A Historical Commentary
on
Suetonius' Lives
of
Galba, Otho and Vitellius

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Declaration

The thesis which follows - "A historical Commentary on Suetonius' Lives of Galba, Otho and Vitellius" - has been composed by me and represents my own work.

London, Ontario.

29th April, 1976

C. L. Murison
Preface

My interest in the period A.D.68-69 was first stirred by the lectures on the *Histories* of Tacitus by Kenneth Wellesley which I heard as an undergraduate at the University of Edinburgh. Shortly thereafter, as an Affiliated Student at Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, I was fortunate enough to have M. McCrum as my Tutor and A. G. Woodhead as my Director of Studies, and to attend the lectures of J. M. Reynolds on the period 68-96. Upon coming to Canada in 1963 to take up a teaching appointment in the Classics Department of the University of Western Ontario I started to assemble a bibliography and to collect materials bearing upon the Year of the Four Emperors and the Flavians. In 1970-71 I was able to commence serious research on this period when I was granted a sabbatical leave: this I spent in Edinburgh working under the supervision of Dr. T. J. Cadoux and and Messrs. R. G. Lewis and K. Wellesley. To Dr. Cadoux I owe sincere thanks for his interest and encouragement; to Mr. Lewis I am deeply indebted for the healthy scepticism which he brought to bear on my wilder theories and for his kindness in sharing with me so unstintingly the fruits of his own labours in the history of the Roman Republic and early Principate; in having Mr. Wellesley as a supervisor I have been singularly fortunate: there can be few, if any, scholars in the world today with a deeper knowledge or keener understanding of the Roman Civil War of 68-69. To me personally he has displayed a kindness, generosity and willingness to help for which these formal words of thanks are but poor acknowledgement.

In Canada, I owe a debt of gratitude to the Canada Council for the grant of a Doctoral Fellowship which enabled me to visit Italy and examine in detail the topography of the area around Cremona; within the University of Western Ontario I am indebted to the Faculty of Arts for financial support to enable me to acquire photocopies of important and rare materials; to Hanna Spencer of the Department of German for assistance in matters of modern German Sprachgefühl and for translating for me a paper in Czech; and to my colleagues in the Classics Department for help and encouragement. I must, however, single out two of them for special thanks: Douglas Gerber, for making available to me at all times his extensive personal collection of books and his
impressive bibliographic expertise, and Ivars Avotins, who owns more books on the Roman Empire than anyone else I know and who, on frequent visits to Boston, has cheerfully accepted commissions to overheat the xerox machines in Harvard University Library on my behalf.

Finally, I must thank two other ladies: my wife, Barbara, for her support and encouragement at all times and for invaluable help in proof-reading the final typescript, and Jane Stewart, not only for producing such a splendid final version from an extremely difficult manuscript, but also for reading critically what she typed and thus for saving me from numerous errors.
## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Bibliography</td>
<td>xv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Abbreviations</td>
<td>xvii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COMMENTARY:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Life of Galba</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Life of Otho</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Life of Vitellius</td>
<td>395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 1: The Vitellian Attack on Italy</td>
<td>509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 2: Vitellius' Journey to Italy</td>
<td>524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maps (in pocket in inside back cover):</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The Via Postumia from Cremona to Bedriacum.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The Vicinity of Cremona.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A historical commentary of over five hundred pages on a Latin text occupying but thirty-three pages in the Teubner edition may well be thought to require justification. Although the main topic of the commentary is obviously the crowded and complex period from the revolt of Vindex in March, A.D.68, to the death of Vitellius in December, 69, a period for which there is considerable evidence and therefore one about which much can be said, the question remains: why use Suetonius' Lives of Galba, Otho and Vitellius as a vehicle for the study of this period?

One answer, less important perhaps than the others, lies in a personal reaction to the sort of criticism which attacks Suetonius because he is a biographer and not a historian, because he is fond of anecdotes and is less restrained in the telling of them than others and because his focus is kept rigidly upon the subject of his biography, and which then proceeds to denigrate the actual historical information which he does provide. There are numerous examples of this and by way of illustration one may perhaps suffice: the first chapter of V. M. Scramuzza's book The Emperor Claudius (Cambridge, Mass., 1940) is a survey of the evidence for the Principate of Claudius; the section on Suetonius (26-32) begins: "It is difficult to say whether Suetonius wrote the Lives of the Caesars as serious history, or light
biography, or with some other end in view. A rhetor by profession and instinct, he is always ready to sacrifice historical accuracy to stylistic virtuosity. Constantly striving after effect he creates figures that are vivid and colorful, but like no human being ever seen." Criticism such as this (and there is much more in like vein) is best countered by a detailed examination of what Suetonius actually says: if he is as sloppy and inaccurate as Scramuzza alleges, his failings should show up particularly clearly in the Lives of Galba and Otho, and, to a lesser extent, of Vitellius, because of the important parallel accounts which we have in Plutarch's Lives of Galba and Otho and, above all, in Books 1-3 of the Histories of Tacitus. In general, an examination of these sources makes it hard to justify this sort of attack on Suetonius: in places he is certainly guilty of extreme compression (as in his account of the disturbance caused by Otho's Praetorian Guard, where he pares away "unnecessary" detail and eliminates altogether the banquet which Otho gave for eighty senators and their wives; see below pp. 333-5); again, in some places he seems prepared to quote his sources from memory, especially where the topic is of less interest to him (e.g. the details of Vitellius' arrangement of his forces for the invasion of Italy; pp. 455-7) and this can lead him into inaccuracy; and certainly he has his prejudices and perhaps even psychological quirks (T. F. Carney has, for example, recently suggested that S. betrays signs of possessing an authoritarian and somewhat repressed personality, with a possibly unhealthy interest in sexual matters, ill-concealed under the guise of a general censoriousness towards "irregularities" of conduct: see PACA 11 [1968] 7-24; cf. below S.'s discussion of real or alleged homosexual behaviour by Galba [pp. 243-4] Otho [pp.
269-270] and Vitellius [pp. 431-2]). On the other hand, there is no difficulty in seeing the subjects of these Lives as consistent and integrated personalities: Galba is not very sympathetically handled (cf. G 14.1 nn.) but the picture we get of the aged vir militaris, hopelessly out of touch with the realities of his position in January, 69, reacting to events rather as would the modern stereotype of a retired Indian Army colonel and yet facing his final ordeal like a true soldier - with his linen breastplate! - ultimately arouses our pity and certainly rings true; the picture of Otho, ostensibly the greatest villain of the three Emperors, is heightened not only by the nobility of his end but also by an apparent admiration which S. has some difficulty insuppressing (see below p. 375): his character was obviously the most complex of the three and for ancient theories of a fixed personality it was almost impossible to explain (for S.'s difficulties, see Q 12, mn.); and even Vitellius, the least complicated and interesting of the Emperors of 69, in spite of being vel praecipue luxuriae saevitiaeque deditus (Vit. 13.1), is still possessed of a certain crude geniality and and even has a sense of humour (cf. espec. Vit. 13.2). These Emperors, then, emerge as individuals and certainly not as mere "types."

Another reason for using Suetonius as a vehicle for the study of the period 68-69 is the difference of viewpoint which he affords: the great bulk of the work on this period done in recent years (and since the mid-nineteenth century generally) has concentrated on Tacitus and the Histories - justifiably so, since Tacitus is by far the most important single source and even a commentary on Suetonius must make constant reference to the Histories (at times, inevitably, the reader may even wonder which author is the principal object of
study!); the result of this is, however, a "Tacitean" view of the period: what Tacitus says comes to be regarded as the "norm" and any information in our other sources which differs from what he says is a variation or even a "deviation" from this norm; methodologically, of course, for the historian such a method of proceeding is highly suspect. Tacitus is probably the most reliable of our sources, but he too has his prejudices and hobby horses (e.g., military indiscipline; senatorial dislike of the principate; social snobbery) and he is not above suppressing material on grounds of taste (e.g. the detail about Galba's head; see below G 20.2 nn.) or even in order to give his narrative artistic shape (e.g. the question of the three (?) attempted abdications by Vitellius; see Vit. 15.2-4 nn.) Suetonius was, of course, an equestrian - a civil servant and lawyer: he is not jaundiced about the principate and his attitude towards it is certainly different from that of the senatorial historian (pace Scramuzza, op. cit. 28: "Suetonius' point of view was essentially senatorial"; this does not, however, imply wholesale acceptance of the idea of a doggedly "equestrian viewpoint," seen at every turn by F. della Corte in Svetonio, Eques Romanus [Milano/ Varese, 1958], especially 173-201; for criticisms of this view, see G. B. Townend, JRS 49 [1959] 202-3; B. Mouchová, ZJKF 8 [1966] 5-8). For instance, we may see examples of bureaucratic precision in S.'s figure for the size of the equestrian commission established by Galba to recover most of Nero's excessively large gifts (G 15.1 nn.) and for Vitellius' consular designations in decennales (Vit. 11.2 n.); his legal interests can be seen in his remarks on Galba's treatment of the jury panels (G 14.3), and in his careful use of correct legal terminology concerning Otho's divorce (G 3.2),
Otho's land transactions when appointed an arbiter (O 4.2) and in Vitellius' threat of action for calumnia and his formula iniuriarum (Vit. 7.2).

Finally, in approaching the crisis of 68-69 through Suetonius' Lives of Galba, Otho and Vitellius, we can avoid the possible pitfall of seeing this period in isolation from the earlier history of the Principate. It is all too easy to read the Histories of Tacitus (and Plutarch's Galba and Otho too, since these are not complete Lives but sections of a continuous narrative) as a complete and independent unit, since Tacitus himself, starting on 1st January, 69, gives us all the background we need to follow the action. However, with the Life of Galba Suetonius takes us back not only to the beginnings of the Principate (G 1) but even further, to the Republic and the rôle of the Sulpicii Galeae in the turbulent history of the second and first centuries B.C.; with the Lives of Otho and Vitellius we are made aware of the great changes which came about in Roman society and government as a result of the Augustan revolution, and in the background history of the families of Otho and Vitellius we see the emergence of the new "nobility" of the Julio-Claudian period. By the time we reach 68 in each Life, then, we are aware of the types of issue which came together to form the crisis of 68-69 (e.g., the arbitrary nature of the Principate, the characters of the Emperors, the rôles of favourites and freedmen, the feelings of desperation among "opposition groups," the dissatisfaction of the various armies and their commanders) and we are prepared for the part which each of the three Emperors was to play in its dénouement.

Regarding the sources for this period, a lengthy disquisition

Of earlier works on the sources, still important are:

In general, my view is that Pliny the Elder's *Historiae* a fine Aufidi Bassi was probably the "common source" for this period. Beyond that, however, the greatest caution is necessary: I do not accept the proposition that our extant authors used only one or two sources in writing their accounts and that all variations or alternatives to be found in their works are copied holus bolus from earlier accounts now lost; this is, as W. W. Tarn put it (*Alexander the Great II* 306-7), "...the well-known belief that no writer we possess can ever have done any work himself, but always had it done
for him by some unknown predecessor who has perished without trace." Furthermore, a glance at HRR and the two pages of fragments surviving of Pliny's Historiae, the page and a half of fragments of Fabius Rusticus and Cluvius Rufus and the two-thirds of a page of Vipstanus Messalla should serve as a corrective when excessive enthusiasm for the Quellenforschung of lost works threatens to overwhelm us. Also, although we know of monographs by Herennius Senecio (on Helvidius Priscus), Ti. Claudius Pollio (on L. Annius Bassus), Julius Secundus (on Otho), Pompeius Planta (on the Bedriacum campaign?) and memoirs by Vespasian, Mucianus, Marius Celsus (probably: see Syme, Tacitus 683) and perhaps also by Suetonius Paulinus and Vestricius Spurinna (and memoirs, especially, are likely to have been thoroughly self-serving), any or all of which an intelligent and perceptive student such as Pliny the Elder, or Tacitus, or Suetonius, may have used, we should never exclude from our consideration of sources information acquired by our extant authorities directly (or indirectly) from the personal recollections of acquaintances and friends; for example, Pliny the Younger was a friend of Tacitus (Ep. 6.16 and 20 provide the latter with information on the eruption of Vesuvius in 79 for the Historiae) and a patron of Suetonius: through him both Tacitus and Suetonius may have met or obtained information about 68-69 from Verginius Rufus and Vestricius Spurinna; Suetonius also certainly had information from his father (see 0 10.1) and Plutarch visited the north of Italy in the company of his patron L. Mestrius Florus (0 14.2-3). Sources of this type are usually undetectable and make nonsense of any attempt to expound in detail the origin of each and every variant in our extant accounts (for probable traces of such material see below,
for example, pp. 216, 237-8, 328, 347, 386, 495).

We should also consider the possibility that Suetonius used (or had at least read and may have remembered details of) Plutarch's Lives of the Caesars and Tacitus' Histories. Plutarch probably wrote these Lives during the Principate of Domitian (on this point, see C. P. Jones, Plutarch and Rome 72-78, where the proposition is strongly argued that Tacitus too may have inspected Plutarch's Lives of the Caesars); Suetonius himself wrote works in Greek (cf. Schanz- Hosius-Krüger III (1922) 58, 61) and there is no reason to assume that he would not have examined carefully a series of Lives (available by late in the Flavian period) which covered much of his area of biographical interest (cf. below p.317; Jones [op. cit. 62] even suggests that he may have got the idea of writing a series of imperial biographies from Plutarch). As for the Histories, the likelihood that Suetonius had at least read them seems all the greater: as a protégé of Pliny the Younger, the friend of Tacitus, it is hard to imagine Suetonius being unaware of this work. However, it is quite impossible to prove that at any point in these Lives Suetonius is actually correcting what Tacitus had said in the Histories, though we may occasionally suspect it (e.g. below pp. 196, 236, 382, 386, 474). As for the date when Suetonius wrote the Lives of the Caesars, see below pp. xv , 259.

Finally, with regard to the non-literary material surviving from the period 68-69, a similar note of caution is necessary. Coins, especially, are issued in this period mainly for purposes of propaganda: although a representative selection of these issues certainly survives, the interpretation of them (especially the anonymous issues from Spain and Gaul) is extremely difficult and is
almost always, unfortunately, subjective rather than objective
(on this topic see further C. H. V. Sutherland, JRS 49 [1959] 46-
55). The survival of inscriptions is probably much more haphazard
than that of coins and there is nothing to suggest that what we
have from the period is anything more than a random sample.
Again, similar caution is necessary if the inscription is an official
document of any sort and with regard to private funerary inscriptions
we should always remember Dr. Johnson's dictum that "In lapidary
inscriptions a man is not upon his oath." The most important series
of inscriptions from this period is the Acta Fratrum Arvalium, but
these not only reflect "official truth" (see, most famously, the
entry for 14th March, 69), but are frequently very fragmentary: more
than one reconstruction is therefore possible and here too caution
is necessary. Lastly, papyri: in many ways these are subject to
the same drawbacks as inscriptions with the added difficulty that
they are all from the Nile valley; however, there are few of
importance for the study of this period.

The commentary which follows is, as its title implies,
strictly historical: its principal justification may be sought in the
fact that there has been no commentary of any sort on these Lives
since G. W. Mooney's Translation and Commentary on Galba-Domitian
which appeared in 1930: this has long been out of print and is today
virtually unobtainable. Furthermore his commentary is greatly
occupied with literary, grammatical and "cultural" items (cf., for
example, Mooney's note on sculptura at G 10.4) and is less concerned
with the details of the history of the period. In what follows here
very little attention is paid to the elucidation of stylistic and
grammatical points or of possible textual variants, except where such matters are of importance for the understanding of historical events. Furthermore, there is no discussion of biography as a genre, nor of Suetonius' place within that genre (for a brief listing of recent works on Suetonius, see the Basic Bibliography below). In addition to G. W. Mooney's commentary, I have frequently referred to the commentaries of C. Hofstee (1898) and G. Baumgarten-Crusius (Turin ed., 1824). The texts cited are as follows: Suetonius: Teubner, ed. Ihm; Tacitus, Teubner, ed. Koestermann; Plutarch's Lives: Teubner, rev. ed. by Ziegler; Josephus, Philostratus, Dio: LCL; Aurelius Victor: Teubner, ed. Pichlmayr; Eutropius: Teubner, ed. Dietsch; Orosius: ed. Zangemeister (1967 repr. of 1882 edn., Wien).
Basic Bibliography

Suetonius


Steidle, W., Sueton und die antike Biographie, München, 1951.


The following sections list fundamental works frequently consulted during the preparation of the commentary; however, to avoid excessive repetition they are infrequently cited below.
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Dessau, H., Geschichte der römischen Kaiserzeit II.1
Berlin, 1926 277-373.


Fuhrmann, M., "Das Vierkaiserjahr bei Tacitus" Philologus 104 (1960) 250-78.

Gerstenecker, Der Krieg des Otho und Vitellius in Italien im J. 69, München, 1882.


Zancan, P., La crisi del principato nell'anno 69 d.C., Padova, 1939.

Galba

Fluss, M. (?), 'Sulpicius'no. 63, RE IV A (1931) 772-801.


Nagl, A. (?), 'Salvius' no. 21 RE I A (1920) 2035-55.


Vitellius


Hanslik, R. 'Vitellius' no. 7(b) RE Suppl. IX (1962) 1706-33.

Abbreviations

Abbreviations are generally as in the Oxford Classical Dictionary (2nd Ed., 1970) and in J. Marouzeau, L'Année Philologique (slightly anglicised - e.g. AJP instead of AJPh). The following are peculiar to this commentary:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFA</td>
<td>Acta Fratrum Arvalium (see also Henzen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>de Laet, Samenstelling</td>
<td>S. J. de Laet, De Samenstelling van den Romeinschen Senaat gedurende de eerste eeuw van het Principaat (28 vor Chr. - 68 na Chr.) Antwerpen, 1941.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latte, RR</td>
<td>K. Latte, Römisches Religionsgeschichte, München, 1960.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCL</td>
<td>Loeb Classical Library.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLD</td>
<td>Oxford Latin Dictionary</td>
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<tr>
<td>TLL</td>
<td>Thesaurus Linguae Latinae.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIFE OF GALBA
The Fall of the Julio-Claudian House

The first chapter of the Life of Galba serves as an introduction to Books 7 and 8 of the Lives of the Caesars. This is the first major break-point in the Lives and S. feels constrained to indicate its importance; he does this not by looking forward to the year of the four Emperors or to the Flavian regime but by going back to the point where the Julii and the Claudii came together with the marriage of Livia and Octavian and formed the dynasty which established the Principate and ruled Rome for a century.

1 Progenies Caesarum in Nerone defecit: this is the bluntest statement in our major sources of what was believed to be the main reason for the civil strife of A.D. 68-70, and it is constantly repeated in later authors; e.g. Dio 62.18.4 and 63.29.3; Aur.Vict. Caes. 5.17; Eutrop. 7.15; Oros. 7.15; even Tacitus has Galba refer in passing to finita Iuliorum Claudiorumque domo (Hist. 1.16.1). However, none of these sources is factually correct: certainly, male descent from Augustus was a prime factor in Nero's elimination of people such as M. Iunius Silanus, his son L. Iunius Silanus Torquatus and his brother D. Iunius Silanus Torquatus, while descent from Augustus' sister Octavia proved fatal for Faustus Cornelius Sulla (who was also the last descendant of the Dictator Sulla); even descent from Livia was a factor in the death of
1- Progenies...deficit cont.

Rubellius Plautus (for details of all these cases, see R. S. Rogers, "Heirs and Rivals to Nero," TAPA 86 [1955] 190-212 and D. McAlindon, "Senatorial Opposition to Claudius and Nero," AJP 77 [1956] 113-132); and Nero's execution of Claudius' daughters Octavia and Claudia Antonia (the latter in A.D. 65, for treason, after she refused to marry him) shows his increasing determination to avoid even the possibility of some Roman noble using a marriage connection with any member of the Julio-Claudian family as a pretext for an attempted coup. Accordingly, the continued survival of Iunia Calvina (sister and aunt of the Silani mentioned above; see Hohl, RE X s.v. 'Calvinus' no. 198; PIR² I 856) is the more surprising, since she had fallen foul of Nero's mother Agrippina in A.D. 48 (Ann. 12.4) and had been banished from Italy early in 49, shortly after the marriage of Agrippina and Claudius (Ann. 12.8.1: she and her brother were, according to R. Syme [Tacitus 315] "victims of a dynastic plot"). Nero himself restored her in 59 as part of the amnesty which followed his mother's murder (Ann. 14.12), so he must have been aware of her existence.

However, very little is known about her, beyond the fact that she was sane decora et procax (Ann. 12.4.1); in §8 of the Ludus de morte Claudii she is described as festivissimam omnium puellarum, quam omnes Venerem vocarent. Her line of descent was Augustus - Julia the Elder - Julia the Younger - Aemilia Lepida - Iunia Calvina. She was the latest-surviving of all the progenies Caesarum and she was alive in A.D. 79, when Vespasian claimed that the ominous opening of the Mausoleum of Augustus applied to her (S. Vesp. 23.4).

See also J. P. V. D. Balsdon, Roman Women 129-30.
compluribus quidem signis: the context makes it clear that what S. is talking about is portents that Nero was to be the last of the progenies Caesarum: this therefore excludes the dreams, auspices and omens listed by him at Ner. 46, which were taken to refer simply to Nero's coming end, without any wider "Julio-Claudian" significance. The only other "prophecies" concerning the Julio-Claudians as a whole are (perhaps) to be found in Revelation 17.10-11, where the five "fallen kings" could be Augustus, Tiberius, Gaius, Claudius and Nero, the one who "is" could be Galba, and the other "not yet come," who will "continue a short space" could be Otho: this gives a dramatic date for these verses of late 68 or early 69, and in v.11 there may even be reference to one of the "false Neros" (cf. H 2.8-9).

Liviaeolim post Augusti...nuptias: Livia Drusilla, later named Iulia Augusta after her testamentary adoption by Augustus (which gave rise to the erroneous, but convenient, "Livia Augusta": cf. S. Calig. 10.1; 15.2; 23.2; G 5.2; O 1.1), was the daughter of M. Livius Drusus Claudianus (a Claudius Pulcher by birth and perhaps the adoptive son of M. Livius Drusus the Younger: cf. Münzer, RE XIII s.v. 'Livius' no. 19, and PIR² L 294) and his wife Alfidia (the daughter of a M. Alfidius [from Fundi?]); this Alfidius may have been a local magistrate who later held office at Rome: see CIL IX 3661 and S. Tib. 5.1; but cf. S. Calig. 23.2; Hor. Serm. 1.5.34, and T. P. Wiseman, Historia 14 [1965] 333-334; see now also J. Linderski, Historia 23 [1974] 463-480). Livia was born on 30th January, 58 B.C. and was married, probably in 43 B.C., to her father's kinsman (possibly even nephew) Ti.
Claudius Nero (cf. Münzer, RE III s.v. 'Claudius' no. 254), to whom she bore two sons, in 42 B.C. Ti. Claudius Nero (the later Emperor Tiberius) and in 38 Decimus (later Nero) Claudius Drusus. Nothing whatever is known of Livia's childhood, but it is clear that her life during her marriage to Nero was extremely unsettled: her father, a political ally of the "Triumvirs" in the fifties B.C., was perhaps neutral in the civil war between Pompey and Caesar; after Caesar's assassination, he became a supporter of the senatorial cause, was proscribed in 43, escaped to the East and, after Philippi, committed suicide. Her husband had been a lieutenant of Caesar in 48 and 46 B.C., but he had clearly become disillusioned with the Dictator by March 44, since after Caesar's assassination he proposed that his murderers be rewarded (S. Tib. 4.1). In spite of this, he appears to have made his peace with the leaders of the Caesarian party; for he was allowed to become praetor in 42 B.C., the year of Philippi (cf. R. Syme, Sallust 130-131). At the end of that year, however, when there was widespread unrest in Italy, he did not give up his fasces, and in 41-40 he became involved in the Perusine War as a partisan of L. Antonius. After Octavian's capture of Perusia, Nero escaped to Praeneste and then to Naples, from which he fled, along with Livia and the infant Tiberius, to Sicily and the headquarters of the sole remaining "republican" leader, Sex. Pompeius. Pompeius was unimpressed by his fasces and pretensions, and so Nero, proud as any Claudian, moved his family to Greece and became a supporter of M. Antonius. Livia and the young Tiberius stayed for a time in Sparta and were almost killed in a forest fire as they were leaving the area (Veil.
1- Liviae olim...nuptias cont.

Eventually all three returned to Italy under the general amnesty arranged between the Triumvirs and Sex. Pompeius at Misenum in 39 (Vell.Pat. 2.57.2-3; S. Tib. 4.3; Ann. 5.1.1; Dio 48.36.3), and it is at this point that matters become exceedingly complex.

Octavian met Livia and became enamoured of her; at his request Nero not only divorced her but, early in 38 B.C., complaisantly gave her away at the marriage ceremony and participated in the subsequent festivities - this in spite of the fact that Livia was six months pregnant by him at the time (Vell.Pat. 2.79.2; 2.94.1; S. Aug. 62.2; Tib. 4.3; Claud. 1.1; Ann. 1.10.5; 5.1.2; Dio 48.44.1-5). Thus far the literary evidence: the most surprising thing here is the attitude of Nero; why was he so willing to surrender the wife who had borne him one son and was soon to produce another child to a man whom he seems to have disliked intensely?

However, in 1923 the discovery of the Fasti anni Verulani gave us the exact date of the marriage of Livia and Octavian - 17th January (sc. 38 B.C.: Feriae ex s.c. quod eo die Augusta nupsit divo Aug[us]t[o]. cf. I.I. XIII.2 pp. 160, 161 and Tabb. LIV, LV; also EJ p. 46), which in itself causes no particular difficulty (using only the literary evidence, Ollendorff, RE XIII 902, had earlier calculated that the marriage was celebrated "wohl zu Beginn des J. 38 v. Chr."); however, these same Fasti also give, under 14th January, [v]itiosus ex s.c. Ant(onis) natal(is) (I.I. XIII.2 pp. 158, 159; Tabb. LIV, LV; EJ p. 45), and, taken with S. Claud. 11.6: (Claudius)...testatus quondam per edictum, tanto impensius petere se ut natalem patris Drusi celebrarent, quod idem esset et avi sui
1- Liviaeolim...nuptias cont.

Antoni, this demonstrates that Drusus was born three days before the marriage of Livia and Octavian.

It is simply not possible to harmonize all the literary and epigraphic evidence concerning the marriage of Livia and Octavian and the birth of Drusus. Carcopino made an attempt (Rev. Hist 161 [1929] 225-236), but it fails to convince, being based on the hypothesis of a marriage by usus, perhaps as late as December 39 B.C., followed by a "religious" ceremony on 17th January, 38: the parallel to the modern French practice is striking.

The evidence given by the Fasti Verulani has no direct confirmation elsewhere, but nevertheless merits credence for the following reasons:

14th January: this day is listed as vitiosus or vitiosus ex s.c. in the Fasti anni Caeretani, Maffeiani, Oppiani, and Praenestini, and from literary evidence it is clear that M. Antonius suffered damnatio memoriae; see espc. Dio 51.19.3: ...τὴν τε ἱμέραν ἐν ᾧ ἐγεγένητο μιαρὰν ἐνόμισαν, καὶ τὸ τοῦ Μάρκου πρόσφορα ἀπεκπό ὑδενὶ τῶν συγγενῶν αὐτοῦ εἶναί· cf. Plut. Cic. 49.6; the Fasti Verulani therefore slot together this literary and epigraphic evidence very neatly.

17th January: other epigraphic evidence reveals the importance placed upon this day by the Julio-Claudian family: Tiberius dedicated an altar to the numen Augusti on this date in A.D. 5 or 9 (Fasti Praenestini; cf. L. R. Taylor, AJP 58 [1937] 185-193, esp. 188-191); the day became a public holiday after Augustus' death (perhaps because the Ludi Palatini, held in his honour, were celebrated on this day? see Taylor, op. cit. 189-190, but cf. also
1- Liviae olim...nuptias cont.

Fasti Praenestini addit.); and on this day early in the principate of Claudius Livia was deified (AFA 17th January, A.D.43-48 [Henzen p. LV]; cf. S. Claud. 11.2): this was the day par excellence which brought the Julian and Claudian families together. (For the detailed listing of the evidence concerning 14th and 17th January see Degrassi's Commentarii Diurni in LI XIII.2, esp. pp. 397-8, 401-2; cf. EJ pp. 45, 46).

As for the literary evidence pertaining to the marriage of Livia and Octavian, on closer scrutiny we may note that only S. (Claud.1.1) actually states that Livia was married when she was six months pregnant: this statement may have arisen as an inference from the story of the consultation of the pontifices preserved in Ann. 1.10.5 and Dio 48.44.2; perhaps Octavian did ask such a question as an concepto necdum edito partu rite nuberet, but it need not imply that he acted upon the favourable answer which Dio says he received. Dio, however, strongly implies (48.44.3-5) that the wedding took place when Livia was six months pregnant, but his account may not be inconsistent with Octavian's simply taking Livia to his house at that point, perhaps as a paelex (cf. S. Aug. 69.1:...dimissam Scriboniam, quia liberius doluisset nimiam potentiam paelicis), and this would accord quite closely with Ann.5.1: exin Caesar cupidine formae aufert (sc. Liviam) marito, incertum an invitam, adeo properus, ut ne spatio quidem ad enitendum dato penatibus suis gravidam inducerit - it may also explain the peculiar incertum an invitam; cf. S. Aug. 72.2:...ac statim Liviam Drusillam matrimonio Tiberi Neronis et quidem prægnantem abduxit dilexitque et probavit unice ac perseveranter. None of this is inconsistent with what we find in
1- Liviae olim... nuptias cont.

our earliest source, Velleius Paterculus, who says, speaking of 38 B.C.: hac classi Caesar, cum prius despondente ei Nerone, cui ante nupta fuerat, Liviam, auspicatis rei publicae omnibus duxisset eam uxorem, Pompeio Siciliaeque bellum intulit (2.79.2; we should note that the position of prius is slightly ambiguous: conceivably it goes with despondente as well as with cum, but it is perverse, given the meaning of the entire sentence, to punctuate Caesar, cum, prius despondente ei Nerone,..., as Carcopino does [op. cit. 233]). What were the auspicatis rei publicae omnibus? Surely Livia's proven fertility, since she had given birth to two sons by 17th January, 38 B.C. Equally, with two sons to carry on his name, her first husband may have been prepared to "give her away"; he may also have tired of her austere character and glacial beauty (see J.P. V. D. Balsdon, Roman Women 90-96, esp. 91-92). Finally, in the propaganda war before Actium, M. Antonius twitted Octavian with his festinatas Liviae nuptias (S. Aug. 69.1): this surely refers to the fact that the wedding took place a mere three days after the confinement, the last possible reason for religious scruple on the part of an ardent and impatient lover who was also extremely superstitious (S. Aug. 90-93).

statim: according to Dio (48.52.3), this incident occurred in 37 B.C., which is a year or more after the marriage of Livia and Octavian. On the other hand, Pliny says that it happened cum pacta esset illa (sc. Livia Drusilla) Caesari (NH 15.136), which implies late 39 B.C. and which for a portent of this type is much more impressive: it would seem that this story about Livia had no precise
time reference, though clearly it belonged somewhere near the beginning of her association with Octavian, and individual authors have incorporated it in their narratives at what seemed to them to be an appropriate context.

Veientanum suum: only S. mentions the famous villa of Livia at Prima Porta, some nine miles from Rome, in connection with this story. The villa was situated on a craggy hill of volcanic tufa overlooking the Tiber valley near the point where the Via Flaminia and Via Tiberina diverge. Excavations in 1863 uncovered two masterpieces: the most famous of all statues of Augustus (now in the Vatican Museum), and the fresco from an underground room which "shows a garden of somewhat sombre woodland beyond a low garden-paling, and its subtle gradation of blues and greens, with birds here and there amongst the leaves, has something of the melancholy graciousness of the age of Corot" (M. Wheeler, Roman Art and Architecture, 183 and fig. 166). This fresco is, in the view of R. Bianchi-Bandinelli, the earliest surviving representation of a *paradeisos*, a "fenced garden, composed of various elements - carefully selected, yet looking wild ... an Iranian invention" (Rome: The Centre of Power, 125 and figs. 130, 131, 133). Now in the Museo Nazionale delle Terme, the fresco was executed c. 30-25 B.C. and, in its cool, unemotional refinement, seems to complement admirably what we know of the character of its owner. (See further H. v. Heintze, Römische Kunst, 116 and pl. 108; W. J. T. Peters, Landscape in Romano-Campanian Mural Painting, 47 and 203 n. 205; and especially, M. M. Gabriel, Livia's Garden Room at Prima Porta (New York, 1955).
praectervolans aquila gallinam albam...demisit in
gremium: eagle portents are particularly common in S. and are
usually associated with predictions of supreme power, e.g. Aug. 94.7;
96.1; cf. 97.1; Tib. 14.4; Claud. 7; and, concerning the Emperors
of A.D. 69, G 4.2; Vit. 9; Vesp. 5.6.

This particular story (cf. Pliny, NH 15.136-137 and Dio
48.52.3-4) is reminiscent of the story of "Lucumum" (Tarquinius
Priscus) in Livy (1.34.8-9, on which see Ogilvie's Commentary, on
1.34.8 s.v. 'aquila'). Pliny reveals that Livia consulted the augurs,
and reared the hen and its offspring and planted the laurel branch
at their instruction. All our sources mention that the hen landed
in Livia's lap and Dio stresses the significance of this: ἦ τε
Διονύσια ἔγκολπώσεθαι καὶ τὴν τοῦ Καίσαρος ἱσχύν καὶ ἐν
πᾶσιν αὐτῶν κρατήσειν ἐμελλέ. S., however, is not really
interested in the nuances of interpretation of this event as a
prophecy of power for the Julio-Claudian family: for him its
significance lies only in the deaths of the trees and the chickens.

ad Gallinas: the use of ad with the accusative to indicate
"in the vicinity of" or "near" a place is well-known; S. uses this sort
of expression in Aug. 5 when giving the location of Augustus'
birthplace: regione Palati ad Capita Bubula (cf. Dom. 1.1: regione
urbis sexta ad Malum Punicum). This use of ad is not vague, nor does
it reflect any topographic uncertainty: in an ancient city, where not
all streets were named and houses were not numbered, this was simply
the method of giving an address. However, in an expression like
ad Gallinas, the ad is virtually meaningless; it has simply become
part of the name, as can be seen in other examples of the same thing: intumus circus ad Murciae vocatur (Varro, Ling. 5.154); ad Mecium is locus dicitur (Livy 6.2.8; cf. 38.14.10); colonia quae vocatur ad turrem Lisibonis (Pliny NH 3.85: mod. Porto Torres in Sardinia); Capralia appellatur ager, qui vulgo ad caprae paludes dici solet (Paul. Fest. 57.6 Lindsay): here Paulus Diaconus is certainly correct in his use of vulgo, and this "colloquial" ad has cognates in other languages; cf."zum Goldenen Löwen" (as an inn name nowadays equals simply "der Goldene Löwe"); Aubagne, Aumont, R. Aubois; and, if the popular etymology be correct, Istanbul (εἰς τὴν πόλιν).

See further TLL I 527-528 and, for a rather unsatisfactory discussion of this passage, M. Bassols di Climent, Homenaje a Antonio Tovar (Madrid, 1972) 66-68.

triumphaturi Caesares: this phrase must be interpreted strictly: it refers only to triumphs and not ovationes (see next n.). The "triumphs of the Caesars" are as follows:


Tiberius: 1st January, 7 B.C. (Germany): Vell.Pat. 2.97.4, but cf. 2.96.3; Dio 55.8.1-2; cf. 55.6.5; 23rd October, A.D. 12 (Illyricum): Vell. Pat. 2.121.2; S. Tib. 17.1-2; 20; Dio 56.17.1; Fasti anni
Praenestini, 23rd Oct. (addit; cf. EJ p.54).

Germanicus: 26th May, A.D. 17 (Germany): Vell.Pat. 2.129.2; S. Calig. 1.2; Ann. 1.55.1 (cf. 2.26.2); 2.41.2-42.1; Fasti anni Amiternini, 26th May (cf. EJ p. 49, and Fasti Ostienses, same date).

Claudius: A.D. 44 (Britain): S. Claud. 17.2-3; Dio 60.23.1-6; BMC Imp. I Claudius nos. 29, 32-36, 49-50.

Finally, there is the problem of Nero's entry into Rome early in A.D. 68 after his return from Greece as περιοδονίκης, victor in all the great Games. Both S. (Ner. 25.1-2) and Dio (63.20.1-5) use expressions appropriate to a triumph; both mention that in his right hand he carried the Pythian crown, which was, of course, a laurel wreath. (For the possible significance of this, see the next n.) However, the whole business was a sham and we should conclude with C. Barini (Triumphalia 91) that this was "la parodia del vero trionfo."

laureas decerperent: the use of laurel was one of the distinctive signs of a triumph. The currus triumphalis was decorated with laurel branches and the triumphator wore on his head a corona laurea (also called the corona triumphalis) and held in his right hand a laurel branch (there are many accounts of the triumph; see, for example, Ehlers, RE VII s.v. 'Triumphus' 504, 505-506, 507; for a detailed bibliography, see Versnel, Triumphus 56 nn. 1, 4). On the other hand, a general granted an ovatio wore, during his ceremonial entry into Rome, a wreath of myrtle (Gell. N.A. 5.6.20, 21; cf. Pliny NH 15.125) and the laurel had no part in his ornatus (see also Versnel, op. cit. 166).
fuitque mos triumphantibus, alias confestim eodem loco pangere: cf. Pliny, who is somewhat more explicit (NH 15.137): mireque silva ea (sc. from the branch planted by Livia) provenit: ex ea triumphans postea Caesar laurum in manu tenuit coronamque capite gessit, ac deinde imperatores Caesares cuncti; traditusque mos est ramos quos tenuerant serendi... This implies that the branches carried in the triumphs were then taken back to Prima Porta and planted; hence the emendations of alias found in Ihm's apparatus criticus. The process of propagation involved is presumably the use of cuttings.

et observatum est sub cuiusque obitum...interiit: we may perhaps accept that there was a laurel-grove at Livia's villa at Prima Porta and that a tradition grew up among the members of the Julio-Claudian family of using laurel branches from it for triumphs; conceivably, too, successive members of the family planted additional trees, and all of this may have been because of some story about Livia, which became increasingly elaborate with the passage of time. However, with the remarks here cited S. enters the realm of fantasy: taken literally, they would mean that all the trees planted subsequent to Livia's original planting were dead by the beginning of A.D. 68 (with the possible exception of "Nero's tree"!) and that in that year everything else withered up and died. If this remarkable story were true, we should expect to find it widely quoted; but it is unique to S., and Pliny directly contradicts it in a casual aside. The passage quoted in the n. immediately above (NH 5.137) ends as follows:...traditusque mos est ramos quos
tenuerant serendi et durant silvae nominibus suis discrete.

The total annihilation of the poultry as well is, therefore, wholly predictable.

*Caesarum aede:* S.'s allusion is quite unclear. There are several possibilities:

a) *Templum divi Augusti:* this temple was built by Tiberius and completed, or at any rate dedicated, by Gaius in A.D. 37 (S. Tib. 47; cf. Ann. 6.45.1; S. Calig. 21; Dio 59.7.1; cf. 56.46.3 and 57.10.2; BMC Imp I Gaius nos. 41-43, 69 and p. 156 n.1). The site of this temple is unknown, although for many years it was identified with a building on the N.-W. corner of the Palatine (between the Vicus Tuscus and the Via Nova); this is now, however, thought to be a formal entrance hall, constructed by Domitian, of the Domus Tiberiana (Nash, *s.vv.* 'Augustus, divus, templum'; cf. Platner-Ashby, *s.vv.*; M. Grant, *The Roman Forum* 216). The only evidence for the site of the temple is S. Calig 22.4: *...super templum Divi Augusti ponte transmisso Palatium Capitoliumque coniunxit.* This would suggest that the temple itself was on neither the Palatine nor the Capitoline but lay somewhere between the two (south of the Basilica Iulia and between the Vicus Iugarius and the Vicus Tuscus?)

The temple of divus Augustus is frequently referred to in the *Acta Fratrum Arvalium*, beginning on 18th and 28th March A.D. 38, where it is, quite appropriately, called the *templum novum*; this appellation persists (other exx. are 1st Jan. A.D. 39, 12th Oct. A.D. 58, 23rd June, A.D. 59) up to 3rd January, A.D. 69, which seems to be the last occasion on which the Fratres performed a sacrifice
1- Caesarum aede cont.

in this temple. (The last sacrifices performed anywhere in honour of divus Augustus by the Fratres seem to be those of 30th January and 14th March, 69: Vitellius made no sacrifices to Augustus nor did any of the Flavians). More surprising, however, are references to the templum divi Augusti novum: the entry in the AFA of 23rd September A.D. 38 and perhaps also the next one (of A.D. 39?; CIL VI 32,345 line 5=Sm. 11) may be explained by the temple's novelty, though one might expect it to be called templum novum divi Augusti. However, the entry for a date in A.D. 66 (prior to 20th May; CIL VI 2044c, lines 5-6 = Sm. 26) and CIL VI 8704, the tombstone, apparently of Flavian date, of an aedituus templi novi divi Aug., may lead us to suspect that the 'new' temple is so called to distinguish it from something else (an 'old' or, at any rate, 'earlier' temple?). See further below, under (c): Divorum Aedes.

Since the cult of divus Augustus was not emphasized by the Flavians, it is not surprising to find a new use for the templum divi Augusti instituted between A.D. 88 and 90: the master copies of military diplomata granting citizenship to time-expired veterans of the auxilia and their families had been posted up at various places on the Capitol (see CIL XVI p. 196); however, starting with a diploma of 27th October A.D. 90 (CIL XVI 36 = MW 403), the concluding formula is invariably: descriptum et recognitum ex tabula aenea (aerea from A.D. 138) quae fixa est Romae in muro post templum divi Aug. ad Minervam. (For the precise meaning of ad Minervam see Nesselhauf's discussion, CIL XVI p. 197) Because of these military diplomata, inscriptional evidence for the templum divi Augusti exists down to 7th January, A.D. 298 (CIL XVI 156, pace Platner-Ashby, pp.
1- Caesarum aede cont.

62-63). This use of the temple may help to explain its elaborate reconstruction and restoration by Antoninus Pius in A.D. 157-8 (the evidence for this is a common coin type; e.g. BMC Imp. IV, Antoninus Pius nos. 2063-2066).

b) Divorum Templum: see Platner-Ashby and Nash, s.vv. This was a temple built by Domitian on the Campus Martius; it is clear from the Severan marble plan of Rome that it was a large rectangular area with a portico around the inside and that flanking the main entrance, a triple arch, were an aedes divi Vespasiani and an aedes divi Titi. Hence the slightly baffling reference to in templo divorum in aede divi Titi, which appears three times in CIL VI 10, 234 (lines 8, 9-10, 23; c. A.D. 153; see further, K. Scott, The Imperial Cult under the Flavians, 62-64). Since this was an exclusively Flavian cult centre, we can eliminate it from further consideration in this context.

c) Divorum Aedes: in describing an abortive conspiracy against Septimius Severus in A.D. 205, Dio speaks of an occurrence ἐν ταῖς θεωρίαις ταῖς ἐν τῷ παλατίῳ ἡρωσὶν πεποιημέναις (76.3.3). These religious observances probably took place in the divorum aedes, mentioned three times in the AFA under some such formula as: in palatio in aede divorum: CIL VI 32,379 line 24 (A.D. 145; not in Henzen); cf. CIL VI 2087 line 4 (of uncertain date, but Antoninus Pius; Henzen CLXXII); CIL VI 2104 line 6 (27th May, A.D. 218, Elagabalus; Henzen CCII).

There is no firm evidence to suggest when this temple was built: the establishment of the Caesareum or aedes Caesarei, first mentioned in the AFA for 19th May, A.D. 81, as part of the buildings around
Caesarum aede cont.

the lucus Arvalium (at the fifth milestone on the Via Campana beyond the Porta Portuensis) may imply a Flavian date, or the fact that the first two references to the divorum aedes occur during the principate of Antoninus Pius, an Emperor of antiquarian interests, who restored the temple of divus Augustus, may suggest either that he built it from scratch because the cults of the various divi were falling into desuetude or that he adapted for this purpose some building previously existing. It is conceivable that such a building was the 'old,' or 'earlier,' templum divi Augusti; Pliny the Elder, speaking of the uses of cinnamon says: radicem eius magni ponderis vidimus in Palatii templo quod fecerat divo Augusto coniunx Augusta, aureae paterae inpositam...donec id delubrum incendio consumptum est (NH 12.94). The templum divi Augusti novum, discussed above under (a), was built by Tiberius under the terms of an S.C.; if it was the same temple as that described by Pliny, why should he gratuitously ascribe its construction to Livia? This was a temple which he himself had visited, and there is no reason for assuming error on his part. Further, we should remember that our other sources do not suggest that the 'new' temple was on the Palatine itself. 'Livia's temple' may well have been more like a domestic chapel than a large public temple (cf. Cicero's proposed fanum for Tullia in 45 B.C.; see Shackleton Bailey, Cicero's Letters to Atticus, Vol. V, Appendix III). After Livia's death and deification, 'her' temple would naturally lend itself to a domestic cult of the new diva, and in this connection we should consider CIL VI 4222, a memorial inscription found within the Monumentum Libertorum et Servorum Liviae which mentions an Aedituus Templi.
1- **Caesarum aede cont.**

Divi Aug [et] Divae Augustae quod est in Palatium (sic). (We should also note that, although as part of the deification of Livia, Claudius set up a statue of her $\nu\tau\phi\,\alpha\gamma\o\upsilon\omega\sigma\tau\epsilon\iota\psi$ [Dio 60.5.2], the 'new' temple of Augustus is never referred to as a temple of Augustus and Livia; cf. similarly, **BMC Imp IV**, Antoninus Pius no. 2064, mentioned above [p.16] which depicts statues of both Augustus and Livia within the temple but bears the legend: TEMPLVM DIV AUG REST.)

I would suggest that cult statues of the other Julio-Claudian divi (and divae) followed, so that the temple could have come to be regarded as a Caesarum aedes. Its destruction by fire (NH 12.94), perhaps around A.D. 68 but certainly no later than the early Flavian period (NH was published in 77; cf. Pref. 3), could have given rise to the version found here in S. Finally, Dio's statement that a $\iota\nu\rho\sigma\iota\omicron\nu$ for Augustus was built by Livia and Tiberius (56.46.3) may represent a confusion of two distinct buildings. (See further, Henzen p. 55; Mommsen, *Ges. Schr.* V 44-46.)
Galba’s Background and Career to April, 68

(2. -9.1)

2 nullo gradu contingens Caesarum domum: in the context of this remark, S. is obviously stressing the magnitude of the break which occurred in A.D. 68; however, he may also be providing, en passant, a gentle corrective to Plut. G 3.2: ἦν δὲ τι καὶ Λιβία τῇ Καίσαρος γυναικὶ κατὰ γένους προσῆκεν ὁ Γάλβας. Plutarch may have assumed that Galba’s stepmother Livia Ocellina was a close relative of Livia Drusilla (see below G 3.3, n. on Liviam Ocellinam); however, given that Galba was the stepson of Livia Ocellina and that Livia Drusilla herself belonged to the domus Caesarum only through posthumous adoption (cf. Ann. 1.8.1), even the most genealogically obsessed of Roman nobles would have agreed with S.’s comment.

ut qui statuarum titulis pronepotem se Quinti Catuli Capitolinii semper ascripsisset: there are, however, no examples of this extant.

Q. Lutatius Q.f.Q.n. Catulus (cos. 78 B.C.) was one of the leading figures in the clique of nobles who dominated Roman politics from the retirement of Sulla to the establishment of the amicitia between Caesar, Pompey and Crassus in 60 B.C. His father (cos. 102 B.C.) had revived the political fortunes of the Lutatii - though not without difficulty - after a considerable period of eclipse, and the son, although important politically, was undoubtedly less
gifted (cf. Val.Max 6.9.5; also Syme,R.R.21: "The virtue and integrity of Catulus, rare in that age, earned general recognition: brilliance and vigour were lacking"), and he was later remembered mainly for the buildings with which he was associated: as consul in 78 he saw to the completion of the tabularium, today the best-preserved of Republican buildings in Rome (CIL VI 1314 = ILLRP 367 is his dedicatory inscription; cf. CIL VI 1313 = ILLRP 368, illustrated in Nash, s.v. 'Tabularium'). This building was part of a larger project for the rebuilding of the entire Capitol, which had become practicable after the destruction of the Capitoline Temple by fire in July, 83 B.C. The Dictator Sulla had made himself responsible for the whole reconstruction scheme (Plut. Poplicola 15.1; H 3.72) and upon his death early in 78 Catulus, as consul for that year, was appointed curator restituendi Capitolii (Gell. 2.10.2 - the phrase is Varro's; cf. Cic. Verr. 4.69 and 82), and by 69 the work was sufficiently advanced for him to dedicate the temple (Livy, Per. 98; S. Aug. 94.8; cf. also Plut. Poplicola 51.1; H 3.72), though work on its interior and decoration generally probably continued until almost the time of Catulus' death in 60 B.C. (on this later phase, see S. Iul. 15 and Dio 37.44.1-2; cf. Dio 43.14.6). It was Catulus' temple which burned down in December A.D. 69 (see below, Vit. 15.3).

On Catulus, see further Münzer, RE XIII s.v. 'Lutatius' no. 8; Syme,R.R. Chapter 2 and, for his family connections, Table II.

imperator vero etiam stemma...referret: cf. Silius Italicus (cos. ord. A.D. 68) Punica 8.470-471, where the gens...
Sulpicia (i.e. Galba's paternal line) is referred back to Minos and Pasiphae, which demonstrates how easily this mythological sort of clap-trap can fall into confusion. This is, of course, an attempt to rival the ultimate ancestry of the gens Iulia and we may here see a remnant of Galban propaganda which in A.D. 68 sought to build up the "image" of the new Emperor by providing him with a line of descent at least as impressive as that of the family which he had replaced.

The imagines of distinguished ancestors were kept in armaria (= display cases? cupboards?) in the atrium of a noble Roman's house; the pedigree was indicated by the arrangement of the imagines and by painted lines connecting them; cf. Sen. Ben. 3.28.2; Pliny NH 35.6; Mart. 4.40.1.

3.1 Imagines et elogia universi generis exsequi longum est, familiae breviter attingam: in this case elogia seem to refer to the short laudatory inscriptions attached to the imago of each distinguished ancestor (see further below, Vit. 1.2, n. on extat Q.† Elogi...libellus).

Though Galba's long and distinguished ancestry was perhaps the main reason for his being considered capax imperii in 68 (while Verginius Rufus, for example, was not; cf. H 1.52.4; 2.76.2), we can scarcely blame S. for his reluctance even to attempt to summarize the history and achievements of the gens Sulpicia, since the record of the Sulpicii goes back to the earliest days of the Roman Republic: Ser. Sulpicius P.f. Camerinus Cornutus is recorded in the Fasti as consul in the year 500 B.C.; Q. Sulpicius Camerinus Cornutus, cos.
3.1 Imagines et elogia... attingam cont.

490 B.C., may well have been his brother; prior to the second Punic War, when the Sulpicii Galbae can be distinguished as a separate stirps, members of this gens had held seventeen consulships and two dictatorships; and there were in addition fifteen Tribuni Militum consulari potestate, five interreges, three censors, and one of the Decemviri of 451 B.C. At the earliest stage of the history of the gens, we find the double cognomen Camerinus Cornutus and other double cognomina with the common element Camerinus, e.g. Camerinus Praetextatus and Camerinus Rufus, which would seem to suggest some connection with the old Latin town of Cameria: Ogilvy twice states as a fact that a branch of the gens Sulpicia came from there (Commentary on Livy I-V ap. 1.38.4 and 2.19.1), but nonetheless he seems to favour the idea that the gens may have originated in Lanuvium, in spite of Tacitus' strong rejection of this notion at Ann. 3.48.1. This idea allegedly receives some confirmation from the activities of the monetalis C. Sulpicius C.f. (Galba) (RE 9), who c. 103-102 B.C. issued silver denarii showing on the reverse a pig, which is supposed to represent the story of the sow with the thirty piglets in early Latin mythology, as an allusion to the place of origin of his gens. This presupposes that in making such an allusion, the monetalis was unable to distinguish between Lanuvium and Lavinium, to which the story of the sow and her piglets became attached (for details of this story with modern bibliography see Alfoldi, Early Rome and the Latins 271-278; and for dating see Sydenham, CRR no. 572; Grueber, BMC Rep. nos 1314-25; M.H. Crawford, RRC I p.312, suggests 106 B.C.). With regard, then, to the origins of the gens Sulpicia, it would probably be judicious to conclude cautiously with
Munzer that it was after the destruction of Cameria in 502 B.C. (D.H. 5.49.3-5; cf. 5.51.1) that the Sulpicii who "bis dahin ihren Grundbesitz und meistens auch ihren Wohnsitz in Cameria halten... erst durch dessen Untergang ganz zu einem römischen Geschlecht wurden" (RE IV A s.v. 'Sulpicius').

The gens Sulpicia was always patrician in Roman history, though if the arguments above are valid it must have belonged to the Gentes Minores. And although it is not possible to provide details of the connections between the Sulpicii Galbae and the stirpes which were prominent during the early Republic, there is no reason to doubt that the Sulpicii Galbae were indeed regarded as members of the same gens: P. Sulpicius Ser.f.P.n. Saverrio (RE no. 97), grandfather (probably, see below on Galba 3.1) of the first Galba, was cos. in 304 B.C. - his grandfather's floruit will therefore come c. 370 B.C. and the history of the gens in Rome goes back at least four generations beyond that.

However, during the last two centuries of the Republic the Sulpicii Galbae seem to have become the predominant stirps; the following table is derived from the work of Munzer and Fluss (RE IV A 753-754, 755-756) and J. H. Oliver (AJA 46 [1942] 380-388); down to 31 B.C., the forms of the names are as given by Broughton (MRR); in each case the RE number is appended to the name:
Individuals mentioned by Suetonius will be discussed at the appropriate places below: however, there are a few general problems from the period of Caesar's Civil War which may appropriately be considered here. We may begin with the monetalis Ser. Sulpicius (RE no. 20): Münzer, RE ad loc., Grueber BMC Rep. I p. 488, and Sydenham, CRR lxv, agree that he was monetalis c. 54 B.C.; this means
that he cannot be identified with Ser. Sulpicius Galba (RE 61), praetor of 54 B.C. (cf. Broughton, MRR 453, 622 and Suppl. 61).

If he is a Galba, a supposition which cannot be proved, then he may be the son of the praetor of 54 B.C.

There are in addition two individuals of similar name of about the same period who cannot be positively identified: Servius Sulpicius (RE 21), a senator of the Pompeian party who was in the retinue of King Juba in Africa in 49 B.C. (Caes. BC 2.44): like the monetalis of c. 54, with whom he may possibly be identified, he was not demonstrably a Galba; secondly, (Sulpicius) Galba, a man who had held the praetorship by 48 and who was murdered in 47 by Caesar's troops during a mutiny (Plut. Caes. 51.1): according to Broughton (MRR Suppl. 61) who discusses this individual, he is "not in RE"; cf., however, "(Sulpicius)Galba" (RE 48); he too could possibly be identified with the monetalis of c. 54. Münzer, however, (RE ad loc.) suggests that he may be identified with P. Sulpicius Galba (RE 55), pontifex by 69 B.C., aed. cur. 69 (?), praet. 66 (?) and candidate for cos. in 64 B.C. The whole matter is, however, a tissue of uncertainties: I have therefore not ventured to place either the senator friend of Juba or the murdered ex-praetor on the chart.

_qui primus Sulpiciorum cognomen Galbae tuit..._

appellanturque Galbae: S. is clearly uncertain regarding not only the origin of and reason for the name Galba, but also the identity of the first Galba, as indeed we are today. Since P. Sulpicius Galba Maximus, _cos._ 211 B.C., and Ser. Sulpicius Galba, _aed. cur._ 209 B.C., are almost certainly of the same generation and
3.1- qui primus...appellanturque Galbae cont.

probably brothers, and both bear the cognomen Galba, we can be sure that they are not its originators. The consular fasti list Galba Maximus as "Ser.f.P.n.": the "Ser." is unknown, but the grandfather "P." may, on an economical hypothesis, reasonably be identified with P. Sulpicius Saverrio (RE 98), cos. 279 B.C., who was with his colleague P. Decius Mus defeated by Pyrrhus at Asculum. The unknown "Ser.", father of Galba Maximus, would therefore be the originator of the cognomen Galba and he is therefore entered, quite hypothetically, in the stemma as "Ser. Sulpicius Galba."

The four different etymologies of the name which S. gives are all open to some sort of objection.

a) The reference to the aromatic substance galbanum in connection with the siege of a Spanish town cannot be correct, since as we have seen, the name Galba must first have been used during approximately the period of the 1st Punic War. This suggestion looks like the work of an antiquary who mistakenly believed that the name arose during the Spanish wars of the 2nd century B.C. In TLL there is an exhaustive article on galbanum: from this it is clear that Pliny the Elder made a detailed study of the origin and uses of the substance (cf. NH 1.12.56; 1.24.13; 11.16; 12.121, 126; 19.180; 24.21-22; 31.121). Since his History was one of Suetonius' main sources for this section of the Lives, I would suggest that part at least of this etymological discussion is derived from Pliny's History, as is perhaps the idea that Ser. Sulpicius Galba (RE 58) cos. 144 B.C., was the first to illumine the name Galba (G 3.2).

b) galbeus or galbeum: which S. defines as remediis lana involutis; cf.
The true meaning of the word *galbeus* (or *galbea* f.) is "armband"; cf. Paul. Fest. (Lindsay, p. 96M, 68 Th.) under "G":

> galbeum ornementi genus.

The word appears originally to have been written with an initial "C"; cf. Paul. Fest. (Lindsay, p. 46M, 33Th.) under "C": *calbeos armillas dicebant, quibus triumphantes utebantur* et quibus ob virtutem milites donabantur. This change from initial "C" to "G" proves that the word was used in written form prior to the introduction of the letter "G" to express the voiced guttural stop sometime during the 3rd century B.C., and as a nickname for a branch of a family as loaded with honours as the early Sulpicii, it seems entirely appropriate. From the mistaken identification of this word made by S. or his source, it is clear that it had fallen into disuse: it survives only in grammarians and glosses.

c) *galba*: a Gallic word for a very fat man, according to S. There is a certain amount of etymological evidence in favour of this; cf. Old Norse *kalfi* = thigh, or calf of the leg; the Engl. *calf* in this sense; the old Ger. ending *-kalb* = swelling, as in *wazzar-kalb* = dropsy.

Walde-Hoffman, Lat. Etym. Wörterbuch ³ s.v. *Galba*, accept this sort of meaning for the name and translate it "Schmerbauch" (= "paunch"). Certainly this word could have become known to the Romans during the 4th or 3rd centuries B.C. Furthermore, there is a Gallic name

> Galba: see Caes. B.G. 2.4.7.

d) *galba*: said by S. to be the name of a grub or worm found in oak trees. These are apparently very thin, but S. is the only extant mention of these *galbae* and it is correspondingly difficult to comment upon them. Perhaps this word is a dialectism from some country area and referred originally to the colour of the grub: *galbus*, a kind of...
3.1-3.2

bird (= χλωροστροφόνυ) > galbinus = of a greenish-yellow colour
> Romanian galben = yellow.

With these four alternatives S. has not yet exhausted all the possibilities: there is another galba meaning a kind of Greek nut, mentioned by Pliny NH 15.90, quoting Cato; cf., for example, Cicero <Cicer = chick-pea.

While there can be no certainty as to the origin of the name Galba, items (b) and (c) above would seem to have stronger claims to serious attention than the others.

3.2 familiam illustravit: the meaning of this expression is not wholly clear, since Servius Galba consularis (= Ser. Sulpicius Ser. f.P.n. Galba, cos. 144 B.C.; see next n.) was not the first consul to bear the name Galba; S. may not, however, have been aware of this since he does not mention Galba Maximus (cos. 211, 200; dict. 203). On the other hand, the consul of 144 B.C. became so notorious that S.'s use of illustravit may be deliberate and ironic: if this is so, this passage may be misplaced in OLD, s.v. 'illustro' (3): "to give glory, or lustre to"; it should come under (1): "to shine upon, light up, illuminate."

Servius Galba consularis: Servius Sulpicius Galba (RE 58), grandson of Galba Maximus, was probably born in the 190s B.C. He provides one of the grimmest examples of greed and cruelty found in the Senate during the middle part of the 2nd century B.C., its period of greatest ascendancy.

We first hear of him serving as military tribune of the second
3.2- Servius Galba consularis cont.

Legion under L. Aemilius Paullus at Pydna in 168 B.C. In 167 when Paullus returned to Rome for his merited triumph, Galba delivered a four-hour filibuster against the proposal, ostensibly because he felt that the troops, himself no doubt included, had not received a sufficient share of the booty. The next day his opposition was voted down by the Assembly after a stinging speech by the aged consular M. Servilius Pulex Geminus (Livy 45.35.8-39.19; Plut. Aemil. 30.5-32.1). M. Porcius Cato also apparently spoke against Galba at this time (cf. H. H. Scullard, Roman Politics, 220-150 B.C. 2, 269-270).

In 151-150 B.C. during his praetorship and its prorogation in Further Spain, Galba perpetrated the act which made his name a byword for perfidy. In 154 the Lusitani had started a war by invading "Roman" territory in Further Spain; several defeats were sustained by Rome, and during his praetorship Galba won a victory which turned into a defeat because of a careless and over-confident pursuit of the Lusitani (App. Hisp. 58; Livy, Per. 48). A Celtiberian war had broken out in Hither Spain in 153 B.C., but peace was made there by M. Claudius Marcellus during his third consulship in 152 B.C. Marcellus' successor L. Licinius Lucullus, cos. 151, broke this peace by attacking the Vaccaei and seizing the town of Cauca, where he massacred 20,000 people; he then marched into Lusitania to assist Galba, who promised peace to the Lusitani and land to settle on: when they had divided into three separate groups and had laid down their arms, he took 8,000 of them, massacred the majority and then sold the survivors into slavery (App. Hisp. 59-60; Val.Max. 8.1.2; 9.6.2; Oros. 4.21.10). Appian adds that he kept most of the spoils for himself.
3.2 Servius Galba 

One of the few survivors of this massacre was Viriatus, on whom see below 3.2, n. on Viriatini belli causam exstitisse.

On his return to Rome in 149 B.C. Galba was prosecuted in some way (the details are not at all clear) by the tr. pl. L. Scribonius Libo, who also proposed that all the Lusitani enslaved by Galba should be freed; and Cato at the age of 85 was one of the speakers against Galba. However, it is clear that the sense of outrage felt by certain members of the Senate was not because of the massacre per se, but because Galba had broken a formal promise, thus bringing Rome's fides into disrepute (Val.Max. 8.1.2: quod...interposita fide...interemisset; cf. Cic. Brut. 89 and A. E. Douglas' Commentary ad loc.) However, Galba made in all three speeches at this time and during one of these, bringing forward his two young sons and ward, he delivered so effective a miseratio that all action against him was dropped (Livy, Per. 49; Cic. Brut. 89-90; Val.Max. 8.1.2; 8.7.1). Later the same year, on the proposal of the tr. pl. L. Calpurnius Piso, a quaestio de rebus repetundis was established, the first of the quaestiones perpetuae: this does not, however, mean that any real moral revulsion had seized the Senate, since under the new arrangements Senators were both judge and jury, and tribunician interference was forbidden; as long as Rome's fides remained formally inviolate, the Senate was apparently satisfied.

Furthermore a few years later (after a slight delay) Galba became consul in 144 B.C. with L. Aurelius Cotta as his colleague. Both sought the command in Spain, but neither got it after Scipio pronounced them both unsuitable quia alter nihil habet, alteri nihil
3.2-

est satis (Val. Max. 6.4.2): the reference here to avaritia must refer to Galba, since he was very rich and this is in keeping with his previous activities.


†et eloquentissimus: Ihm's text is barely satisfactory; Bentley's vel for et is a simple and easy emendation, but I. Casaubon's suggestion ditissimus et eloquentissimus, based on App. Hisp. 60, is perhaps closer to what S. wrote.

Cicero is our major source of information about Galba as an orator, and from his general references to him it is clear that, for Cicero, he and C. Laelius were the pre-eminent orators of their day; cf. de Or. 1.58: quos [Galba and Laelius] constat dicendi gloria praestitisse. Naturally Cicero tends to compare and contrast them and in so doing tells us much about their respective styles of oratory; cf. especially the story in Brut. 89-89 which concludes (89) elegentiam in Laelio, vir in Galba fuisse. However, Cicero's preference does ultimately seem to have been for Galba: Galba fuit inter tot aequalis unus excellens (Brut. 333; cf. Brut. 98, 295; De Or. 1.40).

Elsewhere Cicero analyses the ars dicendi of Galba specifically: is princeps ex Latinis illa oratorum propria et quasi legitima opera
tractavit, ut egrederetur a proposito ornandi causa, ut delectaret animos, ut per moveret, ut augeret rem, ut miserationibus, ut communibus locis uteretur (Brut. 82); and yet the written versions of Galba's speeches are disappointing (Brut. 93). This may be why no actual quotations or fragments of Galba's speeches survive (cf. Malcovati, ORF no. 19; Clarke, Rhetoric at Rome, 42.)

Viriatini belli causam extitisse: Viriatus was a Lusitanian shepherd and one of the few survivors of the group massacred by Galba. He is next heard of c. 147 B.C. when, no doubt mindful of his experience with Galba, he persuaded 10,000 Lusitani not to surrender to the praetor C. Vetilius with whom they had been negotiating and who had promised them land. (The date is not certain: see Broughton, MRR I 465 n. 2 and Astin, Scipio Aemilianus 343-344). Viriatus' success on this occasion led to his being chosen as commander-in-chief of the Lusitani, and he fought with great success against the Romans in subsequent years. A treaty favourable to the Lusitani was negotiated in 140 B.C. and Viriatus was recognized as a "friend of the Roman people" (App. Hisp. 69). However, this treaty was set aside at the instance of Q. Servilius Caepio (cos.140), governor of Hispania ulterior in 140-139 (App. Hisp. 70; cf. Astin, op. cit. 142-143), and during fresh negotiations thereafter Caepio suborned Viriatus' three principal lieutenants and they murdered him in his tent. The resistance of the Lusitani quickly collapsed and they surrendered to Caepio who had promised not to enslave them: he gave them land to farm and this resettlement process was completed in 138 by the consul D. Iunius Brutus, who
3.2-
subdued the rest of "Lusitania" (App. Hisp. 71-75; Livy, Per. 54-55, Oxy. Per. 54-55).

Although the resistance of Viriatus was completely unnecessary and the result achieved in 139-138 might well have occurred under Vetilius almost a decade earlier, had it not been for memories of Galba, Viriatus was remembered by all as a great and brave captain and an inspiration to his people: vir duxque magnus (Livy Per. 54).

On Viriatus, see further, Schulten, RE XIII 1867-1872 s.v. 'Lusitania' and NJA 39 (1917) 209-237 (fundamental); Gundel, RE IX A 203-230; H. Simon, Roms Kriege in Spanien 87-100, 116-138; Astin, op. cit. 99-100, 125-128, 140-147.

eius nepos: that Ser. Sulpicius Galba (RE 61), praetor in 54 B.C. was the grandson of the consul of 144 B.C. is highly unlikely, even if not quite impossible. The consul of 144 was probably born in the late 190s B.C. (he was praetor in 151 B.C.; cf. A. E. Astin, The Lex Annalis before Sulla 49 n. 3) while the praetor of 54 was probably born c. 94 B.C. If what S. tells us here is accurate, the stemma of the Sulpicii Galbae will have to be emended: the praetor of 54 will then become the son of Ser. Sulpicius Galba, cos. 108 B.C.

ob repulsam consulatus infensus Iulio Caesari: this story too presents certain superficial difficulties. Galba served in Gaul as Caesar's legate during 58-56 B.C., a post similar to one which he had previously held in 62-60 B.C. under the propraetor C. Pomptinus in Gallia Narbonensis (Dio 37.47.1). His most noteworthy
3.2- ob repulsam...Caesari: cont.

exploit came in the late autumn of 57 when, after ostensibly
subduing the Nantuates, Veragri and Seduni, he was attacked by them
while wintering among the Veragri at Octodurus (mod. Martigny) on
the upper Rhône above the Lake of Geneva: a desperate sally from his
hiberna enabled him to get away without excessive loss (Caes. B.G.
3.1.1-3.6.5; Dio 39.5.2-4; Oros. 6.8.1-5). In relating this
incident Caesar repeats what must have been Galba's claim that more
than one-third of 30,000 Gauls were killed -a ludicrous total (cf.
Rice Homes, Commentary ad B.G. 3.6.2); Orosius says that 30,000
were killed!

Galba subsequently returned to Rome and became praetor in 54;
during that year he arranged that his old commander Pomptinus, who
had remained outside the pomerium since his return from Gaul in 60
B.C., should receive a triumph (Dio 39.65.2). In 52 Galba stood
surety for a debt of Pompeius Magnus, which Caesar later made good
(in ?45 B.C.; cf. Val.Max. 6.2.11; Cic. Fam. 6.18.3). He stood
for the patrician consulship in 50 as "Caesarian" candidate, but was
defeated by the "optimate" L. Lentulus Crus: from the words of S.
quoted above it might appear that he was defeated because of Caesar
and so became his enemy, but it is clear from Caesar's own words
that he took Galba's defeat as a setback for himself:...ereptum Ser.
Galbae consulatum,...quod sibi [Caesar] coniunctus et familiaritate
et necessitudine legationis esset (B.G. 8.50.4).

However, Galba subsequently became so alienated from Caesar that
he joined the conspiracy of Brutus and Cassius, as S. tells us
below. Possibly he asked Caesar for a consulship after Caesar had
become master of Italy and was refused. The story of his publicly
asking Caesar what to do about Pompey's debt (Val. Max. 6.2.11; see above) does not look like the action of a loyal follower: the estrangement had therefore, presumably, come about by 45 B.C. (cf. Cic. Fam. 6.18.3).

After Caesar's assassination Galba was active in the senatorial cause: in April 43 he fought in the battle of Forum Gallorum, of which he sent Cicero an account (Fam. 10.30), and in May 43 he served as an envoy from Decimus Brutus to the senate (Fam. 11.18.1). With the passage of the Lex Pedia and the reconciliation between Antony and Octavian in the autumn of 43 B.C., he was presumably hunted down and killed, though the details of his death are not known.

From the sources we obtain a picture of a proud, almost arrogant, individual with a strong sense of personal worth, who would do almost anything for those to whom he felt obligated and who expected like treatment from those who were under an obligation to himself (cf. Cic. Phil. 13.33: fortissimus et constantissimus civis). He was rather "careful" with money (cf. Cic. Fam. 6.18.3: homo in re familiaris non parum diligens), a trait which he shared with the consul of 144 B.C. and with his great-grandson, the Princeps.

Galba (RE 52) is practically unknown apart from the details given here. The date of his praetorship cannot be ascertained (cf. Broughton, MRR II p. 465). His History apparently covered the period from the foundation of Rome to his own day: it is quoted by Plutarch in his Life of Romulus (17, quoted from the history of Juba II)
and also by Orosius for a detail of Pompey's war against Sertorius in Spain (5.22.9). It is also mentioned by Pliny (NH 1.36 ad fin).

Possibly also he is mentioned in a proxeny decree from Delphi (cf. below 3.3, n. on maior Gaius, and see espec. J. H. Oliver, AJA 46 [1942] 380-388, where it is argued [386] that he was sent to Greece as proconsul of Achaea c. 13 B.C.).

pater consulatu functus: in the small fragment of the Fasti Lucerini, known from the middle of the 19th century, an entry easily datable to 5 B.C. bears the name of a cos. suff.: ]VLPICIVS C F GALBA[ . This led to speculation about the praenomen and in PIR III S no. 722 the father of the Princeps Galba appears as Servius Sulpicius Galba and is said to be the same person as the one shown above on the stemma of the Sulpicii Galbae as his brother (RE 62).

That the correct praenomen is C. could easily be demonstrated by a glance over the family tree, were such a demonstration necessary (cf. Fluss, RE IV A s.v. 'Sulpicius' no. 53). However, with the discovery of the fragments of the Fasti Magistrorum Vici in 1928 any lingering doubts were dispelled: in a list of consuls equally easily datable to the year 5 B.C., there appears under the heading SUF the name C SVLPICIVS. (The epigraphical material is collected and commented upon by A Degrassi, I.I. XIII.1 no. 10 [Fasti Lucerini] p. 259; no. 20 [Fasti Magistrorum Vici] pp.279-290).

This, of course, leaves us with the Servius Sulpicius Galba (RE 62) attested in two Athenian inscriptions (IG III 869-870) honouring his daughter Sulpicia (RE 113): this same daughter is
identified with the Sulpicia Ser. Galbae f. to whom a freedwoman made a dedication (CIL VI 27005). This Galba is assumed to be a younger brother of the consul of 5 B.C., and was possibly a consular himself (cf. CIL VI 9319). However, J. H. Oliver argued strongly against the assumption of an otherwise unrecorded Servius Sulpicius Galba (AJA 46 [1942] 387: "forced and unnecessary") and he suggests that his "daughter" is, in reality, the sister of Galba the historian (RE 52), the grandfather of the later Emperor. This view is followed in the stemma given above.

For a possible further epigraphic reference to the father of the Princeps cf. below 3.3, n. on maior Gaius.

brevi corpore atque etiam gibber: cf. Macrobr. 2.4.8: [Augustus] Galbae, cuius informe gibbo erat corpus, agenti apud se causam et frequentor dicenti, "corrige in me siquid reprehendis," respondit: "ego te monere possum, corrigere non possum." cf. also remarks quoted by Macrobius at 2.6.3 and 2.6.4, but see also S. Gram. 9.

modicaeque in dicendo facultatis: this is contradicted by Macrobius (2.6.3): Galbam eloquentia clarum. However, since Macrobius is at this point merely giving a string of anecdotes each of which contains a supposedly witty remark about Galba's physical appearance (cf. previous n.) we may suspect that eloquentia clarum is merely conventional and is used to create situations in which Galba becomes the victim of someone else's repartee.
Mummiam Achaicam, neptem Catuli proneptemque L. Mummi: the princeps Galba seems to have been especially proud of his descent from Q. Lutatius Catulus, *cos.* 78 B.C. (cf. above G 2 and Plut. G 3.1). Borghesi (*Oeuvres* 5.145) suggested that his mother Mummia Achaica was the daughter of a Lutatia (a daughter of the *cos.* of 78 B.C.), and of the Mummius mentioned by Plutarch (*Crassus* 10.2-4) as legate of M. Licinius Crassus Dives in the expedition against Spartacus in 72 B.C. This Mummius was presumably the grandson of L. Mummius Achaicus, *cos.* 146 B.C. There is another possibility for the father of Mummia Achaica: Plutarch (*Sulla* 9.10-11) mentions a C. Mummius serving with Sulla (as legate? cf. *MRR* II 44) during the capture of Rome in 88 B.C. This man may seem more reasonable a match for Catulus' daughter, given the political relations between Catulus and Sulla, than a man who was perhaps allied politically with Crassus: however, it is less probable given the chronology of the generations involved.

How the marriage of Mummia Achaica with Galba's father ended is unknown: there may have been a divorce or she may have died (perhaps even in childbirth when Galba was born; cf. the closeness of his relationship with his stepmother, who had pursued his father and may have married him soon after the end of the first marriage).


*Liviam Ocellinam:* the background of the Princeps' rich, beautiful and ardent step-mother (Fluss, *RE* XIII s.v. 'Livius' no. 41) is not well known: there is a L. Livius Ocella mentioned in *CIL* VI
3.3-3.4

1446 (= ILS 936) and Borghesi (Oeuvres 5.145) suggested, on the basis of Galba’s name after his adoption by his stepmother (see below on G 4.1), that this man was her father. That her father’s name was L. Livius Ocella is highly probable: that the inscription refers to him rather than to Galba or to some ancestor is quite uncertain.

There were two L. Livii Ocellae in the time of Caesar: Cicero refers to an Ocella several times in his letters to Atticus (10.10.4; 10.13.3; 10.17.3; 16.12.1) and Cichorius (Röm. Stud. 253-257) ingeniously reconstructed a few details of the life of this man and his son from extremely scrambled evidence - (Caes) Bell. Afr. 89.5: [L. cellae patri et filio; Plut. Brut. 35.1: ξυνέρα... ἑστρατηγηκότα...Λευκίλον Πέλλαν; Nepos Att. 11.2: L. Iulium Mocillam praetorium et filium eius. Fluss (RE XIII s.v. ‘Livius’ no. 28) speculates that the man in the inscription (the “father” of Galba’s stepmother) was the son of the younger L. Livius Ocella “mentioned” by (Caesar) and Nepos.

On this evidence Livia Ocellina is placed on a stemma of the Livii in RE XIII 811-812: she appears to have been a very distant cousin of Livia Augusta (cf. also PIR² L 305).

3.4 quorum Gaius maior...morte obiit: comparatively little is known of C. Sulpicius Galba, the elder brother of the Princeps. He was consul ordinarius in A.D. 22 (Ann. 3.52.1; cf. 6.40.2: there was only a single pair of consuls that year; cf. EJ p. 41). During his consulship Galba established penalties for equites who kept eating-houses, and the following year he made a speech in the Senate complaining that unauthorized people were wearing the gold ring of
3.4 quorum Gaius...obiit cont.

the ordo equester: this led to the establishment of regulations closely defining the use of the gold ring (Pliny, NH 33.32). Pliny is, however, scathing about Galba's part in this: futtilli paene de causa, cum C. Sulpicius Galba, invenalem famam apud principem... aucupatus,...

Under the principate the practice developed whereby the governorships of Africa and Asia were awarded each year (more or less) to the two most senior consuls who had not yet held either, with the lot determining who got which province. As the number of suffect consuls rose, it naturally took longer for any individual to reach the position of senior eligible consular, and inevitably some ex-consuls proved unsuitable for such a job or incapable of carrying it out properly or simply did not wish it; equally inevitably, the Emperor became involved in the process of deciding who the senior consuls were in any given year and, as Dio tells us (53.14.3), in effect the Emperor prepared the list of those who would draw lots for the consular provinces (and likewise for the praetorian provinces). Tiberius' refusal to permit C. Sulpicius Galba to participate in the drawing of lots (anno suo his "turn" came in A.D. 36, according to Ann. 6.40.2) was probably caused by the suspicion that, since he had squandered all his own resources, he would attempt to recoup his losses at the expense of his province. (On this general question see B. E. Thomasson, Die Statthalter... Nordafrikas I 14-35, esp. 16-20)

C. Sulpicius Galba may have had several children. In CIL VI 3751 there is mention of a Sulpicius described as quaestor), aed[1(is), leg(atus)] Ti. Claudi Caesaris Aug(usti) [Germ]nici:
3.4 quorum Gaius...obiiit cont.

Hübner (Hermes 16 [1881] 524-525) speculated that he was perhaps a legate of Claudius in Britain and in a footnote (525 n. 2) added: "Etwa ein Neffe des späteren Kaisers, Sohn seines unter Tiberius eines unfreiwilligen Todes gestorbenen älteren Bruders?"

CIL VI 9754 is a dedication to two paedagogi made by (presumably) their former charges Sulpiciae C.f.Galbillae. These may be the daughters (two at least) of the consul of A.D. 22 (cf. Fluss, RE IV A s.v. 'Sulpicius' no. 118; see also below 12.2, n. on Cn. Dolabillae).

Finally, there are three Greek inscriptions, all fairly close in time and provenance, all of which refer to Πάλος Σολπίκλος and are said to refer to the historian Galba (RE 62) or to Galba cos. 5 B.C. (RE 53) or to Galba cos. A.D. 22 (RE 54). In the discussion which follows I shall differentiate these men according to their relationship to the Princeps Galba, as "grandfather," "father" and "brother" respectively.

a) H. Pomtow, Klio 17 (1921) 178-179 no. 162a = SEG 1 (1923) no. 169: a decree of proxenia from Delphi in honour of C. Sulpicius Galba, dated by Pomtow "c. a. 19-14" (sc. B.C.). Pomtow says that this is too early for the brother and would make better sense with reference to the father. However, Pomtow believed that the father's praenomen was Servius; so he was forced to conclude that the decree honoured the grandfather, who had perhaps said something flattering about Delphi in his history. Fluss (RE IV A 757), knowing that the father was Gaius, concluded that it is to him that the decree refers. However, the absence of titles may mean that the grandfather clarior studiis quam dignitate is indicated.

b) P. Graindor, BCH 51 (1927) 268-269 no. 35 = SEG 3 (1929) no. 244:
Galba 42

3.4- quorum Gaius...obiit cont.

a decree from Athens in honour of C. Sulpicius, proconsul, dated by orthography as "earlier than Claudius." Since Greece was an imperial province from A.D. 15-44 (cf. Ann. 1.76 and 1.80; S. Claud. 25.3 and Dio 60.24.1), the inscription must be earlier than A.D. 15. Graindor unhesitatingly settled on the brother as the C. Sulpicius mentioned here; Fluss (RE IV A 757) agreed, and the conclusion is that he was governor of Achaea in a praetorian proconsulship before A.D. 15; but there is not the slightest reason for excluding the father, who may equally well have been proconsul of Achaea after his praetorship.

c) M. Schede, MDAI (A) 44 (1919) 38 no. 28 = SEG 1 (1923) no. 391: frag. of a statue base from the Heraeum at Samos which mentions

Γάλον Σολπίκλον [. . .] τὸν Δυνθύμποτο[ν], dated by letter forms to the 1st cent. A.D. Schede's inclination was to take this as a reference to the brother, but since a proconsul at Samos would be the proconsul of Asia, this would be excluded by the fact that G 3.4 - prohibitus...sortiri anno suo proconsulatum - must refer to either Asia or Africa. The conclusion therefore is that the father became procos.Asiae some time after 5 B.C. But it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that as procos. Achaeae (if such he ever was), the brother may have visited the Greek islands, including Samos.

However, in a paper entitled "C. Sulpicius Galba, Proconsul of Achaia" (AJA 46 [1942] 380-388), J. H. Oliver re-examined each of these inscriptions (380-2) and concluded that all of them refer to C. Sulpicius Galba (the historian), grandfather of the later Emperor (385-8): this is an attractive and economical hypothesis, which I find convincing. For further discussion of this view, see C. Vatin, BCH 96 (1972) 253-8.
4.1 M. Valerio Messala Cn. Lentulo cons. natus est VIII Kal. Ian: according to this evidence, Galba was born on 24th December, 3 B.C. However, in the final chapter of this Life (G 23) S. tells us that Galba died in his 73rd year, i.e. within a month after his 72nd birthday, which presupposes 5 B.C. as his year of birth; likewise, Dio (64.6.5) says that he lived 72 years and 23 days, which taken with Tacitus' evidence (H 1.27.1 - Galba perished on 15th January, A.D. 69) confirms his birthdate of 24th December (using Roman inclusive counting; cf. below G 10.1, n. on cum... conscendisset tribunal) and also gives his year of birth as 5 B.C.

In yet another context, however, S. implies (Ner. 40.3) that Galba was in his 73rd year when he came to power and quotes an oracle from Delphi telling Nero septuagensimum ac tertium annum cavendum, which made him foolishly confident since he thought it applied to himself. This would mean that Galba was in his 74th year by January, 69, which is, in fact, what Tacitus appears to tell us at H 1.49.2: tribus et septuaginta annis quinque principes...emensus. Finally, Plutarch describes Galba in connection with the attempted coup of Nymphidius Sabinus (G 8.1 - obviously before December, 68) with Ἦν γὰρ εἰτῶν τοιῶν καὶ ἐβδομῆκοντα, which may make him even older (for an attempt to explain the calculations of Tacitus and Plutarch, see L. Holzapfel, Klio 12 [1912] 492-3).

Given this sort of confusion in our sources, certainty about the year of Galba's birth is impossible. On balance, however, I should be inclined to accept what S. gives us here: in this context he is concerned with Galba's actual birthdate (not the length of his life or reign) and he gives it in a clear and intelligible form; we can
perhaps allow that he looked it up carefully in the imperial archives. The story of the seventy-third year arose presumably during the Flavian period and it is based either on an erroneous calculation of the date of Galba's birth or on someone's noticing that it was in the seventy-third year after his father's consulship that Galba came to power, and the numbers seven and three invested this rather mundane coincidence with some magical significance for the superstitious. (For modern examples of the same sort of thing, cf. the "parallels" drawn between the careers of Presidents Abraham Lincoln and John F. Kennedy in the U.S.A. after 1963; see also W. R. Tongue, "The Date of Birth of the Emperor Galba," résumé in TAPA 69 [1938] xlix.)

adoptatusque a noverca sua...usurpavit: this must be a "testamentary adoption" (as is shown by the name which Galba assumed) because in classical law a woman, being incapable of patria potestas, could not adopt during her lifetime (Gaius 1.104; this rule was relaxed somewhat in the time of Diocletian: Cod. Iust. 8.47.5; cf. Inst. Iust. 1.11.10). On testamentary adoption, see further below G 17, n. on testamentoque semper in bona et nomen adscitum.

The nomenclature of Romans who were adopted frequently poses problems. R. Syme, in his article "The Consuls of A.D. 13" (JRS 56 [1966] 55-60), touches upon this matter (57-58): originally the adopted person's natal nomen gentile was altered to form a cognomen and was used as part of the new nomenclature, e.g. A. Licinius Nerva Silianus (cos. suff. A.D. 7), originally a Silius; during the latter part of the Republic a different practice arose: instead of a modified
4.1-

nomen gentile an original cognomen (or even two cognomina) was
retained, e.g. M. Terentius Varro Lucullus (cos. 73 B.C.), M. Pupius
Piso Frugi (cos. 61 B.C.); furthermore, an original nomen gentile
may even sometimes have done duty for a cognomen - if P. Sulpicius
Quirinius (cos. 12 B.C.) was originally a Quirinius.

There is, in the Fasti of the Augustan period, no instance
recorded of the preservation of an original nomen gentile in
conjunction with an original cognomen - this first occurs in A.D.
33 when the Fasti Ostienses show the name of one of the consuls as
L. Livius Ocella Sulpicius Galba (I.I. XIII.1 p.188), which serves
to confirm the apparently peculiar information given here by S.
(cf. A. Degrassi, Epigraphica 3 [1941] 25-26.)

It is, of course, possible that the Fasti Ostienses were
inscribed only after Galba had ceased to use the name L. Livius
Ocella, which would give a simple explanation of this unusual
nomenclature, but this is highly unlikely; see Degrassi's discussion

Augustum puero adhuc salutanti se inter aequeales:
for the general reception of his friends and clients (salutatio)
which the Emperor, like any other Roman patronus, conducted each
morning, see Mommsen, Staatsr II\(^3\) 834-5; J. Crook, Consilium Principis
23; and below G 17, n. on repente e media salutantium turba
adprehendit. It appears however, that on certain occasions the
Emperor gave more general receptions (cf. S. Vesp. 4.4: publica
salutatione), to which women and boys and girls were admitted (in
addition to this passage, see S. Claud. 35.2). The occasion described
4.1-
here by S. appears to be a formal reception by Augustus of children (presumably of upper-class families) who were all of approximately the same age - perhaps it was something like a modern "debut."

Constat Augustum puero adhuc...pertinet : unless we are prepared to credit Augustus and Tiberius with second sight, this story requires explanation. S.'s use of the word constat shows that the prophecy story was widely current subsequent to A.D. 68. However, the versions of it given in our sources differ somewhat in importance and details: Tacitus (Ann. 6.20) has Tiberius, graecis verbis, say, "Et tu, Galba, quandoque degustabis imperium," seram ac brevem potentiam significans. Dio (57.19.4) has a similar story, connected with Galba's betrothal; Tiberius' words are, καὶ σὺ ποτὲ τῆς ἱγεμονίας γένος, and again mention is made of the fact that Galba will reign in his old age. Dio mentions this story again in connection with Tiberius at 64.1.1, φήσας ὦτι καὶ αὐτὸς τῆς ἱγεμονίας παραγεύσεται. The same story is also told of Tiberius by Josephus (AJ 18.217) but without any detail.

It is clear that a majority of our sources attached this story to Tiberius, but when Tiberius is supposed to have made the prophecy cannot be determined, since Tacitus appears to have worked it into his narrative of the year A.D. 33 simply because Galba was consul then (cf. his introduction of the story with the words non omiserim) and Dio at 57.19.4 need not necessarily be dating Galba's betrothal to the year A.D. 20, in spite of appearances to the contrary; cf. Groag on Galba's wife Lepida (PIR² A 422).
4.1 Constat Augustus...pertinet cont.

G. B. Townend has examined this problem in detail (in "The Sources of the Greek in Suetonius," Hermes 88 (1960) 113-119) and notes that the name of Tiberius' astrologer Thrasyllus can be connected with these and other prophecies, all of which either had their first "appearance" during the reign of Tiberius, or can be connected with it. Furthermore, as pointed out above, the source (apparently written in Greek), which described the activities of Thrasyllus, must have appeared after A.D.68. Townend therefore suggests that Thrasyllus' son Balbillus, a court astrologer prominent during the principates of both Nero (cf. S. Ner. 36.1) and Vespasian (cf. Dio 66.9.2), wrote a work, probably early in the Flavian period, "on the influence of astrology and other predictions on the imperial succession, with special reference to the successes of Thrasyllus and of Balbillus himself" (op. cit. 116: Townend accepts the identification of the astrologer Balbillus with Ti. Claudius Balbillus, prefect of Egypt A.D.55-59 [cf. Kroll, RE Suppl. V 59-60], in spite of Stein's emphatic rejection [cf. PIR² B 38, C 812, 813], and Pflaum's cautious and searching assessment of the evidence and the various arguments about it, which leads him to a non liquet conclusion [cf. Les carrières procuratorriennes équestres, no.15 pp. 34-41].) Townend then suggests that Cluvius Rufus misunderstood some such word as "Caesar" in this work, took it to mean Augustus, and so gave rise to S.'s first suggestion with its circumstantial puer adhuc and apprehensa buccula; Pliny too, he conjectures, incorporated the Tiberius story into his list of portents announcing Galba's coming glory (op. cit. 117). S. found the Galba-story tied to Tiberius, probably in Pliny's history, and since his two principal sources, Pliny and Cluvius, gave different versions of the story, he put both in the passage under consideration.
4.2-4.3

4.2 *avo quoque eius fulgur procuranti...cum mula pepererit:* The Romans regarded lightning as visible proof of Jupiter's presence among them, and a thunderbolt was usually considered indicative of his displeasure (but not always; cf. S. Aug. 94.2); at any rate, since lightning was certainly a prodigium, rituals were developed to avert the divine anger and find out what the phenomenon portended; for this the Romans borrowed from the disciplina Etrusca and the haruspices were the experts who interpreted the results of the expiatory sacrifice (hence the reference here to exta and responsum est). When lightning struck a locus publicus the procedures were considerably more elaborate; see further Thulin, RE X 1130-31, s.v. 'Iuppiter', §6; Latte, RR 81; F. B. Krauss, An Interpretation of the Omens, Portents, and Prodigies recorded by Livy, Tacitus, and Suetonius (Diss. Pennsylvania, 1930) 35-46.

The story of the eagle and the entrails contains many references to power: the eagle is, of course, the symbol of Jupiter; the oak is sacred to him and it bears its acorns in the autumn; in this case, too, they were abundant - hence *summum sed serum imperium.* For other portents of Galba's rise to supreme power, see below, 9.2, 10.4 and cf. Dio 64.1.

4.3 *sumpta virili toga:* the assumption of the *toga virilis* by a Roman youth was one of the most important days in his life, since it was on this occasion that he was formally enrolled as a full citizen and entered in the register of his tribus. The ceremonies started at home when the young man laid aside the symbols of childhood, the *toga praetexta* and the bulla, before the Lares and put on the plain white
4.3 *assumpta toga virilis* cont.

toga of manhood; after a sacrifice at home (on the domestic ritual see Propertius 4.1.131-2) the new citizen was conducted to the Forum by his father, male relatives and friends, for the entering of his name on the citizen roll (on the details of this see Marquardt, *Privatleben* 125-6). Thereafter a sacrifice was performed on the Capitol, and the rest of the day was spent in feasting and merry-making. (There were obvious variations in municipia and in the provinces, but the proceedings were essentially the same; for the keeping of citizen lists outside of Rome, cf. Cic. *Arch.* 4.8). A Jewish bar-mitzvah probably provides the closest modern parallel to such an occasion.

Marquardt long ago collected a mass of evidence for the age at which specific Romans assumed the *toga virilis* (*Privatleben* 128-130) and his conclusions are well-known: it could happen at any time between the 12th and 19th years of life at the discretion of the paterfamilias or guardian, with the commonest limits being the 14th and 16th years. There was a marked tendency for the age to be lowered as time went on, especially within the Imperial house: e.g. Scipio Africanus at 17 was still called *puer* and *praetextatus* (Sen. *Ben.* 3.33.1; Sil. *Pun.* 4.426, 454, 475; Florus 1.22.10), while Nero assumed the *toga virilis* before his 14th birthday (Ann.12.41), and Caracalla during his 13th year (Dio 78.6.5; SHA *Sev.* 16.3 & 8).

Although there was a definite custom (probably early) of assuming the *toga virilis* on 17th March (the Liberalia), there are numerous instances known of other dates (cf. Marquardt, *op. cit.* 124 n. 2) and, indeed, Galba's date was 1st January, A.D. 14 (Dio 56.29.5-6), shortly after his 16th birthday.
4.3

See further Regner, RE VI A 1450-1453 s.vv. "tirocinium fori";
Warde Fowler, The Roman Festivals 54-57.

somniavit Fortunam: this is either a propaganda story put about at the time of Galba's bid for power or it is a tale which arose after his success as an elaboration of the undeniable fact that Galba was indeed an enthusiastic devotee of the goddess Fortuna; cf. Dio 64.1.1 where the vision of Fortune is described but with no mention of the statuette and no precise time reference, although the implication of the passage is that it was at or near the time when he made his bid for power. However, on the coins which he issued in Gaul during his revolt, Vindex several times used the legend SALVS GENERIS HUMANI (cf. BMC Imp I p. 295n., 296n., 297-298, 299n.). This was subsequently taken up by Galba after his recognition as princeps both in aurei issued in Rome and in silver denarii issued in Gaul (BMC Imp. I 'Galba' nos. 38-45, 230-231): all of these coins have on the reverse a representation of Fortuna holding a rudder and putting her foot on a globe, while sacrificing at a small altar in thanksgiving for success; cf. Kraay, NC Ser. 6 vol. 9 (1949) 136-138; Mattingly BMC Imp I ccvi and ccxiv.

During the Principate Fortuna was, with Victoria, the pre-eminent attribute of the imperial house (dedications to Fortuna Augusta are numerous; see, for example, CIL VI 180-1, 186-7, 196-7, 3680; X 820-8; XIV 2040) and this deity receives offerings or vows from the Arval Brethren also (cf. AFA 770 [= MW 4]; 29th Jan., 89; 25th March, 101; 6th Oct., 213). For general discussions of her importance, see Pliny, NH 2.22-25; Wissowa, RK² 263-4 (with detailed
4.3- references); K. Scott, The Imperial Cult under the Flavians 86, 93-4; C. Brutscher, "Cäsar und sein Glück," MH 15 (1958) 75-83, esp. 79-80; R. T. Scott, Religion and Philosophy in the Histories of Tacitus 70-84.


aperto atrio: this phrase means, in effect: "when the front door of the house was opened." As Vitruvius tells us (6.5.3): in urbe atria proxima ianuis solent esse. The vestibulum, where clients waited in the morning for the patronus to open his front door as a signal that the salutatio could begin, lay outside the door of the house proper (cf. Marquardt, Privatleben 2 224 n. 4; A. G. McKay, Houses, Villas and Palaces in the Roman World 32), while it was in the atrium itself that the morning reception occurred. Atrium aperire, therefore, also means "to admit one's clients"; cf. Hor. Epist. 1.5.31; Mart. 9.100.2; Juv. 7.91.

gremio suo Tusculum avexit: Tusculum (near modern Frascati), birthplace of Cato the Censor, was about 15 miles from Rome, occupying an impressive site along the ridge of Mt. Algidus over 2,100 feet above sea-level. Because of its proximity to Rome, its impressive surroundings and the splendid views afforded over the Roman campagna, Tusculum became almost a suburb of Rome, and the area was dotted with the villas of the wealthy; many of these
have been excavated and the owners of some have been firmly identified: e.g. Lucullus, Tiberius and Livia, C. Crispus Passienus (cf. below, 6 5.1, n. on Agrippinae), Eprius Marcellus. From literary sources the names are known of many others who had villas in this area: e.g. Sulla, Pompey, Brutus, Cato the Younger, Cicero, Pliny the Younger; (for details see G. McCracken, RE VII A 1463-1491, espec. 1484-1489, though he fails to mention Galba's property).

Tusculum was a Latin town, presumably - from its name - coming under strong Etruscan influence during the Roman regal period (cf. Livy 1.49.9 and Ogilvie's comments ad loc.); in 381 B.C. it became the first Latin town to receive Roman citizenship, and it remained steadfastly loyal to Rome thereafter (Livy 6.25-26; cf. 8.14.4).

See further E. J. Salmon, Roman Colonization under the Republic 49, 50 and 172 n. 59; G. McCracken, A Short History of Ancient Tusculum (Washington, 1939).

4.4 veterem civitatis exoletumque morem...obstinatissime retinuit: S. may be correct when he describes this as a veterem civitatis exoletumque morem; all the evidence for it, however, comes from the period of the Principate, and most of it is later than S. (see following n.)

ut liberti servique bis die frequentes adessent...

singuli dicerent: S. appears to have missed part of the essence of this ceremony: it was the entire household (not just slaves and
4.4 ut liberti...singuli dicerent cont.

freedmen) which greeted the paterfamilias in the morning (and evening); cf. Fronto ad M. Caes. 4.6.1 (Naber p. 69): inde salutato patre meo...; furthermore, the reason for this activity is not mentioned: offerings were made to the household gods and to the Genius of the paterfamilias; see Fronto loc. cit.: ...abii ad patrem meum et immolanti adstiti. (cf. SHA Alex. Sev. 29).

That this was indeed Galba's practice is confirmed by S. himself (Otho 6.2): mane Galbam salutavit...etiam sacrificanti interfuit...

This practice ought to be archaic, reflecting as it does a simple, unsophisticated, family type of worship (cf. Heichelheim and Yeo, History of the Roman People 56); however, as Warde Fowler states (Social Life at Rome in the Age of Cicero 269 n.1): "It is curious that all our information on this early business comes from the literature of the Empire. The single passage of Cicero which Marquardt could find to illustrate it unluckily relates to his practice as governor of Cilicia (ad Att. vi.2.5)." (This refers to the perhaps related custom whereby a patronus greeted his clients in the morning and discussed with them matters of mutual concern: cf. Hor. Epist. 2.1.103-104 and see above, § 3, n. on aperto atrio).

Accordingly, this passage and the one at Otho 6.2 referred to above provide the earliest extant evidence for the family salutatio and sacrifice in the morning: it may well have been an ancient custom, but the absence of any earlier mention of it may suggest conscious archaism.

See further Marquardt, Privatleben 2 258-9; on the nature of the Genius, see H. J. Rose, CR 17 (1923) 57-60; W. F. Otto, RE VII 1155-1170 s.v. 'Genius'; Latte, RR 103-107.
5.1 inter liberales disciplinas attendit et iuri: it would appear that by liberales disciplinas S. is not referring to the traditional seven liberal arts of grammar, dialectic (or logic), rhetoric, geometry, arithmetic, astronomy (or astrology) and music, the first three of which, derived ultimately from the educational theories of Isocrates and the sophists, gave rise to the mediaeval trivium, while the latter four, going back to Hippias of Elis and Plato, formed the basis of the later quadrivium: these represented what today would be termed secondary education. Beyond this there were various areas of higher education, such as medicine, architecture, law and, above all, philosophy - τῆς ἀλλῆς παλαίειας ὤσπερ κεφάλαιον (Plut. Mor. 7D).

From this passage and others where S. includes among liberales disciplinae such diverse topics as eruditio (Calig. 53.1) and philosophia and cognitio veterum oratorum (Ner. 52.1) we may conclude that a reasonable translation of disciplinae liberales would be "studies in the humanities."

Legal training was not far advanced by the time of Galba's youth. As Clarke points out (Higher Education in the Ancient World 14): "whereas an English barrister has a thorough training in law and little in the art of advocacy, his counterpart in the ancient world had a thorough training in advocacy and little in law"; on this topic see also Cic. de Or. 1.185-203. During the last period of the Republic, certain men, learned in the law, were recognized as iurisconsulti or iurisperiti, and legal training at this time consisted merely of young men who had lately assumed the toga virilis attending the consultations of some famous jurist, as when
5.1-

the young Cicero sat at the feet of Q. Mucius Scaevola "the Augur" in 89-88 B.C. (Cic. Brut. 306 and Amic. 1). With the coming of the Principate, this informal system of dispensing legal advice was brought to an end and henceforth jurisconsults were licensed by the state, i.e. were granted the ius respondendi by the Emperors, beginning with Augustus. The two most influential jurists of the Augustan age were M. Antistius Labeo and his great rival C. Ateius Capito (cos. A.D. 5). Their disputes and disagreements and those of their pupils and followers gave rise to the two legal "schools," later called Proculiani and Sabiniani (or Cassiani) respectively. Since Labeo died c. A.D. 10 or 11 (OCD² s.v. 'Labeo' no. 1), he cannot have been Galba's teacher, but Galba no doubt "studied" law with some such licensed jurist early in the principate of Tiberius.

See further Jörs, RE I s.v. 'Antistius' no. 34, and RE II s.v. 'Ateius' no. 8; Stein, PIR² A 760, 1279; Jolowicz-Nicholas, Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law³ 91-97, 359-363, 378-382.

amissa uxore Lepida: this paragraph contains all the information which we possess about Galba's wife, and it does not enable us to identify her positively. We may conclude from Dio 57.19.1 & 4 and 57.18.10b (continuous excerpts from Xiphilinus which describe the change in Tiberius' character after the death of Germanicus) that Galba was betrothed (Dio 57.19.4) some time after 10th October, A.D. 19 (I.1. 13.1 p. 329 = EJ p. 53), which serves as a terminus post quern. Tacitus (Ann. 3.35.2) mentions a Lepidus who had a nubilem filiam in A.D. 21, and an economical hypothesis would make this otherwise unknown lady Galba's wife: so von Rohden (RE I
s.v. 'Lepidus' no. 171) and Groag (PR² A 422). However, they both suggest that she was the daughter of Manius Lepidus (cos. ord. A.D. 11); Syme has more recently demonstrated (JRS 45 [1955] 22-23) that most modern texts of the Annals show much confusion between M. Lepidus and M. Lepidus (cos. ord. A.D. 6) and that the nubilis filia of A.D. 21 was a daughter of Marcus Lepidus, who was the capax imperii praised by Augustus (Ann.1.13.2; cf. Vell.Pat. 2.114.5: vir nomini ac fortuna Caesarum proximus); apart from this change of father, Syme accepts the identification of the lady with Galba's wife (op. cit. nn. 74 and 88). For possible objections to this view, see below, n. on correpta iurgio...a matre Lepidae.

From the information contained in this paragraph we can conclude that Galba's wife died after the beginning of Claudius' principate, since Agrippina was in exile when Domitius died and she was restored by Claudius, presumably in 41 (S. Ner. 6.4; Dio 60.4.1): it does not, however, follow that Lepida died anywhere near this time.

Agrippinae: Iulia Agrippina, eldest daughter of Germanicus and Agrippina the Elder, born at Ara Ubiorum (later Colonia Agrippinensis, in her honour; cf. Ann. 12.27) on 6th November (I.I. 13.1 p. 330 = EJ p. 54), A.D. 15 (for the year, see Mommsen, Hermes 13 [1878] 251-259), in A.D. 28 married Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus (see next n.) and on 15th December A.D. 37 bore him a son, the future Emperor Nero. The accession of her brother Gaius to the Principate a few months earlier brought Agrippina and her younger sisters Drusilla and Livilla to positions of prominence and influence (S. Calig. 15.3; Dio 59.3.4); however, her ambition to enjoy absolute
5.1 Agrippinae cont.

power seems always to have been insatiable and through her brother's infatuation with M. Aemilius Lepidus, who was, in rapid succession, married to and widowed by Agrippina's sister Drusilla, she saw her way open (on Lepidus, see PIR² A 371; his parentage is nowhere attested but he was probably a son of the cos. ord. of A.D. 6, capax imperii, rather than a son of Aemilia Lepida, daughter of Julia the Younger and L. Aemilius Paullus; cf. Z. Stewart, AJP 74 [1953] 74 nn. 34, 35 and R. Syme, JRS 45 [1955] 33 n. 90): Gaius announced his intention of making Lepidus his successor as Princeps (Dio 59.22.6-7) and Agrippina formed an adulterous liaison with him (Dio loc. cit.; cf. Ann.14.2.2: quae [sc. Agrippina] puellaribus annis stuprum cum Lepido spe dominationis admisserat). Lepidus appears thereafter, in A.D. 39, to have formed a conspiracy against Gaius, in which Agrippina and Livilla were implicated. Lepidus was executed, apparently in Germany, and Agrippina, singled out for special punishment, was ordered to carry his ashes back to Rome and was then sent into exile with Livilla to the Pontian Islands (S. Calig. 24.3; cf. 39.1 and 43; Dio 59.22.7-8; cf. 59.21.1-2: Gaius' decision to visit Germany and Gaul seems to have been a very sudden one; he did, however, take Lepidus and his sisters with him. His advance too was extremely rapid, which suggests an emergency - presumably the revolt of Gaetulicus, on which see below G 6.2, n. on Gaetulici).

Agrippina was brought back from exile by Claudius after his accession, but since the new Princeps was then married to the dangerous and jealous Messalina, who hated Agrippina, her aunt by marriage (cf. Ann. 11.12.1), she decided to remarry, preferably someone both rich and powerful: hence her pursuit of Galba (cf. Plut.
5.1

§ 3.1: Σουλπίκιος ὁ δὲ μὲν ἤδητης πλουσιώτατος ἀπάντων εἶς τὸν Καίσαραν παρῆλθεν οἶκον, ὑμολογεῖται
cf. also § 7.1). After her failure with Galba, she married C.
Sallustius Crispus Passienus (cos. suff. A.D. 27, cos II ord. A.D.
44), the witty, elegant and above all, extremely wealthy
adoptive son of Sallustius Crispus (he was previously married to
Domitia, Agrippina's sister-in-law, from whom she may have detached
him). The date of this marriage is not clear: Hanslik (RE XVIII s.v.
'Passienus' no. 2) suggests A.D. 44, which seems late in view of
Messalina's ardent hostility; furthermore, since Passienus was
proconsul Asiae in 42/43 and the inhabitants of Cos set up a statue
of Agrippina on the base of which she was described as γυναῖκα...
τοῦ ἀνθυπάτου Ταίου Σαλλούστιου Γρίσπου Πασσιένου...
ἐθεργήτην τοῦ δάμου (R. Herzog, HZ 125 [1922] 237 n. 2), the
marriage probably took place before the middle of A.D. 42. This
marriage proved fatal for Passienus: with the fall of Messalina in
A.D. 48, Agrippina saw her chance to marry Claudius. Passienus
conveniently died, allegedly poisoned by his wife (Suet. Vita
Passieni Crispi: cf. Schol. Iuv. 4.81: both Hanslik [loc. cit] and
Lackeit [RE X 910-911] give A.D. 48 for Passienus' death; Syme
suggests early 47, at the latest [Tacitus 328 n. 12]). For the death
of Agrippina herself, see below § 3.1 n. on die, quem necandae matri
Nero destinaret.

On Agrippina see further Lackeit, RE X s.v. 'Iulius' no. 556;
Petersen, PIR² I 641; J. P. V. D. Balsdon, Roman Women 107-122.

morte Domitii: Domitius died of dropsy at Pyrgi, probably in
5.1- morte Domitii cont.

December A.D. 40 (the date depends on what S. means by trimulus at Ner. 6.3: it could be very early in 41; cf. R. M. Geer, TAPA 62 [1931] 59-61). He was closely connected with the Julio-Claudian house: his mother was Antonia maior, the niece of Augustus (S. Ner. 5.1; Tacitus wrongly gives his mother as Antonia minor at Ann. 4.44 and 12.64), while his father, L. Domitius Ahenobarbus (cos. 16 B.C.; PIR² D 128) was one of Augustus' marshals, occupying an extremely influential position during Tiberius' years in eclipse.

His son, Agrippina's husband, was cos. ord. in A.D. 32, but was neither as distinguished nor as capable as his father and he seems to have possessed a personality as repellent as any to be found during the early Principate: S. describes him as omni parte vitae detestabilem (Ner. 5.1); the only favourable comments on him are from the Elder Seneca (Controv. 9.4.18: nobilissimus vir) and Velleius (2.10.2: nobilissimae simplicitatis iuvenem; cf. 2.72.3: clarissimi iuvenis). He was cos. for the whole year in A.D. 32 (Dio 58.20.1; G 6.1 implies this; cf. O 2.1, Vit. 2.2), but apparently he governed no province thereafter. Early in 37 he was accused of maiestas, of adultery with Albucilla and of incest with his sister Domitia Lepida, but escaped condemnation because of Tiberius' death (S. Ner. 5.2; Tacitus Ann. 6.47-48; Dio 58.27.2, 5). Nothing is known of his activities during the principate of Gaius; possibly he felt it prudent to withdraw from Rome in view of Agrippina's involvement in the conspiracy of Lepidus and Gaetulicus and her subsequent banishment. Domitius perhaps deserves to be best remembered for his cynical and prophetic remark about his son: he denied quicquam ex se et Agrippina nisi detestabile et malo publico nasci potuisse (S. Ner.
5.1-
6.2; cf. Dio 61.2.3).

See further Groag, RE V s.v. 'Domitius' no. 25; PIR² D 127.

in conventu matronarum: this does not refer to some kind
of upper-class Kaffeeklatsch. There was apparently in Rome a formal
body of aristocratic married women; no doubt it had originally
come into being for some religious purpose, though the scanty
'evidence' for its existence during the Republic is highly ambiguous
(Livy 5.25.8 and 27.37.9).

The only investigation of this body readily available today is
to be found in Friedländer's Sittengeschichte (even Schroff's article
on 'matrona' in RE XIV simply refers the reader to Friedländer on
this matter). In early editions of the Sittengeschichte there is a
lengthy, confident account of the conventus; e.g. 5th Ed. (1881)
Vol. I 423-423; however, the 10th and final edition of the Sittengeschichte
(1922, edited by Wissowa, reprinted 1964) acknowledges only one
mention of the conventus in a context concerning the first century
A.D. (the passage under consideration here) and relegates to a
footnote the information from SHA which Friedländer had used to
construct a detailed picture of its powers, competence and buildings:
these references, it concludes, "müssen als das Werk eines Fälschers
gelten" (I¹ 282 n. 6). The overall conclusion is: "Doch über
Zusammensetzung, Verfassung und Kompetenz dieser Korporation wissen
wir aus keiner Zeit etwas Näheres" (I¹ 282).

See also R. MacMullen, Roman Social Relations 82 and n. 86.

correpta iurgio atque etiam manu pulsata sit a matre
Galba

5.1-

Lepidae: as we have seen, this must have happened in A.D. 41-42, between the time of Agrippina's restoration and her marriage to Passienus Crispus (and putative departure with him for Asia). The fascinating question arises: which Roman matron would have the temerity to slap Agrippina at what was almost a public function? If Galba's wife Lepida was the daughter of M. Aemilius Lepidus (cos. A.D. 6), as is generally asserted, her mother, given this action, ought to have been a member of the Julio-Claudian house, and an important member at that. However, it is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to find a suitable candidate.

However, we are not told anywhere that Galba's wife was an Aemilia Lepida, and we should therefore consider Lepidae from other gentes, although there are no immediately obvious candidates. Very tentatively one might consider the much-married Domitia Lepida, sister of Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus and therefore sister-in-law to Agrippina; her family connections were extremely distinguished: her mother was Antonia Maior (pace Ann. 12.64.2), the daughter of M. Antonius and Octavia.

Domitia Lepida's date of birth is not known, though she must have been at least forty by A.D. 42, given her mother's date of birth (39 B.C.). However, she appears not to have looked her years, since Tacitus, comparing her and Agrippina, says: nec forma, aetas, opes multum distabant (Ann. 12.64.2).

Such a theory would at least explain why Lepida's mother would feel free to slap Agrippina: Antonia Maior was her great-aunt and had been her mother-in-law, and if alive in 42, she was almost certainly the oldest surviving member of the imperial family.
5.1- 5.2

However, given Augustan legislation on marriage and the social and political sanctions which existed against celibacy, it is hard to see how Galba could have remained unmarried as late as A.D. 42, when Domitia Lepida's third husband was executed (S. Claud. 37.2; Dio 60.14.2-4); furthermore, the silences of both S. and Tacitus make such a marriage improbable, and the most obvious explanation for Galba's holding of offices ante legitimum tempus (below, 6.1) is the existence of his children. On the other hand, given Livia's favour (§2 below), the Lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus could have been evaded, so that the possibility of this marriage is not completely ruled out.

5.2 Observavit...Liviam Augustam: Syme describes the private activities of Livia as "deep and devious"(R.R. 385-6): besides helping Galba in his early career, she secured entry into the Senate for M. Salvius Otho, grandfather of the later Princeps (see below 0 1.1) and also obtained a consulship for M. Plautius Silvanus (2 B.C.). the son of her close friend Urgulania (cf. Ann. 2.34; 4.21-22) and perhaps also for C. Fufius Geminus (A.D. 29; see Ann. 5.2.2: is gratia Augustae floruerat, which seems to parallel Galba's situation).

While we may ignore Tacitean innuendo against Livia (e.g. Ann. 1.3.3-4; 1.4.5; 1.5.1-2; 1.10.5; 3.17.1-2, 4; 4.71.4), we should remember that, after the death of Augustus, Livia, now Julia Augusta, remained the grande dame of Rome: her son was Princeps but he was not married between 14 and 29. Accordingly, Livia gave formal receptions, receiving members of the Senate and other notables in her own house, and the details of such occasions were published in
5.2-
the "Court Circular" (Dio 57.12.2). Given her undoubted intelligence, cool and penetrating, her influence is not surprising.

...sed quia notata: numerals are a constant source of trouble in ancient texts, especially when numerical notation is used. S. is, of course, careful not to use it here and, given the point of the story, the copyists have managed likewise to resist the temptation. The principal difficulty lay in the fact that Roman numerical notation was based on seven signs only - I, V, X, L, C, D, M. To simplify the writing of very large numbers, a bar at the top of the sign was used to indicate that the number was to be multiplied by 1,000; so 500,000. For even larger numbers, two vertical bars were added to the horizontal one, to indicate a multiplication by 100,000; so = 50,000,000. However, fraudulent alteration of one number to another a hundred times larger was extremely simple, and common prudence therefore dictated that in important documents, as with modern cheques, figures should be written out in words as well as in numerical signs.

As for the verbal notation of large numbers in sums of money, the practice is as follows: up to 2000 HS reckoning is by sestertii with a cardinal number: e.g., 500 HS = quingenti sestertii; between 2,000 and 1,000,000 HS, by sestertia with a distributive number, or, more rarely, a cardinal number (milia being understood in both cases): e.g., 500,000 HS = quingena sestertia or, as here, quingenta sestertia; 1,000,000 HS and over, by sestertium with a numerical adverb (centena milia being understood): e.g., 5,000,000 HS =
5.2-6.1

quinquagies sestertium.

\[\text{here} \text{de Tiberio legatum ad quingenta revocante:}\]

Tiberius, no doubt recognizing that his mother would not leave a mere HS 500 to her favourite, arbitrarily read the figure in her will as \(\bar{0}\) rather than \(\overline{0}\).

\[\text{ne haec quidem accepit: this accords with what we know of Tiberius' treatment of Livia's will; cf. S. Tib. 51.2; Ann. 5.1.4.}\]

However, Gaius, as S. himself makes clear, is supposed to have paid all Livia's legacies (in A.D. 37?): \textit{legata ex testamento...et Iuliae Augustae, quod Tiberius suppresserat, cum fide ac sine calumnia repraesentata persolvit} (Calig. 16.3). At first sight, S.'s failure to mention here that Gaius paid Livia's legacies may serve to strengthen the argument advanced by G. W. Bowersock (\textit{Hommages à M. Renard I} 119-125) that the Lives of Galba to Domitian were written under Trajan, before those of the Julio-Claudians: S. would then not have known of Gaius' action until he began his research for that Life; however, in all probability, S. is here merely describing how Galba fared at Tiberius' hands.

Hirschfeld (\textit{Kaiserlichen Verwaltungsbeamten} 26 n. 1) dismisses the entire story of a huge legacy as "nicht wahrscheinlich."

6.1 \textit{honoribus ante legitimum tempus initis: in the light of our other information about Galba's career, this statement looks decidedly odd.}

The holding of magistracies under the system evolved by Augustus
was as follows: a man became eligible for the quaestorship in his twenty-fifth year, the praetorship in his thirtieth (with the tribunate or aedileship coming somewhere about the middle of the five-year interval between the two), and, if he were a patrician, the consulate in his thirty-third year, or, if he were a plebeian, his forty-second (SymeRR. 369, considerably modified by J. Morris, "Leges Annales under the Principate" LF 86 [1963] 317-318, 323-336). As a result of Augustan practice, later enshrined in the Lex Papia-Poppaea of A.D. 9, fathers were permitted to compete in elections as many years before the usual minimum age as the total number of their children (Dig. 4.4.2; cf. Ann. 2.51; Dio 56.10.1-3; H. Last, CAH X 452). If Galba held his junior magistracies ante legitimum tempus, this we should expect to have been because of his children, mentioned above (5.1).

ludorum Floralium: the Ludi Florales were celebrated in the Augustan period from 28th April till 3rd May. The cult of Flora was obviously very old since she had a flamen, but nothing is known of it prior to c. 241 B.C., when a temple was built for her as a result of consultation of the Sibylline Books (Pliny [NH 18.286] gives 238 B.C., while Tacitus [Ann. 2.49] and Ovid [Fasti 5.287-292] connect the events of this period with the names L. and M. Publicius Malleolus, plebeian aediles, according to Broughton [MRR I 219], in 241 B.C.; for this date see also Vell.Pat. 1.14.8). According to Ovid (Fasti 5.295-296; 327-330), the games became annual in 173 B.C.

The most distinctive feature of these games was their sexuality: indecent mimes and public disrobing by prostitutes give clear
6.1-
evidence of this (Ovid Fasti 5.331, 347, 349-350; Val.Max. 2.10.8; Sen. Ep. 97.8; Schol. Iuv. 6.250); other activities, such as the hurling of chick peas, beans and lupins into the crowd (Hor. Sat. 2.3.182 and Porph. ad. loc.; Persius 5.177-179 and schol.) and the hunting of hares and goats in the Circus Maximus (so Latte, RR 73 n.1, but this may not be what the ancient evidence says: Mart. 8.67.4 mentions feras, while hares and capreæ figure in Ovid, Fasti 5.372; cf. OLD on the distinction between capra and caprea, but see also Bömer, Gymnasium 64 [1957] 132) could have sexual significance (so Ogilvie, The Romans and their Gods 83), but need not.

See further Wissowa, RE VI 2747-2752, s.vv. 'Flora' no. 1 and 'Floralia'; Warde Fowler, The Roman Festivals 91-95; Altheim, History of Roman Religion 122-123, 137-138; Latte, RR 73-74.

novum spectaculi genus elephantos funambulos edidit: on elephants for show, see J. M. C. Toynbee, Animals in Roman Life and Art 48-49 and 352 nn. 103-110 (Professor Toynbee rejects Galba's priority in displaying rope-walking elephants); see also H. H. Scullard, The Elephant in the Greek and Roman World 250-259.

exim provinciae Aquitaniae anno fere praefuit: this governorship seems slightly odd, since nobiles in the period after Augustus usually governed senatorial provinces as praetorian proconsuls; Aquitania, however, was an important imperial province. According to the patterns described by E. Birley ("Senators in the Emperor's Service," PBA 39 [1953] 197-214), Galba will have
served as a legate of a legion after his praetorship and then as governor of a praetorian province (op. cit. 203). It looks as if, despite his patrician birth, and because of unusual favour or because of exceptional talents and loyalty, Galba is advancing in the Emperor's service as a budding vir militaris (for a more detailed account of a similar cursus, see Tacitus Agr. 5-9, esp. 9.1 with Ogilvie and Richmond's nn. ad loc.) However, his tenure in Aquitania seems unusually brief: this may perhaps suggest a sudden loss of favour (the death of Livia? the fall of Sejanus?) or, less likely, a sudden recall to the consulship.

consulatum per sex menses ordinarium gessit: Galba was not consul until A.D. 33 and, accepting 24th December, 3 B.C., as his date of birth, by 1st January, 33, he will have just celebrated his thirty-fourth birthday and was therefore in his thirty-fifth year. J. Morris has analysed the data concerning the known ages of approximately 180 consuls between 42 B.C. and A.D. 254 (LF 86 [1963] 323-336): this represents a sample of roughly ten percent of those whose names are known to us and the conclusions are striking. Patricians usually reached the consulship at about the age of 32, and any patrician reaching it later than 33 probably did so because of a failure to obtain the praetorship at the first attempt (op. cit. 332, 334-336). Certainly in the first century A.D. the praetorship was the object of keen competition, and even though the number of praetors was raised to fifteen by the end of Tiberius' principate (Dio 58.20.5; 59.20.5), inevitably there were disappointments, since the quaestors regularly numbered twenty(Morris,
6.1-6.2

op. cit. 322-323). However, these "rules" were by no means rigid and the fact that Galba held an ordinary consulship certainly does not imply imperial disfavour; Galba's praetorship may have been delayed or he may have served a longer than average term as a legatus legionis after his praetorship. In the absence of firm evidence, further speculation is unhelpful.

evenitque ut in eo ipse †L. Domitio patri Neronis, ipsi Salvius Otho pater Othonis succederet: the father of Nero was Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus; this is probably a scribal error with the mention of Nero leading to his name being substituted for that of his father. The coincidence is even slightly more striking than S. allows: Cn. Domitius was cos. ord. in 32, Galba was cos. ord. in 33, his suffect in 33 was L. Salvius M.f.Otho, but one of the ordinary consuls of 34 was L. Vitellius, father of Otho's successor.

6.2 A Gaio Caesare...substitutus: it is clear from the soldiers' jingle a few lines below that Galba replaced Gaetulicus as legatus of the army of Upper Germany; accordingly, at the end of the lacuna in a Gaio Caesare...lici (or ...licio or ...licis or ...liciiis) some case of the name Gaetulicus is called for. The meaning is clear, though the precise wording can only be a matter of personal preference: the version printed in Ihm's text was suggested by Turnebus in the 16th century; in his apparatus Ihm suggests A Gaio Caesare legatus Germaniae superioris in locum Gaetulici instead of Madvig's A Gaio Caesare in administratione exercitus Germanici. However, Galba was
never "legate of Upper Germany," since Upper Germany did not become a province until the time of Domitian (c. A.D. 90).

Accordingly, since a reference to the post involved is perhaps necessary, I would read here a Gaio Caesare legatus superioris Germaniae exercitus in locum Gaetulici substitutus... For a parallel to the in locum Gaetulici construction, see S. Tib. 4.1.

Gaetulici: Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Gaetulicus took the cognomen (or agnomen; cf. L&S s.v.) by which he was known from his father Cossus Cornelius Lentulus (cos. ord. 1 B.C.), who had defeated the Gaetuli in N. Africa and had been awarded ornamenta triumphalia (Vell. Pat. 2.116.2). Gaetulicus was cos. ord. in A.D. 26 (with C. Calvisius Sabinus) and in 30 was appointed legate of the army of Upper Germany, a post which he held until 39; in 30 his father-in-law L. Apronius was legate of the army of Lower Germany (he held this post from some time in the 20's till 34 at least: cf. Ann. 6.30.2; note also how Velleius contrives flatteringly to mention Gaetulicus and his father-in-law together [2.116.2-3]). Gaetulicus and Apronius both received their appointments during Sejanus' period of maximum influence. Furthermore, Gaetulicus' daughter had been betrothed to Sejanus' son (Ann. 6.30.2) and Sejanus and Gaetulicus may even have been kinsmen (cf. Z. Stewart, AJP 74 [1953] 73 n. 21). The other ordinarius of A.D. 26, C. Calvisius Sabinus, was married to a Cornelia, whom Groag assumes to have been Gaetulicus' sister (PIR² C 354; see table, PIR² II p. 328): Calvisius became governor of Pannonia at some point in the 30's (the date is quite uncertain: for a survey of theories see A. Dob6, Die Verwaltung der römischen Provinz Pannonien von Augustus bis
Diocletianus 26; cf. also W. Reidinger, Die Statthalter des ungeteilten Pannonien und Oberpannoniens von Augustus bis Diokletian 34-35 and R. Syme, Gnomon 29 [1957] 519-520); this appointment may have been part of a process of "rehabilitation" of Seianiani undertaken by Gaius, or it may even, like the postings to Upper and Lower Germany, have gone back to before the fall of Sejanus (cf. Stewart, op. cit. 72-77). However, in 39 Gaius apparently had a change of heart about both Tiberius and the Seianiani and revived the law of maiestas (Dio 59.16.1-8): one of the first to fall was Calvisius Sabinus (Dio 59.18.4: he and his wife committed suicide; cf. Plut. C 12.1-3; H 1.48.2-3). Whether the fall of Calvisius in some way alerted Gaius to a conspiracy against him involving Gaetulicus and others, or whether it caused panic among surviving Seianiani and led to a conspiracy against Gaius, is impossible to discern (cf. Stewart, loc. cit.; Balsdon, Gaius 71-75). At any rate, it appears that Gaius was to be murdered on his arrival in Germany for a campaign which had long been advertised (cf. Balsdon, op. cit. 68-70): his sudden change of plan and dash towards Germany in the late summer of A.D. 39 will have happened as a result of his discovery of the plot (cf. above, 5.1, n. on Agrippinae).

Gaetulicus and his father-in-law L. Apronius had been inefficient administrators and lax disciplinarians and Gaetulicus in particular had been popular with both armies (Ann. 4.72-74.1; 6.30.2; cf. 11.19.1; Dio 59.22.5). In addition, whatever lies behind the improbable-sounding dispatch (attributed by Tacitus to a fama constans: Ann. 6.30.3) allegedly sent by him to Tiberius in A.D. 34, Gaetulicus was certainly aware of the strength of the position he occupied:
Galba

6.2-

hence Gaius' extreme haste and circumspection in dealing with him. Gaetulicus was apparently executed immediately after Gaius' arrival at his camp (cf. S. Calig. 44.1) and news of the suppression of his conspiracy had reached Rome by 27th October, A.D. 39, when the Arval Brethren sacrificed ob detecta nefaria con(silia in C. Germani) cum Cn. Lentuli Gaet(ulici...)."

disce miles militare: Galba est, non Gaetulicus:

the metre is trochaic septenarius, which occurs several times in soldiers' jingles quoted by S., no doubt because of the opportunities for rhythmic chanting and stamping on the march; e.g. DJ 49.4:

Gallias . Caesar subegit, Nicomedes Caesarem:
ecce Caesar nunc triumphat qui subegit Gallias,
Nicomedes non triumphat qui subegit Caesarem.

and DJ 51:
urbani, servate uxores: moechum calvom adducimus.
aurum in Gallia effutuisti, hic sumpsisti mutuum.

6.3 veteranum ac tironem militem opere assiduo

corroboravit: on his arrival on the Rhine for his projected invasion of Germany Gaius was faced with two major problems: besides the conspiracy of Gaetulicus and Lepidus there was the unsatisfactory result of Gaetulicus' disciplinary laxness - the fact that the soldiers of the army of Upper Germany were simply not fit enough to engage in a major campaign. Gaius had summoned considerable forces for the campaigns which he planned in Germany and Britain (S. Calig. 43; Dio [59.22.1] says 200,000 or 250,000 men): his timetable had been altered by the discovery of the conspiracy and he was in Germany much sooner than he had intended. Accordingly, he had time to oversee
6.3-

some hard training during the last months of A.D. 59, so that the army would be ready for active service in the spring of 40. Furthermore, the commanders of the various detachments summoned from distant provinces were lackadaisical about arriving at the rendezvous point (Mainz?) in time. The result therefore was a considerable tightening-up of discipline both among officers and men (S. Calig. 44.1; cf. 48, which may really refer to early discharge: see Balsdon, Gaius 77).

The precise circumstances of Galba's appointment, e.g. whether he went to Germany in Gaius' suite or whether he was summoned from Rome after the execution of Gaetulicus, cannot be determined. However, the strange accounts of Gaius' "campaign" in Germany which we find in our sources (S. Calig. 45; Dio 59.21.3, 22.2) make much better sense if read as accounts of field-days and practice attacks (cf. Balsdon, Gaius 81), all of which accords perfectly with Galba's task as described by S. On these manoeuvres, see further R. W. Davies, Historia 15 (1966) 124-8 and P. Bicknell, Historia 17 (1968) 496-505.

matureque barbaris...coercitis: the fact that marauding Germans were making raids beyond even the military district of Upper Germany into Belgica and possibly also Lugdunensis indicates how serious the weakness of the army of Upper Germany had become. The mere presence of a vigorous commander such as Galba combined with a few "police actions" was no doubt sufficient to suppress the nuisance.

praesenti quoque Gaio: we must assume that Gaius toured
the various army camps in both German provinces and that various displays and field-days were put on to impress the Emperor with the fitness and battle-readiness of the units concerned.

Gaius himself was present in Germany until about the beginning of December, A.D. 39, which can be demonstrated in the following manner: after word reached Rome of the suppression of the conspiracy of Gaetulicus and Lepidus (c. 27th October; cf. AFA), a senatorial mission was sent to congratulate the Emperor and announce to him the award of an ovatio (Dio. 59.23.1-2); Claudius was a member of this embassy and S. speaks of him as having been sent in Germaniam and as praecipitatum quoque in flumen sic ut vestitus advenerat (S. Claud. 9.1, which must refer to the Rhine): given the distance from Rome - to Mainz 871 mp, or to Cologne 946 mp, and the fact that this was a senatorial embassy, we cannot reasonably suppose that it reached Germany in less time than Gaius himself had done, and this was about 46 days (see Balsdon, JRS 24 [1934] 16-17 for detailed calculations); accordingly, if the embassy left Rome on 28th October, it will not have reached Mainz (if that was its destination) before 13th December. By this time Gaius will have been preparing for his move southwards to Lyons where he spent the remainder of the winter of 39-40 (S. Calig. 17.1; Dio 59.24.2-6).

inter innumeratas contractasque ex omnibus provinciis copias: these words are exaggerated in order to enhance the picture of Galba's vigour and efficiency in A.D. 39-40. However, there is no doubt that the forces assembled in Germany in late 39 (and perhaps transferred to Gaul in the spring of 40; but see P. Bicknell, Historia
6.3-
17 [1968] 501-505) were considerable: as we have seen above, Dio suggests 200,000 or 250,000 men (59.22.1), while S. in another passage emphasizes again the size of the force and adds that troops were widely levied on a large scale (Calig. 43: dilectibus ubique acerbissime actis); the brief notices in Tacitus confirm this (Agr. 13.2: ingentes adversus Germaniam conatus; Ger. 37.4: ingentes C. Caesars minae; cf. Aur. Victor Caes. 3.11, Oros. 7.5.5). In his major article in RE XII on "Legio" Ritterling suggested that besides perhaps summoning vexillationes from III Cyrenaica (1508-1509) and XXII Deiotariana (1798 n.**), both from Egypt, and from IV Macedonica from Spain (1551), Gaius also created two new legions, XV Primigenia and XXII Primigenia (RE XII 1244-1249; his arguments in favour of this proposition are clearly summarized by H. M. D. Parker, The Roman Legions 93-95). Balsdon added further arguments in favour of Ritterling's view (JRS 24 [1934] 13-16) and, in spite of Parker's objections (op. cit. 95-98), Ritterling's case seems reasonably secure.

Although nothing came of either the German or the British "expeditions" of Gaius in 39-40, the legionary forces in Germany at the end of his principate were massive:

Lower Germany (commanded by P. Gabinius Secundus): I, V, XX, XXI, XXII.
Upper Germany (commanded by Galba): II, XIII, XIV, XV, XVI.

campestrem decursionem scuto moderatus: it is clear from this passage and from S. Ner. 7.2 that on field manoeuvres and at ceremonial drills the commander of a group of soldiers, moving with the men, would use his shield to signal commands in much the same
way as the drum-major in a military band today uses his staff.

ad essedum imperatoris...cucurrit: there is no suggestion here that Galba had to do this: S. is merely stressing that in his forty-second year Galba was as tough as any legionary. However, elsewhere he tells us that Gaius made senators run behind his chariot as a form of humiliation (Calig.26.2: the reference to quosdam summis honoribus functos may be a generalized version of the Galba story) and, given Gaius' "oriental" predilections, the evidence quoted by Hofstee that this practice was of Persian origin (Plut. Lucull. 21.5; Amm. Marc. 14.11.10; Eutrop. 9.24; Oros 7.25.9 - most of it is much later than the Julio-Claudian period) may be significant. A remarkably similar modern version of this humiliation appeared in the film version of Joseph Heller's antic novel Catch 22.

Caede Gai nuntiata...quietem praetulit: Gaius was assassinated in the early afternoon of 24th January, A.D. 41. As in 44 B.C., the conspirators somewhat naively assumed that with the removal of the tyrant all would automatically be well and that "liberty" would naturally return; accordingly, no candidate for the Principate had been agreed upon. Furthermore, although the consuls Cn. Sentius Saturninus and Q. Pomponius Secundus took care to secure the state treasury and summoned the senate to a meeting in the Capitol (rather than in the "Julian" senate-house), no effort was made to place the leading members of the Imperial family under house arrest, nor was any attempt made to control or placate the praetorian guard (S. Calig. 58, 60; Claud. 10.1-4; Dio 59.30.3; 60.1.1-4). Inevitably, the senate
7.1- Caede Gai...praetulit cont.
could not agree on the form the new government should take, and on
the following day Claudius, who had on the day of the assassination
been carried off to the Praetorian camp by the enraged soldiery
(cf. S. Claud. 10.2: fluctuantis nec quicquam adhuc quam frementis),
hearing that the populace was clamouring for a single ruler and
that his name was being shouted, finally assented to the praetorians'
Oath of allegiance.

We may presume that one of the first acts of the consuls after
Gaius' death was the dispatch of this news to provincial governors.
The message will have reached Moguntiacum by about the end of
January, though Galba may not have been there and his troops may not
have gone into winter quarters at all. The famous "hammered coins of
Hofheim," coins of Gaius defaced presumably on receipt of news of his
murder, are part of the evidence for Ritterling's theory that in the
summer of A.D. 40, after Gaius' departure for Italy, Galba advanced
the frontier of Upper Germany beyond the Rhine and may have wintered
there; for details, see Balsdon, JRS 24 (1934) 14-15 and Gaius 194-195.
The coins also suggest that Gaius was not popular within the army
of Upper Germany: hence S.'s reference here to multis ad occasionem
stimulantibus.

Galba, however, separated from Italy by the Alps and in the
middle of winter (and perhaps sitting in newly-conquered territory),
had no desire to make a move on the basis of what was, no doubt, a
very preliminary and sketchy report. Perhaps he was saved from the
fate of Scribonianus the following year (see below, O 1.2, n. on
motu Camilli) by his desire to see through to a satisfactory conclusion
the business which he had on hand in Germany: in A.D. 41 he defeated
the Chatti, while his colleague in Lower Germany, P. Gabinius
Secundus, won a victory over the Chauci and recovered the last "Varian" eagle in German hands, as a result of all of which Claudius received his first imperatorial salutation (Dio 60.8.7). However, this "offer" to Galba and the similar offers made to Verginius Rufus in 68 (see below p. 106-7) may perhaps explain why Galba put two particularly weak characters - A. Vitellius and Hordeonius Flaccus - in charge of the German provinces in the latter part of 68.

For quies as a political virtue, see Sallust, Hist. 1.95.9M: illa quies et otium cum libertate quae multi proib potius quam laborem cum honoribus capessebant; cf. S. Tib. 15.1; Ann. 14.47.1; Syme, R.R. 504.

per hoc gratissimus Claudio receptusque in cohortem amicorum: perhaps the most striking psychological characteristic of Claudius was his excessive timidity, which affected him from childhood on (Dio 60.2.4; cf. the rather odd expression, perhaps from his early days, quoted at S. Claud. 40.3: λάλει και μὴ θ'γγανει); for example, he always had those who came near him searched, men and women alike, and he never ventured out, even on a social visit, without an excessively large bodyguard (S. Claud. 35; Dio 60.3.2-4). Obviously prudence was necessary, for, as Scramuzza points out (The Emperor Claudius 48), "He was also aware that the Senate's hatred of him was deeper than against his predecessors for the very good reason that he had shattered forever its dream of regaining power." But Claudius clearly carried things to extremes.

A passage in Dio may suggest that names of potential non Julio-Claudian successors to Gaius were actually discussed in the Senate.
on 24-25th January, A.D. 41 (60.3.2, but cf. the "amnesty decree" mentioned at S. Claud. 11.1): if Galba's name was one of these, we should expect Claudius to be exceedingly cautious towards him. But Galba's obvious loyalty and his success in the summer of 41 will have helped to reassure the Princeps. Galba was, however, recalled: the date is not certain - perhaps late 41 or early 42 (cf. Ritterling, Fasti des röm. Deutschland 13-14; Thomasson, Laterculi Praesidum II.1 15)

dilatus sit expeditionis Britannicae dies: the meaning of this expression is far from clear: does it refer to the start of the main expeditionary force in A.D. 43, i.e. the "go" signal for the entire invasion commanded by Aulus Plautius? This seems unlikely: that decision must have been taken some time in A.D. 42, and the soldiers' near-mutiny in the spring (?) of 43 and the necessity of summoning the imperial agent and spokesman Narcissus (Dio 60.19.2-3) will have caused considerable delay (if he was summoned from Rome, as seems likely, the delay may have been as long as two months); the main expedition, therefore, suffered sufficient delays for Galba's illness to be of no consequence.

Is S., then, referring to Claudius' part in the expedition? Presumably yes, but again we must ask if the reference is to Claudius' departure from Rome for the north, or to his departure from Gesoriaecum for England (S. Claud. 17.2; cf. Dio 60.21.2-3). Certainty is impossible, though we may suspect the latter proposition (Claudius' departure from Rome would probably be described as profectio): the delay occasioned by Plautius' "summoning" of Claudius from Rome
7.1-
to take command of the main invasion force (for its crossing of the Thames and march to Camulodunum) and the time necessary for his journey to the north coast of Gaul will have made his crossing of the Channel (late August/early September?) occur uncomfortably close to the time of the equinoctial gales of late September. There was, therefore, by this time need for haste and any delay to allow Galba to recover from even a trivial illness will argue great sollicitude and goodwill on Claudius' part.


_Africam pro consule biennio optiminuit:_ the dates of Galba's proconsulship cannot be calculated precisely. The earliest possible starting date would be July 44, but this would probably presuppose a designation by Claudius prior to his departure for Britain in 43, which is unlikely, since Claudius took Galba with him and did not, of course, then know how long they would be away. Furthermore, since Dio says (60.23.1) that Claudius returned to Rome in 44 after an absence of six months, the later after July 1st 43 we consider Claudius to have left Rome for Britain, the later after January 1st 44 will be his arrival in Rome again. As Thomasson points out (Die Statthalter...Nordafrikas II 33), it is likely that the lottery for the proconsulships of 44/45 had taken place by the time Claudius returned. Given the peculiarities of Galba's appointment (see next n.), the Emperor was almost certainly involved
7.1-
in his "election." Finally, his appointment appears to have been in response to specific troubles and was probably made in a hurry: a designation more than a short time before his departure for Africa, therefore, would seem to be excluded. Accordingly, 45 is the earliest likely date for the start of Galba's proconsulship.

extra sortem electus ad ordinandum provinciam...
inquietam: since the proconsulship in Africa of Q. Marcius Barea Soranus (cos. suff. 34) can be firmly dated to 41 (-43, at least; cf. Thomasson, Die Statthalter...Nordafrikas II 31-32) and since it is possible that L. Salvius Otho (cos. suff. 33) was proconsul in 40/41 (Thomasson, op. cit. 33-34), it looks as if Galba may have been unlucky in the sortitions for Africa and Asia. extra sortem electus implies interference by Claudius (cf. Dio 60.25.6), and this was not without precedent: for example, in A.D. 21 Tiberius had urged the senate, because of disturbances in Africa, to choose (iudicio...
patrum deligendum) a vir militaris as proconsul; the senators responded by asking the Emperor to pick someone suitable; Tiberius demurred and suggested two individuals, one of whom subsequently withdrew (Ann. 3.32 and 35; cf. Syme, JRS 45 [1955] 25-26).

Of the two reasons given here for Claudius' interference, the second, barbarorum tumultus, is perhaps the more straightforward: this upheaval appears not to have been confined to the province of Africa proconsularis nor even to Africa and Numidia. It was an outbreak of the Musulamii (Aur.Vict. Caes 4.2), perhaps the most troublesome to Rome of the nomadic tribes of North Africa; they were one of the Gaetulian peoples (cf. R. Syme, "Tacfarinas, the Musulamii and Thubursicu" in Studies in Roman Economic and Social
7.1- extra sortem electus... inquietam cont.

History in honor of A. C. Johnson (Princeton, 1951) 113-130, esp. 115, 119). The murder by Gaius of King Ptolemy of Mauretania in 40 (Dio 59.25.1; in Lyons? cf. J. Carcopino, "La mort de Ptolemée" in Mélanges Ernout [Paris, 1940] 39-50) occasioned a rebellion in that territory which was suppressed only after campaigning in 41 and 42, as a result of which Mauretania was annexed and divided into two provinces (Dio 60.8.6; 60.9.1-6). The upheaval in Mauretania apparently spread to Numidia and it was with this that Galba had to deal. (For the territory of the Musulamii, cf. Syme, op. cit. 115: "the wide expanses of the Numidian plateau, plain and rolling country, southeastward from the territory of Cirta and northeastward from the Aurès Mountains extending across the Algerian border into Tunisia.") The fact that he was subsequently awarded the ornamenta triumphalia (below, G 8.1) confirms that he engaged in a military campaign, and this brings us to S.'s first reason for his appointment to Africa - intestina dissensio. This is usually ascribed to difficulties of administration following the division of powers in the province of Africa imposed by Gaius in A.D. 39 between the proconsul Africæ and the legatus of legio III Augusta (cf. Pallu de Lessert, Fastes des provinces africaines I 125; P. Romanelli, Storia delle province romane dell'Africa 264-66; the sources for this division are H 4.48 and Dio 59.20.7, admirably discussed by Thomasson in Die Statthalter... Nordafrikas I 10-11; cf. 82-83). Galba's obvious resumption of full powers, including command of legio III Augusta, can have been a temporary expedient at best, since Gaius' system was clearly reintroduced after Galba's departure; why, therefore, does S. give us the firm ordinavitque here? The suspicion naturally arises that the intestina dissensio involved something
other than the division of powers. In a recent study T. F. Carney has examined the far-reaching administrative consequences of Claudius' re-organization of the grain supply of the city of Rome ("The Emperor Claudius and the Grain Trade," in Pro Munere Grates: Studies presented to H. L. Gonin [Pretoria, 1971] 39-57): one major change was that tribute grain from the "bread-basket" provinces (except Egypt and, therefore, involving principally Africa), previously the main source of revenue for the senate's treasury, came increasingly under the oversight of imperial agents; this included attempts to improve the efficiency of the collection at source (cf. the case of Umbonius Silo: Dio 60.24.5) and the incorporation of the means of collection into the imperial administration. Carney mentions Galba's posting to Africa (op. cit. 47-48) but does not specifically connect it with changes in the grain administration in that province; however, this could well explain S.'s blunt ordinavit: the Emperor's nominee oversees the transfer of the grain collection and deals with any difficulties which arise. (It is probably just coincidence that the anecdote which S. relates below to illustrate Galba's severitas deals with annona!)

Galba also, of course, had a family connection with the grain trade, since the largest granaries in Rome, the Horrea Sulpicia, were apparently founded by a Servius Sulpicius Galba (either cos. 144 B.C. or cos. 108 B.C.; cf. CIL VI 31617). According to G. Rickman (Roman Granaries and Store Buildings 165-68) the name of the Emperor Galba is closely connected with these horrea (op. cit. 166 and nn. 4, 5) and they were his private property when he became Emperor (cf. CIL VI 33743 [= 8680], dated to late 68, which speaks of horriorum (sic) Ser. Galbae Imp. Augusti: note the possessive genitive rather
7.1-7.2

than a descriptive adjective such as Galbana, which did, in fact, become attached to them later). From both the military and financial/commercial point of view, therefore, Galba was an excellent choice for this job.

For a full but somewhat speculative account of Galba's (and Claudius') policies in N. Africa, see further M. Le Glay, "Une dédicace à Venus offerte à 'Caesarea' (Chercel) par le futur empereur Galba" in Mélanges Carcopino (Paris, 1966) 629-640; cf., however, the cautionary comments of A. Degrassi in ArchClass 18 (1966).

ordinavitque magna severitatis ac iustitiae cura
etiam in parvulis rebus: the first anecdote illustrates Galba's magna severitatis cura and the latter his magna iustitiae cura.
The story of the soldier and his rations (see next n.) is absurd and reveals complete ignorance of how the military commissariat operated - not that this would prevent such a nonsense from circulating (cf. the popular belief in the "curse" which is supposed to have struck down those who excavated the tomb of Tut-ankh-amun). Superficial plausibility, plus a grain of truth (in this case, Galba's known toughness), is all that is necessary in such cases.

7.2 militi qui...residuum cibariorum tritici modium centum
denariis vendidisse arguebatur: the provision of free rations was not a perquisite of service in the Roman army. This can most clearly be seen in the accounts of Nero's rewards to the praetorians in A.D. 65 after the detection of Piso's conspiracy: addiditque sine pretio frumentum, quo ante ex modo annonae utebantur (Ann. 15.72.1); cf. S. Ner. 10.1: frumentum menstruum gratuitum. The soldier had to
pay for his rations and money was stopped out of his salary for this purpose; cf. Pap.Gen. Lat. 1, Recto 1 (= MW 405), which lists salary accounts for two soldiers in Egypt for the three pay periods of A.D. 81: in each period there is a deduction of 80 dr. in victum. Furthermore, in Tacitus' account of the Pannonian mutiny of A.D. 14, the failure of Percennius to mention deductions for food as one of the soldiers' grievances (Ann. 1.17.4) does not entitle us to assume that food was free at this time (pace Koestermann, ad loc.); rather, its payment was absolutely routine and the complaints were about irregular expenses (cf. N. P. Miller, ad loc.; G. R. Watson, The Roman Soldier 103-4).

Since the soldier paid for his rations, presumably he became their legal owner and what he did with them thereafter was no one's business but his own; hence the absurdity of this anecdote.

vetuit..a quoquam opem ferri; et is fame extabuit: however, the point of the story is that in matters of military discipline, Galba had the reputation of being fully as strict as, for example, Corbulo; on whom cf. Ann. 13.35.9: nec enim, ut in aliis exercitibus, primum alterumque delictum venia prosequebatur, sed qui signa reliquerat, statim capite poenas luebat.


cum de proprietate iumenti...ad quem sponte se a potu recepisset: at first sight this looks like a familiar kind of folk
tale. However, it turns out to have no parallel anywhere (see Stith Thompson, Motif Index of Folk-Literature [revised ed. 1966], Vol. 4, Sections J 1170 and 1171, for stories with some similarities); it may even be true.

8.1 *ornamenta triumphalia:* these were invented by Augustus as a substitute for a triumph for those who had achieved signal victories but who were his legati and therefore not suis auspiciis. Precisely when they began to be bestowed is not clear: L. Cornelius Balbus celebrated on 27th March, 19 B.C. the last triumph awarded to a general who was not a member of the ruling house; Mommsen, comparing S. Tib. 9.2 with Dio 54.31.4, suggested (Staatsr. I 346 n. 1) that Tiberius was the first to receive the *ornamenta triumphalia* - in 12 B.C.; however, L. R. Taylor argued (JRS 26 [1936] 168-170) that, by a combination of S. Tib. 9.2 and Vell. Pat. 2.122.1, a case could be made for Tiberius having received the *ornamenta* in 20 B.C., after his expedition to Armenia (cf. Dio 54.9.5: a *supplicatio* frequently preceded a triumph). Mommsen's example seems certain, but Taylor's, though perhaps less likely, cannot be ruled out.

The *ornamenta* consisted of the right to wear triumphal garb - the *tunica palmata* and the *toga picta* (pace Taylor, op. cit. 170, the *toga praetexta* was worn at Claudius' British triumph by the generals who had been awarded the *ornamenta* simply to avoid their being as splendidly attired as the Emperor himself; see S. Claud. 17. 2-3) and a laurel crown - on public occasions and at the games. (Triumphantal garb is depicted on several Augustan *denarii* from a
8.1-
Spanish mint: see BMC Imp. I cxi, pp. 69-70 and plates 8.20 and 9.1-2). Furthermore, from 2 B.C. at least, a bronze statue of the recipient of these ornamenta was set up before the temple of Mars Ultor in the Forum Augusti (Dio 55.10.4; cf. Pliny, NH 35.27.1).
See further Boršák, RE XVIII 1121-2, s.v. 'Ornamenta triumphalia'; C. Barini, Triumphalia 22-26.

sacerdotium triplex, inter quindecimviro sodalesque
Titios item Augustales cooptatus: the word cooptatus may, strictly speaking, be applicable only to the sodales Titii, though we have no positive evidence about the manner of their selection; however, under the Principate the XVviri and the Augustales were "elected" by the Senate with the Emperor able to commend candidates (cf. Dio 51.20.3; Ann. 3.19.1; Mommsen, Staatsr. II 1109-1113).

The quindecimviri sacris faciundis looked after the Sibylline Books in the Capitoline temple of Jupiter and possessed general oversight of all foreign cults in Rome. They are fairly well attested throughout the Republic: duumviri originally, they became decemviri in the Licinian-Sextian period, half patrician and half plebeian, and their number reached fifteen during the last century B.C., perhaps during Sulla's dictatorship and as part of a reorganization following the destruction of the temple in July, 83 B.C. (cf. above, G 2, n. on ut qui...semper ascripserit) and loss of the Sibylline Books. During the Principate, the name quindecimviri remained, though in the Acta of the Ludi Saeculares of 17 B.C., a total of 21 names is mentioned. For detailed information, see further A. A. Boyce, 'The Development of the Decemviri Sacris
8.1- sacerdotium triplex...cooptatus cont.

Faciundis", TAPA 69 (1938) 161-187; M. W. Hoffman Lewis, The Official Priests of Rome under the Julio Claudians 48-56, 86-91, 102-107; more generally, Radke, RE XXIV 1114-1148 s.v. 'Quindecimviri' no. 1; Wissowa, RK 534-543; Latte, RR 160-161; 397-398; Ogilvie, Commentary on Livy Books 1-5 654-655.

For the sodales Titii and Augustales, see Ann. 1.54.1 and H 2.95.1; according to Tacitus, the Augustales were modelled on the sodales Titii, but on the origins in the regal period of the latter he is quite uncertain: ut quondam T. Tatius retinendis Sabinorum sacris sodales Titios instituerat (Ann.); cf. Augustales...quod sacerdotium, ut Romulus Tatio regi, ita Caesar Tiberius Iuliae genti sacravit (H). The sodales Titii may have had a connection with augury (cf. Varro, Ling. 5.85) but the College had probably fallen into complete desuetude by the late Republic. The date of its restoration by Augustus, its size, organization and functions are all unknown. See further M. W. Hoffman Lewis, op. cit. 113-4, esp. 114 n. 11, 136-8, 155-9; Kornemann, RE IV 383; Glaser, RE IV A 2473-6; Weinstock, RE VI A 1538-1540.

About the sodales Augustales we are somewhat better informed: the college was founded in A.D. 14 and consisted of 21 members, drawn from the most distinguished families in Rome, plus four members extra ordinem from the Imperial house; the number of members rose gradually till there were 28 all told in the 2nd century A.D. With the deification of Claudius in 54, the college became known as the Sodales Augustales Claudiales (and after the year of the four emperors, new sodalititates were created for the various rulers or houses; e.g. Flaviales, Hadrianales, Antoniniani). Its activities
were directed by three magistri and it ranked almost with the four major colleges of priests. See further M. W. Hoffman Lewis, op. cit. 116-7, 133-6, 155-9; Kornemann, RE IV 383; Wissowa RK² 345; Latte, RR 318 n.1; Strasburger, RE Suppl. VII 1219-20.

From the wording of this sentence in S., it looks very much as if Galba was not "co-opted" into any of these priesthoods until after his return from Africa (c. 47, pace Mrs. Hoffman Lewis, who suggests [op. cit. 52 n.34] that Galba may have become a quindecimvir before 29 "because he was a favorite of Livia"!).

*atque ex eo tempore prope ad medium Neronis principatum in secessu plurimum vixit...decies sestertium in auro efferret:* if we accept that Galba returned to Rome from Africa in 47 at the earliest (cf. Thomasson, *Die Statthalter...Nordafrikas II* 33), the honours and decorations bestowed on him thereafter will probably fall in 47-48. If they seem somewhat lavish, we should also remember that he was a patrician of old republican antecedents and a close friend of Claudius (cf. above, 7.1, esp. n. on dilatus sit expeditionis Britannicae dies), but this makes it all the more surprising that suddenly thereafter Galba should simply drop out of affairs until c. 59-60, when he was offered and accepted the government of Hispania Tarraconensis.

The obvious fact that he feared for his life during this period gives us the clue to the cause of his eclipse - Agrippina, who wormed her way into Claudius' affections during the latter part of 48, after Messalina's execution (Ann. 12.3-5); and after her marriage to Claudius early in 49 she exercised total control (Ann. 12.7.3: versa ex eo civitas, et cuncta feminae oboediebant). From this time
on Galba clearly made himself as unobtrusive as possible, which was simply common prudence, for Agrippina was a good hater with a long memory; we can assume that Galba's resistance to her earlier overtures and the public humiliation which she had received from his mother-in-law (above, 5.1) will have rankled for years. In addition, the list of her victims is impressive: Lollia Paulina (Ann. 12.22), Domitia Lepida (Ann. 12.64-65; cf. above 5.1, n. on correpta iurgio atque etiam pulsata sit a matre Lepidae), Claudius himself (? - Ann. 12.66-67), M. Iunius Silanus (Ann. 13.1.1-2) and the freedman Narcissus (Ann. 13.1.3) all lost their lives, while many others were exiled, although we do not know the full total of these lesser victims.

However, it is notable that soon after Agrippina's death in March, 59 (see below, O 3.1, n. on die, quem necandae matris Nero desinarat), Nero restored from exile Junia Calvina and Calpurnia and the ex-praetors Valerius Capito and Licinius Gabolus (Ann. 14.12.3; cf. 12.22.3). Accordingly, Galba's return to favour in 59-60 is fully consistent with Nero's behaviour at that time.

Hispania Tarraconensis: this province was in A.D. 60 the largest of the three Spanish provinces since it comprised the whole of northern and eastern Spain and a sizable part of central Spain also - in total well over half of the Iberian peninsula. In 197 B.C. when two praetorian commands were created for Hispania Citerior and Hispania Ulterior, Roman holdings in Spain consisted of little more than a 400 mile long coastal strip, reaching a little way south of Carthago Nova with two strong points at Carthago Nova and
8.1- *Hispania Tarraconensis* cont.

Tarraco (Citerior), and southern Spain including the valley of the Baetis (Ulterior). Bitter and fairly constant warfare from 197 to 177 and more peaceful progress thereafter led to a slow but steady extension of the territory under Roman control and by 154 B.C. the limit of Roman authority was, roughly, a line running in a N.-E. direction from the mouth of the Baetis to the middle of the Pyrenees. At the end of the wars of 154-133 B.C. (on which, in part, see above 2.2 nn.) Roman power had advanced to a line running somewhat unevenly from the mouth of the Tagus to the western end of the Pyrenees. The two provinces steadily increased in size, but by 133 Citerior was almost twice the size of Ulterior, and even before the conquest of the remaining mountainous triangle in the northwest (Callaecia, Asturia and Cantabria) by Augustus and his lieutenants during the years 28-19 B.C., the need for a re-organization of the provinces had become increasingly obvious. The original area of Ulterior was more cut off from the interior than was the original area of Citerior, which had the valleys of the Sucro and the Iberus as means of access to the central plateau, from which the valleys of the Durius and the Tagus led to the west coast.

In 27 B.C. therefore (Dio 53.12.4-5) Augustus divided Spain into three provinces and the peaceful and urbanized Ulterior (cf. Strabo 3.2.15; Pliny, *NH* 3.7-17), reduced once more to almost its original size, was handed over to the senate and renamed Baetica. The western part of the remainder of the Iberian peninsula became the imperial province of Lusitania, and the central and eastern part, the former Citerior, was renamed *Hispania Tarraconensis*: it too remained under the control of the princeps. This arrangement was not entirely
8.1- **Hispania Tarracoensis** cont.
satisfactory since the "northwestern triangle" was divided between Lusitania (Callaecia and Asturia) and Tarracoensis (Cantabria); furthermore, Lusitania south of the Durius had by the time of Augustus become more or less peaceful and required comparatively little in the way of a garrison. At about the end of the 1st century B.C., therefore, a further re-organization took place and the recently conquered areas of Callaecia and Asturia were transferred to Tarracoensis, so that after the time of Augustus Lusitania was governed by a praetorian legate commanding only units of auxilia: the essential differences between Lusitania and the rest of the Iberian peninsula are still reflected in the modern distinction between Portugal and Spain. A small part of eastern Baetica was also added to Tarracoensis.

This re-arrangement left Tarracoensis as a large, rather amorphous province, with the coastal regions civilized and urbanised, the interior making rapid strides towards romanization (by the time of Augustus' death the province contained 11 citizen colonies, of which 7 were on or near the coast; for details see Kornemann, RE IV 511-588, nos. 88-92, 182-187), and with the northwest still untamed and prone to violent outbreaks. Strabo (3.4.20) outlines a system of government which apparently existed in Tarracoensis under the earlier Julio-Claudians: the consular legatus Caesaris had three legions and three legati legionis serving under him; two legions under one of the legati controlled the area from the Durius to the eastern side of Asturia; the third legion under another of the legati looked after Cantabria; the third legatus looked after the administration of the togati inhabitants of the interior. Finally, the governor spent the winter, based on Tarraco and Carthago Nova, seeing to the administration of justice on the Mediterranean coast;
8.1 **Hispania Tarraconensis** cont.

In the summer he travelled round the province exercising a general oversight of the administration. In addition to his military personnel the governor of Tarraconensis also had *legati iuridici*, who assisted the legionary legates with civil administration in the areas under their control: these were doubtless withdrawn as the legionary legates found themselves able to devote less time to purely military affairs and more to civil government. By the later Julio-Claudian period, it had proved possible to withdraw two of the three legions (but see below 9.1, n. on *paulatim in desidiam segnitiamque conversus est*), and Pliny (NH 3.18-28) describes Tarraconensis as being divided into seven *conventus*, or assize districts (cf. OLD s.v. 4(b)), based on the towns of Carthago Nova, Tarraco, Caesaraugusta, Clunia, Asturica, Lucus Augusti, and Bracara: this indicates that pacification and romanization had proceeded rapidly, even in the northwest. Also, there were in the province *procuratores*, financial officials appointed by the princeps (cf. G 9.2; Plut. Galba 4.1).


On economic life under the late Republic and early principate, cf. Justin 44.1.5-6; Schulten, RE VIII 2040-2042; J. J. van Nostrand in ESAR III 119-224; M. P. Charlesworth, *Trade Routes and Commerce of the Roman Empire* (1926) 150-167; T. A. Rickard, "The Mining of the Romans in Spain," JRS 18 (1928) 129-143; L. C. West,
Hispania Tarraconensis oblata est: since we know the name of no governor of Hispania Tarraconensis from A.D. 41-60, it is impossible to say why Nero decided to offer this province specifically to the now "rehabilitated" Galba (see above, n. on atque ex eo tempore...in auro efferret). He may have calculated that, although well past his prime, Galba would still be enough of a disciplinarian to lick the somewhat idle Spanish legions (in 60, VI Victrix and X Gemina) back into reasonable shape (though, in the event, Galba may possibly have been too enthusiastic: see below, 9.1, n. on paulatim in desidiam segniamque conversus est.)

In general, the standards of provincial government do not seem to have been particularly high at any point during the Principate of Nero; for an examination of this question, see P. A. Brunt Latomus 18 (1959) 531-559, espec. 554-559: his main conclusion is that "even the early part of Nero's reign hardly deserves the praise sometimes bestowed on its provincial administration" (554). See also H. I. Bell, "The Economic Crisis in Egypt under Nero," JRS 28 (1938) 1-8; P. A. Brunt, "Charges of Provincial Maladministration under the Early Principate," Historia 10 (1961) 189-227, esp. 225-6 (no record survives of any trial for misgovernment in the provinces after 61); and, with rather more special pleading, B. Baldwin, "Executions, Trials and Punishment in the Reign of Nero," PP 22 (1967) 425-439, esp. 439.
8.2-9.1

8.2 duodecim secures, haud ambiguum summæ imperii signum: what was the summa imperii? Obviously the Principate, which is what the previous part of this paragraph suggests. And this, in turn, implies that 12 lictors bearing fasces with axes normally accompanied a Princeps (outside Rome, presumably, from the reference to axes). Dio's statement (54.10.5) that in 19 B.C. Augustus received consularis potestas, ὥστε καὶ ταῖς δώδεκα ἕβδους ἑξῆς καὶ πανταχοῦ χορήγατο, would seem to confirm this idea, especially the word πανταχοῦ. Domitian's use of 24 lictors (Dio 67.4.3) will represent a major departure from Augustan practice. (On this see Mommsen, Staatsr. I 3 387-8). However, E. S. Staveley has more recently argued (Historia 12 [1963] 458-484, esp. 478-484) that Augustus had 24 lictors outside the city and twelve inside and that Domitian's change merely reflected his desire as a victorious commander to appear before the senate domi with the insignia to which he was entitled militiae. This passage in S., of which Staveley appears to be unaware, would seem to tell against his theory; furthermore, his own comment on the idea that Augustus had 24 lictors militiae ("On this last point, of course, evidence is almost completely lacking" - op. cit. 483) is one word too long; see also Dio 54.1.3.

As legatus Caesaris pro praetore in Spain, Galba was entitled to five lictors (cf. Dio 53.13.8; Mommsen, Staatsr. I 3 385-6; 388).

9.1 Per octo annos: the length of time an imperial legate served as a provincial governor depended entirely on the Princeps. The most extreme example of this occurs under Tiberius, whose practice is described by Tacitus (Ann. 1.80.1): morum Tiberii fuit, continuare
imperia ac plerosque ad finem vitae in isdem exercitibus aut iurisdictionibus habere; in A.D. 11 C. Poppaeus Sabinus, grandfather of Otho's (and Nero's) wife Poppaea, became governor of Moesia; in 15 Achaea and Macedonia were added to his command (Ann. 1.80.1) and he seems to have died in his province at the end of 35 (cf. Ann. 6.39.3).

varie et inaequabiliter provinciam rexit: the anecdotes about Galba's conduct in Spain all emphasize his cruelty (cf. G 10.5 below also); this would appear to reflect a source used by S., which was basically hostile to Galba (Cluvius Rufus, according to G. B. Townend, AJP 85 [1964] 367-8).

nummulario non ex fide versanti pecunias: this phrase makes the function of a nummularius perfectly clear: he is a money-changer (not a money-lender, as Rolfe inexplicably has it in the Loeb translation; see, for example, Petron. Sat. 56; Mart. 10.57.7-8; Apul. Met. 10.9). Such people sometimes worked for the state mints, helping to put fresh issues of coinage into circulation by exchanging new money for old (cf. Mattingly, BMC Imp. I lix and n.5); other nummularii were in business for themselves, changing gold and silver coins into smaller denominations for everyday use. In addition, since coins of small denomination were minted in different areas of the Empire (see Mattingly, op. cit. xxii-xxiv) and would be accepted in a specific place only if they were familiar, the services of the nummularius would be required by travellers and traders. The opportunities for cheating and unjust self-enrichment were
considerable and Galba obviously decided to make an example of this man.

See also, R. Herzog, *RE* XVII 1415-156, s.v. 'Nummularius'; for details of the so-called *Tesserae Nummulariae* under the Republic, see most conveniently Degrassi, *ILLRP* nos. 987-1063.

*tutorem*, quod pupillum...veneno necasset: *tutela* was the commonest type of guardianship in Roman law. The general principle was that every male who was *sui iuris*, (i.e. in no one's *potestas*) and under the age of puberty had to have a guardian (*tutor*); all females, who were not in anyone's *potestas*, had to have a guardian, no matter what their age (though with the passage of time this stern principle was modified considerably in practice). A guardian could be, and usually was, appointed by will; if none were appointed, then the nearest *agnatus* automatically became the guardian; if no *agnatus* were available, the authorities would appoint a guardian. For details of *tutela* see Gaius, *Inst*. 1.142-196; Buckland, *Textbook* 3 142-167; J. A. Crook, *Law and Life of Rome* 113-116.

It was customary where an infant child was named as heir in a will to name a substitute heir as well, in case, after inheriting, the child did not survive to an age when he himself could make a will, i.e. till puberty. This is known as *substitutio pupillaris*; see further, Buckland, *op. cit.* 302-4; Crook, *op. cit.* 121-2. This process is discussed also by Gaius (Inst. 2.179-184), who states that to protect the ward against foul play by the substitute heir, the name of the latter was customarily sealed up in tablets separate
from those containing the will, with instructions that these were not to be opened while the son was still alive and below the age of puberty (2.181). In the case cited here by S., it would seem that the father was both careless and foolish - he let the name of his substitute heir be known and made that man his son's guardian.

implorantique leges et civem Romanum se testificanti: S. does not seem to doubt the man's guilt. Furthermore, there is no suggestion that Galba was acting ultra vires; rather, this is a particularly clear example of how Galba was in coercendis quidem delictis vel immодicus, because crucifixion was always regarded as a servile supplicium. However, there does not seem to have been a law forbidding its use on citizens, though perhaps the murderer here thought otherwise. For comment on this case see especially P. Garnsey, "The Lex Iulia and Appeal under the Empire," JRS 56 (1966) 167-189, esp. 175-6; cf. A. N. Sherwin-White, Roman Society and Roman Law in the New Testament 62; on the other hand, A. H. M. Jones (Studies in Roman Government and Law 56) regards Galba as exceeding his powers here.

We are still faced with the problem of the meaning of implorantique leges: is it simply a reference to supposed (but non-existent) laws forbidding the crucifixion of citizens, or did the man actually try against to appeal his conviction and sentence? It seems clear that the Lex Iulia de vi publica (of uncertain date - perhaps Augustan, possibly Republican) has nothing to do with this case; cf. Paulus, Sent. 5.26.2: Hac lege (sc. L. Iulia) excipiuntur, qui artem ludicram faciunt, iudicati etiam et confessi... Iudicati means iure lege
damnati (see Garnsey, op. cit. 173). Furthermore, the whole question of appeal under the early Principate has been a matter of lively debate in recent years; see the works mentioned above and also A. H. M. Jones, "Imperial and Senatorial Jurisdiction in the Early Principate" in Studies in Roman Government and Law 67-98; it is essentially Jones' view which Garnsey criticizes in JRS 56 (1966) 167-189 (mentioned above) and in "The Criminal Jurisdiction of Governors," JRS 58 (1968) 51-59. Garnsey's conclusions are that the distinction commonly drawn between provocatio and appellatio (e.g. in OCD² s.v. 'provocatio') is chimerical (cf. JRS 56 [1966] 167 and n.1; the real distinction is to be seen in Livy 8.33.7: tribunos plebis appello et provoc ad populum). Secondly, since an appeal from a governor's sentence depended on the willingness of the governor himself to forward the appeal to Rome, "in practice, the efficacy of appeal depended on the discretion of the governor" (Garnsey, JRS 56 (1966) 167; cf. 189. See further Garnsey's book Social Status and Legal Privilege in the Roman Empire [Oxford, 1970] 70-71, 82-85, 267-271). However, the details of the present case are too unclear to permit a firm conclusion: Galba may or may not have possessed the right to refuse an appeal against his sentence; what is clear, though, is that he certainly possessed the power to do so.

paulatim in desidiam segniamque conversus est: was it merely advancing age which caused Galba to become slacker as the years went by? The only event in Spain (apart from the material above) about which we have definite information is the transfer of
9.1-
Legio X Gemina to Pannonia (Carnuntum) in about 63 (for details see Ritterling, RE XII 1680; cf. H. M. D. Parker, The Roman Legions 137): this legion replaced XV Apollinaris which was transferred to Corbulo in the East. We must ask ourselves, however, why it was from Spain that a legion was drawn to make up the complement in Pannonia. Probably the tranquillity of the province and its rapid Romanization contributed most to this decision but Galba may have interpreted it as a warning that his excessive vigour was regarded with some suspicion in Rome. We might therefore say that he "took the hint" and so avoided the fate which befell Corbulo in 66.
The Revolt of Vindex and the Fall of Nero
(9.2-11.)

Introduction: In these chapters S. describes the revolt of Vindex from the point of view of Galba in Spain; similarly, in Ner. 40.1-49.4 he describes events from the point of view of Nero in Italy. Given this strictly biographical approach, important details about events in Gaul and elsewhere are inevitably lacking. For a balanced historical account of these events we must, therefore, supplement S. extensively from other sources. What Tacitus calls the bellum Neronis (H 2.27.2) has, in recent years, almost become for the history of the early Principate what the Peace of Callias has been for Athenian history in the fifth century B.C. - the problem which no one can leave alone, and which no one can solve to the satisfaction of even a majority of interested students of the period. The following are the main papers bearing on this problem which have appeared in the last quarter-century or so: C. M. Kraay, "The Coinage of Vindex and Galba, A.D. 68, and the Continuity of the Augustan Principate," NC 9 (1949) 129-149; H. Mattingly, "Verginius at Lugdunum?" NC 14 (1954) 32-39; G. E. F. Chilver, "The Army in Politics," JRS 47 (1957) 29-35; M. Raoss, "La rivolta di Vindice ed il successo di Galba" Epigraphica 20 (1958) 46-120; 22 (1960) 37-151; P. A. Brunt, "The Revolt of Vindex and the Fall of Nero" Latomus 18 (1959) 531-559; J. B. Hainsworth, "Verginius and Vindex," Historia 11 (1962) 86-96; J. B. Hainsworth, "The Starting-point of Tacitus' Historiae: Fear or Favour by Omission?" G&R 11 (1964) 128-136;
9.2-11 The Revolt of Vindex & The Fall of Nero: Introduction, cont.


P. A. Brunt has made a good case (Latomus 18 [1959] 553-8) for the proposition that by A.D. 68 almost all provinces were badly misgoverned. Their inhabitants were probably desperate and felt that, no matter what happened, they could hardly be worse off than they were already. In Gaul, therefore, many were ready to rise against Nero, probably for the reason stated by C. Julius Vindex, the governor of Gallia Lugdunensis and of Gallic birth himself, when he raised the standard of revolt early in A.D. 68: οἵ τινες τῶν 'Ρωμαίων οἰκουμένης σεσύλημεν (sc. Nero: Dio 63.22.3).

This immediately raises the question of the true aims of the revolt of Vindex. The old view, that Nero was unimportant and that Vindex wished to detach Gaul from the Roman Empire, has little scholarly support today. It was essentially the view of H. Schiller cf. his Gesch. des Röm. Kaiserreichs unter der Regierung des Nero (1872) 261-276, followed by Hardy, Studies in Roman History (2nd Series), 133-141; Henderson, The Life and Principate of the Emperor Nero, 395-405, (on 496-7 Henderson gives a summary of the 19th century controversy on this point); Momigliano, CAH X 739; Syme too (Tacitus 461-3) seems to incline, to some extent, to the old view: "a senator from Gaul was still a native dynast" (461); "... the protest against the tyranny of Nero at once took the form of a
9.2-11 The Revolt of Vindex & the Fall of Nero: Introduction, cont.
native insurrection against the Roman power, recalling Julius Florus
and Julius Sacrovir, chieftains of the Treveri and Aedui, who raised
war in Gaul in the days of Tiberius Caesar... And Vindex did not stand
alone. The notables were with him, bound by ties of tradition, class,
and family, and bringing their host of clients" (462). Mommsen was of
a different opinion and argued that Vindex wished to re-establish the
old Republic ("Der letzte Kampf der römischen Republik," Hermes 13
(1878) 95-105 = Ges. Schr. IV 333-353). However, as Kraay has pointed
out, (NC Vol.9 (1949) 138-9), Republican and Imperial conceptions of
libertas were diametrically opposed: for Cicero (Rep. 2.23.43) libertas
non in eo est ut justo utamur domino sed nullo, while under the
Principate, after the "restoration of the Republic" in 27 B.C., libertas
was an imperial virtue: for Tacitus (H 1.1) it is a rara temporum
felicitas, when sentire quae velis et quae sentias dicere licet. Thus
Augustus could put on his coins a legend such as LIBERTATIS PR VINDEX
(RIC I Augustus, 10). And one may argue that, according to these
concepts of libertas and of the res publica, the replacement of a bad
Princeps by one who would re-establish the Augustan model could be
regarded as a "restoration of the Republic", but this, of course, is
not what Mommsen was talking about.

However, the prevailing view today is that Vindex, as a Roman
senator, wished to overthrow Nero and replace him by a suitable
candidate, and that, as far as he (though not necessarily all his
followers) was concerned, there was nothing but a Roman patriotism
involved (cf. Brunt, op. cit. 543-553). Dio (63.22.3-6) gives us a
purported speech of Vindex to the assembled leaders of Gaul in which
he says that they should revolt because Nero τὸ ἄνθος τῆς βουλῆς
αὐτῶν ἀπολύλεμεν. Later in this speech Vindex asks: εἶτα τις
9.2-11 The Revolt of Vindex & The Fall of Nero: Introduction, cont.

tὸν τοιοῦτον Καῖσαρα καὶ αὐτοκράτορα καὶ Αὔγουστον δυνάσει; μηδὲις· μηδὲις ὑβριζέτω τὰ ἑρᾶ ἐκεῖνα δύνατα. He concludes: ἐπικουρήσατε δὲ τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις, ἐλευθερώσατε δὲ πᾶσαν τὴν οἰκουμένην. We must of course ask ourselves whether or not Dio is simply writing romantic fiction here; this question can be answered easily by reference to material in our other sources. When S. (10.1, below) describes Galba's adhesion to the revolt, we learn that in his speech Galba deploravit temporum statum, which is essentially what Dio has given us; similarly S. tells us (Ner. 41.1) that in one of his edicts Vindex referred to Nero as Ahenobarbus: the implication here, which exactly matches Dio's comment, is that Nero is no Caesar and should be replaced.

Furthermore, Pliny the Elder writing within a very few years of A.D. 68 described Vindex as adsertor ille a Nerone libertatis (NH 20.160), which I would interpret in the same general context as the request from Vindex to Galba ut humano generi assertorem ducemque se accommodaret (G 9.2; the language both here and in Pliny, NH 20.160 is that of manumission in Roman Law; see further below, 9.2, n. on humano generi assertorem). Accordingly, there need be little doubt as to the view of the revolt of Vindex taken by our literary sources writing between the seventies and the 3rd century A.D.

There is also numismatic evidence in the coinage of A.D. 68, which has been carefully analysed by C. M. Kraay (NC 9 [1949] 129-149; there is a partial emendation of Kraay's position suggested by H. Mattingly, NC 14 [1954] 32-39). The importance of any coins issued by Vindex is, of course, obvious, since in them we would have actual examples of his propaganda. It is fully probable that Vindex did have coins struck, if only to pay his Gallic levies; however,
9.2-11 The Revolt of Vindex & the Fall of Nero: Introduction, cont.
he did not put his name on any of them, so there is naturally controversy as to which of the Gallic series of A.D. 68 were actually issued by him. Mattingly, (op. cit. 36-39) would divide this coinage into two groups, the first issued by Vindex at Vienna during the revolt, the second issued at Lugdunum by Verginius Rufus, commander of the army of Upper Germany, after the suppression of the revolt. At present, our concern is with those coins which all numismatists agree were issued by Vindex (cf. further Mattingly, **BMC Imp. I** pp. clxxxix-cci); among these are the following legends: obv. SALVS GENERIS HUMANI rev. S.P.Q.R. OB C.S. (**BMC Imp. I** p. 298 no. 36); obv. SALVS ET LIBERTAS (**BMC Imp. I** p. 297 nos 28-29); obv. PAX ET LIBERTAS (**BMC Imp. I** p. 297 no. 27 cf. p. 299 n.). The appeal is couched in purely Roman terms and harks back to Augustan coin-types and slogans. Kraay concludes that the message proclaimed by Vindex was "that the principate on the Julio-Claudian model was to continue, and that a candidate to succeed Nero was in the field awaiting the constitutional confirmation of the Senate and People of Rome... On the accession of this new ruler would follow the realization of those blessings of imperial rule which Nero had promised but had failed to produce, Pax, Libertas, Salus and Securitas." (op. cit. 142-143.)

We now turn to a consideration of the actual events of the revolt. It began in March of A.D. 68 (cf. S. Ner. 40.4 with Ann. 14.4.1) and it is tempting to think that the Ides of March may be the date. Certainly word of it reached Nero in Naples on the anniversary of his mother's death (the night of 26-27 March, 59; cf. below O 3.1, n. on die, quam necandae matri Nero destinarat). In launching
9.2-11 The Revolt of Vindex & the Fall of Nero: Introduction, cont.

the revolt before assembled Gallic notables (and this was almost certainly not the official provincial assembly of the tres Galliae; cf. A. J. Christopherson, Historia 17 [1968] 362-363), Vindex administered to the participants an oath of loyalty to the Senate and People of Rome (Dio 63.22.2 - 23.1; Zonaras 11.13). This implies that the final decision about Nero's successor was to lie theoretically with the Senate at Rome, since the popular assemblies were no longer of any political significance; it does not mean, however, that Vindex himself had no specific candidate in mind.

The revolt was clearly not a sudden impulse on the part of Vindex: we hear of letters sounding out various (unspecified) provincial governors, all of whom betrayed him to Nero, except for Galba (Plut. Galba 4.4: this cannot have been long before the revolt broke out, since Nero must have dealt with Vindex, given the opportunity); we also hear of negotiations with exiled senators (Joann. Antioch. fr. 91; cf. S. Ner. 43.1 for the rumour that Nero thought at the beginning of the revolt of massacring all army commanders, governors of provinces, and exiles); one might even speculate that Vindex had been implicated in the affair which led to the executions of the Scribonii in Greece in A.D. 67 and so felt personally threatened (Dio 23.17.2-4; cf. J. B. Hainsworth, Historia 11 [1962] 90). Gaul was, for the most part, an unarmed province and Vindex must have known that he could not face the German legions in battle: presumably therefore he hoped that by being the first to commit himself openly, he might persuade other governors to make similar declarations against Nero and for the Senate and People. He must especially have hoped to persuade L. Verginius Rufus, the army commander in Upper Germany (indeed, the remark at Plut. G 4.5 that
9.2-11 The Revolt of Vindex & the Fall of Nero: Introduction, cont.

Vindex invited Galba to offer himself as head of the Gallic provinces, which possessed 100,000 men in arms, may well be a reference to the legions of Upper and Lower Germany, as Hainsworth suggests, *Historia* 11 [1962] 91-2; cf. Daly, *Historia* 24 [1975] 94-5).

Verginius, a man of equestrian origin, hailed from northern Italy (Mediolanum? cf. Pliny, *Ep.* 2.1), and this area, especially the Transpadana, was regarded, even early in the 2nd century A.D., as a home of old-fashioned virtue and modesty. cf. Pliny *Ep.* 1.14.4:

...ex illa nostra Italia quae multum adhuc verecundiae frugalitatis, atque etiam rusticitatis antiquae, retinet ac servat. If he was in any way typical, Verginius cannot have been an eager partisan of a ruler like Nero, even though Nero had raised him to his position of eminence: in A.D. 63 he had been *consul ordinarius*, a rare honour for a *novus homo* and he was now effective commander of the strongest army group in the Empire - he was, of course, from Nero's point of view, "safe". Equally, he seems to have had a strong sense of duty and loyalty, and (since, with the example of the Scribonii before him, he doubtless knew the efficiency of Nero's secret service) he must as a matter of prudent routine have passed on word of the treasonable soundings being made by Vindex early in 68 (cf. above, p.105). However, when Vindex started his revolt the strictly "constitutionalist" line which he took with regard to Nero's replacement clearly appealed to Verginius, whether or not he personally considered himself a suitable candidate for the Principate (cf. H 1.8.2: *an imperare noluisset dubium; voluisset* is a *varia lectio*) However, he was not prepared to accept an "unconstitutional" offer from troops. In fact, he refused perhaps four such offers altogether in 68-69: (a) before Vesontio - Plut. G
9.2-11 The Revolt of Vindex & the Fall of Nero: Introduction, cont.

6.3: this may not represent an offer separate from the others;
(b) immediately after Vesontio - Plut. G 6.4; Dio 63.25.2; cf. H 1.9.3 for something more tentative at approximately the same time;
(c) after Nero's death - Plut. G 10.4. Tacitus' statement at H 1.8.2 could refer to either (b) or (c), or both. (d) after Otho's death - H 2.51; Plut. Q 18.5. His reaction therefore to the news from Gaul must have been one of considerable bewilderment and although he went through the motions of making preparations to suppress the revolt (troops were apparently summoned from both German districts; cf. H 1.51.3; 2.68.4), his somewhat half-hearted attitude must have become known to his legionary legates, with whom we may associate C. Fabius Valens, even though he was stationed in Lower Germany as legate of Legio I Germanica at Bonn: Valens was acting on Galba's behalf and sending information to him, and conceivably also to Vindex (cf. H 1.52.3; 3.62.2).

It would, however, be unfair to suggest, as Henderson does (Life and Principate of the Emperor Nero 402), that it was for this reason that Galba adopted a similar "constitutionalist" pose when he responded to the invitation from Vindex and presented himself as a candidate for the principate at New Carthage at the beginning of April, 68 (see below 10.2).

Nero's initial response to the revolt of Vindex was total indifference (S. Ner. 40.4): as long as it was merely a motus Gallicus, this was a perfectly correct attitude (cf. Tiberius' behaviour at the time of the revolt of Florus and Sacrovir in Gaul in A.D. 21: Ann. 3.44.4). However, when he heard of Galba's revolt, perhaps about the middle of April, he became very upset indeed (S. Ner.42ff;
9.2-11 The Revolt of Vindex & the Fall of Nero: Introduction, cont.
Plut. G 5.3). Galba, as Nero rightly saw, was (as far as anyone in 68 could judge) an entirely suitable candidate for the principate, and furthermore, the fact that there was apparently by about this time no news from Germany of any move by Verginius to suppress even Vindex doubtless made Nero think that there was some monstrous plot going on (cf. S. Ner. 43.1). Accordingly he started to make elaborate military preparations to defend his position: he raised a legion from the fleet at Misenum (H 1.6.2); he recalled the detachments from Britain, Germany and Illyricum which he had sent to the East for his projected war with Parthia (H 1.6.2; 1.9.3; cf. 1.31); the ala Siliana (composed apparently of Germans) was recalled from Egypt (H 1.70.1); and the entire army of Illyricum, four legions in all, was summoned to Italy, and had arrived there prior to Nero's death on 9th June (cf. H 1.19.3 with 2.11.1 and 2.27.2). The scale of these preparations clearly indicates that Nero planned to act not merely against Vindex plus Galba but against all the "rebels", including Verginius. Just when Verginius actually revolted from Nero is not clear, though certainly it was before the battle of Vesontio (cf. Plut. G 6.3: οὐτ' αὐτὸς ἐφή λήμεσθαι τὴν ἡγεμονίαν, οὐτ' ἀλλ' περιλήμεσθαι διδομένην, ἄν ἄν μὴ ἡ σύγκλητος ἑλπῆ, after which we hear of the battle); cf. the coinage of 68 which Mattingly assigns to Vindex and to Verginius, which has one type - bearing a wreath and the legend SPQR - in common (NC 14 (1954) 36-7). Accordingly, Nero mounted a military expedition to Gaul under the leadership of Rubrius Gallus, with an advance guard headed by P. Petronius Turpilianus (Dio 63.27.1 and 1a; H 1.74.2 might suggest that Legio I Italica was part of this
The Revolt of Vindex & the Fall of Nero: Introduction, cont.

Verginius meanwhile may have been worried by the threat to the peace and security of Gaul posed by Vindex and the men which he had under arms; he was doubtless even more worried by news of Nero's military preparations. Accordingly, after taking steps to ensure the security of the Rhine frontier and after calling in help from Lower Germany (§ 1.51.1; 1.53.2; 4.17.3) he moved south, with the principal aim no doubt of being in a position to react rapidly as events might develop. Security within his army was probably not very tight, especially with a man like Fabius Valens about. The troops therefore came to realize what was going on, and they doubtless were of the opinion that Galba was no longer a figure of any real importance: it was, after all, over 30 years since he had commanded in Upper Germany. They therefore proclaimed Verginius princeps and seem to have been unable to understand the line which he subsequently took: however, he persuaded them to swear loyalty to the Senate and People (this can be deduced from Plut. Galba 6.3 and 6.4: ἦ πάλιν μεταβαλομένων πρὸς Νέρωνα cf. S. Ner. 47.1).

Meanwhile, the news that Verginius was coming south with an army may have made Vindex believe that he had decided to try to make a bid for supreme power himself: the move made by Vindex towards Verginius may therefore have been an attempt to open negotiations. Equally, Verginius may have summoned Vindex to complain of the excessive pro-Galban activity in which he was engaging (e.g. the coin propaganda, especially where there were similarities between coins issued by Vindex and Galba's issues in Spain; cf. Kraay, NC 9 [1949] 141-2), since in Verginius' eyes this would have represented
an attempt to diminish the right to a completely "free choice"
on the part of Senate and People (and would tend also to diminish
his own chances?). At any rate, they met at Vesontio and reached
an agreement (Dio 63.24.2; Joann. Antioch fr. 91 makes nonsense of
everything we know about Verginius); like Dio, we can only guess
that it was basically anti-Neronian. Verginius' soldiers perhaps
felt that they could force his hand by attacking Vindex and his
Gauls, whom they saw as a stumbling-block and an enemy. But
Verginius had obviously been satisfied with the agreement reached
between himself and Vindex; he had also been impressed by him, hence
his despair at the "battle" of Vesontio and the subsequent suicide
of Vindex (Dio 63.5.1 cf. Joann. Antioch fr. 91), which made it
appear that he had acted treacherously or on Nero's behalf, and
which also made it clear (to himself at any rate) that he was unable
to control his own troops. Accordingly he reiterated his
"constitutionalist" position (Plut. C 6.4; Dio 63.25.6) and simply
sat tight (probably at Lugdunum) until matters were resolved in
Rome by Nero's suicide, which followed the suborning of the
Praetorians on Galba's behalf by Nymphidius Sabinus; the Guard was
an element which Verginius had, perhaps foolishly, overlooked in
his calculations. However, once Galba was recognized by the Senate,
Verginius made his troops swear loyalty to him.

What is quite clear from the foregoing is the crucial part
played in the bellum Neronis by Verginius Rufus; however, S. does not
mention him at all. This may well be simple prudence on his part:
the role of Verginius in 68 appears to have been considered
controversial in his own lifetime and the historian Cluvius Rufus
The Revolt of Vindex & the Fall of Nero: Introduction, cont.

apparently wrote something about it (unspecified) which he himself thought might offend Verginius (Pliny, Ep. 9.19.5); Syme thinks (Tacitus 179) that Verginius had actually crushed Vindex while remaining loyal to Nero (but how then was Galba ultimately successful? As Syme himself points out a few lines earlier: "If the defeat of Vindex saved Rome and the Empire, it should also have saved Nero..."). For a useful summary of this controversy, see L. J. Daly, Historia 24 (1975) 75-90. It has also been suggested by J. B. Hainsworth (G&R 11 [1964] 128-136) that Tacitus started the Histories with 1st January, 69 to avoid having to relate the he and Verginius events of the Bellum Neronis in detail, since both were close friends of Pliny the Younger and may have been close to each other; at any rate as cos. suff. in 97 Tacitus pronounced the laudatio at Verginius' funeral (Pliny, Ep. 2.1.6), not long before he began work on the Histories (but see also D. C. A. Shotter, CQ 17 [1967] 370-381).

If Tacitus had a problem in dealing with Verginius' role in 68, for S. the difficulty was even more acute: the Younger Pliny, who always exhibited a "jealous and touchy devotion" towards Verginius and his memory (Hainsworth, op. cit. 135), was S.'s patron (S. figures in his letters on many occasions) and it was Pliny who obtained for him from Trajan theius triumliberorum (Ep. 10.94-95). His biographical method with the emphasis first on Nero and then on Galba enabled him to avoid the problem altogether; hence the omission of any mention of Verginius (cf. Hainsworth, op. cit. 132).
9.2 Carthagine nova: Carthago Nova (modern Cartagena) was originally Mastia, capital of the Mastieni, an Iberian people: it was renamed Carthago Nova, probably in 228 B.C., when the area was captured by Hasdrubal, Punic commander in Spain from 229/8 to 221 B.C.; for its site, natural defences and strategic location, see H. H. Scullard, *Scipio Africanus, Soldier and Politican* (1970) 48-50. Carthago Nova was also close to one of the richest silver mines in Spain, and with its easy communications with North Africa, it quickly became the main Punic base and storehouse in Spain: cf. Polyb. 10.8.1-5; Livy 26.42.2-4; App. Hisp. 19; A. Beltrán "Las minas romanas de la región de Cartagena," *MMAP* 6 (1945) 101 ff.

During the Second Punic War it became the prime target for the Romans in Spain and its capture by Scipio in the spring of 209 (Polyb. 10.9.1 - 10.17.16; Livy 26.42.2 - 26.47.10; App. Hisp. 20 - 23) led inexorably to the complete collapse of Punic power in Spain in 206.

In the period after the war Carthago Nova remained for some time the key position in the new province of Hispania Citerior; during the last century of the Republic it grew and prospered as a commercial and manufacturing centre and as a base for fishing and shipping operations cf. J. J. van Nostrand *ap. ESAR III* 130-132, 138-141; C. H. V. Sutherland, *The Romans in Spain* (1939) 58-59, 101-103; J. M. Blázquez, "Estado de la romanización de Hispania bajo César y Augusto," *Emerita* 30 (1962) 71-129: on Carthago Nova, see espec. 104-107; (on p. 104 n.3 Blázquez lists eighteen papers on aspects of the history and archaeology of Carthago Nova published by A. Beltrán between 1945-1952).
Though it became a Roman colony in the time of either Julius Caesar or Augustus (cf. Sutherland, op. cit. 128; M. Grant, From Imperium to Auctoritas [1946] 217), it was gradually overshadowed by Tarraco, the other large base in Hispania Citerior, which in the time of Augustus was renamed Hispania Tarraconensis (cf. above G 8.1, n. on Hispania Tarraconensis). For its administrative position as the centre of a conventus during the early Principate cf. Pliny NH 3.18 and 3.25. Carthago Nova was ultimately sacked by the Vandals in A.D. 425.

Vindicis litterae: cf. Plut. G 4.5; the nature of this letter (or letters: cf. DJ 87.1 for the use this word in a plural sense) is hard to discern, since it was this which apparently persuaded Galba that the time had come to make a decisive move, and yet he would hardly stand up in public and declare that he was in rebellion against Nero simply because a Gallic senator had asked him to do so. This would seem to suggest that the litterae were not simply a piece of private correspondence but, rather, some kind of political pamphlet, represented perhaps as an open letter to Galba; or perhaps copies of a private letter were circulated in Gaul and Spain.

This document, whatever its exact nature, was probably as close as Vindex came to proclaiming Galba princeps (Dio 63.23 does not say that Vindex did this, nor must Plutarch's words at G 4.5 or 22.2 necessarily mean this either): Vindex seems to have urged Galba to claim the principate and to have offered his own services to that end. We should, of course, also distinguish this appeal from earlier
soundings by Vindex (Plut. G 4.4).

humano generi assertorem: the use of this phrase is doubtless meant to call to mind one of the best-known features of a causa liberalis in the Roman courts: when an action was brought to prove the liberty of a person held as a slave, an adsertor libertatis - a citizen who approached the court on behalf of the slave - was necessary. The analogy here is obvious: Nero as a dominus had enslaved the whole human race and action was necessary to restore its libertas: Galba therefore was to be its adsertor libertatis (cf. Gaius, Inst. 1.17; 1.18; 1.35; cf. 4.16; Buckland, Textbook 3 73-4; Jolowicz-Nicholas, Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law 3 134-5.)

Galba was not the only person to be hailed as, or to claim to be, an adsertor libertatis in connection with the events of A.D. 68: Pliny (NH 20.160) described Vindex as adsertor ille a Nerone libertatis; Verginius Rufus in his epitaph asserted: imperium adseruit non sibi sed patriae (Pliny, Ep. 6.10.4); and, given that adsertor and vindex mean the same thing (cf. Donatus in Ter. Adelphi 2.1.40), Vindex may be referring to himself in one of the Gallic coins of 68 which bears the legend HERCVLES ADSERTOR (RIC I p. 184 no. 1 = BMC Imp. I p. 294 n.); and perhaps in allusion to the original appeal of Vindex to him, Galba issued coins in Spain bearing the legend LIBERTAS PR RESTITVTA and showing the "Cap of Liberty" (cf. RIC I p. 184 nos. 1,4 = BMC Imp. I p. 290 nos. 7,8). This whole question is fully discussed by Kraay, NC 9 (1949) 139-140. It may also recall the words of Augustus: rem publicam...oppressam in libertatem
vindicavi (RG 1), which in A.D. 68 need not have seemed as much of a political cliché as it did when Augustus wrote it (cf. C. Wirszubski, Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome, 103-104); it will also tie in nicely with Galba's "Augustan" pretensions (cf. below, 10.1, n. on legatum...professus est.)

nec diu cunctatus: we may be excused for thinking that Galba's desidia segnitiaque (above, 9.1) had forced him into revolt: he alone had failed to report the original soundings made to provincial governors by Vindex and so found himself in a completely exposed position once the revolt in Gaul began. However, this would be an oversimplification; as Chilver (JRS 47 [1957] 32) puts it: "yet in the end Galba too came to believe that his life was in danger. He reacted by building partes on traditional Roman lines." This is almost certainly correct, and yet Chilver cites his evidence carelessly (his n. 29 refers to S. Galba "24,1", which does not exist: a glance at the passage in G 9.2, referring to Nero's instructions to his procurators to murder Galba, in the Loeb edition will reveal the source of the "24,1") and the main thrust of his argument seems misdirected: he argues that Galba started to build partes after he discovered that Nero was plotting his murder (see below: nam et mandata Neronis de nece sua ad procuratores clam missa deprenderat). This discovery was probably a recent one - not more than a month or two old at most. Furthermore, the extent of Galba's support is illuminating: T. Vinius in Hispania Tarraconensis was with him from the start (Plut. G 4.6-7; H 1.48.4); so too was M. Salvius Otho, governor of Lusitania (H 1.13.4; Plut. G 20.3-4);
9.2- nec diu cunctatus cont.

in Baetica the quaestor A. Caecina Alienus was an early adherent (H 1.53.1); in Lower Germany C. Fabius Valens was sending Galba information (H 1.52.3). It is unlikely that all of these suddenly became partisans of Galba after he made his bid for power; similarly, it is clear that Ti. Julius Alexander was not acting under Galba's direct orders in Egypt when he issued his decree on 6th July, A.D. 68 (MW 328: note the form of Galba's name - L. Livius Sulpicius Galba): the suspicion must therefore remain that he had been involved in some sort of negotiation with Galba before Nero's death, and possibly even before the revolt of Vindex. Finally, there is the question of the praetorian prefect Nymphidius Sabinus (whom S. does not mention in connection with the fall of Nero but on whom see further below 11, n. on praefecto praetori Nymphidio Sabino Romae): his defection from Nero was crucial in Galba's rise to power and it would be illuminating to know how he was won over (perhaps by some ally of Galba in the capital?)

And when we turn to Rome, the larger question of senatorial opposition to Nero inevitably arises. What Chilver (op. cit. 31) calls "the holocaust of the last years" reveals the extent to which opposition had grown as the reign progressed (for details, cf. R. Syme, Tacitus, 555-561; D. McAlindon, "Senatorial Opposition to Claudius and Nero," AJP 77 [1956] 113-132, esp. 127-129, 131; R. S. Rogers, "Heirs and Rivals to Nero," TAPA 86 [1955] 190-212, esp. 195 - 196 and 207-211; B. Baldwin, "Executions, Trials and Punishment in the reign of Nero," PP 22 [1967] 425-439, esp. 435-439): among the families which had suffered as a result of conspiracies, real and imagined, were the Pisones, the Crassi and the Scribonii. The
leaders of the so-called philosophic opposition can hardly be separated from "the senators" in general: most notable of all was P. Clodius Thrasea Paetus, executed in A.D. 66 (cf. S. Ner. 37.1; Ann. 16.21-35; Dio 62.26.1-4), whose wife's family had been involved in the revolt of L. Arruntius Camillus Scribonianus in A.D. 42 (Pliny, Ep. 3.16). We may note that Galba was connected with these people: his adoptive son, L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi Licinianus (see below 17, non Pisonem Frugi Licinianum nobilem egregiumque iuvenem) had a Scribonia for a mother, and his real father was M. Licinius Crassus Frugi, cos. ord. A.D. 27. Young Piso had, like Cornelius Laco, Galba's praefectus praetorio (H 1.14.1), been a friend of Rubellius Plautus, who had ultimately been removed by Nero in A.D. 62 because his relationship to Augustus was as close as Nero's (cf. Ann. 13.19.3; 14.22.2-3; 14.57-59). We should also note that, after Galba's murder, his body was removed by C. Helvidius Priscus, son-in-law of Thrasea Paetus (Plut. G 28.4).

Further, when we look at the senior military commanders, we see a similar opposition to Nero: of course, the carnage among them is, as with the "philosophers", a part of the wider story of Neronian purges among the senatorial nobility. In A.D. 66 (probably) Annius Vinicianus, son of L. Annius Vinicianus who had been a ring leader in the conspiracy of Cassius Chaerea which had resulted in Gaius' death in A.D. 41 (Joseph. AJ 19.52; 19.96-98) and who had subsequently urged Scribonianus to revolt in A.D. 42 (Dio 60.15.1-5), was executed for treason (S. Ner. 36.1); in late 66 or early 67 his father-in-law Cn. Domitius Corbulus, governor of Syria and the greatest general of the later Julio-Claudian period, was summoned to Greece
and killed as he landed at Corinna (Dio 63.17.5-6); and at about the same time the brothers Scribonius Proculus and Scribonius Rufus, commanders of the two German army-groups, were also summoned to Greece and forced to commit suicide (Dio 63.17.2-4; cf. H 4.41.3): Dio says that they were Sulpicii, which might suggest some family connection real or imaginary, with Galba; and also, as Scribonii, they were (in the view of Chilver, op. cit. 32 n.27) connected with Scribonianus, the conspirator of A.D. 42.

Accordingly, there need be no difficulty in supposing that Galba had friends and agents in Rome, and it may perhaps be reasonable to guess that he started to make tentative arrangements for an attempt at supreme power for himself after the murders of the Scribonii and Corbulo in 66-67. After Corbulo's death he was, perhaps, the most distinguished figure in the Roman world, and doubtless he felt vulnerable.

Was the revolt of Vindex undertaken independently of Galba's "movement"? There is no direct evidence, but probably it was separate, because by March 68 Galba had clearly made little if any progress towards winning over the armies of Germany and, given the military strength which he had in Spain (one legion, two alae and three cohortes: see below, 10.2), he is unlikely to have started anything spontaneously unless he knew the attitude of the Rhine troops. His failure to report the overtures of Vindex, the news that Nero had ordered his death, and then finally the open appeal from Vindex, all combined to force his hand prematurely.

\[ \text{condicionem...recepit: Plutarch (G 4.5-7) says that Galba} \]
sought the advice of his friends (presumably the reference is to his consilium), before deciding whether or not to put himself forward as a replacement for Nero, and that some of them advised a "wait and see" attitude: T. Vinius, however, in summing up his advice, used a phrase similar to one later used by Tacitus in another context closely parallel to this: qui deliberant, desciverunt (H 2.7.3; for the source of this sententia, see G. B. Townend, AJP 85 [1964] 349 n. 30).

Galba's appraisal of the situation and his conclusion that there would not be another opportunity for him cannot have taken long. However, the "declaration of candidacy" will have required careful stage-management. A good deal of staff work was obviously done very rapidly: perhaps at a minimum ten days were necessary to get gossip and rumour going satisfactorily so that on "the day" a crowd could be assembled προθύμων ἐπὶ τὸν νεωτερισμόν (Plut. C 5.1). Also, the actual "declaration" itself had to be orchestrated with care, and it will have taken some time to assemble the pictures of Nero's victims and to summon the exiled boy from the Balearic Islands (below, 10.1).

mandata Neronis...clam missa: it is unlikely, though possible, that this was Nero's response to Galba's failure to report the approaches made to him by Vindex (Plut. C 4.4: apparently unknown to S. or ignored by him as a possible reason). It is perhaps more probable that Nero's agents discovered something of Galba's soundings and partes-building: Nero may then have decided that it would be easier and less opprobrious to have Galba assassinated and so he ordered procuratores to do it. The plural here, if accurate,
9.2-
probably implies financial agents of the Emperor involved in the management of imperial estates or commercial enterprises in Spain, rather than the chief financial officer of the provincial government, though this cannot be ruled out (cf. H 1.7.1 for the killing of Claudius Macer in Africa by Trebonius Garutanus procurator iussu Galbae): the other procurators might well be imperial freedmen (cf. Helius, Anicetus and other notorious henchmen of Nero). There was at least one other attempt on Galba's life (below, 10.2).

confirmabatur cum secundissimis auspiciis et ominibus: this religious propaganda must have started almost as soon as Galba decided to make his bid for power; S. has distributed the material over several chapters, so that it does not seem as obtrusive as it would were it all in one place: 4.1-3; 6.1; 8.2; 9.2; 10.4; cf. Dio 64.1.1-3. It is, however, quite clear that S. has a greater total number of auspicia et omena than Dio. G. B. Townend (Hermes 88 [1960] 117) surmises that Dio 64.1.1 preserves the "Galba portents" from the work of Ti. Claudius Balbillus (see above 4.1, n. on constat Augustum...pertinet) as they appeared in Pliny's history: these are the prophecy by Augustus or Tiberius (above, 4.1), the vision of Fortune (above, 4.3), the ship full of weapons but having no crew (below, 10.4), the mule bringing forth young (above, 4.2), and the young boy whose hair suddenly turned white (above, 8.2). These are all certainly elaborate prophecies, and it seems reasonable to accept that they are the type of thing that would either be invented by, or draw the attention of, a court astrologer who specialised in spectacular and complex predictions.
It is noticeable that the other portents mentioned by S. are much less "striking": Galba's consulship coming between those of Nero's father and Otho's father (above, 6.1 - which cannot of course have come into being until A.D. 69 at the earliest); the rather vague prophecy about a ruler coming forth from Spain (below, 9.2); the finding of an ancient ring with Victory and a trophy on its stone (below, 10.4). Did Balbillus perhaps omit them from his work for this very reason?

On the other hand, it does not follow that Balbillus himself invented the prophecies which he may subsequently have written about: the ones to do with Spain, especially, may well be the work of Galba's staff. Some may even be based on incidents with a kernel of truth in them; and Galba himself perhaps believed that one or two of them were really portents relating to himself (cf. H 1.10.3: post fortunam credidimus; for the tradition of portents in Roman life and literature, see, for example, Wissowa, RK² 534-549; F. B. Krauss, An Interpretation of the Omens, Portents, and Prodigies recorded by Livy, Tacitus, and Suetonius [Diss. Pennsylvania, 1930] 19-34; Syme, Tacitus 521-527; Latte, RR 267; Ogilvie, The Romans and their Gods 53-69).

However, all these stories, with their varying levels of sophistication, aimed no doubt at different strata of society, had but one aim: ut nemini dubium esset iustum piuque et faventibus diis bellum suscipi (below, 10.4); cf. the very similar procedures followed later in the East on Vespasian's behalf: e.g. H 4.81-82.

Cluniae: near the modern Coruña del Conde in north-central
Spain, Clunia was originally a town of the Arevaci (Ptol. 2.6.55) and is first mentioned in accounts of the war against Sertorius, who made the place his headquarters in 75 B.C. (Livy, Per. 92); by the later Julio-Claudian period Clunia was the centre of one of the seven conventus of Hispania Tarraconensis (Pliny, NH 3.18 and 26) but was, apparently, not a colony (cf. CIL II 5792 of A.D. 40 refers to the inhabitants as Clunienses; but CIL II 2780 of Hadrianic date refers to the inhabitants as coloni Clunienses). Galba retired here in 68 after the battle of Vesontio (Plut. C 6.6) and suggest there is epigraphic evidence to his presence (CIL II 2779). In addition, among the posthumous coinage of Galba (issued by Vespasian in A.D. 70-71; cf. Mattingly, BMC Imp. I ccxii-ccxviii, esp. ccxvi) there are sesterces depicting on the obverse Galba in military dress receiving a palladium from a female figure (Clunia? as Tyche?), and bearing the legend HISPANIA CLVNIA SVL SC (BMC Imp. I p. 356-7, nos. 252-4). The meaning of Clunia Sul is not clear: it may be that Galba made the place a colonia under the name Clunia Sulpicia (cf. Kornemann, RE IV 542 no. 189). See further, Hübner, RE IV s.v. 'Clunia' no. 2; A. García y Bellido ap. Legio VII Gemina (Leon, 1970) 319.

quorum carminum sententia erat oriturum quandoque ex Hispania principem dominumque rerum: in his article "Hidden Verses in Suetonius" (HSCP 9 [1898] 17-24) G. M. Lane claims (21) that we have here an actual piece of the prophecy, "disguised as indirect discourse":

\[ \text{U — orietur quandoque ex Hispania} \]

\[ \text{Principes dominusque rerum.} \]
9.2-10.1

If Lane is correct, the prophecy is obviously a fake, since the term *Princeps* in the sense which it has here was not known *ante ducentos annos*.

10.1 *cum conscendisset tribunal*: the date on which Galba formally made his bid for power is not certain. However, it seems possible that, whenever it was, this was subsequently counted as Galba's *dies imperii*; (cf., however, G 23, Joseph. BJ 4.499, and Holzapfel, *Klio* 12 [1912] 488 nn. 4,5). Our sole evidence for the date of the proclamation at Carthago Nova is Dio's statement (63.6.5) that Galba lived seventy-two years and twenty-three days of which he was *Princeps* for nine months and thirteen days. If we accept the 24th December (3 B.C.) as his birth date (cf. above, G 4.1) and calculate to 15th January (A.D.69) with a total of twenty-three days, we have to count "inclusively" (i.e. count both the first and last date) and this was the usual practice of the Romans in calculating precise dates; e.g., the day after the Ides of March is a.d. *xvii Kal Apr.* (= 16th March, both the 16th March and the 1st April being included in the count). When we apply these criteria to Dio's figures for the length of Galba's reign, we get the following: by the Greek "compensative" calculation, (which is the same method as we use today; for the various methods of counting days, see W.F. Snyder, *Klio* 33 [1940] 42-44), counting backwards, nine months from 15th January, 69 = 15th April, 68; thirteen days from 15th April, 68 = 2nd April, 68. By the Roman *inclusive* (i.e. usual) calculation we get a.d. *xviii Kal. Feb.* (H 1.27) minus 9 months = a.d. *xviii Kal. Mai.; a.d. *xviii Kal. Mai.* minus 13 days = (a.d. *xxx Kal. Mai.*) = a.d. *iv Non. Apr.* = 2nd April. However,
such is the peculiarity of the "Roman calculation" that if we count forwards from 2nd April to 15th January, we get a total of 9 months and 14 days (a.d. iv Non. Apr. = a.d. iv Non. Jan. = 9 months; a.d. iv Non. Jan. = a.d. xviii Kal. Feb. = 14 days); if we count forwards, therefore, we must start on 3rd April in order to reach nine months and thirteen days on 15th January.

Our choice would therefore seem to lie between 2nd and 3rd April and, given the usual Roman method of calculation, the 3rd would seem more likely. Both Snyder (Klio 33 [1940] 47) and Holzapfel (Klio 12 [1912] 491) think that the 3rd is preferable, though neither recognizes the full extent of the problem. Holzapfel's argument is: "Für den 3. spricht die Erwägung dass der 2., wie alle anderen auf die Kalenden, Nonen und Iden folgenden Tage (dies postriduani), eine üble Vorbedeutung in sich schloss (Macrob. Sat. 1.16.21 f.) und daher zu einem wichtigen politischen Akt ungeeignet war. Hätte sich Galba über dieses Bedenken weggesetzt, so wäre dies wohl in gleicher Weise wie bei dem am 2. Jan. 69 von den untergermanischen Legionen auf Vitellius übertragenen Imperium hervorgehaben worden."

This is highly persuasive, but in the absence of clear knowledge of how the Romans calculated timespans (i.e. did they work back from the end to the beginning, or forward from the beginning to the end?) a definitive answer cannot be given.

See further, M. Raoss, Epigraphica 22 (1960) 53, n. 3.

propositis ante se damnatorum occisorumque a Nerone
quam plurimis imaginibus et astante nobili puero: the preparations need not have been particularly elaborate, (perhaps a few portraits or busts of ancestors were borrowed from distinguished citizens of colonia Iulia Victrix Nova Carthago and were placarded with the names of Nero's well-known victims; by and large, who would know what they looked like, anyway?), but they were carefully thought-out, and the summoning of the boy from the Balearic Islands was especially clever: Nero was not only a murderous tyrant, but his victims numbered even children, of which living proof was offered.

consalutatusque imperator legatum se senatus ac populi R. professus est: S.'s picture of events on this day is extremely brief: Galba stands up in public, deplores the state of the times and is immediately hailed as Imperator by the crowd which was presumably present. This account is neither adequate nor convincing: it is clear throughout that Galba wished to be "elected" Princeps by the Senate and People at Rome. If Roman citizens in Spain were to salute him as Imperator, that would provide a useful start for his campaign; he could then "modestly" decline the Imperatorial salutation but still maintain his candidacy for the position. Therefore it may seem rather unlikely that he should have started matters off by denouncing Nero's government.

Plutarch has a rather different version of events (G 5.1-2): "chatter and rumour" gathered together a crowd of people eager for revolution, and as soon as Galba appeared πάντες αὐτὸν ὀμοφώνως αὐτοκράτορα προσείπον. Galba declined this salutation and then
proceeded to denounce Nero; thereafter he said that he would do his utmost for his country and took as his title στρατηγὸς (on this see H. J. Mason, Greek Terms for Roman Institutions, s.v. [9]). Given the stage-management of this occasion to which S. himself attests (cf. preceding note), this account of Plutarch's seems much more likely.

We must also, however, ask ourselves why Galba proceeded on this basis: why did he wish to be "elected" Princeps? In strict theory, the Emperors received their powers from the Senate and People (by a decree of the Senate subsequently confirmed by a series of popular votes; for Otho's case, which is well attested, see below ο 7.1, n. on gesturusque communi omnium arbitrio); the novelty in April 68 was that Galba was offering himself for a position still held by the previously (and properly) "elected" incumbent. Galba had no wish to be a mere usurper, forcing himself upon the "electors" (though his immediate successors had no such scruples). The irony of this situation lies in the fact that Galba was nearly brought to ruin (cf. ο 11) by a similarly rigid and doctrinaire approach on the part of Verginius Rufus, an approach for which he could find no reasonable fault with Verginius.

10.2 e plebe quidem provinciae legiones et auxilia conscripsit super exercitum veterem: that the vetus exercitus consisted of only one legion (VI Victrix) plus auxilia is confirmed by Tacitus (H 1.16.2 and 5.16.3; the three cohorts were probably Cohors II Gallica, Cohors III Gallorum and Cohors IIII Thracum; cf. García y Bellido, ap. Legio VII Gemina 321). The new legion enrolled by Galba (one only, pace S.) was given the number VII and was originally
called Galbiana or Hispana, in both cases perhaps unofficially (see A. Garzetti ap. Legis VII Gemina 333-6; it was subsequently known as VII Gemina). E plebe quidem provinciae suggests that the recruits were taken fairly indiscriminately, since it was obviously done in a hurry, and we may presume that those who were enrolled were granted citizenship when the new unit became a iusta legio (the dies natalis of the aquila was 10th June, 68 [CIL II 2552, 2554, 6183]). Galba took it with him to Rome (H 1.6), but almost immediately thereafter he sent it to Pannonia and there it took the place of X Gemina at Carnuntum (H 2.11, 2.67; cf. RE XII 1 s.v. 'legio'1265 ); its first legatus was M. Antonius Primus (H 2.86). X Gemina had been under Galba's command in Spain during the early years of his governorship of Tarraconensis (until c. A.D. 63), and it was returned to Spain late in A.D. 68 (H 2.58; 3.44; cf. 2.11): evidently Galba had felt that a single legion plus auxilia was inadequate as a garrison for the whole of Spain (cf. Parker, The Roman Legions, 99-100, 140).

Little is known of the new auxilia enrolled by Galba except for a mention of Vasconum lectae a Galba cohortes who performed well during the revolt of Civilis (H 4.33): the Vascones were the ancestors of the modern Basques (see Schulten, RE VIII 439 s.v. Vascones).

It was also presumably during the early stages of his revolt that Galba made special arrangements for defence: Q. Pomponius Rufus was appointed praefectus orae marit(iae) Hispan(iae) Citer(ioris) Galliae[e] N[ar]bon(ensis) bello qu[od] imp(erator) G[alba pro [republica] gessit (IRT 537 = MW 31). With both Italian fleets at his disposal, Nero might have launched a naval invasion of Spain or southern Gaul; Galba's measures to ensure the security of Gaul as
well as of Spain indicate his adhesion to the revolt of Vindex.

See further A. García y Bellido, "Nacimiento de la Legión VII Gemina", Legio VII Gemina 305-328, esp. 321-325 (this is the most complete study available); E. Ritterling, RE XII 1629-1642, (esp. 1630 for a possible explanation of the name Gemina); G. Forni, Il Reclutamento delle Legioni da Augusto a Diocleziano 85, 226.

e primoribus prudentia atque aetate praestantibus vel instar senatus...instituit: this move should be viewed in the light of Galba's "constitutionalist" pretensions: he had claimed to be simply legatus SPQR, and now he seems to have advertised the fact that his major decisions were being reached only after discussions with a body of advisers, described as instar senatus; this expression is difficult: it may mean "a kind of senate" (so Syme, Tacitus 592). Presumably this represented a widening of Galba's consilium and the implication was that had he been in Rome, the senate itself would have been fulfilling this rôle: clearly this was not intended to be an 'anti-Senate' of the type established by Sulla in Greece or Sertorius in Spain. However, such an action would easily be taken in malam partem, and S.'s report of it may well come from Cluvius Rufus, Galba's successor in Tarraconensis, who appears to have written a generally hostile account of Galba's tenure in that province (cf. above, 9.1, n. on varie et inaequabiliter provinciam rexit).

manente anulorum aureorum usu: equites who served in the legions or as centurions lost their equestrian status: cf. Mommsen, Staatsr. III 504. For the ius anulorum see below, 14.2, n. on paulo
Galba

10.2-10.3

ante anulis aurcis et Marciani cognomine ornatus.


These appeals were very broadly based and sought more than just political support from those to whom they were addressed. Money was obviously important: Galba confiscated and sold all of Nero's property in Spain (Plut. G 5.6); he obtained a large amount of gold and silver from Otho (Plut. G 20.3), which he used for coinage; furthermore, he seems to have demanded contributions of predetermined size from cities and communities in both Gaul and Spain, and inevitably these "gifts" were resented and, if possible, evaded (cf. the story of the gold crown from the temple of Jupiter at Tarraco - below, 12.1); those areas of both provinces which hesitated now about giving him their support subsequently had their taxes raised or territory confiscated (below, 12.1; H 1.8.1 and 1.53.3).

Support began to come in fairly rapidly: M. Salvius Otho, governor of Lusitania, was first of all provincial governors to join Galba (H 1.13.4; Plut. G 20.3-4); in Baetica, A. Caecina Alienus, the quaestor, was an early adherent (H 1.53.1): since no mention is made of the the governor of Baetica, we may perhaps assume that he resisted Galba's overtures, and it is possible that Obultronius Sabinus and Cornelius Marcellus, who died in Spain (mentioned by Otho at H 1.37.3 in a list of senators "murdered" by Galba) were the proconsul of Baetica and his legate.

Lucceius Albinus, procuratorial governor of Mauretania Caesariensis, appears to have come over to Galba quite early in the
revolt, because he was subsequently put in charge of Mauretania Tingitana as well (H 2.58.1): from this we may perhaps conclude that the governor of Tingitana had proved hostile to Galba and had been dismissed or killed. We should also note that the two Mauretanian provinces and Baetica formed a natural unit in spite of the Strait of Gibraltar (cf. H 1.78.1; 2.58.1), and it is conceivable that the governor of Baetica and the governor of Tingitana combined in some sort of opposition to Galba at the time of his bid for power.

In the senatorial province of Africa, the machinery of government was rather complex: in A.D. 37 Gaius had divided control between a proconsular governor on the civil side and a legatus Caesaris who looked after military matters (H 4.48; cf. above, 7.1, n. on extra sortem electus ad ordinandam provinciam...inquietam). The name of the proconsul at the time of the fall of Nero is not known. However, he probably supported Galba: an anonymous class of coins, struck apparently in Carthage early in A.D. 68, (BMC Imp. I p. 293 no.15 = Sm. 74) depicts on the obverse a bust of Hispania with two javelins, a shield and two corn ears, with the legend HISPANIA S.C.; on the reverse is a shield lying on two spears, and S.P.Q.R. The legatus Caesaris in command of III Augusta was L. Clodius Macer; according to Tacitus (H 1.73) Calvia Crispinilla, a former mistress of Nero (cf. Dio 63.12.3-4), crossed to Africa ad instigandum in arma Clodium Macrum: this might seem to imply that she was sent to keep Macer loyal to Nero and to persuade him to take action against the proconsul who had declared his support for Galba; however, another interpretation is possible: K. R. Bradley has
recently argued persuasively (AJP 93 [1972] 451-8) that the publica
fames mentioned in S. Ner. 45.1 is to be connected with Tacitus' remark that Calvia Crispinilla famem populo Romano haud obscure molita (H 1.73) and that she did not go to Africa on Nero's behalf; her mission was successful and Macer's revolt probably started at the end of March when the shipping season began: the effect of withholding African grain was a shortage which made itself felt before Nero's death. Furthermore, Macer's coins bearing legends such as CARTHAGO and 2ILICIA suggest that he seized Carthage (after all, he gained possession of the mint there; cf. BMC Imp. I p. 287; presumably the proconsul was killed) and planned to seize Sicily to cut off its grain supplies to Rome as well; in short, he aimed to become a second Sextus Pompeius. (For Macer's subsequent activities, see below, G 11, n. on in Africa Clodio Macro.)

In Egypt Ti. Julius Alexander was possibly, even probably, an early supporter of Galba: see above, 9.2, n. on nec diu cunctatus.

Lastly, there are some very strange coins which were issued in Corinth in A.D. 68 prior to Galba's recognition as Princeps (BMC Corinth p. 71 nos. 572-574): one shows a turreted head of Tyche with the legend ROMAE ET IMPERIO; the other has the head of Nero, but no name or titles - only the legend SENAT[VI] P.Q.R. Mattingly (NC 14 [1954] 35-36) comments: "...such an issue in Greece... can only fall after Vesontio, when the doom of Nero was settled by the revolt of his own victorious army. And we note that action does not go beyond accepting the catchword of Verginius; one must wait for SPQR to decide." If this interpretation of the series is correct, we may conclude that the authorities in Achaea had abandoned Nero and
were perhaps officially "sitting on the fence."

There is no further evidence suggesting active support from provincial governors or their senior staff officers: we may assume that the remainder, like Mucianus in Syria and Vespasian in Judaea, simply waited on the outcome of events in the west, *dein fides erga Galbam* (H 2.6.1). However, there is some additional evidence about assistance to Galba's cause rendered by individuals. Pedanius Costa, a senator, was possibly a *legatus legionis* in Upper Germany in 68: Tacitus tells us that, *adversus Neronem ausus*, he had tried to persuade Verginius Rufus to declare for Galba; Galba had subsequently designated him for a consulship in 69 (H 2.71.2 - probably Oct. to Dec.; see G. B. Townend, AJP 83 [1962] 113-124), but Vitellius struck him out. Cornelius Fuscus, a man of distinguished birth, had voluntarily chosen equestrian rank; in A.D. 68 he persuaded his home town (unknown - among suggestions are Pompeii, Vienna, Aquileia, Baeterrae, Narbo, Arelate and Forum Julii: this last is favoured by Syme, Tacitus 677, 683-684, with detailed bibliography) to come over to Galba, and for this he was rewarded by being appointed imperial procurator in Illyricum (H 2.86.3-4). Finally, we should remember the vitally important part in Galba's ultimate success played by the Praetorian Prefect C. Nymphidius Sabinus (see below, 11, n. on *praefecto praetori Nymphidio Sabino*).

10.4 *oppidi, quod sedem bello delegerat*: the name of this town is unknown, but one would expect it to be in northern Spain, since any attack was most likely to come from Gaul. Leon (i.e. the depot of Legio VII Galbiana) might be the place: it may seem too far west,
but we should ask ourselves why it was chosen as the legion's II.Q.
in the first place.

_Alexandrina navis Dertosam appulit:_ cf. S. Ner. 45.1
for _Alexandrina navis_ meaning "a ship outward bound from Alexandria";
the significance of this ancient "Mary Celeste" is hard to grasp
today. The story as circulated was perhaps deliberately left
rather vague, so that different people might interpret it to their
satisfaction in different ways: the symbolism of the Ship of State
with no hand to guide it coming to Spain and Galba is perhaps most
obvious; a ship from Alexandria would usually have gone to Rome,
but now what Rome stood for was to be found in Spain; or perhaps
this ship merely suggested the widespread nature of Galba's support,
or simply some link with Egypt: the story may have had this detail
added by the Alexandrian Ti. Claudius Balbillus (cf. above 9.2,
n. on _confirmabatur... ominibus_, and 4.1, n. on _constat Augustum_),
and Egypt was to the Romans a mysterious place anyway with its
strange gods and peculiar rituals; cf. Dio 64.1.2, where the ship
becomes plural.

11  _Accessit... mors Vindicis:_ When did the battle of Vesontio
take place? There can be no clear answer to this question, as the
following sample of the opinions of scholars who have worked on the
bellum Neronis recently will show:

(a) C. M. Kraay (NC 9 [1949] 129 n.5) suggests late May or early
June, 68, because news of Vesontio did not reach Nero before his
death on 9th June - "otherwise it is hard to understand his extreme
despair"; also, Galba withdrew to Clunia and contemplated suicide,
and he received news of Nero's death by 16th June: "Prolonged contemplation at such a critical time is not to be expected."

(b) H. Mattingly (NC 13 [1953] iii-iv, a report of a paper delivered on 8th October, 1952): "the evidence suggests a short campaign" and the battle was fought "about the end of April"; however, this paper (?) was printed in NC 14 (1954) 32-39, and on 34 Mattingly says "perhaps about the end of May (sic)"; he then goes on to attack Kraay's date "about a month later"; but Kraay (see above) had suggested late May: Mattingly's date must therefore be late April (cf. his remark [37] about "an interval of some weeks between the battle and the fall of Nero").

These are the main positions: with Kraay's view of late May/early June, Chilver (late May - JRS 47 [1957] 32), Hainsworth (perhaps early June - Historia 11 [1962] 86-87), Garcia y Bellido (about end of May - Legio VII Gemina 317), Daly (towards end of May - Historia 24 [1975] 87), are all in general agreement. Mattingly's date of late April has the firm support of Shotter (Historia 24 [1975] 69 - "last few days of April"; see also his Time-Table of Events [75], which gives "28th April" as the date of the battle). Brunt says (Latomus 18 [1959] 540-1): "Vesontio cannot be precisely dated, but might well be placed as early as the beginning of May": this does not appear to rule out a somewhat later date. Finally, Raoss (Epigraphica 22 [1960] 97-8) will commit himself no further than "maggio".

A consideration of certain factors may make it possible to narrow the range of possible dates for the battle. Reference has already been made (above, p. 107) to the elaborate military preparations undertaken by Nero after he heard of the revolt of
Galba, preparations which indicated strong doubts on Nero's part about the loyalty of Verginius Rufus in Germany. Verginius had clearly been dragging his feet about moving to crush Vindex. This makes any idea of a rapid campaign leading up to Vesontio unlikely.

However, we do not hear of any clash or meeting between Verginius Rufus and Nero's expeditionary force to Gaul, which was commanded by Rubrius Gallus and P. Petronius Turpilianus (Dio 63.27.1 and 1a; we may note that this expedition was sent after word had come of Verginius' desertion: this does not, of course, mean after Vesontio). Ultimately both generals seem to have deserted Nero; certainly Petronius did, and his desertion must have come after Vesontio, when there was no longer any question of a motus Gallicus and when Verginius' attitude had become well-known in detail (how otherwise could Galba have executed him ut dux Neronis? [H 1.6.1]). Given the time necessary to assemble and move this force to Gaul (above, p. 108; it included the new Legio I Adiutrix, which was enrolled when news of the emergency came in: some time must have been spent on its basic training), it is unlikely that it can have arrived there before early May, at the earliest (even if the fleet from Misenum was used to ferry it to Gaul); if it marched to Gaul, it can scarcely have arrived before late May. By this time news may also have come in of the revolt of Clodius Macer in Africa (cf. Plut. G 6.1, which puts before Vesontio news of the defections of both Verginius and Clodius; it should be noted that this in part agrees with Dio 63.27.1). Accordingly, if we were to conclude that the battle of Vesontio occurred towards the middle of May, this would mean that Nero's expeditionary force arrived in Gaul after the battle and at a time
when a decision whether or not to tackle Verginius would have to be taken, i.e. a decision whether or not to remain loyal to Nero; the pretence of dealing with a motus Gallicus could now no longer be used as a pretext for playing a waiting game (as perhaps Verginius himself had done); by this time too, a pronounced trend towards Galba had apparently begun to emerge (cf. again Plut. 6.1), and the natural desire to finish up on the winning side may have served to compel the decision taken by the Neronian generals. A date of about 10th-15th May for the battle would enable us to fit into the picture certain other details as well. Nero had summoned to Italy the army of Illyricum (H 1.9.3): of the four legions involved Legio X Gemina, based at Carnuntum (cf. above, 10.2, n. on legiones et...veterem), had the furthest to come. Where these legions were stationed after arriving in Italy is unknown, but we can assume that it was somewhere in the north, where they could be held in readiness either to move towards Gaul or Germany or to move south towards Rome, as the situation developed: we may accordingly estimate that Legio X Gemina had travelled about 500 mp: (for distances see the diagram below, p.341). If we allow approximately 6 days for Nero's summons to reach Carnuntum, and approximately 6 days for the legion to prepare its equipment and supplies for the march and 32 days for the actual journey (at approx. 16 mp per day), we can conclude that these legions were all in N. Italy by, at the latest, approx. 44 days after Nero had summoned them. There is, however, no word of their being sent to Gaul: they must therefore have arrived too late to join the expeditionary force led by Petronius and Rubrius. In fact, we hear so little about them as
instruments of Neronian policy that we may be justified in thinking that they arrived in Italy at a time when the tide was flowing strongly against Nero, and the date of this can be estimated: if Nero made his major preparations only after receiving news that Galba too was in revolt (c. 15th April) and sent word to Illyricum almost at once, our calculations above would suggest that it was only about 29th May that all four legions arrived at their destination in N. Italy. By this time word will have reached Italy not only of Vesontio, but also, of course, of Verginius' "constitutionalist" stance, and perhaps also of the defection of Turpilianus and Rubrius.

At this point the Illyrian legions will have discussed and finally sent off their mission to Verginius (H 1.9.3, urging him to declare himself a candidate for the Principate, presumably). Of the four legions, XIV Gemina apparently held out the longest for Nero (cf. H 2.11.1: longa illis erga Neronem fides) but was ultimately induced to desert by its auxiliary cohorts of Batavians, who subsequently set out for home on their own (H 2.27.2: coercitos a se quartadecimanos, oblatam Neroni Italiam atque omnem belli fortunam in ipsorum manu sitam iactantes; cf. H 1.59.1 and 1.64.2). It was the news of this defection above all others (but including perhaps for the first time definite news of the defection of Petronius and Rubrius; cf. Dio 63.27.1a, and perhaps also H 1.89.2) which induced in Nero his final loss of nerve (S. Ner. 47.1). Since this news apparently reached him the day before his deposition and suicide (S. Ner. 47.1 - 49.4), we may assume that debate among the Illyrian legions was fairly protracted and that the decision to
abandon Nero and approach Verginius may have been reached as late as 4th or 5th June (for the time taken by messages to travel from the vicinity of Cremona to Rome, see below, O 11.2, n. on circa lucem...nonagensimo et quinto imperii die). By this time too word not only of Verginius' "constitutionalist" attitude, but also of the German legions' repeated attempts to proclaim him Princeps (both before and after Vesontio), could have become widespread; hence the addition of the voice of the Illyrian legions. If, however, the battle of Vesontio was fought earlier than about 10th May, it is unlikely that there would have been any need for protracted debate among the Illyrian troops after their arrival in Italy, since the current would have been running overwhelmingly strongly against Nero by the end of May.

Finally, there is the series of coins issued in Corinth which seem to imply rejection of Nero by the administration in Greece (see above pp. 130-131, for details). If Mattingly's interpretation of this series is correct, we must assume as early a date as possible for Vesontio.

Between the apparently conflicting claims for (a) a later date for the battle, suggested by the reluctance of part at least of the Illyrian army to abandon Nero, and (b) an early date, suggested by the Corinthian coinage, our possible freedom of choice is not great: hence the suggestion 10th - 15th May, which seems to fit all the available data.

non multum afuit quin vitae renuntiaret: this must have been an immediate panic-reaction to the news of the battle of Vesontio
and the death of Vindex. Galba presumably interpreted these events as a sign that Verginius had decided to seize supreme power for himself. In such an event Galba would, of course, have stood no chance of prevailing: hence his alarm and despondency, and the letter to Verginius (Plut. G 6.5-6), παρακαλῶν κοινοπραγεῖν καὶ διαφυλάσσειν ἀμα τὴν ἡγεμονίαν καὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν Ἰταλοῖς. However, receipt of detailed information about the battle, and possibly even a reply from Verginius, will have shown him that his chances were not appreciably weakened. The withdrawal to Clunia reported by Plutarch (loc. cit.) seems to have been subsequent to the initial thoughts of suicide. Plutarch says that Galba passed his time in Clunia regretting what had happened and longing for his customary ἀπαγγελνή: perhaps he decided simply to appear to let events take their course. Moreover, S.'s story of contemplated suicide may simply represent a highly-coloured version (Cluvius Rufus?) of the story followed by Plutarch's source (Pliny?).
Introduction: The evidence for the principate of Galba is unsatisfactory: as biographers, both Suetonius and Plutarch concentrate mainly on the personality of the princeps and do not give either a balanced account of his policies or a narration of his actions with a firm chronological base; Tacitus concentrates on the last two weeks of Galba's life starting with 1st January, 69, and details of events and policies from the earlier part of the principate are given either in summaries (perhaps corresponding to modern footnotes) or in asides: in spite of this, however, Tacitus remains the most useful of the literary sources; the epitomes of Dio are simply a scrappy rag-bag; and whilst inscriptions, coins and papyri are useful and informative, they cannot serve as a remedy for what is lacking in our other evidence. It follows, therefore, that a detailed history of the principate of Galba cannot be written.

In the commentary on chapters 11-17 which follows, an attempt is made to elucidate as fully as possible the matters on which Suetonius has touched: but his picture of Galba's principate has to be supplemented from our other source material, and since there is no adequate chronological framework for the period, a topic-by-topic analysis becomes the obvious method of procedure.

1. Galba's "Party"

As we have seen (above, 9.2, n. on nec diu cunctatus), Galba
perhaps started, in a rather desultory way, to plot an attempt at
supreme power as early as A.D. 66-67. We have also seen (above,
10.3, n. on etiam per provincias...causam iuvarent) that support
came rapidly after he did make his bid for power at the beginning of
April, 68; to recapitulate, the list of Galba's known (or probable)
supporters before his recognition at Rome is as follows: A. Caecina
Alienus, Cornelius Fuscus, Cornelius Laco, C. Fabius Valens, Ti.
Julius Alexander, Lucceius Albinus, C. Nymphidius Sabinus, Pedanius
Costa, M. Salvius Otho, T. Vinius Rufinus, and the unknown proconsul
Africarum. This, we may presume, is not the whole of Galba's following,
and from chance references we gain a few additional names: e.g.
Raecius Gallus, a Spanish supporter of Galba, who apparently accompanied
him to Rome (the text at MW 256 is incorrect; cf. J. M. Reynolds,
JRS 61 [1971] 144 and n. 65); Pompeius Longinus, a tribune of
the Praetorian Guard at the beginning of A.D. 69, who is described as
e Galbae amicis (H 1.31.3); Antonius Primus, appointed legatus of
Galba's new Legio VII (H 2.86.1-2 - he was of Gallic origin; cf. Vit.
18); and conceivably also Cn. Julius Agricola from Forum Julii (cf.
Tac. Agr. 6.5). Consular designations will reveal a few additional
names (see below).

From these names it can be seen that, although Galba may have
had contacts among members of the "opposition" to Nero (cf. above,
9.2, n. on nec diu cunctatus), his main supporters were not prominent
in that opposition; equally, they were not those who had achieved
senior administrative positions towards the end of Nero's principate;
and they were not survivors of the old Republican nobility. In the
main, they were energetic men in middle-ranking administrative posts,
11-17  The Principate of Galba: Introduction, cont.

frequently with rather "unsatisfactory" reputations, who were trying to restore their personal fortunes (e.g. Otho was really in exile in Lusitania: cf. H 1.13.3: Antonius Primus had been exiled for forging a will: cf. Ann. 14.40; and the entire career of T. Vinius was a catalogue of scandal and disgrace: cf. below 14.2, n. on T. Vinius legatus...cupiditatis immensae), or they were simply opportunists, who hoped to obtain senior appointments without moving through the regular stages of promotion and advancement (cf. the cases of Cornelius Laco and Caecina Alienus, below).

From his treatment of areas in Spain and Gaul which either supported or opposed him (see below, 12.1, n. on civitates Hispaniarum Galliarumque...punisset), we can see that Galba distributed rewards and punishments on a strictly party basis. It was therefore valuable to have supported and assisted him before his general recognition as princeps, and he was doubtless enough of a Roman of the old school to feel himself to be under an obligation to satisfy the claims for advancement of the members of his "party", unsatisfactory in many ways though some of these men undoubtedly were.

2.  Galba's Administrative Appointments

a) Rome

Cornelius Laco was appointed praefectus praetorio, possibly even before Galba left Spain (Plut. C 13.1; cf. H 1.13.1-2; see further below, 14.1, n. on Cornelius Laco...intolerabilis); A. Ducenius Geminus, cos. suff. before A.D. 62 (PIR² D 201), became praefectus urbi (H 1.14.1); and Plotius Firmus, more a supporter
11-17 The Principate of Galba: Introduction, cont.
of Otho than of Galba, became praefectus vigilum (H 1.46.1; cf. H 1.82.2; 2.46.2; 2.49.3).

With regard to consular designations, it is impossible to say when the last pair of A.D. 68, C. Bellicus Natalis and P. Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus, took up office, or whether they were designated by Nero or by Galba. Bellicus came from Vienna, a city on which Galba conferred multus honor (H 1.65.1), and it is quite possible that Galba did appoint this pair for the last three months of 68, as Townend argues (AJP 83 [1962] 117; also, Syme, Tacitus 592 n. 4). For 69, Townend argues convincingly (op. cit. 118-120, 124) that Galba's designations were as follows: January to March - Galba and T. Vinius; April to June - Cn. Arulenus Caelius Sabinus and T. Flavius Sabinus (the original ordinarii in Nero's designations for this year); July to September - Arrius Antoninus and Marius Celsus (Arrius and Cingonius Varro, executed for his involvement with Nymphidius Sabinus, had been Nero's original suffecti for 69); October to December - Valerius Marinus and Pedanius Costa (this pair was subsequently cut out by Vitellius: H 2.71.2). All of these must have been at least acceptable to Galba: Arrius Antoninus, presumed to be of Narbonenian origin, possibly from Nemausus (Syme, Tacitus 605, 683), will have suited well Galba's policy of honouring the parts of Gaul which had supported him (if indeed he was not a Galban nominee, substituted for an unattested colleague of Cingonius Varro); Marius Celsus, Valerius Marinus and Pedanius Costa were all, presumably, important supporters of Galba: unfortunately, little is known of Marinus (PIR V 76, cf. 75; Hanslik, RE VIII A s.v. "Valerius" no. 232; cf. Townend, op. cit.
11-17  The Principate of Galba: Introduction, cont.
120 n. 5), but Marius Celsus was Galbae usque in extremas res amicus fidusque (H 1.45.2) and seems to have belonged to an inner circle of amici (cf. his presence among only four advisers at the time of Galba's adoption of Piso: H 1.14), and Pedanius Costa seems to have been active on Galba's behalf as one of Verginius Rufus' legates in Upper Germany in A.D. 68 (H 2.71.2).

For 70, Townend argues (op. cit. 125-129) that the only known Galban nominee is Valerius Asiaticus from Vienna: he had been a prominent supporter of Vindex (H 2.94.2) and was presumably also a partisan of Galba.

b) Army High Commands and Provincial Government.

Lower Germany: Fonteius Capito retained his command for some time after Nero's death. At least two of the legionary legates were supporters of Galba, C. Fabius Valens, who may have been in touch with him even before the revolt of Vindex (cf. H 1.52.3 and above, 9.2, n. on nec diu cunctatus), and Cornelius Aquinus (H 1.7.1-3). These two killed Fonteius in somewhat mysterious circumstances (see below 11, n. on Fonteio Capitone). Fonteius was not replaced immediately, but late in 68 Galba sent Aulus Vitellius to take over (H 1.9.1; 1.52.1-2): the appointment was apparently sudden and surprising (Vit. 7.1).

Upper Germany: Verginius Rufus was quickly recalled and replaced by the disastrous Hordeonius Flaccus (see H 1.9.1 for Tacitus' scathing introduction). Of the existing legionary legates, one at least was replaced by A. Caecina Alienus, quaestor in Baetica at the time of the revolt of Vindex (H 1.53.1-2): he may even have
replaced Pedanius Costa, designated by Galba for a consulship in 69 (H 2.71.2). Julius Burdo, prefect of the classis Germanica, was removed by Vitellius (H 1.58.1): he too will have been a supporter of Galba, if not appointed by him.

Gaul: Lugdunensis was vacant (Vindex had been governor); Aquitania too was probably vacant (the governor appears to have opposed Vindex; see above, 9.2). Junius Blaesus, an elegant but perhaps rather inert figure, was put in charge of Lugdunensis, though he left it early in 69 and accompanied Vitellius to Rome (H 1.59.2; 2.59.2; 3.38-39). The governor of Aquitania is not known, nor of the senatorial province of Narbonensis. Belgica was governed by Valerius Asiaticus (H 1.59.2) and this may well have been a Galban appointment (see further Townend, _AJP_ 83 [1962] 125-129; Weynand, _RE_ VIII A s.v. "Valerius" n. 107); Galba's procurator in Belgica was the vigorous and loyal Pompeius Propinquus (H 1.12.1; 1.58.1).

Spain: Tarraconensis was vacant after Galba's elevation; Otho left Lusitania when Galba left Spain; cf. H 1.21-23) and the governor of Baetica may have been executed (cf. above 10.3, n. on etiam per provincias...causam iuarent). Galba seems to have united all three Spanish provinces under Cluvius Rufus (H 1.8.1: Hispaniae praerat Cluvius Rufus vir facundus et pacis artibus, bellis inexpertus; cf. H 2.58, where the defence of Baetica seems to have been in his hands); he had, however, two legions under his command - VI Victrix (left by Galba) and X Gemina sent from Pannonia late in 68 (cf. H 2.58.2; 3.44).

Danubian Provinces: Galba appears to have made few alterations to the existing arrangements. The governors of Pannonia and Dalmatia
The Principate of Galba: Introduction, cont.

were Tampius Flavianus and Pompeius Silvanus respectively - divites senes (H 2.86.3), and there is no reason to suppose that they were appointed by Galba. However, Galba's enthusiastic partisan Cornelius Fuscus (see above, 10.3, n. on etiam per provincias... causam iuvarent) was made procurator, apparently in both provinces, partly, no doubt, to keep an eye on things in Galba's interest (H 2.86.3). The new Spanish legion VII Galbiana was sent to Pannonia late in 68, under the command of Antonius Primus, whose dash and energy became patent in 69.

Asia Minor: according to Tacitus (H 2.9) Galba appointed Calpurnius Asprenas governor of Galatia and Pamphylia. An inscription from Lepcis Magna (IRT 346 = MW 303) mentions a L. Nonius Asprenas who had, at about this time, been governor of Galatia, Paphlagonia, Pamphylia and Pisidia: the two individuals are probably one and the same (IRT 346 n. 4; cf. Groag, RE XVII s.v. "Nonius" no. 29; Thomasson, RE Suppl. IX 463). This appears to have been a new arrangement of districts, doubtless undertaken in the interests of efficiency.

Africa: the government was presumably reconstructed after the destruction of Clodius Macer (cf. below, 11, n. on in Africa... Clodio Macro). At the time of Otho's coup the proconsul Africae was C. Vipstanus Apronianus (H 1.76.3), cos. ord. A.D. 59: either he was the proconsul, favourable to Galba, whom Macer ousted, or else he was appointed after Macer's death at Galba's behest (cf. Hanslik, RE IX A s.v. "Vipstanus" no. 1; B. E. Thomasson, Die Statthalter... Nordafrikas II.44). The legatus pro praetore exercitus Africae was, by the middle of A.D. 69, Valerius Festus, a relation by marriage of Vitellius (H 2.98.1; 4.49.1).
11-17 The Principate of Galba: Introduction cont.

Mauretania: in Caesariensis Luceceius Albinus, the procurator in charge of the government, had been an early adherent of Galba (above, 10.3, n. on etiam per provincias...causam iuvarent). Subsequently, Galba put him in charge in Tingitana as well: he was vigorous and unscrupulous (H 2.58-59).

Syria, Judaea, Egypt: C. Licinius Mucianus, T. Flavius Vespasianus and Ti. Julius Alexander all quickly swore allegiance to Galba after Nero's death (cf. H 1.10 and 11), and it appears that no changes were made in the government of these provinces.

There are certain obvious conclusions to be drawn from this evidence: in general, but especially in armed provinces near Italy, Galba preferred to have rather sluggish nonentities in the top jobs (e.g. Hordeonius and Vitellius in Germany, Cluvius Rufus in Spain, and the divites senes in Illyricum), partisans if possible, but men at all costs who were unlikely to want to make a bid for power. In the middle- and lower-ranking positions Galba sought to place energetic partisans (e.g. Valens and Caecina in Germany, Pompeius Propinquus in Belgica, Cornelius Fuscus and Antonius Primus in Illyricum), who would keep control of their men and report on the senior officers; he doubtless expected that these men would not themselves pose any sort of threat.

We should also note the high proportion of provincials from Gaul among Galba's known appointments. In the main, this will reflect the importance of the revolt of Vindex in Galba's coming to power and will, therefore, represent a settlement of political debts. But possibly it may also suggest something else. As we have seen, some of Galba's supporters were thoroughly disreputable, and this problem
11-17 **The Principate of Galba: Introduction, cont.**

actually became more acute during his principate: the behaviour of his henchmen in Rome was a public scandal (cf. below, nn. on 14.2), Lucceius Albinus in the Mauretania was wild and probably beyond control (H 2.58), and by January, 69, Caecina was about to be tried for embezzlement (H 1.53.1). This will have given his administration a rather raffish aspect; it may also have caused difficulties when Galba sought to make appointments from the pool of available administrative talent in Rome: some people will, no doubt, have felt slighted at being passed over for a particular job, to which they may have felt entitled, in favour of one of Galba's partisans, while others will have been reluctant to become involved with Galba's administration at all. Thus Galba may have been in the awkward position of having a large number of political debts to pay, and yet at the same time of suffering from a shortage of suitable people to appoint to administrative positions (see further below, 15.1, n. on *existimabatur etiam senatoria et equestria officia...invitis ac recusantibus*).

However, given that there was a large number of supporters whom he had to reward, we may conclude that the system which he established for his provincial government was generally sound, and that, with regard to the German armies, he could reasonably have expected little further trouble. As it turned out, he had bad luck in Germany, but if he had not made the fatal mistake in Rome of alienating the Praetorians, he might well have met and overcome the Vitellian challenge.

3. **Galba's Aims and Policies**

As we have seen (above, 10.1 and 10.2, nn. on *consalutusque...*
professus est and e primoribus...instituit), Galba proceeded very cautiously at the beginning of his bid for power and followed a strictly "constitutionalist" line in his candidacy for the principate; and this was only partly in order to retain the support which Vindex had gathered and to avoid offending other "constitutionalists" such as Verginius Rufus: Galba also sought to imitate Augustus in 27 B.C. There are, therefore, few surprises when we examine Galba's aims as outlined on his coinage, which falls into three categories: (a) anonymous coinage issued in Spain, April - June, 68; (b) coinage with Galba's name and titles issued in Spain after news of his recognition by Senate and People: the continuity of types and legends from (a) to (b) guarantees the Galban origin of (a); (c) coinage issued in Rome with Galba's names and titles - obviously after Nero's death.

Common to all three categories are coins stressing the new era which is dawning - ROMA RENASCENS ([a] BMC Imp. I p. 291 nos. 9-11; [b] BMC Imp. I Galba nos. 178-184; [c] BMC Imp. I Galba nos. 26-28) and the freedom which Galba is bringing to the Roman people: in (a) the message LIBERTAS P.R. RESTITVTA is spread over both obverse and reverse and is divided as LIBERTAS P.R./ RESTITVTA (BMC Imp. I p. 290 no. 8) or, perhaps more effective, LIBERTAS/P.R. RESTITVTA (BMC Imp. I p. 290 no. 7); in (b) we find LIBERTAS RESTITVTA (BMC Imp. I Galba nos. 197-198) and in (c) LIBERTAS PR (BMC Imp. I Galba no. 24; cf. also H 1.16.1). Further significant propaganda was issued after Galba's recognition at Rome: in Spain (b) he issued a coin with the legend AVGVSTVS P.R. (BMC Imp. I p. 337 n.), claiming that he was the people's choice as princeps; and from both Spain and Rome (b and c) there are numerous series depicting Livia and bearing the
11-17 The Principate of Galba: Introduction, cont.

legend DIVA AVGVSTA (BMC Imp. I Galba nos. 166-169, 201-202; and 3-13; cf. 54): Livia had been an early patron of Galba (cf. above, 5.2), and so we may conclude that Galba is here emphasizing his personal link with the founder of the Principate. Lastly, in a series of coins apparently from the Roman mint but showing Gallic influence, and so perhaps struck by Gallic moneyers who had accompanied Galba to Rome, we find emphasis on Peace and Freedom as blessings peculiarly associated with the now-established princeps: PAX AVGVSTA (BMC Imp. I Galba, nos. 76, 123-133) and LIBERTAS AVGVSTA (BMC Imp. I Galba, nos. 65-67, 142). Of the latter type Mattingly comments (BMC Imp. I p. ccv): "Perhaps the most popular of all Galba's types - interesting in showing what stress he laid on the constitutional character of his rule."

Furthermore, our belief that Galba's "constitutionalist" line was more than a convenient pose is strengthened when we consider certain specific actions. The German bodyguard which had served the Julio-Claudian principes was abruptly dismissed, presumably because it was "unrepublican" (cf. below, 12.2, n. on Germanorum cohortem... dissolvit). Some of the more objectionable of Nero's freedmen were executed (cf. below, 15.2, n. on quin etiam populo R...increpuit), possibly because Galba was prepared to assert to the full his rights as their patronus in succession to Nero. Similarly, slaves who had acted or spoken against their masters were handed over to these masters for punishment (Dio 64.3.4a): this too represented a somewhat old-fashioned or possibly "republican" attitude to the master-slave relationship, and doubtless served to strengthen the idea that Roman citizens were fundamentally different from other
people; cf. the view that Galba was unwilling to grant Roman citizenship (below, 14.3, but cf. n. ad loc. on civitates R. raro dedit).

More important is Galba's change in the management of the aerarium. It is clear from Tacitus (Hist. 4.9.1) that late in 69 the aerarium was in the charge of praetores aerarii; however, in 56 Nero had appointed praefecti to carry out this function (Ann. 13.38-39; cf. A. H. M. Jones, JRS 40 [1950] 24), and there is no reason to suppose that this arrangement was changed before his death. It looks, therefore, as if either Galba or Otho or Vitellius introduced the new system, and, given Galba's known predilections, it is reasonable to conclude that he restored the Augustan system, which gave control of the state's finances to magistrates of the people rather than to officials appointed by the princeps. This, of course, affected the reality not one whit: it simply looked better and no doubt pleased the Senate.

In general, Galba's policies tended to create public confidence in the new regime, and it may have been in celebration of Galba's arrival in Rome (for discussion of possible dates, see below, 12.2, n. on ut primum urbem introiit) that a group of humble citizens, mostly perhaps freedmen, set up a statue of Libertas restituta on 15th October, A.D. 68 (ILS 238 = MW 30).

With regard to state finance, a policy of retrenchment and strict economy was instituted (for details, see below, 12.3, n. on illa quoque verene an falsa per ludibrium iactabantur): unfortunately, here as so often (cf. below on Plebeian attitudes) Galba seems to have gone too far and caused real hardship, not only through
bankruptcies and sequestrations of property (H 1.20.1-2; cf. below, 15.1, n. on ut...auferretur emporibus, quando illi pretio absumpsit
solvere nequirent), but also perhaps through failure to provide
employment for common people in Rome (cf. Vespasian's care in this
regard: S. Vesp. 18; 19.1): for example, the only public works
undertaken during his Principate of which any record survives are
repairs late in A.D. 68 to the Horrea Sulpicia (or Horrea Galbana;
see above, pp. 81-82). Of course, perhaps not much more could be
expected in the period October, 68 - January, 69.

4. Attitudes to Galba

In his general survey of the main part of Galba's reign (H 1.4-11), Tacitus stresses the great outburst of joy which greeted
Nero's death, followed by varios motus animorum, since the secret of
empire was now revealed: posse principem alibi quam Romae fieri
(H 1.4.1-2). This may be dramatically effective, but as a
statement of fact it is almost certainly premature: cf. below,
16.2, n. on displicere imperatorem...comprobarent. However, it is
probably fair to say that, at the beginning of his Principate, almost
everyone in the Roman state was prepared at least to suspend
judgement on Galba and await developments. And yet, speaking of
a time not long after Galba's arrival in Rome, Suetonius can say:
per haec prope universis ordiuis offensis vel praecipua flagrabit
invidia apud milites (G 16.1). How did such hostile attitudes
develop among the various groups in Roman society?

a) The Senate: members of the Senate may have felt some irritation
at the manner of Galba's "election" (especially the role of Nymphidius
Sabinus and the Praetorian Guard), since now there could not be even the slightest pretence at the traditional (but largely imaginary) "processes of consultation" (but cf. B. Grenzheuser, Kaiser und Senat in der Zeit von Nero bis Nerva [Diss. Münster, 1964] 59).

However, given the generally lickspittle attitudes of the Senate throughout the period described in the Histories of Tacitus, it is hard to sympathize with such irritation. At the beginning of Galba's principate Nymphidius Sabinus was supreme in Rome and the Senate paid him elaborate court and fawned upon his every whim, no matter how outrageous (Plut. G 8.3-4). On the other hand, Tacitus says: sed patres laeti, usurpata statim libertate licentius ut erga principem novum et absentem (H 1.4.3). Presumably this refers to the period immediately after Nymphidius' death, before Galba arrived in Rome. The initiative seized was an attempt to prosecute Neronian delatores (H 2.10; 4.6.1-2): Annius Faustus was prosecuted by Vibius Crispus and soon condemned; and Eprius Marcellus was prosecuted by Helvidius Priscus, who sought revenge for the death of his father-in-law Thrasea Paetus: this case, however, was dropped dubia voluntate Galbae, which suggests that the senate's initiative was really rather cautious.

The senators' dislike of Galba was almost certainly caused by the excessive and obvious power of his henchmen, particularly perhaps the freedman Icelus, and by the executions of several opponents, especially Cingonius Varro and Petronius Turpilianus (these were especially blatant), since almost all of the executed were senators, and since all, it would seem, were killed without trial (cf. below, 14.3, n. on quosdam claros...inauditos condemnavit). The absence of
trials made it possible for speculation to develop that the
victims were really innocent of any wrongdoing, and such speculation
inevitably made Galba appear in a progressively worse light. However,
he does seem to have enjoyed some measure of posthumous popularity
among Senators: see below 23, and cf. J. Gagé, REA 54 (1952) 290-
297.

b) The Equites: the position of the equites is made clear by
Tacitus' comment: primores equitum proximi gaudio patrum (Hist 1.4.3);
as a group, the equites no longer had any political weight and,
therefore, it was only as individuals, as Tacitus points out, that
they could make their views known. However, since the prominent
members of the class were merchants, landowners, and, above all,
"civil servants," they would naturally welcome the idea of a
"constitutionalist" princeps, who would maintain order and security
and free them from fears of arbitrary confiscations, or worse. The
attempt by Galba to recover Nero's gifts, even from those who had
bought them bona fide from the original recipients (cf. below, 15.1,
nn. on liberalitates Neronis...solvere nequirent) will have caused
offence, as will the failure of the regime to maintain high
standards of honesty, but, in the main, by January 69, the equites in
general were probably less hostile to Galba than any other class
in Rome.

c) The Plebs: like the equites, the plebs no longer had any real
political influence (but cf. Z. Yavetz, Plebs and Princeps 103-140),
but their reactions served to indicate the general impression which
the regime created. Tacitus divides the plebs into two groups
(H 1.4.3): the pars populi integra, which included the clients of
11-17 The Principate of Galba: Introduction, cont.
great houses and of those who had been exiled under Nero, had high hopes - presumably for peace, just government and prosperity; whilst the plebs sordida and the worst elements among the slave population (probably, the traditional "urban mob"), living as they did on imperial hand-outs and amusing themselves with circuses and shows, lamented Nero's passing and spread rumours. Galba's economy measures no doubt aroused great opposition among this latter group, since their usually rather wretched existence will have been made more difficult still. But these measures will also have caused hardship among respectable working-class people, as we have seen (above, p. 152). Furthermore, the members of great houses whom Galba brought back from exile did not have their property restored to them (Plut. O 1.4; cf. H 2.92.2); this doubtless irritated some clients and freedmen who had come to hope that their patroni might regain their former wealth and influence, which in turn would probably have meant a better life for themselves.

d) The Army: the only really dissatisfied military group during the principate of Galba consisted of the armies of Upper and Lower Germany. Both armies had lost their commanders-in-chief after Galba's accession; both had been involved in the suppression of the revolt of Vindex (see above, p. 109) and both were regarded with deep suspicion by Galba. For the development and eventual eruption of various frustrations, especially in the army of Upper Germany, see below 16.2, n. on sed maxime fremebat superioris Germaniae exercitus...operae.

e) The Praetorian Guard: the attitudes of the Praetorians were crucial throughout Galba's principate. However, he seems to have been unaware of the extent of his debt to them (cf. below, 16.2, n.
on statimque legationem ad praetorianos cum mandatis destinaverunt)
and they seem to have been remarkably low on his list for rewards
or preferential treatment. Their attitudes towards him were always
cautious and ambivalent, and Galba's continuing failure to pay even
a small part of the donative promised in his name soon brought them
to a state of anger and hostility (see especially II 1.18.3: constat
potuisse conciliari animos quantulacumque parci senis liberalitate):
for a discussion of the donative question and its effect on the
behaviour of the Praetorians, see below nn. on 16.1.

5. Galba's Mistakes
(This section will serve to summarize the main points raised in the
preceding discussion).

Undoubtedly Galba's greatest mistake lay in his handling of
the military generally: his treatment of the army of Upper Germany
was tactless, but his behaviour towards the Praetorians was utterly
foolish: given the situation in 68-69, he was in no position to
insist on discipline and at the same time to refuse to pay the
promised donative. Furthermore, his legati and his praefecti were
incompetent, or wilfully blind, or disloyal: Otho's conspiracy was
neither very widespread nor particularly discreet and it should
have been detected and dealt with. His purges and executions added
tension when nerves were already strained. All in all, we may
conclude that Galba was out of touch with nearly every aspect of
military affairs during his principate.

Ultimately, this was his own fault, because he was shielded from
reality by his principal henchmen in Rome, and he had given them
their places and their power. Furthermore, these favourites were so outrageously corrupt or so totally incompetent that they brought the regime into disrepute (H 1.6; cf. below, 14.2 and nn. on his favourites; 15.2 and nn.), and Galba became the principal target for the hatred and contempt which his aides had aroused.

And so a picture of Galba developed which depicted him as a weak and helpless old man and there can be little doubt that he no longer had sufficient drive and energy for the task which he had undertaken. At this point we may recall his gradual change to desidia segnitiae in Spain and wonder at its real cause (above, 9.1); arguably, by A.D. 68 Galba was becoming increasingly elderly and less and less able to rouse himself to sustained activity; because of the threat to himself at the time of the revolt of Vindex he made a supreme effort of will and won through; but by the time he reached Rome his impetus was spent - hence his almost total reliance on his favourites, hence the wide gap between his advertised aims and his actual policies, and hence his automatic reliance on disciplina (or saevitia, as his opponents called it; cf. G 12.1, and n. on praecesserat de eo...avaritiae) whenever problems arose. Even the adoption of L. Calpurnius Piso Licinianus reveals signs of Galba's lack of contact with reality: Piso was completely without administrative or military experience and, at best, aroused only the polite but largely indifferent support of senators (H 1.19.1) and got nowhere with the praetorians (cf. below 17 and nn.)

The net result was that by mid-January, 69, Galba's regime came to be regarded as little better than Nero's, and since Galba was economising on public expenditure, the people lacked the diversions
which Nero had provided: eademque novae aulae mala, aeque gravia, non aeque excusata (H 1.7.3).

supervenientibus ab urbe nuntiis: S. here has simplified a somewhat complex process. We learn from S. (below, 22) and Plutarch (G 7.1-3) that the first word was brought by Galba's freedman Icelus: he had been in Rome at the beginning of Galba's revolt and had been imprisoned by Nero; he was released at Nero's fall and, after viewing his body, as Galba's agent gave permission for it to be cremated unmutilated as Nero himself had requested (S. Ner. 49.4). Icelus then made the journey from Rome to Clunia in seven days (sc. from Nero's death), which means that he reached Galba late (βραχὺ πρὸ δὲ έξιμα) on 16th June, a remarkable time for a journey of something over 1100 mp by road. (Probably impossible: a daily average of c. 160 mp for a dispatch rider is nowhere else attested. Presumably he made a fast voyage from Ostia to Tarraco in about five days and then galloped to Clunia). Plutarch also tells us that a further report arrived two days later (G 7.5: part of the text is doubtful; for a possible reconstruction involving Iustus Minicius, who was praefectus castrorum of Legio VII Gemina in September 69, see A. I. Kessissoglu, Hermes 103 [1975] 127-8 and cf. H 3.7.1): these messengers brought the exact text of the senate's decrees. We may assume that they, using the facilities of the cursus publicus, had journeyed by the regular route from Rome to Spain, leaving a little later than Icelus: their average speed of c. 122 mp per day is quite feasible for official dispatches (see further below 12.2, n. on ut primum urbem introiit).
Nero probably died on 9th June, A.D. 68: his dies imperii was 13th October, A.D. 54 (Ann. 12.69.1) and the length of his reign is given by ancient chronographers as either 13 years 7 months 28 days (Holzapfel, Klio 12 [1912] 488 n. 1) or 13 years 7 months 27 days (ibid. 488 n. 2). Dio gives us other useful data: at 63.29.3 he gives the length of Nero's reign as 13 years and 8 months lacking 2 days (Zonaras): at 66.17.4 he states that 1 year and 22 days elapsed from the death of Nero to the accession of Vespasian (1st July A.D. 69; H 2.79; S. Vesp. 6.3). June 9th is the only date which fits all these data: 13 years 7 months and 28 days is reached by "inclusive calculation", Greek and Roman; 13 years 7 months and 27 days by "compensative calculation", Greek and Roman. Dio's statements fit 9th June, again by "compensative calculation", Greek and Roman.

Accordingly if we accept that the majority of ancient chronographers take 9th June A.D. 68 as Galba's dies imperii we get a precisely similar variation in the accounts of the length of his reign: 7 months 6 days (Holzapfel, op. cit. 488 n. 4) and 7 months 7 days (ibid. 488 n. 5), to 15th January, 69 (H 1.27.1; Plut. G 24.3). It remains likely, however, that Galba himself counted 2nd or, more probably, 3rd April 68 as his dies imperii (cf. above 10.1, n. on cum...conscendisset tribunal).

deposita legati suscepit Caesaris appellationem: by A.D. 68 'Caesar' was probably as much a title as a name, and by assuming it along with 'Imperator' and 'Augustus', which had never
been anything but titles, Galba was apparently laying claim to the entire inheritance of the Julio-Claudian house - their auctoritas, their patrimonium and, especially, their clientela. However, it seems likely that he proceeded cautiously: we do not have a precise timetable for his assumption of the various titles and powers, but it is clear from other accessions that the Senate normally took the first legal step in transferring the principate from one person to another by swearing an oath of loyalty and by passing a decree conferring on the new princeps the titles and powers customarily held by his predecessors (cf. **HI** 1.47.1; 2.55.2; Plut. G 28.1; Dio 64.6.5a and 8.1): this served as an enabling act, but it was, from the strictly legal point of view, of no constitutional weight, since the proposal had to be taken to an assembly of the people for confirmation. By A.D. 68 such confirmation was the merest of formalities; however, it was scrupulously adhered to; cf. AFA after Otho's accession (= MW 2g), esp. 16th Jan. (restored), 26th Jan., 28th Feb., 5th March, 9th March.

This distinction between theory and practice may account for the slightly ambiguous information about Galba's acknowledgement and titles given in our sources: Dio 63.29.6 (cf. Zonaras 11, 13 p. 42, 10-20 D) speaks of the Senate voting him τῆν ἄρχην, but adds that he did not adopt the name of Caesar until the Senate's envoys met him (at Narbo, according to Plut. G 11.1); Plut. (G 7.5) speaks of "resolutions" (τὰ δὲξαντα) of the Senate (cf. 7.2 where it is reported that the army, Senate and people proclaimed Galba emperor). Given Galba's earlier caution, we may perhaps conclude that Dio is correct.
As for Galba's other titles, on his coins he is usually SER.

GALBA IMP. CAESAR AVG. TR. P (e.g. BMC Imp. I p. 318 no. 63 = MW 28). The title P.M. was conferred by 22nd December, 68 (ILS 1988 = ME 396) and P.P. occurs only on the "posthumous" coinage (BMC Imp. I ccxv).

iterque ingressus est paludatus...pectus: we may presume that Galba did not leave Spain until he had settled affairs there (cf. below, 12.1 n. on civitates Hispaniarum Galliarumque) and made arrangements for its government. On his journey Galba sent Hordeonius Flaccus to replace Verginius Rufus in Upper Germany; Verginius then met Galba on his march and joined his suite (apparently before Galba reached Narbo: Plut. G 10.6-7; cf. 11.1).

For the date of Galba's arrival in Rome, see below 12.2, n. on ut primum urbem introiit.

The picture of the aged Galba doggedly acting as a soldier on the march (paludatus) because he still had enemies may seem to us at best only slightly comical; but by Dio's time it was regarded as incurring πάνυ πολὺν γέλωτα (64.3.4). However, the dagger which Galba wore seems to have been highly important; see A.-J. Reinach in Daremberg-Saglio, Dictionnaire des antiquités s.v. 'Pugio', p. 764 n. 12: the entire army adopted the pugio as a personal weapon during the Principate, "même les empereurs pour qui c'était comme le symbole de leur droit de vie et de mort pour les soldats; Tac. Hist. III, 68; Sueton. Galba 11; Vitell. 15."

nec prius usum togae recuperavit...legatis: this sentence
suggests that the deaths of Nymphidius Sabinus, Fonteius Capito and Clodius Macer, after which Galba resumed civilian garb, occurred before his arrival in Rome, i.e. while he was still on the march; cf. *iter ingressus est*. Until he was sure that all threats to his authority had been crushed, Galba preferred to present himself as a *vir militaris*, an *imperator* rather than a *princeps*; perhaps this was intended to palliate somewhat the questionable legality of the executions carried out during this period (cf. below 12.1, n. on *praepositos...liberis*).

praefecto praetori Nymphidio Sabino Romae: Tacitus too passes over Nymphidius' attempted coup very rapidly: he tried to seize the imperial position for himself but was killed (H 1.5.1-2). However, Plutarch gives a copious account of events in Rome prior to Galba's arrival (G 2; 8-9; 13-15): Nymphidius had hoped to be able to act as the real power behind Galba; he ordered his colleague Tigellinus to resign and fabricated a 'spontaneous' demand from the Praetorians to Galba that he should be appointed sole Praetorian Prefect for life. The Senate deferred to his pretensions, and he started to aspire to the principate: he claimed to be a natural son of C. Caesar, began to construct partes, and sent a spy to watch Galba's actions.

Galba either knew nothing of his pretensions or else simply ignored them: he appointed Cornelius Laco as his Praetorian Prefect and disregarded subsequent alarmist letters which Nymphidius, now growing desperate, sent him. Nymphidius therefore decided to launch his coup by presenting himself to the Praetorians (a clumsy mistake,
especially since the officers of the Guard had already refused to send Galba an ultimatum), and the attempt misfired badly: Antonius Honoratus, one of the praetorian tribunes, rallied the men and they killed Nymphidius when he came to the camp. Galba subsequently ordered the executions of such of Nymphidius' followers as had not committed suicide, especially Cingonius Varro, consul designate, who had written the speech which Nymphidius had intended to deliver to the Praetorians, and Mithridates of Pontus (apparently a client princeling).

On Nymphidius' background and earlier history, see Stein, RE XVII s.v. 'Nymphidius' no. 5; Dessau, PIR N 200; also G. Manfrè, "Il tentativo imperiale di Gaio Ninfidio Sabino," RFIC 19 (1941) 118-120.

in Germania Fonteio Capitone: the case of Fonteius Capito is rather mysterious (cf. Kappelmacher, RE VI s.v. 'Fonteius' no. 18; Groag, PIR² F 468). He belonged to a family which had achieved curule office in the second century B.C. (though not the consulship until 33 B.C.) and was remembered for its continuae praeturae (Cic. Font. 41 (31), perhaps a reference to the praetors of 169, 168 and 166 B.C.; cf. MRR I pp. 424, 428, 429, 434, 437). Fonteius was consul ordinarius in A.D. 67 and doubtless replaced one of the Scribonii as legatus of the army of Lower Germany. In Germany, he executed Julius Paulus of the Batavian royal family on a trumped-up charge of rebellion (H 4.13.1 - perhaps in connection with the revolt of Vindex, though the Tacitus context makes this doubtful), and he was avaritia et libidine foedum ac maculosum (H 1.7.2). His relations with his senior officers seem to have been bad: Julius
Burdo, praefectus Germanicae classis, invented some sort of accusation and subsequently plotted against his life (H 1.58.1-2); two of his legionary legates, Cornelius Aquinus and Fabius Valens, actually killed him, without receiving instructions so to do: Tacitus is scathing about Galba's failure to make any inquiry into this affair (H 1.7.1), and twice suggests that Fonteius was killed because he would not conspire against Galba (H 1.7.2; 3.62.2). But we also learn that Fonteius was nihilominus militibus gratus (H 1.58.2), which makes the soldiers' readiness to obey Valens and yet blaze out against Julius Burdo when the Vitellian revolt began the more surprising.

Both Plutarch (G 15.3) and S. (here) have Galba regard Fonteius as a dangerous and even active opponent, and Dio preserves a strange anecdote about Fonteius calling himself Caesar (64.2.3). Whatever justification there may have been for the killing of Fonteius, the deed came to be regarded as simply another specimen of Galba's 'tyranny' (cf. H 1.37.3) and knowledge of the precise details was either lost or suppressed.

in Africa Clodio Macro: for Macer's activities up till approximately the time of Nero's death, see above, pp.130-131. The attempt, if any, of Calvia Crispinilla to keep Macer loyal to Nero failed since, according to Plutarch (G 6.1), he and Verginius ἄντις καθ' εαυτός έμπρατον. However, his occupation of Carthage and ousting (or killing) of the proconsul Africae was, in Mattingly's view (BMC Imp. I ccxviii, 362-363), preceded by the issue of a series of denarii in which Galba is named and bears the titles IMP. AVG., which should come after 9th June. Subsequently,
Macer himself issued a series of coins bearing marked resemblances to the Galba coinage just mentioned: it presumably came from the same mint, which can only have been Carthage (see Mattingly, BMC Imp. I clxxxvi - clxxxviii for a discussion of this coinage along with a possible chronology of Macer's revolt; the coins are described on pp. 285-287). Macer's line in Africa was basically similar to Galba's in Spain: he called himself propraet. Africæ (BMC Imp. I 285 no. 1 = Sm. 73) and stressed Rome and the Constitution (his name usually appears in the genitive, in the Republican manner). He gave his legion III Augusta the surname Liberatrix and enlisted a new legion I Macriana, which was also given the surname Liberatrix (subsequently disbanded with its auxilia by Galba: H 2.97.2).

However, the threat he posed looked more serious than it turned out to be; he was doomed from the beginning because of the smallness of his resources and his failure to attract any support outside Africa. Nevertheless, although he was dealt with quite easily - his murder was arranged, on Galba's order, by the procurator Trebonius Garutianus (H 1.7.1 and 11.2; H 4.49: one of the actual murderers was a centurion named Papiarius) - he did manage to make trouble: as we have seen (above, p. 130), grain ships were kept back and there seems to have been unrest in Rome after Nero's death (Plut. G 13.4 - because of the grain shortage; cf. H 1.73). Macer is said to have committed robberies and murders through cruelty and greed (Plut. G 6.2), and neither the inhabitants of the province nor the officers there seem to have had much enthusiasm for him; after his death the province was quiet (H 1.11.2).
His death probably preceded Galba's arrival in Rome (Plut. G 15.3, compared with 15.5, and H 1.37.3 seem to imply this, whilst H 1.7.1 does not necessarily contradict it): S. also seems to place this event before Galba's entry into Rome (cf. 12.2, below), and it would be reasonable to assume that in this sentence he places the deaths of Nymphidius, Fonteius and Clodius in their correct chronological order.

On Macer see further Groag, RE IV s.v. 'Clodius' no. 38; Stein, PIR² C 1170; J. Burian, "L. Clodius Macer, dominus minor Africae," Klio 38 (1960) 167-173.

12.1 Praecesserat de eo fama saevitiae simul atque avaritiae: this chapter and its successors (to the end of 15), which credit Galba with no forward-looking policies whatever, doubtless represent the common opinion of him which (presumably) developed and found literary expression during the Flavian period; likewise, although S. also says (below, 14.1), ...quamquam multa documenta egregii principis daret, he does not give a single specific example: after Nero's financial recklessness any attempt to institute a policy of economic restraint, however necessary, was bound to be unpopular (see below, 12.3, n. on illa quoque... iactabantur).

As regards saevitia, Galba himself would no doubt have called it disciplina, or perhaps severitas (on which cf. above 6.3 and H 3.57.1).

civitates Hispaniarum Galliarumque...punisset: there is
12.1-
here no suggestion that Galba rewarded anyone for supporting him,
and yet, on balance, there is more evidence about this than there
is about punishments.

Spain: apart from the remark below about Tarraco and its golden
crown, there is no evidence of punishment meted out to Spanish
civitates. Clunia (see above, 9.2, n. on Cluniae) was honoured and
perhaps even made a colonia.

Gaul: for a general statement of Galba's policy of distributing rewards
and punishments on a strictly party basis, see H 1.8.1, which mentions
a grant of Roman citizenship and a reduction of taxation, as well as
confiscation of lands from some tribes close to the German armies:
these were principally the Treviri and the Lingones (though there
were others: H 1.53.3 - 54.1; cf. H 1.57.2); Lugdunum too seems to
have suffered the loss of its revenues (H 1.65.1 - the exact meaning
of redivus is unclear: Heraeus suggested that it refers to Nero's
16.13.3, but this seems unlikely). Of the places favoured, we know
that Vienna was honoured (though in what form is not made clear; cf.
H 1.65.1); we cannot necessarily deduce from H 1.51.4 that it was the
Sequani and Aedui who received remission of a quarter of their tribute
and gifts at state expense, though this would seem to be a reasonable
assumption, as witness CIL V 6887, which refers to a community called
colonia Sequanorum (Vesontio?): since there was usually some sort of
municipal body to serve as a focus for romanization when a grant of
citizenship was given, we may assume that the Sequani at least shared
in the grant mentioned in H 1.8.1.

Beyond this there remains the puzzling evidence of the coins issued
by the mint at Tarraco in 68-69 which depict on the obverse three prisoners with their hands tied behind their backs, with the legend QUADRAGENSVMA REMISSA (BMC Imp. I 345 no. 205 plus n.; cf. MW 29). These should be considered in conjunction with other coins bearing the legend R.XL. (obviously remissa quadragensima) issued in Gaul (e.g. BMC Imp. I 319 no. 66 and n.; 322 nos. 84-86; for Mattingly's discussion see ccv-ccvi and ccix). The prisoners may plausibly be taken to represent the Neronian agents who plundered Spain (cf. Plut. G 4.1), but the problem of the remitted fortieth remains: Mattingly emphasizes that this legend appears only on Spanish and Gallic coins, which would suggest that it particularly concerns these two provinces. He adds: "There can be no serious doubt that Galba remitted the portorium, the 'quadragensuma Galliarum,' or 2.1/2 per cent. import and export duty." (op. cit. ccvi). The portorium was paid on all goods going in and out of Gaul, and since a great many items from Spain would naturally pass into Gaul, the Spanish provinces too would benefit by the remission. If this is not sufficient justification for having this legend on coins struck in Spain, we may perhaps assume that the portorium Hispaniarum was also 2.1/2% and that it too was remitted (cf. Mattingly, op. cit. ccvi n. 1), but this is the only "evidence" for such an assumption at this time (cf. CIL XIV 4708, which indicates that during the 2nd or 3rd cents. - under an 'Antoninus' - there was a quadragensima Hispaniarum et Galliarum). There is another possibility: as we have seen, certain Gallic communities received a remission of Tribute amounting to one quarter (H 1.8.1; 1.51.4); if the level of tribute was 10% (as Mattingly observes, "a not improbable figure" - op. cit. ccix n. 3), then one
quarter of this would mean a remission of 2.1/2% or a quadragensima of the whole: this too, we should have to assume, applied to favoured communities in Spain also. This remission was apparently continued by Vespasian (cf. BMC Imp. I ccxv and 354 no.*).

From this discussion we may note that Gaul appears to have been treated more generously than Spain, but Gaul had suffered much more during the revolt of Vindex and romanization had advanced further; cf. Vespasian's grant of Latinitas (only) to Spain (Pliny, NH 3.30); cf. also S. Vesp. 16.1.

praepositos procuratoresque supplicio capitis adfecisset: for a comparison of S.'s uses of supplicio adficere and affligere, see K. R. Bradley, CR 22 (1972) 9-10. As we have already seen (n. immediately preceding), Galba announced the quadragensima remissa in Spain by means of a coin which depicted three men with their hands tied behind their backs. That this beneficence should be proclaimed in a context signifying the punishment of those who had mishandled the collection of revenues during the previous administration seems entirely appropriate, especially in view of what S. tells us here.

The word praepositos is vague: it may apply not only to governors, but also to army officers and almost any type of official. It was suggested above (n. on 10.3, etiam per provincias..iuvarent) that Obultronius Sabinus and Cornelius Marcellus, who were executed in Spain (H 1.37.3), were the governor of Baetica and his legate. Similarly, the legate of Aquitania may have been Betuus Cilo (above, n. on 9.2 legato Aquitaniae), who was killed in Gaul.
Other military men were killed (cf. 14.3, n. on claros... condemnavit) or dismissed (cf. 16.1, n. on removens subinde plerosque), but there is no suggestion elsewhere of wives and children being executed. We should of course remember that, in law, the word caput means not only one's life but all one's rights, privileges and duties as a citizen: any loss of these privileges was capitis deminutio. There were, in strict law, three types of capitis deminutio - minima, minor (or media) and maxima: as punishments only minor and maxima are involved (cf. Gaius Inst. I.160-161), and, if we omit executions, only the various forms of banishment concern us here. Under the Principate exile became a regular punishment rather than, as previously, a method of escaping capital punishment in its conventional sense. Two types of exile involved what might be termed capitis supplicium: aquae et ignis interdictio, where no specific place of exile was designated but the victim lost his citizenship and had his property confiscated, and deportatio (which tended to replace interdictio) which involved all this plus forcible removal to an island or some other appointed place (cf. M. V. Braginton, "Exile under the Roman Emperors," CJ 39 [1943/44] 391-407; J. Crook, Law and Life of Rome, 272-274).

Wives and children certainly did accompany husbands and fathers into exile (cf. H 1.3.1; Pliny, Ep. 7.19.4) and S.'s comments here, taken literally, may mean no more than this, though undoubtedly the aim is to create a different impression.

12.2 ut primum urbem introiit: the date of Galba's arrival in Rome can only be estimated. If we allow him one month in Spain after
receiving word of his acceptance at Rome (16th June; cf. Plut. G 7.1) to settle his affairs there and make new arrangements for the administration of the province, and if we assume that he travelled from Tarraco to Rome by the coastal, the most direct route, the via Augusta, which passes through Narbo Martius (Plut. G 11.1), his journey was one of 987 mp (cf. K. Miller, Itineraria Romana, Strecke 34): since there were doubtless official receptions at numerous points on the route (cf. below 18.1) and since Galba had his new legion with him (cf. H 1.6.1), we are probably justified in assuming a maximum speed of c. 15 mp per day (for the speeds of armies on the march and of dispatch riders, see K. Wellesley, JRS 57 [1967] 25 n. 9, and 27), which means a journey of about 66 days, and an arrival in Rome about 20th September, A.D. 68. It should be stressed that this merely provides a terminus post quem: there are other considerations.

Tacitus tells us (H 1.23) that Otho attempted to ingratiate himself with certain soldiers: studia militum iam pridem... adfectaverat, in itinere, in agmine, in stationibus..., this would appear at first sight to be a reference to Legio VII Galbiana on its march from Spain to Italy; however, later in the same chapter Tacitus says that these soldiers were seriously disaffected because of labores itinerum, inopia commeatuum, duritia imperii and concludes with a remark which reveals that he is talking about the Praetorians: cum Campaniae lacus et Achaiae urbes classibus adire soliti Pyrenaeeum et Alpes et immensa viarum spatia aegre sub armis eniterentur (cf. also H 1.23.1: alios adgnoscere, quosdam requirere). The obvious conclusion is that a detachment from the Guard was
shipped to Spain and accompanied the new Princeps on his journey to Rome (thus Heubner ad H 1.23.1 on studia militum). We should note as well not only the order Pyrenees - Alps, but also the mountains involved: coming along the Riviera coast of France one does not "struggle over" the Alps. We may therefore assume that Galba did not come by the coast road, and if he did not, we may also assume that he visited some areas in the interior of Gaul.

Galba's presence in, perhaps, Vienna might serve to explain the extreme bitterness between that city and Lugdunum (H 1.65); his presence in central Gaul may also serve to explain the term Galbiana applied by the army of Germany to those who had supported Vindex (H 1.51.3): fastidito Vindice scarcely serves to explain why they were not called Vindiciani. Finally, there is Plutarch's remark that Galba felt constrained to show gratitude to Vindex after his death μαλ γεραίσευ δημοσίους ἐναγισμοὺς (C 22.2): this is admittedly reported by Plutarch as hearsay, but it could conceivably mean that Galba went in person to Vesontio (it also suggests that he had no doubts himself as to the motives behind the revolt of Vindex).

If Galba left the "coast road" at Arelate and went to Vienna, but no further into Gaul, his probable route from there would be Vienna - Brigantia - Cottian Alps (Mont Genev्रe) - Augusta Taurinorum - Placentia - Ariminum (Via Aemilia) - Rome (Via Flaminia), a total journey of some 1,170 mp (c. 78 days), giving a t.p.q. for his arrival in Rome of 2nd October. Finally, with a detour to Vesontio and an Alpine crossing by the Pennine pass (Great St. Bernard) the total distance becomes more than 1,300 mp and the t.p.q. becomes 12th October.
Since there was an Alpine crossing, we should probably accept at least the "Vienna hypothesis"; however, 2nd October is only a terminus post. We cannot necessarily assume that Galba covered 15 mp every day, and therefore we may perhaps conclude that his arrival in Rome was not until mid- or even late October (cf. Fluss, RE IV A 785).

nam cum classiarios...decimavit etiam; cf. H 1.6.2; Plut. G 15.5-9; Dio 64.3.1-2. We should perhaps first determine who were the men involved in this incident. Dio speaks of Nero's δορυφόροι, i.e. Praetorians, which is almost certainly wrong, since there was no question of Galba planning a wholesale dismissal of Praetorians; Plutarch speaks of rowers whom Nero had collected into a single legion and called soldiers: this would appear to be a reference to the newly formed Leg. I Adiutrix, but the identification is unlikely, given Tacitus' narrative: he refers to trucidatis tot milibus inermium militum and in the very next sentence, speaking of legions in Rome, mentions remanente ea quam e classe Nero conscripserat, which is of course Legio I Adiutrix. It is clear from S.'s information here about classiarii refusing to return ad pristinum statum and demanding aquilam et signa, that although they had been undergoing training (quos Nero...iustos milites fecerat) they were not yet a regularly constituted legion: Nero had presumably intended to create a Legio II Adiutrix but the necessary arrangements had not been completed by 9th June, 68. With Nero's death and the abandonment of an eastern campaign it seemed unlikely that their services would now be needed (very unlikely, given Galba's financial situation and policies; cf. below 12.3, n. on illa quoque...per ludibrium iactabantur); they
therefore went to the Milvian Bridge on the outskirts of the city (cf. H 1.87.1) to petition Galba on his arrival for their retention as soldiers.

Casualties were no doubt high, but Dio’s 7,000 and Tacitus’ tot milibus must be exaggerations. Both Dio and Tacitus (H 1.37.3) share with S references to decimation: perhaps the casualties were such that they were equivalent to decimation. Finally, we should note that only Dio speaks approvingly of Galba’s action: no doubt this would have become the official line on the incident if Galba had survived.

The repercussions of this incident were considerable: in spite of Galba’s (routine) grant of citizenship to men of Legio I Adiutrix (cf. the military diploma of 22nd Dec. A.D. 68 – CIL XVI 7 = MW 396), the legion remained hostile ob caedem commilitonum and immediately joined Otho when he launched his coup (H 1.31.2 and 3; 1.36.3). Otho subsequently offered service to the survivors of the Milvian Bridge massacre (H 1.87.1), but this presumably ended with the defeat of his party. Later still, the fleet at Ravenna, following the lead of its prefect Lucilius Bassus, went over to the Flavians (H 3.12), a defection which shocked Vitellius and proved decisive in determining the subsequent behaviour of Caecina (H 3.13) and Valens (H 3.40-41), and Tacitus mentions that men from the Ravenna fleet, demanding legionarium militiam, were put into service alongside forces from Dalmatia for the final Flavian drive southwards (H 3.50.3); lastly, almost at the very end of his principate Vitellius sent a legio e classicis to Narnia (H 3.55.1) but it too quickly went over to the winning side (H 3.63.1 & 67.2).
In A.D. 70 we hear of a legion *e recens conscriptis secunda* (II 4.68.4; cf. 5.16.3): there is also a military diploma dated 7th March A.D. 70 referring to men of *Leg. II adiutrix pia fidelis* (CIL XVI 10 = MW 397). The obvious conclusion is that this new legion was raised from the *classici*, mainly from Ravenna, but with perhaps some recruits from the often-disappointed men from Misenum.

On *Legio II Adiutrix* in general, see Ritterling, *RE* XII 1437-1456 espec. 1438-1440.

Germanorum cohortem...dissolvit: there may also have been an element of constitutional propriety in this act, on the grounds that it was unrepublican for a commander-in-chief to have anything more than a *cohors praetoria*. However, the tradition of "barbarian" *corporis custodes* goes back to Marius (App. BCiv. 1.70-71), and Caesar, Decimus Brutus and Octavian before Actium all had something similar (S. DJ 86; App. BCiv. 3.97; S. Aug. 49.1). It was Augustus who chose Germans, principally Batavians, to serve as these *custodes*. Although they were dismissed after the Varus disaster (S. Aug. 49.1), we hear of them at the beginning of Tiberius' principate (Ann. 1.24.2), under Gaius, whose life they failed to save in A.D. 41 (S. Calig. 43 and 58.3), and Nero (Ann. 13.18.3; 15.58.2; cf. S. Ner. 34).

Originally slaves and part of the princeps' *familia*, they may later have included freedmen in their number, as S.'s next remark *ac sine commodoullo remisit in patriam* implies. They established, doubtless for burial purposes, a collegium *Germanorum* (CIL VI 8802-5, 8807-9), and references to *decuriae* and *decoriones* in these
12.2-

inscriptions probably apply to the collegium and not to the organization of the custodes as such: S.'s reference to a cohors probably relates only to their number. The only information extant about the commander and officers of the custodes is S. Calig. 55.2, which, taken with Joseph. AJ 19.122, indicates that Thracian gladiators were so employed in Gaius' day.

Galba's disbanding of these custodes seems to have been permanent; cf. Ann. 1.24.2: ...Germanorum qui tum custodes imperatori aderant.

See further Keune, RE IV 1900-1903; Durry, Les Cohortes prétoriennes, 22-23.

Cn. Dolabellae: cf. Groag, RE IV s.v. "Cornelius" no. 136; Groag, PIR² C 1347 (with stemma facing p. 318). S. appears to have made a mistake about his praenomen: our Dolabella was almost certainly the father of Ser. Dolabella Petronianus (cos. ord. A.D. 86: RE no. 147; PIR² C 1351) and the grandfather of Ser. Cornelius Ser. f. P. nep. P. pronep. P. abnepos Dolabella Metilianus Pompeius Marcellus (CIL IX 3154; RE no. 146; PIR² C 1350). He was related to Galba (H 1.88.1), and Groag (PIR) suggests that his mother was one of Galba's nieces (cf. above 3.4, n. on maior Gaius and stemma): such a relationship would explain why his son and grandson bore the praenomen Servius, according to Groag, but Groag believed that Servius was the praenomen of C. Sulpicius Galba (cos. suff. 5 B.C.), father of the Princeps and grandfather of the Sulpiciae Galbillae. The theory, certainly attractive, remains quite unproven and rather doubtful.
12.2-12.3

Dolabella's wife Petronia (probably the granddaughter of P. Petronius, cos. suff. A.D. 19) had previously been married to A. Vitellius, Otho's successor as Princeps (H 2.64.1). When Galba was considering whom to adopt as his successor, Dolabella's name was put forward (Plut. G 23.2). Galba rejected it and the German guard was dismissed (n. immediately preceding) because its loyalty had apparently been tampered with. Otho subsequently banished Dolabella to Aquinum (H 1.88.1; 2.63.1; Plut. O 5.1), from which he returned to Rome unbidden after Otho's death; Vitellius, who hated him, summoned him to his presence and ordered that he make a détour via Interamnium, where he was to be killed: however, his assassin thought this was too complicated and murdered him in an inn on the way, to the great disrepute of Vitellius' new regime (H 2.63-64).

12.3 illa quoque verene an falso per ludibrium iactabantur: S. concludes this chapter on Galba's saevitia and avaritia with a few anecdotes highlighting Galba's stinginess: they are not really hostile, but we may note that in Plutarch's version of the story of Canus the choraula (G 16.2) the reward was gold pieces and Galba stressed that the money was his own and not the state's: this does not serve the purposes of ludibrium as satisfactorily as do the five denarii, but it illustrates well Galba's concern in the matter of state finance.

The level of public resources was clearly low after the extravagance of Nero's last years (cf. S. Ner. 31-32), but funds were, apparently, not completely exhausted (cf. Plut. O 1.4: some of Nero's
confiscations in kind were still unused at the beginning of Otho's principate). In addition there were fresh, permanent calls upon resources: three new legions had been raised - I Italica (in 67 probably; cf. Ritterling, RE XII 1407-8) and I Adiutrix (H I.6.2) by Nero, and VII Galbiana by Galba himself in Spain (see above, 10.2, n. on legiones...veterem), and in the case of the Spanish legion at least there were new auxilia as well. In addition, Nero had granted libertas to the province of Achaea (limited autonomy and immunity from tribute; cf. S. Ner. 24.2 and the Acraephia inscription = SIG² 814 = Sm. 64: this happened on 28th Nov 66; for the year, cf. CAH X 735 n. 2). For his part, Galba had remitted taxes in Gaul and Spain (cf. above, 12.1, n. on civitates Hispianiarum...punisset). Finally, there was the problem of the donative promised in Galba's name to the Praetorians and others (Plut. G 2.2). The sum involved was huge - the Praetorians' donative alone was in the region of HS 180 million (assuming that the Praetorian cohorts were quingenariae equitatae: cf. Durry, Les cohortes prêtoriennes, 81-89).

On the credit side, Galba had increased taxes in unfriendly areas of Gaul and Spain (above, 12.1; H I.65.1); furthermore, he had sold off all Nero's property in Spain (Plut. G 5.6), but this money was probably quickly spent; the dismissal of the German body-guard, for all its penny-pinching accompaniments, probably represented only a drop in the financial bucket. However, it is perhaps reasonable to conclude that the total state income was less than it had been previously: it is therefore not surprising that Galba practised stringent economies wherever possible, and it is equally not surprising that he should have acquired a reputation for avaritia (cf. Dio 64.2.1).
Nevertheless, while much of what he did was sound and sensible, Galba did tend to carry his severitas to extremes: while it was reasonable to attempt to recover some of Nero's more excessive gifts (see below, 15.1, n. on liberalitates Neronis...solvere nequirit), it was patently unfair to seize property from those who had in good faith purchased it when the recipients of Nero's largesse had chosen to convert the gifts into cash. Similarly, it was unfair (and, in the event, fatal) to refuse to pay the donative (below, 16.1), since this had become traditional (cf. S. Claud. 10.4; Ann. 12.69.2). Finally, we should remember that there was not much employment for common people to be had in Rome other than supplying goods and services to the court and the government generally, including the games, shows and entertainments which were so characteristic a feature of Nero's regime. Excessive economy here would cause real hardship for the plebs urbana: cf. above, p.152.

13 proximo spectaculo apparuit: as we saw above (12.2, n. on ut primum urbem introiit) the earliest possible date for Galba's arrival in Rome would be approx. 20th September, 68, and it is likely that he did not arrive until mid- or late October. The reference will, therefore, be to the ludi scaenici held on 4-12th November as part of the Plebeian Games (4-17th November; the previous games with the ludi scaenici, the Roman Games, had their dramatic performances on 4-12th September and are therefore too early; cf. Habel, RE Suppl V 617-621; L. R. Taylor, TAPA 68 [1937] 285 n. 2).

venit[i] Onesimus a villa: there is considerable doubt
13-14.2
about the reading here; W. A. Schmidt (1891) suggested venit Dorsennus, which is quoted with approval by G. M. Lane (HSCP 9 [1898] 17) as follows:

Venít Dorsennus á villa.

Whether S. or Tacitus more closely reflects the "common source" is impossible to determine; opinions about Galba obviously changed: by the end of 69 after Otho and, especially, Vitellius he will have seemed better than he did in January, 69, particularly to members of the Senate (cf. below, 23). What we have here appears to be a communis opinio which probably developed in the Flavian period.

sed nequaquam tam grata erant quam invisa quae secus fierent: however, no "good" deeds of Galba are specified by S.; cf. H 1.7.2: et inviso semel principi seu bene seu mala facta parem invidiam adferebant. However, in his obituary notice (H 1.49) Tacitus does try to balance Galba's good points with his faults; cf. Dio 64.2.1- 3.4.

14.2 regebatur trium arbitrio, quos...paedagogos vulgo vocabant: S. has in a sense summarised the information about Galba's principal aides which appears in a rather more scattered form in our other sources. He has also perhaps oversimplified
14.2-
matters somewhat; at H 1.6.1 Tacitus speaks scathingly of the
characters and influence of Titus Vinius and Cornelius Laco, and
this is borne out by the picture in Plutarch, which illustrates
Vinius' unfortunate influence on Galba already at work by the time
he reached Narbo (G 11.3-4), and which also shows Laco's growing
influence during the march to Rome; Plutarch ends with the comment
that Galba ὑπὸ Οὐλινίου καὶ Λάμωνος ὀπκ ἐό διοικετθεῖ (G 13.1-2); but Tacitus introduces the freedman Icelus only at
H 1.13: potentia principatus divisa in Titum Vinium consulem Cornelium
Laconem praetorii praefectum; nec minor gratia Icelo Galbae
liberto...: this corresponds to the present passage in S., but in
Tacitus the overall effect is of a subtle downgrading of Icelus' position. Plutarch has nothing corresponding to this passage in S.: he introduces Icelus somewhat artlessly at the time when news of Nero's fall reaches Galba and gives all the details about him there and then, adding that he had τὴν πρώτην ἐν τοῖς ἄπελευθέροις
dύναμιν (G 71-6; cf. the probably corrupt passage at G 20.6).
This picture of Vinius and Laco as the leading powers behind the
throne with Icelus as the leading freedman and a somewhat junior
member of the trio presumably comes from the "common source," and
represents the impression gained by people at the time.

T. Vinius legatus...cupiditatis immensae: there is no
disagreement among our sources as to the character of T. Vinius
Rufinus. He was born in A.D. 21/22 and from the very beginning his
career moved erratically from one scandal to another (see H 1.48 and
Plut. G 12 for details; cf. Dio 59.18.4); he was undoubtedly able
and served as quaestor, praetor and then legatus legionis during Claudius' principate; in spite of further disgrace he was sent (now presumably at Nero's suggestion) to govern Gallia Narbonensis which he did, according to Tacitus, severe integreque. His appointment as legatus legionis of VI Victrix in Spain looks like a setback, but it may have been designed as a test of his apparent "reformation" (cf. E. Birley, _PBA_ 39 [1953] 203-205). However, in 68 he was vehement in urging Galba to involve himself in the revolt of Vindex (Plut. _G_ 4.6-7), which suggests considerable hostility to Nero, or fear for his own future under Nero.

After Galba's arrival in Rome Vinius became, in effect, minister of finance (Plut. _G_ 12.5), and proceeded to line his own pocket at astonishing speed even for a man of his rapacity (Plut. _G_ 12.1; 17.4; 18.2), and at _H_ 1.37.5 Tacitus has Otho say: minore avaritia ac licentia grassatus esset T. Vinius si ipse imperasset, and he then goes on to imply that Vinius had amassed a fortune of at least HS 180 million: this may represent what the people, who hated him (_H_ 1.12.3; 1.72.2-3), alleged, or what the soldiers believed.

Vinius also allied himself with certain rather dubious individuals - Tigellinus, who was protected by him and from whom he received large sums of money (_H_ 1.72; Plut. _G_ 17.3-7); Vitellius, for whose appointment to Lower Germany Vinius was said to have been responsible (S. _Vit._ 7.1); and Otho, whom he championed as Galba's possible heir when the question of the succession first arose (late in A.D. 68 - Plut. _G_ 21; cf. _H_ 1.13.2): it was rumoured that Otho had agreed to marry Vinius' daughter in return for his support.

Vinius' power and influence reached its peak in the first few
Galba

14.2 -
days of A.D. 69 when he was consul ordinarius along with the Princeps. However, on 10th January Galba decided to adopt Piso Licinianus, who was hostile to Vinius (H 1.14 ff., 1.34.1); thereafter Otho plotted and executed his coup, and it is possible that Vinius was privy to this (H 1.39.2; 1.42; Plut. G 27.7-8): however, he was killed and his property was confiscated (H 1.48.2-4). Tacitus' summing up is masterly: ...audax, callidus, promptus et, prout animum intendisset, pravus aut industrius, eadem vi (H 1.48.4).

See further Hanslik, RE IX A s.v. 'Vinius' no. 5: Dessau, PIR V 45.

Cornelius Laco ex assessore praefectus praetorii, arrogantia socordiaque intolerabilis: of his background nothing is known except what S. here tells us. His appointment as praetorian prefect implies that he was of equestrian status, which he may of course have recently acquired. Again our sources are agreed on his undesirable qualities: mortalium...ignavissimus (H 1.6.1); socordiam (H 1.24.2); ignarus militarum animorum (H 1.26.2). He opposed and even hated T. Vinius (H 1.13.2; Plut. G 26.1; H 1.33.2) and is said to have contemplated killing him on 15th January, A.D. 69 (H 1.39.2). Because of this he tended to ally himself with the freedman Icelus (cf. H 1.13.1-2; 1.33.2), which appears to suggest that, of Galba's three paedagogi, Vinius on his own was almost as important and influential as the other two together.

Laco's greatest success lay in his championing of Piso Licinianus, whom Galba adopted: Tacitus says that he had become
friendly with him at the house of Rubellius Plautus (H 1.14). Since Rubellius was a Stoic of somewhat austere character who had withdrawn to Asia in A.D. 60 and committed suicide on Nero's orders two years later (cf. R. S. Rogers, TAPA 86 [1955] 190-212, espec. 195-204; B. Baldwin, PP 22 [1967] 425-439, espec. 431-435), the suggested friendship between Laco on the one hand and Rubellius and the equally austere Piso on the other seems improbable, especially as early as A.D. 60: it may be a story invented to explain his support of Piso.

As praetorian prefect Laco appears to have been useless: he knew nothing of the bitter mood of his troops and though rumours of Otho's coming coup were widespread and even reached Galba's ears, he either failed to notice them or else played them down (H 1.24.2; 1.26.2).

Although he might be accused of physical cowardice for his refusal to accompany Piso on his projected mission to the German army (H 1.19.2: a perfectly proper job for a praetorian prefect; cf. Ann. 1.24.1-2), when Otho's coup was launched on 15th January, Laco at least proposed vigorous counter-measures (H 1.33; Plut. G 26.1). Regarding his death, Plutarch implies that he was killed at about the same time as Vinius (G 27.8); Tacitus, however, says that he was banished to an island and murdered on the way on Otho's order (H 1.46.5; cf. Heubner's comments ad loc.): presumably therefore he survived Galba by a few days.

There is little evidence of much personal corruption or venality on Laco's part (cf. Plut. G 29.5, which may be merely conventional): he appears to have been a somewhat stubborn man of limited talents,
who found himself hopelessly out of his depth as praetorian prefect.

See further, Stein, RE IV s.v. "Cornelius" 169; Stein, PIR$^2$ C 1374.

**libertus Icelus:** on the form of this name, see W. Heraeus (WKPh 34 [1917] 208-9), who argues that it should be Hicelus. For Icelus' activities until 16th June 68, see above 11, n. on supervenientibus...nuntius. Plutarch mentions that thereafter he was the most powerful of the freedmen (G 7.6), and doubtless therewith he had considerable opportunities for personal enrichment, which he certainly seems to have seized; for in his speech to the Praetorians, Otho says that in seven months Icelus had stolen more than all Nero's favourites had squandered (H 1.37.5; cf. 2.95.3).

He opposed Vinius' proposal that Otho be adopted by Galba (H 1.13.2), even though Otho paid court to him and asked him for favours (Plut. G 20.6). Once Otho became princeps, as heir to Galba's patrimonium and clientela he became Icelus' patronus and had him executed (H 1.46.5).

Nothing is known of Icelus' background though Hardy, perhaps rightly, suggests that he was a Greek (ap. Plut. G 7.1). S. says (below, 22) that he was Galba's catamite: there is no particular reason to doubt this, but cf. Stein's furious rejection of it as "wohl nur später entstandener Stadtklatsch, den Sueton überhaupt gern aufgreift" (RE IX 820).

See also Petersen, PIR$^2$ I 16.
paulo ante anulis aureis et Marciani cognomine ornatus: it would appear that Icelus was given equestrian status shortly after he brought the good news from Rome to Clunia (C 7.6; cf. H 1.13.1). After A.D. 23 the mere possession of equestrian status with the ius anulorum implied possession of the equestrian census and three generations of free birth in the male line, along with eligibility under the Lex Julii theatralis for a seat in the first XIV rows in the theatre (Pliny, NH 33.32; cf. above, 3.4, n. on quorum Gaius maior). In Icelus' case ingenuitas was a patent fiction but the right to bestow it like a decoration seems to have been formally recognized as part of the princeps' prerogative with the passage of the Lex Visellia of A.D. 24 (Cod. Iust. 9.21; cf. Charlesworth, CAH X 616).

When S. uses the words anulis aureis there is no reason to assume that he means anything other than that Icelus was given more than one gold ring, cf. S. DJ 39.2 where Decimus Laberius is donatus... anulo aureo. There is no question of the plural being used in any "technical" sense: Romans usually wore several rings simultaneously (e.g. Petron, Sat. 71; Pliny, NH 33.24-25; Martial 11.59), and after a detailed examination of the evidence H. C. Nutting (CQ 22 [1928] 172-175, espec. 173) concludes: "...it seems not at all unlikely that individual knights often possessed more than one ring, either as a recognition...or as appropriate to membership in the emperor's household..." (173); see now, however, A Vassileou, AC 40 [1971] 649-657).

With regard to the name Marcianus Tacitus says: quem (Icelus)... equestri nomine Marcianum vocitabant (H 1.13.1), which confirms the
implication of S.'s ornatus: presumably Galba gave him the name, so that instead of becoming "Servius Sulpicius Icelus" he became "Servius Sulpicius Marcianus", which served to some extent to mask his servile origin. (This is confirmed by the material collected by I. Kajanto, The Latin Cognomina 150. However, it was only after this time that the name Marcianus became common: cf. RE XIV 1511-34, where Icelus Marcianus is no. 2.)


i'am summae equestris gradus candidatus: summae equestris
gradus undoubtedly means the office of praefectus praetorio (cf. Vell. Pat. 2.127.3: Seius Strabo is princeps equestris ordinis; Ann. 4.40: the prefecture is fastigium equestre; see also Durry, Les cohortes prétoriennes, Chapter VI, with bibliography on p. 149).
candidatus is perhaps slightly ambiguous: it probably means that Icelus was hoping that Galba would make him colleague to Cornelius Laco; Stein (RE IX 820) suggests: "Den Icelus hatte Galba für das höchste Ritteramt (die Gardepräfektur) ausgerufen", which may be true; it is not, however, quite what the Latin says. In other contexts S. uses the word candidatus of the person seeking the position, with the job sought in the genitive; cf. Aug. 4.1; Tib. 42; Claud. 40.2; Vesp. 2.3. And for gradus as the equivalent of ordo, cf. Cic. Leg. Man. 61; Livy 2.1.10; Vell. Pat. 2.118.2;
14.2-4.3

Pliny, Ep. 2.13.4; 3.2.4.

14.3 quosdam claros ex utroque ordine viros suspicione minima inauditos condemnavit: S. here carefully defines the people about whom he is talking by means of a complex series of epithets: if the basic sentence is viros...condemnavit, then there are five separate qualifications - quosdam, claros, ex utroque ordine, suspicione minima, inauditos. However, the intention in this case is not to restrict the reference through careful definition, but to create the impression of a bloodthirsty tyrant on the rampage, since the five epithets are in an emotively ascending sequence. A comparison with Plut. C 15.1-4 and H 1.6.1 and 1.37.3-4 shows that the total list of people involved is: Nymphidius Sabinus, Fonteius Capito, Clodius Macer, Mithridates of Pontus, Obultronius Sabinus, Cornelius Marcellus, Betuus Cilo, Cingonius Varro and Petronius and Mithridates Turpilianus; all of these (except Nymphidius) were apparently of senatorial rank, and while it is not unlikely that others, possibly of equestrian rank, were purged after the deaths of Fonteius, Nymphidius and Macer, their names were not preserved.

Of this list only Cingonius Varro and Petronius Turpilianus require further comment (for the others see above, nn. on 11 and 12.1). For Cingonius see Groag, RE III 2560-2561: of him Tacitus says that he was killed in via (H 1.37.3): in this sentence Otho is recounting to the Praetorians the names of Galba's victims and the places where they met their ends; the list starts in the further provinces and "moves" in towards Rome, culminating in the very praetorian camp itself (with Nymphidius Sabinus, surely a poor illustration of Galba's cruelty!); the list has no chronological basis, since Plutarch makes it clear that both Cingonius and
Galba 189

14.3- quosdam claros...condemnavit cont.

Petronius died after Nymphidius (C 15.2-3). We must therefore assume that after the attempt of Nymphidius had been crushed, Galba ordered either that Cingonius be brought to him or that he be sent into exile, and had him murdered in via; cf. the exactly parallel cases of Laco under Otho (above, 14.2, n. on Cornelius Laco... intolerabilis) and Dolabella under Vitellius (above, 12.2, n. on Cn. Dolabellae).

P. Petronius Turpilianus (Groag, RE XIX s.v. 'Petronius' no. 75) had been cos. ord. in A.D. 61, and in the latter part of that year he succeeded Suetonius Paulinus as governor of Britain (Ann. 14.39.3; Agr. 16.3). Nero was obviously grateful for Petronius' part in the suppression of the Pisonian conspiracy (cf. Ann. 15.72.1) and enlisted his help in 68 when the revolt of Vindex broke out: Petronius was sent to Gaul with the advance guard (more than half of the army which was raised to suppress the revolt); however, he went over to Galba (Dio 63.27.1a), apparently before Nero's death (see above, pp. 134, 136). Given this change of side by Petronius at a possibly crucial moment, Galba's action in causing his death (H 1.6.1) in Rome (H 1.37.1) looks like gross ingratitude. Plutarch waxes emotional: ἀνὴρ ὑπατίκος καὶ Νέρωνι πιστὸς ἀποθανεῖν κελευσθεὶς, Πετρώνιος Τουρπιλιανός and he later describes him as γέροντα γυμνὸν καὶ ἀνοπλὸν who was given no opportunity to defend himself (C 15.2, 4; cf. H 1.6.1 of Cingonius and Petronius: inauditi atque indefensi). We must assume that after he went over to Galba Petronius was sent back to Rome and subsequently was ordered to commit suicide. Tacitus' words at H 1.6.1 demand closer scrutiny: as mentioned, he brackets Cingonius with Petronius;
Cingonius was killed ut Nymphidii Socius and Petronius ut dux Neronis; he then says that they were killed without a hearing or being allowed to make any defence tamquam innocentes - a very ambiguous remark: "so that they were thought to be innocent men." The implication may be that they were no such thing, and Tacitus perhaps also implies that the assigned reasons for the deaths of the two were not the real reasons. Plutarch has no such doubts about Cingonius at least (cf. G 15.1: τὸν λόγον [sc. Νυμφιδίους] γυράς) and about him nothing more can be said. We may, however, perhaps speculate further about Petronius: it is possible that he had taken the bulk of his army back to Rome with him (a few lines further down Tacitus mentions that Rome was plena...exercitu insolito, at least at the time of Galba's entry); conceivably Petronius had made some attempt to tamper with the loyalty of these troops, who were ingens novis rebus materia (H 1.6.2, ad fin.)

The crucial point, however, is that these deaths cast a shadow over the beginning of Galba's principate and facilitated the manoeuvres of Otho, Caecina and Valens. They also served to blacken Galba's posthumous reputation; cf. Ann. 1.6.1: Primum facinus novi principatus...; 13.1.1: Prima novo principatu mors...

civitates R. raro dedit: a somewhat vague phrase; we may ask "compared with whom?" (Nero? or possibly Otho? cf. H 1.78.1) It is certainly not true as regards Gaul, or perhaps Spain either (cf. above 12.1, n. on civitates Hispaniarum Galliarumque...punisset). Furthermore, Pliny (NH 3.37) mentions that Galba (presumably while he was in Gaul) gave Roman citizenship to two Alpine tribes, the
Avantici and Bodiontici (cf. NH 3.137 - Brodiontii: both the Avantici and Brodiontii are shown on the Tabula Imperii Romani [Sheet L-32, 1h] as being in the general vicinity of Dinia, mod. Digne). However, Galba's grant of citizenship on 22nd December, 68, to at least three men, and probably a good many more, qui militaverunt in legione I Adiutrice, and to their wives and children (CIL XVI 7 = MW 396; CIL XVI 8 and 9) was no more than a matter of routine.

iura trium liberorum vix uni atque alteri ac ne iis quidem nisi ad certum praefinitumque tempus: under Augustan legislation designed to promote marriage and stimulate the birth rate (esp. the Lex Julia de maritandis ordinibus of 18 B.C. and the Lex Papia Poppaea of A.D.9) neither a man nor a woman was completely free of legal disabilities of various kinds unless and until they had begotten or borne three children (for details, see Last, CAH X 448-456). However, the Emperors could grant exemptions from these regulations by a grant of the so-called ius trium liberorum: the earliest known recipient appears to have been Livia in 9 B.C. (Dio 55.2.5). At the instance of Pliny the Younger, S. himself received such a grant from Trajan ea condicione qua adsuevi (revocation on re-marriage? Pliny, Ep. 10.94, 95; cf. Sherwin-White, Commentary on the Letters of Pliny ad locc.). Galba's imposition of terms does not really seem unreasonable.

iudicibus sextam decuriam adici precantibus: the locus classicus on the decuriae, or jury panels, in the iudicia publica
14.3-
is Pliny NH 33.29-33 (which is brilliantly analysed by M. I. Henderson, JRS 53 [1963] 65-70). Under Augustus, three panels of iudices were appointed (S. Aug. 32.3): this duty was unpopular and to make up the numbers (1000 in each decuria; cf. Pliny, NH 33.30-31), he had to lower the age limit and allow one year off in three, along with a suspension of court sittings in November and December. Pliny adds (NH 33.31) that a fourth decuria existed, consisting of 900 men, who were drawn from the other three: their duty was to look after the voting urns at elections (confirmed by the Tabula Hebana, lines 11-14 [= EJ 94a]), which makes it clear that this fourth decuria was established by a lex Valeria Cornelia of A.D. 5). Furthermore, in the Tabula Hebana all the iudices are referred to as equites (which proves that the fourth decuria is not the same as the "additional" one mentioned by S. [Aug. 32.3], enrolled from men worth HS 200,000 to deal with petty offences). However, Pliny states that most of the iudices were not called equites until A.D.23 when in unitatem venit equester ordo (NH 33.30 and 32). Pliny is here thinking historically: equites as such had served on jury panels during the late Republic; however, under Augustus' arrangements the only equites, strictly speaking, were the equites equo publico, now organized in turmae and existing almost exclusively for parade purposes as a sort of elite "Order of Chivalry" (Henderson, op. cit. 67) and possessing the gold ring; thus when the iudices were formally recognized once more as equites and were given the ius anulorum, in unitatem venit equester ordo.

To the four existing decuriae Gaius added a fifth, and with the social prestige attached to the ius anulorum, even freedmen made attempts to slip into the decuriae (Pliny, NH 33.33).
By A.D.68 the members of the five panels presumably felt overworked and requested the establishment of the additional decuria.


non modo negavit sed et...beneficium...eripuit: clearly S. sees Galba's refusal to agree to the creation of a sixth decuria as symptomatic of his general niggardliness with regard to privileges of any sort; as suggested in the note immediately above, the iudices perhaps claimed that a sixth decuria was necessary because their court calendar was overcrowded. Galba's reply was typical: the decuriae could meet throughout what we should call the winter months and so spread their work-load over a longer period. (The Romans regarded their seasons as beginning earlier than we do today: Varro [RR 1.28.2] says: dies primus est veris in Aquario [Jan 20 - Feb.18], aestatis in Tauro [Apr. 20 - May 20], autumni in Leone [July 23 - Aug. 22], hiemis in Scorpione [Oct. 23 - Nov. 21]).

The beneficium conferred by Claudius is not altogether clear: Augustus had excused the iudices from duty in November and December (S. Aug. 32.3); S. here says that under Claudius they were not summoned in winter or at the beginning of the year; however, at Claud. 23.1 he says: rerum actum divisum antea in hibernos aestivosque menses coniunxit. If any consistency is to be assumed, we must
conclude that at some time after Augustus the courts had had a further vacation inserted in their calendar, perhaps in the early summer: Claudius eliminated this, but extended the winter vacation to include not only November and December but also the *initium anni* (perhaps January - February?).

15.1  *existimabatur etiam senatoria et equestria officia ...invitis ac recusantibus:* we have seen above (pp. 144-148) that Galba tended to appoint nonentities to top-ranking positions in provincial administration. While this was probably mainly due to a desire to protect himself against possible rivals for the principate, it is also arguable that he simply lacked senior administrators and army commanders of proven competence among his supporters: certainly he did not succeed in appointing reliable partisans to enough of the legionary commands in Germany. This idea may also gain support from his practice of grouping several provinces together under a single governor (e.g. Spain, the Mauretanias, and the provinces around Galatia).

This sentence in S. may represent a deliberate distortion of the policy which Galba perhaps considered adopting because of the shortage of officials who were both willing and, in Galba's own estimation, able and reliable. The two-year term of office may have been a promise from Galba to those whom he more or less conscripted into his administration: this will have suited both sides, since Galba himself knew from his own long tenure in Spain that such things were potentially dangerous. As for appointing people unwilling to
serve, Galba must have known that a conscientious official, even if performing his duties somewhat reluctantly, would probably help to provide efficient government in the provinces, while overeagerness to serve might well indicate an enthusiasm for perquisites and self-enrichment.

liberalititates Neronis non plus decimis concessis...
revocandas curavit: for this curious episode, cf. H 1.20.1-2 and Plut. G 16.3-4. Nero had squandered HS 2,200 million on largesse of one sort or another for his favourites: most of this seems to have been goods or property confiscated from his victims (cf. H 1.20.2: grande gaudium quod tam pauperes forent quibus donasset Nero quam quibus abstulisset.

As to the recipients of this bounty, we cannot be sure: S. here says only that gifts given to scaenici and xystici were to be recovered even from third parties and Plutarch says essentially the same thing, mentioning οἱ περὶ οἰκήνην καὶ παλαιστραν. Tacitus is less specific: in general, the recipients had remaining scarcely the one-tenth they were to be allowed to keep, while others (rapacissimus quisque ac perditissimus) had not even that. One notable exception to the general rule of squandering and dissipation among Nero's beneficiaries was the Pythia at Delphi: Nero had given her HS 400,000, all of which, apparently, Galba recovered (Dio 63.14.2).

S. gives us no clear idea as to when Galba set up this commission. Tacitus seems to date it after the adoption of Piso (10th January, 69), since having described that event, he continues:
proxima pecuniae cura. Plutarch, by contrast, describes this affair early in his account of events after Galba's arrival in Rome. Since the result of the commission's activities was widespread bankruptcy and numerous lawsuits (Tacitus), it can hardly all have happened between 10th and 15th January, 69. Plutarch is therefore probably correct, and Tacitus' proxima cannot be temporal, but must indicate the order of importance in which Galba placed his various problems: the succession caused the most anxiety, followed by finance.

per quinquaginta equites R.: it is not clear how this group was supposed to function (as an adjudication committee? as directors of investigation? or as actual snoopers themselves?). Tacitus (H 1.20) says: exactioni triginta equites Romani praepositi, and though all the commentators on Tacitus mention the variant to be found in S., the assumption appears to be that Tacitus is, of course, correct: cf. Stevenson, CAH X 814. There is no decisive way of judging between the figures given us: we should, however, remember the magnitude of the task which may perhaps dispose us to regard S.'s figure as more likely to be correct; furthermore, as an administrative secretary himself, he might be more inclined to accuracy in details of this sort.

et auferretur emptoribus, quando illi pretio absumpto solvere requeirunt: S. sees this particularly unfair action as part and parcel of Galba's establishment of the commission; Plutarch (G 16.3-4) indicates that it was supplementary to Galba's
original scheme, so that it came about because the commission was recovering very little (μηρά καὶ γλύσχα): S. is probably abbreviating the story as it originally appeared.

15.2 nihil non per comites atque libertos pretio addici aut donari gratia passus est: insofar as Galba did not stop them, this statement is true and there is ample evidence that his principal advisers, especially Vinius and Icelus, were corrupt (cf. 14.2; Plut. G 18.1-2), but so far as is known Galba did not himself connive at any financial irregularities that came to his attention; in fact, his readiness to prosecute Caecina in Germany for embezzlement (H 1.53.1-2) may well have contributed substantially to his own downfall.

quin etiam populo R. deposcente supplicium... increpuit: because of the excessive influence wielded over him by corrupt figures such as Vinius and Laco, Galba's policies were applied in a glaringly inconsistent manner (cf. 14.2: ut vix sibi ipse constaret). Thus because for a price they had obtained the protection of Galba's favourites, Halotus and Tigellinus (on whom see immediately below) were safe for a while. However, although S. uses the term solos to describe the preservation of these two (if indeed, this is the correct way to understand solos; H. C. Nutting [CW 28 (1935) 182] argues that solos...vel maleficentissimos represents simply a plural form of unus with a superlative), he does not specifically point out that Galba did make away with some of Nero's most notorious agents - Helius, Polycleitus, Petinus,
15.2-
Petrobius, Narcissus and the poisoner Locusta (Plut. G 17.2-3; Dio 63.3.4; cf. B. Baldwin, PP 22 [1967] 428, and CQ 20 [1970] 364). We may conclude therefore that while Galba's inclinations were in favour of eliminating Nero's creatures, he allowed himself in this instance as in others to be overruled by his paedagogi; in addition to which, there was possibly an old man's peevish stubbornness in the face of what looked like popular pressure. Furthermore, the very existence of Galba's own favourites reminded people of the excesses perpetrated at Nero's court (H 1.37.5).

Haloti: a eunuch who served as foodtaster to Claudius, he was employed by Agrippina to administer the famous poisoned mushrooms which led to that Princeps' death in A.D. 54 (Ann. 12.66.2; cf. S. Claud. 44.2). Very little is known of his activities during Nero's principate, but it is clear from S.'s words here that his influence was remembered as wholly malign. Again, there is no indication of how he managed to survive and even flourish during Galba's principate: possibly he was preserved by Icelus.

See further Stein, RE VII 2283-2284; Petersen, PIR² H 11.

Tigellini: Ofonius Tigellinus was perhaps the most generally hated of Nero's ministers: Plutarch describes him as τὸν διδάσκαλον καὶ παιδαγωγὸν τῆς τυραννίδος (G 17.2), a judgement widely echoed in our sources (cf. Ann. 14.51.2-3; 15.50.3; Dio 62.13.3; 63.12.3). In his youth he was convicted of adultery with Agrippina and Livilla, the sisters of Gaius, and was exiled to Greece where he supported himself by selling fish; he was permitted
15.2-
to return to Italy during Claudius’ principate and bred horses
in the south of Italy for quadriga races; he became friendly with
Nero and became his praefectus vigilum; in A.D. 62 on the death of
Burrus he was appointed praefectus praetorio along with Faenius
Rufus (H 1.72; schol. Iuv. 1.155; Ann. 14.51) and within a few
months had persuaded Nero to order the deaths of Faustus Cornelius
Sulla and Rubellius Plautus (Ann. 14.57-59). From then on Tigellinus’
influence was paramount and he was, in effect, head of the security
police in a totalitarian state: he even tried to convict the sage
Apollonius of Tyana for "impiety" against Nero (Philostr. VA 4.
42-44). However, after the detection of the Pisonian conspiracy in
A.D. 65 Nymphidius Sabinus became his colleague as praetorian
prefect, and in 68 it was Nymphidius who took the lead in inducing
the praetorians to desert Nero: he subsequently forced Tigellinus
to resign (Plut. G 2.1-2; 8.3). Since Tigellinus was probably
already suffering from an incurable disease (cf. Plut. G 17.5;
G 2.1-2 - perhaps tuberculosis or cancer), his powers may well have
been failing and he may perhaps have hoped to be allowed to live out
the remainder of his life in quiet depravity. He ensured his safety
under Galba by bribing T. Vinius (see above, 14.2, n. on T. Vinius
...cupiditatis immensae). However, after Otho came to power he was
ordered to commit suicide and, to universal rejoicing, he cut his
throat with a razor (Plut. G 2; cf. H 1.72: infamem vitam foedavit
etiam exitu sero et inhonesto.)

See further Stein, RE XVII 2056-2061 and PIR S ("Sofonius") 540.
15.2-16.1

Halotum proccuratione amplissima ornavit: this may be referred to in CIL VI 8835 (= MW 198), where a Halotus Aug(usti) 1( ibertus) proc(urator) is mentioned.


16.1 per haec prope universis ordinibus offenis vel praecipua flagrabat invidia apud milites: in this sentence S. summarizes and reinforces the impression he has attempted to create in chapters 14 and 15, which have served as his account of Galba's policies and practices after his arrival in Rome; this account, as we have seen, is biassed, since it concentrates solely on the negative aspects of Galba's actions and suppresses completely anything which might enable us to see Galba in a favourable light.

At the end of this sentence with the emphatically-placed words apud milites S. turns our attention to the soldiers - not only to the Praetorians, though these are the most important element in the last two weeks of Galba's life, but also to the army of Upper Germany, since it started the chain of events which brought Galba down. The soldiers remain for the time being the unifying idea in S.'s narrative: in this chapter their attitudes are explained in some detail, and in chapters 17 and 18, which ostensibly deal almost exclusively with other subjects, in each case towards the end of the chapter soldiers are mentioned, as if to remind the reader of the
brooding presence always in the background.

nam cum...donativum grandius solito praepositi pronuntiassent: again the word praepositi is somewhat vague (cf. above 12.1, no. on praepositos...adfecisset): Plutarch speaks of Nymphidius Sabinus promising HS 30,000 to each of the Praetorians and other urban troops and HS 5,000 for those serving in the legions (G 2.1-2); presumably the defection from Nero and the sum to be promised were agreed on beforehand between Nymphidius and at least some of the praetorian tribunes, but probably no precise information on this point survived - hence S.'s vagueness; cf. Tacitus' use of the passive: donativum sub nomine Galbae promissum (H 1.5.1).

The sum promised was twice as large as anything hitherto known. Donativa seem to have been regarded during the Julio-Claudian period (and after) as the military equivalent of congiaria: they were given either to celebrate joyful events in the life of the state, e.g. Augustus' grandson C. Caesar joining the army for the first time (Dio 55.6.4); Nero's assumption of the toga virilis (S. Ner. 7.2); the tenth anniversary of Septimius Severus' accession (Dio 76.1.1), or else they were sums of money left to the soldiers by a Princeps in his will. This practice led them to be regarded as an "accession bribe," since in A.D. 14 and A.D. 37 Tiberius as Augustus' heir and Gaius as Tiberius' heir respectively paid the sums, and no doubt the money tended to be regarded as a gift from the new Princeps rather than a legacy from the old. These first two accession donatives were not large: HS 1000 to the praetorians, HS 500 to the urban cohorts and HS 300 to the legionary troops; we may also note that Gaius doubled
16.1-
the amount which Tiberius had left to the praetorians (Ann.1.8.2; S. Aug. 101; Dio 56.32.2; 59.2.1-3). However, in A.D. 41 Claudius on his accession personally promised HS 15,000 to each of the praetorians, primus Caesarum fidem militis etiam praemio pigneratus (S. Claud. 10.4). In A.D. 54 when Nero too succeeded to the principate in rather dubious circumstances, he promised the same donative as Claudius (Ann. 12.69.2; Dio 61.3.1). Possibly Nymphidius felt that twice the amount of A.D. 41 and 54 was necessary to induce the miles urbanus long Caesarem sacramentum imbutus (H 1.5.1) to overthrow a dynasty. We may also note that Vespasian succeeded where Galba failed: when he launched his attempt the soldiers in the east were promised only a modest donative (H 2.82), and after the fall of Vitellius, when Mucianus arrived in Rome he distributed to each soldier in the victorious Flavian army the sum of HS 100 (Dio 65.22.2)!

in verba eius absentis iurantibus: the key word is absentis. This had not happened before, as far as the Praetorians were concerned, in the history of the principate and the word underlines what Tacitus means by the imperii arcanum which was now revealed: posse principem alibi quam Romae fieri (H 1.4.2). The implications of this change were not immediately apparent (in June, 68), but by January, 69 there was undoubtedly a feeling both in Rome and among the frontier armies that a fundamental power shift of some sort had taken place (see further, however, below, 16.2, n. on displicere imperatorem...comprobarent).
Galba may have been technically within his rights in refusing to pay the donative promised without his knowledge. Furthermore, the resignation of Tigellinus and the death of Nymphidius, along with the dismissal, if not the execution, of some of his close associates among the praetorians and their tribunes (see also below, 16.1, n. on removens...Nymphidi socios), may have made Galba feel even less bound by the promise than he might otherwise have done. However, he was completely in the wrong morally, and any excuses that may have been put forward will certainly have been regarded as mere sophistry. Galba, however, will have felt that the Principate was in a most unhealthy state if the succession was to be decided in this way; he failed to realize that he was not in a position to put a stop to it.

S.'s subinde may well be true; for this remark is preserved in all our sources: cf. Plut. G 18.4; H 1.5.2; Dio 64.3.3. The tragic aspect of Galba's stubbornness is that even a partial payment of the donative would probably have satisfied the praetorians: Galba had a formidable reputation as a disciplinarian and the soldiers might have respected this up to a point. Plutarch comments: τούς δὲ στρατιώτας τὴν δωρεὰν μὴ κομιζομένους ἐν ἀργῷ μὲν ἔλπις παρῄγεν ὅς, εἶ μαῖ καὶ μὴ τοσοῦτον, ἀλλ' ὅσον Ἡρών ἔδωκεν, ἀποδώσοντος (G 18.3), while Tacitus, speaking of the situation on 10th January, 69, says: constat potuisse concilari animos quantulacumque parci senis liberalitate: nocuit antiquus rigor et nimia severitas...(H 1.18.3; cf. 1.25.2: ira et
omnis, qui ubique erant, exacerbavit: contact between army units at an "unofficial" level seems to have been fairly regular (cf., for example, H 2.82.3, 85.1, 86.4, 98.1); in addition gossip and rumour will have travelled quite rapidly along the main routes of the Empire since the messengers using the cursus publicus will have been asked for general news at every way-station. It is clear, therefore, that the legionary troops were no more successful in obtaining their donative than were the Praetorians. This was, however, hardly a major factor in causing the revolt in Germany; rather, it helped to confirm pre-existing feelings of dissatisfaction.

praetorianos etiam metu et indignitate commovit: there is no doubt that Galba attempted to tighten up discipline within the Praetorian Guard. As we have seen (above, 12.2, n. on ut primum urbem introiit), detachments from the Guard were probably summoned to Spain and marched every mile of the way back to Rome under the strict supervision of the new Princeps: the trauma of this for soldiers who had gone soft must have been considerable (cf. H 1.5.2: laudata olim et militari fama celebrata severitas eius angebat [sc. milites] aspernantes veterem disciplinam atque ita quattuordecim annis a Nerone adsuefactos, ut haud minus vitia principum amarent quam olim virtutes verebantur). See further next n.

removens subinde plerosque ut suspectos et Nymphidi
16.1-16.2

Tacitus mentions that after the attempt of Nymphidius had been crushed, manebat plerisque militum conscientia (HI 1.5.2).
The use of conscientia here is very subtle: it cannot simply be "consciousness of guilt" about Nymphidius' attempted coup, since few of the Praetorians had actually been involved in it; more probably it means that the soldiers were aware that they had been involved with Nymphidius in the overthrow of Nero and, in the light of what subsequently occurred, they felt uneasy about it; at the same time, they probably sensed that, because they had plotted with Nymphidius once, Galba had grounds for suspecting them of doing so again: this too would cause them anxiety.

S. here concentrates more on Galba's attitudes, (in marked contrast to Tacitus' manebat plerisque militum conscientia), and through them comes to the metus and indignitas which the Praetorians felt. His use of praetorianos...plerosque implies that men as well as officers were dismissed, and we can see from our other sources that this combination of justifiable fear and anger was not restricted to the Praetorians (cf. HI 1.20.3 for the dismissal of two praetorian tribunes along with officers in the urban cohorts and vigiles, and further comments on the poisonous atmosphere among the city troops; cf. HI 3.57.1; 1.51.5; 2.97.2).

16.2 sed maxime fremebat superioris Germaniae exercitus fraudari se praemiis navatae adversus Gallos et Vindicem operae: cf. Plut. G 22.1-2; HI 1.51-53; Dio 64.4.1-2); the key question here concerns the meaning of superioris Germaniae exercitus: does it mean what it says, or does exercitus, as so often, really refer
only to officers and legati? Chilver argues that, while ordinary soldiers were blamed for much of the trouble everywhere in A.D. 68-70, only the rising of the German armies (with Vitellius an almost fortuitous leader) was started and driven from below ("The Army in Politics, A.D. 68-70," JRS 47 [1957] 29-35, espec. 33-34). There is no doubt that until the revolt of Vindex, when the German armies obtained a taste of plunder (and licence) in the largely unarmed Gallic provinces, there had been (since A.D. 14) no problem of loyalty or control in Germany (tarde a Nerone desciverant: H 1.8.2): it was particularly unfortunate that the victory won by the army crushed the ally of the man who ultimately came out on top. This meant that the promotions to centurionships and tribuneships, the new postings to better climates, to easier jobs and, most desirable of all, to the Praetorian Guard, all of which could reasonably be looked for after the crushing of a provincial revolt, were not in this case available. This affected ordinary soldiers and junior officers just as much as legionary commanders and army legates. Furthermore, Galba's rigidly applied policy of distributing rewards along strictly party lines prevented him from "overlooking" the suppression of the Vindex revolt and rewarding the men anyway; this, in turn, along with incidents such as the recall of Verginius Rufus and the killing of Fonteius Capito, served to increase to boiling-point the anger and frustration already existing.

However, we cannot be sure of the extent to which this dissatisfaction welled up naturally: it is possible that, if Galba's legati had been completely loyal (and had not been men on the make such as Caecina and Valens) steps could still have been taken to ease
the situation; instead, the discontent was deliberately exacerbated and rumours were spread of decimations and dismissals (H 1.51.5); furthermore, the actual revolt against Galba seems to have been planned for some time before 1st January 69, and its outbreak was carefully orchestrated (see below, S. Vit. 8.2, n. on consentiente deinde etiam superioris provinciae exercitu...defecerat)

S. rightly emphasizes the role of the army of Upper Germany: it had been mainly responsible for the suppression of the Vindex revolt (cf. H 1.53.2; above, pp. 109-10), it had seen its friends, the Gallic tribes living nearest to it, punished for opposing Vindex (H 1.53-54), and it had lost its admired commander and had seen him replaced by the useless Hordeonius Flaccus (H 1.9; 1.54). It was undoubtedly in a greater state of tension than the army of Lower Germany.

\[\text{ergo}\cdot\text{primi obsequium rumpere ausi Kal. Jan. adigi sacramento...recusarunt: }\]

Tacitus tells the same story in more detail (H 1.55-56): initially, although there was some trouble in Lower Germany, the revolt was confined to the legions IV Macedonica and XXII Primigenia stationed at Moguntiacum in Upper Germany, and they only of the eight legions in Germany actually refused to take the oath of allegiance to Galba.

\[\text{nisi in nomen senatus: }\]

cf. H 1.55.4: ac ne reverentiam imperii exuere viderentur, senatus populusque Romani obliterata iam nomina sacramento advocabant...; see also Plut. G 22.3; with regard to the senate, cf. too the policy of Tiberius at the time of the

statimque legationem ad praetorianos cum mandatis destinaverunt: this sentence proves the extent of Galba's real debt to the Praetorians. In A.D. 41 and 54 the practice had been established that the Praetorians chose the Princeps and that the Senate and People should thereafter ratify their choice. The German armies (and others, by implication) had recognized and accepted this practice by their acquiescence in the Praetorians' choice of Galba in the summer of A.D. 68. Accordingly, if at that time Galba had chosen to march on Rome without the recognition of Guard, Senate and People, he would almost certainly have been attacked and destroyed by the German armies, who would then in all probability have imposed their own solution. The Praetorians, therefore, did indeed have a legitimate grievance against Galba.

displercre imperatorem in Hispania factum; eligerent ipsi quem cuncti exercitus comprobarent: this is simply a more realistic version of the senator's superioris Germaniae legiones ...

...imperatorem alium flagitare et senatui ac populo Romano arbitrium eligendi permettere (H 1.12.1).

The fact that an Emperor could be "made in Spain" should immediately have suggested that one could also be made in Germany or anywhere else; however, the fact that Galba had made no move until he was recognized at Rome may have served to mask this possibility. However, at the beginning of A.D. 69 the soldiers of Germany were now stating that the Praetorians had made a mistake in the summer of 68
16.2-17

and that the principle followed in 41, 54 and 68 should be modified to take into account the feelings of all the armies; the choice made in 68 was, therefore, now to be considered invalid and a new Princeps should be chosen. Tacitus regards this as a sham:...quo seditio mollius acciperetur (H 1.12.1); for him, Galba's elevation outside Italy revealed once and for all the arcanum imperii (cf. above, 16.1, n. on in verba eius absentis iurantibus).

Appearances to the contrary, there was of course no real power shift involved: since the days of Marius and Sulla the great provincial army commands had been the keys to power in the Roman state, and this was still true after Actium - hence Augustus' vast provincia and its armed forces. However, for a century Augustus' propaganda had prevailed, that Rome was the real centre of power and that Rome's word was what counted. The recognition that this was a myth did not come equally quickly in all parts of the Empire; cf. H 1.76.2: longinquae provinciae et quidquid armorum mari dirimitur penes Othonem manebat, non partium studio, sed erat grande momentum in nomine urbis ac praetexto senatus... The secret was not fully revealed until Vitellius had fought his way to supreme power opposed totally by the Guard and by the Senate and People at Rome.

17 quod ut nuntiatum est: since the formal adoption of Piso took place on 10th January, 69 (H 1.18.7) and according to S., in the morning (cf. below, e media salutantium turba) we may assume that word reached Galba of the trouble in Germany by the evening of the 9th. The message that reached him came from Pompeius Propinquus, imperial procurator in Gallia Belgica and was that two legions in Upper
Germany were in revolt (I 1.12.1; 1.16.3; 1.18.2). This report was in essence the same as the one which arrived in Cologne from Moguntiacum after nightfall on 1st January; it contained no word of the spread of the revolt to Lower Germany or of any involvement of Vitellius, which came on 2nd January; the message must therefore have been sent on 1st January. This, incidentally, serves to demonstrate the speed with which messages could be sent over long distances: depending on variations in the route followed, the distance from Trier to Rome is 860-880 mp and since the journey took eight days at most, the daily average is 110-125 mp (cf. K. Wellesley, JRS 59 [1967] 25 n.9, 27 and n.15).

S. here suggests that Galba's adoption of Piso came about as a direct consequence of the news of the outbreak in Germany; Tacitus states this as a fact: sed Galba post nuntios Germanicae seditionis ...quod remedium unicum rebatur, comitia imperii transigit (I 1.14.1; cf. Dio 64.5.1). Plutarch, however, gives us an account with considerably more background material. He indicates that Galba began to think about a successor some time late in 68 (G 19.1 - 21.4) and that the general unrest then among the German armies, rather than a specific outbreak, was the reason for the discussions which took place. Unfortunately the text of Plutarch is corrupt at a vital point in this account (19.1), but it is clear that the troops under Vitellius in Lower Germany are indicated (Tigellinus in the codd. is nonsense): this suggests that the inconclusive discussions in Rome occurred somewhere about the middle of December, and it is at this point in his narrative (G 19.2 - 20.7) that Plutarch has the lengthy introduction of Otho, which Tacitus inserts immediately before his account of
Piso's adoption (I 1.13.2-4). Tacitus, of course, starts his narrative on 1st January, 69, and so his account is doubtless adapted to avoid undue complexity; furthermore, he does at least hint that the "adoption question" had its roots in 68, when he introduces Galba's financial problems with proxima pecuniae cura (cf. above, 15.1, n. on liberalitates Neronis...revocandas curavit): the succession was more important than finance, and Tacitus may even be rejecting the idea, clearly implicit in the "common source," that the question only arose as late as mid-December, 68 (cf. also I 1.12.2: maturavit ea res consilium Galbae iam pridem de adoptione secum et cum proximis agitantes). S. here, as so often, has compressed the account to such an extent that we are left merely with a précis of events.

despectui esse non tam senectam suam quam orbitatem ratus: these words appear to be a direct quotation from the "common source"; cf. Plut. G 1.19.1: ὃ δὲ (Galba) μορμηθεῖς, ἢς μὴ μόνον διὰ τὸ γῆρος, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν ἀπαλλαγὴν καταφαυνόμενος...

But can Galba really have thought this? The revolt in Germany was in response to his policy of rewarding friends and punishing enemies and perhaps, more generally, to his saevitia: his age and childlessness had little, if anything, to do with it and as he had already received news of discontent in Germany (Plut. G 18.7 - 19.1) we may presume that some information about the reasons for it was available to him. Accordingly, the fact that he responded to the news of the revolt by proceeding immediately to adopt his heir suggests not that he thought that his would serve as any sort of placatory response to the German armies, but rather that it would tell them that he was master of affairs in Rome, that he would arrange things as he saw fit, and that
such matters were none of their business. This in turn suggests that Galba was unaware of, or at least chose to ignore, the realities of power in the Roman state: the fact that the legions had not marched on Rome for over a century may have served to strengthen this delusion. At any rate, his actions were both tactless and stupid.

Pisonem Frugi Licinianum nobilem egregiumque iuvenem: (hereafter referred to as "Piso Licinianus): his full name was L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi Licinianus (cf. his tomb inscription, CIL VI 31723 = MW 76); he was the son of M. Licinus Crassus Frugi (cos. ord. A.D. 27 and, it would appear, a descendant by adoption of Crassus the "triumvir": cf. R. Syme, "Piso Frugi and Crassus Frugi," JRS 50 [1960] 12-20; PIR² Vol. 5, stemma facing p. 41, which partly replaces the stemma in PIR² Vol. 2, facing p. 54) and of Scribonia, a direct descendant of Pompey the Great (H 1.42.2; 1.15.1; Syme, R.R. Table V): there were five, possibly six, children of this marriage - Cn. Pompeius Magnus (PIR P 477; apparently not in RE), M. Licinius Crassus Frugi (cos. ord. A.D. 64; PIR² L 191; RE XIII s.v. "Licinius" no. 74), Crassus Scribonianus (PIR² L 192; RE XIII s.v. "Licinius" no. 77), L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi Licinianus (Galba's heir; PIR² C 300; RE III s.v. "Calpurnius" no. 100) and Licinia Magna (PIR² L 269; RE XIII s.v. "Licinius" no. 198; for the possibility of another daughter, see Groag, RE XIII s.v. "Licinius" no. 189). The family was prominent in the "senatorial opposition" to the later Julio-Claudians and suffered accordingly (see D. McAlindon, AJP 77 [1956] 113-132, espec. 126-128); some of this
opposition was perhaps only tactless or rather silly, e.g. the names which the consul of A.D. 27 (fatuus, according to Seneca, Apocol. 11.2) bestowed on his children, but even this had its dangers: the eldest son, Cn. Pompeius Magnus, was almost put to death by Gaius because of his name (S. Calig. 35.1; Dio 60.5.8-9); the son referred to by Tacitus as "Scribonianus" or "Crassus Scribonianus" (H 1.47.2; 4.39.3) must have reminded people of the family's Pompeian connection or perhaps, even more unfortunate, of Camillus Scribonianus who revolted against Claudius in A.D. 42 and who was also in some way connected with Pompey (cf. R. Syme, JRS 50 [1960] 18-19); finally, the full name of Piso Licinianus recalls the great annalist and consul of 133 B.C., who may have been a direct ancestor.

However, when Claudius became princeps in A.D. 41, he took pains to conciliate and win over this family with its emotive and well-advertised Pompeian and Licinian connections: the consul of A.D. 27 twice received ornamenta triumphalia (CIL VI 31721 = Sm. 224; S. Claud. 17.3) and Cn. Pompeius Magnus was given Claudius' daughter Antonia in marriage (S. Claud. 27.2; cf. CIL VI 31722 = Sm. 235). However, something went seriously wrong c. A.D. 46: there may have been an attempt to make Pompeius princeps in Claudius' place, or Messalina may have feared that the position of her son Britannicus would ultimately be threatened (cf. Dio 60.31.8); at any rate, Pompeius Magnus was put to death along with his father and mother (S. Claud. 27.2; 29.1-2; H 1.48.1; Sen. Apocol. 11.2 and 4; Dio 60.29.6a; 60.30.6a; Plut. G 23.2 is incorrect). Subsequently, M. Licinius Crassus Frugi (cos. A.D. 64) was put to death towards the
end of Nero's reign following an accusation by M. Aquilius Regulus (Plin. Ep. 1.5.3; H 1.481; 4.42), and Crassus Scribonianus, who helped to arrange the obsequies for his brother Piso Licinianus in January 69, apparently perished in Rome early in A.D. 70, perhaps at Mucianus' hands, after Antonius Primus had unsuccessfully attempted to persuade him to make a bid for power (H 1.47.2; 4.39.3; 1.48.1).

Piso Licinianus was born in A.D. 38 (cf. H 1.48.1) and was therefore only about eight years old when his parents and eldest brother were executed. There is no evidence as to who was his tutor or whether he was adopted, but we should note Irvine's bald statement that he was "a Licinius Crassus adopted by a Calpurnius Piso" (Commentary on Tacitus, Histories I & II, ap. H 1.14): his father's consular colleague in A.D. 27 was L. Calpurnius Piso, whose son of the same name (cos. ord. A.D. 57; PIR² C 294) married Licinia Magna, sister of Piso Licinianus, whose nomenclature would certainly suit such an adoption (though, given the "eccentricity" of the names of his siblings, this argument cannot bear much weight); that relations between the two fathers should have been close is more than likely: they were probably distantly related by blood and both had suffered under the Caesars (the father of L. Calpurnius Piso, cos. ord. A.D. 27, was Cn. Piso, the governor of Syria and enemy of Germanicus). However, the adoption idea must remain no more than an unsupported speculation.

Tacitus tells us that Piso Licinianus was diu exul (H 1.48.1; cf. H 1.21.1; 1.38.1): this would certainly explain why he had held no offices. His character was undoubtedly shaped by adversity: vultu habituque moris antiqui, et aestimatione recta severus, deterius
interpretantibus tristior habebatur (H 1.14.2; cf., more favourably, Plut. G 23.2). However, according to Tacitus, this made him the more suitable as a candidate for adoption in Galba's eyes (loc. cit.; cf. H 1.15); on the other hand, Otho, his enemy, is made to describe him as iuvenem ingenio trucem et longo exilio efferatum (H 1.21.1) and tristitia et avaritia... (Galbae) simillimum (H 1.38.1). Certainly, at the time of his adoption and immediately after, Piso made little or no impression on anyone, acting quasi imperare posset magis quam vellet (H 1.17.1; cf. Plut. G 23.5); the majority of the senate was indifferent (H 1.19); and Piso's speech to a praetorian cohort on 15th January (H 1.29.2 - 30.3) had no effect on the outcome of events (H 1.31.1).

The only friends that we hear of him possessing are the unlikely pair Cornelius Laco and Rubellius Plautus (H 1.14; cf. above, 14.2, n. on Cornelius Laco...intolerabilis); besides Otho, we hear of T. Vinius (H 1.34) and M. Aquilius Regulus (H 4.42.2: cf. Plin. Ep. 2.20.2) as enemies. He was married to Verania Gemina (PIR V 268), daughter of Q. Veranius (cos. ord. A.D. 49); she survived him (H 1.47.2; Plut. G 28.2) and, ironically, on her death-bed fell victim to the legacy-hunting tricks of Regulus (Plin. Ep. 2.20.1-6).

sibi olim probatissimum: that Galba should have thought highly of Piso, given Piso's upright, dignified, rather old-fashioned character, need occasion no surprise. Moreover, the fact that he recalled Piso from exile (H 1.21.1; 1.38.1) and was prepared to adopt him as his successor, in spite of his lack of experience and in spite of a general clamour for the adoption of either Otho or
Dolabella (cf. H 1.13; Plut. G 21; 23.2), argues strongly that Galba knew both him and his family well: indeed, Piso's father (cos. A.D. 27) and Galba (cos. A.D. 33) were probably near contemporaries; finally, S.'s words olim probatissimum suggest an admiration of long standing (cf. next n.)

testamentoque semper in bona et nomen adscitum: cf. H 1.14.1: Pisonem Liciniamum accersiri iubet, seu propria electione, sive, ut quidam crediderunt, Lacone instante... S.'s statement is not necessarily at variance with Tacitus': propria electione comes first (though admittedly it does not receive the heaviest emphasis), and Laco's championing of Piso may simply have been fortuitous, or the result of shrewd observation. However, S.'s remark about Galba's will has been severely criticised by Townend (AJP 85 [1964] 354): "Suetonius says that Piso...was named his heir by adoption in his will, a tradition which is manifestly improbable..." For Townend, Tacitus' account of a cabinet meeting at which Galba announced his decision "bears all the marks of the type of inner history which there is reason to associate with Cluvius Rufus" (loc. cit.). Having thus satisfied himself that Tacitus' comitia imperii comes from Cluvius (though we may perhaps feel that knowledge of Galba's long-term testamentary arrangements could also qualify as "the type of inner history..."), Townend then feels free to conclude that S.'s version of events comes from Pliny: "...as I have argued in Hermes LXXXIX, p. 241, Suetonius' account of the adoption contains clear indications that it is derived from Pliny." However, the only adoption mentioned in the passage here cited is
that of Galba by his step-mother Livia Ocellina, which surely cannot be evidence for Galba's adoption of Piso. Furthermore, by assuming that only Cluvius and Pliny can be sources for the adoption of Piso, Townend implicitly denies the possibility of independent research by either Tacitus or S.

There is no compelling reason for regarding the accounts of Tacitus and S. as contradictory, and, more important, closer consideration will show that S.'s statement about Galba's will is NOT "manifestly improbable." In his will, a childless Roman, who wished his name to continue, might direct that, as a condition of inheritance, his principal heir take his name: this amounted to "adoption by will," a practice which, unfortunately, is not discussed by the classical writers on Roman law: its mechanics are therefore somewhat controversial (cf. Buckland, Textbook 127; see also Mommsen, Staatsr. III 39-40; Botsford, Roman Assemblies 161; the best discussion of this matter known to me is by E. J. Weinrib, HSCP 72 [1967] 253-261, with full legal bibliography (nn. 27, 35): his conclusion is that "testamentary adoption" was usually nothing more than the institution of an heir with a condicio nominis ferendi). In the most famous example, the testamentary adoption of Octavius by Julius Caesar was ultimately confirmed by a lex curiata (App. BCiv. 3.94: this made it a form of adrogatio which, of course, meant that Octavian inherited Caesar's clientela; cf. Gaius 1.97-107 and below, n. on filiumque appellans perduxit in castro ac pro contione adoptavit). That Galba, as a wealthy Roman of proud and ancient lineage, should have wished his name to continue (cf. above, 5.1), is hardly surprising; that for this he should have picked a young man of distinguished ancestry and sterling character (who, we may note,
was not the eldest surviving son in his own family; cf. H.1.15.2) could almost be predicted.

When would Galba have drawn up his will? Romans seem to have revised or re-drawn their wills before major changes in their lives or at the onset of possible danger: for example, Caesar's final will was drawn up on 13th September, 45 B.C. when he was beginning to make his plans for the coming eastern campaign (S. DJ 83, discussed by Adcock, CAH IX 724-725), and Augustus' last will was dated 3rd April, A.D. 13, possibly when "Tiberius became co-regent, in virtue of a law conferring on him powers equal with the Princeps in the control of provinces and armies" (Syme, R.R. 433). Accordingly, I would suggest that Galba may have drawn up a will, in which he adopted Piso, before leaving for Hispania Tarraconensis in A.D. 60, and that, whatever changes were made in his legacies and bequests during his years in Spain, Piso will have remained his principal heir throughout. This takes S.'s statement at its face value; but there is no reason for doing otherwise. And if we ask why Galba did not simply adopt Piso in A.D. 60, or subsequently, the answer may be that Piso was by then already in exile: he may even have been in exile at the time of his parents' death (c. A.D. 46). In any case, his exile will presumably have been no more than a form of relegatio, the mildest type of banishment, which involved no loss of citizen rights. He could, therefore, have inherited under Galba's will, but Galba would perhaps have shrunk from openly adopting him before his own death for fear of offending the princeps. Of course, when Galba himself became princeps, the will which he had made as a privatus would have assumed great political significance in the event of his
sudden (natural) death. He recalled Piso from exile and may have wished to give him experience in public life before formally adopting him as his successor. In the meantime, if he were to die suddenly, Piso would certainly be in no worse position than Octavian in 44 B.C. We can now, perhaps, appreciate why Galba, unlike almost everyone else in Rome (cf. H 1.12.2 - non sane crebrior tota civitate sermo per illos mensis fuerat), was in no hurry to see a successor nominated. He sounded out opinion among his advisers (H 1.12.2: Plut. G 19.1; 21) but actually made his move only when he felt the need to demonstrate his authority in face of the revolt in Germany: his adoption of the unknown and apparently unsuitable Piso represented no change in his ultimate plan; as Tacitus says of the German revolt, perhaps not realizing the full import of his words, maturavit ea res consilium Galbae (H 1.12.2).

The information about Galba's will is unique to S.; its source must therefore remain a mystery. Possibly it is the result of his own research, and one conceivable source might be Pliny the Younger, who seems to have been acquainted with Piso's widow Verania Gemina (Ep. 2.20.2-5), who lived until c. A.D. 96-100: cf. A. E. Gordon, Q. Veranius Consul A.D. 49 (Univ. of California Publ. in Class. Arch., 1952) 242; she never remarried after Piso's death and her remains were ultimately buried with his (MW 76, illustrated in Gordon, op. cit. pl. 12).

repente e media salutantium turba adprehendit: the precise reference of repente is not wholly clear: it could refer to
17- repente...adprehendit cont.
the apparent suddenness of Galba's decision to adopt Piso formally
(seemingly made overnight, 9th-10th January, A.D. 69; cf. above,
17, n. on quod ut nuntiatum est), or it could refer to the
suddenness with which Piso found himself "Servius Sulpicius Galba
Caesar" (AFA for 10th January, 69 = MW 2).

The salutantium turba implies amici principis (and others)
who were admitted to the Emperor's presence each morning.
Vespasian's morning routine, for example, is fairly well attested:
he rose before daylight, dealt with correspondence and official
papers and then admitted his amici, who greeted him while he was
getting dressed; they then sat down with him to deal with any
matters which required discussion or decision (S. Vesp. 21; Pliny
Ep. 3.59; Philostr. VA 5.31-37; see further Crook, Consilium
Principis 21-30, espec. 27-28), and this seems to have been more or
less the routine followed by all principes in the 1st and 2nd centuries
A.D.

Tacitus' account of the adoption of Piso tells of a meeting
between Galba and Vinius, Laco, Marius Celsus and Ducenius Geminus,
at which pauc a praefatus de sua senectute, Pisonem Licicianum
accersiri iubet (H 1.14.1). Plutarch sets no scene in his account,
but simply says that, after hearing of the revolt in Germany, he no
longer put off the matter of an adoption (sc. - as he had done
earlier: cf. G 21.3), and, since he did not approve of either Otho
or Dolabella, ἀφω ὡς ἔτεκεν προειτικὸν μετεπέμπατο Πείσωνα
(G 23.2): this is quite close to what S. gives us, but without the
detail of the turba salutantium, which might not have meant much to
Greek readers. It would therefore appear that, on the morning of
10th January, Galba did not allow his amici to be admitted to his presence as usual; instead, he summoned only four, and while he was meeting them, the others were kept waiting outside, among them not only Piso, but presumably Otho too (cf. Plut. G 23.5-6).

After telling his closest advisers that, because of his age, he had made a decision, he had Piso brought in. The contradiction between Tacitus' paucis praefatus de sua senectute and Plutarch's μηδὲν προειπὼν can be explained by understanding Plutarch's words to refer specifically to Galba's choice of Piso, about which there was no forewarning. However, there are objections to this reconstruction: principes seem usually to have dealt with formal business after the morning salutatio, and, more important, the meeting described by Tacitus seems wholly pointless, since Galba did not seek any advice, nor did he ask for opinions about Piso as a potential successor. The story as it stands is not very plausible (though it may be evidence for the names of Galba's most trusted advisers), and we may prefer to accept S.'s story: at the morning salutatio, Galba simply announced that he had decided to adopt a successor, asked that Piso be brought to him, and called him his son.

filiumque appellans perduxit in castra ac pro contione adoptavit: where, exactly, did Galba adopt Piso? In the palace (filiumque appellans) or in the praetorian camp (pro contione adoptavit)? Since the main verb adoptavit refers to the camp, S. presumably intends us to understand that the decisive act took place there; cf. Plut. G 23.3: καὶ κατέβαινεν εἰς τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐκείνον ἀποδείξεων Καίσαρα καὶ διάδοχον... But adrogatio,
the adoption of a person *sui iuris*, was a solemn and formal act and, legally, it could not take place either *inter amicos* or *apud milites*. It required the summoning *arbitris pontificibus* of the *comitia curiata* (Gellius, *NA* 5.19.6), under the presidency of the *pontifex maximus*, and this procedure for adoption was called *adrogatio*, *quia is qui adoptat rogatur, id est interrogatur*, an *velit eum quem adoptaturus sit iustum sibi filium esse*, *et is qui adoptatur rogatur an id fieri patiatur, et populus rogatur an id fieri iubeat* (Gaius 1.99; see further Mommsen, *Staatsr. II* 37-38; *III* 38-39; Botsford, *Roman Assemblies* 160-161). Of course, the *comitia curiata* had long since ceased to operate as a genuine assembly of the people and the original 30 *curiae* were represented by 30 *lictors* (cf. Cic. *Leg. Agr.* 2.12.31), but the legal forms were still strictly observed: the procedure is described by Gellius (5.19) and by the jurist Gaius (1.98-107), both of whom wrote in the second century A.D. and both of whom use the *present tense* in their accounts; cf. Buckland, *Textbook* 125: "Nominally this continued to be the form up to the time of Diocletian...Diocletian abolished the old system, providing that it might be done by imperial rescript, which is in effect no change of principle, the existing legislative authority being substituted for the original." (On the *comitia curiata* see further Gellius 15.27; Botsford, *Roman Assemblies* 152-200, with detailed older bibliography; Mommsen, *Staatsr III* 316-321; Greenidge, *Roman Public Life* 250-251; Taylor, *Roman Voting Assemblies* 315; Momigliano, *JRS* 53 [1963] 108-112.) As *pontifex maximus* Galba could no more dispense with the traditional forms than the Queen today, entertaining the members of both Houses of Parliament, could
have a new law passed at the dinner-table on the collective whim of a moment. Spooner is wrong in saying (ap. H 1.15.1 adoptarem): "Galba as pontifex maximus could dispense with the ordinary forms"; Irvine is misleading in saying (ap. H 1.15.1 leges curiata): "Originally an adoption could only be legally carried out before the Pontifex Maximus in the Comitia Curiata"; it was still so. And Heubner too is wrong in speaking of a "Neuerung" in the case of Piso's adoption, which "liegt im äusseren Vollzug, denn Piso wird nicht leges curiata apud pontifices, sondern durch einseitige kaiserliche Willenserklärung arrogiert. Der Grund dafür liegt zweifellos darin, dass diese Arrogation...in ihrer Besonderheit markiert und von den privaten Alltagsadoptionen abgehoben werden sollte" (Komm. zu H I p. 47, quoting Nesselhauf, Hermes 83 [1955] 488-489). Scholars have been misled by the opening sentence of Galba's "speech" to Piso as given by Tacitus (H 1.15): si te privatus leges curiata apud pontifices, ut moris est, adoptarem... The emphasis here is not on leges curiata, but on privatus. This is confirmed by the contrasting statement: nunc me deorum hominumque consensu ad imperium vocatum praeclera insoles tua et amor patriae impulit ut principatum...offeram. In other words, Galba is doing more than merely adopting Piso: he is making him his successor in the Principate as well. But this does not imply that he has dispensed with the necessary legal forms for adrogatio.

On the other hand, given that the actual legally-required ritual of adoption was now the merest of formalities, the important step was the public announcement of it. Tacitus was aware of this; hence his statement at the end of the scene among the amici: consultatum
inde, pro rostris an in senatu an in castris adoptio nuncuparetur. iri in castra placuit (H 1.17.2), and then: apud frequentem militia contionem imperatoria brevitate adoptari a se Pisonem...pronuntiat (H 1.18.2); Plutarch, possibly reflecting some verbal caution in his source, makes no mention of adoption in the praetorian camp: Galba goes there ἐκείνον (sc. Piso) ἀποδέξετων καύσαν καὶ δίδοσον (G 23.2); but S., perhaps impatient with Pettifogging legal niceties, summarizes the whole process by saying pro contione adoptavit. Certainly this announcement, giving the soldiers precedence over the senate and people and reflecting political reality, was the crucial act. The actual legal formalities appear to have been carried out on 10th January, probably after the speeches in the camp and the curia: cf. Tacitus' use of adoptati rather than adoptatum esse in H 1.18.2, and the words adoptio facta and ob adoptione[m Ser. Sulpici Galbae Caesaris in the AFA for 10th January, 69 (= MW2, lines 24, 27).

ne tunc quidem donativi ulla mentione facta: this was crucial; both Plutarch (G 23.4) and Tacitus (H 1.18.2) make the same point, and as we have already seen, Tacitus' comment shows how easily Galba could have ensured his own and Piso's safety: constat potuisse conciliari animos quantulacumque parci senis liberalitate.

M. Salvio Othoni: S. introduces Otho at this point with great skill. (His previous mention of him, at Galba 6.1, is merely an aside.) The use of the tria nomina (whatever the source S. may have followed: cf. Dio 65.5.2 and Townend, Hermes 89 [1961] 242-243)
lends weight to the introduction, which is immediately clarified by the words praebuit perficiendi conata intra sextum adoptionis diem: this is all that the reader needs to know about Otho at this point; his background, early life and career to date can wait until his Life is reached, since to introduce such personal details at this point would ruin the flow of S.'s rapid narrative. We may also note how effectively here S. employs his practice of describing events from the point of view of the person whose life he is writing, since Tacitus' account is clearly thrown off balance by his lengthy introduction of Otho at H 1.13.3-4; similarly Plutarch at G 19.2 - 20.7 (which demonstrates that, in his Galba and Otho, Plutarch is not really writing biographies, but, rather, a narrative of the period chopped willy-nilly into "Lives" at the beginning of each reign.)
The Fall of Galba
(18.1 - 20.2)

Introduction: S.'s account of the fall of Galba and the events of 15th January, 69, is predictably divided between 6 18.1 - 20.2 and 6 5.1-7.1. With his view firmly focussed on first Galba and then Otho, his account is much simpler and less emotionally affecting than the accounts of either Tacitus (H 1.21-49) or Plutarch (G 23.5 - 29.5): it is also briefer than either. The epitome of Dio's account of Galba's fall consists essentially of one excerpt (64.4.1 - 6.5), which describes the rising of Vitellius in Germany, Galba's adoption of Piso and Otho's reaction to it, and then the murder of Galba.

Inevitably the principal problem which arises in any consideration of these versions of events is Quellenforschung: how many separate sources underlie our extant accounts, and who used which? These questions are simply unanswerable, because although it is possible to form some estimate of the number and type of the lost literary works on A.D. 68-69, it is not possible to form any impression of the eye-witness accounts of events in Rome on 15th January, 69, on which Pliny the Elder or Cluvius Rufus or Tacitus or Plutarch or Suetonius might have drawn: Pliny the Younger's letters to Tacitus on the eruption of Vesuvius (Ep. 6.16, 20) provide one example, while Plutarch's remarks about his patron Mestrius Florus (Q 14) provide another; finally, Tacitus himself as a boy of about thirteen or fourteen may have been in Rome on that day and may have retained
vivid personal impressions of the course of events. This means

that when we read Sunt qui tradant...plures autem prodiderunt (G 20.1) or extremam eius vocem...varie prodidere. alii...plures...

(H 1.41.2), we are not entitled to assume that both S. and Tacitus

are using the same single source and that they are following no more

tha "a convention of Roman historiography" (Townend, AJP 85 [1964]

342). Equally, although we may be fairly certain that both the

ignotus (? Pliny the Elder) and Cluvius Rufus wrote accounts of the

events of this day, it is, at best, hazardous to attempt to assign

each and every single variant in our extant accounts to one or the

other; this can lead to dogmatic assertions of what is no more than

fine-spun and highly complex theorising (cf., for example, Townend

[op. cit. 358-95], on the role of Sempronius Densus: "Two

interpretations are possible. Pliny clearly gave the story as we have

it in Plutarch and Dio. Cluvius either related the prowess of

Densus in connection with Piso, or did not mention Densus at all. In

the latter case, Tacitus, while following Cluvius' account of Galba's

total isolation, has admired Pliny's story of Densus sufficiently to

incorporate it in an entirely different setting. Either way, Pliny's

wording has been used for a version of the story which he did not
give himself." Detailed examinations of the similarities and

discrepancies in our extant sources have been made by E. G. Hardy

(Studies in Roman History [1st Series] 294-334, esp. 303-4, 313,

319-20, 333; cf. his earlier edition of Plutarch's Lives of Galba and

Otho, pp. xxix-xxxiv) and P. Fabia ("La Journée du 15 janvier 69 à

see also Rome," R Ph 36 [1912] 78-129; R. Syme, Tacitus, App. 29; G. B.

18.1-

Major differences in the extant accounts will be noted at the appropriate places below.

18.1 Magna et assidua monstra iam inde a principio exitum ei qualis evenit, portenderant: this collections of omens and portents is unique to S.; none of the other sources contains any of those listed in this chapter.

taurus securis ictu consternatus...essedum eius invasit: it was considered extremely unlucky if a half-killed beast broke away. The sacrifice was ruined; cf. S. DJ 59, for Caesar's disregard of such an omen. Vitellius, however, in late 69 was not so bold: when he moved from Rome to Mevania to take command of the forces facing the advancing column of Antonius Primus, he was confronted by this same omen (H 3.56.1): as Ogilvie puts it (The Romans and their Gods, 49): "he took the hint and hurried home to Rome."

urbem quoque et deinde Palatium ingressum excepturrae tremor et assimilis quidam mugitui sonus: earthquakes were always regarded very seriously; they were prodigia publica and and were therefore of national significance; cf. Pliny, NH 2.200: numquam urbs Roma tremuit ut non futuri eventus alicuius id praenuntium esset; Cicero states (Div. 1.43.97) that earthquakes portend magna...bella perniciosaeque seditiones. As for earthquakes predicting an Emperor's death, S. tells us at Tib.74 that the lighthouse at Capri was wrecked by one a few days before Tiberius' death: cf. also Ner. 48.2. For the assimilis quidam mugitui sonus one can
18.1-18.3

scarce to do better than read Evans' description of the earthquake of 26th June, 1926, which caught him in the basement of the Villa Ariadne at Knossus (Palace of Minos II 316, 325): "A dull sound rose from the ground like the muffled roar of an angry bull... It is something to have heard with one's own ears the bellowing of the bull beneath the earth who, according to a primitive belief, tosses it on his horns."

18.2 **ad ornandam Fortunam suam Tusculanam:** for Galba's statuette of Fortune and its shrine in his villa at Tusculum, see above 4.3 and nn. Galba seems to have been particularly superstitious about dreams, though not about other types of omen (see below 18.3, n. on adoptionis die).

**Capitolinae Veneri:** apart from a reference in S. Calig. 7, "Capitoline Venus" is otherwise unattested; there was an altar or shrine to Venus Victrix on the Capitol mentioned in one of the Calendars (CIL I² p. 245; cf. Mommsen's comment, p. 403) and there was also a temple of Venus Erycina dedicated by Q. Fabius Maximus in 215 B.C. (Livy 23.30.14, 31.9): this latter Platner-Ashby identify with the aedes mentioned here (551).

18.3 **Kal. Ian. sacrificandi:** other sacrifices were performed on 1st January, 69, by the Arval Brethren (see Henzen, p.XC ; MW 2).

**coronam de capite excidisse:** cf. below Vit. 9: laurea, quam religiosissime circumdederat, in profluentem excidit. Alexander
the Great encountered a similar omen not long before his death (Arr. 7.22; Diod. 17.116.6).

*auspicanti pullos avolasse:* they were supposed to eat and the more greedily, the better, so that food would fall from their mouths (cf. Cic. Div. 1.15.27-28; 2.34.72); cf. S. Tib. 2.2 for the famous story of P. Claudius Pulcher, cos. 249 B.C., off Drepanum.

*auctionis die:* the omens here recorded by S. seem trivial in comparison with what we have from Tacitus (Hist. 1.18.1): Quartum Idus Ianuarias, foedere imbribus diem, tonitrua et fulgura et caelestes minae ultra solitum turbaverant (cf. Plut. C 23.3 for essentially the same thing). Tacitus adds that Galba was contemptorem talium ut fortuitorum, seu quae fato manent, quamvis significata, non vitantur.

19.1 *prius vero quam occideretur sacrificantem mane haruspex identidem monuit...abesse:* for this dramatic scene, see below Q 6.2 and n. on *etiam sacrificanti interfuit audivitque praedicta haruspicis.*

*Haud multo post cognoscit teneri castra ab Othone:* S. is suitably vague about the time involved here. Otho left Galba at the temple of Apollo on the Palatine and went through the palace (presumably the domus Tiberiana) and out the "back door" (i.e. the side furthest away from the Forum); he then made for the Velabrum and thence headed for the Forum and the Golden Milestone, where he
was met by some soldiers and hustled off to the Praetorian Camp in a litter (see below Q 6.2-3 and nn.). The exact distance covered is hard to estimate but it would seem to be at least 2 mp, and since it was not all covered at a particularly brisk rate, Otho will not have arrived in the Camp until at least half an hour after he left Galba and word can hardly have reached Galba until about one hour after Otho’s departure. Accordingly, the picture of Galba standing on the Palatine beside the haruspex who was still holding the entrails when word came of the revolt (Plut. G 25.7, H 1.29.1) may be dramatic, but is scarcely credible - unless the haruspex was exceptionally slow.

nihil amplius quam continere se statuit et legionariorum firmare praesiis, qui multifariam diverseque tendebant: S. omits any mention of the decision to send Piso, Galba’s heir, to test the feelings of the Praetorian cohort on guard at the Palace (Plut. G 25.8; H 1.29.1-31.1), no doubt because it came to nothing, and also because it would take the focus of attention away from Galba (see also G. B. Townend, AJP 85 [1964] 357).

There were, it seems, numerous legionary and auxiliary soldiers in Rome in January, 69: at the beginning of the Histories (1.6.2), Tacitus mentions the legio Hispana which Galba had brought with him (this was Legio VII Galbiana/Gemina, which had actually by January 69 been transferred to Pannonia), the legion which Nero had enrolled from the fleet (Legio I Adiutrix, which Galba had made a iusta legio; cf. CIL XVI 7 = MW 396), and many detachments from Germany, Britain
and Illyricum (which Nero had sent east for his projected war with Parthia and which he had subsequently recalled to Italy at the time of the revolt of Vindex). At H 1.26.1 Tacitus mentions that the disaffection of the Praetorian Guard and the news of the revolt of legions in Germany affected the loyalty of the legionary and auxiliary troops in Rome. We hear of all these troops in Tacitus' account of the events of 15th January, and this serves to confirm and amplify the information given here by S. Marius Celsus was sent to the Porticus Vipsania to try the temper of the Illyrian detachments who were encamped there: they drove him away at spearpoint (cf. Plut. G 259); two centurions were sent to summon the German troops from the Atrium Libertatis: Tacitus says that they diu nutavere since Galba had been kind to them when they were sick (H 1.31.2-3; cf. below G 20.1); furthermore, Piso was eventually murdered by Sulpicius Florus, a soldier from the British auxiliaries (H 1.43.2) and Galba himself seems to have been killed by one Camurius, a legionary from XV Primigenia, who was obviously part of the German detachment (H 1.41.3; cf. Plut. G 27.2). However, it seems clear from H 1.74.3 and 89.2 that by mid-March 69 only the praetorian and urban cohorts remained in Rome: presumably therefore Otho had sent these troops to other postings after 15th January (though what became of the troops from Germany and Britain is hard to fathom).

loricam tamen induit linteam: linen corslets are attested among the Greeks from the Archaic Period, (Iliad 2.529, 830; Anth. Pal. 14.73; Hdt. 3.47.2-3; cf. 2.182.1; Nepos, Iphicrates 1.4; Paus. 1.21.7) although there is usually an element of the exotic about them
and they appear, in general, to be regarded as oriental—either Egyptian or Persian (for the "Amasis corslet" stolen by Polycrates of Samos, see M.-Th. Picard, Hommages à Waldemar Deonna 363-370; Alexander the Great at Gaugamela wore a linen corslet which was, according to Plutarch [Alex. 32.8], part of the spoils from Issus); however, H. Lumpkin has recently suggested (Journ. of the Arms and Armour Soc. 8 [1975] 193-212) that the Macedonian κόσμουβος (cf. LSJ Addenda; = Grk. κόσμουμβος) was a linen or leather corslet worn by the centre and rear ranks in the Macedonian phalanx. Such a garment would obviously be most attractive in hot countries or for ceremonial use by (perhaps elderly) heads of state.

Linen armour was still used at the time of the Crusades; cf. I. Casaubon's note on the present passage in S. (most conveniently available today, with comments by S. Törnvist, in ORom 7 [1969] 80-81). In general, see the discussions of H. L. Lorimer, Homer and the Monuments 210-11; D. L. Page, Sappho and Alcaeus 215-16; A. M. Snodgrass, Arms and Armour of the Greeks 90, 108.

19.2 sed extractus rumoribus falsis.....in Forum usque processit: cf. Plut. G 26.1-3; H 1.34.2 -35.2 (note here espec. compositum auctumque rumorem mixtis iam Othonianis, qui ad evocandum Galbam laeta falsō volgaverint); Dio 64.6.2-3. Although the storyline is clearly taken from the common source, there are slight differences of emphasis and detail. The soldier who claimed to have killed Otho was, according to Plutarch and Tacitus, a speculator named Julius Atticus; Galba's question may have been either quis iussit? or quo auctore? (cf. the Greek τίς σε...ικέλευσε;) Tacitus,
however, uses this as an opportunity to emphasize for the last time Galba's severitas, with the question Commilito, quis iussit? (cf. P. Schunk's comments, SO 39 [1964] 48). S., by contrast, sees this as vainglory (tanta fiducia, ut...).

ibi equites...incitati desertum a suis contrucidarunt: S. brings his story to a rapid conclusion, with a few details to follow; he does not give us a picture of the aged vir militaris (so enfeebled that he had to be carried in a litter) tossed this way and that in a forum packed with people (cf. Plut. G 26.4; H 1.40.1), who watched and waited, as if at some munus, to see what the outcome would be.

S.'s reference to equites is confirmed by Tacitus (H 1.40.2: truces armis, rapidi equis) and Plutarch (G 26.5, though Plutarch is more precise and his ἐσωαίνοντο πρῶτον ἱππεῖς, εἶδο δὲ πλατῶν shows that the mad dash from the Praetorian Camp to the Forum was similar to one which would occur less than two months later; cf. below 8.2, n. on ac repente omnes nullo certo duce in Palatium cucurrerunt).

20.1 Sunt qui tradant, ad primum tumultum...donativum etiam pollicitum: both S. and Tacitus (H 1.41.2) give alternative versions of Galba's last words: in both cases the first alternative is less dignified - Tacitus' very much less so: alii suppliciter interrogasasse, quid mali meruisset, paucos dies exsolvendo donativo deprecatum (cf. Dio 64.6.4). Apart from the detail about the largess, this is hardly the same as S.'s

Quid agitis commilitones? Ego vester sum et vos mei.
However, since, as G. M. Lane pointed out ([HSCP] 9 [1898] 18), this is a line of verse (trochaic septenarius) we may suspect a soldiers' marching-song (cf. above, 6,2): Galba, tough old soldier to the last, may himself have quoted a well-known line, or possibly this represents some parody of his words shouted out with metrical foot-stamping by the soldiers who carried his head about on a pike later the same day (see below, 20.2; cf. G. B. Townend, AJP 85 [1964] 359-60).

plures autem prodiderunt...ut hoc agerent et ferirent, quando ita videtur, hortatum: this alternative is, of course, much more dignified; however, the two versions are not mutually exclusive. Galba clearly knew that he had not much chance if the Praetorians were indeed completely suborned by Otho; cf. his remark, quoted above (19.1), about the linen corslet. He may have tried both to dissuade the soldiers from killing him by acting as a "fellow-soldier" and, when he saw that this was useless, to die with some dignity. However, we should always remember that the last words of famous men are particularly prone to distortion; witness the case of William Pitt the Younger, as cited in the Oxford Dictionary of Quotations: the first alternative (with variations) is: "Oh, my country! how I love my country"; the other main variant is: "I think I could eat one of Bellamy's veal pies" (ODQ² p. 379 nos. 18-20, 21).

illud mirum admodum fuerit, neque praesentium quemquam opem imperatori ferre conatum: this passage raises two issues - the matter of the apparent indifference to what was going on shown by the civilians in the Forum (on this, see R. W. Husband, 'Galba's
Assassination and the Indifferent Citizen," CT 10 [1915] 321-325) and, perhaps more significant, the contradictions in our other sources about the rôle played by the heroic centurion, Sempronius Densus: according to Tacitus (II 1.43.1), he was a centurion in the Praetorian Guard assigned by Galba to protect Piso, who held off the assassins sent by Otho long enough for Piso to escape to the temple of Vesta; however, according to Plutarch (G 26.8-10) and Dio (64.6.5) Sempronius was the only person who stood and defended Galba when the assassins arrived. If we believe that Plutarch used no Latin account other than the common source, we must accept that the common source depicted Sempronius as a defender of Galba. Why, then, has Tacitus rejected this version (especially if the common source was indeed Pliny, who was normally reliable and who may well have been in Rome in 69 [cf. Syme, Tacitus 60-61])? Presumably because from a study of eye-witness accounts he became convinced that the *ignotus* had wrongly concluded that a centurion of the Praetorian Guard, killed while remaining faithful to his allegiance, had died trying to protect the Emperor himself; but no one had tried to save the hapless Galba. S.'s omission of the story implies either that he came to the same conclusion as Tacitus or that he had read Tacitus' account and followed it; since Piso does not figure in S.'s account of 15th January, there is no room for Sempronius Densus either.

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omnes qui arcesserentur sprevisse nuntium excepta Germanici< orum vexillatione: as we have seen (above p.232 ) the German troops in Rome in January, 69 were bivouacked at the Atrium Libertatis (precise location unknown; perhaps somewhere on the line
20.1-20.2
of the later Imperial Fora; cf. Cic. Att. 4.16.8; Platner-Ashby
56-57); they seem, in general, not to have shared in the disaffection
of the other soldiers in the city. Tacitus tells us (H 1.31.3) that
diu nutavere, which can hardly be harmonized with S.'s in auxilium
advolaverunt; however, since both Tacitus and S. have the detail
that Galba had shown great kindness to them, various explanations
for their non-appearance must have arisen: S.'s, that after a stay
near the Forum of perhaps almost six months they did not know their
way thither, seems rather unconvincing.

20.2 Iugulatus est ad lacum Curtium: cf. H 1.41.2-3; Plut.
G 27.1-2. Galba's litter was overturned when his bearers panicked
and he was tumbled out on to the ground near the Lacus Curtius (almost
at the centre of the Forum Romanum; see Ogilvie, Commentary on Livy
1-5 75-77; Platner-Ashby, 310-11; Nash, I 542-4) while the people who
had been watching either fled or were chased away by the soldiers.
Tacitus adds de percussore non satis constat, and then gives three
alternatives, of whom the favourite, according to both Tacitus and
Plutarch, was Camurius, a legionary of XV Primigenia.

ac relictus ita uti erat donec gregarius miles a
frumentatione rediens abieicto onere caput ei amputavit:
this is perhaps the most horrific sentence in S.'s account of Galba's
murder. We have a picture of a bloody corpse lying abandoned and of
an ordinary soldier casually coming along carrying his grain ration;
the juxtaposition of the awful and the mundane is highly effective.
This soldier then spots a prize, throws away his ration and cuts off
Galba's head. The impression of mindless insensitivity is almost overwhelming, but this account is apparently not from the common source, since both Tacitus (Hist. 1.41.3) and Plutarch (G 27.2-4) indicate that Galba's head was cut off more or less at the same time as he was killed and that his attackers went on mutilating his now-headless corpse. (However, the story of Galba's bald head which S. then gives us was apparently in the common source; cf. Plut. G 27.3, though there is a minor difference of detail.) It is impossible, of course, to specify a source for S.'s variant here (and even the boldest modern Quellenforscher is silent on this point).

et quoniam capillo arripere non poterat...ad
Othonem detulit: for Galba's extreme baldness, see below G 21 and Plut. G 13.6. From a conflation of Tacitus, Plutarch and S. it is clear that the common source gave four names of soldiers in its account of Galba's murder. The fourth, Fabius Fabullus (given by Plutarch at G 27.3) cut off Galba's head, and this is suppressed by Tacitus because of the unseemly details (cf. Syme, Tacitus 189 and n. 6).

Galba Cupido, fruaris aetate tua: H. C. Nutting (CP 23 [1928] 287-8) examines the phrase aetate frui and, quoting Sen. Phaed. 447, Ovid, Ars Am. 3.65 and Livy 26.50.5, concludes that in the present passage the intent is wholly crude; since Galba was thought to have boasted that he was still "some fellow" (see next n.), this phrase should be rendered "Go it, Galba, you Cupid!"
quod ante paucos dies exierat in vulgus, laudantique cuidam formam suam: obviously a flatterer; cf. below chapter 21 for a description of Galba's rather decrepit physical appearance towards the end of his life. He was not only bald but also very wrinkled (Plut. G 13.6). In a note on this passage (CW 27 [1933] 45) H. C. Nutting points out that S. does not vouch for this anecdote (exierat in vulgus) and suggests either that the person who praised formam suam was boasting about himself (i.e. "what a man" he still was) and that Galba ironically cut him down to size by boasting of his unimpaired vigour, or that Galba was responding sarcastically to a piece of flattery directed at himself. In either event, the remark reached the Praetorian Camp and the soldiers used it as a basis for derision.

Patrobius Neroniani libertus centum aureis redemptum eo loco...abiecit: Patrobius is mentioned by our sources as one of the most notorious of Nero's freedmen and he was executed (probably towards the end of 68) in Galba's purge of Neronian agents (see above, 15.2, n. on quin etiam populo R. deposcente supplicium... increpuit; cf. Plut. C 17.2; H 2.95.2; Dio 64.3.4; see also Pliny, NH 35.168; Dio 63.3.1). As for what was done with Galba's head, Plutarch (G 28.2-4) agrees with S., stating that it was thrown down in the place called Sessorium Τόδε ὑπὸ τῶν Καλαμών πολακομένους θανατοθείν. Tacitus, on the other hand, says (H 1.49.1) that Galba's head was placed ante Patrobius tumulum. However, according to Platner-Ashby (487-8) Sessorium was outside the Servian wall beyond the Esquiline Gate and was a place "where paupers and criminals are said to have been buried."
dispensator Argivus: Tacitus (II 1.49.1) calls him Argius and describes him as being "e pri<oribus servis; cf. Plut. G 28.4: ἄπελεύθερος. Plutarch adds the detail that Galba's body was recovered by Helvidius Priscus (cf. above, p. 117).

in privatis eius hortis Aurelia via: their precise location is unknown, though probably they lay in the vicinity of the Janiculum (cf. Eutrop. 7.16).
Personal Details about Galba

(21. - 23.)

21  Statura fuit iusta, capite praecalvo, oculis caeruleis, adunco naso: existing portraits would not, of course, show his baldness since Romans regarded this as shameful (cf. S. DJ 45.2); in addition, Plutarch mentions that his face was wrinkled (G 13.6), but this does not really give us much of a description. Regarding coin portraits, Ines Soncini has suggested (RIN 73 [1971] 63-76, esp. 74-6) that there are essentially two types, the commoner one rather conventional (cf. BMC Imp. I Plate 56, no.7 for the type) and revealing "una personalità forte ed imperiosa, un carattere duro, avvezzo al comando, un vero imperatore della Grande Roma quale può essere concepito dalla considerazione dei suoi Fasti" (74); the other is vivacious, individualized and realistic (for the type, see BMC Imp. I Plate 52, nos. 6, 12, 19) and reveals "un guerriero forte ed ancor giovane d'anni, eccezionale come individuo e come condottiero" (74). Moreover, J. Charbonneaux (Hommages à Albert Gremer I 397-402) identifies a marble head now in the Louvre (inventory no. MND 2222) as an official portrait of Galba issued during his principate: in profile this head bears a striking resemblance to the profile shown on a denarius "du Cabinet des Médailles" (no further identification is given; see BMC Imp. I Plate 52 no. 17 for a very similar, but not identical, denarius; cf. also Plate 52 no. 15, an aureus, and see also M. Grant, Nero 234), and convinced C. M. Kraay of the
21-22
correctness of the identification (Charbonneaux, 397 n.4).
This head is very different from the one illustrated in MW, Plate 1
(also in Paris).

*manibus pedibusque articulari morbo distortissimis:*
this must refer to some general disease of the joints such as
rheumatism or, more probably, arthritis (cf. OLD s.v. 'articularis').
Gout is also a possibility (cf. L-S, s.v. 'articularis').

*ut neque calceum perpeti...valeret:* this accords very
ill with our earlier picture of the aged *vir militaris* on the
march to Rome (above, 11) as does the account of his severe hernia
immediately below; perhaps the picture of Galba in his linen corslet
being carried in a litter into the forum on 15th January, 69,
(above, p. 235) accords more closely with reality.

22 *cibi plurimi traditur:* cf. S. Aug. 76.1; the remainder
of this sentence is clearly amplification of this initial remark.

*tempore hiberno etiam ante lucem capere consuerat:
*of course, since the nights in winter are much longer than in summer,
this may mean simply that Galba got up and had his *ientaculum* at
much the same time (by our clock) all the year round (see further
Marquardt, *Privatleben*² 264-9). However, by implication, Galba's
practice was considered excessive.

*inter cenam vero:* the *vero* appears to be used intensively;
cf. Baumgarten-Crusius *ad loc.*
usque co abundanti<s>: this is the emendation of I. G. Graevius and abundantis refers to cibi.

ut congestas super manus reliquias circumferri
iuberet spargique ad pedes stantibus: this consecutive clause ought to illustrate graphically the quantity of food that Galba was in the habit of tackling. The words super manus are particularly difficult to interpret: the commonest suggestion seems to be "in front of him" (Baumgarten-Crusius, Hofstee, Mooney, Rolfe). Baumgarten-Crusius quotes a dissertation by D. C. Grimm (Leipzig, 1798) where the reading circum se ferri is adopted, which implies that Galba had everyone else's leavings piled up around him and then, when he was finished, what remained was distributed to the attendants (ad pedes stantibus). Baumgarten-Crusius himself takes ad pedes stantibus to be a dative of agent (to avoid ab ad pedes stantibus) and suggests that the servants carried Galba's leavings round all the diners ostentandi causa, quantum fauces et venter valerent and that these were then piled up (spargique) into an impressive heap. This seems highly improbable. Since it was customary to distribute left-overs to the attendants, I would agree with Hofstee that the meaning here is that Galba tackled so many dishes at dinner that his leavings gathered together were sufficient for all the servants at the table.

libidinis in mares pronior: in spite of S.'s qualification (et eos non nisi praeduros exoletosque), Galba was remembered not only as a homosexual but as a pederast: cf. Epit.
22-23

de Caes. 6.2: in adulescentes infamis (probably alluded to at Aur. Vict., Caes. 6.1: rapere trahere vexare ac foedum in modum vastare cuncta et polluere). For his relationship with Icelus, see above p. 185. Townend (AJP 85 [1964] 368 comments on this chapter: "...Suetonius' closing remarks on Galba's character (22) credit him with the improbable vices of gluttony and pederasty, the latter illustrated with an anecdote of Galba's conduct in Spain...";

inevitably these details come from Cluvius Rufus, "who was able to exploit his position as Galba's successor in Tarraconensis to blacken his character with allegedly well-authenticated slanders, and so justify his own tergiversation."

For S.'s attitude towards homosexuality, see T. F. Carney, PACA 11 (1968) 11-12, 20-21.

ferebant in Hispania Icelum...de Neronis exitu nuntiantem: for Icelus' arrival in Spain see above 11, n. on supemenientibus ab urbe nuntiis.

23 Periit tertio et septuagesimo aetatis anno,

imperii mense septimo: for a discussion of Galba's year of birth, see above 4.1, n. on M. Valerio Messala Cn. Lentulo cons. natus est VIII Kal. Ian... For the duration of his principate, see above 10.1, n. on cum...consendisset tribunal.

senatus, ut primum licitum est, statuam ei decreverat: this will have come after the death of Vitellius
(20th December, 69; see below, Vit.16, n. on *Postridie response opperienti*), who originally made his bid for power by rebelling against Galba. At the time of the Flavian bid for power, attempts were made to win over former supporters of Galba (and these were apparently more numerous than might be imagined: see H 2.55.1 for moves to honour his memory in Rome after the death of Otho); see H 3.7.2 - an action of Antonius Primus, but one apparently in keeping with the "Flavian line" at the time; see also H 4.40.1, for Domitian's proposal de restituendis Galbae honoribus (early January, 70). However, after the Flavian victory, official enthusiasm for Galba rapidly cooled (see next n.; cf. J. Gagé, *REA* 54 [1952] 290-297; A. Garzetti, *Mélanges A. Piganiol* II 781 n.7).

The erection of a statue in the Forum was a prerogative of the Senate, (cf. below S. O 1.3; Vit. 3.1), in theory: this was not, however, done without the assent of the Emperor (cf. Pliny, Ep. 1.17.1).

*sed decretum Vespasianus abolevit, percussores opinatus*: clearly, this represents the end of a Flavian rehabilitation of Galba. This statement looks like a fabrication, but it is expressed in very general, even vague, terms and certainly no one would venture to question it or have the temerity to demand details. The ultimate Flavian line on Galba seems to have been that he rebelled against Nero, an unsatisfactory ruler but nonetheless the legitimate holder of the Principate. (Vespasian, of course, disliked Nero but acted properly towards him). This served to explain why the saviour Vespasian was prepared to rebel only against
a tyrant and usurper such as Vitellius (for this attitude, see Philostr. VA 5.29; see further below, pp. 490-2).
LIFE
OF
OTHO
Otho's Background and Career to January, 69

(1.1 - 5.1)

1.1 Maiores Othonis orti sunt oppido Ferentio: cf. H

2.50.1. There is some doubt as to the correct form of the name of this town. Hülsen (RE VI 2209) argues that Ferentis (indecl.) is correct (cf. Vitruv. 2.7.4 codd.; CIL VI 2778). However, Ferentium, attested perhaps by the majority of ancient sources (cf. also S. Vesp. 3 for a locative/genitive form Ferenti) is probably the correct Latin form, while Ferentis (or perhaps Frentis) was the original Etruscan form. For a detailed discussion with a complete listing of all variants, see the important article by A. Degrassi, "Il Sepolcro dei Salvii a Férento e le sue Iscrizioni," RPAA 34 (1961-62) 59-77, esp. 59-61.

Ferentium lay about 12 miles south-east of Lake Bolsena, originally in the territory of the powerful Etruscan city of Volsinii; it was a typical small town on the Etruscan plain, situated a few miles to the east of the Via Cassia, the main Roman road through the interior of Etruria: see further G. Dennis, Cities and Cemeteries of Etruria (Everyman Edition) I 250-257; M. Pallottino, The Etruscans (ed. D. Ridgeway) 114-5.

The most important archaeological find at Ferentium was made in 1921 with the discovery of the chamber tomb of the Salvii, which contained 20 sarcophagi dating probably from the last decades of the second century B.C. to 23 B.C. (Degrassi, op. cit. 62-3, 73-5).
That the Emperor Otho himself was actually born at Ferentium, as Tacitus asserts (Hist 2.50.1; cf. Epit. de Caes. 7.1) is perhaps confirmed by an inscription found there, and dedicated to him as Princeps by the munifices (CIL XI 7417 = MW 78).

See further M. Torelli, DArch 3 (1969) 311-12, 342.

familia vetere et honorata: this is probably true; cf. Degrassi, RPAA 34 (1961-62) 73: "Forse esagera Svetonio quando dice che i Salvii furono ex principibus Etruriae: la piccola Férento non fu sede di lucumonia, ma dovette dipendere da un centro maggiore. Ma che i Salvii fossero la famiglia principale del luogo, almeno quando essa passò sotto il dominio romano, non pare possa mettersi in dubbio." When the name Otho was adopted is not clear: it is not found in the tomb-inscriptions at Ferentium, but when this family appears in Rome, the name is 'Salvius Otho'; perhaps even more significant, it is the name 'Otho' alone which S. uses in this opening of the Life of Otho, and it is this name which is noteworthy; cf. Nagl on M. Salvius Otho, grandfather of the Princeps (RE IIA 2034-2036 s.v. 'Salvius' no. 20). According to Schulze, (Zur Gesch. lat. Eigennamen 93, 472), the nomen 'Salvius' is one of the commonest of Italian gentilicia and spread among the Etruscans from a Latin source. However, the name 'Otho' is very different: Schulze derives it from Etr.*u *gu and connects it with such gentilicia as Odinius, Otius, Uttius, Uttedius and Ottedius (201-202); cognomina, which, according to Latin tradition, originally belonged to the Etruscan name-system are, for the most part, family names and are so passed down from generation to generation like real gentilicia; so that
'Otho' can be called a cognomen gentile (315-316, n. 1); cf. its use in three successive generations of this family. This suggests a desire to keep up part of the Etruscan tradition which lay in the family's background.

avus M. Salvius Otho...nec praeturae gradum excessit:
cf. Nagl, RE II A s.v. 'Salvius' no. 20; Dessau PIR S 108; Wiseman, New Men in the Roman Senate 139 B.C. - 14 A.D., 259 no. 376.

Details survive of only one of the offices which this M. Salvius Otho held: he was a moneyer (iiivir aere argento auro flando feriundo) along with M. Maecilius Tullus and P. Lurius Agrippa, and was involved in the issue of "triumphal" bronze coinage of uncertain date: estimates range from 12-3 B.C., but 7 B.C. is the current favourite; cf. Mattingly, BMC Imp. I xlix, xcvii and pp. 43-44; for recent views with modern bibliography, see A. Degrassi, RPAA 34 (1961-62) 75 n. 57; A. S. Robertson, Roman Imperial Coins in the Hunter Coin Cabinet I xxxv. For the social (and political) importance of this post, usually held in one's late teens, see E. Birley, PBA 39 (1953) 199-205; Wiseman, op. cit. 147-153. The dates of his quaestorship and praetorship and of any other offices which he may have held are unknown.

Perhaps the most interesting feature of his career is Livia's influence. Degrassi has suggested (op. cit. 76) that he was born c. 26-25 B.C. and that his father, the eques Romanus mentioned here by S., was the husband of Titia L.f., who died at the age of 18 or 19 on 14th September, 23 B.C. and whose sarcophagus is the latest of those deposited in the tomb of the Salvii at Ferentium: this
1.1-1.2

would serve to explain the second cognomen Titianus, later found in the family. This is an attractive and economical hypothesis which would, of course, relegate to the category of vituperatio S.'s remark matre humili incertum an ingenua; however, if the eques Romanus moved from Ferentium not long after 23 and his son was "taken up" by Livia (the connection here is quite untraceable), the absence of his mother could well have given rise to hostile gossip: as a member of the municipal aristocracy and with the backing of the Princeps' wife, it is not surprising that this M. Salvius Otho held the socially prestigious post of moneyer. His failure to advance beyond the praetorship is also inexplicable; perhaps he died young.

1.2 Pater L. Otho...procreatum ex eo crederent: the identity of the princeps' grandmother must remain a mystery. That this lady of impressive family background was a mistress of Tiberius is certainly not impossible: her grandson was later prepared to be a complaisant husband for a subsequent princeps (or so it was alleged - see below S. O 3.1-2; H 1.13.3; Ann. 13.46) and his grandfather may perhaps have been prepared to tolerate such a situation for the sake of personal advancement. On the other hand, it is more likely that this is typical Suetonian gossip, based principally on Tiberius' affection, and plerique is the clue: if S. had found anything positive in his examination of the archives of Augustus' principate, we would have names and details here (cf. S. Vesp.1 for an example of careful genealogical research). The story may even have originated in Otho's day as a doublet with the
1.2-

story of Poppaea, in which case we may ascribe it to someone like Cluvius Rufus, or it may just conceivably represent some attempt on Otho's part in A.D. 69 to link himself with the Julio-Claudian house, in the manner attempted by Nymphidius Sabinus in 68 (cf. S. Galba 11, n. on praefecto praetori Nymphidio Sabino Romae).

Lucius Salvius Otho (Nagl, RE II A s.v. 'Salvius' no. 17: Dessau, PIR S 107) was born no later than A.D.1 (from his consulship in A.D.33) and perhaps a few years before. From the duties which were entrusted to him (see nn. immediately following), it is clear that he was a strict, conscientious and efficient administrator: he enjoyed the confidence of three successive Emperors - Tiberius, Gaius and Claudius and by the end of his life he clearly belonged to the inner circle of Claudius' amici. However, the date of his death is uncertain, though he was dead by A.D.55 (cf. S. 0 2.2 with Ann. 13.12: Otho became a friend of Nero after he became princeps and after his father's death; we first hear of him as Nero's confidant in A.D.55; see further below, 0 2.2, n. on libertinam...decrepitam).

urbanos honores: only the date of his consulship is known: he was cos. suff. in A.D.33, succeeding Galba (cf. S. G 6; H 2.50.1; Ann. 13.12.1; Degrassi, I.I. XIII.1 pp. 188, 217).

In addition, he was a Frater Arvalis, a flamen and, in A.D. 39 at least, promagister of the Arval Brethren (AFA for 39, esp. Oct. 27th = Sm. 7, 8, 9).

proconsulaturn Africae: the date is quite uncertain;
1.2- proconsulatum Africae cont.

Thomasson, Die Statthalter...Nordafrikas II 33-34 and ORom VII
(1969) 167, suggests A.D. 40/41, i.e. between L. Calpurnius Piso
(cos. ord. 27 - proc. Africæ 39/40) and Q. Marcius Barea Soranus
(cos. suff. 34 - proc. Africæ 41/43), which assumes that S. is here
giving his offices in correct chronological order, or "under
Claudius," i.e. either immediately before or after Galba: Galba's
proconsulship was either 44/46 or 45/47, with the latter slightly
more probable, so that the range of possibilities for L. Salvius
Otho is 43/44 or 44/45, OR 46/47 or 47/48, with 44/45 or 47/48
likewise slightly more probable. However, there is no reason to
assume that S. has given Otho's offices in strict chronological
order; in fact, it seems likely that the governorship in Illyricum
comes last simply because it has a story attached to it and leads
on to the honours bestowed on Otho and his adlection inter patricios.
Also, the proconsulship of Africa or Asia would normally be the
culmination of a man's career. The Claudian dates are, therefore,
more likely and must be examined further.

S. tells us (below, 1.3) that Otho incurred Claudius' displeasure during his governorship of Dalmatia (A.D. 42/43 - see
below, n. on in Illyrico): this and the fact that he returned to
court and subsequently regained Claudius' good-will (which may have
taken some time) will almost certainly eliminate 43/44 and perhaps
also 44/45: this leaves 47/48 as the most likely date for his
proconsulship, though it should be noted that the average interval
between consulship and proconsulship (Africæ vel Asiæ) during
Claudius' principate was 7-9 years, which may argue for 44/45.
However, there were special circumstances in this case, and intervals
of 14 and "at least" 16 years are attested for this period
(Thomasson, op. cit. I 29); so, on balance, 47/48 remains most
probable.

extraordinaria imperia: S.'s words extraordinaria
imperia severissime administravit. ausus etiam est in Illyrico...
prove that this was not a regular governorship, but, rather, a
special commission (and although S. uses the plural we know of this
one only in Otho's career) to settle affairs after the revolt of
L. Arruntius Camillus Scribonianus (cf. Wilkes, Dalmatia App. II
p. 443 no. 6; Jagenteufel, Die Statthalter d. röm Provinz Dalmatia
25-26 and n. 138). On the other hand, Otho clearly had command of
troops and power of life and death over them: this makes it likely
that, officially, he was legatus Augusti pro praetore provinciae
Dalmatiae. The "extraordinary" aspect of his command perhaps lay
in the fact that he was appointed at very short notice and at a time
when no new appointment had originally been planned; it is also
possible that a successor to Scribonianus had been designated
before the revolt, and so Otho may have displaced someone else.

ausus etiam est in Illyrico milites quosdam...
capite punire: in general, military law was stricter than civilian
law and soldiers had fewer rights than ordinary citizens. Speaking
of the Roman army at the time of the Jewish revolt Josephus says:
προσωπικοῦνται (sc. Roman soldiers) δὲ καὶ τῷ σόβῳ. οἴ τε
γὰρ νόμοι τοι' αὐτοῖς οὐ λατοταξίαν μόνον ἄλλα καὶ ἡγετικὴς
διάλυσθανατικοί, οἴ τε στρατηγοὶ τῶν νόμων ροβερότεροι
(BJ 3.102-103).
The problems connected with the so-called ius gladii are discussed and analysed by A. H. M. Jones in his paper "I appeal unto Caesar" (Studies in Roman Government and Law 51-65, espec. 58-63), and his conclusions are that, although the ius gladii is first mentioned in an inscription of Domitianic date (ILS 9200 = MW 372), there is justification for conjecturing that it is substantially older than this and perhaps goes back to the beginning of the Principate. Originally it was "a power granted to army commanders to execute Roman soldiers, but not civilians under their jurisdiction" (op. cit. 60), which was, by the time of the Constitutio Antoninana, extended to all provincial governors and involved civilians too (with certain privileged exceptions), and it is in this extended sense of an unlimited right of coercitio against civilians that the term is popularly used in later legal authorities. However, P. Garnsey has more recently argued (JRS 58 [1968] 51-59) that the ius gladii was held by all provincial governors not only in the first three centuries A.D., but also during the Republic and that it was not a specifically delegated power but was an inherent part of their office.

Either way, therefore, Otho was acting within his rights in executing soldiers found guilty of mutiny, although he was not in this case acting either wisely or tactfully. Furthermore, in the 1st century A.D., army commanders avoided the death penalty if possible, and those who insisted on it are usually regarded by our sources as exceptional (e.g. L. Apronius - Ann. 3.21.1; Corbulo - Ann. 13.35.9; Galba - S. C 12.2; and of course Otho here): this is to be expected in an age when there was no conscription and the army was a professional body of volunteers. (See further G. R. Watson, The Roman Soldier 117-126).
1.2-

in Illyrico: there is no doubt that this refers to the province of Dalmatia. "Illyricum" was the Roman term for the entire territory extending eastwards from the Adriatic between the middle Danube and Macedonia (Wilkes, Dalmatia 5 n. 1, and 161): it became a single imperial province in 11 B.C. (Dio 54.34.4), but after the great revolt of A.D. 6-9, it was divided into two imperial provinces known as Illyricum superius and inferius and later (by Flavian times) as Dalmatia and Pannonia respectively (see Vulić, RE IX 1087, repeated by Wilkes in OCD2 s.vv. 'Dalmatia' and 'Illyricum'). However, terminology seems not to have been so clear-cut: the first governor of Illyricum superius, C. Vibius Postumus (cos. suff. A.D. 5), is described by Velleius as vir consularis, praepositus Dalmatiae (2.116.1); similarly, in A.D. 42 Scribonianus is described as Dalmatiae legatus (S. Claud. 13.2).

Otho's tenure of the province was A.D. 42/43 (cf. Wilkes, Dalmatia 83, 443; Jagenteufel, Die Statthalter d. röm. Provinz Dalmatia 25-27, with detailed bibliography.)

motu Camilli: L. Arruntius Camillus Scribonianus (cos. ord. A.D.32; for the full form of his name see CIL III 9864a; for discussion of details, cf. von Rohden RE II 1264 s.v. 'Arruntius' no. 14; Groag, PIR² A 1140, and Jagenteufel, Die Statthalter d. röm. Provinz Dalmatia 21-25 and espec. nn. 116, 117) was governor of Dalmatia from about A.D. 40 (CIL III 9864a describes him as pro pr C [C] ae[s]aris Aug) until 42 when, at the urging of L. Annius Vinicianus, he made a bid for power (Pliny Ep. 3.16.7-9; H 1.89; 2.75; S. Claud. 13.2; 35.2; Dio 60.15.1 - 16.7 [under the year 42]);
Otho

1.2-

Epit. de Caes. 414; Orosius 7.6.6-7), which quickly failed, though many senators and equites precipitately went over to his side, to their ultimate regret.

The background of Camillus Scribonianus is significant: he was almost certainly the son of M. Furius Camillus (cos. ord. A.D. 8) and was adopted by L. Arruntius (cos. ord. A.D.6), as Mommsen demonstrated (Hermes 3 [1869] 133-135 = Ges. Schr. 4.465-467). He also had some connection with Cn. Pompeius Magnus, from whom his son L. Arruntius Furius Scribonianus later claimed descent (CIL III 7043 = ILS 976). However, the precise details of this connection are not clear, but the link, either real or adoptive, appears to be Pompeia, a daughter of Sextus Pompeius and Scribonia (cf. Groag, PIR² A 1147 and 1140; Jagenteufel, op. cit. 22 n. 117). This Pompeia was at one time married to L. Scribonius Libo (Dessau, PIR S 211, with stemma), and their daughter Scribonia became the wife of M. Licinius Crassus Frugi (cos. ord. A.D.27) and the mother of L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi Licinianus, Galba's heir (for further comment on connections between Scribonianus and Galba, and for Vinicianus, see above, S. G 9.2, n. on nec diu cunctatus).

quod...ex paenitentia praepositos suos quasi
defectionis adversus Claudium auctores occiderant: the
paenitentia was very rapid: (Scribonianus) intra quintum diem
oppressus est legionibus, quae sacramentum mutaverunt, in paenitentiam
religione conversis... (S. Claud. 13.2; cf. Orosius 7.6.7; Dio
60.15.3, though the detail of his suicide is incorrect; cf. H 2.75).
This incident highlights a problem of military law which has never been satisfactorily settled: the degree of responsibility of the
ordinary soldier in obeying orders which appear, or which he knows, to be "illegal." In returning to their loyalty to Claudius, the legions in Dalmatia found themselves forced to disobey orders from their superiors on the spot, but since their oath was to Claudius, in strict law they were correct in refusing to obey their dissident officers. However, they had no right to kill any officers (who should have been sent to Rome for trial as rebels), and it is here that the conflict between political expediency (Claudius' condoning of their actions and promotion of their ringleaders) and military discipline (Otho's treatment of the matter from the point of view of a commander on the spot) becomes acute: Otho knew that troops who had killed their superiors with impunity would be impossible to control subsequently. But with a little less severitas on his part and somewhat more political finesse on Claudius', the matter could perhaps have been resolved by means of a discreet transfer of the troops in question to another area or areas.

et quidem ante principia se coram: clearly, S. regards this as the crowning touch of Otho's severitas, and he is correct, because by having the executions carried out with full ceremony and in his own presence, Otho was demonstrating in signal fashion his decision to override Claudius' earlier act of leniency. It was an act of considerable courage, especially since Claudius, a man notoriously timid and suspicious (S. Claud. 35.1), had given the legions in Dalmatia (VII and XI) the titles Claudia pia fidelis (Dio 60.15.4): possibly Otho's action was a miscalculation, based on what he thought were Claudius' "republican" sentiments; more
1.2-1.3
probably, as the governor on the spot Otho was faced with a serious breakdown in military discipline and decided that drastic measures were necessary there and then, while he no doubt assumed that he would later be able to explain the situation to Claudius personally.

1.3 quo facto sicut gloriām auxit, ita gratiam minuit: exactly what Claudius' displeasure entailed is not made clear, but Otho's actions may possibly have made him suspect that another Scribonianus had arisen (cf. S. Claud. 37.1: nulla adeo suspicio, nullus auctor tam levis exstitit, a quo non mediocri scrupulo iniecto ad cavendum ulciscendumque compelleretur): perhaps Otho was recalled immediately, or the term of office assigned to him was curtailed. On the other hand, Otho's stern assertion of the claims of traditional military discipline over the personal interests of the princeps will have tended to make him more acceptable to the senatorial nobility with whom Claudius was at first, and remained, unpopular (Dio 60.15.3; for a general summary, see Balsdon's article in OCD² s.v. 'Claudius (1)'), and to whom Otho must have seemed a parvenu. However, Otho was no Scribonianus: he did not belong to one of the great Republican families and his political connections, which seem to have lain entirely within the Julio-Claudian family (cf. Livia's influence), in no way enabled him to sneer at the princeps. Accordingly, as soon as the opportunity presented itself, he re-ingratiated himself with Claudius (next n.).

quam tamen mature recipervit detecta equitis R. fraude...compererat: Dio dates this conspiracy to A.D.43 (60.18.4).
Nothing further is known of it, and S. does not mention it in his list of conspiracies against Claudius (Claud. 13, where a conspiracy of two equites is mentioned; but this is clearly not the same incident and S. appears to date it earlier than the revolt of Scribonianus): from this we may conclude that S. did not learn of it while doing his research into Claudius' principate, but discovered it while investigating Otho's antecedents. This will tend to confirm that S. did indeed write the Lives of the Caesars in chronological order, contrary to the recent suggestion of G. W. Bowersock (Hommages à M. Renard I 119-125) that the Lives of Galba, Otho, Vitellius and the Flavians were written under Trajan, and those of the Julio-Claudians under Hadrian.

**senatus honore rarissimo, statua in Palatio posita:** the mention of the Senate implies that the statue was in a public place on the Palatine Hill; cf. Ann. 15.72.1 for statues of Tigellinus and Nerva set up after the detection of the Pisonian conspiracy and S. Tit. 2 for a statue of Britannicus set up by Titus; see also G 23 and Vit. 3.1 for other statues set up by decree of the Senate.

**Claudius adlectum inter patricios conlaudans:** this will have been during Claudius' censorship in A.D.47-48, on which, see below, Vit. 2.4, n. on *mox cum Claudio principe duos insuper ordinarios consulatus censuramque gessit.*
ex Albia Terentia splendida femina: cf. Groag, PIR² A 486: it seems likely that the Princeps' mother was the daughter of Q. Terentius Culleo (PIR T 53) and his wife Albia (PIR² A 485; cf. CIL VI 4483). This couple may also have had a son: at any rate, there is another Q. Terentius Culleo (PIR T 54), who is attested as cos. suff. on 29th May, A.D.40 (Fasti Feriarum Latinarum: see Degrassi, I.I. XIII.1 pp. 150-151, 157).

Splendida femina appears to be a reference to her lineage; Tacitus, on the other hand, in his obituary notice of Otho at H 2.50.1 mentions that his father had been consul and his grandfather praetor and adds: maternum genus impar nec tamen indecorum. This may be technically true for the two generations specified, but a Q. Terentius Culleo (Münzer, RE V A s.v. 'Terentius' no. 43) had been praetor peregrinus as long ago as 187 B.C. (MRR I pp. 368, 370 n. 3), and it is tempting to associate him with her family. If they were survivors of a line prominent in the period of greatest senatorial influence, they might well consider themselves socially superior to the Salvii Othones of recent (and perhaps slightly dubious) distinction: hence, possibly, the ultimate source of the comment of Eutropius (7.17): Otho...materno genere nobilior, quam paterno, neutro tamen obscoro. Hence, too, perhaps, S.'s cautious splendida femina.

duos filios tulit, L. Titianum et minorem M. cognominem sibi: S. has apparently misunderstood the effects of the Etruscan cognomina gentilicia (cf. above 1.1, n. on familia vetere et honorata), and he seems to think that the two brothers were L. Salvius Titianus and M. Salvius Otho; however, there is ample
1.3-
evidence that the full name of the elder brother was L. Salvius Otho Titianus (e.g. CIL VI 5512; AFA 30th Jan., A.D.69 = MW 2, lines 46, 48). There is no suggestion that Titianus is the result of an adoption; see also above 1.1, n. on avus M. Salvius Otho...excessit.

L. Titianum: since L. Salvius Otho Titianus was the elder brother of the Princeps, he must have been born before A.D.32 (cf. 2.1,below), but since he was cos. ord. in A.D.52 (Ann. 12.52; cf. Sm. p. 4 for details of suffectsis in that year) he should have been born by, at the latest, A.D. 19 (cf. Syme, R.R.369; under Augustan arrangements some men became eligible to assume the consulship in their thirty-third year), though, given his father's influence at the court of Claudius, perhaps not much earlier either. However, if his son L. Salvius Otho Cocceianus was born earlier than 52, as seems quite likely (cf. below, 10.2, n. on fratris filium), he would have been eligible for the consulship in his thirty-second year under the provisions of the Lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus (for discussion, see Last, CAH X 452); accordingly, A.D.20 is his latest possible year of birth.

He was proconsul Asiae, probably in A.D.63/64 (cf. Magie, Roman Rule in Asia Minor 1582); since his quaestor was Cn. Iulius Agricola, Tacitus comments on his government there: sors quaesturae provinciam Asiam, proconsulem Salvium Titianum dedit, quorum neutro corruptus est, quamquam et provincia dives et parata pecantibus, et proconsul in omnem aviditatem pronus quantalibet facilitate redempturus esset mutuam dissimulationem mali (Agr. 6.2). Prior to A.D.69, his only other activities of which any record survives concern the Arval
1.3- L. Titianum cont.

Brethren; he first appears in the Acta in A.D.57 (after a considerable lacuna) as promagister, and he plays a prominent part in the activities of the Brethren in 58, 59, 60, 63 and 66 (where fragments of the Acta are dateable); in 69 he served as promagister under both Galba and his brother.

After Otho's coup on 15th January, 69, L. Titianus became his brother's colleague in the consulship, in place of T. Vinius. This consulship was held until 28th February (H 1.77.2; cf. AFA 28th February, 1st March 69). When Otho departed for the north on 15th March, quietem urbis curasque imperii Salvio Titiano fratri permisit (H 1.90.3); from Tacitus' language this would seem to have been a general oversight of the remaining praefecti and bureaux of state exercised through the Emperor's auctoritas rather than through any official position (cf. the position of Nero's freedmen in Italy while he was in Greece in 66-67). However, constant sniping at his generals (both Annius Gallus in the "advance guard," and Suetonius Paulinus and Marius Celsus, who were in command of the main army: H 1.87.2; 2.11.2; 2.23.4-5; for Otho's general strategy, see below Introduction: The Othonian Counter-Offensive) by the troops induced Otho, already prey to all sorts of fears and uncertainties, to summon Titianus to take command of the army; however, the real commander turned out to be the inexperienced praetorian prefect Licinius Proculus (H 2.23.5, 39.1, 40; Plut. 0 7.5-7). This decision had disastrous consequences for Otho, but not for Titianus: after the battle near Cremona he fled to the main Othonian camp at Bedriacum, which he apparently entered under cover of darkness (H 2.44.1-2). Next day, 15th April, the main Othonian army surrendered
(II 2.45.2: posteram die haud ambigua Othoniani exercitus voluntate):
according to Plutarch, Titianus was a prime mover in sending Marius Celsus and Annius Gallus to negotiate with Caecina and Valens (Q 13.6); however, when it came to the actual surrender, he changed his mind and urged the troops still in the Othonian camp to resist Caecina when he arrived, but this "resistance" collapsed almost immediately (Plut. Q 13.11-13). It would seem possible that at this point Titianus fled to Brixellum, which lay about 20 mp south of Bedriacum; at any rate, S. mentions his presence there on the evening of 15th April (below, 10.2), and there is no compelling reason to doubt this evidence.

After his brother's suicide Titianus, seeing the Othonian party was finished, presumably surrendered to the Vitellians, and along with the other Othonian commanders, accompanied Caecina and Valens to Lugdunum, where they awaited the arrival of Vitellius (II 2.59.3). Titianus had little to fear from him; he had heeded his letter to him at the beginning of the war warning him of the consequences if Vitellius' family in Rome were harmed (II 1.75.2). He was "forgiven" on the grounds of his pietas and ignavia (II 2.60.2), and nothing more is known of him.

See further, Dessau, PIR S 111; Nagl, RE II A s.v. 'Salvius' no. 19.

*tulit et filiam, quam vixdum nubilem Druso
Germanici filio despondit*: very little is known about her; her name is assumed to be Salvia; cf. Nagl, RE IIA s.v. 'Salvius' no. 25 (no entry in PIR). If she was betrothed to Drusus when barely of
marriageable age, this might mean when she was about 11-12 years old: according to L. Petersen (PIR² 1 220, on 'Drusus Iulius Caesar') the betrothal came after his assumption of the toga virilis in A.D. 23 (Ann. 4.4.1) and before he became urban prefect during the Feriae Latinae in A.D.24 (Ann. 4.36.1). There is no evidence to support this, but it seems a reasonable guess: this would mean that 'Salvia' was born somewhere about A.D.12.

Drusus did not, however, marry her; it is perhaps strange that there is no explanation for this, but it was not, pace Gardthausen (on 'Drusus Iulius Caesar,' RE X s.v. 'Iulius' no. 137), because she "sehr früh starb": she was still alive in 69 (see below). Instead, to his cost, he married Aemilia Lepida, daughter of M. Aemilius Lepidus (Ann. 6.40.4).

Otho's sister is mentioned only once more: on the evening before he committed suicide (i.e. 15th April, A.D.69; cf. below 11.2, n. on circa lucem demum expergefactus...die) Otho wrote her a codicillus consolatorius (below, 10.2).

2.1 Otho imperator IIII Kal. Mai. natus est Camillo 
Arruntio Domitio Ahenobarbo cons.: i.e. 28th April, A.D.32.

This gives to the family of L. Salvius Otho (cos. A.D.33) an extremely strung-out appearance. As we have seen, 'Salvia' appears to have been born c. A.D.12; L. Titianus was born c. A.D.19-20 and Marcus was born in A.D.32. That Albia Terentia should have borne children over a period of twenty years is not impossible: that she should have borne only three during such a period may, however, appear improbable. Two possible explanations occur: there may have been
many children, the majority of whom were either still-born or
died in infancy (cf. the three sons of Germanicus and Agrippina
born between c. A.D. 8 and A.D. 11, all of whom died very young; our
scanty knowledge of them doubtless depends on the prominence of the
parents. See further PIR² I 218, 225, and stemma of the Julio-
Claudian family; Mommsen, Hermes 13 [1878] 245-265, esp. 247-8),
or, conceivably, we have in Germanicus' son Drusus the wrong
'Drusus Germanici filius' for the betrothed of 'Salvia': there
was, for example, a Drusus born to Ti. Claudius Drusus Nero
Germanicus (i.e. the later Emperor Claudius) c. A.D. 20, and he died
shortly before reaching the age of puberty (PIR² C 856 - an ideal
candidate, but he will not do here, since he was promised to Seianus'
daughter Aelia Iunilla throughout his short life: Ann. 3.29; S.
Claud. 27.1). If another such Drusus could be found, born c. A.D.
20 and dying some 10-12 years later, 'Salvia' could then be born
between her brothers Lucius and Marcus, and her failure to marry him
would require no explanation.

a prima adolescentia...a patre: cf. H 1.13.3: namque Otho
pueritiam incuriose, adolescentiam petulanter egerat, gratus Neroni
aemulatione luxus: Plut. G 19.2: Μακρός ὁ Οθο...τρυφή δὲ καὶ
πιληθονίας εὐθὺς ἐν παιδῶν ἐν δόξῃς ἐγγονῶν ἀλεθεομένους.
L. Otho's taste for order and discipline clearly extended to his own
family, but equally clearly his frequent absences from Rome and the
unhealthy atmosphere of the court meant that Otho received little or
no stabilising paternal influence during his formative years. The
intermittent bursts of strict discipline which his father attempted
to impose were probably worse than useless, and may even have served to make him the wilder; also, as the youngest child in a strung-out family, Otho may have been spoiled by his grown-up sister and brother and perhaps developed his youthful precocity from their company.

prodigus ac procax: cf. Plut. G 21.3: μικρωτον...
mai πολυτελη. Otho was so extravagant that he sometimes teased Nero about his "meanness," and even outdid the Emperor in conspicuous and reckless expenditure. (Plut. G 19.4-5; cf. Pliny NH 13.22). His family does not seem to have been particularly wealthy, and nothing is known of Otho's private means, if any; cf. Tacitus' comment (pertaining to the time of Galba's principate): interea Othonem...multa simul exstimulabant, luxuria etiam principi onerosa, inopia vix privato toleranda (H 1.21.1). For his debts, see below 5.1, n. on sed postquam Pisone praelato...magnitudine aeris alieni; see also below 2.2, n. on actantum potentia voluit... ad agendas gratias introducere.

ferebatur et vagari...in sublime iactare: S. presumably has no information about the young Otho's fellow Mohocks and although a "gang" is perhaps implied we are here left with a curious picture of a wild young rake tossing people in a blanket single-handed! It is noteworthy, however, that Nero too had a penchant for nocturnal adventures in the city (see S. Ner. 26.1-2; Ann. 13.25.1-3; Dio 61.9.1-4). For ordinary people the streets of Rome by night, pitch-dark and unlit unless there happened to be a
2.1-2.2

moon and a cloudless sky, were a source of terror and danger
(cf. Juv. 3.268-314).

post patris deinde mortem: the date is uncertain and
could be anywhere between 47 (his adlection to the Patriciate) and
55 (cf. above p. 251)

libertinam aulicam...paene decrepitam: her identity
is unknown, though Nagl (RE II A 2038) suggests that she was Acte,
which seems highly improbable since Acte was not in any way gratiosa
before she became Nero's mistress; furthermore, given Nero's passion
for her, it seems most peculiar that Otho should have sought to worm
his way into Nero's favour by pretending to be in love with her
himself; finally, if Acte was an anus...paene decrepita we should
expect to hear more of it in the tirades against her reported of

2.2 facile summum inter amicos locum tenuit: in describing
Nero's passion for Acte in A.D.55, Tacitus mentions Otho and Claudius
Senecio as his confidants, in that order (Ann. 13.12.1: but this may
simply be social convention on Tacitus' part; cf. quorum Otho familia
consulari, Senecio liberto Caesaris patre genitus.) Senecio was an
eques and, like Otho, must ultimately have had reason to hate Nero,
for he joined Piso's conspiracy, in which he perished (Ann. 15.50,
56-57, 70).

However, in spite of Otho's summus locus, which is proved by
his remark to Nero: "οὕτω μὲ Καῖσαρα ἵππος" (Dio 61.11.2), Nero
2.2- facile summum...tenuit cont.

does not seem to have had much confidence in Otho's abilities (cf. his reply to Otho's remark just quoted: "οὐδὲ ὑποτέων οὐκ ὄνομα") when he was sent to Lusitania Otho had apparently held no office above the quaestorship (cf. below, 3.2: provinciam administravit quaestorius), and there is no record of his having performed any military service. His only other attested position in Rome prior to his departure for Lusitania is membership in the Arval Brethren in the latter part of 57 (CIL VI 2039 = Sm 19; Henzen LXIV). However, in 69, following Galba's death, Otho is attested as magister iterum (AFA 26th Jan., 69 = MW 2): his previous tenure as magister must therefore have come before his departure for Lusitania (if we accept 59 as the date of his banishment; but cf. below 3.2, n. on provinciam administravit... per decem annos), and, indeed, before 57, since the magistri for 57, 58 and 59 are attested and the latter part of 68 is unlikely, given the fact that the magistri of the Brethren held office from Saturnalia to Saturnalia (cf. AFA 29th May, A.D.119, for the election of C. Vitorius Hosidius Geta; on 23rd Dec. of the same year an extraordinary meeting of the Brethren was held and Hosidius presided as magister: the last regular meeting in any year was held on 15th December, by which date the changeover of magistri had not, of course, taken place; cf. AFA 15th Dec., A.D.59, with 3rd Jan., 60); at the beginning of 69 Galba appears as magister and unless the magister for 68 had died after Galba's accession (and probably after his arrival in Rome), it is unlikely that Otho could have been magister suffectus in late 68 (for suffect and deputy magistri, see Henzen, pp. IV-V).
2.2- congruentia morum, ut vero quidam tradunt, et consuetudine mutui stupri: the position of ut quidam tradunt is somewhat surprising, since it appears that the qualification is applied to the statement that Otho and Nero became friends because they had the same moral outlook, while the statement that they became friends because they had homosexual relations is not so qualified. This is impossible and we must, therefore, presume that the passage is to be understood asyndetically, with the break coming after morum, and et (= etiam) used adverbially rather than as a conjunction; vero will mean "but in fact". The meaning, then, is: "Nero and Otho became close friends because of the similarity of their characters, but in fact, as some say, because they had a sexual relationship as well." (In their Index Verborum C. Suetoni Tranquilli [84 col. 2] Howard and Jackson take the et here to be adverbial; cf. J. C. Rolfe's Loeb translation.)

While Nero's bisexuality is amply attested (e.g. S. Ner. 28-29; Ann. 15.37.4; Dio 62.28.3; 63.13.1-2), there is very little in the way of real evidence to prove the same of Otho: apart from this blunt statement in S., there is only an aside in Dio about τὸ ...τῷ Σπόρῳ συνείναι (64.8.3 - referring to Otho's imitation of Nero in A.D.69) and suggestions that Otho was effeminate (cf. below, 12.1, espec. munditiarum vero paene muliebrium). Thus, though it seems quite likely, given the mores of the Neronian court, that S.'s statement is true, our verdict on the basis of the available evidence must be "not proven."

Finally, who are the quidam referred to by S.? According to Townend (AJP 85 [1964] 369), both Pliny and Cluvius Rufus appear to
2.2-

have given details of Otho's effeminacy, and the use of the plural is probably justified.

*ac tantum potentia valuit...ad agendas gratias introducere:* during the period 54-59 only one restitution of a consular convicted for *repetundae* is known, that of Lurius Varus in 57, recorded at *Ann.* 13.32; on Lurius Varus, see *PIR*² L 428 and E. Groag, "Prosopographische Bemerkungen III: Lurius Varius (*sic*)," *WS* 50 (1932) 202-205.

If Lurius Varus is the person alluded to here by S., several interesting possibilities emerge: in 57 Otho was in his 25th year, which under the Augustan system was the minimum age at which one could hold the quaestorship (cf. Syme, *R.R.* 369). Holding the quaestorship gave admission to the Senate (since the time of the Dictator Sulla) and S.'s words *non dubitaret in senatum...introducere* imply that Otho was at this time a senator. Furthermore, Otho had certainly been quaestor by the time he was sent to Lusitania (cf. below 3.2: *provinciam administravit quaestorius*). Therefore we may conclude that Otho was quaestor in 57, in Rome obviously, and so, probably, a *quaestor Caesaris*: as such he would have presented to the Senate Nero's formal request for *restitutio*. 
Introduction: Chapter 3 of the Life of Otho raises in an acute form all the major problems of source criticism which bedevil the study not only of the "Year of the Four Emperors" but also of the reign of Nero. There are extant today five accounts of the Otho-Poppaea-Nero Triangle: Plutarch's (G 19.2-20.2), Suetonius' (here), Tacitus' two versions (Hist. 1.13.3-4 and Ann. 13.45-46) and Dio's (61.11.2-4), and although no two of them are identical, until recently they were regarded as reflecting the three main literary sources for the last hexad of the Annals and for part at least of the Year of the Four Emperors - Pliny the Elder, Cluvius Rufus and Fabius Rusticus; cf. R. Syme (Tacitus 290): "Tacitus in the Historiae stated that Nero, having fallen violently in love with Poppaea Sabina, found for her a compliant husband in the person of his friend Salvius Otho, and deposited her in a temporary matrimony until he should have got rid of Octavia. Such is the version also transmitted by Suetonius, by Plutarch, and by Cassius Dio. In the Annales Tacitus discards the story - no argument, no hint of any variant: Nero took away a friend's wife." He then suggests that Pliny or Fabius (either or both) "innocent or avid for scandal" was responsible for the "vulgate version" (i.e. the version found in the Histories) and, although Syme is very cautious at this point, Fabia had long before decided that Cluvius Rufus had provided the "corrective"

found in the Annals (RPh 20 [1896] 12-22, esp. 18-22; for a contrary view and detailed bibliography, see O. Schönberger, Historia 12 [1963] 500-509, esp. 500-501 and nn. 2-5).

However, as part of his analysis of the source material for the history of this period (see, especially, "The Sources of the Greek in Suetonius," Hermes 88 [1960] 98-100; "Traces in Dio Cassius of Cluvius, Aufidius and Pliny," Hermes 89 [1961] 227-248, and "Cluvius Rufus in the Histories of Tacitus," AJP 85 [1964] 337-377), G. B. Townend has attempted to distinguish the contributions made by Pliny, Cluvius and Fabius to our extant accounts of the relations between Otho, Poppaea and Nero (specifically, in Hermes 89 [1961] 242-247). Briefly, his conclusions are as follows:

Pliny the Elder (from Plut. G 19.2-20.2; S. Ner. 35.1; and the formal "naming formulae" in S. G 17, Dio 64.5.2, Plut. G 19.2 and H 1.13.2) made no mention of Otho in his account of Nero's principate, since the "Otho interlude" was trivial and of no significance, nor until he came to summarize Otho's early career in his account of the coup against Galba; Poppaea was introduced not long before the death of Octavia and her marriage with Nero in 62; Nero had fallen in love with her while she was still married to Crispinus and had persuaded Otho to press his suit with her and provide a cover for a liaison of his own; Poppaea simply lived with Otho temporarily and was not married to him; however, Otho himself fell in love with her and, proving difficult, was banished to Lusitania and saved from a worse fate through Seneca's good offices (op. cit. 242-243; 244; 245-246).

Cluvius Rufus (reconstructed from S. O 3.1-2; H 1.13; Ann. 13.45-46, 14.1-2; Dio 61.11.2-12.1) has Otho prominent in the events (58-59) leading up to the death of Agrippina; Poppaea was already Nero's mistress, having been detached from Crispinus, her previous husband, by the Princeps himself; she was then "deposited on trust" with Otho; Otho seduced her, or was suspected of having done so, and was packed off to Lusitania: the "marriage" between Otho and Poppaea was therefore a complete sham; thereafter there developed a conflict for supremacy between Poppaea and Agrippina, in which Agrippina attempted to seduce Nero, and which ended in Agrippina's murder (op. cit. 243; 244-245; 247).

Fabius Rusticus (derived from the explicit citation at Ann. 14.2.2) in describing the events of 58-59 made Nero more interested in Agrippina than in Poppaea "for whom, as for Otho, there is no room in this version" (sic; op. cit. 243).

Finally, Townend sees a fourth version of these events, one made up by Tacitus himself, "almost certainly out of his own head" (Ann. 13.45-46; 14.1): in this Otho seduced Poppaea and married her; she came to Nero's attention only because of Otho's boasting; Poppaea, unscrupulously ambitious, provoked Nero into banishing Otho in 58 and in 59 demanded the removal of Agrippina. This version was based on Cluvius, but Nero was now the seducer and Otho was the "more or less innocent husband" and no longer the "treacherous seducer of his nominal wife" (op. cit. 246-247).

cf. "In Pliny's version...out of respect for Agrippina and Octavia he (sc. Nero) sets on Otho to seduce and marry her in order to provide a cover..." (244) with "he (sc. Pliny) said nothing of the conflict with Agrippina, introducing Poppaea probably not long before the death of Octavia and the marriage in 62" (245) and "In Pliny's version at least it looks as if Poppaea simply went to live with Otho" (245 n. 1).
Townend's ingenious and detailed analysis depends upon (and is at the same time part of the argument for) a series of basic propositions about our extant accounts and their sources, which have emerged in the course of his research. Basically, these propositions are as follows:

(a) Pliny's rather pedestrian but detailed annalistic record was the "common source" for the period (I 105; III 337-342; 344, 347).

(b) Cluvius Rufus' work was not a chronological account, and may not have covered the events of A.D.69 in any detail (III 371; but more recently Townend appears to suggest that Cluvius also covered the early years of Vespasian's principate [CQ 22 (1972) 381]); it was essentially an anecdotal *chronique scandaleuse* (I 103; II 227, 248; III 346-347).

(c) Fabius Rusticus may have written little more than a monograph on Seneca (I 119; III 343-344).

(d) Plutarch did not use Cluvius Rufus as a source for his *Lives* of Galba and Otho (I 107; II 239; III 342).

(e) There is very little from Cluvius Rufus in the *Histories* of Tacitus (I 107; III 344-372, esp. 371-372; IV 480).

The validity of Townend's analysis of the sources for the specific problem of Otho, Poppaea and Nero (and of some of his propositions) can be tested by laying out the evidence in the extant accounts in tabular form as answers to certain basic questions, as in the accompanying table:

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1 The figures in brackets at the end of each proposition refer to Townend's articles; the following code is used to simplify citation: I = Hermes 88 (1960); II = Hermes 89 (1961); III = AJP 85 (1964); IV = Hermes 92 (1964). The citations are illustrative only, and no claim of completeness is made.
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<th>2. How did the other become involved?</th>
<th>Seduction done on Nero's behalf: idea was they would share her.</th>
<th>Nero deposited her with Otho until he could get rid of Octavia.</th>
<th>Nero deposited her interim.</th>
<th>Otho boasted about her; perhaps willing to share her.</th>
<th>Nero gave her to Otho and they shared her.</th>
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| 3. Poppaea's relationship to Otho? | wife (γυμέτη, γυμής) | apparently not married. | nuptiarum specie, minus matrimonio, uxoris. | wife | apparently not married. |
|---------------------------------|---------------------|------------------|---------------------|---------------------|

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<th>5. When was Otho banished?</th>
<th>before 62 (Seneca still influential).</th>
<th></th>
<th>no indication.</th>
<th>A.D. 58 or 59.</th>
<th>A.D. 58.</th>
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<th>6. Agrippina's attitude to Poppaea?</th>
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<th>Agrippina tried to seduce Nero (Cluvius Rufus).</th>
<th>Agrippina tried to &quot;enslave&quot; Nero.</th>
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By way of comment on these questions, we may note the following:

Question 1: with the exception of Tac. Ann., Nero is the prime mover in all cases. (In Plut. he falls in love with Poppaea and has Otho press his suit.)

Question 2: it is significant to note that both Plut. and Dio state categorically that Nero and Otho "shared" Poppaea, while Tac. Ann. suggests that Otho (and Poppaea too) was not averse to this. Tac. H and S., on the other hand, suggest that Otho was not supposed to have any physical dealings at all with Poppaea, which presupposes a source which at least implied that Otho was homosexual.

Question 3: there is a wide range of ideas here. In spite of S.'s use of the words matrimonium and uxor, the couplet quoted about Otho becoming the moechus of his uxor makes it clear again that he was not supposed to have a sexual relationship with Poppaea: this ties S.'s version once more with that of Tac. H. Since both of the sources which state firmly that Otho and Poppaea were married (Plut. and Tac. Ann.) also contain references to "sharing," there is a presumption of complaisance at least on Otho's part. Dio's evidence here is entirely compatible with his blunt statement καὶ αὕτη ἀμφότεροι ἕνα ἔχοντο.


Question 5: there are possibly two variant sources reflected here.
Question 6: Tac. Ann. and Dio both present this story as Agrippina's reaction to Nero's passion for Poppaea; furthermore, Tac. tells us (Ann. 14.2.1) that his version comes from Cluvius; he adds that Fabius Rusticus has the story the other way round, but ceteri auctores (which must include Pliny) agree with Cluvius. However, the story of incest between Nero and Agrippina need not belong to the context of A.D. 59 and we should naturally expect it to come at an earlier date, especially since in Tac.'s account Acté is still influential with Nero in 59; cf. S. Ner. 28.2, which is similar to Dio 61.11.4, but without the time reference. It would seem therefore that, although both Pliny and Cluvius reported incest between Nero and Agrippina, only one of the sources tied this incident to a contest for sexual domination of Nero - presumably Cluvius, since Tac. mentions him first. If we accept this conclusion, we must also accept that Cluvius is responsible for the allegation that Poppaea was the cause of Agrippina's murder (Question 7).

If we compare these observations with Townend's conclusions, certain contradictions emerge: the idea that Otho and Nero would (or did) share the favours of Poppaea, either as their joint mistress or as Otho's wife, is found in Plut., Tac. Ann. (perhaps), and Dio, while the idea that Otho merely "looked after" her (with its strong implication of homosexuality) is found in Tac. H and S.: but Townend derives Cluvius' account from both S. and Dio, and insists that Plutarch is closely based on Pliny. But if Plutarch is based on Pliny, then so also is Dio and possibly Tac. Ann.; furthermore, Cluvius is supposed to be "scandalous", while Pliny is "pedestrian".
it would be hard to decide which of these two versions is scandalous and which pedestrian! According to Townend also, Pliny did not record a marriage between Otho and Poppaea: if this is true, we must ask on whose account Plutarch's version is based (and Tac. Ann. too): not Pliny, therefore, but surely not Cluvius either, since he, we are told, is the source of S.'s mimus and nuptiarum species. Similarly, we may note that although Cluvius is claimed by Townend to be the basis for Tac. Ann., with regard to the story of Poppaea's coyness towards Nero and her encouragement of rivalry between Nero and Otho, there is a close resemblance to Plutarch's version (supposedly Pliny).

From all this it will be clear that, although we may have a general idea of what the primary sources for this period were like, it is impossible to analyse every incident and ascribe each variant precisely to a particular source. Furthermore, it is probably a mistake to think exclusively in terms of Pliny the Elder, Cluvius Rufus and Fabius Rusticus as the primary sources for this period (not that we have much impression of Fabius). Plutarch, in particular, tends to be downgraded by the assumption that he merely reproduced Pliny: we should remember that he travelled in Italy some time after the battle of Bedriacum (Plut. O 14.1), that he had an influential senatorial patron who had been in Otho's suite in 69, and this could well have gained him access to many who participated in events as far back as A.D. 58-59 (see further, C. P. Jones, Plutarch and Rome 74-78). Furthermore, if we assume that Tacitus began to collect material for the Histories about A.D.96, his distance from the events leading up to Agrippina's murder was little different from that of an
historian today investigating the Abdication Crisis of 1936.

Our conclusion therefore must be that, impressive and complex though Townend's arguments are, his methods are ultimately over-
subtle and unsatisfactory. From the historian's point of view, they have another major drawback, since they cannot bring us any
closer to determining what actually happened (cf. Hermes 89 [1961]
247: "Tacitus' second account...is dramatically satisfactory; it is most unlikely to be nearer the truth than Cluvius' malicious account or Pliny's ill-informed one") and, indeed, this is
avowedly not the aim (op. cit. 248: "...the purpose of this paper has not been so much to discover historical facts as to disentangle the different traditions...;" cf. AJP 85 [1964] 344: "Fabia added to this error [Nissen's doctrine of a single source] a determination to ascertain not merely what Pliny said but what actually happened.") While we may readily grant the extreme difficulty of determining the precise events which led up to the deaths of Agrippina and Octavia and the inner thoughts and conflicts of those most closely involved, we should acknowledge that we have reliable evidence of this intimate type for very few events in the whole of ancient history, and that where satisfactory evidence is lacking we should simply admit the fact, demonstrate the range of possibilities, and move on.

3.1 omnium autem consiliorum secretorumque particeps:
by means of this adjectival phrase, which underlines the impression of Otho's influence left at the end of the preceding chapter, S.
introduces the most impressive and awful illustration possible of Otho's closeness to Nero. The dramatic skill is considerable,
3.1-
although the logic of the argument is faulty: S. creates the impression that the "Poppaea incident" was subsequent to Agrippina's death (since it leads straight into the story of his "banishment" to Lusitania); this may even be true, if we reject completely Cluvius Rufus' story (Ann. 14.2.1) of a contest between Agrippina and Poppaea for Nero's affections (and certainly S. has no mention of it), but S. is illogical thereafter in stating that Otho governed Lusitania for ten years, since this item too is probably from Cluvius and allows Poppaea to be free to marry Nero in 59, which in turn gives rise to the contest between Agrippina and Poppaea...cf. Townend, Hermes 89 (1961) 245.

die, quem necandae matri Nero destinarat: the date of Agrippina's death can be pinpointed with reasonable accuracy, since our sources appear to place it during the Quinquatrus Minervae (19th-23rd March) of A.D.59 (S. Ner. 34.2; Ann. 14.4.1; cf. also the rather strange meeting of the Arval Brethren held on 28th March, probably almost immediately after news of Agrippina's death reached Rome, with the elaborate sacrifices performed on 5th April ex S.C. ob supplicationes indictas pro salute Neronis Claudi Caesar. (Aug. Germ.) and see Henzen's comments on pp. 77-78; see also Ann. 14.12.1). J. D. Bishop ("Dating in Tacitus by Moonless Nights," CP 55 [1960] 164-170, esp. 167-169) points out that in Tacitus' account the decision to murder Agrippina seems to have been taken only during the Quinquatrus itself (Ann. 14.3.3-4.1), and that his pretended reconciliation with Agrippina was a somewhat drawn-out process (cf. Dio 61.13.1-2): from the date of the "strange" meeting of the Arval
Brethren (28th March) and from the fact that Agrippina's boat collapsed while the sky was moonless (Ann. 14.5.1), Bishop argues persuasively that Agrippina was in fact murdered between midnight and 2 a.m. on 26-27th March.

If we accept the surviving accounts of Agrippina's murder more or less at their face value (S. Ner. 34.2-4; Ann. 14.1-12; Dio 61.12.1-14.4: there are only minor variations of detail), this is probably the best that can be done. However, we should at least consider the possibility that there was no die, quem necandae matri Nero destinarat: Tacitus' story is riddled with improbabilities (e.g. Poppaea's role in persuading Nero to get rid of Agrippina but her lack of success in becoming his wife till 62; the story of collapsing boat, built within the space of three or four days and steered from inside Agrippina's cabin; for destructive analysis of the Tacitean account, see A. Dawson, CJ 64 [1969] 252-267, esp. 252-257), and modern biographers of Nero find it difficult to explain why he should have decided to murder his mother in 59, especially since she had lost all effective power three or four years previously (e.g. M. Grant, Nero 73-76; B. H. Warmington, Nero: Reality and Legend 46-47). Conceivably, Nero's indictment of his mother and his allegation that her freedman Agerinus had been sent to assassinate him were no more than the literal truth, as was his statement that she committed suicide when her attempt failed (Ann. 14.10-11; cf. Dio 61.14.3; S. Ner. 34.3). Certainly when Nero did venture to return to Rome there were no popular demonstrations against him (Ann. 14.13: on the contrary, popular enthusiasm was greater even than that promised by his lackeys, a very different state of affairs from that
obtaining in 62 when he first divorced Octavia; cf. Ann. 14.60-61),
and Agrippina's death seems not to have upset the Praetorians,
despite their well-known devotion to the house of Germanicus (cf. Ann. 14.7.4; see also, J. Hind, "The Death of Agrippina and the Finale of the 'Oedipus' of Seneca," AUMLA 38 [1972] 204-211.)

Nero undoubtedly became a monster and this inevitably colours our picture of him; however, the question "When did he become a monster?" remains unanswerable.

cenam utrique exquisitissimae comitatis dedit: this is presumably the banquet described in S. Ner.54.2 and Ann. 14.4, and the culmination of the series described in Dio (61.13.1-2).

exquisitissimae comitatis, with the unnecessary and exaggerated superlative, deftly and perhaps slightly maliciously confirms the impression we have already gained of Otho's rarified, almost Wildean aestheticism.

The banquet took place in a villa of Otho's at Baiae, not Bauli, as Dio implies (61.13.1); see P. J. Bicknell, "Agrippina's Villa at Bauli," CR 13 (1963) 261-262, and J. D'Arms, Romans on the Bay of Naples 94-96.

Poppaeam Sabinam: cf. von Rohden, PIR P 650; Hanslik, RE XXII 85-91, s.v. 'Poppaeus' no. 4. She was the daughter of T. Ollius, who perished in connection with the fall of Seianus in A.D.31, and of Poppaea Sabina, the greatest beauty of her day, who incurred the enmity of Messalina and was driven to suicide in A.D.47 (Ann. 11.1-2).
Since her father had died in disgrace either just before or just after her birth, she took the name of her maternal grandfather, C. Poppaeus Sabinus, cos. ord. A.D.9. Blessed with charm, beauty, fame and wit, as Tacitus says (Ann. 13.45.2), huic mulieri cuncta alia fuere praeter honestum animum. She was ambitious, cruel, unscrupulous, amoral and incapable, apparently, of any of the better human emotions: neque affectui suo aut alieno obnoxia, unde utilitas ostenderetur, illuc libidinem transferebat (Ann. 13.45.3).

In matters of religion she was both credulous and superstitious, and was in the habit of consulting a considerable number of astrologers about private matters (cf. H 1.22.2), and from her interest in Judaism (cf. Joseph. AJ 20.189-196: there is, however, no reason to assume any special interest in Judaism; cf. E. M. Smallwood, JThS 10 [1959] 329-335) we may deduce an interest in "exotic" and un-Roman types of religion (cf. also her mummification-instead of cremation-burial in A.D.65: Ann. 16.6.2).

Poppaea was married first to the eques Rufrius Crispinus, praetorian prefect from 47 (at least; cf. Ann. 11.1.3) to 51 (Ann. 12.42.1), by whom she had a son (Ann. 13.45.4; S. Ner. 35.5), then to Otho (?), and finally to Nero, to whom she bore a daughter, Claudia Augusta (January-May, A.D.63: PIR² C 1061). She was pregnant again when she died in 65 (Ann. 16.6.1; S. Ner.35.3).

tunc adhuc amicam eius: the tunc adhuc is not helpful, since the story of Poppaea, introduced with item, clearly begins as simply another illustration of how close Otho was to Nero: tunc adhuc will therefore mean no more than "up to the time when this particular
3.1-

story began." On the other hand, the reader of this chapter undoubtedly gets the impression that Otho's involvement with Poppaea comes after the murder of Agrippina since it is this involvement which leads straight to Otho's "banishment" to Lusitania, and from this we may conclude that S. is here contaminating at least two sources (Townend's "Cluvius" for the details of the deposit and the ten years in Lusitania, and Townend's "Pliny" for the chronological sequence).

Compare with the rather prim amicam eius Tacitus' blunt principale scortum (H 1.13.3).

abductam marito: sc. Rufrius Crispinus, no doubt much older than Poppaea and since his dismissal at Agrippina's urging in A.D.51 (Ann. 12.42.1; cf. n. on Poppaeam Sabinam above) no longer, perhaps, of much interest to his ambitious wife. However, the dismissal of Rufrius and possible social slights which accompanied it may have engendered in Poppaea an intense dislike of Agrippina, which caught fire later on.

On Rufrius, see further von Rohden PIR R 121; Nagl, RE I A 1201-2 s.v. 'Rufrius' no. 1.

demandatamque interim sibi: the interim here corresponds to donec Octaviam uxorem amoliretur (H 1.13.2).

nuptiarum specie receptit: there is no doubt that there actually was a marriage ceremony; cf. § 2 below, diducto matrimonio and uxoris. The intention, however, according to the tradition followed
3.1-3.2

here, was that it should be "a marriage in name only," and there
was no idea that Otho and Nero would share Poppaea: clearly Otho was
expected to have nothing to do with Poppaea. So far, then, S. has
painted for us a coherent picture of Otho as Nero's most intimate
friend, and there are hints that Nero believed him to be wholly
homosexual and therefore "safe" as a protector for Poppaea.

nec corrupisse contentus adeo dilexit ut...tulerit
animo: at this point S.'s story becomes somewhat inconsistent: not
only does Otho seduce Poppaea, but he falls violently in love with
her and makes no secret of it. The first part is foolish enough, but,
under the circumstances, the second is tantamount to lunacy. Also
this version differs noticeably from that of Tac. H: mox suspectum
in eadem Poppaea in provinciam Lusitaniam specie legationis
seposuit (1.13.3). T. F. Carney may well be correct in seeing in this
variant, which does nothing to alter the beginning and the outcome of
the story as Tac. relates it, something of S.'s own prejudices:
"Hadrian seems, in fact, to have been given to becoming very
emotionally involved in his affairs of the heart, a practice which
Suetonius specifically castigates" (PACA 11 [1968] 12 and n. 27: "For
S.'s disapproval of such displays of emotion see Vit. 2, 4; 12; Cal.
24,2 (and 55,1) and cf. Oth. 3, and Dom. 3" ). Furthermore, Poppaea
too seems rather different from the cold and calculating character
depicted by Tacitus.

3.2 creditur certe...ac depositum reposcentem: this has
the appearance of being the sort of anecdote about Nero which members
of the upper classes would gleefully relate. Its ultimate source and its authenticity are alike impossible to determine. Or perhaps S. himself elaborated on the basic story of the "deposit" so that he would be able to present this grotesque parody of the traditional paraklausithyron. creditur certe suggests that S. is sceptical about the truth of the story, which he finds too amusing to omit.

diducto matrimonio: this phrase tends to be translated misleadingly; cf. J. C. Rolfe (Loeb): "Therefore Nero annulled the marriage..."; R. Graves: "Fear of scandal alone kept Nero from doing more than annul the marriage..." The idea that an Emperor could annul people's marriages at his whim is completely mistaken, though it may have originated in S.'s account of the divorce of Julia and Tiberius (Tib. 11.4): comperit (Tiberius) deinde Iuliam uxorem ob libidines atque adulteria damnatam repudiumque ei suo nomine ex auctoritate Augusti remissum. Up till the time of Antoninus Pius, a father had the right to end by divorce the marriage of a child in potestate sua, and until the triumph of Christianity either party to a marriage could end it, either by joint agreement or unilaterally (repudium, though in this latter case, under Augustan legislation, a notification to the other party had to be witnessed by seven adult Roman citizens). In the case of Tiberius and Julia, Augustus was acting legally in divorcing them, though his means were questionable. With regard to Otho, it is likely that, at Nero's behest, Poppaea issued a repudium (see further Buckland, Textbook 3 116-118; Crook, Law and Life of Rome 104-106).
3.2-

sepositus est per causam legationis in Lusitaniam:

according to Plutarch (C. 19.9-20.1), Otho was in peril of his life but Seneca, who was well-disposed towards him, advised and persuaded Nero to send him to Lusitania. For Otho's very real danger we may compare the fates of others who impeded (or were thought to be impeding) Nero's marital arrangements: Faustus Cornelius Sulla and Rubellius Plautus (Ann. 13.57-59); Octavia (Ann. 14.60-64); Doryphorus (Ann. 14.65.1); and Claudia Antonia (S. Ner. 35.4); Burrus was widely believed to have been poisoned, perhaps because of his opposition to Nero's expressed desire to divorce Octavia (Ann. 14.51.1; Dio 62.13.1-3); and Rufrius Crispinus was banished merely because he had been married to Poppaea, and later he was forced to commit suicide (Ann. 15.71.4; 16.17.1-2).

We may wonder why Nero treated Otho differently: S.'s suggestion (immediately below) may well contain part of the truth; also, of course, Otho had been a very close friend and companion and had performed useful services for Nero in the past (e.g. with regard to Acte and Agrippina) and in this connection we may compare his banishment to Lusitania with that of the similarly "useful" Anicetus to Sardinia; ubi non inops exilium toleravit et fato obiit (Ann. 14.62.4).

Otho's posting to Lusitania was, of course, highly irregular, since a legatus Caesaris pro praetore was normally of praetorian or consular rank (cf. Stevenson, Roman Provincial Administration 108-110; Petit, La paix romaine 141-143); however, it seems somewhat inappropriate to regard this posting as "a flagrant example of favouritism," (cf. beginning of the next chapter ultionis occasio)

provinciam administravit...per decem annos: this appears to come from the same tradition as that followed by Tacitus when he placed Otho's banishment within the events of A.D. 58 (Ann. 13.46.3). Equally, it appears to contradict S.'s own statement about Otho's presence in Campania at the time of Agrippina's murder (above, 3.1): however, attempts have been made to evade this contradiction, in S.'s case at least, in various ways: G. B. Townend suggests (Hermes 89 [1961] 245) that Cluvius may have produced per decem annos as "a round figure calculated from later in 59 or early in 60"; G. Heuten et al. (Latomus 2 [1938] 258-259) state that Otho was governor of Lusitania from 58 but absent from Rome from 59; A. Dawson (CJ 64 [1967] 258-260) thinks that Otho was intended to be Agrippina's candidate for the principate in a coup which misfired, after which she committed suicide, and Nero (ever merciful!) then contented himself with merely banishing Otho, who ruled Lusitania from June 59 to June 68 = 10 years. None of these suggestions seems even remotely reasonable, especially the arithmetic of the last! The only way in which S.'s account can be made self-consistent is for us to assume that Otho was sent to Lusitania between April and June (?) of 59: he will have been governor until his departure for Rome with Galba in the late summer of 68. (He was certainly not governor till 69, as Heuten et al. state in three separate contexts: op. cit. 258, 259, 276). This will mean that he was governor of Lusitania for nine years plus something, which may
casually have been described as ten years; for a similar argument concerning Caesar's command in Gaul, see J. P. V. D. Balsdon, JRS 29 (1939) 179; cf. the conventional "six-year" duration of the Second World War (3rd September, 1939 - 8th May, 1945).

However, all of this may be completely wrong and Otho may not, in reality, have gone to Lusitania until the spring of A.D. 62 (cf. above, p.272 and 3.1, n. on tunc adhuc amicam eius). Such a revised chronology would certainly allow him to be magister of the Arval Brethren at a more reasonable date.

quaestorius: students are often puzzled by the title quaestor propraetore, attached during the Principate to quaestors who served in senatorial provinces, and used even when their superior, the governor, was present. As Greenidge pointed out (CR 9 [1895] 258-259), the reason for this probably lies in the aedilician jurisdiction assumed by quaestors in these provinces during this period (cf. Gaius 1.6), and independent provincial jurisdiction naturally implies imperium. In an imperial province quaestors were not found, but since, under the Principate, quaestors could have an imperium, it was a small step for Nero to appoint a quaestorius as legatus Caesaris pro praetore. See also Wesener, RE XXIV 816-817, s.v. 'Provinzialquaestoren.'

moderatione atque abstinentia singulari: cf. Plut. G 20.2: καὶ παρέσχεν ἑαυτὸν οὕκ ἄχαρτον ὁδὲ ἑπαχθῆ τοῖς ὑπηκόοις... H 1.13.4: comiter administrata provincia; Ann. 13.46.3:
3.2-4.1

non ex priore infamia, sed integre sancteque egit. This is the astonishing thing about Otho: when he had no responsibilities, his behaviour was appalling, but when he assumed a specific task, everyone was pleasantly surprised. His behaviour after he became Princeps confirms these reports of his conduct in Lusitania.

4.1 ut tandem occasio ultionis data est, conatibus Galbae primus accessit: since Otho had been in Lusitania about a year longer than Galba was in Hispania Tarraconensis (assuming that he went there in 59), he probably felt that he was doomed to stay there indefinitely; no doubt he had come to know Galba fairly well in the meantime and Galba's revolt in April, 68 will have seemed the best prospect for a return to Rome; furthermore, S.'s remark immediately below about the condicio temporum perhaps represents Otho's calculation of the possibilities arising from this revolt: with the movement of Vindex he may well have had little sympathy, feeling that it was doomed to failure; but Galba with his lineage and record - and age - was a different matter altogether. Accordingly, when Galba sought his support (cf. above G 10.3), he supported him as vigorously as possible: Plutarch tells us (G 20.3) that he gave him all the gold and silver that he had and sent him those of his servants best suited to wait upon an Emperor's table.

ex affirmatione Seleuci mathematici: this appears to be a mistake on S.'s part for Seleucus was Vespasian's court astrologer (H 2.78.1): both Tacitus (H 1.22) and Plutarch (G 23.7) state that Otho's astrologer was named Ptolemaeus, while Tacitus adds that Otho
4.1-4.2

had acquired him from Poppaea Sabina; although the details of his prophecies are somewhat unclear (cf. G. B. Townend, AJP 85 [1964] 352-3), it appears that he had predicted that Otho would at least survive Nero. Tacitus is also thoroughly scathing about this man’s influence over Otho, describing him as sceleris instinctor, ad quod facillime ab eius modi voto transitor (H 1.22.3).

4.2 nullo igitur officii aut ambitionis in quemquam genere omisso: Tacitus adds the detail (H 1.23.1) that Otho made a point of ingratiating himself with all the soldiers with whom he came into contact, and we should note that this will include those members of the Praetorian Guard who came to Spain to accompany Galba to Rome (see above, pp. 171-2; see also Plut. G 20.4-6).

quotiens cena principem acciperet...demerebatur: Plutarch (G 20.7) and Tacitus (H 1.24.1) give the same story, the only variants being that Tacitus gives the everyday value of the aureus (HS 100) and names Maevius Pudens, a close friend of Tigellinus, as Otho’s agent in making these payments.

cuidam etiam de parte finium cum vicino litiganti adhibitus arbiter...redemit emancipavitque: Tacitus gives the story in much more general terms (H 1.24.2) but adds the detail that the quidam was a speculator named Cocceius Proculus. S. is notably precise here in using correct legal terminology: an arbiter was essentially the same as a iudex, but was more usually employed
in a case involving bona fides; his job was to determine the verdict on the basis of the pleadings submitted to him by the pursuer and the defender and of the formula worked out previously by these parties in conjunction with the magistrate (in iure; on the formulary system generally, see Buckland, Textbook 625-630). Tacitus regards Otho's action in this case as an example of enterprise in corruption. This may be exaggerated: Otho clearly wished to gain a supporter and so, while he could have decided the case corruptly in the man's favour, he preferred to save him the bother of going through the remainder of his litigation with its inevitable delays. Again, with the word emancipavit S. uses correct legal terminology: Italic land was a res mancipi (Gaius 2.14a-27), full title in which could be conveyed only by the ritual process known as mancipatio (Gaius 1.119-122) or, less commonly, by a formal procedure called in iure cessio.
This section should, of course, be read in close conjunction with the account of the fall of Galba (G 18.1-20.2; above pp. 226-240).

5.1 sed postquam Pisone praelato spe decidit, ad vim conversus est instigante super animi dolorem etiam magnitudine aeris alieni: cf. above G 17 nn. Tacitus paints for us (H1.21.1) a graphic picture of Otho's chagrin at the events of 10th January; furthermore, praegravem se Neroni fuisse, nec Lusitaniam rursus et alterius exilii honorem exspectandum. suspectum semper invisumque dominantibus qui proximus destinaretur. In addition, Otho must have been borrowing and extorting large sums of money on the strength of his influence and expectations (see below 5.2) and his debts are said to have amounted to fifty millions (Plut. G 21.3: presumably Plutarch here means drachmae; the total would therefore be HS 200 million).

5.2 hoc subsidium tanti coepti fuit: compared to the size of Otho's debts, one million sesterces was a small sum indeed with which to finance a coup d'état: Plutarch mentions (G 23.8-24.3) that most of the former adherents of Nymphidius Sabinus and Tigellinus
supported and encouraged Otho, and that the principal agents in
the organization of the Praetorian Guard for the coup were an optio
named Veturius and a tesserarius named Barbius Proculus (both of
whom would, from the nature of their jobs, know many of the men),
assisted by Otho's freedman Onomastus (H 1.25). He makes the
additional point that the troops were very seriously disaffected
by this time (on 10th January Galba had still said nothing about
paying the promised donative; cf. H 1.18.2-3), since the four days
which intervened between 10th and 15th January were not sufficient
to suborn a loyal force.

6.1 tulerat animus post adoptionem statim castra
occupare cenantemque in Palatio Galbam adgredi: Tacitus
states (H 1.26) that the planned coup was ready on 14th January and
that the conspirators were going to seize Otho as he returned from
dinner (and presumably take him to the Praetorian camp where he would
be proclaimed); however, they were deterred by the difficulties of
carrying out such an action at night, since there were many troops
scattered throughout the city and they were afraid that some drunken
soldiers might grab the wrong person and proclaim him Emperor!
This looks like the typical Tacitean topos on military indiscipline
and drunkenness (cf. below, Introduction to The Praetorian Outbreak,
p. 324); ultimately this story may derive from Cluvius Rufus
(suggested both by F. R. B. Godolphin, AJP 56 [1935] 324-8 and by
G. B. Townend, AJP 85 [1964] 356, but for wholly different reasons).
S.'s reason for the postponement of the coup seems much more
in keeping with what we see elsewhere of Otho's sensitivity to and
6.1-6.2

appreciation of the soldiers' point of view (cf. below 8.1-2; 9.3; 10.1; 11.1; 12.2); presumably S. has it from some military source - perhaps his father (cf. below, 10.1).

6.2 Ergo destinata die: if we combine this phrase with the preceding sentence (medium...tempus religio et Seleucus exemit), it becomes clear that the date for the coup d'état was actually determined by astrological considerations. This may seem wholly outlandish, but it is not unknown even today. In 1967, the then Governor of California was sworn in at one minute past midnight on 2nd January, the time allegedly being chosen for astrological reasons (Newsweek 69 16th January, 1967: 30).

in foro sub aede Saturni ad miliarium aureum: as one descended from the Capitol by the clivus Capitolinus, the temple of Saturn lay on the right; if one turned right, past the front of this temple, the golden milestone was on the left a few yards beyond the temple. This golden milestone was a marble column covered with gilt bronze and was erected by Augustus in 20 B.C. (Dio 54.8.4); it was regarded as the point at which all the great highways of the Empire converged (Plut. G 24.7). However, distances from Rome to other cities were measured not from this point but from the gates in the Servian Wall through which the highways passed (Pliny, NH 3.66). Part of the column was discovered in 1835 and in 1959 what appeared to be its concrete foundation was uncovered just S.E. of the hemicyclium of the Rostra. See further Platner-Ashby, s.vv. 'Milliarum Aureum'; Nash II 64-65. For the temple of Saturn see Platner-Ashby, s.vv.
mane Galbam salutavit, utque consueverat osculo exceptus: it seems to have been customary for the Emperor to greet his closest friends and associates (amici of the prima admissio? cf. J. Crook, Consilium Principis 23) with a kiss at the morning salutatio. Tiberius, perhaps predictably, had no enthusiasm for this practice and banned it by edict (S. Tib. 34.2): he may have done so on medical grounds (cf. Ann. 4.57.2) and it may be no coincidence that in the middle of Claudius' principate there was a major outbreak of a skin disease called lichen or mentagra, which began on the chin and which seems not to have affected women, slaves, or the middle or lower classes in society, sed proceres veloci transitu osculi maxime (Pliny, NH 26.2-4; this ailment cannot be identified with any certainty: perhaps it was something like the now almost-forgotten impetigo). It is not clear when the practice of kissing was revived, but it had become so common by the time of Domitian that Martial devotes two poems to an attack on what he regards as a social menace (11.98; 12.59). On this topic see further Friedländer, Sittengeschichte 10 I 95).

etiam sacrificanti interfuit audivitque praedicta haruspicis: we learn from Tacitus (II 1.27.1) that the sacrifice took place in front of the temple of Apollo on the Palatine and that Umbricius, the haruspex, tristia exta et instantes insidias ac domesticum hostem praedicit (cf. Plut. G 24.4-5; Dio 64.5.3): Otho was standing next to Galba at the moment when the pronouncement was
6.2-

made. This highly dramatic picture was obviously presented in the common source, as may also have been some equivalent of Plutarch's comment μονονουγε τὸν Ὀθόνα τοῦ θεοῦ γενοὶ ληπτὸν παραδοξόντος. However, Tacitus and Plutarch differ markedly in their accounts of Otho's reactions to this news. It is impossible to say which version was in the common source: perhaps Plutarch's, since an Otho overwhelmed with confusion and now blushing red and now pale with fear suits the generally melodramatic (and hostile) picture of this source. On the other hand, the common source may have presented a neutral word such as motus, which Tacitus and Plutarch interpreted according to their own preconceptions (cf. P. Noyen and G. Sanders, AC 28 [1959] 226-7).

deinde liberto adesse architectos...ad constitutum: the freedman was Onomastus (cf. above, 5.2, n. on hoc subsidium tanti coepti fuit) and by conflating the information given here and by Tacitus (H 1.27.1-2) and Plutarch (G 24.6-7), we can follow Otho's route to the golden milestone: he went from the Temple of Apollo through the domus Tiberiana and, instead of making straight for the forum by the clivus Victoriae, he then headed in the opposite direction (postica parte Palati) and made for the Velabrum, which lay to the west of the Palatine; from there he headed towards the Forum, presumably by the vicus Tusius.

alii febrem simulasse aiunt eamque excusationem proximis mandasse, si quae reretur: this variant is found only in S. and we can therefore say nothing certain about its provenance;
G. B. Townend speculates (AJP 85 [1964] 356-7) that it may have been present in Pliny's history as a "dubious alternative" but that "more probably it was Cluvius' version, as Plutarch's silence suggests." He further suggests that in Tacitus' account of Otho's departure (H 1.27.2) the words innixus liberto, which do not seem to have anything to do with the story of the architect and the contractors, really belong to the "Cluvian" version and that this detail "almost looks as if intended as an acknowledgement that Tacitus knew of the story to which it belonged": this seems very far-fetched indeed. In a detailed discussion of this incident, P. Noyen and G. Sanders ("Innixus Liberto," AC 28 [1959] 223-231) put forward several possible explanations, their favourite being that the words in Tacitus are a gloss, inserted in a manuscript by a reader who remembered the variant in Suetonius and who was struck by the resemblance of S.'s story to that given by Tacitus in his account of the conspiracy of Libo Drusus, where someone planning to kill the Emperor appears metu et aegritudine fessus...innisusque fratri (Ann. 2.29.2).

It is possible that S.'s variant actually arose because Otho, bandy-legged and splay-footed as he was (below, O 12.1), began to trip over his feet as he made his way through the domus Tiberiana and that, as his excitement got the better of him, Onomastus took him by the arm both to restrain him and prevent him from tripping up; this pair must have presented an odd sight to the staff of the palace and Onomastus may have explained Otho's high colour and uncertain gait to those they passed as an attack of fever.
6.3- 

6.3 **tunc abditus propere muliebri sella in castra contendit:** Tacitus (H 1.27.2) and Plutarch (G 25.1-3) state that there were only twenty-three soldiers waiting for him at the golden milestone and that Otho, seeing the fewness of their number, became afraid. Plutarch even hints that he tried to call off the coup but was hustled away by the soldiers who would not hear of it. As Otho's group approached the camp more and more soldiers "tagged along," as S. indicates below.

**ibi missis qui Galbam et Pisonem trucidarent:** for the death of Galba, see above G 19-20 and nn. Piso was apparently with Galba when the Emperor was killed (H 1.39.1) but managed to escape, though wounded, and took refuge in the temple of Vesta, where he eluded detection for a while. Otho, on receiving the head of Galba, demanded Piso's as well and sent troops to hunt him down. Of these Sulpicius Florus, an auxiliary soldier recently given Roman citizenship by Galba, and Statius Murcus, a speculator, dragged Piso from the temple and killed him (H 1.43; Plut. G 27.5-6).

**ad conciliandos polllicitationibus...quod sibi illi reliquissent:** that Otho should have made some such vague but generally satisfactory statement of policy when he was hauled into the Praetorian Camp and saluted as Emperor is to be expected: he can hardly have remained mute! However, after describing for us a scene of soldiery run wild, Tacitus gives us a speech by Otho (H 1.37-38) which sounds like a revolutionary manifesto and consists mostly of diatribes against Galba, his ministers and his heir. In this case,
6.3-
since Plutarch too gives us nothing in the way of a speech we may assume that the common source was silent and that this, like the earlier speech of Piso, is an invention of Tacitus (on this topic, see M. C. Mittelstadt, RSC 15 [1967] 293-304, esp. 301, 304).
Otho's Principate in Rome
(7.1 - 8.2)

Introduction: Our accounts of Otho's activities during the eight and a half weeks which he spent as Princeps in Rome (15th January - 15th March, A.D.69) contain little that can be tied chronologically to any specific point in the period. Tacitus gives us the most detailed account (H 1.45-47 for the first day, and H 1.79-90 for the remainder), but his time indications are very vague: interim (H 1.71.1); per idem tempus (H 1.73); interim (H 1.74.1); we then have a reference to the coming civil war (H 1.79.1); interim (H 1.80.1); and per eos dies (H 1.88.1). Plutarch's account is substantially shorter (Otho 1.1-5.4), and for extreme brevity there is little to choose between Suetonius and Dio. S.'s time indications are as vague as those in our other sources: dein vergente iam die (O 7.1 - 15th January); postridie (O 7.2); sub idem vero tempus (O 8.1); verum haud dubio bello (O 8.1).

Most of the events of Otho's principate in Rome, then, seem to have been remembered as occurring more or less simultaneously. The principal source or sources used by our extant authors gave little assistance with chronology: certain events are grouped together at the beginning of Otho's principate (e.g. the 'pardoning' of Marius Celsus: H 1.71; Plut. O 1.1-2; Otho's nightmare: S. O 7.2; Dio 64.7.2; the death of Tigellinus: H 1.72; Plut. O 2; the surprise
which Otho caused everyone by acting as a reasonable Princeps: H 1.71.7; Plut. O 3.1; Dio 64.7.3); similarly, there are certain 'common' elements in our accounts of events immediately prior to Otho's departure from Rome for the north on 14th March (e.g. various omens and prodigies [H 1.86; Plut. O 4.7-10]; Cornelius Dolabella's "banishment" to Aquinum [H 1.88.1; Plut. O 5.1, with different emphasis and fuller explanation]; Otho's "suite" for the war [H 1.88.2; Plut. O 5.1-2]). However, in the "middle section" there are fairly radical discrepancies in order, most easily observed in Tacitus and Plutarch, since they give so much more information than S. or Dio: for example, Plutarch mentions the arrival in a continuous succession of news of Otho's acceptance by the armies of Pannonia, Dalmatia and Moesia, and then by Mucianus in Syria and Vespasian in Judaea, which gave Otho confidence, so that he wrote to Vitellius offering him a pension and a place in which to live a life of ease and pleasure (O 4.1-6). But since we hear that Vitellius replied to Otho and that thereafter their correspondence became increasingly acrimonious, a moment's reflection will show that, given the time necessary for news of Otho's accession to reach the East and for reaction to it to come back to Rome (especially from Mucianus and Vespasian, who were working in concert and who no doubt consulted each other about their joint reaction; cf. H 2.5), the correspondence between Otho and Vitellius cannot come after all this but must have started very early in Otho's principate; however, Plutarch does give us a picture which appears psychologically reasonable. Tacitus, on the other hand, arranges these events in a more skilful and more "logical" sequence: as soon as the initial
actions of his principate are completed, Otho starts his correspondence with Vitellius; we then hear of spies being sent by both Otho and Vitellius, and finally we get an elaborate picture of developing provincial allegiances (H 1.74-76). Accordingly, in this case we can say that Tacitus' version seems more probable than Plutarch's.

There is another notable example of a discrepancy between Tacitus and Plutarch in the placing of events, but in this case upon examination the discrepancy proves to be illusory - this concerns the context of the unexpected and wild outbreak of the Praetorians (H 1.80-85; O 3.3-13, also mentioned by Dio at 64.8.2-3; for discussion, see below, nn. on 8.2 ff.). Tacitus puts this event "late" in his narrative: there is a clear sequence of events from this incident up to the time when Otho leaves the city, and the bulk of his account of Otho's principate in Rome precedes the outbreak. Furthermore, just before beginning his account he says *conversis ad civile bellum animis*, and tells of an attempted barbarian invasion of Moesia (H 1.79); he then introduces the praetorian outbreak with *interim* (H 1.80.1). This would seem to suggest that Tacitus placed the incident somewhere about the beginning of March. Plutarch, however, appears to place the affair very early in Otho's principate: after the elements common to both accounts at the beginning (mentioned above), he adds a few details which Tacitus seems to place somewhat later (e.g. consular re-arrangements: O 1.3, cf. H 1.77.2; and Otho's salutation as "Nero-Otho": O 3.1-2, cf. H 1.78.2), and then he immediately launches into his account of the Praetorian outbreak, and it is only after this that Plutarch turns to the
question of support for Otho coming in from the provinces, Otho's increasing confidence and his correspondence with Vitellius. But, as we have seen, this business of provincial support and letters between Otho and Vitellius probably does not belong in any single place in a chronology of Otho's doings in Rome and should certainly start very near the beginning of his Principate. However, if we remove from its position in Plutarch's narrative the account of Otho's provincial support and his correspondence with Vitellius (which is wrongly placed in any case), we may then note that the Praetorian outbreak is in exactly the same position in Plutarch's narrative as it is in Tacitus': that is, the narratives of Plutarch and Tacitus are really not as different as they appear to be at first, and, in their main outlines at least, they may well go back to a single source. This seems the more likely, given the remarkable verbal parallels which occur in their versions of the two main sets of incidents under discussion: for the correspondence between Otho and Vitellius, cf. mox quasi rixantes stupra ac flagitia in vicem obietavere, neuter falso (H 1.74.1) with ἐκ δὲ τούτου διερεθιζόμενοι, πολλὰ βλάχαιμα καὶ ἁσελγὴ κενώσοντες ὅλιπλοις ἔργωσον, οὐ πενδᾶς... (O 4.5); for the Praetorian outbreak, cf. cum timeret Otho, timebatur (H 1.81.1) with φοβοῦμενος γὰρ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀντός ἦν φοβερὸς ἐπείνως (O 3.8; on this topic, see especially E. G. Hardy, Studies in Roman History 295-334).

Of our other narratives, S. puts his rather different version of the Praetorian story in the "Tacitean" position, i.e. after his account of the correspondence between Otho and Vitellius and
immediately before his account of Otho's departure for the north (Q 8.1-3); Dio, perhaps not surprisingly, seems to follow Plutarch: he puts the Praetorian affair immediately before the correspondence and then has the war follow that (64.9.2-10.1; cf. Zonaras 11, 15, p. 45, 17-24D).

It is still not possible to construct a detailed chronology of Otho's principate from 15th January - 15th March: however, certain items can be assigned to approximate dates: the expedition to Gallia Narbonensis probably took place during the first few days of March (see below, 9.2, n. on apud Alpes) and it was perhaps in conjunction with the preparations for this expedition that the order was given to move the 17th Cohort from Ostia to Rome, which in turn gave rise to the Praetorian outbreak (see below 8.1, n. on verum haud dubio bello iamque ducibus...appropinquantibus). In addition, the Arval Brethren give us certain dates in January, February and March of A.D.69 which enable us to pinpoint more exactly events which are somewhat blurred in our literary sources, especially the details of the formal grants of Otho's various powers (see below, 7.1, n. on gesturusque communi omnium arbitrio); for the present, we should note that on 1st March the Brethren performed sacrifices ob laurum positam: presumably this refers to the arrival of news from Moesia of the defeat of the Rhoxolani (H 1.79.5). The actual dispatch may have arrived a few days earlier, and we note again that Tacitus then proceeds to his account of the Praetorian outbreak with the word interim (H 1.80.1).

One of the major elements in any consideration of Otho's...
Otho's Principate in Rome: Introduction, cont.

policies as Princeps must be his relationship with the Praetorian Guard: the Praetorian officers and men were his only enthusiastic supporters, and he was compelled to tread a narrow and difficult path between retaining their favour (at the price of excessive indulgence, if necessary) on the one hand and conciliating other groups in Rome and the Empire on the other, with the aim of broadening the basis of his support. This was an almost impossible task, since the Praetorians were deeply suspicious of the Senate (e.g. H 1.80.2 and 82.1; cf. Plut. Q 3.3-10) and certainly had no respect for it (not without justification: cf. H 1.35.1 with 1.45.1), while the Senate and people generally were horrified at the manner of Otho's coming to power (H 1.50.1), and the members of the upper classes were especially fearful where the Praetorians were concerned (H 1.81). Given this basic situation, Otho knew that he could not follow Galba's policy of punishing opponents and rewarding only partisans: Galba's end had shown how dangerous such a policy could be.

The Praetorians and city soldiery: the Praetorians were allowed to choose their own prefects, and they selected Plotius Firmus and Licinius Procillus, both of whom had apparently been involved in Otho's plot against Galba (H 1.46.1; for Plotius, see further von Rohden, PIR P 382; Klass, RE XXI s.v. 'Plotius' no. 2; for Licinius, see further Stein, RE XIII s.v. 'Licinius' no. 147; Petersen, PIR2 L 233). Flavius Sabinus was re-instated by the troops (cf. H 1.46.1 praefecere) as urban prefect: he had been Nero's prefect originally, but had been dismissed by Galba (Plut. Q 5.4); his
re-appointment was interpreted both as a compliment to Nero's memory and as a conciliatory gesture towards Flavius' brother Vespasian, governor of Judaea (II.46.1).

In addition, the pernicious system of vacationes, whereby a soldier had to pay his centurion in order to obtain a release from duties, was abolished (II.146.2; this system had been in part the cause of a mutiny in Pannonia as long ago as A.D.14; see Ann. 117.4); however, since Otho also had to avoid alienating the centurions, he had to promise that the fiscus would in future pay the centurions for the vacationes taken annually by their men. As far as Tacitus was concerned, this reform could hardly redound to Otho's credit, since at this time he was in no position to refuse the soldiers anything (cf. his rather grudging praise at II.46.1: rem haud dubio utilem et a bonis postea principibus perpetuitate disciplinae firmatam). Perhaps, too, Vitellius had anticipated him in this respect in Germany (cf. II.58.1; the chronology here is not clear, and word of this reform in Germany may conceivably have reached Rome by the time of Otho's coup).

Time and again we see Otho flattering the soldiers and shamelessly begging favours from them (II.36, 45-46, 80-85, esp. 86.4; Plut. Q 1.2; 3.11-13): this attitude is summed up by Plutarch's sinister καὶ τὸ στρατιωτικὸν ἐπηνεσεν (Q 1.2), and by Tacitus' sarcastic omnia serviliter pro dominatione (II.36.3).

The Upper Classes: when Otho came to power, members of the Senatorial nobility were, naturally, exceedingly nervous (Plut. Q 1.4-5), and few can have felt much pride in their own behaviour (cf. II.145.1,
Otho's Principate in Rome; Introduction, cont.

typically: quantoque magis falsa erant quae fiebant, tanto plura facere). Otho knew full well how important recognition by the Senate was for his position in the Empire as a whole (cf. the words which Tacitus puts into his mouth when he calls it caput imperii et decora omnium provinciarum: H1.84.3); active co-operation by members of the Senate would be even more valuable. He therefore exerted himself to the full to win them over, and with regard to his own formal powers and offices, he followed a strictly "constitutionalist" line (see below 7.1, n. on gesturusque communi omnium arbitrio).

He publicly and ostentatiously "forgave" Marius Celsus for his loyalty to Galba and was rewarded for this by the unremitting devotion of Marius and the approbation of all classes in Rome, especially the nobles (H 1.71.2; cf. Plut. O 1.1-2). Verginius Rufus, who had little cause to remember Galba with affection was given a second consulship and obviously helped to confer respectability on the new regime (H 1.77.2; Plut. O 1.3: the idea that this consulship would serve ut aliquod exercitui Germanico delenimentum seems curiously misguided, since by this time [cf. AFA 26th Jan.: ob [c]omitia consularia imp. Othonis Caesar. Aug.] the German soldiers had in Vitellius a much more satisfactory focus for their affection: cf. H 1.53.3 and 2.68.4). Some exiles restored by Galba were especially easy for Otho to win over; for Galba had, in some cases at least, failed to give them back the property which had been confiscated by the state. As far as possible, Otho returned it to them (Plut. O 1.4, but cf. H 1.90.1), and, in other cases, where he was, presumably, unable to do this, he gave places in the colleges of pontiffs and augurs to such returned exiles as had previously gone
through the cursus honorum, while on younger nobles lately restored he bestowed the priesthods which their fathers and grandfathers had held (H 1.77.3; Plut. O 1.4; cf. AFA 5th and 9th March). All of this doubtless cost Otho little, but clearly it had its effect (Plut. O 1.5). In some cases, however, his attempts to ingratiate himself went too far and ultimately may have become counter-productive, since not everyone exiled under Claudius and Nero had been condemned unjustly (H 1.77.3; cf. Brunt, Historia 10 [1969] 225-226). However, Otho was anxious to avoid giving offence to anyone: hence in making his arrangements for the consulship he kept the designations of Nero and Galba, and made alterations only by filling in blanks and shortening terms (H 1.77.2; see also G. B. Townend, "The Consuls of A.D.69-70," AJP 83 [1962] 113-124).

The People: Tacitus brackets the populus with the Senate in his account of changed attitudes to Otho after Galba's death: alium crederes senatum, alium populum (H 1.45.1). His combination of populus here with senatus is probably not a harking-back to the old formula S.P.Q.R., but serves rather to remind us of his earlier division of the People into two groups (H 1.4.3) - the pars populi integra, which simply followed the views of the members of the great houses to which it was attached, and the plebs sordida (cf. below, 7.1: ab infima plebe), who had been passionately pro-Nero. While Otho personally had little reason to revere the memory of Nero, he set out to win the support of the latter group as well: creditus est etiam de celebranda Neronis memoria agitavisse spe volgum alliciendi (H 1.78.2). It was doubtless such people who gave rise to the
Otho's Principate in Rome: Introduction, cont.

appellation "Nero-Otho" in Rome; (see further below, 7.1, n. on super ceteras...nullum indicium recusantis dedit), and Otho performed certain actions which could be interpreted as honouring Nero's memory. However, the ear-marking of funds for the Aurea Domus (7.1) and the re-instatement of certain of Nero's procurators and freedmen (7.1) may well have been undertaken for reasons mainly to do with Otho's own convenience (see nn. ad locc.). The move to set up again busts and statues of Nero (7.1; cf. Plut. O 3.1) which will have involved replacing heads and repairing damaged features, was a picayune matter, and any anxiety about what it implied, which may have been felt by other segments of society, was no doubt lulled once more by Otho's removal of the hated Tigellinus, an action which seems to have met with universal approval (Plut. O 2; H 1.72).

The Provinces: again in contrast to Galba, Otho was generous in his grants of citizenship, and he did not restrict himself to paying off debts (Dio 64.8.2; cf. above, G 14.3). Evidence is scanty, but, with regard to Spain and Gaul, we may note that Otho apparently tried to compensate for Galba's shortcomings. (The list of his grants is given at H 1.78.1: the reading Lingonibus has been doubted, probably unnecessarily; cf. Heubner ad loc.) The Roman colonies of Hispalis and Emerita (cf. Pliny, NH 3.11 and 4.118) received additional inhabitants (which may have meant additional grants of citizenship). Emerita was in Otho's former province of Lusitania and here, if anywhere, we may perhaps see the settlement of old obligations. Hispalis was in Baetica and we should note that Baetica
was also given territory in Mauretania (H 1.78.1): this may represent an attempt to compensate for Galba's niggardliness (cf. above pp. 129 - 130 for speculation about the attitude of Baetica's governor at the time of Galba's revolt from Nero); equally, it may be that Otho was trying to pre-empt any lingering influence which Caecina Alfenius, formerly quaestor in Baetica and now prominent in Vitellius' entourage (H 1.53.1), may still have possessed there.

In Gaul, Galba had punished several civitates, notably the Treviri and the Lingones, for failing to support first Vindex and then himself against Nero (H 1.53.3), while Gallic states which had chosen the "correct" side were rewarded generously (H 1.51.4-5; see also above pp. 167-9). Resentment at this treatment appears to have been particularly bitter among the Lingones (H 1.54.1), and Otho's grant of citizenship to the entire people may have been a gambler's attempt to pry them loose from their attachment to the army of Upper Germany. In addition, the designation of Otho's old friend Pompeius Vopiscus as consular colleague with Verginius Rufus was widely regarded as a compliment to the city of Vienne (H 1.77.2).

Elsewhere, we hear of Cappadocia and Africa receiving nova iura (H 1.78.1), which is usually translated as "new constitutions": these were, however, ostentui magis quam mansura. In the case of Africa this will have meant some alteration of the strange system of government in effect since the days of Gaius (cf. H 4.48); Galba will not have wished to do anything for Africa in view of the revolt of Clodius Macer (cf. above pp. 130-31; 164-6). Cappadocia, previously a client kingdom, had been annexed in A.D.17 (Ann. 2.42.2-4) and was a procuratorial province until A.D.72, when, along with Armenia Minor,
Otho


it was joined with Galatia under a consular legatus (S. Vesp. 8.4 says this was done propter adsiduos barbarorum incursus; see also R. Syme, CAH XI 140-141; W. E. Gwatkin, "Cappadocia as a Roman Procuratorial Province," Univ. of Mo. Stud. V.4 [1930] 55-62):

Otho's efforts here seem to have represented a transitory attempt at improving a potentially dangerous situation.

We should also note Otho's efforts to ingratiate himself with the various army groups: the appointment of Flavius Sabinus as praefectus urbi was, as previously noted, regarded as a compliment to Vespasian, and the designation of Verginius Rufus as consul was similarly thought to be aimed at soothing the feelings of the German army (cf. above pp.306-7; 308 ). In the Danubian provinces, the energetic Galban partisan Cornelius Fuscus was left in office as procurator of Dalmatia, and the equally energetic Antonius Primus remained as legatus of Leg. VII Galbiana in Pannonia. While it may be fanciful to see in this compliments to their native places, Tolosa (Antonius Primus) and Forum Iulii (? Cornelius Fuscus; cf. Syme, Tacitus 684; see above, p. 132), we can be reasonably sure that Otho at least approved of these men continuing to hold their "Galban" appointments; for on 26th February, A.D.69, L. Tampius Flavianus, governor of Pannonia, was co-opted into the Arval Brethren (to take the place of Galba): this was a signal honour (cf. H. Bloch, OCD\(^2\) s.v. 'Fratres Arvales'), and suggests that Otho had undertaken a careful examination of the entire administrative and military organization in Illyricum. Slightly further east, an incursion of the Rhoxolani in Moesia was repelled by Leg. III Gallica, and the governor M. Aponius and the three legionary legates were all

extravagantly rewarded (H 1.79.5).

The result of Otho's efforts in Pannonia, Dalmatia and Moesia can be seen in the persistent loyalty shown towards him by the seven legions of this area: this was perhaps his most significant success as Princeps.

Overall, we may conclude that Otho accomplished a surprising amount in the eight weeks or so that he spent as Princeps in Rome. Of course, possession of the city and recognition by the Senate and the Praetorians inevitably counted for much, especially with the eastern provinces (H 1.76; cf. 1.84.3-4), and their recognition of him implied nothing in the way of loyalty or enthusiasm. In Rome itself, his attempts at conciliation surprised and pleased those most fearful of him, but their support was, at best, wary and transitory, and Tacitus may well reflect contemporary views in the savage attack on Otho's character with which he begins and concludes his account of his Principate (H 1.50; 71; 2.31). Had there been no Vitellius, Otho might ultimately have become a Princeps as highly regarded as Titus; however, he consistently underestimated the threat from Germany.

7.1  Dein vergente iam die ingressus senatum: cf. Plut. G 28.1; H 1.47.1); regarding the time of day, S. here spells out what is merely implicit in our other sources. The Senate was summoned by the praetor urbanus, according to Tacitus, which was constitutionally correct, both consuls (Galba and Vinius) now being dead. Since Otho was most scrupulous in attending to constitutional
niceties after his coup (see below, n. on *gesturusque communi omnium arbitrio*), we may assume that he followed orthodox practice in not having a meeting of the Senate after sunset; cf. *Gell. NA* 14.7.8, quoting Varro: *...dicit senatus consultum ante exortum aut post occasum solemn factum ratum non fuisse*; and *Livy* (44.20.1): *...legati ex Macedonia...adeo expectati venerunt ut, nisi vesperr esset, extemplo senatum vocaturi consules fuerint*. The time can be narrowed down still further: *maiores...nostri novam relationem post horam decimam in senatu fieri vetabant* (Sen. Tranq. 17.7). On 15th January, 69, at Rome the sun rose at 7:20 a.m. and set at 4:59 p.m. (according to members of the Department of Astronomy, University of Western Ontario): the 10th hour will, therefore, have finished at 3:22:30 p.m. The Senate, therefore, was probably called into session no later than about 2:30 p.m.

*quasi raptus de publico et suscipere imperium vi coactus*: this probably did become the "official" version of how Otho was proclaimed Princeps (cf. Dio 64.8.1, where Otho claims to have tried to oppose the soldiers!); certainly to a casual bystander, the events described at *H 1.27.2* and Plut. *G* 25.1-3, where a scared-looking Otho was suddenly surrounded by a gang of armed men and hustled away in a litter would have tended to confirm this "explanation."

*gesturusque communi omnium arbitrio*: this is probably no more than a conventional pledge to rule in a "constitutional" manner, and there is evidence to show that Otho was scrupulous about constitutional niceties. Although *Tacitus* tells us (*H 1.47.1*) that
7.1-

at the meeting of the Senate late on 15th January **decernitur**

Othoni tribunicia potestas et nomen Augusti et omnes principum

honores (cf. Plut. G 28.1; Dio 64.8.1); what was passed by the

Senate was, strictly speaking, only a recommendation: **de iure** these

powers had to come from the people. Accordingly, a series of

"elections" took place (the evidence for which is the AFA for

January - March, 69; [= MW 2]) as follows:

26th January - **comitia consularia**

28th February - **comitia tribuniciae potestatis**

5th March - **comitia sacerdotiorum**

9th March - **comitia pontificatus maximi**

In addition, the Acta show the final lines of the account of

sacrifices on a date **after** 10th January and **before** 26th January,

which were probably held on 16th January **ob imperium imp. Othonis

Caesars Aug.** (Henzen's reconstruction).

It was, of course, the Senate's resolution which mattered, but

these curious survivals were gone through to ensure public goodwill.

*ac super ceteras...nullum indicium recusantis dedit*:

to the casual reader it may appear that the information about the

greeting "Nero-Otho" refers to Otho's first day as Emperor, but

this sentence and the rest of the information contained in 7.1 has

no precise temporal context. The narrative sequence is ...**Palatium

petit...Dicitur ea nocte** (7.2).

Apparently no specific information survived about the occasion

or occasions on which the **infima plebs** hailed Otho as "Nero"; in

Plutarch (O 3.1) the incident comes "early"; in Tacitus (H 1.78.2)
it apparently comes "late" (immediately before the account of the
invasion of Moesia by the Rhoxolani); however, there are no real
indications of time in either of these versions (cf. above, pp.
303-4).

According to Plutarch, τὸς...πολλοῖς χαριζόμενος,
où κ ἔφευγε το πρῶτον εὖ τούς θεάτρῳς Νέρων προσωγορεύσεθαί
(τὸ πρῶτον presumably means when he was first so addressed),
which, as with S., implies no overt act on Otho's part, but merely
acquiescence. Tacitus suggests that Otho did not even go so far:
ipse in suspenso tenuit, vetandi metu vel adgnoscendi pudore, although
he does quote a tradition (creditus est) that Otho had raised the
question of commemorating Nero in some way in order to gain popular
support. Perhaps it was from the small factual kernel of a greeting
in the theatre that the various stories about Otho's "Neronian"
activities arose.

immo, ut quidam tradunt, etiam diplomatibus...
Neronis cognomen adiecit: the source of this particular story
is revealed by Plutarch (Q 3.2) to have been Cluvius Rufus, governor
of Spain after Galba's departure for Rome (cf. H 1.8.1), and
Cluvius' information is described as referring specifically to
diplomata sent to Spain. G. B. Townend (Hermes 88 [1960] 106) accepts
the earlier theory of Momigliano (see RAL 8 [1932] 328-31) that this
reference to Cluvius in Plutarch actually comes from Pliny the
Elder, who was Plutarch's main source; cf. Townend's "basic
proposition" that Plutarch did not himself use Cluvius Rufus as a
source (see above, p. 274); he further argues that it is unlikely
that Pliny actually read Cluvius: "somehow or other the detail reached Pliny", who did his writing "mainly in the provinces during the early years of Vespasian" (op. cit. 107). However, there is no compelling reason to deny the possibility that Plutarch himself read and used Cluvius; furthermore, it is equally possible that S. had read both Plutarch and Cluvius: hence his use of quidam; however, S. does avoid citing sources by name and quidam may merely be a cover for Cluvius Rufus (cf. Townend, op. cit. 106 and CQ 9 [1959] 289). Furthermore, S. does seem to have doubts about the truth of the story; (cf. certe, implying a contrast, with which the next sentence begins), while Tacitus with his picture of Otho's hesitation over the "Nero" salutation has no room at all for this story of overt action on his part.

diplomatibus: originally a diploma was a laissez-passer for those using government resources or facilities while making a journey, and with the coming of the cursus publicus, especially for those using its facilities (cf. OLD s.v. diploma). It also came to mean a certificate outlining privileges bestowed on anyone by the government, as in the military diplomata collected in CIL XVI (for examples, see MW 396-403; for an illustration see J. P. V. D. Balsdon, Rome: The Story of an Empire 83; the article s.v. in OCD is quite misleading in its basic definition).

ad quosdam provinciarum praesides: while it is possible for S. to expand one source (Cluvius Rufus) into quidam, we may doubt that he would arbitrarily so expand precise information, such as that
about the Spanish diplomata, unless we are prepared to believe that no singular or plural anywhere in S. means what it says. We may therefore suspect that once Cluvius spread the tale of the Spanish diplomata, gossip, which S. picked up, expanded this to include epistulae...ad quosdam provinciarum praesides, which were rather different from "open-ended" diplomata.

certe et imagines statuasque eius reponi passus est: cf. Plut. O 3.1: καὶ τὰῦν ἐλάχιστα Νέρωνος εἰς τοὺς πολεμεῖν, οὐκ ἐκάλυψε. Perhaps these comments reflect the same source (or sources): clearly no overt action on Otho's part is involved. Tacitus (H 1.78.2) makes it even less the result of any Othonian initiative: et fuere qui imagines Neronis proponerent.

et procuratores atque libertos ad eadem officia revocavit: this seems somewhat sinister, when we recall Nero's administration (cf. Brunt, Latomus 18 (1959) 554-9). However, Otho had almost no choice, since he probably felt unable to trust Galba's officials. Little is known of this aspect of his administration: Tacitus highlights it from the senatorial viewpoint with his picture of Nero's freedman Crescens arranging a huge banquet for the common people in Carthage to celebrate Otho's accession; his disdainful comment nam et hi (sc. liberti) malis temporibus partem se rei publicae faciunt (H 1.76.3), suggests that Crescens was given an official position in the provincial administration.

Since this chapter reflects a tradition hostile to Otho,
7.1-
there is no mention of his protection of Marius Celsus or of his removal of the generally hated Tigellinus (H 1.71-72; Plut. O 1.1-2; 2; on Tigellinus see further above, G 15.2, n. on Tigellini).

quingenties sestertium ad peragendam Auream Domum: for the amount, see above G 5.2, n. on sestertium namque quingenties, sed quia notata, ... ne haec quidem accept.

The Golden House was built in the period immediately following the great fire of A.D.64: it covered approximately 125 acres with buildings and landscaped gardens, connecting properties already belonging to the imperial house on the Palatine and Esquiline Hills and occupying also the depression which lay between these Hills and the Caelian Hill (the Velia ridge, site of the Domus Transitoria, and the Colosseum valley): see Ann. 15.42-43 and S. Ner. 31. For the revolution which the Golden House represented in design, construction techniques and interior decoration, see A. Boethius, The Golden House of Nero 94-128; W. L. MacDonald, The Architecture of the Roman Empire 31-46 and Plates 21a-34; M. Grant, Nero 163-195 (with superb illustrations). Of recent discussions of the political impact of this palace the most interesting is perhaps by M. P. O. Morford: "The distortion of the Domus Aurea tradition" (Eranos 66 [1968] 158-179).

As we saw above (2.2 and nn.) Otho and Nero had similar tastes; Otho's admiration for the Golden House is not, therefore, surprising; Vitellius, on the other hand, did not like its highly refined, even austere, decoration (Dio 65.4.1-2) and his successors gradually made away with it; for details see Platner-Ashby 166-172; Nash I 339-348.
7.2- 

7.2 Dicitur ea nocte per quietem pavesfactus...

*μακροτες αὐλοτες*: the sequence is clear: *ea nocte* refers to the night of 15-16th January; *postridie* will refer to Otho's first formal sacrifice as Emperor, on the morning of 16th January (for this practice cf. 6.2, above). Plutarch (O 1.1) does not mention Otho's nightmare, but he has Otho go to the Capitol at dawn on 16th January to sacrifice. Tacitus, however, has an extra visit to the Capitol (on 15th January after Galba's death; cf. H 1.47.2 and 71.1): Otho cruento adhuc foro per stragem iacentium in Capitolium atque inde in Palatium vectus. This may simply be for dramatic effect; from the point of view of religion it seems neither necessary nor apt. Dio (65.7.1-2) may be following this sequence in part, since he has Otho sacrifice and refer to long flutes (see next n.) before he has the nightmare. S.'s account of these events is the clearest and most straightforward. Whether one can assign one sequence to Pliny the Elder and the other to Cluvius Rufus is doubtful: if one accepts G. B. Townend's theory that quotations in Greek in S. are from Cluvius Rufus, one will have to accept that the "long flutes" remark is from that author; since neither Tacitus nor Plutarch refer to Otho's nightmare one cannot really state with confidence that that too comes from Cluvius, though it might (Hermes 88 [1960] 105; AJP 85 [1964] 361-2).

Although the phrase about "long flutes" is given by Dio (65.7 .1 - here from Xiphilinus 190, 8-25 R. St.) in a slightly different form (*τί γάρ με έδει μακροτες αὐλοτες αὐλείαν*), what is perhaps significant is the explanation that this was a proverbial expression applied to those who were doing something for which they were not
fitted. If this is true and is not merely a "guessing" gloss added by some Byzantine reader, it may be correct to regard the Greek as a misquotation of what Cicero says of Pompey (Att. 2.16.2 = Sophocles fr. 768, with Pearson's commentary, q.v.):

φυσαὶ γὰρ οὐ σειρίοισιν αὐλίσκοις ἔτι, ὡλλ' ἀγρίως σύσαλτι φορβεῖς ὀτερ,

which seems to mean that Pompey is no longer playing on a small flute but a large one which produces a loud, deep blast.

8.1 Sub idem vero tempus: a fairly loose expression, since it refers to the events of 1-3 January, 69: cf. above G 16.2 and nn., and below Vit. 8.2, n. on consentiente deinde etiam superioris provinciae exercitu...defecerat.

Auctor senatui fuitmittendae legationis: S. has here simplified a somewhat more complicated story. According to Tacitus (H 1.19.2), at some point subsequent to the adoption of Piso on 10th January, 69, censuerant patres mittendos ad Germanicum exercitum legatos: there were discussions as to whether Piso should go; Laco vetoed a suggestion that he should go and finally the senate asked Galba to decide who should go, and he dithered. It is hard to imagine, therefore, that the embassy had been established and its preparations for the journey made and that its departure had taken place by 15th January. However, Tacitus states (H 1.74.2) that Otho recalled the envoys which Galba had sent and then sent them off again to both German armies and to Legio I Italica and the other forces at Lugdunum specie senatus. This last phrase is
important: S. tells us here that the envoys were to announce electum iam principem, quietem concordiamque suaderet. It was the Senate to which the legions of Upper Germany had sworn allegiance on 1st January and they had demanded that the Praetorians in Rome should choose a new Emperor (above, G 16.2).

This embassy eventually reached Vitellius and the envoys apparently defected to him immediately (H 1.74.2). For a detailed analysis of our accounts of this embassy, see further P. Fabia, RPh 37 (1913) 53-61.

et tamen per internuntios ac litteras...Vitellio optulit: cf. Plut. O 4.4-6; H 1.74.1; Dio 64.10.1. For a discussion of this correspondence, see above, pp.302-303. Only S. to form states that Otho offered a marriage alliance with Vitellius.
The Praetorian Outbreak
(8.1 - 2)

Introduction: At this point in his narrative, S. gives a very summary account of an unexpected and wild outbreak of violence among the Praetorian soldiers, who suspected that a "senatorial" counter-coup against Otho was being prepared or was actually already under way: they burst into the palace and not only caused a panic among the senators and their wives who were dining there with Otho, but also terrified the Princeps himself. With difficulty they were calmed; the next day they were given a substantial cash payment and only very light punishment was meted out.

All our sources note this incident: the fullest accounts are in Tacitus (Hist. 1.80-85) and Plutarch (Otho 3.3-13), while Dio's account (64.9.2-3) is even briefer than S.'s. However, none of these accounts is by itself free from objections, and so, perhaps not surprisingly, the three most recent studies of this incident have little in common in their conclusions (E. Hohl, "Der Praetorianeraufstand unter Otho," Klio 32 [1939] 307-324; H. Heubner, "Der Praetorianertumult vom Jahre 69 n.Chr.," RhM 101 [1958] 339-353; cf. also Heubner's Kommentar zu Hist. I pp. 167-168; H. Drexler, "Zur Geschichte Kaiser Othos bei Tacitus und Plutarch," §1. Der sogennante Praetorianeraufstand, Klio 37 [1959] 153-163; for earlier opinions on this problem, see Hohl, op. cit. 308, 310-313, 319-320). Tacitus and Plutarch have,
in places, close verbal parallels, indicating the use of at least one major source in common (Pliny the Elder?). However, the value of Tacitus' account is lessened by his insistence on seeing this incident simply as an example of a military revolt and by his use of over-emotional, highly-coloured and, ultimately, unjustified language (e.g. in Hist. 1.80: orta seditio prope urbi excidio fuit; visa inter temulentos arma; pessimus quisque in occasionem praedarum, vulgus, ut mos est, cuiusque motus novi cupidum; severissimos centurionum obtruncant; rapta arma, nudati gladii): we are reminded of the scenes in Pannonia and Germany in Annals I (for detailed analysis of this aspect of Tacitus' account, see Drexler, 158-160; Hohl, 317). Plutarch's version shows much less of a tendency to reduce the incident to a _topos_: for him it is the result either of genuine concern for Otho's safety on the part of the Praetorians or of a desire simply to raise hell (O 3.3; cf. Drexler, 158). However, he appears to have misunderstood his principal Latin source (which may, possibly, have been somewhat ambiguous) and, as a result, his _mise-en-scène_ for the outbreak _seems_ to be the Camp of the 17th Cohort at Ostia. This is, however, highly unlikely, since with a _tumultus_ beginning even at nightfall, and Plutarch says simply _νυκτός_, the soldiers could not march (or ride) the 16 mp from Ostia to Rome and arrive in the palace in time to disrupt Otho's banquet. Heubner, however, argues strenuously (340-344) that Plutarch's account does not imply an outbreak in Ostia, but, persuasive though he is, he does not satisfactorily account for the words ἡλαύνον εἰς τὴν ῟άμην (O 3.5), which seems an unlikely phrase to use of people going from the Praetorian camp, just outside the

City walls, into the city; cf. Tacitus' urben ac Palatium petunt (H 1.80.2; see also Drexler, 162): Plutarch is probably "clarifying" some such phrase for his Greek readers, and in so doing betrays his misapprehension. The couple of sentences surviving in the epitome of Dio contribute nothing to an understanding of the incident, which is used simply to illustrate the τόλμη and παρανομία of the troops.

S.'s brief account is rather different from Tacitus-Plutarch, but this need not imply that he is following a wholly distinct tradition; for if his account can be shown to harmonize with the fuller versions and even supplement them, we can easily conclude that he is following at least one major source in common with Tacitus-Plutarch. "Variations" may then be ascribed to his concentration on what seemed to him to be the essential elements of the story and to his desire to précis the background as much as possible. There is therefore no mention of the 17th Cohort or of Ostia, since they play no part in subsequent events: S.'s account begins with the movement of weapons in the Praetorian camp, but it lacks clarity in certain details because of its extreme compression.

verum haud dubio bello iamque ducibus...

appropinquantibus: S. uses this somewhat vague time indication to signify the context within which he places the Praetorian outbreak. In this he is similar to Tacitus, who in H 1.79.1 introduces his account of the invasion of Moesia by the Rhoxolani with the words conversis ad civile bellum animis and in the
8.1- verum haud dubio...appropinquantibus cont.

following chapter begins the story of the Praetorians with interim; as stated above (pp.303 ff.), the position of the Praetorian outbreak in Tacitus' narrative and the evidence of the sacrifices performed by the Arval Brethren on 1st March ob laurum positam would tend to suggest that the Praetorian outbreak took place at about the beginning of March, probably during the very first days of the month.

A consideration of the movement of Vitellian forces will tend to confirm this impression (for detailed calculations, see below App. I: The Vitellian Attack on Italy): the column led by Fabius Valens left Cologne around 12th January, 69; the distance which it covered from Cologne to the Alpine crossing at the Alpes Cottiae (Mont Genève) via Lugdunum, Valentia, Lucus and Brigantia is 521 mp. The march was, according to Tacitus (H 1.63-66), slow and bloody, and at best the distance covered by the army is unlikely ever to have exceeded 15 mp per day; assuming a continuous march at this speed (and it is clear from Tacitus' narrative that we can do no such thing), we obtain a marching time of about 35 days from Cologne to the Alpine crossing, which would imply that Valens reached Mt. Genève c. 16th February. This somewhat mechanistic calculation will give us a terminus post quem for Valens' arrival at Mt. Genève. However, when we remember time-consuming activities such as these - lento deinde agmine per finis Allobrogum ac Vocontiorum ductus exercitus, ipsa itinerum spatia et stativorum mutationes venditante duce, foedis pactionibus adversus possessores agrorum et magistratus civitatum (H 1.66.3) - we should perhaps add at least two weeks, if not rather more, to the time taken by Valens' army. Accordingly,
its arrival at the Alpine crossing will have been during the first week or so of March (for a different version, see F. Koester, "Der Marsch der Invasionsarmee des Fabius Valens vom Niederrhein nach Italien," Diss. Münster 1927, 10-22), and it was to prevent (or at least to slow down) this crossing that Otho sent his expedition to Gallia Narbonensis.

For other views on the date of the Praetorian outbreak, see Hohl, 322-323; Heubner, 350-353; cf. *Kommentar zu Hist.* I p. 168; Drexler, 155-156: in general, we may note that Tacitus' remark, *tum vero passim magistratus projectis insignibus...*(H 1.81) does not refer specifically to consular insignia and so is not evidence for dating the incident after 1st March (cf. G. B. Townend, *AJP* 83 [1962] 115-124); and, as we have already seen (above, pp. 303-5) the differences in the placing of events in their narratives by Plutarch and Dio on the one hand and Tacitus and S. on the other are more apparent than real.

The idea that Otho was the sort of person to excite such devotion, and even affection, simply could not square with the hostile and moralizing picture of him which came to be accepted, and which appears so prominently in Tacitus' account. It was therefore eliminated by Tacitus; but nevertheless, "wir haben diese Treue als ein ebenso unbezweifelbares wie bedeutsames historisches Faktum zur Kenntnis zu nehmen...Das Bild, das Tacitus, ausser am Ende, von ihm...
zeichnet, kann also schwerlich ganz richtig sein" (p. 157); cf. also above, pp. 323-5.

paene internecione amplissimi ordinis: cf. below 8.2; in Palatium cucurrerunt caedem senatus flagitantes; S. is therefore self-consistent but the statement is almost certainly exaggerated. From Plutarch (0 3.6, 8) and Tacitus (H 1.81.1) we learn that eighty senators and their wives were in the palace attending a banquet provided by Otho, which the Praetorians interrupted and broke up. While these people may have been in some physical danger (cf. Plut. 0 3.6: νεν μακρὸν εἶναι λέγοντες ἐν ταύτῃ πάντας ἀνελεῖν τοῖς ἱεραρχοῖς πολεμίους and 3.10: τὸν μισθοκόρον...πυνθευμένων, τι γεγονάσιν οἱ ἱεράρχοις πολέμου), the main concern of the soldiers was clearly Otho's safety (cf. Plut. 0 3.5: παραμελέσαντες ἀλλήλους Καίσαρι βοηθήσαν and H 1.82.1: ostendi sibi Othonem expostulantes); and although people in Rome expected a slaughter and/or sack to take place (cf. Plut. 0 3.7: ἦ μὲν οὖν πόλις ἦς αὐτίκα διαμαχησομένη θύρυμον εἰς πολὺν... and H 1.82.2: postera die velut capta urbe clausae domus, rarus per vias populus, maesta plebs), in fact no senator or property was harmed. The greatest exaggeration about this incident, however, is Tacitus' introductory remarks (H 1.80.1): parvo interim initio, unde nihil timebatur, orta seditio prope urbi excidio fuit; perhaps one or more of the senators present recorded the incident in historical works or memoirs, and Tacitus decided that it would constitute a suitable pretext for a sermon on discipline.
8.2- 

8.2  [et] placuerat: et is meaningless here and should be excised; Bücheler's emendation ei has merit: the decision to move weapons was clearly Otho's, and since Otho is also the subject of the concluding words of the preceding sentence, there need be no difficulty in understanding the reference. For S.'s intermittent failure to use the linking qui quae quod, see the next clause, ea cum in castris and cf. below 10.1: interfuit huic bello pater meus...is mox referre crebro solebat....

ei placuerat per classiarios arma transferri remittique

navibus: the grammatical structure of this sentence is perfectly straightforward: both per classiarios and navibus (abl.) denote means; cf. Woodcock, New Latin Syntax 32: "The instrumental ablative of means is mostly used of things. A personal agent employed by another is usually denoted by per, 'through' (i.e. 'through the agency of'), with the accusative."

It is therefore perverse of Heubner to assume that the main actors throughout S.'s account are the classiarii (not praetorians, nor members of the 17th Cohort), and then to compound the misapprehension by taking navibus as a dative, translating navibus remitti as "den Schiffen wiederzugestellt werden sollten" (347 and n. 19).

This is the most valuable information which S. gives us about the praetorian outbreak: it is not wholly intelligible in itself, since the weapons are merely to be "sent back" to somewhere unspecified, but this is, no doubt, the result of excessive compression. However, taken with the accounts in Plutarch and Tacitus, it both confirms...
and clarifies the picture: the weapons were to be moved from the Praetorian Camp, just outside Rome between the Via Nomentana and the Via Tiburtina, to the quarters of the 17th Cohort at Ostia. (This cohort of Roman citizens had been sent to Ostia to guard against fires during the principate of Claudius, no doubt at the time when the port facilities there were greatly expanded; cf. S. Claud. 20.3; 25.2). A convenient way to do this would be to use a ship or ships, and service ships (thus classiarios) rather than civilian ones: the use of classiarii would also suggest that a squadron, presumably from the Misenum fleet, was at this time stationed at Ostia. The praetorian camp was not, of course, on the river, and if more than one ship was necessary to move all the weapons and equipment (cf. navibus), then, obviously, carts would have to be brought to the camp (apparently from Ostia, no doubt to simplify the transfer at the other end; cf. H 1.80: vehicula cohortis; Plut. O 3.4: ταξις άμυνας, and Heubner's comments on p.342), where they would be loaded with arms and then taken across (transferri) the northern part of the city to the navalia, which lay on the river within the area of the Campus Martius, perhaps just above the later Pons Aelius (cf. Livy 3.26.8; Nash, II 117-119; Platner-Ashby, s.v. 'navalia'; both Kiepert and the Grosser Historischer Weltatlas, however, put the navalia near the Pons Agrippae). They would then be sent back to Ostia (remitti), i.e. back to their owners, the members of the 17th Cohort, who could then be properly equipped for their return to Rome, which was the original object of the exercise (Plut. O 3.4; H 1.80.1).

This theory may appear excessively complex but it has two
advantages: a) it enables us to preserve the data given by all our sources, especially the passage under consideration; b) it makes 'psychological' sense in the context of the time: Rome was about to be stripped of much of its garrison; Otho was naturally sensitive to questions of security and civil order, especially as he himself was shortly to leave the capital; it was essential, therefore, that the garrison replacements should look as soldierly and efficient as possible when they marched into the city.

in castris: there can be no serious doubt that this refers to the Castra Praetoria in Rome: the previous reference in this passage has been to the animum fidemque...praetorianorum, and it follows that quidam and omnes in the next two clauses likewise refer to the Praetorians; similarly H 1.80.1, where the reference to Varius Crispinus, the praetorian tribune, seeking to carry out his orders when the camp was quiet, leads to the same conclusion (cf. Hohl, 308; Drexler, 156, 161; Heubner, 340-344).


insidias quidam suspicati tumultum excitaverunt: both Plutarch (O 3.4-5) and Tacitus (H 1.80) give much more detailed accounts of the actual outbreak of trouble, especially Tacitus, who starts his mutiny topos at this point (cf. above, p.324); both state that the Praetorians immediately suspected a counter-coup in which the weapons would be used by the familiae of senators.
ac repente omnes nullo certo duce in Palatium cucurrerunt: S. here emphasizes the confusion/the scene as the Praetorians suddenly surged from their camp, no doubt by now obsessed with the idea that the senatorial counter-coup against Otho was already underway and that only by dashing at top speed to the Palace could they have any hope of saving him. They probably did not stop to arm themselves properly: Tacitus' rapta arma, nudati gladii (Hist 1.80.2) may refer to weapons simply grabbed from the carts; cf. Plutarch's πάντες δὲ διασκευασμένοι καὶ πανακαλέσαντες ἀλλά οὺς Καύσαρι βοήθειν ἠλαυνον... (0 3.5).

Of the sources, S. and Plutarch have the closest verbal resemblance: Tacitus here has a detail about the Praetorians insidentes equis, which seems perfectly natural for men who wished to reach the Palace as quickly as possible; some, then, will have made for the stables, while others ran into the city on foot as rapidly as they could: the distance from the Castra Praetoria to the Area Palatina is approximately 1.6 mp and the shortest route between them would be well-known to the soldiers; they are unlikely to have taken more than about fifteen minutes to cover this distance in their panic-stricken rush; those who went on horseback will have had to go to the stables, get horses, and at least put harness on them, even if they did not equip them completely; we may therefore assume that infantry and cavalry arrived at the Palace more or less together, in a confused, leaderless and near-hysterical mass.

repulsisque tribunorum qui inhibere temptabant, nonnullis et occisis: according to Plutarch and Tacitus, no one
was actually killed at the Palace: Plutarch gives us the most detailed information about events at the camp (O 3.5-6, 9-10), while Tacitus is most precise about events in the Palace (H 1.81-82.1). Combining their accounts we learn that the praetorian tribune Varius Crispinus and two centurions were killed in the camp, while of the praetorian and other officers sent by Otho to try to calm the soldiers who were forcing their way into the Palace, two, Julius Martialis, a praetorian tribune, and Vitellius Saturninus praefectus (castrorum) legionis (classicae) (cf. Heubner ap. H 1.82 n. on Julio Martiale...), were wounded.

S.'s somewhat misleading account may, once more, be the result of extreme compression; given the detail of the other accounts, it seems probable that he is simply wrong here. Heubner thinks that in his account of this incident S. is using the main source from memory (349, 350); it is, however, extremely hard to summarize the details of this incident without some minor error: e.g., Drexler (157) appears to understand S.'s occisis as "verwundet."

Sibi Othonem expostulantes; cf. also above, 8.1, n. on animum fidemque...expertus est. S. has suppressed all direct mention of the senators and their wives who were dining with Otho when the soldiers arrived (though the words amplissimi ordinis, caedem senatus and in triclinium would remind his readers of what was no doubt a well-known story): they are purely fortuitous adjuncts to the story of Praetorian devotion, and their omission enables him to dispense with the complication of the attempt by Otho's officers to hold the
8.2-
soldiers back until the guests could be hustled out of the palace (cf. Plut. O 3.8-10; H 1.81-82.1; but see further next n.)

perruperunt in triclinium usque nec nisi viso
destiterunt: by his elimination of the story of the banquet, S. creates the impression (probably not deliberately) that Otho was dining more or less alone when the soldiers burst in upon him, and he says that they stopped their rampage only when they saw for themselves that he was safe. Here too perhaps he oversimplifies his account; for we have no mention of the rather humiliating lengths to which Otho had to go to quieten the troops: τότε μὲν οὖν οὖν ὅθεν ἡ τῆς κλήνης πολλὰ παρηγορήσας καὶ δειπνήσας, καὶ μὴ δὲ δοκήσαντες πεισόμενος, μόλις ἀπέπεμψεν αὐτούς. (Plut. O 3.11); Tacitus' version is almost word for word the same, but it contains one significant additional phrase: Otho contra decus imperii toro insistens... (H 1.82.1), and this may be the reason why S. omits this aspect of the incident: Otho's dignity was seriously impaired at this point (and in the sequel too, when the troops were given money and Otho made a speech in the Praetorian Camp praising them for what they had done: Plut. O 3.12-13; H 1.82.2-85.1).

It looks as if S. had a sneaking admiration for Otho and tended to avoid showing him in a bad light unless the facts were absolutely inescapable and the incident essential for a biography. The nobility of Otho's end, no doubt, had much to do with this, but even more important is S.'s mention of his father's reminiscences of A.D.69 (below, 12.1); this would suggest that S. grew up believing that Otho was not as bad as he was usually alleged to be. In a
recent study of S.'s relations with Hadrian, T. F. Carney categorizes S.'s attitudes towards the subjects of his biographies and suggests that towards Julius Caesar, Claudius and Otho S. is "ambivalent" (PACA 11 [1968] nn. 21, 24).

Finally, we should consider the overall context of this incident: why did Otho order the 17th Cohort back to Rome, and what has it to do with his campaign against Vitellius? Since there is no hard evidence, any suggestion can be little more than a guess. (Drexler [p. 162] is especially pessimistic on this point.) However, a date at about the beginning of March connected in our sources with the coming of civil war suggests either the sea-borne invasion of Gallia Narbonensis or the main Othonian expedition to N. Italy. The 17th Cohort was only being rearmed at this time; as fighting troops, therefore, its members were not likely to be of much use. Tacitus tells us (Hist. 1.87.1) that for the expedition to Gallia Narbonensis Otho added to the fleet urbanas cohortis et plerosque e praetorianis. I take this to mean literally what it says: the urban cohorts, the four cohorts in the city, went to Gallia Narbonensis. The 17th Cohort is nowhere called a cohors urbana. (Durry, Les cohortes prétoriennes 12 n. 6 cites all the evidence, and concludes: "mais nulle part il n'est précisé que la XVII\textsuperscript{e} et la XVIII\textsuperscript{e} fussent urbaines." I do not therefore understand his remark [p. 372] about "l'affaire de la XVII\textsuperscript{e} cohorte urbaine" and [n. 8] "qu'il s'agisse d'une urbaine, il n'y a aucune doute..."; cf. Drexler, 161 n.2.) I would therefore not include it in the
8.2-
expedition to Gallia Narbonensis, but I would assume that it was recalled to Rome to stiffen what remained of the city garrison at the time when the other cohorts were sent off. Given these considerations, then, I conclude that the affair of the weapons of the 17th Cohort is more likely to be connected with the preparations for the invasion of Gallia Narbonensis than those for the main Othonian campaign in N. Italy, though this cannot, of course, be excluded.

The Othonian Counter-Offensive
(8.3 - 9.2)

Introduction: Otho left Rome for the north of Italy and his campaign against the Vitellian invasion probably on 15th March, 69 (see below, 8.3, n. on et die quo cultores deum Matris lamentari et plangere incipiunt; cf. H 1.90.1, where 14th March is given as the date of his "farewell speech"). Prior to this, however, he had sent off two smaller groups of forces: a) an expeditionary force, which was dispatched to Narbonese Gaul; b) an "advance guard," sent to the north of Italy. These must be considered before we turn to Otho's main forces.

a) The expedition to Narbonese Gaul.

Tacitus tells us that it was while he was planning his main campaign against Vitellius that Otho decided to send a force to Narbonese Gaul; this was a sea-borne invasion, quando Poeninae Cottiaeque Alpes et ceteri Galliarum aditus Vitellianis exercitibus claudebantur (H 1.87.1). It has been suggested that Fabius Valens was probably in a position to cross the Cottian Pass (Mt. Genèvre) during the first week or so of March (O 8.1, n. on verum haud dubio ...appropinquantibus). While we are ill-informed about Otho's intelligence-gathering in Gaul and Germany during January and February of 69 (and according to Tacitus [H 1.75], his efforts were wholly unsuccessful), we do know that messages passed back and forth
8.3-9.2 The Othonian Counter-Offensive: Introduction, cont. 
between the two sides (H 1.74; see above p. 302) and some information will have filtered back to Rome; Otho seems to have believed for far too long that he could negotiate a settlement with Vitellius, relying, we may assume, on his personal knowledge of Vitellius' essentially lazy and easy-going nature; and it may have been word of the approach of Vitellius' forces to the Alps (cf. what S. says above at 8.1: verum haud dubio bello iamque ducibus et copiis, quas Vitellius praemiserat, appropinquabat, which finally spurred him into action: hitherto Otho ut in multa pace munia imperii obibat (H 1.77.1). His reaction to this news was to send off his "advance guard" to hold the line of the Po, but he knew that it would require at least two weeks to take up its position, and he could also work out that, if the Vitellian advance proceeded unimpeded in the meantime, the enemy could be well south of the Po by then (Placentia, one of the key junction-points in the road system of N. Italy, was c. 191 mp, about twelve days journey, from the Pass of Mt. Genève). His most pressing need, therefore, was to bring the Vitellian advance to a dead stop for a while - until his forces could get into position along the Po. Hence the expedition to Narbonese Gaul, which was purely diversionary. It consisted of urban cohorts and praetorians and marines from the fleet - all units based in Rome or nearby (there were apparently naval vessels at Ostia at about the beginning of March; cf. above 8.2, n. on ei placuerat per classiarios arma transferri remittique navibus). This force could, therefore, have been assembled and sent off within a very few days. For its activities in Narbonese Gaul and Liguria see below 9.2, n. on apud Alpes.
b) The "advance guard".

About the movements of Caecina Alienus (who was advancing from Upper Germany via the Great St. Bernard Pass) Otho was probably even less well-informed; however, he may have known that there were two Vitellian columns and, if one were known to be approaching the Alps, the obvious assumption would be that the other was too. While there was no simple way to check its advance (and there was always the chilling possibility that this force planned a movement across the Po valley towards the East to block the vital route from the Dalmatian provinces), the need for forces in position on the line of the Po and towards the North-East was equally patent.

At H 1.87.2 Tacitus tells us that Otho appointed Suetonius Paulinus, Marius Celsus and Annius Gallus as his generals for the forthcoming campaign, along with the praetorian prefect Licinius Proculus, in whom his confidence was greatest; at this point we are not told their precise duties. Later (at H 2.11.2) we learn that Annius Gallus was sent on ahead (praemissus) with Vestricius Spurinna ad occupandas Padi ripas. This "advance guard" was made up of troops from Rome itself (ex ipsa urbe haud spernenda manus) and comprised five praetorian cohorts, some detachments of cavalry (unspecified), the new legion I Adiutrix, and 2,000 gladiators. Spurinna was sent towards the North-West and occupied Placentia with a force of three praetorian cohorts, a thousand legionaries (presumably drawn from Legio I Adiutrix) and a few cavalry (H 2.18.1); the gladiators (under the command of Martius Macer) were sent towards Cremona (H 2.23.3); the destination of Annius Gallus is not specified, but since he reappears (at H 2.23.1-2) marching to the
relief of Placentia and stops at Bedriacum (cf. Plut. O 7.1), we may assume that he had originally gone somewhere to the East of that area - perhaps to Mantua or Verona, presumably to keep open the route towards the Danubian provinces from which Otho had already summoned help (see below pp. 341-345).

This "advance guard" was fairly successful: Spurinna succeeded in beating off an assault by Caecina and his forces at Placentia and compelled him to stay north of the Po and head East towards Cremona (H 2.20-22; see also below 9.2, no. on circaque Placentiam); the gladiators too had a successful engagement with Vitellian forces near Cremona (H 2.23.2): this city may have been in Vitellian hands since before the arrival of the Othonian advance forces in the area (cf. H 2.17.2; R. Syme, Tacitus 159) and Macer, apart from his sudden sally across the Po, seems to have remained on the south bank of the river in the general vicinity of Cremona (cf. H 2.34-36); Annius Gallus made no contact with the enemy during this first phase. At any rate, the main objective was achieved and the line of the Po was held until the arrival of Otho with additional forces from the south.

At the beginning of his main narrative of events leading up to the battle of Bedriacum (H 2.11 ff.), Tacitus tells us that Otho had summoned to Italy the legions of Pannonia and Dalmatia, four in all. It is, however, clear both from S. (Vesp. 6.2) and from later remarks by Tacitus (H 2.46.3; 85.1) that the three legions forming the garrison of Moesia were also summoned to Italy by Otho. From a consideration of the movements of all these legions it is possible
to determine almost exactly when Otho started his military preparations: so far, we have concluded that it was about the first week of March.

The following schematic diagram gives the essential details about the distances involved in this stage of the Othonian counter-offensive:

A very similar table accompanies K. Wellesley's paper on Othonian strategy (JRS 61 [1971] 28-51: see p. 42); however, since the figures
The Othonian Counter-Offensive: Introduction, cont.

given here differ somewhat from his, their origin should be explained. The distances were established primarily from the careful and detailed calculations of stages used by the cursus publicus, given by K. Miller in *Itineraria Romana* (Stuttgart, 1916; repr. Rome, 1964); where figures are simply lacking (as, for example, on the Via Postumia between Bedriacum and Verona), measurements were taken from sections of the *Tabula Imperii Romani* (L 32-33-34). Finally, for purposes of comparison, the figures given by the *Itinerarium Antonini* are appended (where they exist).

The position of the legions of Pannonia and Dalmatia was therefore as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Base</th>
<th>from Bedriacum</th>
<th>from Rome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VII Galbiana</td>
<td>Carnuntum</td>
<td>501 mp</td>
<td>713 mp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIII Gemina</td>
<td>Poetovio</td>
<td>338 mp</td>
<td>550 mp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XI Claudia</td>
<td>Burnum</td>
<td>407 mp</td>
<td>619 mp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIV Gemina</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>374-400 mp</td>
<td>586+ mp</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We have to remember that these legions were in winter quarters and would take some time to get all their equipment, including waggons and artillery, ready and their supplies organized for a campaign. We must also assume their speed of march - c.15 mp per day over a prolonged distance would probably not be far out. Finally, we can get some idea of the dates involved if we know how many of these legions were actually at the battle of Bedriacum.

XIII Gemina was the nearest, and we hear of a vexillation of this legion at the battle *ad Castores*, which took place about 5th April (H 2.24.3; see below 9.2, n. on *ad Castoris, quod loco nomen est*); in the account of the actual battle of Bedriacum on 14th April, we hear that the legion was routed (H 2.43.2: *propulsa...tertia*).
The Othonian Counter-Offensive: Introduction, cont.

decima legio). This then confirms Tacitus' information (H 2.11.1) that vexillations were sent ahead of the main bodies of the legions, which followed modicis intervallis. The main body of XIII Gemina will therefore have reached Bedriacum between the two battles - to be arbitrary, on, say 10th April. At 15 mp per day, it will have been about 22 days on the march, and therefore left Poetovio about 19th March. If we allow about 10 days for its preparations, word from Rome will have arrived around 9th March. Otho's messenger from Rome summoning the legion to Italy will have taken 5-6 days to cover the 550 mp to Poetovio; Otho's order therefore went out about 3rd March.

The next nearest legion appears to have been XIV Gemina: at any rate, we hear of quartadecimani being surrounded during the battle of Bedriacum (H 2.43.2); and in the Othonian council of war, which was held about four days before the battle, Suetonius Paulinus states that legio XIV will arrive within a few days (H 2.32.2). It is clear, therefore, that only a vexillation had arrived by 14th April; and sure enough, after the battle and Otho's suicide, we hear of the arrival of the legion proper (H 2.54.1: the actual date is not clear - it may have been 15th or 16th April). However, before we can attempt any further calculations concerning XIV Gemina, we should examine the movements of the other two legions.

We hear nothing of XI Claudia or VII Galbiana in connection with the battle of Bedriacum, so we may assume that they did not arrive in time. This can be tested. XI Claudia at Burnum was 619 mp from Rome; a message sent by Otho about 3rd March would reach it around 10th March. If the legion left on or about 20th March, it
would reach the vicinity of Cremona where the battle took place (about 20 miles west of Bedriacum, and therefore c. 427 mp from its depot) around 17-18th April (28-29 days' march). Similarly VII Galbiana was 713 mp from Rome and will have received Otho's message about 11th March; leaving Carnuntum about 21st March, it would take about 35 days to reach Cremona, arriving on 25th April.

It is surprising how soon after the battle XI Claudia appears to have arrived and yet we hear nothing of it in the aftermath of defeat. Later in the same year this legion was apparently slow off the mark in joining the Flavian cause (H 3.50.2) and in the same context Tacitus describes M. Pompeius Silvanus, governor of Dalmatia, as socordem bello et dies rerum verbis terentem. Perhaps therefore we should conclude that, if it got as far as Bedriacum, XI Claudia arrived after 20th April.

As for XIV Gemina (above p.343), Tacitus says of it (if not of the other legions): sed quo plus virium ac roboris, e fiducia tarditas inerat (H 2.11.1). We may assume that it had no further to come than XI Claudia, i.e. 405 mp, but since it arrived some five or six days later than XIII Gemina, we may also assume that it had somewhat further to come than that legion's 338 mp. If we allow about 6 days for Otho's message to reach it, it will have received its marching orders around 9th March. The legion will have left its depot around 19th March: from then till 15th April (above, p.343) is 27 days and at 15 mp per day, this gives a distance of 405 mp, which is almost exactly the same as XI Claudia. We should therefore probably reduce the total distance somewhat to allow for tarditas e fiducia. Where was its depot? We can measure distances along main
The way in which these detailed calculations hang together serves to increase our confidence that Otho did indeed start his military preparations on or very close to 3rd March; we can also see why his generals advised delay at the Othonian council of war on c. 10th April, and this makes all the more surprising Otho's decision to press for an early conclusion (but see below 9.1, espec. n. on quamvis dubium nemini esset quin trahi bellum oporteret).

As for Otho's own movements, there are two ways of looking at his journey towards Bedriacum and his decision to replace his senior generals with his brother L. Salvius Otho Titianus, whom he made supreme commander (H 1.90; 2.11.3, 23.4-5, 31.2, 33.2-3; Plut. O 5.5; 8.1, 10.1): the distance from Rome to Brixellum, where Otho had his headquarters, is 345 mp, and if we believe Tacitus' words at H 2.11.3, nec illi segne aut corruptum luxu iter, we may perhaps assume a rather more rapid than usual rate of progress - possibly 20 mp per day - which would place Otho at Brixellum after 17-18 days of travel, i.e. on about 1st April. His chief commanders up to this point, Suetonius Paulinus and Marius Celsus, had apparently preceded him to the scene of operations (perhaps leaving Rome at the same time as Otho but travelling on horseback with a cavalry escort and taking about ten days to reach the front) since complaints about their "enthusiasm" began to reach Otho either upon his arrival at Brixellum.
8.3-9.2 The Othonian Counter-Offensive: Introduction, cont.
or perhaps while he was still on his way north (H 2.23.5). If
Otho assessed the situation after his arrival at Brixellum and then
decided to summon his brother, it would still be possible for him
to arrive in time for the crucial conference at Bedriacum on c.
10th April (Otho's messenger headed south on, say, 3rd April, reached
Rome on 6th April and Titianus came at posting speed and almost as
soon as he got his brother's summons). However, it may be more
realistic to assume that Otho travelled north at a considerably
slower speed than was posited above, especially when we recall that
a large part of the Senate had accompanied him on his journey: these
senators had been left (under guard) at Mutina (H 2.52; cf. Plut.
0 14.2), 36 mp short of Brixellum, and they no doubt slowed up the
speed of Otho's advance considerably. Some may have been able to
ride but others, more elderly or infirm, will have travelled in
carriages or even in litters. Since the grand strategy session
at Bedriacum probably occurred very soon after Otho's arrival in the
area, it may be that he progressed at about 14-15 mp (nec...segne,
as Tacitus says, but nothing spectacular either); he will probably
have reached Brixellum about 8th April and must have summoned
Titianus to come and take over while he was still travelling north.

For a detailed time-table of events during the latter part
of Otho's principate, see below 11.2, n. on et circa lucem...
nonagensimo et quinto imperii die ad fin.

8.3 expeditionem autem inpigre atque etiam praepopere
incohavit: inpigre is borne out by Tacitus (H 1.89.3): aspernatus
est omnem cunctationem; (cf. H 2.11.3: nec illi segne aut corruptum
luxu iter, sed orica ferrea usus est et ante signa pedes ire, horridus, incomptus famaeque dissimilis). praepropere, however, is qualified principally by nulla ne religionum quidem cura, and what we have here, then, is an interpretation of Otho's departure which arose after his defeat and death: the focus in the remainder of this chapter is on omens and portents rather than on Otho's dash and vigour.

nulla ne religionum quidem cura: curiously enough, S. forbears here to recount the many omens and prodigies listed by Tacitus (H 1.86.1) and Plutarch (O 4.7-9), with the exception of the Tiber floods and their consequences; conversely, his references to Cybele and Dis Pater are not found in our other sources, which suggests that S. may here be drawing on the recollections of his own or his father's acquaintances (cf. below, 10.1).

sed et motis necdum conditis ancilibus: cf. H 1.89.3: fuere qui profiscenti Othoni moras religionemque nondum conditorum ancilium adferrent. This is a reference to a ritual of extreme antiquity performed in March by the Salii, the dancing priests of Mars. The ancilia were shields whose prototype was thought to have fallen from heaven in the time of Numa Pompilius (cf. Ovid. Fast. 3.361-392; Plut. Numa 13; Dion. Hal. 2.71.1-2). From their figure-of-eight shape and from the accounts of the curious costume and armour worn by the Salii, it would appear that the ritual originated in the Bronze Age and that the armour is a survival of Mycenaean types: certainly in Rome and in Latium the institution of the Salii
Ancilia movere describes the essential of the ritual: between 1st and 24th March, the Salii took the shields from their resting-place (the sacrarium Martis or the Curia Saliorum: on these places see Platner-Ashby 441 s.v. 'Regia' and 147; Nash, s.v. 'Auguratorium', but cf. Habel, RE I 2113) and carried them through the city in procession, leaping and dancing and striking their shields with a spear or staff (for a detailed description, see Dion.Hal. 2.70-71; cf. Livy 1.20.4: caelestiaque arma, quae ancilia appellantur, ferre ac per urbem ire canentes carmina cum tripudiis sollemnique saltatu iussit [sc. Numa]). Each evening the ancilia were stored at a temporary resting-place (mansiones Saliorum), the Salii feasted, and the ritual was resumed on the following day. On the 24th March the ancilia were restored to their original resting-place (ancilia condere), whereby S. gives us his terminus ante quem for Otho's departure from Rome.

The function of this ritual is not clear: originally it was perhaps apotropaic, but as a cult-act in honour of Mars it was almost certainly a war-dance, since the March rituals, especially the Quinquatrus (19th March), when there was a lustrato of the ancilia, were paralleled by others in October culminating in the Armilustrium on the 19th of that month. Thus the 19th March and 19th October represented the opening and closing of the campaigning season in the early Roman calendar; hence S.'s next remark: quod antiquitus
8.3-

infaustum habetur. On this, however, see J.P.V.D. Balsdon, CR 16 (1966) 146-147.

See further Ogilvie, The Romans and their Gods 78-80; Latte, RR 114-117; Habel, RE I 2112-3 s.v. 'Ancilia'; Rappaport, RE IA 1874-99 s.v. 'Salii'; Warde Fowler, The Roman Festivals, 35-44.

et die, quo cultores deum Matris lamentari et plangere incipiunt: The Mater deum, is, of course, Cybele, the Magna Mater, and during the Republican period her main festival in Rome was the Megalensia, which lasted from 4th-10th April. There seems to have been an extensive re-organization of the cult in the time of Claudius, but unfortunately the details of this are quite unclear, since detailed descriptions of the new series of rituals, introduced as a supplement to, rather than a replacement for, the Megalensia and lasting from 15th-27th March, date from the fourth century A.D. and later, and reflect the religious calendar of that period.

However, it is clear from S.'s use of lamentari et plangere that we are here concerned with the March rituals, which centred on the death and resurrection of Attis, the beloved of Cybele (cf. H 1.90.1, which gives 14th March A.D.69 as the date of Otho's final contio before his departure from Rome). The Calendar of Philocalus (A.D. 354; CIL I 2 p. 260) gives the following schedule of events:

15th March: Entry of the Reed
22nd March: Entry of the Tree
24th March: Day of Blood
25th March: Day of Joy
26th March: Day of Rest

27th March: Washing Ceremony

It would seem a simple matter to deduce from this programme that "the day on which the devotees of Cybele begin their wailing" was March 15th; however, objection can be raised to such a conclusion: the problem is that Johannes Lydus (de Mensibus 4.49) states that on 15th March there were έθαλ θημόςα Page 309 τοι θυμελπινον γενέσθαι τον θυμαυτόν. ἤρατευν δὲ καὶ ταύρων ἐξέτη άπερ τον καὶ τος ορεσιν αγρον, ἤγουμενον τοι θυμελπινον καὶ τον θανηφόρων τῆς Μητρός. This looks very much like a reference to the rite known as taurobolium and the earliest known official taurobolium (which later involved the Archigallus, the chief priest of Cybele) was in A.D.160 (CIL XIII 1751). This sacrifice, then, which also involved the cannophori, the "Reed-bearers", appears to have been instituted under the Antonines (for a discussion of CIL XIII 1751 and the Antonine innovations in the cult of Cybele, see J. B. Rutter, Phoenix 22 [1968] 226-249, esp. 233-236). The question then arises: was the procession of the Reed-bearers itself also an Antonine innovation, or did it exist, without the taurobolium, from the time of Claudius? In a recent exhaustive study of all the evidence, both literary and epigraphic, D. Fishwick ("The Cannophori and the March Festival of the Magna Mater," TAPA 97 [1966] 193-202, esp. 197-198 and 200-202) has concluded: "As instituted by Claudius the festival seems to have been of a predominantly funerary nature, its focal points being the dendrophoria (22nd March), and dies sanguinis (24th March) and the Lavatio (27th March)." He also argues, with specific
8.3-

reference to 8.3, that Otho's departure from Rome took place on 22nd March, which was the first day of the Claudian "lamentations" (op. cit. 200 and n.26). This will then put S. in marked contradiction not only with Tacitus, who implies Otho's departure from Rome on 14th or perhaps 15th March (H 1.90.1), but also with what is implied by AFA for 14th March, 69: pr. idus Mart. vota nu(n)cupata pro s(al)ute et redivt [Vitelli] Germanici imp. (inscribed at a slightly later date, after Otho's death, with Vitellius' name erroneously inserted and, later still, partly erased).

Furthermore, this conclusion also makes Otho's advance to N. Italy unreasonably rapid (assuming his arrival at Bedriacum shortly before 10th April; cf. K. Wellesley, JRS 61 [1971] 48), in view of the fact that he had large numbers of senators in his suite (H 1.88.1; 2.52.1; Plut. O 14.2). Accordingly, though certainty is impossible, we should probably conclude that if S. is alluding to 22nd March, he is simply wrong; however, it seems more reasonable to assume with Lambrechts (BIBR 27 [1952] 165 and 165 n. 2, in spite of his comment("Il nous intéresse peu de savoir si le départ eut lieu le 14 mars ou le 24...") that S. did mean 15th March.

In general, see F. Cumont, RE III 1484-85 s.v. 'cannophori'; K. Latte, RR 342-343; R. Duthoy, The Taurobolium: Its Evolution and Terminology 87-127; J. Ferguson, The Religions of the Roman Empire Chapter 2, esp. 28-29, with endnotes.

nam et victima Diti patri caesa litavit, cum tali sacrificio contraria exta potiora sint: this is the only evidence that in sacrificing to Dis Pater one looked for unfavourable
8.3-

omens: perhaps the idea was that, if Dis was not in favour of you, you could expect to survive your coming crisis; or possibly, as Latte suggests (RR 248 n.2), in making sacrifice to Dis Pater, Otho was calling down a curse on Vitellius.

et primo egressu inundationibus Tiberis retardatus: from the position of the account of these floods in the narratives of Tacitus (H 1.86.2-87.1) and Plutarch (O 4.10), i.e. before Otho made his detailed plans and military appointments for the coming campaign and before he banished Dolabella to Aquincum (cf. above G 12.2, n. on Cn Dolabellae), we may assume that they occurred at about the end of February or the very beginning of March and that S., in implying that they hindered Otho's physical exit from the city, is guilty of a rather careless compression of events (cf. Tacitus' words at H 1.86.3: id ipsum, quod paranti expeditionem Othoni campus Martius et via Flaminia iter belli esset obstructum.

It is clear from Plutarch and Tacitus that these floods caused widespread and serious damage: the Pons Sublicius collapsed and dammed up the river bed causing the river to flood a greater area of the city than was usually afflicted (for a modern analogy to this, compare the part played by the Ponte Vecchio, which did not collapse, in extending the flooding in Florence during the disastrous inundation of 4th November, 1966; see National Geographic 132,1[July, 1967]1-43); a large area of shops and houses was seriously affected, and the city's food reserves were badly damaged, since the horrea were inundated (for a careful and convincing analysis of the economic difficulties faced by the inhabitants of Rome in 69, see R. F. Newbold,
8.3-9.1


For a discussion of the reasons for Tiber floods, a serious hazard at all times (even today: parts of the city of Rome were flooded early in 1976), see H. Philipp, RE VI A 801-2; Platner-Ashby (537 - published in 1929) claim that 132 inundations have been recorded.

ad vicensimum etiam lapidem ruina aedificiorum praeclusam viam offendit: this cannot be the result of the floods, for the way station Ad Vicesimum on the via Flaminia is several miles from the Tiber and about 300 metres above sea level. Newbold must be correct in his suggestion (Historia 22 [1972] 311) that an earth-tremor affected the Tiber basin at about the same time as the floods. The via Flaminia crosses the Tiber near the 40th milestone, but there is no justification for an arbitrary change of text.

9.1 simili temeritate: this phrase, stronger than etiam praepropere in 8.3 above, though linked to it by simili, condemns not only Otho's departure for the campaign against the Vitellians (the reference is almost certainly, as before, to the date of his leaving Rome and the portents at that time) but also, and perhaps more reasonably, his decision to fight a decisive battle before all his troops had arrived from the Danubian area. All this, of course, is mere conventional sniping based on the outcome of events; it may also represent what became the standard excuse for the failure of their cause which was subsequently put forward by the defeated Othonians - Otho's temeritas.
9.1-

quamvis dubium nemini esset quin trahi bellum oporteret: this argument could certainly be applied to the situation obtaining after the battle of Bedriacum (cf. below 9.3); S. therefore concludes that it applied as much, if not more, to the situation before the battle. Accordingly, he gives what he considers to be the main reasons in favour of postponing a battle (quando et fame et angustiae locorum urgeretur hostis) and then goes on to speculate about Otho's decision the other way. The analysis is superficial and unsatisfactory, but it is not S.'s, for it appears to have been in the "common source", and Tacitus ascribes these views to the general Suetonius Paulinus (H 2.32; cf. Plut. O 8.3-5).

However, there is no sign at all that, after their arrival in Gallia Cisalpina, the Vitellian forces were dependent on supplies brought over the Alps from Gaul or Germany; in fact, the area north of the Po and west of Cremona had gone over to Vitellius even before the first of his forces emerged from the Alpine passes (H 1.70.1-2; for details of the Vitellian advance, see below. Vit. App. I); from this we may conclude that there was simply no question of fames afflicting the Vitellians. Likewise, the point about angustiae locorum seems to be based on a misapprehension: the Vitellians were not penned into a narrow area between the Po and the Alps (from his crossing at Mt. Genève to what became the main Vitellian base at Cremona Fabius Valens advanced a distance of approximately 216 mp, while A. Caecina Alienus had previously marched about 214 mp from the Great St. Bernard Pass to Cremona); they had ample room in which to manoeuvre and, as we shall see, they were probably taking strategic initiatives when the decisive battle came.
As for S.'s account of Otho's motives for deciding to fight quickly, *impatiens longioris sollicitudinis* may have some validity, given Otho's gambler's instincts, his nervous anxiety and his general lack of stomach for warfare (cf. below 9.3: see also H 2.33 and Plut O 9.2-3, where his secretary, the Gallic rhetor Julius Secundus, is quoted as the source; cf. Dio 64.10.2 and Zon. 11.15). Similarly, the exact whereabouts of Vitellius (*sperans ante Vitellii adventum profligari proelium posse*) may well have been unknown to the Othonian commanders; his absence from Cremona will have given rise to speculation that he was not far distant, which, in turn, would have emphasized the desirability of trying to defeat the Vitellians while they were still "divided". (Vitellius had, of course, advanced only a little way from Cologne by this time - see below, Vitellius, App. 2). However, S.'s last reason for Otho's decision (*impar militum ardori pugnam deposcentium*) reflects the general picture of military unruliness which we find in all our major sources for this campaign (cf. Plut. O 5.5-6; 7.5; 9.1; H 2.18.2, 23.4, 26.2, 36.2, 39.1); it should be noted, however, that *militum... pugnam deposcentium* hardly bears out the earlier words *quamvis dubium nemini esset... oporteret*, which appear not to include Otho's troops!

Overall, then, except for his comment about the possible proximity of Vitellius, S. gives us essentially the "conventional" picture of Otho's motives and actions which developed after the failure of his cause. What is wholly lacking is any serious attempt to discover the reasons for Otho's decision to fight, if such it was, and the general strategic considerations which prompted his apparently reckless initiatives.
We should first of all note that, although his timing may have been slightly peculiar, Otho's moves up to the date of his arrival at Bedriacum for the grand strategy session with his commanders (about 10th April, 69) were perfectly sound and had succeeded in their primary objective, which was the holding of the line of the Po. If we assume that this remained the Othonian objective, we can perhaps understand why Otho returned to Brixellum after the conference with a considerable force of infantry and cavalry (Plut. O 10.1; H 2.33.2-3): the one thing he had to fear was a Vitellian crossing of the Po and southward thrust before the Danubian legions could arrive; the forces at Brixellum, therefore, were intended to stop any Vitellian units which managed to cross the river. However, neither they nor the force of gladiators stationed on the south bank of the Po opposite Cremona would be sufficient to stop a determined advance if the main Vitellian forces under Caecina and Valens succeeded in crossing the river.

Our sources preserve two phrases which give us the essential clues to the Othonian master-plan decided upon at the conference on 10th April and put into effect on 13-14th April: at the same time as the conference at Bedriacum was taking place, there was, according to Plutarch (O 10.2), fighting at the river Po, ΤΟῌ ΜΕΝ ΚΕΝΙΝΩ ΞΕΝΥΝΥΝΤΟΣ ΤΗΝ ΔΙΑΒΑΣΙΝ, while Tacitus tells us (H 2.40) that when the Othonians advanced from Bedriacum towards Cremona, they were not making for the town itself but for the Po, non ut ad pugnam sed ad bellandum profecti. These, then are the crucial facts: the Vitellians were not prepared to advance eastwards against the main Othonian position at Bedriacum; instead, they decided to build
9.1-9.2

a bridge and break across the Po and so drive southwards towards the Apennines and Rome before major reinforcements reached Otho from the Danubian provinces. Otho countered this by ordering his main force to advance from Bedriacum and establish a new base close enough to the site of the Vitellian bridge to prevent its completion. This was a risky move, since his army might be attacked on its way to its new position (as indeed it was); but had it succeeded, the Vitellians would have been finished and their invasion of Italy would probably have ended without a major battle, which may well have been Otho's ultimate aim.


*nec ulli pugnae affuit substititque Brixelli*: this too is heavily criticised in our sources (cf. Tacitus on Otho's return to Brixellum from the conference at Bedriacum [H 2.33.3]: *is primus dies Othonianas partes adflixit...et remanentium fractus animus*; cf. Plut. _Q_ 10.1), though, as we have seen (previous n.), there were sound strategic reasons for the move; on balance, however, it looks as if the damage done to the morale of the troops at Bedriacum outweighed any advantage which might have resulted from this action.

9.2 *apud Alpes*: *apud Alpes* refers to the fighting which followed the landings of the diversionary force sent by Otho to the coastal regions of the Maritime Alps and Narbonese Gaul. Tacitus alone preserves an account of this expedition (H 1.87.1; 2.12-15). The
9.2-

dates of its activities can be determined only approximately: it cannot have left Rome before 3rd March, since its dispatch presupposes a desire on Otho's part to delay the advance of Fabius Valens and such a desire in turn presupposes a decision to fight the forces of Vitellius in the north of Italy; for this the legions of the Danubian provinces were necessary and, therefore, the sending of this expedition cannot precede the sending of movement orders to these legions.

The composition of this force was such that it could be assembled and sent off rapidly, possibly within a few hours of the decision to act (see above, p.338); from this we may conclude that it will have left Rome by about 4th March. The dates of its encounters with the troops sent by Valens can be worked out roughly from Valens's assumed position when news of its descent on the coast near Albintimilium reached him and from a calculation of the distances involved. This, in turn, requires an understanding of the invasion route of Valens' column, which is considered in detail below (Vitellius - App. I (b) - The Route of Valens and its Chronology): if we assume, perhaps slightly optimistically, that the Othonian force arrived in S. Gaul about 8-9th March, the earliest possible date for a clash (just to the west of Albintimilium) between this force and the troops sent by Valens will be about 21-22nd March (described at H 2.13; see further F. Koester, Der Marsch der Invasionsarmee des Fabius Valens vom Niederrhein nach Italien [Diss. Münster, 1927] 47); the second clash, in which the Vitellians attacked the Othonian camp at Albintimilium, came only after they had summoned reinforcements (presumably from Forum Iulii, 64 mp away:
Otho

9.2- apud Alpes cont.

cf. H 2.15.1; accitis auxiliis, with 14.1, e quibus pars in colonia Foroiuliensi retenta; see also Koester, op. cit. 48-49). This then will have occurred on about 24-25th March. In this second encounter the Vitellians were defeated and both sides thereafter withdrew, the Vitellians to Antipolis (Antibes) and the Othonians to Albingaunum in Liguria. In all, the Othonians, operating apparently from Albintimilium, will have had over two weeks to attack and terrorize a considerable stretch of coast: tamquam externa litora et urbes hostium urere vastare rapere, eo atrocius, quod nihil usquam provisum adversum metus (H 2.12.2); and it was during these attacks that Iulia Procilla, the mother of Cn. Iulius Agricola, was murdered (Agr.7.1).

Our ancient sources do not indicate what subsequently became of these Othonian troops. Since Otho did not possess a superabundance of forces in Italy, it seems likely that the expeditionary force had orders to head for the main front in N. Italy after its task in Narbonese Gaul/Liguria was over. The fleet will have sailed around or across the Gulf of Genoa to a port such as Luna, and from there the soldiers could have marched the approx. 105 mp over the Apennines via the Cisa Pass to Parma and Brixellum and thence to Bedriacum within about 10 days of leaving Albingaunum. They could therefore have reached Bedriacum by 4th April. There is one slight piece of evidence which may support this hypothesis: we do not know how many praetorians went with the expedition - Tacitus tells us merely (H 1.87.1) that Otho addidit classi urbanas cohortes et plerosque e praetorianis (plerosque is very ambiguous: does it mean a majority of the praetorian cohorts, i.e. more than six? or
9.2-

does it mean a majority of the soldiers participating in the expedition, i.e. more than the total of the urban cohorts and perhaps the marines too? or does it mean, as so often in Tacitus, no more than "very many"? cf. Koestermann, ap. H 1.52 plerisque; Gerber-Greef 1123b.) - but if our earlier assumption, that Otho did not reach Brixellum until about 8th April, is correct, it may be possible to see some of these praetorians again. Annius Gallus, as overall commander of the advance guard, was assigned five praetorian cohorts (H 2.11.2); of these, three were posted in Placentia under the command of Vestricius Spurinna (H 2.18.1); presumably, therefore, Gallus had two, which he took to Bedriacum with him (H 2.23.1-2). However, we are told that in the Othonian line at the battle ad Castores which occurred on about 5th April, there were three praetorian cohorts (H 2.24.3). If Otho had not yet arrived in the vicinity, this third cohort must represent part at least of the praetorian element from the expedition to Narbonese Gaul/Liguria. My own estimate would be that five praetorian cohorts at least went on the expedition and that Otho advanced north with only two as an escort. Whether they all went on to Bedriacum or four of them waited for him at Brixellum while the fifth carried on is impossible to tell. What is reasonably sure, however, is that the larger the praetorian element in the naval expedition, the more certain we can be that it rejoined the main Othonian force.

circaque Placentiam: the defence of Placentia by T. Vestricius Spurinna is described in detail by Tacitus (H 2.20.2-22.3; for his forces, see above p.339). Given the distance he had to travel
9.2-
from Rome to take up his position in Placentia (384 mp), Spurinna
may have arrived c. 23-24th March. His troops were extremely unruly
and had to be taken on a two-day route march to remind them of
practical realities (H 2.18-19: 26-27th March). Caecina arrived
some time later and, after attempting unsuccessfully to talk
Spurinna's forces into surrender, launched a two-day attempt to
take Placentia by storm (? 30-31st March): when this failed, he was
forced to re-cross the Po - any attempt to move south while Placentia
was in Othonian hands would have been suicidal - and head east
towards Cremona, where he fortified a camp on the N.E. side of the
city (this work may have been completed by about 2-3rd April).

et ad Castoris, quod loco nomen est: Tacitus refers to
the place as Locus Castorum and states that it was by the 12th
milestone from Cremona (H 2.24.2; sc. on the via Postumia): from this
we may assume that there was a shrine of Castor and Pollux by the
roadside. Its precise location is unknown, but certainly cannot
have been at S. Pietro in Mendicate (suggested, doubtfully, by the
Gazetteer to Tabula Imperii Romani L 32 [1966] s.vv. 'Locus Castorum';
cf. G. Pontiroli, CSDIR 1 [1967-68] 198, also doubtfully quoting
an early version of Passerini's article on the battle of Bedriacum;
the version available to me [Studi Ciaceri (1940) 178-248] does not
contain this identification), which is almost 3 mp too far east:
the 12th milestone should be almost exactly half-way between the
church "Sant. di M. Vergine" and the side-road to Rocca de' Golferani.

We do not know exactly what happened at this battle because
there are major discrepancies between the accounts of Plutarch (Q 7.2-7) and Tacitus (H 2.24-26). Plutarch gives a briefer and more or less comprehensible story: Caecina set an ambush for the Othonians on the road and sent out cavalrymen to entice them into it; the Othonian general Marius Celsus heard of the plan from Vitellian deserters and pretended to fall into the trap, but surrounded the ambushers with his cavalry (presumably by means of a sweeping pincer-movement); when they were surrounded he then summoned infantry from the Othonian camp (c. 8-10 mp away: this seems somewhat odd?); at this point we are given to understand that Caecina had committed all his troops to the ambush; for Plutarch says that if the Othonian infantry had arrived \( \varepsilon \nu \kappa \alpha \lambda \rho \varepsilon \), Caecina's entire army would have been wiped out; but Suetonius Paulinus brought his troops up \( \delta \nu \varepsilon \ \kappa \alpha \lambda \ \sigma \chi \alpha \lambda \varepsilon \) (and, presumably, the Vitellians were able to break out and escape).

Tacitus seems to have used the same basic account; also, he explicitly describes Caecina's motives: he had failed at Placentia, his cavalry patrols and auxiliaries were faring badly in skirmishes, and Valens was approaching; so he wished to bolster his reputation with one success at least. Tacitus also mentions that Marius Celsus was in command of the cavalry and Suetonius Paulinus of the infantry on the Othonian side. However, he also states that it was auxiliary troops which Caecina placed in the ambush (H 2.24.2: he seems also to have had auxiliary cohorts in reserve some distance behind the ones in the ambush; cf. 2.26.1). However, in Tacitus' account it is clear that Suetonius Paulinus did come up with his troops and engaged the Vitellians, which contradicts Plutarch; in
fact, Tacitus gives us a detailed statement of the units, both infantry and cavalry, in the Othonian battle-line (H 2.24.3), of which there is not a hint in Plutarch. However, just where this battle-line was drawn up is quite unclear, as is our picture of the course of the battle, if we try to follow Tacitus' description. Furthermore, he tells us that the Vitellians left their ambush, pursued Celsus' cavalry and then fell themselves into an Othonian trap (again, this differs from Plutarch's version); they were surrounded but Suetonius Paulinus was excessively cautious and did not give his troops the signal to engage at the most propitious time (H 2.25: the remark compleri fossas, aperiri campum, pandi aciem iubebat makes no sense in this context); the result was that the Othonians were not as successful in their attack as they should have been, although Caecina's reserves coming up cohort by cohort were swept away in the panic of his by now fleeing "ambushers" (H 2.26.1). At this point Tacitus mentions a mutiny in castris (and it is clearly the main Vitellian camp which is referred to) because Caecina had not led his entire army out to do battle, and the muddle in his account now becomes almost total: ceterum ea ubique formido fuit apud fugientes occurrantes, in acie pro vallo, ut deleri cum universo exercitu Caecinam potuisse, ni Suetonius Paulinus receptui cecinisset; utrisque in partibus percrebruerit: a) to whom does occurrantes refer? Is it the Vitellian reserves, although we have already been told that they were swept away? Or is it troops from the main Vitellian camp, at least 12 mp away, who burst into mutiny apparently at the exact moment when Caecina's ambush went wrong, and who have now suddenly appeared on the scene ad Castoris at the crisis of the
battle? b) what does *in acie* mean? A rout is under way and can there still be an *acies*?  c) but, most crucial of all, what are we to understand by *pro vallo*? Is this a reference to the Vitellian camp, over 12 mp from the scene of the battle? Did the Othonians pursue their defeated opponents so far? Apparently not, since Suetonius Paulinus defended his action in sounding the retreat by saying *timuisse se...tantum insuper laboris atque itineris, ne Vitellianus miles recens e castris fessos adgrederetur et perculsis nullum retro subsidium foret*. Perhaps we can assume that, as the first panic-stricken fugitives from the battle arrived at the main Vitellian camp, regular soldiers seized their arms and rushed outside either to go to the aid of their comrades or to face the expected attack of the victorious Othonians, and that the absence of definite orders and the continuous arrival of still more fugitives left them in a state of bewilderment and confusion; so that if the victorious Othonians had pressed their pursuit and proceeded to attack the Vitellian camp, Caecina and his whole army might have been wiped out.

Such assumptions, however, are more than should be expected of even the most attentive audience and Tacitus must be convicted of considerable muddle-headedness in his account of the battle. It is clear that he has contaminated at least two sources and, since he has precise information about the Othonian battle-line and can quote Suetonius Paulinus directly (cf. *timuisse se Paulinus ferebat: H 2.26.2*), it would be reasonable to assume that he has here used the memoirs of that general (assuming that they existed; see main Introduction p. xi) or has heard the details from someone like...
Agricola, who appears to have been an admirer (cf. Tacitus Agr. 5.1). Suetonius Paulinus' version of events is likely to have been interested and self-serving (cf. K. Wellesley, JRS 61 [1971] 40), and Tacitus' obvious desire to exculpate him has probably led to the unsatisfactory account which we have.

For a (perhaps excessively) critical scrutiny of Tacitus' account, see H. Drexler, Klio 37 (1959) 170-74; see also A. Passerini, op. cit. 214-126; H. Heubner's commentary on Histories 2 pp. 99-104.

This battle appears to have taken place on about 5th April, 69 and it was by far the most significant of the "minor" victories won by Otho: Plutarch's assertion (O 7.6) that it was as a result of this battle that Otho decided to send for his brother Titianus simply cannot be correct (there was not time for him to be summoned from Rome after this and still be present at the strategy session at Brixellum on about 10th April); we must therefore follow Tacitus' version (H 2.23.4-5) which puts the decision somewhat earlier.

However, on the Vitellian side the consequences were considerable: as Valens was entering Ticinum (on about 6th April) he received word of Caecina's defeat; a forced march brought his first troops to Cremona late on 7th April (for calculations, see F. Koester, Der Marsch der Invasionsarmee des Fabius Valens vom Niederrhein nach Italien [Diss. Münster, 1927] 17-18). This junction of the two Vitellian columns obviously reduced considerably Otho's chances for a quick victory.

\textit{novissimo maximoque apud Betriacum fraude superatus est, cum spe...dimicandum fuisset}: that the Othonian forces
were defeated through treachery rather than straightforwardly in a set-piece battle was probably an excuse widely canvassed among Otho's soldiers in the north of Italy and the Danubian provinces; they never felt defeated and so were all the more willing to try again and attempt to restore their amour propre in the latter part of 69 when the Flavian movement got under way (cf. H 2.86; 3.24.1).

As we have seen (above, 9.1, n. on quamvis dubium...oppereret), the Othonian forces which marched west from Bedriacum (on 13th April, 69) were not intended to fight a pitched battle with the armies of Caecina and Valens: their purpose was on 14th April to establish a forward base near Cremona and so prevent further work on a bridge which was intended to lead to a Vitellian crossing of the Po and an advance southwards towards the Apennines and Rome.

To the evidence cited above, we can add the statement which Tacitus ascribes (H 2.44) to the praetorian soldiers at Bedriacum after the Othonian defeat: ... magnam exercitus partem Bedriaci remansisse. For other theories on the Othonian strategy, all of which involve attempts to explain or explain away the notorious crux at H 2.40 (Non ut ad pugnam sed ad bellandum profecti confluences Padi et Ardeae fluminum, sedecim inde milium spatio distantes, petebant), see R. Syme, Tacitus App. 30; G. E. F. Chilver, CSDIR 3 (1970-71) 101-113, esp. 109-113; K. Wellesley, JRS 61 (1971) 28-51, esp. 36-41; it is Wellesley's view of Otho's strategy which is followed here.

As with all other explanations of H 2.40, Wellesley is forced to emend the text: he reads confluences Padi et accolae fluminum (op. cit. 28) and argues that the Othonian objective was near the spot where the present-day Cavo Morbasco flows into the Po, just over 3 mp SSE from the centre of Cremona (op. cit. 34-35, 38). To
9.2 novissimo maximoque...fuisset cont.
reach this spot the Othonian forces would have proceeded along
the Via Postumia to a point c. 3.5 mp from Cremona and then turned
left down some side-road towards the river, perhaps the one leading
to San Giacomo Lovara (op. cit. 34-35; the road running through
this village is clearly shown as one of the cardines of the
Cremonese centuriation on Tavola V accompanying P. Tozzi's Storia
Padana Antica), and it was while they were making this turn that
the Othonians were attacked (cf. H 2.41.3).

The only objection to Wellesley's theory is that he assumes
that the course of the Po in A.D.69 was identical to its course
today. This is highly unlikely for several reasons:

a) a glance at even a fairly small-scale map of the area (such
as the 1:100,000 map issued by the Istituto Geografico Militare,
Sheet 61: see accompanying map 1) will be show that the land SSE
of Cremona near the modern course of the Po is quite extraordinary;
from one section to another the alignment of fields, drainage ditches
and tracks varies immensely and bears no relation to the standard
centuriation pattern N. and E. of Cremona. In addition, there are
two more or less circular areas which look like the remains of ancient
lagoons: beside one of these there is a village called "Stagno
Lombardo," which suggests that the river withdrew from this area only
during the Middle Ages.

b) even today, this land is quite low-lying and is maintained
by a series of dykes, with ditches and canals contained upon and
within high embankments, as in parts of modern Lincolnshire; in
antiquity it will have been a swamp, at the very least.

c) if one follows the modern road from Cremona to Battaglione,
to Pieve d'Olmi and then to S. Daniele Po (which I would suggest was
9.2 novissimo maximoque...fuisset cont.
the road closest to the river bank in antiquity) one is immediately struck by the fact that, although today there are many farms and small villages in the area between this road and the river, there is not a single saint's name or church in the entire tract; this suggests again that this land was uninhabitable when the Christian system of parishes and bishoprics was established in N. Italy.

d) finally, no Roman remains of any type have been found within this tract; see G. Pontiroli's archaeological map of Cremona, accompanying his article in CSDIR 1 (1967-68) 163-218 and P. Tozzi's Tavola I in Storia Padana Antica.

On the accompanying map no. 1 I have suggested a possible line for the left bank of the Po in antiquity (see also P. Tozzi, op. cit. Tavola IV: it is, of course, quite impossible to make any suggestion about the location of the right bank; all that can be asserted is that the river has retreated in this area.) The result of this realignment is that the confluence towards which the Othonians were marching was probably much closer to the Vitellian camp than Wellesley supposed: in fact, I would put it in the vicinity of the bridge by the modern church of S. Rocco (see accompanying map no. 2: the difference in position between the two confluences will not materially affect calculations of marching distances from Bedriacum, since we do not know Bedriacum's precise position).

With the confluence so much closer to the Vitellian camp, the need for secrecy about the Othonian march and its goal was even greater than we may previously have imagined. Furthermore, there
does seem to have been some treacherous plotting among certain Othonian officers: why, otherwise, did two praetorian tribunes visit Caccina shortly before the battle (H 2.41.1; cf. too Tacitus' speculations at 2.37 about the motives of Suetonius Paulinus himself; see also Chilver, CSDIR 3 [1970-71] 109)? The crucial point, however, is that the Othonian manoeuvre failed and the Vitellian attack caught the troops at a very bad moment: not only were they strung out along the via Postumia but they were also impediti and the baggage and supply trains were mixed in with the marching soldiers (H 2.41.3; Plut. O 12.3). Finally, both Tacitus (H 2.42.1) and Plutarch (O 12.1-2) preserve, in rather greater detail, the story given here by S. that the Vitellian troops were thought to be going to come over to Otho; Tacitus sums the incident up as follows: is rumor ab exploratibus Vitellii dispersus, an in ipsa Othonis parte seu dolo seu forte surrexerit, parum compertum. All of these factors, no doubt magnified with frequent telling, gave rise to the Othonian belief in fraus.

apud Betriacum: there are two main problems connected with this place -the correct form of the name and its location.

Our extant sources show considerable variation in the form of the name of this place, which Tacitus describes as vicus, duabus iam Romanis cladibus notus infaustusque (H 2.23.2; cf. schol. Iuv. 2.99; cf. Plut. O 8.1: πολύχυνη). These fall into three groups: Betriacum, or simple corruptions of it, is the form found in Plut. O 8.1 (bis); 11.1 (bis); 13.7 and 10; S. O 9.2; Vit. 10.1; 15.2; Vesp. 5.7; Eutrop. 7.17; Epit. de Caes. 7.2; Bedriacum is given by
9.2 *apud Betriacum* cont.

Pliny, *NI* 10.135; Joseph. *BJ* 4.547; and Tacitus *passim*; see also Oros. 7.8.6 and *Cosmograph. Ray.* 4.30; finally Juvenal 2.106 presupposes Bebriacum, a form also found in schol *ad loc.* and ad 2.99; cf. Tab. Peut.: B(?D)e/loriac, where the -lo- could reflect an original -b-. Of these three groups, the first two do not really represent a significant variation: the difference in pronunciation between -d- and -t- is very slight and since no genuine inscription bearing the name of the place survives, the decision must be purely arbitrary. Mommsen favoured Betriacum (cf. *Hermes* 5 [1871] 163 n.1; *CIL* V p. 411) and this has tended to influence continental scholars up to the present (cf. A. Passerini, *Studi Ciaceri* [1940] 179-181); a notable exception is A. Garzetti, who has a succinct and useful discussion of the problem (*L'Impero da Tiberio agli Antonini* 634-5; Engl. tr. 628) and follows Tacitus with Bedriacum, as do most historians writing in English.

Essentially, then, the variation is between Betriacum/Bedriacum and Bebriacum, and the best possible case for the latter was made by L. Herr, who suggested (*RPh* 17 [1893] 208-212) that the name is Celtic and is analogous to names such as Bebronna, Bibrax, Bibracte, derived from a root *bibr* (= 'beaver') so that: "Le sens est clair: Bebriacum, c'est le bourg aux castors; Bebriaci campi, c'est la plaine aux castors" (op. *cit.* 211), which would explain why two battles, fought quite close to Cremona, were both remembered as battles of Bedriacum: also, of course, in this light Tacitus' *locus Castorum* looks very different! However, fascinating though this hypothesis is, it should almost certainly be rejected, if only because there is no evidence for beavers in Italy (*pace* O. Keller,
9.2- apud Betriacum cont.

Die Antike Tierwelt 1 186 who cites Strabo, without giving a reference, as evidence for their presence at the mouth of the Po; cf., however, M. Wellman's firm assertion [RE III 400, s.v. 'Biber'] "...im eigentlichen Griechenland und Italien kam er nicht vor.")

For general and decisive criticism of this theory, see L. Valmaggi, BFC 3 (1896-7) 62-65.

The precise position of Bedriacum is likewise uncertain. Tacitus tells us (H 2.23.2) that it lay between Cremona and Verona, while the scholiast on Juvenal 2.99 quotes Pompeius Planta to the effect that it was 20 mp from Cremona; (cf. schol Iuv. 2.106: Bebriacos campos inter Hostiliam et Cremonam). Finally, the Tab. Peut. suggests that Bedriacum was 22 mp from Cremona and lay on a route from Cremona to Mantua. Mommsen discussed these figures in detail over a century ago (Hermes 5 [1871] 163-165) and concluded (164): "Mag nun aber Betriacum bei Calvatone zu suchen sein oder weiter westlich davon gegen Piadena zu, es war ein militarisch ungemein wichtiger Punkt." The identification of Calvatone with Bedriacum (22.5 mp from Cremona) was apparently popular in Mommsen's day "bei den dortigen Localgelehrten"; it still is: see A. Passerini (Studi...Ciaceri, 1940) 181-189, esp. 188-9; G. Pontiroli, CSDIR 1 (1967-68) 197; P. Tozzi, Storia Padana Antica (Milano, 1972) 30. For a thorough recent examination of the evidence see K. Wellesley (JRS 61 [1971] 28-31, 33-34); his conclusion is that Tornata is probably the modern successor to Bedriacum (29) and that the Othonian camp lay just west of it. Given the variation between 20 and 22 mp for the distance from Cremona to Bedriacum, certainty is impossible.
Introduction: it is clear that for the ancients nothing in Otho's life so became him like the leaving it. That this carpet knight, this "choice luxury product of the Neronian court" (R. Syme, Tacitus 205) should at the end of his career reveal a nobility of spirit and a willingness to sacrifice himself for the good of the state unequalled even by the patron saint of Roman stoicism, Cato Uticensis, was an apparent paradox which our ancient sources are at a loss to explain. Even the usually savage Martial has a couplet which places the matter in a solidly Roman perspective (6.32.5-6):

Sit Cato, dum vivit, sane vel Caesare maior:
dum moritur, numquid maior Othone fuit?

As is to be expected, all our sources give, in their respective dimensions, details and copious accounts of Otho's death (Plut. 0 15-18; Tac. H 2.46-50; S. O 9.3-12.2; Dio 64.11-15), and this undoubtedly reflects the prominence which this episode received in the common source and, probably, in first-hand accounts of the period also. Of the extant sources Tacitus has the most elaborate account and it has received, in recent years, the greatest critical attention: e.g. F. Klingner, "Die Geschichte Kaiser Othos bei Tacitus" Sächsische S-B, phil. hist. Kl. 92 (1940), Heft 1, 3-27, esp. 21-27; R. Syme, Tacitus 205; B. F. Harris, "Tacitus on the Death of Otho," CJ 58 (1962) 73-77; P. Schunk, "Studien zur Darstellung des

Furthermore, it is in Tacitus' account that the contrast between Otho's life and death is most marked. The picture of his life is almost unreservedly bleak and has coloured even our modern impression of him. Stolte (op. cit.189) demonstrates by quotation from his Tacitus how even Sir R. Syme has accepted Otho at Tacitus' estimate (156, 183 and 205). As with his later picture of Tiberius, for which the Otho of the Histories might fairly be described as a prototype, the impression which Tacitus leaves is often quite different from what his words actually say: for example, at H 1.44.1 he tells us that Otho possessed an immitem animum and that nullam caedem (sc. Piso's) Otho maiore laetitia excepisse, nullum caput tam insatiabilibus oculis perlustrasse, but this sentence lamely ends dicitur - it is, in fact, all hearsay. Again, as in his later portrait of Tiberius, Tacitus sees dissimulatio as the key to Otho's character: dilatae voluptates, dissimulata luxuria et cuncta ad decorum imperii composita, eoque plus formidinis adferebant falsae virtutes et vitia reditura (1.71.1); nothing that Otho does receives commendation (apart from his suicide): cf. his decision about vacationes - rem haud dubie utilem et a bonis principibus perpetuitate disciplinae firmatam (1.46.4). Finally, just before his account of the battle of Bedriacum, Tacitus, comparing Otho and Vitellius, tells us (2.31.1) that minus Vitelli ignavae voluptates quam Othonis
flagrantissimae libidines timebantur (but there is not a shred of evidence about any sexual activities of Otho's during his principate except for Tacitus' own dilatae voluptates) and that Vitellius ventre et gula sibi inhospitus, Otho luxu saevitia audacia reipublicae exitiosior ducebatur.

With such a damning indictment of his life, the nobility of his death does present a stark and astonishing contrast. We need not, however, be as surprised at this as were our ancient sources in general or Tacitus in particular: certainly Otho was wild and undisciplined in his youth and corrupt and probably depraved as a young man, but his fall from imperial favour in 59 and virtual banishment to Lusitania seem to have sobered him very considerably - the responsibilities of his position may even have matured him (cf. the famous transition of Prince Hal to Henry V) - and it is notable that his government of that province is conceded by all to have been exemplary (he did not, apparently, indulge in any sort of self-enrichment, for he was heavily in debt when he accompanied Galba to Rome late in 68); in fact, we may assume that he possessed the same sort of administrative talents as his father. Certainly it is impossible to excuse his coup d'état and assassination of Galba but we should at least remember that it was a relatively bloodless coup and that far fewer died in this seizure of power than in the accessions of either Galba or Vitellius. Furthermore, as we have seen, there is little cogent criticism which can be levelled at Otho's conduct of affairs during the portion of his principate which he spent in Rome, and his counter-offensive, though late in starting, was perfectly sound. Had his generals possessed the same confidence
9.3-12.2  The Death of Otho: Introduction, cont.

in him as his troops obviously did, its outcome might well have
matched its conception.

Overall, then, it seems that S. gives us a more balanced
and, in my view, more authentic picture of Otho than any other extant
source. The reason is most readily apparent in this last section
of the Life: S.'s father Suetonius Laetus knew Otho personally and
obviously admired him; the elder Suetonius was a military tribune
in Legio XIII Gemina, an eques - not a senator, a soldier - not a
civilian (below, O 10.1). Undoubtedly, he saw Otho at his best
but, equally, we must ask why the Emperor made so deep an impression.
It is clear that he possessed a special trait of personality, that
spark which an earlier generation called "glamour" and which
nowadays causes the misuse of the word "charisma"; equally clearly
it appealed more readily to soldiers than to civilians; and ultimately
it produced a fanaticism which led men to kill themselves around
Otho's funeral pyre (below, O12.2; cf. H 2.49.4; Dio 64.15.1²; and
see especially Plut. O 17.10-12).

Was everything lost and need Otho have killed himself after
the defeat near Cremona? Here we can agree with the negative answer
to this question which is the unanimous verdict of the ancient
sources (for details, see below O 9.3, n. on quam desperatione...
solae subirent). A "second round" for Otho would, however, have
involved much more than merely re-grouping his existing troops
and waiting for the arrival of the remaining Danubian legions: the
Vitellian forces would meanwhile probably have thrust south towards
Rome and Otho would have found himself with a prolonged and bloody
civil war on his hands. He loathed the idea of civil war (see
9.3-12.2 The Death of Otho: Introduction, cont.

below 0 10.1; cf. Plut. 0 15.7-8; H 2.47.2-3; Dio 64.131-2) and his whole strategy had been based on winning the struggle with Vitellius without a major battle, if possible, or, failing that, in one, sharp, decisive encounter. (See further Wellesley, JRS 61 [1971] 50-51). With the defeat near Cremona, for Otho the game was over.

See also H. Heubner's Vorbemerkungen on Otho's death in his Commentary on Histories 2 pp. 181-190.

9.3 ac statim moriendi impetum cepit: from this point to the end of 10.1 S. gives us a general background discussion of Otho's strategic position after the defeat of his force near Cremona and an assessment of his character, culminating in the event which brought him to his decision to die. It becomes clear that statim here is something of an exaggeration.

magis pudore, ne tanto rerum hominumque periculo dominationem sibi asserere perseveraret: the remainder of this paragraph is meant to represent Otho's own calculations (cf. the sibi here and the secum in the next clause). However, the pudor, like the impetus moriendi, does not arise for some little time; cf. below 10.1 ad fin; proclamasse eum...non amplius se in periculum talis tamque bene meritos coniecturum. Plutarch's version is similar (0 15.4-8), though Otho's calculations are presented in the form of a speech. Tacitus, however, makes them purely external (H 2.46), with encouragement and advice coming from Otho's troops, the praetorian prefect Plotius Firmus and the praemissi e Moesia:
this makes Otho's decision to end it all come more slowly and more deliberately; the dramatic effect is heightened and Otho's nobility of spirit is emphasized.

quam desperatione ulla aut diffidentia copiarum; quippe...solae subirent: in this passage S. mentions three groups of forces available to Otho after the defeat of his troops who were attempting to establish a forward base near Cremona: residuis integrisque (the forces which he had with him at Brixellum); supervenientibus aliis (the Danubian units still advancing towards Italy and Bedriacum), and victis (the survivors of the units defeated near Cremona). Each of these groups will be considered separately.

a) Tacitus tells us (H2.33.3) that, after the conference at Bedriacum, as Otho was returning to Brixellum, cum ipso praetorianorum cohortium et speculatorum equitumque valida manus discissit: since it was this removal of enthusiastic troops (cf. Plut. O 10.1: τοὺς ἐρωμενεστάτους καὶ προθυμοστάτους περὶ αὐτῶν ἵππεῖς καὶ πεζοῦς) which so affected morale (cf. above O 9.1, n. on nec ullam pugnae affuit substititque Brixelli) we may assume that Otho actually withdrew troops from Bedriacum and returned to Brixellum with substantially more than simply the escort which had accompanied him to the conference. Numbers obviously cannot be estimated with any precision (though it is clear from H 2.44.3 that there was still a considerable number of praetorians at Bedriacum); however, when we remember the purpose for which Otho took this force to Brixellum (above p.356) we might not be far wrong in estimating its size at about half the remaining total of praetorians.
### 9.3-

b) Of the Danubian legions, as we saw above (pp.340-5)

XIII Gemina and a vexillation of XIV Gemina were at the main battle near Cremona; the remainder of XIV Gemina arrived soon after, XI Claudia appeared about, or shortly after, 20th April, and VII Gemina about 11 days after the battle. However, of the three legions of Moesia, no troops had even reached Aquileia by the time of Otho's death (S. Vesp. 6.2), though a mounted detachment from these units was sent on ahead and actually participated in the battle (cf. H 2.41.2 equites prorupere with H 3.2.4 duae tunc Pannonicae ac Moesicae alae perupere hostem) and afterwards rode to Brixellum to encourage Otho (cf. H 2.46.3: praemissi e Moesia; for a discussion of what exactly they told him, see K. Wellesley, JRS 61 [1971] 44).

We can see, therefore, that by 26th April, Otho could have expected to have a substantial accession of strength and that all the legions of Dalmatia and Pannonia would have reached him. The legions of Moesia, however, are a very different matter: they were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legion</th>
<th>Base</th>
<th>from Bedriacum</th>
<th>from Rome</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VII Claudia</td>
<td>Viminacium</td>
<td>667 mp</td>
<td>879 mp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III Gallica</td>
<td>Oescus</td>
<td>904 mp</td>
<td>*1116 mp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII Augusta</td>
<td>Novae</td>
<td>956 mp</td>
<td>*1168 mp</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* a message may perhaps not have gone overland via Aquileia to these places, but rather from Rome to Brindisium, across the Adriatic to Dyrrhachium and from there N. to Lissus and then N.E. to Naissus and so to the main route along the Danube at Ratiaria.

If we apply to VII Claudia at Viminacium the same procedures as we applied to the legions of Dalmatia and Pannonia, the results are - message sent from Rome on 3rd March reaches Viminacium about 12th March; departure of main force (not the whole legion but only
2,000 men: See S. Vesp. 6.2) about 22nd March; marching time
to Bedriacum at 15 mp per day would be about 45 days - so arrival
at Bedriacum would have been around 6th May, had they advanced so
far. This, however, assumes that the contingents from Moesia
marched separately towards Italy. However, in his account of their
advance to Aquileia after news had reached them of Otho's defeat
and death, S. appears to imply that the 2,000 men from each of the
three legions of Moesia marched together (Vesp. 6.2, which seems to
be confirmed by Tacitus' account of the same incident at Hist. 2.85.1-2).
Since all would advance along the same road, no forces may have
moved from their bases until the detachment from VIII Augusta from
Novae reached them; or if they did, they advanced so slowly that the
units from further east "caught up" and all reached Aquileia
together. This will have made for considerable delay - hence, perhaps,
the cavalry squadron sent ahead - and, since Otho's summons from
Rome can hardly have reached Novae before 15th March, even if we
assume that the 2,000 men of VIII Augusta were got on the road within
five days (since the entire legion seems not to have been involved;
the situation in Moesia in the aftermath of the invasion of the
Rhoxolani will have made it seem unsafe to reduce the defences any
further at this stage: it was to be a different story later the
same year), the journey to Aquileia (780 mp) will have required 52
days on the march, so that the detachments from Moesia could not have
arrived there until about 11th May.

These troops cannot have figured very prominently in Otho's
calculation of possibilities for the period immediately after the
defeat near Cremona.
c) As for the troops defeated on 14th April, a goodly number appear to have fled back to Bedriacum, while a large part of the army had remained there during the advance of the rest on 13-14th April to the new forward base to be established near the confluence (H 2.44); furthermore, the victorious army of Caecina and Valens approached Bedriacum very cautiously and camped for the night of 14-15th April 5 mp from the Othonian base and the Othonians surrendered only on the 15th (H 2.34; for a somewhat different account, see Plut. 0 13.) Had Otho decided to continue his resistance, he might still have had available over 50% of the original force at Bedriacum.

10.1 Othonem...usque adeo detestatum civilia arma, ut memorante quodam inter epulas de Cassi Brutique exitu cohorruerit: the point here is not so much that both Cassius and Brutus ultimately committed suicide, but that this was the outcome of over two years of convulsion for the Roman state: the bloodshed, the thousands of deaths, even the murder of Caesar itself must have seemed quite pointless by the middle of the 1st century A.D., especially since Philippi and the deaths of Brutus and Cassius produced only a temporary lull in the civil war which had gone on since Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon and was to continue for a dozen more years.

nec concursurum cum Galba fuisse, nisi confideret sine bello rem transigi posse: cf. above G 16.2, where the army of Upper Germany decides to send envoys to the praetorians to state
that they did not like the Emperor made in Spain: eligerent ipsi
(sc. praetoriani) quem cuncti exercitus comprobarent, and O 8.1,
where Otho persuades the senate to send a legatio to Germany quae
doceret electum iam principem, quietem concordiamque suaderet.
Otho still believed that once the Senate and Praetorian Guard
settled on a Princeps, the matter was settled; of course, every
precedent pointed to this, including Galba's accession the year before.
The threat to the stability of the state presented by first the
Vitellian and then the Flavian seizures of power in 69 was so patent
that probably more by good management than good luck the Romans
avoided repeating their mistakes for more than a century, until
after the death of Commodus.

tunc ad despic-iendam vitam exemplo manipularis
militis concitatum...gladio ante pedes eius incubuerit:
the same story is told by Dio, but of a cavalryman (64.11); Plutarch
has an account of a soldier's suicide (Q 15.3) but the reasons for
his death are quite different. However, in this case we must believe
S., since his father was an eye-witness to the incident. Tacitus,
on the other hand, appears to transfer the entire story to the last
weeks of Vitellius (H 3.54.2-3) and describes the man as a centurion
named Julius Agrestis (the fact that no other source preserves such
a story in the Tacitean position while Tacitus has nothing of this in
his account of Otho's end must cast suspicion on Tacitus' placing of
the story). Furthermore, Tacitus is at pains to contrast the deaths
of Otho and Vitellius: sane ante utriusque exitum, quo egregiam Otho
famam, Vitellium flagitiosissimam meruere...(H 2.31.1); the
transference of this story to Vitellius will have served to emphasize that emperor's worthlessness. Conceivably too S., by insisting on his father's presence at the scene, is covertly correcting the version given by Tacitus.

For a somewhat different interpretation, see P. Schunk, _SO_ 39 (1964) 80-81.

10.2 _fratrem_: as noted above (1.3, n. on _L. Titianum_), this passage is the only evidence that Otho Titianus fled to Brixellum at about the time of the surrender of the Othonian forces in the camp at Bedriacum on the day following the battle (i.e. 15th April, 69; see H 2.45; Plut. O 13.6-13). Since S. is relying on an eye-witness account, we should accept this evidence: it also makes clear the fact that Otho died on the morning of the second day after the battle.

_fratrisque filium_: his full name was _L. Salvius Otho Cocceianus_ and he was the last of the Salvii Othones, perishing at the hands of Domitian quod Othonis imperatoris patrui sui diem natalem celebraverat (S. _Dom._ 10.3). When he was with his uncle the Emperor at Brixellum he was apparently still quite young (cf. Plut. O 16.2: _μεταφερόμενον οὖν_. H 2.48: _prima iuventa, trepidum et maerentem_). Plutarch (_loc. cit._) states that Otho intended to adopt him as his heir but had put the matter off pending the outcome of the civil war, _μὴ προσφέρομεν τοις πταίσαντος_. In itself this story may seem credible, but we may wonder that a man of not quite thirty-seven should feel inclined to act as Galba had done (especially one who remembered what had happened to Galba's heir!) and that such a story should ever have
got out, if it were true. It is more likely, as Ludwig Krauss points out (De Vitarum Imperatoris Othonis Fide Quaestiones [Prog. Zweibrücken, 1880] 15-16), that this is a fiction designed to show Otho's affection and regard for his nephew. This fiction may first have appeared in some accounts published after Cocceianus' death (i.e. in 81 or later); it may well be the same account as the one which contained the poignant and apparently prophetic advice of Otho to his nephew proinde erecto animo capesseret vitam, neu patrum sibi Othonem fuisse aut oblivisceturum quam aut nimium meminisset (H 2.48.2; cf. Plut. 0 16.4).

See further Dessau, PIR S 110; Nagl, RE I A s. v. 'Salvius' no. 18.

ad sororem: on Salvia (?), see above 0 1.3, n. on tulit et filiam, quam vixdum nubilem Druso Germanici filio despondit. Nothing further is known of her.

ad Messalinam Neronis, quam matrimonio destinarat: at Ner. 35.1 S. tells us that Statilia Messalina was the great-great granddaughter of T. Statilius Taurus (cos. suff. 37 B.C.; cos II 26 B.C.), perhaps the second most important of Augustus' marshals, and that she was Nero's third wife; she had previously been his mistress but nevertheless had married M. Atticus Vestinus (cos. 65) whom Nero ordered to commit suicide in that year (Ann. 15.68-69). According to schol. Iuv. 6.434, Vestinus was her fourth husband; nothing, however, is known of the first three. Nero married her probably in the first half of A.D.66 (cf. Dessau, PIR S 625) and she accompanied him on his
tour of Greece (cf. ILS 8794 = Sm. 64, lines 51-52), and was probably still married to him in June, 68. For her life thereafter, all we have is schol. Iuv. 6.434: post quem (sc. Neronem) interemptum et opibus et forma et ingenio plurimum viguit. consequetata est usum eloquentiae usque ad studium declamandi.

See further Nagl, RE III A s.v. 'Statilius' no. 45.

binos codicillos exaravit: from the verb exaravit it is clear that these were small tablets probably of wood with a slightly raised edge all round and a layer of wax on the surface which was scratched with a stylus; such tablets usually came in pairs (cf. binos) with cloth or tape hinges, so that when closed the two writing surfaces were on the inside and protected: these were codicilli (see OLD s.v., 2; cf. OCD s.vv. 'Letters, Latin', 2; Marquardt, Privatleben 802-807).

commendans reliquias suas et memoriam: this implies not only that Otho asked Messalina to make offerings to his shade (memoriam) but also that she was to be responsible for the disposition of his ashes and for the construction and maintenance of his tomb; in fact, he was hurriedly cremated after his suicide to prevent his body falling into the hands of the Vitellians, and his ashes were buried in a modest tomb at Brixellum (below 11.2: celeriter nam ita praecipserat, funeratus; see also Plut. O 18.1-2; H 2.49-3.4; and see below, Vit. 10.3, n. on lapidem memoriae Othonis inscriptum intuens dignum eo Mausoleo ait).
10.2-11.1

`quicquid deinde epistularum erat...cremavit: cf. H 2.48.1; Dio 64.15.1a; this, of course, refers to the correspondence which Otho had with him at Brixellum. There were other, more damaging letters in Rome; cf. below, Vit. 10.1, n. on centum autem atque viginti...conquiri et supplicio adfici imperavit.

divisit et pecunias domesticis ex copia praesenti: according to Plutarch (O 17.1-2) it was now evening and Otho distributed his money carefully giving some larger amounts and some smaller, τὸ ἡμιτίμον καὶ τὸ μέτριον ἐπιμελῆς φυλάττων. cf. H 2.48.1; Dio 64.15.1.

11.1 atque ita paratus intentusque iam morti: it is clear from S.'s account that Otho intended to commit suicide that evening, i.e. 15th April, but that he did not so that he could continue to exercise his authority over his troops long enough to enable his close friends and the senators in his suite to get well clear of Brixellum.

tumultu inter moras exorto...vetuitque vim cuiquam fieri: cf. Plut. O 16.1 and 5-6; H 2.48.1 and 49.1: the soldiers were most violent towards Verginius Rufus, who had been cos. II during the month of March (for a discussion of his precise term of office, see G. B. Townend, AJP 83 [1962] 113-120); he appears not to have departed from Brixellum during this general evacuation, since Otho's troops turned to him the next day and begged him threateningly either to assume the imperial office himself or to negotiate on their behalf with
11.1-11.2

Caecina and Valens, at which point he slipped away (H 2.51; cf. Plut. O 18.5-7): clearly he was the only senior person of military standing who was still at Brixellum when Otho died, and he seems, with characteristic stubbornness, not even to have appeared to transfer his allegiance to Vitellius until after Otho's death (cf. H 2.68). See also D. C. A. Shotter, CQ 17 (1967) 377-9.

adiciamus, inquit...his ipsis totidemque verbis:
cf. Mooney ad loc: "The emphasis which Suetonius lays on the accuracy of his statement of Otho's words may be due to a desire to correct some current misrepresentation of them." Since none of our other extant sources gives any such words of Otho, it is impossible to say whom S. is trying to correct; or it may be that he is simply attempting to "out-detail" other accounts!

11.2  post hoc sedata siti...artissimo somno quievit:
cf. H 2.49.2: vesperascente die sitim haustu gelidae aquae sedavit, tum adlatis pugionibus, cum utrumque pertemptasset, alterum capiti subdidit. et explorato iam profectos amicos, noctem quietam, utque adfirmatur, non insomnem egit. Plutarch (O 17.1-3) has a similar account except that Otho tests the blades of his ξυλόν for a long time and conceals one εἰς τὰς ἀγκύλας. It is clear that S. and Tacitus and Plutarch are all using the same basic source but that each has at least one "subsidiary" version (S. has his father; Plutarch has Mestrius Florus: cf. O 14.2-3; Tacitus has the source concealed by utque adfirmatur): this gives rise to minor variations of detail, though there is no major disagreement.
It is important to determine the date on which Otho committed suicide, because it is by counting back from this date that the dates of the other events which occurred in April of 69 can be determined (cf. the method used by M. Puhl, De Othone et Vitellio Imperatoribus Quaestiones [Diss. Halle, 1883] 6-10). The extant sources give copious (and varied) information about the length of Otho's life and reign:

Joseph., BJ 4.548: Otho was Emperor for 3 months and 2 days; Plut. 0 18.3: Otho lived 37 years and ruled for 3 months; Tac. H 2.49.4: Otho died in his 37th year; Dio 64.15.2: Otho lived 37 years less 11 days and ruled for 90 days; Eutrop. 7.17 (repeating what S. has here): Otho died in his 38th year and on the 95th day of his reign; Aur.Vict. Caes 7.2: Otho died on about the 85th day of his reign; Epit de Caes.: Otho committed suicide in his 37th year. As is to be expected, scholars have differed widely on how this material is to be interpreted; in general, the possible dates have been recognized to be 15th, 16th or
11.2- circa lucem...quinto imperii die cont. 

17th April (for an exhaustive listing of suggestions, see L. Holzapfel, Klio 13 [1913] 289; see also W. F. Snyder, Klio 33 [1940] 47-48).

It appears that 16th April is the correct date for the following reasons: Vitellius was formally recognized at Rome on 19th April (cf. AFA for 1st May, 69, when sacrifices were performed ob diem imperi [Vitelli] German. imp., quod XIII K. Mai. statut. est...); presumably, therefore, word of Otho's death arrived too late on 18th April for senatorial action. This may be confirmed from Tacitus' statement that the ludi Cereales were being celebrated when the news of Otho's end arrived, and that this was announced in the theatre (H 2.55.1): the ludi Cereales were celebrated from 12th-19th April at this period with the last day devoted to ludi circenses (CIL I² p. 315; Ovid Fast. 4.679-680; Wissowa RK² 301-2). Tacitus' statement, therefore, implies that news of Otho's death arrived in Rome no later than the evening of 18th April (and it was probably no earlier than an hour or two before sunset; see above, O 7.1, n. on dein vergente iam die ingressus senatum). The distance from Brixellum to Rome is 345 mp, and if we allow a maximum of 125-150 mp per day for dispatch riders carrying exceedingly important messages to Rome (cf. A. M. Ramsay, JRS 15 [1925] 60-74), the message could have reached the capital in about two and a half days. Since Otho died at dawn (perhaps about 5.30 a.m. in mid April) and the message arrived in Rome in the early evening of 18th April, Otho's death occurred on 16th April (see further L. Holzapfel, op. cit. 294-5).

Since Otho was born on 28th April, A.D.32, S. is simply careless in saying that he died tricensimo et octavo aetatis anno;
11.2- circa lucem...quinto imperii die cont.

as for his remark about the 95th day of this rule, the calculation here is from 15th January, the date of his accession, to 19th April, the day on which Vitellius was recognized.

To sum up, then, the following timetable emerges for the latter part of Otho's principate; (the items in italics are less certain approximations):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>March</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Summons dispatched to legions of Dalmatia and Pannonia (and Moesia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Immediate preparations for sending of &quot;advance guard&quot; to N. Italy and amphibious force to Narbonese Gaul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Praetorian</em> outbreak.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td><em>Dispatch of expedition to Narbonese Gaul.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Advance Guard leaves Rome.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Otho's final <em>contio.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Otho's departure with large part of Senate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Suetonius Paulinus and Marius Celsus depart for north with cavalry escort.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23/24</td>
<td>Spurinna arrives in Placentia (384 mp from Rome).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26/27</td>
<td>Spurinna takes his troops on two-day march.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30/31</td>
<td>Caecina's assault on Placentia.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>April</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2/3</td>
<td>Caecina in position in fortified camp at Cremona.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td><em>Battle ad Castores.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Valens' advance units reach Cremona.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td><em>Otho reaches Brixellum</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td><em>Otho travels to Bedriacum.</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
11.2-12.1

10 Strategic conference of Othonian commanders at Bedriacum.
11 Otho returns to Brixellum.
13 Othonian forces advance from Bedriacum towards Cremona.
14 Battle of "Bedriacum" (near Cremona).
16 Suicide of Otho.
18 News of Otho's death reaches Rome.
19 Senate formally recognizes Vitellius.

12.1 **Tantō Othonis animo nequaquam corpus aut habitus competit:** the implications of this remark are considerable: people who perform brave and noble deeds should look "brave and noble," while, presumably, effeminate men of suspected homosexual tendencies should mince and look languid. S. does seem to have believed that physiognomy revealed character: this is especially true in his descriptions of Emperors such as Gaius, Nero and Domitian (for details see the study by J. Couissin, REL 31 [1953] 234-256). Otho, however, does not accord at all well with such a belief: "et il lui (sc. Suétone) suffit alors de croquer rapidement la mise trop apprêtée d'Othon pour suggerer son vice bien connu...Dire d'Othon que son physique n'est pas d'accord avec son suicide stoïcien implique une optique physiognomoniste" (op. cit. 236). Tacitus' version of this (1.22.1) is rather different: **non erat Othonis mollis et corpori similis animus;** cf. schol.Iuv. 2.99; for the suggestion that this hostile material ultimately derives from Cluvius Rufus, see G. B. Townend, *Hermes* 89 (1961) 243; CQ 22 (1972) 381-2.
fuisset enim et modicae staturae et male pedatus
\(\|\text{scambusque traditur: it is in a sense unfortunate that Otho did not look like a Stoic hero, for then we might have had a detailed description of him from S., with precise enumeration of his distinguishing features. This he would have been in a good position to give us, since he had access to sources who had known Otho personally. As it is, however, all we have are a few general details.}\\
\\
\textit{munditiarum vero paene muliebrum...ne barbatus}
\(\|\text{numquam esset: it is impossible to say whether these details of Otho's personal grooming are true or whether they are hearsay based on his supposed effeminacy; cf. Juvenal on Otho (2.99-107):}\\
\\
\textit{ille tenet speculum, pathici gestamen Othonis, Actoris Aurunci spolium, quo se ille videbat armatum, cum iam tolli vexilla iuberet. res memoranda novis annalibus atque recenti historia, speculum civilis sarcina belli; nimiram summi ducis est occidere Galbam et curare cutem; summi constantia civis Bebriacis campis spolium affectare Palati, et pressum in facie digitis extendere panem...}\\
\\
Mooney (on pane madido linere) suggests that, since Poppaea was so meticulous about her beauty care that certain cosmetics came to be called Poppaeana (cf. Juv. 6.461-2), Otho may have acquired some of these habits from his association with her. However, cf. Tacitus' description of Otho on the march to the North of Italy (H 2.11.3): \textit{sed lorica ferrea usus est et ante signa pedes ire, horridus, incomptus famaeque dissimilis.}\\
\\
As for his use of a wig, a glance at the plate in BMC Imp. I which illustrates Otho's coinage (Pl. 60, nos. 1-14) will reveal
several coins where the rows of carefully dressed curls look
highly artificial and quite different from anything found on the
coinage of other Emperors of this period (see espec. nos. 2, 3, 10,
11).

sacra etiam Isidis saepe in lintea religiosaque
veste propalam celebrasse: Otho appears to have been the first
Emperor publicly to participate in Isiac rituals in Rome; prior to
this time the cult of Isis had had a somewhat chequered history: it
spread to Italy probably during the second century B.C. but met with
strong opposition from the Roman authorities during the late Republic,
perhaps because of its determinedly foreign and exotic aspects (e.g.
the shaven-headed Egyptian priests; the use of music and dancing in
rituals; the vessels of holy Nile water). In 43 B.C. the triumvirs
allowed a temple to be built for Sarapis and Isis (perhaps on the
Campus Martius, since Augustus was later prepared to allow Isiac
worship outside the pomerium: see Dio 47.15.4; 53.2.4); in Tiberius'
principate there was a notable sex-scandal involving the priests of
Isis, a gullible lady worshipper named Paulina and a lovestruck
eques, Decius Mundus; as a result of which Tiberius had the priests of
Isis crucified, the temple of Isis demolished, the cult statue of
Isis thrown into the Tiber, and Decius exiled (Joseph. AJ 18.65-80;
cf. Ann. 2.85.4 - A.D.19). However, the later Julio-Claudians were
less hostile, especially Gaius, who established an official state cult
of Isis, and called part of his palace the Aula Isiaca. There is,
however, no evidence to suggest a shrine or altar of Isis on the
Capitol in A.D.69, since the famous escape of Domitian after the
burning of the Capitol (on 19th December, 69) came on the following
12.1-day, when disguised as a worshipper of Isis he joined a procession which enabled him to get across the Tiber (to Regio XIV of the city) where he hid with the mother of a condiscipulus (S. Dom. 1.2; H 3.74.1, 86.3; cf. Dio 65.17.4; for a discussion of the problems connected with this episode see K. Wellesley, CQ 6 [1956] 211-14).

For Isis worship, see Marquardt, Röm. Staatsverwaltung III 76-80; R. E. Witt, Isis in the Graeco-Roman World, espec. chapter 17 "The Goddess Darling of Roman Emperors"; for the mysteries, above all, the eleventh book of Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*.

12.2 *multi praesentium militum...vim suae vitae attulerunt:* cf. H 2.49.3-4: *tulere corpus praetoriae cohortes cum laudibus et lacrimis volnus manusque eius exosculanties.* quidam militum iuxta rogum interfecere se, non noxa neque ob metum, sed aemulatione decoris et caritate principis; see also Plut. O 17.7-12; Dio 64.15.12.

*multi et absentium accepto nuntio prae dolore armis inter se ad internecionem concurrerunt:* cf. H 2.49.4: *ac postea promisce Bedriaci Placentiae aliisque in castris celebratum id genus mortis.* For Otho's sepulchre which Tacitus calls *modicum et mansurum* (H 2.49.4), see Plutarch's eye-witness description (O 18.1-2) and below, Vit.10.3, n. on *lapidem memoriae Othonis inscriptum intuens dignum eo Mausoleo ait.*

denique magna pars hominum incolumem gravissime detestata mortuum laudibus tulit: cf. Plut. O 19.5; H 2.31.1,
It is interesting to note that, by implication, S. excludes himself from this group.

*ut vulgo iactatum sit etiam...rei p. ac libertatis restituendae causa interemptum*; this essentially meaningless allegation (cf. Ann. 1.3.7, relating to A.D.14: *quotus quisque reliquus, qui rem publicam vidisset?*) came to be associated with several of the more genial members of the Julio-Claudian house, who died young (e.g. Drusus, the brother of Tiberius: S. *Claud.* 1.4; Ann. 1.33.2; Germanicus Caesar: S. *Calig.* 3.2; Ann. 2.82.2; Dio 57.18.6-7) and represents both a sentimental hankering on the part of certain members of the upper classes in Rome and a means of indicating dissatisfaction with the government of the day. The unreality of any idea of a genuine restoration of the old republican system should have been clear after the events which followed the death of Gaius in 41 (see above G 7.1, n. on *Caede Gai nuntiata..quietem praetulit*).
LIFE OF VITELLIUS
1.1. *adulatores obtructatoresque imperatoris Vitelli*: nothing adulatory about Vitellius has survived, which is not surprising, since the literary tradition about him was established during the regime of the Flavians who had overthrown him. Indeed, S. *Vit* 10.1 is the only passage in our extant sources which depicts Vitellius in a light which is at all favourable.

The official Flavian line seems to have been that Vitellius was a worthless tyrant, a corrupt military adventurer, and that Vespasian, stung by accounts of his cruel and vicious behaviour in Rome after his victory (cf. Joseph. *BJ* 4.588-600; 4.647), felt impelled to come to his country's rescue. We may note in passing that this view of Vitellius as a mere usurper also serves to explain why Vespasian did not become his country's "saviour" in A.D.68: Nero was the legitimate ruler; cf. Philostr. *VA* 5.29. That this explanation is either misleading or simply untrue on two counts - (the planning of the Flavian attempt probably began about the time of Nero's death; and, since this attempt was actually launched on 1st July, A.D. 69, word of Vitellius' behaviour in Rome cannot by then have reached the East [see below S. *Vit* 11.1]) - need not have detracted from the effectiveness of the propaganda.

This Flavian view of Vitellius, reflected in Josephus and Philostratus (*locc. cit.*), can also be detected in Dio (65.2-4).
Vitus, always an independent judge of character, certainly despises Vitellius, but mainly because of his self-indulgence and torpor ([1.62; 2.31; 62, 67, 71, 77, 87, 88, 95; 3.36, 56]). However, he does not see Vitellius as essentially vicious and his portrait of him is not as bleak as that to be found in our other sources (cf. H 1.52, 58; and esp. 3.86).

nisi aliquanto prius de familiae condicione variatum esset:  sc. before A.D. 69, when one would expect this sort of thing in the propaganda war with Otho and the Flavians. The account which follows was presumably concocted before A.D. 14 (cf. Divi Augusti quaestorem) and is typical of what happens with genealogies at a time of social mobility when new classes are penetrating a traditional aristocracy. On this topic, see the trenchant remarks of J. H. Plumb, The Death of the Past, 31-35; cf. especially his quotation (p. 32 n.2) from Lawrence Stone, The Crisis of the Aristocracy 1588-1641, 25, referring to "...the heraldic fantasy world whose finest hour came at the end of the eighteenth century with the 719 quarterings of the Grenvilles depicted on the ceiling of their Gothic Library at Stowe."

1.2 extat Q. 4Elogi...libellus: the majority of mss. read extatq elogi (or elogii); the only significant variant is elogium (the 11th century Codex Gudianus 268). Without resorting to emendation, one can read extatq as extatque, followed by either elogi...libellus, or elogium ad Quintum Vitelium Divi Augusti quaestorem, libellus quo continetur. But what exactly does elogium mean? and could it be anything like as long as a libellus? Laudatory elogia were usually short
Vitellius

1.2-

inscriptions in either prose or verse (cf. OLD s.v.1: "an elegiac distych"). However, the term can, perhaps, have a more generalized meaning: G. Brugnoli, Maia 5 (1952) 113-117, argues that it can mean simply "scritto elogiativo" (114, with evidence cited from TLL: Cato Orig. 83, Cic. Tusc 1.31; Pis.72; Hier. Epist. 52.8.3) and in this passage reads elogium but brackets libellus quo continetur as an explanatory gloss. If we can accept the -que in extatque as epexegetic of variatum esset, this approach may commend itself: it might also be better to take elogium as equivalent to a genitive plural and then read extatque elogiorum ad Quintum Vitellium Divi Augusti quaestorem libellus, quo continetur, which would refer to a collection of short pieces comprising a history of the Vitellii in the remote past.

However, the -que seems very strained (at S. Ner. 28.1 extatque, quoted by Brugnoli [op. cit. 114] as an "evidente parallelismo", merely introduces another in a series of points) and since S. appears to have read the work, which, being highly laudatory, was probably not anonymous, we would expect him to mention the author's name, especially since he mentions Cassius Severus as the principal hostile source on the Vitellii. For this emendation is necessary and suggestions are numerous; e.g. Q. Clodii Muretus; Q. Longini Lipsius; Q. Eulogii or Eclogii I. Casaubon. All are paleographically possible, but none is compelling because the names are otherwise unknown. I. Casaubon's suggestion that the author was a freedman of the Divi Augusti quaestor, named Q. Vitellius Eulogius, is perhaps the most attractive emendation.

Fauno Aboriginum rege: Faunus was a rustic deity with a festival celebrated on 5th December, for which the principal evidence is
1.2-
an Ode of Horace (3.18). Very little is known about Faunus or his
cult; the meaning of his name is disputed and the various theories,
both ancient and modern, give rise to widely differing explanations
of his origin and function; e.g. Servius (ad Georg. 1.10) says:
"quidam Faunos putant dictos ab eo quod frugibus faveant," implying
a derivation from favere ("the kindly one"); but cf. Varro on Fauni
(L.L. 7.36): "...in silvestribus locis traditum est solitos fari
futura a quo fando Faunos dictos," i.e. the name is derived from fari
("the speaker, the seer"). From these quotations we may note
connections with fields and woods (cf. Verg. Georg. 1.10 and Aen.
8.314) and we should also note the possibility that Faunus was
originally plural: this is the basis of Warde Fowler's conclusion
that the idea of the Fauni arose "from the contact of the first
clearers and cultivators of Italian soil with a wild aboriginal race
of the hills and woods" (Roman Festivals 264-265). Other ideas about
Faunus, such as those identifying him with the deity of the Lupercalia
(cf. Ovid Fasti 2.361), or making him a king of the Aborigines (as
here; cf. Dion. Hal. 1.31), or placing him among the "kings of
Ratium" (Saturnus, Picus, Faunus, Latinus: Verg. Aen. 7.45-49), seem
to be the work of priests and annalists in the period after his cult
was introduced to Rome with the building of a temple on the Tiber
Island in 196 B.C. (Livy 33.42.10).

See further Roscher Lex. 1454-1460 s.v. (Wissowa); W. Warde
Fowler, Roman Festivals 256-265; Otto, RE VI 2054-2073 s.v.

Vitellia: perhaps not surprisingly, this goddess is heard of
nowhere else: quae multis locis pro numine coleretur is really somewhat
The name Vitellia may be a reworking of some other name such as Vitula (cf. the similar Julian Iulus \( \rightarrow \) Iulius, which may even have provided the starting-point), though Vitula, a goddess or spirit with a mysterious festival on 8th July (Macrob. Sat. 3.2.11-15; Roscher Lex s.v. [Wissowa]; Eisenhut, RE IX A s.v. 'Vitula'), has the first syllable long, while in Vitellius it is short. However, given the invented nature of the whole genealogy, we may well doubt the cogency of such an objection.

See also Wissowa, RK2 33 n.3; and W. F. Otto, RhM 64 (1909) 449-468, who states (451): "...die Vitellia aber ist sicher echt und alt ab Geschlechtsgöttin der Vitellii."

horum residuam stirpem ex Sabinis transisse Romam atque inter patricios adlectam: this story is somewhat disjointed but it appears that the main branch of the family has died out, leaving only collaterals in Sabine territory. What we have here is almost a doublet of the story of the gens Claudia which moved to Rome from Sabine country under the leadership of "Attius Clausus" (in 504 B.C., according to the commonest version: Livy 2.16.4-5; D.H. 5.40; Plut. Poplicola 21.4-10; Appian Reg. 12; for a variant see S. Tib. 1.1).

We may also note, however, that S. gives no indication of date for this immigration of the Vitellii; he also fails to mention the appearance, in the annalistic accounts of 509 B.C., of two brothers M. and M.' Vitellius, members of the senate (and therefore patricians), whose sister was married to M. Iunius Brutus and who, along with the Aquilii and the sons of Brutus, became involved in a conspiracy to
1.2-1.3
restore the Tarquins (Livy 2.3-5; D.H. 5.6-13; Plut. Poplicola 3.4-7.8; cf. Gundel RE IX A s.v. 'Vitellius' nos. 1 and 4; for a persuasive hypothesis concerning the "origin" of these Vitellii, see Ogilvie, Commentary on Livy 1-5 p. 242). S., of course, does not transmit this story because his source will have regarded it as unsuitable for a laudatory compilation.

There is no reliable evidence for Vitellii in Rome at or near the beginning of the Republic; cf. Gundel, RE IX A s.v. 'Vitellius,' 383-384; and A. Klotz, RhM 87 (1938) 44. For the name Vitellius, see Schulze, Zur Gesch. latein. Eigennamen 153, 257, 445.

1.3 viam Vitelliam ab Ianiculo ad mare usque: this name is not otherwise attested. There are three other roads in this general area (running from Rome to the sea by or near the right bank of the Tiber) which should perhaps be considered.

The via Campana is probably the most ancient of these roads and, as a route from Rome to the salt-beds on the right bank of the Tiber near its mouth (the campi salinarum - hence the name of the road), it may even precede the foundation of the city: the via Salaria, the main route of the salt trade from the north-east, seems to be heading for the Tiber crossing in Rome just below the island in the area of the Pons Sublicius and would then link up with the via Campana (see Ashby, Roman Campagna 219). This route kept closest to the Tiber of all the ancient roads.

The via Portuensis connected Rome with Portus Augusti, the harbour two miles north of the mouth of the Tiber built by Claudius and
1.3 viam...ad mare usque cont.
subsequently greatly expanded by Trajan (although there are two harbours, the Portus Augusti and the Portus Traiani Felicis, the town that grew up around them was called simply Portus: for details, see Meiggs, Roman Ostia 141-171). The via Portuensis is not attested before the fourth century A.D. (the Constantinian Plan of Rome): the date of its construction cannot, therefore, be estimated. By inference we can assume that, since there was a Porta Portuensis in the Aurelian Wall, there was a via Portuensis passing through it, but whether this road is of Claudian or Trajanic date cannot be determined. It probably coincided with the via Campana near its beginning and its end.

The via Ianiculensis appears only on the Constantinian Plan of Rome and Nissen suggested that, since the via Vitellia is not mentioned on the Plan, via Ianiculensis is simply a later name for the via Vitellia (Italische Landeskunde II 43).

We may also note than any early road running from the Ianiculum to the sea would probably start at or near the site of the later Porta Aurelia on the Ianiculum. Although we might assume that such a road would ultimately arrive at the salt-beds previously mentioned, but by a more northerly route than that of the via Campana (see Kiepert's Atlas Antiquus, insert to Tab. VIII in the 1898 maps), we should also note Ashby's suggestion (op. cit. 226-227) that the via Vitellia followed the route of the later via Aurelia as far as the stream now called the Galéria (to a place named Malagrotta, about 8 miles from Rome), where he detected an ancient track heading towards Maccarese (and the sea at Fregenae?) which he thought might
1.3 viam...ad mare usque cont. represent the via Vitellia.

Since the via Aurelia is itself early (estimates range from 241 B.C., the censorship of C. Aurelius L.f. Cotta, through 200 B.C., the consulship of C. Aurelius C.f. Cotta, to 126 B.C., the consulship of L. Aurelius L.f. Orestes), if the via Vitellia was indeed older and represented a route to early Roman strong points in Etruscan territory (Fregenae was colonised c. 245 B.C.; cf. Salmon, Etruscan Cities and Rome 276 and n. 199), the writer of the libellus may here be preserving a genuine historical tradition.

For a recent and thorough discussion of roads near Rome see Radke, RE Suppl. XIII 1479, 1614-15 (with the diagram on 1425-26).

item coloniam eiusdem nominis: presumably therefore Vitellia. This was one of the fourteen priscae coloniae Latinae, founded, usually jointly, by Rome and the Latins in the period before the dissolution of the Latin League in 338 B.C.; however, the correct form of its name, its foundation date and its location are all uncertain. Livy mentions the place twice (2.39.4 and 5.29.3): in the first passage it is simply a Latin town called Vetelia (for possible meanings of this name, see Conway's apparatus ad loc. in the old O.C.T.; cf. Festus p. 94 L, and Conway, Italic Dialects 48), but in the second it is a colonia Romana called Vitellia (for Livy's terminology concerning colonies founded jointly by Rome and the Latins, see E. T. Salmon, Roman Colonization under the Republic 41-42); we may also note that, in his catalogue of the vanished peoples of Latium (NH. 3.69), Pliny mentions Vitellenses, which could suggest a place named Vitellia,
though this story about the origins of the Vitellii may well have been known to Pliny when he was compiling the NH. The second passage in Livy refers to events in 393 B.C., which gives us a terminus ante quem for the foundation of Vitellia as a colony. There is, however, no precise evidence for the actual foundation date: Radke (RE IX A s.v. 'Vitellia' no. 1), following the views of Niebuhr and Mommsen, takes the account in Livy 5.24.4 of the foundation of a colony in Volscos in 395 B.C. to refer to Vitellia (followed apparently by Salmon, op. cit. 41), but Vitellia is described as being in agro Aequo at 5.29.3, and the foundation in 395 is now usually taken to refer to Circeii (cf. Ogilvie, Commentary on Livy 1-5 ad loc.). Vitellia evidently did not flourish, since it had disappeared by the time of the Latin War of 340-338 and is not heard of again. Although modern guesses place it near Valmontone (Salmon op. cit. 43) or Labico (till 1880 called Lugnano, and not the same as the ancient Labici: Ogilvie, op. cit. pp 332-33; cf. Ashby, PBSR 1 (1902) 256-269; 273 and nn. 1, 2, with maps VII and VIII), there is no actual evidence for its location.

quam gentili copia...olim depoposcissent: since I would understand tutandum to refer to a single expedition, this story presents us with another suspicious doublet, this time reminiscent of the famous story of the gens Fabia which fought alone at the Cremera against the Veientes in 478 or 477 B.C. (Livy 2.48-50; cf. 2.51.1; Diod. 11.53.6; D.H. 9.18.5-9.22.6; for a detailed discussion of the date and credibility of that story, with a full bibliography, see Ogilvie Commentary on Livy 1-5 pp 359-361).
tempore deinde Samnitici belli praesidio in Apuliam misso: the term praesidium implies a garrison, and this suggests the second Samnite War (328-304 B.C.), and more specifically the period immediately following the Caudine Peace of 321: in 318/17 Rome made alliances with various Apulian communities in order to threaten the Samnites with warfare on two fronts (Livy 9.20.4-9; cf. 9.13.6; Diod. 19.10.2) and in 315, soon after the resumption of war, the consul L. Papirius Cursor attacked Luceria, the main Samnite base in Apulia (Livy 9.12.9). After its capture Luceria became a Latin colony (in 314: Livy 9.26.1-5; Diod. 19.72.8-9). Thereafter Apulia remained for the Romans an important strategic area in their struggles against the Samnites; cf. the founding of the large Latin colony at Venusia in 291 B.C. (Dion. Hal. 17/18 5.1-2).

For a good modern account of Roman operations in Apulia at this period see E. T. Salmon, Samnium and the Samnites 221-275; cf. Salmon, Roman Colonization under the Republic 58-62.

quosdam ex Vitelliis subsedisse Nuceriae: this looks like a muddle: in Apulia the major centre of Roman power was Luceria (see prev. n.), a place frequently referred to, apparently erroneously, as Nuceria (see Philipp, RE XIII 1565-6 for details: for example, Tab. Peut. VI 3 reads Nucerie Apule [discussed by Miller, Itineraria Romana 373]); so common is this error that in his RE article on the various places referred to as Nuceria (RE XVII 1235-8) Philipp includes a suggestion that the name of Luceria was actually changed to Nuceria, though he himself is of the opinion that the Vitelli came from Nuceria Alfaterna in Campania (op. cit.1237). However, S. does seem
here to be referring to the place usually called Luceria. Tacitus is no help to us in his obituary notice of the Emperor Vitellius, since there is a lacuna in the text at the crucial spot (II 3.86.1).

In his note on this passage Hofstee mentions the existence of Samnite coins bearing the name Vitellius and suggests that this confirms the existence of a family of Vitellii in this area of Italy. However, he is guilty of a serious misapprehension: during the Social War, the Samnites issued coins bearing the legend Italia, which is, of course, Latin, or Viteliu (ヴィテリウ), which is Oscan for Italia; cf. Walde-Hofmann, Lat. etym. Wörterbuch s.v. 'Italia'; Grueber, BMC Rep. II pp. 326-329, esp. 326 n.1.

progeniem longo post intervallo repetisse urbem atque ordinem senatorium: this completes the fantasy in a tidy manner and Gundel (RE IX A 384) neatly summarizes its importance:
"Historisch ist die Stelle für die Geschichte der Republik wertlos; lediglich für Stammbaumkonstruktion etwa der Augusteischen Zeit ist sie aufschlussreich." It is clear, however, that when they first appeared in Augustan Rome in the person of P. Vitellius of Nuceria, procurator Augusti, the Vitellii were not accepted as the long-lost scions of an ancient senatorial family: they had to make their way - with imperial favour, naturally; for this was the only means by which new men could gain the latus clavus (cf. O'Brien Moore, RE Suppl. VI cols 761-762; M. Hammond, The Augustan Principate 117-118; H. Stuart Jones, CAH X 161-165).
2.1-  

2.1 *contra plures auctorem generis libertinum* prodiderunt: after the flattering account of the origins of the Vitellii, we come to what was evidently the more generally accepted version, with variations in detail.

S. sometimes uses *plures* for *complures* (cf. DJ.76.3; 81.4; Aug. 21.3; Calig. 57.4; Tit. 3.2); this passage may help to explain how the usage arises: so far we have seen the "flattering version," presumably the work of a single author (?Q. Eulogius); what follows is given by more authorities, but they are probably not numerous (= the sources for the main story, plus Cassius Severus and perhaps others for the seamy details): hence the meaning "several" for *plures*; cf. similarly Ner. 1.2; Tit. 8.5.

*Cassius Severus nec minus alii:* this probably means "Cassius Severus, with great vehemence"! We may well suspect muckraking in this section, since Cassius Severus, an orator of the Augustan age, had a very bad reputation for *vituperatio*; cf. Ann. 1.72.3: *primus Augustus cognitionem de famosis libellis specie legis eius tractavit, commotus Cassii Serveri libidine, qua viros feminasque inlustres procacibus scriptis diffamaverat.* He was exiled to Crete but continued these activities and so in A.D. 24 he was interdicted from fire and water and condemned to the rocky island of Seriphos for the rest of his life, while his works were burned (Ann. 4.21.3; cf. S. Calig. 16.1).

See further Stein PIR² C 522; Teufel, Gesch. d. röm. Lit. II 7 §267.11 (pp. 164-165); Brzoska, RE 3 s.v. 'Cassius' no. 89.
sectionibus et cognituris uberiuss com comprehendium

nanctus: sectionibus means "by the sale of confiscated or captured goods"; presumably this Vitellius either sold such goods on behalf of the aerarium or, perhaps more probably, bought them cheap in job lots, possibly at the time of the Sullan proscriptions, and sold them in the sort of operation which today is loosely called "an army surplus store".

cognituris is much more difficult; the word occurs only four times in extant literature (cf. TLL s.v. 'cognitura') and in each of the other three occurrences (Quint. Inst. 12.99; Gaius 4.124 (bis); Fr. Vat. [Paul?] 324; an additional citation in Lewis and Short is wrong), it means simply "the duty of a cognitor", which is what the OLD gives, except for the gratuitous addition of "or attorney," which is perhaps misleading. There are a great many references to cognitor cited in TLL (III 1487-8) under three main headings: I - in a broad sense, one who cognoscit or knows something; II - in a technical sense, one who cognoscit about something in a judicial proceeding, i.e. a iudex; III - in a technical legal sense, a representative in litigation: this is perhaps the most confusing meaning of the word (cf. OLD's "attorney"), since a cognitor by a kind of legal fiction actually became the party to a lawsuit (cf. Buckland, Textbook3, 708-711, section CCXXXIX, "Representation in Litigation", who summarizes the matter thus: "The cognitor did not then "represent" in the modern sense: he was the actual party, who was condemned or absolved, and had or was liable to the actio iudicati...he brought his principal's case into issue, so that, on the principle of non bis in idem, further action was barred"). It is
this meaning of cognitor which appears to be implied in all the other occurrences of cognitura and, no doubt because of the difficulty of explaining how this Vitellius acquired an uberius compendium by becoming such a cognitor, Lewis and Short suggested for the meaning of cognitura: "the office of a fiscal agent, who looks up the debtors to the treasury; a state's attorneyship, a state agency"; Hofstee, Commentary, ad loc. takes this a step further, speaking of munus cognitoris, hominis qui praemiis delationis pellecutus debites aerarii sive fisci investigat. This would certainly go well with sectionibus, but there appears to be no evidence to support it. Mooney quotes Ann. 13.23.1, where mention is made of a certain Paetus, an informer who was exercendis apud aerarium sectionibus famosus, but as a parallel to the present passage in S., this begs the question.

sed quod discrepat, sit in medio: Suetonius here affects not to be interested in the minutiae of the sordid origins of the family, but only after he has given us them!

There should be no problem with the meaning of this sentence; however, in his paraphrase of Suetonius (Penguin Classics) Graves has: "The truth probably lies somewhere between these anecdotal extremes." J. C. Rolfe (LCL) is surely correct with: "But this difference of opinion may be left unsettled."

2.2 ceterum P. Vitellius...eques certe R. et rerum Augusti procurator: at this point Suetonius "cuts the Gordian knot" about the family background and, starting with the earliest
2.2 ceterum P. Vitellius...Augusti procurator cont.

person about whom he is sure (certe), makes this P. Vitellius the starting-point for a detailed examination of the family. Since P. Vitellius was a procurator rerum Augusti, he must have been an eques, as S. says; presumably he is the one referred to in the preceding paragraph. Although he himself did not reach senatorial rank, there is a Q. Vitellius mentioned by Dio (51.22.4) but not by Suetonius, who fought as a gladiator at the dedication of the temple of divus Iulius in 29 B.C.: he was a senator and therefore presumably had held the quaestorship. Hanslik (RE Suppl. IX s.v. 'Vitellius' no. 7f) thinks that "probably" he was the brother of the procurator Augusti and therefore the first of the Vitellii to reach senatorial rank (cf. Suolahti, The Roman Censors 511). If these two Vitellii were the grandsons of a freedman, the senator Q. Vitellius evidently rose as rapidly as was, in theory, permitted down to the Augustan period; cf. Mommsen on ingenuitas (Staatsr. I 3 488): "Verstanden wir darunter die Geburt von einem freigeborenen Vater, das heisst der Nachweis eines freien Vaters und eines freien, wenn auch nicht freigeborenen Grossvaters." (This rule is nowhere stated specifically in extant sources but is implied in S. Claud. 24.1 and Ner. 15.2; cf. Pliny NH 33.32).

In this generation there is also a Vitellia not mentioned by S. (RE Suppl. IX s.v., no. 7q; cf. Ann. 3.49.1; G. E. Bean, JHS 74 [1954] 91-92 no. 28); she was the wife of A. Plautius (cos. suff. 1 B.C.) and the mother of A. Plautius (cos. suff. A.D. 29 and later governor of Britain) and a Plautia, wife of P. Petronius (cos. suff. A.D. 19); again, Hanslik thinks that she was a sister of the procurator Augusti: certainly marriage alliances such as these
would be of considerable help to the procurator's sons at the beginning of their careers.

For the possibility that the rerum Augusti procurator was really A. Vitellius, see below, n. on Aulus in consulatu obiit; see also Dessau, PIR V 503.

quattuor filios...reliquit Aul(um), Q(uintum), P(ublium ), L(ucium): we cannot be certain that this order of names reflects the true chronological order of the four sons, because Lucius, the most successful, comes last, which gives a neat climax to the account of the family success in this generation; furthermore, Lucius may also be placed last because he was the father of the princeps Vitellius and so the account of his career leads naturally into that of his son. Also, since they were all novi homines and we do not know the ages at which they reached the consulship, there is no guarantee that Aulus (cos. suff. A.D. 32) was older than Lucius (cos. ord. A.D. 34), although we may be inclined to believe that, because of his energy and ability, Lucius reached the consulship fairly young. Finally, the general "rules" drawn up by scholars such as E. Birley (cf. PBA 39 [1953] 203-204) and J. Morris (cf. LF 86 [1963] 332-336, esp. 334) about careers in the Emperor's service and the ages at which the various stages were reached, were probably not firm enough in the principate of Tiberius to enable us to draw any sort of conclusion from the failure of P. Vitellius to reach the consulship after a praetorship as early as the last years of Augustus (see below, S. Vit 2.3, n. on Publius...accusavit); for J. Morris overstates matters when he says ("Leges Annales under the Principate:
2.2 quattuor filios...L(ucium) cont.

Political effects," LF 88 [1965] 22-31, esp. 23) that a sharp change in the character of the consulate began with the fall of Sejanus and that novi homines commonly reached the consulship only after 31: the change which did occur is that increasing number of novi became consules ordinarii; this can be seen from the accompanying table, derived from material cited by G. Tibiletti in Principe e Magistrate Reppublicani (Rome, 1953), 229-267.

Consuls in the Principate of Tiberius

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A.D. 15-22</th>
<th>Nobles &amp; Imperial Family</th>
<th>Novi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cos. ord.</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cos. suff.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.D. 23-31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cos. ord.</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cos. Suff.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.D. 32-37</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cos. ord.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cos. suff. (to 36 only)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cos. ord.</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cos. suff.</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>55</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Aulus in consulatu obiit: there is little than can be added to what S. tells us here; A. Vitellius was suffect in A.D. 32 to L. Arruntius Camillus Scribonianus, while Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, the
2.2-

other cos. ord., remained in office for the whole year. Since the
Fasti do not list an additional suffect for 32 (for full refs., see
Hanslik, RE Suppl. IX s.v. 'Vitellius' no. 7a), we may assume that he
died late in that year.

CIL VI 879 mentions a Ti. Caisaris Augusti legatus pro pr.
A. Vitellius A.f. Hanslik says of the A.f.: "...das muss auf einem
Irrtum des Steinmetzen beruhen." This will not do, since a novus
homo setting up a short (in this case) dedicatory inscription to the
Princeps is going a) to look at it, and b) to make sure that the
details are correct. Accordingly we must conclude either that S.
has got the name of the procurator Augusti wrong, or that the
inscription was set up by a son of the cos. suff. of A.D. 32, who
must therefore have been quite elderly by the time he reached the
consulship; even so, as Mommsen remarks (ap. CIL VI 879), it would
be surprising if his son had served as legatus pro praetore before
37. On balance, therefore, an error on S.'s part seems more likely.

praesca\(\text{u}\)tus alioqui famosusque cenarum magnificentia:
if this is true and not merely a doublet from the gourmandizing
activities of the better-known A. Vitellius, the Princeps (see
below Vit. 13 and, for example, H 1.62.2; 2.62.1, 87, 95), it may
perhaps suggest a family failing (see also the next n. below).

Quintus caruit ordine, cum...placuisset: this was in
A.D. 17 when Tiberius forced the removal or obtained the resignations
of five senators, among them Q. Vitellius, prodigos et ob flagitia
gentes (Ann. 2.48.3). This Q. Vitellius is presumably the man
2.2 *Quintus caruit ordine, cum... placuisset* cont.
mentioned above (Vit. 1.2) as Divi Augusti quaestorem; it was he who had the "fantasy" version of the early history of the Vitellii cobbled together, and from this fact and the information about prodigos given by Tacitus, we may assume that he was a typical illustration of the dictum "clogs to clogs in three generations," in other words, an arriviste, an idler and a wastrel who dissipated a fortune which he himself had done nothing to earn. On the other hand, as a youth he must have seemed promising, since Augustus picked him to be one of his own quaestors. Only seven *quaestores Augusti* are known from the period up to a.D. 14 and in this company he cuts a very poor figure indeed: for details, see M. Cébeillac, *Les 'Quaestores Principis et Candidati' aux Ier and IIème siècles de l'Empire* (Milan, 1972) 5-25, esp. 5-8, 21-25 (unfortunately her actual discussion of Q. Vitellius on pp. 16-17 is hopelessly muddled, since she confuses him with the other Q. Vitellius, the senator of 29 B.C., mentioned above). The more notorious this Q. Vitellius became, the more of a reproach his selection as *quaestor Augusti* would have been to Augustus. We have, of course, no information as to the precise degree of notoriety which he achieved, but O. Hirschfeld’s suggestion that *quetedii* in the desperate and famous crux at Ann. 1.10.5 conceals Q. Vitellii is both paleographically reasonable and highly persuasive (Hermes 24 [1889] 103-104: the citation in *RE Suppl. IX s.v. 'Vitellius' no. 7g is incorrect both in volume number and year).

We know also of a woman named Bassa (CIL VI 359) who was married to a Q. Vitellius and bore him a son (also Q. Vitellius): Groag (PIR² B 65) thinks she may have been the wife of this Q. Vitellius.
2.3-  
P(ublius), Germanici comes, Cn. Pisonem inimicum et interfectorem eiusmod accusavit: the impression we get of P. Vitellius is of a loyal, conscientious, capable, but politically not very adroit staff officer; unlike his brother Lucius (see below) he made all the wrong choices at the crucial points in his career. We first hear of him during Germanicus' campaigns in Germany: in A.D. 15 he was given the job of leading two legions along the German coast from the Ems towards the Rhine and got into severe difficulties because of equinoctial gales (Ann. 1.70); the following year he was missus ad census Galliarum (Ann. 2.6.1), an indication perhaps of where his talents lay (cf. below his later prefectship of the aerarium militare). The fact that he was a legatus legionis in A.D. 15 implies that he had held the praetorship: this is confirmed by his governorship of Bithynia in A.D. 17-18 (the evidence for this is numismatic - coins issued in Nicodemia showing Germanicus and bearing the legend Ἐπὶ Ποπλίου Οὐτελλίου Ἀνθυπάτου: see Mionnet, Description des médailles antiques II 466 no. 304; cf. VII 86; Suppl. V 170 no. 982; for the date, see C. Bosch, Die Kleinasiastischen Münzen der Römischen Kaiserzeit [Stuttgart, 1935] II.7.1 p. 79 no. 3), which suggests a date for his praetorship no later than A.D. 11 or 12 (cf. G. H. Stevenson, CAH X 213-314; S.'s remark below post praeturae honorem inter Seiani conscios arreptos, therefore, while not inaccurate, is definitely misleading).  

It was after his posting to Bithynia that P. Vitellius became involved in the events to which S. alludes here: he seems to have joined the suite of Germanicus in the East, perhaps at Antioch as early as the winter of A.D. 18-19, and he was present when Germanicus
died on 10th October, 19; with Germanicus' other devoted lieutenant, Q. Veranius, he hurried back to Rome and there (A.D. 20) led the prosecution of Cn. Calpurnius Piso (cos. ord. 7 B.C.), the lieutenant and friend of Tiberius, and the enemy and alleged poisoner of Germanicus (Ann. 2.74; 3.10.1). This trial (Ann. 3.10-15, esp. 13.2; cf. Pliny NH 11.187) resulted in the suicide of Piso and in considerable odium for Tiberius, in spite of his attempts to remain scrupulously fair (Ann. 3.16-19; cf. R. Seager, Tiberius 116-118); the popular belief was, as S. expressed it here, that Germanicus had been poisoned by Piso. Accordingly, although Vitellius and the other prosecutors of Piso were formally rewarded with priestships (Ann. 3.19.1), Tiberius cannot have felt anything approaching gratitude.

inter Seiani conscios arreptus...morbo periit: after the death of Germanicus, Sejanus became all-powerful (cf. Dio 57.19.5-8) and anyone who wished to "get on" had to pay court to him and receive his approbation (on this see the revealing speech which Tacitus gives to the eques M. Terentius at Ann. 6.8). At the time of the fall of Sejanus (18th October, A.D. 31; cf. EJ p. 54 and ILS 157, 158), P. Vitellius was prefect of the aerarium militare and was accused of having offered its resources rebus novis (Ann. 5.8), a reference to the mysterious "plot" allegedly fomented by Sejanus (for an account of the fall of Sejanus, see R. Seager, Tiberius 214-223, with a discussion of the "plot" on 214-217; cf. R. Syme, Tacitus 406): there is nothing to suggest that Vitellius was guilty of anything, but in the witch-hunting hysteria prevalent in Rome at the time he obviously felt that he had no chance. Tacitus tells us a similar story of a pen-knife (Ann. 5.8.2),
but omits the detail of *nec tam mortis paenitentia quam suorum obtestatione obligari curarique se passus* and states simply *vitam... aegritudine animi finivit.*

We may note a major difference in the treatment of the family of Sejanus (fast. Ost. Oct.-Nov. A.D. 31: cf. EJ p. 42; Ann. 5.9: cf. S. Tib 61.5; Dio 58.12.5-6) and of the families of others who fell with him: there was no "guilt by association", and within three years of the death of P. Vitellius two of his brothers reached the consulship as novi.

On P. Vitellius, see Dessau, PIR V 502 and the lengthy article by M. Schuster in RE IX A, s.v. 'Vitellius' no. 5; cf. also C. Zäch, Die Majestätsprozesse unter Tiberius in der Darstellung des Tacitus (Diss. Zürich, 1972) 53. Ovid (Pont. 4.7.27) refers to a Vitellius, in command of a Roman force, capturing Aegissus in the Dobrudja, perhaps during the great Pannonian-Dalmatian revolt of A.D. 6-8; this may be P. Vitellius, but certainty is quite impossible. Dessau and Schuster are properly cautious, but de Laet (Samenstelling, p. 95 no. 425), although citing Ovid, unwisely states as a fact that Vitellius was *legatus* of a legion in Pannonia, A.D. 6-8 (even though Aegissus is almost at the eastern extremity of Moesia), while Wiseman (New Men in the Roman Senate 139 B.C.-14 A.D., p. 276 no. 503) baldly and recklessly lists the beginning of Vitellius' career: *leg. Aug. (Pann.) A.D. 6-8,...*

2.4 L(ucius) ex consulatu Syriae praepositus: L. Vitellius was perhaps the most talented of the four brothers and fundamentally he may have been, as S. says below, *innocens et industrius* (cf. Ann.
2.4 *L(uclius) ex consulatu Syriae praepositus* cont.

6.32.4: *regendis provinciis prisca virtute egit*; however, he was in many ways quite unappealing.

*ex consulatu Syriae praepositus* implies that he went straight to Syria from his consulship (he was *cos. ord.* A.D. 34) and, since there were apparently two *suffecti* in that year, Magie may well be correct in suggesting that he went to Syria before the end of 34 (Roman Rule II 1364 n. 39). Trouble had broken out in the East, apparently in 34, with the death of Zeno (Artaxias III) of Armenia, which had prompted Artabanus III of Parthia to attempt to place one of his own sons on the Armenian throne. Tiberius acted with vigour and skill, sending Vitellius to Syria with more than usual powers (cf. Ann. 6.32.3: *cunctis, quae apud Orientem parabantur, L. Vitellium praefecit*; the actual extent of these powers is not clear). Vitellius' instructions appear to have been to preserve Roman interests in Armenia and to arrange the removal of Artabanus from the Parthian throne, all without recourse to arms, if possible.

In Armenia Vitellius was wholly successful; in Parthia, Artabanus was temporarily replaced by the Roman puppets Phraates and Tiridates, though no long-term alteration of the *status quo* was achieved. However, Artabanus was sufficiently humbled that he was prepared to meet Vitellius, make a formal treaty recognizing the Roman nominee as King of Armenia and surrender one of his sons as a hostage. This was a major triumph for Roman diplomacy and it had been achieved without the serious involvement of Roman arms.

The sources for this episode are Ann. 6.31-37, 41-44; Joseph. AJ 18.95-105, (with which cf. S. Calig. 19.2); Dio 58.26.1-4; 59.27.2-3; S. Calig. 14.3; for modern accounts see E. Täubler, *Die
Artabanum Parthorum regem...ad veneranda legionum
signa pellexit: there are numerous problems connected with this
meeting: where did Artabanus meet Vitellius? what did he do at the
meeting? when was it held? In his other account of this incident
(Calig. 14.3) S. emphasizes the hatred and contempt which Artabanus
had always felt for Tiberius (cf. S. Tib.66) and states that he
ultra petiit (cf. here Lucius...regem summis artibus...pellexit) the
friendship of Gaius and came to a meeting at which he crossed the
Euphrates and aquilas et signa Romana Caesarumque imagines adoravit.
According to Dio (59.27.3) Vitellius compelled Artabanus (Ὑνάγμας) to sacrifice to the imagines of Augustus and Gaius; similarly,
Tacitus has no mention of this meeting in his account of the
principate of Tiberius. Josephus, on the other hand, in much the
most elaborate account of the meeting (AJ 18.101-105) has Tiberius
order Vitellius to establish friendly relations with Artabanus; this
meeting takes place at the mid-point of a bridge over the Euphrates;
no mention is made of eagles or images, but Herod Antipas is said
to have provided a feast in a pavilion constructed in the middle of
the river; finally, Herod anticipated Vitellius in sending news of
the successful outcome of the talks to the Emperor, which greatly
angered Vitellius who, however, concealed his wrath until after the
accession of Gaius.

These two traditions cannot be harmonized; Josephus implies a date some months at least before the death of Tiberius, presumably in the autumn of 36 at the latest. Moreover, the mention by Josephus of Herod Antipas serves to confirm such a date, and no violence is done to the known (or presumed) movements of Vitellius at this time (see E. M. Smallwood, *Journ. of Jewish Studies* 5 [1954] 19-20 and esp. 19 n. 2). The ascription of the diplomatic triumph to the principate of Gaius may be the result of Vitellius' well-known penchant for flattery and adulation; furthermore, the circumstances of his return to Rome were exceedingly dangerous and yet he managed to become one of Gaius' closest friends (Dio 59.27.4-6). As for the obeisance to standards and images of the Caesars, Anderson's comment may suffice (CAH X 750): "...an admission of vassalage which no Parthian king would have made save with the sword at his throat. The truth has been preserved by Josephus."

mox cum Claudio principe duos insuper ordinarios

*consulatus censuramque gessit*: after the ample successes of his career under Tiberius and his remarkable *tour de force* in gaining the friendship of the bitterly jealous and suspicious Gaius (Dio 59.27.2-6; cf. below 2.5), in the principate of Claudius Vitellius crowned his career as the most successful politician of the Julio-Claudian period by going further than anyone who was not connected with the imperial house either by blood or marriage: he was *cos. ord.* II and III in 43 and 47 as colleague to the Princeps, and in 47-48, as Claudius' colleague in the censorship for the traditional
eighteen months, he received the most signal honour of all (on this census see Ann. 11.13; Pliny NH 10.5; Aur.Vict. Caes. 4.4; and esp. S. Claud. 16; for a modern account of the acts of these censors see J. Suolahti, The Roman Censors 507-512).

The only separate act performed by Vitellius as censor of which we know was his exclusion of L. Iunius Silanus from the album senatorium in A.D. 48 as a means of gaining Agrippina's favour, quamquam lecto pridem senatu lustroque condito (Ann. 12.4.3; cf. above Galba 1, n. on progenies Caesarum in Nerone defecit.)

curam quoque imperii sustinuit absente eo expeditione Britannica: for details of Claudius' part in the invasion of Britain, see above G 7.1, n. on dilatus sit expeditionis Britannicae dies; Dio (60.23.1) states that Claudius returned to Rome in 44 after an absence of six months: this will give us an indication of the length of Vitellius' cura imperii.

Constitutionally there was no such thing as a "deputy" princeps or "acting" princeps and, in theory, the Emperor was supposed to do his job wherever he happened to be; in practice, however, this could be difficult when he was absent from Rome and so, on occasion, some person was left in charge: Mommsen (Staatsr. II 113-4) cites the examples of Agrippa and Maecenas using Augustus' seal (Pliny, NH 37.10; Dio 51.3.5-7) and of Mucianus acting likewise as Vespasian's deputy (Dio 66.2); these are perhaps the most impressive cases known (and with them we can compare Titus' practice of actually signing his father's name to documents; see S. Tit. 6.1; cf. J. A. Crook, AJP 72 [1951] 168-9), but there are other apparently less thoroughgoing
examples such as the present case and the appointment by Otho of his brother L. Salvius Otho Titianus to look after affairs in Rome during his absence in the north of Italy (see above 0 1.3, n. on L. Titianum); there is also one example which was considerably more shocking to Roman upper class opinion: Nero's appointment of the freedman Helius to govern Rome and Italy during his absence in Greece in 66-68 (Dio 63.12; cf. S. Ner. 23.1).

It is pointless to seek a formal legal definition of the powers of such "deputies": they were simply acting in loco Principis, they had his confidence and they were among his closest friends and advisers. People therefore simply accepted the situation and did what they were told. (Dio's suggestion at 60.21.2 that L. Vitellius was left in charge by Claudius because they were both consuls in A.D. 43 is shown by Mommsen [loc. cit] to be incorrect: Claudius did not leave Rome until the later part of 43 and both he and Vitellius had laid down their consulships by 1st March of that year.)

sed amore libertinae perinfamis...pro remedio fovebat: this outlandish and, to us, rather disgusting story is far from unique in ancient literature. In Latin the richest source of information on the medical, paramedical and magical uses of spittle is Pliny's Natural History (see in general 28.35-39, for a cough mixture 28.193, and, for a recipe requiring specifically a female's spittle, 28.76); cf. also H 4.81 and S. Vesp. 7.2-3 and, for a survey of the whole question, F. W. Nicolson, "The Saliva Superstition in Classical Literature," HSCP 8 (1897) 23-40.
2.5 idem miri in adulando ingenii primus C. Caesarem adorare ut deum instituit...osculabundus: the incident with Gaius has been mentioned above (cf. Dio 59:27.2-6). However, Vitellius' career as a toady and flatterer began during Tiberius' principate when he had cultivated Antonia Minor, the mother of Claudius (Ann. 11.3.1). Her relations with Tiberius, her brother-in-law, seem to have been candid and amicable, and it was she who first made Tiberius fully aware of the machinations of Sejanus (Jos. AJ 18.180-182, though this has lately been disputed: see J. Nicols, "Antonia and Sejanus," Historia 24 [1975] 48-58): if Vitellius was a protégé of hers, it might explain how the son of an eques could be designated consul ordinarius for A.D. 34 so soon after the fall of Sejanus with whom his brother Publius had been closely involved.

His services to Claudius' wives (both Messalina and Agrippina, whom S. does not mention) were considerable: in 47 Messalina wished to destroy D. Valerius Asiaticus and Vitellius was instrumental in bringing this about (Ann. 11.1-3); after her fall, Vitellius adroitly took up the cause of Agrippina and in 48-49 helped prepare the way for her marriage to Claudius (Ann. 12.1-7; for an interesting sidelight on this matter, see F. R. B. Godolphin, "A Note on the marriage of Claudius and Agrippina," CP 29 [1934] 143-145; cf. below Vit. 3.1, n. on decessit paralysi).

Narcissi quoque et Pallantis imagines aureas inter Lares coluit: on Narcissus see PIR N 18 and Stein, RE XVI s.v. no. 1; on (M. Antonius) Pallas see PIR² A 858; von Rohden, RE I s.v. 'Antonius' no. 84; S. I. Oost, "The Career of M. Antonius Pallas,"
During the principate of Claudius, Narcissus and Pallas were probably the most influential freedmen (cf. S. Claud. 28; Callistus, the a libellis, does not seem to have been quite as powerful as the other two) and certainly the richest: Narcissus amassed a fortune of HS 400 million and Pallas one of HS 300 million (see R. Duncan-Jones, The Economy of the Roman Empire 343, App. 7, nos. 2 and 6); and of these two, Narcissus, the ab epistulis, is sometimes described as the more successful (cf. Stein, op. cit. col. 1701; similarly Hanslik, Der Kleine Pauly, s.v. no. 1). Oost, on the other hand, hints that, as a rationibus, Pallas was the more important minister (op. cit. 113-114; but cf. 123). In fact, Narcissus seems to have been the most influential freedman in A.D. 41-48, allying himself with Messalina (or vice versa) in order to destroy various enemies, furthering the career of the future Emperor Vespasian, and even being sent to Gaul to address mutinous troops before the invasion of Britain (cf. above Galba 7.1, n. on dilatus est expeditionis Britannicae dies). The turning point came in 48 after the fall of Messalina, which Narcissus himself had engineered (on this see Oost, op. cit. 117-119), with the question of a new wife for Claudius: Callistus favoured Lollia Paulina, a former wife of Gaius, Narcissus supported Aelia Paetina, who had been married to Claudius before, while Pallas urged the advantages of an alliance with Agrippina. Pallas' advice prevailed (Ann. 12.1-3) and with Vitellius' assistance legal and religious difficulties were smoothed over and the marriage took place. Henceforth Pallas was the most influential freedman and in A.D. 50 as ally to Agrippina he helped bring about the
adoption of Nero by Claudius. On 23rd January A.D. 52 he received
by a decree of the Senate ornamenta praetoria and a grant of 15
million for services rendered, especially in the cause of law
reform (Ann. 12.53; cf. Pliny Ep. 7.29; 8.6; for his services at the
time of the fall of Messalina, Narcissus had received only
quaestoria ornamenta: Ann. 11.38.4). Pallas accepted the praetorian
insignia but declined the cash award.

After Claudius' death he remained influential for a while
(Narcissus was immediately forced to commit suicide: Ann. 13.13; Dio
60.34.4-6), but he was pushed aside when Nero began to break free of
Agrippina's domination. Although accused of maestas in A.D. 55, a
charge of which he was easily proved innocent (Ann. 13.23), he
retained sufficient influence with Nero to arrange in A.D. 60 for
all charges of maladministration in Judaea laid against his brother
M. Antonius Felix to be dropped (Jos. AJ 20.182). He died in 62,
allegedly poisoned by Nero (Ann. 14.65; S. Ner. 35.5; Dio 62.14.5).

For senatorial attitudes to successful and influential freedmen,
we can refer, for example, to the scorn and disdain of Tacitus for
Crescens, one of Nero's freedmen who had given a public dinner in
Carthage when news of Otho's accession arrived (Hist. 1.76.3): nam et
hi (sc. liberti) malis temporibus partem se rei publicae faciunt;
while the Younger Pliny (Ep. 7.29 and 8.6 passim) brings the full
force of his talent for invective to bear upon Pallas. Whatever
the truth about the influence (and honesty) of such freedmen, who
were undoubtedly competent and talented administrators, the sort of
actions attributed here by S. to Vitellius will have earned him
considerable ill-repute.
2.5

saeculares ludos edenti Claudio: in addition to this passage the sources for the secular games of A.D. 47 are: CIL VI 32324-5, 32336; Pliny NH 7.159; 8.160; S. Claud. 21.1-3; Ann. 11.11.1-2; Censorin. DN 17.11; Aur. Vict. Caes. 4.14; Zosimus 2.4.3.

The main significance of these games was probably that they came in Rome's 800th year; the games were held early in June and the 800th year began with the Parilia on 21st April, A.D. 47 (cf. Cic. Div. 2.98; Varro, Rust. 2.1.9).

Details of the system used to calculate the saeculum or, indeed, of its length cannot be asserted with anything approaching certainty: games were held during the Republic in 348 (possibly), 249 and 146, which would suggest a slightly flexible saeculum of 100 years (see L. R. Taylor, AJP 55 [1934] 101-120 for a useful history); for the famous celebration of 17 B.C. Augustus used a saeculum of 110 years (Censorin. DN 17.10-11, confirmed by Horace at Carm. Saec. 21-22, but cf. the Greek text of Res Gestae 22.2), starting from 456 B.C. (with the games of 17 B.C. held a year early). Claudius, however, is said to have reverted to a 100 year cycle, starting from the Varronian date for the foundation of the city (Mommsen, Eph. Epigr. 8 [1892] 225-309=Ges. Schr. 8 567-626 [slightly abridged]). However, Momigliano (Claudius 89-90, following Hirschfeld, WS 3 [1881] 101-102) argues that, since Claudius is reported to have said in his Historiae intermissos eos (sc. ludos) Augustum multo post diligentissime annorum ratione subducta in ordinem redegisse (S. Claud. 21.2), he must have approved of the basis of calculation, but not the actual calculation itself: accordingly, Claudius did use the 110 year saeculum but started from 504 B.C. (A.U.C. 250), when Poplicola,
Vitellius

2.5-3.1

cos. IV, is said to have initiated such games (cf. Plut. Poplicola 21.3); this year had the added advantage of being the traditional date for the arrival in Rome of the gens Claudia (S. Tib. 1.1; Plut. Poplicola 21.4-10). This is extremely ingenious but we should perhaps heed Scramuzza's cautionary words (The Emperor Claudius 284 n. 12): "One cannot say that Augustus was right or Claudius wrong...Where interest, glory or idealism are concerned, arithmetic is meaningless."

On secular games see, in addition to the items mentioned above, Warde Fowler, The Religious Experience of the Roman People 438-447; Nilsson, RE I A 1696-1720; E. Diehl, RhM 83 (1934) 255-272 and 348-372; Latte, RR 246-248; and, for a collection of all relevant ancient sources, with commentary and full bibliography, Pighi, De Ludis Saecularibus (originally 1941; reprinted with supplem. 1965), esp. 3-29.

3.1  decessit paralysi altero die quam correptus est:

L. Vitellius is last heard of in A.D. 51, validissima gratia, aetate extrema (Ann. 12.42.3), when a senator accused him of treason and of having a desire for the imperial power, serious charges for anyone to have to face, given Claudius' excessive and unreasoning timidity (cf. T. D. Ruth, The Problem of Claudius 82 and 95); however, Agrippina now repaid her debt to Vitellius and minis magis quam precibus brought Claudius round to exiling the accuser.

Vitellius probably died fairly soon thereafter (before 54 at any rate: see below, n. on statua pro rostris...PRINCIPEM).
3.1-

duobus filiis superstitibus, quos...consules vidit:

these were Aulus (the Princeps) and Lucius (on whom see Dessau, PIR V 501; Hanslik, RE Suppl. IX s.v. 'Vitellius' no. 7d). They were consuls in A.D. 48 (the year after their father's third consulship), with Aulus as cos. ord. (his name does not actually appear in the fasti; cf. Degrassi, I.I. XIII.1 pp. 332-333, but see Ann. 11.23.1) and Lucius as his suffect. This would suggest that Aulus was the elder of the two sons and this, in turn, leads to interesting, though speculative, conclusions about their birthdates (see below, Vit. 3.2, n. on A. Vitellius...cons.).

Sestilia probatissima nec ignobili femina: the comment on her character is confirmed by Tacitus: pari probitate (as that shown by Vitellius' wife Galeria) mater Vitelliorum Sextilia, antiqui moris (H 2.64.2); nihil principatu filii adsecuta nisi luctum et bonam famam (H 3.67.1; cf. S.'s words below in 52:mater...appellatum imperatorem pro afflicto statim lamentata sit); see also Dio 65.4.5. She was in Rome early in 69, when Otho made special arrangements for her protection (Plut. O 5.3; cf. H 1.75.2), and she appears to have remained there throughout the year: in mid-July when Vitellius entered the city in triumph, he embraced her publicly at the Capitol and bestowed on her the title Augusta (H 2.89.2; cf. Dio 65.4.5). According to Tacitus, she died fessa aetate about the middle of December, only a few days before Vitellius himself was killed (H 3.67.1); S.'s story (below, Vit. 14.5) is much more lurid and probably belongs to a series of hostile anecdotes about astrology and methods of predicting the future.
The exact form of her name is not clear, since Tacitus gives Sextilia. Fluss, RE II A s.v. 'Sextilius' no. 32, suggests that she may have been the daughter of one M. Sextilius Q.f., a duumvir of Antium, who had been IIIvir a.a.a.f.f. (CIL X 6661; PIR S 456; RE s.v. no. 11): if this purely speculative identification were correct, it would confirm the form of her name and might explain S.'s somewhat cautious nec ignobili femina.

defunctum senatus publico funere honoravit: the locus classicus for senatorial decrees in honour of citizens who had rendered distinguished service to their country is Cicero's Ninth Philippic, an encomium on Ser. Sulpicius Rufus (cos. 51 B.C.), who had died early in 43 while on an embassy to M. Antonius. At the end of the speech Cicero formally proposes (§ 15-17) that Ser. Sulpicio statuam pedestrem aeneam in rostris ex huius ordinis sententia statui and that cumque antea senatus auctoritatem suam in virorum fortium funeribus ornamentisque ostenderit, placere eum quam amplissume supremo suo die efferri (cf. Dig. I 2.43). Under the Principate the impulse for such honours usually came from the Emperor; e.g. Ann. 3.48.1 (A.D. 21): Sub idem tempus, ut mors Sulpicii Quirini publicis exsequiis frequentaretur, petivit a senatu (sc. Tiberius); cf. Ann. 6.11.3: L. Calpurnius Piso, praefectus urbi.

For a discussion of the history of this practice see Mommsen, Staatsr. III 1187-9; cf. also J. M. C. Toynbee, Death and Burial in the Roman World 55-56.

Statua pro rostris...PRINCIPEM: the setting-up of statues
3.1-

in this location was also a senatorial prerogative (see previous n. and cf. Galba 23); from the inscription we may presume that this was done in Claudius' lifetime; cf. his comment quoted by Josephus (AJ 20.12): ὁ κράτιστος καὶ μου τιμωτάτος Ωβιτέλλιος...
The Career of Vitellius to his Accession

(3.2-9.1)

3.2 A. Vitellius L. filius imperator...Druso Caesare

Norbano Flacco cons: S. here gives as Vitellius' birthdate either 24th Sept. or 7th Sept., A.D. 15 (cf. Dio 65.22.1); however, to this information we must add from Vit. 18: periit...anno vitae septimo quinquagesimo (cf. H 4.86: septimum et quinquagensimum aetatis annum explebat), which implies a different year for his birth. Holzapfel argued in detail and convincingly (Klio 15 [1918] 105-118) that a) the text of Tacitus must be emended, since a man with a birthday in September who died some three months later could not be completing any year of his life: he suggested explerat, which would agree with Aur.Vict. Caes. 8.6 annos natus septuaginta et quinque amplius; b) there are two traditions, then, which give the year of Vitellius' birth as A.D. 15 or A.D. 12; c) although Dessau (PIR V 499) accepts A.D. 15, pointing for corroboration to A.D. 48, the year of Vitellius' consulship (cf. Augustan "rules"), further consideration of A.D. 48 reminds us that A. Vitellius' younger brother Lucius (see above, Vit.3.1,n. on duobus filiis... consules vidit) succeeded him as consul in that year: Lucius must therefore have been born no later than 15 and Aulus in an earlier year, presumably 12; d) an examination of events in the campaign of the autumn of 69 and their relationship to Vitellius' birthday celebrations in that year (mentioned at H 2.95.1 and Dio 65.4.3)
indicates that 7th Sept. is far more likely than 24th for Vitellius' birthday (cf. M. Puhl, *De Othone et Vitellio Imperatoribus Quaestiones* [Diss. Halle, 1883] 24-31).

pueritiam primamque adolescetiam Capreis egit inter Tiberiana scorta: Tiberius left Rome, never to return, in A.D. 26 (Ann. 4.57) and in 27 settled on the island of Capri (S. Tib. 39-42; Ann. 4.67; Dio 58.1.1 and 5.1); given his longing for seclusion and his loathing of public attention, it is not surprising that increasingly lurid tales began to circulate about sexual irregularities (Ann. 6.1; S. Tib. 43-45; Dio 58.22.1; cf. Seager, *Tiberius* 224: "...it is said that he showed such imagination in the invention of unprecedented sexual pastimes that eager chroniclers found themselves constrained to devise a whole new terminology.") The truth or falsehood of these stories need not exercise us, but we should note that where they can be dated in our sources, they occur in our sources only in narratives of the year 31 (Tac.) and 33 (Dio) - that is, Tiberius gradually slipped into a life of unbridled sensuality.

From this, then, we can easily conclude that the allegation cited here concerning A. Vitellius is mere *vituperatio*: if he was born in A.D. 12 he would have been 19 in A.D. 31 and the phrase *pueritiam primamque adolescetiam...egit* is meaningless, though we may surmise that the later date for his birth perhaps represents an attempt to give this story a spurious air of authenticity.

Since the allegation that Vitellius was one of Tiberius' *spintriae* is found also in Dio (64.4.2; 65.5.1), G. B. Townend has suggested that it originated with Cluvius Rufus (*Hermes* 89 [1961])
3.2-
241-2; AJP 85 [1964] 370); however, we should also consider F. B Marsh's observations on the development of the literary picture of Tiberius as tyrant and its possible Domitianic context (Reign of Tiberius 222).

Capreis: S. displays a possibly unhealthy interest in the stories of Capri and of the spintriae (see refs. cited in prev. n. and cf. T. F. Carney, PACA 11 [1968] 11-12). However, his one other reference to spintriae is odd; at Calig. 16.1 he says of Gaius: spintriae monstrosarum libidinum aegre ne profundo mergeret exoratus, urbe submovit. What were they doing in the city? This suggests that the tradition about them may be as bogus as the stories about Vitellius.

existimatusque corporis gratia initium et causa incrementorum patri fuisse: again, this story may appear superficially plausible, but it will not stand up to close examination: as a novus homo L. Vitellius will have advanced rather slowly in the imperial service, having to "prove" himself at several levels before becoming eligible for the consulship. His career probably started even before Aulus was born, and that career will have been well on its way by A.D. 26, when Tiberius left Rome, so that to say that Aulus could in any way have been responsible for the initium of his father's career is rubbish; as for its incrementa, the allegation is only marginally more plausible. Here again, we have a commonplace of Flavian vituperatio of either A.D. 69 or some time thereafter.
omnibus probris contaminatus: this is extremely vague and suggests that later propagandists could find very little to say about Vitellius during the principates of Gaius and Claudius.

Gaio per aurigandi...studium: cf. S. Calig.18.3; 54; Dio 59.2.5, 5.2-5, 14. 6-7: with regard to his public performances Gaius seems almost to have been on a par with Nero.

Claudio per aleae studium: Claudius' addiction to gaming was notorious; cf. S. Claud. 5.33.2; Sen. Apocol. 12 ad fin; 14-15.

cum propter eadem haec: for Nero's addiction to chariot racing see S. Ner. 22.1-2; 24.2; 53; like Gaius (cf. S. Calig. 55.2) Nero was a fanatical devotee of the factio Prasina (the Greens):
Vitellius, perhaps oddly, was a supporter of the factio Veneta (the Blues; see below, Vit.7.1).

In addition, Tacitus gives us a scornful sketch of Vitellius, pillar of the Neronian establishment (Ann. 14.49.1): ...in quibus adulatione promptissimus fuit A. Vitellius, optimum quemque iurgio lacessens et respondenti reticens, ut pavida ingenia solent.

praesidens certaminis Neroneo: for the institution of the Neronia, the first "Greek games" held in Rome, see S. Ner. 12.3; Ann. 14.20-21; Dio 61.21.1-2: the presidents at the various contests were, unusually, ex-consuls. The games were supposed to be quinquennial (see Tacitus' notice of their second celebration in A.D. 65: Ann. 16.2.2 and 16.4-5) and it is clear that it was in A.D. 65
that Nero first sang in public, which enables us to date the incident described here by S. (cf. Ner. 21.1-2, which seems to refer to the same incident, though S. is probably wrong in describing it as a repetition of the Neronia ante praestitutum diem: any such repetition must have come after 65). Not unnaturally, these Games lapsed after Nero’s death (but cf. Aur.Vict. Caes. 27.7).

For numismatic issues associated with the Neronia, see Mattingly, BMC Imp. I clxxx-clxxxii; and pp. 249-254, 274, 277-278. On the Neronia generally, see W. Hartke, RE XVII s.v. no. 2 42-48.

5 Trium itaque principum indulgentia...auctus: A. Vitellius was clearly a chip off the old block as far as flattery was concerned; of his honores we know nothing except for what is here and in Vit. 3.1; as for the sacerdotia, we know that he was a member of the Arval Brethren and participated in their rituals from the autumn of A.D. 57 to January, 60, in May, 62 (? see Henzen, AFA p. LXXXVII), April, 63, and somewhere between January and June, 66 (?: Henzen, op. cit. p. LXXXII line 7 reads A. (L.?) Vitellius: L. Vitellius, brother of the Princeps, may have belonged to the College from 63; cf. Henzen, op. cit. p. LXXIX n. 5). In addition, he was a member of the XViri sacris faciundis, probably, though not certainly, before his elevation to the principate; cf. the numerous coins bearing the legend XV VIR SACR. FAC. which he issued in 69 (BMC Imp. I 368-371, 373-4, 393) and Mattingly's comment (op. cit. ccxxiv): "the importance attached by Vitellius to this one (sc. priesthood) is...rather curious: probably he valued it because he
had held it as a private citizen - even more perhaps for the banquets for which the college was famous."

_proconsulatum Africae_: the date of this is not known and can only be estimated approximately from the information contained in the previous n. As S. makes clear immediately below, we need a two-year period for Vitellius' service in Africa: the period 57-60 is excluded, leaving 54-57 (Vitellius first appears in the AFA in the autumn of 57, probably October or early November), 63-65 and 66-68 (Thomasson, _Die Statthalter...Nordafrikas II_ 39-40 ignores the probable appearance of Vitellius in the AFA for 66).

Of these dates, 54-57 seem most probable, since the "normal" interval between consulship and proconsulship is 7-9 years under Claudius and 8-10 years under Nero (Thomasson, op. cit. I 29); the later dates are therefore less likely and the implication of S.'s words above (Vit. 3.2) _ut pater magno opere semper contenderit, ne qua ei provincia vivo se committeretur_ is that this held good only while the father was alive and changed soon after his death; as we saw, L. Vitellius probably died between 51 and 54 (see above, Vit. 3.1, n. on _decessit paralysi...corruptus est_); accordingly, the years 55-57 would fit all available evidence quite well.

_curamque operum publicorum_: for this job there were two curatores of praetorian or consular rank and, although their precise designation varies, the fullest form of their title appears to be _curatores aedium sacrarum et operum locorumque publicorum_ (CIL VI 3702; cf. VI 858): since the job naturally fell into two parts, each curator tended to look after one area (cf. CIL VI
Vitellius

814: operum publicorum curator, and CIL VI 1517: curator aedium sacrarum). However, Mommsen argued from this passage in S. (Staatsr. II 3 1052 n. 2) that the short title curator operum publicorum was used in a general sense for both jobs, since Vitellius clearly had responsibility for temples, as can be seen below.

This office was established during the later years of Augustus and represents a return to the aerarium of responsibility for the maintenance and repair of public buildings (cf. RG 19-21).

In general, see Mommsen, Staatsr. II 3 1045-1054, esp. 1051-1053; Kornemann, RE IV s.v. 'curatores' I.A.4 (1787-1790: this includes a complete epigraphical listing); cf. G. H. Stevenson, CAH X 203.

in provincia singularem innocentiam praestitit:
cf. H 2.97.2: integrum illic (sc. in Africa) ac favorabilem proconsulatum Vitellius...egerat. In Africa, perhaps, away from the corrupting influences of Rome and the temptations of a powerful army command, the best side of Vitellius' nature could appear; cf. H 3.86. 2: inerat tamen simplicitas ac liberalitas...; certainly the officers of a squadron of auxiliary cavalry, the ala Siliana, remembered him with affection and rendered his cause important assistance in the spring of 69 (H 1.70.1-2).

in urbano officio...supposuisse: his job was apparently salaried and counted as a curule office, with magisterial insignia (Mommsen, Staatsr. II 3 1049-1051). However, we do not know the size or the basis of Vitellius' fortune and since he appears to have occupied this position after his "honest" two years in Africa, he may
well have been in financial difficulties because of his horse-racing and gambling activities; certainly in late 68 he was alleged to be desperately short of cash and deeply in debt (see below, Vit. 7.2). The votive offerings and adornments in the temples under his care must have presented an irresistible temptation to him, especially since he will have had reason to hope that his cheap substitutes would go unnoticed. However, all of this is qualified by the word *ferebatur* and we may again be dealing with Flavian propaganda, a particularly insidious specimen, based on Vitellius' lack of resources and Nero's well-known cupidity (cf. S. Ner. 32.4).

*aurichalcum*: the ancients, like ourselves, knew full well that "all that glisters is not gold", but with *aurichalcum* (< ὄρειχαλκὸς, "mountain-copper," used with zinc to make brass) they liked to pretend otherwise. The best-known Roman use for *aurichalcum* was in the production of coins - the *sestertius* and *dupondius* (cf. BMC Imp. I 11; RIC I 27; cf. Pliny, NH 34.2-4).

6 *Vxorem habuit Petroniam consularis uiri filiam*: an examination of scholarly attempts to identify this lady shows clearly the "progress" of prosopography in the last eighty years: in *PIR III* (1898) von Rohden identified Petronia (P 241) as the daughter of P. Petronius P.f. (P 198; cos. suff. A.D. 19) and sister of P. Petronius Turpilianus (P 233; cos. ord. A.D. 61), and Hofstee, Commentary *ad hunc loc.* reveals the reasoning which applied: since in 69 Vitellius' wife was Galeria Fundana (see below) and he had by her a daughter of marriageable age (H 1.59.2), his marriage to her
must have occurred not later than 56; from the remainder of this chapter in S. it is clear that the ending of Vitellius' first marriage must have come c. 55, with the death of his son Vitellius Petronianus soon before (cf. duxit max Galeriam below). Since this son was of an age to be manumitted (about sixteen years old at least) in 55-56, he must have been born c. 39-40 at the latest; his mother therefore was married c. 38 and was herself born no later than 27, and probably earlier. Hofstee concluded that P. Petronius (cos. suff. A.D. 19) was the most likely person to be her father but did not exclude P. Petronius Turpilianus (cos. ord. A.D. 61) or A. Petronius Lurco (cos. suff. A.D. 58).

However, this Petronia subsequently married Cn. (P.? ) Cornelius Dolabella (see above Galba 12.2, n. on Cn. Dolabellae) and was almost certainly the mother of Ser. Dolabella Petronianus (cos. ord. 86), who must presumably have been born c. 53. Hanslik, writing on Petronia in 1937 (RE XIX s.v. 'Petronius' no. 97) and interpreting H 2.64.1 (Igitur Vitellius metu et odio, quod Petroniam uxor eius max Dolabella in matrimonium accepisset...) to mean that Petronia and Vitellius were not married for long and that Petronia was probably responsible for the divorce, concluded: "jedenfalls fällt der Tod dieses Petronianus (sc. the son of Vitellius and Petronia) längere Zeit nach der Scheidung des Vitellius von P(etronia)." This, of course, could make Petronia very much younger than was previously supposed, and modern prosopographers allow that she may have been the granddaughter of the cos. suff. of A.D. 19 (Hanslik, loc. cit.; cf. Groag's remarks in PIR² C 1347, published in 1936; but in his stemma of the Vitellii in RE Suppl. IX [1962] 1707-8, Hanslik seems
to make her his great-granddaughter!); however, Hanslik is quite certain that she was not the daughter of Petronius Turpilianus (cos. ord. A.D. 61).

We should note that Hanslik's theories are very thin-spun indeed; his interpretation of H 2.64.1 is possible, but not compelling; and his reading of Vit. 6 is implausible: certainly the breach between Petronia and Vitellius seems to have been a bitter one, which could well account for the hatred which Vitellius later felt for Dolabella, but it is surely perverse to take S.'s words below to mean anything other than that Vitellius' second marriage came after the death of his son. The son's death, when he was at least sixteen and possibly older, may have come c. 53, or sooner (he would be his mother's sole [?] heir only until she bore Dolabella's son): this, then, pushes his birthdate, the date of Vitellius' first marriage, and the date of Petronia's birth back even further than Hofstee calculated. Moreover, on balance, we may conclude that Hofstee's picture makes better sense than Hanslik's and, while Petronia may have been the granddaughter of the cos. suff. of A.D. 19, she could have been his daughter (cf. the apparently large gap between him and his son, the cos. ord. of A.D. 61).

Finally, we should also note that Petronia was a cousin of sorts to Vitellius: the cos. suff. of A.D. 19 was the son-in-law of Vitellia, on whom see above, n. on Vit. ceterum P. Vitellius... rerum Augusti procurator.

filium Petronianum...hausisset: there is no further information about Vitellius Petronianus; presumably the story of his
mother's will and his emancipation from his father's potestas is true; his death soon thereafter (brevi) gave rise to the ugly rumours which we have here. This is, however, unlikely to be Flavian vituperatio, since we also have Vitellius' "explanation" of what happened. Presumably the murder story was current in Rome at the time of the young man's death: Vitellius' version is somewhat similar to Nero's account of events leading to Agrippina's death (Ann. 14.10.3), and both may be true.

Galeriam Fundanam: the year of her birth is unknown; the date was 3rd June (AFA for 69 ad loc. [= CIL VI 2051 Tab. II line 10] reads III. NON. IV [...], which, as Henzen points out[p. XCV n. 6], could be June or July, but must be June because this entry begins [Isdem co]s., as does the previous one (for 29th May) and there were new consuls on 1st July (H 1.77.2; cf. G. B. Townend, AJP 83 [1972] 118-122); however, presumably still thinking of the Nones of July (= 5th July), Henzen glossed this passage with Ian. 5, an error perpetuated in CIL [ad loc.] and repeated by MW).

liberos utriusque sexus tullit: the unfortunate boy, who was six years old in May of 69 when his mother took him to Gaul, was given at Lugdunum the title Germanicus and an imperatorial salutation (H 2.59.3; Dio 65.1.2a; Tacitus' use of infans is more significant than he perhaps realized). He survived his father's fall but some months later, in A.D. 70, he was put to death on the order of Mucianus, mansuram discordiam obtendens, ni semina belli restinxisset (H 4.80.1; cf. Dio 65.22.2 and see below Vit. 18).
In his article 'Vitellius Germanicus' (RE Suppl. IX s.v. 'Vitellius' no. 7i), Hanslik begins, "Geboren am 6. Juni 62..." and later says: "Anlässlich seines Geburtstages im J. 69 brachten in Rom die Arvalbrüder ein Opfer dar, CIL VI 2051 (cf. 32359) 10.12": that is, he thinks iiii Non. Iun. = 6th June, and that the words ob nata]lem Galeriae Germanic[i imp. III A]ug. refer to Vitellius' son!

The daughter (Vitellia? cf. RE Suppl. IX s.v. 'Vitellius' no. 7r) was the elder child, since she was promised and perhaps married in 69 to D. Valerius Asiaticus, governor of Gallia Belgica (H 1.59.2: whether or not the marriage actually took place will depend on the meaning assigned to generum adscivit; cf. OLD s.v. 'gener' (b)); at any rate, by late 69 Vitellius was, allegedly, offering her hand to Antonius Primus (cf. H 3.78.1; see further, G. B. Townend, AJP 83 [1962] 125-129). Later on, Vespasian Vitellius hostis sui filiam splendidissime maritavit, dotavit etiam et instruxit (S. Vesp. 14).

Vitellius seems to have felt a fierce affection for both his children (cf. H 3.67) and they figure on his coinage in issues from Rome, Spain and Gaul (cf. BMC Imp. I ccxxiv, ccxxix, pp. 370, 372, 386 n., 392); furthermore, their very existence gave him "dynastic" advantages which were not available to either Galba or Otho in 68-69.

7.1 in inferiorem Germaniam: this was, of course, as successor to Fonteius Capito (on whose tenure in Lower Germany see above, G 11, n. on in Germania Fonteio Capitone). The appointment may have been made while Galba was still on his journey from Spain to Rome; if it was after his arrival in Rome, it must have come soon thereafter (cf.
Vitellius

7.1-

above G 12.2, n. on ut primum urbem introiit and H 1.52.1: sub
ipsas superioris anni kalendas Decembres Aulus Vitellius
inferiorem Germaniam ingressus...).

contra opinionem: this suggests that everyone was surprised, Vitellius included. He was in straitened circumstances (see below 7.2) and this would suggest that he had been "unemployed" for some time prior to his posting to Germany; so perhaps he was under some sort of cloud even during Nero's later years: Nero did not always employ his "friends"; cf. his remark to Otho (Dio 61.11.2, quoted above, p.268).

T. Vini: this correction (by L. Torrentius, 1578) of the meaningless mss. reading T. Iun(i) is very neat paleographically and virtually certain; cf. tunc potentissimi immediately below, and see G 14.2, esp. n. on T. Vinius legatus...cupiditatis immensae.

per communem factionis Venetae favorem: there were four factiones in Roman chariot-racing by the end of the Julio-Claudian period: the Albata (Whites), Russata (Reds), Prasina (Greens) and the Veneta (Blues). The Reds and the Whites seem to have existed during the late Republic, with the Greens and Blues appearing probably early in the first century A.D.: these names refer to the colour of the tunics worn by the drivers and the term factio applies to the supporters in the crowd as much as to the various stables themselves. This passage in S. is the earliest mention of the Blues (cf. Dio 65.5.1) and Vitellius' passion for
7.1-
them was such that in June or July of 69 we actually find the Arval Brethren performing a sacrifice on their behalf: ..._m. faction_.

Venet. porcam et a[gnam.

This passage is also the first example of political consequences arising from support of some faction; in Constantinople later the quarrels between supporters of the Blues and the Greens (the only factiones remaining after the second century A.D.) were notorious, reaching into religion (Greens=monophysites, Blues=trinitarians) and, especially, politics and culminating in the infamous riots of A.D. 532 which left, at the lowest estimate, 30,000 dead (cf. Procop. 1.24.54).

On factiones, see further Pollack, RE VI 1954-1957, s.v; H. A. Harris, Sport in Greece and Rome 151-243.

_nisi quod Galba...contemptu magis quam gratia electum:_

with Galba's remark cf. the famous one attributed to Caesar by Shakespeare (Julius Caesar 1.2.191-194):

> Let me have men about me that are fat; Sleek-headed men and such as sleep o'nights. Yond Cassius has a lean and hungry look; He thinks too much: such men are dangerous.

As mentioned previously (pp144-7), for the top positions, at least, Galba preferred to find rather sluggish nonentities; Vitellius probably seemed ideal (cf. S.'s description of him in 7.3, below), and on past form he would probably have done a good job, but for the restiveness of the army and, most important of all, the presence as a legatus legionis of the disaffected C. Fabius Valens.
7.2 satis constat...ut uxore et liberis...meritorio

cenaculo abditis domum in reliquam partem anni ablocaret:
satis constat suggests that this is simply vituperatio and an
extreme illustration of Vitellius' financial position in 68. It is
certainly reminiscent of Caesar's financial position in 61 B.C.
(S. DJ 18.1) when, according to Plutarch (Caes. 11.1), he was obliged
to borrow heavily from Crassus in order to satisfy his creditors
sufficiently to enable him to leave for Hispania Ulterior.

cenaculum is widely mistranslated as "garret" or "attic" (so
Graves and Rolfe ad loc.; cf. OLD s.v.), and we are apparently to
assume that only garrets were let as lodgings! This immediately
raises the question, since housing in Rome consisted basically of the
domus (private mansion) and the insula (block of flats, in which the
whole of the main floor could be leased, forming what amounted to
a domus), of what happened to the intermediate floors of insulae.
It seems likely that the word cenaculum means simply "flat" or
"apartment": some would be wretched and small (for a graphic picture,
see Carcopino, Daily Life in Ancient Rome chap. 2,§§ 1 and 2),
while others no doubt approximated more nearly to Albany (cf. the
aediculae rented by Caelius: Cic. Cael. 17: aedicula too appears to
be misdefined in OLD).

Finally, the phrase in reliquam partem annimay appear puzzling:
if Vitellius left Rome around 1st November, 68, it is hard to imagine
why he would let his house for two months only. The annus in
question is probably the "renting-year", which appears to have begun
on 1st July (cf. Petron. Sat. 38.10; Mart. 12.32.1).

On letting and hiring generally, see Dig. 19.2; Buckland,
Textbook 3 498-503; J. A. Crook, Law and Life of Rome 152-158.
quorum publica vectigalia interverterat: the immediate problem here is the nature of the vectigalia which Vitellius embezzled. There were two kinds of vectigalia: a) items such as portoria, sales taxes, inheritance duties and rents from various types of state property which were, in the first century A.D. at least, collected by societates publicanorum on behalf of the state treasury, which ultimately received the revenues (cf. Ann.4.6.3; 13.50-51, and Furneaux' and Kornemann's comments ad loc.; and for innovations in this area, see S. Calig. 40); b) local revenues, most often rents from land and other property (cf. Cic. Fam. 13.7 and 13.11 for lands owned by Atella and Arpinum; see also S. Tib. 49.2; and, in general, see Abbott and Johnson, Municipal Administration in the Roman Empire 138-143); these revenues too were farmed (cf. Liebenam, Städteverwaltung 312-320; J. S. Reid, The Municipalities of the Roman Empire 455).

Presumably it is this second group of vectigalia, local revenues, with which we are concerned; Vitellius must have been involved with a societas which was farming revenues for the towns of Sinuessa and Formiae (they are only 18 mp apart and may have co-operated in putting their revenue-collection out to tender). If the vectigalia had been of the first group, it would not have been the townspeople who were after Vitellius, but agents of the aerarium, unless, of course, these towns were themselves responsible for collecting revenues for the state (unlikely, this early).

In general, see the useful summaries in OCD s.vv.'publicani', 'vectigal'; and Urögdi, RE Suppl. XI 1184-1208, esp. 1202-3; Rostowzew, Geschichte der Staatspacht 374-415, esp. 379.
terrore calumniæ: cf. J. M. Kelly, Roman Litigation (1966) 160 (slightly adapted): "No doubt the most typical instance of calumnia is that of corruptly instituting an action or prosecution against another; and...since as a statistical generality plaintiffs or prosecutors (i.e., in this context, calumniatores) would tend to be more than a match in power for the defendants, a defendant... would, as a statistical generality, find himself faced with the task of suing one who was more powerful than himself, a situation which ...was essentially disadvantageous and unpromising."

calumnia could exist in both civil and criminal law: in civil law, the penalty for bringing a vexatious action was one-tenth of the amount wrongfully claimed or, in the case of a false claim of liberty from slavery, one-third of the value of the slave (Caius, Inst. 4.174-181 and de Zulueta, ad loc.); in criminal law, condemnation for calumnia involved infamia, which meant that one could not stand for public office nor bring an accusation before a judicium publicum; it usually also included exile or relegation or loss of rank; furthermore, in the early Republic the letter 'K' may have been branded on the heads of calumniatores (Dig. III. 2.1; XLVIII.2.4; Paul. Sent. 5.4.11; Cic. Rosc. Am. 57); and other penalties were arbitrarily introduced from time to time by various Emperors (cf. Ann. 3.37.1; 13.23.2; 13.33.3; S. Tit. 9.5; Dom. 9.3; Pliny Pan. 35).

In general, see Hitzig, RE III 1414-1421 s.v. 'Calumnia'.

injuriarum formulam...intendisset: the use of the word formula relates to a technicality of Roman legal procedure in the first stage of a civil action (in iure). The so-called 'formulary
7.2-7.3

procedure was developed through praetorian initiative as a replacement for the cumbersome and rather primitive legis actions and was eventually sanctioned by a Lex Aebutia (of uncertain date - pre-Ciceronian and probably after 150 B.C.). No longer were ritual words and actions, derived from archaic pontifical lore, merely repeated and acted out by magistrate and litigants alike: the magistrate now controlled the proceedings and could lay down the structure of the formula, which was a written statement of the details of the case, hammered out between the magistrate and the parties, and used in the second stage of the proceedings - apud iudicem. There were model formulae laid down in the praetor's Edict and the words were adapted to suit the particular case. Essentially, then, the formula spelled out precisely the point at issue and gave instructions to the iudex (named in the formula) on how he was to settle things, depending on which side convinced him.

On the formula, see Gaius Inst. 4.30-68, esp. 39-44; 4.115-137; Buckland, Textbook 3 628-662, esp. 647-659.

On injuria (= insult or outrage, by words or conduct), see Gaius, Inst. 3.220-225 and de Zulueta, ad loc.; Buckland, op. cit. 589-592.

7.3 Advenientem: this participle is perhaps less precise than it may at first appear to be: arriving where? The remainder of this paragraph depicts Vitellius on his journey (presumably the last part as he approached Cologne) and the next chapter begins castra vero ingressus, so we are left with a somewhat vague general impression of Vitellius moving north surrounded by an aura of bonhomie and
affability.

We may well suspect that something was afoot: did a representative of the military malcontents in Lower Germany (cf. H 1.8.2-9.1) meet Vitellius on the northern side of the Alps so that he was fully briefed as to the situation in his province and, perhaps unwittingly, was already being primed for the coming attempt? (cf. H 1.52.4, espec. the final sentence, and see below, 8.1, n. on vixdum mense transacto.)

8.1 castra vero ingressus...supplicia dempsit:cf. H 1.52.1: ...Aulus Vitellius inferiorem Germaniam ingressus hiberna legionum cum cura adierat: redditi plerisque ordines, remissa ignominia, adlevatae notae.

_notas_ refers to lesser penalties than reduction in rank or floggings: these were more a matter of humiliation (cf. ignominiosis) than major punishments; e.g., Octavian punished centurions by making them stand all day in front of the praetorium, sometimes beltless and clad only in their tunics, and on occasion holding measuring rods or even a piece of turf (S. Aug. 24.2; cf. Val. Max. 2.7.9; Frontinus Strat. 4.1.26-27).

People accused of serious offences habitually put on mourning (sordes). Best-known perhaps is the case of Cicero early in 58 B.C.: when Clodius promulgated his bill banning from fire and water anyone who had put Roman citizens to death without trial, not only Cicero, but many Equites and the members of the Senate too put on mourning (Cic. Sest. 26-27, 32; Pis. 17-18; Plut. Cic. 30.6-31.1; Dio 38.14.4-16.3). Accordingly, as Hofstee puts it, _sordes dempsit=crimina remisit._
vixdum mense transacto: this agrees with what Tacitus has:
cf. sub ipsas superioris anni (sc. 68) Kalendas Decembres Aulus

Vitellius inferiorem Germaniam ingressus (H 1.52.1) with H 1.55 and
nocte, quae kalendas Ianuarias secuta est, in coloniam Agrippinensem
aquilifer quartae legionis epulanti Vitellio nuntiat quartam et
duovicisimam legiones proiectis Galbae imaginibus in senatus ac
populi Romani verba iurasse (H 1.56.2); cf. also Plut. G 22.3-4 and
above, S. G 16.2 and nn.

At this point it is worth reminding ourselves of the legions
of the armies of Lower and Upper Germany and their bases and legates
(where known; see also G. Alföldy, Epigraphische Studien 3 [1967] 7-10):

Legions in Lower Germany

I (Germanica) Bonna Fabius Valens (H 1.57); replaced
probably in Jan. 69 by Herennius
Gallus (H 4.19, 62, 70).

V Alaudae Vetera Fabius Fabullus (H 3.14 - summer
of 69).

XV Primigenia Vetera Munius Lupercus (H 4.18 and 22;
cf. Ritterling, RE XII 1760).

XVI (Gallica) Novaesium Numisius Rufus (H 4.22 and 70;
cf. 4.62).

Legions in Upper Germany

IV Macedonica Moguntiacum A. Caecina Alienus? (cf. Ritterling
RE XII 1554; 1801 - till Jan 69?
legate unknown thereafter).

XXII Primigenia Moguntiacum C. Dillius Vocula (H 4.24; CIL
VI 1402).

XXI Rapax Vindonissa unknown; possibly Caecina.

Most of this evidence pertains to the later part of A.D. 69;
however, all of the legates mentioned above (apart from Fabius Valens,
Fabius Fabullus and Caecina Alienus) were in Germany in late 69 and
early 70 during the revolt of Civilis, and since the eagles of I, XV Primigenia, XVI and of IV Macedonica remained in Germany throughout this period, it is tempting to assume that the legionary legates remained there also. There is no mention in our sources of any change in the command of these legions made by Vitellius in 69 and, apart from necessary replacements for Valens and Caecina in January of that year, there is not much time for changes to have been carried out between the time of Vitellius' arrival in Rome and the outbreak of the revolt of Civilis. The case of Dillius Vocula seems especially clear: Caecina took a vexillation from XXII Primigenia with him to Italy (cf. H 1.61 cf. below, Appendix I (a)), while Vitellius took almost the entire legion, including its eagle, when he advanced (H 2.57, 100; cf. 2.89): what was left in Germany must have been pauci veterum militum in hibernis plus raw recruits from the Gallic provinces (cf. H 2.57); and yet when Vocula is first mentioned he is duoetvicensimae legionis legatus (H 4.24). It is hard to see how he can have been sent to command this fragment, without even an eagle, after Vitellius' departure from Germany.

One problem remains: when Fonteius Capito was murdered (cf. above G 11, n. on in Germania Fonteio Capitone; ? September 68) the prime movers were two of his legati legionum, Valens and Cornelius Aquinus (H 1.7); nothing further is heard of the latter, but it becomes clear that at least one of the legates in the army of Lower Germany must have been fairly new by mid-summer, 69. (See further Ritterling, Fasti des röm. Deutschland 54-55).

neque diei neque temporis ratione habita: temporis
presumably refers to the lateness of the hour; diei is not so clear: perhaps a reference is intended to the fact that dies postriduani were considered ill-omened (Macrob. Sat. 1.16.21-25; cf. above, G 10.1, n. on cum...consendisset tribunal ad fin.); more probably S. is remembering that the soldiers of Lower Germany had just renewed their oath of allegiance to Galba (H 1.55.1-2).

ac iam vespere, subito a militibus e cubiculo raptus etc.: this is a dramatic story but it is rather different from the version in Tacitus (H 1.55-57) and Plutarch (G 22.3-8): for example, no mention is made of the discussion which Vitellius is said to have held with his advisers and of the decision to offer Vitellius as Emperor to the troops (H 1.56.2-3), nor of Valens' arrival from Bonn the next day, nor of the rivalry among the legions of Lower Germany in proclaiming Vitellius (H 1.57.1; Plut. G 22.9-10). However, vespere corresponds to the arrival from Moguntiacum, late on the evening of 1st January, 69, of the aquilifer of IV Macedonica, who reported the revolt of the legions of Upper Germany (IV Macedonica and XXII Primigenia only at this stage, presumably); a militibus...raptus presumably corresponds to the arrival next day of Valens and his salutation of Vitellius as Emperor. Both Tacitus and Plutarch mention that Vitellius was at dinner when the aquilifer arrived (epulanti - H 1.56.2; ἔστωμένων πολλῶν παντι αὐτῇ,- G 22.9): a trace of this has survived in S.'s story below of the blazing dining-room.

S.'s version, then, is extremely compressed and may represent a condensation of the main points of the "common source," quoted (badly)
8.1-8.2

from memory. Furthermore, it makes Vitellius even more of a "victim of circumstance" and there is no implication of gluttony on his part, as may be implied in the other account. However, both versions ultimately reflect Vitellian propaganda and are essentially misleading (see next n.).

8.2 consentiente deinde etiam superioris provinciae exercitu...defecerat: cf. above, G 16.2; according to Tacitus (H 1.57.1), this happened on 3rd January, 69; initially it can only have involved the legions at Moguntiacum. Thereafter, we are told, the civilian population of areas near the military bases, including the disaffected Treveri and Lingones, joined in eagerly and there was a general and enthusiastic upsurge of support for Vitellius.

This story of "spontaneous" actions occurring in widely separated places is probably complete fiction: the revolt seems to have been planned some time prior to 1st January, 69, and its outbreak was carefully orchestrated. This can most easily be seen from the speed with which events followed thereafter: several provincial governors quickly swore allegiance to Vitellius - D. Valerius Asiaticus in Gallia Belgica, Junius Blaesus in Gallia Lugdunensis (along with Legio I Italica and other troops stationed at Lugdunum), Trebellius Maximus and the army of Britain (3 legions), and the governor of Raetia with his auxiliary forces (? Porcius Septimius: cf. H 3.5.2). But Vitellius must have known the full extent of the forces at his disposal by the time he arranged his command structure and sent the invasion columns off towards Italy; and the date of departure of the column of Fabius Valens from Cologne
can be calculated: Valens had reached the territory of the Leuci, whose capital was Tullum (Toul), when he heard that Galba had been murdered in Rome on 15th January, and succeeded by Otho (H 1.64.1); word of this will have been sent to Germany at top speed, since Otho was seeking recognition as Emperor, and so the news will have reached Tullum about 21st January, six days after the event. Valens' march thither was slow and bloody: there had, for example, been a massacre at Divodurum among the Mediomatrici in which 4,000 people were killed (H 1.63). Tullum is 134 mp from Cologne; so if we allow Valens a moderate rate of progress, about 15 mp per day, he will have left Cologne around 12th January.

Can we really believe that Vitellius made his bid for power, received news of support (especially from Britain), arranged his command structure and got his legions out of winter quarters and fully equipped for their long march and a major campaign, all within the space of ten days or so? It seems clear that a plot was fomented in Germany much earlier, perhaps as early as October 68 and certainly by the beginning of December; we may surmise that the key movers were Valens and Caecina and that neighbouring governors had been sounded out well before 2nd January. Vitellius may even have been "chosen" as the candidate for supreme power before his arrival in Germany: the sorts of arguments used on him by Valens (as described by Tacitus at H 1.52.3-4) could have been worked out long before, and once it became clear that he was prepared to co-operate, the dates of "spontaneous outbreaks" and declarations of support could be agreed upon.

There may be some numismatic support for this view in the so-called
8.2-
"military coinage" of A. D. 68 or 69 (for details see BMC Imp I cxcviii-cc and 305-308): see the articles by H. Mattingly and C. M. Kraay in NC 12 (1952) 72-77 and 78-86, respectively: Kraay's paper, which suggests that these anonymous coins were minted about March or April 69 in southern Gaul "to be smuggled into Rome, put into circulation there and thus subvert the loyalty to Otho of both troops and civilians" (78), seems almost totally erroneous, since there is no convincing explanation of how the coins were to be moved to Rome: the Othonian praetorians sent as escort for the embassy to Vitellius and Vitellian forces in Gaul (H 1.74.2-3) simply will not do for this purpose, because Valens sent them back to Italy, fearing that they would tamper with the loyalty of his own troops (for this, the obvious interpretation of Valens' action, see P. Fabia, RPh 37 [1913] 57-60); Mattingly, rejecting what he had previously said in BMC Imp I, suggests that the coinage was issued in Cologne shortly before the proclamation of Vitellius: "Rebellion was certainly being planned some weeks before it became manifest and our series...might serve as a 'ballon d'essai'" (77).

cognomen Germanici...recepit, Augusti distulit, Caesaris in perpetuum recusavit: this is essentially correct (cf. H 1.62.2 and see also H 2.62.2), though there may be one slight error: about 9-10th December, 69, when things were going very badly for the Vitellian cause, ...et Caesarem se dici voluit, aspernatus antea, sed tunc superstitione nominis (H 3.58.3). However, the "Suetonian version" is borne out by Vitellius' coinage, since there are no issues known bearing the title Caesar: the earliest coins, issued at
Cologne or Lugdunum probably in January, 69, bear the legend A. VITELLIIUS IMP. GERMAN.; similarly the earliest Vitellian issue from Rome (late April, 69): A. VITELLIIUS GERMANICUS IMP; in May this becomes A. VITELLIIUS GERMAN. IMP. TR. P.; and then, from about 18th July, the legend is A. VITELLIIUS GERM. IMP. AUG. (P.M.) TR. P. (Mattingly BMC Imp I ccxii, ccxxx-ccxxxi; and NC 12 [1952] 72-77). The most striking thing about the coinage is the word Germanicus: the legend on the issues from Cologne or Lugdunum probably means "A. Vitellius the German Imperator" or "Imperator by the will of the Germanies" (cf. Mattingly, op. cit. ccxxiii); the coinage from Rome probably attempts to make Germanicus more of a cognomen and, therefore, less aggressive and, in Mattingly's words (ibid.), "more constitutional." Its invariable use on Vitellius' coinage may suggest that he intended to use Germanicus as a permanent replacement for Caesar and to break away as much as possible from Julio-Claudian practice.

For further comment on Vitellius' formula with full bibliography and an interesting example from Egypt, see E. Van't Dack, ANRW (= Festschrift J. Vogt) II.1 (1974) 877. For a detailed analysis of Vitellian coinage see A. J. Coale, Jr., Vitellius Imperator: A Study in the Literary and Numismatic Sources for the Rebellion and Rule of the Emperor Vitellius, A. D. 69 (Diss. Michigan, 1971) 110-210; for the "military coinage" especially, 179-184.

9 ac subinde caede Galbae adnuntiata: S. does not concern himself with the details of the Vitellian invasion of Italy, because Vitellius himself took no part in it. The spotlight, then, is firmly fixed on the Emperor himself at all times; accordingly, we hear of the
"eagle incident" (immediately below) because it happened on the day on which Valens' column was formally sent on its way by Vitellius. S.'s lack of interest in this campaign is betrayed by errors of fact and misleading remarks: he has simply quoted rather dimly-recollected sources from memory (cf. Fabia, Les sources de Tacite 159 for this practice; Koester's idea [Der Marsch der Invasionsarmee 21 n. 71] that S. "sich hier einer anderen, mehr von Rom aus orientierten Quelle anschliesst, die über die Einzelheiten der gallischen Ereignisse nicht so genau unterrichtet war", seems unnecessarily elaborate).

The present passage, then, is simply wrong: Tacitus used a detailed source which ultimately rested on "Kriegstagebücher" (Koester, op. cit. 38-42) and, given the detail of his account of events in Germany (H 1.51-70), we must accept his statement that the expedition was well under way before news of Galba's death arrived (H 1.64.1).

**compositis Germanicis rebus**: this rather vague phrase may suggest the later Batavian revolt; there were, however, no signs of any such trouble in Germany in January, 69. The reference is probably to Vitellius' elimination of any opposition to himself (e.g. the killing of Pompeius Propinquus, procurator of Gallia Belgica, the sacking of Julius Burdo, prefect of the *classis Germanica*, and the execution of four centurions at Moguntiacum who had tried to check the initial outbreak of the legions there: H 1.58-59) and perhaps also to his arrangements for fresh troops to be levied in Gaul to supplement the depleted legions on the Rhine (H 2.57.1: this latter point, in strict logic, comes after the troops for the expeditionary
forces are picked and sent on their way, but S.'s account is very summary here).

partitus est copias, quas adversus Othonem praemitteret quasque ipse perduceret: this is misleading and S. has oversimplified the details of the division of the forces at Vitellius' disposal (cf. H 1.61). To be sure, the two-fold division outlined here has a certain validity (the main invasion force - in two parts - led by Valens and Caecina, and the back-up force, led by Vitellius himself), but only the columns led by Valens and Caecina played any part in the overthrow of Otho. However, S.'s sole hint at their role comes at the end of this chapter in the words confirmatum per legatos suos imperium.

For details of the size of the various forces and the invasion routes of Valens and Caecina, see below Appendix I, "The Vitellian Attack on Italy."

praemisso agmine laetum evenit auspicium: again, S. ignores the division of the invasion force. This incident occurred on the day on which Valens' column left Colonia Agrippinensis; cf. H 1.62.3, where the gaudentium militum clamor is as much part of the omen as the quies interritae alitis. S., on the other hand, is more concerned to point a contrast between the lucky omen which the invasion force received and the bad omens which befell Vitellius.

Viennae: for the route and approximate dates of Vitellius' journey to Italy, see below, Appendix 2.
Vienna (mod. Vienne) was the city in Gaul most hostile to Vitellius and the Vitellian cause (cf. H 1.65-66); Vitellius himself was uneasy about its attitude even after he had arrived in Italy (H 2.66.3).

pro tribunali iurareddenti gallinaceus supra humerum ac deinde in capite astitit: this is a strange story and its point is not immediately apparent; obviously from its context it is meant to be a bad omen, as the following sentence, beginning quibus ostentis par respondit exitus, makes clear. But it is not until the last sentence of this Life (Vit. 18) that we learn why: there is a pun on gallus/gallinaceus (= "Gaul" or "cock"), and M. Antonius Primus, legate of Legio VII Gemina in Pannonia and leader of the Danubian legions which overthrew Vitellius late in 69, was a native of Tolosa and therefore a Gaul; also, in his youth he was nicknamed Becco, apparently a Gallic word for a cock's beak. This story is obviously a post eventum fabrication and it is not even very probable in itself, since no alert person is going to allow a cock to jump on his shoulder and then on to his head; indeed, it is downright hostile to Vitellius since there may be a suggestion that he was asleep or half-drunk while ostensibly engaged on "offical business."

This anecdote may have originated in the legions led by Antonius Primus in 69: it is friendly towards him (and therefore not Flavian propaganda; on this point, cf. K. Wellesley's edition of Histories III pp. 3-5, 15-18), and we may suspect S.'s father Suetonius Laetus, a tribune in XIII Gemina (cf. above, 0 10.1), as the proximate source.
The Principate of Vitellius
(10.1-14.5)

Introduction: Otho committed suicide on 16th April, 69, and Vitellius was officially recognized at Rome on 19th April (AFA for 1st May have details of sacrifices ob diem imperi [Vitelli] German. imp., quod XIII K. Mai statut.. est; cf. H 2.55 and L. Holzapfel, Klio 13 [1913] 294-5). Of course, he had been acting as Emperor since 2nd January and any survey of his rule must start with that date.

We are very poorly informed about the general policies and administrative practices of Vitellius' principate. Our surviving accounts concentrate on the campaign to defeat Otho, the Flavian campaign to eliminate Vitellius, and Vitellius' personal orgy of self-indulgence. Very little attention is paid to other matters and all surviving accounts are generally hostile.

Administrative policy: in general, Vitellius seems to have aimed at making a break with the Julio-Claudian past. As we have seen (above, S. Vit. 8.2, n. on cognomen Germanici receptit, Augusti distulit, Caesaris in perpetuum recusavit) he was, initially at least, disinclined to accept the traditional titles of a Princeps and sought something new for himself; this is perfectly understandable, for when "Caesar" is mentioned, only one person really springs to mind, and likewise "Augustus"; and it is arguable that the same was true in A.D. 69. Of course, one could not simply write off a century
The Principate of Vitellius: Introduction, cont.

of history and the sacrifices to the shade of Nero (Vit. 11.2, n.; H 2.95.1) may have been meant to signal the idea that, although changes were under way, the better aspects of Julio-Claudian administrative practice would be retained and there would be continuity; S.'s idea that this was an exemplar of Vitellius' policies for running the state may be mistaken. Tacitus is cynical about the change of emphasis, cum de potestate nihil detrērēt (H 2.62).

However, there is one important practical change which Vitellius did put into effect: he gave posts customarily held by freedmen to equites (H 1.58.1). There is no doubt that by the end of the Julio-Claudian period the power and influence of imperial freedmen was widely resented (cf. above p.424). This had, of course, arisen because under the Republic a magistrate or provincial governor had used his own staff of slaves or freedmen to carry out the administrative duties of his office. In this respect Augustus and his successors had merely followed precedent. However, the growth of the imperial bureaucracy was such that the sort of job that would once have been scorned by the free-born now carried with it considerable power and patronage and was therefore attractive to ambitious men. Just as the leading freedmen of the later Julio-Claudian period were given equestrian standing (or even quaestorian and praetorian status; cf. above Vit. 2.5, n. on Narcissi quoque et Pallantis imagines aureas inter Lares coluit), so members of the equestrian order were prepared to fill positions previously occupied by freedmen. For example, the Gallic rhetor Julius Secundus, who was certainly free-born and may have been of equestrian status,
served as Otho's ab epistulis (Plut. O 9.3; cf. PIR² 1 559; cf. 560). Vitellius, then, exploited this attitude and those who served under him were not subsequently ashamed of what they had done (cf. CIL XI 5028 = MW 338, which commemorates Sex. Caesius Propertianus, a military tribune of Legio IV Macedonica of the army of Upper Germany in 69, who served as imperial secretary in charge of the patrimonium Caesaris, legacies and petitions; since Leg. IV Maced. was cashiered in A.D. 70, he was probably active in affairs in Germany in 69 and an eques by then), because after this time senior administrative positions were commonly held by equites; witness the career of S. himself. There was certainly no intent on Vitellius' part to humiliate the equestrian order; on the contrary, he upheld the dignity of the equites by forbidding them from training or appearing as gladiators (H 2.62.2; cf. Dio 65.6.3, where senators are included and the ban is extended to theatrical performances as well).

In Rome Vitellius adhered to constitutional practice by assuming his various powers gradually (cf. AFA 30th April, 1st May). He was lenient towards Otho's family and friends (H 1.75; 2.60, 62.1; BMC Imp I ccxxviii, though he still acquired a possibly exaggerated reputation for cruelty; cf. below, Vit. 14), he attended meetings of the Senate regularly and participated in debates (H 2.91.3; Dio 65.7.2), he canvassed on behalf of his friends before the consular elections in true Republican fashion (H 2.91.2), and in rewarding his supporters with consulships he tried as much as possible to avoid displacing those designated by his predecessors; hence his designations for ten years (see below, Vit. 11.2 n. on comitia in decem annos.

ordinavit). Finally, we should remember that the games, shows and feasts, the extravagance of which is heavily censured in our sources (e.g. Vit. 13; H 2.91.2. 95.1-2; Dio 65.2-4, 7.1), kept the general populace happy and helped to provide employment (cf. S. Vesp. 18 and 19.1).

The Army: the armies of Germany had revolted because they felt cheated of what they considered their natural rewards for the suppression of the revolt of Vindex; they were ill-disciplined and almost uncontrollable, and they wanted loot and good postings, especially to the Praetorian Guard. Vitellius seems to have given in to them constantly (cf. H 2.94.2, where the soldiers from Germany were still seeking revenge on supporters of Vindex: also, Vitellius had no money to pay a donative) and he allowed them to pillage their way across Italy even after their final victory (H 2.56-57). Of course, he had played no part in the Bedriacum campaign and as Emperor he was very much the creation of the German legions, hence his weakness, for example, with the Batavian cohorts who were perhaps the worst troublemakers in the army and whose eventual posting back to Germany probably contributed greatly to the outbreak of the revolt of Civilis (H 2.66, 69; 3.46.1; 4.15).

With regard to the Othonian army, Vitellius was in an impossible position: Galba had alienated the German armies by distributing favours on a strictly party basis and his attempts at imposing stern discipline had turned the Praetorians against him; but if Vitellius had acted mildly and in a spirit of reconciliation he would have angered the German legions. He took the easy way out

and began executing certain centurions who had been Otho's most active supporters (H 2.60.1); Tacitus' comment on this is illuminating: unde precipua in Vitellium alienatio per Illyricos exercitus; simul ceterae legiones contactu et adversus Germanicos milites invidia bellum meditabantur. He tried to "dilute" Othonian units by scattering them about Italy and encamping them side by side with Vitellian units (H 2.66). This simply caused trouble because some of the Othonian units had not been at Bedriacum and therefore did not regard themselves as having been defeated. Eventually Vitellius decided to return Legio XIV Gemina Martia Victrix to Britain, from which it had come in 67 to serve in Nero's projected Parthian campaign (though it had ended up in ? Pannonia); Legio I Adiutrix was now sent to Spain; Legio XI Claudia was returned to Dalmatia and VII Galbiana/Gemina to Pannonia, while XIII Gemina was kept in Italy to build amphitheatres at Cremona and Bononia (H 2.67; XIII Gemina was obviously sent back to Pannonia immediately thereafter: cf. H 2.86.1). All these legions were extremely hostile to Vitellius and they infected others with their hatred for him (H 2.86).

Vitellius dismissed not only the entire Othonian Praetorian Guard (see below Vit. 10.1, n.) but also the urban cohorts (cf. H 2.93.2). To avoid trouble these units were split up and discharged gradually; the process was not complete by the time the Flavian revolt broke out, a cause which the dismissed men eagerly embraced: tum resumpta militia robur Flavianarum partium fuere (H 2.67.1). Sixteen new praetorian and four new urban cohorts were enrolled from the soldiers of the German armies; it appears from Tac.'s comments
that Valens got more of his men into these politically powerful units than did Caecina (H 2.93.2 - which, in Tac.'s opinion, first caused Caecina's loyalty to waver) and that in the mad scramble for these "plum" positions the men, rather than their officers, chose the branch of the service which they preferred; this means that no effort was made to ensure that the legions from which they came were not weakened: robora tamen legionibus alisque subtracta, convolsum castrorum decus, viginti milibus e toto exercitu permixtis magis quam electis (H 2.94.1).

In short, Vitellius' military policy was completely unsatisfactory but he was really in no position to do otherwise. Where he had the scope, he tried to be as conciliatory as possible: Flavius Sabinus, Vespasian's brother, was retained as praefectus urbi (H 2.55.1, 63.1: see further below, Vit. 15.2-3 nn.) and all other army commanders appear to have been confirmed in their appointments. Finally, news of his recognition by the armies of the East lulled Vitellius and his soldiers into a totally false sense of security (H 2.73).

10.1 De Betriacensi victoria et Othonis exitu, cum adhuc in Gallia esset, audiit: according to Tacitus (H 2.57) he had set off with his forces but had not gone far (paucorum dierum iter progressus). On the battle of Bedriacum (14th April, 69) see above 0 9.2, n. on novissimo maximoque apud Betriacum fraude superatus est cum spe...dimicandum fuisset, and on Otho's suicide (16th April) see 0 9.3-11.2. Vitellius probably received this news around 20th April (see below, Appendix 2).
nihilque cunctatus... uno exauctoravit edicto: Tacitus appears to offer a different chronology; at H 2.67.1, after describing Vitellius' problems with the Othonian legions, especially XIV Gemina, he begins: proximus Vitellio e praetoriis cohortibus metus erat. Of course, proximus here need not have chronological significance (cf. H 1.20.1: proxima pecuniae cura), though it will certainly indicate the seriousness of Vitellius' concern; on the other hand, in the previous chapter we hear of two praetorian cohorts at Augusta Taurinorum, apparently at the time when Vitellius himself was passing through, which would suggest that Tacitus himself was thinking of a chronological sequence.

Furthermore Tacitus indicates (loc. cit.) that the dismissal of the praetorian cohorts was accomplished in stages: they were first separated from each other, and then were promised honesta missio; this process was still under way when word of the Flavian revolt reached Italy, after which they became the robur Flavianarum partium.

Although it is possible that Vitellius issued an order for the dismissal of the Othonian praetorians as soon as he heard of his victory and that he further instructed his commanders to avoid trouble in carrying out this task, it is difficult to see how S.'s words ut pessimi exempli (referring, of course, to their betrayal both of Galba and Nero) can be made to jibe with Tacitus' addito honestae missionis lenimento: S. (or his source) must be editorializing at this point.

For the establishment of the Vitellian Praetorian guard, see H 2.93.2-94.1.
10.1-

iussas tribunis tradere arma: cf. H 2.67.1: arma
ad tribunos suos deferebant; as we saw earlier, during the
Praetorian upheaval in Rome in early March it was a praetorian
tribune, Varius Crispinus, who had opened the armoury and arranged
for the removal of weapons for the re-arming of the 17th cohort
(above, O 8.2, n. on in castris). It would appear that the weapons
which had been issued to the Praetorians, presumably when they left
Rome for the Maritime Alps and the main battle front in northern
Italy, were still in their hands. This was certainly not conducive
to good order and it is not surprising that, after the Othonian
collapse, the defeated troops should have been ordered to turn
their weapons over to the appropriate officers; this would have
happened whatever the plans for the Praetorian cohorts.

centum autem atque viginti...conquiri et supplicio
adfici imperavit: cf. Plut. C 27.10 and H 1.44.2, though Tacitus
manages to avoid the praise which S. heaps upon this act:...non
honore Galbae, sed tradito principibus more munimentum ad praesens,
in posterum ultionem.

This action certainly took place after Vitellius reached Rome,
since before his suicide Otho had burned any incriminating papers which
he had with him (H 2.48.1; O 10.2; Dio 64.35.1a).

egregie prorsus atque magnifice et ut summi principis:
this paragraph contains almost the only words in S.'s Life which give
any indication of a better and more responsible side to Vitellius'
nature. Though this relief from the generally hostile account is very
brief (cf., immediately following, nisi cetera magis ex natura et priore vita sua quam ex imperii maiestate gessisset), S.'s picture of Vitellius is not as bleak as that to be found in Josephus (BJ 4.588-596; 4.647-652), where Vitellius is innately cruel and vicious, and in Philostratus (VA 5.29-34), where there are references to his drunkenness, dicing, effeminate behaviour and immorality, and there is simply nothing good to be said about him. Dio (65.2-4) is equally harsh but the picture is relieved at 65.6, which begins οὔτω δὲ βλεψάντες οὖν ἁμολογείτε ἵνα παντάπασι καὶ καλῶν ἐργῶν and lists several examples. Tacitus too tends to relieve the darkness somewhat from time to time; he despises Vitellius (e.g. H 2.59.1: brevi auditu quamvis magna transibat, impar curis gravioribus; 2.67.2:...numquam ita ad curas intento Vitellio, ut voluptatum oblivisceretur; 2.91.2: quae grata sane et popularia, sì a virtutibus proficiscerentur, memoria vitae prioris indecora et vilia accipiebantur) and constantly harps on his torpor and obsessive self-indulgence (cf. 1.62; 2.31. 62, 67, 71, 77, 87, 88, 95; 3.36, 56), but occasionally we learn that Vitellius did have some redeeming features, though these are usually qualified in some way (e.g. 2.62.1, 62.2 ad fin.; 3.86.2: inerat tamem simplicitas ac liberalitas, quae, ni adsit modus, in exitium vertuntur).

10.2 namque itinere incohato...nonnumquam necem repraesentantes adversantibus: S. here gives us a brief but vivid impression of the general disorder and riot which accompanied Vitellius on his journey across Gaul and Italy to Rome (cf. espec. H 2.62.1, 68.1, 71.1, 77-78). Again, S. is somewhat imprecise in his details:
Vitellius did not travel per...flumina delicatissimis navigiis et variarum coronarum genere redimitis; according to Tacitus (H 2.59.2) he sailed down only one river, the Arar (Saône) to Lugdunum (though possibly he sailed from there on the Rhone to Vienna), nullo principali paratu, sed vetere egestate conspicuus, donec Iunius Blaesus Lugudunensis Galliae rector...circumdaret principi ministeria, comitaretur liberaliter, which does not suggest a particularly flashy retinue at the beginning of his voyage.

10.3 utque campos, in quibus pugnatum est, adit...melius civem: for a fuller account of the same horrific scene, see H 2.70, where Tacitus states that Vitellius arrived at the battlefield intra quadragensimum pugnae diem, i.e. by 23rd May. For the site of the battle, see above, 9.2, n. on novissimo maximoque apud Betriacum fraude superatus est, cum spe...dimicandum fuisset, and cf. K. Wellesley, JRS 61 (1971) 28-51.

lapidem memoriae Othonis inscriptum intuens dignum eo Mausoleo ait: cf. H 2.49.4; Plutarch actually visited the tomb while travelling in Italy with his patron L. Mestrius Florus, perhaps during the principate of Vespasian: εἴδον ὅτ' ἐν Βοιείλαῷ γενόμενος καὶ μνήμα μέτριον καὶ τὴν ἑπεγραφὴν οὕτως ἔχουσαν, εἰ μεταφρασθείη "Ἀπλώσει Μάρκου Ὀθωνοῦ." (O 18.2; cf. MW 34).

The reference to a Mausoleum is, of course, heavily sarcastic.
pugionemque, quo is se occiderat,...misit Marti dedicandum: sc. in exchange for the Divi Iulii gladium which he had filched from the same temple earlier (cf. Vit. 8.1).

in Agrippinensem coloniam: the full name was Colonia Claudia Ara Augusta Agrippinensium: it was so named in A.D. 50 when the settlement previously called Ara Ubiorum (from c. 9 B.C.; cf. Ann. 1.57.2) became a colony of veterans (Ann. 12.27.1); its name honours Agrippina the Younger, who was born there in A.D. 15.

On the early history of Cologne, see further Ihm, RE 1 900-901; MacKendrick, The Romans on the Rhine 46-58.

in Appennini quidem iugis etiam pervigilium egit: the idea of an all-night religious observance seems to have been rare during the Republic (cf. Cic. Leg. 2.21 on the rites of the Bona Dea); under the Principate with its heavier borrowings from oriental religion, pervigilia became more frequent: in the main, they seem to have been associated with women (cf. Ann. 15.44.1) and with generally licentious conduct (cf. S. Calig. 54.2; Pliny [NH 18.124] mentions a pervigilium for Venus, which, in turn, reminds us of the famous poem): in this connection we should remember Tacitus' words about the general tone of the Vitellian party as it travelled across Italy (H 2.68.1): apud Vitellium omnia indisposita temulenta, pervigiliis ac bacchanalibus quam disciplinae et castris propiora.

The site of this pervigilium will depend on Vitellius' route after Bononia (cf. H 2.71.1); Hofstee thinks he took the direct route south to Florentia (roughly equivalent to modern route 65) and
10.3-11.1

thence to Rome by the Via Cassia, and he would therefore place the festivities at the modern Passo della Futa (2963 ft); however, on this road the Raticosa Pass, some 8 miles north of the Futa Pass, is the highest point in the Apennine crossing (3176 ft). Moreover, since Tacitus notes that Vitellius, ad omnes municipiorum villarumque amoenitates resistens, gravi urbem agmine petebat (H 2.87.1), it is perhaps slightly more probable that he headed south on the Via Flaminia, whose highest point in the Apennines (1886 ft.) is at a place called Aesis (in Tab. Peut. ad Ensem; mod. Scheggia; cf. Miller, Itineraria Romana 305-306; JRS 11 [1921] 181), where the road from Iguvium (mod. Gubbio) joins the main road linking Urbino and Spoleto. Near Scheggia and probably in the territory of Iguvium was the famous temple of Juppiter Penninus, probably the site of Vitellius' pervigilium.

On pervigilium, see further Hanell, RE XIX 1061-2.

11.1 urbem denique ad classicum introiit...detectis commilitonum armis: Tacitus (H 2.89.1) gives a slightly less reproachful account; there are, however, differences: quo minus ut captam urbem ingrederetur, amicorum consilio deterritus: sumpta praetexta et composito agmine incessit. However, the procession which entered the city was at least quasi-triumphal (see the remainder of H 2.89.1, where eagles and standards and full dress uniforms are mentioned).

The date of Vitellius' entry into Rome is quite uncertain: he had assumed the position of Pontifex Maximus on or before 18th July
11.1- urbem...armis cont.
(see next n.) and this had to be done at Rome (cf. Mommsen, Staatsr. II 3 1106-7). Apart from this the only indication of date in our literary sources comes at the end of Tacitus' description of the advance of Vitellius' army across Italy: arvaque maturis iam frugibus ut hostile solum vastabantur (II 2.87.2). This is extremely vague and could suggest anywhere from mid-June to mid-July, but we are certainly not entitled to conclude that Vitellius entered Rome on 17th July because Tacitus says that he assumed the title Augustus the day after he arrived in the city (II 2.90) and then goes on in the following chapter to mention his assumption of the position of Pontifex Maximus and to comment on the issue by Vitellius of religious regulations on 18th July; and yet Garzetti states this as a fact (From Tiberius to the Antonines 219 [Engl. translation only; cf. Ital. original 228]), as does Hanslik (RE Suppl. IX 1720).

Recently an attempt has been made to find an approximate date for Vitellius' arrival in Rome by wholly different means (A. J. Coale, Jr., "Dies Alliensis," TAPA 102 [1971] 49-58). Coale uses the entry from AFA describing sacrifices on the birthday of Vitellius' wife (discussed above, Vit.6, n. on Galeria Fundanam); as we saw, her birthday was 3rd June (Coale, like everyone else, reads III Non. Iu [n. as 5th June]. The entry for this date reads:


Coale points out (as Henzen did [XCV, n. 7]) that Galeria Fundana is described as Germanic[i imp. III A]ug., and since Vitellius did not become Augustus until the day after he entered Rome (II 2.90),
he must have arrived there by 4th June at the latest (op. cit.56; i.e. 2nd June, correcting the error in III non. Jun.)

This is simply impossible, as can easily be demonstrated: Vitellius had reached Cremona by 23rd May, and certainly not much earlier, as we have seen (above, Vit. 10.3, n. on utque campos, in quibus...melius civem). Rome is 384 mp from Cremona and to reach it by 2nd June (10 days marching time), he would have had to cover, with his army of 60,000 men and numerous camp-followers and hangers-on, over 38 mp every day. Coale has, unfortunately, made two fundamental errors; the first concerns the "arrival date" 4th June; the second is that somehow he manages to transfer the information about Vitellius' arrival at Cremona to Bononia, which is 294 mp from Rome (op. cit. 55-56); he therefore gives Vitellius 12 marching days and accepts a daily marching average of 24.5 mp with "Vitellius was evidently in something of a hurry"!

It is clear that, although Vitellius is scrupulously not called Augustus every other time his name occurs on the AFA stone in question (= CIL VI 2051 Tab. II, and it occurs probably as Vitellius Germanicus imp. at the beginning of the entry for 3rd June and as [Vitellii] imp. in an undateable later entry - line 16), when his wife is mentioned, she is conventionally (and erroneously) referred to as Galeria Germanica[ι imp. III A]ug.

To sum up, we do not know when Vitellius reached Rome. Since the distance from Cremona to Rome is 384 mp, allowing a marching speed of 15 mp per day, we may conclude that, at the very earliest, Vitellius could have entered Rome on 18th June: fromTacitus' account (Hist 2.71, 87-89) the march was a slow one and we may be inclined to place his
11.1-11.2
arrival in Rome at about the end of June.

11.2 Magis deinde ac magis omni divino humanoque iure neglecto Alliensi die pontificatum maximum cepit: cf. II 2.91.1: Apud civitatem cuncta interpretantem funesti ominis loco acceptum est, quod maximum pontificatum adeptus Vitellius de caerimoniiis publicis XV kalendas Augustas edixisset, antiquitus infausto die Cremerensi Alliensique cladibus: adeo omnis humani divinique iuris expers... The phrase about Vitellius' "disregard for/ignorance of law, human and divine" makes it clear that both S. and Tacitus are using the same source. But what did this source say about 18th July, 69? According to S., this was the day on which Vitellius became Pontifex Maximus; Tacitus does not say this and his words could mean that Vitellius became P.M. some time before.

A. J. Coale, Jr., (AJP 102 [1971] 54-55) interprets the matter thus: "It should be emphasized that Suetonius here shows no sign of providing additional or more precise information: he uses the same words but contradicts Tacitus; the passage is an excellent example of error arising from condensation."

This interpretation could be correct (though S. does not contradict Tacitus): however, with our evidence as it stands, the balance of probability perhaps inclines the other way. Mommsen (Staatsr. II 3 1107) states as a fact that Vitellius became P.M. on 18th July, 69.

comitia in decem annos ordinavit sequre perpetuum consulem: cf. II 3.55.2, referring to about the middle of November:
ipse (sc. Vitellius) nihil e solito luxu remittens et diffidentia
properus festinare comitia, quibus consules in multos annos
destinabat. comitia refers to the formal 'election' by senate and
people of the candidates selected by the Emperor. It is perhaps
worth noting that S. and Tacitus are here certainly not using the
same source: not only do they place the incident in quite different
contexts, but it is also hard to imagine the wording that gave rise
both to Tacitus' in multos annos and S.'s in decem annos, especially
since S. is usually thought to be the less meticulous transmitter
of source material. Furthermore, Tacitus does not have the detail
about a perpetual consulship; however, this is neatly confirmed by
a short inscription from Rome (CIL VI 929 = MW 81): A Vitellius L.f.
imperator cos. perp. When and why Vitellius assumed this title is
not clear: perhaps it was part of his apparent desire to revise the
constitutional basis of the Principate, and he may have been
imitating Caesar's title of dictator perpetuus.

For Vitellius' re-arrangement of consulships in 69, see H 2.71.2

et ne cui dubium foret...exultans etiam plausit:

cf. H 2.95.1: Tacitus adds that the publici sacerdotes mentioned here
were the Augustales, the official priests of the Julio-Claudian cult
(cf. above G 8.1, n. on sacerdotium triplex...cooptatus). Vitellius
had been a friend of Nero and had particularly encouraged his artistic
ambitions (cf. above Vit. 4; see also Ann 14.49.1; H 2.71.1: clearly,
his enthusiasm was genuine). In addition, he seems to have adopted a
generally benign attitude towards his immediate predecessors (Dio 65.6.1-3).
11.2-12
de dominico: se.(?) libro, presumably a collection either of Nero's own compositions or of his favourite musical set-pieces (or both), which may actually have been published, or whose contents may have been well-known both to courtiers and musicians. For Nero's sung performances, see S. Ner. 21.2-3; Juv. 8.220, 228-9, Ann. 15.33, 16.4; Dio 61.20.1-2. Hofstee (Commentary, ad Neroniana cantica, below) criticizes Baumgarten-Crusius for mentioning Nero's Halosis Illii in this connection, and argues that it was an epic, not a song, as is clear from Juv. 8.221 and Dio 62.29.1; however, in his account of the great fire of Rome in A.D. 64 S. tells us (Ner. 38.2) that Nero Halosin Illii in illo suo scaenico habitu decantavit (cf. Dio 62.18.1: ἔσεν ἀλωσιν... Ἰλίου).

A dominicus liber (or a collection called simply dominicum) suggests that Nero was regularly addressed as dominus, although it is generally assumed from S.'s censure (Dom. 13.1-2) that Domitian was the first to indulge himself in this way; at any rate, the practice was standard by the reign of Trajan (Pliny, Ep. 10 passim).

12 magnam imperii partem non nisi consilio et arbitrio vilissimi cuiusque histrionum et aurigarum administravit: that Vitellius should have gathered about him a crowd of people connected with the theatre and the Circus is hardly surprising in view of his earlier enthusiasms (see above Vit.4; 7.1 and below, 17.2). No doubt he had many old friends in these circles. Tacitus paints a graphic picture of the various people who came out from Rome to meet him as he advanced triumphantly towards the capital.
Vitellius

12- magnam imperii...administravit cont.

(H 2.87), and among them adgregabantur e plebe flagitiosa per obsequia Vitellio cogniti scurrac histrones aurigae, quibus ille amiciiurum dehonestamentis mire gaudebat (cf. H 2.71.1). What S. gives us here is probably no more than vituperative exaggeration, based on Vitellius' fondness for such people and their delight in his victory.

The type of drama presented at Rome had changed greatly since the days of the great Roscius; Livy thought that the drama of his own time was a dangerous extravagance which threatened the stability of the state (7.2.13) and by the end of the Julio-Claudian period performances were often merely obscene (see W. Beare, The Roman Stage 3 233-240; Tenney Frank, "The Status of Actors at Rome" CP 26 [1931] 11-20, esp. 16-20). It is not surprising, therefore, that actors became infames (see Dig. III.2.2.5, where Ulpian is cited quoting the jurists Pegasus and Nerva filius; for their dates, see Jolowicz-Nicholas, Historical Introduction to Roman Law 3 382-3: it seems likely that this infamia was proclaimed in the Neronian or early Flavian period; cf. S. Ner.16.2; Ann 13.25.4).

While charioteers were not, it seems, considered infames, most appear to have been of servile birth: successful drivers became enormously wealthy and although many were killed at a fairly early age, the "stars" attracted vast followings and regarded themselves as being above the law (cf. S. Ner. 16.2: vetiti quadrigariorum lusus, quibus inveterata licentia passim vagantibus fallere ac furari per iocum ius erat). See further Carcopino, Daily Life in Ancient Rome, (1956) 220-221; H. A. Harris, Sport in Greece and Rome 198-209.
et maxime Asiatici liberti: this chapter gives us the bulk of our information about Asiaticus. Tacitus describes his elevation to the equestrian order in terms almost identical to those found here (H 2.57.2) and calls him foedum mancipium et malis artibus ambitiosum; at H 2.95.2 he speaks angrily of his corruption: nondum quartus a victoria mensis et libertus Vitellii Asiaticus Polyclitos Patrobios et vetera odorum nomina aequabat. After the Flavian capture of Rome and the arrival in the city of C. Licinius Mucianus, Vespasian's principal lieutenant, late in December, 69, there were several executions, among them the crucifixion of this freedman: Asiaticus...malam potentiam servili supplicio expiavit (H 4.11.3).

Asiaticus was remembered for his exceptional corruption as late as the 5th century; cf. Sid. Apoll. Epist. 5.7.3.

poscam: this was a combination of wine-vinegar and water, producing a cheap and refreshing drink, which also had the advantage of not causing intoxication. It was widely used in the Roman army at all periods (cf. Plut. Cato Maior 1.10; SHA Hadr. 10.2; Avid. Cass. 5.3; Pesc.10.3; Veget. 3.3): perhaps the most famous example of this is to be found in the accounts of the Crucifixion (Matthew 28.48; Mark 15.36; Luke 23.36); it was still used in the army of Napoleon, as can be seen from the entry for 17th June 1807 in the Journal of Baron Percy, Chief Surgeon of the Grand Army (quoted by Jacques André, L'Alimentation et la Cuisine à Rome 175 n. 122):"Il faisait extrêmement chaud...Je crie à nos soldats:
'Enfants, courez après le vinaigre plutôt qu'après le schnapps et mélez-en à votre eau.' It was also used for medicinal purposes, e.g., for eye inflammation (Pliny, NH 28.56) and as a base for concoctions (Celsus 3.20.4).

See further F. Wotke, RE XXII 420-421.

Circumforano lanistae: the word lanista seems to be related to lanius (butcher) and the verb laniare, all of these words being ultimately of Etruscan origin (cf. Isid. Etym. 10.159: id est carnifex Tusca lingua appellatus, a laniando scilicet corpora); the occupation was considered a particularly degraded one and the lanista, like his fellow flesh-peddler the leno, was infamis (cf. Lex Iulia Municipalis = CIL I² 593 line 123, where both are ineligible to hold municipal office; Martial 11.66; et delator es et calumniator, et fraudator et lanista; Juv. 3.153-158; SHA Hadr. 18.1; there is no mention of lanistae in the Digest title on infames [3.2] because they had disappeared more than a century before it was compiled).

In Rome the training and keeping of gladiators became an imperial monopoly quite early in the Principate (in the four great imperial Ludi, looked after by procurators, with "branch-plants" in the major cities of the Empire) and the giving of gladiatorial displays was almost the exclusive prerogative of the Princeps (cf. Dio 54.2.4). However, in other parts of Italy and throughout the Empire anyone could put on a display: the would-be editor could purchase gladiators specially for the occasion, use his own troop if he had one, or, more usually, rent a troop from a lanista. Many lanistae were itinerant, working the towns of an area in a sort of
"circuit": hence S.'s epithet *circumforanus*.


*muneris*: gladiatorial shows were always called *munera* because (in theory, at least) they represented some sort of "obligation" or "service" to the dead (cf. Serv. Aen. 10.519 for the term *bustuarii* applied to them); precisely wherein this "service" consisted is not clear: the blood of the fighters may have been an offering in honour of the dead or to appease or strengthen their shades (cf. Tert. *De Spect.* 12). The earliest example in Roman history was in 264 B.C. when the sons of D. Iunius Brutus Pera matched three pairs of slaves against each other in the Forum Boarium at the end of the period of mourning following his death (Livy, *Epit.* 16; Val. Max. 2.4.7). The practice rapidly became popular: in 216 B.C., at the obsequies of M. Aemilius Lepidus, 22 pairs fought (Livy 23.30.15), and in 183 for P. Licinius 60 pairs (Livy 39.46.2). Part at least of the vast carnage perpetrated by Caesar at his quadruple triumph in 46 B.C. was a *munus* on behalf of his daughter Julia (Dio 43.22.3-4). Finally, under the Emperors almost any anniversary or occasion could serve as an excuse for gladiatorial shows.


*primo imperii die*: this should mean on 2nd January, 69; in his otherwise identical account of this incident Tacitus (Hist. 2.57.2)
indicates that it happened on the day (or very soon thereafter) on which Vitellius heard of his forces' success at Bedriacum and the suicide of Otho. It is impossible to say for sure which is correct; in general, Tacitus is more careful with details of events in Germany and we have already seen evidence of careless quotation or faulty recollection by S. in this area (above, Vit.8); accordingly, we may perhaps incline to heed Tacitus here.

_aureis donavit anulis:_ for the significance of this, see S.'s remarks above on Galba's Freedman Icelus (C 14.2 and esp. n. on _paulo ante anulis aureis et Marciani cognomine ornatus_).

13.1 _Sed vel praecipue luxuriae saevitiaeque deditus:_ chap. 13 deals with _luxuria_, a term which could be taken to mean any sort of excess in one's living habits, while chap. 14 concentrates on _saevitia_. These two chapters constitute perhaps the most sustained attack on Vitellius' character to be found in our extant sources; most of the material in chap. 13 can be paralleled in other accounts and we may assume that these stories had some element of truth in them, though it is, of course, impossible to separate reality from the _vituperatio_ of Flavian propaganda. On the other hand, most of the material in chap. 14 is unique to S.: some of the stories are so outrageous that we may suppose that they too are anti-Vitellian propaganda which Tacitus simply rejected out of hand but which S., with his penchant for the grotesque, retained; or we may conclude that we have here a collection of anecdotes gathered by S. himself
using material from both the Flavian archives and from personal (and, no doubt, exaggerated) reminiscences. However, given Tacitus' obvious dislike of Vitellius, the latter proposition is more likely.

There is one notable omission in the catalogue of Vitellius' vices: there is no real accusation of any kind of sexual misbehaviour. When Philostratus in a speech ascribed to Vespasian (VA 5.29) has the Emperor say of Vitellius ἐταίρας δὲ ὑποκείμενος ἐπιθεόνυται τὰς γεγομημένας, ἦδον φάσιν τὰ μετὰ κυνάγινον ἐρωτικά, the image is of a rutting animal and obviously represents successful Flavian propaganda in the Greek-speaking world. Tacitus has a very unspecific slur-cum-accusation at H 2.95.2: unum ad potentiam iter, prodigis epulis et sumptu ganeaque satiare inexplebiles Vitellii libidines. But, given the material in Vit. 3.2 (cf. Dio 65.5.1περονευκότω) and 12, we must conclude that Vitellius was simply not guilty of any such misconduct during his principate.

epulas trifariam semper, interdum quadrifariam dispertiebat: cf. Dio 65.4.3. In general, the Romans ate rather sparingly, with only one substantial meal per day. Ientaculum was usually a very light breakfast indeed, nothing more than a piece of bread, possibly dipped in wine, and fruit or cheese. Cena underwent the same change as "dinner" in English: this was the main meal of the day, customarily taken around noon, and it was followed by a light supper (vesperna); however, by the early principate cena had become a late afternoon/early evening meal, and in its place around
13.1-13.2
mid-day a light luncheon (prandium) was inserted. The comissatio
was a sort of stylized drinking-bout which sometimes followed an
elaborate cena: it was perhaps reminiscent of Oxford scocing,
with all present competing. For details of Roman meals, with
specific references, see Marquardt, Privatleben² 264-268, 297-

facile omnibus sufficiens vomitandi consuetudine:
this reminds us of the scornful words of Seneca (Cons. ad. Helv.
10.3): vomunt ut edant, edunt ut vomant, et epulas, quas toto orbe
conquirunt, nec concoquere dignantur. Friedländer argues
(Sittengeschichte¹⁰ 2.294-6; RLM 2.153-4) that the use of emetics
after meals was not a sign of gluttony, as is commonly assumed, but
was simply part of standard dietetic practice. (However, he does
allow that there were gluttons and that Vitellius was outstanding
among them). Cf. also Mart. 3.82.8-9; 7.67.9-10; Juv. 6.425-433.

indicebat autem aliud alii eadem die, nec cuiquam
minus singuli apparatus quadringenis milibus nummum con-
stiterunt: cf. Dio 65.4.3., though the financial details are not
so clear. Both Tacitus (H 2.95.3) and Dio (65.3.2) preserve the
tradition that Vitellius himself squandered HS 900 million
(presumably from the fiscus) on banquets during his principate.

13.2 dedicatione patinae quam...clipeum Minervae πολυχοου
dicitabat: this is the only indication in our sources that Vitellius
had a sense of humour: the pun is on πολυχοου (a standard epithet
of Athena - hence Minervae) and πολυσυγγεγυς. By the 1st century A.D. both words were pronounced identically.

This vast platter was obviously described in more than one source: Pliny says (NH 35.163-4) that the dish cost HS 1 million and implies that it was made of pottery, while Dio (65.3.3) agrees about the cost but states that, since it was impossible to make so large a vessel of pottery, it was made of silver; this dish, he says, survived until the time of Hadrian, who had it melted down. Since Dio describes the contents of the platter in terms very similar to S.'s (next sentence), we may assume that both used the same source, but that this source was not Pliny; accordingly, if Pliny's History was the "common source," S. almost certainly did not use it here. Townend suggests (Hermes 89 [1961] 242 n. 1) that Cluvius Rufus was the source for the punning name of the dish; he would therefore be Dio's source as well.

in hac scarorum iocinera...commiscuit: cf. Dio 65.3.3 and 3.1; for details of exotic food consumed by Roman gourmets and its provenance, see Friedländer, Sittengeschichte 10 2.306-313; RLM 2.165-170; Carcopino, Daily Life in Ancient Rome (1956) 271. Of the items mentioned here by S., only murenarum lactes causes any difficulty: muraena is probably the Murry (or Moray "eel": taxonom. muraena helena) a vicious eel-like fish with strong, sharp teeth, kept in fish-ponds by the Romans and considered a delicacy at the table. (The usual translation "lamprey" seems erroneous; cf. the well-known story of Vedius Pollio and Augustus and the slave who broke the crystal goblet [e.g., Sen. Clem. 1.18.2; Pliny, NH 9.77]:
13.2-14.1

Lampreys are essentially parasites; one can die of eating them, but not of being involuntarily eaten by them.) **lactes** is obviously connected with **lac** and the "milk" aspect could refer either to colour or consistency: the word seems basically to mean "small, milky-coloured fat-covered intestines" (cf. Lewis and Short and Old s.v.); however, Walde-Hoffman (Lat. etym. Wörterbuch 4 s.v.) give as a second meaning "the milt of a male fish" and this is how both Rolfe and Graves translate it here, perhaps correctly (cf. similarly SHA Elag. 23.8).

_a Parthia usque fretoque Hispanicum per nauarchos ac triremes petitarum:_ cf. Dio 65.3.1: not only was the entire empire scoured for delicacies for Vitellius' table, but the navy was used to transport them. This was not, however, without precedent: see Pliny NH 9.62 for an account of the introduction of the _scarus_ (parrot-wrasse?) to the waters between Ostia and Campania by Ti. Julius Optatus Pontianus, prefect of the fleet at Misenum Tiberio Claudio principe (this should probably be Claudius: cf. CIL XVI 1, a diploma of 11th December, 52; Stein, RE X s.v. 'Iulius' no. 372; PIR² 1 443).

14.1 _nobiles viros...occidit:_ we know of two only: Cn. (P.?) Cornelius Dolabella, mentioned above at G 12.2 (see n. on Cn. Dolabellae), who had married Vitellius' first wife Petronia (see above Vit. 6, n. on Vxorem habuit Petroniam consularis viri filiam) - this was a sordid murder (II 2.63-64); and Junius Blaesus, governor of Gallia Lugdunensis early in 69, who had decked Vitellius out in
princely fashion (II 2.59) and had presumably accompanied him to Rome. For his death, see II 3.38-39: he was of distinguished birth, numbering the Junii and the Antonii among his ancestors (on this see J. Nicols, Historia 24 [1975] 48-49) and (allegedly) making much of his descent from a family of successful military commanders (II 3.38.3; see also PIR² I 736-739). Vitellius obviously feared and disliked him and was, apparently, worked up to murder him by L. Vitellius, who seems to have been the evil genius of his principate (cf. II 2.63.1). However, there is no convincing motive for this crime and the "details" of a supposedly secret meeting between the Emperor and his brother (II 3.38.2-4) suggest that there was, in fact, no murder.

On the possible significance of the word nobiles here, see M. Gelzer, Hermes 50 (1915) 410 = The Roman Nobility, tr. R. Seager, 156; however, see also H. Hill, Historia 18 (1969) 230-250, esp. 232-5, 244; T. D. Barnes, Phoenix 28 (1974) 444-9.

etiam unum veneno manu sua porrecto in aquae frigidae potionem: this may be another reference to the death of Junius Blaesus; cf. II 3.39.1. The facts in this case seem to be that Vitellius hated and feared Blaesus; the latter fell ill and Vitellius went to visit him and evidently enjoyed the sight of his (imagined) rival's fatal illness - notabili gaudio Blaesum visendo (Tac. loc. cit.: cf. Wellesley's Commentary ad loc.).

14.2 tum faeneratorum et stipulatorum publicanorumque... vix ulli pepercit: Dio tells a wholly different story (65.5.2-3):
people were amused to see a crowd of soldiers or admirers in the Forum around a man who previously could not be seen for the mob of creditors; people who had dunned him in days gone by put on mourning and hid (when he came to Rome), but Vitellius sought them out and spared their lives in lieu of payment of his debts - and demanded back his notes. This sounds more in character: Vitellius was probably not a cruel man by nature (though he could be manipulated to commit acts of cruelty) and his "revenge" on the creditors who had harried him probably cost them plenty.

A stipulator in Roman law was a creditor who made a certain type of verbal contract (stipulatio), usually in the form "spondesne?", "spondeo" (though obviously there were details added); the form of words changed with the passage of time and the need for witnesses came to be felt. Stipulatio could cover all kinds of dealing - promises of certa pecunia, certa res, incerta res, and even individual acts. See further Buckland, Textbook 434-443; Jolowicz-Nicholas, Historical Introduction to Roman Law 279-281.

velle se dicens pascere oculos: Tacitus uses these words of Vitellius' visit to Junius Blaesus' deathbed (H 3.39.1): quin et audita est saevissima Vitelli vox, qua se (ipsa enim verba referam) pavisse oculos spectata inimici morte iactavit. We can now see what has happened: the individual parts of the story of this one murder (if that is what it was) were each "generalized" into a separate murder or series of murders in anti-Vitellian propaganda.

14.3 quod Venetae factionis clare male dixerant: cf. above,
14.3-14.4

Vit. 7.1, n. on per commumem factionis Venetae favorem.

14.4 et mathematicis: according to F. H. Cramer (Astrology in Roman Law and Politics 244), the term mathematici for "astrologers" came gradually during the 1st century A.D. to replace the earlier geographic designation Chaldaei. However, Aulus Gellius suggests (NA 1.9.6) that the former is the colloquial term for the latter: vulgus autem, quos gentilicio vocabulo "Chaldaeos" dicere oportet, "mathematicos" dicit. (This may have arisen because astrologers attempted to reduce all the movements of the heavenly bodies to mathematical order.) This distinction will explain why S. calls them mathematici in his narrative but Chaldaeos when he quotes their mock edict.

Zonaras says (11.16) that Vitellius was φιλόμαντις...μαι μηδὲ τὸ βοαχὺ πρόσωπον ἀνευ αὐτῶν. However, this does not mean that he was particularly enamoured of astrology: we may recall that the astrological indications at his birth were very bad (above, Vit. 3.2) and he is alleged to have mocked their predictions that he would one day become Emperor (Dio 64.4.3, though this was during Nero's principate and the act may simply have been common prudence).

At any rate, it would appear that the general disorder of A.D. 68-69 - Vitellius was the fourth Emperor in Rome in just over twelve months and by early September word began to come in of the Flavian revolt (cf. H 2.96.1, 99.1, after Vitellius' birthday on 7th Sept.) - led to Vitellius' edict expelling the mathematici. People were obviously trying to find out what was going to happen, and as Jack Lindsay puts it (Origins of Astrology 254): "The danger of death
14.4-14.5

prophecies was that they stirred up slaves, wives, husbands, heirs and enemies who, on finding the stars too slow in action, were stimulated to make the predictions come true; in the case of an emperor they might raise the hopes of heirs or pretenders to the throne."

For details of the many expulsions of astrologers from Rome, see F. H. Cramer, C&G 12 (1951) 9-50, and esp. 36-39 for the Vitellian expulsion.

**bonum factum:** sc. bonum factum sit. This or something like it normally prefixed all edicts and formal declarations (e.g. S. DJ 80.2; Aug. 58.3; Calig. 15.3; cf. Cic. Div. 1.102: maiores nostri ...

...omnibus rebus agendis "quod bonum faustum felix fortunatumque esset" praefabantur.

ne Vitellius Germanicus intra eundem Kalendarum diem usquam esset: this is an erroneous prediction that Vitellius would perish by 1st October, 69. It is interesting to note how this story becomes less precise with the passage of time: Dio (65.1.4) says that the astrologers posted a counter-edict in which they bade him depart his life on the very day on which he actually did die - οὕτως ἄμεριβάς τὸ γενησόμενον προέγνωσαν (cf. Cramer, C&G 12 [1951] 39).

14.5 **morte matris:** on this see above Vit. 3.1, n. on Sestilia probatissima nec ignobili femina.
14.5-

vaticinante Chatta muliere, cui velut oraculo
adquiescabat: as we saw above (Vit. 14.4, n. on ct mathematicis),
Vitellius believed strongly in omens and did nothing of any
importance without considering them (Zon. 11.16): a German
prophetess looks like part of his Imperator Germanicus set-up,
though she may have won his attention by predicting success at the
beginning of his bid for power.

On the powers exercised by German women, see Tac. Germ. 8.2.
We know the names of several prophetesses: Albruna (Germ. 8.3),
Veleda (belonging to the Bructeri and wielding great influence at
the time of the revolt of Civilis: Germ. 8.3; H 4.61.2, 65.3-4;
5.22.3, 24; she was later captured by the Romans: Stat. Silv.
1.4.90; in general, see Walser, RE VIII A 617-621) and Ganna (? of
the Suebian Semnones [so PIR² G 72], successor to Veleda, who
visited Domitian, presumably in Germany, and was honoured by him:
Dio 67.5.3).

The Chatti were Rome's most formidable foes in Germany during
the 1st century A.D.: they lived in the area between the Fulda and
the Eder (where their name has survived in the mod. Hessen): among
German tribes they were remarkable for their military discipline
and organization. See esp. Tac. Germ. 30-31 and the commentaries
of K. Müllenhoff and R. Much (2nd ed) ad locc. For Roman dealings
with them during the Julio-Claudian and Flavian periods, see C. M.
Wells, The German Policy of Augustus 154-6; Syme, CAH X 363, 377,
785-6; XI 162-5, 174-5.
The Fall of Vitellius

(15-18)

Introduction: S. gives no coherent picture, either here or in the Life of Vespasian, of the beginnings of the Flavian revolt and the great campaign of the latter part of 69 which destroyed Vitellius and his party. Tacitus, on the other hand, devotes the last chapters of H 2 (96-101) and the whole of H 3 (on which see the recent commentaries of H. Heubner and K. Wellesley) to this, and even the epitomes of Dio preserve a much more substantial account of these events than does S. (65.8-22). As is his usual practice, S. concentrates on the subject of his biography (cf. Vesp. 7, where the focus is on Vespasian's visit to Egypt, not the Flavian invasion of Italy) but, even so, he skips several months in a very few lines and resumes his narrative of Vitellius' last days at 15.2: atque ubique aut superatus aut proditus salutem sibi et milies sestertium a Flavio Sabino Vespasiani fratre pepigit (c. 17th Dec.). It is therefore necessary for the sake of intelligibility to give a brief account of the background, outbreak and progress of the Flavian revolt.

Although this revolt formally began on 1st July, 69, when the legions of Egypt under Tiberius Julius Alexander proclaimed Vespasian (H 2.79; S. Vesp. 6.3), it is clear that planning started much earlier. The official Flavian version as given in Josephus' Bellum Iudaicum, a work which bore Titus' own imprimatur (Joseph.Vit.363), was that
The Fall of Vitellius: Introduction, cont.

Vespasian was angered at reports of the conduct of Vitellius and his troops after their arrival in Rome, but that contemplating his distance from Italy he did nothing until forced by his equally outraged soldiers to make a bid for power (BJ 4.585-621): this is utterly tendentious, since Vitellius probably did not reach Rome until late June and there simply was not time for word of his behaviour there to reach the East before 1st July (though news of his behaviour before his arrival in Rome could conceivably have reached the East by this date). Both S. and Dio suggest Flavian thoughts of revolt early in 69 (Vesp. 5.1; Dio 65.8.3), while Tacitus seems to have suspected even earlier Flavian planning (H 2.5.2: Vespasian and Mucianus had composed their differences at the time of Nero's death through the agency of Titus; H 2.7: they decided to let Otho and Vitellius fight it out - igitur arma in occasionem distulere; cf. H 2.6; also, although we hear at H 1.10.3 that neither Vespasian's wishes nor feelings were hostile to Galba, the mission of Titus described in H 2.1-10 seems to have been very slow-moving: Galba was formally recognized as Emperor in June, 68, and yet by the latter part of January, 69, Titus had only reached Corinth). However, Josephus himself makes the matter clear with his admission (BJ 4.497-8, 502) that nothing was done to prosecute the Jewish war from the time of Nero's death (cf. H 5.10.2, which shows that nothing was done in 69): Josephus' excuse that Vespasian would do nothing until he received fresh orders from Galba about the war (BJ 4.498) is almost fatuous, since any Emperor would want the revolt crushed. On this point we should also note Chilver's
The Fall of Vitellius: Introduction, cont.

Conclusion (JRS 47 [1957] 34): "The penetration of Vespasian's agents into high circles is almost more extraordinary than that of Galba's; the ubiquity of his party was embarrassing when it came to paying off his debts" (details follow, op. cit. 34-5). Planning, then, for the Flavian coup was slow and careful.

When the time for the actual revolt arrived, everything went smoothly; as we saw, the two legions of Egypt swore allegiance to Vespasian on 1st July, 69; the three legions of Judaea followed suit on 3rd (H 2.79) or 11th July (S. Vesp. 6.3: the problem here is V Non. Iul. or V Id. Iul. and cannot be resolved), while the four legions of Syria had sworn by 15th July. Then various client kings followed, as did the eastern provinces of the Empire as far as Asia and Achaea, and a grand council of war was held at Beirut. All the carefully-laid plans were put into operation: levies were organized, arrangements were made for the manufacture of weapons and the minting of coinage, and individuals were won over with promises of prefectures and procuratorial positions and adlections to the senate, while a small donative was offered to the troops. Mucianus was to lead the main invasion force, while Titus was to finish off the war in Judaea and Vespasian himself hold Egypt. Envoys were sent to Parthia and Armenia to ensure that no attack would come while the eastern defences of the Empire were reduced. Finally, all the armies and their commanders were instructed to offer service and re-instatement to the members of the now-dismissed Praetorian Guard of Otho (H 2.80-82).

Mucianus then advanced to Byzantium with a medium-sized striking force (Legio VI Ferrata from Syria and 13,000 veteran
The Black Sea fleet was ordered to rendezvous with him at Byzantium and until he arrived there the decision regarding the route thereafter to Italy was left open (*H* 2.84: *either* through Greece and then across the Adriatic from Dyrrhachium or *via* Moesia to Aquileia and the north of Italy): clearly the adhesion of the Danubian legions was hoped for (especially since Legio III Gallica had recently been transferred from Syria to Moesia: *H* 2.74.1; *S. Vesp.* 6.3) but not yet guaranteed when the revolt began.

However, by the time Mucianus reached Byzantium, a great pro-Flavian movement had built up in the Danubian provinces. The leaders in this were M. Antonius Primus, legate of Legio VII Galbiana/Gemina (in Pannonia) and Cornelius Fuscus, the imperial procurator in Illyricum; all six legions in the provinces of Pannonia, Dalmatia and Moesia quickly joined the revolt and sent letters seeking support to other legions which had previously fought for Otho against Vitellius (Legio XIV Gemina Martia Victrix, then in Britain, and I Adiutrix in Spain) and to the Gallic provinces (*H* 2.85-6).

Vitellius learned only of the revolt of Legio III Gallica before the whole Danubian area went over to Vespasian (*H* 2.96.1).

Antonius Primus and Cornelius Fuscus moved with incredible (and reckless) speed and pushed quite far into Italy with only vexillations; the legions gradually caught up with them, but at its peak the invasion force from the Danubian area consisted of five legions only (c. 30,000 men; cf. *H* 3.6-10). Vitellius had at least twice that number in Italy; he dispatched Caecina and Valens to face the invaders but (this was the crucial thing and Antonius may have known of it beforehand) Caecina was already wavering in his loyalty,
15-18 The Fall of Vitellius: Introduction, cont.

The Flavian forces had overrun Italy as far as the Apennines and had defeated the Vitellian army at the "second battle of Bedriacum" (on 24/25th October; fought, like the "first battle" in April on or near the Via Postumia to the east of Cremona; for details of this battle see Wellesley, RhM 100 [1957] 244-252 and his Commentary on Histories 3, App. II). After this Vitellian resistance stiffened and the Flavian advance was slow. However, Antonius still led the way (Cornelius Fuscus had been left at Ravenna in charge of the fleet: H 3.12.3) and Mucianus came hurrying behind, considerably delayed by a Dacian invasion of the thinly defended province of Moesia (see Wellesley, op. cit. App. VI for an analysis and timetable of events).

By 16th December Antonius' troops had reached Ocriculum, 42 mp from Rome and there they stopped to celebrate the Saturnalia (beginning 17th December), when the word came that launched them on their final dash for the Capital (H 3.78).

On the beginnings of the Flavian bid for power, see A. Briessmann, Tacitus und das flavische Geschichtsbild (Hermes Einzelschriften - Heft 10) 2-27.
15.1 Octavo imperii mense...in praesentis Vespasiani verba iurarunt: for the correct chronology see above, pp.490-2.

The legions of Moesia, Pannonia and Dalmatia did not join the revolt until the latter part of August. Also, at Vesp. 6.3 S. correctly places Vespasian's acclamation by the legions of the East in early July, so why the apparent muddle here? The reasons probably lie in the events of April, 69, and in boasting by soldiers from the Danube area conveyed to S. by his father: vexillations from Moesia had reached Aquileia in April and there learned of Otho's defeat and death; they had then gone on an enraged rampage and, according to S. (Vesp. 6.3), at that time actually proclaimed Vespasian emperor; Tacitus mentions the outbreak but not a formal declaration for Vespasian; however, he adds that these troops did then begin to plan a revolt on Vespasian's behalf (H 2.85). In later years, therefore, the soldiers from this army could, and probably did, claim that they were the first to support Vespasian - hence S.'s order of events in this sentence. However, his octavo imperii mense reflects the chronological truth about the revolt in the Danubian provinces: it came in August, 69, in the eighth month from Vitellius' proclamation in Germany.

ad retinendum ergo ceterorum...largitus est: perhaps it was his extravagance in his increasingly frantic attempts to retain popular support which accounted for the squandering of HS 900 million by Vitellius. It is easier to believe that such an enormous sum was used for this purpose than for banquets, as Tacitus (H 2.95.3) and Dio (65.3.2) claim: cf. above 13.1, .n. on indicebat
15.1-15.2

autem aliud alii...quadringenis milibus nummum constiterunt.

dilectum quoque ea condicione in urbe egit ut...

polliceretur: this was about 9th December, 69. According to Tacitus (H 3.58.2) the levy took place only after Vitellius' botched attempt to hold the line of the Apennines and lead his troops in person: this failed because of appalling omens and Vitellius returned to ease and inaction in Rome (H 3.55-57). S.'s chronology here is very muddled; for the next sentence, which summarizes events up to about 17th December, begins urgenti deinde..., which suggests that the defection of the fleet at Ravenna, the second battle of Bedriacum and the Flavian drive southwards all came after the levy described here.

15.2 hinc fratrem cum classe ac tironibus et gladiatorum manu opposuit: again this appears somewhat muddled, probably as a result of excessive compression by S.; cf. H 3.57-58, where Tacitus gives much more detail: what remained of the fleet at Misenum eventually deserted (late November), urged on by a Flavian agent and led by a senator named Apinius Tiro, who just "happened" to be in the vicinity on holiday (cf. Chilver, JRS 47 [1957] 34).

Vitellius sent an officer with an urban cohort and a band of gladiators to deal with this revolt, but they promptly went over to the rebels. Vitellius then dispatched his brother Lucius with six (praetorian) cohorts and 500 cavalry towards Campania (c. 9th December): he was moderately successful and re-captured Tarracina, which the rebels had seized (H 3.77). L. Vitellius remained in S.
Vitellius

15.2-

Latium with his troops and surrendered after the fall of Rome (H 4.2.2-3.2). Accordingly, S.'s next sentence (still part of his summary) beginning ubique aut superatus aut proditus is also misleading.

hinc Betriacenses copias et duces: sc. Fabius Valens and A. Caecina Alienus. Valens was seriously ill when Vitellius sent his troops towards the north of Italy to face the coming invasion of the Danubian legions (c. mid-September, 69); Caecina, therefore, whose loyalty was wavering if not completely undermined, commanded all the forces, and although Valens was urged on by Vitellius to follow Caecina as soon as possible (he appears to have left Rome about ten days after Caecina; cf. H 3.36.1), he moved very slowly multo ac molli concubinarum spadonumque agmine, and could, according to Tacitus, have prevented the defection of Caecina had he hurried (H 3.40). Caecina failed to persuade his troops to change sides and he was arrested and thrown into chains by them (at Hostilia on 18th October: H 3.13-14; cf. Dio 65.11.1). Though he was consul at this time (with Valens, for September and October), he was kept under lock and key in Cremona until after the second battle of Bedriacum (24/25th October) and was released only when the Vitellian forces surrendered to Antonius Primus and the Danubian legions (last days of October: H 3.31.2-4).

Valens meanwhile was simply wasting time further south and instead of heading north from Umbria he turned aside into Etruria where he heard of the Vitellian disaster at Cremona. He then decided to sail for Narbonese Gaul and raise fresh forces for
15.2-

Vitellius in Gaul and Germany (H 3.41-42). However, he was captured at the Stoechades Insulae (Isles d'Hyères, to the E. of Massilia: H 3.43), brought back to Italy and eventually executed at Urvinum (H 3.62). Caecina flourished until 79 when he was suddenly accused of plotting against the Flavian regime and executed (S. Tit. 6.2; Dio 66.16.3-4; see further, J. A. Crook, AJP 72 [1951] 162-175).

It is clear that S.'s following words atque ubique aut superatus aut proditus refer mainly to the activities of Vitellius' Betriacenses copias et duces.

**salutem sibi et milies sestertium a Flavio Sabino**

Vespasiani fratre pepigit: for the figures involved, see above G 5.2 nn. According to Tacitus (H 3.63.2), the Flavian commanders Arrius Varus and Antonius Primus and Mucianus as well all sent frequent letters to Vitellius offering him his life, money and a retreat in Campania, but it was only after several conversations with Flavius Sabinus that a deal was worked out, with Cluvius Rufus and the poet Silius Italicus the only witnesses (H 3.65.2).

T. Flavius Sabinus, Vespasian's elder brother, was praefectus urbi at this time. Prior to 69 he was undoubtedly the most distinguished member of the Flavian house; he had been consul (year unknown) and had served as governor of Moesia for seven years. As for his position as urban prefect, it is not clear how many separate terms he served: Tacitus says (H 3.75.1) that he held the post for 12 years but since he was dismissed by Galba in 68 and reinstated by Otho (Plut. O 5.4; H 1.46.1), there must have been at least one
break in his years of office, and if Tacitus' figure 12 is correct there must have been three terms altogether (at Ann 14.42.1 we learn that in A.D. 61 the then urban prefect was murdered by slaves and 61-68 plus 69 x 12 years; this, in turn, requires a change in the restoration of CIL VI 31293 printed at MW 97 to praef. urb[i]ter... see PIR² F 352).

On Flavius Sabinus' descendants, see Townend, JRS 51 (1961) 54-57, 62; for his death, see below Vit.15.3, n. on succensoque templo Iovis Optimi Maximi oppressit.

statimque pro gradibus Palati...rem distulit: Tacitus gives us only one attempted abdication, but this is preceded by a speech allegedly containing the arguments against abdication used by Vitellius' most devoted followers (H 3.66-68): it looks as if Tacitus has eliminated the initial attempt (though something of the sort is implied by the counter arguments of Vitellius' supporters) so as to build up the emotional and rhetorical effect of the formal occasion (H 3.68).

nocte interposita: this probably implies that the first attempted abdication came during the evening.

primo diluculo sordidatus ad rostra...e libello testatus est: Tacitus gives us the valuable information that this happened on 18th December (H 3.67.2): the first attempt, therefore, came on 17th December. In §§ 3-4 below S. describes yet another attempted abdication, after the burning of the Capitol: however,
15.2-15.3

the story of the dagger told there by S. is related by Tacitus as part of the events of 18th December (H 3.68.2-3) and in his account it seems that, in the immediate aftermath of the burning of the Capitol and the death of Sabinus, Vitellius was once more in a mood to fight (H 3.80.1). However, he soon turned yet again to negotiation and sent envoys to ask Antonius Primus to hold off the final assault for one day to allow time for a negotiated settlement (H 3.80.1-81.2). In his very quickly changing moods (on these, see Dio 65.16.3-5) Vitellius may well have tried to abdicate once more, and it looks as if Tacitus has artistically reshaped a somewhat repetitive and untidy reality; at any rate, it is easier to imagine that three attempts were reduced to one than to explain how a single attempt came to be tripled.

15.3 animum resumpsit Sabinumque et reliquos Flavianos nihil iam metuentis vi subita in Capitolium compulit:

this took place on 18th December. Here more than almost anywhere else the hand of the Flavian propagandist can be seen, because the burning of the Capitoline temple of Jupiter, Juno and Minerva was a most shocking event (cf. H 3.72) and naturally the Flavians cast the blame for this on Vitellius and his supporters. There are, however, two main points: who was responsible for the decision of Sabinus and his friends to take refuge on the Capitol in the first place, and who was to blame for the burning of the Capitol? The second point was the crucial one and Flavian propaganda was prepared to accept some blame on the first to ensure a more telling effect on the second. On the first question, then, S. has here no doubt as to
who is to blame and Dio (65.17.2) preserves essentially the same version, where Sabinus and his friends come off badly in an encounter with Vitellius' "German guards" (i.e. the Praetorians) and so flee to the Capitol. Tacitus is rather less anti-Vitellian and emphasizes that the encounter with the Praetorians was an accident which induced Sabinus to occupy the Capitol for safety's sake (H 3.69.2-3). Finally, according to Josephus (BJ 4.645) the seizure of the Capitol was undertaken by Sabinus on his own initiative because 'Ανεθάρσει δὲ ἡ δῆ καὶ...Σαβίνος, ὦς πλησίον 'Αντώνιος ὄν ἀπηγγέλλετο. With Sabinus safely dead, his somewhat botched attempt in Rome to take over from the (now theoretically) ex-Emperor could be used to delimit what little blame the Flavians felt they deserved for the disaster. Of course, this leads to a much more hostile account of the actual burning of the temple (see next n.).

succensoque templo Iovis Optimi Maximi oppressit: cf. Joseph. BJ 4.649 (after the capture of the Capitoline hill): Σαβίνος ἀναχθεὶς ἐπὶ Οὐτέλλιον ἀναρέται, διασπάσαντες τε ὁι στρατιώται τὰ ἁπαθήματα τὸν ναὸν ἐνέπρησαν. Dio (65.17.3) is very similar but not quite so extreme since he has the temple plundered and burnt during the assault, rather than cold-bloodedly afterwards. Tacitus has his doubts about this episode: he is inclined to think that the Flavians used fire first (to block the approach of the Vitellians) and that the flames spread and so the temple was (accidentally) burned down clausis foribus indefensum et indireptum (H 3.71.4). However, S. by means of the p.p.p. may
simply be evading the question and trying to avoid assigning any blame at all (the general, though by no means invariable, rule in Latin would, however, suggest that the subject of the verb oppressit also performed the act of arson; see R. Kühner and H. Stegman, Ausführliche Grammatik der lateinischen Sprache II.1 772-3).

Tacitus' account is much the most thoughtful and, if not wholly clear, seems at least to be based on personal research and careful scrutiny of the evidence (cf. A. Briessmann,Tacitus und das flavische Geschichtsbild 69-80; K. Wellesley,Commentary on Histories 3 pp. 16-18).

It seems clear that Flavius Sabinus and his companions were taken prisoner during the assault and that Sabinus was brought before Vitellius and then killed. S.'s summary oppressit assigns the blame for this to Vitellius himself, which no other source does so explicitly. Tacitus says that Vitellius wished to save his life: however, the soldiers sent him packing and then killed Sabinus (H 3.74.2); Josephus (quoted above) could mean this, but the use of the passive verb is perhaps intended to convey a different impression; the epitomator of Dio simply loses Sabinus after he is sent to Vitellius (65.17.3).

The burning of the Capitol and the deaths of Flavius Sabinus and many of his followers took place on 19th December. Only Tacitus waxes eloquent on the death of Vespasian's brother (H 3.75.1-2), perhaps because he was aware that it solved a lot of problems: Mucianus is said to have been glad at his murder; Antonius Primus seems to have moved very slowly on the penultimate stage of his advance on Rome (at H 3.78.1 Tacitus speaks of pravae morae) -
perhaps wishing to have one less rival for Vespasian's favour; and Vespasian himself seems not to have been on wholly good terms with his brother (H 3.65.1).

Finally, we should note that S. here suppresses all mention of Domitian's role in these events: this is reserved for his Life of that Emperor (Dom. 1.3).

cum et proelium et incendium e Tiberiana prospiceret domo inter epulas: Townend may be correct in stating that this word-picture has a Neronian ring to it (AJP [1964] 365) but what does he mean when he says that S. here repeats "the suggestion, made earlier about Nero, that the man who watches a fire must necessarily have kindled it"?

non multo post...vocata contione iuravit: this contio, the scene of Vitellius' third attempt at abdication, appears to have been summoned on the same day as the burning of the Capitol, i.e. 19th December; cf. above, 15.2, n. on primo diluculo sordidatus ad rostra...e libello testatus est.

15.4 tunc solutum a latere pugionem...quasi in aede Concordiae positurus abscessit: mention of Vitellius' dagger makes this perhaps the most serious of his attempts at abdication (for its significance, see above G 11, n. on iterque ingressus est paludatus...pectus). According to Tacitus (H 3.68.2), the consul involved in this incident was (Cn.) Caecilius Simplex; Vitellius intended to deposit the dagger, which no one would accept, in the
15.4-16

temple of Concord (on which see Platner-Ashby, 138-140; Nash, I 292-294) and then go to his brother's house; however, the people would not let him go to a private dwelling but demanded that he return to the palace: tum consili i inops in Palatium rediit.

sed quibusdam adclamantibus ipsum esse Concordiam...

verum etiam Concordiae recipere cognomen: we could disregard this story as a weird and improbable invention were it not for the fact that Concordia is commonly depicted on the reverse side of Vitellian coins from the mint of Rome and the idea of concord obviously weighed heavily with him (see Mattingly, BMC Imp. I ccxxiii; pp. 368-9, 371, 375, 382-4; A. J. Coale, Jr., Vitellius Imperator [Diss. Michigan, 1971] 122-167, 189.)

16 suasitque senatui...ad consultandum petituros:

cf. H 3.80.1-81.2; Dio 65.18.3-19.1; Tacitus indicates that there were several groups of envoys and that the Vestal Virgins were sent off last in a desperate attempt to postpone the final Flavian attack.

Postridie responsa opperienti: the date is 20th December, the day on which Rome fell and Vitellius was killed. Flavius Sabinus had sent a message to Antonius Primus during the night (18/19th Dec.) before the assault on the Flavian group on the Capitol (H 3.69.4: on Tacitus' concubia nocte see Wellesley's commentary; he suggests c. 10 p.m.). The message reached Antonius at Ocriculum (42 mp from Rome) sufficiently early on 19th Dec. for him to march
his army the 35 mp to Saxa Rubra (7 mp from Rome) by very late on the same day (H 3.79.1) - a most noteworthy and exceptional achievement.

S. does not mention the cavalry column sent ahead, probably from Interamna, under the command of Petilius Cerealis to move cross country to join the Via Salaria (? at Reate) and then advance south to stage a diversionary attack on Rome (H 3.78.3): when the news of the attack on the Capitol reached Petilius he rushed in to attack the city; this misfired badly and he was repulsed (19th Dec.: H 3.79; Dio 65.18.3). However, the final Flavian assault came on 20th Dec. with Antonius' forces dividing into three columns after they had crossed the Milvian Bridge and Petilius' cavalry re-joining the fight (H 3.82-84.3; Dio 65.19.1-20).

continuo igitur...ut inde in Campaniam fugeret:
cf. H 3.84.4: for paternam domum Tacitus has in domum uxoris, which certainly makes no sense with the cenaculum we heard of in Vit. 7.2; Tacitus also omits the number and occupations of Vitellius' companions: the pistor and cocus seem unlikely but S. cannot resist one last stab at Vitellius' gluttony. Finally, S.'s reference to Campania is not immediately clear; for this Tacitus has ut...

Tarracinam ad cohortes fratremque perfugeret.

ubi cum deserta omnia repperisset...confugitque in cellulam ianitoris, religato pro foribus cane lectoque et culcita obiectis: Dio (65.20.1) says that he actually hid in a kennel: that a ianitor should have dogs is highly likely, and so Dio
16-17.2
and S. are probably referring to more-or-less the same place;
Tacitus (H 3.84.4) suddenly becomes reticent and mentions only
pudenda latebra.

17.1 Irruperant iam agminis antecessores: sc.into the
Palace.
ab his extractus...mendacio elusit: not in Tacitus;
Dio (65.20.2) has something of this in καὶ αὐτὸν ἀναξιτήσαντες
οἱ στρατιῶται καὶ ἔξευρόντες (σοῦ γὰρ που καὶ ἐπὶ πολὺ
λαθεῖν ἀκριβῶς ἔδυνατο ὡτε αὐτοκράτωρ γεγονός)
ουνέλαβον.

deinde agnitus...ut custodiretur interim vel in
carcere: again, this is unique to S.

donec religatis post terga manibus, inietcto
cervicibus laqueo...per totum viae Sacrae spatium: Dio
65.20.2-3 is almost identical; Tacitus (H 3.84.5) has a similar
but briefer account.

reducto coma capite, ceu noxii solent: cf. H 3.85;
Dio 65.21.1; for the practice of treating condemned criminals in
this way, cf. Pliny, Paneg. 34.3: nihil tamen gratius, nihil
saeculo dignius, quam quod contigit desuper intueri delatorum
supina ora retortasque cervices.

17.2 parte vulgi etiam corporis vitia exprobrante: at this
point S., with somewhat tasteless artistry, works in the physical
description of his subject which often comes just before the end of
a Life (cf. Ner. 51; G 21; O 12.1; Dom. 18).

tandem apud Gemonias minutissimis ictibus
excarnificatus atque confectus est et inde unco tractus in
Tiberim: S. does not give us the story of the German (? praetorian)
who tried to kill Vitellius quickly (Dio 65.21.1; cf. H 3.84.5), nor
does he give us Vitellius' rather dignified reply to those who
insulted him: una vox non degeneris animi excepta cum tribunno
insultanti se tamen imperatorem eius fuisse respondit (H 3.85; cf.
Dio 65.21.2). Dio also tells us that he was dragged first to the
Carcer (at the N.W. corner of the Forum, just below the Arx; see
Platner-Ashby, 99-100; Nash, I 206-7) and then finally was killed
on the Scalae Gemoniae (The Stairs of Wailing; see Platner-Ashby,
466), which climbed the slope of the Arx between the Carcer and the
Temple of Concord.

18 Periit...anno vitae septimo quinquagesimo: the crucial
dates in Vitellius' life are worked out with great care and ingenuity
by L. Holzapfel in Klio 13 (1913) 295-304 and 15 (1918) 99-118:
these computations carry conviction. For the date of Vitellius'
death, calculations begin with Tacitus' statement that Vitellius
attempted to abdicate on 18th December (H 3.67), and it is clear both
from Tacitus' account of events thereafter and from Josephus' dating
of the fall of Rome to the third day of the month Apellaeus (BJ 4.654;
this appears to be in accordance with the Tyrian version of the
Macedonian calendar adapted to the Julian system; see E. J. Bickerman, *Chronology of the Ancient World* 50) that Vitellius was killed on 20th December, A.D.69.

_cum fratre et filio_: this is rather imprecise. L. Vitellius was apparently on his way to Rome from Tarracina when the city fell to the Flavians (Dio 65.22.1; H 4.2.2-3) and he surrendered with his troops near Bovillae on the Via Appia, 10 mp from Rome; according to Dio, he had been promised his life but was killed anyway. This was probably only a day or two after his brother's death. Of L. Vitellius Tacitus says (loc. cit.): *par viitis fratris, in principatu eius vigilantior, nec perinde prosperis socius quam adversis abstractus.*

For the death of Vitellius' son, see H 4.80.1; Dio 65.22.2 and above, *Vit.* 6, n. on *liberos utriusque sexus tulit.*

_Antonio Primo_: on this curious story see above, *Vit.* 9, n. on *pro tribunali iura reddenti gallinaceus supra umerum ac deinde in capite astitit.*
Appendix I

The Vitellian Attack on Italy

The main source is Tacitus, Histories 1.51-70. From this we learn that Vitellius sent off Fabius Valens to seize Gaul and Italy if Tarpeian should happen, while Caecina Alienus was assigned the land beyond the Po near the Cottian Alps (1.61.1). He himself would advance later, tota mole belli secuturus (1.61.2). There are three matters which require discussion: a) the size of the forces; b) the route of Valens and its chronology; c) the route of Caecina and its chronology.

a) The size of the forces.

By the time his invasion columns moved off Vitellius had at his disposal 11 legions plus auxilia (seven legions in Upper and Lower Germany; three legions in Britain, and I Italica at Lugdunum); Tacitus tells us (Histories 1.61.2) that Valens was given the pick of the army of Lower Germany along with the eagle of Legio V Alaudae (and therefore most of its men) plus auxiliary infantry and cavalry, to a total of 40,000 men, while Caecina received troops from Upper Germany including the bulk of Legio XXI Rapax, making 30,000 men in all. These figures seem much too large, especially when we remember that Vitellius was going to follow tota mole belli.

A legion at full strength would number about 5,500 men (cf. Liebenam, RE VI s.v. 'exercitus', 1606; Kromayer-Veith, Heerwesen und Kriegführung 478, 492-495; Watson, The Roman Soldier 13, 22);
however, the source responsible for the size of the columns of Valens and Caecina seems to have estimated that, complete with auxilia (which are a completely unknown and, no doubt, variable quantity), a legion totalled about 10,000 men; therefore Valens "representing" the four legions of Lower Germany, would have 40,000 men, while Caecina from Upper Germany would have 30,000.

Of course, it is clear that the whole German army did not go off under the command of Valens and Caecina - if so, what then would have been left with Vitellius to be described as tota belli moles? If we allow Valens 2,000 men from each of I, XV and XVI and 4,000 from V, we have a total of 10,000 legionaries. Each legion had c. 120 cavalrymen: so he may have had c. 400-500 of these. How many men would he have had from the auxilia? We cannot be precise here, but if we allow him as many as from the legions, this would give him, very approximately, a force of 20,000 men. Caecina likewise might have had 4,000 men from XXI and 2,000 from each of IV and XXII, giving a total of about 8,000 legionaries. If his forces were in a 3:4 ratio to those of Valens, as the inflated figures in H 1.61.2 suggest, his total, including auxilia, would be 15-16,000 men.

As for Vitellius, after a rushed recruiting campaign in the Gallic provinces, he could proceed with the bulk of the remaining legionary veterans - at most, 7,000 men from Lower Germany (2,000 x 3 + ? 1,000) and 5,000 from Upper Germany (2,000 x 2 + ? 1,000), a total of 12,000; as for auxilia, the bulk of these had probably already departed. In addition, Vitellius took 8,000 men from the British legions (H 2.57.1): the total therefore would be approximately 20,000 legionaries plus perhaps 10,000 from the auxilia, giving
Appendix I: The Vitellian Attack on Italy

c. 30,000 in all, a force larger than that of either Valens or Caecina, and approaching the size of both together; hence the tota belli moles remark. We should also note that the figures given by Tacitus at H 1.61.2 refer to the forces at the time of their departure from bases in Germany: Valens acquired at Lugdunum Legio I Italica and the auxiliary ala Tauriana (H 1.64.3; cf. 1.59.2). A considerable accession of strength, while Caecina gained the support of the ala Siliana in N. Italy (H 1.70.1).

Our totals, therefore, are very approximately:

Valens: c. 20,000 men.
Caecina: c. 15-16,000 men.
Vitellius: c. 30,000 men.

b) The Route of Valens and its Chronology (H 1.62-65; 2.14-15; 2.27-30)

From Tacitus' account it is easy to plot Valens' route through Gaul on a map showing Roman roads. The only slight problem lies in his route from Vienna (mod. Vienne) to the Cottian Pass (Mt. Genèvre): the most direct route is 123 mp long, but Valens clearly swept further south before heading for the Alpine crossing. He advanced due south from Vienna to Valentia and then swung south and east by way of Lucus and Brigantia to the Cottian Pass. The following represents his journey to Cremona, with cumulative mp worked out from K. Miller, Itineraria Romana:

Colonia Agrippinensis - Augusta Treverorum (73) - Divodurum (110) - Tullum (134) - Andematunnum (176) - Lugdunum (287) - Vienna (303) - Valentia (349) - Lucus (412) - Vapincum (460) - Brigantia (515) - Cottian Pass (521) - Augusta Taurinorum (592) - Ticinum (687) - Cremona (c. 737).

The timetable of this advance is rather more difficult to ascertain. The whole problem was studied in great detail by
Appendix I: The Vitellian Invasion of Italy

F. Koester in Der Marsch der Invasionsarmee des Fabius Valens vom Niederrhein nach Italien (Diss. Münster, 1927). His main conclusions are as follows:


To achieve these results, Koester attempted to determine the starting & finishing dates for the march. In addition, he "graded" the terrain over which the army marched and estimated the maximum speed it was likely to have achieved over each particular type. Finally, he postulated a "rest day" after approximately every three days of marching. Methodologically, little fault can be found with such procedures; Koester's results, however, are quite unsatisfactory and it is necessary to demonstrate why this is so.

His "finishing date" of 7th April, (op. cit.17-18, based on the calculations of M. Puhl, De Othone et Vitellio imperatoribus quaestiones [Diss. Halle, 1883] 5-8; cf. Holzapfel, Klio 13 [1913] 289-295) seems quite acceptable, and certainly cannot be wrong by more than a day or so in either direction. However, his "starting date" of 15th January is based on the idea that only after he was formally proclaimed by the legions of Lower Germany (on 2nd January) did Vitellius send messengers seeking support to places as far afield as Raetia and the legionary bases in Britain, and that he did not send off his invasion forces until word of the adhesion of these provinces to his cause reached Cologne. As we have already seen (above Vit.
Appendix I: The Vitellian Invasion of Italy

8.2, n. on consentiente deinde...defecerat), this account (in H 1.59-61) probably bears little relation to reality, but Koester accepts it unquestioningly and after elaborate time-and-distance calculations for messengers (op. cit. 11-14) concludes: "Unmittelbar nach der Rückkehr der Kuriere aus Britannien und Raetien werden alsdann die beiden germanischen Heere...den Vormarsch angetreten haben. Man wird also kaum fehlgehen wenn man annimmt, dass sich beide Armeen spätestens am 15. Januar in Bewegung gesetzt haben" (op. cit. 14). If the army of Britain had proved obstinately loyal to Galba, Vitellius probably could not have dispatched his expeditionary forces in the way he did; given the ardour of his troops (cf. H 1.62) he would have been extremely foolish to have withdrawn them from their hiberna and got them ready for the campaign if there was any possibility that it might have to be postponed; and yet on Koester's reckoning he must have been doing just that while his messengers were away. Even more difficult is the fact that Valens had reached Tullum by the time news arrived of Galba's death (H 1.64.1; see above, Vit. 8.2, n. cit.) - by Koester's calculations the first Vitellian units reached Tullum on 28th January, so that, whereas at the beginning of the month a message could get from the Rhineland to Rome in no more than 8 days, by the end of the month it is taking 13-15 days (Koester has the troops stay in Tullum until 30th January) for a message to travel a lesser distance! Koester admits the difficulty and casts about for explanations (op. cit.19-21): he suggests that the messenger from Otho would be instructed to take word of the change of ruler not only to Vitellius but also to the governors of Gallia Lugdunensis
Appendix I: The Vitellian Attack on Italy

and Belgica: his route, therefore, Lugdunum - Durocortorum - Colonia Agrippinensis, bypassed the route of Valens and, assuming a one-day's stay in Lugdunum and Durocortorum, the messenger would have taken 10-11 1/2 days to go from Rome to Cologne, arriving about 26-27 January; word would then travel from Cologne to Tullum and would reach Valens on 28th January at the earliest. Again, this is ingenious but we may doubt if Otho was really anxious to get word to Durocortorum before Cologne: the revolt of Vitellius was known in Rome by the time of Galba's death (H 1.50.1) and it was to Vitellius and, perhaps even more, to the armies of Germany that Otho's message would be directed. Ultimately, then, Koester's explanation of this point is unconvincing.

Having established his starting and finishing dates for Valens' march, Koester then succumbed to the temptation to fill in on the calendar as many dates as possible between 15th January and 7th April; the result is overly schematic and is based on what seems to be far too low an average speed for legions marching on top quality roads through what was either friendly or unarmed and terrified territory - 8-10 mp per day as a regular speed and 16 mp per day for a forced march, while in the mountains this speed drops to an average of only c. 6-1/2 mp per day (op. cit. 15-16): Koester here accepts the arguments of Franz Stolle, who is notorious for having calculated the weight carried by a legionary in F.S.M.O. as over 41 kg! (cf. G. R. Watson, The Roman Soldier 62-66 on this point: with such a weight, it is not surprising that the distance covered each day becomes extremely short). A daily march of 15-20 mp seems more reasonable, with forced marches of up to 25 mp per day not impossible
Appendix I: The Vitellian Attack on Italy
(cf. Watson, op. cit. 54-55, and nn. 106-107).

It is quite impossible to calculate just where Valens will have been on any given date; as suggested earlier (above O 8.1, n. on verum haud dubio bello iamque ducibus...appropinquantibus), a basic calculation of the distance from Cologne to Mt. Genève (521 mp) and an arbitrary average speed of 15 mp per day will give a marching time of c. 35 days and thus, with Valens leaving Cologne on c. 12th January, an absolute terminus ante quem of c. 16th February for his arrival at Mt. Genève. However, as an average speed for the entire journey, 15 mp is probably unrealistically high and, allowing for occasional rest days (one rest day for every three marching days, as per Koester, op. cit. 16, seems excessive) and other time-consuming activities, the result obtained is that Valens may have been in a position to cross the Cottian Pass about the end of the first week of March. However, it is clear that he did not do so and this brings us to the final major objection to Koester's calculations.

In a lengthy discussion of the Othonian expedition to Liguria and Narbonese Gaul (op. cit. 42-55, esp. 46-51; see II 2.11-15 and 28; see also above, O 9.2, n. on apud Alpes), Koester dates the expedition by the position of Valens at certain arbitrarily-chosen points on his journey towards the Alps (the timetable which Koester drew up earlier now becomes a solid "factual" base, on which further hypotheses can be erected): he assumes, almost certainly correctly, that Valens dispatched troops to deal with the Othonian landings before he crossed the Alpine Pass at Mt. Genève, and then performs two separate sets of time and distance calculations - for troops
Appendix I: The Vitellian Attack on Italy

dispatched while Valens was at Valentia and while he was at Lucus. (Eventually he decides in favour of his "Lucus hypothesis.") There are several objections to Koester's method, aside from his excessive reliance on the somewhat suspect timetable for Valens' march.

Firstly, Koester assumes that all messages from the area of Forum Julii had to go first to Arelate and then north to Valentia and, in the "Lucus hypothesis", from Valentia east towards Lucus ("Eine andere Marschrute kommt nicht in Frage" - *op. cit.* 46): this seems excessively roundabout and, given Koester's daily marching speeds, slow; furthermore, if Valens was, in fact, at Vapincum by the time he received word of the Othonian landings, there is another, shorter route thither via the valley of the Druentia (mod. Durance), as Koester himself admits (*op. cit.* 59; cf. Miller, *Itineraria Romana* Karte 28 and pp. 133-134); but even this is unnecessarily long: the great Itineraries of the Empire were concerned with communications between various provincial centres and Italy, and most attention is given, in this area of S. Gaul, to routes running more or less from west to east. But these are not the only routes: the *Tabula Imperii Romani*, Sheet L32 (Mediolanum) shows a network of roads extending south from Vapincum, and though details and precise distances are uncertain, it seems clear that the route from Forum Iulii to Reis Apollinaris (mod. Riez) extended north-west towards Alaunium or perhaps north-north-west to Segustero, and from there up the valley of the Druentia to Vapincum (cf. Miller,*op. cit.* Karte 28 and pp. 132-133; Kiepert's map of 1898, Tab. XI in his *Atlas Antiquus*, in fact shows a road linking Forum Iulii with Reis, Segustero and Vapincum), a total distance from Forum Iulii to Vapincum of c. 120 mp or from Forum Iulii to Brigantia of c. 175 mp:
a message concerning the Othonian attack on the coast could have reached Valens within a day (cf. H 2.14.1 - the messengers included natives of the area and they would know the shortest routes) and the detachments which he sent, assuming the longer distance - from Brigantia, could have reached the coast in about 8 or 9 days.

Secondly, Koester makes no attempt to assess the strategic purpose of the Othonian attack on Narbonese Gaul: Tacitus, somewhat cryptically (H 2.12.1), speaks of maritimarum Alpium, quibus temptandis adgrediendaeque provinciae Narbonensi... duces dederat (sc. Otho). As we have seen (above, O 9.2, n. on apud Alpes), this attack was almost certainly diversionary, its purpose being to delay Valens long enough to enable Otho to get his advance guard into position on the line of the Po: it was probably sent off in the first days of March, when Otho realized that he had a war on his hands, at the time when he ordered the Danubian legions to come to his aid (c. 3rd March, 69). The aim, therefore, was to create as much panic as possible in the coastal regions of the Maritime Alps/Gallia Narbonensis, so that Valens would be forced to stop his advance, send troops and wait to see what the outcome would be. Koester makes no allowance for Valens stopping and he bases all his calculations on continuous movement by the main force; but if the Othonian landings had been the start of a major invasion of S. Gaul, Valens would have looked extremely silly marching away from the enemy towards Mt. Genèvre! He must surely have waited until he got word of the size, composition and performance of the enemy force.

Since Tacitus gives us no clear indication of how long this episode lasted, we can only make rough estimates: assuming that the
Appendix I: The Vitellian Attack on Italy

Othonian force left Rome c. 4th March, it may have reached its objective c. 9th March (Pliny's statement at NH 19.4 suggests that the sea passage from Gallia Narbonensis to Ostia took about three days, but we have no information about sailing times in the other direction), so that word of the attack could have reached Valens by 10th March or thereabouts. The force which he sent (H 2.14.1) could therefore have reached Forum Iulii by 18-19th March. The actual battles will have taken place (in the vicinity of Luma-Albintimilium, according to Koester, op. cit.47; these places are 60-64 mp from Forum Iulii) on about 21-22nd March: Koester suggests (op. cit.48-49) that the second battle, a Vitellian attack on the Othonian camp (H 2.15) will have been delayed long enough to enable reinforcements to be brought up from Forum Iulii (cf. H 2.15.1 accitis auxiliis with 2.14.1 e quibus pars in colonia Foroiuliensi retenta). Since the distance from Forum Iulii to Albintimilium, the probable site of the Othonian camp, is 64 mp, the attack on this camp would have come probably three days at least after the first battle, i.e. c. 24-25th March. Accordingly, word of the defeat of the Vitellians and the withdrawal of both sides (H 2.15.2) can have reached Valens at Brigantia no earlier than c. 25-26th March. By this time he must have been in a frenzy of impatience; he will probably have known that Caecina had already crossed the Alps and two conflicting possibilities may have been exercising him simultaneously: that Caecina might defeat the main Othonian forces singlehandedly and win all the glory of the campaign, and that Caecina, fighting on his own, might be wiped out, with grim consequences for Valens' army. Furthermore, the dispatch which reached him from the coast c. 25-26th
Appendix I: The Vitellian Attack on Italy

March will have contained fairly reliable information about the size of the Othonian force. Valens will therefore have been able to cross the pass at Mt. Genèvre forthwith, which he must have done to reach Ticinum on 6th April and Cremona on the 7th (the distance from Brigantia to Ticinum is 172 mp; cf. H 2.27.1 and 30.1, and see above p.511).

Tacitus tells us that it was on hearing of the defeat of his forces on the coast that Valens decided to send south some of the troublesome Batavian cohorts (H 2.28); this provoked a storm of protest among his troops: orbari se fortissimorum virorum auxilio, veteres illos et tot bellorum victores, postquam in conspectu sit hostis, velut ex acie abduci. As Koester argues (op. cit. 51), the words postquam in conspectu...abduci probably suggest that the order sending off the Batavians came after Valens had crossed the Alps. There are routes leading almost due south from Augusta Taurinorum both to Albingaunum and to Cemenelum (Tabula Imp. Rom. L 32 and Kiepert, tab. cit.): either of these would have sufficed, though it seems quite unlikely that the troops were ever actually dispatched (H 2.29.3; cf. 2.43, 66 and 69).

c) The Route of Caecina and its Chronology (H 1.67-70; 2.11, 17-27).

Our time-indications for Caecina's march are much vaguer than those for the march of Valens; the only reasonably firm date we possess has to be calculated: this concerns the battle ad Castores (on which see above, O 9.2, n. on et ad Castoris, quod loco nomen est), which probably took place on 5th April, 69.

With this date in mind we now turn to the details of Caecina's
Appendix I: The Vitellian Attack on Italy

march: since the main part of his force consisted of the bulk of Legio XXI Rapax (see above pp. 509-11), we may assume that his expeditionary force was assembled at its base, Vindonissa. We do not know of which legion Caecina was legatus (either IV Macedonica at Moguntiacum or XXI Rapax at Vindonissa: the former is preferred because Vindonissa seems too far south for Caecina to have been as closely involved in planning the revolt as he obviously was, and also because the actual revolt broke out in Moguntiacum; cf. above, Vit. 8.1, n. on vixdum mense transacto), but since part of his force came from Leg. IV Macedonica and XXI Primigenia, we should not be far wrong in estimating that these detachments set off S. from Moguntiacum for Vindonissa (169 mp) c. 12th January or soon after (i.e. the date on which Valens' column set off from Cologne). Caecina's full force will have left Vindonissa c. 25th January.

Tacitus does not give us much information about his route (H 1.67-70) but since we know that he was to march to Italy from Upper Germany crossing the Alps by the Pennine Range (Great St. Bernard Pass: H 1.61.1), we can deduce from known Roman roads in the area that he went via Salodurum, Aventicum and Octodurus to Augusta Praetoria, which is just inside Italy, and this is confirmed by a reference to Aventicum at H 1.68.2; thereafter he seems to have advanced towards Placentia via Ticinum and thence to Cremona (H 2.17.2, 20, 22.3). As before, using K. Miller's Itineraria Romana and comparing distances given in the Peutinger Table and Antonine Itinerary with measurements taken from Tabula Imperii Romana (L 32 - Mediolanum), we get the following route with cumulative mp:
Appendix I: The Vitellian Attack on Italy

Vindonissa (169 from Moguntiacum) - Salodurum (by most direct road - 43) - Aventicum (79) - Viviscus (124) - Octodurus (159) - Pennine Summit (184) - Augusta Praetoria (209) - Ticinum (337) - Placentia (373) - Cremona (c. 398).

His march was far from straightforward: on the way he became embroiled in a fight with the Helvetii and this was more a small campaign than a passing skirmish. Troops were called in from the neighbouring province of Raetia (H 1.67.2) and there was a major battle with multa hominum milia caesa, multa sub corona venundata (H 1.68.2). After this Aventicum surrendered and prisoners were sent to Vitellius for judgement; Caecina remained among the Helvetii to await Vitellius’ decision (H 1.69-70: presumably on whether further repression was necessary). All of this must have taken considerable time, particularly the summoning and movement of troops from Raetia. However, while Caecina was still among the Helvetii, he learned that the ala Siliana, a squadron of auxiliary cavalry stationed in N. Italy along the upper Po, had declared for Vitellius, under whom it had previously served in Africa. To enable this unit to hold the towns of Mediolanum, Novaria, Eporedia and Vercellae, Caecina sent ahead detachments from his own infantry and cavalry. Vitellian forces, therefore, held the Grt. St. Bernard Pass for some time before Caecina actually crossed it himself. After toying with and rejecting the idea of making a great sweep to the East and entering Italy via Noricum, Caecina finally crossed the Alps (H 1.70).

After this, his march to Placentia will have been fairly rapid: the distance from the Pass is c. 189 mp, which would take roughly
Appendix I: The Vitellian Attack on Italy

12 days at 16 mp per day. To estimate the date of his arrival there and to establish some sort of timetable for events leading up to the battle ad Castores, we must now consider the movements of the Othonian forces and in particular of the force consisting of three Praetorian cohorts, 1000 veteran soldiers and a handful of cavalry which was sent to Placentia under the command of T. Vestricius Spurinna (H 2.18.1): this was part of the Othonian forward defence, which had been given the task of holding key points on the line of the Po and of keeping communications open towards the Danubian provinces (H 2.11.2: I take transgressus iam Alpes Caecina, quem sisti intra Gallias posse speraverat, which is simply a repetition of Caecina iam Alpes transgressus at H 1.89.3, to be, in fact, a reference to Caecina's troops sent over the Alps ahead of his main force to assist the Ala Siliana to hold the main towns of N.W. Italy: Caecina himself appears not to have crossed until substantially later; given his rivalry with Valens, his desire to achieve something noteworthy before his rival's forces were joined with his own, and his general impulsiveness which led him into near disaster in the battle ad Castores [cf. H 2.24.1 above, and see 0 9.2, n. on et ad Castoris, quod loco nomen est], it is highly unlikely that he would have delayed his advance across the Transpadana; there was no opposition and the key points on the banks of the Po were, in early March, quite undefended). Otho's advance guard will have been sent off from Rome in great haste c. 4th March, when Otho started his military preparations. The distance from Rome to Placentia by the Via Aemilia is 384 mp, so even by marching at a steady 20 mp per day Spurinna's force cannot have been in
Appendix I: The Vitellian Attack on Italy

Placentia until about 23/24th March. At this time Caecina had not yet arrived, though his forward units were operating near Placentia (H 2.17.2). Soon after Spurinna arrived there he took his troops out on a two-day march to remind them of the realities of warfare (H 2.17-19) - perhaps about 26-27th March. Caecina seems to have arrived fairly soon thereafter and launched a two-day assault on Placentia, which ended in failure (H 2.20.2-22.3) - perhaps about 30-31st March. After this Caecina headed for Cremona (c. 25 mp), where he fortified a camp on the N.E. side of the city; this would mean that he was firmly established at Cremona by c. 2nd April.

From this, we may conclude very tentatively that, if Caecina reached Placentia c. 30th March, he will have crossed the Great St. Bernard Pass (189 mp from Placentia) by c. 18th March at the latest.
Appendix 2

Vitellius' Journey to Italy

The evidence for Vitellius' journey to Italy is even scantier than that for the journeys of his lieutenants Valens and Caecina. As far as Cremona, it is as follows:

H 2.57.1: Vitellius had advanced from Germany while the campaign was still going on in Italy and after, victoriae suae nescius ut ad integrum bellum.

H 2.57.2: et paucorum dierum iter progressus prosperas apud Bedriacum res ac morte Othonis cecidisse bellum acceptit.

H 2.59.2-3: Vitellius ordered his army to continue its march, while he sailed down the Arar to Lugdunum where the generals of both sides in the recent campaign awaited him.

S. Vit. 9: Vitellius performed judicial functions at Vienna.

H 2.66.2-3: At Augusta Taurinorum Vitellius ordered the troublesome Batavian cohorts to join his train.

H 2.68.1: Vitellius at Ticinum.

H 2.69.1: "Next day" Vitellius met a senatorial delegation.

H 2.70: Vitellius "made a detour" to Cremona to view the site of the battle of Bedriacum. This was intra quadragesimum pugnae diem.

Certain basic points are clear:

(a) Vitellius followed almost the same route as Valens, excluding Valens' southward sweep from Vienna to Brigantia via Valentia and Lucus; accordingly his itinerary with cumulative mp was:

Colonia Agrippinensis - Tullum (134) - Lugdunum (287) - Vienna (303) - Cottian Pass (426) - Augusta Taurinorum (497) - Ticinum (592) - Cremona (642).

(b) Vitellius kept his army with him (most of the way); so the
Appendix 2: Vitellius' Journey to Italy

marching speed of soldiers will be a limiting factor.

(c) The first few days of his journey from Colonia Agrippinensis will have been rather slow.

(d) Word of the defeat of Otho's forces and his suicide can have been sent off on 16th April at the earliest, and the generals of both sides cannot themselves have set off for Lugdunum until this date.

(e) Vitellius was at Cremona by 23rd May at the latest (39 days after 14th April, the date of the battle of Bedriacum).

Where was Vitellius when he received the news of his generals' success? This can only be estimated, but he must have been far enough away from Lugdunum that his and Otho's generals could get there before he did. A reasonable guess would be that he was somewhere in the vicinity of Tullum, where Valens had in January received word of Galba's death (about 12 days journey from Cologne = ? paucorum dierum iter). The distance from Cremona to Tullum is 508 mp; the message would take about four days to arrive; so Vitellius would have learned of his victory on about 20th April. Vitellius now had 33 days at most to arrive at Cremona intra quadragsimun pugnae diem: this would require from Tullum a marching average of slightly in excess of 15 mp per day.

The distance from Tullum to Lugdunum is 153 mp; at just over 15 mp per day, the journey would take ten days, but in Vitellius' case, it could have taken less, since he sailed down the Arar on the last stage of his journey thither (perhaps only from Cabillonum). This means that the generals from the battle of Bedriacum must
Appendix 2: Vitellius' Journey to Italy

have been in Lugdunum by, at the latest, 30th April, fourteen days after Otho's death. The distance from Cremona to Lugdunum is 355 mp; their speed, therefore, must have been over 25 mp per day; from this we can assume that they rode, probably with a cavalry escort, and may well have covered 40-50 mp per day, spending 8-9 days on the journey. They probably left Cremona about 19-20th April.

After he received word of Otho's death, Vitellius himself seems to have moved at greatly varying speeds - it is clear that there were delays at major points on the way (e.g. Lugdunum, Vienna, Augusta Taurinorum and Ticinum)- but the marching capacity of his (accompanying) army enables overall averages to be calculated. However, it is not practicable to attempt to fix the dates in Vitellius' progress after Lugdunum.
THE VIA POSTVMIA
FROM CREMONA TO BEDRIACVM
(from Istituto Geografico Militare 1:100,000 map, Sheet 61)
Scale: 1 cm = 1 km.
The Vicinity of Cremona
(from Istituto Geografico Militare 1:25,000 map, Sheet 61 III N.O.)

Scale: 1 cm. = 250 m.