of Business and Education, BITC
Interview, 2/05/2012

Still, May saw the greatest benefit of a TFA-type scheme in London as being its ability to expose a new generation of business leaders to the “reality” of educational issues.

I think Business in the Community, and certainly I, was keener that young people should do two years and then get into business because what I saw then was a cohort of junior managers who would eventually be senior managers and directors within firms having a much better idea about the realities of the British education system than they currently do. And so that was certainly my desire. And there’s always been a tension between the educationalists – who might see Teach First as simply another way of getting young people into teaching and that retaining them in teaching was the priority and desire of the programme – [and] those of us who were at least agnostic and in my case actually positively wanting young people, having had their Teach First experience, to take that experience into the wider workplace.

– John May, Director of Business and Education, BITC
Interview, 2/05/2012
May’s support subsequently brought BITC behind the idea. Although Cleverdon, as BITC’s CEO, had the final say on the BITC’s behalf, O’Brien noted, “If John May had been opposed to it, I’m sure Julia [Cleverdon] would’ve supported him.” Cleverdon’s support was particularly helpful because, as O’Brien mentioned, she “understood the education world very well, better than I did.” With the support of both CEOs of London First and BITC, the decision was made to try to establish a scheme similar to TFA.

4.6 Another Supporter Surfaces

Serendipitously, an independent consultant and self-described serial entrepreneur named Jo Owen became another advocate for establishing a TFA-type programme in the U.K during this time. Owen, a Cambridge graduate, had spent the previous twenty years working across the corporate consulting world before becoming a partner at Accenture and setting up new businesses in Europe, North America, and Japan. In early 2001, he had set up a mid-sized U.K. bank, but by that October, he said his role in the venture ended because of a buy-out by Halifax. As a result, he found himself on a short break in California where he learned of TFA.

I was in San Francisco and listening to a radio programme… [discuss] a project which gets great graduates teaching in inner-city schools. I thought, “Well that’s interesting.” So I rang up the radio station and said, “What was the name of that project again?” They said it was Teach For America. So I rang up Teach For America and… got through to Wendy [Kopp]. I said, “Right, Wendy, you’ve got to bring this across to the U.K.” And she said, “I’m actually a little bit busy but, some people from McKinsey were interviewing me.” So I got hold of McKinsey and they said, “Yeah, we are doing a project to see what can be done about problems in inner-city schools.” And I said, “I know you are, but I’ve got the solution”. And from that point – I met Brett [Wigdortz], who was working on the study.

– Jo Owen, management consultant/serial entrepreneur
   Interview, 25/06/2015

Owen said he quickly became involved in advocating for a TFA-type programme for the U.K. He recalled, “I just thought that [TFA] was a really simple and neat solution to a very pressing problem, and I was going, ‘Why isn’t anyone doing it in the U.K.?’” Owen recalled the outcome of the McKinsey study “was, essentially, get
more great teachers in and you might have an impact on results… It’s not a very surprising finding, but it’s a very important finding.” Yet at that point, he said “there was absolutely no bloody plan whatsoever, there was just an idea, and it was about getting some great teachers into London schools”.

Wigdortz (2012) described meeting Owen in mid-December and Kirkpatrick only vaguely recalled being introduced to Owen after which Kirkpatrick moved on to other consulting projects. Subsequently, Owen became an advocate for a TFA-type programme in England as well as a mentor to Wigdortz. His enthusiasm for the TFA model confirms Wigdortz’s plan would establish a similar programme.

4.7 Moving Forward with “Teach For London”

As Kirkpatrick, Wigdortz, May, and Kiley became convinced that a TFA-type scheme could help London schools, they decided to try to establish such a programme in the U.K.

We got everybody at McKinsey pretty enthusiastic about it. We were around a table, and it wasn’t just Brett [Wigdortz] and the analysts who were about 23 or 24. We had a [McKinsey] partner who was head of government practice – somebody who was very much on the partnership track. Stephen O’Brien thought it was a great idea, and Jo Valentine [Managing Director of London First] did, and we thought we should go for it.

– Rona Kiley, Director of Business and Education, London First Interview, 30/04/2012

Although BITC was also supportive, Kiley indicated it was agreed that London First would lead on the project since the scheme would initially target only London schools. Although Wigdortz’s role as data analyst in the McKinsey study had technically come to an end, he wanted to help establish it. As a result, he took an unpaid six-month leave of absence from his position at McKinsey to join Kiley and her colleagues in getting the scheme started. Due to the idea’s close resemblance to the high-profile success of TFA, they agreed to refer to the U.K. scheme “Teach For London” (TfL).

It is worth noting that Wigdortz (2012) describes contemplating and deciding to try to establish the scheme, with encouragement from Owen and a promise from Kiley to help him fundraise. In this way, he portrays the decision to campaign for
the idea as more of an individual one with himself leading the efforts. This was not the perception of a majority of interviewees, and thus, I defer to their version of events. However, this is not to minimize the commitment of Wigdortz and McKinsey’s role in helping advocate for the idea. From the start, Kiley knew McKinsey’s influence and connections would be critically helpful in starting a new initiative. Nevertheless, London First played a leading role in the campaign to establish TfL with one interviewee referring to Wigdortz’s initial role as “a very small cog in the wheel” given his limited social influence.

At this point, in mid-December of 2001, the activities of these key individuals shifted from looking for a solution and discussing the potential of a TFA-type programme in London to seeking to mobilize support and resources for its creation. Thus, the first phase of the development of what later became Teach First concluded. Although the idea for the scheme would undergo further development in Phase II, Wigdortz apparently went along with Kiley and her colleagues’ vision of the scheme as an import and adaptation of the TFA model to London. However, Kirkpatrick said he warned Wigdortz against relying too heavily on TFA to sell the idea to some audiences.

I encouraged Brett [Wigdortz] to play down [the association with TFA] in the public rhetoric because I think... just on an emotional level a “this-is-an-American-model-they’re-importing-it-over-here” pitch might have put some back up amongst the educational establishment. It was better almost to let the concept stand on its own two feet, which it does, and when necessary explain that it’s worked elsewhere and in these circumstances.

– John Kirkpatrick, McKinsey consultant/manager
  Interview, 13/05/2015

It was likely that only later on, after Wigdortz was pressured to abandon reference to TFA in terms of training models, that he began to develop a view of Teach First as a scheme primarily derived from his original application of the War for Talent concept to teacher recruitment rather than TFA. But in Phase I, even if Wigdortz resisted the comparison of “his” initial idea to TFA from the start (as he in effect portrays in his 2012 memoir), most accounts indicate Wigdortz and Kiley developed the initial idea through learning more about TFA. In this sense, TFA became the model on which TfL was, at least in part, originally based. Calling the scheme “Teach For London” signaled this likeness, and led Kiley, Wigdortz, and colleagues to advocate for the
idea. Thus, the plot moved into its second phase – the mobilization of support and resources to further TfL’s establishment.
5.1 Policy Entrepreneurs and the Decision to Initiate Transfer

In Phase I, a small group of individuals from intersecting and overlapping corporate networks came together for the explicit purpose of finding a suitable course of action to improve London schools. In this chapter, I first examine how organizational interests coupled with contextual triggers led this group to come together, engage in policy learning, and ultimately decide to become policy entrepreneurs. In the process, I aim to answer the central research questions related to impulses of policy borrowing and decision-making – What sparked individuals’ cross-national attraction to TFA? – And the subsequent, related question – Why and how did these actors decide to initiate steps to bring about the transfer of TFA to London? In short, I focus on what factors led individuals to engage in policy entrepreneurship and how resource-rich networks, within shifting and fragmented institutional contexts, enable such agency.

Secondly, I explore the varying views individuals within the group held of TFA and the benefits of transferring such a model to England. Too often in policy transfer research it is assumed the collective decision of individuals to initiate policy transfer signals a unity of understanding and purpose. This was not the case in Phase I as the perspectives of Kiley, May, and Wigdortz indicate how differently they felt towards TFA and the rationale for TfL. The existence of such differences in viewpoints does not, of course, preclude collective action amongst actors. However, such contrasting views does raise an awareness of how policy transfer relies on actors’ agreement on action but not necessarily on meaning.

Finally, I dive into the mindset of one group member, Wigdortz, to theorize why he did not return to his job as a management consultant but chose instead to become, essentially, an unpaid policy entrepreneur. Wigdortz’s account of events and rationales during the learning and decision-making process differed in a number of ways from the account of others. As a result, I deconstruct his perspective to and explain these discrepancies and highlight how his learning process in this period differed from others. Explaining Wigdortz’s learning and perception is particularly relevant for understanding policy outcomes because he eventually becomes the CEO.
of the scheme and put in charge of its implementation. A closer look at Wigdortz’s perspective also illuminates the power dynamics at play between individuals, as well as within McKinsey, in this and subsequent phases and illustrates how the most passionate of policy entrepreneurs may feel personally committed to what they see as “their” idea and see themselves as the de facto leader of efforts to establish it.

5.2 Contextual Impulse leading to a Cross-National Attraction to TFA

5.2.1 The Intersection of Organizational Interests & External Pressures to Act

The original impulse behind the decision of London business leaders to initiate policy transfer lies in the intersecting interests of London First and BITC, two resource-rich network-based organizations representing corporate interests at the local and national level respectively. Although the history and causes behind this eclipse of interests differed for each organization, the CEOs of both London First and BITC were both seeking to respond to either direct or indirect external pressures to act. In the case of BITC, direct pressure to act came from an influential member of its network while in the case of London First, the pressure to act was more indirect and stemmed from the organization’s need to redefine its relevance and role in a changing institutional context. To explain how all this came about requires a closer look at BITC’s and London First’s histories, agendas, and their privileged position in the wider political context.

For BITC, schools had always been high on its agenda as education tied in to training and employment. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, BITC had worked with governments to form business-education partnerships (initially based on the Boston Compact model) and helped develop Partners in Leadership as a national mentoring scheme between business leaders and headteachers. BITC was involved in a number of other education-related campaigns including initiatives to teach students about enterprise and to encourage employee volunteering in schools. With education rated the most popular CSR priority for businesses, (Grayson 2007b), BITC’s central focus on schools was logical. During the Thatcher years and later under New Labour, the government welcomed business leadership and involvement with schools. Still, by the late 1990s, the government’s expectations frustrated BITC head Julia Cleverdon
because policy-makers assumed financial contributions were the best way for the corporate sector to help schools. Cleverdon, meanwhile, had publicly campaigned to convince others that businesses had much more to offer than simply funds and suggested that business-education links were more effective when businesses became involved in schools (Nash 2002). New Labour was warming to this approach, particularly with its support for the concept of academies in which business sponsors had a management role in school affairs (Adonis 2012).

In this political context, BITC was further motivated to seek out a new way to approach the problems plaguing schools following Prince Charles’s comment in the summer of 2001. His concern regarding the limited effect of the Partners in Leadership spurred Cleverdon to re-examine BITC’s business-education links. She realized that the business community should be saying: “Isn’t there more we can do to help schools other than mentoring and reading support?” (Nash 2002). With BITC’s recent expansion in size and hence funding, it had the capability to enact new initiatives. The Prince’s recommendation was a particularly powerful motive for action as he held the largely symbolic position of President of BITC and was a close professional friend of Cleverdon. In fact, Cleverdon was used to receiving “reams of hand-written notes, sometimes three a day, [which] Prince Charles shower[ed] her with, full of ideas and suggestions” (Davidson 2007). Davidson (2007) further noted, “BITC is one of Prince Charles’s favorite ways of getting things done in Britain, and Cleverdon knows the power this gives her”. As a result, the Prince’s comment motivated Cleverdon to respond.

Unlike BITC, the decade-old London First had not engaged with schools in the past. Although O’Brien was the former head of BITC, his role at London First was to lead the private sector in taking up a more central role in strategic planning for London and policy implementation through partnerships. However, the political contexts were shifting as a popular referendum had brought about the creation and election of a municipal government for London in 2000. The introduction of a city-wide level of government known as the Greater London Authority (GLA) brought about a shift in institutional context and political climate to the city. As O’Brien mentioned, London First had a “very deep connection with local government in London” and “had been responsible for promoting the idea that London should have its own elected mayor” [Interview, 31/05/2012].
Actually, London First had initially ignored calls for a new city-wide government earlier in the 1990s as the power vacuum – created when the Labour-dominated Greater London Council (GLC) was abolished – was precisely why and how London First emerged as a powerful voice for the capital and key ally of the central government. However, with Londoners’ growing concerns regarding the lack of democratic accountability and the need for a democratic city-wide government, the coalition eventually came to advocate for its establishment as New Labour came to power. After a 1998 referendum gave central government the mandate to create a new London-wide council, London First became influential in shaping the plans of the city-wide government, expressing their preference for a strong executive mayor, comparable the role of mayors in several U.S. cities. London First had also insisted that any elected assembly be designed to work in “real” partnership with businesses, stating: “London’s prosperity and competitiveness depends on business. For London to remain competitive, business needs access to decision-making, a coherent voice to articulate its needs and the ability to make things happen” (London First quoted by Kleinman 1999b, p.165).

These concerns were, for the most part, taken into account by New Labour leaders who created the Greater London Authority (GLA), which was more limited in size and powers and more business-orientated than its predecessor, the GLC. Furthermore, with the election of Ken Livingstone, London First found itself with a mayor who, despite having deep Old Labour roots, ultimately upheld businesses’ privileged access to policy-makers and worked in partnership with corporate leaders in formulating the city government’s strategic priorities (Thornley et al. 2005a; Mcneill 2002).

In these new institutional arrangements and a changed political climate, London First had ceded part of its visionary role to the new GLA but felt confident to look for ways of expanding its role in new directions. Education was one area in which the coalition had not yet been involved but was of high relevance to the economic competitiveness of London. Furthermore, in London, education was a sector that the new GLA had limited power over as schools remained run and overseen by the borough authorities and central government since the early 1990s when the Inner London Education Authority (ILEA) as abolished. As a result, the GLA relied on the boroughs to implement its strategy through their own plans and policies (Thornley et al. 2005a). This meant that schools remained a policy issue.
over which power was institutionally fragmented across the metropolitan area, making it a policy issue on which London First was uniquely experienced to coordinate action.

However, as Newman and Thornley (1997) point out, London First acted primarily as a lobby, with few resources or staff of their own. It summoned expertise and resources on an ad hoc basis, “setting up and dissolving working groups and networks for specific purposes” (Newman & Thornley 1997, p.983). This loose and rather flexible organizational structure depended on key individuals to provide overall guidance. As a result, London First was in need of an education director able to organize and coordinate future action – a job that O’Brien offered to Kiley, a well-connected and experienced organizer herself, who was also the wife of the Transport Commissioner.

Furthermore, O’Brien was motivated to consider how London First might become involved in schools by his view that BITC had “lost its way in terms of making a real difference in education” [O’Brien Interview, 31/05/2012]. BITC had become heavily involved in other issues in the recent years including protecting the environment, developing benchmarks for corporate responsibility, and starting initiatives in rural areas. At the time, BITC’s main education programmes were headteacher mentoring and employee-volunteering schemes through which workers coached pupils in reading and maths. O’Brien felt the need for a new initiative through which business could renew their focus and commitment to schools.

In sum, London First and BITC came together to start a new education initiative for different reasons but similar interests. The changing institutional and political context of London coupled with O’Brien’s belief that businesses could do more for schools (shared by Cleverdon) led London First to seek out a new education initiative. Meanwhile, BITC became focused on schools due to the concerns of its President, Prince Charles. BITC CEO Cleverdon was also keen to show government that business involvement in schools should go beyond financial contributions and involve businesses in a more meaningful way. It is important to highlight the significance of organizational contexts of Phase I. While all individuals involved here shared a concern and dissatisfaction for the status quo within London’s failing state schools, organizational priorities were driving their actions. London First and BITC had their own agendas to pursue as well as their influential relationships and privileged position to maintain, both which were shaped and driven by the views and
interests of its members, primarily big business. BITC existed to organize and coordinate business involvement in improving communities while London First existed to build partnership and policy goals to improve London’s economic competitiveness. Thus, the two business-led coalitions were seeking new ideas to enact their own organizational priorities.

What is also particularly notable is the political influence and agency both business-led organizations possessed, rooted in their extensive and resource-rich network of members, which enabled and empowered them to engage in “puzzling” about a persistent policy problem and act accordingly. Both coalitions had close ties to central government, Prince Charles, community leaders, and (of course) business heads. Through these influential networks, London First and BITC were organizations that had significant experience in policy – at times initiating it, and other times shaping it, but most often implementing it in a range of areas through building cross-sector partnerships at various levels (local, regional, national). In these ways, BITC and London First were expected to come up with new ideas and lead action – effectively acting in as policy entrepreneurs who build new and extended old networks to foster cooperation and bring about policy initiatives. Because of this, London First and BITC were in the empowered position to engage in prospective policy learning to address a persistent problem – education underachievement – affecting London communities and their business members. In this context, London First and BITC agreed to commission a report to determine what ways businesses could better support schools – choosing McKinsey to do so.

5.2.2 Partnering with McKinsey: The First Strategic Step in Policy Innovation

To find an innovative new way for businesses to engage with schools, the leaders of both BITC and London First agreed to recruit McKinsey to carry out a study on the topic. Why did they seek out a consulting firm, and why did they specifically want McKinsey to propose ways to solve an education-related problem? The decision was based on a number of reasons that are very worth discussing at length here to provide insight into why consultants, particularly elite ones, are
increasingly common sources of policy innovation as well as agents of policy transfer (Saint-Martin 1998; Prince 2012).

First, there were practical and strategic reasons for hiring McKinsey. Research on management consultancies suggests business managers hire such consultants for primarily three reasons: (1) to facilitate the introduction of new ideas or practices, (2) to utilize a consultancy firm’s expertise in certain areas, and/or (3) to add temporary skilled workers to their work force (Bennett 1990). The leaders of London First and BITC turned to McKinsey consultants for all of these reasons. Kiley, O’Brien, and Cleverdon wanted McKinsey to (1) come up with innovative solutions, (2) use their management expertise to solve the coalitions’ stated goals, and (3) potentially use their social influence and well-connected network to introduce the idea to wider audiences. In short, Kiley and her colleagues hoped McKinsey could act as an innovator, legitimator, and facilitator – effectively coming up with a new idea and, if decided, promote its adoption. I briefly discuss how and why McKinsey was considered capable of filling all of these roles – knowledge expert, “rational outsider”, and social influencer – to illustrate why consultants, and McKinsey in particular, became the partner of choice for London First and BITC.

Social Influence London First and BITC’s choice of McKinsey was based on its elite profile, networks, and influence. McKinsey could be described as an organization located at or near the center of the corporate consulting field’s informal status hierarchy and, thus, within the social network of elites, the firm’s influential status was well-known. Kiley indicated she wanted to partner with McKinsey because she had learned of and had been impressed by McKinsey’s ability to influence while working with them in the past. A McKinsey consultant helped her raise the profile of the non-profit she represented among New York City’s wealthy and powerful. As a result, she knew McKinsey had an expansive network of alumni and clients and thus could provide access to elites and the credibility needed to jumpstart a new idea. In London, McKinsey had strong relations with both multinational businesses and local elites. The global firm, founded in Chicago in 1926 and second in size only to Anderson Consulting by 2001, had set up its first European office in London in 1959 and grew its U.K. practice rapidly in the decades to follow. In the U.K., McKinsey worked primarily with businesses but also built a strong relationship with central government leaders, first working on projects for the Bank of England in the 1960s and then carrying out assessments of Britain’s colonial
administration in Hong Kong during the 1970s (Kipping 1999). McKinsey’s influence only grew in the 1980s and 1990s as the government hired record numbers of management consultants to help plan reforms related to the New Public Management (Saint-Martin 1998).

Over time, McKinsey’s influence and relationship to centers of power was furthered strengthened and institutionalized through the movement of its consultants out of the firm and into heads of corporations, government positions, and other influential roles in the U.K. and other countries (O’Shea & Madigan 1997; Kipping 1999, p.218). Because of this influential alumni network, McKinsey had been labeled by one London newspaper, the Independent, as “Britain’s most powerful old boys’ network”, reporting that the firm “can count more former partners running Britain than anyone else” (Hirst 2002). This sentiment echoed the earlier findings of O’Shea and Madigan (1997, p.252) who, after their investigation into a number of global consulting firms, concluded that “there is no consulting firm in the world that carries more weight into corporate boardrooms than McKinsey & Co… by large measure the most influential of them all.” Thus, Kiley wanted to partner with McKinsey again to accomplish her and London First’s goals.

Organizational Ties In addition to providing social influence, McKinsey was also an attractive choice for BITC because of the positive organizational relationship between the two, dating back at least ten years. Kiley and O’Brien alluded to McKinsey’s membership and past collaboration with BITC as one of the reasons that they partnered with BITC – to ensure access to McKinsey. BITC had often tapped McKinsey consultants for different causes. In 1992, upon Prince Charles’s request to consider the impact of future employment trends for businesses, BITC assembled a team of experts from member companies, including McKinsey, to carry out the analysis (Grayson 2007b, p.36). In 1994, the BITC board chose McKinsey to complete a pro-bono strategic review of BITC as an organization (Grayson 2007b, p.52). These past collaborations between BITC and McKinsey (and there were likely more) point to a close relationship between the two, which made it easy for BITC to tap McKinsey to work on a new project.

Expertise Kiley and her colleagues also wanted McKinsey because the firm had expertise in managing corporations, financial institutions, and growing expertise restructuring public sector bodies. Though management consultants lacked experience in managing educational organizations, this was irrelevant as business
leaders felt new ideas and perspectives were needed and the problems facing large school systems were not unlike those in the private sector. This sentiment was reflected in BITC’s headteacher mentoring programme, Partners in Leadership, as it was based on the realization – initially made by an executive of KMPG – that many of the challenges facing headteachers were the same management problems businesses encountered (Ball & Junemann 2011, p.656). Thus, the national programme sought to provide business management expertise to school heads that often lacked such training. In short, while McKinsey had little educational expertise, it was not required as London First and BITC were looking for advice from a strategic management perspective and McKinsey was a leader in this field.

Objective Outsider In addition to management expertise, London First and BITC wanted McKinsey because its assessment would be seen by the business community and potentially government leaders as objective and impartial, further bolstering the legitimacy of the study’s claims. Studies indicate that business executives generally hire consultants because they symbolize the rational approach to business issues, providing analytical expertise and data-driven objectivity (Armbrüster 2004b; Sturdy et al. 2009). Consultants are also seen as providing an outsider perspective, having a position outside the client organization and drawing upon knowledge from a wider base. It is because of their rational outsider status that consultants tend to be viewed as either “innovators”, transferring new knowledge to their clients, or “legitimators”, providing outsider approval or recognition of existing client knowledge or agenda (Sturdy et al. 2009). Of course, in reality, consultants are often both. Thus, instead of seeking out researchers specializing in education, London First and BITC preferred to utilize consultants’ expertise in business management, their quantitative and (perceived) objective approach to problems, and their unbiased, outsider perspective.

A Common Managerial Outlook Related to the last point, McKinsey was also an attractive partner for the coalitions to seek out because its consultants prioritized the needs of clients and generally shared clients’ entrepreneurial outlooks and market-oriented beliefs. A shared understanding of problems and solutions was particularly important given that any idea the two London coalitions backed had to appeal to their corporate members. McKinsey consultants were aware of the needs and outlooks of clients and built their business around them. McKinsey’s success, like other elite consulting firms, was built on the business of repeat clients. Satisfied
clients signaled the effectiveness and value of consultants’ advice, and the maintenance of client relationships was a high priority for consulting firms (O’Shea & Madigan 1997). Thus, McKinsey was known to address and remedy the problems of their clients with confidentiality, competence, and a common outlook with corporate executives, making McKinsey an attractive firm with which to partner.

To summarize, London’s leading business coalitions preferred management consultants to carry out a report on schools because of the firm’s (1) management expertise and outlook, (2) rational approach to problem-solving, (3) ability to generate and spread new ideas, and (4) influence centres of power through its extensive elite social networks and high-status reputation. In addition, McKinsey was a familiar choice for BITC to tap due to the history of collaboration between the two, illustrating the mutual respect and trust each organization had built with the other.

Furthermore, London First and BITC’s motives for partnering with McKinsey also bring attention to the nature of their client-consultant relationship, which was collaborative. In the existing literature on management consultants, clients are often only portrayed as anxiety-ridden managers, seeking the expertise of confident consultants who pass on latest management trends (Sturdy et al. 2009; Sturdy 1997). This was not the case for the London First/BITC-McKinsey partnership which was interactive with the coalitions’ leaders asserting their agency. Thus, the relationship amongst BITC, London First, and McKinsey was one in which power and respect were shared amongst the organizational leaders. This dynamic facilitated collaborative learning among the parties. It is important to note, BITC and London First were seeking to assess educational problems – not problems within their own organizations. They were looking to improve education, and McKinsey represented trusted and influential friends with problem-solving approaches that businesses respected as rational and apolitical.

As a result, BITC and London First partnered with McKinsey to engage in a form of policy-orientated social learning, or to “collectively puzzle” (Heclo 1974, p.304), about how to solve London’s educational problems. McKinsey ensured that this learning took place in a client-consultant relationship in which outlooks and priorities were mutually shared and in which BITC and London First ultimately controlled the focus and, once the project was complete, determined future actions.
For these reasons, choosing management consultants, and McKinsey in particular, was a strategic and logical choice for London First and BITC.

**5.2.3 McKinsey’s Motives for Pro-Bono Engagements**

While the leaders of London First and BITC saw calculated benefits from working with McKinsey, *why did McKinsey agree to complete a pro-bono study on education for the two business-led coalitions?* Despite an elite global reputation and ability to command high fees for their consultants, McKinsey often engaged in pro-bono projects because doing so served the firm’s own organizational interests. First, McKinsey’s senior partners were not only encouraged but “expected to reach out to their communities by serving on boards and doing the kind of pro-bono work that enhances The Firm’s reputation” (O’Shea & Madigan 1997, p.255). (This strategic thinking likely prompted McKinsey to become a member of BITC in the first place.) Secondly, pro-bono projects promised to expand McKinsey’s knowledge and contacts in a new area, which the firm was always keen to do as it shunned advertising and instead relied on many of its new clients coming through word-of-mouth referrals (Sturdy 1997, p.406).

Thus, it was already part of McKinsey strategy to offer their services on a pro-bono basis to gain new clients. O’Shea and Madigan (1997, p.17) report that “McKinsey finances economic studies of nations such as France, Germany, Brazil, South Korea, and the Netherlands and then shares the results with the government as a way to get a foot in the door for future business”, adding that in the U.K. in particular, such consultants have “reaped huge fees studying institutions such as the Department of Health and Social Security and the [BBC].” Thus, carrying out work on a pro-bono basis was a known strategy employed by McKinsey to expand its organizational knowledge and experience, build key relationships, gain additional contacts and new clients, and enhance its own reputation. (Note: McKinsey also attracted new clients by producing high numbers of books, reports, and Harvard Business Review articles and arranging executive-level discussion seminars through courted new business leaders (O’Shea & Madigan 1997, p.260))

The pro-bono study for BITC and London First served these interests as well as immediate needs. In the short-term, McKinsey offered to complete this task for
the London business community because, in 2001, the firm needed additional work as it had recently experienced a drop in corporate client projects. This was primarily due to the bursting of the dot-com bubble (Armbruster 2006) and a downturn in the U.K. economy in this period, which caused corporations to reduce staff and seek to save money. McKinsey had fewer projects, which forced Wigdortz, whose specialty was financial institutions, to internally apply for any project available within the firm. Thus, in this period of slower-than-usual business, McKinsey needed to keep its army of consultants busy and pro-bono work provided that. In the long-term, an education-based study could help McKinsey build up its consulting expertise and contacts in this area. Despite its four-decade history in the U.K., McKinsey apparently had not carried out any work related to the country’s education sector.

In sum, McKinsey agreed to have its high-paid consultants carry out a pro-bono study on education on behalf of London First and BITC because the work could serve its organizational priorities in the short- and long-term. McKinsey aimed to enhance its reputation and improve its relationships with London businesses as well as expand its knowledge in education fields and keep its consultants busy. With these goals, McKinsey’s consultants approached their study of London schools with methodic rationality although not without interests of their own.

5.3 Engaging in Policy Learning for Potential Transfer

Once the results of McKinsey’s study were presented and the link to the idea of TFA made, how did individuals from London First, BITC, and McKinsey decide to initiate a policy transfer in the form of TfL? The decision to transfer TFA to London was not simply a decision made in response to McKinsey’s presentation. It was a decision produced through a social process of learning from others’ opinions and experiences and rooted in individuals’ experiences (or lack thereof in Wigdortz’s case). It was also a learning process that drew on a network of TFA insiders for lessons. Below, I examine in more detail how policy learning among the group members took place and why TFA quickly became a more plausible and inspiring idea than Wigdortz’s War for Talent proposal based on a three-month study.
5.3.1 The McKinsey Study: Conclusive but Uninspiring

McKinsey’s study, presented through a chart-filled PowerPoint presentation, was as thorough and analytical as leaders of London First and BITC expected. However, the conclusions drawn from the study – that quality teaching and effective school leadership could raise pupil achievement – did not surprise them but were “common sense” – but then again, this was in some ways intentional as Kirkpatrick indicated. Kirkpatrick, as a former civil servant, was aware of the complexity of social problems and the inherent difficulties of drawing conclusions from various educational data using consulting techniques. But he was also aware that they needed conclusions and ones that would to be plausible to business elites. The solutions delivered were exactly that. O’Brien already linked between the low-status profession of teaching to the prevailing view that “many of our schools suffered from pretty low-quality leadership and low-quality teaching” [Interview, 31/05/2012]. Because of this sentiment, none of the interviewees doubted the conclusion that McKinsey’s analysis produced. This served to focus their attention on teaching and leadership, rather than other factors.

However, while McKinsey’s study and conclusions resonated with the experience and views of BITC and London First leaders, it did not convince them of the feasibility of Wigdortz’s recommendation for a graduate scheme. Kirkpatrick (and likely others) said he initially questioned if such a scheme would interest top graduates, while May suspected such a scheme would not likely produce effective teachers due to its limited training and high needs of disadvantaged pupils. As the only former teacher and school leader, May would have likely dampened any future prospects for Wigdortz’s proposal had Kiley not enthusiastically compared the scheme to TFA. In fact, the scheme Wigdortz proposed did not capture the group’s imagination until Kiley likened it to TFA, raising the potential credibility of the idea.

5.3.2 Learning from the Experienced: Accessing TFA through Social Networks

Social networks were a critical resource that directed and shaped the group’s awareness, understanding, and opinion of TFA. Both Kiley and O’Brien already developed an awareness of TFA from their own social networks. O’Brien had
“heard” of TFA through his cosmopolitan and trans-Atlantic networks involved in CSR while Kiley had a friend, similar in age and in her passion for civil rights activism, who was intimately involved with TFA. Through these social influences, the idea of TFA seemed worthwhile and plausible, and Kiley’s personal network connection to the programme enabled the group to learn more about TFA.

Starting with Kiley’s contact, TFA chairman Sue Lehmann, discussions took place between the London group and TFA’s leadership and members of their network of influential alumni. Since whom the group spoke with was determined initially by Kiley’s personal connection to its chairman and then the leadership of TFA itself, the type of knowledge received about the programme was generally positive, advisory, and rooted in experience. The TFA proponents described the successes of the programme but also the critical opposition it faced, particularly from the teacher unions. These personal conversations relaying first-hand accounts and anecdotal lessons drawn directly from TFA were highly influential in building a consensus among the group in support of bringing TFA to the England.

However, that did not mean that the group in London had the same views. Instead, their opinions were also rooted in their background experiences and work-related roles. To begin with, Kiley was the most familiar with TFA. In her view, TFA was a success because it engaged talented, young people in a pressing social problem. Through friends who had their children participate in TFA, she knew of positive and negative experiences in TFA schools. In addition, throughout her career she had worked in disadvantaged communities and was aware of the complexity of challenges facing such communities. As a result, she was enthusiastic about a TFA-type programme for the U.K. but also realistic about its varied results. Thus, Kiley viewed the idea favorably but was less confident about its appeal to Britain’s graduates, political leadership, and educational establishment. Kiley credited Lehmann’s enthusiasm for TFA with removing her concerns and inspiring them all toward launching a similar scheme. Kiley served as the more knowledgeable and credible spokesperson on TFA in the group.

Similarly, May admitted learning of the success of TFA convinced him of the merits of the idea, especially given Kirkpatrick’s argument that such a scheme was needed in light of the dire teacher shortages in London. Because of his personal experience in teaching and leading schools, May had been skeptical and initially doubted the simplistic solution of training elite graduates to teach. Though May still
doubted the ability of such a scheme’s teachers to be wildly effective without more training, he reasoned that those teachers moving into business would be a benefit for companies.

As the two coalitions’ education directors, Kiley and May convinced their respective CEOs that a TFA-type scheme was worth backing. O’Brien was already favorable toward the idea of transferring TFA to London because he had learned of TFA previously and believed in adapting successful American initiatives to the U.K. May also convinced his CEO, Cleverdon, to back the idea. In this way, O’Brien and Kiley became the lead advocates behind Wigdortz’s proposal, which became tagged TfL in response to their understanding of it as an adaptation of TFA.

Meanwhile, TFA had a reassuring impact on Wigdortz, who was already convinced of the feasibility and potential of his idea. Thus, he saw TFA as primarily complementing his plan and welcomed the enthusiasm and approval his idea gained amongst the clients once it was associated with TFA. Higher-ranking McKinsey consultants involved in the project had also become more enthusiastic about Wigdortz’s idea upon learning about TFA and offered their support in getting the scheme started. Yet, the pro-bono study was technically complete, and thus the consultants who carried out the study were set to move onto other projects. In response, Wigdortz was allowed to take a six-month unpaid leave-of-absence from his position to be able to work full-time in helping start TfL and given space in McKinsey offices to work. In this manner, Wigdortz became the coordinator of McKinsey’s ongoing engagement with starting the scheme, a strategic but not leading position. Kiley was in the lead as she, with O’Brien’s help, began building bases of political, corporate, and educational support.

While the decision to pursue the establishment of TfL was collective, this learning process and outcome was also shaped by the power dynamics underpinning the group’s dynamics. London First and BITC were both in the driver’s seat of discussions as they were the clients who had commissioned the study. In addition, May was the experienced headteacher, and Kiley was the most familiar with TFA, giving them additional insight and clout in discussions. Wigdortz’s role in these critical discussions was somewhat peripheral as his role was mainly a data analyst on the McKinsey team, and the analysis was not what was driving the decision to support the scheme. There was no analysis or evidence in the McKinsey report that indicated elite graduates would make effective teachers in state schools with little
training. The analysis produced by Wigdortz and colleagues only confirmed the link between school achievement and socio-economic inequality and the need for high quality teachers and leadership. It was TFA that provided evidence for the link between top university graduates and successful teaching, which became the key to unlocking the group’s collective support for creating a similar scheme in London.

5.4 The Making of a Policy Entrepreneur: Wigdortz’s Perspective

5.4.1 Unpacking Wigdortz’s Account and Why It Matters

While learning about TFA convinced leaders of London First, BITC, and McKinsey to attempt to transfer TfL to England, Wigdortz was already convinced his idea was powerfully logical, would work, and would radically improve schools. All interviewees noted the passion with which Wigdortz spoke about and believed in his idea for a corporate-type graduate scheme for teaching. Wigdortz had become deeply concerned with the link between poor students and academic failure and believed his analysis made a robust case for recruiting elite graduates to become teachers. According to Wigdortz, learning about TFA only confirmed and further informed his idea, but it was not the inspiration for it. Instead, Wigdortz indicated his inspiration for a graduate scheme had come from the War for Talent ethos at McKinsey and his observations of a “leadership gap” in low-performing schools. In this way, Wigdortz quietly resisted the notion that his idea was based on TFA and said it should not have been seen as a model borrowed from the U.S. How can Wigdortz’s perspective be explained, given that it seems to contradict the views of others? The particularities of Wigdortz’s account and experiences at this point in the story are critical to understanding why he chose to become a policy entrepreneur (the others were already in such lobbying-type positions at London First and BITC) and how he reinvents the TfL as Teach First in Phase III, when he is no longer a peripheral actor but the programme’s CEO.

To explain Wigdortz’s perspective, I turn to social and organizational theories of learning featured in the sociological study of institutions. Unlike cognitive learning theories, which focus on knowledge as an abstract entity and present learning as taking place primarily in the mind of the individual, social and organizational theories of learning highlight the ways in which meaning and
understanding are shaped by social contexts and interactions with others. In this perspective, Lave and Wenger’s (1991) situated learning theory draws attention to the significance of power relations in shaping learning and Weick’s (1993; 1995a) concept of sensemaking integrates multiple concepts from social psychology to describe how individuals within organizational contexts make sense of situations to inform their actions and decisions. Both approaches emphasize the importance of identity (its construction and maintenance) as well as social interaction as the medium through which individual processes of learning take place.

At its core, Weick’s sensemaking directs scholarly attention to seven elements in the formation of individuals’ understanding of reality; sensemaking is (1) grounded in identity construction, (2) retrospective, meaning understanding if formed not as events occur but upon reflection, (3) enactive of sensible environment, meaning individuals and context are not inseparable and individuals produce part of the environment they face, (4) social, or made through dialogue with a real or imagined audience, (5) ongoing, (6) focused on and by extracted cues, and (7) driven by plausibility rather than accuracy (Weick 1995a, p.17). Furthermore, sensemaking has been implicated in explaining how emotion can derive from experience (Magala 1997), and critical sensemaking, an extended version of Weick’s work, calls attention to organizational or societal power dynamics, in terms of discourse and privilege, in shaping local sensemaking (Helms-Mills 2003; Mills et al. 2010). Thus, I employ these concepts to provide insights into understanding how Wigdortz and others learned and differed in their perspectives.

Wigdortz’s perspective was shaped fundamentally by the organizational context of McKinsey, his own identity, and his disorienting experience when first visiting a disadvantaged London school. To begin unpacking these inter-related points, I first discuss how McKinsey structured consultants’ roles, scripts, and learning pertaining to the London First/BITC study. I then examine how and why Wigdortz’s work identity was strongly tied to McKinsey’s expectations and power structure. Finally, I suggest that Wigdortz’s learning became personally meaningful upon visiting a disadvantaged school and being shocked and disoriented at conditions inside. This experience confounded his expectations and prompted him to engage in sensemaking. As a result, Wigdortz developed an emotional connection to his work, became convinced in the merits of his analytical work and solution (before
it was likened to TFA), and felt that he had ownership over the idea and was the leader of the campaign to launch it.

5.4.2 Organizational Context, Power Relations and Learning at McKinsey

McKinsey’s organizational structure and culture determined the power relations among consultants and directed their learning on consulting engagements. Within McKinsey, client projects were typically carried out by consultant teams who were expected to use company techniques and tools to guide learning and produce a substantial written analysis on the problem and solutions to present to clients within the time specified for the task. Consulting teams were structured according to seniority within McKinsey, based on each consultant’s past experience, expertise, and results of ongoing performance reviews. A consultant’s rank was a particularly important indicator of influence because of the greater amount of control each level had over work and advancement of those under them. McKinsey’s structure and competitive culture was modeled after those in successful law firms in which new members worked toward becoming junior and then senior partners through proving their ability to perform on and add value to the firm. New consultants started out as “junior associates” serving on various project teams as data analysts until they were promoted to “engagement managers” who supervised teams and interacted with the firm’s partners and clients. Engagement managers had to meet progressively higher expectations until, around their fifth year consulting, senior McKinsey partners decided whether those managers became junior partners or transitioned out of the firm. The percentage of new consultants reaching the level of junior partner was one in five, with only 50 percent of those who became junior partners continuing on to become senior partners (O’Shea & Madigan 1997, pp.269–270).

Salary differentials reinforced McKinsey’s organizational divisions based on rank. Although pay was relatively high at the entry level (Wigdortz earned roughly £140,000 annually at the time (Wilby 2012)), senior partners received much higher salaries, often one million pounds or more, since they managed the firm’s institutional relationships and led on multiple consulting projects. Yet, because partners split their time between these tasks, teams of lower ranked consultants carried out most of the day-to-day work on client projects. As a result, McKinsey was an intensively competitive office environment that promoted an “up or out”
culture. Performance reviews were frequent and critical, effective mentoring from superiors was crucial for promotion, and the attrition rate of new consultants within the first five years was high, approximately 80 percent (O’Shea & Madigan 1997; Kipping 1999).

In this context, Wigdortz was still a relatively new consultant who participated in McKinsey’s pro-bono study as a legitimate but peripheral member of the consulting team. He carried out what was considered the least “visible” and rather “mundane” role of data analyst (Handley et al. 2007, p.185). Kirkpatrick, as an engagement manager, selected Wigdortz onto the team and had significant control over the team’s learning outcomes and access to clients. Wigdortz had to attain permission from Kirkpatrick to present his idea at the concluding client meeting, which he had never done in previous engagements. While this hierarchy signaled to clients that Kirkpatrick had more experience and expertise, it also exempted him from performing first-hand data collection and preliminary analysis. Instead, he coached Wigdortz and other junior associates in gathering data and performing analyses.

The leaders of BITC and London First were aware of the power hierarchy within the firm, as Kiley pointed out in her interview that Wigdortz held a rather “lowly perch” at McKinsey. I sensed that this power differential, coupled with Wigdortz’s lack of contacts and experience within the U.K., affected how others judged Wigdortz’s views, seeing him as a rather naïve apprentice that was still learning “rules of the game”. At the same time, Wigdortz was confident that his “intellectually rigorous” analysis pointed to the need and potential for such a programme, despite knowing very little about the U.K. This perspective was the result of his McKinsey-linked identity and his unexpected encounter with sensemaking. Next, I discuss each of these aspects in turn.

5.4.3 Wigdortz’s Work Identity

Wigdortz’s work identity was strongly shaped by McKinsey’s expectations, roles, and culture. Wigdortz lacked an elite education and had limited work experiences prior to joining McKinsey, a career path that he himself described as “peripatetic” and “lacking in any obvious structure or plan beyond trying to see as much of the world as possible” (Wigdortz 2012, p.32). Wigdortz had done free-
lance reporting while traveling in Indonesia after earning his master’s degree but then took up menial or temporary jobs in his New Jersey hometown until he applied to McKinsey. Wigdortz took his acceptance into McKinsey as a signal he possessed the intellect and analytical skills worthy of joining an elite consulting firm – an identity McKinsey actively promoted through their narrow recruitment from elite universities and unique methods of screening and selecting new hires (Armbrüster 2004a). If McKinsey traditionally hired only graduates from “super elite” business schools (Armbrüster 2006; Rivera 2015), why did it hire Wigdortz? McKinsey consultants’ decision to hire Wigdortz was likely based on the firm’s needs at the time. According to O’Shea and Madigan (1997, p.283-288), by the mid-1990s, McKinsey was forced to widen its recruitment pools because of its rapid growth into a global practice. In addition, after the unexpected fall of the U.S.S.R., McKinsey had become keenly aware of the need to hire individuals with expertise in economic forecasting for whole countries and regions. Thus, Wigdortz was likely hired for (1) his knowledge of and experiences in Indonesia, the country in which McKinsey had recently established a new office, and (2) his skill in regional economic analysis, which he practiced in both his graduate and undergraduate work. Once hired, Wigdortz became a “junior associate”, a position at the bottom of the McKinsey’s organizational hierarchy. In this structure, junior associates were gradually mentored in apprentice-style on how to analyze problems and present their ideas to elite clients (Handley et al. 2007). This was particularly true at McKinsey where they were coached in how to dress and behave according to McKinsey’s protocols (O’Shea & Madigan 1997, pp.260–261).

As McKinsey represented Wigdortz’s first permanent and professional job, he constructed his occupational identity around the firm’s values and practices in order to be successful, a common experience among new young consultants (Armbrüster 2004a). As Handley et al. (2007) point out, new consultants develop the foundation of their work-based identity and practice as “good consultants” through their work as data analysts. Handley et al. (2007) found that, because junior associates typically worked long hours performing data input and preliminary analysis for senior consultants, junior associates often took “considerable pride in their intellectual skills and the rigor of their analysis” (2007, p.186). This theme exemplified “identity work” through which an analyst “expressed his identity as someone who had this intellectual ability” (p.186, emphasis in the original). In this
light, Wigdortz’s view of his work as “intellectually rigorous” was not an uncommon assumption among new consultants and functioned to preserve his work identity and to cope with heavy workloads.

Such occupational pride was also likely a response to being on the bottom of the organization’s power hierarchy. Wigdortz’s pride in his analysis resembled the sense of occupational pride – expressed through “heroic” troubleshooting – by photocopier technicians in Orr’s (1996) ethnographic study. Although featuring very different types of jobs, both cases represent work roles that were at the bottom of an organizational hierarchy, serving to distance workers relationally from managerial power and limiting their autonomy through close supervision, heavy workload, and lack of control and design over their work. In response, the marginalized group took particular pride in their work and their skills, which contributed to their positive self-identity and motivation at work. Thus, Wigdortz was asserting his identity and worthiness within the competitive organizational culture and power hierarchy at McKinsey by regarding his work as “intellectually rigorous” and insightful despite relying on the consulting firm’s analytical templates and pre-selected variables in a sectoral context the business analysts were only vaguely familiar with. In this way, Wigdortz attempted to fit in with McKinsey colleagues, which he was finding particularly difficult in London – where he recalled peers often deemed him the office “muppet” for saying something naïve or idiotic (Wigdortz 2012, p.45). To brush off such teasing, Wigdortz developed particular pride in his analytic work.

For these reasons, Wigdortz embraced McKinsey’s rational approach to problem solving, exhibited confidence and pride in his analysis and ability to solve clients’ problems. However, he lacked the perspective to critically reflect on his work and did not typically question McKinsey’s methodology or interests because to do so would have been paramount to doubting his constructed work identity. This identity and ability to solve problems was both challenged and relied upon as a buffer when Wigdortz stepped into London schools as he was unprepared for the apparent irrationality of what he observed.

5.4.4 Wigdortz’s Descent into Sensemaking

Before visiting schools, Wigdortz had already found a strong correlation between pupil achievement and family income. But the reason for that connection
suddenly became confusing when he visited a chaotic school environment. The experience sent him into what Weick terms an “occasion”, or episode, of sensemaking. Although individuals constantly engage in making sense of the world and their own actions, particular episodes of sensemaking can be triggered, often dramatically, by an interruption in an individual’s sense of reality. Examples of triggers include when an unexpected disaster occurs or when one starts a new job in an unfamiliar organization, causing an individual to reconsider or revise his/her understanding of social reality (Louis 1980; Weick 1990; Weick 1993; Gephart 1993).

Visiting a disadvantaged London school became an event in which Wigdortz’s sense of reality was challenged. He noted that he found the school “didn’t look anything like what I had imagined” (Wigdortz 2012, p.18). Instead, he found the conditions in schools “horrifying” and “eye-opening” (p.41) and likened it to a prison – “only worse” (p.17). The experience did not resemble his childhood memories of schooling in a middle class neighborhood or growing up in a family in which his mother and other relatives were teachers. Wigdortz had a rationalized image of schooling in his mind and, as the school visit progressed, less and less of what he saw made sense: Teachers and students did not seem to be enacting their prescribed roles. Students expressed negative attitudes toward school and learning. School staff seemed unfazed and indifferent to the lack of pupil engagement and chaos in the hallways. It is worth noting that Wigdortz’s confusion stemmed from a lack of meaning, not from a lack of information – a common symptom in sensemaking (Weick 1995a, p.27). He had studied Ofsted reports, yet when experiencing an environment that contradicted his expectations of what defined a school, Wigdortz had difficulty understanding what was going on. Wigdortz could rationally hypothesize how “poverty” would present obstacles to pupils’ academic learning – e.g. lack of resources at home, younger siblings to look after, high student mobility, etc. But he had not imagined a scenario in which the roles and routines of schooling were not enacted by students and staff.

This collapse of role structure led him to disregard poverty-related factors and consider how to change the routines and culture within schools, which he reasoned would inevitably lead to greater pupil learning. Moreover, with the deadline for the study’s completion nearing, Wigdortz needed to hypothesize a solution soon. As Weick pointed out (1993, pp.638–39) “There is good evidence
that when people are put under pressure, they regress to their most habituated ways of responding.” As a result, Wigdortz, drew on the War for Talent, which he had already applied in previous client engagements, for insight on how to improve the performance of schools. In this way, he overlaid not just a McKinsey strategy onto school contexts but an organizational perspective – replete with meanings, values, and assumptions – to extrapolate meaning and propose a solution. The War for Talent aided in his construction of an explanation for the chaos he observed in schools – staff were simply not talented, committed leaders. Pupils, Wigdortz (2012) reasoned, were “being failed” by adults in their schools (p.40, italics in the original) and the “sheer unfairness” (p.41) of the situation disturbed him. As Wigdortz formed a narrative to make meaning of the situation, he noted the poor physical conditions of schools and the economically depressed communities they were situated in, but disregarded these factors (effectively ignoring the structural inequalities producing them) as less important than teachers. Wider historical, sociological, or economic contexts of education or local communities did not factor into his analysis nor solution.

In this way, Wigdortz only focused on the human resource dimension of schools that fit his understanding of why organizations perform poorly. The War for Talent provided the template that helped Wigdortz make sense of the environmental cues and provided a solution – attract the most talented people to teach in schools. Such talented people, he reasoned, could be recruited the same way McKinsey and other blue chip companies sought theirs – through recruiting the country’s most selective universities. Using this logic, Wigdortz felt his solution was common sense, based on his data, and could powerfully change schools.

Wigdortz’s struggle to make sense of the school conditions he observed affected Wigdortz emotionally, making him first confused and disheartened but then hopeful and determined once he felt he understood and had a solution to the situation. Thus, he became enthusiastically motivated and personally committed to starting the graduate scheme with little understanding of why others may not share his perspective. Others around Wigdortz, including the clients, did not experience a similar disorientation nor engage in sensemaking. As a result, they did not feel the same emotional attachment or level of motivation as Wigdortz. Other interviewees also had broader experiences in disadvantaged communities and were more aware of
the effects of structural inequalities and hence, were more realistic about the potential impact a TFA-type scheme could have.

Furthermore, Wigdortz felt he personally came up with the idea for TfL because he engaged in sensemaking, a learning process that “is less about discovery than it is about invention” because it requires one “to construct, filter, frame, create facticity (Turner 1987), and render the subjective into something more tangible” (Weick 1995b, pp.13–14). In Weick’s view, sensemaking requires higher engagement than interpretation and is the process of invention that precedes and makes possible interpretation. Thus, others considering TfL in Phase I were not involved in the same disorienting learning process Wigdortz went through. Instead, they were simply evaluating Wigdortz’s interpretation of the problem and solution, which he had formulated through sensemaking. For them, TFA was the engaging and interactive learning experience that helped convince them of the merits of the idea. This points to the power of experiential learning and helps explain why the War for Talent was an inspiration for Wigdortz but not for others.

One final point about Wigdortz’s learning and perspective relates to innovation and his own role in moving TfL forward. Although McKinsey had determined Wigdortz’s role, data sources, and methodology, Wigdortz was able to take ownership of his work through sensemaking and arriving at a recommendation for clients. This, again, gave him a sense of pride and intellectual ownership over the idea and increased his faith in the scheme. Unlike others, he held a rather starry-eyed and unproblematic vision of the scheme and its potential impact, prompting him to take unpaid leave from his consulting position to become a policy entrepreneur. As a result, he felt he was acting boldly and leading the effort to launch the scheme. However, given his position on the team as a junior associate/analyst, the power dynamics at play did not deem Wigdortz the group’s leader nor preclude others from interpreting it as they saw it – a U.K. version of TFA.

5.5 Summary of Discussion

In this chapter, I have drawn upon historical development of London First and BITC to locate and illuminate their organizational interests and bring attention to the powerful and privileged networks each represented. It was the intersection of
these interests, coupled with external pressures its leaders felt in 2001, which led them to team up to propose an intervention through which businesses could support challenging schools. Through a partnership with McKinsey, the leaders London First and BITC discussed possible solutions but soon settled on the idea of replicating TFA in London after learning of its successes from TFA insiders. In the next phase of the story, this team of policy entrepreneurs must convince others of the transferability and merit of a “Teach for London”.
6.1 The Policy Plot Thickens

The second phase of Teach First’s development, what I term the “mobilization” period, took place between December 2001 and July 2002. Starting with the recruitment of supportive business executives, the TfL team worked to convince a diverse array of leaders to back TfL, building relationships with those in and around government, the educational establishment and unions, as well as London’s philanthropic community. (See the appendix A.3 for a diagram of key organizations and leaders that supported TfL from these sectors.) Thus, the aim of this chapter is to reconstruct, from the interview data, the process through which Kiley and Wigdortz mobilized support for TfL and how and why leaders came to understand and endorse (or oppose) the idea.

Organized thematically by sector as well as roughly chronologically, I recount the meetings that unlocked new pockets of support, with connections between people and social networks identified and highlighted. I also provide brief biographies of interviewees as well as organizational histories to better illuminate their perspectives and contexts. Furthermore, I use the term “TfL” during this phase to signify the idea for the scheme specifically in this period of time. TfL was a concept which Kiley and Wigdortz had slightly different understandings of and which was developed and contested throughout Phase II before being launched as Teach First. Thus, “TfL” represented an evolving idea though the majority saw the scheme as modeled on TFA.

What emerges from these accounts is a complex process, occurring over approximately seven months, of strategic campaigning and network-building. Led by London First and McKinsey, Kiley tapped into the political, educational, and socially elite networks of London to recruit allies to her initiative. Wigdortz worked with London’s leading education school to develop and adapt, or reinvent, Wigdortz’s original proposal. However, as networks became central conduits through which awareness and support for TfL diffused, the topic of reinvention became a major stumbling block for supporters and opponents alike to reconcile.
6.2 Building Businesses Support through BITC/London First Networks

Among the first supporters recruited to back TfL were members of BITC, London First, and McKinsey. BITC’s John May (Interview, 2/05/2012) recalled, “We started with corporate support, so [Kiley and I] both went to our own boards, presented, and got some considerable enthusiasm behind it. In my case, that meant talking to Richard Handover, [CEO] at W.H. Smith [and BITC] chairman at that time.” Kiley (Interview, 30/04/2012) also explained that “they got everyone at McKinsey excited about this” and said the plan was to find advocates from among businesses and universities first since both were members of London First. The supporters around Kiley and Wigdortz represented a diverse team drawn from London First, BITC and McKinsey. The group worked from two different offices – London First’s and McKinsey’s – both located near central London’s Trafalgar Square.

The TfL team then began courting other business executives. Serial entrepreneur Jo Owen summarized the strategy as rather straightforward – convince “one person at a time, one meeting at a time” of the merits of their idea. “The McKinsey work was very, very important in terms of giving profile to this whole challenge and giving credibility to the idea that something needed to be done and could be done,” Owen recalled (Interview, 25/06/2012). O’Brien echoed Owen’s point, noting that some leaders were weary of policy ideas imported from the U.S., a common occurrence in the 1980s and early 1990s, but said that McKinsey’s report, coupled with TFA’s profile, impressed them. Owen further explained that the team’s initial strategy was not funding but legitimizing the idea.

In the early days, we had a simple system where even if they wouldn’t give money, we’d just get them to sign the pledge. And the pledge was no more than something along the lines of saying they thought it was a very good idea. But then, of course, we could print brochures and stuff like that saying, “here’s the list of our supporters”… And we quite quickly [assembled] a list of quite impressive corporates who had taken the pledge and that built more confidence that this was an idea that was going to be going places.

– Jo Owen, management consultant/serial entrepreneur
Interview, 25/06/2012

While executives were signing up to endorse TfL, the Chief Executive of the Canary Wharf Group, George Iacobescu, became the first to offer funding.
Iacobescu had left Communist Romania in the 1970s and lived in Canada and the U.S. before relocating to London in 1988 to redevelop the Isle of Dogs, part of the Borough of Tower Hamlets in London’s East End. By 2002, he had overseen the construction of more than a dozen office buildings with nine more under construction in the area, creating what London newspapers called “a mini-Manhattan” and “populated by some of the world’s biggest financial occupiers” (Judd 2001). Renamed Canary Wharf, the area became London’s second major financial centre after The City, and Iacobescu had become one of the highest paid CEOs in London (Clement 2001).

Canary Wharf Group was a member of both BITC and London First, with Iacobescu serving as a director for the latter at the time. Thus, when Kiley requested to meet with him, he agreed, knowing that she was also the wife of London’s new Transport Commissioner.

When I met with Rona [Kiley] the first time, she told me that she’s getting very good compliments from everybody for her idea, and her idea was Teach For America… and that struck me as a fantastic idea…it’s almost like patriotic work. And when I saw the number of people involved in Teach For America, I thought that you could create something very similar to it… But they had no funds, so then I said, “Look, it’s a great idea, I’d really like to make something like that happen because we’d be doing good not only for London but also for Tower Hamlets and it’s a way to help the redistribution of teachers and bring a lot more teachers into the system”. And that was the reason that I gave them the money.

– George Iacobescu, CEO of Canary Wharf Group, Interview, 11/01/2013

The head of Tower Hamlets had also recently come to see Iacobescu, distressed that “they couldn’t get teachers in Tower Hamlets schools because the area was perceived to be so poor and the kids were perceived to be aggressive” (Iacobescu Interview, 11/01/2013). This incident, coupled with Iacobescu’s view that TfL aligned with Canary Wharf’s CSR goal to ensure local community benefited from the area’s revitalization, convinced him to back the scheme.

Iacobescu subsequently met with Wigdortz and gave TfL £25,000, believing graduates in the programme would also benefit from seeing “a different aspect of life… how the rest of the people live and how difficult it is” (Iacobescu Interview, 11/01/2013). He then told his colleagues of the scheme and introduced Kiley and Wigdortz to other executives.
I made sure that we, as a company, and I as a person, told all the people that we were doing business [with] and all the tenants in Canary Wharf, which has a high concentration of financial services and companies that are able to help, we told them about Teach First. But Brett [Wigdortz] and his people [did] a very good job and went and saw all the tenants of Canary Wharf with Rona [Kiley]… We got them appointments and Rona [Kiley] got her own appointments [at] the level of chief executives or people in charge with community affairs. And they made their point.

– George Iacobescu, CEO of Canary Wharf Group
Interview, 11/01/2013

Another early supporter who pledged £50,000 in seed funding to TfL through his company, Capital & Provident, was retired property trader Cyril Dennis. Wigdortz could not recall how Dennis became a supporter of TfL but suggested Kiley recruited him. Dennis’s sponsorship of the scheme appears to fit with his other charitable activities in support of schools at the time. The Isreali-domiciled entrepreneur, worth an estimated £100 million, was already a benefactor to a Jewish primary school and, in February 2002, the DfES announced Dennis agreed to sponsor an academy in Liverpool (Henry & Thornton 2002). In addition, another interviewee recalled Dennis became a close advisor in helping build TfL organizationally later that year and cited his ties to the Jewish community and its philanthropic ethos as among Dennis’s motives.

Still, not all businesses agreed to support TfL. Interestingly, Wigdortz (2012) described the reactions of the business community as primarily unsupportive and critical of TfL. “During the first few months, it was difficult to get traction,” wrote Wigdortz (2012, p.59). “We had meetings with… business leaders who struggled to understand how we would be able to attract and develop people that they were finding difficult to recruit themselves.” Yet, Wigdortz’s judgment seemed to be based on the fact that few business leaders pledged funding for TfL at the time. However, businesses were helping in many other ways. “Businesses thought this was a wonderfully exciting idea,” Kiley recalled, “and so lots of people gave us various kinds of help – arrange a meeting with their consultant for us and different things, and we wouldn’t have to pay for it” (Interview, 30/04/2012). In this way, several corporate executives came to support TfL, symbolically and in-kind, in those first weeks and months. Meanwhile, Kiley looked for a strategic ally for TfL in higher education.
6.3. Introducing TfL to Government

As Kiley and Wigdortz approached businesses for their support, McKinsey sent a letter to the Department of Education and Skills (DfES) in an effort to interest government in their idea. The letter subsequently landed on the desk of Graham Holley, a senior civil servant at the DfES. He had joined the DfES in his early 20s and he had spent three decades working there, with short stints in various Whitehall departments and agencies. At the time, Holley was the divisional manager generally responsible for teacher recruitment, including teacher modernization. Holley said the letter was sent by McKinsey and recalled civil servants were not keen on the idea. “Officials were being quite cool about [TfL] because there were already lots of teacher education programmes,” he said (Interview, 30/05/2012), “and the thrust in the [DfES] at the time was to rationalize programmes rather than add to the number.” In response to teacher shortages, the government had created several new routes into teaching in recent years. Civil servants did not see how TfL fit into those efforts.

Inside the [DfES], there was a certain coolness about the idea [because] there was a serious teacher recruitment crisis at the time… Some schools were thinking and indeed implementing four-day weeks because there weren’t enough teachers… And all of the effort inside a quite lowly manned but very busy DfES was in trying to make the existing schemes of recruitment work as well as they could rather than add unproven programmes to an already quite complicated scene for teacher recruitment. That was it really. Here we were struggling as to make the mainstream work well, at the end of our tether in the middle of a teaching recruitment crisis, hanging on by the skin of our teeth, and here comes someone wanting to take money away from that programme to create a new one that isn’t yet proven. That was the original skepticism.

– Graham Holley, Divisional Manager, DfES
Interview, 30/05/2012

TfL’s resemblance to TFA, which Holley had vaguely heard of, did not convince Holley it was necessarily a good idea.

I picked up what [TFA] was mainly all about and saw that there was a lot of passion involved, and it clearly had made a contribution in America. But what I wasn’t sure about was whether a slightly different scheme that was being proposed for London was likely to have the same effect with different people… The problem we always have in education is working out which concepts will translate easily from another country to this country.

– Graham Holley, Divisional Manager, DfES
Interview, 30/05/2012
Holley explained he and his colleagues at the DfES often looked abroad for new ideas. He was a member of European policy networks and frequently gathered research evidence from further afield, mainly through UNESCO. Around 2002, he recalled, “New Zealand was particularly interesting [as] they were at the time thinking about quite unique ways to train teachers.”

With the DfES expressing little interest in TfL, Holley passed McKinsey’s letter to the Teacher Training Agency (TTA), the executive non-departmental body responsible for funding initial teacher training. The TTA, which was established in 1994 and, in 2002, was located in the Portland House skyscraper in Westminster, had two specific responsibilities: (1) to recruit prospective teachers to enter initial teacher training (ITT) each year from the graduate labour market, and (2) to ensure that the quality of ITT provided was at the highest possible level (Tabberer 2003, p.2). To accomplish this, the TTA had the power to purchase ITT provision and thus allocate training places to providers, mainly universities and school consortia, based on the quality of their programme (as rated by inspection reports). Although the DfES funded the TTA, it remained separate and autonomous with its own board and remit. Holley was the TTA’s departmental “sponsor”, who oversaw the agency’s work. Sponsors acted as middle managers who, while not as senior as the agency’s Chief Executive, were “immensely valuable advisors and support [and] make sure everything is lined up properly, that the money comes at the right time, that the policy doesn’t go in different directions” (Tabberer Interview, 22/05/2012).

Upon receiving the McKinsey letter, the TTA staff agreed to meet with Wigdortz in mid-December about TfL. Wigdortz, with little understanding of England’s teacher training, was unprepared for the TTA officer’s reaction to his proposal. Referring to the meeting as the “70 Competencies Speech”, Wigdortz (2011) recalled, “I remember sitting with a woman [at the TTA] who had her arms crossed and said, ‘OK, it’s an interesting idea but how are you going to [address], competency number 3.6 or … 2.1’ and I had no idea, no answer for her. So I hadn’t actually thought through all the implications of this.”

This was the first of several meetings between the TTA and Wigdortz along with some of his supporters, including May, who recalled the adverse reaction of TTA officers.
We first of all had quite a lot of negotiating to do with the Teacher Training Agency, and they just didn’t seem to be biting at all. They were talking about the gold standard of the training that they undertook already, that this would be a new route into teaching and one that they felt would not properly equip young adults to be working with children. That certainly was the initial reaction.

– John May, Director of Business & Education, BITC Interview, 2/05/2012

Lorraine Marriott, who joined the TTA in 2000 after working as an accountant in the private sector, confirmed the TTA was uninterested in TfL. Marriott was a project manager in one of the TTA’s “less traditional” units, tasked with managing new innovations such as developing online teacher testing programmes. She recalled colleagues responded skeptically to what they called the “McKinsey idea”.

[Initial reactions within the TTA were] “Who are these guys? What do they think they’re doing? What do they know about teaching?” And it was very negative at the beginning, quite rightly, because most of the people that we came into contact with initially [from TfL were] young, American sometimes, people that were loosely within education but were not strictly teachers through the channels that all these people in the TTA and the Department had come through.

– Lorraine Marriott, project manager, TTA Interview, 6/12/2012

However, Marriott pointed out that while some of her colleagues rejected TfL instinctively, others had rational concerns. “The thing about [TfL] was that there was no legal basis to have training in the way proposed,” Marriott said. “It couldn’t go through the Fast Track route because… the trainees didn’t have any kind of PGCE background [or] teacher training” (Marriott Interview, 6/12/2012).

Concerns about cost and teacher retention only added to the reluctance of TTA staff to consider TfL. Such vocal skeptics confounded Wigdortz. “[TTA staff] were great people [but] they had a certain role to perform with Brett [Wigdortz], and I don’t think Brett was used to dealing with such bureaucracy, and these [TTA] people were like dealing with the bureaucratic side of the bureaucracy,” Marriott recalled (Interview, 6/12/2012).

Many within the TTA had not heard of TFA before but were not impressed by its success in the U.S. and similarities to TfL. For all these reasons, the TTA tried to dismiss the idea.
[TfL proponents] were really challenging every single concept about teaching… The [TTA’s] thoughts were – it’s never going to work, it’s never going to happen, just keep these guys quiet for a little while, tell them you’ve looked and, you know, just basically push them aside. So we had a look. We had some meetings really early on with McKinsey guys, and eventually things appeared like we couldn’t just push it under the table. We couldn’t just get rid of it.

– Lorraine Marriott, project manager, TTA
Interview, 6/06/2012

While Wigdortz met with the TTA, Kiley set up a meeting with Stephen Timms, the Minister of State for School Standards. Timms had graduated from Cambridge and then worked in the telecommunications industry for fifteen years before becoming a Member of Parliament (MP) in 1994 representing London’s East End (Newham Council n.d.). As a Labour MP, Timms served in ministerial posts at the Department of Social Security and the Treasury before being appointed Schools Minister in June 2001. Timms first learned of TfL sometime in December 2001 or January 2002.

I’d been approached by London First to promote this idea [TfL] and urged that we should run with it. It was Rona Kiley, and she had some very strong business support, including Richard Greenhalgh, the chairman of Unilever at the time, [and] somebody from WH Smith. There were a number of very senior businesses saying that they thought this idea could work… It was clear… that businesses had two interests in [TfL]. One was that this was going to raise the standard of teaching in schools and the achievements of young people, and therefore be a benefit to the businesses themselves for their recruitment later on… But also, they were interested in being able to recruit – into managerial and demanding placements within their own organizations – young people who had done [TfL] for two years.

– Stephen Timms, Minister of School Standards
Interview, 26/04/2012

Timms said he was interested in the idea because of the potentially positive impact such a scheme could have in his constituency, which he described as “very, very inner-city”. He saw TfL as a way to bring “really enthusiastic, committed, energetic young people” into schools “to give a chance to some of the very bright kids growing up in my constituency but [who] historically often had not really had the chance to fulfill their potential.”
While Timms said he looked positively on the scheme, he did not give this impression to others at the time. May, who attended Kiley’s meetings with Timms, recalled that it was difficult to discuss the scheme while civil servants were present.

I remember having conversations with the [DfES], and sitting, trying to persuade ministers that this was an important programme and recognizing that we weren’t really making much of an inroad. Not, I suspect, because the ministers weren’t interested, but certainly the officials were less than interested… We sat in a meeting with Stephen Timms, … and he was clearly being directed by his officials not to be particularly supportive.

– John May, Director of Education, BITC Interview, 2/05/2012

Another interviewee also commented that the minister “lacked confidence and lacked understanding” of the model, making him reluctant to voice his support for it. While Timms maintained he was supportive from the start, he confirmed his civil servants were not keen on developing it.

There was some skepticism [within the DfES] – you know, this was an American idea. We had a perfectly good system. Ok, we weren’t getting at the moment the numbers [of teachers] we wanted, but – I think there was some official reluctance to do this completely new thing, which sort of undermined the traditional structures. And they were focused on getting the traditional structures to work and not being distracted from that onto doing this very new thing.

– Stephen Timms, Minister of School Standards Interview, 26/04/2012

With government not particularly interested in TfL, Kiley looked for a wider net of supporters to gain further credibility.

### 6.4 Involving the Institute of Education

TfL needed allies among the educational establishment to improve its chances of becoming established. For this reason, Kiley sought out the Director of London’s Institute of Education (IOE), Geoff Whitty. The IOE was one of three education schools associated with the University of London and was located in the Bloomsbury district of central London. The IOE was among the country’s leading educational research bodies and trained approximately 900 teachers annually. It was
also a member of London First, which was the network through which Whitty said Kiley first contacted him with the idea for TfL.

As Director of the IOE, Whitty was well-known and widely respected in London education circles. Whitty had come from a family of teachers and had wanted to be a teacher in a state school from a young age. Upon finishing secondary school in the mid-1960s, he spent a gap year as an “ uncertificated” teacher in an inner-city primary school. Determined to return to teaching, Whitty then attended Cambridge University on a scholarship where he earned a bachelor’s degree in history and political science (as the university did not yet offer one in Education). Next, Whitty attended the IOE and earned a PGCE. He began teaching in schools around London and went on to earn a master’s in the sociology of education from the IOE. Afterwards, in 1973, he moved into teacher training at the University of Bath. Whitty then continued his career in higher education with a focus on sociological research. He held posts at King's College London, Bristol Polytechnic, and Goldsmiths College before returning to the IOE as a professor in 1992. He became the IOE’s Dean of Research in 1998 and then was appointed its Director in 2000. In this role, he represented the IOE in London First and agreed to meet Kiley regarding her idea.

On 28 January 2002 Kiley and Wigdortz met with Whitty and Michael Totterdell, the then head of the secondary PGCE programme at the IOE. They discussed McKinsey’s study and the proposal for TfL. Totterdell described the McKinsey report as mainly focused on education in relation to businesses. “They made a very clear connection in terms of inadequate education provision in London and therefore, an underachieving workforce,” Totterdell said (Interview, 23/11/2012). While Wigdortz’s statistics surprised neither Whitty nor Totterdell, they were perplexed by the report’s lack of understanding of the U.K. context and underdevelopment of the TfL concept.

[People] seem to be operating on the assumption that Teach First was a formed idea [at that point], and it wasn’t. Both Brett [Wigdortz] and Rona [Kiley] were educational, and frankly typical, neophytes. They didn’t have much of a clue as to how the English education system operated. What they had was a notion of what they would like to do [and] they knew they needed accreditation. They were asking us to help shape the idea and

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2 Exact dates of IOE meetings were gleaned from Whitty’s professional and personal diaries from 2002, available at the IOE archives.
introduce them to the world of teacher education in such a way that that idea would have traction and would attract the funding necessary to make it realizable. So there wasn’t a hard formed idea when they first approached us… There was an analysis [and] an outline of the idea, which was a sort of conversionist notion of bringing Teach For America to the U.K. via the City of London…

– Michael Totterdell, Head of the Secondary PGCE Programme, IOE Interview, 23/11/2012

While Totterdell had not heard of TFA before, Whitty had. When TFA was established in 1990, Whitty was on an academic sabbatical at the University of Wisconsin in Madison and had friends at the university working on developing the TFA training programme for Wendy Kopp.

I was involved because I happened to be there, in some of that training. So I knew about Teach For America very early on… I’d particularly liked [its] espirit de corps. So when I was first involved in discussions about Teach For London, I came to it with a generally positive view that it was something that we should support. I have to say, I was probably in a minority of one within the teacher education establishment in England at the time.

– Geoff Whitty, Director of the IOE Interview, 9/07/2012

Whitty also recalled Kiley and Wigdortz clearly did not understand England’s educational context.

It was a relatively uninformed analysis [and] very culturally insensitive to the English situation and attempted to import Teach For America in a manner that I judged would get nowhere. And I persuaded Rona [Kiley], not sure about Brett [Wigdortz], that actually they needed to be more culturally sensitive to the London/U.K. situation if it was to get anywhere… One of the big issues was whether the teacher trade unions would respond positively to it. And Brett had a concept that the English teaching unions were the same as the American teaching unions, and therefore, you had to find a way around them rather than trying to embrace them.

– Geoff Whitty, Director, IOE Interview, 9/07/2012

Whitty said these issues concerned him and Totterdell, so they agreed to become involved. “I wanted to help them make it culturally acceptable in the U.K./London context,” Whitty said [Interview, 9/07/2012]. Kiley confirmed Whitty’s initial enthusiasm for the scheme due to his positive view of TFA. Totterdell, on the other hand, agreed to develop the idea forward to improve teacher training.
I was asked basically to do three things. One, to come up with some sort of an analysis as to how we might make [TfL] happen. Secondly, to broker meetings with key players of influence in the world of education at the time to basically sell the idea. And thirdly, to come up with a model that would be attractive firstly to the kind of people that they wished to recruit, secondly to the schools, and thirdly to the education establishment in the sense of those who had a reformist mind-set and were trying to look for new angles for teacher education that might indeed be more transformative than the more orthodox approaches around.

– Michael Totterdell, Head of the Secondary PGCE Programme, IOE Interview, 23/11/2012

In the months that followed, Whitty and Totterdell played different roles in promoting TfL. Whitty said he played an “outward-facing” role, helping introduce Kiley and Wigdortz to union leaders and his influential contacts in government. Meanwhile, Totterdell played an “inward-facing” role, working with Wigdortz to develop the programme’s training model and helping to “sell” the idea to new audiences. As supporters of TfL, Whitty and Totterdell helped introduce Kiley and Wigdortz to others at the TTA but found similar resistance. “So we started a conversation,” Totterdell recalled, “[but] the TTA were not desperately interested at first… they weren’t encouraging.” However, after deciding to back TfL, Whitty contacted other government insiders to help move the idea forward.

*Bringing Barber Aboard*

In the days after first meeting Kiley and Wigdortz in late January, Whitty phoned Michael Barber, a former colleague and “close friend” of his. At the time, Barber was the Head of the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit at 10 Downing Street. In this role, he was responsible for overseeing the implementation of various government initiatives and reported directly to Tony Blair. Barber, who had started his career as a teacher after graduating from Oxford, also worked in various positions at the NUT before becoming an academic alongside Whitty at the IOE. Whitty said he personally called Barber and encouraged him to consider TfL and meet with Kiley and Wigdortz. This led to a meeting between the four on the 13th of February 2002.

Upon learning of the scheme, Barber recalled he was “an enthusiast for [TfL] from the start” [Personal correspondence, 15/11/2015], noting that he had already known of TFA through his dialogues from 1997 onward with U.S. policy-makers and
the Clinton administration. He indicated he “admired” TFA and thus saw the potential of TfL to make a similar contribution. However, he also recalled, “I thought it was important to shape [TfL] so it became an element of our wider strategy for the reform of the teaching profession, which Ralph Tabberer was leading and which built on the [Green] Paper I had led on [entitled] ‘Teachers: Meeting the Challenge of Change’” [Personal correspondence, 15/11/2015]. That Green Paper, published in December 1998, had called for a number of changes in teacher recruitment, training, and employment including a number of initiatives aimed at attracting, improving, and rewarding high-quality teachers – aims that arguably aligned with TfL’s. Barber also indicated that TfL fit into the London Challenge initiative that he and Andrew Adonis, head of the Prime Minister’s Policy Unit, were helping to develop within the DfES. Thus, believing that “TfL would have more impact [as part of a wider strategy] than as separate initiative”, Barber spoke to Andrew Adonis, head of the TTA Ralph Tabberer, and others at the DfES about supporting the scheme [Personal correspondence, 15/11/2015].

Kiley confirmed Barber “thought it was a good idea”, and May credited Barber’s endorsement with bringing about more government support for TfL.

Behind the scenes, [we were] persuading Michael Barber that actually this really was a good thing and that we needed to do something to help London schools that was generally revolutionary rather than simply doing more of the same. And I think that support then trickled through to ministers, and the attitude changed, but it was still difficult.

– John May, Director of Education, BITC Interview, 2/05/2012

Barber was also a friend of Totterdell’s and the two subsequently met to discuss TfL. Totterdell described Barber as “quite a strong champion” of the scheme who “certainly would have influenced not just [Andrew] Adonis, but the Prime Minister, who took an interest very early on.” He also recalled David Miliband³, a Labour MP and former head policy advisor to Blair, became interested in the scheme.

³ David Miliband was the former head of the Blair’s Policy Unit until he was elected as a member of Parliament in June 2001. He remained a backbench MP until he was appointed to replace Timms as Schools Minister in June 2002.
6.5 Ministers Learn More About TFA

Meanwhile, Kiley attempted to convince Timms of TfL’s merits by arranging for him to learn more about TFA during his upcoming trip to Washington, D.C. in February 2002.

I think I said that I’d really like to look at this [TFA] when I go to the States. So the trip to the U.S. was already planned, but I was able to vary the agenda a bit in order to meet some people from Teach For America, which I did and was impressed… I remember very clearly visiting a school where there were some Teach For America participants… I thought it was an attractive model.

– Stephen Timms, Minister of School Standards
Interview, 26/04/2012

Kiley recalled she planned Timms’s introduction to TFA during his trip abroad, which she felt ignited his enthusiasm for the idea.

We had it all arranged for him [Timms] to do this visit with TFA in Washington because he was going to Washington for a meeting. And then it happened that while he was there, there was going to be a fundraiser for [TFA] in Washington, and we got him to sit at a table with Hillary Clinton⁴ and Laura Bush⁵. And so, we really worked it, sort of getting him jazzed up about it. (laughs) But then he came back and [those at] the Department of Education – the people that are on the permanent bureaucracy – were very careful. They saw this as upsetting the system. So we’d have a meeting with [Timms] and there would be six people standing behind him or sitting around quietly taking notes as if he was the “yes” minister, right? (laughs) Well, it did feel like that – [and] that there are all these people that are going to say: “You must be careful about this and you must be careful about that” – not in front of us – [but] whatever enthusiasm he had may have been masked by that.

– Rona Kiley, Director of Business and Education, London First
Interview, 30/04/2012

While Kiley suspected the civil servants dampened Timms’s enthusiasm for TfL, the trip motivated him to bring it to the attention of the Secretary of State for Education, Estelle Morris. Morris had earned a Bachelor’s in Education and taught in Coventry comprehensives before joining Parliament in 1992 as a Labour MP from

⁴ Hillary Clinton, the wife of the previous U.S. president, Bill Clinton, was a U.S. Senator at that time.
⁵ Laura Bush, the wife of the then President George W. Bush, had designated TFA as one of five education-related programs that would receive her special attention and support (Klein 2003).
Birmingham. She recalled that Timms’s experience triggered her interest in the scheme.

Stephen Timms went on a ministerial trip to the States and he saw [TFA] in action, and he came back and… said, “I was really impressed by it and I think we should look at it, about introducing it here.”… I actually think had he not been on that trip and suggested we look at it, we certainly would not have introduced it when we did.

– Estelle Morris, Education Secretary
Interview, 16/04/2012

Timms’s enthusiasm for TFA convinced Morris to look favourably on TfL. “I was very much in favor of it,” Morris said (Interview, 16/04/2012), “but the thing that did worry me [was] the length of training because I do believe in training teachers.” She added, “I’m not somebody who thinks that just because you got a first class degree you can go and be a teacher.” Still, while her concerns prompted her to ask questions, Morris said her career as a teacher made her believe that a programme like TfL was needed. “I knew we needed to be more innovative… I taught for 18 years and think it is increasingly difficult to teach all your life,” Morris said (Interview, 16/04/2012), “And I thought… if people will give us five or ten years [in teaching], we might need to say that’s the best we can hope for.” Morris also said she saw the scheme as a way to potentially improve the society’s image of teachers.

Though supportive, Morris was not directly involved in the discussions about the scheme. “We didn’t meet with her at all,” Kiley recalled (Interview, 4/30/2012). Nevertheless, through Timms’s visit to the U.S., Kiley showcased TFA’s work and high-profile supporters and generated interest in TfL amongst education ministers despite the concerns of civil servants.

6.6 “Courting” the Unions and Wider Education Establishment

On Whitty’s advice, Kiley and Wigdortz recognized they needed the support of the teacher trade unions and hence planned their approach carefully. “You see, we knew what enemies the unions were [to TFA] in the U.S.,” Kiley said (Interview, 30/04/2012), “and so we really worked at courting the unions.” Kiley and her colleagues first approached the headteacher unions and the teacher unions afterward,
reasoning the latter would more difficult to bring on board. Whitty and Totterdell recalled they helped make the first introductions to the headteacher unions.

The two headteachers unions at the time were the National Association of Head Teachers (NAHT) and the Secondary Heads Association (SHA)\(^6\). The NAHT, the older and larger of the two, was established in 1897 and had more than 20,000 school leaders as members across England, Wales, and Northern Ireland. Its General Secretary, David Hart, was a solicitor by trade and became head of the NAHT in 1979. He was known as an effective negotiator and a highly-respected voice within education and government circles (Garner 2005). The SHA was established much later, in 1977, and had more than 10,000 secondary headteachers as members in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland. Its General Secretary, John Dunford, estimated the SHA had around 1,000 members in London alone. Dunford had become the General Secretary of the SHA in 1998 after working more than a decade as a member of its national council and serving as its president in 1995-96. Dunford had graduated from the University of Nottingham, earned a PGCE, and taught in Northeast England secondaries during the 1970s before becoming a headteacher in 1982. Later, he gained a Master’s degree and a doctorate from the University of Durham.

When Hart and Dunford met with Kiley and Wigdortz, they both supported the idea. Dunford, who said he saw it as “an idea borrowed from America”, felt the scheme was needed.

> It seemed to me right from the outset that this was an idea that had merit for lot of reasons. One, it would help us with the teachers supply crisis. Secondly, it would attract more graduates with very good degrees into teaching and thus help to make teaching a more highly regarded profession.
> 
> – John Dunford, General Secretary, SHA, Interview, 9/05/2012

Hart was also supportive of TfL. However, as one interviewee pointed out, TfL was aimed at helping secondary schools and thus the support of the SHA was more important because its members were secondary heads while the NAHT’s membership was mostly primary heads. Thus, Dunford agreed to become a vocal advocate of the scheme amongst the SHA’s London members.

\(^6\) In 2006, the SHA was renamed the Association of School and College Leaders (ASCL).
There were two things I did at that time. One was to help gradually in bringing the other unions on side to the concept of TfL. But much more important than that, to sell the idea to the secondary headteachers in London who were members of the association that I led… So I went along to the early meetings that TfL had with London secondary headteachers to explain the concept to them and to get them to sign up [to take TfL] teachers.

– John Dunford, General Secretary, SHA
Interview, 9/05/2012

Dunford noted that SHA members outside London often faced teacher shortages but “they all recognized that the difficulties of teacher recruitment in London were much worse, and therefore they were either supportive or, at best, agnostic about a programme that helped London exclusively” (Interview, 9/05/2012). As a result, Dunford encountered relatively little opposition to TfL from his members.

Totterdell also attended these meetings with headteachers, often organized as social events, to help recruit school leaders that would endorse the scheme.

[Among heads], there was a lot of interest. [And] what we could demonstrate was a significant cadre of headteachers would sign up to this, would welcome it and would make the commitment in terms of the funding of the posts… And I knew many of those headteachers because I’d been into their schools and because they were part of our own partnership at the Institute of Education. So my role was, basically, to make them feel that this was something that could help them and could bring a new dimension and a new dynamic to their schools that was sustainable year on year.

– Michael Totterdell, Head of the Secondary PGCE Programme, IOE
Interview, 23/11/2012

During these events, London headteachers also raised a number of their concerns, including what Totterdell referred to as “about helicoptering in and helicoptering out” teachers. This referred to the staff instability that may result from hiring teachers with a limited two-year time commitment. The TfL team addressed this issue by referencing evidence from TFA. “Brett [Wigdortz] was pretty good at doing a breakdown analysis of the figures from [TFA], which indicated a substantial commitment by a substantial percentage [of their teachers],” Totterdell said (Interview, 23/11/2012) adding, “That was enough for [headteachers] to see that the residual benefits, as well as the interventionist benefit, could be significant.” TFA had reported that approximately two-thirds of its alumni remained working in
education-related fields. Totterdell also pointed out that once they set those figures against the annual turnover in disadvantaged schools, it was “very easy” to make an argument that TfL could provide “significant continuity.”

Totterdell also recalled how Wigdortz used stories of TFA to bolster his argument that TfL would be able to recruit high-quality individuals. “Brett [Wigdortz] had done some very good profiling of Teach For America and used to put on the table vignettes of the kind of the people who could be attracted,” Totterdell said (Interview, 23/11/2012), adding, “He’d also done a very good job of networking with the top six [or] ten universities, so he… demonstrate on paper that [TfL] had a commitment [from such universities] allowing him to go in and recruit and they would be supportive.” Finally, headteachers were also told that TfL teachers who leave the classroom could also become “very powerful advocates for education in the business community in London” (Totterdell, Interview 23/11/2012). While some headteachers became enthused by the potential benefits of TfL, Totterdell recalled others supported the idea simply because they needed more teachers.

With the support of leaders from the SHA, NAHT, and IOE, the proponents of TfL shifted their attention to the teacher unions – the National Union of Teachers (NUT), the National Association of Schoolmasters/Union of Women Teachers (NASUWT), and the Association of Teachers and Lecturers (ATL). The NUT operated in only England and Wales but was the largest teacher union with approximately 215,000 members in 2001 (BBC 2001b). In contrast, the NASUWT and ATL operated in all parts of the U.K. and had approximately 190,000 and 150,000 members respectively (BBC 2001b), both which – unlike the NUT – included teaching assistants. Kiley recalled approaching all three unions regarding TfL.

Having learned from the mistakes that Wendy [Kopp] made, we tried to start out on the right foot and pretty early on, sat down with representatives of the NUT, the NASUWT, and the ATL. The NUT [wasn’t] really exactly hostile, but they weren’t going to back us. And the NASUWT – they were very negative, or some of them were… [and they were] was on the radio denouncing us… Only one, the ATL, they were fine with it. They decided to endorse us right away – they came to our first breakfast.

– Rona Kiley, Director of Business and Education, London First
Interview, 30/04/2012
Dunford also recalled the skepticism of the teacher unions. “Classroom teachers felt that Teach Firsters were being pitched into the classroom without any real training and they undermined the professionalism of teaching,” Dunford said (Interview, 9/05/2012).

According to John Bangs, one of the policy leaders of the NUT, these practical concerns were linked to a much wider frustration felt by the teacher unions at the way TFL was being presented.

The promotion of Teach First has never really varied... it’s about getting high-flying graduates into teaching and having them in schools in socially-deprived areas. And they were described then, and now, as the best teachers on the block. And response of the [teacher] unions was of anger, to be honest, certainly from the NUT at that particular spin – that these teachers [were going to be] far better than teachers that went on teacher training courses from other universities and colleges.

– John Bangs, Head of Education, NUT
Interview, 3/10/2012

Bangs, who had been an art teacher in London secondaries for twenty years before joining the NUT in 1990, understood his union’s anger but was somewhat supportive of the idea. Still, he remained critical of how it proposed promoting the teaching profession to recent graduates.

Its greatest flaw at the time... and one of the things that unions criticized them for, was that... to attract high-flying graduates, [TfL] would say to them, “you are only expected to teach in school for two years, and then you could go off and do... the rest of your career.” And that kind of parachuting into socially-deprived schools was one of the biggest mistakes because kids in those schools need consistency and having someone there who’s committed to them for the long-term... But [TfL] was an idea [that] felt very much like one of those Blairite things about what we need is magic solutions [like academies]... It was a top down approach to meeting the issues of social deprivation and lack of social mobility.

– John Bangs, Head of Education, NUT
Interview, 3/10/2012

Although Bangs said he was not familiar with TFA in the U.S., he recalled that TfL was very much seen by the unions as an attempt to import TFA. “For the NUT, [TfL] seemed to be of the order of a range of New Labour initiatives that were plucked out of the air and were modeled rather insecurely on initiatives that had taken place in the U.S.,” he recalled. Yet, on a personal level, Bangs embraced TfL’s broader message.
[TfL] sounded very exciting actually because it met, in a sense, the Labour government’s agenda, which I agreed with, that actually you needed to ensure social mobility, and [not] always assume that the people who were [teaching] in tough schools were always going to be people who had lower degrees…. [TfL’s] view was – Why shouldn’t anyone be a teacher? Why do we always exclude people who might have about a career in banking or finance? Why do they automatically ignore teaching? Why shouldn’t they come in and have an impact? It was an idealistic view, and I [didn’t] particularly have a problem with that.

– John Bangs, Head of Education, NUT

Interview, 3/10/2012

Bangs said he ultimately convinced the NUT “to not oppose [TfL] but to stand away from it – just to park it, in a way, to have a neutral approach towards it.” He indicated part of this response was pragmatic. “We, as a union didn’t go in for big public criticism of it because all those students in [TfL] were potentially union members, and you don’t alienate student teachers by telling them they’re on the wrong course,” he recalled.

As a result, the NUT was less critical of TfL than some had anticipated. Serial entrepreneur Jo Owen, who served as Wigdortz’s mentor in launching TfL, recalled that others had told them to expect the unions to be “a nightmare” because “they were all very left wing”. However, Owen (Interview, 12/06/2012) said he was surprised by the willingness of the unions to consider the idea, noting “They clearly had the interests of their members at heart, and we had to respect that and find a way of positioning [TfL] so that… it would actually sit alongside their agendas in a suitable way.” Although not all the teacher unions decided to support TfL at the time, Owen gave them credit for not denouncing the scheme. “They heard our story, heard our pitch and asked hard and probing questions,” he said. May, of BITC, echoed Owen’s surprise. “We spent some considerable time speaking on a one-to-one basis with trade union leaders,” May recalled, “and we were quite surprised by the way in which they were prepared to look at different ways of moving forward.”

While unions were discussing TfL, Totterdell promoted the scheme among members of the University Council Education and Teachers (UCET). At the time, Totterdell was the Vice-Chair of UCET, a national forum for networking and policy formation among teacher educators and researchers. “I negotiated some support [for TfL] from them,” he recalled (Interview, 23/11/2012), “[but] I would have to say UCET didn’t like them.” UCET members and others within higher education
opposed TfL in part, according to Totterdell, because they understood it as the same as TFA. “Some English researchers who did the same [as UCET members] just lifted stuff straight out of the American critiques [of TFA] in the early days, which was unhelpful,” Totterdell recalled (Interview, 23/11/2012). Thus, while TFA impressed some, its shortcomings in the eyes of leading American educationalists fed teacher educators’ concerns regarding TfL in the U.K.

In sum, the two headteacher unions embraced TfL while the teacher unions’ response to TfL was varied with the ATL supporting it, the NASUWT rejecting it, and the NUT undecided in their position. At the same time, the teacher education establishment was generally opposed to the idea despite the IOE’s endorsement. Nevertheless, Kiley and her colleagues continued to promote TfL to new audiences.

6.7 Developing the Training Model for TfL

As TfL was pitched to external audiences, Wigdortz had a series of meetings with Totterdell to discuss how teacher training for the programme should work. They knew the training model needed to appeal to a number of stakeholders, and Totterdell was keen to help, believing current teacher education programmes were inadequate. His views were shaped by his experiences in the military where he had spent ten years working in various units, including the elite intelligence service. Toward the end of his military career in 1980, he became interested in education through a mission in post-civil war Zimbabwe during which he designed and delivered “a creative educational programme” for former combatants. Afterwards, Totterdell returned to London, earned a bachelor’s degree and then completed a PGCE at London’s IOE, purposely avoiding undergraduate programmes in Education due to his concerns with its quality and low status. Totterdell then taught in secondary schools while earning a master’s degree at the IOE. In 1991, he moved into the IOE, working in various positions, before being appointed Assistant Dean and head of the secondary school PGCE programme in early 2001. With such diverse experiences, Totterdell wanted to craft a radical new teacher training model for TfL that would help highly-capable recruits have a significant impact in the classroom.
To do so, Wigdortz and Totterdell met at least three times between February and April of 2002 at McKinsey’s offices where other consultants frequently dropped in to help. During their first meeting, they focused on the question of how innovative TfL should be. They considered whether to develop a new model based on current training regulations or an experimental model designed according to what they believed would be most effective. Totterdell had serious doubts about the first option believing it would “adulterate” or “domesticate” the vision he and Wigdortz shared of TfL as an innovative, high-impact, and radically different scheme. However, the second experimental option would make it more difficult to gain support and funding from the TTA. Given these choices, Totterdell and Wigodrtz decided to create a new model of teacher training – the second the option.

We didn’t do any of the planning [while] thinking about the TTA at all. What we thought about was the Ministry [DfES] and policy and impact, and that was refreshing because it would not have been possible for me, within a university context, to have thought that way. I would have been suitably obsessed by Ofsted and the TTA.

– Michael Totterdell, Head of the Secondary PGCE Programme, IOE Interview, 23/11/2012

Around this time, Totterdell learned more about TFA since it was the programme that Kiley and Wigdortz seemed to want to reinvent, presuming (incorrectly) that Wigdortz was an alumnus of TFA. Thus, he visited TFA’s headquarters in New York City in late February 2002 where he spoke with TFA staff, observed graduate selection processes, and toured two of their placements schools. He also read Kopp’s (2001) account of starting TFA, recent studies of TFA’s effectiveness (Laczko-Kerr & Berliner 2002), and Linda Darling-Hammond’s scathing critique (1994)7 of TFA, which he felt “was more critical than it should have been at the time”. Totterdell reflected on how elements of the TFA model could fit the English context.

Over the course of their meetings, Totterdell and Wigdortz made a number of decisions that formed the basis of the TfL model at that point in time. As Totterdell recalled (Interview, 21/01/2015), they agreed that TfL would:

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7 In her 1994 article, Darling-Hammond condemned TFA as harmful to disadvantaged schools and their mostly black and Hispanic pupils. Her conclusions, based on qualitative evidence, highlighted the shortcomings of TFA’s limited training and support for their teachers, its lack of transparency and resistance to outside evaluations, and concerns about TFA’s philosophy and assumptions about the teacher education programmes, the teaching profession, and the needs of low-income communities.
(1) be “fundamentally school-based, practice-orientated and would involve
teams rather than individuals in settings on their own”,

(2) utilize “the summer as the initiation period, so that we caught
undergraduates when they were fresh from their studies, highly motivated,
and had time on their hands and when schools had a downtime whereby
they… get a taste for the impact these people could make in the next
academic year”, and

(3) feature ongoing training and support structured around “a notion of peer
review [involving] mentors and team mediators that would allow folks to
learn very, very quickly from experience, from inspection evidence, and
from… the university fabric that they were engaging with in terms of
educational theory and perspective and research evidence”.

Although this model resembled TFA’s in that it had a pre-service summer training,
its features were more rooted in Totterdell’s knowledge and experience gained in the
military, in schools, and at the IOE. For example, the peer-mentoring and team
structure of the programme were concepts Totterdell first gleaned from military
strategies.

It’s peer support [but] it was more radical than that. I don’t suppose
Brett [Wigdortz] realized it at the time because I wouldn’t have said it,
but fundamentally Teach First – the model they used – [was] based on
the British special forces “brick” model of teams of four being built up,
depending upon the circumstances, the situation, the mission, to sixteen,
twenty, but sharing key ideas. In Special Forces, we call it a “head
shop”. And rank goes out the window and what you draw on are
experience, analysis, readings, perspectives. Put it together and then
come up with a team plan of action. And that basically is the essence of
what I put on paper for the initial Teach First model.

– Michael Totterdell, Head of the Secondary PGCE Programme, IOE
Interview, 23/11/2012

In the past years, Totterdell said he had advocated such a team-based training
because he had watched many new teachers fail in challenging schools “against the
backdrop of the cynicism of the staff room.” He recalled, “I’d seen [new teachers]

8 The “brick” model of teams was a tactic developed in the early 1970s and used in Northern Ireland
to patrol urban environments. The “brick” refers to a four-man team led by a corporal or lance
corporal. Sets of these “bricks” usually made up a patrol, commanded by a senior corporal, sergeant
or junior officer. In smaller teams of four, the patrols were more mobile and flexible, and they could
provide more mutual support and defense to other teams (Miller 1993).
wallowing, some of them leave, many of them marred in their own perspectives, and their ability stymied to some extent.” As a result, Totterdell was involved in running an experimental “area-based” training course at the IOE in the early 1990s, which organized schools with beginning teachers in clusters. While the model was ultimately discontinued for logistical reasons, Totterdell felt it had been a beneficial arrangement for schools. Thus, in the TfL model, teachers would be placed in schools as four-person teams. These teams would be grouped regionally so they could meet, share experiences, and learn from each other.

Other elements of the TfL model were based on Totterdell’s previous work in reconceptualizing teacher education (Totterdell & Lambert 1998). Totterdell had previously called for a more integrated and balanced relationship between universities and schools in training. He had also proposed an inquiry-based, peer-supported, and research-grounded training model to develop trainees as reflective, intellectual, and professionally competent practitioners. In his view, such a model could be a “middle way” or centrist position in teacher education that sat between (1) a “process model” of pre-service teacher training and (2) the managerial “outcomes model” of teacher training that promoted “competence-based professionalism” and focused “on skills best learned at the chalkface” (Totterdell & Lambert 1998, pp.356–7). In this way, Totterdell conceptualized TfL’s training as radically different from current models and one that challenged his own colleagues’ assumptions. “The model we were going to use would not just be an elitist strand of the existing models,” Totterdell said (Interview 23/11/2012). “It would be a different model [that] was basically not premised on what teacher education orthodoxy was premised on… but was rather premised on a much more practice-orientated approach to changing culture.” Thus, he also noted, his perspective represented “an ideological clash” with his colleagues in teacher education.

Still, Totterdell said, the model did aim to fulfill the competency standards set by the TTA, enabling teachers to earn their qualified teacher’s status (QTS), but also offer trainees the chance to gain traditional qualifications – a PGCE and potentially a master’s degree. To do this, Totterdell said they envisioned that TfL and the IOE would have a “dynamic relationship” in which they would share staff and implement the programme collaboratively. The IOE would be the accredited provider and, along with TfL, would manage TfL as a school-based experimental model.
Finally, Totterdell recalled his discussions with Wigdortz regarding leadership were more tied to the type of person the scheme would aim to attract into teaching and not about designing business-linked leadership development training.

In the beginning, the whole idea was that one would take a caliber of person who would normally be entering the boardroom early and would certainly be working in a high-profile way and have “prospective senior executive” stamped indelibly, albeit in invisible ink, on their file somewhere. But one was taking that driving momentum and that kind of framework of references and networking and importing that into education.

– Michael Totterdell, Head of the Secondary PGCE Programme, IOE Interview, 23/11/2012

When interviewed, Wigdortz said he was unable to recall much about the initial model he developed with Totterdell. “I only had a four part meeting with Michael Totterdell where we kind of went through how some of the ways the training could be,” Wigdortz said (Interview, 30/06/2015), adding, “I only saw them [the IOE leaders] as, like, advisors.” This statement seems to contradict his earlier accounts (Wigdortz 2011; 2012) of how he worked with “a senior supporter” from the IOE to develop a detailed training model. Totterdell also insisted he was much more than an advisor at the time. “At the time, the Teach First/IOE proposal was indivisible and no clear role had been formulated, let alone articulated, for the IOE,” Totterdell stated (personal correspondence, 22/07/2015).

What is clear though is that throughout the spring of 2002, Totterdell worked with Wigdortz to produce a more conceptually mature blueprint for TfL – one that was more contextually grounded and educationally informed than Wigdortz’s initial plan. At the same time, Totterdell was helping Wigdortz explain and “sell” TfL as a model that was innovative, team-based, and different from traditional teacher education. The question remained though whether the scheme would find enough government support to move it forward.

6.8 Engaging the Prime Minister’s Office

After gaining the support of the IOE, Barber, and the unions, Kiley personally introduced the idea to Andrew Adonis, the Head of the Prime Minister’s Policy Unit (PMPU). This unit consisted of a small team of approximately twenty
advisors who were primarily political appointees but also some civil servants. Prior to working in government, Adonis had earned a doctorate from Oxford University, worked in academia, and then became a writer for the Financial Times and the Observer in the 1990s. In 1998, Adonis became an education advisor in the PMPU (Wintour 2002a), and in June 2001, he became the head of the PMPU. In his role, Adonis focused heavily on education. Adonis’s aide, Patrick Diamond, a Cambridge graduate and a New Labour specialist in his mid-twenties (Passmore 2001), said he was present at the first meeting between Kiley and Adonis.

At that point, Rona had herself been in contact with the Department of Education and was getting pretty frustrated by the lack of response… [as were] other figures in London First. So they came to No. 10 partly because they were trying to get us to unblock the blockage. So she came in two or three times over the course of several months and essentially presented the outlines of these ideas to us. And obviously we were very interested in what was being proposed.

– Patrick Diamond, Policy Aide, PMPU
Interview, 30/01/2015

Adonis said he was very excited about TfL, believing it could address a number of pressing policy concerns. “I was very enthusiastic from the onset because there had been a pre-existing concern… about the quality and quantity of teacher recruitment particularly in shortage secondary subjects,” Adonis said (Interview, 20/04/2012). He noted the government had set up the Graduate Teaching Programme (GTP), bursaries, and the Fast Track scheme9 – all aimed at improving the quality of teacher recruitment but “hadn’t done enough”. Adonis said he wanted to “increase radically the number of graduates from top universities who were going into state school teaching” and so embraced TfL.

Adonis’s support for TfL also stemmed from his prior knowledge of TFA. He knew about [TFA] and had been interested in it for some time, but I had no engagement with it directly. It was Wendy [Kopp] coming to see me that made me realize that it could happen here because it dispelled my views of how there was something very usual or special about the U.S. I then realized that [TFA] was a very successful social enterprise which was pitched into a situation quite similar to the one we were in of two basic problems – seriously inadequate teacher recruitment and a serious

9 The Fast Track scheme was designed to enable promising PGCE students to advance into school leadership positions early on in their careers.
problem of the top graduates not going anywhere near conventional mainstream state school teaching... [So] that meeting was absolutely crucial... in persuading me that the context was similar, and that you weren’t dealing with a radically different context which you couldn’t read across.

– Andrew Adonis, Head of PMPU
Interview, 20/04/2012

Adonis’s meeting with Kopp was likely set up during New Labour’s first term by Peter Lampl, a high-profile British educational philanthropist. Lampl was a former management consultant and entrepreneur who had spent most of his adult life in the U.S. where, in the 1980s, he founded and expanded his own private equity firm, becoming extremely wealthy in the process. During this time, in the 1990s, Lampl learned of TFA. He said he then tried to interest the New Labour government in TFA after retiring to the U.K. and founding, in 1997, the Sutton Trust, a foundation to promote social mobility through education.

I lived full-time in New York for approximately twenty years, so I’m very plugged into both the financial [scene] and also the foundations and charity stuff that was going on in New York... I was introduced to Wendy [Kopp], and I went to visit the Teach For America operation in New York well before Teach First was even thought of. I was very impressed with it. It’s very low budget, which I kind of liked. I was very impressed with the cost-effectiveness of it. But I got to know Wendy Kopp... And I thought [TFA] was such a great idea that I brought Wendy over to London to meet Andrew Adonis and some other people.

– Peter Lampl, Education Philanthropist/Founder of the Sutton Trust
Interview, 12/06/2012

While Adonis was equally impressed by TFA, he emphasized that the backing of London’s business community also convinced him to support TfL.

Rona Kiley, London First, and Business in the Community were absolutely crucial and so important. What they did was to give me firm, firm security that I had really serious organizations that were going to be behind this whose own reputation was at stake. My own view is, if you had a series of hugely important organizations headed by London First and Business in the Community attached, I couldn’t see how it would fail. And then Brett [Wigdortz] coming along with the McKinsey team, this was also crucial because I was certain there was actually a plan that works.

– Andrew Adonis, Head of PMPU
Interview, 20/04/2012
Diamond (Interview, 30/01/2015) expressed a similar sentiment, recalling that although others looked favourably on TFA, it was “the Rona Kiley-McKinsey-London First axis” that pushed TfL “onto the agenda of the government at that point”.

Adonis was also impressed Kiley and Wigdortz had found endorsements amongst the unions. He had recently struggled to convince the unions to accept the concept of academies he was promoting. “We went to courts and all kinds of other hostile action from the NUT in respect to academies,” Adonis said, “[but] none of that applied to [TfL] because, at the outset, the key trade unions decided to support the scheme.”

For all these reasons – TFA’s success, a business-backed plan, and union supporters (and likely Barber’s endorsement) – Adonis was convinced that TfL could succeed. With support from the Prime Minister, Adonis encouraged the DfES and TTA to re-examine the scheme. “The key thing after those initial meetings was persuading the Department to go for it,” Adonis said (Interview, 20/04/2012), adding “I spoke to lots of people individually about it and made it clear that I and the Government were very strongly supportive… anything to help to solidify support behind it.” Throughout these “extensive discussions” with the DfES, Adonis also continued to have “parallel discussions” with TfL supporters.

On the topic of Adonis, it is worth noting that Wigdortz (2012, p.61) recalled his first contact with Adonis was through cold-calling the Prime Minister’s office. This call probably occurred after Adonis initially met with Kiley as Adonis indicated that, “The leading figure for me at the beginning, in terms of the person who made the approaches, was Rona Kiley” (Interview, 20/04/2012). In light of Adonis’s account, Wigdortz’s call to Adonis was likely not the ground-breaking contact Wigdortz believed it was since discussions between Adonis and Kiley had already taken place.

Regardless, TfL gained the backing of the Prime Minister and his closest advisors. Although Barber had become an influential supporter of the scheme first, Adonis became its most visible advocate. By speaking out on behalf of TfL, Adonis forced the DfES to reconsider the scheme.

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6.9 “Pump-priming” the DfES: Funding from Foundations

While Kiley had quickly found supporters in the business community, she and the head of London First, Stephen O’Brien, had been searching for support among London’s philanthropic community as well. They soon found four charitable foundations willing to fund TfL early on.

The Esmée Fairbairn Foundation was among the first charitable organizations to pledge funding for the scheme. Set up in 1961 by a leading City figure, Ian Fairbairn, the foundation was one of the largest independent grant-making bodies in the U.K., awarding some £30 to £35 million to U.K. programmes each year in areas of education, the environment, the arts, and social change (Anon 2014b). In 2002, the foundation was led by Margaret Hyde who was overseeing the organization’s transition, between 2000 and 2003, from “being a generalist, reactive funder to a specialist proactive one” (Anon 2014a). Hilary Hodgson was Esmée Fairbairn’s Director of Education in charge of its grant policy and strategy. Hodgson recalled Stephen O’Brien approached her and Hyde about TfL. They were already familiar with O’Brien since Esmée Fairbairn had supported a number of initiatives promoted by BITC in the past. Hodgson, an Oxford graduate who taught in London comprehensive for two years before entering the charitable sector, recalled that she liked the idea but had concerns.

It was clear to us that there was a problem with the status of teaching at the time [and] with teacher training in recruiting able youngsters to go into state schools. [But] there were concerns, largely around whether the idea would be supported by the establishment, whether the DfE would allow it…and whether the trade unions would make a fuss and how many of [its teachers] would stay in [teaching].

– Hilary Hodgson, Director of Education, Esmée Fairbairn
Interview, 2/02/2015

Hodgson said she was aware of TFA through reading about it but “didn’t have any connections with them”. Thus, for Hodgson, TFA did not have a significant impact on her view of the proposal. In addition to concerns about the political feasibility of TfL, Hodgson said her foundation was reluctant to provide funding due to the nature of its work.

We debated it, actually. I took a paper to trustees and outlined some of the pros and cons of doing it, including whether this was really funding
for a statutory cause because Esmée Fairbairn [doesn’t] fund work that should be done by the statutory sector, and of course, teacher training is normally the role and remit of the DfES. So I spent quite a lot of time with trustees debating whether it was legitimate to fund [TfL]… and then brought Stephen [O’Brien] in to talk [about] it. And then we took a proposal to the board, which they endorsed and funded.

– Hilary Hodgson, Director of Education, Esmée Fairbairn Interview, 2/02/2015

In the end, the Esmée Fairbairn’s board pledged approximately £120,000 over two years to the scheme. According to Hodgson, the trustees funded TfL despite being an area under the government’s remit in large part because of Hodgson’s rationale.

I persuaded them that it didn’t matter, that sometimes government didn’t know what it was doing and that this might make a difference, and bring some new blood into the profession and the issue mattered more than – and also, perhaps, we could get the DfES onboard and use our money to pump-prime a larger investment from DfES.

– Hilary Hodgson, Director of Education, Esmée Fairbairn Interview, 2/02/2015

Hodgson subsequently encouraged another foundation, Paul Hamlyn, to support TfL.

The Paul Hamlyn Foundation, founded by publisher and philanthropist Paul Hamlyn in 1987, was also one of the U.K.’s largest independent grant-making bodies. The trust focused on combating disadvantage among young people and marginalized groups through projects related to education, the arts, social justice, and India. Due to the founder’s common phrase “there must be a better way”, the foundation was committed to supporting work “which others may find hard to fund, perhaps because it breaks new ground, is too risky or is unpopular” (Anon 2014c). The Foundation’s Director in 2002 was Lady Patricia Lankester, who had taught in London comprehensive schools for eight years before entering the third sector. She recalled Kiley introduced her to TfL.

I knew about Teach For America, and I met Rona Kiley and that was what she was trying to do – bring Teach For America to the U.K., and it really started quite informally in conversations with her… She was having difficulty with the Department of Education… The whole issue of how many young people might be involved was a very hot one because the teaching unions were not happy.

– Patricia Lankester, Director, The Paul Hamlyn Foundation Interview, 19/06/2012
Lankester said she and her colleagues decided to become a founding supporter of TfL. “We felt that it would make their case much stronger if there was some early support from an independent foundation,” Lankester said, “and I was very interested because of my background in teaching.” In addition, Lankester said TfL was the type of experimental initiative that her foundation generally liked to support. “The Paul Hamlyn Foundation was, to some extent, very good at taking a chance on something and seeing what happens,” Lankester recalled, “and because the situation in London schools was in need of new approaches and experimentation, it seemed a good thing to back.” Thus, Lankester submitted a formal grant application for TfL to her board, where it gained approval for £25,000 for the scheme’s first year.

Two other charitable organizations – SHINE and the Sutton Trust – also pledged £50,000 each to TfL during the spring of 2002. SHINE became involved when its founder, Jim O’Neill, agreed to become one of TfL’s “first individual donors” (Wigdortz 2012, p.83). O’Neill grew up in a working class family in Manchester before becoming a leading economist and partner at Goldman Sachs. He founded SHINE, an acronym for Support and Help In Education, in 1999 and described it as “like venture capital in educational charity” (Midgley 2011). The charity financed initiatives aimed at helping the most disadvantaged kids access to quality educational opportunities. O’Neill explained, “We only give money to projects where we think we can measure their performance because we believe in monitoring and evolution” (Blackhurst 2009). TfL likely fit into O’Neill’s charitable priorities by aiming to improve education for disadvantaged pupils in a measurable way – recruit significant numbers of top graduates into teaching.

The Sutton Trust also pledged funding for TfL prior to its launch. Its founder, Peter Lampl, had created the foundation in 1997 to promote social mobility through education. By commissioning research and funding new initiatives, the Sutton Trust soon “shaped and guided the debate on social mobility in the U.K.” (Cook 2013), collaborating with government to expand or replicate successful ideas (Bunting 2000). Lampl was motivated to found the Sutton Trust because he considered himself as someone who had benefitted from social mobility (Wilby 2007). He said he grew up with little money but, after attending local academically selective state schools, he earned a place at Cambridge in 1966. He credited the opportunity to attend elite schools as enabling him to gain a quality education and
pursue a successful career in consulting and private equity. In this field, he became a multi-millionaire while working in the U.S. during the 1980s and 1990s.

While working in New York City in the 1990s, Lampl had learned of TFA and was very impressed by the organization’s entrepreneurial spirit. Thus, he previously introduced Kopp to Adonis in hopes of interesting the Blair government in the scheme. “If it works in America, why can’t it work in Britain? So that’s why I backed it,” Lampl said (Interview, 12/06/2012), adding, “Teach First is not the new idea… It’s taking [TFA] and introducing it into the U.K.” Lampl’s support for TfL was particularly significant because he had become an active and high-profile advocate for the social mobility agenda. “I do recall him [Lampl] being a sounding board [for] Rona [Kiley] and Brett [Wigdortz] not least because he’s a big name and he can add a bit of weight to it,” recalled Paul Davies, Wigdortz’s McKinsey colleague who later became Teach First’s Chief Operating Officer (Interview, 21/09/2012).

The early support from these foundations and individuals, as well as Adonis, provided Kiley and Wigdortz more financial and symbolic support for their idea. With this development, discussions at the DfES regarding TfL continued and coalitions of support and opposition formed. (See the Appendix A.5 for a complete table of Teach First’s founding funders and donation totals.)

6.10 Discussions Renewed at the DfES

While support for TfL was growing outside the DfES, some officials within the DfES began backing the idea. Many in the DfES who had expressed a lack of enthusiasm for TfL began to consider it as a chance to “test out different ideas… to see if some of those ideas could then be translated across into the mainstream programmes in some way”, according to Holley (Interview, 30/05/2012). As more DfES officials learned of the scheme, Kiley recalled that several were supportive.

There were a few people that… were really interested and saw promise in [TfL]. Jon Coles\textsuperscript{10} was certainly one and… Peter Housden, [the

\textsuperscript{10} Jon Coles was a Deputy Director in the DfES and the head of a five-person policy team tasked with developing and implementing a new school-improvement initiative called the London Challenge.}
Director General for Schools]… He really got [TfL]… thought it was a great idea [and] was an advocate. People were scared early on to be too much of an advocate…[because] the idea that you could train people in six weeks was controversial.

– Rona Kiley, Director of Business and Education, London First Interview, 30/04/2012

Upon speaking with DfES officials, Adonis’s aide Patrick Diamond said he found many had considered TfL a distraction and were not hostile toward the idea. Thus, he recalled, “Our goal was to try to persuade the Department that actually [TfL] would be a good way of broadening the recruitment stream into the teaching profession” (Interview, 30/01/2015). Diamond acknowledged that Adonis was an influential, and often controversial, figure within education policy-making at the time but pointed out that TfL was not a high-profile policy issue and the DfES itself was internally divided on the idea.

To represent [the situation] as kind of “the Department versus No. 10” [would be incorrect] – that dispute would happen occasionally but often it was much more subtle and complex than that… There would have been a coalition [of] officials who were more senior and responsive to ministerial and Number 10 persuasion [and] would have been both positive and would have been trying to make things happen [for TfL]. But there are layers of officials below them who certainly were not as positively disposed. So within the Department, there would have been different coalitions of support or opposition. So in that sense, there was [not] one Departmental view on [TfL]… People tend to see [government departments] as being quite monolithic in terms of their views – that they represent a particular ideological stance or whatever. But the Education Department isn’t like that… The views are much more pluralistic, and the coalitions are much more flexible and change around a lot.

– Patrick Diamond, Aid, PMPU Interview, 30/01/2015

In parallel to Adonis and Diamond’s talks with individuals at the DfES, Kiley and her colleagues continued to meet with civil servants. BITC’s John May (Interview, 2/05/2012) recalled that their “strongest relationship” within the DfES “was with a department within the Department whose job it was to have, or build, relationships with corporates.” Lynn Fabes was the director of that eight-person team, called the new Business Development Unit, which had been formed by the DfES in 2000 (Fabes 2002). She confirmed hearing of TfL through the office of the Schools Minister and attending a meeting between Timms, O’Brien, and Wigdortz.
“Basically they were seeking funding from the Department to start up [TfL],” Fabes recalled. “They presented a paper, evidence-based research from Teach For America, and their perception of the impact [TfL] could potentially have in England” (Fabes Interview, 23/01/2015). Afterwards, she advised Timms to support the programme. “My advice was to go ahead with it, match funding to a certain level,” Fabes said although she emphasized that Timms sought input from other officers as well.

The existence of Fabes’s unit also indicated that the DfES was already eager to engage the corporate sector in new education initiatives, which Holley confirmed. Furthermore, the proposal that TfL be set up as an independent charity – and not a government programme – made it appealing to many. “Ministers were much more enthusiastic [about TfL] straight away [because] it was different and separate,” Holley recalled. “They wanted to test different means of recruiting good teachers, and this was another way” (Holley Interview, 03/05/2012).

Adonis was also a particularly strong proponent of new educational initiatives having independence from government authority. His idea for academies was inspired by City Technical Colleges (CTCs)\(^\text{11}\) which he considered successful because they were run “free of the shifting sands of local and national education bureaucracies” (Adonis 2012, p.56) and were able to appoint strong headteachers with help from governing sponsors. Likewise, he also linked TFA’s success to its independence as a non-profit organization and hence, wanted TfL to have the same autonomy.

Discussions regarding TfL continued to take place at the various levels of the DfES, and an internal coalition in support of the scheme grew in the DfES. Still, others opposed the scheme, arguing it would drain money from other projects and become a distraction from current initiatives and challenges. While talks continued, the head of the TTA became involved in considering the idea.

\(^{11}\) These state secondary schools, set up between 1988 and 1993, were managed and primarily funded directly by the Department of Education, instead of local authorities, with additional capital coming from the private sponsors.
6.11 TTA Head Considers TfL

Though many at the TTA had hoped to push aside the TfL proposal, vocal support from the PMPU and some at the DfES forced the TTA to consider the scheme. At this point, Marriott was asked to assess the potential of the scheme.

Slowly, slowly the idea started to gain a bit of support in the higher ranks of the TTA and the Department. So I was given the task, along with a couple of [my colleagues], to meet with these guys [those purposing TfL], to review what they’d done, to write a paper on it, [and] to put a proposal to the board of the TTA. And eventually, we got to the point where there was a really serious question to be asked… What is it going to take to make this initiative even legal?

– Lorraine Marriott, project manager, TTA
  Interview, 6/12/2012

Marriott recalled there were several meetings regarding TfL between TTA members and “two streams” of individuals – (1) educational leaders, including Dunford was “quite well respected within the TTA” and (2) business proponents of TfL, who Marriott recalled were “not really confidants of the [DfES].” The two sets of people, according to Marriott, “eventually became closer and closer and worked together”.

During these meetings, the design and experience of TFA in the U.S. were common topics of discussion.

[TFA was often discussed] because that was the only reference that people had at that time. So it was very much looking at Teach For America, looking at the differences in that programme, figuring out whether Teach For America could work in the U.K., and there were lots of changes needed. It wasn’t possible just to transpose that programme into the U.K. and make it work.

– Lorraine Marriott, project manager, TTA
  Interview, 6/12/2012

A top concern of the TTA continued to be how TfL could fit into the TTA’s regulatory frameworks, a point Adonis argued against.

There were certainly discussions, which I was a party to, with the TTA [who] wanted to make Teach First much more like conventional training. And my view very strongly was that we should go with the Teach First [TfL] plan as it had been submitted because we needed it to be managed and run independently.

– Andrew Adonis, Head of PMPU
  Interview, 20/04/2012
Unsurprisingly, the TTA’s Chief Executive, Tabberer became involved in considering the scheme. Tabberer, a Cambridge graduate, had earned a PGCE and taught a few years in London before moving into various posts in research and local government. In 1994, Tabberer became Deputy Director at the National Foundation for Education Research [NFER], where he first became aware of TFA’s success and its critics. Subsequently, in 1997, Tabberer became a senior advisor within the DfES’s School Standards and Effectiveness Unit, a unit with a staff of 275 headed by Barber. Tabberer recalled, “I had worked with Michael [Barber] for three years [from] 1997 to 2000 in the [DfES], and we were pretty inseparable.” While at the DfES, Tabberer also worked with Adonis in launching a new schools initiative in 1999 called Excellence in Cities. Shortly thereafter, in February 2000, Tabberer was appointed Chief Executive of the TTA. Tabberer emphasized that, as head of the TTA, he remained close with his former colleagues.

Tabberer recalled Holley had made him aware that TfL was being proposed to Timms. “At that stage, we had a conversation about it, looked at the paperwork, talked about Number 10’s interest, picked up there was an Institute of Education connection, and started to talk about what was going on,” Tabberer said (Interview, 22/05/2012). He added that, in the beginning, he relayed his initial reactions through Graham, a fairly common practice.

My first impression of the paperwork I saw from McKinsey was that the paper was flawed. It had got the wrong analysis of the teacher recruitment problem in the U.K. It was much more of a paper about the American problem… [and] didn’t take account lots of reforms and measures that we’d been taking in the U.K for a while… [For] example, [we] had already introduced subtle, very large initiatives [that] were moving away from the conventional one-year postgraduate course or the three-year undergraduate course... So we [had] serious money and serious scales of initiatives [that] were already doing the sorts of things [TfL] seemed to be talking about.

– Ralph Tabberer, Chief Executive, TTA

Interview, 22/05/2012

In addition, although Tabberer knew about TFA, he said he “wasn’t wonderfully impressed with the idea of [TfL].” He insisted England did not need a TFA-type programme because of differences between the two countries’ teacher training contexts.
The U.K. and the U.S. models are very different, and the U.S. model is essentially something like 1,700 teaching colleges, which are largely accredited by the universities in which they are in and by the states in which they work, and largely, they are driven by the academics and professionals in those organizations. It’s a provider-oriented system, really – the providers and producers are in charge. In the U.K. it’s different. The TTA has the funding to buy training from registered trainers and they might be in the universities, they might be in schools, [and] they have to satisfy the Training Agency that they are good enough quality. If they are not very good then the TTA will take money away from them… [or] close them down. I think in the whole history of the U.S, nobody has ever closed a training college for being unsatisfactory in quality.

– Ralph Tabberer, Chief Executive, TTA
Interview, 22/05/2012

Because of the lack of regulatory quality controls on teacher training in the U.S., Tabberer viewed TFA as a “disruptive innovation” that was needed in the U.S.

It felt, from a distance, that Teach For America was trying to do something really important and disrupt a rather complacent system. The system was fighting back, [and] the establishment of teachers and academics was trying to stop them thriving, but they kept going. And my instincts were Teach For America was a very good thing and it's the kind of innovation that America needed. So again, when [TfL] came with that background, even though I didn’t think the U.K. needed something similar, I was similarly very well disposed to listen to them and talk to them.

– Ralph Tabberer, Chief Executive, TTA
Interview, 22/05/2012

Since Tabberer viewed TFA as challenging the status quo in the U.S., he had dismissed the criticisms, particularly those raised by Darling-Hammond (1994), as interest-driven.

The way I read the American situation was, actually how very sad the politics of that were, and I consider Linda Darling-Hammond to be a great researcher. But I think there were political glitches on the researchers who were working on TFA, and it may be they were provoked by [TFA’s] initial model, but when I read those papers I didn’t think I was reading objective, critical research. I thought I was reading an impassionate defense of the professional status quo in the U.S., which frankly isn’t tackling the problems that they’ve got.

– Ralph Tabberer, Chief Executive, TTA
Interview, 22/05/2012
Because of his admiration of TFA, Tabberer was open to hearing more about TfL. He was confident in the TTA’s model of quality management and its ability to accommodate a diversity of providers regardless of politics.

The TTA essentially had control of the number of places, the unit resource, [and] quality levers, so therefore it could make sure that every year the amount of quality training was better than the year before. It was the best-organized teacher training system in the world… Nobody had managed the market like the TTA had and that does give you this respect. So it’s never an issue of governments. As long as it’s legal, run by people who know what they’re doing, you can allow [providers] to do what they plan because you can check them. It’s a great system.

– Ralph Tabberer, Chief Executive, TTA
Interview, 22/05/2012

Tabberer was also willing to consider TfL because the TTA, under his leadership, had brought the numbers of teacher recruits up significantly in recent years. “This [was] a time when the TTA was in a very strong position because we had started to turn around teacher recruitment,” Tabberer said. “There was a lot of confidence amongst ministers [and] Number 10 about the way we were approaching the problem” (Tabberer Interview, 22/05/2012).

As a result, he indicated that the TTA was not “in crisis” and did not need “to grab a solution from somewhere else.” Instead, they were going about their jobs and looking for more good ideas. “If it hadn’t been designed right, we didn’t need to pick it up and do it just for the political noise or further disruption,” Tabberer said (Interview, 22/05/2012). Finally, Tabberer gave his attention to TfL also because “McKinsey and some senior business people” were backing it. “That doesn’t happen by accident,” Tabberer said, “so I was very interested in meeting them and hearing what they had to say, but also had loads of questions about the way they had analyzed it and… how it might work” (Interview, 22/05/2012).

Thus, after reviewing the paperwork and feeding back initial criticisms to Holley, Tabberer accompanied Timms to a meeting at the DfES with Wigdortz and Kiley in late April 2002. Although the purpose and details of this meeting remain disputed, it nevertheless became a key turning point in the evolution of TfL.
In late April 2002, when Timms and Tabberer met with Kiley and Wigdortz at the DfES, Wigdortz (2012, p.64) indicated he was under the impression that this was a meeting arranged for a “formal sign-off” of the scheme due to the “support from Downing Street” and “interest at ministerial level”. However, he indicated they had not yet secured solid support of the DfES and TTA, so they brought a handful of high-profile business supporters to the meeting to “convince the minister how serious we were”. According to Tabberer, however, the meeting was his first direct interaction with TfL proponents during which he wanted to discuss and ask questions of their proposal.

Tabberer and Wigdortz also had somewhat different recollections of the meeting. According to Wigdortz (2012, p.65), at the start of the meeting, Timms “looked glumly at his notes and shook his head” and announced his rejection of TfL, then left. Then, Wigdortz recalled, the civil servants explained the reasons for rejecting the scheme – essentially, TfL would be too costly and draw graduates away from other routes through which they would be better trained. Wigdortz (2012, p.65) indicated that he “briefly… tried to make a case for changing the decision, but was stopped short. The decision was final.”

Meanwhile, Tabberer’s recollection of that meeting was somewhat different.

[Timms] shared my interest in getting something going... But the meeting... didn’t go very easily because, of course, I and others were asking questions about exactly what was going to go on, exactly what the costs were, precisely how it was going to work and these areas where people didn’t know how things worked already. There were awkward parts of the conversation because people didn’t have answers. So by the end of that meeting there was some sense of “okay, this is difficult, this isn’t just going to be ‘let’s go ahead and do it’.” In fact, probably by the end of it, the [TfL] people were wondering whether actually they should [go ahead]... whether they could satisfy people and it would make a contribution.

– Ralph Tabberer, Chief Executive, TTA
Interview, 22/05/2012

From Tabberer’s account, Timms did not reject TfL outright. Timms liked the idea and involved Tabberer in discussions.

I’ve yet to meet a politician who hadn’t been completely charmed by Rona [Kiley] or Brett [Wigdortz]. They seem to be stunning in the way
they could charm politicians… But [while] a politician might want something because it’s attractive, it’s got business links, it looks good as an announcement, it will help what we are doing… the guys like me and Graham [Holley] working on the civil service side have to ask the questions of – Is it going to work? Is it in step with all the legislation so far, the regulations? Is it going to be value for money? We have to do all that work because ministers rely on us.

– Ralph Tabberer, Chief Executive, TTA
Interview, 22/05/2012

Thus, instead of a hostile lecture by the civil servants, Tabberer recalled the meeting as a question-directed dialogue during which it became clear to everyone present that TfL was not (yet) a workable scheme. Kiley, Wigdortz, and their handful of corporate supporters were simply unable to address Tabberer’s questions. Still, Wigdortz doubted Tabberer’s concerns with the scheme.

Part of the challenge was to understand what the real objection was. I didn’t believe that the problems were the officials’ stated ones – “it’s costly” or “it won’t work” – since the amount of money and support we were asking for was so small. Instead the problems were unstated – “it’s not under our control”, “it might embarrass some of the efforts we’ve already made” or “we don’t trust you”… If we had gone back showing PowerPoint presentations of how brilliantly it would work, it would have scared them even more.

– Brett Wigdortz (2012, p.69), McKinsey consultant

While Wigdortz’s narrative suggests that money was not the “real” objection because they were requesting “only” £500,000 to get started, this was not entirely accurate. In addition to the £500,000 needed from the DfES to launch TfL, the scheme needed an additional funding stream from the TTA, likely to run into a few million pounds, to finance the training of its proposed 200+ recruits. Those training costs, Tabberer insisted, were unclear since the training model and training provider had not been officially agreed upon. As a result, he could not assess the scheme’s value-for-money. Furthermore, these costs would ultimately come from the DfES since it funded the TTA.

Thus, both the training and operational costs of TfL were a real concern for the DfES because it was unclear from where such funding would ultimately come. Although Tabberer and other interviewees recalled extra funding was available since the Blair government started to increase spending in its second term, Holley insisted there was not extra funding for TfL. “The money was the main issue because the money had to come from somewhere,” Holley said (Interview, 30/05/2012), “[and]
there wasn’t much new money around at the time, so the money had to come from other existing programmes.” Holley did concede, however, that the amount TfL needed was “a drop in the bucket” compared to the government’s roughly “250 million pound programme for increasing teachers”.

Hollely also disputed Wigdortz’s assertion that the DfES saw TfL and its potential success as a threat or embarrassment to their current work. “[TfL] wasn’t seen as a rival because it was too small,” Holley said. “It [would be] recruiting a few hundred – a very small amount of teachers, whereas the Department was looking for 40,000 teachers every single year. So it was never a serious rival to mainstream recruitment.” Still, issues of distrust likely existed as officials emphasized they themselves would be ultimately responsible if the programme failed.

It’s also about accountability because [if] there is taxpayer money going into the programme, it appears in [TTA] accounts for which ministers are responsible. So if Parliament were to ask if this expenditure is value for money, it wouldn’t be [TfL] answering, it would be ministers and therefore, both the [TTA] and Department [DfES] have a duty to make sure that throughout the money is being spent well.

– Graham Holley, Division Manager, DfES 
Interview, 30/05/2012

Meanwhile, Kiley felt that officials were critical of TfL because they “didn’t get it”, were risk averse, and/or focused on their own career advancement. She also noted department ministers and officials changed frequently with some likely aiming to work in more prestigious departments like the Treasury.

Yet, Totterdell, who was not invited to the late April ministerial meeting (though he subsequently learned of its results), felt that Kiley had overestimated the influence of the private sector in government decision-making in the U.K.

At the time neither Brett [Wigdortz] nor Rona [Kiley] really understood the dynamics of teacher education and training nor the underlying tensions around ideology, inspection, and impact. Rona in particular was highly reliant on a form of corporate clout that pervades American lobbying, including social service initiatives, but has more limited reach in the U.K. particularly in the context of the reforming zeal of the early Blairite era.

– Michael Totterdell, Head of the Secondary PGCE Programme, IOE 
Personal correspondence, 16/01/2015
Thus, Totterdell suspected he was not included in the late April meeting with Timms since he was an educationalist and not part of Kiley’s corporate-based “camp”.

My sense was there two sets of camps – Rona’s [Kiley’s] people and Brett’s [Wigdortz’s] people. And they did intermingle, but they didn’t necessarily always deploy at the same time in the same way. And Rona’s view of how you got things was basically her husband’s… and it was through political influence and meetings involving notable persons. It’s very much a New York-style, business methodology… [So] she probably set up that meeting, but I certainly wasn’t a party to it… But somehow I got to know that it had not gone well.

– Michael Totterdell, Head of the Secondary PGCE Programme, IOE
Interview, 24/01/2015

Since becoming involved in promoting TfL, Totterdell also attended meetings regarding the scheme with Whitty in April that did not include Kiley or Wigdortz. Whitty recalled (Interview, 9/12/2012) that one meeting, likely set up through Barber (though he did not attend), brought together “various of the greatest and good of education” to discuss TfL with Timms. This meeting took place at Westminster/DfES on 15 April, apparently just prior to the ministerial meeting involving Tabberer, Kiley, Wigdortz and corporate supporters. In attendance, according to Whitty, were a number of TfL supporters involved in education including Lampl and May. Another meeting took place between Whitty, Timms, and Tabberer on 29 April – around the time, and more likely just after, Tabberer’s “difficult” meeting with Kiley and Wigdortz.

Whitty described these meetings as the means through which his institution helped bring about government support for TfL and recalled Tabberer’s involvement in discussions signaled a change. “Originally, the idea was that TfL would be outside the mainstream,” Whitty said (Interview, 9/07/2012), “[and] as a result of the meeting with Timms, Ralph Tabberer I think was tasked with getting this into the mainstream [meaning under the auspices of the TTA].” Whitty had not directly lobbied Tabberer previously, despite being on friendly terms, due to the roles each played – Tabberer was the head of the agency awarding contracts to training providers such as the IOE.

Whitty and Totterdell] were right in lobbying Number 10 and the Department ministers rather than necessarily trying to come and persuade me. It’s sometimes arcane but… there are always rules of behavior. There’s right ways and wrong ways of doing these things, and it is about
being open to each other but also trying always to make sure that you’re not favoring somebody just because it’s sort of a fashionable idea or pet love.

– Ralph Tabberer, Chief Executive, TTA
Interview, 20/01/2015

Immediately after the meeting with Tabberer in late April 2002, Wigdortz and Kiley held an “emergency strategy meeting” with McKinsey consultants in which they “planned out whom we needed to influence and how” (Wigdortz 2012, p.67). To remedy their precarious position, they planned a “two-pronged approach” with some of their supporters “contacting Downing Street to ask them to approach the [DfES] to give us another look” while Wigdortz would “get in touch with Ralph Tabberer” to see how to gain his approval (Wigdortz 2012, p.68). The TfL “backers” whom they tapped to contact the Prime Minister’s office were likely Whitty and/or Barber. As a result, another critical meeting was set up with Adonis at 10 Downing Street. That meeting, Totterdell said, was “a rescue operation” aimed at reviving TfL.

6.13 A “Rescue” Meeting at 10 Downing Street

In early May 2002, a meeting took place at 10 Downing Street between (1) Wigdortz and Totterdell12, (2) Timms and an official from the DfES, and (3) Adonis and Diamond. Totterdell recalled Adonis and Diamond were the “key recipients” of their presentation while Timms and another were “passive partners on the ‘government side’”. He felt the goal of this meeting was to convince Timms and the DfES that TfL should be backed and funded. Notably, Tabberer was not present nor were any other TTA officials in attendance. During the meeting, Totterdell and Wigdortz presented their PowerPoint explaining the need and their design for the programme.

We had about an hour, and we did the presentation, we had an exchange. My role there was really to first of all, do the introductions… but also to sell it as a teacher education model that could add value, potentially transformative, and something that really was worth a try, that couldn’t just be subsumed under current methodologies and models, which the

12 Another McKinsey consultant was also present, but Totterdell was unable to recall his name.
TTA at the time were very keen to do… He [Adonis] was very open… [and] asked some penetrating questions. The meeting actually went from a neutral tenor where we were being given a hearing to a rather enthusiastic one in which we felt we had resonated with Adonis and his own advisor.

– Michael Totterdell, Head of the Secondary PGCE Programme, IOE
Interview, 23/11/2012

Totterdell believed this meeting had a decisive impact on Timms as well, a judgment that he based on his later encounters and subsequent friendship with Timms.

[Timms] had very, very little sense in his own right of education, though a good deal of sense about technology and its potential in education and was locked into a complete minder syndrome with the DfE … He is someone whom I respect for his wider set of beliefs, but he was not his own person and he certainly would not have been able to make any pro-Teach First decision under pressure from financiers and City heavyweights in London and would’ve been definitely protected from doing so by those around him, which makes me believe the meeting in Number 10 was actually really cathartic and quite decisive [for him]. It was the turning point.

– Michael Totterdell, Head of the Secondary PGCE Programme, IOE
Interview, 25/01/2015

The subsequent outcomes of that meeting were enthusiastic ministerial support and, critically, assurances of a funding stream for the programme from the DfES – both which Totterdell attributed to the influence of Adonis.

Adonis, after that meeting, clearly got the Department to free up funds… and exerted a major influence there that turned around the schools minister… Adonis was able to get his hands on a budget and that’s where the Number 10 was so significant because without that budget, Teach First would’ve been stifled by the TTA. I mean [Teach First] would’ve been a miniscule little group that [the TTA] would have controlled quite dramatically in the early years and probably – if it weren’t snuffed out – it certainly would have conformed much more to the standard operating models.

– Michael Totterdell, Head of the Secondary PGCE Programme, IOE
Interview, 25/01/2015

Diamond confirmed that he and Adonis helped find DfES funding for the scheme but insisted that Adonis “never said at any point to the Department, ‘You have to do this because the Prime Minister said so’…it was more about exaltation and persuasion” (Interview, 30/01/2015).
There were obviously some to-ing and fro-ing between us and the Department [DfES] and what became Teach First over the funding issues, particularly, obviously the funding was quite contentious, and we had to resolve some of those issues. We were not getting involved in any of the very detailed, mechanical discussions about the implementation.

– Patrick Diamond, Aide, PMPU
Interview, 30/01/2015

Some civil servants, however, were irked by the sudden push to fund TfL without being involved in meetings.

It was a bit frustrating for people in the Department to see [TfL] almost going around their backs to talk to ministers because civil servants who would have been responsible for implementing the programme had to play catch up to find out what was being discussed and what had been agreed… they didn’t get the chance to offer their own view. It was coming down from ministers. You know, “I met Brett Wigdortz last night and this is what he said and this is what we’re going to do” whether or not that was basically a good idea or one that had the money allocated to it already.

– Graham Holley, Division Manager, DfES
Interview, 30/05/2012

Despite the frustrations of some, the DfES put together roughly £500,000 to help launch TfL. Though Timms could not recall specific meetings with Adonis, he said the two did collaborate to launch TfL. “Certainly, I’ve talked to Andrew since [then] about the fact that we got Teach First going at that time,” Timms said, adding, “I think Andrew claims credit for it. I’m sure he did play some part in it, but it was me that was the Minister” (Interview, 26/04/2012). Timms was, in fact, the minister and who (along with the Education Secretary) ultimately had the power to authorize departmental funding for the scheme. Still, Tabberer warned, “Don’t underestimate Andrew’s [Adonis’s] influence on these kinds of initiatives. It’s what Andrew is really good at. He talks to all parties and explains what he’s doing and he’s very highly trusted by all parts of the political, you know…” (Interview, 22/05/2012).

While Timms and Adonis went about securing DfES funding for TfL, Wigdortz sought out Tabberer to discuss TfL’s training model. Technically, TfL needed the approval and funding from the TTA in order to train teachers. However, one interviewee suggested that TfL could have existed outside the TTA’s accreditation system and simply had its recruits work as unqualified teachers. If TfL did that – chose to operate outside and independent of the TTA regulatory system –
then, as Whitty pointed out, “the programme would have needed to be funded by the private sector and by the Peter Lampls of this world to a vastly greater extent than it was” (Interview, 9/07/2012). Given that Kiley and Wigdortz were having some trouble raising £500,000 privately, it looked unlikely that TfL would ever be fully or primarily funded by the business community and/or philanthropic sector.

6.14 Revising TfL: Wigdortz and Tabberer Meet

To discuss how the TfL model could be adapted to satisfy the TTA, Wigdortz emailed Tabberer for a meeting as planned in the McKinsey emergency strategy meeting. Tabberer responded promptly by calling Wigdortz to set up a meeting because Timms had urged him to help resolve the impasse.

[After the ministerial meeting in late April] there was pretty quickly a reaction, which probably came out of Stephen Timms and Andrew [Adonis] talking and saying, “Is there something we can do with this?”… I can remember a conversation where [Timms] turned to me and asked if I would do some work on it. That really pointed me back at it… It was pretty important to me that I had a minister turn to me and say, “Ralph, could you see them and see if you can give them some help?” That was the critical thing, the personal motivation, because Timms is a very impressive minister and when somebody turns to you like that, and he’s getting some encouragement or he sees something in it, you take a second and a very careful look. So I wanted to find out if we could make it work for him… that’s when I invited Brett [Wigdortz] over to the Agency to talk.

– Ralph Tabberer, Chief Executive, TTA
Interview, 20/01/2015

In addition to Timms’s personal request, Tabberer had another concern motivating him. “I very much wanted any scheme like this to fall under the aegis of the TTA,” Tabberer said. “The last thing you want, as an agency, is for part of your work to be governed by someone else, and I didn’t want this overseen by the Department. If it was to go ahead, it had to come through us” (Tabberer Interview, 20/01/2015)

Thus, when Tabberer and Wigdortz sat down together, Tabberer made it clear that, unlike TFA, TfL had to work according to TTA frameworks and not detract from the work of other existing routes. It also needed a different name.
There were two leaps to make. One of them was to drop the idea that we could copy something like Teach For America... they tended to see things through that lens... We needed some of the features of [TFA], but we didn’t need a copy-cat, and we didn’t need something which completely sat outside the system... And “Teach For London” just didn’t really sound like a campaign that would work here – the U.K. not being that same sort of nationalist orientation. The second leap was to look at [TfL] in the context of all the other things we were doing in order to improve teacher recruitment, most particularly the GTP programme which had been radically redesigned the year before... to get people into schools and trained by schools and accredited through an on-the-job approach. So there wasn’t much point in [TfL] replicating that model.

– Ralph Tabberer, Chief Executive, TTA
Interview, 20/01/2015

Tabberer proposed that TfL recruitment target a segment of the labour market that the TTA did not already cater to – individuals TTA referred to as the “wont’s” and who were individuals not interested in the teaching profession. Tabberer explained the TTA had diverse training routes for those who wanted to become teachers (the “wills”) and those who were considering teaching (“the maybe’s”). In this way, Tabberer envisioned TfL would recruit a new group rather than drawing them away from already established routes. This thinking helped him accept that, according to Wigdortz’s estimates based on TFA’s experience, only 50 or 60 percent of TfL’s graduates may teach after two years.

They also discussed issues of teacher accreditation. Tabberer rejected the IOE-designed model and insisted teachers on the scheme be required to meet the TTA’s criteria for QTS.

The original proposal wanted to accredit people on the basis of the preparation. [But TfL needed to] be constructed in such a way that these people did not automatically get QTS just by the preparation plus the time in schools. They had to satisfy the QTS requirements both teacher outcome-rated standards – the 42 standards that we created – and there had to be an assessment... and that was critical to us.

– Ralph Tabberer, Chief Executive, TTA
Interview, 20/01/2015

Tabberer also discussed alternatives to the proposed IOE-TfL partnership envisioned in Totterdell’s model.

In order to be a provider of [training] places, [TfL] needed to be a credible teacher trainer, and there were three ways to do that. One of them was to stay with the [IOE] and be part of the Institute. Second way
was to build their own capacity, but they’d have to go through the accreditation process which would take them about a year [and] would slow everybody down... Or third was to go to an open procurement whereby they set out what they wanted and we would help them in picking the best provider in an open competition. And they chose that third route, and we preferred that third route because [we could] turn with total honestly and transparency to the whole market and say, you know, government isn’t just favoring the Institute because it’s down the road or because people like Michael [Totterdell] that they like – this is a genuine opportunity open to everybody.

– Ralph Tabberer, Chief Executive, TTA
Interview, 20/01/2015

Although Tabberer acknowledged the IOE’s role in helping the TfL idea reach this stage, Tabberer said, “Our prime interest was in funding teacher training places. That’s what we had money for. We weren’t terribly interested in giving new organizations money based on their ideas. That’s not the kind of agency we were” (Interview, 20/01/2015).

Emphasizing that he himself was “not political in the slightest”, Tabberer further explained that his insistence on QTS and a procurement process was mandated by legislation.

The agency is rule-bound [and] very well organized... It’s basically the market management, or procurement, system. And [with] opportunities like Teach First, it’s amazing how often that system and that legislation dictated how we would respond. And it was qustered – here’s another route into teaching, so let’s make sure whoever does it is accredited, everybody on it is heading toward [QTS], and there is competition in this market between people to provide it, it will be inspected and if it does well it can grow and if it doesn’t it will fade. We were applying those rules again.

– Ralph Tabberer, Chief Executive, TTA
Interview, 20/01/2015

Tabberer and Wigdortz’s discussion turned into a handful of meetings that took place over the span of a week or so, and eventually included Kiley and other private sector supporters. The changes Tabberer proposed – the targeted pool for recruitment, the training’s adherence to QTS, an open tender to select a training provider, and a change of name – were agreed upon by all.

Wigdortz (2012, p.69) described the TTA’s changes as tweaks to the programme. Kiley accepted the changes but considered some a bit strict. “Tabberer definitely said we had to be an additionality, [meaning] we had to recruit people who
would not otherwise teach,” she said (Kiley Interview, 30/04/2012). She recalled if an applicant said he/she had applied to or were considering undertaking another teacher training route or wanted to be career teachers, then those applicants were not to be selected for TfL. Meanwhile, Tabberer spoke highly of Wigdortz and Kiley, saying they “really listened to us and didn’t hear what we said as blockage – they heard it as challenges” (Tabberer Interview, 22/05/2012).

With the TTA’s changes to the scheme agreed upon, Tabberer presented TfL to the TTA board as a scheme that represented an acceptable value-for-money programme. “Because of the way [TfL] was set up – [with] a lot of the costs of the employment being covered by schools – it wasn’t difficult for us to make sure that the training costs to the Training Agency were economic compared to other options,” Tabberer recalled (Interview, 22/04/2012). The board agreed and approved TfL.

Totterdell subsequently learned of Wigdortz’s discussions with Tabberer and believed he was intentionally excluded from the meetings so the TTA could help determine TfL’s training model and provider.

There is no way we [the IOE] should have been ruled out of that meeting. In holding that meeting, Brett [Wigdortz], with a lack of experience and the sort of packaged projector head that he had at that time, would have been putty in Tabberer’s hands. He’s a master negotiator. But that’s exactly what that meeting was about. And at that meeting, ground was given away that led to a very, very poor initial tender [the TTA’s model specifications for the tender in December 2002].

– Michael Totterdell, Head of the Secondary PGCE Programme, IOE Interview, 24/01/2015

Totterdell also suspected that Tabberer framed his insistence on QTS as the way in which TfL could become a more independent and high-profile organization.

My sense is that probably the tradeoff that took place between Tabberer and Brett [Wigdortz] that if they confined themselves to QTS, they would be allowed to be as high-profile as they wanted to be. If they involved themselves in a PGCE or master’s programme, they would not. They would be tied much more closely to the tails of the provider involved. I would be very surprised if that conversation didn’t take place because Tabberer thinks in quite similar ways to Adonis though not so radically. So my sense is from the beginning they were independent and independent-minded.

– Michael Totterdell, Head of the Secondary PGCE Programme, IOE Interview, 24/01/2015
Totterdell also said he was not immediately aware that Wigdortz agreed to have an open competition managed by the TTA to select TFL’s training provider. Thus, Totterdell continued to advocate for TFL amongst his teacher educators and others until later that fall when the TTA announced there would be a bidding process.

With agreed modifications to the scheme made and funding from the TTA and DfES approved, Timms held a meeting with the proponents of the scheme in mid-May. There, Timms officially announced his support for TFL.

6.15 Preparing for the Launch of “Teach First”

The launch date for the scheme was set for 15 July 2002 and was publicly announced in five London newspapers. Headlines and details emphasized the scheme’s purpose to recruit “top” graduates for “poor” schools, highlighting its connections to “blue-chip” business sponsors. Headlines read:

- “Graduates to teach before joining City” – Evening Standard, 22 May (Miles 2002)
- “Campus volunteers urged to teach” – The Guardian 23 May (Wintour 2002b)
- “Blue-chip talent to help poor schools” – The Times, 23 May (Baldwin 2002)
- “Top graduates for ‘sink’ schools” – The Telegraph, 24 May (Sylvester 2002)
- “Top students to be roped in to teach tough kids” – Straits Times/the Sunday Times, 24 May (Anon 2002)

Notably, all of the newspaper articles (1) referred to the scheme as “Teach For London”, (2) stated it was modeled on TFA, and (3) described TFA as a successful programme that top graduates in America were applying to in significant numbers. While all articles stated the London business community had proposed and backed TFL, only one referred McKinsey’s supporting role (Wintour 2002b). The articles relied primarily on quotes from Kiley in which she described various benefits the new programme would provide. Wigdortz’s name was never mentioned although the IOE was cited in one article for helping develop the scheme’s training.

Soon after the public announcement, Timms was rotated out of the DfES. His replacement – David Miliband – was also supportive of TFL. However, the MP
assigned to TfL was Stephen Twigg, the newly-appointed Minister of London Schools. This was a ministerial role a level under the Schools Minister created in May 2002 in preparation for the launch of the London Challenge, an upcoming initiative the DfES planned to launch in July (Kidson & Norris 2014). Twigg, an Oxford graduate and former London borough councilman, represented North London’s Enfield-Southgate area and first learned of TfL through a brief submitted to him. “My immediate reaction was very, very positive,” Twigg said (Interview, 24/04/2012), adding, “Clearly, it was rooted in the Teach For America programme, so I was presented with analysis of how that programme worked and that was very encouraging.” He recalled he saw TfL as complementary to the goals the DfES was developing for the London Challenge.

The task of London Challenge was to raise quality of education but also to challenge some of those misconceptions that existed about the quality of education in London… As it happened, Teach First coincided with the launch of the London Challenge and we absolutely, in the narrative of London Challenge, included Teach First as a positive programme to help improve the quality of teaching and learning in London schools. So I saw it as integral.

– Stephen Twigg, London Schools Minister
Interview, 24/04/2012

For these reasons, Twigg endorsed and coordinated the DfES’s commitment to TfL.

With government’s support for TfL secured, Kiley’s group renewed their search for business supporters to finance TfL and join the advisory board being set up for the scheme. From among London First’s members, Kiley targeted Citigroup and pitched the TfL idea to Jennifer Scardino, Citigroup’s Director of Corporate Affairs for Europe, Middle East and Africa. Scardino was an American graduate of Columbia University who had worked in the Clinton Administration before joining Citigroup in 2000. In her new position, Scardino [Interview, 18/05/15] said she was responsible at the time for creating “a feeling of cohesion” across the company, which was a recent amalgamation of three organizations: two U.S.-based companies – Citibank and the Traveler’s Group (an insurance company) and a division of the U.K.-based asset-management company Schroders. With around 50,000 employees in her region, she was looking for “a few flagship programmes to help give the business some CSR strategy and some things our people could get involved in… to
help integrate [our] diverse cultures”. Thus, when Kiley asked for her support for “a
Teach For America in London”, Scardino said the decision was easy.

I was already exploring what we were going to be doing in the CSR space for the bank. [And] I was very aware of the work of TFA… My husband had been working at AmeriCorp, the Clinton Administration’s domestic Peace Corps [which provided funding for TFA], and we lived in D.C., and so through that community of people I had met Wendy [Kopp] or met somebody who worked there… It’s a really good idea that people can really get their heads around, makes a lot of sense, and a lot of us, myself included, have thought, “Wow, I wish they had been around when I was a graduate”, because, you know, I went straight into an industry and never stopped.

– Jennifer Scardino, Director of Corporate Affairs, Citigroup
Interview, 18/05/15

Scardino also pointed out that “in attempting to design a CSR programme for what was at the time the world’s biggest bank, you are not going take a huge risk”. Thus, Scardino and Citigroup’s Chairman in Europe, Winfried Bischoff, agreed to back TfL because it was based on an already proven model, TFA. Scardino then gained approval of the company’s board and requested money from the Citi Foundation in New York City, which allocated the company’s charitable funds globally. Scardino said her “American colleagues at the Citi Foundation… knew exactly what it was because they had been financing TFA for years” and thus promptly approved £50,000 for TfL. Scardino also joined TfL’s advisory board.

Another executive that joined the advisory board and sponsored TfL was Rob Habgood, Managing Director of Capital One in the U.K. Habgood, an American, had set up the British arm of the U.S. credit card company from scratch starting in 1996. By 2002, Capital One was well established in the country, and Habgood said its senior executives were being encouraged to “get involved in one or two non-profit activities”, thus prompting him to look around.

One of the things we tried to do at Capital One was find local non-profit activity that we could get involved in, that we were passionate about, [and] thought was well-aligned with what Capital One was trying to focus on in the non-profit space [which was] kids at risk. [And] one of the key things that we looked for in getting involved were places where it wasn’t just sitting through a board meeting and giving money, but places where we could be actively involved in adding value, with sharing our experience and advice, and Teach First ended up being a great match on that side of things.

– Rob Habgood, Managing Director, Capital One
Habgood recalled he was already “aware and inspired” by TFA when he met Wigdortz and learned of the upcoming launch of TfL.

I immediately hit it off with Brett [Wigdortz] and loved the fact that he was facing very similar challenges in the non-profit space to what I had faced in the for-profit space in building out Capital One… [and] [Teach First] is such a compelling concept because [it’s a] Peace Corps-type of opportunity at home with the benefit of getting a teaching certificate that people can use later in life.

– Rob Habgood, Managing Director, Capital One

Interview, 28/04/2015

Thus, Habgood became an advisor to Wigdortz and secured Capital One’s £50,000 donation to the scheme.

During this time, Kiley, Wigdortz, and their colleagues also discussed what to rename TfL. Tabberer had insisted the name TfL would not work and Kopp had not wanted TFA to be so closely associated with the London scheme. Thus, when Kiley suggested Teach London First due to its association with London First, it was decided to drop “London” and go with simply “Teach First” (Wigdortz 2012, p.84).

In preparation for the official launch, Teach First was set up as a charity that was owned and jointly managed by a board of five trustees from London First and BITC. The advisory board ultimately included business executives, leaders of the headteacher unions, and other supporters. Moreover, Wigdortz requested to continue on as Teach First’s Chief Executive, to which the trustees agreed.

In the early days [Wigdortz] wasn’t what you’d say was a leader. But he was the only person on that team that really, really internalized the mission and by the time we came to look for a Chief Executive, he was the only one who really wanted to do it… We were all very nervous, but we definitely wanted to move forward with this. There were many reasons why Brett was a terrible idea. (laughs)… [But] he really had fire in his belly about wanting to do it. So that was very attractive, but we had a lot of growing pains at the beginning.

– Rona Kiley, Director of Business and Education, London First

Interview, 30/04/2012

13 The trustees were Kiley, May, and Cleverdon, as well as O’Brien and Iacobescu (the only independent trustee) who acted as co-chairs.

14 Advisory board members included O’Neill (Goldman Sachs and SHINE), Lovegrove (McKinsey), Dunford (SHA), Hart (NAHT), Hodgson (Paul Hamlyn Foundation), Scardino (Citigroup), Habgood (Capital One), and Fabes as an “observer” (DfES).
The trustees then helped Wigdortz hire a staff, though he first offered positions to his colleagues at McKinsey who had been supporting the scheme. Two of his McKinsey colleagues, Nat Wei and Paul Davies, decided to join the organization as Director of Graduate Recruitment and Chief Operating Officer respectively. To help with graduate recruitment, he then hired Nicole Sherrin, a TFA alumni and award-winning teacher referred to him by Kopp. Wigdortz and colleagues then put an advertisement in the *Times* and interviewed individuals for graduate recruitment positions. Just prior to the launch date, final staff members were hired, and Kopp came to visit Wigdortz and Kiley.

Finally, the launch event was held in Canary Wharf on 15 July 2002 and was led by Twigg and other educational leaders. As speeches continued, Wigdortz (2012, p.88), recalled, “At the last minute, I was told that it did not make sense for me to be one of the main speakers… since I wasn’t of the same stature as the rest of the guests.” Instead, Wigdortz answered questions at the close of the event. He later regretted this as he recalled the speeches at the launch focused on the problems in education and the importance of good teachers and “lacked the energy and specificity” he envisioned. Nevertheless, the idea for TfL had become a reality with a new name, hired staff, and secured government funding.

The launch marked the end of the mobilization phase of Teach First. Although fundraising and the recruitment of supporters for the scheme continued into the next phase, the primary goal was no longer seeking the approval and establishment of the programme. The goal in Phase III was implementing the scheme.
7.1 Policy Entrepreneurs, Networks, and Reinvention

In Phase II, Kiley, Wigdortz, and their teams became policy entrepreneurs and built an influential network of supporters in favour of the transfer of TfL. They eventually succeeded in officially launching the scheme as Teach First by July 2002. The mobilization phase of Teach First’s emergence was a complex process of political maneuvering, tapping the right networks to bring together the symbolic support and resources across London’s many sectors. In this period, networks were critically important and debates over how TfL should be reinvented were key themes. Thus, my guiding research questions in this process were: How did policy entrepreneurs utilize networks to effectively diffuse the idea of TfL and ultimately bring about its transfer? And, How was TfL perceived and its reinvention viewed by others in the process of mobilizing support for TfL?

In addition to these two research questions, which focus on the issues of agency and processes, I also consider: How did institutional contexts shape actors’ interpretations, as well as the actions and outcomes, of the mobilization phase? This question directly relates to the concept of reinvention and how various influential actors judged TfL should be adapted in relation to the contextual peculiarities of the two countries. Thus, I first ground this chapter in a comparative analysis of (1) the institutional contexts which TfL advocates were navigating and (2) the institutional contexts of the U.S., and (3) the history of TFA and the contexts in which it developed. Institutional contexts, particularly the educational and political settings, were markedly different in the U.S. and U.K. and comparing them serves to highlight how transferring the TFA model to England was not a simple task but involved judgments in how it should be reinvented. This reinvention debate was central to overcoming opposition to TfL during this phase.

To be clear, this chapter is organized as follows. In the first half, I compare and analyze the American and British institutional contexts as they related to TFA and TfL respectively. This enables me to highlight the conditions that facilitated TFA’s development in the U.S. and how contexts and actors’ subjective interpretations put the question of TfL’s transferability into question. In the second
half of the chapter, I proceed to examine the processes of policy development during Phase II through identifying four stages of activity: base-building, pressuring, negotiating, and legitimizing. In each stage, I identify the strategies employed by the policy entrepreneurs advocating for TfL and discuss how these efforts ultimately led to a negotiated reinvention of TfL, enabling it to be launched as “Teach First”.

7.2 The Complexity of Contexts and Difficulty of Drawing Lessons

As Kiley and Wigdortz began their efforts to launch TfL, they stepped into a realm of policy that had been radically transformed since the mid-1980s. The issue of how teachers were trained and who trained them had been highly contested and an area over which government exercised considerable control. As Americans, Kiley and Wigdortz had little understanding of this institutional context and history, and hence, were not familiar with political struggles and power dynamics that were created by it. This lack of knowledge of policy contexts would be both an asset and a weakness – an asset in the sense that it allowed Wigdortz and Kiley to advocate for TfL as seemingly neutral and objective outsiders, but also a weakness that limited their awareness of New Labour’s priorities, the TTA’s role in teacher training, and universities’ stake in ITT. However, Kiley and Wigdortz – as well as other interviewees – had limited understanding of TFA and its development and role in the context of education in the U.S. This prompted individuals in Phase II – including Tabberer, Barber, and Adonis – to draw contrasting lessons from the American programme. These contrasting lessons were shaped by several factors: (1) their personal background, (2) interpretations of contexts, (3) the views of close contacts within their own networks, and (4) the extent of their knowledge of TFA and its history.

I begin unraveling the complexity of contexts, and actors’ situated understandings of TFA/TfL, by discussing TFA. I briefly trace the circumstances, founding contexts, and development of TFA. Next, I compare and highlight the ways in which TFA’s contexts differed from the landscapes TfL was entering. I then discuss two other key contextual differences between the U.S. and England that caused TfL to evolve differently than TFA before proceeding to analyze the process through which the scheme became officially established.
7.2.1 Understanding the Development of TFA in the U.S. Context

While the U.S and England had similar problems meeting teacher demand and addressing low pupil achievement in high-poverty schools, the countries had very different approaches to managing the quality and supply of teachers. While the British government had pro-actively inserted itself into teacher education and largely determined its structure and design by 2002, the federal government in the U.S. had no such role. Federal involvement in teacher education in the U.S. remained relatively weak compared to England. Education policy and teacher certification remained issues determined predominately at the state and school district level. As a result, state standards for teacher certification varied along with the unconventional routes available to become a teacher although university schools of education still provided the vast majority of the country’s teachers (Feistritzer & Chester 2000). Still, efforts had been made to promote national standards and greater accountability in teacher education (Roth & Swail 2000) with two national bodies in the U.S. offering accreditation to teacher education programmes on a voluntary basis. Because institutional accreditation was also available through state and regional bodies, only a third of the more than 1,300 institutions providing teacher education held accreditation on the national level.

TFA first developed in this fragmented and decentralized context as a privately funded national programme that operated independently but partnered with school district authorities to place its recruits into schools in states that had existing alternative certification routes and teacher shortages. For TFA’s first summer institute in 1990, Kopp recruited teacher educators specializing in multi-cultural education at the University of Wisconsin-Madison to deliver teacher training (which was how Whitty encountered TFA as he was on sabbatical there). Soon, however, TFA evolved in response to (1) national debates around teacher training, (2) its need for private funding, and (3) its concern with safeguarding its brand and image.

After its first summer institute training, Kopp dissolved TFA’s association with university-based teacher educators, in part due to complaints from private funders, including wealthy conservative Texas businessman Ross Perot (Boyle-Baise Interview, 20/01/2012). Instead, Kopp switched to using TFA alumni and a more practical-based curriculum for its summer training. This not only reflected Kopp’s perceptions of weaknesses in universities’ approach to teacher training but also her
concern with the low-status of schools of education and the preferences of funders on which TFA relied. Despite facing funding shortfalls in its first years, Kopp succeeded in keeping TFA afloat and in marketing it as the new domestic Peace Corps that carried on the legacy of the Civil Rights Movement by working to end education inequity. Meanwhile, TFA successfully recruited top university graduates and placed them in some of America’s neediest schools.

However, with this success, Kopp and TFA soon developed a contentious relationship with teacher educators and profession-led bodies by further wading into the highly politicized national debate about how teachers should be trained. Throughout the 1990s, there were two camps in the U.S. vying for influence over policy related to school teachers: (1) the proponents for professionalization of teaching (e.g. Darling-Hammond 2000; Darling-Hammond et al. 1999), led by the teacher educators and professional bodies, and (2) the advocates of deregulation (e.g. Ballou & Podgursky 2000; Kanstoroom & Finn 1999), led by New Right intellectuals, economists, business leaders, and conservative think tanks. Professionalization advocates called for national standards and assessments for teacher certification while the deregulators proposed abolishing state certification requirements and allowing schools to hire individuals from the open market, including those with no teaching experience or training (for more details on the national debate, see Cochran-Smith & Fries 2001).

In this highly politicized debate, Kopp publicly championed the side of deregulation early on by publishing arguments calling on state policy-makers to bypass teacher education and certification altogether and directly fund school districts to recruit, hire, and train their own teachers (with the help of a new company she was planning to launch to help districts do such) (Kopp 1992; 1994). As a result, a leading education academic at Columbia University, Linda Darling-Hammond, published a scathing critique of the shortcomings of Kopp and her TFA programme. Darling-Hammond (1994) drew attention to Kopp’s lack of knowledge about teacher education and highlighted evidence of the dismal performance of TFA recruits in classrooms across New York City. While Kopp expressed shock and outrage at Darling-Hammond’s claims (Kopp 2001), the negative assessment of TFA posed a potential threat to TFA’s credibility and funding. However, as discovered in the course of my study, Darling-Hammond’s criticism also had the effect of galvanizing support for the struggling non-profit.
From this experience, Kopp learned her views could negatively impact TFA’s work. As a result, she learned to disengage from public debate and purport that TFA was apolitical. Doing so allowed Kopp to protect TFA’s reputation, enabling the organization to continue to recruit bi-partisan support and appeal to elite graduates of all backgrounds. Yet, in more private settings and among funders, Kopp continued to position TFA as a viable and effective alternative to schools of education (Schneider 2011; 2014), mirroring the New Right attacks on university-based teacher education espoused in the U.K based on provider-capture arguments.

While carefully managing its image, TFA continued to grow as a well-connected but politically controversial programme. Critics were dismayed by TFA’s substantial corporate funding and its limited teacher training. In addition, critics questioned claims that TFA was producing more effective teachers than schools of education while the scheme simultaneously shielded itself from outside scrutiny and accountability. Meanwhile, TFA was starting to demonstrate to its supporters how it empowered a new breed of education reformers who were establishing charter schools (e.g. KIPP) and other educational innovations, including a company to help school districts develop alternative teacher training routes (The New Teacher Project). In 2000, the leaders of TFA set ambitious expansion goals which prompted them to engage in lobbying the federal government at the same time as the monumental No Child Left Behind Act was being formulated (Russo 2012). Thus, TFA’s size and political influence at the federal level was just beginning to expand as Kiley and Wigdortz were championing TfL in the U.K. However, at that time, TFA also had its opponents in Congress, notably among them the influential Senator Ted Kennedy, who sided with the teacher unions that certification mattered and, thus, was essentially against the expansion of TFA (Russo 2012).

The point here is not to defend or attack TFA but highlight that TFA was an evolving innovation with a complex history shaped by political and educational contexts of the U.S. While TFA did not have to seek permission from government nor regulatory bodies such as the TTA, finding funding was nevertheless a main challenge for TFA in its first five years. As a result, Kopp had to navigate politically charged debates that were constantly reshaping the teacher training field in both practice and policy. Still, as a national programme, TFA had the flexibility of building relationships with different states and districts that favoured TFA’s approach while avoiding localities whose leaders and policies were less...
accommodating. This contributed to TFA’s independence and ability to survive despite criticism and attacks on its effectiveness.

Because Kiley and Wigdortz did not fully understand the differences between the U.S. and England’s teacher education context nor appreciate how TFA was an innovation moulded by American political structure and contexts, they made biased assumptions about how such a scheme could be launched in England and in what form. Drawing lessons from TFA’s experience, they assumed the wider education establishment, especially the unions, would automatically be hostile toward TfL. They also conceptualized TfL as a programme that would essentially operate independently and presumably outside the normal teacher training frameworks, not foreseeing this as a particularly problematic stance.

Still, they were aware of Blair’s focus on “education, education, education” yet only vaguely knowledgeable of the policies New Labour was enacting and the rationale behind them. Adopting a pro-active “let’s-do-it” attitude, they likely did not feel the need to learn more about contextual differences as they saw their idea as rooted in common sense and backed by the McKinsey study. They linked the idea to TFA to indicate it was already “tried-and-tested” in the U.S. and hence clearly effective in addressing an urgent problem. However, knowledge of New Labour’s education agenda was misleading as they lacked an understanding of teacher training in the U.K. Without a deeper knowledge of such background contexts, Kiley and Wigdortz initially dismissed those critical of TfL without considering how TfL may be adapted to appeal to bureaucratic “sceptics”. Fortunately for them, Totterdell and (eventually) Tabberer provided the expertise to help adapt TfL, but both men had opposing visions of what the ideal adaptations were.

7.2.2 Problems with Drawing Lessons from TFA for Transfer & Reinvention

Kiley and Wigdortz drew lessons from TFA to inform their efforts to launch TfL. Meanwhile, members of New Labour – including Barber, Adonis, and Tabberer – knew about TFA and judged it based on their understanding of TFA and the American context. They drew somewhat different, and even contradictory lessons, which highlights the problem of a-historical lesson-drawing (Rose 1993) to inform policy transfer. A key factor that led to differences among the lessons drawn
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from TFA was the varying levels of knowledge of TFA, its development, and the educational and political contexts of both countries. On this point, I offer a brief look at actors’ knowledge, the lessons each drew, and the consequences of presumption.

Kiley and Wigdortz both had limited (and arguably biased) knowledge of TFA and its history but differing knowledge of education and political context in the U.S. Prior to December 2001, Kiley had known of TFA only through her social contacts in New York, and Wigdortz had never heard of TFA. They both sought instrumental knowledge of TFA through conference calls with Kopp and TFA alumni. In this way, Kiley and Wigdortz both gained more knowledge but still only a limited understanding of TFA. Yet, some interviewees (e.g., O’Brien, Totterdell), who had some or no previous awareness of TFA, perceived Kiley and/or Wigdortz as rather knowledgeable of TFA and hence afforded them more authority on the subject, perhaps due in part to their American nationality and personal contact with TFA leaders. At the same time, Kiley, as a former social worker and education advocate, was more knowledgeable of American political and educational contexts than Wigdortz, who was younger and worked primarily outside the continental U.S. after finishing university in 1996. However, both Kiley and Wigdortz had little more than a basic understanding of the English context. This mix contributed to their positive and uncritical views of TFA and their attempt to design and navigate political contexts in a similar way that TFA had, both lessons which proved problematic.

Meanwhile, as former educational researchers, both Tabberer and Barber had generally positive views of TFA. Both were highly knowledgeable of England’s educational and political context and understood to some degree the differences between the countries’ regulatory contexts. They also both considered England’s more structured and centralized government controls over ITT as superior to the Americans’ decentralized and relatively autonomous teacher education system (Barber 1995; Tabberer 2012). Perhaps because of these obvious differences, transferring the TFA idea to the U.K. had not been seriously considered before. Still, Tabberer and Barber differed in their view of TFA’s transferability to the U.K. because they chose different dimensions of context on which to base their analysis. Tabberer was aware of the roots of controversy surrounding TFA and had come to view TFA as a “disruptive innovation” that challenged the dominance of schools of
education in teacher training. Since the TTA tightly regulated ITT providers in England, Tabberer felt TFA was not needed in the U.K. He also understood that TFA had a nationalistic and missionary appeal to graduates that would likely be unsuccessful in the U.K. given the differences in the national cultures of the two countries. In other words, he contended that graduates in the U.K. would not likely join a TFA-type programme as promoted in the U.S. In this way, he looked at the regulatory context to understand the merit and appeal of TFA as an American-specific innovation and one not needed in England.

In contrast, Barber saw TFA as transferable and needed in the U.K. He indicated TFA had the potential to address similar problems both countries faced in attracting top graduates into teaching, recruiting enough teachers to satisfy demand, and improving pupil achievement in disadvantaged schools. He admired TFA’s success in addressing these areas and believed such a TFA-type scheme in London could address the policy goals of the Green Paper. In this way, Barber based his assessment and lessons on the “contexts of policy problems” of both countries and considered TFA a transferrable and desirable policy solution given New Labour’s agenda. By looking only at “contexts of policy problems”, he minimized the importance of other differences in national contexts, leaving adaptation up to the DfES and TTA.

Adonis, unlike Tabberer and Barber, had limited knowledge of the educational contexts of the U.S. (though was probably well-informed of its national politics), but he was highly knowledgeable in the political and educational contexts of the U.K. He had heard about TFA in the years prior, but not until personally meeting Kopp (sometime in the late 1990s or early 2000) did he learn more details about the scheme. As a result, he came to view TFA as transferrable because it addressed problems common to both the American and English, namely teacher quality, teacher shortages, and underachievement in disadvantaged schools. Thus, like Barber, he saw TFA as a needed and transferrable policy solution based on his analysis of the policy-problem context. Unlike Tabberer and Barber, however, Adonis felt TFA’s success stemmed from its autonomy from government control, much like Thomas Telford School, a successful CTC in Shropshire (Adonis 2012). Thus, he had already championed policy ideas that circumvented bureaucracy, such as academies and Fast Track, both of which were directly managed by the DfES. Because of this, he considered the differences in the two regulatory contexts of the
two nations as irrelevant. He wanted TfL to operate as TFA did, independently of government bureaucracy, including the TTA.

Thus, Adonis, Tabberer, and Barber as well as Kiley and Wigdortz learned different lessons from TFA and thus had differing rationales mainly for (but also against) TfL and how the scheme might work in the U.K. Individuals’ own depth of knowledge of TFA and how they made sense of contexts shaped the lesson they drew from TFA to inform their view of TfL. Individuals’ views were also affected and empowered by their organizational positions, most notably with Tabberer as head of the TTA. Barber and Adonis, on the other hand, had worked in the DfES and thus were less tied to a particular institutional script than Tabberer and free to associate and favour the TfL training model proposed by the IOE.

7.2.3 Other Contextual Differences Affecting TfL’s Transfer & Reinvention

Two other notable differences between the national contexts of the U.S. and U.K. that affected the transfer and reinvention of TfL were: (1) the levels of philanthropic giving among individuals and corporations and (2) business involvement in education policy. I briefly explain these contextual differences and how they shaped TFA as well as the TfL concept and efforts to launch it.

**Philanthropic Sector** Although TFA had successfully launched with financial resources from wealthy business leaders, corporations, and philanthropic foundations, such high levels of private sector support was not possible for TfL. Kiley and Wigdortz learned that levels of charitable giving among individuals and the corporate sector in the U.K. were far below those in the U.S. (despite increased levels of giving through the work of BITC) (Campbell et al. 2002). In the U.S., levels of corporate philanthropy were much higher and more institutionalized in part because the government tax incentives that encouraged giving. Other reasons for this difference stem from contrasting cultural attitudes of Americans and Britons toward money, class, and government responsibility as well as differences in the historical and economic contexts of the two countries (Wright 2002; Grant 2011).

Given this difference in philanthropic giving between contexts, it is perhaps no surprise that TfL found financial support from those in the corporate world who were either:
(1) Americans working for American-based multinational corporations in the U.K., such as Jennifer Scardino (Citibank) and Rob Habgood (Capital One);
(2) Britons who had worked for American-based multinational corporations such as Jim O’Neill (SHINE/Goldman Sachs), or
(3) Britons who had lived/worked in the U.S., such as George Iacobescu (Canary Wharf), Patricia Lankester (Paul Hamlyn Foundation), Peter Lampl (Sutton Trust).

Most of these individuals, in addition to already having a familiarity with TFA, also likely modelled U.S. philanthropy practices. In fact, Lampl cited Americans’ expectations of philanthropic giving by the financially successful as among the inspirations that led him to become a philanthropist in the U.K. Notably, Lampl and O’Neill have been viewed as examples of what has been termed the “new philanthropy” in the U.K. through which a more American view of self-interested altruism has been promoted and whose impact in the education sectors has grown (Stephen J Ball 2008; Ball & Junemann 2011; Henley 2012).

Businesses’ Involvement in Education and Policy-making While Kiley and Wigdortz could not rely exclusively on private funding to launch TfL (unlike TFA), they also discovered that business influence on education policy was more limited in the U.K. than in the U.S. While the conservative governments of both the U.S. and U.K. encouraged the private sector to take a more active role in society in the 1980s, the decentralized nature of U.S. governance historically afforded businesses more influence and participation in education policy at all levels. Consequently, American corporate leaders became increasingly involved in formulating and lobbying for school reforms in the 1980s and 1990s (David 1991; Cradle 2007).

In contrast, the U.K.’s more centralized government engaged in more prescriptive policy-making in education and teacher training in particular (David 1991). As a result, despite the influential and privileged role London First had in the governance of London throughout the 1990s and after the formation of the GLA in 2000 (Thornley et al. 2005b), that influence did not translate into significant clout in education policy-making. Still, as discussed in previous chapters, London First was aiming to become involved with London schools because it was an important CSR priority and borough authorities – not the GLA – managed the city’s schools. Thus,
although individual businesses had been involved with schools locally, TfL represented London First’s first collective venture into the education policy and collaboration with the DfES.

However, TfL was different from the type of business-education partnership initiative that BITC had commonly facilitated. TfL was an idea that represented an alternative model for teacher recruitment and training, an area of policy that was managed nationally by the TTA. Thus, the proposal for TfL challenged a highly regulated (and contested) policy area where business influence was non-existent. Consequently, Kiley’s strategy of amassing business clout to influence policy eventually had limited success. Instead, the fight for TfL’s future played out more behind the scenes. Because leaders on education matters – notably Adonis, Barber, Tabberer, and Totterdell – held differing interpretations of TFA, their conflict of views initially stalled the progress of TfL and left the Schools Minister indecisive. Thus, interpretations shaped the process of the scheme’s emergence and later determined in what form it was eventually approved.

7.2.4 New Labour’s Education Agenda (1997-2002)

Stepping away from comparing national contexts, I return to the local contexts of England to address how New Labour’s education agenda set the stage for both support and opposition to TfL amongst those in No. 10 and the DfES. Since Blair’s New Labour government came to power in 1997, improving education had been among its top priorities. While accepting most of the reforms enacted by the Conservative, New Labour aimed to increase the prestige of teaching by declaring teaching would be an all-graduate profession and setting out its agenda for improving the profession in the 1998 Green Paper, *Teachers: Meeting the Challenge of Change* (DfEE 1998). Co-written primarily by Adonis and Barber, the paper proposed “a new vision” for the profession in which excellent teaching practice and school leadership was both developed and rewarded.

To accomplish this, the Blair government called for the “modernisation of the teaching profession” (DfEE 1998, p.6). This “new” professional was contrasted with other notions of professionalism among teachers who the paper described as “isolated, unaccountable professionals” who “made curriculum and pedagogical
decisions alone, without reference to the outside world” (DfEE 1998, p.14). Instead, teachers now needed:

- to have high expectations of themselves and of all pupils;
- to accept accountability;
- to take personal and collective responsibility for improving their skills and subject knowledge;
- to seek to base decisions on evidence of what works in schools in this country and internationally;
- to work in partnership with other staff in schools;
- to welcome the contribution that parents, business and others outside a school can make to its success; and
- to anticipate change and promote innovation.  

(DfEE 1998, p.14)

With this outline, the government directed teachers to focus on developing the practical skills to transmit knowledge prescribed by the national curriculum, accept imposed accountability measures, and be responsive to policy change. For teachers in disadvantaged schools, New Labour promised interventions to provide additional support, and hence the development of the Education Action Zones, Excellence in Cities, and the London Challenge. Through these targeted interventions, New Labour advocated for improving social mobility through education, a focus which created an alignment between government and Lampl’s work through the Sutton Trust and made Barber and Adonis particularly receptive to TFA.

In addition, New Labour’s policies on teachers exalted teachers as “agents of change” who were vitally important (Johnson & Hallgarten 2002). This sentiment mirrored the views of both TFA and TfL as the schemes aimed to change children’s futures through transforming top graduates into leaders in the classroom. Still, Johnson and Hallgarten (2002, p.16) suggested that New Labour “viewed [teachers] as passive tools to be used in its centralized push on standards” which differed from previous Conservative governments that treated teachers “as an obstruction to be overcome in the implementation of the [1988] Education Reform Act”. Totterdell sought to circumvent this limited view of teachers as technicians by creating a new model of training to empower teachers. However, New Labour’s reliance on the TTA to maintain control and improve the quality of ITT and increase the teacher supply precluded others from accepting Totterdell’s experimental model.
Interestingly, the government’s Green Paper hardly mentioned universities. That was because, according to Furlong (2005), New Labour no longer saw teacher education as a key policy concern or prime site in the formation of teachers’ professionalism (unlike past Conservative governments). Instead, government shifted its focus to school-level initiatives and related policies such as structured induction, merit pay, and professional development – all issues promoted in the 1998 Green Paper. This shift in focus from schools of education to schools and teachers themselves as sites of reform likely prevented Totterdell’s training model from gaining more support within the DfES and may have contributed to Wigdortz’s presumption that university training providers were more “advisors” and deliverers of training than autonomous professionals and key partners.

Finally, the Green Paper also emphasized the need to recruit and retain the best teachers for the full potential of the education system to be realized. Thus, “attracting good teachers” was a policy priority identified in the Green Paper, which asserted, “The profession as a whole does not attract enough ambitious young people” (p.15). To attract high quality graduates and raise the appeal and status of teaching, the Blair government proposed greater flexibility in ITT programmes, more consistent and rigorous assessments for QTS, and performance-related pay for teachers and heads. The government also proposed a national Fast Track scheme to identify and rapidly advance the careers of promising teachers. Attracting high-quality teachers and leaders was another New Labour priority that caused Barber and Adonis to look favorably on TfL although others in the DfES wanted to focus on making the floundering Fast Track initiative work rather than consider TfL.

After public consultation, the government began implementing the reforms of the Green Paper in mid-1999, and by 2002, many were up and running and in the process of being reviewed and improved following New Labour’s re-election in mid-2001. Still, there were chronic shortages of teachers in certain subjects and in disadvantaged schools, particularly in London. Resolving this problem became a constant priority for the DfES and TTA in New Labour’s first and second terms, leading to the development of numerous new routes into teaching. These included the GTP, Overseas Trained Teacher scheme, and the flexible PGCE. This policy priority prompted both support and opposition to TfL with some wanting to focus on teacher training routes already created and others wanting to continue to develop new pathways into the profession.
In sum, New Labour’s portrayal of teachers as “agents of change”, its promotion of education as a vehicle for social mobility, and its emphasis on raising the status of teachers and attracting ambitious graduates into teaching led many within government to favour TfL. Meanwhile, constant teacher shortages increased collaboration between the TTA and DfES as they sought to remedy the situation, leading some within the DfES to side with the TTA in initially rejecting TfL. In these ways, New Labour’s policy agenda and work shaped the reactions and interpretations of individuals in government. In this context, Kiley and Wigdortz were disadvantaged with only a cursory knowledge of the party’s policy agenda in education and current teacher training regulations. Still, their embeddedness in influential networks and their ability to tap the expertise and resources of other networks in education, business, and the philanthropic community made up for their outsider status. Their persistent advocacy for TfL as modeled on TFA caught the attention of key individuals already familiar with the American programme.

7.2.5 Awareness of TFA among New Labour leaders

It is worth considering how “new” was the idea of TFA in the British context. TfL clearly came into a policy context in which key policy-makers were already somewhat familiar with TFA. Both Adonis and Barber indicated they knew of TFA prior to hearing about TfL while Tabberer had learned about the controversy surrounding TFA in the mid-1990s. Moreover, with TFA in existence since 1990 and many Britons looking to the U.S. for policy ideas, awareness of TFA among civil servants and New Labour may have been more common than my interviews suggest. Interestingly, the earliest indication that the New Labour had an awareness and admiration for TFA was in 1996. At that time, the *Guardian* reported that Labour proposed “giving incentives to headteachers to take up posts in deprived areas”, an idea “modelled on the Teach for America corps of outstanding graduates who make a two-year commitment to teach in deprived US urban schools” (MacLeod & Smithers 1996). Clearly, TFA had caught the attention of some in England through various channels. Barber had learned of TFA by staying informed of the policies favoured by the Clinton administration. Adonis had learned of TFA through Lampl’s enthusiasm for the scheme and introduction to Kopp. Tabberer had learned of TFA through research that had highlighted the controversy around it.
In sum, all these contexts – ranging from education policy and debates to philanthropy practices and business involvement in education to New Labour’s agenda – helped set the stage for the emergence of TfL. I now turn to analyzing how the temporal process of establishing TfL played out through this complex contextual terrain.

7.3 The Process of Establishing TfL – Agency through Networks

In a roughly seven-month period, TfL was successfully launched in London through a process of relationship- and network-building led by Kiley, Wigdorz, and their colleagues. Their efforts, which drove the mobilization process, were persistent and strategic. Unlike social activists, the team of policy entrepreneurs did not run a public campaign aiming to drum up popular support for TfL by “going door-to-door” but instead strategically knocked on doors which they knew could open other doors closer to the centers of power. Throughout the campaign to bring about the transfer of TFA, the primary activity of the entrepreneurial team shifted as the concept of TfL evolved and support for it grew. I identify four distinct modes of activity: base-building, pressuring, negotiating, and legitimizing. Initially, TfL proponents engaged in base-building, searching for influential supporters from December 2001. Once key advocates for TfL were recruited by February 2002, the strategy became one of pressuring government to approve TfL through repeated meetings with key decision-makers and the recruitment of additional supporters from mid-February to mid-April.

By late April, pressure had built up among coalitions of supporters and opposition within government, raising the profile of the scheme. This pressure came to a head in late-April when the future of TfL looked dim after a meeting between Tabberer, Wigdortz, and Kiley. This prompted a flurry of negotiating amongst the actors involved in the weeks between late April and mid-May. After negotiations settled contested aspects of TfL among key individuals, the scheme gained official government approval and funding in late May. This decision signaled the beginning of activity to formally and publicly legitimize TfL during which steps were taken to officially recognize and legalize its existence, funding, and method of teacher training. These stages represent shifts in activity as well as the progress and
accumulation of influence the policy entrepreneurs were achieving. Below, I examine each stage of activity in more detail and consider how personal biographies, organizational interests, and institutional histories shaped network structures and outcomes.

7.3.1 Base-Building (mid-December 2001 – mid-February 2002)

The Government’s Dismissal

In their initial approach to the DfES, Kiley and Wigdortz banked on the power of their idea, the backing of McKinsey’s study, the success of TFA, and the clout of their corporate supporters to convince officials that TfL was worth backing. This, to their dismay, did not happen. DfES civil servants were unenthusiastic about TfL and passed the proposal to TTA officers to consider. The TTA officers who met with Wigdortz were unimpressed with the proposal as it did not align with its regulatory frameworks. For DfES and TTA officials, the McKinsey study did not provide compelling insights or justification for TfL, and TFA was a model few cared to learn more about. With DfES officials overworked and focused on making the many New Labour policies work, civil servants advised the Schools Minister against considering TfL despite its notable business supporters.

While Kiley and Wigdortz felt the McKinsey report and the success of TFA gave credence to their idea, their failure to grasp the very policy contexts in which the DfES and TTA were working gave away their status as somewhat clueless interlopers. McKinsey’s justification for TfL was rooted in already known educational data, and thus, its analysis and solution was unconvincing. Meanwhile, Kiley and Wigdortz seemed unaware of the weaknesses of their approach, and thus they attributed the lack of interest among civil servants as symptomatic of their bureaucratic, risk-adverse perspective and evidence of the “radical” nature of their idea. From civil servants’ perspective, however, the underdeveloped TfL proposal was seen as a distraction because it was so utterly disconnected from the realities of the system. Additionally, Kiley and Wigdortz underestimated the relatively high esteem with which civil servants are generally viewed in the U.K., in which they are seen as professionals and public servants. Kiley’s cultural miscalculation became more evident in the negotiating stage.
Wisely, Kiley and Wigdortz sought out other potential supporters while these early attempts to interest government in the idea floundered. Because government officials were not interested in TfL, it became critically important for TfL to recruit a diverse coalition of supportive and influential leaders. Business executives and university leaders provided that early support although these two groups had distinct motives and played different advocacy roles.

*Businesses Back TfL – Motives and Symbolic Support*

Although Kiley and Wigdortz were newly arrived Americans, this seemed not to be a disadvantage but rather an advantage among the cosmopolitan network of London’s corporate leaders. In these networks, interviewees indicated that American ingenuity and capitalism were admired, and many business leaders were familiar with American culture and policies from having lived in or frequently visited the U.S. As a result, Kiley and Wigdortz were “outsiders” by nationality but seen as part of and accepted among the elite social networks of the rather cosmopolite corporate sector; they were similar to George Simmel’s “strangers” (Simmel 1950) – individuals who were members of a system but were not strongly attached to that system (Rogers 1999) – which afforded them the ability to more easily deviate from the norms of the system and be perceived as innovative (at least among fellow corporate friends).

As newcomers, Kiley and Wigdortz accessed influential social networks through London First, McKinsey, and BITC. Kiley was a skilled networker and knew they needed well-connected, local opinion leaders to become “early adopters”, or rather “early advocates”, for the scheme. By tapping into the member networks of London First and BITC, Kiley and Wigdortz successfully recruited business leaders to support TfL and advocate on its behalf. These were large companies that had a specific interest already in helping London (hence were members of London First) and/or raising their CSR profiles (hence were members of BITC). These priorities made them receptive targets for new ideas.

Consequently, business leaders supported TfL, believing it provided practical advantages for graduates and local schools and aligned with their companies’ CSR goals. To them, TfL seemed like a common-sense solution to teacher shortages in London and was based on an already-tested model, TFA. This practical reasoning, coupled with the fact the proposal for TfL was endorsed by McKinsey research, drew
corporate leaders to support the idea. But business executives were limited to supporting TfL through endorsements and funding as most were essentially “outsiders” to the education sector and the DfES. Instead, another member of London First – the IOE – provided the most strategic help, and connections, at this early period.

**IOE Helps Advance TfL: Motives and Strategic Support**

When Kiley and Wigdortz first discussed TfL with IOE leaders, they were not simply “strangers” to the education sector – they were, as Totterdell stated, “neophytes”. Kiley had only developed a limited number of connections to the education sector. Moreover, she and Wigdortz did not understand the politics of England’s teacher education sector, the regulations governing it, nor the personalities and power dynamics shaping it. Thus, they asked Whitty, Director of the IOE, to help them with their idea. As a result, Whitty and Totterdell became involved despite considering McKinsey’s analysis flawed, the idea for TfL underdeveloped, and their strategy for promoting TfL as contextually and culturally insensitive.

So why did the IOE leaders back TfL? They did so for personal, professional, and institutional reasons. First, both Whitty and Totterdell felt obliged to help as leaders and experts in their field. Kiley had personally approached Whitty as a fellow colleague in London First, and Whitty likely felt obligated to advise her. But, they also saw TfL as a potentially exciting new initiative with which they personally, and the IOE institutionally, could be involved. On a personal level, Whitty looked favourably on TfL due to his own observation of TFA years earlier and his admiration for the esprit de corps fostered among TFA trainees. Meanwhile, Totterdell saw TfL as a potential opportunity to innovate in and improve teacher training. This is because both he and Whitty understood the vision for TfL to operate independently of conventional ITT routes just as TFA did.

The IOE leaders’ decision to support and advocate for TfL was bold as they were set to challenge not only the TTA’s frameworks but fellow teacher educators who (as Whitty and Totterdell anticipated) came to view and oppose TfL as somewhat elitist. Still, Whitty and Totterdell believed TfL could replicate TFA’s success in recruiting top graduates and training them to be highly effective teachers with disadvantaged pupils. Their boldness reflected the IOE’s culture in which
government policies were often challenged, new ideas developed, and independence valued.

The IOE’s position of leadership within the field of education locally, nationally, and even globally boosted the profile and potential of TfL. With extensive professional and inter-organizational networks and a role in coordinating policy among boroughs since the dissolution of the ILEA in 1990, the IOE was positioned at or near the top of the status hierarchy within its organizational field. The IOE’s status as an independent body, its willingness to criticize government in support of the common good, and its reputation as a guardian of the public good made it an incredibly influential ally for TfL (see Aldrich 2002).

While business executives provided symbolic and financial support for TfL, the IOE provided critical help in fourth other ways. First, Whitty and Totterdell provided TfL with a symbolic endorsement from the IOE, which gave more weight and credibility to the scheme among those working in schools, teacher training, and education policy. Secondly, Whitty and Totterdell provided insight into a more contextually-appropriate strategy for mobilizing education-based support, advising Kiley to approach the unions collaboratively rather than avoid them as TFA’s experience had suggested. Thirdly, they offered their time and expertise in conceptually adapting and developing the TfL proposal, particularly its training model designed to operate on a trial-basis outside national regulatory frameworks. Fourthly, Whitty and Totterdell introduced Kiley and Wigdortz to government insiders (Barber in particular) and union leaders through their established social and professional networks. In these ways, the IOE’s early support for TfL jumpstarted the idea in the education field and began to counter the resistance of the DfES and TTA that corporate support had not yet weakened in two months of discussions.

What is also important to consider is how Totterdell became somewhat of a policy entrepreneur on the TfL team early on. He personally sought out TFA while visiting the U.S. to learn more about the initiative and was personally motivated to develop TfL’s training model. Although Wigdortz later insisted Totterdell was only an advisor, the strategic help the IOE provided Kiley and Wigdortz suggests that the two groups were forming a partnership that, although undefined, was based on trust, shared views, and mutual interests.
7.3.2 Pressuring Government through Networks (mid-Feb. 2002 – April 2002)

Once the IOE leaders partnered with TfL’s advocates, the idea had two strong bases of support – the business community and a leading higher education body – from which to challenge the government’s initial dismissal of the idea. Through the opinion leaders and social networks of London First and the IOE, Kiley and Wigdortz recruited a diversity of high-profile supporters for TfL. These supporters provided TfL with endorsements and resources that enabled them to effectively pressure the schools minister, DfES civil servants, and the TTA to reconsider TfL. During the process of recruiting a network of supporters, TFA was repeatedly cited as evidence that such a scheme could work and prompted strong reactions from key decision-makers.

Pressuring the government to formally back and fund TfL took place between mid-February to mid-April 2002. In this two month time period, Kiley and Wigdortz (1) continued to build a network of influential supporters in favour of transfer, (2) continued to meet with government officials about TfL, and (3) developed TfL conceptually. I first discuss how Kiley and Wigdortz developed strong targeted messages and narratives in support of TfL that were more contextually relevant than their early attempts. These strategies reflected social marketing techniques and served to strategically diffuse TfL among selected networks. Not only did this help Kiley and Wigdortz establish relationships with new supporters but also created a buzz about the programme that made it hard for government insiders to ignore. In this way, the TfL team was able to increase the pressure on government to accept TfL. Next, I detail how the IOE and London First served as the gateway to tapping educational and philanthropic networks respectively while both pressuring government officials to embrace TfL. Finally, I argue that the form of TfL’s training model, as developed by Totterdell, became the main point of contention among government leaders.

Kiley & Wigdortz Use Social Marketing to Strategically Diffuse TfL

After gaining the IOE’s support, Kiley and Wigdortz stepped up their efforts to build the momentum to launch TfL. With advice from their growing network of local supporters, Kiley and Wigdortz developed more effective strategies to
communicate and convince London elites that TfL was a worthwhile idea. These strategies mirrored well-known social marketing strategies often employed by companies to launch new consumer services or products (Kotler & Zaltman 1971). In the marketing world, campaigns introducing new products are designed to both change the audience’s perceptions of what is possible or desirable and to change the audience’s social behavior to use the new idea, product, or service (Fox & Kotler 1980). TfL needed to inspire a range of audiences to do both – to believe that TfL was a plausible way to improve disadvantaged schools and to provide their support for scheme.

To induce such a change in perceptions and behavior, the marketing strand of diffusion literature identifies five strategies on which companies rely (Rogers 2003, pp.85–86). The first strategy is audience segmentation, through which the target audience for the social innovation is identified. Secondly, with the target market identified, formal research is usually carried out to understand the values and orientation of that audience. Thirdly, the innovation is positioned, or presented, in such a way as to emphasize particular characteristics of the innovation that will appeal to a targeted audience. Fourthly, the cost of the innovation is purposely kept very low to encourage adoption, and finally, communication channels are strategically used to reach the targeted audience.

Kiley and her early supporters utilized these strategies to promote TfL with the exception of formal research. There was neither time nor the need for studying targeted audiences as supportive local opinion leaders such as Whitty, O’Brien, and others provided contextual knowledge that helped determine how to position TfL to each group. Kiley and Wigdortz targeted key groups and opinion leaders (audience segmentation) based on the strategy of convincing a subset of individuals to adopt the idea with the goal of triggering a larger cascade of further adoptions among other key leaders.

For each targeted audience, different messages and aspects of TfL were stressed to shape the perceptions of the innovation and appeal to their interests. TFA served to provided “observability”, or a chance to see how the programme worked. Moreover, TfL had the attractive quality of being voluntary in the sense that headteachers could choose whether or not to hire TfL teachers and determine how many. The projected cost of TfL or commitment needed to support TfL was also kept low to appeal to different audiences. (Note: Wigdortz (2012) mentioned he had
let McKinsey colleagues reduce TfL’s initial projected budget which were later proved to be too low). Finally, personal communication channels (rather than media) were always used to share information, ensuring that the process of learning about TfL and TFA was always interactive.

This approach was particularly successful in softening the reactions of the unions – with the headteacher unions courted first and with their support, bringing headteachers aboard. Meanwhile the teacher unions were approached later on after the coalition of support for TfL was larger. Thus, as policy entrepreneurs, Kiley and Wigdortz, along with their leading local supporters, essentially planned what could be called a strategic “divide, convince, and conquer” strategy for winning the support of opinion leaders, or at least persuading them not to oppose TfL. In this way, Kiley and her colleagues began cultivating more acceptance and wider support for TfL through social networks.

**Understanding the Reactions of the Teacher Unions**

With the support of the headteacher unions and the IOE, TfL proponents then approached the three major teacher unions, positioning TfL as a way to fill chronic vacancies in schools and bring high quality graduates into the profession. The fact that the IOE was involved in introducing the scheme to the teacher unions likely had a significant impact in softening resistance to the idea among union leadership. This was because the IOE was generally seen as the voice and protector of the public good since the central government abolished the ILEA in 1990 and became increasingly involved in directing education policy in the capital. To what extent the IOE’s involvement shaped reactions is unclear because other factors were at play as well.

On a practical level, the unions could not ignore the scheme’s perceived relative advantage of increasing teacher supply since the teacher unions had recently criticized New Labour for failing to alleviate the teacher shortages (BBC 2001a). Yet, TfL’s claim that top graduates with little training would be highly effective teachers was perceived as somewhat elitist and as positioning itself to be superior to other training routes. Bangs, of the NUT, and likely the NASUWT both saw this as incompatible with their values and those of the profession. Still, overall, the teacher unions seemed to have more questions than criticisms. Their questions focused...
mainly on pay and training, which were issues that had not yet been determined and so were openly discussed.

Yet, ultimately, the teacher unions differed in their positions toward TfL likely due to their internal orientations and context in which they operated. Upon learning of TfL, the ATL supported it, the NASUWT condemned it, and the NUT ignored it. The unions’ positions appear rooted their differing philosophical orientations. While the prevailing public assumption was that the NUT was the most militant (Redman & Snape 2006), Barber – a former NUT officer himself who wrote a history of the development of teacher unions (Barber 1992) – suggested that that perception stemmed from the NUT’s vocal left-wing teachers who dominated conferences but were in the minority of members. Instead, he argued the NASUWT had a more militant philosophy than the NUT, the latter which attempted to balance its militancy with a professional stance, a view echoed by others (e.g., Woodward 2001). Meanwhile, the ATL, which originated in the grammar school sector and had more members in the private school sector than the other unions, was considered “moderate in the extreme” and “presenting itself as the voice of the ordinary teacher” (Barber 1996, p.213).

Interestingly, each union’s reaction to TfL seemed to reflect its general orientation. The most moderate union, the ATL, supported TfL, and the most left-wing union, NASUWT, denounced it, while the NUT took a skeptically neutral stance toward it. These different stances were also likely a product of the intensively competitive environment in which each recruited members. According to Barber (1996), the intense rivalry and competition for members caused the unions to accentuate their political differences, which at times produced contrasting positions on policies. Thus, the ATL’s leadership decision to support TfL may have prompted the NASUWT to condemn it, leaving the NUT to strategically decide to wait to and see if, when, and how the scheme would develop. So while TfL’s supporters expressed their shock of the unions’ mixed reactions and willingness to consider TfL, such division and pragmatic positioning was perhaps unsurprising given their different political orientations and highly competitive nature.

Although the teaching unions were not fully supportive of TfL, their lack of a unified stance against it made TfL more attractive to government, especially Adonis who had had his academies initially challenged both vocally and legally by them. Two other points are worth noting in regard to the lack of opposition toward TfL
among the unions. First, TfL was pitched, as its name suggested, as a programme for London, which suffered from chronic and acute shortages. As a result, the scheme likely seemed irrelevant to union members outside the capital, especially for union representatives in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland where education policy decisions were determined locally. As a London-based scheme, TfL was also likely seen as a rather small and relatively insignificant programme in the larger policy arena.

Finally, it is possible that the stance of the NUT toward TfL, which was largely orchestrated by Bangs, may have been moderated by knowledge of Barber’s support for the scheme. Barber had worked for the NUT from 1989 to 1993, and when Barber left his senior post, Bangs filled it. With this personal and organizational connection between Barber and the NUT, knowledge of Barber’s support for TfL – if voiced in private discussions – may have directly or indirectly softened the NUT’s stance toward it as well. However, this comment is more based on conjecture than evidence. Regardless, the possibility exists and serves to highlight the inter-connected nature of London’s educational leadership. Certainly, the IOE’s vocal support for TfL muted opposition to the scheme in some leadership corridors as the IOE was seen as a voice of the public good against overzealous government reforms. With headteacher unions supporting TfL and teacher unions divided, pressure was mounting for the TTA to reconsider the scheme.

Networks & Social Influence: “New” Philanthropists Provide More Than Money

Four foundations gave TfL funding in the spring of 2002, three of which I confirmed had been recruited by Kiley or London First’s CEO, Stephen O’Brien. (Lampl could not recall how he first became aware of TfL.) The four philanthropic foundations that offered funding to TfL during the spring 2002 were of two different types: traditional and entrepreneurial. These two types differed in terms of their orientation, funding criteria, and their relationship with the government. More significantly, the founders of the two entrepreneurial foundations had, at that time, a close relationship with New Labour leaders and thus a greater degree of influence among government policy-makers.
The Paul Hamlyn Foundation and Esmée Fairbairn were examples of the traditional foundations that fit the typical mode of giving characteristic of the sector. Both foundations had a governing board ensuring grants were allocated to a selected range of policy areas based around the foundation’s mission. Hodgson, Director of Esmée Fairbairn, decided to fund TfL for its potential to recruit high quality graduates into teaching. However, she first had to convince her board to become involved in this policy area – teacher training – which was largely government’s responsibility. She succeeded and saw the purpose of the funding as pressuring, or “pump-priming”, the government to also fund TfL. Meanwhile, Lankester of the Paul Hamlyn Foundation was aware of TFA and met Kiley socially. Kiley expressed her frustration with her efforts to import the model, so Lankester decided to help secure TfL a grant from her board. While both traditional foundations were well-established, respected, and involved with BITC in the past, their influence on New Labour was less than the newer, more entrepreneurial foundations whose practices and priorities closely reflected those of the government.

The Sutton Trust and SHINE were examples of the entrepreneurial foundations established in 1997 and 1999 by wealthy businessmen O’Neill and Lampl respectively. Their approach to educational improvement and ability to act as boundary-spanning networkers made them more influential among New Labour’s leadership. In regards to reform approach, both Lampl and O’Neill ensured grants were given to projects that (1) fit the single focus of improving educational opportunities for disadvantaged pupils and (2) whose impact was measurable and potentially scalable.

By funding research and initiatives that had measurable impact and potential for expansion, Lampl and O’Neill sought to apply venture capital practices to philanthropy. Lampl referred to this brand of giving as “strategic philanthropy” although others in the U.S. called it “venture philanthropy”. Ball (2008) refers to such giving as the “new philanthropy” because, unlike previous modes of charitable giving, the “new” philanthropists involve themselves in policy communities, directly give to “policy” ideas, and take a more “hands-on” approach to projects they fund (Ball 2008, p.759). Lampl had become particularly influential in government circles as his work had appealed to New Labour’s goal of promoting social mobility as well as promoting social entrepreneurship, a relatively new concept supported by Demos and an idea of which Blair was a fan (Hunt 2000). Since the later 1990s, Lampl had
“become the confidant of cabinet ministers and one of the most influential figures in British education” (Wilby 2007). Thus, it is not surprising that Lampl had been the one to set up a meeting between Adonis and the head of TFA, Wendy Kopp, in years prior.

Lampl’s particular enthusiasm for the idea of TfL was notable. He had already advocated for the transfer of TFA in the past, thus spreading awareness of the idea prior to TfL. He was taken by the idea for TfL because he saw it as a proposal for the direct transfer of TFA, and hence not a “new” or “untested” idea. Lampl supported TfL because, like TFA, it represented an innovative social enterprise that sought to recruit elite graduates into state school teaching. In the high-flying corporate world, hiring the “best and brightest” graduates was “common sense”, and thus the application of this mindset to education was appealing to Lampl and other business leaders. Looking at TFA, Lampl also saw TfL as both a sustainable and potentially expandable programme promoting change in a measurable way. Lampl had been particularly impressed with TFA because of its efficient use of minimal resources and measurable results (in terms of number of elite graduates recruited) and believed replicating the model in the U.K. would achieve the same.

In sum, the support of the Sutton Trust and SHINE was critical. Each charity represented an influential government advisor and an intermediary between multiple networks across the business sector, philanthropic community, and the government. In this way, the support of Lampl and O’Neill provided not only financial help but also social influence and networks through which to pressure government to approve TfL. Lampl’s personal involvement was noted by Whitty who recalled Lampl as among the most influential voices present in a key meeting with the Schools Minister regarding TfL. Thus, while Paul Hamlyn Foundation and Esmée Fairbairn provided TfL funding in hopes of indirectly inducing a larger government commitment (“pump-priming”), education philanthropists provided TfL with more than funding – they provided a channel of direct influence on government. The “new” philanthropists threw their weight behind Kiley and Wigdortz’s idea, and Lampl engaged and encouraged the Schools Minister and New Labour leaders to embrace TfL, adding to the pressure for approval.
Coalitions form within Government based on Interests and Social Networks

The formation of network supporting TfL within government suggests that Kiley and her colleagues were achieving some success as “policy entrepreneurs” by Kingdon’s original definition. Kingdon saw policy entrepreneurs as individuals who help link up policy problems, solutions, and politics to open a window for a new policy. Still, this was a complex process. While the support for TfL was growing outside of government, Kiley and her associates continued to meet with various government officials, including Adonis who became the most vocally supportive of TfL. As Barber and then Adonis became advocates for the scheme, coalitions of support or opposition to TfL developed, each with a different angle and rationale for TfL. Within the DfES, the business innovation unit headed by Lynn Fabes supported TfL based on their purpose of building links between education and the private sector. Meanwhile, another influential unit working on developing the London Challenge looked favorably on TfL as an additional intervention that the government could include in their plans for boosting achievement in the capital. However, those responsible for coordinating the funding for the department’s programmes and policies were unwelcoming of TfL as it looked to drain money from other initiatives.

Meanwhile, TTA officers re-examined TfL and learned more about TFA that its advocates seemed to want to replicate. However, they continued to reject TfL based on the conclusion that there was no legal precedent for funding teacher training in such way. Thus, the TTA opposed TfL because its institutional script did not allow for such a possibility and few were interested in bending its rules. In addition to seeing TfL as unfeasible, many also considered it an undesirable programme to import based on the “gold-standard” of training they had already established (May Interview, 2/05/2012). Tabberer, from what he was hearing second-hand, was also convinced that TfL was not acceptable, especially not the way in which the IOE had developed it.

This window into deliberations of the DfES and the TTA offers a view of fragmented policy learning among different groups of civil servants and officials with niche priorities. In this environment, it is perhaps easy to see how policy suggestions originating from outside government may easily be abandoned and forgotten in the deadlock among coalitions. But concerns of TTA staff and niche priorities departments within the DfES were not the only factor dividing opinion on TfL. Networks of social influence also swayed minds in one direction or the other.
This made the pressure exerted by the IOE, unions leaders, and business executives critically important and the support of Adonis and Barber even more so. Barber and Adonis’s vocal support for TfL created a climate within the DfES that made supporting the scheme acceptable and even forward-thinking. As Diamond (Adonis’s aide) pointed out, there “were more senior” people within the DfES who were more “responsive to ministerial and Number 10 persuasion”, suggesting those closer to the New Labour leadership were more apt to support TfL.

Thus, through using their own social networks to advocate for TfL, Adonis and Barber helped create support for TfL but, it’s possible that their own contrasting views of how TfL should work, or be “reinvented” in England, only contributed to the fragmented debate within the DfES. Adonis and Barber had formed their own beliefs about how TfL should work in practice. Barber saw TfL as a future element of the DfES’s and TTA’s work while Adonis saw TfL as an innovative scheme that, like TFA, needed independence from government scripts and frameworks. With Tabberer categorically opposed to accepting such a programme, Timms, the Schools Minister – who had been central in all these discussions – was unsure of how to proceed. Thus, due to these conflicting views of TfL, Kiley and Wigdortz were having trouble moving their idea forward. In Kingdon’s (1984) view, these two policy entrepreneurs were struggling to align the “politics” stream with the “problem” and “solution” stream in their limited window of opportunity to achieve their policy goal. However, Kiley’s and Wigdortz’s persistent pressure on government and their ability to build a supportive network for TfL finally led to negotiations in April.

Disputed Reinvention: The Polarizing Effect of IOE-TfL’s Training Model

As TfL won more supporters, the details of the TfL proposal became more important and a common point of contention. While those outside of government did not often question the details of the TfL proposal, those within government had particularly strong concerns and views about how it should be reinvented. This made the topic of reinvention a key stumbling point in the campaign to launch the programme. It did not help the situation that many within the TTA and some within the DfES had limited or no knowledge of the original model, TFA. Thus, debates regarding how to reinvent TfL were likely more affected by personal interpretations
and affinities than by facts and evidence. This made TfL alliance with the IOE and proposed model a key point of contention.

By mid-April, enthusiasm for the scheme was at a high point and Timms held at least two meetings with educationalists, including Whitty, about the scheme. While the involvement of the IOE and the training model developed by Totterdell and Wigdortz likely gave Timms confidence in the scheme, it prompted opposition from Tabberer who did not accept the model’s experimental design or the presumption that IOE would deliver it without an open bid. Tabberer had already opposed TfL on the grounds that it was based on an American model that was not needed or feasible in the U.K. However, the IOE’s partnership with TfL and development of an innovative model hardened his stance against the scheme. Meanwhile, Adonis was supportive of a training design for TfL that was experimental and outside bureaucratic controls.

To counter Adonis’s position, Tabberer became directly involved in discussions through Timms, who then introduced the TTA head to meet his main TfL contact – Kiley – in a meeting in late April. Kiley sensed that this was the chance to convince the TTA to back them and so invited a group of business executives to demonstrate their influence, a sign Wigdortz took to mean TfL was on the verge of being approved. This was an inflated expectation and misreading of the situation. As Totterdell astutely noted, Kiley seemed to be relying on the use of corporate clout to push her agenda, but this was not common custom in London:

Distinct political customs are evident too [between the U.S. and U.K.]: ... The British public servant and company director are from a similar “social catchment” and thus speak the same language, while the diverse origins of the American federal administrator and corporate managers place them at arms length. A “frank exchange of views” is the prescribed form of business contact with senior civil servants in London; aggressive “lobbying” of federal officials is normative corporate practice in Washington (Useem 2014, p.8).

In effect, Kiley was relying on the wrong people and approach to overcome resistance to TfL. They were themselves entrepreneurial professionals that seemed to advocate an equally entrepreneurial type of teacher professionalism that other civil servants may have considered incompatible with their efforts to restore the professional stance of teachers as fellow public-sector professionals.
Because Kiley and her corporate supporters were unable to answer Tabberer’s questions, Tabberer was able to better demonstrate his point that TfL was flawed and ill-adapted for context. However, the persistence of TfL supporters and influential support behind them prompted him to “find a way forward” or, in other words, negotiate.

7.3.3 Negotiating the Reinvention of TfL (late-April to mid-May)

By mid-April, the question of reinvention was holding up TfL’s approval in the backstages of government. Whether TFA was transferrable or even necessary in England was being debated – in the Schools Minister’s office and DfES – by leading personalities that had rather strong and conflicting views on TfL. As previously discussed, Adonis and Barber had slightly different notions of how TfL should relate to government. Barber wanted it incorporated into the London Challenge and fit into the government’s broader agenda for education. Meanwhile, Adonis preferred TfL be free from government bureaucracy. Barber seemed more inclined to have TfL fit into the TTA frameworks yet also possibly favored the IOE’s involvement with the scheme. With Tabberer still resisting the scheme altogether, discussions regarding TfL suddenly intensified in the few weeks after Kiley and Wigdortz’s awkward meeting with Tabberer. These discussions culminated in two key meetings – one in Adonis’s office at 10 Downing Street and the other at the TTA. In these two meetings, very different versions of TfL were discussed. They triggered negotiating among actors, though TfL proponents seemed less aware of the underlying nature of the government’s gridlock on the matter.

Difficulty in Establishing Sequence and Cause-and-Effects

From this point, the sequence of meetings and agreements became especially significant but more difficult to confirm, and thus the causal chains among them remains unclear. Throughout Phase II, sequencing of meeting and their effects was often vague due to the fact that so many individuals were in separate discussions without fully understanding or coordinating with others. However, as events played out slowly, I was able to develop a timeline of events based on comments in interviews. Still, the links between causes and effects during this time were nearly
impossible to determine with certainty given that negotiating TfL (1) played out in only a few weeks, (2) occurred a decade ago, and (3) was a sensitive topic given that certain interests were at stake.

On this point, Totterdell’s perception of different “camps” among TfL supporters was insightful. Wigdortz and Kiley were obviously not always in sync with each other in regard to their knowledge, actions, or perceptions of the situation – one of the clearest example perhaps being Wigdortz’s story of first contacting Adonis through cold calling his office while Adonis described being first approached by Kiley. While neither had deep knowledge of the U.K., Kiley was highly perceptive of others in the elite political and social circles of which she was apart. She usually made the first contact with individuals, established mutual rapport and trust, and remained the primary contact for supporters. Kiley, thus, initiated and cultivated most of the relationships with TfL supporters, putting her essentially in the driver seat of events and receiver of more insider information.

Wigdortz, on the other hand, was more of the enthusiastic salesman of the idea and a representative of McKinsey. He had been given the task of developing his business plan for TfL, which included: (1) working with his McKinsey colleagues on cost projections, marketing research (i.e. TFA statistics, contacting U.K. universities), promotional materials, and (2) collaborating with Totterdell on the training model while also (3) presenting TfL in external meetings. As a result, Wigdortz’s camp was much more limited and internal to the campaign than Kiley’s work in expansive, external networks among London’s political and social elite. (Here it is worth remembering that Kiley is also the wife of the Transport Commission, a highly public and influential position in London.) Thus, when Kiley’s best efforts failed to secure TfL the minister’s approval, she stepped back and enabled others to try a different approach.

The Case for TfL, as an “Experimental Reinvention” of TFA, at No. 10

Because Kiley and Wigdortz feared their efforts to establish scheme were failing, they asked their supporters – most likely Whitty or Barber – to approach Adonis about how the DfES and Schools Minister may be convinced to approve the scheme. This led to the meeting at 10 Downing Street in early May during which Totterdell and Wigdortz presented TfL and their training model to Adonis and
Timms. This was a significant meeting but not simply because Totterdell reported that DfES funding for TfL was secured soon afterward. It was significant because Adonis and Timms, along with an unidentified DfES official, listened to Totterdell’s proposed training model. Up until this point, Adonis and Timms had not heard details of the training model from Totterdell as most of their contact with TfL was through Kiley. However, with the TTA insisting TfL’s model as unworkable, they sat down to listen carefully to the plan developed by Totterdell and Wigdortz.

Totterdell said his role in the meeting was to “sell [TfL] as a teacher education model that could add value, potentially transformative, and something that really was worth a try, that couldn’t just be subsumed under current methodologies and models” [Interview, 23/11/2012]. Totterdell recalled Adonis asked “penetrating” questions and, by the end, others seemed enthusiastic about the plan. With no one from the TTA present, this meeting was likely the first step toward approving TfL and potentially funding it directly through the DfES without the TTA’s involvement. This was not completely unprecedented as this was how the Fast Track and Adonis’s academies programme were run.

Most interestingly, Wigdortz indicated in his interview (30/06/2015) that he did not recall attending a meeting at 10 Downing Street with Totterdell. This seems curious given that he vividly remembered successfully cold calling Adonis’s office, a momentous triumph he described in his memoir. Meanwhile, Totterdell vividly remembered details of the meeting, from how he arrived (by taxi) to the set-up of Adonis’s office suite, and recalled Wigdortz was present. I attempted to confirm the meeting with others. However, I was unable to receive a response from Adonis on the matter, and Diamond did not have clear recollections of subsequent meetings.

I have deferred to Totterdell’s account over Wigdortz’s for two reasons. First, after interviewing both twice, I found Totterdell’s recollections were more consistent and detailed than Wigdortz’s, which were at times inconsistent, vague, and on some points inaccurate. Wigdortz’s memory seemed limited to a set narrative from which he found difficult or was unprepared to deviate. Thus, Totterdell’s account was most likely more accurate because (1) he had greater knowledge of the political/educational contexts and officials shaping them at the time, which informed his memory, and (2) he indicated that, as part of his military intelligence work, he had been trained in observational strategies to recall events and environments accurately at a later time.
The second reason I deferred to Totterdell’s account was because he had little to gain or lose from the interview as he no longer worked for the IOE or was involved with Teach First. Wigdortz, on the other hand, had constructed in his mind an understanding of events in that period and institutionalized that narrative through multiple retellings over the years and in his 2012 memoir. In these narratives, the IOE played a very minor role in events while he, his idea, and his business colleagues were the catalysts of change. More importantly though, Wigdortz may have conveniently forgotten the meeting at No. 10 because he also met with the Tabberer, on his own, to discuss how TfL may be changed to please the TTA, which represented a kind of betrayal of his collaboration with Totterdell and the IOE.

**Collaborative or Coercive Reinvention? Wigdortz at the TTA**

Around the time of the meeting at No. 10, Tabberer and Wigdortz also met one-on-one to discuss ways in which TfL may be modified, or reinvented, to gain the TTA’s approval. The outcomes of this meeting, which led to a series of others, were clear: Wigdortz and Kiley agreed they would (1) recruit a distinctly new pool of graduates into teaching, (2) accept an open bidding process to select a training provider, and (3) require trainees to follow the TTA’s regulations for QTS. As these agreements had significant implications for TfL’s form and implementation, how these agreements were reached and why becomes an important question. While Wigdortz portrayed these agreements as minor, technical issues that were collaboratively overcome, Totterdell suggested those one-on-one meetings (from which he was excluded) constituted savvy politicking on behalf of Tabberer aimed at decoupling the IOE from the scheme and ensuring that TfL was reinvented in a manner that followed the TTA’s rules. Tabberer, meanwhile, confirmed these intentions but explained his priorities reflected his role and remit as head of the TTA. Thus, Tabberer expressed pride in the fact that, although he was bound by rules, he and Wigdortz found a creative way to satisfy.

Still, the question arises: *Were the agreed modifications between the TTA and TfL proponents an instance of mutual collaboration or essentially, forced compliance?* I argue differences among participants’ knowledge, power, and goals suggest adaptations were essentially coerced despite Tabberer and Wigdortz’s account of collaborative problem-solving. Wigdortz and Kiley’s perceptions were
limited by their lack of understanding of educational contexts and were driven by the singular goal of launching TfL. They were, at that point, prepared to make compromises. In the months prior, Wigdortz (2012, p.60) had resisted suggestions made by others to alter the basic idea of TfL, such as having graduates be teaching assistants or recruiting a smaller cohort. While he was not willing to consider those types of changes, he was now willing to accept the TTA’s regulations because he believed that compromise was the only way forward after the April ministerial meeting.

However, what Kiley and Wigdortz did not realize was that it had become in Tabberer’s interest to help TfL gain approval. Tabberer knew of Timms and Adonis’s enthusiasm for the scheme and did not want TfL to go ahead under the control of the DfES. Therefore, his goal became to have TfL comply with TTA regulations. Thus, the ministerial meeting in late April was set up for Tabberer to gauge the thinking of the scheme’s proponents. It may also have been orchestrated to put Kiley and Wigdortz on the defensive, making them more willing to compromise afterwards. This would help explain why only corporate supporters were invited to the meeting and why Timms, despite his enthusiasm for the scheme, may have theatrically rejected it at the start of the meeting. Such political maneuvering by high-level TTA officials was apparently not uncommon. Hextall and Mahony (2000, p.130) reported that a “very experienced” TTA officer who possessed “wide political, negotiating and administrative experience” recounted:

… there is a lot of subterranean to-ing and fro-ing [with the DfES] so that you know what will work and what won’t and where you’re going to have to push, to get a Minister to change his or her mind. And if you don’t do that you’re just not competent. I mean it’s not a question of morals, it’s a question of competence. If you want something to happen you’ve got to know whether it will happen and if it won’t happen you’ve got to go around creating the climate where it will happen and you’ve got to do that in Ministerial Aides’ and in Ministerial minds… (TTA officer quoted by Hextall & Mahony 2000, p.130, emphasis added)

The above comment illustrates the skill set of high-level TTA officials and attests to Totterdell’s view of Tabberer as a “master negotiator”. Hence, it is very possible that Tabberer’s ministerial meeting with Kiley and Wigdortz was held to intentionally pave the way for his one-on-one meeting with Wigdortz, enabling him to succeed in convincing Wigdortz to see the situation his way. As Hextall and
Mahony point out, this type of climate- and policy-manipulation by individual TTA officers often makes tracing policy origins and evolution problematic.

Meanwhile, during the April ministerial meeting, Tabberer found Kiley and Wigdortz had little understanding of the problems he had with their model, making them potentially easy adversaries with which to negotiate directly. Thus, afterwards, when Timms indicated to Tabberer that he and Adonis were still keen on starting TfL (perhaps after discussing the model with Totterdell at No. 10), Tabberer knew he needed to (and likely could) win concessions from Wigdortz. Wanting to avoid the chance of TfL becoming a DfES-controlled initiative, Tabberer was pleased when Wigdortz was eager to talk.

In contrast, Wigdortz was desperate as the scheme looked like it would not be approved and his six-month leave from McKinsey was ending in another month. This highlights the temporal constraints that face policy entrepreneurs in their attempts to enact policies or, in this case, bring about a policy transfer. Consequently, he sought out Tabberer’s help. In their one-on-one meetings, Wigdortz was in the less knowledgeable and less powerful position, with gaining approval for the scheme his only priority. Still, while Wigdortz and Kiley felt compelled to comply with TTA rules, they likely did not see a significant problem with such compliance as they assumed the IOE would win any bidding contest (as evident in Phase III). Hence, they assumed their model would not be radically changed, though it is possible Wigdortz had little appreciation or attachment to Totterdell’s particular model in the first place.

Years later, Wigdortz described his discussions with Tabberer as how he personally (and rather heroically) turned the government’s “no” into a “yes” while downplaying changes made to TfL as relatively minor (Wigdortz 2011; 2012). Hence, Wigdortz’s inability to recall attending a meeting at No. 10 with Totterdell may possibly be explained by his desire to obscure conflicts among key individuals that he eventually allied with and to preserve his narrative of Teach First in which he, not the IOE, played a leading role in discussions. Again, whether Wigdortz was aware of the possibility of the scheme moving forward under the aegis of the DfES (as opposed to the TTA) is unclear. However, it is unlikely given his limited local knowledge and misreading of the political and educational contexts up to that point.

Like Wigdortz, Tabberer’s account suggests that adaptations to TfL were made in a non-political, collaborative, and even “creative” manner, yet he clearly
held his cards close to his chest to pursue personal and organizational interests. By suggesting to Wigdortz that TfL could either “be part of the Institute [IOE]”, pursue its own accreditation (which would be difficult and time-consuming), or hold an open procurement, Tabberer fed into Wigdortz’s original interest of being an independent body and in charge of its own training like TFA (though this was not to be, as evident in Phase III). By agreeing to an open procurement, Wigdortz saw a chance to establish Teach First’s authority over a training provider, which would work for his organization. While Tabberer and Wigdortz had their own agendas that soon fused, Kiley expressed annoyance on bureaucratic stipulations put on the programme, evidence of her curtailed agency. Still, she also felt forced to be pragmatic and simply agreed so the scheme could be approved.

Stepping back, the exact dates and sequences, causal chains in these few weeks of negotiating remain elusive, making analysis important but ultimately limited. But we do know that in the few weeks following Kiley and Wigdortz’s meeting with Tabberer and Timms, key meetings occurred at the TTA and at No. 10 that led to approval of the scheme and funding from both the TTA and DfES. These events may have been triggered by McKinsey’s “emergency” strategy but were ultimately effective because Adonis and Timms wanted to move forward with TfL, with or possibly without the TTA.

7.3.4 Launching TfL as “Teach First”

With the proposal for TfL approved, the fourth stage of activity, legitimizing, took place in which TfL was set up as a state-approved and supported organization. Within these final two months of Phase II, from mid-May to mid-July, additional support for TfL was recruited, resources and advocates institutionally consolidated, and the new organization publically announced with London First taking the lead role in such developments.

A Transfer Network Revised: Business Leaders Regain Influence, Wigdortz Gains a Central Position, and the IOE Loses a Role

With the central government’s approval of the scheme, as reinvented by the TTA and renamed “Teach First”, the dynamics of the network built to support TfL
changed. In these final two months of Phase II, the business community re-emerged as the leaders in organizing TfL while educationalists were sidelined. When “Teach First” was incorporated as a charity, it belonged to London First and BITC and four of the five trustees were the leaders involved in the McKinsey study in Phase I. In addition, TfL’s advisory board was primarily comprised of business leaders who were especially keen to offer their expertise in managing a new enterprise. In contrast, the IOE leaders receded into the background, taking on a supportive advisory role but no longer strategically involved in TfL’s affairs. Meanwhile, Timms was rotated out of the DfES, and Twigg became the junior minister supporting TfL. Twigg was busy developing his own London-wide initiative, and thus gave Kiley and Wigdortz the space and trust to develop according to their own plans.

Yet, the most significant development signaling the re-emergence of TfL’s business orientation was the appointment of Wigdortz as the CEO of the new Teach First. Though inexperienced himself, trustees agreed to his appointment with the older and more experienced entrepreneur Jo Owen serving as his personal mentor in managing the scheme. While awaiting the TTA’s bidding process to select an official training partner, Wigdortz was finally in the position to pursue his own War-for-Talent-inspired vision of the scheme. Thus, he began moving away from the TFA model, wanting to create a distinctly different brand. Notably, he hired two of his friends at McKinsey to help implement his vision of Teach First. Still, Wigdortz’s credibility within the education sphere was limited and thus, he was not a prominent speaker at the launch of his own programme, illustrating the significant role educationalists played in helping establish the scheme.

Meanwhile, despite the name change, Teach First continued to benefit from its links with TFA. The first press releases called the scheme “Teach For London” and described TFA as the model for it. The scheme’s link to TFA attracted additional corporate supporters, including both Scardino of Citigroup and Habgood of Capital One, both Americans impressed with TFA. Kopp also visited with Kiley and Wigdortz in London to signal her support for the endeavor. Finally, on Kopp’s recommendation, Wigdortz hired a recent TFA alumna and, through this link, the organization benefited from an insider perspective of TFA.
7.4 Summary of Discussion

In this chapter, I first explored the contextual differences between the U.S. and U.K. that forced TfL down a different course of development. In this discussion, I also highlighted the manner TFA first developed and its place in the U.S. educational landscape. Through this comparative analysis, I discussed: (1) the extent interviewees knew about and understood TFA, (2) the ways in which TFA was a unique product of the American context, and (3) how TfL, as a idea modeled on TFA, had different contextual challenges to overcome, and (4) why drawing lessons from TFA with limited knowledge of both contexts was haphazard and unhelpful. These issues affected how TfL was perceived as it diffused and why the type of reinvention of TFA/TfL became a thorny problem to overcome.

I then moved on to discussing the twists and turns of the policy story, marking the way in which the efforts of policy entrepreneurs slowly accumulated and changed the type of action they engaged in. Ultimately, Kiley and Wigdortz and their team tapped influential leaders and built alliances through which they strategically diffused, inspired support for, and reinvented TfL. Networks played a central role in enabling this process, enabling access to elites and quickly diffusing information about TfL. Kiley and Wigdortz were also building what Evans and Davies (1999) term a policy transfer network – supporters linked by their desire and efforts to bring about the transfer of TFA to England. Kiley and her colleagues’ success in forming this policy transfer network, made up of influential business leaders, educationalists, and philanthropists, challenged the rules and authority of the TTA. In the end, the TTA negotiated the scheme’s first permanent reinvention, distancing it from TFA in order to gain ministerial approval. This reinvention shifted the power dynamics within the policy transfer network, according the most influence to its core corporate supporters while sidelines educationalists.
CHAPTER 8: PHASE III: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TEACH FIRST

8.1 Goals of First-Year Implementation

After officially launching in July 2002, Wigdortz and colleagues set about implementing the scheme. Teach First had one year before its first summer institute was set to run in 2003. In that time, the organization needed to accomplish five goals:

1. Set up the Teach First organization
2. Recruit some 200 top graduates to join Teach First
3. Select an accredited teacher training partner
4. Recruit eligible London schools for teacher placements
5. Continue to raise funds and support for the scheme

Reaching these goals fell primarily on the Teach First staff, though supporters provided additional help and resources. Teach First initially set up their offices near Aldgate East in the borough of Tower Hamlets before moving into a high-rise office in Canary Wharf, donated by co-chair trustee George Iacobescu, in February 2003.

With staff hired prior to launching, Teach First was structured into three components: upper management, graduate recruitment, and placement school recruitment/training support. Upper management comprised of Wigdortz and two of his colleagues from McKinsey, Paul Davies and Nat Wei with Jo Owen advising the trio. While Davies assumed the role of Chief Operating Officer, responsible for the finances and running of the organization, Wei led graduate recruitment with another director, Lindsay Salmon-Davies. They together managed four, sometimes five, graduate recruiters. Meanwhile, ex-TTA member Lorraine Marriott and TFA alumna Nicole Sherrin were hired to recruit schools to the scheme and help plan its summer training. Despite these divisions in organizational roles, interviewees reported they all helped each other and fulfilled various roles, especially when it came to recruiting graduates onto the scheme.
8.2 Recruiting Graduates from Top Universities

Teach First aimed to recruit 200 graduates from top universities to join the scheme in 2002-2003. To achieve this, the Teach First staff set to work crafting recruitment messages and strategies as well as a selection criteria and assessment processes to attract those talented graduates. Nat Wei and Lyndsey Salmon-Davies together headed graduate recruitment. Wei was a 25-year-old Oxford graduate who had worked for McKinsey for three years before deciding to help set up Teach First. Wei was confident he could recruit talent for schools. “We saw ourselves as needing to build a team [of] expertise…” Wei said (Interview, 28/08/2012), “but ultimately, it was a talent job. It was all about talent and that’s very transferable. You may not know everything about education, but you know how to get great people.”

Wei had no experience in graduate recruiting, but Salmon-Davies, a woman in her late twenties, did. Salmon-Davies had graduated from Portsmouth University and worked in the corporate sector, first for Lockheed Martin as a business analyst and then for Arthur Anderson as a graduate recruiter. At the time, Arthur Anderson was one of the top five accountancy firms in the world and recruited more than 400 graduates annually to fill their positions in the London-area alone. However, in 2002, Arthur Anderson was facing criminal charges in its handling of the accounting for Enron, prompting a disillusioned Salmon-Davies to reconsider the direction of her career and look into teaching.

I actually took voluntary redundancy from Andersen... and then an email was sent to me from the director of recruitment for McKinsey, who was friends with my director at Arthur Andersen, saying would I be interested in interviewing for the graduate recruitment team for Teach First… I was just applying to do a PGCE and decided, actually 200 graduates as opposed to just one going into London schools sounds pretty good. I’m also from London [and] went to an inner-city school, so to me, I thought it was just amazing to be able to get involved with a city that I love and really make a difference.

– Lyndsey Salmon-Davies, Director of Graduate Recruitment, Teach First
Interview, 11/12/2012

As Salmon-Davies and Wei began to plan for the recruitment drive, Salmon-Davies recalled they had the “tiniest budget”, equal to what Arthur Anderson typically spent for one university. Still, they planned to recruit 200 graduates and target the same top twenty U.K. universities other corporate graduate programmes did.
There was many a late night spent in McKinsey offices with Nat [Wei] and Brett [Wigdortz], with basically me drawing upon all of my recruitment experience because they didn’t have any, and building a programme together of how we tackle milkrounds, how our recruitment would look, certainly with regards to the assessment days.

– Lyndsey Salmon-Davies, Head of Graduate Recruitment, Teach First

Interview, 11/12/2012

Although Wei [Interview, 28/08/2012] said, “we knew from McKinsey how to go about attracting top graduates”, Salmon-Davies said she drew instead on advice from John Kirkpatrick, the McKinsey manager of the 2001 study. “[Kirkpatrick] was a good sounding board for when I needed to talk to somebody about what I was doing,” Salmon-Davies recalled, “because Brett [Wigdortz] and Nat [Wei] had absolutely no idea.” Kirkpatrick recalled helping the team, particularly in setting up candidate selection criteria and assessment exercises.

I had been involved in some reshaping of our recruitment processes at McKinsey, and the recruitment model that we built for Teach First was unashamedly modeled, or at least in part, on that [although] there were different… [applicant] characteristics we were looking for which we tried to use different components of the recruitment process to test. If you think about it, we were a startup with no reputation and essentially almost no substance. A [small] staff operating on a shoestring budget working out of a borrowed office space, and yet we constructed a recruitment process that looked itself quite like the ones that were being run… by the elite, the blue chip banks [and] consultancies because we knew we were competing with them in the market for these right people.

– John Kirkpatrick, McKinsey consultant

Interview, 13/05/2015

Although corporate models were used to create Teach First’s recruitment strategy, Salmon-Davies said that she understood Teach First as a U.K. version of TFA. Thus, to inform their recruitment approach, Salmon-Davies read Kopp’s 2001 book on TFA and drew upon the expertise of Nicole Sherrin, an alumna of TFA who joined the staff. However, she recalled, “We didn’t have someone to draw upon and say – hey, look, can you give us a blueprint of what you did? We were doing it ourselves.”

Still, Wigdortz, Wei, and Davies saw their organization’s connection to TFA somewhat differently.

We thought we had a more developed idea than TFA. So we thought what we did [was] took TFA and improved it, and put into the English context. And I think there was a certain amount of arrogance on our
part... we were very, very pleased with ourselves and we might not have acknowledge and honored the history of TFA and how it was so influential for us.

– Paul Davies, COO, Teach First
   Interview, 21/09/2012

Despite these differing views, the directors agreed that they needed to tailor their approach to top U.K. graduates who indicated that a purely altruistic or patriotic message would be unsuccessful.

In our marketing campaign, we didn’t really focus on teaching as the prime hook because our focus groups... were saying one thing about teaching, which is exciting, is that we think we would learn a lot about leadership and managing people, through being dropped in the deep end, which you don’t get if you’re in a bank doing a spreadsheet, or in the civil service writing a memo for a minister. You don’t learn leadership in that way.

– Nat Wei, Director Graduate Recruitment, Teach First
   Interview, 28/08/2012

As a result, the directors hired two independent marketers who they felt understood the vision of Teach First rather than use the TTA’s advertising firm. The marketers subsequently created a leadership-themed promotional campaign for the scheme.

[They] came up with... a revolutionary campaign that... used the tag line “Leaders of the Future, Unite!” with a focus on what the world would look like in 2023... but amidst the science fiction overtones was a powerful message – the best leaders in 2023 would all be graduates who had taught in schools in challenging circumstances through Teach First in 2003.

– Brett Wigdortz (2012, p.135), CEO, Teach First

With this messaging, Teach First created marketing materials and set up their website and online application. According to Hutchings et al. (2006), the website stated: “By joining Teach First ... you will mark yourself out as a cut above the rest” and called on graduates to teach in challenging schools and be “dedicated to addressing the imbalances and injustices that cause poverty”. Marketing materials also emphasized Teach First was a programme through which participants would “gain leadership, communication and influencing skills that are often difficult to build as a junior or graduate recruit in a large organization” (quoted by Hutchings et al. 2006).
As messaging around Teach First was finalized, Salmon-Davies prepared their four young graduate recruiters for the milkrounds – a term used in the U.K. to refer to the on-campus recruiting of graduates by companies. (For a complete list of the universities and dates of Teach First’s milkround events in fall of 2002, see Appendix A.6) Although none of the recruiters had prior experience recruiting, all were recent graduates from Russell group universities: Helen Arney (2002 Imperial graduate), Vivienne Mann (2002 Cambridge graduate), Will Sampson (2002 Oxford graduate), and Paul Siaens (1999 Newcastle graduate). Wei recalled these individuals were selected specifically for their particular social networks. “Brett had a very good idea, which was to recruit the elite leaders on campuses to be our champions,” Wei said [Interview 28/08/2012], “and so the people we recruited to be the recruiters were generally well networked into the very societies and places where you could find top graduates.”

Recruiter Vivienne Mann, who had attended a London comprehensive and was attracted to the social mission of Teach First, recalled she and her fellow graduate recruiters received a crash-course in how to do their jobs with minimal resources.

We were essentially told to do – they called it guerrilla marketing. So some of it was around flyering, seeing how much we could get done for free, how much we could do through word of mouth... It wasn’t that professional of an organization, but then it was run by extremely inexperienced people. Nat [Wei] was my manager. He’d never managed anyone in his life before... Lyndsay [Salmon-Davies]... was the only one in the organization who knew what we were doing, and so she planned the overall strategy. Essentially we were told to book a presentation, get as many people along as possible, and support people through the application process... We were given our own version of a boot camp on how to be a graduate recruiter and left to it.

– Vivienne Mann, Graduate Recruiter, Teach First
Interview, 30/11/2012

Each recruiter was assigned a set of universities, including their own, from which to recruit. The recruiters distributed brochures, posted adverts on bulletin boards, and sent out emails to advertise for Teach First. One email in particular that described a cold, dimly lit classroom and its pupils, like victims, looking for “guidance and hope” was cited by many selected participants as particularly powerful in attracting them to Teach First, according Hutchings et al. (2006).

Still, Mann confirmed she and the other recruiters targeted and tapped social networks, noting “were literally fresh out of university, so we still had networks and
we still knew people.” She felt this was the key to convincing graduates to apply to Teach First.

The type of places we’d studied, it was easy to get the word out there if you know the right person. [So] our job was really to make people aware of this concept called Teach First, and we pulled it off. It was amazing because there was a lot of goodwill, we had the existing networks, and I think the reason that we were recruited [onto staff] was we were seen as the type of people who would join the scheme, not necessarily people who were any good at graduate recruitment... We were just seen as bright individuals who would be able to attract similar people.

– Vivienne Mann, Graduate Recruiter, Teach First
Interview, 30/11/2012

Media coverage also spread awareness of Teach First although mainstream news articles expressed mixed views of the scheme. Articles in the *Guardian* (Wegg-Prosser 2002; Crace 2002) and the *BBC* (Wheeler 2003) pointed out the scheme’s strengths but also related the concerns of its critics. Meanwhile, two articles in the *Sunday Times* (Gold 2002) and the *Times* (Wyke 2003) emphasized the scheme’s connections to the business community and the advantages its recruits would enjoy by teaching in the programme. Another January 2003 article in the *Times Educational Supplement* (Thornton 2003) profiled an enthusiastic soon-to-be Oxford graduate, who was one of ninety selected onto the scheme thus far. Notably, all articles referenced TFA as the model or inspiration on which Teach First was based, often quoting TFA’s recruitment statistics and alumni retention rates in teaching. Kiley also wrote a short promotional piece for the *Evening Standard* (Kiley 2003) in January, encouraging graduates to consider its benefits.

While raising awareness of Teach First on campuses, recruiters also encouraged students to attend an informational presentation to learn more about the scheme. These presentations were given at top universities from early October to mid-November and consisted of a three-part talk devised to “inspire” graduates to apply. In each presentation, a recruiter introduced the scheme and then Sherrin described her experience teaching in disadvantaged Arizona schools for TFA. Occasionally, May spoke about becoming a London headteacher in his late twenties, illustrating how this experience led to his role at BITC.

Finally, Wigdortz discussed the scheme’s leadership training, emphasizing the personal and professional benefits participants would gain by participating in the scheme. As McKinsey’s War for Talent advocated crafting irresistible “employee
value propositions” to attract talent, Wigdortz recalled presenting Teach First’s “value proposition” as a three-pronged approach to developing one’s leadership abilities through teaching. Applicants were told they could (1) “Make a difference”, (2) “Gain distinctive recognized skills” and (3) “Access the inside track” (Wigdortz 2012, p.132). In this way, Wigdortz stated they aimed to appeal to an applicant’s “heart” as well as “head”. One recruiter recalled, “We wanted inspirational graduates, [and] what they would get out of it was a [teaching] qualification, some business leadership training – sort of the best training in some of their lives” (Mann Interview, 30/11/2012).

As the Teach First staff wrapped up their campus presentations in mid-November, they began reviewing applications and inviting promising applicants to assessment centers at the offices of its corporate supporters. Kirkpatrick recalled the challenges of coming up with assessment and selection criteria.

One, we knew the entire programme would stand on the quality of the first cohort… Second, although we had in theory the profile of the characteristics we thought people would need, a bunch of these things were really difficult to write down and characterize, like “humility”. Thirdly, even once we had written them down and agreed what we meant by them, finding a recruitment process that could actually identify them and distinguish people, was not very easy either.

– John Kirkpatrick, former McKinsey consultant Interview, 13/05/2015

Teach First’s directors ultimately settled on eleven characteristics, or “competencies”¹⁵, they looked for in applicants to build their first cohort. They then designed a day-long assessment centre through which they tested batches of short-listed applicants for these characteristics in various ways.

We did a number of things that were probably quite unusual [but that] we thought was essential to be able to get people who were not just brilliant… but were also communicators of the kind that could deal with a class of secondary school pupils. We built some education-related case studies… so that interviewers could get a sense for how far [applicants] had thought through the sorts of challenges that they might face… We asked them to deliver a ten-minute lesson to the interview panel… [assessments that] required quite a high degree of organization and

¹⁵ These eleven competencies, which were somewhat revised the following year were: positive outlook, personal responsibility, commitment to equity, understanding of programme, self evaluation/critique, leadership, teamwork, initiative, critical thinking, communication skills, and humility respect and empathy (Hutchings et al. 2006, p.16).
investment to make it work. Lots of other [corporate] recruitment processes do similar things – use role-play exercises, case studies, psychometric testing [but] they all do that with substantial HR departments, internal resources and/or recruitment consultants. We had [none] of those. We just had to put it together by ourselves.

– John Kirkpatrick, former McKinsey consultant
Interview, 13/05/2015

After each applicant completed an interview, demo-lesson, and education-related case study in which they had to resolve a problem, the Teach First staff then met to discuss the results of each candidate and make selection decisions. Teach First ran assessment centres from January to March, with final selections made by late spring.

By June, Teach First had selected 186 participants from roughly 1,300 applicants. Eighty-three percent of those selected had degrees from Russell Group universities, and a third came from Oxford and Cambridge alone (Hutchings et al. 2006). A large number of selected participants were also from Imperial College London (Blandford 2004). In addition, 87 percent of the cohort had earned first or upper second-class degrees, and 43 percent had degrees in maths or science. According to a survey of selected participants, the top three aspects of the programme that influenced them to join Teach First were: “keeping your career options open”, “the chance to make a contribution in areas of disadvantage” and “the ethos of the programme” (Hutchings et al. 2006). With these results, Teach First was named number 63 in *The Times’* Top 100 Graduate Recruiters of 2003 (Wigdortz 2012).

8.3 The Internal Organizational Struggles of Teach First

Although the recruitment drive proved successful, the Teach First staff often struggled with a number of challenges internally, primarily conflicts around how the organization was being managed. Nearly all staff interviewees referred to Wigdortz’s inexperience as a leader as a common cause for friction. Others noted the importation of McKinsey-style management as another. However, all staff members interviewed recalled being inspired by the idea behind Teach First rather than those leading it.
In the first year, the primacy was the idea – a very strong collective belief, I remember a writing on the wall – that this [was] an idea whose time had come, and our job is not to screw it up. And we were all in service in getting this off the ground and self-interest was very low around all... [which was] why we worked the stupid hours, all that kind of stuff. So it wasn’t like everyone was following Brett [Wigdortz] – everyone’s following this idea that we are now stewards of... which is in no way to denigrate Brett. He was absolutely dedicated and... played a really proper CEO role [as] the face of Teach First externally, going and networking, and meeting people and the like. So we had fantastic external profile, but it was all pretty much around Brett rather than the organization… So Brett was seen as the hero and visionary, [but] it was the idea [that] had primacy and we all had a responsibility to that.

– Paul Davies, COO, Teach First
Interview, 21/09/2012

It was an appallingly run organization. Most people weren’t particularly well qualified for the jobs that they were doing. Brett [was] a terrible leader... But we had blind faith, and that’s probably what kept us going… I think we were just [a staff] made up by this strange amalgamation of people who only united [because of] one cause. There [was] a lot of politics and there are a lot of questions to why Brett was leading this organization… So some of us, I think, left a bit bitter from the experience.

– Vivienne Mann, Graduate Recruiter, Teach First
Interview, 30/11/2012

Mann also recalled TFA was used to bolster recruiters’ confidence in the new scheme.

We were told that Teach First is loosely based on Teach For America, and the main message was that TFA worked and it was successful, therefore it could work in the U.K. Bear in mind, when we first started the milkround, it was still unproven. We didn’t really have any schools on board. We didn’t have a training partner. We were winging it really, mostly, 90 percent of the time.

– Vivienne Mann, Graduate Recruiter, Teach First
Interview, 30/11/2012

All three graduate recruiters interviewed said they had joined the scheme because they believed the programme would help disadvantaged pupils. Salmon-Davies recalled how the young recruiters’ commitment to the idea of Teach First helped them.

[Because] we were selling a brand new product and going up against consultancy firms, accountancy firms, marketing, all the rest of it – the team needed to believe in Teach First and that was one of the major things that we were able to do… which was pretty tricky to do with the
style of management that was sometimes put upon the team. [The recruiters] didn’t always quite get what was going on, and I was very much a buffer, the diplomat, within the management team.
– Lyndsey Salmon-Davies, Director of Graduate Recruitment, Teach First Interview, 11/12/2012

As a middle manager like Salmon-Davies, Marriott also voiced concerns about the way Teach First was run, which in her view was essentially “the old boys’ club”. She felt she did not fit “within the ethos of the upper echelons of the Teach First directors” due to her background – she had not been to a top university, nor “to a posh school”, and had come directly from the public sector. She felt her perspective differed markedly from the corporate culture that the former consultants brought into the organization and recalled one meeting where those orientations clashed.

There was a point in time [when] we were really struggling for money. We had a directors meeting, and there was a choice of like, “What do we do? We haven’t got enough money to pay everyone.” And there was a whole conversation about who to get rid of. And I raised a point to say, “Let’s forego our bonuses because we get a decent salary. The bonuses are nice, but it’s just an extra couple of thousand compared to somebody being laid off. That would be my choice.” And there was this silence all the way around the room, and it was absolutely rejected out of hand, like, “we will not forego our bonuses. These are really important.” So I think that was something that I found quite shocking actually.
– Lorraine Marriott, Director of Teacher Placement, Teach First Interview, 06/12/2012

Wigdortz (2012) admitted bonuses became an issue that frustrated other staff members. He recalled he set up the bonuses tied to performance targets to motivate staff, but a staff member soon reminded him “money isn’t what is driving us” (p.105). In this way, Wigdortz (2012) explained how he often “took the ideas [he] had learned as a management consultant and often used the wrong lessons from it” (p.105), which led to several near mutinies within his staff.

In regard to money, it is worth noting that Teach First was set up with a salary hierarchy differentiated by roles, with the CEO earning the most (£60,000) while the COO and directors/managers earning 75 percent (£45,000) and 58 percent (£35,000) of the CEO’s salary respectively. The graduate recruiters and other support staff received roughly 37 percent (£22,500) of the CEO’s pay. Sherrin, the TFA alumna, was paid only slightly more than graduates recruiters (£25,000) – a point she felt was somewhat unfair given her years of teaching experience, useful knowledge of TFA,
and Teach First’s messaging regarding the high value and transferrable skills of successful teachers. The salary hierarchy, along with the bonus structure, further frustrated some staff due to the reality that upper management lacked experience and all staff members recalled sharing roles.

Despite these internal divisions, the altruistic goals of Teach First pulled the staff together to work successfully toward their goals. However, the business culture and managerial approach of Teach First would soon clash with another perspective – that of the scheme’s university training provider.

8.4 Selecting an Accredited Teacher Training Provider

While recruiting graduates, Teach First needed to partner with an accredited training provider to prepare its participants for teaching in schools. Since January 2002, the IOE had worked closely with the leaders behind the scheme to develop a training model and convince a variety of stakeholders to back the programme. In the months after Teach First’s launch, the relationship between Teach First and the IOE continued with Totterdell corresponding with the TTA to further develop an acceptable training model for the scheme. However, he said he found it difficult to move forward on this front. As he liaised with the TTA, he was unaware of the TTA’s intent to put the training contract out to tender.

The TTA wanted to get the training package to conform as tightly packaged to the existing ones… So it was an extremely difficult dialogue, and we were dialoguing with middle managers who were quite set in their ways and some of whom were quite conservative. So that was the role I found myself playing much of the summer and autumn into the winter of that year.

– Michael Totterdell, Head of the Secondary PGCE Programme, IOE Interview, 23/11/2012

In the fall, communication between the IOE and Teach First ended when the TTA announced a bidding process would take place in December 2002 and issued the specific criteria for proposed training models to meet. While the IOE was invited to apply for the contract, the TTA also encouraged bids from other providers and Tabberer discussed the range of potential partners with Wigdortz. The TTA’s selection committee was set up to include Wigdortz and representatives from the
TTA and DfES. Still, Wigdortz continued to feel disrespected by TTA officers he met with during the fall and sensed “petty bureaucratic games” were being played (Wigdortz 2012, p.178).

Nevertheless, the bidding process proceeded and in late December, the TTA received one bid – from the IOE. However, the bid was rather different from the TTA’s requirements. “The IOE put in a bid, but it was sort of framed on their terms saying this is what we will do rather than what Teach First and the spec was specifically asking for,” said one interviewee, who asked not to be named due to the confidential nature of the bidding process.

Totterdell felt “there was a misunderstanding between ourselves and the TTA as to what we were doing” [Interview, 23/11/2012], referring to his belief that the first year of Teach First would be an experimental pilot. He also said that the proposal he put forth was not ideal but the only arrangement he could feasibly work out given the internal situation at the IOE in late 2002.

That was the same time that we [at the IOE] were identifying a major shortfall in funding in teacher education. So I was in a very tricky position internally and externally and basically could not pull together the resources to make it work from January and the coming summer with the [IOE’s] other commitments without bringing in some additionality.

– Michael Totterdell, Head of the Secondary PGCE Programme, IOE
Interview, 23/11/2012

By “additionality” Totterdell meant he needed to partner with an outside education consultancy16 to provide short-term but experienced staff. He conceded that using temporary staff from outside was not “great” and “raised the price” of the training but insisted it was necessary due to the research pressures facing his staff at the time.

[The IOE] had just come through the second research assessment exercise and had not done as well as anticipated [mainly because of] the “long tail” of teacher training, i.e. my staff. So my people were utterly determined to get research time so that they could hold their own. And what the Teach First implied was a very intensive summer institute and I would have to deploy the very people who were desperate to be doing research. So there were real tensions within the Institute as well as within the TTA [as] to whether we had [or] could create the capacity.

– Michael Totterdell, Head of the Secondary PGCE Programme, IOE
Interview, 24/01/2015

16 The two education consultancies Totterdell considered partnering with were Cambridge Education and CfBT though he could not recall which one he ultimately chose in the planned model of the bid.
Totterdell also recalled his staff had significant coursework assessment marking to carry out in the summer. Overall, the situation frustrated him.

On the one hand, Teach First I thought was an extremely promising programme that would expose us to some very good ideas, some outstanding people, and make a real impact on London. But [on] the other side, it was going to be resource expensive and came at a time when we were having to remodel our own teacher training and finally do something about the research status within that particular part of the Institute’s work.

– Michael Totterdell, Head of the Secondary PGCE Programme, IOE Interview, 23/11/2012

The TTA, nevertheless, rejected Totterdell’s proposal. Wigdortz (2012, pp.179–180) was also unhappy with the bid, suggesting it proposed training only a hundred graduates, relied extensively on video lectures due to summer staff being largely unavailable, and planned for graduates to start as mentees in schools before becoming full-time teachers. As a result, the TTA set up a second round of bidding for January.

During the first bidding round, the IOE had been the only bidder. Totterdell suggested this was because the TTA’s specifications were “utterly unrealistic” for providers to meet. Another interviewee, however, suggested London providers had a different motive for not bidding.

Some of the London providers at that point decided they would have nothing to do with [the bidding] whatsoever, working on the principle that maybe if Teach First didn’t have a provider to work with, this strange new thing would go away.

– Jacquie Nunn, former head of ITE, Roehampton University Interview, 24/08/2012

Thus, in preparation for the second round of bidding, the TTA contacted Sonia Blandford, Dean of Education at Canterbury Christ Church University College (CCCUC or “Canterbury”). CCCUC was a higher education institution with three campuses across Kent, although its original and primary campus remained in the historic town of Canterbury, sixty miles southeast of London. Founded in 1962 by the Church of England as a teacher training college, CCCUC had expanded over the decades into a larger institution offering courses in a number of fields. In 1995, the
college was granted the power to award its own degrees for taught courses and became known as CCCUC 17.

Blandford had assumed the role of Dean of the College of Education in May 2002, though had been working in that role unofficially from January 2002. She had been headhunted for the position, which allowed her to continue her record of achievement that she said was unlikely given her background. Raised by parents who had left school at age fourteen unable to read, Blandford said she was determined to succeed at an early age to avoid a fate of working in factories. A music teacher at her London comprehensive inspired Blandford to become a music teacher herself. She subsequently earned a Bachelor of Education from the University of Leeds. After becoming a teacher, Blandford went on to earn a Masters and Doctorate in Education. She then worked in university teacher education, becoming assistant dean and then a professor at Oxford Brookes University. In her new position at Canterbury, Blandford was tasked with expanding and improving the college.

When I arrived at Canterbury, it had an absolutely superb primary provision, and it had a developing secondary provision. It was also in a period of growth – it had become a university college, and it was destined to become a university... So there were three aims: one was an overarching aim of growth with the number of programmes, the second was [raising] the quality of programmes, and the third aim was to develop the structure to include separate departments within the faculty of education from cradle to grave provision, so early years through to primary, secondary, post-16 and adult education.

– Sonia Blandford, Dean of Education, CCCUC
Interview, 20/03/2015

With these goals, Blandford had worked closely with the TTA in recent years to develop the GTP, Fast Track, and other employment-based programmes at Oxford Brooks and then Canterbury. Blandford said, likely due in part to this close prior collaboration with the TTA, she received a call from a senior TTA official in late December asking if Canterbury would be interested in being involved with Teach First. Blandford said she also talked with Tabberer regarding “the nature of the programme because clearly there was a reputational risk to Canterbury” (Interview,

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17 Subsequently, in 2005, the institution dropped “college” from its name when it was granted the title of “university” by the Privy Council. However, at the time, the university college was known as CCCUC.
20/03/2015). Despite the risk, Blandford said she prided herself on being able to build successful new partnerships and thus was interested in Teach First.

In the interview, though, Blandford emphasized she was being invited to bid for a programme that was not yet created. “[The TTA] didn’t describe the programme because it didn’t become a programme until we made it a programme – Ok?” she said. “It was an idea and Teach First was an organization, [and] there wasn’t anybody on the Teach First staff that was qualified to devise a programme” [Blandford Interview, 20/03/2015]. Thus, Blandford saw an opportunity to assume a central role in creating what she viewed as a new type of teacher training programme. Subsequently, Blandford agreed to put together a training proposal and bid for the contract. Although expanding CCCUC’s secondary programmes was a priority for her, Blandford said she wanted to work with Teach First to improve London’s teaching force.

The reason I said “yes” to it was because – besides coming from London, I taught in London – I knew there’s an acute shortage of qualified teachers... I also knew that the quality and knowledge-base of the teachers, particularly in science, maths and English, was poor not because the existing staff were in any way poor but because they were there for short term – by [which] I mean less than two years.

– Sonia Blandford, Dean of Education, CCCUC Interview, 20/03/2015

Although some of her staff at CCCUC initially rejected the idea for Teach First, Blandford worked with colleagues to put together a training model that was a “hybrid” of three programmes already operating at CCCUC: (1) the GTP and other employment-based programmes, (2) elements of the secondary provision, and (3) the work of James Learmonth, an academic and former London headteacher who was founding a centre on educational leadership at Canterbury.

Although Blandford was aware of the IOE’s previous collaboration with Teach First, she did not have any contact with the IOE regarding the programme. However, like Totterdell, she had hoped to design a training programme that offered trainees a PGCE but quickly realized this would not be possible.

I wanted it to be a PGCE... It couldn’t be because there had to be a certain amount of attendance at university and clearly that wasn’t going to be happening. So both the university college and the leadership of the
TTA would not allow it... It didn’t fit the system, so therefore the system wasn’t going to flex in order for it to be a PGCE.

– Sonia Blandford, Dean of Education, CCCUC

Interview, 20/03/2015

In designing Teach First’s training, Blandford also said she did not base any of her model on TFA. “I’d never heard of Teach For America,” Blandford said [Interview, 20/03/2015], “[and] we didn’t at any point use TFA as a reference. I had no idea what they did in their summer institute.”

In January, Blandford and Totterdell submitted and pitched their respective proposals to the TTA. Although Totterdell had refined his proposal, aiming to fulfill the TTA’s revised requirements, he lost the bid to Blandford. Marriott, who was on the selection panel, said she was surprised the IOE bid failed again. “The thinking at Teach First was, ‘well, there’s no way that the Institute could ever lose this bid because they helped us design the programme,’” Marriott said [Interview, 06/12/2012].

Totterdell was disappointed in the outcome of the bid and the TTA’s unwillingness to experiment with a new form of teacher training.

By singling out QTS, [the TTA] guaranteed compliance and that’s what they were interested in having. What we were really interested – and I honestly believe Brett [Wigdortz] in his heart of hearts was as well – was a new cadre of leaders of teaching who would not be “yes” people, who would ask the difficult questions, experiment, take risks, pull down international-level research and employ it in highly effective teams in London. I mean, my own background in the military was an elite, and when I got involved in this model, I was trying to put together a model that would allow an elite volunteer to make a radically significant difference, and my sense is that to do that, they needed exposure to the international narratives, the bigger picture, and... they sure as heck [weren’t going to] get that from Canterbury.

– Michael Totterdell, Head of the Secondary PGCE Programme, IOE

Interview, 23/11/2012

Totterdell also pointed out the differences between CCCUC and the IOE as well as between Blandford and himself in regard to resources and professional perspective.

What [Canterbury] had was spare staff, capacity, an ability to hire part-timers as if budget was no expense, and my counter-part there [Blandford], frankly was much more in tune with the TTA’s thinking than I was. I mean, my thinking was more radical, more differentiated. I had good relations with the TTA, but I didn’t see them as the beginning and
the end of what is involved in teacher professional preparation and formation.

– Michael Totterdell, Head of the Secondary PGCE Programme, IOE Interview, 23/11/2012

Marriott confirmed that the bid from CCCUC won not only due to its design, but also because of Blandford’s strong relationship with the TTA.

[CCCUC] already had the confidence of the TTA and the Department because of Sonia Blandford. She had a lot of respect from the TTA and the Department, and she and her team put forward this amazing bid within a great budget, thinking quite long term, like “we believe this [Teach First] is going to run and run and run so let’s see what we can do with it”. And they overwhelmingly won this tender process.

– Lorraine Marriott, Director of Teacher Placement, Teach First Interview, 06/12/2012

In contrast, Marriott observed some at the TTA and DfES expressing a negative attitude toward the IOE.

I don’t know what happened in the past, but [the IOE] had so little respect from the TTA and the DfES. They were really seen almost to be, like, the people that they would not want involved in Teach First… I seem to remember there was a lack of trust in the Institute of Education, either because they’d messed up some contracts or some funding, or they were left vulnerable in some way. But there was something institutional that the TTA absolutely despised them for.

– Lorraine Marriott, Director of Teacher Placement, Teach First Interview, 06/12/2012

Totterdell and Whitty both acknowledged the “vulnerability” of the IOE and its somewhat rocky relationship with the DfES and TTA under the former head of IOE, Peter Mortimer. However, since Whitty and Tabberer assumed leadership positions at the IOE in 2000 and TTA in 2001 respectively, both said they felt those conflicts had faded into irrelevance by 2002. “The Institute was very close to New Labour government at that point – it hadn’t been earlier,” Whitty recalled [Interview 09/07/2012], “[and] part of my job as Director was to rebuild that relationship through Michael Barber.” Regardless of the effects of institutional politics or personal allegiances, Blandford’s proposal satisfied the selection committee and won.

When the IOE lost the bid, the staff of Teach First was initially apprehensive about partnering with CCCUC.
At the beginning it was like, “oh no, all that travel to Canterbury, they don’t really get London schools, they don’t really get what we’re talking about, they’re far away, it’s not an inner-city”… but then we quickly came to realize that there’s going to be no London university that has a campus big enough to fit 200 trainees without splitting them up into separate residences, and yet Canterbury had this amazing place where it was green and everyone could stay together. So that was a big draw in the end.

– Lorraine Marriott, Director of Teacher Placement, Teach First Interview, 06/12/2012

CCCUC’s partnership with Teach First was announced in late January 2003, and Blandford, with Wigdortz, met with other London training providers in March 2003 to explain their programme. While CCCUC had not been involved in London secondary schools, it had a record of placing trainees in primary schools through its own centre in Tower Hamlets. Still, London’s university providers were not welcoming of the news.

At that stage, [Teach First] was seen as being something that was being imported, untested. And when Canterbury… was awarded the contract, it caused shock waves in London [and] consternation really, partly because Canterbury was seen as encroaching on the territory of the London providers. I mean, it’s enormously difficult to get your trainees into decent schools, and one of the anxieties about Teach First was this idea that it would be taking away places from regular PGCE. So there was anxiety about all of that, about destabilizing existing partnerships, and people were slightly unnerved with Canterbury stepping into that space.

– Jacquie Nunn, former head of ITE, Roehampton University Interview, 24/08/2012

While news spread of the partnership between Teach First and CCCUC, the IOE quickly lost any association with Teach First, ending the year-long association between the two.

What Teach First did was, politically, to disaffiliate from the Institute and to re-affiliate with Canterbury… Looking back on it, I think it was disingenuous of them, but I suspect it was driven by political alignments and a sense of wanting to get on with enacting the model rather than to look back at how the model was constructed, propagated, argued for and made persuasive.

– Michael Totterdell, Head of the Secondary PGCE Programme, IOE Interview, 23/11/2012
Rona [Kiley] and I got on well, but there was a period after Canterbury got the [contract] where it was difficult because the Institute had no role at all. Michael Totterdell was gobsmacked that there was a bid that met the criteria, and was quite rightly accepted by the Teacher Training Agency... I have no quarrel at all with [CCCUC] who saw a business opportunity and took it. And that’s absolutely fine. What I do have problems with is that I think the Institute lost intellectual property that it had contributed to Teach First’s proposal… and I also strongly resent the way the Institute was subsequently written out of the history… I think it [was] Michael Totterdell, however he may has misjudged the bidding process, made Teach First possible in terms of writing documents and … making the proposal culturally sensitive to the U.K. context.

– Geoff Whitty, Director, IOE
Interview, 12/07/2012

After winning the bid, CCCUC began to prepare the training programme for Teach First. However, when the leaders of the CCCUC and Teach First met, Blandford quickly noted a difference in perspective between the two parties.

In February [2003] the Teach First team – Rona Kiley, Brett [Wigdortz], Nat [Wei], and Lyndsey [Salmon-Davies] – came and met with our senior leadership at what was quite a difficult meeting [because of] the approach taken by the Teach First team… We very much wanted it to be a partnership... [and] Teach First were not really positive about creating a partnership… [For them] it was their idea. We respected that, and we would’ve, at the start, really appreciated more of a respect for what Canterbury, not just myself, but where Canterbury were as leaders of change within teacher education because they were… [but] they wanted to tell Canterbury how to devise a teacher training programme, and there was nobody within Teach First that had that level of expertise.

– Sonia Blandford, Dean of Education, CCCUC
Interview, 20/03/2015

Wigdortz’s (2012) account alluded to the managerial positioning first taken by Teach First, which produced a strained relationship between Teach First and CCCUC.

One of my non-negotiable points [with the TTA] was that the university should feel accountable to us and not just the government. After all, this was the Teach First programme and we needed to be in charge of the messaging, recruiting, training and all elements of the programme. We should choose our university training partner since, in essence, they would be working for us.

– Brett Wigdortz (2012, p.177), CEO, Teach First

Furthermore, John Moss, head of the secondary PGCE programme at CCCUC, recalled that the relationship between the TTA, Teach First, and CCCUC was never clearly defined and that Wigdortz wanted more control over the training aspect than
he and his colleagues at CCCUC anticipated (Moss Interview, 17/09/2012). The expectations of Wigdortz and some of his colleagues stemmed from their admiration for McKinsey’s training as well as their understanding of TFA’s training.

We would [have] loved the teacher training to be done directly… rather than outsourced… Coming from a background where McKinsey does all its training – it works with the practitioners and knows how to develop training that really works – [doing that] just wasn’t politically or logistically possible [for Teach First]. TFA was very heavily involved in the designing of the training programme – on the educational pedagogy side. And in the U.K. that just wasn’t possible because of the time scales and it’s quite regulated here.

– Nat Wei, Director of Graduate Recruitment, Teach First Interview, 28/08/2012

Control over branding, the messages, and content of Teach First’s training remained a point of contention throughout the early years of the partnership with CCCUC.

Nevertheless, during the spring of 2003, CCCUC proceeded to organize the training programme. Blandford also selected the training staff, which was a mixture of three groups: existing CCCUC staff, newly recruited staff, and two TFA alumni that agreed to present workshops in the summer. Finally, CCCUC also became involved with recruiting placement schools in London as the Teach First staff had not yet recruited enough.

8.5 Recruiting Placement Schools

The recruitment of placement schools for Teach First teachers began in fall 2002 and lasted throughout the academic year. Lorraine Marriott led the effort to recruit schools with the help of TFA alumna Nicole Sherrin and Rona Kiley. To start, Marriott recalled they compiled a list of London schools to target, which had more than 30 percent of pupils on free school meals and/or considerably low GCSE results. They were not allowed to consider schools in “special measures”, or deemed failing by Ofsted. With a list made, Marriott’s team began contacting schools. “We made phone calls to the heads, faxed information over, tried to get the TTA to support us,” Marriott recalled [Interview, 6/12/2012]. “In the beginning it was incredibly difficult. We couldn’t even get the headteachers to answer the phone to us, nevermind meet with us.”
When they did finally manage to meet with some headteachers, Marriott said they found “huge resistance, huge skepticism”. Despite such resistance, the Teach First staff continued to approach schools. “Most private schools in the U.K. recruit directly from Oxbridge or wherever, so there was precedence,” Wei said, “and the [schools] that were totally against it or too disorganized to jump on it, just very quickly stopped talking [so] we went to the ones that were interested” [Interview, 28/08/2012]. One of those interested heads was Elizabeth Phillips.

Phillips was one of the first headteachers to sign up for Teach First although, Marriott recalled, her school “really didn’t need Teach First”. She had been the headteacher of St. Marylebone, a multi-cultural girls’ comprehensive in Westminster since 1994. Under her leadership, the school was deemed by the DfES as the most improved school in the country in 2000. That year 89 percent of the school’s pupils earned five GCSEs at grade A*–C, up from only 39 percent in 1997. The school’s intake drew mainly from council estates where 60 percent of the pupils spoke English as their second language, and 42 percent were eligible for free schools meals. In explaining her success, Phillips said “the single biggest factor in improving a school is the staff” and advised that headteachers “need to be single-minded and determined in finding and keeping the best teachers” (BBC 2000). With this view, Phillips, who graduated from Kings College London and had a previous career in management at Unilever, embraced the ethos of Teach First, signed up, and became a vocal advocate for it.

Elizabeth [Phillips] gathered together quite a big meeting of headteachers from the people that she knew and around the borough, and that was the first time we actually got people to sit down and listen to us. So that was quite a break through moment, when we had this headteacher, saying, “we should listen to these people. Don’t dismiss them.” She was older lady [and] really quite instrumental in helping [my] team get to some of the headteachers who perhaps we wouldn’t have normally got in touch with.

– Lorraine Marriott, Director of Teacher Placement, Teach First
Interview, 06/12/2012

Blandford also recalled Phillips being very helpful because she “was incredibly well networked” within the education establishment as well as in the business world through her husband, the company secretary at Wimbledon.

Phillips also became part of a headteachers group that advised and supported Teach First. “[They] were wonderful,” Kiley said [Interview, 30/04/2012], “because
they told us what they thought would work, like how much we could charge each school.” The charge Kiley referred to was the fee – £3,500 per teacher to be paid in installments – Teach First required of schools involved in the programme. Often called a “recruitment fee”, the payment served two purposes: to confirm a school’s commitment to take a teacher and to provide additional funds to run Teach First.

As school recruitment continued, Marriott’s team received additional help when CCCUC came aboard. Blandford met with approximately a dozen headteachers to convince them to take part in the scheme.

They were obviously thinking about what the credibility of Canterbury to deliver programmes to support training in London, and we just got our Ofsted report for both the GTP, secondary, and also the primary provision which referenced what we did in London. And I actually took those Ofsted reports to the meeting with the headteachers to persuade them.

– Sonia Blandford, Dean of Education, CCCUC
Interview, 20/03/2015

In addition, CCCUC’s James Learmonth became a vocal supporter of Teach First. Learmonth had started teaching in urban schools in 1964, later becoming a headteacher in Tower Hamlets, a school inspector, an academic, and an advisor to CCCUC. Learmonth encouraged headteachers to sign up for Teach First, including Jill Coughlan, the headteacher at Elizabeth Garrett Anderson School since 1994.

James Learmonth had done some work in Islington local authority and at [our] school… and he had credibility with heads who were working in challenging areas. So we already knew him and valued his work, and when he said that Canterbury had won the contract for Teach First, he sold us the idea. So it [was] really done through networking… James Learmonth approached me, and really, unless there hadn’t been the personal professional connection, we probably wouldn’t have looked at it.

– Jill Coughlan, Headteacher, Elizabeth Garrett Anderson School
Interview, 04/12/2012

Coughlan said her school, a girls’ comprehensive in north London, did meet Teach First’s criteria as a “challenging” school with 50 percent of its students on free school meals, 66 percent bilingual learners, and 20 percent refugee and asylum seekers. Still, the school was performing relatively well on exam results and did not have difficulty recruiting teachers. Thus, Learmonth’s encouragement was critical in her decision to participate in Teach First as Coughlan and her staff had concerns about the scheme.
I discussed [Teach First] with [my] senior leadership team… because a lot of the staff were questioning of it, as I was. I mean, there was a part of me that thought, “Don’t they think good graduates are already in London education?” and it was marginally insulting… and really I only accepted to be involved because it was James [Learmonth] and we trusted him, knew his values, and we wanted to be helpful.

– Jill Coughlan, Headteacher, Elizabeth Garrett Anderson School
   Interview, 04/12/2012

Although a Cambridge graduate herself, Coughlan remained somewhat skeptical but agreed to take one Teach First teacher in the coming year.

While Learmonth convinced several headteachers to work with Teach First, Sally Coates, headteacher of Sacred Heart Roman Catholic School in south inner-London, learned of the scheme through the media.

On one Friday, the front-page story of the Times Educational Supplement was about the launch of this new scheme called Teach First. It had a big picture of a young man, a math graduate from Oxford, and there was a story about him and how Teach First recruited him and would be sending hundreds of [such] students into schools. So I saw this story, and I thought “gosh, I’d like that young man to work in my school because he looks dynamic and just obviously very academic and well-qualified”, and reading about his life and why he wants to be a teacher I thought “I’ve got to get involved with this.” So that’s when I contacted Teach First and said I’d like Sacred Heart to be involved.

– Sally Coates, headteacher, Sacred Heart
   Interview, 11/01/2013

The TES article Coates read, entitled “Lured from the City to capital’s schools” (Thornton 2003), ran on the 31 of January 2003 and mentioned that 90 graduates had already been selected onto Teach First. The Oxford recruit featured in the article was a London native who was interested in education after brief teaching stints in South Africa and Hong Kong. Set to graduate from Oxford after studying geography, he wanted to inspire London pupils who had traditionally been “excluded and alienated” while keeping his career options open.

Coates said she saw Teach First as “solving their recruitment problems”, a struggle she was familiar with as head of a challenging school. More than half of the 635 pupils at Sacred Heart qualified for free school meals, according to the school’s 2002 Ofsted report, and more than 90 percent were from black and other minority backgrounds. Although a challenging environment, Scared Heart was “very functional and organized” Coates said. The school had significantly improved since
its inspection in 1996 and was rated by Ofsted in 2002 as “highly effective”. Still, recruiting teachers was a challenge, so Coates hired two maths and one language teacher from Teach First. Although the TES article had referenced TFA as the model for Teach First, Coates recalled she only heard about TFA from Kiley after signing up for the scheme. “Obviously, I was reassured about hearing it worked perfectly in the States, but the States is a very different context to England,” Coates said “and so I was a bit nervous about it” [Interview, 11/01/2013].

Another headteacher who hired eight Teach First teachers in 2003 was Tom Widdows, principal of Bexley Business Academy in southeast London. The school was among the first academies set up in 2002 and replaced Thamesmead Community College, a comprehensive in which only 20 percent of its pupils achieved five A*-C grades. The enterprise-themed school sponsored by Sir David Garrard, a millionaire property developer, was set to move into its new £31 million building, complete with its own mini-stock exchange. Widdows, who had worked in schools for more than two decades, said he initially learned of Teach First through Rona Kiley. He was interested in the idea because he was finding it difficult to recruit teachers for the academy because of its location in “a very, very tough area – violence, drugs, lots of different nationalities” [Interview, 7/01/2013]. Hence, he was still looking for more staff who would embrace the new ethos of the academy.

We needed people who would come in and challenge the accepted orthodox and challenge what these children from very deprived backgrounds could achieve. And it was better maybe to have more innocent people that had a very open mind and young staff tended to have this… I mean, we were trying to run these [academy] schools, playing on the idea of leadership, emotion, getting people very heavily involved in it, getting the children to buy into education, and education could change their lives, and we could help change their lives by working together, and this was something that the young teachers in Teach First [offered].
– Tom Widdows, Principal, Bexley Business Academy
Interview, 7/01/2013

Widdows said he was optimistic about Teach First because he had seen positive results from setting up the GTP at his previous school in Norfolk. Yet, ultimately, he was willing to accept Teach First because of the dire situation at the school. “We were ready to try anything on an experimental basis because we were so worried about getting results up,” Widdows recalled. “So it wasn’t the case of having
confidence in Teach First. It was there, and… we went in with the attitude of – It looks good, we’ll make it work for us” [Interview, 7/01/2013].

Thus, like Coats at Sacred Heart, Widdows needed additional highly-educated and motivated teachers. Marriott confirmed that this was their primary pitch to schools, especially in terms of teachers in shortage subjects. “Initially, the way we sold it was, ‘you’re never going to find the quality and caliber of maths and science graduates that you will through Teach First,’ and that really made headteachers sit up and listen,” Marriott said [Interview, 7/12/2012].

By the summer of 2003, a number of schools had been recruited but more placements were still needed, according to Blandford. As a result, Blandford said she and her staff recruited additional schools during the summer. “It was literally us phoning up, blanket phoning up the schools that were eligible,” Blandford said, “and using any contacts and networks that we had, including me going back to my own school [Longford Community High School in Feltham].” In all, 44 London schools signed up to take on one or more of the 186 graduates recruited by Teach First. Although the focus had been on inner-London, a number of Teach First schools were located in the outer boroughs of the capital.

In sum, schools were recruited in a number of ways – through CCCUC, well-connected and supportive headteachers, and awareness raised by media stories. SHA leader, John Dunford, also said he continued to encouraged headteachers to sign up for Teach First. The motives of headteachers taking part also varied. Some headteachers saw Teach First as a way to fill chronic vacancies in their schools, while others signed up due to social connections and/or professional beliefs. Finally, some headteachers reported to becoming involved in Teach First partly due to the possibility of forming links with businesses (Hutchings et al. 2006).

8.6 Consolidating Support for Teach First

During the year, while Teach First recruited top graduates and officially partnered with CCCUC, its leaders continued to build support for the organization in both the business and education communities. From the business community, Teach First’s COO, Paul Davies, recalled they recruited a number of large corporations to sign up to sponsor and/or participate in Teach First. However, he noted their reasons
for doing so were different than the first set of business supporters who backed the scheme before its launch.

The early tranche – people like Canary Wharf and Capital & Provident, [thought] “this is a good thing”… to improve education in London. The next tranche, people like PwC in particular, came on [because] they were after good graduates. I remember a [leader] from PwC said, “Aw, this [Teach First] is fantastic. Basically, we at PwC either recruit graduates who know nothing… or we recruit professionals [from various fields]… and they all come in feeling quite clever and basically don’t do what we tell them. So if you can do something in between, where you take graduates, [tie] them up a little bit for two years to get how the world works, then hand them to us, that’s almost the perfect thing we could ever have.” So that second tranche [was] the businesses [that] recruited a lot. So the value proposition that was attractive to the sponsors evolved… it started with ending disadvantage and … some people came on early over that, and the next tranche came in a much more self-interested way around “yes, we’d like these graduates, please”.

– Paul Davies, COO, Teach First
Interview, 21/09/2012

As more businesses signed up to sponsor the scheme, Teach First also began to build a positive relationship with the teacher unions. Although the headteacher unions endorsed Teach First early on, the teacher unions had not. However, after CCCUC became Teach First’s training provider, Blandford brokered an agreement with the unions.

Sonia Blandford was friendly with the head of policy at the NUT [John Bangs]. She got us a meeting with him, and he came up with a deal that, if we allowed the NUT to address our teachers during the training session in the summer, explaining the benefits of being a member of the union, they would give our teachers six months free membership. And we said fine. So that took the thunder out of the other unions that didn’t want support and wanted to denounce us.

– Rona Kiley, Director of Business and Education, London First
Interview, 30/04/2012

Blandford said the same agreement was subsequently made with the NASUWT and the ATL, though the latter had already supported TfL early on. Bangs said the NUT agreed to the arrangement after realizing “the importance of Teach First.”

When we realized how big Teach First was going to be, we established a good relationship [and] had a number of meetings with the students at Teach First about the benefits of joining the [NUT]… My personal view
is that we should have been far faster off the block [and initially] embraced it and made our criticisms from the inside… [Subsequently] the Union took a strategic position, which was to basically say Teach First would settle down like any other initiative and we had to relate to it…. and be critical friends… But [internally] rather large numbers of [our members] didn’t like it, about 30% I think, and we had to deal with that. So it’s a balancing act that you constantly have to do with initiatives that [some] don’t particularly like but are going to be there for the long-term.

– John Bangs, Head of Education, NUT
  Interview, 3/10/2012

Although Bangs convinced the NUT to accept Teach First, his support for the programme was mixed with a frustration at its consistent branding as an elite provider. Thus, while the teacher unions accepted Teach First, criticisms remained but were voiced privately rather than publicly.

Meanwhile, the creation of Teach First impacted some London training providers differently than others.

The issue of Teach First taking places in the schools that traditional providers held… didn’t affect us at Institute as strongly as it affected some other providers because, before Teach First, we and King’s College London were the elite teacher training providers in London. And therefore, schools were less likely to give up working with us... We did lose some places but weren’t hit as much as some other places, which were very resentful of it... It was quite lucky that there was a teacher shortage at the time, so that London could accommodate other providers. If that hadn’t been the case, I think there would have been a lot more blood on the carpet.

– Geoff Whitty, Director, the IOE
  Interview, 9/07/2012

While the IOE may not have lost many trainee places in schools, it may have lost future students. There was some speculation as to what extent trainees recruited onto Teach First were actually a new pool of graduates that would have not tried teaching in state schools otherwise, which was one of the ways the TTA had rationalized Teach First and “sold it” to the teacher training establishment.

I was very amused at the beginning of Teach First when [in spring 2003] I was invited to a launch party they were having with Tony Blair [who subsequently] didn’t turn up, so it was a bit of a damp squid because all these trainees who were about to go off into schools were left talking over the canapés. And I had this group [of participants] and I said “Oh well, what would you have done if you hadn’t gone to Teach First?”… They said, “Oh well, we were going to apply to your institution to become
PGCE students.” … That did raise a legitimate fear in my mind – have I just been taken for a ride by saying this is a new group of people? … If these two I was talking to were typical, I really had let a cuckoo into the nest.

– Geoff Whitty, Director, IOE
Interview, 9/07/2012

Nevertheless, with the teacher unions placated and more businesses pledging support for Teach First, the scheme officially started with 186 trainees in June of 2003. Notably, the recruits started their training despite the fact that Teach First was still not a legalized route into teaching. The programme did not become an official teacher training route until August of 2003 when Parliament approved a secondary legislation change. Marriott recalled that process was tedious, involving meetings with the TTA, DfES and ministers for over a year. Ultimately, Parliament authorized Teach First by altering the national regulations for the GTP that required trainees to be aged 24 or older. Since most Teach First participants were 21 or 22, “a sub-clause put in, to change [that],” recalled Blandford, thus removing the specified age limit. In this way, Teach First became sanctioned as a new pathway into secondary school teaching. The organization had successfully carved out a unique space in London’s landscape, with bases of strategic support in the education, business, and government sectors.
CHAPTER 9: PHASE III: ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

9.1 Policy Entrepreneurs, Networks, & Reinvention For Implementation

Notable policy transfer scholars have argued that it is necessary to examine the implementation of a transferred policy in its new context to determine (1) how it is further reinvented and (2) whether it is ultimately “successful” in its new context or not. As Evan and Davies’ (1999) declare, “The study of policy transfer is incomplete without an implementation perspective” (p.379). As the last chapter illustrated, this could not be more true as Teach First continued to reinvent the TFA idea in particular ways during Phase III.

Teach First’s implementation between August 2002 and June 2003 began initially with the formation of Teach First as an organization. While this organization began promoting its mission and recruiting graduates, it slowly developed further as an inter-organizational programme – delivering teacher training and leadership development – between itself and CCCUC. In this chapter, I consider the following questions related to policy entrepreneurs, networks, and reinvention during Phase III:

- How did the role of TfL’s policy entrepreneurs and networks change as the process of transfer shifted into its implementation phase?
- In what ways was Teach First reinvented further in the process of its implementation?
- How did institutional contexts shape significance and reinvention of Teach First in the education sector?

To address these questions, I discuss ways in which Wigdortz and his colleagues became bicoleurs in the process of learning and constructing something new. I further suggest this insight may extend our understanding of policy entrepreneurs and why and how reinvention occurs. Next, I analyze the ways in which Wigdortz and his staff purposely reinvented aspects of TFA again in their construction of Teach First’s internal norms and the development to the scheme’s graduate recruitment model.

The exploration of the third question requires a consideration of how, starting
in Phase II, Teach First epitomized the wider power struggle – between government and education professionals – over the form and content of teacher training. Thus, in the final sections of this chapter, I take a look at the development of teacher training in England. This institutional history provides insight into the third and final reinvention of the TFA transfer and highlights the way in which contextual factors constrain some ideas and actors while empowering others. As a result, London schools, local teacher training providers, and teacher unions came to accept Teach First and prepare for the impact the scheme would have on the existing context.

9.2 The Continuation and Evolution of TfL’s Policy Transfer Network

In Phase II, Kiley and Wigdortz and their team pulled together an extensive network of supporters to advocate for the transfer of TFA/TfL to England. After the scheme was approved, this core group of policy entrepreneurs (Kiley, Wigdortz, O’Brien, Cleverdon) became the managers and overseers of Teach First and its implementation. Although Evans and Davies (1999) theorize that policy transfer networks are networks of advocates formed only to bring about a policy transfer after which they dissipate, this clearly did not happen in the case of Teach First. The diverse and influential network whose members were bound in their support of TfL persisted and continued to grow. However, the purpose and activities of the network seemed to shift after Teach First was launched. At that point, the purpose of the network changed from one of political advocacy to one of providing resources and visible public support for the scheme.

With this shift in purpose, some supporters, namely businesses, became more active than others for several reasons. First, businesses had the time, relevant expertise, and a variety of resources with which they could help the new organization and staff. In addition, business executives had closer ties with Teach First leaders as all originated from the corporate sector. Furthermore, businesses had become involved with transferring scheme as a CSR initiative and hence planned to directly participate in it for the long-term. A prime example of this commitment and involvement was Rob Habgood of Capital One who became a mentor for Wigdortz. An American expat himself, he was happy to share his experience in setting up Capital One’s services in the U.K. from scratch. Other examples include: (1) Owens
who became the close mentor of the newly appointed CEO, Wigdortz, (2) Kirkpatrick who drew on his McKinsey experience to help Teach First plan recruitment strategies, and (3) May of BITC who spoke at universities during informational meetings to share his experiences of how one can transfer their school leadership into a career in the private sector. All these individuals donated their time and expertise to help implement Teach First. Such business leaders also volunteered to serve on Teach First’s advisory board.

Meanwhile, other supporters remained enthusiastic supporters of the new scheme but were not involved in its day-to-day implementation. Government leaders such as Adonis and Barber continued on with their jobs as did the philanthropists and union heads. While remaining part of the network, these types of supporters did not play a large role in actually implementing Teach First. The leading educationalists involved with TfL, Whitty and Totterdell, were also unofficially sidelined from participating in Teach First’s implementation. Totterdell said he was not fully informed of developments between Teach First and the TTA and hence did not know until late fall 2002 that the TTA was holding an open bidding process to select Teach First’s teacher training partner. His lack of awareness indicates how he was left in a somewhat peripheral position within Teach First’s network after its approval and launch in the summer. Of course, the absence of the IOE’s involvement with Teach First stemmed from Wigdortz’s compromise with the TTA and temporarily distanced the new scheme from London’s teacher educators more generally. With the loss of these networks, though, came the strategic advice and support from the TTA and DfES, both whom now had a stake in the new programme’s success.

As the implementation of Teach First continued through Phase III, the network continued to grow and include leaders and organizations from across the capital. Teach First staff and its board members continued to successfully recruit new business sponsors, placement schools, and philanthropic foundations into its evolving network of supporters. In addition, Teach First’s selection of a university training partner brought a new set of professional networks into the fold of the growing, yet still exclusive, Teach First family.

In sum, the network of supporters brought together in Phase II to advocate for TfL did not dissolve after Teach First’s launch but continued to provide symbolic and material support to the new scheme. The most supportive and involved was the corporate-based section of the policy transfer network. This group supplied the
expertise, personnel, and other resources to help Teach First establish itself. This affected the approaches Teach First took toward graduate recruitment as well as the models and practices that Wigdortz drew upon to internally manage the organization.

9.3 Policy Entrepreneurs as the Bricoleurs of Implementation

Teach First, as policy transfer proposed and ultimately implemented by policy entrepreneurs, appears to have a rather unconventional pattern and style of implementation compared with those that are government-led. Policies brought about and implemented by governments usually involve experienced civil servants, established procedures, and coordination between center peripheral decision-makers and authorities. However, the implementation of Teach First by policy entrepreneurs was a more improvisational process of creating and managing something new. In Phase III, the role of Kiley and Wigdortz and their close allies shifted away from policy advocacy to creating and managing a new enterprise. As a result, I propose the role of policy entrepreneurs shifts in the implementation phase of transfer from policy brokers to that of policy bricoleurs, or those who engage in bricolage. Defined by the Oxford dictionary as “construction or creation from a diverse range of available things”, the concept of bricolage captures the process of reinvention that Wigdortz engaged in with others to create Teach First and manage its graduate recruitment drive in the fall of 2002.

Anthropologists have traditionally defined bricolage as making do with current resources and creating new forms and order from tools and materials at hand (Levi-Strauss, 1966). Scholars have then applied this term in different concepts. Freeman (2007) proposed “epistemological bricolage” to explain how policy-makers (in his case public health officials) draw on various types of learning and domains of knowledge rooted in differing epistemologies to piece together coherent policies. He highlights the social and situational elements of learning, stating:

Knowledge is negotiated not only between actors and interests but between ways of thinking; more precisely, because it is debated between differently situated actors, with different interests and traditions, it is also built from their respective styles of thought. Policy makers do this inevitably as much as intentionally, but they do it all the same. (Freeman 2007, p.491)
The concept of epistemological bricolage is useful in describing how Teach First was not only argued for in Phase II by Kiley and Wigdortz but also implemented in Phase III. Through these phases, actors were making decisions about TfL and Teach First through discussing and drawing on different types and sources of knowledge. These forms and sources varied from Phase II to Phase III but included the McKinsey study, academic studies (i.e. Darling-Hammond 1994), TFA-produced statistics, first-hand accounts of TFA, personal hunches or affinities based on past experience, and the subjective evaluations of trusted peers. However, I primarily focus on how Wigdortz managed the process of implementation and highlight that his policy-oriented learning never ceased but drew upon and combined elements from his private sector experiences and others. His learning could be seen as an ongoing episode of sensemaking as he and his colleagues continued to fashion new things from various resources and test the limits of what others thought was possible.

This last point helps me shift away from bricolage rooted in forms of learning and knowledge to bricolage as an ongoing process of constructing something new from that type of knowing. Using the metaphor of bricolage helps capture just how Wigdortz and his supporters actually implemented Teach First with ideas, resources, and staff expertise drawn upon in an ad-hoc fashion from various sources. This should not be surprising considering that the concepts of bricolage and entrepreneurship are already closely linked. After all, entrepreneurs are considered pioneers, innovators, and inventors because they create or launch something new. In adapting the term bricolage for the study of entrepreneurship, Baker and Nelson (2005) extended Levi-Strauss’s definition of “making do” to include the tendency for bricoleurs to “consciously and consistently” test “conventional limitations” (2005, pp.335–6). Thus, one engaged in “entrepreneurial bricolage”… “creates something from nothing by rendering novel services that arise from their ability and willingness to refuse to enact commonly accepted limitations” (Baker & Nelson 2005, p.354). The emphasis here is on not only risk and potential gain, which are concepts usually with entrepreneur and entrepreneurship, but on starting “from nothing” and trying the unthinkable and being different. Bricoleur and bricolage help deepen the concept of policy entrepreneurs who are not simply agents of policy transfer but may also be involved, or even leading, the reinvention of those ideas during implementation.

Again, drawing on observations from the story of Teach First, I am suggesting the policy entrepreneur’s role in the implementation of a transfer shifts
away from political advocacy. Instead, the policy entrepreneur becomes involved in creating something new from nothing by combining elements from various sources in a process of bricolage. Bricolage is involved in both learning and constructing. For instance, Perkmann and Spicer (2014) offer the concept of organizational bricolage, which they define as “a process whereby a new organization is shaped by drawing on organizational forms that are to hand in a particular environment” (p.1786). The idea captures how Widgortz and his colleagues engaged in constructing a new type of organization to carry out their programme. Like TFA, they created Teach First as a social enterprise, a hybrid type of organization that pursued a charitable social mission through the use and application of business-inspired norms and practices.

The main point here is that Wigdortz and his supporters brought Teach First into existence, not through the established ways and means that governments typically do, but by muddling through and making sense of what TFA was, what Teach First should be, and what others’ experiences can teach them about how to go about reaching their desired outcomes. To manage implementation, Wigdortz and his staff creatively drew upon the resources available in their networks to pursue their goals. They improvised their strategies and activities in response to cultural cues, regulatory pressures, and material constraints. Within a very limited time scale, Teach First leaders blended and applied their knowledge, experiences, and resources in creative and effective ways. Thus, the implementation of transferred ideas by policy entrepreneurs appears to be a messy process of bricolage, in both learning and constructing.

Acting as a bricoleur also spurs reinvention during the implementation phase of the transfer process. While Teach First was a transfer of TFA as essentially a two-year programme that recruited top graduates to improve teaching in state schools, Wigdortz’s combined that model with ethos and strategies drawn from McKinsey. As discussed in Phase I, Wigdortz did not really consider TFA a complete model from which to build Teach First. He indicated from the start that he saw his idea as an adaptation of McKinsey’s War for Talent philosophy which he had utilized during his previous consulting projects in Southeast Asia. One interviewee expressed how Wigdortz and his McKinsey colleagues believed they were improving and expanding on the TFA through their use of McKinsey strategies. Thus, Teach First was shaped by the views, choices, and experiences of Widgortz, the lead policy entrepreneur.
managing the process of bricolage through which parts of TFA were transferred and other parts reinvented. However, as he was still highly inexperienced and a relative newcomer to the U.K., Wigdortz relied heavily on those in the networks around him to advise and guide Teach First’s development, leading to the distinctly corporate reinvention of the basic TFA premise.

9.4 Teach First Undergoes Further Reinvention Under Wigdortz

9.4.1 Teach First’s Internal Management Emulated Corporate Norms

In Phase III, the internal management of Teach First resembled private sector practices and rationales as Wigdortz and his former McKinsey colleagues structured and managed Teach First in ways they had experienced at McKinsey. This was similar to DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) theory of institutional isomorphism through mimetic processes. As DiMaggio and Powell (1983) point out, “Uncertainty is also a powerful force that encourages imitation” (p. 191). With Teach First’s form and future uncertain, its inexperienced leaders emulated McKinsey practices and corporate models of organizing which were more accessible and familiar than TFA. As evident from accounts of staff members, a number of corporate-like structures and practices were put in place to manage the new organization.

First, Wigdortz organized the staff in a tiered hierarchy based on roles and salaries with performance-related bonuses. This structure was designed to reflect corporate norms more than effectively divide work as individuals’ job-related skills and experiences rarely coincided with these defined roles and staff reported sharing roles. Of the dozen employees, only Salmon-Davies had relevant expertise and experience, gained at Arthur Anderson, for her position as co-director of graduate recruitment. Additionally, the bonus-pay scheme tied to performance targets did little to motivate a staff that shared roles and were already committed to the organization for ideological reasons rather than financial ones. Still, it is worth noting that Wigdortz retained the bonus-pay scheme in subsequent years, evidence that corporate emulation persisted despite a lack of evidence of its role in improving organizational performance or morale. In other words, bonus-pay was another practice adopted to make Teach First appear more in the mold of corporate
organizations rather than public or charitable ones.

At times, Teach First’s emulation of corporate sector norms had a somewhat negative effect on the staff. Wigdortz and Wei’s McKinsey-esque management style confused and frustrated other staff members who were unfamiliar with those practices and often saw them as unnecessary or inappropriate. It was especially, at times, off-putting to the mid-level managers of the staff – Marriott, Salmon-Davies, and Sherrin – who found Wigdortz’s management style unhelpful and divisive. In contrast to upper management, these middle managers were all women, two of which had left their careers in the private sector out of disillusionment (Salmon-Davies and Marriott) and a third (Sherrin) who had come from the education sector after serving in TFA. This stark contrast between the values, skills, and orientation of upper management and middle management, the latter with more job relevant experience than the former, led to some frustration and conflict within the staff. Although Wigdortz and Wei were the leaders, the young inexperienced graduate recruiters relied on Salmon-Davies for direction. Meanwhile, Sherrin and Marriott drew on their experiences at the TFA and the TTA respectively to recruit graduates and headteachers to participate in Teach First. The practical experience and expertise of these women often complemented, but also at times clashed, with the overtly corporate-orientated values and exclusivity of Teach First.

Another way in which Teach First demonstrated and emphasized its status and closeness to the corporate world and its elites was through its workspaces. Like values and behavior, the buildings and spaces and even geographical locations in which an organization works communicate status and legitimacy (Vaujany & Vaast 2014). Teach First symbolically used prestigious corporate venues to launch its programme, to carry out graduate assessment centers, and to hold informational meetings with key stakeholders. In one instance, Teach First held a meeting with headteachers and SHA union leaders to discuss the programme at Freshfields’ corporate law offices. In addition, while Teach First staff initially worked in a temporary office in East Aldgate, within months they moved into a donated office space in a Canary Wharf skyscraper. These locations not only signaled Teach First’s connections with the corporate sector but also relayed the impression of a well-funded, prestigious, and influential outfit.

In sum, Wigdortz and Wei’s admiration of the private sector and their familiarity with McKinsey significantly shaped the emergent organizational design.
of Teach First. As leaders of the organization, the former McKinsey consultants imported structure, practices, and values derived from corporate consulting norms irrespective of the benefits or appropriateness of those logics for the operation and purpose of Teach First.

9.4.2 Graduate Recruitment: Copying and Competing with Corporate Models

During the fall of 2002, Wigdortz and his fellow managers planned Teach First’s graduate recruitment drive and modeled it on corporate sector practices. They did so for several reasons: (1) to differentiate and distance Teach First from other teacher training routes, (2) to create an aura of selectivity and prestige around the new scheme, and (3) to compete with other corporate recruiters in attracting the “best” graduates. At the same time, Teach First differentiated itself from other corporate graduates schemes by emphasizing the importance of its social mission. Notably, Teach First established its status and appeal among elite university graduates, not through likening itself to TFA (which probably few, if any, U.K. graduates had heard of), but primarily through its association and links with the corporate sector. Thus, while TFA was often referenced as the successful example on which TfL was modeled on in Phase II, this was not the case during implementation. In Phase III, references to TFA in marketing the programme to graduates were used sparingly and mainly for the purposes of demonstrating the inspirational success of such a scheme. Instead, Teach First’s messages during graduate recruitment emphasized its corporate affiliations and its practices in order to establish itself as a prestigious programme.

How exactly did Teach First reinvent its graduate recruitment to attract graduates from top universities onto its scheme? First, Teach First emulated corporate practices of aggressively recruiting graduates to draw in a large pool of applicants. Persuading a sizable pool of graduates to apply was especially important as low selection ratios raised institutions’ claims to be highly selective. Furthermore, because Teach First needed to appeal to specifically top graduates who would not have otherwise considered teaching (as required by the TTA), the views and values of that demographic became the focal point around which Teach First’s messaging was crafted. Teach First was positioned to target those who were considering a career in the corporate sector – or the field of professional service firms in such areas
as finance, consulting, and accounting. This led Teach First to deliberately avoid using teaching as a “hook” to attract the attention of graduates to its programme (as Wei pointed out) and, instead, positioned the scheme as a leadership programme for career-oriented high fliers in its marketing materials. Teach First aimed to convince graduates it was a not a route into teaching but a route through teaching and a programme through which they could build upon their experiences and develop new skills while leaving their choice of career still very much open.

Once graduates were interested and in attendance at a Teach First informational meeting, the staff presented Teach First as a compelling and more detailed proposition that addressed top graduates’ needs for career advancement along with their desire to help others. This strategy again reflected McKinsey’s War for Talent philosophy Wigdortz had initially cited as inspiration in coming up with the idea for the scheme. This McKinsey-espoused “mind-set” urged companies to seek out the most talented managers and lure such leaders to one’s company through a “winning employee-value proposition”. Wigdortz saw this as the primary purpose of Teach First and the way in which graduates would be lured to help disadvantaged schools.

In reality, recruiting the best talent was especially critical not just to help schools but for Teach First because, as Kirkpatrick pointed out, Teach First was a new organization with no reputation and its success or failure would be based on the quality of graduates recruited in its first year. Kirkpatrick’s point was touching upon the fact that Teach First had only provisional legitimacy, supplied initially by the backing of government and the business community, to establish itself. To fully establish and sustain itself, Teach First needed to succeed in recruiting what was considered the “high quality” graduates, widely understood to mean those with a first or 2:1 from one of the U.K.’s most selective universities. Whether Teach First could attract such exceptional individuals, as it had promised participating schools, would determine the ultimate fate of the scheme. Thus, Teach First’s graduate recruitment was significantly important in establishing the programme’s legitimacy, conditioning the expectations of its participants, and shaping its public image.

While Teach First highlighted its partnership with elite blue chip companies in their marketing, they also emulated corporate practices in the way they assessed candidates. Salmon-Davies and Kirkpatrick, drawing on their expertise from Arthur Anderson and McKinsey respectively, designed its selection criteria and assessment
model that resembled corporate models of graduate recruitment. The model did this by assessing applicants in batches at one-day “assessment centers” during which applicants complete multiple tasks. Through these mechanisms, Teach First signaled its claim to be highly selective and seeking only the most talented graduate leaders.

Although aiming to emulate and compete with other corporate recruiters, Teach First had a comparatively small budget. This prompted Wigdortz to hire recent graduates of elite universities to minimize salaries while also taking advantage of their social networking to spread awareness of the scheme. Teach First also utilized venues of corporate sponsors for official events. Thus, in many ways, Teach First’s limited resources shaped the process of recruitment, prompting the staff to come up with creative and symbolic ways to enhance its image among elite graduates.

The absence of an official university training partner for most of the graduate recruitment season also encouraged Teach First to emulate and reference the corporate sector. With no university set to deliver the programme’s training until late January 2003, Teach First’s recruiting messages remained silent and/or vague on the topic, which had the result of effectively disconnecting and distancing of Teach First from traditional ITT. Had an accredited provider already been selected for the scheme, a representative from that institution would likely have participated in Teach First informational meetings on campuses to detail how the teacher training aspect of the scheme would work. In absence of such a representative, Teach First was perceived as a very different type of programme from convention ITT routes and a scheme in which learning to teach was only one element. The lack of a university training partner also contributed to graduates’ and Wigdortz’s view of Teach First as its own programme and brand, irrespective of the accredited training provider. This foreshadowed and later created conflicts between Teach First and CCCUC as both competed to control the programme’s messages and training elements.

9.5 Teach First and Teacher Education in England

As Teach First recruited graduates, Wigdortz also participated in the TTA’s bidding process to select an accredited training partner. To understand the significance of the bidding process, I turn my focus to the context into which Teach
First was set to operate – that of initial teacher training (ITT). In this section, I review the radically changing field of teacher training over the two decades prior to Teach First’s emergence. The changing patterns of power, policy, and practices within this sector provide both the context and insight into why it was challenging for Teach First to select its own teacher training partner and model and what that choice represented. I then proceed to analyze how this context shaped the meaning and outcomes of the bidding.

9.5.1 A History of Radical Change in Teacher Education in England

Teacher Education Before Thatcher

In England, in the decades prior to the 1980s, teachers and teacher educators were widely considered “experts” and enjoyed relative independence and autonomy in their professional work (Furlong et al. 2000). During this time, individuals were prepared to become teachers through either a three- or four-year Bachelor of Education degree or a one-year PGCE programme offered by higher education institutions. The content of these programmes was diverse and grounded in theory from sociology, history, psychology, and philosophy. However, criticism of the education establishment’s perceived progressive ideals and espousal of child-centred pedagogy grew in late 1960s and 1970s and teachers and schooling became the centre of national debates following Prime Minister Callaghan’s Ruskin speech in 1976 (Ball 1990). Upon election of the Conservatives in 1979, the Thatcher government gradually took the lead in enacting policy to change initial teacher education (ITE) to curtail the autonomy of the teaching profession and make its training more practical and accountable.

Council for the Accreditation of Teacher Education (CATE)

The first significant reform to teacher education was the creation of the Council for the Accreditation of Teacher Education (CATE) in 1984. CATE oversaw the new mandatory accreditation of ITE programmes and was groundbreaking because it established the right of the Education Secretary to be directly involved shaping teacher education programmes. In creating the QTS award, which was separate from an academic degree, CATE became the gatekeeper of entry into
the teaching profession. Through CATE, the government acquired the “capacity to control directly the nature of teacher education by scrutinizing courses of initial teacher training… and deciding up on their appropriateness in terms of criteria defined by central government” (Barton et al. 1993, p.306). Thus, the establishment of CATE marked the end of higher education’s autonomy in the provision of ITE (Furlong et al. 2000). From 1984 to 1994, the criteria set by the government for CATE accreditation drastically reshaped ITE by requiring half of a student’s training be school-based and requiring “ITT” to focus on subject-specific and practical courses (Furlong 1994).

Introduction of “Non-Conventional” Routes into Teaching

During the mid-1980s, while government regulations for ITT became more prescriptive, advocates for the deregulation of teacher education in England gained considerable influence over policy (Furlong 2002, p.23). From this privileged position, they challenged what they perceived as “producer capture” in teacher education, claiming that institutions providing ITE served and protected their own interests and spread a progressive and anti-intellectual ideology that undermined student achievement (Furlong 2002; Ball 1990). As a result, the government enacted two new experimental teacher training schemes in the early 1990s: (1) the articled teacher scheme (ATS), which limited the involvement of higher education institutions in teacher training, and (2) the licensed teacher scheme (LTS), which potentially eliminated their role altogether. Recruitment for these school-based schemes also targeted new populations for teacher recruitment while testing out new approaches to training.

The ATS was a new two-year PGCE programme jointly managed by local education authorities (LEAs) and higher education institutions through which trainees spent 80 percent of their time in schools. The route began in 1990 with 410 trainees and was well funded by government. Later, evaluations revealed the ATS neither attracted a new pool of graduates nor produced better teachers than the conventional PGCE. Yet the ATS cost twice as much as a PGCE to run, and so the scheme was discontinued after 1994.

The LTS, meanwhile, allowed schools to directly hire unqualified but “mature” individuals (over age 24) with a minimum of two years in higher education to be full-time teachers while receiving training on-the-job. How that training was
provided – either through the school, LEA, or higher education – was decided by LEAs or governors of grant-maintained schools. After two years, licensed teachers were then assessed for readiness for QTS. Initially, LEAs supported LTS as a way to deal with teacher shortages although teacher unions opposed it on the grounds that it allowed non-graduates into the profession (Galvin 1994). Nevertheless, the LTS was set up in 1990, and within two years the government had issued approximately 1,000 licences to teachers hired by roughly 60 LEAs. However, because the type of training provided varied widely as did its quality, the LTS was largely discontinued after 1994 and did not challenge the universities’ role in teacher training (Furlong et al. 2000).

More Radical Regulatory Reforms

Lessons from these experimental routes led the Conservative government to enact another wave of radical and more confrontational reforms from 1992-1995. During this time, government increased trainees’ required time in schools to at least 66 percent, gave schools the right to be involved in designing the training, and defined the terms on which schools and universities were to collaborate. In addition, lessons drawn from the LTS and ATS led to the development of School-Centred Initial Teacher Training (SCITT) in 1993 through which consortia of schools received direct funding from government to run employment-based teacher training. School consortium either became accredited themselves or hired higher education faculty to train their supernumerary trainee teachers. During this period, government symbolically shifted to using the term “initial teacher training” (ITT) to describe ITE. While reforms bred some resistance among many teacher educators, 1994 brought another major reform to manage the sector – the TTA.

The Establishment of TTA

The most radical development in ITT came in 1994 when the Conservative government abolished CATE and established the Teacher Training Agency (TTA), arguing that because SCITTs existed outside existing funding frameworks, a new agency was needed to manage the funding and evaluation of all ITT programmes. Thus, the TTA was given the responsibility for managing the recruitment and supply of new teachers as well as the funding and accreditation of all ITT programmes. Still, the TTA was a highly controversial agency as it formally separated the funding
of ITT in England from the funding of other forms of higher education, introduced market competition, and labelled universities and colleges offering ITE programmes as “service providers”.

From its inception, the TTA was charged with promoting SCITTs (though evaluations indicated they were not particularly effective). In addition, the TTA soon linked its judgments of ITT programmes (and hence the allocating of trainees and funding to providers) to Ofsted inspection data. With the appointment of Chris Woodhead as head of Ofsted in 1994, the relationship between ITT providers on one and Ofsted and TTA on the other became quite confrontational. Inspections were carried out frequently, and inspection frameworks gradually became more detailed, prescriptive, and atomistic. Teacher educators complained Ofsted’s inspections were “heavy handed”, “invasive”, and held them accountable for the quality of training in schools over which they often had very little control (Furlong et al. 2000, p.148). Thus, the TTA/Ofsted criteria for appraisal and funding remained contested but ITT providers had little choice but to comply.

**The TTA Under New Labour**

With continued support from New Labour, the TTA continued its dual pursuit of increasing the teacher supply while raising the quality of training. To do so, the TTA developed employment-based initial teacher training (EBITT), which most notably included the Graduate Teacher Programme (GTP). Through the GTP, graduates were paid to train on-the-job while supervised by qualified teachers in a specific school, although in many cases higher education institutions also oversaw the training. First introduced in 1997, the GTP was largely seen as successful and expanded to 3,000 places in 2002 (Tabberer 2003, p.5). The TTA also introduced the Registered Teacher Programme through which non-graduates with two years of higher education agreed to complete a degree while working and training in schools.

With the appointment of Tabberer as head of the TTA in 2000, such invasive controls were gradually relaxed and, in 2002, government scrapped its prescriptive 1997 ITT curriculum in favour of more general guidelines (Furlong et al. 2000). It is important to note that the TTA also promoted the idea, espoused by government and certain academics such as David Hargreaves, that classroom practice needed to be based upon research of “what works”, much like the American model of medical research (Hulme 2006). Thus, the TTA began funding classroom-based research
projects for a select number of teachers to back its goal of having teaching standards and practices that were “evidence-based” unlike university research which was considered more critical than reconstructive (Young 1998, p.56).

Overall, the TTA represented a “transformation in the mode of governance of teacher education” (Mahony & Hextall 1997a, p.269) and reflected the market-based orientation and neo-liberal thinking behind new public management reforms occurring across other sectors during the 1990s (Bevir et al. 2003). While the market for teacher training was being opened to new providers and new types of courses promoted, the TTA acted as the gatekeeper into the profession by determining the performance-based competencies, or “standards”, for the award of QTS. The TTA enforced its QTS standards through funding frameworks linked to Ofsted inspections. In this way, the TTA promoted competition among providers while attempting to standardize the content, structure, and outcomes of ITT programmes.

Thus, by 2002, the TTA was a powerful agency that affected nearly every aspect of teaching and represented a very different view of teaching when compared to the profession as it existed in the 1960s and 1970s. As Hextall and Mahoney (1997a) noted, the TTA was “potentially so powerful” that many teacher educators “were not ‘inclined to make waves’” when asked to consult for it and described the agency’s power as “both ‘seductive’ and ‘threatening’ at one and the same time” (p.273). Hextall and Mahoney (1997a; 1997b; 2000) also argued that the TTA’s work often lacked transparency, skirted democratic accountability, and ignored issues of social justice. Nevertheless, the agency was supported by New Labour and considered largely successful for increasing teacher supply and driving up quality among training providers. With this understanding of the realities of England’s teacher training context, I now return to examining the case of Teach First and the scheme’s need for an accredited teacher training partner and a training model.

9.5.2 The Politics of Innovation in Teacher Training

By 2002, innovation within ITT had become a tricky business for teacher educators. Policy-makers and the TTA were the only ones allowed to experiment with new policies to serve their particular goals and agenda. Such innovation in ITT during New Labour’s first term included the Fast Track Scheme and the National
College and School Leadership. In 1997, the TTA also created a national ITT curriculum by holding a consultation process with professionals in the field whose input helped construct and validate it. Thus, most innovation was essentially government-led, either handed down from above or directly sponsored by those in authority.

In contrast, attempts by teacher educators to exercise agency and some autonomy in their work to innovate were stifled. As Furlong (2002, p.24) noted, the chance for educationalists to experiment was limited due to the frequency and dominance of new regulations:

During the 1990s, most teacher educators found practical course reform a constant and all-consuming activity. Given that change was imposed, there was little time for – or even point in – debate. However, they also saw course design as an important arena of agency… In reality though… such agency has been progressively curtailed. In recent years, the form and content of many courses has become increasingly bureaucratic and the opportunities for influencing the detail of what goes on in school – where student teachers now spend so much of their time – is limited.

Thus, independent innovation led by educationalists had largely been curtailed and discouraged through the highly prescriptive regulations of the TTA and enforced through Ofsted inspections. The government’s increasing control over the content, structure, and funding of teaching education also made university training providers constantly aware and more responsive to new policy.

Meanwhile, those education professionals who engaged with the TTA were rewarded. Education leaders and heads of ITT programmes who partnered with the TTA in government-led innovations – such as building new training routes or programmes (i.e., GTP, Fast Track) – discovered there were benefits in doing so. Such education leaders could gain more funding, additional visibility and influence, and access to wider professional networks through the TTA. Still, such guided innovation rarely provided the autonomy many teacher educators desired and had enjoyed before the creation of the TTA or CATE. In this way, the TTA represented a powerful body that constrained their agency. Yet, for those willing to embrace its policies, the TTA provided advancement for institutions and, in some cases, career empowerment for individuals.

Teach First represented an attempt to independently innovate in the ITT sector. It clearly met with staunch resistance from the TTA in Phase II because
Wigdortz’s original plan, and later Totterdell’s model, challenged the rules and authority of the TTA. While Whitty had voiced his support for the idea, Totterdell took the professional risk by creating something new. The TTA, meanwhile, had built its power and authority for the past eight years on raising the quality of training and fostering competition in ITT through ensuring compliance with its imposed standards.

Thus, the underlying tension in the field between educators wanting to have autonomy and innovate and the TTA wanting regulatory control and conformity was inescapably present in Phase II and III negotiations over TfL’s training model. The TTA became determined to “get compliance” while Totterdell was set on not creating an elite model of other training routes but in offering a new paradigm and model of training. Meanwhile, Wigdortz and Kiley were apparently unaware of those underlying tensions and power dynamics, which were only heightened by the high level of status and influence the IOE enjoyed. Unlike other training providers, the IOE did not always embrace the government’s ideas or work enthusiastically with the TTA, although they still complied with regulations. Rather, the IOE was seen as acting as the vanguard of the public’s trust, fighting for teachers’ and students’ interests against potentially harmful, politically-driven policy reform. To help shape policy, its leadership generally (and Whitty in particular) fostered a closer relationship with the government of the day through policy insiders. Thus the IOE represented, in some ways, competition with the TTA for influence over government policy.

Teach First was clearly an example of this competition for government influence between the IOE and TTA. Although the TTA was an independent, non-governmental agency with its own internal board, and thus did not simply rely on the DfES or ministers for their policy or implementation decisions, the Education Secretary retained ultimate ministerial authority for the agency and its funding. Thus, in their studies of the TTA, Hextall and Mahoney (2000, p.130) found the relationship between “the Minister, Chair, Chief Executive, senior Civil Servants and TTA officers” rather “opaque”. They reported TTA officers having conflicting loyalties between the agency and the DfES and using considerable discretion in their decision-making. At times, direct influence from the DfES and/or minister in TTA policy decisions was evident and vice versa. However, with Barber as one of New Labour education policy architects, the IOE’s influence potentially loomed large.
With leading government officials enamoured with the TfL/IOE proposal as a transfer of TFA, the TTA was forced to respond by co-opting the initiative and making it a government-TTA sponsored innovation. Thus, the IOE’s position regarding Teach First had been weakened late in Phase II when Wigdortz made compromises on the model with Tabberer, agreeing to comply with QTS frameworks and hold an open bidding process to select a training provider. In doing so, Tabberer invoked the rationale of market models and appeals to fairness among training providers.

The issue of intellectual property rights, specifically in regard to Totterdell’s work on the training model, was not considered. This was likely because (1) the TTA planned to set the criteria for the model and (2) Wigdortz clearly felt ownership of the idea for the scheme, and (3) he and Kiley envisioned the IOE still partnering with the scheme in the future. However, the fact remained that Totterdell’s training model appealed to Timms and Adonis and helped secure DfES approval and funding for the scheme. In addition, Wigdortz retained a number of elements of Totterdell’s training framework, such as the “brick” model of teams. Yet, Totterdell found himself and the IOE ostracized from TfL after the spring, and his efforts and ideas went largely unacknowledged.

This is illustrative of how difficult it was to innovate in ITT with the TTA and government closely regulating the field. While Totterdell understood Wigdortz’s compromises enabled the scheme to launch by gaining the TTA’s approval, he had hoped to have more freedom to experiment with a new model. There was still a possibility of doing so in the upcoming bidding process for Teach First’s training partner. Hence, Wigdortz and Tabberer’s negotiations over the design and control of Teach First’s teacher training model were only temporarily alleviated in Phase II. Disagreements over the scheme’s training model came back to haunt the TTA and Teach First in Phase III as the bidding process got under way.

9.5.3 First Round of Bidding: IOE Bid Fails, Other London Providers Abstain

In the initial bidding round, Totterdell again aimed to follow his original plan as much as possible while satisfying the bidding criteria of the TTA. His unique perspective on how elite graduates should be trained from the classroom was derived
from his untraditional background as a former soldier and his highly philosophic
orientation toward his work. As a seasoned educator who had witnessed the changes
in the field over the past two decades, Totterdell saw the TTA’s rules as potentially
bendable. He had participated in government-led innovation before, such as Fast
Track, and did not see the TTA’s authority as indisputable.

However, Totterdell faced unanticipated challenges in coming up with a
training model for the TTA’s bidding process. In the fall of 2002, the IOE found
itself facing internal institutional challenges that forced Totterdell to modify his
original idea. First, the IOE identified a shortfall in its funding, a limitation that
shaped decisions on personnel and project allocations in the foreseeable future.
Secondly, Totterdell’s staff felt pressure to carry out more research to prove “they
could hold their own” (Totterdell Interview, 24/01/2015). This pressure stemmed
from the release of the result of the 2001 Research Assessment Exercise (RAE)\textsuperscript{18},
which gave the IOE a strong rating but indicated that teacher educators had not
contributed significantly to the result. Consequently, Totterdell’s staff of teacher
educators was not able or willing to commit their summer to working with Teach
First as they felt the pressure to produce more research. This all meant that
Totterdell’s internal resources and authority were limited as his department had to
address wider institutional pressures related to research and funding rather than
pursue risky and potentially costly innovations. With these constraints, Totterdell’s
bid for Teach First morphed into an unrecognizable model that both the TTA and
Teach First found unsatisfactory.

However, when none of the other training providers in London bid for the
Teach First contract, the TTA found itself in a bind as to how to implement the
scheme with no training provider and only seven months before it was set to start.
Why the nine other London training providers did not bid for the contract is
interesting and seems to reflect the ongoing tensions between university providers
and the TTA at the time. While Totterdell suggested the model specifications set by
the TTA were unrealistic, the former head of ITE at Roehampton mentioned there

\textsuperscript{18} The RAE, first set up in 1986 under a different name, had become an intense competition,
particularly among the research-intensive Russell Group universities, and occurred roughly every five
years. RAE ratings were based primarily on the strength, or quality (and not quantity), of published
academic papers, and had wide ranging effects on universities (Bence & Oppenheim 2005). Scores
largely determined institutions’ future funding levels and prestige rankings and shaped universities’
internal priorities, hiring practices, and academic careers (MacLeod & Major 2000).
was a quiet collective agreement between the heads of local training providers that none would bid in hopes that the Teach First programme would then not be implemented. Considering Teach First represented 200 extra training places for providers, a sizable amount for any programme, the decision not to apply for the contract indicates how disapproving lead teacher educators were of Teach First and their disinterest in implementing its model as specified by the TTA. Perhaps other training providers also felt the need, like the IOE, to prioritize other organizational needs in response to external environmental pressures and limited resources.

Regardless, it is clear that the TTA’s bidding process was less about enacting quasi-markets to encourage competition and efficiency and more about ensuring conformity through regulation. The fact that bidding was confidential only added to the difficulty of deciphering which goals were being furthered and how judging was taking place. Overall, what became evident in the outcome of the first bid was that the highly-regulated field of teacher training was still not particularly conducive to innovation or rewarding of such professional experimentation.

At the heart of the bidding process was also a struggle over what teachers should know and be able to do. The TTA had arguably promoted a technicist view of teachers through its prescriptive regulations on how and what to teach in ITT and by making ITT a primarily school-based affair. This had promoted a view of teachers as skilled practitioners that were expected to implement in their classroom “what works” (Hextall & Mahony 2000). Meanwhile, most teacher educators favoured a professional view of teaching that involved more reflective forms of practice based. Such reflective professionalism relied on a diversity of theoretical perspectives for teachers to understand the contexts affecting their classrooms and adapt practices to the needs of a range of pupils and situations. In response to past criticism that its standards enforced a technicist view of teachers, the TTA took the position that its regulations ensured the “mastery of one’s craft” which “releases creativity and potential … not stifle it” (Hextall & Mahony 2000, p.336).

The tension between these two conceptions of teachers was at the core of Totterdell’s struggle with the TTA. He not only wanted to have the autonomy to experiment but also believed that teachers needed diverse research and theoretical perspectives to make informed professional judgements and have a significant impact in the classroom. Hence, he wanted trainees to be exposed to the IOE’s rich research tradition. He believed they should understand competing perspectives
within the field and complete academic work for a PGCE or a master’s degree. His view was influenced by his own experience as a teacher trainee at the IOE in the early 1980s, before government intervention in the field, which he credited with training teachers to be “a mini-scholar in your own right in the classroom” (Interview, 23/11/2012). Totterdell’s insistence on the importance of knowing and utilizing theory to empower teachers was reminiscent of Ball’s (1995) impassioned argument for theory to be reintroduced into the ITT curriculum.

Theory is a vehicle for “thinking otherwise”; it is a platform for “outrageous hypotheses” and for “unleashing criticism” … It offers a language for challenge, and modes of thought, other than those articulated for us by dominant others. It provides a language of rigour and irony rather than contingency. The purpose of such theory is to de-familiarise present practices and categories, to make them seem less self-evident and necessary, and to open up spaces for the invention of new forms of experience.

(Ball 1995, p.226)

Thus, for Totterdell, a model that offered trainees exposure to research and theory provided them more perspectives with which to make more reflective professional judgments. Such training would also enable them to reconsider and challenge current policies and practices as well as experiment and innovate.

However, the TTA and government both had publicly expressed their view that theoretical research was of little practical value to the training of new teachers. Thus, Teach First’s collaboration with the TTA led to a bidding specification that had an overtly technicist approach to training and did not promote the academic, multi-disciplinary study of education. Ironically, Teach First’s minimal pre-service training already represented and promoted teachers as technicians. The fact that Teach First recruits would only be provided a six-week training course before becoming full-time classroom teachers would inevitably lead them to prioritize technical knowledge and practical advice over academic perspectives and theoretical reflection. Relatedly, as trainees took up full-time teaching posts after the summer, the role of the university and academic study of education was more limited than most other schemes such as the GTP whose trainees were supernumerary.

In addition to having limited time for university-based training (a summer), Teach First represented rather technicist views of teaching because its leaders believed leadership and management training along with practical on-the-job
experience and mentoring in schools was sufficient for transforming graduates into effective teachers. This is evident by Wei’s comment that “would have loved the teacher training to be done directly… rather than out-sourced” [Interview, 12/08/12]. Thus, Wei would have preferred to train participants in-house using “practitioners” as many private companies (including McKinsey) and TFA did, but Wei admitted this could not happen because of TTA regulations. Here, the example of TFA is notable as Kopp ceased to use teacher educators in its summer training after its first year. Kopp had come to the conclusion that beginning teachers needed practical training, not theory, to begin teaching (Kopp 1992; 1994; 2001). Thus, TFA developed a highly practice-oriented training institute mostly staffed by TFA alumni who typically had only a few years of training in the classroom. TFA thus designed and controlled all of its initial training and was able to promote its mission-oriented, data-driven, rather technicist views of teaching and learning. In this sense, TFA’s training was a model Wigdortz and Wei wished they could have emulated.

Additional evidence of the teacher-as-technicist orientation of Teach First’s leadership, again as expressed by Wei, was the notion that graduates with elite degrees needed no traditional teacher training as exemplified by the hiring practices of the private schools, which often recruited teachers directly from Oxbridge. Hence, while Teach First’s leaders certainly valued academic learning and selected high achieving graduates for the programme, Teach First viewed learning to teach more about delivery of curriculum in digestible form for pupils than a complex process of long-term professional development. This was an understandable view given Teach First’s premise that it recruited participants who were not planning to become career teachers. However, it should be noted that technicist models are typically viewed as disempowering, taking away teachers’ autonomy and own professional judgment (Dadds 1997). Yet, Teach First’s leaders sought to empower trainees professionally by promoting an exclusive esprit de corps among its cohorts. This esprit de corps was expected to boost Teach First teachers’ morale and set them apart from traditional teachers. Later on, Teach First’s technicist views of teaching along with its managerial notions of leadership in the classroom clashed with some of the messages and views underpinning CCCUC’s training, leading to tension and mixed messages within the programme’s summer institute.
9.5.4 Second Round of Bidding: A Final Reinvention

When no accredited training partner was selected after the initial bidding process, the TTA decided to put the Teach First contract up for a second round of bidding. To help ensure that outcomes differed this time, the TTA took the extra step of calling CCCUC to invite Blandford to bid. Whether the TTA called other providers as well is unknown, but what was evident at the time was that Blandford had good standing with the TTA, due to her previous collaborations with the agency. In contrast to Totterdell, who was willing to challenge the TTA, Blandford had a record of setting up new partnerships with the TTA and outwardly respecting both its policies and its authority.

As Dean of CCCUC, Blandford lacked the influential London networks and high status of the IOE’s leaders, and so she was more pragmatic in her approach to the TTA’s invitation to bid. She saw the scheme as an opportunity to expand the work and status of CCCUC while continuing to advance her own career. She also viewed Teach First as an opportunity to help London’s disadvantaged pupils, which she herself had been. She recognized the TTA needed a reliable training provider and that Wigdortz’s organization had already recruited nearly 100 top graduates but had no experience or expertise in training teachers. To Blandford, this was a worthwhile opportunity. Consequently, she decided to put forth a training bid, which she produced in a matter of a few weeks. As a result, her training model closely resembled a hybrid of existing models with supplemental training in educational leadership. While she, like Totterdell, had wanted to offer trainees a PGCE, she accepted this was simply not a possibility the TTA would consider and moved on.

Blandford’s thinking reflected her priorities as a dean of CCCUC. She was willing to make such compromises and conform to regulatory stipulations to ensure she raised the profile of CCCUC. The university college was a relatively small but expanding institution 60 miles outside of London. Unlike the IOE/University College London, CCCUC was not a member of the elite research-led Russell Group of universities. CCCUC’s work was rooted more deeply in teacher training than research, leading it to receive a mid-level ranking of 3a from RAE in 2001. Because CCCUC did not compete, in research terms, with more elite universities, Blandford was able to focus more on building new routes and improving the ITT provision at CCCUC.
It is worth noting though that Blandford and Totterdell both became teachers in the 1980s and as university educators and researchers in the 1990s, they experienced the transformation of the ITE first-hand. The models of teacher training they oversaw were very different training than they themselves had experienced. Their personal responses and beliefs about that change clearly differed, and Totterdell seemed to become somewhat of a maverick within the field. He was less concerned with the pragmatics of policy-making, restoring past ITE models, or institution-building. His professional interest was in reconceptualising ITT for the greater good of the field (Totterdell & Lambert 1998). Blandford, meanwhile, was more focused on pursuing organizational goals and innovating within the current norms and regulations of the sector.

In the end, CCCUC’s bid aligned with the TTA’s specifications, and Blandford won the Teach First contract in round two. Wigdortz and his staff were initially disappointed with having an institution with a weaker reputation (or “brand”) and moving the training to Canterbury. Their concerns regarding status and logistics are further evidence of their lack of awareness of the battles raging in ITT. They were seemingly unaware of the ongoing institutional tensions and political conflicts over the nature of teaching, the role of the university and research in training, and the authority of the TTA. Marriott had only vaguely understood the deep-rooted struggle and recalled that the TTA and DfES viewed the IOE as the most undesirable choice of partners for Teach First. It was “something institutional”, she recalled, and rooted in the past. Meanwhile, the whole bidding process demonstrated that these were tensions that were not going away despite the dominant power of government’s regulation in steering ITT in England. Histories – both institutional and organizational – mattered and shaped how the training model of Teach First was reinvented in the process of implementation. The scheme’s training model was not based on neither TFA nor Totterdell’s theories but improvised by Blandford from parts of other existing programmes at CCCUC.

9.5.5 The Responses of Schools to Teach First

Throughout Teach First’s graduate recruitment drive and the TTA bidding process, headteachers of disadvantaged London schools were reluctant to become involved in Teach First. Despite the concerted efforts of Marriott, Kiley, and
Sherrin, Teach First was not able to sign up many placement schools for its trainees. Although many schools clearly needed more teachers, the untested, American-inspired, corporate-backed scheme did not elicit confidence among school leaders. This attitude began to change, however, when two critical things occurred around the same time – (1) Teach First indicated it successfully recruited at least 100 top graduates into its programme and (2) Teach First officially gained an accredited university training partner, CCCUC. With a glimpse of the types of trainees the programme offered, coupled with assurances that professional teacher educators would be training them, opinion leaders within the social networks of headteachers embraced the scheme and were able to convince others to join. Current and former heads such as Elizabeth Phillips of St. Marylebone and CCCUC’s James Learmonth reached through their extensive professional networks and successfully led the campaign to bring dozens of schools on board the scheme.

The need for teachers, particularly in shortage subjects, propelled some schools to take more Teach First teachers than others, with at least one new academy taking on an unusually large number of eight trainees. The subsequent relationship between Teach First and academies has been profiled by Ball and colleagues (Ball 2008; 2012; Ball & Junemann 2012) but remains another important area for future research. Such research would be especially relevant given the strong relationship that developed between TFA and the charter school movement in the U.S. (Sondel 2015; Kretchmar 2014; Kretchmar et al. 2014; Strauss 2012b).

9.5.6 Transfer Completed: Normalizing Teach First

Late in spring 2003, as Teach First was wrapping up graduate recruitment, CCCUC was busy hiring and assembling its summer institute plans, and a significant numbers of London schools had signed on to take the new trainees, the inevitable was clear. Teach First would go ahead, as approved nearly a year earlier, and the teacher unions had little reason to resist its establishment publicly. As a result, the NUT, through a meeting set up by Bangs and Blandford, was the first union to agree to a deal offering a six-month free membership to Teach First trainees. In exchange, the union was invited to address and explain their union and benefits to the cohort during the summer training. The ATL and NASUWT reportedly agreed to the same
deal and, in this cordial manner, the critical position some teacher union leaders had publically taken in regard to Teach First was overcome.

The timing of this deal suggests that the mutually accommodating arrangement was a pragmatic decision taken by the unions in response to the prevailing environmental pressure to accept the new scheme. These pressures, rather than social influence of Blandford in particular, brought about the teacher unions’ official acceptance of Teach First despite significant opposition, scepticism, and even hostility shown toward the scheme by a significant portion of its members. Even some supportive leaders had their own private criticisms of the programme, as Bangs’ comments regarding its elite positioning indicated. However, teacher educators and union leaders realized that resistance to Teach First had become futile given scheme’s government support, regulatory approval, and their own limited influence in policy.

With 200 Teach First teachers set to join schools across London that fall, the teacher unions previously opposed or neutral toward TfL chose to accommodate the new addition to the institutional environment. The ATL and NASUWT acted pragmatically and bargained with Teach First’s stakeholders to serve their own organizational interests although there remained critics within its ranks. With the dissipation of official resistance from the unions, other training providers in London were forced to accept the establishment of Teach First and faced increased competition for school placement and other resources as a result. With the transfer and reinvention of TFA to England finally complete, there was little doubt that the context of teacher training in London had been changed. As more than one interviewee noted, there was now “a new-kid-on-the-block”.

9.6 Summary of Discussion

In Phase III, the policy entrepreneurs and business networks that first conceptualized and backed Teach First became the organizations’ leaders and overseers. With expertise and personnel drawn primarily from the corporate sector, Teach First underwent two further reinventions that made it increasingly different from TFA. First, the Teach First organization was implemented in ways that made it resemble the corporate sector generally, and McKinsey in particular. Wigdortz and
Wei managed the new Teach First staff by using jargon and practices imported from McKinsey. At the same time, the staff developed a graduate recruitment drive that emulated the models used by elite corporate recruiters in the way they targeted and assessed top graduates. Lastly, Teach First was advertised to graduates as a leadership development programme that was closely allied with the private sector and could enable its participants to both help students while advancing their careers.

The second reinvention of Teach First during this phase occurred when CCCUC was selected as Teach First’s teacher training provider. This event ensured that the scheme trained its teachers in ways that reflected already established TTA routes such as GTP. This made Teach First noticeably different from TFA as the latter ran its own summer training without university educators and with no oversight from a national regulatory body. The selection of CCCUC as Teach First’s training partner also officially severed the link the scheme had originally formed with the IOE. The decision also ensured that Totterdell’s plans for an innovative model of training was laid to rest.

This last point is significant because, in the context of the ITT sector, it represented another battle teacher educators lost in seeking greater professional autonomy. Much of the past two decades had seen university teacher educators forced to cede both their control and influence over the content and structure of initial teacher preparation to policy-makers and bureaucrats. The shift from the term “teacher education” to simple “teacher training” was emblematic of the technicist views of teaching that successive governments had imposed on the sector. In the 1990s, the TTA and Ofsted gained further control over teacher preparation. With a system of regulatory controls and monitoring mechanisms, the TTA had made professional innovation virtually impossible for teacher educators. As a result, Totterdell had originally found TfL inspiring and exciting as an opportunity to apply his expertise to develop an experimental model of training that sat outside the mainstream. However, the dominance of the TTA ensured that such a model did not come into existence. In this way, the final twist in the tale of Teach First’s emergence epitomized and reinforced the radical direction of change within the ITT sector that continued to alter the nature of the teaching profession in England.
10.1 Reflections on the Emergence of Teach First

Welcome to the denouement, or the final resolution, of the Teach First tale. We have arrived at the end of the policy story (and the analysis of its progression) and may now consider how strands of the plot came together to produce the outcome of a policy transfer process that began with an idea— to bring TFA to London. In the course of this chapter, I argue that the story’s outcome, Teach First, represented both a transfer and a unique reinvention of the concept of TFA. Yet, the final version of Teach First was not engineered through the agency of policy entrepreneurs alone, but reached— with the help of influential networks— by navigating the highly politicized terrain of initial teacher training and negotiating a settlement with incumbents in the field. In this way, the policy story of Teach First illuminates how policy entrepreneurs and networks play pivotal roles in initiating and bringing about policy transfer and how institutional contexts shape and are reshaped by networks. Thus, Teach First offers a number of conceptual insights that both challenge and extend our current understanding of policy entrepreneurs and networks as well as the process of transfer, reinvention, and diffusion.

While Teach First’s narrative helps bring into focus the role of actors and networks in policy transfer and reinvention, I also suggest this story has another, less obvious but nevertheless significant outcome: a more slow-moving process, set in motion during this story, through which a powerful emergent network was forming, both “between” the interstices and “around the edges” of existing ones. This expanding and influential network began in an ad hoc manner and for the explicit purpose of policy transfer but did not simply dissipate once the transfer was achieved. Instead, its membership continued to selectively expand and its members remained informed, involved, and even inspired to continue engaging in policy entrepreneurship, particularly in education. The potential of this network to bring about change in England’s educational landscape is discussed further below.

Finally, I also propose policy transfer scholars can benefit in many ways from utilizing a “narrative reconstruction” approach to study cases of transfer. This methodology, involving attention to temporal sequences and reconstructive narrative
analysis, can enable researchers to effectively synthesize multiple levels of analysis, make sense of relevant contexts, and account for the role of subjectivities and power dynamics in decision-making. However, there are challenges and limitations to this approach, like any other. I elaborate on these issues and possible ways forward.

10.2 Teach First as an Outcome of Policy Transfer

10.2.1 Three Critical Points of Reinvention

In the course of this study, I have identified three moments of reinvention in which the idea for Teach First underwent significant change. At these points, Teach First was adapted, voluntarily or involuntarily, in ways that made it significantly different from TFA. It is important to note that each reinvention had an effect on the next, directing Teach First to develop in a particularly idiosyncratic way that was not always anticipated by its advocates. Here, I summarize the three moments of reinvention in order to facilitate a discussion on how Teach First qualifies as a transfer of the TFA model to England.

The first point of reinvention was in the negotiation moment of Phase II. During these meetings at the TTA in April/May 2002, Ralph Tabberer and Brett Wigdortz agreed to move the initiative forward by requiring it to (1) recruit only elite graduates who were not considering entering other teacher training routes, (2) ensure it’s the programme’s training focused on achieving QTS, and (3) allow the TTA to hold an open bidding process to select its teacher training provider. Tabberer also suggested that the scheme not be called “Teach for London” and instead distance itself from trying to replicate TFA. This agreement had a profound effect on the course of Teach First’s development. In effect, the agreement permanently yoked the policy idea to the TTA and prevented its autonomous development in ways that may have led it to reflective of TFA. Had the agreement not taken place, it is possible there would not have been a Teach First. However, it is also possible that TfL could have eventually gained ministerial approval as a DfES-funded experiment much like Adonis’ academies. Thus, the negotiation set TfL on a particular course of develop as “Teach First”. I have not included Totterdell’s innovative TfL model in amongst the moments of reinvention in the story of Teach First because this version
was subsequently rejected though certain features of it persisted (i.e., placing programme participants in groups within schools). Thus, Totterdell’s model became rather inconsequential for the development of Teach First’s training model despite the fact that it gained the admiration of Adonis and Timms, and hence helped trigger the TTA to compromise with TfL proponents.

The second reinvention occurred in the fall of 2002 during the first months of Teach First’s implementation (Phase III). In this period of time, Wigdortz and his staff drew on models from McKinsey and other elite corporate firms to construct and manage Teach First as an organization and to develop its particular brand of graduate recruitment. This use of corporate branding helped establish Teach First as a selective and prestigious programme but also assisted Teach First in fulfilling its promise to the TTA to “not poach” graduates intending to enroll in other ITT routes. Using these corporate models caused some disaffection among lower staff members, but ultimately proved effective in luring elite graduates onto the scheme.

The third and final moment of reinvention in the emergence of Teach First came in the winter of 2002 when CCCUC won the TTA’s contract to provide teacher training for Teach First (also in Phase III). This was a pivotal moment of reinvention that ensured the teacher training model for Teach First was devoid of any significant influence from TFA. Teach First staff member and TFA alumna Nicole Sherrin offered her views on TFA and advice on training to CCCUC. However, Blandford developed the training model without reference to TFA. As a result, the curriculum and messaging of Teach First’s training model reflected other mainstream ITT routes and focused participants on achieving QTS. The only influence TFA apparently had on Teach First’s summer institute was in the form of extra-curricular workshops planned around lectures by two TFA alumni hired for the summer.

These three moments of reinvention were, in some ways, triggered by the necessity to adapt a foreign idea to context as often suggested in the policy transfer literature. However, Teach First’s story also illustrates how reinventions are more social processes in which actors negotiate meaning. Rules, as institutionalized, can be changed or exceptions can be made. Researchers need to be aware of how seemingly obvious “contextual factors” that shape the reinvention of policy during transfer only became such when invoked by the actors that see their relevance (e.g. benefit from them). For example, to enable Teach First to legally operate, Parliament quietly changed the rule that stipulated graduates must be over age 26 to
join an on-the-job ITT route. This rule was quickly amended after Teach First’s
summer training and just before its teachers reached the classroom, illustrating that
the fact that Teach First was technically illegal before this point was of no
consequence. Hypothetically speaking, the TTA could have enforced the “26-year-
old age stipulation” and thus made it a factor that forced further reinvention upon
TfL. Thus, reinvention is not simply an adaptation or adjustment made to a policy
idea based on a fixed context. Rather, reinvention is a social process through which
actors’ with different interests negotiate the meaning of policy ideas and contexts. In
the process of reinvention, both the policy idea and the local context can be amended
to accommodate each other.

These three moments of reinvention combined to give Teach First a distinctly
different form than TFA. As a result, Wigdortz has expressed his disagreement with
the suggestion that his idea was a transfer of TFA to England. However, the fact
remains that TFA was the model that initially inspired London First and BITC to
advocate for its transfer, as uncovered in this study. Furthermore, TFA set the
precedent for Teach First and enabled potential supporters to link the two and
emerge with confidence that such a programme could be successful. For these
reasons, I argue Teach First remains a case of policy transfer through which TFA
came to England. To more fully expand on this point, I reflect on the ways in which
Teach First emerged as a programme similar to TFA and yet very different.

10.2.2 Similarities between Teach First and TFA

Despite undergoing three significant moments of reinventions, Teach First, in
many ways, remains a transfer of TFA as both shared several basic features. First,
the general premise behind TFA and Teach First (or its “theory of change” as the
TFA calls it), remained identical. That premise was that high-achieving graduates, if
recruited to be teachers in challenging schools for two years, could improve
educational outcomes for even the most disadvantaged pupils. Thus, both TFA and
Teach First originally aimed to recruit only graduates from the most elite universities
and place them in challenging schools as teachers for two years. To accomplish this,
both programmes (1) boasted high selectivity, (2) promised to embed members in
resource-rich social networks, and (3) offered increased access for its alumni to
connect to non-teaching career ladders (Maier 2012). Both also lowered the cost (in terms of money, social status, and time) of entering and exploring the teaching profession for elite graduates, making it appealing to idealistic individuals who were unwilling or undecided about their career path.

In addition, both schemes enabled graduates to escape being characterized as teacher by default – “that is, one who becomes a teacher because they are not talented enough for more prestigious occupations” (Maier 2012, p.16). Instead of being seen as taking up a regular job, recruits of Teach First, like those of TFA, were positioned as those who were “giving up” more lucrative, private sector positions available to them and instead acting altruistically by giving their services to education. As a result, alumni of the programme were promised to be highly marketable in the private sector as experienced and ambitious risk-taking leaders of their generation, a status not bestowed on non-Teach First teachers. Thus, for graduates of prestigious universities, Teach First and TFA both offered the chance to teach without the risk of downward social mobility and an alumni network through which to climb professionally. Although Teach First tried to avoid “poaching” graduates from other ITT programmes (as stipulated by the TTA), TFA and Teach First were offering more prestige and benefits than any other route. As a result, both likely drew some graduates away from considering other teacher training programmes at elite universities, as Whitty’s recollection of conversation with Teach First participants suggests.

On an organizational and field level, Teach First and TFA are alike as both took the form of a “social enterprise”, combining the logics and structural elements drawn from the private and charitable sectors. While the concept of a social enterprise is fluid and varies widely in research and in policy contexts (Teasdale 2012), Ball and Exley (2010, p.162) describe such organizations as those that combine a “strong public service ethos” with business acumen. Similarly, others define social enterprises as hybrid forms of organization that pursue “the dual mission of financial sustainability and social purpose” (Doherty et al. 2014, p.417). Social enterprises are seen as different from other forms of entrepreneurship in that they give priority to promoting and creating social value rather than economic value or profits (Mair & Marti 2006). As such, both were well-positioned in the non-profit sector and built strategic links across the public and private domains.

As social enterprises, both TFA and Teach First reflected the trend of
charitable organizations becoming more professionalized (Hwang & Powell 2009) and business-like (Maier et al. 2014) and concerned with developing and managing their organization’s particular “brand” (Philippa Hankinson 2004). For both TFA and Teach First, their “branding” was of the upmost importance as it shaped what type of graduate they could recruit. Both schemes depended upon their lofty rhetoric of addressing a societal injustice and cultivating leaders who “make a difference” while coming across as selective and high-status as possible.

Thus, this posed a dilemma when both schemes needed to partner with a university school of education to provide teacher training for its initial cohort. To maintain an aura of selectivity and prestige, both Teach First and TFA played up their brand and downplayed their links within university schools of education. In practice, the influence of teacher educators on recruits was limited and overshadowed by those leading Teach First and TFA. This was mainly because Teach First and TFA maintained control of graduate recruitment and the programmes’ messaging. Thus, Teach First and TFA marketed and branded their programme as a unique and worthwhile challenge for the “best and brightest”. This branding shaped participants’ understanding and expectations of the type of scheme, schools, and profession they were entering. However, while the two organizations were founded on similar solutions to turning around failing schools – TFA and Teach First differed in significant ways.

10.2.3 Teach First’s “Corporate” Identity vs. TFA’s “Service” Identity

While sharing many similarities with TFA, Teach First’s emulation of the corporate sector in its branding and training programme represented a significant break with the TFA model. While both schemes relied on funds and resources from the private sector to launch, Teach First was much more corporate-oriented in its character, recruitment messages, and training than TFA. From its inception, TFA’s identity and rhetoric utilized messages of social justice, education inequity, and national service, and likened itself to the Peace Corps to appeal to elite graduates (Chira 1990; Kopp 2001). In a study of TFA’s early years, Popkewitz (1998) described how TFA encouraged its “corps members” to see themselves as missionaries whose duty it was to rescue their poor and minority pupils from the
social and cultural environments of disadvantage. TFA’s marketing messages relied on a patriotic sense of civic service that was uniquely American and rooted in individualism and community values that avoided, or mistrusted, government solutions to social problems.

As Widortz set to lure graduates to Teach First, others (particularly Tabberer) warned Wigdortz that borrowing TFA’s recruitment messaging was unfeasible in the U.K. given the differences in national culture. Initially, Wigdortz tested TFA’s approach by holding focus groups with Oxbridge students. The groups rejected patriotic and missionary appeals to “combat poverty” but valued leadership opportunities and transferable skills (Wigdortz 2012). Consequently, Teach First crafted a dual message to graduates that explicitly constructed its identity as an organization created by and in continuing association with the corporate sector. Teach First’s messages emphasized companies’ involvement in its two-year training programme and promised recruits business management training, corporate summer internships, and preferential hiring amongst its private sector sponsors.

TFA had not used its corporate sponsors in this way despite being primarily funded by corporate and private donations since its inception. Such a corporate theme was alien to the service ethos of the TFA programme. Offering management training, corporate internships, or networking events with companies simply did not make sense for TFA amongst its themes of civic activism and social justice. Ironically, although American philanthropy was based on the idea of “enlightened self-interest”, this was not true of the Peace Corps or TFA. Although the selectivity and prestige of these programmes certainly attracted talented graduates, the public suggestion that one did such service, in part, for career-advancement was not socially acceptable (though did exist). In contrast, Teach First urged selected graduates to see themselves as “a cut above the rest” and future elites, declaring: “Teach First unashamedly expects many of its participants to become future Ministers, CEOs, and serial entrepreneurs of our times” (Hutchings et al. 2006, p.10). TFA did not use such messages in targeting graduates between 1990 and 2002.

Thus, while both schemes encouraged graduates to take on teaching as a social mission, Teach First was different in that it marketed itself as a way participants could help others while also advancing themselves. Teach First promised recruits the chance to develop leadership, transferrable skills, and social networks in preparation for another career. Unlike TFA, Teach First crafted
messages that directly appealed to graduates’ sense of ambition as well as altruism to convince them to teach. To be very clear though, Kopp and TFA did initially build and develop, over the years, close and significant ties to the private sector since its founding. It probably is debatable today which organization is actually more corporate-oriented given their respective funding sources, political actions and agenda, and operation over the past decade. My point here is not to paint TFA as a purely idealistic, anti-corporate, or altruistic social enterprise. Instead, I simply emphasize that TFA’s founding identity and recruiting messages up until 2002 were not based upon its private sector sponsors nor were corporate internships or management training ever part of the TFA programme. Teach First, however, did utilize its close ties with the corporate sector in these ways.

Why did TFA and Teach First initially development and crystallize in these contrasting ways? Teach First emulated the corporate sector more than TFA for three inter-related reasons. First, simply, the schemes were founded in different national, cultural, and sectoral contexts. As already discussed, the scheme emerged from London’s corporate community and its establishment led by London First and McKinsey. TFA, on the other hand, had its origins in the senior thesis of a Princeton undergraduate, Kopp, who modeled her idea on the Peace Corps and the former Nations Teacher Corps, both launched in the 1960s. Thus, she launched TFA on her own as a non-profit through utilizing Princeton’s social and professional networks and courting business executives who were already interested in education reform.

Secondly, Teach First and TFA differed due to their respective leaders’ visions and skills. While both Kopp and Wigdortz were passionate about helping disadvantaged pupils, they differed in the founding inspirations and ethos on which they built their respective organizations. Wigdortz based his ideas on the War for Talent and recruited a staff with private sector experience to manage and implement Teach First. Being unfamiliar with English contexts as an American, he conceptualized Teach First as a practical solution to an immoral but ultimately solvable problem in education. In contrast, Kopp founded TFA as a 21-year-old Princeton graduate who became aware of differences in educational opportunities among communities and became convinced that young, idealist graduates like herself would jump at the chance to address this problem.

Wigdortz and Kopp also differed in their professional skills. On the one hand, Wigdortz had advanced analytic skills in quantitative data and economic
forecasting among other things. As discussed in Phase I, he was a data analyst being trained to solve organizational problems and interact with clients. With limited management skills, Wigdortz relied on business leaders as mentors and hired a management staff drawn from the private sector. Kopp, on the other hand, had developed confidence and professional skills at Princeton through the Foundation for Student Communication, a student organization through which she regularly met with business executives (Cradle 2007). By her senior year in 1989, Kopp had also become the manager of the organization’s national, student-run business magazine with a staff of 60 and a budget of $1.5 million (Chira 1990). With this experience, she pursued her idea for TFA with aura of both confidence and idealism that resonated with business executives looking for education reform. However, her ability to fundraise did not affect her idealistic social vision of TFA, and she recruited a staff that reflected this. Her first-year staff members were fellow recent graduates from elite universities who had been involved in teaching, non-profits, and/or the Peace Corps prior to being hired.

Differences between TFA and Teach First’s staff also had a significant impact on the identity and the management of each organization. With three former McKinsey consultants leading Teach First, Wigdortz’s management resembled professional firms with a power and pay hierarchy based on roles, performance-related pay, and language and concepts borrowed from McKinsey. This differed markedly from the practices of TFA when it was first set up in 1989-90. Kopp managed her staff in a democratic and egalitarian manner, putting organizational decisions to a vote and paying all staff members (including herself) the same salary set at the level of a new teacher ($25,000 at the time) (Kopp 2001, p.65; Chira 1990). Kopp kept this horizontal structure and democratic ethos for roughly the first five years of TFA’s existence until it became unmanageable and unproductive. She then adopted a more decentralized and hierarchical governance model on the advice of an experienced management expert (Kopp 2001). Hence, while TFA had become more business-like in structure by the time Wigdortz learned of it, the programme had initially been managed in a manner that reflected the Kopp’s youthful idealism and her service-oriented and patriotic view of TFA’s mission. With that said, however, the founding staff of both organizations were inspired by and committed to fulfilling the social cause of the programme. Thus, ideals were among the driving forces of both staffs.
Finally, Teach First became more corporate-oriented in response to regulatory pressures from the TTA. Essentially, the scheme emphasized its business training and social benefits to appeal to the subset of top graduates that, as the TTA required, were “not likely” or “not” considering teaching as a career. While TFA had the freedom to widely target idealistic elite graduates at 100 highly selective U.S. universities, the TTA pressured Teach First to bring a new demographic into the teacher labour market and not simply “poach” potential trainees from other routes on the campus of the 16 or so U.K. universities from which it recruited. Thus, the TTA’s stipulation further pushed Teach First to play up its corporate ethos and professional career benefits.

In sum, Teach First became a rather different version of TFA due to (1) their founding in contrasting cultural contexts, (2) the background and experience of its leaders and first staff, and (3) regulatory stipulations. In short, the former incorporated its extensive ties to the private sector into its values, identity, and training. In this way, Teach First became a charitable organization focused on a social mission but one that was heavily infused with corporate values, structures, and identity. In contrast, TFA built its prestige and appeal among elite graduates using the patriotic, service-oriented and nationalistic messaging. This made Teach First very different from TFA while both continued to share many similarities.

10.3 Policy Entrepreneurs in Policy Transfer

This study of Teach First’s emergence has shed considerable light on the role and activities of policy entrepreneurs and how they may bring about policy transfer. This is part of the study’s contribution to knowledge in the field. The role of the policy entrepreneurs has been largely neglected as researchers have tended to focus on more established and stable networks of experts or coalitions of advocates who regularly engage in policy processes. These approaches, most notably Haas’ epistemic communities and Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s advocacy coalition framework, cannot account for the spontaneous appearance of groups of policy entrepreneurs that lobby government to achieve their policy goals. In contrast, Evans and Davies (1999) offer the concept of a policy transfer network that does arise for the occasion and purpose of a single transfer. However, their approach still
privileges policy-makers or government bureaucrats as the agents directing the process of transfer. As a result, they offer little insight into the political motivation of policy entrepreneurs themselves or how policy entrepreneurs may differ from government agents in going about constructing such networks. Still, Evans and Davies’ concept of a policy transfer network is helpful as a starting point for considering how policy entrepreneurs may use networks. This was certainly the main means through which Kiley and Wigdortz brought about the transfer of TFA, a point to which I will soon return.

But first, how is our understanding of policy entrepreneurs extended and challenge by evidence from Teach First? Within the literature, there is a general consensus that policy entrepreneurs are often those located outside government and may be knowledgeable experts, activists, or other types of professionals from the civil society. I suggest that this study offers the following insights into who policy entrepreneurs may be, where they may come from, and why they may appear:

First, policy entrepreneurs can emerge from privileged and resource-rich networks, which empower them to act and engage with others in the policy domain despite their position outside of government. Because of their origin in such elite networks, policy entrepreneurs may merge together and work as a team. However, on an individual level, they may have different motivations and interpretations of the policy they for which are advocating.

Second, policy entrepreneurs may be more common, or more likely to appear, in institutionally fragmented contexts where central, coordinating authorities are weak or do not exist. In such a context, modes of network governance may develop and give particular networks power to formulate collective policy goals and coordinate action. This was the case in London for more than a decade in the 1990s, which gave rise to London First and furthered the development of BITC. Meanwhile, an example on the opposite side of the spectrum was the teacher training sector. England’s teacher training sector was highly regulated with a strong central authority – the TTA. Hence, one would not expect policy entrepreneurs touting new policy innovations to emerge in this context.

Third, policy entrepreneurs may be more likely to become involved in bringing about policy transfer if the networks from which they emerge are somewhat cosmopolitan in nature and composition. London First and BITC were local and national network-based business organizations, and thus they included global
individuals from the corporate sector. Partnering with McKinsey brought a further mix of cosmopolitan and well-connected individuals with varied experiences in both local and international contexts.

Fourth, policy entrepreneurs may be located in the local environment but may also be, in Simmel’s sense, “strangers” to it, meaning the policy entrepreneur may be part of a social group but still not considered by others as one of that group. Such individuals differ from others in that they are (1) exposed to new ideas outside the local social system, (2) not held to the same norms as others, and hence are (3) more apt to be the sources of innovation or new practices introduced to the social system. Both Kiley and Wigdortz were, in this sense, “strangers” in London as both were Americans who had recently moved to the country. As such, they had limited knowledge of local contexts although they were very well embedded in the social elite networks of London through their position at London First and McKinsey. This is important to highlight because Kingdon’s (1984) oft-cited description of a policy entrepreneur refers to individuals who “lie in wait” and use their knowledge of the policy process to exploit, or bring about, windows of opportunity to further their own policy goals (p.164-5). Although Kingdon’s definition was subsequently expanded by other scholars, there is still little acknowledgement that policy entrepreneurs can be foreigners who are not from the local context. In contrast, this is a foundational concept in the innovation-diffusion literature.

Moving onto what policy entrepreneurs actually do, the existing literature on policy entrepreneurs offers a comprehensive list of their various strategies. In general, policy entrepreneurs “introduce, translate, and help implement new ideas” (Roberts & King 1991, p.147). Their role is multi-faceted and includes (1) idea generating and problem-framing, (2) cultivating networks among a wide variety of stakeholders, (3) attracting media support, and (4) carrying out administrative duties and evaluative activities related to implementation. Only, Oborn et al. (2011) argue that policy entrepreneurs can do more than open a policy window – a policy entrepreneur can also build a network through which policy agendas can be enacted. To do this, the policy entrepreneur in their study, Professor Sir Ara Darzi engaged in “re-defining problems, forging alliances across interest groups (and mediating between them), and developing (or refining) policy proposals” (Oborn et al. 2011, p.342). In these ways, Darzi was active in shaping the context, content, and process of the policy development.
My study builds on Oborn et al. (2011) by providing further evidence on how policy entrepreneurs can also effectively build influential networks to bring about a policy transfer. Kiley, Wigdortz, and their teams were effective in (1) locating influential contacts and networks for diffusion, (2) recruiting key allies and building consensual knowledge of the innovation, (3) enlisting expertise of strong allies and (4) repeatedly lobbying policy-makers and bureaucrats to consider their idea. More specifically, they drew strategically on information from TFA to make a case for TfL. The policy transfer network they built brought together individual sponsors and often their organizational, professional, and/or personal contacts as well. In this way, while Kiley and Wigdortz’s diffused the idea of TfL, their network of supporters grew and put pressures on the government and the TTA to re-examine and approve the idea.

In the process of building support for a policy transfer, policy entrepreneurs can find themselves constrained by time or by resources. For example, Wigdortz only had limited time to enact TfL as his leave from his job at McKisney was only six months. Thus, as time went by, he became more open to compromising his vision for the programme in order to bring it into existence. Totterdell, on the other hand, was prepared and able to wait and see if TfL could be approved by the minister without modifications made by the TTA. However, Totterdell found himself constrained by resources as his organization’s funding and staff availability was limited.

Another insight into the work of policy entrepreneurs may be how effectively they can work behind the scenes, a finding also noted by Beeson and Stone (2013). In Phase II, the process of recruiting supporters and lobbying government and bureaucrats took place relatively quietly and behind closed doors. No media articles regarding the possibility of transferring TFA to the U.K. appeared prior to May 2002. Instead, Kiley, Wigdortz, and their teams knocked only on certain doors and held meetings targeting influential groups of leaders, such as the representatives of the headteachers unions, to quietly spread the idea and garner support for TfL. This time-consuming method of going person-to-person through social networks likely made the policy transfer network particularly strong as its members were directly tied to the leaders of the initiative, namely Kiley, O’Brien, and Wigdortz.

As the transfer of TfL moved into the implementation stage, the roles of Kiley and Wigdortz changed to overseer and manager of Teach First respectively.
This role entailed a process of piecing together – much like a bricoleur – the knowledge, advice, and resources offered by the policy transfer network and creating the policy programme from scratch. Meanwhile, the policy transfer network formed to bring about the transfer did not dissolve, as Evans and Davies (1999) suggest, but continued on to publicly support the new initiative and offer resources such as funding, expertise, and personnel. Before moving on to examining the role of networks, I offer one last reflection on policy entrepreneurs in the story of Teach First. Kiley and Wigdortz were at the centre of Teach First’s story. However, their agency was really only enabled by the powerful networks in which they were embedded through London First and McKinsey. Had they not been in those organizations and networks, they would not have been asked to puzzle over how to address London’s educational problems nor would they have been empowered to act upon their idea. Thus, while the policy entrepreneurs in this story were exceptional in their abilities and effort to launch and implement Teach First, their actions cannot be wholly separated from the context and the networks in which they were embedded. Hence, researchers must be careful not to accord all credit and agency to leading individuals which tends to happen when studying individual cases of policy entrepreneurship that are actor-centric. As Hardy and McGuire (2008) highlight, a process-centric approach to studying entrepreneurship can help avoid this pitfall by widening the analytical scope of the research.

10.4 The Role of Networks in Bringing about Policy Transfer & Beyond

Networks played a central role in shaping both contexts and action within the story of Teach First. As part of the structural context, networks enabled and empowered actors to initiate transfer and diffuse the idea of the TfL among elites. Such networks had been part of the changing governance structures of London that had given business an influential role in policy in the capital. Networks were also the means through which policy entrepreneurs accomplished their goals. By using London First’s networks as well as continuing to network on its behalf, Kiley and O’Brien recruited the types of individuals that were likely to have contacts and/or influence in government (i.e. Lampl, Whitty, Iacobescu). They also tapped their business networks to recruit those who could provide resources – both material and
symbolic – to support the transfer of TfL as well as the implementation of Teach First.

During the process, it was clear that local individuals and networks influenced government and brought about the policy transfer. Although Kiley and Wigdortz were central players, they were not able to convince the TTA and minister to approve the scheme in the beginning (without local networks and opinion leaders sponsoring them). Thus, this study provides qualitative support for Mintrom and Vergari’s (1998) finding that policy entrepreneurs’ utilization of policy networks, particularly local ones (Mintrom 1997), increases the likelihood of achieving their innovative policy goals.

Networks also provided policy entrepreneurs with the means to direct and shape policy learning. The most vivid example of this is when Kiley arranged for the schools minister, Timms, to attend a TFA fundraiser while he was in Washington D.C. early on in Phase II. Timms was unsure of the idea for TfL. His civil servants as well as the TTA were advising him against it. However, by attending the fundraiser in Washington D.C., he was able to learn more about TFA. He was also impressed by TFA’s high-profile supporters, notably Senator Hillary Clinton and First Lady Laura Bush. This learning opportunity, arranged by Kiley, had ensured that Timms saw TFA in a positive light and witnessed an influential politician – who held a structurally equivalent position – supporting the idea.

As network theory highlights, actors can be influenced by either their direct contacts or by taking cues from others in the same structurally equivalent positions as themselves. Timms now had an opportunity to be influenced by both and came back to the U.K. much more enthusiastic about the idea. However, had he been in contact with other networks in Washington, he could have discovered TFA had powerful adversaries as well. At that time, the survival of TFA was in question because No Child Left Behind proposed every child have a “highly qualified teacher”. While some supported the provision that TFA teachers fit that description, other prominent Democratic Senators, such as Ted Kennedy and Joseph Lieberman, had opposed such a notion and insisted “highly qualified” meant certified. The point here is that there was opposition to TFA on Capitol Hill. However, the networks forming around TfL to support its transfer had biases against critical perspectives and negative inputs and thus avoided them (Evans and Davis 1999). Kiley made sure to direct others to only TFA allies and sources of information that were positive and
uncritical of TFA. This, in turn, had an echo chamber effect and further influenced the opinions of others in the network considering TfL.

As Kiley and her colleagues recruited more supporters to her idea, the TfL network they built did reflect the traits of a policy transfer network as conceptualized by Evans and Davies (1999). The network was ad-hoc, action-oriented, and set up with the specific intention of engineering policy transfer. In addition, it had (1) a limited membership, (2) contact among members that was high-quality during Phase II and related to transfer, and (3) all members possessed some type of resources to provide in support of the transfer. Once the TfL was approved and implemented, however, the network persisted as I discussed in Chapter 9. There, I detailed how the policy transfer network evolved into a support network for the implementation of Teach First. Its members vouched for the scheme publicly as well as provided resources (i.e., funds, expertise, personnel, status by association, etc.). Although the IOE was sidelined within this network and business supporters exercised greater influence over the implementation, the network by and large persisted and grew throughout Phase III. After the IOE was replaced by the CCCUC, Teach First support network grew in the education sector as it prepared to place its teachers in schools that fall. Although Evans and Davies (1999) describe a policy transfer network as one that dissolves after the transfer is achieved, they do suggest that “there must be a positive-sum game if the network is to persist” (p.374).

This point highlights perhaps the main reason why the influential network around Teach First crystallized to bring about the transfer and then persisted. In different ways, the scheme offered its supporters something of value. For example, it offered business supporters the chance to be involved with and later hire its recruits. Policy-makers and bureaucrats were able to highlight their support for a programme that successfully recruited talented graduates to help failing schools. Philanthropists and foundation heads were able to learn from the programme and chart its progress, and so on. Perhaps one of the highlights for all supporters was the opportunity to be a member and participant in the newly formed network that spanned sectors and brought together somewhat individuals. These members can frequently socialize and network together as well as meet the enthusiastic and talented participants of the programme during the many Teach First events held throughout the year.

For these reasons, the policy transfer network persisted and became stable and enduring as Teach First continued to succeed and expand. I suspect that Teach
First’s network grew from this time to become of an influential part of a wider coalition of new actors bringing about change in the education sector, a topic most recently explored by Ball (2007) and Ball and Junemann (2011). In other words, I am suggesting that the policy entrepreneurs in the case of Teach First, in the process of building a network to facilitate a policy transfer, brought about a subtle but significant reconfiguration of networks that represented an influential new voice in the field of teacher training specifically, and in education policy more generally.

10.5 Using Narrative Reconstruction in the Study of Policy Transfer

What policy transfer studies, in both political science and education, often fail to capture and account for is the way in which actors’ past experiences, subjective interpretations, and social connections affect the decisions that are made and the actions that are taken. Reconstructing a policy story – with its diverse cast of characters, complex settings, and plot twists – helps bring a researcher’s analytical gaze close to the human side of “rational” and “voluntary” modes of policy transfer. Thus, among the contributions of this study is the illustration of the value of using stories, or narrative reconstructions, in the study of policy transfer. Using this approach helps to integrate multiple perspectives to uncover the intersecting influence of several factors on multiple levels – individuals, networks, organizations, institutions – to understand what is happening. The key to achieving this, however, is to interview a wide range of individuals involved in the transfer process and seek out their subjective interpretations of the policy idea, events, and wider contexts.

In reconstructing a case of policy transfer, the focus on histories is important. The history of people, organizations, and sectors is critical to understanding the context informing and shaping the action. Knowing such history sheds light on individuals’ personal networks as well as inter-organizational networks and the position of individuals and organizations in wider contexts. Biographies are especially helpful in illuminating how actors interpret their experiences, with whom they associated with, and which networks they were part of. Any narrative account of policy transfer needs an understanding of the individuals’ views, past experiences, and positioning related to other actors in the process. This enables one to understand the dynamics of the account being recalled. Such a perspective can help unravel the
contradictions inherent in interviewees’ accounts and bring previously unknown factors that shaped the story to light. I also suggest that by asking about one’s life story during an interview, interviewees may be more inclined to discussing their decision-making process, providing high-quality data. Hence, using reconstructive narrative analysis offers an innovative way to uncover policy entrepreneurs actions and networks and helps researchers chart a more process-oriented account of a policy transfer.

10.6 Limitations of Study

In reflection, there are at least two ways my results are limited due to the method of data collection and knowledge gaps of my own. First, the snow-balling method for identifying interviewees, while effective, somewhat limited the range of perspectives and actors involved in the emergence of Teach First. Although I interviewed the central actors who were visibly influential in bringing about Teach First, their narratives often differed from those interviewees who had less visible roles. Hence, between the two accounts, I sensed a more balanced picture emerged from certain episodes. However, I often was unable to find the less prominent, or visible, actors that were present. Often times, interviewees could not recall the names of officials at the TTA or within the DfES. In addition, a few interviewees seemed able or unwilling to offer the names of individuals who had been critical of the TfL/Teach First. This highlighted a related challenge I encountered during data collection – it was hard to locate “the skeptics”. Thus, I sensed there were perspectives missing from the narrative. However,remedying this limitation was difficult as no official documents, notable speeches, or debates existed on this case of policy development.

My perspective as the researcher conducting this study was also somewhat biased given that I, as an American studying in the U.K., was not as familiar with the British political culture and history as perhaps a native would have been. Through the process of interviewing, I subsequently cultivated a wider and more nuanced understanding of political cultures and norms among London elites. However, as this was my first study interviewing elites, I felt disadvantaged during some interviews when I was unable to effectively probe, with enough background
knowledge, some of their perspectives or views. Though I did try to remedy this blind spot later on by interviewing a handful of key respondents again, I would encourage other researchers working in unfamiliar settings to be vigilant in learning as much background context as possible before and between interviews and in the process of carefully analyzing the data.

10.7 Avenues for Further Research

This study into the emergence of Teach First demonstrated how Teach First was a transfer of TFA yet was also shaped by the policy entrepreneurs who founded it and the networks that molded the idea to fit conflicted contexts. In terms of future research, there is a need to pursue further research into the subsequent transfers of Teach First worldwide as well as the evolution of Teach First itself. In both these areas, policy entrepreneurs and networks are shaping and implementing education policy in novel ways.

First, I recommend researchers investigate the policy entrepreneurs and networks involved in starting Teach First-inspired programmes abroad. Of the 38 Teach for All affiliated programmes across the world, all launched within the past 10 years, there are four that incorporate “Teach First” into their programme names: Teach First Deutschland (2009), Teach First Israel (2010), Teach First New Zealand (2013), Teach First Denmark (2016). All the other programmes have “Teach For” names or different variations of this theme. What types of programmes are these and how are they related to Teach First and TFA? As discussed in Chapter 1, research into the spread of the TFA and Teach First models is just beginning. We have little empirical research on what elements of these models are being transferred, why, and how they are being adapted, interpreted, and negotiated at the local levels. How Teach First and TFA came together to establish the organization that supports transfer of their model is also vaguely known. These are all avenues into further research that could be pursued and compared to my findings on the emergence of Teach First. The role of McKinsey in these activities also calls for a closer examination as the firm helped launch Teach for All in 2007.

In addition, while it has been my view throughout this study that the founding stage of TFA and Teach First is essential for understanding the different but related
logics and values underpinning them, more study is needed on Teach First to understand how its founders and network of supporters continued to influence education policy and subsequent transfers. My study ends in June 2003 but Teach First has certainly evolved, expanded, and changed considerably since then. How has Teach First developed over time and how has its relationship with TFA evolved? I suspect that after Teach First was established and successful in delivering its programme, it began to collaborate and learn more with TFA and on a more collegial basis. I saw this from my experience at Teach First in 2007 and working under the TFA alumna hired to expand Teach First outside of London. Such a trend is the reverse of Phillips and Ochs (2003) model of policy borrowing that suggests, over time, policies become internalized and less like the original transfers.

To confirm or dispel my prediction, I suggest Teach First, and for that matter TFA, both organizations need to have their history critically researched and written. While the memoirs written by Wigdortz and Kopp offer an insider perspective on their respective organizations, their accounts are naturally limited and actor-centric. Hence, such accounts are not necessarily complete, objective, or fully informed (as I discovered). Yet, the organizational narrative told by these CEOs seems to have taken on the status of “social facts” as their story has been repeatedly told and mythologized. To correct this, it is important for researchers to capture the process through which these programmes came into existence and chart how develop and evolve within local contexts. Why does such history matter? The historical development of Teach First is important because, as this study reveals, policy entrepreneurs can make and influence policy through networks in ways that are not always transparent or accountable. If the power and influence of TFA is anything to go by, then researchers would be wise to take Teach First and other similarly-inspired programmes into account, for both TFA and Teach First enjoy unusually high levels of political support and influence. Furthermore, as Stephen Ball’s recent work is beginning to demonstrate, Teach First may be one node of many in new policy networks changing the English educational landscape. Fully understanding the policy entrepreneurs and networks shaping domestic policy and international transfers is critical for political scientists and educational researchers alike.
RECOMMENDED CITATIONS


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### APPENDICES

#### A.1 TFA Interview List

**Table 2: TFA Interviewees**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TFA Interviewee</th>
<th>Relevance/Connection with Teach For America</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Duration (min)</th>
<th>Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Rick Belding</td>
<td>Sat on first TFA advisory board, also Head of Recruiting New Teachers, involved in private education and teacher supply agency, set up account for TFA donations through Princeton</td>
<td>3/2/12</td>
<td>92:11 (1hr32m)</td>
<td>Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Tom Payzant</td>
<td>Sat on first TFA advisory board, then superintendent of San Diego schools</td>
<td>6/2/12</td>
<td>41:05</td>
<td>Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Sonja Brookins-Santelises</td>
<td>Staff member of TFA during its first year</td>
<td>12/3/12</td>
<td>65:15</td>
<td>TFA Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Susan Sutton</td>
<td>Staff member of TFA during its first year, former Peace Corps volunteer</td>
<td>11/5/12</td>
<td>59:08</td>
<td>TFA Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Tim Knowles</td>
<td>Staff member of TFA and Founding NYC TFA Director, found jobs for TFA recruits in NYC</td>
<td>13/3/12</td>
<td>53:01</td>
<td>TFA Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Pearl Kane</td>
<td>Professor at Columbia University’s Teacher’s College, specializes in private schooling</td>
<td>19/12/12</td>
<td>13:08</td>
<td>Columbia Univ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Carl Grant</td>
<td>Professor of Multi-culturalism, Univ of Wisconsin – Madison, Coordinator of the first TFA Summer Training</td>
<td>25/1/12</td>
<td>64:52</td>
<td>Univ. of Wisconsin – Madison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Marilynn Boyle-Baise</td>
<td>Teacher Instructor at first TFA Summer Training</td>
<td>20/1/12</td>
<td>43:41</td>
<td>Univ. of Wisconsin – Madison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Tony Wagner</td>
<td>Academic and Instructor at the first TFA Summer Training</td>
<td>19/12/12</td>
<td>38:25</td>
<td>Other Univ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Julia Hammond Cradle</td>
<td>Researcher on a team evaluating the first summer institute and year of TFA, completed her PhD on TFA’s formation</td>
<td>2/16/12</td>
<td>161:38 (2hrs,41m)</td>
<td>Univ. of Wisconsin – Madison</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### A.2 Teach First Interview List

#### Table 3: Teach First Interview List

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Teach First Interviewee</th>
<th>Relevance/Connection with Teach First</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Duration (min)</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Brett Wigdortz</td>
<td>McKinsey consultant who helped found and became CEO of TF</td>
<td>28/3/12</td>
<td>28:49</td>
<td>McKinsey and Teach First CEO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30/6/15</td>
<td>18:29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Jo Owen</td>
<td>Called ‘cofounder’ of Teach First, mentored Brett Wigdortz, background is Management consultant and ‘leadership guru’</td>
<td>25/6/12</td>
<td>68:54 (1hr8m)</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Rona Kiley</td>
<td>Director of Education Initiatives for London First, wife of newly appointed Transport for London</td>
<td>30/4/12</td>
<td>100:39 (1hr40m)</td>
<td>London First</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. John Dunford</td>
<td>Leader of the Secondary Heads Association (SHA) which later became Association of School and College Leaders</td>
<td>9/5/12</td>
<td>37:04</td>
<td>SHA (headteacher union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. John Bangs</td>
<td>Head of Education at the National Union of Teachers</td>
<td>3/10/12</td>
<td>33:39</td>
<td>NUT (Union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Ralph Tabberer</td>
<td>CEO of the Teacher Training Agency (became Teacher and Development Agency)</td>
<td>22/5/12</td>
<td>94:35 (1hr34m)</td>
<td>TTA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20/01/15</td>
<td>69:51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Jacque Nunn</td>
<td>Former teacher educator working within the TTA</td>
<td>24/8/12</td>
<td>84:51 (1hr24m)</td>
<td>TTA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Graham Holley</td>
<td>Civil servant at the DfES who worked with Ralph Tabberer (later became head of TDA)</td>
<td>30/5/12</td>
<td>49:12</td>
<td>DfES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teach First Interviewee</td>
<td>Relevance/Connection with Teach First</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Duration (min)</td>
<td>Organisation</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Stephen O'Brien</td>
<td>Founder/CEO of London First, previously founded Business in the Community – became Teach First’s co-Chair of Trustees w/Iacobescu</td>
<td>31/5/12</td>
<td>45:42</td>
<td>London First</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. George Iacobescu</td>
<td>Head of Canary Wharf Group, developer, and first corporate donor of TF - became co-Chair of Trustees of TF w/O’Brien</td>
<td>11/1/13</td>
<td>33:33</td>
<td>Canary Wharf Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. John May</td>
<td>Director of Education for Business in the Community, London</td>
<td>2/5/12</td>
<td>38:28</td>
<td>BITC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Mark Seligman</td>
<td>Credit Suisse, early but not initial supporter of TF</td>
<td>6/2/13</td>
<td>46:01</td>
<td>Credit Suisse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Jennifer Scardino</td>
<td>Director of Corporate Communications, Citigroup</td>
<td>18/05/15</td>
<td>39:41</td>
<td>Citigroup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Rob Habgood</td>
<td>Founder and Head of Capital One’s UK operations</td>
<td>28/4/15</td>
<td>44:30</td>
<td>Capital One</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Peter Lampl</td>
<td>Founder of The Sutton Trust, educational philanthropist, made his fortune in setting up his own private equity firm in NYC</td>
<td>12/6/12</td>
<td>27:51</td>
<td>Charity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Patricia Lankester</td>
<td>Director of the Paul Hamlyn grant making foundation</td>
<td>19/6/12</td>
<td>29:32</td>
<td>Charity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Hilary Hodgson</td>
<td>Director of Education, Esmee Fairbairn</td>
<td>2/2/15</td>
<td>20:04</td>
<td>Charity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Andrew Adonis</td>
<td>Head of Prime Minister’s Policy Unit, No. 10 Downing Street</td>
<td>20/4/12</td>
<td>28:35</td>
<td>No. 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Patrick Diamond</td>
<td>Assistant to Adonis in the Prime Minister’s Policy Unit</td>
<td>30/01/15</td>
<td>40:39</td>
<td>No. 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teach First Interviewee</td>
<td>Relevance/Connection with Teach First</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Duration (min)</td>
<td>Organisation</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Estelle Morris</td>
<td>Education Secretary, 2002</td>
<td>16/4/12</td>
<td>33:36</td>
<td>Education Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Lynne Fabes</td>
<td>DfES, Head of Business-Partnership Unit</td>
<td>23/01/15</td>
<td>23:37</td>
<td>DfES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Geoff Whitty</td>
<td>Professor of Education and head of Institute of Education, London - early supporter of the Teach First idea</td>
<td>9/7/12</td>
<td>119:18</td>
<td>IOE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>24/01/15</td>
<td>73:40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Sonia Blandford</td>
<td>Dean of Education at CCCUC</td>
<td>20/03/15</td>
<td>87:57</td>
<td>CCCUC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. John Moss</td>
<td>Education Professor at Christ Canterbury Church College, which became the training provider for TF</td>
<td>17/09/12</td>
<td>94:13</td>
<td>CCCUC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Nat Wei</td>
<td>More senior colleague of Brett Wigdortz at McKinsey and member of first TF staff</td>
<td>28/8/12</td>
<td>40:22</td>
<td>McKinsey &amp; TF Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. Paul Davies</td>
<td>More senior colleague of Brett Wigdortz at McKinsey and member of first TF staff</td>
<td>29/8/12 and 21/9/12</td>
<td>60:13 and 68:04</td>
<td>McKinsey and TF Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. Nicole Sherrin</td>
<td>Member of first TF staff, alumna of TFA</td>
<td>15/11/12</td>
<td>46:23</td>
<td>TFA and Teach First Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teach First Interviewee</td>
<td>Relevance/Connection with Teach First</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Duration (min)</td>
<td>Organisation</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. Helen Arney</td>
<td>Recent graduate of Imperial College, London and a recruiter on first staff of TF</td>
<td>19/11/12</td>
<td>81:36 (1hr22m)</td>
<td>Teach First Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. Vivienne Man</td>
<td>Recent graduate of Oxford and a recruiter on first staff of TF</td>
<td>30/11/12</td>
<td>8:15 and 43:38</td>
<td>Teach First Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. Lorraine Marriot</td>
<td>Employee of the TTA then joined the first TF staff</td>
<td>6/12/12 &amp; 7/12/12</td>
<td>82:41 and 42:36</td>
<td>Teach First Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. Lyndsey Salmon-Davies</td>
<td>Recruitment manager on the first staff of TF, previously graduate recruiter for Arthur Anderson</td>
<td>11/12/12</td>
<td>67:01</td>
<td>Teach First Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36. Iain Cassidy</td>
<td>Experienced recruiter on the first staff of TF, previously graduate recruiter for Goldman Sachs</td>
<td>14/12/12</td>
<td>46:19</td>
<td>Teach First Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37. Tom Widdows</td>
<td>Headteacher of Bexley Business Academy, one of the first academies in London and among first placement schools for TF teachers</td>
<td>7/1/12</td>
<td>49:33</td>
<td>London School head</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38. Jill Coughlan</td>
<td>Headteacher of Elizabeth Garrett Anderson, one of the first placement schools for TF teachers</td>
<td>4/12/12</td>
<td>34:17</td>
<td>London School head</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39. Sally Coates</td>
<td>Headteacher of Sacred Hearts RC High School, one of the first placement schools for TF teachers</td>
<td>11/01/13</td>
<td>28:11</td>
<td>London School head</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40. Randall Lahann</td>
<td>TFA alumna who helped with TF training in the summer 2003</td>
<td>16/3/12</td>
<td>45:22</td>
<td>Later Teach First staff (post 6/2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41. Tia Lendo</td>
<td>Staff member of TF from summer 2003, alumni of TFA</td>
<td>12/4/12</td>
<td>59:40</td>
<td>Later Teach First staff (post 6/2003)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 3: Diagram of Teach First Individuals*  
*This list includes interviewees and others mentioned in the study. Interviewees are in bold.
A.4 Code Developed to Analyze Transcripts

1. **Background:** Who?
   a. Age
   b. Background
      i. University
      ii. Work
      iii. International experience/Geographic
      iv. Other

2. **Defining the policy (TFA/TF): What is the purpose/mission and means?**
   a. Their understanding of TFA & TF – Form, purpose, goal, strategies
   b. The importance of the TF goal and means
   c. What it meant to them

3. **Why? Personal thinking behind decision to support TFA/TF:**
   a. Improve ‘quality’ of teaching force/bring in ‘talent’
   b. Need more teachers because of London shortage
   c. Chance to innovate in ITE
   d. Improve teaching for pupils in challenging schools
   e. Improve leadership challenging schools
   f. Be apart of an entrepreneurial start-up
   g. Prior knowledge of TFA

4. **Speed of Support**
   a. Immediate support
   b. Needed persuasion
   c. Skeptical/ambivalent

5. **Influences on interviewees’ decision to support TF/TFA?**
   a. Support through one or two trusted associate(s)
   b. Support through persuasion
   c. Support through bandwagon effects
   d. Support due to seeing/hearing about TFA success
   e. Support because would also help academies programme
   f. Personal or sentimental connection - Socially-conscious/‘Meaningful’
      job in non-profit sector (anyone)

6. **Personal, Career, or Organizational Motives: Ways interviewee benefit from supporting TF**
   a. More funding and recognition for their organization (HEIs, TTA)
   b. Unique research opportunities (HEIs)
   c. Develop contacts/network in business world or education sector(Schools, HEIs)
   d. More staff/members for their organization (schools, HEI, unions)
   e. More skilled workforce to select from in the future (Employers)
   f. CV building
   g. Increased power/influence – Increased engagement with policy-makers, leading businesses, London education sector, etc.
7. Types of TF Support: How – meaning, in what ways – did interviewee support the programme?
   a. Financial donations
   b. Donated resources
   c. Donated/shared expertise
   d. Shared contacts/networks
   e. Advocated for publicly
   f. Advocated for through own networks
   g. Mentored/Advised the organization

8. Timings – When?
   a. Dates
      i. Before launch (fall 2001-summer 2002)
      ii. Implementation (summer 2002-summer 2003)
      iii. This period is combined in TFA (summer 1989 - summer 1990)
      iv. Consider phases of interstitial emergence – (1) innovation, (2) mobilization/critical mass, (3) structuration

9. U.S. Contextual Factors – What settings, recent events, and other circumstances influenced the support for TF?
   a. Political
   b. Educational
      i. Regulatory
      ii. Teacher Education
      iii. Labor Market
   c. Economic
      i. Labor Market
      ii. Teacher Salary
   d. Cultural
   e. Historical
   f. Geographical – National v. Local, Size/demographics

10. England’s Contextual Factors – What settings, recent events, and other circumstances influenced the support for TF?
    a. Political
    b. Educational
       i. Regulatory
       ii. Teacher Education
       iii. Labor Market
    c. Economic
       i. Labor Market
       ii. Teacher Salary
    d. Cultural
    e. Historical
    f. Geographical – National v. Local, Size/demographics
11. Prior Policy Influence – Peace Corps/Federal Teachers Corps for TFA, TFA for TF
   a. Contacts
   b. Knowledge/Idea of TFA
   c. Experience with
   d. Role this prior policy influence affected development of TF support or programme design

12. Personal Connection with TF Mission
   a. Same targeted educational background
   b. Same career trajectory of wanting to teach in a state school
   c. Similar social justice/social mobility goals
   d. Sympathy with start up

13. Degree of Trust/Nature of Relationship…. Network Connections between People Involved
   a. Who knew/worked with whom
   b. How much trust appears to exist and influence relationship to TF
   c. What established networks are being used and what new networks are being formed?

14. Identity & Association: Does the interviewee seem to express his/her identity in regard to the political landscape? Who does he/she appear to identify and associate with?
   a. Specific sector
   b. Specific university
   c. Specific ideologies
   d. Other

15. Influence of Business Culture/Ideas
   a. McKinsey
   b. New forms of philanthropy run as private equity firms or by self-made capitalists favoring particular forms of charity
   c. Other common consulting practices, business models, ethos, and strategies being utilized or used for rationales in networking or running TFA/TF
   d. Policy vs. Social Entrepreneur and ideas of enterprise and social change – focus on social mobility vs. social efficiency

16. Trends Among State Schools Involved
   a. Academies
   b. Staff shortages
   c. Other
   d. Connections with persons involved in TF
### A.5 Private Funding Sources of Teach First (July 2002 to June 2003)

#### Table 4: Private Funding Sources of Teach First

**Private Funding Sources of Teach First for July 2002 to June 2003**

*Source: Records Maintained by Teach First*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Private Funding Source</th>
<th>2002/3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>INITIAL FUNDING (Phase II/early Phase III)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Emsée Fairbairn Foundation (Hilary Hodgson)</td>
<td>£68,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. SHINE (Jim O’Neill)</td>
<td>£50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Sutton Trust (Peter Lampl)</td>
<td>£50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Capital One (Rob Habgood)</td>
<td>£50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Capital &amp; Provident Management (Cyril Dennis)</td>
<td>£50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Canary Wharf (George Iacobescu)</td>
<td>£25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Paul Hamlyn Foundation (Patricia Lankester)</td>
<td>£25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Corporation of London</td>
<td>£2,351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ADDITIONAL FUNDS (later in Phase III)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Garfield Weston Foundation</td>
<td>£94,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Corporation of London</td>
<td>£50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Canary Wharf (George Iacobescu)**</td>
<td>£25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>£546,351</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Not an exhaustive list

*Note: Second donation for Iacobescu*
A.6 Table of Teach First’s Milkround Schedule (Fall 2002)

Table 5 – Teach First’s Milkround Schedule (Fall 2002)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Date in 2002</th>
<th>Type of Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Birmingham</td>
<td>08-Oct</td>
<td>Milkround</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Imperial College</td>
<td>09-Oct</td>
<td>Milkround</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Nottingham</td>
<td>16-Oct</td>
<td>Milkround</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Bristol</td>
<td>16-Oct</td>
<td>Careers Fair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Bath</td>
<td>17-Oct</td>
<td>Milkround</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Durham</td>
<td>17-Oct</td>
<td>Milkround</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. London School of</td>
<td>18-Oct</td>
<td>Careers Fair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. York</td>
<td>21-Oct</td>
<td>Milkround</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Bristol</td>
<td>24-Oct</td>
<td>Milkround</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Dublin</td>
<td>29-Oct</td>
<td>Milkround</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Edinburgh</td>
<td>30-Oct</td>
<td>Milkround</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Glasgow</td>
<td>31-Oct</td>
<td>Milkround</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Liverpool</td>
<td>04-Nov</td>
<td>Milkround</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Imperial College</td>
<td>06-Nov</td>
<td>Careers Fair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. London</td>
<td>06-Nov</td>
<td>Milkround</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Manchester</td>
<td>07-Nov</td>
<td>Milkround</td>
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<tr>
<td>17. Cambridge</td>
<td>13-Nov</td>
<td>Milkround</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Cambridge</td>
<td>14-Nov</td>
<td>Careers Fair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Warwick</td>
<td>14-Nov</td>
<td>Milkround</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Oxford</td>
<td>18-Nov</td>
<td>Milkround</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>