THE TERM SA'ADA IN THE SELECTED WORKS
OF AL-FARABI AND AL-GHAZALI

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ABSTRACT

This study is an attempt to analyse the meaning and significance of the term sa‘āda (roughly "happiness") in the selected works of al-Fārābī and al-Ghazālī with some references to the Greek and Neoplatonic sources which were accessible to Muslim philosophers. After the introduction which deals briefly with the nature of the subject-matter of the study and the works which are taken as primary sources, attention is turned to the use of the term sa‘āda in pre-Islamic poetry, the Qur‘ān and Traditions. The first chapter argues that sa‘āda in pre-Islamic literature is used in a non-eschatological sense and associated with Time, stars and some other physical and irrational forces. The Qur‘ān uses the term sa‘īd in an eschatological sense in which it refers to the people who will be in Paradise. In Traditions sa‘āda is used in respect of religious matters and in respect of daily life and social surroundings.

The rest of the dissertation is divided into six chapters in which sa‘āda is envisaged from psycho-cosmological, ethico-political and eschatological standpoints.

The second chapter tries to analyse sa‘āda in the psychology of al-Fārābī. It explains how the Potential Intellect becomes the Acquired Intellect and then reaches the stage of "conjunction" (ittigāl) and in this its sa‘āda consists. It also shows that those who know what sa‘āda is but do not try to attain it will be punished (shaqāwa) and that those who remain "ignorant" of sa‘āda
will be destroyed.

The third chapter deals with ethical perfection and examines \textit{sa'āda} from the point of view of other goods, i.e. pleasure, riches and so forth, which are called "supposed \textit{sa'āda}".

The fourth chapter examines \textit{sa'āda} as a social achievement and shows how al-
\textit{Fārābī} classifies the "cities" and people according to their concept of \textit{sa'āda}.

The same approach is followed in the last three chapters which are devoted to al-
\textit{Ghazālī}. The fifth chapter examines the relation between \textit{sa'āda} and \textit{ma'rifa}, and concludes that \textit{sa'āda} consists of the knowledge of God which determines love of God in this world and the vision of God in the world to come.

The sixth chapter deals with the classification of people in the world to come and with the different degrees of \textit{sa'āda} and \textit{shaqāwa}. It also shows how al-
\textit{Ghazālī} draws a distinction between "the goods of Paradise" and the vision of God which is the \textit{summum bonum} of men. Here, in addition to constant references to the works of al-
\textit{Fārābī}, two sections are devoted to al-
\textit{Ghazālī}'s criticism of otherworldly \textit{sa'āda} in \textit{falāsifā} and the Bā'\textit{tinites}.

The last chapter deals with \textit{sa'āda} in the ethics and politics of al-
\textit{Ghazālī}. It shows how man can become ethically virtuous and how he can refine his character as an individual and as a member of a community at the head of which there is a legitimate caliph. This chapter also argues that according to al-
\textit{Ghazālī} \textit{sa'āda} is
nothing but a divine gift.

The dissertation ends with a concluding remark about some of the main points which came out during the course of our study.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am indebted to the supervisor of this study, W. Montgomery Watt of the University of Edinburgh. Acknowledgement is also due to my friend Miss A. Lamb and to my wife for their considerable help during the preparation of this dissertation.
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Iljām Al-Ghazālī. Iljām al-awām ‘an ‘ilm al-kalām
Imlā’ ___________ Kitāb al-imlā’ ‘an ishkālāt al-iḥyā’.
Iq. ___________ Kitāb al-iqtiṣād fi ‘l-i’tiqād.
J ___________ Jawābir al-Qur’ān
Maqāṣid ___________ Maqāṣid al-falāsifa.
Md ___________ Kitāb al-maqsad al-asnā’ shahr asmā’ Allah al-ḥusnā.
M.K. ___________ Maqūn bihi ‘alā ghayr ablih.
M.S. ___________ Maqūn as-gābir.
Munqīdīh ___________ Al-munqidd min a’d-dalāl
N.M. ___________ Al-Ghazālī’s Book of Counsel for Kings. (Nāṣihat al-Mulūk)
T ___________ Tahāfut al-Falāsifa
W ___________ Ayyuhā ‘l-walād.

2. Other Works.

ACR Averroes’ Commentary on Plato’s “Republic” (see Ibn Rushd)
BFA Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts, Cairo.
Belleten Türk Tarih Kurumu Belleten, Ankara.
BEO Bulletin des Études Orientales.
The Cambridge History The Cambridge History of Later Greek and
Early Medieval Philosophy.
Certitude Jabre, F. La notion de certitude selon Ghazali.
D.A. Aristotle, De Anima.
DTCFD Dil Tarih ve Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi, Ankara.
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INTRODUCTION

Those who are interested in the history of philosophy will not fail to notice that in recent years the majority of the people who have made contributions to the field have tended to concentrate on analysis of the key philosophical terms. It would not be an exaggeration to say that as far as studies in Greek philosophy are concerned, this analysing of the basic philosophical terms has reached its zenith. The student of Greek philosophy is likely to obtain more than one book and many articles about any philosophical concept, say, the concept of *eudaimonia*, or virtue or pleasure.

Despite the recent contributions of scholars in the West as well as in the East, studies in Islamic philosophy are still in their preliminary phases. There is not even a proper dictionary of technical terms in Islamic philosophy. The studies of A.M. Goichon,¹ Farid Jabre² and above all the studies of S.M. Afnan³ are extremely useful but not enough. I have not come across even an article on the ethics of al-Fārābī, let alone on happiness or virtue or any other philosophical concept.

The problem of man's happiness is one of the central themes of Islamic philosophy. The way in which the Muslim philosophers have developed their conception of man's ultimate happiness

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¹ Lexique de la langue philosophique d'Ibn Sinā, Paris, 1938.
³ Philosophical Terminology in Arabic and Persian, Leiden, 1964, and A philosophical lexicon in Persian and Arabic, Beirut, 1969. Unfortunately I failed to obtain a copy of the last work.
(as-sa‘āda al-quswā) owes a great deal to the achievements of Greek-Hellenistic philosophy. A careful analysis of the term sa‘āda, the subject of this dissertation, reveals how deeply the Muslim philosophers were influenced by the ideas of Plato, Aristotle and the Neoplatonic philosophers. They thought that the aims of the teachings of Muḥammad and those of Plato and Aristotle, which were essentially the same according to al-Fārābī, coincided; they all prepare man for the attainment of his ultimate happiness. It seems, however, that although Islam as a religion teaches philosophers and simple believers how to secure their happiness here and in the world to come, philosophers' preoccupation with the term sa‘āda is largely due to their preoccupation with Greek philosophy.

Sa‘āda refers to the highest degree of man's existence. As al-Fārābī states very clearly, its attainment is the sole reason for man's creation. Therefore all other ethical concepts such as virtue and good play a secondary role compared with that which the concept of sa‘āda plays. Sa‘āda is the fruit of all man's activities; it is the ultimate end.

Although this dissertation starts with the term sa‘āda in pre-Islamic literature, the Qur‘ān and Tradition, its main purpose is to deal with sa‘āda in the selected writings of al-Fārābī and al-Ghazālī. The first chapter is nothing more than, as it were, a background for the main subject.

There are many reasons why we have tried to analyse the term sa‘āda in al-Fārābī and al-Ghazālī. As far as sa‘āda is concerned,

al-Fārābī's works are more worthy of careful examination than any other philosophical works with which we are familiar. He is the first Muslim philosopher who gives a comprehensive account of the concept of saʿāda.

Among more than two hundred treatises which are attributed to al-Kindī\(^1\) only a few are devoted to ethical and political questions,\(^2\) and as far as we are aware only his book "On the Means to Drive away Sorrow" has been published with an Italian translation by H. Ritter and R. Walzer.\(^3\) As the title of the book clearly shows, it is about sorrow (ḥuzn), its nature, causes and the means by the help of which man tries to avoid it. Although this book has influenced Ibn Miskawayh\(^4\) and probably al-‘Amīrī and al-Ghazālī, it says very little about saʿāda. It does, however, contain a few useful remarks about saʿāda and its relation to joy, human will and so on.\(^5\)

There is another great name to be mentioned, that of the physician and philosopher ar-Rāzī. Like al-Kindī, he wrote treatises on popular ethics, but unlike him he challenged the

\(^{1}\) See George N. Atiyeh, Al-Kindī, (Rawalpindi, Islamic Research Institute, 1966), pp. 114ff.

\(^{2}\) Ibid., pp. 195-6. Cf. also p. 124 where the writer says that "Out of twelve treatises written by al-Kindī on general topic of politics, only two complete ones have reached us."

\(^{3}\) Studi su al-Kindī 11, uno scritto morale inedito di al-Kindī, in Atti della Reale Accademia Nazionale de Lincei, Memorie della classe de scienze morali, storiche e filologiche, Serie IV, vii (1938-9) pp. 3-64.


\(^{5}\) For a useful article which is based on this treatise see Simone Van Riet, "Joie et bonheur dans le traité d’al-Kindī sur l’art de combattre la tristesse", RPL, 61, pp. 13-23.
fundamental tenets of Islam and asserted that philosophy was the only way of salvation. His best known book on ethics has been translated into English under the title of The Spiritual Physick.

The book primarily deals with popular ethical subjects such as pleasure, virtuous life, conceit, envy and greed. Although the whole treatise explains the way that leads to happiness, sa'āda per se has not been dealt with. In his kitāb as-Sīra al-falsafiyya, he shows how reason and the study of philosophy purify the soul and make it worthy of the spiritual world. In this treatise he deals with bodily and spiritual pleasures, with the well-known idea of the likeness to God and with other matters in a fairly Neoplatonic Platonic manner. Although the idea of the salvation of the soul is the central theme, the term sa'āda has not been dealt with.

In all these foregoing lines, it becomes clear that we are justified in saying that it is al-Fārābī who has fully analysed the concept of sa'āda, and this is why his works are worthy of a more careful study than those of his predecessors in this respect.

Al-Fārābī and al-Ghazālī represent two different world views: the former sees the universe from a standpoint dominated by Greek and Neoplatonic ideas, whereas the latter systematically refutes this Greco-Neoplatonic world view, though he owes much to Greek and Neoplatonic philosophers and their two great Muslim representatives, al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā. It was al-Fārābī's idea of the nature of

2. Edited by Kraus in Al-Rāzī, Opera Philosophica, (Cairo, 1939), pp. 261ff.
man and his denial of the share of the body in the everlasting sa'āda that invited al-Ghazālī's severe criticism in which he went as far as to prove al-Fārābī's heresy (kufr).

Both al-Fārābī and al-Ghazālī had their respective disciples, or rather followers, and both have greatly influenced the subsequent Muslim philosophical, mystical and theological movements. Al-Fārābī's influence has continued to survive in the writings of Ibn Sinā, Ibn Ṭufayl, Ibn Bājja and Ibn Rushd; and al-Ghazālī's influence and the influence of his attack on falāṣīfā, including their concept of sa'āda, was kept alive in the writings of such outstanding Islamic thinkers as Ibn Khaldūn,1 ar-Rāghib al-Isfahānī2 and Ibn Sab‘īn3 to mention only a few. Even those who wrote as philosophers such as Ibn Bājja and Ibn Ṭufayl had to think twice and take al-Ghazālī's criticism of falāṣīfā very seriously when they wrote about sa'āda, immortality and the like.

As two great historical figures, both al-Fārābī and al-Ghazālī must have tried to change the opinion of others which they thought harmful for the attainment of sa'āda. In this respect, however, we know very little about al-Fārābī. Unlike al-Ghazālī he left no autobiographical work. He lived in one of the most critical periods

2. Cf. Tafṣīl an-nash'atayn wa-taḥṣīl as-sa'ādatayn in Majmū'a at-tusawwuf (Cairo, 1960).
of Islamic history, but there is no real evidence whether he took sides in any of the political and religious controversies which were then at their height, and though he seems to have lived under the patronage of a Shi'ite ruler, there is no real evidence to associate him with any of the then popular Shi'ite ideals. There are, however, many similarities between some of his opinions and those of the Shi'ites especially concerning the infallible authority of the imām.1 The Sunnite and the Shi'ite movements were ideologically settled in the time of al-Ghazālī, whereas in the time of al-Fārābī they were still in the making.

His relationship with the Mu'tazilite movement too is not at all clear, although he comes fairly close to the Mu'tazilites especially in his ideas concerning God, the place of reason in the determination of what is good and bad and in the attainment of sa'āda. In all these matters we know where we stand with al-Ghazālī and this enables us to see in which direction al-Ghazālī is leading us.

It seems that al-Fārābī's main concern was to find a home for philosophical ideas within the Islamic surrounding and in this lies his originality. His interest in politics was mainly theoretical. As for his real involvement with the actual political affairs of his time, there are different opinions. According to Professor Watt perhaps he "was chiefly concerned that philosophy could be fully used to improve conditions in the caliphate."2 R. Walzer is of the

opinion that al-Fārābī "even advised the reshaping of the whole political organization of the Muslim world in accordance with the views of Plato putting forward the idea of the philosopher king as the remedy for the troubled state of affairs."\(^1\) According to another scholar, however, al-Fārābī "was not interested in the art of government, nor was he a critic of contemporary politics or even a reformer."\(^2\)

Again in the case of al-Ghazālī we are on fairly clear ground, thanks to his involvement with all the socio-political events of his time. We are well informed by his own books what he wanted to do and how to do it.

In explanation of the title of the present work I would say that it is very difficult to take all the books which are attributed to al-Fārābī and al-Ghazālī and arrive at any certain conclusions. Such a difficulty is due to the fact that not all the books which are attributed to them are considered to be authentic and that to study all that has been written is not an easy matter. Nor does it seem to be possible to take just a single work and base the whole study on it. This is perfectly all right, say, in the case of Aristotle or Plato. As a matter of fact there are many works which deal with a single concept in a single work of Aristotle or Plato. In Islamic philosophy, however, this can only be done provisionally. As for the idea of selecting some works and basing a work on them,

\(^1\) "Aspects of Islamic political thought", BSOAS, 16, (1963), p. 43.
this is comparatively more profitable, though by no means satisfactory. This becomes clearer when we briefly examine our primary sources.

Practically all the best known works of al-Farābī have something to say about the term saʿāda. It is well known that two of his works have this term in their titles: the one is The Attainment of saʿāda, or taḥṣīl as-saʿāda, and the other is The Book of Direction to the Way to Saʿāda, or Kitab at-tanbīh ‘alā sabīl as-saʿāda. Both of these works are studied in this present work. In addition to these two, our work relies heavily on Kitāb arāʿ āhl al-madīna al-fāḍila, kitāb as-siyāsa al-madaniyya and fuṣūl al-madani. Some scattered statements about our subject-matter can also be found in al-Farābī's small treatises such as 'uyūn al-masāʾil, kitāb al-jamʿ bayn maʿyī al-ḥakīmayn, at-tâʿlīqat, al-masāʾil al-mutafarriga, aghrāḍ mā baʿd at-ṭabīʿa: none of the relevant remarks that occur in these works is knowingly left out, but as far as the term saʿāda is concerned they add very little to what is already found in al-Farābī's major works. There are some important passages about our subject in Ḥisāʾ al-ʿulūm, risāla fī l-ʿaqī and al-milla al-fāḍila, so these passages too are taken into consideration. His exposition of the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle are found in his De Plotonis Philosophia, Talkhīṣ Nawāmis Aftātūn ("compendium Legum Platonis") and Philosophy of Aristotle. These works are also included in our primary sources.
In addition to some other works which are attributed to al-Fārābī, the famous fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam is not used in this work. Despite its relevance to our subject, there are many convincing reasons which shed doubt on the authenticity of this book.¹

None of the works of al-Fārābī which we have studied here gives all alone a comprehensive account of his idea of saʿāda. The term ittisāl, for instance, occupies a very important place in the Madīna and the Siyāsa while it does not even occur in the Fuṣūl and the Tanbīh. In the Taḥṣīl, we have a comprehensive treatment of his idea of the fourfold virtues; in the Madīna, on the other hand, he says almost nothing about virtues. That is why we have said earlier on that it is very difficult to choose a single work to study a concept like saʿāda which can only be understood in relation to many other concepts such as good, virtue, pleasure and so forth. It is, therefore, the nature of the subject of this dissertation and the nature of the works which we have used that have led us to select certain works and base our study on them.

These difficulties which arise in the study of al-Fārābī become even greater in the case of al-Ghazālī. The vast number of works which are attributed to him and the doubt about the authenticity of some of them have inevitably led us to choose the works of al-Ghazālī which have not been seriously challenged from the point of view of

¹. For more information about this book and the question of its authenticity see Khalil Georr, "Fārābī, est-il l'auteur des fogouq", REI, (1941-1946) pp. 31-9; cf. R. Walzer, "Al-Fārābī", EI², p. 780 and the literature cited there.
their authenticity.\footnote{For the question of authenticity see Watt, "The authenticity of works attributed to al-Ghazālī" JRAS, April 1952, pp. 24-45. Cf. also his "A forgery in al-Ghazālī's Mishkāt," JRAS, April, 1949, pp. 5-22.} Talking of the works whose authenticity is doubtful, Professor Watt says that "if any one wants to make a statement about al-Ghazālī on the basis of any of these works he must first do something to justify his use of such materials."\footnote{Ibid., p. 31.}

In choosing the works of al-Ghazālī I was primarily assisted by the contributions of Prof. W. Montgomery Watt and Farid Jabre to the study of al-Ghazālī. The works on which this present study is based are largely accepted as authentic.

The basic source of our work is no doubt al-Ghazālī's *Iḥyaʾ al-ʿulūm ad-dīn*, especially the last two quarters. The connection between the terms *muhliktāt* (destructive matters) and *shaqāwa* and between *munjiyāt* (saving matters) and *saʿāda* is so clear that it hardly needs any comment; and *munjiyāt* and *muhliktāt* are the names of the fourth and the third quarters of *Iḥyaʾ* respectively. *Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn*, though it is very useful, does not appear to add anything to the knowledge of *saʿāda* which we already have in the *Iḥyaʾ*. *Al-maqṣad al-asnāʾ* is extremely important, since it deals with al-Ghazālī's ideas of perfection and the imitation of the divine attributes which constitute the ideal forms of a perfect man. *Maqāsid al-falāsifa*, *tahāfut al-falāsifa* and *faḍāʾīḥ al-bāṭiniyya* are indispensable for al-Ghazālī's exposition and criticism of the idea of *saʿāda* in the *falāsifa* and the Bāṭinites. The importance

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1. For the question of authenticity see Watt, "The authenticity of works attributed to al-Ghazālī" JRAS, April 1952, pp. 24-45. Cf. also his "A forgery in al-Ghazālī's Mishkāt," JRAS, April, 1949, pp. 5-22.

2. Ibid., p. 31.
of Munqidh in respect of the whole question of salvation needs no explanation, though saʿāda as a term has not been dealt with. In connection with saʿāda, or some other relevant terms, some references are made to ilmā', iljam, ayyuha'1-walad, nasīḥat al-muluk, iqṭisād, and jawāhir. There are only a few references to al-Ghazālī's mağnūn as-saghīr and mağnūn bihī 'alā ghayr ablih, and they are just for the sake of explanation. These references neither add much to our understanding of saʿāda nor do they go against what we already know from the teachings of the ihyā' and other major works, so whether these two books are authentic or not makes no difference to us.

Al-Ghazālī's mizān al-ʿamal, kimyā'is-saʿāda, mishkāt al-anwār and durrat al-fākhira are relevant to our subject-matter but they are not included in our textus receptus. Here again the doubt about the authenticity of mizān, mishkāt and durrat al-fākhira has prevented us from including these works in this study.

Before we come to our main text, a few remarks about the method which we have tried to apply would not be out of place. In a general sense the subject matter of this dissertation belongs to the field of the history of philosophy, since it deals not only with the term saʿāda in al-Fārābī and al-Ghazālī, but with the origin and development of the term as well. Primarily we have tried to allow the text to speak for itself. By studying and comparing different

1. A complete list of the works on which we base our dissertation is given on pp. x - xi. Cf. also our bibliography.
passages which deal with *saʿāda* we have tried to determine the meaning of the term. What al-Fārābī and al-Ghazālī say about *saʿāda* and how they say it are our primary concerns. This does not mean that we have not tried to see what lies behind and beyond the textual definitions and descriptions and to place a value judgement upon the text, other than those which the text itself manifests. In other words, unlike a phenomenologist, we have not been content with mere "understanding", "description" and the "essence" of the concept of *saʿāda*; nor have we taken the attitude of the so-called "suspension of judgement" which is essential for the phenomenological approach. It should be added immediately, however, that in this present study there is no thorough examination of the origin and development of the concept of *saʿāda* in the history of philosophy before al-Fārābī on which he heavily depends. Without an adequate knowledge of Greek and Latin this task cannot be undertaken and the writer has not, unfortunately, made a study of these languages. Nevertheless, constant references are made to the works of Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus and others. These references occur more in our chapters on al-Fārābī than in those on al-Ghazālī. This is because al-Fārābī openly admits and wholeheartedly welcomes this Greek-Hellenistic influence. One can see this influence on al-Fārābī directly whereas in the case of al-Ghazālī such influence seems to have taken place through the philosophical writings of *falāsifa*. We are not trying to say, however, that al-Ghazālī did not directly use the texts which were translated from Greek and Syriac into Arabic.
As will be noticed, there is hardly any reference to the works of the ṣūfis. Especially in the case of al-Ghazālī some comparisons between the works of al-Ghazālī and those of al-Juwaynī, Junayd, Abū-Ṭālib al-Makkī, al-Muḥāsibī and many others might have brought much light on to the development of the concept of saʿāda. Although this is very important, it lies beyond the scope of this dissertation. For a full understanding of the origins and the developments of such terms as saʿāda, qurb, kamāl, maʿrifa there have to be many studies which aim at the analysis of these basic key-terms which are widely used in Islamic theology, philosophy and ṣūfism.
CHAPTER ONE

SA'ADA IN PRE-ISLAMIC LITERATURE, THE QUR'AN AND TRADITION

i) Sa'ada in Pre-Islamic Literature.

The term sa'ada which comes from the root s-’d is usually rendered into English as happiness, felicity, good fortune and good luck. Thus the verb sa'ada or su'ida means to be happy, fortunate and the like. "The root sa'd and some of its derivatives are associated in various connections with pre-Islamic Arab conceptions."¹

The term sa'Id is used for a man who is in a state of felicity with respect to religion and to worldly things. In pre-Islamic times it was Time or the stars or any other physical or irrational force which brought man to this state. In Islam, on the other hand, it is God who gives man happiness in this world and in the world to come. In phrases like malik as-sa'Id or wazir as-sa'Id, however, the term sa'Id simply means majesty or highness. They are used in court language and belles-lettres.² Dar us-seade is the court and seadetli is a title used in the Turkish official hierarchy.

In Arabic there are some other terms such as yumm, ni'ma and baraka which have the same connotations and are usually translated into English as happiness, prosperity and the like. To these terms we can add the words surur and farah which have come to mean something like happiness, joy, pleasure, delight and so on. It can be said,

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¹ A.J. Wensinck, "Sa'ada", EI.¹
² Māwardī, Kitāb al-irshād ilā Ādāb al-wizarā', (Halet Efendi, 765) fols. 21b-22a.
however, that the term saʿāda refers to a deeper experience than, say, surūr and farah.

The opposite of saʿāda is, in most cases, the word shaqāwa, misery or wretchedness. Both terms are usually used together to show two diametrically opposite states or conditions. There are, however, some other Arabic terms such as musība,1 shuʿūm, naḥās which have come to mean more or less unhappiness, misfortune, calamity and evil.

It is a well known fact that when the Prophet invited the Arabs to submit to Islam, he emphatically and repeatedly stressed on man's life in the world to come. The Meccan Suras are full of lively and vivid descriptions of Paradise and Hell which can be taken as the descriptions of saʿāda and shaqāwa respectively. It is equally well-known that Muḥammad's opponents did not hesitate to reject and even to ridicule the Qur'ānic idea of a future life in general and the idea of happiness and misery in particular. To imagine that their rejection was due to their lack of understanding of what the Qur'ān meant seems to be absurd. In order to understand the reasons which underly the rejection of the opponents of Islam a distinction between the old Arabic ideas and those of the Qur'ān is necessary.

Generally speaking there are two ways to obtain some information about the Arabs before and during the rise of Islam: by studying what is called the pre-Islamic literature, and by studying the reasons for their refusal of the Islamic ideas which are mentioned in

the Qur'ān itself. The Qur'ān makes references not only to the
time of Muḥammad but to the early periods as well.

The idea of happiness or unhappiness is fixed and systematised,
if there is a fixed theory of values. The Arabs before Islam were
mainly interested in their daily lives. Their valuation of things
were simple and traditional. As T. Izutsu observes, the Arabs had
a number of firmly rooted moral values. "But they were just as
membra disjecta without any definite underlying principle to support
them. They were based almost exclusively on an irrational sort of
emotion, or rather, a blind and violent passion for the mode of life
that had been handed down from generation to generation as a priceless
tribal asset".¹

The basic difference between the Qur'ānic idea of sa'āda and
that of the early Arabs who rejected the Qur'ān lies in the fact that
the former is primarily connected with the life after death, whereas
the latter is based on a kind of physical and even to some extent
magical relationship between man and the universe. As C.J. Lyall
has pointed out, "the ordinary Arabs of the desert had but a vague
notion of a hereafter, and probably connected with no idea of reward
and punishment".² The Arabs found something strange and even absurd
in the Qur'ānic idea of resurrection. The Qur'ān is full of
references about this. That is why they said to the prophet Muḥammad

1. Izutsu, The Ethico-Religious Concepts in the Qur'ān, (Montreal;
2. Sir Charles James Lyall, Ancient Arabian Poetry, (London,
Edinburgh, 1885), xxx.
that "there is nothing but our first death, we shall not be revived. Bring us our fathers, if you speak truly". (XLIV. 34-5). 1

It is this denial of life after death, at least in the Qur'ānic sense, made them think about happiness in a non-eschatological fashion. According to them the stars, jinn and many other forces were self-determining and directly connected with the happiness and unhappiness of human beings. The Qur'ān, it is true, did not reject the idea that the happiness of man was determined, nor did it reject many of the irrational forces in which the Arabs believed. No doubt in the Qur'ān the supernatural existence such as jinn or shayātīn are the creatures of God. They are created for a purpose and live under the will of God. "They are", to quote H.A.R. Gibb, "so to speak, rationalized, and serve in their return to rationalize the mysterious evils and misfortunes that befall men." 2

Perhaps one of the strongest determining forces among the Arabs was Time (dahr). The term dahr, which has the connotation of Fate, was considered to be the cause of all happiness and misery. 3

The famous poet al-Mumazzaq al-‘Abdī says:

Is there for a man any protector against the daughters of Time?
Or is there any magician who can charm away from him the fated doom of death? 4

Time seems to be related more to misery than to happiness. It was the pessimist who talked and grumbled about Time more than anyone else. One of these pessimists says:

Greatly do I marvel at him who piles together riches, while the guile of Time is full of disasters. It destroys him against whom it (Time) directs Its attack, whether he be in misery [shaqā'] or in kingship like Paradise, ample and rich.

The Qur'ān too refers to this attitude of Arabs towards Time. A verse reports the Arabs saying: "there is nothing but our present life, we die, and we live, and nothing but only dahr destroys us" (XLV, 24). This Qur'ānic reference confirms the view that the ancient Arabs did not really believe in the life of the world to come. This irrational attitude towards dahr did not disappear, though its meaning has been transformed. In a Tradition swearing at Time is forbidden, but not because of its destructive power, rather because of its being creature of God.² Dahr is also used to explain the idea of blind chance as well.³

Although the cause of happiness and misery was Time or some other forces, what the pre-Islamic poets meant by the term sa'āda and shaqāwa does not very much differ from the modern usages of these terms in the Arabic language; that is to say when they are used in a non-eschatological sense. As a matter of fact in many leading European languages as well as in Arabic, Persian and Turkish the

1. Ibid., LIX, 4, 5.
2. Al-Ghazālī, Ih, IV, 502; 1q, 75-6.
primary meaning of the term "happiness" seems to involve the idea of good chance, fortune and luck.¹ It is this meaning which underlines the use of sa‘āda, yumm, baraka in Arabic poetry in pre-Islamic times. This essential meaning of the term sa‘āda has kept its place alongside the eschatological and philosophical usages. The poets of pre-Islamic periods constantly used the terms sa‘āda and shaqāwa to express their joys and sorrows which were caused by their natural, tribal and social surroundings.² No doubt the same thing continued after the rise of Islam.

As has already been pointed out what was attacked by the Qur‘ān and by those who wrote as Muslims was not what the Arabs of Jahiliyya meant by the terms of sa‘āda and shaqāwa, but rather the idea that Time, the stars and other forces cause happiness or misery.³ If a thing seems to be the cause of happiness, this must be accepted not as an ultimate cause but an intermediary which works under the will of God. It is God, says a Muslim poet, who bestows happiness on us.⁴ If one group of people, for instance, become miserable and make other people miserable; or if they become happy and make others


happy, it must be accepted that all these interrelations are directed by God; therefore the sa‘īd should send his thanksgivings to God and nothing else.¹

It is quite possible to multiply the number of these examples in Arabic Literature, but even these few are enough to show the basic meaning of the terms sa‘āda and shaqāwa and other terms with similar meanings such as ni‘ma and nathā which have sometimes been used in place of sa‘āda and shaqāwa respectively.² It seems that it was through the influence of the Qur‘ān and Traditions the basic meanings, or rather the worldly characters, of these terms were pushed to the background and their usage in religious and eschatological sense became dominant.


². Mufaddaliyat, LVII, 18. For more information about the term sa‘āda in Arabic literature the following works can be consulted:


Ibn Qutayba, Kitāb ash-shi‘r wa-sh-Shu‘arā’ (Two Vol. Cairo, 1364-9 H.), Vol. i, 502; Vol. ii, 553.

Al-Isfahānī, Kitāb al-aghānī, (Cairo, 1963), Vol. vii, 41; Vol. x, 207.

The aim of this chapter is to show the relationship of some of the key-terms of the Qurʾān with the concept of happiness. To give a complete account of the Qurʾānic idea of salvation here is impossible. This is because the teachings of the Qurʾān as a whole are concerned with the idea of happiness of mankind. It is "sent down ... to give good tidings unto the believers, who do righteous deeds, that theirs shall be a goodly wage therein to abide for ever." (XVIII, 1-3).

The Qurʾān explicitly and repeatedly emphasizes that man's happiness in this world and in the world to come lies in his obedience to God as shown by His Prophet. What man ought or ought not to do for the achievement of his happiness is "written down" in the Book. The secrets of happiness are hidden in joyful submission to the commands of God.

Since the Qurʾān is not a work of philosophical ethics, it does not put forward a fully developed system of abstract concepts of happiness, good and evil, but there are quite a few words which are usually translated as happiness, prosperity, salvation and the like.

The Qurʾānic ethical terms, however, are mostly descriptive. What is good or evil can easily be established by the help of the descriptions of believers or unbelievers, hypocrites and above all of shayṭān or iblīs. In the Qurʾānic verses the terms which are related to the idea of salvation such as prosperity (falāḥ), salvation (najāt) and triumph or success (fawz) usually follow the
qualities of believers. The second Sūra, for instance, starts with the qualities of the godfearing and ends with the verse "those are the ones who prosper." (11.4) And there are many verses which end in a similar fashion, though instead of the word prosper we might have the word fā'izūn, the ones who are saved, or muḥtadūn, the ones who are guided and the like. It is not unusual, however, to see a verse starting for instance, with the word aflaha, "became prosperous", and then enumerating the qualities of the believers.¹

Despite the frequent occurrences of falāḥ and fawz, the term najāt, which has become the name of the doctrine of salvation in later Islam,² occurs only once in the Qurʾān in Sūra XL. 44. It runs: "O my people, how is it with me, that I call you to salvation and you call me to the Fire?"

The term najāt literally means to escape or to be saved from a danger. In the verse just quoted najāt is contrasted with the Fire. Thus, salvation means to escape from the Fire. To invoke Fire means to call "to disbelieve in God" (XL. 45) and to beg for salvation means to call "to the All-mighty, the All-forgiving" (ibid). This is the core of the Qurʾānic idea of salvation which has been elaborated and defended by many Muslim theologians, șūfis and even philosophers.

God-centredness and the other worldly characteristics of

¹. Cf. also XXIII. 1-10; XCI. 9.
salvation become even clearer when the terms sa‘āda and shaqāwa are analysed.

The term sa‘āda does not occur in the Qur‘ān. We have the term sa‘īd which is used together with its opposite shaqī in the same verse:

The day it comes, no soul shall speak, save by His leave. Some of them shall be wretched (shaqī) and some happy (sa‘īd). As for the wretched (shaqaw) they shall be in the Fire …… there dwelling for ever, save thy Lord will; surely thy Lord accomplishes what He desires. And as for the happy (su‘īdu), they shall be in Paradise, therein dwelling forever, so long as the heavens and the earth abide, save as thy Lord will for a gift unbroken. (XI, 107-110)

There seems to be an agreement among the commentators as far as the interpretation of sa‘īd and shaqī is concerned, but about the full implication of the verses their opinions are sometimes at variance.

We have already mentioned what the term sa‘āda means when it is used in Arabic in a non-technical sense. Thinking of the literal meaning of the term sa‘īd, at-Tabarî says that the Arabs say that "so and so has become sa‘īd" when he obtains what he wishes and needs. "He has become shaqī", they say, if he fails. And the verb su‘īdu, according to at-Tabarî, means to be blessed or

1. To read the word sa‘ādū and su‘īdū is possible. See at-Tabarî, Tafsīr, (Cairo, 1321 A.H.), xii, 67.
2. To avoid repetition this verse will be referred to as "sa‘āda verse".
provided with saʿāda.¹

It is clear in these verses that saʿīd and shaqī are used in eschatological sense. Since this is the only place where the term saʿīd occurs, it is only logical to think that this term can offer us nothing as far as the Qurʾānic idea of worldly happiness is concerned. We know that ḥasana, which can be interpreted as goodness and happiness, is used in the Qurʾān for this and other worldly happiness.² As for the term shaqī and some of its derivatives, they are used in the Qurʾān in worldly, non-religious as well as in eschatological sense. God says to the Prophet:

We have not sent down the Qurʾān upon thee for thee to be unprosperous (litashqā). (XX, 1-2).

According to az-Zamakhshari, tashqā here means tatʿab, fatigue, trouble, toil and so on. It seems that the verse was sent down, since Muḥammad was very sad about the unbelief of the Arabs.³ Taʿb is more general than shaqāwa. As al-Isfahānī says, every shaqāwa is taʿb, but not vice versa.⁴

Commentators mention another reason for God's saying to Muḥammad that the Qurʾān was not sent down to him for him to become unprosperous. Abū Jahl and Nadr b. Hārith seem to have told Muḥammad: "You are

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1. Ibid., XII, 67.
3. As-Suyūṭī, Al-Manshūr fi l-maʿthūr, (Şehid Ali Paşa, 124), iii, fols. 54a-54b.
shaqī because you have left the religion of your fathers.¹ This use of shaqī is very helpful for a clear understanding of the concept of happiness. There seems to be a very old Arabic idea that whoever abandons the traditional religion, or rather the way of life of his ancestors ('urf), will be miserable. The idea does not seem to convey any eschatological meaning, at least not in the sense which is taught by the Qur'ān. Since Abū Jahl and Nadr b. Hārith themselves denied the Qur'ānic idea of otherworldly sa'āda which is, as has just been shown, eschatological. 'Urf was, for the Arabs, "what was customary and approved." The poet Abū l-Atāhiya says "it is only the shaqī who denies 'urf."² The same idea does occur in some philosophical writings.

In a risāla, entitled kitāb taqwīm as-siyāsī al-mulūkīyya fī l-umūr as-salṭāna, there is a saying of Plato that "the saʿād king is the one who carries out the policy of his father; the shaqī is the one by whose acts this policy comes to an end."³ Now let us turn to the eschatological implications of "the saʿāda verse".

This verse provides us with the clues for three main topics which are connected with the term saʿāda. These three topics are: the classification of people or souls in respect of the otherworldly happiness and misery; the degrees of happiness and unhappiness; and the relation between happiness and predestination. All

these three are very important, because many philosophers, theologians and šūfis have tried, as will be shown in many parts of this work, to shed some light on them and to answer the questions raised by their theological and philosophical speculations. Now let us try to examine them one by one.

1. The division of men in the world to come.

In "the saʿāda verse" only two classes are mentioned; the saʿīd and the shaql. The former will enter Paradise and the latter Hell. Now the question can legitimately be asked whether there are only two classes of men. If this is so, then, what will happen to those who are not in a position to take upon themselves their religious duties (taklīf) such as the children and the insane - the people who are not responsible for their actions?

According to at-Ṭabarī, the division of man into saʿīd and shaql does not exclude the possibility of a third class.¹ To accept a third class will necessitate the acceptance of an intermediary place between Paradise and Hell, and an intermediary degree between saʿāda and shaqā which will, in its turn, enable us to see whether we can call children and the insane happy or miserable or something else.

Many Muslim theologians and commentators have taken the term aʿrāf² to be the name of this intermediate position. An-Nisābūrī believes that children and the insane "are the people of aʿrāf."³

1. At-Ṭabarī, Tafsīr, V, 90-1.
2. Sura, VII, 44-46.
But, as R. Bell observes,\(^1\) it is not very easy to determine the meaning of a’rāf. The people of a’rāf are not in Paradise and when they see the people of Fire they say "Our Lord, do not Thou assign us with the people of the evildoers". (VII, 45). The verse does not say that they are not in Paradise because they are sinful. Any reader of the Qur'ān is impressed by the lively and colourful descriptions of what the people of Paradise and of Hell will be given. Even if an intermediate place is accepted, it will not be easy to determine what kind of things will be given to the people of this place, since the Qur'ān does not say anything about it.

Without making sure of the possibility of an intermediate position, to enter into the discussion about the case of the children of believers and of the unbelievers - a fiercely debated subject\(^2\) - will not throw any light on this difficulty.

There is another verse in the Qur'ān which deals with the subject under discussion and which has had great influence on people who have tackled this problem:

> When the Terror descends ... when the earth shall be reached and mountains crumbled and become a dust scattered, and you shall be in three bands Companions of the Right ... Companions of the Left and Outstrippers..." (L VI. 5-10; Cf. also XC. 17-20)

The verses go on describing the things which will be given to each

\(^1\) R. Bell. "The Men on the A‘rāf", MW., 22 (1932), pp. 45 and 46 where it is suggested that if the term is read as i‘rāf instead of a‘rāf, then the people of a‘rāf will mean "the men of recognition...who are the judges (prophets)".

of these classes. There does not seem to be any difference between the terms Companions of the Right and Companions of Paradise and between the Companions of the Left and the Companions of Hell.¹ We have already said that yumm and sa'āda; shu'm and shaqa'wa are synonymous. The class of sābiqūn, who are the people that are "brought nigh the throne", (muqarrabūn), are the highest among the believers in Paradise; in other words the people who have priority for God's reward in His Paradise because of their good works.² As will be pointed out later on, they are what the philosophers called the pure and perfect who are higher than those who just refrain from evil. The division of people into non-virtuous, virtuous and divine exists in Plotinus too. But the classes of the foregoing verse and those of Plotinus are not, as some writers tend to think, the same.³

Now it can easily be said that although the Qur'ān mentions "three bands", we are again left with two major classes, i.e. the people of Paradise and the people of Hell; in other words the sa'īd and the shaqi. The difference between the muqarrabūn and the Companions of the Right is a matter of degree rather than of two entirely different classes.

¹ Kashshāf, II, 1440; Al-Mufradāt, pp. 575-6.
² Al-Mufradāt, p. 221; Kashshāf, II, 1440, where these classes are explained.
³ Shushtery, Outline of Islamic Culture (2 vols., Bangalore, 1938) II, 390.
2. The degrees of sa'āda and shaqāwa

Since men differ in their knowledge of God and in their services, a just distribution of rewards in the world to come will vary accordingly. The same thing applies to different kinds of punishment. The Qur'ān does not use the comparative or superlative form of sa'āda, but the superlative form of shaqāwa or shiqwa is used. This may have encouraged commentators to use the superlative form of sa'āda when they tried to explain different degrees of sa'āda.

The sa'īd, it is thought, is the man who enters Paradise where he is rewarded according to his service. The sa'ād, on the other hand, is one who is much higher than the sa'īd. He will be rewarded for his knowledge, piety and love.1 The Companions of Right are taken to be sa'īd whereas the Mugharrabūn are taken to be sa'ād. We will see the full implications of this distinction when we study al-Ghazālī's doctrine of the degrees of sa'āda.

As for the shaqī and ashqā, the former is understood by some commentators as the one who will enter Hell; but, because of his belief in God, will eventually emerge and become sa'īd; whereas the latter will eternally remain in Hell. It is unbelief, or what theologians called "not to be among the people of tawḥīd", 2 that causes everlasting punishment. In the sa'āda verse" the term shaqī is used in a general sense, irrespective of any degree in Hell.

1. S. Sirrī brings out this distinction very clearly in his discussion on the five causes of sa'āda and shaqāwa in his Asbūb al-Falāḥ, (Istanbul, 1302 AH.), pp. 255-6.
2. Wensinck, Creed, pp. 46ff.
But the verse says the wretched dwell in Hell for ever "save thy Lord will" and the same thing is said about the sa'āda. Now does this mean that sa'āda and shaqāwa will come to an end if and when God wills so? To answer the question in affirmation is to accept some kind of contradiction in the Qur'ān which repeatedly emphasizes that Paradise and Hell are eternal. It seems that some people thought that God might eventually release everyone from Hell and there is even a Tradition in which the Prophet says that a day will come when the doors of Hell will be opened and no one will remain there. Az-Zamakhsharī does not accept this Tradition as authentic.¹

Even some modern writers, however, hold that "the Qur'ān appears to hesitate a little on the question of the eternity of punishment in Hell."² By dividing the people of shaqāwa into two major classes, and the people of sa'āda into different groups according to their faith and practice, some commentators have tried to solve the problem. Shaqī, it is supposed, is the one who believes in the oneness of God, and his being in Hell is due to his disobedience. So the verse does not mean that shaqāwa will come to an end, but it simply means they will remain there as long as God wills; He can bring an end to their punishment and join them with the class of sa'āda. The second class is the most miserable of all (ashqā). They will remain in Hell for ever, the shaqī has committed only a grave sin. In other words he is fāsiq; ashqā, on the other hand, is the one

¹. Kashshāf, i, 632-3.
². "Jahannam", EI.(S)., pp. 81b-82a.
who disbelieves (kāfir). The Qur‘ān says "none but the most wretched shall be roasted, he cried lies and turned away and from which the most godfearing shall be removed." (XCII, 15-17). Here 'the most wretched' (ashqā) is at the opposite pole from that at which the most godfearing man (atqā) stands.1

It should be stated, however, that there are very many divergent opinions about the relationship between shaqi and fāsiq; ashqā and kāfir. The Khārijites for example were very hard on fāsiq. They thought that a fāsiq is not a believer (Cf. X, 33). The Murji‘ites on the other hand, took the opposite view, while the Mu‘tazilites were somewhere in the middle,2 and the prevailing Sunnite idea was that they were sinful believers. The classification of people of shaqāwa and the degrees of unhappiness have never been agreed to among the Muslims. A detailed account of this matter is not our concern here, it is sufficient to say that according to the prevailing idea no one can say that fāsiq will die as a fāsiq and nor can any one deny that the term sa‘āda will eventually include the person who once was a fāsiq. These theological discussions, however, have had a great deal of influence on the writings of Muslim philosophers and we will return to this later on in this present work.

The degrees of happiness and its being eternal in Paradise have been taken for granted. God can remove His servant from a

2. Wensinck, Creed, p. 61. According to Wensinck (ibid., 173) the idea of mitigating the punishment in Hell for the sinners correspond to "the introduction of the idea of Purgatory."
lower degree to a higher one; this is what is meant by the phrase "they shall be in Paradise therein dwelling forever, so long as the heavens and earth abide, save as thy Lord will."

We have already mentioned the most favoured people (mugarrabûn) and 'the Companions of the Right' in Paradise. Generally speaking Paradise is happiness for believers, and all awards will be given in Paradise, from "the flesh of birds" up to "God's favour and approval" (ridwân Allâh), God says: "for those who fear the judgement-seat of their Lord are two gardens" (LX, 46). Some şûfís seem to have understood two Paradises from this verse; one for bodily happiness, the other for the privileged wherein they will enjoy a spiritual happiness, the vision of God; but this, as L. Gardet rightly points out, is an exaggeration since the Qur'ân accepts both bodily and spiritual happiness in the same Paradise. And the verse does not mean either that there are two Paradises "one is this world and the other is the life to come" as one modern interpreter suggests. It is true that the Qur'ân accepts goodness or happiness in this world and in the world to come, but this cannot lead us to say that the word janna is applicable to this world. The word jannatân does not seem to mean more than what aṭ-Ṭabârî calls "two gardens".

5. Aṭ-Ṭabârî, Tafsîr, XXVII, 76.
The question of what is the highest degree of happiness in Paradise has occupied the minds of many commentators, theologians and others. Although all rewards will be given in Paradise, the term janna was primarily associated with what the Qur'an itself says, rivers, the gardens, ḥūr and such like. Some of the şūfis thought this could not be the highest 'wage'. To work towards Paradise was not, in fact should not be, the aim of a true şūfi. And in consequence discussing riḍwān Allāh, ru'yat Allāh, liqū' Allāh and so on with little or sometimes with no reference to Paradise seems to have become very common among those who were somewhat reluctant to talk about the happiness that includes the bodily elements.

The favour of God (riḍwān Allāh) has been taken by many commentators to be the name of the highest degree of happiness in Paradise. The term sometimes simply means the will and the pleasure of God and is sometimes used together with the words "the Mercy of God" (raḥma) and "janna" (IX, 21). One of the most quoted passages in the Qur'an is Sura IX, 73, in which it is said that "God has promised the believers, men and women, gardens underneath which rivers flow, forever therein to dwell and goodly dwelling-places in the Gardens of Eden; and greater God's pleasure; that is the mighty triumph."¹ Now the underlined phrase has been understood as something higher than the other 'goods of Paradise'. Man's being well-pleased with God and God's being well-pleased with man² is

2. Sura, XCVIII, 8.
the highest purpose in most mystical literature. This is because the verse conveys a great many emotional undertones. The Qur'ānic use of this term together with the term "the soul at peace" (nafs al-
muṭma'ima) has been especially the source of inspiration. God says:

O soul at peace, return unto thy Lord,  
Well-pleased, well pleasing!  
Enter thou My servants  
Enter thou My paradise! (LXXXIX, 28-30).

This degree of happiness is not only the extreme opposite of the conditions of Hell, but is also too high for those who have lived with a "self-accusing soul" (nafs al-lawwāma) and managed to enter paradise, perhaps through the intercession of prophets. Hell is for those who have become the slaves of "the soul which incites to evil", (nafs al-amāra bi-s-sū'). The virtuous will be in Paradise, but only "the soul at peace" will obtain the favour of God. Most of these clear distinctions, however, belong to the later periods.

The idea of man's being pleased with God and vice-versa, however, leads us to another question which has been the subject of endless discussions in theological writings, namely the vision of God as the sumnum bonum of life. Though the doctrine of the vision of God has many aspects, we are only interested here in the aspect of its being the highest degree of happiness in Paradise.

"To desire", or more precisely, "to seek the Face of God, (ibtighā' wajh Allah)" occurs in several places in the Qur'ān.

1. Sura, XII, 53.
In Sura XCII, 17-21, God says:

And from which [Fire] the most godfearing shall be removed, even he who gives his wealth to purify himself and confers no favour on any man for recompense, Only seeking the Face of his Lord, the Most High; and he shall surely be satisfied.

As to the fulfilment of what is desired and sought in the world to come, the Qur'ān does not say much. There is a reference to the vision of God in Sura LXXV, 22, in which God says: "Upon that day faces shall be radiant, gazing upon their Lord." The whole Sura in which this verse occurs is about Resurrection. This reference in the Qur'ān refers to the possibility of the vision of God in the world to come and not to its being the highest degree of happiness. In fact it is through some Traditions that we learn that the vision of God is the highest reward. One of the most quoted on this subject runs: 2

When the people of Paradise have entered, Allah will say to them: If you have any desire I will fulfil it. They will answer: Have You not made our faces bright, have You not made us enter Paradise, have You not saved us from Hell? Thereupon Allah will remove the veil and the vision of their Lord will be the most precious of the gifts lavished upon them. Then he recited the verse: They who do right shall receive a most excellent reward and a superabundant addition. 3

The formulation of the doctrine of the vision of God as the highest degree of happiness seems to have started with theological speculations 4 and found its everlasting place in the writings of

1. Cf. also XXX, 38; XIII, 20; XVIII, 27.
3. Sura, X, 27.
the sūfis to which we return later on.

Now after all these foregoing explanations we may conclude that there are different degrees of happiness and of unhappiness; and that it is in the hands of God to transplant man from one degree of happiness, or unhappiness, to another. It is God who has the absolute control over the sa'āda and shaqāwa of men and it is this idea which brings us to our last point, i.e. the relation between sa'āda and predestination.

3. Sa'āda and Predestination

It has already been mentioned that according to the Arabs of the pre-Islamic period sa'āda and shaqāwa were determined by dahr or some other irrational forces. Now if we replace these forces with the concept of the Qur'ānic God we will find ourselves at a point which is not very far from the Qur'ānic and early Islamic idea of the relationship between sa'āda and predestination.

With his mu'tazilite leanings, az-Zamakhshârî interprets the terms sa'īd and shagî in "the sa'āda verse" as respectively the one who deserved a place in Paradise for his good deeds, and as the one who deserved to be condemned to Hell for his evil deeds.¹ Nīsābūrī quotes this explanation of Kashshâf and says: "This is according to the Mu'tazilites."² Aṭ-Ṭabarî, on the other hand, states that even if we accepted that man becomes sa'īd by his actions, this would not change the idea that his sa'āda is predetermined, since man's actions

2. An-Nīsābūrī, Tafsîr., XII, 74-75.
too are created by God. To think otherwise is absurd.¹

It seems that the idea that man's saʿāda and shaqāwa are determined by God puzzled not only the later theologians but the early Muslims as well. 'Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb asks Muhammad about this, and Muhammad answers: "Everything is made easier to a person who is among the people of saʿāda and he does the work of saʿāda."²

Another Tradition goes a little further than this. It says that the saʿāda and shaqāwa of a person are determined, together with his substance, his term and his actions by God while the person is still in an embryonic state in the womb.³ But the Prophet also says: Work! everybody will be guided. The one who belongs to the people of saʿāda will be guided to the works of saʿāda; and the one who belongs to the people of shaqā will be guided to the work of shaqā. After quoting this Tradition Prof. Watt comments that this Tradition approaches abandonment to fatalism.⁴

The Traditions about the saʿāda-predestination relationship have been studied and quoted in theological writings, although their whole concern is the doctrine of predestination and not the theory of saʿāda. This should not, however, give the impression that the term saʿāda or saʿId is not used in different senses in the Traditions. There are quite a few Traditions in which saʿāda is

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¹ At-Tabarî, Tafsîr, I, 632-3 and V, 90-1; ar-Ḥisâbûrî, Tafsîr, XII, 74-5.
² At-Tirmidhî, Sahîh, (Cairo, 1931-4), VIII, 299-30.
³ Ibid., 301.
associated with worldly happiness, e.g. to have a good wife, a long life, a good neighbour and many similar things, and in some Traditions sa‘āda is related to the life of the believer in Paradise, though it seems almost certain that most of the Traditions which deal with sa‘āda are mainly about predestination.¹

Although theological discussions are not included in our present work, it is not outwith its scope to mention one of the theological problems which has a direct bearing on the sa‘āda-predestination relationship. If the sa‘āda and shaqāwa of men are predetermined, then does this mean the sa‘īd will never become shaqā? The Ash‘arites would answer: No he will not, since his happiness and unhappiness were, as the Prophet states, determined while he was in the womb. They even say that Abū Bakr and Umar b. Khāṭṭāb, for example, were believers before they embraced Islām. The Hanafite-Ma‘ūrīdite leaders, on the other hand, hold that an unbeliever should be called shaqā, but if and when he becomes a Muslim, the term shaqā is no longer applicable. We cannot call a Muslim shaqā, but when he abandons his faith he becomes a downright shaq ī. Here it is obvious that their argument is a verbal one rather than anything else, since both agree that the position of man is judged, as the Prophet says, on the basis of his concluding acts (khawātim)² and God knows what a man’s concluding acts are going to be. Accordingly some rightly thought that to say that man’s sa‘āda or

2. Cf. Wensinck, Creed, p. 56.
shaqāwa is predetermined simply means that eternal divine knowledge covers everything including the final acts of man; that is to say his sa‘āda or shaqāwa.¹

Most of the theological discussions and speculations about man and his future life paved the way for, and had an influence on, the development of Islamic philosophical tradition whose greatest representative was, no doubt, al-Fārābī to whom the following three chapters are devoted.

¹ For these theological disputes see 'Abd ar-Rahmān b. 'Alī, Naẓm al-farā‘īd wa-Jam‘ al-fawā‘īd (2nd ed. Cairo, n.d.) pp. 62-4.
CHAPTER TWO

SAʿĀDA IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF AL-FĀRĀĪ

In al-Farabi's philosophy ethics cannot be separated from psychology. Nor is it possible to reach any definite conclusion in any branch of his philosophy without taking it as a whole. The main parts and faculties of the soul are used as a basis for the classification of human excellences as ethical and intellectual. This commonly used approach goes back to Aristotle\(^1\) whose influence on al-Farabi is predominant.\(^2\) Aristotle's advice that the student of politics must study the soul\(^3\) finds its true value in the political writings of al-Farabi. Though al-Farabi starts his main political works such as the Madīna and the Siyāsa with metaphysics, it is more convenient to start here with his psychology and then go on to ethics and politics.

1) The Soul and its Relation to the Body.

Man's nature, his relation to the whole universe and the reasons for his creation are the main questions with which al-Farabi, like many other philosophers before him, occupies himself. The analysis of the nature of the soul and its relation to the body are essential for a correct understanding of human nature as a whole.

2. Fuṣūl, Sections 6, 7 and 8.
Only such understanding will make it possible to say whether man's happiness belongs to his soul or to his body or to both body and soul.

In the concluding pages of the Madīna, al-Fārābī mentions and criticises some of the opinions held by others about the nature of man and the nature of his happiness. He does not try, however, to give a comprehensive account of these divergent opinions. We know that Aristotle too had tried to summarise the opinions of his predecessors about the nature of man, before he gave his own account on the subject in De Anima.\(^1\) Al-Fārābī is of the opinion that the wrong opinions about the nature of man and of his natural existence constitute the basis of the Ignorant Cities.

Among the citizens of these cities there are people who believe that there is perfection and happiness for man, but this perfection and happiness cannot be obtained by his "phenomenal existence", since whatever is observed today is not the "natural existence" of things. As a matter of fact the "natural existence" opposes "the phenomenal existence". So the natural perfection which goes along with the "natural existence" can only be obtained when this "phenomenal existence" is willingly destroyed, since it is an obstacle to this perfection.\(^2\)

Some believe that the soul's entry into the body is not natural and this is the source of all evil. The soul becomes perfect when it frees itself of the body. In the state of happiness the

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1. See D.A. i. 1. 403b ff.
soul does not need the body, nor does it need anything external such as wealth, neighbours, friends and the like. Thus the denial of corporeal existence becomes necessary for the attainment of happiness.¹

There are people, on the other hand, who accept the body but reject the accidents of the soul. According to them these accidents are not "natural". Complete perfection and happiness can be attained when these accidents cease to exist. They think that anger, desire, jealousy, meanness and similar things are usually caused by wealth, pleasure, domination and such like. Therefore not only the accidents of the soul but also the things which cause these accidents to come into being are not useful for man's "natural existence" and for the working of the rational part of his soul.²

After mentioning all these different views, al-Fārābī does not try to give a philosophical argument for the refusal of any of these opinions. But he makes it clear enough that he does not accept any of them as they stand. It is true, as will be seen later on, that he does not think that the Acquired Intellect needs the body when it reaches the state of ultimate happiness, or the state of direct communication with the Active Intellect (ittisāl). This does not

¹. Ibid., p. 143.
². Ibid., pp. 143-4.
lead him, however, to say that the soul's entry into the body is not natural and the soul does not need the body, wealth, friends, social and political organization for the attainment of happiness. Unlike the Stoics,¹ al-Fārābī does not condemn all passions good and bad. So long as they are employed in a praiseworthy way and useful for the attainment of happiness, it is quite natural to have them.

Similar ideas occur in the Fusūl, but again he offers no criticism. It is quite obvious, however, that he disagrees with those who think that "the wicked man is only wicked by reason of the union of the soul with the body, and by its separation he becomes good."² To accept this is tantamount to denying any kind of worldly happiness and this is equally unacceptable.³ In this respect he could easily agree with Aristotle who accepts that "in a secondary degree life in accordance with the other kind of virtue is happy; for the activities with this befit our human estate."⁴ But Aristotle's gloomy view of future happiness, which will be discussed later on, does not show itself in al-Fārābī, though we are told by Ibn Ṭūfayl that al-Fārābī entertained such a view in his commentary on Aristotle's Ethics.⁵

² Fusūl, sec. 76.
³ Cf. R. Walzer, Greek into Arabic, p. 224.
⁴ E.N. X. 8. 1178a.
⁵ Ibn Ṭūfayl, Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān, ed. by Ṭabādīlī Amīn (Cairo, 1959), p. 62.
In the foregoing discussion, we have tried to see the importance of the term 'Natural' in respect of its relation to human nature in general; that is to say to the body and soul relationship. In addition to this, there are two other main themes with which the term Natural is linked; mainly the term Separation or Death, and the idea which finds its expression in the famous maxim: Live with the harmony with Nature, then you will be happy. Both these points will be taken into consideration in due course.

As to the nature of the soul itself, al-Fārābī relies on Aristotle as well as on the Neo-Platonic commentators of Aristotle's De Anima, which was translated into Arabic by Ḥunayn b. Ishāq.

To sum up al-Fārābī's psychology, he divides the main parts of the faculties of the soul into five: "The Nutritive, the Sensory, the Imaginative, the Appetitive and the Rational". There is a master-servant relationship between these different faculties of the soul. As a matter of fact al-Fārābī sees the same hierarchical order in a perfect socio-political organization and in the universe. The Rational is divided into theoretical and practical, Al-Fārābī cannot be credited with any kind of originality in any of these ideas. The most original part of his philosophy is, probably, his theory of the Active Intellect and its relation to the human intellect, and his idea of prophecy which goes with the doctrine of the Active Intellect.

1. The Arabic term ṭabī‘ī is mostly used in philosophical works; the theologians seem to use fitri rather than ṭabī‘ī.


3. Fusūl, sec. 6.

In order to understand this relationship we have to touch upon the nature of man's intellect and that of the Active Intellect.

ii) The Intellect

The first initial capacity which everybody shares is the Potential Intellect. Al-Fārābī, in his risāla on the intellect, says that "the intellect which is in potentiality is some soul, or part of a soul, or one of the faculties of the soul, or something whose essence is ready and prepared to abstract the quiddities of all existing things and their forms from their matters, so that it makes all of them a form for itself or forms for itself."¹ No doubt this is a fairly vague definition of the intellect. In another place we are told that this intellect is the first entelechy of a physical body having lived potentially.² The idea that the intellect is a disposition in Matter goes back to Alexander of Aphrodisias.³ In his 'Uyun al-Mathā'īl, however, he has a different view about the Potential Intellect; here it is "a simple substance and not material."⁴

To accept the Potential Intellect as a disposition in matter seems to be entirely consistent with al-Fārābī's doctrine of immortality and that of sa'āda. Now from the point of view of the

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² Masā'īl mutafarrīqa, pp. 18-9.
³ F. Rahman, Prophecy in Islam, p. 11.
⁴ Phil. Abh., p. 64.
intellect happiness comes about when this Potential Intellect becomes the Intellect in Act and thereby becomes the Acquired Intellect. This transformation from potentiality to actuality is also a transformation of sensibles to intelligibles. Man is the only animal who has been endowed with such capacity.\(^1\) When he acquires knowledge, actuality begins to take place, and at the initial stage he needs body and the bodily organs.

The passage about the ascent of the intellect to its highest stage is so important that it is worth quoting it in full:

The lowest state of existence for man is that in which, in order to subsist, he needs the body as the form needs matter. His next higher state of existence is that in which he does not depend for subsistence on the body as matter; nevertheless he needs for all his actions or for most of them some powers of his body and is positively benefited by them. For instance, he employs the senses and the imagination. The highest state of existence is attained by a man when his actions are not in anything other than himself, that is, when he musters his whole energy to realize his innermost self as a result of which his being and action and whatever he does become one and the same. In this state he does not stand in need of matter. His body no longer serves as the material for his survival, nor does he depend on matter for his actions. That is, he neither employs any powers of his body nor takes their help in causing any kind of change in any body. He does not make use of any bodily organ at all.\(^2\)

This new rank of existence makes the Potential Intellect the actual intellect. When this process of actualization takes place, the intellect and the intelligibles which are abstracted from matter obtain a different ontological status. It is here that the Intellect in Act, which is itself an intelligible, knows itself. Now, the

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1. Madīna, 103; cf. also Phil. Abh., pp. 30-1.
intellect is self-intelligible and self-intellective at the same time. It is a form of forms. Its existence is separate from matter. Here it becomes the Acquired Intellect, which is the highest rank that the intellect can reach.\(^1\) It seems that the source of al-Fārābī concerning the Acquired Intellect is Alexander of Aphrodisias who says that "intellect in man exists primarily only as disposition; through the development of this disposition, there arises the real activity of thought - intelligence as the operative quality, as an active power."\(^2\)

After explaining the nature of the Potential Intellect, al-Fārābī tries to answer the question how man, or rather the intellect, reaches the stage of actuality. According to him it is not possible to think that a thing can become actual without help from another being outside itself and not potential. There should be an eternally active power which can give the Potential Intellect the aid it needs. This existent is the Active Intellect, without which the whole universe, according to al-Fārābī, is unthinkable, let alone man and his happiness.\(^3\)

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mentions it in the third book of the De Anima. It is this intellect which makes the intellect in potentiality the intellect in actuality and makes the potential intelligibles, intelligibles in reality.² Here al-Fārābī has probably Alexander of Aphrodisias in mind who also says the Active Intellect, as Zeller puts it, "is not a part of our soul but only the divine reason operating upon it, and in consequence of this operation conceived by it."³

Al-Fārābī's theory of the Active Intellect, despite his indebtedness to others who wrote something about this subject, has been regarded as the most original part of his philosophy. Carra de Vaux rightly credits al-Fārābī with the honour of "propounding clearly the theory of Active Intellect (intellectus agens) as a pure form, separate from matter."⁴ In spite of some changes here and there this theory has left a deep impression on the history of Islamic philosophy. Al-Fārābī himself believes that it was Aristotle, in fact, who showed that the Active Intellect is "a separate form of man, a separate agent and a separate end." It is the end, because its examples are followed; the agent, because it gives the principles which render man so far as he is man; it is also the perfection, because man attempts to approach it.⁵

1. 'Aql, pp. 42f.; Siyāsa, pp. 34-5.
Unlike Alexander of Aphrodisias, al-Fārābī does not identify the Active Intellect with God. As a Muslim this is impossible for him, and he can only go as far as identifying it with ṭūh al-quds, the Holy Spirit or a similar name; its grades should be called by a title such as al-malakūt, the Kingdom of Heaven.¹

In this identification the influence of Islam is quite obvious. Probably under the influence of al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, too, identifies the world of intellects with that of angels. It should be stated however that there is a main difference between these intellects in philosophy and the angels of the Qur'ān. It is quite clear in the foregoing explanations that the Active Intellect, which is one of the heavenly spiritual beings, has a very important creative role. The angels of the Qur'ān, on the other hand, are the servants of God and obey God's commands. It seems that with the identification of the separate intellects (al-mufāraqāt) with the angels, al-Fārābī comes to believe no spiritual beings except the intellects with which metaphysics deals.²

The word 'angel' is also used for 'gods' in the Arabic translations of some philosophical works. For instance in Arabic summary of Galen’s De Moribus³ when the subject comes to the idea of man's obtaining a life similar to the life of 'gods', the

1. Siyāsa, p. 35; cf. Walzer, Greek into Arabic, p. 247.
3. Cf. Walzer, Greek into Arabic, p. 166.
translator uses 'angels' for 'gods' in the original. Although the phrase 'imitating God' was quite harmless, 'to become god' could only be accepted, if the word god was replaced by the word 'angel'.

As for the role of the Active Intellect, it has two main functions. Firstly it is the giver of forms (wāhib as-ṣuwar), since it is always at work - a quality which gives the basis of the assurance of existence. Secondly it illuminates man's intellect and makes it possible for man to cognize the realities of God, sa'āda and other spiritual entities. It is through the communication with the Active Intellect that he receives revelation and cognition which are explained by the term ittisāl, the conjunction.

Al-Fārābī believes that sa'āda is only possible when man receives the first intelligibles (al-ma'qūlāt al-uwal) which are the primary principles of knowledge (al-ma'ārif al-uwal). There are three first intelligibles; primary principles of knowledge of geometry; principles of the knowledge of good and bad (ethical knowledge); and principles of metaphysical knowledge. Without this initial capacity there cannot be the knowledge of, or even desire for, sa'āda, since to desire it requires some degree of knowledge. Al-Fārābī states that:

Man knows it [sa'āda] when he makes use of the first principles and the primary knowledge given to him by the Active Intellect. When he knows happiness, desires

1. Ibid., 166-7.
2. Siyāsā, 79.
3. Madīna, p. 84; Siyāsā, p. 74; Plato and Aristotle, p. 15.
it by the Appetitive Faculty, deliberates by the Practical Rational Faculty upon what he ought to do in order to attain it, uses the instrument of the Appetitive Faculty to do the actions he has discovered by deliberation, and his Imagination and Sensitive Faculties assist and obey the Rational and aid in arousing man to do the actions with which he attains happiness.

The impression one has from reading this and similar passages in al-Fārābī's writings is that the Active Intellect actually gives these intelligibles. It is not easy, however, to elaborate this impression, though the Arabic word aṭā means to give and it is used by al-Fārābī. In his treaties on 'Aql it is said that "the relation of the Active Intellect to the intellect which is in potentiality is like the relation of the sun to the eye which is sight in potentiality as long as it is in darkness... The meaning of darkness is transparency in potentiality and the privation of transparency in actuality, and the meaning of transparency is illumination by something opposite which is luminous." It seems that the intelligibles are abstracted from matter rather than given by the Active Intellect in the actual sense. But the primary intelligibles are given or rather emandit from the Active Intellect. One thing seems to be certain, that when things become intelligibles in actuality their ontological status becomes independent and pure. According to F. Rahman this doctrine is neither Aristotelian nor Alexandrian, since Alexander of Aphrodisias does not seem to believe

that the intelligibles have any real existence outside the individual destructible objects,\(^1\) though a Neoplatonic influence is possible.

The important thing, however, is not to try to establish whether the intelligibles are abstracted from matter or actually given by the Active Intellect, but the fact that without the light of the Active Intellect the human intellect is hopeless. In this respect the role of the Active Intellect seems to undermine the freedom of man and his capacity, though it has very significant epistemological, metaphysical and religio-political implications.

In order to receive the aid of the Active Intellect there should be an effort and struggle to reach the highest stage. Otherwise "neither the Imaginative Faculty nor the Appetitive Faculty perceives happiness. Not even the Rational Faculty perceives happiness, except when it strives to apprehend it".\(^2\) Not to struggle is a crime in the eyes of al-Fārābī. We will come to this point again when we deal with the deliberative action in the next chapter.

We have touched upon the importance of knowledge without saying anything about its nature and scope. Now we reached a place in which it is appropriate to see two basic mental activities which lead the individual as well as the community to happiness, namely cognitive and imaginative.

iv) Cognition and Imagination

The Arabic term *tasawwur* stands for the idea of cognition as well as that of contemplation. It means "to have the essence of the principles of beings, their ranks of order, happiness and the rulership of virtuous cities as they really are imprinted in man's soul."¹

This definition of *tasawwur* was accepted by other Muslim philosophers after al-Fārābī. Al-Ghazālī, for example, will take the same definition and call it not *tasawwur* but *ma‘rifa*. There are, however, some differences between *tasawwur* and *ma‘rifa*, but this will be dealt with later on.

As for imagination (*takhayyul*), it means "to have imprinted in man's soul their [first principles, happiness and so on] images, representations of them, or matters that are imitations of them."² Both *tasawwur* and *takhayyul* are called knowledge (*ma‘rifa*)³ and defended by al-Fārābī as legitimate ways of obtaining *sa‘āda*. The distinction between cognition and imagination is the core of al-Fārābī's philosophy. This distinction leads to the distinction between philosophical and religious modes of thought or knowledge which in its turn serve for the classification of men in respect of their capacities concerning these two forms of knowledge. And all these were adopted by the subsequent Muslim philosophers in one way or another.

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². Ibid.
What is cognitive and imaginative cannot be understood without taking their respective faculties into consideration. A thing can only be called cognitive so far as it is controlled and used by the intellect. In this case the intellect must have an absolute authority over other faculties, i.e. sensitive, representative and so forth, each of which has its own perfection. It is called imaginative if the realities of things were represented as symbols or imitations. Cognitive power knows what saʿāda is whereas the imaginative power, as its name indicates, imagines. What is cognized is universal, and what is imagined varies. There can be many different imitations of the same reality. According to al-Fārābī the meanings of first principles, saʿāda, Active Intellect and the like "are one and immutable", whereas the things by which they are represented "are many and varied". Some imitations are nearer to the truth, some are removed, some are so removed that one can hardly see the connection between the imitation and the real thing.¹ In any case cognitive knowledge provides the basis of the subject-matter of imagination.

Now we have just said that the distinction between cognition and imagination leads al-Fārābī to classify people according to their natural aptitude for knowledge. Al-Fārābī is of the opinion that "most people, either by nature or by habit, are unable to comprehend and cognize those things [first principles, saʿāda and so forth], these are the men for whom one ought to represent the manner in which the

¹. Siyāsa, p. 85.
principles of beings, their rank of order...exist through that are
imitations of them". Those who cognize sa‘āda are called ḥukamā'
philosophers or the wise men, and those who must be content with
representations are called mu‘minūn, the believers.2

It is interesting to note that the distinction is between
ḥukamā' and mu‘minūn and not ḥukamā' and anbiyā'. The Qur'ānic
term mu‘minūn reveals a great deal in this distinction. As we will
try to explain later on, the similarities between ḥukamā' and mu‘minūn
in al-Fārābī and ţarifūn and muqallidūn in al-Ghazālī are very striking, 
though the way they express their ideas are very different. In the
light of this distinction one can argue that al-Fārābī, although he
does not say explicitly, believes that the Prophet Muḥammad possessed
cognitive and representative aspects of realities. What he knew was
philosophy first, it became religion when his knowledge was explained
through symbols and images.

On the social level ḥukamā' constitute the class of the élite
and mu‘minūn the common people, which are explained by the Arabic
terms khāṣṣ and ‘āmm respectively.3 For the former al-Fārābī wrote
his Taḥṣīl and for the latter he does not seem to have bothered. It
is because the latter "need not conceive and comprehend the things
as they are".4 ḥukamā' or khāṣṣ reach their beliefs and knowledge
through theorising and scrutinizing, whereas the vulgar should

2. Siyāsā, p. 56.
confine themselves to unexamined common opinions - the idea which
reminds us of al-Ghazālī's *ilmān al-*āwām* and its subject-matter. Like al-Ghazālī, al-Fārābī too accepts that the objects of cognition
and imagination (or *maʿrifat* and *taqlīd* in case of al-Ghazālī) are
the same. Only do the ways of knowing them differ.

However when al-Fārābī defines *saʿāda* in terms of knowledge he
has cognition in mind. In this sense the seeking after metaphysical
knowledge is tantamount to seeking after happiness. The programme
which al-Fārābī lays down for the study of philosophy in the *Tahṣīl*
is in fact the programme for the attainment of happiness. Only the
advancing of knowledge will purify the soul, or to be more precise
will make man's intellect perfect, and elevate it. Man goes through
many stages "until he attains lastly the knowledge of *saʿāda* which is
in truth *saʿāda*." In this struggle philosophy supplies the
maximum of his perfection and happiness. Different sciences
contribute different things to man in his struggle for the attainment
of *saʿāda*.

Theoretical knowledge is preferred because it aims at the
existent whose existence and continuance do not depend on the
contrivance of man at all. In fact the use of the term knowledge
is metaphorical, if the case is practical rather than theoretical. Because of al-Fārābī's idea that true knowledge or wisdom "acquaints
one with what is true happiness", and because of his whole attitude

2. *Fusūl*, Sec. 69.
3. Ibid, Secs. 32 and 33.
4. Ibid., Sec. 49.
towards philosophy, al-Fārābī is sometimes taken as a thorough-going intellectualist.¹

In his glorification of theory al-Fārābī has, no doubt, the support of Aristotle² as well as that of the Neo-Platonic sources. In De Causis, or what is otherwise known among the Arabs as Kitāb al-khāyār al-maḥfī, for instance, knowledge is defined as the property of intellect, whose possession renders perfection to man.³ Al-Fārābī’s Plato investigates the true nature of this knowledge. He says in his Euthyphron that religion does not give such knowledge, nor does the science of language (in Cratylus) nor poetry (in Ion), nor rhetoric (in Gorgias) nor sophistry (in Sophist). Plato knew however that such knowledge exists, although Protagoras and many others tried to deny it. Plato proved this in his Meno where he stated that “this knowledge is the knowledge of the substance of each of the beings; this knowledge is the final perfection of man.”⁴ It was Plato, according to as-Sijistānī, one of the well-known disciples of al-Fārābī, who showed that “knowledge is happiness; he who is not intelligent, is not happy and he who is happy cannot be stupid.”⁵

Although knowledge alone does not constitute the whole happiness of man, it is higher than the moral act, since it decides upon it. According to al-Fārābī knowledge is sometimes obtained

4. Plato and Aristotle, p. 53; cf. also pp. 5ff.
5. F. Rosenthal, "On the Knowledge of Plato’s Philosophy In the Islamic World" IO, (1940), p. 408 n.2.
for its own sake and sometimes for the sake of something else, such as wealth, honour and the like.¹ For an intelligent man, however, the metaphysical knowledge is the supreme object.

The aim of the speculative man is certainty which is contrasted with opinion (ya'ann) and persuasion (iqnā'). Certainty comes into being if there is an identity between principles of instruction (mabādi’ at-ta’lim) and the principles of being (mabādi’ al-wujūd). When a man reaches certainty in what he is investigating he can hope for no better assurance and reliability.²

Among the branches of philosophy, Logic has a far-reaching importance for the attainment of certainty.³ Al-Farābī puts the study of Logic first in the Tanbīh.⁴ This is because "logic leads to the formation of correct concept and true judgement and discloses the hidden reality, clears up obscurities in our minds."⁵ It must be due to al-Farābī's influence that his disciple Yahyā b. 'Adī says that "logic is the key to happiness, since it provides the means of certainty."⁶ Taking logic first is, according to al-Farābī, Aristotelian.⁷ The idea that logic and other sciences such as

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1. Tanbīh, pp. 2-3.
2. Taḥṣil, 5-6.
3. Plato and Aristotle, 82.
4. Tanbīh, pp. 3-4; cf. also Aghrād ma ba’d at-ṭablī'a, p. 52.
5. Ḥṣa', pp. 53ff.
7. Plato and Aristotle, p. 82.
geometry and physics are the key to happiness was one of the strangest things according to some subsequent Muslim writers. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, for example, says that the usefulness of mathematics and natural sciences is obvious, but what have perfection and sa'āda to do with this?¹

From sciences that help man's theoretical perfection al-Fārābī passes to poetry which has an imaginative rather than a cognitive value. De Boer, having probably the risāla which is entitled risāla fī mā yanbaghī an yuqaddama qabla ta'allum al-falsafa² in mind, says that "poetry stands at the very bottom of the scale, being in al-Fārābī's opinion a lying and immoral absurdity."³ De Boer's conclusion is only partly true. Al-Fārābī divides poetry into six groups and says that three of them are praiseworthy, such as those poems which aim at improving the production of the imaginative impression of divine matters which are indispensable for the happiness of the common people.⁴ Those which aim at distorting the facts and giving incorrect imitations of divine realities and happiness are blameworthy and a pack of lies. It is of these poems Ibn Rushd spoke "full of evils".⁵ Both al-Fārābī and Ibn Rushd might have had Arabic poetry in mind, which represented even the concept of life incorrectly. Their opinions about bad poetry have

¹ Miftāh dār as-sa'āda, (Hasan Hüsnü Paşa, 580) fol. 424; cf. also Rasa'il Ibn Sab'in, p. 32. and pp. 113–4.
⁴ Fusul, sec. 52; cf. also Philosophy of Aristotle, p. 85.
the support of the Qur'ān\(^1\) as well as Plato. When we come to sa'āda in al-Fārābī's politics we will touch again upon the importance of poetry and poets who constitute one of the groups of the Virtuous City.

In sum, al-Fārābī consistently puts forward the idea that without theoretical knowledge the attainment of happiness is impossible. Theoretical knowledge *per se* is the happiness of the wise men (ḥukamā'). It decides upon practical knowledge; by the help of theoretical knowledge the wise man or the philosopher tries to instruct the masses through representations and imitations of realities which are indispensable for *mu'minūn*. Theoretical knowledge is the noblest thing because it aims at the knowledge of pure intelligibles and above all at the knowledge of God whom man tries to imitate.

v) Sa'āda Through the Contemplation and Imitation of God

When a man attains theoretical perfection, he possesses the power of contemplation. Accepting that happiness consists in contemplation, al-Fārābī tries to reach a harmony within the views of Plato, Aristotle and Neo-Platonists. Like Aristotle, he believes that contemplation is a god-like activity. They both believe that He is the most perfect of all.\(^2\) If an existent does not possess the power of contemplation, it cannot be called happy.\(^3\)

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1. Cf. XXVI. 224b-227.
extends as far as contemplation does.\textsuperscript{1} Because of his contemplative activities the philosopher is dearest to the gods, so he will be happy more than anyone else.\textsuperscript{2} In all this there is an agreement between al-Fārābī and Aristotle. According to al-Fārābī, Aristotle, Plato, Alexander of Aphrodisias and many other philosophers agreed that man's intellect is the noblest thing because of its being able to know God.\textsuperscript{3}

Man's ability to know God is not, however, all-embracing. "It is unthinkable", al-Fārābī says, "that knowledge should embrace what is limitless."\textsuperscript{4} We cannot see Him, because He is everywhere and because His perfection dazzles the eye. He is intellectus, intelligens intellectum.\textsuperscript{5} He is also the One Who loves and is Beloved (al-‘āshiq wa-l-ma‘shūq). In Him the Lover and Beloved are not two separate beings. He is the First mahbūb and the First ma‘shūq.\textsuperscript{6}

We must know that because of our involvement with matter, our essence is kept at a distance from the essence of God. When our essence becomes closer to His essence, our perception of Him becomes more perfect, certain and real. This is only possible when we leave matter behind and when we become the intellect in act, and when we are finally separated from matter altogether our perception of Him reaches its uppermost perfection.\textsuperscript{7} The more our perfection increases

\begin{itemize}
\item [1.] Ibid.
\item [2.] Ibid., 1179a.
\item [3.] Phil. Abh., pp. 30-1; cf. D.A., iii. 5. 430a.
\item [4.] Fuṣūl, sec. 98. cf. Madīna, pp. 33-4.
\item [5.] Madīna, p. 31; Phil. Abh., p. 58.
\item [6.] Madīna, p. 37; Phil. Abh., p. 58.
\item [7.] Madīna, p. 34.
\end{itemize}
the closer we become to Him and this leads to the assimilation of man to the divine.

The idea of imitation of God or assimilation of man to the divine was one of the two definitions of philosophy, the other being the practice of death. Plato is said to have been the first to define philosophy as imitation of God in our actions\(^1\) - the idea that found a warm welcome from Plotinus.\(^2\) The Arabic summary of Galen's De Moribus says:

> Since you are a human being through your rational soul alone, being able through it to remain alive and thinking and to do without the spirited and appetitive souls - were the rational soul free of both of them, it would have never been entangled in a bad way of life - you should disregard the actions and "accidents" (i.e. emotions, ṣanā'ā) connected with these two. And if you, after having become free of both of them together with the body, are still able to reason and to think - according to the best philosophers' statements about the state of man after death - you should know that you will have, after having become free of the body, a life like the gods.\(^3\) But if you are not yet certain that your mind is immortal, then there is nothing easier than to strive that your way of life becomes similar to the life of the gods while you are still alive.\(^4\)

When we think that this summary was translated by Hunayn b. Ishāq, it would be quite plausible to suggest that the book might have been accessible to al-Fārābī. In fact there is a striking resemblance between the view stated above and that of al-Fārābī. It should be borne in mind, however, that in al-Fārābī man tries to

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1. Cf. Theaetetus, 176B.
2. Enn., I. 2.
4. Quoted by Walzer, Greek into Arabic, p. 166.
resemble the Active Intellect rather than God. In the doctrine of the imitation of God two stages can be distinguished. Firstly there is the metaphysical stage which can be reached through the knowledge of the Creator. This is the aim of teaching philosophy. Secondly there is the ethical stage at which the philosopher tries, according to al-Fārābī, to imitate God as far as he can.¹

Unfortunately al-Fārābī does not develop this idea. How the philosopher imitates God in his actions remain unexplained. For instance al-Ghazālī too, as we will study in detail later on, talks about these two stages of the likeness of God, but he devotes his whole Maqṣūd al-asnā for this subject. Al-Ghazālī, unlike al-Fārābī, explains all attributes of God and shows how they can be ethical ideals of a Muslim. Al-Fārābī studiously avoids almost all the religious terms such as ṭū yat Allāh, hubb Allāh as well as the mystical ones such as fa'ā', baqā' and the like. There is hardly any reference, if at all, to the Qur'ān, Tradition and sayings of the early Muslims, though this tradition was in vogue before and after al-Fārābī's time.² This is especially true about al-Fārābī's major works such as the Siyāsā, the Maḏīna and the Tāḥṣīl.³

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3. In some of the rasā’il attributed to al-Fārābī, his style and terminology are somewhat different. In Da‘wī al-qalbiyya (cf. p. 11) he talks of miracles, the healing through du‘ā’, the description of the world to come given by prophets, the necessity of prescribed prayers and so forth. In another small risāla (cf. Mīls wa-nuṣūṣ al-ukhūrā, p. 96) he talks of the vision of God, the service of Angels and many stories about prophets. He talks about these with a fairly un-Fārābian fashion.
According to O'Leary "the most curious part of al-Fārābī's work is the way in which he employs the terminology of the Qur'ān as corresponding to that of Neoplatonists. So that the Qur'ānic Pen, Tablet etc. the Neoplatonic etc." It seems that here O'Leary has *Fuṣūṣ al-Hikam* in mind, since such terms do not occur in the works which are generally considered as authentic. It is true that in the *Siyāsa* he uses the terms rūḥ al-quds, malakūt and so forth, and in *Fuṣūl al-Fārābī* makes use of a few verses and Traditions. But these are so few that one cannot help wondering how al-Fārābī could manage to write on such religious subjects without using the specific Islamic terms.

In none of the foregoing explanation have we tried to suggest that al-Fārābī underestimated the importance of religion in general and Islam in particular. Without the power (*quwwa*) which emanates from the First Cause through the Active Intellect, man cannot define what happiness is, nor can he find the means to attain it. "This emanation which comes from the Active Intellect to the Passive Intellect through the intermediary of the Acquired Intellect is called revelation (wahy)" Now for a close examination of al-Fārābī's idea of wahy and its relevance to *saʿāda*, let us come to his doctrine of ittisāl.

1. *Arabic Thought in History*, 15.
vi) Saʿāda and Ittisāl

The Aristotelian idea of contemplation and the Neo-Platonic idea of emanation helped al-Fārābī to work out his theory of ittisāl which he identifies with the ultimate saʿāda. The Neo-Platonic influence, however, gives a special mystical colour to al-Fārābī's concept of saʿāda and brings about a point of departure from Aristotle's realism. Since al-Fārābī hardly mentions his source, it is not an easy matter to be precise about the way in which he establishes his concept of ittisāl.

We read in the famous De Causis that "ittisāl is only possible between things which resemble each other."¹ This is in fact the starting point of the concept of ittisāl. It has already been pointed out that the highest stage for the Potential Intellect is the stage of Acquired Intellect. The Acquired Intellect resembles the Active Intellect,² and it is the nearest thing to the Active Intellect.³ "The Passive Intellect is like matter and substratum to the Acquired Intellect and the latter is like matter and substratum to the Active Intellect. It is then that the power that enables man to understand how to define things and actions and how to direct them towards happiness, emanates from the Active Intellect."⁴

The state of the ultimate saʿāda or ittisāl is described by al-Fārābī in both his major works mainly the Siyāsa and the Madīna.

¹. Neoplatonici Apud Arab, p. 31.
². ʿAql, pp. 24-5.
³. Ibid., p. 31.
In the Siyāsa he writes:

As one group of them [the saʿīd citizens of the Virtuous City] passes away, and their bodies are destroyed, their souls have achieved salvation and happiness, and they are succeeded by other men who assume their positions in the city and perform their actions, the souls of the latter will also achieve salvation. As their bodies are destroyed, and they join the ranks of the former group that had passed away, they will be together with them in the way that incorporeal things are together, and the kindred souls within each group will be in a state of union with one another; ... and the more they are joined by those who come after them, the greater, the pleasure felt by each of the latter through their encounter with the former as well as the pleasure felt by the former through their union with the latter. For each soul will then be intelleting, in addition to itself, many more souls that are of the same kind; and it will be intelleting more souls as the ones that had passed away are joined by the ones succeeding them. Hence the pleasure felt by the very ancient ones will continue to increase indefinitely. Such is the state of every group of them. This, then, is true and supreme happiness, which is the purpose of the Active Intellect.

A similar passage occurs in the Madīna as well. In this passage there are three points to be noted. Firstly this ittiṣāl takes place among the happy souls as well as between them and the Active Intellect. Secondly this ittiṣāl occurs not in this world but in the world to come, for that reason it is identified with saʿāda al-quswā. And thirdly this happens when the bodies are destroyed. In other words this is a state of 'matterlessness' or incorporeality.

Apart from this description of ittiṣāl, al-Farabi does not wish to talk about the realm of incorporeality. All he says is that here the intellect "is no longer subject to any accidents that are attached to bodies as such; therefore it cannot be said of it that

1. Ibid., p. 82; trans., 38.
it moves or it rests. Rather one ought then to apply to it a statement appropriate to what is incorporeal ... The comprehension and conception of the states are extremely difficult and at variance with the common usage."¹ This is the stage at which man becomes divine after having been an existent in potentiä.²

Although the full ittisâl, or the ultimate sa‘āda, takes place after the destruction of bodies, al-Fârâbî accepts some kind of ittisâl for some exceptional souls in this life as well. When this happens to a man, he becomes the first ruler in the Virtuous City. It can be said of this man, al-Fârâbî argues, that he receives revelation which occurs when there is no longer a veil between him and the Active Intellect. This is only possible in a man who has superior natural dispositions.³ We will return to the importance of this earthly ittisâl later on.

A complete ittisâl is not possible in this life, since it requires a complete detachment from matter. Al-Fârâbî identifies this ittisâl with "the other life" (al-ḥayât al-ākhira). When man's intellect attains the stage of the Acquired Intellect, it comes closer to, and resembles, the Active Intellect. "This is the ultimate happiness and the after life, namely that comes to man some other thing through which he becomes a substance. And there comes to him his final perfection."⁴ Now here the terms ittisâl, sa‘āda al-quašwâ,

1. Siyâsa, pp. 81-2; Madīna, p. 113.
2. Siyâsa, pp. 36
3. Ibid., p. 79.
al-kamāl al-ākhīr and al-ḥayāt al-ākhīra become synonymous. We are told many times that "the real saʿāda is not in this life but in other life which is after this [life]."¹

This is one of the most subtle and, at the same time, difficult points in al-Fārābī's philosophy. If we stress the otherworldly character of ittisāl and ignore the importance of the first ruler - Active Intellect relationship, which is also called ittisāl, al-Fārābī's system collapses, since his doctrine of prophecy and his whole ethico-political philosophy stand on this relationship. On the other hand, if we accept "the other life" as the life of the philosopher after ittisāl in this life, we might be led to believe that al-Fārābī does not believe in the life after death.

Among the modern writers on al-Fārābī, it was Dr. E.J. Rosenthal who raised doubts about al-Fārābī's use of the term "other life". "The question may legitimately be asked," writes Rosenthal, "whether he [al-Fārābī] meant by 'other life' the future life of the Muslim or the life of speculation and contemplation of the philosopher in the ideal state."² He does not seem to be certain about Ibn Sīnā's concept of 'other life' either. And when he comes to Ibn Bājja, Dr. Rosenthal argues that Ibn Bājja means by the term ḥayāt al-ākhīra the life of contemplation. His source for Ibn Bājja is the philosopher's book on ittisāl where he says "speculation ... is the future life; it is the utmost happiness, peculiar to man alone."³

¹ Milla, p. 52 and 54; cf. also O. Amin's introduction to Iḥṣā', pp. 38-9.
² E.J. Rosenthal, Political Thought, p. 271, n. 29.
³ Ibid., p. 163; cf. also p. 150.
By this statement Ibn Bājja, according to Dr. Rosenthal, "places himself outside Islam."¹ It is for this reason he calls Ibn Bājja "rationalist", reserving the term 'intellectualism' for other Muslim philosophers.² Surprisingly enough in another place Dr. Rosenthal observes that it does not seem to be logical that one can attain the ultimate happiness in this world, since it is almost impossible for an individual to possess the fourfold perfection, i.e. theoretical, deliberative, moral and practical arts.³ Dr. Rosenthal is right in this last comment, since al-Fārābī himself says many times that it is very difficult to reach the ultimate perfection in these four.⁴ As Dr. Rosenthal's argument about 'the other life', we will return to it a little later on, since to understand his standpoint and al-Fārābī's standpoint, we may begin better with the attacks of other Muslim philosophers which were directed against al-Fārābī's opinions concerning the immortality of the soul and the happiness of the soul as an individual entity.

vii) The Immortality and Happiness of the Individual Soul

The most devastating blow to al-Fārābī's idea of happiness was dealt by Ibn Ṭufayl. He asserted that al-Fārābī is utterly inconsistent in his idea of ultimate happiness.

¹. Ibid.
². Ibid.
⁴. Cf. Fusūl, sec. 10. According to al-Ghazālī, only the Prophet can have such perfection. See Ih, iii, 71.
In his Virtuous Religion [al-Milla al-fadila] he [al-Farabi] affirms that the souls of the wicked are doomed after death to infinite suffering for an infinite time. Then he declares in the Political Regime [Siyasa] that they dissolve into nothingness and that only the virtuous and perfect souls survive. Then in his commentary on the Ethics [of Aristotle] he declares an aspect of human happiness and affirms that this is achieved only in this life and in this very world. He then adds a remark whose meaning can be summed up as follows: All that is said contrary to this is senseless jabber and tales told by old women. A doctrine like this leads all men to despair of God's mercy and places the wicked and good in the same category since, according to this doctrine, all men are destined for nothingness. This is a slip that cannot be rectified, and a false step that cannot be remedied.

We are in a position to study all the points mentioned in this quotation, since the works of al-Farabi cited by Ibn Tufayl are now accessible to us except the commentary on Aristotle's Ethics, which is presumed to have been lost. In none of al-Farabi's existing works can one trace the idea that "all men are destined for nothingness." This is the point that should be left aside for the time being.

It has already been pointed out that immortality, according to al-Farabi, is not in the essence of the soul. Man is not born as an immortal being. His intellect, which is the only immortal part in him, becomes immortal when it obtains knowledge. In this respect al-Farabi differs from Ibn Sina who states very clearly that immortality is in the essence of the soul, and not gained by knowledge. Whether immortality is gained by knowledge or not is

another subject which we are not directly concerned with. All we can say is that al-Fārābī asserts without a shadow of doubt that the souls of the happy are immortal; this is quite clear in the passage which was quoted in connection with the ittiṣāl of happy souls.

Broadly speaking there are three kinds of souls: a) the souls of the sa'īd, b) the souls of the shaqī and c) the indifferent souls, or the souls which remain in potentia and do not reach the stage of actual existence. For al-Fārābī the first group of souls are like the different parts of one single soul. Under the concept of ittiṣāl, which is the aim of the Active Intellect, al-Fārābī preserve their eternal unity and happiness after the destruction of their bodies; that is to say after death. Al-Fārābī does not explicitly say what will happen to the soul of the first ruler who already reaches the stage of ittiṣāl on earth. But it is absurd to accept that his happiness will be the same as that of the souls of those whom he ruled and led to happiness. To accept the existence of the degrees of happiness necessitates the acceptance of different souls. Concerning the worldly happiness there are degrees of happiness. "It is evident," says al-Fārābī, "that the kinds of happiness attained by the citizens of the city differ in quantity and in quality as a result of the difference in the perfections they acquire through political activities. Accordingly, the pleasure they attain varies in excellence."¹ But the passage may very well mean that the souls of the citizens of the virtuous will have different degrees of pleasure after death.

The degrees of happiness after death must be accepted, since the quality of each soul, according to al-Fārābī, will differ because of the different bodies in which they inhabited during their earthly lives.¹ As al-Ghazālī points out in his Tahāfut, the falāsifa argued that "no two souls can have the same proclivity; because proclivities result from the moral character, and like external physiognomy, the moral character can never be the same in any two instances."²

Al-Fārābī usually uses the terms sa‘āda and shaqāwa in the singular. In 'Uyun, however, he uses the plural forms of these words. Here al-Fārābī says: "After the death of the body there are different kinds of happiness (sa‘ādāt) and misery (shaqāwāt) for the soul; and these states or conditions (ahwāl) vary according to [different] souls."³ To accept one kind of happiness is tantamount to denying the merits of each soul, which goes against justice and what is logically necessary.⁴ Here al-Fārābī makes no reference to the indifferent souls. This together with other points about the soul give a different tone to the 'Uyun. In this respect the book is nearer to the generally accepted views about the soul and its happiness than his major works, such as the Tahāfut, the Madīna and the Siyāsa.

Al-Fārābī’s account of the happy souls is, as it were, the

¹ Madīna, p. 113.
³ Phil. Abh., p. 64.
⁴ Ibid.
incorporeal, or spiritual, image of his city of the virtuous people. The people of these cities obtain their personal happiness by the help of other people all of whom live under the guiding light of the first ruler. Each person is a part of the whole without losing his personal identity. It seems that the Active Intellect takes the place of the first ruler when we come to the happiness of the souls after death. Al-Fārābī follows divine Plato who believes that the wise who are freed from the tribulations of the flesh in this life will live after death in an eternal bliss in the company of gods.¹ If we replace Plato’s gods with al-Fārābī’s Active Intellect and other heavenly beings, we will come to al-Fārābī’s doctrine of saʿāda after death. To my mind one can, by basing oneself on al-Fārābī’s major works, plausibly argue that according to al-Fārābī saʿāda after death is experienced by the happy souls together without losing their individual identity. The "passage concerning ittisāl" in the Siyāsa and in the Madīna says very clearly that "each soul will then be intel lecting, in addition to itself, many more souls that are of the same kind."² How can a soul intellect its own substance if it loses its individual identity?

For al-Fārābī ittisāl with the Active Intellect is primarily an illumination deriving from the Active Intellect itself - the fact which is also true for Ibn Sīnā. Therefore ittisāl is not at all a matter of identification of human intellect with the Active

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¹. Russell, History of Western Philosophy, p. 272.
². Siyāsa, p. 82; Madīna, pp. 114-5.
Intellect, though without the Active Intellect, as we have argued before, it cannot reach the stage of ittisāl. Identification must be out of the question, since this would mean the loss of individuality from the part of the human intellect.

Our emphasis on the importance of the individuality of the soul will become more important, when we take the fact into consideration that there are quite a few scholars who believe that al-Fārābī does not accept the individual happiness of the soul. According to O’Leary, for instance, "the only immortal part of man was the part which came to him from the Agent Intellect, and when emanation was set free from its association with the human body and lower soul it became inevitable to suggest its re-absorption in the omnipresent source from which it had been derived. The logical conclusion was thus a denial not of a future life nor its eternity, but of the separate existence of an individual soul." This was due to al-Fārābī’s acceptance of Aristotelianism. Al-Fārābī found himself in a dilemma, continues O’Leary, because he "did not know where Aristotelian teaching would lead him."¹ There is no need to take all the points which O’Leary puts forward about al-Fārābī. What he says is just the opposite of what we have been saying about the function of the Active Intellect, the nature of the intellect and its happiness. We have said many times that the Active Intellect, according to al-Fārābī, does not give "the only immortal part of man", i.e. intellect.

If the case was what O'Leary seems to believe, even the souls of the "ignorant" or indifferent souls would not be destroyed. The "reabsorption" would include all the souls. In fact most of the views of O'Leary about al-Fārābī cannot be accepted without some drastic modifications.

R. Hammond and S. Pines too have raised doubt about the immortality of the individual soul in al-Fārābī. The former is not certain about this point in al-Fārābī, though he says that "most probably he [al-Fārābī] did not believe in it [immortality of the individual soul]."¹ And the latter says that "the so-called Arabic Jewish Aristotelian philosophers - with the sizeable exception of al-Kindī, Avicenna and their respective disciples - did not as a rule believe in individual after life."²

Unfortunately most of these remarks are made in rather general contexts where al-Fārābī has been just referred to. That makes it very difficult to determine the full implications of such remarks. This does not mean that the foregoing views of some scholars do not deserve a careful study. In fact the core of the confusion is al-Fārābī's works themselves. Any judgement on any part of al-Fārābī's philosophy must be prepared to accept some kind of modification. Ibn Ṭufayl takes the credit for his noticing this peculiar aspect of the works attributed to al-Fārābī. Ibn Ṣahīn too clearly says that al-Fārābī was not at all certain about the

real nature of the Potential Intellect and the immortality of the soul; his books such as *kitāb fī l-akhlāq*, *kitāb al-milla al-fāqīla* and *as-siyāsa al-madaniyya* are at variance in this respect.¹ In the light of the works which are studied here, however, it seems to be quite reasonable to conclude that al-Fārābī did not deny the immortality of the soul nor its individual happiness after death.

viii) Al-Fārābī’s *ittiṣāl*, the *ittiḥād* of the Śūfīs and Ecstasy of Plotinus.

Quite a few terms have been used to explain al-Fārābī’s whole approach to philosophy. We are told that he is a "thoroughgoing intellectualist,"² just "intellectualist"³ or intellectual intuitionist⁴ and so forth. All these terms can be used for al-Fārābī’s philosophy, provided that one who uses them explains what he means by the term he uses.⁵

One thing seems to be fairly certain, that although al-Fārābī himself led a life of a śūfī, he nevertheless rejected the ascetic approach to the concept of saʿāda. As we have pointed out a little earlier on, al-Fārābī believes that the first ruler can have an intellectual communication with the Active Intellect. He states

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¹ S.I. Estabanlator, "Ibn Sabʿīn y su 'Budd Al-Ārif'," *Al-Andalus*, ix, (1944), pp. 398-9 n.6.
⁴ A. Adivar, "Farabi" in *İslam Ansiklopedisi*.
⁵ For the difficulties of using such terms for Ancient and Medieval Philosophers see R. Jackson, "Rationalism and Intellectualism in the ethics of Aristotle", *Mind*, (1942), pp. 343ff.
very clearly that during ittiṣāl the grade of the Active Intellect remains higher than that of the human intellect.¹ Having this in mind, R. Walzer says that in al-Fārābī "the intellectual vision does not lead to a mystical unification..., whereas Plotinus, Porphyry and Proclus had themselves experienced unity with God and considered it the highest state of existence which a human could reach."² Here R. Walzer is talking about what we call ittiṣāl in this life. In this sort of ittiṣāl, or what Walzer calls 'mystical unification', human intellect cannot unite with the Active Intellect because it "is not yet fully detached from the body."³ What happens when this full detachment takes place? Walzer's answer is: "the souls of those who have lived a life resembling that of God...lose their individuality after death and then become part of the 'Active Intellect' of the Kingdom of Heaven."⁴ Now we are back to our old argument: the individual happiness of the human soul. Like O'Leary and S. Pines, R. Walzer holds this view without mentioning how he has arrived at it and without touching any of the difficulties which accompany such point of view. We agree with Walzer as far as his idea on the 'mystical unification' in this world is concerned, Since the first ruler never becomes "Active Intellect through the control of intelligibilia" as Professor Grunebaum seems to believe.⁵

¹. Madīna, p.85.
². Walzer, Greek into Arabic, p. 21.
⁴. Walzer, Greek into Arabic, p. 22.
⁵. See his Medieval Islam; p. 158, n.33.
The term which stands close to the philosophical ittiṣāl is ittiḥād, which is extensively used by the ṣūfis. It is very tempting to make a distinction between the philosopher and the ṣūfis in respect of the use of these two technical terms. According to Ibrahim Madqour the terms ittiṣāl and ittiḥād designate the doctrine of al-Fārābī and the ecstasy of Ḥallāj. It is quite true that the philosophers usually use the term ittiṣāl when they talk about man's highest perfection, whereas the ṣūfis are keen on the terms ittiḥād and wasāl. Some of them accept even the doctrine of "inherence" (ḥulūl). As we will see later on in the second part of our work, al-Ghazālī strongly attacks those who have held such ideas.

Although al-Fārābī does not accept ittiḥād and ḥulūl in the sense that the ṣūfis do, he sees no harm in saying that the soul of the perfect man "unites with the Active Intellect" (muttaḥidatun bi l-sāl al-fa‘‘āl). He even says that the Active Intellect "resides (halla) in him" But none of these terms seems to be used in the technical sense. It seems certain that al-Fārābī does not believe in ittiḥād and ḥulūl.

The ṣūfis, however, use ittiṣāl as well, but it is used in a rather different sense. "The meaning of ittiṣāl is that the heart should be separated from everything except God; should glorify nothing except God and listen to nobody except Him." It goes without saying that al-Fārābī's ittiṣāl has nothing to do with ittiṣāl in

1. Madqour, La place d'Al-Farabi, p. 186.
this sense. **Ittiṣāl** in this ṣūfistic sense necessitates separation (infiṣāl) from all worldly things.

The obvious difference between the doctrine of **Ittiṣāl** in al-Fārābī and the ṣūfistic ittiḥād is that the former aims at the Active Intellect, whereas the latter at God. The difference that in ittiḥād one is led to mystical unification in which the Creator and creature are made one, whereas in ittiṣāl they remain separately, has a secondary importance. This is because even in ittiḥād there is not always "a mystical unity" - the idea that has been rejected rather than accepted by many ṣūfis. Ittiḥād also means "the passing away of that which is willed by the creature in that which is willed by God."¹ Even in this sense al-Fārābī's ittiṣāl is different from ittiḥād, since God does not directly come into the doctrine of ittiṣāl. The warmth of ittiḥād is completely absent in al-Fārābī's cool intellectual vision of the Active Intellect. It should be pointed out however that a thorough examination of the doctrines of the ṣūfī movement might reveal many similarities between ittiṣāl and ittiḥād in some other respects. After all both heavily rely on a common source: the Neoplatonic teachings.

The importance of what is so-called Theologia of Aristotle in this case is a well-known and frequently repeated fact. Due to the existence of this book and probably to some other sources, al-Fārābī reveals a visible Neoplatonic influence. For both al-Fārābī and Plotinus happiness depends on perfection and perfection means above

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all purification. Such purification leads to ultimate sa'āda, or ittişāl, in al-Fārābī and to becoming-god like or god in Plotinus. In the description of this highest stage al-Fārābī's language and style are quite different from those of Plotinus. Al-Fārābī talks of intellectual pleasure and how this pleasure is increased by the arrivals of many other more souls. He prefers silence to talking about the real condition of the soul after the destruction of the body. As we have said earlier on, he thinks that to talk about the comprehension and conception of the states of the soul after ittişāl is extremely difficult. Al-Fārābī does not talk of love and drunkenness, as Plotinus does. In Plotinus, according to A.H. Armstrong, there are two stages: "sobriety" which is the stage of knowing, and "drunkenness" which is the stage of love. Despite the insistence on love, Plotinus, Armstrong argues, does not deny the reality of intellect which necessitates the acceptance of its individual existence in one. In another passage Plotinus speaks of 'shock' which seems to announce the 'feeling of a Presence', and comes independent of will, unexpectedly and by chance.

We have none of these terms and ideas, when we come to the ittişāl between the first ruler and the Active Intellect. It seems that al-Fārābī is nearer to Plato who wants to rest in the vision of Good than Plotinus who wants to analyse it.

There are, however, some similarities between Plotinus' ecstasy and al-Fārābī's ittīgāl. In both cases there is an effort towards the idea of the immobility of the soul during the "meeting". "It does not wish to think," says Plotinus; "because thought is a movement and it does not wish to move". In al-Fārābī there is an eternal 'intellecting', but he too says that it cannot be said of this soul that it moves or rests. In fact al-Fārābī does not even want to say that the soul wishes to rest. Not talking becomes his explanation when he comes to say something about the condition of man's intellect during ittīgāl. Another similarity between the two is that neither the One of Plotinus nor the Active Intellect of al-Fārābī has love for man, which is a dominating concept in Islamic and Christian mysticism. Al-Fārābī talks of love, but in a metaphysical sense where it has a function of uniting things together, and in an ethical sense where it is connected with the exercise of virtue in the Virtuous City. To this subject we will return again. In both thinkers there is a trust in reason; and in ittīgāl as well as in Plotinus' ecstasy there is hardly any room for psychological analysis; both have cognitive values.

In short the teachings of Neoplatonism in general and those of Theologia in particular influenced al-Fārābī more than anything else in respect of the subject under discussion. The progress of the intellect in al-Fārābī and in Theologia is strikingly similar.

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The Theologia divides men into three classes: the class of sense perception, the class which rises a little above sense perception — this is the class which abandoned the search for virtues; and the class of superior men. These three classes roughly correspond to al-Fārābī's three classes, i.e. jāhil, shaqi and sa'īd. The Theologia says that the divine world cannot be described by tongues, nor can it be comprehended by ears. And so does al-Fārābī.

The idea that a happy soul becomes free of matter; that it becomes knowledgeable of itself and other intelligibles and many other views which are dealt with in al-Fārābī's works go back to Theologia.

We may now conclude our discussion on this subject by saying that ittigāl is the name of the theory of the union or conjunction of the happy souls with the Active Intellect. This union can also take place between some exceptional souls and the Active Intellect in this world. The term 'other life' can be used for this union in the sense that one who receives this divine communication becomes the most perfect and happiest of all — the characteristics of an otherworldly happy life. However the real union comes after "the destruction of the bodies". This is the real meaning of 'other life' or 'after life' by which al-Fārābī means the future life of the virtuous man and not the life of contemplation. In this case


2. The idea that the divine world and man's ultimate sa'āda cannot be known and described adequately occurs in the Qur'an and Tradition and is defended by al-Ghazālī (See Iq, iv, 384) and many others.

Dr. E.I.J. Rosenthal's doubts can hardly be justified. As a matter of fact the future life exists, according to al-Fārābī, not only for the happy souls, but for the wretched souls as well, although the future of the latter will be a painful one.

ix) Shaqāwā and the Position of the Wretched Souls.

Shaqāwā, which we translated as unhappiness, misery or wretchedness, is understood, by al-Fārābī, as the opposite of saʿāda.¹ Both saʿāda and shaqāwā have the same starting point; in both cases man knows what saʿāda is - the sole condition without which man cannot separate himself from matter. However both differ in respect of actions. The happy man knows what happiness is and works for its attainment and eventually finds it here on earth and in the world to come. The wretched man, on the other hand, knows what happiness is, but does the actions which are at variance with the actions by which happiness is obtained and eventually his life culminates in ultimate misery. In other words shaqāwā occurs when a man deliberately abandons the right means of achieving saʿāda.

Al-Fārābī uses the term fāsiq in order to designate the man who knows what is right and does the opposite. The far-reaching importance of the term fāsiq hardly needs any comment. As a matter of fact we have briefly stated in the first chapter that each theological school occupied itself with the word fāsiq and analysed it in detail. Fāsiq, according to al-Fārābī, experiences the

¹ Madīna, pp. 119-120.
greatest pain possible. The dispositions (hay'āt) which his soul acquires through the virtuous opinions (al-āra’ al-fādila) save it from becoming matter. When fāsiq performs non-virtuous actions his soul acquires some bad dispositions, and there comes to be a conflict between these two different dispositions. Good dispositions will be disturbed by the bad ones, and this will cause a great pain. The bad dispositions will be disturbed, in their turn, by the resistance and the opposition of good ones and therefore will not be able to perform bad actions without having pain. As a result the soul will be overtaken by a double pain.¹

The rational part of the soul may not feel this pain in all its intensity while it is still in the body. For such a feeling the soul should be entirely free of matter and the senses. The case of the soul of fāsiq resembles the case of a man who is distressed or ill, but does not feel, or feels little, his illness or distress because of his being fully occupied with the perception of the senses. As soon as he becomes free of this occupation, he will be fully aware of the pain.²

It is quite obvious that a complete freedom from the perception of the senses is possible only by death. The pain of each soul, or the rational part of the soul, will increase the pain of other similar souls when it joins them. They will remain in this intense

¹. Ibid., p. 119. In some early editions of Madīna the word fāsiq was read as fāqil. This error changes the meaning of the whole passage. Naturally the same mistake occurs in the translations which are based on these editions, including the French translation.

². Ibid.
pain indefinitely and the infinite number of souls will be added to each other endlessly. "This is shaqā', the opposite of sa'āda".¹

Although this passage reminds us of the passage which we quoted during our discussion on ittisāl,² al-Fārābī does not seem to have a special name for the gathering of these shaqī souls. The passage in fact is very weak if we compare it with the 'ittisāl passage'. Al-Fārābī does not tell us anything about how one soul or intellect will increase the pain of another one. Unfortunately we are left without a real description of shaqā' after death. The reason for this, to my mind, is obvious, though al-Fārābī does not say it: the denial of the bodily sa'āda and shaqāwa. In order to explain the punishment or shaqā', al-Fārābī could not use the vivid, lovely and extremely colourful Qur'ānic descriptions, since without the body it is impossible to talk of "roasting the wretched in great fire" (LXXXVII, 11) or making people drink "boiling water and pus" (LXXVIII, 25).

The phrase 'otherworldly torture' ('adḥāb al-ākhira) is hardly used by al-Fārābī. As far as I know, he uses it in a little risāla entitled Zīnūn al-Kabīr al-Yūnānî³ in its traditional sense. After talking about the man whose condition is contrary to that of the wise man and who remains in a state of astonishment and calamity after death, he says "we take refuge in God for the punishment in

1. Madīna, pp. 119-120.
2. Siyāsa, p. 82.
3. p. 10.
the world to come." The terms 'reward' (thawāb) and 'punishment' ('iqāb) are used in Jam' when he defends Aristotle and Plato against the charge that they did not believe in reward or punishment. In this respect he does not have much to say about Aristotle's attitude towards otherworldly life, but in connection with Plato, al-Fārābī says that Plato towards the end of The Republic talks of Resurrection, Judgement, Justice, Scale (mīzān) and of reward and punishment according to the goodness or badness of actions. All of these, however, are not more than references scattered here and there in al-Fārābī's works. In the light of this scanty information, one cannot try to see a fully developed idea of the otherworldly punishment. R. Walzer tells us that "al-Fārābī accepted reward and punishment in a future world on the level of traditional religion and believed that the conduct of the common man could be improved; he thought that this must have been in Muḥammad's mind when he taught this in the Qur'ān. But as a philosopher he showed the deep and serious conviction of the Stoics that only the souls of the good enjoy eternal bliss." In fact this is what R. Walzer understands rather than what al-Fārābī actually says. Al-Fārābī is radically at variance with the Qur'ānic account of otherworldly reward and punishment, so it is very difficult to prove the idea that al-Fārābī accepts the future life on the level of traditional religion. However we will come to al-Fārābī's attitude towards the Qur'ānic concept of saʿāda later on.

2. Walzer, Greek into Arabic, pp. 21-2.
Not everybody, however, does accept the foregoing ideas about al-Fārābī's doctrine of *shaqā*. According to F. Rahman, al-Fārābī "has no doctrine of torture after death (*shaqā*), but only that of the bliss."¹ In another place he says that "only the intellectually developed souls survive and are blessed...therefore there cannot be any talk of punishment in the hereafter."² It is not very difficult to see how F. Rahman has arrived at this conclusion. As we have said in our account of *ittisāl*, the survival of the souls depend on their inner development. They are happy and immortal in their union with the Active Intellect. As far as these souls are concerned *saʿāda* and immortality are interchangeable. It appears that F. Rahman sees the whole question of happiness and immortality within the idea of *ittisāl*. He might have thought that since there is no possibility of the union of the *shaqī* souls with the Active Intellect, and since there is no immortality without such union, then there is no soul to punish after death. I think F. Rahman fails to see that the souls of *shaqī* are intellectually developed, but they are morally corrupt. It is true that there are some souls which will perish by death, but these are what al-Fārābī calls 'ignorant souls', to which we will come presently, and not the wretched souls. These wretched souls received illumination from above, through which they know the nature of God, happiness, heavenly bodies and the like. This illumination or rather knowledge make them immortal but not happy

¹. Rahman, *Prophecy*, p. 25 n. 20; For the same idea Cf. also his article on "Dream and Imagination and *ʿalām al-mithāl*, IS, 13 (1964), p. 168.
since they did not live up to this truth. Therefore they became immortal without being happy. The position which we take on this point will be clearer if we take the end of the souls of 'The Ignorant' into consideration.

x) The Souls of the Ignorant.

So far we have seen two major classes of souls: happy and wretched. The former are perfect and pure, whereas the latter are perfect but impure. The terms saʿāda and shaqaʿ or shaqāwa designate their conditions after death respectively. Now we come to the souls which are impure and imperfect.

To remain ignorant (jāhil) is, according to al-Fārābī, tantamount to remaining linked with, and attached to matter. These souls are not in the position to have any image or imitation of heavenly existents, let alone true knowledge of God, happiness and so on. If the existence of a thing is tied up with the existence of matter it is only logical to say that the destruction of matter necessitates the destruction of that thing as well. These ignorant souls are, al-Fārābī believes, "sick and remain chained to matter".¹ They are, like beasts, doomed to nothingness.² Their intellects remain at the level of potentiality, and Potential Intellect, as we have said earlier on, is not immortal. According to A. Badawi, Alexander of Aphrodisias too is silent about the immortality of the Potential Intellect. This silence makes Badawi suggest that he did not believe

¹ Siyāsa, p. 83.
² Madīna, pp.116-9; Siyāsa, p. 33.
in its immortality.1

Although this idea is radically at variance with the Islamic tenets, it is quite consistent as far as al-Fārābī's philosophy is concerned; but to discuss this here will lead to an unnecessary repetition of what we have already discussed in more than one place. It seems that it does not make much difference whether these souls are ignorant because of their natural dispositions or because of the circumstances in which they happen to live.

It is very surprising, however, that al-Ghazālī criticises the philosophers' doctrine of saʿāda and shaqāwa, and charges them with infidelity because of their denial of bodily saʿāda and shaqāwa, but says nothing about al-Fārābī's non-Islamic idea of the position of the ignorant souls.2

After al-Fārābī, both Ibn Sinā and al-Ghazālī paid a great deal of attention to the case of what they called bulh, the people with weak intellect. Al-Fārābī uses the term jāhil instead of bulh. The different meanings of the term balāha and the positions of the souls which are named by this term will be studied in the last part of this work when we come to al-Ghazālī. We will also leave the socio-political implications of al-Fārābī's theory of the wretched and indifferent soul for our chapter on al-Fārābī's politics.

xi) Death, its Anxiety and Happiness

Man's attitude towards death plays a very important role in his life both psychologically and ethically. Is it the characteristic of a virtuous man to desire his death which frees him from matter? Al-Fārābī gives a negative answer to this question. He believes that to have a long and happy life is the aim of every virtuous man. He "must seek means to survive as long as possible, in order that he may increasingly do what brings him happiness, and in order that the people of the city may not lose his usefulness to them by his virtue." Al-Fārābī could accordingly not agree with some of the Stoic philosophers who contemplated and preached suicide. He does not believe that man becomes happy only after death. Nor does he accept the definition of philosophy in terms of "the practice of death" - a definition which is usually linked with the name of Plato.

Here again al-Fārābī believes that Plato and Aristotle did not advise people to abandon the worldly life. Some thought, according to al-Fārābī, that Plato ignored this life and Aristotle the future life. They are mistaken. Despite al-Fārābī's emphasis that there is no difference between these two divine sages, a difference between them was always the subject of a

1. Fuṣūl, sec. 73.
2. Cf. Phæado, 67E.
discussion among the Muslim students of Greek philosophy. In a
fairly vague passage al-Fārābī himself says that "Aristotle sees
the perfection of man as Plato sees it and more." What al-Fārābī
means by the word "more" is not clear. According to Muḥsin Mahdī
this might be a praise or a blame. Those who had a ṣūfīstic outlook
on life welcomed the idea of the denial of this world. It is quite
well-known that the Islamic Platonic tradition had a widespread
influence on the ṣūfī literature. As a matter of fact the idea
that Aristotle is not very clear about man's happiness has, after all,
a case. It is Aristotle who says that "certainly the future is
obscure to us, while happiness, we claim, is an end and something in
every way final. If so, we shall call happy those among the living
in whom these conditions are, and are to be, fulfilled - but happy
man [translator's italics]." Whether the Muslim philosophers were
in possession of all the parts of Aristotle's Ethics is not easy to
determine; the book was known to them. In its optimistic approach
to worldly pleasures and happiness, it influenced al-Fārābī, Abū l-
Ḥasan al-ʿAmīrī, Ibn Mishawayh and many other Muslim writers on
ethics. But this must not lead us to underestimate the fact that
Muslim philosophers were much more at home with Plato than Aristotle,
at least as far as their interest in the otherworldly happiness and
ethics and politics were concerned.

2. E.N. i.10.1101a.
The virtuous man must not spoil his happiness with the anxiety of death. He tries to live longer and multiply the good deeds by which "his happiness after death is increased." The fear of death is seen among the ignorant rather than virtuous people. The wretched people are afraid of death more than any other class of man. The 'Ignorant' fear, since they believe that the worldly pleasures, riches and happiness all they have. They feel happy so long as their worldly happiness is guaranteed. They cannot worry about what will happen to them after death, since they know nothing about the ultimate happiness in the world to come.

As for the fear of fāsīqūn, their fear is due to two reasons: firstly they will lose the pleasures of this world, and secondly they know they will not be happy in the world to come. They know what they will lose by death, and what will happen to them after death. They will live and die in great sadness. They are, as the Qur'ān says, vile, unchaste and in error; and they have all the reasons to fear death.²

A person's attitude towards death is usually determined by his ideas about man's nature as a whole. There were people among the ancients, writes al-Fārābī, who thought that what is not natural to man's existence should be destroyed. They said "die voluntarily, then you will live by nature."³ They thought that there are two

1. Fuṣūl, sec. 72.
2. Cf. Above, Chapter One.
kinds of death: natural and voluntary. By the former they meant the separation of the soul from the body, in other words real death. And by the latter they meant the destruction of the accidents of the soul such as desire and anger. We have already mentioned while we were dealing with the nature of man that al-Fārābī accepts man as he is, with his soul and with his body and therefore rejects this Stoic approach towards death, life and happiness. In this al-Fārābī was followed by other Muslim philosophers. It is extremely interesting to note that some Muslim writers thought that the falāsifa had found, in their account of saʿāda, the happy medium between "the ancient philosophers" and the "first teacher" i.e. Aristotle. According to an-Nirāqī, for instance, Aristotle stressed the body in his idea of happiness whereas "the ancients" (aqdamūn) denied the soul its happiness as long as it remained attached to the body. In other words they did not believe that man can be happy as long as he is occupied with his body. The Muslim philosophers did not fall into any of these errors and accepted the fact that saʿāda can only be attained with the combined effort of the soul and the body.

So far we have talked about saʿāda from epistemological and to some extent cosmological standpoints. This is only a part of


the problem. Al-Fārābī himself says that there are two aspects of the problem of saʿāda: firstly there is the aspect which is concerned with "opinions" (al-ārāʾ) - an aspect whose importance reveals itself very clearly with the full title of al-Fārābī's major work: "The Book of the Opinions of the People of the Virtuous City." Secondly there is the aspect which is concerned with "actions" (al-asfāʾāl) with which he deals in his Taḥṣīl, Tanbīh, Milla and other minor works. In the present work the first aspect is taken first, since it determines, according to al-Fārābī, the second. In the following two chapters we will try to envisage saʿāda from an ethico-political standpoint.
CHAPTER THREE

SA'ADA IN THE ETHICS OF AL-FARABI

1) Sa'ada in Terms of Perfection (kamal)

Happiness and perfection in existence go together. The more complete one's being is, the happiest one is. The hierarchy of perfection in al-Farabi follows the process of emanation at the highest stage of which there is the Most Perfect Being, God. Then comes other intellects. God is intellect in the full and purest sense of the term.\(^1\) Matter is the last in the list, since it has no perfection whatsoever. Between God and Matter the one above is always more perfect than the one below.

Man is potentially perfect. His intellect has the capacity to reach perfection; it is the noblest thing in him, as all the ancients agreed.\(^2\) Perfection comes only through the dominance of this noble part over other parts of the soul. Here al-Farabi's starting point seems to be Aristotle whose concept of perfection includes passions which are subdued by rational part of the soul. As by accepting the stage of incorporeality the highest degree of perfection, he leaves Aristotle's concept of perfection behind and comes closer to Neoplatonism.

In Islamic philosophical tradition perfection (kamal) is usually divided into two. This division starts probably with al-Farabi who states that "man according to them [Socrates, Plato

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and Aristotle] has a first and a last perfection. The last results to us not in this life but in the after-life, when there has preceded it the first perfection in this life of ours...The last perfection is the ultimate happiness [as-sa‘āda al-quswā] which is the ultimate good [al-khayr al-mutlaq]. When man attains the last perfection, he equally attains the highest rank of being; thereby he finds reality. This is the conclusion which takes it basis from the analysis of al-Fārābī which starts from the experience of knowing as the fundamental good. Certainty in knowledge and perfection in being cannot be separated from a perfect man, since perfection depends on knowledge which must have a perfect object of knowing, i.e. God.

The "first perfection" is defined as the actions of all virtues and the "last perfection" as ultimate happiness. Despite some minor modifications, Muslim philosophers adopted al-Fārābī's division and definition of perfection. Abū’l-Hasan al-‘Amirī, for instance, uses as-sa‘āda al-adnā and as-sa‘āda al-quswā for these two degrees of perfection. In Ibn Miskawayh, al-kamāl al-quswā stands for as-sa‘āda al-quswā and al-kamāl-qarīb for the first perfection. Ibn Miskawayh prefers the words "final" and "distant" perfections to the "first" and "second" perfections. A similar idea occurs in Ibn Sab‘īn’s risāla al-faqīriyya.

1. Fusūl, sec. 25.
3. Ibn Miskawayh, Tahdhib al-akhlāq, (Cairo, 1329H) pp. 32, 42 and 90; Cf. also Ibn Miskawayh, Kitāb as-sa‘āda (Cairo, 1346H), pp. 165-6.
Al-Fārābī and other Muslim philosophers agree that the first perfection is an indispensable step for the ultimate perfection. By the combination of two, man attains his greatest happiness (as-saʿāda al-ʿuzmā). In his idea of perfection or happiness or ittiṣāl - they all come to mean the same thing - al-Fārābī exalts the intellect and the intellectual in man. This naturally leads him to denial of matter in his concept of the ultimate perfection and in so doing he goes against the generally accepted Islamic idea of perfection which includes bodily as well as spiritual happiness.

ii) Saʿāda in terms of Good (khayr)

If saʿāda is the end of all activities, then it must be the final good at which everybody aims. Probably having Aristotle in mind, al-Fārābī says that "happiness is good without qualification (al-khayr al-mutlaq)", if so, then "everything useful for the achievement of happiness, or by which it is obtained is good too, not for its own sake, but because it is useful for the sake of happiness." This clear definition of saʿāda in terms of khayr was adopted by the subsequent Muslim philosophers. After having defined good as something useful for happiness, it was not difficult for al-Fārābī to define evil: "everything that obstructs the way to happiness in any fashion is unqualified evil."

1. Daʿāwī al-qalbiyya, p. 11.
2. Siyāsa, p. 72; Madīna, p. 86; Fūṣūl, sec. 25.
This definition of good suggests that goods can be divided into two broad divisions: good as means and good as end. Only the last has an intrinsic value and "it is always desired for its own sake." These definitions and the classification of good are taken from Aristotle's *Ethics.*

Although the word "khayr" is a purely Qur'ānic one, the meaning that al-Fārābī gives to it is more Greek than Qur'ānic. However, such terms like al-khayr al-muṭlaq or ash-sharr al-muṭlaq and al-khayr al-maḥd are not used in the Qur'ān. Like the terms al-'aql al-maḥd and al-ma'qūl al-maḥd, they are mostly used in philosophical literature. It appears that khayr in the sense which al-Fārābī uses is a fairly correct translation of the Greek word ἄρετή. Commenting on this Greek word, Ernest Barker says that the corresponding English word cannot be said to possess the same connotation. In Greek "goodness implies not only moral excellence, but also, as it were, intellectual efficiency ... Plato [for instance] means by 'goodness' something which is an intellectual as well as moral quality." There does not seem to be a difference between this 'goodness' and the 'goodness' that al-Fārābī's first ruler possesses in this world.

There are many varieties of goodness, but only happiness can be taken as the final good. Happiness in reality is final, self-sufficient and self-desirable. This happiness must not be confused

1. Madīna, p. 86.
2. E.N. 1. 6. 1096a., 1097a-b.
with supposed happiness which consists of other goods such as wealth, pleasure and honour. Real happiness, though it depends on other goods as far as its attainment is concerned, differs from other goods in kind and in degree. In other words it is not a higher degree of another good, nor is it the sum of other goods. As a matter of fact, sa'āda al-qūṣwā is not the existence but the non-existence of all these external goods. All other external goods depend for their existence on the body whereas the ultimate sa'āda, as has been said before, is identical with the rank of incorporeality.

What al-Fārābī calls supposed sa'āda is sometimes called 'the objective happiness' in modern philosophical writings, by which it is meant, the good that is capable of giving a person his perfection by fulfilling his every day needs such as material goods, refined pleasures (Aristippus, Halvetus); virtue (Stoics); social prosperity (Bentham, Mill) and so on. This happiness is different from 'subjective happiness' by which it is meant a person's actual perfection which is experienced by the realization of his potentialities. Al-Fārābī, like most of these philosophers, believes that the realizations of man's potentialities is the right end and the rest is not more than means.

For the attainment of worldly and otherworldly happiness, the determination of the right end, i.e. the ultimate good, is very important. Ultimate good is the end of life. The end for which

1. Siyāsa, pp. 73ff.
man lives is called *al-ghāya al-quswā* or the purpose which is sought, *al-gharaḍ al-multamās*. In al-Farābī, to say that man has a rational power amounts to saying that man lives to an end. Following the Greek philosophical tradition, al-Farābī classifies people according to their determination of ends. The correct apprehension of right end and means leads to *saʿāda*. "Wisdom", al-Farābī believes, "is that which gives the ultimate end, and practical wisdom gives that by which this end is attained." Any failure in respect to theory and to practice leads man to destruction and misery. To illustrate this let us turn, again, to the classification of men. In the case of *saʿīd* there is the correct apprehension of the end as well as of the means. At the opposite pole there is the 'ignorant man' who fails in both parts, i.e. in theoretical and in practical wisdom. In other words, failure in the determination of the right end and the right means, which results in the destruction of man. That is to say *saʿīd* finds a real *wujūd* whereas *jāhil*, meets his *ʿadam*. In the case of *fāsiq* there is no failure in the right apprehension of the end. His failure is connected with his desire and will; in other words it is a failure in practical and not in theoretical wisdom. So it is very clear that the confusion of some means, i.e. supposed *saʿāda*, with the ultimate end, i.e. *as-saʿāda al-quswā*, brings the whole hierarchical structure of means and ends to the stage of disorderliness, in which up is down and down is up.

1. Milla, p. 66.
2. Fūsūl, sec. 49.
The case of fēsiq leads us to another difficulty: can a man choose the wrong means in spite of his knowledge of the right end? We will try to answer this question when we come to al-Fārābī's idea of 'will and choice.'

But now we have to take the idea of 'inversion', i.e. taking one of the goods as an ultimate end, into consideration in a more elaborate way.

It has already been said that, though there is one ultimate end, there are many varieties of goods any of which can be taken as an end. What are these goods and what is the relation of any of these goods to man's ultimate happiness?

Al-Fārābī accepts the Aristotelian division of goods, which are the goods of the soul, i.e. virtue and knowledge, bodily goods i.e. power and beauty and external goods, i.e. wealth. The external goods, according to Aristotle, are indispensable for man's happiness. This idea is rejected by Plotinus. Al-Fārābī starts, as it were, with Aristotle and meets Plotinus in the end. He accepts the external goods so far as they are useful for the attainment of happiness, but when happiness is realized there is no room for them.

Among these goods, pleasure comes first, which can easily be taken as an end.

1. E.N. x. 8. 1178a; Madīna, p. 35.
2. Madīna, p. 35.
1) Sa'āda and Pleasure

Pleasure (ladh ḥa) is the common property of the real as well as supposed happiness, and is regarded as good.¹ There are people who think that "the most excellent thing is the enjoyment of pleasure."² This hedonistic approach to life is strongly rejected by al-Fārābī. Talking about rulers, he says that a man who thinks that the end of politics is the pursuit of pleasure cannot be a real ruler, as the ancients repeatedly emphasised.³

Al-Fārābī's treatment of the concept of pleasure is primarily ethical. He does not seem to be interested in psychological analysis of pleasure. Broadly speaking he divides pleasure into two: sensual and intellectual. Sensual pleasures differ among themselves; some are stronger than others. The pleasure of sexual intercourse (jimā'), for instance, as Plato pointed out, is stronger than other sensual pleasures. Its usefulness and its harm are too obvious.⁴ Most men think that the bodily pleasures constitute the perfection of life (kamāl al-'ajīsh), and there are some reasons for this. To begin with an intimate relationship between us and some of the sensual pleasures starts with birth. Some of these pleasures are produced by some activities which are necessary for the continuity of our lives such as eating, drinking, sexual activities and many others. Secondly sensual pleasures are easily available and strongly

¹ Cf. Enn. I. 4, 12.
² Milla, p. 52; Ḥusūl, sec. 36.
³ Ḥusūl, sec. 28.
⁴ Tanbīḥ, p. 17; Compendium Legum, Arabic Section, p. 38.
perceived, and so we have a better knowledge of them.  

As for the intellectual pleasures, they are produced by intellectual activities. The pleasure of ruling, dominating, conquest and knowledge come under this class.  

Connected with this, al-Fārābī also talks of imaginative pleasures which are associated with plays and games.  

The pleasure which is immediately experienced is called 'ājil, and those that can only be experienced in the long run are called ājil or ʿaqlba, which roughly corresponds to what is usually called momentary and rational hedonism in the history of Greek philosophy. The former was defended by Aristippus and some other Cretan philosophers according to whom "men desire and ought to desire only the pleasures of the present moment." The latter was defended by Plato, Epicurus and some others.  

The downright condemnation and the exaltation of sensual pleasures have often come to the scene in the history of philosophy and religion. Al-Fārābī does not commit to any of these extremes. There are people, al-Fārābī argues, who think "that pleasure of whatever kind is good and that pain of whatever kind is evil, especially which affects the sense of touch. All these are in error."  

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5. Fusül, sec. 60; Tanbih, p. 18; cf. also E.N.  

References:

- Tanbih, p. 15.
- Siyaa, p. 89.
- Ibid.
- Fusül, sec. 60; Tanbih, p. 18; cf. also E.N. vii. 11. 1152b.
He himself says very little about these pleasures. In the *Tanbih* he defends the idea that man should try to free himself from the sensual pleasures, or at least he should try to reduce them to a level where he should not require them more than is absolutely necessary. This is an indispensable condition for the formation of a good character.\(^1\) His disfavor towards these pleasures does not come from the idea that they have some intrinsic evil in them, but comes rather from the idea that they hinder us, as speculation and contemplation make it clear, from many goods by means of which we obtain happiness.\(^2\) Man must not seek pleasure in every action he performs, since there are many good actions which do not immediately bring pleasure. On the contrary they may even cause pain, though in the end pleasure will follow them. In the case of bad actions it is just the reverse: they may give pleasure at the beginning and pain in the end, so it is extremely dangerous to perform an action which produces an immediate pleasurable sensation.\(^3\) Although he does not actually say it, it seems quite logical to say that al-Fārābī, like Plato, might have accepted pain instrumentally good and probably less deceitful.

The intellectual pleasures are stronger and last longer than the sensual ones. Unlike the sensual pleasures they are not followed by any pain. Both types of pleasures are different in kind and in degree. Not only pleasures themselves but the objects which

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give pleasure are different. Aristotle, according to al-Fārābī, observed that "the more perfect the being man apprehends and understands, the greater is his rejoicing and his pleasure with his apprehension."¹ This confirms the view of the Theology of Aristotle where it is stated that when man approaches the First Cause through knowledge (ma‘rifa) he obtains the greatest delight.² Any step towards a more perfect and beautiful being will be followed with an ever increasing pleasure.³

Of course man will obtain the highest and purest pleasure when he reaches the ultimate sa‘āda which occurs when he is in the union with the Active Intellect. The pleasure that every intellect receives after ittiṣāl is ever-increasing. So is the pain of the souls of the wretched people. The source of pleasure in the case of the happy souls is self-intellecting and intellecting of other souls. Unfortunately al-Fārābī does not talk more than this about the pleasures which happy souls receive after death.

In ethics and in politics the concept of pleasure plays an essential role. There is a close relationship between virtue and pleasure. So long as pleasure is derived from virtuous actions, it is good.⁴ The ethical importance of performing an act with pleasure will be dealt with when we come to the concept of the Golden Mean. Here it is sufficient to say that al-Fārābī does not believe

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1. Plato and Aristotle, p. 60.
that people can be left alone to pursue their own pleasure. It was Plato, says al-Farābī, who observed that pleasures vary with respect to different men, their conditions, natural dispositions and moral habits.\(^1\) Therefore the aim of the education and training should be defined in terms of ordering pleasure and pain.\(^2\) That is why Aristotle says that "the study of pleasure and pain belongs to the province of the political philosophers."\(^3\) Only a man with this qualification will be able to classify people in respect of different kinds of pleasure and apply a method suited to their needs. He will also be able to use pain in order to bring good to them.

Pleasure from an educational standpoint will be dealt with in the next chapter. Now we come to another external good.

2) \textit{Sa'āda} and Riches

Riches (\textit{yasār}) is another constituent element of the worldly or 'supposed happiness'. It is considered as good and obtained by the help of the excellence of deliberation;\(^4\) some sort of worldly possessions are needed for the continuity of our worldly existence, but man's true happiness cannot be said to be comprised of riches - an idea which agrees with that of Aristotle as stated in his \textit{Ethics}.\(^5\) To be obsessed by worldly and material possessions can be extremely perilous for man's happiness. It is for this reason important that

\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{Compendium Legum}, p. 15.
\item \textit{Ibid.}, p. 12.
\item \textit{E.N.}, vii, 11. 1152b.
\item \textit{Fuğül}, sec. 38.
\item Cf. \textit{E.N.}, i, 5. 1096a.
\end{itemize}
al-Fārābī's ruler of the Virtuous City should not indulge his soul in the love of silver, gold and dinār, and such an attitude is one of the qualifications of the ruler.¹ It is in the Ignorant Cities that the deprivation of wealth is considered as misery, since, according to the people of these cities the greatest happiness consists in the sum of all worldly pleasures, wealth, honour and the like. The aim of life is, in the eyes of the people of Vile Cities, wealth, money and worldly prosperity.

In order to support their views, Muslim philosophers have usually cited the names of Plato, Aristotle and other philosophers. There are, however, many contradictions in the ideas which are ascribed to them. For example, in one place Plato defines richness in terms of evil and misery,² whereas al-Fārābī's Plato says that if wealth is gained in a praiseworthy way, it is much better than poverty. Otherwise abstinence from its acquisition is better.³ In the Arabic Rhetorica too riches are considered to be good, though not in themselves. It is said that yasār is the cause of two noble things: pleasure and life.⁴ In a Neoplatonic work known as Muʿādhalat-an-nafs, the soul is advised not to dislike wealth, security and joy, since it is the ignorant man who prefers poverty to richness, fear to security and humiliation to greatness.⁵

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1. Madīna, p. 106.
3. Compendium Legum, p. 28.
4. Rhetorica, p. 28.
5. Neoplatonici Apud Arab, p. 66.
The aim of the foregoing references is not to show the opinions of these philosophers about richness but is rather to point out that the attitude that al-Fārābī takes toward worldly possessions has its parallels in other philosophical works on which al-Fārābī depends.

Before we conclude this section, it should be pointed out the Arabic term َ‫غَنَّ‬ or َ‫غِنَّ‬ primarily means riches and wealth. But it is obvious the term also implies 'independence'. َ‫قَهْنَ‬ is one of the attributes of God. َ‫قِهْنَّ‬ in this sense is one of the qualities of َ‫سَعَدَ‬. That is why al-Fārābī says: َ‫أَرَنِّي لِلَّهِ‬ deliver me from the world of misery (َ‫شَقاَّ‬) and destruction (َ‫فَنَّاَ‬) and clothe me with the happiness of the rich (َ‫سَعَدُّتُ الْغَنِيَّةُ‬)

It will be seen later on that al-Ghazālī too defines other worldly happiness in terms of richness without poverty, eternity without destruction and so on.

In short it can be said that like many other Muslim writers on ethics al-Fārābī too accepts riches as good as long as they are used to a good end, although he is fully aware of the fact that man inclines to use them for some other purposes rather than for َ‫سَعَدَ‬. One of the things for which man may spend his wealth and at which he may aim in all his activities is honour (َ‫كَرَمَ‬).

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1. Milla, p. 89.
3) Sa'āda and Honour (karāma)

The primary interest of al-Fārābī in the concept of honour is not its psychological analysis. He is much more concerned with its ethical aspect. There are people, according to al-Fārābī, who take honour as an end for their lives. These people constitute the citizens of what he calls the City of Honour (madīna al-karāma or karrāmiyya) which roughly corresponds to Plato's Timocracy and which is considered by al-Fārābī as one of the Ignorant Cities.¹

The rulers of this Timocratic City employ different means in order to obtain honour. Some of them employ good and virtuous means and al-Fārābī regards these rulers as the best rulers among all other Ignorant Cities.² There are rulers who want to use their wealth to obtain it, and some do not mind forcing and frightening people and doing cruel things to them in order to arrive at their aims; and some of them think that honour is given for descent only.³

Although honour is regarded as good, it leads to some extremely dangerous situations when it is taken as the purpose of life. If this happens, then the Timocratic City turns out to be the city of tyrants and oppressors.⁴ Al-Fārābī agrees with Aristotle that it is too superficial to suppose that all we are looking for is honour, since it is bestowed by someone and can easily be taken back. The good which is supposed to be something proper to man must possess some higher qualities than those which honour has.⁵

1. Fusūl, sec. 28; Madīna. p. 110; Siyāsā, pp. 89-90; cf. also E.N. viii, 10. 1160b.
2. Fusūl, sec. 28.
3. Ibid.
4. Siyāsā, p. 94; Fusūl, secs. 36 and 58.
5. E.N., i, 5. 1095b.
It is probably due to the influence of Aristotle that al-Fārābī pays a great deal of attention to how honour is given in the Timocratic City. The citizens of this city, al-Fārābī observes, co-operate in order to be honoured in speech and deed, which can take place among the people of one Timocratic City as well as among the people of other Timocratic Cities. They give honour to each other on the basis of merits (istihālāt) which are based not on virtue but on wealth, pleasure, usefulness and domination. As in the case of a business transaction, the one who bestows honour on someone merits thereby to be honoured in return.

iii) The Qualifications of Human Actions: Virtue and Vice (al-Faqlīla and ar-radhīla)

In Islamic philosophy the term faqlīla is used for the word "virtue" in Greek philosophy. The word faqlīla is a purely Arabic term and in non-philosophical writings it simply means the excellence of a thing in comparison with another thing. Al-Fārābī defines virtue as an established disposition from which good actions proceed. In other words the actions which lead to happiness are called good actions, and the power or the faculty of executing these actions is called virtue. When bad actions come from it, it is called vice (radhīla).

2. Ibid., p. 91.
4. Madīna, p. 86.
5. Ibid.
When we talk of the virtues of the soul, we mean that each part of the soul does its work properly and well. Generally speaking what al-Fārābī means by 'virtue' does not differ very much from what Plato and Aristotle mean by that term. Especially the influence of Aristotle is very clear. Unlike the Stoics, he does not think that virtue alone is truly good. The direction in Stoicism is towards virtue, whereas in al-Fārābī it is towards sa'āda. It should be stated, however, that al-Fārābī's position to virtue is not altogether clear. It seems that he favours the idea that virtue is not good in itself, but good for the sake of happiness, though some virtues are good in themselves and good for happiness.

In the second chapter of this work we tried to analyse al-Fārābī's idea of theoretical perfection, which is the result of the theoretical virtues. Now these virtues "are sometimes a cause and principle for the coming into existence of the practical virtues and practical arts."

In the Tanbīh actions are divided into three: Praiseworthy, blameworthy and neutral or indifferent. Only the first two classes deserve reward and punishment - an Aristotelian idea. The third class cannot normally be called human actions. Al-Fārābī divides the human actions into three: Actions proper, the accidents of the soul, viz., desire, pleasure and so forth and excellence in

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1. Russell, History of Western Philosophy, p. 278.
2. Madīna, p. 86.
3. Fusūl, sec. 89.
discernment or discrimination of the intellect. Each of these divisions has its good and bad sides both of which are established in man through habituation (i’tiyād). For such habituation two things are necessary: The discovery of the means which is possible through the employment of the deliberative faculty and the actual performance of what has been discovered.

1) Deliberative Virtues

The theoretical perfection, as it was studied earlier on, consists in the excellence of the faculty of cognition whose object is the discernment of the intelligibles that exist outside the soul and do not vary under any circumstances. They can be called Natural Intelligibles. The accidents and states that accompany these intelligibles are given by nature. It is in this perfection that man's real happiness consists. A subsidiary aspect of this perfection is the faculty of deliberation whose object is the discovery and discernment of Voluntary Intelligibles which are variable.

Thus the perfection of the deliberative faculty consists in the discovery and determination of what is most useful for the achievement of happiness. The business of the deliberative faculty

1. Tanbīh, pp. 4-5. For the relation between arts and virtues, or what al-Fārābī calls sa‘ādāt, which can easily be replaced by faqā‘īl, see Madīna, pp. 116-7.
2. Taḥṣīl, p. 17.
3. Ibid., pp. 18ff; cf. also Plato and Aristotle, p. 123.
4. Taḥṣīl, p. 21; Fuṣūl, sec. 90.
is the investigation of means, but without sa'āda, i.e. without establishing the ultimate end; this is of importance. This is why the theoretical virtues "are sometimes a cause and principle for the coming into existence of the practical virtues and practical arts."¹ The former is also called wisdom (ḥikma) and the latter practical wisdom (ta'aqqul).² The latter is called wisdom by metaphor.³ The end of the former is knowledge and the end of the latter is action.

It is quite clear that the deliberative faculty is a part of practical virtue,⁴ which is also called intelligence by common people, and it is to this part that volition and choice adhere.⁵ The power of deliberation deserves to be called 'virtue' when it is employed for a good end, viz. happiness; when it is employed for a bad end "the ancients" did not call it virtue. They called it "by other names such as deceit, artifice and stratagem."⁶

To employ the power of deliberation for a good end does not only include the good end for the individual, but political legislation and household economy as well.⁷ The employment of the deliberative virtue of the first ruler, for instance is not only good for himself, but for the whole community as well. In fact

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1. Fuṣūl, sec. 89.
2. Ibid., sec. 49.
3. Ibid., sec. 48.
4. Ibid., secs. 6, 30, 36, 42.
5. Ibid., sec. 38; Plato and Aristotle, p. 129.
it is according to the deliberative virtue, the ranks of the people of the Virtuous City are established.¹

If a man has a perfect faculty of cognition and of deliberation, then he is the ruler par excellence. However al-Fārābī is of the opinion that these two perfections may exist separately,² - an idea that leads him to accept more than one leader in the city when it is necessary.

The case is somewhat different when we come to the relation between deliberative and moral virtue. It is very difficult to see that a man possesses the deliberative virtue without possessing the moral virtue.³ As we have just said, al-Fārābī does not call the power of deliberation 'virtue' if it is not employed for a good end. "Therefore the man of practical wisdom must be virtuous with ethical virtues."⁴ In other words the core of the idea of happiness is to know what happiness is; then comes the determination of means; and then comes the performance of the things that are determined. The last which constitutes the practical perfection is only subordinate to the theoretical perfection.⁵

In all these al-Fārābī's dependence on Aristotle is quite obvious. In several parts of his works, especially in the Fusūl and The Philosophy of Aristotle he mentions Aristotle by name in respect of some of the ideas which are under discussion.

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1. Tahsīl, p. 36.
2. Ibid., p. 22.; cf. also ACR.,pp. 189-190.
3. Tahsīl, pp. 22-3.
4. Fusūl, secs. 37 and 80.
Like al-Fārābī, Aristotle believes that deliberation is a process of thinking which starts from a desired end, and aims at the discovery of means. He, too, believes that the object of deliberation is variable things;¹ that all other parts of the soul should aim at the realization of the theoretical virtues.² It seems that Epicureanism and Stoicism tried to do the opposite viz., "subordinate theoretical philosophy to ethics in order to become self-sufficient, i.e. to liberate oneself of everything that is external."³

The analysis of the faculty of deliberation leads us to the analysis of two things: Will and Choice. Al-Fārābī has just said that both of these belong to the deliberative faculty.

2) Will, Choice and the Formation of Character

Al-Fārābī starts his analysis of volition and choice with a generic term ḫiḍā. In man as well as in animals there is, to begin with, an inclination (nuzū'). This inclination is sometimes towards knowledge, especially in man, or towards an action. The roots of this initiative desire are in the Appetitive Faculty.⁴ From this inclination to choice there are three stages:

a) The Will is nothing but a desire (shawq) that follows from a sensation through the sensitive.

b) Next there has to develop the imaginative part of the soul and the desire that adheres to it. Hence a second will develop after the first. This will is desire that follows from [an act of the] Imagination.

c) After these two wills, it becomes possible for the primary knowledge that emanates from the Active Intellect to the Rational Part to take place at this point a third kind of will develops in man - the desire that follows from intellecting - which is specifically called Choice (al-ikhtiyār)...when this will develops in man, with it he is able to seek or not to seek happiness and to do what is good or evil, noble or base in so far as this lies in his power...[and] because of this there is reward and punishment.

A similar passage occurs in the Madīna where he emphasises that the first two stages are common for man and animals alike, whereas choice belongs to man. This definition of choice and its appropriate place in man are Aristotelian. Aristotle states that "choice cannot exist either without reason and intellect or without a moral state," therefore "it belongs to man only." Will in its preliminary stages is to desire or not desire a thing which comes to man through sensation or imagination. If this is to be followed by a judgement about taking this thing or not taking it, choice, or a third will, comes about.

Though choice is called a higher stage, it differs from the ordinary will. Man choses only what is possible whereas he can

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3. E.N., iv. 2. 1139a.
4. E.E., ii. 10. 1226b.
5. Madīna, p. 72; Fūṣūl, sec. 6.
will something which may not be possible, i.e. he may will not to
die. Will is more general than choice; every choice is a will
but not vice-versa.¹

Choice implies responsibility and without some kind of freedom
there cannot be a consistent defence of the doctrine of
responsibility. As Nettleship says in connection with Plato, "the
choice which the souls make of life is the all important crisis in
their history."² But is man free to choose? We know that
Aristotle took a great deal of trouble to give a consistent answer
to this question. Though he strongly and emphatically defended the
voluntariness and responsibility of vice, he found himself driven,
as H. Sidgwick states, into real determinism in his doctrine of
purposed actions.³

According to al-Fārābī, there are two basic things in man as
far as his character is concerned. Firstly a natural disposition,
which is, as it were, his first perfection which he does not choose.
Secondly there are the dispositions which are formed by man's willed
actions. The ancients, al-Fārābī argues, did not call the natural
disposition virtue; in fact there is no special name for it.⁴ Some
of these natural dispositions "may be made to disappear and be

¹ Al-Masa’il al-mutafarriqa, p. 17; For the same idea cf. E.E. ii.
10. 1226b.

² Lectures on the Republic of Plato, Papermac series (2nd ed.

³ H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, Papermac series 19,

⁴ Fusūl, sec. 9.
altered by habit completely, being replaced by states contrary to them. Others may be broken down and weakened."1 Without the freedom of acting against this natural disposition, we cannot talk about the character of a man. Animals and children do not have such freedom, therefore they do not possess character in the true sense of the term.2

Al-Fārābī believes that Plato and Aristotle too defended the same line of thought. It is an error, al-Fārābī continues, to suggest that Aristotle in his Ethics denied anything which is natural in man's character and believed that everything comes into being through habituation. It is equally an error to say that Plato took the opposite line: nature overpowers habit, therefore man can hardly change anything in his nature.3 This does not mean, however, that al-Fārābī sees man as absolutely free. Some people are more free than others. But he says very clearly that happiness is attained through man's willed actions. In his account of natural and voluntary goods he says:

The good that is useful for the achievement of happiness may be something that exists by nature, or that comes into being by the will...So does evil with respect to shaqāwa. That of it which is by nature is given by the celestial bodies, but not because they intend to assist the Active Intellect towards its purpose or to hamper it. For when celestial bodies give something that contributes to the purpose of the Active Intellect, they do not do so with the intention of assisting the Active Intellect...Rather it is inherent in the substance of the celestial bodies to give all that is in the nature of matter to receive, without concerning themselves with whether it contributes or harms, the purpose of the Active Intellect.

1. Ibid., Sec. 12; cf. also 15.
3. Ibid., pp. 17-18.
As for the voluntary good and evil, which are the noble and base respectively, they have their origin specially in man.¹

In order to explain how these voluntary goods and evils come into being, al-Fārābī bases himself on his five-fold division of the soul. Each part, or rather power, of the soul has its appropriate desire. When and if all powers of the soul employ the desire appropriate to each of them in the service of the rational part of the soul, which is the only part that perceives happiness, and when all these efforts aim at happiness, then the voluntary goods come into being. If happiness is replaced by anything else, then the faculties of the soul will concentrate on that thing. This time voluntary evil comes into being.² These goods are also called human goods (al-khayrāt al-insāniyya).

Al-Fārābī thinks that "it is unlikely and improbable that anyone exists who is by nature completely disposed to all the virtues, ethical and rational...or to all wicked actions. Yet both cases are not impossible. Most commonly, each man is disposed towards a certain virtue or certain definite number of virtues."³ The person who is disposed to all or most of the virtues is called the divine man.⁴ He is also called the free man. He has the excellence of deliberation and the power of determination to carry out what he

¹. Siyāsa, pp. 73-4, English tran. "The Political Regime", p. 34.
2. Fuṣūl, sec. 88; cf. also sec. 11. cf. also Milla, p. 43.
3. Fuṣūl, sec. 10.
4. Ibid., sec. 9. cf. also Madīna, p. 106.
thinks is necessary. This man is extremely competent in the employment of pleasure and pain in order to perform good actions and abandon bad ones.¹

The diametrically opposite character of the divine man is, what the ancients occasionally called, the wild beast.² This man has none of the qualities of the divine or free man. He can only be trained through the employment of physical or non-physical pain.³ This man is doomed to destruction.

The third man in al-Fārābī’s classification of character, is the one who has been given the character of a slave by nature. He has the excellence of deliberation but not the power of determination. And in some people the case is just the opposite: they have the power of determination but not the excellence of deliberation. If these people can have someone to deliberate for them, they will be saved.⁴ Without an outside help these people will live the life of a fool - the character "whose purpose is sound but often his deliberation brings him into trouble when he does not intend to fall into it."⁵ About who will obtain happiness al-Fārābī seems to have no doubt.

Some men are not equipped by nature to receive any of the first intelligibles; and some receive them, but not as

2. Fuṣūl, sec. 9.
3. Tanbīh, p. 18.
4. Ibid.; For Aristotelian idea of "moral weakness" see Hardie, op.cit., p. 258.
5. Fuṣūl, sec. 45. For some of these characters cf. also K.S.I., 87f.
they really are - this is the case of the insane; others receive them as they really are. The last ones have sound human natural dispositions and they are the only ones who would attain sa'āda. 

3) The Golden Mean

Al-Fārābī, unlike Ibn Miskawayh and other Muslim writers on ethics, does not primarily occupy himself with a detailed account of moral or ethical virtues. We have already seen how man becomes morally virtuous through habituation. The ethical virtues, al-Fārābī believes, are the virtues of the appetitive part of the soul such as temperance, bravery, generosity, justice and so on. These virtues are the established dispositions in the soul without which happiness cannot be attained. In order to have these settled dispositions in the soul man needs patience and time. Indeed, happiness, as Plato said, cannot be obtained save in the course of a very long life.

Taking Aristotle's definition, al-Fārābī says that virtuous actions are the mean actions which are the basis of a noble character. Al-Fārābī mentions some ethical virtues so as to explain his idea of the Golden Mean. He uses the term wasāṭ or tawassut in respect of physical aspects of life, e.g. eating, drinking, sleeping, as well as in respect of moral aspects of life;

1. Siyāsa, pp. 74-5.
2. Compendium Legum, Arabic sec. p. 26; Fusūl, sec. 7.
this goes back to Aristotle.\(^1\) Plato, too, according to al-\(\text{Fārābī}\), has dealt with moderation in \textit{Charmides}.\(^2\)

Ethical virtue is defined in terms of \textit{tawassuṭ} which, in its turn, is defined as the mean between excess (\textit{ziyāda}) and defects (\textit{nuqṣan}) which are also called \textit{ifrāṭ} and \textit{tafrit} respectively.

"Moderate, mean actions, measured in relation to the circumstances which attach to them must be, among other conditions, useful in the attaining happiness, and he who produces them must make happiness the mark for his eyes."\(^3\)

Again like Aristotle, al-\(\text{Fārābī}\) believes that to seize the Golden Mean is very difficult, so to be good is very difficult too, or even rare.\(^4\) Do we have any criterion by which we can measure whether or not our actions proceed from the Golden Mean? Al-\(\text{Fārābī}\) answers in the affirmative. It is a well-known fact, al-\(\text{Fārābī}\) argues, that bad actions result from a bad character which may be due to natural disposition, or to a disposition that is formed by will, or sometimes to both. In either case the one who tries to correct this disposition should try to discover whether it is the result of an excess or defect. Having established this, one should turn in the opposite direction; that is to say one should try to perform a good action continuously over a long period. Here the man should try to see whether he obtains any pleasure in the

\(^1\) E.N., i. 13. 1104a; \textit{Tanbīh}, p. 9.
\(^2\) Plato and Aristotle, p. 60.
\(^3\) \textit{Fuṣūl}, sec. 26.
\(^4\) M.M. 1186b-1187a; \textit{Tanbīh}, p. 10.
performance of this good action. A good action becomes virtuous action if it is performed with ease \(\text{(subūla)}\) and with pleasure. We must be careful however about actions which resemble the mean ones, although they deviate from the mean. To squander, for instance, resembles generosity. There are some actions to which we are naturally inclined, such as parsimony and similar things which can be performed with ease and pleasure. We must not confuse them with virtuous actions either.¹

Before we finish this subject we must say something about al-Fārābī's idea of "the man who restrains himself" \(\text{(dābiṭ)}\) who seems to correspond to the Continent Man of Aristotle. Of this man al-Fārābī says:

Between the man who restrains himself and the virtuous man is a difference, viz., that the man who restrains himself, though as doing good deeds he does virtuous actions, likes and desires wicked actions and contends with his liking. In his action he does the opposite of what his state and desire prompt him to. He does good deeds, yet suffers in doing them. The virtuous man in his action follows what his state and desire prompt him to, and does good deeds, liking them and desiring them, not feeling pain but finding pleasure in them.²

This passage is almost a quotation from Aristotle's Ethics,³ of which W.F.R. Hardie says that this distinction is a major achievement in ethics.⁴ It appears that both Aristotle and al-Fārābī accept that the man who restrains himself is a second best to the virtuous man.

¹ Tanbīh, p. 14f.
² Fūsūl, sec. 13; cf. also K.S.I., p. 79 and A.C.R., p. 127.
³ E.N., vii, 9. 1151b - 1152a.
⁴ Hardie, op.cit., p. 139.
The counterpart of the virtuous man is the wicked man. "The wicked man desires always the ends that are wicked in reality, but imagines them good, on account of the sickness of his soul."¹ This man resembles the sick man who imagines that what is sweet is bitter. The analogy between bodily sickness and the sickness of the soul was adopted by many earlier philosophers.² A sick body, al-Fārābī's Plato says cannot bear the burden of useful work, nor can a sick soul function properly. The sickness of the soul is usually due to the absence of divine political instruction and training.³

Mean actions can be taught. To this, we will come in the next chapter. Here it is sufficient to say that al-Fārābī's concept of wasat, or tawassul, is quite important, although it is not fully developed. The ethics of moderation is said to be the nearest to the generally accepted Islamic ethics.⁴ Al-Fārābī does not seem to have tried to distinguish between actions and emotions in respect to the idea of the Golden Mean. What is the moderation, for instance, in the love of God? It should be stated, however, that not only in this part of his philosophy but in his whole ethical-political philosophy al-Fārābī has little to say about emotions. It is probably here more than anywhere else that al-Fārābī differs from Ibn Sīnā, al-Ghazālī, Ibn Ṭufayl and many other Muslim writers on ethics. In the works of these philosophers not only man's attitude

¹. Funūl, sec. 37; E.N., iii. 1. 1113a.
². Cf. Gorgias, 464b.
towards God but God's attitude towards man come to the foreground. Now we will try to see if al-Fārābī has anything to say about God's assistance to man in his struggle for happiness.

iv) Providence and Happiness

So far we have tried to analyse al-Fārābī's idea of four-fold perfection. It is clear from what we have tried to say up to this point that the only pathway to happiness is the rational faculty of man. But its dependence on the Active Intellect undermines, to some extent, man's freedom. The Active Intellect however is not the master of all things concerning man's happiness. Its very own existence depends on the First Principle, or God.

Although the existence of the whole universe depends on the existence of God, in al-Fārābī's philosophy He hardly comes directly into the discussion about man's happiness. This is the most unique part of al-Fārābī's philosophy. Most of the Muslim philosophers after him hardly say anything about man's happiness without bringing God's assistance into it. Al-Fārābī talks very briefly indeed about God's care and aiding hand.

The word 'ināya, which is usually translated as Providence, care and assistance, is used by al-Fārābī in respect of the king's help for his subjects as well as of God's guidance for His creatures. In his summary of Plato's Laws he says that it is the duty of the

Law-giver to take charge of the important matters "with a complete care." (al-'ināya-t-at-tāmma). In the 'Uyun he states very clearly that success (tawfīq) in all matters is in the hands of God. Reminding us of a Tradition which we studied in the first chapter, he says that everyone is guided towards the things which are created for him. God's 'ināya covers everything and meets everyone. All that comes into being does so in accordance with His eternal decree and knowledge (qadar and qaḍā'). Evil follows the same pattern.¹

Evil reaches only corrupted things, and it is a necessary consequence of the finiteness of the individual thing. Thus its existence is accidental and in this respect it is praiseworthy, since if there were not evils, there would not be goods in bolder relief in the universe.² This idea of evil is consistent with that studied in the Fuṣūl. Here too he says that "evil has no absolute existence." The greatest evil is shagāwa and everything that leads to it is also evil. Both of these are voluntary. A thing is good, continues al-Fārābī, if it exists according to the harmony and justice with merit. And it is absurd to think that things happened in the celestial or divine world contrary to merit. That is why it is said that evil has no absolute existence.³

About how 'ināya operates, different people held different views. Some people liken His care for His creatures to the care of

3. Fuṣūl, sec. 69.
a king for his subjects; others think this is not sufficient unless He undertakes the personal management of each one of His creatures in each one of their actions.¹ Al-Fārābī criticises the second view and leaves the first one without any comment. As D.M. Dunlop comments, the first view represents more or less the generally accepted Islamic view and al-Fārābī may have held the same view.²

It appears that al-Fārābī dealt with Providence in his lost commentary of Aristotle's Ethics. According to Maimonides al-Fārābī has said that "those who have the capacity of making their souls pass from one moral quality to another are those of whom Plato has said that God's Providence watches over them."³ In connection with this point S. Pines says that "it seems clear that al-Fārābī maintained that the fact that human individuals progressed toward, or attained, perfection can be equated with Providence watching over them. This was Maimonides' own opinion as he himself points out in this context. In all probability, he took it over, with or without modification, from al-Fārābī."⁴

Thus al-Fārābī, being a Muslim and a follower of Plato and Aristotle, could not agree with Epicurus, for instance, who holds that "the belief in Providence is nonsense."⁵ Nor could he agree

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1. Fuṣūl, sec. 82.
2. Ibid., p. 91 n.[82].
4. Ibid.
with Alexander of Aphrodisias who accepts a partial Providence by confining it to the world beneath the moon only.¹ He would be much more at home with Plato who asserts that the denial of God's Providence is blasphemy and deserves punishment. When the goodness of gods is accepted, their providence must be accepted too, since the former involves the latter.² Proclus too accepts and defends the concept of Providence.³

1. Ibid., p. 330.
3. Ibid.
CHAPTER FOUR

SA'ADA IN THE POLITICS OF AL-FARABI

The man who knows what sa'ada is has to perform the actions which lead to sa'ada. In addition to this he has to concern himself with the happiness of others. This is the conclusion at which al-Farabi arrives after a long philosophical investigation which starts from metaphysics and ends with legislation or politics. In one of the most explicit and frequently quoted statements al-Farabi says that "the idea of the Philosopher, Supreme Ruler, Prince, Legislator, and Imam is but a single one," so what is divine will be attained through politics. Through the Active Intellect the world of man is linked with the divine world, and with the philosopher-imam. God's eternal light reaches those who are not themselves equipped for such a high rank of being.

In this part of his philosophy al-Farabi had the support of Plato as well as the teachings of Muhammad. Here he reached the summit of his philosophy where he had philosophy and revelation in one man. It was al-Farabi who gave Plato's Republic the place which it deserved. Unlike Proclus, for instance, who disliked Plato's Republic and the Laws, al-Farabi was glad that the divine Plato had written them,^1 because he did not believe, as the Stoics did,

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1. Taṣṣīl, p. 43.
that the happiness of a wise man depends on himself alone. \(^1\) Nor did he stress, as Porphyry and many other Neoplatonic philosophers did, only the otherworldly aspect of the life of a philosopher - a stress which led them to ignore the political writings of Plato and Aristotle. As a matter of fact it was al-Fārābī who put an end to the silence about political philosophy and gave it its right position. \(^2\) Through the mouth of Plato he says that it is very unlikely that a man is in a position to achieve what he wants in isolation. \(^3\) Two things are indispensable for the achievement of saʿāda: an art through which man can know the things that lead to happiness; and a place where this art can be put into practice. This art is political science (siyāsa) and this place is the Virtuous City (al-Madīna al-Fādila).

1) **Saʿāda** and Political Science

Political science or the highest art in the Virtuous City consists in the knowledge of things through which the people of this city obtain saʿāda. In other words, it consists of the knowledge of how saʿāda is obtained through political association. \(^4\) The distinction between the real and supposed saʿāda, good and evil, fair and ugly, virtue and vice are all the subject-matters of political science. \(^5\) It is with the help of this science that men are

\(^1\) Merlan "Greek Philosophy from Plato to Plotinus", in *The Cambridge History*, p. 125.


\(^3\) *Plato and Aristotle*, p. 64.

\(^4\) *Tahṣīl*, p. 16; *Madīna*, p. 102; *Iḥṣāʾ*, p. 102; cf. E.N.i, 11, 1094b.

\(^5\) *Tahṣīl*, p. 37; *Iḥṣāʾ*, p. 102; *Milla*, pp. 53-4 and 59.
classified in respect of their ranks and of sa‘āda. In addition to this all the matters, divine and worldly alike, that are relevant to the sa‘āda of this world and the world to come are known through this art.¹ Unlike ethics which is the regime of the individual, politics is the regime of a community or a nation or even the whole world.²

Political Philosophy (al-falsafa al-madaniyya) covers not only actions, laws and so on, it includes the definition of sa‘āda (ta‘rīf-as-sa‘āda) as well.³ This is what gives political science its superiority over other sciences and it seems that ethics does not really have an independence.⁴ Other religious sciences such as theology and jurisprudence are corollaries to the political science.⁵

The chief aim of al-Fārābī's political philosophy is to make people understand that Islam and what is called classical political philosophy do not contradict one another. A rational understanding of religious beliefs and actions means understanding religion in terms of political science, and it is by the help of such understanding that a virtuous community can attain their happiness.⁶

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1. Milla, pp. 69 and 72.
3. İhsā', p. 104.
4. Leo Strauss, "Quelques remarques sur la science politique de Maimonides et d' al-Fārābī", REJ, 100 bis (1936), pp. 95.
5. İhsā', pp. 108f.
ii) The Virtuous City

The classification of the states is made according to the concept of sa'āda which is the end of all political activities. As soon as the individual's idea of sa'āda is learnt, it will not be very difficult to say to what sort of state he belongs or would like to belong. If he has a concept of ultimate sa'āda that consists in the knowledge of God, first principles, sa'āda, then this man yearns for a perfect state where he can find all these things, i.e. the Virtuous City. If an individual aims at such a concept of sa'āda, for which he is created, he is a virtuous individual; if a community or a nation aims at it, then this community or nation is a virtuous one; if all the inhabitants of the world aim at it, then the world becomes a virtuous world (al-'ma'mūra al-fāḍīla); it is in respect of sa'āda that a virtuous man resembles a Virtuous City, which in its turn resembles the whole universe.¹

The 'Ancients', too, according to al-Fārābī, agreed that the ideal city is the one whose inhabitants help one another towards the attainment of the last perfection, i.e. ultimate happiness.² The happiness of the individual is coincides with that of the whole community in the virtuous city. Not only the first perfection, i.e. worldly happiness but also the last perfection i.e. otherworldly sa'āda is attained in this city.³ It is only in the Virtuous City

¹. Madīna, p. 97; cf. Inṣā', pp. 103f.; cf. also Milla, pp. 54-5.
². Fusūl, secs. 25 and 84.
³. Ibid.
that a virtuous polity is followed.

The ideal polity is that in which the ruler attains a kind of virtue which he could not possibly attain except in it—the highest virtue that can be attained by man. The ruled attain in their temporal life and the life of the world to come virtues which could not possibly be attained except in it.

It is very clear in this passage that happiness is a social achievement which includes the ruler and the ruled alike, and it is the struggle for this achievement that brings the people of the virtuous city together.²

The cause of unity in cities and nations varies. Usefulness, fear of an enemy, defence and many similar causes can make them stick to one another and work together. Such things, however, are more the characteristics of the Ignorant Cities than the virtuous ones,³ in which the people are united and bound together by love.⁴ This love is due to sharing in virtue. Without love and justice, goodness and happiness cannot be attained, as Plato says.⁵

Unfortunately al-Fārābī says very little about these important conceptions: love and justice. Both terms are used in a metaphysical sense. We are told that God is not only Pure Intellect but also the Lover and Beloved (al-‘āshiq wa l-ma‘shūq), and that Love (mahabba) has a uniting power and it is from the First⁶—an

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1. Ibid., sec. 84.
4. Fusūl, sec. 57.
5. Compendium Legum, p. 21; Fusūl, sec. 57.
idea which reminds us of Posidonius' Sympathy which "was the basis for Stoic theory of Divination."\(^1\) Whatever takes place in the Universe does so according to the divine justice.

"The term 'justice'" al-Fārābī tells us "is sometimes applied in a more general sense, viz. a man's employment of acts of virtue in relation to others, whatever the virtue."\(^2\) Love unites the parts of the city and the classes, and justice controls and preserves this unity without which the citizens cannot attain happiness.\(^3\) Voluntary love comes by sharing in virtue. This applies to the ideas and actions. When they agree on what the right ideas and actions are, they will find happiness.\(^4\)

This view of justice and love is the opposite of what the people of the Ignorant Cities mean by these two terms. We know that Plato pays a great deal of attention to the relation between justice and happiness.\(^5\) The people of the Ignorant Cities hold, al-Fārābī observes, that might is justice and that, vanquisher, or the oppressor, among them is the happiest and the most envied man.

What is given by nature, they continue, should be carried out to its full realisation. This is, as it were, Natural Justice which is based on the interests of the strong and on the fear and helplessness of the weak.\(^6\)

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2. Fusūl, sec. 60.
3. Ibid., sec. 57.
4. Ibid.
1) The Ruler

The existence and the continuity of the Virtuous City is unthinkable without the existence of a man, or a group of men, who knows what happiness and other divine things are and makes known to other people what these things are. It is the law of nature that some people are destined to rule and some to be ruled. The ruler of the Virtuous City must be the highest in respect of the natural dispositions and of the dispositions which are formed by the will. 1 It is he who communicates with the Active Intellect - a communication which makes him the cause of happiness. He it is who may be said to receive revelation, for man receives revelation when there is no intermediary between him and the Active Intellect. 2 His function in the city resembles the function of the First Cause in the universe. 3 He is able to give a rational and representative account of happiness, since he is the most perfect of all in respect of happiness. Otherwise he cannot be the cause of happiness. 4 The people of the city can only be perfect and happy when they are ruled by a virtuous and happy ruler. 5

It is quite well-known that al-Fārābī demands many qualifications in which we are not interested. Here it is sufficient to say that in a perfect ruler he demands the perfection of theoretical faculty, as well as

1. Tahṣīl, p. 29; Madīna, pp. 101ff; Siyāsah, p. 79.
2. Siyāsah, p. 79; Madīna, p. 103.
3. Tahṣīl, p. 25; cf. also Madīna, p. 104.
4. Fuṣūl, sec. 27; Tahṣīl, p. 42; Madīna, p. 104; Siyāsah, p. 80.
as the perfection of imagination. For this reason he identifies the ruler-prophet with the ruler-philosopher. Without philosophy the ruler lacking in the cognition of happiness and without the power of imagination, which is the foundation of prophecy, he is lacking in legislative wisdom and in the ability of providing a political framework without which the art of being happy cannot be taught. It is true that al-Fārābī lays the stress sometimes on philosophy and sometimes on religion, especially in his treatment of Plato's philosophy; he holds the necessity of both throughout his works.

However, al-Fārābī is realistic enough to realise that it is extremely difficult to have a ruler with all qualities, so he sees no other way than having more than one ruler. Most of the Muslim philosophers did not accept this solution, they even criticized him for having entertained such a view. It was rejected by al-ʿAmīrī, al-Ghazālī and by those who had Shiʿite leanings.

2) The ruled and their instruction in what causes Saʿāda

Broadly speaking the people of the Virtuous City are divided into two major classes. The wise men of the city who are able to cognize God, incorporeal existents, saʿāda and the like; and those who are only able to know these things through images; these

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are called hukamā' and mu'minūn respectively.¹ We have already dealt with both of these terms in some detail.

After the ruler there comes a group of people who have been instructed in what causes sa'āda of nations. Their duty is to persuade and instruct others. In so doing they must not deviate from what the supreme ruler finds useful for the happiness of a nation. These are the elect (khāṣṣ) who work under the supervision of the most elect i.e. the first ruler. For the instruction of the elect demonstrative methods are used. After this second rank there comes the third one which is composed of the common people (‘āmm). They have two major characteristics: firstly they adhere to the unexamined common opinions and confine themselves to the images of realities. They are in fact what is generally called muqallidūn, the people who rely on authority. The representative images can vary from nation to nation - an idea which leads al-Fārābī to accept that there can be more than one virtuous city, though they aim to the same end, i.e. sa’āda.

The second characteristic of the common people is connected with their education. These people are not equipped, either by nature or by habituation or by a combination of these, to be instructed by demonstrative methods. Therefore they can only be instructed by the methods of persuasion and imaginative representation.²

The aim of education is the formation of the character of an

¹ Taḥṣīl, pp. 36ff.
² Taḥṣīl, pp. 37-8; Madīna, pp. 122-3; Siyāsa, pp. 85-6.
individual or a group of individuals or nations. Instruction or teaching (ta'lim) aims at creating theoretical excellences whereas upbringing (ta'dib) aims at creating moral excellences. Education must concern itself with the disappearance of the wicked actions, since happiness takes place when voluntary as well as natural evils disappear, and voluntary as well as natural goods are established in towns and in nations. This can be done either by the establishment of virtues or by self-imposed restraint. The third possibility is to use mandatory methods. The ruler should use persuasive methods which Aristotle mentions, according to al-Farābī, in his Retoric; but if he fails, compulsion becomes necessary. In the city there is a group of people who are appointed by the first ruler to use the compulsive methods.

It has been mentioned many times that whatever comes from the virtuous leader is good and has a direct bearing on the happiness of the people. Agreeing with Aristotle, al-Farābī accepts that the disobedient people, the people with wicked characters, should be punished; and if they are incurable, they should be completely banished. The ruler has the right to declare war against wicked

2. Siyāsa, p. 84.
3. Fusūl, sec. 14; cf. also Tanbīh, pp. 16ff.
6. Tahṣīl, p. 32.
people. If the aim of war is saʿāda, then this war is a virtuous one,\(^1\) or what Leo Strauss rightly calls "une guerre civilisatrice."\(^2\) The virtuous leader can declare war against a wicked city even if there is no danger of being attacked by the people of that city. Holy war is a legitimate means to make others virtuous and aware of what real happiness is. Muhsin Mahdi is right in saying that al-Farābī "seems to favour not only defensive but offensive war also."\(^3\) To accomplish this al-Farābī demands a warlike virtue from the first ruler.

After this brief analysis of al-Fārābī's idea of war one is tempted to see a link between the idea of war in al-Fārābī and the Holy War of Islam.\(^4\) The attitude of Muḥammad towards the pagans of his time might have served as a background for al-Fārābī. Although jihād seems to be understood as a defensive war, most of the Muslim rulers have seen something, to quote L. Strauss, "civilisatrice" in the idea of jihād. To try to give a comprehensive account of al-Fārābī's idea of war and its relation to jihād, however, is not our concern.

In al-Fārābī's classification of men in the Virtuous City, in his theory of education, in his stress on legislation and

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1. Taḥṣīl, p. 32.
2. See "Quelques remarques", p. 35.
4. According to De Boer, al-Fārābī has no place for Holy War and worldly matters in his ethics and politics. (See his History of Philosophy in Islam, p. 125).
above all in his idea of the happiness of citizens, the influence of Plato is overwhelming. However it is beyond the scope of this work to tackle any of these matters.

After a thorough examination of the opinions (ארכ') and actions (אפאל) in the Virtuous City, al-Fārābī comes to those cities which are the opposite of the virtuous city. Again the classification is made according to the concept of sa'āda which exists in these cities.

Here we are not interested in al-Fārābī's analysis of these non-virtuous cities. Our primary object is to try to see the relation between sa'āda and these states or cities.

iii) The Ignorant Cities

We have already dealt with the nature and the end of the ignorant souls. The Ignorant people are the ones who know nothing about the happiness in the world to come. Their souls remain undetached from matter and therefore incomplete. They are all sick in the soul, though they may not be aware of it. They constitute the inhabitants of the Ignorant Cities and they have no future happiness or even life after death.¹

Al-Fārābī explains some of the non-virtuous and corrupted cities as follows: First of all there is the Indispensable, or Necessary City in which the idea of happiness consists in bare necessities, such as eating, drinking, clothing and the like. Secondly there is the Vile City whose people think that sa'āda consists in

¹ Madīna, pp. 118f; Siyāsa, pp. 87ff.
wealth, money and other worldly properties. Thirdly comes the Base City whose inhabitants seek pleasures; saʿāda, they think, is nought but pleasure. Fourthly there is the City of Honour of which we have talked while we were dealing with the concept of honour. The people of this city accept honour as their aim, i.e. saʿāda. Fifthly there is the city which aims at the achievement of victory, suppression and domination. These things can be taken for themselves or for some other ends such as wealth, pleasure and so on. This is called the Despotic City. And there is the Democratic City in which there are many ends. The people of this last city gives far-reaching importance to freedom.  

1. The City of fāsiq.

The term fāsiq has already been studied. The people of this city differ from those of other Ignorant cities, because they once believed in and cognized the opinions which are true. Despite their knowledge of what the real saʿāda is, they abandoned the actions that lead to saʿāda. In as far as their actions are concerned, they resemble the people of the Ignorant Cities. They will have a future life but in misery (shaqāwa) and not in saʿāda. The actions and ways of life in these non-virtuous cities are considered diseases by the people of the virtuous cities.  

1. Siyāsa, pp. 87ff; Madīna, pp. 110ff and 126; Fuṣūl, sec. 25.  
2. Siyāsa, pp. 103-4; Madīna, p. 111.  
2) Erring City

The people of this city have a false knowledge of saʿāda, God and other divine things. They are, as it were, pushed to this state. The images and symbols which are given to them are not the true symbols, nor can the actions that are prescribed for them lead to saʿāda.¹

Those who led these people astray know what the real saʿāda is, so they will be saved from destruction, though they will remain in utter shaqāwa like the fāsiq. As for the people of this city, they will be destroyed like the people of the Ignorant Cities,² since immortality depends on right knowledge which they lack.

Having analysed all these, al-Fārābī turns his attention to two different classes of people who do not fit into the general classification of the states according to the concept of saʿāda. These two classes are: those who are virtuous but have to live in one way or another in non-virtuous cities; and those who live in the Virtuous City without really being able to rise to its standard.

If a virtuous man is forced to perform the actions of the Ignorant, he will naturally suffer pain. This pain will differ, however, from the one that fāsiq suffers. Although both of them have the right knowledge of saʿāda and both perform non-virtuous actions, in the case of the virtuous man these actions do not proceed from a firmly established disposition, whereas in the case of fāsiq

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¹ Siyāsa, p. 104; Milla, pp. 43-4.
² Madīna, p. 120.
they do. Fasiq will suffer after death because of his detachment from worldly pleasure that leaves permanent wounds in his soul. To be forced to do bad actions, on the other hand, cannot have the same effect. Al-Farâbî calls these people "the forced, the compelled." He does not tell us how far these men are happy, nor does he seem to ask them to bring about a change in that Ignorant City in which they are forced to live. In the Milla he says that a virtuous man who lives in a non-virtuous city remains there like a stranger (gharîb). He is like an animal with the legs of a different kind of animal whose grade in life is lower than its own.

The same thing can be said about a man who belongs to an Ignorant City but lives in the Virtuous City. He is too like an animal with the head of a different kind of animal which is higher and nobler than itself. In both cases the combination is unnatural. In order to put an end to his suffering the virtuous man should emigrate from the non-virtuous city if this is possible.

As for those who live in the Virtuous City and cannot adjust themselves to the life which is required in this city, al-Farâbî calls them "the weeds" (nawâbit) and divides them into many classes. There can never be a city which is based upon the opinions of the Weeds. Some of them are just opportunists. They perform the actions which lead to happiness. Their aim, however, is not happiness but something else such as honour, leadership and riches. In other words

1. Madīna, p. 120.
they do good actions for an end which is not good per se.¹ Some of them desire the goods which are taken as ends by the people of the Ignorant Cities. In order to obtain them they try to interpret the words of the law-giver according to their desire, since the rules of the Virtuous City prevents them from attaining these ends. Some of them lack in understanding. All these groups of people suffer some errors and imperfections. It seems that there is only one group among them which can imagine what happiness is and reach the truth.²

The first ruler must keep an eye on these weeds. He should try to keep the city free from their evils by employing various methods, such as driving them out of towns, punishing or imprisoning them, or using them in some forms of business.³

Some of these points will be mentioned again in our conclusion with some critical comments. But now we come to the second part of our study, namely the term sa'ada in al-Ghazâlî.

1. Siyâsa, p. 104.
2. Siyâsa, pp. 104ff.
CHAPTER FIVE

SA‘ĀDA FROM THE PSYCHO-COSMOLOGICAL STANDPOINT

1) Al-Ghazālī and al-Fārābī

Much has been written about the relation between al-Ghazālī and falsafa. In recent years many scholars in the West as well as in the East have tried to shed some light on the quarrel between al-Ghazālī and the Muslim philosophers. The aim of this section is to try to see al-Ghazālī’s attitude towards the ethics, politics and psychology of falsafa in general and al-Fārābī in particular. Since in the foregoing chapters we have tried to envisage sa‘āda from the psychological and ethico-political standpoints, some remarks about how al-Ghazālī approached the psychology, ethics and politics of falsafa will not be out of place.

In al-Ghazali’s works the term falsafa refers primarily to the philosophies of al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā and the Brethren of Purity. Falsafa is not an independent subject; it is comprised of some disciplines which are themselves independent. In the Iḥyā‘, al-Ghazālī mentions four disciplines: mathematics, logic, theology and natural sciences or physics. Though theology, for instance, is considered as fard kifāya, philosophy itself is not considered so.¹ In the Munqidh, however, these disciplines go up to six: mathematics, physics, logic, natural science, theology, politics and ethics.²

1. Iḥ, i, 35-6.
2. Faith and Practice, 32-33.
The term *falāsifa* too primarily refers to al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, the two great representatives of Greek philosophy. There are however many philosophical sects and systems. Such terms as *madhdhab al-falāsifa* and *firaq al-falāsifa* refer to the Theists (*ṭabī‘iyyūn*) as well as to the Materialists (*dahriyyūn*) and Naturalists (*ṭabī‘iyyūn*).²

It is quite well-known that al-Ghazālī criticises *falāsifa* in two ways: directly and indirectly. In the *Munqidh* and in the *Tahāfut* he is face to face with *falāsifa* whereas in *faḍā‘iḥ al-bāṭiniyya* he criticises *falāsifa* through attacking the opinions of the Bāṭinites. Al-Ghazālī accepts *falāsifa* as an independent group. The Bāṭinites, theologians and philosophers are also three separate groups, though they have many things in common.

The use of the word 'philosophy' for theological and mystical movements is a recent innovation. It is true that philosophical ideas did not come to an end by the declining of philosophy in the Muslim lands. They continued to exist, as H. Corbin tries to show in his *Histoire de la philosophie islamique,*³ in ṣūfī literature and in semi-philosophical and Ismā‘īlī works. But the term *falāsifa* has usually been used for those thinkers who wrote under the influence of Greek philosophy. Al-Ghazālī rightly observes many similarities between *falāsifa* and the Mu‘tazilites and between

3. For Corbin's opinion of Islamic philosophy in general and of the *"Ismā‘īlī philosophy"* in particular see his introduction, pp. 6ff.
falāsifa and the Bāṭinītes. The common theological problems among these groups do not change the fact that the Muʿtazilīte and the Bāṭinīte movements were not just different facets of falsafā. It seems quite plausible to say, together with L. Gardet and Ahmad Amīn, 1 that falāsifa were philosophers first and men of religion afterwards. They occupied themselves with religion when they felt that their philosophies were following a different line from that of religion. They must have felt that a harmony between religion and philosophy is not only necessary but desirable as well. The Muʿtazilītes, on the other hand, were just the contrary. They were occupied with philosophical problems and methods because this helped them to solve their theological difficulties.

As for the Bāṭinītes, al-Ghazālī rightly says that they took most of their opinions from falāsifa and used them for their own political purposes. Prof. Watt is right in saying that these two movements remained separate and al-Ghazālī did not study philosophy in order to reject the Bāṭinītes. 2

It is a pity that the critics of Muslim philosophers such as al-Ghazālī, Ibn Khaldūn, Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyya and many others usually used the word falāsifa in their writings


2. Watt, "The Study of al-Ghazālī", Oriens, 13-4 (1961), p. 129. For his criticism of F. Jabre who seems to suggest that philosophers were merely another facet of the Bāṭinītes see Intellectual, p. 143.
rather than the names of the Muslim philosophers. Whether they did this on purpose in order to condemn the philosophers irrespective of the differences between them or whether they did it because criticising a group or a body of people was easier and less risky from the point of view of scholarly criticism is very difficult to settle. The differences among falāsifa, e.g. al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, the Brethren of Purity, are sometimes so great that any criticism that ignores such differences will definitely create an unfair atmosphere for the individual thinkers. This will become clearer when we come to al-Ghazālī's attitude towards philosophical sciences.

Of the politics of falāsifa al-Ghazālī says:

All their discussion of this is based on considerations of worldly and governmental advantage. These they borrow from the Divine scriptures revealed through the prophets and from the maxims handed down from the saints of old.

Now what al-Ghazālī says here seems to be perfectly true in the case of the popular treatises on politics such as the works of the writers of the so-called "Mirrors for Princes". In the case of the political writings of al-Fārābī, which are primarily theoretical, this description of al-Ghazālī is neither complete nor in fact correct. In our discussion on al-Fārābī we have repeatedly emphasised that al-Fārābī borrows many things from Plato, Aristotle and the Neoplatonic sources. He hardly quotes any verse from the Divine Scriptures nor is he keen on what al-Ghazālī calls "the maxims handed down from the saints of old". Although modern writers on

1. The Faith, p. 38.
Islamic philosophy accept in *falāsifa*'s political thought a great achievement, it is interesting to note that al-Ghazālī sees no originality in it.

As for the ethics of *falāsifa*, we are told that "their whole discussion of ethics consists in defining the characteristics of moral constitution of the soul and enumerating the various types of soul and the method of moderating and controlling them. This they borrow from the teachings of the mystics...The philosophers have taken over this teaching and mingled it with their own disquisitions, furtively using this embellishment to sell their rubbishy wares more readily."

Here al-Ghazālī is absolutely right when we think of the ethical epistles of the Brethren of Purity. In fact al-Ghazālī refers to these ethical *rasā'il* in his discussion on ethics of *falāsifa*. According to al-Ghazālī, one can learn a lot from their ethics if one is in a position to distinguish "their rubbishy wares" from the real teaching of the ṣūfis.

No one can deny the mystical tendencies in al-Fārābī's philosophy. The Neoplatonic sources are the common property of philosophers as well as the ṣūfis. But al-Fārābī was no mystic. Again if we apply the foregoing description of ethics to the ethics of al-Fārābī, it falls short and is to some extent misleading. It is almost certain that al-Ghazālī has the works of ḥikwān in mind in the foregoing description of ethics, when he talks later on about the danger of abstaining from every truth which is mentioned by the philosophers. If we abstain, then "we should be obliged to

3. Ibid.
leave aside a great number of the verses of the Qur'ān and the Traditions of the Messenger and the accounts of the early Muslims...
The reason for that is that the author of the book of the 'Brethren of Purity' has cited them in his work. We would hardly have left aside any verse of the Qur'ān or Tradition if we abstain from the Madīna, Sīvāsā and Taḥṣīl of al-Fārābī. Ibn Sīnā does not directly enter into al-Ghazālī's criticism, since Ibn Sīnā says very little about ethics and politics. Nor does Ibn Miskawayh come into it, since al-Ghazālī himself, as R. Walzer points out, incorporated the greater part of Ibn Miskawayh's Tahdīb al-akhlāq in his Iḥyā'.

In the light of the foregoing discussion it is quite clear that to criticise all Muslim philosophers for the mistake of one, or one group, of them might cause serious difficulties. That is why we have said that the term falāsīfa has created an unfair atmosphere around individual philosophers. However there are many points such as their denial of bodily sa'āda, the doctrine of creation, God's knowledge of particulars, and the doctrine of the allegoric interpretation of the prophetic teaching which could be, and have been, accepted as the common opinions among falāsīfa and criticized under such title, without necessarily being unfair to the individual philosophers who are involved in such criticism.

1. Ibid.
2. Walzer, Greek into Arabic, p. 232, cf. also his article on "Akhlāq", EI².
Despite al-Ghazālī's cool attitude towards philosophers' ethics and politics in the Munqidh, he does not really seem to have a serious quarrel with them in these fields. It must not be forgotten, however, that the doctrine of the Active Intellect plays, as we have tried to show in the foregoing chapters, a very important role in the ethico-political thoughts of falāsifa. Anyone who attacks this theory, will accordingly attack the metaphysical foundation of ethics and politics of falāsifa as well. It is worth noting that al-Ghazālī summarises falāsifa's doctrine of saʿāda and shaqā in the fifth article of the Maqāsid under the title of "Of what emanates to the souls from the Active Intellect". Here al-Ghazālī says that the theory of the Active Intellect is connected with theodicy (ilāhiyyāt); then he goes on explaining ten points which are dealt by falāsifa in their ethics, politics and metaphysics. Al-Ghazālī was fully aware that philosophers' concepts of saʿāda and shaqāwa are directly connected with their theories of the Active Intellect, knowledge, immortality, character, ittisāl, prophecy and so forth. It is therefore not correct to say that the theory of saʿāda or shaqāwa is an ethico-political question and since al-Ghazālī does not quarrel with falāsifa in these fields, he does not reject their theory of saʿāda. Saʿāda is not, as we have stressed many times, an ethico-political question only; it is connected with every activity of man.

2. Ibid.
Al-Ghazālī accepted many points of falāsifa in connection with the doctrine of saʿāda. He refers to their theory of tawassut, the faculties of the soul, theoretical and practical perfections and so on, and says very clearly that falāsifa's treatment of most of these questions does not go against the law. In fact "they are observable facts". Al-Ghazālī could accept their division of the powers of the soul, most of their opinions concerning the theory of good and bad character, the necessity of a supernatural aid for the attainment of saʿāda and many other ideas without accepting their theory of emanation, their account of the happiness of the soul after death and above all their blind trust in the power of intellect which undermined the place of revelation in man's life. Al-Ghazālī sees no harm in learning and accepting the truth without bothering from whom it comes.

In the sphere of psychology, his dependence on Ibn Sīnā is a well-known fact. He sometimes takes Ibn Sīnā en bloc. A. Badawī has noticed many similarities in the Ḥyā' and in some Neoplatonic sources. In fact as far as the theory of saʿāda is concerned the similarities and differences between al-Ghazālī and Muslim philosophers will become clearer when we take the above-mentioned points separately and consider what al-Ghazālī himself says about them.

1. T, pp. 238ff.
II) The Nature of Man

Although al-Ghazālī is comparatively clearer than al-Fārābī about the nature of man (and of the soul), his account of man is by no means neatly formulated. Like Muslim philosophers, he emphasises the spiritual aspect of man, but unlike the philosophers he does not exclude body from his theory of the ultimate sa‘āda. In many places he seems to combine the philosophers' account of man with that of revelation - a task which can hardly be accomplished.¹

Like al-Fārābī, al-Ghazālī believes that man is the noblest creature on earth. What makes man noble is, according to al-Ghazālī, his heart which is sometimes synonymously used with the term ṭūb, nafs and 'aql.² Every heart is, by its nature, sound and tends towards the knowledge of realities, since the heart itself is from the world of malakūt and is an āmr of God. It is with the possession of this divine existent that man is entitled to be given amāna, or Trust, whose two fundamental constituent elements are the knowledge of God and the confession of His Unity (ma‘rifā and tawḥīd).³

Al-Ghazālī’s adherence to the idea that man is created in the image of God has been studied by many scholars such as A.J. Wensinck, D.B. Macdonald, Asin Palacios, Carra de Vaux, W.M. Watt, F. Jabre, Obermann and many others. The idea plays a very important role in Islamic Sūfism. F. Jabre, in his analysis

¹. For al-Ghazālī's struggle to combine what Prof. Watt calls the 'monistic' and 'dualistic' conceptions of man see Intellectual, pp. 64-5. Cf. also Wensinck, La Pensée de Ghazzālī, (Paris, 1940), pp. 39-40.
². Ih, iii, pp. 4ff; Arb, 259.
³. Ih, iii, 19.
of different aspects of ma‘rifa in al-Ghazālī has shown us how this particular form of knowledge rests on the idea that man is created in the image of God and how man, through psychological and cosmological ways, realises this fact with the help of revelation. As will be shown in the following pages, it is this realization that constitutes man’s sa‘āda.

In order to reach perfection, which consists in man’s being cognisant of the divine attributes and actions, the heart, or the reason, should take the dominant position in his life. The heart, or the soul, operates two–sidedly: the senses link it with the external world and through another door it has access to the world of malakūt. Whatever happens in the heart has an influence on senses and vice-versa. Without such a link between the body and the soul the acquirement of virtues and arts, which are indispensable for the attainment of sa‘āda would be impossible.

To illustrate this body-soul relationship al-Ghazālī, like al-Fārābī before him, employs quite a few metaphors. The soul, for example, is likened to a king and the body to a city, and the rational power of the soul to a vizier. The city is indispensable if there is going to be a king. Thus, al-Ghazālī neither denies

2. Ḥ, iii, 33; Arb, 227.
3. Ḥ, iii, 33.
4. Ibid., 76-7.
5. Ibid., 9-10. Most of the metaphors that al-Ghazālī uses have their origins in Neoplatonic and Greek sources. For more information see Walzer, Greek into Arabic, p. 171, n.2. and the literature cited there.
nor condemns the body and the phenomenal world. The lower state is essential for the attainment of the higher one. Therefore the soul's coming to this lower world and its inhabiting in the body is not for punishment but to acquire the ultimate happiness. The body and this world should be taken very seriously not for their own sake but for the sake of such a noble cause.¹

In all this al-Ghazālī does not fundamentally differ from al-Fārābī. They start and develop their ideas in a similar fashion. Though both accept the body as a vehicle for the attainment of saʿāda, al-Fārābī has no place for the body when saʿāda is ultimately attained after death; whereas al-Ghazālī, because of his total adherence to the principles of Islam, defends bodily happiness and accepts it as a constituent element of the ultimate human happiness;² to this, however, we will come later on.

In order to illustrate man's nature and his position in the universe, al-Ghazālī makes constant comparisons between man and the angels and between man and the devil. It seems that he accepts four elements in man which produce four qualities, namely the divine, the satanic, the beastly and the brutal. What is expected from man is that he should subdue the last three qualities and try to become an angel rather than a beast. He has the potentiality to be characterised by the qualities of God as well as by the qualities of the devil.³ The satanic character is worse than the beastly and

¹. И, iv, 285; cf. also Wensinck, La Pensée de Ghazzālī, p. 47.
³. И, iii, 14-5 and И, iv, 20.
brutal characters, since in addition to the dominance of appetite and anger, which are the characteristics of animals, the satanic character has the power of discrimination which helps him to find many means to the attainment of wicked ends.¹ Most of what al-Ghazālī says here is the common property of Muslim writers on ethics and most of these opinions eventually go back to Greek philosophy.

Of the dominant element in man's nature in the early stages of his life, al-Ghazālī is not at all clear. In some passages he emphasises the angelic, in others the beastly qualities. He says, for instance, that although man takes pleasure in performing bad actions when he is accustomed to them, "the tendency of the soul towards these actions is ugly and not natural. This, in fact, resembles eating clay which overtakes some people through habituation. The tendency of the soul, on the other hand, towards wisdom, knowledge and love of God and worship [is natural and] is like the tendency towards eating and drinking...And the tendency towards the requirements of appetite is strange to its essence and accidental to its nature."² In another passage he repeats this again and says that what is suitable to man's fitra is to know God and seek to see Him and to know that he is a stranger in this world and that the animal desires in him are accidental.³ Man, by his very nature, loves what is divine.⁴

¹. Ibid. Cf. also Arb, 188-9.
². In, iii, 76.
³. Ibid., 508; cf. also Jabre, Certitude, 191.
⁴. Arb, 124 and 27.
Al-Ghazālī does not hesitate, however, to say that evil is kneaded with good in man’s clay and only the fire of penitence (nadm) or the fire of Hell frees him from that evil. Though his real position lies somewhere between the grades of angel and of animals, while his real differentia lies in knowledge and wisdom, man can easily become the slave of Satan by obeying the desires of appetite and anger. Throughout man’s life Satan tries to find a door through which he can enter his heart. If Satan is victorious in the end, man’s sound nature will be deformed and he will begin to take pleasure in evil actions. The soul which has come or fallen to this world will not be able to find its divine origin, if evil overcomes good in man’s nature. Having probably this shift of emphasis on man’s nature in mind, Z. Mubārak accuses al-Ghazālī of being inconsistent in his account of the nature of man.

Al-Ghazālī’s view of the universe in general and man’s place in it in particular is teleological. Everything is created for a purpose. We may or may not be able to realise that purpose, since the divine sagacity (ḥikma) in the act of creation is not always obvious. Man is created in order to obtain sa‘āda. This

1. Ṭḥ., iv, 4.
2. Ṭḥ., iii, 12.
3. Ibid., 14ff and 41ff.
4. It should be stated that there is no "Fall" in al-Ghazālī in the Christian sense of the term.
teleological approach agrees with the Qur'ān as well as al-Fārābī's world view. It is also the main characteristic of Aristotelianism and Platonism. "Everything" writes al-Ghazālī, "that is created in this world is only created as an instrument for man by means of which he reaches otherworldly sa‘āda and thus attains the Divine Proximity."¹ And "there is no aim for man save this sa‘āda."² Man cannot attain this sa‘āda except through love of God and intimacy with Him, which can only be obtained through knowledge and thinking. Without the body we cannot do this and without food the body cannot continue to exist. Food is produced with the help of earth, water and air which themselves depend on the existence of the heavens and earth.³ All these are created for man in order to enable him to attain the ultimate sa‘āda.

iii) Sa‘āda and Knowledge

Happiness consists in the action of the heart, or intellect, if the latter is taken to mean an innate and natural disposition through which man comprehends the realities of things. The word ‘aql is also applied to intelligence (fitna) and cleverness (kays). A man who lacks in this natural disposition or faculty by birth cannot possibly acquire them in life. If this natural power exists, then it is not difficult to strengthen it by practice. Strengthening it is indispensable since "the whole foundation of different kinds

¹. Ḥib, iii, and 113.
². Ibid., 199.
³. Ibid., 113.
of happiness (ṣaʿādāt) rests on intellect and cleverness.\(^1\) In another place we are told that "the keys of saʿāda are watchfulness (tayyāquz) and intelligence and the fountainhead of šaghāwa are negligence (ghafāla) and deception or vain hope (ghfrūr)."\(^2\)

According to al-Ghazālī three things save man from this deception which leads to misery: intellect (aql), maʿrifat and 'ilm. We have just said what al-Ghazālī means by aql. As for maʿrifat, here it means four things: man's knowledge of himself, the knowledge of his Lord, the knowledge of this world and lastly the knowledge of the world to come.\(^3\) And by 'ilm al-Ghazālī means the knowledge of how to walk in the way to God and the knowledge of what brings man to God and what takes man away from Him.\(^4\)

Now we all know that al-Ghazālī divides 'ilm al-ukhrawiyya into two divisions: 'ilm al-muʿamala and 'ilm al-mukāshafa. By the former al-Ghazālī means the science of practical religion, mainly what is lawful or unlawful, ethics including the question of faith. This type of knowledge aims at action and obtains its value through practice; whereas by the latter al-Ghazālī means the knowledge of God, His attributes and actions, which is also called 'ilm al-maʿrifat.\(^5\) Although 'ilm al-mukāshafa, which is the highest type of knowledge that can be attained in this world, is what ultimately leads to happiness, both types of knowledge are indispensable. Thus al-Ghazālī

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1. Th, iii, 508-9.
2. Ibid., 468-9; Th, iv, 498 and 392.
3. Th, iii, 509.
4. Ibid., 510.
5. Ibid., 480-1.
includes practical science in the science of mukāshara, since it is impossible to gain such high knowledge without the purification of the soul.

Al-Ghazālī states very clearly that whoever possesses the true knowledge, or faith, about God, His attributes, His Books, His Messengers and the Last Day as they really are, is called sa‘īd.¹ This sort of knowledge, or faith, comes either through investigation and enquiry (taḥqīq) or through accepting it on authority (taqlīd).² Both are called knowledge and both lead to sa‘āda.

We have already mentioned while we were dealing with al-Fārābī that al-Ghazālī's ma‘rifa and taqlīd correspond to al-Fārābī's taṣawwur or ta‘ammul and takhayyul respectively.³ Despite many differences, the descriptions of ‘ārifūn and muqallidūn in al-Ghazālī are strikingly similar to the descriptions of ḥukamā’ and mu’minūn in al-Fārābī. In both thinkers these two classes constitute the only groups of people who attain sa‘āda. The similarities and dissimilarities will become clearer when we take and try to examine the terms ma‘rifa and taqlīd of al-Ghazālī separately.

1) Sa‘āda and Ma‘rifa: General characteristics of ma‘rifa

The analysis of different aspects of the term ma‘rifa is, as F. Jabre has shown,⁴ extremely important for a correct understanding

1. Iljām, p. 80; Ḩ, 1, 163.
2. Ḩ, iv, 63.
3. See above, section on 'Cognition and Imagination'.
of al-Ghazālī's thought. It is also probably one of the most difficult and complex concepts in al-Ghazālī's thought. The purpose of this section is, however, just to try to show the link between ma‘rifā and sa‘āda.

The object of ma‘rifā, or "the knowledge of ma‘rifā" is, strictly speaking, God, His attributes and His actions as they really are - a type of knowledge which takes revelation as its ultimate foundation. Only such knowledge brings about sa‘āda in the world to come and thus it is sought for its own sake.¹

Concerning the knowledge of God and the Last Day and everything that goes with them, al-Ghazālī accepts three grades. Firstly in the heart of every Muslim there must be a firm and complete belief in what concerns God and the Last Day. This is called 'aqīda which normally proceeds the other two grades. Secondly comes the knowledge of the proofs of this 'aqīda (without going into its secret meanings). And thirdly the grade of the knowledge of "secrets", the quintessence of these realities and the realities of the apparent aspect of this 'aqīda.² The first grade is sufficient only for mere salvation. One does not have to go further than the first grade if one is only interested in saving oneself from punishment. For the perfection of sa‘āda (kamāl as-sa‘āda), however, the last two grades are necessary.³ Strictly speaking only the last grade constitutes ma‘rifā.⁴ After these three grades al-Ghazālī mentions

¹. Cf. Th., i, 57; cf. also Th., iii, 351-2, and J., 24-5.
². Arb., 23.
³. Ibid., 23-4.
⁴. Ibid., 25.
three grades of salvation: najāt, fawz and saʿāda,¹ to which we will return later on.

Iʿtiqād, simple belief, saves man from the eternal punishment, if this belief is not weakened by sin. From this stage man can go to the stage of ʿilm by constant purification through the performance of religious duties and by investigation and examination. And when God casts the light onto his heart, man reaches the stage of maʿrifa which is also the stage of "immediate experience" (dāwq) which rests on contemplation (mushāhada).² The last stage is realised "by those who walk in the way leading to it."³

We have already pointed out that it is in the knowledge of God, His attributes and His actions that lie man's perfection and saʿāda.⁴ In maʿrifa and in saʿāda the highest stage is occupied by the prophets who receive the realities of things through revelation and divine disclosure.⁵ Without revelation man can attain no certainty (yaqīn) in what he knows. It is revelation that safeguards the certainty which eventually leads man to saʿāda.⁶ Yaqīn can mean the lack of doubt which usually results from evidence. This is what most of the philosophers and theologians mean by yaqīn. Another meaning of yaqīn is faith which comes to exist "whenever the soul inclines to the acceptance of anything which prevails over the

1. Ibid., 23-4.
3. The Faith, 62.
4. Ṣrī, iii, 12.
5. Ibid., 11.
6. Ṣrī, i, 104.
heart and takes hold of it and as a result becomes the ruler and
dispenser of the soul either by urging it to action or by forbidding
it therefrom. The second type of certainty is higher than the
first. God shows in many verses of the Qurʾān that the second
type of yaqīn links man with goodness and happiness. The yaqīn
in the first sense is found among all believers, whereas the yaqīn
in the second sense is reserved to the saints (awliyāʾ). Yaqīn
in the second sense leads to saʿāda, because when a man believes
that God and His power are the sources of everything, he will be in
the position to acquire the virtues such as dependence on God
(tawakkul), contentment (riḍā), resignation (taslīm) and such like.
The acquisition of these virtues will naturally free him from the
vices such as anger, envy and rancour. The attainment of such
positive values and the disappearance of such vices will lead man
to happiness here and in the world to come.

There is no doubt that al-Ghazālī accepts revelation as the
highest and the most certain knowledge. It is not easy, however, to
determine how this knowledge comes. In other words what is the
faculty through which this knowledge reaches men? In al-Fārābī
this faculty was the intellect, or to be more precise the Acquired
Intellect. In al-Ghazālī to answer this question is not so simple,
and therefore the relation between intellect and happiness requires
a close examination.

2. Ibid., 104.
3. Ibid., 101.
4. Ibid., 104.
5. Ibid.
2) Intellect and Sa'ada.¹

Like al-Fārābī, al-Ghazālī is fully aware that the term 'aql is used in many different senses; and he is equally aware that a single definition of this term cannot cover all its different meanings. He does not seem to object to the superiority of intellect on the basis that by 'aql one must not understand the meaning which is given to it by the scholastic theologians and dialecticians; that is to say when understand by intellect mean the power of argumentation and debate about contradictions and requisites. The fundamental use of the word 'aql indicates, according to al-Ghazālī, an instinct (gharjaz) through which man comprehends theoretical sciences. When this power develops, man will be able to govern himself by his intellect. Intellect in this sense is "the light of the insight" by the help of which man knows God and recognizes the truthfulness of His Messenger.² 'Aql in this sense is praised by the Law. Some of the Sufis blamed intellect without realizing that some people misused the term 'aql.³ As we have pointed out earlier on, 'aql in the sense "the light of the insight" is sometimes used synonymously with qalb and ṭūb,⁴ and it is only in this sense that intellect is regarded as "the capital from which all forms of happiness are derived."⁵ "It is the means of sa'āda in this world

¹ Although it seems to be more appropriate to use the word "Reason" here, we kept the word intellect, since the term 'aql has rendered as intellect in the foregoing chapters.

² Ih, i, 123 and 117ff.
³ Ibid., 122-3.
⁴ Ibid., 123.
⁵ N.M., 25.
and in the world to come."¹

In al-Fārābī intellect cannot lead man to happiness unless it reaches illumination from the Active Intellect. In al-Ghāzālī there is no Active Intellect and no emanation (ṣudūr) in the sense that they exist in al-Fārābī. It is true that al-Fārābī sometimes equates Active Intellect with the angel Gabriel, accepts ittīṣāl as revelation (wahy) and believes that saʿāda is guaranteed by this ittīṣāl. No doubt al-Fārābī tries to rationalize the Islamic ideas of angel, revelation, prophecy and so on. This rationalization, however, not only falls short but also leads to many grave errors, therefore it would be wrong to suggest that both al-Fārābī and al-Ghāzālī are talking about the same thing, even though one does so as a philosopher, the other as a theologian and a mystic.

Saʿāda is found, according to al-Ghāzālī, in the divine proximity (qurb), which will be studied later on in this chapter. Ittīṣāl, too, can be regarded as a divine proximity. However it would not make sense if we said that according to al-Ghāzālī saʿāda is obtained when man is united with the angel Gabriel. Moreover a prophet can receive revelation without the angel Gabriel, so it is possible to receive the truth about things directly from God. In the case of al-Fārābī to remove the Active Intellect will result in the collapse of his whole system.

Al-Ghāzālī does not fail to emphasise that intellect in the sense in which it is used by the philosophers and scholastic

¹. Ṭḥ, i, 115-6.
theologians is not the ultimate authority in bringing about man's happiness. In many places in his works he criticises the hair-splitting theorising of the philosophers. "The danger of intellectual subtlety", as Gibb points out, "lies not in the use of the intelligence, but in the abuse of it; more specifically it may lead to self-confidence or to simple surrender to the pleasure of intellectual exercise, and both are forms of infidelity. The one is irreconcilable with the Muslim duty of humility before God, the second converts thinking about God into a kind of sport."¹

Al-Ghazālī's concept of intellect does not go against the authority of the Law. In fact it is like a merchant trying to gain the highest degree in paradise and to reach the Extremity (sidrat al-muntahā'). In reality it tends towards obedience to God, and its disobedience and shaqāwa are due to its being mixed with dirt and corruption. In its purest form it is the knower of God and seeks to be near to Him.²

It should be taken for granted that intellect cannot know everything. There are matters, though understood by intellect, which can only be supplied by revelation. Our knowledge concerning other worldly matters cannot be attained by intellect.³ "The intellect neither comprehends all it attempts to know nor solves all its problems."⁴ There are things that we know by intellect, things by

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2. Th, iii, 3.
4. The Faith, 44; cf. also Th, iii, 46.
the Law and things by both intellect and the Law. To say, for example, that an action is good for the attainment of happiness is not sufficient. Even if we, together with the philosophers, accept intellect as an absolute authority, we cannot go further than saying what is good or bad to bring about our salvation. This does not guarantee such salvation. In order to have such a guarantee some actions should be defined as not only useful but also obligatory (wājib), and this can only be done by the Law. "Intellect does not guide men to works which lead to salvation in the hereafter." Therefore the foundation of moral obligation is not intellect or reason but the divine commandments and prohibitions; and without such a foundation happiness cannot be conceived.

In fact al-Ghazālī seems always to have been against the people who took pride in their hair-splitting theorising. Not only the philosophers and the theologians, but some jurists as well occupied themselves with matters that hardly took place in life. Discussing the meaning of a well-known phrase "there is neither might (hawl) nor power but in God", al-Ghazālī refers again to the Mu'tazilites and philosophers and says that because of their hair-splitting speculations they found themselves face to face with polytheism in the Unity of God (ash-shirk fī-t-tawḥīd).}

1. *Iq.* 94-5.
5. T, 139.
All this mistrust in the authority of intellect in its theologico-philosophical usages lead al-Ghazālī to the acceptance and glorification of ṣūfistic experience based upon the revelation of Muḥammad. There are many things, it is true, that can be obtained through study, observation and speculation as well as through purifying the heart and having realities reflected on it, which al-Ghazālī calls "instruction" or "study" (ta‘līm) and cleansing (tāṣīr) respectively. These two ways of obtaining the reality of the universe and its form go back to al-Ghazālī's acceptance of the two gateways of the heart, one opening onto the phenomenal world through the senses and other onto the world of malakūt and lawḥ maḥfūz. Al-Ghazālī's illustration of this idea with his story about a competition of painting between the people of Rūm, representing 'ulamā', and the people of China, representing awliyā' is too well-known to repeat here. The fact that comes out very clearly in this story is that both the 'ulamā' and awliyā' reach the same realities in different ways. Since both gateways belong to the heart or 'aql, in the sense al-Ghazālī uses it, it is quite plausible to suggest that intellect is the highest faculty in man. The matter, however, is not so simple.

The acceptance of a parallelism between what is reached through study and what is reached through 'religious intuition' does not seem to be explicitly defended by al-Ghazālī. He never adheres to the idea that philosophical wisdom is equal to revelation. "The man" writes al-Ghazālī, "who verbally professes belief in prophecy,

1. Ḥ, iii, 27-8.
but equates the prescription of the revealed scripture with (philosophic) wisdom, really disbelieves in prophecy. "1 It is quite clear that 'aql in the sense that the philosophers and theologians use cannot be the faculty of revelation. "Faith in prophecy is to acknowledge the existence of a sphere beyond reason; into this sphere an eye penetrates whereby man apprehends special objects-of-apprehension."2 A little later in the same passage we are told that "a super-rational sphere is possible, indeed that it actually exists."3

F. Jabre, starting probably from the idea that al-Ghazālī uses sometimes 'aql, qalb and rūḥ synonymously, seems to argue that in the ḥiyā' especially in K. at-tafakkur, al-Ghazālī does not attribute a super-rational faculty to the Prophet. Jabre applies this to the Munqidh and other works and concludes that 'aql in its purest state is the highest faculty. 'Aql al-gharība which is translated by Jabre as raison-instinct is accepted "as the principle of knowledge and of certitude in the believer and the Prophet: but in the latter reason must be considered in its original purity." Al-Ghazālī rejects reason, argues Jabre, but "non pas de la raison-faculté, oeil du coeur, 'lumière de Dieu'."4 By interpreting the passages in the Munqidh and the Mishkāt in the light of the foregoing idea,

1. The Faith, 77.
2. Ibid., 78.
3. Ibid., 81.
4. Certitude, pp. 264-5; cf. also p. 147.
F. Jabre accepts that al-Ghazālī is entirely consistent in the
treatment of this question in the Ḣiyā' as well as in his later works.

Professor Watt once suggested that "al-Ghazālī advanced from
the thought of parallelism of reason and religious experience to
that of superiority of religious intuition to reason."¹ This has
led Professor Watt, as he himself puts it, to maintain that "in the
Munqidh and the Mishkāt al-Ghazālī asserted the existence of a sphere
above the sphere of reason, which he called the sphere of dhawq;
this was the characteristic of prophets and saints but was shared
to some extent by ordinary man."² In the light of the further
information given by F. Jabre, Professor Watt agrees that "the
beginning of the dhawq period has to be placed much earlier and
that there is a greater continuity in al-Ghazālī's thought than had
been realized."³ He is of the opinion, however, that "Jabre has
overstated his case and been carried away by his theories about
al-Ghazālī to such an extent that he has failed to notice that there
is at least a superficial contradiction which may perhaps be
explained away, but which certainly requires much fuller discussion."⁴

Our aim here is not really to try to determine whether there
is a sphere of dhawq above intellect or reason. What is important
for us here is the fact that through whatever faculty it comes the

¹. Watt, "The Authenticity of the works attributed to al-Ghazālī",
JRAS, (1952), p. 27; cf. also his article on "A forgery in al-
³. Ibid., 126.
⁴. Ibid., 127.
revealed knowledge is the foundation of all kinds of happiness and this knowledge is apprehended by "immediate experience", \(^1\) (dhawq), by ecstacy and by a moral change.\(^2\) This "immediate experience" is described as "actually witnessing a thing and taking it in one's hand. It is only found in the way of mysticism."\(^3\) To describe this state the terms dhawq, wajd, ma'rifah or 'irfan are sometimes used synonymously;\(^4\) and such a state can be apprehended not by study but only by dhawq.\(^5\) This is the way of the sufis; the soundest and safest way of sa'āda. The sufis are the right followers of the prophets who "had direct vision of the truth."\(^6\) It is due to the prophetic intervention that an opinion is transformed into certainty without which there can be no happiness. "There is no one save the Prophet whose knowledge is not sometimes followed and sometimes rejected."\(^7\) In another place al-Ghazālī says more emphatically that "the purpose of the creation of mankind is the realization of sa'āda of being close to the Divine Presence, and this is only possible through the teachings of the prophets."\(^8\)

These are just a few remarks about the theoretical aspect of prophecy. To its practical aspect we will return later on when we come to the guiding forces to sa'āda.

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1. The Faith, 66.
2. Ibid., 55.
3. Ibid., 61-2.
5. The Faith, 54-5.
6. Ibid., 66.
7. Ḩ, i, 109.
8. M.S., 98; cf. Arb, 89.
It is interesting to note that in the light of the foregoing explanation it becomes clear that al-Ghazālī is by no means less persistent than the philosophers on the necessity of knowledge for the attainment of saʿāda. It is because of this that Ibn Taymiyya says that the Ḥiyā' of al-Ghazālī teaches that the aim of all actions is knowledge, which is also the core of the teachings of the philosophers. Al-Ghazālī's emphasis on revelation however distinguishes him sharply from the philosophers. We have already noted that he utterly rejects the farabian idea that philosophic wisdom can be equated with prophetic revelation. Another point which al-Ghazālī does not accept is al-Fārābī's concept of ṣudūr which is based on Neoplatonic teaching.

It is true that al-Ghazālī uses such terms like ṣudūr and fayḍ which are usually translated as "emanation". In the Maqṣad al-Ghazālī says that "existence is a light that emanates (fāʿīd) from the light of God's essence." In another passage of the same book we are told that "the existence of God is the existence from which the existence of all other beings emanates or outpours (yaṣduru)." He does not use the term fayḍ, however, only in respect of existence, but of other things as well. He says, for instance, that "karāma emanates from Him unto His creatures."

2. Mād, 70.
3. Ibid., 52.
4. Ibid., 68.
It does not seem that al-Ghazālī uses these terms in the technical sense. In these passages al-Ghazālī means that God is the grandeur of existence and kārāma. In the Arbaʿīn he uses fayḍ in respect of knowledge. "Know" he says, "that real maʿrifat emanates, or outpours, from the world of malakūt to the secrets of the heart, since the heart too is from the world of malakūt." Further on he likens the Qurʾān to the sun and the outpouring of the secrets of maʿārif which flow from the Qurʾān to the heart to the outpouring of lights from the sun. Again the use of fayḍ in respect of knowledge has nothing to do with the sense in which al-Fārābī uses it. No doubt al-Ghazālī makes use of the philosophical idea of emanation, but not without emptying its content and, as it were, neutralizing it.

Much has been written on al-Ghazālī's relation to the philosophical doctrine of emanation. Most of what has been said, however, is primarily based on Mishkāt al-anwār, which is not included among the works of al-Ghazālī on which we base ourselves in this study. It appears that even in this fairly controversial work al-Ghazālī does not accept the emanational theory of al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā.

1. Arb, 49; cf. also 50 and N, 111, 5 and 25.
According to al-Ghazālī when man purifies his soul, the light of faith is cast to his heart by God Himself. He may not even know whence and how this light comes. This is not within the choice of man. This does not mean, however, that man knows all about God when the curtain between him and God is removed. Man never gets such direct knowledge of Him. Knowledge is obtained by the heart through the intermediaries of angels. ¹ We have already pointed out that angels, in the commonly accepted Islamic sense are different from the Intelligences of the philosophers. Therefore to accept angels as intermediaries is something quite different from the idea of the Active Intellect without which, according to al-Fārābī there can be no knowledge and so no happiness.

3) The Knowledge of God and Saʿāda

The basis of saʿāda is the knowledge of God which determines two things: Love of God in this life and the vision of God in the life to come. In sum, al-Ghazālī's idea of saʿāda consists in knowing Him (maʿrifā), loving Him (maḥabba) and, seeing Him (ruʿya), and this is the purpose for which man is created.

The only praiseworthy knowledge in the absolute sense is the knowledge of God, His actions and attributes and the knowledge of His law which underlines His creation. This is the knowledge which brings us the ultimate saʿāda in the world to come. ² Whichever branch of knowledge is useful for the attainment of this knowledge is

1. Ḥb, iii, 24-5.
2. Ḥb, 1, 57-8.
praiseworthy. Knowledge of the Arabic language, jurisprudence and Traditions are praiseworthy in this respect.\(^1\) There is no gain, however, in spending one's whole life in order to become an expert in one of these sciences.\(^2\) Man must equally be careful not to spend his life absorbing knowledge which has no value at all, such as the knowledge of ancestry and the like.\(^3\)

Only the knowledge of \textit{ma'rifat Allah} will accompany man after death, for which reason it is sought for its own sake and not for the sake of something else.\(^4\)

The highest stage at which man arrives in his quest for knowledge of God is defined by al-Ghazālī as proximity or nearness to God (\textit{qurb}); we will return to this a little later on in the chapter. Man is in a position to obtain such nearness thanks to his soul, or heart, which is itself from the divine world and which enables him to be characterized by \textit{traits of character}, or the qualities, of God.

Probably the most important work for the subject under discussion is al-Ghazālī's \textit{Maqṣad} where he mentions two ways to the attainment of knowledge of God and thus nearness to Him. These two ways are called "the imperfect" and "the blocked" respectively.\(^5\)

The starting point of the imperfect way is man's knowledge

\begin{itemize}
  \item[Ibid., iii, 351-2.]
  \item[Ibid., i, 58.]
  \item[Ibid., iii, 351-2 and i, 57-8.]
  \item[J., 24-5.]
  \item[Md., 20. For an explanation of these two ways see pp. 20-3.]
\end{itemize}
of himself. Man cannot understand anything about an object unless there is a relation between himself and the object of which knowledge is desired. First he knows himself and what relates to him, and then, by analogy, he knows others. Supposing that a man has experienced no pleasure or pain in himself, it will be impossible to make him understand, say, what sort of place Paradise and Hell can be. Now it is quite possible that knowledge through such analogy falls very short indeed. In fact there is no real resemblance between the pleasures of Paradise and those of this world. A well-known Tradition says that no eye has seen and no ear has heard the true pleasures of Paradise which are promised for the righteous people.1

When we become aware that we are alive, that we possess power and knowledge, and then we hear these qualities in the descriptions of God, we will be able to know and apprehend Him, though imperfectly and insufficiently. In fact the only common thing between the attributes of man and those of God is naught but name.

As for the "blocked way" it is the way of the investigator (muḥaqiq) who tries or rather hopes to obtain for himself the qualities of lordship which will make him a lord. This is impossible, since nobody can really know God except God Himself. The end of the knowledge of 'ārif is the realization that he cannot know the reality of God. The realization and comprehension of his weakness is itself a realization. He will know Him through His

attributes and names and not through immediate experience (dhawq). It should be borne in mind that man cannot know the realities of these attributes either. Through the knowledge of these attributes however, man gets near to Him and thereby secures his happiness.

The knowledge of the attributes of God and man's imitation of them have a far-reaching importance in al-Ghazālī's concept of saʿāda. In his theory of the divine attributes al-Ghazālī tries to explain the ideas that man is created in the image of God and he is able to be characterized by the qualities of God through imitating them. Now let us examine the last point a little more closely.

4) Saʿāda through the Imitation of the Attributes of God.

We have already dealt with the idea of the "likeness to God" in al-Fārābī. Al-Ghazālī says that one of the purposes of his writing Maqṣad is to explain the meaning of a Tradition in which the Prophet says "be characterized with the traits of character of God". Here in the same passage al-Ghazālī mentions another Tradition which runs as: "God has such and such qualities and whoever adopts one of them will enter Paradise."2

In the fourth section of the Maqṣad al-Ghazālī states very clearly that "man's perfection and saʿāda consist in the adoption of the traits of character of God and in being adorned with the meanings of His attributes and names in proportion to what is

1. Above, pp.60f.
2. Maqṣad, 72.
conceivable about him.\textsuperscript{1} Al-Ghazālī mentions different ranks of men in respect to their share in the divine names. He is only interested in the share of 

muqarrabūn. Here al-Ghazālī suggests three stages. Firstly the attainment of knowledge of the meaning of these names to such an extent that they become clear and certain. This knowledge comes through mukāshafa and mushāhada. Secondly when these 

muqarrabūn know, they desire and exalt what is known. At this stage they will deeply feel the greatness of God which will arouse a desire and eagerness in their heart to be endowed with the qualities of God. Without this desire (shawq) and eagerness (ḥirā'), man cannot attain his full perfection. According to al-Ghazālī, the lack of such desire is due either to the weakness of knowledge and certainty or to the absorption of the heart with other desires. The seed of shawq is knowledge. It flourishes when the heart is free from other desires. Thirdly come the effort and struggle for the attainment of as much as possible of these attributes. When this is realised, man becomes divine (rabbānī) and closer to the Lord.\textsuperscript{2} This is the fulfilment of his human potentialities, since "man, by his very nature, loves what is divine."\textsuperscript{3}

It is noteworthy that al-Ghazālī's conception of perfection in the Maqṣad is an intellectual achievement secured by and lying in the theoretical knowledge of God. F. Jabre calls this way of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} Ibid., 15-6.
\item \textsuperscript{2} Ibid., 16-7.
\item \textsuperscript{3} Arb, 135.
\end{itemize}
knowing God "psychological" in which the task of man is going to consist precisely in disengaging the meaning of the divine names, in making them intensely present in the conscience by remembrance and by recollecting one's thoughts. Thanks to these latter means, man remembers the divine names and the attributes designated by these names. He deepens the doctrinal content of these divine names through the knowledge of himself, which permits him to affirm that all of that is true of God analogically.

There are many dangers which can overtake the man who arrives at this stage. Al-Ghazālī worries that the representative elements of this sort of psychological experience in the process might lend themselves to a false interpretation. Before we come to what this false interpretation is, we must say something about the idea of the likeness to angels which is a part of the idea of the likeness to God.

We have already discussed some aspects of this theory while we were dealing with al-Fārābī, and al-Ghazālī seems to be fully aware of the accounts of the philosophers concerning this idea. He knows that the philosophers too were occupied with the idea of qurb, or divine proximity. It was philosophers who believed that "the heaven obeys God and seeks to be near to him. "They thought, however, that since God is above favour and displeasure, this seeking after proximity cannot aim at gaining these things. Nor is it

1. Ma‘rifa, p. 90.
3. Above, pp. 60ff.
possible to think of this proximity in terms of space. The only remaining possible explanation is that proximity means an effort for closer relationship in respect of attributes. They also hold that the angels are the nearest creatures to God, not in respect of space but attributes. They maintained, for instance, that the angels that are permitted to be near to God (al-mla'ika al-muqarrabun) are the unchangeable, imperishable, intellectual substances which know things as they are. When man, in respect of the attributes, comes closer to God, he resembles the angels and this constitutes the highest degree for him.\(^1\)

Although al-Ghazālī rejects some of what the philosophers say about qurb, e.g. that qurb does not aim at God's favour and that al-mla'ika al-muqarrabun are intellectual substances, he nevertheless takes this idea and freely uses it for his own purposes. As in many other parts of his account of the philosophers, here too al-Ghazālī has Ibn Sīnā in mind. The philosophers' chief mistake was not really their talking of these matters, but rather their insistence on the idea that they could know these things by reason and they could actually prove what they knew.\(^2\)

According to al-Ghazālī, man by adopting the traits of the character of God resembles the Favourite Angels (al-mla'ika al-muqarrabun).\(^3\) The degree of the angels is the highest, since the

\(^1\) T, 208-9. English trns. 168.
\(^2\) T, English trns. 170ff.
\(^3\) Md, 16.
angels in their perception are not affected by time and space as men are. Nor do the angels act under the compulsion of anger and desire as men do. The angels by their very creation are near to God. In fact unlike men they have fixed duties to perform and their places are fixed too. Man in his seeking qurb becomes a companion of the angels. Whoever adopts the qualities of the angels will attain the nearness of the angels to God.\(^1\) As a matter of fact he ascends higher than some of the angels.\(^2\) Man can ascend to this degree thanks to his possession of the "light of intellect" (nūr al-‘aql) which itself freely moves in the Kingdom of heaven and earth. It needs no body for its seeking of the divine proximity.\(^3\)

At the first stage anger and desire are the prime movers of man. Here he can only perceive through the senses. This goes on until the desire to seek perfection, which requires a careful look at the consequences of his actions and disobedience to the demands of desire and anger,\(^\text{\textsuperscript{b}}\) If he can dominate and weaken his anger and desire to such an extent that they are no longer able to motivate his actions, then he will obtain a likeness to the angels. And lastly if he can break his habitual relationship with the objects of imagination and the senses and become indifferent towards them and grow accustomed to the perception of things that are beyond the senses and imagination, then he will obtain another degree of

\(^{1}\) Ibid., 17.

\(^{2}\) Arb, 292; cf. Ḥ, iv, 327.

\(^{3}\) In Ḥyā’ he ascribes all these qualities to ḍārifūn. See below, p.265.
resemblance to the angels. In so doing he will leave behind the animal qualities which exist in his nature and will get closer to the angels. Whoever comes closer to the angels comes closer to God.\(^1\) It is this closeness to God and likeness to the angels and thus to Him that bring man his ultimate happiness, since "\(\text{sa'āda}\) consists in his resembling the angels by abstaining from desire and weakening the \(\text{nafs}\) which incites to evil."\(^1\) This idea is also al-Ghazālī's idea of freedom which reminds us of the Stoic concept of liberty. A man who is free of everything save God is absolutely free; and this is the degree of the truthful and righteous (\(\text{siddīqūn}\)).\(^2\)

Similar opinions are expressed in the \(\text{Ihya}'\) as well. Here he divides perfection into three: the perfection of knowledge, the perfection of power and the perfection of freedom. The first is defined in terms of \(\text{ma'rifat Allah}\), the second in terms of freedom from desire and anger and all other worldly worries, - a quality which makes man resemble the angels - and the third in terms of the ability to gain perfection of knowledge. Knowledge and freedom (\(\text{ma'rifā} \text{and } \text{hurriyya}\)) are not destroyed by death. These two perfections remain eternally and they are the true means for arrival at nearness to God (\(\text{qurb}\)).\(^3\)

The more man becomes perfect through the adoption of the qualities of God, the more he realizes that in reality he belongs

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1. \(\text{Arb}, \text{94}; \text{cf. } \text{Ihya}, \text{iii, 36.}\)
2. \(\text{Ihya}, \text{iv, 483.}\)
3. \(\text{Ibid.}, \text{iii, 352.}\)
to the world of malakūt, that he is the image of God and that he is a microcosm of the whole universe.

The relation between man and the universe - or the relation between man's psychological experience and cosmology - was one of the major topics with which philosophers occupied themselves, and al-Ghazālī makes use of the philosophers' cosmological theories in his sufistic writings.¹ There are some similarities between man and the universe. Both have an external part and an internal part; that is to say the universe is divided into the world of mulk, which is apparent and sensible, and the world of malakūt; man too is divided into two parts: the apparent and sensible such as the body and all other bodily organs, and the internal or hidden such as rūḥ, 'aql and the like. The universe is divided into the world of mulk, the world of malakūt and the world of jabarūt which is between the first two worlds. The corresponding elements in man are the body, rūḥ, intellect, will and such like and the world of senses.²

Now the ultimate link between the world of malakūt and the heart can only be established, or rather reestablished, if man does not spoil the original divine purity of the heart. This also constitutes man's ultimate saʿāda. The whole saʿāda comes about, al-Ghazālī believes, when man makes meeting with God (liaqā' Allah) his sole aim, and the world to come his eternal abode. He also

². Imlā' in Ḥ, v, 54-5.
regards this world as a place for the attainment of this sa'āda, his body as a vehicle and his bodily organs as servants. If he does all this he will be happy, successful and grateful, and if he does not, then he will be shaqī, ungrateful and destitute.¹

When such a link is completed, man obtains a unified view of the universe. The total of the world mulk and malakūt, when they are taken all at once, is called "the divine presence" (al-hādra al-rubūbiyya), since "the divine presence" covers everything. In fact nothing exists save Him, His actions and His kingdom.² As has been pointed out earlier on, the heart is able to reflect the realities of things when the curtain between itself and the lawḥ mahfūz is removed. A complete removal of this curtain, however, becomes possible by death.³

It is through the removal of this curtain that awliyā' and prophets receive knowledge which enables them to see what sa'āda is and how it is attained, since no one can attain sa'āda save through knowledge and ma'rifah.⁴

Although such knowledge (i.e. 'ilm al-mukāshafa) comes from the world of malakūt, it extends its scope to the world of mulk as well. In fact these two worlds are interrelated. The similarities between man and the universe have already been mentioned. Al-Ghazālī views the same similarity from the standpoint of the interdependence

1. P. iii, 13.
2. Ibid., 20.
3. Ibid., 24.
4. Ibid., 29.
of mulk and malakūt which brings his psychology and cosmology together and which underlines the necessity of the practical aspect of Islam.

Any action which proceeds from any quality of the heart does not pass without influencing the heart. The strength and the weakness of the qualities of the heart are very much connected with the bodily actions. According to al-Ghazālī:

This relation is of the same nature as that of the relation between the visible world ('ālam al-mulk) and the invisible world ('ālam al-malakūt). The heart belongs to the invisible world while the members of the body as well as their activities belong to the visible world. The subtlety and fineness of the interdependence of the two worlds have led some men to think that they are closely related... For this reason the science of revelation (ilm al-mukashafa) extends its scope every now and then into the realm of practical religion and does not withdraw until it imposes some obligations. This then is belief, in accordance with this usage, increases through good works.

Now saʿāda belongs to the world of malakūt, since it consists in closeness to God. It is not in the world of mulk, since the knowledge which we receive through the senses is so limited that it cannot provide man with the certainty which is indispensable for saʿāda. The world of jabarūt is only a ship which moves between the two worlds, so the foundation of knowledge will be reached through it. The man who is in the way to God has to pass the first two worlds and rests in the third, where everything is created by the eternal divine amr and fixed once and for all.

1. Ibid., i, 164.
2. Ibid.; English trns. by Parīs (ii), 119-120.
4. Imlāʾ, p. 54.
In all the foregoing explanations it becomes quite clear that al-Ghazālī sees man as a living synthesis of the world of mulk and malakūt and that his concept of saʿāda consists in the psycho-cosmological journey of the heart towards malakūt. At the end of this journey, man's knowledge will become certain and his saʿāda will be secured, thanks to his knowledge of God, His attributes, His actions and to his realization of his being the image of God in the universe.¹

There are a lot of men, however, who have failed to understand the real nature of this relation between man and God. Although saʿāda consists in closeness to God (qurb), the representative elements of this psychological experience have led these people to utterly wrong interpretations of the ultimate stage of man's existence. Now it is time that we examined what these false interpretations are.

5) False interpretations of the ultimate stage of man's life.

The term qurb indicates man's position in respect of the ultimate object. Unlike al-Fārābī's ittīsāl, al-Ghazālī's qurb cannot easily be defined. Ittīsāl requires some kind of contact or conjunction, whereas qurb indicates "nearness", "proximity" or "closeness" to God. We must not forget however that the object of ittīsāl is the Active Intellect whereas in the case of qurb the object is God.

¹ For more information about the subject under discussion see Jabre, Certitude, ch. iii, pp. 180-206; Wensinck, La Pensée de Ghazzâli, ch. iii, pp. 79-101.
In order to name the ultimate stage of man we have three major terms: union (ittihād) inheritance (ḥulūl) and connection (wuṣūl). Al-Ghazālī criticises and rejects three of them. What man manages to achieve is "nearness" (qurb) and nothing else. The last term, i.e. qurb, does not convey any dangerous and erroneous idea, since it does not have an absolute end. When man obtains some degree of nearness, there will be another degree of nearness before him. The arrival at the furthest stage is impossible.

Al-Ghazālī's rejection of ittihād, ḥulūl and wuṣūl has far-reaching theological and socio-political importance. From the theological standpoint he rejects ittihād, because to say that servant has become Lord is in itself self-contradictory. There is no absolute unity between two similar entities, let alone between God and man. To accept unity with God will render all outward deeds superfluous - a danger from which quite a few people could not escape. The rejection of ittihād includes the rejection of ḥulūl, since residing in God cannot be considered without the idea of union. As has already been mentioned, man can imitate and adopt the traits of character of God, but in order to talk about ittihād and ḥulūl, one has to accept the actual transference of divine attributes to man (intiqāl) which is impossible.

1. The Faith, 61.
2. Ḥ, 11, 371.
3. Cf. Ma, 74.
4. Ḥ, 1, 53-4.
5. Ma, 76.
6. Ibid., 73.
According to al-Ghazālī, sa‘āda depends on a correct knowledge of the self and of God. Whoever claims union with, or inherence in, God has a wrong idea about the nature of man and about God, which prepares man for the ultimate shaqāwa.

From the practical standpoint such a rejection is even clearer. How can one believe in the necessity of worship and other religious obligations if one claims to be in union with God? We will come to the danger of neglecting ‘ibādāt when we come to al-Ghazālī’s criticism of falāsifa and Bāṭiniyya in respect of the religious obligation. Here it is sufficient to say that al-Ghazālī fears that to talk about union, inherence and similar ideas will have a very bad influence on the common people. These ideas are like fire for the common folk whose happiness depends on taqlīd. Pretentious and unintelligible ecstatic utterances will cause nothing but harm.1 Here al-Ghazālī worries more about the common folk than the theological impossibilities.

The term wuṣūl needs a special treatment. In the Munājidh al-Ghazālī includes it among the terms which he rejects. He tells us that he has explained the reasons for his rejection of ittiḥād, ḥulūl and wuṣūl in the Maqāsid.2 It appears that he rejects wuṣūl if it is understood in the sense of ittiḥād; that is to say in the sense of connection between two essences (wuṣūl bayn adh-dhawātayn). When the term is understood as an expression of qurb, al-Ghazālī accepts it. In fact the aim of man’s effort for the purification

1. Ḣ, 1, 54.
2. The Faith, 61.
of man's inner world is the attainment of ḫusūl. This will be achieved when the veil between man and God is removed and when man is absorbed into the divine ḫanūfīyat and when he knows and desires no one but God.¹ It seems that the terms ḫusūl and ḫanā sometimes mean the same thing. ḫusūl is the end of the journey of ṣāḥīk. It is the stage where "he is altogether stripped of himself and is devoted to Him alone and he becomes, as it were, Him; and that is ḫusūl."² This description of ḫusūl is similar to that of ḫanā' Ḧi-t-tawḥīd in the Ḧyā'.³

6) ḫanā' as a glimpse of saʿāda

Although al-Ghazālī believes that man should not write about the ultimate stage at which the sincere (mukhliṣūn) arrive, he cannot escape some kind of description of it. Much has been written about the concept of ḫanā'.

In many respects al-Ghazālī's description of ḫanā' Ḧi-t-tawḥīd reminds us of al-Fārābī's ittiṣāl, though they are essentially different. ḫanā' is said to be the ultimate aim of the seeker and the ultimate fruit of the revealed knowledge.⁴ It is the stage where the seeker loses his consciousness in the divine presence. Here all the senses come to a standstill, even the imagination remains in quietude and passivity.⁵ In this description al-Ghazālī is

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¹ Ḫāy'āni, 76.
² Ibid., 76.
³ Ḫāy'āni, 4v, 305.
⁵ Arb, 56.
nearer to Plotinus, who also accepts a stage of immobility of thought, than to al-Fārābī, who does not even talk of such immobility.

The stage of fanā' can only be apprehended by the people of dhawq. Although this dhawq does not last long at the beginning, it eventually does so when it becomes a firmly rooted disposition by which man ascends towards the highest world and becomes aware of the Real and Pure Existence.¹ Fanā' is not, however, as Jabre repeats many times,² an ontological or metaphysical stage of existence, it is only a psychological experience. Those who are not able to experience or understand it must not deny its existence. For those who deny it there is a great punishment.³ The pleasure which is reserved for 'ārifūn can only be perceived by them. In order not to endanger the happiness of the common people the economy of teaching is indispensable.⁴

In order to arrive at the stage of fanā', and thus qurb, al-Ghazālī lays much emphasis on thought (fikr) which is defined as the key of knowledge⁵ and as a constituent element of wisdom.⁶ Tafakkur is a concentration on the object of knowledge and in this sense it is used synonymously with meditation (ta'ammul) and reflection (tadabbur). Despite some slightly different shades of

1. Ibid., 54.
3. Arb, 57.
4. Th, iv, 198-9; cf. also Imā' in Th, v, 44f.
5. Th, iv, 526.
6. Ibid., 528.
meaning, these three terms together with remembrance (tadhakkur), consideration (i‘tibār) and speculation (nazar) refer to the same spiritual or mental activity. Thought is sometimes related to man himself, his attributes and his conditions, and sometimes to God, His attributes and His actions. It can be about God’s essence, attributes and the Beautiful Names, and can also be about His actions, His mulk and malakūt and about things which exist between them.

Normally thought starts with man himself: is he a servant whom God loves? If he has succeeded in adopting the qualities which are mentioned in the fourth quarter of Ihya’ (i.e. saving matters, mun‘iyyāt) and freed himself from the destructive matters (muhlikāt) which are mentioned in the third quarter of Ihya’, then he will perhaps be able to answer this question in the affirmative. After the achievement of this stage comes the second stage at which he will contemplate God with "the eye of the heart (bi‘ayn al-qalb)". For the attainment of a complete mushāhada the first stage is indispensable. Even some shortcomings here and there will spoil and obscure the vision. A lover cannot fully enjoy the pleasure of the contemplation of beloved, if there are snakes and scorpions under his coat.

Thought about God’s essence is a very difficult matter. That is why it is said "think about the creatures of God and not about His essence". Only the siddiqūn may have such thoughts, but they

1. Ih, iv, 528-9; cf. Jabre, Certitude, p. 142.
2. Ih, 530-1.
3. Ibid., 531.
cannot hold on to them for a long time.¹ In another passage the people who have the true knowledge of God are divided into the strong (aqwiyā’) and the weak. The former know God first and know other things through Him, whereas the latter know the actions first and then through them go to the Agent. Both of these ways are mentioned in the Qur’ān. The second way is easy and can be explained clearly.²

Al-Ghazālī emphasizes the importance of thought, but without ignoring the fact that without actions one cannot go on to the stage of contemplation. This is obvious from his insistence on the fulfilment of conditions mentioned in the last two quarters of Ḥyā’. In the Arba’īn, the relation between fikr and sa’āda is clearly stated: ‘ibādāt lead to fikr and dhikr, the last two lead to ma’rifa and maṣhabba and these two, in their turn, determine and lead to sa’āda in the eternal world.³

Thought can also lead to shaqāwa. If a man fails to see the power of the Creator in everything and turns into a proud and ignorant Naturalist (tabī’i) who sees not the Creator but only the natural causes, then he becomes shaqi.⁴ Al-Ghazālī, like al-Fārābī, does not recognize any chance of happiness for those who have a materialistic approach to the universe. Such an approach can never lead to the recognition of the power of Almighty God, His greatness

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1. Ḥ, iv, 538-9.
2. Ibid., 389.
3. Arch, 98 and 143.
4. Ḥ, iv, 556 and 551.
and Beauty. Without reaching the stage of this recognition, man cannot know the Creator of everything and without knowing Him and loving Him there can be no happiness.

After this brief examination of the ma'rifah-sa'ada relationship, let us now try to see the relation between mahabba and sa'ada.

iv) Sa'ada and Love (mahabba) with reference to other religious "stations" (maqamat)

Love is the tendency of nafs towards an object which is pleasurable and loved. If it becomes very strong, then it is called passion ('ishq). In this sense mahabba is the opposite of "hate" (bughd) whose accessive degree is called maqt.1

Love springs from knowledge, since man loves what he knows. It is ultimately applied to God and only metaphorically applied to other things.2 "Love for God is the ultimate end,"3 and "the ultimate sa'ada is to die as a lover of God."4 After love there is no stage but its fruits such as desire (shawq), intimacy (una) and satisfaction or resignation (rida), and before it there are only preliminary steps such as repentance, patience and denunciation of the world.5

Knowledge of God provides the basis of such virtues as thanksgiving (shukr), reliance (tawakkul), fear of God and so on, and all

1. Arb, 251; Th, iv, 369.
2. Th, iv, 357-8. ( Cf. also 374 and iii, 274.)
3. Ibid., 365.
4. Ibid., 208.
5. Ibid., 365.
these virtues are connected with the love of God. A brief examination of some of these virtues, or what al-Ghazālī calls "saving matters" (munjiyāt), and their importance as preliminary steps for the Love of God will not be out of place.

Patience (ṣabr), which is important for the establishment of pious motives and the opposition to the desire of appetite, is indispensable for the attainment of knowledge, love and sa‘āda in this world and the world to come. It comes after love and satisfaction in the grade of importance.¹

Thanksgiving or gratitude (shukr) is higher than patience. Patience and similar virtues are sought for the sake of something else, whereas thanksgiving is sought for its own sake. There will not be patience, denunciation and fear in Paradise, but there will be thanksgiving.² This virtue too springs from the knowledge of God and leads to love.

Reliance (tawakkul) is the highest virtue; it is based on the knowledge of the oneness of God. That is why al-Ghazālī treats Unity (tawhīd) and reliance in the same book of the Īhya.³ The Qur’ān promises many rewards to those who are patient and put their trust in God (mutawakkil).⁴

The "station" of tawakkul comprises knowledge (ma‘rifa), state

1. Th, iv, 78-9.
4. Ibid., 347. where al-Ghazālī mentions some of the verses which are connected with ṣabr and tawakkul. See also Arb, 237ff.
(ḥāl) and deeds (ʿamal). Knowledge is essential. When man reaches the highest stage of knowledge he realizes that there is only one Agent. At the stage of tawakkul man leaves his affairs in the hands of God - an indispensable condition for the attainment of peacefulness in the heart. Tawakkul consists of the state where man turns to no one but Him. As for the deeds, they are the fruits of tawakkul.

Tawakkul can only be improved by renunciation of this world (zuhd) whose degrees are three: renunciation of the world while inclinations tend still towards it; renunciation of worldly goods and alienation from them for the sake of the attainment of the goods of the world to come; and the state of indifference towards the existence or non-existence of this world. The renunciation of the world can be due to the fear of Hell-fire or to the hope of attaining the otherworldly goods or to the acceptance of God as the only Master. This last is the highest of all.

Love of this world is the fountainhead of all evils. If wealth and other worldly goods lead man to the love of this world, then poverty is more advantageous and better than all this, since poverty is one of the causes of saʿāda. The one who loves no one but God is a real muwahhid and therefore anyone who wishes other things rather than God is in a state of hidden shirk.

1. Ḩ, iv, 322; Arb, 238.
3. Ibid., 244; Ḩ, iv, 305.
4. Ḩ, iv, 334.
6. Arb, 208.
7. Ibid., 209.
8. Ibid., 282.
Most of these can only be achieved if man possesses and justly employs two other "saving matters", namely fear and hope. "They are the wings with which muga'rabūn fly to every praiseworthy station."\(^1\)

Fear of God, His fire and punishment has a direct bearing on the happiness of man. Al-Ghazālī himself is an example par excellence of this bearing. "I saw for certain", he tells us in the Mungidh, "that I was on the brink of a crumbling bank of sand and in imminent danger of hell-fire unless I set about mending my ways."\(^2\) This fear is an important motive in what is called al-Ghazālī's conversion to Ṣūfism.\(^3\) Al-Ghazālī has Abū-l-Ḥusayn ad-Dirrīr to say that "the sign of sa'āda is the fear of shaqāwa, since fear is a rein between God and man and when man breaks it he will be destroyed with those who are destroyed."\(^4\) It is with the help of fear that man becomes patient\(^5\) and is drawn to knowledge and actions by means of which qurb is attained.\(^6\)

Fear of God may be due to the knowledge of God's attributes; it may as well be due to man's crimes and disobedience and sometimes to both.\(^7\) The fear of common folk is usually due to hell-fire and other punishments. This sort of fear can be caused

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1. *Ib*, iv, 176; cf. also *Arb*, 200.
4. *Ib*, iv, 201.
and established by preaching and making people think of the great terror of death. This fear prevents man from attending to the requirements of appetite and leads him to the divine presence.

Here again the basis of fear is the knowledge of God. The one who knows that God is great, that it is He who created Paradise and Hell and the people who will enter them, that the divine decision is completed, sa'āda or shaqāwa of every person is fixed rightly and justly, will definitely have fear in his heart. The degrees of fear vary according to the degrees of knowledge. The highest degree, however, consists of the fear of separation and being veiled from God, which is the fear of ārifūn, and this fear remains as a component element of mahabbā.

There are many references in the Qur'ān and Tradition which show how important and meritorious fear is. One can see this by reflection as well. The merit and virtue of a thing is measured according to its being adequately useful for the attainment of the sa'āda of meeting God in the world to come. Since fear has this virtue and it leads to the attainment of other virtues such as abstinence (wara'ī), piety (taqwā), chastity ('iffa), it can easily be concluded that it is a virtue (fadīla) and it and the virtues to which it leads are praiseworthy and essential for the attainment of

1. Ibid., 208.
2. Ibid., 112.
3. Arb, 197.
4. Th, iv, 198.
5. Ibid., 199.
the nearness to God.\(^1\) No one can be free of such fear, not even the prophets and saints.\(^2\)

Although "fear is a whip with which man is driven to \textit{sa'āda}, it must not go to such an extreme degree that it produces despair which is blameworthy. When fear becomes dominant it should be mixed with hope (\textit{raja'}).\(^3\) According to al-Ghazālī, fear and hope are not opposites but are complementary. It is security (\textit{amn}) which is the opposite of fear, and the opposite of hope is despair.\(^4\) Hope leads us to the search for what is good and desired.\(^5\) Hope is the satisfaction of the heart which is produced in the state of expectation of what is loved.\(^6\) As a motive of action hope is higher than fear. Therefore the nearest people to God are the ones who love Him. In fact love dominates hope.\(^7\)

To go to the extreme in hope results in the abandonment of service to God, and to the extreme in fear, on the other hand, results in obsessive perseverance in service which harms the self. Both of these are deviations from the Golden Mean and therefore blameworthy.\(^8\) \textit{Sa'āda} is obtained through work and struggle, and the one who is in despair will not be able to do this.\(^9\)

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1. \textit{Ibid.}
2. \textit{Ibid.}, 238.
3. \textit{Arb}, 199.
4. \textit{Th}, iv, 201 and 179.
5. \textit{Arb}, 200.
6. \textit{Th}, iv, 177.
All these "saving matters" together with some others such as truthfulness (ṣidq) and sincerity (ikhlāṣ)\(^1\) prepare the way for the love of God and become stronger after this love is established. Now we shall return again to love and its fruits and their relations to ʿaḍa.

It has already been mentioned that love is a natural tendency towards a thing which gives pleasure. Despite the objections of some people, love exists between two people and between man and God. Man loves himself, his existence and perfection. He loves what is beneficial and good. He loves beauty whether it be internal (or moral), or external. He loves God because He is the Most Perfect and Beautiful. This love is sought for its own sake and not for the sake of something else.\(^2\)

Love of God is the ultimate end and the highest of all degrees.\(^3\)

With our physical eyes we perceive physical beauties and with "the light of insight", which is also "the light of faith", "the divine light", we perceive spiritual beauty.\(^4\) In the face of the ultimate beauty of God, this "light" remains weak, therefore man can never reach the end of knowledge and love of God.\(^5\)

God is loved for two basic reasons: for His bounties (iḥsān) and for His perfection and beauty. The former constitutes the love of the common folk (ʿamm), whereas the latter constitutes the love

\(^1\) Ikhlāṣ and ṣidq will be examined later on in connection with the responsibility of man.
\(^2\) Th, iv, 370ff.
\(^3\) Ibid., 365.
\(^4\) Ibid., 372.
\(^5\) Ibid., 400.
of the elect (khāṣṣ), as al-Ghazālī makes al-Junayd say. The elect are not many in number. They love God for His power, beauty and the knowledge of His attributes.¹

The lack of love is due either to the lack of knowledge or to the love of this world and everything that goes with it.² A man who dies with a heart which is full of love for this world will meet destruction. As for the man who dies while he is in the state of loving Him, he will advance towards God, as a good servant will yearn to meet his master. He will face very many difficulties and toils in his way to God, since he yearns to meet Him.³ This is the perfection and sincerity of the heart, and saʿāda depends on this soundness (perfection) of the heart. As the Qurʾān says "the day when neither wealth nor sons shall profit, except for him who comes to God with a pure heart".⁴

The concept of mahabba is directly linked with al-Ghazālī's concept of perfection (kamāl) and domination (istilā'). We have already talked about perfection in connection with the idea of adopting the traits of the character of God. Ultimate perfection and sovereignty belong to God, and man by his very nature loves, and yearns for, perfection and sovereignty. These two are the qualities of the Lord and "Lordship is naturally loved" - a love which derives its basis from the secret ṭūb-Rabb relationship.

¹. Ibid., 421.
². Ibid., 393 and 208.
³. Ibid., 219.
⁴. Ibid., iii, 71. The verse is in Sūra xxvi, 89.
Although nafs realizes the fact that it cannot reach the end of perfection, it never drops the desire for it. It desires and seeks perfection for its own sake.¹

As for domination (istīlā‘) "it generally becomes the object of love, since it is a kind of perfection".² Every man loves to secure his own unique existence through the domination of other things. Therefore he loves having things at his disposal and makes use of them. He cannot, however, have every thing at his disposal. There are things that never change and come under man's influence and control such as God, His essence, attributes and the like. There are things that change but not under man's influence such as stars and the like. And there are things which come under man's control and are changed and used according to man's will such as earthly things (ardiyyāt).

Man loves to see his domination in all these three spheres. In order to dominate the last sphere man needs power (gudra) whose perfection is naturally loved. In the case of the first two spheres knowledge is brought in. Man loves to know God, His attributes, the angels, the wonders of the heavens, "because knowledge is a kind of domination over these things and domination is a kind of perfection".³

As we have mentioned before, al-Ghazālī distinguishes three kinds of perfection: perfection of power, perfection of freedom

1. Th., iii, 348-9.
2. Ibid., 349.
3. Ibid.
from desires and perfection of knowledge. In power there is no real perfection for man. This belongs to God, whereas there is a perfection of knowledge. The relation between man and the objects over which he exerts power will be cut by death. Only the perfection of knowledge and freedom will accompany him after death.¹

From all this it follows that real domination and sovereignty consist in the knowledge of God. Putting the three together real perfection, real sovereignty and real saʿāda result from this knowledge. That is why al-Ghazālī emphatically repeats that "maʿrifat Allah is the end which is sought for its own sake, it is the source of saʿāda and indeed it is saʿāda itself; but the heart is not aware of its being saʿāda itself. It will be aware of it only in the world to come."²

Now this maʿrifah and mahabba are not two entirely separate things. To be sure mahabba follows maʿrifah, but to love God includes the knowledge of Him and it is impossible not to love Him, if real knowledge of Him is possessed. When al-Ghazālī talks about "the seed of ruʿya", or the vision of God, in the world to come, he sometimes says it is mahabba and sometimes it is maʿrifah that changes into vision. However we will come to this later on.

It is this maʿrifah-mahabba which constitutes man's happiness in this world and turns into his happiness in the world to come. The one who loves God will be worthy of God's love and presence.

¹. Ih, iv, 352.
². Ibid., 170.
God will remove the curtain from his heart and he will be able to see Him with his heart. This is the result of God's love for man, which draws him closer to Himself. In fact man's love for God is one of the signs of God's love for man. That is why the Prophet says: "if man loves meeting God, then God loves meeting him." 

Intimacy (uns), satisfaction (riqā'), longing (shawq) and fear (khawf) are all the fruits of maḥabba. Uns, which means the joy of the heart with the contemplation of the divine beauty is obtained through continuous remembrance (dhikr ad-dā'im). Uns and ma'rīfa are the two causes of sa'āda in the world to come. When man attains uns, he desires nothing save being together with God. Uns gives the greatest pleasure to man. Dhikr leads to uns and maḥabba-uns leads to the meeting (liqā') and contemplation (mushāhada).

As for satisfaction (riqā') it is the acquiescence of the heart in whatever God chooses for man and an absolute willingness to accept it. It is patience (ṣabr) that causes, or rather turns

1. Ibid., 408.
2. Ibid., 410.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., 422 and 427.
5. Ibid., 422.
6. Ibid., 456.
8. Ih. iv, 423.
9. Ibid., iii, 273-4.
out to be, riḍā, but is higher than ʿaḥbr.\footnote{1} Mutual satisfaction between man and God (riḍwān) is accepted as the highest degree in Paradise.\footnote{2}

Longing desire, or yearning, too is a fruit of maḥabba. It arises from yearning for the eternal beauty of God to which it has no access at the present and from the realization of the lover's imperfection in the comprehension of His greatness and beauty.\footnote{3} It is natural that man cannot yearn for something which is present.

Al-Ghazālī distinguishes two kinds of shawq. The first is yearning for "perfection of clarity" (kamāl al-wuqūf) which culminates in mushāhāda. This is in fact "a yearning to see" and it will be fulfilled with ruʿya, liqā‘ and mushāhāda (all refer to the same reality) in the world to come. In the second shawq man yearns for God's beauty, greatness, wisdom and so on as known to Him alone. The fulfilment of this shawq is impossible, since God's greatness and beauty are limitless. Aʿrif who arrives at a certain degree of liqā‘ or mushāhāda will see that there are degrees before him. To be sure that man will never be able to obtain a total clarity,\footnote{4} although he will yearn for the complete perfection of wisāl after having reached the root of it (asl al-wisāl).\footnote{5}

\footnotesize{1. \textit{Ib}, iv, 86.}
\footnotesize{2. \textit{Ibid.}, 427-8; cf. above, section on the \textit{saʿāda} in the Qurʿān}
\footnotesize{3. \textit{Ibid.}, 423.}
\footnotesize{5. \textit{Ib}, iv, 403.}
The relation between the "religious stations" (maqāmāt ad-dīn), which are described as preliminary steps for mahābba, and love together with its fruits is very dynamic. Each "station" is a step towards happiness. It seems that al-Ghazālī is not always consistent in the number and order of these "stations". Here consistency is not important in his eyes.

In the fourth quarter of the Ihyā' he gives the list of these "stations" in more than five or six places, though, as we have just said, not exactly the same list. In order to show the connection between these "stations" and sa'āda a list is given below. This list however does not depend on one single passage. A more or less complete list can be found in the Book of Fear and Hope where he also shows how all the "stations" or "virtues" are related to sa'āda. "Virtue" should be understood here in a general fashion. That is to say according to al-Ghazālī whatever helps the attainment of sa'āda is a virtue.  

\[ \text{yāqīn} \] (Belief in God, the Last Day, Paradise, Hell and the like. This is the first stage of ma'rifat, that is to say "asl al-Imān")  

\[ \text{khawf-raja} \] (which leads to such virtues as 'iffa, wara', taqwā and mujāhada)

1. See Ih, iv, 113, 199, 208, 394, 535.  
2. Ibid., 199.  
3. Ibid.  
4. Ih, iv, 199 and 394 and 112.
sabr
    (sometimes mentioned together with tawba)
zuhd
    (domination of desire and the abandonment of the world and its love. Without zuhd there can be no tawakkul (Ib., iv, 339)).

fikr-dhikr

ma'rifa - mahabba
    uns
    riḍa
    khawf
    shawq
    tawakkul

sa'āda in this world

sa'āda, wuṣūl Allah
or wuṣūl ilā jiwār Allah
ladhdhat-an-nazar
ru'ya - liqā'- mushāhada

all these terms refer to sa'āda in the world to come.

The sphere from yaqīn to fikr-dhikr is the sphere of the purification of the heart. In other words it is the stage of "action" ('amal) which is a preparation for knowledge ('ilm).

1. Ibid., 394.
2. Ma'rifa is what the Qur'ān calls "kalima ṭayyiba" (Ibid).
3. Ibid., 199.
4. Ibid., 113.
5. Ibid., 112.
6. Ibid., 390.
7. Ibid., 402-3.
Ma'rifah-mahabba does not enter the heart without fikr-dhikr which is, as it were, a second stage between 'amal and 'ilm. We have already touched on the importance of fikr earlier on in this chapter. "If you are seeker after sa'ads", writes al-Ghazālī, "then leave the world behind you and engage <your> life wholly in necessary thought (fikr al-lāzim) and with continuous rememberance (dhikr ad-dā'im)". Ma'rifah follows fikr, and mahabba and ʿuns are produced by dhikr. Fikr is higher than dhikr, since the former already includes the latter. Constant remembrance, however, establishes things in the heart. In sum, "action" ('amal) depends on the state of the heart (ḥal) which in its turn depends on 'ilm and 'ilm depends on fikr which is the key to all goods.

The starting point, as is clear from all we have said, is a simple belief in the oneness of God (tawḥīd). At every state or "station", man comes to realize this tawḥīd more fully, and at the ultimate stage he is absorbed in this tawḥīd (fanā'). Here he sees nothing but God and this is the contemplation of ʿiddiqūn. Here he also finds himself in the highest degree of reliance on God (tawakkul) and as the Qurʾān says "God loves those who rely on Him".

1. Ih, iv, 394.
2. Ibid., 397.
3. Ibid., 529.
4. Ibid.
5. Ih, iv, 305f.
6. Ibid., 303.
Now to say that at every stage man comes to know God more is tantamount to saying that at every stage man becomes more happy, since happiness consists in the knowledge of God. The most pleasurable thing in life is to know Him and to see Him. There is no pleasure which can be higher than the pleasure which is produced through knowledge of God. This constitutes man's highest happiness in this world.

Although it might be appropriate to pass to the question of ru'ya in which as-sa'āda al-haqqiyya consists, we will leave this to the next chapter where sa'āda will be viewed from the eschatological standpoint. The aim of this chapter is just to show how far man can go in this life. We have seen that al-Ghazālī made it clear that man, due to the secret relationship between himself and God, can ascend to a stage where he loses the sight of everything, including himself, save God. Man, however, can never have an actual contact with God. Therefore there is no unity and inherence between the two. What man can manage to obtain is just divine proximity (qurb). Unity is not possible even in the world to come.

So far we have talked about what one can call the highest degree of sa'āda. In other words we have talked about muqarrabūn and have said practically nothing about those who are not, for some reason, in a position to go through all the stages which are mentioned in

1. Ibid., 382.
2. Ibid., 386.
3. For most of the points which are dealt with in this chapter, especially for mahabba, cf. Wensinck, La pensée de Ghazzalī, ch. v, pp. 127ff; and F. Jabre, Ma'rifā, ch. III.
the foregoing pages. Those who attain salvation and the lower
degree of sa‘āda in the world to come are called, no doubt after
the Qur'ān, "the People of Right" (aṣḥāb al-yamīn). They attain
sa‘āda not through personal experience of the Truth but through
accepting the realities by naive belief (taqlīd).

v) Sa‘āda through Taqlīd

Like al-Fārābī, al-Ghazālī too believes that most men cannot
know the realities of things as they really are. Al-Fārābī believed
that the people who cannot be one of the wise men (ḥukamā’) can be
saved from destruction by following the wise and becoming the
believers (mu‘minūn) in ḥukamā’. As we have pointed out earlier
on, this division occurs in al-Ghazālī not as ḥukamā’ and mu‘minūn
but as ‘ārifūn, or mugarrabūn, and muqallidūn.

Al-Fārābī accepts "imagination" of realities as some kind of
knowledge and a legitimate way of salvation.¹ Al-Ghazālī too
accepts taqlīd as some kind of knowledge and a means to salvation.
It is due to its being accepted as knowledge that taqlīd becomes
the subject of this chapter which is mainly about the relation
between ma‘rifaa and sa‘āda.

Taqlīd, which is defined as accepting something on authority
without needing a proof,² is a very general term. In its broadest
sense it includes ‘ārifūn as well as muqallidūn. In the imitation

¹ See above, section on 'Cognition and Imagination'.
² It, iv, 34 and 63.
of the Prophet, for instance, everybody is a muqallid, since whatever the Prophet did or said has direct bearing on the happiness of the believer in this life and in the life to come. But this is not really the technical meaning of the term. A clear distinction is always made between knowledge reached through "revelation" (kashf), or "immediate experience" (dhawq) or "investigation" (tahhiq) and knowledge which is attained through taqlid.

Al-Ghazālī repeats again and again that what is necessary for sa'āda in general is faith which comes either through taqlid or tahlīq. A man is himself either in the Way (sālik) through which he has personal and immediate experience of the truth (dhawq) and arrives at "certainty itself" ('ayn al-yaqīn) or he himself is not sālik but believes in it and accepts it. The latter does not arrive at 'ayn al-yaqīn but at "the knowledge of yaqīn" ('ilm al-yaqīn).

Only the people who belong to either 'ayn al-yaqīn or 'ilm al-yaqīn will attain happiness. The one who is outside these two groups will not be judged with the believers on the Day of Judgement. In the Iljām, which is supposed to be the last work of al-Ghazālī, he says very emphatically that "sa'iḍ is the one who believes the profound reality of truth in that which concerns God, His attributes, His books, His messengers and the Last Day as they

1. Arb, 94; Ḩ, iv, 217-8.
2. Ḩ, iv, 268-9.
really are". Even if his belief were not based on any theological proof, he would still be sa'Id. The important thing is to have the profound reality of truth (haqiqat al-ḥaqiq) in the heart. How it came to be in the heart is less important. If the form, or image, (ṣūra) that exists in the heart is in conformity with the reality, then there is no reason to ask whether its cause is a real proof or an acceptance by "the proof of persuasion" or just acceptance on authority (taqlid). What the Law demands is the right belief.

The degree of 'ārif is higher than that of mugallid; this cannot be denied, but all the same 'ārif and mugallid are both believers. Both will be sa'Id, though the degrees of their happiness will vary. As for the difference between the theologians (mutakallimūn) and those whose belief depends on authority in respect of sa'āda, al-Ghazālī does not seem to see any difference.

The belief of the theologian is strengthened by proof and not by mukāshafa and mushāhada. It has nothing to do with "immediate experience" and therefore the belief by proof cannot be very far from the degree of taqlid.

In order to secure salvation, however, the knowledge which is accepted on authority and the form or image, which is present in the heart should be the knowledge and the image of truth

1. Iljām, 79.
2. Ibid.; cf. also Ih, i, 163 and 217.
3. Iljām, 80.
4. Ih, iii, 20-1.
(taqlīd al-haqq) and not of falsehood (taqlīd al-bāṣīl). Like most of the Muslims, the Jews and Christians too, for example, are content with taqlīd; that is to say with what they hear from their mothers and fathers. Such taqlīd does not grant salvation for Jews and Christians because what is handed down from their fathers and mothers is false (khaṭa‘).

This attitude towards the Jews and Christians is quite consistent with al-Ghazālī’s doctrine of sa‘āda in general. As has been pointed out many times, sa‘āda depends on the knowledge of God, His attributes and His angels as they really are. Neither the knowledge nor the images that Christians and Jews possess are in conformity with the truth, though they are nearer to the truth than the knowledge and images given by other religions.

We have seen earlier on that al-Fārābī too expressed similar views, though in a more general and abstract way. He too believes that some religious representations are nearer to the truth (meaning probably Islamic representation) than others. It must be remembered however that al-Fārābī seems to accept religion in general as an imitation of philosophical truth. Al-Ghazālī, on the other hand, does not even accept an equation, let alone superiority of philosophical truth, between religious and philosophic wisdom.

Al-Ghazālī does not exalt taqlīd as a way to happiness, but he accepts it as a matter of fact. We are told that in Islamic

1. Arb, 47; Ih, iv, 9 and 217.
2. Ih, iii, 20-1.
3. See above, p.54.
history there are some objections to the idea that mere taqlīd is sufficient for the attainment of happiness.\textsuperscript{1} Al-Ghazālī on the other hand, believes that such objections are baseless from the point of view of the ability of most men and from the point of view of the demands of the Law. With his idea of what can be called 'the economy of teaching', al-Ghazālī takes up and explains the first point. Having done this he goes to the second point and asks whether the Law demands the highest degree of ma'rifā and thus sa'āda.

To refer to the title of Iljām al-'awāmm' an 'ilm al-kalām and to its subject-matter is enough to show the importance and the necessity of the economy of teaching. Al-Ghazālī holds this view, because he, like al-Farābī and in fact many Muslim thinkers, believes that most men are incapable of understanding the subtleties of theological arguments. His acceptance of this view is due to this deep understanding of human weakness and to his ultimate concern with the happiness of the common folk and definitely not to his "intellectual snobbism" as is sometimes suggested. "The safety (salāma) of the common folk consists in their busying themselves with good deeds and not with exposing themselves to what is beyond their ability."\textsuperscript{2} It should be remembered that salaf too were prohibited from speculating and indulging in theological matters.\textsuperscript{3}

\begin{itemize}
\item[1.] D.B. Maccadnald, Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory, (New York, 1926), pp. 316, 318.
\item[2.] **Ibn**, iv, 218.
\item[3.] Ibid.
\end{itemize}
What is proper for the common folk is just to believe and occupy themselves with their worship of God and with the acquisition of their own daily necessities, leaving knowledge to the learned. It were better for an ordinary man to steal and commit adultery than to occupy himself with theological matters. The one who enters theological discourse about God and his religion without adequate knowledge will find himself in front of unbelief (kufr) without realizing it.¹

Al-Ghazālī's deep concern with the happiness of the Muslims in general led him to concentrate his effort to keep them away from the harmful discussions of philosophers, the irresponsible ecstatic utterances of some ṣūfis and the hair-splitting discussions of the theologians. His personal excitement and involvement with ṣūfistic dhawq, however, sometimes makes him neglect, if not forget, this weakness of the common folk and start talking about matters that should not be discussed, according to him, in books written for the generally educated public rather than for specialists. After all, the protests that arose against this aspect of al-Ghazālī's writings from different quarters especially from some North African and Spanish Muslim writers including Ibn Rushd were not unjustified.

Although he says very clearly the term sa'īd applies to both the people of taqlīd and the people of dhawq, he does not hesitate to add that the happiness of the former cannot be compared with that

¹. Ib., iii, 46-7.
of the latter. How great the difference is between the one who believes that there is such a thing as sickness and the one who really experiences that sickness! "Therefore strive to be one of the people of mushāhada". It would not be fair to say that al-Ghazālī himself studied all the different branches of science while he was preventing others from doing the same.

The difference between sa‘āda which is reached by taqlīd and that which is reached by ma‘rifat-maḥabba will become clear when we come to the position of "the People of Right" (aṣḥāb al-yāmīn) and that of muqarrabūn in Paradise in the next chapter. Now we will turn to our second point, namely how much does the law demand from a believer? In other words is it a religious obligation (wājib) to try to attain the highest degree of ma‘rifat in this world and the ultimate sa‘āda in the world to come? It must be said, however, that this question is a legal and practical one rather than a theoretical one, but due to its close connection with the subject under discussion we prefer to answer it here.

In the Book of Repentance of Ḥyā’ al-Ghazālī tries to answer the question why repentance is necessary in all conditions. In other words why does one have to repent if one has not committed any crime? According to al-Ghazālī it would be a very limited way of looking at the concept of repentance, if we accepted it as a state of mind when confronted by an obvious wrongdoing. Repentance

1. Arb, 57.
2. Such a view was entertained in Z. Mubārak's Akhlāq 'ind al-Ghazālī (Cairo, 1924), Section 14.
3. Ḥ, iv, 5ff.
al-Ghazālī writes, is a transference (intiqa‘) from the causes of imperfection to perfection. Now the heart can never be free of imperfection and so it can never be free of repentance. Ultimate perfection, as it has been said many times, consists in the knowledge of God. Man's failure to grasp the real essence of this knowledge is an imperfection (naqṣ). It logically follows that in his ascending towards God man has always to turn from a less perfect degree to a more perfect one and there is no final end for his journey. Al-Ghazālī has, however, made the reader to say that all these come under "virtues" (fada‘l) and not under "religious duties" (farā‘iḍ), and this leads us to the dismissal of the idea that "repentance is wājib in all conditions. In these matters it is not wājib, because the realization of kamāl itself is not wājib according to the Law."¹

Al-Ghazālī's long explanation of this question can be summarized something like this: He accepts that not all the degrees of perfection are wājib. It is impossible to think otherwise. Supposing that all men were obliged by the Law to fear God with a true fear, they would all abandon the acquisition of their daily necessities and reject the world altogether, which would destroy life. But when the attainment of divine proximity and the most praised degree of truthful people are desired, then repentance becomes wājib in everything which is needed for the attainment of this degree.²

1. Ibid., 13.
2. Ibid., 13-14.
In short some obligations are put forward by the Law, and others become obligations not by the Law but by the very nature of a situation in which man wants to find himself.

This distinction between two meanings of wājib helps him to analyse the positions of mugarrabūn and muqallidūn from an ethico-legal point of view. Moreover this distinction leads to the distinction between mere salvation (asl an-najāt) and the ultimate sa'āda in the world to come. It is this aspect of the problem which interests us here.¹

With respect to religion, al-Ghazālī divides people into two: those whose power is limited and who are restrained (qāsir) and the happy (sa‘īd). The former cannot go beyond taqlīd in his pace and needs to listen to the words (nass) of the Qur'ān or the Traditions of the Prophet. The latter does not need a nass for every thing they do. His breast has been opened wide for Islam which is a light from his Lord, and the light of the Qur'ān and faith shines in his heart. Thanks to "the light of insight", he knows that the meaning of wājib, for instance, is that which is necessary for the attainment of eternal sa'āda and salvation from the eternal destruction. "Since if there were no bearing of doing and not doing of an action on sa'āda and shagāwa, there would be no meaning in its being described as wājib."² Now as soon as he realises that the obligatoriness (wujūbiyya) of an action should be thought of in terms of sa'āda

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid., 6.
and that there is no saʿāda in the world to come except in meeting God and that whoever is veiled from Him becomes shaqī, the departure from the way which leads away from Him becomes wājib for the attainment of divine proximity. It is obvious that this stage is too high for the common folk and therefore they can only secure their salvation (najāt) through taqūd.¹

What becomes clear from all this is that the basic obligatory actions which are included in general legal decisions (fatwā al-ʿāmma) can only lead to what can be called "the basis of salvation" (aṣl an-najāt) after which there are different kinds of happiness (saʿādāt). In order to make a clear distinction between this aṣl an-najāt and saʿāda, al-Ghazālī makes a comparison between "life" (ḥayāt) and najāt. The one, al-Ghazālī argues, who wants to be a perfect man in a physical sense needs eyes, ears, hands, feet and so on. It is with the help of these he will be able to attain the high degrees in this life and realise fully his humanity. But if the one is only interested in and satisfied with the basis of life (aṣl-al-ḥayāt) and is content with being like a piece of flesh on a butcher's block or like a piece of thrown-away cloth, he does not need his eyes, ears and so forth. In the same way, any one who is satisfied with his being saved from destruction (najāt) does not have to do anything more than he ought to do, that is to say more than what is wājib for him. The prophets, the saints and the

¹ Ibid.
learned however cannot be content with mere salvation. Their desire and ambition consist in sa‘āda which is beyond this najāt; that is why they refuse the pleasures of this world altogether. ¹ As soon as they start struggling towards sa‘āda, then everything which is indispensable for its attainment becomes wālib, though it was not so before their decision to struggle for sa‘āda. The one who wants the benefit of the worship of tātawwū‘ has to do the required cleaning, but if he wants to deprive himself of the merits of tātawwū‘ he does not have to do such cleaning. In the first case cleanliness is wālib, in the second case it is not. ²

Here the importance of ‘ibāda in general and that of nawāfil in particular comes in. For the attainment of sa‘āda not only the prescribed duties but also nawāfil are indispensable. To this we will come later on when we come to al-Ghazālī’s rejection of Bātinism and some of the philosophers and Sufis who hold that when man reaches a certain degree, he becomes perfect. After that he needs no worship nor does he have anything to repent, which goes against al-Ghazālī’s idea that man never becomes absolutely perfect and therefore he has to turn from a less perfect degree to a more perfect one. This is what repentance means in the opinions of the people of insight.

This long parenthesis seemed to us necessary for a clear understanding of the distinction between ma‘rifa and taqlīd and

1. Ibid., 14.
2. Ibid.
between what is wājib and what is not in respect of saʿāda and najāt. We have not said anything, however, about the real distinction between "the happy" (saʿīd) and "the saved" (nājī) in the life to come. This is the subject of the next chapter.

Whatever man does in this world is a preparation for the world to come. Saʿāda in the ultimate sense belongs to the world to come; and whatever man does in his earthly life is nought but a preparation for this saʿāda.
CHAPTER SIX

THE ULTIMATE SA'ĀDA IN THE WORLD TO COME AND ITS IMPORTANCE IN THE ESCHATOLOGY OF AL-GHAZĀLĪ

1) The position of the Sa'īd During Dying and in his Grave

2) The concluding stage of life (al-Khātima)

"A man dies according as he lives" is one of the statements which occurs in many places of Ḥyā'. To this he sometimes adds the sentence that "man will be raised on the Day of Judgement according as he died."²

Like al-Fārābī, al-Ghazālī believes that a good man does not fear dying, though he wishes to live long in order to multiply his good deeds.³ Thinking about death and remembering it, however, bring many advantages and affect man's purpose. To be mindful of death brings about a dislike of this world, which is the fountainhead of all goods, and it leads to many ideas and reflections which eventually make him sa'īd.⁴ To be unmindful of it, on the other hand, is absolute ignorance and it is due to long indulgence of hope (ṭūl al-amal).⁵

We know very little about the reality of death. The people of insight give us general information on the conditions of the dying people, and mainly on people's being divided into shaqī and

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1. Ḥy, iv, 216, 221.
2. Ibid., 221 and 223.
3. See above, section on 'Death, its Anxiety and Happiness'.
4. Arb, 275-6; Ḥy, iv, 208.
5. Arb, 277.
but what will happen to individuals cannot be determined. 1

Al-Ghazālī himself attaches a great deal of importance to the "concluding stage" of man's life (al-khātima). It seems that man will be able to know whether he is saʿād or shaqī during the agony of death (sakarāt al-mawt). When a man dies while the love of this world is still dominant in his heart, his condition will be very perilous, since "man dies according as he lives". To think that man's rūḥ will be snatched away while he is in this stage inspires fear and terror. This is because man knows that the condition of the heart does not change after death. The quality (ṣīfa) of the heart is changed with the works of the physical organs. When these organs are nullified the work will be nullified too. He knows equally well that there is no chance of coming to this world again and of obtaining of what has already been missed. In such circumstances his grief will greatly increase. Only the basic faith and love of God which are established in the heart and strengthened with good actions can erase from the heart this state into which it falls during dying. This is only one of the two degrees of 'Bad Ending' (sūʿ-al-khātima). 2

The other degree which is greater than this consists in the condition of the heart which is overtaken by either doubt or denial during the agony of death. If the spirit is snatched away while the heart is in one of these conditions, there comes to be a veil

1. Ы, iv, 625; cf. also Ы, 31.
2. Ы, iv, 216.
between man and God which leads to eternal separation and endless punishment.¹ 'Bad Ending' is the beginning of a miserable life which can be temporary (the first case) or eternal (the second case).

When death approaches and the forelock of the Angel of death becomes visible to man, he often knows that what he has believed through ignorance is false. This is because the state of death is that of the removing of a curtain. Some matters may be disclosed to man while he is in this state. The "innovator" (mubtadi‘) for example will know the true nature of his innovation (bid‘a) by which al-Ghazālī means the belief of a man in the essence of God, His attributes and His actions contrary to what they really are. Whether he obtained his belief through his own speculation and reflection or through taqlīd will not change this situation. The disclosure that he believed in some matters due to ignorance will be a cause of his making void of the rest of what he believed or of his having doubt in it. Now if his rūh is snatched away at this stage before he can stand firm and turn to the foundation of faith, he will finish his life with 'Bad Ending' and his rūh will leave him when he is in the state of polytheism (shirk).²

Another thing that may cause šaqa wa during the departure of rūh, that is to say during the agony of death, is the weakness of faith in the foundation, and the domination of the love of this

1. Ibid., 215-6.
2. Ibid., iv, 217; cf. also 628.
world in the heart. When the agony of death comes, the love of God becomes even weaker, since the love of this world is dominant in the heart and the pain of separation from this world overtakes the heart. Man in this state hates death and God, since death is from Him. If the spirit is taken away while there is hatred, and not love, in the heart the concluding act will be bad again.  

As for the one who dies as a lover of God, he will go towards God like a servant who yearns to meet his master. This does not mean that they do not fear the 'Bad Ending'. As a matter of fact 'ārifūn and even the prophets have always been perplexed by and feared the agony of death and the 'Bad Ending', since they know what these are all about.  

The obedient man realizes during dying that he is sa‘īd. His rūḥ will be taken away without probably much difficulty. He may see the Angel of death in its most beautiful form, and he may even know what sort of place he is given in Paradise. The wretched people too will know something about their places in Hell. Dying and seeing the Angel of death will be a great punishment for them. This is briefly the position of sa‘īd and shaqī during dying.  

2) The grave as a place of sa‘āda or shaqāwa  

As the Tradition states, "the grave is either a pit of the pits

1. Ibid., 219.  
2. Ibid.  
3. Ibid., 578 and 574.  
5. Ibid.  
of fire or one of the meadows of Paradise." Whoever denies this is an innovator who is veiled from the light of God. To the grave of the person who has deserved punishment seventy doors of Hall will be opened, although the ignorant man looks into the grave and says that he sees nothing. Such ignorance is due to the love of this world in his heart. It seems that the interrogation of the angels Munkar and Nakir takes place first and then begins the punishment which may vary. Shaqi tastes all different kinds of punishment unless God shows His mercy.

It must not be supposed that dust consumes the place of faith, i.e. ruh. Until the Book reaches its term dust will consume all the organs and disperses them but not ruh. When the term is completed all the separate organs will be gathered together and ruh will be brought back. From the time of death until this return ruh will have been either in the crops of the green birds which are suspended beneath the Throne ('arsh), if ruh were sa'Id, or in a state which is different from this one, if it were shaqi.

It is not very easy to determine what is really meant by this Tradition about "ruh's residence in the crops of the green birds." L. Gardet sees a connection between this Tradition and the theory of "celestial bodies" (al-mawād̩ al-jismānī), which seems to have

1. Ṭb, iv, 216; cf. Md, 59.
2. Arb, 286.
3. Ṭb, iv, 216-7.
4. Ibid., 217.
5. Cf. Gardet, La pensée religieuse d'Avicenne, 10ff.
been held by some Muslim writers according to Ibn Sīnā.\footnote{1} We will come to this theory and its relevance to our subject when we deal with the souls of the "Weak" (bulh) later in this chapter.

What is clear is that before man eventually enters Paradise or Hell he has to go through many stages all of which are parts of a happy or miserable eternal life after death. Sa'id does not become sa'id after, as it were, the official declaration which seems to take place after the Scale (mizān). When man's good deeds weigh the heavier an angel will declare that "so and so has been blessed with sa'āda after which there is no shaqāwa" and the people will hear what the angel says. The declaration of shaqāwa will be made in the case of the shaqī too.\footnote{2} The sa'id will be treated as sa'id from the agony of death onwards and the shaqī will meet what he deserves. Every stage which takes place before Hell-fire is a kind of punishment for the shaqī.

Al-Ghazālī finds it useful to repeat almost all the colourful descriptions of the punishment of grave then in vogue in Islamic eschatological literature.\footnote{3} Al-Ghazālī believes that punishment in the grave exists; we cannot see it because our eyes are not made to see what belongs to the world of malakūt.\footnote{4} The pain of a shaqī in his grave is a double one: separation from what he loves and the meeting of the things that cause pain. Al-Ghazālī says

\footnote{1. N.B., 110.}
\footnote{2. Th, iv, 646. For this formal declaration see also pp. 635, 636, 638.}
\footnote{3. Cf. Ibid., 618ff.}
\footnote{4. Ibid., 621.}
that the pain which is caused by separation from what one loves will be greater than the biting of snakes and scorpions.\footnote{Ibid., 623.} The more one loves this world the greater one's punishment will be in the grave. According to al-Ghazālī the number of the snakes and scorpions will be multiplied in the grave of, for example, a rich man who loved this world more than he did God.

In respect of the acceptance of the existence of the snakes and scorpions and the pain they cause, al-Ghazālī mentions three stages. Firstly the acceptance of their existence and the pain which is caused by their biting. Secondly the acceptance of the pain without trying to prove whether we can see or imagine the snake, since this will not change the fact that pain is there. This situation resembles the case of a man who sees a snake and feels the pain caused by its biting in his dream. Neither he nor we can see it in the physical sense, but pain and snake are there. And thirdly the acceptance of the fact that a snake itself does not cause pain. It is its poison which gives pain. In fact it is not even the poison \textit{per se} but its effect on man that causes pain. If it were possible to produce such an effect without poison, the suffering would be there. \footnote{Ibid., 622.} It is not possible, however, to define that sort of punishment as pain without relating it to the cause which habitually produces that pain. The important thing is the effect and not the cause, since the latter is desired for the former and not for its own sake.
From this al-Ghazālī advances to the idea that the destructive qualities (āṣ-ṣifāt al-muhlikāt) turn out to be the pain givers in the soul during dying; their pain is like the pain which is caused by the biting of a snake, although there exists no snake. In other words it is evil deeds that cause a pain which resembles the pain which is produced by the snake.1 Some people accept the first and reject the other two and some accept the last and reject the others. Al-Ghazālī is of the opinion that all of these are possible and a believer should believe so.

With the last point al-Ghazālī gives the snakes and scorpions an ontological status. It appears that this idea has led as-Suhrawardī to think of the existence of a new realm between the spiritual and the physical.2 The last alternative that al-Ghazālī mentions was held by al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā though al-Fārābī does not say anything about the punishment of the grave and other eschatological matters. He simply believes that it is evils that cause pain and lead man to shaqāwa. In the analysis of the third alternative al-Ghazālī might have borrowed some materials from al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā.3

To go in detail into the accounts of sa‘īd and shaqi and to give all the colourful eschatological descriptions of these two classes is neither possible nor indeed relevant here. Although al-Ghazālī believes every word he says, his primary object in his

1. Ibid.
description of these eschatological scenes is the improvement of the life of Muslims here. Think of the moment, says al-Ghazālī, when you will be declared as saʿīd. This will be your time of joy and happiness. Your face will be illuminated like the moon on the day of Badr, and people will look at you and envy your goodness and beauty. The angels will walk around you and announce that there will be no shagāwa for you after that moment. After this, al-Ghazālī turns to the case of shaqī which is even more descriptive. These descriptions have had an enormous influence on the life of common folk and on that of the learned alike throughout Islamic history, and in all these the Qurʾān is the source of inspiration.

In his analysis of the 'Ending' (khatm), the agony of death, interrogation, the punishment of the grave and what happens on the Day of Judgement, al-Ghazālī concentrates on two major classes of people, namely saʿīd and shaqī. The matter, however, is more complicated than this. In order to understand the real nature of the otherworldly saʿāda and shagāwa, a close examination of all classes in the world to come is necessary, since different classes of people correspond to varying degrees of saʿāda and shagāwa.

ii) The Classification of People in the World to Come.

Al-Ghazālī, like al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, believes that the quality of life in the world to come depends on the quality of life on earth. "We say", writes al-Ghazālī, "that people in the world to

1. Ih, iv, 650.
come are divided into different classes and their degrees and ranks in saʿāda and shaqāwā vary so much that they cannot come under any definite classification as they differ in saʿāda and shaqāwā in this world. The otherworld does not certainly differ in this respect.....we say that people in the world to come are necessarily divided into four classes: The perished or the doomed (hālikūn), the punished (muʿādhdhabūn), the saved (nājīn) and the rewarded (fāʿizūn).1 Al-Ghazālī illustrates this division with the example of the conquest of a king: when the king brings a country under his domination his treatment of the different classes of people in this newly conquered land varies. He kills some of them (hālikūn) and tortures some others (muʿādhdhabūn). He frees some and lets them go (nājīn) and he rewards some others (fāʿizūn). All of these classes vary within themselves. Not everybody deserves the same punishment or reward.2

In the same manner the four classes in the world to come vary within themselves. Some of the fāʿizūn, for instance, will dwell in the garden of 'adn, some in the garden of maʿwā and some in the garden of firdaws. The ones who are punished are also divided into those who are punished for a short period and those who are punished for from one thousand to seven thousand years.3 Now let us take each of these four classes separately.

1. Ḥ, iv, 30.
2. Ibid., 30-1.
3. Ibid., 31.
1. The destroyed (hālikūn)

Al-Ghazālī uses quite a variety of words to describe this class: the veiled (mahjubūn), the hopeless (āyisūn), the ignorant (jābilūn), the weak (qāsirūn), the disobedient, the deniers (jāhidūn) to mention only a few. Al-Ghazālī defines hālikūn as the people who deny God, His prophets and His Messengers. We know that "the other-worldly saʿāda consists in closeness to God and gazing on His face and so it cannot be attained except through maʿrīfā which is interpreted as faith and acceptance. Those who reject are the disbelievers and those who deny the truth are the ones who deprive themselves of the mercy of God for ever." These people are veiled from God and forever there is between God and them a veil. They will be burnt with the fire of separation which is worse than the fire that burns physical objects.1 These people are not only ignorant but unbelievers as well.

Halāk, according to al-Ghazālī, is not a destruction in the ontological sense "It is the lack of pleasure and of the qualities of perfection".2 Therefore the term can be used for the state of those who lack all qualities of perfection, as in the state of the unbeliever, or for those who lack some qualities of perfection as in the case of a sinful believer. In the first case halāk refers to a permanent condition, whereas in the second it refers to a

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1. Ṭb, iv, 31.
2. Ṭb, iii, 352.
temporary one. However, since we have only one class of the people who are punished (mu‘adhdhabūn) here in a division, the term hālikūn is used for people for whom there is no hope of happiness. The same thing can be said about the term mahjubūn or the veiled which is usually used as an opposite of the term wāsilūn.\(^1\) Eternal shaqāwa is only for this class of people.

It is unbelief which brings about eternal destruction. It is a poison, the Prophet tells us, and it leads to destruction, whereas belief is a cure and the cause of happiness (muṣ‘īd). In this respect the terms hālik and sa‘āda are opposites.\(^2\) In a general sense what leads to destruction is explained in the third volume, i.e. rub‘ al-muhlikāt, of the Ḣiyā‘.

Al-Ghazālī’s class of hālikūn corresponds to the "imperfect and impure" class of falāsifa. As a matter of fact he uses the term hālik when he gives the falāsifa’s definition of the imperfect and impure character in Tahāfut al-falāsifa. "Hālik is the one who lacks in moral character and knowledge". The one who combines these two perfections is ʿārif and saʿīd.\(^3\) So here again the terms hālik and saʿīd are opposites.

2) Those who are punished (muʿadhdhabūn)

This class of people believe in God and His Messengers but they lack the fulfilment of the requirements of this faith. They are

1. Ḥ, 14.
2. Ḥ, 87; cf. Ḥ, iv, 388-9.
3. Ḥ, 272.
imperfect in respect of the degrees of qurb and every imperfection is accompanied by two kinds of fire: the fire of separation and the hell-fire as described by the Qur'an. Anyone who deviates from the right path will be punished by both kinds of fire, though the degree of such punishment varies in accordance with the strength or weakness of faith as well as in accordance with the involvement with desire.¹

There are many sorts of punishment in the world to come, the lowest degree being the punishment which is caused by discussion over man's sins during Counting.² The one who has the basic faith, however, will eventually be freed from punishment, since, as the Prophet narrated, God said "My mercy surpasses My anger."³

The difference between this class and the people who are destroyed is obvious. In the case of the unbeliever the non-existence of faith darkens the heart to the core. The heart of the believer, however weak his faith may be, is not so corrupted, though it is tarnished through the performance of evil deeds. There is still a place for purification. For this reason it will be plunged into the fire, but when the purification is completed it will become worthy of Paradise which is promised by the Law.⁴

In connection with the people who will be subjected to transient pain there are two points which must be taken into consideration:

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1. İh, iv, 33.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., 34.
4. Ibid., 389.
Grave sin (fisq) and Intercession (shafā‘a).

a) Fāsiq

We have already had a lengthy discussion on fāsiq in al-Fārābī. According to falāsifa, writes al-Ghazālī "one who combines moral and intellectual greatness is the devout sage; and his reward will be absolute bliss. He who has intellectual, but not moral greatness is an irreligious scholar; the punishment awarded to him will last a long time. But it will not be perpetual, for after all his soul had been perfected by knowledge......He who has virtue but not knowledge will yet be saved and will experience no pain. But he will not attain perfect bliss."¹

Here, as in many parts of his account of falāsifa, al-Ghazālī's source is not al-Fārābī but Ibn Sīnā, who gives his four-fold classification of men in ma‘rifat-an-nafs and in najāt.² These four classes are: The people who are perfect in knowledge and in action; the people who lack both; the people who have knowledge but lack good deeds; and lastly the people who are perfect in action, but not in knowledge.³ In ma‘rifat-an-nafs Ibn Sīnā combines the third and the fourth classes and brings the number down to three. He also says that his division is based on the division made by the Qur‘ān in Sūra lvi, 7-11. We have already discussed this verse in our first chapter.

¹. T, 272-3; English trns., 234.
². N.B., p. 94.
³. Ibid.
As we have pointed out, while we were dealing with al-Fārābī's account of ḥāṣiq, that ḥāṣiqūn constitute al-Fārābī's class of ṣahāwa. We are not told that these people will one day join the people of ṣaʿāda. Al-Ghazālī seems to have missed this point. In the passage of Tahāfut which has just been quoted, his description of ḥāṣiq, i.e. ḥāṣiq learned, does not differ from the generally accepted view, including his own, of ḥāṣiq. In the Maqāṣid al-Ghazālī says that according to ṣafāsīfā, when the soul gains knowledge, the rational part of the soul gains perfection. If a man with this perfection follows his appetite, he will find himself in a very painful condition. On the one hand he will be drawn towards heavenly and perfect beings thanks to the perfection of the rational part of the soul and on the other hand he will be drawn towards lowest nature because his appetite will not leave him. ¹ This is indeed the opinion of al-Fārābī which is also adopted by al-Ghazālī himself. The difficulty arises when we follow al-Ghazālī's argument a little further. He says that again according to ṣafāsīfā this pain is not eternal. After this what al-Ghazālī ascribes to ṣafāsīfā seems to be in close agreement with a generally held orthodox view. We are told that the position of ḥāṣiq will be worse than that of ḥāṣiqūn, according to ṣafāsīfā. Supposing that a king is killed, writes al-Ghazālī, leaving two children behind. One of the children is an infant who knows nothing about wealth, property and such like, and the other is old enough to know all

¹ Maqāṣid, p. 375.
about these goods. It is quite obvious that the last knows what he has missed and suffers intensely, whereas the infant will not suffer. That is why the Prophet says that those who do not act according to what they know, in other words the learned who lack moral perfection, will receive the most painful punishment.¹

In the Tahāfut he takes up the same idea and here again he says that according to falāsifa "whoever has the theoretical virtues but not the moral ones is called a dissolute learned (al- físīq)" whose punishment will not be for ever.²

It is quite clear from what we are told in the Maqāsid and in Tahāfut al-falāsifa that the term físīq reminds us of físīq in Ibn Sīnā and not in al-Fārābī. The harsh treatment of físīq by al-Fārābī does not appear in either of these two works.

As for the treatment of físīq in al-Ghazālī's ihyā', arba'īn and other works, he agrees entirely with the generally accepted Sunnite point of view. The term físq is usually linked with the term "disobedience" ('išyān);³ it leads to the abandonment of other-worldly actions for the sake of this world.⁴ Freedom from físq leads to the lower degree of piety (warā') and to moral justice or equilibrium. After this stage it is possible to move towards the piety of the righteous (ṣāliḥūn), then to that of muttaqūn and then to siddiqūn.⁵ Fisq is a deviation from the right path or the

¹. Ibid., 375; cf. also Ib., iv, 10.
2. I., 273.
3. Ib., i, 343.
4. Arb, 205.
5. Ibid., 63-4.
Golden Mean. To define āsiq in terms of deviation from the Golden Mean is accepted by Ibn Misāmayh as well.¹

It appears that āsiq not only performs evil actions but also takes pride in his ability to perform them. Āsiq thinks that perfection consists in possessing wealth and having a sinful and immoral relationship with women and lads² - an idea of perfection which is also defended by the people of the "āsiq cities" of al-Fārābī. Talking of the improvement of the character of different classes of people, al-Ghazālī says that it is very difficult and rare to improve the character of a person who not only performs evil actions but enjoys doing so. His case however is better than the case of the sharīr who, in addition to performing evil actions and enjoying what he does, misleads other people as well.³

In al-Fārābī's account of āsiq these two qualities are combined. It is very strange indeed that al-Ghazālī says very clearly that according to the Mu'tazilites āsiq will eternally remain outside the people of sa'āda;⁴ but he seems to favour the idea that falāsifa did not believe that āsiq would not join the people of happiness. Al-Ghazālī accuses the Mu'tazilites of failure to understand the Qur'ānic verses on which they based their argument. Repeating one of his favourite analogies, al-Ghazālī says that the case of āsiq is like that of a man who loses his legs or arms. Though he is not a complete man, nevertheless he is still a man.

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1. Tahdīb, p. 207.
2. Ib., iii, 437.
3. Ib., iv, 73.
4. Ibid., i, 160.
It is true that fāsiq is not a perfect believer, but he has faith all the same.¹

Al-Ghazālī never fails to agree with the Muʿtazilites that there is a relationship between evil deeds and the weakness of faith.² Fisq is a consciously disobedient act which makes fāsiq a more dangerous person not only from the point of view of otherworldly saʿāda but from the view of the socio-political stability of the Islamic community. The Bāṭinites were very successful, for example, among those who were fallen into fisq.³ Unlike the Muʿtazilites, however, he asserted that one day fāsiq will be forgiven and accepted into the community of the happy. It is to this the Prophet referred when he said that whoever possesses an atom of faith in his heart, and whoever confesses the Unity of God will eventually enter Paradise.

The idea that fāsiq or shaqi will eventually become saʿīd cannot however be defended without accepting the idea that man, or to use al-Ghazālī's own term, the heart, will gain some new qualities. To say that fire will clean the heart and make it worthy of the Divine Presence is nothing more than relating this fact.

In the Book of Fear and Hope, al-Ghazālī states that man dies according as he has lived, and it is not possible for the heart to gain another quality after death which opposes the quality which was dominant over him, since he can only bring changes in his heart

1. Ibid., 162.
2. Ibid., iv, 10.
3. F.B., 36.
through the actions of his organs. When his organs are nullified, his actions are nullified too. In this case grief becomes great unless the roots of faith and the love of God have been firmly established in the heart for a long period and strengthened with good deeds. This will erase from the heart this state in which it fell during death. Thus if the strength of his faith were up to the amount of a mithqāl, he would be taken out of the Fire. If it were less than this, then his staying in Fire would be longer, but if it were not more than a mithqāl of a seed, he would still come out of the Fire even if it were after a thousand years.¹

It is here that the concept of 'intercession' (shafā‘a) comes in and has a far-reaching importance especially when saʿāda is viewed from the standpoint of Divine Grace and Mercy.

b) Intercession: the transformation of shaqī into saʿīd

In the Arbaʿīn al-Ghazālī repeats the idea that anyone who has an atom's weight of faith will come out of the Fire. Some people come out before they complete the punishment which they deserve because of their sins. This happens through the intercession of the prophets, the martyrs, the learned and whoever is given such a role is given.²

Here we are not interested in the whole idea of shafā‘a. Our interest lies in the fact that through Intercession it is

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1. Ṣaḥ, iv, 216; Ṣarb, 21-2.
possible to put an end to the punishment of a *shaqī* and make *saʿīd*.
The one who believes that the character of the heart does not and cannot change after death, cannot defend the doctrine of Intercession. In a system like that of al-Fārābī, for instance, Intercession cannot have a place, unless an obvious inconsistency is tolerated. Both al-Fārābī and al-Ghazālī agree that after death man, or the Intellect, or the heart, cannot gain a character which is the opposite of the character which was dominant during dying. Al-Fārābī goes no further here, but al-Ghazālī brings divine intervention onto the scene and, therefore, makes *saʿāda* as a divine gift. In fact this is what the Muslims have always believed. The Divine Grace may act directly without any intercessor and release man from Hell, or it may act through Prophets, or martyrs thanks to the power of Intercession given to them by God.¹

In *Madnūn bihi ʿalā ghayr ahlihi*, al-Ghazālī states that Intercession is embodied in the light which shines from the Divine Presence on to the substance of prophethood and from here it illuminates all other substances which have fortified their relation with the substance of prophethood through their love for, and their perseverance in, *Sunna*. The proceeding of this light from the Divine Presence resembles that of the light of the sun which reflects from water and hence reflects on a special part of a wall and not just on any part.² If the Unity (*tawḥīd*) is dominant in

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the heart of the believer, the light from the Divine Presence may come directly, but if the heart finds its way only through following prophecy, then the light reflects on it through an intermediary, e.g. the prophets.

To be forgiven by God in the world to come does not essentially differ from His forgiving the sins of a believer in this world. There may be many hidden reasons which bring about God's forgiveness and salvation and which we may not know. It must be accepted as a possibility that a disobedient person can be forgiven despite his many apparent evil deeds, and an obedient one may face God's anger, despite his apparent obedience. The people of insight inform us that a man is not forgiven except for a good reason, though this reason may not be known to us, and a man is not driven to face God's anger again except for an apparent or an unknown disobedience. If this were not so, there would be no place for justice. In other words to transform a shaqi into a sa'Id without any reason is not compatible with divine justice. This was the idea of the Mu'tazilites. Al-Ghazâlî accepts that everyone will get what he deserves, but we cannot say that God does injustice if He forgives a sinner. In order to say this, we have to know everything about the sinner, which is impossible. By the idea of "hidden reasons" (al-batin) al-Ghazâlî tries to overcome this difficulty.

1. Ib., iv, 38.
3) Those who are saved (nājin)

We have already said something about the meaning of najāt in our first chapter. Generally speaking it is the name of the doctrine of salvation and in this sense it can be applied to anyone who is saved from shaqāwa irrespective of one's degree of sa'āda. In this particular classification, however, by najāt al-Ghazālī means "just safety (salāma) and not sa'āda or fawz". 1 Those who are called nājin are the people who deserve neither reward nor punishment, like the insane and the children of the unbelievers and those who inhabit the extremities of the inhabited world where they have not received any invitation to accept the right faith. This class of people have a very meagre intellect (balah) and with no knowledge at all. There is neither obedience nor disobedience on their part; and they are neither of the people of Paradise nor of those of Hell. Rather, do they stay in a place between the two (al-manzila bayn al-manzilatayn) which is interpreted as a‘rāf by the Law. 2

In the Arba‘īn al-Ghazālī defines najāt in the same way, namely "freedom from punishment" and there too he makes the same clear distinction between najāt, fawz and sa'āda without making any reference however to balah and a‘rāf. 3

It seems that the class of nājin roughly corresponds to al-Fārābī's class of the "ignorant people". Unlike al-Ghazālī,

1. Ṭr., iv, 38.
2. Ibid., 38.
3. Arb., 23–4. For Tūsī's idea of 'the weak souls' cf. Risālā gawa'id-al-’aqā'id (Ṣahīd Ali Pāṣa, 2721/1) fol, 26b.
al-Farābī does not think that they will remain in aʿrāf, but they will be destroyed. An immortal soul is either saʿĪd or shaqī and there is no third possibility.

Ibn Sīnā, on the other hand, accepts that the souls of bulh are immortal, since the soul as an existent is immortal. In the second section of ilāhiyat in the Najāt he divides these meagre souls into those that are morally wicked and those that are not. The former will be punished after death, because they will lose the body which is the only means for their satisfaction. As for the latter, they will be met by the great mercy of God and have "some kind of ease (rāḥa)"¹ We are not given enough information about the nature of this "ease", but it is not saʿāda, since saʿāda in Ibn Sīnā too is only for intellectually and morally perfect souls. It is quite plausible to suggest that this "ease" is what al-Ghazālī means by the term aʿrāf or rather the condition of life that takes place in aʿrāf.

We have not come across a division of these weak souls into good and bad in al-Ghazālī. Nor does he say anything about whether there will be any improvement in the condition of these souls. Ibn Sīnā, on the other hand, seems to accept some kind of improvement.² He talks about the idea of the "celestial bodies" or "something similar" which, he says, were accepted by "some ulamā." With the help of these "celestial bodies" these souls will imagine what otherworldly pleasure or pain is. F. Rahman believes that according to Ibn Sīnā

1. N.B., p. 110.
2. Cf. Gardet, La pensée religieuse d'Avicenne, p. 102.
"some underdeveloped souls are also said to become good and bad
demons after death, thanks to their power of imagination."¹

Ibn Sīnā likens the pleasure or pain which is perceived after
death to the pleasure which is experienced in dreams. No one can
say this experience is less powerful than the sensual one. As a
matter of fact after death the imaginative experience can be stronger
than our present sensual experience, because there will no longer
be the body and bodily occupations.²

Our mentioning of Ibn Sīnā's ideas here is not out of place,
since they had a considerable influence on al-Ghazālī. In al-Fārābī
we have intellectual or spiritual otherworldly pain and pleasure.
Ibn Sīnā accepts spiritual and imaginative pain and pleasure. He
does not deny the possibility of sensual experience of pain and
pleasure after death in the shifā', though he rejects it in his
risāla aḍhawiyya fī-amr-al-ma'ād.³ And al-Ghazālī accepted the
possibility of intellectual, imaginative and sensual experiences of
otherworldly sā'āda and shaqāwa. We will return to this very
important relationship a little later on.

Al-Ghazālī did not have the difficulties with which al-Fārābī
and Ibn Sīnā had dealt before him. His acceptance of the
resurrection of the body saved him from such ideas as thinking of
some celestial bodies for the souls which are not perfect enough to

2. N.B., 110-1.
3. Cf. S. Dunya's introduction to his edition of Tahāfut al-falāsifa,
experience spiritual pleasure. This does not mean, however, that al-Ghazālī's idea of the "weak souls" is not complicated.

It appears that al-Ghazālī uses the Arabic term bulh, or bulh, in two different senses. Firstly it is used for the people who are not mindful of the matters of this world because of their involvement with the matters of the world to come. This is why the Prophet has said that "most of the people of Paradise are bulh".¹ The description of bulh in this sense comes very near to al-Ghazālī's description of the "People of Right" - a term which is used as a name of the people who enter Paradise but do not attain the highest degree which is reserved for mugarrabūn. Talking about the danger of investigation into the matters which are essential for salvation, al-Ghazālī says that whoever believes in God, His attributes and His actions to be other than they actually are either through taqlīd or speculation is in a perilous condition, and ascetism and good deeds are not enough to repel this peril. "Bulh, however, are free from this peril. I mean those people who believe in God, His Messengers and the Last Day with a firmly established belief such as the bedouin and the negroes and other people who have not indulged in research and speculation...That is why the Prophet has said 'most of the people of Paradise are bulh'."²

Now it is clear from this passage that bulh in this technical sense is nothing but another name for the people who accept religious matters on authority.

¹. Ṣūrah, iii, 23; cf. also iv, 35 and 49, 49.
². Ṣūrah, iv, 217-8.
Secondly al-Ghazâlî uses bulh in a non-technical sense. Here it implies weakness of intellectual power. The relation between the two meanings of the term is obvious. One does not become mugallâd, if one is not intellectually weak. These two different meanings, however, must be kept apart, since the class of mugallâdûn and the class of people with "weak intellect" namely the insane and so on, to which the first and the second meaning of the term bulh refers respectively, are two separate classes. So are their degrees in the world to come: mugallâdûn will be in Paradise, whereas bulh in the second sense will be in a‘râf. The former have their share in sa‘âda, though not in its highest degree, the latter, on the other hand, do not attain any sa‘âda, but just mere salvation (najât) from shaqâwa.

Despite this illuminating explanation about the class of nâjîn, or the people of a‘râf, al-Ghazâlî usually ignores this class when he mentions his general classification of men in the world to come in many other places of his works. He says, for instance, that people will be divided into three groups after the major interrogation (su‘al): those who will attain eternal sa‘âda, those who will attain eternal shaqâwa and those whose good deeds are mixed with their bad deeds. Though the last group will be punished, they will eventually enter Paradise.1 Here there is no mention of the class of bulh. This may be due to the fact that these people will not even be brought to the scene of Interrogation, since they have

1. Îbî, iv, 646.
nothing to say or to answer.

Al-Ghazālī's not mentioning the class of ṣulḥ or nājīn may also be due to the fact that the Qur'ān itself says very little about them. We have already pointed out the obscurity of the Qur'ānic term ʿār̲af and the difficulty of finding an intermediary place between Paradise and Hell. Al-Ghazālī is aware that because of this lack of information, it is not easy to talk about this rank, namely the rank of mere salvation.¹

4) Those who are saved and rewarded (faʾizūn)

These people constitute the highest rank in al-Ghazālī's classification of men after death, and this class corresponds to the perfect and pure class of falāsīfa. These people are called ʿārifūn and not muqallidūn; they are the "outstrippers": the people who are brought near to God (as-sābiqūn al-mugarrabūn).²

Muqallid is from the 'People of Right' who have some kind of place in Paradise, mugarrabūn on the other hand, attain a degree whose height can hardly be described. The Qur'ān refers to this fact when it says that "no soul knows what comfort is laid up for them secretly, as recompense for that they were doing". (XXXII, 17). Of this degree the Prophet has said that "no eye has seen, no ear has heard and no heart of man has ever conceived."³ What ʿārifūn

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1. Ibid., 39.
2. Ibid., 39; cf. The Qur'ān, LVI, 10-35.
3. Ib., iv, 39. For the verse and the Tradition which al-Ghazālī cites when he criticises the philosophers' concept of saʿāda see T, 275-6.
desire cannot be conceived in this world. As for hūr, castles, fruits, milk, honey and so on, ārifūn are not keen on them; they would not be contented even if they were given to them. "They desire nothing save the pleasure of gazing on His face; this is the end of all kinds of saʿāda and the end of all pleasures."¹

Here there is no need to go into a detailed description of the classes of ārifūn. We have already given enough information about the nature of the class of ārifūn and muqallidūn which constitute the only two classes of faʿizūn. What remains to be done is the analysis of al-Ghazālī's ideas about the goods of Paradise which constitute the happiness of the "People of Right" and the vision of God which is the ultimate saʿāda.

iii) Saʿāda in Paradise.

1) The goods of Paradise and the happiness of the 'People of Right' (aṣḥāb-al-yamīn)

Since knowledge and faith vary in this world from person to person, the rewards which will be given to the believers will vary accordingly. There are degrees among the People of Right as well as among as-sābiqūn al-muqarrabūn. There is not, however, a gap between these two classes of people. "The highest degree of the People of Right touches the lowest degree of sābiqūn."²

The pleasures of Paradise will be given to people according to

¹. Ibid., 39-40.
². Ibid., 444. In another passage (Ibid., 35) instead of the word tulāsīgu (touches) there is the word tugāribu (becomes near).
how they have lived in this world. Those who have desired the goods of Paradise, i.e. ْحُرُ, castles and such like, and worked for them will attain them, but this is not the great pleasure which results in ِرُؤْيَةٌ ْاللَّهِ. In fact there is no relation of these goods and the pleasures following them to the pleasure of ِرُؤْيَةٌ ْاللَّهِ and of meeting Him.¹

The highest degree of the People of Right is given to those who avoid all the great sins (كَبَآَرٍ) and perform all the religious duties (فَارَآِیْدَ). These are the people who come very close to the class of ْمُقَارَبَٰنَ.² There will be many rewards for these people. In fact as the Qurʾān and many Traditions promise every person will find what he desires. It seems, however, that they do not go as far as the stage of ْمُشْهَرَة, since this stage depends on ْمَعْرِیْفَةَ and ْمَاشَابَة which they lack. Without knowledge there cannot be any desire and without desire there is no fulfilment. The one whose hope and desire are directed towards ْحُرُ and castles while he is in this world will find them ready for him, but there will end his pleasure in the world to come. In other words he will not be able to perceive the pleasure of meeting God.³

The People of Right, who are also called "the good" (أَبْرَار), will live in comfort in the gardens and be pleased with ْحُرُ and ْوِلِدَان in Paradise. ْمُقَارَبَٰنَ, on the other hand, adhere to the Divine Presence and are entirely devoted to it. They despise and

1. Ibid., 624-5.
2. Ibid., 35.
3. Ibid., 672-3.
have a low opinion of the goods of Paradise when they compare them with a very small particle of this Presence.¹

This last point is particularly important. Although al-Ghazālī severely criticises the philosophers and some of the šūfis who rejected the goods of Paradise and tried to explain the Qur'ānic descriptions of them metaphorically, he himself somewhat ignores these otherworldly goods when he is carried away with the idea of meeting God. To be sure he never doubts about the existence of such goods. It is possible, however, to say that his emphasis on the vision of God and his attitude towards the people who despise the goods of Paradise are not the views which were held by the early Muslims. One can even go a step further and say such an attitude was somewhat different from that of most of the Muslims who accepted the goods of Paradise not only as a reward for blind taqlīd, but for ma'rifa and mahabba as well.

Despite al-Ghazālī's emphasis on the pleasure which results in ru'yat Allah, he defends the doctrine of bodily sa'āda and shaqāwa together with the spiritual ones. How strongly he feels about this becomes very clear when we briefly examine the attitude of the philosophers and the Bāṭinites towards the share of the body in the otherworldly sa'āda

¹. Ibid.
a) Falāsīfā's allegorical interpretation of eternal saʿāda

There are many points which are matters of conflict between al-Ghazālī and Falāsīfā. Al-Ghazālī criticises them because of their emphasis on abstract knowledge, their reliance on the discursive intellect, their ignoring of the importance of actions, their understanding of prophecy and their allegorical interpretation of eschatological matters.

We have already pointed out that there are many similarities between Ibn Sīnā's classification of the souls after death and that of al-Ghazālī. Both Ibn Sīnā and al-Ghazālī agree that eternal pleasure is for theoretically and morally perfect souls, and that eternal shaqāwa is for those souls which lack both perfections, and that transient shaqāwa is for the souls which are only morally imperfect. The philosophers, however, deny the return of the souls to their bodies. They do not accept the physical existence of Paradise and Hell and the things which exist in them. They assert that the Qur'ānic descriptions of these things are symbolical and designed to facilitate the understanding of common people who are incapable of comprehending the realities of spiritual reward and punishment.

Now here the philosophers come up against the Islamic concept of eternal saʿāda and shaqāwa. No doubt what is spiritual is always higher than what is sensual, but no one can say that sensual

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1. T, 282-3; Maqāṣid, pp. 371ff; N.B., 34-5.
2. T, 273.
and spiritual saʿāda (or shaqāwa) cannot be combined.¹ In fact the combination of these two will produce the greatest perfection. The Qurʾān has promised us such perfection and therefore one must not go against this explicit promise of religion.²

Falāsifa found themselves in this awkward position because of their denial of the resurrection of bodies. They thought that the souls are infinite whereas matter is finite and this makes the resurrection of bodies impossible. This idea is the result of their idea concerning the eternity of the world and rotatory motion.³

In other words their metaphysics obscured their views on eschatological matters.

In addition to their denial of bodily resurrection and thus bodily reward and punishment from the metaphysical standpoint, the philosophers had other reasons. It is the body, they thought, that prevents the soul from perceiving intellectual pleasures. The soul’s residence in the body causes distress not only in this world but even in the world to come. Though the body perishes with death, the proclivity remains which is a distressing element. How can the soul perceive the pleasure of eternal saʿāda if it has to attend to the needs of the body after death?⁴

Al-Ghazālī and many other theologians after him tried to answer this question. Generally speaking al-Ghazālī’s answer is simple. He says God is able to combine sensual and spiritual pleasures and

¹. Ibid., 274; cf. The Faith, p. 37.
². T, 276.
³. Ibid., 266; cf. Ig, 96 and 111.
⁴. T, 271.
pains and we have to believe this. Some, for instance, like Fakhr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī thought that in believing in sensual and spiritual pleasures one combines philosophy and the Law. Those who believed in the possibility of such a combination, continues ar-Rāzī, thought that this combination is not possible in this world, since, when man is absorbed in bodily pleasures, he does not pay any attention to spiritual ones, and when he is absorbed in the latter he ignores the former. The soul cannot apprehend these two pleasures at the same time while it is in this life, because it is too weak for that, but when it is separated by death and drawn upon the spiritual world, it becomes strong and perfect so that when it returns to the body for the second time it will be able to combine both pleasures which is the ultimate degree of sa‘āda.

The question of the resurrection of bodies is manifold. A detailed analysis of it, which constitutes the last "problem" of the Tahāfut, is not our concern here. Although al-Ghazālī tries to refute the argument of the philosophers concerning the resurrection of bodies, he himself does not try to introduce any logical proof in favour of the idea of the possibility of bodily resurrection. This is not a matter that can be explained, or proved, by reason, but it is a matter over which only the Law has authority. Therefore al-Ghazālī's criticism of philosophy is eventually revealed to be a legal one rather than one of metaphysics.

1. Ibid., 274.
From the point of view of the Law, the philosophers remain outside the Islamic community. Their adherence to the allegorical interpretation of the otherworldly happiness does not alter this situation. As far as the descriptions of sa'āda and shaqāwa in the world to come are concerned, there is no room for interpretation. Moreover to say that these descriptions are for the well-being of the common people is tantamount to saying that something is false in prophecy. This implies that the Qur'ānic text is fraudulent.¹ This is nought but accusing the Prophet of falsehood and hypocrisy.² We are certain that if someone clearly denied Paradise, Hell, ḫūr and castles before the companions of the prophet, they would accept it as an act of accusation of God and His Apostle of falsehood and they would hasten his murder.³ However if it were said that if a person believes in the oneness of God, but turns to ta'wīl in matters concerning the conditions of resurrection, Gathering, Paradise, Hell and so on without denying their realities, and if he accepts that sa'āda consists in spiritual pleasures which culminate in ittiqāl with the world of intelligibles, and that this sa'āda can only be attained when the Law is obeyed and that shaqāwa which consists in the lack of perfection and in being veiled from it, would he still be condemned as an unbeliever? Al-Ghazālī's answer to this question is that if a man confesses his faith in basic sa'āda and shaqāwa and disputes over the details, such as the amount of

1. T, 295.
2. Iq, 96 and 111; The Faith, p. 37.
reward and punishment, he would not be regarded as an unbeliever. But the Qur'ānic description of Paradise and Hell, which occur throughout the Qur'ān, cannot be treated as a matter of detail and therefore there cannot be any disputation and doubt over them.¹

The Lawgiver meant with these concepts, viz. the concept of Paradise, Hell and such like, what is clearly and apparently meant by them.² Therefore it is necessary to stick to the apparent meaning of the Qur'ānic text in this matter.³

Al-Ghazālī himself accepted ta'wil, but he did so in such matters as attributes of God, the verse of istiwa' and the like. We can base our interpretation of these matters on the Qur'ān which says that "Like Him there is naught" (xlii, 9). The eschatological matters are different.⁴ These should be taken literally as the Ash'arites advocated.⁵

The Mu'tazilites, though they erred in other respects, confessed the sensual nature of otherworldly pleasure and pain, but they explained away the possibility of seeing God. The philosophers interpret all otherworldly matters as allegories.⁶

Despite al-Ghazālī's rejection of the philosophers' idea of a purely spiritual sa'āda and shaqāwa, he seems to have been influenced by them a great deal. After summarizing the philosophers'  

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¹. Ibid., 151-3.
². Ibid., 154.
³. T, 278.
⁴. F.B., 155; Ṣb, 1, 141-2; cf. Watt, Intellectual, pp. 64-5.
⁵. Ṣb, 1, 142.
⁶. Ibid.
views on intellectual pleasures in the hereafter, al-Ghazālī says that most of what they say is not contrary to religion. He accepts their argument upon the superior nature of intellectual pleasure in the world to come over the sensuous pleasures of this world.¹ He accepts that otherworldly pleasure can be sensual, imaginative and intellectual according to the case.² He accepts that only those who are intellectually and morally perfect will attain the highest degree, though what he and the philosophers mean by perfection is not the same.

b) The errors of the Bāṭinites concerning the eternal saʿāda

As far as the subject under discussion is concerned there are many things in common between falāsifa and the Bāṭinites. In fact the speculations of the former constitute the theoretical basis of the latter. For this reason it was not very difficult for al-Ghazālī to see how far the argument of the Bāṭinites can extend, thanks to his knowledge of philosophy. This does not mean, however, that he studied philosophy in order to refute the Bāṭinites.³

The Bāṭinites adopted philosophers' views on saʿāda, shaqāwā, resurrection of bodies, prophecy, ḥashr, maʿād and many more.⁴ They

¹. T. 269f.
². Ḥn. iv, 621; cf. Arb. 183-4; cf. M.K., 84-5; cf. Gardet, La pensée religieuse d'Avicenne, p. 104 n.5.
³. Such a view was entertained by Jabre in Certitude, pp. 291-3, 316f. Jabre's view is criticised by Watt, "The Study of al-Ghazālī" p. 129.
⁴. F.B., 37ff. and 46. For how much the Bāṭinites owe to the psychocosmological doctrines of falāsifa see Jabre, Certitude, pp. 291 and 315ff.
thought that only a blind following of the imam can lead to real knowledge and *saʿāda*. When people follow the infallible imam, they will be acquainted with realities of matters and esoteric knowledge. This, in its turn, will free them from religious duties, and they will be *saʿīd* by such freedom.¹ Some of them thought, al-Ghazālī continues, that the religious obligations were a kind of punishment.² Their adherence to what they call the esoteric meaning of the Qur’ān and their allegorical interpretations are not only without foundation but also absolutely silly. According to al-Ghazālī, these are the people for whom a disastrous concluding act (*ṣūʿal-khātimah*) is waiting.³

It is doubtful whether al-Ghazālī took the views of the Bāṭinites on *saʿāda* as seriously as he did those of *falāsīfa*. What he learned from the Bāṭinites is probably the fact that people are more inclined to leave matters concerning their happiness in the authority of others than he himself imagined. Due probably to the influence of such realization he stressed the idea that only the Prophet Muhammad is a true imam who can lead us to *saʿāda* here and in the world to come.

2) The ultimate *saʿāda*: Ruʿyat Allah

The relation between *maʿrifah-mañhabba* and vision of God has

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¹. F.B., 57; 46-7; cf. also Watt, *Intellectual*, p. 81.
². F.B., 57.
³. Ibid., 36
already been mentioned. The most comprehensive passage about this relation occurs in the Book of Love of Ḣyā'. Since this passage includes several other ideas which can be taken as premises, or corollaries, it is worth quoting it in full. Al-Ghazālī says:

Whoever does not know God in this world cannot see Him in the world to come; and whoever has not found the pleasure of ma'rifā in this world cannot find the pleasure of vision (nazar) in the world to come, since there would be no giving back of a thing to a person in the world to come, if he did not possess it while he was in this world. No one can reap anything save what he has sown. No one is brought to the place of judgement save according as he died and mankind according as he has lived. Only the amount of knowledge that he possesses will be beneficial to him. Only this knowledge changes into an internal vision (mushāhada) by the removal of the curtain which, in its turn, will increase the pleasure, as the pleasure of the lover increases when imagining the form of beloved changes into seeing his form; and this surely is his supreme pleasure. Verily what is good of Paradise is that everyone will find there what he desires. The one who desires nothing except meeting Him; takes pleasure in nothing save in this. Even he often suffers an injury from other things. Thus the goods of Paradise are given in proportion to the love of God and the love of God in proportion to ma'rifā. The foundation of all kinds of happiness is knowledge (ma'rifā) which is interpreted by the Law as faith (imān).

We have all the clues that we need in this passage. To begin with it is obvious that the place of the ultimate sa'āda is the world to come, since it is only there that everyone finds what he desires. This is affirmed in several places of the Qur'ān which is al-Ghazālī's major source. "The meaning of al-akhirā is to come to God and perceive the happiness of meeting Him."2

The idea that ākhira is the place where every one finds what he

1. Ḣyā', iv, 390.
2. Ibid., 394.
desires, includes, logically speaking, the idea that the fulfilment of desires is happiness. Some desire ārūr, castles and the like. They will find them in Paradise and this will be their happiness; others desire to see God and meet Him. They too will find this in Paradise and this finding will constitute their summum bonum. But why does desire for God, and not for other things, lead to ʿāda? Al-Ghazālī's answer is straightforward: what is desired less is always abandoned in favour of what is desired more. The desire for food is abandoned in favour of the desire for sex and the latter is abandoned in favour of the desire for conquest and domination. Now the strongest desire is, naturally, the desire for the knowledge of a Perfect Being. If we fail to have such a desire then we are sick. To desire Him is "natural". Deviation from what is natural goes against the virtue of man's creation. "The characteristic of rūḥ is the knowledge of realities", and God is the most High and Perfect Being. Only the corrupted and sick heart can refuse the knowledge of God which is, in fact, its food.¹ If the desire of meeting Him is happiness and leads to eternal happiness and if the lack of this desire is sickness, then the lack of desire for happiness is sickness and a spiritual bankruptcy.

Knowledge is affirmed by love and love is affirmed by yearning (shawq). Can man remain at this stage and say that he is happy? According to al-Ghazālī he can do this, but only as far as his

¹ Arb, 259-260.
earthly life is concerned. Man can only know Him, love Him and yearn for Him while he is in this world, but this cannot be the ultimate happiness, because the act of craving and yearning is a state of restlessness. The stage of shawq is the stage of tension whereas the state of happiness must be the state of tranquility. The tension, yearning and all the signs of restlessness of a lover disappear when he finds himself in the presence of the Beloved.1

Al-Ghazâlî uses three terms when he refers to this state of existence: contemplation (mushâhâda), meeting (liqâ') and seeing (ru'ya).2 To give the general meaning of these terms, al-Ghazâlî begins with the division of the objects of our knowledge. They are divided into those which enter our imagination and those which do not. Then al-Ghazâlî explains the difference between imagining and seeing. This difference, al-Ghazâlî continues, does not lie in their object, since in both cases the form of the object is the same, but lies rather in the fact that there is more clarity and revelation in seeing. Imagination is the beginning of perception whereas seeing (ru'ya) is the perfection of this perception; it is the extreme point of disclosure and revealment.3

Al-Ghazâlî applies this distinction to the objects of knowledge which are not formed in our imagination. Here again there are two degrees; one is the perfection of the other. The one which is

2. Ibid., 386.
3. Ibid.
perfect in relation to clarity and disclosure is called mushāhada, ligā' and ru'ya. Now, we can know God here but we can only see or meet Him in the world to come. The object of knowledge and of seeing, however, is the same. By seeing we do not meet a different object, but we only perfect our perception. That is why we say that "knowledge is the beginning of seeing" and that "knowledge will be transformed into vision (nazar)", since "knowledge is like a kernel that changes into, or becomes, mushāhada in the world to come, as a seed changes into a plant and a kernel into a tree." "Whoever does not know God in this world cannot see Him in the world to come; and whoever has not found the pleasure of knowledge here cannot find the pleasure of seeing Him there."

Although the pleasure of vision depends on the amount of knowledge, and as far as ma'rifā extends; so far does vision extend; it remains always higher than the pleasure of knowledge. In fact the two cannot even be compared, as we cannot compare the pleasure of imagining the beloved with that of seeing him. Perception is the cause of pleasure and "the perfection of perception culminates in seeing."

Ru'ya is the end of all effort and labour. We live in this

1. Ibid.
2. Arb, 262, 265; cf. Ḥ, i, 147.
3. Arb, 262; Ḥ, iv, 389-390.
4. Ḥ, iv, 389-390.
5. Ibid., 390.
6. Arb, 261; Ḥ, iv, 391.
7. Ḥ, iv, 391.
8. Ibid., 401.
world in order to see in the world to come. Like ma'rifat, ru'ya too is the activity of the heart, since "ma'rifat is the beginning of nazar" and "mushahada", and whatever is said about ma'rifat is also true about mahabba. In most cases mahabba is interchangeable with ma'rifat. The stronger mahabba is in this world the happier (as'ad) man is in the world to come.1 "Varying degrees of mahabba are the causes of varying degrees of sa'ada in the world to come."2

For the attainment of ru'ya-liqā'-mushahada the removal (kashf) of the curtain is necessary. In order to transform the act of imagination to that of seeing one has to open one's eye-lids. As the eye-lids stand between imagining and seeing so does this life stand between man and mushahada-liqā'-ru'ya. That is why God said to Moses "you cannot see Me" and in another place He said that "the eyes cannot perceive Him". Death has to come if this curtain is to be removed.3 As long as we are on this side of the curtain we cannot have anything more than feeling and knowing His Presence; but when we are taken to the other side we will be able to contemplate, to meet and to see the Divine Presence. Only after this will we have a real life. "The good and pure life is only after death; the only life is the life in the world to come."4

According to al-Ghazālī, to be happy is to be alive in the full sense of the term which results in stepping out of the boundaries

1. Ibid., 393.
2. Ibid., 398.
3. Ibid., 388; cf. also Tarīkh, i, 147.
4. Tarīkh, iv, 391.
of space and time. To make this point clear let us take the case of the martyrs of whom God says that we must not suppose that they are dead, because they are alive. Now this does not mean that others are dead in the sense that their souls have perished. This is against the teachings of the Law. Every soul will live after death, but to be alive in the real sense is nothing but to be in His Presence. It must not be thought that this case is only for martyrs. 'Ārif possesses the degree of a thousand martyrs. All the quarters of the Kingdom of the heavens and earth are the open space for 'ārifūn. He can dwell wherever he likes without having to move with his body and person. 

Reminding us of al-Fārābī's famous passage about ittiṣāl, al-Ghazālī goes on saying that although there are many similar 'ārifūn, they do not squeeze each other during the manifestation of the beauty of malakūt. Verily they vary among themselves according to how far their vision and knowledge extend. In sum, to be sa'Id means to have a real life, a life which is beyond time and space. This can only take place not in this world but in the world of Malakūt. That is why the real happiness belongs to that world. Rūh may step out of time and space while it is in this world. This, however, will be neither long nor complete, as in the case of fanā'. Rūh knows God without reference to time and space in this world and it will see Him in the world to come, again

1. Ibid., 385.
2. Ibid.
without reference to time and space.\(^1\)

The whole good, or real good (\textit{an-ni\'ma al-\-haq\-qiyya}) can only be attained in a world where there are no restrictions and limitations which are imposed upon man by time and space. \textit{Sa\textordmasca} is this "real good" which is desired for its own sake. This good consists of four elements: life without destruction; pleasure without pain; knowledge without ignorance and lastly wealth without poverty.\(^2\) When this "whole" is attained, all man's desires will be satisfied and therefore he will be happy. But will he be satisfied completely?

We have already answered this question while we were dealing with two kinds of \textit{shawq}. Through \textit{naz\-ar}, or \textit{mush\-ah\-da\-da}, man arrives at the first degree of perception which is the degree of perfect clarity that man desires. The second degree of \textit{shawq}, however, consists of man's desire for His greatness, beauty and wisdom as He knows them. It is this degree of total clarity which is impossible for man.\(^3\) In other words, man is still under some kind of limitation.

It seems that this degree is beyond man's capacities and therefore the fact which is revealed by the statement that happiness is "knowledge without ignorance" will remain unimpaired. If happiness consisted of the knowledge of God as He knows Himself, this would be tantamount to saying that in order to be happy man either has to become God or someone who is equal to Him in all His attributes.

\begin{footnotes}
  \item[Ibid., p. 147.]
  \item[Ibid., iv, p. 128.]
  \item[Ibid., pp. 402-3; cf. \textit{Md}. p. 44.]
\end{footnotes}
Al-Ghazālī's constant condemnation of ittiḥād, ḫulūl and intiqāl shows very clearly how he felt about this kind of concept of saʿāda. Saʿāda consists in contemplation (mushāhada) which is a state of awareness of the Divine Presence. It is the degrees of this awareness that constitute different degrees of saʿāda.

In a broad sense all believers are in the Divine Presence in ākhira. This fact becomes obvious when we think of al-Ghazālī's idea of maʿrifa-Imān relationship. For the attainment of the Divine Presence maʿrifa is essential, but this maʿrifa, as al-Ghazālī repeatedly says, is interpreted as Imān by the Law.1 As the term Imān includes ārifūn and mugallīdūn so does the term saʿāda.2 It can be said that the feeling of awareness of a mugallīd resembles the case of a lover who feels the presence of his beloved under a very weak light. The degree of awareness of ārif, on the other hand, is like seeing his beloved under the ample light of the sun.

As far as I am aware, al-Ghazālī uses the terms mushāhada, liqāʾ, ruʿya, nazar, mukāshafa when he talks about ārifūn. The term tajāllī, which can be translated as revealing or disclosure, or even better, manifestation, however is used for the feeling of the awareness of both ārifūn and mugallī dūn. Al-Ghazālī says:

mushāhada of everyone will be in proportion to his maʿrifa. Thus, pleasure of āwlīyāʾ of God which is obtained in seeing Him (nazar) will be higher than the pleasure of others "God will manifest Himself (yatajallī) to Abū-Bakr in particular and to other people in general". That is why no one can see Him save ārifūn, since maʿrifa is the beginning of nazar; still more maʿrifa changes into mushāhada, like imagining changes into seeing.3

1. Ḩ, iv, 390. "fa asl-us-saʿādat hiyaʾl-maʿrifa allatī `abbāra sh-shab, `anha bi-l-Imān"
2. II-jām, 79-80.
3. Arb, 262.
This manifestation is omnipresent; it takes place in every second of life here and in the hereafter. Since there can be no end for the Divine Manifestation, man's feeling of His Presence does not come to a halt at a particular stage. This makes the other-worldly sa'āda everlasting and ever increasing.
CHAPTER SEVEN

SA'ADA FROM THE ETHICO-POLITICAL STANDPOINT

1) Sa'ada in Relation to Goods

So far we have tried to explain what the term sa'ada means in al-Ghazālī's thought and said practically nothing about the relation of sa'ada to other goods and about its attainment.

Following the traditionally established pattern, al-Ghazālī accepts "purpose" as a fundamental concept of ethics. Like Greek and Muslim philosophers before him, al-Ghazālī tries to justify the reasons for doing or not doing an act. According to this teleological line of thought, which had been the prevailing view of ethics till the philosophy of Kant, life has a definite purpose, viz., happiness, good life; and the duty of ethics is to tell us how to achieve this purpose.

Broadly speaking most of what we have said about happiness-good relationship in al-Fārābī's philosophy is also true in the case of al-Ghazālī's ethics. In both cases, as soon as we establish the ultimate good, or "good in itself", it becomes very easy to determine other goods, or "good as means".

For the English word "good" al-Ghazālī uses two terms, namely khayr and ni'ma. He uses both terms interchangeably, but in his general classification of goods in the fourth quarter of Ihya' he prefers the term ni'ma to khayr or sa'ādat.1 It appears that he

1. Ih, iv, 124ff.
does this when he thinks of God, His endless mercy, His help and
guidance in man's attainment of happiness. It is the term ni'ma
which reveals the fact that whatever exists before man as means
for the attainment of happiness is given by God and therefore he
has to be thankful and grateful for all this.

Like al-Farābī, al-Ghazālī believes that "there is no aim save
sa'āda"¹ and that "everything that is created in this world is
created only as a means by which man reaches otherworldly sa'āda and
attains divine proximity (qurb)"² A thing is called virtuous if
it helps towards the realization of this aim.³

Everything that is good, pleasurable and makes man happy is
called ni'ma, "but real ni'ma is the otherworldly sa'āda. When the
term ni'ma is applied to other things rather than sa'āda, it is
either an error or metaphorical. It is not a mistake, however, to
call this-worldly goods ni'ma as long as they are useful for the
attainment of the real ni'ma, i.e. sa'āda.⁴

The same thing applies to the term sa'āda. That is to say
sa'āda in the real sense is used for the otherworldly sa'āda, but it
can also be used for anything that leads to this sa'āda. In short,
real ni'ma, real khayr, and real sa'āda are one and the same thing,
i.e. sa'ādāt al-akhira.

The things that are called ni'ma can be divided into different
classes from different points of view.

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1. Ibid., 199.
2. Ibid., 111.
3. Ibid., and 128.
4. Ibid., 124.
First of all the things that are related to us can be divided into:

a) things which are useful in this world and in the world to come, such as knowledge and good character;

b) things which are the reverse: harmful here and in the hereafter, such as ignorance and bad character;

c) things which are useful in this world but not in the world to come such as bodily pleasures;

d) things which are supposed to be harmful here but useful in the world to come such as the suppression of bodily desires. The first of these four is absolutely good; the second is absolutely bad; the third is bad in the eyes of the learned and considered good in the eyes of the ignorant; the fourth is good for a man of insight, though the ignorant think that it is bad.

Secondly worldly means can be divided into different classes in respect of the extent to which they are beneficial or harmful for the attainment of happiness. Good and bad are blended in some means and it is easy to separate good from bad. In some cases there can be a balance between good and bad. In other cases the advantages of means can be greater than their disadvantages or vice versa.

Thirdly goods can be divided into:

a) good in itself, b) good as means, c) good in itself as well as for the sake of something else. The pleasure of seeing God, for example, is good in itself. Money is a good example for the second category and health and safety for the third.

Fourthly goods can be divided into:

a) that which is useful, b) that which is pleasurable, c) that which is beautiful. The opposites of these three categories are harmful, ugly and painful
all of which are called evil. A thing can be absolutely good, such as knowledge and wisdom, or absolutely bad such as ignorance. Real good possesses all these three qualities and evil in the absolute sense lacks all. If a thing possesses some of the qualities and lacks others, then it is good in a limited sense (muqayyad). For example to throw goods into the sea with a view to saving a sinking ship is useful in respect of the safety of the people on board and not useful in respect of goods which are thrown into the sea.

The useful too is divided into a) that which is indispensable such as faith and good character for the attainment of saʿāda, and b) that which is dispensable such as the use of the oxymel for the treatment of bile.¹

Al-Ghazālī's fifth division of goods is mainly about pleasure. Due to the importance of the concept of pleasure, we will examine it a little more closely.

1. Saʿāda in relation to pleasure (laqhdha)

Pleasurable means that something which provides satisfaction at present.² This meaning is usually attached to sensual sensation. The pleasures which are related to man can be divided into three in respect of his being the only existent that perceives

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1. ibid., iv, 124-6, and 159; cf. also Arb., 251. For the identification of good and beautiful and Greco-Stoic origin of this idea see Bergh, "The Love of God in al-Ghazālī's Vivification of Theology," J. Semitic Studies, 1, (1956), pp. 312ff; cf. also L. Gardet, "Allah", EI(2).

2. ibid., iv, 125-6.
pleasure and of his sharing it with other creatures. These three kinds of pleasures are firstly the intellectual pleasures which are peculiar to man; secondly bodily pleasures which man shares with some animals; and thirdly the bodily pleasures which he shares with all animals. Since the last two consist in bodily pleasure, pleasures in general can simply be divided into intellectual and bodily.

Purely sensual pleasures are common properties between men and animals. The pleasures of power, domination and conquest are common between men and some animals, e.g. tigers, lions and such like. The pleasure of knowledge and wisdom, on the other hand, belongs to men only. These kinds of pleasures are not very common even among people, since there are not very many learned people who are in a position to perceive such pleasures with the heart, which can also be called "inner perception" or "the sixth sense." The highest of all the intellectual pleasures is the pleasure of knowing God, loving Him and seeing Him which is reserved for siddiqūn.¹ In order to reach the rank of siddiqūn, the heart must be freed from not only the sensual pleasures but the pleasure of domination, ruling and the like. Those who can weaken their attachment to sensual pleasures and keep them under control are called the good (gāliḥūn), but only siddiqūn can resist the pleasure of ruling and domination.²

The reasons for the lack of the perception of intellectual pleasures are manifold. First of all it can be due to the lack of

1. Ibid., 126-7; cf. also 384 and 386; Arb, 259-260.
2. Dḥ, iv, 127.
"immediate experience" (dhawq), since the lack of dhawq leads to the lack of ma'rifā and desire (shawq). Secondly it can be due to the sickness of the heart and the corruption of disposition which is the result of the pursuit of sensual pleasures. Thirdly, it can be due to the lack of natural aptitude, as in the infant who takes pleasure in having milk rather than, say, eating honey.¹

It has already been mentioned how a man frees himself from sensual pleasures which are dominant in the first stages of life when he meets the pleasure of ruling, domination and the like and how he leaves all these pleasures behind when he tastes the pleasure of knowing and loving God. The one who has the pleasure of seeing and meeting Him does not even pay attention to the goods of Paradise such as ħūr, castles and so on.² Man should know that the pleasure of this world cannot be pure and that there is no relation between the pleasures of this world and the pleasure of sa'āda in the world to come.³

Since every good act is pleasurable, there is no need to condemn all the pleasures. It must be taken for granted that though pleasure which follows the performance of good acts is good, it cannot be an end itself and it cannot constitute man's ultimate aim. It is nevertheless an essential element of a perfect life. Like falāsifa, al-Ghazālī believes that pleasure is an agreeable

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1. Ibid., 127; cf. J, 50.
2. Ḥi, iv, 282.
3. Ibid., 281; cf. also Arb, 263.
awareness of perfection. To be conscious of one's own perfection is pleasurable, because perfection is a divine attribute. Both al-Fārābī and al-Ghazālī talk of pleasure when they analyse their respective concepts of the ultimate happiness. In itṭiṣāl as well as in ruʿya-mushāhada-liqāʾ the pleasure that the happy perceive is eternal.

Generally speaking al-Ghazālī accepts the philosophers' account of pleasure and makes it his own without, however, accepting their idea of a purely spiritual otherworldly saʿāḍa. We have already dealt with this matter in the previous chapter where we have pointed out that al-Ghazālī accepts sensual, imaginative and intellectual pleasures in his account of otherworldly saʿāḍa. Those who adhere to the Qurʾānic account of saʿāḍa are in the Golden Mean and safe from the excessive claims of other groups of people.

2) Saʿāḍa in relation to the "external goods" and to "the goods of the body"

Here the term "external goods" (al-khayrāt al-khārijīyya or an-nīʿām al-khārijīyya) refers to the goods which are outside the goods of the soul and those of the body. In his main division of the means (wasāʾil), al-Ghazālī mentions four of these goods, namely wealth, family, position and noble pedigree.

None of these goods can be the constituent element of saʿāḍa. They are not good in themselves, but useful for the sake of something

1. Cf. T, 154-5, and Arb, 139.
3. Ih, iv, 129.
else. Their absence may lead to some defects in respect of "internal goods" (an-ni'am ad-dākhila). That is why the Prophet has said: "what an excellent thing the good property is for a good man!" Poverty prevents man from performing many good things such as alms-giving, pilgrimage to Mecca and charity. The lack of the basic necessities of life may also prevent man from dhikr and fikr which are indispensable for the attainment of marifa and maḥabba.

The same thing can be said about having a family. The Prophet praised the good wife and good son. The performance of good actions of a son is beneficial to his father even after his father dies. Al-Ghazālī seems to accept the Intercession (shafā'a) of small children for their parents in the world to come. "A small child draws his parents to Paradise", said the Prophet. Al-Ghazālī cites quite a few Traditions in respect of the children's Intercession for their parents in the next world.

This is, however, just one side of the coin. Wealth, children and similar worldly goods can obstruct the way to happiness. When a man starts complaining about not being able to increase his wealth and when he is prevented from worship and contemplation in which his happiness consists, then wealth becomes a calamity and misfortune (balā') and not ni'ma. If a man's real aim was worship

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid., 130.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., 11, 31.
5. Ibid., 34.
6. Ibid., 34-5.
and knowledge, he would be content with the necessary amount of wealth and the existence or the non-existence of gold and the possession of villages and towns would be the same for him.\(^1\) When all these are spent for good actions, knowledge and happiness, they become good as means.\(^2\) According to al-Ghazâlî, it is better to be poor than to possess wealth which obstructs the way to God. Poverty can be one of the causes of \(sa‘āda\).\(^3\) Supposing a person blessed with abundant riches, gardens and slave girls, he will suffer greater pain when the time of separation comes to him.\(^4\) As has already been mentioned, the condition of the heart becomes very perilous during dying, if the love of this world is dominant in it. For this very reason al-Ghazâlî himself abandoned all worldly possessions for the sake of a god-fearing ṣūfistic life.\(^5\)

In the life of a man love of position (\(jāh\)) is usually more dominant than other worldly goods, since most men seek riches or desire to belong to a noble family in order to obtain a high social rank that gives them greatness and glory. Man loves greatness and glory by nature, since they are among the attributes of God. It has been pointed out before how man loves to obtain the divine qualities, thanks to the secret relationship between God and \(rūh\).\(^6\)

Al-Ghazâlî believes that everybody desires to say "I am the

\(^{1}\) Ibid., 125 and 130; cf. also Arb, 126-7.
\(^{2}\) Th, iii, 292.
\(^{3}\) Arb, 209.
\(^{4}\) N.M., 35.
\(^{5}\) Cf. The Faith, p. 56.
\(^{6}\) Arb, 135, 188-9.
Lord"; Pharaoh spoke it aloud, whereas others hid it. In many cases the love of position is combined with hypocrisy and such a combination makes man ambitious, and this is in itself soul-destroying.

Al-Ghazâlî devotes an independent section to the analysis of love of position where he explains what is blameworthy or praiseworthy about it. Al-Ghazâlî defines jân as possession of, and dominance over, hearts; it comes to an end with death as the possession of other worldly things does. To desire wealth and position, to attain the basic necessities of life is not blameworthy, but to love and desire them for their own sake is blameworthy. The love of position is considered as "a destructive matter", if it becomes dominant over the heart, and it must be cured through knowledge and practice. If man knows in what real perfection consists, - a perfection which does not leave him after death - he will not pay any attention to the love of position. In order to be free of peoples' applause and praise which lead to the love of position, it is permissible to perform some acts which make a person fall in others' esteem. These actions, however, must not be irreligious and obscene like some of the actions of people who belong to the sect of Malâmatiyya.

In sum, riches, family, noble pedigree and position are good

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1. Ibid., 134.
2. Ibid., 353ff.
3. Ibid., 353.
4. Ibid., 356.
5. Ibid., 357.
as long as they are used as a means to the attainment of the other-worldly happiness. Otherwise they are all blameworthy and lead to "the love of this world which is the fountainhead of every evil." None of them accompanies man after death and whatever remains behind after death cannot be an essential ingredient of eternal otherworldly sa'āda. Sa'āda does not depend on any of these things, but it rather depends on the freedom of the heart from the "accidents" of the world. No one can be happy "except the one who comes to God with a sound heart" (XXVI, 89).

As for the goods, or "virtues of the body" (al-fadā'il al badaniyya), they come second after the virtues of the soul in the rank of importance. Al-Ghazālī mentions four bodily goods in his division of goods or virtues in the Ḥiyā'. They are health, strength, beauty and long life. It is quite obvious, al-Ghazālī writes, how desperately man needs three of these bodily goods for the attainment of knowledge and performance of actions. Beauty is not so important as, say, health and strength. The goods of the body are goods in themselves as well as goods as means.

Without a healthy life man cannot be safe from depression, despair and many other disturbing things. That is why the Prophet said that "prolongation of life in obedience to God is one of the most valued sa'ādāt". Every hour even a single breath of life is precious and must not be wasted. It should be spent for the

1. Ibid., 74.
2. Ḥiyā', iv, 129.
3. Ibid., 131; al-Ghazālī quotes this Tradition many times in the Ḥiyā'. See iii, 75; iv, 196.
attainment of everlasting \textit{sa'āda} and the avoidance of everlasting shaqāwa.\footnote{Ibid., 15.} The promised happiness (\textit{as-sa'āda al-maw'ūda}) cannot be attained by occasional performance of good actions. One swallow does not bring the summer. Good actions must be performed throughout one's life time. Only in this sense is long life considered the best of the kinds of happiness (\textit{sa'ādāt}).\footnote{Ibid., \textit{i}, 75. It is worth repeating that the terms \textit{ni'ām}, \textit{khayrāt} and \textit{sa'ādāt} are sometimes interchangeable.}

Strength enables us to work hard and to be patient, and beauty makes us more acceptable and thus makes things easier for us. Whatever helps us to solve our worldly difficulties is also helpful as means for otherworldly matters.\footnote{Ibid., iv, 131-2.} This is briefly the relation of \textit{sa'āda} to other goods.

3) \textbf{Man \textendash; world relationship and the misconception of \textit{sa'āda}}

There is a very important section in the Sixth Book of the third quarter of \textit{Ihya} which deals with the reality of the world and man's forgetfulness of himself, his Creator and his origin because of his involvement with the world. This book of \textit{Ihya} in general and this particular section of the book in particular has a capital importance for al-Ghazālī's analysis of what is usually called the 'philosophy of life.' The passage is also important because of its resemblance to some passages of the \textit{Madīna} and the \textit{Siyāsa} of al-Fārābī where he deals with the classification of men.
in respect of the misconception of saʿāda.

After talking about different occupations and the different classes of people who perform different functions in a society, al-Ghazālī comes to the classes of people according to the concept of saʿāda which they have. He mentions eight groups of people. Five of these groups start with an entirely wrong idea about saʿāda and end up with shaqāwa, but the last three start with a right opinion about saʿāda and end up with shaqāwa. Now it is time we examined what these people and their ideas about saʿāda are.

a) The first group of people consists of those who are dominated by ignorance and negligence and who do not open their eyes to see the consequences of their actions. They say that their aim is to live day by day in this world. They eat in order to gain strength and acquire their daily necessities and they acquire these things in order to eat, like peasants and artisans. They have no other good in this world, nor any advancement towards religion. The way they live is a journey that comes to an end only with death.¹

b) The second group consists of people who think that they understand what life is all about. According to them there is no purpose in getting tired with work and taking trouble. There is no easy life in this world. Saʿāda consists in the satisfaction of desires which are mainly the desires of eating and drinking and sex. These people forget themselves; all their

¹Ibn, iii, 284-5.
worries are about chasing women and attaining more pleasure in eating and so on. They eat like animals and they think that if they obtain all these pleasures they will realise the final degree of sa‘āda. In so doing they distract themselves from God and forget the fear of the Last Day.\(^1\)

c) The third group consists of those who think that sa‘āda consists in abundance of wealth and the possessing of treasures. They spend their nights awake and pass their days struggling in order to collect these things. In order not to decrease their wealth they do not even eat except very little just enough to keep the body and soul together. This is their pleasure which finally becomes an addiction. This will go on till they experience death. After that the collector will face the exhaustion and the evil consequences of this wealth and those who eat it will obtain its pleasure.\(^2\)

d) Another group of people think that "sa‘āda consists in reputation and in being talked of with praise and admiration." Their whole struggle aims at gaining wealth and riches without even spending, and at giving them away for the sake of nice clothes and riding-animals with which they try to impress others. When they get people talking about them as rich and affluent, they think that they have attained sa‘āda.\(^3\)

\(^1\) Ibid., 285.
\(^2\) Ibid.
\(^3\) Ibid.
Another group among these ignorant people think that sa'āda consists in honour and in making people bow before them with humility and respect. When they establish their power and authority over other people they feel happy with a great happiness. Such a desire is irresistible to the hearts of the negligent people.\footnote{1}

In addition to these five groups there are many more which have gone astray because of their attachment to this world and their accepting it as an end rather than a means. The Prophet referred to this fact when he had said that "love of this world is the fountainhead of all errors."\footnote{2}

After these five groups al-Ghazālī comes to the groups of people who have gone astray not because of their attachment to this world but rather because of their failure to grasp the reality of otherworldly sa'āda. Among these people al-Ghazālī distinguishes three groups.

The first group consists of those who think that this world is the world of tribulation and misfortune whereas the world to come is the place for sa'āda for everyone. Whoever reaches there will be happy whether he has worshipped while he was in this world or not; this is of no importance. In order to free themselves from the tribulations of this world, man has the right, they think, to kill himself. Some men among the people of India held this view and killed themselves by walking right into fire.\footnote{3}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[Ibid.]
\item[Ibid.]; cf. also p. 75 and \textit{Ib}, iv, 131 and 196.
\item[Ib, iii, 286.]
\end{footnotes}
g) Some others think that killing oneself does not bring freedom and salvation; one must, first of all, kill the human qualities (as-sifat al-bashariyya). Sa'ada consists in cutting one's relation with desire and anger. Having this in mind they engaged in struggle and began to be hard on themselves to such an extent that some of them became very weak through hard exercise and some even became insane. Some of them failed to weaken their human qualities entirely and then came to believe that the fulfillment of the obligations of the Law is not possible and therefore the Law is misleading and it has no foundation; in so doing they fell into unbelief.

Some others thought that God does not need our service, nor does He become less perfect because of our disobedience. Then they returned to the satisfaction of their desires and took the way of self-indulgence, asserting that what they were doing was the result of the purity of their belief in the unity of God who needs no service from men.¹

h) Another group of people think that the aim of worship and struggle is to enable man to attain the knowledge of God. As soon as this aim is reached man needs no device and means. Finally they abandoned worship and thought that their positions were lifted up to the degree of the knowledge of God (ma'rifat Allāh) and that they could dispense with religious duties, since they were only for common folk.²

¹. Ibid.
². Ibid.
In addition to the groups of people mentioned here there are many more. Their numbers go up to seventy odd. None of them is, however, considered to be the group that will attain salvation. There is only one group, or sect, that will be saved; this is the group that follows the path of the Prophet and his Companions. It is a path which has none of the extremes of the others. It advocates neither the total abandonment of the world nor the total destruction of desires nor a total devotion to any of them. It strikes the happy medium whose definition is found in the Law. The group of people who will be saved are the ones who, as the Prophet said, "the people of sunna and jamā'a" - The people who follow the Prophet and his Companions.¹

Apart from "some people of India" al-Ghazālī does not mention any other groups by name. However if his criticism of other people, which occurs throughout the Ḥiyā', is read in the light of the foregoing classification, it will not be very difficult to see that the "Materialists", the Bāṭinites, some of the ṣūfis and some philosophers can be included in this classification.

Despite some differences here and there, al-Ghazālī's classes are strikingly similar to those of al-Farābī. As has been pointed out in our second chapter, al-Farābī talks about those people who have wrong ideas about sa'āda. Some of them thought that our

¹. Ibid., 286-7.
phenomenal existence must be destroyed for the attainment of sa'āda; some thought that not our phenomenal existence but the accidents of the soul, viz., desire and anger, must be destroyed; and some did not accept that the residence of the soul in the body is natural.  

The similarities between these classes of al-Fārābī and the sixth and seventh classes of al-Ghazālī need no comment. Al-Ghazālī's first group corresponds to al-Fārābī's "the city of bare necessities" (al-madīna aq-ṣarūriyya). Both of them give peasants as an example, but al-Fārābī's class is explained more comprehensively. Al-Ghazālī's third group corresponds to al-Fārābī's al-madīna an-nadhīhāla. In both cases the gathering of riches for their own sake is considered to be the ultimate aim. Al-Ghazālī's second group corresponds to al-Fārābī's al-madīna al-khassa or shiqwa where sensual pleasures are considered sa'āda. The fifth group in al-Ghazālī corresponds to Madīna al-kāramiyya of al-Fārābī. In fact al-Ghazālī himself uses the word karama when he explains this class, though he does not use the other names of "cities" that are used by al-Fārābī such as ṣarūriyya, nadhdhāla and khassa. There is no directly corresponding class in the passages of siyāsa and madīna to al-Ghazālī's fourth class. This is because this class is not really an independent one. It can easily be included in the

1. Madīna, p. 141ff; cf. Fugūl, secs. 70 and 76.
2. Siyāsa, p. 88; Madīna, p. 110.
3. Or "madīna al-baddāla" as occurs in the Madīna, p. 110.
5. Ibid., p. 89; Madīna, p. 110.
fifth class. The difference between the two is very slight. The people of the fourth class are interested in fame and reputation; they wish to be praised. The people of the fifth group are interested in honour and social position. Now the relation between honour, social position and fame and reputation is obvious. It is just a matter of emphasis, although honour extends further than the desire of being famous and praised.

No doubt al-Ghazālī's "people of sunna and jamā'ā" or al-firqa an-nājiya corresponds to al-Fārābī's "people of the Virtuous City". Both al-Ghazālī and al-Fārābī define these happy classes as the ones who follow the imam and his companions. This imam for al-Ghazālī is the Prophet; and if we remember al-Fārābī's equation of the imam-first ruler-philosopher with the law-giver-prophet, both thinkers will come even closer. However it must be added right away that we do not mean to say that al-Fārābī's "people of the Virtuous City" and al-Ghazālī's "people of sunna" are one and the same thing. In order to arrive at such a conclusion some further research is necessary which lies beyond the scope of this work.

Al-Ghazālī might have reached his conclusion about different classes through his personal and independent observation of people who lived inside and outside the Islamic community. However, I am more inclined to suggest that he was influenced by al-Fārābī's analysis of social classes. In this field al-Fārābī's reputation goes without saying. In fact till Ibn Khaldūn, al-Fārābī remained almost the sole authority, though in the theoretical sense, on social and political philosophy. And al-Ghazālī was ready to use
any idea which he thought would serve his purpose on the condition that it was not in conflict with the Law as he understood it.

ii) Sa'āda in Relation to Virtue and Character.

In many places of his works al-Ghazālī uses the terms khayrāt and faḍā'il interchangeably. He uses, for example, the term khayrāt for the goods which are external to the body and soul as well as the term faḍā'il. The term ni'ma, as we have just pointed out, refers to all means that are given by God.

Although he uses faḍīla for "virtue" quite freely, he does not seem to be keen on it. This is probably because the word had been over used by falāsīfa and many others. Instead of using such strictly defined technical terms as "vice" (radhīla) and "virtue" (faḍīla), al-Ghazālī was much more at home with the words "destructive matters" (muhlikāt) and "saving matters" (munjīyāt) which are the names of the third and fourth quarters of Ḥyā' respectively. Munjīyāt are the means to the attainment of sa'āda. That is why he sometimes calls them "al-munjīyāt al-mus'idāt". It should be clear, however, that al-Ghazālī has nothing against the word faḍīla which he uses as a technical term meaning virtue and in an ordinary sense meaning advantage, superiority and the like.

Al-Ghazālī's not being keen on falāsīfa's technical terms, such as faḍīla, radhīla and so on, may have some practical reasons. To begin with faḍīla and radhīla in the sense that falāsīfa used

1. Ḥ, iv, 129.
2. Ibid., iii, 292.
3. Ibid., 273.
them might have been somewhat strange to the ears of even well-educated Muslims who were not familiar with the works of falāsifa. In other words munjiyāt is more comprehensive and even, as it were more Arabic, than faḍā‘il in respect of the means of salvation. Secondly, although al-Ghazālī was in favour of accepting the philosophers' ideas if they were not in conflict with the Law, he tried to avoid mentioning their names or quoting passages from their works. In so doing he could avoid two possible dangers, namely the spread of the philosophers' ideas and the danger of being criticised and being considered as one of the followers of the philosophers. This attitude of al-Ghazālī sometimes becomes very clear. For instance while he is discussing the four cardinal virtues in the Ihyā' al-Ghazālī refers to Shāfi‘ī whereas one expects to see the name of Ibn Miskawayh, if not al-Fārābī, who was known as the "second teacher"¹ as far as ethics was concerned, and whose work was, for the most part, incorporated into the works of al-Ghazālī.²

Al-Ghazālī was fully aware of the fact that one could write a book on ethical subjects without referring to the Qur‘ān, Tradition and other Islamic sources; and this was one of the significant achievements of the influence of the Greek ethical thought. This could have probably been accepted by al-Ghazālī as an intellectual exercise but not as a work of ethics for a Muslim whose Prophet

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¹. It seems that al-Fārābī's being "the second teacher" was accepted without challenge in the field of logic, metaphysics and other fields of philosophy except ethics in which, it has been supposed, he was not very interested.

². Ih., iv, 528.
was sent to complete "the noble traits of character" (makārīm-al-akhlāq).

As we learn from the Munqidh, despite this careful and cautious approach to the works of the philosophers, he was still accused of being on the same, or at least a similar, line as the philosophers.¹

One thing that seems to be fairly clear in respect of the use of the ethical technical terms, is that he does not like those people who "seek realities in words";² but to say that al-Ghazālī "developed a certain contempt for accurate terminology"³ is pushing the matter a little too far.

Another question that should be posed before we come to saʿāda-fadīla relationship, is why haa al-Ghazālī included what is usually called "philosophical ethics" at all in the Ḥiyā'? Is he not responsible for the integration of this "philosophical ethics" with the "religious ethics"?

Al-Ghazālī deals with virtues, character and similar ethical problems in the second book of the third quarter of Ḥiyā'. In this book of Ḥiyā' it is doubtful if there is any originality at all. Most of the points with which al-Ghazālī occupies himself in this book were dealt by Ibn Miskawayh in a more comprehensive manner. This does not mean however that the subject matter of this book is

2. Ḥ, i, 123.
3. This idea was entertained by H. Lazarus-Yafeh, see "Philosophical terms as a criterion of authenticity in the writings of al-Ghazālī." ŚI, 25, (1966), p. 115. Concerning some misunderstanding of al-Ghazālī's terminology see Jabr, Maʿrifā, pp. 63-6.
isolated in the Ihya* and does not have anything to do with the rest of the Ihya*, as has sometimes been suggested.¹ The importance and the relevance of this book can easily be seen in the section on ni’ma in the Book of Patience and Thanksgiving.

To begin with such ideas as the four cardinal virtues, their divisions and subdivisions, the Golden Mean and so on were not in conflict with the Law. Secondly the "philosophical ethics" was an excellent system through which psychology was linked with ethics and thus the relation between the faculties, or the powers, of the soul and virtues was firmly established. In short al-Ghazālī might have thought that the "philosophical ethics" was so integrated in the Islamic culture that there was no need to keep it out of a book which is about the "revival of religious sciences". Al-Ghazālī was no fanatic; what was good and beneficial may be taken irrespective of the source, as long as it does not go against religion. Al-Ghazālī saw no harm in using the findings of other thinkers not only in respect of logic² but ethics as well. It is probably due to the influence of al-Ghazālī that ethics of the Golden Mean became an integrated part of the Islamic ethics in general.

1. See De Boer, "Ethics and Morality (Muslim)" in J. Hastings' Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. V, p. 509a, where he says that the second book of the third quarter of Ihya* attaches the Platonic and Aristotelian doctrines to its subject matter in a superficial way and "they have no further influence on the contents of part iii and iv."

2. For how logic became an integrated part of Islamic theological writings see Watt, Intellectual, pp. 173-4.
1. Good character (husn al-khulq)

Al-Ghazālī is of the opinion that the otherworldly saʿāda can only be obtained with the help of the virtues of the soul, i.e. knowledge and good character; the virtues of the body, i.e. health and security; external virtues, i.e. wealth, family and so on. The most important of these virtues are the ones that belong to the soul, then come the virtues of the body and then the external virtues.¹

The virtues of the soul are divided into four: the science of revelation (‘ilm al-mukāshafa), practical science, Temperance and Justice. These four can be reduced to faith (īmān) and good character (husn al-khulq) or virtue, since al-Ghazālī does not seem to make any distinction between the term ṭaṣdīla and khulq. To this threefold virtue he adds the divine guidance (ḥidāya) divine direction (rūshd) divine leading (ṭasdīd) and divine support (ṭaʿyīd). By dividing the means first into four and then dividing each of these four divisions into four subdivisions, al-Ghazālī makes the total number of niʿma sixteen.²

The division of goods as spiritual, bodily and external goes back to Aristotle. Instead of the words khayr or ṭaṣdīla sometimes we have the word saʿāda in the writings of Muslim moralists. For

¹ Ih, iii, 292.
² Ibid., iv, 129. For the sources of this division and many other important points concerning the subject under the discussion see Bergh, "Ghazālī on 'Gratitude towards God' and its Greek sources", SI, 8, (1957), pp. 77-98.
instance al-Isfahānī divides saʿāda first into worldly and otherworldly, then he divides the former into the happiness of the soul (saʿādāt an-nafs), the happiness of the body and external happiness.¹

Al-Ghazālī constantly repeats that for the attainment of saʿāda knowledge and action (or faith and good character) are indispensable. We have already tried to show the relation between knowledge, or faith, and saʿāda in our previous chapter. Now we come to the second pillar, namely the good character.

Following the well-known Greek line of thought, al-Ghazālī begins with the definition of khulq. Khulq, according to al-Ghazālī, is not the practice of what is good or bad; nor is it the possessing of the power to perform an act; nor is it just the knowledge of what is good or bad; but rather it is a "habitual disposition" (hayʾa rāsikha) which is firmly established in the soul and from which actions emanate with ease and without the effort of thinking and meditation. One is not born with a moral law. There are only neutral traits which can be developed into a praiseworthy as well as blameworthy character. The quality of "praiseworthy" or "blameworthy" is judged in accordance with the authority of reason and the Law.²

This disposition must be firmly established in the soul, since just an accidental act of spending money does not bring to a man the virtue of generosity. The actions that are wished to be performed must proceed from this disposition with ease, since forcing

¹. Mufradāt, 265-6.
². Ih, iii, 68-9; For a similar definition of khulq in Ibn Sīnā, see N.B., 109.
oneself to perform an act of virtue does not make one virtuous.\textsuperscript{1} Good or virtuous character depends on a harmonious relationship within the powers, or faculties, of the soul. These powers are the power of knowledge, the power of anger, the power of desire. If a harmony is established between these powers, then justice comes about. Each of these powers has its own appropriate virtue or goodness. The power of knowledge depends, as we have seen earlier on, on its being in a position to distinguish lie from sincerity and truth, good actions from bad ones. When such ability becomes firmly established in the soul, the virtue of wisdom (\textit{hikma}) comes into being.

The goodness of the powers of anger and desire consists in the ability to control them according to necessary requirements of reason and the Law. When these two powers are controlled according to wisdom, i.e. reason and the Law, man becomes just.\textsuperscript{2}

Following the vogue of his time al-Ghazālī explains the relation between the powers of the soul through some metaphors most of which are taken from his predecessors. These metaphors, however, are not relevant here.\textsuperscript{3}

Although al-Ghazālī omits the virtue of courage in his division of virtues in the \textit{Book of Patience and Thanksgiving}, he mentions all four cardinal virtues here in the \textit{Book of Self-Discipline}. The division of virtues into \textit{hikma}, \textit{shajā'a}, \textit{'iffa} and \textit{'adāla} and the

\textsuperscript{1} \textit{In}, iii, 68-9.
\textsuperscript{2} \textit{Ibid.}, 69; cf. \textit{Arb}, 177ff.
\textsuperscript{3} \textit{In}, iii, 69.
subdivision of each of these virtues are briefly mentioned.¹ Like Ibn Miskawayh, al-Ghazālī too includes some Qurʿānic virtues such as ḥilm which did not exist in Greek Philosophy.² Like al-Fārābī and Ibn Miskawayh, al-Ghazālī adopts the Aristotelian definition of virtue, i.e. a mean between two extremes.³ He too distinguishes two meanings of ḥikma, i.e. theoretical and practical wisdom,⁴ and defines justice as "putting things in their proper places".⁵ Al-Ghazālī believes that it is not very easy to reach perfection in the four cardinal virtues except for the Prophet. The one who gets closer to the Prophet in these traits of character, gets closer to God (qurb) in proportion to his closeness to the Prophet of God.⁶

It is clear that in this passage the character of the Prophet is identified with the perfection in all four cardinal virtues. His use of his favourite term qurb here is worth noticing. This is clear evidence to show that the Book of Self-discipline is not out of touch with other major concepts which were dealt with in the Ḣiyā‘.

In another passage al-Ghazālī takes Temperance (‘iffa) as a first step in self-discipline and shows the link between this "philosophical virtue" and those of religious ones. He says that

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¹ Ḥ, iii, 70.
² Ibid.
³ Ibid.
⁴ Ḥ, 76.
⁵ Arb, 91; cf. Md, 47 and 57-8.
⁶ Arb, 71.
after 'iffa, which is refraining from being dominated by desire and anger, comes wara', which is refraining from all that is prohibited, which is followed by piety (taqwā). Piety includes not only refraining from what is prohibited but from what is dubious as well. Beyond Piety there is truthfulness (ṣiddq) which includes all three virtues. The one who possesses ṣiddq is closer to God (garīb). ¹

In both passages we arrive at the degree of qurb in which al-Ghazālī's concept of saʿāda consists. In fact one can take any of the four cardinal virtues and easily show how it is related to saʿāda. In a passage of the Arbaʿīn, for example, al-Ghazālī writes that when one accustoms oneself to observe equity, or mean (iʿtidāl) in niceties of moments, uprightness and soundness become a way of life rooted in one's heart and one will be ready to receive "the form of happiness" (ṣūrat as-saʿāda). ²

What is the limit, however, of observing equity in niceties of moments? This question is answered with the help of another philosophical concept, namely the Golden Mean (wasat).

We have already discussed what is obligatory (wājib) for man in the attainment of salvation. The purpose of religious obligations is to put man on the right path. Religion calls this path "the straight path" (ṣirāt al-mustaqīm) and the philosophers

¹. Êb, iv, 194.
². Arb, 91–2. As far as I know the term surat as-saʿāda is not used anywhere else in the works of al-Ghazālī that are included in this study. For the definition of saʿāda in terms of "perfection of ġūra" see al-ʿAmlī, K.S.I., 5.
call it "mean" (wasat or tawassût). Al-Ghazālī identifies the Qur'ānic "straight path" with the Golden Mean. The Prophet himself pointed out that "the best of everything is their mean. The Golden Mean is desired in every matter and trait of character; it is always praiseworthy and good, whereas both extremes, i.e. defect and excess are bad and blameworthy.

Al-Ghazālī approves of the philosophers' idea of the Golden Mean and adopts it without hesitation. Like the philosophers, he accepts that virtue consists in the mean actions; this is basically an Aristotelian idea, in which every virtue has two opposites, i.e. vices, except justice which has only one opposite, i.e. injustice.

Al-Ghazālī makes it clear again and again that the Golden Mean does not mean the destruction and the total annihilation of the powers of desire and anger, but rather it means to weaken them and keep them under control. This is absolutely necessary, since there can be no way to sa'āda in the world to come except forbidding oneself to follow desire and training oneself to oppose it. To believe in the validity of this fact is necessary. In fact the destruction of the powers of desire and anger may lead to some defects which cannot be considered virtues. For the preservation of the body, man needs the power of desire. He becomes a beast,

1. Ṣḥ, iii, 121; and Ṣḥ, iv, 181-2; cf. M.K., 83 and Arb, 179.
2. Ṣḥ, iii, 121; cf. also Ṣḥ, iv, 181-2.
3. Cf. T, 272; cf. also Watt, Philosophy and Theology, p. 119.
4. Ṣḥ, iii, 70.
5. Md, 18.
6. Ṣḥ, iii, 86.
if he follows desire to the extent where he deviates from the
Golden Mean. The same thing applies to anger which has a positive
value. Its lack is considered as imperfection. Anger is
indispensable for the supression of desire and self-discipline. The
Qur'ān praises "those who are hard on the unbelievers" (XLVIII, 29). The one who lacks completely the power of anger cannot be hard and
thus cannot perform this praiseworthy act.¹

To keep in the Golden Mean is not always easy. The mean is
thinner than a single hair. In fact being always in the mean state
and being free of defects are the qualities of angels in the imitation of which, as has been pointed out before, lies man's
perfection and happiness; and it is this perfection and the theoretical perfection that constitute man's real perfection (ṣākamāl
al-haqīqī) and accompany man after death.

In the classification of people in respect of the misconception
of saʿāda, al-Ghazālī makes it clear how dangerous the situation can
be if a man goes into an excess in the performance of a virtuous act. Some people went insane when they became hard on themselves. Al-
Ghazālī stresses the necessity of 'the mean' when he talks of fear and hope. The man who is dominated by fear will continue to worship
to the extent that he will neglect himself, his children and his family. On the other hand, he who is dominated by hope will neglect his duty and forget the terrible punishment of God.²

¹ Ibid., 208.
² Th., iv, 181.
Although it is difficult to be in an absolutely perfect equilibrium, since this requires absolute goodness (husn al-muṭlaq), one should try to be as close as possible to it. It is because of this difficulty that a Muslim prays to God as "guide us to the straight path" (i, 4) in every rak'a of his worship. Perfection of equilibrium, or i'tidāl, belongs to the Prophet who is "upon a mighty morality" (LXVIII, 4).¹

In our discussion on al-Fārābī, we pointed out that al-Fārābī, following Aristotle, makes a clear distinction between the virtuous man (fādil) and the man who restrains himself (dābit). As far as I know al-Ghazālī does not use the term dābit in this sense, but the idea is implicit. He says that in order to reach "the perfection of saʿāda" (kamāl as-saʿāda), man must perform his acts of worship and abandon what must be avoided. For the attainment of the "promised saʿāda" man must obtain pleasure in the performance of good actions and dislike in the performance of bad ones. It is true that perseverance in the avoidance of what is prohibited is better even if one dislikes doing so, but one must persevere with a view to abandoning bad actions rather than performing their opposites unwillingly.² In other words al-Ghazālī too believes that one does not become virtuous, if one performs virtuous acts with difficulty. It is one of the essential qualities of virtue that it should be performed with ease.³

1. Arb, 180.
2. Ṭār, iii, 75.
3. Ibid., 68.
2. Deviation from the Golden Mean and its cure

By drawing a parallel between the sickness of the body and that of the soul - a parallelism which has a very long history in ethics -, al-Ghazâlî tries to be as accurate as possible in his account of "the sickness of the heart" - a Qur'ânic expression employed by all Muslim moralists. Any bodily organ that fails to perform its appropriate task and function properly is called sick. The same rule applies to the soul. The things for which the heart is created are knowledge, wisdom, ma'rifâ, love of God, service to God and the perception of pleasure in His remembrance. Any heart that fails in the fulfilment of this purpose and loves other things more than it does God is sick.¹

Ignorance is the sickness par excellence of the heart and it is the cause of all miseries;² It leads to the obedience of the heart to desire and anger which in its turn leads it to shaqâwa. When these "two armies", i.e. anger and desire revolt against the domination of the heart, the heart should seek assistance from knowledge, wisdom and reflection. When the obedience of these "two armies" to the heart is secured, man finds himself on the way to the eternal sa'âda.³

Man's committing a sin is the result of sickness of the heart. Sin, which consists of that which goes against the commandments

¹. Ibid., 80-1.
². W, 47ff.
³. Ib, iii, 89.
of God, is a veil between him and what he loves. No committed sin passes away without leaving a dark spot on the face of the heart. If a man is made sa'îd by the eternal decree of God, that spot becomes obvious to him before he commits a sin and thus he may be prevented from committing that sin; if, however, he is made shaqî, that spot may be hidden from him to the extent that it occupies the whole heart and so hell-fire becomes necessary.¹

Al-Ghazâlî is optimistic enough, however, to accept that one committed sin does not make a man unworthy of Paradise. He is fully aware that no man is free of sin; not even the Prophets are free of small transgressions. There are many verses in the Qur'ân that mention their tears and repentance of their mistakes.² Although there is a difference between a small and a grave sin, the avoidance of both must be attempted. Even a grave sin does not necessitate the eternal shaqâwa, but it must not be forgotten that the idleness of one day leads to that of another one then to that of another. Man may even, one day, find idleness is something pleasurable. In the same way, a small sin leads to another one and another one until man destroys the foundation of faith (asl-al-îmân) and in so doing loses the foundation of sa'îda (asl-as-sa'îda) during the concluding stage of life (khâtabim).³ Therefore man must always be on the watch in respect of the small sins.

Any sin is a deviation from the Golden Mean which needs an

¹. Ibid., iv, 68. This is one of the clear passages in which al-Ghazâlî adheres to the well-known Orthodox idea that sa'îda or shaqâwa of a man is predetermined.
². Ibid., 12.
³. Ibid., iii, 77; and iv, 41.
immediate cure. Like al-Farābī, al-Ghazālī believes that vices which are the maladies of the soul can be cured by their opposites.\(^1\) If the application of a virtue to cure a vice which opposes it fails, then it is commendable to cure a serious fault with a less serious one.\(^2\) Cure (‘ilāj) in this sense means to return to the Golden Mean.\(^3\) In other words not only freedom from vices, but acquisition of virtues is necessary for a complete cure, and this necessitates the performance of a virtuous act with ease and with pleasure. A heart in this position is safe and sound from other non-virtuous traits of character and it will be brought to God as a safe and sound (salīm) heart, and it will join the group of muṣarrabūn as "a soul at peace" (an-nafs al-mutma’inna).\(^4\)

It is quite obvious from this passage that al-Ghazālī accepts the ethics of the Qur’ān as an ethics of an equilibrium (i’tīdāl) and the heart which stays in the Golden Mean is the heart which is described as "sound" and "peaceful" by the Qur’ān. It is worth repeating once again how al-Ghazālī harmonizes the Qur’ānic ethics with the "philosophical" one and how he relates the Book of Self-discipline to the whole of Ḩiyā.\(^5\)

According to al-Ghazālī one can discover one’s own faults through the help of a shaykh or a friend as well as through listening what his enemies say about him and through mixing with

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1. Th, iii, 81.
2. Ibid., 73-4.
3. Ibid., 81.
4. Ibid.
5. For the idea that the Qur’ānic ethics is not 'the ethics of the mean' but it is near to it, see above, section on the Golden Mean.
other people and discovering the blameworthy actions which are performed by them and then trying to find out if he has any of these vices.¹

After this discovery he can start cleansing himself gradually. There are four grades of cleanliness, or purification (ṣahāra): the cleansing of the external part, the cleansing of the bodily organs, the cleansing of the heart from vices and the cleansing of sirr from everything save God; the last degree belongs to the prophets and the Sincere.²

Before everything else, however, the sick man must believe that there are causes of sickness and of health for the coming into existence of which he is, in a way, responsible. There is no use in his occupying himself with a cure, if he does not believe in the principles of medicine. The same thing can be said about the curing of the heart. Man must believe in the principles of the Law which say that there are causes of otherworldly sa'āda and shaqāwa which are obedience and disobedience respectively. Without this faith, which may come into existence through personal investigation or accepting it on authority (taqlīd), there is no use in occupying himself with the curing of his heart.³

In addition to his belief in medicine, he must believe in the diagnosis and prescriptions of his doctor; otherwise his former belief will be of no use. In the same way the spiritually sick

¹. Ḥb., iii, 82-3.
². Ibid., i, 170; cf. Arb., 27.
³. Ḥb., iv, 63.
man must believe in what the Prophet - the doctor of the heart - says. Then he must heed what the Prophet says and act accordingly.\footnote{Ibid.}

If a man follows all these steps, there is no reason for being pessimistic about the possibility of his returning to the Golden Mean. In other words a change from bad to good is usually, if not always, possible. Like most of the Muslim moralists, al-Ghazālī accepts that through discipline a disposition can be changed to another one and the traits of character can be refined. A good character can be obtained sometimes by nature and sometimes by discipline and earnest effort.\footnote{Ibid., 75 and 71f.}

In the methods of attaining new virtues al-Ghazālī seems to follow his predecessors, namely Ibn Miskawayh, Ibn Sīnā and al-Fārābī. Even the examples he gives in this respect are mostly taken from falāsifā, such as the analogy between acquiring the virtue of generosity and the art of calligraphy and so on.

Like al-Fārābī, al-Ghazālī too divides people into different classes in respect of the possibility of changing character. First of all there are ignorant people who cannot distinguish truth from falsehood. To cure them is not very difficult. All they need is a good teacher and guide.

Secondly there are people who are ignorant and in error (jahil and dāll). They know what is good and bad in actions, but they do not act according to this knowledge. Bad action seems beautiful to them. Although it is very difficult to change their bad
dispositions to good ones, it is possible to bring some kind of refinement.

Thirdly there are people who are ignorant, in error and dissolute (jāhīl, ḍālī and ḍāsīq). These people not only perform evil acts, but also think that these acts are virtuous and beautiful. In this case the hope for cure is extremely slim.

Fourthly, there are people who are, in addition to the first three qualities, wicked (shārīr). They do all the evil deeds of the previous classes. Moreover they mislead others as well. In so doing they think that they excel in their social rank. To try to change the character of these people is as difficult as trying to change the character of a wolf.¹

It is noteworthy that the term ḍāsīq in the third group is used in a comparatively stronger sense than the usually accepted sense in which it refers to a sinful believer. When shārīr is added to ḍāsīq, cure becomes almost impossible. Now this ḍāsīq-shārīr is the same as al-Fārābī's fāsīq. In al-Fārābī the people of the madīna al-fāsīqa not only perform evil deeds but also enjoy and take pride in doing so. The leaders of the City of Error deserve eternal shaqāwa not only because they take pleasure in performing evil acts, but also because they mislead those who live under their leadership.

It seems that when fāsīq is viewed from an ethical standpoint, al-Ghazālī is as hard on him as al-Fārābī; but when he is viewed

1. Ḍh, iii, 72-3; cf. W, 47ff.
from the standpoint of theology, in which al-Fārābī does not seem
to be interested, al-Ghazālī makes it clear that a fāsiq is a
believer and must not be treated as an unbeliever. The otherworldly
saʿāda is not only a question of ethics, but also, and above all, a
question of the Law. We have said enough about this matter while
we were dealing with the relation of "obligation" (wājib) to the
perfection of saʿāda.

After establishing the fact that an established disposition
can be replaced by another one through riyāḍa and mujāhada, al-
Ghazālī shows the ways of purifying the heart. To give a complete
account of the purification of the soul here is impossible. In
fact the "ṣūfistic stations" such as yaqīn, khawf-rajà, zuhd, dhikr
and fikr are all different but successive steps of purification.
We have already touched upon the importance of all these "stations"
in the attainment of saʿāda. As a matter of fact whatever we have
said about perfection, adopting the traits of character of angels
and of God as well as about patience, repentance and so on are
directly connected with the idea of purification.

Without purification of the heart man cannot attain maʿrīfa.
We have already noticed that perfection depends on maʿrīfa. The
highest degree of perfection, however, is not a religious obligation.
In order to purify the heart and so gain perfection man has to do
something more than just what the Law demands; some additional
and voluntary practices (nawāfil) are indispensable.

Nawāfil in worship (salāt), or supererogatory petitions, are
divided into the Sunna of the Prophet, that which is desirable (mustahabb) and that which is performed spontaneously and willingly. All these actions are intrinsically related to saʿāda. The Prophet said that God tells that "nothing brings man near to Me than the performance of what I made obligatory for him; and in works of supererogation My servant comes ever nearer to Me until I love him."²

Those who wish to attain mere salvation can be content with the obligatory performances, but those who desire ultimate saʿāda ought to perform something more. In fact it is psychologically impossible for muqarrabūn, for example, to be content with what is obligatory. It is only in this sense that the idea that "the good deeds of the Righteous (abrār) are considered the 'bad' deeds of muqarrabūn" (ḥasanāt al-abrār sayyāfāt al-muqarrabīn) becomes meaningful.³ In other words what the Righteous people do is good, but what they do cannot bring the ultimate saʿāda. Muqarrabūn do not consider the things good in the real sense if they fall short of their expectation, i.e. meeting God. Therefore in addition to what the Righteous people perform, they also undertake nawāfil.

Al-Ghazālī sees an intrinsic relationship between wājibāt, or farāʿīd, and najāt, and between nawāfil and faḍāʿīl, and between faḍāʿīl and saʿāda al-quswā. Thanks to such clear relationship

1. Ih, i, 255.
2. The Faith, p. 90, and Ih, i, 100; cf. also Jabre, Maʿrifā, pp. 109ff.
3. Ih, iv, 62, and Ih, i, 100.
al-Ghazālī's idea of *saʿāda* and its attainment is clearer than that of *falāsifa* in general and al-Fārābī in particular. It is true, in al-Fārābī as well as in al-Ghazālī there are different degrees of *saʿāda* which are the results of different degrees of knowledge and moral perfection. In what precisely does this moral perfection consist? The philosophers are vague in their answers, whereas al-Ghazālī is straightforward: do what the Law demands, if you want to receive salvation; and perform *nawāfīl* - additional prayer, fasting, charity and so on -, if you want to get still nearer to God and be *saʿīd*. It is this precision that makes al-Ghazālī's idea of *saʿāda* and virtuous acts not only clear but also more Islamic and less abstract, or, as it were, philosophical. Al-Ghazālī was perfectly aware of the fact that nothing could be stranger to the ear of a Muslim than the abstract formulations of the ideas of good, bad, perfection, happiness and so on. That is why he views every concept from an Islamic standpoint. Philosophy can say many things about what is moral and what is not, and a philosophically minded person can benefit from such philosophical speculations. However what most men need is not an abstract formulation of good and bad, moral and immoral, but a clear and concrete definition of actions that lead to *saʿāda*. In order to guarantee the minimum degree of *saʿāda* (*najāt*), men must be commanded to perform acts. Man will be held responsible, if he chooses not to obey the divine commandments.
3) The responsibility of man in the attainment of his sa‘āda

The attitude of a theologian who is faithful to the basic principles of the Ash‘arite school towards the insoluble problem of freedom and determinism may not be very difficult to guess. The Traditions that have been quoted many times by the Ash‘arite theologians in favour of a pre-established world view occur in the works of al-Ghazālī as well. Some of these Traditions have already been quoted in our first chapter.

According to al-Ghazālī the eternal divine decree covers everything. As the Prophet pointed out, sa‘īd is sa‘īd by the decree of God and so shaqī is shaqī by the decree of God.¹ The divine decree covers not only the final two stages, i.e. sa‘āda and shaqāwa, but the acts of obedience and those of disobedience, which are the causes of sa‘āda and shaqāwa respectively. One cannot explain these things more than this, since the secrets of the divine decree are neither known nor are to be explained, even if they are known.²

Commenting on the Tradition that everybody is guided towards what is created for him, al-Ghazālī says that if the divine decree has decided that so and so will be sa‘īd, then this man will be guided to the acts of obedience which are means to sa‘āda; if a person, on the other hand, has been made shaqī, he will attain it through idleness. It is sheer ignorance, however, to say that if I am decreed sa‘īd, then I will be sa‘īd, so there is no need to

1. Ḩ, iv, 197.
2. Ibid., iii.
work; and if I am decreed shaqī, then work cannot change it. This is ignorance, because to abandon actions is downright shaqāwa itself.\(^1\)

It is, however, the firm belief in this eternal decree that makes al-Ghazālī praise God as the One Who guides, directs, makes someone sa‘īd or shaqī in many places of Ḥyā’.\(^2\) According to al-Ghazālī the authority of God cannot be questioned; if He wanted to destroy someone, He would do it despite his truthfulness and if He wanted to make someone sa‘īd, He would do it despite his ignorance.\(^3\) Of course the divine law does not operate in this way. This is just an idea to remind man of God’s eternal and limitless freedom.

In fact the position that man holds in respect of freedom and determinism is somewhere in the middle. His actions are not determined in the same way, say, as the act of burning which has no choice but to burn, nor are they like the actions of God Who is entirely free. Everything that takes place before the act of choice is determined, but choice, which takes place after reflection and consideration, is attached to man. Man is determined in his choice. In order to designate this middle position the Ashʿarites coined the term kasb (acquisition).\(^4\)

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1. Md, 54; For the Tradition that saʿāda and shaqāwa are determined while the foetus is still in the womb, see Ḥ, iv, 319. And for the Tradition that God created good and the people for it, see Arb, 266, and for the one in which the Prophet urges us to stick to the causes of saʿāda, see Ḥ, iv, 111.
2. Ḥ, 1, 274; iv, 550.
3. Ḥ, iv, 172.
4. Ibid., 317.
It must be remembered however that although choice belongs to man, it too, like all other things, is from God. Everything is created and regulated by God. Man follows a divine pattern before he chooses anything. Before man chooses to take some food, for example, there have to be many things at his disposal. God creates a healthy hand, and food which gives pleasure. It is He Who gives knowledge of the fact that food satisfies man's desire and that it is not harmful and so there is no danger in receiving it. When all these causes get together, there comes to be a will to attain it. The resolution of the will which takes place after some hesitation and the desire for food is called choice (İkhtiyar).

In order to choose man needs knowledge and power and therefore choice is not an isolated act. It is due to the complexities of matters that people usually fail to comprehend the real nature of what is determined and what is not. That is why some of them favoured determinism and some freedom and some others kaab.¹ "If the doors of heaven were opened to them and they could look into the world of the Unseen and malakūt, it would become obvious to them that all of them were right in one respect and all fell short in another respect."²

Man attains sa'āda through his voluntary actions. From one point of view sa'āda is the result of man's good actions; from another point of view it is a divine gift. Actions purify the soul and make it ready to accept the divine light which is in the hand of

1. Ibid., 7-8.
2. Ibid., 8-9.
God. In order to receive this divine gift man's intention (niyaa), will (irada) and choice (ikhtiyar) must be directed towards it.

Intention has a moral value and it is very important for the determination of the value of an action. It is, as it were, the spirit of an action.\(^1\) This is why the Prophet says that "actions are judged according to intentions". Intention is one of the causes of God's help;\(^2\) it springs from knowledge and is directed towards action.\(^3\) An act which is performed without intention brings no good to man.\(^4\) An intention without action is better than an action without intention in respect of sa`ada.\(^5\)

A voluntary act is completed in three stages: knowledge, will and power. Man cannot will a thing unless he knows something about it and does not use his power and execute an act unless he wills it.\(^6\)

First of all there are only impressions in the mind. This stage is followed by an inclination towards impressions. Then comes a conviction, or the decision of the heart in favour of the object of inclination. Lastly comes the determination to do a thing. The last stage is also called intention or aim (qaṣd).\(^7\)

Will (irada), which is an integral part of the heart as a faculty of knowledge, is the awakening of the soul towards a thing which it sees as a suitable aim either in the present or in the future.\(^8\)

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1. Ibid., 466.
2. Ibid., 451.
3. Arb, 226.
4. In, iv, 456.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., 454.
7. Ibid., iii, 53-4 and iv, 545.
8. Ibid., iv, 464-5.
What is suitable comes to us in two ways; naturally and without deliberation and hesitation such as man's reflexive removal of a sword before him; after deliberation and hesitation. The second case occurs when the intellect hesitates whether a thing is good or not. When it decides that it is good (khayr) and when will, which comes into being after such deliberation, decides to execute what is good, voluntary actions take place, and this degree of will is called choice, ikhtiyār, coming from the word "good" (khayr).1

The basic difference between man and animals lies in man's possessing this higher degree of will and knowledge. The will of man has the controlling power of intellect by the help of which man perceives the consequences of his actions and the way of goodness and finds out the right means to the attainment of this good. Will in this sense in fact is just the opposite of the will of desire and of other animals.2

Let us consider once again how man attains saʿāda. First of all he knows, or rather is taught by the prophets, that the ultimate good is saʿāda. After this knowledge there develops a will in the heart to attain it. He decides what kinds of means are indispensable for its attainment, and then he needs the power to follow the right course and to do the acts that lead to the desired end.3

The right means in the case of saʿāda are the acts of obedience for the performance of which he may have many reasons. However as

1. Ibid., iv, 316.
2. Ibid., iii, 10.
3. Ibid., iv, 456.
long as man wills their performance for the attainment of Paradise or for the avoidance of the hell-fire or just for glorifying God, his intentions are considered as sound, since they all aim at what is promised in the world to come. The people of insight, however, perform the acts of obedience for the sake of love of God. This is incomparably higher than performing them for the pleasure of the food and marriages (mankūihat) of Paradise.\(^1\) The same action can be performed for many reasons, and the determination of the value of the action depends on, and is determined by, intention, will and aim - the three terms which are sometimes used synonymously. A man who wills to perform his duties for the sake of Paradise, will be given that reward; if he performs the same duties for the sake of God's greatness and beauty he will be given much higher rewards. Here not the action itself but intention changes the result.\(^2\) If a man performs an action for the sake of being close to God (qurb), he is called the Sincere (mukhliš) and the opposite is the one who performs an action for the sake of something else than God which is considered "polytheism" (shirk).\(^3\)

Here al-Ghazālī faces one of the most difficult questions: Is it in the hand of man to decide to do an act for this or that purpose? On the one hand there is man who possesses intention, will and choice; and on the other hand there are goods which are outside him and which are means to sa‘āda. If man is not altogether free to choose

\(^{1.}\) Ibid., 466.  
\(^{2.}\) Ibid.  
\(^{3.}\) Ibid., 471.
these means and attain sa'āda, then what is the real force which links man with the means of sa'āda? According to al-Ghazālī, between the will of man and the means, or to be more precise the external goods, stands another group of goods which he calls "the aiding or harmonizing goods" (an-ni'am at-tawfiqiyya).¹

iii) Guiding Forces to Sa'āda

1) Sa'āda as a gift of God

The word tawfiq has many different meanings in Arabic. In this special context, however, al-Ghazālī defines it as something that brings harmony and unity between the will of man and the divine decree and predestination. Since the divine decree and predestination cover both good and bad, sa'āda and shaqāwa, tawfiq too has the same function. However the term is habitually used in respect of sa'āda, like for example the word ilḥād which means to lean or incline towards something, but it is particularly used in respect of the person who inclines towards falsehood and abandons truth.² In another passage al-Ghazālī defines tawfiq as something that brings a harmonious relationship between the will of man and the causes (ma‘nā) which are the acts of obedience that are useful in the world to come.³

Al-Ghazālī divides "the goods of tawfiqiyya"⁴ into "guidance"

1. Ibid., 75 and 129, 134.
2. Ḥ, iv, 134, 129.
4. In Mīzān, which is not included in our work, al-Ghazālī uses the term ṭadā‘il instead of ni‘am; see p. 301.
(hidāya), "divine direction" (rushd), "divine support" or confirmation (ta'īlād) and "divine leading" (tasdīd).¹

a) hidāya consists in the divine guidance without which there can be no happiness for anyone. It is the very condition of all other virtues. Will, power and all other means are of no use without it. Not even the Prophet himself can enter Paradise without hidāya.²

Al-Ghazālī distinguishes three stages of hidāya. Firstly God guides man in respect of the way of good and of bad (ṭarīq-al-khayr wa-sh-sharr). God provides everybody with His knowledge; some obtain it through intellect (bi-l-'aql) and some through the prophets. The means through which guidance is received are the Books, the prophets and the clairvoyance of the intelligent people (baṣā'ir-al-'uqūl).³

It is a well-known fact that the Ash'arites did not believe in the objective theory of value. Al-Ghazālī, as G. Hourani observes, "restated the subjective theory of value which was established by ash-Shāfī‘I and al-Ash‘arī. According to them God reveals what is right and what is wrong."⁴ He does not believe that things are good or bad in themselves as the Mu’tazilites do. The foundation of obligation is the revealed knowledge and not reason. Al-Ghazālī’s acceptance of the fact that 'aql knows the way that

1. Ḥ, iv, 134.
2. Ibid., 134-5.
3. Ibid., 135.
leads to good or bad shows that he never underestimates the importance of 'aql in respect of the knowledge of what is good and bad. It must be remembered however that he does not use the term 'aql in the sense in which theologians and logicians use it.

Secondly God guides man because of his struggle and effort. This is beyond the first degree of guidance which is general. This guidance comes only from time to time and only as a fruit of mujāhada.¹

The third degree of hidāya is far beyond the second; it is a light that shines in the world of prophethood and sainthood (nubuwwa and walāya) and follows the perfection of mujāhada. With this guidance man is guided to such a degree which cannot be attained by the guidance of intellect. This is called "absolute guidance" (al-ḥudā-al-muṭlaq).²

God's attribute hāḍî covers the happiness of the elect as well as that of the common folk; in fact it is concerned with the well-being of all creatures.³

b) Rushd consists of the divine direction of man's will during his struggle for the attainment of his aims. In short it consists of the divine providence (‘ināya) which aids man, gives him strength to accomplish what is good and avoid what is bad and corrupted. It is an inducement to attain saʿāda. Rushd is more complete than

¹. Ṣālīḥ, iv, 135.
². Ibid.
³. Mā, 71; cf. Ibn al-‘Arabī, kitāb sharḥ al-Asmā’ al-husnā [Ayasofya, 1862] fols. 21 a-b, where al-Ghazālī's influence is quite obvious on Ibn al-‘Arabī's explanation of the divine attributes.
mere guidance. Guidance in a general sense is present everywhere. The important thing is its employment which cannot be done without direction. It is direction that calls to action.¹

c) Taṣdīḍ consists of the divine leading; it steers man's actions toward what is desired and it enables him to achieve his aim in a short period. Mere guidance is not enough unless it is accompanied by ṭūḥād and the latter is not enough unless it is accompanied by taṣdīḍ. Ḥidāya itself is nothing more than the definition of what is good and bad, ṭūḥād is the calling of man's attention to, and reminding him of, the action; and taṣdīḍ is the assistance with which man uses his bodily organs in the attainment of the right thing. In other words it creates a congenial climate for the fulfilment of man's will.²

d) As for ta'yīḍ, it combines, as it were, everything. It is the divine confirmation that brings internal and external strength through insight and fortification of man's combativeness. With the help of the divine confirmation man may reach the degree of infallibility (ʾīsma) which consists of the divine generosity. When this ʾīsma operates in man, he becomes strong in the pursuit of good and in the repelling of evil to the extent that something like an invisible obstacle prevents him from doing evil.³ This high stage, however, is usually linked with prophets, since there is no

¹. Ṣ., iv, 135. For the Bāṭinites' interpretation of ṭūḥād and našāt see F.B. 30.
². Ṣ., iv, 135-6.
³. Ibid., 136.
one (except the prophet) whose knowledge is sometimes rejected and sometimes accepted.1

Man, according to al-Ghazālī, must not be pessimistic in respect of the goods of tawfiqiyya. Al-Ghazālī, like the Stoics, believes that God's Providence is for all individuals. Man must know that God obtains no satisfaction out of driving His servants into eternal destruction. In fact when a man opens his eyes he will clearly see that most men have at their disposal all the means of sa'āda. That is why man hardly wishes his own death. No doubt the means through which man arrives at good things are predominant in the world.2 Goods that we are given are infinite. Even the existence of evil can be considered instrumentally good. The punishment in hell-fire, for instance, is good (ni'ma), not for the one who is punished, but for other people. There is a beneficial lesson for one tribe in the misfortunes of another. If God had not created punishment and people for it, those to whom goods are given would not know how valuable those goods are. To think about the terrible pain that people experience in Hell will make the people of Paradise realize the importance of the pleasures of Paradise.3

As has been noted before, there are many means through which God's assistance reaches man. Al-Ghazālī emphasises on three of

1. Ibid., i, 109.
2. Ibid., iv, 182.
3. Ibid., 160; For the idea that good does not exist without evil, which has a Stoic origin, see Bergh, "The love of God in al-Ghazali's Vivification of Theology", p. 320.
these means, namely the angels, the prophets and those who follow the path of the prophets such as shaykhs and the learned. Due to the importance of these three groups of guiding forces to sa'āda we shall examine them a little more closely.

2) Angels, prophets and the spiritual leaders

a) Angels are the beings which are created by God for spreading good, increasing knowledge and unveiling the truth. At the opposite pole there is the devil, who calls to evil, commands vileness and frightens man with the threat of poverty when there is solicitude for the good.¹

The assistance of angels is usually explained in terms of revelation and inspiration. The concepts of wahy and ilhām constitute the basis of our knowledge and both are linked with the concept of tawfiq. Ilhām is a sudden knowledge which enters the heart without teaching and instruction. It is the opposite of the whisper of the devil (waswass).²

As has been pointed out a little earlier on, before actions proper there have to be some impressions in the heart which are the product of reflection and remembrance. Now these impressions move desire, since desire, will, intention, resolution all follow impressions (khawāṣir). Naturally there are impressions which incite to good and impressions which incite to evil; the former

¹. Ḩ. , 111, 35.
². Ibid., 34.
are caused by angels, the latter by the devil. Thanks to tawfīq the heart becomes ready to accept the dictation of ilhām which is a praiseworthy impression. If temptation (īghtā'ī) and desertion (khazlān) take the place of tawfīq, then the heart heeds the whisper of the devil.¹ So we have malak, ilhām, khayr and sa'āda on one side and Shayṭān, waswasa, sharr and shagāwa on the other side. Tawfīq joins the first group of concepts one to another; and khazlān joins the second group of concepts.

This is not the place to go into a detailed account of al-Ghazālī's idea of angels. It seems that their duties start from the administration of the digestion of food in the stomach and go up to the duty of bringing the divine commands and prohibitions to the prophets.² As has been explained in the previous chapters, it is angels that write down man's sa'āda and shagāwa and it is again they who reveal man's sa'āda or shagāwa during dying and lastly announce the ultimate declaration after the major Interrogation (su'āl).³

b) Prophets

Although ilhām belongs to everyone whose heart is clean enough to accept it, wāfy belongs to prophets. In wāfy there is the idea of Law which lays down the basis of a community, whereas in ilhām there is no such thing. It is the prophet and not the

1. Ibid., 34-5.
2. Ibid., iv, 150, 123; cf. Arb, 292. Some of what al-Ghazālī says about angels are in agreement with Ibn Sīnā's ideas. See T.T., II, 162.
3. Cf, N.M., 12.
wali who has to take the happiness of the whole community into consideration.1

We have already pointed out the importance of prophetic knowledge while we were dealing with the place of intellect in man's sa'āda. Here we will take some of the practical matters which link man with the prophet in the search for happiness.

Those who guide people to otherworldly sa'āda are prophets and the learned.2 The Prophet is a person to whom the real nature of things is disclosed and who is occupied with the improvement of the condition of people.3 "Know", says al-Ghazālī, "that the key of sa'āda is to follow the Sunna and to imitate the apostle of God." This following him includes his way of eating, drinking, sleeping and so on.4 This, man has to do since among them there are actions which have direct bearing on the preparation of sa'āda and which can only be known through the light of prophecy. If the Prophet prefers one permissible act to another while he is able to choose any of them, then one must realize that his choice is based on the light of prophecy.5 There are many things that may not seem to us relevant to our happiness; we may not be aware of their secrets. Here again we have to follow the Prophet. If the Prophet says that you must not be cupped on Saturday, then leave it there.6

1. Th, iii, 33.
3. Th, iii, 33.
4. Arb, 89.
5. Ibid., 93.
6. Ibid., 332-3.
Al-Ghazālī would still insist on this, even though the physician ar-Rāzī thought otherwise. It is the Prophet, as we all know, who has direct access to the world of malakūt.

If there is no prophecy, there is neither saʿāda nor shaqāwa for man. It was commonly held by the Sunnite theologians, including al-Ghazālī, that if some people who lived in the remote parts of the world and by any chance did not hear anything about Islam, they would not be held responsible for their ignorance.

Al-Ghazālī leaves them in aʿrāf where they have some kind of easy life (rāḥa), but not happiness. Here the theologians base their argument on the Qurʾān which says: "We never chastise, until we send forth a messenger" (XVII, 15).

The latter theologians and writers have followed this idea vigorously. Under the influence of al-Ghazālī such outstanding people as al-Isfahānī, Ibn Khaldūn and many others emphatically stated that the question of saʿāda and shaqāwa is the business of prophecy and not philosophy. They all maintained, as al-Ghazālī did, that the philosophers confused their understanding of saʿāda with the Qurʾānic idea of "the promised saʿāda". The philosophers have failed, says Ibn Qayyim al-Jawjiyya to show the real link between moral virtues and saʿāda. They have equally failed to give a clear definition of their idea of saʿāda. 

1. Ibid., 94.
2. Ibid., 93.
3. Miftāḥ dār as-saʿāda, [Hasan Hūsnū Paşa 580], fols. 423-4.
wonders how, for example, the philosophers can explain that eating pork can be the cause of shaqāwa in the world to come. 1

Ibn Khaldūn is as hard on falāsīfī as al-Ghazālī is in respect of their concept of sa‘āda. He thinks that the philosophers' idea that sa‘āda consists in coming to perceive existence as it is, by means of logical arguments is bizarre and fraudulent. 2 They think that the joy they obtain from this perception is identical with the promised happiness. 3 When the question of man's happiness is discussed, Ibn Khaldūn tells his reader to follow the Prophet who is more desirous of man's happiness than man himself. 4 In all these most of the Muslim writers who tackled the problem of man's happiness sided with al-Ghazālī rather than falāsīfī.

However there is one thing on which the philosophers and al-Ghazālī and their respective followers agree and that is the political aspect of prophecy. We will come to this after making a few remarks about the spiritual leaders as guiding forces to sa‘āda

c) Spiritual leaders (mashāyikh and 'ulamā'

After the prophets, the şūfis occupy the highest rank. The only people whose insight may be comparable to that of the prophets are the şūfis. Like the prophets, they are the physicians of the heart. 5

Al-Ghazālī repeatedly talks about the "learned of the world to

1. See taṣāl an-nash‘atayn wa-taṣāl as-sa‘ādatayn, pp. 42-3.
2. The Muqaddima of Ibn Khaldūn, (English trns.) iii, 253f.
3. Ibid., 255.
4. Ibid., 38.
5. Ḥ, iii, 82.
come" ('ulamā' al-akhira) and their contribution to the happiness of men. These are the learned men who have five basic Qur'ānic virtues: fear of God, humility, modesty, good nature and renunciation of this world for the sake of the world to come. These people are at the opposite pole to those whom al-Ghazālī calls "the learned of this world" ('ulamā' ad-dunyā). They try to obtain the favour of people rather than that of God. How far, al-Ghazālī continues, is he removed from saʿāda who becomes a learned person of this sort.

The ulama, whether they be in towns, districts, or in the country, are the people who are in charge of religious matters. They should teach people their religion and how to distinguish what leads to saʿāda from what leads to shaqāwa. They must not wait for people to come and ask about these things; they must go to them, since they are the genuine followers of the prophets who guided people and did not let them remain in darkness.

In the formation of character, the role of "the learned of the world to come" is exceedingly important. First of all they teach people how to discover their own faults, then they tell them how to change their bad disposition. What is more important is that they themselves become the living exemplar with their actions, since "human nature is more inclined to share in what is done than to follow what is said."

1. Th, i, 107.
2. Ibid., 108.
4. Th, iii, 82-3.
5. The Faith, p. 89.
iv) Sa'āda in Relation to Politics.

1) Religion, ethics and politics.

We have already pointed out how al-Ghazālī views the political thought of falāsifa in the beginning of our account of al-Ghazālī.

Like the philosophers, al-Ghazālī accepts the fact that ethics and politics cannot be separated from one another. If so, then man as an individual and man as a member of a community are not two different people. When it is said that politics aims at the good ordering of this world and at the guarding of religion, its relation with the subject-matter of our work becomes clear.\footnote{M, i, 29.}

Politics is not an end in itself, but a means which enables man to work for his happiness here and in the hereafter.

It is true that the final end of all ethical and political activities is the otherworldly sa'āda which is primarily experienced by man as an individual. In other words sa'āda is considered to be the subject matter of politics so far as its attainment is concerned. Man's actual experience of sa'āda in the world to come cannot be political. Only in this sense one can say that al-Ghazālī's ethics is more individual than social. Otherwise it is a gross mistake to say that all al-Ghazālī is interested in is the personal salvation of the individual; to say this is tantamount to accusing al-Ghazālī of misunderstanding the teaching of the Prophet.

Al-Ghazālī's assertion that the philosophers borrowed some of their political ideas "from the divine Scripture revealed through
the prophets,\textsuperscript{1} is a clear evidence to show the political relevance of the Shari'a. Al-Fārābī views this aspect of the Law from a Platonic standpoint. Al-Ghazālī, on the other hand, views it from a theological standpoint in which realism and idealism are interwoven, and the practical application of the Law is given priority. It would be absurd to say that the Prophet received the realities of things, including the reality of sa'āda, but did not occupy himself with the improvement of the conditions of mankind.\textsuperscript{2} This fact also becomes clear when al-Ghazālī talks of the distinction between nubuwwa and walāya: the former, it seems, necessitates the improvement of the condition of people, whereas the latter does not.\textsuperscript{3} This distinction, however, is made from a theoretical, or theological, point of view rather than a practical one, since both nabī and wali try to make the climate more suitable for their fellow human beings to attain salvation. After all those who know the realities of things are the true inheritors of the prophets.\textsuperscript{4}

It is very interesting to note that al-Fārābī does not make such a distinction between the prophets and others who have access to the world of intelligibles. One wonders how al-Fārābī could have made such a distinction, since any one who reaches the stage of ittisāl, though this is as rare as prophecy, has to busy himself with political matters. He is a philosopher-legislator.

\textsuperscript{1} The Faith, p. 38.
\textsuperscript{2} Jih, iii, 33.
\textsuperscript{3} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{4} Ibid., iv, 123.
Both al-Fārābī and al-Ghazālī saw the Prophet as a legislator and organizer of the life of the city. According to al-Ghazālī, no one can reach perfection of equilibrium in the four cardinal virtues except the Prophet. The virtue of other people is measured in respect of their being near to, or remote from, the Prophet. Naturally whoever is close to the Prophet is close to God too.\(^1\) The Prophet Muḥammad is above all other prophets, since he combined religion (dīn), kingship (mulk) and ruling power (salties). None of the other prophets possessed such power over these three domains.\(^2\) The one who possesses the perfection of the four cardinal virtues has the right to be a ruler obeyed by other people. All other people ought to go to him and follow him in all actions. The one who lacks completely all these four virtues must be driven out of towns and kept away from the people, since he is close to the devil, the damned.\(^3\)

Here in this passage al-Ghazālī's tone is very Farabian indeed, although he may or may not have taken his ideas from the works of al-Fārābī; especially from the Taḥsīl. Whatever al-Ghazālī says here about Muḥammad is also true about al-Fārābī's imam-ruler-legislator. Both men think that they are at the summit of perfection in respect of the four cardinal virtues; both think they have, as it were, a natural right to be the ruler who is absolutely

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1. Ibid., iii, 71.
2. Ibid., iv, 123. For the concept of the twinship of āwla and dīn see G.E. von Grunebaum, "The Sources of Islamic Civilization" Der Islam (1970), pp. 21ff.
3. Ibid., iii, 71.
obeyed and followed in all actions; and lastly both men add that the one who stands at the extreme opposite of the Prophet should be driven out of towns.¹

2) The necessity of imāma for the attainment of saʿāda

Of the necessity of imāma, both al-Fārābī and al-Ghazālī have no doubt. The difference between them lies in the fact that according to al-Ghazālī it is the business of the Law and not philosophy to say that imāma is necessary.² Without an imam a legal transaction cannot be valid³ and his appointment is necessary for the preservation of Islam.⁴ "The Sultan is necessary for the good ordering of this world, the good ordering of this world is necessary for the good ordering of religion and the good ordering of religion is necessary for salvation (fawz) with saʿāda in the world to come which is certainly the aim of the prophets."⁵

The office of imāma can be the cause of saʿāda as well as of shaqāwa. If this office is run as it should be, it certainly brings saʿāda.⁶ "There is no greater blessing than God's grant to a person of the office of ruler and Sultan whereby one hour of his life is raised (to be equivalent) to the whole life of any other person."⁷ If he becomes tyrannous, then he should know that

1. Fusūl, secs. 11, 14; For the relation between ethics and politics and their relation to Islam see H. Lacout, La politique de Gazālī (Paris, 1970), pp. 317-8, 378-9; and Jabre, Certitude, pp. 256, 261.
2. Ig., 106, Cf. Ḥ, i, 157.
5. Ig., 106.
7. N.M., 14.
"the hardest torment on the Resurrection Day will be for the unjust Sultan."\(^1\) The Caliph 'Umar wrote to Abū Mūsā al-Ash‘arī: "the happiest master of subjects is one whose subjects are happy under him and the unhappiest is the one whose subjects are unhappy under him."\(^2\)

It is due to the necessity of having an imam that al-Ghazālī asks the believers to obey him. In the Ḥiyā' he says that the Sultan must not be despised and humiliated even if he is unjust and fāsiq.\(^3\) "Obedience to the imams is necessary (wājib), but in his obedience to God and not in his disobedience."\(^4\) Obedience to the imam however is not for the sake of the imam himself but for the sake of God. If al-Ghazālī asks a man not to disobey a Sultan even if he is not very religious, it is not a concession to expediency; rather it is the fear of a total disintegration of the community that leads him not to reject the authority of a Sultan.\(^5\) He strongly rejected the pretentious claims of some ṣūfis, such as their idea of ittiḥād, ḥulūl and so on, for the very same reason.\(^6\) For al-Ghazālī social disintegration and civil war (fiṭna) are the worse evils of all. When al-Ghazālī talks about the duty of "commanding good and forbidding evil" (al-amr bi-l-ma'rūf wa-n-nahy 'an al-munkar), he says that the subjects must not try to prevent

\(^1\) Ibid., 15.
\(^2\) Ibid., 23.
\(^3\) Ḥ, iv, 123.
\(^4\) F.B., 208, 169.
\(^5\) Cf. Ḥ, ii, 437; For censuring the Sultan for his disobedience see Ibid., pp. 406-7.
\(^6\) Ibid., 1, 53; cf. ii, 417.
the Sultan from doing evil by force (qahr), since this incites fitna. One should try to prevent him through making him aware of the nature of the act of disobedience that he commits (ta‘rif) and through exhortation (wa’s) and in some cases probably through a strong language.¹ This shows al-Ghazālī does not recommend a blind obedience to authority.

As has just been pointed out, al-Ghazālī’s stress on the obedience to imam and the men in power is only a means to an end. This end is the good order of religion with ultimate sa‘āda as final aim. Anything, including the office of imāma, which does not aim at the attainment of this otherworldly sa‘āda has no real value. The end of all activities is the attainment of this sa‘āda.

¹. Ibid., iii, 437.
CONCLUSION

It has been the purpose of this study to determine the meaning and significance of the term sa‘āda in the selected works of al-Fārābī and al-Ghazālī with some references to the Greek and Neoplatonic sources which were accessible to Muslim philosophers.

The primary meaning of sa‘āda is good luck, prosperity, felicity and so on; it is used in respect of this as well as other worldly life. In Pre-Islamic poetry it is used in a non-eschatological sense and is associated with such conceptions as Time, determinism and some other irrational forces.

The Qur‘ān uses the term sa‘ād in an eschatological sense referring to the people in Paradise. In Traditions it is used in respect of religion and in respect of worldly life. The Qur‘ān rejects the idea that man’s sa‘āda is determined by Time, Stars and other forces and states emphatically that it is God who determines everything including man’s sa‘āda or shaqāwa.

As the study has progressed, it has become clear that both al-Fārābī and al-Ghazālī accept sa‘āda as the highest and purest stage of existence and both accept that man is created for the attainment of sa‘āda.

They both reject an entirely ascetic approach to sa‘āda according to which man has to destroy his phenomenal existence in order to attain real perfection; and also an entirely hedonistic approach which aims at the satisfaction of sensual desires. Both believe that pleasure, riches and other worldly goods are good as
long as they are not taken for their own sake and both agree that the body is indispensable for the attainment of sa'āda.

Unlike al-Fārābī, however, al-Ghazālī in his idea of sa'āda in the world to come does not deny the share of the body, though he allows his 'ārif to have a low opinion of the goods of Paradise such as castles, rivers and ḥūr. Al-Fārābī's concept of as-sa'āda al-quswa depends on the total annihilation of matter. This idea seems to be his concept of the immortality of the soul as well.

Al-Fārābī is of the opinion that the Potential Intellect has the capacity to be perfect and thus immortal. Man is born with "the primary knowledge" but he can only attain perfection through investigation and study. Knowledge makes intellect detach itself from matter and become ultimately an actual being itself. It reaches the highest stage when it becomes Acquired Intellect and this is only possible by the help of the Active Intellect whose purpose is to make man realize his eternal sa'āda.

Sa'āda comes about when the "conjunction" (ittisāl) takes place between the Acquired Intellect and the Active Intellect. It is possible that some sort of ittisāl can take place in this life, - an idea which has a far-reaching importance in al-Fārābī's epistemology and in his theory of prophecy -, but al-Fārābī maintains that a total ittisāl, which is identical with his idea of the future life, can only take place after the separation of the soul from the body, i.e. death. With ittisāl man becomes eternal, self-intellecting, intelligible, immortal and incorporeal.
As for the souls that cannot reach the stage of ittisāl, there are two possibilities: a) they are either perfect, that is to say they know what sa‘āda and other heavenly beings are, but they are morally impure; in this case they will be in great pain after death; b) or they are imperfect and impure and totally attached to matter, in this case they will be destroyed when matter is finally destroyed. Only two types of people can attain sa‘āda: those who cognize (tasawwur) the essence of the principles of being, their ranks of order and sa‘āda as they really are; and those who can have representations and images of these realities (takhayyul). The former are called the wise (pukamā') and the latter are called "believers" (mu‘minūn).

In all this al-Fārābī tries to combine the teachings of Greek and especially Neoplatonic philosophers with those of Islām as he understands them.

Al-Ghazālī vehemently attacks most of these foregoing opinions. First of all he makes it clear that no one can ever prove that the otherworldly sa‘āda is entirely spiritual. Therefore man has no choice but only a total adherence to the Qur’ānic descriptions of otherworldly life. Secondly, sa‘āda comes about when man knows what God, His angels, His Books and the Last Day are. Nothing stands between God and man. Knowledge which is indispensable for the attainment of sa‘āda comes from God through His Prophets. Al-Ghazālī accepts neither the Active Intellect nor al-Fārābī's emanational theory. Man understands the realities of things not by the intellect of logicians but by "immediate experience"
Al-Fārābī destroyed his own happiness by denying the explicit statements of the Qur'ān and equating philosophic wisdom with prophecy which in fact leads to disbelief in prophecy. Despite all these attacks, however, al-Ghazālī seems to have missed al-Fārābī's idea of "Ignorant souls" which is totally un-Islamic.

Al-Ghazālī accepts three grades of knowledge namely taqlīd, knowledge of proofs and knowledge of "secrets". The grades of happiness which correspond to these different types of knowledge are najāt, fawz and saʿāda.

After death there will be five classes of people. Firstly there are the people who are called 'ārifūn, their saʿāda is explained in terms of ruʿyat Allah, liqāʿ Allah and mushāhada. This class corresponds to al-Fārābī's ḥukamā’. Secondly there are the people who are called mugallidūn or aşḥāb al-yāmin; they will be rewarded in Paradise, though they do not attain as-saʿāda al-quswā. This class corresponds to al-Fārābī's muʾminūn. Thirdly there are the people who are believers but morally impure; they will be punished but they will join the people of Paradise when the period of their punishment is over. This class corresponds to al-Fārābī's fāsiqūn, but in al-Fārābī they lose the chance of being happy after death. Fourthly there are the people who do not believe; they will be in shaqāwa for ever. And finally there are the people of weak intellect (bulb); there will be some kind of easy life for them but they will not have saʿāda. This class corresponds to al-Fārābī's Ignorant souls which are destroyed.
Although al-Ghazālī attacks the conclusions of ḥalāṣifa, he nevertheless depends on their achievements in psychological, epistemological and cosmological spheres. From a psychological standpoint al-Fārābī's approach can be described as "intellectualist" by which it is meant that al-Fārābī tends to emphasise the intellectual or cognitive aspect and to neglect the emotional. Whereas al-Ghazālī's approach can be described as "Ṣūfistic" which depends on ḍhawq without denying the cognitive elements. His maḥabbah has not only emotional value but also cognitive value as well. A single term, however, can never be taken as a name for their respective theory of saʿāda. For al-Ghazālī, saʿāda is knowing God (maʿrifah), loving Him (maḥabbah) and ultimately meeting Him (ligā Allah) and seeing Him (ruʿyat Allah). For him saʿāda cannot be an eternal intellecting of the self, the Active Intellect and other intelligibilia; this is, as it were, too dry and not humanly possible. In al-Ghazālī's account of human saʿāda man loves God and God loves man, and there is a mutual desire to meet each other which culminates in mutual satisfaction (ridwān).

When one looks at their respective theories of saʿāda from this point of view, one is led to think that despite all the successful and intellectually powerful and subtle achievements in his philosophising which ends with saʿāda, al-Fārābī's saʿāda remains more Neoplatonic than Islamic; and al-Ghazālī, though he sometimes dangerously approaches a pantheistic world-view, remains faithful to the Qur'ānic concept of saʿāda. By the terms "Islamic" and "Qur'ānic" we primarily have their "orthodox" interpretations in mind.
In the ethical sphere both thinkers agree that without ethical or moral perfection theoretical perfection, and therefore sa'āda, cannot be attained. They both take Aristotelian psychology as a basis for the classification of virtues and both define virtue as a mean between two extremes (Aristotelian Golden Mean) and equally agree that virtue can be taught.

Al-Fārābī's theory of four-fold virtues is well formulated, though he pays less attention to definition and description of moral virtues. He seems to see the origin of "voluntary goods" (al-khayrāt al-irādiyya) specifically in man; and this enables him to talk about sa'āda without referring to divine guidance, though he accepts the idea of Providence. This gives the impression that sa'āda is primarily the achievement of man himself. The function of the Active Intellect in respect of sa'āda, however, must not be forgotten.

Al-Ghazālī, on the other hand, does the reverse: he does not deny the importance of man's effort and his responsibility in the attainment of sa'āda, but by his emphasis on divine help, guidance and leading he accepts sa'āda as divine gift. He gives the so-called "philosophical ethics" its due right but his primary concern is to show the relation between sa'āda and what he calls the "saving matters" (al-munjīyāt). Unlike Al-Fārābī, Al-Ghazālī is precise about what kind of actions produce happiness. He believes that the actions that are prescribed as obligatory (wājib) can only enable man to attain najāt, or mere salvation. In order to gain sa'āda man
has to perform the actions which are described as faḍā‘il. Farā‘id save man from the Hell-fire, but only nawāfīl bring him to the divine presence.

Al-Ghazālī is not fully preoccupied with politics as al-Fārābī is. Al-Fārābī's whole classification of "cities" and therefore people depends on the concept of sa‘āda. He views the whole human effort, whether it be psychological, ethical or political, from the point of view of sa‘āda.

Sa‘āda for al-Fārābī is a social achievement. Al-Fārābī's originality and the power of his philosophising in the field of politics deserve admiration. It should be borne in mind however that the Virtuous City is ideal and not real. The picture of the First Ruler of this city has very little in common with the picture of a true ruler in Islamic civilization which existed before and after al-Fārābī. The warmth and humaneness of the character of Muḥammad, AbūBakr and ‘Umar are almost totally absent in al-Fārābī's First Ruler. Even if he had, as it has sometimes been supposed, the personality of Muḥammad in mind when he worked out his theory of the First Ruler, his ideas in this respect were so static and rigid that one cannot help feeling that they were bound to be ignored. His theory of a perfect society is well-formulated and original, but unfortunately it is here more than anywhere else al-Fārābī seems to ignore the real nature of man.

Even after death al-Fārābī's sa‘āda is experienced communally, i.e. together with other souls in the company of the Active Intellect. This does not mean however that the soul loses its individual
existence. In al-Ghazālī saʿāda and shaqāwa in the world to come are ultimately personal; no one shares for example the punishment of an individual in his grave. This idea brings a point of departure from al-Fārābī in respect of the politics and of saʿāda as a social achievement. Al-Ghazālī has no doubt that "religion and ('secular') power are twins". The good ordering of this world is necessary for the good ordering of religion and the latter is necessary for the attainment of saʿāda. As a ṣūfī however he emphasizes individualism, but by and large individualism and communalism are well-integrated in his thought. In this study, al-Fārābī's influence on al-Ghazālī's analysis of social classes in respect of saʿāda has been accepted.

There are many points on which both thinkers agree. This study has also tried to draw attention to this fact which seems to have been somewhat over-shadowed by the attack which al-Ghazālī launched against Muslim philosophers.

These are some of the conclusions which we reached in the course of our study of some of the works of the two greatly admired Muslim thinkers, al-Fārābī and al-Ghazālī.
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